People v Corral, G.R. No. L-42300 (Jan.

31, 1936)

Facts:
Appellant was charged having voted illegally at the general elections held on June 5, 1934. After
due trial, he was convicted on the ground that he had voted while laboring under a legal disqualification.
The judgment of conviction was based on section 2642, in connection with section 432 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
It is undisputed that appellant was sentenced by final judgment of this court promulgated on
March 3, 1910 to suffer eight years and one day of presidio mayor. No evidence was presented to show
that prior to June 5, 1934, he had been granted a plenary pardon. It is likewise undisputed that at the
general elections held on June 5, 1934, the voted in election precinct No. 18 of the municipality of Davao,
Province of Davao.
Counsel for the appellant contend that inasmuch as the latter voted in 1928 his offense had
already prescribed, and he could no longer be prosecuted for illegal voting at the general election held on
June 5, 1934.
Issue:
1. W/N the state has the right to deprive a persons right to suffrage
2. W/N the appellants contention that the end of his punishment thus ends of his disqualification for
election has merit.

Held:
Yes. The right of the State to deprive persons to the right of suffrage by reason of their having
been convicted of crime, is beyond question. "The manifest purpose of such restrictions upon this right is
to preserve the purity of elections. The presumption is that one rendered infamous by conviction of
felony, or other base offense indicative of moral turpitude, is unfit to exercise the privilege of suffrage or
to hold office. The exclusion must for this reason be adjudged a mere disqualification, imposed for
protection and not for punishment, the withholding of a privilege and not the denial of a personal right.
No. Neither is there any merit in the contention advanced by counsel for the appellant that the
disqualification imposed on the latter must be considered as having been removed at the expiration of his
sentence. This claim is based upon an erroneous theory of the nature of the disqualification. It regards it
as a punishment when, as already indicated, the correct view is that it is imposed, "for protection and not
for punishment,. the withholding of a privilege and not the denial of a personal right." Judicial
interpretation and long established administrative practice are against such a view.