Scientific Essentialism Siete Eset defends the view that the fandamentl lavas of ture de pend on the essential properties ofthe things on wich they are sid to op- ‘mate and are therefore not independent of ther Thexe lw ae not impored ‘on the word by God, the forces of nature or anything ele, but rather ae m= manent in the word. ‘Brian Elis agues that outs isa dynamic word consisting of more of es transient objecs that ae constantly interacting with each other and whose ‘dents depend om their roles in these proceses. Natural objects must be- Ihave they do ecase to do otherwise would be contrary to thie natures, ‘The laws of ature ae therefore metaphysialy neces and consequently there ae necesary connections between evens nan innovative contibution to contemporary metaphysis, Elis el for the rejection ofthe theory of Humean Supervenience and implementation ‘of new kind of elim in philvophical analyst, ‘This book wil interest professionals and student of philosophy and the philosophy of rience Brian Ellis Profesor Emeritus of Philosophy at La Trobe University, Victoria, Asta, and Profsoral Fellow in the Department of History atid Dhiloiopy of Science at the University of Melbourne, His books include Basic Comepts of Meaanoment (Cambridge Universcy Pres, 1966), Rational Bali Sytoms, and Thth nd ObeyGenel itor snes Soh Brown Univers) Advi io sonnmtan nave (Univesity of Resting) Jou facia (Universty of St Andre) ‘canes Hana (Princeton Unies) sa ncasons (atl Nasional Unies) ‘atin o2veat (Univer of North Carolin at Capel Hl) syoniy storms (Cornell Unies) oor -miomson (Masaehses Insite of eehnology) ness RDNA BAKER Explain Aides owen A son Carta Prychby and Phys Minds ‘manny Maun Cals ase astevir Comin to Or Seer scnA ZIMMERMAN The Coney of Mol Oigtion cian STOCKER with LZADETHC HECEMUAN Fig Eatin Sronny sHommaean The Fint-Poe Pepe and te aye "NORTON NECKIN Conc adhe Orgs f Tout sane Lancs and ous o'UEARY 7 ORE The Guar f Meaning Tae AaMTRONG A Hold of tas of Afi: MERE COM Wht Minds Can Do ‘anon onto The Wl What he Min thin tne reupian Usain, Heo, and Der LAURENCE HONOUR fy Defoe of Pe Reason pavan sats Per i Pacphial Lapc ‘warts as plate saved eoeKBORN Oth Times rnin Lews Pipe Metpy and Epiteliey [RAYMOND MARTIN Selmer overt ats Sting Tra Se-Daxptin cena marine Fe of Ieton pant HoMASsOn Fain and Mepis vio tes apr om Eis ad Sac Phy rae omerate Postion, Kole and Beli ys RobNa bak Pen and Boles Jone cnc Patig Shp a Th Pace ‘penx renencoM Lig how Fre WilScientific Essentialism BRIAN ELLIS La Tiobe University and University of Melbourne CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS"The ir Dading ramping St, Cod United Kegon “The Rdagh Bling, CabesdgrCB2 28 UK s0 We 20S, Now Yn NY FOU11-21, USA 10 Ser Rend, Ong VIC 34 aa Rat de Alen 13,2074 Mae Spin Dock Hae, Te Wn Cape Ton 801 South ice napa one (Bin Bi 20 “This bok sin opi Subject any exepton snd. the porn fit alec ening ween, no eproanen oy pace hep wat ‘se ten prmnon Cage Uae) Pes et poibed 2001 Tire Bebo 105/13 ye Syn Quai 406} Ae mend ik nfo te Bi ie by f Cg Cag Piaion Das Ei 8D (Beas Dod 729- ‘Sew een Bsn Ei prem. (Cambie i doy 1. Bence Pop) 2 Seence Pho Tie I Seri 15887052 008 hack B Seamp Who hp il on the loo kind my he “ead me fom whatever eats thee mag be From hate foes And defeersof Ene SaperveiencePree Contents Incest Part One Concepts 11 Concepts of Scientific Eseniaiom 1 12 13 14 15 16 7 18 19 110 rau 112 ‘Real Properties and Relations [Natural Kinds and Excencee Species, Instances, nd Tropes Incrnsi Properties and Sectors Intrinsic Properties and Real Ewences Two Brands of Necesity [Necesty and A Pro Knowledge [Natural Necestity The Famean Mecaphysic Emipircit and Esentalist Perspectives on Realy (Cats Powers and Cavs Proceses ‘Causal Powers and Causal Laws Notes Pert Too Ontology 2 Natural Kinds 24 22 23 24 25 26 27 “The Aims of Ontology Ontological Dependence “The Natural Kinde Structate ofthe World Accidental Incidenal, nd Essenial ropes Spectal Kinds ‘The Theory of Ontological Reduction ‘Real Properties and Property Meatiry28 29 210 Properties and Predicates So What Are Natal Kind? ‘The Logic of Natual Kinds Notes 3 Powers and Dispositions Tireduction ‘The Dead World of Mechanise Fores a External to Objects ‘The Dubious Status of Dispositions Categorical Reason Dispositions and Categorical Realism Mellors Dsposional Foundational An Analysis of Dpotions Dispositonal Een Dispositional Properties and Causal Laws Meinongianism Categorical Properties and Relations Notes Port Three Scientific Explanation 4 Reali and Esentatsm in Science a 42 43 “4 45 46 a7 48 49 410 ‘Esenialis Realm Scientific Realm CCriige ofthe Standard Argument for Realism [Reali and the Haman Supervenience Thess (Causal Process Realm | Essentials in Chemistry Essentials in Physi Estenilsm in Biology [senialsm in rychology ‘Consructing Esenbalst Explanations Notes 5 Escuilsm inthe Social Sciences 54 52 53 54 55 56 57 55 ‘Scientc Esenilsm and Social Theory Historical Explanations ‘The Structare of Reals Explanations in Science Economic Esentialsm Economic Models Neo-Clasical A Proran ‘Theoredcl Ideals and Explanatory Frameworks ‘Theoreieal Models in Physic and Economics, 100 101 106 07 0 m1 uz 18 11 123 wz 12 132 125 138 145 145 146 150 154 157 it 165 16 173 175 7 i m9 ie 184 186 187 89 90 59 Methodology 5.10. Economic Empiriciem Notes Port Four Laws of Natare 6 Theories of Laws of Nature 6:1 Introdaction 62. Claiticrton of the Las of Nature 63 The Caual Laws 64 Desidera fora Theory of Laws 65. The Problems About Laws of Notre 66 The Humean Regularity Theory of Laws 67 Conveationalist Theories of Laws 68 Natural Necestaion Theories 6.9. Exeatialit Theories of Las 6.10. Solving the Three Main Problems 6:11 The Abstract Character of Theoretical Laws 612 The Role of Ideaization ia Physic Theory, 613 The Demareation Problem Notes [Natural Necesiy TA. The Problem of Natural Necesity 72. Hume’ Concept of Natural Necesiy 73 imagined Possibility TA Redland Logical Posibiity 715 Indvidsal Esences and Kind Esences 716 “Posuble Worlds" Theories of Natural Necessity 77 Hiomean and Esentalist Perspectives on Realty 718 — Grounding Natural Necessiies in the World 7.9. TheWorld as One of a Kind 7.10. Alien Worlds and Alien Kinds of Pings 71 Ie Metaphysial NecesityToo Stong? 7.42 Four Principles of Natorl Necesity Notes Part Five ‘The New Estentalise The Essential Program 8.1. Exentals and Humesn Metaphysics 82 The Ultimate Sources of Power inthe World 83 Forces, Causal Relations and Causal Powers 84 The Program of Logical Analysis. 194 197 198 203 204 206 207 20 ai 23 215 217 29 24 26 261 261 263, 265, 26885 Actus and Pose Words 86 Realatic Semantics for Natural Modalities 8:7 An Exentialst Theory of Conditionals 88 Realistic Amyss and the Theory of Conditionals 89. Esentaem and the Problem of Induction B10 Necesary Connections Between Evens BAL The New Case for Epistemic Conservatism 812 The Program of Realistic Amlyss Notes Bitingephy Indes Preface “This book had its origin ina series of discussions I had with John Bigelow and Caroline Liere, beginning in 1989, on che idea thatthe world isan instance ofa natural kind and thatthe laws of nature ae ofits essence: This ‘is nota new idea, Rom Harré and E-H. Madden (1975) had expressed a similar view in their excellent book, Causal Powws, But we thought that the ides wis worth 2 more thorough investigation than it had had up to that time, and the three of us wrote joint paper on this topic Bigelow, Elis, and Lierse, 1992). ‘Avthe time, 1 was thinking about the problem of objective knowledge in the particular forma in which it rope out of the work that I was then doing on Tith and Objstoty If the world has no intrinsic structure, I thought, then, in principle any single way of conceptualizing the world might be as good as any other, There would be an objective work, and pethaps fom a human perspective, a bes description of it. But sucha de- scription might not ako be the best fom the point of view of an alien boeing, whose epistemic values might well be diferent fom ours. How— ever ithe world hada natural kind structure, reasoned, chen we should be able to casify things in the world objectively in two quite different ‘ays ~ vertically in terms of the dstnce object that are she members of| the natural kinds, and horizontally ~in terms of the kinds to which they ‘belong, and hence che properties they mast have by virtue of thei mem- berships ofthese kinds. In tat eae, there would bea st of objective facts about the world fact that would exit independently of how we, oF ny other being, might think or reson about che worl. The hypothesis of a natural-kind sractore of reality thus promised to yield solution to the objective knowledge problem, for objective knowledge could then be defined with reference to this SeuctureFor thre years, ftom 1990, Caroline Liesse worked with me as 3 1e= search assistant, and then in 1993 a a research astociate. Inthe period, we ‘wrote a series of papers on a range of topics, including dispesitional prop- erties, laws of mature, and the ontology of matual kinds Joint papers were read at national conferences of the Atstraiasin Astocintion of Philosophy and Social Studies of Science in 1992 and 1993. One of these was ter pblished a:"Dispostional Enentals." This book is heavily dependent ‘on the work we did together in thi period, nd Tam greatly indebeed to (Caroline for her contribution tot am particularly indebted for her work ‘on powers and dispositions (in Chapter 3), for her arguments agaist Humanism (published separately in Lierse, 1996), for contributions, too numerous to detail, to other sections ofthe work, and fo the encourage ‘ment and support she gave me in pursuit ofthe projec. ‘The book has also profited from discusions with John Bigelow, John Fox, David Armstrong, Alan Chalmers, Keith Campbell, George Molnar, ‘George Besler andl Erik Anderson, and with several overseas correspon ents, including Evan Fales, Chris Swoyer, and Stores McCall T wish to thank them al for their contributions, and pay special tribute to the ‘members ofthe School of Philosophy at LaTeobe University and the De- partment of History and Philosophy of Science at che Univenity of Mel- bourne, who puc up with my going on and on about natural kinds, avs, and essential natures, and doing it allso very goodnaturedly. For long petiods of time, my wife Jenny, has also had 2 lotto put up ‘with, with my sting i font of my computer (even when it was 4 bea sifl day outside and I should have Been out in the garden). I thank her for her tolerance and support, without which thie project would never have been completed Introduction “There ae two very diferent theories sbout how the laws of nature relate to the world. One is that they ae somehow imposed on things whose identities ae independent ofthe aw. The other is that dhe laws ae m= ‘manent in the world, not superimposed on it. On the second theory. the Inws of nature depend on the essential properties ofthe things on which they ae std to operate, and are therefore not independent of them. “The fists the dominant world-view of modern philosophy, Ie isa view that vas shared by Descares, Newton, Locke, Hume, and Kant ~ che founding fathers of all of the major philosophical traditions of Western Europe: This view i closely associated with seventeenth and eighteenth= ‘century mechanisn, an like mechanism, it implies thatthe laws of ature tre contingent and operate on things that ae esenally inert or pasve things were naturally active then they would be bound to act accord- ing to thei natures, rather than asthe imposed laws of nature might re- ‘quire. Consequently the dominant world-view implies that what happens inthe world depend estentally on what the laws of nature happen tobe. Te does not depend only on what kinds of things there ae in the work, for in what circumstances they exist. "The second world-view is eeentialism. [tis the srt of theory Iwill be defending in this book. cis nota view that has been widely accepted in ‘modern times, One hasta go ll the way back to Aristotle to find a tuly notable defender of esentalsm. Yet, extentialsm is precisely the sort of theory that one would expect any modern sient realist to accept For 2 realist would now be hard prested to make much sense of the pasive, ‘nd iteinsiealy inert, world on which the laws of nature are supposed 10 ‘opetateThe world according to modeen science, seems not tobe innately psive, but fundamentally active and reactive. Its certainly not a mecha-nisic word of things having ony the ateributes of extension and impen- ‘bility as Descarter' and Locke's worlds were. Rather, it sa dynamic ‘world consisting of more or ess tanient objects which are constantly in- tericting with each other, and whose identities would appear to depend fon their roles in thete proceses T wil assume that this appearance is also realty Thus Iwill asume that itis imposible ~ metaphysically impossible ~ fora proton of any other fundamental particle to havea causal role diferent fom the one i actully has."The assumption is plausible, T suggest, because 2 proton ‘would appear to have no identity at all apart from its role in caus processes. IF tis is right, then the laws concerning the behavior of pro- tons and thei interactions cannot be jst accidental ~ tha i, avs which could well have been otherwise. On the contrary, it is essential co the nature ofa proton that it be disposed to interact with other things as it does, Its causal powers, capacities, and propensities are not just acciden- tal properties of protons, which depend on what the laws of nature hap ‘pen to be, but exsential properties, without which there would be no protons, and which protons could not lose without ceasing to exist (or ‘ain without coming into being).'The idea that the laws of particle physics ae superimposed om intrinsically pasve things which have iden tities thatare independent ofthe laws of thee behavior thus lies very wn- ‘easly with modern science. Scientific esentalism is propoted ata metaphysc for scientific realism which is compatible with this intuition, and aso with the evident dy- rnamism of modern science, I is nota reversion to Arstotelianism, of an aempt to resuscitate medieval views about the nature of reality On the contrary, its origins are decidedly twentieth century. It depends, for ex ample, on the existence of quantum dicreteness in the world. Fort is this discretenes atthe quantum level which ulimately guarantee that there ae real, ontologically bated distinctions of kind in nature. That ithe de cretenes of quantum reality isthe generator of the real distinctions be- ‘ween natural kinds of substances, properties, and process. And this fat {is crucial forthe viabilcy of modern esentalism. Aristotle was able to be- lieve in natural kinds (although he didnot cll chem this) beause ofthe diversity and apparent distinctness ofthe various animal and plant species that he knew about, But the idea that biological species are natural kinds has no suvived criticism, especialy in light of Darwin’ theory of evolu- Sion. he new esentaism, however is not 3 defense of Aristotle’ theory of biologi! kinds, and does not depend on it. It depends rather on the recognition that here are hierarchies of natural physical kinds, formally ike the supposed hierarchies of biological species, but real kinds, nevertheless, based om quanta discretenes,and existing ata deeper level “The distinctions between the chemical elements, for example, are real and absolute. There is 0 continuum of elementary chemical variety ‘which we must atbitatily divide somehow into chemical elements. The distinctions beeween the elements are there for us to discover, and are fquaranteed by the limited variety of quantum mechanically posible atomic nucle. Many of the distinctions between kinds of physical and ‘chemical process are also real and absolute There is no continuum of ‘proceses within which the proces of B-emission oceus,and fom which 4 must be abitaily distinguished. The word i just not like that. At fandamental level, the proceses chat occu often allow real and absolute distinctions of kind to be made.TTherefore, if there are natural kinds of ob- jects or subutances as T believe there ae, there ate alo natural kinds of ‘events and processes Scientific essentials ie thus concerned with natural kinds, which range over events or process 28 well t with the more traditional sort, which range only over objects or substances. The natural kinds in these toro categories evidently occur in natural hierarchies. At the apex ofthe Inierarchies,I postulate chat thee ae two very general natueal kinds,The ‘most general natural kind in the category of substances includes every ‘other natural kind of substance existing in che work. This i the global kind, for our word in the eategory of substances. Te defines the range of natural kinds of objects or substances that can exis in our wood. The ‘most general kind in the category of events isthe global kind, which in- cludes every other natural kind of event of process which occurs in the ‘world. This global kind effectively defines the range of kinds of events or processes that can occur in our world, ‘Atte bases ofthese two hieratchics are the infimie species of objects and events These are species that have no sub-species,and whose mem- bers ate therefore estentilly identical To illustrate‘ The most fundamen tal paticles that we know about ae plausibly members of infimie species inthe hierarchy of natural kinds of substances. In the hierarchy of natu= ral kinds of events, the infimic species are plassibly just quantitatively ‘identical natural kinds of events or procestes These infimic species have all ofthe formal characteristic of clasical universal, except chat they range over diferent kinds of things. call them substantive and dynamic ‘universal, espectivelyin onder to distinguish them from each other, and ako fiom the more usval property univers, whose instances are tropes, for property instancesI postulate that the world itelfis a member of a natural kind that dis tinguished Som world of al other kinds by the global natural kinds of object or events, to which it is host and by is fundamental ontology of objects, events, nd properties. I this is right, hen the most general Laws of nature can be seen to arte om the esendal properties ofthese most ‘general natural kinds of objects and events. The more specific hws of ratuce~ che causal lave and the laws defining the seructures ofthe nats= ral kinds of substances that exist in che world ~ might then be seen as de- riving om the esental properties ofthe more specific kinds of ubstances and events occurring in the world. According to sientifc esentialsm, therefor al ofthe laws of nature, fom the mort general (for example, the conservation laws and the global structural priniples) to the more spe- fc (for example, we defining the structures of molecules of various kinds, o specific laws of chemical interaction) derive from the essential propertiet ofthe objec and events that constiut it, and must holdin any ‘world of the same natural kind as ous Scientific esentialism challenges orthodoxy in philosophy in a mum- ‘ber of ways It requires us to believe that there are ontological irreducible causal powers in nature ~ dispositional properties that define the cal roles oftheir beers. In the sandard Hismean view, dispositional proper- tis are all ontologcally dependent on the categorical (non-ispostional) properties of things, and on what the las of mature happen to be. They cannot therefore be fundamental propertics,but mustsupervene on an un~ dering categorical reality: But, according to scientific estentalsm,chere sre causal powers in nature and somé of them ate ontologically primary. ‘They do not depend on what the causal laws of mature happen to be.On. the contrary, the causal avs jus describe the natural kinds of processes in- volved in their display. ‘Scientific escntialiam also requires us to reject the thesis known as Humean Supervenience ~ the thess that all modal properties (for exam: ple, natural necesiy, natutal posibiliy, objective probability and so on) supervene on non-modal properties. This thesis derives its plausibility fiom the Humean conception of realty a consisting of atoms i the oid"— of elf-contained atomic objects or states of affairs that ate located in space and time, and succeeding one another in ways determined by the laws of natute.The intuition to which this conception naturally gives rise is that if one can say which objects possessing what intrinsic qualities ex- ist at which poins in space and time, then one can describe the world completely. Therefore any properties that describe what a thing must ot right do in given circumstances must supervene on those that describe ‘things as they ate in themselves. That i, chee could not be two words ‘that ar identical in respect ofall non-modal properties that nevertheless lifer in respect of modal properties. fone accepts the Humesn Supervenience these, then the problem of explaining what modal properties ae, or what makes statements atribat- ing such properties to things tre, becomes acute. Some Humeans have [gone fo quite extraordinary lengths to accommodate them, interpreting all modal statements a claims about relationships holding between possi ble works. But since every posible word, according to Humeanism, is ‘world without modal properties, iti hard to see how this is supposed to solve the problem, A universe of words without modalities is 3 universe ‘without causal powers Scientific esentislits simply reject the Humean conception of realty and the Supervenience Thesis that it ental. From the perspective of scientific esentialim, the word i not an agglomers- tion of logical independent states of airs or self-contained atoms of any other kind. The world consist ultimately of things that have their causal posers esentilly that determine what they can, must, or cannot 4 in relation to other things, ‘The causal powers of things ae displayed in proceses belonging to ratural kinds. Process of these kinds ean only be brought about by 2p propriate activating events or circumstances, and wiat is essential co chem ts procese is precisely chat they are the actions of such properties in such circumstances. There is therefore a cote link between natural kinds of processes, causal powers, and the circumstances of theie display. Specifi- ‘ly i anything has a given causal power, then ie must be disposed to act in the appropriate way in the appropriate circumstances. Moreover, if anything has this power esentally then it is necessarily the case chat will bo disposed to actin this way in circumstances of this kn. leis one ofthe aim of physical science to discover and to describe the inherent caus powers of things. For these powers are the teuth-makers for thore lnws of nature that are generally known as causal Inws. Causal powers thus have 4 very important role inthe world, for they are the sources of the immanent causal laws of nature ‘The causal powers of an object ae chore of ts properties chat deter- tmine how iis disposed to behave. These properties ae all essentially dis- ‘positional. That i, thee identities depend on the dispositions they un- derpin, For any specific causal power, there i range of possible displays, normaly related by a probability function fiom the state of the object that poseeses it and the properties ofthe circumstances in which it ean bbe activated, The range of posible ways in which a given causal powercan act then defines a natural kind of proces. For there is no process, however similar in appearance, that is a proces ofthis kind but isnot an action or display ofthis causal power, Causal powers and the natural kinds of process that are their displays ehus go hand in hand, and are inter- definable. "The posible displays ofany given causal power are all proceses that are csenally similar in thee stucruze and chat differ from each other only in ways that lie within che permitted range variation for the kind of process concerned: The caus powers ofan object ae thus the real exences ofthe causal processes that can occur when tha object acts causally The grav tional mas of an object, for example, isthe dispositional property ithasthat determines its casa role in generating gravitational feds, and hence the effecs i has on other objects immersed in these field. The charge on an ‘object isthe dipositional property it has that determines its causal role in senersting electromagnetic feldsand hence the effects i has on other ob- {Jecs that are in or moving through these fields. Therefor, ifanything, say 4 fundamental particle, hat a certain mass and a certain charge esentally, then ic muse generate such Geld in any wosld in which ie mighe exis and hhave precisely the same effects on things of us the same kinds. "The fac chat the causal laws all ulimately depend on the causal pow- c= of things belonging to natural kinds, and the manners and circum- stances of their displays, has many implications. Fir t implies that these laws of nature are metaphysially necessary Since they are immanent in the world, the laws of nature cannot be changed, without the world it. self being changed. And things of the kinds that do exis i this wood could not exist i any other world in which che laws of nate affecting, them are supposed to be diferent Second, i implies that causal laws can only be found in ateas concerned with natural kinds of objects, proper- Wes, o processes. Consequently there are no laws of nature tobe found in ‘he social or human sciences, not even in economies. Third, itimplies that the ls of nature are noe just observable regularities. For natural process are normally superimposed one om top of another, and to sty anyhing sensible about any of them, they need to be separated, at leas in thought. ‘Therefore, the laws of naire, which ae concerned withthe description cof natural kinds of processes, must often be expresied abstractly with re- erence to idealized objects in ideal circumstances, This book will elaborate and defend a modern essentialist metaphysic, based on an ontology of natural kinds of objects, properties and process. ‘This ontology will be developed in Chapter 2.As a metapysc, it stands ‘opposed to vome widely held views about the mature of reality. These views motdy derive from the common seventcenth- and eighteenth- century belief the esential pasivity of matter. Iti a view which is sill widely held by English-speaking philosopher. Somewhat ahistori cally I cll the metaphysic that derives from this belief, “Humanism.” Huneanisi will aot be che subject of any one chapter or section of che book, but wil come under attack, in one way or another, thoughout, For ry ama sto present a comprchensive metaphysic that can be seen a an aleernative to Himesnism. ‘As well as holding that matter i exsentilly passive, Humeans generally subscribe to the following theses! 1. Tht asl elations hold berween logically independent evens 2. That the ws of ature are behavior regulars of some kind tat could in principle be found to exist in any eld of nguiy 3. That the laws of mature are contingent ‘Tha the identi of objects are independent ofthe laws of nature 5. That the dispositional properties of things ate not genuinely occurrent prop ster whieh woud veto be theme al posable world —but re some- ‘whit phoney word-bound properties tht depend on what the ws of mature happen 0 be ‘Against these theses, Iwill argue forthe view that nature i active, not pas sive and that: 1. Cuil elation ate relions between evens in aul process an event of ‘natu Kind thi would atte = given cal power 3 certain way 0c ‘ur an event of marl kind which woul dhen be an appropriate day ‘ofthat power must ako occur (ven though the feet may Sometimes be ratked by othe eft). 2, The laws of mate ae not just behavioral regulars although they imply the cexitence of underlying paterns of behavior, bt description of mtural kinds of process aring fom the intinsic properties of things belonging to mato- tal kinds There are, accordingly, no Ins of mature in eld such scilogy 3, The ws of mature are not contingent but metepysicalynecesuryThe same ‘hing inthe states in which they ureenty ex would have to ave the same behavioral positions in any wold in which they might exit 4. The identi of objets ae not independent of he laws of mature, the ws ‘of nature were fren, the things exsingin the weld would hae to bedi fret.5. There are naturel dispositional properties that are genuinely occurrent, nd ‘which therefore act in the sine ways nal pole words Thee inclade dhe ‘aul powers of the most findamental kinds of thingy, so da ings of these ‘ame kinds, exiting n any other word, would be dpsed to bebae in just the same ways In Chapter 1, will develop some of the machinery tha willbe r= quired for esentalst analysis, nd elaborate on some ofthe themes to be a ‘Sixth matual kinds ate distinguished from other sors of things by their associations with exential properties and real esences If what makes an ob- Ject or proces one ofa certain kind depends only on its intrinsic nacre, then any object ot proces that ha this nature is necesally one ofthis Kind, Call cis the esetaity requirement Te is wsefl to distinguish between fixed and variable maturl kinds, “There are some natural kind that ave all of ther intrinsic properties an structates etenilly This is tue ofthe fundamental paticles—forexam= pleauch thing ar theve cannot acquire of lose ntrnsc properties or struc tures without ceasing co be things of the kinds they ae. all these fed natural kinds, There are other natural kinds that have some of their in- ‘tinsc properties or structures accidentally. A metallic ery, for exam- ple,can become electrically charged, and so acquite a caus power it did ‘not have befor, without ceasing to be a metalic crystal of the kind itis Metalic crystals are therefore members of variable natural kinds. [Ac the far end of the spectrum of variable natural kinds chere ar the biological species. Plasiby these may be regarded as clusters of closely related natural kinds, whose exences are their genetic constitutions (Wilkerson, 1995). Butif they ate clusters of natun kinds, they ate afong, ‘way fiom being clusters of fixed natural kinds, For animals and plans are all highly variable in thei causal powers and capacities, and can obviously sin o lose them, while remaining genetically the same, "The variability of natural kind appears to be 2 function ofits com- plexity The members ofthe simplest natural kinds have 2e0 varabiiry. "That isthey have all oftheir causl powers, capacities, and propensities es sentially, and so cannot acquire or be given auy new powers or lose any of| the powers chey bave without ceaing to be things of the specific kinds that they ae. One cannot, for example, teach a copper atom or a proton, any new erick, But things belonging to more complex kinds may have ‘variable powers ~ powers they may acquire, lose, or have changed — with cout their ceasing to be dings ofthe kinds they ae. Crysis of various kinds are good examples. At 2 more complex level stl it appears that things may have metecaual powers, ~ powers to change the powers they have, while remaining things ofthe kinds they are Human beings, for ex- ample, while noe all members of the same strict natural kind (ance they have diverse genetic makeup) are certainly able to choose todo one thing rather than another, and thus change thie behavioral dispositions.” Tefollovs fiom the esenislty requirement that membesship of a natu- ral kind cannot be die to superficial resemblance. fit has che essential properti and structures of the kind, then it must be athing ofthat kind,ven iit looks different. Conversely anything that isa member of given natural kind must have the essential properties and structure of things of this kind. Therefore, the sets of properties or structures that define these natures and thus distinguish the natural kinds ffom each other, are dis- ‘inetive of the natural kinds Traditionally such properties have been elled the esiential properties ofthe kind, and together they constitute what is Jaaown as the teal exence of the kind. They ae the properties or struc- tues in vitue of which any objector proces of that kind & the kind of object or proces iis. In what fllows, it will be supposed thatthe objects, properties, and processes that exist most fundamentally in the world ae all instances of ratural kinds, and that these occur in natural hierarchies, I call this the “Basic Structural Hypothesis” (Ie willbe explained more flyin Chap- ter 2) Acceptance ofthis hypothesis has a numberof significant implica- Sons. First it commits us to che existence of a variety of kinds of real essences. every natural kind has areal esence 8 we suppose, there are real essences, not only of natural kinds of objet a8 nezely everyone c= knowledges, but ako of matual kinds of ents and proses And if paper ‘ies and relations can properly be regarded 2s natural kinds of wopes, which | chink they can, then there must be esental properties of properties and relations too, Second, if natural kinds exist n hierazchies, as seems to be ‘the case, then there must alo be hierarchies of real ewences. The more ‘general kinds of objects, properties, relations, and processes must ll have corspondingly general esential matures, and the more specific kinds, ‘more specific natures. Third, the shembers of the various kinds must be consisting ofa property or relation universal U and an object or event or set of sich things a in which the universal U is instantiated, This is not to ay that a trope is such an ordered pi. Nosh= {ng s fundamental in ontology 2s 2 rope could possibly be an abstract en- tity ike aset.A wope of any inimie species of any natral property has to bbe something ike an elementary factor state of affairs —for example, the ‘ce ofthis property’ being instantiated in tis objec or this elation’s be~ ing instantiated by this ordeted pair of things. I fllows thatthe topes of ny property or relation U anus always exist in things oF se of things — that in whatever things or sets of things have this property or sand in this relation, UcThe topes ae never the things chemselves that have these properties or relations Nor ae chey the universals that are instantiated in them. "These i thus 2 distinction to be drawn beeween being instansated in something and being instantiated by it Property universls or property kinds ate always instansited in ehe things that have or display them. They are never instantiated by them. The objector event in which a trope i in- Stantated isthe locus ofthis trope. But it is not the trope its The ropes are the propetty or elation instances that stand tothe properties and re- Intions of which they ae instances inthe same wa as individual electrons stand tothe substantive natural kind whote instances are electrons. ‘This distinction between being instaiated in something and instant ated by it will turn out to have important implications for ontology, 26 we shal seein the next chapter Inthe case of property kinds, tis easy to con= fase instances with infimie species, because any instance ofa such a kind ‘wl also be an instance ofan infimic species of chat kind. Any insance of| the color-kind rd, for exampe,® such as that exemplified ina particular ripe tomato, wll ao bean instanceof precisely this specific shade of te. But this specific shade of red is also a color-kind which may have many instances ~ for example, in other ripe tomatoes, So the shade of red is not an instanceof the color kind red, but a species oft ‘There are no auch or similar problems with natural kinds that have ob ects or events as cher instancet The substantive natural kind, baryon, for ‘example asa least two infimic species — the substantive nacural kinds ‘prot and newton, Each of these infimic species has billions of instances, dal ofthese instances are instances of the generic natural kind baryon. “There is no danger that anyone will confuse instances with species here. "The instances ae object, the species are universalsThe same with natu ral kinds of evens. d- and B-decays are two species of radioactive decay processes They are dynamic univers, The millions of such events that feccurin nature, however, ate not univers, and no one would be likely to think that chey are:There ie therefore a clear disincion tobe made be- tween species and instances in the cates of substantive and dynamic uni- versal. Only the parallel dssncson forthe case of property univers is likely co prove difficult.In win follows, shall ofen refer to the infimie species of property ‘unverslsas“lasica” and whenever I speak of ope" it tthe ropes ‘of property universals that I have in mind. fct,Ishall not we the word “trope” in connection with substantive or dynamic universal although I suppose thete i no good reason, other than custom, why not shall smn- ply refer to the instances of such universals as objects or events atthe case may be 14 INTRINSIC PROPERTIES AND STRUCTURES "To discover the estentil properties of ny natural kind, we have to know ‘where colook. One thing we know to start with i thatthe esential prop- tis distinctive of any natural kind must be independent ofthe histories, Tocations and sursoundings ofits members, The essential properties of any member ofa natural kind must therefore be among ie intrinsic proper- ties or structures. Most of us have a rough idea of what i meant bya in- tinsic property or sucture. Its a property that something bar inde- pendently of any other thing. Buti is hard to say much more precisely ‘han this what an intrinsic property or structure is Several philosophers have tried to do so. Bu their atcempts have so far not succeeded, or not succeeded in explicating a concept that it relevant tothe theory or prac- tice of science. The problem is that the concept of itensialiey that hae :inly been sought isa logical or acausal one ~ chat is the independence required for inernsicaity has been assumed to be logit independence, But this may not bean appropriate coriception forthe kind of dynamic world wwe live in, in which things ae highly interdependent causally. What is needed for science isa concept of cana independence, For most philosophers shape is paradigmatcilly intrinsic. Fore shape ‘of any object is logically independent of anything external tit, However, the shape of an object ata given time is not necessarily the shape it hat intrinsically, in the more interesting causl sense ofthis word Let A be a stretched rubber band and G its manifest shape. Now some object might Ihave this shape inerinsically A steel band, for example, might have this shape independently ofthe external forces acting on it. But i snot the case chatif any object has his shape, them it necessarily has it intrinsically. Te the rubber band were causally isolated from its surroundings, t woud ‘not have cis shape. Totcinsialey inthe causal sene is therefore not a property of proper ‘ies 26 many of chose who have ered co explicate a logical concepe of in- ‘isicalty have supposed. Thisis because che very sime property (having, the setched rubber band shape) may be an intrinsic property of one thing, (for example, see] model ofa stretched rubber band), and not an intcinsic property of another (for example, the suetched rubber band it- fel), Causal ineinicalty must therefore be either a relation berween 2 property and its bearer chat is distinct ftom the normal bearing relation, ‘or eke a property of tha elation. I suppose ito be a property ofthe beat- ing relation. ‘fan object has the property P intrinsically, then P must be a property thar it does, in some sense, really have even if what is manifested or dis- played is something different. For we do not want to allow chat ar ob- ject might have the property P intrinsically even though it does not re- ally have this property. I'it has the property P intrinsically, chen ie must Ihave i, even though it mighe not be whae is actually displayed. For, in audition to having the property B, dhe object might be subject to the 2c- ‘ion of some distorting force Fs thae whac is actually displayed is not just P but the reultane of P and Fn the case of the rubber band, I s1y ‘that the objec has a certain shape intrinsically, a shape chat isnot in the circumstances actually displayed. What is actully displayed results fom superimposing a certain distortion onto this underiying intrinsic shape. "The logical and causal concepts of intrnscaity are therefore very dif ferent fiom one another The logical concept purports to distinguish be- ‘nwven two esentilly dierent kinds of properties —thote that are neces- sarily intrinsic and thoe that are necessarily extrinsic The causal concept, ‘on the other hand, concerns the natu of the relation berween a prop- ‘erty and its hearer On this conception, properties are notin themselves intrinsic or extrinsic; chey are had or posesed intrinsically or extinsi- cally To mark the diineion, lec us reserve dhe term “internal” for prop- ‘erties that are intrinsic in che logical sense, and introduce the ewo-place predicate™...is intrinsically." co denote this special “bearing” relation ‘One philosopher who ha red to define internal properties is Jaegwor Kim. Kim's definition of an internal property is equivalent tothe follow ing Di: G is internal =, possibly some objec x has G, although no con- tingent object, wholly distinct from x, exiss.* ‘There ate problems wit ths definition, expecially if one is a nominalst, and does not make a dear distinction beeween properties and predicates. For example the property of being the sole object in the universe at ¢ satisies D1, bu this properey.fit sa property is clearly not internal. But om