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Nagapattinam to Suvarnadwipa: Re5lections on the Chola Naval Expeditions to Southeast Asia, edited by
Hermann Kulke, K. Kesavapany, and Vijay Sakuja. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009

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The Military Campaigns of Rajendra Chola

3
THE MILITARY CAMPAIGNS OF
RAJENDRA CHOLA AND THE
CHOLA-SRIVIJAYA-CHINA
TRIANGLE
Tansen Sen
The Chola king Rajendra (101244) is known to have launched several
military expeditions against kingdoms in the Indian Ocean. This paper
focuses on his raids on the Srivijayan ports in the context of growing
commercial activity between southern Asia and Song China (9601279). It
argues that Rajendra Chola launched two attacks on the Srivijayan ports,
one in 1017, and then a more extensive raid in 1025, in retaliation for
Srivijayan interference in the direct trade between southern India and Song
China. Scholars such as K.A. Nilakanta Sastri and O.W. Wolters have
already proposed this motive for the Chola military campaigns against
Srivijaya. However, the details about the Srivijayan interference that resulted
in these raids by Rajendra Cholas navy have not been fully explained. By
analysing relevant Chinese sources, this paper will provide some specific
examples of ways in which the Srivijayans might have attempted to prevent
direct commercial (and perhaps diplomatic) links between the Cholas and
the Song court.

THE ALLURE OF CHINESE MARKETS


In the early eleventh century, the markets and ports in China emerged as
some of the most lucrative places for international commerce. Traders from
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almost every region of Asia gathered at these places to procure Chinese


commodities such as porcelain and silk, and sell foreign goods ranging from
spices to horses. In fact, trading activity in China during the tenth and
eleventh centuries had begun to affect the local economies of several Indian
Ocean kingdoms and shaped the lives of merchant communities as far away
as the Mediterranean Sea. Rajendra Cholas military raids on the Srivijayan
ports must be understood in this context of an international trading system
that linked markets in China to the economies and societies elsewhere in
the world.
Although foreign traders had been frequenting Chinese markets as
early as the Han dynasty (see, for example, Yu 1967), significant expansion
in their numbers took place after the middle of the eighth century. This
increased interest in Chinese markets and the upsurge in foreign trade
during the eighth century were intimately liked to the abolition of an
extremely rigid economic system that had previously existed in China. The
An Lushan rebellion of 755 against the reigning Tang dynasty, although
unsuccessful, had significant impact on the existing political and social
structure. The rebellion also gave rise to changes in fiscal policies that had
previously rarely considered revenue from internal and external trade. Perhaps
the most important of these changes was the institution of monetary
taxation under the Liangshui fa (twice-yearly tax) system. The increased use
of money in the late Tang economy encouraged the growth and diversification
of private commerce and overhauled the market and credit structures in
China (Sen 2003).
The late Tang and the subsequent Five Dynasties periods witnessed a
number of other significant economic developments. New varieties of crops
were introduced into China from Southeast Asia, improved irrigation machines
and techniques spread rapidly, and the Chinese population started migrating
towards the fertile southern region of the country. Because of these
developments, the Chinese population grew almost fourfold from 32 million
in 961 to about 121 million in 1109 (Chao 1986, p. 35), and cities expanded
in numbers and density. Urban growth prompted further changes in the legal
structure of markets and the patterns of mercantile activities throughout
China. Restrictions limiting the markets to designated areas, which were
regularly enforced during the Tang period, were lifted (Twitchett 1968). This
dismantling of the rigid marketing system contributed to the emergence of
active private entrepreneurs, stimulated commercial exchanges within China,
and eventually led to the incorporation of international trade into Chinese
fiscal policy (Sen 2003).
As part of this transformed fiscal policy, the long neglected maritime
trade was brought under government administration and local officials given

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autonomy to control and tax maritime commerce. Known as Shibosi (Bureau


of Maritime Commerce), the office in charge of administrating maritime
commerce was initially established in Guangzhou in 714. The decision to
establish the Bureau in Guangzhou indicates that maritime commerce was
already flourishing in that city during the early eighth century. Indeed,
Chinese sources indicate that there were large numbers of foreign traders
from the Persian Gulf, Southeast Asia, and southern Asia who resided in the
foreigners quarter of the city. According to one eyewitness account, there
were also three Brahmanical temples in Guangzhou in the middle of the
eighth century (Sen 2003, p. 163; Schafer 1963, pp. 1415). The number of
foreign traders seemed to have swelled to over 100,000 before a rebellion by
a person named Huang Chao in 879 led to the massacre of many of them and
the disruption of maritime trade in Guangzhou.
After a brief hiatus, foreign merchants returned to Guangzhou and
overseas trading activity in the town flourished again during the Song dynasty.
The Song court took an active role in promoting maritime trade and even
lobbied seafaring merchants to bring tribute to China by giving them special
incentives. The fact that the overland trading routes were occupied by the
semi-nomadic Khitans, Tanguts, and Jurchens forced the Song court to
explore maritime trade as a source for fiscal revenue. Seafaring traders could
now conduct trading activities at several Chinese ports, including the
increasingly popular Quanzhou in present-day Fujian province. By the late
eleventh century, as Robert Hartwell (1989, pp. 45354) points out, the total
volume of international commerce at Chinese ports amounted to 1.7 per cent
of GNP, and therefore, ten to twenty percent of income derived from nonagricultural activities.
Hartwell (1989, p. 453) also notes that urban and demographic changes
in China, especially the growing densities of populations in the coastal
regions, created an ever-increasing demand for foreign products for defense,
medicine, liturgy, home and garden, office, clothing, cosmetics, transportation
and cuisine. Hartwell argues that from the late tenth century to the middle
of the twelfth century, Song Chinas foreign trade was dependent on nonluxury, staple goods such as frankincense, sandalwood, black pepper, and
cloves. The nature of these goods, he writes (1989, p. 454), played an
important role in determining the character of government control, the
organization of economic activity, and the scale and persistence of the flow of
trade between the different parts of China and each of her trading partners.
To meet the increasing demand for foreign goods, the Song court revamped
the traditional tribute system and turned it into a major source of income.
Through this revamped system, the government not only obtained foreign
commodities without payment, but also derived substantial revenue by levying

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taxes on items sold in Chinese markets by the tribute carriers. In fact, the
revenue collected from taxing foreign tribute and by selling products acquired
through the tribute system amounted to about 9.29 per cent of the total Privy
Purse income (Hartwell 1988). This revamped tribute system was also
profitable to foreign merchants in many ways. They are known to have
received preferential tax rates for appearing as tribute carriers, in addition to
return gifts and honorific titles from the Song court.
Often these return gifts and honorific titles made commercial dealings
with the Chinese government more lucrative than the usual market trade. In
1028, for example, the Song court decreed to give 4,000 strings of cash in
return for tribute valued at 3,600 strings of cash from an embassy from
Vietnam. And in 1077, a delegation representing the Cholas was given
81,800 strings of cash and 52,000 taels of silver. Similarly, imperial titles,
such as the title of Jiangjun (General), received by a Arab merchant named Pu
Ma-wu-tuo-po-li (Abu Muhammad Dawal?) in 1073, seems to have elevated
the status of tribute carriers among the foreign community trading with
China. Such titles, at times, could have also made it easier for merchants to
pass through Chinese custom houses. The growth of foreign trade during the
Song dynasty thus served the needs of the Song government, foreign traders,
and tribute carriers.
The encouragement of maritime trade under the Song government and
the increasing demand for foreign commodities in China were major factors
in the development of a vast Indian Ocean trading system in the eleventh and
twelfth centuries that stretched from eastern Asia to the Mediterranean Sea
(Abu-Lughod 1989). Indeed, these developments are also credited with
ushering in a global economy in the mid-thirteenth century. George Modelski
and William R. Thompson (1996, p. 149), for example, write that the Sung
(Song) realm was the part of the world where demand and supply conditions
strongly conducive to the emergence of a world market existed, and were
capable of exercising a pull of attraction on the whole of the world economy.
Traders from Srivijaya, Chola, and the Arab kingdoms were all attracted
to this pull of Song markets and the revamped tributary system. The
number of foreign merchants and settlements at Song ports reached
unprecedented levels and the competition among the seafaring traders for a
share of the profits intensified. The Song courts decision to link market trade
to the tributary system was one of the key reasons for the increased competition
among foreign traders. They vied to bring large amounts of tribute and
represent as many kingdoms as possible when they arrived at the Song court.
The aim was to gain recognition from the Song court in addition to making
handsome profit from tax rebates. Many of these tribute carriers were Muslim
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traders, who either resided at the Song ports, or came from their diasporas in
Southeast and Southern Asia. The fact that some of these tribute carriers are
identified as ship masters (bozhu) in Chinese sources indicates that the Song
court was aware that they were traders rather than officials from foreign
kingdoms. Similarly, memorials from coastal officials suggest that the court
also knew that foreign residents from ports such as Guangzhou and Quanzhou
often appeared at the Song court as foreign envoys (see Chaffee 2006).
However, the Song court, more concerned about the threat from the north
and its fiscal needs, rarely attempted to curtail foreign merchants from
profiting from the tributary trade.
The practice of tribute carriers representing multiple foreign kingdoms
and the uncertainty of their places of residence make the Song notices of
foreign diplomatic missions extremely complicated. In some cases, such as
the embassy representing the Chola kingdom that arrived at the Song court in
1077, it is very difficult to establish the actual role of foreign rulers in
instigating the tributary missions. In other words, the records of tribute
missions to the Song court must be used with caution, especially when
reconstructing the diplomatic relations between Song China and foreign
kingdoms.

THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF SRIVIJAYA


In the last quarter of the seventh century, Srivijaya emerged as one of the
leading transit points for ships sailing from the Chinese coast to southern
Asia. This is evident from the journey of the Chinese monk Yijing to the
eastern coast of India. Yijing embarked on his trip in 671 and lived in
Srivijaya for about six months before boarding a ship for India. On his return
voyage to China, Yijing again stopped at Srivijaya, this time for about six
years, from 687 to 693 (Wang 1996, pp. 1214; see also Wolters 1986 and
Spencer 1983, pp. 10711). Similarly, the Indian monk Vajrabodhi, on his
trip from southern India to China, is reported to have passed through
Srivijaya on a Persian ship. Before arriving in Guangzhou in 719, the mercantile
ship carrying Vajrabodhi anchored at Southeast Asian ports to trade
commodities that ranged from precious jewels to local products. Soon after
the death of Vajrabodhi, his disciple Amoghavajra embarked on a journey to
Sri Lanka and India from Guangzhou on a Southeast Asian (Kunlun),
possibly Srivijayan, ship (Sen 2003, p. 214).
These records of Buddhist monks travelling between India and China
not only indicate the prevalence of Buddhism in Srivijaya, but also the
strategic location, both commercial and cultural, which Srivijaya occupied on
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the maritime routes between coastal China and southern Asia. The commercial
role of the kingdom is highlighted, for example, in the works of Arab traders
such as Ibn Khurdadhbih and Abu Zaid (Reinaud 1845). The rulers and
traders from Srivijaya used this vital position to advance their economic and
diplomatic relations with the courts in China as well as the kingdoms in
southern Asia. Already in 683, the Tang court, perhaps in recognition of the
importance of the Southeast Asian kingdom, had sent a diplomatic mission
to Srivijaya (Wolters 1961, p. 418). The first embassy from Srivijaya to the
Tang court arrived in 702. Four other embassies from Srivijaya are reported
to have reached the Tang court in the eighth century. These embassies usually
presented local goods or exotic items such as five-coloured parrots and
pygmies. In return, the Srivijayan rulers received titular titles from the Tang
court (Bielenstein 2005, pp. 5859).
During the Song dynasty, embassies from Srivijaya became more frequent.
Between 960 and 1017, about sixteen missions from Srivijaya reached the
Song court (Hartwell 1983, pp. 17275; Bielenstein 2005, pp. 5960).
Many of these missions were led by Muslims, such as Pu-Tuo-han (Abu
Dahan?) in 976, Pu-Ya-tuo-luo (Abu Abdullah?) in 983, Pu-Ya-tuo-li (Abu
Abdullah?) in 988, and Pu Mou-xi (Abu Musa?) in 1017. In 985, the
Srivijayan mission to the Song court was led by a ship master named Jin-hua.
In addition to local goods and religious items, many of these missions
presented commodities that Hartwell calls the staples of maritime trade. He
notes, for example, that the Srivijayan missions to the Song court seldom
carried less than fifty tons of frankincense (Hartwell 1989, p. 456). In fact,
Hartwell argues that Srivijaya attempted, with high degree of success, to use
its apparently formidable navy to control the straits of Sunda and Malacca
and thereby the Indonesian and Near Eastern trade with China. The Palembang
regime developed sophisticated techniques markedly similar to Chinese
models to administer their monopolies. The total output of the sandalwood
produced in eastern Java and the Lesser Sundas was sold to the Sumatran
king. The commodity was then resold to Canton-bound traders at severalfold profit. Arabian frankincense seems to have been handled in the same way.
It was divided into thirteen grades by the Palembang customs administration
and then re-exported to China in large quantities (Hartwell 1989, p. 456).
Tribute from Srivijaya also included large quantities of black pepper,
rosewater, gharuwood, and aromatics and medicines, all in high demand in
Chinese markets. Clearly, many of these missions from Srivijaya, similar to
the tributary missions from other kingdoms, were sent with commercial
motives. As noted above, caution must be taken to explain these tributary
missions in the context of political and diplomatic relations between the
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rulers of Srivijaya and Song China. It is also not clear the extent to which the
Srivijayan rulers, even though they are frequently mentioned as the instigators
of the tributary missions, were involved in organizing and dispatching these
missions. This issue is especially significant when examining the Srivijayan
mission of 1077, as discussed below, the personnel of which seem to have also
represented the Chola ruler Kulottunga I (r. 107018).
Exchanges between the Srivijayan rulers and kingdoms in southern Asia
are frequently reported in Indian sources. Inscriptions from Nalanda reveal
intimate relations between the Srivijayan kings and Buddhist monks and Pala
kings in Bengal. The Srivijayan ruler Dharanindravarman, for example, is
mentioned as a pupil of a monk from Bengal called Kumaraghosa. Another
inscription from Nalanda records that the Srivijayan king Balaputradeva,
who reigned in the middle of the ninth century, sent an envoy to the court of
the Pala ruler Devapala requesting permission to endow a Buddhist monastery
at Nalanda. Balaputradeva also petitioned for a grant of five villages for its
upkeep and maintenance. The Pala king is reported to have granted these
requests of the Srivijayan king (Niyogi 1980, p. 23).
The Srivijayan rulers also donated gifts to religious institutions located in
the territories belonging to the Chola kingdom. In 1005, for example, the
Srivijayan ruler Chudamanivarman financed the construction of a Buddhist
vihara at Nagapattinam, a leading Chola port. Almost ten years later, a
representative of the Srivijayan king presented precious stones to an idol in a
temple in Nagapattinam. This was followed by a gift of lamps by a trader
from Srivijaya. Sometime around 1018, a Srivijayan ruler mentioned as the
king of Kadram offered gifts, including Chinese gold (cinakkanakam), to
a temple in Nagapattinam (Hall 1978, pp. 8788; Abraham 1988, p. 138).
Several scholars have pointed out that through the presentation of these gifts,
the Srivijayan rulers wanted to foster commercial relations with the powerful
Chola kingdom. Scholars have also used these records as evidence of friendly
and cordial relations between Srivijaya and the Chola kingdom. As the
section below will argue, the latter interpretation may not be very accurate.

THE CHINA-SRIVIJAYA-CHOLA TRIANGLE


By the early eleventh century, commercial activity in the Indian Ocean had
become increasingly complex and contentious not only due to the Song
courts revamped tributary system, but also because of the attempts by
Srivijayans to dominate commercial exchanges through the Straits of Malacca,
and the Chola courts interest in expanding its commercial and political
spheres in the Indian Ocean. Inheriting, and building upon, many of the
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political and economic structures of the previous Rashtrakuta and Pallava


dynasties, the Cholas emerged as one of the most dominant powers in
peninsular India from the tenth through the thirteenth centuries. Under the
leadership of Rajaraja I (r. 9851014), Rajendra I (r. 1014), and Rajadhiraja
I (r. 101854), the Chola forces invaded Sri Lanka, sacked a number of
neighbouring kingdoms, undertook punitive attacks on the states in the Bay
of Bengal region, and even raided the ports of Southeast Asia. The reign of
these three rulers, and, indeed, almost the entire four centuries of Chola
administration, was marked by internal stability, flourishing Brahmanical
institutions and art, increased occupational specializations, and the expansion
of domestic and international trade (see, for example, Hall 1980; Abraham
1988; Champakalakshmi 1996; Heitzman 1997).
Similar to the Srivijayans, the rulers and traders from the Chola kingdom
had keen interest in developing commercial relations with China. Like the
ports in Srivijaya, the coastal regions controlled by the Cholas had also
emerged as important centres of trans-shipment trade. These two kingdoms
profited from taxing and supplying goods meant for markets in the Persian
Gulf or Song China. The common interest in controlling this lucrative
maritime trade seems to have been a source of tension between the Cholas
and Srivijayans, despite the fact that the representatives from the latter
kingdom presented gifts to temples in the Chola ports.
The first military confrontation between the Cholas and Srivijayans may
have taken place some time in 1017, to be followed by a more extensive raid
on the Srivijayan ports in 1025. A third Chola offensive reportedly took place
in the 1070s. Based on the Tiruvalangadu plates dated in the sixth year of
Rajendra Chola (that is, 101718), R.C. Majumdar (1937, pp. 17172) was
the first to suggest the possibility of a Chola raid on Srivijayan ports sometime
in 1017. The Tiruvalangadu inscription mentions that the Chola king had
successfully conquered Kataha, identified as Kedah in the Malay Peninsula.
Dismissing Majumdars suggestion, Nilakanta Sastri (1949; 1984) argues that
a military confrontation at this early stage could not have taken place
because Rajendra and the reigning Srivijayan king were on friendly terms.
Nilakanta Sastri also maintained that the section of the Tiruvalangadu plate
that mentions Rajendras conquest of Kataha was added at a later date. In a
response to Nilakanta Sastris objections, Majumdar (1961) points to
inscriptions on copper plates from the village of Puttur, dated in the eighth
year of Rajendra Chola (that is, 101920), that also suggest a Chola raid
before the more famous offensive of 1025.
A careful analysis of Chinese records indicates that the relations between
Chola and Srivijaya prior to 1025 were not as friendly as Nilakanta Sastri
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claims. Indeed, the Chinese sources suggest that representatives from Srivijaya
may have been passing inaccurate information about the Chola kingdom to
the Song court before 1015, when the first diplomatic mission from the
southern Indian kingdom arrived in China. This is revealed from the status
assigned to the Cholas by the Song court and in a memorial presented to the
Song Emperor Huizong (r. 110125) in 1106. In response to Huizongs order
to receive the envoys from Pagan (in present-day Myanmar) in accordance
with the status given to the Chola embassies, the president of the Council of
Rites objected by saying:
The Chola [kingdom] is subject to Srivijaya, this is why during the
Xining reign period (10681077), we wrote to its ruler on coarse paper
with an envelope of plain stuff. Pagan, on the other hand, is a great
kingdom and should not be perceived as a small tributary state. [It]
deserves a comparable status [given to] the Arabs, Jiaozhi (present-day
Vietnam), and other similar states. (Song shi, p. 489: 14087; Sen 2003,
p. 224)

The inaccurate information regarding a Srivijayan subjugation of the


Cholas, noted in the above memorial, seems to have been supplied to the
Song court before the first Chola mission reached China. Upon its arrival at
the Song court, the Cholas were accorded a status similar to that of Kucha,
a tributary state of the Song in Central Asia. The status of a specific foreign
kingdom was usually fixed on the basis of its military strength, which then
determined the type of reception embassies received when they arrived at the
Song court. Commercially, the bestowal of higher status helped merchants
representing these kingdoms obtain favourable trading rights at the Song
ports. The designation of Chola as a tributary kingdom meant that the Song
court not only perceived the Cholas as a militarily weak state that was
subjugated by the Srivijayan ruler, but also that traders from southern India
may have received limited access to the Song markets and trading rights in
China compared with their Southeast Asian counterparts.
It is possible that traders and officials from Srivijaya were responsible for
misinforming the Chinese about the military strength of the Cholas. In fact,
even Sri Lanka, regions of which were occupied by the Cholas in the eleventh
century, is also incorrectly listed in Chinese sources as one of the dependencies
of Srivijaya. It seems that the Srivijayans were the main informants about the
southern Asia region for Song scribes. This might explain why Chinese works
fail to mention the Chola raids on the Srivijayan ports, and the Song officials,
until at least the early twelfth century, insisted that the Chola kingdom was
a vassal state of the Srivijayans.
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This intrusive role of the Srivijayans may have been known to Tamil
traders and could have become evident to Chola officials after the visit of
their representatives to the Song court. Tamil traders and the Chola court,
which had launched several military raids in southern Asia to advance its
commercial reach (Hall 1980; Spencer 1983), most likely wanted to have
direct access to the lucrative Chinese markets. However, a direct commercial
relationship between the Cholas and the Chinese would have affected the
commercial interests of the Srivijayans. Because of their geographical location,
the Tamil merchant guilds were in a position to monopolize the supply of
black pepper and commodities from the Middle East destined for Song
markets. Similarly, the supply of Chinese commodities to the Jewish and
Arab merchants residing in Chola territories by Tamil traders would also
have endangered Srivijayan profits. In other words, the Srivijayans may
have perceived the entry of Cholas into the South China Sea as a major
threat to their participation in trans-shipment trade. Consequently, the
Southeast Asian kingdom seems to have taken prudent steps to prevent the
establishment of direct Chola-Chinese trading relations, or, at least, disrupted
the conditions that would have provided favourable trading terms to merchant
guilds from the south Indian coast.
Thus, a Chola raid on Srivijaya in 1017, shortly after the return of the
first Chola mission to China, is not inconceivable. Although the event is not
mentioned in Chinese sources, it should be noted that there is also no record
of Srivijayan missions to the Song court for about a decade from 1018 to
1028. Instead, in 1020, a Chola mission is reported to have arrived at the
Song court. The lead envoy, Pa-lan-de-ma-lie-di, suddenly became sick and
died shortly after he reached Guangzhou. Five years later, in 1025, Rajendra
Chola launched a massive raid on Srivijayan ports. There is no evidence to
indicate that the Srivijayans had any role in the death of the Chola envoy, but
it is clear that the first raid, perhaps a brief offensive, had failed to accomplish
its goal. Even the 1025 raid seems to have been unsuccessful in preventing
Srivijayan from interfering in Chola-Song exchanges. This can be discerned
from an embassy that arrived in China in 1077.
Song sources confusingly attribute the mission of 1077 to both the
Cholas and Srivijayans. The section on the Chola kingdom in the Song shi
(Dynastic History of the Song) reports that the Chola ruler Di-hua-jia-luo
(Divakara?) sent this embassy. The chief envoy Qi-luo-luo, vice-envoy Nanbei-pa-da, and staff member Ma-tu-hua-luo led the embassy and had an
imperial audience on 26 June 1077. The same source, in fact, in the same
chapter but under the sub-section on Srivijaya, had previously noted that
Di-hua-jia-luo was a Great Chieftain of the Southeast Asian kingdom.
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Fortunately, a contemporary inscription found at a Daoist temple in


Guangzhou has helped decipher the identity of Di-hua-jia-luo and the
envoys who visited the Song court as representatives of both the Srivijaya
and Chola kingdoms. The inscription, written in Chinese, and translated
into English by Tan Yeok Seong (1964), reads:
During the reign of Chih Ping (Zhiping) (106467), the Lord of the
Land of San Fo Tsi (San-fo-qi, that is, Srivijaya), the Paramount Chief Ti
Hao Ka lo (Di-hua-jia-luo), ordered one of his clansmen Chih Lo Lo
(Zhi-luo-luo) to this city (that is, Guangzhou). Chih Lo Lo saw the
temple in ruins, its foundation being buried in wilderness. He then
returned home and reported the matter to the Lord. Since then Ti Hua
Ka lo began to have inclinations for Tao (Dao) Presently, a Judge by
the name of Ma Tu Hua Lo (Ma-tu-hua-luo), a man of moral virtue, came
to pay tribute to the Court. Permission was asked to accept his donations
to construct the Hall of San Ching (Sanjing) in the Imperial Library.

Tan suggests that Di-hua-jia-luo in this inscription and in the Song shi refers
to the Chola king Kulottunga, who, according to him, ruled both the Chola
and Srivijayan kingdoms. Di-hua-jia-luo, Tan (1964 p. 20) writes, was
holding a very high position in the conquered country. Sri Vijaya, which was
overrun by King Virarajendra (that is, Rajendra Deva Kullottunga) before
AD 1067. He went home and ascended the Cola throne in 1077 A.D. He
had a long and prosperous reign until AD 1119.
George Spencer (1983) rejects Tans conclusion and instead offers the
possibility of a marriage alliance between the Cholas and Srivijayans in order
to explain the confusing Chinese records. He writes (1983, pp. 14647), It
was after all, very common for the Cholas to establish such alliances with
both defeated adversaries and potential rivals, so a marriage alliance with the
kings of Srivijaya, as a result of Rajendras conquest [in 1025] or even under
other circumstances, would not have been out of character. To prove his
point, Spencer refers to records on the genealogy of fifteenth-century Malayan
rulers preserved in the Malay annals, Sejarah Melayu. The record states that
the Indian conqueror Raja Shulan (Rajendra I, according to Spencer), after
the successful naval raid of 1025, married Onang Kiu, the daughter of the
defeated King Chulin. The daughter of Onang Kiu and Shulan later married
Raja Iskandar, the ancestor of the Malacca sultans. Their son, Raja Chulan,
according to the Malay annals, succeeded to the Chola throne in India.
After narrating this story from Sejarah Melayu, however, even Spencer
appears reluctant to accept the marriage-alliance theory. He concludes by
saying (1983, p. 148), But since [in] the Sejarah Melayus version of events
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too few generations are allowed between the time of Raja Shulan (Rajendra)
in the eleventh century, and the founding of Singapore by Sri Tri Buana in the
fourteenth, that account must be highly condensed at best. Perhaps the Chola
connection was merely an inspired fiction.
Both these analyses about the puzzling Song records concerning the 1077
mission and the Guangzhou inscription prove inadequate. An alternative,
and much simpler, explanation seems to lie in the interests of Srivijayan
traders in preserving their commercial status with the Chinese after a series of
raids by the Cholas had weakened their sphere of influence in the Indian
Ocean. Di-hua-jia-luo was probably no more than a local landlord (as the
Chinese inscription suggests [Ch. dizhu = landlord]) trying to maintain
commercial relations with the Chinese after the Chola raids on Southeast
Asian ports. Hermann Kulke (1999, p. 29) suggests that after the sacking of
the Southeast Asian ports, the Cholas under Kulottunga may have supported
one faction of the Srivijayan court or one port-city of its confederation,
while, another faction could have spread the news that the Chola kingdom
had become a vassal of Srivijaya. It is possible that the 1077 mission to the
Song court attributed to the Chola kingdom came from the faction opposed
to Kulottunga. The goal of this mission was not to present the Chola
kingdom as a leading maritime state in the Indian Ocean, but to reinforce the
Chinese view that Srivijaya was a militarily powerful state that subjugated the
Cholas and, as a result, deserved to maintain its trading privileges at the
Chinese ports. Indeed, the statement by the Chinese official in 1106 regarding
the subjugation of the Chola state by Srivijaya and the continued tributary
missions from the Southeast Asian kingdom seem to indicate that Di-hua-jialuo and his envoys succeeded in preserving this false perception and helped
retain the privileges it had received from the Song court (see another
interpretation of this confusion in Professor Karashimas translation of the
Song shi record).

CONCLUSION
Changes in Chinese fiscal and commercial policies and the revamped tributary
system under the Song government attracted an unprecedented number of
foreign traders to the coastal regions of China. Maritime trading networks
that linked China all the way to the Red Sea became vital to the movement
of people and goods. These developments transformed the structure of
diplomatic exchanges among Indian Ocean states and led to the formation of
several new emporia across the Indian Ocean. For many Indian Ocean
kingdoms, the Cholas and Srivijayans in particular, the profit from international
commerce became a key component of the local economy and regional
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politics. Indeed, the participation in international commerce not only


contributed to economic activities within the kingdoms, but also enhanced
the political status of local rulers. Consequently, commercial and diplomatic
exchanges among Indian Ocean kingdoms became interlinked and the
relationship between rulers and traders turned more intimate than at any
time before in Asian history. Together, these developments led to the integration
of major markets in the Indian Ocean through multi-ethnic, well structured,
and extremely complex trading networks that stretched from the Mediterranean
Sea to the Chinese coast.
The confrontation between the Cholas and Srivijayans, as discussed in
this paper, resulted from the intense competition to access markets in Song
China. Indeed, the demand for foreign staples in China that mostly came
from the Persian Gulf region, and the export of Chinese porcelain and other
goods to the Middle East, made trade with China extremely lucrative to
traders and rulers in both the Srivijayan and Chola kingdoms. Because of
their geographical locations and powerful naval forces, the two kingdoms
already maintained significant control over key segments of Indian Ocean
commerce during the eleventh century. The unprecedented naval conflicts
between kingdoms in southern and Southeastern Asia seem to have been a
consequence of attempts by Chola traders and rulers to extend their sphere of
influence into the coastal regions of China. While Tamil sources indicate that
the Cholas were able to defeat the Srivijayans and sack many of their port
cities, Chinese records suggest that traders and rulers from Srivijaya continued
to enjoy their privileged position in Song China until the twelfth century. In
fact, it is not clear if Rajendra Cholas triumph in Srivijaya had any immediate
impact on Cholas trading relations with Song China. It seems that traders
from the Chola kingdom were able to establish their diaspora in China only
in the twelfth century (Clark 1995; Sen 2006). For the Song officials, as
evident from the 1106 memorial, the Cholas were perceived as a vassal state
of Srivijaya. The memorial suggests that the Cholas failed to gain access to the
Chinese markets despite their touted victories in Southeast Asia.
The triangular relationship between Song China, the Cholas, and the
Srivijayans illustrates a dramatically changed nature of the cross-cultural
interactions in Asian history. Previously, the land routes were the main
conduits of diplomatic and commercial interactions between eastern and
southern Asia. The expansion of territories and spheres of influence usually
also took place through the overland routes. The emergence of the Cholas in
southern India, Srivijaya in Southeast Asia, and the Song courts decision to
promote maritime trade, shifted the focus of cross-cultural interactions from
the overland roads across Central Asia to the sea routes passing through
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74

Tansen Sen

Southeast Asia. This shift resulted in intense commercial, diplomatic, and


religious exchanges between the coastal kingdoms of India and southern
regions of China that continued even after the European commercial enterprises
occupied the maritime trading networks in Asia.
The relationship between Song China, the Cholas, and the Srivijayans
also shows that the exchanges through the maritime routes were not always
peaceful. In fact, during the subsequent period, the Yuan and Ming dynasties
of China tried to use their naval might to dictate the nature of commercial
and diplomatic exchanges in the Indian Ocean. But the Chola raids on
Srivijaya are unique because of the commercial motives involved in instigating
the strikes. The exchanges between southern Asia and China had been
previously defined by the transmission of Buddhist ideas. The triangular
relationship between Song China, the Cholas, and the Srivijayans
demonstrates the heightened role of commerce in India-China interactions
and cross-cultural exchanges in Asia.

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