SET Case No. 001-15 — RIZALITO Y. DAVID, petitioner v. MARY GRACE POE LLAMANZARES, respondent. NOV 17 2015 Promulgated: BRION, J. L ‘RODUCTION I write this Separate Dissenting Opinion to explain my vote to disqualify the respondent Senator Mary Grace Poe Llamanzares (respondent or Grace Poe) from the position of Senator of the Republic of the Philippines. LA. Th ed to Explain My Vote I feel bound to explain my vote as before this Tribunal (the Senate Electoral Tribunal or SET) is a nationally elected public official who received the highest number of votes in the 2013 senatorial elections. The Filipino people who elected her deserve a full and exhaustive explanation of the votes the SET members cast. 1 take this Separate Dissenting Opinion, too, as an opportunity to offer my thoughts (in my capacity as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court nominated to represent the Court in the SET) on points of law that I feel are critical in understanding the present case. I specifically refer to the understanding of how our treaty obligations and the general principles of international law form part of the Philippine legal system, and how they interact with the Constitution. I also believe that as an Associate Justice of the Court (who can no longer take part if and when the present case comes up to the Court for review), I have the duty to express my views on any interpretation of the applicable provisions of the 1987 Constitution — particularly on a point that I believe had been erroneously applied — for to condone ‘an error and the practices that spring from it, is to violate my oath of office by permitting a continuing violation of the Constitution. I speak of this duty in relation with the Court’s decision in Bengzon v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,’ which held that the GO Pi 6, TEE (»Separate Dissenting Opinion 2 SET Case No. 001-15 reacquisition of Philippine citizenship includes the reacquisition of the natural-born status. While the SET has no power to reverse or declare the reversal of the Bengzon ruling, it is nor without the power to undertake its own reading of the Constitution. As the constitutionally designated “sole judge of the returns, elections, and qualifications'” of members of the Senate, our immutable task is to apply the Constitution in accordance with its terms, as these terms have been approved by the sovereign Filipino people, subject only to the Supreme Court’s exercise of its power of judicial review under Article VIL, Section | of the 1987 Constitution. LB. The Case is Justiciable As my last point in this Introduction, the disqualification case before us and its issues are fully justiciable and is not a dispute that the people resolved when they elected the respondent to the Senate ‘The 1987 Constitution provides, in unequivocally clear and negatively structured language, that “no person shall be a senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines...” The Constitution even defined who natural-born citizens are." These terms embody standards that are required of every senator holding office under the 1987 Constitution, and are terms that this Tribunal is bound to apply until they are changed by the sovereign Filipino people. When judicially discoverable and manageable standards for the resolution of a case are in place, the SET — as the sole judge of all contests involving the election, returns, and qualifications of senators — cannot and should not refuse to rule on the contest before it under the guise of upholiing the will of the electorate.’ In the present case, the presence of these standards renders the disqualification case against the respondent a justiciable one that the SET cannot choose to ignore because of the votes that the respondent received when she was elected Senator. Constiunion, Aniicle VI, Seettan 17. dd, Section 3 provides: SECTION 3, No person shall be a Senator unless he is a nalural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the cay of the election, is at least thirty-five yeurs of age, able to read, and write, a registered voier, and « resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of te election, 4d, Section 2 provides: SECTION 2. Natural-bom citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect theie Philippine citizenship. ‘Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-bors citizens, The Court cannot, on the ground of the political question doctrine, rule upon @ matter brought beiave it wheve it “lack{s] of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.” Garcia v, Executive Secretary, 602 Phil. 64, 74 (2009), citing Taitada v. Cuerico, 103 Phil, 1081 (1957) and Baker v. Carr. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Conversely, the presence oF judicially Siscoverable and manageable standards for resolving # case brings @ ease aut of the coverage oF the political question doctrine, ane! makes it justiciable,Separate Dissenting Opinion 3 SET Case No. 007-15 The principle of vox populi est suprema lex cannot prevail over the clear eligibility requirements for holding public office: the will of the people expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially when this question was not raised when they voted the respondent into office.’ Our republican and democratic government is a government of laws that are intended 10 reflect the higher will of the sovereign people es expressed through these laws.’ And there can be no law higher than the Constitution that was ratified by the Filipino people as the ultimate governing rules in running our country. The citizenship requirement is a constitutional requirement for nationally elected representatives to the legislature. This requirement, first provided in the 1935 Constitution and reiterated in the 1987 Constitution, cannot be amended or cured by electoral mandate to allow an unqualified candidate to hold office. IL THE CASE ILA. The Facts Grace Poe was found abandoned on September 3, 1968, by a certain Edgardo Militar in front of the Parish Church in Jaro, Iloilo, Edgardo later tumed her over to the care of Emiliano Militar and his wife, residents of Jaro, Loilo. On November 27, 1968, Emiliano registered Grace Poe's birth with the Office of the Civil Registrar, Jaro, Iloilo, as a foundling under the name “Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar.” * Sometime in 1974, the spouses Ronald Allan Poe (a.k.a. “Femando Poe, Jr.”) and Jesusa L, Sonora (a.k.a. “Susan Roces”) filed before the Municipal Trisl Court (MTC) of San Juan, Rizal,a petition to adopt Grace Poe. In its decision” dated May 13, 1974, the MTC approved the spouses Poe’s petition for adoption. It ordered, among others, that Grace Poe’s name be changed to “Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe” from “Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar.” Jacot % Dal, $92 Pail. 661, 680 (2008), citing Frivaldo » Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989, 174 SCRA 245, 255 See: Aguino v. Commission on Bloetions, G.R. No. \2026S, September 18, 1995, 248 SCRA 400, 429, . See: Cenified True Copy of Foundling Certifieate and Certificate of Live Birth, Exhibit “P* for the petitioner and Exhibit “1” for the respondent. Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. “Susan Roees”) registered Grace Poe's birth with the National Statistics Office on May 4, 2006, See; NSO Certificate of Live Birth, Registry No. 4175, Exhibit “O” for the petitioner and Exhibit “3” for the respondent, Docke‘ed as Spécial Proceeding No. 138 entitled “in the Matter of the Adoption of the Minor Mary Grace Natividad Contretas Militar.” See: Exhibit “Q-Q1" for the petitioner and Exhibit "2 2for the respondent.Separate Dissenting Opinion 4 SET Case No. 001-15 When she turned 18 years old, Grace Poe applied for registration as voter in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. On December 13, 1986, the Commission on Elections (Comelec) issued in her favor a Voter's Identification Card" for Precinct No. 196, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. On April 4, 1988, she obtained Philippine Passport No, F927287"! from the Department of Foreign Affaits (DFA). She renewed her passport on April 5, 1993 and on May 19, 1998," In 1988, Grace Poe went to the United States of America (U.S.) for her tertiary studies. She graduated in 1991 with a degree of Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the Boston College in Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts. On July 27, 1991, Grace Poe married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, a Filipino-American citizen, at the Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan, Metro Manila. On July 29, 1991, Grace Poe went to live with her husband in the U.S. ‘They have three children, namely: Brian Daniel, bora in the U.S. in 1992; Henna MacKenzie, bora in the Philippines in 1998; and Jesusa Anika, likewise born in the Philippines in 2004. On October 18, 2001, Grace Poe became an American citizen through naturalization. She subsequently obtained U.S. Passport No. 17037793." On April 8, 2004, Grace Poe retumed to the Philippines to give moral support to her adoptive father, Fernando Poe, Jr., in his bid to be the country’s President in the May 2004 elections. She went back to the U.S. on July 8. 2004. On December 11, 2004, Fernando Poe, Jr. was hospitalized and eventually slipped into coma. Grace Poe immediately returned to the Philippines on December 13, 2004 after learning of her father’s condition. Fernando Poe, Jr. died the following day. Grace Poe stayed in the Philippines until February 3, 2005, for her father’s funeral and to help setile her father’s estate.'* See: Exhibit “R° for tbe petitioner and Exhibit “#" forthe eespondent See: Exhibit “B1" forthe petitioner and Exhibit~S" forthe respondent. See: Copies of her Philippine Passport Nos. L8151 and DDIS6616, Exhibits “3 and Bd” for the petitioner and Exhibits “S-| and 5.2 forthe cespondent Oa December 18, 2001. See: Exhibit “KK” forthe petitioner and Exhibit “20” for the respondent For ihe purpose of setling her father’s estate, Grace Poe secured a Bureau of Internal Revenue Iontification Card issued on July 22, 2008, Sov: Exhibit “S" forthe petitioner and Exhibit “6” for the respondentSeparate Dissenting Opinion 3 SET Case No. 001-15 On May 24, 2005, Grace Poe returned to the Philippines with the intent to resettle in the country for good.'° On July 10, 2006, Grace Poe filed with the Bureau of Immigration (BL a sworn Petition’ to reacquire Philippine citizenship under the provisions of the Republic Act No. 9225 (RA-9225) or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. On July 7, 2006, she took her Oath of Allegiance under the Act.'7 Grace Poe also filed petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three children,'* who were all below 18 years of age at that time. In its July 18, 2006 Order,"” the BL approved Grace Poe’s petitions for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship and for the derivative citizenship of her children. The BI issued Identification Certificates” in Grace Poe’s name and in the name of her three children. On August 31, 2006, Grace Poe registered anew as voter, this time in Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City.”! Qn October 13, 2009, Grace Poe obtained Philippine Passport No XX473199," which she renewed on March 18, 2014.3 Between October 18, 2001 (when Grace Poe became a nsturalized American citizen) and July 18, 2006 (when the Philippine BI approved Grace Poe's petition for renequisition of Philippine citizenship), Grace Poe retumed to the Philippines on numerous occasions, often under Balikbayan Visa or under the Philippine Government's BaltKiayan program. The following ceniriesstamped dates in Grace Poe’s U.S. Passport were on December 27, 2001: January 13, 2002; November 9, 2003: April 8, 2004; December 13, 2004; March 11. 2006, and July 5, 2006 See: copy of Grace Poe's U.S. Passport, Fxhibit “KK” for the petitioner and Exhibit "20° for the respondent ‘See Exhibit “C* for the petitioner and Exhibit 7" for the respondent, See: Exhibit “A” for the petitioner and Exhibit "8" for the respondent. Grace Poe's Oath of Alllegiance reads: “I, Mary Grace Poe Liamanzares, solemnly swear that will support end defend ‘the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly coustituted authorities of the Philippines; and [ hereby declare that I recognize and aceept the supreme authority ef the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto: and that | impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of See: Evhibits “F, | and L" forthe petitioner and Exhibits “8, 9-1 and 9-2" for the respondent, Comtitied True Copy of the July 18, 2006 Order ia CRR'No, 06-7) 10-9474 No, AFF-06-9133 signed by 13] Associste Commissioner Roy M, Almaro on behalf of Bl Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandes, Jr. See; Exhibit *E” for dee petitioner und Exhibit "0" for the respondent. See: Exhibits °N. G, J, and M" for the petitioner and Exhibits “11, 11-1, 11-2, and 11-3 for the respondent, ‘See: stub of Grace Poe's application form No. 7405300002355 for registration as voter at Precinet No, 0349-A, Sati Juan City, Exhibit “T" forthe petitioner and Exhibit “12° for the respondent ‘ce: Exhibit “15” for the petitioner and Exhibit “5-3" for the respondent, Between July 18, 2006 (when svhen the Philippine BI approved Grace Poe's petition for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship) and Octaber 13, 2009 (when Grace Poe obtained 2 new Philippine Passport after reacquiring her Philippine citizenship under RA 9225), Grace Poe still Used her U.S. Passport on several occasions in her trips abroad and to and fom the Philippines. But the Philippine Bl-stampeci marks oa her U.S. Passpor for her travels to and ftom the Philippines on these occasions either classified her as “RC” (resident citizen) or indicated herSeparate Dissenting Opinion 6 SET Case No. 001-15 On October 6, 2010, President Benigno $. Aquino III appointed Grace Poe as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB).! To comply with the legal requirements, Grace Poe executed on October 20, 2010 an “Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship.””* The following day, October 21, 2010, Grace Poe took her oath of office as Chairperson of the MTRCB before President Aquino.” She assumed office as Chairperson on October 26, 2010.”” On July 12, 2011, Grace Poe executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Manila an “Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States.” She likewise accomplished on the same date a swom “Questionnaire” stating that she had taken her oath as MTRCB Chairperson on October 21, 2010 with the intent, among others, of relinquishing her American citizenship. Idemification Certificate No. 06-10918 issued pursuant to RA 9225 in relation with ‘Administrative Order No. 91, series of 2004, end Memorandum Circular No. AFF-2-005 after the B) approved her petition for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. See: copy of her U.S, Passport, Exhibit “KK” for the petitioner and Exhibit "20" for the respondent. See: Philippine Passport No, BCO588861, Exhibit B-6” for the petitioner and Exhibit “5-5” forthe respondent ‘See: Exhibit “U" for the petitioner and Exhibit “13° for the respondent ‘See: Exhibit "V" for the petitioner and Exhibit “14” for the respondent. The Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship reads: “1, MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES, Filipino, of legal age, and presently residing at No. 107 Rodso Drive, Corinthian Hills, Quezon City Philippines, after having been duly swom to in aceordanee with the law, do hhoreby depose and state that with this affidavit, [ hereby expressly and voluntarily renounce my United States nationality/American citizenship, together with all rights and privileges and all duties and allegianes and fidelity thereunto pertaining. [ make this renunciation intentionslly, voluntarily, and of my own fee will, free of any duress or undue influence.” Grace Poe took the oath of office pursuant 10 Presidentia) Decree No. 1986 and Section 5(3) of RA 9225. See: Exhibit “X” for the petitioner and Exhibit 6" for the respondent, Her Oath of Office stated: ‘Ako, si MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES, na itinalaga sa Katunghalan bilang Chairperson, Movie end Television Review and Classification Board, ay taimtina na narwirumpa na tueyparin ko nang buong husay at katapaian, sa abot ng aking kakayahan, ang mga tungkulin ng aking kasaluknvang Katungkilan at ing mga iba pang pagkaraan nito'y gagampanan ko sa ilalim ng Republika ng Pilipinas; ma sunay na mananalig at eatalima ako rito; na susundin ko ang mga ates, meat hautusang legal ai mga dekretong pinaiiral ng mga sadvang itinakdarg may apangvarihan ng Republika mg Piliginas: at kusa kong babalikutin ang pananagwang ito. nang walang ano mang pasubali 0 hangaring umiwas.” a See: Certified True Copy of Grace Poe's Centficate of Assumption of Oitice as MTRCB ‘Chainperson dated October 26, 2010, Exhibit “W for the petitioner and Exhibit “14” for the respondent. ‘The Outh was taken before Vice Consul Somer E. Bessire-Briers. See: Exhibit °Y™ for the petitioner and Exhibit “17” for the respondent. See: Exhibit “Z.t0 Z-4 for the petitioner nnd Exhibit 18” for the respondentSeparate Dissenting Opinion z SET Case No, 001-15 On December 9, 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued a “Certificate of Loss of Nationality” certifying that as of October 21, 2010, Grace Poe had lost her U.S. citizenship when she took her oath of office as MTRCB Chairperson. On October 2, 2012, Grace Poe filed her certificate of candidacy’! (CoC) for Senator in the May 13, 2013 elections. Petitioner Rizalito David (petitioner or David) likewise filed his CoC for the same post. Grace Poe obtained a total of Twenty Million Three Hundred Thirty- Seven Thousand Three Hundred Twenty-Seven (20,337,327) votes in the May 13, 2013 senatorial elections. This was the highest number of votes cast for a senatorial candidate. She was proclaimed as winner on May 16, 2013, and she subsequently took her oath and assumed the duties of a senator. David, on the other hand, failed to obtain sufficient votes to secure a senatorial seat. On August 5, 2015, David filed the present guo warranto petition against Grace Poe, challenging het qualifications for the position of Senator of the Republic of the Philippines. Before filing the present petition, David filed with the Comelec’s Law Department an Affidavit-Complaint” charging Grace Poe with an election offense. ‘The relevant provision of the 1987 Constitution with respect to the position of Senator is Article VI, Section 3 which reads: Section 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, oa the day of the election, is at least thisty- five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immecistely preceding the day of the election. [emphases supplied] The quo warranto petition is based on the above provision’s citizenship and the residency requirements. ‘The challenge to her residency qualification was subsequently dropped’* at the ‘Tribunal’s suggestion and recognition that this ground was filed beyond the required period. Issucd by US. Viee Consul Jason Gallian. See: Exinibit “AA® for the petitioner and Exhibit “19” for the respondent See: Exhibit "MM" for the petitioner and Exhibit “21” for thé respondent. Filed on Angust 17, 2015 at 10:05 aim., or hows before David filed the petition for quo warranto before the SET. See: Exhibit *22" for the respondent. See: SET Resolution No. 15-07 dated September 17, 2015, p.3 2013 Rules of the SET, Rule 18,Separate Dissenting Opinion 8 SET Case No, 001-15 The question regarding the respondent’s Philippine citizenship is itself based on two grounds: first, that the respondent is not a natural-born Filipino because she is a foundling: and second, she could not have re-acquired a natural-born Filipino status through RA 9225, as she was not a Filipino to begin with. ILC. My Position and Vote After considering these challenges and the issues they gave rise to, I vote as follows: (1) As a foundling whose parents are both unknown, the respondent's Philippine citizenship cannot be established, recognized, or presumed under the 1935 Constitutio tution did not grant citizenship to children ppines whose parents were unknown; b. the presumption that the respondent claims - that a foundling’s parents are citizens ofthe territory where the foundling is found — inherently contradicts the terms and underlying principles of the 1935 Constitution. Thus, the presumption cannot be recognized as part of the law of the land applicable to her cases ¢. the Philippines’ treaty obligations do not grant Philippine citizenship outright to foundlings. These obligations simply require the country to recognize a foundling’s right to acquire Philippines citizenship. a. since her citizenship cannot be established, recognized, or presumed, she had no citizenship to reacquire under RA 9225; b. even if she had been a natural-born Philippine citizen, her naturalization in the U.S. rendered her ineligible to be considered natural-born, As a foreigner who had undergone an expedited form of naturalization under RA 9225, she had to perform acts to acquire Philippine citizenship and did not, therefore fall under the Constitution’s definition of a natural- born citizen.Separate Dissenting Opinion 9 SET Case No. 001-15 I, therefore, vote to disqualify the respondent Grace Poe for the position of Senator of the Republic of the Philippines. TL EXPLANATION OF MY VOTE HLA. Threshold Considerations IELA.1. The SET & the Quo Warranto Proceedings Before It. From its inception, the purpose of a guo warranro petition is to determine whether a person holding a public office is eligible for the position he or she holds. Quo warranio started as a prerogative writ, issued by the King, against anyone alleged to have usurped or claimed any office, franchise or liberty of the English Crown, to inquire into the alleged usurper’s authority.° ‘The English translation of guo warranto ~ “by what warrant?” — captures the very purpose of this writ, In the present times, the original purpose of a quo warranto proceeding remains, i.¢., to determine the legality of a person, association, or corporation’s right to hold an office or franchise. *” The method to achieve this purpose has evolved to reflect our tripartite, republican system of government. Instead of being answerable to a sovereign king, the public official or franchisee holder now answers to the sovereign State, as represented by its executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. Our Rules of Court contains procedural rules unique to quo warrant proceedings, which reflect their origin as a prerogative writ.“ As a rule, a petition for quo warranto may be instituted only by the Solicitor General and brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.” ‘This step replaces the quo warranto demand by the King that his subject show the basis under which he or she enjoys his or her office or franchise. ‘Under specific instances, the Solicitor General is duty-bound to file a petition for quo warranto, as follows: See: Act No. 199 or the Code of Civil Procedure, Section 519 (1901); 1964 and 1997 RuLes oF CouiRT, Rule 66, Section | 8 Ageaoili v. Suaguitan, 48 Phil. 676, 692 (1926). The writ of quo warranio originated from a 13" ‘century starute of King Edward |. Itdirected am alleged usurper of royal office a privilege to show by whet warrant he maintained his or her claim. For a history of the writ of gia warranto, see: D. Sutherland, Qua Warranto Proceedings in the Reign of Baward 1. 1278-1294 (1963), RULES OF COURT, Rule 66, Section 1 Hd, Section 2 4d. Sections 1, 2 ancl 3parate Dissenting Opinion 10 @ No. 001-15 Section 2. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor must commence action. — The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the preceding section can be established by proof,’ must commence such action. Courts with jurisdiction over guo warranto proceedings then determine, based on the parties’ arguments and evidence, the right or qualification of a challenged public officer or franchise holder to hold his or her office or franchise. ‘The SET is the unique constitutional body specifically tasked to be the “sole judge” of all “contests” relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the Senate under Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution.” As the sole judge, the SET’s jurisdiction — exercised through quo warranto proceedings — is exclusive and original.’ Interestingly, the Constitution does not specifically require that the “contests” under the SET’s jurisdiction be resolved through the remedy of quo warranto.” But in the light of evolved history, tradition, practice,” and the exclusive and independent nature of the constitutional grant, the SET adopted a guo warranto proceeding as its procedural remedy, as embodied in its own Rules of Procedure."* In this sense, a quo warranto proceeding in the SET is different from quo warranto proceedings in ordinary courts, and is governed by a different set of rules. Notably, a guo warranto proceeding in the SET may be initiated by any registered voter, and carries different prescriptive periods.” Despite these differences, the purpose behind the SET’s guo warranto is very much the same as the writ of quo warranto that King Edward 1 first issued, ic., to determine whether a person holding office is qualified to his 7935 ConsuIIUTION, Article, VI, Section 11, which states: Section. |1, The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Eleecorsl Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, wao shall be ctiosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party heving the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman, See: Defunsar Santiago v. Sen. Guingona, Jr, 359 Phil, 276, 294 (1998), citing Co v. HRET, GR, ‘No, 9202-03, July 30, 1991, 199 SCRA 692 and Lazatin v. HRET, 250 Phil. 390 (1988). See: CONSTITUTION, Article VI, Section 17. 1 See Angara x. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936); Rasuf v. Comelee, 371 Phil, T60, 766 (1999), 2013 RULES OF THE SET, Rules 15 and 18. "fd Rule 18.Separate Dissenting Opinion il SET Case No. 001-15 or her position."* That the SET has exclusive jurisdiction over contests involving the election, returns and qualifications of Senators even reinforces this purpose. Further discus proper topic below. ions of the powers of the SET shall be made under the TIL.A.2, Burden of Proof and the Presumption of Regularity of the Respondent's Cited Government Documents. As part of her defense, the respondent paints the present guo warranto proceeding as one where the petitioner carries the burden of proving the respondent's disqualification. To discharge this burden, the respondent posits that the petitioner must establish that both of the respondent’s parents are foreigners. The respondent claims, too, that in the absence of such proof, the government documents acknowledging her status as a natural- born Filipino should prevail. These documents, according to the respondent, are presumed to have been issued legally and in the regular course of business, Thus, the information contained in these documents regarding the respondent's citizenship should be deemed correct until proven otherwise IILA.2.i, Burden of proof, burden of evidence, and presumptions in quo warranto proceedings Jurisprudence characterizes a quo warranto proceeding as a civil proceeding” where the parties must prove their allegations by preponderance of evidence, or by that degree of evidence that is more worthy of belief to the court when compared with the opposing evidence presented.” Facts established in civil proceedings are thus considered to % The weit of que warranto originated from a thirteenth century statute of King Edward the Statute of Quo Warranto 1290, which grants the King the right to direct an alleged usurper of a royal olive or privilege to show by what warrant hie maintained bis claim. Shel Herman, “The Code of Practice of 1825: The Adaptation of Common Law Institutions,” 24 Tul. Bur. & Civ. L.P. 207, 230 (2009) citing Donald W. Sutherland, Qua Warranto Proceedings in the Reign of Edward 1 (1963); Helen Cam, The Quo Warranto Proceedings Under Edward I, in Liberties and Communities of Medieval England (1963): T.F-T. Plucknett, Legislation of Edward [, at 38-50 (1949); LH, Baker, An Introduction to Eaulisti Legal History 145 (4th ed. 2002), Notably, de Statue ofthe Writ of Quo Warranto 1290 was sad to have been a compromise bepween the King and the barons in order to sete teirdispmtes over titles. The king had been asking the barons to present their titles to their royal offices, in order to reassert his authority against the growing independence of the barons, who had forced hit 1 sign the Magna Cara, See tie California Attorney Generals Office, “Quo Werranto: Resolution of Disputes ~ Right to Public Oiffee” (1990) p. | gecessed from hhups.//ong.ca.gos/sitosallfilcs/apwebipdtivag_opinions/quo-warranto-suidelines pdf, citing Baser, An {ntroduction to English Legal History (1979) pp. 125-126. Casin v. Caluog, 80 Poi! 758, 760-761 (1948) RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, Section 1. See: Magdivvang Realuy Corporation v. Manila Banking Corporation, 694 Phil. 392, 407 (2012),Separate Dissenting Opinion 12 SET C No. 001-15 embody the probable truth regarding the Factual issues resolved, not the truth beyond reasonable doubt that criminal proceedings require. The SBT has similarly characterized its own quo warranto proceeding. Accordingly, its Rules of Procedure also recognize that the quantum of evidence necessary to establish a claim is preponderance of evidence.” Thus, in quo warranio, the petitioner who challenges the respondent's qualification to office carries the burden of proving, by preponderance of evidence, the facts constituting the disqualification.” Upon such proof, the burden shifis to the respondent who must now present opposing evidence constituting his or her defense or establishing his or her affirmative defense. ‘These dynamies highlight the difference between burden of proof and burden of evidence: burden of proof involves the duty of a party to present evidence establishing the facts in issue in his claim or defense, to the degree required by law. * Burden of evidence, on the other hand, involves the duty of a party to present evidence to counter the prima facie evidence presented against him. In the present case, printa facie evidence is the proof sufficient to establish the respondent’s disquslification unless disproved by her opposing evidence A distinct difference between burden of proof and burden of evidence is that the burden of proof never shifts, and is always on the party claiming a right or a defense; the burden of evidence shifts from one party to the other as they adduce proof of their respective claims and defenses. In civil proceedings, the plaintiff (the petitioner in the present case) always carries the burden to prove that he is entitled to the relief he or she prays for (in the present petition, the disqualification of Grace Poe as a Senator). The defendant (or the respondent in the present case) can also raise his or her affirmative and other defenses that he or she has to prove.” Both the petitioner and the respondent yield to the rule that he or she who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proving it, * Gov. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. $83, 890-891 (2001), 2013 RULCS OF THESET, Rule 73. Supra Note 47. ‘Asian Construction and Development Corporation v. Tulabut, 496 Phil. 777-778, 786 (2008). RULES OF CouRr, Rule 131, Section | See: Agile Maritime Resources, Inc. . Siadar, G.R. No, 191034, Cetober 1,2014, 737 SCRA 360- 361, 371; Commissioner of Infernal Revenue v. PB, GR, No, 180290, September 29, 2014, 736 SCRA 609, 620; and, DBP Pool of Accredited Insurance Companies y. Radio Mindanaa Network, tire. 316 Phil. 110, 118-119 (2006), Bautista v. Hon. Sarmiento, 223 Phil 181, 185-186 (1985). diss ¥. Court of Appeais, 350 Phil, 138, 173 (1998), Bank of the Phil. Islands v. Spouses Royeca. 581 Phil. 188, 194 (2008). hid. See also: Bunk of Commerce v. Radio Philippines Network, Inc, G.R. No. 195615, April 21, 2014.Separate Dissenting Opinion B SET Case No. 001-15 In contrast, the burden of evidence shifts when a party has presented evidence prima facie establishing a case against the other party.” Thus, after the petitioner has met the burden of proof that he or she carries, the burden of presenting evidence to oppose and defeat the petitioner's evidence shifts to the respondent. ©” Should the respondent successfully negate the evidence presented against him or her, the petitioner’s case fails unless he or she can present evidence responding to the respondent’s evidence; thus, the burden of evidence shifis back to the petitioner. The burden of evidence shifis back and forth between the parties in this manner as the case progresses." In the end, the party able to present the more convincing evidence enjoys the greater weight of evidence; he or she is the party who has proven his or her claim or defense with preponderance of evidence.” Presumptions affect the burden of evidence, by drawing an established inference from a set of facts proven by evidence.” A disputable presumption provides an inference that can be rebutted, thus shifting the burden of evidence to the other party to disprove the facts supporting the presumption; otherwise, the presumption will be considered an established fact. IILA.2.ii, The pet burden of proof. ner has successfully discharged the The petitioner in a disqualification case must prove the allegations cited as grounds for disqualification, otherwise, his or her action will not prosper.” In the present case, the petitioner has alleged that the respondent is @ foundling. He posits that, as a foundling, has no known parents from whom to trace the origins of her eitizenship, the respondent is not a Filipino citizen and is, therefore, not eligible for the position of senator. Significantly, the respondent admitted her status as a foundting, thus, lifting the petitioner's burden of proving his claim that she is a foundling. With the admission, the fact necessary to establish the petitioner’s claim is considered established. Supra Note $5 at 186. Supra Note $ Supra Note $6 at 173. RULES oF Courr, Rule 133, Section | Mewrepolitan Bank Corporation v. Tobias, 680 Phil.173, 188-189 (2012). Seo Gupilar iguilar v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 197307, February 26, 2014, 717 House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 623 Phil 656 (2009),Separate Dissenting Opinion 4 SET Case No. 001-15 This evidentiary situation now presents to the Tribunal solely the legal question of whether a person who, as a foundling found in the Philippines and who has no known parents from whom her citizenship may be traced, can be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen. I reach my conclusion on the respondent's citizenship and ineligibility after considering a very critical legal reality: that the Constitution requires — with no exceptions or qualifications — that Filipino senators must be natural- born Philippine citizens. Anticle VIL, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides a clear, absolute command, couched in the strongest language possible, that is, through a negative phraseology — “No person shall be a Senator unless he is a naturat-born citizen of the Philippines. In Valdez vy. Tuason, the Court held that negative statutes are mandatory and must be presumed to have been intended as a repeal of all conflicting provisions, unless the contrary can clearly be shown. The Court then said: Conformably with this idea, it will be found that constitutional provisions which are intended to operate with universal force and to permit of no exceptions are commonly expressed in neyative form, as “No person shall be imprisoned for debt” “No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be enacted:” “No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law;” “No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation by law,” etc.®” ‘The negative form and its mandatory character connote that no exceptions or qualifications can be allowed to the requirement of natural- born Philippine citizenship. This absolute command affects the evidence necessary to prove that a senator is disqualified because of his or her citizenship. This means that a petitioner alleging lack of citizenship as a ground for disqualification should establish facts proving that the senator does not fall under any of the modes for acquiring Philippine citizenship under the Constitution. Conversely. he or she does not need io prove that the respondent is actually a foreigner. To repeat the consequence of this strict rule, proof of foreign citizenship is not required. By the negative terms used, proof that the claimant to the office is not a Filipino or, even if Filipino, is not natural- born would suffice to disqualify a claimant or holder of the position of senator. As the petitioner has alleged and established his cause of action, the burden of evidence now shifts to the respondent. She has the option to 40 Phil. 943 (1920). 7 td a 947,Separate Dissenting Opinion Is SET Case No, 001-15 present evidence contradicting the petitioner’s allegation that she is a foundling (i.e., a negative defense) and/or present an affirmative defense, ie., that despite her admitted status as a foundling, she was actually born of Filipino parents Instead of presenting evidence regarding her parentage, the respondent presented various government documents proclaiming that she is a natural-bom Filipino, and claimed that the presumption of regularity of official acts should first be disproven by the petitioner before she could be burdened with proof of her citizenship. ‘The respondent, by putting forward the presumption of regularity in official acts, effectively offered the submitted documents as proof of her natural-born citizenship and thus attempted to shift the burden of evidence back to the petitioner. She effectively argued that the government documents attesting to her status as a natural-born Philippine citizen should be given credit unless the petitioner can prove that her parents are both foreigners. In other words, the respondent wants us to deduce and to infer her natural-born citizenship status from the government documents she presented, and asks us to take this inference as true until the petitioner can establish that both her parents are foreigners, I find this position to be legally incorrect for the following reasons: First, like all presumptions, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty may be disproven by contrary evidence. Thus, the presumption of regularity vanishes upon proof of irregularity behind the government acts, such as when the government officials involved acted outside the standard of conduct required by law. The presumption cannot also prevail when faced with proof disproving the contents of the public document, © The implementing rules and regulations of Act No. 3753” or the Law on Registry of Civil Status require a separate registry for foundlings,”' as well as a different form for a foundling’s birth certificate.” The form for a foundling’s certificate of live birth does not contain any information regarding the foundling’s citizenship, presumably because the foundling’s parents are unknown; hence, the child's citizenship cannot be determined on the basis of the foundling’s certificate.” Because of these legal and factual People v. Delos Reyes, 672 Phil. 77, 121 (2011), citing People v, Sy Chua, 444 Phil. 757 (2003) ‘See: People v. Capuno, 685 Phil. 226, 244 (2011), Appraved on November 26, 1930. Office of the Civil Registrar-General (GCRG) Administrative Order No, 1, series of 1993 or the implementing Rules and Regulations of Aet No. 3753 and Other Laws on Civil Registration, Rule Tb) 4d, Rule 2943), ‘See: OCRG Form No. 101, revised January 1993, available from hup:!(wow.ns0r12 ppd files‘C1VIL %420REGISTRA LTON%201 AWS/AOT 1993%420(1R R%42000%20C f1%420Rexistration 208%. 0Procesiures) pdfSeparate Dissenting Opinion 16 I Case No, 001-15 realities, the respondent’s first certificate of live birth’ cannot contain any conclusive information establishing the identity of the respondent’s birth parents or her citizenship. The respondent’s birth certificate was subsequently amended on May 4, 2006,” with the respondent's adoptive mother, Susan Roces, acting as the informant, The amended birth certificate now shows that the respondent is a Filipino. The implementing rules and regulations of Act No. 3753 allow the amendment of an adopted foundling’s birth certificate to reflect a foundling’s change in civil status and citizenship.” The amendment of the respondent's birth certificate to attest to her Philippine citizenship, however, ignores the evidentiary reality (that exists up to the present time) that at the time her birth certificate was amended, NO BASIS existed to recognize the respondent as a natural-born Philippine citizen. The following established facts contradict the information in the respondent's amended birth certificate regarding her natural-born Philippine citizenship: (1) at the time the respondent’s birth certificate was amended, both her birth parents were (and still are) unknown and hence her citizenship could not have been traced to them; (2) the respondent had not successfully undergone the naturalization process to become a Filipino; (3) the respondent's adoption, which was the basis for the amendment of her birth certificate, did not confer on her the political privilege of citizenship; and (4) the informant who provided information on the respondent’s citizenship was her adoptive mother, not her birth mother who was then still unknown, In these lights, I cannot give weight to the respondent’s amended birth certificate as a prima facie evidence of her natural-borm Philippine citizenship. Consequently, given that neither of the respondent's birth certificates could validly serve as evidence of her Philippine citizenship, the other government documents that the respondent submitted to show her Philippine citizenship cannot likewise be used to prove her citizenship. These other See: Centilied True Copy of Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, Exbibit “P” for the petitioner and Exhibit “I” forthe respondent See. Exhibit “O° for the petidoner and Exhibit 3" for the respondent See: Item No. 7 in the Certificate of Live Birth, supra Note 8, OCRG Administrative Order No, |, series of 1993, Rule 55 (1X¢)Separate Dissenting Opinion 17 ‘ase No. 001-15 government documents only relied on the respondent's birth certificates for information on her citizenship and, hence, cannot have any higher probative value than these birth certificates. In short, all of them cannot be considered prima facie evidence of her natural-born Philippine citizenship. At most, these government documents — her passport, travel documents, voter’s ID and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship — show that the respondent had been exercising the rights and privileges of a Philippine citizen. That a person exercises the privileges of Philippine citizen, however, does not prove that he or she is one. Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed from the exercise of the rights and privileges of a Philippine citizen; the fact of citizenship must be proven by competent evidence by the party claiming it. Second, since the petitioner's ground for disqualifying the respondent is based on her status as a foundling, the allegation that she is a child of Filipino parents, made after her admission that she is a foundling, is an affirmative defense that the respondent has the burden of proving. ‘The Rules of Court define an affirmative defense as “an allegation of a new matter that, while hypothetically admitting the material allegations in the pleading of the claimant, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery.”” An affirmative defense thus introduces a new fact or a set of facts that would negate the petitioner’s claim even assuming this claim to be true, Because it is a positive allegation of a different set of facts that the respondent relies on as a defense, the burden of proving this affirmative defense is always with the respondent.” In the present case, the petitioner claimed and the respondent admitted that she is a foundling. Despite this status and its legal consequences on her citizenship, the eventual identification and proof of citizenship of her birth parents can be the basis to declare her a Filipino: should the respondent’s birth parents be identified and be proven to be Filipinos, then she would not in fact be a foundling and should be considered a Philippine citizen from birth even if she had been considered a foundling all her life. As an affirmative defense, the identification of the respondent's parents and of their citizenship are facts that the respondent has the burden of proving by preponderance of evidence. Without this evidence, the petitioner does not have the burden of disproving the identities and Filipino citizenship of the respondent's birth parents, or of proving that her birth parents are in fact foreigners. The burden of presenting contrary evidence shifis to the petitioner only after the respondent has established her affirmative defense. a RULES OF COURT, Rule 5, Section 6(b). See: Fitarioh Corporaiion ¥, Losin, G.R. No, 18]$60, 15 November 2010, 634 SCRA 671, 684Separate Dissenting Opinion 18 SPT Case No, 001-15 I discuss all these factual and legal intricacies to support my position that T cannot and should not immediately and unquestioningly accept the information laid out in the respondent's presented government documents. ULB. CITIZENSHIP UNDER THE 1935 CONSTITUTION ILLB.1. Asa foundling, the respondent could not have acquired the status of a natural-born Philippine citizen through any of the modes enumerated under the 1935 Constitution. The respondent was found in Jaro, Iloilo, on September 3, 1968, The prevailing law at the time she was found (and bom, considering the undisputed circumstances under which she was found) was the 1935 Constitution whose Article on Citizenship provide: ARTICLE IV CITIZENSHIP Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution. (2) Those bom in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands. (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. (4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippi reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship. (5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with Law. and, upon Section 2. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reaequired in the manner provided by law. I conclude — based on my consideration of these provisions, their background and history, and relevant jurisprudence — that the respondent could not have acquired Philippine citizenship through any of the above listed modes, As a foundling, the respondent’s parentage is unknown. This is an undisputed point. And because the identities of the respondent’s parents are unknown, their citizenship cannot as well be determined. Thus, the respondent could not have acquired Philippine citizenship through paragraph (3) of Section 1 which requires that the respondent's birth father be a Philippine citizen so she herself can be a Philippine citizen.Separate Dissenting Opinion 19 SET Case No, 001-15 Neither could the respondent have acquired her Philippine citizenship through her mother under paragraph (4) since her birth mother’s identity (and consequently, her citizenship) is also unknown. Parenthetically, under the 1935 Constitution, @ person born of a Filipino mother but whose father is a foreigner (or is unknown) has the option to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. This election is govemed by Commonwealth Act No. 625 (CA 625), which requires that a person electing Philippine citizenship file before the nearest civil registry a signed and sworn statement expressing his intent to become a Filipino. He or she shall also accompany this statement with an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Philippine government." Furthermore, no election of Philippine citizenship shall be accepted for registration under CA 625 unless the party exercising the right of election has complied with the requirements of the Alien Registration Act of 1950. In other words, he or she should first be required to register as an alien. Pertinently, the person electing Philippine citizenship is required to file a petition with the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (now, the BI) for the cancellation of his or her alien certificate of registration based on his or her election of Philippine citizenship; the Commission will initially decide, based on the evidence presented, the validity or invalidity of the election made. The election shall thereafter be elevated to the Ministry (now Department) of Justice for final determination and review.*! This procedure should be followed, otherwise the person tracing his Philippine citizenship from his or her mother would not be considered a Philippine citizen.” The election of Philippine citizenship should also be made within a reasonable time after reaching the age of majority. The records show that the respondent has never formally elected Philippine citizenship after reaching the age of majority. The respondent, however, was issued a voter's identification card on December 1986, and hence was a registered voter since turning 18 ‘years old. As discussed Seetion | of Commonwealth Act No. 625 provides: Section 1. The option co elect Philippine citizenship in accordance wich subsection (4), section 1, Article TV, of the Constitution shall be expressed in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concemed before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines. Republic v. Sagun, 682 Phil 303, 315 2012). P5314, "In Re: Application for the Admission to the Philippine Bar y. Vicente D. Ching, 374 Phil 342 (1999), the Court held that a person can no longer eleet Philippine citizenship 14 years atter reaching the age of majority; while in Republic v. Sagun, supra Nove 81 at 316, the Court noted that 12 years after reaching the age ef majority is Likewise not a reasonable period to allow to lapse before electing Philippine citizenship. Both cases recognize that the reasonable period for electing Philippine citizenship is tree yeurs after reaching the age of majority.Separate Dissenting Opinion 20 SET Case Ne, 001-15 elsewhere in this Separate Dissenting Opinion, registration as a voter does not amount to an election of Philippine citizenship. Voting is a right granted by virtue of being a Philippine citizen, and is not a proof or a means of electing to become one. Neither can Philippine citizenship be presumed from exercising the rights attendant to citizenship.** The other categories under paragraphs (1) and (2) do not apply to grant the respondent Philippine citizenship. The respondent had not yet been born in 1935, and thus could not have been a Filipino at the time of the adoption of the 1935 Constitution, as paragraph (1) above requires. Neither could she have held public clective office before the adoption of the 1935 Constitution; hence, she cannot claim citizenship under paragraph (2), The respondent has admittedly undergone the expedited proceedings under RA 9225 and could possibly claim citizenship through naturalization “in accordance with law,” as provided under paragraph (5). Her RA 9225 application, however, was tainted with fatal irregularities, as 1 explain elsewhere in this Opinion. Hence, neither can she claim to be “naturalized in accordance with law” under paragraph (5). In sum, since the respondent has not met any of the conditions that Article IV, Section 1, of the 1935 Constitution requires to be a Filipino, then she cannot be a Philippine citizen. At most, she can — as a foundling — claim the right to acquire Philippine citizenship pursuant to international law. This point of law is explained below. But in the absence of any statute specifically governing the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by foundlings, she would need to undergo the naturalization process currently in place. This is under Commonwealth Act No. 63 (C4 63), which she can still avail of pursuant to Philippine commitments under existing treaties as fully explained below. IILB.2. The 1935 Constitution did not expressly or impliedly include “foundlings” within its terms. The express terms of, as well as the framers’ debates under," the 1935 Constitution show that the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis (or blood relationship) in determining citizenship. Either or both parents of a child must be Philippine citizens at the time of the child’s birth so that the child can claim Philippine citizenship. Significantly, none of the 1935 constitutional provisions contemplate the Paav. Chan, 128 Phil 815, 824 (1967). Constitutional Convention, Vol, No. Vi, Journal No, 96, November 26, 1934 This is also the prevailing rule under Section 1(2), Article TV of the 1987 Constitution.Separate Dissenting Opinion a SET Case No. 001-15 situation where both parents’ identities (and consequently, their citizenships) are unknown, as in the case of foundlings. The silence of Article IV, Section 1, of the 1935 Constitution on the citizenship of foundlings in the Philippines in fact speaks loudly about their legal situation, It can only mean that the 1935 Constitution left the decision of granting Philippine citizenship to foundlings to Congress which can, by law, provide the means for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship. Furthermore, the enumeration of who ate citizens of the Philippines in Article IV, Section | of the 1935 Constitution is am exclusive list. According to the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alierius, items not provided in ¢ list are presumed not to be included in it.” As the list of Philippine citizens under Article IV, Section 1 does not include foundlings, then they are not included among those constitutionally granted or recognized to be Philippine citizens. Established rules of legal interpretation tell us that nothing is to be added to what the text states or reasonably implies; a matter that is not covered is to be treated as not covered. This situation, of course, does not mean that foundlings cannot be Philippine citizens, but their inclusion rests with Congress, as Article IV, Section 5 allows individuals not specifically included in the list to be naturalized in accordance with law. This view is shared by Sr. Buslon, a member of the 1934 Constitutional Convention, when another member (Sr. Rafols) proposed to include foundlings among the list of Philippine citizens in Article IV, Section 1, viz:*”” English R. RAFOLS: Para una enmienda, SR: RAFOLS: For an amendment, Mr. Sefior Presidente. Propongo que | President/Chairman. | propose that after the del inciso 2 se inserte lo | second subsection, the following be inserted: siguiente: "Los hijos naturales de un | "The natural children of a foreigner father padre extranjero y de una madre | and a Filipino mother whom (referring to the filipina no reconoeidos por aquel,” | children) the former does not recognize” EL PRESIDENTE: La Mesa desea | THE PRESIDENT: The Chair wishes to ask a pedir una aclaracién del proponente de | clatification from the proposer of the a enmienda. Se refiere Su Sefioria a | amendment. Does Your Honor refer to hijos naturales o a toda clase de hijos | natural children or to all kinds of illegitimate ilegitimos? children? Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment Through Alternative Legal Services, Ine. v. Power Secior Asseis and Liabilities Management Corporation, G.R. No. 192088, October 9, 2012, 682 SCRA 602, 649. A. Scalia and B. Gamer. Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal! Texts 2012) at 95 1934 Constitutional Convention, Vol. VI, Journal No. 96, November 26, 1934. (Separate Dissenting Opinion SET Case No. (01-15 SR. RAFOLS: A toda clase de hijos ilegitimos. También se incluye 2 los hijos naturales de padres conocidos, y los hijos naturales o ilegitimos de padres desconocidos. SR. MONTINOLA: Para una aclaracion. Alli se dice "de padres desconocidos”. Los Cédigos actuales consideran como filipino, es decir, me refiero al Cédigo espaol, que considera como espaaoles a todos los hijos de padres desconocidos nacidos en territorio espaftol, porque 1a presuncién es que el hijo de padres desconocidos es hijo de un espaol. ¥ de igual manera se podra aplicar eso en Filipinas, de que un hijo de padre deseonocido y nacido en Filipinas se consideraque es filipino, de modo que no hay necesidad. SR. RAFOLS: Hay necesidad, porque estamos relatando las condiciones de Jos que van a ser filipinos. SR. MONTINOLA: Pero esa es la intepretacin de la ley ghora, de manera que no hay neeesidad de la enmienda, SR. RAFOLS: La enmienda debe leerse de esta manera: "Los hijos naturales © ilegitimos de un padre extranjero y de una madre filipina, no reconecidos por aquel, o los hijos de padres desconocidos.” Xxx SR. BUSLON: Mr. President, don’t you think it would be better to Ieave this matter to the hands of the Legislature? (original in English) XX. SR. ROXAS: Sefor Presidente, mi opinién humilde es que éstos son casos muy insignificantes y coatados, pare que la Constitucién necesite refetirse a ellos. Por las leyes SR. RAFOLS: To all kinds of iegitimate children. Also included are the natural childcen of known parents and the natural or illegitimate children of unknown parents, SR. MONTINOLA: To clarify, the text says "of unknown parents". The present Codes consider as Filipino, that is to say, I refer (0 the Spanish Code, which consider es Spaniards all the children of unknown parents bom in Spanish territory, because the presumption is that the child of unknown patents is child of a Spaniard, and, similarly, that can be applied in the Philippines, namely, that the child of an unkown father born in the Philippines will be considered as Filipino, such that there is no need SR. RAFOLS: There is a need, because we are declaring the conditions of those who are going to be Filipinos SR. MONTINOLA: But that is how the law is interpreted now, and so there is no need for an amendment. SR. RAFOLS: The amendment should read thus: "The natural or illegitimate children of foreigner father and a Filipino mother not recognized by the foreigner father, or the children of unknown parents". 3x SR. BUSLON: Mr. President, don't you think it would be betier to leave this matter to the hands of the Legislature? (original in English) SR. ROXAS: Mr. Chairman, my humble opinion is that these cases are very insignificant or rare for the Constitution to make a reference to them. The principle is recognized by intemational laws that the children or the persons born in & countty of unknown parents are children of that country, and it is not necessary to include in the Constitution a specific stipulation on the matter.