THE THOMIST A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW cesta (OF THBOLOGY AND PHILosorHy <@ aS. ~ ( uiararr i non: Tie Dosencas Farinas or mt Prov on Beg, aes Te Tit Pr, Waigoe 1D Vou XXIV APRIL, JULY, OCTOBER, 1981 Now 3,004 ‘THE DIGNITY OF SCIENCE SCIENTIFIC METHODOLOGY Demonstration and Sell-Bvidence wana D. Sinetons, PRD. 157 ‘The Sipofcanes of the Univeral ut mone oun A. Onseea, Ph.D. 165 Williams Harvey, MDs Modera br Ancient Scientist ‘emus Ragen, M.D. 178 PART TWO HISTORY OF SCIENCE ‘Medicine and Philosophy inthe 11th and Teth Centaris Rrewano P.McKxow, Ph.D. 210 ‘The Origins of the Problem ofthe Unity of Farm Dasis A Causes, OP. S.-M, D.Phil 257 "The Cxlestal Movers in Medieval Physics, nsees A. Waster, O-P, Ph.D, D.Phil. 286 ‘Gravitational Motion According to Theodore of Freiberg Wrntnie A, Watsacy,0.P,PbD.ST-D, 387 "Mining AM Within 's Clarke’ Notes to Roba Traité de Physique ‘Micnast A. Hosnay, Ph.D. 858DEMONSTRATION AND SELF-EVIDENCE I, Scmertric Mimovoroor -T ean be forefuly argued that there is no place in phi- Towophy for an “epistemological ertgue” of knowledge, though the integrity ofthe intellect stood in doubt ti it was somehow philosophically “lead.” Surly, for reason to eltempt to establish the trstworthiness af reason i for it to lay to pall itself up by its own epistemological boot straps, The history of thought gives ample evidence that exiti- fal attempts to justify the philosophical effort are in vain. No Inatier how honest the epistemological critique in intention, it results chavscteritcally in an unnatural imposition of ‘util limite placed upon our capacities to know. Witness the divergent streams of extreme rationalism and extreme ‘enpircsm which ind their source in the eitqne of Descartes! Sianicantly, St.Thomas dd nt in it necessary to initiate bis plillosophicn effort with a ertique of knowledge. A Thomist fesks meaningfully of epstemalogy best in reference to a ietaphysical inquiry into the character of intentional being. He takes epistemology as an attempt to understand what i is tolknow, not an attempt to defend the radical integrity of our ct Ge, Wine, Rais Thon Oe dee Comat (abc 4:0 eine Mba (iP Ti, 8) Gt i ne om wo Rey he tin et ba Pipa mt ed Get tw Se Ue icy wt tt bw at ish tt et tot tt el hn Sing hsm tw my nt By lt mi aed the sey gp” Tho Cay of Phd rine or Yor Ce Soe Sa). WO 130140 owas », smMOxs cxpaciies for knowledge. ‘That we can know is evident. Tt is both futile and unnecessary to attempt to prove this* ‘Although St. ‘Thomes did not hamper his capacities for Jnowledge by imposing a priori restritions upon them, he sa ‘that ins sense, they imposed restitions upon him. ‘There is ‘no question, from the very start, as to the radical integsty fof sense and intellect. Despite the fact that we are sometimes in enor, its evident that we ean, and adequately, know what js, ut our eapacities for knowing are in no sense unlimited, Tlonest reflection upon the epistemological facts reveals thet ‘the burman intellect is that Ieser type of intellect which is at fee a reason, For us all doctrine and discipline is from pre ‘sisting knowledge* We ear by moving from what is already known to what follows from this. ‘The fact is clear that, as far a leaning is concerned, the human intllet is naturally discursive. Moreover, the price of discursive advance in know!- ‘ge i the construction within the intellet of logial atices Such as definitions and argumentations. The method of con- struction which is ealed for by the demands of discourse is in ro sense arbitrary. As always the final cause isthe cause of the eatsalityof the other causes. The end of the logieal con- struct regres eetain determinate ruler scoring to. which the objects known are to be ordered in knowledge in reference to one another. ‘Thus, there are definite rules of procedure ‘which constexin the intellect in its discursive progress? These cu, St, Ged S., °A Date nthe Mite of tesa” The ston Ts er So Sn dW) ea. Sse ope Main fr he ‘sie wks heen uf aie pn we al te a ce whe ane sftoge ng sestnemly int ts Cie Arcot ie eine ape, ing sn i he wae yet a Beant sooty toh he aa rt (oe foi of sour the th aloo soe Suse Andi he ceo DmMONEDRANON AnD SHLERIDENCE ny ‘ean be sad to constitute 8 method, and the reflexive investi ‘Blon of them can be spoken of as methodology. It should be Siar that this is not method in the manner of Cartesian ‘tethod, nor is it methodology in the manner of epsterologcal ceitiqe. ‘There is for man but one reason. Hence, there is generally ‘put one method, tht is the discursive method which measures Upto the demands of that one reason. But there are many “deren things to be known, on radically different scientifically ‘rlevant levels, As @ consequent, the general method of the {eason must be proportioned to’ each scientifically diferent Uhjet foreach formally diferent scientific efor. The general Ihethod of Ube reason ie logic. Logi is at best analogously Common to every scientific inquiry. By itself itis inadequate {orany perticalar sientife subject matter. Logic must be con tracted, and in analogously different ways, to the needs of Chery scientially diferent subject, This contraction of logic {relized in the particular sientiie methods proper to each, formally diferent scentife subject Note that while logic by itll is inadequate to any given scentife inquiry beesuse of the special demands ofthe proper subject ofthat inquiry, there ‘ean, heeause of the demands of the reason itself, be no particular nj aman i nd i ol ye eh ‘Et nl Sey th mow Fila ofa at ‘Soren tn dnd ofthe es nents wich sours to obec a a ‘ec te tbe ol oar ae Pa ‘pilin Sima Pe "he Naw sd Lite of Lop” The Tan SIV atc ts na de inf Ba ne wes he ‘Siku spn), ad oma of map Catt). $e nection ego age Sasawe OWA D, SOLOS ‘eientifie method whieh is not generally Togcal. Clearly, the investigation into genera logial method is methodology in one sense, while the investigation into the presse method of any fiven scientife inquiry ie methodology in another (related) fense, We ean refer tothe former as general methodology and the latter as particular or special methodology" “in this paper we shall concern ourselves with the role ofthe self-evident proposition in the theory of demonstration. This is a study in general methodology. ‘The point made will be sf a common character, and the methodological principles “uncovered willbe ony generally relevant fr sientifie inquiry. Tnevery ease an approprinte contraction of the doctrine pee- sented willbe necessary before itis proximately adequate to lany given seientifie effort, Before proceeding, however, there remains one more dstinetion to be made, the beter to locate the discussion of thi paper. General methodology is identical vith logial theory, and, as such, admits of the distinction bbetmeen formal end material logic. Ths ia distinction whichis both legitimate and significant, but itis @ distinction which is frequently misunderstood. Although itis distinction which should he made within the limits of general logical theory, iis ‘ot infrequently understood in such a way that formal loc is ‘enifed with general methodology while material logic is ess cinted intrinsically with particular sentie methodology. This mistaken view makes logic less than adequate to the demands fof reason even in abstraction from the particular demands of any given scent subject. And, while it may not positively vitiate the investigation into particular scenic method, i ples an unreasonable burden upon it. Just as there are ireneral rues of logieal procedure to he followed if discourse is tobe consistent or valid, so there are general rules of procedure tobe followed if discourse isto he of some determinate sient force. Categorieal spllogism is defined in terms of validity. "The rule which must be folowed to make the sllogism pre- cisely a syllogiam (e.g, the middle term must be fully LMEMONSRRANION AND SELE-EVIDENCE 3 Aistibuted at least once) are canons of valid or consistent \Tacoarse. Demonstration, on the other hand, while pre apposing validity is defined in terms of scant fore, And there are general rules, able to be determined apart from any particular scientific subject, which must be followed if « sllo- Bam is to be demonstration (e.g, the premises must be ‘pecesarly true), and even more doterminate general rules Which must be followed if the demonstration is to be of Certain type (e.g, explanatory demonstration must have a middle tern whieh is related to the scientific subject as its real definition). "These rules, while quite clearly remaining of {2 gneral logial chasacter ce, open to contraction in the face of special sientife subject matter, but not yet con tiscted )are canons of propel scent, and not simply con- sistent, discourse, Rrles sich ab these are proper to material Tog, while the rules of merely consistent discourse are roles tf formal logic, ‘There are reasons which explain why formal Tosi is sometimes confused with the whole of logic and why terial Toge is sometimes confused with particular scientiie tmethodology.* But Ubese reasons only help to excuse the man thc rl he wine ge he cd etn, Sen ite our nl fom sense the tum ih soe ee lk Joey Ste of a male of fag fe, pn ‘a en mew Sy er oe Sa a hk ‘Svoch Tine cpl dtp btwn eel od ae ‘lyoko pf i hd ope ete Pas ne, pe th ton Ela a Sate el a ft odd ‘prone he oi stone Ha {lS You “Fareed” The Wout i of Je of Thay, ed by Ye Som, In lll ‘i Do Helo (Cag lage Uainnty Pr 1) 90. em) {Re tit ter fra tc svete ed i a ee ‘hi he nat ie tnd ines Tomy ‘tench ng fra Caen nl forms nd ee tl (inning he ge ttf Sts te et of cso) An en apr ons har awed ne trl ibe emesis noted th he nigel of Sennus wan 9, aDEH0%8 ‘who is confused. They do not defend the confusion as &noctic Feet, The theory of demonstration in general rains, as much te the theory simply of splogiam, the eoncera properly ofthe Torieinn. Tt must be assumed and contracted to the needs of {ie apecial subject matter for any given scientife inquiry. ‘Thur the concern of this paper is within the Knits of lori, ‘but it belongs to that branch of loge which is material loge rather than formal loge. ‘This brings us signifeantly closer to {he area of particular methodology than a paper in, formal Toate would, but we emain in loge without trespassing beyond, IL, Smravmner Prorosinios— Tun Baste Taorss ‘or Deoxstnarion ‘Barly in the Posterior Analyte after determining the nature of siete Knowledge (in bret, certaeopnitio per caus”), ai Aa tate es mate Ve el {cle Wee TSG TELS iar aes hae head fore t d a i nt Sen, tat earl gen tel po a TE nea cn th a ed ey) ar SpE pte saps a Ge moe * oe ed cee tome le RCULIIESES ct ater anche coe net a ee ft sd ma be ir a Teton Stacie id kg en 6), By eed end tay wt) eninge SOSA chad te mde late of Srey at rt ‘Tanase Sa RESETS ala” i of am gn, ee Ei iy St i ty Peete mtr Scat fe uth de Try 6 ae ep gel ta en sn» en men a 8 lr palin oe niin ly peptide id Soren ds hat) Hava ed hr ait omg wie cand hy Fe Paster dain, ae he ne CSSLEPS SDSS thc tn he prin be nonely tw a Aistlle defines demonstration in terms ofits final cause as a ‘pllogsm productive of scienoe. ‘Then, using this deiition of Gemonstration itself as @ principle of demonstration, he pro- fos to demonstrate the defnition of demonstration in terms fils matter. He argues that if syllogism is to produce the Kind of conclusion which is properly scntife it must proceed fram premises which are true, primary, immediate, better own then, prior to, and cause of the condusion, ‘This is to fy that it mist proceed from necessarily true, absolutely frat ‘propositions, which look to no prior proposition for their evi fence but are caleulated to supply evidence for other propos- tions. We speak ofthese propositions as sl-evident. Scientific Inowledge is proven in o demonstration whose premises mani fest the truth of the scientific conclusion. As principles of the foncsion these premises are properly premise. Tn any given fase, however, they may also be conclusions from other premises. But itis impossible, of ours, that every premise he its» conclusion from a prior premise, We must arrive tikimately at premises which are only premises, at propositions tric are not shown tobe evident by way of prior propositions bout whose evidence ix found within themselves, These abuolate premises are ultimately the complex principles of scientific knowledge, themselves not propery scent, but rather pre- scientific. ‘They are self-evident propositions, the propositions spoken of in the Povterior Amalytice as the immediate basie truths of syllogism "of, more delerminataly, of demonstration sty (9, oi me ash i a (Eitct p o ppter gid daunted ely opal leat 8 eee “Arn nif inn ent i of a ‘ial wan gee, ough salt ato eh. Te former ae oer ‘nn of atten Tater a clr pe Wea eae ‘ily oh ees poco ements ne ps tency ST Sis i ae ean ‘Smeat psie ewer mtn fhe da of meas pi (GB Thoma elton or ino Sy let0 waa 9, SBEONS St, Thomas speaks of these “basic truths” as per 2¢ nota propositions. Although this an apt expression, there is some anger of eonfusion here, Fist ofall, St. Thomas may some- tine ue the term per se nota of @ propaition which is not ‘ident fn the way in which the basic truths of demonstration fre aelbevident!™ Secondly, St. Thomas frequently speaks of the modes of persity (the modi dicendi per se)" and, despite the terminological suggestion to the contrary it not trae that ‘shenever we have & proposition which involves a mode of Dersity we have a per av nota or self-evident proposition ‘hese points wil have to be clarified before we are through. For the premises of demonstration to be at all they must ve tru, for the eare of & proposition isan esse verum. For them to be principles of manifestation for the siento com Cdasion they mast be neveasarly true, for necessity is of the senor of science, And for Uhem to be baric truths, that is \eolute premises, the premises of demonstration rst be, at east redtetivly, immediate propositions, Here is precisely trhere the sceatie proposition differs from its presenti Drincipl. ‘The scientific proposition is necessarily true, and it Pra conclusion. The selentife principle is necessarily true, bat jean be (almately) in no sense a conclusion. The eonchsion ff 1 silogism is eharacteristiclly mediate, fr the counection between its extremes i manifested in splogism by way of & term commonly identified with both extremes, thus functioning fia middle, ‘The basic truth? of syllogism or the absolute premises must themselves be evident without a middle. ‘The Predicate mst belong immediatly to the subject lest we admit {he infinite egress which would male deduction totally ince tive. Tro thing, atleast shouldbe pointed out here, Fest of fil there is a sigifcent and not unrelated use of the term ‘Ypumediste” which isnot intended at this point. Por example, Toning three angles equal to two right angler is necessarily 1s Phe ee "ta atin pr ata nt emi tn Pat Al 1; Im 1 De Ais et. 14 40; J ¥ Mt et DEMONSTRATION AND SELE-EFIOENGE wr ee eee eras eet eno Sere seyret ser aap er nce ee parece eae eae Scene eae eee er ‘commensurately universal or convertible (primo or possessed Goeon aeons a ee eae ee eer ac ree eles ee cee ea Setter ar ee eee ere rer eae oe ee Se Seeeearte ee oan Ee eee ory cee cee oe eee ESE We din he eee pte he co te pa eae Sana a Se acd eter acta wear ga oe SS STceniome a tes Romie esus oveand , SIMMONS propositions are ot totally norempscl,for,as we al nts, Be Emam byway ofan mediate induction rom este TEE Yee do not depend ety upon empl data tte ction Soent to them founded upon an itll TB se ito them sic that i imposible to thin the eae fe Ty if ope understands the meanings ofthe toms Pere spoon The whole i greater than eng of te parts telat seen to thie proposition dite apart rom Be Beh of thin or Oat sembly existing whol oF part she note for sent isin sete, ult into the proposition Tene the sltevident propotion i immediate Beene TES tat pio propos fr its evdence, but there ae weet tions which are evident in tis way without bing lf repel The are the factually evident propositions which ee, esau they report accurately om the way things pus fat tobe, wheter they could be otherive ont seen Ut propmins like this are This penal i yellow, saatkor ts pleswnt today and fel pret, These props Fe teed ince they do ok depend on pie Prope son fet tie ath The eidenee for them i found fem itey in the factual situation. Tolar os «factually ae potion is frmally characterized by its commit ertsPeta happens to be the case, the fctaly evident sion ennot tend the necesty seeded fran abucate prmerthemonattation, ‘Ths, though each is immediate, Frm pede proposition ile radially from the el Sa ae roecton” Ta the Commentary on the Physica St sat weds demntan, que spare pa et a i si cr niee my Boor ee atea tit a Pras Nid, Mee? o 8 Ql, 2 Le tae es a het bt a te op, Th thing ly wine ene nS tn ft ha the nord “at” de Ey a mang Poel Sie Nos a seo esate conan mat ny om Toe enon DENONEDRATION AND SELP-EVIDENCE 140 ‘thomas says that i x per e notum that nature exists because tural Uhings are manifest to the sense.” Natural chinge exist jz an immediate proposition. But itis not self-evident—for, ‘Sooe natural things aze exetentally contingent and need not bbe we cannot assent to the proposition Natural things exist, imply because we understand the meaning ofits tems. Tt ix jimmetiately evident only on the basis of the empirical fact ‘nmistakably given n ou sensory-intlletual grasp of the exis ence of sensible existents immediately present to the external sense. This is cleanly a factually evident propotition. Tk is of ‘Sguifleant relevance forthe philosophy of nature, but itis not relevant in the way in which a self-evident proposition is relevant” despite the fact that St, Thomas deseribes it ax por te nate, One mse darication at this point. ‘The immedisey Of the selbevident proposition mes it indemonstrable, But tot all indemonstrable propositions are immediate (consider ‘eondusons of dialetial or probable argumentation). Nor ‘ven, of cours, are all immediate and indemonsteable propos See eet, teh i cal eit sd ‘Scat pete Bry se och ot St mat Be peter than on of ip owed proponent, and aly om otto a pes orm ce th ter et tt ban ot tana be ond nda ete (i) Aug he pect tan rope i densa rls foe peer eh of wil vent, tee ao een a ‘ena owl fd one ny et pre Tar ty mee te mnt of Seana we be aogier poms ee Senay tly ee tng Sh tee on Lowa ars Di emi td ed wii ‘douse Te eee of te ‘Sh nol bea eae oa ret of te taal hing at SEE ig oct it la ta Se sc ae wn ny ie mae he tie160 pwAND D. SELON tins aleident (constr the example given above for the htuly evident proposition) Certainly trae props in crrtatt nattr ar indenontable bene of 8 deelency STntuar. ellevident propositions are always in necesey srs their inet rings fom ther exe Tene ruber Cn frm sme die in matter, Demonsta- {Gata event something whic i not lend evident. Yee danonstmble etait pivation. Because they re Matha themselves alteventproposton do not have {hi peration.™ Savio pron ar coat tained ‘ois makes them stone pinary they have wo propstons to than (go ih thy depend fo eens) nd {ia are prempposd tothe meat propositions whi ok o sh freien Infra hy up even fre motos popston thy ease them tobe edusns. An ‘they an be ‘related to the conclusion as cause to effect only {nf as they are pet and better frown th the eon on The tai uth of logan "are bs insofr os they “nit f mo pe prepontonsnsestaryto make them eidet ‘They are truth of the nloprm Isla as they are pipes iro wish cosatons ean be peerated. TT, Taz Tyees ov Sour-aviwe Provostrion ‘We have noted that a seléevident proposition is one which is known to be necessrily true once its terms are understod. ‘The most perfect instance of this is found in the proposition in which the predicate i of the definition ofthe subject.” Once ct mee i rn dt Cirisaoeeimnmatica inte tains pnt ex cod paditon postr dane SHER ees aera e ‘Tl fp Boy mt ain! pte of ph DEMONSTRATION AND SELE-EVIDENCR 1s the subjet is understod in its definition the identity of subject sn predicate is grasped, and the intellect is moved to commit itefizevocably tothe truth ofthe proposition, Ifa proposi= tion has a predicate within the definition ofits subject, but this subject defies dfisition by any man, then this proposition ‘an be described as selevident in tel, but not sltevident tous Hon the other hand, its ubject ean be defined by us, itis elevident both in itself and to-ns, Tf the subject is able to be dened only by those who are babitusted to operate vithina given scientific eld, the proposition is sid to be self. ‘evident only to the learned, But if is ia common conoept tundertood by every one, itis, of course, selevident to all ‘Thus, it is rather easy to see, at least apropos of the pie type of sellevident proposition, the rationale of the traditional division ofthe per se nota proposition into the per se nota in be and the per se nota quoad nos, and the subdivision of the Inter into the per se nota quoad sapientes and the per se nota ‘oad omen” ‘St, Thomas appeals to the fact that the proposition Gio i i not self-evident quoad nor even though it i al-vident in isd” Were we to know the essence of God we could not— noe would we need to—demonstrate His exstenee, for Hie semce is His existence. Yet, since we do not now His essence tre are able from Tis effects, which are known to us, to prove His existence. Aristotle and St. Thomas supply several ‘examples of per 2e nota propositions which are known to all because their terms are common conceptions easly and nel ‘masped by all men, ‘These examples include: The same thing ‘cannot be and not Be; The sume proposition dove not admit ‘inuldencoualy of affirmation and denial: The whole is greater than any of ite parts; Things equal to one and the eame thing are equal to one another; Equals taken awoy from equals leavei i i se rowanp 0, sro equals2* ‘These propositions are called dignitates oF sxioms ‘enue they are the absolutly ultimate and common. prin oles which guerantee the integrity of all discourse and into ‘ehich all dicourse is realved. Discourse would be imposible or anyone ignorant of these axioms, Propositions per oe nota ‘quond sopietee ace related to the axioms as the proper is Rated to the common, ‘They em be known only by the earned beeause the terms involved are more determinate than the common notions which alone are able to be understood by the academically ‘unskilled, St, Thomas iMustrates this by Stugesting the proposition AU right angler are eral. ‘This is proposition which is immediately evident only to one who now that equality enters into the definition of eight angles tnd this isa definition ofcourse, which escapes the knowledge ff many. Another example which is traditionally offered isthe proposition Incorporel eubstencer are not situated in place. Werean ad to these any proposition in which the essential Uletston or some part off ix predated ofa specific subject, ‘ach ax Bvery man i @ rational enimal. A. proposition ofthis {ope is known as. postio o thesis The axioms are neeessry if we are to demonstrate in any scientific ares, but the theses ‘proper to & given area are necexary only for demonstrations Droperly within this aren. Axioms may or may not be used Dacossrnasion ASD sxaa-=vIDEXCE 108 presupposed to any demonstration, even when they are not ‘explicitly expressed as premises, presisely Deeause the knowl- ‘edge of proper concepts which i required fr theses presupposes tnd in a sense depends upon a peor grasp of cammon con- fepte* Those which are logical in charactor function neces ‘arly a8 methodological principles whieh guarantee the integrity tof discourse without being built into its doctrinal principles For example, the principle of contradietion isan abscitely ‘common methodological principle without which Ubee ould be to discourse at all. No propesition ean function propery as & ‘riniple of demonstration except that it be firmly accepted that the affirmation of its opposite is excluded in the fae of ts ‘own afraation® Of course axioms of an ontological character {when illumined by the light of metaphysical abstraction) ean be used as premises in metaphysical discourse, just as axioms ca logieal charter mast be built into prone in logical theory fs explicit premises, ‘The reason for this i that metaphysics fnd loge are common sciences, so that the principles common tothe other sciences are proper to them. As a matter of fact, these common propositions can even be used as explicit pre: tuses in the particular sciences, though bere they bacome Prneples of dialectical rather than demonstrative disconrse™ {Explctly es premises in demonstration, but theses are principles ie tive aly they ampere 0 prem ebm : eae snd cerally ie ose mich re Geeta eas os i ae game (eg the pce of West) od en : cee ce loal In career (even the prise of Lert ay la eetradiction), ‘Those which are ontological in character are ‘Pisa sent ies sd tie Soh mr Sigua cee tc ates mad cptor al em wo on cep i cna 10 Bat te of he Comnsirg om he ‘ee! Aelia noted hs a of eet i {ating noes) toons ‘ec tar sn itm” fF dn be ‘thou te dnt we ogee ming ste Seon dain dan, ge ae wih malay ta SE eins sir yf eo eh we Tike pee on nampa orga ile dati bes % EES ee inmate or sms one in te Ot 3 SF Ti pepe ee! nyt or pti Wee sd Ve Satya pest nt oe164 whup 9. SIMO IV, Tor Grvests op su Suur-eeroext Prorosiriox ‘As St, Thomas teaches, the selevident absolute premises from which scontife conclusions are generated are natural to the buman intellect" However, this docs not mean, on the fone hand thst they are possessed fom the very start as fully formed conceptions dependent in no sense upon experience oF, fu'the other, that they are no more than mental constructs fabricated by the intellect totally out of its own “stuf.” In the final leson of his Commentary on the Posterion Analytics ‘Se Thomas finds fault with those who suggest that we already posses the principles but do not know this fom the beginins ‘This is absurd since the principles of demonstration must be etter known than the conclusions they generate, and it is Empouible to know demonstrtively and aot be aware ofthis, Se Thoma also disputes with those who say that self-evident propositions arse in us from nothing. Experience indicates and Fearon demands that they come from something. But they ‘Cannot come from prior intellectual knowledge, for then they Srould ot be immediate, ‘They are generated irom previous nse knowledge by way of an immediate induction However, osay this snot to imply that they are ens achieved.* This is simply not the ease for the large majority of set-evident Sunn 14 Tie in ule hail gum ine ened tne ite sein or uo ert al ie ‘pone mr in hr ei i het snes of en "Sur us a be cy et aie rent th he a Min nb ecm nora ech De SELPET Mee perpen sat cin ss wi a SRE MEET ede ptr dew npn of pre) v8 ay COED Day the prot tt tore» play le Seat ate lo et nt ued ea Gy thik" oo See SUES abt to mya ler tm tl) Te fen ak SERS te see Smale Beno he Mai of PAE ota nee ek ayes st Bc 0, ese tro ti So "SOPEAISC seo docntte ce comp so oma That tet siertam mn yh nner ol mi ww DDENONSERATION AND SuLP-EvIORNER 166 propositions. I takes s aufcient experience (spoken of by "Thomas as an ezperimentum which comes about fom many memories)" of the singular manifestations of universally ‘necessary truth belore we are ready to penetrate beyond the ttcidentals ofthese singulers to the underlying necessity. ‘This xperimentam isnot always csly achieved. And the intuitive imsiht (into the necessity potentially in the experimentum) effected by the possible intellect through the light ofthe agent intellect is dilenlt asa matter of course. More often than no, it seems, propositions which are selevident in themselves aco not seen to be selevident by ts nd when they are, its only iy way’ of @ tremendously dificult daletical procedure. "To grasp the truth of a sell-evident proposition one mst fst sp the menning of the tems invalved. Hence, the search fr Seat pi pose wii nse shea SELES nce or mete tet os lint ws te ‘ncn fu ctw sey (G0 het an) \pertaat plat that once the thro night i aievl te anwnt i md i taton of th itive ticity he poain G The dei be SSE EE set pee tees ate ranens tam eons cop meme Figs Fieenie see bec tne ee pevbome tee, se pia Scio Elemente eae So SS Soe136 WARD D, SELONS seltevident propositions is at last a dial asthe starch Tee etnies Cajetan suggests that its more dit than Tete ead ot hin Commentary om the Porter Analyt estas the induction of the per ve note proposition. He eens that induction fe nessa, not only asthe source of tre eRotaplor terms of Ue complet pencpes, but that 3 is Rey aswell for the eomposon of hese tert in the eGo, Hears that we would not know that eal Dee rom equate eave eqs if we new only the meng weet be taken fm” and to eave” For this ce stat or the gees of hs alvin propa Tem thre must be induction, not only ofthe meanings of the {Shank evn oft onjuetion fn this proposition, Ta sme (Sat Tene we have son, St, Thoma indates that the {Sitelbw of the ersten forthe fetlectual grip of sertespie, Appeal to personal esporcnce, after the BeuErSr Cajctantxmo to neate hat sometimes he inde SeeGT the tema lone eufons (a for example, with hes SB proportion Beery man is 6 ratonal animal and hat STmwtmen nore is equa (ov in the example‘ ted by Gita) Te itevdeat proposition i at simply report on = facta tation, Yet i not @ prior abd it dos have an eee ference, It were not the case that come things ffaypen to be such an such precisely ecanse they cannot be tint esl tndeh we woud nev gran the didn. Sidon, Tt is ony through suicient contact with the ‘aly in guestin that eight into the necenity which Het the fact (hati the wa’ in which thee this ax) sso" eis ue at ween stat he ale sae tan any of fs pars eventhough we are not presently Sitntel by a conete wile and its pars. The trth of ‘has ropston is guaranteed by the very meanings of whole ee gt int la we ema I Oe Sa ea i ae ENR 1st and part, Still I would never know the mesning of whole and part if Tnever Jnew any concrete whole and it parts. And, that is more important, there is no intliibiity at all to whole oF part except that there are (atleast powsily) con tzetely existing wholes and puri, ‘The whole és greater thas ny of its purts precisely because that’s the way wholes and parts are, For every whole and its parts there is the fect that this whole happens to be greater than each ofits parts—and bohind this fact is the necesity which damands it, neceity ‘hich is one with the intligible structure of whole snd part ‘The fact and the necesty which dietates it are equally tel. Yet they dll. The fact i incommunicable, end alone ean be expreaied in a factually evident proposition, ‘The necessity behind the fact is impervious to sense. Yet itis potentially in what is sensed (end in what is eported on in a factually evident proposition), and iti, of coun, fundamentally uni versal. Tt ean be known only by an intuitive insight whieh is the result of an abstrective indvetion, and when known iti expressed in formally universal preposition. The self-evident proposition comes into being only’ when it is inductively fschieved from an experience of singulars—and it is meaningful only insofar a it bears Snally upon singulars. However the self-evident proposition is only materially dependent an exper- face for its verification. Tt is directly verified in its own intrinsic intelligibility, which precludes the posibty even of conceiving the opposite. YV. Per Se Nota axo Modi Dicendi Per Se ‘There is temptation to identify por we nota or self-evident propositions with propositions involving @ modus dizendi per fe or a mode of persity, However, such an identication can be teen toe ermneas once it i noted that the conelision of astrict poplar quid demonstration involves the second mode of peneity. As conclusion, and not premise, the proposition in the second mode of perstity is obvicusly not a sell-evident proposition. Hence, not every per ae proposition is per ae nota188 ROWARD D, SENOS or self-evident. ‘The modes of perseity of concer to us here fre the fist, second, and fourth, A proposition involves the frst mode of perity when its predicate falls in the definition ils subject, the second when ts subject falls in the definition tf its predicate, and the fourth when the subject is related to the predicate es a necessary and proper cause" In a strict Dpropter quid demonstration the major premise has the fourth Ino of perstity (e.g, Every rational animal is capable of {peech), the minor premise the frst mode of pereily (©.£ Every man ia sational animal, and the concsion the seond ‘Bvory men ie capable of speech. ‘connection between subject and predicate, and it refers exc tively to the objective structare of the propositions, Per se hota on the other band, refers rather to intelligible structure “propos of our knowledge of it ie, with or without a middle term, onthe bass of intrinsic iteligibility or empirieal data) [A pore nota proposition is one known immediately on the basis ‘of is intrinsic ineligibility. Every proposition (including the ‘onclusion) in stret propter quid demonstration must be per te, but only the premises must (and ean) be per se nota "Yet the ease ofthe proposition in the second mode of persity cannot be easily disposed of. ‘True enough, as conclusion this proposition cannot be sell-evident—at least not to us. But Ivy isv'itselfeident tous? And iit, while not self-evident to us, sell-evident in itself? Te is necessary pies to demonstra- tation that we kuow something sboct the subject and predicate {our conelason and about the premises frm whieh the con- ‘dusion is generated—that they are and/or what they arc Concerning the predicate of the concusion, namely the proper ‘crap sn ts oe met a at ENONSTRATION AND SELP-VIONNER 150 passion to be proven of the scent subject, we must know nly its ‘nominal definition, In fact we cannot, prior to ‘demonstration, know its esentaldefsition, for this is what is to be proved. ‘To know, prior to demonstration, the exential Gefnition of the proper passion in the demonstration, is to ‘know its inherence in its proper subject (.e, the scientific subject of thir demonstration), for the proper subject is ia ‘ude inthe essential definition ofthe pasion.™ Tt would seem {at proporiton per ae in the second mode, with « proper ‘pession predicated ofits subject is self-evident in itself, since the subject itself isin the definition of the predicate, but not seltevident to us, precisely because we fil to understand the teseatial definition of the passion short of demonstration. CCajetan seems to agree with thi postion, for when he points ‘out that the per se nota proposition whose predicate fll into the definition ofits subject is only the principal type of por se nota proposition, he adds a second type in which a passion issaid ofits proper subject Tf this type of proposition is self- evident it cannot be sel-evident secundum nos, since it can be demonsteated, but in ae tantum. Suppose this i the ease, shy should it be that this sper se nota only in se? ‘The reason ray be found in the type of causality exercised by the proper fubjet in reference to its proper passion, ‘This i at least materiel causality, and in the ease of the second mode of pene! precisely material causality which is actually involved. But matter as such i not proportioned to manifest ‘The connection between the subjcet snd its property ie mani fested to us only by way of the lnm which is implied by the subject and which ie the active enuse of this property. ‘The fonelasion can be sad to be virtually in the fourth mode of erwity because its subject implies this form. Tt is only in cexplicating this in the propter quid demonstration that we see Sint Port fad oct160 ovesno B, SIROLONS the necesary (but not, to us t lens, immediate) connection between the subject and its property: IV, x Coxexvsios aot se nl ge pn tus up t0 te fnous lemma of Meno. How can one evr cere imma ibeeab a at poeta iieragejat henner Si orgs ena ‘he Torche af pert aed ho seead meds of perwiy. And ther i 20 ieee shes che She es oueee toe ie a ic cei oi ot Sone ims eee eae act neice Ws Ent at TEES ira ewer md Geese see re frais rican cae Ficnae Pereanmarenoac ranked See erm Ja aos nie noe tae Sastre viceesatet mesa Tei ated an cet ist em te don hugh i al Sots Siete mh SiS Teen eeccaae ie ee Stine stow peu ates Sh chenceremeee aets bce ty Saco mre nm so DexossRAos Aa srurstERSce re notion of potential being (which in sense represents a middle found between being simpliiter and non-being simplisiter) Ina similar fashion he defends the integrity of discourse by introducing the notion of the seltevident proposition. Séell- cvident propositions are the base truths of demonstration, and in them scientific conclusions exist in potency. The demonstra tive movement represents a true advance in knowledge from the potentiality of the scentife conclusion to ite actuality. Pio to discourse the conclusion is not known rimplietor, but at the same time itis not unknown smplicter, It is potentially Icnown in its principles. The aetnal grasp of the self-evident proposition isthe potential grasp of the scientife conclusions rtually contained therein. ‘The premises of demonstration— taken as premises, that is, sam together to involve a middle ‘erm—fusction after the fashion of efficient causes. whi sctuate the potentiality of the conclusion and make it be? ‘The whole ofthe Pavterior Analytics ie concerned to investigate the logieal vehicle (namely, demonstraton) which brings us from the self-evident principles to our scientific conclusions. Inthe first book demonstration and its types and properties ae investigated. ‘The second book concentrates on definition precisely as the medium of demonstration. Quite sigaiicantly the last chapter of this second book-—which completes the Posterior Analytico—eomes fll round tothe top of the very fist chapter. Meno’s dilemma is absolved in terms ofthe uni versilly necesary and immediate base principles of discourse Scientific wonelusions are truly conclusions ingofar as they ate diferent from these basic trth ut ste generate from them. ‘They are truly scientific insofar asthe baie truths of discourse Into which they are resolved are primary and inoontrovertible allimations of the ral, Upon the integrity ofthese base tratht ‘or principles of demonstration depend the integrity of demon uit, VI" xi sie nti quan ii i sem moonbat, asp penn at Ss ‘re iran pis? ya De Fo,162 EDWARD 3. SIMONE stration and the worth of ts concasons, ‘Thus, i the Sal tt, Asote dtende the nti ofthe peas the SORE erm of an intuive induction from the incon SES data of sae perience Sk Thomas points ont that TWeililrence between dnt! dixoure and demenetraton ese Seence Between unterminated and terminated dix asthe daectcan fale tort of Bg 9 acentt re SEE pcan atc ncn are not finally gourd See maT deta metho ie fre 10a 4 "atonal met reiely insta ts conlson remain vehi the reason. The demonstrative tio isthe method Weece ce it grandes connsons necessary inthe ash docs he infra it reves them into el “leat ropaons ‘There is no scene save that there be rst popenion fom principles to ssentfeconsixons ‘Thon escent ntellet tna rato. But tthe tin en sc sve ht he nation of Ste prices that the seni intellct is leo an Recta! Damonttation may be an instrument of the iat eso ut ther cam be no meaning theory of ‘Mineation ave that the per s note propaton, ile SE the tect of inlet intellect, be Sealy Dut of tht tery Epwano D, Snsacoxs Marte, in go seen," cin emi se ih on ater yom pb reli el SOLIS ta eet nn te tin termi ess ue, en pg a Peel TSR Tay gue Verona dit nia mod SELES S UtSiam, perp sti ty io bi es ‘tn £ is swaatinen ena tlt a obit cgi te Buse Pony &2 1 bt in rok eats ee pas ie tact Pirin ‘THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE UNIVERSAL ur NuNe hs cmnentry onthe Potion Analyt of Aristotle [Stems ts it tines antl stow i ery ita i eed ile it utero Ants om the my tn Pr pair Inubelter sores onerned wit the fom ofthese {Eo nthe wi wat comm to any son oats tte nly commoner he freee ‘adhng ot damon or dec ue in his cnet, Aree to tuy that it omer eld whenever Ue peat fo tobe mena thos tgs wc {Sn onder the js. Ons However we bein to conser th slogan onthe part of tenet oy mov son! {ie doom, Hene,nmetntly she aging aa oe pe ati found ah of he th hte onan se thea Sth nd *Thiscrhapen ier t nn, thin ths way the dls tine eld ona ett nd for lin nd thi ay only the deo. Ser ue Tn ding th ncn nd mdr! er of wiv, scartp tava hs tinction ben he el i Eclat provision ced nro mato ‘tnd to igor Ue pata the ner ha tt od pera frteinvesgtion of matae. An empleo he ide de mn este namon property of every ae Dae tg hve ie er ag oul ts tigen intact iver a ane as Priced at's cmon property ef swan ‘The omer Propsty mas based pm 2 proper gui dont ae Sher na asl on rater derived roman nem Hc mt sgt vl af mn, tar gud deal de invite mn so np em 163