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Q.Discusstherulesofstatutaryinterpretationwiththehelpofdecidedcases.
ExplainLiteralRule,MischiefRule(akaRuleinHaydon'scase),GoldenRule,
RuleofHarmoniousConstruction,Nosciurasociis,Ejusdemgeneris,
Reddendosingulsinguis.Statethecircumstanceswhentheserulesareapplied
bythecourts.
Introduction
Statutoryinterpretationistheprocessofinterpretingandapplyinglegislationtodecidecases.Interpretationisnecessary
whencaseinvolvessubleorambiguousaspectsofastatute.Generally,thewordsofastatutehaveaplainand
straightforwardmeaning.Butinsomecases,theremaybeambiguityorvaguenessinthewordsofthestatutethatmustbe
resolvedbythejudge.Thereasonforambiguityorvaguenessofalegislationisthefundamentalnatureoflanguage.Itis
notalwayspossibletopreciselytransformtheintentionofthelegislatureintowrittenwords.Interpretingastatuteto
determinewhetheritappliestoagivensetoffactsoftenboilsdowntoanalyzingwhetherasinglewordorshortphrase
coverssomeelementofthefactualsituationbeforethejudge.Theexpansivenessoflanguagenecessarilymeansthat
therewilloftenbeequallygoodorequallyunconvincingargumentsfortwocompetinginterpretations.Ajudgeisthen
forcedtoresorttodocumentationoflegislativeintent,whichmayalsobeunhelpful,andthenfinallytohisorherown
judgmentofwhatoutcomeisultimatelyfairandlogicalunderthetotalityofthecircumstances.Tofindthemeaningsof
statutes,judgesusevarioustoolsandmethodsofstatutoryinterpretation,includingtraditionalcanonsofstatutory
interpretation,legislativehistory,andpurpose.Incommonlawjurisdictions,thejudiciarymayapplyrulesofstatutory
interpretationtolegislationenactedbythelegislatureortodelegatedlegislationsuchasadministrativeagency
regulations.
Overtime,variousmethodsofstatutoryinterpretationandconstructionhavefalleninandoutoffavor.Someofthe
importantrulesofstatutaryinterpretationare:
1. PrimaryRules
1. LiteralRule(akaPlainMeaningRule)Itmeansthatstatutesaretobeinterpretedusingtheordinary
meaningofthelanguageofthestatuteunlessastatuteexplicitlydefinessomeofitstermsotherwise.In
otherwords,thelawmustberead,wordforword,anditshouldnotdivertfromitstruemeaning.
2. MischiefruleThisruleattemptstodeterminethelegislator'sintention.Originatingfroma16thcentury
caseintheUnitedKingdom,itsmainaimistodeterminethe"mischiefanddefect"thatthestatutein
questionhassetouttoremedy,andwhatrulingwouldeffectivelyimplementthisremedy.Smithvs.
Hughes[1960]2AllE.R.859
3. GoldenruleItisacompromisebetweentheplainmeaning(orliteral)ruleandthemischiefrule.Likethe
plainmeaningrule,itgivesthewordsofastatutetheirplain,ordinarymeaning.However,whenthismay
leadtoanirrationalresultthatisunlikelytobethelegislature'sintention,thejudgecandepartfromthis
meaning.Inthecaseofhomographs,whereawordcanhavemorethanonemeaning,thejudgecan
choosethepreferredmeaning.Ifthewordonlyhasonemeaning,andapplyingthismeaningwouldleadto
abaddecision,thejudgecanapplyacompletelydifferentmeaning.
4. RuleofHarmoniousConstructionwhentherearetwoprovisionsinastatute,whichareinconflictwith
eachother,theyshouldbeinterpretedsuchthateffectcanbegiventobothandtheconstructionwhich
renderseitheroftheminoperativeanduselessshouldnotbeadoptedexceptinthelastresort.Bengal
immunityCo.vs.StateofBihar(1955)6STC446(SC).
2. SecondaryRulesakaRulesofLanguage
1. NosciturasociisWhenawordisambiguous,itsmeaningmaybedeterminedbyreferencetotherestof
thestatute.
2. EjusdemGenerisWhenalistoftwoormorespecificdescriptorsarefollowedbymoregeneral
descriptors,theotherwisewidemeaningofthegeneraldescriptorsmustberestrictedtothesameclass,if
any,ofthespecificwordsthatprecedetheme.g.vehiclesin"cars,motorbikes,motorpoweredvehicles"
wouldbeinterpretedinalimitedsenseandthereforecannotbeinterpretedasincludingairplanes.
3. ReddendoSingulaSingulisWhenalistofwordshasamodifyingphraseattheend,thephraserefers
onlytothelastword,e.g.,firemen,policemen,anddoctorsinahospital.Here,"inahospital"onlyappliesto
doctorsandnottofiremenorpolicemen.

LiteralRule
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Astatuesoftencontainsa"definitions"section,whichexplicitlydefinesthemostimportanttermsusedinthatstatute.
However,somestatutesomitadefinitionssectionentirely,orfailtodefineaparticularterm.Theliteralrule,whichisalso
knownastheplainmeaningrule,attemptstoguidecourtsfacedwithlitigationthatturnsonthemeaningofatermnot
definedbythestatute,oronthatofawordfoundwithinadefinitionitself.Accordingtothisrule,whenaworddoesnot
containanydefinitioninastatute,itmustbegivenitsplain,ordinary,andliteralmeaning.Ifthewordisclear,itmustbe
applied,eventhoughtheintentionofthelegislaturemayhavebeendifferentortheresultisharshorundesirable.The
literalruleiswhatthelawsaysinsteadofwhatthelawmeans.Thisistheoldestoftherulesofconstructionandisstill
usedtoday,primarilybecausejudgesarenotsupposedtolegislate.Asthereisalwaysthedangerthataparticular
interpretationmaybetheequivalentofmakinglaw,somejudgesprefertoadheretothelaw'sliteralwording.
WhenthewordsofaStatuteareclear,plainorunambiguous,i.e.theyarereasonablysusceptibletoonlyonemeaning,
thecourtsareboundtogiveeffecttothatmeaningirrespectiveofconsequences.InJ.P.Bansalv.StateofRajasthan
2003,SCobservedthattheintentionofthelegislatureisprimarilytobegatheredfromthelanguageused,whichmeans
thatattentionshouldbepaidtowhathasbeensaidasalsotowhathasnotbeensaid.Asaconsequence,aconstruction
whichrequiresforitssupport,addition,substitution,orremovalofwordsorwhichresultsinrejectionofwordsas
meaninglesshastobeavoided.ThisisaccordancewiththecaseofCrawfordvsSpooner,1846,whereprivycouncil
notedthatthecourtscannotaidthelegislature'sdefectivephrasingofanAct,theycannotaddormend,andby
constructionmakeupfordeficiencieswhichareleftthere.
InKannailalaSurvsParammindhiSadhuKhan1957,JGajendragadkarsaysthatifthewordsusedinstatuteare
capableofonlyoneconstructionthenitisnotopentothecourtstoadoptanyotherhypotheticalconstructiononthe
groundthatsuchconstructionismoreconsistentwiththeallegedobjectiveandpolicyoftheact..
InMVJoshivsMVShimpi,AIR1961,relatingtoFoodandAdulterationAct,itwascontentedthattheactdoesnotapply
tobuttermadefromcurd.However,SCheldthatthewordbutterinthesaidactisplainandclearandthereisnoneedto
interpretitdifferently.Butterisbutterwhethermadefrommilkorcurd.
Thus,whenthelanguageofaprovisionisplainandclear,courtcannotenlargethescopeoftheprovisionbyinterpretive
process.Further,aconstructionwhichrequiresforitssupportadditionofwordsorwhichresultsinrejectionofwordsas
meaninglesshastobeavoided
Advantages
1. Proponentsoftheplainmeaningruleclaimthatitpreventscourtsfromtakingsidesinlegislativeorpoliticalissues.
2. Theyalsopointoutthatordinarypeopleandlawyersdonothaveextensiveaccesstosecondarysourcesandthus
dependingontheordinarymeaningofthewordsisthesafestroute.
3. Itencouragesprecisionindrafting.
Disadvantages
1. Opponentsoftheplainmeaningruleclaimthattherulerestsontheerroneousassumptionthatwordshaveafixed
meaning.Wordsareimprecise,leadingjusticestoimposetheirownprejudicestodeterminethemeaningofa
statute.However,sincelittleelseisofferedasanalternativediscretionconfiningtheory,plainmeaningsurvives.
2. SometimestheuseoftheliteralrulemaydefeattheintentionofParliament.Forinstance,inthecaseofWhiteley
vsChappel(1868LR4QB147),thecourtcametothereluctantconclusionthatWhiteleycouldnotbeconvicted
ofimpersonating"anypersonentitledtovote"atanelection,becausethepersonheimpersonatedwasdead.
Usingaliteralconstructionoftherelevantstatutoryprovision,thedeceasedwasnot"apersonentitledtovote."
This,surely,couldnothavebeentheintentionofParliament.However,theliteralruledoesnottakeintoaccount
theconsequencesofaliteralinterpretation,onlywhetherwordshaveaclearmeaningthatmakessensewithin
thatcontext.IfParliamentdoesnotliketheliteralinterpretation,thenitmustamendthelegislation.
3. Itobligesthecourtstofallbackonstandardcommonlawprinciplesofstatutoryinterpretation.Legislationisdrawn
upwiththeseprinciplesinmind.However,theseprinciplesmaynotbeappropriatetoconstitutionalinterpretation,
whichbyitsnaturetendstolaydowngeneralprinciples.ItissaidthatitseemswrongtoparceltheConstitutionas
ifitwereaFinanceAct.
4. Clearly,theliteralapproachhasanotherdisadvantageinthatonejudgesliteralinterpretationmightbevery
differentfromanothers.Caseysays:Whatmayseemplaintoonejudgemayseemperverseandunrealto
another.
5. Itignoresthelimitationsoflanguage.
6. Toplaceundueemphasisontheliteralmeaningofthewordsistoassumeanunattainableperfectionin
draftsmanship.
7. Judgeshavetendedexcessivelytoemphasisetheliteralmeaningofstatutoryprovisionswithoutgivingdue
weighttotheirmeaninginwidercontexts.

MischiefRule
TheMischiefRuleisusedbyjudgesinstatutoryinterpretationinordertodiscoverlegislature'sintention.Itessentially
asksthequestion:BycreatinganActofParliamentwhatwasthe"mischief"thatthepreviousorexistinglawdidnotcover
andthisactcovers.ThisrulewasdevelopedbyLordCokeinSirJohnHeydon'sCase,1584,whereitwasstatedthat
therewerefourpointstobetakenintoconsiderationwheninterpretingastatute:
1. Whatwasthecommonlawbeforethemakingoftheact?
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2. Whatwasthe"mischiefordefect"forwhichthecommonlawdidnotprovide?
3. Whatremedytheparliamenthathresolvedandappointedtocurethediseaseofthecommonwealth?
4. Whatisthetruereasonoftheremedy?
Theapplicationofthisrulegivesthejudgemorediscretionthantheliteralandthegoldenruleasitallowshimto
effectivelydecideonParliament'sintent.Legislativeintentisdeterminedbyexaminingsecondarysources,suchas
committeereports,treatises,lawreviewarticlesandcorrespondingstatutes.Therulewasfurtherillustratedinthecaseof
SmithvHughes,1960,whereundertheStreetOffencesAct1959,itwasacrimeforprostitutesto"loiterorsolicitinthe
streetforthepurposesofprostitution".Thedefendantswerecallingtomeninthestreetfrombalconiesandtappingon
windows.Theyclaimedtheywerenotguiltyastheywerenotinthe"street."Thejudgeappliedthemischiefruletocometo
theconclusionthattheywereguiltyastheintentionoftheActwastocoverthemischiefofharassmentfromprostitutes.
Thisruleisofnarrowerapplicationthanthegoldenruleortheplainmeaningrule,inthatitcanonlybeusedtointerpreta
statuteandonlywhenthestatutewaspassedtoremedyadefectinthecommonlaw.Thisrulehasoftenbeenusedto
resolveambiguitiesincasesinwhichtheliteralrulecannotbeapplied.AsseenInSmithvHughes,themischief
approachgaveamoresensibleoutcomethanthatoftheliteralapproach.
Advantages
1. TheLawCommissionseesitasafarmoresatisfactorywayofinterpretingactsasopposedtotheGoldenorLiteral
rules.
2. Itusuallyavoidsunjustorabsurdresultsinsentencing
Disadvantages
1. Itisseentobeoutofdateasithasbeeninusesincethe16thcentury,whencommonlawwastheprimarysource
oflawandparliamentarysupremacywasnotestablished.
2. Itgivestoomuchpowertotheunelectedjudiciarywhichisarguedtobeundemocratic.
3. Inthe16thcentury,thejudiciarywouldoftendraftactsonbehalfofthekingandwerethereforewellqualifiedin
whatmischieftheactwasmeanttoremedy,however,suchisnotthecaseanymore.

GoldenRule
Thisruleofstatutoryinterpretationallowsashiftfromtheordinarysenseofaword(s)iftheoverallcontentofthedocument
demandsit.Thisruleisamodificationoftheliteralrule.Itstatesthatiftheliteralruleproducesanabsurdity,thenthecourt
shouldlookforanothermeaningofthewordstoavoidthatabsurdresult.TherulewasevolvedbyParkeB(wholater
becameLordWensleydale)inBeckevSmith,1836andinGreyvPearson,1857,whostated,"Thegrammaticaland
ordinarysenseofthewordsistobeadheredtounlessthatwouldleadtosomeabsurdityorsomerepugnanceor
inconsistencywiththerestoftheinstrumentinwhichcasethegrammaticalandordinarysenseofthewordsmaybe
modifiedsoastoavoidtheabsurdityandinconsistency,butnofarther."
Itisaveryusefulruleintheconstructionofastatuteasitallowstoadheretotheordinarymeaningofthewordsused,and
tothegrammaticalconstruction,unlessthatisatvariancewiththeintentionofthelegislaturetobecollectedfromthe
statuteitself,orleadstoanymanifestabsurdityorrepugnance,inwhichcaseitallowsthelanguagetobevariedor
modifiedsoastoavoidsuchinconvenience.
Thisrulemaybeusedintwoways.Itisappliedmostfrequentlyinanarrowsensewherethereissomeambiguityor
absurdityinthewordsthemselves.Forexample,imaginetheremaybeasignsaying"Donotuseliftsincaseoffire."
Undertheliteralinterpretationofthissign,peoplemustneverusethelifts,incasethereisafire.However,thiswouldbe
anabsurdresult,astheintentionofthepersonwhomadethesignisobviouslytopreventpeoplefromusingtheliftsonly
ifthereiscurrentlyafirenearby.ThiswasillustratedinthecaseofLeevsKnapp1967QBwheretheinterpretationofthe
word"stop"wasinvolved.UnderRoadTrafficAct,1960,apersoncausinganaccident"shallstop"aftertheaccident.In
thiscase,thedriverstoppedaftercausingtheaccidentandthendroveoff.Itwasheldthattheliteralinterpretationofthe
wordstopisabsurdandthattherequirementundertheactwasnotfulfilledbecausethedriverdidnotstopfora
reasonabletimesothatinterestedpartiescanmakeinquiriesfromhimabouttheaccident.
Theseconduseofthegoldenruleisinawidersense,toavoidaresultthatisobnoxioustoprinciplesofpublicpolicy,
evenwherewordshaveonlyonemeaning.BedfordvsBedford,1935,isanotherinterestingcasethathighlightedthe
useofthisrule.Itconcernedacasewhereasonmurderedhismotherandcommittedsuicide.Thecourtswererequiredto
ruleonwhotheninheritedtheestate,themother'sfamily,ortheson'sdescendants.Themotherhadnotmadeawilland
undertheAdministrationofJusticeAct1925herestatewouldbeinheritedbyhernextofkin,i.e.herson.Therewasno
ambiguityinthewordsoftheAct,butthecourtwasnotpreparedtoletthesonwhohadmurderedhismotherbenefitfrom
hiscrime.Itwasheldthattheliteralruleshouldnotapplyandthatthegoldenruleshouldbeusedtopreventthe
repugnantsituationofthesoninheriting.Thecourtheldthatifthesoninheritstheestatethatwouldamounttoprofiting
fromacrimeandthatwouldberepugnanttotheact.
Thus,theGoldenruleimpliesthatifastrictinterpretationofastatutewouldleadtoanabsurdresultthenthemeaningof
thewordsshouldbesoconstruedsoastoleadtotheavoidanceofsuchabsurdity.Afurthercorollarytothisruleisthatin
casetherearemultipleconstructionstoeffecttheGoldenruletheonewhichfavorstheassesseeshouldalwaysbetaken.
ThisruleisalsoknownastheRuleofReasonableConstruction.
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Advantages
1. Thisrulepreventsabsurdresultsinsomecasescontainingsituationsthatarecompletelyunimaginedbythelaw
makers.
2. Itfocusesonimpartingjusticeinsteadofblindlyenforcingthelaw.
Disadvantages
1. Thegoldenruleprovidesnoclearmeanstotesttheexistenceorextentofanabsurdity.Itseemstodependonthe
resultofeachindividualcase.Whilstthegoldenrulehastheadvantageofavoidingabsurdities,itthereforehas
thedisadvantagethatnotestexiststodeterminewhatisanabsurdity.
2. Thisruletendstoletthejudiciaryoverpowerthelegislaturebyapplyingitsownstandardsofwhatisabsurdand
whatitnot.

Thepurposiveapproach
Thisapproachhasemergedinmorerecenttimes.Herethecourtisnotjustlookingtoseewhatthegapwasintheold
law,itismakingadecisionastowhattheyfeltParliamentmeanttoachieve.LordDenningintheCourtofAppealstatedin
MagorandSt.MellonsRuralDistrictCouncilvNewportCorporation,1950,"wesitheretofindouttheintentionof
Parliamentandofministersandcarryitout,andwedothisbetterbyfillinginthegapsandmakingsenseoftheenactment
byopeningituptodestructiveanalysis".
ThisattitudewascriticisedonappealbytheHouseofLords.LordSimmonscalledthisapproach"anakedusurpationof
thelegislativefunctionunderthethindisguiseofinterpretation".Hewentontosaythatifagapisdisclosed,theremedy
liesinanamendingAct..
Thesecommentshighlightoneissuewiththepurposiveapproach.HowParliament'sintentionscanbedeterminedand
whetherjudgesshouldreallyberefusingtofollowtheclearwordsofParliament.Thepurposiveapproachisoneusedby
mostcontinentalEuropeancountrieswheninterpretingtheirownlegislation.Itisalsotheapproachwhichistakenbythe
EuropeanCourtofJusticeininterpretingEUlaw.
SincetheUnitedKingdombecameamemberoftheEuropeanEconomicCommunityin1973,theinfluenceofthe
EuropeanpreferenceforthepurposiveapproachhasaffectedtheEnglishcourtsinanumberofways.First,thecourts
havebeenrequiredtoacceptthat,from1973,thepurposiveapproachhastobeusedwhendecidingonEUmatters.
Second,astheyusethepurposiveapproachforEUlawtheyarebecomingaccustomedtousingitandmorelikelytouse
ittointerpretdomesticlaw.OneexampleisPickstonevFreemansplc(1998).Here,womenwarehouseoperativeswere
paidthesameasmalewarehouseoperatives.However,MissPickstoneclaimedthattheworkofthewarehouse
operativeswasofequalvaluetothatdonebymalewarehousecheckerswhowerepaid1.22perweekmorethanthey
were.Theemployersarguedthatawomanwarehouseoperativewasemployedonlikeworktothemalewarehouse
operatives,soshecouldnotbringaclaimundersection1(2)(c)ofthe1970statuteforworkofequalvalue.Thiswasa
literalinterpretationofthe1970statute.TheHouseofLordsdecidedthattheliteralapproachwouldhavelefttheUnited
KingdominbreachofitstreatyobligationstogiveeffecttoanEUdirective.Itthereforeusedthepurposiveapproachand
statedthatMissPickstonewasentitledtoclaimonthebasisofworkofequalvalueeventhoughtherewasamale
employeedoingthesameworkasher.

NoscituraSociis
Nosceremeanstoknowandsociismeansassociation.Thus,NoscituraSociismeansknowingfromassociation.Thus,
underthedoctrineof"nosciturasociis"thequestionablemeaningofawordordoubtfulwordscanbederivedfromits
associationwithotherwordswithinthecontextofthephrase.Thismeansthatwordsinalistwithinastatutehave
meaningsthatarerelatedtoeachother.Ifmultiplewordshavingsimilarmeaningareputtogether,theyaretobe
understoodintheircollectivemeaning.AccordingtoMaxwell,"thisrulemeansthatwhentwoormorewordssusceptible
toanalogousmeaningareclubbedtogether,theyareunderstoodtobeusedintheircognatesense.Theytakeasitwere
theircolourfromeachother,i.e.themoregeneralisrestrictedtoasenseanaloguoustoalessgeneral".
Thisdoctrineisbroaderthanthedoctrineofejusdemgenerisbecausethisruleputsthewordsincontextofthewhole
phraseandnotjustinrelationtothenearbywords.Thelanguageofthephrasecanbeusedasaguidetoarriveatthe
truemeaningoftheword.ThisruleisillustratedinFostervDiphwysCasson(1887)18QBD428,involvingastatute
whichstatedthatexplosivestakenintoaminemustbeina"caseorcanister".Herethedefendantusedaclothbag.The
courtshadtoconsiderwhetheraclothbagwaswithinthedefinition.UnderNosciturasociis,itwasheldthatthebag
couldnothavebeenwithinthestatutorydefinition,becauseparliament'sintentionwasreferingtoacaseorcontainerof
thesamestrengthasacanister.
InStateofAssamvsRMuhammadAIR1967,SCmadeuseofthisruletoarriveatthemeaningoftheword"posting"
usedinArticle233(1)oftheConstitution.Itheldthatsincetheword"posting"occursinassociationwiththewords
"appointment"and"promotion",ittookitscolourfromthemandsoitmeans"assignmentofanappointeeorapromoteeto
aposition"anddoesnotmeantransferofapersonfromonestationtoanother.
Nosciturasociisisonlyaruleofconstructionanditcannotbeusedwhenitisclearthatthewordwithwidermeaningis
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deliberatelyusedinordertoincreasethescope.Itcanonlybeusedwhentheintentionofthelegislatureinusingaword
withwidersensealongwiththewordswithnarrowermeaningisnotclear.Further,thisrulecanonlybeusedwhenthe
associatedwordshaveanalogousmeaning.Itcannotbeusedwhenthewordshavedisjointmeanings.Forexample,in
thecaseofLokmatNewspapersvsShankarprasadAIR1999,itwasheldthatthewords"discharge"and"dismissal"do
nothavethesameanalogousmeaningandsothisrulecannotbeapplied.

EjusdemGeneris
Theejusdemgeneris,orofthesamegenusrule,issimilarthoughnarrowerthanthemoregeneralruleofnoscitura
sociis.Itoperateswhereabroadoropenendedtermappearsfollowingaseriesofmorerestrictivetermsinthetextofa
statute.Wherethetermslistedaresimilarenoughtoconstituteaclassorgenus,thecourtswillpresume,ininterpreting
thegeneralwordsthatfollow,thattheyareintendedtoapplyonlytothingsofthesamegenusastheparticularitems
listed.Accordingtothisrule,whenparticularwordspertainingtoaclassoragenusarefollowedbygeneralwords,the
generalwordsareconstruedaslimitedtothethingsofthesamekindasthosespecifiedbytheclassorthegenus.The
meaningofanexpressionwithwidermeaningislimitedtothemeaningofthepreceedingspecificexpressions.However,
forthisruletoapply,thepreceedingwordsmustforaspecificclassorgenus.Further,thisrulecannotbeappliedinthe
wordswithawidermeaningappearbeforethewordswithspecificornarrowmeaning.InUPStateElectricityBoardvs
Harishankar,AIR1979,SCheldthatthefollowingconditionsmustexistfortheapplicationofthisrule
1.Thestatuecontainsanenumerationofspecificwords
2.Thesubjectoftheenumerationconstituteaclassoracategory
3.Theclassorcategoryisnotexhaustedbytheenumeration
4.Ageneraltermispresentattheendoftheenumeration
5.Thereisnoindicationofadifferentlegislativeintent
JusticeHidayatullahexplainedtheprinciplesofthisrulethroughthefollowingexampleIntheexpression,"books,
pamphlets,newspapers,andotherdocuments",privatelettersmaynotbeheldincludedif"otherdocuments"be
interpretedejusdemgeneriswithwhatgoesbefore.Butinaprovisionwhichreads,"newspapersorotherdocuments
likelytoconveysecretstotheenemy",thewords"otherdocuments"wouldincludedocumentsofanykindandwouldnot
taketheirmeaningfromnewspaper.
ThiswasalsoillustratedinthecaseofIshwarSinghBaggavsStateofRajasthan1987,wherethewords"otherperson",
intheexpression"anypoliceofficerauthorizedinthisbehalforanyotherpersonauthorizedinthisbehalfbytheState
government"inSection129ofMotorVehiclesAct,wereheldnottobeinterpretedejusdemgenerisbecausethemention
ofasinglespeciesof"policeofficers"doesnotconstituteagenus.
Itcanbeseenthatthisruleisanexceptiontotheruleofconstructionthatgeneralwordsshouldbegiventheirfulland
naturalmeaning.Itisacanonofconstructionlikemanyotherrulesthatareusedtounderstandtheintentionofthe
legislature.
ThisrulealsocoversTherankprinciple,whichgoesasfollowsWhereastringofitemsofacertainrankorlevelis
followedbygeneralresiduarywords,itispresumedthattheresiduarywordsarenotintendedtoincludeitemsofahigher
rankthanthosespecified.Byspecifiyingonlyitemsoflowerranktheimpressioniscreatedthathigherranksarenot
intenedtobecovered.Iftheywere,thentheirmentionwouldbeexpectedafortiori.Forexample,thephrase"tradesman,
artificer,workman,labourer,orotherpersonwhatsoever"washeldnottoincludepersonsabovetheartisanclass.
Similarly,thephrase"copper,brass,pewter,andtin,andallothermetals"inalocalActof1825washeldnottoinclude
preciousmetalssuchasgoldandsilver.

ReddendoSingulaSingulis
Thereddendosingulasingulisprincipleconcernstheuseofwordsdistributively.Whereacomplexsentencehasmore
thanonesubject,andmorethanoneobject,itmaybetherightconstructiontorendereachtoeach,byreadingthe
provisiondistributivelyandapplyingeachobjecttoitsappropriatesubject.Asimilarprincipleappliestoverbsandtheir
subjects,andtootherpartsofspeech.Atypicalapplicationofthisprincipleiswhereatestatorsays'Ideviseand
bequeathallmyrealandpersonalpropertytoB'.Thetermdeviseisappropriateonlytorealproperty.Thetermbequeath
isappropriateonlytopersonalproperty.Accordingly,bytheapplicationoftheprinciplereddendosingulasingulis,the
testamentarydispositionisreadasifitwereworded'Ideviseallmyrealproperty,andbequeathallmypersonalproperty,
toB'.
ThisrulehasbeenappliedinthecaseofKoteshwarVittalKamatvsKRangappaBaliga,AIR1969,intheconstruction
oftheProvisotoArticle304oftheConstitutionwhichreads,"Providedthatnobilloramendmentforthepurposeofclause
(b),shallbeintroducedormovedinthelegislatureofastatewithouttheprevioussanctionofthePresident".Itwasheld
thatthewordintroducedappliestobillandmovedappliestoamendment.

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