Georgia Estel vs Recaredo Diego, Sr.

and Recaredo Diego,Jr

FACTS:
A complaint for forcible entry, damages and injunction with
application for TRO by Recaredos' was filed with the MTCC of
Gingoog. This complaint alleges that on April 1991, they entered
with a contract of sale of a parcel of land with the Estel. Estel
voluntarily delivered the physical and material possession of the
the subject matter after receiving the down payment. Then the
Recaredos
have
occupied
the
land
since
then
without
any
disturbances. 5 years after, Esthel with her two sons and 5 other
people uprooted the fence surrounding the land, entered the
premises and destroyed the trees and plants found therein. Recaredo
Sr., witnessed the incident but found himself helpless at that
time.
Respondents then prayed for the restoration of their possession,
issuance of permanent injunction against petitioner. MTCC issued a
TRO against petitioner and any person acting in her behalf.
In her defense and counterclaims, Estel denied the material
allegations in the complaint contending that respondents were never
physical, actual, public, adverse and uninterrupted possession of
the land. Also saying that he sale done before was abrogated when
she offered to return the amount which the respondents refused.
MTCC rendered order saying that the petitioners must vacate the
premises of the land and return the same to the respondents with
additional payments. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the RTC of
Gingoog, but RTC affirmed the decision of MTCC. Petitioner then
filed a petition for review with the CA, CA affirmed the decision
of the RTC. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the
CA denied it as well.
ISSUES: (1) MTCC of Gingoog has jurisdiction over the subject
matter? (2) Conclusions are not supported by competent material
evidence?
HELD:
(1) Petitioner did not raise the issue of jurisdiction in the MTCC
and RTC, so she is estopped from raising that issue now. Estoppel
sets in when a party participates in all stages of a case before
challenging the jurisdiction of the lower court.
(2) Respondents sufficiently alleged in their complaint the
material facts constituting forcible entry, as they explicitly
claimed that they had prior possession of the land since its
purchase from the petitioner, who voluntarily delivered it to them.