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Report
QRA FOR SKANGASS LNG PLANT FERRY BUNKERING PROJECT
SKANGASS AS
MANAGING RISK
Rev.
No.
Date
Prepared by
2013-06-03
Reference to part of this report which may lead to misinterpretation is not permissible.
Page iii of iv
Verified by
Approved by
RISVIK
ELLING
MANAGING RISK
Table of Contents
Page
INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................................3
COMPARISON OF RIGID LNG LOADING ARMS AND FLEXIBLE LOADING HOSES ..........7
SENSITIVITIES ................................................................................................................................28
6.1 Individual Risk 1st party and 2nd party ..................................................................................... 28
6.2 Societal and Individual risk 3rd party ....................................................................................... 31
6.2.1 Societal risk ....................................................................................................................... 31
6.2.2 Individual risk ................................................................................................................... 33
6.3 Sensitivities discussion............................................................................................................. 35
REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................................39
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Skangass is in the process to install an LNG bunkering station at the Fjordline ferry terminal
in Risavika, located adjacent to Skangass LNG Base Load Plant. Skangass would like to take
benefit of the close proximity to ferry terminal (approximately 600 m), by feeding LNG
directly from the plant, through an underground pipeline.
The Skangass ferry bunkering project is currently in the detailed engineering phase. In order
to provide to the reader and the decision maker a risk overview as close as possible to the
reality, some of the assumptions have been reviewed, such as, for example, differentiation of
risk criteria for ferry terminal workers (2nd party). All the assumptions are available in the
Appendix A of this report.
The main objective of this QRA is to:
Assess the combined risk for the ferry terminal area, taking into consideration both the
new LNG bunkering station and the updated risk results for the Base Load Plant,
Compare the risks with the risk acceptance criteria.
Based on experience in LNG bunkering, DNV assesses that the time of detection is likely to
be close to 90s in total (60s for detection and initiation, 30s for completion (time to close the
valve)). While Skangass estimates, based on its experience, that the total time can be reduced
down to 36s (30s for detection and initiation, 6s for completion). Even if a closing time of 6
seconds could be possible if Skangass documents that the facility uses a valve in compliance
with this requirement, DNVs experience shows that time to detect and initiate the ESV is
often extended to 60 seconds.
Therefore this report contains three sets of risk results:
-
The risk picture based on DNV recommendation corresponding to ESD total time of
90s, presented in section 5.
DNV considers the risk results based on the first alternative (total ESD time of 90s) as the
valid results. The two sensitivities are there to help the reader to understand the impact of a
shorter duration of ESD completion
Risk calculated for the planned LNG bunkering station and LNG Base Load Plant (Train 1),
combined, is presented in the report:
DNV Rep. No.: 2013-4091
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2013-06-11
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MANAGING RISK
The 1st/2nd party individual risk is found to be within the ALARP region for all
personnel categories.
The calculated 3rd party societal risk is acceptable or within the ALARP area for all
events.
3rd party Individual Specific Risk is acceptable or in the ALARP area for all
individuals except.
The passengers on board the ferry are at lower risk than the passengers at the terminal.
As a consequence of this boarding of most of passengers is planned to take place
before bunkering, ref. Skangass Design Basis /4/. Late-comers will be able to board
once the bunkering operations are completed. According to the same reference, no
passengers are allowed in the passenger tube during bunkering and only late-comers
will board through the tube after bunkering.
The sensitivities show a reduction in the risk picture for 1st party (only for the group
Skangass operators at the ferry terminal jetty), 2nd party and 3rd party. However, the
risk results remain in the same order of magnitude.
The detailed engineering of Risavika ferry station is regarded as safer than standard practice.
As the calculated risk is in ALARP area, Skangass should consider taking measures to reduce
the risk as the one presented below as example. Indeed, ALARP stands for As Low As
Reasonably Practicable, meaning that the risk is tolerable if risk reduction is impracticable or
if its cost is grossly disproportionate to the improvement.
Recommendations for risk mitigation provided in the plants QRA /1/ are valid also for the
bunkering station:
Focus on ignition source control to reduce the ignition probability
In general, reduction of LNG volume in the bunkering pipeline (e.g. either by
segmentation or by depressurizing part of the pipelines in between bunkering
operation), would reduce the fire and explosion risk.
Liquid bunds/trays around the LNG loading arm where an LNG leak could occur
would help limiting the pool size in the event of an LNG leak.
DNV recommends that ESD equipment is qualified for compliance with the
requirements to short response time (from gas detection to isolation) assumed in the
sensitivities in this analysis.
DNV recommends to apply all the points for manual local supervision as presented in
section 8.
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MANAGING RISK
INTRODUCTION
Fjordline is converting ferries for use of natural gas (LNG) instead of conventional fuels. In
light of this, Skangass is evaluating to install an LNG bunkering station at the Fjordline ferry
terminal in Risavika, located adjacent to Skangass LNG Base Load Plant. Skangass would
like to take benefit of the close proximity to ferry terminal (approximately 600 m), by feeding
LNG directly from the plant, through an underground pipeline.
The objective of this QRA is to:
Calculate the risk for the ferry terminal area, taking into consideration both the new
LNG bunkering station and the updated risk results for the Base Load Plant,
Compare the risks with the risk acceptance criteria, described in appendix C.
Risk levels are reported in terms of:
Individual risk for on-site manning (1st/2nd party)
Societal risk for off-site population (3rd party)
Report Structure
The main part of this report presents background, objectives, risk acceptance criteria and
results of the analysis. Mitigating measures are provided as recommendations. The content of
the 5 appendices is described below:
Appendix
Description
Appendix A Assumptions
Appendix B HAZID
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The risk picture based on DNV recommendation corresponding to ESD total time of
90s, presented in section 5.
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o Risk picture based on a mixed inputs from DNV recommendation and
Skangass input, 66s ESD total time,
o Risk picture based on Skangass estimation, 36s ESD total time.
DNV considers the risk results based on the first alternative (total ESD time of 90s) as the
valid results. The two sensitivities are there to help the reader to understand the impact of a
shorter duration of ESD completion.
Figure 1 LNG Base Load Plant and Fjordline ferry terminal area. LNG pipeline route
(indicative) as red line.
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MANAGING RISK
Skangass intention with its current design is to provide an LNG bunkering system for ferries
which is safer than conventional systems, e.g. by truck-to-ship, ship-to-ship or terminal-toship. By conventional is meant the small scale LNG filling stations in Norway, which is
found acceptable to DSB and the Norwegian Maritime Authority (Sjfartsdirektoratet), and
therefore may be regarded as standard practice. Naturally, these stations vary in technical
features but are typically characterized by
Flexible filling hose
Bolted flange connections requiring manual disconnection
Manual operation (e.g. truck driver, ship crew)
Ventilation lines / relief to atmosphere
No automatic/instrumented shut down upon gas detection
Reasons for stating that Skangass proposed design is safer are basically due to the simplicity
of the bunkering terminal due to the benefit of the close proximity to the Skangass LNG Plant
and selection of equipment with low leak frequency. Some examples are:
Simpler fewer possible leak sources:
o No ventilation lines or pressure safety relief valves to atmosphere
o All equipment components are selected based on low leak frequency (LNG
bunkering pump, LNG bunkering arm, vacuum insulated piping, etc.)
Reduced LNG inventory in the proximity of the bunkering system:
o No LNG buffer tank
o Pipeline in underground tunnel
Use of best available equipment:
o Loading arm instead of hose
o ESD link between ship/shore according to the SIGTTO standard
o Stainless steel, double wall, vacuum insulated piping gas detection between
the walls instead of PUR piping outside the plant
o Can pump without external seals instead of a centrifugal pump
Automatic, in addition to manual, ESD system
F&G detection and alarm system triggering automatic shutdown of the bunkering
system located on shore side and ship side.
Bunkering operation always manned with at least two operators. One on shore side
and one on ship side.
DNV Rep. No.: 2013-4091
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2013-06-11
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MANAGING RISK
A thorough assessment of the actual improvement of Skangass design as opposed to
conventional bunkering systems goes beyond the scope of this report, as this would require
a detailed assessment of each of the points above. The following is however noted: Each of
the points in the list above does not implicitly represent an improvement compared to
conventional design, in terms of safety, but as a whole, the technical design of Risavika
bunkering station is regarded as safer than standard practice.
The memo developed by DNV /5/ presents a qualitative assessment of the difference between
rigid LNG loading arms and flexible hoses used in the truck-to-ship operations for instance.
Prior to this assessment, Skangass have decided upon rigid LNG loading arms as a base case
solution for LNG bunkering at Risavika. In case of maintenance or failure of these loading arms,
Skangass are considering using flexible LNG loading hoses as a backup solution for their Ferry
Bunkering Station at Risavika.
The conclusion presented below summarizes the assessment done. All the details leading to this
conclusion can be found in the memo /5/:
DNV agree with Skangass prioritization on using rigid loading arms as the base case for the
LNG bunkering operations at Risavika. If hoses shall be used as a backup solution, stringent
operation and maintenance procedures need to be in place to control risk for loss of containment.
DNV suggest to further analyze the risk picture of bunkering operations with flexible hoses.
However the available data are not sufficient and consistent enough to develop a possible
acknowledged failure frequency for flexible LNG hoses at this stage. This will only be possible
after a qualification program, such as the program TNO1 initiated last year.
Dutch Organization for Applied Scientific Research (TNO), who has an independent position that allows to give objective
scientifically founded judgments and acknowledged as valid source of information for technical safety subjects, have recently
focused on the lack of sufficient qualification programs and proven track records for flexible LNG hoses
DNV Rep. No.: 2013-4091
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2013-06-11
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MANAGING RISK
RISK RESULTS
Risk contours generated by the Train 1 of the plant or as it is today in section 5.1.2 ;
To help the reader to differentiate the risk due to the different operations phase of the
bunkering facility, the risk contours generated by the plant and the bunkering facility for the
two operational phases are presented in section 5.1.3. But note that these are considered as
snapshots and are only valid during the two specific periods:
-
Risk contours generated by Train 1 and bunkering facility between the bunkering
operations (23 hours per day);
Risk contours generated by Train 1 and bunkering facility during the bunkering
operations (assumed taking place 1 hour per day);
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MANAGING RISK
Figure 2 Risk contours today: LNG Base Load Plant (Train 1) without ferry bunkering
installation
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Figure 3 Risk contours today: LNG Base Load Plant (Train 1) without ferry bunkering
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Figure 4 Risks contours (Train 1 and ferry bunkering system) between bunkering
operations
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5.1.3.2 Risk contours during bunkering operations
Figure 5 shows risk contours for the peninsula due to the LNG Base Load Plant (Train 1),
with the ferry bunkering facility installed. These risk contours however are valid during
bunkering of LNG. I.e. the figure is a snapshot showing the risk a person, present at any
point outdoors, is exposed to during bunkering operations.
Comparison with Figure 4 shows that the 1E-4 and 1E-5 risk contours are drifted slightly
southwards, due to the activity at the jetty during the bunkering. However, according to
Figure 5 the risk for passengers outdoors at the ferry terminal is slightly increasing, but
remains in the same order of magnitude.
Figure 5 Risk contours (Train and ferry bunkering system) during bunkering
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MANAGING RISK
5.1.4 Risk contours generated by the plant with the bunkering facility
Figure 6 and Figure 7 show risk contours for the peninsula due to the LNG Base Load Plant
(Train 1) with the ferry bunkering system installed. The contours show individual risk, for a
person present at any point outdoors, continuously exposed 8 760 hours per year, at any time
of the day, an average of both bunkering and no bunkering phases. Therefore, these figures
are the most appropriate for comparing with todays risk picture, i.e. Figure 2 and Figure 3.
The presence of the underground pipeline increases the overall risk level. The additional
pipeline raises the risk around the main pipe rack located at the south of the plant; the areas
covered by 2E-4 and 1E-4risk contours appear to be extended southwards. Apart for this
increase, the new installation does not change the coverage of risks contours 4E-4, 3E-4 as
shown in Figure 2. Concerning the 1E-5 risk contour; it now covers a greater part of the
peninsula including the ferry terminal and its surroundings.
Figure 6 Risks Contours for the combination of Train 1 and bunkering facility, average
of both bunkering and no bunkering phases.
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Figure 7 Risks contours combination of Train 1 and bunkering facility, average of both
bunkering and no bunkering phases.
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5.2
5.2.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the calculated individual risk for 1st and 2nd parties. For better seeing
what contributes to the risk, the results are presented in the following way:
1. Risk for the area today, due to the existing LNG Base Load Plant (Train 1). The
calculated values are compared with the acceptance criteria, ref. Appendix C.
2. The added risk contribution due to the planned ferry bunkering facility, when no LNG
bunkering is taking place. I.e. with 7 barg in the pipeline upstream the ESV at the
loading arm, 23 hours a day. The calculated values thus do not represent total risk
during this operational phase, and cannot be compared with the acceptance
criteria.
3. The added risk contribution due to the planned bunkering facility, during bunkering.
I.e. 10 barg operating pressure for 1 hour a day. The calculated values thus do not
represent total risk during this operational phase, and cannot be compared with
the acceptance criteria.
4. Risk for the area after installation of the ferry bunkering facility, equals to the sum of
1-3 above. The calculated values are compared with the acceptance criteria, ref.
Appendix C.
2. Ferry bunkering
facility no
bunkering
3. Ferry bunkering
facility during
bunkering
1800
1800
225
360
360
225
1440
1440
225
Total
1800
1800
225
Truck loading
terminal
438
438
225
Ship loading
terminal
122
122
122
Ship loading
terminal
671
671
225
Individual
Operator/Maintenance
Location
Control room
building (indoor)
Most exposed
process point
Control room
building (indoor)
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MANAGING RISK
Ship bridge (indoor fraction
0.75, during loading only)
Ship loading
terminal
671
671
225
Ferry loading
terminal
450
450
225
2. Ferry bunkering
facility no
bunkering
3. Ferry bunkering
facility during
bunkering
Individual
Location
Ferry terminal
indoor
1800
1800
225
Ferry terminal
outdoor
1800
1800
225
Adding the ferry bunkering system to the plant involves a slight augmentation of each
ISR, especially for the personnel around the loading bay (loading truck area), closest
location to the future pipelines location.
Table 5 presents calculated Individual Specific Risk (ISR) per working group at the Ferry
terminal (2nd Party):
- ISR for all groups in all locations is according to Table 5 within the ALARP area. No
values exceed the maximum criterion of 1E-04.
- Adding the ferry bunkering system to the plant involves a net augmentation of both 2nd
party ISR. However, when comparing the contribution to the risk according to the
activities running, the phase no bunkering is contributing with about 80%. This is
due to the high fraction of time (23/24) for this phase compared to the fraction of time
bunkering is taking place (1/24).
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Table 3 Individual specific risks for most exposed persons (1st party). Note that ISRs in column pairs 2. and 3. are additional risk
contributions, i.e. they do not represent total risk during this operational phase, and cannot be compared with the acceptance criteria,
ref. appendix C.
1. LNG Base Load Plant
(Train 1)
Individual
Location
Control room
building (indoor)
Most exposed
process point
Control room
building (indoor)
Operator/Maintenance
Truck loading
terminal
Ship loading
terminal
Individual
risk
(per year)
ISR
(per year)
1.18E-05
2.42E-06
1.04E-05
2.14E-06
2.00E-05
4.16E-04
6.50E-06
7.97E-06
5.38E-07
1.18E-05
1.52E-05
1.04E-06
2.47E-06
Total
Truck loading (1 person per truck per
1.2h)
Ship loading (jetty only during
connection and disconnection)1
2.17E-05
4. Combined Risk
Individual
risk y
(per year)
ISR
(per year)
5.13E-07
4.22E-05
5.07E-06
4.47E-05
4.50E-07
4.94E-04
7.49E-06
2.00E-05
8.48E-07
4.22E-05
1.83E-05
3.01E-06
1.30E-06
2.58E-05
1.36E-04
6.80E-06
8.00E-05
4.00E-06
9.38E-05
2.41E-06
3.10E-04
1.32E-05
4.45E-05
6.20E-07
9.53E-06
1.33E-07
9.93E-06
1.38E-07
6.40E-05
8.91E-07
Ship loading
terminal
4.92E-05
3.77E-06
1.09E-05
8.35E-07
1.33E-05
3.42E-07
7.34E-05
4.95E-06
Ship loading
terminal
4.92E-05
2.05E-06
1.09E-05
2.99E-07
1.33E-05
1.28E-07
7.34E-05
2.48E-06
Ferry loading
terminal
4.45E-05
3.80E-07 *
9.53E-06
4.32E-07
1.08E-04
2.78E-06
1.32E-04
3.59E-06
*Represent risk level for 2 hours of exposure to the LNG Load Base plant when operators are at the ferry terminal jetty.
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In Table 4 the AIR is calculated based on the Individual Specific Risk (ISR) for each working
group and the percentage of the total number of people each group constitutes.
The AIR is calculated from the formula
AIR
As shown in Table 4 AIR is still in the ALARP area, compared with the Skangass acceptance
criterion (ref. Appendix C), after installation of the ferry bunkering facility.
Table 4 Average ISR for 1st/2nd party
Criteria
Total number
of exposed
individuals
59
4.56E-06
6.83E-06
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MANAGING RISK
Individual specific risks for most exposed persons (2nd party). Note that ISRs in column pairs 2. and 3. are additional risk
contributions, i.e. they do not represent total risk during this operational phase, and cannot be compared with the acceptance criteria,
ref. appendix C.
Table 5
Location
Ferry terminal
indoor
Ferry terminal
outdoor
Individual risk
(per year)
ISR
(per
year)
1.02E-06
1.7E-07
1.68E-05
8.20E-07
2.32E-05
7.39E-06
1.2E-06
3.99E-06
3.45E-06
1.08E-04
Page 20 of 39
4. Combined risk
Individual risk
y
(per year)
ISR
(per
year)
5.96E-07
2.82E-05
1.63E-06
2.77E-06
1.32E-04
7.74E-06
MANAGING RISK
Figure 8 F-N curves for societal risk 3rd party, DNV inputs
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Individual
Location
1. LNG Base
Load Plant
(Train 1)
2. Ferry
bunkering
facility no
bunkering
3. Ferry
bunkering
facility
during
bunkering
Hours of presence
(per year)
Hours of presence
(per year)
Hours of presence
(per year)
Peninsula
Peninsula
280
280
280
Hiking track
Hiking track
70
70
70
219
110
110
Energiveien indoor
1800
225
225
Energiveien+Risavika industry
workers
Energiveien outdoor
1800
225
225
1800
225
225
1800
225
225
Rest indoor
1800
225
225
Rest outdoor
1800
225
225
Rest indoor
8760
365
365
Tananger indoor /
Tananger outdoor
8760
365
365
Ferry deck
Passengers indoor
219
109.5
109.5
Passengers outdoor
219
109.5
109.5
Living quarters
(indoor fraction of 0.75)
Tananger population
(indoor fraction of 0.75)
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In an event of a leak between the bunkering operations, the total inventory of the
system has been assumed to be released. No leak control such as ESD system is taken
into account.
Also, the ignition sources are more present between the bunkering operations in the
vicinity of this location. For example, between the bunkering operations, the
passengers will have to board the ferry with their cars. Therefore, contribution to the
ignition probability from the traffic on the parking and for passengers boarding have
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been taken into account. Thus the ignition probability is higher, generating a greater
risk of fire event.
For the Tananger population, the ISR increase, due to the additional ferry bunkering activity,
is not significant.
The ISR related to the passengers are in the ALARP area but vary according to their location.
The passengers on board the ferry are exposed of a lower risk than the passengers at the
terminal. As a consequence DNV recommends to keep the boarding of passengers before the
bunkering is taking place as suggested in the ref. Skangass Design Basis /4/. According to
the same reference, no passengers are allowed in the passenger tube during bunkering and
only late-comers will board through the tube after bunkering.
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Table 7 Individual Risk for 3rd party, Base Load Plant and ferry bunkering station combined. Note that ISRs in column pairs 2. and 3. are
additional risk contributions, i.e. they do not represent total risk during this operational phase, and cannot be compared with the acceptance criteria, ref.
appendix C.
1. LNG Base Load Plant
(Train 1)
Individual
Peninsula
Hiking track
Ferry Terminal
passengers
Energiveien+Risavika
office workers
Energiveien+Risavika
industry workers
Container area
office workers
Container area
industry workers
Rest companies
office workers
Rest companies
industry workers
Living quarters
(indoor fraction of
0.75)
Tananger population
(indoor fraction of
0.75)
Location
ISR
(per year)
Individual
risk y
(per year)
ISR
(per
year)
8.34E-08
3.30E-06
1.06E-07
4.07E-05
1.30E-06
3.06E-05
2.45E-07
4.32E-05
3.45E-07
2.69E-04
2.15E-06
6.53E-08
3.99E-06
8.98E-08
2.32E-05
5.55E-07
2.82E-05
7.10E-07
Negl.
Negl.
8.26E-10
1.70E-10
Negl.
Negl.
1.58E-09
3.25E-10
7.55E-09
1.55E-09
8.26E-09
1.70E-09
Negl.
Negl.
1.58E-08
3.25E-09
1.03E-08
2.12E-09
2.04E-08
4.19E-09
1.58E-07
4.07E-09
1.89E-07
1.04E-08
1.03E-07
2.12E-08
1.16E-07
2.38E-08
1.11E-06
2.86E-08
1.33E-06
7.36E-08
Rest indoor
2.33E-09
4.79E-10
3.98E-10
Negl.
Negl.
Negl.
2.80E-09
5.62E-10
Rest
outdoor
2.32E-08
4.77E-09
3.98E-09
8.18E-10
7.41E-10
Negl.
2.79E-08
5.60E-09
Rest indoor
2.33E-09
7.55E-09
3.98E-10
1.29E-09
Negl.
Negl.
2.80E-09
8.85E-09
Tananger
indoor /
Tananger
outdoor
1.78E-08
(indoor) /
1.78E-07
(outdoor)
5.80E-08
2.25E-09
(indoor) /
2.25E-08
(outdoor)
7.31E-09
1.97E-09 (indoor) /
1.97E-08 (outdoor)
Negl.
2.21E-08
(indoor) /
2.21E-07
(outdoor)
6.55E-08
Hiking
track
Ferry
terminal
indoor
Energiveien
indoor
Energiveien
outdoor
Container
area indoor
Container
area
outdoor
ISR
(per year)
3.48E-05
1.11E-06
2.61E-06
1.95E-04
1.56E-06
1.02E-06
4. Combined risk
Individual risk
(per year)
Peninsula
Individual
risk
(per year)
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1. LNG Base Load Plant
(Train 1)
Individual
Ferry deck
Parking area
passengers
Location
Passengers
indoor
Passengers
outdoor
Individual
risk
(per year)
ISR
(per year)
4.00E-07
2.18E-08
2.51E-06
2.38E-06
5.95E-08
3.54E-06
4. Combined risk
Individual risk
(per year)
ISR
(per year)
Individual
risk y
(per year)
ISR
(per
year)
5.16E-08
1.29E-04
6.12E-07
3.19E-05
6.85E-07
4.43E-08
1.89E-06
2.37E-08
7.81E-06
1.27E-07
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In Table 4 the AIR is calculated based on the Individual Specific Risk (ISR) for each working group
and the percentage of the total number of people each group constitutes.
The AIR is calculated from the formula:
AIR
As shown in Table 8 AIR is up from acceptable to ALARP area, compared with the Skangass
acceptance criterion (ref. Appendix C), after installation of the ferry bunkering facility.
Table 8 Average Individual specific risk 3rd party ferry bunkering station (per year)
Criteria
Total number of
exposed individuals
10 531
4.67E-08
1.37E-07
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MANAGING RISK
SENSITIVITIES
The results provided in section 5 are based on DNV recommendation corresponding to a total duration
of 90 seconds (60s to detect and initiate ESD and 30s for the ESD to close). However, Skangass
estimates that it is possible to activate the ESD system in a shorter time of 36s (30s to detect and
initiate ESD and 6s for the ESD valve to close).
Even if a closing time of 6 seconds could be possible if Skangass documents that the facility uses a
valve in compliance with this requirement, DNVs experience shows that the detection, initiation time
of the ESV is often extended to 60 seconds.
Therefore two sensitivities have been developed to investigate the risk picture for:
-
A duration of 66 seconds (60s to detect and initiate ESD, as recommended by DNV and 6s for
the ESD to close, as suggested by Skangass)
A duration of 36 seconds as estimated by Skangass (30s to detect and initiate ESD and 6s for
the ESD to close)
For both cases it has been assumed that the consequences of a leak on the pipeline between the
bunkering operations will remain the same. Thus only the risk picture during the bunkering operation
will be impacted.
The results of these two sensitivities are compared against the risk results based on the time
recommended by DNV.
6.1
For 1st and 2nd party the reduction in ESD time reduce the risk for the Skangass operators and terminal
workers at the ferry terminal,
For 1st party, Table 9 and Table 10 show the different individual risk according to the ESD time. The
individual risk for 2nd party is presented in Table 11 and Table 12.
For the most exposed 1st party which are the Skangass operators at the ferry terminal, the individual
risk contribution from bunkering is reduced by 62% with initiation and closing time according to
Skangass inputs, and the overall LNG-related risk is reduced with 39%.
For the most exposed 2nd party, which are the workers at the ferry terminal, the individual risk
contribution from bunkering is reduced by approximately 50% with initiation and closing time
according to Skangass inputs, and the overall LNG-related risk is reduced with 36% for outdoor
workers and 18% for indoor workers.
Table 9 Sensitivity, Individual specific risks for most exposed persons (1st party). Note that ISRs in
column 3.. are additional risk contributions, i.e. they do not represent total risk during this operational phase, and
cannot be compared with the acceptance criteria, ref. appendix C.
Individual
Location
3. Ferry bunkering
facility during
bunkering
Added risk contribution
DNV inputs
Page 28 of 39
3. Ferry bunkering
facility during
bunkering
Added risk contribution
DNV and Skangass
inputs
3. Ferry bunkering
facility during
bunkering
Added risk
contribution
Skangass Inputs
MANAGING RISK
Operator/Maintenance
Control room
building (indoor)
Most exposed
process point
Control room
building (indoor)
Individual
risk
(per year)
ISR
(per year)
Individual
risk
(per year)
Individual
risk
(per year)
ISR
(per
year)
Individual
risk
(per year)
2.00E-05
5.13E-07
1.99E-05
5.12E-07
1.98E-05
5.09E-07
4.47E-05
4.50E-07
4.47E-05
4.50E-07
4.47E-05
4.50E-07
2.00E-05
8.48E-07
1.99E-05
8.46E-07
1.98E-05
8.37E-07
Total
1.30E-06
1.30E-06
0.00E+00
Truck loading
terminal
9.38E-05
2.41E-06
9.36E-05
2.40E-06
9.30E-05
2.39E-06
Ship loading
terminal
9.93E-06
1.38E-07
9.93E-06
1.38E-07
9.93E-06
1.38E-07
Ship loading
terminal
1.33E-05
3.42E-07
1.33E-05
3.42E-07
1.33E-05
3.42E-07
Ship loading
terminal
1.33E-05
1.28E-07
1.33E-05
1.28E-07
1.33E-05
1.28E-07
Ferry loading
terminal
1.08E-04
3.69E-05
1.05E-04
2.71E-06
5.40E-05
1.39E-06
risks for most exposed persons (1st party). Base Load Plant
4.Combined Risk
DNV inputs
Individual
Operator/Maintenance
Location
Control room
building (indoor)
Most exposed
process point
Control room
building (indoor)
4.Combined Risk
DNV and Skangass
inputs
Individual Individual
risk
risk
(per year) (per year)
Individual
risk
(per year)
ISR
(per year)
4.22E-05
5.07E-06
4.22E-05
4.94E-04
7.49E-06
4.22E-05
1.83E-05
Total
4.Combined Risk
Skangass Inputs
ISR
(per
year)
Individual
risk
(per year)
5.07E-06
4.20E-05
5.07E-06
4.94E-04
7.49E-06
4.69E-04
7.49E-06
4.22E-05
1.83E-05
3.26E-05
1.83E-05
2.58E-05
2.58E-05
2.58E-05
Truck loading
terminal
3.10E-04
1.32E-05
3.10E-04
1.32E-05
3.09E-04
1.32E-05
Ship loading
terminal
6.40E-05
8.91E-07
6.40E-05
8.91E-07
6.40E-05
8.91E-07
Ship loading
terminal
7.34E-05
4.95E-06
7.34E-05
4.95E-06
7.34E-05
4.95E-06
Ship loading
terminal
7.34E-05
2.48E-06
7.34E-05
2.48E-06
7.34E-05
2.48E-06
Ferry loading
terminal
1.32E-04
3.59E-06
1.30E-04
3.52E-06
7.82E-05
2.20E-06
Page 29 of 39
MANAGING RISK
nd
Table 11 Sensitivity, Individual specific risks for most exposed persons (2 party). Note that ISRs in
column pairs 2. and 3. is additional risk contributions, i.e. they do not represent total risk during this operational phase,
and cannot be compared with the acceptance criteria, ref. appendix C.
Individual
Location
Ferry terminal
office workers
Ferry
terminal
indoor
Ferry
terminal
outdoor
Ferry terminal
industry workers
Table 12
2.32E-05
5.96E-07
2.26E-05
5.81E-07
1.19E-05
3.04E-07
1.08E-04
2.77E-06
1.05E04
2.70E-06
5.39E-05
1.38E-06
Sensitivity, Individual specific risks for most exposed persons (2nd party). Base Load Plant
Location
Ferry terminal
office workers
Ferry terminal
industry workers
Ferry terminal
indoor
Ferry terminal
outdoor
4.Combined Risk
DNV inputs
Individual
ISR
risk
(per year)
(per year)
4.Combined Risk
DNV and Skangass inputs
Individual
Individua
risk
l risk
(per year)
(per year)
4.Combined Risk
Skangass Inputs
ISR
(per year)
Individual risk
(per year)
2.82E-05
1.63E-06
2.76E-05
1.61E-06
1.69E-05
1.33E-06
1.32E-04
7.74E-06
1.29E-04
7.67E-06
7.81E-05
4.96E-06
Page 30 of 39
MANAGING RISK
Figure 9 F-N curves for societal risk 3rd party, DNV inputs
Page 31 of 39
MANAGING RISK
Figure 10 Sensitivity F-N curves for societal risk 3rd party, Mixed inputs
Figure 11 Sensitivity F-N curves for societal risk 3rd party, Skangass inputs
Page 32 of 39
MANAGING RISK
Individual
Peninsula
Hiking track
Ferry Terminal
passengers
Energiveien+Risavika
office workers
Energiveien+Risavika
industry workers
Container area
office workers
Container area
industry workers
Rest companies
office workers
Rest companies
industry workers
Living quarters
(indoor fraction of
0.75)
Tananger population
(indoor fraction of
0.75)
Ferry deck
Location
Peninsula
3. Ferry bunkering
facility during
bunkering
Added risk contribution
DNV inputs
Individual
ISR
risk
(per year)
(per year)
Individual
risk
(per year)
ISR
(per year)
Individual
risk
(per year)
ISR
(per year)
3.30E-06
1.06E-07
3.30E-06
1.06E-07
3.30E-06
1.06E-07
4.32E-05
3.45E-07
4.32E-05
3.45E-07
4.32E-05
3.45E-07
2.32E-05
5.55E-07
2.26E-05
5.41E-07
1.19E-05
2.80E-07
Negl.
Negl.
Negl.
Negl.
Negl.
Negl.
Negl.
Negl.
Negl.
Negl.
Negl.
Negl.
1.58E-07
4.07E-09
1.10E-07
2.82E-09
1.65E-08
4.24E-10
1.11E-06
2.86E-08
8.70E-07
2.23E-08
1.27E-07
3.26E-09
Negl.
Negl.
Negl.
Negl.
Negl.
Negl.
7.41E-10
Negl.
2.26E-10
Negl.
2.25E-10
Negl.
Rest indoor
Negl.
Negl.
Negl.
Negl.
Negl.
Negl.
Tananger
indoor /
Tananger
outdoor
Passengers
indoor
1.97E-09
(indoor) /
1.97E-08
(outdoor)
2.67E-10
1.97E-09
(indoor) /
1.97E-08
(outdoor)
2.67E-10
1.97E-09
(indoor) /
1.97E-08
(outdoor)
2.67E-10
1.29E-04
6.12E-07
2.83E-05
6.05E-07
1.50E-05
2.91E-07
Hiking
track
Ferry
terminal
indoor
Energiveien
indoor
Energiveien
outdoor
Container
area indoor
Container
area
outdoor
Rest indoor
Rest
outdoor
Page 33 of 39
MANAGING RISK
Individual
Parking area
passengers
Location
Passengers
outdoor
Table 14 Sensitivities -
3. Ferry bunkering
facility during
bunkering
Added risk contribution
DNV inputs
Individual
ISR
risk
(per year)
(per year)
2.07E-06
2.59E-08
Individual
risk
(per year)
ISR
(per year)
Individual
risk
(per year)
ISR
(per year)
2.07E-06
2.59E-08
1.14E-06
1.42E-08
Individual Risk for 3rd party, Base Load Plant and ferry bunkering station
combined.
Individual
Location
Peninsula
Peninsula
Hiking track
Ferry Terminal
passengers
Energiveien+Risavika
office workers
Energiveien+Risavika
industry workers
Container area
office workers
Container area
industry workers
Rest companies
office workers
Rest companies
industry workers
Living quarters
(indoor fraction of
0.75)
Tananger population
(indoor fraction of
0.75)
Ferry deck
Parking area
passengers
4.Combined Risk
DNV inputs
Individual
ISR
risk
(per year)
(per year)
4.Combined Risk
DNV and Skangass inputs
Individual
ISR
risk
(per year)
(per year)
4.Combined Risk
Skangass Inputs
Individual
ISR
risk
(per year)
(per year)
4.07E-05
1.30E-06
4.07E-05
1.30E-06
4.07E-05
1.30E-06
2.69E-04
2.15E-06
2.69E-04
2.15E-06
2.69E-04
2.15E-06
2.82E-05
7.10E-07
2.76E-05
6.96E-07
1.69E-05
4.35E-07
1.58E-09
3.25E-10
1.58E-09
3.25E-10
1.58E-09
3.25E-10
1.58E-08
3.25E-09
1.58E-08
3.25E-09
1.58E-08
3.25E-09
1.89E-07
1.04E-08
1.40E-07
9.12E-09
4.72E-08
6.73E-09
1.33E-06
7.36E-08
1.09E-06
6.73E-08
3.46E-07
4.83E-08
Rest indoor
2.80E-09
5.62E-10
2.75E-09
5.61E-10
2.75E-09
5.61E-10
Rest
outdoor
2.79E-08
5.60E-09
2.74E-08
5.59E-09
2.74E-08
5.59E-09
Rest indoor
2.80E-09
8.85E-09
2.75E-09
8.84E-09
2.75E-09
8.84E-09
Tananger
indoor /
Tananger
outdoor
Passengers
indoor
Passengers
outdoor
2.21E-08
(indoor) /
2.21E-07
(outdoor)
6.55E-08
2.21E-08
(indoor) /
2.21E-07
(outdoor)
6.55E-08
2.21E-08
(indoor) /
2.21E-07
(outdoor)
6.55E-08
3.19E-05
6.85E-07
3.12E-05
6.78E-07
1.79E-05
3.65E07
7.99E-06
1.30E-07
7.99E-06
1.30E-07
7.06E-06
1.18E-07
Hiking
track
Ferry
terminal
indoor
Energiveien
indoor
Energiveien
outdoor
Container
area indoor
Container
area
outdoor
Page 34 of 39
MANAGING RISK
Page 35 of 39
MANAGING RISK
The following comments were given in the previous QRA and remain the same for this version of the
report:
DNV has reviewed the interim location of the ship bunkering manifold and ventilation intakes, to
assess if there could be any non-conformity with respect to the DNV class rules.
The review is based on Skangass Design Basis, ref. /4/ and info from Fjordline:
Bunkering location is suggested to be on deck 3, # 106, port side.
Ventilation intakes are located on car deck, # 149-161, both port and starboard sides.
Initial comments, taken into consideration that the exact location is not set, are as follows:
Areas within the distance of 3 m from the gas fuel manifold valve are considered as hazardous
zone 1 (ref. IEC standard 60092-502, 4.2.2.7)
Areas of 1.5 m surrounding the hazardous zone 1 is considered as hazardous zone 2 (ref. IEC
standard 60092-502, 4.2.3.1)
Within the areas described above all electrical equipment need to be certified for the relevant
zone.
Air inlets for non-hazardous enclosed spaces shall be taken from non-hazardous areas at least
1.5 m from the boundaries of any hazardous area (ref. IEC standard 60092-502, 8.2.5).
Implicitly, this means that ventilation inlets to the accommodation or other gas safe spaces
need to be located at least 6 m from the gas manifold.
These are general comments which should be considered during the design phase. A bunker manifold
which is arranged in such a way that the above requirements are fulfilled will be considered acceptable
according to DNV class rules with respect to location.
Given that the manifold will be installed at the suggested location, the distance to the ventilation
intakes should be sufficient.
Detailed review of the entire gas bunkering system in order to verify compliance with DNV rules Pt.6
Ch. 13 Gas Fuelled Engine Installation will be carried out on a later stage based on final design.
Page 36 of 39
MANAGING RISK
Risk calculated for the planned LNG bunkering station and LNG Base Load Plant (Train 1), combined,
is presented in the report:
The 1st/2nd individual risk is found to be within the ALARP region or acceptable for all
personnel categories.
The calculated 3rd party societal risk, in terms of F-N curve, is within the ALARP or acceptable
area for all events.
3rd party Individual Specific Risk is found acceptable or in the ALARP area for all individuals.
The passengers on board the ferry are at lower risk than the passengers at the terminal. As a
consequence of this boarding of passengers is planned to take place before bunkering, ref.
Skangass Design Basis /4/. According to the same reference, no passengers are allowed in the
passenger tube during bunkering and only late-comers will board through the tube after
bunkering.
The sensitivities shows a reduction in the risk picture for 1st party (only for the group
Skangass operators at the ferry terminal jetty), 2nd party and 3rd party. However the risk
results remain in the same order of magnitude.
The technical concept of Risavika ferry station is regarded as safer than standard practice.
As the calculated risk is in ALARP area, Skangass should consider taking measures to reduce the risk
as the one presented below. Indeed, ALARP stands for As Low As Practible, meaning that the risk is
tolerable if risk reduction is impracticable or if its cost is grossly disproportionate to the improvement.
DNV recommends a high focus on ignition source control to reduce the ignition probability at the
Skangass LNG plant and ferry terminal. The traffic should be kept to a minimum. The public should
be made aware the potentially hazardous bunkering taking place on the jetty and explained about the
different safety procedures.
It should be noted that fiscal metring system and/or the direct monitoring of Skangass operators
shutting down the ignition sources in the event of a detected leak, are already taken into account in the
analysis. In addition, DNV recommends investigating the possibility of controlling the ignition sources
due to the car traffic in ferry terminal area. Also, the use of Ex proof equipment at the jetty, and
possibly on the ferry, should be considered.
It has been found that the groups working in the vicinity of the plant and the ferry terminal see their
risk increased. It has been assessed that the main contributor to the risk is the underground pipeline
between the bunkering operations that remained under 7 barg of pressure and filled with LNG to cool
down the line.
In general, reduction of LNG volume in the bunkering pipeline by segmentation part of the pipelines in
between bunkering operation would reduce the fire and explosion risk.
Also reduction of the standby pressure between the bunkering operations by depressurizing the whole
underground pipeline would reduce the fire and explosion risk. This study does not account for any
segmentation or depressurization of the loading line.
Page 37 of 39
MANAGING RISK
The main contributors to the leak frequencies are small bore fittings and flanges. Thus, it should be
considered to evaluate the benefits of using as less as practically possible flanges and small bore
fittings in order to reduce further the leak frequency at the jetty.
Liquid bunds/trays around the LNG loading arm where an LNG leak could occur would help limiting
the pool size in the event of an LNG leak.
Short response and closing times recommended by DNV for ESD upon confirmed leak are used in the
analysis (60 s for leaks response and 30 s for closing). This is based on continuous local supervision by
operators during transfer helping to activate the ESD system manually. It appears that the reduction of
the total ESD time will reduce the risk level, however the times estimated by Skangass are shorter than
what it is experienced in the industry.
Also, DNV recommends that all of the following conditions have to be met in order to justify a short
reaction time:
From the start to the end of the loading operation the operators present at the ferry terminal
jetty has a view of the loading operation and the loading/unloading arm. In particular, the
operator is not sitting inside a building during the loading operation.
The presence of the operators on-site is guaranteed by means of a facility such as a deadmans
handle or by a procedure in the safety management system and is checked during inspections.
The process of actuating the emergency stop device by the operators present in the event of a
leak during the loading operation is laid out in a procedure.
The operators present on-site is adequately trained and is also familiar with the applicable
procedures.
The emergency stop device is positioned according to the applicable standards, so that an
emergency button can be actuated within a short time irrespective of the direction of the
outflow.
It is also possible to close the ventilation system in the ferry terminal, from the Skangass LNG Plant,
upon gas detection. It is recommended to include possible leaks from the ferry bunkering facility in
this picture to ensure that the ventilation system closes also upon gas detection from the ferry
bunkering facility.
Page 38 of 39
MANAGING RISK
REFERENCES
/1/
QRA for Skangass LNG Plant, DNV, Report no.: 2009-0068, Rev 1, 08.05.2009
/2/
/3/
/4/
/5/
Comparison of LNG loading hoses vs. Rigid loading arms, Memo No. 16DJTWB2/JASTEIN, DNV, 18.03.2013
Page 39 of 39