Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
Political Chronicle
1967-1991
1967-1991
A CHP Production
Produced and published in Australia by
Crawford House Publishing Pty Ltd
PO Box 1484
Bathurst NSW 2795
Published in the UK by
C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd
38 King Street, Covent Garden
London WC2E 8JZ
National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry
A Papua New Guinea political chronicle.
Includes index.
ISBN 1 86333 124 7.
1. Papua New Guinea- Politics and government- To
1975. 2. Papua New Guinea- Politics and government
- 1975- . I. Moore, Clive, 1951- . II. Kooyman,
Mary, 1928- . III. Title: Australian journal of politics
and history.
320.9953
C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd ISBN 1-85065-506-5
Copyright 1998 Clive Moore and Mary Kooyman and the
several authors in respect of the chapters contributed by them;
for the full list of such copyright owners, see the Table of
Contents of this volume.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be
reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any
form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying
or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publishers.
Printed in Australia
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
CONTENTS
viii
xii
XIll
CLIVE MOORE
Introduction
XV
EDWARD P. WOLFERS
January-April 1967
May-August 1967
15
September-December 1967
23
January-April 1968
32
May-August 1968
42
September-December 1968
58
ROBERT WADDELL
7
January-April 1969
74
May-August 1969
83
September-December 1969
92
10
January-April 1970
99
11
May-August 1970
108
12
September-December 1970
117
13
January-Aprill971
126
DAVID HEGARTY
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
May-August 1971
September-December
January-April 1972
May-August 1972
September-December
January-April 1973
May-August 1973
September-December
January-Aprill974
May-August 1974
September-December
1971
1972
1973
1974
134
143
151
160
170
181
191
204
214
220
227
JAMES GRIFFIN
25
26
January-June 1975
July-December 1975
233
247
DONALD DENOON
27
January-June 1976
271
28
29
30
31
32
DAVID HEGARTY
July-December 1976
January-June 1977
July-December 1977
January-June 1978
July-December 1978
286
294
308
316
321
33
STEPHEN POKAWIN
January-December 1979
330
34
DAVID HEGARTY
January-December 1980
338
35
PETER KING
January-December 1981
347
36
355
PETER KING
37
38
39
July-December 1982
January-June 1983
July-December 1983
362
367
373
YAWSAFFU
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
January-June 1984
July-December 1984
January-June 1985
July-December 1985
January-December 1986
January-December 1987
January-June 1988
378
385
397
405
416
429
447
47
MICHAEL OLIVER
July-December 1988
457
48
49
50
YAWSAFFU
January-December 1989
January-December 1990
January-December 1991
467
482
497
NOTES
509
APPENDIX I
Papua New Guinea Colonial Chronology
550
APPENDIX II
Members Elected to the House of Assembly, 1964-1997
553
INDEX
561
David Hegarty holds a BA, Dip Ed, from Melbourne University and an MA
from the University of London. He joined the University of Papua New
Guinea as a tutor in the Department of Political and Administrative Studies
in 1970. When he left in late 1982 he had been promoted to Senior Lecturer
and had served as Chairman of Department. He had previously lectured at
Monash Teachers' College in Victoria and had studied as a postgraduate
fellow at the University of the West Indies in Jamaica. His major research
and teaching interests have been in the politics, development and security
of the Asia-Pacific region with a special focus on Papua New Guinea and
the South Pacific. He has edited Electoral Politics in Papua New Guinea:
studies of the 1977 National Election (1983), and authored numerous articles
and monographs on Papua New Guinea and South Pacific politics. Since
leaving Papua New Guinea he has worked in Canberra, Australia, as an
analyst in the Office of National Assessments, a Senior Research Fellow in
the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National
ix
xi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The fifty chapters in this volume are the Papua New Guinea Political
Chronicle published in the Australian Journal of Politics and History, 19671991, the flag-ship publication of the History Department ofthe University
of Queensland. Acknowledgement is due to all editors of the journal since
1967 and to its publisher Queensland University Press. Without them and
the labour of the chroniclers there would be no book.
Edward Wolfers, Robert Waddell, David Hegarty and James Griffin have
given their time to revising and re-proofreading their chapters in the
chronicle. They have also kindly agreed that all royalties from the book go
towards a fund to publish a monograph series based on postgraduate
students' theses from the History Department.
Geoffrey Bolton, now at Edith Cowan University, encouraged the project
from its inception. Eve Rannells, Law librarian at Michael Somare Library,
University of Papua New Guinea, helped provide details on politicians. Peter
Cahill and Edward Wolfers provided valuable comments on an earlier draft
of the Introduction. Thanks are due to Stewart Firth and Webb Books for
permission to use the map of colonial boundaries, and to the Geography
Department of the University of Papua New Guinea for the map of modern
Papua New Guinea.
Suzanne Lewis laboured for many months over the manuscript, and
survived a change from one word processing program to another, which
scattered parenthesis marks and introduced unknown hieroglyphics into the
text. She coped with remarkable aplomb amid the chaos and deserves great
thanks.
The book also owes much to the skills of Mary Kooyman, recently retired
editorial assistant of the Australian Journal of Politics and History, who
scanned the original political chronicles onto the word processor and
undertook the first part of the editing process, as well as casting a critical
and remarkably accurate eye over the final product.
Special thanks must go to the History Department, Research School of
Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, for the financial
grant that made this publication possible.
ABBREVIATIONS
xiv
INTRODUCTION
PAPUA AND NEW GUINEA'S POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT TO 1967
Clive Moore
xvi
Clive Moore
Introduction
XVll
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Introduction
XIX
Ten years later under the Anglo-German Treaty over Samoa the boundary
between the British Solomon Islands Protectorate (proclaimed in 1893) and
German New Guinea was moved north to its present position between
Bougainville and the Shortlands. At the same time most of eastern
Micronesia, the Mariana and the Caroline groups but excluding Guam, was
incorporated into German New Guinea as the "Island Territory". The
German Protectorate of the Marshall Islands, including Nauru, was added
to the German New Guinea territories in 1906.7
In September 1914 at the request of the Allies Australia and Japan
militarily occupied German New Guinea: Australia took over the "Old
Protectorate", leaving Japan controlling the "Island Territory" above the
equator. The southern section of the German colony was awarded to
Australia as a League of Nations Mandated Territory in 1921, remaining
under Australian administration until the interruption of the Pacific War,
1942-45. After the war the colony became a United Nations Trusteeship,
though governed as one unit with Papua until both became independent as
Papua New Guinea in 1975.
Papua is the twentieth century name of the British New Guinea
Protectorate, proclaimed on 6 November 1884 at Hanuabada, Port Moresby.
Australian colonists, particularly those in Queensland, were reluctant to
allow any other European power to colonise east New Guinea and expected
Britain to act on their behalf. Much of pre-Protectorate contact between
Papuans and outsiders was through the movement north of traders, labour
recruiters, missionaries, goldminers and officials from Queensland.
The chief executive of the British New Guinea Protectorate was a Special
Commissioner responsible to the Colonial Office, the title replaced by that
of Administrator in 1888 when the Protectorate became a British colony,
then altered to Lieutenant-Governor in 1895. Due to the untimely death of
the first Special Commissioner, from 1885 until1888 British New Guinea
was governed from Port Moresby and Thursday Island, Queensland's
northern-most administrative centre in Torres Strait. Even as a British colony
from 1888 New Guinea still fell primarily under the authority of Queensland.
All dispatches were liable to consideration by the Governor of Queensland,
acting on behalf of Britain and the Australian colonies which provided some
of the funds. Extraordinary matters could be referred to the Governor-inCouncil in any of the funding colonies but in reality there was little
communication or interference. British New Guinea was transferred to the
new Australian Commonwealth by Letters Patent in 1902, legislated for as
the Territory of Papua through the Papua Act 1905, and formally proclaimed
in Port Moresby on 1 September 1906. The chief executive's title was
changed from Lieutenant-Governor to Administrator after the death of the
long-serving incumbent Sir Hubert Murray in 1940. Temporary or acting
appointments, 1895-1940, were always termed Administrator.
The German chief executive of the company-colony from 1885 until 1899
was the Landeshauptmann, or Administrator. When German New Guinea
became a German colony, 1899-1914, the title changed to Governor. During
war-time Australian occupation of the colony there were Military
XX
Clive Moore
Introduction
XXI
opted village leaders acting as interpreters, village headmen, medical orderlies and police. In Papua village constables were the counterparts of government headmen in New Guinea. The Germans called their indigenous officials
the luluais, headmen or local government representatives, and the tultuls
or interpreters. In some areas paramount luluais exercised authority over
lesser luluais. Australia never attempted to promulgate the position in Papua,
though there was provision made for Government Chiefs.IO
Government in Papua was initially divided into Divisions until1951, each
with its own Resident Magistrate, a pattern first laid down by Governor
William MacGregor in the late 1880s. Divisions were sub-divided into
smaller parts, under the control of Assistant Resident Magistrates, supported
by Patrol Officers. II In the New Guinea Territory the administrative units
were called Districts and the officials called District Officers, with Assistant
District Officers and Patrol Officers under them in Sub-Districts. After the
Pacific War the unified Territory was divided into eighteen administrative
Districts, each progressively subdivided into Sub-Districts (seventy-nine by
1969) as administration became more intense.
Various local church and a few informal government councils existed
before the Second World War. In New Guinea kiaps (patrol officers) sometimes called kivungs (large village meetings) to consult the people. In 1927
Motu-Koita villagers at Port Moresby elected the first local councillors, with
further elections in 1929 and 1935. These Papuan councils were remarkably successful, providing a forum for discussion of problems in these semiurban villages. Individual members acted as assessors for government courts
in matters concerning native custom and compensation, and provided a
conduit direct to Sir Hubert Murray.I2 But they lacked finances or statutory
authority until Australia's Papua and New Guinea Act 1949 and the Native
Local Government Councils Ordinance 1949-60 which passed to local government councils many of the powers held by village constables in Papua
and luluais in New Guinea. The first local councils were established on the
Gazelle Peninsula of New Britain, at Hanuabada village, Port Moresby, and
on Baluan Island, Manus District.l3 In 1954 these "village councils" officially
became "local councils"; village constables were attached to council areas,
responsible for law and order, and became known as local constables. Local
councils were responsible for collecting all direct taxes on the indigenous
people, and were able to make and administer regulations on everything from
gambling and community work to controls on weapons, disease and plant
pests. These local councils were subJect to the Department of Native Affairs'
supervisors, later called advisors. I
Concerted policy to introduce universal local government dates from the
1960s. The council system was extended from 1960, a Local Government
Ordinance was passed in 1963, operating from 1965, and a Director of
District Administration was appointed in 1967. Although varying enormously
in the number of people they covered, the size of their areas and the level
of economic development in each, by 1967 there were 139 councils covering
eighty-two per cent of the population. The 1963 Ordinance also removed the
word "native", a significant change in policy, enabling non-native residents
xxii
Clive Moore
to stand for and vote in elections. Six years later 111 of the 142 councils
were multi-racial, with growing indigenous allegations that Australian
officials and councillors were dominating the local political process through
their English language competency and other means.l5 This came to a head
on the Gazelle Peninsula with concerted and violent opposition from the
Mataungan Association.l6
In the 1960s the largest councils, first Gazelle and Wewak-But, began to
delegate responsibility to Ward Committees, a move formalised by the
House of Assembly in 1967.17 Nominated District Advisory Councils
(DACs), made up from expatriates and chaired by District Commissioners
existed from the late 1940s. The Papua and New Guinea Act contained
provisions for nominated indigenous positions on Advisory Councils for
Native Matters, but none was ever established and in 1956 indigenous
members were added to the DACs. Ten years later the majority of DAC
members was indigenous. As local councils proliferated in the early 1960s
representatives of the councils became involved in regular District, Regional
and Territory-wide conferences. A Local Government Association was
formed in 1968, with annual conferences, followed in 1971 by the Local
Government (Authorities) Act which inaugurated a second level of local
government, overarching the limited geographic areas of the councils. Area
Authorities were established, District-level bodies set up to counter growing
regional sentiment, and made up primarily of local government council
representatives. Up to one-third of their members were appointed rather than
elected. With the advent of the House of Assembly in 1964 fundamental
questions arose concerning the roles of elected members and District
Commissioners, and central and local government. The intention in the 1971
Act was for DACs to be dissolved and District Commissioners and members
of the House whose electorates coincided with the local areas to have
speaking but not voting rights in all discussions. IS
_
Before the war the Lieutenant-Governor in Papua and the Administrator
in New Guinea received advice from European members of small Executive
and Legislative Councils. There were no elected members. Nominated public
servants held the majority of places (eight out of thirteen in Papua 192441, and eiht out of fifteen in New Guinea 1931-41) in the Legislative
Councils.l Non-official members were appointed by the Administration,
always representing plantation, mining, commercial and mission interests.
Each Territory also had an Executive Council composed of eight official
and one non-official members, the latter elected from among equivalent
members of the Legislative Councils.20 Papua New Guineans were not
represented, although officials and mission representatives were presumed
to protect their interests.
The post-war Australia Labor government introduced a new deal for
Papua and New Guinea, the terms of which continued under the LiberalCountry party government after 1949. Australia owed the people a
considerable debt of gratitude for helping to turn the war away from
Australia, and increased funding for education, health and welfare, but was
reluctant to transfer power from Canberra to J.K. Murray's Port Moresby
Introduction
xxiii
administration and was still not serious about training the indigenous people
to run their own country.
Australia's relationship with Papua and New Guinea in the 1950s and
1960s needs to be viewed against policy towards indigenous Australians and
the thinking behind the "White Australia Policy". Papuans were Australian
nationals with no right of entry into Australia. There are similarities between
the administration of Papua and New Guinea and remote Aboriginal
communities, particularly in the Northern Territory.21 From 1951 the
administration of Papua and New Guinea was combined with the Northern
Territory, with Paul Hasluck as minister,22 and Northern Territory patrol
officers were trained with Papua and New Guinea officers at the Australian
School of Pacific Administration in Sydney.
Within Australia, Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders (who were
Australians rather than Papuans only because of the territorial ambitions
of Queensland in the 1870s) lived in appalling conditions, deprived ofland
rights, largely confined to government reserves and missions, and controlled
by paternalistic laws. Not until a constitutional referendum in May 1967
were indigenous Australians counted in the national census and the
Commonwealth given power over the States in matters pertaining to them.
This was at a time when many Papuans and New Guineans had voted in local
council elections, and in two national elections, although the 1961 election
had been largely indirect. More than one million voters were on the electoral
roll for the 1964 elections.
The "White Australia Policy" remained current well into the 1960s,
though less firmly enunciated than in earlier decades. So at the same time
that Australia was giving way to international pressure to prepare Papua and
New Guinea for eventual independence, it was slowly changing conditions
for indigenous Australians and generally re-thinking racial attitudes. But it
would be much longer before indigenous Australians took control of their
own lives. Australian policy in Papua and New Guinea in the 1960s was well
in advance of that dealing with indigenous Australians.23
Australia established a "Staff Conference" in 1945, based in Port
Moresby, which continued until 1951. This was a committee of Heads of
departments and other co-opted officers of the government who advised the
Administrator on policy and legislation. Then in 1951 the "Staff Conference" was replaced by a re-constituted Legislative Council consisting of sixteen official and twelve non-official members, three of them elected by the
foreign population, which made laws subject to approval by the Administrator. There were three nominated positions for Papuans and New Guineans in the Legislative Council. The composition of the Council remained
stable throughout the 1950s but was amended in 1960, expanding the number
of members and allowing for more indigenous representation.
Just as the 1960s brought the beginnings of change for indigenous
Australians, the first years of the decade were crucial to shaping modern
Papua New Guinea. International changes stimulated constitutional changes
in Papua and New Guinea. The United Nations Trusteeship Council adopted
a resolution calling on Australia to set target dates for stages in political
xxiv
Clive Moore
Introduction
XXV
The 1964 national election was the first large scale exercise of
democracy. In 1961 the elections operated on a nominal electoral role of
less than 500,000, which was doubled to 1,029,000 in 1964. Political
education campaigns preceded the elections with patrols reaching out
into remote villages, though as John Ryan notes many kiaps did not
bother to try to explain the intricacies of the Australian system of
preferential voting. Many voters used the "whisper" system in which
they were shown photos of candidates, whispered their choice and
watched the polling officer mark their ballot paper. Seventy-two per
cent of eligible voters actually took part. 298 hopeful candidates
contested the 1964 elections: 31 Europeans stood in the ten Special
electorates and 235 indigenous and 32 Europeans contested the forty-four
Open seats.29
Europeans won in six of the Open electorates, which the planners had
presumed would all go to indigenous candidates. The educational standards
and political abilities of the other thirty-eight members in Open electorates
varied: three (John Guise, Simogen Pita and Nicholas Brokam) had served
in the 1961 Legislative Council; nineteen had no schooling and only four
had been educated past Grade VI (all school teachers). Generally coastal
members were better educated than the Highlanders but only around half a
dozen members could hold their own in the House against Europeans, and
then only on topics of special interest. There were considerable language
difficulties in the parliament: only John Guise and Dirona Abe, both
Papuans, were fluent in English; twelve others spoke little English, and only
one Highlander spoke English; only two Papuans spoke fluent Tok Pisin.
Handabe Tiaba, member for Tari, knew only Huli, his mother tongue, and
could not communicate directly with any other member of the House. He
was provided with an interpreter between Huli and Tok Pisin.30 Debates
were in English, Tok Pisin or Hiri Motu with simultaneous translator services
provided. Five of the seven elected members appointed to the
Administrator's Council were indigenous: they and five others became
under-secretaries, understudies to the official members who were
departmental heads.
Establishing indigenous under-secretaries in a government in the
beginning stages of transition was not easy. The senior government officers
they understudied complained about their lack of training and ability, and
shared power to varying degrees. In turn the new under-secretaries felt that
they had not really been given any clear responsibilities, and that they were
not free agents, but expected to support the government. Lucy Mair quoted
one significant observation made by a journalist in relation to the 1968-72
House:
the votes of the members from the Highlands could at any time be carried
by an explanation of the question at issue in his fluent Pidgin by the district
commissioner for Western Highlands, who was one of the official
members.31
John Guise, member for Milne Bay and under-secretary for the Department
XXVl
Clive Moore
Political Parties
Papua New Guinea political parties fall into three categories: local branches
of extra-Territorial parties; indigenous-sponsored political parties formed
to mobilise votes in the House; and indigenous-sponsored movements and
associations aimed at mobilising electors on multiple levels. Wolfers
identifies the Kuomintang (the Chinese Nationalist party) as the first foreign
party to have a branch established in Papua New Guinea, in Rabaul in the
1920s; though this was more of a social organisation than a political party.
Next came the Australian Labor party (ALP), with branches in Wau in 1938,
Rabaul and Port Moresby in 1941. Mainly on the basis "of evidence or
accusations supplied by their political opponents" Wolfers suggests that the
Italian Fascist and German Nazi parties had devotees in New Guinea before
the war, as did the Communist party of Australia and the Australian
Democratic Labor party in the 1950s. Certainly the_ United Australia
Movement and the Australian Country party made ventures into Papua New
Guinea in the 1960s. 33
The first home-grown party was the United Progress party, established
in 1960 by three members of the outgoing Legislative Council: Donald
Barret, RE Bunting, and Pita Simogen, the indigenous nominated nonofficial member for the New Guinea mainland, 1951-1960, later member
for Wewak-Aitape in East Sepik, 1964-68_34 The party went into self-imposed
suspended animation in September 1961. It lacked cohesion and finance,
but managed to stand four indigenous and five expatriate candidates in the
1961 Legislative Council elections: four of its candidates were elected; the
one successful indigenous candidate was Vin ToBaining from New Britain.
Indigenous-sponsored parties began to be formed just before this political
chronicle begins. Papua New Guinea's longest surviving and most famous
political party is the Papua New Guinea Union (PANGU) Pati, herein called
Pangu pati, founded on 13 June 1967_35 But Pangu was not the first. Oala
Oala-Rarua formed the first truly indigenous-sponsored party, the New
Guinea United National party, in September 1965. Oala-Rarua's party
negotiated with sixteen MHAs including five Europeans, but failed to secure
Introduction
xxvii
xxviii
Clive Moore
Revealingly, Sir John recalled to Hess that "if I didn't form a Workers'
Association ... I would have formed a political party". A consummate
politician and undoubtedly the most successful individual politician before
independence, though never party-oriented Guise's interest in trade
unionism was political rather than industriaJ.43
The 1967 and later political chronicles carry details on all political parties,
however short-lived, and the development of the long-stayers such as Pangu
and the People's Progress party.44
Early Politicians
Papua New Guinea's indigenous national political leaders honed their skills
in the 1960s and 1970s. Some of the earliest leaders served first in the
Legislative Council: Kondom Agaundo, Vin ToBaining and John Guise are
good examples of the diverse origins of these leaders during the political
transition.
Kondom, a tribal leader from Kundiawa, Chimbu (Simbu), served in the
Legislative Council, 1961-64, representing almost one million Highlanders.
Born in the late 1910s, the son of a war leader, but orphaned in early
childhood, Agaundo became one of the youngest luluais, involving his
people in coffee-growing and himself concerned in Waiye Local
Government Council, of which he became president in 1959. Agaundo had
numerous wives (estimates vary from seven to fourteen) and up to forty
natural and adopted children. Although he never learnt English and was not
Introduction
XXIX
XXX
Clive Moore
Travel was part of the political awakening of John Guise. His first
overseas trip was to Australia in 1949, followed quickly by four trips to
Anglican Synods, and a visit to London in 1953 as part of the police
contmgent at the Coronation. Guise's first overt political activity was in the
Port Moresby Mixed Race Association, of which he became president in
1958. The association encouraged mixed-race Papuans to side with the
European elite, separating their development from other Papuans. He found
the elitism distasteful but was involved long enough to come to the attention
of the Administration which chose him to represent local opinion on the
Central District Advisory Council. They later regretted their choice because
of his opposition to all racial discrimination. Already "blooded" in politics
Guise entered the Legislative Council as member for East Papua in 1961,
becoming by far the most successful indigenous politician in terms of his
grasp of procedures and his progressive political philosophy. At this stage
Guise developed close connections with workers' organisations. Already
active in the cooperative movement he helped found the Milne Bay District
Workers Association.49
John Ryan compared Guise with other New Guinea political leaders of
the 1960s, suggesting that his only real equivalents were amongst the elite
of Netherlands New Guinea- men like Nicolaas Jouwe, Herman
Womsiwor, Johan Ariks, Eleizer Bonay, and Marcus Kaisiepo- most of
whom left before the Indonesians took over from the Dutch in 1963. The
Administration appreciated and fostered Guise's talents by sending him to
represent Papua and New Guinea at the 1962 South Pacific Commission
conference at Pago Pago, then later the same year and in 1965 sent him to
New York as special adviser to the Australian delegation at the United
Nations Trusteeship CounciJ.50
Ian Downs assessed Guise during his term in the Legislative Assembly
as "a cautious pioneer of nationalism at a time when h.e could expect less
support from his own people than from Australians".51 His statements on
the West Irian crisis and on the political future of Papua and New Guinea
were reasoned and moderate but strongly nationalist. His pre-independence
political career led him to be Chairman of the Select Committee on
Constitutional Development, Speaker of the House of Assembly, Deputy
Chief Minister, Minister for Lands and Minister for the Interior. He was the
first Papua New Guinean to be honoured with the degree of Doctor of Laws,
honoris causa, by the University of Papua and New Guinea in 1970,
followed by a knighthood in 1975 before he became Governor-General.
There is a degree of machiavellianism in the elevation of Guise out of the
political arena: he was so capable a politician that he was a threat to others
who desired the prime ministership. Yet there can be no doubt that Guise
was also the perfect choice for Governor-General: involved and dignified,
still at home with village people and equally fond of chewing buai (betel
nut). Ultimately frustrated by his vice-regal position he resigned in 1977
and returned to politics until 1982, dying in 1991. The cunning lone wolf
of politics in the 1960s and 1970s, Guise was an outstanding survivor.
Kondom, ToBaining and Guise are all politicians who date from before
Introduction
xxxi
the House of Assembly. Since the House first sat in 1964 Papua New
Guinea's voters have elected 440 national politicians. Only four have
become Prime Minister.
xxxii
Clive Moore
he returned to work at Radio Wewak late in 1966, but was back in Port
Moresby in mid-1967 to help found Pangu pati.53 Under its auspices
Somare contested the East Sepik Regional electorate in 1968, which he
has held ever since. A great negotiator and survivor, Somare has served
as Chief Minister (1972-75), Prime Minister (1975-80; 1982-85), Leader
of the Opposition (1980-82), Minister for Foreign Affairs (1988-92) in the
Namaliu government, and Minister without portfolio in the Chan
government. 54
Somare straddles the pre- and post-independence political modes. The
other three Prime Ministers have all been newer-style politicians. Sir
Julius Chan, born in 1939, of Chinese and New Ireland parentage,
educated to matriculation level in Queensland, like Somare has been a
constant force in politics for twenty-five years. A second generation
businessman of considerable wealth, Chan has been in parliament since
1968. One of the nation's most accomplished politicians, and credited
with introducing stable financial strategies, he has been Prime Minister
twice (1980-82; 1994-97), four times Deputy Prime Minister (1977-78;
1985-7; 1987-88; 1992-94), three times Minister for Finance (1973-77;
1985-87; 1992-94), and also Minister for Primary Industries (1978),
Trade and Industry (1986-87) and Foreign Affairs (1994). Knighted in
1980, Sir Julius created and remains the central power in and the
financial backer of the People's Progress party.
Rabbie Namaliu was born in 1948 at Kokopo, East New Britain.
Educated at Kerevat and Sogeri high schools Namaliu graduated from the
University of Papua New Guinea with a Bachelor of Arts in history and
English. Namaliu went on to complete a Masters degree in history and
politics at University of Victoria, British Colombia in 1972, returning to
the University of Papua New Guinea in 1973 as a Lecturer in the History
Department. For the next decade until he entered parliament in 1982
Namaliu moved through a series of administrative positions: principal
private secretary to Chief Minister Somare (1974-75); District Commissioner for East New Britain (1976); Chairman of the Public Service
Commission (1977); then principal research officer for Prime Minister
Somare and Pangu pati activist to 1980; and finally executive officer to
Somare as Leader of the Opposition in 1981. Member for Kokopo in East
New Britain, his education and administrative background prepared him
for cabinet positions as Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade (1982-84)
and Minister for Primary Industry (1984-85), a period as Leader of the
Opposition and his final elevation to prime ministerial office, 1988-92. In
August 1994 he became Speaker of the House, and was knighted in 1996.
Paias Wingti, born in Moika, Western Highlands in 1951, was educated
at Mount Hagen community school and high school, studying economics
and political science at the University of Papua New Guinea until 1976.
Wingti never completed his degree, instead entering parliament in 1977
to represent the Western Highlands. He became Government Whip in the
same year, Minister for Transport and Civil Aviation (1979-80), Deputy
Prime Minister, (1982-85), Minister for National Planning and
Introduction
xxxiii
xxxiv
was then dropped from the journal as an anachronism, given that Papua
New Guinea became independent in 1975 and two other journals, Journal
of Pacific History and Contemporary Pacific carry quite satisfactory
Papua New Guinea poiitical chronicles, within a wider Pacific nation
context. The 1967-75 chroniclers were Edward Wolfers, Robert Waddell,
David Hegarty and James Griffin, followed by Donald Denoon, David
Hegarty, Peter King, Stephen Pokawin, Michael Oliver and Yaw Saffu,
1976-1991.
The original suggestion to include a Papua New Guinea chronicle with
the Australian State chronicles in the journal carne from Edward Wolfers,
who was about to take up a resident fellowship in Papua New Guinea. He
raised the possibility with Professor R.N. Spann of the Department of
Government and Public Administration, Sydney University, who in turn
wrote to Professor Gordon Greenwood of the History Department,
University of Queensland. Greenwood's response was positive, as Wolfers
says "at a time when politics in and concerning Papua New Guinea was
not a fashionable subject of academic interest in Australia".56 Thus began
the longest-running political chronicle of events in Papua New Guinea.
Initially it was necessary to be current with the media in Australia as
well as Papua and New Guinea, together with United Nations
publications. This was achieved through financial support from the
Institute of Current World Affairs for Wolfers' subscription to a
comprehensive Australian clipping-service. The United Nations
Information Centre in Sydney supplied relevant releases and publications,
particularly those relating to the Trusteeship council. After Wolfers' years
as chronicler Professor Charles Rowley of the Department of Political and
Administrative Studies, University of Papua and New Guinea (UPNG)
helped institutionalise the chronicle at UPNG, and Colin Freeman,
librarian in charge of the New Guinea Collection in .the UPNG library
agreed to subscribe to a clipping service to make the enterprise possible.
The authors have all been experts on Papua New Guinea affairs,
observing national politics from Port Moresby.
The chronicles have been edited slightly to standardise style, but all
retain a sense of immediacy; even the tenses used often indicate that they
are reports and analysis of recent events. Only a few cosmetic alterations
have been made to the chronicle, mainly to standardise spelling of names.
The "and" between Papua and New Guinea, correct from 1949 and 1971,
has been removed, and "Niugini" has been confined to Air Niugini,
although it was used interchangeably for Papua New Guinea in some
chapters of the political chronicle. "PNG" became a common term in the
1970s and is used in the later chapters of the chronicle.
The political chronicle is the most detailed account available of
national politics in Papua New Guinea, 1967 to 1991. The text is
augmented by two appendices. The first is an historical chronology of
Papua New Guinea to 1975, and the second contains a full list of
members of the House of Assembly, 1964-97. There is also a substantial
index.
1
JANUARY-APRIL 1967
Edward P. Wolfers
Australian policy in Papua and New Guinea since 1962 has had three
distinct, sometimes conflicting, elements. There has, firstly, been a
relentless insistence by the Minister for Territories, first Paul Hasluck, then
Charles Barnes, that "the people of the Territory have the right to choose
self-government or independence at any time". 1 Secondly, there has been
the hope that the movement towards self-determination "can proceed at a
pace [that the indigenes] ... want and in an atmosphere of calm". 2 The latter
hope has been based on the assumption that continued cooperation and real
harmony of interest between the Australian government and the territory's
leaders are not only proper, but likely. Lastly, the Australian government has
sought to establish certain minimum safeguards so that, should Australia's
hopes fail, the territory will soon be ready to follow whatever constitutional
path it chooses.
The first element has involved Australian resentment at outside criticism
of government policy for the territory, and fear that a radical elite might
attempt to force the pace, at a greater rate, and in a more independent
direction, than the indigenous majority presently desires. The second
element has led the Administration, albeit reluctantly at times, to increase
its consultation of local leaders, especially in the House of Assembly. The
increase in consultation has, however, often been granted less as part of a
consistent attempt to answer, or to foster local demands for a greater say in
Territory policy-making, than to demonstrate the Administration's faith that
"the real community of interest between the House and the Administration
can be used to the Territory's advantage". 3 Accompanying the last
assumption has been the vague hope, now increasingly acknowledged in
public, that the Territory's leaders will choose to remain closely associated
with Australia in the future, perhaps through some constitutional device
short of complete independence. The last element, based largely on fear, or
perhaps a realistic appraisal of the situation, depending upon one's
interpretation of official motives, has led to an Administration and Australian
government tendency to stress majority views in the Territory at the expense
of the views of the rapidly-growing educated elite. This stress has involved
attempts to discredit elite views as unrepresentative, and has led to quite
serious moves in the direction of preparing for the Territory's eventual
Edward P. Wolfers
January-Apri/1967
Edward P. Wolfers
January-April 1967
statement as embarrassing, and the Age criticised him for it too. 21 The
Australian still continued unrepentant, and felt that "the words 'if at all' are
unwarrantably self-satisfied", 22 and there, but for some questions in the
House of Representatives,2 3 the matter rested - the real words used never
fully produced or denied, and their correct interpretation still in
considerable doubt.
The House of Assembly's Twelfth Meeting
The February-March meeting of the House of Assembly saw few matters
raised that had not been brought up before, but the proximity of the 1968
elections lent to their deliberation an urgency, and an explicitness about the
nature of some problems, that were both quite new to the House.
The first motion before the House began as "a discussion of a matter of
definite public importance, and rapidly developed, on both occasions as a
result of moves initiated by John Guise (MHA Milne Bay), into a debate on
the motion that "a Statutory Land Development Authority [on lines similar
to those of its Malaysian and Kenyan predecessors, be set up] to handle ...
every aspect of Land Resettlement ... with the object of centralizing and
coordinating all ... matters of Land Resettlement in the control of one
authority"Y The official members, with reservations as to the relevance of
overseas experience in this field, were soon forced to accept the elected
majority's support for the proposal. It seems likely, then, that one body may
soon replace the five departments, plus the relevant labours of the
Development Bank, the two Assistant Administrators and the Department of
Territories, Canberra, in this field. Guise's motion, in fact, represents the
second recent attempt by the House to alter present administrative
arrangements in the territory, though his motion was more definitely worded
than its predecessor, which only requested the Administrator last year to
consider the establishment of a Department of Local Government.
The continuing land and mining problem on Bougainville was again
raised during this meeting of the House, only to result in the usual confusion
and differences of opinion when debated. In November 1966, the House of
Assembly had finally supported Paul Lapun's (MHA Bougainville) attempt,
over the official members' opposition, to work a compromise between the
Administration and Conzinc Rio Tinto (Australia) Exploration Pty Ltd
(CRA) on the one hand, and the Panguna people of Bougainville on the
other. Lapun had sought to reconcile the Panguna people's opposition to
CRA's copper explorations through offering them five per cent of the
Administration's mining royalties from the project. Unfortunately the
Panguna people had again opposed the CRA application in February to
continue its activities, and the compromise appeared to have failed.
Don S. Grove, Director of Lands, Surveys and Mines, then made a
statement to the House to inform it of the current situation at Panguna.
Grove's statement indicated the nature of CRA's difficulties in Bougainville,
and showed the attempts CRA was making, through provision of high school
scholarships, etc., to win the local people's cooperation. The ensuing debate,
Edward P. Wolfers
January-Aprill967
emphasise the futility of those who hope for seventh statehood when,
separately, they pressed for Papuans and New Guineans to be trained
respectively as information officers and diplomats and posted overseas. The
Public Officers (Employment Security) Bill 1967, which gave legislative
form to the White Paper on the future security of permanent overseas
officers of the public service, only reinforced the apparent decolonising
tendency of Australian administrative policy in the territory.
The Public Officers Bill "gives machinery to give an assurance of job
security to permanent overseas officers of the public service by providing
for a compensation scheme for them in the event of the premature
termination of their services because of the requirements of localisation of
the public service or of political or constitutional change in the Territory". 28
Clearly, the Administration fears that, far from actually promoting stability
within the public service through providing security for its members, the
bill may actually foster fears and insecurity among those of the House's
members, probably still the majority, who fear desertion at, and even the
term, independence, though not a steady progression towards the same
result. In order to avoid too confused and disturbing a debate, therefore, and
possibly to forestall the criticism of members such as Ian Downs (MHA
Highlands) who felt that a contract service promotes insecurity and who,
therefore, desired the return of the old-style permanent service, 29 and of
those members possibly unsympathetic to any compensation for Europeans
who wanted, or needed, to leave as local participation in government
increased, W.W. Watkins (Secretary for Law) requested members to ask
their questions then for recording in Hansard, or to submit them to him
"before the bill is again debated, as the Government is anxious that the
scheme be fully explained and understood throughout the Territory". 30
Many members seemed to view the state of race relations in the territory
rather differently from Sir Donald Cleland. Indeed, one of the principal
preoccupations of the House seemed to be with the general theme of interracial and inter-regional relations, and there was widespread support for a
proposal to set up a three-member committee to recommend amendments to
the Discriminatory Practices Ordinance 1963. 3'
The many separate speeches as well as the general debate on the subject
of law and order in the territory seemed to focus very much on inter-racial
and inter-tribal relations too. The need for greater concentration on primarylevel education was repeatedly stressed, though its emphasis varied from
many indigenous members' purely parochial demands for more schools in
their own electorates, to the rather mild echo of the Highlands Farmers and
Settlers Bulletin 's 32 attack on the new university which appeared even in
O.I. Ashton's (MHA New Britain) attack on the "Hilton-like" facilities at
Vudal Agricultural College and Keravat High School, and on "the June
Valley dragon just about to devour its eight [sic] or ninth professor"Y
It was during the debate on the Native Employment (Amendment) Bill
(No. 2) 1966 that one of the more revealing exchanges took place, and one
with some relevance for the political groupings that were to emerge after the
thirteenth meeting of the House. The bill under debate proposed, against the
Edward P. Wolfers
wishes, but not against the vote, of Ian Downs, to provide rural workers
with one week's annual leave. John Stuntz (MHA East Papua) was able,
however, to amend the bill to allow casual workers and their employers to
terrninate their employment "at any time by eiiher pany wiihout notice", 34
and only six members were prepared to vote against him. John Guise's
amendment to increase the leave provision for plantation workers from six
to twelve days fared little better than Stuntz's opponents had done, and was
lost by fourteen votes to thirty-eight. Finally Stuntz was able to have the
leave due to agreement workers deferred until the end of their two years'
contract. The debate on Stuntz's initial amendment, however, provided the
occasion for an exchange between Downs and A.(Tony) C. Voutas (MHA
Kaindi) which highlighted the growing tensions between those who identify
themselves with the indigenous cause in a radical sense, and those with a
real economic stake in the country who assume (perhaps need to assume)
that race relations are good.
Downs had written a series of articles for the South Pacific Post, 35 and
spoken in the House, on the need to restrict the over-production of coffee.
Indigenous planting should be restricted, he felt, and the cash-cropping of
sweet potato and other locally-grown staples encouraged. Downs felt "unable
to weep with" the indigenous members over coffee prices, for they were
now even endangering European holdings. The Highlanders were beginning
to "substitute [coffee] for food in the cyclic food planting programme", and
even to buy food instead of planting coffee simply "as an extra agricultural
effort". 36 Downs seemed to feel then that Voutas' consistent support of the
losing side in the Native Employment Bill debate represented an attempt on
Voutas' part to gain the "reputation of being the only man who looks after
the people of Papua and New Guinea in this House ...". "Mr Voutas", he
said, "likes to call himself a brother of the people", but his irresponsible
attitudes were more likely to foment than to prevent inter_-racial troubleY
The Emergence of Parties
In the long-term, probably the most significant events of the first half of
1967 will prove to be the emergence of the territory's first two political
parties able to command support within the House of Assembly and outside.
The facade of unity which the caucus of all of the elected members of the
House of Assembly had provided had never commanded the ideological
unity or the organisational means for the emergence of a party, and even the
facade had crumbled by the middle of 1966. On paper, the territory had
only one political party.
The New Guinea United National party was formed in September 1965.
It gained the allegiance of no members of the House of Assembly, and its
total membership was never publicly revealed to consist of anyone apart
from its president, Oala Oala-Rarua. Once its formation was announced, it
had rapidly collapsed under pressure of the attack by certain MHAs,
especially Frank Martin (MHA Madang-Sepik), who disapproved of its
mildly socialistic platform, and the too-ready embrace of a few European
January-Apri/1967
radicals who sympathised with its platform rather than understood its
organisational problems. Party membership had offered no real advantage to
the present members of the House of Assembly, and the possible
disadvantage of association with a party whose aims were vague,
organisation nebulous, and leadership uncertain. An overly eager press corps
in search of significance where it hoped for it rather than found it, and the
failure of the party's appeal for non-European support, had ensured its
effective demise.
For at least eighteen months before its final formation, there had been
rumours of a potential political party in the Sepik district. There had been
signs in the press and elsewhere of a possible connection between the future
party and the leadership courses sponsored by the local Roman Catholic
mission both within the territory and in Melbourne, while its likely seventh
state bias was only too readily apparent. In March, however, the South Pacific
Post reported that the present United Christian Democratic party had been
formed already in June 1966, under the name of the United Democratic party, 38
although the party's first formal meeting was only held in May 1967.
The Christian Democratic party began with a circular from Otto
Kovingre, vice-president of the Wewak-But Local Government Council,
endorsed by Peter Maut, the council's president, and Pita Simogen (MHA
Wewak-Aitape). The party's original aims were: "(1) To unite the nation of
Papua-New Guinea as one country; (2) To unite all people of all
denominations; (3) To get people to follow the law of the Government
provided the law agreed with the law of God; (4) To unite all people of all
races in the country; and (5) To make people stop stealing, fighting and
murdering and to bring all together as brothers and sisters of one big family
within the party". 39 The explicit formulation of these aims seemed vague
when it was reported that the party opposed the early granting of selfgovernment, but that it would approach Oala Oala-Rarua's party to suggest
their amalgamation. The latter party had, of course, advocated the early
granting of self-government, originally by 1968, and Simogen's comment
that the two would never unite seemed rather more realistic than other
reports.
In May, the Christian Democrats finally announced a programme quite
at odds with that of Oala-Rarua's party, while its leaders seemed to be a
much less sophisticated group of European-guided pidgin-speakers. The
party's principal aims were: seventh statehood for the territory within the
Australian federation, and, simultaneously, to have pidgin as the territory's
national language; to endorse candidates in the House of Assembly and Local
Government elections, and to encourage primary education. 40 The party's
leaders later denied any association with the Roman Catholic church, 41
though its first meeting opened and closed with the Lord's Prayer and Ave
Maria, and its leadership included a mission catechist and two mission school
teachers. The two European members were a Roman Catholic priest and
Graham Gilmore, MHA. One of the party's leaders, Peter Maut, has already
been endorsed as the successor to its only other member in the present
House of Assembly, Pita Simogen. 42 At first centred exclusively in the
10
Edward P. Wolfers
Wewak area, the party soon claimed adherents at Madang, Kavieng and
Rabaul, and was recruiting in Lae, Port Moresby and Maprik to boost its
membership from the total of 3,000 at the end of MayY
Outside \Vewak, however, there was much discussion during the year as to
whether the territory was ready yet to have political parties, and, if so, how
many and of what type they should be. 44 Much of the debate centred around
the territory-wide hearings of the House of Assembly's Select Committee on
Constitutional Development. Various suggestions were made. One prominent
leader from the Finschhafen area suggested that two political parties be set
up, and even stated his preference as to what they both should seek to
represent. Tony Voutas, MHA, on the other hand, toured the New Guinea
district and regional local government conferences, and sent a letter to all
council presidents, suggesting that a local government party be formed. 45 The
Voutas proposal was potentially illegal in that it might involve direct council
donations for political purposes, and dangerous in that it could lead the
party's opponents to oppose local government as an institution. James
Meanggarum (MHA Ramu) wrote to the councillors and other people in his
area stating that "The time for 'yes sir, yes sir' is now finished, and I think it
is now time for 'no sir'. Things are not as they ought to be, because we have
not got a party, and we are in the habit of speaking one at a time and alone [in
the House of Assembly] about your conditions and the conditions of the
people of this country, "Meanggarum asked the councillors and people to
start a party, and not to heed" the cajoling of administration officers". The
platform should concern the necessity of roads and bridges for economic
development, improved wages for workers and mission teachers, and better
prices for producer cooperatives.~6 In short, there were some demands that
political parties be set up, but no attempt, outside the Wewak area, perhaps
because there was not the necessary knowledge, to start them.
The point at which many political demands received ~xplicit formulation,
and about which many organisational demands crystallised, occurred when
a group of thirteen Papuans and New Guineans presented their much
publicised demands for self-government to the Select Committee on
Constitutional Development in mid-March. The submission was actually the
third of a series which were presented in April 1966, by a group of ten
Papuans and New Guineans which included six of the final thirteen names
from January 1967, over the signatures of Cecil Abel and Albert Maori
Kiki, and then in March 1967. The final thirteen signatories were Dr
Reuben Taureka, the most senior indigenous public servant, Dr Ilimo
Batton, Albert Maori Kiki, Joseph Kaal Nombri, Gerai Asiba, Ebia Olewale,
Elliott Elijah, Cecil Abel, Sinaka Goava, Kamona Walo, Penuelli Anakapu,
Oala Oala-Rarua and Michael Somare. Cecil Abel was the only European
and Joseph Nombri the only Highlander among them, while only three were
from New Guinea. Three were government trainees, three patrol officers,
three concerned with education, two were doctors, plus a broadcaster and a
workers' association leader. All of them had acquired some prominence
outside their home areas, in the urban environment. 47
The demands of the thirteen were of a markedly different kind from
January-April 1967
11
those of most of the witnesses who had appeared before the Select
Committee, though no more radical, if nonetheless different in form, than
the suggestions circulated shortly thereafter by two MHAs, Messrs Voutas
and Holloway. 48 The thirteen claimed there was a "widespread feeling
amongst our thinking people that Federal Government [sic] is temporising
and foot-dragging". They pressed "for constitutional changes involving the
setting up of an Executive and the granting of nothing less than limited selfgovernment in 1968".'9 They wanted the under-secretary system to be
replaced by full ministerial government with at least eight ministers
including a chief minister, and the Administrator to be replaced by a high
commissioner with a Papuan or New Guinean deputy. They sought control
of the ministries of Home Affairs, to replace the present Department of
District Administration, Local Government, Lands, Surveys and Mines,
Labour, Information and Culture; with local Finance and Education to be in
local hands, their previous directors to become permanent secretaries of
their departments. They wanted the localisation of the public service to
proceed at a greater rate, under the guidance of a new Public Service Board
(PSB), to replace the present Commissioner. The "new framework after
1968 must be a 'caretaker administration'", or transition commission,50 they
felt, and their reasons for confidence in the success of the handover they
proposed were based on their conviction that there must be "a complete
face-about ... in policy and outlook on indigenous rule", their faith that "a
new type of politician will emerge in 1968 - younger, better educated and
with greater understanding of politics", and that the public service already
contained men quite capable of holding down its top positions. 51 The
group's combination of youth, education and organisational achievement
was impressive, and even the South Pacific Post welcomed the group's
submission with but few reservations, mainly concerning its fear that
overseas investors might be disturbed by such demands. 52
The response of Watkins, Secretary for Land, and Deputy Chairman of
the Select Committee, was as predictable as the reply to him was sharp.
Watkins felt that "all of these people could not possibly go along with some
of the statements here, which I think are impertinent, and also show an
absolute disregard for what has been done for the Territory ... and exhibits a
situation which shows no thanks for what has been done" .53 Other
correspondence in the press conveyed a similar charge of ingratitude on the
part of the "12 apostles", 54 but Watkins' remarks were quickly countered
with the charge that they almost bordered on contempt of the House of
Assembly. 55
It was, then, scarcely surprising when the "thirteen angry men" and nine
members of the House of Assembly announced on 13 June that they had
formed the PANGU Pati (the Papua New Guinea Union). The party
included Paul Lapun, Pita Lus, Barry Holloway, Nicholas Brokam, James
Meanggarum, Tony Voutas, Paliau Maloat, Wegra Kenu and Siwi Kurondo,
MHAs, all from the New Guinea side, and only the last-named from the
Highlands, and, later, John Guise and Eriko Rarupu, both Papuans. The
interim central executive of J.K. Nombri (Highlands), Oala Oala-Rarua
12
Edward P. Wolfers
(Papua), Michael Somare (New Guinea Mainland) and Vin ToBaining (New
Guinea Islands) represented all of the territory's major regions. It was also
announced by Oala-Rarua that the New Guinea United National party had
now ceased to exist.
The party desired home-rule, leading to ultimate independence, the
territory's unification, increased localisation of the public service, improved
educational and communication facilities, and increased economic
development through stepped-up overseas investment. Again pidgin was
advanced as the territory's nationallanguage. 56 As yet, however, the party's
final platform and constitution are not public. Recent allegations, both in
the press and on the radio, that at least two prominent MHAs openly
advocate the cause of the rebel Rhodesian government may provide the
party with some interesting opponents.
Local Public Servants' Pay
The decision of the public service arbitrator on salary rates for local officers
in the territory public service, L.G. Matthews, was finally handed down on
11 May. In sum, he awarded a $40 per annum rise to all officers in the
lowest adult male range of $440-560, and a $600 increase to those in the
top present salary levels, i.e. above $4,875. At the intermediate levels, he
simply set two benchmarks from which the complete structure could be
evolved. The present $950 paid to first class artisans, patrol officers, grade 1
education officers and grade 2 clerks was raised to $1,070, and the $1,700
paid to professional graduates, class 1, rose to $1,950. All pay-rises were to
apply only from the first pay period in July. 57
Local feeling over the small rises, granted after a hearing which began in
October 1965, ran high. Local Public Service Association (PSA) branches
expressed their dismay at the decision, a petition was circulated requesting
the Governor-General to disallow the decision, and Matthews' dismissal
was sought by the association. Despite Barnes' attempts to discredit the
protesters as an unrepresentative minority of dissidents, and his opinion that
"The umpire's decision is final and must be obeyed", 58 the decision was
followed, on 2 June, by probably the largest demonstration ever seen in Port
Moresby, when 1,500 people, not all of them public servants, marched
through the town to present a list of demands to the Administrator, David
Hay. 59 The PSA has now filed a memorandum with the Australian Prime
Minister requesting a review of the decision by the president of the
Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission and two of his
nominees. 60 The decision has not been disallowed, and will, therefore, be
enforced, but the memorandum is as yet unanswered. One form of
preparation for self-determination at least, the lowering of indigenous public
servants' pay-scales in accord with the territory's "capacity to pay", seems
to be exercising a very great influence on the form of the indigenes'
ultimate decision.
The scandals revealed by the House of Assembly's Public Accounts
Committee in regard to local public service housing, while nonetheless
January-April 1967
13
14
Edward P. Wolfers
2
MAYAUGUST 1967
Edward P. Wolfers
16
Edward P. Wolfers
May-August 1967
17
18
Edward P. Wolfers
May-August 1967
19
Edward P. Wolfers
20
resigned from the party anyway. His final charge was that Pangu was
effectively controlled by the three European members of its executive,
Messrs Voutas, Holloway and Abel, a charge that the Pangu executive
denied. 30
Despite press fears that Oala-Rarua's expulsion represented a serious split
in Pangu, and would weaken the party, the party seemed only to gain from
its new, rather more conservative, image. Four additional members were
added to the parliamentary wing: Edric Eupu (MHA Popondetta, and UnderSecretary for Lands, Surveys and Mines), Stoi Umut (MHA Rai Coast),
Tambu Melo (MHA Kutubu), and Singin Pasom (MHA Lae). Several other
MHAs have made no secret of their sympathy for the party. To date, the
party has branches in Port Moresby, Lae, Rabaul, Kavieng and at several
places in the Morobe District. Albert Maori Kiki has been appointed the
party's full-time secretary, while the parliamentary wing now has an
established leadership of Paul Lapun and Edric Eupu, its leader and deputy
leader respectively, and Pita Lus, the parliamentary whip.
More Parties
Reactions to the emergence of political parties have varied from regret
that they have appeared at all on the part of some European settlers in the
Highlands, 31 to accusations that Pangu is predominantly a Papuan party, 12
to fears at the radicalism of Pangu, and even of the Christian Democrats.
The All Peoples' party, which was formed at Angoram on 2 July, falls
into this last category. Founded by a group of European Sepik and Ramu
river area traders, the All Peoples' party, which as yet lacks any real formal
organisation, has now endorsed at least nine candidates in the East Sepik,
Madang and Eastern Highlands districts. Clearly, as the invective heaped
upon Pangu at the party's first meeting showed, its founder, Jim McKinnon,
is motivated by the fear of rapid political change rather than by the desire
for political organisation.
The All Peoples' party stresses the importance of economic development,
the need to criticise the Administration only in a "constructive way", and
emphasises the territory's reliance upon Australian help and guidance. Most
importantly, it opposes self-government at this stage, but suggests that "a
target date should be set whereby everyone can work towards bringing the
economic, social and political development to a level where self government
would be a simple, painless, natural step", such a date being set by the
electors. 33 The party is also concerned with the protection of European
economic investments in the territory. It may be significant that one of the
party's two current members in the House of Assembly, Frank Martin (the
other is Suguman Matibri, (MHA Madang)) is an outspoken advocate of a
"Recognise Rhodesia" policy for Australia. 34
A proposal that the All Peoples' party and the United Christian
Democratic party should merge led to two attempts at initiating talks. 35 The
proposal was aborted partly because of personality clashes, and perhaps
because the Christian Democrats have now been obliged to alter their policy
May-August 1967
21
22
Edward P. Wolfers
sufferings of the people of New Hanover, and asked who had introduced
the income tax bill into the House of Assembly. When told it was the
Treasurer, he expressed his disapproval of "a new tax being imposed on an
already helpless people". His disapprovai of the under-secretary system was
quite evident when he concluded that Zure Zurecnuoc's (Under-Secretary
for the Treasury) work was of an advisory nature only: "He picks up a little
information from the population and passes it along to the Treasurer".
Zurecnuoc therefore attempted, in answer, to stress his powers of decision
too. Eastman was also far from happy with labour conditions on plantations,
and cited examples in support of his case.
It was perhaps inevitable that with a female president and vice-president
Australia should have been asked to add a female adviser to next year's
delegation. The drafting committee which prepared the Council's report on
New Guinea was predictably mild in its strictures. Its members were the
New Zealand and Chinese representatives on the Council. The Soviet Union
voted against the final report, and proposed an alternative one of its own.
The first report was, however, adopted by five votes to one (the USSR), with
one abstention (Australia). Liberia raised many objections to the report, and
asked that a minority report be prepared. In consequence of the failure to
prepare such a report, Liberia refused even to be present in the chamber when
the report was finally adopted.
The Council concluded that the present political situation in the territory
is "unexceptionable in principal", but considered that experience suggested
that at these crucial stages before independence "there is a need for
stimulating more rapid advance in the political field", particularly by
increasing the financial powers of the House of Assembly and by
accelerating the indigenisation of policy-making posts and bodies. It
endorsed the report of the Select Committee on Constitutional Development,
but urged that the regional electorates and the retention of the official
members in the House of Assembly be regarded "as a transitional phase
only". It also urged the progressive reduction of the number of fields in
which official power to disallow legislation might be exercised.
Curiously perhaps, in view of the minister's statement as to the
impossibility of seventh statehood, the Council insisted "that all options for
the future of the people of Papua and New Guinea continue to be kept open".
A number of critics of recent Australian policy in the territory had urged
that seventh statehood be ruled out in view of its inherent unacceptability
in the eyes of the United Nations. It is difficult to tell whether the report,
therefore, conveyed an element of criticism of Barnes' early statement and
was responsible for its later qualification, or whether the drafting committee
was pro-Australian, as one newspaper alleged, and was simply "caught on
the hop" by Barnes' unexpected pronouncement. 39
3
SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER 1967
Edward P. Wolfers
Edward P. Wolfers
24
Commodity producing
sector
Economic overheads
Social services'"
General administration,
law and order"
1967-68'
$million
per cent
of total
1966-67
$million
per cent
of total
19.143
25.341
49.980
13.63
18.02
35.55
13.488
23.790
41.499
11.24
19.82
34.57
31.840
22.64
29.740
24.77
September-December 1967
25
26
Edward P. Wolfers
year. Liberty and light were certainly on Gilmore's side when he asked,
"Why should we stop these people from making their own decisions? It is
something for them to decide ... ", if the country is to be built on a firm
foundation of national unity. Clearly, however, many indigenous members
were simply frightened of the whole issue, and preferred to leave it to the
Australian government to handle: "We do not want to hear talk that may
divide the country and the people into two. Now we are one country and
one people. I do not want bad thoughts brought here" (Edric Eupu). 20
The Administration was opposed to the motion on the (for it) quite
traditional lines that "it would be most inadvisable at this stage if acts of
emotion were to precipitate any forms of cleavage or endeavour to affect
status before all peoples of the Territory have been given the opportunity
of examining the various futures available to them ... ". 21 Despite taunts that
they were denying the people their democratic right to be consulted on such
a major issue, and an amendment deferring the referendum until "any
irrevocable act towards the constitutional union of Papua and New Guinea
takes place", and extending the referendum's scope to New Guinea as well, 22
the official members and the Pangu pati remained resolutely opposed to the
motion. Indeed, John Pasquarelli's taunts at those "white men, who
seemingly all their time have tried to ingratiate themselves with the native
people by trying to not act as white men", 23 stirred up no hostility at all
towards Holloway and Voutas, but led Nicholas Brokam to point out that
the whole referendum issue had not been raised by Papuans and New
Guineans at all: "This does not come from the people of Papua and New
Guinea at all- from the black men -but I say this comes from the Europeans.
Some white men in this country want to divide us." 24 Clearly, very few
members were prepared to face the issue at this stage or in the proposed
form, and so the motion failed by thirty votes to nineteen. The only other
issue to raise a great deal of heat was the question of conditions at the Laloki
mental hospital near Port Moresby. Shocked by conditions there when they
paid a private visit, a group of members requested an organised tour of the
hospital. With the local press in support of their claims, Gilmore, Pasquarelli,
Chatterton, Stuntz, Martin and Downs made the Administration to agree that
conditions there were lamentable, though Gilmore was forced to withdraw
his charge that the patients had been drugged for the MHAs' visit. In
consequence of the unfavourable publicity, plans were later announced for
a special allocation to improve conditions at the hospital immediately,25 with
proposals for major extensions and improvements at a later date. 26
Some long-pending debates were also laid to rest, when the Mining
(Bougainville Copper Agreement) Bill 1967, was passed giving legislative
endorsement to the Administration's promises to Conzinc Rio Tinto in regard
to special taxation, and mining concessions for its activities at Panguna;
Gilmore's motion to allow the direct leasing of land from its indigenous
owners was lost. The latter motion was, however, implemented in effect,
and without demur, at the next meeting of the House with the passing of
the Land (Tenure Conversion) Bill 1967. This bill preserves the existing
restrictions on land dealings between natives and non-natives, although it
September-December 1967
27
28
Edward P. Wolfers
year, the Territory Country party and the Agricultural Reform party seemed
to be moribund, and the various attempts at talks between the All Peoples'
party and the United Christian Democratic party, with a merger in view, had
failed. 29 The All Peoples' party also gained the adherence of an additional
MHA, Keith Tetley (MHA Gulf Open). 30
Extra-Parliamentary Politics
Outside the House of Assembly, most of the territory's politicians were too
preoccupied with purely local political problems, specifically those
connected with their desire for (re-)election, for there to be much activity
of national significance. Pressure continued from the Returned Servicemen's
League (RSL) and the New Guinea Graziers' Association for the government
to guarantee Australian investments in the territory, but to no availY The
annual federal subsidy to Burns Philp for the territory-Australia run will
be phased out between April and December 1968, and so the MV Bulolo
has already been withdrawnY There was some public discussion about the
role of the army in the territory's future, and the RSL lamented the heavily
stressed warnings in an Administration pamphlet against the perils of a
military takeover after independence. The Administrator, however, refused
to withdraw the booklet. 33 The Administration was also bitterly criticised
by many ex-servicemen for its failure to give financial support to a proposed
war museum. 34 Despite favourable press and much pressure, however, the
Public Service Association's demands for an increase in the pay-scales for
indigenous public servants finally failed, when the public service arbitrator,
L.G. Matthews, refused permission for an appeal against his earlier decision
to the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission. 35 In what
was the first public opinion poll ever held on the subject, Australians were
asked what they wanted the territory to be. The result was: under Australian
control, thirty-one per cent; a state of Australia, thirty per cent; independent,
twenty-seven per cent; undecided, twelve per cent. When analysed by party
affiliation and age group, the poll produced no significant differences from
the norm, except that the vote for independence was highest, at thirty per
cent, among the 21-29 age group.l6
The Fifteenth Meeting of the House of Assembly
The final meeting of the first House of Assembly was in many ways no more
than a postscript to the previous four years. Some unfinished business was
finally disposed of, while almost every debate was in some sense dominated
by the members' awareness of the imminence of the elections.
The Standing Committee on Public Accounts presented six reports, of
which one, the fourteenth, had later to be withdrawn because of the
unavailability of copies for all members of the House. The tenth report
concerned recruitment and training in the administration, and recommended
principally that use be made of outside consultants and organisation and
methods teams, and that a central authority be established to oversee and
September-December 1967
29
30
Edward P. Wolfers
September-December 1967
31
4
JANUARY-APRIL 1968
Edward P. Wolfers
In view uf Lhe laler controversy over the degree to which the Department ot
Territories should and does control the day-to-day administration of Papua
and New Guinea, the very first news story of the year had a certain ironic
touch to it: George H. Warwick Smith, Secretary of the Department of
Territories, was made a Commander of the British Empire.'
January-April1968
33
still remained, although perhaps "the old ambiguities now exist elsewhere" .7
The second Australian Institute of Political Science summer school to
deal with Papua and New Guinea took place in January (the first was in
1958). At the summer school, Barnes was exposed probably more forcefully
than ever to the jostling of the experts. 8 The papers themselves occasioned
relatively little comment, except for H.L. Wootten, QC's demand that the
territory be offered only one choice for its long-term political future independence. Albert Maori Kiki (secretary of the Pangu pati) received wide
publicity for his remark in an otherwise restrained and carefully reasoned
speech that Papuans and New Guineans were forced to lick Australians'
boots. 9 Despite the encouragement of a number of his critics to change his
stance, Barnes did not deviate at all from his belief that "you do not close
off possibilities which in the light of later events may turn out to be wanted
by both countries and an advantage to them both". 10 K.E. Beazley, for the
Federal Opposition, spelled out for the first time the exact nature of the
ALP's commitment to Papua and New Guinea after independence; he
promised at least $50 million a year for thirty years. 11
Barnes' "policy of negation and evasion" was again attacked by the
Australian. Indeed, he was accused of espousing a policy of "risky seventh
statism" 12 in what was described as "one of the most extraordinary, kindly
and probably unconsciously paternalistic" 13 speeches he had given. He had
doubted, it was claimed, that Papua and New Guinea could ever be a separate
country, and insisted, that any demand by the House of Assembly for selfgovernment should, in his view, be confirmed by a popular referendum
before the Australian government should accede to it. Rather more
characteristic perhaps than the minister's critics of the Australian press and
public, neither of which have ever displayed any marked interest in Territory
affairs, the Brisbane Courier-Mail accused Maori Kiki and another
commentator who had criticised race relations in the territory at the seminar
of "having a chip on [their] ... shoulder". On the whole, the editorial said,
Australia has "not a bad record in New Guinea" .14
The Governor-General's opening address to Federal Parliament early in
March reiterated most of the principal themes of Barnes' earlier policies.
Australia intends to develop the territory for self-determination, Lord Casey
said, although he spelled out for the first time in formal terms what Barnes
had hinted at during 1967. The government continued specifically to hold
out the possibility of "a special relationship" between a self-governing Papua
and New Guinea and Australia, but the government now "believes that the
development of Papua and New Guinea as a seventh State of Australia is
fraught with difficulties, and that statehood, as against self-government, is
not likely to be the outcome of such development" 15 - scarcely a repudiation
of Barnes.
Gough Whittam and Kim Beazley for the ALP attacked the
government's tardiness in developing Papua and New Guinea for
independence, and the latter criticised again the inappropriateness of the
Westminster system of responsible government in the territory context. 16 The
strongest and most carefully reasoned attack on Barnes, however, came from
34
Edward P. Wolfers
a Liberal party backbencher, E.H. StJohn, QC, who urged the government
to commit itself to independence as the only goal for the territory, and
criticised the government's failure to provide more funds for the University
of Papua and New Guinea (see below).!' Barnes added a certain amount of
publicity to the force of StJohn's speech by walking out during it. The
minister did not bother with his critics during his address-in-reply speech.
"What is uppermost in the minds of many Papuans and New Guineans", he
insisted, "is development economic development ... [and] the task of nation
building in Papua and New Guinea is as much an economic problem as a
political problem" }8 The remainder of the speech, as well as his speech at
the opening of ANG house in Port Moresby on 18 April, 19 was concerned
with economic, especially agricultural and financial, problems. At a press
conference on 18 April, Barnes cast some light on his apparent lack of
concern with constitutional and political issues. Independence for Papua and
New Guinea, he estimated, was still twenty to thirty years off.2
January-Apri/1968
35
The 484 candidates who contested the sixty-nine open and fifteen regional
electorates tended to be younger and relatively better educated than their
predecessors.22 Thirty to forty per cent of them had had some experience in local
government, while forty-six of the fifty-four elected members and one official
member (J.K. McCarthy) of the first House stood for re-election. Two sitting
members, R.T.D. Neville and Tei Abal, were re-elected unopposed for the
Southern Highlands Regional and Wabag Open electorates respectively, while
the new members for the Upper Sepik open and the West Sepik Regional also
had no opponents. Twenty-three European candidates stood for seventeen
Open and thirty-two for fourteen Regional electorates, while, for the first time,
two Asians contested the Kavieng Open electorate in the New Ireland district.
Two part-Asians stood for Namatanai, and a number of mixed-race candidates
stood elsewhere throughout the territory. Nineteen indigenous candidates
nominated for ten Regional electorates, for which the territory intermediate
certificate or its equivalent was required. Surprisingly four indigenes stood
in the Western Highlands Regional, and one in Chimbu, while in such
relatively sophisticated areas as Madang, New Britain and Morobe no
indigenous candidates contested the Regional electorates. Only one "foreign
native" stood for a Regional electorate (a Tolai in the Manus and New Ireland
Regional), although quite a number stood in Open electorates, including at
least four Papuans in the Madang-Morobe area. In five Regional and one
Open (Moresby) electorates, only Europeans stood, while in five electorates
two former elected members stood against each other, and in Moresby one
former elected and one former official member stood. In all, forty-eight
candidates resigned directly from the public service to contest the elections
(including sixteen interpreters, predominantly from the Highlands), although
relatively few of them were members of the so-called "urban elite". Other major
occupational groups among the candidates were (mission) teachers, farmers,
businessmen, etc. Only one woman stood (for Esa' ala). In general, Highlands
electorates attracted the greatest number of contestants; sixteen candidates
stood for each of the Chimbu, Gumine, Sinasina and Goroka Open electorates.
As regards the candidates' party affiliations: Pangu put up about thirty
formally announced candidates, and claimed a total of fifty-two Open
members and sympathisers. Tony Voutas hoped that the party would have
twenty members in the second House of Assembly. 23 The United Christian
Democratic party dropped the "Christian" from its title (and is, therefore,
now the UDP) and announced that it intended "to give second preferences
to genuine mainly indigenous political parties rather than to independents". 24
The UDP's leaders claim to have paid the $50 nomination fees of six
candidates in the Sepik (not all of whom will confirm the fact), and they
were its "endorsed" candidates. In addition, they seemed to have the
sympathy and ordinary membership of at least half of the indigenous
candidates in the Sepik, while the leaders also claimed the (unannounced)
36
Edward P. Wolfers
January-Apri/1968
37
Huon Gulf), and a third did well at Bogia. The new member for Kikori was
also born outside his electorate, in the Kerema electorate, while one mixedrace candidate and a part-Asian were elected too. Although only about onequarter of the winners had an absolute majority of the votes on the first
count, in only eight electorates was the ultimate winner not the leader on
the primary count.
The new House of Assembly contains twenty-three members of the first
house, including, however, only four Europeans. All but three of the
indigenous incumbents in the Highlands were re-elected, and all of those
candidates of both races who stood again in the New Guinea Islands and
were not opposed by another incumbent. Only one candidate from each of
the Madang and Morobe districts and from both Sepik districts were reelected, and none of the coastal Papuans from west of Port Moresby.
Indigenous candidates were, contrary to many expectations, successful in
four regional electorates, while eight Europeans gained election in Open
electorates, including two, Angoram and Kainantu, that had been represented
by (different) Europeans before. Five of the eleven under-secretaries were
re-elected, which caused some surprise in that candidates in a number of
areas had found it electorally desirable to promise not to accept ministerial
office if elected, and to concentrate on their electoral duties. John Guise is
the only surviving elected member of the old Legislative Council.
The new indigenous members of the House of Assembly are, on average,
probably better educated, and more experienced politically than their
predecessors: 27 only twenty-six of them have no formal education at all,
while nineteen have some post-primary (i.e. post-standard VI) education to
their credit, including two who have completed a year's university, and one
Highlander (from Kompiam-Baiyer) with four years' post-primary
missionary training. All members speak at least one of the three territory
lingue franche, and thirty-one have some local government experience,
including fourteen council presidents, a number of vice-presidents, plus two
council clerks and a supervisor. Four members are workers' association
leaders, and many others have experience in other social and economic
organisations. Thirty-five of the indigenous members, including all ofthose
who were re-elected from the first House, have travelled outside the territory.
Only one of the indigenous members publicly acknowledges no mission
affiliation at all, while the largest known mission group consists of about
twenty-six Roman Catholics.
The European members are, on the whole, probably somewhat more
conservative than their predecessors. Four of them have university degrees,
and the length of their time in the territory varies from one who was born
in Papua and another who was brought up here, down to just under seven
years. Six of them were born outside Australia and her dependencies.
The state of the parties in the second House of Assembly seems unclear,
and their numbers seem to hinge very much on whether party members are
allowed to accept ministerial positions. Various Pangu leaders have
estimated the party's membership in the House at a number of different
figures, up to thirty. Presently, however, only the following members have
38
Edward P. Wolfers
January-Aprill968
39
40
Edward P. Wolfers
The University
As forecast earlier, the University of Papua and New Guinea seems unlikely
now to receive all of the money it requires to expand in accordance with its
earlier plans. Already, it has had to turn away thirty prospective students in
1968, and the government seems intent on sticking to the Currie Commission's projection of 575 students in 1970 as opposed to the 825 the university
claims tt could and should take. Editorials throughout the Australian press
were on the university's side, and criticised the minister's adherence to the
earlier plan as an "extension of bureaucratic bookkeeping into a field where
it simply does not work ... ". 44 Professor Inglis' and Dr Gunther's attacks
on the government's policy were given wide publicity in Australia, although
some of the university's critics in the territory carped at the expense
($28,000) ofthe Vice-Chancellor's new house, 45 and pointed to the need for
greater government expenditure on other types of education too.
Permits
The permit system, under which travellers between Australia and the
territory must obtain a travel document from the Department of External
Territories before entering or leaving Papua and New Guinea, received
further notoriety when a Port Moresby magistrate criticised the inefficiency
of a system that allows convicted criminals into the terdtory.46 On the other
hand, a number of other bodies had earlier expressed their grievance at the
system's efficiency in excluding a Russian journalist, Yuri Yasnev, a Pravda
correspondent, from the territory because he was both Russian and a
Communist (while two Polish journalists were already touring the
territory). 47 Yasnev was denied permission to tour the territory with a group
of journalists writing about the elections because there were, allegedly, no
further seats available, while James Anthony, a post-graduate student in
Pacific History at the Australian National University, was refused a permit
unless he signed a declaration promising not to take part in any political
activities while in the Territory. 48 The public disclosure of the conditions
placed upon Anthony so damaged the possibility that his research could be
carried out effectively that Anthony decided, in the end, not to come to the
Territory.
Other Matters
A report by two officers of the Department of District Administration on a
youth survey of Port Moresby and environs advocated a head tax on all
January-Apri/1968
41
urban dwellers to limit the drift to the towns, and the improvement of
accommodation and recreational facilities in the area. 49
The Public Service Association failed in its request to be consulted in
the appointment of a new Public Service Arbitrator, 50 and L.G. Matthews
was reappointed. The Associatio~ then petitioned the UN Trusteeship
Council to appoint a commission lD examine the existing public service
salary structure, the commission to consist of an independent chairman and
four other members, of whom two each should be acceptable to the Public
Service Association and the Administration respectively. 51 A tripartite
mission, consisting of the Chairman of the Australian Council of Trade
Unions (ACTU), A.E. Monk, the executive manager of the Employers'
Federation, George Polites, the secretary of the Department of Labour and
National Service and leader of the mission, Dr H. Cook, a former president
of the Chamber of Manufacturers, A.M. Simpson, and the secretary of the
New South Wales Trades and Labour Council, R.B. Marsh, visited the
territory in April (as a similar mission did in 1960) to report to the Minister
for External Territories on wages and labour conditions in the territory. The
only important public comment by a member of the mission to date has been
Monk's remark that the Australian trade union movement was disappointed
with the results so far of its efforts to help establish trade unions in the
terri tory. 52
5
MAY-AUGUST 1968
Edward P. Wolfers
Insofar as Papua and New Guinea has a constitution in the narrow sense of
a single document outlining the institutions of the territory's government,
and their functions, it is the Papua and New Guinea Act. Because the
territory is still an Australian dependency, however, a proper understanding
of its constitution in the broad sense, i.e. of the general principles underlying
the manner and method of its government, requires more than a knowledge
of the actual operation of internal territory politics. It requires such
knowledge, of course, but it requires, too, an understanding of the
assumptions of Australia's territorial policy-makers, as well as an
appreciation of just where, and to what degree, various bodies of the United
Nations play a part in Papua and New Guinea's political development.
The second third of 1968 was, therefore, of rather extraordinary significance in the constitutional development of Papua and New Guinea. Firstly,
the Papua and New Guinea Act itself was amended, and both the manner of
its amendment, and the reactions that the amendments aroused, provided
an interesting commentary upon the assumptions ofCanbe<rra's policy-makers.
Secondly, the seventh United Nations visiting mission's report was released,
and debated, in New York, and an opportunity thereby provided for an
assessment of the degree, and trend, of international interest in New Guinea.
Finally, the first meeting of the second House of Assembly, and preparations
for its second (budget) meeting, provided a useful insight into the changes
that had occurred in, and the actual operation of, one of the most important
formal instruments of political change in Papua and New Guinea.
The Papua and New Guinea Bill1968
The Honourable C.F. Barnes (the present Minister for External Territories)
announced the Australian government's acceptance of the House of
Assembly's revised version of the recommendations contained in the final
report of its own Select Committee on Constitutional Development in
October 1967. The requisite legislation, the Papua and New Guinea Bill
1968, was not, however, introduced into the Australian Parliament until May
1968, after the election (but before the first meeting) of the legislature it was
designed to reform. The minister kept his promise to legislate in accordance
May-August 1968
43
44
Edward P. Wolfers
May-August 1968
45
46
Edward P. Wolfers
hurriedly added to the bill, provided that male and female public servants
should, henceforth, receive equal pay. There were a number of technical
inadequacies to Voutas' general scheme (especially insofar as it dealt with
salary scales rat.lter than actual pay}, but the government was able to ensure
the survival of its single-line salary structure for indigenous and expatriate
public servants without risking a second full-scale debate on the general
principles of the bill. The House's refusal to omit the amendment could have
been met with the Governor-General's new partial veto. 21 A second
amendment to the Papua and New Guinea Act to provide "for priority to be
obtained for urgent administration business in the House of Assembly on a
message to the House by the Administrator", 22 further enhanced the
government's control, even over the House of Assembly's notice-paper.
The reaction to the minister's interpretation of the House of Assembly's
wishes, and to his own amendments to the Papua and New GuirteuAct, wa:.
both swift in coming, and generally unfavourable. A group offive members
of the new House, John Guise (chairman of the first House's Select
Committee on Constitutional Development), Tony Voutas (whose
amendment to the Public Service Bill was clearly the minister's immediate
target), Percy Chatterton (also a member of the first House) and Oala OalaRarua and Cecil Abel (both newly elected to the House) issued a joint
statement that they were "disturbed" at the proposed deviations from the
Select Committee's report. The Governor-General's new partial veto, the
failure to spell out more precisely the powers and duties of the ministerial
and assistant ministerial members, and the provision enabling the
Administration to claim priority for its business in the House, were all, they
felt, "a reflection on the dignity and authority of the first House of
Assembly". 23 They wanted the priority provision at least to be exercised only
on the advice of the Administrator's Executive Council. Even the Pacific
Islands Monthly concurred: to "some observers here", it commented, "the
recently enacted amendments to the Papua and New Guinea Act take a
hesitating step forward towards self-government followed by two smart
paces backward". 24
The minister answered his critics (especially those on the ALP side in
Federal parliament, for he never answered the five protesting legislators
directly) in a rather patiently paternalistic statement, in which he declared
it to be the government's ambition "to give as much administrative power
as possible to these ministerial and assistant ministerial members. Our
experience with under-secretaries has been that it is difficult to get people
into a situation to take the full responsibility of administering a department"
- hence the need for flexibility (i.e., the lack of a precise definition of the
ministerial members' powers) in the new House. His explanation of the
significance of the Governor-General's new partial veto was disingenuous
in the extreme. In Barnes' view the new provision "simplifies the situation.
In a sense ... [he somehow imagined] this provision limits the power of
assent of the Governor-General. Instead of withholding assent from the
whole of the Bill, he can withhold his assent from part of the Bill." 25
Barnes' failings on the constitutional issue were compounded, in some
May-August 1968
47
48
Edward P. Wolfers
The absence of any public reaction to his proposal by any Papuan and
New Guinean leaders lent additional credence to the minister's view that
"[p]ressure for early self-government ... was coming mainly from outside",
and especially from sections of the Australian press, although apathy
perhaps, rather than the "resistance" that the minister thought he perceived,
May-August 1968
49
The Speakership
The speakership of the Papua and New Guinea House of Assembly is a
disproportionately important office by the normal standards of a
Westminster-style Parliament. It is, in fact, the most powerful executive
office open to the territory's legislators, especially since the minister
delineated his conception of the ministerial members' roles. It is also the
most prestigious office to which Papuans and New Guineans may presently
aspire: in official protocol, it ranks only after the Administrator and Chief
Justice in precedence, and all of the members of the legislature, elected and
official, indigenous and expatriate, must show its incumbent due and public
deference at every sitting of the House.
Under the 1965 ordinance establishing the Department of the House of
Assembly, 37 the Speaker was given much the same powers over the
legislature's staff as his Australian counterpart, and was thereby given rather
greater authority than any other legislative office-bearer in the territory.
Specifically, the Speaker was empowered under this ordinance to report
directly to the Minister for External Territories (and it was assumed that
the minister would customarily act in accordance with the Speaker's reports)
on all matters affecting the appointment, promotion and transfer of officers
of the department. He is also able to recommend the creation and abolition
of offices, without the permission of (but customarily in consultation with)
the Public Service Commissioner; in short, to recommend any changes in
the organisation, and classification, of offices within his department; and
none of the officers affected by his decisions can appeal beyond the Speaker
against his regulations and determinations. Further, the Speaker alone can
determine his officers' periods of recreation leave. The speakership,
therefore, allows its incumbent a greater potential for actual experience in
the day-to-day administration of a department than is presently available
to anyone other than departmental directors within the Administration, and,
unlike them, and unlike the ministerial members, he has no really effective
superiors he must first consult. Moreover, because officialdom, and probably
a majority of the members, regard the House of Assembly as a training
institution, in which experience is gained in the forms and procedures of
government, rather than the exercise of power, the Speaker's office is
important because of its incumbent's role in preserving the decorum of the
House, and in showing the indigenous members how to do things "properly".
In a House of independents, the Speaker's right to decide who shall speak
when, may play an important role in determining the temper, if not the actual
trend, of a debate (for only on a very few occasions, such as the annual
appropriations debates, in which most members know beforehand that they
want to speak, is it possible to prepare a list of speakers, and to adhere to it,
before the debate begins).
The defeat of the former speaker, H.L.R. Niall, the chairman of
committees, J.K. McCarthy, and his successor at the first House's last
50
Edward P. Wolfers
meeting, Don Barrett, as well as the three other temporary chairmen, John
Stuntz, Dirona Abe and Zure Zurecnuoc, meant that none of the members
of the second House had ever had any experience in the Speaker's chair.
There was, therefore, considerable speculation in the press as to who would
get the job, most of it centred around the four expatriates who had been reelected (Ashton, Chatterton, Neville and Voutas), and Ron Slaughter while
he was leading on the first count, and seemed likely to win, in the central
regional electorate. (He finally lost on preferences to Oala-Rarua.) It was
widely assumed that very few of the indigenous members would be capable
of the job, and that most of those who were would probably prefer to seek
ministerial office- a point that was reinforced by John Guise's publicly
announced indecision whether he would accept nomination for the
speakership, and his definite willingness to become a ministerial member,
1f asked. 38 Gradually, however, the speculative field came to include Guise,
Matthias Toliman, Tei Abal and Paul Lapun, although there seemed to be
some support for Ian Downs' suggestion that an official member who was
close to retirement (W.W. Watkins?) be allowed to fill the position for, say,
the first two years, before handing over to his indigenous deputy whom he
would have trained for the position in the interim. 39
The problem of the speakership was finally resolved at the school for
members, which was held in Port Moresby before the new House met. The
school, as did its predecessor at Sogeri in 1964, provided an occasion for
teaching the new members parliamentary procedure, as well as helping them
to get to know one another, to discuss political matters, and, especially, to
resolve such questions as the speakership in private. The (unofficial) result
of all the speculation was the nomination of Roy Ashton (who was said to
be keener on a ministerial position), N.M. Casey (who did want to be
Speaker), and Percy Chatterton, who withdrew when his fellow member for
a Papuan electorate, John Guise, nominated. Guise won, because, as one
commentator unkindly put it, the "Highlands bloc ... [believed] that he
would be more useful as Speaker than in shaking things up on the benches",
while Pangu supported him in order "to avoid a public showdown over the
ministerial issue". 40 The result also enabled the new Speaker to resolve, at
minimum political cost to himself, the conflict that his ambition and his
commitment to the new ministerial system (as the former Chairman of the
Select Committee on Constitutional Development that had recommended its
establishment) presented with his membership of Pangu, which wanted to
boycott all executive office for the time being. W.W. Watkins was elected
as Guise's deputy, and Angmai Bilas, Percy Chatterton, Oala Oala-Rarua,
Paul Langro and Sinake Giregire became temporary chairmen of committees.
Despite Barnes' rather patronising comment that it was "good to see a
Papuan has the confidence of the House for such high office", 41 Guise's
election to office has already brought about an important change in the
atmosphere of the House. He takes great care to explain changes in
procedure, and the issue of each vote to the members, in pidgin, and has,
both in manner and in his dress within as well as outside the House, reduced
the formality, but none of the dignity, of his office. His acceptance speech
May-August 1968
51
and his ceremonial official dress have also stressed his desire to transcend
regional and party divisions in the national cause. His formal nomination
and seconding by two Highlands members, and his addition of a tapa cloth
(for Papua), birds of paradise feathers and (symbolically for a radical?) a
kina shell around his neck (to represent the Highlands) have underlined his
desire to use the speakership as "a symbol of Papua and New Guinea striving
for unity and nation building" .42 Even as Speaker, however, Guise has provided ample evidence of his political astuteness. As local member, he has
announced his desire to continue to look after his electorate's interests through
submitting a detailed report of their "needs and aspirations direct to the
Administration through the appropriate channels ... " and to back them up
through distributing copies of these reports throughout his electorate" .43 In
reply to the many questions he has been asked as to whether he remains a Pangu
member, Guise simply reiterates the relevant portions of his acceptance speech:
I shall maintain the impartial and the middle course of this office ... at all times.
No affiliation, no personal opinion, no likes, no dislikes will in any way affect
... the carrying out of my duties .... Every member of the House is a friend
and no one is above the other. The office of Speaker shall not be the subject
of any party pressure from any political party or group or individuals from
within the House, either from elected members or the official members.
The new House did not discuss any really important or controversial issues
at its first meeting. The Administration seemed content to let the new
members find their feet first, and to choose the House's office-bearers. Thus,
it is difficult to estimate with any accuracy just how much more radical or
sophisticated (except in purely formal terms, i.e. education, extra-village
experience, etc.) the new House is than its predecessor. The re-election of
only nineteen indigenous and four expatriate members of the first House
has meant that, at least in terms of the members' mastery of parliamentary
procedure, the new House has had to start off very little further ahead of
where its predecessors had begun in 1964. In this light, then, Niwia Ebia
Olewale's complaint towards the end ofthe meeting that he had understood
very little of what had passed45 was an important indication of the likely
frustration of many members with the procedures of Westminster, especially
as the complainant is one of the half-dozen best educated indigenous
members. Tei Abal's question on the second morning as to why he had had
to change sides with Siwi Kurondo when they had nominated Guise as
Speaker, 46 was another sign that ignorance of some of Westminster's
ceremonial and substantively irrelevant trappings may embarrass even the
most conscientious of legislators.
The general tenor of the address-in-reply, and the daily adjournment
debates, as well as of the questions asked, revealed a House that was
probably even more concerned with parochial issues than its predecessor,
possibly because its members now have practical experience ofthe political
Edward P. Wolfers
52
May-August 1968
53
Pangu now has ten members in the House: Michael Somare (East Sepik
Regional, and the party's parliamentary leader), Paul Lapun (South
Bougainville Open, and deputy leader), Pita Lus (Maprik Open, and party
whip), Niwia Ebia Olewale (South Fly Open), Mangobing Kakun (Munya
Open), James Meanggarum (Bogia Open), Paliau Maloat (Manus Open),
Tony Voutas (Morobe Regional), Cecil Abel (Milne Bay Regional), and
Michael Kaniniba (Huon Gulf Open), who at one point denied in the House
that he was (yet?) a party member at all. 51 Guise's elevation to the
speakership, and Siwi Kurondo's acceptance of ministerial office seemed
effectively to cut them off from the remainder of the party.
The Pangu members opened firmly, with an attempted demonstration of
unity and coordination, in which Somare, Lapun, Voutas and Abel
successively outlined the party's policies towards the new ministerial
system, local and self-government, home rule, and economic development
respectively. Somare announced, firstly, that no member of the party would
accept ministerial office (although Lapun was a member of the Ministerial
Nominations Committee). The party wanted to avoid any conflict between
party membership and a ministerial member's loyalty to the Administrator's
Executive Council. It sought to become, in effect, the House's "loyal
opposition". Thirdly, Pangu did not want to jeopardise its commitment to
its policies through loss of some of its members' votes to the Administration.
The party, therefore, committed itself to the fostering of a two-party system
in Papua and New Guinea. Somare concluded his outline of party policy
with an attack upon the appointment of so many kiaps to the House, as well
as the alleged concentration of these men's experience in the Highlands. In
Somare's view, the new official members had been appointed purposely "to
herd and shepherd the unsophisticated members ofthis House, thus exerting
a subtle form of direct rule ... [in order to encourage] controversial support
for the Administration ... from less sophisticated members. It would have
been better if other people, with special knowledge in certain fields had been
appointed to the house rather than the kiaps. " 52
The range of responses to Pangu's presence, cohesion and statements
of policy in the House was fairly wide. Several Highlands members
expressed their very real interest in discovering what parties were, and
specifically what Pangu stood for, although several of them added that they
feared the development of parties at this stage. Jim McKinnon, the leader
of the All Peoples' party, later sought to capitalise upon these fears (and
perhaps to take over the elected members' group that was formed during
the meeting), when he announced that Dennis Buchanan and himself, the
party's only announced legislative members, would henceforth call
themselves the "All Peoples' group", as "the majority of the people have
not the slightest idea of politics or party systems, and consequently have
little trust in parties". 53 The All Peoples' group (which one commentator
said had been renamed by some the "One Person's Party") 54 also announced
that its members would accept ministerial positions, if nominated - seven
hours after the list of potential office-holders had been accepted by the
House. At the other end of the political spectrum, Oala Oala-Rarua (a former
54
Edward P. Wolfers
co-chairman of Pangu, who had left the party after a dispute over his
prediction that independence could come by 1970) attacked Pangu, from
his own standpoint as "a straight out nationalist" for not allowing its
members to gain experience in the ministerial system it had advocated. 55
N.I. Uroe, from a more conservative position than Oala-Rarua, later added
that it was not just Pangu's prerogative, but "the role of all elected members
to act as the Loyal Opposition of this government" .56
Officialdom was clearly disconcerted, if not surprised, at Somare's
vehement attack upon the kiaps. L.W. Johnson, Assistant Administrator
(Services), rose very soon after Somare had spoken to point out that the
Administration had not wanted to appoint official members from within
departments which had ministerial representation in the House, as the
government wanted the ministerial members to have complete, unprumplt:u
responsibility for their departments in the House. The four new nominees
had, therefore, been "entirely on the basis of the personal qualities of the
individual man chosen for the job ... ".57 Curious, then, that these individual
official members (i.e., they are not representatives of their department) have
"District Commissioner" or "District Inspector" printed in brackets after
their names in Hansard each time they speak, in exactly the same position
as other members' constituencies or official titles are recorded. H.P. Seale
(District Commissioner (DC) at Lae, whose real role is probably that of
counterweight to Voutas among the seven Morobe Open members) then
explained that he had spent only eight of his thirty-four years in the Territory
in the Highlands, 58 while S.M. Foley later calculated that between the four
of them, they had spent only twenty-five of their one hundred territory years
in that area. Anyway, he insisted, he was not ashamed of being a kiap or a
government man. The kiaps' role in the House was "not an attempt to stand
between the member and the Government", but "both inside and outside the
House, to tell the people, what the Government is doing, and why it is doing
it". If Somare had meant by "simple" that the Highlanders were
unintelligent, then he should look again at the complexity of their traditional
culture, and agricultural system, and - an obvious appeal to Highlands
chauvinism - at the way their districts had been developed since contact
"in a manner unparalleled in this country". 59 Clearly, the official members
knew from experience (Foley, as DC for Chimbu, and then Ellis' successor
in the Western Highlands; Seale as former DC for the Eastern Highlands;
and Littler as District Inspector at Mount Hagen) just what makes the
Highlands tick.
A little later in the meeting, Neville (himself a former kiap, and from
an area where most of the members repeatedly ask for more, and more
regular, patrols) asked T.W. Ellis, Director of District Administration, a
question which enabled the latter to speak in detail and at length on the need
for more patrol officers to be recruited, and for those who are trained to be
retained. 60
The most important reaction to Pangu's presence and activities in the
House, however, came from about fifty of the uncommitted (i.e. non-Pangu,
non-official) members of the House who began to meet together as a group
May-August 1968
55
towards the end of the meeting. The group, variously labelled a "'power'
group" 61 or just an elected or independent members' group by the press, bore
a close resemblance to the elected members' group that emerged early in
the life of the first House. Although the group lacks any announced formal
organisation, its leaders are alleged to be expatriates, especially Casey and
Watts. 62 The reasons various members gave for their adherence to the group
varied widely: in some cases, simple resentment at the coherence and lucid
certainty of several Pangu members may have been the cause; in other cases,
it was a desire to frustrate, and put Pangu in its place (as evidenced in those
divisions where the official members supported a Pangu motion on its merits,
against the resolute opposition of nearly every other member); at least one
conservative expatriate supported the group because he feared that a few of
the other members would "join anyone who looks like becoming the strength
... "and he wanted to show that it was not Pangu. 63 In short, the group was
designed to give the vast majority of members a sense of belonging, as well
as to make sure that Pangu had an effective and organised opposition in the
House, apart from the Administration (on some issues).
To date, the elected members' group has displayed "almost party-like
coherence" 64 in the House, despite the absence of any real common interest
(except perhaps a desire to belong, and a fear ofPangu) among its members.
As early as its third meeting, however, an argument allegedly occurred, and
one European member is reported to have walked out in a huff. 65 The group's
apparent leadership by expatriates, its lack of a declared platform or even a
firm policy, and its informal methods of meeting and organisation, have
already given rise to widespread speculation as to its durability. The general
verdict of the press seems to be that the group will either go the way of the
caucus Guise once led (from 1964 until mid-1966), or eventually become,
as some of its members seem to hope, a party-like organisation in its own
right.
The rest of the first meeting tended to centre around two themes: the
experience, and lessons, of the last election; and the need to tidy up the
unfinished business of the first House (including a, perhaps unplanned,
reassertion of official control over the legislature).
Most speeches were concerned with relatively parochial matters
although some acknowledgement was also made of the country's brittle
unity, as displayed in the Papuans-versus-New Guineans' brawling in Port
Moresby which coincided with the meeting. In many cases, parochialism was
but the result of a member's analysis of why he had won, or a rival,
especially an incumbent, had lost. The members' experience with the
realities of electoral success, and loss, ensured widespread support for
Ashton's move to set up a select committee to investigate the possibility of
setting up a superannuation scheme for members. Somare's motion to set up
a commission of inquiry into the electoral system failed, however, initially
because of the mover's specification of what aspects of the system should be
investigated, and his advocacy of specific changes. Even when the original
wording of the motion, which almost presupposed the results of the
investigation, was changed to a more general form, which received official
56
Edward P. Wolfers
support, it was defeated. In large part, the debate simply provided the first
occasion for the uncommitted members' group to put Pangu down, although
it was also probably just not rational to expect the members to support a
move to change the system which had so recently allowed them to gain
election to the House. Voutas' motion for a select committee to examine
legislative procedures had to be amended too, for the same reasons as
Somare's motion, in order to gain official support. Although it was then
adjourned until the next meeting, it seemed likely to succeed, just because
it seemed less threatening, and very relevant, to most of the members.
Several bills, e.g. the National Fitness, and Gaming (Playing Cards)
Bills, were passed without debate, for they only tidied up some technical
shortcomings in their predecessors. Nonetheless, a lot of tidying up from
the first House still remains to be done- thirty-three of its ordinances had
still not come into force by June (plus part of one already in force, two about
which there were technical doubts, and two to which assent had been
refused) - an interesting set of indications of the care and urgency with
which officialdom prepares and considers legislation. 66 The Administration's
carelessness was further displayed in the way in which one bill was moved
and passed, without copies having been distributed to the members,67 and
one official member promised to answer a question on another bill after it
was passed. 68 Finally, the session provided an occasion for the (re-)assertion
of the government's power- one bill was refused assent/9 and another was
returned by the Governor-General for amendment. 70 In the latter case,
Voutas was at least promised that a committee would be established to
consider the principle of equal pay for equal work by men and women,
although his request that he be included on the committee was not
subsequently granted.
Other debates which aroused controversy concerned an announced
shortfall of $4 million in the Territory's internal revenue in 1967-8; the
question of an alleged decline in the discipline of the police force, especially
in the Sepik; and the desirability of sending a parliamentary mission abroad
to investigate the use to which long-term overseas volunteers were put
elsewhere in the Pacific (the motion was defeated because of the mission's
likely cost, rather than on the desirability of having volunteers). Legislation
was also passed to set up a four-man (including two indigenes, the
Administration promised) public service board; and legislation enabling the
negotiation of a $US 7,000,000 loan from the World Bank to improve the
Territory's telecommunications systems was quickly passed. The
Administration's Industrial Relations Bill 1968 was also passed, despite
some members' objection that the requirement that the parties concerned
report a threatened strike or lockout to the Labour Department could lead
to prosecutions in those cases where the threat was not perceived as being
real until too late. J.J. Garrett's amendment to require the report only if a
strike or lockout actually took place was defeated by thirty-one votes to fiftyfive. Throughout the meeting, the newly-elected ministerial and assistant
ministerial members still freely criticised, and even voted against, the
Administration.
May-August 1968
57
The new ministerial members are: Angmai Bilas (Trade and Industry);
O.I. Ashton (Public Works); Matthias Toliman (Education); Sinake Giregire
(Posts and Telegraphs); Tei Abal (Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries); Tore
Lokoloko (Health); Toua Kapena (Labour). The assistant ministerial
members are: Andagari Wabiria (Lands, Surveys and Mines); Joseph Lue
(Technical Education and Training); Kaibelt Diria (Local Government);
Lepani Watson (Cooperatives); Meek Singiliong (Rural Development); Oala
Oala-Rarua (Treasury); Paul Langro (Information and Extension Services);
Siwi Kurondo (Forests). Tom Leahy was nominated by the Administrator
as the non-ministerial, elected member of his Executive Council. Toua
Kapena, Paul Langro and Kaibelt Diria resigned from the Ministerial
Nominations Committee after Lapun, Neville and they themselves agreed
that they be nominated for office.
The Administrator seemed content with the appointments, despite the lack
of knowledge of English in seven cases, and the putative illiteracy of three,
although he was thought to have been unhappy with the inclusion of an
expatriate in the list of nominees. 71 Although the Administrator publicly
denied that there had been any major points of disagreement between the
Ministerial Nominations Committee and himself, he was reported as
regarding the ministerial positions as being mainly for training purposes,
and therefore not designed for expatriates. He was content to go slowly at
first, and claimed that their selection had not been over-ridingly based on
the need for geographical representation, but that their capacity (not literacy)
and age had been taken into account too. 72 The Administration tabled a code
of conduct for the new office-holders in the House immediately they had
been appointed, and the first "cabinet" meeting was held on 17 June.
There was some surprise among the press that Oala-Rarua had not made
full ministerial rank, and that Lepani Watson (alone of the four former undersecretaries who sought re-appointment) had not been "promoted" either;
indeed, he was now the assistant ministerial member for only a section of
the department for which he had once been the under-secretary. 73 In its usual
charming and tactful way, the South Pacific Post welcomed the new
ministerial members with a front-page comment from a Melbourne
journalist, who lamented the inability of some of them to read of the
activities of what the author amusingly called "the great advanced races".
"Boys", he concluded, choosing his words carefully, "if you want to keep
your illusions (and perhaps ours, too) you'd better stay illiterate". 74
The production by the Department of Information and Extension Services
of a roneoed weekly summary of the House's activities, This Week in the
House of Assembly, unfortunately only in English, and the Treasurer's
promise of a special budget seminar for members at the next meeting,
provided further evidence of the government's desire for the second House
to "work" internally, and "come across" at the popular level. Early in August,
the ministerial and assistant ministerial members also spent two days
practising the handling of government business in the House of Assembly
in preparation for the House's second meeting.
6
SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER 1968
Edward P. Wolfers
59
September-December 1968
1968-92 1967-8
per cent
$million
$million
of total
Commodity producing
sectors'
Economic overheads'
Social services'
General administration,
law and order'
per cent
of total
20.159
30.674
51.859
13.19
20.07
33.92
17.836
23.594
48.752
13.36
17.66
36.51
35.354
23.12
31.330
23.46
152.860
100.00
133.547
100.00
The budget itself was, in the Treasurer's (A.P.J. Newman) words, just
"more of the same thing as last year". 8 It was, however, perhaps a rather
more significant document in the long-term in that it represented the first
instalment ofthe Administration's five year economic development plan for
the Territory which was introduced later in the meeting. Indeed, the budget's
overall emphasis accorded closely with the plan: "to expend an increasing
proportion of our resources on the economic sector [basically on economic
overheads rather than in the commodity producing sector], with a decreasing
proportion on the social services and other sectors of the budget" .9 Similarly,
the budget's revenue-raising provisions accorded with the plan's, in that they
sought to increase internal receipts as much as practicable, and to attract
increasing Commonwealth grants, within an "overall trend ... towards
increasing internal and decreasing grant proportions of the total" .10 Thus
forty-three per cent of the Territory's receipts will be raised from internal
sources in 1968-9, while fifty-seven per cent represent the grant's percentage
contribution to revenue (as against figures of forty-two per cent and fiftyeight per cent respectively in 1967-8).
On the administrative front, the Treasurer promised that the
recruitment of public servants from overseas would henceforth be permitted
"only ... in those categories of employment for which there are insufficient
trained local officers" . 11 In practice, this would mean the cessation of
overseas recruitment of base-grade clerks (although replacements for
existing positions might still be sought overseas), and the recruitment of
training officers for all departments that still lacked them. In addition, a
special section would be established within the Public Service
Commissioner's Department to speed up the localisation of the Administration
bureaucracy.
Otherwise, the budget provided increases of 9.8 per cent and 8.9 per cent
respectively in the allocations for the Departments of Public Health and District
Administration, much of which will be absorbed in increased salaries
60
Edward P. Wolfers
and allowances, while the education grant rose by a modest $1,479,000. The
departments of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries, and Lands, Surveys and
Mines seemed to do best, with a rise of 20.8 per cent in the former's
allocation, mainly for salaries, and livestock subsidies, etc., and of 16.7 per
cent in the latter's, mainly for land purchases. As the Administration grows,
of course, so less and less becomes available for purely developmental
purposes each year, and more- $11,875,000 this year (a rise of 12.2 per
cent) is absorbed by general maintenance costs. The works programme
accordingly rose by only 5.8 per cent to $23.8 million, although this figure
does not include a further $6.1 million to be spent on capital works during
the year by the Electricity and Housing Commissions, the Ports and
Harbours Board, the University of Papua and New Guinea and the University
of Technology. Grants to these "Other Institutions" as they are called (i.e.,
the five institutions mentioned above plus the Development Bank) rose, in
all, by 36.1 per cent for 1968-9, without taking into account a special
promise by the Commonwealth government "to consider increasing the grant
to the Administration [by an unspecified amount], if the need of the
[Development] Bank for funds seems likely to exceed its resources and the
Government considers it necessary to assist the Administration to make an
additional contribution towards the Bank's capital"Y
Revenue-raising procedures differed only marginally from those that
pertained through 1967-8. The Administration believes that "development
is not just a matter for the Government", 13 and that the tax burden on private
and company incomes should, therefore, remain substantially lower than
in Australia. Nonetheless, the Territory's income tax was raised slightly by
the budget, the increases ranging from 1.1 per cent at the lower income levels
to 12.5 per cent at the top (average: 7.42 per cent). Overall, the tax rise will
yield a further $1 million during the financial year, offset as it is by
additional concessional deductions for superannuation_and life assurance
payments, and by a rise in the concessional deduction for a taxpayer's
children's educational expenses. The Territory's loan target for 1968-9 was
raised by $2 million to $10 million (as against the actual figure of $8.4
million achieved in 1967-8).
The budget debate tended to focus on parochial matters rather than
principles. Most of the members seemed, at least implicitly, to agree with
Neville, who opened the debate, that "the passage of this bill (which we
believe was largely prepared in Canberra, presumably by people who are not
conversant with the requirements of this Territory) is a fait accompli, and
that we are not really in any position whatsoever to make changes" . 14
Nevertheless, of course, a long series of minor, usually parochially-inspired
changes, were proposed. Voutas pressed on with Neville's allegation of
Canberra control by suggesting that the original budget approved by the
Administrator's Executive Council had been significantly changed at the last
minute by George Warwick Smith, Secretary ofthe Department of External
Territories. 15 Smith himself did not reply to Voutas until after the budget
had been passed, when he denied the suggestion, 16 while Ellis testified
immediately on his behalf that both the ministerial and assistant ministerial
September-December 1968
61
members "have had a large hand, since they took up duty, in the compilation
of the budget" .17 Several of the ministerial and assistant ministerial members,
however, commented themselves on just how great a hand they felt they had
had. Their attitudes ranged from an answer to another member's question
by the Ministerial Member for Public Works (0.1. Ashton) that he had "had
no part in the Works Programme", 18 to an entertaining plea by Siwi Kurondo
that his Department of Forests be allocated more money. 19 Paul Langro was
nQt alone among the ministerial office-holders in pressing the demands of
his electorate against the present budget, 20 while Lepani Watson (Assistant
Ministerial Member for Cooperatives) made known his views on "his"
budget at the beginning of his speech:
Before I deal with the budget on behalf of my Department, I would like to
thank the Australian taxpayers for their contribution. My thanks come on
behalf of the Territory as a whole. My electors have not told me to express
their thanks because they do not seem to have received anything. 21
Most of the budget debate consisted of what the Pacific Islands Monthly
called "the usual run of 'I want speeches'", 22 climaxing in Koriam Urekit's
request for five fish freezers, a road, patrol and agricultural officers, a doctor,
a high school and a land demarcation committee for his electorate.23 On a
more general level, Neville was grateful for the Australian grant, but
concerned that the public service structure in the Territory might be
"somewhat too elaborate for us to sustain" .24 His only misgivings concerned
the public service's alleged inefficiency, and the effects of increasing
taxation on overseas investment. Michael Somare, who led for the Pangu
pati, congratulated the Treasurer for what he had managed to do within "the
limitations imposed by the Australian Government". He was, however,
critical of those limitations. In Somare's view, a true picture of Australian
spending in Papua and New Guinea could be obtained only by adding the
grant, direct Commonwealth departmental expenditure, and money spent
on "commercial activities" (e.g. the Australian Broadcasting Commission
and Trans-Australia Airlines) together. Then, total spending for 1968-9 could
be seen to have risen only slightly from the 1967-8 figure, by $1,400,000
to $119 million, and not by $10 million (the rise in the grant). Somare then
queried just why the Australian government is "levelling off its expenditure
in the Territory and not increasing it". "This Territory", he believed, "can
absorb a much larger grant - even double the present grant - without too
much pressure or wastage ofresources". 25 As the Pacific Islands Monthly's
local correspondent concluded: the Treasurer must have "listened happily
while Ron Neville and ... Michael Somare made, from opposite points of
view, criticisms which neatly cancelled each other out". 26
Other economic matters to come before the House at this meeting were
the five-year economic development programme, 27 which was tabled for
discussion at the following meeting of the House (see below), the
development capital guarantee declaration, which had been passed by the
first House of Assembly and was re-passed now without debate, and a
motion for a select committee to investigate "methods of increasing
62
Edward P. Wolfers
September-December 1968
63
position? - he could not support it. Instead, he accused the Public Service
Association of lying to local officers that the arbitration case would
automatically lead to rises in pay, a claim which the Association vigorously
denied, and he blamed the Administration for failing to consult local opinion
before altering the public service's salary structure in the first place. 34 In
the end, both Toua Kapena and Oala-Rarua abstained from voting on the
measure by walking from the chamber when a division was called, together
with three other Assistant Ministerial Members, Meek Singiliong, Lepani
Watson and Paul Langro, all of whom either supported the bill privately, or
just did not wish to be constrained into opposing it for the sake of preserving
the solidarity of the ministry. Although the Administration still won the vote
against the bill, by fifty-three votes to twenty-five, the abstention of five
members of the ministry presented a serious constitutional problem for the
government in that the ministry's collective responsibility to the House had
been openly breached. The whole matter was, therefore, referred to Canberra
for advice, although no action was ever publicly taken against any of the
five abstainers. 35 Curiously, however, in view of the publicity that surrounded
their action on this occasion, very little comment was ever made, at least
publicly, about an. earlier, more blatant breach of the ministry's solidarity
when three of the ministerial members, Ashton, Oala-Rarua and Paul
Langro, together with T.J. Leahy, a non-ministerial member of the
Administrator's Executive Council, had openly voted against the
government without reproof, albeit on a procedural aspect of a
comparatively minor, and unanimously approved, Lands Bill. 36 The
substantive issues raised by Chatterton's bill did not rest with its defeat
either, for shortly thereafter W.A. Lussick (MHA Manus and New Ireland
Regional) introduced the Public Service Arbitration Commission Bill 1968
which sought to establish a regular system of appeals from arbitration within
the public service rather than to canvass the merits of a particular decision.
The South Pacific.Post thought that Lussick's bill might well receive the
Administration's support at the next meeting of the House as a compromise
between the need for an orderly arbitration system and the political
desirability of reviewing the decision in the local officers' caseY
The debate on the Land Titles Commission (Jurisdiction and Appeals)
Bill1968 led to a rather similar confrontation to that which had taken place
on Chatterton's bill. Indeed, some members seemed to construe the two bills
in rather similar terms, despite the Administration's insistence that they were
not at all comparable. The bill proposed four important changes: (a) an
increase in the number of commissioners who would hear applications for
the restoration of land titles lost during the war, and also in land disputes
involving indigenes and non-indigenes, from one to three -land disputes
between indigenes would continue to be heard by a single commissioner; (b) a
widening of the present grounds of appeal to the Supreme Court to include
matters of fact as well as points oflaw; (c) the Supreme Court's powers to
adjourn, accept or reject appeals, and to return cases to the Commission were
clarified; (d) the power to appoint deputy land titles commissioners was
vested in the Administrator-in-Council. The debate on the bill became rather
64
Edward P. Wolfers
September-December 1968
65
for Neville by the Speaker for making his charges through other than the
proper channels. 45 A final incident provided a valuable insight into the
problems Pangu faces in the House when Pita Lus (MHA Maprik) succeeded
in having his bill to change motor traffic signs from English words to
symbols approved by the House, against the opposition of the official
members. Koitaga Mano (MHA Kandep-Tambul) seemed to capture the
ambivalence many members feel towards Pangu when he spoke approvingly
of Lus' bill and of Somare's knowledge of the Administration: "I like this
bill of Mr Pita Lus", he concluded "but because some of the speeches from
Pangu members have made me ashamed, I cannot support it" .46
Secessionism
66
Edward P. Wolfers
September-December 1968
67
68
Edward P. Wolfers
MIF. Both were led by failed candidates at the 1968 elections, the United
Islands Progress Society, at Kavieng, by a Chinese commercial artist, Perry
Kwan, and the United Niugini party, among villagers in the Paparatava area
near Rabaul, by a Tolai school teacher, Stanis Boramilat ToLiman. Both of
them are dedicated to the encouragement of a sense of national unity in the
Territory, and have small, highly localised memberships. They bear a close
resemblance to the "dwarf parties"65 with national aspirations, but localised,
ethnically-based support, that can be found in many parts of Africa and
India. 66
At least three of the six parties formed during 1967 continue to function
-the United Democratic party, the National Progress party (Napro) and
Pangu, while the MIF is reported to have emerged from among some
elements of the now-defunct Agricultural Reform party. 67 Late in September,
Pangu announced a new list uf uu:mbers of its interim central executive:
Keni Pythias, Cromwell Burau, Barry Holloway, Gerai Asiba, John
Yocklunn, J. Lee and Epel Tito, four of whom were unsuccessful candidates
at the 1968 general elections, while J.K. Nombri, Gavera Rea (also a failed
candidate) and Jacob Sabo constitute the membership of the new Bung of
co-chairmen. 68 Napro held its annual general meeting in November, and its
members re-elected one another to the executive: Bill Dihm (chairman), 0.
Dickson and Goodwill Tabua (deputy chairmen), Ephraim Karara (general
secretary), Sevese Morea (treasurer), Leo Saulep, and Mr and Mrs John
Jack. 69 In October, Pangu became involved in a minor controversy over an
allegation by Oala Oala-Rarua that one of its co-chairmen, Gavera Rea (who
had founded the Central District Waterside Workers' Association in July)
and Albert Maori Kiki, the party's secretary, were using trade unionism as
a "cover up ... to increase [Pangu's] mass support". Kiki and Rea thereupon
challenged Oala-Rarua, president of the Port Moresby Workers' Association,
to lodge an objection when the new Central District Building Workers'
Union, of which they are executives, sought official registration. There was
no public response from Oala-Rarua. 70
September-December 1968
69
70
Edward P. Wolfers
several members pleaded for such special local causes as the Madang-Mount
Hagen road, which was not mentioned in the plan, as the Administration
had not yet received the report of the United Nations Development
Programme's transport survey team. The plan's profoundest critics were
familiar companions - Percy Chatterton and several members of Pangu,
many of whose arguments bore a close resemblance to those employed by
academic critics of the 1965 World Bank report.
Chatterton argued that rapid economic development would require a
considerable amount of overseas investment. He preferred a slower rate of
development with increased indigenous participation. He deemed it less
likely then that Papua and New Guinea would become what he termed a
"banana republic" after independence, manipulated by overseas interests.
Specifically, Chatterton wanted companies that give indigenes positions of
genuine responsibility to receive a special tax concession, and "something
like a Black New Guinea Policy" in those aspects of economic development
where Papuans and New Guineans can already, or will soon be able to, go
it alone. By way of example, he suggested that the establishment of village
trade-stores be confined to indigenous entrepreneurs. 79
A.C. Voutas, who opened for the Pangu pati, followed Chatterton's line
of reasoning, emphasising that the plan tended to follow the Australian
Liberal-Country party's "philosophy of free enterprise capitalism" much too
closely. He wanted increased indigenous participation in business too. By
1974-5, he said, internal revenue was expected to exceed the Australian
grant, and the House might well decide to control the budget itself (i.e., to
undertake full internal self-government for the Territory), only to find that
economic power was not in the local people's hands at all. 80 Michael Somare,
Cecil Abel and Pita Lus followed Voutas' line, while Ebia Olewale (also a
Pangu member) confined himself principally to his own electorate's
problems. The final vote to take note of the plan was _agreed to by sixtyeight votes to twelve, in which division Ebia Olewale and Paliau Maloat
sided with the government against the rest of Pangu (which was now down
to nine acknowledged members after James Meanggarum's resignation).
The most dramatic debate of the meeting, in purely political terms, was
that on W.A. Lussick's Public Service Arbitration Commission Bill 1968.
Lussick's bill arose out of discussions surrounding Chatterton's bill at the
previous meeting, when many members expressed a desire for a system of
appeals from public service arbitration cases to be established in the
Territory without attacking the present arbitration system, as the
Administration felt that Chatterton's bill did. The new bill, therefore,
provided for a panel of three people (to replace the present single arbitrator),
who were to be appointed by the Chief Justice, to hear major public service
claims, and for an appeals system against decisions by a single arbitrator.
In November, just before the House met, the Administrator, apparently
acting on orders from Canberra, asked Lussick to defer his bill until the
government had had time to appoint, and then receive a report from, a group
of experts who would investigate the effectiveness of the present Public
Service Arbitration Ordinance. 81 Lussick, however, refused to commit
September-December 1968
71
72
Edward P. Wolfers
September-December 1968
73
Lussick, the group's present apparent leader, insofar as it has a single leader,
was quoted as thinking party organisation for the group to be about a year
off. Pangu, Beilby felt, had emerged from the session "milder, [and]
matured", trying to cast off its loser's image, although worried that some
more of its members (especially Paliau Mal oat) might resign from the party. 97
By the end of the meeting, some of the fascination of membership in a
new Parliament had worn off for at least a few indigenous members. Yauwe
Wauwe (MHA Chuave), for example, said he would never again ask
questions in the House because they never led to anything (but subsequently
asked several), while Kaibelt Diria (Assistant Ministerial Member for Local
Government) expressed his frustration at the government's failure to solve
his electorate's problems, and his own difficulties in explaining why to his
constituents. 98 Finally, James Meanggarum made a careful and sustained
criticism of most members' general demeanour in the House. He urged
greater moderation in the attitudes that the independent and Pangu members
showed towards one another. 99
7
JANUARY-APRIL 1969
Robert Waddell
January-Aprill969
75
A great and heated debate was promised for the introduction of the Public
76
Robert Waddell
January-April 1969
77
dispute to be heard before the full tribunal or the chairman only (flanked
by the assistant members in a deliberative, non-voting capacity). Where
"issues of general public importance are involved" the tribunal may "request
the Minister to refer the claim or any aspect of or matter arising out of the
proceedings to a Board of Inquiry", consisting of a chairman and not less
than three other members, appointed by the minister. The board does not
determine wages but investigates, collects data and reports. There is no
provision for appeal. As Henderson said, "Appeals in arbitration exist only
in Australia and they are for a specific reason, namely coordination between
awards of arbitration in different sectors. The bill follows the report (TurnerChambers) in taking the view that arbitration after attempted conciliation
is in itself an appeal." 18
A measure which aroused controversy was the Evidence by Affidavit Bill
1968. discussion on which was resumed from 29 November 1968. 19 On the
day of the debate John Griffin, Senior Lecturer in Law at the University of
Papua New Guinea, wrote a letter to the South Pacific Post setting out his
objections to the bill. He said that it might be sensible to allow evidence to
be given by affidavit rather than in person in civil cases- at least if the power
were limited to Supreme Court judges and stipendiary magistrates. But in
criminal cases "where the liberty of the subject is involved it should not be
possible for a court to take evidence into account unless it is given to the
court by the witness personally" _20 A subsequent editorial branded the
measure as "Trial by Correspondence'". 21
Griffin's views were supported in the House by Chatterton and Voutas
who were able to get one amendment accepted - namely that the power to
accept evidence by affidavit be restricted to "the Supreme Court, a judge
or a District Court". 22 Otherwise the bill was passed intact by seventy-three
votes to ten.
Education was the subject of a great number of statements both in and
out of the House during this period. On 4 March, Matthias Toliman
(Ministerial Member for Education) referred to a statement made by Barnes
on 7 February, in which the latter announced the appointment of a committee
of three to study and make recommendations on the relationship between
mission and Administration education. The members were Dr C.E. Beeby,
a former Director of Education in New Zealand, and Gabriel Gris, a lecturer
at the Dental College, Port Moresby. The chairman was W. Weeden of the
Department of Education and Science, Canberra. The terms of reference
included such things as the salaries of mission teachers, and the possibility
of having "a single teaching service to employ all teachers, mission and
Administration". 23
On 10 March Toliman said that it would cost about $2 million per
annum over the period of the five-year plan to raise mission teachers' salaries
to the level currently paid to local education officers of the same
qualifications. He added that forty- five per cent of the Territory's secondary
and sixty-six per cent of its primary school children attended mission
schools. 24 In an earlier statement he had said there were 240,000 students
enrolled in the Territory's schools, of which according to a statement made
78
Robert Waddell
One might comment that by all accounts it is not just the big decisions
that are made in Canberra.
"Localisation" of the public service is a very serious issue to which little
thought appears to have been given or perhaps much thought and little
action. One reason for inaction is, of course, that in 1966 there were only
14,500 Papuans and New Guineans with any secondary education. 32
However, Paulus Arek at a press conference in Canberra said Australia was
not doing enough about localisation. "A lot of Australian wives are in typing
positions and a lot of storemen's jobs are being done by Australians. These
jobs could be filled by Papuans and New Guineans." 33 Arek also criticised
January-Aprill969
79
80
Robert Waddell
Barnes: "Well in major regard- I am expressing a personal view- I don't.
But I feel that [the] House of Assembly may have other views, but I think I
have always opposed too rapid progress in these things. I believe we have
made a tremendous step forward in the last constitutional changes. Why not
let it settle down for a term or two until they really know where they are
heading, really know what they want?"
January-Aprill969
81
over fifteen years. The planned capacity of the mine was 125,000 tons of
copper in concentrate a year, which was about twenty-five per cent more
than the entire Australian output. 46 Later it was announced that the output
might be as much as 160,000 tons. 47
In February Barnes said that the company had agreed that the
Administration would receive 1.25 per cent of gross revenue as a royalty.
The Administration would also have an option to take up twenty per cent
of the equity of the new company. Furthermore after an initial low-tax
"holiday" the company would pay fifty per cent of its taxable income to
the Administration. This could amount to $10 million or more a year. 48 The
tribal landowners would receive five per cent of the royalties paid to the
Administration. This could amount to $600,000 a year.
It is clear that the Administration is determined to let CRAgo ahead with
the project as expeditiously as possible. Trouble, however, has arisen over
the choice of a site for the new mining town which will be required to support
CRA's activities.
The Administration has chosen a site which takes in the highly productive
1,000 acre Arawa plantation owned by F.R. McKillop as well as some 3,200
acres of New Guinean-owned land. McKillop intends to fight the resumption
of his land. He and the Planters' Association of New Guinea allege that other,
undeveloped, land was available and had actually been chosen by CRA but
that the Administration was afraid of taking over a site entirely owned by
New Guineans even if it was undeveloped. 49 Once the Administration had
demonstrated its impartiality by taking over land belonging to an expatriate
it could then the more easily take over New Guinean-owned land later when
required. The Administrator, however, maintained that of the various sites
considered the Arawa one was chosen because it would involve the least
disruption to the least number of people. He emphasised that fair and just
compensation would be paid. 50
Meanwhile the encouragement of indigenous business enterprises
continues. Some think the Papua New Guinea Development Bank is much
too conservative in its policy. The bank's record may be judged by the
following figures, taken from its Annual Report for 1968:
Classification of appr&vals during the year according to the race
of the applicants shows the following:
Indigenes
No.
422
Amount
$678,304
12
$1,865,451
Non-indigenes
66
$1,207,041
TOTAL
500
$3,750,796
82
Robert Waddell
8
MAY-AUGUST 1969
Robert Waddell
Bougainville
At the time of writing it looks as if the Bougainvi11e story is going to have
a satisfactory, it not entirely happy, ending. But this happy issue out of all
our afflictions reflects no great credit on the Administration which seems
to have been following rather than guiding the course of events.
The Administration has not had an easy time; it has been under fire
from both New Guinean and expatriate landowners. The New Guineans have
been fighting for either a better price or no sale at all; while the planters
have been contesting the right of the Administration to resume the
flourishing Arawa plantation which was owned by an Australian,
F.R. McKillop.
On 3 May Tony Newman, acting Assistant Administrator (Economic
Affairs), used the Administration's Radio Bougainville to reprimand Paul
Lapun (MHA Bougainville South) for whipping up anti-Administration
feeling "to suit his personal interest". Newman said that Joseph Lue, the
Regional member for Bougainville, and Assistant Ministerial Member for
Technical Education, had reported that almost 100 per cent of the Siwai
people (who live on the other side of the island from Arawa) and the local
government council approved the actions of the Administration. 1
A few days later it was announced that the Administration was arranging
for ten carefully selected Bougainville leaders to visit projects mthe Eastern
and Western Highlands, the object presumably being to open their eyes to
the benefits of economic development.
Meanwhile there was a fresh outburst of survey-peg removing- this time
at Guava not far from the actual site of the copper mine. Lapun, who had
previously been the target of the Administration's attack, was now asked to
use his influence to soothe the villagers and make the true state of affairs
clear to them. 2 This was not a task which he found congenial.
Later a high-powered delegation consisting of five ministerial and
assistant ministerial members was sent to Bougainville to discuss the copper
project with villagers. On this occasion Lue declared that it would be much
better if village leaders, rather than officers of the district administration,
accompanied the survey teams: they could "do much better jobs than kiaps". 3
On 23 June Tony Newman, as the Treasurer, gave the
84
Robert Waddell
Administration's reasons for choosing the Arawa site and announced that
the Administration had reached "a stage where the lands which the
Administration has proposed for the town site, that is Arawa Plantation and
the 660 acres adjacent to Arawa Plantation, is available to the Administration
on a sale basis, and not on a compulsory acquisition basis" .4
Tony Voutas (Morobe ), 5 a member of the Pangu pati, said he found it very
difficult to believe that the Arawa landowners had already agreed to hand
over their land. This doubt was implicit in the speeches of other members
who all talked as if the land problem was still to be solved. Subsequent
events proved that the doubters were right.
Roy Ashton (East and West New Britain- Ministerial Member for Public
Works) put the orthodox view with great force and clarity. He looked forward
to the day when the House of Assembly would be full of "strong m~n",
Papuans and New Guineans, who had "a national conscience", and would
not "worry about a minority". He warned members that if the international
finance houses "see you arguing and squabbling about a bit of ground for a
company, they might well fail to lend the company the money - $200
million". 6
On 2 July McKillop was reported to have agreed to sell Arawa plantation.
On 26 July Newman told New Guineans in Bougainville that the
Administration would not allow a few people to obstruct the development
of the whole of Papua New Guinea. He also told Rorovana villagers that
the Administration would grant Conzinc Rio Tin to a lease of 600 acres of
their land on 1 August for a construction camp and storage shed. Extra police
would be sent to prevent obstruction when the survey markers were put in. 7
On the day itself about twenty-five Rorovanan women succeeded in
removing the first marker. Having won this symbolic victory in the presence
of several dozen police and a helicopter they retired, apparently in good
.
humour.
On the same day the Administrator, D.O. Hay, was reported as rejecting
Lapun's suggestion that negotiations over the land should be reopened.
Joseph Lue warned that "this attitude of sell your land or else" was not
palatable to the Bougainvilleans. He added that he had made this clear at
the monthly meeting of the ministerial and assistant ministerial members
with the Administrator. 8
The turning point in the Bougainville Copper saga was 5 August. On that
day police used tear-gas and batons to shift sixty-five Rorovanan people who
were trying to prevent bulldozers clearing their land. 9
A few days later it was announced that the Napidakoe Association had
been formed with Paul Lapun as president, Raphael Bele as treasurer and
Barry Middlemiss, an Arawa plantation overseer, as secretary. The
Association, which claimed a membership of 4,734 from seventy-two
villages in the Kieta sub-district, aimed to handle all future law negotiations
with CRA on behalf of the villagers. 10
The Administration now seemed to start back-pedalling vigorously.
Tripartite conferences were held between villagers, senior Administration
officials and the CRA area manager. Flying in to attend the opening of the
May-August 1969
85
South Pacific Games, C.E. Barnes, Minister for External Territories, was
able to discuss Bougainville with Hay. Later Hay himself flew to
Bougainville to assess the situation and he held discussions with various
leading local citizens.
By this time a writ had been filed in the Supreme Court claiming the New
Guinea mining ordinances were invalid and void. The claim was taken
seriously by the Administrator who instructed the District Commissioner
in Bougainville to tell CRA to suspend operations until the legal position
was made clear.
On 20 August the sale of Arawa plantation was completed. The owners
were reported to be receiving something like $900 an acre, a sum which
immediately threw into stark relief the $100 an acre being offered to the
New Guinean owners ofthe neighbouring land.U Although a fair part of the
$900 consisted of compensation for improvements and loss of profits from
future harvests, the general public mostly chose to see the transaction as an
instance of Europeans getting better terms than New Guineans, and it
became obvious that organisations like theN apidakoe Association were not
likely to let the matter rest.
In this case Canberra saw the point very quickly. Very shortly after details
of the Arawa plantation's sale had been made public Barnes announced that
he and Prime Minister Gorton were prepared to negotiate a settlement. "We
indicated", he said, "that if the native landholders were prepared to negotiate
a settlement, similar procedures and principles would apply to the question
of compensation or payment to the native landholders as had applied in the
negotiations for the purchase of the Arawa plantation". 12
86
Robert Waddell
May-August 1969
87
and Privileges Ordinance for anything he has said or done outside the
Territory even if that person knows that what he says or does will be
republished in Papua and New Guinea".
Although Kiki had escaped, the committee could have suggested pursuing
the local newspapers, the republishers of Kiki's statements, but it refrained
from doing so. It merely said that the House should be prepared to accept
an apology from them.
Kiki understandably remained silent. The press were not so discreet. The
Post-Courier instructed its lawyers to send a statement to the Clerk of the
House in which it denied having committed contempt. The statement went
on to say that if the House thought otherwise it should allow the matter to
be taken to court.
This riposte of the Post-Courier was mentioned by Dutton when
introducing his report on 29 August. He said the statement by the
newspaper's lawyers was "irrelevant and verging on the impertinent. It
suggests that the South Pacific Post Pty. Ltd., is a body capable of
determining what is a contempt of the House."
The report was adopted by fifty-eight votes to twelve. During the debate
W.W. Watkins, S.ecretary for Law, and the only member with legal
qualifications, advised members to exercise caution. He reiterated that the
House and the courts had no jurisdiction over Kiki's extra-territorial remarks
and he further suggested that no action be taken against the ABC and the
newspapers, whose defence could be that they were "performing the
functions of publishing news for the public". 16
The House was not to be deprived of a victim. Oala Oala-Rarua moved
that the Post-Courier's reporters be banned from the House for the rest of
the current meeting. The motion was passed fifty-five votes to eleven. It was
perhaps significant that Watkins was not present when the House divided.
A number of people, including Tony Voutas and Dr J.T. Gunther, a former
Assistant Administrator and currently Vice-Chancellor of the University,
attacked the press ban. Dr Gunther said that the House had been unable to
deal with the real culprit Albert Maori Kiki. "Like a mad dog the House,
with official support, bit whoever or whatever it could." 17
The Gazelle Peninsula Multi-racial Local Government Council
In February 1969 a proclamation was issued by the Administrator-in-Council
announcing the extension of the Gazelle local government council's area
to cover several new villages and land which was occupied by Europeans
and Chinese. The main effect of the proclamation was to make the council
a "multi-racial" one- that is to say one which contained both New Guinean
and non-New Guinean taxpayers. This meant that non-New Guineans were
eligible for election to the council but it did not mean that there had to be
non-New Guineans on the council: this was entirely a matter for the
electorate which was overwhelmingly New Guinean.
Oscar Tammur (Kokopo, New Britain) who had been elected to the
House of Assembly partly on a promise that certain groups ofTolais would
88
Robert Waddell
not be included in any new local government council area, decided to lend
his organisational powers to the district villagers.
On 15 May the old local government council held its last meeting. In the
presence of Tammur the meeting, chaired by the vice-president - though
the president was also there - decided to reverse its earlier decision to
become "multi-racial" .18 The Administrator chose to disregard this resolution
"in view of evidence of haste and pressure" and decided that the election
should proceed as planned. 19 David Hay in person told the council that the
proclamation was now the law, "and even I haven't the power to cancel it". 20
On 16 May Tammur led a march of 5,000 or more Tolais through Rabaul
in protest. Tammur had various reasons for opposing the formation of the
new council. At the time of the Rabaul march he was reported as saying
that land was a major issue among the Tolais. The Administration, he alleged,
had bought up practically all arable land in New Britain. "When we attain
independence the indigenous people will 4ave no more sources of income
by which to obtain money to run their own country." Tammur's other main
objection was that the people had had the new arrangements thrust on them
without prior consultation.
The elections took place during the period 20 May to 12 June. Tammur
had said beforehand that his followers would boycott the elections. The
results showed that his instructions had probably been carried out. Of 33,688
voters on the roll only 6,720 people voted. The new council contained an
overwhelming majority of Tolais, there being only one Chinese and three
Europeans in a total council membership of thirty-eight.
After the elections Tom Ellis (Director of District Administration)
defended the official record. 21 He said that as early as 28 May 1967 it had
been resolved that members of the council should explain to their
constituents the proposal for the council to be reconstituted to include all
residents and for the council to consult by letter all non-indigenous residents.
So much for the allegation that the people had not been consulted.
Furthermore, said Ellis, in June 1968 Tammur had consulted the
Administrator and had agreed that the drawing of Raluana and other noncouncil villages into the council area would be a good thing and would
promote Tolai unity. With the election of the new council the uproar died
down for the moment but it was interesting to note that one of the first
resolutions passed by the council - on the motion of councillor George
Edwards, one of the three Europeans- was to drop the word "multi-racial"
from its title on the grounds that it "confused" a lot of villagers. The motion
was passed unanimously. 22
Administrative Reorganisation
A major administrative reorganisation was announced on 7 July. 23 The
Department of District Administration was to cease to exist as a separate
entity and was to become part of the department was to be Tom Ellis. The
new secretary of the enlarged Department of the Administrator was to be
Tom Ellis. The previous secretary of the Administrator's Department, David
May-August 1969
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90
Robert Waddell
May-August 1969
91
does".' 3
9
SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER 1969
Robert Waddell
Gazelle Peninsula
The Gazelle Peninsula of New Britain seems destined to occupy the centre
of the political stage in the territory for some time to come. After the
elections to the new "multi-racial" council had been held there was a
temporary lull in political activity but trouble broke out again at the
beginning of September. On 1 September a thousand Tolais attended a
protest meeting in Rabaul while a small band of their compatriots led by
Damien ToKereku, Daniel Rumet and Melchior Tomot - all prominent
members of the recently formed "Mataungan Association" - took the keys
of the local government council offices from the attendants, told the council
workers to go home and then locked up the premises. They were later
charged with obstructing the work of the council.
On 3 September four members of the House of Assembly from New
Britain, Oscar Tammur, Matthias Toliman, Epineri Titimur and Roy Ashton,
flew to Rabaul to hold a conference with the Mataungan Association's
leaders. Outside the building 4,000 or more Tolais gath~red in support of
the association. The Assistant Administrator, L.W. Johnson, said the
Mataungan Association was ready to use violence to achieve its ends; he
suggested that the House set up a committee to investigate the problems of
the Gazelle Peninsula. 1 In an editorial published on 8 September the PostCourier welcomed the suggestion but warned that care must be taken over
the membership of the committee: "Obviously the Mataungan Association
would not accept an enquiry by Europeans. They should not be asked to do
so. For the same reason the Tolais, whose interests are at stake, should not
expect representation. The Commission must be completely independent."
In the event the three-man commission of enquiry consisted of an
Australian and two Tolais. The chairman, P.D. Connolly, was president of
the Law Council of Australia and the Queensland Bar Association but had
no specialist knowledge of Tolai customs. Of the two Tolais appointed one
was a bishop of the United Church in Rabaul, Simon Gaius, and the other
was a teacher, Aisea Taviai. The bishop had been a member of the New
Britain district advisory council which in May 1967 discussed the question
of a multi-racial council and passed a motion requesting the Administration
to take certain steps with the aim of having the Gazelle and Bainings
September-December 1969
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Robert Waddell
Members of the group are very much concerned to know that the Administration
has bought up practically all arable land in New Britain as well as all timber
forests. Their concern is aggravated by the additional fear that the Administration
besides taking up all our land, will so allow private companies to exploit all our
economic resources that when we attain Independence the indigenous people will
have no more sources of income where to obtain money to run their country. We
can clearly see that we indigenous [sic] will not run our own country but the white
men will, since they will always have superior economy. Money is power. Even
if we indigenes manage to govern our country we will govern it when it will have
been fully exploited and deprived of its economic resources.'
September-December 1969
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Robert Waddell
of whom had already paid their "tax" to the Mataungan Association which
they regarded as the "true" council.
On 1 December the Association refused to meet representatives of the
Gazelle local government council on "neutral grounds" in New Ireland. On
7 December, a Sunday, violence broke out as bands of Mataungan men
sought out and attacked various supporters of the new council. Two
prominent Tolai pro-council leaders, Vin ToBaining and Napitalai Toliron
ended up in hospital.
At this point Tom Ellis, secretary of the Department of the
Administrator, was reported as having taken over "the control of
Government forces in the area" .18 Many arrests were made and among
prominent Mataungans later jailed were Tomot, Matlaun, Lotu and Rumet.
Oscar Tammur faced a charge of non-payment of tax but his case was
adjourned.
Bougainville - The Copper Project
In the second week of September it was announced that Conzinc Rio Tinto
of Australia had made a new offer to the Rorovanan owners of land required
for the copper mining project. The offer was accepted and the lease was
eventually signed on 1 December. The owners were to get $7,000 a year,
plus $30,000 lump sum for damages to the land plus $7,000 worth in shares
in Bougainville Copper Pty Ltd at the issue price. 19 Although this particular
problem had now been solved the very generosity of the settlement was
certain to generate more difficulties in the Arawa area where a much lower
price per acre was being currently offered to New Guinean landowners.
Napidakoe Navitu
Much of the credit for the obtaining of such good terms for the Rorovanans
must go to Napidakoe Navitu, an organisation formed originally to assist
villagers in their negotiations with CRA and the Administration over terms
for the leasing of land. 20 On 2 October details were released of the
association's constitution. Napidakoe's prime aim was the encouragement
of unity among the people of Bougainville and the advancement of their
economic and social welfare. On the broader front the association intended
to put up candidates for the 1972 elections to the House of Assembly and
would press for "early domestic internal self-government for the Territory".
The president, Paul Lapun, was also a member of the Pangu pati and there
was some speculation as to whether Napidakoe and Pangu might eventually
amalgamate.
Constitutional
With the Select Committee on Constitutional Development pursuing its
enquiries under the chairmanship of Paulus Arek, there was a good deal of
comment on constitutional matters. One point on which there was a
September-December 1969
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Robert Waddell
twenty-seven per cent in Manus and West New Britain. There was a similar
inequality between urban and rural areas. Toliman seemed to be suggesting
these tendencies were politically undesirable and that entry into high school
should be by a territory-wide quota rather than by strict competition.
Proposals for improving the standard of education came from the
Advisory Committee on Education whose report was tabled in the House
on 11 November. 25 Its main recommendations were that there should be a
unified education system and a single employment authority for all teachers
and that teachers in approved mission schools should be paid the same
salaries as their Administration counterparts. Shortage of teachers and high
turnover of staff was thought to be the main reason for poor results in schools
-in which only thirty-two out of every one hundred entrants reach standard
VI - and it was hoped that higher salaries and better conditions might
improve matters.
Another remedy for lowering the turnover rate was to employ more Papua
New Guinean teachers and it was encouraging in this context to note that
the first twenty-seven Papua New Guinean secondary school teachers
graduated from Goroka Teachers' College on 27 November.
On the tertiary educational front a major clash occurred between the
Papuan Medical College and the University of Papua New Guinea on the
one hand and the Administrator and the Department of External Territories
on the other. According to Dr J.T. Gunther,26 the university's Vice-Chancellor,
the Administration had up to a very late stage been pressing the university
to give a degree course in medicine; why then should the minister suddenly
decide not to make the medical college a Faculty of Medicine at the
university? The medical college students, who at present get a diploma, not
a degree, at the end of their course, were highly incensed and sent a
deputation to Canberra in an attempt to have the decision rescinded. By the
end of the year there were signs that Canberra might after all relent.
10
JANUARY-APRIL 1970
Robert Waddell
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Robert Waddell
was anathema not only to the Administration but also to the expatriate
business community and - it must be said - to many fellow Tolais of the
Gazelle Peninsula of New Britain; it was also the case that twenty-four
members oftheAssociation were serving jail sentences of up to six months
on charges of having struck members ofthe Gazelle Peninsula (multi-racial)
Council.
In his speech to an audience of more than 11,000 Whitlam promised his
listeners that if there was a change of government in Australia at the next
general election Labor would "let New Guineans govern themselves",
"appoint a New Guinean as Administrator of New Guinea" and "appoint
some New Guineans as District Commissioners". Whitlam labelled the land
arrangements in the Gazelle Peninsula as "old-fashioned" and "unfair" and
promised that in future New Guineans would be able to make their own laws
about matters of this kind. He warned Mataungans against violence. "We
do ask you particularly to be orderly and well behaved, not to make
disturbance or let people hit each other or bash each other." "You can only
make good laws in Parliament in the House of Assembly. You can't make
good laws by violence."
In a statement made in Port Moresby on 11 January, Whitlam said "I
deliberately avoided any expression of opinion whatsoever on the issues of
the multi racial council, taxes or jailings". The Post-Courier, however,
reported him as saying to the Mataungan members "I support you. I wish
you well in your fight ... ". He was also reported as telling a deputation from
the Gazelle Peninsula (multi-racial) Council he hoped the Administration
would reconsider and abolish their council. 4 On 9 January Whitlam added
fuel to the fire by visiting three leaders of the Mataungan Association who
were serving prison sentences for assault: these were Damien ToKereku,
president; Daniel Rumet, vice-president and Melchior Tomot.
On his return to Canberra, Whitlam asserted that the recent resignations
of the Police Commissioner, Ray Whitrod, and the Assistant Administrator
for Services, L.W. Johnson, 5 were the results of disagreements within the
Administration. In making this assertion Whitlam was merely giving public
expression to a widely held private suspicion that Whitrod had clashed with
the Secretary of the Department of the Administrator, Tom Ellis, over the
handling of the Rabaul incidents. Johnson also clearly did not see eye to
eye with the Administration over the handling of the Mataungan Association.
In addition it was widely supposed that neither man took kindly to
continuous interference from Canberra. 6
January-Aprill970
101
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Robert Waddell
and deplored the fact that the conduct of a referendum was beyond the means
of the Navitu. In March, however, the secretary of Napidakoe Navitu, Barry
Middlemiss, announced that 16,000 voting slips had been distributed in
Bougainville and that the 11,000 which had been completed and returned
showed "overwhelming support for the complete break with Papua and New
Guinea". 12
New political parties that appeared or threatened to appear were the
Independent Members' party - or whatever its name may turn out to be and "Compass". The formation of the first-named had been on the agenda
for many months but nothing concrete had been achieved; however in
January in Singapore Tore Lokoloko and Sinake Giregire, both ministerial
members, announced that the party would be launched within three monthsY
Lokoloko said it would be modelled on the Australian Country party and
would represent the rural interest. It would include among its members
cultivators, planters and businessmen of all nationalities. In spite of
Lokoloko's confident words no such party did in fact emerge over the
succeeding four months.
"Compass" - standing for "combined political associations" - was the
brain-child of John Watts, MHA for the Western Highlands. 14 Its basic policy
was to work steadily towards the establishment of Westminster democracy
in the territory. In keeping with the supposed conservatism of the
Highlanders, "Compass" was in no hurry to attain self-government and
preferred to leave decisions in the hands of the Administrator aided by his
Executive Council and under the guidance of Canberra. It also proposed that
no decision about independence should be made without the prior approval
of the Highlanders whose wishes should be ascertained by means of a
referendum.
The Pangu pati made history by bringing out in April the first number of
what was hoped to be a regular monthly newspaper. PaiJgu Pati Nius is an
eight-page publication. Its aims are stated to be:
To provide news on important events in government, industrial relations and
business in Niugini.
To inform the public on the aims and policies of the Pangu Pati. To give an
independent view of political events in Niugini.
To serve as a means of political education.
January-Apri/1970
103
104
Robert Waddell
Bougainville towards the report will undoubtedly add fuel to the flame of
secessionism in that island.
January-April1970
105
now controlled three of the four main unions in the district, namely the Port
Moresby Workers' Association, the Building and Construction Industry
Workers' Union, and the Waterside Workers' Union; the fourth was the Staff
Association of the University of Papua New Guinea.
The setting up of a board of inquiry into rural wages was partly the result
of Whitlam's arguments with Gorton over the wages paid on plantations.
Whitlam asserted that the workers were paid $5 a month while Barnes
countered by saying that with other benefits such as food and lodging the
real wage could be assessed at about $20 a month. Subsequently it was
conceded by William McMahon on 5 May 1970 in the House of
Representatives in Canberra that wages in other Pacific territories were
substantially higher than current wages (however calculated) in Papua New
Guinea. 22
After an initial protest over its composition- it contained no workers'
representative- the board went about its work and will eventually produce
a report and recommendations.
Immigration Policy
The University of Papua New Guinea figured prominently in a controversy
over the granting of permits to two Indian academics, Mahommad Idris and
Dr I.H. Khan. The former, who was already a member of the staff, having
already obtained a new three-year contract with the university, then applied
for a renewal of his residency permit. There followed such an undue delay
that the Staff Association took up Idris' case and was told that the matter
had been referred to the Minister for External Territories. When eventually
Idris did get his permit it was not for the full period of his contract.
At about the same time serious trouble arose over the appointment of
Dr I.J. Khan to a post as Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political
Studies at the university. When selected for the post Dr Khan applied for a
residency permit on 17 December 1969 in good time to take up his
appointment on 1 February 1970. By mid-March 1970 Khan had received
no permit or any word from the Department of External Territories, nor
had Barnes given any explanation to the university. Under great pressure
from the university's Council and Staff Association, not to mention the
territory's Administrator, and the Australian Labor Party, Barnes said that
the Australian government had an obligation to see those appointed to
the staff of the University of Papua New Guinea were not "people who
promoted views and attitudes antagonistic to the peoples ofthe Territory".
Barnes was also reported as saying that he had a duty to see that Papua
New Guinea avoided the sort of racial problems now arising in other
countries. 23
In answer to this the Staff Association pointed out the absurdity of the
notion that two Indian academics would upset the "racial balance" in Papua
New Guinea. On 17 March the House of Assembly unanimously passed a
motion asking the Australian government to give the Administrator's
Executive Council more say in deciding immigration policy. 24
106
Robert Waddell
January-April1970
107
provision for future employment. On the other hand the majority of officers
could not afford to resign and were likely to try to hold onto their jobs for
as long as they could: this, the president argued, could impede localisation
because there would "be no inducement for many overseas officers to put
themselves out of a job by training a local replacement".
Gerald Unkles, chairman of the Public Service Board, came under fire
for his handling of an important piece of "localisation". A vacancy arose
for the post of assistant secretary in the Department of Social Development
and Home Affairs. Out of the various applicants R.R. Bryant, then Chief
Electoral Officer, was selected. This move enabled Simon Kaumi, a Papua
New Guinean and at that time Deputy Chief Electoral Officer, to be
promoted one step to take Bryant's position. Eleven appeals were lodged
against Bryant's promotion and the Promotion Appeals Committee
unanimously agreed that there were three officers better qualified than
Bryant to fill the vacancy. But the Public Service Board eventually confirmed
both Bryant's and Kaumi's promotions.
In a statement the council of the Public Service Association said that it
had no objection to Kaumi's promotion- in fact it felt he should have been
promoted a year before: what it did object to was the "inadequate and
dilatory way in which the Public Service is being localised".
Unkles deplored the fact that the Association had chosen to attack him
personallyY This implied that his two Papua New Guinean colleagues took
no part in making the corporate decisions of the Board - which was quite
untrue. In any case the appeals committee did not make "recommendations";
it made reports. It was not for the committee to determine appeals, that was
the task of the Public Service Board, the statutory authority appointed to
manage the Public Service.
In the context of localisation one may note that sixty-one Public Service
cadets are undergoing tertiary education in the Territory: thirty at the
university, mostly taking Arts degrees, and thirty-one at the Institute of
Technology at Lae, studying mechanical and civil engineering, architecture,
surveying and business studies and accountancy. 28
11
MAY-AUGUST 1970
Robert Waddell
A New Administrator
The announcement on Tuesday, 5 May, that Warwick Smith, Secretary of
the Department of External Territories, was to be transferred to the
Department of the Interior and that he would be replaced by David Hay,
the current Administrator, and that Hay's place would be taken by the former
Assistant Administrator, L.W. Johnson, was received with widespread
satisfaction in the Territory. During Hay's incumbency the political climate
had changed with unbelievable rapidity and there was a general feeling that
the new situation required new men with new approaches; particularly was
this so in respect to the problems of the Gazelle Peninsula of New Britain
which seemed incapable of solution except by someone who was not
committed to the course upon which the Administration had already
embarked; Johnson was such a man. In spite of all official denials it had
been widely supposed that he and the Commissioner of Police, Ray Whitrod,
had resigned over the handling of the Rabaul situation and Johnson could
certainly not deny that he had as good as repudiated the findings of the
Connolly Commission in a debate on the matter in the House of Assembly. 1
Johnson's assumption of the post of Administrator did not usher in the
millennium but it marked a radical change in style. The formality of the Hay
era was gone; it seemed unlikely that the Territory would see any more selfdesigned uniforms. With the informality of dress went an easier and more
relaxed approach to people and problems. The previous Administration had
frequently been too rigid in its handling of delicate situations: it had allowed
itself to be committed in advance to a particular line of action and then been
unable to change course when necessary. It had also ignored the advice of
people on the spot, as in the case of the holding of elections for the new
multi-racial council which became the centre of all the controversy in the
Gazelle: it is said that the majority of the field staff was against proceeding
with the elections but this advice was overridden by staff officers in Port
Moresby.
As a former Director of Education in the Territory, the new Administrator
was also expected to advance the cause of education and in particular to
adopt a less hostile and suspicious attitude to tertiary institutions such
as the university and the Administrative College than seemed to inform
May-August 1970
109
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Robert Waddell
May-August 1970
111
Kaputin: Yes, we will contest it by marching on to that road and you can
kill off as many as you want to. We will come here to resist and let the
Australian people know what you are doing to us.
West: The Australian people already know what we are doing in respect to
this land here. We are making available land to the Tolai people to help them
solve their land problems.
Kaputin: You are not giving the land to the Tolai people. What you want is
what you have theorised in your political ideology and you are shooting off,
killing off thousands in Vietnam because you won't support that and you are
doing the same thing right here. 7
In the end, after reports that Canberra had given the Administration
permission to use troops of the Pacific Islands Regiment if necessary and
after a group of prominent churchmen and politicians had implored the
government not to use force, 8 the problems were solved for the time being
when the police quietly evicted several hundred squatters. No force was
required. The employment of large numbers of police aroused the usual
adverse criticism but further ammunition was quite unnecessarily provided
for the critics when C.E. Barnes, Minister for External Territories, said that
it was the Administrator's Executive Council which had asked for police
reinforcements. This assertion was roundly repudiated by three members
of the Administrator's Executive Council and subsequently by Prime
Minister Gorton himself.9
As soon as Johnson arrived in the Territory to take over from Hay he
announced that, as foreshadowed in Gorton's policy statement of 6 July,
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Robert Waddell
powers were going to be devolved to the districts. "We do not see why there
should be uniform development" he said in an evident reference to the
Gazelle Peninsula where some of the Tolai leaders, including Kaputin, had
been demanding a measure of self-government. 10 He warned, however, that
there could be no question of giving increased responsibility to the Tolais
in their present divided state. It was up to them to sort out their differences
and decide exactly what sort of council they wanted. This, it should be noted,
was the first time that any Administration official had suggested that the
status of the present multi-racial council might be negotiable; the previous
Administrator had always adopted a "What I have written, I have written"
stance.
Johnson visited Rabaul on 5 August and had talks with members of the
multi-racial council, Tolai "big men" and even some members of the
Mataungan Association. The Association's chairman, Damien ToKereku,
had said that there was no point in meeting Johnson, "just another
Administration official implementing the Australian Prime Minister's
policies"; 11 however, the vice-president, Daniel Rumet, did meet Johnson
and apparently was prepared to discuss the situation "with all parties" on
certain conditions. It was not, however, certain ifRumet was really speaking
for the entire Mataungan executive. Meanwhile another major land problem
was solved when village leaders, brought together by Johnson, came to an
agreement as to how plantation land bought by the Administration should
be divided and used. 12
By the end of August the multi-racial Gazelle local government council
was in dire financial straits. It had over $40,000 owing to it in taxes for the
1969-1970 financial year and as much again for the current year and was
quite unable to meet many of its commitments. In particular the allowance
for primary education in East New Britain was likely to be cut from $40,000
to $1 ,000- a reduction which would entail the closing down of some primary
schools. 13 The council had started to prosecute tax defaulters and in midAugust Oscar Tammur, MHA for Kokopo, and ToKereku, respectively
patron and chairman of Mataungan, had received summonses. Although a
decisive confrontation looked imminent it was thought the Association was
likely to put off the evil day yet again by challenging the validity of the
Gazelle council in the courts, a move which was certain to embarrass certain
senior members of the Administration who had wondered all along if the
council had been properly constituted. As for the council itself, any doubts
it may have had earlier about its own legal standing appeared now to have
vanished; under its new and vigorous president, Hosea ToWartovo, it was
clearly in no mood to truckle to the Mataungan Association.
May-August 1970
113
seminar which lasted from 9-15 May was labelled "The Politics of
Melanesia" 14 and could well have been a dull and highly academic affair.
In fact it was no such thing. The speakers had been brilliantly chosen by
Professor Rowley, Head of the Department of Political Studies, to include
representatives of the Mataungan Association, the Napidakoe Navitu and
millenarian movements as well as student leaders, members of the Pangu
pati and Trade Union organisers. To these practical politicians was added a
lively collection of professional economists, political scientists,
anthropologists and public servants. With unbelievable obtuseness the
Administration discouraged public servants from attending the seminar and
in one or two cases actively forbade them to do so. The one or two Papua
New Guinean public servants who were allowed to deliver papers had
obviously had their scripts censored to the point of inanity by Canberra and
their patent unease contrasted strongly with the apparent freedom of
expression accorded to delegates from neighbouring colonies. The seminar
ended with a paper delivered by George Warwick Smith, the departing
Secretary of the Department of External Territories. The lifeless content and
delivery of the paper itself and the low-keyed and soporific filibuster which
followed in the ens!ling question-and-answer session dramatically illustrated
the great gap between the lively potential of this country and the prosaic
but no doubt well-intentioned approach of Canberra and Konedobu.
The fourth Waigani Seminar did a number of important things: it revealed
the extent of Papua New Guinean disenchantment with the Administration
and the strength of anti-white feeling; it brought out into the open the aims
and motivations of the various radical political movements; it made many
of the audience (which sometimes numbered over 400) realise that
nationalism was nothing new or alarming but a phenomenon with which all
colonial powers have had to come to terms; above all it gave Papua New
Guineans confidence in their ability to cope with the problems of selfgovernment and independence. The Territory in some ways is a small place
where the influence of a small number of educated people is
disproportionately great; before the Waigani Seminar took place one doubts
whether many of this elite group had thought that self-government was
anything more than a rousing Whitlamite slogan. Now for the first time
responsible, sober- and often Melanesian -people were telling them that
self-government was not only feasible but should be acquired without
unnecessary delay. As far as the politically-minded Papua New Guineans
were concerned the last psychological barrier was down and it was no longer
possible for anyone to argue that Papua New Guineans were not ready to
make their own decisions.
Constitutional Development
What with the controversy raised by Whitlam's visit, and the speculation
aroused by Gorton's impending tour in July, constitutional development was
a much discussed theme in the Territory's political circles. To this discussion
was brought the expertise of the speakers at the Waigani Seminar and the
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Robert Waddell
May-August 1970
115
government will continue to be fully responsible for "the judiciary, law and
order, internal security, ex .ernal affairs, international trade relations, defence
and some matters which Commonwealth Departments administer directly
in the Territory such as Civil Aviation". Significantly, the Australian
government "will also continue to carry special responsibility for projects
necessary to give effect to the Development Programme" or Five Year Plan. 19
Paulus Arek, chairman of the Select Committee on Constitutional
Development, welcomed the proposals and said that they had been the
subject of discussions between the committee and the Commonwealth
government for some time. "In fact the Committee regards the proposed
changes to have been part of its work ... ". Arek went on to say that the
committee would now be free to "examine the more fundamental
constitutional questions on which the future form of a government may be
based". In spite of Arek's belief that his committee was not superfluous it
looked increasingly as if Papua New Guinea was going to be treated like
Henry Ford's early customers and be offered any kind of constitution
provided it was parliamentary, unicameral and unitary.
116
Robert Waddell
which was later handed to the Administrator; and it was discussed in a closed
meeting between Curtis and the staff and students of the University's Law
Faculty.
On 26 August the Administrator announced that his Executive Council
would consider amendments to the bill. "There has been widespread
discussion of the Bill and the administration is anxious that its provisions
should be fully understood and discussed by the community at large. That
is why we have taken the unusual step of releasing the Bill to the public
before it has been introduced in the House." 22 But it was not only enquiring
members of the public who obtained copies of the bill; copies were also
distributed by the Director of Education to high schools together with a
commentary specially written for the occasion by Professor Weston. 23
On 27 August a meeting was held in Hohola, a suburb of Port Moresby,
to protest against the bill. 24 The sponsors included several university
students who announced that they were members of a recently formed black
power movement. A great deal of militant talk came from speakers like John
Kasaipwalova and Leo Hannett but the chairman, Albert Maori Kiki, would
not commit either himself or his trade union followers specifically to antiwhite action. Although the general opinion on the university campus was
that black power was more appropriate to the Aboriginal situation than to
the situation of Papua New Guineans on the verge of self-government and
independence, there could be no mistaking the strength of the anti-white
sentiments expressed at Hohola and earlier at the fourth Waigani Seminar.
In such an atmosphere measures such as the proposed Public Order Bill
seemed to be almost purposely designed to create the very situations which
they were presumably intended to prevent. Fortunately by the end of August
it was clear that if the bill did reach the House of Assembly it would do so
in a heavily-amended form.
12
SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER 1970
Robert Waddell
118
Robert Waddell
Political Parties
If in one way Leahy's appointment as spokesman was something of a damp
squib, it certainly had important, possibly unintended, effects in other
directions.
For some time now the Administration had been trying to encourage the
growth of a conservative, middle-of-the-road political party or
intra-parliamentary faction with enough members and enough discipline to
form a majority in the House of Assembly. In January 1970 Messrs Lokoloko
and Giregire announced confidently, in Singapore, that the so-called
Independent Members' group in which they and W.A. Lussick were
prominent, would shortly form itself into a fully-fledged political party.
Hitherto the only intra-parliamentary group with any consistent record of
voting as a bloc had been the Pangu pati but there seemed no prospects of
its being able to command enough support in the House to form a majority.
When therefore it appeared that the loosely-knit, amorphous Independent
Members' group might become a cohesive party with a parliamentary
majority at its command the Administration did what it could to promote
this happy event. It is said that the Administration tried hard to persuade a
prominent Independent - it may have been Tei Abal - to assume the
responsibilities of leadership and to demonstrate that the new party had
enough cohesion to become the first indigenous government in a selfgoverning Papua New Guinea but no leader was forthcoming and the scheme
collapsed. Furthermore, by the end of 1970 the Independent Members' group
was moribund and its members had either become truly independent or
joined new factions.
Personalities and personal ambitions played a large part in the dissolution
of the Independent Members' group. In the centre of the complex web Leahy,
the newly appointed spokesman, was trying to create a.bridge to connect
himself and his supporters in the Executive Council to the rank-and-file
members of the House outside.
The obvious bridge, or so it seemed in August, was the Independent
Members' group, which contained not only Executive Council members like
Tei Abal, Sinake Giregire and Tore Lokoloko but also influential
"back-benchers" like Wally Luss1ck, Julius Chan and a number of
conservative Papua New Guineans. It had been expected that there might
have been some collusion between Independent members in the council and
those outside but if there was it came to an untimely end on 24 September
when Leahy, supported by the other members of the council, voted against
Lussick's bill to set up a select committee on air transport. Lussick had
apparently been counting on Leahy's support for the bill and felt badly let
down.
It was in the weeks following this incident that at least four parties, all
led by former "independents", were founded. The first and most significant
one was the Compass party which included Tom Leahy, Sinake Giregire,
Andagari Wabiria and Kaibelt Diria, all of whom were ministerial or
assistant ministerial members. The name "Compass" was borrowed from
September-December 1970
119
an association which had been formed earlier in the year by John Watts,
MHA for the Western Highlands. The exact relationship between the two
Compasses was not entirely clear but both organisations had much the same
programmes, namely the expansion of economic and educational
opportunities allied to a slow and orderly political progress towards selfgovernment and independence.
The meeting at which the new Compass was formed was held at Minj in
the Highlands at the end of October and was said to have been attended by
three hundred leading Highlanders. It was afterwards said by newspaper
reporters and other witnesses that trucks belonging to the district
administration and a plane belonging to Dennis Buchanan, MHA, an airline
owner, were used to transport many of the participants to the meeting.
Prominent Independents who did not attend the Minj meeting included
Lussick, Neville, Lokoloko and Oala-Rarua. None of these had declared his
hand by the end of the year but it certainly seemed very unlikely that
Lussick, for one, would join Compass. After the 24 September incident
Lussick was apparently in no mood to join a party in which Leahy was a
leading figure.
The second political party which arose from the ashes of the Independent
Members' group was the People's Progress party. Led by Julius Chan (MHA
Namatani, New Ireland) and Warren Dutton (MHA North Fly), the party's
initial eleven parliamentary members contained ten former Independents.
Tei Abal said that he hoped the People's Progress party would cooperate
with Compass but there was no sign, by the end of 1970, of any formal
association between the two parties.
The third party to emerge was the Papua New Guinea National party
whose founder, Thomas Kavali (MHA for Jimi in the Western Highlands)
had once been a member of the Independent Members' group. Kavali and
Siwi Kurondo, an assistant ministerial member, were the only MHAs in the
party, but it was said to have quite an influential following outside the House
and there were several university students on its executive committee. An
interesting feature of the party was that its founding marked a genuine
attempt to bring Highlanders and coastal men together. It was evident that
leading student politicians were becoming conscious of the need to diminish
internecine rivalries and to work for a measure of political unity in the
Territory.
The net result of all this political activity was that by the end of 1970
Compass had a majority of the elected members of the Administrator's
Executive Council. The question still remained whether the party could
muster a majority in the House and if so whether it was willing and able to
establish effective liaison between the "cabinet" and "backbenchers". If it
could succeed in doing this the Territory would be able to take a good step
forward in its political development.
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September-December 1970
121
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stated that no councils would be able to carry out a full range of functions
without trained staff. 3
On the credit side, six Papuans and New Guineans were appointed to
permanent posts as district officers in the Department of the Administrator.
These were the first such appointments. Two days later it was announced
that Pauli us Matane, a member of the Public Service Board, would be the
first Papuan or New Guinean to become a head of department on a permanent
basis. The department in this case was a new one, the Department of
Business Development.
A month later the Public Service Board came under heavy fire from the
Public Service Association (PSA) for twice rejecting the recommendation
of the Promotions Appeal Committee that a former PSA president, John
Greville Smith, be appointed Crown Solicitor. The Association removed its
representative from the appeal committee thus blockmg the consideration
of further appeals and demanded that Unkles, the Public Service Board's
chairman be replaced. The Board retaliated by saying that it was not obliged
to follow the recommendations of the appeal committee and that the latter
could function- albeit much more slowly- without the participation of the
Public Service Association. The situation, however, became much more
serious when it was announced that the Council of Commonwealth Public
Service Organizations had decided to declare a black ban on the Territory's
public service. In the same week the Public Service Board aroused more
controversy by decreeing that in future new contract officers and those who
had renewed their contracts after 18 November 1970 would not have the
right to appeal against promotions of other officers and that this right would
be confined to permanent and local officers only.
To the Board's assertion that this move would assist the progress of
localisation the Public Service Association retorted that the Territory could
ill afford to lose the services of repatriated officers who. might be panicked
into leaving Papua New Guinea prematurely.
Discontent reached its climax on 1 December when Unkles delivered a
paper at a seminar on management at the Public Service Training Centre
(formerly the Administrative College) in Port Moresby. In the paper Unkles
described the Territory's public service as "second class" and castigated
some of its members for unpunctuality, disloyalty and illegal and unethical
actions. The speech caused a great deal of resentment but the clamour was
stilled on 4 December when C.E. Barnes, Minister for External Territories,
announced that Unkles would not be renewing his contract and that his
position would be filled by Sere Pitoi, a Papuan member of the Board who
had previously served as acting Director of the Department of Posts and
Telegraphs. Sere Pitoi's appointment did not, however, alter the attitude of
the Public Service Association to the question of appeal rights and one of
the new chairman's first tasks would be to formulate a clear policy for
localisation, a policy which would make it plain whether promotion was
going in future to be based on merit regardless of nationality or on the
principle that preference should be given wherever possible to Papuans and
New Guineans.
September-December 1970
123
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Robert Waddell
More progress was made in the endeavour to involve Papuans and New
Guineas in the commercial and industrial life of their country. On 24
September a Bill was introduced the aim of which was to set up an investment
corporation. The object of the corporation was "to provide for an equity
holding by eligible persons in major enterprises in the Territory financed or
largely financed by capital from outside the Territory or financed or largely
financed, or controlled or largely controlled, by persons other than eligible
persons ... ". In this context "eligible person" means "a native", the
Administration, the Development Bank, a local government council, a
society registered under the Cooperative Societies Ordinance, "or any other
group or body ... declared by the Administrator in council ... to be an eligible
person ... ". If passed the bill would have at least two important effects. It
would in the first place enable Papuans and New Guineans to have
representation on the board of foreign companies by virtue of the size of
the Investment Corporation's holding in those companies; secondly it would
enable Papuans and New Guineans of modest means to invest in foreign
companies through unit trusts, investment companies and other institutions
set up by the corporation.
There was no question, said Tony Newman, the Assistant Administrator
(Economic Affairs), of "compulsion on any company to sell shares to the
corporation" . 9 Even more desirable than the promotion of financial
participation by Papua New Guineans in foreign enterprises was the
promotion of business enterprise by Papua New Guineans themselves. In
this connection Ebia Olewale of Pangu (MHA for South Fly) had two
constructive suggestions. He advocated that the Administration should give
foreign businesses a timetable for the localisation of their enterprises and
that "a national development corporation should be established where the
principal function would be the promotion of Papuan and New Guinean
businesses". No move was made to implement Olewale's first suggestion but
presumably the Administration thought to satisfy him on the second point
by establishing a new Department of Business Development. According to
Johnson and Unkles the department would comprise the existing divisions
of cooperatives, extension and business training and management of the
Department of Trade and Industry. It was later announced the head of the
new department would be Paulius Matane, then a member of the Public
September-December 1970
125
Service Board.
On 9 November the Administrator, L.W. Johnson, warned foreign
business men that they must "serve the needs of the country" and not be
"purely exploitive". If they did this there would be "no reason at all why
the normal political evolution of this country towards self-government and
independence should affect business enterprises in any way - unless to
stimulate them ... ". 10 On the very same day Lussick, in the House of
Assembly, attacked Pita Lus (the Pangu MHA for Maprik) for suggesting
that the Administration should protect rural areas from foreigners, ask local
government councils to cut down the number of business licenses to
expatriates in rural areas, and give priority to Papua New Guineans in
commercial and light industrial activities in the towns. Lussick condemned
the suggestions as being "clearly discriminatory and racist"; he was
supported by Tei Abal and Tom Leahy, leaders of the Compass party, who
both said they wished to see inter-racial harmony and cooperation in the
task of economic development.
Diametrically opposed to the views of the Compass party was John
Kaputin, one of the Mataungan Association's leaders, who regarded all "such
terms as partnership, multi-racialism, coalition and so on" with suspicion.
Quoting Kenneth Kaunda, Kaputin went on "all such terms ... mean one
thing and one thing only. And that is white supremacy." Such an a attitude
expressed very neatly the Mataungan rationale without any help from the
Administration or the Europeans or the Chinese. Kaputin put his theories
into practice by helping to establish the New Guinea Development
Corporation, a purely local enterprise, for which by the end of the year he
claimed to have raised almost $30,000. 11 The intention was that the
organisation should be registered as a public company early in 1971. Kaputin
was of the opinion that the stimulation of foreign enterprise and investment
could only serve one main purpose - namely to provide the country with
an alternative source of revenue to the Australian grant and thus enable the
Australian government to cut Papua New Guinea loose from the mother
country; it could "never attend to the basic social, political and economic
development of the people" .12 Both Kaputin and Lus made valid points and
it was sad to see how many intelligent people of all races failed to realise
that there was an urgent need for "discriminatory" practices in both the
political and economic fields.
13
JANUARYAPRIL 1971
Robert Waddell
January-Apri/1971
127
128
Robert Waddell
January-Apri/1971
129
Constitutional Development
In March the Select Committee on Constitutional Development presented
its findings to the House of Assembly. The progressives, moderates and
conservatives in the committee had obviously found it very difficult to reach
a consensus and_ the report which eventually emerged from their
deliberations was a curious patchwork of a document, full of internal
inconsistencies. Having stated quite bluntly that "the majority of the people
of Papua New Guinea feel that internal self-government should come about
no sooner than during the life of the 1976-1980 House of Assembly", the
committee went on to recommend that "the development of the Territory
be geared to preparing the country for internal self-government during the
life of the next [1972-1976] House ... ".
On the subject of secession, however, the committee was quite resolute.
It firmly repudiated any suggestion that Bougainville or the Gazelle should
be allowed to secede or even to hold a referendum on the question.
As expected the committee plumped for a unicameral parliament on
existing lines. Against expectation regional electorates, in which candidates
had to possess certain minimum educational qualifications, were not only
retained but increased in number from 15 to 18. Again, in response to
widespread popular demand, the number of open electorates was increased
by 13 to 82. The committee also suggested that there should be provision for
having not more than three nominated members in the House but that these
should be chosen by a select committee of the House. If a public servant
was nominated he would have to resign his post in the public service before
taking his seat in the House. The committee decided to allow four official
members to sit in the House. The revised House would thus have 100 elected
members, up to three nominated members and four official members.
The committee further recommended that the Executive Council should
consist of the Administrator, three official members and ten ministers; that
the Territory be called Niugini and its inhabitants Niuginians; and that the
national flag be based on a design submitted by a young school-girl named
Susan Kanike.
All in all, apart from the hint that self-government might come in the
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Robert Waddell
period 1972-76, there was nothing startling in the report, and certainly
nothing that suggested that the Papua New Guineans would get very much
more practice in self-government before they were overtaken by events.
Many of the better-educated Papua New Guineans had pressed for the
exclusion of expatriate public servants from the House so that political and
administrative roles could be clearly separated and so that indigenous
members could be allowed to make political decisions.
The Australian government's thoughts on the matter were clearly
expressed on 27 April by C.E. Barnes, Minister for External Territories,
when he said that the Australian government would prepare a programme
for movement to full Territory internal self-government in the period 197276. He added significantly that "a cohesive group of Ministers with the
support of the House of Assemhly after the 1972 elections could be
recognized as a government". 7 There was little doubt in the minds of most
observers that the Compass party (now the United party) was the group
which the government had in mind.
Political Parties
The first four months of 1971 saw the birth of one new party and the
renaming of another but otherwise nothing of great import. If some of the
parties were hoping for financial support from their opposite numbers in
Australia, they hoped in vain. Gough Whitlam, for instance, made it quite
plain that the ALP was not going to back any political party in the Territory.
He did not, however, omit to say where his own sympathies lay. "If I were
living in New Guinea", he said, "I would vote Pangu. It is not a stooge for
Australian companies. Pangu is a national party and finds all its money itself.
The only other party we know about is Compass and that gets its money
from Australian companies and planters." This jibe at the Administrationbacked Compass party did not cut much ice in the Highlands. Many New
Guineans there have interests in common with the expatriate planters and
do not greatly care where the financial support for their party comes from.
Compass in fact had more than financial support from expatriates; one of
the Australian Country party's organisers was sent over to give it advice on
how best to conduct its affairs both inside and outside the House. The June
sitting of the House would no doubt reveal how successful the organiser
had been.
In early February in Wewak a new party, the National Labour party, was
launched. Its organiser was William Hawarri, leader of the Sepik Youth
Movement. Hawarri explained that the party had no connection with the ALP
although it hoped for financial aid from Australian trade unions. The party's
platform was comprehensive and radical and included such things as the
setting of a national minimum wage, free education to high school level,
free hospital services and the return of certain alienated lands to their
original owners.
The National Labour party was only a small party and of all the parties
which had appeared on the scene by the end of April 1971 only the United
January-April1971
131
party (formerly Compass), Pangu and the People's Progress party looked
like playing any significant part in the next few sessions of the House of
Assembly. If, as was anticipated, the members of the leading parties were
going to be allowed to sit in blocs in the House, the United party, boasting
forty to fifty members, would clearly have a good chance of demonstrating
its discipline and unity and its fitness to provide the first ministry when selfgovernment came. If on the other hand the party failed to stay together it
could prove the salvation of the smaller but more compact Pangu pati, to
whose relatively better-disciplined ranks defectors from other looser-knit
parties with Establishment affiliations might well be attracted.
Town Councils
Urban local government has been introduced to the major towns of Port
Moresby, Lae and Madang (but not yet Rabaul) some twenty years after its
initial proposal. A variety of pressures together with hesitant Administration
policy has successfully stalled its introduction. In 1969, however, Citizen's
Consultative Committees were established and soon after recommended to
the Administration the area, composition and possible structure of these
councils. The committees for Lae and Madang recommended that only
alienated land be included in the council boundaries and thereby avoided
the problem of rating communally owned land. The Port Moresby committee
recommended the inclusion of all land, regardless of ownership, within a
wide radius of the town. In so doing the Port Moresby committee tackled
the wider social and economic problems of rapid urbanisation. It saw the
necessity of an administrative framework to meet the needs of both sectors
of the town; that is, the developed, serviced and predominantly expatriate
sector living on Administration or privately owned land, and the unserviced,
predominantly indigenous sector whose villages and settlements are situated
largely on communally owned land.
Multi-member wards were devised and the system of voting employed
was the familiar "modified preferential" system used in both national
elections. Candidates receiving lowest first preferences were excluded and
preferences distributed until the required number of councillors remained.
Such a method militates against party "ticket" voting.
On 3 April elections were held in the three towns. Large numbers of
candidates nominated (137 for 21 seats in Port Moresby), but the turnout
of voters varied. In Lae and Madang more than sixty per cent of those
eligible voted, while in Port Moresby just over twenty per cent voted. Part
of the explanation for this must be found in the intensity of the campaigns.
A rather curious statement by the Administrator early in February added
interest to the performance of political parties. Johnson said that it was his
belief that local government elections were not the proper place for political
parties "to struggle for supremacy". 8 His statement appeared some time after
parties had commenced organising. He was immediately attacked by Pangu
politician, A.C. Voutas MHA, for breaking the "revered principle of
political neutrality" 9 of the Public Service and later criticised by the
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January-Aprill971
133
14
MAY-AUGUST 1971
David Hegarty
National Unity?
The stresses and tensions which mark the transition to self-government and
independence were revealed in recent events. The question of unity or
disunity was raised early in the period under review. On 20 May the
Administrator, L.W. Johnson, issued a statement, authorised by the Minister
for External Territories, C.E. Barnes, "to re-affirm that it is the policy of
the Australian Government to advance Papua New Guinea to internal
self-government and independence as a united country". 1 The only alternative
to national unity, the Administrator forecast, was an inevitable breakdown
into "a collection of tiny, hostile fragments". He explained that in practice
there had been no difference in the legal status between Papuans and New
Guineans since the administrative union of the territories in 1947 and he
warned politicians not to seek political capital in pressing for separate
treatment. The timing of this statement was probably designed to dampen the
heated argument which marked the last days of the March session of the
House of Assembly, but it was probably also an attempt to deflate a growing
Papuan "movement". It did not prevent MHAs raising the question. On the
first day of the June session of the House on a discussion of a "matter of
public importance- political welfare of the Papuan people", Papuan
members, while expressing a desire for unity, criticised the Australian
government for a lack of consultation with the Papuan people on both their
legal status as individuals and their future union with New Guinea. Oala
Oala-Rarua (Central Regional), Assistant Ministerial Member for the
Treasury, was particularly critical of the United Nations' Visiting Mission,
which, he said, had urged unity without any real consultation with Papuans.
Papuans had not been specifically asked whether or not they wanted to unite
with New Guinea. Ebia Olewale expressed concern that the drift toward
unification had gone with Papuans largely unaware of it and without choice.
Bert Counsel, (MHA Western and Gulf Regional), told the House that a poll
which he had conducted showed that many Papuans were opposed to uniting
with New Guinea. They feared that they would lose their identity, receive
less development finance, and have decisions continually made for them by
others. In reply A.P.J. Newman, Deputy Administrator, an official member
and leader of government business in the House, suggested that there were
May-August 1971
135
136
David Hegarty
May-August 1971
137
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David Hegarty
Administration either does not share this optimism or that it is not really
prepared to decentralise authority. In noting the relative weakness of
political parties and the possibility that those in existence may solidify on
a regional basis, the report suggested that the Administration "encourage"
the development of at least two nationally organised parties. The
Administration's response has been to arrange for a booklet outlining the
purpose of parties and providing space for individual party statements. The
more rapid localisation of the judiciary was strongly recommended. In mid1971 the judiciary had no indigenous Supreme Court judges, no full-time
indigenous District Court magistrates, and only twenty-four indigenous local
court magistrates. An overall plan for the localisation of the public service
which ensured the selection of skilled expatriates and adequately
compensated those displaced was considered a necessity. A plan scheduled
for presentation to the June session ot the House was apparently rejected
by the Australian Cabinet and yet another committee was established to
report on localisation. 15 The report recommended that political education
should become the responsibility of all teachers, field officers and business
leaders. The report also recommended that the transfer of power to
ministerial members be continued so that a cabinet system could develop.
The armed forces should also be represented in the Administrator's
Executive Council to provide "a focus oflocalloyalty". The report did not
suggest what should be done if a cabinet lacked consistent majority support
in the legislature.
Developments have occurred, however, within the ministerial system
during the period under review, In May, during a visit by the Administrator's
Executive Council to the Morobe District, the Administrator announced that
the Territory no longer had a colonial administration but a Papua New
Guinea Government. The titles of Administration and Ministerial Members
were to become Government, and Ministers respectively. 16 Considerably
more legislation has been channelled through the Administrator's Executive
Council and committees of ministers have been set up to process it. 17
Responsibility for development planning is soon to come within the ambit
of the Administrator's Executive Council. Although the authority of
individual ministerial members has increased during the past months, these
moves have neither clarified their role as policy initiators nor have they
clarified the question of responsibility both collectively and to the
legislature.
The Trusteeship Council debate on New Guinea in June followed the
usual pattern. The Australian special representative was asked to provide
details of powers still retained by the Australian government and over which
it could exercise its veto. The representative listed twenty-nine main powers
which included the familiar controls over international relations, defence
and security, and the maintenance of law and order, down to such others as
the granting of pardons and the eradication of malaria. The Russian delegate
criticised the Australian government for its lack of a complete assurance to
the people of the Territory that a timetable for independence would be
followed. He pointed particularly to Barnes' statement regarding a "flexible
May-August 1971
139
position" after the 1972 elections and to the retention of the Administrator's
veto. He may have hit a responsive chord when he also criticised the political
education programme carried out by field officers of the colonial power and
the fact that local government has little real power. The delegate from the
United Kingdom generally praised the work of the Administration and
suggested that it might aid the development of parties by providing transport,
cheap printing facilities, cheap postage rates for party literature and the
allocation of radio time. Adnan Raouf, a member of the Visiting Mission,
thought it necessary to emphasise the need for localisation. It was sad, he
said during the debate, that there was not a single indigenous district
commissioner.
Consistent with its policy that the Council cannot make recommendations
to an administering authority, Australia abstained from voting on the
adoption of the reports. The Council later decided to send a mission to
observe the 1972 elections.
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David Hegarty
May-August 1971
141
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David Hegarty
15
SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER 1971
David Hegarty
House of Assembly
At the election in 1968 for the second House of Assembly only twenty-three
of the forty-six MHAs who presented for re-election were successful. It is,
therefore, understandable that debates and proceedings in the final two
sessions of the House, in September and November 1971, rarely attained a
high level of exci~ement. Although elections for the third House were only
some months away, few individual members attempted to use the House for
private campaigning. There was, however, an interesting exchange between
supporters of the two major parties which indicated to some extent the level
of intra-parliamentary party politics.
On 8 November, Tim Ward (Esa'ala), read from a document purportedly
signed and distributed by the president of the Nawae Local Government
Council in the Morobe District. 1 The document told of how a Pangu pati
ship had arrived in Lae and its passengers - supporters of Tony Voutas had distributed money and cigarettes. When the Pangu pati gained
independence, the story ran, it would give people cars, houses, food, sealed
roads, and would only require forty cents tax! United party members then
attacked Pangu for fostering cultist activities. Their laughter was stilled,
however, three days later when Voutas revealed that the Nawae Council
president was a strong United party supporter. Later in the session, Pangu
leader, Michael Somare, produced a letter addressed to Highlands school
and college students and said to be written by Anton Parao, general secretary
of the United party and a man with some teachers' college training. The letter
warned students to beware the "smart coastal fellows" who are moving for
the top positions and who classify Highlanders only at the "grass cutting
level". Somare accused Parao's letter of deliberately promoting regionalism
while Thomas Kavali (MHA Jimi, New Guinea National party) attacked the
hypocrisy behind the title "United" party. On each of these occasions rather
sober speeches were delivered by Paul Lapun (South Bougainville) and Oala
Oala-Rarua (Central) who counselled an end to bitter party conflict. The
introduction of the budget for 1971-72 in the September sitting produced
little reaction from MHAs and public alike. 2 Total budgeting expenditure for
1971-72 is expected to be $208,062,000- an increase of nine per cent over
that of 1970-71. (This figure excludes an estimated $36 million for overseas
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David Hegarty
officers' allowances and benefits paid for by the Commonwealth and which
is no longer part of the Papua New Guinea budget.)
The general pattern of previous budgets was repeated with increases in
allocation to individual departments largely absorbed by general salaries
and the increased cost of goods and services. As for revenue estimates the
Commonwealth grant-in-aid of $30 million and development grant of $40
million remain static; total loans are expected to raise $33 million; and an
internal revenue of $80 million. is expected. An additional $4 million is
expected to be raised by increased import and excise duties on beer, spirits,
and tobacco; an increase of 2.5 per cent to a rate of twenty-five per cent in
company tax; and a small lift in charges for motor vehicle registration. More
than fifty per cent of the total cost of government is now being borne by
Papua New Guinea.
The Chamber of Commerce grumbled at the increased rate of company
tax but more general criticism came from the young member for South Fly,
Ebia Olewale. Olewale accused the Administration of taking the easy way
out by leaving the first self-governing government the unenviable task of
increasing taxes. He described it as a status quo budget which determined
no priorities in economic and social development (a criticism which people
were to make of the revised Development Programme introduced on 31
August) and one which included "no effective effort ... for Papua New
Guineans to gain real economic power in their own country".' Pangu pati
criticism was directed at the "meagre increase" in allocations to the
Departments of Education and Social Development and Home Affairs. The
debate produced the usual parochial demands for roads, hospitals and
schools but the demands seemed to be less in number and persistence than
previously. The debate also produced one minor incident in which Somare
labelled United party leader Tei Abal (Wabag, Ministerial Member for
Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries) a "puppet", "stooge" and "bloody rockape".4
The House also witnessed an emotional debate over the death of Jack
Emanuel. 5 Many expatriate members took the opportunity to condemn the
activities of the Mataungan Association, whereas most Papua New Guinean
members expressed sorrow at this death. Implicit in many speeches was the
reluctant acceptance of the inevitable decline in authority of the kiap.
Matiabe Yuwi (Tari) rebuked Ron Neville (Southern Highlands) for the
preposterous suggestion that Southern Highlands' leaders wanted to charter
a plane to Rabaul to fight the Tolais. 6 This was one of a number of occasions
when Papua New Guineans publicly opposed expatriate members of their
own party.
Among other matters raised was an interesting motion proposed by OalaRarua for the establishment of a commission on constitutional and political
developmenU If there is no clear and cohesive majority in the third House
of Assembly, such a commission could be useful in negotiating the terms
of self-government. Briefly the proposal is for a committee of people with
expertise, experience and an understanding of the aspirations of Papua New
Guineans to investigate and report on constitutional forms and on
September-December 1971
145
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David Hegarty
September-December 1971
147
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David Hegarty
already government policy. It considered that there was some merit in the
third recommendation, but a build-up ofTolai public servants in their home
region was likely to trigger similar requests from other regions which would
be harmful to national unity. Subsequently the Administration extended the
date for the Gazelle Council elections until June 1972. It appears that the
Administration has accepted the recommendations on land but has not taken
up the underlying philosophy of decentralisation in the report.
On the Gazelle Peninsula the basic conflict remained. The reaction to
Emanuel's death brought increased tax and licence payments to the council
but also brought accusations from Oscar Tammur (MHA Kokopo) that
people were being threatened by armed police. Tammur was jailed for fifty
days for again refusing to pay council tax but was released soon after an
anonymous donor paid his fine. Several attempts by Tammur and Matthias
Toliman (Ministerial Member for Education and MHA tor Gazelle) to bring
the three competing groups together to negotiate their differences apparently
failed. When Tammur moved in the September sittings of the House to
debate possible solutions to the dispute he was howled down. In the
November sittings he found his motion "buried" on the notice paper.
The Administration policy was to blame the Mataungan Association for
the disturbances on the Gazelle and to try to isolate the Association if not
to destroy it. In the House on 28 September, Tom Ellis, Secretary of the
Department of the Administrator, said: "Sir, I believe that the responsibility
for disruption and fear in the Gazelle lies with the Honourable Member
[Tammur] and his supporters" .18 In a series of radio broadcasts in Rabaul,
the new East New Britain District Commissioner, Arthur Carey, employed
a crude mixture of "fear" and "shame" in exhorting Tolais to obey the law.
In his broadcasts he emphasised that if law was not respected, prosperity
for the Tolai would be lost and there would be a "return to darkness"Y
"Begin working to make the Tolai name again a good name in Papua New
Guinea", Carey said. 20 Of the dissentients of the Gazelle he said, "They are
urging you to fight against your government. Disown these people. Cast
them out." 21 In electing men for the next House of Assembly " ... I think it
very important that whoever you choose will be people who will honestly
work for unity among the Tolai rather than someone who works for
division". 22 In his treatment of the problem as one of law and order rather
than of politics, Carey appears to ignore the existence of a genuine
nationalist movement and to be unaware that the acceptance of law and other
institutions is scarcely enhanced by exhortation and threats. 21
In October and November several Land Titles Commissioners began
hearing claims to disputed land and the Administration showed a willingness
to negotiate with "squatters" on Japlik plantation. In early December a Tolai
was appointed as adviser of the Gazelle council. The resolution of the
problems, however, appears no further advanced. As John Kaputin - the
Mataungan spokesman- recently put it: "Intimidation and oppression will
succeed in the short-term in slowing down the forces of nationalism - but
the will of the people will outlive colonial oppression" .24 As for a solution:
"we must challenge the present set-up for a structural change in our power
September-December 1971
149
relationships ... simply changing a white council adviser for a black one is
no solution for anything". 25
Social Control
An increasing crime rate - particularly of crime related to drunkenness has caused concern throughout Papua New Guinea. In mid-1971 the
Administration established a Commission of Inquiry into Alcoholic Drink
which is to report on possible action. A submission to the Commission
showed that of all cases heard by local and district courts in Port Moresby,
forty-five per cent involved charges of drunkenness. There has been doubt
cast on the adequacy of the police force to control the situation. A
particularly damaging criticism is a claim that villages and migrant
("squatter") settlements in the towns are rarely policed. The Administrator,
L.W. Johnson, denied that there has been a breakdown of law, but has
admitted that the police are below strength and has invited the South
Australian Commissioner for Police, Brigadier McKinna, to examine the
problems of the Territory police force. 26
Several prominept members of the United party, however, had no illusions
about the capabilities of the police. Following a series of riots, tribal fights,
and thefts from trucks along the Highlands Highway, the United party group
consisting of Messrs Giregire, Buchanan, Fielding and Hagon made
representations in Canberra to the Minister for External Territories, C.E.
Barnes, and the Minister for the Army, Andrew Peacock, for Australian army
assistance. They requested the secondment of forty troops to train and
reinforce the police. It was reported that the Ministers had agreed "in
principle" to the request, and the group expected the first of the army team
to arrive in January 1972.27
The United party request was criticised by the Pangu pati and by the
Police Association which claimed that it invited a "Congo situation" and
besides, if army personnel were needed, the Pacific Islands Regiment had
more local experience. 28 It would appear that more than just an increase in
the coercive power of the police is needed. New roles for the police must
be found to fit in with the changing role of district administration. In the
towns, coordinated planning for urbanisation and effective administrative
structures are needed to replace the traditional methods of social control
which are rapidly breaking down.
Election Preparations
The redistribution of electoral boundaries for the 1972 elections introduced
thirteen new Open electorates and three additional Regional electorates. The
Open electorates are based on a population of roughly 30,000 whereas the
Regionals, which require an educational qualification for candidates, are
based on the eighteen administrative districts regardless of population.29 This
follows the report of the Select Committee on Constitutional Development
which also recommended that four official members and up to three
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16
JANUARY-APRIL 1972
David Hegarty
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David Hegarty
January-Apri/1972
153
and property by a strengthened police force, and slow progress towards selfgovernment. The UP claimed that most Highlands candidates and many
throughout the country were sympathetic and would join the party if elected.
In mid-January UP member Bill Fielding confidently predicted in a radio
broadcast that his party would win sixty seats, form a government and have
Tei Abal as Chief Minister.
The People's Progress party nominated twenty-nine candidates, but, apart
from occasional assistance from a sitting member, they campaigned as
individuals. The New Guinea National party had two candidates- Thomas
Kavali (MHA Jimi) and Paul Pora, an economics graduate - who
campaigned openly as party members in the Highlands, but there were a
number of sympathisers who also stood. The Mataungan Association ran a
well organised campaign for the four Gazelle electorates and the Napidakoe
Navitu on Bougainville supported three winning candidates.
The impact of political parties on this election was substantial. Although
there were very few direct contests between the parties, their activities
throughout the country spread the concept of organisation as a criterion for
electoral success, they injected issues into the campaigns and they provided
a political orientation for candidates and members. During the campaign it
was reported that the UP had launched an appeal for $100,000 both to
finance their campaign and to establish a central organisation. About
$70,000 of that amount had been raised by April when the results became
known. Costs may well have been in excess of that figure if such things as
the loan of aeroplanes for party leaders to tour other electorates is taken
into account. The Pangu pati's expenses were estimated at just over $4,000
with candidates contributing additional amounts to their own campaign
funds. In December 1971, Bougainville Copper Pty Ltd, had offered Pangu,
UP and the PPP a campaign donation of $3,000 each. After the election in
the "Letters" page of the Post-Courier there was a short exchange as to the
source of funds between John Middleton, Michael Somare and Josephine
Abaijah - the first woman to be elected to the legislature.
Polling was held from 19 February to 11 March during the wet season
and was observed by a United Nations' mission. There were a few incidents
worth reporting. On the Gazelle Peninsula District Commissioner Carey was
apprehensive that voters would be intimidated and he urged Tolais to vote
without assistance from others. Somare protested that a patrol officer in the
East Sepik had "interfered" in the campaign and he successfully sought the
man's removal from the area. In late January the Chief Electoral Officer,
Simon Kaumi, flew to the Sepik to investigate reports that voters were
moving into the Yangoru-Saussia electorate hoping to vote for the cargo cult
leader Matthias Yaliwan. 1 Yaliwan was later elected. In the Morobe Regional
electorate a candidate who had failed in Pangu's pre-selection and then
accepted UP nomination tried to withdraw from the election. 2 In
Kairuku-Hiri in the Central District a ballot box containing sixty votes was
lost in a creek. The seat was later won by sixty votes and subsequently a
protest was made to the Court of Disputed Returns. And with exquisite
timing a political education booklet outlining the policies of the three main
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David Hegarty
political parties arrived in the electorates only days before polling began.
Voters elected younger and better educated members than were elected
in 1968. 3 The average age of MHAs has fallen from forty-one in 1968 to
thirty-five in 1972. The percentage of indigenous Open MHAs with no
formal education has fallen from forty-two per cent to thirty per cent. The
percentage of those with some primary education has risen from twentyfive per cent to thirty-six per cent, and there has been a small increase in
those Open members with a post-primary education of some type. When
the fourteen Papua New Guinean Regional members and the nine Europeans
are added the members of the House constitute an elite group.
In terms of occupation close to forty per cent of MHAs are classified as
businessmen (planters, traders, farmers, store-owners, etc.), about thirty per
cent as government officials (interpreters, clerks, senior officials), and about
seventeen per cent as school teachers. There were also eight managers and
supervisors, two party secretaries, one priest and one pastor, one politician
and one domestic servant elected to the House. Most of these MHAs had
varying degrees of political experience and, apart from those with previous
experience in the legislature, the seventeen or so who had had organisational
experience in trade unions, workers' associations, or political parties are
worth noting.
When the election results were known in March no party had a
majority, but the United party with about forty members was expected to
form the government. The Acting Administrator, A.P.J. Newman, rather
clumsily represented the idea which had been floated in 1971 by the
Administrator, L.W. Johnson, and the Administrator's Executive Council
spokesman, Tom Leahy, that all parties should join in a "grand coalition"
government. Pangu's national president, Gavera Rea, who had won the
Moresby Coastal seat quickly rejected a coalition with the UP. 4 The five
weeks which followed provided a fascinating scenario for students of the
strategy of lobbying. First the UP then Pangu claimed majorities in the
House. At one stage the numbers claimed by parties totalled fifteen more
than there were members. Defeated UP members and particularly the
Europeans Leahy, Lussick, Buchanan and Fielding lobbied uncommitted
MHAs and approached PPP leader Julius Chan for support. Somare also
visited Chan but most lobbying of other members was done by Pangu
supporters within the areas concerned. In the days before the first session
of the House on 20 April, Somare seized the initiative and announced that
Pangu together with like minded groups and individuals could form a
majority and if the PPP joined them they would have a certain majority.
Pangu's tactic had been to hold meetings entirely conducted by Papua New
Guineans with its only European member, Barry Holloway (Eastern
Highlands Regional) sitting quietly in the background. The UP took a block
booking at the Salvation Army hostel at Koki in an attempt to maintain
solidarity. The PPP was under pressure from both parties and its own
members were divided. Late on the night ofWednesday, 19 April, however,
Chan announced that all ten members of his party would join the National
Coalition.
January-April1972
155
156
David Hegarty
moved that formal recognition and status be accorded the Leader of the
Opposition.
Ministries were allocated in the following manner:
Pangu
Michael Somare (Deputy Chairman of AEC)
Paul Lapun (Mines)
Ebia Olewale (Education)
Albert Maori Kiki (Lands)
Gavera Rea (Labour)
Reuben Taureka (Health)
Boyamo Sali (Local Government)
Coalition Members
John Guise (Interior)
Paulus Arek (Information & Extension Services)
New Guinea National party
Thomas Kavali (Works)
Iambakey Okuk (Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries)
Sasakila Moses (Forests)
Kaibelt Diria (Posts & Telegraphs)
People's Progress party
Julius Chan (Internal Finance)
Donatus Mola (Business Development)
John Poe (Trade & Industry)
Bruce Jephcott (Transport)
January-Apri/1972
157
that a young and vigorous minister was required for such a sensitive position.
Peacock, warned by his colleagues about the potential embarrassment of a
difficult portfolio, immediately set about creating a favourable impression
in Papua New Guinea. In the first five weeks of office he visited the country
four times and held talks with administrators, politicians, business
representatives, and university students and staff. His approach to
decolonisation appeared to be more realistic and to embrace a wider
perspective than that of his predecessor. In terms of policy Peacock has
shown a willingness to take the initiative in advancing Papua New Guinea
to self-government. He was hopeful, as was the Administrator, that the
government would not be composed totally of conservatives. He insisted
that the new government and its ministers accept the responsibility for their
decisions. In a speech to a Liberal party conference in Brisbane he said "We
believe the best way for people in government to learn the skills of
government is actually to practise them" .6 (Albert Maori Kiki, Pangu's
secretary, had been preaching the same theme for years.) The Australian
government should not wait for self-government to happen, the Minister
said; rather it should actively encourage a desire for self-government; it
should prepare a programme of legislative and administrative actions; and
it should intensify public service training programmes. The new minister
also seemed prepared to recognise that the form of government adopted
would eventually be moulded by those Papua New Guineans with "a
fundamental understanding ofthe fabric of life in Papua New Guinea". 7 In
mid-February a position was created in the Administrator's Department (at
First Assistant Secretary level) to advise the Papua New Guinea government
on a programme of legislative and administrative actions relating to the
attainment of self-government and to the evolution of a constitution. The
officer- a former university Lecturer in Law- was given the enormous task
of liaising with the Commonwealth government, of implementing the
han dover programme, of continually assessing the situation and of advising
on further desirable action. He was to be responsible through the
Administrator to the Deputy Chairman of the Administrator's Executive
Council, but where conflicts of interest arose between the governments of
Australia and Papua New Guinea he was to side with the latter. In effect he
has become the National Coalition's adviser on the transfer of power. To
hasten the public service training programme the Australian School of
Pacific Administration in Sydney accepted ninety Papua New Guineans for
a special course in administration.
In other areas Peacock showed a welcome appreciation of some of the
anxieties and problems confronting the country. In speaking to both Papua
New Guinean and Australian audiences he has stressed that large-scale
Australian aid would be continued; advised that foreign relations other than
those with Australia should soon be developed; and warned that, in the light
of African experience, independence should be anticipated very soon after
self-government. Criticism of the minister, however, will likely revolve
around the apparent lack of a coherent economic development strategy for
the country. The only focus in this area so far has been on the need for
158
David Hegarty
January-Apri/1972
159
17
MAY-AUGUST 1972
David Hegarty
In its first four months in office the National Coalition government led by
Chief Minister Michael Somare, set out to establish control over the machinery
of government and to bring some degree of popular acceptance. It was not
an easy task for the inheritors of the colonial political system. Bureaucratic
structures and personnel oriented towards the achievement of colonial
policies, subordination of politicians to administrators, a low level of integration,
and an externally dominated economy are legacies which make the task of
a nationalist government difficult indeed. The task is made even more
difficult when the metropole-colony relationships have been so close as to
inhibit policy decisions being made within the colonial administration; when
the incoming government is a coalition of parties with neither common cause
nor ideology; and when the government faces significant opposition from
one region of the country on such an emotional issue as self-government.
By the end of August, however, the Coalition was still intact and had
slightly increased its majority in the House of Assembly; most ministers
had established working relationships with their departments and appeared
more confident about their decision-making role; an Office of the Chief
Minister had been created; the complex process of transferring power from
Australia proceeded by a round of constitutional talks; and an all-party
Constitutional Planning Committee had been established to recommend a
constitution. Inevitably, as ideas for policy on economic development,
foreign investment and the structure of the public service were tloated,
tensions began to appear and pressure from interest groups mounted.
Opposition
May-August 1972
161
there was more value in being "with" the government than against it. At
Kundiawa in the Chimbu District, a demonstration of 300 against the
Highlands members of the Coalition was led by United party leader Sinake
Giregire. Posters carried by the crowd proclaimed that self-government
should not be attained before 1978. The following day Somare announced
that "death threats" had been made against Highlands members. 2 A second
demonstration of 10,000 planned by the United party for Kundiawa on 20
May did not materialise. Instead Iambakey Okuk - Chimbu Regional and
Minister for Agriculture - who had returned to Kundiawa to answer his
critics held his own meeting of 2,000 people. Okuk, guarded by police and
a riot squad, warned expatriates and defeated United party candidates that
they would face charges if they continued to stir up opposition to the
Coalition.
In the June session of the House Highlands MHAs returned to the fray.
A matter of public importance- the "reaction of many highlands people to
the prospect of early self-government under the National Coalition
government and the consequent threat to the well-being of people from other
parts of Papua New Guinea working in the Highlands" 3 - was raised by Tei
Abal. Accusations of hypocrisy were made from both sides of the House
with United party speakers emphasising that the opinion of the people as
surveyed by the Select Committee on Constitutional Development should
be respected, and National party speakers urging members both to educate
and to lead their electors. The implications of the second part of the matter
were left unstated.
At the United Nations in early June, Anton Parao- Western Highlands
Regional, and United party secretary who had been invited to join the annual
delegation to the UN - again attacked the Coalition. He claimed that the
Coalition was improperly formed (because members had been persuaded
to join!), that it was non-representative of the country and that it was being
pushed too quickly towards self-government. There was, of course, a
considerable amount of post-election "sour grapes" in all this, but important
also is the "fear" of self-government whether it be a manifestation of
dependence or a regionalist political delaying tactic. If one wanted to know
what self-government actually meant to the people these debates, despite
their bitterness, were not particularly enlightening.
The Ministers
The Chief Minister's initial approach to his role as leader of an embryonic
nation was understandably one of caution. When interviewed on ABC
television in Australia on 8 May on the major problems and future policies
of his government his replies were either vague or guarded. Somare
reiterated his personal belief in immediate self-government but because of
coalition politics and his desire to win some consensus on the issue he
indicated that towards the end of 1973 would be a suitable target. On the
question of separatist movements Somare was quite optimistic: "I've found
that once you involve people in a system, when they feel that they're part of
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David Hegarty
the system, it's very difficult for them to separate themselves" .4 He thought
that some degree of regional autonomy was also desirable. The
parliamentary system may need some modification, particularly because of
a lack of party solidarity, but in other respects it was working satisfactorily.
Government policy would be to encourage foreign investment but Papua
New Guineans must share in the ownership of industry and be employed
by these new industries. The familiar question of future relations with Japan
was asked and the usual answer given: that is, Japanese investment and trade
would be encouraged but that all investment would be carefully looked at.
Somare has enjoyed using Japan as a political lever in the past but now that
power is at stake there may be little political capital left in the tactic.
On his tour of the Highlands in the first week of July Somare continued
to play a soft-line on self-government. He emphasised that Papua New
Guinea must be prepared for self-government should the ALP win the 1972
Australian election. A second theme which he pushed at every meeting was
more positive: "You should not fear self-government. It will not bring a
wholesale exodus of the white man and his possessions nor will it plunge
us into chaos; it will bring the day when Papuans and New Guineans elected
by their people will make the decisions that are in the interests of their
people."5 Somare met opposition from councillors and leaders in the Western
Highlands at Laiagam and at Baiyer River but in Mount Hagen, the Wahgi
and Jimi valleys he received support. At meetings arranged with public
servants and school students he suggested that a one-party system of
government might be more appropriate than that of government and
opposition. European planters and businessmen were told that they must
involve more Papua New Guineans in their enterprises if they wanted to
avoid the chaos so many of them had predicted. Journalists travelling with
the Chief Minister reported that he "won respect with his proud demeanour,
willingness to listen and refusal to be overawed by the most bitter
denunciations of his policies", 6 and that his tour was a personal success.
There is no doubting Somare's skill as a leader but it is a mistaken view of
New Guinea politics to expect grand triumphant tours throughout the
country. It was certainly a new experience for the people to see a black
politician receive so much attention from the kiaps. Support and success,
however, do not depend on mass appeal, but on mutual trust and close ties
with local leaders and opinion makers and utilisation of their networks.
On 19 June it was announced that an Office of the Chief Minister had
been established. It includes the Secretariat of the Administrator's Executive
Council, a ministerial services branch, and a political development branch
which is responsible for planning and implementing constitutional
development policy and political education. 7 Eventually the office will
acquire most of the functions of the present Administrator's Department
including the division of District Administration. In speaking to the District
Commissioners' conference in July Somare indicated that the Department of
District Administration would come under his control in 1973. He expected
that field administration would continue to be a vital part of the government
but that cooperation was essential; attitudes would have to change, and
May-August 1972
163
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David Hegarty
these ministers.
Some ministers stepped quickly into their new roles. Albert Maori Kiki
(Lands), for example, insisted that a tourist development company return
half of the island of Wuvulu to the people if the company wanted to develop
the area as a luxury resort. Dr John Guise (Interior) made it clear that
bureaucratic slowness and non-cooperation would not be tolerated. Ebia
Olewale (Education) despite encountering in his own electorate, disbelief
that a black man could be an important man in the government, suggested
a post-primary vocational training programme to alleviate the problem of
so-called school drop-outs. Julius Chan (Internal Finance) quickly
established a working relationship with the Treasurer, Harry Ritchie, who
had recently been recruited from the Fijian civil service.
Towards Policy
For six years the Waigani Seminar held at the university has opened up
debate on such development problems as land, education, population,
agriculture, politics and administration. It was particularly appropriate that
the sixth Waigani Seminar held in the first week of May at the time the
National Coalition came to power had as its theme, "priorities in Melanesian
development". Speakers raised numerous policy questions which in the past
would have been considered "academic" but which now are the subject of
serious government attention. Topics discussed included types of
constitutions; the suitability of the Westminster system; educational
priorities and the nature of the educational system; local government,
political education and community development; foreign investment and the
role of multi-national corporations; and problems of national identity. The
three international speakers were Dr Ivan Illich, Lloyd Best (a West Indian
economist), and Professor Rene Dumont, all of whom challenged the
meaning of the term development and raised doubts in the minds of most
participants about the relevance of the "private car" civilisation for Papua
New Guinea. It was Professor Dumont who set the stage for an exciting
seminar by immediately attacking the view of economic development
proposed in the opening address by the Minister for External Territories,
Andrew Peacock. Professor Dumom criticised the government's policy for
deliberately attempting to create a class society and for neglecting research
into food crops and import replacement schemes. He reminded his audience
that in no country did the rich look after the poor and that a policy of selfreliance was the only sure way of a country retaining its pride. As the fourth
Waigani Seminar in 1970 had signified 'l break-through in the development
of nationalist politics, 10 the sixth Waigani Seminar threw down a challenge
to conventional notions of development as put forward by colonial
economists.
Perhaps the largest question facing the Coalition was that of the nature
of the second Economic Development Programme. The first programme to
cover the period 1968-69 to 1972-73 was designed to maximise, in the short
run, gross national income largely by importing foreign skill and capital.
May-August 1972
165
The programme aroused a small debate with critics emphasising that it was
more a series of projections than a plan and that indigenous participation
amounted only to "tokenism" .11 In 1971 the programme was revised largely
to take into account the impact of the Bougainville Copper Project, and, an
Office of Programming and Coordination (OPC) was established. 12 It was
hoped that one of the purposes of the Office would be to involve ministerial
members more closely in the planning process. The philosophy of the
programme bears fairly heavily the stamp of the Director of OPC, Bill
McCasker, who acts as chief economic adviser to the government. It became
obvious that the new ministry and members were not in sympathy with the
aims of the first programme. An OPC White Paper entitled "Programmes
for Development - Principles, Choices and Priorities" designed to elicit
some discussion and direction from MHAs met with a fairly hostile
reaction. 13 The chairman of the House of Assembly Economic Development
Committee, Dennis Young (Milne Bay Regional), was quite explicit in his
rejection of former policy in advocating a policy of self-sufficiency, of rural
development, and of indigenous control of the economy. He hoped that the
House would "Tell Mr McCasker that this is not part of Australia, it is not
part of England, it is not part of America- it is Papua New Guinea" in which
the economy should be based on the villages. 14
In August the draft version of the UNDP report on strategies for the
second Development Programme was leaked to the press. The "Faber
Report" as it became known, after its chairman Professor M.L.O. Faber,
recommended a marked change in emphasis from that of the first
programme. Localisation or indigenisation of the economy should be
stressed rather than growth defined in terms of the rate of increase of gross
monetary sector product. A rural vitalisation programme should be
undertaken; small-scale artisan and service activities should be encouraged;
major projects requiring foreign capital should be undertaken only if
appropriate terms were negotiated. The report was labelled "socialist" by
its Administration critics but its general philosophy of self-sufficiency,
reduction of social and economic inequalities and economic control in the
hands of nationalists captured the imagination of many Cabinet and private
members. Young's committee was later to endorse these proposals.
The government expects the final version of the report in November. If
adopted it may necessitate a recasting of the economic management
machinery and will require constant dialogue and good relations between
planners, senior politicians and administrators. Academic economists,
research institutes and administration departments have been invited to
submit ideas on future economic management for the country.
Another part of the economic infrastructure which the government has
inherited is the Papua New Guinea Investment Corporation. The Corporation
with a total capital of $6 million was established to hold equities in
"existing, substantial, viable operations in the Territory and those which are
significant employers of native or local labour", and at a later stage to sell
shares (unit trusts) to Papua New Guineans. So far investments of twenty
per cent or more have been made in the predominantly Australian oriented
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David Hegarty
May-August 1972
167
which has been unable to resolve its own stance on offshore rights was hardly
in a position to take action.
Periodic clashes on the West Irian border between Indonesian troops and
West Irian "freedom fighters" 19 and a small stream of West Irianese
requesting permissive residence continue to pose problems for the
government. A minor controversy arose in mid-August when Somare
contradicted the grounds offered by the Administrator for the deportation
of eight West Irianese. Somare said that "criminals, spies or those using
Papua New Guinea as a base for operations against Indonesian authorities"
would not be granted permissive residency. 20 The Administrator had
previously said that the deportees were not connected with the Free Papua
Movement but were being deported because they could not satisfy the
conditions of permissive residency and that they would not face persecution
on their return to West Irian. In Jakarta, the Indonesian Foreign Minister,
Dr Malik, widened the perspective on the problem by suggesting that
relations would become difficult if Papua New Guinea were to progress
politically and economically far in advance of West Irian. 21
On the eastern front Papua New Guinea's membership of the South
Pacific Forum - .a conference of Pacific leaders to afford "top-level
consultation and cooperation on the politicallevel" 22 - was opposed by Fiji
on the grounds that Papua New Guinea was not yet self-governing or
independent and may not be able to speak for itself. Fiji's objection was
understandable considering the size of Papua New Guinea in relation to the
other Pacific nations, but So mare was not amused at the implication of being
a "stooge". At a seminar held at the university on 17 and 18 June, several
ministers, including the Chief Minister, presented short papers on aspects
of a future foreign policy for Papua New Guinea. The ideas presented could
only be described as "pushes" towards policy but it was obvious that a
separate identity was of prime importance. An editorialist described the
papers as rather "cheerful anti-Australianism". 23
Constitutional Talks
To facilitate the transfer of power to Papua New Guinea, a "programme of
legislative and administrative actions" had been undertaken early in 1972.
In July and August a series of talks was held which involved Peacock,
Somare, Toliman (as Leader of the Opposition), Fr Momis (later to become
deputy chairman of the Constitutional Planning Committee) and most other
ministers. Somare indicated his intention to obtain final powers over as many
areas as possible and Peacock played along with the very familiar theme of
"developing at your own pace". Matthias Toliman announced that the
Opposition was not bound by any decisions of the conference. At the end
of the talks a list of powers to be transferred was agreed upon. 24 Somare
was to become spokesman on both defence and police matters, and he had
the power to create new ministries. The powers which have yet to be
transferred- for example trade, internal security and most importantly, the
public service- indicate that the constitutional stage reached is still that of
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David Hegarty
pre-self-government.
Prior to these talks a series of study groups composed of officials from
Canberra and Konedobu had prepared the background to those powers
transferred. After the talks a plethora of committees or study groups was
set up to prepare reports for Papua New Guinea ministers for the next round
of constitutional talks to be held in October. The groups were composed of
members of the Chief Minister's Office, officers from relevant departments
and academics from the university and the New Guinea Research Unit. Their
task was to recommend appropriate policy and strategy for the Papua New
Guinea government to pursue in the October negotiations. The use of these
groups was an interesting attempt at policy formulation. There were the
obvious difficulties: colonial administrators trying to wear new hats,
academics trying to shape policy without access to recent files and
mtormatwn, and the uncertainty of the shape of the second development
programme. The growth of these groups appears to have arisen from a desire
on the part of the Chief Minister's advisers to utilise all advice possible, to
find alternative approaches other than those produced by departments, and
to circumvent the considerable influence of personalities in the upper
echelons of the public service. The use of these groups raises the problem
of the politics and quality of advice obtained, and of the possible resentment
of outsiders by public servants. This may be, however, the first small step
towards reorienting the colonial Administration towards one designed to deal
with development problems.
Other Developments
May-August 1972
169
18
SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER 1972
David Hegarty
September-December 1972
171
the CPC was conceded one more when the CPC was approved by the House.
The permanent consultants to the CPC are Professor J.W. Davidson,
Professor of Pacific History at the Australian National University, who has
acted as constitutional adviser to Western Samoa, Nauru, the Cook Islands
and Micronesia; Dr David Stone, a Research Fellow in politics at the New
Guinea Research Unit who has had constitutional experience in the Cook
Islands; and Edward Wolfers, Lecturer in Political Science at Macquarie
University, who is well known to many MHAs through his research in
Papua New Guinea over the past five years. John Ley, legal counsel to the
House of Assembly, was appointed legal officer, and Seaea Avosa, an arts
graduate from the University of Papua New Guinea was appointed executive
officer. In November a Papua New Guinea law graduate from the University
of Sydney, Bernard Narakobi, was appointed as a fourth permanent
consultant. Two overseas constitutional authorities, Professor Ali Mazrui
ofMakerere University, Uganda, and ProfessorY.P. Ghai of the International
Legal Centre at the United Nations, are expected to consult with the CPC
in 1973.
Previously constitutional development had occurred either at the initiative
of the Commonwe.alth government or on the recommendations of the House
of Assembly's Select Committees on Constitutional Development whose
reports were rarely out of step with Canberra. Although still subject to the
Australian government's final approval, the CPC has almost complete
freedom of action and for the first time decisions affecting the constitutional
future of the country are to be made in the country and by its politicians.
The broad terms of reference of the CPC, however, posed a problem for the
government in that, should the government require any constitutional or
structural change it must either consult with the CPC or await its
recommendations. Political and administrative tensions generated during
this transition period might require the government to act unilaterally on
such matters as, for example, regional autonomy. The Minister for Local
Government, Boyamo Sali, has already opened a number of Area Authorities
which may be the forerunner to some form of district government. In the
short-term, however, the CPC was useful to the government for it helped
slow down the transfer of power by insisting on critical examination of each
proposal. During the discussions preceding the planned October round of
Constitutional Talks between the Minister for External Territories, Andrew
Peacock, and the Administrator's Executive Council, several ministers
expressed alarm at the pace at which they were acquiring power and at the
confusion over exactly in which areas they had final responsibility. The CPC,
faced with the possibilities of being pre-empted by seeing power transferred
to structures which it had not yet analysed, also became involved in the
preliminary discussions. The upshot was that the Constitutional Talks were
cancelled and a system of detailed consultations replaced them.
After preliminary talks to decide on the "substantive matters" to be
included in the recommendations for a constitution, the CPC made
arrangements to use the Government Liaison Branch of the Chief Minister's
Office, "as a channel of communication between the Committee and the
172
David Hegarty
September-December 1972
173
Public Service
One of the most significant changes which occurred during the period under
review was that in government policy on the size and composition of the
PNG public service. Early in September in an Information Paper to the
House of Assembly, the Public Service Board reviewed the steps which had
been taken since August 1971 to advance the localisation of the public
service. The measures taken to hasten localisation included the
establishment oflqcalisation committees in each department to identify local
officers with potential and to set target dates; the implementation of a
promotion scheme designed to give preference to "efficient local officers";
the establishment of a "Senior Executive Programme" for training for senior
posts; and the expansion of training facilities. The Information Paper,
however, did not clarify where the final responsibility for localisation lay.
The Public Service Board estimated that, even with high targets for
localisation in all divisions of the service and with an expansion rate of only
half that of the previous five years, there would still be a need for over 7,000
overseas officers in 1976 (overseas officers would then constitute an
estimated twenty-three per cent of a total service of 30,000 compared with
thirty-one percent of a total service of 25,500 in 1971 ).
Publication of the Board's document provoked the government into
framing new guidelines. During the budget debate the Opposition criticised
public service expense and Somare answered this on 26 September by
announcing a drastic change in public service policy. 8 The service would
not grow at anything like the rate projected by the Public Service Board;
expatriate numbers in the service would be reduced from 7,000 to 3,000
over a period of three and a half years; and the number of departments and
statutory corporations would also be reduced. These reductions were
necessary, So mare said- for Papua New Guinea could not afford to maintain
a service based on Australian lines - and it was time that Papua New
Guineans had more responsibility in the running of the country.
Somare further clarified his new policy by explaining that it was not
intended as a "purge" of overseas officers 9 but reductions would be achieved
by non-renewal of contracts and non-replacement of officers whose contracts
had expired and by a natural retirement rate; by reducing the number of
temporary employees; and by a compulsory retirement scheme which would
be utilised once the Employment Security Scheme was finalised. The
174
David Hegarty
reverberations of the new policy were a dominant feature of the final months
of 1972. The Public Service Board's Information Paper implied that
localisation would continue at a leisurely pace within the framework of
existing structures and policies, and it made clear that there were no plans
or procedures for reducing the expatriate content of the public service. The
new policy required that plans be produced immediately and the response
was a mechanical application of the targets suggested by Somare;
department heads were asked to recommend programmes for reducing their
expatriate staff by sixteen per cent per annum. A Cabinet sub-committee,
co-opting the chairman of the Public Service Board, was appointed to
oversee the reduction effort, assisted by an "officials committee" composed
largely of Papua New Guinean public servants.
The new policy also made it evident that there could be no further delay in
settling arrangements for employment security for expatriate public servants.
Failure of the Australian government to provide details of compensation for
officers displaced or localised or compulsorily retired had hampered the
development of an effective localisation programme for several years. In
1971 the Public Service Association of Papua New Guinea and the
Department of External Territories agreed on compensation terms, but these
were rejected by the Australian Cabinet and counter-proposals were
withdrawn in the face of opposition from the House of Assembly, supporting
the Public Service Association. After a further rejection by the Australian
Cabinet of terms satisfactory to the Public Service Association, the then
Minister for External Territories, Andrew Peacock, appointed a South
Australian businessman, A.M. Simpson, to inquire into the issue and formulate
new proposals. The Simpson Report, largely favourable to the Public Service
Association position, had been submitted at the time Somare announced the
new public service policy, and the report was accepted in principle by the
Australian government late in October 1972. In brief the report recommends:
1. The Australian government be responsible for payment of compensation
for loss of career, superannuation and repatriation expenses;
2. Permanent officers and contract officers employed by the Minister for
External Territories (i.e, excluding temporary appointments and secondees)
be deemed Commonwealth employees;
3. At either 1 December 1973 (or at an earlier transfer of public service
control), or at 30 June 1976 (or earlier independence), permanent officers may
voluntarily terminate their careers and receive compensation of three times
superannuation contributions at the first date or 4.2 times compensation at
the second; and
4. That there will be no compulsion for permanent officers to accept alterative
employment.'"
Anxiety and uncertainty among expatriate public servants, which had
been focused on compensation terms, turned to the localisation/reduction
programme and the letters columns of the Post-Courier were filled with dire
forecasts of a drastic reduction in efficiency, as well as sharper critiques of
September-December 1972
175
176
David Hegarty
loans.
A further difficulty which officials experienced in framing the 1972-73
Budget was that they had no knowledge of the amount of assistance available
from the Australian government unti119 July. As usual there was little public
reaction to the budget. The United party's opposition in the House amounted
only to criticism of the internal revenue raising measures. John Kaputin
criticised the protection of foreign interests implicit in the budget. In
November, Julius Chan and the Treasurer, Harry Ritchie, visited financial
institutions in Australia to seek investor support for the $27 million loan
programme. Press reports indicated that the minister would have difficulty
in raising the sum required. 12
The first outward signs of tension in the coalition arose over the adoption
of investment policy relating to mining. On an ABC current affairs
programme the Minister for Mines, Paul Lapun (South Bouga.iuvilh::), haJ
proffered his personal view that the Bougainville Copper Agreement was
not sufficiently beneficial to the country and that it might need to be renegotiated. Challenged by Ron Neville (Southern Highlands Regional) in
the House of Assembly about his view, Lapun reiterated that he thought it
was "proper to discuss re-negotiation of the agreement" .13
More concern was aroused, however, when on 27 September Fr John
Momis (Bougainville Regional) tabled a long private-member's motion,
without notice, on future mining ventures. 14 The preamble of the motion
called on the government to recognise that economic control was essential
to "self-determination and real political independence" and that investment
principles relating to mining ventures should be adopted. The list of thirteen
"principles" included a majority of equity in the project to be held by the
government; maximum employment of Papua New Guineans; employee
participation and decision-making in management; maximum participation
by Papua New Guineans in ancillary economic activity; government
purchase of equity to be paid out of future earnings of the mine; tax holidays
to be balanced against the country's need for revenue; and for the
government to recruit a specialist team to engage in the negotiation and
supervision of mining ventures. The section of the motion which caused
most controversy, however, read as follows: "(i) An Agreement setting up a
mining venture should make provision for its re-negotiation in the light of
changing circumstances and the acquisition of new knowledge."
The motion was attacked in the House and in the press for implying that
no future agreements would be considered binding and that potential
investment would not be forthcoming. (It was reported that within twelve
hours of Lapun's interview the Investment Corporation had been contacted
by a London stockbroker asking for confirmation that the Minister for Mines
had advocated mining re-negotiations.) One direct result of the motion was
that Bougainville Copper shares fell sharply on Australian Stock Exchanges.
The difficulty Chan had found in attracting investment in the loan
programme was also attributed to the Bougainvilleans' move. BCP and other
mining lobbyists were active and observers thought that this was an issue
over which the PPP might break with the coalition. 15
September-December 1972
177
178
David Hegarty
In line with the new objectives the large centralised Office of Programming
and Coordination is to be abolished and a small central planning secretariat
responsible to a Cabinet committee on planning is to be established. The
new secretariat will be physically located in the Department of Finance "for
administrative purposes". The Cabinet committee on planning is to be
comprised of the four coalition leaders, two senior local officer public
servants and one leading Papua New Guinean non-official. The new
machinery represents a compromise between the Office of the Chief Minister
and the Department of Finance- both of which sought to have the planning
secretariat attached to their departments. The reason given for the smallness
of the planning secretariat was that in future much of the planning process
will be decentralised, to departments and districts. In summary, government
activity highlighted problems of administ rative innovation and of the
inadequacy of structures. Policy formulation in such important areas as
localisation and economic planning was going without, or without regard
for appropriate consultative machinery. It appeared to some that the
administrative system was being "overloaded".
Regional Politics
Apart from handling basic questions of government policy and structure
and managing conflict within the House and within the coalition itself, the
government faced difficulties and pressures from various regions.
In October and November throughout many parts of the Highlands a
combination of drought and frost necessitated a large famine relief
operation. By mid-October an estimated 61,000 villagers, mainly from the
Southern and Western Highlands districts were dependent on government
food supplies of rice and tinned fish. The cost of the relief was estimated to
amount to $2 million.
Throughout the period, however, and even in parts of the famine areas,
tribal fighting and brawling occurred on an increasing scale. From
September to December there were numerous press reports of fights over
land, marriage and other clan disputes. Although very few deaths occur at
any one time, the system of "pay-back" ensures a continuation of the
disputes. On at least two occasions tribesmen turned on district
administration staff and forced them to retreat. Part of the cause of the
fighting appears to be an attempt to reassert group solidarity and to revive
the status of the older fight leaders in a period of rapid social change. Courts
were hastily convened and hundreds of warriors imprisoned, but it is obvious
that law enforcement measures are inadequate. District administration,
police and local government infrastructures are extremely fragile in the
Highlands.
Although the government convened a committee of senior Papua New
Guineans to investigate the law and order problem, the introduction of
village courts and the reduction in size of local government councils may
be the only viable method of administration other than more authoritarian
forms of rule.
September-December 1972
179
The period under review also saw the emergence of the Highlands
Liberation Front which was formed by a group of university students with
the expressed intention of "liberating" Highlanders from the domination of
whites and coastal people. The front claimed that expatriate businessmen
had exploited Highlands resources and labour and that coastal Papua New
Guineans dominate senior public service positions. The aims of the front
include a controlling interest in all businesses in the Highlands for the
Highlanders themselves; decentralisation of the public service and army;
the appointment of Highlanders to senior administrative posts; and
"liberation" of the tourist-oriented Goroka and Mount Hagen shows. The
front appears to have little grass-roots support but it is the first Highlands
group to articulate regional demands for concessions from the government
other than demands for roads and bridges of the more conservative United
party MHAs. Many Highlands students active in political parties have
rejected the front because of its regionalism.
On the Gazelle Peninsula the political situation appeared more stable than
for some time. Although Europeans and Chinese continued to emigrate from
the area the Tolai factions appeared to have arrived at some compromise. In
September the government introduced a bill designed to give a special form
of "local self-government" to the Gazelle. The bill was considerably
amended in the November session and was then adjourned without debate
until 1973. The bill provides for the abolition of the Gazelle Peninsula Local
Government Council (which had been suspended in June), the establishment
of a trust to manage the property of the council, and for the recognition of
three "groups" on the Gazelle. These groups are the Warkurai Nigunan (the
Mataungan Association's form of local government), the Warbete Kivung,
which is a group of Tolais who have refused to participate in local
government since its inception, and the Greater Toma Council which consist
of groups loyal to the former Gazelle council and which in October held
their own informal elections. The groups still have power to tax their
registered members and will be less subject to central government
supervision over spending than previous councils.
No coordinating machinery is provided for but the idea of a likun or a
community approach has been suggested. The sentencing of Matthias
Toliman to two months' jail for his part in a scuffle at Toma at which the
Minister for Lands, Albert Maori Kiki, and several Mataungan leaders were
present, was another item of interest. 20 Toliman later successfully appealed
against his sentence. Of further interest was the announcement in November
of the considerable assets and plans for expansion of the New Guinea
Development Corporation - the business arm of the Mataungan
Association. 21
On Bougainville the secession movement continues. At a seminar
organised by the students' "Mungkas" (black skin) Association, many
speakers including Fr Momis and Leo Hannett were more cautious in their
approach to the question. It appeared that the students were more committed
to secession than their political leaders. The murder of two senior
Bougainvillean public servants in Goroka on 26 December after a car
180
David Hegarty
accident in which a young Gorokan girl was killed, sparked off demands
for Bougainvilleans to return home and for coastal public servants to refuse
postings in the Highlands. Early in the New Year, Somare, on a visit to
Bougainville, was confronted by angry villagers.
19
JANUARY-APRIL 1973
David Hegarty
Australian Policy
The end of 1972 saw the defeat of the McMahon Coalition government in
Australia. Early in 1973 the new Australian Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam,
and the Minister for External Territories, Bill Morrison, laid down the Labor
government's policy on self-government and independence for Papua New
Guinea. The policy was essentially that which the ALP - and Whitlam in
particular- had advocated since 1970 and it differed only in emphasis from
that pursued by Peacock's administration in 1972. The first difference was
the emphasis which the Labor leaders placed on the target of 1974 for
independence. Both affirmed previous statements that Australia was "no
longer willing to be the ruler of a colony". 1 The second difference was on
the question of aid. Australian aid would continue into independence at least
at the present level and Papua New Guinea would have "first call" on
Australia's future foreign aid programme. Consideration would also be given
to grants over a three-year period rather than on the present year-to-year
basis. However, late in April, Bill Morrison indicated that contributions after
independence may take the form of "tied" or "project" aid. 2 The third
difference was the emphasis which the Prime Minister, in particular, laid
on national unity. In his February speech he made it clear that Australia
would deal only with the central government of Papua New Guinea. In a
clear warning to potential secessionists he said: "It is folly for anybody to
believe that any section of Papua New Guinea would serve its interests by
going it alone. For it would truly mean going it alone." 3
The Australian emphasis on 197 4 as the target for independence
immediately generated tension within political circles and between the
Minister for External Territories and the Chief Minister, Michael Somare.
Early in January, on his first visit, Morrison announced that his talks with
Somare would concern "terminal arrangements" for independence. 4 When
interviewed after the talks Morrison told journalists that Papua New Guinea
would be independent in 1974; that the change would be a natural "flow-on"
from self-government; and that there was no difference in attitude toward
independence between himself and the Papua New Guinea government. 5
Although Somare and members of his Cabinet may privately agree on the
desirability of early independence, Morrison's announcement was an obvious
182
David Hegarty
January-April1973
183
Australian policy was thus to continue the rapid transfer of power to the
Papua New Guinea government. Since 1972 the process of transfer has
occurred within the framework of a "gearing up programme". This
programme categorised the powers to be transferred essentially into three:
(a) those which would be transferred by 1 December 1973; 19 (b) those which
might not be transferred until after self-government; 20 and (c) those problems
and powers which would not be resolved until independence. 21 Alterations
would be made to the Papua New Guinea Act so that by 1 December only
provisions relating to the Trusteeship Agreement and reserved areas such
as defence and foreign affairs would remain in Australia's hands.
The method of transfer has involved a continuous series of discussions
between officials of the government and the Department of External
Territories, followed by consultations between the Chief Minister and the
Minister for External Territories. Once agreement is reached on a group of
powers to be transferred, Cabinet and House of Assembly approval is
obtained. The Territories Minister then signs the "approved arrangements"
(Section 25, Papua New Guinea Act) granting powers to the ministers
(Section 24). Initially the approved arrangements listed the powers which
ministers could exercise but recently the arrangements have described the
ministers' general power over their departments (and statutory bodies) and
have listed in an annex the powers for which the Australian government
remains responsible. On 30 April, Morrison signed instruments which laid
out in the most complete form for some time, the powers and responsibilities
of the Papua New Guinea ministry and the Australian "administration"
respectively. 22
These written arrangements, however, are not completely tidy for there
are powers "waiting" to be transferred but for which there has been no
appropriate minister (e.g. Justice), and many powers which remain, on paper,
an Australian responsibility but which are in fact being exercised by
ministers. For example, the Chief Minister controls the Improvement
184
David Hegarty
Programme; the Minister for Finance international loans; and the Minister
for Trade and Industry tariff policy. In many such areas the government
decides its policy and then informs Australia.
This gradual approach has the advantage of allowing the government to
"phase-in" self-government. The intention has been to avoid an "abrupt step"
which might aggravate the prevailing suspicions of the consequences of selfgovernment. The government has been able to proclaim for some time that
it is "almost self-governing". A further advantage has been to allow the
ministers to control the pace of the transfer and to ensure that the proposed
arrangements are acceptable.
The method of transfer, however, has on at least two occasions created
tensions between the government and the all-party Constitutional Planning
Committee (CPC) which has the task of framing a "home-grown"
constitutionY The first occasion involved a boycott of the CPC by United
party members from 29 March to 9 April. One of the reasons given for the
walk-out was that the CPC was merely an "academic exercise" and that
decisions on constitutional change were being made outside the
Committee. 24 Somare made it clear, however, that the Committee would
continue its work with the target for self-government at 1 December 1973.
There were other factors involved in the dispute including some politicking
by staff in the Opposition Leader's office, annoyance at the government's
handling of the independence date, the appointment of an "independent
adviser", and accusations of bias against the permanent consultants. The
boycott ended with only a minor concession to the United party - an
agreement to appoint an executive officer to assist Tei Abal. 25 So far that
position has not been filled.
The second occasion arose at the end of April when Somare and Morrison
issued a joint communique describing talks in which they had reviewed the
progress toward self-government and considered the nc:<xt group of powers
to be transferred. 26 The Deputy Chief Minister, Dr John Guise, and the acting
Minister for Finance, Gavera Rea, were the only other representatives at
the discussions. The communique said that no formal agreement had been
reached but such topics as the withdrawal of official members from the
House of Assembly, the future role of the Administrator, 27 the transfer of
control over the Improvement Programme, and those matters (including
electoral policy, currency, membership of international organisations) which
"for administrative or constitutional reasons might not be transferred until
after self-government" .28
Members of the CPC immediately viewed these moves as an attempt to
pre-empt their function and they issued an extraordinary denunciation of
the "Australian government" and "Papua New Guinea Officials". 29 In a
resolution released by the Deputy Chairman, Fr John Momis, the CPC
condemned "[t]he continuing colonialist attitude of the Australian government
towards the constitutional development of Papua New Guinea- in particular
its interference with the work of this committee ... [and] the willingness of
officials in the Office of the Chief Minister to actively collaborate in
advancing this Australian policy" .30 The resolution said that officials from
January-Apri/1973
185
both Canberra and Port Moresby determined to push ahead with the talks
despite the absence of the Chief Minister. The CPC singled out the Political
Development Division of the Chief Minister's Office for persistently seeing
problems (of constitutional change) "in purely bureaucratic, legalistic and
technical terms, and not as questions to which solutions must be found which
accord with the political realities of this country". 31
The CPC and its advisers were obviously annoyed at being left out of
the talks (although Fr Momis had been invited but decided not to go);
frustrated at the pace at which the government wanted to move; and more
than a little piqued at being pre-empted. Fr Momis personally felt that the
officials were intent on destroying the CommitteeY
In reply Somare, himself annoyed by the attack, said that the CPC had
over-reacted to the communique and he denied that officials were sabotaging
the Committee but he would take steps to ensure better communication
between them. It was, in a sense, a crisis situation which could have been
avoided. On the one hand the talks may not have been necessary as the CPC
pointed out. Morrison may have been seeking another announcement of
substance in addition to his Waigani Seminar paper on aid although, as the
communique pointed out, the talks were the first ministerial review of the
"gearing up" programme that Papua New Guinea had had with the new
Australian government. 33 On the other hand members of the CPC may have
been misreading the role of the Committee in the essential process of
constitution-making. The upshot has been that communications and relations
between the CPC and the government have improved, but the government
is "calling the shots".
186
David Hegarty
reallocation.
In their continuing attempts to control their departments, ministers
experienced further frustrations. Ebia Olewale (Education) formed an
advisory committee of local public servants with direct access to him. The
PNG Teachers' Association often found the Education Minister a willing
listener on subjects in which he was in conflict with his senior officers. John
Guise also announced plans to form a similar advisory committee. Other
ministers, particularly Kiki (Lands), Arek (Information), and Okuk
(Agriculture) have obtained much of their policy advice outside their
departments or from levels below that of departmental head. Okuk found it
necessary to rebuke officers of his department in the Eastern Highlands
District for their attitude to extension work and to cooperation within the
department.
In teuns of intetnal poli~.:y, those of economic development and the
structure of government received most attention. The objectives of the
"Improvement Programme" announced in December last year were
expanded by the Chief Minister in the House of Assembly when he moved
that the House take note of "A Report on Development Strategies for Papua
New Guinea" (the Faber Report) and endorse a list of eight aims "as the
basis for economic planning in the coming years". 35 The Faber Report
proposed policies and strategies aimed at producing a model of development
which emphasises such things as social harmony, relatively fair income
distribution and national self-reliance, as well as increased production,
employment, real income and consumption. The aims of the government
are coherent with many of the recommendations in the report. They include:
a rapid increase in the proportion of the economy under the control of Papua
New Guineans; more equal distribution of economic benefits;
decentralisation of economic activity; emphasis on small-scale artisan,
service and business activity; less dependence on imported goods; increase
in locally raised revenue; participation by women in economic and social
activity; and government control of sectors of the economy where
necessary. 36 In an address to the Economic Students' Association Somare
emphasised that rural development, self-reliance and an egalitarian society
were his government's major objectives. He spent time in his address
criticising the development of elites and elitismY
Administrative Change
January-Apri/1973
187
188
David Hegarty
January-Aprill973
189
Inter-clan politics was also involved and the situation verged on violent
confrontation. The Chief Minister invited the opposing chiefs to Port
Moresby in an attempt at mediation. 45 The Chief Minister's representative
attended a 2,000 strong meeting called to work out priorities in the spending
of the monies collected by the Kabisawali Movement. Both sides in the
dispute are to contest the council elections in June. 46
One of the themes of local level political activity has been (with few
exceptions) the unpopularity of local government councils. The Nemea
Landowners Association in the Abau area of the Central District is one such
group which has refused to participate in the affairs of the introduced council
yet which operates its own "para-council". An anti-tax "movement" has
grown in many parts of the country and frustration has developed with the
size of the councils, their apparent inactivity, and their powerlessness to deal
with disputes. For the Gazelle Peninsula, however, legislation was passed,
which, it was hoped, might provide a model for local government
arrangements in other parts of the country. 47 The legislation provides for the
"recognised groups" on the Gazelle - the Warkurai Nigunan, the Greater
Toma Council and the Warbete Kivung to register and tax their members.
A trust has been established to take over the assets of the old Gazelle Local
Government Council, and the executive of the trust representatives from all
groups- will decide on economic and community projects. Initial opposition
from Toliman and his supporters from the Toma Council appears to have
subsided. Mataungan Association leaders hailed the legislation as a victory.
It also signalled the end of their opposition now that one of their "causes"
was legitimate.
As in previous months most of the news which comes from the Highlands
concerns reports of tribal or inter-clan fighting involving frequently
hundreds of warriors. The immediate causes usually concern disputes over
land boundaries, marriage, sorcery, compensation claims and even card
debts. The long-term causes, of course, are associated with the environment
of rapid social, political and economic change in which land shortages,
population pressure, competition to be involved in the cash economy and
the degrees of "marginality" associated with that venture, and political
uncertainty compound the problem.<8 The absence of effective, authoritative,
dispute-settling bodies and the deployment of the police riot-squad
enforcement agencies contribute to and actually increase tension.
As a reaction to impending self-government, groups (which in many parts
of the Highlands are concentrated in close proximity) are reviving traditional
practices49 and the status attached to fighting and land are being reasserted.
Group cohesion, universally strong in New Guinea societies through
"primordial sentiments", is consequently being strengthened.
The government has received a report on tribal fighting in the Highlands
which recommends local level courts and tribunals so as to maintain a
presence of government at the village or ward level; kin group liability in
compensation; improved police field tactics; punishment of lineage groups
involved; increased maximum sentences and other longer term
recommendations such as business advisory sessions and resettlement
190
David Hegarty
schemes. 50
Conclusion
Prevailing opinion among observers of the Papua New Guinea political
scene has for the twelve months of coalition rule oscillated between degrees
of pessimism and optimism. The pessimists point to the lack of a mobilising
and integrating ideology; to the lack of mass parties or indeed party
machinery; to the tiny elite and an inadequate education system; to a rigid,
mechanistic bureaucracy constructed for other ends; to an incredible lack
of coordination; to a lack of Cabinet leadership and decision; to the crisis
of authority in the rural areas; to the rising urban crime-rate and the
inadequacies of the police; to the dependence on the Australian grant and
the inahility to assess the worth of aid and investment. On the other hand
the optimists take heart that the coalition has survived its first twelve months,
that it has put in train far-reaching policy-changes, that it has tackled
questions of structure and policy which few, if any, new states tackled prior
to self-government, that the weakness of the Opposition will allow them
three more years of rule, that gradually relationships between local and
expatriate public servants are becoming more realistic, and that gradually
a "system" of operation is being evolved in Konedobu. 51 The most useful
concept for political scientists to employ in assessing the present and the
near future appears to be C.E. Lindblom's "muddling through". It may not
be sufficient, however, when at independence, that alien power which lends,
in Georges Balandier's terms, an "artificiality" to colonial politics, is
removed.
20
MAY-AUGUST 1973
David Hegarty
Unlike the first months of 1973 when government set the pace with transfer
of powers and the adoption of economic policy guidelines, the mid-months
were dominated by political activity. The event which provided a focus for
observers was the riot which occurred in Port Moresby on 22 and 23 July.
The search for causes highlighted existing economic and racial tensions
which had been inflamed over recent months by the activities of a Papuan
separatist movement. In so doing, questions were raised about the ability
of government- both urban and national- to resolve them. As it happened
urban administrators and government departments had neither planning nor
coordinating machinery to grapple effectively with the problems of the town,
while national leaders were absorbed in a crisis within their own coalition.
Port Moresby Riot
On Sunday, 22 July, a riot broke out in Port Moresby. The event which
triggered it off was the result of a Rugby League game in which a representative side from Papua defeated a side from New Guinea by forty-one points
to nineteen. As the crowd dispersed from the sports ground jeers and insults
hurled by New Guineans at Papuans quickly led to more violent outbursts. 1
Passengers in a bus were stoned and cars leaving the ground had windows
smashed. Taxi-truck and bus windows were smashed by flying bricks, stones
and bottles. As police reinforcements firing tear-gas moved in, the crowd
quickly moved on towards the Boroko shopping centre. A wedding being
celebrated in the backyard of an expatriate's house less than a hundred yards
from the ground was interrupted momentarily as police truncheoned a
suspected stone-thrower who had sought refuge in the driveway.
At Boroko more people- mostly Highlanders who frequent the betel nut
stalls, Chinese trade stores and hotel on Saturday and Sunday afternoonsjoined the fight. By this time most public transport had been withdrawn from
service and the crowd moved along Waigani Drive toward the suburbs of
Waigani and Tokarara four miles further out. Papuans walking home were
terrorised by New Guineans. Cars driven by Papuans or carrying Papuan
passengers were singled out for stoning and bashing. Europeans who drove
slowly were allowed to pass while others who drove quickly were stoned. As
192
David Hegarty
police sirens were heard behind the crowd a "chase" began. The police using
more tear-gas eventually dispersed the crowd at Waigani where the plateglass windows of three Chinese stores employing Papuan assistants were
smashed. On the route to the migrant settlements beyond both Waigani and
Tokarara chicken coops and gardens were raided by the mob as they fled
the police. Houses occupied by Papuans were stoned and their fly-wire
screens and glass louvres smashed. On the radio that evening the Chief
Minister, Michael Somare, said he was disappointed that such behaviour
should follow a game of football.
On Monday Papuans at Koki market retaliated. Police again used teargas to stop the fighting and two government ministers, Dr John Guise and
Dr Reuben Taureka, appealed to the people of the area to be peaceful. Many
coastal Papuans who had settled round Koki anchored their canoes some
distance off shore while others e~tablhh~::J lt:mporary settlements on the
nearby islands. Roadblocks restricted vehicular movements close to Port
Moresby and police prevented Highlanders and Papuans converging on the
town from nearby plantations and villages. Police appealed to residents to
stay indoors. Schools, whose numbers were depleted, closed early,
Konedobu public servants went home for the afternoon and Boroko shopping
centre was deserted. The garbage collectors (once the occupational preserve
of Goilalas but now increasingly dominated by Highlanders) continued their
rounds. In the afternoon several hundred university students, in an
impressive display of unity, marched to Koki market and to Konedobu. A
delegation then accompanied the Chief Minister to Hanuabada.
On Tuesday police with the help of Dr Taureka persuaded hundreds of
men in a convoy of trucks from the Rigo-Abau area to return to their
villages. The men were armed with sticks, spears, axes and bows and
arrows.
Overall the fighting had not been on a large scale. There had been no
deaths; the most serious injury reported was a broken jaw; houses, buses,
cars and trucks were quickly repaired. Nineteen people were subsequently
gaoled for their part in the riots and under a new police measure seventeen
of those were repatriated to their home areas (five Chimbu, three Eastern
Highlands, two Western Highlands, and seven from the Tapini and Bereina
areas of the Central District). The riot, however, was symptomatic of
tensions consequent upon both rapid urbanisation and the imminent change
in the political status of the country. Over the past few years the
demographic and social nature of the town has changed radically. In 1966
villagers numbered only sixteen per cent of the town's population, sixteen
per cent were expatriates and the remainder were migrants to the town
although many had been born in the Central District. The population of the
town is now estimated at 80,000- an increase of almost 40,000 since 1966.
The fastest flow of migrants has been from the Highlands and it is estimated
that 18,000 of the town's population originated there. These migrants are
mostly young, unskilled and poorly educated men, many of whom live in the
more recent squatter settlements on the fringes of the town. The ratio of men
to women in these settlements has been estimated at fifteen to one. Tension
May-August 1973
193
has existed for a considerable time between the relatively better off Papuans
(of the Central District in particular) and New Guineans (particularly
Highlanders) whose position in the town is relatively insecure. These
tensions had been exacerbated in recent months by demands from prominent
Papuans that unemployed Highlanders be sent home, but more particularly
by the political demands of Josephine Abaijah (Central Regional) and her
Papua Besena (Hands Off Papua) movement.
In many of her speeches demanding a separate political status for
Papua, Abaijah was openly contemptuous of Highlanders; she accused them
of taking over Papuan land and assaulting Papuan women. Rumours of a
fight at the football match had been brewing for weeks. At the base of the
rumours was Abaijah. In the course of the riots New Guineans shouted
derisively ofthe "meri Papua". 2 In a letter to the editor of the Post-Courier,
a university student wrote that workers in Port Moresby "hoped for some
incidents to occur ... Abaijah's ambitious call for Papuan separation was
well and truly on the nerves of many New Guineans. The ordinary New
Guinean workers, who do not feel secure in an unfriendly city, viewed the
Papua Besena Movement with contempt. It made them feel rejected and
snubbed." 3
Causes of the riot, however, run much deeper than that. Port Moresby
has witnessed over the past few years the very definite emergence of social
classes with different styles and conflicting interests. Another student, Kopii
Kepore, wrote of an interview he had conducted with a Highlander living
in a settlement.4 He asked: "Why did you want to fight?" The reply:
I left my home and came to Port Moresby about eight years ago. Moresby
was a dry, barren place with little building or development there. It is we New
Guineans who have come to work and develop Moresby to its present stage.
Papuans haven't worked hard and taken labouring jobs to develop Moresby.
We have heard many times ov-:r the radio that Papuans would get rid of us
and send us home. If that is so we must destroy what we have helped to
establish before they send us home.
194
David Hegarty
May-August 1973
195
196
David Hegarty
May-August 1973
197
198
David Hegarty
AEC
PPP
NATIONAL
Chan (Finance)
Kavali (Works)
Kiki (Lands)
Lapun (Mines)
Olewale (Education)
Taureka (Health)
Okuk (Agric.)
Moses (Forests)
Diria (Posts &
Rea (Labour)
SaJi<> (State)
Jephcott (Trans.)
Arek(b' (Info.)
IND.
Guise (Interior)
Telegraphs)
(a) Minister for State assisting the Chief Minister on local government and district
administration.
(b) Arekjoined the PPP in March having previously been independent.
Pangu leaders had been concerned from the outset with both the number
of portfolios held by the PPP in relation to its voting strength (about ten)
and with the PPP's dominance of the economic portfolios. They were acutely
aware of the polished political performance of Julius Chan (the PPP leader),
who was usually prepared and persuasive in argument. It was rumoured that
the Chief Minister could often rely on the support of only two or three of
his colleagues in Cabinet. Pangu's major concern was to strengthen the Chief
Minister's hand and to counter Chan's conservative economic philosophyY
For this reason Pangu was anxious that John Kaputin (Rabaul), spokesman
for the Mataungan Association and chairman of the Tolai-owned New
Guinea Development Corporation, be appointed to Cabinet. The Pangu
executive had also been critical ofPPP ministers John Poe and Donatus Mola
and urged their party leaders to break the economic portfolio monopoly of
the PPP.
The National party remained firm in its support for Pangu and the
Coalition and it hoped to receive another "policy" ministry in the reshuffle.
In fact, late in June an unsuccessful attempt was made to merge the two
parties. The PPP for its part had little to gain from the proposed changes
and in mid-July, announced its opposition to the reshuffle. The possibility
of Chan becoming Deputy Chief Minister in place of John Guise (who would
become Minister for Justice) was not considered sufficient reward for losing
a portfolio. Throughout June backbenchers jockeyed for positions. Some
who could see themselves missing out threatened to form breakaway
groups. 17
Matters were brought to a head in the House of Assembly on Friday,
6 July- the last day of the three-week June-July session. Somare moved
that the House approve the ministerial appointment of Pita Lus, MHA for
Maprik since 1964, and the most senior Pangu member in line for a
portfolio; Yano Belo (Kagua-Erave) a Southern Highlander and National
party member; and John Kaputin. The United party in a brilliant tactical
May-August 1973
199
200
David Hegarty
May-August 1973
201
period agreement was reached on the ownership of Air Niugini but the
problems of dealing with an insensitive Australian Minister for Transport
in May were replaced by problems of dealing with Australian pilots,
engineers and radio operators unions. The decision to establish a central
bank was announced. The Investment Corporation issued its first shares to
the Anglican church. Export prices for copra and cocoa boomed, but
revaluation of the Australian dollar left the tea industry, particularly in the
Western Highlands, in a desperate plight. (The political implications of this
have yet to emerge.) Largely as a result of Australian inflation a massive
rise in the cost of living occurred. Motor car sales and savings bank deposits
fell as the exodus of expatriates proceeded. A mini-budget was introduced
in July to raise an additional $3 million.
Constitutional Planning
202
David Hegarty
meetings, for example in Kundiawa, there was conflict of opinion over the
move to self-government; at others such as that in Hanuabada, people were
more concerned with the behaviour of MHAs and ministers and the
government's power to sack recalcitrants than with questions on bicameral
legislatures.
One question which did attract strong support from most centres was that
of district government. In fact the Committee quite frequently appeared to
be "selling" the idea. Predictably the area which made the strongest demands
for regional autonomy was Bougainville. The Bougainville Special
Development Committee which had consolidated opinion on the political
future presented a list of negotiable demands and conditions to the CPC
through its chairman Leo Hannett.
Following the CPC crisis in April the style and approach of the
Committee appeared to change considerably. Committee members
appeared more relaxed, inter-party barriers were broken down and a
sense of loyalty to the CPC as much as to parties developed. A new spirit
of cooperation with the government also emerged as evidenced by
their willingness to consider interim arrangements for Bougainville. 29 A
number of factors may have been responsible for the change. The
proximity of members touring the country together and attempting to
agree on some of the most fundamental issues facing the nation may
have been partly responsible. The leadership of Momis and Kaputin
has also been important. The performance of Kaputin in a speech delivered
in Bougainville on responsibility to the nation was particularly
impressive. 30 A further factor in the change was the visit in March of
the consultant, Professor Yash Ghai of Kenya, an expert on constitutional
law and currently Professor of Law at Harvard University. In his
writings on East Africa Professor Ghai cast perspectives on the process
of constitution-making and on the durability of independence constitutions.
He argued that a revision in the analysis of new states' constitutions is
necessary. Constitutions agreed upon by the colonial power and national
leaders did not and could not provide a neutral framework or rules in
which politics could be played out. Rather they should be viewed as
devices for the attainment of independence. He argued further that, in
explaining the frequency of post-independence constitutional change,
the constitutiOn should be regarded "as a weapon in the political struggle
itself so that the constitution becomes, or more precisely, is made a
handmaiden of the party in power, as a means to the retention of
power". 31
The emphasis which both the CPC and the government have placed on
district government will no doubt enhance the prospects of the constitution
being approved. Once accepted the government will then be free to move
quickly to independence. The intervening period may not be sufficient to
allow for the establishment of appropriate district level structures and by
independence the government may find that a stronger central authority is
required.
May-August 1973
203
Public Service
In July, four months before self-government, five Papua New Guineans were
appointed directors of public service departments, thus bringing the number
of local officers in the first division to eightY Although regulations for a
national public service have yet to be finalised, they are expected to include
provisions whereby "stagnation" (i.e. the situation in which public servants
relatively young but less educated and trained than those junior to them,
remain at the top of the public service hierarchy for a considerable time after
independence) is avoided. Hence these five appointments have been made
for an initial period of only three years.
Statistics released in June revealed a significant increase in the number
of local officers in both second and third divisions since the White Paper
on "accelerated localisation" in August 1971. There had also been an
increase in the average level of positions held by local public servants. The
expatriate reduction target often per cent was achieved in the year June 1972
to June 1973. The biggest reductions were made in the temporary and third
division levels. At 30 June there remained almost 6,000 expatriates in the
public service compared with almost 20,000 local officers.
Parties and Unions
Late in May yet another political party was announced. The Social Workers'
party of PNG arose, according to its organisers, out of workers' frustration
with the government's performance. The objectives of the party are to
"advocate and fight for a strong and viable socialist Papua New Guinea.
The party is a coalition of urban and rural workers, villagers and students
representing a true grass roots democratic party." Its programme lists fortyone "immediate demands" encompassing industrial, rural, social and
political areas, and including nationalisation of all foreign industries; a basic
wage of $30 per week; workers' control and management of industries; rural
development schemes; political freedom for the villagers; support for the
Free Papua Movement and for the "liberation" struggles of the Mataungan
Association and the Kabisawali Peoples' Government. Also considered to
be an immediate demand, was "the defeat of capitalism, imperialism and
colonialism on all phases of the global universe". Further local government
should be abolished and the Melanesian form of "tribal chiefs [sic]"
recognised. On a "national" level, Papua New Guinea, the SWP says, "must
consist of a federation of republics and be a nation in its own right" .33
21
SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER 1973
David Hegarty
Self-Government
Self-government day -Saturday, 1 December 1973 -passed quietly in Papua
New Guinea. In a short symbolic ceremony at Konedobu, the High
Commissioner (formerly Administrator) of Papua New Guinea, Les Johnson,
signed over responsibility for powers transferred to Ministers and swore in
members of the Executive Council. Only a small crowd gathered outside
for the event. Throughout the country all was quiet. The sale of liquor was
banned and hotels closed for three days from Friday, 30 November. On
Friday in a radio broadcast, the Police Commissioner warned that "the whole
of our greatly improved police resources will be used to ensure that selfgoverning Papua New Guinea gets away to a good start". On Saturday more
than 500 police were on duty in the major centres of the country. In Port
Moresby police squads in open trucks patrolled the almost deserted streets.
Koki and Waigani markets had closed and only a few stores remained open.
Early that afternoon a crowd of about 1,500 attended a rally at the suburb
of Kaugere where Papua Besena supporters called for "self-government for
an independent Papua". The leader of the Papua Besena movement,
Josephine Abaijah, spoke at a similar rally at Bereina some sixty miles along
the coast. Apart from an official reception at Government House the only
public celebration of self-government of which this chronicler is aware was
that held in the tiny Duke of York Islands to the north of New Britain. An
"end-of-year" primary school function had been organised to coincide with
self-government day and choral-singing, traditional dancing and speeches
lasted all day.
Self-government day was, in effect, a planned anti-climax. It had been
the intention of both the Australian and Papua New Guinean governments
that powers be transferred gradually and that self-government not mark an
abrupt change in status and responsibilities. 1 But that in itself was no
guarantee against possible trouble. In the preceding three months opposition
was still raised to self-government. The United party, although virtually
accepting the target date, did not give up its long campaign without a final
question concerning the method of transfer. 2 During the "National Day"
celebrations in September the Papua New Guinean flag was tom down and
burned in the Chimbu District. Further opposition was voiced during the
September-December 1973
205
206
David Hegarty
was that from the Speaker, Barry Holloway, who admitted that Bougainville
was an exceptional case. He argued that although the creation of district
governments may temporarily "take the heat off' the centre by focusing the
attention of dissident or ambitious politicians on district-level politics,
ultimately it could unleash the potential centrifugal forces in the country
and would almost certainly lead to the proliferation of bureaucracies with
consequent confusion and lack of coordination. He suggested a type of
"linkage" system by which the central government negotiated with groups
or districts as they became organised and voiced their demands for some
autonomy. If popular support was not on the side of the Speaker the one
thing in favour of his objections was the lack of administrators skilled in
decentralised government.
The Budget and Government Policy
The annual budget introduced by the Minister for Finance, Julius Chan, in
the August-September session of the House differed little from those of
previous years. 5 Estimated expenditure increased from $216 million in 197273 to $304 million although $63 million of this was for costs involved in
transferring certain Commonwealth assets such as DCA installations, in
creating the Bank of Papua New Guinea, the Papua New Guinea Banking
Corporation, and for the establishment of Air Niugini. These costs were to
be met by special grants and loans from Australia. Revenue for 1973-74 was
to come from the Australian Grant-in-Aid and Development Grant totalling
$77 million ($78 million in 1972-73); loans amounting to $33 million of
which $21 million would be drawn from International Aid Agencies; and
from internal revenue estimated at $105 million ($93 million in 1972-73).
Marginal rises in customs and excise duties on certain items, and the
abolition of some taxation concessions were designe.d to meet the gap
between estimated expenditure and receipts. A small increase in revenue
from dividend withholding taxes and investments, largely in Bougainville
Copper, was expected, but no alterations were made to company tax.
The dependence on Australian aid is made more obvious when it is
realised that $49.9 million for salaries and allowances for the Australian
Staffing Assistance Group is paid as part of normal Australian aid but is
not part of the budget. With the advent of self-government bargaining for
aid and attempts to show that such aid is in Australia's interests are likely
to increase.
The United party found little to dissent from in the budget although it
seized upon the lack of emphasis on any of the government's much vaunted
"Eight Points". Opposition speakers pointed to the government's anti-elitist
stance and its intended expenditure of $11 million on the two universities
compared with $3.3 million on the Rural Development Programme. The
most pungent criticism, however, came from the government's influential
backbencher, Fr John Momis. In his speech he stated that the budget had
"dismally failed to implement the philosophy of the New Improvement
Programme". 6 1t had, he said, neither reassured the people nor given them
September-December 1973
207
208
David Hegarty
September-December 1973
209
to dispel the belief held in some parts of Papua New Guinea that Indonesia
had designs on "East Irian". Disparities in economic development between
the two parts of the island and sympathy from students and others for the
West Irianese are more likely causes of future tension. 17
Although no formal intergovernmental links have been established,
Japanese investment in PNG has been estimated at $20 million and a number
of leading firms have established offices in Port Moresby. 18 On two occasions
PNG has been represented at interministerial trade talks between Japan and
Australia: the latest at the insistence of the Minister for External Territories
and the shadow Minister, Andrew Peacock. 19
New Zealand has also shown considerable interest with an exchange of
visits by Michael Somare and the New Zealand Prime Minister, Norman
Kirk. New Zealand has offered aid worth $1.45 million over three years.
In regional affairs PNG appears to have approached its role in the South
Pacific Commission with some degree of enthusiasm. At the South Pacific
Commission Conference held in Guam in September, Albert Maori Kiki,
speaking in the debate on French nuclear testing in the Pacific said: "It is
time for all Pacific peoples to tell foreign powers that we will not tolerate
further manipulation of our own affairs. We call upon people in French
territories to liberate yourselves from such manipulation by a foreign power
". 20 In December PNG became a member of the Colombo Plan and, in all
probability, will apply for membership of the Commonwealth of Nations.
IfPNG has any current favourites among its neighbours they are the small
island nations of the Pacific. Commenting on a proposal put by both Malik
and Kirk for a sub-regional grouping (New Zealand, Australia, PNG and
Indonesia) Kiki was reported as saying that although PNG saw itself as a
"bridge" between Southeast Asia and the Pacific, it would continue to give
first priority to relations with the states and island peoples in the Pacific
with whom Papua New Guineans felt they had the greatest cultural affinity. 21
In the field of defence Somare indicated that after independence a
defence treaty with Australia was most likely but he was insistent that
Australia would not be called upon to handle internal security problemsY
During these months, however, an Australian Senate Committee inquiry into
the state of the Australian army was being told by military experts and others
that post-independent Papua New Guinea was potentially volatile and
"internal disorder of major proportions" could erupt. 23 In August an
Australian Army staff exercise - code-named "Cocoana" - had been
conducted at Duntroon. It involved problems of Australian military
involvement in aid of a post-independence government in a hypothetical
country which just happened to look like PNG. 24 In October a newspaper
report revealed that Australia had contingency plans for a military operation
and evacuation of civilians after independence and that "exercises" would
be held in February 1974. 25
Within the defence force itself the PNG Volunteer Rifles- a small force
of 340 men scattered throughout the country -was disbanded. 26 The
Australian Labor government's view that expatriate officers should not be
involved in any emergency situation resulted in the adoption of a rapid
210
David Hegarty
September-December 1973
211
212
David Hegarty
Disaffection
One of the features of the period under review was the strong current of
disaffection with the government among intellectuals and others. Some
university graduates, students and younger public servants, who had
previously given unqualified support to the Somare government, became
irritated at the apparent lack of action on government policy and
consequently focused their criticism on the national leadership. Many began
to question the commitment of politicians to the philosophy of the Eight
Point Improvement Plan and to doubt ministers' abilities to gain authority
over their departments so that the strategies for achieving the plan could be
implemented. Many doubted the government's sincerity in wanting to
change society and pointed to the lack of action on renegotiating the BCP
agreement; to the lack of investment policy; and to the tardiness and
inadequacies of localisation policy. Most were aghast at the statements by
Ministers Taureka and Poe that localisation was proceeding too quickly. 34
Many were disappointed at the growing authoritarian trend in public
statements made by ministers, but the basic factor in their misgivings
appeared to be the lack of attempts to build and communicate an ideology
of development which was implicit in many of the reports presented to and
accepted by the government.
Although there were prior symptoms this disenchantment surfaced
publicly at a university forum on 5 October at which Ll(o Hannett angrily,
yet trenchantly, attacked government leadership. Hannett had been
dismissed the day before from his position as special adviser to the Chief
Minister on Bougainville affairs for calling for the resignation of the two
Bougainville ministers, Lapun and Mola. His speech, however, was not
merely "sour grapes" for it struck a responsive chord amongst his audience.
In his speech he accused government leaders of hypocrisy in that they were
merely "mouthing platitudes about the needs and wishes of the people",
when in fact no change had emanated from the centralist colonially
orientated bureaucracy. No practical steps had been taken he said, to
implement the Eight Point Plan. Ministers were attempting to rule by "bluff'
and "ad hocery": "black actors had merely replaced white actors". Hannett
accused ministers of being the "stooges" of their white advisers and public
servants, and alleged that politicians had accepted "gifts" of watches and
transistor radios. He predicted that the result could easily be a "political
confrontation" in which the people's aspirations might have to be realised
by bloodshed. He pointed out that the Chief Minister and Cabinet were not
to blame for this state of affairs but there was a lack of machinery to link
up people's aspirations and convert them into manageable objectives.
September-December 1973
213
Hannett believed that he was offered his position with the Chief Minister
only as "a palliative for the people of Bougainville", but he had become the
victim of empty promises. Through his efforts and those of the Special
Committee on Political Development, politics on Bougainville had moved
"half-way from the market place" and cries for secession had been translated
into negotiable demands. He claimed, however, that the government had not
trusted him, and officials, under central government direction, had reported
on his activities and harassed him.
Two months later further Papua New Guinean frustration at the slowness
of localisation and of the dominance of whites in the decision-making
structure was expressed by SeaeaAvosa, executive officer of the CPC. 35 He
alleged that it was a mockery of self-government if whites were to maintain
their key policy-making positions. Papua New Guineans, he said, could not
in these circumstances mould their own society according to their own
values.
Much of this criticism might well have been directed at the Australian
government for its inadequate preparation for the transfer of power. The
National Coalition came to power with basically reformist intentions and
the difficulties it has experienced have largely stemmed from the nature of
the coalition itself and from the economic and administrative systems it
inherited. However, young and inexperienced politicians have had difficulty
in asserting their authority. There has been an evident disparity between the
ideology implicit in for example the Faber Report and the Eight Points, and
the pragmatic economic "philosophy" expressed by many senior politicians.
Evident also is the "gap" in the decision-making apparatus between
ministers and the Administration. Two essential elements missing from the
political administrative structure have been, firstly, the adequate provision
for briefing ministers on policies and policy options and, secondly the ability
to translate adequately general policies into specific strategies. By the end
of the year, perhaps not surprisingly, some of the disenchanted had
succeeded in "taking over" the Pangu pati and were moving into government
advisory positions.
22
JANUARY-APRIL 1974
David Hegarty
January-April1974
215
and on the implementation of the Eight Point Plan. It warned leaders that they
should step down in favour of those with "the necessary commitment" unless
they were prepared to "lead the country with far-sightedness and in the
long-term interests of all". The following day John Kaputin continued the
attack, alleging that PNG lacked "legitimate leaders" who could control the
country's affairs. This was immediately interpreted by press and radio as an
attack on Michael Somare's leadership to which the Chief Minister replied
that he was not an ambitious man and that he would be prepared to resign
if challenged seriously. 2
The government responded to the BCL announcement cautiously. The
Chief Minister called for "talks" with the company and established a
committee of officials to recruit a team of international experts and prepare
for the recognition of the agreement. His own view was that his government
should have "a little bit more" and should possibly own forty-nine per cent
of the company. No public political direction was given to the renegotiators.
The government did, however, show increasing sensitivity to the question
of foreign investment. Julius Chan, Minister for Finance, and leader of the
PPP, hastened to note that he had not urged restraint on the government in
its attempt to renegotiate. In an address in Sydney to the Australian Institute
of Directors, Somare said that his government would place emphasis on
partnership arrangements, resource taxation, and taxation of spectacular
profits.~ Soon after both Chan and the Commerce Minister, Ebia Olewale,
accused some foreign firms of having "cheated" and "tricked" the
government. Even the Australian Minister, Bill Morrison, felt obliged to
warn Japanese companies about fair dealings in PNG.
But the basic division in government ranks on this issue remained and it
came to be seen increasingly in terms of the "economic nationalists" intent
on gaining control over the economy on the one hand, versus the cautious
pragmatists intent on securing foreign investment on the other. In the wider
perspective, the magnitude of the profit (equal to one and a half times
estimated internal government revenue for 1972-73) underlines the problems
which new, small states have in dealing with multi-national corporations
and in maintaining political integrity.
Cabinet Reshuffle
On 27 February the Chief Minister in a move known to only one or two ministers
reshuffled his cabinet. Although the reason given was to "revitalise the
Ministry and produce new initiatives", and to place ministers where each could
utilise "his particular strength to achieve the Eight Point Improvement Plan",4
the move appeared designed to strengthen the hand of the Chief Minister
and his Pangu pati ministers at the expense of the smaller groups in the
Coalition and particularly the PPP. Those ministers most affected were:
Pangu: Michael Somare, Chief Minister, acquired the Department oflnformation
and the Social Development division from Interior. Gavera Rea, National
Development, in addition to his old Labour portfolio acquired the Investment
216
David Hegarty
January-April 1974
217
unsolved.
218
David Hegarty
January-Apri/1974
219
23
MAYAUGUST 1974
David Hegarty
The politics of relative advantage and the sttugglt: fu1 puwt:r and influence
in the changing power structure continue to characterise Papua New Guinea
affairs. In this review period, both the government and the polity at large came
under increasing pressure from disagreement over such issues as economic
management and control; independence; nationalism and national unity; and
the future constitutional framework. As a result further divisions appeared
in the country's ruling elite which are likely to last well into independence.
Pressure and Response
A galloping inflation rate estimated at twenty per cent and rises in the cost
of living of six per cent in the first quarter and ten per cent in the second,
produced increasing unrest amongst the urban population. In mid-June a
crowd of Papuan women stormed and damaged the Chief Minister's offices
in Konedobu demanding higher wages for their husbands and a freeze on
prices. 1 The following day in a repeat demonstration the. women physically
attacked Michael Somare, Minister for Defence and Foreign Relations,
Albert Maori Kiki, and members of their staff as they tried to address a
crowd at the Sir Hubert Murray football stadium. Trade union leaders who
had earlier rejected the government's proposed policy of "wage restraint" 2
and who were currently appearing before both rural and urban boards of
inquiry into wages warned of a series of rolling strikes if their demands were
not met. The Public Service Association which had seen its agreement on a
wages freeze rendered obsolete by the spiralling cost of living demanded
an immediate increase in public service salaries.
The government responded by widening price control measures on such
staples as rice, flour and tinned fish and by reducing taxes on some food
items in the hope that prices would be reduced. A fresh vegetable supply
was instituted for the Port Moresby area as a government service to
supplement the city's markets. Efforts were made to locate cheaper overseas
supplies of sugar, and the Department of Agriculture disseminated portable
rice mills and investigated potential commercial sugar growing areas in the
country. Despite inflation the economy was reported to be sound by the
Secretary for Finance with good returns from primary export crops. 3
May-August 1974
221
In the first week in June the government was subjected to pressure from
striking students at both universities. The strikes initially were called over
food and allowances, but escalated into demands of national significance
when the government took a tough, anti-elitist line. The students demanded
a freeze on ministerial, MHA and senior public servant's salaries, an
immediate increase in the minimum wage, renegotiation of the Bougainville
copper agreement and controls on foreign investment, more strict control
over the behaviour and international trips of ministers, and the sale of a
ministerial retreat outside Port Moresby. One of the continuing themes of
student criticism of the government had been of its general economic
strategy: of the hiatus between rhetoric and action on the Eight Point Plan.
The students were pacified by a series of promises but by tying up cabinet
for at least two afternoons and by forcing the hand of some ministers they
had shown that they had some influence within the political system. Their
actions, in part, prompted a major speech by the Minister for Finance, Julius
Chan, on the difficulties of managing the economy and of implementing
the government's "equalisation" policies. Chan attempted to answer the
critics of his government's encouragement of foreign investment and he
spoke of the nect<ssity to increase internal revenue through large scale
resource projects.
Pressure from the PPP not to move to independence until satisfactory
citizenship provisions had been agreed to, and from sections of the United
party which had indicated support to the government in its confrontation
with the CPC, pushed the Chief Minister into amending his original 1
December 1974 target date for independence. 5 In the House on 25 June, the
Chief Minister proposed that independence be achieved "as soon as
practicable after a constitution had been enacted by this House". Opposition
leader, Tei Abal, further amended the motion so that the House of Assembly
itself would endorse any independence date. 6 The Australian government's
policy to treat Papua New Guinea as "an independent nation" both helped
the Chief Minister and, at the same time, created difficulties for him in
negotiating consensus in Port Moresby. 7
Perhaps the greatest shock to the government came when some of the
Papuan ministers questioned the desirability of Papuan union with New
Guinea at independence. The Minister for Commerce, Ebia Olewale, (South
Fly) in opening the Port Moresby show questioned whether unity and
independence in December were the only options open for Papuans. 8
Meetings of Papuan MHAs throughout that week however ended in
stalemate. No rapprochement occurred between Olewale and Josephine
Abaijah. Although they were seeking the same goals by different methods,
according to Olewale, Abaijah was "too emotional" for him to become
involved with her Papua Besena movement. 9 The Papuan MHAs, however,
did establish themselves as a bargaining faction which the Chief Minister
would have to take into account in the event of a cabinet reshuffle or further
constitutional change.
For eighteen months or more the government had underestimated the
strength of Papuan separatist feeling. By the end of August, at the instigation
222
David Hegarty
of the Chief Minister's research officer and Pangu president, Moi Avei, a
"Papuan Task Force" was established to recommend "on all types of
development opportunities in Papua", and in Avei's words, "to get some
action out of the bureaucracy" . 10 Ironically the Task Force occupied the
recently vacated CPC offices in Waigani and politicians were already
wondering what political threat these young Papuan organisers might pose.
These and other pressures therefore gave rise to a period of uncertainty
which in turn gave rise to the impression that things were "falling apart"
with the most crucial challenge - that of the constitution - yet to come. In
this situation it was obvious that the "numbers game" was well and truly in
operation.
May-August 1974
223
224
David Hegarty
May-August 1974
225
226
David Hegarty
24
SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER 1974
David Hegarty
228
David Hegarty
years before being eligible for naturalisation. The CPC argued that a
residential period prior to "Citizenship Day" should not be counted towards
this time as the life enjoyed during the colonial period had not "prepared"
foreigners for a life in independent PNG. The CPC argued that such
requirements would help create a national identity; would enhance
localisation of employment and business; would ensure that nationals were
in political control - and would help overcome "the present serious
imbalance in the distribution of benefits and opportunities" in society. 2 The
government's proposals differed in two respects. Firstly it provided for
"provisional citizenship" whereby people who had eight years' continuous
residence, who satisfied naturalisation criteria, and who applied, could retain
all rights of citizens including that of holding public office and of standing
for elections. 3 Secondly the government paper provided for a Citizenship
Advisory Committee, different from that of the CPC, which operated at a
national level and with only one community member coopted to advise on
the acceptability in the local area of the applicant. The government, however,
had given considerable ground since the original proposal in the minority
report of Michael Somare and John Guise.
A third area of difference arose over the power of parliament vis-a-vis
the executive. 4 The CPC recommended that the national parliament be
strengthened by the introduction of powerful permanent committees which
would have wide investigatory powers in all fields of governmental activity.
The CPC argued for the need to increase backbench participation and for a
more constructive role for parliament. The government paper proposed that
a committee system be allowed to evolve but such a "watch-dog" system as
proposed by the CPC could render parliament unworkable (particularly if
captured by an opposition party). The government also proposed the
retention of Regional electorates, which the CPC wanted abolished, and
elections every five years as against the CPC's four. 5 The CPC proposed that
in "Melanesian tradition" there would be no single head of state but that
legal executive power should be vested in a National Executive Council
comprising all ministers, and that most symbolic functions should be
performed by the Speaker. The government, however, provided for a head
of state to wield executive power on the advice of the National Executive
Council. Differences arose over the election of the prime minister: the CPC
arguing for a direct election immediately after that of the Speaker; the
government arguing for appointment by the head of state and the subsequent
endorsement by the House (probably in an attempt to avoid the confusion
in balloting which occurred when the coalition came to power in 1972). A
serious difference arose over transitional provisions involving the prime
minister and his ministry. The CPC recommended a "spill" of all ministerial
positions immediately the constitution was adopted- then the election of a
prime minister who would then select a new ministry. The United party
supported this proposal and came close to defeating the government on the
issue.
Chapter ten of the CPC report on provincial government began: "There
is a widespread discontent with the present distribution of power in our
September-December 1974
229
country, and a deep yearning among our people for a greater say in the
conduct of their affairs" .6 Further on Professors Tordoff and Watts- two
political scientists commissioned to report on central-provincial relations
-are quoted as saying "in our experience of political systems in Asia, Africa
and the Caribbean, we have not come across an administrative system so
highly centralised and dominated by its bureaucracy". 7 The chapter then
argued the case for devolution of powers and proposed categories of powers
necessary for provincial autonomy to exist within a unitary system, and the
stages by which the scheme could be implemented. The government paper
agreed in principle but qualified its statement with warnings of the cost of
creating many small bureaucracies, of the need for flexibility and of the
necessity for ordinary legislation to provide it, of the difficulty of classifying
powers, and of the need for the centre to retain taxing and disbursement
powers. 8 Other differences arose over the method of appointing judges and
senior officials, and over the use of the defence force in times of civil
unrest.
The debates in the House of Assembly took place with the House meeting
in committee with the intention of sending drafting instructions to the
Legislative Council for the preparation of a draft constitution. The Chief
Minister moved that the CPC recommendations be approved subject to the
amendments and differences set out in the government paper. The debates
were not particularly illuminating. Only on rare occasions did the standard
rise above repetition of arguments used in the documents, or did the
"founding fathers" discuss constitutional principles or points of political
theory. In fact, from the start, the debate had become a matter of numbers
and negotiation. The CPC members formed a PNG Nationalist Pressure
Group in an attempt to muster a block of votes. The government, however,
maintained its majority on almost every occasion. It had reached agreement
with the United party Opposition on many issues and easily outvoted the
Nationalist Pressure Group and the Country party. On other occasions the
government allowed UP amendments. The NPG achieved maximum support
of twenty-eight but on a number of occasions its members were either absent
or voted with the government. On the citizenship issue the government
carried its amendment by fifty-one votes to twenty-one. The closest shave
for the government in this numbers game came on 27 November when the
UP supported the CPC recommendation that the ministry resign immediately
the constitution was adopted. Opposition leader Tei Abal's amendment was
defeated thirty-six votes to thirty-eight. It was unanimously agreed in private
at that time that Somare would win an election for prime minister, but the
opposing groups were hopeful that a "spill" would give them a chance to
select a new ministry from all sections of the House. The number of MHAs
voting on this issue was inexplicably smalJ.9 Tore Lokoloko, an Opposition
front bencher, voted with the government as did Tony Ila, a member of the
CPC. Fr Momis was absent on sick leave during that session.
The internal politicking of the period was understandably difficult to
follow. The government worked hard to maintain its majority by
"sounding-out" backbenchers from both sides for possible ministerial
230
David Hegarty
Other Issues
Many other issues either ran parallel to or cut across the debate on the
constitution. The one most immediately affected was the date of
independence. The delay in debating and adopting the constitution meant
that either June or September 1975 were likely targets. The Australian
government continued to show its impatience. Prime Minister Whitlam told
the UN General Assembly in November that he hoped a date would soon
be announced. It was reported later that month that Australia had suggested
unilateral decolonisation on its part if events were not speeded up. Australia
then resolved to treat PNG as though it were independent and on 3 December
legislation was passed in the House of Representatives clearing the way for
PNG to assume control over its own defence and foreign affairs. On 13
December the UN adopted a resolution to end the trusteeship agreement
when notified by PNG of its independence from Australia.
One of the continuing issues has been that of control over foreign
September-December 1974
231
232
David Hegarty
25
JANUARY-JUNE 1975
James Griffin
Secession Movements
234
James Griffin
history", 5 said Somare of Kaumi and soon after dismissed him finally from
the public service. 6 Similarly groups with names such as the Papuan
Liberation movement and the Papuan Black Power movement seemed to
take up ominous postures but showed little capacity for mobilisation. The
only effective power base Papua Besena has lies in its majority in the Port
Moresby City Council which voted to support the Papuan republic but
seemed to take seriously enough the government's threat to disband it if it
openly abused its authority. Papuan politicians such as Dr (now Sir) John
Guise (from Milne Bay district) and Tom Koraea (Gulf) warned that
separatist feeling may be overwhelmingly strong during the next
elections, 7 perhaps in order to draw attention to the needs of their districts,
but they remain loyal to Somare and unity. Papuans seem too strongly
entrenched in cabinet, the public service, army, police, church, and
commerce, and their villages seem too dispersed for secessionism to be
more than a nagging problem, unless there is an utter breakdown of law and
order. 8
Bougainville posed a much more serious issue. A provisional provincial
government had been meeting since January 1974 and was functioning with
an elan unprecedented in PNG. (For example, by March seventy-five per
cent of its engineering programme for 1974-75 had been completed.) It had
won the copper royalties (approximately $2.5 million) from the government
in December and was investing in transport and commerce. The small fleet
of Bougainville Airways, acquired in freehold, was already flying under the
sub-national insignia of the traditional initiatory upi hat. The central
government, however, continued to put off the promised official provincial
elections. In February the Chief Electoral Officer maintained that the
administrative problems would be worked out by March. 9 In March it was
claimed that the rolls could not be drawn up until the constitutional
provisions on citizenship had been determined. There were grave doubts in
Bougainville as to the government's sincerity rather than about its ability
to decentralise power. The final impasse came when a central government
team met the provincial government representatives on 29 April at Arawa
to discuss the 1975-76 capital works programme. The provincial government
sought Kina (K)5.3 million* for a rolling programme. It was granted Kl.3
million (excluding royalties) which was insufficient to meet its contractual
agreements. From a reading of the minutes and discussion with observers
it is difficult not to deduce either utter misunderstanding or provocation on
the part of the central government and either intransigence and insensitivity
to the national interest or deeply-laid guile on the part of some Bougainville
leaders. In any case it seems not to have been appreciated by the central
government that the K5.3 million was for a rolling programme- the
provincial government simply lacks the capacity to spend that much- and
that some K3 million would have sufficed for 1975-76. Meanwhile Hannett
(perhaps deliberately) failed to clarify the issue. On 30 May "by an almost
* A national currency was introduced in April 197 5, kina and toea replacing
Australian dollars and cents (eds).
January-June 1975
235
unanimous vote" and with the support of "some 200 elected traditional
leaders" the assembly resolved to secede from PNG.A vote of no-confidence
was moved in Sir Paul Lapun (South Bougainville) and Donatus Mola (North
Bougainville), both ministers in the Somare government, and soon after
Raphael Bele (Central Bougainville) and Fr Momis (Bougainville Regional)
announced that they would resign from the House of Assembly in support
of secession. Secession was also somewhat ambivalently supported by Dr
Alexis Sarei, the District Commissioner but, in spite of pressure from the
Post-Courier, Somare did no more than place his position "under review" .10
On 12 June a fourteen-man delegation from Bougainville flew to Port
Moresby for talks with the central government which quickly broke down
because of the presence of Lapun and Mola. The Bougainvillean team
insisted that secession was non-negotiable and that it wanted K150 million
to set up its own government; in return it would negotiate PNG's twenty
per cent equity in the copper mine. Naturally the central government was
prepared merely to offer a little more for capital works.
From this point speculation raged as to how much support the
Bougainvilleans had. The Post-Courier and the National Broadcasting
Commission (NBC) slanted every index of support for the government, but
Dr Sarei, who headed a fact-finding team around Bougainville, was probably
justified in estimating support at some eighty-six per cent. At the end of
June an official government team under the Minister for Justice, Ebia
Olewale, was preparing to visit Bougainville to find its own facts and
encourage potential supporters. The government was said to be entertaining
various ploys such as "divide-and-conquer" by paying monies only to groups
supporting it, blocking off services, evacuating personnel and even sending
Bougainvillean students home from the mainland. However, any blockade
would affect mining efficiency and the workers' rampage in May made these
seem dubious tactics. The only bright spot was that Abaijah, instead of
applauding fragmentation, sent the Bougainville Provincial Assembly a bill
for K4, 100 million "payable to the Republic of Papua for damages caused
to Papua and Papuans by Bougainville projects and policies" .n The not so
silly side of this is that the Bougainvillean stance, by promoting antagonism,
seemed to be having not so much a "domino effect" as a consolidating effect
on other Papua New Guineans.
Setting the Date for Independence
On 6 March, in "a pre-independence day surprise move", Australia
transferred full sovereign rights over defence and foreign relations to Papua
New Guinea. This was a move "unprecedented in modern political history"
because, said the Post-Courier, "by definition no country can hold such
power until it is a sovereign state, because formal international status does
not exist before independence". 12 In his announcement to the House of
Assembly on 4 March, Sir Maori Kiki, Minister for Foreign Relations and
Trade, admitted that PNG was now "in a peculiar position" but that a special
relationship had been arrived at "to make the plan work in the short period
236
James Griffin
January-June 1975
237
238
James Griffin
House adjourned until17 June but a United party front-bencher, Yalob Talis
(Wapei-Nuku Open), "announced" that the government intended to set 15
September for Independence Day. 18
Talis proved to be almost right. The Bougainville crisis obviously decided
the issue. Talks with secessionists reached an impasse on Friday, 13 June.
On 17 June the Post-Courier announced that legislation would be introduced
the following day to ensure that Independence Day was a legal public
holiday but it still held that it was "not likely to be announced until the
Constitution had been passed". Next day (Wednesday) at 3.45 pm with only
sixty-six members in the House, Somare announced that he would later move
for Independence Day to be 16 September. The House rescinded the July
1974 motion that the constitution had to be passed first; "seven of our
organic laws are in your hands", said the Chief Minister. Kaputin lost his
move to adjourn the vote till the next day. The Umted party lost a vote to
continue discussion of their amendment to put the date back to 1 December
by fifteen votes to forty-five. The final vote came right on 5 pm, the time
specifically set the day before for ending the sitting. Kaputin and Abaijah
left before the final vote was taken. 19 Fr Momis had not attended the sitting
at all and the missing United party members also seemed unaware of what
had been going to happen. It is not clear why less than two-thirds of the
members were present at the "crunch". There have been unpublicised
allegations that an "outing" was conveniently arranged for some United
party members for that afternoon but simpler explanations (that the basic
constitutional fight had been won; that the government used the Bougainville
"crisis" to lobby effectively and at least keep some declared opponents of
"early" independence away; that the government simply counted on the
feckless absenteeism of many members) are available. It is an incident which
could throw light on future parliamentary processes.
The Constitution
The decision to make PNG into a monarchy seemed even more precipitate. At
the Governor-General's investiture in April, Somare repeated what he had
said during the Queen's visit early in 1974: PNG was "proud of its links
with the Queen". However, there was no intimation of a continuing role for
the Queen in PNG when, later in April, it was decided that the head of the
state was to be a citizen who was eligible for the House of Assembly and
that he would be chosen by secret ballot. The Post-Courier- of which it is
simply fair to say that it tries to endorse government policy with laboured
inanity,- editorialised: "Nothing can be fairer- that the people, through
their elected representatives, should choose their own head of State. In many
Commonwealth countries it is a straight-out political appointment, with
overtones of patronage. And in some the President elects himself by force
of arms .... It will be interesting, indeed, to see whether nominations are in
fact made from the general public as distinct from Members of the House." 20
It was, then, a great surprise when on 19 May it was announced that
the Queen was to be asked to be head of state. Obviously it was to be a
January-June 1975
239
popular move with the more conservative United party. The problem then
became: why this apparent change of mind? The cabinet statement said there
were "sound reasons .... The early years of our independence will be years
of adjustment and settling down. Continued ties with the Queen would give
a sense of security to a significant section of the community." 21 The position
is to be reviewed after three years. Responding to this pragmatism, the PostCourier did not become radiantly patriotic but simply spelt out the message
a little more clearly: "we will have a Governor-General as the Queen's
representative ... [who] would be appointed on the advice of the Government
and act in accordance with its wishes. There have been one or two notable
instances of Queen's representatives who, if they were not openly defiant
towards their governments, were at least a little difficult to get along with.
But anyone inclined not to comply with the democratic rules can be replaced
- and that has happened." 22
It is generally believed that the post of Governor-General will have to
go to Sir John Guise, who on the Queen's birthday was made a knight
commander of the British Empire not, like Sir Paul Lapun or Sir Albert
Maori Kiki, a knight bachelor. Sir John is a Papuan who, from time to time
gives studious warnings about secessionism. He has also, on occasion, been
thought to be too masterful when deputising for the Chief Minister.
Obviously a Queen's representative will be easier to remove than an
indigenous head of state. There were some protests at the Queen's
appointment, particularly by the students of the University of Papua New
Guinea, by Momis ("detrimental to the real emergence of Papua New Guinea
ideology, self-reliance and self-respect and commitment to our cultural
heritage") and by Abaijah ("should be chosen by the people and not by
politicians"). However, by and large, the decision was treated with respect
and people seemed to accept the Chief Minister's plea not "to bring shame
to us as a nation ... [by involving] the Sovereign in a political controversy".
So much for acculturation.
By the end of June the Constituent Assembly had approved nine parts of
the fourteen-part constitution, In the provisions members were not
unsolicitous of their own welfare. A fear of the educated can be detected in
the provision that candidates for the House of Assembly will have to be at
least twenty-five. An absolute majority of parliament is to be required to call a
fresh election before a government has served its full term. The House can
have up to three nominated members. MHAs are to be allowed to retain jobs
and businesses. An ombudsman commission was established. The judiciary
and senior public officials are guaranteed independence of government
interference. Rights to liberty, freedom of expression, conscience, thought
and religion and the right to privacy are set down although the only Tolai
United party member, Martin ToVadek, cautioned against "allowing too
many rights and freedoms", because "human rights was not a Papua New
Guinean tradition but something imported and could be very dangerous".
An independent tribunal is to be set up to hear misconduct cases against
politicians and senior public servants. While the tribunal will not have power
to dismiss leaders it can make recommendations to the head of state in the
240
James Griffin
case of elected leaders and to the appointing authority in the case of public
servants. The NPG added a new section to ensure "that village court
decisions were in line with natural justice". A government move excluded
non-citizens from "protection from unjust deprivation of property" because,
said Michael Somare, "the government needed the power to expropriate
foreign-owned property and would provide in legislation for adequate
compensation". The NPG failed in its attempt to require only a simple
majority vote for the disapproval of treaties and for the removal of a
provision that treaties could be kept secret "in the national interest". The
NPG also tried to require the Prime Minister and the Speaker to consult the
Leader of the Opposition before a treaty was deemed too urgent to be tabled
or to be kept secret.
The three controversial issues that were left were emergency powers,
provincial eovernment anci C'itiZf~nship Of these provincial government
promises to be the most difficult and no doubt policy will be affected by
developments in the Bougainville secession movement. Citizenship,
however, was vigorously and inconclusively aired in the last week of June
and caused divisions between and within parties. The draft before the
Constituent Assembly stated that only those with at least two PNG
grandparents and no substantive foreign citizenship should automatically
become citizens. Foreigners who were long-term residents could apply after
independence for provisional citizenship and become citizens after eight
years. As the People's Progress party, however, insisted that this would
create a group of"second-rate citizens", the government moved to eliminate
provisional citizenship and allow those who had lived in PNG for eight years
before independence to apply for citizenship. A United party amendment
allowing Papua New Guineans who hold foreign citizenship to become
citizens automatically was passed with government support, forty-five to
twenty-four. Another amendment provided that foreign ci_tizenship will have
to be renounced within two months of independence. How long other people
holding foreign citizenship will have to wait before naturalisation was not
decided. The issues were passionately discussed. The Chief Minister took
a moderate line. He said the government would not hand out citizenship to
the undeserving but by taking a tough line, "many of our own people who
are no different from ourselves" are hurt. "We must not confuse
vindictiveness with justice" because "'we are deciding the whole future of
our country for years and years to come". 23 The Country party leader, Sinake
Giregire, and United party member, Mackenzie Daugi, felt that the "present
power structure is weighted in favour of foreign citizens" and they wanted
to equalise opportunities between all peoples in PNG. John Kaputin, whose
children by two Australian wives live in Australia, said that he had "felt the
pain of being a person involved in two societies". He did not care if his
children had to wait eight years "to get this piece of paper" which in itself
did not mean the recipients would have the respect of Papua New Guineans.
"I want some assurances. I want some guarantees for my children", he said. 24
It is probably regrettable that such a difficult decision has been deferred
till the eve of independence.
January-June 1975
241
242
James Griffin
External Affairs
The most interesting overseas visitor to PNG was probably Solomon
Mamaloni, Chief Minister of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate
(BSIP), who was so little known in Port Moresby that the Post-Courier
misspelt his name three times in its welcoming editorial.J0 There have long
been stirrings between the Buin-Siwai areas of South Bougainville and the
Shortland Island of BSIP, some five miles across the strait, for reunion. The
sentiment results from blood ties and petty trade but there is a diffused
feeling for realignment with Bougainville in the Western Solomons because
of the similarity of pigmentation, putative traditional relationships and
dissatisfaction with the "redskins" of the Eastern Solomons, especially the
numerically significant Malaitans. There is, however, a realisation even in
the Eastern Solomons that if Bougainville seceded from PNG and joined
with BSIP in a Solomons Republic it would make a viable geopolitical
entity. 31 Similarly the danger that the Western Solomons would want to join
an independent Bougainville is recognised. In a personal interview in
December 197 4, Mamaloni showed awareness of the problem and took the
statesmanlike view that the issue was, in the first instance, one that had to
be decided with PNG. Discussions obviously took place on this issue
between the two Chief Ministers and an "understanding" was said to have
been reached. On the border issue, Mamaloni said "his Government would
always keep in mind the human needs of people on both sides and felt sure
... a satisfactory agreement about the border would [eventually] be
reached". 32
Senator Willesee, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, arrived on his
first official visit. He discussed with Sir Maori Kiki "matters affecting
the two countries after independence" including Australia's aid programme.
An unconditional guarantee of an $18-19 million loan from the United States
of America "for general developmental purposes" followed. The
Post-Courier inferred that "PNG is obviously a good bet for taking up
outside loans because of its vast export resources and because of its
January-June 1975
243
244
James Griffin
Towards Independence
A national currency was introduced in April. The publicity beforehand was
excellent: there seemed to be little hoarding of Australian money and no
cultic disruption. The "holey" kina coin (pierced to resemble traditional shell
money) was so popular on the Sepik that some artifact-sellers were trading
at three dollars value to the kina. 39 A dual currency will be in operation until
December. Chan gave an assurance that devaluation was not being planned
and that currency speculators would be wise to think in terms of
appredatiu11. Whik "nu government can ever give binding undertakings on
the future", he said, "PNG had every reason for establishing an international
reputation for the soundness of its currency" .40
Export prices for PNG's three main agricultural exports- coffee, copra,
cocoa- slumped, as did the price of copper. In 1974 total payments to the
government and the Investment Corporation from Bougainville Copper Ltd
(BCL) amounted to $93.5 million, a third of PNG's national revenue, but
this year there is a world copper surplus. It was revealed only in April that
CIPEC's 41 executive director, Sacha Gueronik, had visited PNG in February
to inform the government of CIPEC's activities, and to invite PNG to become
a full member. A government spokesman said that PNG would be unlikely
to cut production. "If it could be shown that a I 0% reduction ... could force
a 15% rise in revenue we would be interested. But so far CIPEC has given
no indication that it is capable of this." 42 At least this indicated that PNG
was not averse to cartels in principle and was capable oflearning the lessons
of OPEC. Sir Val Duncan, chairman of Rio Tin to Zinc, apnounced that BCL
would not respond to pressure to cut back production or agree to further
cutbacks to Japanese contracted buyers. "We have great respect for the PNG
government", he said, no doubt remembering his personal humiliation at
the renegotiation talks in 1974, "and I don't think it is boasting to say they
have some respect for us". 43
Both the slump and the 1974 Bougainville renegotiation would have
influenced the withdrawal of Kennecott Ltd from the politically important
Ok Tedi copper project in the remote Star Mountains area of the Western
District of Papua, near the Irian Jaya border. (Ok Tedi could reduce
dependence on Bougainville and, if the minerals were freighted south, it
would increase development in Papua.) Kennecott could not accept the
government's excess profits tax proposals. The company said that while it
had always accepted the principle that the government should take "the lion's
share" of windfall profits, it could not accept a rigorous application "in any
year when profits exceed the minimum level required for the project's
viability". Even apart from the excess profits tax, the effective tax provisions
were less favourable than those available to "all c.:nners" in developed
countries such as the USA. However, Somare was not dismayed. According
January-June 1975
245
to him "nine or ten overseas companies" were discussing the project with
the government in April. In May the government floated its own private
company, Ok Tedi Development Company Pty Ltd, with a staff of fifty, a
start-up capital of KlO,OOO and with the government as sole shareholder.
The government would consider a number of methods for developing Ok
Tedi: sub-contracting, independent private development, or partnership.
Meanwhile the National Investment and Development Authority (NIDA)
reaffirmed its determination to control foreign businesses under a national
investment priorities schedule. 44
These manifestations of political will and control were not matched in
the arena of daily law and order. The retiring Chief of Police, Inspector B.
Holloway, called the crime rate "a national disgrace". He was supported by
Sergeant Buka, president of the Police Association, who must have been
referring to the elitist endowments of his rivals in the army when he urged
leaders to examine the crime problem instead of wasting resources on "the
imaginary enemy outside our boundary" .45 The Teachers' Association
"recommended that in certain cases teachers should be withdrawn from rural
schools and the schools should be closed", while residents in the Port
Moresby suburb of Tokarara seemed to live in nocturnal siege. Pita Lus,
Minister for Police, who has been in the past fiercely critical of expatriates,
became flattering about the services of expatriate police officers and
virtually begged them to stay. Lus may have won some favour in advocating
tougher laws- he urges curfews and prohibitions without a blush at reverting
to colonial patterns - but he must have shaken even the old Africa hands
among his white officers when he urged that people who criticised
government leaders should be executed. "In the traditional structure of our
society", he said, "when the leader is speaking, the subjects have to listen
to him, but I do not see this happening now in this Parliament". His fellow
Sepik, Michael Somare, rejected such "final solutions" but said blandly that
he would retain Lus in the ministry because he "would lose his temper
regardless of whether he was a Minister or not". 46
While the police were inept in matters of routine, the riot squad
showed its effectiveness in quelling the rampage of workers at the
Bougainville copper mine on 12-13 May. They did this without using their
semi-automatic rifles and shotguns but with batons, tear-gas and, as the front
page of the Post-Courier showed, boots. 47 Company personnel managed to
escape from Panguna to Arawa (seventeen miles) with light casualties. Lus
was so incensed by the havoc (K250,000 damages and a week's production
missed) that he urged, "Shoot them, shoot them" .'8 Some 1,000 workers were
arrested and impounded in a makeshift prison, but after five days most were
released for fear of disease. Ultimately few prosecutions were successful.
The root causes of the riot were not made clear but, as with so much that
has happened on Bougainville, there was no lack of warning for those who
could read the signs. The riot was triggered by the sacking of the Workers'
Union president, G. Porn Porn, as a result of an off-duty brawl in the
company tavern.
This was in line with company policy but the action did not appear
246
James Griffin
consistent with the reinstatement of other brawlers three weeks earlier. The
strike itself, however, was led by skilled workers who were apparently
indignant at last year's minimum urban wage decision which raised wages
but narrowed differentials with unskilled workers. The fact that the decision
was binding on BCL does not seem to have been communicated effectively
between company and unionists. Judging by the inarticulateness of the union
leader in formulating grounds for dispute and negotiation, BCL's training
programmes in consultation and conciliation would not seem to have been
a success. The crowning irony came on 25 June when the workers met to
elect another president. In a secret ballot the position went to Henry Moses,
a vociferous Bougainvillean secessionist and a wealthy businessman in his
own right as a result of BCL patronage from its earliest days. Apparently
he won by a two to one majority. As Hamlet said, "it defies augury".
As independence approached the quest for autochthony seemed as
baffling as ever. Its superficial manifestation, localisation, proceeded apace
but in some areas with a worrying decline in efficiency. The Public Health
Department, once the pride of the Australian Administration, was seriously
run down; Air Niugini continued to draw severe criticism. The distinguished
historian, Professor K.S. Inglis, ended his term as Vice-Chancellor of the
university and handed over to Dr Gabriel Gris, a dentist and administrator
by training, but during the student strike Dr Gris failed to display any of
the resources of his authority. The strike itself was inchoate and there were
some disturbing signs of intellectual Luddism. In the end the students
seemed unaware that they had achieved one thing only, and that was a
constraint on civil liberty: the government declared its Waigani offices out
of bounds to demonstrators. The students had downed biros for over a week,
ostensibly to protest against the appointment of a foreigner as head of state,
but a fortnight later cheerfully accepted the Queen's birthday as a holiday.
At the opening of the colourful Creative Arts Centre, Sir Maori Kiki could
boast that "God made Papua New Guinea on a Saturday ... and gave his
richest culture to the last man he made". Papua New Guinean art "was not
primitive - it was advanced ... our culture is not written in any
encyclopaedia, it is written in the head". Those present were treated to a
performance of traditional music by Sepik flute players. Yet when the
national anthem competition was finalised, not one of the five selected
anthems, in either melody or verse, rose above the most banal Edwardianism.
Eventually the palm was to go Arise, all you [originally "ye"] sons of this
Land, which had flagrant fanfares from the Marseillaise. Perhaps this was
a fitting counterpart to the cultic gesture of the Catholic church which
proclaimed St Michael the patron saint of PNG because, said Bishop ToPaivu
"Michael the Archangel is a good spirit - and spirits have had a lot to do
with the kanakas of our country". 49 It seemed a rather naive parti pris.
Perhaps if Josephine Abaijah succeeds in her mission, Papua will be placed
under the protection of Joan of Arc.
26
JULY-DECEMBER 1975
James Griffin
Independence
"It is important", said the first Governor-General, Sir John Guise, "that the
people of the [sic] Papua New Guinea and the rest of the world realise the
spirit in which we are lowering the flag of our colonisers. We are lowering
it, not tearing it down.'" 1 Thus at 5.11 pm on 15 September Australian
colonialism was terminated. The combined PNG Defence Force, Police and
Royal Australian Navy bands played Auld Lang Syne and, after Prince
Charles, dressed as a full colonel of the Welsh Guards, had inspected the
troops with the PNG commander, Brigadier-General Edward Diro, the troops
gave afeu dejoie. The Australian Governor-General, Sir John Kerr, received
the folded flag and said that "both Papua New Guinea and Australia have
been fortunate in that during the long period of colonisation we managed
to avoid policies and relationships which have proved tragic elsewhere". 2
Gough Whitlam sat with Michael Somare in the grandstand and looked
satisfied- perhaps, inevitably, even a little smug. If Australian politics had
taken a more regular course, Whitlam would have achieved what he vowed
in late 1969: self-government and independence within the life of his first
government.
At 10.25 am on 16 September the triangulated black and red flag of PNG
with its white Southern Cross and golden bird of paradise was raised on
Independence Hill near the new Waigani administrative blocks which are
dominated by the Australian High Commission. The accompanying
ceremonies went with gratifying smoothness and decorum. Sales of alcohol
had been banned for a week before. Prime ministers came from Australia
and Oceania but the most conspicuous visitor was Immelda Marcos who
wore gorgeous dresses, brought an impossibly large entourage and invariably
arrived late. Independence for PNG was a minor but heartening event in
world history.
Celebrations in the provinces were cheerful enough, though many were
very doubtful about leaving their (imperial) mother's breast (to use their
own cliche of dependency). In Wabag (Western Highlands) in the heart of
the Enga, PNG's largest "tribe", a man cut off his finger in a traditional
expression of sorrow and a fellow tribesman, Tei Abal, Leader of the
Opposition, reported that his people wept. "My people were sad because they
James Griffin
248
are conscious of the great deal of help Australia has given to us so that we
can be independent". He went on to say that "his people wanted Papua New
Guinea and Australia to maintain ties of friendship and work closely
together" .3 In Bougainville, in spite of the secessionist boycott, an estimated
18,000 of non-locals and locals were curious enough to watch the flagraising.4 Many Papuans stayed away. The Papua Besena rainmaker, 0' ongu
Maughivu, tried to ruin the celebrations and, indeed, there were
unseasonable squalls around Port Moresby but, like Papua Besena, they
proved portentous rather than disruptive. Josephine Abaijah was in Sydney
with her vizier, Dr Eric Wright, who had been recently deported. She thought
Australia had groomed Somare "to play the role of dictator" .5
The independence spirit was surprisingly magnanimous in view of the
August bombshell when it was suddenly revealed that Australia would partly
renege on her commitment of 1974 to lJlOviJ~: $500 million in aiJ over lhree
years. This commitment was made because of the difficulties of an aid
relationship in which the donor has financed the annual budget to the tune
of some forty per cent in recent years. The high level of these funds has led
to the creation of a Public Service which is too costly for the current PNG
resources but, as the official book says, "it is difficult in the short-term to
achieve changes in expenditure patterns and the aspiration of people
receiving government services" .6 Therefore a relatively high level of aid is
needed until internal revenue is built up. As it takes several months for
government economists to negotiate the level of assistance needed, PNG
departments prepare their estimates in January and February but they do
not know what they will get until August. It was to remove this uncertainty
and facilitate long-term planning that the Australian government, in 197 4,
guaranteed $500 million over three years from 1974-75 to 1976-77.
The following table tells some of the story:
Australian Assistance
1973-74
1974-75
1975-76
$A million
77.1
79.0
89.6
0.7
1.0
1.5
53.9
51.6
53.0
Airport Construction
5.1
9.2
1.2
1.2
137.9
154.5
Australian Budget
Australian Salaries Assistance Grant
(ASAG)
131.7
July-December 1975
249
While the table shows an increase of some twelve per cent in monetary
terms, in fact $60 million was budgeted for ASAG in 1974-75 and ASAG
expenditure will again be lower this year than expected. This means that
Australian aid has increased only by some five per cent in monetary terms,
and thus, making allowance for inflation (but not last year's devaluation),
there has been a decline in the real level of aid of about twelve per cent.
The official figure then over the first two years of the Australian commitment
is expected to be $292.4 million. It is hardly likely that the balance of the
$500 million can be made up in 1976-77 and it should be emphasised that
PNG government economists are genuinely trying to implement self-reliance
and did pare their requests to a minimum (Kl80 million), unlike the
Australian departments which anticipated cuts when drawing up
submissions and would have made some allowance for them. It was never
understood, however, by PNG that payments through the Employment
Security Scheme (ESS) to ex-public servants returning to Australia would
be part of this sum because PNG derives no benefit from ESS. The Whitlam
government thought otherwise and the private reports of the curt way in
which Messrs Whitlam and Hayden made and presented their decision were
far from reassuring from PNG's point of view, even allowing for the
problems of the Australian budget.
Michael Somare personally flew to Australia with Julius Chan
(Finance) and Sir Maori Kiki (Defence, Foreign Relations and Trade) and
had to be content with bargaining with Bill Hayden, Don Willesee and Frank
Stewart (Minister Assisting the Treasurer). They got nowhere. "Australia
has dumped us", Somare said bitterly on his return. "They have broken my
back, but not the back of my people. We have enough courage to go on."
Somare reported that, when he asked Whitlam for a commitment after
independence, Whitlam "did not give an answer". "That's a big question
mark", he was reported to have said. So mare placed the blame on
advisers rather than on Whitlam: "Because of their own mess they could
not see our point of view .... The minister who represented Bill H.1yden
did not know much about Papua New Guinea .... He was fighting here in
the jungle during the war and that was about all he knew." 8 He later pointed
out that "the Australian minister who was responsible for the introduction
of the scheme, Mr Andrew Peacock, has assured PNG that ESS payments
were never intended to be considered as aid by the Australian
Government". 9 Chan, for his part, preached against the "lavish standards"
introduced by Australia: "Unless we change those habits we will suffer
the fate of all spendthrifts ... the gutter" . 10 The then Deputy Chief
Minister, Sir John Guise, said that the Labor government would be
held responsible for all social, economic and political problems arising
from the cuts, "especially in the realm of district expenditure and in
the politically sensitive areas of Bougainville and the Southern
Highlands". When it had been in Opposition, the Labor party had promised
PNG "the world- even God himself'. Sir John thought that the move
towards self-reliance would now be slower and dependency on Australia
prolonged. 11
250
James Griffin
John Kaputin, one of the leaders of the Nationalist Pressure Group (NPG),
thought Whitlam, who professed to be a socialist but was no more than a
"good colonial imperialist", "might have unconsciously done PNG a favour
by reducing aid". He wanted "independent domestic and foreign policies"
which could be achieved by:
Sacking all remaining white senior public servants still involved in policy making;
Critically reviewing the present public service structure;
Accelerating the acquisition of all plantations;
Banning all non-nationals from carrying out business in rural areas;
Overhauling the House of Assembly;
Re-examining citizenship laws, which were now to the advantage of Australia
and Australians. '2
Jo:,t:phiut: Abaijah also Lhought the cuts were goodY
Andrew Peacock, shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs, however, was
alarmed enough to fly to Port Moresby where he was photographed on arrival
with both arms studiously around the Minister for Commerce, Boyamo Sali. 14
On his return to Australia he said on television's "Federal File" that it was
"less than a fortnight since the Soviet Ambassador visited Papua New
Guinea and gave them undertaking [sic] that the Soviet Union would be
prepared to lend economic assistance. Furthermore, as Sir Maori Kiki
advised me, he himself visited Peking earlier this year." 15 There could also
be aid from Japan. He estimated aid had been slashed by twenty-nine per
cent. He gave "an undertaking in principle to enter into long-term planning"
with the PNG government when his party came to power. 16 Andrew Peacock
promised "continued and comprehensive aid" when his party returned to
power and his views were vigorously supported by the Australian press.
Senator Wille see, however, circulated a paper with Hayden's budget which
showed that PNG was receiving K21 0 million in aid, al! increase of K39 .3
million on 1974-75. He included all allowances to expatriates and
emphasised that PNG would continue to have first call on aid. 17 He also told
the Senate that Peacock had a "colonialist's" view of PNG and said that "he
had often tried to encourage other countries to contribute to the
development" of PNG. Peacock was "looking backwards to the bogeys of
the Cold War, rather than looking forward to the realities of the future" .18
In early October the former Administrator, Leslie Johnson, and a team from
the Australian Development Assistance Agency (including a former founder
of the Pangu pati, Tony Voutas) arrived in Moresby for talks over two days.
They would translate, said Chan, "Australia's commitment into a more
concrete understanding that would let the Government plan ahead and avoid
a repeat of this year's confusion over the Australian aid .... the national
interests of both Australia and Papua New Guinea would be explored" .19
The cutback was a disturbing gesture at the birth of a nation and it made
Australia's independence gift of a K2 million National Library buildingfor which there is no demand and little prospect of servicing - seem like
incongruous tokenism. There was no electoral demand in Australia for such
drastic retrenchment in PNG. A Gallup Poll taken before independence
July-December 1975
251
showed forty-one per cent of Australians thought the current level of aid
satisfactory, twenty-nine per cent wanted to give more and twenty per cent
less. 20
Olewale does not want to force those unhappy Islanders who do not
appreciate "real development", PNG-style, to take PNG status- and there
seem to be none who want to. He thinks they should move and their
economic interests should be taken over by his own Western District people.
He also disapproved of any unilateral restrictions being imposed on the area
by Australia as they would retard economic development. If restrictions were
not mutually agreed upon, the government would "effect economic
development in the area as we ourselves think fit" .26 In October the Western
Regional member, Napuri Maina, gave notice to parliament that he would
move for a commission to be set up, as provided under the constitution, to
investigate the border issue. The governments of Australia and Papua New
Guinea had failed to do so. The issue has interesting long-term implications
both internally as well as externally. For example, Papua Besena can
252
James Griffin
July-December 1975
253
The Constitution
Although independence was in train by July the two most controversial
sections of the constitution remained to be settled: citizenship and provincial
government. The Minister for Transport and Civil Aviation, Iambakey Okuk
(National party), spearheaded a move to stop naturalised citizens from
serving in the next parliament because "in the past these outsiders dominated
the Papua New Guinean members and ruthlessly fought for their minority
interest to the detriment of the country as a whole". He said his plan "would
wipe out the 'wrongs' of the colonial past"Y The Minister for Lands and
National party leader, Thomas Kavali, wanted an amendment to the proposed
citizenship provisions which would restrict property rights of nationalised
citizens for five years after independence. He believed that "some foreign
citizens intended to apply for naturalisation only to protect their present
privileged position". Although the Lands Acquisition Act allowed compulsory
acquisition of foreign-owned plantations and although proposed legislation
would convert all foreign-owned freehold to leasehold without compensation,
"it would be some years before economic and social opportunities could be
said to be equal". A naturalised citizen would "gain all the protection
afforded under the Constitution to the property rights of citizens, thus
preventing any attempt by the Government to deal with his property so as
to bring him into line with the opportunities available to other citizens" .35
When the Constituent Assembly voted, the Nationalist Pressure Group-Country
party (NPG-CP) amendment to make long-term residents wait five years
after independence for naturalisation was lost fourteen to sixty-two in favour
of a government amendment to allow foreigners who have been in PNG for
eight years or more at independence to apply immediately for naturalisation.
Others will have to wait eight years regardless of whether this is before or
after independence. The Citizenship Advisory Committee would decide
whether a person was suitable for citizenship and criteria would include
whether a person has accepted pay or conditions greater than those offered
to Papua New Guineans; whether the majority of his business interests were
in PNG; whether he was married to a citizen; his services to or sacrifices
for PNG and its people; his knowledge of pidgin, Motu or a vernacular; and
whether his children are included in his application. While the concept of
provisional citizenship was dropped altogether, the economic opportunities
of naturalised citizens were to be restricted for ten years (e.g. in relation to
Development Bank loans, shares in the Investment Corporation, preferences
254
James Griffin
At the closing date, 16 November, only 500 people had applied for
citizenship, the most notable of these being the Speaker, Barry Holloway,
and the Minister for Natural Resources, Bruce Jephcott. 43 The Australian
government was known to be concerned at the failure of mixed-race people
to take up citizenship. Of more than 3,200 counted at the last census, 1,000
had applied for Australian citizenship since 1971 and won the right to take
up residence in Australia. In fact, during October the PNG government had
begun a campaign to advise mixed-race people of their rights, if they had
two grandparents born in PNG. 44
Provincial government, the lynchpin of the CPC's attempt to create
participatory democracy in PNG, was thrown out of the Constitution in less
July-December 1975
255
256
James Griffin
July-December 1975
257
think we have all that much money to create and maintain such an office
.... I understand England has got a lot of money and I am pretty certain that
they would very well meet the expenses of having the Governor-General."
But he appreciated the politics of the issue. Somare had warned him "that
the Papuan secessionist case could have been strengthened if the two top
government posts were held by New Guineans". 55
258
James Griffin
members, he said, were "greatly involved with the Western Papuan Freedom
Fighters living in border areas". Their involvement was being investigated
by national security officers in Vanimo, but evidence was not sufficient at
this stage "to warrant the Government to combat the proposed Association's
operations". Langro also found it "quite unpalatable that the association's
first move was to demand the removal of the West Sepik Provincial
Commissioner". 60 The implications of all this are not immediately clear but,
in the wake of the Indonesian onslaught on East Timor, the most hot-headed
of PNG's ministers, Pita Lus, who, like Somare, comes from the East Sepik
province, could contain himself no longer. "The Government could no longer
ignore the nightmare the West Irianese have been through", he claimed.
People on the border were living in constant fear of unidentified soldiers
who frequented the area. "Everybody knows", Lus said, "that the West
Trianese have heen <;uppres<;ecl anrl rlenierl fref':clnm to P-hoose their own futme
ever since the Dutch left the area. The Government, through the United
Nations, must fight hard by letting the world know what has been happening
on this side of the world." 61
Lus was not the only person to voice his concern at Indonesia's "imperialism"
in East Timor and to ask the government to "stop sitting on the fence". 62
Bernard Narakobi, chairman of the Law Reform Commission, and a prominent
nationalist, said "Papua New Guineans must in future be mobilised. Our
homes are no longer safe." He maintained that "pro-Indonesian forces caught
during the struggle on Timor had letters from generals telling them to watch
closely secessionist movements in Papua New Guinea". These letters allegedly
told the forces they could be "called upon". Indonesia, said Mr Narakobi:
justified its invasion by saying that instability on the island would not be good
for the region. If that logic follows to conclusion [sic] then instability in Papua
New Guinea would justify Indonesian intervention. Most of the people in East
Timor are Melanesian and belong to the Pacific. If they cannot be safe, how
can we be safe? Indonesia is proving itself to be a military imperialist,
contradicting its initial stand that it would support Third World countries for
the rights of small nations. Indonesia is suppressing the right of selfdetermination that it fought for against Western European powers.<'
Narakobi was supported by Langro and by the National Union of Students
and the Women's Action Group. The latter wanted PNG to participate in a
UN peace-keeping operation, take in Timorese refugees "through a United
Nations arrangement" and support an independent East Timor at the UN. 64
It organised a protest rally outside the government offices at Waigani. 65
Somare, however, said PNG would take "a non-partisan approach". He
"strongly supported ... United Nations moves for a ceasefire and
international supervision of the decolonisation process which would ensure
genuine self-determination for the people of East Timor". PNG had agreed
to co-sponsor a UN resolution to that effect. "Papua New Guinea is against
unilateral declarations either producing independence in the form of a fait
accompli or prematurely attaching the country to some other nation before
all inhabitants had the opportunity to participate in a proper act of
July-December 1975
259
260
James Griffin
that his country would welcome the setting-up of a PNG office in Moscow
and that "Russia had much to offer PNG, particularly in the field of
technological equipment and industrial machinery" while Russia was
interested in some of PNG's "traditional primary goods" and especially in
helping to build up her fishing industry.75 There was also "the possibility
that financial aid could be extended by way of long-term loans and
favourable credit". Basor added that "reports of a Soviet Naval build-up in
the Indian Ocean were completely without foundation ... Russia was
concerned with developing friendly relations with all countries ... the
Pacific and Indian Oceans should not be used as areas of international
struggle" .76
PNG was not, however, about to venture far from the capitalist matrix.
Chan went to Hong Kong in October "to woo investors"n and in December
a trade mission from Taiwan and Hong Kong was "highly impressed"
by PNG's "investment potential", although it found the National
Investment and Development Agency (NIDA) "bureaucratic ... in the
processing of applications and approvals [which] may impede
investments from abroad". 78 In London in October, Somare had talks with
British shippers on aid to set up a South Pacific regional fleet and on his
return announced that a London office would be set up in 197 6. 79 Sir
Maori Kiki 's first major overseas visit after independence took him to
London, Brussels, Bonn and Malawi where he lodged a successful
application to join the Lome Convention. "We were lucky", said Sir
Maori. Because of "former colonial ties" with Britain and Germany,
PNG was probably among the last countries to be linked to the European
Economic Community which "took more than one-third" of PNGs
exports. A one-man office was to be set up in Brussels to deal with the
EEC. 80 The Commission of Enquiry into Standardisation of Imports
recommended that cars and trucks sold in the country should be limited to
five Japanese makes. 81 New Zealand businessmen were offered tax
concessions and rights to invest "in mineral resources and commercial
structure". The PNG High Commissioner, Leo Morgan, felt that New
Zealand was not fully aware of PNG's "vast resources" and of its coffee,
tea and cocoa products which New Zealand bought from "distant
countries". New Zealand aid would be worth $A5.5 million in the
current financial year, but as it was "highly project-oriented ... we find
we cannot take proper advantage of it". 82 New Zealand, however, later
stressed that it "could only expand its business if it increased its buying
from countries which bought from it". 83 Chan reaffirmed his policy of
pegging the kina to the Australian dollar, "a strong, single currency".
He could not "foresee circumstances in which it would be sensible to
devalue the kina in terms of world major currencies". 84
Mary Seymour Olmsted became the United States' first ambassador to
PNG. She had previously been serving as charge d'affaires. 85
July-December 1975
261
Government
Sir Maori Kiki, a Papuan, succeeded Sir John Guise as Deputy Chief (later
Prime) Minister. 86 Highlanders were perturbed that they did not occupy any
of the great offices of state and John Pokio (Okapa) warned that coastalHighlands rivalry was developing again in parliament. 87 The term "cabinet"
was abolished in favour of "National Executive Council" and all former
cabinet committees were abolished in favour of a new national planning
committee with slightly increased membership, viz. the Prime Minister,
Deputy Prime Minister (both Pangu pati), Chan (People's Progress party),
Kavali (National party) and four public service heads. 88 A National Capital
Regional and an Enga Regional seat were created out of the Central and
Western Highlands Regional electorates respectively, with Josephine
Abaijah and Anton Parao as incumbents. The old seats were declared
vacant. 89
Even before the cuts in Australian aid were known, Julius Chan had
written to all ministers urging cuts in departmental expenditure and harder
work from public servants. 90 More rigorous methods of accounting were to
be adopted. 91 There can be no doubt from informal reports that there has
been great laxity in such matters as travel, telephone expenditure and the
purchase and use of equipment. The Auditor-General's report revealed
salaries for non-existent employees and unauthorised expenditure, for
example, on the ministerial aircraft, a Cessna 421 B, which had been
purchased in breach of the Government Contracts Act and Public Finance
Regulations. 92 To the Local Government Association, Chan affirmed that he
would "tighten" funds; he was determined to be "the Minister for SelfReliance, not the Minister for Handouts". 93 In mid-August a mini-budget
raised duties on beer, imported liquor and cigarettes by about forty-six per
cent. It was expected to add K6 million to the revenue. The maxi-budget
(30 September) saw radical changes in the income tax system, higher stamp
duty, and customs increases of up to forty-five per cent on luxury goods.
Concessional tax deductions were abolished, the general taxation rate increased
by an average of twelve percent but the minimum taxable income level was
raised from K12 to K18 per week. Low income earners with dependants
also profited: a person with four dependants will pay no tax unless he earns
K2, 112 per year. "It was not an Independence but a self-reliance Budget",
said Chan. 94 Drastic action had to be taken with the drop in copper and copra
prices, a suspicion that PNG was "uncreditworthy" with the World Bank, 95
and a gloomy general economic outlook at least until1977. 96 A mass public
service strike over the government's unilateral reduction of the wage
indexation base was narrowly averted in November by Somare's negotiating
skills and a general sense of the danger of economic disruption by union
leaders. However, with government housing rents being raised and
electricity charges going up thirty per cent, the urban dweller was feeling
the pinch. The only bright prospect was the likelihood that Broken Hill
Proprietary would conduct a two-year feasibility study of the copper
mine at Ok Tedi. 97 Informed reports from the whole Star Mountains area
262
James Griffin
The most significant changes concerned the two National party leaders,
Thomas Kavali and Iambakey Okuk, the two Bougainvillean
anti-secessionists, Sir Paul Lapun and Donatus Mola, the former Education
Minister, Dr Reuben Taureka, and the former Minister for Police, Pita Lus.
Sir Paul Lapun had been in Mines and Energy since 1972 but his current
lack of popularity in Bougainville made him no longer a politically necessary
choice. Similarly, Mola, who had presided over a rapid decline in Health
Services, no longer needed sensitive treatment. Dr Taureka had been
consistently at loggerheads with both teachers and bureaucrats in the
Education Department and had made no secret of his elitist tendencies. He
resigned from Pangu as a result of his relegation to a "minor" ministry. 99
Lus had given a deal of bloodthirsty advice during the year, urging the
shooting of Bougainvillean miners who rioted in May and the "execution" of
dissidents. 100 Perhaps to demonstrate his incorrigibility he urged from his
new Corrective Institutions portfolio that escaping prisoners should be "shot"
July-December 1975
263
on sight", 101 which elicited soon after from the Minister for Justice, Ebia
Olewale, the reassuring statement that prisoners in PNG had rights, that no
law authorised their ill-treatment and that anyone firing a weapon at them
could be liable to criminal prosecution. 102
The reaction of Kavali and Okuk to the reshuffle showed little evidence
of "teamwork". Both were believed to be under a cloud for irregularities in
their administration of the Department of Lands and the Department of
Transport and Civil Aviation respectively. The Post-Courier maintained that
neither had been demoted as Kavali had now both Lands and Minerals and
Energy in his National Resources portfolio and Okuk's Education post was
"an essential troubleshooter's job". 103 They did not see it that way, and
threatened to withdraw from the coalition. 104 At a meeting in Mount Hagen
on 16 December organised by students of the University of Technology,
about fifty representatives of the five Highlands provinces urged the National
party to withdraw and help to effect an election in 1976. Twelve MPs were
present, mostly from the United party (UP), including notables such as Tei
Abal and Anton Parao. Resolutions were passed calling on the government
to give senior posts in the ministry and public service to Highlanders.
Iambakey Okuk accused So mare of telling the People's Progress party (PPP)
leader, Julius Chan, of the proposed changes three months before but not
the National party, which had always been loyal and undemanding. When
the national coalition was formed he said, "we didn't ask [Somare] ... for
any Ministries like the People's Progress Party" .105 Never one for discretion,
Okuk claimed that the National party had been used to get rid of the former
Minister for Justice, John Kaputin, in 1974 and during the "debate on the
Constitution we were used to make things hard for the former chairman of
the Constitutional Planning Committee, Fr John Momis (Bougainville)". 106
Similarly with Sir John Guise, the government considered him "dangerous
and they lobbied to get him appointed Governor-General with only a
symbolic status" . 107 Somare had promised the National party the deputy
prime ministership if Sir John won the position of Governor-General, but
had given it to a Papuan instead. Belieing the name of his party, Okuk did
not hesitate next day in Goroka to emphasise that it was "a Highlands based
party" .108 Somare was "not afraid of making the Ministerial changes because
he knew he could replace any Minister with disgruntled United Party
members who defected from the Opposition" .109 He doubted if the United
party would move a no-confidence vote in the government "because there
was very little left of the party. You might find, one day ... Abal in a
ministerial position." 110 He had been given the Education ministry which is
"in a mess" although he "had no part in" but for which he would be blamed
as the next elections approached. "The Government has given me the rope
to hang myself', he said. 111 Moreover he was removed from Transport
because of moves by Ansett Airlines which wanted its nominee to be the
next head of Air Niugini and wanted "to continue netting K479,000 a week
for their planes" . 112 Interestingly, he does not seem to have reminded
listeners that his successor, Jephcott, was the only white man in the NECor, at least, the Post-Courier did not report it. In spite of such strong
264
James Griffin
criticism, the National party executive voted to remain with the government
rather than risk instability, 113 but it was hard to believe that a man of Okuk's
temperament could adjust himself to cabinet discipline again even if Somare
really wanted him to.
Chan denied that he knew about the changes and was reported to have
been "perturbed at not being consulted". He offered to return all PPP
portfolios for redistribution. He also revealed that he had not sought the
finance portfolio for PPP in 1972, only Transport, Trade and Industry,
Business Development and Information, and had accepted it only under
pressure from the former Administrator, L.W. Johnson. 114 The chairman of
the PPP, John Man eke, supported Chan, and said that PPP ministers were
above "petty personal interests or party pressures" and stressed that they
"have not caused undesirable publicity through their behaviour, either inside
or ont<:ici~ Papua New Guinea through drunkenness or court actions, but have
always maintained a good image for the nation". 115
Okuk was possibly right about the United party. Its troubles continued.
The shadow Minister for Education, Mackenzie Daugi (significantly, like
Anton Parao, a former member of the NPG) resigned because the UP was
not a constructive opposition and was dominated by "white elements", such
as the former member, Wally Lussick. 116 Abal defended his failure to "stir"
because "of the sensitive awareness that rivalry for power brings about
bloody events and civil unrests in newly independent countries" .117 However,
even Matiabe Yuwi thought Abal was obsessive about his problems with
Parao 118 and should either "clarify his position or hand over the leadership" .119
A six-man committee was set up to look into the leadership and into
Lussick's position and give Parao a chance to stay in the party.l2 In the
unlikely event of Abal losing the party leadership, his successor would
probably be Langro who, is, unlike his leader, fluent in English. Lussick's
influence would necessarily be reduced. Lussick denied he was trying to
influence the party. "Tei makes a statement and I put it into English", 121 he
said with extraordinary ingenuousness for a founder of the United party.
Thanks to the dominance of Somare, the Pangu pati nominally remained
the leading force in government but its branches had virtually gone out of
existence and few financial members remained. Moi Avei, the party
president, resigned from the ineffectual Village Task Force (and failed to
present his report) to devote himself to rebuilding Pangu. He asked
individual Pangu ministers to come down from their lofty heights and listen
to the 'rank and file' of Pangu. Ministers who refuse party discipline might
as well start organising their own future elections as Pangu will not be
supporting any political opportunists for the sake of numbers. It is better to
have half a dozen dedicated and committed party servants than to have a party
of a million individuals.
"Pangu", said Avei, "should work as a dedicated unit to fight with the
common people for an egalitarian society". 122 This criticism was believed to
be directed at all eight Pangu ministers with whom the party executive had
disagreed on some major issues including the citizenship provisions of the
July-December 1975
265
266
James Griffin
probably the worst offender. Somare, the Speaker and ministers had to be
called into the House to restrain him on one occasion, 131 and two days later,
he "head-butted and punched" Andagai Wabiria, an Opposition frontbencher,
for calling him a "pumpkin-head". Later at a reconciliation outside the
House he explained that he "had been sensitive about references to his head
since an expatriate member in an earlier House of Assembly had referred
to him as het kindam (prawn head)'' .132 The colonial scapegoat will continue
to have the oddest uses. Lus was also able to defend the ministers against
the criticism of sloth: "Did you know", he expostulated, "that we work until
7 p.m. at times" [author's italics]. 133 Is that attitude perhaps a legacy of the
expatriate public service? In spite of these functional difficulties, PNG
remained committed to the Westminster system. Sere Pitoi, chairman of the
Public Service Board, emphasised that senior public servants could not
belong to a political party or organisation. Local government councils. area
authorities and registered industrial organisations are not included in the
prohibition although senior officers still require Public Service Board
approval before nominating for office on these bodies. However, the Public
Service Board did, said Pitoi, "encourage discussion among public servants
on matters of national importance and submission of their views to the
Government through workshops and seminars ... The board was now
planning to extend these forums." 134
To support his homilies and cutbacks by personal example, Somare
slashed his own salary (Kl2,000) by Kl,OOO in December as a gesture
towards a general saving and to make unionists "more amenable to accepting
some restraint in their pay levels". He also said his Daimler Sovereign car
would be offered for sale; the ministerial chalet at Sapphire Creek and the
five contentious Mercedes purchased for the independence celebrations
would be sold; ministerial staff would be paid local salaries and a review
of ministerial staff salaries would be made; new methods of checking
expenditure would be introduced and there would be cuts in ministerial
travel expenses." 135 Although not an austere or a particularly forceful man,
Somare continued to show resourcefulness under pressure and stood
unchallenged as the most adroit politician in the country. In conversation
he likes to refer to "the art of the possible"; in fact, he continues to function
even with the often highly improbable (e.g. Lus). His personal balance was
shown when he declined to rejoice at the defeat of Gough Whitlam although
he must stand to gain from Malcolm Fraser's victory and Andrew Peacock's
accession to Foreign Affairs. "Quite apart from the results of the election",
he said, "the people of Papua New Guinea will always retain ... a warm
spot in their hearts for the Labor Party, and for the way they prepared and
helped us to win Self-Government and Independence. This is something we
will not forget." 136
Secession Movements
On the Bougainville issue it was left to the doyen of Pacific anthropologists,
Margaret Mead, to rush in where even unsubtle Marxists have been known
July-December 1975
267
268
James Griffin
July-December 1975
269
270
James Griffin
27
JANUARY-JUNE 1976
Donald Denoon
The first half of 1976 has yielded a number of events which enable observers
to begin to see patterns in the political economy of the country. Questions
which were posed when Papua New Guinea became independent in
September 1975 still resist final answers- but tentative answers can now
be formulated.
A question posed by the formal independence of a new state, is the
nature and extent of its constitutionally asserted freedom. Will Papua New
Guinea be a successor state to the colonial administration set up by Australia
and modified by Australians and Papua New Guineans to achieve
independence? In late colonial times, Papua New Guinea was characterised
by dualism in the economy, social life, culture and even in politics: will
independent Papua New Guinea tolerate the continuance of such dualism?
And will the country's economy continue to be characterised by the massive
export of primary products, the unrestrained import of manufactured goods,
and a budget balanced by colossal infusions of Australian aid? Behind all
these very specific questions looms a rather amorphous one: what is the
meaning of "self-reliance", a term culled from the government's policy
statement (the "Eight Aims"), and bandied about in most economic
discussions? Since it now seems possible to propose an answer to the
overriding question, it is likely that the specific questions will answer
themselves in due course.
The converse of the first question needs to be posed. In colonial times
government was dependent upon Australia and to that extent independent
of the Papua New Guinean populace. Is the independent government of
Papua New Guinea, dependent upon the will of the people of the country?
Demonstrably, the most crucial question of internal affairs is to ask how
relations between the central government and various regional political
organisations developed. It is tempting to see this problem as a number of
unrelated, bilateral relationships; but in practice the central government's
handling of the Bougainville issue was clearly influenced by the fear of
provoking similar developments in other regions; and it may well be that
Bougainville's approach to the Papua New Guinea problem was influenced
by the leaders' estimate of the amount of enthusiasm for devolution in other
regions in Papua New Guinea. 1
Donald Denoon
272
***
Whatever else may be meant by "self-reliance" it implies a diminished
dependence upon Australian financial aid for ordinary budgetary purposes.
Over the past year, Papua New Guinea has been consuming Australian aid
at a rate of $A55.00 per capita per annum, and slightly more than half of
the budgeted receipts came from Australian aid. 2 These figures must, of
course, be treated with caution. They include military as well as civilian
aid (at least until1976); and the more than generous salaries and severance
allowances of Australian bureaucrats are also incorporated in these gross
figures. Nevertheless a country which depends so heavily upon a single
foreign benefactor has seriously restricted its freedom in international and
indeed internal affairs. Papua New Guinea and Australia have, in this respect,
created a new world record for direct financial dependency. The sheer size
of the annual subvention means, of course, that any modification of the aid
package in Canberra has direct and drastic consequences in Port Moresby.
The early weeks in 1976 were clouded by doubt as to the precise meaning
of existing aid agreements to the new Australian government of Malcolm
Fraser: even relatively minor reinterpretations by Fraser of commitments
by Gough Whitlam could create budgetary and political havoc; and it was a
matter of great importance that Fraser be publicly committed to a generous
interpretation.
Accordingly, the Prime Minister, Michael Somare, went to Australia
early in March. He came home with a revised agreement which was
widely praised. Over the following five years, Fraser committed Australia
to pay no less than K930,000,000 in aid to Papua New Guinea. 3 Ministers
congratulating themselves on this figure have shown a tendency to
emphasise that it is a minimum figure, and have sometimes been tempted
to round it up to the next hundred million. The Finance Minister, Julius
Chan, hailed the agreement as a means of securing long-term
self-reliance. This is a provocative definition: whatever self-reliance is, it
is reinforced by the guarantee of K930,000,000 of foreign aid over five
years. Self-reliance, thus described, would be destroyed if Australia
January-June 1976
273
274
Donald Denoon
January-June 1976
275
276
Donald Denoon
the second placed candidate was James Kupul with 8,466 first preference
votes. 8
It would be a mistake to read too much national significance into
two regional by-elections, in which party lines were never very clearly
drawn. Nonetheless they suggested to Pangu 9 that something should be
done to arrest the decline of the party's appeal. At the bottom of the
problem was the question "what is Pangu?". It had a number of
policy-reviewing committees, but these evidently never met, and although
it had branches throughout the country, these were almost all moribund.
The party could point to absolutely no political programme and was
therefore reduced to describing as national party policy, whatever policy
its ministerial members had most recently adopted in cabinet discussions.
It was therefore quite impossible to portray Pangu as an independent force
in national affairs, even if it was becoming a significant force in the
national economy. When Pangu conducted its post mortem into the
by-election results, Moi Avei resigned from the party presidency, and the
party executive resolved to develop a party policy as a matter of urgency.
The value of these decisions will no doubt emerge in future. Since Avei
was the most prominent member of Pangu to protest at Pangu's entry
(with the United party) into the business of selling cars, his removal from
the national presidency is not, in itself, very reassuring. The policies
promised by the meeting may well emerge in time for national election
purposes; but at the time of writing (August 1976) there is still no
evidence that Pangu can develop policies significantly different from those
pursued by ministers from day to day. It is - to come to the point hard to believe that Pangu is anything more than a political fiction in
1976.
The political organisations which appear to have substantial strength
are those untainted by involvement in government: the regional
movements demanding autonomy or separation (Bougainville and Papua
Besena), and the United party. The regional movements will be
considered later. Meanwhile it is worth looking at the fortunes of the
United party opposition. The sheer survival of the United party is
somewhat surprising, considering the attractions of office and the few
rewards of loyal opposition. The party was also under severe internal
strains. The personal feud continued between Tei Abal, leader of the
United party, and Anton Parao the much younger member for Enga
Regional. After a number of verbal incidents in the Enga Province, Abal
sought damages from Parao in the Supreme court in Port Moresby 10 His
successes in these encounters seem to have consolidated his hold on the
party: his knighthood in the Queen's birthday honours list may also have
some marginal influence. The political consequences of Sir Tei's
continued ascendancy in the opposition include the entrenchment of his
view of how an opposition should behave in a newly independent country.
His strategy involves a quiet, thoughtful, cooperative posture in public
debate, and it is doubtful whether many of his colleagues would pursue so
quiet a policy if Sir Tei were not leader. The fact that the two leading
January-June 1976
277
***
The half year opened with a by-election triumph for Papua Besena: it
closed under the shadow of disputed elections in, and for, Bougainville.
At no point in the six months could the government forget the vexed issue
of regional autonomy. During the half year, the central government
abandoned its earlier opinion that the country cannot afford provincial
government, and now appears to take the view that the country cannot
afford to dispense with provincial government. When the two National
party ministers were dismissed, Oscar Tammur became Minister for
Provincial Affairs, 14 a portfolio previously submerged in the Justice
portfolio held by Ebia Olewale. Tammur almost immediately set off with
278
Donald Denoon
two aides on a fifty-four day, ten-country, round the world tour; though under
protest he cut the tour by two days. 15 Nevertheless his appointment signalled
a revival of interest in provincial affairs, and the restoration of legal
provincial government to Bougainville in ApriP 6 was the first tangible result
of the changed policy.
The shape of provincial government is evidently a matter of considerable
concern. Most political leaders have assumed that the autonomous provinces
should be coterminous with the old districts. The only exception to this
statement is that supporters of Papua Besena, who tend to see provincial
government as a step towards Papuan independence, would like to see the
whole of Papua subsumed in a single province. Oro (Northern) Province
leaders, however, and possibly politicians in other areas outside the Central
Province, press for the former district boundaries rather than see Papua reemerge as a political expression.
There is also a great variation in enthusiasm for provincial
government from region to region. Bougainvilleans see it as the very least
that can be accepted, in the event of their abandoning their aspiration for
separatism. Highland leaders by and large seem willing to acquiesce in
provincial government, but only in the Eastern Highlands - possibly
encouraged by the Speaker, Barry Holloway - have local leaders
responded with any enthusiasm to the government's invitation to draft
constitutions for themselvesY The New Guinea Islands provinces seem
enthusiastic, and the East Sepik has also drafted a constitution. Other
districts either do not feel cheerful about achieving viability or - like
most of the Highlands - they expect to dominate the next national
government anyway.
Bougainville/central government relations set the pace throughout the
period under review. Violence broke out in Bougainville late in January,
involving the destruction of central government property and the digging
up of air strips. The police and riot squad personnel were evidently unable
to cope with the situation, and on 30 January police flew in by helicopter
to rescue a startled Sir Paul Lapun, who had not thought that his life was
endangered in his south Bougainville home. 18 Once again matters
simmered down and another round of talks was held in mid-February,
which led to the formal reinstatement of provincial government in
Bougainville and mutual reassurances of benevolent and cooperative
intentions. 19 When Parliament re-opened in the middle of March, Somare
seems to have expected that it would be possible to reseat Raphael Bele
and to see Fr John Momis once more in his parliamentary seat: but after the
first few days of the session, it became clear that neither of the
Bougainvilleans was going to sit in Parliament again. 20 It then became
desirable for the central government to hold by-elections in Bougainville,
to replace the two resigned members; but at once Momis warned that it
would seem like bad faith on Somare's part if he persisted in holding byelections for the national Parliament before the Bougainville provincial
elections had been held, after which the will of the people of the North
Solomons would be more discoverable. 21 Nominations were nevertheless
January-June 1976
279
***
During the first half of 1976 a number of relationships have been
demonstrated which do not altogether amount to a single coherent pattern,
but which are extremely suggestive. First, a relationship which has been
unfolding throughout the year relates to education policy. The approach
adopted by the Ministry of Education last year, though rejected by
Parliament, remained the official line: namely to distinguish between
Papua New Guinea curriculum schools and multi-racial schools, and to
deny entry to multi-racial schools to most Papua New Guinean children.
The specific device for restricting entry to multi-racial schools was a
special fee of K400 per child per annum, over and above the much
smaller fees customarily charged by such schools to cover expenses of
libraries and extra services. Several challenges have been launched against
this policy. The parliamentary challenge, though formally successful, has
had no visible effect on departmental policy. The Papua New Guinea
Teachers' Association has objected to the existence of a loophole through
which the children of wealthy Papua New Guineans might obtain an
education thought to be better than that available to most national
children. Most effectively, the policy has been challenged by the courts,
in consequence of which the multi-racial schools will almost certainly
have to become private schools during the second half of 1976, in order
to continue as they are at present. At the heart of the problem lies the
small number of Papua New Guinean children currently enrolled in
multi-racial schools - no more than one-tenth of one per cent of the
280
Donald Denoon
January-June 1976
281
282
Donald Denoon
January-June 1976
283
business ann of the Pangu pati had acted as intermediary between the foreign
bank and the PSA, and had taken a commission for doing so. The Minister
of Finance was relieved to report that no conflict of interest or concealment
of interest had been involved but he did not specify how it happened that
Pangu's business arm had happened to be able to put the PSA in touch with
a foreign investor. 37 If we then remind ourselves that Pangu has suffered from
the reputation of being the "radical" wing of the governing coalition, then
we grasp something of what has happened to the tone of political life during
the past three or four years.
The purpose of this chronicle, however, is not to rake muck. Two
further developments may help us to see these events in some kind of
perspective. The Lae Miscellaneous Workers' Union - a very powerful
organisation, led by Tony Ila - announced its intention to acquire and
operate a taxi service in Lae. 38 Similar proposals have been rumoured for
other institutions, but never formally reported. What it does to a trade
union, simultaneously to represent under-privileged workers, and to
employ them, is not easy to comprehend, but we may assume that there
is some consequence in terms of working class militancy. Secondly, we
must consider a letter in the press from John Kaputin. Kaputin's mission
is to break new ground. He was the first indigenous football player, the
first to marry a white woman, and the first to commit himself full-time to
organising the business affairs of a political association. Once again, in
the period of this review, he declared himself in memorable and important
terms, which other Papua New Guineans will follow in future. The
occasion arose when the Post-Courier published a letter in effect
attacking Kaputin for elitism: for owning a fast sports car, for investing
Mataungan money in prestige urban investments, and for neglecting the
wishes and aspirations of the rural people. In his reply 39 Kaputin
identified the anonymous letter-writer as an expatriate, and answered the
implied criticisms one by one. He could, he pointed out, dissemble his
sports car by driving a beat-up jalopy around Port Moresby (a veiled
attack, we may suppose, on the Chief Minister whose Daimler remained
unsold, and whose colleagues' Mercedes had still not been disposed of), 40
but that would prove nothing. What - asked Kaputin - was there to be
ashamed of in being affluent? His antagonist accused him of choosing
urban prestige investments: on the contrary, he chose precisely those
investments which would yield the greatest dividend for the improvement
of rural life among subscribers to Mataungan funds (the New Guinea
Development Corporation). If these happened to be urban prestige
investments, should he, as responsible investor, eschew them? Who said
- he asked - that Papua New Guineans had a moral obligation to invest only
in trucks and rural trade stores, irrespective of profit? If responsible
investors, like Kaputin, steered clear of the most profitable investments, then
where would funds come from, for rural improvement? To these questions,
in these terms, there is no answer. Since the missions began operating in
Melanesia, by and large driving for self-sufficiency through plantation
investment, it is not very surprising that Papua New Guineans should
Donald Denoon
284
***
Finally foreign affairs have impinged slightly upon the Papua New
Guinea political scene. When the year opened, some Papua New
Guineans were drawing analogies between themselves and the East
Timorese, who also shared an island with the Indonesians. The closer the
analogy, the less comfortable for the analysts. It was clearly important for
the government to be seen to have a foreign policy, at least insofar as
concerned relations with Irian Jaya. Towards the end of February the
Prime Minister warned his citizens not to involve themselves with West
Irianese, who were seen to be rebels against legitimately constituted
authority.' 3 The Minister for Foreign Affairs then announced that he had
been involved in trying to bring together representatives of the Free
Papua Movement and the Indonesian government; and that the failure of
these endeavours could be blamed on the Irianese. 44 Within two days there
was a student demonstration against the Indonesian Embassy, over East
Timor. The students trampled the Indonesian flag; and although they
apologised the following day, the government was acutely embarrassed by
the public scene.'5
What made the issue embarrassing was that there was probably a great
deal of sympathy for the cause of the East Timor political groups who did
not wish to be incorporated into Indonesia, but that it was quite
impossible for Papua New Guinea to pursue a foreign policy at variance
with that of Australia. Dependence upon Australia continued to be the
cornerstone - if not the whole edifice - of the foreign policy of the
independent country. Early in March the government rejected the first two
reports of the Commission of Enquiry into the Standardisation of Selected
January-June 1976
285
28
JULY-DECEMBER 1976
David Hegarty
July-December 1976
287
two or three new resource projects within the next decade sufficient to
allow them to dispense with aid. Internally joint ventures (local
participation and foreign capital), individual and corporate
entrepreneurship, and the extension of cash cropping to increase earnings
of the local monetary sector are vigorously promoted with little regard for
the resultant loss of autonomy and social inequality. Recent government
policy statements indicate planners are aware that inequalities are
becoming entrenched and that dependence is long-term but see the only
alternative as a concentration on rural development and promotion of
resource projects "slowly" to reduce dependence on foreign aid. It is
sufficient to note that when World Bank and IMF missions visited late in
the year they endorsed the government's economic and fiscal policies.
A further aspect of the neo-colonial condition is found in the role
played by the political elite. Writing largely with respect to post colonial
East Africa, Colin Leys observed that neo-colonialism is not only a
particular mode of imperialist policy toward ex-colonies but it also
assumes a characteristic form of social, political and economic life within
ex-colonies particularly those in which the transition to independence
passed smoothly and left power in the hands of a regime "based on the
support of social classes linked very closely to the foreign interests which
were formally represented by the colonial state". 5
In PNG the class situation is complex. Embryonic classes have
emerged but for historical and other reasons the pattern varies from
region to region and such stratification as has occurred is cross-cut by
tribal and other loyalties. Class consciousness is minimal and it does not
yet make sense to describe PNG politics in class terms. The most obvious
developments have been the emergence of an educated, largely urban,
petty bourgeois strata whose aspirations and anxieties were described in
the previous political chronicle, and in rural PNG, where the
peasantisation process is well under way, a "big farmer" or "rich peasant"
class or group has emerged. It has also been reported that the extension
of cash cropping and animal husbandry in parts of the Highlands has
resulted in permanent landlessness and tenancy for a small but increasing
proportion of the population. 6 In the towns a small working class has
formed, but the union movement is not particular strong.
The orientation of the ruling political elite drawn from these various
strata is clear. By and large it favours the present development strategy,
the pro-Western direction of foreign policy and the continuation of a large
foreign presence. There is a clear convergence of interest among the elite
which is reflected both in the state of the political parties and in the
absence of any ideological opposition. The parties, with the exception of
a period of attempted mobilisation prior to the 1972 elections, have
remained as they began - parliamentary factions. Initially there were
differences between the two major parties - Pangu and United- over the
timing of independence and in their nationalist rhetoric, but their
approach to contemporary issues is virtually identical. All parties are
capitalist oriented and have engaged in business activities either through
288
David Hegarty
July-December 1976
289
290
David Hegarty
Political tensions generated in the review period derive from two basic
sources: the forthcoming elections scheduled for May 1977; and the ongoing friction between politicians and bureaucrats characteristic of many
former colonies. The elections had originally been scheduled for this year
but the opposition and government backbenchers for scarcely concealed
reasons forced a postponement. As the final year of the third Parliament
wore on, the Prime Minister had increasing difficulty maintaining a
majority on the floor of the chamber. Members of Parliament competed
vigorously to speak in the hope that their constituents would hear their
names "called" on the radio and consequently government business
suffered. Party solidarity which had been strong only in the first eighteen
months of Parliament virtually collapsed. The United party, largely
through the efforts of a newly hired research officer, attacked the
government on a broad range of issues and had one notable success in
forcing the government to withdraw a "Public Order" Bill but this did not
prevent the Pangu and United parties drawing closer together. On the eve
of the Independence anniversary, Sir Tei Abal, United party and
opposition leader wrote that he would support Michael Somare for Prime
Minister after the next election. 14 The United party, in fact, is split into
two if not three factions and thus speculation about any range of
coalitions next year was feasible. The government was embarrassed by
the persistency of Paul Langro (West Sepik Regional) in seeking some
government action on behalf of the Irianese refugees, but the Prime
Minister was even more embarrassed at the exposure of the frequency and
cost of international trips which his ministers were making, 15 provoking
an uproar amongst his backbench when he persuaded Waitea Magnolias
(UP, Lagaip) to defect and join his ministry. 16 Iambakey Okuk and
Thomas Kavali who had previously been dismissed as coalition ministers
launched what journalists referred to as an "informal Highlands block"
designed to harass the government. Manoeuvring for possible coalitions
after the next election had begun in earnest and lists of potential partners
began to circulate. 17 One which gave considerable food for thought was
that which combined the leaders of the secession movements with the
remaining core of the CPC. The party political scene could almost be
described as that of the "outs" versus the "ins".
Tensions between bureaucrats and politicians arose for two reasons.
The first (and the one most common to new states) was that bureaucrats
felt they were entitled to more power on the basis of their experience and
qualifications than the generally poorly educated politicians. In addition
many senior public servants having recently arrived in their positions
began to look to politicians for policy directives and found them wanting.
The second and major bone of contention was the government's practice
of making both political and short-term appointments to senior positions.
The appointment to the chairmanship of the PSC of Rabbie Namaliu, a
Tolai graduate in history with a postgraduate degree from Canada who
had previously been private secretary to the Prime Minister and Provincial
Commissioner of East New Britain, sparked a hostile reaction from senior
July-December 1976
291
292
David Hegarty
North and South Korea. 24 Universalism, Sir Maori added, resembled but
differed from non-alignment. The benefits of such a policy are not
immediately clear. It is perfectly understandable for a new state to want
to avoid international friction. Perhaps also understandable is the
reluctance of the present regime to commit itself to a Third World bloc
given its belief that the special Australian relationship provides it with a
counterweight in negotiation with foreign investors. But in that case
"universalism" scarcely conceals its real international orientation. As
well, "universalism" offers no guide to policy on such issues as the recent
Indonesian invasion of Timor, nor is it likely to offer inspiration in
dealing with an Indonesia perturbed by the operations of a guerilla force
along their common border.
The second point of interest was the negotiations over the relocation of
the Torres Strait border between Australia and Papua New Guinea. In
June the Foreign Ministers of both countries had reached agreement on
many points giving PNG a substantially satisfactory result-25 Agitation by
the Islanders, disagreement between the Australian Foreign Affairs
Department and Aboriginal Affairs Department, and a row within the
Liberal party over control of offshore minerals had by the end of the year
stalled the agreement.
The third point concerned Michael Somare's visit to China in
September. The Chinese accorded the Prime Minister a warm reception
and spoke courteously of PNG's "struggle" for liberation. Papua New
Guineans at home, however, were reassured by the Post-Courier
journalist, Angus Smales, travelling with Somare, that the Prime Minister
was not "dazzled" by the reception and that although Somare liked
China's small scale technology he had no time for its ideology. On his
return Somare stopped over in the Philippines where, it appears, he was
more impressed by the slogans of President Marcos than of Chairman
Mao. Not long after his return Somare announced that the "New Society"
would be Pangu's objective in the forthcoming elections. 26
One of the more obvious difficulties which beset a chronicler located
in Port Moresby at the centre of the political system is to assess
accurately and adequately what is happening at the periphei"y. In days of
"kiap rule" the task was relatively simple. Politics was usually cast in
terms of local confrontations with kiaps, of "law and order" problems
concerning fights over land, women and pigs, of experiments with local
government structures or of general acquiescence. Political and social
change has proceeded at such a rate, however, as to make even a quick
survey difficult. In the period under review there were two features which
will be of prime importance for some considerable time to come.
Provincial government was the pace-setter. East New Britain, Eastern
Highlands, East Sepik and Central Provinces in addition to North
Solomons (Bougainville) established provincial assemblies thus providing
a new arena for political competition and patronage and doubtless
complicating legal and administrative arrangements within the new state.
The Gazelle Peninsula appeared set for another round of strife as the
July-December 1976
293
29
JANUARY-JUNE 1977
David Hegarty
National Elections
The first national elections since independence dominated political affairs
in Papua New Guinea in the first half of 1977. The coalition government
composed of the Pangu and People's Progress parties led by Michael
Somare and Julius Chan respectively was returned to office with an
increased majority. The United party (UP) again assumed the role of
opposition although this time with depleted ranks and its organisation in
considerable disarray. Immediately counting of the poll was completed (9
July), a period of uncertainty (similar to that following the 1972
elections) prevailed in which it was not clear which parties and groups
would form the government. Despite the substantial impact parties had
made on this election, the absence of a nationwide, integrative party
system produced a post-election situation in which the loyalties and
affiliations of many winning candidates were not known with any
certainty thus precipitating an intense period of lobbying for the support
of independents.
To most observers it appeared that Pangu and the Peoples' Progress
party (PPP) would have the required number - at least fifty-five in a
Parliament of 109 - to form the government. The UP however, in a bid
to wrest power from the incumbents proposed that a "national alliance"
led by former Governor-General, Sir John Guise, with UP leader Sir Tei
Abal as his deputy and incorporating the members of the United, National
and Country parties, Papua Besena and other independents, had sufficient
numbers to govern". 1 A smaller and hastily formed group known as the
"Alliance for Progress and Regional Development" (APRD) led by John
Kaputin and Fr John Momis, which claimed the support of most New
Guinea Islands members of Parliament as well as the support of the
Bougainville and East New Britain provincial governments, attempted to
play a "balance-of-power" role between the two bigger blocs. When the
numbers were ultimately tested in the vote for Prime Minister in
Parliament on 9 August, Somare decisively defeated Sir John by sixtynine votes to thirty-six. 2 The "national alliance" had seriously
miscalculated its strength and neither the "balancing" role nor the
claimed numerical support materialised for the APRD.
January-June 1977
295
296
David Hegarty
December quarter of 1976, but in fact fell in the March quarter of 1977.
Price control on certain items, the maintenance of a hard currency
strategy, and a revaluation of the kina against the Australian dollar by
thirteen per cent in December 1976 accounted for the fall in the CPI. 4
The hard currency strategy, however, had not attracted foreign investment:
in fact, disinvestment had occurred. 5 There was a slight fall in the
enumerated labour force and a drop in real wages, but neither appeared
to have had short-term political repercussions. The International Monetary
Fund had commented favourably on the stability and management of the
economy and PNG's credit was obviously reasonably good with
international lending agencies.
In broad areas of public policy and bureaucratic and political
management the government had performed satisfactorily. Despite some
cleterioration, stanclarcls, particularly in the fielcl of puhlic health, puhlic
services and infrastructural development, were generally maintained at
pre-independence levels. Since the collapse of the CPC-inspired
nationalist pressure group in 1975 the government encountered little
opposition to its general strategy. 6 The major political crisis to have arisen
-the attempted secession by Bougainville- had been resolved apparently
satisfactorily in 1976. (The issue of secession, however, was of
paramount importance within the Bougainville electorate.) In April the
government defused a potential conflict with the powerful Public Service
Association when it negotiated a three-year "pay deal" in which public
service salaries would be fully adjusted each six months in line with rises
in the CPI (with a limit of twelve per cent per annum), and in which long
service leave credits were brought in line with the private sector. 7
Table 1. Export Commodity Prices in PNG Currency
Commodity
Cocoa
Copra
Coffee
Tea
Rubber
(Copper
(% Small-holder Production*)
35
40
75
25
3
March 1976
K9l 0 per tonne
K 130 per tonne
K 1.46 per kilo
K0.95 per kilo
K0.615 per kilo
Kl.6 per kilo
March 1977
K2,006 per tonne
K230 per tonne
K4.56 per kilo
K2.57 per kilo
K0.773 per kilo
Kl.2 per kilo)
* 1971-74 figures
Source: Bank of PNG, Quarterly Economic Bulletin March 1977.
The policy area which aroused most consternation prior to the election
was that of foreign affairs and particularly that of PNG's relations with
Indonesia. Insofar as PNG has a foreign policy it is premised on a
reluctance to get involved with or offend other nations. The government
so far has consistently supported Indonesia's stance in relation to its
minority and territorial problems. 8 But their relationship is constrained by
a number of factors which include: the difficulties in administering the
500-mile PNG-Irian Jaya border; the existence of an 1,800 strong West
Irian liberation movement conducting guerilla operations into the province
January-June 1977
297
and around the border area; the attitude of the PNG elite to their
Melanesian "brothers"; and the particular perceptions of the Indonesians
of their status and role in the region. In January Somare visited Jakarta
and discussed with President Suharto the border issue, the movement of
villagers, the question of refugees, and the problem of guerrillas seeking
sanctuary on the PNG side of the border. On his return Somare stressed
that no agreement had been entered into regarding the repatriation of
"Irian J ayans hostile to Indonesia". 9
Late in April a statement attributed to the new leadership of the OPM
to the effect that PLO-type terrorist tactics might be employed throughout
the Pacific was reported in the press. 10 In May shortly after the
Indonesian elections, about three hundred Irianese were reported to have
crossed the border into the Western Province, and it was alleged that a
Sangaun (We_st Sepik) villager had been shot by Indonesian soldiers. 11
The government announced that it would send the refugees back and
disclaimed any knowledge of the situation across the border. This brought
angry reactions from journalists who were refused access to the border
and from Paul Langro, shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs, whose
electorate was in Sandaun. Langro alleged that a deal had been made
permitting "hot pursuit" of guerillas. Somare appealed on the radio for
people not to "panic" over the border problems. Although the issue did
not translate into any electoral significance (Langro, however, lost his
seat) it is bound to be a continuing source of tension in the PNGlndonesia-Australia "triangle".
The Torres Strait border issue was raised during the early months of
1977. After appearing to take a firmer stand by passing "national seas"
legislation in Parliament 12 the government then dropped the issue and
omitted it from the agenda of discussions with the Australian Prime
Minister, Malcolm Fraser, when he visited Port Moresby a few days later.
The lack of substance and consistency in foreign policy was further
highlighted when the Prime Minister contradicted his Foreign Minister
over the admission of Ugandan President, Idi Amin, to the
Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, 13 and by criticisms
contained in an attack on the Department of Foreign Relations by PNG's
Ambassador in New York, Paulias Matane. 14
Government policy which had undoubted appeal and which had begun
to build up momentum was that of the introduction of provincial
government. A two-tier system of government was decided upon for a
variety of motives not least of which was a genuine desire to decentralise,
and an attempt to defuse political pressure on, the centre. By mid-year six
provincial governments were in operation. To assist with the many
problems of such a decentralised system the government hired at
considerable expense a firm of international consultants (McKinsey & Co
Inc) to report and devise strategies for implementation. Apart from the
structural, financial, functional and legal problems which will arise
between two tiers, all of which are in some way compounded by the first
provincial government agreement with Bougainville being seen as a
298
David Hegarty
"model", the problem which surfaced first was that of the position of
national public servants in relation to provincial governments. Electorally,
however, the establishment of provincial governments was an obvious
"plus" for the government, while candidates in the election were quick to
see the support base which association with their provincial government
could provide. The interplay between these two tiers of government will
provide much of the substance of domestic politics throughout the
foreseeable future.
The last session of the 197 5-77 national Parliament was held in
February-March but by then the attention of members was focused
elsewhere. Tore Lokoloko, the UP member for Kerema, was elected to
succeed Sir John Guise as Governor-General, Sir John having resigned in
February to re-enter the political arenaY In February the constitution was
amended to include the provision on provincial government. Relations
between parties and leaders were strained by the government's attempt to
rush through legislation. Former minister, Iambakey Okuk, leader of the
recently formed "Highlands bloc", provided much of the criticism of the
government. In February he temporarily frustrated the front bench by
refusing leave to introduce offshore resource legislation on the eve of
Fraser's visit. 16 Later he questioned the Minister for Justice, Ebia
Olewale, on why John Kasaipwalova was the "first political prisoner" in
Papua New Guinea. 17 The political party concept again came in for
criticism from a variety of viewpoints. 18
Public awareness of the impending election varied throughout the
country. In some parts people only realised that an election was being
held when the polling team arrived, but the overall turnout of voters (c.
sixty-five per cent) was consistent with previous elections. The progovernment Post-Courier gave the campaigning wide coverage and the
elections attracted considerable interest from foreign embassy staff with
the Australian High Commission being particularly interested in the
outcome. For a time early in the year it appeared that the UP had a
chance of winning power, an impression supported by a seeming
indifference to Pangu, of public criticism of ministerial performance, of
disillusionment among Port Moresby based public servants. with a "tired
government". On a short tour of parts of the country prior w polling it
appeared, to this chronicler at least, that the popularity of Somare was
widespread, the UP leadership was divided, no substantial criticism of the
government had crystallised, and that the advantages of incumbency in
terms of patronage would enable the governing parties to attract a larger
number of the uncommitted candidates (should they win) than would the
opposition.
Polling was delayed from May to June largely as a result of the
Electoral Commission's difficulties in compiling the rolls. Few census
patrols had been conducted in the intervening years and, as James Mileng,
the Electoral Commissioner, correctly pointed out, Parliament itself
contributed to the delay by rejecting the proposed boundary distribution
earlier in the year. Polling was conducted quite smoothly despite the
January-June 1977
299
The Campaigns
A total of 879 candidates stood for the 109 seats (compared with 611 for
100 seats in 1972) and they included about eighty public servants, some
of whom had held top positions. The tenor of the campaigns varied
considerably but in many electorates there was an awareness among the
candidates at least that power, privilege and access to government
resources was at stake now that the colonial "referee" had departed. This
was the first national election to be conducted on a "first-past-the-post"
system and there was obviously a greater awareness of the "arithmetic"
of the electorate. Candidates and party organisers, particularly in the
Highlands, calculated clan voting strengths and in many instances votesplitting tactics were employed whereby a candidate would persuade
(often with financial incentives) other-clan candidates to run thus
reducing the chances of their opponents. There was also wider
recognition that a financial resource base and organisation was necessary
for success which led many actively to seek out party endorsement.
Provincial electorate candidates in some cases linked themselves with
open candidates and campaigned for each other, a method which proved
strikingly successful for Fr John Momis and his "ticket" on Bougainville.
Many ministers as would be expected sought maximum publicity for the
various activities (official openings, etc.) and some, like Boyamo Sali,
Minister for Primary Industry, were in a position regularly to announce
increases in commodity export prices and to propose small resource
projects (e.g. forests) in their electorates.
An analysis of the socio-political characteristic of candidates is
currently being prepared at the University of Papua New Guinea for a
forthcoming book on the elections, 19 but preliminary observations reveal
a number of characteristics different from previous elections. In part these
differences reflect the social differentiation occurring in Papua New
Guinea. These elections saw the demise of the older style big-men and
the rise of the "new men" drawn from the rural and urban elites. The bulk
of candidates tended to be "businessmen" of some sort or to have had a
corporation or a salaried income as a base. (Some had all three.)
General education levels were higher than in the past and the amounts of
money spent on campaigns increased dramatically. In the Simbu for
example the three leading provincial electorate candidates - Okuk, Kale
and Nilkare - each spent an estimated K20,000 or more. Expenditures
for all candidates are difficult to assess but most winners probably
spent in excess of K4,000 on their campaigns. In contrast, however, in
areas where early political mobilisation had occurred expenditure
appeared considerably lower. The successful Mataungans (although they
may be an exception) probably had individual expenditures of less than
K1,000.
300
David Hegarty
Political Parties
In the intervening years between elections party organisations had
generally atrophied. None had attempted to build a mass base and such
organisation as existed was dominated by a core of leaders and officials
in Port Moresby. The only significant development had been their entry
into business - usually real estate - with the aim of generating an ongoing source of funds. The lack of grass-roots organisation meant that
parties pre-selected candidates in an ad hoc manner with party officials
attempting to "spot" likely winners with large clan bases. Parties,
however, had a much more significant impact on these elections than in
the past. Pangu, PPP and UP endorsed 295 candidates and had reached
private "agreements" with many others should they win. Party "labels"
were more widely known throughout and although the concept of parties
had not penetrated to the villages many candidates were aware of their
significance both in terms of the financial support they could offer and
their linkage role at the national parliamentary level. There were more
direct contests between endorsed party candidates than occurred in 1972,
the "fear" of party attachment noted in previous elections having largely
dissipated. Disputants in local level conflicts on occasions adopted
national party labels - a feature not uncharacteristic of politics without a
developed party system.
In the months prior to the election all parties produced platforms
which reflected a clear convergence of ideology and policy. 20 They
were bland documents all emphasising rural development programmes,
foreign investment to stimulate industry and mineral resource projects,
extension of road and transport infrastructure, more education, law and
order, and the maintenance of stable government. Despite claims by
Pangu officials after the elections the policy differences with the PPP had
to be ironed out, the only discernible differences appeared to be Pangu's
slightly more cautious approach to foreign investment (viz. investment
"which truly benefits the people", compared with the PPP's "appropriate
incentives" and returns for investors and "reasonable royalties" for the
people). The PPP was also less emphatic about decentralisation and it urged
PNG's active cooperation with the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN). The UP platform was little different in substance but was
critical of the government on a number of points urging changes in the
Electoral Act, a four-year parliamentary term, a royal commission into the
public service, abolition of political appointments to the public service,
a reorganisation of the Education Department, and lower cost embassies.
One novel suggestion, that is for the UP, was for the establishment of
state farms. Papua Besena's brief platform was interesting for the fact that
no mention was made of separation from New Guinea although it was
implicit in advertisements. Besena had three slogans: "Justice" the thrust
of which was connected with the return of alienated land; "Integrity", a
critique of governmental and ministerial extravagance; and "Development"
which tended to emphasise the problems of urban Port Moresby. The
January-June 1977
301
302
David Hegarty
January-June 1977
303
304
David Hegarty
aligned with the coalition. Somare and Chan reaffirmed their partnership
agreeing that Chan should become Deputy Prime Minister and that
portfolios would be distributed, six to PPP, nine to Pangu and three for
Pangu-independents. 26 The major problem as they saw it was to obtain
wide regional representation in the ministry. Pangu toyed with the idea of
a "grand coalition" and, in fact, offered Sir Tei two ministries provided
he deiivered fourteen members to the government. The UP rejected this
and when the "national alliance" was announced with Sir John Guise as
its leader the division hardened. Somare was particularly antagonistic to
Guise having campaigned against him in Milne Bay. Guise, however,
extracted a statement from Chan to the effect that he (Guise) was a great
national leader. The entry of the Alliance for Progress and Regional
Development (APRD) onto the scene posed two problems for Pangu: it
tended to reinforce regionalist sentiment, and it appeared to split Father
Momis, whom Pangu was anxious to have in the cabinet, from the
coalition. Momis, however, was wary of Guise's intention to hold the
provincial affairs portfolio himself, and when both he and Kaputin
realised the numbers were with the coalition, decided to support it.
The vote for the prime ministership on 9 August revealed the following
support for Somare and Guise:
Table 2.
Somare
Guise
38
19
12
69
Pangu
ppp
Independents
Total
United party
Independents
Papua Besena
Total
25
5
6
36
Table 3.
Opposition
Government
ppp
38
20
Independents
Total
69
Pangu
II
United party
Independents
Papua Besena
Total
27
6
7
40
January-June 1977
305
March 1977
(102 seats)
August 1977
(109 seats)
24
10
12
3
7
(54)
25
16
7
3
3
(54)
38
20
9
2'
42
32
10
3
1
(46)
2
(48)
Government
Pangu
ppp
Independent
MA
National'
(Total Government)
-'
(69)
Opposition
United
Country'
National
Independent
Papua Besena
(Total Opposition)
27
1'
I
4
7
(40)
Notes:
I. National party split early in 1976 with the expulsion of Okuk and Kavali from the
ministry.
2. Country party was formed in May 1974.
3. Kaputin, still MA, sits as independent opposition.
4. Kavali, once leader of National party, now describes himself as "pro-Pangu
independent".
5. Pondros.
6. Okuk.
The most obvious result of these elections has been the rise in strength
of the two major governing parties and the decline of the United party.
The explanation for this can be reduced to five factors: the favourable
political and economic climate which has prevailed since the government
took office in 1972; the notion among members that being "with the
government" is essential to gain access to goods, services and rewards;
the absence of a credible alternative; the popularity of Somare and Chan
306
David Hegarty
(i.e. the personality factor); and sound patronage politicking by those two
leaders.
The regional representation of the government is now quite wide - the
only provinces in which it has minimal support are Enga, National
Capital and Central. Pangu, in addition to its support bases in Morobe
and East Sepik, improved its membership in Sandaun, Madang, Simbu
and, quite strikingly in the Eastern Highlands. With the two Mataungans,
Tammur and ToKereku, and Kavali and three Western Highlands members
of Parliament joining Pangu as pro-Pangu independents its strength is
considerable. Pangu, however, lost ground in Papua, notably with the loss
of three ministers, Kiki, Rea and Taureka. The PPP improved its
membership in the Papuan provinces of Milne Bay and Western and
gained surprising support from the Southern Highlands where Chan had
assiduously cultivated area authority members.
The United party lost ground in Madang, Sandaun, Simbu and the
Eastern and Southern Highlands. It is now more obviously a Highlands
based party. Papua Besena won all but two of the eight seats in the
National Capital and Central Provinces, but, despite considerable support,
failed to make electoral ground in the rest of Papua.
Conclusion
January-June 1977
307
30
JULY-DECEMBER 1977
David Hegarty
Politics from July through December 1977 revolved largely around the
settling in of the re-elected government, the sharing out of the spoils of
office. the dispute between the government and the heads of the defence
and police forces. and the affirmation or adaptation of government policy.
Government
The election of Michael Somare as Prime Minister over his opponent, Sir
John Guise. by sixty-nine votes to thirty-six provided a clear indication
of government and opposition support in the new Parliament. In the
governing coalition Pangu and pro-Pangu independents numbered fifty
(including the Speaker) while the PPP mustered twenty MPs. (Pangu later
increased its ranks by defections from the opposition.) Initially there were
to be eighteen ministries - a number supported by the Public Service
Commission and the Ombudsman - of which Pangu would have nine,
pro-Pangu two, and PPP six. 1 Four days after this allocation Somare
unilaterally increased the ministry by four and announced the creation of
eight Parliamentary Secretary positions. 2 This move, which gave each of
the twenty provinces representation, was designed to give the cabinet a
"national" appearance and to stifle criticism both from provinces where
government support was high and from previously unrepresented regions.
This brought the total number of executive positions to thirty and when
to that is added the speakership, the deputy speakership and the
chairmanships of the various parliamentary committees which carry
privileges above that of an ordinary MP, the proportion of those involved
in some form of government activity in a Parliament of 109 is quite high.
In the new ministry Pangu has eleven portfolios and four
parliamentary secretaryships, PPP has seven and four, while pro-Pangu
MPs hold four portfolios. The PPP did well in the allocation with eleven
executive positions for a parliamentary party of twenty and, although it
does not dominate the "economic" portfolios as it did in 1972, the
ministries which it has all have large budgets and most have extension
activities and/or functions which can be utilised for patronage purposes.
The basis for Pangu's allocation amongst its own members appears to
have been firstly seniority within the party (no minister was dropped),
July-December 1977
309
Opposition
The opposition in the new Parliament consisted of the United party,
Papua Besena, and a few independents. Sir Tei Abal was re-elected
opposition leader and in August selected his shadow ministry. 4
Dissatisfaction within United party ranks precipitated an attempted "spill"
of offices and moves were made for Sir John Guise to replace Sir Tei as
leader. The basic causes of this dissatisfaction were that Sir Tei has
played a largely supportive role for the government in the past: that his
leadership lacked dynamism and he was under the influence of white
officials in the United party (notably Wally Lussick, a former MHA and
a founding member of the party) and that the composition of the United
party had changed significantly with the election of younger and more
ambitious men to its ranks. Moves for the "spill" were made after a
budget reply speech by John Jaminan (shadow finance) was denied by
Martin To Vadek (UP deputy leader) as not representing UP policy.
Jaminan countered by saying that he would not take orders from any
white man, and a petition was circulated to remove Sir Tei.
The attempted takeover, however, was stalled largely because of the
tight hold exercised over the United party executive by Sir Tei and his
officials and by the lack of a clear procedure for succession within the
United party. However, with a depleted and divided formal opposition,
effective criticism of government passed to an informal "ginger group" of
MPs drawn from all sections of the chamber. The ideological position of
this "ginger group" which includes Tony Bais (Pangu), Noel Levi (PPP),
John Jaminan (UP), Iambakey Okuk (NP), Michael Pondros (Country
party), John Kaputin (Mataungan), is essentially one of economic
nationalism. The group's concerns were evident in its move in the
September session of Parliament to establish a select committee on
foreign business interests (and those of naturalised citizens), and in
various statements made by its members. PPP parliamentary secretaries
John Noel and Noel Levi vented their concern by attacking the GovernorGeneral's address to Parliament on general government policyP Jaminan
criticised the government budget for its continuing dependence on foreign
aid. Kaputin queried the position of four naturalised citizens in the
ministry 6 and ridiculed the Minister of Commerce, Pita Lus, for his
naivete on the motivation of foreign investors. 7
310
David Hegarty
Papua Besena has aligned with the opposition for obvious reasons. The
movement does not regard the government (which it claims is dominated
by New Guineans) as legitimate but there is some division between its
two most prominent spokesmen- Josephine Abaijah and James Mopioover what parliamentary role it should play. 8
Coup d'etat?
July-December 1977
311
312
David Hegarty
July-December 1977
313
Foreign Policy
Papua New Guinea persists with its policy of "universalism", that is a
314
David Hegarty
July-December 1977
315
31
JANUARY-JUNE 1978
David Hegarty
Leadership Code
In national Parliament on 3 March, Prime Minister Somare surprised
politicians, administrators and observers alike by proposing a more stringent
code of leadership. 1 In his statement to Parliament the Prime Minister said:
For some time now ... I have been increasingly disturbed by some ofthe trends
I see in our country. I have become convinced that there are dangerous
tendencies at work in our society and that if allowed to continue these
tendencies will corrupt our policies, subvert our efforts at national
development, and set us on the wrong road.
The tendency which worried the Prime Minister most was that national
leaders, both politicians and bureaucrats were becoming too closely involved
with foreign business interests "for the good of our people". Leaders, he
said, were putting themselves in a position where they were bound to be
tempted to place personal gain above the national interest. Michael Somare
reminded MPs that their duty and responsibility was to the people from
whom their power derived. He called for a "decisive change in outlook" to
prevent the graft, corruption and domination of decision-making by foreign
interests, characteristic of other Third World countries, developing in Papua
New Guinea. How, the Prime Minister asked, "can the minister or senior
official who has urban business or large property interests really make
decisions which will promote the rural areas? And how can the leader who
accepts a share in a foreign company deal honestly with that company when
it seeks licences or other favours from the government?".
The option proposed by the Prime Minister was either politics or
business. The revised code envisaged that "national leaders" - defined as
ministers, departmental heads, heads of statutory bodies, the Leader of the
January-June 1978
317
It appears also that the Prime Minister saw in the code an opportunity to
overcome the impression that he was tired, uninterested and had lost his
grip on the government, and thus to regain his status and authority. A
point not missed by observers, however, was that after his statement to
Parliament he and his supporters retired to his office for a champagne
toast. 3
Strong opposition to the code mounted quickly, both privately and
publicly. Behind the scenes the Australian High Commissioner in
particular lobbied the Prime Minister to change his mind on the grounds
that the code had socialist implications and that it would produce
instability in the coalition. Some Pangu ministers and aspiring ministers
had reservations about it. The leader of the People's United Front,
Iambakey Okuk, opposed it and successfully passed a motion in
Parliament to establish a tribunal to investigate ministers' business
interests. 4
The major thrust of opposition to the code came predictably from
318
David Hegarty
the junior partner in the governing coalition, the People's Progress party.
Although the PPP initially approved the code "in principle", its leader Julius
Chan, was clearly annoyed at the lack of consultation on the code and
suggested that if the Prime Minister had evidence of corruption among
leaders it should have been exposed. Various members and spokesmen for
the party raised objections to the proposal, namely: that the Prime Minister
had been insufficiently explicit in defining a "conflict of interest"; that there
was no distinction between assets acquired before leaders took office and
those acquired since; and that the administration of the government trust
would be difficult and costly, particularly if unprofitable businesses were
to be taken over. Chan emphasised the point that the code would stop
experienced and talented men entering politics. In effect, the code was a
threat to the survival of the PPP.Its leaders had substantial business interests
(although Chan explaineci that he was only a "dormant shareholder" in his
family's business) and party loyalty was built around a form of patronage
whereby members became shareholders and directors of party and other
businesses.
By May it was clear that no compromise could be reached and that
a split in the coalition was imminent. PPP backbencher, Warren Dutton
(North Fly) said that the code could destroy the coalition and that mutual
trust could never be re-established. 5 Dutton and other backbenchers
announced that they would vote against the code. On 25 May, Prime
Minister Somare decided to shelve the code, giving as his reasons the
"volatility" of Parliament and the desire to avoid instability. Apart from the
PPP dissent, the struggle for the leadership of the opposition (see below)
in which some government backbenchers participated raised doubts about
the government's ability to muster a majority on the issue. A week later,
however, under backbench and ministerial pressure, the Prime Minister
announced that he could re-present the leadership code at the August session
of Parliament.
Budget and Planning
In February the Finance Minister brought down the budget for 1978.
Estimated government expenditure was set at kina 486 million which
anticipated a three per cent growth in government expenditure for the year
and a reduction of two per cent in the real value of Australian aid.
Measures to increase internal revenue included increased duties on selected
luxury and semi-luxury imports; a restructured personal income tax system
which increased tax rates for higher income earners; the abolition of the
tax-holiday scheme except for businesses totally owned by nationals; and
a broadening of the fifteen per cent dividend withholding tax to cover all
dividends paid. 6
Simultaneously the Prime Minister introduced the first National Public
Expenditure Plan designed as a first attempt to control and redirect
government expenditure. The introduction to the NPEP admitted that
the "eight aims" promulgated in December 1972 and by which the
January-June 1978
319
320
David Hegarty
32
JULY-DECEMBER 1978
David Hegarty
The climax to a tense political year arrived in November when the ruling
Pangu-People's Progress party coalition government broke up after more
than six years in office. The PPP withdrew from the coalition after a
cabinet reshuffle had effectively demoted its ministers. Prime Minister
and Pangu leader, Michael Somare, retained power however when his
party was joined on the government benches by its long-standing opponent,
the United party. Although the reshuffle precipitated the split, its catalyst
was undoubtedly the leadership code dispute which had raged since early
March. Pangu and PPP had been at loggerheads since then over the Prime
Minister's proposed code designed to prevent corruption in government
by excluding national leaders from private business. Opposition leader,
Iambakey Okuk, sensing a tired and divided government, joined issue and
the ensuing power struggle produced perhaps the most turbulent period in
Papua New Guinea politics since the constitutional debates of 1974.
Leadership Code Dispute
In the Political Chronicle for January-June 1978, it was noted that
compromise between Pangu and PPP over the code was unlikely. In fact
four different versions of the code were prepared but no common position
could be reached. Fr John Momis, Minister for Decentralisation,
assuming the role of Pangu's spokesman, based his arguments for the
code on the need to change the country's economic and political structure
currently characterised by foreign monopoly and influence. 1 He later
extended his critique to encompass "the beginnings of a comprador class
which provides a convenient bridgehead for the continued onslaught of
foreign capita1". 2 If the "basic principles of equal and collective
development" were to be achieved, he argued, the code was necessary to
demonstrate to the people that the government identified with them, was
responsive to them, was restrained in advancing its own interests, was not
satiated with power, and was not subject to foreign influence. He
criticised those who argued that business and politics went hand-in-hand
in Papua New Guinea society, and that business experience was a
prerequisite for successful political leadership. On the contrary he
declared that traditional leadership in Papua New Guinea was not basically
322
David Hegarty
acquisitive but distributive and that the "big man" usually acted as the
custodian of community wealth. 1 (Prime Minister Somare was later to
argue that "big men" are directly accountable to village society.)4 Momis
also warned that Pangu had made too many concessions to the PPP in the
past and that the Nationalist Pressure Group might be reconstituted in an
attempt to provide nationalist leadership.
The PPP which had had its compromise proposals of a strengthened
Ombudsman and a parliamentary register of business interests rejected by
Pangu, argued, in summary, that the code was unworkable, that it did not
reflect societal values, that it would be a drain on the public purse, and
that it would deprive the individual of the right to accumulate wealth. Its
spokesman, Sergius Arek, said in part: "The proposed Code is foreign in
concept. It is an exercise in ideologies and its practicality is most
Juublful" .5 In TanJ:auia wht:rt: a 1>imilar c.;uJt: haJ bt:t:n inlruJuc.;t:J il haJ
failed to check corruption in the middle and lower ranks of government.
Arek said the PPP did not want to split the coalition, but it demanded
consultation by its coalition partner on such important issues.
Iambakey Okuk was more explicit in his rejection of the code on the
grounds that it was socialist in inspiration. "We believe in a private
enterprise system. The present government, despite all its fancy talk, does
not. The proposed Leadership Code shows just how much the present
government is under the influence of people who don't want business and
industry to expand, but who want all the power to be kept by Government
and their public service bureaucrats."" Early in August Okuk declared his
own assets which included a coffee factory and urban real estate. 7 Papua
Besena leader, Josephine Abaijah, said the code would have no effect for
"corruption and patronage" has been built into the system and the
compensation scheme was hypocritical. She argued that: "The only way
to remove corruption is to change the system, not to monkey with it.
There should be no Ministers, no privileges, no luxuries and few overseas
jaunts. All politicians should be on the same level and have the same
authority". 8
Opposition Challenge and No-confidence Motion I
With the government divided and personal enmity between its members
quite apparent, Okuk and his advisers orchestrated an attempt to topple
the government. Their strategy had essentially four elements: firstly, to
consolidate opposition numbers; secondly, to create further division in
government ranks; thirdly, to seize the initiative and dominate the media
through criticism of government performance; and fourthly, to expound
an alternative policy.
Having captured the opposition leadership in May and formed a
provisional party, the Peoples' United Front (PUF), Iambakey Okuk then
reached agreement with UP leaders, Raphael Doa and Roy Evara, and
Papua Besena MPs, to form a coalition in opposition. Meetings and
manoeuvring with dissident and potentially dissident government members
July-December 1978
323
went on throughout June, July and August. Reports that talks had taken
place with the PPP in July were denied, but it was later revealed that
considerable discussions had been held over the possible formation of a
new government. The PPP was obviously split with a substantial group
urging Chan to join with Okuk. Okuk also sought to strengthen his
Highland base by gaining the support of Highland provincial
governments. Using the media effectively the opposition criticised
ministers' expensive overseas trips, ministers' failure to exercise authority
over their departments, and the government's scheme to standardise
expatriate public service contracts which it said would result in an exodus
of skilled personnel. The opposition called on the Prime Minister to
resign and in Parliament in August moved a motion of no-confidence in
the PPP Minister for Transport, Bruce Jephcott, over allegedly misleading
the House, in the hope of attracting wide support from MPs. In the
August session Okuk spelled out his investment policy, the first in a
series of statements which if he came to power his group would
implement. It argued that the National Investment and Development
Authority (NIDA) was too restrictive in dealing with investment and that
a greater inflow of foreign investment was necessary to end dependence
on aid." (NIDA had also been a target of Chan's criticism). The
opposition, he said, would reverse the government's "socialism" for the
opposition believed that "profit was not a dirty word".
The scene was thus set for an intriguing week in Parliament. On 17
August, Roy Evara, deputy leader of the UP, moved the first ever motion
of no-confidence in an elected government, claiming that it was divided
and unfit to govern. 10 Under the constitution one week must elapse before
a no-confidence motion debate takes place, and another MP must be
nominated as the alternative Prime Minister. In this case Okuk was
nominated.
On 21 August Prime Minister Somare sought leave of Parliament to
introduce legislation governing the leadership code. With Parliament in
uproar PPP voted solidly with the opposition to deny the Prime Minister
leave, and the leadership code legislation was later struck from the notice
paper.
On 24 August the no-confidence motion was debated and defeated by
the government, sixty-eight votes to thirty-five, as the coalition held firm.
Evara, speaking to the motion accused Chan of breaking an undertaking
that if the leadership code was blocked his party would support the
motion of no-confidence. Okuk described Chan as "deceitful" and
deserving of a knighthood. Chan replied that he had no apology to make
for holding discussions with the opposition in the interests of stable
government and said that those who had speculated on the divisions in
the PPP were wrong. Other speakers denigrated the "power politics" of
the session, for which Okuk himself made no apology reminding MPs
that: "If you are not hungry for power then you should be working for the
missions and reading the Bible all the day". The Prime Minister said that
the code would return when he could be certain of a fifty-five-vote
324
David Hegarty
July-December 1978
325
Outcome
The outcome of this power struggle was that a change in the composition
of the government occurred but it did not signal any immediate change in
policy. The economic nationalist group has been strengthened in the
ministry and in time we might expect some attempts at tackling the
question of foreign control of the economy. If those attempts merely
reflect the current demands from national entrepreneurs to reserve areas
such as real estate, transport and plantations for nationals then little
fundamental restructuring is likely to take place. The withdrawal of the
PPP meant the loss of some experience in cabinet but, given the limited
extent to which ministers have provided direction in the past, this may
not pose too great a problem. Fairly even regional representation was
maintained both in government and opposition. The result also reemphasised the centrality of Michael Somare in the formation of any
government in the current context of Papua New Guinea politics.
Australian media comment on the split tended to stress the instability
of Papua New Guinea's political situation. In a parliamentary system in
which the parties are essentially factions and in which party
identifications are loose and loyalties built largely around personalities,
shifting alliances and coalitions are bound to occur. On this occasion the
parliamentary dispute became particularly heated, and the Prime Minister
was heard to question whether the parliamentary system was really
appropriate, but the opposition challenge and change of government was
conducted entirely within the constitutional framework. The ructions in
Parliament were not a reflection of popular disaffection or bureaucratic
breakdown.
326
David Hegarty
Other Issues
Other issues and events which arose during the July-December period and
which at various points in time related to the power struggle concerned
criticisms of the process of decentralisation; questions of foreign policy;
and problems of maintaining "law and order". These issues will only be
noted in this review and taken up in future chronicles.
Conference papers delivered at the University of Papua New Guinea's
Waigani Seminar revealed mounting criticism of the decentralisation
process and demonstrated considerable divergence of views on the
desirability of provincial government. All indications were, however, that
the concept was popularly accepted and that the process would be very
difficult to reverse. 14
In July th~:: Imlunesian guvermnenl launched a month-long offensive
against the Irianese liberation movement, the OPM, following the
abduction of Indonesian officials by the OPM in May. The offensive
brought a flood of refugees (as many as 1,000) across the border, and it
was reported that Indonesian soldiers had crossed into Papua New Guinea
territory. Prime Minister Somare, obviously concerned, raised the matter
with Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew apparently in the hope
that the ASEAN states might exert some pressure on Indonesia. The
Australian government reportedly protested to the Indonesian government
about the scale of the operation. Concern and anger was expressed by a
number of Papua New Guinea politicians and student protesters but the
government's course of a tougher line against the OPM was not altered.
In October, Jakob Prai, military leader of the OPM and his "defence
minister", Otto Ondawame, were captured by police in the west Sepik
town of Vanimo where they had arrived in the hope of seeing Prime
Minister Somare. They were subsequently jailed for two months for
"illegal entry" into Papua New Guinea. The government resisted
Indonesian demands for their deportation and requested the UN
Commissioner for Refugees to find a third country for their asylum.
In December Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr Mochtar
Kusumaatmadja, arrived in Port Moresby for talks and announced that
Indonesia had agreed upon a "new policy" for Irian Jaya, that it would
not demand the return of Prai nor an extradition treaty with Papua New
Guinea, and that it desired a revision of the "rudimentary" border
agreement. 15 Papua New Guinea's Foreign Minister, Ebia Olewale, said
that the border issue had become an emotional domestic issue and
reiterated that his government was based on humanitarian principles and
was thus placed in an awkward situation.
The Torres Strait border agreement between Papua New Guinea and
Australia was successfully concluded in November with a rather unique
bilateral arrangement for a resource-sharing zone.
At the South Pacific Forum in Niue in September division occurred
between member states over proposed American membership of the
Pacific Regional Fisheries Agency. Papua New Guinea along with Fiji
July-December 1978
327
took the lead in opposing America's entry, signalling the country's first
major independent step in its foreign policy.
Problems of controlling increasing rural and urban crime rates were
highlighted by a series of attacks on defendants held in police custody. A
cabinet sub-committee was later established to investigate possible longterm solutions.
Conclusion
If there was an underlying theme to the politics of 1978 it was one of
concern for the country's post-colonial direction. Competing views
emerged on both the nature of the problem and on possible solutions.
There was a concern amongst some over the pattern of neo-colonial
politics, and the leadership code itself with its explicit criticism of elitism
and of the emerging comprador class was the most obvious manifestation
of this. For others neo-colonialism was not an issue. The clear
implication of the opposition's revised policy and criticism of the
government's alleged "leftist" orientation was that the creation of a stateassisted bourgeoisie had been restrained by the government's emphasis on
"redistribution", and that the capitalist road to "development" had been
obstructed by a restrictive investment policy.
Two points should be noted about these views. Firstly, neither would
necessarily achieve the objective of reducing dependency. The leadership
code, although a "progressive" step, by itself, without a sustained
ideological programme and the development of political machinery to
support it, would probably not succeed in containing acquisitiveness or in
inducing greater responsibility. Okuk's policy would almost certainly lead
to the entrenchment of dependency. Secondly, while superficially there
would appear to be considerable ideological distance between these
views, pragmatism won out.
The pattern of post-colonial politics is thus firmly established. The
"shake-out" which appeared imminent in June 1978 occurred but its
consequences at this point in time do not appear to be particularly farreaching. The economy remains aid and trade dependent. State power is
in the hands of a political and administrative elite, or in class terms,
shared by a loose alliance of an educated petty bourgeoisie and a rich
peasantry. The rhetoric of redistribution is still current but the essentially
accommodative political and governmental style ultimately works in the
interests of those with the most economic and political clout. Internal
crises are managed in ad hoc fashion, the key to their resolution being
political expediency and the dispensation of patronage. Despite the
emergence of tentative and often confused ideological positions the
"pole" of political attraction remains the centre.
328
David Hegarty
APPENDIX A
PNG Ministry at 1/llnS (former position in brackets)
Pangu:
PPP:
APPENDIXB
PNG Ministry at 8/IIns. (former position in brackets)
PANGU:
July-December 1978
UNITED PARTY:
**
329
On the eve of the second motion of no-confidence Kavali left the government. His ministry
was later taken by John Noel who left the PPP during the coalition split.
33
JANUARY-DECEMBER 1979
Stephen Pokawin
Government
Having been in power since 1972, the government under Michael Somare
has moved away from an earlier attempt to adopt ideological guidelines
under the rhetoric of the Eight Point Aims, 1 and later National Goals and
Directive Principles/ to the day-to-day upkeep of government. In 1979
the government concentrated its efforts on responding to crisis situations.
Even though the government was not seriously threatened, it was faced
with conditions of instability which raised doubts about its ability to
provide effective leadership and government. Nineteen-seventy-nine was
the most tumultuous year of the decade. The government was faced with
industrial strikes, threats of strikes, moves by the opposition political
parties to topple the government, widespread rural complaints about
neglect on the part of governments, accusations of mal-administration and
mistreatment of villagers by government officers, apparent lack of
solidarity within the National Executive Council, claims of near anarchy
due to alleged breakdown in law and order, alleged constitutional
violation by the executive arm of government, and ineffectiveness of the
public service. 3
The government frequently employed delay tactics and committees to
counter confrontations and demands from its many constituencies. Instead
of acting to resolve the issues, it has displayed initial interest to appease
the people, and has then either set up a committee or referred the
decision to a committee. In the meantime it has expected that people may
cool down and forget about it. Among the committees in 1979 were:
committee of inquiry into the Waigani fire; committee of inquiry into the
disturbances at Hanuabada; committee of inquiry into alleged
mistreatment of villagers at Menyamya; committee of inquiry into the
prison unrests; committee of review into local level government; constitutional review committee; committee of review into information services;
ToRobert committee investigating the public services; and the emergency
committee. When deadlock was reached between the unions and the
employers, the conflicts were referred to the Arbitration and Conciliation
Tribunal for decision. This approach to government was indicative of the
indecision and half-hearted policies of the Somare government in 1979.
January-December 1979
331
332
Stephen Pokawin
Provincial Government
Provincial governments in 1979 proved to be an important level of
government to deal with. This was due to the leadership and commitment
of the Minister for Decentralisation, Fr John Momis, and the enthusiasm
and determination of the provincial governments to establish themselves
effectively in their respective provinces. By the end of the year thirteen
provinces had elected provincial governments, while six (Sandaun (West
Sepik), Simbu, Western Highlands, Southern Highlands, Enga and
Morobe Provinces) continued to operate under the Interim Arrangement
Act. With the establishment of provincial governments the responsibility
and process of allocating scarce resources came under the watchful eyes
of the villagers. Decisions and actions of the leaders became subject to
close scrutiny. Consequently, the villagers have become politically
mobilised. 9
On 8 November the East New Britain provincial government
successfully engineered a move which caused the national Parliament
promptly to enact legislation empowering the provinces to run lotteries.
Similarly, soon after the National Executive Council decided for a multimillion kina Ramu Sugar Project, Oro and East Sepik Provinces
spearheaded a coup in favour of small-scale sugar projects. The Minister
for Primary Industries a few days later announced his flexibility in
accommodating small-scale projects. 10
The provincial governments also faced numerous problems. Antipolitical party feeling was widespread. In the New Ireland Province the
election of Robert Seeto as Premier led to accusations of PPP's
involvement in provincial government politics. This resulted in a series of
resignations from members of the secretariat. The anti-party feeling
repeated itself throughout the country. 11 Furthermore, it was alleged that
provincial governments were misusing public monies. Members of the
national Parliament were particularly critical over this issue. They
attempted to acquire control over this aspect of provincial government by
suggesting the powers of the Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee
extend to the provincial governments. 12 And in April, the interim Premier
of East New Britain, Koniel Alar, and his Deputy Speaker, Hosea Biu.
were jailed for organising an illegal police force. 13
Foreign policy
In 1979 Papua New Guinea came out unreservedly against a continuing
"colonial" presence of metropolitan powers in the Pacific. At the South
Pacific Forum meeting in Honiara, Solomon Islands, the Foreign Minister,
Ebia Olewale, championed the cause for self-determination for the French
Pacific territories. 14 He repeated the stand at Papeete during the 19th
South Pacific Conference when he waived protocol to address a public
rally organised by pro-independence parties. 15
From 4 to 6 June, Papua New Guinea played host to President
January-December 1979
333
334
Stephen Pokawin
Yonki hydro-electric complexes, the Port Moresby bus drivers, the Port
Moresby waterside and seamen's union, the national air pilots employed
with Air Niugini, the Papua New Guinea Teachers Association, the Public
Services Association, the national nurses employed with the Department
of Public Health and the Bougainville mine workers union. 19 In all these
cases the issues revolved around improved and better working conditions
and government or company decisions which were considered detrimental
to the interests of the workers.
Strikes and demonstrations extended to the villagers and the student
population. In addition to the tertiary students' strike of May, students at
the national high schools at Aiyura and Kerevat staged a boycott of
classes. The villagers employed protest marches to government offices to
demonstrate their dissatisfaction at decisions made by the government on
matters attectmg them.
State of Emergency
January-December 1979
335
Premdas/Rooney Affair
The single most serious crisis to be faced by the government was what
has become known as the "Rooney affair". 24 It began with the
government's deportation order to Dr Ralph Premdas, an academic with
the University of Papua New Guinea. Dr Premdas unsuccessfully
appealed to the ministerial appeals committee. Premdas then sought and
was granted a staying order from the National court to enable him to
appeal further against the decision. In response the then Minister for
Justice, Nahau Rooney, communicated in writing with the Chief Justice,
Mr Justice Prentice, outlining her views on the role of the judiciary in the
Premdas case. The communication was treated by the Chief Justice as an
attempt by the Minister for Justice to interfere with the operation of the
judiciary which he claimed under the constitution was not permissible.
The situation led to the involvement of the public prosecutor who later
disclosed another communication from the Minister for Justice regarding
the case of another minister, John Kaputin. The Minister for Justice was
tried by the Supreme court, whose members were party to the conflict,
and sentenced to eight months' imprisonment. The government responded
by invoking the power of licence vested in the Minister for Justice which by then had been assumed by the Prime Minister - to release the
imprisoned former Justice Minister. The Act led to massive unrest in the
prison and among the university students. More than 200 prisoners
escaped from major prisons in the country. The students staged
demonstrations and public campaigns to remove the government from
power. It was accused of acting unconstitutionally and creating the
situation whereby it was seen that the laws of the country were not
applicable to all people alike. Dr Premdas was deported from the country
well before the Rooney affair erupted.
Before the situation had a chance to calm down, the Supreme court
sentenced another minister, John Kaputin, Minister for National Planning
and Development, to ten weeks' imprisonment after finding him guilty of
336
Stephen Pokawin
not complying with a court order to file the 1977 report of the New
Guinea Development Corporation with the Registrar. The decision
shocked the government but no action was taken to remedy what was
regarded as blatant mal-administration of justice. The situation culminated
in an obvious conflict between the judiciary and the executive arm of
government. The Rooney affair led to resignations of five judges of the
National and Supreme court, including the Chief Justice. Soon after the
government appointed Mr Justice Wotten from New South Wales as Chief
Justice and the government took an historic step in appointing the first
Papua New Guinean judge, Murray Kapi, who was then the state
solicitor. 25
Political Mobilisation
Nineteen seventy-nine ended a decade of broad political mobilisation
among the people of Papua New Guinea. All decisions made by the
national and provincial governments as well as private enterprises became
subject to political action from groups who were affected one way or
another. Decisions regarding development of projects, roads, expansion of
towns, establishment of major projects, became issues of contention
between the authorities and the people who opposed the decisions. The
increasing tendency for the people to demand high compensation
for work done on their land was seen to increase towards the end of
1979. Similarly the loss of lives through accidents or tribal fighting
was followed by concerted moves from relatives for high
compensation. Compensation has become a matter of political concern.
Instances are abundant. The building of the highway through the Central
Province has led to demands by the people whose land the road
passes for K400,000 compensation. The government responded by setting
up a committee to look into the issue. The cannery which was to be
built in Manus Province was, as a result of concerted opposition from
the villagers and the defence force, moved out to New Ireland, even
though the Manus provincial and national governments had approved the
project.
Similarly the women were politically active in influencing
decisions. The women's groups in Western Highlands spearheaded
support for the government in its attempt to restore peace among
conflicting groups in the Highlands. The women in other provinces were
also very active in the affairs of the nation as well as the affairs of the
provinces. 26
The country was provoked by the publication of a naked Papua New
Guinea female advertising the perfume Eve. The flow of protest from all
quarters eventually forced the agency to modify the form of
advertisement of the product.
These instances were indicative of massive involvement of the people
in the process of influence in the country. The political nature of 1979
ended a decade which was politically sensitive and volatile.
January-December 1979
337
1980 Budget
On 6 November the Minister for Finance, Barry Holloway, handed down
the 1980 budget. Of the total of K573.8 million, departmental
expenditures topped the appropriations with Kl87.7 million to be
followed by Kll7 .9 million grants to the nineteen provinces. The
breakdown of revenue sources showed internal sources fifty-four per cent,
Australian grant-in-aid thirty-two per cent, and borrowing fourteen per
cent.
End of a Decade
1979 ended a decade which shall go down in the history of Papua New
Guinea as a landmark. In one decade PNG saw an end to direct
colonialism, the rise of the national elites to power, a vigorous attempt at
establishing international status, and an intense questioning of the status
quo. A late starter among the colonised, Papua New Guinea in her quest
for human dignity, independence and equality had before her the
experiences of many Third World countries. However, the odds were
against her. On the national and international scenes, the effects of
colonial rule overshadowed the initial stages of the country's postcolonial period. The paternalistic concern of Australia, the former
colonial power, and the dependent attitude of the national elites and the
populace dominated the affairs of the decade under the ideology of good
government, political and economic stability and creditable international
reputation along the capitalist line coated with socialist rhetoric.
The chronicle for 1979 is a culmination of a decade indicative of a late
starter.
34
JANUARY-DECEMBER 1980
David Hegarty
January-December 1980
339
340
David Hegarty
Numbers
20
18
8
6
7
1
Ministries
7
5
3
3
6
1
Total
60
25
As the year progressed more members of the United party and a small
number of pro-Pangu MPs switched to the new government while a small
number of coalition MPs drifted to the opposition.
The constituent elements of the coalition appeared to have little in
common other than a discontent with the previous government. Indeed on
many major issues such as decentralisation, foreign investment, separate
status for Papua, the leadership code, and citizenship, the coalition
partners had previously been on opposite sides of the political fence. This
was in part reflected in the initial coalition agreement, in which the
parties bargained both for the number of ministries per party and for the
right to allocate portfolios among their own members - thus, from the
outset, reducing the Prime Minister's control over his ministry.
Policy
The Prime Minister, in his "State of the Nation" speech to Parliament on
24 June, addressed a number of policy themes and issues. 8 On the
economy he suggested that his government was primarily interested in
restraining the inflation rate which had risen to 11.6 per cent - a rise of
five per cent over the previous months; creating a favourable investment
January-December 1980
341
342
David Hegarty
manager of the airline as well as two senior national executives who had
publicly opposed the minister and had supported a strike by airline
employees, and replaced the members of the National Airlines
Commission with his own nominees. Okuk's intervention was vindicated,
in part, by the release in late June of the Ombudsman Commission's
Interim report on Air Niugini which analysed the financial decline of the
company and suggested that, "up on the penthouse level where
management lives we have discovered a den of iniquity".
On the law and order front, the government detailed recent increases in
crime11 and announced more funds and improved conditions for the police
force, and a new Department of Community and Family Services which
it hoped would provide coordinated youth development policies. Police
Commissioner Philip Bouraga established a "special squad" of plainclothes police to tackle the problem of urban "rascal" gangs, a move
which was later to bring him into conflict with his minister, Warren
Dutton.
The government (or at least part of it) continued to support the process
of decentralisation. In Parliament in July, Decentralisation Minister, Fr
Momis, reviewed the progress of devolution. In the period of three and a
half years all but one of the nineteen provinces had held democratic
elections, but only four provincial governments (North Solomons, East
New Britain, New Ireland, and Eastern Highlands) had attained complete
financial autonomy. The administration of provinces had been reorganised
so that all public servants in the field came under the umbrella of a
provincial department headed by a Secretary with the same status as a
head of department in Port Moresby. The central Department of
Decentralization was also trimmed and reorganised so as to provide better
budgeting, planning and management support to provinces. Fr Momis also
pointed to the problems of decentralisation which included an excessive
interest in the "perks" of office by provincial members, lack of liaison
between national and provincial members, administrative overlap between
the two tiers of government, financial mismanagement by provinces, and
the reluctance of provinces to devolve powers to the local-level
community governments. Late in the year the government had to bail out
four provinces in debt, but took steps to impose tighter financial controls
by requiring forward budget estimates and monthly reports from all
provinces. It also prepared a constitutional amendment giving cabinet
power to suspend poorly managed provincial governments.
Criticism of the decentralisation process continued to be heard from
academics, journalists and national politicians. 12 The most ardent critic
was Deputy Prime Minister Okuk who seized the chance of undermining
provincial governments by deciding in cabinet (with Chan, Momis and
Kaputin absent) to allocate sectoral transport programme funds, which
would normally have gone from the central government to the provinces,
directly to national parliamentarians. 13 Okuk's explanation was that these
allocations would significantly increase the power and status of national
MPs vis-a-vis provincial governments, but with the Agriculture and Health
January-December 1980
343
Ministers following suit with their sectoral funds, it opened the way to
the abuse of government expenditure for blatantly political and personal
purposes. Cabinet was clearly divided on this issue, but Momis did not
have the numbers to rescind the decision.
In foreign affairs the government did make a number of shifts in
policy, and scored considerable political kudos through the intervention of
defence force troops in the Santo rebellion in Vanuatu. A series of
statements in Parliament by Foreign Minister Noel Levi - based largely
on a preliminary report by Australian academic consultant, Ted Wolfers
- indicated the abandonment of the previous "universalism" policy and
the adoption of a policy of "selective engagement". In July Noel Levi
said that PNG's areas of primary concern "obviously include our
immediate neighbours, Australia, Indonesia and Solomon Islands and our
major economic partners" . 14 Levi was critical of the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan (and subsequently PNG stopped a Soviet tourist cruise ship
from embarking in Madang); expressed concern at the plight of refugees
from Kampuchea and Vietnam; and was pointedly critical of both colonial
and racist regimes. This was not a significant departure from the policy
of the Somare government, but in late November Levi informed
Parliament of the government's new approach:
We intend to engage our energies and resources with those countries,
international organisations and issues, which are of greatest concern to us.
Our approach will be one of selective engagement in accordance with
Papua New Guinea's national interests, and our human, financial and other
resources. 15(my emphasis)
344
David Hegarty
January-December 1980
345
The Finance Department estimated the cost of the aircraft at K29 million
over the next few years, excluding the cost of upgrading airstrips in
provinces where the aircraft would be used. (Naturally one of those
airstrips was in Okuk's electorate.) Prime Minister Chan declined to
discipline his deputy, and cabinet, after long and heated debate, agreed to
the Dash-7 deal on the basis that it was time for Air Niugini to refleet.
Throughout this and other disputes (which included the Air Niugini
affair, a motion of no-confidence - partly inspired by Okuk - against the
PPP's Police Minister, Warren Dutton, and Okuk's proposal for a "minibudget") Prime Minister Chan maintained a low-profile approach. He
appeared content to be a mediator and conciliator. Commentators could
not agree on the effectiveness of this style. In the early months of the
new government some saw the combination of the "manager" (Chan) and
the "hit-man" Okuk as a dynamic duo. Later, it was held that Chan was
astutely allowing Okuk sufficient rope to hang himself prior to the 1982
elections. By year's end, however, there was agreement that the coalition
partners were completely out of step and that Chan had lost all semblance
of control. Chan's proposal in his State of the Nation address for a code
of ethics for ministers was nowhere to be seen, and allegations of petty
corruption against national politicians were as frequent as they had been
in the last months of the Somare government. As for the other coalition
partners, only the Melanesian Alliance (which adopted a manifesto calling
for social justice in December)1 9 appeared intent on "holding the line"
against irresponsible government spending.
While the approach to government of the new regime may have
differed in some respects from that of its predecessor, the Ombudsman
had no illusions that the style of leadership had changed significantly. In
his annual report for 1980 the Ombudsman said:
Many leaders have got themselves involved in private businesses by instigating
business groups or family businesses. Some Leaders obtained loans from
the Banks which were guaranteed to be repaid from funds to be made
available from the Village Economic Development Fund (VEDF). Some
people jokingly stated that the name Village Economic Development Fund
is a misnomer, it should be called "Leader's Economic Development Fund". 20
The Ombudsman also complained that the total amount of bad debts
and dishonoured cheques on the part of leaders had continued to increase.
Conclusion
Nineteen eighty ended with speculation about the stability and longevity
of the Chan government. It was reported that Okuk had approached
Somare with a view to a coalition between the National and Pangu parties
with Okuk as Prime Minister. Somare's response was that he and Okuk
were "good friends", but he later indicated that he would not serve in the
"number two" position. 21 The Bank of PNG also warned the government
that its economic policy direction was now suspect. The bank's Quarterly
346
David Hegarty
Economic Bulletin reported that the hard kina strategy was damaging the
export sector; that the profitability of importers stood in marked contrast
to the plight of exporters; that no discipline had occurred in levels of
government spending; and that the trend of financing increased
government expenditure through international borrowing was dangerous.
The Governor of the bank, Sir Henry ToRobert, suggested that fiscal
policies were undermining economic stability; his diagnosis: "We are
currently living beyond our means". 22
35
JANUARY-DECEMBER 1981
Peter King
The new governing coalition of March 1980 led by Sir Julius Chan
continued its sway throughout 1981 against many expectations and
perhaps against the odds, but it was a different coalition by year's end.
Several ministers had been pressed into resigning for indictable
misbehaviour, and the leader of the United party, Roy Evara, who had
been sacked as Primary Industry Minister by Michael Somare in the
declining months of the first post-independence government, was sacked
once more in September 1981 - and from the same portfolio. (A racial
gibe against the Prime Minister's part-Chinese ancestry came on top of
clear evidence of disloyalty.) 1
A perennial question was posed. Would the leader of the United party
lead his party out of the coalition? In the event, ministerial office proved
to have special charms in a pre-election year, and a United party substitute
was found in deputy leader Paul Torato, who moved over from Justice to
Primary Industry. The cabinet team - Julius Chan's People's Progress
party; Iambakey Okuk's National party; Evara's United party; Galeva
Kwarara's (after April, when Kwarara came under a cloud, Gerega Pepena's
Papua Besena); and Fr John Momis' Melanesian Alliance - played on,
and the United party itself was scarcely disturbed. Roy Evara stayed
leader, despite Paul Torato's claims as a member of the government.
As for Michael Somare's opposition Pangu pati, it soldiered on rather
dimly and alone, gathering inspiration only as campaigning for the 1982
elections got under way towards year's end.
Government Disunity
The PNG party system has shown great vitality of a kind in the years
since independence. The parties, having little ideological distinctiveness,
or discipline, or grass roots support, are not very cohesive, even in
government. But what the governing parties have lacked in coherence
they have made up for in openness. Rows are frequent and usually public.
In the first six months of 1981 the chief opposition leaders de facto were
actually inside the coalition. The leading Melanesian Alliance ministers,
the 'two Johns', Kaputin and Momis, stood up frequently to the
348
Peter King
January-December 1981
349
funds for personal and political purposes was a constant complaint of the
Pangu opposition, the Melanesian Alliance ministers, most provincial
governments, and almost all commentators. Okuk and Evara argued that
provincial government had made national MPs redundant and that the
sectoral funds could serve to restore their authority and usefulness. Critics
argued that the sectoral funds made a mockery of provincial planning and
were cynically designed to secure the re-election of favoured sitting
members and thus consolidate support for the ministers managing the
overall patronage flow.
Other election run-up moves included the Deputy Prime Minister's
freewheeling deal to lease/purchase Canadian Dash-7 aircraft for Air
Niugini at a cost of K27 million. (The deal, although not authorised in
advance, was endorsed by the National Executive Council in April.) The
Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister argued that refleeting was
timely and that the Dash with its short take-off could bring quality
service to additional airports. The Finance Minister and most
commentators argued that refleeting was unduly expensive and quite
unnecessary, and that the deal was election-motivated - and also ethically
questionable. 6 (The Ombudsman Commission is known to have looked
into the Dash deal, but dropped its enquiries following NEC
endorsement.) The 1982 election was by year's end the bigger issue of
1981. What were the others?
Provincial Government
The heroic post-independence experiment of setting up nineteen extra
parliaments for three million people held its popularity in 1981, but
performance was still very patchy. A great debate about decentralisation
and the state of the nation erupted several times between Deputy Prime
Minister Okuk and Decentralisation Minister Momis during the year. In
a speech during a fund-raising visit to Australia in July, and in an epic
exchange of letters with Okuk in November, Fr Momis contended that
PNG was a neo-colony undergoing moral, economic and political decline;
that Okuk's activities were a large part of the problem; and that the
decentralisation process was essential to keep leaders under popular
control, tap latent energies and nationalist consciousness, and share
equitably the growing burdens of recession. Okuk wished for Fr John's
early return to the church, and declared that he was sabotaging the
government. Okuk condemned the expense, mediocrity, and incoherence
allegedly inherent in provincial government and called for four regional
governments. Fr Momis spoke for responsive grass-roots democracy and
defended the provinces (his own, North Solomons, in particular) and his
department against the ravages of the sectoral programmesJ
East New Britain, North Solomons and Morobe clearly were going
well, but the list of problem provinces was long, and local people kept up
a barrage of letters to the press about them. Nevertheless high hopes still
rested on decentralisation. Despite the overseas trips, collapsing business
350
Peter King
Resources Development
"Gearing up" in Western Province and elsewhere for Ok Tedi gold and
copper to come on stream was all the rage in 1981, but the start-up date
for mining kept slipping - which could pose a serious threat to national
finances after 1986 when the latest five-year Australian aid agreement
runs out. And as the authors of the Jackson Report on the overall impact
of Ok Tedi had feared in 1980, the national government was doing
precious little to ensure economic spin-off and local benefit in the North
Fly region from the biggest resource project in the country's history. 8 The
aspiring province of North Fly, seeking to defect from Western Province
for Ok Tedi's sake, was seemingly stopped in its tracks in September by
a timely handout, but forward planning remained exigious. 9 Towards
year's end Bougainville Copper Ltd was sporadically under siege as the
people of the North Solomons, the most prosperous province in the
country, geared up to get extra millions in BCL royalties and also
substantial equity in the mine. 10 It began to appear that prosperity was
being near a copper mine. Certainly the country will not escape its
extreme dependence on copper and gold sales before century's end.
Copper and gold were at least manageable revenue earners for the
national government. Transfer pricing by foreign companies seeking to
hold down local earnings and thus tax payments is not a great problem
with these commodities. But on other fronts questionable resource deals
were gathering momentum in 1981. Fish and timber exploitation and
exports were definitely not under control. Primary Industry Minister
Evara was under fire for much of the year from Sir John Guise and the
three Papuan coast Premiers for issuing fishing licences to the Utama
Company in which his brother had an interest, and which was using joint
venture Taiwanese boats. 11 His United party successor in the DPI
portfolio, Paul Torato, promised reform, but by year's end the Taiwanese
boats, detained for poaching, had escaped custody and fled to Singapore. 12
In forestry the big deal was with the Filipinos. The Hetura Meja
company won a tender to develop the huge Vanimo timber resource in
partnership with East Sepik Province and the national government. The
rumours of pay-offs on this KlOO million deal seemed to be well
confirmed by release of correspondence implicating the previous
government, by the strange on-again, off-again tendering process which
cut out several reputable non-Filipino logging companies, and by the
startling revelation that Hetura Meja had no timber-getting experience in
its own right, but would rely exclusively on sub-contractors for logging.U
If the Vanimo deal is the wave of the future, and it may be, Hetura's
offer to prop up Wesdeco, the terminally ailing Sandaun provincial
government business arm, was a wavelet. The offer was finally rejected
and Wesdeco allowed to collapse gracelessly in November; 14 but with
January-December 1981
351
352
Peter King
January-December 1981
353
354
Peter King
36
JANUARY-JUNE 1982
The Economy
The perception that the world economic recession and highly depressed
commodity markets were likely to last for years rather than months
gradually came to dominate Port Moresby political debate in the run-up
to the national elections of June 1982. After its first quarterly review for
1982, the Chan government made cuts of K9 million in the budget which
it had brought down in November 1981. This figure represented the exact
reduction in payments to revenue from the Mineral Stabilisation Fund which will continue to be fed almost exclusively by levies on Bougainville
Copper Ltd until the Ok Tedi gold and copper project comes on stream in
1984. 1 Bougainville, the most profitable copper mine in the world, began
to make losses in 1982 with the copper price at 75 cents US a pound.
Mineral revenues had thus become a collapsing contribution to general
revenue, joining copra, cocoa, and coffee; and Australian aid, although
itself declining, now represented a rising proportion of the budget for the
first time since independence in 1975. K9 million was also the sum which
the government in effect decided to seek as relief from Australia in May
when it sent a team to Canberra to ask for immediate remission of the
five per cent per annum aid cuts being made under the current five-year
aid agreement which runs to 1986. Total aid receipts as given in the 1982
budget figures were K198.6 million - K197 million of them Australian. 2
The gold price had been sufficiently low for sufficiently long to justify or
"trigger" the making of the relief request under the five-year agreement.
The failure of economic recovery - which was still expected late in
1981 -to appear early in 1982 led to marked anxiety on two scores- the
government's poor administrative and economic performance in
consuming no less than forty per cent of a Kl.5 billion GNP, which was
shrinking in real terms; and social polarisation between those tied in to
the modern sector of the economy - especially to government services
and perks - and the ninety per cent of people beyond government safety
nets in the rural subsistence sector. A Canadian researcher, Professor Michael
Trebilcock, released a devastating report on the profit and employment
creating performance of statutory bodies in April; 3 and Port Moresby
hospital - to name but one - seemed on the point of collapse several
356
times early in the year. 4 Sectoral funds for transport, agriculture and
health continued to be allocated at the discretion of national MPs rather
than through provincial governments as originally intended; and the
National Fiscal Commission strongly condemned the system in February,
recommending that a fiscal agreement be drawn up between ministers,
national MPs and provincial governments before allocation of the funds. 5
Decentralisation Minister John ~v1omis summarised the NFC's finding
thus:
The Fiscal Commission left no doubt that two ministers of the national
government, one of them Deputy Prime Minister [Okuk], had quite
recklessly taken over public money intended for the poor of this country
and allowed it to be squandered .... Years of precious work to build up
vital standards of objectivity and accountability were steadily wiped out by
these ministers .... The Agriculture Minister of the day [Evara] lacked any
finesse at all. He handed money sometimes only to his political supporters
among the MPs and his opponents got no money for their areas.
January-June 1982
357
Authority criticised the failure of the Hetura company to inject its own
capital into the project, while also condemning a flood of half-baked
business proposals and backdoor dealings traceable to carpet-bagging
Filipino businessmen. 9
The national government had also come under heavy fire for its role in
another, inadvertent resources deal in March following the seizure of the
American tuna boat Danica in PNG waters. In the wake of a court order
for the confiscation of the Danica, the Prime Minister found himself
under pressure from the US owners and the American Embassy on the
one hand, and from economic nationalists - including the Department of
Primary Industry - on the other. The result of a rather chaotic negotiation
was interpreted as a sell-out by the Times and a triumph by the Prime
Minister- who claimed that the US had at last recognised PNG's 200mile economic zone. The buy-back price of the Danica was K200,000,
three per cent of its estimated value and equal to the owners' first asking
price. The agreement on licence fees for future American tuna fishing
rights will yield only one-third of the amount paid by Japanese vessels of
comparable size. 10
Apart from resource deals, two other moves scandalised observers
concerned with either the political weakness or the propensity to selfenrichment of PNG's governing class. One was the cut-price release of a
large parcel of enormously scarce and valuable Port Moresby residential
land to a whos who of bureaucratic, political and business notables in
June. 11 The other was government support for NBC Chairman Leo
Morgan's fresh initiatives to introduce commercial television. 12 This latter
episode, which involved hired-gun international consultants, was the
stimulus for a transparent hoax by a cabal of expatriate journalists in Port
Moresby, who got under the guard of the credulous Post-Courier and the
NBC itself. 13 Critics attacked the spending of money on television while
radio is still poorly developed and half the country's children are unable
to find primary school places.
The National Election
From April onwards the national election campaign began to dominate the
political scene almost exclusively. Campaigning had begun in earnest
during late 1981 as the various parties held national conventions, adopted
party platforms, and pre-selected party candidates. The eight significant
parties (Pangu, People's Progress, National, United, Melanesian Alliance,
Papua Besena, Papua Action and the PNG Independent Group) endorsed
about sixty per cent of the 1,125 candidates who contested the 109 seats.
The term "endorsement" has a variety of meanings in Papua New Guinea.
In some cases candidates were committed party supporters; in others,
candidates were only sympathetic to the party or its leaders; and in others
again candidates approached parties in the hope of receiving financial
support. Some candidates were endorsed by two or even more parties.
Party platforms were quite similar in substance, calling for more rural
358
January-June 1982
359
360
Results
Election polling was carried out between 5 and 26 June. In terms of voter
support for party endorsed candidates, Pangu clearly outpolled every
other party and, at the close of counting, had won fifty of the 108 seats.
(One seat was to be contested late due to the death of a candidate before
the poll.) Table I reveals the extent of support for each of the parties.
Candidates of Pangu won more votes than other parties in three of the
four regions. In the northern region it won twenty-four of the twentyeight seats, consolidating its traditional support bases, and it later won the
support of two other MPs in that tegiun. Tl11:: Mdam:~ian Alliam;~
outpolled Pangu in the Islands region and won eight seats overall, but lost
two MPs to Pangu in the post-election lobbying. The PPP's votes were
evenly spread throughout the country but it lost support in the northern
region. The National party, surprisingly, polled quite weakly, particularly
in the Highlands. Diro's PNG Independent Group polled well in Papua
and made inroads in other regions. The United party retained a small vote
in all regions, winning nine seats, but losing three of these to Pangu after
the count. The secessionist wing of Papua Besena disappeared, while its
non-secessionist wing, the Papua party, managed to retain three seats. The
Papuan Action party did not win a seat.
Table 1. Candidates percentage: Vote percentage: Seats Won
Percentage
Candidates
Endorsed
PANGU
PPP NP
DIRO*
PAP
MA
UP
PBt
IND.
TOTAL
17
13
1.2
6.4
1.2
41.2
Percentage of
Total Vote
Obtained
34
10
10
6.0
0.8
8.6
7.2
1.6
20.9
Number of
Seats Won
14
13
108
50
The next chronicle will discuss the results of the ballot for Prime
Minister on 2 August and the party composition of the new Parliament
compared with that of the former Parliament.
Voter turnout for the 1982 elections was approximately sixty per cent
of the eligible voting population (18 years and over) which continued the
pattern of previous elections. Of the 103 incumbent MPs who contested,
only fifty retained their seats, again continuing the pattern of a high
turnover of incumbents. 20 Twelve of the twenty-seven ministers in the
January-June 1982
361
37
JULY-DECEMBER 1982
Peter King
On Monday, 2 August 1982, over a month after the end of polling for the
national elections, the national Parliament elevated Michael Somare to be
Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea for the third time. Somare's margin
over the outgoing coalition's last-minute nominee, Fr John Momis, was
sixty-six votes to forty, ending weeks of confused and largely futile
factional manoeuvre for control of the new government. The process was
begun on the morrow of the election result by the defeated National party
leader, Iambakey Okuk, who sensationally nominated General Ted Diro retired commander of the Defence Force, newly elected MP for Central
Province, and leader of his own Independent Group - to lead the National
party in the new Parliament. The merger of the two parties which
followed effectively blocked a Diro-Somare coalition because the new
alignment was too large for Somare's purposes. On the other hand, the
constituent elements of the old Chan coalition could not agree on a new
governing formula despite considerable but misplaced confidence in their
ability to stop the Pangu party in Parliament.
In the event Somare once again chose the lacklustre United party, under
Roy Evara's still disputed leadership, as governing partner, and the parliamentary vote of August gave him eleven more supporters than a bare
majority in the 109 seat Parliament. The new ruling coalition consisted of:
fifty Pangu MPs; eleven MPs who were either independent or who switched
to Pangu from other parties immediately after the poll or just before the
parliamentary ballot; and six United party MPs. The new National party
leader, Diro, defeated the Melanesian Alliance leader, Fr Momis, for the
position of Opposition Leader by eighteen votes to seventeen and the opposition line-up was then: nineteen National party (i.e., fourteen "old" NP and
five Diro supporters); six Melanesian Alliance; three Papua Besena, and
thirteen People's Progress party. Sir Julius Chan chose to take minority party
status for his PP rather than throw in his lot with the official opposition.
Despite an election promise to trim the size of the ministry in a time
of severe recession, and despite Pangu's unprecedentedly strong
parliamentary position, Somare announced a cabinet of 26 on 4 August only one short of the constitutional maximum of twenty-seven allowed
under section 144(i). The pressures to maximise patronage, and appease
July-December 1982
363
coalition partners and potentially wavering independents and partyswappers, were evidently too great for "the Chief'; but it was an
uninspiring start.
The full cabinet consisted of:
Michael Somare (East Sepik) Prime Minister
Paias Wingti (Western
Highlands)- Deputy Prime
Minister, Minister for National
Planning & Development, and
Minister for Primary Industry)*
Mathew Bendumb (Bulolo)Transport & Civil Aviation
Rabbie Namaliu (Kokopo)Foreign Affairs & Trade
John Nilkare (Simbu) - Decentralisation
Casper Angua (Bogia) - Labour
& Employment
Barry Holloway (Eastern
Highlands)- Education
Pato Kakaraya (Wapenamanda)
- Works & Supply
Pundia Kange (lalibu-Pangia) Corrective Institutions and
Liquor Licensing
Martin Tovadek (Gazelle)Health
Philip Bouraga (National
Capital) - Finance
Bebes Korowara (Goroka) Lands
*
**
Primary Industry passed later in the year to Dennis Young (Milne Bay),
So mare's first choice for Speaker.
Pondros was suspended on a corruption charge in November and his portfolio
was taken over by Media Minister Boyamo Sali.
364
Peter King
July-December 1982
365
366
Peter King
38
JANUARY-JUNE 1983
Peter King
368
Peter King
January-June 1983
369
370
Peter King
Affairs Department argue that the trespassing border road has poor acces~
to present and planned transmigration blocks, and that its purpose is
purely military - to cope with the OPM and perhaps the PNG Defence
Force in the border area. The outspoken ex-kiap and MP for the North
Fly electorate in Western Province, Warren Dutton, agrees (North Fly
borders the Merauke kabupaten.) In one popular scenario, the area of
Western Province south of the so-cailed "Fly bulge'' between the Fly
River, the Gulf of Papua and the border is "taken out" by the Indonesian
army in double quick time to constitute a buffer against OPM interference
in the progressive Javanisation of the Merauke area. 14
If Papua New Guinea was suffering various forms of neo-colonial
pressure chiefly from its two big neighbours in early 1983, there was yet
a third putative friend to beware of. The new Japanese Ambassador to
PNG, Makato Taniguchi, stated frankly in April that Japan was frustrated
by PNG's strict planning guidelines and other bureaucratic obstacles
standing in the way of tied aid. Japanese aid to independent PNG leaving aside long-term low interest credits to finance hydro schemes has totalled a mere K2.2 million - for a Fisheries College in Kavieng,
New Ireland. Japan, taking forty per cent of PNG's 1981 (K220 million)
-mostly copper, coffee, fish and timber exports and producing 16.7 per
cent of her imports (K125 million), would like to undertake new forestry
and fisheries projects, but insists on Japanese consultants and
contractors. 15 Enthusiastic senior ministers in PNG have been unable to
help the Japanese get around the National Planning Office, and perhaps
some of them felt relieved that they had failed after an episode of heavyhanded resource diplomacy in April. Sohbu Trading Corporation operates
a large timber lease at Open Bay in West New Britain, and also owns a
fishing venture, Pacific Seafoods, which the tax office has assessed for
Kl.84 million in back taxes owing as a result of transfer pricing practices.
The notorious distaste of Japanese companies in PNG for "downstream"
processing of primary products seemed to be well illustrated by the
mysterious burning down and non-replacement of a sawmill provided for
in the original Open Bay lease agreement. Despite Open Bay's supposed
failure ever to turn a profit in nine years of operation (average loss was
put at Kl million a year), the company and the embassy fought long and
hard for lease renewal when the PNG government announced in April not for the first time - that the lease would be terminated in June. Hints
were dropped in Tokyo that financial aid to PNG could be affected. 16
Although there must be a strong suspicion that Sohbu practises transfer
pricing in log as well as fish exports, the PNG government backed down
for another six months. It would surely be even more vulnerable to~
yennish pressure if Japan were allowed to develop a strong presence
through project aid.
On the domestic front, destabilising developments for the Pangu
government stood out in the first half of 1983. Iambakey Okuk, despite
being Deputy Prime Minister and throwing perhaps the largest beer party
in .history - at Kundiawa, Simbu - lost his seat in his own province, at
January-June 1983
371
the June 1982 national elections. But from April to July 1983 he made a
remarkably easy come-back in his wife's district through a hotly contested
by-election. The new member for Unggai-Bena, Eastern Highlands, who
had nominated General Diro as his successor at the helm of the National
party after his 1982 defeat, then rapidly returned to the leadership of both
the National party and the opposition by a constitutionally curious
process of acclamation. An embarrassed and diminished General Diro was
left in limbo with his surviving, mainly Papuan following. 17
The Somare leadership was extremely nervous at first as the
uncrowned king of the Highlands resumed his flamboyant parliamentary
- and extra-parliamentary - ways. 18 But without his shrewd and
sometimes inspired white handler from his days in government, Jeff Wall,
Okuk's manoeuvres seemed to have lost their touch, and Highland
defections from the Pangu pati in Parliament were quickly contained. It
was at this time that Gabriel Ramoi, the apparently underage Pangu
backbencher, self-professed socialist and immediate past president of the
University of Papua New Guinea Students' Representative Council, made
the unforgettable remark that the opposition consisted of all MPs without
a ministry.
The other issue threatening to unhinge the numerically sound Pangu
government early in the year was industrial action against the so-called
dual salary structure. Expatriate salaries are two to three times as large as
national ones for the same work in the public sector, and are fleshed out
with free travel, free schooling and free housing. The system is very
unpopular among citizens, but, when the Public Employees' Association
(PEA) called a twenty-four hour stop-work in February, the government
played tough. The Public Service Minister, Tony Siaguru, and the
chairman of the Public Services Commission, Renagi Lohia, threatened to
sack all striking public servants - ineffectually as it turned out. 19 The
government was groping for a cosmetic solution which would abolish the
dual salary structure in principle and on paper without destroying
incentives for skilled foreigners to take employment, or blowing out the
government wages budget to an extent that would cripple development
spending. This was to come in the second half of the year.
Meanwhile University of Papua New Guinea students, already aroused
by the recent "de-localisation" of their vice-chancellorship, alleged
corruption at the university, 20 and descended on Parliament in support of
the PEA. Student placards denounced elected leaders as stooges for
foreigners and called for a tough new leadership code which would end
land dealing and insist on the sale of leaders' business interests to the
state. The students were met with dogs, tear gas and vocal support from
the opposition, who scented massacre and dictatorship in the air. 21 It
seemed possible that the linked issues of foreign privilege, foreign
interests and foreign influence had arrived at the top of the political
agenda a decade after self-government. But the uncomfortable fact was
that the government still needed to go cap in hand to Australia in order to
find the money to begin rolling back the dual salary structure. Moreover,
372
Peter King
with productivity among the national salariat about half or less that of
expatriates - at least in the private sector22 - and with salaries absorbing
well over bplf of government budget in a time of still deepening
recession, equal pay was potentially a formula for disaster.
39
JULY-DECEMBER 1983
Peter King
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July-December 1983
375
376
Peter King
July-December 1983
377
budgets, but they were right in the sense that the country has not found
a formula for reliable and durable economic expansion, and is faced with
acute long-term problems which threaten the modest economic
achievements of self-government and Independence - a slow but steady
rise in external debt; a debilitating dependence on high levels of
Australian aid and high world gold and copper prices in combination with
the early success of the Ok Tedi project; the great expense of provincial
government; the threat of expenditure blowout arising from the campaign
by national civil servants against the so-called dual salary structure and
expatriate privilege; and, finally, the rising tide of corruption in
government.
Two developments in the second half of 1983 were particularly
disturbing from this perspective. Firstly, Public Service Minister Siaguru
announced the abolition of the dual salary structure as a "colonial relic"
in August, at an immediate cost of K14.5 million. This "abolition" was
largely symbolic, but was likely to stimulate powerfully the trade union
appetites of all the government's white collar employees when lawyers,
academics and doctors had already made significant recent gains. 18
Secondly, it became clear in November that the Public Prosecutor would
not act against apparently corrupt leaders implicated in the Ombudsman
Commission's massive and philosophically concerned report on the socalled Executive Diaries Affair, Corruption in Government. 19 (See
Political Chronicle July-December 1982). The Ombudsman's report was
intended as the thin end of the wedge for a crack-down on political
corruption, which is clearly distorting the pattern of economic
development and exacerbating class inequality in the country. The Chief
Ombudsman was privately outraged at what was seen as the pusillanimity
of the Public Prosecutor; and revelations in early 1984 of extensive
institutionalised corruption in the Works and Supply Department
suggested that the outrage would need to be maintained.
40
JANUARY-JUNE 1984
YawSatTu
Papua New Guinea politics during the first half of 1984 have been
dominated by four of her hardy political perennials: provincial
government matters, OPM activities and their ramifications, efforts by
politicians to secure a firmer grip over the bureaucratic machinery, and
law and order problems.
Provincial Government: Elections and Worries About Non-Performance
With nineteen elected provincial legislatures of varying originating dates
and life-spans, hardly a year passes in PNG without flurries of elections.
In May/June, there were provincial elections in Simbu, Morobe, North
Solomons, Western Highlands and West New Britain.
If the outcomes of these elections are seen in terms of party popularity,
as political leaders and the press somewhat misleadingly urge us to see
them, 1 Pangu pati, the party in control at the National Centre,2 was
reconfirmed as the governing party in West New Britain but was
dislodged by the Melanesian Alliance of Fr John Momis in the North
Solomons. In Simbu and Western Highlands politicians claiming
allegiance to Pangu secured the premiership while in Morobe a proMelanesian Alliance group of populist politicians, the Morobe
Independent Group led by the incumbent Premier, Utula Samana, beat off
a strong Pangu bid for provincial government power.
The elections in Morobe and North Solomons generated the most
interest nationally. Morobe, the largest province, is regarded as a Pangu
territory, thanks to the yeoman services of the ex-kiap, Tony Voutas, and
others, back in the sixties. Indeed, at the 1982 general elections, as in
previous ones, Pangu-sponsored candidates had swept the polls there. But
the provincial government there since 1979 had been dominated by a
Premier who has dedicated himself, as he once told me, "to burying
Pangu in Morobe".
Samana, who describes himself as "a Melanesian Christian
Socialist", is clearly contemptuous of the party leaders at the national
level, with the exception of Fr John Momis, because they follow what he
considers to be a disastrous, unnationalistic, un-Melanesian, pro-foreign
January-June 1984
379
domination and capitalistic path. But, in Papua New Guinea where the
ancient Chinese saying "Your enemy's enemy ..." is a cardinal guide to
political behaviour, Iambakey Okuk, Leader of the Opposition, a bornagain capitalist, between whom and Samana there has clearly been no
love lost in the past, came proffering campaign support, which was
gratefully received. In the end, Samana's re-confirmation as Premier
depended on his going into alliance with members of Sir Julius Chan's
People's Progress party, a party that is constant only in its adherence to
Friedmanite economics and the harsh, remorseless capitalism that flows
from it.
North Solomons, politically the most advanced province in PNG,
whose bid for secession in the mid-seventies precipitated the
establishment of the provincial government system, had a government
that was dominated by Leo Hannett, a Pangu stalwart. This was
incongruous because North Solomons is the citadel of John Momis'
Melanesian Alliance. Against Pangu's colourful verbaliser and reputedly
capable administrator, Leo Hannett, Melanesian Alliance fielded a former
Premier of the province, Dr Alexis Sarei, who had resigned his plum job
as PNG's Ambassador to the court of StJames to make himself available,
in the presidential-type election by which the North Solomons chooses its
Premier.
As in the general election two years before, party leaders and,
especially, the media sought to create the impression that the provincial
election campaigns were being waged on issues: restoration of business
confidence in Lae (Morobe); provincial-national government relations,
particularly over the share of benefits from the Panguna mine (North
Solomons); the revival of local government councils (Western Highlands
Province); and so on. But, as anybody who has attempted to discover the
determinants of electoral choice in PNG would readily testify, it is the
influences of the electors' personal knowledge of the candidate, their
kinship or community-based relationship with the candidate and, above
all, their perceptions and calculations regarding the candidate's ability to
perform in the distribution of tangible material benefits to persons and
communities, that are dominant.
With the exception of North Solomons, where the presidential-style
election of the Premier produced a decisive winner, all the other
provinces experienced the usual post-election cliff-hanging drama of
juggling with figures, lobbying intensely, bargaining, and auctioning and
buying support in order to come up with the winning number in the
Assembly. But it was in Simbu where the neatest solution was found to
this most persistent of all PNG's political leaders' nightmares; how to
obtain and retain a winning coalition in the absence of deeply felt
loyalties and in the face of obviously limited ministerial positions which,
as Peter King pointed out in the last chronicle, is PNG's hardest currency
in trading among politicians. The shrewd Mathew Siune, pc!rhaps taking
a leaf out of the book of the new Oro provincial government's illegal
expansion of the cabinet from eight to ten in order to survive, produced a
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January-June 1984
381
382
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January-June 1984
383
the June session, with the intention revealed in the June session to move
away from annual, project-based or shopping-list planning to a
medium-term (five-year) and sectoral planning from 1986, and with the
White Paper on Industrial Policy which was tabled in the earlier
February/March session, a new period of government activism is perhaps
heralded.
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JULY-DECEMBER 1984
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Introduction
Faction fights within the ruling Pangu pati cabinet, and relentless efforts
by the opposition parties to capitalise on these, to woo the losing faction
out of Pangu, and to threaten to bring down the government through a
motion of no-confidence, eclipsed in interest and intensity all other items
on the political agenda of PNG during the second half of 1984. A partial
consequence of all this was that the Prime Minister shuffled his cabinet
at the end of the year. On the opposition side, the combative, "no-holdsbarred" leader. Iambakey Okuk, lost his parliamentary seat after a court
decision, causing changes in the leadership positions of the parliamentary
opposition. Apart from a spirited confrontation between the government
and its international partners in the giant Ok Tedi gold and copper mining
venture, all the other items that occupied centre stage of the political
arena during the six-month period were essentially a continuation of
trends that had been visible in the earlier half of the year. On the
provincial government front, there were more elections, further changes
of provincial governments through votes of no-confidence, and further
dissatisfaction within the performance of provincial governments. Law
and order problems scaled new heights, provoking massive
demonstrations and forcing the government to come up with forty-nine
specific proposals to combat the appalling crime situation. The Irian Jaya
problem refused to go away. But the government's clearer efforts to bring
the issues involved to the attention of the international community
appeared eventually to soften attitudes in Jakarta.
Some Political Consequences of Mr Wingti's Discomfort within Pangu
After the 1982 elections, having conceded that in deference to the dictates
of PNG's political arithmetic the Deputy Prime Minister should be a
Highlander, the Prime Minister astutely threw to the Highlands Bloc in
the parliamentary wing of his party the question which of its members
should have that position. Paias Wingti, a convert from United party to
Pangu during the usual after-election scramble for members and
ministerial positions in 1977, was the choice of the majority of the
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their opposition. Externally, Indonesian troops did not make things any
easier for the government. There were allegations that they burnt down
houses and gardens on the PNG side, no doubt to force the villagers not
to aid and comfort the OPM rebels/freedom fighters. OPM activities were
also tending to harass the government. At the beginning of July the
government gave the OPM a deadline, 3 pm on 3 July, to release a
community school teacher whom they had abducted as a protest against
government measures to repatriate the border-crossers/refugees. He was
released before the deadline. Troops were moved up to Sandaun Province
in the middle of July to check OPM activities inside PNG, while around
the same time the Foreign Minister, Rabbie Namaliu, raised the question
of Indonesian incursion at the seventeenth meeting of ASEAN in Jakarta.
The Indonesians pledged to give PNG advance warning on future military
exercises. Namaliu again raised the Irian Jaya issue at the UN in
September.
For several reasons, the Irian Jaya issue took a fair amount of
Parliament's time during the November session. First, there had been
several deaths in the refugee camps, beginning in August, no doubt
because of the insanitary conditions in the camps. Secondly, Fr John
Momis had met the OPM leader, James Nyaro, on PNG soil. Thirdly, a
joint verification team had been attacked by the refugees at the
Blackwater Camp, and some Indonesian members on the team had been
critically injured, provoking demonstrations in Jakarta against the PNG
mission. Fourthly, there were renewed clashes between the OPM and
Indonesian forces in October. Therefore, the Prime Minister had
authorised the use of troops on the border at the beginning of November.
Finally a new border agreement had been initialled in October and this
had to be ratified by Parliament.
Relations with Indonesia were getting warmer meanwhile, in spite of
all these developments and in spite of the Jakarta demonstrations. Jakarta
was mellowing. Indonesia now agreed, in December, to allow UNHCR to
participate in the repatriation exercise. Indonesia also agreed to let PNG
officials travel with border crossers to their home villages and to make
checks at later times. By the end of the year, Foreign Minister Namaliu
assessed the situation in the following way: about 500 Irian Jayans,
mostly academics, government officials, and army deserters who did not
want to return would qualify for political refugee status. More than 1,000
had hitched back to their villages, leaving about 9,300 in the various
camps on the border. These would be repatriated but it would not be done
in a hurry. Some moneys were now coming from UNHCR, Indonesia,
Australia and PNG itself to clothe and feed them until March 1985 at
least.
Law and Order Problems
Law and order, or more to the point, lawlessness and lack of order, are
fast becoming the Achilles' heel of PNG, the outstanding threat to the
July-December 1984
395
practice of humane government that has characterised the first ten years
of her independent existence. Of course, some commentators would see
crime as a mere symptom of more basic sicknesses in the society. But
whatever the cause of crime, and whether it is capable of affecting the
course of national development, the cost of the evidently uncontrollable
urban crime to the victims, to the government and to society at large is
daily in evidence. A siege mentality has been fostered. Like the weather
to the English, crime has become an obsession. The difference though is
that crime in PNG is not a mere opening conversation gambit. It is a real
worry. The situation has been building up over several years now. But the
anti-crime emotions released by a gang rape of two expatriate women and
an eleven-year old girl at the Port Moresby suburb of Badili in October
were spectacular.
A virtually spontaneous protest demonstration was under way the next
day. A week later, a more organised, and a truly mammoth demonstration
by an impassioned and angry crowd of about 25,000 finally ended up at
the government offices at Waigani, where a petition for more serious and
effective measures to combat the law and order problem was presented to
the Prime Minister. Other urban centres organised similar demonstrations,
the one in Madang timed to coincide with the National Executive Council
meeting there. On 17 October, the NEC meeting in Madang adopted
forty-nine specific measures. 25 A task force headed by an excommissioner of police was appointed to oversee the implementation of
those measures.
There has been no shortage of suggestions from all sorts of quarters on
how the crime situation can be improved. Roland To Vue, the East New
Britain Premier, advocates the reinstatement of the colonial Vagrancy Act,
to allow police to send unemployed squatters back to their villages.
Indeed, the Madang provincial government has been trying to implement
its own undeclared "Vagrancy Act", trying to evict Sepik settlers and
repatriate them. Sir Barry Holloway, after a visit to Israel, was much
taken with the kibbutz idea. With the support of some of his cabinet
colleagues, he proposed a scheme to settle each of the various ethnic
groups presently living in squatter settlements on a 50 hectare kibbutz in
the Moitaka area of Port Moresby. No doubt if it worked it would be
extended to other urban centres. For Utula Samana, who obviously does
not share the national parliamentarians' faith in minimum penalties, as he
unsuccessfully challenged the legality of the Minimum Penalties Act in
the Supreme court, the formula for success in crime control in Morobe is
for the provincial government to be given control of the police, land and
investment! A consultants' report, the so-called Clifford Report,
sponsored by the Institute of National Affairs and issued in September,
saw community responsibility, integration of the police in neighbourhood
communities, and the expansion and strengthening of village courts as the
major prongs of attack on crime. 26
The report managed to miss the obvious point that village courts in
urban settings are a complete nonstarter. Whose traditions and customs
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JANUARYJUNE 1985
YawSaffu
On the basis of the events of the first six months of 1985, the only
prediction that a wise man should be prepared to put his money on is that
PNG politics will continue to be characterised by a conspicuous
formlessness, well beyond the next national elections scheduled for 1987.
Nothing else is predictable.
The Political Chronicle for July-December 1984 gave the reasons
behind the cabinet reshuffle on 21 December. It also showed how the
disqualification of lambakey Okuk as an MP on 6 December led to John
Momis and Stephen Tago becoming the Leader and Deputy Leader,
respectively, of the opposition. In February, an extraordinary letter written
by Okuk to Somare was leaked to the press. Machiavelli himself would
have been hard put to it to match the cynical amoralism that suffused
Okuk's proposals in the letter.
Reminding Somare of the continuing danger which Wingti, in
collaboration with the opposition, represented to the Pangu government,
Okuk proposed a coalition between his National party and Somare's
Pangu as the way to stop Wingti. Further, and here was the punchline,
Somare should order the Electoral Commissioner to issue the writs for
the Unggai-Bena by-election immediately, to ensure that Okuk would be
back in Parliament for the March session. The letter contained very
specific instructions on how Somare should go about this clearly
unconstitutional, and potentially politically damaging, chore.
Somare should summon the Electoral Commissioner and present him
with an ultimatum: to issue writs immediately or be replaced. Somare
should "ensure that only two of you are in the room and that you advise
him that the conversation is being contained within the four walls and
that if he discussed it outside the room, you will deny that the
conversation ever took place. Of course, you will have to replace him if
he goes to the media". 1
While this amazing plan was simply Okuk's super-speed boat to get
him back to Parliament, Okuk sought to justify it, ironically, in terms of
an alleged danger to constitutional democracy. "It is fine for us to have
a constitution of an ultra-democratic Society", he said, "but the type of
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January-June 1985
399
that Momis would lead his Melanesian Alliance into the coalition and
save the Pangu government from being thrown out. So venomous had
been Momis's attacks on alleged Pangu government corruption, especially
since assuming the leadership of the opposition in December, and so
wide, relatively speaking, did the policy gap between Pangu and the
Melanesian Alliance appear over practically every issue, that Momis's
decision took people by surprise.
On 25 March, after losing by sixty-five to forty on a procedural but
tell-tale vote, Wingti led a walk-out by a section of the opposition so that
when the National party and the Melanesian Alliance voted with Pangu, 5
the motion of no-confidence was easily defeated, by sixty-eight votes to
nineteen.
In the wake of the easy defeat came the difficult reshuffle, the second
in less than four months, this time to accommodate new coalition
partners. Boyamo Sali, Minister for Defence and a senior, steadfast Pangu
stalwart, had resigned on 13 March. Apparently, his personal conduct had
invited pressures on him to resign. 6 Together with the Education Ministry
vacated by Wingti, there were thus two vacancies. But these were not
enough. Barry Holloway and Tony Siaguru had to resign to free two more
ministries. While the Melanesian Alliance obtained the deputy prime
ministership (Momis) and two ministries, Public Service (Momis) and
Education (Sam Tulo), in return for bringing the support of only five
MPs, the National party, with twelve members, obtained only two
portfolios, Defence (Stephen Tago) and Civil Aviation (William Wi),
when it had wanted one ministry for every four MPs. Thus the National
party was taunted by the new opposition Whip, Mahuru Rarua Rarua, for
having accepted a cheap bride-price.
Perhaps a more graphic illustration cannot be offered of the
formlessness of PNG politics than the spectacle of Wingti, now Leader of
the Opposition, spouting vintage Momis expressions of righteous
indignation, in his relentless attacks on alleged Pangu government
corruption, with Fr Momis now having to deflect waspish opposition
probes, and having to defend the Pangu government and Pangu policies
against erstwhile anti-Pangu comrades-in-arms. Without a hint of what the
difference was, between his November 1984 motion of no-confidence and
the March move by Chang-Wingti, Momis condemned the latter as a
"self-interested bid for power". 7 Perhaps nemesis is Fr Momis, with his
image of one who works hard at personifying moral rectitude, having to
convince his followers about the rightness of teaming up with a
government he had so trenchantly berated for moral laxitude.
In May, Okuk won the Unggai-Bena by-election and was back in
Parliament for the May-June session. He regained the parliamentary
leadership of the National party while Stephen Tago reverted to the
position of deputy, Gai Dawubane having resigned to make this possible.
Okuk, naturally, expected to be given a ministry. But Somare had a real
problem. There just were not enough ministries to go round. Somare even
considered creating a second Deputy Prime Minister. But he had to
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January-June 1985
401
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January-June 1985
403
law enforcement agencies were losing the fight against the criminals. In
the Highlands, banks shut up shop for one day in February to dramatise
and protest their insecurity. A coffee strike by buyers in the Western and
Eastern Highlands was initiated in June because of armed hold-ups and
shootings. The executive officer of the Coffee Industry Association
warned that the coffee industry was "in grave danger of collapsing unless
the law and order problem was brought under control". 15 Horrific stories
of pack rapes, of armed robberies, of break and enters accompanied by
violence and terrorism, hogged prime space in newspapers, day after day.
Meanwhile, in April, Pious Kerepia (in charge of the Law and Order
Task Force) decided to try a different tack. He organised a five-day
retreat at the army training camp, Goldie River, with the leaders of the
criminal gangs operating in Port Moresby. 16
The intention was to initiate a dialogue between representatives of
State and Society and those of gangsterdom to enable the former to learn
directly from the gangsters why they had turned to crime, and what could
be done to turn them from a life of crime. There was also an attempt to
appeal to the gang leaders on rational, patriotic, emotional, moral and
religious grounds to reform. YIPs, including the Governor-General,
participated in the dialogue. At the end of the retreat, the gang leaders
presented to the organisers a memorandum entitled "A Call to the
Nation". This was essentially a restatement of the December 1984 pledge
by the gangsters. 17 They will give up their criminal activities if the
government makes it possible for them to earn income from legitimate
sources, such as cleaning contracts, small business ventures, trade stores,
fishing, farming.
This Christian approach to the crime problem was, however, fraught
with serious dangers, not the least of which was that its success in
weaning the gangsters would almost certainly backfire. To the extent that
unemployment (and its attendant boredom and frustration) was a root
cause of the problem, success could, paradoxically, lead to the spawning
of more and more gangsters. Joining a criminal gang could come to be
seen as perhaps the path towards securing employment, in an environment
of depressingly high unemployment.
The rapidly escalating incidence of violent criminal activity forced the
Prime Minister to revise his opinion, no doubt uttered in a fit of recurrent
complacency, that the crime situation was under control and that the
streets were becoming safer to walk at night. The public ridicule of the
Prime Minister on account of this misjudgment was reflected in a
dismissive Post-Courier editorial: "We do not wish to comment further on
the foolishness of that statement". 18 Jolted by the public reaction to his
misassessment, Somare now moved, in June, to propose the death penalty,
castration, flogging, etc, to deal with the "uncontrollable law and order
situation" . 19 The government introduced a bill to counter rape with
castration and death.
But the bill was shelved when it evoked very strong criticism from
the opposition, church leaders, and the Melanesian Alliance coalition
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JULY-DECEMBER 1985
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July-December 1985
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Bale, who stood as a PPP candidate for a Port Moresby seat in the 1977
election, went on demonstration against the levy.
To explain the motion of no-confidence that was moved on 14
November by Chan, again seconded by Okuk, and again naming Wingti
as the alternative Prime Minister, one has to say it was a continuation of
the favourite game of the opposition in Parliament for which Chan now
sought to provide a refurbished rationalisation. The people elect MPs. but
they do not mandate any particular party or parties to rule. It is MPs who
determine which coalition forms the government. They determine this
after elections, and they have the right to change their mind any time, in
between elections, about which coalition of parties should rule. Stability
should not necessarily take precedence over effectiveness, competence
and honesty of government. 9 But, as the Post-Courier editorial of the day
intoned, in that case the people hec:ome mere "bystanders of
democracy". 10
But while conceding that the motion was part of the ongoing
opposition game, it must also be said that the impending 1987 elections
raised the stakes of the game and fuelled passions. It was primarily about
obtaining and denying access to state resources and opportunities on the
eve of an election. To move a vote of no-confidence so close to the
scheduled elections meant that either the opposition believed that
resources available to an incumbent government are so decisive in
elections that they more than compensate for all the possible liabilities in
office, or it did not believe its own propaganda about the sunken image
of the government, or how unpopular its budget proposals presented to
Parliament on 12 November were.
A significant boost for this interpretation of the motion of noconfidence was Chan's PPP national convention in Lae at the end of
October. The organisers and party executive were obviously buoyed up by
the attendance of provincial "heavies". There were three Premiers, from
New Ireland, Gulf and Southern Highlands, seven Deputy Premiers,
including one from the Pangu heartland of East Sepik, who was
accompanied by a well-known Angoram businessman, Mr Schulze, and
thirteen provincial ministers. As the reported public speeches made clear,
the convention was about winning the 1987 elections. There was evident
satisfaction with all aspects of preparation except for funding."
In accordance with PNG rules in the numbers game, the opposition
guaranteed steadfastness of support by cloistering at the Kokoda Trail
Motel outside Port Moresby MPs who had pledged to vote for the
motion. On the morning of 21 November, they came down from the
mountain retreat straight to Parliament to vote, 58 to 51, to oust Somare
and to install Wingti. Voting for the motion were members of Wingti's
Democratic Movement (17), Chan's PPP (13), Okuk's National party,
except William Wi, the Aviation Minister in Somare's government (13),
a section of the United party under Paul Torato (5), the Papua party (3),
and a group of independent members, disgruntled Pangu backbenchers
and a rebel Melanesian Alliance member (7).
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trimming the cabinet and pruning the departments, only time will tell
whether Wingti's promise to cut down overseas travel by ministers and
bureaucrats to save money will be fulfilled or not.
Before Parliament adjourned on 25 November, it voted to reject the
budget handed down by the deposed government. A Supply Bill, to allow
the new government to use up to a third of the 1985 appropriation, as the
constitution allowed under section 212, was passed to enable the
government to prepare its own budget, according to its priorities, for
submission in the March 1986 session. Tax reduction and cuts in
government spending, redirection of government expenditure away from
service and welfare activities and the bureaucracy to the economic
departments, such as DPI, Forests, Trade and Industry, privatisation and
deregulation or, at any rate, relaxation of controls and cutting red tape,
and a heavier reliance on the private sector to bring about the growth that
the government now put forward as a top priority (the same as the
Somare government too had opted for in its last year) were the guidelines
that both Wingti and Chan emphasised for the future budget.
On the political front, it was all change on the parliamentary
committees. A Parliamentary Select Committee investigating the
provincial government system (the Siaguru committee) was abolished,
perhaps myopically, to cut Siaguru down to size and/or to save the
K300,000 or so which the year-long examination of the system was going
to cost. The terms of the Pelair investigation were widened to include the
proposal for a joint air-freight between Air Niugini and Wings Australia,
the alleged drug ring operating between PNG and Australia and the role
played by PNG Aviation in the sale and purchase of the aircraft. The
Commission was expected to be extra thorough as it was now given a
longer period, 30 September 1986, to complete its work.
The government initiated extensive changes of personnel at the top of
the bureaucracy, thus contributing to a growing tradition which is more
consistent with the American notion of the political bureaucrat who
comes and goes with the changing political executive than it is with the
British notion of the neutral civil servant, there to serve equally
whichever party or coalition comes to power. Close to one half of the
bureaucrats at the departmental Secretary level were replaced. The
government said the changes were in aid of efficiency. Wingti said he had
no time for "incompetent people". His refrain was that the bureaucracy
was "inefficient beyond belief'. But it is also clear that political
calculations entered into the exercise. The appointment of Tony Huai as
Commander of the PNG Defence Force, perhaps the most controversial
and most ill advised of the changes, illustrates this.
Tony Huai, apparently a very capable solider, had resigned earlier on
in the year as Chief of Operations in the Defence Force and had made
very public criticisms of various aspects of the Somare government's
handling of defence matters which, he claimed, had led to an exodus of
officers. He went to work for Chan in the PPP office soon after he left
and announced his intention to stand in the next elections on a PPP ticket.
July-December 1985
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414
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44
JANUARY-DECEMBER 1986
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January-December 1986
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418
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calling itself the Pangu Independent Group (PIG), led by Pangu's ideas
men and experienced organisers, Tony Siaguru, Barry Holloway and John
Nilkare, broke away, after failing to be allowed to operate virtually as a
party within the Pangu pati. Their mate, Karl Stack, the former Industrial
Development Minister, had resigned five weeks earlier, largely because of
attempts by Somare to sack him the previous year because of the Pelair
allegations, and to give his ministry to Gai Duwabane, the National party
MP, in an effort to appease the National party which was threatening to
leave the coalition. In May, the four of them and the Telefomin MP,
Felix Tapimeng, launched a new party, the League for National
Advancement.
The break-away of the Siaguru faction, like the emergence of several
new parties in November and December, was spurred on by the
impending national elections. The origins of the break-away, however, lay
in earlier intra-Pangu politics pre-dating the defection of Wingti's faction
and his accession to the prime ministership. 11
In opposition, Pangu began to ponder how it might revitalise itself for
1987. The effectiveness of Somare's leadership style came into question.
But it was also clear that dislodging him was not going to be easy. So,
PIG proposed that it be allowed to operate as a party within Pangu. PIG
wanted to be accorded a right to develop its own policies, raise funds
independently, sponsor its own candidates, promote its own posters and
publish its advertisements and differentiate these by the words "Affiliate
Member of Pangu". Caucus expectedly rejected the proposal. The group
quit at the end of April and in May launched the League for National
Advancement.
With the approach of elections, new parties sprang up. Some of them,
like the National Settlement party of Louis Vagi, announced in December,
and Roy Evara's Wantok party, a month earlier, were derided as one-man
parties. But the People's Action party, launched in December, appeared to
be more substantial, and somewhat more broadly based than on one
person's political ambition. However, the Papuan core of the party, and
the preponderance of ex-Defence Force/Defence Department personnel in
its leadership suggested that it was probably Ted Diro's refurbished
vehicle for the elections, seeing that his 1982 model, the PNG
Independent Group, had lost all power of acceleration after a few months
into the new Parliament.
The Economy
By the standards of Third World non-oil producing economies, the
economy in 1986 appeared healthy. Foreign reserves were adequate for a
six-month import cover. Inflation was low, around five per cent. And
there was promise of a considerable future minerals boom. But not only
were the usual problems associated with Third World primary producing
economies evident, a coffee rust disease discovered in April posed a threat
to the coffee industry. There were also strong indications of serious social
422
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January-December 1986
423
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easy money to buy votes in the coffee growing and thickly populated
Highlands. A plan initiated by Wingti and approved by cabinet would
involve an amount of K40 million and an estimated 200,000 familiesY
The scheme gave these small-time coffee growers access to cheap loans
of up to K2,000 per family, to enable them to take action against the
coffee rust disease and boost production. The loans would be payable in
four years after a grace period of two years at three per cent interest, with
the government paying the balance of the interest.
Alongside the loan facility, a Coffee Development Authority was also
created to administer the rehabilitation and rust control program and,
indirectly, rationalise the purchasing/marketing of coffee as well as
checking stealing and other crimes associated with the coffee industry.
The agency was to wage an awareness campaign and register every coffee
garden over the next two years. Growers would have to produce their
registration certificate in order to sell their coffee. The Highlands
Premiers strongly supported this initiative.
Provincial Government Affairs
Provincial government affairs helped to emphasise several features of
PNG politics: the continuing fragility of PNG unity; instability of
coalitions and political alliances; the over subscription of elections and
the super-rapid circulation of elites; the weakness of financial controls;
and so on.
The suspension of the Simbu provincial government lapsed in March
when Parliament failed to extend it for another six months, as Warena,
the Minister for Provincial Affairs, had wanted. The Simbu Premier at the
time of the suspension, Peter Gul, sought a Supreme court ruling on the
status of his government. Was his government not entitled to complete the
balance of its term? And did it not have full powers of a duly elected
government? He got satisfaction on both points.
The suspension of the Enga provincial government was also lifted, in
May, after provincial elections were held. Over 160 candidates stood for
the twenty-two seats. Allegations of rigging were made by losing
candidates.
Provincial government office blocks were burnt down, and vehicles
were destroyed, in the violence that ensued. Nat Laina, a former kiap,
won the presidential type election to become the new Premier.
The Western provincial government remained suspended. In several
provinces, instability continued to characterise politics. In Madang, the
fourteen-month Moeder government was deposed in March, by sixteen
votes to eight. Andrew Ariako, a Melanesian Alliance man, became the
new Premier. Three months later, the Provincial Assembly voted
unanimously to change the manner of appointing its ministers, allowing
the Premier to choose the team he wanted, instead of having to choose on
the basis of the districts represented in the assembly. The size of the
cabinet was also increased from nine to eleven, in the twenty-four
January-December 1986
425
member assembly. With the Speaker making twelve, it was expected that
future governments would thus be safe from successful votes of noconfidence.
In Morobe, Utula Samana survived a vote of no-confidence by twentytwo votes to twelve in March. He survived another motion in December.
In the Western Highlands Assembly notice of a motion of no-confidence
was given in March. In the Central Province (where the irony of the year
was perpetrated, when the provincial government suspended the Hiri
Local Government Council in August for not performing) the Premier
increased the size of his cabinet from six to ten, in order to reward four
members who crossed the floor to vote for him in a vote of noconfidence.
The continuing fragility of PNG as a united entity was exhibited
throughout the year, with the Islands provinces, East New Britain and
North Solomons, pushing for the repatriation of unemployed settlers from
the mainland provinces. The National party, perhaps seeing itself as the
true Highlands party, was the only party to take a firm stand against the
intentions of the provincial authorities in those provinces.
Provincial elections were due at the end of the year in Eastern
Highlands, Milne Bay and New Ireland. The Electoral Commissioner
sought to postpone all three elections on the implausible grounds that
they would interfere with the holding of the national elections, seven to
eight months later. He was challenged in court. The Supreme court
ordered him to hold the elections as scheduled. In the Eastern Highlands,
polling began on 30 December and finished on 21 January 1987. In Milne
Bay and New Ireland, polling began on 20 November and finished on 10
January 1987.
The elections were over-subscribed. 236 candidates contested the
twenty-nine seats in Eastern Highlands Province (EHP), 128 candidates
chased after twenty-one seats in Milne Bay while in New Ireland
ninety-three candidates slogged it out for the nineteen seats. All these
elections produced new Premiers. In EHP, James Yanepa, Premier since
the inception of the provincial government, failed to get re-elected to the
Assembly. Walter Nombe, a former Works and Transport Minister in one
of Yanepa's governments, was elected Premier in February, with the
support of the National party members and some independents. The PPP
group, the largest group in the Assembly, led the opposition forces. In
Milne Bay, Lepani Watson, the grand old man of Milne Bay politics, also
failed to gain re-election. Navy Aule, a former Shell executive and a
businessman who had served briefly in Lepani Watson's last government,
succeeded him as Premier, with the backing of PPP and the Milne Bay
Solidarity Group. In New Ireland, Pedi Anis, for a long time Fr. Momis's
executive officer, became Premier at the head of a Melanesian Alliance/
Pangu group. Robert Seeto's long innings as Premier ended, or was
perhaps merely interrupted, at the same time as Yanepa and Lepani
Watson's.
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January-December 1986
427
treaty also promised the expansion of direct trade, shipping and air links.
Perhaps what was really new and different about the treaty, as
critics like Bernard Narokobi and the ex-Foreign Minister, John Giheno
pointed out, was that even the former theoretical ability of PNG to raise
questions about the treatment of the Melanesian Irian Jayans in
international forums seemed now to be sacrificed because such might be
taken as an unfriendly act. Unfriendly acts had been disallowed under
previous border agreements also. But in the context of those agreements,
unfriendly acts had referred to not giving aid and comfort to rebels, or
allowing the use of one's territory by unfriendly forces against the other.
Papua New Guinea had felt able, although not often, to raise the Irian
Jayan issues at international forums without feeling that any agreements
with Indonesia were being breached. In the context of the new
comprehensive Treaty of Friendship, such an activity could more easily
be claimed to be an unfriendly act. The basic objectives of the treaty,. to
deny a casus belli to Indonesia, and also to get PNG closer to ASEAN
through Indonesia, appeared to policy makers to justify that self-denying
ordinance.
Relations with Australia came under some strain, historical relations,
aid and trade, co-membership in the South Pacific Forum and the
Commonwealth and co-interest in ASEAN notwithstanding. 18 Indeed,
some of these elements accounted for the strain. The third quinquennial
aid agreement since independence had been signed in September 1985,
after lengthy negotiations. It was to cover the period 1986-91. But in July
1986 the Australian government slashed the aid by $A10 million in
response to Australia's economic problems. Papua New Guinea was told
of it only after it was done. The Australian government followed this with
a new formula, once again arrived at unilaterally, by which the agreed aid
would fall by $A15 million to $A45 million each year, depending on the
performance of the Australian economy.
Papua New Guinea authorities were not well pleased. The Secretary for
Finance publicly blamed an "Australian Mafia" in the Public Service for
blocking aid relations with Japan. The Australian actions helped to push
on PNG's search for alternative sources of aid. Tied aid from other
donors such as Japan which had been rejected in the past now became
acceptable not only because of the declining Australian aid, but also
because Australia was itself now very gradually shifting to tied aid and
also because the younger PNG politicians appeared to want a dilution of
the "special relations" with Australia.
Trade and investment relations with Australia also had a bumpy ride.
Deregulation of the rice trade, for instance, brought the first importation
of American rice in October, thus undermining Australian suppliers'
monopoly of the $A75 million a year trade. The attempts by the Wingti
government to repudiate the Somare government's agreements with two
Australian firms, Newcastle Broadcasting Network for television
broadcast, and James Barnes for a meat cannery, raised hackles in
Australian business circles. There was also the case of a $A4.8 million
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45
JANUARY-DECEMBER 1987
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The political chronicle of Papua New Guinea in 1987 can be written around
the 13 June to 4 July national election. Virtually every domestic political
event of significance could be related to the dictates of the impending
election or to its aftermath, the struggle to form and maintain a government
from a number of fractious groupings, otherwise known as parties.
Background to the Election:
The Economy
Compared with the economic recession which served as the backdrop to
the 1982 election, and which could be said to have adversely affected the
popularity of the incumbent Chan-led coalition government, the economic
conditions accompanying the 1987 elections were buoyant, particularly in
the Highlands and Port Moresby. 1 Private sector employment was rising:
3.2 per cent higher in the first half of 1987, compared with 1986. General
business conditions showed improvement in the first half of the year
compared with the corresponding period in 1986, and business outlook
was optimistic. Inflation, already low at 4.8 per cent for 1986, was falling
further, thanks largely to the depreciation of the currency of Australia and
New Zealand, major sources of PNG imports. Inflation was only three per
cent for the whole of 1987.
Although commodity prices were on the decline on the world market,
the stabilisation funds had healthy balances built up from the preceding
two years of relatively high commodity prices. Appropriately high bounty
payments, particularly for coffee, effectively insulated farmers from the
effects of the declining prices.
For the government, higher volumes and higher prices for gold exports
more than took up the slack in export earnings from other exports.
Government expenditure on goods and services was 11.5 per cent higher
in the first half of 1987, compared with a year before. Government's
internal revenues were up, in spite of the K32 million tax gifts which
Finance Minister Chan had handed to taxpayers in the 1987 budget,
described by opposition spokesmen as an election budget.
However, the increase in internal revenue was still below the
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The Parties
At the beginning of January, there were as many as fifteen parties in the
country ready to do battle in the impending elections. Five of them were
new and untested. Morobe Independent Group (MIG) was led by the fiery
Morobe Premier, Utula Samana. Wantok party was led by the erstwhile
United party minister, Roy Evara. Leiba party of Oscar Tammur was
based not on the emerging proletariat of Lae or Port Moresby but on the
Kokopo area of East New Britain because of kinship affiliations, local
loyalties and other personal factors pertaining to the founder. The
Country party of Sinake Giregire barely existed only around Goroka in
the Eastern Highlands where the founder lives. Finally, there was the
National Settlement party, another paper party, of Louis Vagi. Papua
Besena, the former secessionist group led by Josephine Abaijah, also had
no representation in the House which was dissolved in March.
Of the nine parties represented in Parliament, five were in the
governing coalition. Prime Minister Wingti's People's Democratic
Movement (PDM) had twenty members. Sir Julius Chan's People's
Progress party (PPP) had thirteen members. National party, led in
Parliament by Steve Tago (who was apparently at odds with the party's
power brokers, the rich, Highlands coffee farmers and businessmen) had
twelve members. Ted Diro's Independent Group, lately rebaptised as
People's Action party (PAP), had three members. Papua party, led by
Galeva Kwarara, also had three members. Finally, a section of the ever
disunited United party (UP), led by Paul Torato, was with Wingti.
For more than a year, intra-coalition solidarity had been weakening in
the face of the impending elections, with coalition leaders seeking to
mobilise their resources, differentiate their parties, and project
themselves. 2 There was no indication that the coalition partners were
going to cooperate electorally. On the contrary, the nearer the election
date approached, the clearer every party leader made it that they were all
free agents. They might be inclined towards continuing the coalition, but
their decision would depend on the outcome of the election. Wingti's
reshuffle of his cabinet in April, just four months after the December
1986 one, and only two months before the elections, with Parliament
already dissolved, fuelled intra-coalition disagreement further, as some of
the changes were resisted, in particular Torato's shift from "opportunity
knocks" Forests to thankless Police.
On the opposition benches were Pangu pati, led by Somare, with
thirty-five members; Fr John Momis' Melanesian Alliance (MA), with
January-December 1987
431
four members; The League for National Advancement (LNA), with five
members; and two UP rebels, including Roy Evara, before he formed his
Wantok party. There were also eight independent MPs. Pangu and MA,
whose collaboration in the New Ireland provincial government election
had resulted in the ending of Robert Seeto and PPP's rule in January, said
they would go into the election as allies, although concrete manifestation
of this wish was not observable outside that particular province. To some
extent Pangu and MA were united by a sense of relative deprivation, as
they perceived the extent to which parties in government sought to use
state resources for their campaign. In February, Somare highlighted
instances of what he termed illegal distribution of minor works funds to
government MPs to hurry through projects in their constituencies during
the campaign period. Wingti did not deny the opposition's allegations. He
merely pointed out that the sums involved were only one percent of the
national budget, while the minister involved, Works Minister Peter
Kuman, advised his critics "to go jump in the lake".
Wingti himself was proving to be the primary beneficiary of the
governing coalition's access to state resources for partisan purposes. His
election campaign could only benefit from the coffee rust awareness
campaign that began in 1986 and which had him staring boldly out of
some 500,000 large, glossy posters, promising government support to the
growers and advising them to tend their farms. The same message, with
every sentence prefaced by "The Prime Minister says ...", was also on
radio throughout the campaign period.
Wingti's group stood to gain most from the operations of a Coffee
Development Authority hastily put together by the government in the
previous year to oversee the rehabilitation of the industry in the wake of
the coffee rust. Throughout the campaign period, this Authority was
engaged in disbursing funds to small growers throughout the Highlands,
alongside the Agriculture Bank, which was operating throughout the
country with much more funds than ever before. 3 A much more
controversial exploitation of his position for partisan advantage was
Wingti's three minute appearance at the beginning of a video tape
commissioned by the Electoral Commissioner for voter education.
Finally, all available evidence regarding the suspension of the Western
Highlands provincial government in March suggests that Wingti was
heavily involved. 4 Ostensibly, the suspension was for financial
mismanagement. However most observers seem to agree that it was
politically motivated. Wingti was standing for the province's Regional
seat. His political ally, Kagul Koroka, reputed to be one of the richest
men in the country, and apparently one of his major financial backers,
had been unseated as the Premier of the province through a vote of noconfidence in April 1986. The man who took over from Koroka, Philip
Kapal, was a National party man and his government was dominated by
National party men.
One Kingal Kai Kuri, a former minister in the suspended
government, testified under oath in court that Wingti had called a meeting
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The Issues
What did the parties stand for? The point has been made often, and
correctly, by commentators on PNG politics that issues, in the form of
nationally highlighted controversies on which parties offer visible
policies, do not count for very much in PNG elections. It is not that there
are no issues crying out for debate. Of course there are, particularly in a
new state. But the electorate is not attentive to issues, unless these happen
to take on a micro, local garb, such as fish dying in streams from the
effects of mining ventures, payment of adequate compensation to
landowners, imbalance in the distribution of "development" projects in
the district, and so on.
Yet the issuing of glossy party manifestos, advertisements and jingles
to bring to the attention of radio audiences, the small reading public and,
lately, the even smaller television audience, are as much part of PNG
elections as bilas are of PNG culture. The manifestos were routinely
launched, but they hardly raised an eyebrow. Party candidates hardly
based their campaigns on them. And opponents hardly reacted to them.
But if issues and policies counted for more in PNG's elections, Chan's
PPP would have been miles ahead of its nearest rival.
PPP's election manifesto was easily the most elaborate, the most
coherent and detailed, including even attempts at costing the programmes
January-December 1987
433
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January-December 1987
435
436
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servants on hire to the Commission, and the policemen who watched over
proceedings and guarded personnel and ballot boxes, performed
creditably under very difficult conditions. So-called scrutineers, looking
after the interests of candidates, were everywhere: at the polling stations;
at the police stations guarding the ballot boxes with the police men; in
the counting halls. Officials genuinely tried very hard not to give any
scrutineer an opponunity to question their impartiality. In any case, the
officials realized that their lives could be in grave danger unless they
were scrupulously fair and honest. The tendency for aggrieved groups to
take the law into their own hands and unleash their own brand of justice
is a familiar problem in Papua New Guinea.
Although democratic elections are meant to take violence out of the
resolution of the succession problem in politics, the election was attended
by a disturbing amount of violence. As one leader commented: "This is
the worst election I can remember. Unrest during polling and counting
must be taken as a warning of worse to come" .12 In terms of violence, the
Highlands region was the worst, with ballot boxes being burnt in the
Kandep area of Enga, and officials being assaulted and rivals being axed.
Worse violence often followed the declaration of results.
A basic reason for the increasing incidence of electoral violence is that
elections have become a very important factor in class formation in Papua
New Guinea. Elections have come to constitute a very rapid route to the
top of the heap. As in several contemporary post-colonial situations,
''elections have become the alchemy that turns base metal into gold" . 13
Because rewards of electoral success can be so spectacular, candidates,
their backers and supporters, are prepared to invest staggering amounts of
money and energy in the race to Parliament. Observing the elections in
the Highlands, I was constantly amazed at the sums of monies that I
learnt were being spent by candidates. Several candidates admitted to
spending 50,000 kina and over. The participants raised the stakes so high
that defeat often could not be just shrugged off with equanimity.
The Results
Voting finished at 6pm on 4 July. Counting started almost immediately,
but results were very slow to come, and it was not until a week later that
the final results came in. On 15 July the Electoral Commission officially
announced the results of 106 constituencies. 14 The two tables below
summarise most aspects of the results.
Only two parties managed to win more than ten per cent of the
votes. Pangu polled 14.8 per cent and took twenty-six seats, while PDM
took eleven per cent of the votes and seventeen seats. Eight parties
accounted for 31.5 per cent of the total votes and forty-three seats. The
remaining five parties, accounting for two per cent of the votes, obtained
no seats.
In contrast with the parties, most of which suffered a decline in the
number of seats held, the Independents increased their representation
437
January-December 1987
significantly. They won forty-one per cent of the votes and secured
twenty-three seats, a significant proportional under-representation.
A number of the results were disputed by losing candidates.
Eventually, forty-one petitions were lodged with the court of Disputed
Returns, but by the end of the year, only three petitions had been
disposed of, one of them proving a successful challenge, with Albert
Karo being declared a winner in Moresby South instead of Legu Vagi, the
Police Minister. Miscounting was discovered after the judge ordered a
recount.
If the high degree of party fractionalisation indicated by Table 1 was
disappointing from the point of view of ensuring a strong stable
government, other features of the results, summarised in Table 2, were
equally disappointing, from the point of view of the legitimating
functions of elections. As Table 2 shows, only seven seats were won with
an absolute majority of votes cast, a decline of more than sixty per cent
from 1982, while at the other end, the number of seats won with less than
twenty per cent doubled.
Table 1: Papua New Guinea National Election, 1987 Results
PARTY
SEATS HELD AT
DISSOLUTION
VOTES
OBTAINED
PERCENT
VOTES
SEATS
WON
PERCENT
SEATS
Independent
1145839
41.0
23
21.8
Pangu pany
35
414424
14.8
26
23.8
People's Democratic
Movement (PDM)
20
307395
11.0
17
15.6
13
174293
6.2
5.5
157188
5.6
6.4
12
145221
5.2
13
11.9
132720
4.7
2.8
88328
3.2
5.6
United pany
87243
3.1
60922
2.2
3.7
Papuapany
34636
1.2
2.7
0.9
Papua Besena
17122
0.6
Wantok party
17976
0.6
Country party
11058
0.4
Leiba pany
2611
0.1
164
109
2796690
0.01
99.910
0
109
0
100.0
438
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Number of
Number of Average per
Percentage of Votes per Winning Candidate
Constituencies Candidates Constituency 0%-20%
20%-40% 40%-50% Over 50%
1977
109
879
8.1
11
63
16
19
1982
109
1125
!0.3
20
55
14
18
1987
109
1513
13.9
40
50
January-December 1987
439
1986, Stephen Tago had lost his seat and Michael Mel, formerly the
party's president, now an MP, had just been elected leader) reckoned
realistically that the party stood to get more ministries in the Somare
camp than in the Wingti camp, seeing that PDM was also predominantly
a Highlands party. Certainly, while Michael Mel could aspire to become
Deputy Prime Minister under Somare, that would be out of the question
in the Wingti camp, because Wingti is also a Highlander.
From all the groups in the Somare camp, there were fifty-two MPs
presumably committed to his leadership. In addition, there were credible
claims that up to twelve independents were really camp members. The
number required to win the Prime Minister's position was fifty-four.
Because of delayed elections, 106 seats, instead of the full 109, would
have been filled by 5 August. Thus, if past experience was any guide, on
the basis of those figures, a bandwagon effect could be created easily to
put Somare firmly in the Prime Minister's seat. Creating such a
bandwagon effect was precisely the strategy Somare chose.
On the Wingti side, the official tally gave his camp thirty-two
members, as follows: PDM, seventeen; PAP, six; PPP, five; Papua party,
three; and United party, one. However, the Wingti camp also claimed the
support of an unspecified number of independent MPs.
Initial prospect thus seemed more favourable to Somare. His strategy
of media blitz, talking horse to the press to generate a bandwagon effect,
also appeared a reasonable one. However, a more astute handling of
negotiations with MPs was called for because in Wingti Somare had a
more cunning opponent, a more intelligent Machiavellian, than he had
ever had to deal with in such circumstances.
The Somare camp held a political bazaar in Rabaul from 15 to 20 July.
On the last day, the names of sixty-one MPs, said to be members of the
camp, were published in the Post-Courier. That was part of the bandwagon strategy. But it looked to some named MPs as Somare's overweening pressure to force them through publicity to join him, when all
they were doing at that stage was playing the favourite PNG MPs' game
of shopping around for the best deal.
The Rabaul meeting also committed two unpardonable errors
(according to the PNG rules of the political game). First, the meeting
went into details about firm ministerial allocations, including the question
of the deputy prime ministership, which expectedly went to Michael Mel.
The constitution makers had, with magnificent prescience, put an upper
limit to the number of ministerial positions. A maximum of only twentyseven ministerial positions (a quarter of the number of MPs) were
available. But virtually every MP who turned up in Rabaul believed he
was ministerial material. And even if he wasn't he did not see why he
should not be when he knew he could enjoy the trappings of office and
exploit the opportunities of the position as well as the next fellow.
Secondly, there was some attempt to hammer out agreed policies
which all coalition partners would be expected to support in Parliament.
Leaders of the MA-MIG group at the meeting, Momis, 'Narokobi and
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January-December 1987
443
Papua New Guinea. "I did it for PNG. I was using Angus to develop
Central Province. It is common in PNG for politicians to use the returns
from business to secure votes. Electoral benefits (votes) through
commercial linkages are not self-interest of a sinister kind". 24 Aruru
Matiabe sought to support his leader by saying that it was "normal for
PNG leaders to receive contributions from foreign sources". 25
For this and other embarrassments to the government, (his radical
positions on the New Caledonian issue, for instance, had had to be
contradicted publicly on several occasions by the Prime Minister) Aruru
Matiabe was made to give up the Foreign Ministry. After the Prime
Minister had had it for a fortnight, Akoka Doi, the Speaker and a member
of the Papuan bloc was appointed to the post in November. Diro had
resigned from cabinet on 8 November, after he had been charged on three
counts of perjury (later increased to five counts) in connection with his
evidence before the Forest Inquiry.
Diro's resignation was the signal for the start of strong rumours of an
impending coup throughout November and December. Diro had
apparently been a popular Commander of the Defence Force, the first
Papua New Guinean to occupy that position. The top echelons of the
Force were occupied disproportionately by Papuan Officers. Diro's
utterances, after his resignation, did nothing to dissipate the rumours. In
his resignation letter, he had said: "I am a peaceful man who believes in
the unity of PNG. But the events of the past couple of months have had
implications leading to rumours of disobedience in the disciplined
forces". 26
Meanwhile, Wingti was being reassured by the senior Defence
Force officers that the coup rumours were "rubbish", and that "any
attempt to overthrow a peacetime PNG government was more likely to
come from disaffected businessmen unable to get what they wanted
through the bureaucracy and parliament"Y But Diro, with his back now
to the wall, seemed bent on inciting some action by the military. He told
Parliament that "the ingredients are here for a coup, whether you like it
or not ... I do not want to be blamed when this arises". 28 Suddenly, he had
become the champion of the underdog, speaking in unfamiliar populist
tones: "50,000 young people leave school every year but the country is
able to cater for only 10,000 of them. The economy is dominated by
foreigners. Unless the leadership address itself to these problems, we are
sitting on a time bomb". 29 The two coups in Fiji were, of course, making
everybody more aware of the possibility of a coup, and hence more
nervous.
In December, in the midst of all these rumours, General Tony Huai,
Commander of the PNG Defence Force (and, incidentally, like Diro, a
Papuan), was sacked by the government, a year before the end of his
term. He was replaced by Brigadier Rochus Lokinap from Namatanai, Sir
Julius Chan's electorate in the New Ireland Province. Huai, who had
apparently been under National Intelligence Office surveillance for
months, was said to have made unauthorised trips to Indonesia to meet
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Yaw Sa.ffu
and brief General Benny Murdani on the defence provisions in the Joint
Declaration of Principles being negotiated between PNG and Australia.
He was said to have accepted an offer of 1,000 army uniforms and a gift
of lounge furniture from Murdani. The Defence Minister, James Pokasui
a former Army Captain, alleged further that, by his slack leadership, Huai
had failed to stamp out incipient indiscipline, such as officers lobbying
politicians for promotion, and infighting among officers. All this was
allegedly beginning to affect discipline and morale among the troops.
Indeed, a Times journalist reported that Huai's close relations with
Murdani had nearly resulted in a mutiny of senior officers and NCO's in
November. 30
While the situation in the army appeared to be most threatening to
stability, the image of the Wingti cabinet (as a bunch of unruly politicians
intent on displaying their newly acqUired sense of power and publicly
squabbling over the distribution of perks) was also not particularly
reassuring for stability. A cabinet reshuffle became necessary not only to
improve the image of the government. It was also necessary because of
vacancies created, first by the resignation of Diro, (consequently the
Speaker Akoka Doi, was appointed Foreign Minister and Dennis Young
moved from Public Service to the speakership) and, secondly, by the
ousting of the Police Minister, Legu Vagi, from Parliament, as a result of
a successful challenge in the Court of Disputed Returns. The reshuffle
was also necessitated by the need to accommodate Utula Samana who
had been enticed to the government side by a firm promise to appoint
him a Minister. Samana had left his allies on the opposition benches in
October without notice and migrated with four followers to the
government benches. Finally, the virtual ultimatums issued by Peter
Kuman and Thomas Negints, PDM MPs who accused Wingti of
making them "sacrificial lambs", had to be addressed positively, because
of the ever present fear that disaffected backbenchers in PNG tend to
make common cause with the opposition and vote the government out of
power.
On 23 December, Wingti reshuffled his cabinet. Six new faces were
introduced Samana (Public Service); Joseph Aoae, Papua party,
Education; Albert Karo. PAP. Culture and Tourism (hived off from Hugo
Berghuser's Civil Aviation, Culture and Tourism); Peter Kuman, PDM,
Police; and Thomas Negints PDM, Internal Affairs (a new and powerful
ministry with responsibility for the increasingly active National
Intelligence Office, disaster management, and the independent
constitutional bodies such as the Electoral Commission, the Auditor
General's and the Ombudsman Commission). Tom Amaiu, UP, whose
short stint as Housing Minister had been accompanied by such
widespread allegations of greed, brazen wantokism and favouritism, was
shifted to Corrective Institutions (showing Wingti has a sense of
humour!). Housing was taken over by Bill Ninkama, ex-National party,
now PDM. Two ministers were not reappointed: Aruru Matiabe (PAP) and
Aaron Noaio, (PAP).
January-December 1987
445
Foreign Affairs
Unlike 1982, when Iambakey Okuk tried but failed to inject foreign
policy issues into the campaign, particularly the Irian Jaya issue, this year
no politician appeared interested enough, or politicians were too realistic,
to raise any of the number of foreign policy issues on which PNG took
high profile stands, or in which she was directly involved. With the
precedent of the comprehensive Treaty of Friendship with Indonesia
towards the end of 1986, and also because of the 1986 unilateral
Australian revision of the aid agreement between herself and PNG, the
Wingti government initiated at the beginning of the year discussions
aimed at putting the whole range of bilateral relations between PNG and
Australia on a formal footing, in the form of a Joint Declaration of
Principles (JDP). The JDP which covered most aspects of relations
between two countries, aid, trade, defence, aviation, communications,
culture, was signed in Canberra on 12 December. It was hailed by PNG
spokesmen as having put PNG-Australian relations on a new, more equal,
more mature, less colonialist, footing.
446
YawSaffu
PNG, with the excessively pro-West, anti-Soviet Ted Diro then in charge
of Foreign Affairs, joined the US-inspired anti-Libyan hysteria in the
Pacific in April. Whereas PNG politicians were divided over the
advisability of concluding a fishing deal with the Soviets, Vanuatu
evidently had no hesitation in plumping for a deal. In spite of such
differences, however, emerging practical cooperation among the three
Melanesian states foreshadowed the group as a cornerstone of PNG
foreign policy. Talks among the three to conclude a treaty to encourage
closer relations got under way after the return of the Wingti government.
So did negotiations for the loan of PNG officials to Vanuatu. Travel
between member groups was set to improve with Air Niugini obtaining
landing rights in both Honiara and Port Vila.
Events in Fiji (which PNG leaders insist on regarding as another
Melanesian state) provided opportunities for the Wingti government to
distance itself from Australia and New Zealand in a manner that was
hailed by the PNG press as a sign of PNG's new-found independence:
"the days of follow big brother are gone forever" Y Both at the Apia
meeting of the South Pacific Forum in May and at the Commonwealth
Heads of Government meeting in Canada in October, Wingti was a strong
champion of Sitiveni Rabuka's cause. Events in Fiji were seen almost
entirely in emotive, racial terms: Indians were threatening to turn
indigenous Fijians into second-class citizens in their own country. Only
a handful of PNG leaders, Fr Momis, Sir Julius Chan, Tony Siaguru and
the ex-diplomat and top bureaucrat, Sir Paulias Matane, clearly and
unequivocally lamented the setting aside of liberal democratic principles
in Fiji.
In September, the government unveiled a new slogan, "independent
commitment to international cooperation", as the underlying philosophy
of its foreign policy. This was accompanied by an announcement, in the
same month, of PNG's intention to apply for membership of the NonAligned movement.
Finally, the excellent relations with Indonesia, in the wake of the
October 1986 Treaty of Friendship, appeared to have been a factor in the
weakening of OPM's resolve. In June, a faction of the movement, under
Seth Meser and Benny Anaya, surrendered to Indonesian authorities in
the Arso area in Jayapura. They said they could no longer cope with the
harsh life they led as guerillas in the jungle. Meanwhile, the PNG
government and UNHCR made concrete moves to resettle Irian Jayan
refugees in areas away from the border.
46
JANUARY-JUNE 1988
Yaw Saffu
448
Yaw Saffu
January-June 1988
449
the introduction of violence of that nature into PNG politics. Somare, who
did, blamed manipulation "by unscrupulous politicians" for the threats. 11
The sacking in January of the three top Papuan officers, was never
satisfactorily explained by the government. The Defence Minister, James
Pokasui, said the officers had been dismissed for disloyalty. But it was
never made clear to whom the officers had been disloyal, whether to him
personally (as an ex-Captain in the Defence Force), to their superior
officers, or to the government and the state. But the sackings lent
credence to rumours of an impending coup that had circulated at the end
of 1987. At another time, Pokasui's explanation was that "continuous
infighting and back-stabbing, political lobbying by the colonels posed a
security threat to the country". 12 But a belief that the dismissals were a
"payback" by Pokasui was propagated by no less a person than the exAnglican Archbishop of PNG, David Hand, who wrote a weekly column
in the Times. Commenting on a clear instance of military insubordination
in June 1988 which had been allowed to go unpunished, when the top
brass defied government orders that the Lae Airport be closed and all
users relocate at Nadzab airport, some forty kilometres away, Bishop
Hand wrote: "Not long ago a Commander of the Defence Force was
sacked. A new Commander was appointed over the heads of a number of
officers with longer experience and records as good. Some of these
officers had been connected with the terminating from the Force (years
ago) of the present Minister of Defence. Three of them were sacked by
that same minister as soon as he took power, with no reasons given
except unproven disloyalty and lack of discipline. No opportunity was
given for self-defence. That looks to the general public like sheer
vindictiveness of 'payback'". 13
Waiting for Parliament
In March, a month before Parliament was due to re-convene, there was a
lot of movement on the political front. The opposition had set up a Task
Force in November 1987 to stem the tide of defections from its ranks, to
woo back the earlier defectors, and to prepare for a vote of no-confidence
in the April session. It was having some success. For instance, the Deputy
Speaker, Andrew Temo, said he would support an opposition motion of
no-confidence as "a matter of principle". 14 (He became a minister in the
Namaliu Government). Two MPs, Paul Wanjik and Bernard Vogae,
defected back to the opposition, making some damming statements along
the way. Paul Wanjik, for instance, said he was "fed up with the
underhand political tactics and manipulation of MPs for numerical
supremacy by Prime Minister Wingti and his deputy, Sir Julius Chan ...
I can no longer support a government that is morally corrupt ... I have
had a gutful of deceit and hypocrisy"Y Vogae's statement was equally
trenchant.
On the Papuan front, it appeared that some PAP MPs were
beginning to resent the power of the extra-parliamentary executive,
450
Yaw So.fji.i
January-June 1988
451
452
Yaw Saffi.J..
16 April, he phoned Somare who agreed that for the sake of stability he
was prepared to bring the opposition into a grand coalition. But before
the details could be worked out, indeed before Somare could consult
properly with his opposition allies, Wingti had called a big press
conference, to which diplomats and other dignitaries had been invited.
Somare and Wingti emerged from a scheduled meeting on the issue at
Parliament House on 20 April into the glare of a huge, expectant crowd
of diplomats, journalists and top public servants. Wingti announced that
an agreement had been reached in principle to form a grand coalition.
But even at the Press Conference, it was clear that Somare and Wingti
had different conceptions of what they had agreed in principle to achieve.
Asked if what they had in mind to achieve was a government of national
unity embracing all the parties, Somare said yes but Wingti said no.
Wingti only wanted a stronger coalition or, at any rate a weaker
opposition. If Pangu joined the coalition, the remaining opposition would
be so weak that Ted Diro's defection, even with all PAP members, would
no longer constitute a credible threat to his government. Thus the two
protagonists wanted different things. But they had not given themselves
enough time to work out the likely consequences of this divergence
before they unveiled their "agreement in principle".
There were specific points of disagreement as well. For instance,
Wingti rejected Somare's demands for a code of conduct whereby
ministers under investigation or facing charges would be excluded from
office. Somare also reportedly demanded that the proposed media bill be
dropped. These were the issues Roy Yaki, Minister for Transport and the
chief government negotiator, referred to as the opposition's emphasis on
"petty, parochial issues", when he blamed the opposition for the collapse
of the negotiations. He also blamed the opposition's "unrealistic
proposals", namely Somare's insistence that all the opposition parties
come in together.
For Somare, "the Prime Minister's complete failure to address the main
causes of instability in government", that is, the ability and willingness of
parties to switch sides at the drop of a hat, was the principal reason for
the collapse of the negotiations. It was for this reason he had insisted on
all party leaders (except those under a cloud) and their most able
lieutenants being included in the grand coalition. John Giheno, the chief
Pangu negotiator at this stage, was critical of Somare's insistence that
other coalition parties participate in the talks: "You have to think about
your own survival irrespective of our moral obligation to coalition
partners, the party comes first". 25
January-June 1988
453
now wanted to lead a national party rather than a regional one, launched
his Melanesian United Front (MUF), timing it to take advantage of
possible defections occasioned by the reshuffle that would become
necessary if the negotiations for a grand coalition succeeded. He claimed
to have fifteen MPs in his party. But at least four of the MPs he named
denied they were with him. Samana claimed that the formation of his
party was aimed at bringing stability to "the current government". 26 But
that he felt it necessary to announce, four days later, that he did not
"want to be Prime Minister this session, not even Deputy Prime
Minister" 27 suggested that some people perhaps did not believe that
contributing to stability was his uppermost aim.
Disagreements within PAP, which had been simmering for
some time, boiled over with the sacking on 12 May of Albert Karo,
Minister for Tourism and Culture since the December reshuffle, and his
wife, a vice-president of the party. Karo was determined to stick with
Wingti and hang on to his portfolio rather than support Diro's threats, in
the name of party solidarity, and possibly lose his portfolio in a crossover
to the opposition. On 11 May, the Niugini Nius had claimed in a front
page story that PAP's deadline for Wingti to give the deputy prime
ministership to Diro was expiring that day. Albert Karo reacted to that
story by saying that he and six others, including Alan Ebu, the Minister
for Fisheries, and Tenda Lau, the only Highlander MP inPAP, (he was to
resign from PAP a week later) disassociated themselves from Diro's
ultimatum. He said Diro's moves were "a dead issue. He must clear his
backyard first before he comes up with demands. I don't believe in
regionalism, and there is no need to destabilise. If Diro wants to go into
opposition, he is welcome to do so". 28
Three of the six MPs Karo named, Daniel ltu (Kikori), David Beu
(Sohe) and Benson Garui (Northern) claimed the next day that they had
been forced by Karo to sign the letters! They now condemned Karo's
move as destabilising and embarrassing. The PAP executive told the press
that PAP continued to support the Wingti government, but that Karo's
position as minister was now untenable, as he was no longer a PAP
member. There was a clear message in this for the other "rebel" PAP
minister, Alan Ebu.
Pangu, for its part, was involved in replacing Somare as leader. On 22
May, Somare stepped down as leader of Pangu, three weeks before the
date he had set in November, namely the twenty-first anniversary of
Pangu and his leadership of that party. Namaliu was elected leader with
John Giheno and Jack Genia as deputy leaders. The changeover had been
advanced because PDM and Pangu had resumed talks on a coalition. In
spite of the fact that Namaliu was reportedly not in favour, 29 he had to go
along to save his party from a further split because it appeared that his
two deputies and a section of Pangu MPs had their minds set on going
into government.
454
YawSaffu
January-June 1988
455
PDM and a confidant of Wingti that this was at Sir Julius Chan's
prompting, perhaps a move to preserve his Deputy Prime Minister's
position. Perhaps, more Machiavellian, it was a move to destroy Pangu.
The National party leadership, claiming justly that it was Pangu that had
broken faith with them by signing the memorandum of understanding,
jumped at Wingti's offer.
Another Reshuffle
On 1 June, the country was again taken by surprise. Wingti called off the
marriage with Pangu and, instead, brought in the National party.
Incredibly, he blamed Pangu for his action. He claimed that Somare's
decision to turn down the Foreign Affairs job breached the memorandum
of understanding. He announced a twenty-eight-member cabinet. Six
ministers had been dumped: Diro (Internal Affairs), Akoka Doi (Foreign
Affairs), Tom Amaiu (Correctional Services), John Kaputin (Minerals and
Energy), Gai Duwabane (Agriculture and Livestock) and Tim Ward
(Health). Michael Mel, the National party leader, got the new Treasury
Ministry, with Kwarara still in charge of a much depleted Finance
portfolio. There were two other National party men in the cabinet: Ben
Sabumei (Health) and Wiwa Korowi (Minerals and Energy). Chan kept
his deputy prime ministership and the Trade and Industry portfolio.
Samana obtained the Agriculture and Livestock Ministry, while Thomas
Negints took Fisheries, pushing Alan Ebu to Correctional Services.
Wingti's coalition now claimed to have seventy-two members in
Parliament. But, as it turned out, his troubles were far from over. First,
Wingti's modus operandi had helped to raise the levels of cynicism and
deception in PNG politics. For instance, Diro reportedly had a signed
letter from Wingti offering him the deputy prime ministership in AprilY
On 29 May, just two days before PAP was virtually wiped out from his
cabinet, Wingti had met with PAP officials in Room 314, Travelodge
hotel, and had expressed his interest in a long term partnership between
PAP and PDM until the 1992 elections. Trust had received such battering
since the aftermath of the 1987 elections that Wingti was soon to discover
that he too could not count on it. Secondly, the National party was, not
surprisingly, divided over the decision to join. 33 In any case, it was
claimed the party caucus was not consulted. 34 Finally, Diro and Pangu
were now more determined than ever to bring Wingti down.
The End
As soon as Parliament met on 27 June, notice of a motion of noconfidence was given. Namaliu was named as the alternative Prime
Minister. Within the one week period between the notice and the vote, the
exodus from Wingti's coalition was indicative of the way the vote was
likely to go. With each defection accompanied by a press conference or
a press release detailing in colourful language the alleged failings of the
456
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47
JULY-DECEMBER 1988
Michael Oliver
Namiliu's Cabinet
At mid-year, the political manoeuvring that had dominated the first half
of 1988 receded gradually. The new Namaliu government entered its six
months grace period, during which the constitution permits no vote of
lack of confidence. The cabinet Namaliu put together seemed to be a
masterpiece of political architecture. Out of twenty-eight posts, he
assigned seven to each of the four regions (Papua, Highlands, Islands and
Mamose) and named at least one person from each of the provinces and
the National Capital District. Pangu pati garnered thirteen seats and the
other members of the coalition (People's Action party, Melanesian
Alliance, National party, Papua party, and the League for National
Advancement) were rewarded in ingenious combinations of number and
importance of portfolios. 1 The outcries of those who had been left out, or
whose region, or party or province did not get what it hoped for were,
however, instantaneous and vociferous. Highlands students at the
University of Technology called the allocation of ministries a complete
mockery, complaining that the crucial economic portfolios like Minerals
and Energy, Forests and Agriculture and Livestock had been given to
other parts of the country. Papua spokesmen also voiced grievances,
although their share of powerful ministries included the deputy prime
ministership (Akoka Doi), Trade and Industry (Galeva Kwarara), and
Fisheries (Alan Ebu). 2 Discontent in Papua still focused on Ted Diro and
his exclusion from the National Executive Council. By the year's end, the
charges (other than perjury) that the Barnett Commission had proposed
had still not been laid against him. He remained a powerful figure, not
included in cabinet, with an unmatched capacity to destabilise Papua New
Guinean politics.
Most of the political shifts that took place in the weeks after the
election were caused by the customary defections from opposition to
government ranks, always made in response to demands from constituents
that might be almost inaudible to others, but were loud in the ears of the
defecting members.
Gabriel Ramoi's decision was an exception. He left the People's
Democratic Movement (once more) in August and announced his intention
458
Michael Oliver
July-December 1988
459
460
Michael Oliver
Labour
Trade unions in Papua New Guinea began in 1988 to show concern for
the share their members might hope to enjoy in the promised prosperity
of the 1990s. Strike activity was concentrated in the resource sector. In
August, 200 workers stopped work for two days at the Kennecott
company on Lihir Island, where gold mining operations were getting
under way, calling for overtime allowances, compensation for industrial
accidents and company housing. 13 But the most spectacular conflict
occurred at Ok Tedi Mining Company's operation at Tabubil in Western
Province. The differences between national workers and management
built up towards the middle of the year. There were initial work stoppages
in July and August, the latter being sufficiently serious to require special
police reinforcement. But the major hlow-up came in September Workers
rampaged through the company offices in Tabubil and burned down the
Golf Club and the Hash House Harriers Club in a display of resentment
that could not be ignored. A special board of enquiry into the issues was
set up under the direction of Wep Kanawi, Secretary of the Department
of the Public Service, and a full investigation of workers' grievances was
required. The list of complaints was significant, in that it focused on the
perception of workers that expatriates were being much better treated
than they were. The company's housing policy came under attack, as did
its slowness in localising well-paid and responsible positions, and its
failure to provide an adequate training programme for increasing skill
levels and on-the-job training. The staff development failures were
alleged to go from mechanical trades through secretarial posts, to
foremen, middle-management and supervisory training. On top of these
questions of relative status between nationals and expatriates, there were
the strains of a two-shift system lasting for twelve hours each in a roundthe-clock operation. '4
Ok Tedi Mining had reached a stage in its operations when the highly
profitable gold had been mined out and copper, produced for a depressed
market, had to be mined rapidly and continuously, and by the lowest cost
methods, if profit expectations were to be fulfilled. Budget-paring had
reduced the staff development programme of the company to a very low
ebb, 15 and there is little doubt that the absence of clear paths to
advancement contributed to the disauiet of national workers at all levels
of the company.
'
July-December 1988
461
462
Michael Oliver
July-December 1988
463
464
Michael Oliver
agreements in two local forest areas within the west coast sector already
spoken for by the provincial government. The minister, Karl Stack,
announced his intention to approve the landowners' applications and
Pokawin then went to court asking for, and receiving, a temporary
restraining order forbidding Stack from "granting or declaring any local
forest areas in the Manus Province". 29 At stake was not only the
provincial government's claim to royalties, which would not accrue to it
under the Private Dealings provisions, but also the ability of a provincial
government to plan a rational system of forest exploitation that would
include an obligation to process timber in the province, rather than
permitting a company simply to ship out raw logs. 30 The possibility of a
national government/landowner coalition being mounted against a
province was evidently as great as the North Solomons style provincial
government/landowner combination against the national government.
The Namaliu Budget
Paul Pora, the Minister of Finance and Planning, presented his first
budget to the national Parliament in mid-November and it was passed by
the last day of the month. Although it did not represent any striking
departure from the fiscal policy of the Wingti regime, there were changes
of some significance, as well as the continuation of policies that might
well have been changed. The budget called for expenditures of Kl, 190
million and revenues of K963 million, leaving a deficit of K227 million.
It was posited on real growth of the Gross Domestic Product of 4.3 per
cent for 1989 and an inflation rate of seven per cent, which included the
effect of a shift to higher indirect taxes, on beer and spirits, cigarettes and
petrol. It foresaw slight improvements in agricultural commodity prices
and slightly lower mineral prices.
The main themes of the government, "unity, reconciliation and
reconstruction" were, Paul Pora claimed, the guiding principles of the
budget and changes in expenditure policy which embodied these
principles were concentrated in fields to which the Namaliu government
had assigned priority: law and order; education and social services; and
infrastructure development. Law and order expendimres were increased
by seventeen per cent, most of the monies to be devoted to improvement of
housing, salary and working conditions for the defence and police forces.
Social Services were assigned Kl9 million more than the previous year
and infrastructure development including the development of industrial
parks (or manufacturing estates), was assigned an extra K209 millionY A
new "Sectoral Policies and Strategies" document was prepared for the
budget and became Volume I of the budget papers. It revealed reasonably
developed policies of the government on questions like investment,
employment, wages, the exchange rate and population growth. More
generally, it seemed to mark a return to earlier planning policies, like the
Medium Term Development Plan of the last Somare government which
emphasised the links between sectors. Unfortunately, it also revealed the
July-December 1988
465
466
Michael Oliver
48
JANUARY-DECEMBER 1989
YawSaffu
Introduction
Events on Bougainville (the North Solomons Provi!lce) and their
extensive ramifications dominated PNG politics m 1989. The
uncompromisingly violent nature of the insurgency resulted in the shutdown of the Bougainville Copper Ltd (BCL) Panguna mine from 15 May,
and this was expected eventually to affect forty per cent of the country's
annual foreign exchange earnings and seventeen per cent of government
revenue. The insurgency posed a great challenge to the territorial integrity
of PNG because the insurgents' demands escalated to include secession.
It also posed a challenge to the viability of the emerging tradition of
open, constitutional politics because counter-insurgency measures tended
to undermine this, with restrictions on journalists, talk of internment bills
and human rights abuses by the security forces. The year also saw the
first political assassinations in modern Papua New Guinea. The usual
threats of instability within the ruling coalitions and the constant resort to
the vote of no-confidence by the opposition showed no abatement, even
in the face of the massive threats to the system unleashed by the
Bougainville crisis. The turmoil in the provincial government system also
continued, culminating in the suspension of the Morobe provincial
government, once regarded as a success story of decentralisation. On top
of all this, an escalation in the violence used or threatened by criminals
and by striking workers and political actors to back their demands, and in
the weaponry used by tribal fighters, 1 signified the descent to a new
plateau of political difficulties, and tested to the hilt the pragmatic genius
of PNG politicians.
Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency on Bougainville
There is a history, going back to the sixties and seventies, of both antiBCL and secessionist sentiments on Bougainville. 2 But to the extent that
such facets of social change can be dated, the current, violent revival of
these emotions may be dated from the formation, in the aftermath of the
1987 election campaign, of a new Panguna Landowner~ Association
(NPLA).3 Comprising younger, better educated members of the families
468
Yaw Saffu
whose land has been more or less cavalierly acquired by the colonial
administration and leased to BCL, NPLA began a campaign of sabotage
and political violence in November 1988, after its April demand for a ten
billion kina compensation had not been treated seriously. The campaign
spread and intensified throughout 1989, leading to a declaration of a State
of Emergency on the island in June, and a half-hearted prosecution of a
counter-insurgency war by the state against the NPLA's armed wing: The
Bougainville-Revolutionary Army (BRA).
What did the landowners (both moderate and militant and the armed
wing of the latter) want? How did the government react to the demands?
What was the opposition's stand? Initially, NPLA demands were directed
as much to their older kinsmen at the helm of the old Panguna
Landowners' Association (OPLA) as they were to BCL. There was evident
dissatisfaction with OPLA's alleged collaborationist stance towards BCL
and with the manner in which cash benefits were distributed (or not
distributed) to all entitled (especially younger) members of the extended
matrilineage families which owned the land. 4 Thus Matthew Kove, a
village elder, an executive member of OPLA, reportedly a maternal uncle
of Perpetua Serero and Francis Ona, respectively chairperson and
secretary of NPLA, was abducted by the militants in January and was
never seen again. Also in January, two boats belonging to Siverenus
Ampoai (a businessman, an executive member of OPLA and closely
associated with BCL's public relations efforts) were burnt while his
commercial vehicle was sprayed with bullets, nearly killing his brother.
Once the OPLA had been silenced by the terrorist tactics, the ten
billion kina compensation demand from BCL (for damage to the
environment, for past arrears and for allegedly arrogant, discriminatory
attitudes) came to the fore. The sheer magnitude of the demand (about
twice the mine's total gross earnings since its inception in the seventies)
suggested that NPLA's real demand was for BCL to cease mining. The
campaign of sabotage of BCL installations begun in November 1988,
which forced a temporary closure of the mine in December, escalated in
January with arson, destruction of power pylons, etc.
In response to the campaign of sabotage and terrorism the government
imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew in January in the affected central parts
and increased police strength on the island. The government also
appointed a Ministerial Review Committee headed by Deputy Prime
Minister Akoka Doi, to review the BCL agreement, more than a year after
it became due. The Committee considered and approved a review of the
Bougainville Copper Agreement (BCA), a reorganisation of the PLA
Trust Fund and implementation of social amenities and infrastructural
projects in the province, particularly in the mining area. It also agreed on
a Commission of Enquiry to determine the causes of the crisis. Cabinet
accepted the Committee's report.
Although a call-out of Defence Force soldiers had been authorised
by the Governor-General and had been gazetted on 23 December 1988,
and although some responsible opinion5 was already urging the
January-December 1989
469
470
YawSaffu
But even as the troops were being flown in, peace tmttatives were
being unveiled. A bipartisan committee under the chairmanship of Rabaul
MP, John Kaputin, was announced in response to Sir Julius Chan's
urgings for a national, all-party approach to the crisis. In April the
government unveiled a package of generous proposals, transferring half of
its nineteen per cent equity in BCL to the landowners and the provincial
government, and providing a special support gram of one per cent of the
gross value of BCL sales (worth about four million kina a year) as an
unconditional grant to the provincial government. In addition, a number
of infrastructural projects, including roads, health facilities and schools,
worth about K200 million, would be implemented in the province over
the next five years. The new improved formula of compensation worked
out for the landowners of the new Porgera gold mine in Enga and
covering occupation, damage and disruption fees, was otlered to Panguna
landowners. It was estimated that this would result in an average annual
receipt of about K47,000 by each landowner.B
The provincial government and members of OPLA regarded the
government proposals as a promising basis for negotiations. But the
militants rejected any prospect of negotiations until the riot police and
soldiers were withdrawn from the island. The security forces were
increasingly accused by militants, the Catholic Justice and Peace
Committee and Amnesty International, of gross abuse of human rights.
Like amnesty for Ona, withdrawal of the security forces had become a
newly pressing demand of the militants.
Alarmed by the enormous escalation of the militants' demand beyond
the virtually universally applauded one of securing a greater share of the
earnings from the copper mine for the landowners and the province
(secession had evidently become the primarily goal of the militants) and
also no doubt alarmed by the militants' methods of eliminating dissent
from its hardline position (for instance, the Premier claimed that
secessionists were after his life) the provincial government sought to
bolsters its relatively moderate position by mobilising moderate opinion
through a survey. The survey was conducted in April by a select
committee of the Provincial Assembly under the chairmanship of John
Bika, provincial Minister for Commerce, to determine the wishes of
Bougainvilleans over the secession issue. In May, the Committee
recommended to the Assembly rejection of calls for secession. It
recommended instead that the province press for increased autonomy,
with only foreign affairs, defence and currency to be controlled
exclusively by the national government.
In May the Provincial Assembly endorsed these recommendations as
well as the national government's peace package. Despite the endorsement
and the Premier's positive assessment of the national government's
sincerity, the deadline for the landowners and the provincial government's
response to the peace package expired on 12 May without any firm
response. In June the provincial government made its counter-offer. But
it was not until August that OPLA leaders, claiming to speak for all
January-December 1989
471
landowners, made their response. They wanted the entire ten per cent
share the government was offering, and demanded tax exemptions for a
landowners' company to be formed, and a right to sell the shares at any
time to anybody, to national or foreign interests, and new royalty-sharing
arrangements. 14
Increased militants' attacks on BCL workers and installations led to a
shut-down on the mine on 15 May. Three days later, the government
authorised security forces to go and search for Ona, instead of them being
restricted to guarding installations and public facilities and maintaining
law and order, but even after this change of policy, the government still
ruled out a declaration of a State of Emergency and full military
operations against the militants. 15 Instead, the government actively
pursued the possibility of a dialogue, through the so-called bi-partisan
committee under John Kaputin, and through Catholic church
intermediaries led by Bishop Gregory Singkai, himself a Bougainvillean.
Indeed, on 23 May, the government declared a fifteen-day truce and
invited Francis Ona to come out for negotiations.
The government's faith in Ona's reasonableness was hard to reconcile
with a stream of clear statements from him in February, April and May,
indicating that he was not interested in any compromise and that
secession had become his primary objective. Ona's responses to earlier
government "raid moratoria" in February, at the beginning of March, and
in April, had been consistent with his disdain for compromise. Each time
the government reined in its forces to give peaceful solution a chance,
Ona stepped up his campaign. Admittedly, security forces on the ground
had not always abided by the government's orders on "raid moratoria"
and had thus reinforced the militants' perception of government duplicity.
But even if Ona had genuinely wanted to negotiate, the new demand that
he be granted amnesty from prosecution was one that even the extremely
accommodating and pragmatic Namaliu government felt unable to meet.
The truce period expired on 6 June with negotiations no nearer than
before.
After the expiry of the truce period, the Namaliu government appeared
at last to embrace the option of a full military offensive against the
militants. It received the opposition's support for that. 16 The BRA was
outlawed on 20 June and a State of Emergency was finally declared on 26
June. Police Commissioner Paul Tohian was appointed controller of the
State of Emergency with the officer controlling the troops on
Bougainville as his deputy.
The government's new offensive appeared to succeed sufficiently for
the militants to put out feelers in August for talks, for the mine to prepare
to re-open in September, and for a date, 12 September, to be named for
the signing of the peace package between the government, the provincial
government and the landowners. At the beginning of September the troops
were withdrawn to defensive positions, to allow leaders to make a "final
attempt" to entice Ona to the negotiating table. The mine re-opened on 5
September but militant activities forced it to close down eight and a half
472
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January-December 1989
473
gun" Y Peace efforts occupied the rest of the year, with a meeting in
Rabaul between the North Solomons Premier and four senior government
ministers in the third week of November. The church leaders who had
played mediatory roles most of the year doubled their efforts. The Prime
Minister, ever willing to emphasise peace prospects, declared on 6
December that ceasefire talks were gong well. Two weeks later, he
admitted that the ceasefire talks had failed. The militants insisted on the
total withdrawal of security forces and total secession. At the very end of
the year, on 28 December, BCL reluctantly "mothballed" the mine. This
suggested that both BCL and the government had concluded that the end
of the Bougainville crisis was far out of sight.
Other Landowner Agitations
Panguna landowner dissatisfaction caused the greatest strife in 1989. But
the phenomenon of landowner agitations against resource developers (or
resource exploiters) and against their own government over alleged nonpayment or underpayment for land required for infrastructural and urban
facilities (often supported if not instigated by politicians) was as
widespread in 1989 as ever. In Enga, site of the still developing
mammoth Porgera gold mine, the Premier, Ned Laina, led his people to
make startling demands on the developers (or exploiters). In February, the
landowners demanded ten per cent of the shares in the mine without
payment. 23
Their delegation to Sydney in the same month demanded: the
construction of a permanent tailings dam before mining begins; the
upgrading of the health centre to hospital standard; the awarding of all
spin-off contracts to Porgerans, and Engans; and the starting of a training
and employment programme for Engans and Porgerans. In March the
Premier, who claimed he was supported by all Engan politicians and the
landowners, now wanted thirty per cent of the shares in the Porgera gold
mine to be given to the Enga Development Corporation, owned by the
landowners, six local government councils and the provincial
government. 24 He did not indicate whether the allocation should be free or
how it would be paid for. The Premier also wanted the Enga Development
Corporation to be an "automatic partner in any sub-contract work";
transportation of machinery, equipment, and goods between Lae and
Porgera to be restricted to Engans only, and no fly-in-fly-out of an elite
work force based in Cairns, an idea that resource developers and their
social impact consultants were beginning to sell hard. If these demands
could not be met, he proposed that "Porgera be put up to tender" and the
companies be compensated for work done so far. 25
In April the national government agreed to let the Enga provincial
government acquire a ten per cent share in the Porgera mine, and acceded
to practically all the other demands by the Premier regarding spin-off
contracts and employment of Engans. Then it was announced that Porgera
has twenty-seven per cent more gold than estimated earlier. 26 So, the
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YawSaffu
Premier staked out for a greater share for Enga. He wanted twenty per
cent. Further, he wanted the agreement with the developers (Placer,
Renison and Highlands Gold, a subsidiary of Mt Isa Mines) to guarantee
specified contracts to Porgerans and Engans and threatened he would not
sign otherwise. A month later, on 12 May, the Porgera agreement was
signed by all parties: the government, the developers, the provincial
government and the landowners. Within six weeks of the signing,
however, Engan politicians were accusing the developers of being
"dishonest and unfair" in not awarding contracts to the Enga
Development Corporation and were threatening to burn installations at the
mine which was expected to start operation on 15 July. 27
In the Western Province, the landowners of the established Ok Tedi
mine, led by the Premier and other politicians from the province,
demanded KIO million compensation for the mine access road; a
doubling of occupation fees to ten kina per hectare (for the 18,000
hectares); the supply of electricity to all the villages within the mine
lease area. As usual, violent action was threatened unless demands were
met. 28 Earlier in the year, the demands had been even higher: K20 million
a year compensation (presumably for polluting river systems in the
province) and a further K3 million to upgrade the Daru wharf (the port
used by Ok Tedi).
Pollution from Ok Tedi was a genuine concern, even if some opposition
politicians from the area also sought to embarrass the government with it.
In April the Environment and Conservation Minister threatened to close
Ok Tedi unless the company came up with an appropriate solution. A
tailings dam was estimated to cost K322 million. Apart from the cost, the
company claimed that geological instability in the area, manifested by
landslides in 1985 and again in August 1989, made the construction of a
tailings dam a hazardous enterprise. But concerns were raised by the
state's consultants, Applied Geology Associates, that marine life was at
risk from the Ok Tedi waste discharge. The Minerals and Energy
Minister, whose department took a view of mines pollution different from
that of the Department of Environment and Conservation, was instructed
to report to cabinet by 30 July with necessary scientific data on pollution
in the Fly River. 29 The fact of the matter, however, was that economic
benefits from the mine appeared to make environmentally destructive
total discharge the only viable option. As far as the developers were
concerned, three other options, including the building of a tailings dam,
would all lead to a close down of the mine, a situation the government
could not contemplate. It was calculated that in the lifetime of the mine,
the government would earn K750 million from its twenty per cent share
and taxes; the Western provincial government K120 million; the
landowners K20 million; while business associated with the mine would
be worth K22 million per year. Further, Ok Tedi employs, directly and
indirectly, 4,500 Papua New Guineans. 30 In October, university students
organised a demonstration against the government decision to allow Ok
Tedi to operate without building a tailings dam.
January-December 1989
475
476
YawSaff.t
spread of squatter settlements and (it was hoped) urban crime; a change
in the Leadership Code, to make it tougher and to extend it to include
provincial government members; changes to the Group Fighting Act to
shift the onus of proof on to suspects; to make perjury before a
commission of enquiry a punishable offence; and to abolish regional seats
and "sectional voting" (voting by those whose names are not on the
electoral roll) and to require the issue of picture identity cards to all
voters. 35 Only the bill to criminalise perjury before a Commission of
Enquiry became law during the year. A bill to amend the constitution to
limit motions of no-confidence was introduced. But it got no further than
that. The opposition and government backbench MPs were thus able to
pursue their favourite game of muddying the political waters with their
constant crossings. aided by somewhat unquestionine, unc.ritkal journalists
who dutifully reported the headline grabbing antics and exaggerated
opinions of self-promoting politicians, in the lead-up to sessions of
Parliament and the inevitable no-confidence challenges to the government.
Before Parliament sat on 21 February, the opposition made it clear
they would challenge. Wingti was clearly under pressure from his backbench and from other opposition leaders. On the eve of the session, he
promised: "I certainly do not want to see a change of government every
eight months. But at the same time I will not allow this country to slide
backwards". 36 On the day the session began, he reiterated "We should
give this government a fair go. And we have. But we cannot let the
government drag us to ruin"Y Sir Julius Chan, leader of the People's
Progress party (PPP), believed the opposition could win because Namaliu
was "presiding over mutinies and coups, not break and enters",'8 a
reference to the soldiers' rampage earlier in the month (on which more
further on). The media reported rumours of a split in Ted Diro's People's
Action party (PAP), a partner in Prime Minister Namaliu's government,
and also in two opposition parties, the People's Democratic Movement
(PDM) of Paias Wingti and the National party faction that remained in
opposition under Michael Mel. 19 As was usual in the numbers game, some
MPs announced their defection and rumours of even more defections
became inevitable. On this basis, Wingti claimed at the end of February
that he had the numbers to overthrow the government.
On 2 March, Utula Samana, leader of Melanesian United Front
(MUP), gave notice of a motion of no-confidence in the government, and
named Paias Wingti as the alternative Prime Minister. The next day, by
fifty-three votes to forty-six, the government abruptly adjourned
Parliament till July, rather than face the vote at the end of the required
seven-day notice. This was the third use of the early adjournment ploy
which had been first employed by the Somare government back in 1985,
and which the Wingti government had resorted to in April 1988. But
while in 1988 it was the government that had been criticised for
adjourning early, the much more aroused popular anger in 1989 was not
directed at the government but at the opposition. The March issues of the
national newspapers (the Post-Courier, Niugini Nius, and the Times) made
January-December 1989
477
it clear that public opinion was overwhelmingly against the motion of noconfidence. Students, trade unions, press surveys, letters to the editor,
concerned citizens' groups, a conference of provincial education ministers
(which included four Premiers), a meeting of the five Islands Premiers,
and a hugely attended public debate organised at the University of Papua
New Guinea on 21 March between leading government and opposition
MPs, all conveyed the same message: the opposition had no convincing
case; seven months was not long enough to judge performance of a
government; the people had become rather tired of the MP's numbers
game.
For the first time there was a powerful impression of massive popular
participation in politics, outside of a general election. The aroused
popular interest did not impress some opposition spokesmen. They
claimed that motions of no-confidence had "nothing to do with any
member of the public except MPs" and that "those groups have no
legitimate standing or right to protest". "The power to reason and judge
is vested in the MP when he or she is voted into Parliament, our actions
and decisions must not be directed or influenced by sectional demands,
pressures or interests". "Politics should be left to politicians". Thus spoke
Wingti, Philomen Embel, Jacob Lemeki and Perry Zeipi, all leading
members of the parliamentary opposition. 40 Apart from everything else,
they managed to ignore a very significant political event which had
occurred only days before their pontification. A defecting MP, Ben Garry,
had been successfully pressured through the press by powerful
constituents and clan members to return to the government backbenches
or lose their support.
In April, virtually all the defectors from the governing parties streamed
back, amidst speculations about an impending cabinet reshuffle, to
consolidate government. The League of National Advancement (LNA), a
partner in the governing coalition, was successfully enticing opposition
members into its ranks with the aim of increasing its membership in
cabinet. The People's Action party (PAP) sought the reinstatement of its
parliamentary leader, Ted Diro, as minister. Akoka Doi, the Deputy Prime
Minister and a member of PAP, even claimed he wanted Diro to replace
him as Deputy Prime Minister. PAP also sought the reinstatement of
Aruru Matiabe, its deputy parliamentary leader. Namaliu's own Pangu
pati backbenchers also harboured ministerial ambitions. Namaliu's natural
reaction was to procrastinate. But Ted Diro reportedly issued one of his
familiar ultimatums: Namaliu should reshuffle and bring him back into
cabinet by 4 pm on Friday, 19 May, or he would move his group out of
the coalition. 41 The highly damaging findings against Diro, by the Justice
Barnett Commission of Enquiry into Forestry, were still pending. But
with sixteen members, PAP was the third largest group in the Parliament,
after Pangu and Wingti's PDM. Namaliu caved in. Diro was sworn in as
Minister of State on 20 May, replacing John Giheno, one of the two
Pangu pati deputy leaders, who moved to Trade and Industry. Dropped in
the reshuffle were Galeva Kwarara (Trade and Industry), leader of the
478
YawSaffu
evidently one-man Papua party, and two Pangu pati ministers, Arnold
Marsipal (Defence) and Paul Kamod (Administrative Services). Ben
Sabumei, who moved from the National party to LNA in April, and
Theodore Tuya, aiso LNA, were appointed respectively to the Defence
and Administration Services ministries.
In spite of popular outcry against the motion of no-confidence, and the
efforts of the government to strengthen its defences, the motion of noconfidence remained on the agenda for the next session of Parliament.
PPP declared it would back the vote of no-confidence, in spite of (or
perhaps precisely because of) its own internal dissension, which led to
Jacob Lemeki resigning from PPP, and accusing Chan of "personal greed
and ambition that has left the party in ruin and death" .42 On 30 June, five
days hefore Parliament reconvened, the Minister of Communications,
Malipu Balakau, was murdered by gunmen at his home in Mount Hagen.
The shock of the assassination (the body was laid in state in Parliament
on the second day of the July sitting) managed to squelch ardour for a
vote of no-confidence in that session.
But by October, on the eve of the November budget session of
Parliament, the hunt was on again for MPs who were willing to move
around in the numbers game. Once again, gyrations within PAP provided
the momentum. Towards the end of October, while Akoka Doi was acting
as Prime Minister, he replaced the Minister for Culture and Tourism, a
co-member of PAP with Aruru Matiabe, the deputy parliamentary leader
of the same party. Matiabe claimed that the mini-reshuffle was not what
had been agreed within the party. He was supposed to have taken over the
Health portfolio from Robert Suckling. He warned of rising discontent
within PAP on account of "unprincipled decisions": which had brought
the party to "breaking point", thus posing "a serious threat to the survival
of Mr Rabbie Namaliu" .43 Only the previous week, two PAP ministers had
also indicated their discontent with the affairs of the party. In July, the
deputy president of the party, Professor John Waiko, had resigned, also
claiming dissatisfaction with the performance of the party leadership.
Matiabe called on both Diro and Doi to resign, staking his own claim to
the leadership and to the deputy prime ministership. 44 At least three
restless PAP backbenchers, Daniel ltu, Benson Garui and Aaron Noaio,
were reported to be ready to support a motion of no-confidence, which
the opposition made clear it would introduce.
On 31 October, the first day of the session, the opposition sought to
give the required one week's notice of its motion of no-confidence.
However, the Clerk of Parliament delayed acceptance for one day, saying
he wanted to verify a signature on the document. The MP concerned was
out of the country and the Clerk suspected that his signature had been
forged. On 1 November, Utula Samana gave the required notice for a
motion of no-confidence, with Paias Wingti named as the alternative
Prime Minister. In the horse trading that preceded such votes, Matiabe
demanded from Wingti and was apparently promised, the deputy prime
ministership. So, a day before the vote, 7 November, he announced his
January-December 1989
479
resignation from PAP. However, by the evening of the same day, he had
been made to see that the deputy prime ministership neither would nor
could be delivered, even if Wingti won. Not only is Matiabe a
Highlander, like Wingti and the Governor-General at that time, but the
idea that Sir Julius Chan or Utula Samana would yield the Deputy Prime
Minister's position to him was also pure delusion. Matiabe's return to the
Namaliu camp, along with other similar cases of "cold feet", forced Utula
Samana to withdraw the motion on 8 November. Theodore Tuya LNA
Minister for Administrative Affairs, who resigned and joined the Wingti
camp only hours before the motion was withdrawn, was replaced
immediately by William Ank, an opposition MP who crossed over to the
government side that morning.
Submissions of further interim reports from the Justice T. Barnett
Commission of Enquiry into the Forest Industry throughout the first half
of the year, and then of the final report in July, meant that allegations of
corruption or improper behaviour against prominent politicians constantly
engaged the public's attention. PPP and the United party were singled out
as beneficiaries of the timber operator Santa's largesse. The
Commission's reports, which formally came to a total of nineteen hefty
volumes, were referred to the Police Commissioner after they were tabled
in Parliament. But, by the end of 1989, of all the politicians named, only
the Kavieng MP and Minister for Housing, Gerald Sigulogo, had been
suspended from Parliament as a result of the Commissioner's findings.
The Military and Politics
On 8 February, some 300 and 400 soldiers (other ranks and NCOs) defied
their officers and took to the streets in Port Moresby, to protest over the
paucity of a pay increase they had just received. Joined by unemployed
youths with their own frustrations and grievances, the soldiers marched
on Parliament, damaging vehicles and property and threatening people en
route. A panicked government gave in to the soldiers' demands on the
spot, although it claimed that the pay increase the Deputy Prime Minister
announced to the demonstrating soldiers had been authorised earlier and
that it was Defence Department's tardiness in implementing the decision
that had resulted in the soldiers' frustration. The following day, soldiers
at Moem Barracks in Wewak also took to the streets in solidarity. The
government suspended the Commander of the PNG Defence Force, the
Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Department of Defence, and set up
a General Defence Board of Inquiry to investigate the causes of the
rampage and the entire administration and management of the PNG
Defence Force and the Defence Department. In June the Report of the
Board of Inquiry was submitted to the government, and was tabled in
Parliament in November.
The Report called not only for the expansion of the Defence Force but
for improvements in everything: housing, transportation, recreational
facilities, welfare services, pay, leave entitlements, retirement awards,
480
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January-December 1989
481
49
JANUARY-DECEMBER 1990
YawSaffu
January-December 1990
483
been evacuated. BCL reduced its workforce from 2,300 to 300 by the end
of February. The plantations had lost their labourers and in most cases
their managers as well. Commercial life ground to a halt with the banks
closing down, with airlines suspending flights to the island in February,
and insurance companies refusing to provide cover.
The ferocity of the militants' response, recognition by the government
that "any lasting solution will need much more than just a military
solution", 5 plus the influence of the peace faction, contributed to the
government's decision to declare a ceasefire, less than six weeks after
claiming there was no other option but the military one. On the militants'
part, a ceasefire was as good as victory. A ceasefire would herald
negotiations, constitute a de facto recognition by the government, and
probably mean the resumption of imports and services. There were all
kinds of groups, churchmen, academics, women's groups, concerned
citizens, trying to arrange a ceasefire. 6 On 1 March, Sam Kauona, on
behalf of the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA), and Colonel Leo
Nuia, on behalf of the PNG government, signed a ceasefire agreement.
The agreement called for a complete withdrawal of all security forces
by 16 March. Kauona insisted that regular police on the island before the
build-up were also to be withdrawn. Paul Tohian, the Police
Commissioner and controller of the state emergency, apparently out of
fear for the fate of his men if they were not withdrawn, perhaps out of
pique as well, agreed with Kauona's interpretation. Without notice to the
government, he withdrew all security personnel, including general duty
policemen. Not a single policeman was left on the island. The BRA, for
its part, agreed to surrender its arms. But while the government expected
that the arms would be surrendered to a team of international observers
appointed by the Commonwealth Secretariat, the militants insisted that
surrender meant handing the arms in to BRA headquarters. And that is
what the international team confirmed as having happened. In effect, the
ceasefire left the rebels in absolute control of the island while the
government waited for talks to begin. It was the BRA which welcomed
the international observers and looked after them on the island. No
wonder the Post-Courier editorialised, more than a month later, when the
expected talks were pushed further and further away: "In reality, we have
lost Bougainville". 7
On 17 May, the BRA declared Bougainville independent and renamed
it The Republic of Meekamui (Sacred Island), under interim President
Francis Ona. The interim government included Joseph Kabui and the
heads of all the religious denominations on the island. The new republic
failed to secure international recognition. It said much for the political
sophistication of the republic's leaders and their lack of touch with reality
that they actually approached the Australian Prime Minister for
recognition. 8 Furthermore, in a period of communist collapse and retreat,
and of the Soviet Union's strenuous efforts to ingratiate itself with the
West, Kauona threatened to look to the communist countries for support,
unless his neighbours recognised his republic. 9
484
YawSaffu
January-December 1990
485
486
Yaw Saffi..i
1984, followed the devaluation. A wages explosion was feared when the
Police Association sought a ten per cent salary increase a few days after
the devaluation, citing its likely effects on the cost of living. However, the
Public Employees Association, the largest and the most influential in the
Trade Union Congress, agreed that the embattled nation could not afford
trade union militancy and entered into agreement with the government in
January to limit pay increases by up to two percentage points below the
Wages Board determination for July 1989-March 1992.
In real terms, Gross Domestic Product contracted by more than the 1.6
per cent which the December 1989 Bank of PNG Quarterly Economic
Bulletin had forecast. Only increased output of gold from Ok Tedi and
Misima and the beginning of production at Porgera as well as the
exploration activities of several companies, particularly Conzinc Rio
Tinto of Australia (CRA) and the giant Chevron and its partners in the
proven Kutubu oil fields of Southern Highlands, stemmed the decline in
the economy. 13 To counter the negative impact of the Bougainville crisis
on foreign investor confidence, the government decided to replace the
National Investment and Development Authority (NIDA), the regulatory
body unloved by prospective foreign investors, with an investment board
which had a promotional rather than regulatory bias. Also, the
government decided to lower the level of local equity participation
required to qualify a company as a local company from seventy-five per
cent to fifty per cent, a move that was expectedly condemned by the
Melanesian Chamber of Commerce.
The increasing importance of the extractive sector, cultural values
about land and the impact of the Bougainville crisis on attitudes all
combined to make landowners the most powerful pressure group. They
were also readier than most to resort to the use of their chief weapon,
blocking access to sites. The tendency of landowners to ignore
agreements or to question them, taking the law into their own hands to
enforce their interpretation, and the government's "softly softly" approach
most of the time, all made for their enhanced visibility. Such was their
clout that even Pedi Anis, the Premier of New Ireland and a farsighted
PNG politician, sought payment of compensation to landowners before
the sealing programme could begin for a road which was built by the
Germans before the First World War. In January, Ok Tedi landowners,
demanding an increase of their share of royalty from twenty to fifty per
cent, blocked the mine access road and disrupted production. Landowners
at Mt Kare obtained forty-nine per cent ownership of the mine against
CRA's fifty-one per cent, plus an annual compensation of around
K200,000. Misima landowners, on the other hand, opted for an
impressive list of infrastructural developments and provision of one-off
capital for their company. 14
The Kutubu oil fields in Southern Highlands and the proposed 260kilometre export pipeline through the Gulf Province led to a proliferation
of landowner associations and elite nationalist intermediary companies.
The most ambitious of the latter was Monticello Enterprises Ltd. Its
January-December 1990
487
488
YawSaffu
for MPs, as the parliamentary numbers game gets underway. The game
begins with dizzyingly rapid movements by MPs flitting backwards and
forwards, between opposition and government benches. The free press is
crucial at this stage. Its rather undiscriminating highlighting of the
spectacle adds to the momentum of an impending showdown. The game
proceeds with the Prime Minister shuffling his cabinet and with notice of
a motion of no-confidence being given in Parliament. Depending on how
cunning the Prime Minister has managed to be, the motion may or may
not be pressed to a vote.
The year kicked off amicably enough with a much discussed Namaliu
luncheon in January with the ex-Prime Ministers in Parliament, Somare,
Chan and Wingti, to try and forge a consensus over pressing issues. Sir
Julius Chan's response to these discussions was to call in February for
the establishment of a grand coalition government under Somare.
Namaliu interpreted the call as the opposition's ploy to wreck Pangu, the
leading partner in the five party coalition government. The call was
rejected.
In anticipation of the March session, Philemon Embel, the treasurer of
Wingti' People's Democratic Movement (PDM), defected to the League
for National Advancement (LNA), a government coalition partner. He was
soon joined by five other opposition members. After the obligatory
altruistic reasons, 21 the real reason for the move was also given: "We are
elected to Parliament to be in government" _22 On 18 April another
defection was announced, this time from PDM to Ted Diro's People's
Action party (PAP). Two days later, some wildly optimistic projections
about PAP numbers in Parliament given by its general secretary were
dutifully reported in the Post-Courier. In view of those projections, Ted
Diro's appointment as Deputy Prime Minister and Public Services
Minister at the end of April was not surprising. The matter which had
kept Ted Diro out of office, the charges of misconduct arising from the
Justice Barnett Forestry Enquiry, 2' had still not gone before a Leadership
Tribunal or the courts.
Just when it was claimed that the magical number, seventy-three MPs,
required to pass constitutional amendments was a certainty for Namaliu, 24
a prominent Pangu backbencher, Matthew Bendumb, resigned from the
party because, he said, "the current leadership is weak and indecisive". 25
He promised to lobby MPs to support any no-confidence motion to oust
the Namaliu government. However, more MPs were joining the
government parties than were leaving for the opposition. The general
secretary of PDM, Tom Horik, headed for the government side. Utula
Samana, leader of Melanesian United Front (MUF) and the person who
spearheaded two attempts to remove Namaliu in 1990, also moved with
four of his followers to the government side in June.
Samana's move caused three Southern Highlands MPs to leave the
government benches. They had moved only two months before to the
government side to provide needed political stability! In a brutally frank
statement, Wiwa Korowi, Soso Tomu and Philemon Embel said the
January-December 1990
489
490
Yaw Saffu
January-December 1990
491
492
YawSaffu
blame bureaucrats. Thus, for instance, the Trade and Industry Minister,
John Giheno, blamed bureaucrats for failing to get papers ready for a K9
million loan agreement with the Asian Development Bank. 38 But if
cabinet ministers were really in charge, might the frequency of such
lapses not diminish? The inability of Parliament to pass necessary reform
bills, for instance those advocated by the independent Electoral
Commission and endorsed by cabinet, 39 as well as those presented by
Parliament's own Committee on Constitutional Reforms, 40 strengthens the
impression of a system adrift and rudderless. The frequent public
evidence of cabinet in-fighting also strengthens this impression. But a
celebrated public squabble between two of PNG's highest public servants
was perhaps the best illustration in 1990 of this impression of a system
lacking an effective, controlling centre.
On 6 July, the Governor of the Central Bank caused a Puhlic Notice to
be published in the Post-Courier. The Notice blamed the Department of
Finance and Planning and the PNG Banking Corporation (PNGBC), the
government's commercial bank, for creating an embarrassing crisis for
the government. Government employees were not paid, causing rumours
that the government had no cash. The notice blamed the Finance and
Planning Department for neglecting to communicate effectively with the
Central Bank. The PNGBC was blamed for refusing to accept further
government cheques. Four days later, the Managing Director of PNGBC
also took a page in the Post-Courier to shift the blame back to the
Central Bank, saying that it was the Central Bank's bouncing of
government cheques presented by PNGBC in June that forced it to refuse
to accept further government cheques.
Whatever reasons the Central Bank had for its initial action (the most
charitable was that it was trying to force the government to adhere to the
IMF's conditions for its Balance of Payments Support) the fact remains
that the Central Bank's Public Notice constituted a most unfavourable
reflection on the performance of the Department of Finance and Planning
and of the government as a whole. It spoke volumes about lack of
coordination, of the left hand not knowing or perhaps not caring
sufficiently what the right hand did, or did not do.
Provincial Governments
Nineteen-ninety was a year of renewed, increased calls for the abolition
of the provincial government system. However, ironically, as part of the
efforts to resolve the Bougainville crisis, the year began with an
investigation by the Department of Provincial Affairs, under the political
leadership of that champion of decentralised government, Fr Momis, into
ways of making the North Solomons Province, and "others which
qualify", more autonomous. A team of experts was assembled in January
to advise on such a new autonomous status, in which the provinces would
manage all state affairs except key ones like defence, foreign affairs and
currency. 41
January-December 1990
493
In the Gulf Province, the year began with a new Premier, Sepoe
Karava, in place of Tom Koraea who was removed through a vote of noconfidence. Turmoil in the Central provincial government also resulted in
the ousting of the Premier in a successful vote of no-confidence and his
replacement by Isaiah Oda in March. But it was the unfolding tales of
woeful mismanagement and seemingly complete absence of
accountability in the use of provincial government resources by the
suspended government in Morobe that led the Post-Courier to advocate
the abolition of the provincial government system in February. 42 The
suspension of the Morobe provincial government was extended for
another six months to the end of the year.
A Parliamentary Select Committee, the so-called Hesingtut Committee,
was appointed in March to review the provincial government system. It
provoked the Premiers' Council to set up its own committee to counter
the expected centralising recommendations of the Parliamentary
Committee. 43 In April the Governor-General broke with tradition and
commented publicly on a controversial political issue. He called publicly
for the abolition of the provincial government system by 1992 and
provoked a passionate debate about the propriety of such vice-regal
interventions. Wingti, the Leader of the Opposition, declared he was
personally in favour of abolishing the system. Namaliu, on the other
hand, said his government was not only committed to the provincial
government system, it would pursue increased autonomy for provincial
governments. But it was doubtful whether his cabinet was united behind
this view.
Attempts to change the government of the Sandaun Province through
a vote of no-confidence during its July-August sitting failed, while the
Deputy Premier of East New Britain Province survived a no-confidence
motion in September. In Enga, the June election was over subscribed (272
candidates for twenty-two constituencies) and it was attended by much
violence. A former Premier, Danley Tindiwi, replaced Ned Laina as
Premier. In the Southern Highlands, a former policeman, Albert Mokai,
leading the Southern Highlands Solidarity Group, became Premier in
place of Yaungtine Koromba after the June elections. In New Ireland, the
post-election horse trading in December resulted in the replacement of
Pedi Anis by his deputy, Demas Kavavu.
494
YawSaffu
dictatorship". 45
The police were involved in "special operations" in the Western
Province at the beginning of the year (Operation Fly Bagarap) and in the
Highlands, covering Southern Highlands, Western Highlands and Enga
(Operation Blue Beret) from the middle of the year. The special anticrime operations begun in 1989 in the East Sepik Province continued.
The Highlands, in particular, seemed to be overwhelmed by the law and
order problem and authorities seemed helpless. The Western Highlands
Deputy Premier lamented: "Criminals have taken over our province". 46
The first statement made by the new Premier of Enga was to call on the
national government to declare a State of Emergency in Enga. A meeting
of Highlands leaders in March passed such drastic resolutions that their
implementation would have put the Police in charge of the state. 47
In response, the government proposed a Repatriation Bill in June,
seeking to give the Police and a proposed repatriation court powers to
send unemployed persons back to their home province. This was hailed
by the Post-Courier as a step in the right direction. 48 A Peace and Good
Order Bill, 1990, was also talked about from August and was publicly
unveiled at the end of October, intended for the November session of
Parliament. According to the papers, it sought to restrict rights and
freedoms under the constitution, to outlaw squatter settlements and
control processions and public meetings. The Law Reform Commission
condemned it. 49 One uncontroversial response to the problem was a
proposal to set up a National Youth Service with an initial funding of K5
million in the 1991 budget. 50
A feature of the law and order problem which became clearer in 1990
was the emergence of politically motivated criminal activities, beyond
armed robbery, rape and break and enter. In August, the offices of the
Ombudsman Commission were broken into and vital documents were
reportedly stolen. Within three days, the offices of the National Fraud
Squad, the Police anti-corruption unit, were razed to the ground in what
the papers called a "mystery-fire", and secret files reportedly went up in
flamesY No less a person than the Police Minister claimed in public that
"criminals are working with politicians", 52 something that an academic
researcher had uncovered two years earlier, but which sounded strange
and incredible coming from a Minister of Police. A Police source claimed
that policemen were helping criminals out of frustration. 53 Reports of
repeated thefts of large quantities of explosives in Rabaul and of twelve
high-powered rifles from the Boroko police station in August could only
lend credence to such claims.
External Relations
The Bougainville crisis, particularly the economic havoc it wrought on
PNG, revealed the strong international goodwill which PNG enjoys,
thanks largely to Australian solicitations on her behalf and to PNG's own
bountiful natural resources. In May, aid donors, states and international
January-December 1990
495
496
YawSajfu
associations with Australia, New Zealand, US, and British armed forces
. .. There is no better way of creating better understanding and trust
between our two countries than having the armed forces in Indonesia
working with our forces and people to build a village project. It is this
type of cooperation that will slowly dismantle the psychological fear of
Indonesia held strongly by many of our leaders and people". 60 It was
announced that General Sutrisno, Indonesia's Chief of Armed Forces,
would visit PNG before the end of the year. 61
Relations with the People's Republic of China in 1990, on the other
hand, continued their downward trend, because of PNG's increasing
friendship with Taiwan, despite PNG's declared acceptance of the oneChina policy. 62
50
JANUARY-DECEMBER 1991
YawSaffu
The Bougainville cns1s constituted the largest item in the last two
chronicles and its settlement continued to elude the government in 1991.
Tensions between the government and the military, to which the
Bougainville crisis has contributed significantly, resurfaced during the
year.
Pay increases for members of Parliament, recommended by a body
whose composition had been changed by the same MPs in 1989 to give
them a majority, evoked a violent reaction and a boycott of classes by
university students. The boycott led to the closure of the two universities
and the loss of the second semester.
As if to atone for the odium they had brought on themselves, MPs turned
reformist and they passed several important constitutional amendments
which had been pending for years. Optimists on Papua New Guinea's
capacity to muddle through had further news about which to cheer. The
swiftness with which a constitutional crisis was resolved was testimony
to the maturation of a sound political tradition. The crisis was unleashed
by the refusal of the Governor-General to implement the recommendation
of a Leadership Tribunal to dismiss Ted Diro, Deputy Prime Minister, and
leader of the second largest party in the governing coalition.
The deteriorating law-and-order situation, and the threat it could pose
to the staging of the image-enhancing Sixth South Pacific Games on
which huge sums had been expended, prompted the imposition of curfews
in Port Moresby, Lae and Mount Hagen from March until October, after
the end of the Games.
498
YawSaffu
January-December 1991
499
government insisted further that the next round of talks should deal with
the political questions ''once and for all" .1
However, by suddenly renewing attacks on the troops in northern
Bougainville and inflicting casualties at the beginning of July, the rebels
gave notice that the talks were not on. The multinational force had not
been assembled by the end of July because, among other reasons, the
PNG Defence Force was reportedly opposed to it. Leading members of
the rebels' negotiating team went to to Geneva at this time to lobby the
world community on the plight of Bougainvilleans and to exert pressure
on the PNG government to recognise their right to self-determination.
The government announced that 26 August had been agreed on as the
new date for the talks. When the date passed without any talks, a new
date in October was announced. The October date also passed, with no
talks and no new date.
Meanwhile, the task force, under the leadership of Fr Momis, pressed
on with the establishment of district coordinating authorities on
Bougainville to win the peace, by restoring services and initiating
reconstruction. By November cabinet had approved the establishment of
six district authorities, four on Bougainville and one each for Buka and
the atolls, Nissan, Carteret and Bismarck, in what could be regarded as an
attempt at a bureaucratic solution, as against a military or even a political
solution. 2
Tensions in Political-Military Relations
The chronicles for 1989 and 1990 showed the impact of the Bougainville
crisis on the morale and attitudes of the Police and the Defence Force,
and on their relations with the government. Tensions between the military
and politicians were again evident in 1991.
Fr Momis was livid at the April unauthorised landing of troops in
northern Bougainville and said so vehemently, recommending that the
soldiers involved be sacked. In May, a serving officer on Bougainville
wrote to the Post-Courier, arguing that it was Fr Momis who should be
sacked for "being in the same boat" with the secessionists and the BRA:
"If anybody should be sacked ... lunatics like Fr Momis and his Task
Force members are the ones the government should sack". 3 The officer
was reprimanded for his public attack on the minister.
In June, Colonel Nuia gave an interview on the ABC's "Four Corners"
television programme. He contradicted the government publicly on
several controversial issues. He insisted, among other revelations, that the
Australian-donated Iroquois helicopters had been employed as gunships
and also had been used for dumping at sea bodies of civilians killed
during a massacre by the security forces. The government had persistently
denied that the helicopters had been used in that way or that such a
massacre had occurred.
Colonel Nuia had allowed his obvious frustration to get the better of
his judgement. He was sacked. The officer appointed to replace him on
500
Yaw Saffu
January-December 1991
501
502
Yaw Saffu.
January-December 1991
503
504
Yaw Saf/it
Even though the age of eligibility for a candidate was changed during
the year from 25 to 30 years, it would be interesting to see how many of
the 1991 student leaders stand for elections in 1992 and use the help of
students who stayed back in their villages because they could not enrol
in semester one, 1992. These students had to wait until semester two
because the courses they had taken in semester one, 1991 were the same
as those on offer in semester one, 1992.
Constitutional Amendments
The 1991 sessions of Parliament passed several important amendments to
the PNG constitution. The July and November sessions which followed
the students' agitation, stand out as by far the most productive sessions
of the post-independence legislature, generally as far as its primary
function of law-making is concerned, but especially for its significant
function of amending the constitution.
Eight constitutional amendment bills were passed in the two
sessions, including Constitutional Amendment No 14 - Motions of no
Confidence, to reduce the occurrence and the impact of the debilitating
numbers game. The Act, passed on 18 July 1991, increased from six to
eighteen months the grace period of immunity from votes of noconfidence offered an incoming government. The constant threat of noconfidence votes under which PNG governments have laboured, and
which has accounted for some of the political corruption and the
ineffectiveness of Parliament, is expected to be reduced considerably in
the future.
Constitutional Amendment No. 15 - Elections, Organic Law on
National Elections (Amendment No. 1) Law 1991 and Organic Law on
the Calling of Meetings of the Parliament Amendment No. I, all passed
in the November session, incorporated reforms which had been sought for
several years. These included the abolition of the so-called sectional vote
which, by allowing people who were not on the electoral roll to vote,
upon making a simple declaration that they were eligible to vote,
substantially legalised fraud and multiple voting. The shortening of the
voting period from three to two weeks and the period of horse trading
between the return of the writ and the first session of Parliament from
three to one week, was also expected to contribute enormously to the
reduction of burgeoning political corruption.
The student agitation in all probability helped to concentrate the minds
of the parliamentarians. But an underlying reason for the increased
productivity in Parliament was that the two-thirds majority required
(seventy-three MPs) over a longish period (by PNG political time) of two
sessions of Parliament separated by at least two months, was available in
1991. Paradoxically, the widely criticised Namaliu practice of paying for
parliamentary support with all sorts of patronage - short stints in a
ministerial office; overseas trips; cash from the Prime Minister's
discretionary funds for MP's private purposes - is what made the
January-December 1991
505
reforms possible.
506
YawSaffu
External Relations
The comprehensiveness and intensity of relations between Papua New
Guinea and Australia were illustrated once more in 1991. An Australian
National Audit Office Report severely criticised one aspect of the linchpin
of the relationship: the massive annual Australian budget subsidy grant to
PNG, which in 1991 totalled $A3.7 billion since independence. It decried
the lack of Australian say or supervision over how the money was used
and claimed that, as a result, the grants had made little impact on
improving the quality of life for the majority of Papua New Guineans. 19
An influential Australian government organ, the Joint Parliamentary
January-December 1991
507
508
YawSaffu
NOTES
Introduction
I.
Jorge de Meneses, Portuguese Captain-designate of the Malukus may
have reached New Guinea in 1526,
sheltering from a storm in what was
probably Geelvink Bay. He called it
"II has dos Papuas", the name derived from "Papuwah", supposed to
be a Malay word describing the frizzy hair of its inhabitants.
2.
Inigo Ortiz de Retes took possession
of the island for the King of Spain in
1545, at the mouth of the Santo Agustin (Mamberamo) river on the northwest coast, naming it "Nueva Guinea" after Guinea in Africa.
3.
There are exceptional areas where
hereditary chiefs are acknowledged
and inherited leadership is common:
for instance, Wogeo Island, Manam
Island, Buka Island, on New Britain's Gazelle Peninsula; and in the
Trobriand Islands as well as Mekeo
and Roro districts in Papua.
4.
For example seeP. Lawrence, 'Introduction', andJ.B. Watson, 'Tairora:
the politics of despotism in a small
society', in R.M. Berndt and P. Lawrence (eds), Politics in New Guinea:
traditional and in the context of
change some anthropological perspectives (Perth, 1971), pp. l-34,
224-75; and D.L. Oliver's classic A
Solomon Island Society: kinship and
5.
6.
1.
8.
510
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
pp. 73-4.
G. Reid, A Picnic with the Natives:
Aboriginal-European relations in
the Northern Territory to 1910 (Melbourne, 1990); A. Markus, Governing Savages (Sydney, 1990); J. Long,
The Go-Berweens: patrol o.f.!icers in
Aboriginal affairs administration in
the Northern Territory, 1936-1974
(Darwin, 1992).
P. Hasluck, A Time For Building:
Australian administration in Papua
and New Guinea, 1951-1963 (Melbourne, 1976).
S. Bennett, Aborigines and Political
Power (Sydney, 1989), pp. 10-2;
C.D. Rowley, Recovery: the politics
of Aboriginal reform (Ringwood
(Vic.), 1986).
Mair, Australia in New Guinea,
pp. 44-5.
J.D. Waiko, A Short History of Papua New Guinea (Melbourne, 1993),
pp. 108-52; H. Nelson, Papua New
Guinea: black unity or black chaos?
(Ringwood (Vic.) 1974), pp. 126-7;
Hasluck,A Time for Building, p. 374.
Nelson, Papua New Guinea, p. 127.
Downs, The Australian Trusteeship,
pp. 239-42; Ryan, The Hot Land,
pp. 111-3.
Mair, Australia in New Guinea, pp.
44-7.
Ryan, The Hot Land, pp. 115-6, 120.
Nelson, Papua New Guinea, p. 129.
Mair, Australia in New Guinea,
p. 49.
E.P. Wolfers, "Political Parties", Encyclopaedia ofPapua and New Guinea, Vol. 2, p. 937.
Wolfers, "Political Parties", pp. 93545, particularly 935-6.
E.P. Wolfers, "Political Parties", pp.
936-7, and "Simogen Pita", Encyclopaedia of Papua and New Guinea,
Vol. 2, p. 1039; also referto P. Loveday and E.P. Wolfers, "Voting and
511
Notes
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
Ibid.
See also Wolfers, "Political Parties",
pp. 938-45.
A. Griffin, "Who Remembers Kondom Agaundo?", Times of Papua
New Guinea, 20 October 1985.
P. Brown, "Agaundo, Kondom",
Australian Dictionary ofBiography,
Vol. 13, p. 15; idem, "Kondom",
Journal of the Papua and New Guinea Society, Vol. 1, No.2, 1967,
pp. 27-34.
"ToBaining, Vin(l915- )",Encyclopaedia of Papua and New Guinea,
Vol. 2,p.ll37;Downs, TheAustra[ian Trusteeship, pp. 203, 332, 334,
337-8,435.
T. Dutton, Police Motu: lena Sivarai
(Port Moresby, 1985), p. 166; "John
Guise", Encyclopaedia of Papua
and New Guinea, Vol. I, pp. 506-7.
Hess, Unions Under Economic Development, pp. 79-98.
Ryan, The Hot Land, p. 141.
Downs, The Australian Trusteeship,
p. 243.
I. Hogbin, "Somare, Michael Thomas
( 1936- )", Encyclopaedia of Papua
and New Guinea, Vol. 2, pp. 107980; M. Somare, "Citizenship", Current Affairs Bulletin, Vol. 48, No.5,
1971, p. 157.
Maori Kiki, Ten Thousand Years in
a Lifetime, pp. 152-60.
Refer to the introduction in volume
one, p. xxviii and I. Hogbin, "Somare,
Michael Thomas (1936-)", Encyclopaedia of Papua and New Guinea,
Vol. 2, pp. 1079-80; M. So mare,
Sana: an autobiography (Brisbane,
1975).
Entries for Namaliu and Wingti in A.
Turner, Historical Dictionary ofPapua New Guinea (Metuchen (NJ),
1994).
Also refer to C. Moore, "Politics
the Melanesian Way: biographies of
512
56.
January-April1967
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
513
Notes
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
May-August 1967
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30
31.
32.
33.
514
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
September-December 1967
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
Ibid., p. 2664.
Ibid., p. 2521.
Ibid., p. 2695.
Ibid., p. 2727.
Ibid., p. 2795.
Ibid., p. 2796.
Ibid., p. 2505.
W.W. Watkins, ibid., p. 2544.
Ibid., p. 2574.
Ibid., p. 2577.
Ibid., p 2578.
SPP, 6 October 1967.
SPP, 18 December 1967.
HAD, I, 15, p. 3000.
Letter to the editor, SPP, 29 November 1967.
SPP, 15 September; NGTC, 21
September 1967.
SPP, 23 October 1967.
SPP, 2 September 1967; NGTC, 7
September 1967.
SPP, II October 1967.
NGTC, 7 September 1967; SPP, 8
September 1967.
SPP, 20, 25 October 1967; HAD, I,
15, p. 2979 et seq.
SPP, 1 December 1967.
SPP, 20 November 1967.
HAD, I, 15, p. 2894.
SPP, 10 November 1967.
HAD, I, 15, p. 2963.
SPP, 13 September 1967, and HAD,
1, 15, p. 2856.
J. Guise, Parliamentary Mission's
Visit to Malaysia to Examine Land
Resettlement Schemes - Minority
Report (roneoed), 18 October 1967.
HAD, I, 15, p. 2966.
January-Aprill%8
1.
2.
3.
4.
515
Notes
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
II.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
SPP, 22 Aprill968.
SPP, 15 January 1968.
Australian, 18 Aprill968.
Australian, 15 February 1968.
SPP, 3 January 1968.
Age, 5 February 1968.
SPP, 12 February 1968.
Australian, II April 1968.
Peter Hastings, in Australian, 12
Aprill968.
Age, 26 February 1968.
SPP, 6 March 1968.
SPP, 15 April1968.
NGTC, 20 January 1968; SPP, 24
January 1968.
SPP, 23 February 1968.
SPP, 8 April1968.
NGTC, 16 February 1968.
SPP, 5 Aprill968.
SPP, 17 April1968.
May-August 1968
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
II.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
516
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
September-December 1968
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
517
Notes
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
health, housing, water supply, sewerage, cultural and recreational facilities, labour.
Includes expenditure on law, order
and public safety, the legislature and
general administrative services.
Includes transport, the government
printer, and stores.
HAD, II, I, 2, p. 217.
Ibid., p. 212.
Ibid., p. 217.
Ibid., p. 213.
Ibid., p. 216.
Ibid., p. 217.
Ibid., p. 242.
Ibid., pp. 458-9.
SPP, 20 September 1968.
HAD, II, I, 2, p. 494.
Ibid., p. 253.
Ibid., p 378.
Ibid., p. 502.
Ibid, p. 427.
PlM, 39, 10 (October 1968), p. 22.
HAD, II, I, 2, p. 401.
Ibid., p. 243.
Ibid., pp. 245-6.
PlM, 39, 10, (October 1968), p. 22.
TPNG, Programmes and Policies
for the Development of Papua and
New Guinea, Port Moresby, 1968.
HAD, II, I, 2, p. 315.
R. Crocombe, "That Five Year
Plan", New Guinea, 3, 4 (December
1968-January 1969): pp. 57-70.
SPP, 8 November 1968. The advertisement appeared, e.g., in NGTC,
5 October 1968.
SPP, 26 August 1968.
Henderson, HAD, II, I, 2, p. 286.
Ibid., p. 293.
Ibid., pp. 353-5, and SPP, 9 September 1968.
SPP, 6 September 1968.
Gire Gire- Ralum Lands Bill 1968,
HAD, II, I, 2, p. 210.
SPP, 4, 9 September 1968.
HAD, II, I, 2, p. 523.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
518
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
January-Aprill%9
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
IO.
II.
I2.
I3.
14.
IS.
I6.
I7.
I8.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
519
Notes
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
Ibid., p. 1060.
See SPP, 30 Aprill969.
Taken from a printed statement
released on 29 Aprill969.
See PNG Bureau of Statistics Bulletin No. 20.
SPP, 13 January 1969.
Age, lOJanuary 1969.
HAD, II, 4, p. 986.
SPP, 26 March 1969.
SPP, 13 January 1969.
SPP, 28 March 1969.
Western Australian, 10 April 1969.
Australian, 10 April 1969.
Australian, 19 April 1969.
Australian, 15 Apri11969.
SPP, 14 April1969.
SMH, 16 Apri11969.
SMH, 26 February 1969.
Australian Financial Review, 10
February 1969.
Sun Herald, 27 April 1969.
Australian Financial Review 11
February 1969.
See e.g., Australian, 16 Apri11969.
DIES Press Release 28.
See Report.
May-August 1969
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
September-December 1969
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
520
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
21.
22.
23.
1n"7n
17 IV.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
May-August 1970
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
January-April1970
1.
2.
3.
7.
8.
9.
10.
II.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
521
Notes
22.
23.
24.
September-December 1970
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
January-April1971
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
September-December 1971
May-August 1971
I.
2.
3.
4.
I.
2.
3.
522
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
(Port Moresby: Government Printer), for the guidelines and criteria for
determining boundaries.
January-April1972
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
May-August 1972
1.
2.
3.
4.
523
Notes
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
September-December 1972
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
'=""
J""'1"
18.
19.
20.
21.
January-April 1973
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
525
Notes
28.
29.
30.
3l.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
4l.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
5l.
May-August 1973
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
526
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
September-December 1973
1.
527
Notes
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
stration of courts, the Public Solicitor, Prosecutions, House of Assembly and electoral policy were left in
the hands of the Australian government.
PC, 21 November 1973.
Ten thousand expatriates left Papua
New Guinea in the twelve months
November 1972 to November 1973.
(November 1972-49,607: November 1973- 38,898). PC, 3 January
1974.
"Second Interim Report of the
Constitutional Planning Committee"
(Port Moresby, November 1973),
Roneoed.
HAD, Ill, 18, 28 August 1973, p.
2309.
HAD, III, 21,25 September 1973, p.
2763.
Ibid.
HAD, Ill, 18, 28 August 1973.
"Papua New Guinea's Improvement
Plan 1973-74", Prepared in the
Central Office by Authority of the
Cabinet Committee on Planning,
September 1973. (Consists of three
parts: Plan, Summary and Districts
Supplement.)
HAD, 17 November 1973.
Tabled in the House of Assembly, 15
November 1973.
PNG Department of Education:
"Proposed Five Year Plan, November 1973, p. 109.
CPD, HR, 29 November 1973.
PNG Press Release B288l, 20
December 1973.
The United Kingdom was the first
foreign country to establish a Consulate in mid-1973.
PC, 15 October 1973.
PNG Press Release B2557, 2 November 1973. The agreement in fact, had
been drawn up by representatives of
Australia, Indonesia and PNG in
Jakarta in September. Age, 26 Sep-
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
tember 1973.
ChrisAshton,NationalTimes, 19-24
November 1973. Michael Pondros
(Manus Open) criticised his government for not taking into account the
views of the West Irianese on the
border agreement. PC, 21 November
1973.
PC, 28 September 1973.
National Times, 17-22 September
1973.
Paul Grocott: "A Report on the Thirteenth Conference of the South
Pacific Commission", UPNG, l
October 1973, roneoed.
PNG Press Release 82677, 19
November and PC, 20 November
1973.
PC, II September 1973.
Age and Australian, 15 September
1973.
SMH, 16 August 1973.
Financial Review, 23 October 1973.
PC, ll September 1973.
Pressure began to mount against the
expatriates' role, an example of
which occurred during the budget
debate when Oscar Tammur walked
out of the House in protest at John
Middleton leading the Opposition's
reply.
PC, 26 November 1973, See also
Ralph Premdas, "Parties and Independence in Papua New Guinea",
Administration for Development, 4,
1974.
For example the Chief Minister
explained his support for the Public
Service Board chairman's call for
impartiality immediately after the
Pangu convention, by saying that he
supported his party's policy but it
was not yet government policy. See
two thoughtful articles on Somare's
style by Creighton Bums in the Age,
26, 27 September 1973.
HAD, 24 September 1973.
528
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
January-April1974
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
May-August 1974
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
September-December 1974
I.
2.
3.
529
Notes
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
January-June 1975
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
530
July-December 1975
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
531
Notes
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
llO.
Ill.
112.
113.
l14.
115.
116.
117.
I 18.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
January-June 1976
l.
2.
3.
532
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
July-December 1976
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
533
Notes
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
January-June 1977
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
534
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
July-December 1977
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
I5.
I6.
17.
18.
I9.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
January-June 1978
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
535
Notes
10.
July-December 1978
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
II.
12.
13.
14.
15.
January-December 1979
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
536
January-December 1980
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
January-December 1981
I.
537
Notes
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
ll.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
vember 1981.
"Move to Halt Vanimo Talks",
Times, 6 March 1981; "Vanimo
Talks Halted", Times, 20 March
1981. See also "Vanimo Pact Draws
Protest", Times, 23 April 1982, for
a full reconstruction of the original
deal, and Rowan Callick, "Chan
Gets Tough on Forestry", Times, 10
April1982.
"Sandaun Business Arm Winds up
in Red", Times, 6 November 1981.
"It's War on City Thugs", PC, 3
December 1981.
Richard Jackson, "Budget Weakens
Ties of Common Interest Between
State and People", Times, 4 December 1981.
Minister of Finance, Estimates of
Revenue and Expenditures for the
Year Ending 31st December 1982,
Tabled in Parliament, 3 November
1981 (Port Moresby, 1981). The
National Public Expenditure Plan,
1982-85, November 1981.
"Free Education .. . How Will the
Government Pay for It?", PC, 2
October 1981.
"Development on the Border",
Papua New Guinea Foreign Affairs
Review, 1, 2 (1981).
Times, 15 May 19.81; Hank di Suvero (University of PNG Law leeturer and organiser of the Tribunal),
"No Despair in West Papua", and
"'Irian Jaya None of Your Business'
-Indonesian Official", Times, 22
May 198 I ; Hank di Suvero, "Our
Fight Will Never End", Times, 29
May 1981; "Human Rights Group
Reveals Indonesian 'Abuses"', PC,
20 May 1981; "Claims Against
Indonesia Heard", PC, 29 May 1981.
Franzalbert Joku, "Ramoi is Charged
over Hamadi", Times, 24July 1981.
"Foreign Policy", Papua New Guinea
Foreign Affairs Review 1, 4 (1981).
538
23.
14.
January-June 1982
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
PC, 6 April1982.
The National Public Expenditure
Plan, 1982-1985, National Planning
Office, November 1981, 17.
See Times, 30 April and 7 May 1982.
For the full version of the Trebilcock
report see Public Enterprzses m
Papua New Guinea, Institute of
National Affairs Discussion Paper
No.9, 1982.
Times, 5 February 1982.
PC, 15 February 1982.
Times, 12 February 1982.
S.C. 224: In the matter of a Special
Reference by the Ombudsman Commission under Section 19 of the Constitution, and in the Matter of the
Organic Law on National Elections
(Amendment) Act 1981 (S.C.R. No.
2 of 1982), (ii).
"Vanimo Pact Draws Protest",
"Lawyers Played a Vital Role in
Securing Contract", Times, 23 April
1982; Rowan Callick, "It's Not
Over", Times, 30 April 1982. See
also "NEC Rejects Expert Advice on
Vanimo Timber", Times, 2 April
1982.
"Foreigners are Flooding NIDA with
Business Plans", Times, 2 April
1982.
"Chan wanted to sell the Danica for
KlOOO", Times, 19 March 1982.
Times, 18 June 1982.
Times, 19 February 1982.
The case concerned a distinguished
international consultant Professor
Fraudberg(!) extolling PNG's feature film industry (total production
three films), and speaking expan-
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
July-December 1982
1.
2.
3.
539
Notes
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
II.
12.
January-June 1983
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
II.
I2.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
540
22.
12.
July-December 1983
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
"Okuk wants Wingti", PC, 12 August 1983; "Namaliu for PM?", Times,
12 August 1983.
Babani Maragc, "Big Vote Aborted", PC, 16 November 1983.
"Block Members Pull Out", Niugini
Nius, 11 November 1983; "Bouraga
'No' to Offer", PC, 10 November
1983.
Times, 18 November 1983.
Richard Laidlaw, ''The Great Coffee
Debate"; "Behind the Coffee Furore", PC, 18 October 1983.
"NIDA Probes Links in Coffee",
PC, 19 October 1983. (The National
Investment Development Authority
falls within the Deputy PM' s portfolio).
Times, 21 October 1983; Niugini
Nius, 21 October 1983.
Ian Glanville, ''The Changing Face
of Papua New Guinea's Defence
Force", Pacific Defence Reporter,
10, 10 (April1984).
"Indonesian Attack Warning", Niugini Nius, 9 September 1983; "Invasion Not On", PC, 14 September
1983; ''Tito Stands Firm", PC, 15
September 1983; "Australia
Wouldn't Defend Us", PC, 23 September 1983.
Times, 25 November 1983, Weekend
Nius, 26 November 1983.
"Border Plans Being Held Up",
Niugini Nius, 15 November 1983;
Robin Osborne, "Big Masta Watches
over PNG", National Times, 13
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
541
Notes
18.
19.
January-June 1984
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
ll.
July-December 1984
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
542
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
January-June 1985
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
l 0.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
July-December 1985
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
543
Notes
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
January-December 1986
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
544
15.
16.
17.
18.
January-December 1987
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
545
Notes
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
II.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
January-June 1988
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
July-December 1988
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
II.
I2.
546
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
'2<:
-'-'
January-December 1989
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
II.
547
Notes
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
January-December 1990
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
548
7.
8.
9.
10.
II.
12.
n.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
549
Notes
PC, 15, 23 August 1990.
PC, 17 August 1990.
PC, 20 August 1990.
PC, 6 November 1990.
Ibid.
Ibid.
PC, 14, 18 September 1990.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
January-December 1991
I.
PC, 27 February 1991.
2.
This section draws on my article,
''The Bougainville Crisis and Politics in Papua New Guinea", Contemporary Pacific, 4, 2 (1992), pp. 32543.
3.
PC, 17 May 1991.
4.
PC, 27 June 1991.
5.
PC, II July 1991.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
4June 1991.
27 May 1991.
6 June 1991.
27 May 1991.
6 June 1991.
5 June 1991.
Marie Louis O'Callaghan, SMH, 6
June 1991.
PC, 17 July 1991.
PC, 25 September 1991.
PC, 19 July 1991.
PC, 30 September 1991.
PC,
PC,
PC,
PC,
PC,
PC,
Ibid.
Ibid.
PC, !OJanuary 1991.
PC, 3 May 1991.
PC, 23 August 1991.
APPENDIX I
PAPUA NEW GUINEA COLONIAL CHRONOLOGY
BC 50,000- 1,000
1512 AD
1526
1545
1847
Catholic Society of Mary mission established briefly on Woodlark and Umboi Islands
1871
1875
1875
1882
1884
1885
1886
1888-98
1889
1899
1902
1905
German New Guinea's southeastern border moved north to between Bougainville and the Shortland Islands
German New Guinea Company taken over by the German state
Transfer of British New Guinea to the Commonwealth of Australia began
Australia passed the Papua Act
551
Appendix I
1906
1908
1910
1914-1921
1919
1921
1922
1924
1926
1927
1933
1941
Japanese invasion
1942
Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit; first joint civil administration of Papua and New Guinea
1945
Japanese surrender
Provisional civil administration established
J.K. Murray appointed Administrator
Staff Conference established
1946
1949
1951
1954
1957
1959
1960
1961
1962
552
1963
1964
1965
New Guinea United National party established, the first indigenous-sponsored political party
1967
1968
Administrator's Executive Council formed as the premier decision-making body in Papua New Guinea, but the Australian Minister for External Territories reserved some important departments
and functions
1969-73
1970
1972
1973
Self-government
1974
15 March 1975
17 August 1975
Constitution adopted
1 September 1975
Bougainville UDI
APPENDIX II
MEMBERS ELECTED TO THE
HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY, 1964-1997
Papua New Guinea voters have elected their national leaders since 1964
when Australia established the House of Assembly. Elections have been held
in 1964, 1968, 1972, 1987 and 1992. Some Members were also elected at
special by-elections. This list covers all 440 elected members of the House
up until 1997. The names of provinces and the National Capital District
(NCO) are given within brackets. Some provinces have changed their names
since Independence: Chimbu became Simbu; Northern became Oro; West
Sepik became Sandaun; Western became Fly River. Port Moresby is the
centre of the National Capital District which is contained within Central
province. The type of electorate is indicated at the end of each entry:
P = Provincial (Regional) electorate
D = District (Open) electorate
Where a Member served in more than one electorate these have been listed
in chronological order of the membership of the House. Where the Member
has served in both types of electorates it is indicated by double letters: ie.
PO, orDP.
Abaijah, Josephine, 1972-82 (Central/
NCD)P
Abal, Tei, 1964-82 (Enga) D
Abe, Dirona, 1964-68 (Central) D
Abel, Cecil, 1968-72 (Milne Bay) P
Adesim, Juda, 1987-88, 1992-97 (East
Sepik) D
Agiwa, Herowa, 1992-97 (Southern Highlands) D
Aipe, Yambal, 1992-97 (Western Highlands) D
Amaiu, Tom, 1977-80, 1987-92 (Enga) D
Andrew, Poate, 1982-87 (Milne Bay) D
Anggua, Caspar, 1977-87 (Madang) D
Ank, Posu, 1977-82 (Southern Highlands)
D
554
lands) D
Avei, Moi, 1992-97 (Central) D
Avini, Yaip, 1992-97 (Morobe) D
Awasa, Tom, 1964-72 (Morobe) D
Awol, Brere, 1968-77 (West Sepik) D
Azanifa,Bono, 1967-72,1973-77 (Eastern
Highlands) D
D
Bubec, Bob, 1987-97 (Western) D
Buchanan, Dennis, 1968-72 (Eastern Highlands) D
Burege, Esorom, 1987-92 (East New
Britain) D
Buseng, Phillip, 1972-77 (Morobe) D
D
Bendumb, Mathew, 1977-92 (Morobe) D
Beona, Gerald, 1982-92 (Milne Bay) D
Berghuser, Hugo, 1987-92 (National
Capital) P
Beu, David, 1987-92 (Oro) D
Bilas, Angmai Simon, 1968-82 (Madang)
D
Biri, Delba, 1977-82 (Simbu) D
Biritu, Ugi, 1964-88 (Eastern Highlands)
D
Bloomfield, William, 1964-66 (Morobe) D
Boas, Obed, 1972-77 (New Ireland) P
Bokap, Daniel, 1968-72 (New Ireland) D
Bolt, Talu, 1977-82 (Western Highlands)
D
Bomai, Ninkama, 1968-77 (Simbu) D
Bonga, Timothy, 1982-92 (Morobe) D
Bonggere, Karigi, 1968-77 (Simbu) D
Bouraga, Philip, 1982-87 (National Capital) p
Bourne, Neville, 1978-87 (Morobe) D
Brokam, Nicholas, 1964-68 (New Ireland)
555
Appendix II
D
Elo, Paiale, 1977-82 (Southern Highlands)
D
Embahe, Wesley, 1977-82 (Oro) P
Embel, Philemon, 1987-97 (Southern
Highlands) D
Endekan, Kantigane, 1968-72 (Simbu) D
Esef, Camillo, 1992-97 (Central) D
Eupu, Edric, 1964-68 (Oro) D
Evara, Ava Roy, 1977-87, 1992-97 (Gulf)
D
Evennett, Norman, 1968-70 (Milne Bay) D
Farapo, Tony, 1982-87 (Gulf) P
Fielding, William, 1968-72 (Oro) P
Fifita, John Camma, 1972-77 (Milne Bay)
D
Foieke, Simon Ngu' n, 1977-92 (Central) D
Gaige, Peter, 1987-97 (Eastern Highlands)
D
Gainda, Mafuk, 1977-87 (Madang) D
Gam, Rauke (Dana), 1968-72 (Morobe) D
Garong, Peter, 1987-92 (Morobe) D
Garrett, Jason, J., 1968-72 (Madang) P
Garry, Ben, 1987-92 (Morobe) D
Garui, Benson, 1987-92 (Oro) P
Genia, Jack, 1982-97 (Central) D
Giheno, John, 1982-92 (Eastern Highlands)
D
Gilmore, Graham, 1964-77 (Eastern Highlands) P
Giregire, Sinake, 1964-77 (Eastern Highlands) D
Goiye, Waguo, 1977-82 (Simbu) D
Guise, John, 1964-75, 1977-82 (Milne
Bay)D
Gukguk, Walla, 1977-81 (New Ireland) D
Gwaju, Gidisa, 1972-77 (Morobe) D
Habe, Dambali, 1977-82 (Southern Highlands) D
Hai, Billy, 1977-82 (Eastern Highlands) D
Haiveta, Chris, 1992-97 (Enga) D
Harepa, Paulus, 1976-77 (North Solomons)
p
Hepau, Lainus, 1973-77 (East Sepik) D
556
D
Kawo, Marcus, 1972-77 (Madang) D
Kernen, Neapukali, 1980-87 (Enga) D
Kenu, Wegra, 1964-68 (West Sepik) D
Kepi, Billy, 1987-88 (Eastern Highlands)
D
Kiki, Albert Maori, 1972-77 (Central/
NCD)D
Kimi, Atiheme, 1972-73 (Eastern Highlands) D
Kiniyafa, Malo, 1982-87 (Eastern Highlands) D
Kipilan, Albert, 1982-97 (Enga) D
Kofikai, Sabumei, 1968-72 (Eastern Highlands) D
Koimanrea, Francis, 1992-97 (East New
Britain) P
Koki, Alois, 1979-97 (East New Britain) D
Konga, Nakikus, 1992-97 (East New
Britain) D
Kor, Ibne, 1972-82 (Southern Highlands)
D
Koraea, Tom, 1968-72, 1972-82, 1992-97
(Gulf) D
Korowaro, Bebes, 1982-87 (Eastern Highlands) D
Korowi, Wiwa, 1977-82, 1987-92(Southem
Highlands) P
Kouk, Bitak, 1992-97 (Western) D
Kroki'e, Sunnunku, 1977-82 (Eastern
Highlands) D
Kuman, Peter Kakep, 1982-92 (Simbu) DP
Kurnun, Nebar, 1977-82 (Simbu) D
Kunangel, Opai, 1977-82 (Western Highlands) D
Kungka, Peter, 1987-92 (North Solomons)
D
Kungo, Tani, 1977-87 (Morobe) D
Kupul, James, 1977-82, 1987-92 (Western
Highlands) D
Kuri, Parua, 1972-87 (Western Highlands)
D
Kurondo, Siwi, 1968-72 (Simbu) D
Kwan, Perry, 1972-77 (New Ireland) D
Kwarara, Geleva, 1977-92 (Central) D
Laimo, Michael, 1992-97 (North Solomons) D
Laki, Philip, 1982-97 (East Sepik) D
Lang, Galen, 1987-92 (Madang) D
Langro, Paul, 1968-77 (West Sepik) P
Lapun, Paul, 1964-77 (North Solomons) D
Lasaro, Iairo, 1987-97 (Milne Bay) D
Lau, Tenda, 1987-92 (Enga) D
Lawi, Kindi, 1982-87 (Western Highlands)
p
Leahy, Thomas J., 1968-72 (Morobe) D
Lemeki, Jacob Tali a, 1977-92 (Milne Bay)
D
Levi, Noel, 1977-87 (New Ireland) P
Levy, Keith, 1964-68 (Western Highlands)
D
Libe, Balus, 1992-97 (Southern Highlands)
D
Lokoloko, Tore, 1968-77 (Gulf) D
Lowa, Patterson, 1977 (National Capital),
1987-97 (West New Britain) D
Lue, Joseph Adrian, 1968-72 (North
Solomons) P
Lus, Pita, 1964-97 (East Sepik) D
Lussick, Walter, 1968-72 (Manus and New
Ireland) P
Magnolias, Waitea, 1972-77 (Enga) D
Mai, David Garo, 1992-97 (Simbu) P
Mai, Halalu, 1982-92 (Southern Highlands) D
Maibawa, Castan, 1987-97 (Eastern Highlands) D
Maie, Gideon Apeng, 1972-77 (Morobe) D
Maina, Naipuri, 1972-77 (Western) P
Maino, Anani, 1968-72 (Morobe) D
Makiba, Marabe, 1982-92 (Southern High-
557
Appendix//
lands) D
Maladina, Johnson, 1987-92 (Milne Bay)
D
Malip, Pius, 1987-92 (East Sepik) D
Maloat, Paliau, 1964-72 (Manus) D
Mambei, Paul, 1992-97 (Sandaun) D
Mambon, Steven, 1987-92 (Morobe) D
Maneke, John, 1968-72, 1972-77 (West
New Britain) D
Manlel, Paul, 1964-68 (West New Britain)
D
Mano, Koitage, 1972-77 (Western Highlands) D
Marsipal, Arnold, 1983-97 (Manus) P
Martin, Frank, 1964-68 (East Sepik/
Madang) P
Masa, Galopo, 1972-82 (West New Britain)
Masani, Tukape, 1992-97 (Morobe) D
Masive, Kevin, 1992-97 (Eastern Highlands) D
Matiabe, Aruru. 1982-92 (Southern Highlands) D
Matias, Yambumbe, 1977-82 (East Sepik)
D
Matibri, Suguman, 1964-68 (Madang) D
Matik, John, 1972-77 (East Sepik) D
McKinnon, James C., 1968-72 (Madang)
D
Meanggarum, James, 1964-72 (Madang) D
Mel, Michael, 1987-92 (Western Highlands) D
Melo, Tambu, 1964-68 (Southern Highlands) D
Merimba, Wagi, 1987-92 (Simbu) D
Miakwe, Akepa, 1972-82 (Eastern Highlands) D
Micah, Ben, 1992-97 (New Ireland) D
Middleton, John M., 1968-77 (Madang) D
Mirau, Gaudi, 1964-68 (Morobe) D
Mo, Makain, 1968-72 (West Sepik) D
Moar, Kare, 1977-87 (Madang) D
Mola, Donatus, 1968-77 (North Solomons)
D
Momis, John, 1972-76, 1977-97 (North
Solomons) P
Mona, Louis Sebu, 1968-87 (Central) D
Mopio, James Eki, 1976-81 (Central) P
D
Motawiya, Gerald Beona, 1992-97 (Milne
Bay)D
Muliap, Tom, 1982-97 (Madang) D
Mump, Genjim, 1982-87 (Madang) D
Mumurit, Simon, 1982-87 (Milne Bay) D
Mune, Dick, 1992-97 (Southern Highlands) P
Nagle, Robert, 1992-97 (Western Highlands) D
Nalau, Jerry Kasip, 1992-97 (Morobe) P
Nali, Michael, 1992-97 (Southern Highlands) D
Namaliu, Rabbie, 1982-97 (East New
Britain) D
Napo, Samson C., 1992-97 (Morobe) D
Narokobi, Bernard 1987-97 (East Sepik) D
Negints, Thomas, 1982-92 (Western Highlands) D
Netin, Bob, 1992-97 (Sandaun) D
Neville, Ronald, 1964-77 (Southern Highlands) P
Neville, Tim, 1992-97 (Milne Bay) P
Ni, Pyange, 1977-78 (Western Highlands)
D
Niall, H.L.R., 1964-68 (Morobe) P
Nilkare, John, 1982-87, 1992-97 (Simbu)
PD
Nilles, John, 1970-72 (Simbu) P
Nimambot, Patik, 1968-72 (Morobe) D
Niniku, Raphael, 1976-77 (North Solomons) D
Ninkama, Bill, 1982-92 (Simbu) D
Noaio, Aron, 1977-92 (Gulf) D
Noel, John, 1977-82 (Milne Bay) D
Nugints,Mek, 1968-77, 1978-82(Western
Highlands) D
Numi, John, 1982-92 (Simbu) D
0' Shannessy, Thomas, 1972-77 (East
Sepik) D
Oala-Rarua, Oala, 1968-72 (Central) P
Ogio, Michael, 1987-97 (North Solomons)
D
Okona, Amenao, 1972-77 (Morobe) D
558
559
Appendix I/
Singeri, Buaki, 1972-77 (Morobe) D
Singiliong, Meek, 1968-72 (Morobe) D
Sio, Stephen, 1977-82 (West Sepik) D
Sisioka, Pawa, 1982-92 (Simbu) D
Siune, Waiye, 1972-77 (Simbu) D
Skate, Bill, 1992-97 (National Capital) P
Slaughter, Stanton R., 1972-77 (Central) D
Somare, Michael, 1968-97 (East Sepik) P
Sowa, Gunia, 1992-97 (Eastern Highlands)
Stack, Karl Kitchens, 1977-92 (West
Sepik/Sandaun) P
Ston, Asimboro, 1977-87 (East Sepik) D
Stuntz, John Ronald, 1964-68 (Milne Bay)
p
Suckling, Robert, 1987-97 (National
Capital) D
Suja, Wilson, 1968-72 (Oro) D
Swokin, Kala, 1977-92 (Western) P
Tabua, Robert, 1964-68 (Western) D
Tago, Stephen, 1972-82, 1982-87 (Oro) DP
Tai, Kim, 1992-97 (Western Highlands) D
Talis, Yakob, 1968-77 (West Sepik) D
Tamindei, Pita, 1964-68 (East Sepik) D
Tammur, Oscar, 1968-82 (East New
Britain) D
Tanao, Avusi, 1982-97 (Eastern Highlands) D
Tapineng, Felix, 1982-92 (West Sepik/Sandaun) D
Taureka, Reuben, 1972-77 (Central) D
Tekwie, John, 1992-97 (Sandaun) P
Temo, Anthony, 1987-97 (Southern Highlands) D
Tetley, Keith, 1964-68 (Gulf) D
Thompson, Martin, 1992-97 (Manus) D
Tiaba, Handabe, 1964-68 (Southern Highlands) D
Titimur, Epineri, 1968-72 (East New
Britain) D
Tito, Epel, 1982-87 (New Ireland) D
ToBaining, Ereman, 1982-92 (East New
Britain) P
Tohian, Paul, 1992-97 (New Ireland) P
ToKereku, Damien, 1972-77, 1977-82
(East New Britain) DP
Toliman, Stanis B., 1972-77 (Madang) D
560
INDEX
562
sweet potato, 8
tea,201,259-60,296
timber. See Forestry
tree crops, 68
vegetables, 220
See also Bank of Agriculture; Cooperatives; Departments: Forestry
Ahi, Karo, Huon LGC, Pres., 19
Air Niugini. See Transport
Aitape, xxvi
Alar, Mr, interim Premier, East New Britain
Province, 332
Alatas, Prof. Syer Hussein, 364
Alcohol, 24-5, 261
abuse, 149,216,245,265,293
Comm. of Inquiry into Alcoholic Drink,
149
Okuk's election beer party (1983), 370
sale banned, 204, 247
Allen, Dr W., UN visiting mission, 39
Amaiu, Tom (MHA), Min. Corrective
Institutions, 444, 455
Min. Housing, 444
Amet, Mr Justice, Diro Leadership Tribunal,
505
Amin, Idi, Pres. of Uganda, 297
Ampoai, Siverenus, Bougainville businessman,468
Anakapu, Penuelli, 10
Anaya, Benny, OPM leader, 446
ANG house, Port Moresby, 34
Anglican church, xxix, 141, 196, 201
Angua, Casper (MHA Bogia), Min. Labour
& Employment, 363
Anio, Pama, 133
Anis,Pedi
Ex. Off. to Momis, 425
Premier, New Ireland Province, 425, 454,
486,493
Ank, William (MHA)
Min. Administrative Affairs, 479
PPP, expelled from, 491
Anthony, Doug, Aust. Country Party leader,
158
Anthony, James, ANU post-graduate student,
40
Aoae, Joseph (MHA)
Min. Education, 444
Min. Forests, 356
Aparima, Lennie (MHA), Min. of State,
Public Service, 348, 354
Arawa. See Bougainville
563
Index
Dep. Aboriginal Affairs, 292
Dep. Education & Science, 24, 77
Dep. External Affairs, 3, 17, 97
Dep. External Territories, 5, 32, 40, 41, 42,
43, 71, 76, 100, 104, 145, 183
Dep. Foreign Affairs, 292
Dep. Labour & National Service, 41
Dep. Territories. See External
Territories
Development Assistance Agency, 250
Development Bank, 24
Governor-General, 12, 17, 33, 44, 45, 46,
52,56, 71, 76,146,155,224,238,247,
256
High Court, 252
House of Representatives, 5, 48,230
immigration policy, 17
Indonesia, relations with, 368
Irian Jaya
attitude to, 80, 368
border, 273, 326
refugees, 414
Jackson Committee of Australia Aid Program (1985), 401
Joint Australian Parliamentary Committee
on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade,
401,507
League of Nations Mandated Territory, xix
local government, attitude to, 89
Minister External Territories, 1-3, 13, 49,
62. See also Barnes; Morrison; Peacock
Minister, Transport, 201
Papua. See below
Papua New Guinea
Administration, xvi, xix-xxv
devolution of decision making, 1145
Agreed Statement on Security Cooperation,507
Commercial and Trade Relations
Agreement (1991), 507
aid to, 24, 99, 157, 175, 181, 185, 218,
248,272~,286,295,318,337,341,
355,364,367,376,392,401,427,
445,481
National Audit Office Report, 506
Defence Cooperation Agreement, 495
Development Cooperation Treaty, 481
High Commission, 247,298,480
phone bugging accusation, 367,368
High Commissioner, 204, 224, 232, 235,
247,369
564
115
Avei, Moi, 196
candidate for Central Regional, 275
Pangu, Pres., 210, 222, 264
resigned, 276
research officer CM's Office, 210, 222
Village Development Task Force, 264, 290,
275
Avi, Patrick, candidate for Central Regional,
275
Avosa, Seaea, 171
Ex. Off. CPC, 213
Awasa, Tom (MHA Huon Gulf), 387, 398
Min. Religion, Youth, Recreation and
Women, 363, 389
Awol, Brere, MBE (MHA West Sepik
Coastal), 71, 86
Azanifa, Bono (MHA Henganofi), 17
Dais, Tony (MHA Wewak), 309,314
Min. Justice, 363
Bakani, Gabriel (MHA)
Min. Public Utilities, 328
Baki, Gari
Chief Inspector, 469, 484
Commander of the Mobile Squads, 484
coup attempt, 484
treason charge, 484
Balakau, Malipu (MHA)
Min. Communications, assassinated, 478
Balandier, Georges, 190
Bale, Fide, women's group
demonstration, 407-8
Banking,24
Agriculture Bank, 417,423,431
ANZ Bank, 312
Asian Development Bank, 491-2
Bank ofPNG, 201,345-6,492
Governor, 76
Quarterly Economic Bulletin. 392,422,
486
deregulation, 423
PNG Banking Corporation, 206, 492
strike, 403
See below Development Bank
Banono, John, candidate for Bougainville Regional, 279
Barnes, C.E., Aust. Min. Territories, l, 3-5,
12-3, 15,34,42-3,45-6,48, 50, 65, 67, 71,
76-7,79-81,85,103-5,111,114,122,130,
133-3, 145, 149, 156-7
2
Black & White, 86
Boas, Obed (MHA)
Member, Ministerial Nomination Commit-
Index
tee, 197
Bogagu, Brian, 133
Bomai, Ninkama (MHA Gumine), 90, 303
Bonay, Eleizer, xxx
Bonga, Timothy (MHA), Min. Home Affairs,
489
Bougainville, xvi, 271
air strips dug up, 278
Arawa,84,96,234,245
Arawa Bulletin, 267
Arawa plantation, 81, 83-5
Arovo Island tourist resort, 284
Bougainville Airways, 234, 268
Bougainville Copper Agreement, xxvii, 176
Ministerial Review Committee, 468
Momis' "Bougainville Initiative", 434
PLA Trust Fund, 468
renegotiation, 176-7, 212-3, 215, 221,
231,235,244,267,273,289,462,470
Bougainville Copper Pty Ltd (BCL), 96,
153,158,166,176,244,267,350,461,
466
executive shot, 482
mine shut-down, 353,467,471,482
revenue, 214, 267, 355, 367, 376, 392,
434
taxation, 206, 214
Bougainville Development Corporation,
284
Bougainville Initiative, 461
Bougainville Resources Joint Venture, 485
Bougainville Workers' Union strike, 245
Buin, 242, 279, 482
Buka Island, xvi, 267
Carteret Island, 484
Central Bougainville Open electorate, 279
civil war, 467-473,480,482-3,497-8
Administrator appointed, 484
Amnesty International, 470
Australian-donated Iroquois helicopters,
499
Australian electronic monitoring, 507-8
Bougainville-Revolutionary Army (BRA),
468,471,483,498
Buin,482
Buka,482,498,499
Liberation Front, 484
Carteret Island, 499
ceasefire talks, 473, 483, 499
communications blackout, 484
compensation claim, 462, 468
Endeavour Accord, 484, 497
565
Honiara Declaration, 497
Kaveria jail siege, 482
Kieta wharf, 498
Kongara valley, 482
mine shutdown, 467
multinational peace force called for, 498
Nissan Island, 484, 499
peace ceremony, 4 72
peace talks, 484, 497
PNG Defence Force
booby traps authorised, 472
Honiara Defence Accord broken, 498
involvement, 468-9, 471
Operation Footloose, 482
Police, 469,483
raid moratorium, 469,471
Republic of Meekamui declared, 483
sabotage, 462, 468
State of Emergency, 468, 471, 482
curfew, 468
Task Force, 499
terrorism, 468
See also Kauona; Ona; new Panguna
Landowners' Assoc.; Solomon
Islands
copper mining, 69, 79-80, 83-5, 141, 165,
232, 244, 268-9
commencement, 177
royalties, 81, 232, 234,262, 379
District Commissioner, 85, 235, 267
education, 103
geophysical survey, 485
Guava, 83
Independence Day (North Solomons Republic), 269
Independence Day (PNG), 248
Jaba river, 232
Kieta, 84
land acquisition, 81, 83-5, 96
leaders, 234, 268, 284
Lemankoa village, Buka, 267
LGC Conference, 211
Methodist church, 269
Mining Development Forum, 462
Mortlock Atolls, xvi
Nakar Kas society, 267
North Solomons Republic, 269-70
Panguna,5-6,26,245
Panguna Landowners' Assoc., 461,462,
468,470
new Panguna Landowners' Assoc. (NPLA),
467-8
566
Index
Speakers, 390
Chamber of Commerce, 144
Chamber of Manufacturers (Aust.), 41
Chambers, E.A.C., C'W Public Service Arbitrator, 71, 76-7
Chan, Benedict, Mosaic Oil & Mosaic Niugini, 485
Chan, Sir Julius (MHA Namatanai; PM
(1980-82; 1994-)), xxxii, 64, 118-9, 1545, 294, 301, 303, 305-6, 318, 322-3, 359,
361,362,379,387,388,398,405,406,
408,409,430,432,433,438,440,443,
446,447,451,463,465,470,476,478,
479,488
business interests, 318
Deputy Opposition Leader, 501
Deputy PM, xxxii, 304,328,409,417,441,
447,449,455
extra financial powers, 448
Min. Finance, xxxii, 198,200,206,215-6,
218,243,249-50,260-3,272,283
Min. Finance & Planning, 409,417,423,
429
Min. Foreign Affairs, xxxii
Min. Internal Finance, 156, 164, 175-6,
177, 185
Min. Primary Industries, xxxii, 311, 324,
328
Min. Trade & Industry, 420, 455
no-confidence motion in, 419
Placer Share Affair, 419-20,433
Prime Minister, xxxii, 338, 339, 340, 342,
343,345,347,351,353,355,364
acting PM, 313
Charles, Prince of Wales, 247,396
Chatterton, Rev. Sir Percy (MHA Moresby),
17,26,46,50,62-4,70,76-8,97,106,132
Chenoweth, Dr David
Localisation Section, PSB, 104
Principal, Administrative College, 90, 104,
109
Chevron, Katubu oilfield shareholder, 486
Chief Minister, Dept. of, 155-246
Development Administration, 186
Government Liaison Branch, 171-2
Government Paper on the
Constitution (1974), 227
Improvement Programme, 183-4, 186
Office of, 162, 168, 184-5, 194
Papuan Task Force, 222
Political Education Branch, 172
transfer of power, 183
567
See also Somare; Prime Minister
Chimbu. See Simbu
China, 243,250,343,481,508
Deputy PM visits, 353
one-China policy conflicts, 496
PM visits, 292
trade,259
See also Foreign Affairs, Taiwan
Chinese in PNG, xxxii, 35, 68, 88, 93-4, 125,
132,155,179,191-2,205
Christian churches
involvement in politics, 9, 92, 120, 141,
154,269
leadership, 339
Melanesian Council of Churches, 200, 502
missions, 140
See also individual churches
Christianity
ecumenical, 120
influence of, 9
Citizenship. See Constitution; Nationalism
Clark, Hector, 281-2
Cleland, Sir Donald M., Administrator, xx, 2,
7, 145
Clowes, Waliyato (MHA), 303-4
Cochrane, Prof. Donald, 139
Cocoa. See Agriculture
Coconut Products Ltd, 110
Coffee. See Agriculture
Colombo Plan, 209
Commissions
Electricity, 60, 440
Housing, 60, 280
Commonwealth and New Guinea Timbers,
165
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM), 319, 353, 396
Commonwealth PMs Conference, xxiv, 297
Commonwealth Trading Bank, 123
Communications, 38
Comparison with other colonies, ex-colonies
Biafra, 114
BSIP, 79
Cook Islands, 4
Kenya, 5
Malaysia, 5, 31
Puerto Rico, 4
Rhodesia, 12, 20,67
West Africa, 90
Connolly, P.D., 92, 95, 99
Connolly Commission (1970), 108
Constitution, 114, 121,201,221-2, 227-30,
568
236,263,435
adopted, 17 August 1975,255
cabinet size, 362
citizenship, 172, 217-8, 222, 227-8, 234,
236-40, 250, 253-4, 264
Citizenship Advisory Committee, 253
General Constitutional Commission. 365.
376
Ministerial positions, 439
provincial government. See below
See also House of Assembly, National
Constituent Convention
Constitutional development, 79-80, 90, 96-7,
113-5, 120-1,129-130, 157,164,167, 170,
184,201-2,205,217
debate over permanent union of Papua and
New Guinea, 25
federalism, 114
National Constitutional Assembly, 236-42
Papua and New Guinea Act, 42, 46, 114
Seminar, 114
See also House ofAssembly; CPC; SCCD
Conzinc Rio Tinto (Australia) Exploration Pty
Ltd (CRA), 5, 26, 65, 84-5, 96, 486, 507
See also Rio Tinto Zinc Corp Ltd
Cook, Dr H., Dept. Labour & National Service, Sec., 41
Cook Islands, 171
Coombs, Dr H. C. (Nugget), 252
Cooperatives. 10, 126
Copra industry. See Agriculture
Council for New Guinea Affairs, 114
Council of Social Services, 120
Counsel, Bert (MHA Western & Gulf), 135-6
Coup d'etat
attempt, 484
rumours of, xxxiii, 310-11, 324, 375, 443,
449
Courier-Mail (Brisbane), 33, 166
Crawford, Sir John, 2
Aust. aid adviser, 341, 376
Crean, Frank, Aust. Labor Minister, 243
Creative Arts Centre, 246
Crime, 190
adolescent, 16
drunkenness, 149
urban,245
See also Social Cha11ge
Critchley, Tom, Australian High Commissioner, 232,235
Currency. See Banking; Economy
Currie Commission (1963-4), 40
569
Index
Departments
development of ministerial authority, 13-4
list of Departments when first mentioned:
Administrative Services, 420
Administrator, 88
See also above
Agriculture, 216,311
Agriculture, Stock & Fisheries, 47
Business Development, 124, 314
Chief Minister. See above
Civil Aviation, 444
Civil Aviation, Culture & Tourism, 409
Commerce, 216
Cooperatives, 47
Corrective Institutions & Liquor Licensing, 262
Culture & Recreation, 216
Culture, Recreation & Youth Development, 262
Community & Family Services, 342
Decentralisation, 314
Defence, 216
District Administration (DDA), 11
District Services, xxix
Education, 11
Environment & Conservation, 262
Extension Services, 47
Finance, II
Finance & Planning, 409
Fisheries & Forests, 216
Fisheries & Marine Resources, 420
Foreign Affairs & Trade, 262
Foreign Relations, 199
Forests,47
Health, 156
Home Affairs & Youth, 409
House of Assembly, 49
Housing & Supply, 262
Information, 215
Information & Broadcasting, 262
Information & Culture, 11
Information & Extension Services, 57
Interior, 156
Internal Affairs, 444
Internal Finance, 156
Justice, 183
Labour, xxviii, 3, 312
Labour, Commerce & Industry, 262
Lands, 156, 208
Lands, Surveys & Mines, 11
Law,47
Local Government, 5
Development
Australian Development Assistance Agency,250
Bank,5,60,81, 124,147,200,253,282,
288
See also Banking
Business development
expatriate, 125
Indigenous Training Scheme, 81
leases, security of tenure, 91
village trade-stores, 70
Central Planning Secretariat, 178
Dept. CM & Development Administration,
186
economic, 16,20,23-4,43,48, 70, 79,83,
124-5,157-8,164,165,225
Economic Development
Office of Programming & Coordination,
165, 177
Programmes, 144, 164-5, 177
Eight Point Aims, 199-200,206-7,212-4,
570
216,221,241,271,318-9,330
Faber Report, UNDP(l972), 165, 177, 186
five year plan, 59, 69, 78, 115, 177, 207
General Purpose Development Corporations, 199
indigenous participation, 23, 67, 69, 141,
165,265
Investment Corporation, PNG, 124, 165,
176,201,215-6,244,253
General Manager suspended, 448
land tenure problems, 141, 311
Medium Term Development Plan, 464
National Goals and Directive Principles,
330
National Investment & Development Authority (NIDA), 207, 216,245, 260, 323,
357,458,486
National Planning Office, 16, 370, 409
New Guinea Development Corporation,
125,147,179,198,224,283,303,336
See also Economy; Mataungan Assoc.
Papua, 135
plantations, role in, 12
priorities, 164, 210, 212
Rural Development Programme, 206
strategies, 274
trade. See individual nations
Village Development Task Force, 232, 264
village-level, 70, 81, 165, 170, 264
See also Agriculture; Mining
Dibela, Sir Kingsford (MHA), GovernorGeneral (1983-89), 304
Dickson, 0., 68
Dihm, Bill, 27, 68
Diria, Kaibelt (MHA Wahgi), 75, 160-1
Ass. Min. Local Government, 57, 73, 118
Member, Ministerial Nomination Committee, 197
Min. Post & Telegraphs, 156, 19R, 262
Diro, Brigadier Edward (MHA Central),
359,373,421,430,434,440,441,448,
449,452,453,455,457,477,478,487,
488,497
accepts election funds from Indonesian
General, 442-3
Angus (PNG) Ltd, 442, 443
Barnett Forestry Enquiry, 442, 447, 450,
457,463,477,479,488,505
coup d'etat, rumours of, 310,375,443,449,
493
Defence Force Commander, 247,344
demands reinstatement, 450, 477
Index
"The State and Property Rights in Papua
New Guinea", 461,462
Dotaona, Col. Lima, Defence Force commander Bougainville troops, 472,480
sacked, 448
Downs, Ian (MHA Highlands), xxx, 7-8, 16,
23-4,26,29,50,52
political comment, 85, 101
Dumont, Prof. Rene, 164
Dunbar-Reid, Donald, 94, 127
Duncan, Sir Val, Rio Tinto Zinc, Chair., 244
Dutton, Warren (MHA North Fly), 78, 86-7,
119,407,415
assistant to John Poe, Min. Interior, 231
kiap, 370
Min. Police, 342, 345, 348
no-confidence motion in, 345
Duwabane, Gai (MHA), 389
Min. Agriculture and Livestock, 420, 455
Min. Defence, 328
East New Britain Province, 36, 112, 332,
349
Assembly, 292
Bainings, 454
Duke of York Islands, 204
elections, 303,401,480
finances, 342
Japlik, Ill, 123, 148
Kerevat High School, 7, II 0
Kokopo, xxix, xxxii, 135, 430
Latramat village, Gazelle Peninsula, xxv
lottery, 62
Matanatar, 123
no-confidence motion in Deputy
Premier, 493
politicians, 294, 315
Pomio Development Authority, 454
Premiers, 391,401,454,480
Rabaul, 9, 20,66-7,79, 92, 97, 108, Ill,
144
hospital, 24
LGC proposed, 106, 131
Matupit Island, 99, 135-7
movie ban, 219
Paparatava, 68
political meetings, xxvi, 92, 99-100,439
protest marches, 88, 95
radio, 110, 128, 148
Town Council, 106
violence, 134-7
571
See also Gazelle; Mataungan Assoc.;
Tolai
Rabuana village, Gazelle Peninsula, 135
Raluana
mission printery, xxix
village. Gazelle Peninsula, 88
Rasimen village, Gazelle Peninsula, 136
settlers, repatriation, 425
Toma, 179
Vudal Agricultural College, 7
Vunadidir LGC staff college, 121
Vunamami Community Centre, 93; village,
xxviii
Vunapaladig, Ill, 123
East Sepik Province, xxvi, 20, 36, 97, 151,
368,408
Angoram, 20,36-7,408
Assembly, 292
cargo cults, 39, 140-1
constitution, 278
Kainda Teachers College, 475
Mount Atbowagi repeater station, 475
Mount Turu, 140
Maprik, 9, 36
Murik Lakes, xxx
no-confidence motion, 390
Regional electorate, xxxi, 47
sugar cane projects, 332
timber resources, 350
Wewak, 9-10,27, 39, 130
radio, xxxi
Yangoru sub-district, 140
Eastern Highlands Province, 17, 20, 83,
152,186,192,306
Asaro, 219
Assembly, 292
constitution, 278
elections, 425
electorates, 303
finances, 342
Henganofi, xxxiii
Kainantu, 37, 219
Lufa, 17-18,407
Premiers, 425
State of Emergency, 334, 335
tribal wars. See Highlands
Unggai-Bena by-elections (1985), 397,399
Watabung village, 475
Eastman, Nathaniel, Liberian delegate, UNTC,
21-2
Ebu, Alan (MHA)
Min. Correctional Services, 455
572
funding, 112
job training, 82
Kerevat High School, 7, 10, 334
localisation, 98
mission, 77-8, 103
National Library, 250
national system proposed, 64, 77-8, 98, 103
overseas allowances, 72
PNG Teachers' Assoc., 186, 245, 279
policy, 280, 312-3,458
political, 75, 79, 138
political candidates, 34, 37, 154
primary, 7, 9, 21, 97, 112, 313, 351
curriculum schools, 279
multi-racial schools, 279
universal, 208
religious, 103
school cadets, 396
secondary, 77-8, 97-8, 208, 278
standards, 280
Strikes and demonstrations
Administrative College, 104
Papuan Medical College, threat, 104
See also PNG UOT; UPNG
students
enrolled, 77-8, 97
involved in politics, 80, 116
teachers, 132
Bougainville, 279
government, 77, 98, 103
mission, 77, 98, 103
registration of, 103
salaries, 103
teniary, 37,312-3,458
National Union of Students, 258
vocational training, 164
Vudal Agricultural College, 7
Vunadidir LGC staff college, 121
Weedon Advisory Committee Report, 78,
103
See also Public Service, Administrative
College; Goroka Teachers' College;
Papuan Medical College; PNG UOT;
UPNG
Edwards, George, 88
Elections
196}, XXiii, XXV
candidates, xxv
political education, xxv
1964, xxiii, 27, 34-8, 51
1968,28,31,34-8,151
candidates
Index
age, 154
Asian, 38
European, 35
indigenous 34-5,68, 154
qualifications, 129
re-elected, 143
unopposed,35
gifts, 34
malpractice, 36
political education, 79
1972, 96, llO, 130, 135, 138, 141, 143,
149-55, 177
candidates, xxviii, 156
age, 154
education, 152-4
European, 152, 154
first female, 153
Highlands, 151
indigenous, 152, 154
occupations, 154
unopposed, 152
1976, postponed, 242, 263,277
1977,255-6,263,289,294-5,298-307
by-election, 287
candidates
education, 299, 303
naturalised citizens, 303
re-elected, 295
statistics, 299
women. 303
constitutional provisions, 239
delayed. 298
frequency, 228
results, 33
1982,345,348-9,357-361,378,430
candidates, 357, 361
komiti, 359
re-elected, 361
issues, 445
nomination fee increase (disallowed),
354,356
1987,374,408,416,425,429-37,475
candidates, 435
independent, 435
re-elected, 440
class formation, 436
results, 436-7
petitions, 437,444
violence, 436
voting, 435
1992,501
political parties, 152-3
573
endorsement by, 358
finances, 153
UN observation, 74, 139, 153
See also LGCs and Provincial Governments
Electricity Commission
charges, 261
compensation claims, 218
Irian Jaya power, 257
Ok Tedi hydro-electric project, 393, 400
power stations, 136, 273
strike, 333
Electoral System
boundary redistribution, 27, 149, 151,298
by-elections, 276
Chief Electoral Officer, 107, 153, 234
Commission, 444, 492
Commission of Inquiry, 55, 72
Commissioner, 298, 397,431,435
counting,299
Court of Disputed Returns, 153
Electoral Act, 300
Electoral Distribution Committee, 27
nomination fee, 150-1
Open (District) Seats, xxiv, 27, 35, 129,
149-51, 154
qualifications of candidature, 21
rolls, 298
Regional (Provincial) Seats, 22, 35, 129,
149-51,154,228,261,275
Special Seats, xxiv, 16
voter residence, 151
voting age, 150-1
Elijah, Elliot, lO
Elizabeth II, Head of State, 238, 256, 281
requested to dismiss GG, 506
visit to PNG (1982), 365
Ellis, Mr Justice, Diro Leadership Tribunal,
505
Ellis, T.W. (MHA)
Dept. Administrator, Sec., 88-9, 96, 100,
123, 148
District Administration, Dir., 54, 60, 88
Embel, Philomen (MHA), 477,488
Emanuel, E. Jack, DC East New Britain, murder of, xxix, 135-6, 144, 148, 168
Embane, Wesley (MHA)
Min. Media, 328
Employers' Federation (Australia), 41
Employers' associations, 76
Employment
annual leave, 7-8
574
expatriates, 7
job creation, 79
localisation, 11, 28, 75, 273
overseas recruitment, policy towards, 2, 23
private sector, 361
Encyclopaedia of Papua and New Guinea,
158-9
Enga Province, 247,276, 332
designated a "fighting zone", 383
elections, 424, 493
government
Administrator, death threats, 402
buildings burnt, 154
suspended,380,390,412,424
Kandep, electoral vmlence, 436
Mount Kare gold rush, 486, 507
police Operation Blue Beret, 494
politicians, 306
Premiers, 390, 424, 473, 474
Regional electorate
created, 261
divided, 275
State of Emergency, 334, 335, 494
tribal wars. See Highlands
Wabag,L-47,303
See also Pogera Gold Mine
Environment, 351
cyanide, 2,375 drums lost in Fly River
mouth, 393
mining pollution. See Bougainville; Ok
Tedi
See also Forestry
Epstein, Dr T. Scarlett, 93, 95
Eri, Sir Vincent Serei, 448
Governor-General (1990-91), 490,493
attempt to subvert judicial process, 505-6
constitutional crisis, 505
resignation, 497
Peoples' Action party, Pres., 491
Esa' ala Losuia electorate, 35
Ethnic tensions. See Bougainville; Gazelle
peninsula; Highlands; Papua
Eupu, Eric (MHA Popondetta), 20, 26
Lands, Surveys & Mines, Under-Sec., 20
European Economic Community (EEC) delegation,491
See also Economy, Stabex fund
Evara, Roy (MHA Kikori), 322-3, 348, 362,
421,430,431
Min. Home Affairs, 363
Min. Primary Industries, 328, 339, 340,
348,349,350,356
sacked, 347
Utama Co., connection to, 350
Faber, Prof. M.L.O., 165
See Development, Faber Report UNDP
(1972)
Fairbairn, D.E., Aust. Min. Defence, 166
Falkinder, Mr, 2
Farapo, Tony (MHA)
Min. Provincial Affairs, 412
Feeney, G.M., Police Superintendent, 136
Fenbury, David
Administrator's Department, Sec., 88, 13940
Dept. Social Development & Home Affairs,
Sec., 88-9, 139-40
Fielding, Bill (MHA), 149, 153-4
Fiji, 164,167,224,226,259,327,446,460
coups (1987), 446
PNG diplomats withdrawn, 285
Financial Review (Melbourne), 120
First World War, xvi
Fishing, 260, 350, 392
cannery, 336
Danica, USA tuna ship confiscated, 357
economic resources zone (200 mls), 259,
428
Fish Marketing Corporation, 417
Fisheries College, 370
Fisheries Development Authority, 417
licences, 417
Pacific Regional Fisheries Agency, 314,
326
USSR, 446, 490
Focus, 114
Fofoe, John, 132
Foley, S.M. (MHA)
DC: Ch1mbu, 54
Western Highlands, 121
Foot, Sir Hugh (Lord Caradon), xxiv
Foreign Affairs, 445
Administrator's Department, 166
ASEAN, relations with, 209, 257,300, 314,
343,352,353,394,413,426,427,481
bid for membership (1987), 445
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, 445,
481
Commonwealth Heads of Government
Meetings (CHOGM), 353,396,414,446
Defence Act, 236
defence policy, 166-7, 209
575
Index
diplomats
training, 166
withdrawn, 285
economic resources zone (200 mls), 259,
428
non-aligned foreign ministers'
meeting, 353
non-aligned movement, 446
nuclear-free Pacific, 209, 243, 257
policy,208,272,465
independent commitment, 446
selective engagement, 343, 353
universalism, 291, 313-4
regionalism, 209
relationship with
Australia. See above
China. See above
Fiji. See above
France,209,243-4,332,428
Hong Kong, 260
Indonesia. See below
Israel, 481
Japan,243,250,427,508
Malaysia. See below
New Caledonia, 428, 443, 445, 465
New Zealand. See below
Pacific nations, 243, 257
Philippines. See below
Solomon Islands. See below
South Korea, 343
Taiwan, 260, 353,481,496
United Kingdom, 260
USSR. See below
Vanuatu. See below
West Germany, 428
South Pacific Conference (19th), 332; (20th),
343
South Pacific Forum, 314,326,332,427,
428,446
inPNG, 314
Melanesian Spearhead Group, 445
Pacific Regional Fisheries Agency, 314,
326
territorial sea zones, 259,428
treaties, 240
UNO membership, 257-8
White Paper (1981), 353
See also British Commonwealth of Nations; Colombo Plan; Fishing; South
Pacific Commission; South Pacific
Forum
Forestry
576
Index
visit to PNG, 367,368,369
Hay, Sir David 0.
Administrator, xx. 3-4, 12, 47, 69, 71,845, 87, 108, 110-11, 114, 140, 145
Dept. External Territories, Sec., 108
Hayden, Bill
Aust. Min. Foreign Affairs, 367,414,445
Aust. Opposition Leader, 367
Aust. Treasurer, 243, 249-50
visit to PNG, 367-8
Health, 24, 422
cemeteries, 106
doctors, strike, 333
hospitals, 24, 26, 79
fees, 15, 24
Laloki mental hospital, 26
See also towns and provinces
medical practitioners, 10
Red Cross, aid to Irian Jaya
refugees, 393
tuberculosis, 16
urban sanitation, 106
Vanimo acting District Medical Officer, 15
Hegarty, David, xxxiv
Henao, Hoidae, candidate for Central Regional, 275
Henderson, Frank C., 4, 29-30, 43
Assistant Administrator (Economic Affairs),
13,69, 77
Hess, Michael, xxviii
Hetura Meja. See above Forestry
Highlands, 10, 53-54, 76
attitude to Independence and self-government, 102, 146, 182, 204-5
coffee growing, 8, 219
boom, 293
rust, 431
See also Agriculture
development, 71, 89
elections, violence, 436
electorates, 150-1
famine relief, 178
highway, 149
labourers, 135
leaders, 119, 178, 182
Liberation Front, 178-9
migrants, 192
political parties, 19-20, 36, 119-20, 130,
152-3,263
politicians, xxviii-xxix, xxxii-xxxiii, 11,
35, 37, 50-1, 65, 75, 89, 99, 120, 135,
142-3, 150, 152, 155-6, 162, 182, 261,
577
263,278,344,365
public servants, 263
riots, 149
tribal wars
compensation, 336
loyalties, 287
Operation Lo-met-88 (1988), 459
State of Emergency, 334-5,351
wars, 149 ,178, 182-8, 189, 232, 288,
334,351,368,383,415,493
Highlands Farmers and Settlers Bulletin, 7
Hinchliffe, Mr Justice, 432
Holloway, B., Comm. of Police, 245
Holloway, Sir Barry (MHA Kainantu; Eastern Highlands), xxvi, xxxi, 6, 11, 19, 26,
29,68,154,303,415,421,481
Kibbutz scheme proposed, 395
Min. Education, 363, 374, 386
resigned, 399
Min. Finance, 312, 328,337
Min. National Planning & Development,
389
Speake~ 168,206,254,278,293
Holt, Harold, Aust. PM, 4
Hong Kong, 260
Horik, Tom, 488
House of Assembly, 3-4, 9, 33
Chairmen of Parliamentary Committees,
440
Clerk of the House, 478, 501
Committee on Constitutional Reforms, 492
composition of, xxiv, 121
Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC),
160,167-8,170-1,184,201-2,205,211,
217-8, 221-3,227-31,254-5, 263,288,
296,314
contempt of the House, 87
demonstrations at, 371,479,487,490
District Commissioners, xxv, 54
See also above
District Inspector, 54
elected members, 23
Elected Members Group, xxvi
elections. See above
Governor-General. See above
Hesingtut Committee, 493
indigenous participation, problems, 16, 23,
25
interpreters, 64, 196
Leadership Code, 316-8, 321, 322, 323,
327,371,419,420
Leadership Tribunal, 239, 488
578
members
decorum(lackof), 144,216,264-5,266,
331,383,417
first female, 153
Ministers. See below
nominated, 129
officiru,23,45,51,54,57. 129.149
salaries, 497, 500, 501
Ministeriru Nominations Committee, 224.
See also below
Ministers, 138, 197
code of ethics proposed, 345
defy Cabinet solidarity, 331
perquisites, 241
Sapphire Creek chalet, 266
sex scandals, 383
staff, 266
travel, 266
National Executive Council Secretariat
(NEC), 228,261-3, xvi, 79, 86, 104,125,
144, 162
merged with Prime Minister's Department, 410
right to suspend Provinciru governments,
376,380
Nationru Planning Committee, 261
Nationalist Pressure Group (NPG). See
Politicru Alliances
new building opened, 396
No-confidence motions
1976, Somare considers use of, 277
1978, 322-5
1979,331
1980,338
1983 (withdrawn), 373
1984 (withdrawn), 388, 399
1985, 398-400
1985 (withdrawn). 405, 406
1985,407,417
1986,419
1988,447,450,455
1989,476-7
1989, (withdrawn), 478
1990, (withdrawn), 489
Nominated Members, 239
Opposition, 54
Leader of, 51, 167-8,210
role of, 264
See also Abal; Diro; Momis; Okuk;
Somare; Toliman; Wingti
Parliamentary Powers and Privileges Ordinance,86
579
Index
Public Accounts Committee, 9th report,25
Public Officers (Employment Security) Bill, 27
15th Session, 28-31
Appropriation Bill 1967-68 (No. 2),
30
Budget, 29-30
Committee on the Public Service, 29
Public Service (Papua and New Guinea) Bill (No. 2), 30, 45
Standing Committee on Public Accounts, 28-9
Standing Committee on Public Works,
29
1968 Second House
1st Session, 42-57
Budget Standing Committee, 45
Development Capital Guarantee Declaration, 200
Gaming (Playing Cards) Bill, 56
Governor-General's address, 146
Industrial Relations Bill, 56
Ministerial Nominations Committee,
53,57
National Fitness Bill, 56
Ordinances, 56
Papua and New Guinea Bi111968, 42-
8
2nd Session, 58-65
Appropriation Bill, 58-61
five year economic development plan,
59,61
Land Titles Commission
Jurisdiction Bill, 63-4
Public Service Arbitration
Commission Bill, 63, 70
Public Service Commission of Inquiry Bill, 62
3rd Session, 68-73
Bill to establish local government section in DAA, 72
Bill to name Papua New Guinea (defeated), 72
five year economic development plan,
68-9
SC on national names and symbols,
71
SC on role of permanent overseas public
servants, 72
Supreme Court (Appeals) Bill, 72
1969, 74-98
1970
Investment Corporation Bill, 124
Public Order Bill, 109, 115-6, 119-20
1971
June Session
Land Bills postponed, 141
Papuan opposition to united PNG, 135
request for C'W all-party committee
on Papua, 125, 145
September Session, 143
Budget, 143-4
Commission of Constitutional & Political Development, 144-5
Salisbury Report on Gazelle Peninsula, 147
November Session, 143
Parliamentary Integrity Bill, 145
Public Officers Integrity Bill, 145
Public Service Appeals and Promotions system, 146
Salisbury Report on Gazelle Peninsula, 147
White Paper on Employment Security Scheme, 145-6
1972 Third House
April Session, 154-60
Ministerial Nominations Committee,
155
Pangu-led National Coalition, 151,
154-6, 160
June Session, 161-73
Pangu-led National Coalition, 168
Public Service Board Information
Paper, 173
August Session, 175-182
Budget, 175-6
Gazelle Local Government Bill, 179
580
1973
February-March Session
motion on independence, 183-3
June-July Session
Commission of Inquiry into Land
Matters, 200
CPS 2nd Interim Report, 205
mini-Budget, 201
One Year Improvement Programme,
200
August-September Session
Budget, 206-7
Commission of Inquiry into Land
Matters, report, 207
Education Five Year Plan, 207
Improvement Plan 1973-4, 207
Lands Report, 207
1974
February-March Session
Motion for Compensation, Papua, 218
June-July Session
CPC Report, 222-3
August Session, 225
mini-Budget, 261
1975
National Constituent Convention, 23542,253-7,263
citizenship, 253
elections, 239, 255
emergency powers, 240
Head of State, 238-9
Leadership Tribunal, 239
National Executive Council
(NBC), 238
nationalisation, 240
Ombudsman Commission, 239
political candidates, 239
provincial government, 240
righl~ of lhe individual, 239
Treaties wilh foreign nations, 240
September Session
Budget, 261
1976
Commission of Enquiry into the Standardisation of Selected Imports, 284-5
1977
Public Order Bill, withdrawn, 290
February-March Session
constitution amended, 298
offshore resources, 298
Organic Law of Provincial Government, 315
1978
February-March Session, 316
Budget, 318
Leadership Code, 316-7
National Public Expenditure Plan,
318
organic law on political parties, 317
August Session
Leadership Code, 318,323
No-confidence motion, 323
November Session, 324
Budget, 324
National Public Expenditure Plan,
325
No-confidence motion, 325
1979
Committees of Inquiry
Constitutional Review Committee,
330
Emergencies, 330
Hanuabada disturbances, 330
Information Services, 330
Local Government, 330
Menyamya, alleged mistreatment,
330
prison unrest, 330
ToRobert investigation into
Public Services, 330
Waigani fire, 330
August Session
Emergency Committee, 335
State of Emergency, 334-5
September SessiOn
No-confidence motion, 331
State of Emergency, 335
November Session
Budget, 337
1980
February-March Session
No-confidence motion, 338, 339
June Session, 340
August Session
interim Budget, 341
November Session
Budget, 341,351
National Public Expenditure Plan,
581
Index
341,351
1981
Constitutional Review Committee, 354
November Session
Budget, 364, 367
Electoral Nomination Fee, 356
1982
November Session
Budget, 364
1983
February-March Session
General Constitutional Commission
Report, 376
November Session
Budget, 376
NEC power to suspend provincial governments, 380
no-confidence motion (withdrawn),
373
Peace and Good Order Bill, 384
1984
February-March Session
Constitutional Amendment (Public
Services Commission) Law 1984,
382
Minimum Penalties Act, 384
Organic Law on the Public Services
Commission (Repeal) Law 1984,
382
White Paper on Industrial Policy, 383
May-June Session
Morgan Committee Report on Crime,
Law and Order, 384
National Intelligence Organisation
Bill, 382
Public Service Commission amendment laws passed, 382
November Session
Budget, 392
Irian Jaya refugees, 394
no-confidence motion (withdrawn),
388
PNG Volunteer Rifles, 396
reserve police, 396
school cadets, 396
1985
March Session, 398
June Session
Bill to counter rape with castration
and execution, 403-4
State of Emergency, 404
August Session, 406
1986
March Session, 410
Budget, 422
Public Service Bills, 420
May Session
Speaker's resignation demanded, 417-8
November Session
Budget, 423, 429-30
no-confidence motion in Chan gagged,
419
Placer Share Affair, 419-20
1987
August Session, 441
Deputy Ministers, 441
Statutory Authorities, 441
Provincial Assemblies, 441
November Session
Bill to create a Media Tribunal, 441,
452
Bill to enlarge police powers, 441
1988
April Session, 449, 450
adjourned, 450
no-confidence motion, 450
June Session
no-confidence motion, 447, 455
November Session
budget, 464
1989
February-March Session
adjourned, 476
no-confidence motion, 476
proposed legislation
Group Fighting Act, 476
Leadership Code amendment, 476
no-confidence motions, 475
Regional Seats, abolition 476
Sectional voting, abolition 476
Vagrancy Act, 475
582
1990
July Session
no-confidence motion (withdrawn),
489
Repatriation Bill, 494
November Session
adjourned, 491
Budget, 491
1991
May Session
salary rises, 500
July Session
Constitutional Amendment No 15:
no-confidence motions, 504
salary rises rescinded, 503
November Session, 504
Constitutional Amendment No 15:
Elections, Organic Law on National Elections (Amendment No. 1)
Law 1991 [sectional voting], 504;
Organic Law on the Calling of
Meetings of the Parliament Amendment No. 1, 504
1993
September Session
PM Wingti resigned and was re-elected, xxxiii
1994
August Session
Chan elected PM, xxxii
Namaliu elected Speaker, xxxii
1997
March Session
Chan stands down, xxxiii
Howard, Peter, 159
Huai, Brigadier Tony
Air Niugini, Security Chief, 411
allegations against, 443-4
Defence Force Chief of Operations, 410
Index
PNG Foreign Minister visits, 365
Embassy, 284, 319, 358, 365
defence attache recalled, 381
Foreign Min. to PNG, 208-9, 326
Irian Jaya, xxx, 333, 353, 368, 374-6, 3934,413-4
border, xvi, 166, 208, 244, 296-7, 314,
319-20,326,333,352,375,381,394,
413
Free West Papua Movement. See OPM
Jayapura,352,368,369,446,508
OPM attempt to seize parliament, 380
PNG consulate, 466
Kennecott Copper Ltd, 145
Merauke, 369, 375,508
military incursions into PNG, 319,326,
358,369-70,380,394,426,465,495
musjawarah, 80
Netherlands New Guinea, xvi, xxx
Organisasi PapuaMerdeka(OPM), 167,
203,257-8,284,296-7,310,319-20,
326,352,358, 370,375,380,413,446,
495
abduction of AMS pilot, 380
attack on Jayapura, 380
PNG school teacher abducted, 394
Scotchian village warned, 413
plebiscite, UN, 74-5, 80
refugees, 72, 80, 290, 297, 314, 326,
352,380,393-4,413,426,446
Blackwater camp, 394, 413
camps burnt, 495
Red Cross aid, 393
re-settled, 414
South Pacific Human Rights Tribunal,
352
Trans-Irian Highway, 369-70
transmigration, 358, 370, 374-5
treaty (1979), 381
PNG relations with, 284, 296, 314, 319,
352,365,393-4,413-4,426
South Moluccan independence movement,
259
Suharto, Pres., visit to PNG (1979), 332-3
Sutrisno, Chief of Armed Forces, visit to
PNG (1990), 496
trade,427
Treaty of Mutual Respect, Cooperation and
Friendship (1986), 426, 445, 446, 495,
508
West Papua provisional government, 319
See also Netherlands New Guinea
583
Industrial Relations, 330, 333
See also Trade Unions
Industry. See Agriculture; Fishing; Forestry;
Manufacturing; Mining; Pastoralism
Inglis, Prof. Ken, 40
UPNG, Vice-Chancellor, 246
Institute for Applied Social and Economic
Research (lASER), 365, 448
Institute of Current World Affairs, xxxiv
Institute of Higher Education, 24
Institute of National Affairs Clifford Report
on law and order (1984), 395,459
Institute of Technology, 107. See also PNG
UOT
Irian Barat. See Indonesia, Irian Jaya
Irian Jaya. See Indonesia, Irian Jaya
Islands region, 47, 76,278
politicians, 71, 156, 454
secessionism, 65, 67-8
Itu, Daniel (MHA Kikori), 453,478
Pangu, expelled from, 491
Jack,John,68
Jack, Mrs, 68
Jackson, Philip, Aust. HC, Solomon Islands,
268
Jackson, Prof. Richard
lASER, Dir., 365
UPNG,351
Jakarta, 166,285,297
demonstrations at PNG Embassy, 394
Jaminan, John (MHA), 39
Min. Health, 348
Japan,xix,2,80, 158,161,369,491
aid,285,312,370,427
Ambassador, 100
Consul-General, 243
fishing, 357
investment, 209,215
timber leases, 370
trade,209,260,265,370
Javopa, Mackenzie (MHA Sohe)
Min. Culture & Tourism, 363
Jephcott, Sir Bruce (MHA)
Min. Fisheries & Forests (Natural Resources),216,218,222,254,256
Min. Transport, 156, 198
Min. Transport & Civil Aviation, 199,216,
323,325
Min. Transport, Works & Supply, 262-3
Min. Works, 328
584
Index
sacked from cabinet, 275
Western Highlands Review Committee,
402
Kavieng. See New Ireland Province
Kekedo, Rose
adviser to UN delegation, 39
Village Development Task Force, 290
Kennecott Pty Ltd, 158, 196, 244, 273, 460
Kenu, Wegra (MHA), 11, 25
Kepore, Kopii, 193
Kerepia, Pious
Law and Order Task Force, 403
Police Commissioner, 290, 311, 313
Kerr, Sir John, Aust. GG, 247
Khan, Dr I.H., 105
Kiaps (patrol officers), xxi, xxv, 10, 83, 138,
144, 153, 162-3, 175, 187,292
in Parliament, 47, 51, 53-4, 58, 145, 370,
378,424
Kiki, Sir Albert Maori (MHA), xxvii, xxxi,
10,20,32,68,80,85-7,99, 104,116,141,
157,246,303,306,312
acting PM, 257
ANZ Bank, Dir., 42
assaulted by women, 220
call for resignation of
GG, 291
Damai Pty Ltd, Dir., 265
Deputy CM, 261
Deputy PM, 261-2
Min. Defence & Foreign Relations, 199,
208-9
Min. Defence, Foreign Affairs & Trade,
216,230,235-6,242-3,249,250,257,
260-2,268,291,310
Min. Lands, 156, 164, 179, 186, 198
National Shipping Corporation, Chair., 312
New Guinea Motors, Dir., 312
Port Moresby Council of Trade Unions,
Pres., 312
Port Moresby Town Council, 132
King, Peter, xxxiv
Kirk, Norman, New Zealand PM, 209
Kitchens, Carl. See Stack, Carl Kitchens
Knox, Bill, Qld Min. Justice, 252
Koe, John, 140
Kofikai, Sabumei (MHA Goroka), 74, 120
Koki, Alois (MHA), 454
Komboni, Andrew, Premier, Sandaun Province, 391
Komoiam-Baiyer electorate, 37
Kompian-Ambun, Member for, 407
585
Kondom, Agaundo, xxviii-xxix, xxx
Kopi. Veva, Madang Town Council, Pres., 142
Koraea, Tom (MHA GulO. 234
Min. Media, 328
Min. Works & Supply, 328
Premier, Gulf Province, 493
Village Development Task Force, 290
Korokal, Kagul, Premier, Western Highlands
Province, 402,431,432
Koromba, Yaungtine, Premier, Southern
Highlands Province, 401,493
Korowara, Bebes (MHA Goroka)
Min. Lands, 363
Korowi, Sir Wiwa (MHA), 488
Min. Health, 328
Min. Minerals & Energy, 455
Kove, Matthew, Bougainville leader, 468
Kovingre, Otto, Wewak-But LGC, Vice-Pres.,
xxvii,9
Kumaina, Robin, 110
Kuman, Peter (MHA), 387, 444
Min. Police, 444
Min. Works, 431
Kunangel, Opai (MHA), 338
Minister, 69
Kupul, James, candidate for Western Highlands regional, 276
Kuri, Kingal Kai, Western Highlands, 431-2
Kurondo, Siwi (MHA), 11, 38, 51, 53, 119
Ass. Min. Forests, 57,61
Kusumaatmadja, Dr Mochtar, Indonesian
Foreign Min., 326
Kutas, Alphonse, 21
Kwan, Perry (MHA Kavieng), 68
Speaker, 155, 168
Kwarara, Galeva (MHA), 430
Deputy Opposition Leader, 331, 340
Minister, 348
Min. Finance & Planning, 420, 448, 455
Min. Trade & Industry, 409, 457, 477
Labour
contracts, 16
indigenous, 81
Lae,9, 17,20,67, 79,107,110,142-3,150,
152,201,281,309,379
airport, 449, 459
curfew,497
hospital, 24
Kavieng Club, 67
Niall Community Centre, 150
586
Land
acquisition, 79, 81, 83-5, 88, 91, 93, 1101,207,253
alienation, 141, 460-1
Board, 111
Commission oflnquiry Report ( 1973), 207
compensation claims, 475,486
customary ownership, 26, 93, 168, 207,
311, 4bl, 4~6
disputes, 136, 353
indigenous rights, 460-1
Land Development Authority proposed, 5
Lands Acquisition Act, 253
legislation. See House of Assembly
mining leases, 26
non-citizen leases, 207
policy, 5, 100
registered, 141
resettlement schemes, 123
squatter settlements, Ill, 135, 148, 396
Kibbutz scheme proposed, 395
tenure, 141
Titles Commission, 141, 148
urban, 106, 357
Lang, Galen (MHA)
Min. Agriculture, 489-90
Langro, Joe Paul (MHA West Sepik), 50,
155,172,210,257-8,264,301,391
Ass. Min. Information & Extension Services, 57, 61, 63, 97, 224
Premier. Sandaun Province, 391,412
Sandaun Independent Group, 391
shadow Min. for Foreign Affrurs, 297
support for Irian Jayan refugees, 290
Tarangu Pty Ltd, Dir., 265
Language
citizenship, 253
English,xxv,29,57,65,264
Hiri Motu, 195,253
interpreters, 35, 154
lingua franca, 37
Tok Pisin (Pidgin English) in elections, 152
in Parliament, xxv, xxix, 50, 58, 64, 68,
242,264
national language, 9, 12, 62, 253
vernacular, xxv, xxix, 253
Index
432,505
Public Prosecutor, 377
reforms, 158-9
Rooney Affair, 335, 336, 338
sorcery, 136
Special Judges' Report on the Application
of the Minimum Penalties Legislation,
415
stipendiary magistrates, 40, 95, 115, 127,
138, 188
Supreme Court, 63, 85, 91, 138, 276, 309,
311,344,348,356,395,424,425,447,
491
Chief Justice, 49, 70, 145, 335, 336, 442,
505
Court of Appeal, 72, 94
Vagrancy Act, 395
village courts, 169, 178, 239, 395-6
Legislative Assembly, xxiv
Legislative Council, xxiii, xxiv, xxvi, xxviiixxix, 37, 152, 229
education standards of members, xxi
Select Committee on Political Development, xxiv, xxvi, xxx
Lemeki, Jacob (MHA), 477, 478
Min. Labour, 328
PSA, Sec., 282
Levi, Noel (MHA), 325
Min. Foreign Affairs, 343, 352, 353
Min. Housing, 329
Parliamentary Secretary, 309
Ley, John
CPC legal adviser, 171, 237
Leys, Colin, 387
Liberia, 39
Lihir Island; Kennecott involvement, 460
Lilje, Uwe, 104
Lindblom, C.E., 190
Lini, Fr Walter, PM Vanuatu, 460
Littler, C.G., (MHA)
DI Mount Hagen, 54
Livestock, 16
Local(;overniDent, 140,172,178,255
Area Authorities, 171
Association, xxii, 261
Authorities Act 1971, xxii
Bougainville Regional Conference, 188
business licenses, 125
Citizens Consultative Committees, 106,
131
Commissioner, 72
Committee of Inquiry, 330
587
community education, 208
constitutional development, 120
consultation, 101
cooperatives, 126
Councillors, 150
Councils (LGC), xxi, xxii, 10, 35, 89, 189;
staffing, 121-2
Abau, 189
Ambenob, 133
Asaro, 219
Association of, 89, 109
Baiyer River, 162
Bainings, 92
Baluan, xxi
Bougainville LGC Conference, 211
Gazelle, xxix, 168, 179, 189
Gazelle Peninsula, xxii, 87-8, 92-6, 100,
109-12, 123-4, 126-9, 137, 147-8,
179,189,292
Connolly Commission (1970), 108
elections, 148
Greater Toma Council, 189,219
Warkurai Nigunan, MataunganAssoc.
LGC, 137, 179, 189, 137, 189
Hanuabada, xxi
Hiri, 425
Huon, 19
Jimi, 162
Kainantu, 219
Laiagam, 162
Losuia, 188-9
Motu-Koita, xxi
Mount Hagen, 162
Nawae, 143
Teop-Tinputz, 66
Toma, 219
Vunamarni, xxix
Wahgi, 160, 162
Waiye, xxviii
Western Highlands, 99, 162, 379
Wewak-But, xxii, xxvii, 9
Department, 89; included in CM's Dept.,
186
Director of District Administration, xviii
elections, 9, 88, 95, 131
kivungs, xxi
luluai, xxi, xxviii
Ordinances: Local Government 1963, xxi;
Native Local Government 1949-60, xxi
politicians, 37, 163, 266
taxation, 95, 112, 123, 137, 148, 188-9
Town Councils
588
Index
Manus Province, xxi, xxvii, 35, 67, 90,97
cannery project, 336
elections, 480
electorates, 150
governmentsuspended,390,413
Premiers, 413,454,463
timber leases, 463
Maor, Kare (MHA)
Min. Higher Education, 328
Mapun, Dus, Village Development Task
Force, 290
Mara, Premier, Western Highlands, 402
jailed for embezzlement, 402
Mara, Ratu Sir Kamisese, Fiji PM, 226, 344
Maras, Col., Defence Force, 480
commander Bougainviiie troops, 500
Marcos, Ferdinand, Philippines Pres., 281,
292
Marcos, Immelda, 247
Mariana Group, xix
Marsh, R.B., NSW T &LC, 41
Marshall Islands, xix
Marsipal, Arnold (MHA)
Min. Defence, 78, 480
Martin, Frank (MHA Madang-Sepik), 8, 20,
26
Matane, Sir Paulius, 446
Ambassador, 297
Dept. Business Development, Dir., 122,
124,288
Dept. Foreign Affairs & Trade, Sec., 365
East Timor, attitude to, 365
Public Service Board, 110, 122
Matiabe, Aruru (MHA), 434-5, 443, 444,
447,450,477,479
Min. Culture & Tourism, 478
Min. Education, 442
Min. Foreign Affairs (acting), 442, 443
Matibri, Suguman (MHA Madang), 20, 25
Matlaun, Tolai leader, 96
Matthews, L.G., Public Service
Arbitrator, 12, 28, 41, 62
Maughivu, O'ongu, Papua Besena
rainmaker, 248
Maut, Peter, Wewak-But LGC, Pres., xxvii, 9
Mazrui, Prof. Ali, 171
Mead, Prof Margaret,266
Meanggarum, James (MHA Ramu; Bogia),
10-11,38,53,66,70-1
Me~a.9, 12, 17,32,33,34,38,40,57,667,69,80,89, 110,185,218,233,323,373,
387,400,407,439,500
589
advertising campaigns, 152, 336
Australian, 195, 218, 250, 311, 319-20,
325,369-70,375,381,507.
See also ABC
Dept. Information & Public Broadcasting.
See above
elections, 152, 379
freedom of, 282,441-2
llansard,accessto,242
journalists, xxv, 21, 40, 119, 162, 181,282,
292,297,390,438,472,476,482
National Broadcasting Commission, 235,
237,313,411,416,459
Chairman, 366
Okuk stops interview on air, 348
television, 357, 366, 411
New Guinea News Service, 110
Newcastle Broadcasting Network, 427
newspapers, 72,215,267,366,414,440
no-confidence motions, 488
Pravda,40
press conferences, 224, 452
press releases, 187
radio, xxxi, 10, 12, 79, 83, 101, 110, 128,
148,193,199,204,215,217,224,235,
256, 325,431,432
political advertisements, 431
political broadcasts, 150, 153, 290
television, 85-6, 161, 250, 357, 366, 411,
432
Tribunal, 441
See also Niugini Nius; Post-Courier;
Times of Papua New Guinea
Mel, Michael (MHA), 439, 476
Min. Treasury, 455
Melanesian Chamber of Commerce, 486, 500
Melanesian Council of Churches, 200
Melanesian Institute, Goroka, 415
Melanesian Investments Pty Ltd, 265
Melanesian Way, 211, 241, 288, 354
Asian influences, 364
compensation,336,475
conflict resolution, 333
corruption, 12, 216, 241, 262, 288, 364,
376,377,391,412,419-20,444,458,
466, 489, 490. See also Forestry
election strategy, 299
feminism, 364
Leadership Code, 316-8,321-2,327
myth attacked, 341
Narokobi's Melanesian Way
philosophy, 288, 354
590
nationalism, 288
No-confidence motions. See House of Assembly
parliamentary system, 325
political ideology, 287, 327, 378, 398,452
political parties
business arms, 288, 300
coalitions, 408
function of, 287, 290, 300, 307
policies, 300-3, 353, 398, 432-5
politicians, 211
criminal connections, 494
in business, 288
lack ofloyalty to party system, 288, 305,
357,369,371,388,439,475,488
leadership, 353-4, 450
Ministers, defying Cabinet, 331
refuse to vacate office, 390
wantok vote, 359
politics
characteristics, 306, 339, 344, 390
cynical amoralism, 397-8,440,441,449,
489
payback syndrome, 390, 398, 489
provincial, 315
tangential approach, 388
post-election lobbying, 294
public servants, attitudes, 348
riots at Okuk's funeral, 418
wantokism, 444
See also Provincial Government; Social
Change
Melo, Tambu, (MHA Kutuba}, 20
Meser, Seth, OPM leader, 446
Methodist church, 137,269
Miakwe, Akepa (MHA Unggai-Bena}, 389
Micronesia, 171
Middlemiss, Barry, 84, 102
Middleton, John (MHA Sumkar), 153, 303
Mileng, James, Electoral
Commissioner, 298
Milne Bay Province, 306
Commonwealth Development Corp., investment, 392
Dogura, xxix
Gedulalara village, xxix
elections, 425
electorates, 36, 304
financial scandal, 480
Milne Bay Solidarity Group, 425
no-confidence motion, 390
Premiers, 425
Samarai, xxviii
Speaker, 390
timber, 289
Mining
copper, 5, 26, 66, 69, 79, 145, 158, 244,
259,261,267,296,355,361,400-1
exploration, 485, 486
gold,393,400-1,429,486
land rights, 461
Mineral Resources Stabilisation Fund
(MRSF), 355,465
Mining Act, 487
oil, 435, 485, 486
Petroleum Act, 487
policy, 170,176,200,458
See also Bougainville; Ok Tedi
Ministerial advisors, 273-4
Ministers, expenses, 277-8, 290
Ministries, major changes announced, 156,
198-9, 215-6, 262
Minj, Western Highlands, 119
Minogue, Chief Justice John, 168
Misima mine, 486
Missions. See Christianity
Moeder, Max, Premier, Madang Province,
391,412,424
Mokai, Albert, Premier, Southern Highlands
Province, 493
Mola, Donatus (MHA North Bougainville},
38,66,234
Lemankoa village, 267
Min. Business Development, 156, 198,
211-2, 216
Min. Health, 216,262
Min. Public Utilities, 262
Nakar Kas society, 267
resignation announced, 235
Momis, [Father] John (MHA Bougainville),
156, 176-7, 179,235,263,268-70, 278,
299,303-4,340,348,356.359,362,376,
378,379,388,391,394,398,401,406,
430,433,434,438,439,441,446,450,
463,467,472,482,485,492,498,499
Alliance for Progress and Regional
Development, 294
Bougainville Initiative, 434, 461
CPC,DeputyChair., 167,170,184-5,2001, 205-6, 214, 222-4, 229, 237-9, 241,
255,314,458
Deputy Opposition Leader, 389
Deputy PM, 399, 407, 414
meeting with James Nyaro, OPM
Index
Pres., 394
Min. Decentralisation, 314-5, 321-2, 328,
332,339,342,349,354
Min. Minerals & Energy, 339
Min. Provincial Affairs, 458
Min. Public Service, 399
Opposition Leader, 397
threatened by police, 469
Mona Louis (MHA)
Min. Administrative Services, 328
Min. Defence, 328
Village Development Task Force, 290
Monash University, Melbourne, 139
Monk, A.E., Chairman ACTU, 41
Mopio, James, candidate for Central Regional, 275, 310
Morea, Sevese (MHA), 68
Moresby Open electorate, 35
Morgan, Leo
CM's Office, 163
NBC, Chair., 357; sacked, 366
New Zealand, HC to, 260
Morgan Committee Report of Crime, Law
and Order (1984), 384
Morobe Province, 20, 35-7, 90, 152, 332,
349,354,368
Assembly, 383
election, 378
electorates, 36, 54, 150, 153, 303
Finschhafen, xxxi, 9
Garaina, 459
government suspended, 467, 480, 493
Irian Jay a refugees re-settlement offer, 414
Menyamya, 330
Morobe Independent Group (1984), 378
no-confidence motions, 425
Wau, xxvi
Morris, A., PNG Associated Industries, Mgr.
Dir., 265
Morrison, W.L. (Bill)
Aust. Min. External Territories, 181, 1835,196,201,209,215,217,236
Moses, Henry, Bougainville Workers' Union,
Pres., 246
Moses, Sasakila (MHA)
Min. Culture & Recreation, 216
Min. Culture, Recreation & Youth Development, 262
Min. Forests, 156, 198
Muliap, Tom (MHA)
Min. Police, 411
Murdani, General Benny, Indonesian Army
591
Commander
funds to Diro, 442
gifts to Huai, 444
gifts to PNG Defence Force, 444
Murray, Sir Hubert, Lieutenant-Governor of
Papua, xix, xxi
Murray, J.K., Administrator, xx, xxii
Murtopo, Major-General Ali, 208
Museum, of war, 28
Nairobi, Kenya, 166
Namaliu, Rabbie (MHA Kokopo (PM
(1988-92)), xxxii, 110,441,454
CM, principal private secretary to, 210
East New Britain Provincial Commissioner. xxxii, 290
education, xxxii, 290
Min. Foreign Affairs & Trade, xxxii, 363,
365,374,376,386,394
visit to United Nations, 394
Min. Primary Industries, xxxii
Opposition Leader, xxxii
Pangu, Chair., 453
Pangu, Vice-Pres., 210
Prime Minister, 447, 449, 458, 476, 478,
479,482,485,488,489,494,507
Public Service, Chair., xxxii
Grand Coalition talks, 488
policy, 458
PM, priv. sec. to, 290
research officer to, xxxii
PSC, Chair., xxxii, 290, 313
Speaker, xxxii
Napidakoe Assoc. See Political Parties
Narokobi, Bernard (MHA), 354,401,407,
415,427,439
CPC consultant, 171
Judge, 352
Law Reform Commission, Chair., 258, 288
Melanesian Way philosophy, 288, 354
Min. Justice, 472,495
South Pacific Human Rights Tribunal,
Chair., 352
Natera, John, Dept. Agriculture, Stock &
Fisheries, Dir., 288
National Capital District, 306
Commission, 441
State of Emergency (1985), 404
Regional electorate, created, 261
National Executive Council (NEC). See House
of Assembly
592
ANU
New Guinea Times-Courier, 85-6
New Hebrides. See Vanuatu
New Ireland Province, xxxi, 67, 96, 119,315
cannery, 336
elections, 425,431
finances, 342
Kavieng, 9, 20, 27
Fisheries College, 370
Open electorate, 475
Leadership Code Bill, rejected, 412
Namatanai, 119, 303; Open electorate, 35
New Hanover Island, 21
no-confidence motion, 412
Premiers, 408, 454
Tiga Pressure Group, 475
New South Wales Trades and Labour Council,
41
New York, xxx, 166
New Zealand
aid, 209
currency, 429
disaster relief, 259
Endeavour, frigate, 484
investment, 260
PM visits PNG, 209
PNG diplomats withdrawn, 285
workers, 281
Newby, L.R., Information &
Extension Services, Dir., 110
Newman, A.P.J. (MHA), 6, 23, 59
Assistant Administrator (Economic Affairs), 83-4, 124. 128
Deputy Administrator, 135, 154
Niall, H.L.R., 49
Speaker. 4. 35-6
Nilkare, John (MHA Simbu), 386,421
Min. Decentralisation (Provincial Affairs),
363,374,376,386,420
Min. Lands, 389
Ninkama, Bill (MHA)
Index
Min. Housing, 444
Niugini. See Papua New Guinea
Niugini Nius, 365, 369, 387, 440, 453, 476;
issue pulped, 366
Noaio, Aaron (MHA), 478
Min. Corrective Institutions, 444
Noel, John (MHA)
CM's Office, 163
Min. Defence, 328
Parliamentary Secretary, 309
Noga, Brigadier Ken, 411
Nombe, Walter
Min. Works & Transport (EHP), 425
Premier, Eastern Highlands Province, 425
Nombri, Sir Joseph Kaal (MHA), IO, 68
Comm. of Police (associate), 175
kiap, 175
North Solomons Province, 205, 224, 297,
349,493
abolished, 269
Assembly, 270, 292
elections, 234, 278, 378
finances, 268, 342
insignia, 234
local governments, 315
planning officer, 284
Pollee "21 Squad", 351
Premiers, 454, 470
restored, 278, 291
secession, 470. See also Bougainville
settlers, repatriation, 425
See also Bougainville
Northern Province. See Oro Province
Nuclear-Free Pacific, 209, 243, 257
Conference, 243
Nuia, Col. Leo, Defence Force
ABC "Four Corners" interview, 499
Commander (acting), 480
commander Bougainville troops, 472,483,
498
sacked, 499
Nwokolo, !kenna, lawyer, 114
Nyaro, James, OPM, Pres.
ABC interview, 381
Fr Momis, meeting with, 394
Ghana, resettled in, 426
refugee to PNG, 414, 426
Nyerere, Julius, Tanzania, Pres., 257
Oakes, Laurie, journalist, 369
Oala-Rarua, Oala (MHA Central), xxvi,
593
xxxi, 8-12,38,46-7,50,53-4,68,85, 119,
135, 143-5
Ass. Min. Treasury, 57,62-3
Pangu party, expelled from, 19-20
Port Moresby Town Council, 132
Pres., 142
Oda, Isaiah, Premier, Central Province, 493
Ogio, Michael (MHA), 454
Minister, 454
Ok Tedi, 158, 214, 244, 273, 350, 352, 355,
361,377,385,400-1,466
Additional Projects Tax, 400
Amoco, Ok Tedi shareholder, 393
Applied Geology Associates, 474
Broken Hill Proprietary Ltd, 261, 393,400
closure threat, 393, 400
compensation claims, 474, 486
cyanide, 2,375 drums lost in Fly River
mouth, 393
hydro-electricity project, 393, 400, 474
Jackson Report, 350
Kiunga, port, 374
Ok Tedi Development Company Pty
Ltd, 245, 393
pollution,474
revenue from, 474
shutdown, 400
strike, 460
Tabubil, workers burn buildings, 460
tailings dam, 392-3, 400, 474
See also Kennecott Pty Ltd
Okuk, Sir Iambakey (MHA Simbu; UnggaiBena), 155,156,277,290,299,302,3045,309,316,322-3,325,344,345,358,365,
378,383,389,397-8,399,405,406,408,
409,416-8,445
business interests, 322
Chair. of Committees, 155
death from cancer (1986), 416, 438; funeral, 418
defeated, 1982 election, 362, 370
Deputy PM, 341,348,349,354,356
Highlands bloc leader, 298
loses parliamentary seat, 362, 385, 389
Min. Agriculture, Stock & Fisheries, 156,
161,186,198,216
Min. Education, 262-4; dismissed, 275
Min. Primary Industries, 409, 416
Min. Transport & Civil Aviation, 216, 237,
241-2,253,254,263,275,342,345,348
NBC radio broadcast stopped, 348
Opposition Leader, 321, 331, 338, 339,
594
340,371,373
People's United Front, leader, 317
sacked from cabinet, 275
World Anti-Communist League, 417
Olewale, Sir Niwia Ebia (MHA South Fly),
xxxi,IO, 38,51-2,70-1,74-6,97,124, 135,
144
Deputy PM, 328
Min. Commerce, 27
Min. Education, 156, 164, 166, 186, 198,
215,221
Min. Foreign Affairs and Trade, 319,326,
328,332
visit to East Timor, 319
Min. Justice, 235, 251, 255, 262-3, 267,
277,298
Min. assisting PM on Provincial Affairs,
262,267
Oliver, Michael, xxxiv
Olmsted, Mary Seymour
USA Ambassador, 260
USA Charge d'Affaires, 260
Ombudsman Commission, 17, 170, 239,
308,311,322,345,349,383,441,444,
490,505
Chief Ombudsman, 491
Corruption in Government, 364
documents stolen, 494
Executive Diaries Affair, 364, 377
Interim Report of Air Niugini, 342
Placer Share Affair, 419,433
Ona, Francis
Bougainville rebel leader, 462, 468, 469,
471,498
K200,000 prize for capture, 472
Republic of Meekamui, Pres., 483
Ondawame, Otto, OPM leader, 326 , 333
Oram, Nigel, 132, 142, 194
Orea, John, 450
O'Regan, Prof. R.S., 158
Oro Province
cabinet size, 379
curfew,493
leaders, 278
no-confidence motions, 402,412
oil palms, 461
Popondetta, 233
Premiers, 480
sugar cane projects, 332
Post & Telecom Corporation (PTC), 411,
416,440
Ou, Pena (MHA Mount Hagen), 75, 89
Overall, Mr, 2
Overseas volunteers, 56
Pacific Islands Monthly, 46, 51, 61,72
Pago Pago. xxx
Pais, Tom (MHAJ
Min. Agriculture, 489
Paliau Movement. See Political cults
Palm oil industry, 38
Papeete, French Polynesia, 332
Papua,39
Act 1905, xix
Administrator, xix
Bereina, 192, 204
Black Power group, 211, 234
Boera, 196
economy, 244
electorates, 151, 153
ethnic tension, 191-4
Executive Council, xxii
forestry, 350
Goilala, 192
Kairuku-Hiri electorate, 153
Koiari, 218
leaders, 39
Legislative Council, xxii
Lieutenant-Governor, xix
Nemea Landowners Assoc., Abau, 189,
196,210,218
Papua Action, 255
Papua Besena. See Political Parties
Papua Group. 232
Papua Liberation Movement, 234
patrol officers, xxi
political parties, 27
politicians, 10, 35-7,50, 156,218
public servants, 234
regionalism, 440
Republic of Papua, 233-4
bill sent to Bougainville, 235
declaration of independence ( 16 March
1975), 233
Papuan republican fighters army, 233
Kokoda Trail march, 233
Resident Magistrates, xxi
Rigo-Abau. 192
secession from PNG, 270
separatism from New Guinea, 134-5, 145,
173,193-7,204,211,218,221,232,255,
257,270,278
Tapini, 192
Index
Tatana, 234
Papua and New Guinea, administrative union,
135
Papua New Guinea
Citizenship Advisory Committee, 253
flag, 121,129,204,247
Head of State, 238, 256
Independence Day, 247
naming the nation, 71-2
Niugini, 66, 72, 102, 129
Pagini, 121
national anthem, 121, 246
symbols, 71
Papua New Guinea Investment Corporation,
124,165,176,201,215-6,244
Papua New Guinea University of Technology (UOT), 24,201
closed second semester 1991,497, 503
demonstrations, 281
funding, 206
police intervention, 333
staff, 281-2
students, 273,457
boycott classes, 497, 50 l
demonstrations, 281, 335, 393-4, 474,
501
Mount Hagen meeting, 263
Representative Council, 503
strike, 221, 282
Vice-Chancellor, 273, 281
Papuan Medical College, 98, 104
Parao, Anton (MHA Western Highlands),
143,161,172,261,263-4,275-6
expelled from UP, 30 l
Pasom, Singin (MHA Lae), 20
Pasquarelli, John (MHA East Sepik), 26
Pastoralism
beef cattle, 69
Patrol Officers. See Kiaps
Peacock, Andrew
Aust. Min. Army, 149, 156
Aust. Min. External Territories, 156-8, 164,
167, 171, 174, 249
shadow Min., 209, 250, 252, 259
Pedarcher, Wally, Mount Hagen
coffee planter, 418
Pelair, Australia air firm, 405
Peli Assoc. See Political Cults
Pep, Melchior (MHA)
Min. Corrective Institutions, 489
Pepena, Gerega (MHA), 348
Philippines, 352, 354
595
businessmen, 357
Hetura Meja, timber company, 350, 392
workers, 281,358
See also Marcos
Physical Planning Board, 491
Pigs, attitudes to, 16
Piniau, Sam, 109-10
Dept. Information & Extension Services.
Dir., 288
Pitoi, Sir Sere
Dept. Post & Telegraphs, act. Dir., 122
PSB, Chair., 122, 266, 288
Placer Pacific share float, 419-20
Plantation Holdings Ltd, 135
Plantations, 127, 135, 233, 253, 282-3, 311
acquisition scheme, 341
National Plantation Management
Agency, 418
Planters' Assoc., 115; NewGuinea,81;Papua,
68
PNG Associated Industries Ltd, 265
PNG Motors, 265
Poe, John (MHA), 64
Min. Foreign Relations, 199,212
Min. Interior, 216, 226
Min. Police, 262
Min. Trade & Industry, 156, 198-9, 216
Pokasui, James (MHA)
Defence Force Captain, 444
Min. Defence, 444, 449
Pokawin, Stephen, Premier, Manus Province,
xxxiv,413,463,464.480
Pokio, John (MHA Okapa), 261
Police,84,97,111,115,120,132,135~.142,
148-9,152,161,167,178,187,199,204,
233,269,334,341,402,441,493,494
21 Squad, 351
Association, 149, 245
band,247
Boroko police station, rifles stolen, 494
Commission of Enquiry into, 383
Commissioner, l 00, 132, 175, 204, 245,
334, 4ll, 469,479
Defence Force, relations with, 402, 459
discipline, 56
East New Britain, illegal, 332
help criminals, 494
National Fraud Squad, 490; burnt down,
494
Operation Blue Beret, 494
Operation Fly Bagarap, 494
Operation Lo-met-88, 459
596
Politicians
allowances, 48
communism, attitude to, 417,433
corruption, 12,216,241,262,364,377,
405,412,431,489,490
demeanour in the House, 73
education, 290
in-service, 69, 79
literacy, 57, 68, 211
parliamentary procedure, 30, 50-1, 578,64
standard, 37,223
English, lack of, 57, 68
expatriate, 9, 16, 19, 20. 26, 34-37, 53-5,
57-8,75,88, 120, 142, 144, 151-2,222,
264
Asians, 35, 68, 88, 132
Ministers, 156
housing, 47
Leadership Code. See House of Assembly
misconduct, 239
naturalised citizens, 303, 309
new generation, 416,426
participation, 75
retirementloans,30
salaries, 47, 211
sectoral funds allocated to, 431
agriculture, 342, 356
Civil Action Programme (Defence), 450
health, 342, 356
transport, 342, 356
socialist, 135
statutory corporations, appointed to, 450
superannuation, 55
Village Economic Development Funds,
allocated to 339, 345
women, 142
See also Local Government Councils;
Melanesian Way
Parties formed in PNG, 37,53-5, 118-9
Agricultural Reform party ( 1967), 21,
27,36,38,68
All Peoples' party/group (1967), 19-20,
27-8, 36, 38, 53
Combined Political Associations party
(Compass), (1970), 102, 118-9, 125,
130-1. See United party
Country party (CP) (1974), 223,229,
236,237,240,253,255,277,294,
301,303,305,309,430,435,437
Independent Members' group (1968),
72, 85-6, 118
Index
Independent Members' party (1970),
102
League for National Advancement
(LNA) (1986), 420, 431, 435, 437,
457,477,478,488
Leiba party (1987), 430,437
Mataungan Association ( 1969), xxii,
xxvii, xxix, 92-5, 99-101, 109-13,
115, 120, 123, 125, 127, 144, 147-9,
151, 153, 156, 170, 172, 179, 188-9,
198, 203, 210, 212, 219, 224, 267,
274,283,292,299,302,304-6,309
violence, 135-7
See also NG Development Corporation; LGC; Tolai; Rabaul
Melanesian Alliance (MA) (1980), 339,
340, 345, 348, 349, 357, 359, 360,
362, 376, 378, 389, 391, 399, 401,
402,404,409,414,424,425,430,
431, 434, 435, 437, 438, 439, 457,
472,485
Melanesian Independence Front (MIF)
(1968), 65-8, 71
Melanesian United Front (MUF)
(1988), 453, 488
Morobe Independent Group (MIG)
(1987),430,434,435,437,438,439
Napidakoe Navitu Association (1969),
xxvii, 85, 96, 101-2, 113, 153
National Labour party (1971), 130
National Progress party (Napro)
(1967),27,36,38,68
National Settlement party (1986), 421,
430
New Guinea United National party
(1965), xxvi, 8, 12, 143
Pangu (Papua and New Guinea Union)
pati (1967), xxvi, xxviii. xxxi, 11, 1720, 26-7, 32-3, 35-8,47, 50-5, 61-2,
64-8,70-4,76,80,84-6,91,94,96-7,
99, 102, 104, 113, 118, 130, 132-3,
142-4, 149-51, 170, 175, 210, 213,
216,218,222-3,225,230,261-2,2645, 275-6, 287, 292, 294, 298, 300-6,
308-9, 317, 322, 324-5,328,339,340,
345,357,358,360,361,362,363,
370, 371, 373, 378, 383, 38~ 391,
399,402,409,416,425,431,433,
435,436,437,441,447,452,453,
455, 456, 457, 477, 478, 481, 488, 489
Damai Pty Ltd, 265, 4, 282-4, 288,
312,387
597
lack of policy, 276
National Convention (1973), 210
Nius, 102
Pangu Independent Group (PIG)
(1986), 421
Pangu-led 1972 National Coalition,
153-4, 156-7, 163, 185, 198, 211,
213, 215-6, 223, 228, 230, 263-5;
ended,321
Papua Action party (1982), 357,359,
360
Papua Besena (1973), xxvii, 193-7,
204,211,218,221,232-5,251-2,270,
275-7,294,300,302,304-6,309-10,
322, 324, 331, 340, 348, 357, 359,
360,362,390,402,430,434,435
bill sent to Bougainville, 235
dissolved (1987), 430
Papuan Democratic Union, xxvii, 211
rainmaker, 248
[Papua] New Guinea National party
(NP) (1970), 119-20, 151, 153, 156,
161, 170, 177, 198,216,223, 230,
253, 261-4,275, 277, 294, 303, 305,
331,340,345,348,357,358-9,360,
362,389,402,406,408,409,417,
420, 425, 430, 431, 434, 435, 437,
438,444,454,455,456,457,476,
478,491
Papua-New Guinea Workers' party,
xxviii
Papua party (PP) (1982), 359, 360,
409,430,434,435,437,439,441,
444,457,478
People's Action party (PAP) (1986),
421,430,434,435,437,439,441,
444,447,448,449,450,457,476,
477,491
People's Democratic Movement (PDM)
(1985), 398,401,408,409,420,430,
434,435,436,437,438,439,440,
441,444,451,453,455,476,488
People's Progress party (PPP) ( 1970),
xxviii, xxxii, 119, 131,150-1, 153-4,
156,170,177,185,198,215-6,218,
221-2,230,240,261,263-4,275,277,
294, 300-1, 303-6, 308-9, 318, 321-2,
324, 329, 331, 332, 340, 348, 357,
359, 379, 391, 401, 402, 408, 409,
419-20, 435, 430, 431, 432-3, 435,
437,439,440,441,476,478,479
People's United Front (PUF) (1978),
598
322,324
PNG Independent Group ( 1982), 357,
359, 360, 421, 430. See above PAP
Social Democratic party (1988), 458
Social Workers' party (1973), xxviii,
203,218
Territory Country Pany (1967), 21,
27,36
United [Christian] Democratic party
(UDP)(1966), xxvii, 9, 17-18,20,28,
35-6,38,68
United Islands Progress Society ( 1968),
68
United Niugini party (1968), 68
United party (UP) (1971), 130, 133,
142-3, 149-50, 152-6, 160-l, 168,
170,176,184-5,197,199,204,206,
210-1,216,218, 222-3,227-30,236,
238,240-1,275-7,287,290,294,298,
300-l, 303-6, 309, 321-2, 324, 328,
331,339,340,345,348,357,359,
360, 362, 373, 385, 387, 388, 390,
409,430,431,435,437,439,440,
441, 444, 479; investments, 263-5,
274
Wantok party (1986), 421, 430, 431,
435,437
See also Trobriand Kabisawali Movement
Parties from outside PNG:
Australian Country party, xxvi, 130
Australian Labor party (ALP), xxii, xxv,
33, 46, 48, 99, 105, 130, 162, 173,
181,209,249
Australian Liberal party, 157,252, 292
Australian Liberal-Country party
coalition, xxii, 70
Coi!'..munist Party of Australia, xxvi
Democratic Labor party (DLP), xxvi,
114
German Nazi party, xxvi
Italian Fascist party, xxvi
Kuomintang, xxvi
United Australia Movement, xxvi
Porn Porn, G., Bougainville Workers' Union,
Pres., 246
Pondros, Michael (MHA Manus). 185. 255.
304-5,309,314
Min. Public Utilities, 363
OPM, support for, 314
Popondetta. See Oro Province
Pora, Paul (MHA), 153, 456
Index
threat to burn down Parliament, 448
riots (1973), 191-4, (1974), 220
Salvation Army hostel, 154
Show, 221,255
Sixth South Pacific Games (1991), 497
Sogeri plateau, 233
squatter settlements, 192, 395, 396
State of Emergency (1985), 404,414-5
curfew proposed, 493; implemented, 497
Tokarara, 191-2, 204, 245
Waigani, xx, 191-2, 247, 282, 330
women, 220
Postal service, 101
Post-Courier, Papua New Guinea, 87, 89, 92,
99.100,110,120,129,145,174,177,193,
222,235,237,241-2,245,254-5,259,263,
265,267,274,279,282-3,288,292,298,
301-2,357,366,387,400,403,407,408,
439,469,476,483,485,488,491,492,
494,499,500,502,508
Prai, Jacob, OPM leader, 319, 326,333
Premdas, Dr Ralph, 230, 335-6
Premiers' Conference, 315
Prentice, Mr Justice, 335
Prisons, 100,123,168,178,245
Committee of Inquiry, 330
Corrective Institution Service, 231
security, 415
unrest, 335
Pritchard, J., Chief Magistrate, 288
Provincial governments, 172, 206, 225, 232,
253,277-8,292,297,313-5,332,349-50,
401-2,412-3,424-5,480,492-3
Affairs Office, 255
Bougainville, 232; restored, 278.
See also Bougainville; North Solomons
Commissioners, 258
constitution, restored to, 289
constitutional debate, 254-5
corruption, 376,412
CPC proposal, 204, 228-9
elections, 378,401,425,480
financial autonomy, 342
Interim Arrangement Act, 332
Island Provinces threaten secession, 391
Leadership Code, 476
lotteries, 332
McKinsey & Co, consultants, 297
national government power, 315, 342
no-confidence motions, 390, 402, 412,
424-5
referendum mooted, 391
599
sectoral funds diverted from, 342, 349
suspension of, 376
Enga(1984-6),380,390,402,412,424
Manus (1984), 390,402
Morobe (1989), 467,481
Simbu (1984-6), 390,402,412
Western (1985-6), 412,424
Western Highlands ( 1987), 431
transfer of powers to, 314
PublicOrderOrdinance, 109,115-6,136,194
Public Servants, 239
advisers to Ministers, 186,290
arbitration, 63, 70
Association, 41
candidates for political office, 35
corruption, 145
demonstration by, 12
education of, 90, 113, 160
equal pay, 46
expatriates, 105-6, 146, 173,250,273,281,
286,313
''Australian Mafia", 427
education of children, 72, 279-80, 371
Employment Security Scheme, 173-4,
249
localisation, 203, 364; "golden handshake", 27, 146, 368
nominated in House, 130
promotions, 122
recruitment of, 90, 138
salaries, 30, 144, 273, 371
security of employment, 17
wage differences, 281
wives, employment of, 78
Highlanders, 263
housing, 12, 15, 280
Leadership Tribunal, 239
local government candidates, 132-3
misconduct, 239
Papuan support for Papua Besena, 196
political activity, 225,231,266,313,348
political appointments, 290
political candidates, 154, 299
provincial government, 298, 315, 342
safety of, 188
salaries. 103, 221
strike planned, 261
training, 79
Public Service, 7, 10,43, 97,106-7,136,139140,173-5,248,313,341,348,351
Administrative College, xxxi, 90, 104, 108
Arbitration Ordinance, 71
604
Taiwan, 260
fishing, 350
World Anti-Communist League meeting,
417
Talair. See Transport
Talis, Yakob (MHA Wapei-Nuku), 38, 237
Tammur, Oscar (MHA Kokopo), 75, 87-8,
92-3, 96, 99, 112, 120, 123-4, 148, 158,
303,306,430
Mataungan Assoc., patron, 267
Min. Education, 312, 328
Min. Provincial Affairs, 277-8, 291
Taniguichi, Makato, Japanese Ambassador,
370
Tanoa,Avusi (MHA), 475
Min. Lands, 420
Min. Police, 420
Tanzania, 257,286, 322
Tapimeng, Felix (MHA Telefomin), 421
Tarangu Pty Ltd, 265
Tau, Lahui, candidate for Central Regional,
275
Taureka, Dr Reuben, xxxi, 10, 306
Min. Education, 216, 262
Min. Health, 156, 192, 198,212,216
Min. Information & Broadcasting, 262
Premier, Central Province, 390
resigned from Pangu, 262
Taviai, Aisea, 92-3
Index
This Week in the House ofAssembly, 57
Thommy, Geradus
Ghana, resettled in, 426
OPM Commander, 414
refugee to PNG, 414
Thompson, Maurice, SRC, UPNG, 110
Thurecht, Ray, editor-proprietor, Niugini
News, 366
Tiabe, Handabe (MLC Tari), xxv
Tiden, William, Police Commissioner. 334
Times of Papua New Guinea, 356, 357, 364,
365.366,369,375,392,402,414.444,
449,450,476
Tindiwi, Danley, Premier, Enga Province,
402,493
jailed for embezzlement, 402
Tirupia, Tolai land holder, Ill
Titimur. Epineri (MHA). 38, 92
Titimur, Lawrence, PNG Trade Union Council: Pres., 502; Sec., 490
Tito, Epel (MHA Kavieng). 68
Min. Defence. 363. 375
fear of Indonesia, 375
Min. Media. 375
ToBaining, Ereman (MHA)
Pangu. expelled from, 491
ToBaining, Yin (MHA East New Britain),
xxv, xxvi, xxviii, xxix, xxx. 11, 67, 96
ToBunbun, Thomas, 67
Tohian, Paul. Police Commissioner, 462
Controller, Bougainville State of Emergency, 471,483
drunken coup attempt, 484
Tokai Leveller company, 289
ToKereku, Damien (MHA East New Britain), 92-3,95, 100, 112, 123, 172,303,306
Tokiala, Nason, 20
Tokyo, 166
Tolai, 92, 100, 123, 144, 153, 179
cocoa project, 126-8, 135-6, 147
economic development, 71, 111-7
leaders, xxix, 11, 20, 35, 37, 67-8, 87, 92,
96, 108, 111, 112, 136, 147, 172, 179,
212, 224-5, 315
Likun Trust, 212
public servants, 225
resettlement, 123
self-government demanded, 112
violence, xxix, 135-6, 144, 148, 168
Warmaram Group, 109-10
Toliman, Matthias (MHA), xxvi, 50, 92,
148, 150, 155, 179,210
605
Min. Education, 57, 77, 128
Opposition Leader, 167, 182, 185
ToLiman. Stanis Boramilat, 68
Toliron, Napitalai, 96
Tololo, Sir Alkan
Chancellor, UOT & UPNG, 282
Dept. Education, Dir., 287
Dept. Education, Sec., 282
Teaching Service Commission, Comm.,
288
Tolulupa, Berriona, 137
ToMarita, Stanley, 127
Tomot, Melchior, 92-3, 95, 100
Tomu, Soso (MHA), 488
Tonga.259
ToPaivu, Bishop Hermann, 246, 269
Torato, Paul (MHA), 387, 390, 409, 415,
430,440
Min. Forests, 420, 442
Min. Justice. 78
Min. Lands & Physical Planning, 409,418
suspended, 419
Min. Police, 430
Min. Primary Industries, 348, 350
Tordoff. Prof. William, 229
ToRobert, Sir Henry, 330
Governor, PNG Bank, 346
Torres Strait, 166
border dispute, 243, 251-3
Islanders, xxiii
legislation, 297, 320, 326
See also Australia; Foreign Affairs;
Queensland
Toua, Dr Ako, Dept. Health, Dir., 287
Tourism, 164, 179, 188,284,343,351
ToVadek, Martin (MHA Gazelle), 239,309
Min. Health, 363; resigned, 387, 388
Minister, 339
Tarangu Pty Ltd, Dir., 265
To Vue, Sir Roland, Premier, East New Britain
Province, 391, 395,401,480
ToWartovo, Hosea, 112, 123, 127
Towns: Lae, Port Moresby; for other urban
centres see under individual provinces
Trade stores, 70, 125, 188, 191, 283
Trade Unions and Associations, 113, 120,
287-8, 460, 490
Arbitration, 62-3, 280-1
Bougainville Workers' Union, 245, 334
Building and Construction Industry Workers' Union, 105
Central District Building Workers' Union,
606
68
Central District Waterside Workers' Assoc.,
68,280,312
employee associations consulted, 76
government attitude to, 312
Lae Workers' Assoc., 142
Lae Miscellaneous Workers' Union, 283;
taxi service, 283
leaders, 220, 225, 246, 261
Milne Bay District Workers Assoc., xxx
Miscellaneous Workers' and Clerks' Union,
141
National Academic Staff Assoc., 502
National Doctors Assoc., 500
National Medical Officers' Union, 188
National Union of Students, 258
Papua New Guinea Teachers' Assoc., 188.
245,334
Papua New Guinea Trade Union Congress,
442,486,502
Police Assoc., 149,245,486
political candidates, 154
political support, 280
Port Moresby Workers' Assoc., 68, 104-5
Public Employees' Assoc., 371, 486
Public Service Assoc., 12, 28, 41. 62-3, 69,
71, 76, 106-7, 122, 139, 145-6, 174-5,
188,220,223,282,296,312,334,502
funds invested, 282
Savings and Loans Society, 282
Rabaul Workers Assoc., 219
riots, 267
strikes, 141-2, 220, 245-6, 261, 280, 312,
330, 333, 403, 460.
See also Education
UPNG Staff Assoc., 105
wage increases, 141
Waterside Workers' Union, 105, 141
Workers' Associations, xxviii, 37
Trans-Pacific Palm Oil company, 289
Transport, 38, 164
ru~ 118,145,153,248
helicopter, 278
Air Niugini, 195,201,206,246,263,301,
313, 334, 341,410, 446; De Havilland
Dash-7s, purchase of, 344-5, 349
air strips dug up, 278
Ansett Airlines, 263
Associated Mission Aviation (AMS), 380
Bougrunville Airways, 234, 268
bus strike, 333
Harbours Board, 60, 313,416
ministerial
rurcraft, 261
Kumul I (Grumman) Lear jet, 352, 353.
405,406
vehicles, 241, 283
motor vehicle. 274, 276
National Airlines Commission, 313, 342
national shipping line, 241
ports & harbours, 60
regional shipping line, 260
roads, 336
Talair, 119
traffic signs, 65
trans-island highway, 461
vehicle imports, 265
Wings Australia, 410
Trebilcock, Prof. Michael, 355
Trobriand Islands
Kabisawali Movement/Peoples' Government, 188, 203,210,219
Tulo, Sam (MHA)
Min Education, 399
Turner, Prof. H.A., 71,76-7
Tuya, Theodore (MHA)
Min. Administrative Services, 478,479
Uganda, 171,297,314
Umut, Stoi (MHA Rai Coast). 20
United church. 92. 196
United Kingdom, 260
workers, 281. See also British
United Nations, 42, 52
Children's Fund, 39
Commissioner for Refugees, 326, 375, 381,
394,426,446
Committee on Decolonisation, 38
Committee on Trade & Development, 257
delegations to, xxx, 161
Development Programme, 39, 165
Faber Report (1972), 165, 177
elections, observation of, 74, 139, 153
General Assembly, 74, 230, 257
High Commissioner for Refugees, 375,
381,393,394,426,446
PNG signs Convention and Protocol, 426
Information Centre, Sydney, xxxiv
International Legal Centre, 171
International Monetary Fund, 287, 296
Irian Jaya refugees, 413. See also Indonesia
New Caledonia issue rrused, 428
PNG Foreign Minister visits, 291
Index
Trusteeship Council, xxiii, xxx, 41, 74,236
Agreement, 183
China, 22
debates on PNG, 75, 138
Liberia, 21
New Zealand, 22
Russia, 138
Soviet Union, 21
Territory delegates, 27
United Kingdom, 139
woman adviser, 22
Yali for king, 39
visiting missions, 36, 42, 135, 137-9, 166
Foot Report, xxiv
See also Foreign Affairs; World Bank
United States of America, 508
Air Force, 140
Ambassador to PNG, 260
Ambassador to UN visits PNG, 333
Charge d'Affaires, 260
Economic Cooperation Agreement, 481
fishing,314,326-7,357
seizure of Danica, 357
Joan, 242
rice, 427
Status of Forces Agreement, 481
University of Hawaii, East-West Centre, 93
University of Papua [and] New Guinea
(UPNG), 2, 7, 24, 34, 40, 60, 90, 108
Academic Board, 503
academic staff, 40, 77, 90, 97, 103, 105,
113-5, 132, 141, 145, 157-8, 163, 168,
194,208,230,273,351
deported, 335, 351
Chancellor, 104
closed second semester 1991,497,503
Council, 105
Education Research Unit, 208
funding, 206
graduates, 152-3, 171, 188, 212
honourary doctorate, 152
Law Faculty, 115
Medical Faculty, 98, 104
National Academic Staff Assoc., 502
Pangu branch, 104
police intervention, 333, 501-2
Professor of Public Administration, xxxiv,
273
seminars and debates, 167,477
Waigani Seminars, 112-3, 116, 164, 185,
282,326,364
Solomon Islands Society, 66
607
South Pacific Human Rights Tribunal, 352
Staff Assoc., 105
students, xxxii, xxxiii, 107, llO, ll6, 120,
193,212
black power movement, 116
boycott of classes, 497, 500
demonstrations, 192,281,284,335,371,
419,474,487,490,500
Highlands Liberation Front, 178-9
Melanesian Action Group, 200
Mungkas Assoc., 179
National Union of Students, 258
Papua Besena branch, 196
Papuan Black Power group, 211
political involvement, ll9, 157, 178,
200-1, 212, 214, 223-5, 230-1, 239,
502
Representative Council, 110, 352, 501
strikes,221,246,333
sympathy for Irian Jayans, 209
violence, 333
Vice-Chancellors, 2, 40, 104, 246, 371
See also Goroka Teachers' College;
Papuan Medical College
University of Queensland, xxxiv
University of Technology (UOT). See PNG
University of Technology
Unkles, Gerald, 140
Chair., PSB, 90, 104, 107, 122, 124
Upper Sepik Open electorate, 35
Urami, Peter, 136
Urban
crime, 190, 342, 351, 368, 383, 394, 396,
403,448,494
customary land ownership, 106
development, 24, 36, 79, 283-4
education,98
health services, 106
limits, 41
services, I 06
social problems, 131, 149
squatters, 106, 115, 132, 149
UN visiting mission's view, 138
vagrants, 115
See also Social change; Lae; LGC; Madang; Port Moresby; Rabaul
Urekit, Koriam Michael (MHA), xxvii, 61, 304
Uroe, Nathaniel, I. (MHA Rigo-Abau), 53-4,
74
USSR,250,260,343,426,428,446,508
Australian Ambassador, 260
visits PNG, 250
608
Index
project, 392
Hoskins airport, 475
Pacific Seafoods, 370
Premiers, 454, 480
Sohbu Trading Corp., 370
See also Political Cults
West Sepik Province. See Sandaun Province
Western Province, 306, 350, 361
Daru, 145, 474
Defence Force base, 374
District, 166, 244
Fly River, xvi, 474
government suspended, 412, 424
Irian Jayan refugees, 297
Kiunga,414
North Fly area requests separate province,
350
police Operation Fly Bagarap, 494
Premier, 474
Star Mountains, 244, 261
Torres Strait, relations with, 251
Trans-Irian Highway, 369
See also Ok Tedi
Western Highlands Province, 83, 192,201,
247,332
cabinet size, 380
District Advisory Council, 89
elections, 378, 380
electorates, 35, 150, 261
famine, 178
LGC opposition to Independence, 992
Mount Hagen, 54, 79, 179, 263, 418;
curfew, 497
no-confidence motions, 402,425, 432
police Operation Blue Beret, 494
politicians, 304, 306
Premier, 431
Regional electorate, 275
State of Emergency, 334, 335
suspension, 431, 432
tribal wars. See Highlands
women, 334, 336
Western Samoa, 171; Apia, 446
Westminster system of government, 19, 33,
48,51, 79,86, 102,164,211,266
Weston Prof. A.B., 115-6
Wewak. See East Sepik Province
White, M., Qld Liberal party, 252
White Australia Policy, xxiii, 2
Whitlam, E. Gough, 33, 105, 113
Aust. PM, 181-2, 218, 230, 247, 249-51,
266,272
609
LeaderALP,99, 130,166
Whitrod, Ray, Police Commissioner, 100, 108
Wi, William (MHA)
Min. Civil Aviation, 399, 408
Okuk pressures to resign, 406
Willesee, Senator Don, Aust. Min.
Foreign Affairs, 242, 249-50, 259
Wingti,Paias(MHA;PM(l985-1988, 19924)), 398,402,430,431,432,433,438,439,
441
business, 388,411
challenge to Somare's leadership, 386-7
Deputy PM, xxxii, 363,365,373,374,385,
397
resigned, 388, 398
education, xxxii
expelled from Pangu, 398
Government Whip, xxxii
Min. Education, 389
resigned, 398
Min. Foreign Affairs, 443
Min. National Planning & Development,
xxxii, 363, 365, 386
Min. Primary Industries, 363
Min. Transport and Civil Aviation, xxxii, 328
Opposition Leader, xxxiii, 399, 405, 469,
476,477,485,488,493,501
part in WHP no-confidence motion
(1987), 432
Prime Minister, xxxiii, 405, 409, 413, 416,
419,440,447,449,451-2,454,456,478,
479, 481; Grand Coalition talks, 4512,454; Supreme court declares his reelection invalid, xxxiii
Wolfers,DrEdwardP.,xxvi,xxxiv, 146, 171;
advisor to Min. Foreign Affairs, 434, 353
Women,22
adviser to UN delegation, 39
assault on CM and DCM, 220
candidates for election, 153, 303
demonstration, 407-8
Eve perfume advertisement, 336
expatriate women raped, 395
in politics, 35, 142, 336
Melanesian feminism, 364
Min. ofYouth, Women, Religion &
Recreation, 389
Papua, 193
politicians, 153, 303
riot, 220
Rorovana, Bougainville, 84
Western Highlands, 334, 336
610