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To my mother and father

THE TOURNAMENT PLAYER'S REPERTOI RE OF OPENINGS Series Edited by R.G.Wade, O.B.E.

Sicilian:

Jon Kinlay

Keres Attack

B.T.Batsford Ltd,

London

First published 1 981 � Jon Kinlay 1 981

ISBN 0 7134 2139 9 (limp)

Photoset by Andek Printing, London and printed in Great Britain by Bill ing & Son Ltd, London, Guildford & Worcester for the publishers B.T.Batsford Ltd, 4 Fitzhardinge Street, London WIH OAH

A BATSFORD CHESS BOOK

Adviser: R.G.Wade

Technical Editor:

P. A.L amford

Contents

Symbols

 

vi

Acknowledgments

 

vii

I

Int roduction

 

I

2

Central Counterattacks: 6

 

d5; 6

e5

15

3

6

h6

19

4

Queenside C ounterattack:

6

a6

56

5

6

lbc6; 6

e7

75

Index of Complete Games

 

100

Index of Variations

101

Symbols

+

Check

;!;

+

Slight advantage

±

+

Clear advantage

±±

++

Winning advantage

=

Level position

00

Unclear p osition

!

Good move

!!

Outstanding move

!?

· Interesting move

?!

Dubious move

?

Weak move

??

Blunder

Corres

Correspondence

OL

 

Olym piad

IZ

Interz onal

L

League

Ch

 

Championship

\.-Sf

Semi-final

Acknowledgments

My thanks are due to Graham Hillyard for checking the manuscript, to Paul Lamford for his editorial work and especially·to Bob Wade, whose extensive library, friendly advice and warm hospitality were equally invaluable. My thanks also to E,obert, whose creativity both on and off the chess board will always be a source of inspiration, and, above all, to my wife Margaret for her enduring support and patience.

Jonathan Kinlay,

London, July

1 981.

1

Introduction

e4

B
B

The

Keres Attack, introduced

by the IlliO ves

l

e4

cS

2

ltlf3

e6

3

d4

cd

4

ltlxd4

ltlf6

S

ltlc3

d6

6

g4

is one of the most dangerous weapons available to White in the Paulsen Variation of the Sicilian. An uncompromising strategy, its purpose is to assure W hite of an undisputed advantage in space and a firm grip on the centre, which form the basis for a direct kingside attack with pawns. The unbalanced positions w hich arise require a deep understanding of the strategic concepts a nd a high degree of tactical alertness to supplement the necessary detailed knowledge of current theory. This

introduction will provide the reader with an understanding of the

fu ndamental strategic ideas; th e main text will deepen that under­ standing and acquaint him with the theory; tactical ability the reader will himself have to provide.

Origin

The a ttack derives its name from the Estonian grandmaster P aul Keres, whose lucid, attacking styl e of play placed him among the topmost rank of chess masters of

this century. His approach to chess

strategy was clear and direct and

in his handling of openings he displayed an extraordinary inven­

tiveness. These distinctive qualities which typified his style were nowhere more apparent than in the following game in which he first experimented with the attack which was later to bear his name.

Keres-Bogoljubow, Salzburg 1943

l

2

ltle2

cS

Another of Keres' ideas, the pur pose of which is to retain the option of a closed system.

2

3

d4

e6

cd

7 g5

2 Introduction

4

lbxd4

lbf6

8

11Vxd4

lbd7

S

lbc3

d6

9

i.e3

a6

6

g4

10

i.el

1!fc7

Keres wrote: 'Th is interesting idea came into my mind during

 

11

f4

b6

It

now transpires that the normal

11

 

b5 will merely result in a

the course of the game. In this position the continuation 6 g3

serious weakening of Black's pawn

followed by i.g2 was often employ­

formation after 12 a4! since the

undesirable exchange 12

ba is

ed and an attack on the king's wing was begun only later by f4 and g4. The thought came into my head, however, why not save a tempo and begin immediately with g4?'

fo rced due to the positioning of White's queen - directly the result of the premature simplification on

move 7. White's advantage is al ready substantial.

6

�c6

12 fS! (2)

 

It is interesting that Bogoljubow avoided the natural attempts at

e5.

Perhaps he chose this solid contin­ uation instinctively, or perhaps,

like Keres, he was able to convince himself through over-the-board analysis that the idea was sound. In any event he must h ave found the situation confusing and it is not too surprising that he rather quickly goes wrong.

refutation, 6

d5

and 6

�xd4?

Black quite justifiably desires to simplify the position as much as possibl e, but exchanging the knights at this stage turns out to be an error ofjudgment. The white queen takes up a dominating position in t he centre of the board where it hinders both the development of Black's pieces and his intended expansion on the queenside - a theme we will be returning to at various stages of the analysis to follow.

2

B

to at various stages of the analysis to follow. 2 B The concession of e5 in

The concession of e5 in this way is permissible only in special circumstances. Here White is able to force open the f-file by tactical means thereby preventing Black from castling.

12

13 fe

The point is that 13

to

14 "t!f a4+

i.b5!) 15 lbd5!

i.d7 (14

14 a4

lbe5

fe i.x e6 fail s 'ir d7 15

N ot immediately 14 "t!fx b6 't!Vx b6

lib8. The text move

15 i.x b6

Introduction 3

�e7

�b7

ensures that White will be able to

the closed system with the advan­

protect

his

bishop with a5 if

tages of space and piece mobility

necessary.

which he enjoys in the open system.

14

15

h4

the

b -pawn. Black has no time to get

castled.

Renewing

the

th reat

on

15 1!Vc5

16

17 llfl

1!Vc7

1!Vd2

18 ,.td4!

Now 18

� -0 is impossible on

account of 19 1!re3.

18

19 0-0-0

20 llxfl

llf8

llxfl

i.d8

Or 20 "it' g4 etc.

21 .

22 )

�c4 21

't!rf4

"it'g4!

't!rf4 0-0-0 22

lDg6

1!re7

As Keres points out, a prettier

finish would have been 22

23 �d5 1!rc6 24 't!rxe6+ <t>xe6 25 g4 mate! After the move played Keres won as follows: 23 't!rh5 e5 24 �e3 i.c7 25 't!rxh 7 �f4 26 i.xf4 ef 27 i.h5+ <t>d7 28 i.g4+ <t>c6 29 "ft' f5 b5 30 "it' d5+ ct>b 6 31 1!rd4+ <t>c6 32 �d5

<2;>d7

1-0.

Basic Strategies

Keres' comments on the game in which he first experimented with the attack provide an important insight into its rationale and the underlying strategic concepts. In the 6 g3, 7 i.g2 varition to which Keres refers White's aim is to combine the pattern of strategy of

The disadvantage of the variation is th at it is rath er slow, so it is difficult for White to generate and sustain an attacking initiative to offset the looseness of his open formati on. In the Keres At tack the intention is to overcome thi& problem by extending the fianchetto immediately to create a fast moving flank attack. The justification for this is that if Black is thrown onto the defensive at an early stage he will be too preoccupied with his own position to prevent White from consolidating his initial gain in space and subsequently pursuing his ready-made kingside attack. To summarise, Wh ite's aims in the Keres Attack are to:

I) make early gains in space on the

kingside.

2) disorganise Black's forces, so

that it is difficult for him to counter­

attack.

3) consolidate his position in the

centre (note that the displacement of the knight from f6 weakens

Black's control of d5 and e4) and on the kingside.

4) finally, pursue his kingside attack directly with f4, f5 and h4, h5 etc. Turning to Black's viewpoint, there are a numb er of different strategies he can fo llow. We will examine:

d5

A) rapid counteraction with 6

or 6

e5.

4 Introduction

B) restraint on the kingside with 6

h6.

C) counterattack on the queenside

by means of 6

b5.

D) simple dev elopment with 6

ltlc6 or 6

e7.

a6 and

A)

6

d5; 6

e5

dS Black is saddled

with an isolat ed pawn and White gains a subst antial development

dS 7

ed ltlxd5 8 J.b5+ J.d7 9 ltlxd5 ed

10 't!Ve2+ 1!re 7 11 J.e3 g6 12

�xd7+ ltlxd7 13 lObS ltle5 140-0-0 ± Fischer-Reshevsky, USA Ch 1 966/ 67 (3).

adv antage. One example: 6

After 6

USA Ch 1 966/ 67 (3). adv antage. One example: 6 After 6 Diagram 4 shows

Diagram 4 shows a typical

e5,

outcome fro m the move 6

6 Diagram 4 shows a typical e5, outcome fro m the move 6 which ser i

which seriously weakens Black's

white

7

J.b5+! J.d7 8 J.xd7+ 1!rxg7 9 ltlf5

h5 10 J.g5 ltlxg4 II h3 ± (4).

ltlf6 12 J.xf6 gf 13

ltld5 White has complete control.

After 11

square

control: 6

e5

B)

6

h6

Black shores up his defences to

av oid t he disorganisation of his

fo rces which

At t he same time, howev er, t he

move provides a target for Whit e's kingside att ack. There are t hree ways in which White can proceed:

B 1) open up lines immediately

with 7 g5. B2) reinforce his grip on the centre by fianchettoing the bishop. B3) make further preparations for the attack with 7 I!gl.

results from g4-g5 .

Bl)

7 g5

This is a popul ar line of play in which White breaks early on the kingside to gain greater scope for

his pieces. To offset the weakening of his pawn structure he has the open g-file and a strong bishop on g5 which hampe rs the action of Black's pieces while enhancing his

o· wn control

strategy is to restrict his opponent by pushing the f- and h-pa wns,

looking for opportunities for a break with e5 and actio n along the g-file. Blac k usually handles the position slowly, castling long and gradually untangling his position with

J.e7 and

llJg8 (5) .

of the centre. His

In troduction 5

5

B

In troduction 5 5 B .tc8 16 1Wc7 18 lihg 1 lDd5 ! ed 21 ed

.tc8 16

1Wc7

18 lihg 1 lDd5 ! ed

21 ed ;!; Skrobek-Adamski, P olish

Ch 1 977) 17 �b 1 !i:J g8 18 lidg 1 (White saves a tempo in this way)

lih7 19 \tf2 .txg5 20 lixg5 f!Jge7 21 lid 1 g6 22 hg

(;!;) 20

From diagram 5: 15

.tf3 (preventing 16

(16

d5) 16

lih7 17 1!V e2 lDg8

.txg5 19 lixg5 !i:J ge7 20

18

li h5 lig7 24 lig 1 ligg8

lixg5 27

lixg5 f5 with equality, Karpov­

!i:J xg6 23

25

lihg5 !i:J ge7 26 .th5

Andersson, Skara 1980.

But Black can also break quickly

with

a6 and

b5 (6):

6

w

But Black can also break quickly with a6 and b5 (6): 6 w From diagram 6:

From diagram 6: 13 .ig2 (the

simple 13 a3 needs testing) 13

.ib7 14 't!Ve3! b4 15 lDa4

lDd7 1 6 e5! d5 1 7 f5! 't!Vxe5 18 \tf2

b4! (13

1!V xf5 19 1!V xf5 ef - Razuvayev­

Commons, L ublin 1978 - 20

.txd5 ±) 14 lDa4 e5 15 fe de 16 h3

1!V f2 !i:J d 7 with a fi ne

position for Black, Nunn-Ghinda,

Dortmund 1979.

B2) 7 .tg2

A more sedate system which nevertheless deserves attention. White strengthens his position centrally before carrying forward his kingside attack. He can opt for either king- or queenside castling, the latter offering the better attack­ ing opportunities though naturally incurr ing greater risk. The emphasis of the attack has shifted from the wing to the centre so that instead of steering for a g5 advance White will be looking for opportunities to push fo rward with e5 or f4-f5 . Black's typical plan for counter­ action is to wait for White 's f4 a dvance and then liquidate in the

centre with

e5,

when the outcome of the struggle will depend on how well each side

makes use of the resulting open

fi les.

.te6 17

!i:J xd4 and

One example scenario:

7

B

will depend on how well each side makes use of the resulting open fi les. .te6

6

In troduction

11 lt!xd4 12 .t xd4 e5 13 .te3

ef 14 .txf4 .te6 15 0-0-0 0-0 16 'it>b l (White has only a slight pull

in this position and the way he develops his attack using the f- and e-files is most instructive) 16

llac8 17 1!V d2 llfd8 18 llhfl lt!e8?!

19 .te3 .tf6 20 lt!d5 .txd5 21 ed

.te5 22 h4 1Wc4 23 g5 h5 24 .tf4 g6

25 llde l .txf4 26 llxf4 \!Vc 5 27

lle7 with a winning attack in Horvath-Stean, Virovitica 1977. B3) 7 llgl This move introduces an inter­ esting alternative to the more commonplace plans outlined in B 1. White's intention is to run through on the kingside with h2-h4, g4-g5 fo llowed by an e ventual g5-g6. The pawn attack will be all the more dangerous now that Black's kingside defences have been weak­ ened and it is therefore incumbent on the second player to seek active counterplay as quickly as possible. R outine operations will permit White to complete his development wi th .te3, .te2, 1!V d2 and 0-0-0 and then pursue his strategy with

h4 etc, so attention focuses on the

d5. This break

more dynamic

has the effect of shifting the emphasis away from the wing to the centre, so precipitating an immediate struggle for superiority in that sector ofthe board. Although Black is rather better prepared for

d5

discussed in section A, he once again runs the positional risk ofan isolated d-pawn and faces tactical

the contest than after 6

t hreats from Whit e's rapidly mobil­ ised pieces. By way of illust ration we consider t he position shown in diagram 8, arising from the game Karpov­ Spassky, Tilburg 1980.

8

w

8, arising from the game Karpov­ Spassky, Tilburg 1980. 8 w The continuation was 9 .tb5

The continuation was 9 .tb5 .td7 10 ed lt!xd5 11 lt!xd5 ed 12 .te3! (White aims to control the square in front of the isolated pawn and shapes up for an attack on h6 in case Black should castle

short) 12

.te7 13 't!Vd2 .txh4

(not so much pawn grabbing as an attempt to secure a sanctuary for the bishop on f6 where it can

defend the kingside) 14 0-0-0 .tf6

15 lt!f5 .txf5 16 gf a6 (after 16

d4 17 .txd4 .txd4 18 \!Vxd4 1!V xd4 19 .txc6+ be 20 llxd4 Black's

endgame prospects are bleak) 17 .txc6+ be 18 .tc5 llb8 19 b4 llb5

20 llge l+ �d7 21 c4 ±± .

C)

6

a6

The system where Black engages

in an early minority attack with

b5 is the most energetic at

his disposal. It is also the most dangerous plan for the second

and

a6

In troduction

7

player since it allows White a free hand to pursue his ambitions on the otherfl ank. Evidence suggests that Black's most productive for­ mation in this line is the placement of his knights on b6 and d7, in preparation for occupation of c4 or in some cases .an exchange sacrifice on c3. White's optimal development is less easy to define and it is an open question whether it is better to- bring the major pieces into play at an early stage or to co ncentrate on fo rcing concessions with an immediate pawn storm­ an early h4 fo llowed by h5 and eventually g5-g6 seems to be one of the most promising plans, - ut we examine one or two of the options. 1

After 7 g5 .!t::l fd7 8 .te3 (8 llg 1 is interesting, as is 8 .tc4 reaching a

type of Sozin position) 8 a3 we divide into:

C1) 9

C2) Other fo rmations

b5

9

.!t::l b6

Cl)

9

.!t::l b6

As indicated earlier this plan is likely to be Black's best bet and can be precarious for White,

particularly if he routin ely castles queenside, as the game Korsunski­ Timoshchenko, USSR 1 979, illus­ trates (diagram 9). The game follows three phases:

1) occupation of c4; 2) exchange sacrifice on c3 to demolish White's centre; and finally 3) switch to direct attack on the king.

llc 8 13 .td3 .!t::l c4 14 .txc4

llxc4 15 llhe 1 .!t::l c5 16 .ig 1 .te7 !

12

c4 14 .txc4 llxc4 15 llhe 1 .!t::l c5 16 .ig 1 .te7 ! 12 (enticing

(enticing White's next) 17 b3 llxc3

18 ti' xc3 .!t::l xe4 19 ti'f3 't!Va8 20

\!Vg4 0-0 21 lld3 d5 22 llh3 .txa3+

23 'it>b 1 't!Vd 8! 24 lld 1 1!ra5

White's other major piece d evel­ opment strategies comprise llg 1 and 't!Vg4, and the two have been combined although without any particularly noticeable effect. Here

we take a look at the latter scheme, this being rather less well mapped

out than

intention in seeking a more active role for the queen is to pressurise Black's kingside, particularly the e6 square, in the hope of forcing positional concessions for his pawns to exploit - the reverse side ofthose h4 plans in which the pawns do the

the llg 1 plan. White's

=f=f.

for his pawns to exploit - the reverse side ofthose h4 plans in which the pawns

8 Introduction

initial softening up. If we consider the position in diagram 10, it is clear that comparisons with the position shown in diagram 9 are in

order, in which White's fo rmation

has a more passive look to it. Here Black's most natural move is 12 llc8, when in view of the routine exchange sacrifice intended White should test the potency of his own threats with 13 g6!? hg 14 li:lxe6!?

fe I5 't!r xg6+ <i; e 7 I6

f5 li:lf6 I7 e5!?

In the game Kuijpers-Ei sing, Wij k aan Zee I 974, Black decided that

the threats were too dangerous

g6. White logically

and played 12

fo ll owed the plan of weakening the kingside as much as possible

and then switched to the centre for

as much as possible and then switched to the centre for on I2 llh3! (this unusual

on I2 llh3! (this unusual manoeuvre has the benefit of preventing g6 by maintaining the pressure on

\!Vc7 I3 g6!? hg I4 llxh3 I5 gf+) I5

the h-fi le) I2 hg li:lxg6 (or I4

llxh8 lDxh8 I6 \!Vh5 lDg6 I7 i.h3 (White already has considerable pressure for the pawn and in the

the

final breakthrough : I3 h4 h5

next phase ofthe game she capital­

(or

13

lieS I4 h5 llxc3 I5 hg!)

ises on the open files and her

I4

gh lDf6 I5 't!r g i lDc4 I6 i.xc4 be

opponent's mistakes!) I7

e5? IS

17

ll h2 \!Vc7 IS e5 de I9 fe 't!r xe5?

lDf5 li:le7 I9 't!r h8! lDxf5 20 ef i.b7

C2) Other formations

20

lle2 "@ h5 2I i.g5 li:ld5 22 lDxe6!

2I 0-0-0 li:lc4 22 f6 ! gf 23 't!r xf6

fe 23 llxe6! rM7 24 lDxd5 ±± . Finally in section C I we cover briefly the strategy behind the

lDxa3? (irrelevant) 24 llg i i.c8 25 llg8 ! i.xh3 26 llxf8 + I -0.

move 10 h4 with which White has

Lines in which Black refrains

scored several notable victories. After the h-pawn reaches the fifth rank White has to protect or

reposition hi s rook

before the

threat of g5-g6 can become concrete. The older method was llg i which has the defect of allowing Black to

cover

a

model a more recent game which illustrates the modern method. From the position in diagram

II the game Savareide-Markovic,

Malta (Women's OL) I980, went

with

g6.

We

use

as

from the aggressive

tion

first player. Not only are Black's threats on the queenside easier to meet but his control of the d5 square is weakened, offering White opportunities to play f4-f5 when

the response

e5 will be positionally

li:lb6 forma­

pose fe wer difficulties for the

or tactically undesirable. The usual range of strategies are available to White as outlined in section C I

and here we concentrate on a single interesting example which illustrates

In troduction 9

several of the pri ncipal themes.

In troduction 9 several of the pri ncipal themes. The posl tl on in diagram 12

The posl tl on in diagram 12 arises from the game Fedo rowicz­ P etrosian, Hastings 1977/78. White has already committed his queen to the attack (cf. diagr am 10) and stands ready to open the bidding with f4-f� . Black reacts unsteadily, gaining a tempo on the queen only to fa ll back on the defensive at

once: 11

the h-pawn in preparati on for g5-

g6) 12

li'l b6, only now

g6 (per haps Black

lik eS ?! 1 21i' h3 (pi nning

had intended 12

rea lising the consequences of 13 f4 li'l e c4 14 .txc4 llJxc4 15 g6 !) 13 f4 llJ c6 14 Iil g 1 "t!Vc8 15 f5 llJc5 (in

llJb6 lines Black would have been

e5, covering d5

wi th his pieces) 16 fe fe 17 .txb5 ! (Black has taken steps to protect the pawn on e6 but in so doing has weakened his d-pawn: the text is therefore justifi able as a tacti cal means of exploiting this posi tional

weakness) 17

19 Iil gfl .te7 20 1!f h6 llJf7 21 't!Vg7

ab 1 8 llJdx b5 llJd8

happy to play

22

1!rg8+

llJ xe4 .txe4 27 Wxe4 ±± .

1!b h7 llJ xe4 23

Iil f8

25

Iil xf7 Iil xf7 24

ct>d7 26

1!rxg6+

D) Simple Development Strategies:

.te7

The strategic concepts underlying

.te7 lines are

difficult to pi n down in exact terms. Whereas in other variations Black fo llows clear po licies of restraint or

counterattack, here he adopts no

particular str ategic plan but instead concentrates on avoiding weak­ nesses and on completing his development as rapidly as possible.

His i ntention

lega me

and then draw up his plan according to the requirements of the position as he sees them, taking into account the particular method of dev elop­ ment which White has opted for. The i dea is that by retai ning maxi mum flexibility in his positi on he will be able to cope with any conti ngency and later on exploit the positional weaknessesi ncurred

his

fo rces during the early mid

the 6

6

li'l c6; 6

li'l c6 and 6

is

to

regroup

d

by White in the openi ng. On the debit side, the main criticism which

can be made of these lines is that they are essentially passive, and White shoul d aim to exploit this by adopting simple, fo rceful methods. There is no shortage of options

from whi ch

and we exami ne a number of these

in turn.

Whi te may choose,

(completing the penetrati on on

 

6

llJc6 7 g5

llJd7

the dark squares; there fo llows a

Dl)

8 .te3

mopping up operati on) 21

Iil f8

A

non-com mittal

move whi ch

10

In troduction

White can follow up wit h queenside cast ling and a rapid kingside att ack, or Karpov's idea of cent ral act ion, among ot her plans. Diagram 13 shows a t ypical position arising from the former plan. Scent ing White's intent ion of going for an attack with h4-h5 and g5-g6 Black has himself made preparations for an all-out assault on the opposite wing. As the sequel shows, the outcome of the struggle is decided by White's capability to adequately defend his own king while making use of his superiority in the centre to even tually open up lin es to his opponent's.

13

w

to even tually open up lin es to his opponent's. 13 w Mednis-Timman, Sombor 1974, continued

Mednis-Timman, Sombor 1974,

continued 15 h4 a5 16 h5 a4 17 g6

fg 18

hg h6) 1 8 gf+ <3t xf7 1 9 cb ab 20 a3! (Black's play on the queenside is

h6 21

b3? (m ore resi lient was 17

. now essentially dead) 20

llhfl lL!xd4 22 lL!xd4 <3t e8 23 't!rf2 .tc8 (both sides have managed so far to defend adequately but now, after due preparation, White breaks open the centre) 24 e5 llb6 25 f5 !

28

't!r g6+ <3t d8 29 ltlb5+ lld6 30

.tb7 26 fe de 27 't!r g 3 .txg2

1Wxg2 1 -0. Anot her illust rat ion of the king­ side v queenside att ack t heme is provided by the game Alexandria­ Kozlovskaya, Tbilisi 1979, which once again shows the- strength of the plan of breaking open Black's pawn barrier by attacking the white squares with h4-h5 fo llowed by g5-g6.

attacking the white squares with h4-h5 fo llowed by g5-g6. .tc6 (preparing reasons that with her

.tc6

(preparing

reasons that with her pawn attack so far advanc ed the concession of e5 is of lesser significance than the

pressure which this move brings to bear on Black's light squares) 16

lL!c4 18

't!Vf2 ltlxe3 19 't!Vxe3 e5 20 ltld5

.ixd5 21 llxd5 likewise leaves Black with a substantial inferiority on account of the weakness on d5 and the passivity of her pieces) 18 h 5 a 5 19 g6 hg 20 hg llxh3 (this exchange sacrifice alleviates some of the immediate pressure: on 20

there would fo llow 21 gf+

±±) 21 gf+ lL!xf7 22

llxh3 b4 23 fe be 24 ef+ <3; e 7 25 .tg5 + 'i!> xf7 26 1!Vd 5+ <3; g6 27

(White

The sequel was 15

a5)

16

f5 !

lL!e5 17 .ih3 .td7 ( 17

b4

lL!xf7 22 fe

Introduction

11

lixc3 1!V b8 28

ll g3 1-0.

Finally in this section we take a look at a plan devised by Karpov, the essence of which is to break open lin�s in the centre by sacrificial

means in an attempt to exploit the exposed position of Black's king. Naturally there are many fine points to this strategy and the reader is advised to take note in particular. of the idea behind White's 1 2th move.

15

w

particular. of the idea behind White's 1 2th move. 15 w The game Karpov-Dorfman ,­ USSR

The

game

Karpov-Dorfman ,­

USSR Ch 1976, continued 12 llJxc6! (drawing the queen to the c6 square so that after the knight sacrifice on d5 White will be able to recapture with gain of tempo: note also the crucial role played by White's queen acting along the e-file - the point behind it s peculiar looking

't!Vxc6 13

.id4 b4 14 llJd5! ed 15 .txg7 llg8

development on e2) 12

of which is to apply pressure to Black's d-pawn, which has been temporaril y weakened by the retreat of the knight to d7. In order to defend the pawn Black's pieces will be forced to take up exposed positions in the centre where they are subj ect to fu rt her harassment by White's forces. The line can thus be said to be tactically biased with primary emphasis on rapid development and piece play, factors likely to be favoured by K eres

Attack players. One example should be sufficient to highlight the main fe atures of the variation.

16

B

to highlight the main fe atures of the variation. 16 B Szabo-Ivkov, Hilversum 1973, a6 White

Szabo-Ivkov, Hilversum 1973,

a6 White

has the tactic II 0-0-0! �bc4 12 .txc4 llJxc4 13 .txd6: Black's best

is probably 10

went 10

.td7 (on 10

�g6) II .txe5!

(rarely a good move in this line but

16

ed 't!Vc 7 17 .tf6 llJe5 18 .txe5 de

here justifiable on tactical grounds,

19

f4! .if5 20 .th3 .txh3 21 lixh3

e. g. II

g6 12 .txd6!) II

de 12

lieS 22 fe with three pawns and a tremendous amount of play for

the piece . D2) 8 llJdb5 An enterprising move, the point

g6! a6! 13 gf+ �e7 14 �a3 'f/c7 15 0-0-0 g6 16 1!Vh4+ �xf7 17 �c4 �xc4 18 .txc4 .te7 19 1!Vg3! (an important improvement on 19 'f/g4 after which Black can gain a

12

In troduction

t empo

with

h5,

which could

become

necessary later

on)

19

llxd1+

22

22

rook on the h-file where it is doing some useful work while at the same

time

of

the

routine

litad8

20 .tb3 .tc8 21 h4

of the

li:lxd 1! (instead

llxd 1

White

improving

the

�g7

W c3!

28

litd 1

1!r e8

Wxg4

33

maintains

prospects

lld8 23 h5 g5 24

lDe3 h6 25 1!r g4 <M6 26 a3 "t!rd6 27

�b l

llxd8

lDg4 "t!rxh5

32

.txd8 30 'ttf3

± and

his knight) 22

1!r c6

31

29

1!r xc8

White

eventually

won.

03)

8 .tg2

at

White's di sposal, whi ch can never­

theless

does

The

Black

One

of

the

slower

effecti ve

plans

if

prove

not

intention

respond

is

energetically.

to

bolster

the

17

w

not intention respond is energetically. to bolster the 17 w (the logi cal course of events

(the logi cal course of events would be 16 f5 lDc4 17 g6, but in contrast to the game Alexandria-Kozlovskaya - see diagram 14 - Black is able to

handle

squares since his bishop still stands

on

another tempo in order to reach the

d5

appropriate posting on h3) 16

require

the light

the

pressure

on

c8

while White's will

centre prior to

fu rther operations

17 .txd5!? b4! 1 8 li:l e4 ed 19 lDxd6+

on the ki ngside (h4, f4 etc) while at

.txd6

20

ed1!t' c6! (20

 

Wxd6 21

the

same time

restraining

Black's

.tc5

fo llowed

by

22

llhe I+

is

queenside counterplay

as

far as

awkward

for Black)

21

f5 0-0 22

possible. For his

part

the

second

f6 ! b3!

23 ab lDxb3+ 24 '.!? b l 1!r a4

player should take note of a shi ft of

25 cb1!t' e4+

26 '.!? a2

llb5 27 .tc5!

emphasis and in stead of fo ll owing

d4! 281!t' xd41!t' c2 291!t' c4 Wxc4 30

a

routine pattern of development

(

.te7,

0-0)

should himself

take

up

acti ve

operations

in the

centre. The

lDde5,

ill

fu

typical

manoeuvre

li:l c 6,

fo llowing game,

requirement

li:l x d4 fo ll owed by

the

in

the

primary

ustrated

lfils

be llxc5 31 d7 .txd7 32

a level ending.

6

.te7

7 g5

li:lf d7

llxd7 with

These li nes bear a close affinity

to those arising from the 6

lDc6

variation andi ndeed a great number

for

reducing material

and

solves

of

transpositions

are

possible.

the

problem

of

the

congestion

However, it is not altogether clear

amongst

Black's

pie ces,

ensuring

what the

attracti ons

of the move

a level game. From diagram

17 Tai­

are, since in comparable 6

lDc6

Malich,

Halle

1974,

continued

II

lines

Black

generally

leaves the

f4

lDxd4

121!t' x d4

lDc6

13 fi'f2 b5

piece

on

f8,

preferring

to use the

14

.te3

llb8

15 0-0-0

lDa5

16

e5 !?

sorely

needed

tempo

to

secure

Introduction

13

some counterplay in the centre or on the queenside. The move does give Black the option of castling short early on, but this is rarely advisable given the strength of White's attack. On these grounds it would appear that White should do no worse than in analogous 6 li:lc6 lines and in addition to the standard plan of pushing the f­ and h-pawns he has other inviting possih ilities.

D4) 8 i.e3

This gives ri se to positions similar to those discussed in section D 1.

se to positions similar to those discussed in section D 1. Without a positive response by

Without a positive response by Black White will simply roll through with i.h3, f5 etc, as the game Alexandria-Kozlovskaya, Rio de Janeiro 1 979, illustrates: 10

0-0 11 i.h3 li:lxd4 12

't!Vc7 ( 10

't!r xd4 b5 13 0-0-0 Iil e8 14 f5 is vir­ tually untenable for Black, Kostro­

Baumgartner, Corres 1975) 11 i.h3 lDc5 12 f5 b5 13 a3 lDxd4 14

't!r xd4 e5 15 lDd5! \t d8 16 't!r c3 i.b7

17 i.xc5 i.xd5 18 0-0-0! i.b7 19

f6 ! gf 20 gf \t c 7 21 fe \t x c5 22 \t f3

't!r c4 23 't!r f6 i.xe4 24 i.d7+! '.!? xd7

Belyavsky-Vogt , L eningr ad 1977, shows the right way for Black, viz

to break up the pawn roller at once before it breaks on his kingside

11 't!r f3 (there

does not appear to be any method for White to avoid the ensuing simplification: 11 i.g2 hg 12 hg Iil xh 1 + 13 i.xh 1 lDxd4 14 \t xd4

defences: 10

h6!

e5 15 't!r d2 ef 16 i.xf4 lDe5 is about equal, but 11 i.h3 deserves a closer

li:lxd4 12 i.xd4 hg 13

hg Iil xh1 14 't!r xh1 e5 15 i.f2 ef 16 0-0-0 i.xg5 17 \t h8+ lt)f8 18 lDd5

with chances for both sides.

look) 11

DS)

8

Iil g1

This move is rather more effect ive

lDc6 lines,

since given Black's less act ive approach White has more timeto make preparatio ns. He can fo llow up in much the same way as in 04 with f4, h4 etc, but here we examine an alternative strategy based on an attack with pieces.

than in compa rable 6

19

B

based on an attack with pieces. than in compa rable 6 19 B Faced with the

Faced with the dual threats of

lDxe6 and g6 Black is virtually

fo rced to castle. White

will than

14 Introduction

lith3

will force the weakness

g6,

a useful target for th e

Van Riemsdijk-Najdorf,

I978, continued from

0-0 II 0-0-0

presenti ng

h-pawn.

Sao Paolo

diagram I9 with lO

liteS

<t>b I

I7 h5 b4

I2

'ttc7

lilg3 g6

13

't!r e2

I4

xd4 b5

I9 hg fg 20

.tf8

I5 h4 lbxd4 I6

IS lba4

.ib7

b3 leaving White with most of the

positional

trumps.

2

Central Counterattacks: 6

d5;

6

e5

In response to White's unortho­ dox kingside initiative it is natural for Black toc onsider the possibility of an early counterattack in t he centre, in accordance with Nimzo­ witsch's axiom that this is the appropriate reaction to an attack on the flank. If successful such action wo uld completely disrupt the develpment of White's strategy and expose the weaknesses incurred by the knight's pawn's advance. While in general the validity of Nimzowitsch ' s maxim may not be challenged, the Keres Attack is something of an exception to the normal rules. As we shall see, neither of the two candidates for direct central action is an effective antidote to White's wing attack. The reason for this is that despite its a n tipositional lo ok the move 6 g4 is not merely a tactical device initiating an assault on the kingside. It is intended, through the displace­ ment of Black's knight and the consequent disorganisation of his fo rces, to we aken the second player's control of the centre, bringing about an abrupt shift in the balance of power in that

important sector of the board.

A

B

A

6

6

d5

e5

20

w

in that important sector of the board. A B A 6 6 d5 e5 20 w

6

d5 (20)

This appealing move rather rebounds on Black by giving White a lead in development and a strong attacking position after

7

ed

Not 7 .ib5+ .id7 8 ed (8 .ixd7+

was tried in the game Stein-Castro, Havana OL 1966, which continued

8

"t!rxd7 9 e5 i0 e4 10 i0 ce2 i0 c6

11

i0 xc6 Wxc6 12 i0 d4 Wa6 +) 8

.ixb5 9 i0 dxb5 a6 10 i0 d4 i0 xd5 when Black's position is preferable,

being free of weaknesses.

7

White

i0xd5

has a winning position

16

6

d5; 6

e5

a fter 7

't!re7 10 g5.

ed 8 .tb 5+ .td7 9 't!re2+

8 .tbS+ (21)

21

B

8 i.d7
8
i.d7

This is the move which causes a ll the problems f or Black. White's pieces now bec ome extremely active and Blac k's increasingly clumsy.

9

�xdS

ed

10

't!re2+

.te7

't!re7a ga inst

Fischer in the USA Ch of 1 966/6 7

a6 12

.txd7+ �x d7 13 �f5 't!re6 14 0-0-0

0-0-0 15 't!rd3 �f6 16 li[ he1 ±) 12 .txd7+ �xd7 13 �b5 �e5 140-0-0 .tg7 15 li[ xd5 0-0 16 li[ hd1 his

position was hardly enviable.

but af ter 11 .te3 g6 ( 11

Reshevsky tried 10

11 �fS! (22)

but af ter 11 .te3 g6 ( 11 Reshevsky tried 10 11 �fS! (22) So fa

So fa r P anov-K otov, USSR 19 39 , which was fo llo wed in the

game N ikitin-Cherepkov, Moscow

v L eningrad 1 958. The latter went

on 11

't!rxd7 13 .te3 �c6 14 0-0-0 ± was

Bebchuk-Shamkovich, USSR 1958) 13 .tf4 't!ra5+ 14 c3 lieS 15 �xe7 't!rc5 16 .te3 't!rxe7 17 0-0-0 ± .

B

<M8 12 .txd7 �xd7 (12

23

w

--.-�ro-=�-
--.-�ro-=�-

6

eS (23)

White has here two alternatives, the second of which is the more

logical and effective :

B1

B2 7 .tb5+ !

B1

7 �f5

7

�fS

This is the 'book' move, which gives Black some possibilities for counterplay.

7

8

gS

hS

This is the only attempt for a real advantage. It's messy, but then this is a position that demands some brute fo rce . In the game A.Zaitsev-P ersitz, Corres 1 966, White tried the more restrained 8 .tg5 but his position began to slip

after 8

9 gh

hg! (8

.i.xfS

10 ef

.i.e6? is too slow:

.i.e7

II

h6

±±

6

d5: 6

e5

17

could rapidly prove fa tal after 14

lt:lh5 Ilh7 15 lt:lxg7+ Ilxg7 1 6 1!fh5.

Bagirov-Morsovich, USSR 1 960)

13 .txh5

lt:lxh5

9

lt:le3 .i.e6 10 Wd2 lt:lc6 11 0-0-0

i.xh5

14 lt:lc6

lt:ld4 12 .i.xf6 gf 13 lt:lb5 't!Vb 6! 14

lt:lxd4 ed 15 Wxd4 't!rxd4 16 Ilxd4

.i. h6 =F. Black ha d more than sufficient compensation fo r the broken pawns in terms of his very active piece play.

8

lt:lxe4

9 lt:lxg7+ .txg7 10 lt:lxe4 d5 11 . lt:lg3 (24)
9
lt:lxg7+
.txg7
10
lt:lxe4
d5
11
. lt:lg3 (24)

24

B

A

rather

deceptive

pos1t10 n.

Black, though in ful l command of the centre, is under considerable pressure on the kingside where the really important action is taking place.

11

i.g4

This represents some improve­

ment over the move 11

which there fo llowed in the game N eielov-Romanov, C orres 1966, 12 lt:lh5 Ilh7 13 lt:lxg7+ lit xg7 14 t!Y h5 with a pow erful initiative.

h4? after

12

.tel

't!rd7

Again the attempt to save the

.txe2 13 't!rxe2 h4

pawn by 12

25

B

15 .tg4 (25)

the .txe2 13 't!rxe2 h4 pawn by 12 25 B 15 .tg4 (25) Although B lack

Although B lack has some com­ pensati on for the pawn his position is marred by his inability to remove his king from the centre in order to continue active operations there. White will slowly orga nise his development, castle queenside and run the h-pawn.

B2

7

.tb5+ ! (26)

7 .td7
7
.td7

Black cannot avoid the exchange of bishops ai though it emphasises his weakness on the white squares.

18

6

d5; 6

e5

7

li:lf5 a6 9 .txd7+ '@xd7 10 g5 lilg8

II lild5 and White's position is overwhelming.

li:lbd7 is too cumbersome: 8

8 .txd7+

'@xd7

Unsatisfactory is 8

lilf5 lilb6 (9

ll:l bxd7 9

li:lc5 10 f3 ±) 10 g5

g6!? II

lile3 lilh5 12 ll:l ed5 ±.

9

lilfS

hS (2 7)

27

w

g6!? II lile3 lilh5 12 ll:l ed5 ±. 9 lilfS hS (2 7) 27 w On

On 9

g6? 10 .tg5 ! is rather

ll:l xg4 II "& xg4 gf

unsettling: 10

12 "& h4 with 13 li:ld5 to come.

10

.tgS!

Keres' move and typically a very active one. Far less clear is 10 gS

ll:l xe4 II ll:l xg7+ .txg7 12 ll:l xe4 d5, O'Kelly-Christoffel, Groningen 1 946. Gipslis gives 10 f3 h g II fg g6

( I I

Switzerland 1961) 12 lile3 lilc6 13 "& f3 .tg7 14 li:lcd5 ll:l xd5 15 lilxd5 ll:l d4 16 "& g2 ±. The text is rather more dynamic and in keeping with

lila6 12 "& e2 ± Keller-Rat,

Keres' style.

28

8

10

ll:l xg4

11 h3 ± (Keres). 11 lilf6 12 .txf6 gf 13 li:ldS (28)
11
h3
± (Keres).
11 lilf6
12 .txf6
gf
13 li:ldS (28)

White has a winning position.

3

6

h6

29

w

3 6 h6 29 w Lines in which Black plays the restraining 6 and popular branch

Lines in which Black plays the

restraining 6

and popular branch ofthe opening. The idea behind the move is, of course, to impede White's progress

on the kingside until Black's defence i are sufficiently organised t o launch an effective counter­ action. While it is true that Black can avoid the loss of time and disorganisation of his pieces which trouble him in other variations,

the move 6

h6 suffers from the

h6 are an important

concede White a large spatial

advantage (with all the dangers

which that entails) so early on in the opening, and the psychologica l feeling of security which the second player gains by containing White's initiative in this wa y is not to be despised. If we tum our attention to White's viewpoint we fi nd that there are two pa tterns of strate SY

from which he ca n choose. He may break at once with 7 g5 or prepare the advance by fi rst extend­ ing his piece development in one '

fa shion or another (7 .t. g 2,

Opening principles are too crudea yardstick with which to attempt to measure the relative merits of the

two plans and the reader is advised

to familiarise himself with both

types of position before deciding which line to follow. Ideally White

should have one or two (new) tricks

·

7 lilg l).

drawback of allowing White gr eater

up

his sleeve with which to meet

opportunities to ope n lines on the kingside. On balance the extra time which Black buys is ins u fficient

this variation. We will divide our analysis as fo llows:

compensation in itself for the

A

7 g5

weakening of his pawn structure

B

7 .t. g2

which loses a considerable amount

C

7 litgl and other moves.

of its defensive resilience as a result.

A

It is, however, understandable

7

7

gS

hg

that Black should be unwilling to

8

.t.xgS (3 0)

20

6

h6

30

B

20 6 h6 30 B This position is quite possibly the most importa nt that can

This position is quite possibly the most importa nt that can a rise from 6 g4, representing White's most reputa ble attempt for an adva ntage against Black's most solid defence. It has arisen in games at the highest standards of play with world class players championing both the white and

bla ck pieces, and it is for this reason

that I shall spend some considerable timea na lysing the strategic elements

of the position in order to fa miliarise

the rea der with it as thoroughly as

possible. I begin by drawing the reader's attention to the similarity of the position shown in the diagram to that which arises from the Richter­

Rauzer line 1 e4 c5 2 ltlf3 lbc6 3 d4

cd 4 lbxd4 ltlf6 5 lbc3 d6 6 .i.g5 e6.

Since Black in the Keres Attack position almost invariably plays

ltlc6 sooner or later the diff erences between the two positions amount

to the following: White has gained

the open g-file which he can use to put pressure on his opponent's kingside, while Black has the h-file and some possibilities of exploiting

White's now wea kened f3 squa re

by bringinga knight to e5 where it

a tta cks both c4 a nd f3at the sa me time. An importa nt considera tion a lso a re Bla ck's improved end­ ga me prospects brought a bout by the wea kening of the white pa wn structure, a lthough this long term benefit is a mply compensa ted by the enlivening of the white position induced by the excha nge ofpa wns. Exploring the position further some other importa nt points come to light. In the Richter-Ra uzer it is often the case that White's stra tegy will involve exchanging the bishop fo r knight on f6ata time when his opponent can only recapture with the g-pawn, leaving B la ck with a weak h-pawn anda central ma jority which, although strong, tends to hamper the action of his bishops. Such possibilities a re not r eally open to White in the Keres Attack as with Black's h-pa wn a lready gone the first player would have relatively little compensation for the two bishops - Black would have no problems mobilising either his rook on h8 or his black-squared bishop, which could quickly come into play via h6. But we have yet to mention the si ngle most im portant fe ature of the position which is sufficient to outweigh all the disadvantages of the pawn exchange and tip the bala nce in White 's fa vour. It is that the bishop on g5 is virtually immune to attack, and as Black no longer has the option to drive it

6

h6

21

h6 he must suffer the

constriction which it imposes on

W hite

chooses to leave the piece in this position. Furthermore White can later play h4 to support his bishop

and eventually h5, reducing the scope of Black's rook considerably and threatening to undermine his kingside with h6. While it is

possible fo r Black to defend against

these threats he is often forced into

a rather passive position in order to do so and it is this aspect which prospective Keres Attack players are likely to find agreeable. Playing from the position shown in diagram 30 Black must choose between rapid queenside counter­

play with lg ment with 8

't!Vb6.

coupled with the modern

Only the latter seems to promise

near-equality and hence is the current fa vourite .

a6 or solid develop­ �c6, possibly

away with

his game for as long as

this move order to transpose to A2 lines but this plan is not to be recommended as White has more choice in the placement of his queen. 9 1!t' d2

It is also quite fe asible to de velop the queen on e2 where it guards the e-pawn and the c4 and f3 squares. This plan was illustrated by the game Geller-Korchnoi, match (6) Moscow 1971, which went 9 .tg2 (this move order has the benefit of ruling out an early

b5 by Black) 9

�bd7 10 1!Ve2 1!Vc7 11 0-0-0 White

has a considerable advantage accor­ ding to Velimirovic; Black dare

not try 11

and hence must waste time with 11 llb8, and after 12 f4 b5 13 llh el!

White's build-up on the e-file means he is ready for a direct

attack based on e5, e.g. 13

- 13 000 b4? 14 �d5! ± - 14e5 ! de 15

.td7 (on 9

b5? because of 12 e5

llxh2?!

AI 8

a6

fe �g8 - 15

i.b 7 16 ef llxg2 17

A2 8

�c6

�xe6! ±±; 15

�h 7 16 .t/4 ±±;

At

31

w

�xe6! ±±; 15 �h 7 16 .t / 4 ±±; At 31 w 8 a6 (31)

8

a6 (31)

Of course,

Black may choose

15 o 1!Vxe5 161!Vxe5 �xe5 17 llxe5

llxg2 18 c6 ±± - 16 �xe6! fe 17

llxe2 18 i.g6

mate; 17 000

�e 7 181!Vxh2 ±±

�d3+ 19

llxd3 1!Vxh2 once more there is 20 i.g6 mate) 10 1!Ve2 i.e7 11 0-0-0 1!Vc7 12 h4 �c6 (finally Black has no othing better than to transpose

- 1 81!t' xh2! ±± for if 1 8

.te4 ! �xeS - 17 .o.

19

llh6 18 1!Vh5+! llxh5

i.g6 mate; 17

to an infer ior line) 13 f4 0-0-0 14 f5 'it>b8 15 fe fe and now as 16 i.h3?!

�h5 !

allows the equalising 16

White should play 16 llhfl with

22

6

h6

some advantage (Guf eld).

The manoeuvre

�h5 can be

of con siderable use to Black if White has locked in his bishop with f4 and cannot avoid an exchange. For example, the game Kavalek-Szabo, Salgotarian 1967,

32

w

went

9 f4 �bd7 10 1We 2 i.e7 11

0-0-0

�h5! 12 i.xe7 1Wxe 7 1 3 1!re 3

�df6 14 .ie2 e5! and Black took the initiative.

1 3 1!re 3 �df6 14 .ie2 e5! and Black took the initiative.   9 b5
 

9

b5

15 �x e6!

fe

The only move with independent

15

1!rxe 5

16

libe l

be

17

siginificance, but saf er is the trans­

1Wxd7+! �xd7 IS �c7 mate.

position

9

�c6 leading to A2

16

ef

gf

lines. Other possibilities are:

 

17

�e4

.ixe4

 

17

fg

IS

1!rxd7+

"t!Vxd7

19

(a)

9

1Wc7 10 i.g2 �bd7 11 f4

�xf6+

� e7 20

lixd7+

'it>xf6 21

Ji bS 12 0-0-0 �h7 13 i.h4liJ b6 14 libe l! i.d7 15 �d5 ! �xd5 16 ed g5 17 de ! with a crushing attack, Savon-Bikov, Ukrai ne (Spartakiade)

1973.

(b) 9

�xc6! be 12 e5 �d5 13 i.xe7 'tf xe7 14 ed! 1Wxd6 15 0-0-0 Ji bS

16 �e4 1Wf 4 17 c4 and White's

active pieces and queenside pawn majority leave him very much on

top, Ciocaltea-Bukic, Bucharest

i.e7 10 i.g2 �c6?! II

1971.

10

.ig2

.ib7

11

0-0-0

�bd7

12

f4

1Wc7 (32)

Black seems to have successfully completed his development but the sequel demonstrates a weakness in his f ormation on the long white diagonal.

.ixb7 Ji bS 22 .ixa6

±.

i.xe4

18 0-0-0

19 1We2 (33)

33

B

bS 22 .i xa6 ±. i.xe4 18 0 - 0 - 0 19 1We2 (33) 33

Calvo-Panno, Las Palmas 1 973. Black's weak pawns and exposed king will be difficult to def end against the two powerf ul white bishops.

A2

8

�c6

13 e5!

de

Theory suppose s that the immed­

14 fe

b4!

iate

dev elopment

of

the

kn ight

6

h6

23

gives Black a more solid posit ion and bett er equalising chances but White should be able to ret ain a slight plus with best play. In broad out line White's strategy must follow three phases: completion of his queenside development with'4W d2 and 0-0-0; restraint of Black's cent ral majority with .t. g2 or .t. e2- f3; and a st eady advance on the kingside with f4 and h4. As long as

'

34

B

on the kingside with f4 and h4. As long as ' 34 B   The most
 

The most common move at this

White main tains his control oft he centre (and this should present no problems with the bishop now firmly entrenched on g5) the order in which these phases are enacted is relatively unimportant, but there are some nuances of which Keres Attack pl ayers should be aware

point. White fo llows

Richter-Rauzer plan, quickly cast­ ling long before he undertakes

further kingside action. Black has the choice of 9

the older continuat ion which we examine first, and the more modern

a6,

the classical

9

'4Wb6.

and a tho f ough study of the ensuing material is strongly advised. We examine:

A2 11 9 A2 12 9

a6

'4Wb6

A2 1

9'4W d2

A21 1

A22 9 h4 A23 9 .i. g2 An alternative rarely seen in

10

9

a6

10

0-0-0

.t. d7

ll:lxd4 is premature: 11

practice is 9 ll:lb3 with which White

'4W x d4 .t. e 7 1 2 h4'4t c7 13f4'4W c5 14

voluntarily loses a tempo: 9

a6

'4W d 2

b5 15 e5! de 16 fe 1Wxe5 17 lla7 18 llhe l with excellent

10

f4 '4W c 7 11 '4W e 2 b5 (the game

.t. g2

L ane-Pritchett from Decin 1978

attacking chances for the pawn,

varied with 11

.t. e7 12 0-0-0 b5

Medina-Guge, L as Palmas 1973.

13 .t. g2 .t. b7 14 e5 de 15 fe lild5 16

.i.d2 1Wxe5 17 1Wxe5 ll:lxe5 18 ll:lxd5 .t. xd5 19 .t. xd5 ed = ) 12 0-0-0

b4 when Black's rapid queenside expansion gave him the better chances in Karasev-Krogius, USSR Ch 1971. 12 a3 is Korchnoi's suggested improvement.

A21

9 '4W d2 (34)

Naturally 10

'4W b6 is possible,

transposing to A2 1 2.

11 h4

This is marginally more flexible than 11 f4 but the la tter is pe rfectly playable:

.t. e7 12 f5 ll:lxd4 13'4W xd4 '4W c7) 14 ef .t. c6?! 15

llgl llxh2 16 .t. f4 llh7 17 .t. c4 d5

18 .i. b3'4W d7 19'4W e5 and Black was

(a) 11 efl! ( 13

24

6

h6

c7 (35)

completely tied down in Belyavsky­ Steinberg, USSR 1972.

(b) 11 .•• c7 12 i.g2 0-0-0? 13 h4

(13 e5! de 14 ll:lxc6 i.xc6 15

• xd8+ • xd8 16 lit xd8+ 'it>xd8 17

Adamski, Slupsk 1978. White has a small but persistent advantage in this position and there are a number of ways to exploit his superiority:

.txc6 be 18 fe ±±) 13

lit e 8? ( 1 3

A2 1

11

12

f4

.te7) 14 e5! de 15 ll:lxc6 i.xc6 16

A2 1

12

12 i.h3

i.xc6 • x c6 17 fe lild7 18 �4 f6

A2 1

13

12 i.g2

19 ef gf 20 i.xf6 lilxf6 21 • xf6

i.e7 22 � 4� Bangiev-Zeliandinov,

USSR 1974.

(c)

ll:lb3 ll:lg4 13 lite1 f6 =F+ but 1 2 lilf3 seems a promising improvement

't!rb6!? 12 .te2? ! (not 12

11

as White threatens an immediate

ll:lg4 leads nowhere

after 13

• xf3

• xd4 • xd4 14 lit xd4 lilh5! 15 f5 lilg3 16 lite 1 ll:lxe2+ 17 lit xe2 +

e5 and 12

13

14 lit e2! ll:lxd4 13

lite1 -

15 .tg2

±±) 12

Bonev-Padevsky, Bulgaria 1 972.

35

w

11

� 15 .tg2 ±±) 12 Bonev-Padevsky, Bulgaria 1 972. 35 w 11 i.e7 12 lit h

i.e7

12 lit h 3 (nor mal are 12 f4 , 12 .tg2 ,

12 i.e2 or 12 i.h3 transposing eventually to the main line) 12

i.xh3

c 3

fg 18 lilc7+ 'it>f7 1 91!rb 3+ 'it>g6 20

i.f 5+ ct>h621 M7 1-0 Pokojowczyk-

A curiosity was 11

lilxd4 13 • xd4 e5 14

15 .txh3 ll:lg8 16 ll:ld 5! f6 17

A2 1 1 4 12 i.e2

A2111

12

f4

(a)

f6? 14 lilxe6 .txe6 15 .txe6 fg 16

ll:ld5

ll:lxg5

14 hg the threat of 15 i.xe6! makes

life difficult for Black) 141i' xd4 f6

15 f5 fg 16 fe .tc6 17 e7! (drawing

the black queen to the e-file) 17 •xe7 18 lild5 i.xd5 19 ed 1!Vf6 20 1!rb 6 i.e 7 21 lit hfl 1!Vh 6 22 i.d7+! 'it>xd7 23 • xb7+ �d8 24 • xa8+ 'it>d7 25 • xh8 1 -0 was Ma rris­

Formanek, USA 1979.

(b) 12

.te7 13 'it>b 1 (more enter­

winning for White and if 13

a5 17 •xa5 ll:lxa5 18 hg is

lilh7!? 13 .th3 ll:lxd4 (13

12

p rising is 13 i.g2 transposing to A23, or 13 .th3, or 13 .te2 - see A2 1 1 2 and A2 1 14 below) 13 lilh5 14 .ih3 lilxd4 15 • xd4 f6 16

f5 fg 17 fe i.c6 18 hg 0-0-0 was played in Alexandria-Belavenets, Tbilisi 1 979. With two pawns and a strong bind on the light squares White has considerable compen­

sation for the piece. In the game Black did not find a satisfactory way to resolve the problem: 19

'it>b8 to free the

dark-squared bishop is more resilient) 20 lit xh8 lit xh8 21 • xg7 lith5 22 g6 lilxf5 23 ef lit xf5 24

.tf5

ll:lg3 ( 19

6

h6

25

'8h7 't!f d8 25 a3 lilf8? 26 g7 lilg8 27

�7

lilf l

e8

28 lilf7 �8 29

f5

30 lile2 't!f d 8 31 lilf 4 �b8 ,

.te8 33 lilxe7 .txf7 34 ef 1 -0.

A21 12

2 lilg6

A2113

12

12

.tg2

.te7

13

�b l (13 f4) 13

.tc6 15 lilh3 0-0-0

16 llhd3 �b8 17 lLld5!? ed 18 ed

lilxd4 14

xd4

12 .th3

.te7

ll:lxd5! 19 .txd5 .txg5 = Gipslis­

13 f4

lilxd4

Liberzon, Tallinn 1969.

14 "t!Vxd4

A21 14

And now:

(a) 14

and preparing to break open the centre now t hat Black has for feited

castling) 15

lile l "t!Va5 18 a3 lidS 19 li:ld5!? ed

llc8 15 lld2! (to guard c2

"t!Vc 5 16 "t!Vd3 .tc6 1 7

12

.te2

This move has invariably been Karpov's choice in the position. White endeavours to constrict his opponent further by supporting the advance of the h-pawn.

20 ed "t!Vxd5 21 "t!Ve3 with a strong attack f or the piece in Holmov­ Shamkovich, Timisoara 1972.

12

0-0-0

13

f4

.te7

14

h5

�b8

(b) 14

0-0-0 16 li:ld5!) 16 "t!Vf2 lilg8 17 .tg4 lilh6 18 .txe7+ "t!Vxe7 19 .tf3 ll:lg8 20 h5 lilf6 21 lild5! and White had a dangerous initiative, Gipslis-Jansa, Budapest 1970.

(c)

0-0-0 15 �b l � b8 16 f5!

putting a great deal of strain on Black's position with the threat of

switching the attack to the weak dark squares around his king) 16

.tc8 17 .te3 b5 18 a4 ±)

17 't!Vf2 .tc6 18 i.g2 llc8 19 .tf3

b5 20 a3 .tb7 21 lld2 llhd8 22 llhd l and White's simple strategy of loading up on the d5 square was

sufficient to provide a marked advantage in Tarjan-Evans, USA Ch 1 973.

(d) 14

f5 '@c7 18 @f3 llh7

19 lld3 lldh8 with equal chances,

B rowne-Andersson, Las Palmas

.tc6 15 llhe l (15

14

e5 (16

'@c5 15 '@d3 0-0-0 16

llhg l � b 8 17

1974.

14 ll:la5 15 llh3 lilc6 16 lilb3

.te8 17 �b I �b8 18 "t!Ve3 was Sutterer-Podzielny, West German Ch 1978, in which White retained a substantial spatial advantage.

15

�b1

.te8

15 d5 16 e5 lile4 17 lilxe4 de

18 .txe7 lilxe7 19 "t!Ve3 lLlf5 20

ll:lxf5 ef 21 llhg I ± Karpov­

Steinberg, USSR 1971.

36

B

16 .tf3 (3 6)

I ± Karpov­ Steinberg, USSR 1971. 36 B 16 .tf3 (3 6) Antonio 1 972. Black's

Antonio

1 972. Black's position remains

Karpov-Smith,

San

26

6

h6

cramped and he faces grave dif­

ficu lties in attempting

The sequel was 16

�c4 18 lithe! liteS 19 litd3 �g8 20 Wg2 .tf8 21 lith I �e7 22 b3 �a3+

23 �b2 �b5 24 �cxb5 ab 25 't!Vd2

Wb6 26 .th4! b4 27 .tf2 't!Va5 28

31

litd5 't!Va3+ 32 �b I .tf7 33 litd3 b6?! 34 .tf2 �b7 35 c3 be 36 litxc3

.te7 37 litg l lithg8 38 Wb2 't!Vxb2+

39 �xb2 �a7 40 litxc8 �xc8 41

.te l e5 29 �e2 �c6 30 f5! f6

to free it. �a5 17 't!Ve2

�c3 ± ( 1-0, 70).

A212

9

't!Vb6(!)

It sometimes happens that chess commentators get carried away when awarding 'oscars' to their favoured opening innovations. The unfortunate move is lumbered with this extravagant commendation until such time as the author recants or another more dispassionate analyst reviews it rather less enthu­ siastically. The reader will notice that I have attempted to sidestep this pitfall by awarding Black's ninth only ' half an exclamation mark. My intention is to point out that the move, though far from being a devastating blow, represents a tangible improvement in Black's strategy as hitherto examined. The proof that this is so lies not only in the fact that in current

Wb6 is now

regarded as the only acceptable way to play the line: the reasons why the move is good may be

master· practice 9

clearly stated.

for my oscar award: the move Wb6 opens new avenues for Black in not one but two opening variations!

37

B

10 �b3 (3 7)

in not one but two opening variations! 37 B 10 �b3 (3 7) White should not

White should not permit a general exchange of pieces as in the resulting endgame the weak­ nesses in his pawn structure would begin to tell. The interpolation of the moves Wb6 10 �b3, while reducing the attacking p6> tential of the white position, has done little to alter the general pattern of his strategy. Unless Black attempts a

�e5

or an early

as usual with queenside castling, f4, h4 and .te2 or .tg2. Now that the gl-a7 diagonal is not blocked by the knight he may wish to give some consideration to the plan of exploiting Black's dark squares on the queenside with .te3. In the main, though, his intention remains simply to increase his spatial advantage. Black now has:

b5 White will continue

vigoro us fo llow-up such as

9

6

h6 27

By pu tting imm ediate pressu re on his opponent's centre in this way Black forces the knight away f rom its central post, where it has enjoyed considerable activity, to a rather dull square on b3, and in so doing he has neutralised some of

A2121

10

lDe5

A2122

10

a6 (the main line).

A2121

 

10

lDeS

11

1!fel

This mo ve has the benefit of reinf orcing c4 but 11 .te2 is

the dynamic potential in White's position. As a result White's build­ up proceeds rather more slowly

playable, e.g. · 11

.td7 12 0-0-0

lih3 (playing to exploit the absence of the bishop f r om fl - Black now

than in the 9

drawback . to the move is that

a6 1ines. A possible

threatens 13

a mistake would be 12

lixc3 or 13

lDf3;

1!fxf2 on

Black no longer has the option to

account of 13 lDd4) 13 .ie3?! (13

exchange knights on d4 (which

f 4! lDf 3

14 .txf3 lix f3 1 5

e 5 lDg8

could precede an

e5 thrust) but

16

lt:ld4

lih3 17 f5 ± or 13

lixc3

this consideration is rarely of

14

.txf 6! lix b3 15 ab ±) 13

importance.

lixe3!

14 fe

g6

15

What of our comparison with

1!fxb6 ab 17 lixd6

1!fd4 .th6 16 .tc6 with f ull

the Richter-Rauzer? Why af ter I e4

compensation f or the exchange,

c5 2 lt:lf3 1 lDc6 3 d4 cd 4 lt:lx d4 lt:lf 6 5 lDc3 d6 6 .tg5 e6 7 Wd2 is the

analogous 7

"t!fb6 virtually un­

Browne-Kavalek, USA Ch 1975.

1 1

Or 11

.td7

1!fc7 and now:

known? It could be reasoned that

has a natural fo llow-up to

known? It could be reasoned that has a natural fo llow-up to 1!fb6

1!fb6

 

(a) 12 0-0-0 .td7 13f 4 lDc6 14 .tg2

in the Keres Attack position Black

a6 15 .tf 3 0-0-0 16 h4 �b 8 17 h5 Ilc8 18 c.t>b l .te8 19 .th4! ± (the

in

lDe5 to exploit the absence of

black square plan!) 19

lt:ld7?

the defender of W hite's f3 square,

(better was 19

lt:la5 20 lt:lxa5

coupled with the threat ofoccupying

1!fxa5 21 .tf2 lt:ld7 22 We3 lt:lc5)

c4, but it transpires that this strategy

20

.tf2 lDc5 21 lihg l g6 22 hg fg

is not a viable proposition as White

23

f5! lDxb3 24 ab gf 25 ef ef 26

will reorganise his forces to cover the threatened squares and event­

lt:ld5 1!fa5? 27 .ib6 @b5 28 1!ff2 ±± Tatai-Sax, Budapest 1 976.

ually drive out the invader.

(b)

12 h4 .id7 13 0-0-0 Ilc8 14 h5

My belief is that the dif ference

lDc4 15 Ilh3 b5 Gipslis-Sax,

between the two positions is

·

Amsterdam 1976, and now 16

essentially nothing! 7

'itb6 in

lt:ld4! with the idea 16

b4 1 7 lDd5!

the Richter-Rauzer is certainly playable and probably good and my prediction is that we will be seeing more of the move in f uture. This brings me to the second reason

12 Ilc8

0-0-0

13 f4

Less forceful is 13 h4 as played

in the game Lanka-Knaak, Jurmala

a6 14

1978, which continued 13

28

6

h6

h4

lilh3 Wc7 15 f4 l0c4 16 lilhd3 l0h7

17 e5! (17 l0d5!? 1!rb8!) 17

18 hg d5 19 g6! fg 20 Wg4 lilh6 21

lilh3

.tg2 with

l0xb2)

.txh3

�xg5

llxh3

22

22

<M7

xh3

23

(22

attacking chances for the pawn.

13

�c4

14 lild4! (38)
14 lild4! (38)

Having served the eviction order ( 13 f4) the bailiff moves in immed­ iately. Black has no time to consolidate his gain of c4 and the ent ire manoeuvre is shown to be a waste of time. Chiburdanidze­ Erenska, Buenos Aires (Women's

�a5 15

Wd2 l0xb3+ 16 ab l0g4 17 .te2!

ltlf2 18 lilfl l'lxh2 19 f5 (threat:

e5 20 llc4 l'lxc4

21 .txc4 .tc6 22 �d5 l0xe4 23

Wxh2 .txd5 24 .txd5 �xg5 25

�b l

gl @c5 27 "t!Vxc5 ±± .

OL) 1978, continued 14

.ie3 or .if4) 19

c7

26

attack: I I

13 0-0-0 .td7 14 11t'f2 lilb8 15 .td3

a5 18 f4 l0xe3 21

@xe3 lilh5 =F Padevsky- Suba ,

.td7 13 0-0-0

b5 14 .tg2 �b8 15 �b l a5 16 l0d4

l0xd4 17 .txd4 b4 18 l0e2 .ic6 19

�g3 ltld7? ( 1 9

fe .tc5 22 .txc6 't!rxc6 23 @f4

.txd4 24 llxd4 �c5 25 l'lfl lilb7? 26 @g5 ±± Alexandria-Koloyartseva, USSR 1977.

Moscow 1 977) 12

Wc7 12 f4 (12 f3?! b5

l0e5 16 �b l b4 17 l0e2

�eg4 19

g3

a4 20 ltld2

e5!) 20 e5! de 21

Black now chooses between the

.id7 and the aggressive

solid II

II @c7 aiming for a quick b5 . A2 1221 II .td7 A2 1 222
II
@c7 aiming for a quick
b5 .
A2
1221
II
.td7
A2
1 222
II
't!rc7
A21221
i.d7 (3 9)
II

12

A2122

This is the curr ently fa vour ed try for an advantage . Experie nce with alternatives has not been extensive but 12 .te3 seems worthy of investigation.

 

10

a6

II

0-0-0

Most commonly played. II .te3 commits the bishop too early as Black need not fa ll in with White's plans by castling queenside but can instead launch a minority

(a)

12 f3?! llc8 ( 12

0-0-0? 13

.te3 1!Vc 7 14 �a4 ±) 13 �bl @c 7 14 f4 b5 15 .ig2 b4 16 l0e2 a5 and

6

h6

29

Black already held the advantage, Muhin-Estevez, Luhacovice 1973.

!

lL!e5 14 .tg3 g5 ! 15

�b l .te7 16

(b)

12

'f!/c7

13

f4 (13

i.e2 b5 17 a3 llcS + Lein-Benko,

b5 14 i.g2

llcS 15 �b 1 .te7 and now:

Novi Sad 1972) 13

bl) 16 llhe1 b4 17 lL!a4 lL!a5 1S ll:lb6 ll:lc4 19 lL!xc4 '4!¥xc4 Stein­ Krogius, USSR Ch 1964/65, and here 20 e5 is promising.

b2) 16 h3·b4 17 lL!a4 llbS lS '4!¥f2

(notice how with the bishop on e3 White can set up threats on the

40

B

with the bishop on e3 White can set up threats on the 40 B 0-0-0 14

0-0-0

14 i.e3! 'irc7 15 lL!a4 is very difficult for Black; note that this

After 13 .ig2 't!fc7 ( 13

dark squares) lS

.idS 19 e5! de 20

manoeuvre is only possible because

ll:lac5 with an attack, Ambrazatis­ Roizman, Riga 1972.

the bishop on g2 guards the e-pawn) 14 f4 0-0-0 15 .tf3 �bS 16 h5 the

(c)

12 .i.g2 and now:

game transposes to the main line.

cl)

12

i.e7 13 .i.e 3 ! ? 'it'c 7 14 f4

Black may, however, attempt to

ll:la5 lj lL!xa5 'f!/xa5 16 'i!?b l t Hort-A ndersson, Nice OL 1 974.

cross White's plans and prevent the transposition by playing 15

c2) 12

lL!c4 15 lld3 'irc 7 16 h4 .ie7 17 lite l?! b5 18 e5 de 19 fe lObS 20

'f!/f2 (20 .i.xe7 lL!f4! 21 'irg4 ll:lxe5!

lL!xe5 21 llh3? f6 22 .i.e3

b4 �� Tal-Adamski, Lublin 1974.

(d) 12 f4 0-0-0 13 .i.g2 .i.e7 14 'i!?b l

lL!e5 13 'ire2 llcS 14 f4

��) 20

l0g4! 15 .i.xe7 lL!xe7 16 'f!/xd6 •xd6 17 llxd6 lL!g6 1 S f5 lLl6e5 1 9

lL!e3 22

fe

litg2 g5 with an unclear position ,

Mednis-Jansa, Kragujevac 1977.

fe 20

lL!c5

llh6 21 h3

g6 16 'it>b l 'i!?bS and now:

(a) 17 'irf2 lOgS lS i.xe7 (forced

because of the threat of f6) lS

g6 Black

has effectively ruled out h5 by White, but in so doing he has

slightly weakened his dark squares

on the kingside) 19

.icS 20 'irg5

llh7 21 lld2! (with the black­

squared bishops exchanged now is the time for White to pressurise

1!fb6 22

Black's d-pawn) 21

ll:lgxe7 19 't!fg3 (with

12

.te7

llhd 1 'it'e 3 23 'f!/g3 e5 24 fe lL!xe5

13

(40)

13 .ig2 is an important alter­ native since White may arrive at the postion via a number of different routes, e.g. 9 i.g2 .i.e7 10 h4 a6 11 'ird2 1!fb6 1 2 ltlb3 .i.d7 13 0-0-0 (A23).

25 llxd6 llxd6 26 llxd6 l07c6 27 llxc6! llh5 2S llf6 1-0 Mednis­ Fernandez, Budapest 197S.

(b)

17 llhfl .tcS lS f5 (it's rather

too early for White to commit himself in this way and Mednis's more restrained approach is to be

30

6

h6

lbh7 19 .ie3 lbf6

20 'trf2 lbd7 21 llh l .tf6 22 lba4

preferred) 18

lldf8 23 h5 gh 24 llxh5

.te5 25

.ib6 lbxb6 26 lbxb6 lbe7 27 lbxc8

lbxc8 28 lldh 1 llxh5 29 .txh5 ef 30 ef llh8 �-� Tseshkovsky­ Anikayev, USSR Ch (Top L) Minsk 1 979.

13 0-0-0

rJib8 .

15 h5

14 f4

White should not forego this important move which fu rther restricts his opponent's position and cuts out some of his defensive

resources such as

g6. Postpone­

ment of the advance will react in Black's fa vour, as the fo llowing

games illustrate.

15 .tf3 1!fc7 and now:

g6 see

note to White's 13th move) 17

'tre2 (after this White's advantage slips away: the most accurate was

17 h5 to answer 17

lbg8! (played at a

time when White must make the exchange of bishops because of the threat of f6) 18 .txe7 lbgxe7 19 h5 g6 20 a3 gh 21 llxh5 llxh5 22 .txh5 f5 23 'trd2 fe 24 lbxe4 e5 and

(a) 16 rJibl .tc8 (for 16

lbg8 with 18

lthg l) 17

Black has equalised, Chi-Andersson, Buenos Aires (Clarin) 1978.

(b) 16 libel .tc8 1 7 1!ff2 lbg8 ! 18

h5 (the alternative 18 .txe7 lbgxe7

also leaves Black with few problems)

18 .txg5 19 fg f6 20 llgl lbe5 21

.ie2 fg 22 llxg5 lbf6 and Black's firm grip on the important e5 square gives him sufficient counter­ play, Karpov-Andersson, Bugojno

1980.

15

.tc8

16 .tf3 (41)
16 .tf3 (41)

Following his strategy both logically and accurately White has

increased his spatial advantage to the limit while fu lly restra ining his opponent's central counterplay. However, he now fi nds hi mself without a clear way fo rward and so must use the extra flexibility allowed by his spacious position to manoe uvre his fo rces, prepari ng to react quickly to any small concession Black may have to make in order to free his pieces. For his part Black has succeeded in reaching a robust if somewhat defensive position and finding his

counterthrust

contained must seek to alleviate the cra mpedness of his fo rmation by exchanging pieces. With careful play he should be able to secure equality, but White's advantage, though small and static, is likely to persist for some time to come, and even a relatively minor slip by the second player may eventually prove fa tal.

d5 well and truly

6

h6

31

Black now has:

lt:la5 (this is probably not

the best way to seek exchanges) I7

"4We2 '@c7 I8 lt:lxa5 '@xa5 I9 l:thg i Ilde8 20 a3 '@c5? (better was 20

lt:lg8)

2I e5! de 22 fe lLld7 23 .te3 '@c7 24

llxg7 ± Chiburdanidze-Muresan, Budapest I978.

I7 'W'e2 lt:lg8 (the

plan of exchanging bishops is Black's main chance for equality;

notice how White correctly declines to make the exchange, thereby saving two tempi) I8 llhgi .txg5

19 l:txg5 ll:lge7 20 ll:ld5 ! (this is

a noteworthy tactic) 20

f6 22 de fg 23 '@x e7 g4! 24 .te4

l17h8 25 '@xg7 with a dangerous initiative, �robek-Adamski, Polish Ch I977.

(c) 16

the d-pawn in preparation for the exchange of dark-squared bishops and guards against ltld5 tactics (see Skrobek-Adamski above). The move is particularly important because the resulting position can arise from a number of lines,

e.g. after (A2 I 222) II

'@c7 I2

'@c7. This move strengthens

ed 2I ed

(b)

(a)