Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
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Fundamentals of
Patent Law
Interpretation and Scope of Protection
Matthew Fisher
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PREFACE
Mark Twain once famously observed that a country without a good patent system
is like a crab that cant travel any way but sideways or backways. Yet detailed
academic analysis of the patent system in the UK is a relatively rare occurrence. My
objective in writing this book was therefore to provide academic comment on an
area of the law that has great commercial significance and yet is severely underexplored in critical writing. The following text aims to provide the reader with an
overview of the status and development of the process of claim interpretation in the
UK, and also to explore significant practical, academic and theoretical aspects of
this vital subject. Its novelty lies in bringing the theoretical elements of the
discussion together with the view of the profession charged with creating the patent
documentation in the first place, and then examining this in the light of
comparative studies recounting the position adopted elsewhere. It is only by
considering all of the elements that we have before us that we begin to see a pathway
for the development of the law in this area.
The story of the creation of this book begins with an application submitted in the
spring of 1999 for entry onto the PhD programme at the University of Bristol. At
this point in time, towards the end of my undergraduate degree, I thought it would
be quite nice to do a bit more studying (and to avoid paying council tax for another
year or three). I therefore decided to apply for a PhD on purely mercenary grounds
added to the aforementioned council tax avoidance, you could get fundingand
had settled upon IP as the topic of choice. I had narrowed my proposed field of
investigation down to either an exploration of patent claim interpretation or an
examination of plant variety rights. For better or worse I chose the former, and
found that I actually quite liked what I was doing. Therefore, eight years, several
scores of sleepless nights, much blood, sweat and tears later, that original
application has metamorphosed, via a PhD thesis, into this book. It has been a long
time in gestation, and is, needless to say, far changed from that original script, not
least due to the House of Lords tinkering with claim interpretation in Kirin-Amgen.
But it is here, and it is my hope that it makes a contribution to the literature that was
worth the effort. I should add that versions of chapters three and eight have already
appeared in Intellectual Property Quarterly, as [2005] IPQ 1, and [2004] IPQ 85
respectively.
So now on to the thanks.
Thanks must go first to my PhD supervisor, Helen Norman, for all the advice and
support in the early days of my PhD all those little things that supervisors do to put
you on the straight and narrow. To the Faculty of Law, as it was, at the University of
Bristol for the scholarship it gave me to pursue my PhD. To my examiners Margaret
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Llewellyn and Andrew Charlesworth for their helpful comments and, lets face it, for
not asking me to make any amendments. Thanks must also go to Richard Hart for
caring less about the details than he might (length, deadlines, etc), and to all that
worked with him, in the preparation of this book, especially my editor Mel Hamill,
for making this authors relations with his publisher so unproblematic.
I would also like to thank the anonymous patent attorneys who, by recounting
their tales of patent drafting procedure and problems, assisted a very green PhD
student on the road to his doctorate. I learned a great deal from these informal
discussions. Some of those who kindly gave up their time were very encouraging,
and some were not quite so positive (one notably telling me that I should give up on
this line of enquiry and do a PhD on selection patents instead needless to say, I did
not), but all were helpful in their own way and provided ample food for comment.
There are many other people that, whilst not directly involved in the process of
creation, have supported me throughout completion of this book. I thank them all;
with special mention going to Kate, to whom this work is dedicated and who was
turned into a library widow in the months leading up to submission of the
manuscript, but who was still there when I came home. And to my parents for their
eternal support. To my little-sister Lucy for not hating me forever for bundling her
up in a duvet and locking her in the wardrobe when we were small (yes, Im sorry)
and her daughter Isabella (if you ever read this, your name is in full because at the
time of writing you seemed to flit between Izzy and Bella more frequently than
most people change socks but I suppose thats one of the perks of being eighteen
months old) for lightening the tone on so many occasions. To Sarah for putting up
with me for all those years we shared a flat together. To Mark for his companionship,
dry sense of humour, fine taste in alcohol (although Pimms is not to be
recommended neat) and of course for the interminable, indescribable, Belsey
stories. And last, but not least, to Henri for years of friendship and for offering me a
closing line for the book when I was close to the end of my tether. I didnt use it there,
but will use it here instead:
And with that, Charles closed the book, returned it to the shelf, and left the library
...
M Fisher
June 2007
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CONTENTS
Preface
ix
Introduction
5
5
8
11
12
14
23
23
24
24
25
27
28
30
31
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
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Pressure for Change
CONSIDERATION REVISITEDTHE BIRTH AND GROWTH OF
THE SPECIFICATION
From Introduction to Explanation as the Price of Monopoly
THE NOVELTY OF NASMITH
A Mark of Evolution
A PRACTICE ACCEPTED
LIARDET v JOHNSON
CONCLUSION
44
45
46
47
50
51
52
54
57
57
59
60
61
62
64
64
65
66
68
73
81
86
88
91
91
93
95
97
98
99
100
103
106
108
108
112
114
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Contents
5
xiii
119
119
119
120
121
122
124
128
131
135
137
138
140
141
143
145
149
151
152
156
158
160
160
163
166
171
173
173
174
175
178
180
183
184
185
187
189
190
191
192
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Contents
Formative Years: Further Uncertainties
NARROWING THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
Pennwalt Corp v Durand-Wayland Inc
After Pennwalt: Corning Glass
WARNER-JENKINSON: THE SUPREME COURT REVISITS
EQUIVALENTS
Death of the Doctrine?
On File-Wrapper Estoppel
Intent of the Defendant
After-Arising Equivalents?
A Test for Equivalence?
MANI-FESTO FOR THE FUTURE?
The Problem Identified
Judgment en Banc
Fallout
Festo in the Supreme Court
Comment
POSTSCRIPT: THE CAFC REVISITS FESTO
Rebutting the Festo Presumption
The Rebuttal Criteria
CONCLUSION
193
196
196
199
200
200
201
203
204
206
207
208
209
211
212
214
216
217
218
219
223
223
224
226
227
228
229
232
233
233
234
236
237
237
241
242
245
246
247
249
250
252
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CONCLUSION
254
259
259
261
261
263
264
264
265
266
267
270
273
275
278
279
280
280
281
282
283
287
291
291
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
301
303
305
305
307
309
310
312
314
316
317
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Contents
Deconstructing the Dissent
. . . REBELLION QUASHED
The Approach to Construction
Interpretation under the Protocol: Deconstructing PLG
Assidoman Accepted
So Catnic Lives on . . .
IMPROVER BEGETS THE PROTOCOL QUESTIONS
A Radical Approach?
The Majority View
Comment
SYSTEMIC CHANGE
KIRIN-AMGEN TO THE COURT OF APPEAL
CONCLUSION
320
323
324
326
328
331
331
332
335
336
339
342
345
349
349
350
354
355
357
358
359
362
364
365
367
371
373
376
378
11 A Summary
THE JOURNEY SO FAR
OF FAIRNESS, CERTAINTY AND HARMONISATION
SO WHERE NOW?
Towards Further Harmonisation
A Modest Proposal
TO CONCLUDE
381
381
385
388
388
389
391
Bibliography
Index
393
417
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TABLE OF CASES
AC Edwards v Acme Signs & Displays Ltd [1990] RPC 621 (Ch D),
[1992] RPC 131 (CA) ............................................................................ 314, 3167
Ace Denken KK v Yuai Shoji p113 Hanrei Jihou (Law Report) No 1390
(19 Jul 1990) ...................................................................................................... 260
Al-Site Corp v VSI International Inc, 174 F.3d 1308 (1999, CAFC)....................... 188
American Hoist & Derrick Co v Sowa & Sons, Inc, 725 F.2d 1350 (1984,
CAFC)................................................................................................................ 190
American Home Products Corporation v Novartis Pharmaceuticals UK Ltd
[2001] RPC 159 ................................................................................................. 368
Anchor Building Products Ltd v Redland Roof Tiles Ltd [1990] RPC 283 .............. 309
Asahi Kasei Kogyo [1991] RPC 485...................................................................... 8, 74
Assidoman Multipack v The Mead Corporation [1995]
RPC 321............................................................. 241, 323, 3256, 32831, 333, 337
Balfour v Welland (1809) 16 Ves 151...................................................................... 302
Bayer Aktiengesellschaft v Duphar International Research, 738 F.2d 1237
(1984, CAFC)..................................................................................................... 195
Bayer/Carbonless Copying T1/80 [1979-85] B EPOR 250. ................................... 286
Beecham Group v Bristol Laboratories [1978] RPC 153................................. 297, 304
Beloit Technologies Inc v Valmet Paper Machinery Inc [1995] RPC 705 ................ 328
Biogen v Medeva [1997] RPC 1......................................................... 58, 260, 346, 369
Birmingham Sound Reproducers Ltd v Collaro [1956] RPC 232 ....................... 1314
Boulton v Bull, 2 H BL 463, 126 ER 651 ............................................................. 45, 54
Brenner v United States 773 F.2d 306 (1985, CAFC) ............................................. 195
British Hartford-Fairmont Syndicate Ltd v Jackson Bros (Knottingley) Ltd
(1932) 49 RPC 495................................................................................................. 9
Carman Industries Inc v Wahl, 724 F.2d 932 (1983, CAFC) .................................. 198
Cartwright v Eamer, unreported ............................................................................. 82
Case C-251/95 Sabel v Puma [1998] RPC 199....................................................... 132
Catnic Components v Hill & Smith [1982] RPC 183 ................. 2, 4, 249, 2513, 255,
294, 2968, 299304, 30509, 31217, 31930, 331, 333, 335,
337, 339, 3412, 345, 349, 352, 357, 361, 363, 365, 379, 387
Chiron v Organon (No 12) [1996] FSR 153 ............................................................. 94
Clark v Adie (1876-7) 2 App Cas 315................................................................... 123
Clothworkers of Ipswich, Godbolt 252, 78 ER 147.................................. 37, 3941, 51
Codex v Racal-Milgo [1983] RPC 369 ................................................................... 305
Connell v Sears Roebuck & Co, 722 F.2d 1542 (1983, CAFC) ................................ 190
Corning Glass Works v Sumitomo Electric, 868 F.2d 1251 (1989, CAFC).............. 199
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Table of Cases
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xx
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Shinwa Seisakusho v Furuta Denki KK Tokyo court 23 March 2000 ................ 2856
Shore v Wilson (1842) 9 Cl. & Fin. 355................................................................... 302
Skistiefelverschluss [1969] GRUR 534........................................................................ 8
Smith International Inc v Specialised Petroleum Services Group Ltd
[2005] EWHX 686............................................................................................. 376
Southco Inc v Dzus Fastener Europe Ltd, [1990] RPC 587 (Ch D),
[1992] RPC 299 (CA) ........................................................................ 314, 317, 333
Socit Nouvelle des Bennes Saphem v Edbro Ltd [1983] RPC 345 ........................ 305
Spannschraube [1999] GRUR 909 ......................................................................... 249
SS Seiyaku v Zensei Yakuhin KK, Heisei 8 (wa) 8927 (17 Sep, 1998) ................ 2835
Stapeltrockner [2006] GRUR 313 .......................................................................... 255
Stewart-Warner Corp v City of Pontiac, Michigan 767 F.2d 1563 (1985,
CAFC)................................................................................................................ 195
Sundstrand Corporation v Safe Flight Instrument Corporation [1994]
FSR 599 .............................................................................................................. 314
Synthon v SmithKline [2006] 1 All ER 685................................................. 3745, 390
Technip France SAs Patent [2004] RPC 919 ........................... 3501, 354, 361, 3769
Technograph Printed Circuits Ltd v Mills & Rockley (Electronics) Ltd
[1972] RPC 346 ................................................................................................. 299
Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd v Instituto Gentili SpA, [2003] FSR 498.......... 74
Texaco Antilles Ltd v Kenochan [1973] AC 609...................................................... 302
Texas Instruments Inc v United States International Trade Commission,
805 F.2d 1558 (1986, CAFC) ............................................................................. 206
THK Co v Tsubakimoto Seiko Co Infringement Case for Ball Spline
Bearing, 1630 Hanrei Jiho 32 (Supreme Ct, 1998). Ball Spline....... 27885, 2878
Tickner v Honda Motor Co Ltd [2002] EWHC 8 ................................................... 351
Turner v Winter, 1 TR 601, 99 ER 1274.................................................................... 54
Van der Lely v Bamfords [1960] RPC 169 (Ch D), [1961] RPC 296 (CA),
[1963] RPC 61 (HL) ................... 2, 1415, 1719, 99, 112, 247, 254, 284, 295, 324
Vitronics Corp v Conceptronic Inc 90 F.3d 1576 (1996, CAFC) ..................... 174, 225
Warheit v Olympia Tools Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1161 ........................... 182, 341, 347
Warner-Jenkinson Co Inc v Hilton Davis Chemical Co, 520 US 17 (1997,
Supreme Court), 62 F.3d 1512 (1995, CAFC) .......................... 199, 2007, 2089,
21112, 214, 21618
Westinghouse v Boyden Power Brake Co, 170 US 537
(1898, Supreme Court) .......................................................... 150, 1823, 206, 362
Wheatley (Davina) v Drillsafe Ltd, [2001] RPC 133 ..................... 160, 251, 255, 305,
310, 325, 3313, 33641, 345, 348, 350
White v Dunbar, 119 US 47 (1886, Supreme Court)............................................. 181
Winans v Denmead, 56 US 330 (1853, Supreme Court).............. 17880, 1856, 362
Zino Davidoff v A&G Imports Limited & Tesco Stores, [2000] Ch 127 ................... 92
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Introduction
The protection of inventive endeavours by letters patent forms the keystone upon
which multi-billion pound industries are built across the world. Every patent application filed in the United Kingdom must contain a specification, which comprises
a description of the invention, a claim or claims and any drawings referred to in the
description or any claim.1 Claims define the invention for which protection is
sought, and after grant their interpretation determines the scope of the monopoly
that the patent confers.2 Patents operate as a breakwater from competition,
enabling control of the supply and use of a certain type of information; information
that would otherwise be freely appropriable by all. Patents, therefore, create scarcity.
They mark out a novel zone of virgin territory that may only be cultivated by the
patentee, or with their permission. Due to this effect, their scope is of critical importance to the patentee, their competitors, and indeed society at large.
In the United Kingdom, the element at the core of the determination of patent
scope is the claim. Claims define the outer boundary of protection. They are utilised
by the Patent Office when considering issues of patentability and by the courts in
matters of validity and infringement. Their breadth is important to the patentee as
they dictate the extent of their proprietary interest, and to their competitors for the
very same reason. Their interpretation, specifically the tests used for such a task,
must therefore strike a delicate balance between the interests of the right holder and
those of third parties.
In an ideal world the claims would be so clear and unambiguous that no dispute
over their meaning would ever arise. But the world is not ideal; language is, by its
very definition, multifaceted, layered with meaning and capable of simile or substitution. Words are, to put it succinctly, equivocal. Human beings, themselves far
from perfect, draft claims whilst attempting to navigate through the treacherous
waters bordered by the prior art. The words that they use to define the invention
must be broad enough to prevent unscrupulous copying, yet narrow enough to
avoid encroaching on the rocky shore. They must describe an invention that may
not be challenged for up to twenty years after the application is filed,3 at which point
the patent should, in the eyes of the law, be as fresh as the day it was penned.
Against these obstacles it seems unfair that the patentee should be bound by the
literal meaning of the words used to describe their invention, especially where obvious variants exist. The words in the claims are, however, all that the public and the
1
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Introduction
patentees competitors have to inform them of the scope of the monopoly grant; as
such, the interpretation that they enjoy must provide a degree of predictability in
deference to legal certainty. As we shall see, convincing arguments can be made for
both broad and narrow interpretations of the claims when determining the scope of
protection of the patent. In the UK, courts have traditionally accepted the idea that
the protection conferred by a patent cannot be restricted to the literal wording of
the claims. They employ a single stage test in infringement proceedings, using purposive construction4 to tread the fine line between fairness and certainty. However,
despite a growing trend of harmonisation, different jurisdictions utilise different
means and their patents enjoy different scopes, some broader and some narrower
than that in the UK.
This work therefore sets out to explore various aspects of the determination of
patent scope and to critically evaluate the current British position. It essentially asks
two questions: first, what is the purpose of the patent systemie how can the award
of temporary monopoly to the creator of a new manufacture be justified; and second, what scope of protection best serves this purpose? In seeking the answer to
these questions, it also considers whether the objective of harmonisation called for
by the Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 of the European Patent
Convention, and by international agreements such as TRIPs, is in fact misplaced. It
is submitted that attention should not necessarily be focussed on securing conformity, but should rather be directed towards ensuring predictability (as will
become clear in the rest of the book, this is not necessarily synonymous with certainty). However, this fundamental distinction is often overshadowed by a pseudoimperialistic idea of what predictability actually means. In developing this line of
argument, reference is made to historic, economic and comparative viewpoints,
with the aim of providing the reader with a strong contextual platform from which
to comment on the extant policy of claim interpretation in the UK and to provide a
basis for recommending improvement. The discussion is essentially divided into
two parts: part one (chapters 15), historical and economic factors; and part two
(chapters 611), comparative factors.
Part one therefore focusses on identification and analysis of some of the historical and economic factors that have shaped the British patent system and begins the
search for justification of its existence and explanation of its shape. This search
commences in chapter one with discussion of what could be considered to be the
typical British approach to claim interpretation, evidenced by decisions such as
EMI v Lissen,5 Van der Lely v Bamfords,6 and Rodi & Wienenberger v Showell, 7 in the
period up to the genesis of purposive construction in Catnic Components v Hill &
Smith.8 It establishes a base position from which the remaining argument advances
4 Championed by Lord Diplock in Catnic Components v Hill & Smith [1982] RPC 183 and restated by
Lord Hoffmann Kirin-Amgen v Transkaryotic Therapies Inc [2005] 1 All ER 667.
5 (1939) 56 RPC 23.
6 [1963] RPC 61.
7 [1969] RPC 367.
8 Above, n 4.
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and aims to provide the reader with relatively quick and easy access to the material
developed in later chapters. As such, it requires a certain leap of faith, and the reader
may only see the circle completed upon re-reading it at the end. As noted, the real
challenge with this chapter was to set the scene as rapidly as possible and, considering the potential volume of material, it was reasoned that a more fact-based
approach would be preferable to adopting true narrative style. Therefore, the chapter is arranged around a series of quotations from a number of key cases, and as a
consequence may appear a little extract heavy. However, this approach was adopted
in order to deliver the maximum information in the least possible space, and avoids
inflating the chapter out of all proportion to its place within the overall argument.
In addition to setting the scene, chapter one also poses what is often considered to
be the essential question when examining the determination of patent scopewhat
is the purpose of the patent?
Chapter two begins the search for the answer to this question and directs attention back to the foundation of a patent custom in Elizabethan England. In doing so
it seeks to identify the basis upon which the modern system is built and explores the
origins of monopoly phobia arising from abuses of early grants. The chapter therefore provides insight into the pedigree of the restrictive practices discussed in chapter one. In addition, consideration is directed toward the manner in which the
patent system developed in the UK and, in doing so, this provides a base from which
to argue that harmonised protection may not necessarily be in the best interests of
all states at every point in their evolution. This point is picked up once more in part
two of the book during discussion of the comparative studies.
Chapter three begins the exploration of patents within the market economy, and,
using the anti-patent debate of the mid-nineteenth century as its backdrop, discuss
the classical justifications for the grant. Investigation of this period in British history also enables further exploration of the drive against monopoly and the rise of
the laissez faire attitude that can be seen to colour early twentieth century interpretation. This discussion also enables identification of certain key differences
between the traditional British and German approaches to claim interpretation that
are the subject of investigation in chapter seven.
Chapter four continues the exploration of the economics of the patent system,
incorporating the results of empirical research carried out into the realities of claim
drafting, and asks the question Does the philosophy fit the facts?In conducting this
investigation, some of the other determinants of patent scope, separate from the
courts construction of the claims, are laid bare. This study enables evaluation of the
potential effects of modifying the courtsapproach, and is a topic to which we return
in the context of the comparative studies in part two of the book.
In chapter five the post-classical justifications that have been utilised in an
attempt to explain the system and suggest a template for its optimum scope, are
examined. This discussion includes assessment of the argument that all patents are
monopolies and also studies some of the basic economics of supply and demand
that lie at the core of the utility of the grant. In addition, a topology of invention is
introduced that facilitates deconstruction of the argument that the patent system is
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Introduction
good for all innovation, and enables us to discuss how variation in the interpreted
scope of a patent may impact upon the type of invention that is encouraged. This,
in turn, lays the foundation for a discussion of whether the essential questions
posed in chapter one are, in fact, essential at all. These are topics to which we return
in part two of the book.
Part two, concentrates primarily upon other (ie non-UK) jurisdictions in order
to reflect upon wildly differing traditions of interpretation within the classic trinity
of developed patent systems (the US, Europe and Japan). Thus, chapter six examines the US approach to determining patent scope, paying particular attention to
the doctrine of equivalents as broadening the effect of the patentees monopoly
from the literal wording of the claims. The limits placed on the operation of the doctrine, particularly the application of file-wrapper estoppel, are also considered in
order that a full picture may be gained.
Chapter seven focuses on the German patent system. As the German approach to
claim interpretation is traditionally perceived to be diametrically opposed to that in
the UK it therefore provides an excellent opportunity to explore and illustrate some
of the tensions within the European Patent system as a whole. It also enables us to
question the impact of the Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69, and asks
whether the idea of harmonisation is, in fact, desirable as an end in itself.
Finally, to complete the discussion of other systems, Japan is considered.
Therefore, in chapter eight, the nations meteoric rise from technological obscurity
in the mid-nineteenth century to the electronic whiz-kid of today, is explored, paying particular attention to the role that the patent system can be seen to have played
in this process.
Ultimately we return home and, in chapters nine and ten, examine the postCatnic 9 approach to claim interpretation in the UK, assessing this position in the
light of the foregoing discussion, before finally concluding and suggesting that it
may be time to correct some of the more obvious discrepancies of the test.
Above, n 4.
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Part I
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1
The British Tradition
Basic Claim Theory
A state may essentially choose one, or other, of two disparate classificatory theories
when deciding on the role that patent claims will play within a determination of the
grants scope of protection. The names given to these binary positions are peripheral definition theory and central definition theory,1 and any subsequent interpretative stance that may be adopted is subordinate to this primary categorisation of
approach.
Under peripheral definition theory the claims define the outer boundary of protection. They form the linguistic equivalent of fence-posts (hence the alternate
name of fence-post claiming) and pen-in the patents exclusive territory, marking
its outer limits. The major advantage of this approach is that the scope of protection
is relatively clear to any third party who may read the patent documentation,2
thereby providing certainty to the grant. Under central definition theory, on the
other hand, the scope of protection is determined by finding the principle underlying the invention (the inventive idea) by looking at the teaching in the specification
as a whole. The claims are treated merely as sign posts; for while they may be the
starting point for the assessment, courts are not strictly bound by their wording.
Under this theory, patent scope is decided based upon contribution to the art and
therefore central definition has the advantage of providing a fair and flexible degree
of protection for the patentee. However, it may also be seen to suffer in terms of certainty when compared to the alternate interpretative convention.
Traditional examples of countries adopting these different forms of claim theory
would, until relatively recently, have been Britain and Germany, respectively. For
many years the latter treated the claims as guidelines only, basing the scope of protection primarily on what the disclosure in the description would have taught the
notional person skilled in the art.3 The British approach, in contrast, typified
1
These theories are also discussed in ch 6 below, in the context of the evolution of the US patent system. See also, Takenaka, Interpreting Patent Claims: The United States, Germany and Japan (Munich, Max
Planck Institute for Foreign and International Patent, Copyright and Competition Law, 1995) at 312.
2
Subject to s22 Patents Act 1977 (PA 1977) (inventions the publication of which would prejudice
national security or the safety of the public), and to s16 PA 1977 (any prescribed restrictions), all patent
applications are published, and therefore become open to public inspection, a maximum of 18 months
after filing: see r27(1) Patent Rules 1995 (SI 1995/2093) (as amended by the Patents (Amendment) Rules
2005 (SI 2005/2496)).
3 See also, ch 7, below.
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See the judgment of Lord Russell in EMI Ltd v Lissen Ltd (1939) 56 RPC 23 at 39.
Norman, Determining the Scope of the Patentees Monopoly: Purposive Construction Revisited
[1998] Anglo-American Law Review 221 at 223.
6 Sherman, Patent Claim Interpretation: The Impact of the Protocol on Interpretation (1991) 54
MLR 499 at 508.
7 See Sherman, ibid. See also, Bredimas, Methods of Interpretation and Community Law (New York,
Elsevier North-Holland, 1978).
8 See also, chs 3, 5, and 7, below.
9 See, eg, Skistiefelverschluss [1969] GRUR 534. Also note Bruchhausens comments that German
case law on the scope of protection of patents has been invariably aimed at ensuring adequate protection
for the inventor. See Bruchhausen, The Scope of Patent Protection in Different European Countries
An Outline of Recent Case Law (1973) 4 IIC 306, at 322. See also, text accompanying n 64 et seq in ch 7,
below.
10 See, eg, the comments of Lord Oliver in Asahi Kasei Kogyo [1991] RPC 485 at 523 where he states that:
The underlying purpose of the patent system is the encouragement of improvements and innovation.
5
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sional or complete, must commence with the title, and in the case of a complete
specification must end with a distinct summary of the invention claimed. The practice of inserting a specification detailing the invention to be protected had been
common since the mid-eighteenth century,11 however the 1883 Act was the first to
make the provision of claims a statutory requirement. It is apparent, though, that
this formal inclusion of claims in fact prompted little, if any, change in the way in
which specifications were drafted.12 Indeed, as Lord Chelmsford had stated some
seven years previously, the office of a claim is to define and limit with precision what
it is which is claimed to have been invented and therefore patented.13 Thus, even
before the passage of the 1883 Act, the British approach to determining the scope of
protection of a patent was based on peripheral definition theory, with the claims
forming the outer boundary of protection. The rules that were used to interpret the
claims, and to decide whether an alleged infringer operating on the periphery of the
grant in fact fell within the scope of the monopoly, were very straightforward and
very simple.14 The starting point was the principle of literal interpretation. The
method to be undertaken was aptly summarised by Lord Esher in 1894:
[W]hen objection is taken to the claim, or to any one of several claims, it is not using the
true canons of construction to read that alone and to say that, without regard to what there
is in the rest of the patent, that means so-and-so, or that means what is stated as the objection, and therefore, reading it in that way, you must hold the patent is bad. You must look
at the whole of the Specification, and then, having looked at the whole, if it is an objection
to the claim, see what the claim, on the true construction of it is, having regard to the whole
of the instrument.15
However, Romer LJ, later cautioned against over-use of the specification to alter
the clear and unambiguous meaning of a claim:
One may, and one ought to, refer to the body of the Specification for the purpose of ascertaining the meaning of words and phrases used in the Claims or for the purpose of resolving difficulties of construction occasioned by the Claims when read by themselves. But
where the construction of a Claim when read by itself is plain it is not in my opinion legitimate to diminish the ambit of the monopoly claimed merely because in the body of the
Specification the Patentee has described his invention in more restricted terms than in the
Claim itself.16
For such practice would not be to construe but to amend17. Therefore, given that
claims formed the outer limits of protection, infringement could still depend on
11
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18 The factors influencing the intrinsic scope of the patent (ie the scope with which it is drafted) are
discussed more fully in ch 4, below.
19 EMI v Lissen (1939) 56 RPC 23. Lord Russells speech can be found at 3946.
20 See similar assertions in Terrell (15th ed), n 17, above, at 6.38. Also Kemp, n 12, above, at 19.
21 Above, n 19, at 39.
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11
A claim is a portion of the specification which fulfils a separate and distinct function. It and
it alone defines the monopoly; and the patentee is under a statutory obligation to state in
the claims clearly and distinctly what is the invention which he desires to protect.22
This point is echoed by comments of Lord Porter in the same case when he states
that:
If the claims have a plain meaning in themselves, then advantage cannot be taken of the
language used in the body of the Specification to make them mean something different.23
In addition, as Kemp notes, Lord Russells speech must be seen in the context of
the Patent Offices requirements that the body of the specification . . . be consistent
with the claims thereby to render in general less chance for the specification . . . [to
contain] stray phrases . . . for the purpose of narrowing or widening the boundaries
of the monopoly fixed by the plain words of the claim 25
The classic example utilised as an exception to the standard approach advocated
by Lord Russell is the case of Henriksen v Tallon.26 The dispute concerned a patent
for a ball point pen having a plug in contact with the ink at the open end of the tube.
The claims specified:
a fountain pen of the ball tip type, comprising a tubular ink reservoir provided at one end
with a ball tip and at the opposite end with an air inlet, in which there is disposed between
the column of ink in the reservoir and the air inlet a liquid or a viscous or paste-like mass
which does not mix with the ink and forms a plug which moves with the surface of the ink
column and prevents air from contacting the surface of the ink.27 (emphasis added)
22
23
24
25
26
27
Ibid, at 41.
Ibid, at 57.
[1960] RPC 59, at 69.
Kemp, n 12, above, at 19.
[1965] RPC 434.
Claim 1 of the patent, reproduced in Lord Reids judgment, ibid, at 441.
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The alleged infringement contained a grease plug between the ink and air inlet
that did not mix with the ink to any appreciable extent, and which moved with the
surface of the ink column. However, expert evidence demonstrated that the defendants plug only prevented some 60 per cent of the air from contacting
the surface of the ink. Therefore, the question of construction that lay before the
court related to the interpretation of the word prevents in the claims.
The House of Lords unanimously considered that prevents in the patent claims
must be interpreted as meaning prevents for all practical purposes, although Lord
Guest disagreed with the majority over whether the plaintiff had successfully
proved that the defendants embodiment fulfilled this requirement.28 Lord Reid was
the most forthright of their Lordships, stating that:
It is a general principle of construction that, where there is a choice between two meanings,
one should if possible, reject that meaning which leads to an absurd result . . . It would be a
very artificial construction of the claim to hold that, because an infringers plug is not very
efficient though sufficient for commercial purposes, therefore there is no infringement.
That would simply be inviting infringers to take the invention but make it work inefficiently.29
See the final para of Lord Guests judgment, n 26, above, at 453.
[1965] RPC 434 at 443, 445.
30 Per Justice Jackson, delivering the leading judgment in Graver Tank v Linde Air Products 339 US 605
(1949, Supreme Ct), at 607.
31 (18767) 2 App Cas 315 at 320.
29
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13
As Kemp notes: While the metaphor has been criticised the principle enunciated
in Clark v Adie . . . has been followed and applied in many cases.32 Subsequent decisions, however, had refined this doctrine of pith and marrow, in particular making
explicit Lord Cairns implicit reference to mechanical equivalency. Thus, in Marconi
v British Radio Telegraph and Telephone Company Ltd, Parker J referred to the
doctrine in the following terms:
It is a well-known rule of Patent law that no one who borrows the substance of a patented
invention can escape the consequences of infringement by making immaterial variations.
From this point of view the question is whether infringing apparatus is substantially the
same as the apparatus said to have been infringed . . . where the Patent is for a combination
of parts or a process, and the combination or process, besides being itself new, produces
new and useful results; everyone who produces the same results by using the essential parts
of the combination or process is an infringer, even though he has, in fact, altered the combination or process by omitting some unessential part or step and substituting another
part or step, which is, in fact, equivalent to the part or step he has omitted.33
Therefore, by the early twentieth century it had become established that the
patent grant extended to protect against embodiments that, although they omitted
certain features or substituted equivalent means for them, nonetheless took the
essence of the invention. However, it was equally clear that this extension of protection was only available where the variations or omissions were in respect of inessential features of the claimed invention. Therefore, the key issue in infringement
proceedings became whether particular limitations in the claims were of this
nature, or not.
The importance, and difficulty, of making the distinction (as well as affirmation
of the existence of the doctrine, which Kemp notes had lain dormant since the decision of the Privy Council in Pope v Spanish River 34) finds illustration in comments
of Lord Evershed MR, in Birmingham Sound Reproducers Ltd, v Collaro:
In our judgment, it is not open to this court or the authorities to accept that Sir Lionels
submission to the effect that the doctrine of pith and marrow or substance is dead. Nor
do we propose to attempt any comprehensive definition of its scope. We think it can, generally speaking, be taken to be confined to unessential differences, though we appreciate
that the distinction between that which is essential and that which is unessential may be
difficult to draw . . .
The invention with which we are now concerned is an invention consisting of the selection
of particular known mechanical members and the arrangement of them in a particular
way . . . The individual parts of this apparatus are not claimed as inventions and . . . could
not be so claimed. The basic idea which it carries out . . . is not new.
Thus the essence of the invention resides wholly in the selection and arrangement of the
parts and the manner in which they interact when arranged in accordance with the inven32
Kemp, n 12, above, at 20. He continues, listing some of the cases in which favourable reference has
been made to Clark v Adie.
33 (1911) 28 RPC 181 at 217.
34 (1928) 46 RPC 23. See Kemp, n 12, above, at 22.
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14
Page 14
Therefore, under the renewed doctrine little had changed: the courts still had to
analyse the patent in order to establish the essential elements, and then assess
whether the defendants embodiment reproduced each of these. It was not enough
to show equivalent functionality, the doctrine required identity in essence, only
inessential elements could be substituted or omitted.36
law.
37
38
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15
11 of the words hindmost and foremost would be required to identify the useful conversion of a particular raking device, and still less that to suppose that the Patentee so
intended.39
By parity of reasoning, the majority in the Court of Appeal also refused to find
that the patent had been infringed, Upjohn LJ adding:
Why they so confined the claim it is not for us to speculate. The claim could presumably
have been safely drawn to cover dismountability of either group [of wheels] . . . but apparently the appellants did not appreciate this possibility . . . [T]here is no escape . . . we are
bound to construe the words of the claim according to their clear and unambiguous
meaning.41
The case was appealed to the House of Lords where the majority, once again,
declined to find infringement on grounds that the patentee had deliberately limited
their claim to dismountable hindmost wheels. We shall turn to examine the reasoning of the majority on the issue of claim interpretation in due course, however, for
the moment it is interesting to examine the dissenting opinion of Lord Reid, standing alone in his finding of infringement.
Lord Reid took a practical view of the invention. After stating that the defendant
clearly avoided textual infringement of the claim by providing dismountable foremost wheels rather than hindmost wheels as required by the patent, his Lordship
proceeded to assess the scope of the doctrine of pith and marrow:
Copying an invention by taking its pith and marrow without textual infringement of the
patent is an old and familiar abuse which the law has never been powerless to prevent. It
may be that in doing so there is some illogicality, but our law has always preferred good
sense to strict logic.42
He continued, explaining that this illogicality arises due to the fact that the patentee is strictly tied to the invention as claimed. Whilst clearly content that if
another party effected the same improvement as the patentee by different means
this should not infringe, his Lordship noted that:
[I]t has long been recognised that there may be an essence or substance of the invention
underlying the mere accident of form; and that invention, like every other invention, may
be pirated by a theft in a disguised or mutilated form, and it will be in every case a question
39
40
41
42
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of fact whether the alleged piracy is the same in substance and effect, or is a substantially
new or different combination.43
Therefore, the critical element in this case, according to Lord Reid, was the fact
that the defendant was unable to point to any mechanical reason for, or advantage
to, making the foremost wheels dismountable. In his opinion, it was simply done to
try to evade the claim.44 The lower courts had therefore erred in their reasoning, for
even though:
It must be true . . . that in framing their specification the appellants did not appreciate that
the same result could be achieved by moving the foremost wheels, for otherwise they
would have made their claim wide enough to cover this. . . . [S]urely the same must be true
of most if not all cases where there is an attempt to avoid infringement by the substitution
of a mechanical equivalent: if the patentee had foreseen that possibility he would have
made his claim cover it. If that were a good reason for refusing protection to the patentee
against a person who later thinks of and adopts the mechanical equivalent, it seems to me
that there would be very little left of this principle. Upjohn, L.J., said that the appellants
have deliberately chosen to make it an essential feature of the claim that the hindmost
wheels should be detachable. If by that he meant that there is something in the specification to show that they deliberately refrained from including the foremost wheels or went
out of their way to make the hindmost wheels an essential feature I cannot find anything
on which to base such a conclusion. But I do not think that he meant that, because he went
on to agree with Lloyd-Jacob, J., that apparently the appellants did not appreciate the possibility that the foremost wheels might be moved. So I think that he must have meant that
the mere fact that they only mentioned the hindmost wheels was sufficient to make the
limitation to the hindmost wheels an essential feature of the claim. But if that were right,
then I cannot see how there could ever be an unessential feature or how this principle could
ever operate. And I think that the principle is very necessary to prevent sharp practice.45
It is therefore apparent that Lord Reid considered the fact that the patentee failed
to mention any other embodiment as insufficient evidence that they intended to
exclude other embodiments from the scope of protection. His construction is based
on what the patentee could validly have claimed and appears to appreciate the
impossibility of drafting a claim that encompasses all potential variants from the
outset. This approach can be seen to match the scope of protection to the patentees
contribution to the art. As such, it appears that Lord Reid adopts a reward-based
justification for the interpretation that he places on the claims. However, the
integrity of his approach is somewhat compromised by the fact that everything in
his judgment reflects his Lordships opinion that the defendant had consciously
sought to copy the patentees product whilst avoiding a textual infringement. This
latter factor tends to suggest that whilst the intention of the patentee cannot be
assumed from their choice of limiting words, the defendants may be from their
reluctance, or inability, to explain their own choice of elements. It could be argued
43 Ibid. Quoting from James LJ in the Court of Appeals judgment in Clark v Adie (1873) LR 10
Ch 667.
44 Above, n 37, at 75.
45 Ibid, at 767.
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17
that the defendant in this case had more opportunity in the process of litigation to
provide an explanation for their choices than the patentees purely documentary
submission in the patent would have done. However, the lack of reasoning on this
point, indeed lack of acknowledgement of any kind that such an issue could exist, is
still unsettling. A plausible workaround could be found by explicitly adopting a
position in which the patent is assumed to cover all embodiments made obvious to
the skilled addressee in the light of the claims. However, this would come perilously
close to adopting central definition theory and would serve to weaken Lord Reids
position still further.
As noted, Lord Reid was in the minority on the issue of claim interpretation. The
majority held the view that the patentee had deliberately elected to limit the claim
to dismountable hindmost wheels. Therefore, even under the doctrine of pith and
marrow there could be no infringement. Viscount Radcliffe explained that the
application of the principle:
[I]s from first to last directed to the prevention of abuse of patent rights by colourable evasion: it is not a special or benevolent method of construing an uncertain claim . . . [T]he
basic duty of the patentee [is] to state clearly what is the invention for which he seeks protection . . .
When, therefore, one speaks of theft or piracy of anothers invention or says that it has
been taken by an alleged infringer and this pith and marrow principle is invoked to
support the accusation. I think that one must be very careful to see that the inventor has
not by the actual form of his claim left open to the world the appropriation of just that
property that he says has been filched from him by piracy or theft. After all, it is he who has
committed himself to the unequivocal description of what he claims to have invented, and he
must submit in the first place to be judged by his own action and words.
If he is so judged, I cannot for my part see what inventive idea is claimed by claim 11,
regarded as a separate claim, except the idea of dismounting the hindmost wheels and bringing them forwards to a position adjacent to and parallel with the foremost wheels
. . . I cannot, therefore, embark upon an enquiry whether the dismountability of the hindmost wheels is an essential or unessential element of the invention claimed, because it seems
to me that the patentee himself has told us by the way that he has drawn up claim 11 that this
dismountability of the hindmost wheels is the very element of his idea that makes it an
invention. When one says, then, as has been said by the majority of the Court of Appeal, that
the appellants have deliberately chosen to make it an essential feature of the claim that the
hindmost wheels should be detachable, what one means is not merely that the wording of
this claim has been carefully selected, as has all the rest of the patent document, to put the
appellants in as strong a position as their expert advisers thought attainable or desirable, but
also that the appellants have stated clearly and without equivocation that the point of their
invention lies in its application to the hindmost wheels.46 (emphasis added)
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define the scope that he desires from the outset, and, critically, only very limited latitude is to be given for defects in this drafting process.47 The effect is to reduce the
scope of protection to mere textual infringement. By reading all claim integers as
essential, as the patentee must submit in the first place to be judged by his own action
and words, the House of Lords at once sidelines the application of a doctrine that it
explicitly endorses. Thus, a paradox is created in that pith and marrow is from first
to last directed to the prevention of abuse of patent rights by colourable evasion. Yet
it cannot be invoked where the meaning of the claim is unambiguous, for in this
instance the patentee has committed himself to the unequivocal description of what
he claims to have invented. Furthermore, according to Viscount Radcliffe, it is not
intended to provide a special or benevolent method of construing an uncertain
claim48. Therefore, as Lord Reid states, it is difficult to see how there could ever be
an unessential feature or how this principle could ever operate.49
Further illustration of the House of Lords restrictive attitude to claim interpretation in this period is found in Rodi & Wienenberger v Showell.50 The patent
claimed an extensible chain band, more particularly a wristwatch bracelet made of
two layers of cylindrical sleeves connected by a pair of U-shaped bows. The connecting bows were kept firmly in the sleeve by a spring plate in each sleeve. The
defendant marketed two similar products; in both, the connecting bows in the
upper sleeve were joined to form an integral C-shapedlink, the ends of which functioned as the U-shaped bows in the patented article. In one embodiment
(Excalibur 59) leaf springs were included in each sleeve to prevent the bows from
lying loosely, however, they did not function to hold the bows in place to prevent
them falling out of the sleeve, as the shape of the bow itself did this. In the other,
(Excalibur 60) the springs were dispensed with entirely, the middle of the connecting bows being shaped so as to provide their own springs.
Three questions came before the House for consideration. First, did the defendants use of C-shaped bows infringe the patentees U-shaped bows? Second, was
it essential that the spring plate functioned to keep the bows firmly in the sleeve, so
that where the bows were held in place by their shape alone (as in Excalibur 59) this
was not an infringement? Finally, was it essential that a separate bow and leaf spring
comprising a bent spring plate be provided in each sleeve, or could the spring plate
and the connecting bow be combined?
A majority of the House of Lords thought that the defendants products fell outside of the scope of protection afforded by the patent. Lord Upjohn, arguing that:
[T]he question of whether the relevant claim has been infringed . . . is purely a question of
construction of the claim read as a matter of ordinary language, in the light of the complete
specification taken as a whole; but the claim must be construed as a document without
having in mind the alleged infringement. What is not claimed is disclaimed. The claim
47
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19
must be read through the eyes of the notional addressee, the man who is going to carry out
the invention described.51
He continued, stating:
[W]hen the patentee claimed U-shaped connecting bows and then described their insertion and mutual reaction he meant to refer to U-links or bows and not to elongated
C-members . . . As a matter of ordinary construction I think there is only one answer . . .
[the skilled addressee] would think the patentee was describing independent U bows at
each end of a transverse sleeve and that was the extent of the claim. I reach that conclusion
upon the wording of the claim and without reference to the drawings, though the latter do
support that view. That was one of the essential integers claimed in the claim.52
Therefore, by echoing Lord Russells famous words in EMI v Lissen,53 and utilising very similar reasoning to his Lordships own decision in the Court of Appeal in
Van der Lely, Lord Upjohn effectively limited the scope of protection to a literal
interpretation of the claim. However, more significantly, he also made the following
statement of principle to justify this narrow approach:
[I]f the patentee has in his specification limited the essential features of his claim in a manner that may appear to be unnecessary, it may be that the copier can escape infringement
by adopting some simple mechanical equivalent so that it cannot be said that every essential integer of the claim has been taken; the Van der Lely case (admittedly a border line case
which led to a conflict of judicial opinion upon its facts) affords a very good example. But
it must be remembered that unlike a conveyance or commercial document which is normally inter partes and must be interpreted, frequently very broadly, so far as possible to
give effect to what appears to have been the intentions of the parties; a patent is a grant of a
monopoly forbidding others to enter a part of the general commercial territory open to all of
Her Majestys subjects and so in the interests of those subjects that territory must be marked
out with reasonable clarity by the claim, construing it fairly in the light of the relevant art.54
(emphasis added)
Therefore, we are provided with an explicit statement of policy. The patent grant
is a monopoly, and as such it interferes with the rights of men to operate freely
within the general commercial territory. The subtext is therefore that it must be
construed narrowly in order to protect society from its abuse. Once more, it is an
exception to the sanctity of free trade.
Lord Reid, again offering dissenting judgment, was of the opinion that the claims
should be viewed with an eye to the intended recipient; the skilled addressee.
Therefore:
[The] claims are not addressed to conveyancers: they are addressed to practical men
skilled in the prior art, and I do not think that they ought to be construed with that
meticulousness which was once thought appropriate for conveyancing documents.55
51
52
53
54
55
Ibid, at 391.
Ibid, at 3934.
Above, n 19.
Above, n 50, at 3912.
Ibid, at 378.
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Individual phrases should be read in the context of the claim as a whole, interpreted in the light of the specification. As such, the interpretation that is placed on
them should take account of their function. Lord Pearce, also dissenting, added
that:
Had the claim been a direction to a printer or a type-setter, the alphabetical approach
would seem to me correct, since the alphabet would clearly be relevant and the identity and
formation of a particular letter would probably be the essential ingredient of the integer
described. But the essence of the connector to anybody thinking on mechanical rather
than literary lines would be a bridge connecting two parallel limbs which would lie in
adjacent sleeves. That quality would be fulfilled whether one described it as U-shaped
bows, or J-shaped links, or goal posts.
If one discards alphabetical niceties, there remains the more solid argument that here,
instead of the two U-shaped bows, one has running all through the sleeve one continuous
integer albeit having at each end (at the relevant point of interconnection) a link which
performs the same function as a U-shaped link in that it acts as a bridge to join the adjacent sleeves and in that its limbs perform the pivotal action against the leaf springs.
It is important that in construing a patent one should seek to find what it means to the reasonable person who is reasonably versed in the matters of which it speaksin this case
mechanical. It is directed to the workshop and the market place rather than to the cloister.
For that reason a plain straightforward construction is generally to be preferred to one that
is strained or literary or tortuous. And meticulous niceties of construction which are
wholly appropriate to a legal document may seem to the practical man to have a flavour of
pedantry if they so whittle away a patent that they enable a copyist to avoid its ambit by
means that seem to be concerned with words rather than essentials.56
Therefore, there is a clear difference of opinion concerning the canons of construction that are to be applied in any given case. The majority judgment suggests
that the patentees choice of the phrase U-shaped automatically limits the claim to
this, and no other, shape of bow. This approach is significant, as it prompts the view
that in order to provide an adequate scope of protection the patentee should refrain
from adding restrictions to their claims. Their Lordships rationalise this narrow
approach by stating that it is in the interests of society that the patent marks out its
territory with reasonable clarity by the claim. Yet, the result of their narrow interpretation is the exact opposite, in that that the patentee is encouraged to introduce
uncertainties in the hope of broadening their protection.
Lord Upjohns statement that the patent is a grant of a monopoly forbidding others to enter a part of the general commercial territory open to all of Her Majestys
subjects,57 is telling as it exposes a mindset (perhaps even prejudice) that has its
origins in the abuses of Crown grants under Elizabeth I.58 In addition, by focussing
on the rights of society, rather than the rights of the patentee, the House may be criticised as loosing sight of the real reason that we have patent protection at all. As Cole
56
57
58
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21
notes, there is a distinction that exists between the primary purpose of the Patents
Acts and their secondary purposes. The primary purpose is the encouragement of
manufacturing industry within the UK by granting to inventors a limited monopoly in their inventions. The fact that the patentee is asked to define the scope of
their invention in claims is a secondary object of the Act intended to allow the
system to operate smoothly. Where there is conflict between the two, the primary
purpose should prevail.59
The purpose of this work is to examine the validity of these statements. In order
to do this we first look to the history of the patent system, and consider the origins
of the anti-patent attitude in which the grant is seen as an exception to the general
prohibition of monopoly.
59 See Cole, Patent InfringementPith and MarrowA Review of United Kingdom Practice
[1980] EIPR 289 at 298.
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2
History of the Patent System
The Canvas Prepared
Introduction
The exact origin of modern patent law is unknown. Legal academics and historians
vie to produce the definitive point of conception of the system, citing in turn the
Greeks1, Byzantines2, Italians3 and English4, amongst others, as having sown the
first seeds. It is impossible to tell which, if any, of these assertions is correct. What is
clear, however, is that the development of the patent model was by no means peculiar to England, despite the occasional assertion to the contrary.5
The notion that there may be some kind of property in the fruits of intellectual
labour dates back to at least the time of Ancient Greece. However, it is apparent that
any such concepts and attendant rights that may have been attached to them were
usually perceived in terms of the physical object or teaching of the trade so protected.6 Indeed, it is not until the end of the eighteenth century that we begin to see
widespread acceptance of the notion of property in the intangible per se.7 Indeed,
the role played by the patent system within society, and therefore the justifications
that can be used to rationalise its existence, have also changed dramatically over
time. We turn to consider these issues more fully in chapter three, but for now it is
sufficient to note that these early customs bear little resemblance to the system of
grants with which we are faced in the modern commercial sphere. Nevertheless, the
conception and growth of the idea of a patent system, not to mention the English
1 See, eg Merges, Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age (New York, Aspen Law & Business,
1997) at 121.
2 Frumkin,Early History of Patents for Invention (1947) 26 Trans Newcomen Soc. 47.
3 Prager,A History of Intellectual Property 1545 to 1787 (1944) 26 JPOS 711 (Prager,History).
4 Price, The English Patents of Monopoly (Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press, 1913).
5 See, eg Fox, Monopolies and Patents: A Study of the History and Future of the Patent Monopoly
(Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1947), at 85; Price, ibid, at 7; and Hindmarch, A Treatise on the Law
Relative to Patent Privileges for the Sole use of Inventions (London, Stevens, Norton & Benning, 1846) at 3.
6 Long, Invention, Authorship, Intellectual Property, and the Origin of Patents: Notes toward a
Conceptual History (1991) 32 Technology & Culture 846, at 858.
7 Walterscheid,The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (Part I) (1994) 76
JPTOS 697 (Walterscheid, Antecedents I) at 7023. See also Bently & Sherman, The Making of Modern
Intellectual Property Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999), passim.
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custom itself, can teach us much about the motivations and justifications for patent
protection today.
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25
much closer to what we would now call discovery , with property rights often
being granted for the invention of an ore site.11 However, as time went on, and
mining was forced deeper underground by exhaustion of surface deposits, innovative methods and machinery for drainage were protected in the same manner, with
the law on mineral claiming being directly applied.12 Pohlmann, along the same
lines, states that there are examples of proto-patents, as he terms them, in the
German principalities as early as 1378.13 Frumkin, meanwhile, utilises the writings
of Benjamin of Tuleda, a traveller in the twelfth century, to support his (admittedly
vague) assertion that an embryonic patent system was evident in the semiByzantine kingdom of Jerusalem at this time.14 The account on which he bases this
claim describes an exclusive privilege for the dyeing of cloth.Whilst interesting as an
historical aside, Frumkins conclusion that this therefore proves the existence of a
patent system that predates the Statute of Venice by some three centuries is, unfortunately, unfounded. The unofficial nature and singularity of his source render the
authority of the account dubious at best. Frumkin also mentions other early examples of grants including a 15 year monopoly for the manufacture of cloth in
Bordeaux in 1236.15 However, none of these pre-1474 examples can really be said to
show evidence of anything other than isolated instances in which privilege was conferred. None can lay claim to providing for the systematic protection of invention,
however it is defined.
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divers parts. Now, if provision were made for the works and devices discovered by such
persons, so that others who may see them could not build them and take the inventors
honour away, more men would then apply their genius, would discover, and would build
devices of great utility and benefit to our commonwealth. Therefore:
BE IT ENACTED that, by the authority of this Council, every person who shall build any
new and ingenious device in this City, not previously made in our Commonwealth, shall
give notice of it to the office of our General Welfare Board when it has been reduced to perfection so that it can be used and operated. It being forbidden to every other person in any
of our territories and towns to make any further device conforming with and similar to
said one, without the consent and licence of the author, for the term of ten years. And if
anybody builds it in violation hereof, the aforesaid author and inventor shall be entitled to
have him summoned before and magistrate the said infringer shall be constrained to pay
him [one] hundred ducats; and the device shall be destroyed at once. It being, however,
within the power and discretion of the Government, in its activities, to take and use any
such device and instrument, with this condition however that no one but the author shall
operate it.17
The Venetian Statute contained all of the essential features of a modern patent
law. It provided that the devices must be novel (new and ingenious,18 not previously
made in the Commonwealth) and reduced to perfection. It gave a term of protection (10 years), provided for the licensing of the invention, and set out a procedure
for determining infringement, providing a remedy in damages and calling for
destruction of the infringing article. Furthermore, it reserved the right of the State
to take and use the invention for itself, a condition mirrored in the Crown use provisions of the current United Kingdom Patents Act.19 In all aspects it evidences a
modern approach to patents.
The success of this Statute in stimulating invention is difficult to gauge, however,
it is evident that it was accompanied by a profound increase in terms of the number
of State grants of protection. In the 75 years before the enactment of the statute,
some 10 or 11 patent grants are evidenced in Venetian reports,20 compared to over
100 in the next 75.21
17
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27
22 Greenstreet, n 13, above, at 4 states that there is a strong suggestion inferred from records of early
grants in other countries that the idea of patent systems spread throughout Europe from Italy with emigrating glass workers. MacLeod, Accident or Design? George Ravenscrofts Patent and the Invention of
Lead Crystal Glass (1987) 28 Technology & Culture 776 at 7801, states that the patent custom was carried out of Venice by glassmakers seeking to obtain the same degree of protection from local competition that they had enjoyed in the Venetian Republic.
23 MacLeod, Inventing the Industrial Revolution: The English Patent System 16601800 (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1988) (MacLeod, Industrial Revolution) at 11 comments that [i]t is no
coincidence that the first recorded patents in many countries at this time were for glass making, a skill in
which the Venetians excelled. See also Mandich,Inventors Rights, n 20, above, passim.
24
Mandich,Venetian Patents, n 17, above, at 206; and Prager,History, n 3, above, at 723.
25
Price, n 4, above, at 5.
26
Price adduces no evidence to back this up, therefore it should be considered at least speculative. See
also Walterscheid, Antecedents I, n 7, above, at 7113 for a brief discussion of the early French patent
custom.
27
See Walterscheid, Antecedents I, n 7, above, at 711 who makes this assertion. See also Greenstreet,
n 13, above, at 5. Pohlmann, n 13, above, simply states, at 122, that numerous patents were granted
between 1500 and 1600 and that it was only the war of thirty years, 1618 to 1648, which doomed this
promising growth.
28
See Walterscheid, Antecedents I, n 7, above, at 714; see also Doorman, Patents for Inventions in the
Netherlands During the 16th, 17th and 18th Centuries (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1942) at 1415; and
Greenstreet, n 13, above, at 4.
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29
Thus, we see a grant in 1336 to two Brabant weavers to settle in York in consideration of the value of their industry to the Realm;38 an invitation in 1368 to three
clockmakers of Delft to come to England for a short period;39 letters patent dated
1440 to John of Schiedame for a process of making salt on a scale never before
attempted in the Realm;40 and a grant in 1452 to the Bohemian miners, based upon
their possession of scientific methods in mining.41 However, far from providing
evidence of an emerging patent custom, whilst all of these grants were clearly
designed to improve the knowledge of the Realm, they did so on an individual, ad
hoc, and personal basis and did not purport to protect the manufactures as inventions in themselves.
As the conditions for life became more stable and the populace more tolerant of the
international character of these artisans, the need for protection gradually disappeared and the necessity for adequate reward took its place.42 Thus, slowly, these
inducements evolved into limited exclusive rights in areas of industry controlled by
the state; hence pointing the way to the birth of a true monopoly right.43
It is unclear when the first English monopoly patent of invention issued to individuals was in fact granted. The argument seems to lie between those backing
156144 and those who consider 1552 to be the year in which the first issuance
occurred.45 A small number of academics claim the correct date to be 1449,46 but as
one commentator states,John of Utynams patent of 1449 stands solitary, detached,
and inscrutable.47 Whatever the date of the first patent of invention, it is clear that
the system took root and flourished during the reign of Elizabeth I, for in the years
between 1561 and 1600 in excess of 50 patents were granted.48
manufactures of the continent and the produce of the East.. See also Holdsworth, English Law, Vol IV,
n 35, above, at 341, 3446; MacLeod, Industrial Revolution, n 23, above, at 10; Fox, n 5, above, at 437.
38
10 Edw III, Dec 12.
39
42 Edw III, p I.
40
18 Hen VI, Franc 18 m 27.
41
See Hulme, Prerogative, n 32, above, at 143 who asserts that this is [t]he first example of a grant
made to the introducer of a newly-invented process. See also Fox, n 5, above, at 44.
42 Fox, n 5, above, at 45.
43 Walterscheid,Antecedents I, n 7, above, at 707.
44 Including Hulme,Prerogative, n 32, above, at 145; Holdsworth, English Law, Vol IV, n 35, above, at
345; Hauhart, The Origin and Development of the British and American Patent and Copyright Laws
(1983) 8 Whittier Law Review 539 at 541; Bugbee, n 16, above, at 174.
45 See, eg, Davies, Further Light on the Case of Monopolies (1932) 48 LQR 394 (Davies, Further
Light) at 396, a point he reiterates in The Early History of the Patent Specification, (1934) 50 LQR 86
(Davies,Early History) at 95; Klitzke,Historical Background of the English Patent Law (1959) 41 JPOS
615 at 629; Fox, n 5, above, at 601; MacLeod, Industrial Revolution, n 23, above, at 11.
46 See Greenstreet, n 13, above, at 1, 56; see also Gomme, Patents of Invention: Origin and Growth of
the Patent System in Britain (London, Longmans, Green and Co, 1946) at 612. The UK Intellectual
Property Office (the new name for the Patent Office) also backs this claim; see http://www.ipo.gov.uk/
about/about-ourorg/about-history/about-history-patent.htm. The patent is discussed at length in
Thorne, John Utynams Patent AD 1449 and Medieval Common Law and Other Considerations of
Related Interest (1957) 27 Canadian Pat Rep 21.
47 Gomme, ibid, at 13. See also Klitzke, n 45, above, at 630.
48 Again there are disagreements between academics as to the correct number; Hulme, The History
of the Patent System under the Prerogative and at Common LawA Sequel (1900) 16 LQR 44 (Hulme,
Sequel) at 52, states the number to be 51; Klitzke, n 45, above, at 635 cites Hulme for the proposition that
55 grants were made in this period; Fox, n 5, above, at one point states that 55 grants were made (at 50),
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The shift from the sporadic and essentially ad hoc pre-Elizabethan grants is, once
more, presaged by the Italian factor. Commentators note a letter sent in 1537 to the
Kings Principal Secretary, Thomas Cromwell, by a Venetian, one Antonio Guidotti,
proposing to bring Italian silk weavers to England in return for 15 to 20 years control of the production of silk in the Realm.49 Whilst there is no evidence that
Guidotti actually received a grant, the letter provides proof that Venetian practice
was at least known in the Kingdom and therefore helps to explain a number of subsequent developments.
but later asserts that the number was 51 (at 612); whilst Federico, Origin and Early History of Patents
(1929) 11 JPOS 292 at 297, indicates that Elizabeth granted 20 patents in the first 10 years of her reign,
and 40 thereafter.
49
See, eg, MacLeod, Industrial Revolution, n 23, above, at 11; Klitzke, n 45, above, at 629; Gomme,
n 46, above, at 89; Greenstreet, n 13, above, at 56.
50
See Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 2)
(1994) 76 JPTOS 849 (Walterscheid, Antecedents II) at 855 and Getz, History of the Patentees
Obligations in Great Britain,(1964) 46 JPOS 62 (cont at 214) at 6971.
51
Hulme,Prerogative, n 32, above, at 152; see also MacLeod, Industrial Revolution, n 23, above, at 12.
52
See Walterscheid,Antecedents II, n 50, above, at 855; MacLeod, Industrial Revolution, n 23, above,
at 11.
53
See Price, n 4, above, at 6.
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31
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well-known axiom of English law, relating to all forms of Royal grant, that the King
must not be deceived in his grant, the penalty for the contravention of this rule
being the annulment of the grant.60 Englishmen were considered to know and
respect this imperative, but foreigners were apt to plead ignorance of the English
common law!61 and could therefore not be trusted. Thus, clauses were often,62 but
not always,63 worked into the grants themselves in furtherance of this aim.
The most basic of the clauses inserted into grants of this period were those which
required the patentee to work the new art, trade or industry within the kingdom;64
time limits frequently being placed upon such working, with the grant being void
for lack of consideration if they were not adhered to. Also prevalent at the time were
clauses obligating the patentee to employ and train native artisans to practice the
trade covered by the grant. Walterscheid explains that this type of requirement was
usually only applied to foreign patentees in order to safeguard the continuance of
the industry should they abscond before the term of their patent expired:65 therefore accomplishing the same result as the working requirement.66 A variation on
this theme included limitations on the number of aliens that the patentee might
employ. In addition, clauses were sometimes introduced that required the subject
of the grant to prove the novelty or efficacy of their invention within a
specified period. Evidence has been adduced to suggest that it was customary to
bind foreign artisans in this way,67 presumably in an attempt to encourage full
implementation of the invention, to prevent fraud being practiced upon the Crown
and to ensure that the new knowledge could, in fact, be passed on to others. Further,
the Crown often imposed requirements of a minimum standard of quality, and an
obligation that the price be less than if the goods were imported, in consideration of
the grant.
60
For a number of authorities that state this rule see Davies,Early History, n 45, above, at 100.
Walterscheid,Antecedents II, n 50, above, at 857.
62 See Hulme, On the Consideration of the Patent Grant, Past and Present (1897) 13 LQR 313
(Hulme,Consideration) at 314.
63 See Davies, Early History, n 45, above, at 1012 for a discussion of several grants not containing
such clauses but which were accompanied by complimentary indentures between the Crown and the
patentee whereby such requirements were inserted.
64 As opposed to merely introducing it.
65 Walterscheid,Antecedents II, n 50, above, at 857.
66 An example of the use of this type of covenant can be found in the patent of Burchart Cranyce who
undertook to teach the secrets of his arte to Englishmen. See Walterscheid, ibid.
67 Davies,Early History, n 45, above, at 102.
61
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33
patented industry within the specified time period.68 Davies declares its first use as
being in a grant of 1575 to Holmes and Frampton for African headwear.69
The revocation clause rose out of the fact that the grant of a patent was a matter
of Royal grace, and thus the hand that gave could also take away. Despite the potential breadth of the clause, it was mostly exercised in cases of non-use, cases where the
grant was made on a false suggestion of novelty, and where the true inventor was
discovered to be other than the patentee.70 It can be found in patents granted for the
next two hundred years.
The main object of the patent custom at this time was clearly the institution of new
manufacture. Its grand aim was the technological improvement of the Realm, and the
most simple and effective method of doing this was via the importation of knowledge
from abroad. In short, the patent system protected and stimulated innovation directly,
and invention (in the modern sense of creation) only indirectly, if at all.
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It was inevitable that this transfer of power and responsibility would lead to
abuse, and grievances crept into the system early in its life. The Queen was quick to
realise that the granting of monopolies could be used to reward favourites without
depleting the Royal coffers. Courtiers saw that the policy could be exploited for their
own personal gain, the mere existence of a system of exclusive privileges being sufficient incentive to join in the race for favours.73 Drawn by licensing patents or
lucrative new monopolies in old industries, they left the more uncertain reward of
patents for new inventions to the poor and often chimerical inventors74. Thus we
see patents for the production of salt,75 vinegar76 and starch77, all established industries, being granted to court favourites. At the hands of the corrupt courtiers the
system of monopolies, designed originally to foster new arts, became degraded into
a system of plunder.78
Monopoly Classified
The contemporary definition of inventor and invention, combined with a lack of
specifications, makes it impossible to clearly divide the grants of this era into those
that are novel and useful by modern standards, and those that would be considered
abuses.79 However, Lipson, in his Economic History of England, suggested the
sub-division of patents into four categories, which attracted varying degrees of
objection at the time of Elizabeth.80 His approach provides an exhaustive method
of classification,81 and can be summarised as follows:
First, there are patents to which no exception could be taken. These are grants
that provided protection for new industries, whether for inventions in the modern
sense of the word or technological know-how imported from abroad.
At the opposite end of the spectrum were those grants that gave control of an
established trade to an individual or group. These constituted a major grievance as
they took from the people the right to enjoy a liberty previously open to them. In
addition they were often bad for want of consideration moving to the public, as the
notional requirement that society should derive some net benefit in return for sacrificing an area of commerce to the patentees exclusivity went unrealised.
However, it is clear that these first two categories are not necessarily mutually
exclusive as the second may eventually result from the first. Thus, the soap monopoly of Groyett and Le Leuryer to make white sope as good and as fine as any in the
73
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35
Sope house of Triana or Syvile,82 which was unobjectionable when first granted in
1561, was relegated to the second category by a series of additional grants issued
long after the trade had lost its novelty. So too with the monopoly for the production of starch, originally awarded to Young in 1588 and continued by grants to various others well into the mid 1660s.83
Lipsons third category, also disagreeable in nature, concerned grants conveying
powers of supervision over an established industry or trade.
Finally, of intrinsically less objectionable character, but under which grave abuses
nevertheless flourished, were those patents taking the form of licences relaxing the
austerity of the law in areas of import, export and the transport of certain commodities. These grants arose because it was often more expedient to grant limited
licences to evade an unworkable law than to repeal the statute as a whole.
However, it was not simply the grant of patents in these objectionable areas that
caused problems, for instrumental in the creation of these odious monopolies were
the powers of policing that accompanied the grant. The patentee was often provided with full powers of supervision, search, seizure and arrest of infringers in
addition to ability to recover fines or penalties for infringement.84 Needless to say,
this was an open invitation to abuse.
Mounting Opposition
That the matter of abuses escaped serious opposition for most of Elizabeths reign is
partly due to the (overall) cautious manner in which policy was conducted, but also,
in no small measure, it was attributable to the vast power and popularity of the
Queen herself. The issue of odious monopolies was first raised in Parliament in the
1571 session but was the subject of stern rebuke by Elizabeth as an attack on
the Royal prerogative. This sharp, and damning, attack on those who wished to trim
her chiefest Flower was effective in silencing her opponents for the next 25 years
until, in 1597, the issue of odious monopolies once again reared its head, prompted
by the pressures of industrial depression.
Elizabeth was firm in her stance, and once more condemned those who attacked
her. However, seemingly aware that the problem would not just fade away, she also
promised to examine all patents and to abide the touchstone of the law.85 However,
this time her delaying tactics were not so effective.
On 20 November, 1601, a Bill was introduced to Parliament entitled An Act for
the Explanation of the Common Law in Certain Cases of Letters Patent. It
prompted four days of debate, to which the Queen herself put an end by the
issuance of a statement through the Speaker. Thus, Elizabeth said, she understood
82
Which Fox, n 5, above, at 61 states may be said to have launched the policy of encouraging new
manufactures so vigorously pursued by Elizabeth and Burghley.
83
Fox, n 5, above, at 64.
84 Walterscheid,Antecedents II, n 50, above, at 864.
85 1 Parl Hist 906; quoted from Fox, n 5, above, at 75.
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that divers patents, that she had granted, were grievous to her subjects,86 but that
she had never assented to grant anything malum in se.87 Furthermore, she doubted
the wisdom of simply repealing undesirable grants, stating that if the Bill were withdrawn she would agree to submit her patents to trial according to the law.
This concession was most significant as it shifted any blame for the abuses away
from the prerogative and onto the patentee. Moreover, as the courts discussion of
the monopolies in question would inevitably turn on the facts of the individual
cases, an in-depth criticism of the policy of monopoly grant and the role and nature
of the prerogative was deftly avoided.88
The picture to emerge from the continued abuse of monopoly grants is one of
increasing hostility and distrust of monopoly as a barrier to free trade. The monopoly system, designed to foster technological improvement within the Realm, to
make the Kingdom self-sufficient, was being defiled. The minds of the people, of
Parliament, and of the courts of the common law were therefore turned against the
system. The only thing that prevented an overt attack on the prerogative power was
deft manipulation of the situation by a powerful and, most importantly, popular
Queen.
The problem of odious monopoly hangs like a fog shrouding the brilliance of the
invention that such a policy of monopoly grants in fact represents. The main object
of the policy, the technological improvement of the Realm, was, after all, a resounding success. There is no evidence that Elizabeth set out to grant monopolies harmful to the State; even where patents were issued in restraint of trade it is clear that the
necessity for supply was considered greater than the inconvenience caused. Thus,
maintenance of supplies of gunpowder and ordnance of sufficient quality and
quantity for the needs of the Realm was considered to outweigh the social cost of
imposing a monopoly in its production. Indeed, when Elizabeth came to the throne
there was a frightening need for ordnance;89 by 1591 English cannon were considered to be the best in Europe, and even the Spanish attempted to buy them.90 In
short, it was not the monopolies which were bad, but only their abuse.91
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Battles of a King
37
The courts of common law, somewhat curiously, explicitly confirmed this exception to the general illegality of monopoly grants in the 1615 case of the Clothworkers
of Ipswich,97 despite the fact that it had nothing whatsoever to do with the facts
being tried.
Battles of a King
James I acceded to the throne shortly before the decision in Darcy v Allin was
handed down. It may be for this reason that he began his reign on a note of caution
concerning monopoly grants, issuing a proclamation suspending them all until
they could be examined and assessed by the Privy Council.98
92
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Despite such timid beginnings, Jamess reign is not notable for its stable and conservative attitude to monopoly; quite the reverse. The years of 1603 to 1625 mark a
period of extreme vacillation between caution and excess.99
Thus, on 16 March, 1604, James issued an apology to Parliament over the surfeit
of his grants, and promised to moderate his generosity; in addition, he instigated
the Commissioners of Suits to examine the merits of all applications. However, by
1606 the situation concerning monopolies was so bad that the Committee on
Grievances presented a petition to the King at the close of the Parliamentary
Session.100 The King undertook to revoke those patents of most concern, but in fact
did nothing. In 1610 the Committee once again petitioned James, pointing to his
lack of action and stating that in addition he had failed in his undertaking that the
courts should consider and judge of the validity of certain of the grants.101 Shortly
after this petition, the King issued what has become known as his Book of Bounty.
This was a proclamation that all monopolies were against the laws of the Kingdom,
excepting those concerning Projects of new invention, so they be not contrary to
the Law, nor mischievous to the State, by raising prices of commodities at home, or
hurt of trade, or otherwise inconvenient.102
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39
ceding the 1621 Parliament, perhaps prompted by the growing unease with which
his grants were being viewed, James convened a Commission to investigate the
question of monopolies. Fox suggests that it was this act that forced the issue to a
head the opening of the 1621 Session.107
Parliament met on 30 January and extensive debate on public grievances occasioned by monopoly grants was undertaken. A Bill against monopolies was introduced to the House in March whereupon it was passed by the Commons, but failed
to gain approval in the Lords.108 Prompted by the agitation, the King issued a
proclamation akin to Elizabeths of 1601, stating that many privileges had been
granted on false suggestions of benefit to the Realm, and that others had been the
subjects of abuse. He referred to the Book of Bounty saying that he had previously
written of his dislike of such grants and of those who seek to obtain them. He followed these comments by declaring 18 patents void, and opening up 17 others to
trial by the common law, stating that:
[I]f any subject should find himself grieved, injured, or wronged by reason of any of the
said grants, or any clause, article, or thing therein contained, may take their remedy therefor by the common laws of the Realm, or other ordinary course of justice, any matter or
thing in the said grants to the contrary not withstanding.109
However, James was not the monarch that Elizabeth was, and in 1623 Parliament
renewed its onslaught. The Statute of Monopolies thus entered the statute books as
Chapter 3 of 1623.110
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all monopolies are declared to be contrary to the law and utterly void. Section 2
states that all issues of validity are to be determined at common law. Whilst section
3 provides that no one may exercise any monopoly right previously granted. In section 4, remedies are detailed for any party judged by the courts of common law to be
aggrieved by a monopoly. Sections 5 to 14 then contain exceptions to section 1; the
most famous being section 6, which provided an interpretative basis for English
patents granted during the next 450 years.112 The section states that:
any declaration before mentioned shall not extend to any letters patents and graunts of
privilege for the tearme of fowerteene yeares or under, hereafter to be made of the sole
working or makinge of any manner of new manufactures within this realme, to the true
and first inventor and inventors of such manufactures, which others at the tyme of
makinge such letters patents and graunts shall not use, soe as alsoe they be not contrary to
the lawe nor mischievous to the state, by raisinge prices of commodities at home, or hurt
of trade, or generallie inconvenient; the said fourteene yeares to be accomplished from the
date of the first letters patents or grant of such priviledge hereafter to be made, but that the
same shall be of such force as they should be if this Act had never byn made, and of none
other.
Commentary
Sir Edward Coke provides contemporary commentary on the Statute in his
Institutes on the Laws of England.113 He lists seven properties that a privilege of new
manufacture granted thereafter must possess to be valid under section 6. The first
fivethe grant must not exceed 14 years; it must be made to the first and true inventor; it must be for those manufactures which any other at the making of such letters
patents did not use; it must not be contrary to law; and it must not raise prices of
commodities and therefore be mischievous to the Stateare taken from the
Statute itself. The final pairthe patent must not hurt trade; and that it must not be
generally inconvenientalthough not mentioned in the Statute, are consonant
with Elizabethan policy. He then states that where such criteria are fulfilled, the
grant of a patent will be good in law as the inventor bringeth to and for the common
wealth a new manufacture by his invention, cost and charges, and therefore it is reason[able], that he should have a privilege for his reward (and the incouragement of
jurisdiction to the common law courts to deal with disputes connected with these grants. However, as
Walterscheid,Antecedents II, n 50, above, points out, at 875, the previous decisions of the common law
in Darcy v Allin, n 92, above, and the Clothworkers of Ipswich, n 97, above, provide evidence that the jurisdiction given to the common law courts was not new under the Act.
112
Invention was defined in s101 Patents Act 1949 as meaning any manner of new manufacture the
subject of letters patent and grant of privilege within section six of the Statute of Monopolies and any
new method or process of testing applicable to the improvement or control of manufacture.
Interestingly, s6 has never been repealed.
113
Coke, n 103, above, at 1815.
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others in the like) for a convenient time.114 Thus, we see the first explicit policy justification for the patent grant.
In addition, Coke asserted that: It appeareth by the Preamble of this act (as a
judgement in parliament) that all grants of monopolies are against the ancient and
fundamentall laws of this kingdome, and that all monopolies are against the
ancient and fundamentall laws of the realm.115 The latter phrase has served to
colour the patent grant ever since. However, it is clear from both Darcy v Allin and
the Clothworkers of Ipswich, that the right of the Crown to grant monopolies of new
trades or manufactures to those responsible for their introduction to the Realm
(whether by importation of skill or ideas, or by contrivance) was always recognised
at common law as part of the prerogative. Nonetheless, as monopoly is the antithesis of the common right of freedom of trade, which all men are to enjoy as their
birthright, the prerogative right to grant monopolies was, at least in theory, limited
at common law to grants where consideration moved to the public. Even where this
transfer of consideration was not in evidence, as long as a grant could be shown to
be in the best interests of the Realm its validity would be recognised.116 Therefore,
even after the ruling in Darcy v Allin, it is apparent that to omit the caveat relating to
new invention and to condemn all monopolies on the ground that they have ever
been against the ancient and fundamentall laws of the realm117 was an unsustainable argument.
Ibid, at 184; See also Walterscheid, Antecedents II, n 50, above, 876.
Coke, n 103, above, at 181.
See, eg patents for the sole production of saltpetre and ordnance granted by Elizabeth and continued under James which also gained exception to the general prohibition of monopolies in the Statute of
1623 by virtue of s10 of the same. See also Fox, n 5, above, at 60.
117
Coke, n 103, above, at 182.
118
It is evident that the folkloric transition occurred sometime during, or just after, the Patent
Controversy of the 19th century (see ch 3, below) as in the Report of the Select Committee on the Law
Relative to Patents for Inventions, Parliamentary Papers III, 1829 (Command Paper No 332) (Report of the
1829 Select Committee), the Statute is treated roughly equally with An Act Containing the Censure given
in Parliament against Sir Francis Mitchell, Francis Viscount Saint Albane Lord Chancellor of England
and Edward Flood (18 Jac I cap 1 (1621)) and An act to Confirm a Judgement given in Chancery for
Annulling Certain Letters Patent Granted to Henry Heron, for the Sole Privilege of Salting, Drying and
Packing of Fish within the Counties of Devon and Cornwall (21 Jac I cap 11 (1623)). See Bently &
Sherman, n 7, above at 208.
115
116
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150 years.119 Second, the Statute was for the most part merely declaratory of the common law; indeed it receives derisory treatment on this very issue in the Report of the
1829 Select Committee.120 Third, the Statute of Monopolies enjoys the peculiar distinction of having had almost no impact on the development of English patent law
for many years after its enactment.As Walterscheid states,for all intents and purposes
there was no development in the common law relating to patents of invention during
the next century.121
Seen in this light, the true significance of the Statute of Monopolies lies solely in
its prohibition of the unfair monopolisation of a known trade. The underlying policy of Elizabethan grants is still evident and the general concept of encouraging the
implementation of new manufacture is never questioned. Indeed, the Statute can be
seen to stand apart from the adoption of any such policy, instead functioning to
keep guard for potentially unjustified and capricious barriers to free trade. Its primary objective was, after all, to restrain a King gone wild in his grants in order that
odious monopoly be avoided or nullified. It is therefore little more than enduring
testament to the sanctity of free-market dealing.
A Legislative Aftermath
The Statute of Monopolies is a response to a little more than half a century of bad
feeling towards abuses of monopoly privilege. Its chief contribution was to clarify
the existing English law and to reinforce the position taken by the courts until this
time. As Bugbee states, [w]hile only incidentally concerned with . . . [patents of
invention] . . . the Statute provided a firmer legal basis for clearing away the bad
company with which [they] had been forced to travel.122 It did not create a new law
of patents of invention; it merely allowed them to continue to exist, saved from the
stifling effect of the weedlike growth of monopolies.123
However, the story of odious monopoly does not end here. Such grants continued to aggravate English politics for some decades after the Statutes enactment.
The source of contamination is, with hindsight, immediately recognisable when
the Statute is examined, for not only did it exempt patents of invention, but also significant other grants concerning industries considered essential to the Realm,
including saltpetre, alum, ordnance, shot, and gunpowder.124 Furthermore, in section 9 it was provided that grants made to any Corporations, Companies or
Fellowships of any Art, Trade, Occupation, or Mystery, or to any Companies or
119
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Issues of Jurisdiction
43
Issues of Jurisdiction
Further problems arose concerning uncertainty over the exact jurisdiction of the
courts of common law in matters concerning letters patent for invention.125 The
problem arose because of the wording of section 6, which stated that any declaration
before mentioned shall not extendto patents of invention meeting the requirements
set out later in the section. The question that perplexed courts and scholars alike was
whether this meant that such patents were also excused from the requirements of
section 2, which provided that validity of any monopoly should be determined in
accordance with the common law.
If it was the object of the Statute to transfer jurisdiction for patents of invention
to the courts of the common law, it failed in spectacular fashion. Fox asserts that
only one patent case is reported at law during the rest of the seventeenth century,
and only one more appears in the years stretching from 1700 until 1765.126 This
period was not, however, devoid of litigation concerning letters patent for invention, such matters were simply tried in conciliar courts, as was common practice
before the Statute. It was simply not thought fitting or consonant with the royal dignity that questions concerning [the] propriety [of such grants] should be discussed
and considered in ordinary courts of common law.127
In addition, it appears, at least in part, that grants were not turned over to the
common law at this time due to the interference of Parliament, which seems to have
adopted the habit of periodically reviewing the validity of patent grants.128 This
practice seems to stem from sustained concern over the issue of odious monopoly.
However, rather than being seen as safeguarding the interests of society, the procedure served mainly to further undermine trust in the system.
125
This incertitude also goes some way to explain the hiatus in development of the law concerning
patents for invention evident in the century after the enactment of the Statute. See further Walterscheid,
Antecedents III, n 121, above, at 771.
126
Fox, n 5, above, at 119. MacLeod is more cautious, stating that the compilations of judicial precedents are totally silent on patents for the period 16141766, except for a brief reference to [a 1691 case],
however she continues to say that there is evidence to suggest that some cases may have gone unreported,
Industrial Revolution, n 23, above, at 689.
127 Fox, n 5, above, at 120.
128 See Walterscheid,Antecedents III, n 121, above, at 773; also Fox, n 5, above, at 123.
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Another factor keeping the common law away from patents for invention was the
fierce territoriality of the Privy Council. Shortly after the passage of the Statute of
Monopolies, the Council made its views on the supposed common law jurisdiction
very clear when it intervened in a case concerning a challenge to Sir Robert
Mansells glass patent. Not only did it state that there was to be no encroachment on
Mansells rights until a suit at law had been decided, but more importantly, it later
also removed the right of trial at law. The Council pronounced: The Lords declare
that the patent shall stand . . . They think it of Dangerous consequence and trenching upon the prerogative that patents granted on just grounds and of long continuance should be referred to the strict trial of common law, wherefore they order that
all proceedings be stayed.129 Given this clear message, it is hardly surprising that
there was little resort made to the courts of common law in the following decades.
The break in the Privy Councils hold over matters patent came suddenly in 1756
when it made a determination to divest itself of authority in issues of validity.130
Finally the common law was able to begin to establish its grip on patents of invention. However, the going was far from smooth, common law judges being forced to
pick up the threads of the principles of [patent] law without the aid of recent and
reliable precedents.131
The result was uncertainty over the nature of patent law and distrust of a system
that appeared to be capricious from without, as few cases meant few precedents,
and few precedents generally meant uncertainty.132 Failures, patents deemed
unworthy of protection when reviewed at law, were more famous and more frequent than successes, and confidence in the system fell to a new low.133
State Papers, Domestic Dec 6, 1626; quoted from Walterscheid, Antecedents III, n 120, above, at
774.
130 See Walterscheid, ibid. See also Hulme, Privy Council Law and Practice of Letters Patent for
Invention from the Restoration to 1794 (1917) 33 LQR 63 (continued at 180) (Hulme,Privy Council),
at 194; Holdsworth, English Law, Vol XI, n 35, above, at 426.
131 Hulme, Consideration, n 62, above, at 318. It should be noted that the doctrine of precedent,
sacrosanct within modern English law, was itself in its infancy. Case reports such as they were, were unofficial and could be discounted by judges. Conflicting decisions could and did exist side by side. For a more
in-depth treatment of the doctrine of precedent see Kempin, Precedent and Stare Decisis: The Critical
Years, 1800 to 1850 (1959) 3 American Journal of Legal History 28.
132 Dutton, The Patent System and Inventive Activity During the Industrial Revolution 17501852
(Manchester; Manchester University Press, 1984) at 70.
133 Dutton, ibid, at 79 states that during the period from 17501799 only 39% of common law cases
were decided in favour of the patentee.
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45
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138 See MacLeod, Industrial Revolution, n 23, above, at 49; Dutton, n 132, above, at 75; Gomme, n 46,
above, at 27; Davies,Early History, n 45, above, at 87; Adams & Averley,The Patent SpecificationThe
Role of Liardet v Johnson (1986) 7 Journal of Legal History 156 at 158; Walterscheid, ibid, at 782.
139 Quoted from Davies, Early History, n 45, above, at 2634. See also Klitzke, n 45, above, at 6401
and Hulme,Prerogative, n 32, above, at 145.
140 State Papers, Domestic Eliz XVI, 2931.
141 Hulme, AALH, n 34, above, at 142.
142 Rights under this bargain were later transferred to Cockeram and Barnes who were granted a 10year monopoly. They, however, did not have to provide a specification.
143 Davies,Early History, n 45, above, at 2667; also Price, n 4, above, at 108.
144 Davies, ibid.
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47
Thus it is clear that the ideas behind the provision of a specification were not
new at the time of Nasmiths patent, and had in fact been advanced some 100 years
previously, albeit in a climate not yet ready to accept such a change.145
Davies contends that five grants of James I, which required the submission of
models146 or descriptions, are more deserving than Sturtevant of the title of first
specification; although he concedes probably still not enough for its award.147 It is
not known whether these requirements were made for the benefit of the Crown, to
enable the Law Officers to determine more exactly the nature of the grant made, or
for the benefit of the patentee, for their own protection. Indeed, it is possible that it
may have been both. However, it is significant that these grants all occurred in the
period between the Book of Bounty and the Statute of Monopolies, a time marked by
growing unease over the public perception of monopolies. Therefore, the provision
of models may also have been an attempt to assure the validity of such grants in the
eyes of the public by illustrating that they did not cross the line between permitted
and odious monopoly. This view is reinforced by a resurgence in the practice
under Charles I shortly before the civil war,148 a time of great opposition to monopoly policy.149
In addition to these early-seventeenth century examples, there are a number of
references to the annexation of models, schemes, drafts and discourses to patents
after 1670.150 However, it is apparent that these few precursors of the patent specification were seeds that fell on rocky ground, for apart from them we have found no
suggestion in the patents of the seventeenth century of the coming of the novel provisions in Nasmiths patent of 1711 which really originate the history of the modern
patent specification.151
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an argument relating to concerns expressed over the common practice at this time
of inventors entering caveats with the law officers to alert them of petitions in fields
of their interest.
Caveats were notices that could be entered onto a register at any time prior to the
sealing of a patent. They had the effect of preventing grant until after the objectors
arguments had been heard. When a request for a patent was made the caveat book
would be searched and a hearing would be held between the petitioner and the
caveat holder. The opposition would state the current art and his understanding of
the work in the field. The patentee would describe the exact nature of his invention.
Based on the information provided, the law officer would decide whether to go
ahead with the patent or not. It was, in effect, a preliminary trial.153
Caveats saw a lot of use, and it appears that there was widespread belief that the
system could be used to obtain knowledge of pre-grant patents and therefore provide an opportunity to steal the inventions before the patent could be issued.154
This fear found footing from the Statute of Monopolies, which stated that a grant
would only be good for manufactures which others at the time of making such letters patent shall not use.155 Therefore, if anyone obtained knowledge and practised
a patent before its grant, it could be avoided through caveat opposition or through
a writ of scire facias. It was of no consequence that the information was obtained by
fair means or foul.156 Nasmiths statement that he thinks it not safe to mention in
what the New Invention consists until we shall have obtained our Letters Patent157
clearly demonstrates that this fear was at the fore of his mind when petitioning for
protection.
However, detracting from the argument that the patentee introduced the specification to make the grant more certain, is the fact that the majority enrolled at this
time were hopelessly vague.158 Davies also cautions against conclusions drawn
from heavy reliance on the exact language used in such patents as examples could
be given . . . of suggestions which emanated from the Crown being embodied in
patents in language which suggests that they were originally made by the patentee
or vice versa.159 Therefore, although compelling, it is impossible to state with certainty that the specification was enrolled at Nasmiths request. Indeed, because its
first mention appears in the report of the law officer dealing with the petition it may
be deduced that the initiative came from the Crown; the officer requiring a better
153 See Walterscheid,Antecedents III, n 121, above, at 790; Davies,Early History, n 45, above, at 107
for a slightly fuller discussion of the caveat system.
154 Dutton, n 132, above, at 35, 183; Davies, Early History, n 45, above, at 92; Gomme, n 46, above,
at 23; Walterscheid, Antecedents III, n 121, above, at 790; MacLeod, Industrial Revolution, n 23, above,
at 43.
155 s6. Reproduced in text following n 112, above.
156 See Walterscheid,Antecedents III, n 121, above, at 791.
157 Quoted from Walterscheid, ibid.
158 See Adams & Averley, n 138, above, at 161; see also MacLeod, Industrial Revolution, n 23, above,
at 49, who states that the specification, at this time, could be as informative or evasive as the patentee
saw fit.
159 Davies,Early History, n 45, above, at 91.
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49
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Walterscheid, on the other hand, rebukes these arguments as too simplistic; stating many of the Elizabethan grants cannot be said in any reasonable way to have
encompassed the introduction of whole new industries.168 He continues, asking
why the nature of inventions should have remained unchanged for more than 150
years and then suddenly change sufficiently to require a formal disclosure of the
invention in the specification[?]169 Taking these points in turn: whilst many
Elizabethan grants were not for entire industries, it is clear that the majority were
for more than simple mechanical inventions capable of straightforward description. In addition, it is submitted that Walterscheids second argument entirely
misses the point, for it is not suggested that the kind of invention that was patented
changed overnight. The sensible conclusion is that by this point in time conditions
were such that it was far less likely that protection would be sought for the introduction of an entire industry. This argument is supported the fact that even after the
provision of a specification was made a routine condition of grant, there is at least
one case in which exemption was granted.170
Walterscheid further argues that for as long as working of the invention was the
main Crown priority, the idea of a specification was of little importance. Therefore,
the rationale for not requiring one under early English patent custom came more
out of a concern by the Crown and the patentee to avoid legal arguments about the
propriety of the grant than anything else. Moreover, not making the requirement
was, in the main, an attempt to protect the royal prerogative to its fullest extent.171
However, all of these arguments seemingly fail to appreciate that no one reason
can be given for why the specification was not introduced at an earlier point in history. Rather, a gradual change in the type of invention, the fact that working clauses
had been removed, the use of the caveat system, and patentees concerns to make
their grants more certain, amongst other reasons, all conspired to form an environment conducive to the enrolment of a specification. It cannot be said that any one of
these factors was responsible for Nasmiths revolution. It was their combination in
the social, political and economic context of the day that formed what might be
termed the inventive step of the specification.
A Mark of Evolution
The uncertainties concerning the scope and substance of patent rights that had
been evident since before the passage of the Statute of Monopolies, and that were to
continue for decades after the advances marked by Nasmiths patent, were the
inevitable result of an evolution within both the patent sphere and society. When
the system was conceived during Elizabeths reign, all grants were semi-contractual
agreements between the patentee and the Monarch, whereby protection was offered
168
169
170
171
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A Practice Accepted
51
A Practice Accepted
Nasmiths application was made in a period of confusion within the English patent
system. Time and civil war had muted the public furore over odious monopolies,
but had not erased the feeling of general distrust that was left in their wake. By the
end of the seventeenth century, the requirement that the invention be introduced to
the Realm within a specified period had disappeared in practice.173 Moreover, the
utilisation of non obstantibus (notwithstanding) clauses meant that it was not necessary to include a description of any kind with the patent, as the subject matter
receiving protection was that actually used by the patentee.174 Furthermore, great
uncertainty had been injected by the unsettled issue of jurisdiction concerning
patent disputes, the courts of common law not yet having taken up position as sole
arbiter of the system as promised by the Statute of Monopolies.175 With these issues
in mind, it is unsurprising that Nasmiths patent gave no actual guidance as to what
a specification should contain. Therefore, at this point in time, and for many years
after,it is doubtful whether patentees had any clear idea what the function of a specification was or how full and accurate it ought to be.176
172 Mossoff,Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History, 15501800 (2001) 52
Hastings Law Journal 1255 at 1274.
173 See Hulme,On the History of the Patent Law in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries(1902)
18 LQR 280 (Hulme, Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries) at 283, who states that by about 1673 the
obligation to institute the manufacture . . . had disappeared from the contract (unless voluntarily
introduced by the applicant). MacLeod further states that in the context of post-1660 grants nonimplementation did not normally give cause for voiding an English Patent, Industrial Revolution, n 23,
above, at 21. See also Walterscheid,Antecedents III, n 121, above, at 786.
174
See the opinion of Sir William Jones, Attorney General, in 1676 that the description of the article
within the patent was not necessary, it could be constructed as the patentee saw fit, but once set up and
used, that was the sole model protected by the patent. Referred to in MacLeod, Industrial Revolution,
n 23, above, at 62; Walterscheid,Antecedents III, n 121, above, at 786.
175
It will be recalled that the Privy Council finally conceded authority in patent matters in 1756. See
text accompanying n 130 above.
176 MacLeod, Industrial Revolution, n 23, above, at 50.
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However, despite this uncertainty, the concept of bargaining for protection with a
written disclosure gained favour, both with patentees, possibly eager to make their
grants more certain, and with the law officers of the Crown, without whose favourable
report a patent would not be issued. The provision of a written specification detailing
the invention therefore became accepted as the price that the patentee should pay for
the privilege of protection from imitation.177 Thus, the practice of requiring a specification became customary in about 1734.178 However, it took the common law
another four decades to establish its grip on the system, and to openly accept the death
of the doctrine of introduction, instituting the requirement of a specification in its
place. Therefore, in 1778 Nasmiths small step was finally translated into a great leap
for the common law in the landmark case of Liardet v Johnson.179
Liardet v Johnson
Liardet v Johnson has been variously described as a landmark in the history of
English patent law180 and dismissed as insignificant.181 However, its status as the
first reported case in which the courts of the common law expressly required an
enabling disclosure marks it out for attention.
The patent in question concerned a new composition for stucco, a type of
cement. It was granted in 1773 with the, by then, usual proviso that a specification
would be enrolled, in this case within four months.182 The patent was later assigned
to the Adams family who, in 1776, reassigned it to Liardet so that he could seek an
Act of Parliament extending its term.183 The term was subsequently extended to
18 years, on the condition that Liardet enrol a further specification detailing
improvements made to the cement since the original grant. This was done in
September 1776, and Adams, although no reassignment of the patent had taken
place, continued to use the protected stucco.184
177 Thus Hulme,Privy Council, n 130, above, gives the example, at 1889, of a patent set aside in 1732
for failure of specification to set forth nature of invention.
178 Hulme, Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, n 173, above, at 283 states that the first requirement for a specification can be found in a patent of 1716, but that the practice was not uniform until
about 1740; Davies,Early History, n 45, above, at 89 states that the practice was made customary in 1734
but that there are examples of the requirement being made in 1712, three times in 1716, twice in 1717,
twice in 1718, and that between 1720 and 1733, a further 15 specifications were required; Gomme, n 46,
above, at 34 says that between 1711 and 1734 (when the practice became customary), 29 of 158 grants
had a specification enrolled.
179 Reports of the first trial were published in the Morning Advertiser and the Daily Post on 23 Feb,
1778, and in the London Chronicle and the Daily Advertiser the following day. The second trial is reported
in the Morning Post and Daily Advertiser, The Gazetteer and the New Daily Advertiser on 20 Jul, 1778. See
Adams & Averley, n 138, above, at 174. The case is reported at (1780) 1 Y & CC 527.
180 Hulme,Consideration, n 62, above, at 317.
181 Adams & Averley, n 138, above.
182 It was enrolled on 3 Aug 1773. Adams & Averley, n 137, above, at 162.
183 Walterscheid,Antecedents III, n 121, above, at 795.
184 Both Adams & Averley, n 138, above, at 162, and Walterscheid, ibid, state that Liardet acquiesced
in this use.
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Liardet v Johnson
53
In May 1777, Liardet and four Adams Brothers filed a suit in equity against
Johnson, Downes and Bellman, seeking an account and injunction. Johnson replied
by producing an affidavit implying, without expressly stating so, that Liardets
preparation was not novel, and in addition that Johnsons composition was materially different from that protected by the patent. In July 1777, an injunction was
granted restraining Johnson from making, using, or vending the composition, on
the proviso that an action was brought promptly at law.
Johnson replied to the injunction at the beginning of September 1777, stating
that Liardet was not the inventor of the composition, or any imaginary improvements over earlier stucco.185 He further denied that his invention infringed the
Liardet patent, but rather improved upon a known manner of manufacture by the
addition of specific ingredients,186 and stated that he had inspected the second
specification to make sure.
Liardet and the four Adams brothers then instigated action at common law. The
case was first tried before Lord Mansfield on Saturday, 21 February, 1778. It lasted
merely six hours, the jury returning verdict for the plaintiff.
Unfavourable public comment, that Adams & Averley suggest may have been
caused by the fact that the plaintiffs had stuccoed his Lordships house with the
composition some years earlier, may have prompted Mansfield to grant a new trial,
despite the fact that little, or no, new evidence was adduced.187 The case was therefore resubmitted and heard before Mansfield once more on 18 July, 1778.
It is Mansfields charge to the jury in this, the second of the Liardet v Johnson
cases, that is of primary interest to our discussion of the evolution of patent law at
this time.188 Three questions were asked. First, had the defendant used the composition? Second, if he did use it, was the invention new or old within the definition
given in the Statute of Monopolies? Finally, was the specification such as to instruct
others how to make the composition? He continued:
For the condition of giving encouragement is this: that you must specify upon record your
invention in such a way as shall teach an artist, when your term is out, to make itand to
make it as well by your directions: for then at the end of the term, the public shall have benefit of it. The inventor has the benefit during the term, and the public have the benefit after
. . . [Where the invention is a composition] the specification must state . . . the proportions;
so that any other artist may be able to make it, and it must be a lesson and direction to him
by which to make it. If the invention be of any other sort, to be done by mechanism, they
must describe it in a way that an artist must be able to do it.189 (emphasis added)
185
He cited entries in A New and Universal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences published by John Hinton
in 1751, and to the 2nd ed of this work published by a Mr Owen in 1764, as well as Charles Rawlinsons
patent for a composition for slate on roofs, published in his own Directory for Patent Slating in 1772 in
order to substantiate such a claim.
186
Namely serum of ox blood.
187
Adams & Averley, n 138, above, at 164.
188
Although see Adams & Averley, n 138, above, at 171 who suggest that the novelty of the case lies in
its reliance on the testimony of expert witnesses.
189 Quoted from Hulme,Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, n 173, above, at 285.
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Conclusion
Novel, or not, Liardet v Johnson is, at least, evidence of an important step having
been taken in English patent law. It reminds the patentee of the importance of an
enabling disclosure (albeit in rudimentary form) and paints the patent grant as a
contract with the public in which temporary monopoly is exchanged for benefit
accruing from the inventors knowledge entering the public domain. Further, the
case was one of the first on such matters to receive widespread coverage in newspapers and pamphlets. Thus it distributed the message to the public at large, rather
than simply to a small circle of interested parties.192
By the end of the eighteenth century, Liardet v Johnson was settled law, and the
patent could finally be said to have started its separation from grants of Crown
favour. It had entered the market economy as an item of commerce, and the price
was disclosure.193 By this time it was apparent that the patent should teach the operation of the invention without further experimentation,194 such a defect being
grounds for avoiding the grant.195 The working of the invention per se was no
longer sufficient consideration for the award of a monopoly. The function of the
patent grant was therefore changing. Whereas previously it was seen as an object of
patronage, by the end of the 1700s we begin to see it being discussed in connection
with the promotion of invention.
So, finally, more than 200 years after the inception of a discrete policy of monopoly grant for new manufacture, description of the subject matter had come to be
required at law. The hiatus that followed the enactment of the Statute of
Monopolies had been broken and the courts of the common law had asserted their
place as the sole arbiter of the system of monopoly grant.
190
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Conclusion
55
The foregoing discussion highlights some of the problems that the patent system
has experienced during its long history. In addition, examination of the Elizabethan
practice has enabled us to begin to form a picture of the rationale for the grant. The
clear motivation behind the early system was the improvement of the Realm.
Consideration of the price that the patentee should pay for the grant only really
became important when the object shifted from instituting new manufacture to
protecting invention in a modern sense of the word. As technology progressed, the
problems associated with the scope of the grant became more visible. This predicament was compounded by the simple fact that the number of grants also increased.
When there were only 50 patents extant in the country it was relatively simple to
decide issues of infringement, however, as the custom evolved the numbers grew by
exponential degree.
The problem of odious monopoly is also significant for, as we saw in chapter one,
the traditional view of the courts of England & Wales is that the patent is an exception to the principle of free trade. This view shares its roots with the Statute of
Monopolies itself, and it is interesting to note the same arguments being raised
against wide protection today as were levelled at the abuses of Elizabethan policy.
Seen within the historical context, the introduction to the economics of the patent
system in chapter three, reveals more than a simple dry treatment of the subject
would do.
The move away from viewing the patent as an instrument of Crown policy to a
legal right obtained by an inventor is consonant with the common laws tightening
hold over the system. This is reflected in the grants change of focus from the issuing
body to the petitioner. Therefore we see patentees in the period post-Nasmith taking a more active role in the definition of their own scope of protection.
The increasing distance that this shift in focus placed between the Crown and the
grant is also significant as it enabled opponents of the system to begin to voice their
complaints, and competitors to challenge the grants, without this being viewed as
criticism of the Sovereign. However, this did little to address the general feeling of
discontent surrounding the system. Patents were still distrusted and maintained
their association with the odious practice of the past in the mind of the people.
Indeed, Frost, writing in 1912, stated that the courts general distaste for patents of
invention during the eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries was no doubt,
actuated by the deep-seated prejudice which was extremely general in the public
mind and was the direct outcome of the monstrous oppression practiced by means
of patent grants before the statute of James I196 This feeling of discontent was, in
many ways, compounded by the relatively small number of grants that were actually
in existence; the exclusive nature of the right undoubtedly giving rise to a feeling of
elitism and privilege. However, the system was inexorably gaining in popularity.
Thus, the 22 patents granted in the first decade of the eighteenth century had
become 647 in the last.197 Moreover, the growing competitiveness of patenting and
196
Frost, Treatise on the Law and Practice Relating to Letters Patent for Inventions Vol 1 (London,
Stevens & Haynes, 1912) at 332.
197 MacLeod, Industrial Revolution, n 23, above, at 150.
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the oft-hostile attitude of the courts generated a new concern for reform among
patentees themselves.198 In addition, this period in history saw the birth and
popularisation of the political economists such as Smith, Bentham and Mill. Their
comments and theories allowed the patent grant to be considered in a new light in
their revolutionary Market Economy.
198
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3
Patents within the Market Economy
(Part I)
Classical Economics and Philosophy
Preface
Acceptance of the patent as an item of property is not something to which most of
those using the system will ever direct their thoughts. Statute dictates that patents
are to be treated as personal property for the purposes of assignment, mortgage,
transfer upon death, etc.1 Therefore patents are property. However, certain aspects
of intellectual property in general, and patents in particular, render such a simple
conclusion lacking in substance, especially when the boundaries of this property
come to be considered.
The principal problem involved with viewing the patent as an item of property is
also one of its defining features: intangibility. As with any other proprietary right
the patent is capable of being trespassed upon; the rights of the owner can be
infringed by the commercial operation of another in the state(s) in which protection has been obtained.2 However, the fundamental difference between trespass
upon the rights of the owner of tangible property and the rights of the patentee is
the direct product of this intangibility: before matters of infringement can be concluded, the property itself, the extent of the right and its boundaries of protection,
must be decided upon. Herein lies our problem.
The abstract nature of this monopoly makes the application of a traditional legal
analysis of property rights difficult, if not impossible. In cases of theft or trespass
concerning tangible property there is rarely, if ever, the need to enter into complex
debate about the boundaries of the property concerned. It may be that the rights
affected need some clarification, but in general if someone strays onto your land or
appropriates an item of personal property you can see his or her presence.
Boundaries are clear.
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This is not the case with patents. Therefore, it is pertinent to inquire how their
existence as items of property can be justified, and indeed how the legal treatment of
patents can be intellectually separated from the treatment of other forms of intellectual property such as copyright or designs. Such an examination is rendered more
significant when determination of the scope of the patent right is taken into account.
The problem with a patent arises because of the way in which the scope of protection is defined. A patent may be said to provide protection to the inventive idea or
subject matter that lies behind an invention. This is quite often wider than the projection or expression of the idea in real space and, given its abstract nature, the only
sensible way in which this matter can be contained is to pin it down in a net of
words. The accepted, indeed required, method of doing this is to write a series of
claims, backed up by drawings and a more verbose and descriptive specification
detailing the background of the invention, the problems that the inventor faced and
the steps they took to overcome them, and generally explaining their creation to one
versed in the art.3 However, this is not the end of the matter; claims are used to
define the invention but great care must be taken not to make the definition too
wide so as to encompass something that is not new.4 To claim as subject matter that
which is already practiced would be to remove from the public a freedom to operate
within the public domain, a fundamental evil that had been the legitimate subject
of criticism since before Darcy v Allin.5 Therefore it is the job of the claim drafter to
effectively enclose the invention without straying into the prior art and without
overly stretching the claim to encompass things that the inventor has not actually
invented or described.
Thus stated, it is clear that there are two main questions that need to be answered
in respect of the philosophical and legal justifications of patents for invention. First,
and most fundamentally, how is the grant of a bundle of property rights in the
intangible justifiable, ie on what basis does society rationalise the award of a temporary monopoly to the inventor for their invention? Second and inextricably linked
with the first question, how large a bundle of rights should the inventor receive, ie
how broad should the monopoly granted actually be? In answering the latter of
these questions, regard must be had to the extent to which the philosophical justifications of the patent system permit expansion from the literal scope of the claims.
This, in turn, opens the debate to include a consideration of the factors that affect
the intrinsic scope of the patent as drafted (ie the reasons why the patent is drafted
with the breadth that it is), a point that relays us back to the justifications of the
patent system. Armed with this information, it will then be possible to critically
appraise the economics of the patent system and compare philosophical and economic conclusions on the desired breadth of patent protection.
3
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Introduction
59
Introduction
At a time when there is increasing pressure to conform to an international standard,
the lessons of the past are often overlooked. Despite new theories and justifications
being advanced, the patent system is seemingly perpetuated on the basis that there
has ever been and will ever be patents; like them or not, they are part of the scenery.
However, when considering modern questions about the breadth of the system, or
the scope of the grants themselves, it is informative to return to first principles and
consider why it is that we provide protection in the first place. History plays an
important part, as it highlights that patents should not be taken for granted. They
have a hard-won place in the modern economy and, as we shall see, during the antipatent debate6 of the mid to late-nineteenth century Britain came as close as it ever
has to abolishing the system completely.
Utilising this patent controversy as its backdrop, this chapter explores what may
be called the classical justifications for the patent system. The philosophical arguments, both for and against the grant, which appeared in the popular press and the
infantile arena of the political economists at this time, illustrate an early rationalisation of the nature of the right and the exclusivity that a patent provides. This
revelation of nascent policy not only provides a backdrop to the modern theories,
discussed in chapter five below, but also allows us to see the manner in which economic theory began to be utilised in an attempt to clarify, support and modernise
the system, with varying degrees of success.
Integral to this investigation is an examination of the effect that the shadow of
monopoly, which had dogged the grant since Elizabeth Is reign and still habitually
raises its head today, had on the public perception of the grant at this time. Focus on
the nature of the grant (as an instrument of Crown policy) necessarily restricted
realisation of the patent as a distinct entity, as it was seen as a de facto brother of
monopoly if not monopoly itself. This, in turn, hindered its acceptance as an item of
property and its realisation as a separate category in the embryonic sphere of what
is now known as intellectual property law. Therefore, whilst arguments that a property right existed in the patent grant were being advanced as early as the beginning
of the eighteenth century,7 it was not until the reforms of the mid-nineteenth century that the grant of a patent could finally be seen as such.
The chapter therefore explores popular misgivings entertained over the patent
system and assesses their impact. The fact that an anti-patent debate could rage so
furiously, and publicly, in the late nineteenth century is testament, in itself, to the
depth of bad feelings and importance of the issues at stake. This experience demonstrates, perhaps more clearly than any other, that the publics perception matters. It
6
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is not simply sufficient for a legal regime to be fair if it is not also seen to be fair; and
the patent system evident in early-Victorian Britain was ostensibly neither.
However, despite damning criticism, the core survived and important legislative
and administrative changes were undertaken to assuage the popular discontent.
The patenting process and the quality of the grant were greatly improved and, crucially, the claims and the specification assumed what is now considered to be their
proper place at the centre of the patent.
However, this is not all that the Victorian controversy did for the system, for, as we
shall see, it also galvanised economic debate over the justifications of the patent
grant. As a consequence, the philosophies of Bentham, Mill and Smith were revitalised and re-energised, in turn enabling an economic agenda to start to replace the
ostensibly pragmatic justifications of the past. It is important to note that these early
classical theories not only form the basis of much modern economic thought on
the patent system, but also are regularly advanced as justifications in their own
right.
However, before discussing the early economic theory in any depth, we begin
with general comments on the economic appreciation of the patent grant. In addition, we consider the nature of the rights that the patent provides and explore some
of the problems that are associated with the creation of property in the intangible.
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61
Little thought was directed to their justification as tools of commerce. However, all
of this was to change when the patent controversy that swept Europe during the latter half of the nineteenth century brought consideration of the patent system to the
masses.
Despite the fierce intensity of the criticism which was levelled at the system during the anti-patent debate, it clearly survived. Indeed, the grant recovered so well
from its near-death experience that Fox, writing in 1947, stated when discussing
patents for invention that:there has never been, until the present time, any criticism
of this type of exclusive privilege. It was always recognised at common law as a
proper subject for a prerogative grant, and the Statute of Monopolies made no
change in this conception.12 Whilst this may be true regarding the legal provision of
patent protection, it completely ignores the wholesale condemnation that rained
down on the system in the mid-nineteenth century: how easily such a public debate
was forgotten! Foxs comments, however misleading, are testament to the fact that
the patent grant simply exists within the societal mind; like the notion of invention
itself, society takes it for granted. Just as Mill, Bentham and Smith never once questioned the provision of temporary monopoly as a reward to the inventor and, in the
same vein, patents for invention escaped the wrath of the Statute of Monopolies, so
did they, until relatively recently, evade the rigors of economic analysis.
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led to the Statute of Monopolies.15 Thus, Mill and Smith, despite long diatribes on
the evils of monopoly, were content to state that such bad blood did not extend to
the provision of exclusive privileges for a limited time to the originator of an
improved process of manufacture.16
One plausible explanation for the early economists reticence to engage fully in
any critique of the patent system per se lies in the close association that the grant
maintained with the Crown at this point in time. This connection with the Royal
prerogative was, in itself, a major stumbling block to reform, as Parliamentary modification of the system would have exploded the ancient theory that a patent is a
special direct grant from the Crown of certain valuable privileges, and that it is only
by Her Majestys gracious favour that these privileges are granted at all.17 It is therefore unsurprising that it took near-fatal bombardment of the system by abolitionists during the anti-patent debate to force administrative and legislative wheels into
motion.18 Once the debate had been settled, and public argument had established
that the patent custom was essentially valid, yet in dire need of reform, public faith
in the idea of a patent system was able to grow. Such faith was vital to the patents
transition from instrument of the Crown to self-contained entity, as it enabled such
reform to become a serious possibility.
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63
Uncertainty over the requirements for (and exact nature of) the specification,
coupled with widespread ignorance of the state of the law, had led to a perception
that patents granted at this time were practically worthless.21 An inefficient filing
and granting system and petty disputes over who, patent attorneys or lawyers, had
the standing to act as agents for inventors for the purpose of obtaining patents, had
corrupted public perception of the system even further. Thus, a catalogue of
reforms was introduced to pull the system back from the shifting sands of bureaucratic inefficiency onto firmer ground. These included the institution of indexes of
granted patents arranged both chronologically and alphabetically;22 the various
offices, once scattered around the city of London were moved into one building; and
the post of examiner was placed onto sounder footings by the institution of job
specifications and clarification of pension arrangements.23 However, the reform
that had most impact on the promotion of the patent as property (as opposed to
privilege) was the introduction of a system of registration by the 1851 Protection of
Inventions Act.24
Originally introduced as a temporary measure in connection with the Great
Exhibition (therefore consonant with a public event supported by the Queen and
considered not threatening to the role of the Crown in matters patent), registration
proved a sweeping success and paved the way for more concrete legislative reforms.
Therefore, in the 1852 Patent Law Amendment Act,25 Parliament was able to introduce a more effective system of registration whereby property arose in the invention
from the date of application rather than grant by the Crown. This change was of vital
importance in the patents evolution as an item of property as it created bureaucratic
property in the grant enabling its emergence from the shadow of the prerogative.26
However, this change in the administration of the patent system initially did little to
quell the widespread distaste for patents.27 Indeed, problems with the registration
system, combined with the continuing uncertainty of the nature of the patent specification, added fuel to the abolitionists fire.28
21 See Bently & Sherman, n 17, above, at 131, who draw this conclusion from the speech of Lord
Wolverton, Hansard, HL Vol 114 cols 1099 et seq (Nov 17, 1902).
22 As opposed to the purely chronological indexes of the past.
23 All administrative rather than strictly legal reforms. See Bently & Sherman, n 17, above, at 1323.
24 An Act to Extend the Provisions of the Designs Act 1850, and to give Protection from Piracy to
Persons Exhibiting New Inventions in the Exhibition of the Works of Industry of all Nations in 1851, 14
& 15 Vict c8 (1851).
25
An Act for Amending the Law for Granting Patents for Inventions 15 & 16 Vict c83 (1852).
26
See Websters answer to Q544 in Report of the Select Committee on Letters Patent, House of
Commons Papers, 1871 (Command Paper No 368) (Report of the 1871 Select Committee). Also Bently &
Sherman, n 17, above, at 134.
27
The Economist reported on Jun 5, 1869 (some 18 years after the initial reform) that it is probable
that patent laws will be abolished ere long. There is universal agreement that no patent law should cover
all the inventions which are now covered. It is for the general interest that patent laws should be abolished.
28
See further Boehm, The British Patent System: I Administration (Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1967) who states, at 29, that The 1860s and 1870s were also the period in which the patent system
sustained its severest oppositiona claim that, considering The Economists dire proclamation, ibid,
cannot be disputed.
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The slow divorce of the patent from the Crown also created new problems as it
drew focus from the method of creation onto the property created. Therefore conceptual issues arose in relation to the grant, specifically due to the nature of this
property, that had serious repercussions for its justification.
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65
Thus, the social value of an invention is not lessened by its widespread use.
Indeed, it can be convincingly argued that the attendant benefit of use increases its
value, as society is able to enjoy the invention more fully. In short, it is wasteful to
restrict its use. Considered in this light it is clear that where an invention results from
a spontaneous flash of insight, and therefore has no attendant cost of creation, it
should ideally command a zero price in order that its benefit be maximised.
However, such a bold statement ignores the costly reality of invention and innovation. Whilst it may be true that the original inventive idea could be costless, it is
seldom the case that it is so simple and brilliant that it can be perfected or brought
to the market without financial burden. Moreover, in the research-intensive society
in which we live, the costs associated with the creation of an invention may, without
some form of compensation or incentive, be proscriptively high.
However, as Taylor & Silberston state [t]he real difficulty arises because many
inventions, like other types of knowledge, are not simply free goods: they are to a
large extent public goods as well.31 That is to say, as well as their non-exhaustibility,
many inventions also suffer from non-excludability, so that once implemented, or
otherwise disclosed, they can (absent legal protection) be freely, and relatively costlessly, copied by others.
Consequently, because of non-excludability and non-exhaustibility there can be
no market for a public good. In the absence of some sort of protection, once an
invention has been created it is freely appropriable and therefore of strictly limited
worth to its creator. It is, of course, worth an amount commensurate with the market value of the invention. However, if costlessly copied, this value is simply equal to
the production cost, as competition will push the price down.32 The invention itself
cannot be sold, as it is freely appropriable by all. Therefore, in the absence of some
sort of proprietary right there is likely to be a disincentive to invest in invention, as
competition will make it impossible to recover sunken research and developmental
costs.
With these points in mind, we now turn to address the issue of justifying the creation of property in the intangible.
Ibid at 25.
See further, text accompanying n 3 in ch 5, below.
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small, but bountiful, oasis for economic analysis of the patent system in a desert
otherwise relatively featureless until the 1920s.
Broadly four lines of reasoning in general circulation in the mid-nineteenth century can be identified. These arguments form the basis of modern criticism of the
patent system and are still utilised by lawyers, economists and the courts today. Each
category found its own supporters and opponents within the debate and each can
be argued, to some extent, to form a basis for the patent grant. As ever, certain
theories find more favour than others do with contemporary critical thinkers and,
as we shall see, different justifications suggest different scope for the patent rights. It
is obvious to say that no one theory can attempt to provide a complete explanation
of the system, however, insight into these classical justifications allows comment on
current policy decisions. Various academic writers including Dutton33,
Walterscheid34, Coulter35 and Machlup & Penrose36, have covered these four heads
of reasoning in some detail. The following discussion therefore draws on their
work.37
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67
[T]hat every novel idea whose realization or development can become useful to society
belongs primarily to him who conceived it, and that it would be a violation of the rights of
man in their very essence if an industrial invention were not regarded as the property of its
creator.39
Preamble to the French Patent Law of 1791 quoted from Machlup, n 29, above, at 22.
See further, Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Goldie, ed, London, Everyman, 1993, originally
published 1690) Ch V, Book II. For a modern exploration of the philosophy of intellectual property,
which includes discussion of Lockes theories, see Drahos, A Philosophy of Intellectual Property
(Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1996).
41
Taken from Drahos, ibid. at 43.
42
Jobard, Nouvelle conomie sociale ou monautopole industriel, artistique, commercial et littraire
(Paris, Bruxelles [printed], 1844) at 5, 130, 239 et seq. Quoted from Machlup, n 29, above, at 22.
43
Turner, Counsel to Inventors of Improvements in the Useful Arts (London, F Elsworth, 1850) at 50;
Also Coulter, n 35, above, at 80.
44
See comments to this effect in Dutton, n 33, above, at 18; MacLeod, Industrial Revolution, n 7,
above, at 197; Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 1)
(1994) 76 JPTOS 697 (Walterscheid,Antecedents I) at 715.
45 The Patent Laws (1829) XXVI Westminster Review 329.
40
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theft of an idea is for a man to complain that something has been stolen which he
still possesses, and he wants something back which, if given to him a thousand
times, would add nothing to his possession.46 Webster neatly summed up contemporary opinion when he stated that [t]hose who believe the inventor to have a natural right . . . must have an entire misconception as to what it is the inventor really
achieves.47
The main criticisms of natural rights as justification for the patent system stem
from an analysis of the substance of the property concerned and the reality of the system as it stood when the arguments were first advanced.48 Thus, if property in ideas
is a natural right, there is little logical basis for that right to be limited to a term of
years, rather it should be perpetual. In addition, it does not sit comfortably with either
the concept of knowledge as a non-exhaustible commodity,49 nor with any criteria of
patentability that the inventor must satisfy before this property is acknowledged.
Further, it suggests that the scope of the right awarded should be tied to the actual
effort, or degree of labour, exercised in creating the invention, with more time equating to greater protection. This would not only relegate flashes of inventive genius to
receive little (if any) protection, but would also tend to favour complicated, expensive
and time-consuming invention over elegant solutions to problems. Moreover, the
Lockean approach would not justify the provision of an exclusive monopoly where
both copying and independent creation are similarly prohibited.
It is therefore unsurprising that this theory finds little support in modern
literature.50 Indeed, Machlup states that it is apparent that some French lawyers:51
conceded that they preferred to speak of natural property rights chiefly for propaganda purposes, especially because alternative concepts, such as monopoly right
or privilege, were so unpopular.52
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69
of fairness; to secure the inventor their just reward, proportional to the usefulness of
the invention to society. As this reward cannot be guaranteed by reliance upon ordinary market forces, State intervention is justified in the provision of temporary
monopoly.
Smith, Mill and Bentham all find justification for the patent monopoly under this
mantle. Smith noted that optimum economic conditions are often not those found
under natural, unregulated trade. He saw law and the lawmaker as vitally important
players in ensuring that competition was maintained and resources efficiently allocated. His support for the patent system therefore rests on two main points. First,
that the provision of temporary monopoly was the easiest and most natural way in
which the state can [provide] recompense . . . for hazarding a dangerous and expensive experiment, of which the public is afterwards to reap the benefit.53 Further, if
the legislature should appoint pecuniary rewards for the inventors of new
machines, etc., they would hardly ever be so precisely proportiond to the merit of
the invention as . . . [the patent monopoly] is.54 Second, that the grant of such a
monopoly was harmless to society as if the invention be good and as such is profitable to mankind, [the inventor] . . . will probably make a fortune by it; but if it be
of no value he also will reap no benefit. He continues, extending his discussion to
include copyright: These two privileges therefore, as they can do no harm and may
do some good, are not to be altogether condemned. But there are few so harmless.55
Therefore, despite long diatribe on the evils of monopoly, Smith was prepared to
accept that the patent grant was not only necessary but also an economically justifiable means to an end.
Mill, equally forthright in his support for rewarding invention by grant of a
temporary monopoly, states in his Principles of Political Economy: That . . . [the
inventor] ought to be both compensated and rewarded . . . will not be denied . . . it
would be a gross immorality in the law to set everybody free to use a persons work
without his consent, and without giving him an equivalent.56 He also notes that
pecuniary grants have, in some cases, been made to the inventor, but considers that
in general an exclusive privilege, of temporary duration is preferable; because it
leaves nothing to any ones discretion; because the reward conferred by it depends
on the inventions being found useful, and the greater the usefulness, the greater the
reward; and because it is paid by the very persons to whom the service is rendered,
the consumers of the commodity. Therefore, whilst recognising that the present
Patent Laws [ie those of the early-to-mid-nineteenth century] need much improvement57, Mill was eminently satisfied of their conceptual legitimacy as just reward
within the free market economy.
53
Smith, The Wealth of Nations, n 11, above, at 712at this point Smith is actually talking about
grants of temporary monopolies to joint stock companies, but continues A temporary monopoly of this
kind may be vindicated upon the same principles upon which a like monopoly of a new machine is
granted to its inventor.
54
Smith, Selected Essays on Jurisprudence, n 11, above, at 83.
55
Ibid.
56 Mill, n 11, above, at 9323.
57 Ibid, at 933.
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Kitchs prospect theory of protection,67 which draws analogy between the patent system and the US mineral claim system, suggesting that inventions are somehow waiting to be found. It must be noted, however, that Kitch utilises this argument to
provide alternative justification for the control of downstream technology. Ricardo,
on the other hand, was simply utilising the inevitability of invention, as he saw it, to
argue that patent protection was an unjustified restraint on trade.
Other critics did not deny that the inventor had a moral right to be rewarded for
their efforts, but stated that this reward would flow naturally, without the need for
legal intervention. Thus Schffle, whilst supporting the provision of temporary
monopoly for the protection of literary property, denied the need for the same in
respect of inventions. He reasoned that the head start the first user of an invention
gained within the market would, as a general rule, provide sufficient reward for the
inventor. This was, however, not the case in the book publishing business, where
the speed with which pirated editions could enter circulation rendered lead-time
insufficient reward in itself.68 This theory gained widespread support within the
abolitionists camp during the anti-patent debate.69
However, not all opponents of the system were willing to trust the head start
gained by the inventor as guaranteeing sufficient remuneration to justify embarking on the inventive process. Indeed, Macfie, perhaps the most vocal of the critics of
the patent system during the mid- to late-nineteenth century, was of the opinion
that the open market could not be trusted to secure the inventor with sufficient
reward to compensate him for his time and effort. He opposed patents on a number
of grounds, insisting: that they hurt free trade; that too many obvious inventions are
patented; that under the patent system rewards rarely go to those who deserve them,
and are never in proportion to their contribution to the state of the art; and that a
great number of patents are based on old ideas or are useless.70 However, Macfie was
of the opinion that some kind of reward was needed to compensate for the speed
with which competition would act to wipe out any profit that could be made from
the innovation. He therefore proposed a system of monetary prizes or bonuses
determined according to the social utility of the invention as the best method of
providing for the inventor.71 Similarly, The Economist supported the abolition of
the patent monopoly and suggested instigating a system of direct monetary grant in
its place, stating: what the community requires is, that inventors be rewarded; that
67 Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System (1977) 20 Journal of Law & Economics 265.
Discussed fully in ch 5, below.
68
See Schffle, Die Nationalkononomische Theorie der Ausschliessenden Absatzverhltnisse
(Tbingen, 1867), at 141 and 150. Distilled from Machlup & Penrose, n 36, above, at 18; and Machlup,
n 29, above, at 23.
69
See comments to this end in Machlup & Penrose, ibid.
70
See Macfie, The Patent Question under Free Trade: A Solution of the Difficulties by Abolishing or
Shortening the Inventors Monopoly and Instituting National Recompenses (London, W Johnson, 1863,
2nd Ed); also Macfie, Recent Discussions on the Abolition of Patents for Inventions (London, Longmans,
Green, Reader, & Dyer, 1869); see also Oppenheim,Robert Andrew Macfie, Patents, Copyright, Libraries
and Legal Deposit [1998] IPQ 383; Machlup, n 29, above, at 23.
71
See especially Macfie, The Patent Question under Free Trade, ibid. Such a system is akin to that
adopted under Communist rule in the Eastern Bloc whereby the ownership of inventions was swapped
for inventors certificates and a monetary reward.
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skillful men who contribute to the progress of society shall be well paid for their
exertions. The Patent Laws are supported because it is erroneously supposed that
they are a means to this end.72
Despite rational and cogent dissent, Mill, Smith and Benthams economic arguments eventually won the day,73 as it was considered that to reward the inventor
with monetary bonuses would inject partiality or even corruption into the mix by
giving, in essence, discretionary power to administrators. However, the simple fact
that a proposal to hand out money did not win huge support, and thus close the
debate, adds little to the argument that the provision of temporary monopoly can
be justified on the basis that it rewards the inventor. At best all that can be said is that
such means are not less favourable than a system of monetary grant. However, it
should be clear from the foregoing discussion that the provision of monopoly
power as reward to the inventor can be attacked on a number of fronts.
Furthermore, the argument that a prize of any kind was required found criticism on
grounds that it was often not the person most deserving of recompense that
actually received it (whatever it may be) and that it was, in actual fact, impossible
to apportion reward accurately with respect to the services rendered.74 The patent
system, as it stood, attracted further complaint, as it was impossible to prevent
injury being inflicted upon others by restriction of their right to pursue inventive
endeavours in areas protected by patents.75
The reward theory, as a justification for the patent system, also raises a number of
further questions that are difficult to answer and which potentially prejudice its
validity. First, if the inventor is being rewarded, what are they actually being
rewarded for? What is the rationale for being given monopoly privilege? If the
patent is granted for their labour then this returns us to the Lockean construct of
property based on the natural rights of the author, and, as has been noted, this is not
a concept that many take seriously. If the patentee is rewarded for having a good idea
then this moves us to ask why it is only the first who takes their invention to the
Patent Office that receives the reward? What is there in the nature of invention that
makes independent re-creation less worthy than the initial creation? As
Sir Roundell Palmer stated before the 1871 Select Committee:The knowledge used
by inventors is like air, or light, or whatever else is universal and simultaneously
capable of enjoyment by all.76 Therefore, if knowledge is such a resource, why
should only the first person to come up with an idea be rewarded for it? This collision between theory and reality within the system simply did not make sense.
Therefore, as Machlup & Penrose state:If the patent system could not be credited
with meeting the demands of distributive justice, it was still possible to defend it,
72
The Economist (London), Jul 26, 1851. Quoted from Machlup & Penrose, n 36, above, at 19.
Or at least did not lose.
74 See, eg, the speech of Lord Stanley (chairman of the Royal Commission that inquired into the
patent system in 18635) in the House of Commons, May 28, 1868. Reproduced in Macfie, Recent
Discussions on the Abolition of Patents for Inventions, n 70, above, at 111; Also Machlup & Penrose, n 36,
above, at 20.
75 Macfie, ibid.
76 Report of the 1871 Select Committee, n 26, above, at 690.
73
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not on the ground of justice, but on the ground of its social usefulness.77 Thus we
are brought to our third possible justification for the patent system, the incentive to
invent.
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75
When used as an explanation of the beneficial effects of patents, the theory balances upon a number of assumptions: First, that growth and industrial progress is
socially desirable. Second, that invention is necessary for this progress. Third, that
the level of invention will be sub-optimal without incentives, and finally that
patents are the cheapest and most effective way in which these incentives can be
provided.93
The first two of these assumptions are wholly uncontentious, being readily
accepted by both sides in the anti-patent debate. In this context, it should be noted
that the abolitionists never advocated a Luddite philosophy, but rather insisted that,
far from encouraging invention and economic growth, the system acted only to
stifle technological progress. Therefore, the opposition can be grouped into those
who disagreed with one, or both, of the latter assumptions.
The argument that there will be sub-optimal levels of invention in the absence of
incentives can be traced to policy considerations that prompted establishment of
the Elizabethan patent custom. The pro-activity of the Crown during Elizabeth Is
reign was a product of concern over securing improvement of the Realm, and early
grants of patent privilege were aimed at those industries featuring most prominently on the list of imports.94 The majority of abolitionists did not seek to contest
this pedigree, conceding that artificial incentives may well have been necessary in
pre-industrial Britain. However, times had changed, and by the mid-nineteenth
century not everyone saw invention as a creature in need of nurturing. As Coulter
states: Rather than deny the historical utility of the patent grant altogether, they
[the abolitionists] argued that patents had served their purpose and now could
safely be dispensed with.95 Thus, Macfie stated that: The wisdom of our ancestors
is not discredited, when, now that circumstances have completely changed, we
abandon a system of restraint that is no longer tenable.96
Some abolitionists, and even some supporters of the system who felt that justification by incentive undermined their cause, attacked the idea that there was a need
to stimulate invention. Sir William Armstrong, president of the British Association
for the Advancement of Science in 1863, is reported as saying that the seeds of
invention exist, as it were, in the air, ready to germinate whenever suitable conditions arise, and no legislative interference is needed to ensure their growth in proper
season.97 A number of contemporary patent agents, it seems, also shared this
view.98 One is quoted as saying that A man of true genius can no more resist the
93
See Machlup & Penrose, n 36, above, at 21; Walterscheid,Antecedents (Part IV), n 34, above, at 105
omits the final point in his list; Dutton, n 33, above, at 20, simply states that the theory assumes that the
supply of invention (which was also assumed to be a major cause of growth) would be less than it would
otherwise be if patents were not used to protect the inventor.
94
See text accompanying n 51 in ch 2, above. See also, MacLeod, Industrial Revolution, n 7, above,
at 12.
95
Coulter, n 35, above, at 89.
96
Macfie, The Patent Question under Free-Trade, n 70, above, at iv; see also Coulter, ibid.
97
The opening address of the president, Report of the 33rd Meeting of the British Association for the
Advancement of Science (London, 1864) at lii. Quoted from Machlup & Penrose, n 36, above, at 22.
98 One cant but help wonder if they had really thought the repercussions of this line of argument out
fully before proclaiming their belief.
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exercise of his genius than he can resist the growth of his body . . . nearly all those
[inventions] deserving the name of great . . . have been made without any regard
to, or stimulus from the existence of Patent Law.99 Macfie comments on this quote
by asking: If this is true of great inventions, how much more must it be of small
ones? 100 Furthermore, Turner, whist justifying the patent system on natural rights
grounds, felt unable to accept that any incentive was required to induce invention.
The inventive process, he stated, was a product of a taste for experiment, a love of
trying that was characteristic of the English psyche, there was therefore no need for
State intervention to promote such activity.101 This was a view shared by William
Cubitt, President of the Institute of Civil Engineers, who said of invention: I think
people will always invent anything that is useful and good, if it will answer their purpose to do so, even without reference to a patent.102
Such views did not, however, go unchallenged. That some men could not help
inventing might be true, noted Aston, a patent agent, in his Paper on the Patent Laws,
but as a rule men invent as they do other work, they invent to live or help them
live.103 Further, in his testimony to the 1851 Select Committee on Patents,
Carpmael argued that, all of the steps in the history of the whole of manufactures
of this country . . . have been founded upon patents from the earliest date up to the
present time . . . the whole system is built upon patents.104 The supporters arguments were also greatly bolstered by the fact that they could provide at least two
concrete examples of foreign inventors bringing their inventions and expertise to
Britain solely because of the patent system. In testimony before the 1871 Select
Committee, for instance, Bessemer, the German-born inventor of a revolutionary
steel-making process that bears his name, told those gathered that he brought his
invention to Britain because he was able to patent it here.105 Furthermore, Holden,
in evidence before the same Committee, somewhat melodramatically gave the
example of Switzerland, where there is no patent law whatever of any kind, [and
there] industry makes no progress, and the people are unemployed.106
A year later, before the 1872 Select Committee, the tide of opinion was even
stronger, with Siemens, celebrated foreign inventor, Fellow of the Royal Society, and
President of the Institute of Mechanical Engineers also testifying that the patent
99 Letter by the author of A Popular Treatise on the Patent Laws reprinted from the North British Daily
Mail, Feb 2, 1875, and reproduced in Macfie, The Patent Question in 1875 (London, Longmans, Green &
Co, 1875) at 46.
100 Macfie, The Patent Question in 1875, ibid, at ix.
101 Turner, Counsel to Inventors of Improvements in the Useful Arts, n 43, above, at 4; Quoted from
Coulter, n 35, above, at 80
102 See Report and Minutes of Evidence taken before the Select Committee of the House of Lords
Appointed to Consider of the Bill, intituled, An Act to further amend the Law touching Letters Patent for
Inventions and also of the Bill, intituled, An Act for the further Amendment of the Law touching Letters
Patent for Inventions and to report thereon to the House, House of Commons Sessional Papers, Vol XVIII,
1851 (Command Paper No 486) (Report of the 1851 Select Committee) at 456.
103 Aston, A Paper on the Patent Laws (Manchester, Manchester Institute of Engineers, 1870) at 1213;
Quoted from Coulter, n 35, above, at 92.
104 See Report of the 1851 Select Committee, n 102, above, at 281. See also Coulter, n 35, above, at 52.
105 See Report of the 1871 Select Committee, n 26, above, at 74662.
106 Ibid, at 764.
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77
system was responsible for his presence in Britain. It was, he said, the fact of there
being no properly understood and regulated Patent Law in Germany [that] induced
me to come over to this country and make this my real home.107
Most critics of the system at this time did not, however, go as far as Armstrong et
al108 and make forthright pronouncements on the nature of the inventive process.
Even Macfie, by proposing a system of monetary awards in place of the patent system,demonstrated that he was as capable as his opponents of making exceptions to
the general rule of laissez-faire: while they disallowed monopolies but allowed
patents, he disallowed patents but allowed cash subsidies.109 It will therefore come
as no surprise to the reader that the argument that patents are the cheapest and most
effective incentives to invent was attacked on identical grounds to the grant of temporary monopoly as a reward to the inventor; ie that there are better, less harmful
methods available.
Even if it is accepted that patents can provide effective incentives for inducing
inventive activity, it requires a certain leap of faith to move between this assertion
and a statement that they are necessary, across the board, to procure an adequate
level of invention. As Walterscheid states: believing that the supply of invention
would be less than it would otherwise be if patents were not used to protect the
inventor . . . was one thing and proving it was another, but few bothered with any
attempted proof .110 Thus the literature is littered with bold assertions of principle
on one side of the debate or the other. The vehemently pro-patent lobby based their
arguments on the theoretical musings of Mill and Bentham, that patents produced
infinite effect and cost nothing. Taking more of a middle ground were those who
argued that whilst patents were not totally free of social cost, the benefit that they
provided far outweighed any such considerations. At the other end of the spectrum,
others, such as Macfie, argued that monetary awards were more efficacious and
socially cheaper incentives than patents.111
Benthams bold assertion of the great social value of the patent system and the
absence of any associated social costs is not, it is respectfully submitted, a view that
finds much, if any, grounding in truth. At even the most elementary level it will be
appreciated that the patent system is not devoid of such burdens. Indeed, the view that
patents cost nothing is not a view that was accepted by the various Royal
Commissions and Select Committees appointed in the latter-half of the nineteenth
century to examine the question in detail. Instead they concluded that the heavy
social costs associated with the operation of the laws were an unavoidable by-product
of their existence.112 This is not to say that they are therefore without justification,
107
Report of the 1872 Select Committee on Letters Patent, House of Commons Papers, 1872
(Command Paper No. 193) at 433.
108
See text accompanying n 97, et seq, above.
109
See Coulter, n 35, above, at 98.
110
Walterscheid,Antecedents IV, n 34, above, at 105.
111
Macfie, The Patent Question under Free Trade, n 70, above, at 29; See also Machlup & Penrose, n 36,
above, at 22.
112
See, eg, the closing comments of the Royal Commission of 1863 where it is stated that the inconveniences now generally complained of as incident to the working of the Patent Laws . . . cannot be wholly
removed. They are . . . inherent in the nature of a Patent Law, and must be considered as the price which
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quite the contrary, it simply serves to divert attention from bold policy considerations
to more concrete comparison between the social costs and benefits of the system.
Thus Grove, an ardent abolitionist, when called to give evidence to the 1871
Select Committee on Patents, stated that the sole ground on which letters patent
can be held to be justifiable or permissible, is that they are beneficial to the public. If
they are, and, so far as they are, keep them; if they are not, abolish them.113 He concluded that patents were not.
According to the abolitionists the patent system failed to satisfy the public
benefit criteria on a number of grounds. Macfie, as ever, was highly vocal in his condemnation, stating that the provision of royalties to an inventor effectively resulted
in taxation of the public due to the associated increase in prices.114 Another commonly voiced concern was that the uncertainty of the patent grant, when combined
with the prohibitive cost of securing protection, rendered the system at best a lottery
and at worst an elaborate mechanism designed to swindle the unwary.115 It should
be noted that this criticism was also used by those on the other side of the debate in
order to justify amendment of the system, although the injustices were not painted
quite so graphically.
In addition to questions raised about the efficacy of the patent system in promoting invention per se, some contemporary commentators inquired further into the
roots of its function, examining if it did actually promote such activity. In short they
asked if there was an additional social cost associated with the fact that incentives
were given to invent. Where, in reality, did the resources diverted to the inventive
process by the bait of the patent system actually come from? And was this rediversion economically justifiable?
This argument, that the inevitable effect of the patent system was to divert existing activities from areas where they might most benefit into areas in which they
would be most profitable, became one of the mainstays of the abolitionists arsenal.
It provided the campaign against patents a sound economic platform from which to
launch their assault. As Prince-Smith said, patents do not promote inventive activity . . . they merely steer it into uneconomic channels.116 It is a simple argument with
a great deal of emotive strength; moreover, it is an argument that is difficult to
defend against. However, it is also one concerning damage impossible to quantify
and therefore other, more tangible factors, came to be counted at the fore.
Amongst the most touted of these was the bureaucratic cost of administering the
system, ie the court personnel, lawyers, agents, and others engaged in prosecuting
the public consent to pay for the existence of such a law. Report of the Royal Commission to Inquire into
the Working of the Law Relating to Letters Patent for Inventions 1864 (Command Paper No 3419).
113
Report of the 1871 Select Committee, n 26, above, at 7.
114
See, eg, Macfie, Cries in a Crisis for Statesmanship Popular and Patriotic to Test and Contest FreeTrade in our Manufactures (London, Edward Stanford, 1881) at 30.
115
This opinion is amply illustrated by reference to the evidence placed before the 1829 Select
Committee, see n 19, above.
116
Prince-Smith, Ueber Patente fr Erfindungen, Vierteljahrschrift fr Volksswirthschichte, Vol III,
at 161. Quoted from Machlup & Penrose, n 36, above, at 23.
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patent applications and litigations117 However, far more pernicious was the suggestion that the mere existence of the patent system was enough to discourage improvement as the fear of being charged with infringement haunt[ed] the potential user of
new technology and discourage[d] him from attempting to improve his technique.118 Indeed, even Brunel complained that he could hardly introduce the slightest improvement in [his own] machinery without being stopped by a patent.119
Therefore, one of the strongest arguments of the pro-patent lobby, that patents were
acceptable, as they did not deprive the public of anything that they formerly had
enjoyed, now attracted criticism. The patent system, the abolitionists cried, served to
rob the inventor of the opportunity to evolve and improve upon their inventions.
Furthermore, there was a distinct possibility that more than one inventor may have
been working towards the same goal, only for the first to get to the patent office to be
given a monopoly to the exclusion of the others. The fact that [y]ou can never prove
that some other persons have not already invented, or will not soon invent, anything
that is the subject matter of a patent120 meant that the monopoly served to exclude
the public from using the same idea as the patentee had.121 The Economist led the
charge by stating that [o]n all inventors [a patent] . . . is especially a prohibition to
exercise their faculties; and . . . it is an impediment to the general advancement [of
society] with which it is the duty of the legislature not to interfere.122
The actual economic costs of these public disincentives are difficult to gauge, and
it adds little to our discussion to enter into detailed analysis of the pros and cons of
the system extant in the late-nineteenth century. At the time these arguments were
first voiced the institutional structure of the grant was very different to that of today.
Further, the doctrine of precedent was still in its infancy, not yet fully augmented by
the systematic reporting of cases. Litigating a patent was a highly dangerous and
costly process, a voyage only embarked upon by the bold or the reckless. The judiciary was considered to be distinctly anti-patent and the specification, although over
100 years old by the mid-nineteenth century, was still underdeveloped. However,
the commentators of the time raised many objections to the patent system that were
not based on administrative inefficiency or judicial hostility, but which had their
footing in a heartfelt distrust of the patent system per se. Many of these arguments
are no less relevant now as criticisms pertaining to the philosophical justifications
of the system than they were when Macfie was writing. Indeed, the modern economic literature has recently returned to the old arguments and finally begun to
acknowledge the true complexity of the problem; that the patent system not only
acts as an incentive to invent, but also acts to block invention.123
117
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Realisation that the system could act as both incentive and disincentive to invent
added serious weight to the abolitionists argument that the social costs of the system outweighed its benefits. If it could not be said with any certainty that the carrot
on a stick approach was efficacious in procuring invention where there would otherwise be none then, it was argued, the system not only harmed progress, but also
charged the public for the privilege!
It should be noted, however, that at the time these arguments were first advanced
there was still a strong attachment to the image of the inventor as a hero.124 The idea
of an individual, working alone in his workshop, who could not help but invent and
whose driving force was the desire to aid the progression of the Empire. Stories of
achievement in the face of adversity were commonplace. Figures such as Watt and
Brunel were prominent role models to be emulated. The country was still riding on
the crest of the Industrial Revolution and had not yet reached the point where corporate research and development had seized the day. Therefore, it is hardly surprising, as Machlup & Penrose simply state,that the function of the patent as a stimulus
to the inventors financier was not given . . . the full emphasis that it now has.125 The
significance of this point is enhanced by the realisation that the cost of obtaining
and defending a patent was so prohibitive that [t]o make the property worth anything, a capitalist must take it up; but the capitalist, in doing so, stipulates for the
lions share of the profit. Probably in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred the reward
was obtained by such speculators, and not by inventors.126 Therefore, to quote
Bentham slightly out of context: as he who has no hope that he shall reap, will not
take the trouble to sow,127 the logical conclusion drawn from the practical cost of
the patenting process was that it could not actually perform to induce invention
at all.
Furthermore, the incentive thesis in its raw, pre-modern, form can only act as
justification for those inventions actually induced by the offer of a patent. A causal
relationship is required: but for the patent system, the invention would not have
been made. Strict interpretation of this requirement focuses attention on the motivation behind the invention and necessitates denial of protection to serendipitous
or accidental creations. It should be noted that when these arguments were first
advanced the process of invention itself was poorly understood. The inventor was,
by-and-large, an individual and this is reflected in contemporary writing.
References are found to invention only; innovation, investment in research and
development, the process of inventing inventions, was an alien concept. Indeed, it is
only at the beginning of the twentieth century, due to the work of some highly influential economists,128 that we begin to see understanding unfold. It is at this point
124 See MacLeod,Concepts of Invention and the Patent Controversy in Victorian Britain in Fox (ed),
Technological Change: Methods and Themes in the History of Technology (Australia, Harwood Academic
Press, 1996) (MacLeod,Concepts of Invention), at 137.
125 Machlup & Penrose, n 36, above, at 25.
126 The Spectator, Jun 5, 1869; quoted from Machlup & Penrose, ibid.
127 Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham (Edinburgh, William Tait, 1843) Vol III, at 71.
128 Such as Schumpeter, Theory of Economic Development (Cambridge (MA), Harvard University
Press, 1936).
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that we can observe the promotion of innovation, giving it primacy over invention
and placing it at the centre of a modern appreciation of the system. It is this distinction between the act of invention and the inventive process itself that distinguishes
the classical from the modern incentive theory. However, for the present our discussion is limited to consideration of the classical incentive to invent.
The combined weight of these arguments may well have been fatal to any attempt
to preserve the patent system as it stood, however, as already noted no one who took
part in the highly public debate actually advocated maintaining the status quo.129
Instead, the pro-reform lobby used the argument to strengthen their calls for
improvement of the administration of the system and to reduce the attendant costs.
Also instrumental was the increased appreciation of the social contract theory of
patent protectionthat the patent could be seen as a bargain struck between the
inventor and the public whereby monopoly was traded for knowledge.
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acquainted with the means of producing the invention, which became public property at
the expiration of the term of the grant, or earlier.134
As Coulter explains, this view of the patent as a bargain accorded with both the
common law and the exchange arguments of the classical economists. Any restrictions that the patent placed upon use of the new manufacture . . . were temporary
ones acceded to by the public in return for the public in return for the information
contained in the written specification.135
Hindmarch reiterated this point, rationalising that the only way in which the patentee could have exclusive property in his invention, once it was made public, was
by the application of some positive law made with the actual or implied consent of
the whole community.136 Such consent was deemed to exist because of the benefits
accruing to society from the publication of the invention where it might once have
remained secret.137 His authority for this conclusion came from the case of
Cartwright v Eamer 138 in which Eldon LCJ (as he was then) opined that the patent
grant should not be considered in the light of a monopoly, as it had before been put
by the judges, but as a bargain with the public.139 Therefore the question that
should be asked of a particular specification in order that the patent is good was
whether it is such that a mechanist can make the machine from the description
there given.
Like Hindmarch, Spence cited Cartwright v Eamer in support of his proposition
that the specification was the consideration that the patentee provided for his bargain with the State, and which must therefore be judged on good faith.140 Coulter
notes that Spence took this requirement very seriously, not only on legal, but also
moral grounds; warning against a deterioration of inward character that would
surely result, whatever pecuniary award might be secured, from acting in bad
faith.141
The exchange theory as an example of the contractual nature of the patent grant
shares some roots with the incentive to invent. Indeed, it was often the case that they
were deployed together as twinned justifications. Lord Granville, speaking in the
House of Lords Debate on the Patent Law Amendment (No 3) Bill 1851, did just
this. He stated that the only principle on which patents could be justified was, that
the patent was a bargain between the inventor and the public, by which the inventor
134
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83
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useful inventions depend less on any individual than on the progress of society.147
In making this point the abolitionists aimed to distinguish the patent system from
copyright, which the literary property debate of the late-eighteenth century had
settled as intrinsically valid. Thus, Rogers dismissed the claim that literary works
and inventive adaptations are identical in their nature . . . each literary work is a
unique creation, capable of distinct appropriation and limitation; inventions, on
the other hand, lacked the required uniqueness.148 Therefore, the counterargument went, if an inventor wished to keep his creation secret, so be it, it would
not be long before another made the discovery and bought the innovation to the
masses. Such an argument is, however, dependent not only upon the view that
inventions exist in the ether, waiting to be made, but also the assumption that the
next person to invent the same improvement would choose, or be forced, to make
it public. Whilst the probability of the invention moving to the public domain will
increase with the number of people practising it, it is still far from certain, in the
absence of any incentive, that such a move will be made, especially if it can be effectively concealed.
Critics of the theory argued that an invention would inevitably leak to the public
even if its creator tried to keep it secret. They stressed the difficulty of maintaining
secrecy, suggesting it was so great that under the social contract theory protection
was given for nothing in return. The difficulty of keeping most inventions secret was
a point that had previously been utilised by those in favour of the system in order to
justify its existence. Indeed, even with patent protection in Britain there was considerable concern, justifiably so, that patented technology would be stolen and sold to
foreign industry who did not have to abide by such laws, and who could then undercut British manufacturers.149 Supporters of the system had cited the ease with
which competitors could adopt unprotected technology and thereby profit from
the true inventors ingenuity, and now suffered from the success of their argument.
However, this did not stop them defending the system on this ground, even if the
possibility of maintaining secrecy was confined to special circumstances.150 In
addition, they questioned the competitive advantage that the abolitionists said
147
The Economist, Jul 26, 1851; Quoted from Machlup & Penrose, n 36, above, at 27.
Rogers, On the Rationale and Working of the Patent Laws (1863) 26(2) Journal of the Statistical
Society of London 121 at 1358. See also, Coulter, n 35, above, at 86.
149 This concern was most apparent within the textile industry during the industrial revolution where
many measures were adopted in order to stem the flow of valuable information out of the mills and into
the hands of outside (especially foreign) interests. Thus mill windows were made small and high so that
outsiders could not easily look in, oaths of secrecy signed by the workers were commonplace, and in 1719
and 1750 Parliament imposed restrictions to prohibit skilled artisans and manufacturers from emigrating. See Coulter, n 35, above, at 24.
150 Machlup & Penrose, n 36, above, at 27. They quote McCulloch as stating that it would plainly be
for the interest of every one who made a discovery, to endeavour, if possible, to conceal it. And notwithstanding the difficulties in the way of concealment, they are not insuperable; and it is believed that
several important inventions have been lost, from the secret dying with their authors. McCulloch,
Patent, in A Dictionary, Practical, Theoretical and Historical, of Commerce and Commercial Navigation,
n 38, above, Vol II, at 274.
148
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would be gained by all in the absence of patent protection, wryly asking; When do
we hear of an important invention coming to maturity in Switzerland?151
A consequence of the need to keep an invention secret before a patent was
obtained led some opponents of the system to claim that, rather than encouraging
disclosure, it actually promoted secrecy. Prince-Smith states that, in the absence of
a patent system, secret and isolated work would cease and its place would be taken
by a cooperation of all qualified talent.152 Interestingly, the model of scientific
research he advocates closely resembles the corporate-led research efforts of the
present day. However, these comments apparently provoked little, if any interest
during the debate, probably due, at least in part, to the entrenched view of the lone
inventor battling against a sea of competition.153
The difficulty of maintaining secrecy led the systems opponents to their third
criticism of the theory: only those inventions that could not be kept secret would be
patented.With this in mind, Rogers described the bargain between the patentee and
the public as thoroughly one-sided as the inventor only seeks to obtain a patent
where he fears that his invention will be discovered.154 Machlup & Penrose quote
the German Economists, Bhmert and Rentzsch, as holding that this argument
alone reduced the exchange theory to tatters.155 However, as we shall see, it suffers
from a similar inadequacy to that of Granvilles attack on the system in the Lords.156
It will be recalled that his Lordship elides the issues and assumes that incentive and
exchange are so intertwined that the mere fact that to scheme and invent . . . [is]
almost a madness with some people justifies abolition of the system. In doing so he
ignores the distinction between the two justifications and paints the system with too
wide a brush, disregarding the fact that different areas of technology, different
inventions, can be justified in different ways. Bhmert and Rentzch, on the other
hand, separate the theories too much and, in doing so, make the same mistake. They
fail to see the continuum of invention, the spectrum of technology, much of which
cannot be kept secret but which needs special incentive to appear at a socially beneficial rate, and the few inventions that must be coaxed from the fog of secrecy that
would otherwise enshroud them. In treating invention as something inherently
likely to leak to the public, they highlight the need for a system that protects the
inventor from misappropriation of his idea, and therefore implicitly offer justification for the system.
151
Day, On Patents for Inventions (London, Smith & Sons, 1870), at 35. Quoted from Coulter, n 35,
above, at 97.
152
Prince Smith, n 116, above, at 160; quoted in Machlup & Penrose, n 36, above, at 28.
153
For a picture of the inventor and their creations in Victorian Britain see MacLeod, Concepts of
Invention, n 124, above.
154
Rogers, n 148, above, at 128.
155
Machlup & Penrose, n 36, above, at 27, quoting Bhmert, n 86, above, at 67, and Rentzsch, n 46,
above, at 629.
156 See text accompanying n 142, above.
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Postscript
The anti-patent debate marks a period of intense hostility to the notion of creating
property rights relating to inventions. It was prompted, in part, by feelings of injustice provoked by free competition from (generally patentless) outside states.
Abolitionist rhetoric appealed to this perception of injustice, the media became
involved and the debate was taken to the masses. Battle lines were drawn, and territories marked, which divided those who advocated abolition from those who
wanted reform. However, even the most vocal of the abolitionist crowd did not fully
embrace the laissez-faire attitude and advocate removal of all state intervention in
the inventive process. True, there were those that upheld such heterodoxy, but it
would appear that this sentiment, the true laissez-faire, went practically unnoticed
during the debate.
Critics that called for abolition eventually caved in under the weight of history.
Being unable to prove that there was no link between Britains prosperity and the
patent system, between patents and progress, they were forced to attack the system
on less concrete grounds, to suggest that there were better, more cost-efficient methods of promoting the useful arts. Laissez-faire sentiment was all well and good, but
it did not really gain the same foothold in Britain that it did on the Continent. Very
few, and certainly not Macfie, despite his vociferous condemnation of the patent
system, trusted an unregulated market to harbour the required amount of inventive
activity to keep Britain Great.
Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century, two distinct conceptions of the patent
system are in evidence. The first is that of the patent as a tool of commercial leverage, as reflected in the works of Smith, Bentham, Mill and others in the pro-patent
camp. The second is that of the patent as a constraint on trade, the old monopoly
argument, demonstrated by Macfie, Rogers, Grove and the other abolitionists. The
legal system at this time was ill-equipped to deal with treating the intangible as
property; patents did not fit within existing constructs of excludability and
exhaustibility that had been used to define and justify the concept in the past.
Therefore the courts did the only thing that they could do, they tried to force the
shoe to fit. They treated invention like land and required that it be defined accurately and precisely, they stated that what is not claimed is disclaimed, and in doing
so they promoted the specification to the fore. It was no longer simply sufficient to
work the invention and therefore introduce the technology to the Realm in that
manner, now the workings had to be taught to all who would care to read about
them. Bureaucracy had built up around the specification and the smallest of errors
could cause invalidation. The grant was still too close to the Crown for any other
rule to apply, but the gap was widening.
The political economists were keen to mark the patent as a tool of commerce, a
mercantile invention and to cut it free from the mire of its roots. Furthermore, by
the closing years of the nineteenth century, the nature of invention was undergoing
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Postscript
87
fundamental change. The image of the lone inventor was on its way out, slowly
being replaced by the new corporate structure of research and development, however the underlying rationales stayed the same. Technical progress was good for the
country, invention was necessary for technical progress, and the patent system
existed to encourage, promote, and reward. It had history on its side.
Clearly, the fact that the debate could rage in public with such vitriolic fervour at
this time demonstrates that the issues at stake were of critical importance.
Perception of the patent system was, in many respects, more important than the role
that it actually performed. The perceived fairness, or otherwise, of the grant was
paramount, made core by both sides difficulties in demonstrating, or disproving,
its actual efficacy. Given that the system was in place it was impossible to predict the
effects that abolition would have. If the anti-patent lobby were correct then only
benefit would be gained from its destruction. However, if they were wrong the
consequences for the country could be dire. It was this uncertainty, in no small
measure, that eventually enabled proponents of the system to win the day as, despite
the many problems, society could clearly survive with patents.
The inconvenience of the extant system, however, could not be ignored and so
important legislative and administrative changes were undertaken to assuage the
popular discontent. During this process of refining and redeveloping the system,
both the patenting process and the quality of the grant were greatly improved. Key
to modernisation of the law was the decision that the patentee must take more
responsibility for their grant. Therefore the specification was promoted to the fore,
with disclosure and enablement being considered as the price of protection. Most
importantly, in the revisions of 1883, the requirement that this specification . . .
must end with a distinct summary of the invention claimed157 was introduced.
Finally, the patentee was placed at the centre of their grant, responsible not only for
the teaching of their invention, but also for defining the scope of protection that
they were to enjoy. The Victorian era is therefore responsible for transformation of
the grant from an instrument of crown patronage to a free-standing economic
property right regulated by the state; in other words, for the birth of the modern
patent system.
However, not all pressure for reform of the system was internal to Britain.
Building throughout the nineteenth century, there was an increasing international
movement to secure reciprocal protection for, and harmonisation of, industrial
property like patents. The first conference to consider such international aspects of
the protection of inventors met in Vienna in 1873. It was prompted by pressure
from the US government over concerns for the security of American inventions to
be exhibited at an international exposition to be held in Austria-Hungary that same
year.158 It is perhaps somewhat ironic that, as Penrose notes: the first international
conference on patents was held while the controversy between the patent and
157
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anti-patent forces throughout Europe was still lively and bitter.159 However, the
tide was turning in favour of patents and as just Britains own national patent debate
was coming to an end, the wheels of international reform were moving fully into
action. The peak of the late-nineteenth century trend of growing internationalism
was probably provided by the Paris Convention or 1883. This followed three conferences, held in 1878, 1880 and a very brief one in 1883 itself, in which provisions that
were hoped would overcome the worst difficulties facing patentees with international interests, and would at the same time be politically practical were
debated.160 The Convention was incorporated into the British Patents Act 1883, and
provided for new concepts like national treatment161 and Convention priority.162
By the beginning of the twentieth century, therefore, a much-improved grant was
in existence. Reforms prompted by the anti-patent debate had been implemented
and many hallmarks of the system recognisable today, such as preliminary examination, fence-post claims, priority arising from application rather than grant, etc,
were in existence. Fees had been reduced and the application process simplified,
however, distrust of monopoly was still evident. Therefore, perhaps due to the combined effect of a changing face of invention, the last vestiges of the grant being a
grant of crown favour, and the lack of any anti-trust laws, whilst the specification
had assumed its place at the centre of the patent, it was being judged with a highly
critical eye, the odour of monopoly still strong in the air.163
159 See Penrose, The Economics of the International Patent System (Baltimore, John Hopkins Press,
1951), at 48.
160 Extensive coverage of the conferences that lead up to, and the patent provisions contained within,
the Paris Convention 1883 can be found in Penrose, n 158, above, at 4887.
161 The requirement that a Convention country must treat applications from nationals of other
Convention countries as it would its own. This is found within Art 2 Paris Convention.
162 Therefore an application for a patent in one member state will not prejudice a later application in
another member state as long as it is within the prescribed period. The prescribed period is 12 months.
See Art 4 of the Convention.
163 This conclusion is made apparent in the judgment of Salmon LJ in Ethyl Corporations Patent
[1972] RPC 169 at 193 that: From 1883 until after the end of the last war, the courts tended to regard
patent monopolies with some disfavour as being generally contrary to the public interest.
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Postscript
89
Of all of the justifications outlined above, the final two show the most promise as
validation of the modern system. The incentive theories have changed over time
as our understanding of the inventive process has evolved. As we shall see,
Schumpeters pioneering work164 at the beginning of the last century clarified the
connection between invention and innovation, and enabled specific recognition
that the motivations for an entity to invest in the inventive process are clearly not the
same as those that inspire an individual to invent.165 Seen in this broader manner,
the traditional incentive is now sidelined, replaced by realisation of a broader truth:
the patent system serves to secure returns to the investor in invention. In return,
society enjoys the advances that they have enabled and perfected, consideration for
the grant being disclosure in the specification.
This disclosure element of the patent grant has strengthened significantly since
the Victorian Era, indeed, it could be argued that the poor quality of the patent specification in the late nineteenth century rendered justification as a social contract
improbable at best. Yet the question that remains is whether the other side of the
bargain has been similarly fortified. Whilst undoubtedly valuable in certain sectors,
the patent system has become unwieldy in others. As we shall see in later chapters,
recent litigation has demonstrated a fundamental weakness in the system when
considering the protection that should be provided for pioneering breakthroughs.
The approach taken by their Lordships in Kirin-Amgen,166 in particular the tests
laid down therein, provide clear illustration of, at the very least, an unconscious
prejudice against quantum technological leaps. At the beginning of the twenty-first
century therefore, the law is favouring incremental over explosive advance. With a
patent system whose heritage lies in improving the technological standing of the
Realm, and economic justification for the grant based on incentive being the most
rational of the theories hitherto advanced, it is clear to see that, if the operation of
the system fits the philosophy, patent law today not only fails to encourage such
pioneering advances, it also actively discriminates against them when made. With
this in mind, we now turn to consider the reality of the system and ask: does the
philosophy fit the facts?
164
165
166
Above, n 128.
See further, text accompanying n 38 et seq in ch 5, below.
Kirin Amgen Inc and others v Transkaryotic Therapies Inc [2005] 1 All ER 667.
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4
Patents within the Market Economy
(Part II)
Does the Philosophy Fit The Facts?
Introduction
Analysis of the patent grant cannot simply be undertaken by utilising traditional
definitions and constructs of property. The patent is more complex than that: its
area of influence is secondary, concealed behind the words used to define its scope.
Yet, as we have seen, the courts approach to the interpretation of patent claims, the
tangible evidence of the intangible subject of protection, in early-twentieth century
Britain, was clearly influenced by traditional constructs of what property should be.
Therefore, in Lord Russells famous dictum in EMI v Lissen, that there is:
no canon or principle which will justify one in departing from the unambiguous and
grammatical meaning of a claim and narrowing or extending its scope by reading into it
words which are not in it; or which will justify one in using stray phrases in the body of the
specification for the purpose of narrowing or widening the boundaries of the monopoly
fixed by the plain words of a claim.1
The analogy with tangible objects is clearly evident. In land law, for example,
there is no principle of equivalence whereby the owner of a strip of land can prevent
access to property outside of the literal fence-posts of his claim.2 Equally, the owner
of a chattel cannot prevent another (absent ingenious placing of the item) from
coming within six feet of his prize on a claim of trespass by equivalents. Intangible
property, on the other hand, has an infinitely more complex nature and therefore
does not stand up to close analogy with its physical brethren. This said, tangible
property is something with which all of us is familiar, it is something that the human
mind can directly relate to, and therefore the temptation to draw comparison is
great and the capacity for misinterpretation still greater. It is also clear that there is
significant public confusion over the nature and effect of the patent grant. Indeed,
it is not uncommon for relevant members of the public to be unable to distinguish
1
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between categories of intellectual property at all, let alone identify patent content as
a separate entity: One will often hear about copyright in an invention, or a patent in
a book, etc, in the course of any given conversation on the topic. The press are no
better. The following passage appeared in The Guardian on 26 October, 2006, and
illustrates this perfectly:
Starbucks, the giant US coffee chain, has used its muscle to block an attempt by Ethiopias
farmers to copyright their most famous coffee bean types, denying them potential
earnings of up to 47m a year . . . [Oxfam] . . . said the Ethiopian government last year filed
copyright applications to trademark its most famous coffee namesSidamo, Harar and
Yirgacheffe.3
3 Seager,Starbucks, the coffee beans and the copyright row that cost Ethiopia 47m The Guardian, 26
Oct, 2006. Available at The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/frontpage/story/0,,1931675,00.html.
4 A web search for basmati rice patent in any of the major search engines returns literally hundreds
of articles, discussions, and web-site postings on the subject, very few of which display any knowledge, or
even understanding, of patent law whatsoever.
5 See text accompanying n 930 in ch 5, below.
6 A good illustration of derisory treatment in a related field can be found in the Patents Court decision in Zino Davidoff v A&G Imports Limited & Tesco Stores [2000] Ch 127, where Laddie J stated (at para
36) that the trade mark can give its owner a parasitic right to interfere with the distribution of goods.
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Why Patent?
93
The narrowest logical construction of the patent is that based on a literal interpretation of the claims.7 Indeed, on a purely proprietary analysis this is the only
scope that can be justified. In order to expand from this position and offer any
degree of equivalence it is necessary to have recourse to at least one of the philosophical or economic justifications of the patent system discussed above, or a variant thereof. Therefore, in order that we understand this basic position, the literal
core of the assessment of patent scope, it is necessary to inquire into the patentees
apparent motivation in seeking a patent and the process of its construction. This
investigation enables assessment of the intrinsic value of the grant and therefore
allows better understanding of the economic considerations for the determination
of scope. It also allows discussion of the totemic value of the grant and provides a
point from which to examine the substance of the folkloric claim that about 90 per
cent of patents on the register are invalid: in addition, it enables us to ask whether, if
this figure is true, it actually matters.
Our first task is therefore to examine the patentees motivation in seeking a grant
in order that we can contrast the systems commercial and philosophical purposes.
Why Patent?
Based on the foregoing discussion the reader might be excused for thinking that the
answer to this question is simple. The purpose of the patent system is clearly to
foster invention, whether by reward or incentive. It is designed to further the technological prosperity of society; this was the explicit intention of the Elizabethan
grants and there is nothing to suggest that things have changed. The patent provides
protection from competition. The corollary of this is that one therefore obtains a
patent in order that this benefit is realised. This said, the principal reason for patenting is to get monopoly protection.
This is a logical conclusion based on the facts as presented, and is superficially satisfying. There is a cause and an effect that naturally dovetail; the patent is justified
on the ground that it promotes innovation/disclosure, because it awards a monopoly to reward or stimulate the inventor, or compensates them for letting society
benefit from their idea. However, as Taylor & Silberston note, the indiscriminate
promotion of invention is clearly not a defensible economic objective from any
point of view, except probably that of those who earn their living as professional
inventors or research workers.8 Therefore, we redraft our hypothesis and state that
the patent system can only be justified if it causes or rewards the correct type of
inventive activity and attendant disclosure.
7
Although, as shall be seen in ch 8, below, there are other, even narrower, constructions that have
sometimes been used.
8 Taylor & Silberston, The Economic Impact of the Patent System: A Study of the British Experience
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1973) at 28.
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This latter view of the system is supported by the requirements for patentability.
An invention must be new in order to gain patent protection.9 In addition, it must
contain an inventive step (ie not be obvious to the person skilled in the art, based on
their specialist knowledge of the technical field in question).10 Furthermore, it must
be capable of industrial application and not fall within one of the prohibited categories of things that are not inventions for the purposes of British law.11 The legislation that implements patent policy is tuned towards the encouragement of
inventive ideas that have been reduced to practice. Therefore, it is not possible, for
example, to get patent protection for a discovery, as such, in the UK. However, one
can obtain a patent for an invention that utilises a discovery in a practical manner,
for instance the discovery of the virus responsible for Hepatitis C could be utilised
to enable the manufacture of a testing kit, which would not be excluded from patent
protection on policy grounds.12
Everything is relatively neat. The prospective inventor is encouraged to use their
inventive faculties in order to create something new in an area that attracts patent
protection. They are then encouraged to make this innovation known to the world
in return for a patent, which they can use to keep everyone off their patch for the
time that is required for them to realise the value of their invention. The raison
dtre of a patent is the monopoly that it confers.
Under this view of the inventive process, the patent system acts in various stages
to incite and reward invention whilst simultaneously demanding that the inventor
make their creation available to the public and compensating them for doing so.
The theories under this model are intertwined and therefore the scope of the
monopoly granted should reflect this balance; it should extend to cover that which
the inventor has disclosed where this is sufficient to encourage the invention to be
made. The reward that is offered, or the incentive given, should relate to the contribution that the invention makes to society, and the scope of the patent should be
determined by the technical contribution that it makes to the state of the art. This
process of balancing the extent of the reward or incentive with the invention and its
scope of protection should also take into account the possibility, and plausibility, of
any benefit to the creator actually being realised, for part of the decision to patent
should rationally depend upon such a calculation.13
By placing the invention in a market unencumbered by direct imitation, the
patent system enables the patentee to charge a monopoly price and therefore
maximise the value of the granted rights and the attendant profits. This value will be
primarily dependent on the creations utility, either to the user in terms of cost
reductions etc, or to the consumer, arising because it provides a better, cheaper,
9
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Why Patent?
95
more straightforward, or simply more desirable, means or matter for doing something. There is, after all, no value in something that nobody wants. However, the
security of this value is inextricably linked to the scope and stability of the patent
itself, as the value of the invention is necessarily dependent on the availability of
substitutes, the availability of substitutes is linked to the scope of the patent, and the
scope of the patent determines its value as it controls the zone of exclusion. The
patent is therefore the shell that protects the delicate invention within, which
provides its ultimate value and utility. Under this model, the patent is obtained precisely because of its ability to exclude competition and provide monopoly profit to
the enterprise that owns and exploits it.
However, there is at least one other reason for desiring patent protection that
stands independent of the scope of the monopoly conferred. Obtaining a patent,
rather than being a means to an end, may be an end in itself.
14
Again, the reader will note that this will be more problematic for smaller enterprises as, despite the
possibility of costs being awarded for successfully defending a patent right, there are a number of upfront charges that the lone inventor or SME may be unable, or unwilling, to pay.
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holding them is worth putting money intoin a lot of cases they neednt even see a
granted patent, they are just as happy with an application.
Therefore, it is easy to see that there are many reasons for obtaining a patent that
dont necessarily conform to the traditional model of patent for protection. The
patent grant, and in particular the publication of that grant, is an effective tool for
signalling your position to others operating, or simply interested, in that technological area.15 Whether in the interests of attracting investors or potential buyers, or
even for secondary purposes such as the RAE,16 the signalling function of the patent
system cannot be doubted.
This does not, however, undermine the fundamental conclusion that the patent
is a tool of commerce which is obtained simply because there is a commercial
advantage in doing so. Often the advantage is monopoly protection, in which case
the patentee will see the scope of the patent (in terms of maximising its coverage) as
crucial. However, it is apparent that there are many instances in which this is not the
patentees primary concern. For example:
There are some patents that people know they have that arent valid, theyre aware of the
fact that there are major problems with their case. They would prefer that we didnt tell
them that in writing, but they know that. But they like to have a large portfolio of patents.
They have a few that they could sue people with and that theyre happy with, but one of the
ways that you can value your business is on the value of the IP that you own. So, get me
some patents, I dont really care that they arent really valid and wont stand up in court, Ill
never sue anybody with them. . . . From that point of view, does it matter what I put in the
claim? In that sort of case I dont need to worry so much about what will happen if this
were ever litigated, because this ones not going to be. Their only purpose is to enable the
patent holder to tell the shareholders that theyve got X number of patents world-wide.
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ingly. The scope with which they draft will be the scope that is likely to elicit the least
objections; it will be pitched narrowly.
There are, in addition, some instances in which the intrinsic scope of the patent
will be determined by other motivations. One patent attorney gleefully recounted a
case in which he had been instructed to draft a specification that left one particular
embodiment of the invention, which would solve the same problem, free and
accessible. The catch was that this method of manufacture would have been prohibitively expensive, to the point of lunacy. He explained:
[The patentee in such a scenario] doesnt want to keep the competitor right out, but wants
him to see a method of manufacture . . . thats so expensive that he cant compete in the
market placethat amuses them a lot more than keeping them out altogether.
Others, when asked about this behaviour, simply stated that they had heard of
such cases, but could provide no first-hand experience of the patentees sense of
humour.
The reasons for this are many and varied. They range from the fact that it is
possible to amend a specification in the UK by narrowing the scope of the claims,
but not by adding matter,17 to the view that a patent only protecting a precise
embodiment is, at least under traditional thinking, not worth the paper it is written
on:
Its a very expensive piece of paper to put on the wall and I can find much cheaper art that
looks much better than any patent.
Therefore, assuming for the moment that the majority of patent applications are
drafted in cases where the prospective patentee wishes to maximise their protection
(or at least does not communicate their intention to restrict it to their patent attorney), it is prudent for us to inquire into what other factors may affect the intrinsic
17
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scope of the grant. The first of these other factors is the stage within the process of
innovation at which the patent is drafted.
Timing
The majority of patent systems, including the British, subscribe to a first-to-file
paradigm. Therefore, the first person to file an acceptable application concerning a
given invention at the national patent office is, in principle at least, the person entitled to the grant of a patent on that invention.18 This race to the patent office door
is clearly incompatible with any justification of the patent system based on a natural rights theory, but logically dovetails with the idea of the patent as a contract
between inventor and state. It should be noted that some other countries, most
notably the US, grant patents to the first-to-invent rather than the first-to-file. Thus
giving protection to the person who proves they reduced the idea to practice before
anyone else, whether or not they were the first to apply to the US Patent and
Trademark Office.
The first-to-file system is considered to have the benefits of simplicity and expediency, as it is far less complicated to determine priority of application rather than
priority of invention. However, it has been criticised as providing rough justice and
causing premature filing of applications.19
The exact timing of the application will usually depend upon the perceived proximity of potential competitors; the fiercer the competition, the fiercer the race and
therefore the earlier the application. Thus, if the particular research sector from
which the invention emerges is notably dense, the patent is likely to be drafted very
early in the innovative process, possibly before a best method has been settled upon.
At this point in time, the attorney will have little information at their fingertips:
[W]e become involved very much at an early stage [in the innovation process, although]
. . . it varies slightly . . . depending on who your client is, whether youre talking about a
small inventor or a multi-national chemical/drug company, theyre after different things
. . . [I]f you take pharmaceuticals as an example, they all know that their competitors are
working in the same sort of field, so they cant really hang around for long enough to
decide which one of a range of drugs is actually the good product because some other
swine will be out there patenting it before you . . .
We often come in at a stage where we dont really know . . . which [of a number of possible
chemicals] is going to be the active one. With a drug, at the time youre drafting the patent
18 In principle because a later application may, in fact, claim priority from an earlier applications5
PA 1977 deals with the priority of applications.
19 See Gholz,First-to-File or First-to-Invent? (2000) 82 JPTOS 891. For a comparison of the relative
benefits and disadvantages of the first-to-file versus the first-to-invent systems, see, eg; Nicolai,First-toFile vs. First-to-Invent: A Comparative Study Based on German and United States Patent Law (1972) 3
IIC 103; Kingston,Is the United States Right about First-to-Invent? [1992] EIPR 223; Roberts,Paper,
Scissors, Stone [1998] EIPR 89. See also, Parchomovsky, Publish or Perish (2000) 98 Michigan Law
Review 926; Moore,A General Period of Grace in a First to File World: Key Issues [2002] IPQ 75; Wegner,
Elsner: Judicial Drive to Eliminate Territoriality Limitations of Prior Art (2004) 23 Biotechnology Law
Report 747.
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its probably still on the drawing board. It might have been through the pilot planta few
lab experiments will have been done . . . It almost certainly hasnt been on a full-scale plant,
so who knows what modifications will be made before actually bringing something out at
the end. So at the time that youre drafting theres a lot of crystal ball gazing and a lot of our
job is to say to people could it work like this?Have you thought of this?
Therefore, provided the patent is desired for the protection that it affords, the
intrinsic scope of an early filing will be initially broad, as it is far easier to reject
claimed matter than it is to add new material. Where, on the other hand, the application is made later in the day the patent can be tailored more specifically. By this
time the best mode may have been identified and experiments are more likely to
have been carried out that have demonstrated that various permutations either
work or do not work, therefore the intrinsic scope can reflect this:
[Y]ou have to take a very practical attitude as to where you draw your fence around your
invention in the sense that there is no point in drafting something so broad that its never
going to be valid, but equally theres no point in drafting anything so narrow that it effectively teaches a third party how to compete with you.
The trimming of the claim is all important as it enables the patent attorney to dictate a course around what has actually been invented, therefore complying with
requirements of sufficiency, whilst avoiding the submerged rocks that are the prior art.
Leaving the prior art aside for one moment, the only way that a net can be cast
around the invention is if the patent attorney actually knows what has been
invented. It may sound obvious, but problems with communication can provide
great barriers to the formation of the intrinsic scope that an invention deserves.
It sounds deceptively simple, but most described this as the hardest part of their
job, and further suggested it as the cause of failure for a number of well-known
patents:
The Van der Lely case is a prime example of bad communication, a patent agent who didnt ask the right . . . questions . . . It is not the inventors job to look for alternatives; theyre
concerned with getting something that works . . . Its the job of the patent agent to ask for
clarification.
The inventor comes in a variety of shapes and sizes and also has varying levels of
technical expertise, communication skills and, most importantly according to those
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interviewed, varying levels of experience in the patenting game. However, a common complaint, applied across the board, was that prospective patentees tended to
be very narrow-minded:
The trouble is that most inventors only see one tree and its the patent attorneys job to
define the wood, or at least the species of tree, if not the genus that the species lies in. It all
depends on how new it all is, if its the first tree that anybodys ever seen and nothing other
than a cabbage has been known before then you could have a pretty broad claim. But if it
is some minor variant of black maple then thats what youre going to getI mean you
couldnt, but you know what I mean.
This criticism is equally applicable to the big players as it is to the smaller concern, said one of those interviewed. He continued, there are some people that Ive
known for years that still come in here and say Weve invented this, heres how it
works. And I ask them if it would work if we changed this bit here or that bit there
and they look up with a puzzled expression and say Weve invented this and heres
how it works .
One of the skills of the patent attorney is therefore to break the inventor out of
this immutability of focus and to get them to generalise their invention as much as
possible. They must then shape the inventive concept behind the embodiment into
something that can be accorded legal protection. The attorney should therefore
question everything that the inventor tells them:
I think the way that the patent attorney should go about it is that he should cross question
the inventor hard and you will usually find that when you say to him what might a competitor do when he sees this? How would he avoid your patent? Could he do this or could
he do that? The inventor, being fixed, only having seen his way of doing things will have
great difficulty and will be inclined to say well, nobody would want to do it that way and
you would have great difficulty in persuading the inventor that you ought to include other
variations . . . You must remember that youre dealing with human beings, and that is a
great part of it.
However, sometimes the answers that are received are not exactly what the attorney is looking for.
A Breakdown of Communication
The communication skills of some scientists were treated with disdain.Whilst it was
accepted that standards varied greatly from person to person, the following general
comments were made:
Scientists have one major failure in that they tend to equate expertise with a close progression down a very narrow avenue; they use the most up to date jargon and acronyms that
mean little or nothing to the rest of humanity. The very worst at this are the microbiologists whose whole language is made up of abbreviations, acronyms and shorthandits
almost as if they think that they will appear more intelligent if they can encode what they
are doing so that no-one outside of their circle can understand. The simplicity of a lot of
what they are doing is often concealed within their abbreviations.
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Scientists, as a whole, seem little interested in communicating with people outside of their
profession and so make no effort to do sohave you ever tried to read a scientific journal?
Its usually impenetrable. If you then compare that attitude with the function of a patent
and the number of people that you need to communicate with then the tension is obvious.
A patent in the general run of things is designed to be understood by the Patent Office in
examination, by other patent attorneys should the need arise, by licensees/assignees, and
by lawyers and judges. A patent attorney must take all of the technical bunkum that you
are fed by the inventor and reproduce it in a comprehensible form.
The problem of technical jargon is lessened by the fact that the patent specification is directed at the skilled addresseethe person of ordinary skill in the art
therefore a certain degree of knowledge of the technical field, and language used
within it, is taken for granted. However, it is critical to remember that this skilled
person is, in reality, a judicial construct; the mask that the court wears when considering the construction of the claim. The court, in England and Wales at least, is
seldomly scientifically trained. As such, there is a gulf between scientific and legal
language that the patent attorney needs to fill, or at least paper over. A further point,
that according to one cannot be over-stressed, is that if the patent attorney is unable
to understand the explanation of the invention that the inventor gives him then he
is at a loss to be able to adequately describe it in the specification or to claim it.
Another noted that the idea of the skilled addressee is, at best, a familiar fiction, for:
[Whilst] youre not addressing . . . [the specification] to the idiot drafting it or to a person
who knows nothing, youre not really addressing it to a hypothetical person who works in
that field and who knows how it goes either. The true answer of who a specifications aimed
at, of course, is that it is addressed to a judge on the third day of a trial, when hes usually
already come to his decision and is bored to tears of the whole show.
Therefore, the simplicity with which the inventor can relate their invention to the
patent attorney is vitally important to the production of a strong patent:
You have to be very careful, especially when youre starting out, because the skilled
addressee that you have in mind might not be the same as the skilled addressee that the
court, or even your Partner has in mind, and it can change how much you need to put in
[the document].
A number of those questioned said that the ease with which they were able to
extract the information required from the inventor varied enormously with the
technical field within which the invention lay:
[G]etting information from . . . [computer programmers] is like pulling teeth from hens,
impossible. The reason that it is so difficult to do this is that the programs that they write
grow under their fingers. They dont, by and large, plan exactly what they are going to do,
they have some aim in mind, but that might change by the time the thing goes into the
marketplace. The process is inherently iterative, something doesnt work so they move on,
if it does work then it might lead them in another direction, there isnt, in general, any plan
until you ask then to write one for you, and even then its not usually up to much.
[B]iotechnologists are definitely the worst, their reports are scant, their methods
iterative and their language bizarre. The problem is compounded when you realise that it is
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generally the case that the people who actually find the sequences are not the ones who
know how to deal with them. The way that they deal with the problem if they come and see
you is to pretend that the actual introduction technique is something that everyone knows,
often they dont know themselves, they expect you to do the understanding for them.
In the traditional engineering fields where the invention itself could be relatively
easily reduced to plan form, whether by way of technical drawing or electronic circuit, the problems associated with the extraction of the relevant information were:
[I]ndisputably less . . . [T]he inventor has a prop, you see, and I can ask him questions
about this or that and can see what hes referring to. It makes the whole process far more
straightforwardits amazing what a scrap of paper can do for an explanation.
The chemical and pharmaceutical industries also gained praise, those questioned
suggesting that they usually make quite good reports, and besides, they keep good
lab books. The reasons advanced for the distinction between general chemists and
pharmacists and those in the field of biotechnology were mainly based on the relative youth of the biotech industry:
Of course, chemical and pharmaceutical companies have been doing this sort of thing for
a long time, they know the procedure, they know what they want and how to get it . . .
[B]iotech has really taken off in the last few years, and thats one of its main problems.
The throw-away comment at the end of this statement is a telling point, which
can be expanded to cover all forms of technology. One of the consequences of a lack
of knowledge is that it will generally lead to a broader claim than would otherwise
be created, therefore opening the patent up to the prospect of invalidity by anticipation or lack of support in the disclosure. This, again, relates back to the fact that
it is far easier to narrow the scope of a patent in the UK than it is to enlarge it:
Drafting [a claim] is always a matter of keeping your options open as much as possible
when you dont have all of the informationyou dont always have the information about
the prior art, you dont have the information about what your clients ultimately going to
market, and in many cases you dont have the information on which of the things he presents you with is best.
[Our] primary concern is not being too narrow and, well, making sure you understand
how it works . . . So you define it in terms of what it is or how its done as broadly as you
canwhich covers all the species in that genus, excludes things which you already know
to be old or which dont work . . . [and] thats made all the more difficult if you dont know
which bits dont work, . . . if you dont have all of the information.
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This may go some way to explain the historical problem of broad claiming in the
biotech industry.
The reader will appreciate that the prior art impacts from the point of view of
obviousness as well as novelty; however, it would appear that this is less of a concern
to the patent attorney:
Novelty is the key. I would say that unless youre doing an exam youre not terribly bothered about inventive stepits such a subjective thing, you dont really want to restrict the
claim because of perceived doubts about inventive step too early, its something you can
always do in prosecution . . . [But] you will always try to draft a claim that is novel of the
prior art that youre aware of.
At the time that the patent is drafted there are two states of knowledge of the prior
art that the patent attorney may have; they either know nothing or they know something; omniscience is an impossible dream. The amount of prior art that is known
to the patent attorney will depend on the time available to conduct a private search,
and the willingness of the client to pay for one:
[Whether youve searched it or not] depends on the clients strategy . . . whether they want
something filed tomorrow because they think that theres a competitor around, or if
theyre willing to wait for a few weeks for the search results and you can write something a
bit better.
If a search hasnt been done then the patent attorney is effectively shooting in the
dark; where this is the case it is deemed prudent to cover the invention, as far as it is
known, with a broad initial claim and many sub-claims to act as fallback positions:
A lot of clients really havent got a clue; they dont know whats happened other than in
their own heads, their own laboratories, their own garden sheds or wherever theyre
20
This comes from Cokes famous quote that such monopolies were ever without law, but never
without friends. Coke, Part III of the Institutes of the Laws of England (London, Clarke & Sons, 1817;
reprint) at 182.
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inventing things. If they dont want to pay for any searching up front its a fairly hit-andmiss approach as to whether what I put together in terms of defining the invention comes
anywhere near being novel and inventive, or not. Very often its not. Very often it needs
to be restricted quite considerably. But in those circumstances if I were to define the
invention in narrow terms so as to make sure it stands up I would be losing out on a lot of
protection that the client deserves to get.
Thus, it would appear that the secret of a good specification is leeway. Room to
manoeuvre in prosecution combined with a structurally sound framework is of
vital importance to ensure, as much as is possible, the integrity of the patent. By
provisioning fallback positions, even if one of the claims falls in examination or litigation, some degree of protection may still be afforded by the others.
Knowledge of the prior art is one of the areas in which the patentee with larger
financial muscles will generally have an advantage over less affluent inventors. Wellestablished patentees, now usually associated with research and development
(R&D) labs of large corporations, will probably have significant past experience in
dealing with patents and, it was suggested, are more likely to be aware of the relevant
prior art. Such an entity will:
[U]sually have documentation available to let [the patent agent] have the most relevant
materials. Theyll be able to see for themselves, more or less, the direction in which the
invention is going and will be able to draft a protoclaim; a statement that defines the invention in their terms from which I can then work. Thats obviously a good situation from my
point of view because theyve done some of the background searching; they know the
direction in which theyre headed. All I have to do then is check the prior art documents
that theyve sent me to see that the claim isnt ridiculously broad. That being said, it isnt
always best to produce a claim of the scope that I expect to succeed at that stage because its
always good practice to have a search conducted by the patent office on a slightly broader
basis than the protection I desire would suggestin other words to try and get them to
draw prior art out of the woodwork. So slightly too broad a claim at this point is better than
one that is slightly too narrow.
Simple economics dictates that larger corporations will have less of a problem
paying a few thousand pounds for a comprehensive search than a smaller entity
would. Indeed, such expense may place the search out of the reach of many small
enterprises; a risky patent with a chance of success may be seen as far more valuable
than no patent at all. The gamble inherent in deciding against having a private
search done is not, however, as great as it first appears. As one interviewee candidly
stated:
[S]earching is very much a black art. If you find something, you know youve found it, if
you dont find it then you probably werent looking in the right place, it doesnt mean
theres nothing there. If you just have a quick look then youve probably spent all that is justified by the position . . . bearing in mind at this point you still dont know whether the
invention is ever going to make it to market so why spend a lot of money on it?
This said, the efficiency and reliability of the searching process has undergone a
revolution in recent years due to increasing amounts of information available on
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the internet. The cost of searching has been dramatically reduced and the probability of finding what you are after has risen in equal amounts. The European and the
US Patent Offices now have comprehensive online patent databases, which enable
the attorney to perform full-text keyword searches in a fraction of the time in which
a title search could have been performed in the past. There was universal praise for
this advance in the speed of data recovery:
[N]o one really likes doing the searching for a patent application, but you tend to do a small
one just in case; so what you submit doesnt look too stupid. Also clients are often not very
willing to pay for anything other than a quick look. . . . [seven or eight] years ago even a
quick look was very difficult, now you type in three or four words and bingo, there you are.
If items of prior art are known they can be relatively easily dealt with by amending the claims so that they no longer cover the offending subject matter. However,
sometimes the patent attorney will choose to deliberately claim the prior art, making sure that they have narrower claims on which they can fall back when objection
arises:
Maybe youll write a claim which is drawing something that youre pretty sure is obvious
or not novel because youve had a search donebut youll write another sub-claim that
you know youre pretty sure isnt; or you have a claim that that you think might be a bit
dodgy so you write another one claiming the obvious and retreat from it in an examinationgive the examiner his pound of flesh.
If no private search is conducted, the earliest that the patentee and patent attorney may learn about anticipations and possible novelty destroying disclosures will
be after filing when the Patent Office conducts its own search.
A number of interviewees took issue with the efficacy, efficiency, and value of
Patent Office searches, suggesting that in the majority of cases they were a waste of
time:
In my experience although the process of examining in the Patent Office might weed out
the very weak thingsbecause theres a limited amount of time and effort that you can put
into the searching and examinationessentially, its only when you start getting into litigation that people start performing really thorough searches, and then you find out what
the true previous things are because you dig much more deeply.
[T]heres a strong argument that can be made for having no searches and no examination
as in the old French system where you just filed it and let the world sort it out. . . . Theres
nothing scientific about the searching business, its very much a hit and miss procedure
most of the time . . . [However], theres a direct correlation between the amount of money
you throw at a search and the results that you find. It leads to a very uneven playing field.
Thus, the intrinsic scope of the patent specification can be directly linked to a
number of things. These include: the purpose for which the patent is desired; the
knowledge that the attorney has about the way in which the invention works; the
amount of time they have to draft the thing; and their degree of knowledge, and the
proximity, of prior art. Patent attorneys regularly draft claims with purposeful
imprecision to enable them to cut back and prune the monopoly should esoteric,
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potentially novelty destroying, disclosures materialise. They play games and play
the system to get their clients what they want: this is not always a monopoly. It is
hardly surprising therefore that a great deal of the patents on the register probably
are, in fact, invalid. Indeed, this appears to be the conclusion of Jacob LJ when he
states, in Nokia Corp v Interdigital Technology Corp, that:
There can hardly be a patent agent who, privately, will not readily admit that he or she has
got lots of things past the office on flimsy grounds. In the nature of things a patent office,
however hard it tries, can only be a coarse filter. Patents that pass the filter cannot be taken
as necessarily valid.21
Whilst undoubtedly correct, this revelation carries with it an uncomfortable subtext; there is a suspicion, if not presumption, held by, and indeed made public from
within, the judiciary that any given patent is not, in fact, valid until proved to be so
by litigation. However, the quote also carries with it an implicit assumption that all
patents are desired for their scope of exclusion and therefore all are drafted equal, or
at least with equal intention. This, as we have seen, is clearly not the case. The second
assumption acts to reinforce the negative aspects of the first in that it fails to note
that there are many disposable patents that undoubtedly will use smoke and mirrors to glide past the examiner, but that these will rarely, if ever, be used aggressively
and end up being judged in court. When taken together, we see that there is a risk
that patents will be judged according to the sins of the father, and hence subjected to
critical examination as something that should not have been granted, rather than
truly placing the burden on the opposite party. Faith in the system of grant may
therefore be seen to be of significant importance to the scope of the protection that
the patent is to enjoy, both in terms of what one considers one can get away with in
the drafting process and upon interpretation.22 The coarse filter of the Patent Office
therefore serves to compound the, already evident, distaste for the patent grant that,
as we have seen, pervades historic considerations of the system. Moreover, the conclusion that there are many invalid patents masquerading on the register is further
reinforced when the nuts and bolts of the drafting process are considered, and it is
to this topic that we now direct our attention.
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The process of patent claiming was compared to sculpture; whether you work in
granite or bronze, whether you build up or chisel down, the process is broadly the
same, you are constantly refining the structure, constantly redefining the fascia.
Occasionally the subject matter will dictate the approach, but the end product will
have the same volume whichever way you work. The important thing is to retrace
your steps, to deconstruct and interpret as you construct and define:
23
None of those interviewed gave figures greater than 30 hours for a typical application.
Or redraft and file if the specification arrived via a PCT application for introduction into the
European market.
24
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[The primary concern is to create a technical definition, a secondary concern is to] try and
find language that is appropriate to [get it through the Patent Office]. There are tricks of
the trade that are sometimes used here. But getting it right . . . it has to be new and it has to
be inventive, to have inventive height as they sometimes call it, often you cant take a view
on that because you dont always know what the prior art is. You take a fly, you draft
broadly, you put in lots of fallback positionsthats terribly important, its no use drafting
it terribly broadly and then showing one or two specific embodiments because theres
nothing to fall back on. If the broad is too broad, where do you go? Right down to narrow,
to the specifics, and what good is that?
[I]t makes it easier if you know whats out there because you know what you can get away
with and what you cant. It also allows you to write the description so that the examiner
thinks that its clever when it might not be, or at least it appears cleverer than it is. . . . [Y]ou
should write your description and your introductory paragraphs of the specification and
dress them up so that the examiner gets to the end and thinks how clever it is. It might well
be very inventive, it doesnt have to be subterfuge . . . but on the other hand, you can . . . dress
mutton up as lamb in the same way, its no different. Its a game. Its just a matter of telling
the story.
The intrinsic scope of the patent is dependent upon a whole host of factors, but
at the end of the day, tricks of the trade or no, the patent attorney can only provision
for the equivalents and fallback positions that they and the inventor can think of.
Therefore, we now turn to address the question of whether those interviewed
thought that any degree of latitude should be given to the interpretation of the
patent if, and when, it gets litigated.
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protection and the drafter grants this wish, utilising their experience and skill to
create and hone the desired scope of protection. When combined with the specification, the claims form their own dictionary, and once all of the patent documentation has been finalised no further leeway should be given. To interpret the claims in
a more liberal sense than their literal meaning would suggest is to give the patentee
something that they have not specifically asked for. This cannot be allowed:
[The claims] are the definition of the legal monopoly that you seek, so you are required to
define them definitively. . . . If something is outside of your claims then you havent claimed
it. . . . A lot of the things that go to court are very much oh well, I havent claimed it, can I
have it? Please sir, I meant to claim it, honest. . . [Now], quite often they know they wont
get it, but theres so much money at stake that they have to tryshareholders expect it for
a start . . . [Y]ou have to remember that with a lot of cases the stakes are so big that you have
to fight even if the chance of winning are quite small.
A number of those questioned stated, perhaps surprisingly, that even the current
tradition of giving a purposive construction to the claims was going too far:
If you dont agree that whatever isnt claimed is disclaimed[25] then youre really saying
that whatever isnt claimed could be claimed but well argue about it. That road leads to
lack of clarity and essentially removes the need to claim in the first placeif youre not
bound by what you say. Essentially all the requirements in law, in the European Patent
Convention, the rules in the High Court now are for claritythe public needs to know
where they stand. And importantly, so does the patenteea point that is often forgotten in
the quest for fair protection, if you, yourself dont know where the limits of your patent lie
how is that fair? So you need to be precise, youre going to be given a massive monopoly
that could be worth millions of poundsyour half of the bargain is first to produce an
invention and show that it works and is useful and second you have to tell the rest of the
world what you claim and what you dont claimand thats why you have claims at all.
Yes, the more I think about it the more Im firmly of the view that if it isnt claimed it is
disclaimedbecause otherwise where are you?
If one follows this approach then, as the attorney in question went on to state, the
only problem arises where you use very narrow and precise definition for something that oughtnt to have been narrowly and precisely defined. In such a case the
patentee places the court in a potentially difficult position:
[If there is] a broader concept in his invention [than that claimed], and we agree that latitude will be given to the interpretation of what he has actually claimed, are we going to give
him the benefit of the doubt and give him the neighbouring counties, as it were, even if he
hasnt specifically asked for them? If we are then how many does he get?
See the speech of Lord Russell in EMI v Lissen (1939) 56 RPC 23 at 41.
See ch 7, below for further discussion of this traditional German position.
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Ah, but Ive seen German cases where the patentee has got away with blue murder.
Allowing a bit of latitude may be OK, but not that much, and damn right, the public needs
to know where it stands.
They continued, reasoning that a patent is not a God-given right. It is only a right
under the terms of the Patents Act:
You dont have a divine right to a monopoly, you have to do something for it, you have to
claim it, and if you claim it badly and you dont ask for the right thing, well caveat applicant
if you like. I dont, myself, think that the law should fall over backwards to assist you, unless
its clear that you paid an attorney to do it and he did a bad job and its not your fault
youd get a bit of a following wind there, but not a lot. Its like the old saying,if you make a
wish, make sure you think very hard what you wish for. . . . The duty is on you to frame your
wish. . . . [If a patent is framed badly then] I dont think [the claims] . . . should be more
broadly defined when they got to court, [the patentee] . . . chose to define something narrowly, they neednt havethey were of sound mind when they did it. Tough. It is, after all,
a contracttheres a weight on both sides.
A patent is not something that comes in the water; its something that you are allowed to
have in exchange for invention and you have to define what you want. The onus is on you
to define it. . . . Its something you have to work forits not sort of all have done well and
all shall have prizes. Youve actually got to invent something and then the second half of the
requirement is that youve got to actually define what you want, the states not going to do
it for you.
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Furthermore, all of those holding the literal view stated that they were professionals who were paid a lot of money to get the drafting aspect of their job right.
They were covetous of their training, insisting that if you cant draft properly then
you shouldnt be in the patent writing business; a view that has certain charm. They
rationalised that a lack of certainty may benefit the rich patent holder who can
threaten and bully his competitor and who can easily absorb the cost of litigation,
but asked if it can really be fair on the smaller enterprise not to know how far their
monopoly extends. The professional view is that patents are for the big boys and
that you should get what you ask for; if you dont know how to ask then thats your
bad luck:
If you cant draft properly then you shouldnt be in the business. I take the British view of
it, that this works in two ways, if youre wearing the hat of the patent holder, you want
uncertainty, because that gives you effectively broader scopeparticularly if youre a rich
patent holder, if youre a poor patent holder, it means not a lot, but if youre a rich patent
holder, yes, that uncertainty around the edge of your claim, if you can make it great
enough, gives you a more powerful tool. But we must not forget that we often represent the
other guy in this professionhired guns, we shoot who we get paid to shootwe represent both sides, we act for the patent holders or as patent busters. So . . . my view is coloured
by working for both sides of this.
I think it is important to have certainty in areas of law, which is an old British principle.
This applies particularly where someone is asking of the government the grant of a
monopoly, which is a favour; they should be precise in what theyre asking for. Why should
the government give them something furry or fuzzy? They should be given what they ask,
nothing more, nothing less, certainly nothing more. And if they cant ask properly then
thats their bad luck, theyre asking to be given something, their also asking for something
to be taken away from other people, a freedom to do something, a freedom to act in a certain way. . . . I think if you are asking to be granted something like that . . . if you get it wrong
then thats your bad luck, sorry.
[P]retty much everybody is represented in this game, patents are not really for private individuals unless they are really serious entrepreneurs, theyre for businessmen and nobody
in business (as far as I know) is foolish enough to write their own patents, they all have
them done professionallyand if your patent agent makes a mistake then perhaps you
should sue him. That should be your redress, if its not a mistake and you genuinely
thought that your patent was limited to what you had written in your claim then tough,
why should you be entitled to come back and say ah, but what I really meant was . . . which
is what it all boils down to.
Those holding the literal view continued saying that, if nothing else, their view
was the safest:
I think my viewpoint is the safest one because I can guarantee that even given a hard-nosed
interpretation I still get what I thought I would. I would never rely on some vague, broad
interpretation to get me my infringer. . . . It seems to me that by doing it my way you win
whichever jurisdiction youre in because weve probably got one of the hardest nosed jurisdictions in the world, so if you draft towards a British court, itll be OK anywhere else with
the local rule of interpretation.
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The people who lose out are the Continentals because of the way they tend to draft, but
theyre not as bad as they used to be.
A further justification for the approach taken by those holding the literal view
was that, in their eyes, the efficacy of a patent is nowadays largely dependent upon
the financial might of the patent holder. If the owner is wealthy enough then even a
weak patent can be used (or abused) highly effectively3M was a well cited example of a particularly aggressive patent holder likely to press forward with legal action
even in respect of some of the more dubious grants in its portfolio. Literal interpretation was therefore lauded as not only providing certainty for third parties, but also
limiting the effects of big corporations like 3M throwing their weight around.
Whilst this viewpoint does have a certain charm, it might also be argued that the
converse is true; that more liberal interpretation might dissuade large corporations
from feeling that they have to flex their muscles as much, and that insisting upon a
purely literal interpretation would give them added incentive to tread on the little
people. It could also be said to provide the more affluent corporation with a better
opportunity to exploit weaknesses in their competitors patents by throwing
money, time and effort at designing around the right, as in Van der Lely v
Bamfords.28
Whatever the justification, there is another, perhaps less popular, but nonetheless
strongly held view within the profession that deserves explanation.
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More money equals more man-hours of scrutiny, which in turn equals more chance
of striking upon that elusive piece of prior art that will invalidate the patent. More
money also means that the search net can be cast further afield, high translation
costs not necessarily being as limiting as when filing for protection in the first place.
Thus, even before the Court steps in to give the claims a purposive construction, the
odds are against the patentee.
The liberal view therefore holds that the patentee should benefit from having disclosed their invention to the world, and should not be judged according to the depth
of their pockets. They answer the literalists and their call for and unyielding and
steadfast interpretation by stating that:
Patents are not statutes and should not be interpreted as such. They are written relatively
quickly against cost. Moreover, they are written usually by one person, and we all make
mistakesyou only have to look at the atrocious wording of some statutes to see that even
Parliament makes mistakes. It is impossible to get it right in all cases.
[T]he client should benefit from having disclosed, he should then be on a level playing field
with competitors. He should not gain extra benefit from having happened upon a better
patent agent, or from having employed a patent agent on a particularly good day.
The court should therefore be encouraged to look at the patent for what it is, a
description of the invention. It should be encouraged to take the viewpoint that
anyone in the marketplace can get the specification and ask what are the common
features between what Im building, etc, and the patent; are they new and related to
the patent or are they different?
Counsel and the courts, it was stated, seem to take the viewpoint that to give any
latitude is to adopt a position whereby you might give out a monopoly of incorrect
scope, and that if this occurred it would be the end of the world. Attorneys pick up
on this and tend to agree that anything other than literal interpretation encourages
deviants to deprive the public of what is rightly public property. However, it was
stated that in the vast majority of cases if one asks a few simple questions the problem vanishes. Besides:
It is often forgotten that the job of the patent agent is not to make sure that infringers can
get away with infringing, the primary purpose of the agent is to protect the patentees
invention. It is also forgotten that little mistakes are so easy to make and that it is very rare
for anyone to be expected to be perfect all of the time.
They reasoned that the injustice of a literal interpretative doctrine is further compounded if you take a patent document and file it abroad. The original document is
produced with a certain amount of effort, and if it is taken around the world the patentee incurs vast costs in translations alone. If the original document is then knocked
out or avoided because of a technicality in the wording then the rest is vanity.
Some of those interviewed therefore suggested that the teaching and disclosure of
the patent should be promoted to the fore. The ability to capture the returns from an
invention and therefore to encourage investment was said to be the rational basis for
having patent protection in the first place, but it was noted that this justification was
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really only relevant as a consideration ex ante. Ex post the invention, the patent systems main contribution was the fact that it could teach othersor at least
provide avenues for further research and investigation. The information function of
the patent was also something that should be considered when determining the scope
of protection, and this suggested providing protection commensurate with the
patentees contribution to the art. Those holding the liberal view explained that
maintaining the claims as the outer boundary of protection, as required by the
European Patent Convention,30 did not necessarily mean that scope should be determined via their literal interpretation. Furthermore, a static view of the claims was not
realistic as times and technology change with rapid pace and the teaching or inspiration that may be derived from any given patent would, necessarily, fluctuate accordingly. They argue that the claims must therefore be considered in a more fluid manner
in order to reflect the patentees actual contribution to the art, and fixing the point of
reference at the time that they were drafted or published simply did not do this.
In answer to the question of what would happen if someone changed the technology so that, even though using the same principles (and possibly even falling
within the scope of the claims as currently understood), nevertheless the new invention solved the problem with considerable inventive flair, some of those holding the
liberal view pointed towards the US doctrine of reverse equivalents as a possible
solution.31 This doctrine states that where the allegedly infringing article departs so
much in principle from the patented article that it performs the same or a similar
function in a substantially different way, then infringement should not be forthcoming. This was seen to be as much of an issue under the current interpretative
regime as it would be under a more relaxed, contributive, approach.
Nevertheless, and notwithstanding the redevelopment of this area of the law
following the House of Lords decision in Kirin-Amgen,32 it is submitted that the
current state of affairs in the United Kingdom is closer to the literal, more traditional, view than to that of the liberalists. Therefore to return to a quote that has
been used before:
[I]f you make a wish, make sure you think very hard what you wish for
Conclusion
The traditional and liberal views of patent interpretation are not merely different;
at their extremes they are irreconcilable. They stem from different perceptions of
30 Art 69 European Patent Convention states that the extent of protection of a patent is to be determined by the terms of the claims, interpreted with the aid of the drawings and description. This provision forms the basis for s125(1) PA 1977, which essentially reiterates its content.
31 Discussed more fully in ch 5, below.
32 Kirin-Amgen v Transkaryotic Therapies Inc [2005] 1 All ER 667. Discussed more fully in ch 10, below.
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Conclusion
115
the grant and, importantly, different perceptions of the attorneys own jobs and that
of the patent system. The fact that the majority of those questioned saw themselves
as potential double agents, one day working for one client and the next working for
their competitor, is a highly significant factor in the determination of the intrinsic
scope of patent protection. This split allegiance necessitates (at least in the majority
opinion) a minimalistic approach to the latitude that should be given to their wording of the claims. In addition, a fierce professional pride seemed to dictate that scope
should be restricted to the words as they had written them. One of those interviewed likened the drafting of a patent to the copying of a painting; it simply wasnt
good enough until you could fool the experts. You couldnt claim success if they
said, well, this could be the real thing if we give it a broad enough interpretation,
perfection was the only outcome that would suffice.
The fact that the majority of those interviewed branded the patent grant an economic monopoly is also highly significant. The reader is reminded of the stigmatic
effect of monopoly rhetoric and the boost that it gave to the abolitionists argument
during the anti-patent debate of the mid- to late-nineteenth century.33 The fact that
those most intimately involved with the creation of the patent, indeed those
charged with shaping it in the first place and defining its literal scope, class it as a
monopoly that needs to be contained, is saddening. It demonstrates distaste for the
grant and, as we shall see,34 a misconception of the actual effects of the patent in the
majority of cases. This, in itself, is significant.
We have seen the traditional justifications of the patent system and are now in a
position to answer the question of how these fit in with the commercial realities.
Classical economists clearly saw the patent grant as reward or incentive; the reason
for offering a patent was to enable protection from competition. In the modern
sphere there has been a subtle, but significant, shift in the underlying reasons for
patenting. The old justifications still hold true to an extent, however, other motivations behind seeking the grant are now evident which may supplant the older
notions in the majority of cases. These new considerations have far-reaching effects
on the intrinsic scope with which these patents are drafted, as the preceding study
suggests that they are utilised as waypoints to dictate the direction in which the
drafting exercise is to move. Furthermore, the amount of time devoted to the preparation of a patent, when compared to the amount of time that will be devoted to
scrutinising it should it ever come to be litigated, is very small. This is necessarily the
case; however, it is something that some say should be taken into account when
the claims come to be interpreted and their scope defined. This point is made all the
more significant when the depth of the patentees pockets is also considered. If the
patentee is rich, then not only will they be more readily able to defend their patent
should the need arise, but also they will have been able to pay for a better patent in
the first place. Money is indeed the key to better patent protection. Large, wellfunded entities are doubly benefited, for as well as capacious pockets, they will have
33
34
See ch 3, above.
See ch 5, below.
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Conclusion
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5
Patents within the Market Economy
(Part III)
Post-Classical Economic Thought &
Theories of Protection
Some Basics of Economic Analysis
In order to understand the value of the patent grant, and modern economic modelling of patent scope, it is necessary to understand the economic effects that a patent
is traditionally seen to have on the marketplace. Therefore, before proceeding to
discuss the issue of value within the market economy, a little time is taken to examine some of the basic concepts underlying the economic analysis and to define a
number of key terms.
The principles stated can be found in any good basic economics text. Posner,
Economic Analysis of Law 1 and Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent
Monopoly: An Economic Analysis,2 have been extensively utilised by the author in the
preparation of the following.
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Demand Curve
P1
P2
Q1
Q2
Q/t
Therefore, under this model, the sales volume will increase as the price falls. If we
take a simple example to illustrate this and imagine an island (as a closed system) on
which there is one shop. It sells apples and pears and these are the only food items
available on the island. The price of apples and pears are 1 per kg and the shop sells
10 kg of apples per day. The consumers that buy apples value them at 1 per kg or
more, at this price the pear is a poor substitute. If the shopkeeper raises the price of
apples to 1.50 per kg (keeping everything else equal), many consumers will continue to buy apples as they did before, however at this price some consumers will
reduce the amount of apples that they now purchase and will buy pears instead. The
quantity of apples demanded by the consumers, and therefore the amount produced, will fall to avoid wasteful production.
This example is necessarily simplistic and assumes that the only things changing
in the system are the relative price of the goods and the quantity demanded. It
ignores other factors that might impact on the sale of apples; such as other shops
opening, the quality of the apples falling, fluctuations in the income of the consumer, other products being introduced that indirectly compete, etc. However, it
provides simple illustration of the principle at the core of the traditional economic
analysis of patent protection.
Elasticity
The value that the consumer places on the goods (ie the need, or desire, that they
have for them), combined with the substitutability of other products, will affect the
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slope of this curve. The slope of the curve at any given point is referred to as its elasticity. This is a measure of the rate of change of quantity with respect to price. It is
calculated by comparing the percentage change in quantity brought about by a percentage change in price. The higher the elasticity, the greater the impact that a given
price movement will have on the quantity demanded. Where the slope of the
demand curve at a given point is greater than one, the curve is said to be elastic.
Where it is less than one it is inelastic; and at exactly one it is said to be of unitary
elasticity.
If we consider the example of apples and pears once more we can see why this is
the case. If we suppose that the population of the island adore apples but really dislike pears and will only eat them if there is no other alternative, it will take a very
large increase in the price of apples to affect the quantity demanded, as the alternative (buying pears or going hungry) is a poor substitute. Here the curve is inelastic.
If, however, the substitutes are more acceptable then the slope of the demand curve
will be shallower as people will more readily replace apples with pears when the
price rises too high.
The elasticity of the curve at any given point can be described by the mathematical formula:
Eq = p/q dq/dp
Where p is the price, q is the quantity demanded at that price and dq/dp is the
inverse of the gradient of the demand curve.
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qualification comes from the fact that the other sellers in the market may learn of a
reduction in price and therefore also lower their prices. It is tacitly assumed that
other suppliers would not respond in a similar fashion to an increase in price,3 as
they could catch an increased market share by simply selling at current price. Where
the seller reduces the price of the product and the competition follows, they will not
increase their share of the market. They will, however, sell more units in line with
the demand curve for the product.
In any given market, the slope of the demand curve for our hypothetical seller
will primarily depend on two factors: the first is the demand curve for the product,
and the second is the number of other sellers in the market. Where the seller is a
monopolist, the demand curve that they face will be the same as the demand curve
for the product itself. However, where there are a small number of firms competing,
such that the conduct of each firm significantly affects the situation of the other
firms,4 then the demand curve faced by each may look something like that in Figure
2 (below).
D
Demand Curve ( Product )
P0
Q/t
Figure 2: Oligopolistic Competition
The kink in the curve occurs at the existing price (P0), below which the market is
assumed to respond to a reduction of price by similarly lowering prices, therefore
the slope roughly parallels that of the demand curve for the product. Where the
price is raised the market is expected, for the reasons outlined above, not to respond
in a similar way, therefore the curve is more flattened.
As more sellers enter the marketplace the oligopolistic interdependencies
between them are softened, as the effects of competition diminish the impact that a
price change by one seller has on the rest of the market.Where the market is not perfectly competitive, either because the number of sellers is too small or because the
product is not homogeneous, the demand curve faced by the seller may look something like that in Figure 3 (below).
3
4
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123
d
D
Q/t
Figure 3: Imperfect Competition
Where the market is in perfect competitionie the goods of one seller are perfectly substitutable for the goods of another, and there are many separate sellers,
each with small market sharethe demand curve for each seller would look like
that in Figure 4 (below). Here the curve is flat, the elasticity is infinite; such a system
is said to be perfectly elastic. The seller in this scenario can sell all that he produces
at the existing price and nothing at higher prices, as customers would simply go
elsewhere. It is apparent that any rational trader will always wish to sell at the price
that maximises their profitthe difference between their costs and their sales revenue. However, under perfect competition, at every point up to the lowest profitable
price, the seller faces the prospect of being undercut and therefore losing sales. Thus
the market price will gravitate towards this breakeven price.
d
D
Q/t
Figure 4: Perfect Competition
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Marginal Revenue
Another useful concept employed by economists is the marginal revenue curve.
This is the curve that can be drawn for any given demand curve that represents the
net effect on revenues of making ever-larger numbers of sales. If we turn, once
more, to our island example we can see a practical illustration of this principle.
Imagine, once again, that there is only one shop on the island, it sells apples and
pears. The highest price the shopkeeper can charge for apples is 1 each, however at
this price he only sells one per daythis is the unit price. If the shopkeeper drops
the price to 0.95 per apple then he sells two per day5this is the two-unit price.
However, the sale of two apples at 0.95 is less than the sum of the unit price and the
two-unit price (ie 0.95 + 0.95 is less than 1.00 + 0.95). Here the marginal return
is 0.90 (ie 0.95 + 0.951.00). If the shopkeeper wishes to sell three apples he
must again reduce the price. The return to revenue as a result of the last (marginal)
sale will always be less than the price at which the last sale was made.
If the marginal revenue curve is sketched, a number of points become apparent.
First, it will always lie below the demand curve for a product at every quantity after
the first unit (at least where the demand curve is not perfectly elastic. Where the
demand is perfectly elastic the marginal revenue curve will be incidental with the
demand curve as every unit produced can be sold at the prevailing price). Second,
the marginal revenue curve will, itself, slope downwards for as long as the demand
curve follows a linear descent. Third, the marginal revenue curve will hit the x-axis
at the point of unitary elasticity and will then fall below it (ie the marginal revenue
will become negative), as the curve becomes inelastic. This occurs because, after the
point of unitary elasticity, it is necessary to cut the price by more than one-per cent
in order to gain a one-percent increase in quantity sold.
This principle is best illustrated by example. Therefore, suppose that the demand
curve for apples in the shop looks like that shown in Figure 5 (below) and our shopkeeper can sell four apples per day if he prices them at 0.60 each. The revenue he
gets from the sale is 2.40 (ie 40.60 ). If he drops the price to 0.50 each, he can
sell five apples a day. The revenue that he will get from the sales at this new price is
2.50 (ie 50.50). Therefore the marginal return in moving from four to five
apples per day is 0.10 (2.502.40). If our shopkeeper wishes to sell six apples per
day he has to drop the price to 0.40. The revenue he gets from the sale of six apples
is 60.40 = 2.40, ie less than the revenue that he gained from selling five apples at
0.50 each. The curve at the six-apple price is inelastic. The marginal revenue that
accrues from moving between sales of five apples at 0.50 each and six apples at
0.40 each is negative. The shopkeeper loses money by dropping the price to this
level. This is an example of the law of diminishing returns.
5 The demand curve slopes downwards to the right, therefore in order to sell more units the price
must drop.
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Price ()
Demand Curve ( Apples)
0.60
0.50
0.40
6 Quantity/Day
Cost
It should now be apparent to the reader that the demand curve for any given product is of vital importance to the seller or producer of that product, as it will dictate
how, and when, the sale of the product will be profitable. However, this is not the
end of the story for there is another factor of equal importance to demand that
affects the market of a product: cost.
The interrelation between the demand and cost curves for a given product provides information on the level of production that will take best economic advantage
of the situation.
The lowest profitable price in any situation will be the price that the resources consumed in the production and sale of the item would command in their next best use.
This is the price that economists refer to as the opportunity cost. For example,
assume our shopkeeper has a small piece of land that is lying unused. He decides to
start growing lettuce on the land to sell in the shop. The opportunity cost of the lettuce will be the price that the labour, materials and transport, etc involved in bringing
it to the point of sale would have commanded if sold to the next highest bidder. This
is because the producer must have outbid their nearest rival to obtain the resources.
However, importantly, it will not include the purchase of the land, as this is a sunk (or
incurred) cost at the time that production is contemplated and commenced. The
shopkeeper already has the land, it is lying unused and therefore will not (assuming
that he is rational) factor in the price he charges for his lettuce. To take another example, if it cost 10 to assemble a widget, but now that it is assembled the most that it can
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be sold for is 1, the fact that it cost 10 to build should not affect the sale price, as selling at the lower price is preferable to not selling at all.
A consequence of defining cost as the value of the resource in its next best use is
that cost will only be incurred when someone is denied the use of a resource. This
definition means that those resources that can be classified as free goods (goods not
exhausted by use) are, in fact, costless. A commonly quoted example of this concept
is the air that we breathe. Air is costless as one can breathe as much as one wishes
without depriving anyone else of the air that they want. There is no economy of air
as there is no next best use because one cannot, under normal circumstances, be
denied use of the resource. This has important implications for the patent system
that will be explored below.
For expediency, economists often divide the total cost for the production of a
particular item into two elements. The first is fixed cost. This is, by definition, the
same for all levels of output available within the sellers normal operating range (ie
given their current premises and contractual obligations). The second is variable
cost, which rises and falls according to the level of output. Costs may be described in
aggregate or per unit, depending on which is more helpful for any given purpose.
Aggregate variable costs will generally rise as production output increases, as it will
generally cost more to make X+1 items than it did to make X. The total cost of production is calculated by adding the aggregate variable cost at any given point to the
fixed cost. An illustration of possible fixed cost (FC), aggregate variable cost (VC),
and total cost (TC) curves is given in Figure 6 (below).
The average variable cost (variable cost per unit) (AVC), average fixed cost
(AFC), and average total cost (ATC) are calculated by dividing each category by the
number of units of output for any given cost.An illustration of possible average cost
curves is given in Figure 7 (opposite)
TC
VC
FC
Q/t
Figure 6: Cost Curves
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127
In much the same way as we calculated the marginal revenue curve from the
demand curve earlier, it is possible (and very useful) to calculate a marginal cost
ATC
AVC
AFC
Q/t
Figure 7: Average Cost Curves
curve. Marginal cost is the additional amount of cost associated with each successive unit of product, or, put another way, it is the cost avoided by producing one unit
less. Given that fixed costs are, by definition, the same for all levels of output within
the normal operating range, the marginal cost will be attributable to changes in the
variable cost and will bear close relationship to the average variable cost curve.
Just as the marginal revenue and demand curves coincided at unitary production, the marginal cost curve at this level of output will be incidental with the average variable cost curve and the total variable cost curve.6 For as long as the
incremental cost of producing another unit of product is less than the incremental
cost of producing the last unit, the marginal cost and the average variable cost will
both fall. Additionally, as the marginal cost curve is, by definition, not affected by
the higher incremental costs of producing earlier units but the average variable cost
curve is, the average cost will be greater than the marginal cost. At the point at which
the cost of making an additional unit ceases to be less than the incremental cost of
making the unit before, the marginal cost curve will reach its minimum. It will still
be below the average cost; however for successive units it will now start to rise,
whereas the average cost will continue to fall. Where the incremental cost of producing another unit exceeds the average cost of producing all of the units before it,
the average variable cost curve will find its minimum. This will occur where the
marginal cost curve intersects the average variable cost curve. The marginal cost will
6 It is simple to see why this is the case, the marginal cost of moving from no units to one unit of production will obviously be equal to the cost of the first unit.
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always be more than the average variable cost where the latter is rising, and less
where it is falling. See Figure 8 (below) for graphical representation of this point.
MC
AVC
AFC
Q/t
Figure 8: Marginal Cost, Average Variable Cost and Average Fixed Cost Curves
Profit
The motivating factor of all economic behaviour is assumed to be profit maximisation. If the cost and demand curves for any given period are superimposed then it is
possible to see that profit may be maximised if operation proceeds at the level where
marginal cost is equal to marginal revenue. This is because failure to produce a unit
whose incremental cost was less than the incremental revenue that its sale would
bring, would not be consistent with the purpose of maximising profit. Similarly, it
would not maximise profits to produce an additional unit where the incremental
cost of production was more than the incremental return to revenue that its sale
would bring.
If, for simplicitys sake, we assume that the marginal cost (and therefore the average
variable cost) for a particular product is constant, then we might see a situation such
as that represented in Figure 9 (below). The firm, under imperfect competition, will
wish to maximise its profits and therefore produce quantity Q, the quantity that corresponds to the intersection of the marginal revenue (MR) and marginal cost (MC)
curves. It will sell the goods at price P, dictated by the incidence of line q with the
demand curve (D). The total (gross) revenue is the area of the grey shaded rectangle
formed by lines p, q and the axes (ie the price per unit multiplied by the number of
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units produced). The total cost of production will be the average total cost per unit
(the average variable cost plus the average fixed cost) at quantity Q multiplied by Q
(i.e. the area of the hatched rectangle formed by MC, q and the axes in our example).
If the point at which Q intersects the demand curve is above the average total cost
curve then profit will be earned; if it is below it, a loss will be sustained; and if on the
curve, then normal returns to capital will be experienced. Production at point Q (corresponding to the intersection of MC and MR) will maximise any profit or minimise
any losses; production at any other level will be sub-optimal.
P
p
MC = AVC
D
q
0
MR
Q/t
Figure 9: Maximising Profit
Under perfect competition, on the other hand, the price will be driven down to
the opportunity cost; as if the price charged is higher other sellers will be attracted
to the market. Their production will add to the current total production and, due to
the downward slope of the demand curve, this increase in quantity will lead to a
lowering of price until it reaches its minimum level. The opportunity cost of the
resources used to produce a unit of product will dictate the minimum price for that
product, as below that price the bidder would have lost out to the next best use.
Where the product in question is a free good the marginal cost will be zero and
therefore the optimal price (to maximise use) will also be zero.
Where one-person controls the entire supply of goods, ie where there is a monopoly, the monopolist can dictate the quantity produced in order to maximise profits.
As a consequence, production will be less than under competitive conditions. This
means that there will be an under-utilisation of the resources associated with the
production of the goodsas more units of product could be produced at a cost that
is less than the consumer would be willing to pay for them. The price that the producer charges for each unit will still be dictated by the demand curve; however, the
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monopoly price will be more than the competitive price for obvious reasons.
Therefore, society will be charged more for the goods than they would under competitive conditions. This will mean that some consumers will satisfy their desire for
the monopolised goods (for example, apples) by switching to overall less desirable
products (pears), as the high monopoly price of the apples makes pears more desirable.
The effect of monopoly on the supply of a product can be seen in Figure 10
(below). In the absence of monopoly, competition will push the price charged for the
goods down to the marginal cost of their production (ie to Pc for simplicity it is
assumed that marginal cost is constant and that there are no fixed costs, thus, marginal cost equals average total cost). Therefore, production will be at Qc, as this is the
point at which the demand curve for the product and the marginal cost curve intersect.7 If the supply of the product is monopolised, however, the monopolist will be
unencumbered by competition and will be able to set production at a point that
maximises profit (price Pm and quantity Qm in Figure 10). The high price causes
some consumers to substitute to other products. Where these goods cost more to
produce than the monopolised goods, this added cost is a waste to society. The cost
of moving from perfect competition to monopolistic price is approximated by the
shaded triangle marked DW (deadweight loss) in Figure 10. The deadweight loss
associated with monopoly can be simply defined as the welfare loss suffered by those
who stop buying the [preferred] product [which] is not off-set by any gain to the
seller.8 In addition, the restriction on supply will mean that there is a possible underutilisation of resources associated with the production of the product.
Pm
MC = ATC
DW
Pc
MR
Qm
Qc
Q/t
See the foregoing discussion for an explanation of why competition has this effect.
Corones, Restrictive Trade Practices Law (North Ryde (NSW), Law Book Co, 1994) at 5. Quoted from
Loughlan,Patents: Breaking into the Loop (1998) 20 Sydney Law Review 553 at 565.
8
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131
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pull at their purse-strings at the mere mention of the name. The effects of censure
and denunciation in the sphere of criminal law are well known,10 the susceptibility
of the trade mark to tarnishing is also widely acknowledged,11 however the detrimental effect of calling a patent a monopoly is often overlooked. Classification is
important:
[The] question whether a patent privilege is a monopoly is not a mere question of words.
It is the point of departure for two distinct theories, under whose influence courts and legislatures may be led to widely different conclusions as to the dividing line between the
rights to be conceded to inventors and those to be reserved to the public.12
As the late Giles Rich, one of the authors of the United States Patent Act of 1952
and respected patent judge, stated: The tendency is to call a patent monopoly
when it is to be invalidated or restricted and to say it is not a monopoly when it is
held to be valid and infringed.13 However perhaps more importantly, if the patent
cannot be said to be a monopoly, then the traditional economic modelling of the
system may have to be reconsidered as it is predicated upon the assumption that the
patent holder will face a downward sloping demand curve.
To what extent, therefore, may a patent be called a monopoly? The Shorter Oxford
English Dictionary defines monopoly as:
Exclusive possession of the trade in some article of merchandise; the condition of having
no competitor in the sale of some commodity, or in the exercise of some trade or business;
or,
An exclusive privilege (conferred by the sovereign or the state) of selling some commodity
or trading with a particular place or country.14
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133
reliance on the pedantry of definition can cloud the issue. Indeed, it is perfectly possible to prove a patent to be what . . . [you] want by selection of the proper
authority .18
Whatever its definition, it is clear that the monopoly effects of a patent will vary
from invention to invention. Indeed, they will vary from definition to definition,
but for any particular definition it is possible to imagine situations in which total
exclusion will be effected. A popular example is where there is only one drug with
which to treat a particular disease, in such a case there is usually no substitute product. However, this situation will be rare, not least because if there is a large enough
profit to be made other producers will be attracted in an attempt to invent around
the patent. Where the monopoly effects of the grant are strong the scope of the
exclusion will therefore become of paramount importance. In other situations such
effects will be less severe, as there will be effective substitutes that expose the patentee to price pressure. But again the scope of the grant will be critical, as it will dictate the proximity of any new competition.
The breadth of protection that a patent offers is necessarily affected by the perception of the grant as a monopoly, with focus upon the exclusionary characteristics
that it provides; therefore the degree of monopolisation is contingent upon ultimate
recognition of the patent as a good or bad use of monopoly power. Loughlan sums
up the issue succinctly when she states that Patents are rapidly becoming one of the
defining characteristics of the market economies of contemporary capitalism and
yet their inherent nature as an economic monopoly seems to defy the very ideology
of competition which constitutes and drives those market economies.19 She continues, quoting Kastriner, Chief Patent Counsel at the time for Union Carbide
Industrial Gases, Inc: [o]nce the public misperception of patents changed from
anti-competitive monopolies to useful stimulants for creativity and economic
growth the patent system was revived to an extent.20 Again we see perception of the
grant being identified as having significant influence over the efficacy of the system
in pursuing its goals. Just as in the nineteenth century, public faith in the patent is
now seen to offer its own stimulus to the use that is made of the system and so may
be held partly responsible for fulfilling its justificatory role.
In America, Dam21 notes that the patent as monopoly argument showed up frequently in antitrust cases in the period spanning from the 1930s to the mid-1980s,
and was accompanied by a tangible enmity towards patents. He states that if hostility had been limited to antitrust cases, it might not have been so serious, however,
the same anti-monopolistic sentiment was to be found in patent validity cases as
well.22
18
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In his discussion of the patent grant, Rich notes the symbolic potency of the
monopoly nametagto talk of the patent monopoly weds patents to prejudice23but accepts that monopolistic power is the engine of the patent system.24
He reasons that monopoly does not have the capacity to be good or bad, it is simply
a power that can be put to good or bad uses. Therefore, in much the same way as
Coke distinguished odious from unobjectionable grants in his commentary on the
Jacobean Statute,25 Rich separates monopolies into two categories. First are those in
which the use of the monopoly power takes something from the public that they
previously enjoyed unrestricted access to. Here the individual has gained at the publics expense and therefore the monopoly is odious in the manner traditionally
understood. The second category concerns things that never belonged to the public, even before the creation of the monopoly. To these there can be no objection.
Whereas Coke interpreted monopoly to exclude patents, Rich simply states that
patents, due to the criteria that need to be satisfied in order to obtain the grant (ie
that the invention must be novel and inventive), necessarily fall into the category of
legitimate use of monopoly power. In other words, until the patentee invented it the
invention did not exist and Unless the grant of a patent gives some kind of economic power to the patentee that he or she would not otherwise have, the patent
system would not work.26
Thus stated, the patent grant can be said to confer monopoly privilege on the
right-holder, but this does not necessarily lead to a de facto monopoly. Indeed, it is
wrong to assume that protection from imitation and the ability to collect supracompetitive rent necessarily means that the patent owner is placed in a position of
significant market power at all. Figures could be taken from any of the worlds
Patent Offices to provide clear illustration of this: taking the European Patent Office
as an example, in 2004 it received almost 180,000 applications, which resulted in the
grant of 58,730 patents.27 It would be utter madness to state that this means almost
59,000 markets have been monopolised. Indeed it is unlikely that any one of these
patents has provided, or will provide, its owner with a single monopoly in any market.28 A television advertisement for a Dyson vacuum cleaner that was aired in the
summer of 2000 boasted that the machine was protected by no less than 156
patents, yet Dyson, despite its best attempts, does not have a monopoly of the vacuum cleaner market.
of a privilege of exacting tolls from the public . . . The Constitution never sanctioned the patenting of
gadgets . . . The fact that a patent as flimsy and as spurious as this one has to be brought all the way to this
Court to be declared invalid dramatically illustrates how far our patent system frequently departs from
the constitutional standards which are supposed to govern.
23
Rich, n 12, above, at 239.
24
Ibid, at 252.
25
See Coke, Part III of the Institutes of the Laws of England (London, Clarke & Sons, 1817; reprint) at
184. See also, text accompanying n 113 in ch. 2, above.
26
Rich, n 12, above, at 251.
27
See http://annual-report.european-patent-office.org/facts_figures/_pdf/facts_figures_05.pdf. The
actual number of applications in 2004 was 178,579.
28
See Dam, n 21, above, at 250 for a similar conclusion utilising figures for the US.
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135
The best that a patent can hope to provide is an increased economic rent for its
owner, and this is not in itself objectionable. There are, for example, many instances
of natural supra-competitive rents flowing from such things as real estate location,
artistic or sporting talent, etc29 that demonstrate this effect. However, it is clear that
the distaste which is displayed for the increased rent resulting from the patent grant
is inextricably tied to the misconception of the patent as a monopoly.
Therefore, to summarise, the presence of a patent creates property in an invention as it imposes an artificial scarcity on the knowledge resource required for its
operation. Terming the patent grant a monopoly does little to aid any analysis of the
system; rather it engenders distaste and breeds distrust. The patent cannot
accurately be described as a legal monopoly, although it does create and confer
monopoly power. The use of this power is legitimate as nothing is taken from the
public that it had previously enjoyed full access to, indeed, before the invention was
made the subject matter of the patent was not in existence. Moreover, very few
patents will ever give control of any particular market; competition from other
sources, products, and processes operate to erode any monopolistic exclusionary
effects that an individual grant may provide. The essential point, as Epstein clearly
notes, is that: when you have monopolies that are close substitutes to one another,
in practice, you have a competitive market with strong property rights.30 However,
monopolyphobia clouds the issue and the arguments for and against the system.
Therefore, with this in mind, and having already considered some of the early economic and philosophical arguments for the patent system, we turn our attention to
discuss the modern economic theory and consider some of the determinants of
patent value in the market economy. This discussion necessarily involves consideration of the scope of the patent grant and the various theories that have been
advanced to attempt to model the system.
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who actually use the invention, etc. However, the point is made; the inventive/innovative system sometimes needs stimulusa concession that, in itself, provided one
of the justifications for patents.36
The classical economic and philosophical rationales of the patent system are,
however, unsubtle. The arguments advanced in the anti-patent debate are essentially binary in their approach; the patent system either is, or is not, justified on
balance. Yet [p]atents, once established in principle, can either be too broad or too
narrow.37 Early economic treatment of the grant makes no attempt to objectively
criticise the scope of the system and to try to re-model it, refining the protection that
it affords in order to maximise benefit and minimise loss. In other words, under
such classical economic theory there was little or no consideration of variables that
could affect the balance; the question of the strength/scope of the grant, for
instance, was left open. This narrow approach can be attributed to a combination of
factors, including the relative infancy of economic reasoning, the nature of the
debate and the stigmatic association with monopoly, and the changing face of
industry. The rationale behind this observation is not, however, of primary importance to our discussion; it is sufficient to note that a line can be drawn at the beginning of the twentieth century between the classical and post-classical theories.
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41
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not.45 Eisenberg explains this point succinctly when discussing the function of the
non-obviousness standard in patent law. She states that:
patents are unnecessary to bring about mundane improvements that are within easy reach
of those working in the field, but may be needed to motivate inventors to pursue the
nonobvious advances that require something beyond routine work.46
However, as Oddi points out, no means are provided for eliminating the
economic costs associating with inventions that can satisfy the nonobviousness
standard but still would have been invented without a patent system.47 Oddis discussion is directed at the traditional patent-induced invention theory and does not
directly address the wider issues that arise from a post-Schumpeterian analysis
where innovation, and not invention, is the key. Here the patent acts as a means of
directly protecting the investment that has been made in order to get the invention
to the public: but-for the prospect of a patent the money would not have been put
into the research that resulted in the invention, or the invention would not have
been brought to the market. Concentration on investment removes some of the
problems that are apparent under the traditional theory. For example, where an
invention is serendipitous or accidental, it cannot be said that the prospect of a
patent induced it. However, investment is essentially proactive: whereas creation
can be the result of luck or chance, investment cannot. Therefore, by adding another
stage to the analysis, and stating that the process of technological growth is dependent upon innovation (which itself produces invention), protection for all but the
market-induced innovation and the trivial invention can be justified.
It will be noted that this still leaves the problem of identifying the non-patent
induced innovation. In a highly influential study, Scherer developed a categorisation of inventions based on a cost/benefit investment analysis and used this to establish whether, in any given category, the patent was needed to induce that investment,
thereby drawing invention and innovation together.48 This topology of inventions49 provides the apparatus required to solve the patent-induced problem and,
in addition, enables further comparison between groups.
Scherers categorisation proceeds along the following lines.50 First there are those
inventions that can be described as revolutionary, ie those that may be defined
as producing a genuine revolution in consumption or production.51 For these inventions, which are classified as having an uncertain benefit-to-cost ratio, the patent
45
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system provides a necessary incentive, as it is likely that they would not be forthcoming, or would be seriously delayed, without it. The second class contains inventions
with a high benefit-to-cost ratio. This category includes those resulting from accident,
serendipity, or chance. These inventions cam be classified as non-patent-induced, as
there is a high probability that they would be created even in the absence of a patent
system. These are often termed market-induced; clearly they may currently still be the
subject of patent protection, but it would be incorrect to state that this was the driving
force in their creation. Third is the invention with a low benefit-to-cost ratio. This subset includes inventions characterised by high development costs compared to the rent
that they could support under favourable pricing conditions and inventions that are
developed in an industry where there is a high degree of competition. In such cases the
patent system can be said to be necessary for the production of the invention, as without its protection they would be relatively easily copied by others and there would
therefore be little other incentive to produce them.52
Questions of Scope
Justification for patent protection per se is only the first step in any analysis,
however, for once the decision to have patents is made, or the need for patents
highlighted, the next step is to determine their scope. Scherers topology of invention is, again, helpful in this area as it enables restriction of the inventive field and
establishes orderly points for comparison between the different theories that are to
be advanced.
For revolutionary inventions, the scope of protection suggested by the patentinduced theory is necessarily broad. The sine qua non of these creations must, due
to their uncertain cost to benefit ratio, be the patent system. Market factors alone
would not be sufficient to justify entities investing the amount of time, effort and
money that creation of a spectacular technical contribution would require. Broad
protection for these inventions is, therefore, justified; for as Schumpeter demonstrated, such revolutionary creations are an important driving force behind
economic growth.53 This point is easily accepted today, but it is clear that it took a
number of influential empirical studies, including those of Abramowitz54 and
Solow55 to make economists fully aware of the link between innovation, technological progress and economic growth.56
52
See Scherer, Market Structure, ibid, at 447. Also Oddi,Holy Grail, ibid., at 279.
The link between innovation and economic growth was one of the revolutionary points made in
Schumpeters Theory of Economic Development, n 38, above. Studies following on from Schumpeters
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York, Harper & Row, 1942) investigated and refined his
hypothesis that monopoly and large firms are inherently conducive to innovation.
54 Abramowitz, Resource and Output Trends in the United States Since 1870 (1956) 46 American
Economic Review 5.
55 Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function (1957) 39 Review of Economics
and Statistics 312.
56 These two studies are originally sourced from Takalo, Essays on the Economics of Intellectual
Property Protection, an academic dissertation presented to the University of Helsinki and available online
53
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For the second and third of Scherers categories (the high benefit/cost and the low
benefit/cost inventions) the patent-induced theory would predict narrow scope.
For the former this is because the theory posits that the incentive should not extend
further than is necessary to induce the invention. Therefore, as non-patent factors
would probably be sufficient to procure an invention with a high benefit-to-cost
ratio any extra incentive is over-kill. For inventions with a low benefit-to-cost ratio,
on the other hand, broad scope would reduce the incentive for others to make
improvements and would also restrict the use that could be made of the invention,
thereby increasing the costs associated with the patent grant.
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dont have a clue how innovation works (emphasis added),60 and the same can be
said of invention itself. The mysteries of the innovative and inventive processes are
compounded by the fact that they differ so greatly across individuals, industries and
firm sizes. Serendipity also has its own role to play. Therefore, the factors that drive
the process in one enterprise are not guaranteed to work as a model for all. Added to
this conundrum is the fact that there is evidence that stretches back to Brunels comments before the 1851 Select Committee61 that patents may, in certain cases, act to
inhibit innovation rather than encourage it.62
Further, Ko observes that the entire patent-induced theory rests on the dubious
assumption that the invention would not exist but for the efforts of the inventor
who patented it.63 This is a strong point of contention for those commentators that
subscribe to the social evolution theory of invention. This theory is based on the
premise that invention will occur, with or without patents, when the state of basic
knowledge and other social conditions are ripe.64 If this is the case, or even if there
is duplicative research in the area of the invention, then the correctness of granting
a patent to the first inventor must be questioned.
In addition, the patent-induced theory is very simplistic. Oddi puts this criticism
clearly when he notes that: The only conclusion that can be drawn from the theory
is that if patents were restricted to those inventions that are, in fact, induced by the
patent system, then a net benefit would accrue to society.65 Whilst in one sense this
is unobjectionable as a general aim of the system, it is far from rigorous as a justificationespecially when the reality of the patenting process is considered. The simple truth is that the system is not that particular; if it is presented with a creation that
fulfils the definition of an invention, is new, non-obvious and capable of industrial
application, then a patent will be forthcoming whether that creation was induced,
serendipitous, or whatever. Moreover, the theory takes no account of the benefit or
hindrance that the patent might give to future generations of inventions. It is to this
topic that we now divert our attention.
60 See Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital (2000) 4 Journal of Small and
Emerging Business Law 137, at 139.
61 That he could hardly introduce the slightest improvement in [his own] machinery without being
stopped by a patent. See Report and Minutes of Evidence taken before the Select Committee of the House of
Lords Appointed to Consider of the Bill, intituled, An Act to further amend the Law touching Letters Patent
for Inventions and also of the Bill, intituled, An Act for the further Amendment of the Law touching Letters
Patent for Inventions and to report thereon to the House, (Report of the 1851 Select Committee on Patents)
House of Commons Sessional Papers, Vol XVIII, 1851 (Command Paper No 486), at 248.
62 See further, the discussion in Jaffe & Lerner, The Dark Side of Patents in Innovation and its
Discontents (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2004), ch 2; also Heller & Eisenberg, Can Patents
Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research (1998) 280 Science 698.
63 Ko,An Economic Analysis of Biotechnology Patent Protection (1992) 102 Yale Law Journal 777 at
792.
64 See, Ko, ibid, at n 105 in his text. Also, for an interesting aside on the process of creative thought see
Koestler, The Act of Creation, (London, Hutchinson, 1976; 2nd (Danube) Ed).
65 Oddi,Holy Grail, n 47, above, at 281.
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in that area.73 The fact that only one of the competing firms can be awarded a patent
on the invention means that the funds that the others diverted to the race are effectively squandered.
This position is further complicated by the fact that the social value of the primary
invention will also include the boost that it gives to subsequent innovators. The signalling potential of the patent is something that is close to the core of Grady and
Alexanders rent-dissipation theory, discussed below.74 However, for now it is sufficient to note that the extra social value added to the primary innovation by its signalling potential can fall into one of at least three broad groups.75 The first occurs
where the second generation is reliant upon the first for its existenceie the second
generation could not have been developed without the first. Here the primary innovations value to society includes the incremental increase in social surplus added by the
second-generation innovation. The second category encompasses situations in
which the first innovation reduces the costs associated with the second innovation,
i.e. the costs of production or of achieving the second-generation. This cost reduction
is an additional benefit of the primary innovation, and is added to its social surplus.
The final category includes the added-value of obtaining the second-generation
more rapidly if the primary innovation accelerates the process of its creation.
The additional benefits created by one generation of technology in respect of the
next are often overlooked in the patent literature. It is easy to see why this is the case
when the potential permutations and leads offered by any given piece of new technology are considered.76 However, this oversight provides one of the main criticisms of the existing patent theories. Put plainly: There are no simple conclusions
to draw about the optimal breadth of patents.77 Prior agreements and licences of
technology make the situation even more complicated as they enable circumvention of the potential blocking effects of earlier rights.78 Furthermore, the breadth of
any given bundle of patent rights must be dictated by the observable aspects of the
patented technology (ie the external view of the patent), and not prior expectations
regarding technological outcomes and costs of research.79 Because the efficacy, or
attractiveness, of incentives offered necessarily involves a consideration of the
73 This is especially pertinent if the real cost of achieving the invention is far less than the market value
of the patent. See Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants, n 66, above, at 31; see also Loury,
Market Structure and Innovation(1979) 93 Quarterly Journal of Economics 395. In addition, see the criticisms of the prospect theory set out in text accompanying n 101 et seq, below.
74 See text accompanying n 157 et seq below.
75 These three groups are given in Scotchmer,Standing on the Shoulders of Giants, n 66, above, at 31.
The remainder of the paragraph is extensively based on her work.
76 This said, developments in patent mapping software that allows detailed investigation of the landscape in which a patent operates and has influence are beginning to have an impact on the manner in
which the patents zone of influence is understood. Although it should be noted that interpreting these
patent maps meaningfully and relating them to the economic breadth of individual patents is still an
impossible task.
77 Scotchmer,Standing on the Shoulders of Giants, n 66, above, at 37.
78 On the issue of blocking patents see, eg, Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining
Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents (1994) 62 Tennessee Law Review 75. Also see Rai, n 69, above.
79 Scotchmer,Standing on the Shoulders of Giants, n 66, above, at 38.
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inside of the grant (ie a cost/benefit analysis of the value of the invention compared
to the cost of the research and the probability of success), the effectiveness of the
patent system in protecting incentives is greatly restricted.
One further consequence of the cumulative nature of innovation is that the scope
of the patent right will also effectively determine its duration. Schumpeters process
of creative destruction, whereby competition comes from new and improved
inventions, means that a broader patent will have a longer effective life, as the period
of time before it is surpassed by competing technology is extended. It should be
noted that this will only be the case where the second-generation product is in competition for the same subset of the consuming public as the first. If the situation is
otherwise, for example if the new technology serves a different market, then the life
may be independent of breadth.80
Therefore, it is clear to see that patent policy is a very blunt instrument trying to
solve a very delicate problem.81 Up to this point we have been considering the
patent grant in terms of the single innovation without really focussing on the
impact that it will have on the downstream incentives to innovate. This competition
between the static and dynamic effects of the patent system is something that has
troubled many, but has been glossed over by most. For example, as recently as the
early 1990s, both Klemperer82 and Gilbert and Shapiro83 created economic models
for optimal patent scope that did not consider the problems of cumulative innovation. This is somewhat surprising, since in 1977 a theory was first advanced
that looked at the benefits that could accrue from granting broad primary patents
to co-ordinate downstream research. It is to this theory that we now direct our
attention.
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in a technological prospect after the property right has been granted.86 It therefore
promotes efficiency in the development of each prospect as it publicly awards an
exclusive right in that prospect shortly after its discovery, thus placing it firmly, and
clearly, under the control of one entity, which can manage all subsequent development. This enables the holder to co-ordinate further investment in the enhancement and exploitation of the prospect and thus ensures that duplicative investment
is avoided.87 As such, Kitch likens it to the US mineral claims system.
Kitch takes three features of the patent system and uses them as illustrations to
justify the importance of the prospect function in its US embodiment; all are, to a
greater or lesser extent, also applicable to the British system. The first feature that he
highlights is that the scope that is awarded to patent claims is a scope that reaches
well beyond what the reward function would require, often exceeding the contribution of the inventor.88 The second feature concerns the fact that the system encourages early filing and hence early claiming (whether or not a valuable reward has
been found), thus emphasising the prospective nature of the grant. Kitchs third
observation centres on the fact that there are many patents that have been granted
for inventions long before their commercial application became possible, making
recovery of any reward difficult as the patent may expire before the invention is
worth much. He notes that all three points have played an important role in the
antipatent arguments so recurrent in the economics literature, for each is troublesome under the reward theory.89
In developing his theory, Kitch questions the applicability of the traditional
downward sloping demand curve to the patented product, suggesting that, as
[m]any patents face competition from other processes or products, the slope will
vary from case to case.90 However, the implication is clearly that the demand curve
should be substantially horizontal; a point that is reiterated in later work.91
Kitch examines the benefits, or public welfare effects, of a system that offers both
trade secrecy and patent protection, and compares it to a system that only protects
secrets.92 He notes seven distinct advantages that the former holds over this alternative. These include: increased efficiency with which investment in innovation can be
managed; a lowering of the costs of contracting with other firms for complementary information and resources;93 reduction of the amount of duplicative research;
86 Duffy,Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents (2004) 71 University of Chicago Law Review 439,
at 440.
87 Kitch,Nature and Function, n 59, above, at 276.
88 Ibid, at 267. It will be recalled that the traditional reward theory seeks to reward inventive effort
and therefore does not justify patent protection for serendipitous or accidental inventions. See further,
text accompanying n 53 et seq in ch 3, above.
89 Kitch,Nature and Function, n 59, above, at 267-8.
90 Ibid, at 274.
91 See Kitch,Patents: Monopolies or Property Rights? (1986) 8 Research in Law & Economics 31.
92 Kitch reasonably assumes that a system without trade secrecy as an alternative to patent protection
is an impossibility absent the most draconian and costly measures. Ibid, at 275. For a discussion of the
business decisions that are involved in choosing between trade secrecy and patent protection see
Beckerman-Rodau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade Secret Protection: A Legal and
Business Decision (2002) 84 JPTOS 371.
93 As no obligation of secrecy needs to be imposed the discussions can be conducted in the open.
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147
For a complete list of Kitchs benefits see Kitch,Nature and Function, n 59, above, at 27580.
Ibid, at 275.
Ibid, at 284.
See Barzel,Optimal Timing of Innovations (1968) 50 Review of Economics & Statistics 348.
Ibid, at 352.
Kitch,Nature and Function, n 59, above, at 266.
Ibid, at 276.
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149
concludes, Kitchs article can be faulted for failing to explain precisely how a
prospect patent holder can control and coordinate further development given this
defect.112
In addition, Kitchs assumption of a horizontal demand curve is not one that
finds much support amongst commentators; Scherer, in particular, expresses
extreme discomfort with the notion.113
Merges and Nelson, in advancing their own theory of patent protection,114 dismiss the prospect theory and argue that elimination of rivalry, a goal so close to the
core of Kitchs propositions, leads to inactivity and complacency as it diminishes
the threatened costs of inaction.115 They state that practice shows that co-ordinated
development is not better than rivalrous, and note that there are many instances
when a firm that thought it had control over a broad technology rested on its laurels
until jogged into action by an outside threat.116 Scherer also takes issue with Kitchs
view of the inventing around problem that is created by the development of broad
prospects, stating that it seems little influenced by any concern for reality.117
Furthermore, given that it is not possible to know for sure what possible inventions are in the technological pool, as multifarious parties are likely to view the
prospects differently, Merges and Nelson argue that Kitchs attempts to model in
order to prevent wasteful overexploitation of the inventive prospect are misplaced.
The real danger is not, they insist, from overexploitation, but rather from underutilisation of the prospect post-grant.118 This last criticism is especially pertinent when
the implications for patent scope that flow from the prospect theory are considered.
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patent right would be especially important for those inventions that could be
defined as revolutionary, and therefore of uncertain cost to benefit ratio according
to Scherers topology.119 For such creations the co-ordinating benefit of a broad
scope, enabling control of improvements, would be great as it would offset a degree
of uncertainty surrounding the accrual of the inventions benefits.
Ko claims that the prospect theory finds a certain degree of support in US patent
law through the application of the doctrine of equivalents, although co-ordination
of future research has never been explicitly stated as one of the justifications of the
doctrine.120 As noted, Kitchs model would seem to support increases in scope being
awarded to pioneer inventions over mere improvements,121 the degree of
co-ordination possible for major advances being significantly greater than that
applicable for incremental ones. However, this conclusion seemingly exposes
inconsistencies in Kitchs internal reasoning and raises questions concerning its
application to decided cases. As Grady and Alexander state: under the prospect theory the scope of the rights given to each inventor of a substantially new invention
should be much the same, regardless of how many other inventors might be
tempted to develop and exploit improvements.122 The prospect granted would be a
right to exploit the inventive area around the invention, and with Kitchs test of substantial novelty rather than obviousness governing the grant of the patent, mere
improvements would not, in general, be patentable. Moreover, Beck observes that
the Patent Office and the courts have usually avoided granting wide prospects.123
Furthermore, specific problems with the application of the prospect theory arise
in areas such as biotechnology where unpredictability confounds its central notion
of co-ordination.124 The uncertain nature of some experiments carried out in the
field renders predictability, and therefore co-ordination gains, most vague.125 If
gains are low then the impediments to creativity that a broad prospect entails will
probably outweigh them. This may provide one possible explanation of the fact that
small, independent, firms and not corporate monsters, can be seen to drive the
biotech industry, in contrast to other areas such as traditional pharmaceutical
research where size is an important factor.126 If, as another possibility for biotech
119
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patents, direct co-ordination is rejected in preference of wide licensing, so that others develop the patented technology, then the prospect justification for the grant is
removed. This, as Merges and Nelson state, would mean that subsequent development of prospects would proceed in spite of, or at least in indifference to, the broad
patent,127 which cannot have been within Kitchs contemplation. Therefore, clearly
the prospect theory has significant problems matching the reality of the system,
even in the US. This problem is compounded if the system that it is applied to is that
extant in the UK where there is no doctrine of equivalents, only purposive construction, which, at its most liberal, gives only narrow supra-literal protection.128
Thus, having concluded that Kitchs prospect theory is at best limited and at
worst fundamentally flawed, we now turn our attention to a third post-classical
model of patent protectionMerges and Nelsons race-to-invent theory.
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The link between the speed of innovation and their overall number is first
explored in terms of simple economic reasoning.For the same reasons people prefer to have money in hand now, as compared to the same amount (and more,
depending on the interest rate) later, so society prefers to have improvements now,
rather than later.133 And second, by searching for consistency with the goals and
purposes of patent law itself. Thus, the preference for early reduction to practice, the
constant threat of novelty-destroying disclosures, and the priority of the first-to-file
system, all favour early invention.134 Having satisfied themselves that the race-toinvent theory is consistent with both the economics and policy of the system,
Merges and Nelson then use historical case studies to show that technological development has been retarded in industries where broad patent protection was granted
relative to those in which there was significant developmental rivalry.135
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the cost of secrecy can be high or low. If there is perceived to be a benefit to patenting the invention, ie if the costs of the process are outweighed by the benefits that
flow from the grant, then it is more likely to be patented than not. The larger the
benefit, the more likely public disclosure is to follow. The narrower the interpretation of the grant, the less the potential returns and the further the scales tip away
from a decision to patent.
The race-to-invent theorys insistence on narrow protection is therefore both its
greatest strength, as it allows deviation from the classical reward and incentive based
theories (not to mention Kitchs radical approach), and its greatest weakness. To rely
on justification of the system based on a model that does not actually identify with
the majority of decided cases, is also problematic. However, the fundamental problem with Merges and Nelsons theory is their failure to note that narrow grants can
be just as stifling in numbers as can broad protection. Furthermore, the cry that
faster is better is all well and good if it can be demonstrated that what one gets faster
is what one wants, or needs. The race-to-invent theory fails to take into account the
simple fact that a number of innovative activities with uncertain cost to benefit
ratios, that may include pharmaceutical inventions as well as Scherers pioneering
breakthroughs, rely on large rewards to compensate for the large outlays and gambles that are responsible for their creation. For, just as Kitch notes that the patent
system cannot be viewed in isolation from other intellectual property rights when
considering incentives to innovate,156 the process of investing in R&D cannot be
considered on an innovation by innovation basis, as the bill for failures has to be
picked up somewhere. Narrow protection, whilst perhaps individually justifiable,
does not necessarily work on a wider economic and social basis. Thus, having noted
some of the disadvantages of narrow patents arising from the race-to-invent theory,
we now turn our attention to the fourth of the post-classical models of the patent
system, Grady and Alexanders Rent Dissipation Theory.
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theory is therefore born out of dissatisfaction with the traditional view of patent
protection as a trade-off between offering these incentives to innovate, and encouraging hopeful inventors to squander useful, and valuable, resources in a race to win
patent protection.
Grady and Alexander also express disquiet with Merges and Nelsons proposal for
narrow patent protection; although never expressly condemning (or even mentioning) the others work by name they state that such a system would punish the bold
and reward the fussy.159 Equally, Kitchs prospect theory comes under fire; in
awarding full control to the inventor who is first, the costs of developing dreams
that ultimately fail would equal or exceed the benefit to society of those that
succeed.160
An alternative theory upon which to model the patent system is therefore suggested in which the desire to limit rent dissipation explains how actual patent cases
are decided.161 As noted, rent is accrued by calculating the difference between what
society would pay for the invention (based on its utility) and the costs of its development. This rent is paid by way of monopoly right;otherwise competition by imitators would discourage innovation by making it unprofitable.162 However, the
desire for monopoly power carries with it an inherent disadvantage in that it
attracts redundant and wasteful investment in a bid to gain protection for, or to
improve upon, the technology. The benefit to society is therefore reduced by what
Grady and Alexander term rent dissipation. Three types of rent dissipation are thus
identified that occur at different stages in the process of innovation.
The first arises in the rush for the original monopoly, for only one can receive the
prize.163 The second occurs in the race to improve upon the patented technology
where the patent may signal the way to improvements and thus create wasteful
competition in developing those prospects.164 Third is the rent dissipated where
the inventor invests in protecting the secrecy of an inventionie where the
expected returns from a patent are not sufficiently attractive to persuade the inventor to make their invention public. The system is optimised where these rent dissipations are minimised, so that social benefit is at a maximum.
Grady and Alexander remain agnostic about whether patent rewards are a good
idea. Rather, they believe that the courts have found ways of minimizing the
problem that patents create.165 In other words, they contend that the patent system
seeks to discourage wasteful activities contributing little or nothing to social welfare.166 The rent dissipation theory is, therefore, their attempt to understand and
159
Ibid, at 307.
Ibid, at 308.
161 Ibid.
162 Ibid.
163 The reader will appreciate that this is a criticism concomitant with the prospect theory, above.
164 Prospect is this authors addition. This second type of rent dissipation is what Kitchs prospect
theory was aimed at preventing. See text accompanying n 84 et seq, above.
165 Grady & Alexander, n 37, above, at 30910.
166 Merges,Rent Control in the Patent District: Observations on the Grady-Alexander Thesis (1992)
78 Virginia Law Review 359 (Merges,Rent Control in the Patent District) at 360.
160
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rationalise the glosses and policies that the courts utilise to lead them to good
results.167 It is a positive theory of cases interpreting the patent statute as itexists
[sic] and therefore is not directly concerned with justifying the system per se.
However, they note that by minimising the third kind of rent dissipation (that associated with secrecy), implicit justification may be found as it necessarily removes
some of the need to keep the invention secret.
The novelty (or as one commentator put it, the genius168) of Grady and
Alexanders approach is the ability to distinguish between (a) rents promised by
pioneer inventions, and (b) rents arising from follow-on improvements, signaled
by the initial discovery at the time that the discovery is patented.169 As we shall see,
this facet of the theory has significant repercussions for the analysis of patent scope.
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patent. In this respect it is the antithesis of Kitchs prospect theory. Further, for
inventions that provide elegant, unimprovable, solutions to technical problems, the
theory would predict even narrower protection. This causes significant problems
for, as one commentator notes:Applying rent dissipation theory would result in the
ultimate disincentive for investing in the creation of elegant (basic/revolutionary/
pioneer) inventions generally considered the most valuable to society.174 A significant subset of these inventions, ie those where the return to investment in the R&D
process is most uncertain, are those that would traditionally be considered to be
most in need of patent protection in the first place.
The implicit assumption made by Grady and Alexander in connection with the
aforementioned criticism is that all rent dissipation is bad. However, as Oddi notes,
it is far from clear that this is the case.175 For example, it is often stated that the fear
of competition is one of the factors that spurs on innovation in the first place.176
Grady and Alexanders choice of authority to back up their arguments is also a
cause of concern for some. Merges notes that it is only in retrospect that the theory
explains the outcomes; indeed, this is all that the authors lay claim to. However, the
important point to note is that the doctrine under which the cases were decided has
evolved over time and, in addition, slight variation in facts may have led to different
outcomes completely independently of the degree of rent dissipation.177
Further, despite claiming that it seems to explain actual patent rulings better
than the tests and rules applied by the courts,178 the rent dissipation theory has been
heavily criticised on the basis that application to actual patent cases is difficult. The
fact that the technological signalling potential of an invention is the determining
factor in their analysis is the major cause of this complaint. Martin, for example,
doubts whether it is possible to know when an invention signals improvement and
when it does not: What if improvements were signalled but had not yet occurred
when an infringement claim is brought?179 There is no guidance as to the amount
of time that is allowed to pass before the signalling assessment is satisfied. If an
invention is created that is currently the most elegant solution to a problem and
therefore unimprovable, the rent dissipation theory would suggest that no patent
should be granted. However, the invention may only begin to be understood as signalling when future technological advances catch-up with itdoes this mean that
it is less deserving of patent protection now?
Grady and Alexander provide no specific criteria and only a few examples180 to
aid in the interpretation of this core provision of their model. Indeed, they themselves state that [t]o some extent, assessing an inventions technological signal
requires guesswork on the part of judges. However, they stress that [t]he need for
174
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judicial clairvoyance is . . . reduced by the time that inevitably lapses between Patent
Office action and litigation involving the validity of that action.181 This is far from
sound as an explanation of the shortcoming, primarily as it introduces a degree of
hindsight into the analysis, which the British courts, especially, are keen to caution
against.182
Indeed, it is apparent that Grady and Alexander give very few hard guidelines
concerning the application of their theory at all. The balancing act between the
benefits and costs associated with granting a patent on a particular invention, for
example, remains somewhat of a black art. An unfortunate effect that flows from
this is that the theory suffers from a lack of objective reproducibility and capacity
for verification. As Oddi cautions, while the same degree of scientific verifiability
[as a unified theory in physics] cannot be expected of economic theory, methodological rigor may not be ignored.183 Richs comments on the patent as monopoly
arguments, therefore, seem equally apt when considering this theory: You
can prove a patent to be what . . . [you] want by selection of the proper
authority. 184
Recent Alternatives
Despite the failure of Grady and Alexanders theory to adequately explain or model
the patent system, a closely related conceptthat the patent system is an effective
construct for signalling the successes of innovative endeavour to competitors (and
indeed others)may be seen to be a justification for the grant in its own right. This
thread has been taken up recently, in a variety of subtle guises, by a number of academics and would, in many cases, appear to fit the empirical data rather better than
those theories hitherto discussed.
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on reward, then some degree of proportionality between inventive effort and remuneration, or economic value, should be expected.186 Yet as Penrose explains,187 the
very concept of the value of an invention is paradoxical. If value is defined in terms
of price, then it relies on scarcity. When there is no scarcity, the concepts of usefulness to society (social value) and economic value are not, in any way, related. With
informational assets (such as inventions) social value is maximised by widespread
use. Indeed, it is wasteful to restrict use.188 Yet limitation, the imposition of scarcity,
is the raison dtre of the patent system. Therefore price, and hence economic value,
is placed upon inventions not because they are scarce but in order to make them
scarce to those who want to use them.189 Neither the merit of the invention, in terms
of social good, nor the efforts of the inventor play any part in the assessment;
serendipity is treated with the same degree of compassion as hard graft as long as the
nebulous concept of an invention is forthcoming. Indeed, any system that
attempted to increase fairness by assessing the merits of each and every creation
would run the risk of introducing unwanted externalities into the process, such as
the risk of abuse, that would paradoxically act to tip the balance in the opposite
direction, making the process biased and unfair.190 So patents are not primarily
rewards. However, evidence would suggest that they are not primarily incentives
either.
If patents are provided solely to encourage investment in R&D, or possibly to
stimulate the inventive process itself, then we would expect to see all grants being
exploited in some manner in order to recoup investments made.191 Yet, the empirical evidence, both in chapter four above, and in broader studies,192 suggests that a
large number of patents must be gained for other purposes, as they remain unused
for their traditional exclusionary role. As Heald notes,the incentive story is further
undermined by the growing consensus that very few patents confer market power
on their owners.193 As noted, the majority of economic models are based on the
traditional discussion of patents outlined in the first part of this chapter. The negatively sloping demand curve indicative of a monopoly is integral to their construction, and yet the patent rarely functions to exclude in this manner. As Merges states,
In the end, IPRs may well have an effect on price, entry and the like. But it will not
be the simple, straightforward effect of creating a monopoly over a discrete product.194 This is hardly rocket-science; competition from alternative technologies
186 As Carvalho states, for great inventions, great patents; for small inventions, small patents.
Carvalho,The Primary Function of Patents [2001] Journal of Law, Technology and Policy 25.
187 Penrose, The Economics of the International Patent System, (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press,
1951), at 289.
188 See the section on Free Goods and Public Goods in ch 3 (text accompanying n 302 therein),
above.
189 Penrose, n 187, above, at 29.
190 On this point see Carvalho, n 186, above, at 312.
191 Whether of time and effort, funds, or a combination of all three.
192 See, eg, Lemley, n 60, above. See also, Taylor & Silberstone, n 56, above, who conclude that the
patent system is not seen as essential in all but a very small number of industries.
193 Heald,A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law (2005) 66 Ohio State Law Journal 473, at 474.
194 Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and the New Institutional Economics (2000) 53 Vanderbilt
Law Review 1857, at 1859.
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(whether products or processes) that do not fall within the patents zone of control
mean that the system will obviously never be as simple as the apples and pears
example given at the beginning of this chapter would suggest. Yet almost the
entirety of economic literature in this area is based on apples and pears.
In addition, if the patent system actually operated solely on the basis of incentives, it would be logical to conclude that invention and innovation would proceed
on the basis of individual cost/benefit analyses. However, the valuation of intellectual assets is a notoriously difficult process, with recent studies concluding that
decision makers often do not rely on patents in appropriating returns on anticipated investments.195 Furthermore, the patent system is only one of an array of
regimes that can protect the fruits of technologically creative endeavour, the main
alternative being trade secrecy. Therefore, as Long notes, we would expect the
rational inventor to only seek patent protection when the expected rents from the
patent outweigh the costs of disclosing the information.196 If this is correct then
under the traditional model where information about the invention is traded for
protection, there should be no worthless (ie securing no rent in the market) or
unexploited patents. Yet it is an undeniable fact that, when the value of intellectual
property rights is framed purely in terms of exclusivity and rents, worthless patents
abound.197 Moreover, the incentive based theories fail to explain high rates of
patenting when the odds of patent conferring market power are . . . very low.198
This does not mean that the patents for protection argument is entirely redundant, but rather that it is an incomplete explanation of the extant system. There will
be occasions, probably a great number, in which the patents zone of exclusion is
critical to the decision to seek protection. In these instances incentives and rewards
will play a large part in the process. However, as we have seen, there are many different motivations for gaining a patent that have little, or nothing, to do with the scope
of protection that the grant provides. These appear, under the traditional theories,
to be simply patents for patents sake. There must, therefore, be some other, incentive/reward-independent, rationale on which to model these decisions that enables
us to explain and justify the system as a whole. Clarissa Longs Patent Signals theory
is the start of this process.199
195 Heald, n 193, above. Heald refers to Hall & Ziedonis,The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical
Study of Patenting in the US Semiconductor Industry, 19791995 (2001) 32 Rand Journal of Economics
101; Cohen, Nelson & Walsh, n 56, above; Allison, et al Valuable Patents (July 2003) George Mason
University Law & Economics, Research Paper Series, No 03-31, UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper
No. 133. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=426020.
196 Long,Patent Signals (2002) 69 University of Chicago Law Review 625, at 626.
197 Ibid. Long refers to Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office (2001) 95 Northwestern Law
Review 1495; Merges As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business
Concepts and Patent System Reform (1999) 14 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 577; Kitch, Property
Rights in Inventions, Writings, and Marks (1990) 13 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 119, in
support of this point.
198 Heald, n 193, above, at 477.
199 See Long, n 196, above.
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163
Patent Signals
In a fundamental departure from preceding theories, Long eschews conventional
notions of the patent system as a trade-off. She explains that:Rather than focussing
on patents as a mechanism for privatizing information, this [theory] . . . instead
frames patents as a means of credibly publicizing information. . . . Under some circumstances, the informational function of patents may be more valuable to the
rights holder than the substance of the rights.200 This notion can certainly be seen
to have some weight if we consider the comments of the patent attorneys interviewed for chapter four, above. As noted there, the patent must be considered as an
item of commerce in its own right. It is sought primarily because there is commercial benefit in doing so, and this may, or may not, have anything to do with
traditional notions of the protection that the grant provides. Put simply, a firm will
patent the results of innovative endeavours where the benefits of symmetric information as between themselves and the rest of the market outweigh the costs associated with revealing that information. Disclosure, the signalling theory suggests,
often carries its own rewards.
There are, according to Long, at least two distinct advantages that patenting holds
over the alternative, trade secrecy. First, By obtaining a patent, firms can credibly
convey information about the invention to observers who otherwise might not be
willing to expend the costs necessary to obtain the information.201 The public
nature of the patent register, combined with the requirement that the specification
be clear and complete enough to teach the person skilled in the art how to perform
the invention,202 provides cheap access to the information required to determine
whether the patent is of interest. Under an alternative system, wherein the invention
is protected by means of secrecy only, the transaction costs to obtain, or allow others to obtain, the same data could be prohibitive. For whilst [c]ontracts can be written to deter opportunistic behavior by the transferor of a trade secret, . . . entering
into protective agreements and policing them raises the cost of the transaction.203
In addition, determination of the legal status of a trade secret is a difficult process.
Clearly the same could be said of the validity of the patent, but secrecy carries additional burdens. Issues of ownership and title, as well as safeguarding post-transfer
partitionin other words, ensuring that the same material is not further divulged
by the vendor to third partiesare much more complicated than simply checking
a states online database.204 However, one of the most important elements of the
signalling effect of patents stems from the fact that market actors believe that the
number of grants a firm holds, irrespective of their individual quality, bears
direct correlation to certain other, favourable, characteristics. The economic literature is thus littered with examples of patent counts being used as a gauge of a firms
200
201
202
203
204
Ibid, at 625.
Ibid, at 636.
See s14(3) PA 1977.
Heald, n 193, above, at 481.
Ibid, at 480.
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innovative activity and productivity.205 In this sense, the patent is a desirable end in
itself. As Lemley explains: Venture capitalists use client patents (or more likely,
patent applications) as evidence that the company is well managed, is at a certain
stage in development, and has defined and carved out a market niche.206 The reduction in transaction costs that a patent count therefore provides in enabling valuation of the holding entity is Longs second advantage.
In addition to these benefits, Heald, advancing a theory closely related to Longs
in which patent protection is justified on the basis of transaction costs savings,
identifies two additional advantages that the system has over secrecy. The first
relates to the reduction in costs associated with the transference of inventions which
is facilitated by the registration of title, or as Heald puts it, by establishing a recordation system207. By enabling the transferee to record their rights, the system protects, or partitions, them from later interference by the transferor, its creditors,
heirs, and related entities.208 Whilst this does not make their right absolute, for it
may still be declared invalid, it greatly reduces the cost of identifying the quality of
the legal rights the transferor grants and establishes a liability regime that does not
require the transferee to enter into a costly array of protective agreements.209
The second additional benefit that Heald identifies is that patent rules deter
opportunistic behavior at a lower cost than trade secrecy and facilitate the creation
of mediating hierarchs that can effectively address issues of both opportunism and
compensation.210 In other words, a patent is often less costly than keeping a secret
as it avoids the need for implementation of contractual and physical measures
designed to prevent misappropriation by members of the team exposed to the secret
within the firm. It also enables inter-firm co-operation in the development of joint
ventures.
Patents are also claimed to offer credibility, not least because the application has
to pass through examination by the Patent Office before it matures into a grant.211
Thus, by supplying information in an easily decipherable, credible, manner the
value of the firm is less ambiguous than when information is imperfect. The forecasting and valuation benefits that flow from the patenting process are also magnified when we move from single grants to consideration of patent portfolios, as the
latter paints a more vivid picture of a firms innovative trajectory. Raw numbers,
205 The literature is too extensive to be fully detailed here, however, a short selection includes:
Griliches Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey (1990) 28 Journal of Economic Literature
1661; Kortum, Equilibrium R&D and the Patent-R&D Ratio: US Evidence (1993) 83 American
Economic Review 450; Ramani & De Looze, Using patent statistics as knowledge base indicators in the
biotechnology sectors: An application to France, Germany and the UK (2002) 54 Scientometrics 319;
Worgan & Nunn, Exploring a Complicated Labyrinth: Some Tips on Using Patent Data to Measure
Urban and Regional Innovation (2002) 16 Economic Development Quarterly 229. Note also Chartrand,
Patents as Economic Indicator New York Times, 5 Apr, 2004.
206 Lemley, n 197, above, at 15056.
207 Heald, n 193, above, at 507.
208 Ibid, at 482.
209 Ibid.
210 Ibid, at 507.
211 As the Patent Office is a repeat player in the patenting process it would conceivably be damaged if
the grant was seen to be anything other than credible. See Long, n 196, above, at 649.
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Recent Alternatives
165
therefore, give way to trends. Seen in this light, there is added incentive to procure a
portfolio of patents, irrespective, perhaps, of the scope of individual grants.
However, consideration of patent portfolios highlights one of the fundamental
flaws in Longs theory. For whilst grants may be very valuable in numbers, as they
map out the developmental landscape that the firm in question has created, they are
significantly less valuable individually, a point that Long herself accepts.212
Therefore, the signalling effect of individual grants must be treated as suspect, as it
does not matter how clear and loud any given signal is if no one is taking any notice
of it, and why should the market care about information regarding a virtually valueless commodity?213 Moreover, the appearance of patented technology on the
balance sheets of the entity that holds the rights is, in many ways, a by-product of the
patenting process, an effect rather than a cause. The patent is simply the conduit
through which the invention, which has the real value,214 is viewed.We are therefore
faced with a circularity of argument wherein the patent is deemed valuable for the
information that it provides to others (it being conceded that the grant may be of
little exclusionary value), and yet the value of that information must be dictated by
the interest that others will pay to it. As Parchomovsky and Wagner note, the theory
would be more robust if Long could show that third parties were able to identify
high-value inventions better than the patentee. Yet, there seems to be no a priori
reason to assume that third parties have an informational edge over patenting firms
that would enable them to better estimate the value of patents.215 The issue of
validity further compounds this problem, for there is clearly no guarantee that the
grant will be found to be valid upon challenge.216 If the signal is ambiguous in this
manner, then its value must also be suspect.
Carvalho, advancing a theory that shares some ground with Longs (although, it
must be said, which is significantly less-developed), rationalises the patent system in
the following manner, stating that it exists because it is the only known legal institution that allows inventors to put a price on technology and at the same time permits society to measure, through the competitive interplay of market forces, the
adequacy of such a price with relative efficiency.217 Whilst this is true to a point, it
is simultaneously both lacking as a justification of the system whilst also being too
complex as an explanation of its existence.
212 Long, n 196, above, at 626 states that worthless patents abound. It should be noted that such
worthlessness is limited to cases in which the value of the invention is defined purely in terms of rents
and exclusivity, but the simple fact is that a majority of patents will remain unused for their lifespan.
213 Parchomovsky & Wagner, Patent Portfolios (2005) 154 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1
at 21.
214 Even under Longs theory, the invention itself is the substance that demonstrates the innovative
furrow that the firm is excavating. It is therefore at the core of the assessment of value.
215 Parchomovsky & Wagner, n 213, above, at 21.
216 Indeed, it should be noted that recent studies have suggested that there is a direct correlation
between the perceived value of a patent and the probability of it being challenged. Lanjouw &
Schankerman, Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights (Dec 2001) NBER Working Paper Series, No 8656.
Available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8656.pdf. They also note that the size of the firm holding the
patent can be important, with patents owned by small enterprises being more likely to be embroiled in
litigation than those owned by larger firms.
217 Carvalho, n 186, above, at 52.
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In its most basic form, the patent system today operates and exists because a custom of providing protection from competition to the creators of new manufactures
has done, in one form or another, for approximately 500 years. Reliance has been
promoted by widespread and historical use forming a dependency that only the
very confident, reckless, or ill-informed will flout. As Machlup concluded in his
review of the US Patent system in the 1950s:
No economist, on the basis of present knowledge, could possibly state with certainty that
the patent system, as it now operates, confers a net benefit or a net loss upon society. . . . If
we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present
knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. But since we
have had a patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our current knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.218
The patent system therefore exists primarily because of familiarity and reliance
built up over a long period of time; this is, as far as this author can ascertain, the
most pragmatic explanation of the system as we experience it. However, whilst this
is an explanation of the current state of affairs, it is far from rigorous as a philosophical or economic justification or model of the system. The signalling theory fails on
the same ground. It provides adequate description of the behaviour of the patentee
ex post, ie after the invention has come into existence, but has almost nothing to do
with the creative process per se. Indeed, almost by definition, the invention has to
have come into existence before the theory can operate. It therefore does nothing to
provide insight into any ex ante justifications for the patent system, although to be
fair, this is not really what it promises. The great benefit that it brings, however, is
that it expands the horizons of what can be considered to add value to the patent
bundle and facilitates explanation of observable, and previously unaccountable,
patentee behaviour. In other words, it fills in some of the gaps in the traditional theory. It also provides a platform for further consideration of the inherent value of the
patent portfolio as a model for current patenting trends; a model in which strength
of numbers can dramatically outweigh a simple aggregation of the value of individual grants.219 However, even this approach to the patent system gets us little further
than the point at which we left the classical theories.
Closing Comments
None of the traditional or post-classical theories of patent protection detailed
above provide us with a definitive model, although to be fair to the authors of these
theories very few either tried or claimed to have succeeded in doing this. Even those
218 Machlup, An Economic Review of the Patent System, Study No 15 of the Sub-Committee on
Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Committee on the Judiciary, US Senate 85th Congress, 2nd
Session, (1958, Washington) at 801.
219 See Parchomovsky & Wagner, n 213, above, for further explanation.
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Closing Comments
167
constructs that are not solely concerned with the patents for protection argument,
and therefore seem to map more closely with everyday experience of the system, fail
to provide a complete picture.All are found wanting in one respect or another when
questions of real life applicability are considered.
The majority are theoretical without application. Even those that claim to be able
to explain certain decisions are opaque when removed from this initial focus of
interest. None that may be seen to have a direct link with the scope of the patent
right provide any guidance on how a court would, or indeed could, actually utilise
the principles that they espouse in its determination of the scope of a patent. Instead
they concente on an ex post facto analysis of decided cases in an attempt to divine
some sense of order and logic from an essentially human endeavour.220 As Oddi
notes, doubt must be cast on any theory that premises itself on a limited number of
non-randomly selected cases.221 Even those newer theories that break free from the
patents for monopoly mould fail to provide a complete picture, concentrating as
they do on filling in the gaps in conventional thinking.
Moreover, the nature of the comparisons made between sometimes wildly differing technological fields also brings the theories into question. As Taylor and
Silberston concluded in the 1970s, the patent system is seen as more valuable (or
more critical) to certain industries than others.222 Furthermore, figures from the
European Patent Office easily demonstrate that the use of the system varies wildly
between different sectors of technology.223 Either this means that there is inherently
less innovative activity occurring in certain industries or that there is something in
the system that makes it less attractive. Different sectors may not, therefore, respond
equally to the same models and stimuli. Indeed, this is one of the reasons why the
interpretation placed upon the claims and the level of generality with which they are
viewed must depend on the intended addressee. Therefore, any attempt to provide
a general formula of interpretation for all nature of invention is fundamentally
flawed from the outset. Further, any theory must be rejected that considers all cases
to have been rightly decided,224 as error is an integral part of any human experience.
The shifting formulations and evolving doctrines evident in all legal spheres,
especially one as fast moving as that linked with high-technology, mean that the
courts get the chance to review past decisions, to trim and shape, and move with the
times. Historical judgments are important because they tell us what the law is not
and reveal the pathways by which the current law came to be made. Mistakes are
220 ie they are too theoretical, without practical application.Although again, to be fair not many of the
theories actually claimed that they were anything more than analytical models of the system.
221 Oddi,Holy Grail, n 47, above, at 326.
222 Taylor & Silberston, n 56, above.
223 The top performer in 2005 was, according to the Annual Report of the European Patent Office,
electronics and electrical communications technology, which accounted for 11.06% of filings.
Agriculture accounted for 0.79% of applications, and mining for 0.32%. Health related inventions made
up 6.92%, and 1.30% were in the field of inorganic chemistry. Nucleonics was at the bottom of the table,
accounting for only 0.13% of applications. The Annual Report is available at http://annual-report.
european-patent-office.org/2005/_pdf/ar2005_chapter4.pdf.
224 See Merges, Rent Control in the Patent District, n 166, above, at 367; see also Oddi, Holy Grail,
n 47, above, at 326, who states, at n 366, that: Some cases, of course, were never good law.
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possible and bad decisions probable. Times change, and a general theory will always
struggle to explain and rationalise something as fickle and situationally dependent
as human reasoning.
As Oddi sagely states, the outcome of actual patent litigation may be better
explained on the attitude (bias) of the court toward patents at the time of decision
than by any unified theory. To this end, the pro-patent bias of the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit [in the US] (CAFC) is palpable and may offer a far better
indicator of patent validity and infringement than any of the economic theories.225
This author agrees, although noting that the CAFCs favours may now have turned.
Economic theories may help to decide what the scope of protection of any given
grant should optimally be, but modelling the vagaries of the human mind is outside
of any economists current understanding. What is clear is that the traditional,
incentive and reward based, theories offer incomplete justification for the patent
system, or even the decision to patent. Modern views have attempted to remedy the
defects in the traditional models, and, from certain perspectives, may be seen to be
coming closer to their elusive goal. However, the time is not yet ripe for the determination of the scope of the grant to be subjected to mathematical expression.
Therefore, having viewed the arguments and models advanced to justify and
explain the provision of patent protection one cannot help being left with the feeling that grant and litigation is ultimately an expensive lottery where the prizes are
big, and the chances of winning proportional to the financial status of the interested
parties. Thus, in words echoing Machlups conclusion in his review of the US Patent
system in the 1950s,226 the best justification that we currently have for the patent
system is the fact that we currently have a patent system.
It has been the purpose of these three chapters on Patents Within the Market
Economy to provide insight into the economic and theoretical literature on this
topic, and more specifically the determination of patent scope, whist alerting the
reader to the fact that certain settled issues may not be what they first seem. The
issue of monopolyphobia is one that has tainted patent decisions on both sides of
the Atlantic, on and off, ever since the inception of the system.227 Despite convincing arguments advanced by Kitch,228 Dam,229 Rich,230 Rose,231 Loughlan,232 etc,
that the patent grant cannot accurately be described as producing an economic
monopoly, the sentiment can still be found in popular opinion. This public distaste
for monopoly finds itself reflected in judicial pronouncements, both in the UK and
abroad. The traditional British position in relation to determining patent scope has
225 Oddi,Holy Grail, n 47, above, at 326-7. However, whilst this might have been the case at the time
that Oddi was writing, as the reader will see in ch 6, times have changed.
226 Reproduced in text accompanying n 218, above.
227 See Rose, n 21, above.
228 Kitch,Elementary and Persistent Errors n 153, above.
229 Dam, n 21, above.
230 Rich, n 12, above, at 239.
231 Rose, n 21, above.
232 Loughlan, n 8, above.
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Closing Comments
169
already been discussed,233 however, it is clear that other States patent doctrines deal
with the problems in different ways to our own, and it is to these differences that we
now direct our attention.
Three caricatured systems are seen to be in evidence in addition to the UK. The
first, America, offers two-tier protection, extending a patents scope under the doctrine of equivalents to supplement the literal meaning of the claims. The second,
Germany, traditionally offered broad protection for the general inventive idea that
lies behind the invention, and is often raised as an example of a system diametrically
opposed to that in the UK. Finally we look to Japan, where the system is traditionally characterised by very narrow protection giving rise to many small patents. Each
system is examined in turn before moving our focus back to the UK in order to
reflect upon the current state of affairs in the light of our findings.
233
In ch 1, above.
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Part II
Comparative Factors
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6
America
Promoting the Useful Arts
Congress shall have power . . . To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries.
Article 1, s8, cl8 of the Constitution of the United States of America
Preface
There are three systems that were at one time collectively claimed to handle nearly
90 per cent of the worlds total patent traffic.1 The stereotyped approaches to claim
interpretation within the three varies wildly, from the traditionally narrow, subliteral, Japanese approach, through the expansive effects of the US doctrine of
equivalents, to the German courts broad protection of the general inventive idea.
In the first of three comparative chapters, we turn our attention to the US and the
patent system extant there. The US system in many respects treads a middle path
between Germanys traditionally broad protection and the narrowness of Japanese
grants. Full treatment of the jurisdiction could create a work of many times this size,
therefore the subject matter of this chapter has been limited, often crudely, to the
barebones of the doctrines of equivalents and file-wrapper estoppel, the central pillars of US claim interpretation.
1
Namely the US, European and Japanese systems. See Isayama, Japans Views on a Desirable IP
System for the Global Economy (1999) 2 Journal of World Intellectual Property 679, at 685. More recently,
however, the Korean and Chinese patent systems have seen a massive surge in activity. The 5 top-ranking
Offices, in terms of numbers of applications, are now (in descending order) the US, Japan, Korea, China,
and the EPO. Applications to these Offices accounted for 75% of all patents filed in 2004. See WIPO
Patent Report: Statistics on Worldwide Patent Activity (2006), B2 Top 20 offices of filing available at:
http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/patent_report_2006.html#P104_9303.
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Introduction
In the US, as in the United Kingdom, the principle upon which claim drafting is
based is that of peripheral definition, with the claims marking the outer boundary
of protection. However when it comes to interpretation of these claims, the two systems part company, for in the US patent scope is determined by the application of a
two-stage test whereby a literal assessment of the wording used in the claims is augmented by recourse to the doctrine of equivalents. In the UK, on the other hand, the
scope of the patent is determined by a single-stage purposive construction of the
claims.2
Literal infringement in the US is limited to giving the words of the claims their
ordinary and customary meaning;3 Cole explains this as the meaning that the term
would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the
invention4. In order to ascertain this meaning, sources ranging from the remainder
of the claims themselves, through the specification and the prosecution history, to
external sources such as dictionaries and encyclopaedias may be used. Recently,
however, the appellate courts have required that the specification take precedence
over dictionary definition in determination of the literal meaning of the claims,
noting that:extrinsic evidence, which consists of all evidence external to the patent
and prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and
learned treatises is of less significan[ce] than the intrinsic record in determining
the legally operative meaning of claim language (citations omitted).5 The US
approach to literal interpretation focuses on what the words in the claims mean to
the skilled addressee, rather than what the skilled person would have understood
the patentee to mean by their choice of words, as is the test in the UK.6 The
distinction is fine, but it allows US courts to adopt a strict constructionist approach
to literal infringement7, that may not be compatible with the UKs purposive
approach.
Assessment under the doctrine of equivalents lies outside of this literal determination of the scope of the claims. Expanding protection in this manner is justified on the basis that it tempers unsparing logic and prevent[s] an infringer from
2 See Kirin-Amgen v Transkaryotic Therapies Inc [2005] 1 All ER 667, discussed further in chs 9 & 10,
below.
3 Vitronics Corp v Conceptronic Inc 90 F.3d 1576 (1996, CAFC) at 1582. cf the position under the
European Patent Convention (EPC) where, according to Art 69 EPC, it is the terms, or contents, of the
claims (depending on the language of the official text usedsee n 4 and the accompanying text in ch 7,
below) that determines the scope of the patent, suggesting a broader approach than pure literal interpretation.
4 Cole, Fundamentals of Patent Drafting (London, The Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys, 2006)
at 113. See also, Innova/Pure Water Inc v Safari Water Filtration Systems Inc 381 F.3d 1111 (2004, CAFC)
at 1116.
5 Phillips v AWH Corp 415 F.3d 1303 (2005, CAFC) at 1317.
6 See Kirin-Amgen, n 2, above.
7 Cole, Fundamentals of Patent Drafting, n 4, above, at 114.
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175
stealing the benefit of an invention.8 The boundaries of the doctrine are confined
by what is known as file-wrapper estoppel, which ties the patentee to any promises
made, or ground conceded, during initial prosecution to secure the grant of the
patent. The effect of the two doctrines may be said to combine a reasonable degree
of fairness for the patentee, by the expansive effect of equivalents, with a reasonable
degree of certainty for third parties, by limitations based on the file-wrapper. The
balance between the two is critical to the operation of the system. However, as we
shall see, American jurisprudence in this area, especially over the last twenty-five
years, has oscillated between expansive and restrictive interpretation of the doctrines, which has damaged any predictability that they may offer.
Discussion of the US system is deemed necessary as it offers both informative
illustration of the manner in which protection for equivalents can operate, thereby
providing insight into the possible operation of a European doctrine,9 and also
allows us to appreciate the context from which much of the pressure for expansion
of the patent right originates. The chapter therefore begins with brief consideration
of the historical development of the American patent system, with particular
emphasis on the doctrine of equivalents, from Colonisation to the landmark decision of the Supreme Court in Graver Tank Co v Linde Air Products Inc 10 It then
moves on to assess the impact of Graver Tank itself, before consideration of more
recent developments in US law, including the infamous Festo11 litigation; a monolith of legal wrangling which at the time of writing has been plaguing District
courts, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) and the Supreme Court
for more than a decade.12
Early History
Today US patent law is centred around the notion that the claims mark the periphery of the invention, and therefore also the boundaries of protection that the grant
offers. The requirement that claims be included in the patent was first codified in
8 Per Justice Jackson, delivering the leading judgment in Graver Tank v Linde Air Products, 339 US 605
(1949, Supreme Ct) at 608.
9 As provisioned in the amendments to the EPC agreed at the Munich Diplomatic Conference in
Nov 2000, and adopted by the Administrative Council of the European Patent Organisation on 28 Jun,
2001, which introduces the following text as Art 2 of the Protocol on the Interpretation of Art 69 EPC:
For the purpose of determining the extent of protection conferred by a European patent, due account
shall be taken of any element which is equivalent to an element specified in the claims.
10 Above, n 8.
11 Festo Corporation v Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co Ltd, 234 F.3d 558 (2000, CAFC, en banc),
535 US 722 (2002, Supreme Ct), 344 F.3d 1359 (2003, CAFC, en banc).
12 Saris J, opened his judgment in Festo Corporation v Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co Ltd 75
USPQ.2d 1830 (2005, District Ct: Massachusetts) by describing the litigation in the following manner:
Ten years after trial, and following two sojourns to the Supreme Court, this seventeen-year-old suit is
back on remand from the Federal Circuit.
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1836, a full 47 years before the same requirement was made in the UK13 but significantly later than the introduction of a patent custom in the American States.
US patent law is grown from a British seed and as such its lineage is traceable (in
terms of historical markers, if not defining acts) through the common law of the
eighteenth century, the Statute of Monopolies, Elizabethan practice and, ultimately
perhaps, to the Statute of Venice.14 As part of the British Empire, the newly discovered North America inherited the English law concerning monopolies upon
Colonisation. It was transported to the dependency with the first settlers where it
evolved into a patent custom initially little changed from its roots.
Working along the jurisdictional boundaries of the original thirteen States,
patents were granted in America from 1641.15 Such was their utility that the practice continued under the Articles of the Confederation after the Revolution.
However, in the new United States, initially little was done to change the boundaries
of the existing systems, and by the 1780s problems concerning the limited jurisdiction of the patent grant had led to clear inter-state disputes. The paradigm example
of this may be seen in the problems connected with the development of interstate
steamboat lines, which was hampered by conflicting patents issued in separate
States.16
Partly in response to this territorial problem, and partly due to pressure for furtherance of the Union, the Constitutional Convention of 1789 resolved to make
patent protection a right of the United States people. Therefore, Article 1, s8, clause
8 of the US Constitution provides Congress with the power to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the Exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
Thereafter, a nation-wide patent system was created by legislative power in 1790 in
the very early days of the first Congress;17 which, as Merges notes, reflects the
importance of this matter.18 This early American patent law, like its English cousin,
was raw in comparison to its modern incarnation, and it was not for some 45 years,
until the Patent Act of 1836,19 that Congress adopted a recognisable modernistic
approach to the protection of invention.20
13 s5(5) of the Patents Act 1883 requiring for the first time in the UK that a specification, whether
provisional or complete, must commence with the title, and in the case of a complete specification must
end with a distinct summary of the invention claimed.
14 For more information on the history of the British system, see ch 2, above.
15 A patent issued by the State of Massachusetts. See Merges, Intellectual Property in the New
Technological Age (New York, Aspen Law & Business, 1997) at 125.
16 Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (5 Part I) (1996)
78 JPTOS 615 at 6327, see also; Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law:
Antecedents (5 Part II) (1996) 78 JPTOS 665 at 67384; Flexner, Steamboats Come True. American
Inventors in Action (New York, Viking Press, 1944); Merges, Patent Law and Policy: Cases and Materials
(Charlottesville (VA), Michie, 1997; 2nd Ed) (Merges, Patent Law and Policy) at 8.
17 Patent Act of 1790, ch 7, 1 Stat 109 (10 Apr, 1790).
18 See Merges, Patent Law and Policy, n 16, above, at 9.
19 Patent Act of 1836, ch 357, 5 Stat 117 (4 Jul, 1836).
20 The reader will note that this is still a good 15 years before the archaic and cumbersome patent system evident in the UK at this time was the subject of reform. See discussion in text accompanying n 24 in
ch 3, above.
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177
The 1836 Act is noteworthy for a number of reasons, not least because it extended
the possibility of protection to citizens or residents of any country,21 the patent
grant formerly being limited to US resident citizens only. Most importantly, however, it established for the first time a formal system of examination. This replaced
the simple registration scheme introduced by the 1793 Act;22 a scheme heavily criticised as it gave no power to refuse a patent grant on grounds of a lack of novelty or
usefulness.23 Despite providing for the examination of patent applications, the
1836 Act also gave the applicant the right to compel issue of a patent by bill in
equity, against an adverse decision of the Commissioner and of the Board of
Examiners,24 this route to grant being equivalent to a judicial review of the application process.Vojcek describes this as providing an excellent safeguard of the rights
of the inventor,25 and it is one of the many innovations of the 1836 Act that still
remains evident in the modern system.
The Act also introduced a requirement that the potential patentee particularly
specify and point out the part, improvement, or combination, which he claims as
his own invention or discovery.26 Previous Acts had not mentioned, or in any way
required, such elements to be present, asking only that the patentee include a simple description of the invention so as to distinguish it from things already known
and used. However, although significant from a legislative point of view, this
requirement was simply codification of the existing practice required by the courts
and established some 15 years earlier in the case of Evans v Eaton.27 Justice Story,
leading the court, stating that the:
specification . . . has two objects: one is to make known the manner of constructing the
machine . . . so as to enable artizans to make and use it. . . . The other object of the specification is, to put the public in possession of what the party claims as his own invention, so
as to ascertain if he claims anything that is in common use, or is already known, and guard
against prejudice or injury from the use of an invention which the party may otherwise
innocently suppose not to be patented28
21 This is not to say that the playing field was flat for all applicants. There was a significantly raked feescale for US and non-US citizens, which meant that whilst Americans paid $30 for a patent, British inventors were asked to pay $500 and all others $300. See Vojcek, A Survey of the Principal National Patent
Systems (New York, Prentice Hall, 1936), at 117.
22 Registration was introduced in the Amendment of 1793 (Patent Act of 1793, ch 11, 1 Stat 318 (21
Feb, 1793)) as a replacement for the original procedure whereby the patent application was subjected to
the examination of three high-level Government OfficialsSee Merges, Patent Law and Policy, n 16,
above, at 10.
23
Any attack on these grounds had to be conducted in court, giving rise to much unwarranted litigation. See Hantman,Doctrine of Equivalents (1988) 70 JPTOS 511 at 516.
24
See discussion of this point in Vojcek, n 21, above, at 119.
25
Ibid.
26
s6 Patents Act 1836. See Hantman, n 23, above, at 517. See also Takenaka, Interpreting Patent Claims:
The United States, Germany and Japan (Munich, Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Patent,
Copyright and Competition Law, 1995) at 6; Jessup,The Doctrine of Equivalents (1972) 54 JPOS 248.
27
The case reached the Supreme Court in 1818 (16 US 454 (1818, Supreme Ct)), and was the first time
that a substantive patent issue had done so. The Court remanded the issue for a new trial and it returned
to the Supreme Court in 182220 US 356 (1822, Supreme Ct). It is this latter case in which the practice
was formally established.
28 20 US 356 at 433.
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Infringement at this time was decided on principles laid down in the case of
Odiorne v Winkley, where the Court had proclaimed that [m]ere colorable differences, or slight improvements, cannot shake the right of the original inventor.29
The question of where the all important border between colorableand substantial
difference lay had been settled by the 1817 case of Gray v James. Here Justice
Bushrod Washington laid down for the first time the now classic function-wayresult or triple identity test, charging the jury:
[W]e think it may safely be laid down as a general rule, that where the machines are substantially the same, and operate in the same manner, to produce the same result, they must
be in principle the same. I say substantially, in order to exclude all formal differances; and
when I speak of the same result, I must be understood as meaning the same kind of result
though it may differ in extent.30
The scope of protection thus extended to the preferred embodiment (as claimed)
and its equivalents. This method of interpretation, wherein the claims stake out a cen29
30
31
32
Per Circuit Justice Story, charging the jury. 18 F.Cas. 581 at 582 (1814, Circuit Ct: Massachusetts).
10 F.Cas. 1015 at 1016 (1817, Circuit Ct: Pennsylvania).
Patent Act of 1870, ch 230, 16 Stat 198 (8 Jul, 1870).
See Winans v Denmead, 56 US 330 (1853, Supreme Ct) at 342.
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179
tral position and include only the inventions prominent features, infringement being
determined by comparison between the defendants creation and the invention as disclosed in the description and drawings, is widely referred to as central definition theory.33 As already noted, this bears close likeness to traditional German practice.34
In addition to setting out the central approach to claim drafting and determination of scope, Winans v Denmead is also noteworthy in that it is considered by many
to be the first case in which the doctrine of equivalents was voiced.35 The litigation
involved a patent for a railway car designed to carry coal, the key element of which
was that it was described as being shaped in the frustum of a cone. This design was
more efficient than those existing at the time as it distributed the weight of the coal
in an even manner, eliminating the possibility of deformation, and consequent
need for reinforcement, experienced by traditional cars.36 The question that lay
before the Court was whether a car in the shape of a tapered hexagonal pyramid
infringed the patent. Both designs operated in substantially the same way to achieve
the same increased load-bearing benefits. Justice Curtis, adding to the previously
quoted passage, stated that the protection offered by a patent extended beyond the
precise form portrayed:
[I]t being a familiar rule that, to copy the principle or more of operation described, is an
infringement, although such copy should be totally unlike the original in form or proportions.37 (sic)
Evidently at this time the doctrine of equivalents was not used to supplement the
normal scope of protection, it was the primary tool in such a determination.
However, it is generally accepted that it was used to expand beyond the literal scope
of the claim language.38 This is eminently clear for so-called pioneer inventions,
33 As opposed to the peripheral definition theory that categorises the current British approach.
See further, text accompanying n 110 in ch 1, above. Also, Deller, Patent Claims (New York, Lawyers
Co-operative Publishing (Bancroft-Whitney), 1971; 2nd Ed), section 9. Takenaka, n 26, above, at 312;
and Hantman, n 23, above, at 517.
34 See further, the discussion of the German patent system in ch 7, below.
35 See the opinion of the Supreme Court in Graver Tank, n 8, above, at 608; Takenaka, n 26, above, at
9; Adams, The Doctrine of Equivalents: Becoming a Derelict on the Waters of Patent Law (2006) 84
Nebraska Law Review 1113, at 1122. However, Hantman, n 23, above, at 518 states that the Winans principle is a restatement of the charge to the jury in . . . Evans v Eaton. He does, however, concede that it was
the first time that the principle appeared in a Supreme Court decision.
36 See the extract from the patent reproduced in Winans v Denmead, n 32, above, at 342.
37 Ibid.
38
See comments to this end in Sarnoff, The Historic and Modern Doctrines of Equivalents and
Claiming the Future, Part I (17901870) (2005) 87 JPTOS 371, at 393. Sarnoff, however, disputes the
claim, stating that instead, Winans clearly supports judicial approval of liberal construction of claim
language, in order to assure that claims are interpreted so as to provide a meaning consistent with a fair
scope of protection. Hantman, n 23, above, at 527-8 also questions whether the doctrine of equivalents
used to expand beyond the claim in this manner. He uses the dictionary definition of a cone, which he
concludes covers a conical form without a circular base, and therefore argues that the infringing railway
car actually falls within the literal wording of the claims. He fails, however, to note that the test for literal
infringement is not, and has never been, whether the accused device falls within the scope of the claims
as they might be interpreted. The test is whether the alleged infringement falls within the claims as interpreted by the Court. In Winans cone was interpreted as requiring a circular base, therefore it is clear that
a tapered hexagonal prism cannot be said to fall within the literal scope of the claim as interpreted.
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Early History
181
Adding that:
No [question of construction] . . . could have arisen if appellant had used language which
clearly and distinctly points out what it is that he claims in his invention.45
Here the Court refused to find that a patent, which claimed a new manufacture
of the deodorized heavy hydrocarbon oils, suitable for lubricating and other purposes extensively described in the specification, was infringed by production of the
product by other means.Whilst the conclusion that can be drawn from the case, that
a process patent is not infringed by production of the end-product by other means,
seems rather obvious to a student of the modern patent system, this represented a
substantial departure from previous practice at the time.
Similarly in Keystone Bridge Co v Phoenix Iron Co, Justice Bradley, giving the
opinion of the Court, emphasised that:
When the terms of a claim in a patent are clear and distinct (as they always should be), the
patentee, in a suit brought upon the patent, is bound by it . . . He can claim nothing beyond
it.46
Seen in this manner, early development of US theory clearly defines the claims as
fulfilling two distinct purposes. In the first, they formed the consideration for the
patent grant and thus gave validity to the applicants bargain with the state; and in
the second, they notified the public as to the extent of the patentees monopoly. It
was this latter function that slowly came to dominate. Thus, in White v Dunbar,
Justice Bradley famously stated:
Some persons seem to suppose that a claim in a patent is like a nose of wax, which may be
turned and twisted in any direction, by merely referring to the specification, so as to make
it include something more than, or something different from, what its words express. The
context may, undoubtedly, be resorted to, and often is resorted to, for the purpose of better understanding the meaning of the claim; but not for the purpose of changing it, and
making it different from what it is. The claim is a statutory requirement, prescribed for the
very purpose of making the patentee define precisely what his invention is; and it is unjust
to the public, as well as an evasion of the law, to construe it in a manner different from the
plain import of its terms.47
Increased emphasis on the public notice function of the claims had three main
consequences. First, it spurred on acceptance of peripheral definition theory, the
advantages of drawing a bright-line in the sand being clear to all. Second, the latitude given to patentees in infringement proceedings was significantly narrowed and
protection was denied for mere inventive concept.48 Finally, because claims enabled
44
45
46
47
48
Ibid, at 570.
Ibid, at 569.
95 US 274 (1877, Supreme Ct) at 278.
White v Dunbar, 119 US 47 (1886, Supreme Ct) at 512.
ie the general inventive idea.
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applicants to define their inventions more specifically, courts began to require that
they did so. Therefore the old substantially as described claim format was struck
down; the Court in Hobbs v Beach being of the opinion that the phrase added little
to the claims:
If these words are used, the patentee may still prove infringement in the use of a mechanical equivalent; if they are omitted, he is bound to prove no less. Perhaps it would be sufficient to say that, if a doubt arose upon the question whether the infringing machine was
the mechanical equivalent of the patent device, that doubt should be resolved against the
patentee where the claims contain the words substantially as described or set forth.49
Therefore, as time progressed and the claims assumed a core role in defining the
boundaries of patent protection, the early liberal attitude to the determination of
scope, and the expansive doctrine of equivalents that accompanied this, had been
gently, but sternly, phased out.
The knock-on effect of increased judicial reliance on claim language was that the
patentee, robbed of this former interpretative latitude, took to enlarging the literal
scope of their claims as much as possible. It became common practice to include
such stock phrases as means for or adapted to in an attempt to broaden claim language.50 Thus, in a series of cases towards the end of the nineteenth century, which
can be said to have reached culmination in Westinghouse v Boyden Power Brake Co,51
the doctrine of equivalents was used to restrict protection by limiting infringement
to only some of the structures within the claims literal scope. This method of limitation was based on sufficiency of disclosure, its justification being that the patent
could only validly cover the subject matter that the inventor actually disclosed and
equivalents thereof. Therefore:
The patentee may bring the defendant within the letter of his claims, but if the latter has so
far changed the principle of the device that the claims of the patent, literally construed,
have ceased to represent his actual invention, he is as little subject to be adjudged an
infringer as one who has violated the letter of a statute has to be convicted, when he has
done nothing in conflict with its spirit and intent.52
Thus, what would now be called a reverse doctrine of equivalents, restricting protection scope to less than that actually claimed, was born.
The reader will appreciate that the patent systems of Europe were undergoing a
similar age of unrest at this point in time. As discussed in chapter three, above, the
mid- to late-nineteenth century marked a period intense dissatisfaction with the
notion of a patent system. The arguments of a new breed of political economists
had begun to be utilised to question the very foundations and justifications of
patent law, and the fear of broad monopoly stifling domestic industry was, once
49
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Graver Tank
183
again, brought to the fore. The Netherlands abolished its system during this
period,53 and in the UK the patent grant was the subject of heated debate resulting
in significant changes to the law. The period in which inventors and their inventions
were romanticised by the populace was coming to an end, replaced by big business
and corporate research and development. The idealistic image of the lone heroic
inventor was banished to fairytale, apparently taking with it the expansive doctrine
of equivalents.
Graver Tank
The early-twentieth century marked a period of vacillating protection in the US
patent system. A number of strategically important grants in key industries, such as
the light-bulb,54 the aeroplane,55 the basic design of the automobile,56 and in the
area of wireless telegraphy,57 had established significant market power for the entities that owned them. This domination of the market in several key areas did not go
unnoticed by the judiciary and, driven in part by a number of anti-competitive acts
committed by large patent controlling companies, the courts became increasingly
unwilling to enforce patent rights.58 This trend is amply illustrated by reference to
the statistics of Supreme Court decisions in the first 40 years of the twentieth century, see figure 1, below.
However, it would appear that the US involvement in World War II may have
helped to alter the balance, as it was towards the end of the 1940s that the expansive
doctrine of equivalents, which had lain dormant since the critical blow landed by
Westinghouse,59 was brought back to life.
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Total number
of opinions
Patents held
valid
Patents held
invalid
Patents held
not infringed
190005
190610
191115
191620
192125
192630
193135
193640
9
7
4
16
14
12
14
15
2
3
4
5
3
3
3
0
3
1
0
9
8
5
11
13
4
3
0
2
3
4
0
2
23
50
18
Total
91
Figure 1: Results of Patent Litigation before the Supreme Court of the United States62
62 Taken from Fox, Monopolies and Patents: A Study of the History and Future of the Patent Monopoly
(Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1947), at 266. Baum,The Federal Courts and Patent Validity: An
Analysis of the Record (1974) 56 JPOS 758 at 7767 notes that in the period 192173 the Supreme Court
held invalid 82% of the patents that it considered. See also, Janicke, To be or not to be: The Long
Gestation of the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (2002) 69 Antitrust Law Journal 645, at 646.
63 Those elements found within group II of the periodic table, ie beryllium, magnesium, calcium,
strontium, barium and radium.
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Graver Tank
185
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186
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Page 186
against the fundamental principles of the peripheral definition theory, as it introduces unacceptable ambiguity into infringement proceedings.
However, Hantmans argument fails to take account of a number of small, but
important, points. First, under central definition theory, the doctrine of equivalents
provided the test for infringement, there was no other. Second, the Court in Graver
Tank stresses the importance of the claims in the determination of patent scope,
stating that they define the invention, and reduces the doctrine of equivalents to a
secondary measure supplementing an all elements rule so that one-to-one equivalence is required. Third, and possibly most importantly, it recognises that the doctrine may also be used to restrict protection where the device is so far changed in
principle from the patented article that it performs the same or a similar function in
a substantially different way, but nevertheless falls within the literal words of the
claim.71 It is therefore apparent that, far from resurrecting a long-forgotten principle and unleashing it upon an unsuspecting world, the Court made clear the role of
the doctrine under peripheral claim theory. It updated it and applied it to modern
practice, rectifying the inconsistent treatment o the past.
Therefore, whilst Hantmans argument would be valid if the Court had simply
used the old doctrine of equivalents established under Winans without change, this
is not what it did. To argue such a point is simply an exercise in verbalism and avoids
the question of whether the doctrine as laid down in Graver Tank is, in substance,
the same as that under central definition theory. Quite simply, it is not. The motivation for extending protection on an equivalents basis, namely to secure fair protection for the patentee, is the same under both authorities, but, whereas previously it
was subordinate to nothing, under Graver Tank it is a supplemental tool, second
string to the all element, literal infringement rule. Indeed, as Takenaka correctly
points out, it can be said that by clarifying the claim language as the primary point
of reference in any patent infringement action, and by stressing the importance of a
claim referring to an accused device, Graver Tank can actually be seen as the case that
established peripheral definition theory.72
Hantmans second argument, that the decision introduces an unnecessary degree
of uncertainty into the patent process and is therefore against the public interest, is
powerful in the fight against revival of the doctrine. However, it is apparent that the
Court in Graver Tank was adequately aware of this viewpoint, and actually intended
such imprecision. It explained:
Equivalence, in the patent law, is not the prisoner of a formula and is not an absolute to be
considered in a vacuum. It does not require complete identity for every purpose and in
every respect. In determining equivalents, things equal to the same thing may not be equal
to each other and, by the same token, things for most purposes different may sometimes be
equivalents. Consideration must be given to the purpose for which an ingredient is used in
a patent, the qualities it has when combined with the other ingredients, and the function
which it is intended to perform.73
71
72
73
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Graver Tank
187
The Court readily accepted that that one of the primary objects of patent law is
to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by duly rewarding the inventor.
It recognised that to permit evasion of penalties for infringement by making insubstantial changes to the invention as claimed, whilst still allowing the wholesale theft
of its substance, would soon render the patent useless. Moreover, it acknowledged
the fallacy of limiting patent protection to the literal scope of the claims, stating that
this would encourage the concealment of invention, therefore going against
another tenet of patent law. Thus, Takenaka concludes that without the doctrine of
equivalents peripheral definition theory can never function completely and effectively to implement patent policy.74
Whilst the benefits that the doctrine provides in securing fair protection for the
patentee are easily apparent, Takenakas comment overstates the issue. It is, for
example, not clear that patent policy itself would be impossible to implement without the doctrine, as business practices and expectations could be arranged in order
that the goals, as stated, would be realised. As we shall see, this is the situation that
occurred in Japan, where traditionally narrow interpretation of claims forming the
periphery of protection forced the system, as a whole, to react in order that the
underlying policy could be implemented.75 Equally, her comment ignores any
alternative method of expanding protection beyond the literal wording that the patentee uses, such as a true purposive construction wherein the perceived desires of
the patentee inform the lexicon. Furthermore, situations are conceivable in which
the patent attorney, when given sufficient time and resources, could cover all but the
yet-to-be-imagined equivalents within the literal scope of the claims as drafted,
thus circumventing the need for an expansive doctrine at all. However, whilst the
latter situation is a possibility, it is conceded that in practice this would be an
improbable, if not impossible, goal to achieve, and that the doctrine of equivalents
offers a more cost-effective method of providing for fair protection.
74
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thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material,
or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.77
Thus, a second type of equivalent, often confused with the judicially created doctrine of equivalents, was introduced into US law. The CAFC went to great lengths to
explain the difference between the two in DMI Inc v Deere & Co78 stating:
[T]he word equivalent in 112 should not be confused . . . with the doctrine of equivalents. In applying the doctrine of equivalents, the fact finder must determine the range of
equivalents to which the claimed invention is entitled, in light of the prosecution history,
the pioneer-non-pioneer status of the invention, and the prior art. It must then be determined whether the entirety of the accused device or process is so substantially the same
thing, used in substantially the same way, to achieve substantially the same result as to fall
within that range. In applying the means plus function paragraph of 112, however, the
sole question is whether the single means in the accused device which performs the function stated in the claim is the same as or an equivalent of the corresponding structure
described in the patentees specification as performing that function.79
The rationale behind 112(6) was clearly stated in OI Corp v Tekmar Co,80 where
Judge Lourie said that it was intended to permit use of means expressions without
recitation of all the possible means that might be used in a claimed apparatus.
However, [t]he price that must be paid for use of that convenience is limitation of
the claim to the means specified in the written description and equivalents
thereof .81 Therefore, [i]f the specification is not clear as to the structure that the
patentee intends to correspond to the claimed function, then the patentee has not
paid that price but is rather attempting to claim in functional terms unbounded by
any reference to structure in the specification. Such is impermissible under the
statute.82 Thus, the court made clear that the doctrine was not to be interpreted as
providing expansive protection, rather its application was strictly limited by the disclosure in the specification. As such, it cannot be seen as creating a patch of central
definition within a statutory framework. Rather, 112 informs the claim meaning
for a literal infringement analysis, by restricting the scope of a (potentially broadening) functional claim limitation. The doctrine of equivalents, on the other hand,
extends the enforcement of claim terms beyond what is literally described in the
event that there is equivalence between elements of the patented article and the
alleged infringement.83 Therefore, as the statutory provisions merely assist in the
determination of literal infringement, they can only embrace those equivalent
structures or acts existing at the time of issuance. After-arising equivalents84 can
only infringe, if at all, under the doctrine of equivalents.
77
35 USC 112(6).
755 F.2d 1570 (1985, CAFC).
79 Per Chief Judge Markey, giving the opinion of the court, ibid, at 1575.
80 115 F.3d 1576 (1997, CAFC).
81 Ibid at 1583.
82 Per Judge Clevenger, in Medical Instrumentation and Diagnostics Corp v Elekta AB, 344 F.3d 1205
(2003, CAFC).
83 See Al-Site Corp v VSI International Inc, 174 F.3d 1308 (1999, CAFC).
84 ie those arising after issue of the patent.
78
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Graver Tank
189
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This was clearly seen to be the case by the infant court, with Judge Rich leading
the charge against misuse of the moniker:
The patent system, which antedated the Sherman Act by a century, is not an exception to
the antitrust laws, and patent rights are not legal monopolies in the antitrust sense of that
word. Accordingly, if a patent is held to have been obtained illegally, it is not properly said,
ipso facto, that it was all along an illegal monopoly and, thus, that its procurement and
attempted enforcement was a per se violation of the antitrust laws. A holding that monopoly analysis should end in favor of liability on a determination of fraud, without more,
would signal a fundamental misunderstanding of the substance and purposes of both the
patent and the antitrust laws.97
In place of the view of patents as limited monopolies, the CAFC cultivated the
patent grant as intangible property, to be maintained free of trespass.98
94
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191
The Court also stressed that the doctrine of equivalents applied to the invention
as a whole. Therefore, rather than being forced to find equivalents for each and every
claimed element, Hughes established that infringement could be found under the
doctrine if the accused device was substantially similar (in function, way, and result)
to the patented article even if it omitted elements of the claimed invention.102 The
court further opened up the doctrine by saying that elements may be found to be
equivalent even if they were not known to be so at the time that the application was
filed.103 The possibility of after-arising equivalents was therefore confirmed and the
expansive doctrine further invigorated.
The decision in Hughes can be seen as marking the beginning of a period of
extreme protectionist policy within the CAFC during which the doctrine of equivalents became one of the most powerful tools of judicial discretion within patent
99
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193
This is a thread of argument that resurfaces in the now infamous Festo litigation,107 in which the CAFC made significant efforts to reinvigorate and reinforce
the doctrine of file-wrapper estoppel. The Court took the view that this was
required in order to curb an apparently runaway doctrine of equivalents that was
damaging the notice function of the claims.108 However discussion of Festo at this
point is to jump the gun, for at the beginning of its lifetime the CAFC adopted a
position far removed from this rigid application of prosecution history estoppel,
instead favouring a far more flexible approach.
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195
the following year, in Kinzenbaw v Deere & Co,119 the Appeals Court expressed a
commitment to an objective, strict constructionist application of prosecution history estoppel120, and rejected the speculative inquiry121 that the Hughes judgment
would have allowed. Therefore, whilst the doctrine of equivalents was allowed to
progress unabated in its pure form, application of the doctrine was now to be more
fiercely limited based on amendments made during prosecution.
The central problem with this change of heart was the doctrinal instability that
such a volte-face inevitably produced. Instability based on the fact that patents
prosecuted in the intervening period would now be penalised for amendments previously considered to be unproblematic, and which was magnified when, after an
unbroken string of five strict constructionist cases122, the CAFC, once again,
changed its mind. Thus, a mere sixteen months after the original decision in Hughes
had been rejected in Kinzenbaw, the CAFC reinstituted a flexible bar approach in
Loctite Corp v Ultraseal Ltd 123 The court confirmed the Hughes approach by
restricting the decisions in Kinzenbaw and Prodyne Enterprises Inc v Julie Pomerantz
Inc 124 to their facts, reasoning that:
The results reached there only highlight that application of prosecution history estoppel to
limit the doctrine of equivalents should be performed as a legal matter on a case-by-case
basis, guided by equitable and public policy principles underlying the doctrines involved
and by the facts of the particular case.125
The protectionist attitude of the CAFC was therefore reaffirmed, but at what
cost? Despite introducing inconsistencies and uncertainties into the law, the
decision in Loctite, and those cases that followed which endorsed a narrow view
of file-wrapper estoppel, did cement the CAFC as an essentially pro-patent
119
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court.128 However, the fallout from the case was significant. Strawbridge,
McDonald and Moy were damning: No one can predict the outcome of a future
case that the court will evaluate under this anti-rule.129 The courts statements that
it would be led by equitable and public policy principles on a case-by-case basis130
rendered decisions essentially useless as precedent.131 Jamess view was no more
favourable, branding it the Federal Circuits dive into the precedential void of
public policy and equity.132 Therefore, despite confining file-wrapper estoppel,
rejecting the wooden133 approach of the past, and retaining the expansive as a
whole construction of the doctrine of equivalents in a quest for fairness, the CAFC
paradoxically undermined this very principle. Uncertainty, or, more accurately,
unpredictability, dogged judicial construction of the grant.
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197
challenge came in 1987 when the sporadic liberalism of the CAFCs early years,
evidenced by decisions such as Hughes and Loctite, was once again besieged from
within. However, rather than constraining application of the doctrine of equivalents by strict enforcement of file-wrapper estoppel, this time the attack, in the en
banc135 decision of Pennwalt Corp v Durand-Wayland Inc,136 was direct.
The patent in question concerned an apparatus for sorting fruit by weight,
colour, or both. It contained claims in which each element of the invention was represented as a means for performing a particular function. The alleged infringements embodied most, but not all, of the functions of the patented article.
Specifically, the accused devices were found to have neither indicating means to
determine positions of the items to be sorted137 nor their functional equivalent,138
as a microprocessor stored weight and colour data, not the positions of the items
themselves. This therefore negated any chance of finding literal infringement.
The court moved on to the question of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents reminding the parties that:
[T]he doctrine of equivalents is designed to do equity, and to relieve an inventor from a
semantic strait jacket when equity requires, it is not designed to permit wholesale redrafting of a claim to cover non-equivalent devices, i.e., to permit a claim expansion that would
encompass more than an insubstantial change.139
Having dispensed this advice, the majority proceeded to find the patent not
infringed. In coming to this conclusion they did not consider whether the claimed
invention and the accused devices were equivalent as a whole, as had been previous
practice, but instead introduced a new test for determining equivalency. It used an
all elements, or element-by-element, analysis requiring one-to-one equivalency of
claim integers such that if even one element of the claim was missing in an accused
device there could be no finding of infringement:
In sum, the term equivalents in the doctrine of equivalents refers to equivalents of the
elements of the claim, not equivalents of the claimed invention. While a device found to
be an infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is, in a sense, equivalent to the
claimed invention, that conclusion follows from application of the doctrine. It is not the
equivalency determination to which the doctrine is directed, but the result thereof. To
speak of a device as being an equivalentof the patented invention muddles the analysis.140
The dissent was strong and to the point. Senior Circuit Judge Bennett declaring
that:
135
ie judged by the full bench, a session whereby the entire membership of the Court (currently 12
judges in the Federal Circuit) participates in the decision rather than the regular quorum.
136
833 F.2d 931 (1987, CAFC).
137
Ibid, at 935.
138
Due to the fact that the claims of the patent were drafted in means-plus-function format recourse
to 112(6) was necessary to determine literal infringement.
139
833 F.2d 931 at 935, quoting from Perkin-Elmer Corp v Westinghouse Elec Corp, 822 F.2d 1528
(1987, CAFC) at 1352.
140 833 F.2d 931 at 953.
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[T]he majority has made shortsighted policy choices. The majority has contrived an analytical framework for the doctrine of equivalents that is little more than a redundant literal
infringement inquiry, which renders the doctrine of equivalents so unduly restrictive and
inflexible as to end its usefulness as judicial doctrine.141
He continued:
[I]n practical effect, the majority has eviscerated the underlying rationale of the Graver
Tank test by requiring, under the doctrine of equivalents, an exact equivalent for each element of the claimed invention. The majority in fact commends . . . [a test that] was never
the extent of the doctrine of equivalents analysis under our here-ignored precedents which
also required that the analysis be undertaken in light of the entirety of the accused device
and entirety of the patent-in-suit.142
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199
grant. In addition, curtailing the scope of protection in this manner provides further failure on grounds of fairness to the patentee by the overnight theft of a degree
of their accepted zone of protection. The fallout from the decision was significant.
The combined effect of Pennwalt and Corning Glass was inconsistent application
of the two differing standards. However, another seven years of instability within
the CAFC and lower courts were to pass before the Supreme Court was finally called
to settle the issue and address the problem of equivalents. Therefore in 1997,
45 years after Graver Tank had reignited an expansive application of the doctrine,
and following 15 years of instability in the CAFC, the Supreme court issued its judgment in Warner-Jenkinson v Hilton Davis.150
146
See, eg, Safe Flight Instrument Corp v Sunstrand Data Control Inc, 706 F.Supp. 1146 (1989, United
States District Court, Delaware). See also, Takenaka, n 26, above, at 212
147
Corning Glass Works v Sumitomo Electric, 868 F.2d 1251 (1989, CAFC).
148
See, eg, Player, Elemental Equivalence: Interpreting Substantially the Same Way under
PennwaltTaken in Light of Corning Glass [1989] EIPR 421.
149 Corning Glass, n 147, above, at 1259.
150 Warner-Jenkinson Co, Inc v Hilton Davis Chemical Co, 520 US 17 (1997, Supreme Ct).
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Death of a Doctrine?
Justice Thomas, delivering the opinion of a unanimous court, addressed calls for
the doctrines death directly:
Nearly 50 years ago, this Court in [Graver Tank] . . . set out the modern contours of what is
known in patent law as the doctrine of equivalents. . . . [The] Petitioner, which was found
to have infringed upon respondents patent under the doctrine of equivalents, invites us to
speak the death of that doctrine. We decline that invitation.151
This point of policy made, the court continued, lamenting the confusion that had
arisen over operation of the doctrine and stating that it would endeavour to clarify
its scope:
[T]he doctrine of equivalents, as it has come to be applied since Graver Tank, has taken on
a life of its own, unbounded by the patent claims. There can be no denying that the
doctrine of equivalents, when applied broadly, conflicts with the definitional and publicnotice functions of the statutory claiming requirement.152 (emphasis added)
It quoted the dissenting opinion of Judge Nies in the CAFCs judgment on the
case, stating that one means of avoiding the conflict could be found if a distinction
was drawn, which was not too esoteric, between:
substitution of an equivalent for a component in an invention and enlarging the metes and
bounds of the invention beyond what is claimed . . . Where a claim to an invention is
expressed as a combination of elements, as here,equivalents in the sobriquet Doctrine of
Equivalents refers to the equivalency of an element or part of the invention with one that
is substituted in the accused product or process . . . This view that the accused device or
process must be more than equivalent overall reconciles the Supreme Courts position on
infringement by equivalents with its concurrent statements that the courts have no right
151 Warner-Jenkinson Co, Inc v Hilton Davis Chemical Co, 520 US 17 (1997, Supreme Ct), at 21. It is
significant that none of the 21 judges in the Supreme Court and CAFC who ruled on the matter disputed
the existence of the doctrine. Further, at 28, the Court considered that Congress can legislate the doctrine of equivalents out of existence any time it chooses. The various policy arguments [concerning its
abolition] made by both sides are thus best addressed to Congress, not this Court.
152 Ibid, at 289.
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201
to enlarge a patent beyond the scope of its claims as allowed by the Patent Office.
[Citations omitted] The scope is not enlarged if courts do not go beyond the substitution
of equivalent elements.153
And continued:
We concur with this apt reconciliation of our two lines of precedent. Each element contained in a patent claim is deemed material to defining the scope of the patented invention,
and thus the doctrine of equivalents must be applied to individual elements of the claim,
not to the invention as a whole. It is important to ensure that the application of the
doctrine, even as to an individual element, is not allowed such broad play as to effectively
eliminate that element in its entirety.154
Thus the Supreme Court confirmed the all element rule as governing the application of the doctrine of equivalents, thereby firmly promoting the notice function
of the claims within a peripheral definition construct. As we shall see in chapter
seven, below, the alternative formulation, following the CAFCs decision in the case
and adopting a Hughes approach to interpretation applying the as a whole test, is
startlingly similar to the traditional German practice of determining scope by reference to the general inventive idea. Given that US practice is firmly founded in
peripheral definition theory, and has been since the Act of 1870, it is hardly surprising that the court refused to go down this latter route. Nevertheless, Rose raised criticism over the Supreme Court not fully embracing the CAFCs broad view of the
doctrine, instead rendering an opinion focussing on the tension that existed
between expanding protection to cover equivalents and the notice function of the
claims.155
The court did not, however, stop at merely confirming the existence of the doctrine and cementing the all element rule. True to its word, it continued to consider
how equivalents could be limited so as to conform with the notice function of the
statutory claiming requirement. In this capacity, it turned its attention to the doctrine of file-wrapper estoppel.
On File-Wrapper Estoppel
On the matter of file-wrapper estoppel, the court was equally forthright. It rejected
the petitioners argument that the mere fact that an amendment had been made
should preclude use of the doctrine of equivalents. It explained that prior cases had
consistently applied file-wrapper estoppel only where the claims had been amended
for a limited set of reasons, and that it could see no basis to require a more rigid rule
which did away with the right of the patentee to explain the change made. However:
153
Ibid, at 29. Quoting from 62 F.3d 1512, at 15734 (1995, CAFC) Nies, J, dissenting.
Warner-Jenkinson (Supreme Ct), n 150, above, at 29.
155 See Rose,Patent Monopolyphobia: A Means of Extinguishing the Fountainhead(1999) 49 Case
Western Reserve Law Review 509, at 5434.
154
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Where the patent holder is unable to establish such a purpose, a court should presume that
the purpose behind the required amendment is such that prosecution history estoppel
would apply.156
Therefore, where the change was unrelated to patentability, ie it was not made for
the purpose of overcoming a novelty, non-obviousness, etc, objection raised by the
PTO, estoppel could be avoided. However, the explanatory burden was placed on
the shoulders of the patentee, and in the absence of any good reason the presumption was that the Patent Office had substantial grounds related to patentability for
including the limiting element added by amendment. In such circumstances, the
court considered that prosecution history estoppel would apply.157 Yet, critically, it
was silent as to the effect of its application, therefore leaving it open for future litigants to dispute the consequences of a file-wrapper exception following the Hughes
courts pronouncement that it could be within a spectrum ranging from great to
small to zero.158 Whilst in some ways confirming the flexible approach akin to that
adopted in Hughes and Loctite, the courts insistence on the patentee bearing the
explanatory burden represents a sensible middle-ground between the wildly divergent opinions that had come to characterise appellate decisions of the previous
decade. Moreover, by adopting this position, the Supreme Court implicitly
acknowledged the primacy of the PTO in developing the intrinsic scope of the
patent as granted.
The unpredictability within the context of litigation of allowing the patentee a
second chance at trial to recapture ground already seemingly lost during prosecution was thus placed within sensible limits. Where the file-wrapper recorded the
reasons for an amendment that were not related to the standard for patentability,
the patentee was able to argue that the doctrine of equivalents should be unlimited.
There is, after all, no reason to believe that amended claims would be any more perfect than their unamended brethren. However, where the file-wrapper was silent on
the matter, and the patentee could provide no sound explanation as to the reason for
limitation, estoppel prevented them from recapturing ground that had been sacrificed . . . probably. The reason for this caveat, and indeed the major problem with the
Warner-Jenkinson decision, was the courts failure to comment on the effects of
finding that prosecution history estoppel actually applied; the overall consequence
of such a conclusion still being ripe for argument. This left the door wide open for a
different kind of unpredictability, independent of the courtroom, to flow from the
fact of amendment per se. Because the triggering event requiring . . . a rebuttal [is]
. . . an infringement suit,159 a prospect that most rational market players seek to
avoid, and the new practice placed increased significance on recording the reasons
for any modification in claim language, the instigation of a presumptive requirement resulted in both parties to infringement being in a shaky position. The patent
156
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203
holder could have to provide reasons for an amendment made many years previously, possibly before they even owned the patent, in order to rebut the presumption that it was made for reasons related to patentability. The Supreme Court
acknowledged this possibility; Justice Ginsburg, concurring with the majority, was
of the opinion that: The new presumption, if applied woodenly, might in some
instances unfairly discount the expectations of a patentee who had no notice at the
time of patent prosecution that such a presumption would apply.160 The alleged
infringer, on the other hand, was not mentioned, and yet was caught in similar position of uncertainty wherein the patentee may be able to argue ex post that the
altered claim language was, in fact, made for a reason unrelated to patentability,
especially where the file was unclear. Furthermore, even if an estoppel was raised,
the Supreme Courts silence on its effect rendered things even more uncertain. Noe
suggests that commercial pressures, particularly for small firms given their relatively limited resources, would dictate that most of the patentees competitors
would simply assume that estoppel would not apply, as to prove otherwise would
require a trip to court.161 This is clearly unsatisfactory; however it is clear that the
situation was no better for the patentee planning infringement litigation. This end
result is therefore a bitter pill to swallow, especially in the light of the courts own
statements about the definitional and public-notice functions of the statutory
claiming requirement,162 as anything that demands a more detailed consideration
of the file-wrapper to discover the reasons for an amendment (if given), arguably
fights against these functions.
160
161
162
163
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It therefore concluded that although Graver Tank left room for the inclusion of
intent based elements in the doctrine of equivalents, it could not be read as requiring them:
The better view, and the one consistent with Graver Tanks predecessors and the objective
approach to infringement, is that intent plays no role in the application of the doctrine of
equivalents.166
After-Arising Equivalents?
The petitioner had also argued that, in order to be consistent with the notice function of patent claims and to minimise any conflict that may arise, the doctrine of
equivalents should be limited, at the very least, to equivalents known at the time of
issue, and more realistically to equivalents actually disclosed in the patent. The
court declined to accept this approach, stating that knowledge of interchangeability
was not relevant for its own sake, but rather for what it tells the fact finder about the
similarities between elements. It reasoned that:
[T]he perspective of a skilled practitioner provides content to, and limits on, the concept
of equivalence and that the proper time for assessing the known interchangeability of
elements was at the time of infringement, and not before.167
Thus, the court refused to restrict the patents effect to the state of the art at the
time of filing, or even grant, reasoning that the objective nature of the test required
164
165
166
167
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205
the assessment to be made in the light of what was known at the time of infringement. In other words, it enabled the patentees contribution to be linked to the scope
of their rights, and drew together elements of disclosure and teaching with the zone
of exclusion that the grant was to enjoy. The court married the scope of the patent
to the standard for patentability and provided reward related to the patentees
extension of the art. This, in itself, is significant as it provides the final piece of the
jigsaw created by the expansive doctrine of equivalents and the patentability standard, allowing justification for expanding protection beyond the literal wording of
the claims. Whilst the literal scope of the patent provides protection for the core of
the invention, the doctrine of equivalents may be seen to augment this by acknowledging that the grant continues to have an instructive effect even after filing. The
teaching continues and, as society and technology progress, so the interpretation
that may be placed upon a patent will progress with it.
The standard has the additional benefit of avoiding the need for an artificial
investigation into what the court believes the skilled addressee would have considered the scope of the claims to have been at the date that the patent was filed. Whilst
the literal scope of the patent is tied to this moment in time, there is nothing to be
gained from entering into a speculative enquiry of what equivalents the patentee
had in their contemplation at the point of drafting, as logic would dictate that if an
equivalent was considered it would have been covered by the literal wording
used.168 It also acknowledges that hindsight determination of the patents effective
scope of protection is practically unavoidable. By recognising this factor and
embracing it, rather than simply pretending that the patentees foresight definition
of the invention is all that informs the court, predictability is enhanced.Whereas the
doctrine of equivalents may, in itself, be alleged to introduce uncertainties into the
interpretative procedure, by removing the need to consider what would have been
understood to be equivalent at some specified point in time perhaps fifteen years, or
more, before the acts of infringement, the Supreme Court confines the grant to an
easily understandable and eminently predictable set of equivalents. The pertinent
question when considering research and development is no longer to ask would
have been equivalent when the patent was drafted/published/granted, it is now to
enquire what the relevant person would consider to be obviously equivalent today.
Inventive extensions of the prior art would therefore still fall outside of the scope of
the patents protection. To adopt an alternative view, and to consider the matter
from the perspective of the historical claim (necessarily seen in court from a position of hindsight, as the alleged infringement has been committed, but insisting that
this is not the case), ignores the reality of technological development and the fact
that the patents teaching continues to evolve with the grant. Moreover, in no other
168
It should also be noted that a public dedication rule operates wherein subject matter that is disclosed in the description but remains unclaimed is deemed to have been dedicated to the public. See
Maxwell v Baker, 86 F.3d. 1098 (1996, CAFC). This principle was confirmed in Johnson & Johnston
Associates Inc v R E Service Co, 285 F.3d 1046 (2002, CAFC, en banc), at 1054, when the CAFC held that
such matter could additionally not be recaptured through operation of the doctrine of equivalents as this
would conflict with the primacy of the claims in defining the scope of the patentees exclusive right.
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aspect is the claim limited to what the court thought someone else believed it to
mean at the time it was drafted. If this were the case then it would be but a small step
to argue that there is an inalienable right to the patented technology for the
duration of the grant, as the Patent Office and the patentee must have believed at the
point of issue that what they were dealing with was valid. There can be no such presumption.
Acceptance of after-arising equivalents also gives justification to the reverse or
narrowing doctrine of equivalents, which was first advanced in Westinghouse v
Boyden.169 The doctrine had been confirmed some years prior to Warner-Jenkinson
by the CAFC in Texas Instruments Inc v United States International Trade
Commission.170 The court in the latter case, whilst agreeing that the claim in question could be read onto the allegedly infringing devices, considered that they were
in fact so far improved from the claimed invention that:
[T]he total of the technological changes beyond what the inventors disclosed transcends
the equitable limits illustrated, for example, in Graver Tank, . . . [etc.,] and propels the
accused devices beyond a just scope of the . . . claims.171
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207
In answer to this question, the court suggested that different linguistic frameworks would suit different factual situations and that a focus on the role played by
individual elements in the context of a specific claim will inform the inquiry.
However, it refrained from going further and micro managing the Federal Circuits
particular word choice for analyzing equivalence. Preferring instead to leave the
CAFC free to refine the formulation of the test for equivalence in the orderly course
of case-by-case determinations.175 Given the problems evident with applying a
single linguistic framework to all types of invention and technology, elucidation of
the underlying rationale in this manner was an eminently sensible step for the court
to take. Maintaining a firm association between the claims and the extent of protection under the doctrine must also be seen as a positive attempt to confirm the predictability of the grant, going some way to assuage cries that it was inherently
incompatible with the definitional and public notice functions of the claiming
requirement. However, it was apparent that significant parties thought that the
Supreme Court had not gone far enough. Heading this list was a very significant
party indeed: the CAFC.
Ibid.
The first hearing being in the US District Court for the District of Massachusetts before Special
Master Schwartz, judgment delivered on 27 Apr, 1993. Not reported in F.Supp. The decision is available
on Westlaw under reference 1993 WL 1510657 and on LexisNexis under reference 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21434.
177
Festo Corporation v Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co, Ltd, 520 US 1111 (1997, Supreme
Court).
178
Hosteny,Does Festo Change Patent Prosecution? [2001] (May) IP Today 44 at 44.
179 Wegner, Festering Questions After Festo (2003) 13 Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and
Entertainment Law Journal 891, at 891, 907.
176
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nonetheless, stating that the Festo decision may have transformed prosecution history estoppel into an exception that swallows the rule.180
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209
Judgment en Banc
The court began by examining the function of the doctrine of equivalents in patent
law, retracing the steps of the Supreme Court in Warner-Jenkinson. Referring to
Graver Tank, Circuit Judge Schall, giving the opinion of the court, stated that the
doctrine operates to prevent the:
accused infringer from avoiding liability for infringement by changing only minor
or insubstantial details of a claimed invention while retaining the inventions essential
identity.184
He continued:
Prosecution history estoppel is one tool that prevents the doctrine of equivalents from
vitiating the notice function of claims . . . [It] precludes a patentee from obtaining under
the doctrine of equivalents coverage of subject matter that has been relinquished during
the prosecution of its patent application . . . Therefore,[t]he doctrine of equivalents is subservient to . . . [prosecution history] estoppel.186 [citations omitted]
With these points in mind, the court then proceeded to consider the answers to
the five specific questions posed. In respect of the first, it held that a substantial reason related to patentability was not limited to the avoidance of prior art, but also
included any other reason related to the statutory requirements for patentability:
183
184
185
186
Ibid. at 563.
Ibid, at 564. Referring to Graver Tank, n 8, above, at 608.
234 F.3d 558 at 564. Referring to Warner-Jenkinson, n 150, above, at 29.
234 F.3d 558 at 564.
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Therefore, an amendment that narrows the scope of a claim for any reason related to the
statutory requirements for a patent will give rise to prosecution history estoppel with
respect to the amended claim element.187
In answer to the second question, the court considered that voluntary amendments should be treated in the same manner as any other amendments:
[T]herefore, any voluntary amendment that narrows the scope of a claim for a reason
related to the statutory requirements for a patent will give rise to prosecution history
estoppel with respect to the amended claim element . . . [As b]oth voluntary amendments
and amendments required by the Patent Office signal to the public that subject matter has
been surrendered.188
The answer to the third question has been described as the heart of the Festo
opinion190 as the flexible-bar approach of the past191 was swept aside in favour of
the far more restrictive complete-bar to the application of the doctrine of equivalents. The court explained the reason for adopting this standard in the following
manner:
Our decision to reject the flexible bar approach adopted in [Hughes] . . . comes after nearly
twenty years of experience in performing our role as the sole court of appeals for patent
matters. In those years, the notice function of patent claims has become paramount, and the
need for certainty as to the scope of patent protection has been emphasized. A problem
with the flexible bar approach is that it is virtually impossible to predict before the decision on appeal where the line of surrender is drawn.
. . . After our long experience with the flexible bar approach, we conclude that its workability is flawed.192 (emphasis added)
Circuit Judge Schall continued, extolling the virtues of the complete bar
approach in lending certainty to the process of determining the scope of protection
conferred by a patent:
187
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211
With a complete bar, both the public and the patentee know that once an element of a
claim is narrowed by amendment for a reason related to patentability, that elements scope
of coverage will not extend beyond its literal terms. There is no speculation or uncertainty
as to the exact range of equivalents that might be available. This certainty aids both the
public and the patentee in ascertaining the true scope and value of the patent without having to resort to litigation to obtain a case by case analysis of what subject matter the claims
can cover. With a complete bar, neither the public nor the patentee is required to pay the
transaction costs of litigation in order to determine the exact scope of subject matter the
patentee abandoned when the patentee amended the claim.193
Furthermore, in answer to the fourth question, the court stated that no range of
equivalents would be available where no explanation for a claim amendment was
established.194 The court therefore adopted the contraposition to the Hughes courts
narrow interpretation of the effects of the doctrine of file-wrapper estoppel and further extended the complete bar rule. Due to its answers to the preceding questions,
the court found no need to reach a decision in relation to the fifth question.
Fallout
By answering the en banc questions in this manner, the CAFC caused uproar in
patent circles. The primary criticism came from the establishment of the complete
bar approach whereby any amendment related to patentability would automatically preclude application of the doctrine of equivalents to that element.As noted in
chapter four, above, the standard practice of those drafting patent claims is to begin
broad and amend as, and when, necessary to narrow the scope of protection during
prosecution. This approach is a product of many factors, including the stage in the
innovative process at which the patent application is made and the position of
known prior art in relation to the invention. Therefore, those patents that were
drafted prior to the decision in Festo almost invariably suffered from amendments
of some kind, whether related to patentability or not, due simply to the nature of the
drafting process. Before the decision, before the importance of rationalising and
recording the exact reason for the amendment was made clear, there was, however,
no incentive or requirement to explain the claims modification in any way. Yet,
subsequently the bright line standard adopted by the CAFC created a need for the
owner to have specified the reasons for any modification of claim language, or else
to risk equivalents being precluded; such was the requirement of certainty. In
making its statement on the complete nature of the bar, the court failed to consider
the penalties that this certainty would impose upon those patents in force at the
time of the judgment. This, in itself, is somewhat ironic as this very situation was
discussed by members of the Supreme Court in Warner-Jenkinson. Justice
Ginsburg, with whom Justice Kennedy concurred, joining the opinion of the court
but writing separately to add a cautionary note on the rebuttable presumption [it]
193
194
Ibid, at 577.
Ibid, at 578.
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The CAFCs decision in Festo may therefore be criticised on the basis that it is
wholly inconsistent with this warning. Significant problems arise due to the effects
that prior rules had on the system surrounding the interpretation of patent documents. The interpretation that will be placed on the claims of a patent is but one of
a number of factors that govern the effective scope of protection. Institutional practices augmenting the courts approach to the determination of patent scope rely on
consistency for their operation. Patents are drafted in the expectation that they will
be interpreted in a certain way, or at least will not be prejudiced in the future for
compliance with the law of the present. Therefore, criticism of the Festo decision
need not be criticism directed to the future effects on drafting, but rather to the
seismic shift in the status quo that renders past inventive effort devoid of reward.
The effect of the CAFCs decision was to provide a patentees competitors with a
charter to infringe.All that they need do was order a copy of the patent and the prosecution history, isolate those areas in which amendment had been made and substitute functional equivalents for those elements. The apparent policy justifications
for patent protection were changed overnight as a warped caricature of the public
notice function gained prominence. Therefore, patents drafted with all due care
and diligence based on the courts previous practice found themselves, after Festo,
robbed of the scope that they would once have enjoyed. The decision could not be
allowed to stand.
195
196
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213
The patent laws promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by rewarding innovation
with a temporary monopoly . . . [T]he nature of language makes it impossible to capture
the essence of a thing in a patent application. The inventor who chooses to patent an
invention and disclose it to the public, rather than exploit it in secret, bears the risk that
others will devote their efforts toward exploiting the limits of the patents language . . . The
language in the patent claims may not capture every nuance of the invention or describe
with complete precision the range of its novelty. If patents were always interpreted by their
literal terms, their value would be greatly diminished.197 (emphasis added)
The court explained that the doctrine of equivalents had evolved to combat the
devaluation caused by simple acts of copying where unimportant and insubstantial
substitutes for claimed elements had been made. Uncertainty was described as the
the price of ensuring the appropriate incentives for innovation, a price that the
Supreme Court had always been willing to pay, consistently affirm[ing] the doctrine over dissents that urged a more certain rule.198
Yet it was clear that the doctrine of equivalents could not progress unbounded.
For this reason its sister doctrine, file-wrapper estoppel, had been created. Just as
equivalents protection preserves equity in enabling the patentee to capture insubstantial changes that had evaded the literal draft, so prosecution history estoppel
preserves the same in binding the patentee to their concession that the invention as
patented does not extend as far as the original claim:
Prosecution history estoppel ensures that the doctrine of equivalents remains tied to its
underlying purpose. Where the original application once embraced the purported equivalent but the patentee narrowed his claims to obtain the patent or to protect its validity, the
patentee cannot assert that he lacked the words to describe the subject matter in question.
The doctrine of equivalents is premised on languages inability to capture the essence of
innovation, but a prior application describing the precise element at issue undercuts that
premise. In that instance the prosecution history has established that the inventor turned
his attention to the subject matter in question, knew the words for both the broader and
narrower claim, and affirmatively chose the latter.199
The court therefore confirmed that an estoppel would arise where the amendments made to a claim in order to secure the patent resulted in a narrowing of its
scope. However, it rejected the complete bar rule suggested by the CAFC, stating
that this approach was:
inconsistent with the purpose of applying the estoppel in the first placeto hold the
inventor to the representations made during the application process and to the inferences
that may reasonably be drawn from the amendment. By amending the application, the
inventor is deemed to concede that the patent does not extend as far as the original claim.
It does not follow, however, that the amended claim becomes so perfect in its description
that no one could devise an equivalent. After amendment, as before, language remains an
imperfect fit for invention. The narrowing amendment may demonstrate what the claim
is not; but it may still fail to capture precisely what the claim is.200
197
198
199
200
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Thus, there was considered to be no good reason why any narrowing amendment
would result in a claim that was any more perfect than one in its original, unaltered,
state. Moreover, if equivalents were unforeseeable at the time of the amendment,
then it could not even be concluded that the patentee had in any way surrendered
these by the changes to their claims. As such there was no logical reason why the
strict bar on the application of the doctrine of equivalents should apply to amended
claims any more than there was such a reason for abolishing the doctrine of equivalents altogether and holding every patentee to the literal terms of the patent.201
The Supreme Court therefore took a middle path between the CAFCs absolute bar
and the flexible approach of the past, adopting instead a foreseeable standard in line
with that advocated by the US government in its amicus brief.202 As Cole notes, this
foreseeable bar was said to avoid each parade of horribles put forward by respective opponents of the flexible bar and the absolute bar, while simultaneously giving
effect to the policy considerations advanced by their respective advocates.203 To
have adopted the CAFCs position and insisted upon a bright-line complete bar
would, in the words of the court, be to resort to the very literalism the equivalents
rule is designed to overcome.204 Both the doctrine of equivalents and prosecution
history estoppel were, therefore,settled law and:
The responsibility for changing them rests with Congress . . . Fundamental alterations in
these rules risk destroying the legitimate expectations of inventors in their property.205
(emphasis added)
Comment
The Supreme Courts judgment in Festo is clearly focused on the predictability of
the grant. By stating that fundamental alterations in the rules governing claim
interpretation risks destroying the legitimate expectations of inventors, the court
unambiguously reasserted Justice Ginsburgs comments in Warner-Jenkinson
and rebuked the lower court for ignoring this guidance. In providing judgment,
therefore, it recognised the problems associated with expansion of the grant via
equivalents, but also demonstrated appreciation that there is no magic solution to
the inherent problem of defining the invention in a web of words. All approaches
will, in one manner or another, be insufficient and will introduce uncertainties or
prejudice equity. The key, therefore is to appreciate this factor and to work on the
basis that perfection is not a possible, or even plausible, standard to attain.
Rejection of a complete bar standard demonstrates the Supreme Courts view
that the balance cannot be achieved by ignoring the realities of the system and pre201
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215
tending that claims could ever be perfect. As noted in chapter four, above, the possibility of making mistakes, of missing the elusive piece of prior art, or of failing to
convince the examiner that a claim should be allowed in an unamended form, is
inversely proportional to the amount of time (and money) spent on drafting and
searching. Additionally, the degree of familiarity that the patentee has with the
patenting process is significant in securing a solid claim. It is therefore telling to note
that the parties in favour of the absolute bar tended to be large, blue-chip, institutions such as IBM, Kodak, Ford, and Du Pont.206 Clearly all have the experience
and financial muscle to conduct extensive searches and make good of a narrow protection situation, all would ultimately benefit from being able to design around a
competitors invention, and all could probably afford to lose a proportion of their
patents to achieve this bright-line standard. On the other side, arguing for a flexiblebar, lay the American Intellectual Property Law Association, an independent association consisting mainly of intellectual property law practitioners207 and who have
a good chance of working for the little guy.
By rejecting the position advocated by IBM, et al, the Supreme Court demonstrated that it was acutely aware of the effect that such a shift in the legitimate expectations of both patentee and their competitors would have on the process of
innovation already instigated under the patent system. It is clear that the assessment
and determination of the patents zone of protection cannot be isolated from those
grants already in existence, which have had their intrinsic scope (ie the scope of the
patent as drafted) determined by the legitimate expectations of their drafters. The
importance of the doctrine of equivalents in the US is thus primarily related to
the effect that it has on patents in operation, rather than the prospective effect that
it may have on patents in the future. The American experience therefore highlights
one of the paradoxes inherent in designing a better, or optimal, patent regime. The
act of change, in itself, is incompatible with many of the aims of, and justifications
for, the system.As Machlup stated in his review of the US Patent system in the 1950s:
If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present
knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. But since we
have had a patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our current knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.208
206 See the Brief of International Business Machines Corporation, Eastman Kodak Company, Ford
Motor Company, EI Du Pont De Nemours and Company, Agere Systems Incorporated and the Financial
Services Roundtable as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents. Available on Westlaw: 2001 WL
1397747.
207
Their website, http://www.aipla.org, states: The American Intellectual Property Law Association
(AIPLA) is a national bar association constituted primarily of lawyers in private and corporate practice,
in government service, and in the academic community, with more than 16,000 members. The AIPLA
represents a wide and diverse spectrum of individuals, companies and institutions involved directly or
indirectly in the practice of patent, trademark, copyright, and unfair competition law, as well as other
fields of law affecting intellectual property. Our members represent both owners and users of intellectual property.
208
Machlup, An Economic Review of the Patent System, Study No 15 of the Sub-Committee on
Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Committee on the Judiciary, US Senate 85th Congress, 2nd
Session (1958; Washington) at 801.
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The same can be said instituting the sort of ad hoc amendments to current
practice that the CAFC did in Festo. The quest for certainty (under the guise of predictability) undertaken by the court is admirable, however, given the status quo
before Festo, the CAFCs approach was reckless. Predictability means more than
simply having patents whose scope is confined to a literal and therefore certain
interpretation, in common law jurisdictions it also means predictable litigation
based firmly on precedent. The Federal Circuits decision in Festo not only evinces a
change of favour for patents, withdrawing fully from the courts early pro-patent
policy, but also flies in the face of clear precedent.
Such was the outcry over the ruling that it is not at all surprising that the Supreme
Court acted as it did in condemning the junior courts actions. However, the story
does not end here for towards the end of 2003 an en banc CAFC issued judgment in
Festo for the second time.209
He conceded, however, that the consequences of failing to overcome that presumption have been altered.213
The test to be applied was stated to comprise three distinct stages. First, does the
amendment narrow the literal scope of the claim? If it does then the second question may be asked; if not, prosecution history estoppel does not apply. The second
question concerns the motivation for the amendment; was it carried out for a substantial reason relating to patentability? The presumption, following the decision in
Warner-Jenkinson, is that, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary being
209
210
211
212
213
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217
found on the prosecution file, it was.214 As noted above, this raises certain problems
in relation to unclear file-wrappers; however, as a simple continuation of established practice, the standard is unobjectionable. If the amendment is considered to
have been required for reasons relating to patentability the next step in the analysis,
considering the scope of the subject matter surrendered by the narrowing amendment, may be addressed. The presumption connected with this third-stage, the socalled Festo presumption,215 is that the patentee has surrendered all of the territory
between the original claim and the amended claim. Once again, this is subject to
rebuttal; however, the grounds for doing so are significantly limited, leading one
commentator to observe that amendments will virtually never fall into these
escape hatches .216
214
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In other words, it seeks to rely upon representations made and recorded in the
file-wrapper as to why a claim was amended. As Judge Newman explains, the problem with this approach is that the issue of tangentialness will often require consideration of how the reasons for an amendment affected the patentees view that
221
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Conclusion
219
certain technology was extraneous.227 This information will rarely, if ever, be found
in the prosecution history. Furthermore, as Van Thomme suggests: It seems
unlikely . . . that an equivalent that is related closely enough to potentially give rise
to infringement under the doctrine of equivalents could ever be only tangentially
relatedto the amendment in question.228 The majority therefore provide a test that
is narrowed to the point of absurdity.
The third, and final, criterion clarified by the court requires that the patentee
establish some other reason to explain why they could not reasonably be expected
to have described the insubstantial substitute in question.229 Judge Lourie, giving
the opinion of the majority, stressed that:
This category, while vague, must be a narrow one; it is available in order not to totally
foreclose a patentee from relying on reasons, other than unforeseeability and tangentialness, to show that it did not surrender the alleged equivalent. Thus, the third criterion may
be satisfied when there was some reason, such as the shortcomings of language, why the
patentee was prevented from describing the alleged equivalent when it narrowed the
claim.230
However, as Judge Newman once again comments, the possibility of such a reason being contained in the prosecution history, as it would need to be following the
majoritys judgment, is low: a virtual impossibility.231
Whilst the majoritys discussion of the rebuttal criteria is limiting, it is their final
pronouncement that: if the patentee fails to rebut the Festo presumption, then
prosecution history estoppel bars the patentee from relying on the doctrine of
equivalents for the accused element,232 that is the cause for most concern. Given the
narrow interpretation of the possibility of rebuttal, this statement effectively reintroduces the complete bar via the operation of a series of presumptions that expand
the surrendered territory. Once again, the patentees competitors have their courtsanctioned charter to infringe.
Conclusion
The effect of the CAFCs clarification of the presumptions and guidance on applying the rebuttal criteria is to return to a position wherein the complete bar is applied
under a different name. The applicant is still at a serious disadvantage if their claims
have been the subject of amendment, whatever the reason, at some point during the
application process. As Judge Rader, in a concurring opinion, notes:
227
228
229
230
231
232
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[A]t the pace of these changes in fundamental patent law, the noble objective of bringing
more certainty to the doctrine of equivalents nonetheless exacts a price in unintended
consequences . . . [T]he Supreme Courts stringent estoppel presumptions also entail
considerable unanticipated arbitrariness because examiners differ. Some examiners
aggressively seek to narrow and define claims. Others demand far fewer amendments.
Thus the application of the forfeiture presumption often depends on the luck of the examiner draw. In any event, the new certainty rules for equivalents (a rebuttable presumption
that narrowing amendments erect a complete bar), at least for a period of time, may disrupt as much certainty as they provide. In particular, these new rules are likely to influence
both the patent acquisition and enforcement processes in unpredictable ways.233
According to Judge Rader, the CAFC is therefore in it for the long-haul; creating
a clearer and better patent system for the future even if it results in uncertainty
today. This is admirable, but fails to appreciate that this is exactly what Judge Rich
and his fellows were attempting to do by shaping the court as pro-patent at the
beginning of its lifetime. Within little more than 20 years, we have seen a volte-face
in the courts affections, first favouring the patentee and then the public, in each case
proclaiming this to be in the greater interests of society and invention. The Supreme
Court, on the other hand, appears more pragmatic; the doctrine of equivalents is a
given within US patent law and uncertainty is the price that one pays in order that
the underlying policies of this law, as dictated by the Constitution, are satisfied.
Uncertainty of this type is something that patentees have lived with since the seminal decision in Graver Tank, and probably before, and they have coped.
As Bassinger correctly points out, it is Not only . . . the content of the layered presumptions in the CAFCs treatment of Festo that cause uncertainty, but also the
context of the changes embodied by the rapid erosion of established precedent.234
The patent system as a whole, including the procedure of issue, the technique of
drafting, and the interpretation of claims, is internally slow to respond to external
changes imposed upon it by decisions such as Festo. When the goalposts are moved
in this manner, and once routine practices are suddenly made to negatively impact
the scope of protection, the aims, justifications and objectives of the patent system
are undermined. Therefore, paradoxically, the quest for certainty that is being
undertaken by the CAFC in the case is, in itself, responsible for disrupting the fundamental principle of certainty in the scope of patent claims.235 Furthermore, by
placing essentially insurmountable obstacles in the way of patentees asserting the
doctrine of equivalents where they have amended their claims, the court risks turning the patent right into the hollow and useless thing that the Supreme Court in
Graver Tank was so concerned to avoid.236 Bassingers words are, again, apt: The
doctrine of equivalents was developed over nearly two-hundred years of slow and
steady decisions. In the past five years, this precedent has been largely dismantled.237
233
Ibid, at 13756.
Bassinger, Unsettled Expectations in Patent Law: Festo and the Moving Target of Claim
Equivalence (2005) 48 Howard Law Journal 685 at 734.
235 Per Judge Rader, 344 F.3d 1359, at 1376.
236 Graver Tank, n 8, above, at 607. See also Van Thomme, n 215, above, at 1124 for a similar point.
237 Bassinger, n 234, above, at 734.
234
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Conclusion
221
Changes of the magnitude and type seen in Festo provide for an uncertain and
punitive view of the patent system that provides inventors with less incentive to
make their inventions known. Secrecy, especially in those fast-moving, and not
widely understood, realms of technology at the forefront of innovation (what may
be referred to as immature or pioneer arts) may well become more important than
patent protection. If this is the case, then society at large will be the one to lose out.
The perceived attitude of the courts (in the US especially the CAFC), is a far more
accurate measure of the scope that will be given to a litigated patent than any of the
economic or theoretical justifications or models of the system considered above.
The response of society as a whole will, eventually, remedy any changes in interpretative standards, as business practices adapt to maintain their own status quo,
maximising the protection that is available.238 However, with doctrinal shifts of the
size and type displayed by the CAFC from its formation to the judgments in Festo,
the patenting business has essentially been a lottery for a little over two decades.
There are big prizes for the winners, but equally big risks too. Predictability, the very
element that the CAFC and the Supreme Court are apparently seeking, has been
damaged by confused notions of what the balance of protection should be. Whilst
the advances made in recent years may be claimed to be beneficial from some viewpoints,239 this is dwarfed by the uncertainties that have been engendered in the
wider context. The CAFC appears to have forgotten that they are not designing the
patent system from scratch, and that contemplation of existing interests, including
the settled interests of patentees already in the system, must have a bearing on the
outcome. In this context, the patent grant in the US is actually in a worse place than
it was during what Merges describes as the bad old days of the Douglas-Black antipatent jihad,240 because at least then the patentee knew what was coming.
Therefore, with this in mind, we now turn our attention to consider a position
lying at the other end of the spectrum from the restrictive Festo doctrine, as we look
at the German patent system, traditionally characterised as offering broad protection to the general inventive idea.
238 Indeed, in the aftermath of the CAFCs original en banc decision in Festo, articles such as Hosteny,
n 178, above, sprang up giving advice on avoiding the Festo pitfalls.
239 Note, Estopping the Madness at the PTO: Improving Patent Administration Through
Prosecution History Estoppel (2003) 116 Harvard Law Review 2164, arguing at 2174-9 that a complete
bar approach in relation to file-wrapper estoppel scares the patentee into submitting better patents,
therefore driving down the cost of administration of the application.
240 Merges, Back to the Shadows, or Onward and Upward? Current Trends in Patent Law. Available
online at Patently-O: http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2007/01/merges_back_to_.html. The jihad he
refers to is exemplified by Justice Douglas comments in the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co case. See n 13
& 22, above.
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7
Germany
A Tradition Of Expansive Interpretation
Opinions on the German system of determining the scope of protection of patents are
divided. Some believe that the system is too far-reaching and are concerned about the
legal uncertainty caused by vast differences between a patentees characterization of his
invention and the scope of protection granted. Others recommend the system as a
model.
Bruchhausen,The Scope of Patent Protection in Different European Countries
An Outline of Recent Case Law (1973) 4 IIC 306 at 307
Preface
Europe has one patent system, a supposedly homogenised grant and opposition
process for the 32 States1 that contract to the European Patent Convention (the
EPC). In addition, the EPC also boldly legislates for the scope that these grants are
to enjoy once created.2 Yet without a common appeal court to act as final arbiter in
matters relating to the determination of the breadth of protection, a history of
wildly differing interpretative styles has rendered any harmonisation on this latter
ground incomplete. We have already seen the United Kingdoms traditional
approach to claim interpretation, and now in the second of three chapters on comparative aspects of patent scope we turn our attention to one of the UKs closest, and
yet in this arena most distant, neighbours: Germany.
The traditional view of the German patent system is that it lies in diametric opposition to that of the United Kingdom. In almost any text one cares to mention that
discusses the interpretation of British patents, the reader will be referred to decisions of the German courts (most notably, indeed notoriously, the Epilady 3 litigation) as a demonstration of European disharmony on the determination of the
1 As of Apr 2007. The States in question are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hellenic Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom.
2 By virtue of Art 69 EPC and the Protocol on the Interpretation thereof.
3 Improver v Remington [1990] FSR 181 (English proceedings); (1993) 24 IIC 838 (Germany).
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grants scope of protection. This comparison is encouraged, perhaps even engendered to a degree, by the wording of the statutory provisions that guide interpretation of any patent granted by a signatory country of the EPC; Article 69 and the
Protocol on its interpretation.
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225
10
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defining a position between these extremes which combines a fair protection for the patentee with a reasonable degree of certainty for third parties.14
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227
completely liberated from claim language; and [in] the third period . . . the scope of the
patent protection is expansively interpreted based on the claim language.16
Towards Protection
As noted in chapter three, above, the lack of a patent system in the German
Zollverein21 provided one of the main bones of contention for the critics of the
British system in the anti-patent debate of the mid-nineteenth century. It will be
recalled that both sides in the argument utilised the absence of protection as illustration that their own view was correct. The abolitionists called for an end to the
16 Takenaka, Interpreting Claims, n 6, above, at 26. A similar discussion can be found in Winkler,The
Scope of Patent Protection: Past, Present and Future (1979) 10 IIC 296.
17 Not to be confused with EU harmonisation measures, as the EPC is not a product of the EU, its
precursors or affiliated bodies.
18 Festo Corporation v Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co Ltd, 234 F.3d 558 (2000, CAFC, en banc),
and 344 F.3d 1359 (2003, CAFC, en banc).
19
This statement remains true despite the US Supreme Courts interference in the case; see the discussion in text accompanying n 20932 in ch 6, above.
20
The author leaves open for the present the issue of whether this perception is, in fact, a reality.
21
ie the German Customs Union; established in the 1830s. Various individual member states of the
German Reich had already adopted patent protectionVojcek, A Survey of the Principal National
Patent Systems (New York, Prentice Hall, 1936) provides a short list at 144, noting that there had
been patent laws in Prussia since 1815, in Bavaria since 1825, in Wrtemberg since 1828, in Baden since
1845, in Saxony since 1853, in Hessen since 1820, in Hanover since 1847, etc. However, these were the
exception rather than the rule, the political disunity of Germany making uniform patent legislation
impossible until the 1870s. See also, Machlup & Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth
Century (1950) 10 Journal of Economic History 1 at 36; Penrose, The Economics of the International
Patent System (Baltimore, The John Hopkins Press, 1951) at 145.
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idiocy that enabled the free movement of inventive information on the Continent
whilst in Britain growth and technological freedom was hampered by pernicious
patents. The pro-patent lobby, on the other hand, cited famous examples of
German defectors who moved to the UK ostensibly because of the protection that
their inventions would receive there.22
By the end of the century, however, resistance to patents had crumbled and the
British system was saved from abolition. The changing face of invention and innovation, particularly the rise of large research-intensive firms, had emphasised the
need for some degree of incentive/reward to enable the recovery of costs sunk in the
name of R&D. Therefore, rather than abolishing a system that was accepted in principle, but unpopular in practice, the Government ceded to reform. In Germany the
same pressures, especially the growth of large chemical and dyestuff companies like
Bayer, Hoechst and BASF, and the political harmony that flowed from the creation
of the Second Reich in 1871, meant that those opposing the introduction of a patent
system suffered the same fate as their British counterparts. Therefore, in 1877 a uniform patent law for the entire Reich was adopted by the German legislature.
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language of the claims. Therefore, as Takenaka notes, the significance of claim language . . . and that of disclosure . . . were reversed.27 Whereas previously the claims
had defined the scope of protection, functioning as evidence of an agreement
between the Patent Office and the patentee, the courts now took the view that this
agreement must have been intended to cover all possible embodiments disclosed by
the patent unless there was clear evidence to the contrary.28 Where the prosecution
history clearly dictated that a wide view could not be taken, the courts were obliged
to limit the scope to a point corresponding to a literal (or even sub-literal) interpretation of the claims. However, clear adoption of the reward theory of patent protection meant that the predominant trend was towards an expansion from literal
interpretation.29
The development of protection theory along reward justification lines was aided
by the fact that the German model adopted a strict separation of jurisdiction
between the Patent Office and the courts. The technical scope of the invention was
defined by the Patent Office. This had exclusive jurisdiction over the grant and
validity of the patent and required the claims to be drafted in a prescribed form.30
The courts, on the other hand, determined the ambit of protection, which now
moved towards recognition of the essence of the invention and its contribution to
the state of the art. Therefore, the scope of a patent was extended to cover all of the
embodiments of which the patentee could possibly have conceived, including subcombinations of claimed elements where the sub-combination itself did not lie in
the state of the art.31
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concluded that the intentions of the Patent Office and the patentee should be disregarded completely when determining the scope of the patent.33 Rather, the extent
of protection should be determined exclusively by the inventions contribution,
objectively judged, to the state of the art. As Vojc ek comments, The theory was
developed that the patent office, in fixing patent claims, states only the object of the
patent . . ., but that law courts alone decide upon the scope of protection.34 By
adopting this approach to the assessment of patent scope, the court answered the
emerging problem of adequately rewarding the patentee for their inventive efforts.
Therefore, whereas the US courts had adopted peripheral definition theory and the
doctrine of equivalents to protect the inventors interests, the German courts
moved fully to central definition theory.
This divorce of patent scope from the claims heralded the beginning of the
Second, most expansive/least certain,35 period in German case law. In order to justify the courts growing tendency to divert from the clear and unambiguous wording of the claims that was had been evident since the end of the First Period, German
legal philosophers had put forward hypotheses based on the separation of jurisdiction between the courts and the Patent Office.36 One of the leading theorists was
Isay,37 who was of the opinion that, as the Patent Office defines the subject matter
and decides on the patentability of the invention, and the courts independently
decide on the scope of protection, the formers interpretation of the state of the art
in the context of examining the invention during prosecution is irrelevant once that
grant is made. Indeed, given that the Patent Office only considers the invention as a
whole, and never any modification or sub-combination of its elements, and given
the impossibility of being able to consider all of the prior art before grant, the role
of the Office must be limited to consideration of patentability only. Therefore, given
the separation of jurisdiction, and given the different purposes of the investigations
by the two bodies, the intention of the Patent Office in making the grant and the
interpretation that it places on the state of the art could not be binding on the
courts determination of the scope of protection.38 This approach has the benefit of
avoiding the need to simultaneously view the prior art retrospectively in order to
determine the subject of the invention and prospectively to determine future solutions of an identical or similar type when determining the scope of protection of the
patent. It therefore left the Patent Office free to concentrate on the simpler taska
task that Husser notes is from its very preconditions, appropriate to the Patent
33
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element of the signalling potential of the patent was therefore removed from the
equation: unpredictability had entered the fray. This defect in the system therefore
also provided disadvantage to the patentee, as they could not foresee the boundaries
of their rights clearly enough to be able to stake money on defending them effectively. This had important repercussions for the rational patentees decision to litigate. Therefore the adoption of a model wherein the scope of protection was
essentially unconstrained other than by vague notions of what the court perceived
the invention to be served no one well.
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Whilst it is clear that the scope accorded to patents in the Third Period was considerably narrower that that of the Second, the German system was still criticised as
providing uncertain protection.51 Indeed, concerns over the breadth of the general
inventive idea contributed to the decision to insert the Protocol into the EPC.52
Therefore, in order to aid fuller understanding of the middle road along which this
provision is intended to steer we now turn our attention to consider the three-part
doctrine in more detail.
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successful application for revocation that the literal wording of the claims ceased to
be a problem for the alleged infringer.56 Second, in addition to these differences in
practice, there was also disparity in claim style itself during this pre-harmonisation
period, which renders direct comparison of the two states patent regimes impossible. Whereas in Britain the principle for many years had been that the patentee was
free to draft their claim in any manner that they chose, in Germany the Patent Office
had rapidly adopted a prescribed pattern of claim shortly after the inception of protection.57 Husser gives succinct summary of the practice thus:
[T]he generic category to which the invention was most closely subordinate was first
stated, followed by the essential features of the invention; this was done by separating the
two parts by the words in which or characterised in that.
Therefore, given the strict requirements of the Patent Office relating to the formulation of the claims, the fact that the courts habitually determined the scope of
protection based on equivalents analysis, and the fact that central definition was
used, a literal interpretation of the claims of a German patent was correspondingly
narrower than its British counterpart.59
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providing, however, they had the same technical function and retained the same
effect regarding the inventive idea.
The subject matter of the invention was found by adopting a problem and solution analysis; examining the problem that the patented invention set out to solve
and the solution that it provided. Such an examination was designed to expose the
technical teaching, which lay in a combination of elements. Given that the entire
specification would be utilised for the purpose of defining the elements of which the
invention consisted, it was immaterial whether the individual components were
separately claimed (or even whether they were mentioned in the claims at all). The
important factor was that the skilled person would have understood the invention
to compose of these elements at the priority date, without knowledge of the alleged
infringement. As Sijp notes, it was only in a borderline case that the technical teaching may coincide with the literal wording of the claims,61 in most other cases this
level of generalisation of the invention supplemented the literal scope.
Once the subject matter of the invention had been determined, the alleged
infringement then underwent a similar elemental analysis. The two were then compared, and the obviousness of any substitutions, omissions or additions to the
patent formula was considered. It is important to note that the German practice
under this head of protection did not require one-to-one substitutability of
elements. Therefore infringement could not be avoided if an element was omitted
provided that its omission did not change the manner in which the accused embodiment solved the technical problem. The technical teaching of the invention can
thus be seen as similar to the essential elements of the invention under an equivalents analysis. As long as the alleged infringement had the same function and operated in the same way to produce the same result then a finding of infringement
would be forthcoming.62 However, it is clear that whereas the function, way, result
formulation utilised in US decisions such as Graver Tank 63 required the elements to
be identified in the claims themselves, the German tradition of the Third Period
made no such demands. The focus here was on what the specification taught the
skilled addressee, and only modifications, variants, substitutions, additions or
omissions that were immediately evident to the average person skilled in the art
were included within the scope of protection. Therefore, this level of abstraction
from the specification of the patent was relatively uncontentious, as the requirement that any variation be immediately apparent arguably placed no undue burden
on the patentees competitors as it closely paralleled the practice that the Patent
Office would undertake when considering patentability. Additionally, as already
noted, expansion of the scope of protection beyond the literal wording of the claims
was only available where the technical teaching was itself novel. If it was not then
protection was limited to the direct subject matter of the invention.
61
62
63
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Therefore, the difference between this category of protection and that available
under the subject matter of the invention lay in the degree of consideration that the
64
See Sijp, n 49, above, at 437, citing Spengler, [1967] GRUR 390.
Lindenmaier, Der Schutzumfang des Patents nach der Neureren Rechtsprechung [1944] GRUR
49. Cited in Takenaka, Interpreting Claims, n 6, above, at 34.
66 Vojcek, n 21, above, at 149.
67 Sometimes referred to as Lindenmaiers provisos. See Sijp, n 49, above, at 437. Also Beton &
Heimbach,Claim Drafting and SignificanceAn Anglo-German Industrial View, in Kemp (ed), Patent
Claim Drafting and Interpretation (London, Oyez Longman, 1983) at 44.
68 Sijp, n 49, above, at 437.
65
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skilled addressee must devote to the subject of equivalence. Under the technical
teaching any equivalents had to be immediately evident, if they were then the assessment stopped and liability (subject to any defences) was established. If, on the other
hand, the alleged infringement fell outside of the subject matter of the invention,
the court would then consider the general inventive idea. This involved an examination of whether, after special and detailed consideration, the average person skilled in
the art would have realised, at the priority date and without exercising inventive
effort, that they could have replaced elements of the patentees invention with elements of the alleged infringement and still have solved the technical problem in the
same way. Thus the difference between the second and third stages of the three-part
theory lay in the degree of consideration that must be directed towards assessing the
substitutability of the elements. By limiting the application of the general inventive
idea to cases where this substitution did not require the exercise of inventive effort,
the courts could be seen to be putting important restrictions on the scope of the
doctrine whilst simultaneously promoting innovative practice by safeguarding the
rights of competitors to invent around the patent.
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Defined as the scope with which the patent is drafted. See also, ch 4, above.
Of course, the German political and cultural context was in a period of flux at this point in time,
however, whilst this may provide clues as to the motivation of the courts in making the change from the
Second to Third Periods, it does nothing affect the validity of the comparison, per se.
78
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At the core of any patent system, separate from the various theories that can be
utilised to justify the grant, lies a common purposewhat the drafters of the US
Constitution succinctly defined as promoting of the progress of science and the
useful arts.79 The key element is the assumption that technological progress is beneficial, and regardless of whether it is justified on the basis of natural right, reward,
prospect, incentive, race, or whatever, that the patent system has links with this concept. This purpose is not achieved by any one, single, element but by the system as a
whole, by the complex interrelation of components. It is perceived failure in this
core that prompts internal change. Thus, the body of opinion turned against the
system of the Second Period and gave rise to the Third. The German system in the
Third Period worked. It was criticised, it was exalted, supported and denounced, but
one key fact is undeniable; German industry did not falter and grind to a halt under
its influence, the inventive landscape was not choked with unwieldy broad grants. It
served its purpose. Indeed, such was the support for this method of interpretation
that no agreement could be found over narrowing the wording of the Official
German version of Article 69 EPC (which refers to the contents80 of the claims) to
match the Official English and French versions (referring to terms).81 Change,
when it came, was externally imposed and highlights another key point.
It is only when a national patent system becomes international that a divergence
in claim style and interpretation becomes important, and then primarily to foreign
patentees used to one form of drafting. To assume that all other countries will interpret claims in a manner akin to that of the home courts is both arrogant and unfair,
yet this is the predominant principle that underlies any harmonisation measure.
Implicit also is the assumption that the harmonised product is superior to the
original. Whilst this may be the case as regards the ease of transfer between nations,
it is not necessarily so across the board.82 Indeed, as demonstrated by the growth of
both the US and UK systems, it is apparent that different standards may be appropriate at different moments in a countrys technological evolution due to the variation in incentives that broad or narrow protection provides to the inventive pool.83
Concerns over traditions of divergent interpretation in Europe led to the adoption of the Protocol once the decision to harmonise had been made. Whatever the
subsequent successes or failures of this measure, it is noteworthy in that it achieved
a diplomatic compromise that secured speedy enactment of the EPC.84 It is therefore to this post-Protocol period of interpretation that we now turn in order to see
how the institutional and operational traditions of the past have been adapted to
79
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85 s14 of the 1981 Act therefore provides that The extent of protection conferred by a patent or patent
application shall be determined by the contents of the claims. Nevertheless, the description and drawings
shall be used to interpret the claims.
86 This is not to say adopting a position of central definition, merely that the claims could not be
passed over in consideration of the scope of protection.
87
Jacob, n 14, above, at 67.
88
In the UK principally Improver v Remington [1990] FSR 181. For the German decision see Improver
v Remington (1993) 24 IIC 838.
89
Dealing with national, but for practical purposes identical, patents.
90
The Formstein decision was relied upon in the quartet of German cases cited in PLG Research v
Ardon International [1995] RPC 287, discussed in text accompanying n 137-68 in ch 9, below. However,
it must be noted that this rally in Formsteins favour was very short-lived; Aldous J refused to follow the
new approach, declaring it obiter in Assidoman Multipack v The Mead Corporation [1995] RPC 321, less
than two weeks after the decision in PLG.
91 Reported at (1987) 18 IIC 795 with comments by Geissler. Also [1991] RPC 597. All quotes are
taken from Geisslers translation in IIC.
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Formstein
Any change in the legal standards concerning the interpretation of patent documentation necessarily takes time to filter through the system.92 Confusion over the
scope of the new grant was therefore considerable in the early 1980s as patentees,
practitioners and the lower courts considered the impact of the revisions.93 Relief
came in the Re Formstein decision.
The patent in question claimed the following:
1. Integral or cross-sectionally multi-part moulded stone with a longitudinal trough for
dewatering lines at the side of the road, characterised by the fact that it comprises at
least one cross channel branching off form the longitudinal trough and opening into
the side of the stone facing away from the street centre.
2. Moulded stone in accordance with claim 1, characterised by the fact that the cross
channel has a small inclination.94
In other words, a sloping curb-stone with channels to guide water and debris
away from the street, thus facilitating drainage.
The defendant was a city that had laid a street with conventional paving stones
setting gravel-filled gaps between them to channel the water. The patentee brought
an action for infringement. At first instance the court found the patent infringed,
issued an injunction and awarded damages. On appeal the decision was reversed.
The Supreme Court was therefore provided with a perfect opportunity to review
the revisions to the patent law and to comment on their interpretation. In an
uncompromising decision, it did just this.
The Bundesgerichtshof explained that the effect of Article 69 EPC and the
Protocol on its Interpretation was that [i]n contrast to the legal situation until
1978, patent claims are now not merely the starting point but rather the essential
basis for the determination of scope95 (emphasis added). In making this statement,
the court clearly anchored the claims at the core of the grant, however, such was the
magnitude of change brought about by the revisions, and such was the firmness of
the courts resolve to ensure their proper implementation that it continued:
In terms of Sec. 14(2) of the Patent Act of 1981, the contents of the claim have to be determined by interpretation, taking the specifications and drawings into consideration. As the
92 An application for a patent takes an average of 44 months to progress to grant under the EPC. See
http://www.european-patent-office.org/epo/obtain.htm. Additionally, s14 of the new German law only
applied to patent applications made after 1 Jan, 1978see Husser, n 37, above, at 945. Therefore, it is
to be expected that there would be a lag of at least 44 months post-1978 for cases to enter the courts.
Appeal adds more time to this equation, so interpretations of the provisions of the new law in the Higher
Courts would be expected some 7-8 years after the first applicationsie approximately 1985.
93 See, eg, the discussions in Kemp (ed), Patent Claim Drafting and Interpretation (London, Oyez
Longman, 1983).
94 Reproduced in the judgment itself. See Geisslers translation of the judgment, n 91, above, at 795.
In the report reproduced at [1991] RPC 597 the reproduction of the claims is at 600.
95 Judgment of the Supreme Court s5(b), first para. See (1987) 18 IIC 795 at 798.
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Formstein
243
protocol on the interpretation of Art. 69(1) EPC (corresponding to Sec. 14 of the Patent
Act of 1981) shows [citation omitted], the interpretation does not only serve the purpose
of correcting uncertainties in claims but also of clarifying the technical terms used in the
claims as well as the limits and bounds of the invention described therein . . .
Under the Protocol on the Interpretation of Art. 69 EPC, the scope of a patent encompasses not only what follows from the precise wording of the claims. This opens the way for
a determination of the scope of protection beyond the wording of the claims to encompass
modifications of the invention circumscribed in the claims . . .
The scope of protection of a patent filed after January 1, 1978, is determined as regards the
use of the invention by equivalents, by the contents of the claims to be determined by interpretation. The significance of the invention as recognized by person skilled in the art has
to be considered. The question is whether a person skilled in the art based on the invention
protected by the claims, is able to clear up the problem solved by the invention with equally
effective means, i.e. to achieve the desired success with other means which also lead to the
same result. Solutions which the average person skilled in the art can determine due to his
professional knowledge as being equally effective based on considerations oriented to the
inventions paraphrased . . . in the claims will generally fall within the scope of protection of
the patent. This is required by the goal of adequate remuneration for the inventor under
consideration of the aspect of legal certainty.96 (emphasis added)
Ibid, at 7989.
It should be noted that the report at [1992] RPC 597 does not use the word paraphrased, preferring described instead. However, despite the change in wording, the effect is the same.
98 Geissler,Comment on Formstein (1987) 18 IIC 795 at 802.
99 Turner,The German Formstein Case: An Alternative Harmony [1992] EIPR 181 at 181.
97
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whereas previously the defendant could have escaped liability where the alleged
infringement was known from prior teaching,100 the Supreme Court now
expanded the defence to include occasions where it was obvious in view of the prior
art. This, it explained, does not limit the justified reward for the inventor in return
for the disclosure of his patentable invention, but rather secures the freedom of others to continue with non-inventive development of the prior art.101 Therefore, once
again, the mantle of the skilled addressee provided the key to assessing the patents
scope of protection.
The adoption of this standard in Formstein clearly demonstrates the difficulty of
breaking with the old traditions of expansive interpretation and coming to terms
with a new, externally imposed regime. The intention of the court to depart from
the practices of the Second and Third Periods is clear, and the message given in the
judgment to this effect is robust and uncompromising. However, the subtext
pervading the case is littered with remnants of past practice; the references to the
object of the law being to reward the patentee and the statement that the invention
is paraphrased in the claims being the most notable examples of this. Moreover, the
Supreme Courts comments clearly demonstrate that infringement by equivalence
was considered to be as much within the scope of the claim as those elements literally covered by the wording. This point is significant as, contrary to the position in
the US where the demarcation between literal infringement and infringement by
equivalents is tightly policed, the lack of boundary in Germany allowed broad protection to remain, as there was no question of recourse to the doctrine being seen as
offering supplementary protection. Accordingly, the German approach at this time
could still be said to embrace central definition theory as the claims functioned as
the post from which protection was anchored, but did not provide a framework for
clarifying which features in the accused device are beyond the literal meaning of the
claim language.102
However, whilst criticism of the scope of protection post-Formstein can be made,
any comparison to preferred standards of protection must, as already noted, take
into account the wider institutional and administrative context of the grant and the
practices that grew up around it. Recourse to the standard of the skilled addressee
was made more certain by constant collaboration with experts appointed by the
courts in the most widely varying technical fields, for determining the subject
matter of the patent in revocation and infringement proceedings.103 Thus, the system as a whole reacted to the courts own style of interpretation in order to provide
sufficient predictability for efficient operation without compromising the aim of
rewarding the patentee. Cognisance of this factor helps to explain the seemingly
paradoxical effect of the Supreme Courts decision in Formstein, for the trauma of
creating a continental shift in the established practices of interpretation would have
100
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caused more uncertainty than it aimed to prevent.104 Therefore, rather than actually altering the interpretative status quo, the Court can be seen to be paying lip
service to the new regime on interpretation and effecting transfer by other, more
subtle, means; namely expansion of the defence of state of the art.
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continued reliance upon old principles demonstrates just how difficult the transition from the Third Period was proving to be. The Supreme Courts resolve is,
however, unambiguous, and the statement in Handle Cord for Battery that the
requirement of legal certainty is to be given the same consideration as providing
equal reward for the inventor111 reinforces this approach. This said, reward was still
the fundamental justification for the grant of patent protection at this time, and this
simple fact can be seen to have directly contributed to a broader scope of protection
than might otherwise have been the case. Such is clear from the oft-quoted Epilady
litigation.112
Epilady
The multi-jurisdictional litigation between Improver and Remington has provided
commentators with much fodder in their discussion of claim interpretation.113
Parallel actions were brought in the courts of various countries, in Europe and
beyond. All dealt with substantially identical claims, specifications, and allegedly
infringing embodiments, but came to wildly differing conclusions on the matter of
infringement. The decisions are therefore often used as clear illustrations of divergent approaches to claim interpretation under the EPC. We shall return to consider
the validity of this viewpoint in chapter nine when examining the British instalment
in the litigation; however, for the present it is sufficient to consider the German
approach in isolation.
The patent in question concerned a depilatory device (Improver Corps
Epilady) that operated by means of a revolving bent helical spring. The windings
of the spring, when moved rotationally, opened and closed, trapping hairs that were
then plucked out by the motion of the device. The defendants product did not contain a spring, but achieved the same result by substitution with a slotted rubber rod.
When bent and revolved, the slits in the rod opened and closed in the same manner
as the windings of the spring, thereby facilitating hair removal in the same, painfulsounding, manner as the patented device.
111
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Epilady
247
The Decision
The Dsseldorf Court of Appeals (Oberlandesgericht) first considered the patent
claims and concluded that the accused device could not be said to fall within their
literal scope since the disputed embodiment uncontestedly does not feature a helical spring.114 It then proceeded to examine whether the slotted rubber rod could
be said to be a helical spring in equivalent form. In undertaking this analysis, the
court adopted a clear problem-solution approach.115 It went to great lengths to consider the function of the limitations in the claim, assessing the relative merits of
both the patented article and the contested embodiment, and was clearly concerned
with the technical effects of both.
The fact that this initial analysis was conducted outside of the confines of a discussion of literal infringement is significant as it avoided the need to concentrate on
a meticulous analysis of the consequences of using the term helical spring. The
starting point was therefore, once again, what the person skilled in the art would
interpret the patent as teaching. As such, the court considered that the skilled
addressee would:
easily recognize that the coil spring is only proposed for the reason that it is an elastic cylindrical body which may be quickly rotated in the arcuate state and, above all, for the reason
that it features . . . means that stretch the surface of the body to form gaps at the convex side,
while at the concave side they result in clamping areas with the help of which the hairs that
entered the gaps may be clamped and plucked.116
vides.
116
117
118
119
120
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function of the spring, the substitution of a slotted rubber rod was clearly obvious
and therefore fell within the scope of protection. As we shall see when we come to
consider the English courts decision in this case, the outcome there was somewhat
different.121
The important factor here is that the German court approached the problem from
the point of view of operating the invention. Therefore, the question of whether the
scope of protection should be extended from the narrower wording of the claims to
cover obvious variants does not hinge on the conveyed intent of the drafter, as is the
case under the traditional British approach, discussed in chapter one, above, as intention is assumed. By focussing on rewarding inventive efforts, the German courts necessarily provide an opportunity for broader protection than would be available where
the rationale for the grant is based on other considerations.
However, such an approach cannot be dismissed out-of-hand as inconsistent
with the Protocol, despite its obvious links to Third Period interpretative practices,
as it is clear that the claims function to define the scope of protection. Furthermore,
a middle ground is, in fact, trodden between giving them a literal interpretation and
using them only as guidelines. The fact that there were different outcomes in the
German and British legs of the Epilady litigation does not alter this fact. Indeed it
can be argued that such differences are inevitable; after all, if litigation were
homogenised and reduced to algorithm so that every judge held exactly the same
view the appeal process would, in many instances, be redundant. The specific endresult, win or lose, must not therefore be allowed to cloud the issue and become our
primary concern; to seek absolute clarity, unimpeachable opinion agreed with by all
is in any case an impossible wish.
Brndle makes a superficially attractive point on this matter when he states that a
solution to the problem must therefore be found that ensures if not identical application of the law in all countries, then at least legal certainty.122 Despite its charm as
a sound bite, this statement narrowly misses the key issue.Whilst the aim should not
be absolute conformity of decision, for it is evident that even when national courts
consider patent infringement cases different conclusions may be drawn from
identical claims by different judges, there must be conformity of approach to application of the law. The very goal of predictability, of justice if you like, is coloured by
the legitimate expectations of the parties, and these expectations must now be seen
and understood from the European viewpoint. If there is a central position from
which protection may be hatched, then the expectation that the same approach will
be taken in applying the principles of claim construction across the board is legitimate. This does not necessarily mean that identically worded tests must be applied,
for the essential question of what the claims are understood to mean can be dressed
up in as many different semantic cloaks as there are patents on the register.
However, it does mean that the underlying principles of claim construction should
121
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249
be the same. The problems must be approached from the same direction and the
principles underlying the grant must be identical. Currently they are not.
However, despite mentioning the case, this decision offers little more than illustration of the German Court acknowledging the existence of the general Catnic
approach, and falls far short of providing evidence that it was being applied as
Franzosi seems to suggest. His closing comment that In the end, I would not be
surprised if in Europe everybody applies Catnic,127 appears, at the time he was
writing, to have therefore been somewhat premature. This said, he does note that
even if this test is adopted for all of Europe it does not guarantee, and nor would he
expect,uniformity because of that.128
Engel takes a more realistic view of the subject and, rather than making any great
proclamations about shifting to a British viewpoint, concentrates on establishing
trends in the concrete practice of the courts. He highlights specific terminology
utilised in judgments such as Ion Analysis;129 noting that the Wortsinn, the meaning of the words, is intended to express the notion that the examination of an
infringement should not be tied to the literal wording of the claims, but should be
based on its identifiable meaning . . . The decisive factor is not the philological
meaning of the wording but rather the technical sense that the person skilled derives
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
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from the claims.130 Therefore, whilst it is clear that Engel believes the Third Period
practice of completely detaching the scope of protection from the wording of the
claims is firmly behind the German courts, it would still appear that a significant
degree of latitude will be given based on the technical teaching.
Engels belief is supported by a quintet of judgments handed down on the same
day in early 2002 by the German Supreme Court. These five decisions; Plastic
Pipes,131 Cutting Knife I,132 Cutting Knife II,133 Custodiol I 134 and Custodiol II 135, are
described by Takenaka as having surprised German patent professionals by introducing new restrictions on the possibility of finding protection outside of the literal
coverage of the claims under the doctrine of equivalents.136 Given the narrowing
trend in the courts judgments within the Fourth Period, now spanning almost
twenty years, and in particular the fact that during this time the claims had consistently been stated to provide the decisive basis for the patents scope of protection,
the surprise of German patent professionals must, itself, be treated with a degree of
suspicion. Whilst undoubtedly narrowing from a Third Period perspective, there
was nothing unpredictable or overtly shocking about the pronouncements within
the context in which they were delivered. Moreover, the decisions also clearly
demonstrate the courts continuing focus on reward as being the main justification
for protection, and show a tacit, but steadfast, commitment to providing a broad,
yet predictable, interpretation of the grant.
Plastic Pipes
The Plastic Pipes decision concerned an invention for sound-proofed plastic pipe.
The patent specified, amongst other things, that the pipe should have a density
within a range of 1.8 to 2.7 g/cm3, and a minimum weight per unit area of 8kg/m2.
The defendant sold pipes that had all of the features of the patented article except
that their density was 1.6g/cm3, ie outside of the specified range. The question that
came before the court was therefore whether this numerical range was to be
interpreted as excluding the possibility of variance; in other words given that numbers may be considered to be more certain than other language, did their use force a
literal interpretation?
130 Engel, The Wortsinn of Patent Claims in German Case Law on Patent Infringement Disputes
(2003) 34 IIC 233 at 235.
131 Plastic Pipes (Kunststoffrohrteil) [2002] GRUR 511. English translation available in [2003] ENPR
163 and (2003) 34 IIC 302.
132 Cutting Knife I (Schneidmesser I) [2002] GRUR 515. English translation available in [2003] ENPR
309 and (2002) 33 IIC 873.
133 Cutting Knife II (Schneidmesser II) [2002] GRUR 519.
134 Custodiol I [2002] GRUR 523.
135 Custodiol II [2002] GRUR 527. English translation available in (2003) 34 IIC 197.
136 Takenaka, Protection Scope for Claims Including Numerical Limitations: Range of Equivalents
and Prosecution History Estoppel (2004) 11 CASRIP Newsletter. The quote comes from the 2nd
column of the article. Available online at: http://www.law.washington.edu/casrip/Newsletter/Vol11/
newsv11i1Takenaka.pdf.
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The court thought not, and laid down a three-stage test to assist in determination
of the patents scope of protection. First, it asked whether the embodiment solved
the problem addressed by the invention with means which, albeit modified, objectively have substantially similar effects? Second, would the skilled person, as a
result of his specialised knowledge . . . be able to arrive at the modified means as
means having substantially similar effects . . . on the basis of the claim? Finally, is the
effort that the skilled person has to make based on the sense of the technical teaching protected in the claim, so that he considers the differing embodiment with its
modified means to be a solution equivalent to that of the patent?137 The reader may
note that this three-stage assessment bears more than a passing resemblance to the
questions formulated by Hoffmann J (as he then was) in Improver v Remington 138
and utilised as the de facto test for claim interpretation in the UK for almost fifteen
years before being superseded by that in Kirin-Amgen.139 Yet, the focus of the assessment is defined more in terms of equivalency than is the case in the UK (especially
now following Lord Hoffmanns comments in Kirin),140 and clearly reflects the
German courts past interpretative tradition. However, the references to the skilled
addressee being able to divine the technical solution based on the claims suggests
that the move, that was started in Formstein, from the uncertain practices of the
Third Period is maintained in current decisions.
The Plastic Pipes case also provides another example of the German Supreme
Court referring explicitly to Catnic. However, interestingly it latches on to the
approach taken by Lord Diplock as being authority for the proposition that the
decisive factor in the construction of the claim is the semantic context of the patent
determined using the description and the drawings. Therefore, rather than simply
adhering to the patentees alleged intention in drafting the claim, the court asks
whether, given the purpose of the invention, the skilled addressee would consider
that protection extends to the accused embodiment.As we shall see, in chapter nine,
below, this approach is strikingly similar to the dissenting judgment of Aldous LJ in
Wheatley v Drillsafe,141 and provides for an interesting comparison.
However, for now we must content ourselves with consideration of the German
position alone, and here, once again, we can note that the issue is approached from
a direction that places significant emphasis on the concept of fairness. The skilled
addressee expects the patentee to have intended to cover all embodiments that are
made obvious by the claims. Moreover, where some elements are expressed in certain terms and others are worded so as to provide a degree of latitude, the addressee
will note this and progress accordingly.
In this case, the court considered that the skilled reader would have understood
the density to be simply a core range within which he was to operate to prevent
him from arriving at the specified minimum value for the weight per unit area by
137
138
139
140
141
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selecting too thick a wall.142 The fact that the weight per unit area was claimed as a
minimum that had to be complied with, there being no such insistent wording used
for the density, was most significant, as when combined with the descriptions statement that the walls of the pipe should be relatively thin it told the addressee that
they had a certain degree of flexibility in determining whether infringement had
taken place.
The claims, as understood in light of the description and drawings, thus clearly
form the anchor for the investigation. However, the skilled addressees expectations,
the mindset with which they view the claims, allows a more benevolent interpretation than may otherwise be the case.143 This interpretation is still clearly within the
confines demanded by the Protocol, as it treads the infamous middle-path; fairness
to the patentee is clear, and as long as the principles of construction are well known,
the requirements of predictability, and indeed certainty, are fulfilled. It is also
important to note that the presumption of intention is rebuttable where the claims
are precise in their scope, and where the desire to confine protection in this manner
would be plain to the skilled addressee. However, generally the patentee is still
afforded protection consummate with their contribution to the art. Such an
approach graphically illustrates the courts perceived focus of the grant, which,
based on historical and economic analysis, must be to encourage and reward innovative activity. Therefore, rather than extending protection via strict adherence to
an additional elemental analysis under an US-style doctrine of equivalents, the
courts are to provide adequate reward for equivalents by benevolent interpretation
of the expectations of the skilled addressee.
Cutting Knife I
The slant that appears to be being taken on the Catnic decision is further illustrated
by the judgment in Cutting Knife I.144 Here, once again, the British test is held to be
authority for the proposition that the skilled person may consider some degree of
inaccuracy to be within the technical sense of a claim, and therefore within the
patents scope of protection.
The case concerned a patent for a paper cutting apparatus that comprised a cutting knife co-operating with a counter knife, which were inclined at between 9 and
12 degrees to each other. In the allegedly infringing article, the blades were inclined
at 840, ie just outside of the range.
142
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However, it then reiterated comments made in the Handle Cord for Battery 146
case that the requirement of certainty ranks equally with the concept of fair protection for inventive skill , and that the claims were no longer to be merely the starting
point for determining scope, but were now the authoritative basis for doing so.147
The court also reiterated the three-stage test used in Plastic Pipes but then, significantly, proceeded to consider what the British approach may have been in this
particular case. It issued a broad statement that:
An embodiment can be considered to have substantially similar effects in the sense of the
patent claim only if the skilled person can arrive at it as an embodiment that actually
achieves not only the effect of a feature of the invention that is numerically limited in the
claim but also the very effect which he understands to be inherent in the numerical limitation of this feature according to the claim. If that is not the case, an embodiment even having otherwise substantially similar effectsboth objectively, and technically as perceived
by the skilled personis essentially not covered by the extent of protection conferred by
the patent.148
Therefore, it is clear that despite paying lip-service to the British test here, the
German court is still approaching the problem from a direction in which fairness is
exalted. The investigation is very definitely focussed on the claims as determining
the scope of protection, but the presumption of intention, as we shall see in chapter
nine, is diametrically opposed to that applied under the iteration of the Catnic test
which was operative in the UK at the time. Furthermore, the fact that the court
related the interpretation of the claims to the effects of the limitations contained
within them when examined by the skilled addressee is reminiscent of the technical
teaching test of the Third Period. When approached with the presumption that the
145
146
147
148
149
Ibid, at 3156.
Above, n 107.
See Cutting Knife I [2003] ENPR 309 at 316.
Ibid, at 318.
Ibid, at 3189.
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patentee must have intended to include all obvious variants within their claim
unless the contrary is conclusively demonstrated, this results in a broad, rewardbased, interpretation.
Thus, when the court came to apply these principles to the facts of the case, rather
than interpreting the numerical values as decisive cut-off points, whether absolute
or to two significant figures,150 it once again looked to the effect of the restrictions.
The purpose of angling the blades at between 9 and 12 degrees to each other was
simply to ensure a smooth cut. This benefit was also achieved when the angle was
slightly more acute. Therefore, when considering whether an angle of less than 9
was outside of the scope of protection, the court was of the opinion that where:
a specific range was stipulated in a patent claim and there was nothing in the patent specification to suggest that the values claimed might be meant only by way of an example, the
skilled person would generally have no reason to consider whether the invention might be
capable of being performed even if other values were selected. The situation was, however,
inevitably rather different with values that lay only so minimally outside of the range
stated in the patent that there seemed from the outset to be absolutely no likelihood of the
effect being significantly modified.151 (emphasis added)
The focus on the effect of the variant is interesting as it suggests that the primary
question is whether the defendants modification is within the teaching of the
patent rather than within the exact wording of the claim per sean approach that
is strikingly similar to Lord Reids formulation in Van der Lely v Bamfords.152 The
fundamental consideration therefore remains fairness to the patentee. However, by
ensuring that the test is based on objective considerations, the court safeguards predictability of result. The effect of the judgment is to confirm Franzosis suspicion
that adoption of a single test would not necessarily result in conformity of decision
across Europe, for the philosophy underlying the judgment will have a great effect
on the projected outcome.153
Conclusion
The German experience provides graphic illustration of an alternative method to
the relatively strict literalism of the traditional British approach to claim interpretation. The fact that the German courts have habitually viewed the determination of
150
As is the practice in adopted by the courts of England and Wales. See n 143, above.
Cutting Knife I [2003] ENPR 309 at 320.
152 [1963] RPC 61. Discussed at n 425 in ch 1, above.
153 Such is obliquely acknowledged by Lord Hoffmann when discussing the differences between the
German and British approach to construction in Hoffmann,Patent Construction [2006] CIPA Journal
727. Of particular note is the statement (at 731) that When Dr Peter Meier-Beck very kindly sent me
comments on a draft of the Amgen [decision] a couple of years ago and explained the German approach
to equivalence, I told him that the only difference there seemed to be between us was that I was brought
up on the 1960s Oxford philosophy of language and he was brought up on Hegel.
151
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Conclusion
255
patent scope from the point of view of rewarding the patentee is significant, for this
necessarily leads to a broader interpretation (even when using substantially similar)
than when the patent is viewed as an exception to an otherwise absolute prohibition
on monopoly. The runaway protection of the Second and Third Periods has, to a
great extent, been brought under control by the tenacity of the Supreme Court, and
it is undeniable that current practice does accord with the Protocol. However, as
Franzosi notes, this does not necessarily mean that there will be harmonisation
under the EPC (in the strict sense of the word) because of it.154 Indeed, it is debatable whether uniformity is actually achievable at all in the absence of a common
appellate court given the wildly divergent legal foundations upon which any decision would ultimately be based. Brndles cry for legal certainty 155 in preference to
identical application of the law is an oxymoron that cannot be acceptable in
practice. Fairness and predictability are intertwined under Article 69 EPC and
the Protocol, bound together by the legitimate expectations of the parties. These
expectations have to be common in a system in which identical patents are issued
via central examination. Yet differences in the background justifications for the
grant, the preconceptions of the skilled person through whose eyes the patent is to
be viewed, and the application, or not, of a problem/solution approach within construction, have ripple effects that may cause different perceptions to arise. If perceptions and expectations vary, then so does any notion of fairness. After all,
predictability, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder.
The Cutting Knife (Schneidmesser) questions have become the de facto standard
for claim interpretation in Germany (at the time of writing most recently applied by
the Supreme Court in the Stapeltrockner decision).156 There is obvious similarity
between this test and that of the pre-Kirin English approach, embodied by the socalled Protocol questions,157 which has caused some commentators to express a
degree of disquiet that the UK abandoned this formulation just as Germany was
adopting it.158 However, as Hlder quite rightly explains: Upon closer examination, however, not very much has actually changed.159 The UK courts, as their
German counterparts, are still giving effect to the same old principles and viewing
the problem from the same old directions even if operating under new tests. This
said, there are key-figures that appear hold the opinion that the two countries
approaches are cut from the same cloth, even if they differ ever so slightly in the window-dressing. Lord Hoffmann, for example believes that: there is no difference
between Britain and Germany in what we understand the Protocol to Article 69 to
154
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mean and no difference in what we understand by fair protection for the patentee
combined with reasonable certainty for third parties.160 However, understanding
what something means and creating a construct for applying it in a manner that is
universally consistent are two very different things.
Whilst the current German approach provides predictability in a manner that is
less objectionable (ie more easily objectively verifiable) than the arguably broader
protection of the Second and Third Periods, the concept of rewarding the patentee
is still central to the determination of scope. The trend that was evident in the cases
that followed Germanys implementation of the EPC was to clearly constrain the
runaway doctrines that preceded it. Errant decisions of the lower courts were firmly,
but fairly, corrected at the earliest point possible and brought into line with the
Supreme Courts understanding of the text of Article 69 EPC and the Protocol.
However, the rationale upon which the decisions were based remained unchanged.
The Fourth Periods initial uncertainties, caused in no small amount by the action
of change in itself, have now settled to a point were the Bundesgerichtshof is content
to make a direct comparison with the British tests. This analogy is not made with the
intent of exposing a different view, for the references in recent decisions reveal what
the court obviously believes to be conformity of approach. However, the point still
remains that the question, indeed philosophy, of construction is considered with a
benevolent eye that tends towards broad interpretation.
Simply put, the fact that interpretative traditions lying behind the courts decisions are so disparate in the two jurisdictions is sufficient to doubt the integrity of
any apparently harmonised, yet objectively unpoliced, practice. The crux of the
issue lies in the lack of a final arbiter in any dispute, for without one we are in a position in which all can conform to a given standard and yet still reach disparate results
(and not just based on small differences of individual opinion). When the German
and British States had the absolute right to self-determination on issues patent,
neither ones approach could have been said to be any more right, or wrong, than
the other. From the inside, both systems worked based on the different goals, justifications, philosophies and rationales that underpinned them. However, postharmonisation the issue is more pressing, and also more complex. As justice is
inextricably linked with the legitimate expectations of the parties it is not sufficient
for construction to appear to be the same on the surface if the foundations are different. Either the underlying rationale of protection must be harmonised or there
must be conformity mandated from above.
However, this is to stray somewhat from the point. The question that remains
after examination of the traditionally broad protection provided by the German
approach to claim construction is whether the foundations of the patent system can
be fulfilled by radically different means. We have already seen, in chapters four and
five, above, that the patent grant may have a value independent of scope, for the simple fact that it is a patent. We have also seen that the provision of broad protection,
based on the uncertain concept of the general inventive idea did not stifle
160
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Conclusion
257
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8
Japan
And We Shall Have Patents
We have looked about us to see what nations are the greatest, so that we can be like them
. . . We said,What is it that makes the United States such a great nation? and we investigated and found that it was patents, and we shall have patents.
Korekiyo Takahashi, Founder of the Modern Japanese Patent Law
Preface
Of the three patent systems that comprise the modern triptych,1 the Japanese is easily the most esoteric when viewed from a common law perspective. The current law2
was enacted in 1959 and, although somewhat harmonised to a world standard by
international agreements such as TRIPS, still maintains certain features that mark
it out as distinct from the other systems that we have considered. Perhaps the most
interesting, and certainly the most important, distinction from our point of view is
Japans novel approach to the determination of patent scope.
Article 70 of the 1959 Patent Ordinance inserted, for the first time, a requirement
into the substantive law that the courts should determine the technical scope of an
invention, and therefore the breadth of protection, by reference to the claim.3
Previously patent scope was decided by reference to the disclosure in the specification alone, a practice akin to the traditional German approach to claim interpretation.4 However, the promotion of the claim in the 1959 legislation did little to
1 Namely the US, European and Japanese systems; still considered by many to be the leading patent
systems in the world, even if Isayamas claim that their combined output amounts to approximately 90%
of the world total no longer holds true. See Isayama, Japans Views on a Desirable IP System for the
Global Economy (1999) 2 Journal of World Intellectual Property 679 at 685. As noted in ch 6, above, the
Korean and Chinese patent systems have recently seen a massive surge in activity, overtaking the EPO
and placing them in third and fourth place respectively in WIPOs world ranking. See WIPO Patent
Report: Statistics on Worldwide Patent Activity (2006), B2 Top 20 offices of filing available at:
http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/patent_report_2006.html#P104_9303.
2 Tokkyoho (Patent Law) (Law No 121, 1959).
3 At this point in time the Japanese patent system only allowed applications to contain one claim.
4 See Takenaka, Interpreting Patent Claims: The United States, Germany and Japan (Munich, Max
Planck Institute for Foreign and International Patent, Copyright and Competition Law, 1995)
(Takenaka, Interpreting Claims) at 193.
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He continues, giving examples of where the court has followed this seemingly
unorthodox pathway. Thus, in the case of thin token lender in a game center6 the
Osaka District Court ruled that the scope of protection should be limited to what is
indicated in the working example.7
Therefore, despite the fact that the 1959 Patent Law Ordinance stipulated, in
Article 70, that the scope of the invention be determined by reference to the
claim(s), it is clear that as late as 1990 the claim was still simply being utilised as a
guiding principle, to be remoulded at will. This malleability of claim language is
reminiscent of the traditional German practice of utilising the claims to identify the
general inventive idea and then extending protection from this point;8 critically
however, in Japan protection was introverted rather than expanded. Thus, as
Takenaka states, the claim was considered to provide a succinct summary of the
invention, and little more.[T]he scope of protection had to be decided on the basis
of the entire application including the specification and drawings.9
5 Takura, Japanese Claim Interpretation (1994) 19(5) AIPPI Journal 215 at 215. This approach is
similar in underlying principle to the course of action taken by the House of Lords in Biogen v Medeva
[1997] RPC 1, where their Lordships, by an exercise of semantic gymnastics, imported the requirement
of s14(5) Patents Act 1977 (that the claims must be supported by the description) into the grounds of
invalidity found in s72(1)(c) (that the patent must contain an enabling disclosure). However, whereas
their Lordships revoked the patent, the Japanese courts merely restrict the scope of protection that it provides.
6 Token LenderAce Denken KK v Yuai Shojip113 Hanrei Jihou (Law Report) No 1390 (19 Jul,
1990).
7 Takura, n 5, above, at 216.
8 For a discussion of the traditional German approach see ch 7, above. Also Winkler, The Scope of
Patent Protection: Past, Present and Future (1979) 10 IIC 296.
9 Takenaka, Interpreting Claims, n 4, above, at 194. Referring to Nakayama, Chukai Tokkyoho
(Detailed Explanation of Patent Law) (Tokyo, Seirin shoin Publishing, 1983) at 520.
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Brief History
261
Therefore, the Japanese system gave protection to what the inventor realised he
had invented, and thus had fully disclosed in the specification.10 This limiting principle suppresses the breadth of any patent, as the patentee may only claim protection for what he has actually created and therefore fully disclosed to the public. As
an ideology, it fits very well with an economic model that promotes importation
and assimilation of technology, a kind of legalised piracy promoting patent clusters,11 rather than giving incentive to create pioneer inventions. In order to understand why the Japanese law took and maintained this unique shape well into the
1990s we must first consider the historical context in which the seed for Japans legal
protection of inventions was first planted.
Brief History
Japan originally introduced a viable patent system in 1885,12 some 95 years after the
US had instituted similar protection, and 260 years after the Statute of Monopolies
had declared that legitimate patents of invention were not to be condemned as
abuses of Crown prerogative. As such, Japan was a relative latecomer in the patent
law stakes; what Kahn calls a patent follower country.13 This tardy adoption of legal
protection for inventions, and the eventual shape that the system took once created,
can, at least in part, be ascribed to the particular political and cultural influences
that prevailed in Japan from the late-sixteenth, until mid-nineteenth, century. It is
therefore to this period that we briefly direct our attention.14
Towards Isolation
The sixteenth century was a troublesome period in Japanese history.15 Intense conflict between powerful daimyo (landholding military lords) had wracked the land,
and the traditional feudal system was in a state of steady decline. By the mid 1500s,
the civil wars of the previous century had moved into an even fiercer stage of
10 This practice of limiting patent scope based on the disclosure in the specification rather than the
wording of the claims is often labelled the inventors recognition theory (ninshiki gendo ron). See, eg,
Takenaka, Interpreting Claims, n 4, above, at 66.
11 ie the grouping of patents that are narrow in scope and claim only incremental advances over the
prior art around any given inventive concept.
12 Tokkyo Senbai Jorei (Exclusive Selling Patent Ordinance) (Law No 7, 1885).
13 Kahn, Intellectual Property and Economic Development: Lessons from American and European
History, Study Paper 1a of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights. This can be found at:
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/text/study_papers/sp1a_khan_study.txt.
14 The following discussion of the history of Japan is, to a great extent, based on that found in Beasley,
The Japanese Experience: A Short History of Japan (London, Phoenix Press, 2000).
15 So troublesome in fact that the Japanese label for the years from 1467 (the outbreak of the civil
wars) to 1560 is Sengoku, meaning the country at war. See Beasley, ibid at 117.
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Hideyori was born in 1593 and so was only five when his father died. See Beasley, ibid. at 128.
Thus giving the era of Tokugawa rule its alternative title: the Edo bakufu.
That inevitably came twinned with trade from Portugal and other Western nations.
19 In addition, as Beasley notes, the link between Christianity and trade was weakened when the
Portuguese lost their near monopoly on imports from China at the beginning of the 17th century. See
Beasley, n 14, above, at 150.
20 See the discussion of Christianity and Seclusion in Beasley, n 14, above, at 147-51.
17
18
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Brief History
263
any new product based on new technology in Japan.21 In short, the Tokugawa tried
to stop the clock of history,22 and for the next 200 years the country was almost
entirely isolated from the outside world.23
The impact of this seclusion policy was profound. To begin with it was instrumental in enabling the Tokugawa shogunate to establish almost 300 years of peace.
It cemented the power of the shogun by enforcing a strict hierarchical system of
social interaction, with the shogun and daimyos at the top and the peasant classes at
the bottom. However, it also led to severe technological retardation. As a consequence Japan missed out on the developments ushered in by the Industrial
Revolutions that had already swept across Europe and the US, and by the close of the
eighteenth century was still tilling the land as it had always done.
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policy of the previous 160 years, and was thus hardly accepted amongst the
Japanese people.33 The law was therefore repealed in 1872, scarcely 12 months after
its adoption.34
The years that passed between 1872 and 1885 were marked with explosive
advances in Japanese technological understanding. Unhindered by any form of
patent protection, industry was able to progress at a remarkable rate by the assimilation of foreign technology. As Rahn notes:
A period of sweeping reform and extensive modernization [had begun] . . . At this time,
what has now become a fixed tradition, was started on a grand scale: young Japanese by the
thousands were sent abroad . . . [to study] American railways, British textiles and metallurgy, French and German law35
Foreign mania raged everywhere, and everything was manufactured in imitation of foreign articles.36
33
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We have looked about us to see what nations are the greatest, so that we can be like them
. . . We said, What is it that makes the United States such a great nation? and we investigated and found that it was patents, and we shall have patents.38
American Influences
The influence of US patent law policy at this point in time was strong. In 1888, for
example, the patent law was revised to include the first-to-invent principle.
Provision was also made for the annulment of a patent if the invention was not new,
38 See US Department of Commerce, Patent Office, The Story of the United States Patent Office
(Washington, US Department of Commerce, 1972). See also Hayashi, Comparative Study on Patent
Systems between US and Japan1987 and 1993 Revisions in Japan (1995) 20(4) AIPPI Journal 171 at
171; Rahn, n 21, above, at 450; Vaver, The future of Intellectual Property Law: Japanese and European
Perspectives ComparedText of a talk given at the Third Oxford University Academy Salon at Academy
Hills, Tokyo, 13 Apr, 1999. This can be found at http://www.oiprc.ox.ac.uk/EJWP0999.pdf.
39 Notice No 5 of the Exclusive Selling Patent Procedure 1885 (Senbai Tokkyo Tetsuzki) stated that the
procedure for applying for a patent requires the inclusion in an application of a description specifying
the scope of the invention. It is recommended that the phrase the scope that is claimed for a grant of
patent regarding this invention be used. See Takenaka, Interpreting Claims, n 4, above, at 40.
40 Kumagai, n 21, above, at 5. Also Heath, Enforcement of Patent Rights in Japan (2000) 31 IIC 749
at 751, noting the influence of Continental European legal systems on early Japanese patent law.
Additionally, it is interesting to note the wider influence of the Continental European legal system (particularly that of Germany) on the Japanese reforms of the Meiji era. Eg, there was a feeling held by many
Japanese at the time that state constitutions provided the unity that gave Western nations their strength.
A Japanese constitution was therefore drafted, which was published in 1889. The commission that was
responsible for its creation was headed by Ito Hirobumi, who was personally aided by two German
advisors, Alfred Mosse and Hermann Roesler. In preparation for the drafting, Ito travelled widely in
Europe. He is said to have been drawn to the Germanic approach as it provided a sensible balance
between imperial power and constitutional forms that allowed Japan to embrace a certain degree of
modernity without risking social disorder. In related areas, the French system is said to have been rejected
as being too foreign. See Beasley, n 14, above, at 2167.
41 This principle added to the perception of the Japanese patent system as one that granted very narrow rights, as it limited the applicant to one claim per patent.
42 See Kumagai, n 21, above, at 56 for a brief discussion of the main features of the 1885 Ordinance.
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or if the specification contained incomplete or superfluous disclosure.43 In addition, interference procedures, strongly reminiscent of American practice at the
time, were introduced. Furthermore, as Takenaka states: The theory that a patent
constitutes a substantive right also shows strong American influence, because
Japanese patent law at that time regarded a patent as a right to exclude others44 in
the same way that US patent law did.45 German and French law, on the other hand,
regarded the right not only to exclude, but also to exploit the patented invention.
However, although American influence was predominant at this point in time, it is
clear that the law shows what Vojcek describes as the wise eclecticism of Japanese
legislators, as many provisions were copied from other countries.45
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tion is developed, when it is not it simply provides security for foreign businesses
wishing to open up new markets. Strong protection of such interests will clearly lead
to new technology being introduced into the state in question but, critically, it will
be introduced at a premium price, and then only if there is considered to be a market for it. Therefore, the home nation only receives the (delayed) benefit of innovation deemed by external forces to be economically viable.
Domestic industry does not directly benefit from this sort of bargain as it cannot
(generally) make the jumps in technology that are required to get ahead of the pack,
let alone to maintain this position if it gets there. Instead, it is left to pick the bones,
becoming reliant on external innovation without being able to learn by improving.
Once established, piracy is taboo. However, on the road to establishment it is an aid
of unparalleled efficacy in educating and developing a nations technological standing. Indeed, if we look at the birth of the patent system in England then we see that
great advance was made through this very practice, through the systematic
importation of knowledge from abroad.52 Therefore, whilst Britain was free to dictate its own fortunes and form an innovation policy that benefited no-one but itself,
Japan had emerged from its seclusion into an arena governed by international trade
and subject to a new world order. External pressure from the international
community for the equalprotection of inventions was strong.53 On patent matters,
therefore, it was clearly caught between a rock and a hard place. It recognised the
need to advance technology and the benefits that a system of granting temporary
monopolies could provide. In addition, it was clear that foreign investment and the
introduction of overseas inventions was needed, however, it would have been
equally clear that there were significant dangers and disadvantages to domestic
industry if the protection offered was too strong. Therefore, by initially prohibiting
foreign interests from receiving patent protection, Japan gained valuable bargaining power in the renegotiation of the unequal treaties that it had entered into upon
the suspension of its seclusion policy. In addition, it enabled domestic interests to
defend against internal competition in a bid to spur on intellectual and industrial
development. The grant of narrow rights would have been optimal in the pursuit of
such a policy as these encourage incremental technological growth rather than fundamental innovation.54
As already noted, Japans accession to the Paris Convention in 1899, and the
patent law revision Ordinance that accompanied this, put an end to the outright
52
This was, after all, the primary purpose of many of Elizabeth Is initial grants. See Fox, n 48, above,
at 625, discussing the classification of monopolies granted at this time. See also, text accompanying
n 50-84 in ch 2, above.
53
The story of the creation of the NEC Corporation is a vivid example of the international pressure
that Japan found itself under to give strong recognition to intellectual property rights. The Corporation,
formed from a tie up of Nippon Electric Co Ltd of Japan and the Western Electric Co Ltd of the US, was
created just two days after the Paris convention went into force in Japan, and included provisions on the
management of intellectual property rights in its articles of incorporation. For more detail on the creation of NEC see Kondo, n 29, above, at 30.
54 And why bother to invest in fundamental innovation, a costly process, when you can import,
assimilate and improve upon someone elses work?
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prohibition upon granting protection to foreign applicants.55 However, it is apparent that the policy interests underpinning the principle of national favouritism, primarily the need to encourage domestic industry, were not so easily removed.
Indeed, they maintained such a fundamental role in the shaping of Japanese patent
law that the system was often criticised as encouraging follow-on inventions at the
expense of fundamental innovation until well into the 1990s.56 Sato, is blunt in his
comments on the matter: [i]n the hundred-odd years from the Meiji Era onward,
the Japanese industry has developed by improving technology from abroad.57
Post-ConventionIncremental Development
The 1899 patent law Ordinance was the first of a series of revisions that Takenaka
asserts demonstrate the movement from an essentially American to a Germanic system of principles regarding the scope of protection.58 She explains that whilst the
1885 law was based on the US system and saw the patent as a right to exclude others,
the 1899 revision provided that the patent gave the right to use exclusively and
distribute the patented invention, something that the US system did not.59 This
process was continued with the 1909 Ordinance, which adopted a pseudoGermanic model of jurisdictional separation between the Patent Office and the
courts,60 and was completed with the 1921 Ordinance,61 adopting the first-to-file
system of application priority.62 However, in one important aspect the Japanese
system was to retain its own specific identity.
55 However, there was still an obligation to designate an agent residing in Japan. See Kumagai, n 21,
above, at 6.
56 See Maskus & McDaniel, Lessons from Japan for US Patent Reform: Policy Implications of a PreGrant Disclosure System, a Japan Information Access Project working paper (revised on 1 Jun, 1999).
Available online at:
http://www.jiaponline.org/publications/docs/1999/june/FINAL%20PAPER%206.1.99.pdf at 5.
57 Sato, Strengthening the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights to Meet the Needs of the 21st
CenturyFuture Policy on Intellectual Property Rights (2001) 26(4) AIPPI Journal 199 at 200. This
observation, is shared by the Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights in the Twentyfirst Century to the Commissioner of the Japanese Patent Office, 7 Apr, 1997Toward the Era of
Intellectual Creation: Challenges for Breakthrough. A detailed outline of the report may be found at:
http://www.jpo.go.jp/shiryou_e/toushin_e/kenkyukai_e/rep21eng.doc.
58 Takenaka, Interpreting Claims, n 4, above, at 41. See also Vojcek, n 43, above, at 160-5. On the post
1899 developments in Japanese patent law he summarises by stating that We see clearly [in this period]
. . . the development of the Japanese patent system, which in its essential features inclines more and more
to the German and Austrian system . . . [However, p]eculiar to the Japanese system are stipulations concerning . . . contingencies which, as to minuteness have hardly a parallel in any other patent law. Vojcek,
at 165.
59 Takenaka, Interpreting Claims, n 4, above, at 41.
60 Art 49, Tokkyoho (Patent Law) (Law No 32, 1909). This meant that anyone wishing to invalidate a
patent had to commence proceedings at the Patent Office, as per the current German model.
61 Tokkyoho (Patent Law) (Law No 96, 1921).
62 See Kumagai, n 21, above, at 8.
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Post-ConventionIncremental Development
271
The patent scope certification trial was introduced by the 1899 Patent Ordinance,
and effectively functioned to vest interpretative power concerning the scope of
protection in the Patent Office. The trial enabled the patentee to bypass the court
system when questions of this kind arose, and its use may go some way to explain the
very low incidence of reported patent cases in the period up to its abolition with the
1959 Patent Ordinance.
The existence of the certification trial was very important as it functioned to
erode the separation of jurisdiction envisaged by the 1909 Ordinance. As matters of
interpretation were being considered by the Patent Office, a situation akin to that in
the UK and the US63 was effectively in existence based, however, upon German
principles. Therefore, as the Patent Office took the main role in developing claim
interpretation theory, the courts were relegated to second-fiddle. This had important repercussions for cross-jurisdictional transfer of theory between Germany and
Japan, for it is clear that from the 1899 Ordinance onward the influence of the
German legal system was strong. Examples of such international transfer of
policy/theory are given by Takenaka and include the establishment of the concept of
identification of the invention, similar to the general inventive idea of the German
courts, sitting at the core of interpretative theory. In addition, she mentions the classifications that the Patent Office utilised to divide modifications being almost
wholesale copies of their German counterparts.64 However, the blurring of the separation caused by the patent scope certification trial meant that whereas in
Germany these principles were simply utilised to decide the scope of the patent once
granted, in Japan they could also be used to deny protection.
This factor had important repercussions for claim interpretation theory, as it
essentially enabled the courts to operate unrestricted by their wording. The claim
functioned to define the invention, but the disclosure made by the patentee in the
rest of the specification was considered to be of more importance when the scope of
protection was considered. Thus, over and above the principle of classifying
modifications, the Germanic doctrine of the general inventive idea was bastardised
and effectively functioned to limit the scope of the patent to that explicitly recognised by the inventor, evidenced by the disclosure in the specification. This theory,
often known as the inventors recognition limitation theory65 came to be the governing doctrine in Japanese claim interpretation, and confined the protection
afforded by the patent to the explicit disclosure.66 Unlike the German system,
63
Where one body has competence to decide on issues of both infringement and validity. In these
countries that role is played by the court.
64
The classifications that she mentions are mechanical workshop modifications (sekkei henko),
insignificant modification (sekkeijo no bisa), designing around the invention (ukai hatsumei), and
inferior modifications (kaiaku jisshi). See Takenaka, Interpreting Claims, n 4, above, at 42.
65
Ninshiki gendoron. See Takenaka, Interpreting Claims, n 4, above, at 43.
66
Takenaka utilises a judgment of 16 Oct, 1915, (Taisho 7 No 459), stating on at 43, fn 21: Since an
application including descriptions of the nature and purpose of the invention, a detailed explanation of
the invention, the scope claimed for the grant of the patent, and specified the gist of the invention and
means and devices by which the invention is embodied so that he or she claimed the characteristic portions of what he described, the meaning of each element described in the claim must be interpreted with
respect to the nature and purpose of the invention and the detailed description of the invention.
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where the general inventive idea was utilised to expand the scope of protection to
those devices that could have been conceived by the skilled addressee based on the
claim language and the disclosure in the specification, the Japanese inventors
recognition theory operated to limit the scope of the patent to what the inventor
was perceived to have intended to claim based on the disclosure in the rest of the
specification.67
The patent scope certification trial had removed the need to be bound by the
claims by enabling the Patent Office, the forum in which the claims were drafted, to
also determine their scope. The fact that the apparent separation of powers envisaged by the 1909 Ordinance did not adequately correspond to this model appears to
have gone unnoticed in the years that followed its enactment, and the Patent Office
continued to operate as judge, jury and executioner on matters of claim scope. It
was in this respect far more powerful than the courts or Patent Offices in any of the
other jurisdictions that we have considered, as it was free to re-examine and re-draft
the patent as it determined its breadth.Various practices arose to surround this core
concept, including the determination of the gist of the invention (hatsumei no
yoshi), which augmented the narrowing of protection scope by reading the limitations in the description as limitations on the claims themselves.68
However, this was not the end of the matter, as the Japanese courts also adopted
this procedure to justify redrafting the claim in infringement proceedings by
declaring a new claim as the gist of the invention or patent.69 The fact that the courts
adopted this process served to further muddy the jurisdictional separation between
the two bodies, with both entities believing that they had the power to redraft and
reinterpret any claims at will.
Therefore, we see the same principles that were being used in the German courts
to expand the scope of protection being used in the Japanese Patent Office in scope
certification trials, and in the courts in infringement actions, to narrow the claims.
All that the jurisdictional separation envisaged by the 1909 Ordinance succeeded in
doing was to render the decisions of the Patent Office unquestionable in court. The
German motivation for such a division of power was not transferred into the
Japanese model, and, as such, the system preferred narrow protection.
This said, it is clear that the system was able, as and when the circumstances dictated, to expand protection on an ad hoc basis to minor modifications that did not
appear in the description or drawings.70 However, as Takenaka states, this:
involve[d] the mechanical one-to-one exchangeability of claim elements but . . . [did] not
involve the equitable consideration of the patentees interest and the publics interest in the
67 The reader may note that a perception of intention test bears certain similarities with the British
approach to claim interpretation discussed in ch 9, below. The repercussions of this approach are discussed therein.
68 Takenaka, Interpreting Claims, n 4, above, at 4445.
69 Ibid, at 45.
70 An example of the ad hoc application of the doctrine of equivalents can be found in the decision of
the Tokyo District Court of 28 Sep, 1964 (Hanrei No 168). See also, Kukimoto,The Patent Law: Chapter
3 The Patent Right (2001) 26 AIPPI Journal 79 at 87.
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273
context of the patent policy of encouraging innovation . . . [so as to provide a] broad range
of equivalents.71
It is also eminently clear that such expansion of the claim was far from normal.
It may be possible that the outcome of this process was, as some commentators
have claimed, based on incomplete understanding of the legal principles that were
employed in its key stages of creation.72 However, this conclusion ignores the fact
that, from an economic and practical point of view, a policy of granting narrow
patents was manifestly beneficial to Japan and Japanese industry.73 It would be
nave to conclude that a practice that encourages progression by imitation, therefore creating patent clusters74 and spurring on domestic industry75industry that
would be in danger of being strangled by broader protectioncould only be based
on such incomplete understanding. Rather, it would appear that the system flourished, and Japan made the immense technological leap that it did in the manner that
it did, precisely because of the nature and scope of the rights that the patent system
granted.76
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system77 and helped to shape the envelope of intellectual property in general, and
patents in particular. Thus, the interests of society are clearly evident in the decision,
explicit or not, to confine the scope of protection within narrow boundaries.78
The Japanese system can therefore be seen to emphasise the protection of the
general public by limiting the claim to what the inventor has disclosed in the specification. This sub-literal protection also promotes another element of Japanese
patent culture, that of collectivism, over and above the more Western notion of
individual reward. With a system of narrow grants, patents beget patents and it is
virtually impossible for one entity to control all of the technology surrounding an
invention.79 The consequent flooding80 that results from many competing applications may soon render the initial innovation impotent. Therefore, rather than
doggedly defending ones territory and bringing expensive legal actions in order to
ward off competitors, as is the Western approach, Japanese patentees traditionally
entered into cross-licenses as a matter of course.81
This institutionalised diplomacy was vital to the success of the patent system in
Japan, for without it the system would have rapidly become gridlocked. The fact
that the Japanese system encourages the laying open of technology may also
account for the monumental progress, both technological and cultural, that the
country has witnessed since the Meiji Restoration. By opening the knowledge contained in the inventive pool by effective cross-licensing, the Japanese system has
gone far beyond the information/disclosure function of the patent grant itself, in
effect rationalising innovation as a national rather than individual activity. This
process accords with the Schumpeterian notion that large entities are conducive to
77 [I]n order to obtain the highest degree of compliance possible, both judicial opinions and public
laws try to find the common ground or, that magic word, consensus regarding any specific subject.
Port, The Spirit of Japanese Law (Book Review) (2002) 1 Washington University Global Studies Law
Review 573 at 574, reviewing Haley, The Spirit of Japanese Law (Athens (GA), University of Georgia Press,
1998).
78 See, Harris,Competition Law and Patent Protection in Japan: A Half-Century of Progress, A New
Millennium of Challenges (2002) 16 Colombia Journal of Asian Law 71 at 75 to 76. See generally, Rosen
& Usui, n 75, above.
79 This narrow division of the inventive field into numerous thin patents has led some critics of the
Japanese system to nickname it the sashimi system, after the sliced fish delicacysee Sakakibara &
Branstetter, n 73, above, at 3.
80 A term utilised by many commentators including Rosen & Usui, n 75, above, to describe the multitude of patent applications claiming minor, incremental changes over previous innovationssee
Sankaran, Patent Flooding in the United States and Japan (2000) 40 IDEA 393 at 394. See also US
General Accounting Office, Intellectual Property Rights: US Companies Patent Experiences in Japan (Jul
1993) GAO/GGD-93126, at 18, which states that whenever a patent of value is published, competitors
of the patentee will file excessive numbers of patents claiming minor variations, a practice known as
patent flooding.
81 See, eg, Rosen & Usui, n 75, above, at 456. Further, in an interview with a Japanese Patent Attorney
visiting the UK this author was told that that The honourable thing to do is to come to an agreement, not
to litigate. I think that this principle still applies to many patentees in Japan. They learn from their
Western competitors, but it is better to trade than to fight. The general view of the British-qualified
patent attorneys interviewed for ch 4, above, is aptly summed up by one by the following quote: The
Japanese on the whole dont care [about the quality of individual grants, they] . . . only want a patent, they
collect them. They may amass [thousands a year] . . . and bargain with them, they go to their competitors
and say weve got more than you, give us some money. They dont seem to care about the value of each
one.
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including overseas publications within its remit, and it made it possible to file a
patent application that covered more than a single invention for the first time. It also
inserted a requirement, in Article 70, that the court determine the technical scope of
an invention, and therefore the breadth of protection, by reference to the claim.87
Protection scope certification trials were also abolished, thereby transferring
responsibility for claim interpretation to the courts and clarifying the jurisdictional
separation envisaged by the 1909 Ordinance.
The inclusion of Article 70 in the new law was intended to prevent the courts
from re-examining the patent claim, as had been the pre-1959 practice. By inserting
direct reference to it in determining the scope of protection, the legislature aimed
at forcing courts to read the claim as it was granted in infringement litigation.88
However, as ever, legislative intent and court practice do not always see eye-to-eye,
and the courts continued to utilise pre-1959 practice to limit the claim based on disclosures made elsewhere in the specification.
Subsequent revisions to the Patent Law attempted to expand the scope of protection. Therefore in 1975, a multiple claim system was introduced.89 Whereas previously it was only possible to include one single, independent, claim in an
application, the revision allowed the inclusion of multiple dependent claims.90
However, this amendment did not substantially alter the number of claims actually
included in most patent applications at the time.91 The reasons for this are manifold, but a significant contributing factor to this observation must have been the fact
that the revision was primarily motivated by Japans ratification of the Patent Cooperation Treaty,92 ie an external rather than an internal factor. This suggests that
there was no institutionalised call for more claims and therefore, as the single claim
system was perceived internally to be working well, there was little need to include
more claims in the application. This argument is supported by the fact that the
number of patent applications continued to grow year-on-year throughout this
period, rather than suffering downturn as broader protection removed the need for
a patent clustering protection strategy.93
In 1987, following two relatively minor revisions,94 the law was again amended
and the claim system modified to allow multiple independent claims. Furthermore,
the ease with which related inventions could be included in a single patent was significantly increased with the new law. It would appear that these revisions had far
87 At this point in time the Japanese patent system only allowed applications to contain one claim,
thus seriously limiting the scope of protection.
88 Takenaka, Interpreting Claims, n 4, above, at 50. Referring to Comments made by Justice Masao
Miyake, former Japanese Supreme Court Judge.
89 Art 36, Law No 46, 1975.
90 See Sakakibara & Branstetter, n 73, above, at 34. Also Takenaka, Interpreting Claims, n 4, above, at
48, and Kumagai, n 21, above, at 1112.
91 Sakakibara & Branstetter, n 73, above, at 39, provide statistical data gathered by the Japanese Patent
Office that shows that until 1987 the average number of claims per patent application across the board
was below 1.5.
92 And therefore its need to comply with the provisions of the Treaty.
93 See Sakakibara & Branstetter, n 73, above, at 38.
94 One in 1978 (Law No 30, 1978), and one in 1985 (Law No 41, 1985).
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277
greater effect on the average number of claims per patent application than any of the
previous amendments did. For example, figures from the Japanese Patent Office
show a rise from approximately 1.2 to somewhere in the region of 2.5 claims per
application between 1987 and 1988 when the reforms were implemented.95 This is
significant, for an effective multi-claim patent should (theoretically) enable greater
breadth of protection, even under a sub-literal interpretative regime, than a patent
consisting of a single claim would allow. This can be seen in figure 1 (below):96
Key
Prior Art
Independent
Claim
Prior Art
Independent
Claim
Independent
Claim
Prior Art
The diagram shows that the use of three relatively narrow independent claims
enables the patentee to utilise the space surrounding the inventive core of the application without straying into the prior art more effectively than a single claim would
do.Whilst this scope of protection could theoretically have been achieved before the
reforms by the filing of multiple applications (as was the common practice), it is
clear that the revised system would have significantly reduced the cost of a given
level of protection. In addition to this, as Sakakibara & Branstetter note, the multiclaim system may also have improved matters by making it possible for innovations
95 See Sakakibara & Branstetter, n 73, above, at 39, fig 3. By 1989, the average number of claims per
application was 2.8see Japanese Patent Office, Trends of Industrial Property Right Applications and
Registrations, previously available at http://www.jpo.go.jp/shiryou_e/trends_of_ipr.htm [link now
dead]. The data set in the latter document spanned 19892001, and showed a year-on-year rise in the
number of claims per application.
96 Inspired by a similar diagram in Sakakibara & Branstetter, n 73, above, at 37.
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that could not be completely protected under the old system . . . [to] now receive full
protection.97
Therefore, by implementing measures such as these, the scope of a Japanese
patent was manipulated without the need for changes in the established rules of
interpretation. It should be noted, however, that up-take of the multiple claim
system by Japanese patentees was relatively slim in the first few years of its
operation,98 suggesting that there was a need for an institutional change in working
practices in addition to legislative reform.
Policy Reforms
Continued international pressure and criticism, both internal and external, of the
narrow scope of protection afforded by the courts interpretation of Japanese
patents finally became too much to ignore. Therefore, in the midst of a decidedly
pro-patentee era in Japanevidenced by the publication of reports such as that of
the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights in the Twenty-First Century, entitled Toward the Era of Intellectual Creation,99 that details proposals for accelerating
the cycle of intellectual creation through intellectual property rights100the
Japanese Supreme Court issued what has been described as a landmark decision101
in Tsubakimoto Seiko v THK KK 102 (the Ball Spline decision), explicitly endorsing
the doctrine of equivalents.103
As noted, the Japanese system in the pre-equivalents era was heavily biased
towards protection of the interests of society over and above the interests of any
individual patentee. The policy in the early years of the system was geared towards
technological growth, to reduce the yawning gap between Japan and the advanced
Western nations on which it modelled its renovation. Improvement and advance97 Sakakibara & Branstetter, n 73, above, at 6. For more detail on the ways in which the revisions in
1987 expanded the effective scope of Japanese patents see 811 therein.
98 Eg, whereas 91.2% of non-Japanese applicants utilised multiple claims in their applications to the
Japanese Patent Office in 1989, only 40.9% of Japanese applicants did so. See Japanese Patent Office,
Trends of Industrial Property Right Applications and Registrations, n 95, above, figs. 13.
99 Above, n 57.
100 A report of the Planning Subcommittee of the Industrial Property Council entitled To the Better
Understanding of Pro-Patent Policy is rather more blunt in its recitation of policy. This is available
online at: http://www.jpo.go.jp/shiryou_e/toushin_e/shingikai_e/report.pdf.
101 By Yamamoto & Tessensohn, Doctrine of Equivalents adds Torque to Japanese Patent
Infringement (1999) 81 JPTOS 483 (Yamamoto & Tessensohn,Torque) at 483.
102 1630 Hanrei Jiho 32 (Supreme Ct, 1998).
103 Discussions of the Ball Spline decision are many, and include Takenaka, The Doctrine of
Equivalents in Japan (2000) 6 CASRIP Symposium Publication Series 125 at 1256. Available online at:
http://www.law.washington.edu/casrip/Symposium/Number6/Takenaka.pdf. Also see Tani,THK Co. v
Tsubakimoto Seiko Co.Infringement Case for Ball Spline Bearing (1998) 1(6) Journal of World
Intellectual Property 963. Kim, A Comparative Analysis of the Japanese Supreme Court Decision on
Doctrine of Equivalents [2002] IPQ 18. Sonoda & Kobayashi, Doctrine of Equivalents in Japan, available at: http://www.patents.jp/Archive/19980703-01.pdf. Also Yamamoto & Tessensohn,Torque, n 101,
above.
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279
ment were the watchwords, and therefore individual success was less important
than the success of the collective. Technology advanced by assimilation and there
was no room for the uncertainties that extending protection into the area beyond
the literal scope of the claims would allow. Indeed, as Takenaka notes,the Japanese
Courts refused to introduce an unclear concept of equivalents into their patent
system, resulting in a patentees claim for infringement by equivalents often being
viewed as an admission of no infringement.104 It was only in exceptional cases, with
the aim of preventing a manifestly unfair result, that any protection beyond the textual meaning was achieved, and even in such circumstances this was facilitated by
manipulation of the literal meaning under what was known as the substantial
identity rule.105 Explicit recognition of the doctrine of equivalents by the Japanese
supreme judicial body is therefore of considerable importance in the evolution of
the intellectual property system there.
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The Patent
The case concerned a patent for an endlessly sliding ball spline bearing
(constituent element E) comprising four sub-elements A to D. The defendants
product satisfied elements C, D and E, but differed from the claimed product in the
following manner. In regard to element A, the patent called for an outer cylinder
having torque transmitting load-bearing ball-guiding grooves with a U-shaped
cross-section, . . . the outer cylinder having an annular circumferentially directed
groove [in portion 7]109 The Defendants product differed in that it was of semicircular cross section and had a cylindrical portion 7110 The patent claimed element B as a retainer that functioned as a guide for the balls in their continuous
circulation, to retain the balls when the spline shaft was removed, and as a guide for
the ribbed portions of the spline shaft. In the defendants product these functions
were effected by the co-operation of three separate members.111
108
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281
The Appeal
On appeal, the Supreme Court was not content to uphold the decision of the Tokyo
Court on the reasoning given above. Rather it proceeded to take the opportunity to
clearly explain the policy justification for finding infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents, and clarified the appropriate test for applying it.114
The court began by referring to Article 70 of the 1959 Patent Ordinance and
stated that the technical scope of the patented invention must be determined by reference to the claims in the specification.If there are elements that differ between the
constitution described in a patented claim and corresponding product and the like,
the corresponding product cannot be said to fall within the technical scope of the
patented invention.115 However, it continued stating that even if there were elements that differed between the patent claims and the accused infringement, the
latter may be said to be equivalent to the constitution described in the claim, and
may be said to fall within the technical scope of the patented invention, as long as
certain criteria were satisfied. Viz:
(1) that the differing elements are not the essential elements in the patented invention;
(2) even if the differing elements are interchanged by elements of the corresponding
product and the like, the object of the patented invention can be achieved and the
same effects can be obtained;
(3) by interchanging as above, a person of ordinary skill in the art to which the invention
pertains (hereinafter referred to as an artisan) could have easily achieved the corresponding product and the like at the time of manufacture etc. of the corresponding
product;
(4) the corresponding product and the like are not the same as the known art at the time
of application for [the] patent or could not have been easily conceived by an artisan at
the time of application for [the] patent; and
(5) there [are] not any special circumstances such that the corresponding product and
the like are intentionally excluded form the scope of the claim during patent prosecution.116
In sanctioning a departure from the exact wording of the claims, the Court noted
the difficulty of writing a specification that took into account all future modes of
infringement at the outset. In addition, it said that the value of a patent in encouraging innovation would be greatly diminished if another party could easily circumvent its protection by replacing part of the composition with techniques or
materials that became available after the filing date. Such restriction on the rights of
the patentee would not only violate the purpose of patent law to contribute to the
development of industries through protection of and encouragement of invention,
114
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but [would also deny] . . . social justice, resulting in the breach of the concept of
equity.117
The court considered that it should therefore be understood that the substantive
value of a patented invention should extend from the claims to cover equivalents
that would be obvious to a third party and which are substantially identical to the
constitution described in the claims. Conversely, protection would not extend to
technology that was known at the time of filing the patent, or which would have
been obvious to those skilled in the art at the filing date. Furthermore, where the
patentee has intentionally excluded technology from the scope of the claims (eg
during prosecution), or has committed an act that can be outwardly interpreted as
doing so, she will be estopped from making contrary assertions at a later date.118
The court then considered the merits of the case and concluded that despite the
defendants variants being inessential, having no material effect on the way the
invention worked or on the result obtained, and being obvious substitutes for the
elements in the patentees invention119 there was, nonetheless, no infringement.
The reason for this finding lay in the final (negative) requirements for the invocation of the doctrine of equivalents, specifically requirement (4)that the accused
embodiment is not the same as the known art at the time of application for the
patent nor could have been easily conceived by one skilled in the art at this time. The
court found that the accused embodiment could have easily been arrived at without
the teaching of the patented invention and was therefore not equivalent to the
claimed invention.120 This finding is in itself important, as the defendants device in
this instance was a patented invention.121 Therefore, by its finding that the device
did not infringe by reason of being within the prior art, the Supreme Court effectively invalidated the patent despite not having the jurisdiction to do so explicitly.
Para 3.1 of the decision of the Supreme Court in Ball Spline. See Tani, n 103, above.
Paraphrased version of the remainder of para 3.1 of the decision of the Supreme Court in Ball
Spline.
119 ie fulfilling elements (1) to (3) of the test for invoking the doctrine of equivalents.
120 See para 3.2 of the decision of the Supreme Court in Ball Spline, as translated by Tani, n 103, above.
121 Japanese patent No 1611468.
122 Rather than the language of the specification as a whole.
118
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Subsequent Interpretation
Subsequent cases have demonstrated the Japanese courts reluctance to apply the
doctrine of equivalents127 by reliance on restrictive interpretations of the positive
factors, in particular the demonstrable confusion that has arisen over what exactly
characterises a non-essential element of the invention.128 The decisions that directly
followed Ball Spline struggled to come to terms with the sudden change of direction
and degree of ambiguity that it left in its wake. A small number are worthy of note.
In SS Seiyaku v Zensei Yakuhin KK,129 the Osaka District Court considered the
meaning of the phrase essential elements of the invention, and stated that these
must be understood as being the fundamental technical features which produce the
results particular to the invention.130 As such, they are the elements which, if
123
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replaced, would result in a technical idea different to that of the patented invention.
By adopting this definition, the court effectively elides the first two questions of the
test and, additionally, provides interpretative freedom in the determination of
when such an element will produce effects particular to the invention that are not
contributed by prior teaching. Indeed, it is clear that almost any element can be seen
to produce effects particular to an invention and therefore be deemed to be essential131therefore precluding the application of the doctrine of equivalents. In
SS Seiyaku, the court considered that the element for which the defendant had provided a substitute was indeed essential, and therefore declined to find infringement.
Further, considering the non-obviousness of the substitution, it concluded that the
third test for the invocation of the doctrine of equivalents was also not satisfied.132
Another decision that is of interest is that of the Tokyo District Court in
KK Kouken v KK Tatsumi Ryouki.133 The case concerned an invention for a water
resistant load system that comprised a cylindrical main electrode and a hollow
cylindrical base electrode. The base electrode was insulated and the patent required
the main electrode to pass through the bottom of this element. In the alleged
infringement, the main electrode was modified so that it did not pass through the
base electrode, but was rather spaced apart from it.134 It was accepted that this produced a risk of electrical short-circuit being created via the water.
The court began by explaining that the basis for the doctrine of equivalents was
found in the courts ability to give recognition to substance over precise form. In the
same way that the court could recognise a relationship between a man and a woman
who had not registered their marriage but were in substance a married couple, so it
could recognise infringement where the accused and the patented devices were, in
substance, the same. This ability under the general law enabled the court to avoid
unfair results that would be produced by strict enforcement of formality requirements. Having rationalised the application of the doctrine in this way, the court
then proceeded to apply the criteria laid down by the Supreme Court in Ball Spline.
In doing so it allocated the burden of proof for the first three stages of the test (the
positive criteria) to the patentee, and the latter two (the negative criteria) to the
defendant.135
131 For parity of reasoning see, eg, majoritys judgment in the House of Lords decision in Van der Lely
v Bamfords [1963] RPC 61 whereby the patentee, by specifying hindmost wheels mountable in line with
the foremost wheels in his patent, precluded infringement by a competitors machine wherein the foremost wheels were mountable in line with the hindmost.Applying the test set out above, it can be seen that
the specification of hindmost wheels mountable in line with the foremost wheels produces an effect that
is particular to that invention, therefore making this an essential element.
132 ie that the person of ordinary skill in the art would not have perceived the substitution as obvious,
and therefore there could be no infringement.
133 Hanrei Jiho No. 1657, 122 (1999) a decision of the Tokyo District Court (7 Oct, 1998).
134 The summary of the case that appears in the next few paragraphs is largely based on that found in
Yamamoto & Tessensohn, The Evolution of the Doctrine of Equivalents in Recent Japanese Patent
Litigation, n 127, above at 2836. See also Takenaka, The Doctrine of Equivalents after the Supreme
Court Ball SplineDecision (1999) 5 CASRIP Newsletter.Available at: http://www.law.washington.edu/
CASRIP/Newsletter/Vol5/newsv5i4jp1.htm.
135 In contrast to the US position, whereby the burden is placed on the patentee once the prosecution
history has been raised.
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285
Regarding the first and second conditions, ie that the difference must be in an
inessential element of the invention and that the modification must not alter the
function and result of the patented invention, the court found that the defendants
machine was substantially the same as the patentees invention. However, it was on
the interpretation of the third leg of the testthat the variants adopted by the
defendant should have been readily understood by everyone in the field of the invention to be substitutes for those detailed in the patentthat the possibility of
infringement by equivalents floundered. The court considered that the risk of electrical short-circuit in the defendants product was sufficient to dissuade many in the
field from adopting the variant, thus it was not readily conceived by everyone in the
field, and was consequently not equivalent to the patentees invention.136
The adoption of such a standard is most significant, as it renders the degree of
obviousness for the replacement of features between the patented device and the
accused infringement at a much higher level than the corresponding test for inventive step.137 Therefore the protection provided by the patent under an equivalents
analysis does not accurately correspond to the degree of dead flesh that the grant
creates around any given innovation, and furthermore does not correspond to the
Supreme Courts policy justification of the doctrine of equivalents in Ball Spline.138
As such, the establishment of a strict standard enables the courts to provide narrow
protection, denying the application of the doctrine of equivalents to all but the most
obvious modificationsie those cases in which a literal interpretation of the claims
would produce an unfair result; startlingly similar to the pre-Ball Spline position.
Having denied infringement by equivalents in this way the court obviated the
need to enter into the treacherous area surrounding the issue of file wrapper estoppel, in which virtually the whole of the defendants arguments had been based.
Therefore, at the same time as the courts in the US were limiting the effect of the doctrine of equivalents by heavy reliance on the prosecution history,139 the Japanese
courts were developing their own limitations based on other elements of the test.
Foremost in this exercise was the continued tension over what exactly characterised
an essential element of the invention. A review of decisions immediately following
Ball Spline reveals that the courts most frequently rely upon the essential element
test when rejecting the patentees request to invoke the doctrine of equivalents.140
One such example of this approach is the decision in SS Seiyaku, discussed above;
another is the judgment of the Tokyo District Court in Shinwa Seisakusho v Furuta
136 Although this does seem to be precipitously close to saying that an infringement done badly is not
an infringement.
137 The test for the inventive step being defined in Art 29(2) of the Patent Ordinance as would not
readily have been conceived by one skilled in the art.
138 See text accompanying n 11421, above.
139 See the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) in Festo Corporation v
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co Ltd, 234 F.3d 558 (2000, CAFC). Discussed in text accompanying
n 17696 in ch 6, above.
140 See Takenaka, The Essential Element Test Provides a Big Hurdle to Japanese Doctrine of
Equivalents (2000) 7 CASRIP Newsletter (Takenaka, Essential Element). Available at: http://www.law.
washington.edu/CASRIP/Newsletter/Vol7/newsv7i2jp4.pdf.
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Denki KK.141 The latter was the first case since the recognition of the existence of the
doctrine in Ball Spline in which the claim of infringement by equivalents was
upheld. It concerned apparatus for separating seaweed from other matter in seawater, and the decision hinged on the definition of essential element. The court
considered that this phrase should be interpreted as meaning the technical features
that give a basis for solving the problem unique to the patented invention.142
However, the judgment is less important for the exact formulation of the test than
for the clarification of the policy justifications behind adopting the definition. The
court stated that:
The patent system attempts to protect the essential value of the invention, that is the disclosure of the technical idea which has not been existed in the prior art and results in a
solution of a technical object that has never been attained by the prior art. Accordingly,
the essential part should be understood to comprise the technical features, which relate to
the core of the technical idea underlying the solution of the technical object unique to the
patented invention . . . Because the patented invention results in a function and result
unique to that invention through a physical combination of technical features, in determining whether the difference in technical features of the accused device relates to an
essential part, a courts analysis should not simply focus on the technical feature that is
removed from the rest of features recited in the disputed claim. Instead courts should
examine the prior art and identify the characteristic principle underlying the solution of
the technical object unique to the patented invention. They should then examine whether
the principle underlying the solution of the accused product is substantially the same as
the identified principle of the patented invention.143
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Conclusion
287
more likely the elements are to be seen as essentialgiven that they form the basis
for solving the problem unique to the patented invention. The potential for a wide
range of equivalents will, therefore, be most marked in inventions resulting from a
combination of known features, as here all of the elements already exist in the prior
art, and cannot be seen as being essential.
This is a critical distinction, as the introduction of the doctrine of equivalents
into Japanese law was, to a certain degree, prompted by Japans desire to move from
a net imitator to net producer of technology: to enter the era of intellectual creation. It will be recalled that the pre-equivalents Japanese system had been widely
criticised as promoting incremental rather than pioneer innovation. The pioneer
invention entails the greatest risk on the part of the innovator; it has an uncertain
benefit/cost ratio and is therefore the invention that benefits most (in terms of
increasing the probability of production) from patent protection.146 The Ball Spline
decision was hailed as an epoch in Japanese claim interpretation, casting off the
restrictive burden of the previous narrow practice.Yet the requirements and limitations placed on the operation of the doctrine of equivalents under Ball Spline (as
interpreted) once more favour the incremental over the pioneer.147
Conclusion
Despite explicit recognition of the doctrine of equivalents in Japanese patent law
with the decision in Ball Spline, the subsequent ambiguity and narrow approach of
the lower courts when considering the scope of the five-stage test has somewhat
lessened its impact. However, the very fact that it was introduced at all is significant
as it marks conscious recognition by the Supreme Court of Japans need to move
from a net importer of technology to an era of intellectual creation.
However, the question that now arises is whether the changes were actually
required to make this transition, or whether, as the cynic may suggest, they were
implemented in order to fit in with an increasingly Americanised market? Let us
examine the evidence.
In pre-Ball Spline Japan the patent system still managed to push forward technology. However, it did not do this by offering broad monopoly grants designed to
reward only the first to innovate in any given area. It pushed the technological
boundaries by providing a structure in which invention, and innovation, could be
traded. Inventing became not so much a practice of quantum leaps, but rather one
146 This analysis is based on Scherers categorisation of invention that can be found in his highly influential study, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1980;
2nd Ed) at 44350. See text accompanying n 502 in ch 5, above.
147 The reader may note that the approach taken by the House of Lords in Kirin-Amgen v
Transkaryotic Therapies Inc [2005] 1 All ER 667 also seems to limit the interpretation placed on the patent
claims in fast moving technologies (where pioneer inventions are generally to be found). See further,
text accompanying n 96112 in ch 10, below.
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Pokemon anyone?
See ch 5, above.
ie more familiar, Westernised.
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Conclusion
289
property protection151 may actually do more damage than good. Japans story
vividly demonstrates the difficulty of technological evolution in an increasingly
international world. The meteoric rise from feudal surf to technological whiz-kid
that the country has undergone in less than 150 years is little short of astounding,
and poses the question of whether it could be repeated today. The homogenisation
of patent law, the claim implicit in TRIPS that one size can, and indeed should, fit
all, does not adequately correspond with the picture of Japans evolution. If
Sakakibara & Branstetters conclusion is correct, and the Patent Law reforms of
1988 did not have an appreciable effect on the level of innovative activity in Japan,
despite objectively broadening the potential scope of the claimed invention,152 then
the American premise that stronger is better seems to be misplaced. The object of
any patent law cannot be the satisfaction of international interests over and above
protection/ stimulation of national ones, and yet this is what TRIPS demands.
If, as the Japanese experience suggests, narrow protection does not necessarily
equate to slow progress, and moreover broadening protection does not automatically lead to an increase in innovation, then, as Sakakibara & Branstetter conclude,
some of these theoretical models and the pro-patent public policies based on
them will need to be reexamined. 153 Indeed.
151
152
153
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9
From Pith to Purpose
British Claim Interpretation under the Protocol
In principle, according to the authorities, a patent specification is to be construed like
any other document, due regard being paid to the special functions of the claims. . . .
This, however, is theory: in practice, it should not be assumed that the inquiry the Court
makes by way of purposive construction of patent claims . . . will relate to the meaning
of the words of the claim, in any ordinary sense, at all.
Blanco White, Patents For Inventions (London, Stevens & Sons, 1983; 5th Ed) at 2-101.
Preface
The European Patent Convention (EPC) was signed in Munich on 5 October, 1973,
and entered into force four years later, almost to the day, on 7 October, 1977.1 As one
of the original fourteen signatories, the UKs obligations under the Convention
were discharged by the passage of the Patents Act 1977 (the 1977 Act) into law.2
Receiving Royal assent on 29 July, 1977, most of the Act came into force on 1 June,
1978,3 ushering in a new era of patent law.
The Act has been described as a watershed in UK patent jurisprudence,4 clearly
demarking the boundary between old patents whose applications were filed before
its entry into force,5 and those subsequent applications that must be dealt with
solely under the new regime. The reality of the situation is, however, not quite so
clear-cut, for the transitional provisions of the 1977 Act extended some elements of
its influence to existing patents applied for under previous legislation. Notably,
whilst the provisions on infringement within s60 were explicitly proclaimed to be
1 See Haertel, Forward II, in Kemp (ed), Patent Claim Drafting and Interpretation (London, Oyez
Longman, 1983) at xv.
2 The full title of the Act is: An Act to establish a new law of patents applicable to future patents and
application for patents; to amend the law of patents applicable to existing patents and applications for
patents; to give effect to certain international conventions on patents; and for connected purposes. 1977
c.37.
3 See SI 1978/586.
4 Ferguson, Claims in the UK Patent Office, in Kemp (ed), Patent Claim Drafting and Interpretation
(London, Oyez Longman, 1983), 102, at 102.
5 ie those patents applied for under the Patents Act 1949.
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applicable cross-boundary in this manner,6 s125 of the 1977 Act, concerning the
definition of invention and scope of protection, was not.
Notwithstanding this deliberate omission, there was still a degree of uncertainty
that surrounded the issue of scope, for whilst it was clear that the Protocol on the
interpretation of Article 69 EPC (the Protocol) applied for the purposes of 1977 Act
patents,7 it was unclear what effect it had on those applications already made under
the old law. At face value, both Article 69 EPC and Protocols diplomatic compromiseintended to guard against extreme interpretation8 and thereby bring the
laws of the Member States together on the issue of determination of scopedid not
apply to applications already existing at the 1977 Acts entry into force. However, the
transitional provisions tortuous wording9 meant that argument to the contrary
could clearly be made: thus, as s60, which was explicitly stated to be applicable to
both new and old patents,10 defines infringement in terms of the invention, and
s125(3) expressly imports the Protocol into s125(1)s definition of this invention,
so the Protocol could be argued to apply equally, at least as far as infringement is
concerned, for both old and new patents. However, as Blanco White explains, acting
against this construction is the fact that it is not open on the wording of the 1977
Act to raise the same argument in relation to validity, and it can hardly have been
intended that claims should be differently interpreted for infringement and for
validity.11 The better view, therefore, appears to be that the omission of s125 from
the transitional provisions excluded consideration of the Protocol for old Act
patents.
Seen in this manner, the position would have been relatively clear. Patents applied
for under the provisions of the 1949 Act were to be interpreted in line with the
authorities decided under that Act, whilst applications made under the new legislation would require consideration in light of Article 69 and the Protocol. However,
the opaque wording of the transitional provisions meant that divination of the
draftsmans precise intention in this matter was far from straightforward.
Additionally, any separation between approaches was heavily dependent on the
view taken of what each actually demanded of the interpretation to be applied to the
patent. Here the intrinsically woolly12 language of the Protocol did not assist.
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Patents in Transition
293
Patents in Transition
The transitional provisions of the 1977 Act appear, therefore, to have created two
distinct types of patents which had to be interpreted in different ways. The first consisted of those grants applied for before June 1978, which, even after the 1977 Acts
entry into force, would still have had to be interpreted in light of the old law. The
second group comprised those applied for under the 1977 Act which should have
been interpreted under the new watershed provisions. Given patents applied for
under the 1949 Act would have had a maximum life of 20 years following the entry
into force of the new legislation,13 it would not have been until 1998 that the last of
those granted under the old system (and therefore subject to the old interpretative
mechanism) would have expired. Two distinct interpretative regimes may therefore
have been expected.
As already noted,14 the prevalent interpretative mechanism before the passage of
the 1977 Act was the doctrine of pith and marrow. This mixed metaphor was used
to describe the fact that infringement could be said to occur when the defendant
duplicated the essential elements of the patentees invention whilst substituting
mechanical equivalents for the rest. The scope of protection of the patent was therefore defined both in terms of the literal meaning of the claims and by reference to
this second, expansive, doctrine. In Rotocrop v Genbourne 15 Graham J considered
the effect that the EPC and the Protocol would have on pith and marrow, concluding that previous decisions of the House of Lords in this area appeared to be in line
with and indeed to have anticipated that underlying the interpretation of the scope
of monopolies under the European Patent Convention.16 The British position was
thus considered to be practically synonymous with that of the Protocol. Therefore,
whilst acknowledging that it was not actually applicable to old-Act patents, Graham
Js statement appears to suggest that the specification should nevertheless be interpreted with an eye to the balance that the Protocol requires. The UKs interpretative
position was also considered by Jacob (later to become Jacob LJ) in his then contemporary comment on the new Act when he stated that: It seems therefore that the
Protocol adds virtually nothing to our existing methods of construction.17
The gap between the newly imposed structure, under Article 69 and the Protocol,
and the traditional British approach to claim interpretation appears, therefore, to
have been perceived as insignificant at the time of the 1977 Acts entry into force.
The caricatured approach of the courts taking a strict, literal, view of the claims,
13
Previously the term of the patent was governed by s22(3) Patents Act 1949 and was fixed at a maximum of 16 years. s4, Sch 1 PA 1977 extends this to a maximum of 20 years for existing patents, as defined
in s3, Sch 1 PA 1977.
14
In ch 1, above.
15
Rotocrop International Ltd v Genbourne Ltd [1982] FSR 241.
16
Ibid, at 261.
17 Jacob, Interpretation of Claims and Infringement, in Vitoria (ed), The Patents Act 1977 (London,
Sweet & Maxwell, 1978) at 67.
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construing the specification as though it were a conveyancing document and providing no latitude to the patentee, was seen to be something from the past; things
had moved on. Given that the ridiculously rigid18 approaches to interpretation of
the 1950s and 60s had now been isolated and left behind, the UKs courts were in a
position which contrasted starkly with that prevailing in Germany at the time. In
this latter state reform was not simply a possibility, it was a necessity. Pre-EPC
German law on claim construction was clearly not in conformity with the
Convention.19 Realisation of this factor, however, gave the German courts an
advantage. They could now start afresh and try to turn the cart around; in Britain
there was no such impetus for change.
Any division that appears to have been envisaged by the 1977 Act between old and
new patents regarding interpretation of the claims was therefore eroded by the
assumed conformity of previous and new approaches. Therefore, whilst the
(notably vague) wording of the Protocol was complied with, the spirit of the EPC,
or more accurately the harmonisation efforts embodied by the Protocol, were being
ignored in the name of familiarity. As Spengler intones, It is inappropriate to
decline to co-operate on the achievement of legal unification whenever ones own
solution has not been chosen as the model for that of the Community.20 However,
whether the same may be said if you consider your rules are still governing the game
is another matter entirely. By assuming conformity, no attempt was made to assess
the actual impact of the transition to a common European position and how this
should affect the approach to be adopted. In addition, the House of Lords next pronouncement on the matter of claim interpretation simply served to muddy the
water further, making the prospect of critical consideration of prevailing position
even more distant.
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295
time the case came before their Lordships, had at most 18 years left to run.23
However, erosion of the distinction between old and new patents caused by the
assumption that the UKs approach was already in accordance with the Protocol
meant that the cases importance was magnified.
The Dispute
The facts of the case are remarkably straightforward. The dispute concerned
Catnics patented steel lintel, designed to be light, inexpensive and easy to handle.24
It was specifically intended for use in spanning apertures in cavity walls. The claims
of the patent specified as part of the invention that a rigid support member should
extend vertically from or from near the rear edge of a horizontal plate.25 The
defendants had produced lintels substantially identical to Catnics but in which the
rear wall was inclined at 82 or 84 degrees to the horizontal.
At first instance, Whitford J considered that, despite the claim drawing by its
terms a distinction between inclined and vertical members, the defendants had
still infringed under the doctrine of pith and marrow. He explained that: So far as
any question of function is concerned, in as much as there is a difference [between
the plaintiff s and defendants products], it is not such a difference as ought to be
considered . . . a material difference.26 The action therefore succeeded on the basis
that the defendants had simply made immaterial changes to the claimed subject
matter of the invention in order to evade the strict, literal, wording of the claim; this
was still infringement.
The majority of the Court of Appeal, on the other hand, came to the opposite
conclusion. Buckley LJ stated that the crux of the matter was the problem of what
distinguishes a feature of a claim that is essential from one which is not essential.27
In order to answer this conundrum, he focussed on the distinction drawn in the
claims between vertical and inclined members. He explained that, by making this
distinction, the drafter of the patent had therefore made the restriction essential by
their choice of words, even though the support member need not be exactly perpendicular to the horizontal plate in order for the invention to work.28 Therefore, with
reasoning strikingly similar to that of the majority of the House of Lords in Van der
Lely,29 he considered that the patentee had made strict compliance with the primary, literal, meaning of the claim an essential feature of the invention. Further,
23
The case was heard in the Lords on 29 and 30 October 1980, judgment was handed down a little
under three weeks later on 17 November. As stated in n 13 above, the term of patents already existing, or
applied for, at the time of the entry into force of the 1977 Act was extended to a maximum of 20 years by
that Act. All 1949 Act patents would therefore have expired by 1 June 1998, and at this point the Act itself
could be laid to rest.
24
See the specification of patent No 1,298,789, reproduced in [1982] RPC 183 at 186.
25
See claim 1 of the patent, ibid, at 188.
26
Above, n 21, at 218.
27
Ibid, at 225.
28 Ibid. at 2289.
29 Van der Lely v Bamfords [1963] RPC 61, discussed in text accompanying n 37 in ch 1, above.
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Waller LJ, concurring, was of the opinion that to a person familiar with the art, an
engineer or man concerned with the construction of a steel lintel, the use of the
word vertical would indicate precision.30 Thus, irrespective of the patentees
actual intentions, the court was of the belief that the skilled addressee would
consider the scope of the patent to have been limited, as vertical was a word of precision that it appeared had been deliberately chosen and used.
The plaintiffs appealed to the House of Lords.
30
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297
The Judgment
Lord Diplock began his discussion of infringement by considering the nature of the
specification. This, he thought, could be categorised as a unilateral statement made
by the patentee in words of his own choosing, addressed to those likely to have a
practical interest in the subject matter of his invention.35 It had the function of
informing this person of the essential features of the product or process for which
protection had been granted. Such was not controversial.
However, his Lordship then continued, stressing that there were no separate
questions of textual and non-textual infringement:36 simply put, there is but a
single cause of action. Therefore, the:
specification should be given a purposive construction rather than a purely literal one
derived from applying to it the kind of meticulous verbal analysis in which lawyers are too
often tempted by their training to indulge.37
In one fell swoop the doctrine of pith and marrow was therefore extinguished,
replaced by a single-stage purposive construction of the claims; a construction startlingly reminiscent of Lord Diplocks earlier narrow interpretation in Rodi.38 The
essential question (later to be called the Catnic question) was therefore to ask:
whether persons with practical knowledge and experience of the kind of work in which the
invention was intended to be used, would understand that strict compliance with a
particular descriptive word or phrase appearing in a claim was intended by the patentee to
be an essential requirement of the invention so that any variant would fall outside of the
monopoly claimed, even though it could have no material effect on the way the invention
worked.39
His Lordship continued, stating that this was only to be answered in the negative:
when it would be apparent to any reader skilled in the art that a particular descriptive word
or phrase used in a claim cannot have been intended by a patentee, who was also skilled in
the art, to exclude minor variants which, to the knowledge of both him and the readers to
whom the patent was addressed, could have no material effect on the way in which the
invention worked.40 (emphasis added)
Voiced in this manner, and excepting the compaction of the test into one-stage,
there is little that was not presaged by his Lordships earlier judgment in Rodi.
35
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However, the manner in which this test was applied to the facts belies a subtle nod
in the direction of the Protocol and, despite never being acknowledged as such, may
be evidence of an attempt to further distance the UK from the literalism of the past.
Therefore, the view is taken that the addressee of the specification would not, in this
case, have considered that strict compliance was intended by the patentee.No plausible reason has been advanced why any rational patentee should want to place so
narrow a limitation on his invention . . . [as to] render his monopoly for practical
purposes worthless,41 an argument very similar to that advanced in Henriksen v
Tallon.42
Identification of the skilled addressee as a builder familiar with ordinary building operations, is intriguing. By making this selection, Lord Diplock actually
41
42
43
44
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299
addresses the specification to the user of the product, a consumer, rather than the
person strictly interested in performing the invention so disclosed or in creating the
inventive product. His Lordship made no attempt suggest that the test for ascertaining the identity of the skilled addressee was being changed by his judgment, yet the
accepted standard at the time, laid down by Lord Reid in Technograph Printed
Circuits Ltd v Mills & Rockley (Electronics) Ltd, operated far from this level.45 By
focussing the investigation through this person, the consumer or user of the goods
in question, Lord Diplock necessarily provides an opportunity to expand the
boundaries of the grant. Therefore the consumer, unversed with the intricacies of
patent law, sees no reason to hold the patentee to the literal meaning of the wording
used in their claim where this would obviously rob them of all protection. Thus,
82 or 84 degrees from the horizontal is vertical for all practical purposes.46
However, operating within this test, it would have been perfectly possible to come
to completely the opposite conclusion, as the addressee, in order to be able to
answer the question of interpretation properly, would need to first be informed of
the function of the claims in a patent. As Turner notes, their answer would then
depend on what they were told. If, for example, they had been schooled in the
British approach, and informed that the claims define the outer boundary of protection, a narrower interpretation would be forthcoming than if the addressee had
been told the claims simply identified the principal features of the invention.47
Moreover, within these different approaches, the test is also susceptible to modification of result depending on what the justification for the grant is held to be. If
reward considerations dominate then, as we have seen when examining the German
approach to interpretation, a broader view may be taken of the patents scope of
protection than if incentive arguments come to the fore. In other words, the outcome of the claim construction exercise under the Catnic test is largely dependent
upon the courts view of the theoretical underpinnings of the grant: a point to
which we return in due course.
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Lord Diplock introduces a fiction of intent into the equation.Would the specification make it obvious to . . . [the skilled addressee that the claim] could not have been
intended to exclude . . . [minor variants].48 Therefore the question becomes one of
taking an objective interpretation of the subjective intention of the patentee, whilst
operating under a presumption that the patentee has restricted themselves to a literal interpretation of their claims unless this cannot have been their intention.49 In
reality, the fact that a variant does not appear within the literal wording of the claim
would simply suggest that the person drafting the patent, whether the patentee or
(more likely) the patent attorney, had not thought of it. It would not necessarily
flow from this that they therefore intended to exclude all variants. Thus, whilst there
could be an argument that the scope of protection should be restricted to that
explicitly asked for and thereby claimed in the patent, it is another thing entirely to
infer intention from the fact that a variant did not cross the patentees mind.
It is, of course, accepted that taking an objective view of the intent of the drafter
is an approach adopted by the courts when considering the interpretation of contracts. The classic statement on this point being that:Interpretation is the ascertainment of the meaning which the document would convey to a reasonable person
having all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available
to the parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the contract.50
However, this does not necessarily explain why the same principles should therefore
be extended to construction of a patents claims. The essence of the contract is the
concept of bargain, yet the patent specification (containing the claims) is defined as
a unilateral statement in words of [the patentees] . . . own choosing, addressed to
those likely to have a practical interest in the subject matter of his invention.51 There
is no bargain between the inventor and the state in the proper sense of the word,
only a statement of territory exclusively claimed. Indeed, the patent as bargain
metaphor discussed in chapter three, above,52 is perhaps better understood in the
context of incentives rather than bargains per se.
The comparison with contract law is not improved even if the patent is considered to be a unilateral contract rather than a bargain, for then the accepted method
of interpretation is to require strict performance.53 In the words of Lord Hoffmann
in Mannai Investment Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd, this means that, for
example: If the clause had said that the notice had to be on blue paper, it would be
no good serving a notice on pink paper, however clear it might have been that the
tenant wanted to terminate the lease.54 There is, in fact, no compelling reason why
48
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the patent should be considered to be a contract at all. True, the concepts share some
similar features, but common ground does not make an orange a lemon and there
is no reason why it should succeed in making the patents grant of property rights
into a contract.
Interpretation as of Publication
One final element of imprecision is added to the mix when selecting the date at
which the patents claims are to be interpreted. Lord Diplock stated that infringement could not arise unless at the date of publication of the specification it would be
obvious to the informed reader that the variant would have no material effect on
the way in which the invention worked(emphasis added).55 The effect of this
restriction is two-fold. It again requires a fiction to be created. The skilled addressee,
a construct of the court in any case, must be transported back in time to the point at
which the patent was first made public, and must interpret the claims as they then
would have done without consideration of the alleged infringement. The court,
however, will necessarily be aware of the defendants formulation, and so will the
expert witnesses that guide the courts understanding of the technology in issue, yet
all are expected to cast notions of the alleged infringement from their minds when
assessing the scope of the patent in hand. Such is unrealistic, and it has been suggested that, since at the date of publication the court does not know what would
have been obvious to an instructed reader as to the intentions of the writer of the
claims, there is a tendency to substitute the Courts own idea of what would then
have been seen to be essential to the effective operation of the invention.56 Such
hindsight bias must, as has been shown in recent empirical studies,57 inevitably
affect the outcome of any investigation. Moreover, as we shall see, this restriction
also often renders the application of the Catnic question quite impossible in cases
concerning pioneer patents,58 as alternatives obvious at the time of infringement
may never have been contemplated, or even have been possible, at the date of publication and yet may still unjustly profit from the inventors efforts.
It is also difficult to rationalise the requirement of interpretation at publication
with the justifications of the patent system discussed in chapters three and five,
above. The traditional incentive arguments, for example, would suggest that scope
55 Catnic, n 21, above, at 243. The origin of the requirement of interpretation as of publication can
probably be traced back to the comments of Lord Esher MR, in Nobels Explosives Co v Anderson (1894)
11 RPC 519, at 523.
56
Blanco White, n 11, above, at 2-104.
57
See, eg, Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight Bias
Renders Patent Decisions Irrational (Jun 2006). 1st Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies
Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=871684. Also Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious II:
Experimental Study on the Hindsight Issue before the Supreme Court in KSR v Teleflex (Aug 2006).
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=928662.
58
ie patents representing a spectacular technical contribution. See Scherer, Industrial Market
Structure and Economic Performance (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1980; 2nd Ed) at 448. One such example is given by the facts of Kirin-Amgen v Transkaryotic Therapies Inc [2003] RPC 31 (CA), [2005] 1 All
ER 667 (HL). The facts are outlined in text accompanying n 2502, below.
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Post Catnic
303
With the level and character of the skilled addressee, including what they are told
about the function of the claims, being so critical to the subsequent interpretation,
and the further uncertainties introduced by the choice of publication as the date for
interpretation, the Catnic test appears to offer little more than a judicial licence to
enforce, or excuse, on a whim. Yet as we shall see, for the next 20 years it was, with a
certain degree of reinterpretation, to become the de facto test for claim construction
in the UK.
Post Catnic
The Catnic decision, as noted, is unsatisfactory in a number of respects. Lord
Diplocks judgment, seemingly a fair one on the facts, sought to take the UK further
from the literalism of the past and attempted to remedy some of the problems associated with application of the doctrine of pith and marrow. However, in bringing
the construction under a single-stage assessment it rendered the grant eminently
less predictable. Whilst clear that the approach of the courts under pith and marrow
was less than fair to the patentee at times, the potential efficacy of a two-stage assessment in providing clarity of reason and predictability of approach can be argued to
far outweigh that of a single-stage test. By splitting the investigation into two parts,
the court is able to consider the various questions that the notion equivalence raises
without them becoming confused or entangled in debate concerning literalism. In
other words, separation of the issues would promote lucidity of argument and
assessment.
If, as the factual matrix suggests it should have been, the decision in Catnic was
limited to its context,old patents in which the application was processed under the
Patents Act 1949, then the problems with the decision could have been contained.
The dwindling number of these patents, having a maximum of eighteen years left to
run at the time of the decision, would have provided a sandbox in which it could
spend its final days. A new interpretative regime, led by the Protocols guidance on
the interpretation of Article 69 EPC, could then have been implemented for new Act
patents, as was happening in Germany.65 However, in what has been described as a
miraculous sleight of hand66, subsequent cases held that Lord Diplocks approach
was fully consonant with the Protocol and should therefore be applied to 1977 Act
patents as well.
To describe the perpetuation of Catnic in this manner is somewhat misleading, as
it suggests a degree of deception or fraud that was simply not present. The cases
timing is, admittedly, unfortunate, for whilst not mentioning the Protocol explicitly
it is inconceivable that Lord Diplock was not aware of its effect when delivering his
65
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67 At least since his contribution to the Court of Appeals judgment in Rodi & Wienenberger v Showell
[1966] FSR 160, at 176. See n 33, above.
68 His Lordships earlier judgment in Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Ltd, see n 38, above, did
not really provide a good set of facts for detailed discussion of the shortcomings of the doctrine of pith
and marrow. Yet, in applying the law to the facts, his Lordship may be seen once again to be adopting a
position on construction that demonstrates a move away from the classic view of pith and marrow. The
case was concerned with importation of a product (hetacillin), which was considered to be the patented
product (ampicillin) wearing a temporary mask to be discarded before it gets to work. The defendants
product therefore converted to the patented product when put to use for the only purpose for which it is
intended, see Lord Diplocks judgment in the case at [1978] RPC 153 at 197, 202.
69 The protocol was, after all, a diplomatic compromise intended to guard against extreme interpretation of any of the official texts. Armitage, n 8, above, at 814.
70 See Reid, n 9, above, at 58.
71 Jacob, n 17, above, at 67. This view is shared by Cornish in the first edition of his textbook on intellectual property; Cornish, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights
(London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1981). He states, at 130, that Art 69 simply reflects British practice. He also
notes, at 191, that as the EPC in principle accepts the British fence-post view of the claims,accordingly
British practice is likely to remain largely unchanged. By the second edition (London, Sweet & Maxwell,
1989; 2nd Ed), this statement had changed, at 160, to accordingly no radical re-direction of British practice has been called for.
72 Reid, n 9, above, at 58.
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to the appellate courts. However, in contrast to Germany, where the first cases
arrived in the Supreme Court in 1985,81 nothing even appeared in the English
Court of Appeal concerning new grants until August 1988,82 a full 10 years after the
1977 Act had come into force. This, in itself, is odd, as this period in time is not
devoid of discussion of other provisions of the 1977 Act. The issue of construction,
however, seems to have passed the UKs courts by in the decade that runs from the
1977 Acts commencement.
Whether this hiatus was due to the fact that parties who owned 1977 Act patents
were discouraged from entering into litigation because of the perceived interpretative uncertainty after Catnic is a matter of conjecture. Such uncertainties do not
however appear to have had a similarly crippling effect on the flow of litigation in
Germany at the same time. This discrepancy may be explained by noting that
whereas the German courts, especially the Bundesgerichtshof, felt that their practice
did not conform to the Protocol and therefore went to great lengths to ensure
change, the UK attitude was rather more Imperial in nature: current practice satisfied the Protocol, and no discussion would be entertained on the subject. However,
this explanation is also somewhat deficient as it fails to explain the complete lack of
any first-instance reported decisions on the construction of 1977 Act patents in this
period.83 Perhaps, therefore, the most rational explanation is that the mid- to late1980s, the exact period at which we would expect to see litigation of new 1977 Act
patents beginning to filter through the court system, was a boom time within the
UK. During such periods it would be reasonable to conclude that patent holders
concentrate on gathering and licensing their intellectual wares; with more money
available for R&D this, rather than litigation, forms the business focus. Hence, cases
concerning patent claim interpretation may be expected to be few in number during periods of growth. However, once the tide turns and growth becomes recession,
as happened in the UK towards the end of the 1980s, the stored value in patent
grants could become the focus of investigation and infringement actions would
begin to be observed.
As noted above, all of this is conjecture, but whatever the reason, it is clear that by
the end of the 1980s the issue of claim construction was one that was beginning to
demand increased consideration from the courts.
81 See text accompanying n 92 in ch 7, above. The German position may, however, be a special one due
to the sheer number of cases that the Supreme Court handles. Pagenberg,The Scope of Art 69 European
Patent Convention: Should Sub-Combinations be Protected?A Comparative Analysis on the Basis of
the French and German Law (1993) 24 IIC 314, notes, at 321, that it is worth mentioning that the
German Federal Supreme Court and its 10th Senate, the Patent Chamber, handles nearly 100 patent cases
per year in nullity, infringement and both granting and opposition proceedingsa volume which is
probably unmatched worldwide for a last instance court in this special field of law.
82 This case was Improver Corp v Remington Consumer Products Ltd [1989] RPC 69. It concerned an
appeal against the decision of Falconer J, given on 14 Jul, 1988, in which he struck out Improver Corps
action for interim relief in respect of alleged infringement of the patent on its Epilady depilatory device.
83 There are, in fact, also remarkably few reported cases that discuss construction of the claims of 1949
Act patents in this period. The vast majority of those that do appear (some 6 or 7 in total) between the
decisions in Catnic and Hardings Patent are in the Court of Appeal, litigation having been commenced
some years previously.
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Given the notably imprecise wording of the Protocol and the fact that its aim,
according to Armitage, was simply to guard against extreme interpretation of any
one [of the official] text[s]91, the Court of Appeals rigid view of the situation is
clearly erroneous. To assume that one decision is correct and that the other, in
another jurisdiction, is incorrect misunderstands the nature of the Protocol and the
harmonisation brought about under it.All that the provision states is that a position
should be adopted between the extremes which combines fair protection for the
patentee with a reasonable degree of certainty for third parties. On the basis of
the foregoing discussion of the state of German claim interpretation at the time of
the decision,92 the outcome of Improver v Remington was perfectly predictable in
that jurisdiction. The courts there were, admittedly, in a period of transition from
the more liberal protection of the general inventive idea, but decisions in patent
cases were never plucked from the ether. In terms of certainty the perfectly harmonised position imagined by the Court of Appeal, whereby a patent may be
selected at random and assured the same degree of protection in whatever circumstance it finds itself litigated, is unrealistic in a national (let alone international)
context.93 Therefore, what the Court of Appeal comments upon is clearly the ideal
position, but is nevertheless not an outcome that can inevitably be provided for by
the vagaries of the Protocol alone. Moreover, the different interpretative backgrounds of the courts in both states renders exact conformity of approach unlikely,
if not impossible, in the absence of a common appeal court. However, this is not to
say that the outcome will necessarily be any less predictable in one or the other as
long as the national rules relating to construction are understood.
On any interpretation of the Protocol, the Court of Appeals implicit assumption
that there is only one correct position possible under it that combines a fair degree
of protection for the patentee with a reasonable degree of certainty for third parties
is absurd. The wording is simply not that precise and the requirement of certainty
will depend greatly on the point from which the claims are viewed. As Armitage
explains, when considering this issue,The Convention has been able to express only
the broad lines and it remains now for the court jurisprudence to fill in the details.94
Indeed, if we look at the Catnic decision using the mantle of a structural engineer
(the designer) rather than a builder (the consumer) then the decision falls the other
wayvertical is a word of precision. The essential difference, therefore, between
the English and German courts treatment of the Epilady litigation95 is the focus of
justification for the grant. In the UK, the courts approach concentrates, in tradi90
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tional terms, on the freedoms removed by the patent, viewing it as providing incentives to innovate but noting that advancement may be stifled if its scope is too broad,
and therefore tends towards strict interpretation of the claims.96 In Germany, by
contrast, the focus at this point in time was still very firmly on rewarding the patentees contribution to the art.97 Both approaches can be seen to be in accordance with
the Protocol, in that they both tread a middle ground between extremes, but both
necessarily provide different, although by no means less-predictable, decisions. The
choice of justification is largely historic, as has been shown in earlier chapters, and
is something which the Protocol makes no claim to address.
Ironically, a variant of this very point is advanced by Lord Hoffmann as illustration of the fact that the British and German approaches to claim construction are
both cut from the same cloth. He states that:When Dr Peter Meier-Beck very kindly
sent me comments on a draft of the Amgen [decision] a couple of years ago and
explained the German approach to equivalence, I told him that the only difference
there seemed to be between us was that I was brought up on the 1960s Oxford philosophy of language and he was brought up on Hegel.98 Such blithe dismissal of the
nature and extent of the interpretative problem is indicative of the fact that full
harmonisation will not, indeed cannot, occur until there is a point of common
appeal in patent cases within EPCs contracting states. And even then, if the conceptual differences between various states philosophies of protection perpetuate, true
harmonisation may still be thwarted.
96
Hence Lord Diplocks presumption that the patentee has restricted themselves to a literal interpretation of their claims unless this cannot have been their intention. See text accompanying n 48, above.
97
And indeed still is.
98
Hoffmann,Patent Construction [2006] CIPA Journal 727, at 731.
99 See Anchor Building Products Ltd v Redland Roof Tiles Ltd [1990] RPC 283 at 287.
100 See Improver v Remington [1990] FSR 181 at 190.
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If the issue was whether a feature embodied in an alleged infringement which fell outside
the primary, literal or acontextual meaning of a descriptive word or phrase in the claim (a
variant) was nevertheless within its language as properly interpreted, the court should ask
itself the following three questions:
1. Does the variant have a material effect upon the way the invention works? If yes, the
variant is outside the claim. If no
2. Would this (i.e. that the variant had no material effect) have been obvious at the date of
publication of the patent to a reader skilled in the art. If no, the variant is outside the
claim. If yes
3. Would the reader skilled in the art nevertheless have understood from the language of
the claim that the patentee intended that strict compliance with the primary meaning
was an essential requirement of the invention. If yes, the variant is outside the claim.
On the other hand, a negative answer to the last question would lead to the conclusion that
the patentee was intending the word or phrase to have not a literal but a figurative meaning (the figure being a form of synecdoche or metonymy) denoting a class of things which
included the variant and the literal meaning, the latter being perhaps the most perfect,
best-known or striking example of the class.101
The resultant test, known as the Improver questions,102 displays a subtle change
in focus from the original Catnic formulation. This three-stage assessment necessarily narrows the approach to the essential question: would the skilled addressee
consider that the patentee intended, for whatever reason, that strict compliance
with the primary meaning of the claim was an essential requirement of the
invention? This occurs because the presumption, which arises by working through
the initial two questions, is that there must have been some (unknown) reason for
the patentee to want to restrict their claim to exclude this obvious equivalent, or else
why would they not have included it explicitly. The decision therefore leans towards
literalism in the same manner as Catnic itself, by utilising presumptions within the
framework to underscore how the addressee would understand the claims.
Furthermore, by anchoring assessment of the second Improver question at the
publication date of the patent, the test perpetuates the unpredictability, and unfairness, of Lord Diplocks elected time of construction.
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311
When considering the second question, Hoffmann J was of the opinion that the
fact that the variant had no material effect on the way in which the invention
worked would have been obvious to the person skilled in the art at the date of publication of the patent, even if this variant could not have been used in all of the preferred embodiments. He cautioned against reading obvious in this context as one
would understand it in an assessment of inventive step, stating that:
the question supposes that the skilled man is told of both the invention and the variant and
asked whether the variant would obviously work in the same way.104
This question basically asks whether the skilled addressee would have thought at
the time of publication that the variant shared all of the essential characteristics of
the integer specifiedhere was it bendy and slittysuch that it could perform
the function of the former if substituted for it, albeit not necessarily as efficiently.
Hoffmann J considered that it could.
Yet by treating the second element of the test in this way, the approach taken to
the final, Catnic, question is further narrowed. This occurs because, by following
this line of thought, the investigation is now focussed on assessing why the patentee
would have restricted themselves to wording that would exclude patently obvious
variants from the wording of their claims, rather than on what the patent claims
actually suggest to the person skilled in the art. This twist on Lord Diplocks statement that the skilled man would obviously not consider the patentee to have bound
themselves to a literal reading of the claim where the wording cannot have been
intended . . . to exclude minor variants which, to . . . [both their] knowledge . . ., could
have no material effect on the way in which the invention worked105, reflects a narrow approach to claim interpretation. It is therefore most interesting to note the
alternative standard adopted by the German courts in relation to the same restriction when construing the claims. Thus, in the Plastic Pipes (Kunststoffrohrteil)
decision,106 the Bundesgerichtshof considered that the question should be whether
the skilled person, as a result of his specialised knowledge . . . [would] be able to
arrive at the modified means as means having substantially similar effects . . . on the
basis of the claim.107 These two approaches are evidently not synonymous as they
advance upon the question from two completely different directions: Hoffmann J
from the point of view of direct substitutability, and the Bundesgerichtshof from a
position of evident equivalency.
Following on from this narrowed approach, it is hardly surprising that the British
court therefore considered that the skilled addressee would read coiled helical
spring as excluding the defendants mechanical equivalent, the slotted rubber rod.
Hoffmann J explained his conclusion:
104
105
106
107
Ibid.
Ibid.
[2003] ENPR 163. See further, text accompanying n 13642 in ch 7, above.
Ibid, at 169.
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This is not a case like Catnic in which the angle of the support member can be regarded as
an approximation to the vertical. The rubber rod is not an approximation to a helical
spring. It is a different thing which can in limited circumstances work in the same way.108
Reference to Germany
In deference, perhaps, to the Protocols attempts at harmonisation, Hoffmann J also
felt obliged to directly address the fact that the German courts in the same proceedings had come to the opposite conclusion on the matter of infringement.111 Noting
the apparent inconsistency that this implied, he stated, in not so many words, that
the other court was essentially wrong, and then explained why. The Dusseldorf
108
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313
112
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Improver Accepted
Notwithstanding the criticisms that can be levelled at the cases, Lord Diplocks
approach in Catnic, as reinterpreted by Hoffmann J in Improver v Remington, was
rapidly adopted as the de facto test for claim construction in the British courts. The
Improver formulation appears to have been first seized upon by Aldous J in Southco
Inc v Dzus Fastener Europe Ltd,116 although no indication is given in his judgment of
the exact provenance of three-stage test that he applies. Some ten weeks later,117 in
A C Edwards Ltd v Acme Signs & Displays Ltd,118 Aldous J confirmed his application
of the test, stating: In Southco . . . [citation omitted] I had to consider the correct
approach to construction. The parties did not suggest that the approach I adopted
was wrong and I will therefore adopt the same approach in this case.119
When the Court of Appeal came to consider both of these cases, differently constituted courts thought the approach advocated in each was correct. However,
rather than adopting Aldous Js reasoning directly, the courts preferred reference to
Catnic itself, or at least to the Court of Appeals treatment of the decision in the
interim stages of Improver v Remington.120 Indeed, it was not until their judgment
in Optical Coating Laboratory Inc v Pilkington Ltd 121 that we see the Court of Appeal
adopting a three-stage reworking of Catnic at all: Balcombe LJ, referring, for the first
time in this court, to application of the Improver questions.122
Whilst interesting as an historical aside, the Court of Appeals adoption of the
Improver formulation is clearly significant as it further ingrains the assumption that
Catnic was the correct test to apply under the Protocol. It also obviously serves to
perpetuate the narrow approach to claim construction contained within the final
stage of Hoffmann Js test. It is this final question, the real Catnic question, that provides the court with an opportunity to adopt linguistic analysis that may hardly be
said to be within the spirit of the Protocol. An illustration of this point can be found
in the Court of Appeals judgment in Daily v Berchet.123
The patent in question concerned a baby/invalid walker that, amongst other
things, claimed a braking arrangement associated with the rear wheels. The defen116
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Improver Accepted
315
dant produced an infant walker which had flexible suspension on the back wheels
and anti-topple stops just behind them. When pressure was asserted on the back of
the product, the suspension flexed and the anti-topple stops came into contact with
the ground, thereby creating sufficient friction to prevent, on most surfaces at least,
forward movement of the walker.
At first instance, in the newly created Patents County Court, His Honour Judge
Ford had concluded that there was infringement. The key element of the claim was,
in his opinion, the fact that the phrase braking arrangement associated with the rear
wheelsclearly left open the possibility that it would extend to a braking arrangement
that operated in the close vicinity of the rear wheels without operating on them.124
He found the defendants experts contention that that the wheel had to provide
some of the braking force altogether too narrow an interpretation in the present
context.125 The fact that the wheels themselves were not braked made no difference
to the results obtained under the contemplated conditions of operation.
The Court of Appeal did not agree. In overturning Judge Fords finding of
infringement, Balcombe LJ referred explicitly to the Catnic decision and explained
that this dictated that he should give the claim a purposive rather than a strictly
literal construction. He then, however, proceeded to confine himself to a purely linguistic analysis, stating:
A braking arrangement associated with the rear wheelsto me connotes a braking arrangement which acts either directly or indirectly on the rear wheels, causing them to lock. Thus
brake pads operating directly on the rear wheels, or one of them, would be an example of
such a direct braking arrangement, and it is not without significance that an embodiment
of the plaintiff s invention as described in the earlier part of his patent shows brake pads
operating directly on each of the rear wheels. An example of a braking arrangement acting
indirectly on the rear wheels would be an arrangement which, when activated, locked the
rear axle, and thus prevented the rear wheels from turning. Accordingly on this ground
alone I am satisfied that . . . [there is no infringement of] the plaintiff s patent.126
This quote clearly embodies Blanco Whites fears that under the Catnic approach
the skilled addressees view of the claims will be substituted for the Courts own idea
of what would then have been seen to be essential to the effective operation of the
invention.127 Balcombe LJs statement in the first line of the quote, that the claim
limitation to me connotes a particular construction, is clear evidence of the court
eschewing an objective standard. This could be viewed as simple misapplication of
the test, however it is submitted that the defect is more endemic.
Nourse LJ had also adopted a strikingly similar approach to the issue of claim
construction, stating that: a braking arrangement can only be said to be associated
with . . . [the wheels] if it operates as a brake on or through the rear wheels.128
124
125
126
127
128
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Of the three members of the court, only Sir Michael Kerr applied the three-stage
formulation that had been adopted by Aldous J in Southco and Edwards v Acme,129
and which would later come to be described as the Improver formulation. He
considered, albeit with some reservations, that stages one and two of the test would
be satisfied,130 but that stage three would fail. The skilled addressee, he explained,
perhaps particularly if technically skilled, would be looking for some braking
arrangement which operates on the rear wheels. He would say that only such a braking arrangement was intended to be included.131 Notwithstanding the focus on the
person skilled in the art, the emphasis on linguistic considerations is, again, clearly
apparent.
The case also demonstrates some of the difficulties of applying the test, and additionally highlights the malleability of outcome that may flow from it, depending on
how closely one examines the language of the claims. In the words of Sir Michael
Kerr, the final stage of the assessment: is difficult to apply, since its formulation
combines a negative with an intention to exclude. The draftsman of a specification
would generally be more intent upon what he or she intends to include than to
exclude, since non-included matters may not have been thought of at all.132 The
presumption of an intention to exclude is therefore as clearly present under the
Catnic/Improver test as it is in Lord Russells famous dictum in EMI v Lissen that:
What is not claimed is disclaimed.133
Yet the Catnic/Improver approach had been clearly endorsed by the courts under
the 1977 Act, and by the mid-1990s seemed to be in an unassailable position, followed without question by all . . . or at least almost all; for towards the end of 1994
there was a brief, but as it turned out, ill-constructed, moment of rebellion.
Rebellion Instigated . . .
As noted in chapter seven, above, the practice of the German courts in the Third
Period had led to criticism on grounds that the scope offered by utilising the standard
of the general inventive idea and detaching protection from the wording of the claims
led to an unacceptable degree of unpredictability in the interpretation of claims. It was
argued that modification of this principle, although adding uncertainty of its own,
would actually provide no net increase in this level as the position moved to a more
objective assessment overall. The German courts, in particular the Bundesgerichtshof,
therefore threw themselves wholeheartedly into the process of reform.
The situation in the UK was, however, rather different. To begin with, the period
that passed between the passage of the new law contained in the 1977 Act and the
129
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Rebellion Instigated
317
first cases to reach the Court of Appeal was inordinately long when compared to
that witnessed in Germany.134 Furthermore, the Protocol was generally considered
to add virtually nothing to the methods of construction extant immediately before
Catnic,135 and certainly after.136 As Catnic had made steps, in form if not substance,
towards abandonment of the literalism of the past, this cemented the national view
that the UK approach must be in compliance. In addition to these factors, the single
dissent that could have affected the progress of the Catnic/Improver questions was
quickly and effectively crushed thereby perpetuating the, by now, settled approach.
As a piece of judicial intervention, this latter factor is most significant and is something to which we will, in due course, direct our attention. However, first it is necessary to consider the nature and possible effects of the dissent in a little detail.
134
As noted, in text accompanying n 84 above, the interim appeal in Improver v Remington was the
first case dealing with claim interpretation to reach the Court of Appeal under the 1977 Act.
135
See Jacob, n 17, above, at 67. Also the comments of Graham J in Rotocrop v Genbourne [1982] FSR
241, at 261, reproduced in text accompanying n 15, above.
136
See the comments of Purchas LJ to this effect in Southco v Dzus [1992] RPC 299, at 312, and those
of Fox LJ in Edwards v Acme [1992] RPC 131 at 136.
137
[1995] RPC 287.
138
The dispute also involves a third patent for which validity was the only issue.
139
See the judgment of Millett LJ, n 137, above, at 304.
140
[1993] FSR 197, at 207.
141 He also found the patent invalid as it was anticipated by prior art.
142 Above, n 140, at 210.
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would read the patent and appreciate that the problem the invention sought to overcome
was described by reference to net produced from flat sheets. He would have concluded that
the departures from uniplanarity that the patentee was saying were insubstantial were the
sort of departures that could occur in manufacture when working or extruding a flat sheet.
Thus, using his knowledge of what was available in 1980, he would have been able to decide
what was substantially uniplanar.143
With this perspective in mind, Aldous J was able to conclude that the fact that the
departure from uniplanarity would not affect the stretching does not mean that it
would not affect the resulting structure.144 The key factor was that the defendants
departures from uniplanarity may have had an effect on the properties of many of
the end products for which the patented articles were said to be useful.145 The result
of the stretching exercise was therefore determinative of the outcome of the investigation, as, when seen in context, the skilled addressee would appreciate that the
patentee had certain aims in mind when crafting the claims. A construction that
contradicted, or compromised, these aims could not, therefore, have been intended.
The defendants embodiment was thus outside of the scope of the claims.
Despite the finding of non-infringement, the decision is still quite liberal in its
approach to construction. By focussing on the teaching of the patent, in particular
the results of the process and the end products obtained therefromall things that
would have been in the patentees contemplation at the time of draftingAldous Js
reasoning can be seen to mark a departure from Hoffmann Js strict perspective in
Improver. Therefore, if the results of the exercise were within the contemplation of
the skilled addressee in the earlier case it could be argued that this person would
have realised that the coiled helical spring was not being used as a spring per se, but
rather as a metonymy for a body with apertures that could operate in a tweezer-like
manner when bent and rotated.As the bent and slotted elastomeric rod was an obvious equivalent for the spring at the relevant date, and as it clearly worked in the same
manner, the skilled person would have considered it to be covered by the wording of
the claim. In the current case, however, by examining the patentees focus on the use
of the stretched netting, the court considered that the addressee would have understood that the claims had been drafted with a specific meaning in mind for the
phrase substantially uniplanar.
The Court of Appeal, whilst agreeing in the main with Aldous Js contention146
that the problem the invention sought to overcome should be a central concern, also
noted that the skilled addressee would understand that the patentee had stipulated
for a uniplanar starting material because he wanted to stretch it to form a uniplanar
product.147 By focussing on the function of the claimed integer in this manner, the
court was able to conclude that any departure from uniplanarity would be only
regarded as substantial where it had a significant effect on the behaviour of the
143
144
145
146
147
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material during the process of stretching. The use of the end product was therefore
of no consequence, it was the process itself that was critical. Thus, in relation to one
of the defendants products, departures from uniplanarity which occurred in part
of the starting material that was not intended to stretch would be regarded as simply irrelevant and therefore tolerable.148 On this basis, infringement was clearly
forthcoming. This finding, although opposite in conclusion to that of the judge at
first instance, is not unusual per se. However, what marks PLG apart from the crowd
is the radical departure that the Court of Appeal suggests from the, by now, settled
Catnic formulation in order to get to this result. Seizing upon the problems associated with differing approaches to the construction of claims in the UK and
Germany (highlighted by the litigation in Improver v Remington), the court
attempted to rewrite the textbook and to move to what it considered to be a more
Eurocentric approach under the direct guidance of the Protocol.
Millett, LJ, giving the judgment of the court, began his discussion in traditional
terms by considering the development of UK law on the matter of construction. He
examined both Catnic and Improver, but then departed from what would have been
considered accepted practice and embarked upon a review of German case law in this
area. During this discussion he made reference to the Oberlandesgerichts decision in
Improver v Remington,149 and that of the Bundesgerichtshof in Ion Analysis,150 Heavy
Metal Oxidisation Case,151 and Handle Cord for Battery,152 discussed in chapter seven,
above,153 before concluding that when applying the Protocol:
the German Courts, no less than ours, insist that the scope of a patent must be determined
by its language; and, while the extent of protection goes beyond the literal content of the
claim to cover functional equivalents it does not go beyond functional equivalents which
are deducible from the wording of the claim.154
Therefore, when considering the extent of protection, Millett, LJ, stated that the
test that the German courts apply is to ask whether the variant is deducible from
the wording and drawings of the claims.155 He continued; opining that this is not
quite the same as the third Catnic question, but is arguably more in conformity with
the Protocol, which requires a fair measure of protection for the patentee.156 Catnic,
he explained, was a case that concerned the common law of patents, a law replaced
by the approach laid down by the Protocol, and which therefore should be left to
legal historians.157 He then warned that if the approaches under Catnic and the
148
Ibid, at 319.
(1993) 24 IIC 838.
150
Ionenanalyse (1991) 22 IIC 249. Note that the report of PLG v Ardon in the RPC incorrectly cites
this case as reported in the 1989 volume of the IIC.
151
Schwermetalloxidationskatalysator [1989] GRUR 205.
152
Batteriekastenschnur (1991) 22 IIC 104.
153
See text accompanying n 10522 in ch 7, above.
154
[1995] RPC 287 at 309.
155
Ibid. This is an odd choice of phrase, and it is assumed that what was meant is that the variant is
deducible from the claims read in the light of the specification and the drawings. Indeed, this is the view
that the Court of Appeal takes of this passage in Kastner v Rizla [1995] RPC 585, discussed below.
156 [1995] RPC 287, at 309.
157 Ibid.
149
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158
159
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160
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this position would have exploded the scope of most patents; rendering not only
obvious variants, but also those that could have been deduced from the claim
language, within the patents scope. In this sense, asking what the claims made
immediately apparent at their date of creation would have been a far superior
approach to adopt, given these would most likely be the things in contemplation
whilst drafting the patent. However, providing the breadth of protection suggested
by the Court of Appeal clearly pays no heed to the process of claim creation. It is evident from the discussion in chapter four, above, that UK patent attorneys operate
with a narrow formulation in mind, as not only is this the safest style to adopt, but
also from the beginning they are concerned with preventing designing around the
invention. Their focus is clearly on maximising the scope of protection by other,
non-interpretative, meansie by manipulating the intrinsic scope of the patent
rather than relying on ex post facto judicial intervention.
This approach to claim creation necessarily results in a drafting style that is not as
tight as that which would have been practiced by German patent attorneys in the
Third Period, the period in which the courts extended protection to the general
inventive idea. As explained in chapter seven, at this point in time the German
Patent Office required the claims to be drafted in a prescribed form before it would
consider them. Therefore, the German courts relaxed institutional claim interpretation practices can be seen to have mitigated the Patent Offices strict approach to
the claims, and vice versa. The same is true of Japan, where the practices of patentees and the market remedied the courts narrow interpretation of the patents
scope of protection.166 In the UK, on the other hand, the lax requirements of the
Patent Office relating to claim form had been effectively reined in by the courts
when interpreting those claims. Departure from this approach would therefore
have caused further unpredictability whilst a new status quo was reached. This in
itself would not have been a problem if the PLG approach had offered to provide any
benefit in terms of remedying a lack of fair protection or minimising the unpredictabilities inherent in application of the Catnic/Improver test. Unfortunately the
modification of approach suggested by the Court of Appeal was evidently based on
unsound reasoning and therefore substituted nothing beneficial in place of the
formulation it sought to remove.
Moreover, the assumption that by simply adopting the same test as another state,
confluence of approach would somehow miraculously follow is, with respect, nave.
Even if the Court of Appeals assessment of the German position was, in fact, correct
the grant is still justified on different grounds in the two jurisdictions, and this, as
we have seen, informs the interpretation of the claims. Therefore, the PLG court
failed to address the most problematic issue for harmonisation between the
German and British approaches to claim construction: the fact that the courts view
of the theoretical underpinnings of the grant can have so great an impact on the
outcome of the construction exercise.
166
See ch 8, above.
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The court also failed to address the fact that interpretation within the Catnic test
is undertaken as of publication, and additionally that the fictions and multi-layered
presumptions that the courts adopt effectively mean that the issue of claim
construction cannot be second guessed. Thus, not only is the position concerning
pioneer inventions no different under PLG than it was before, but the most obvious
unpredictabilities of the regime that it was criticising also remain unremedied.
Indeed if anything, by suggesting a paradigm shift in interpretation, they are
magnified. Therefore, in the area in which the patent system is most important
(according to Scherers topology167) there is not only no net gain, but in reality a retrograde step is taken as there is no increase in fairness to compensate for the
decrease in predictability.168
. . . Rebellion Quashed
Less than two weeks after the judgment in PLG, Aldous J, came to consider the question of claim construction once more in Assidoman Multipack Ltd v The Mead
Corporation.169 The case concerned the alleged infringement of two patents (Forrer
and Oliff) relating to cartons used in packaging and the blanks for making them.
The decision is critical for a number of reasons, not least because the two patents in
issue were applied for under different Acts.170 In order to decide the dispute, therefore, Aldous J considered that it was necessary to understand what is the correct
approach to determining the ambit of the claims of the Forrer patent under the
1949 Act and thereafter decide whether that approach needs to be modified pursuant to the 1977 Act and, if so, in what way.171
The question of infringement turned solely on construction of the claims. In
relation to the Forrer patent the court was required to consider the meaning of the
phrase comprising a generally rectangular bottom wall . . . and a top wall lap panel
with end flaps foldably joined thereto. The defendants contended that their product did not infringe as it possessed a generally rectangular top panel foldably joined
to side panels that were then foldably joined to lap panels, which when in use
formed a rectangular bottom to the container.172 They submitted that by essentially
turning the patented design upside-down their product was outside of the scope of
the claims. In respect of the Oliff patent, the defendants contended that the way in
which the claim term tubular carton had been used in the specification had limited
the scope of this term to cartons to be used and only to be used in an end loading
167
Scherer, Market Structure, n 58, above, at 44350. See also text accompanying n 48 et seq in ch 5,
above.
168
Caused both by the new test and the act of change itself.
[1995] RPC 321.
170
Forrer under the 1949 Act and Oliff under the 1977 Act.
171
Above, n 169, at 328. This is the first reported decision in which the claims of an old and new Act
patent were to be considered in the same action.
172 See Aldous Js discussion of infringement, ibid, at 340.
169
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system.173 In other words, they argued that the skilled addressee would, by reading
the specification, understand that a particular meaning of the term had been
intended by the patentee.
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This point aside, Aldous J also concluded that: The questions suggested by
Hoffmann J to guide the court require determination of what the skilled reader
would understand the invention and its essentials to be. The court does not resolve
doubt in favour of the patentee or in favour of a strict or literal interpretation.180
Quite whom doubt is resolved in favour of is left unanswered, but taken in the light
of some of Aldous other comments in this case,181 and in other decisions both
pre- and post-Assidoman, it would appear that this statement was intended to provide a degree of flexibility based on the teaching of the patent. Thus, if the feature in
question appears to the skilled person to be one that could be used only literally if
the practical technical teaching claimed is to be followed, a narrow construction
would be forthcoming.182 However, in other circumstances it would enable the
court to come to the opposite conclusion depending, perhaps, on the problem that
the patentee had set out to solve.183 The great benefit of this approach is that it
enables the court to look to the equity of the invention when deciding what the patentee must have meant by their wording, whilst still operating within the Catnic formulation. However, it clearly requires a judge who is technically aware in order for
the test to operate effectively, as it does nothing for predictability in the hands of one
who is not. Herein lies its main weakness.
It is also clear that Aldous statement subtly misrepresents the wording of the
Catnic/Improver test: as noted, Lord Diplock is quite clear that the skilled addressee
is operating under a presumption that the patentee has restricted themselves to a literal interpretation of their claims unless this cannot have been their intention.184
Implicit in the test, therefore, is the notion that doubt will be resolved against the
patentee. This point is confirmed by consideration of Hoffmann Js application of
the test in Improver, wherein evidence that the patentee had not conducted tests into
the possibility of using rubber in their depilatory device was taken to be indicative
of the fact that they had chosen to limit the scope of their patent to that literally
claimed. Indeed, this is the very interpretation that Sir David Kerr places upon the
cases in Daily v Berchet when he states that the third Improver question is difficult to
apply as it combines a negative with an intention to exclude.185 This approach is,
180
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once again, contractual in nature for it echoes the contra proferentem rule.186
However, as noted above, it is far from clear that a patent should be interpreted with
the same principles in mind, especially given the considerations that have to be
taken into account in order to comply with Article 69 and the Protocol.
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made at the interlocutory stage, but that should not mean that they should be disregarded nor does it mean that they do not bind this court. He added: Also those
observations have been accepted to be correct by this court and the Court of Appeal
in the many patent actions that have been decided over the past 14 years.191 The
message was clear, there was no confusion or room to argue, the question of which
position to adopt under the 1977 Act had already been decided. Catnic had been
approved as a test that toed the broad line advocated by the Protocol and that was
the end of the matter.
Turning his attention to the Court of Appeals discussion of the German cases,
Aldous J remarked that he had not thought that the courts in Germany asked
whether the variant embodied in the disputed device is one which is deducible by
persons skilled in the art from the wording and drawings of the claim .192 Such is
clearly correct, as is apparent from direct consideration of the decisions utilised by
Millett LJ in the case itself. As already noted, the test actually applied in Germany at
this time was in fact more in line with Aldous own formulation than with that
advanced by the Court of Appeal in PLG. However, even if the latters view of the
German cases was correct, Aldous still considered that it was difficult to understand
how such a test could be more in conformity with the Protocol than the prevailing
tests in the UK, as in order to support this statement a comparison must be made.
The different conclusions reached by the German and English courts in Improver v
Remington did not necessarily imply that one was right and one was wrong on application of the law: the conclusion in one of the courts could have been wrong, even
though the principles of law applied were right.193 Additionally, although not
expressly mentioned in the case, it is clear that the language of the Protocol is simply not prescriptive enough to rule out the possibility of more than one correct
interpretation within it. The Court of Appeal had therefore fallen into error. This
said, there was still one minor problem that confronted Aldous J in his criticism of
the Court of Appeals approach: it was the Court of Appeal, and therefore held
precedence over his own court.
Adopting, perhaps, the sort of meticulous verbal analysis in which lawyers are too
often tempted by their training to indulge,Aldous J focussed upon Millett LJs statement in PLG that the use of the word substantially in the claim:
imports a degree of flexibility which precludes an exact and literal construction, and
makes it unnecessary to consider whether Lord Diplocks purposive construction was an
accurate if proleptic application of the Protocol.194
This, Aldous explained, demonstrated that the Court of Appeal considered their
observations on the applicability of Catnic under the 1977 Act to have been obiter.
He was therefore not bound by them. However, notwithstanding the foregoing, it is
191
192
Ibid, at 335.
Ibid. For the Court of Appeals discussion of this point in PLG see text accompanying n 1546,
above.
193
194
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perhaps Aldous Js comment that he would be loathe to discard 14 years of case law
unless it is certain that purposive construction is not the correct approach under
the Act, that really cuts to the heart of the matter.195 The great unpredictability that
would have been engendered by a shift of the magnitude that PLG suggested was
simply too much to contemplate at this point in time.
Furthermore, regardless of the actual effect that the change of test would have
had, the perception was that adoption of PLG would have marked a significant
departure from the British way of doing things. It was this perception that mattered.
Moreover, the approach under Catnic/Improver was perceived to be in line with the
Protocol anyway, as indeed had the doctrine of pith and marrow before it. Thus,
criticism of the established position, in the manner in which it was undertaken, was
a non-starter in any case.
In contrast to Germany where the Bundesgerichtshof s swift action had concentrated the uncertainties that inevitably result from such sweeping change into a
period of transition under the new Act, a period where uncertainty would be
expected in any case until things became established, the British courts and industry had grown used to the settled approach. To adopt the recommendations of the
Court of Appeal in PLG would have meant enduring the turmoil 17 years late.
Moreover, this turmoil would have been all the more bitter as the fortuitous (or
unfortunate, depending on which view is taken) timing of the Catnic decision had
effectively precluded transitional disorder on this matter in the first place. This is
the essential point on which any rational decision must have been based. Thus,
when combined with the weakness inherent in the PLG approach, the fact that it
suggested fundamental departure from existing principles that had, until this time,
been consistently affirmed by the Court of Appeal, meant that following the decision was simply not an option. The unpredictability that embedding PLGs flawed
reasoning, only for it to be overturned by a subsequent Court of Appeal judgment
in the area because it did not fit with the accepted picture of the law, was sufficient
to justify the approach taken in Assidoman by itself.
Assidoman Accepted
Aldous J was not alone in his feelings for PLG, for in Beloit Technologies Inc v Valmet
Paper Machinery Inc,196 the next case to come before the High Court concerning
claim construction, Jacob J made no hesitation in proclaiming his belief that Catnic
did indeed represent the via media called for by the Protocol.197 Therefore, even if
Aldous J had been wrong in his conclusion that Milletts reinterpretation was obiter,
the odds were stacking against the decision. The final blow, however, came less than
seven months after the original decision when, in Kastner v Rizla,198 the newly pro195
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moted Aldous LJ was able to confirm, with the full backing of the rest of the
court,199 that the approach he had taken in Assidoman was correct.200
The Kastner v Rizla decision concerns the alleged infringement of a machine for
the production of interleaved cigarette papers. The patentee had claimed, inter alia,
a reciprocating knife and a pusher plate which moved with the knife in both directions. The defendants machine contained a crescent shaped rotary blade and a
pusher plate which operated with an up and over action in place of these elements.
Argument before the Kastner court had attempted to establish that, rather than
concentrating on what Millett LJ had incorrectly stated the position in Germany to
be, effect should instead be given to his intended meaning.201 In other words, the
decision should be treated as though Catnic had been laid to one side in favour of
asking whether the variant was deducible from the words of the claims read in the
light of the specification and drawings. This approach was clearly, and unambiguously, rejected: the Court of Appeal in PLG had not, in fact, decided that the Catnic
test was inappropriate,as they found it was unnecessary for them to come to a conclusion on that matter.202
On the issue of claim construction, therefore, the Catnic test, as reinterpreted by
Hoffmann J in Improver, was applied in order to determine whether the defendants
machine infringed the patent. Concerning the interpretation of this test, Aldous LJ
noted that whilst the scope of a claim should be interpreted without reference to the
alleged infringement or the prior art, the test requires the court to see whether a
variant is excluded from the ambit [of the claims]. Thus in practice the court has to
have in mind the context in which the dispute arises. He also noted that there was
no room for over-rigid application of the third Improver question as this would
lean away from the middle course to which the Protocol directs.203 Thus, once
again, the purpose of the invention and the background against which the inventor
had created their product were considered to be essential to the assessment. Just as
in his judgment in PLG at first instance, Aldous therefore looked at the results of the
variance in order to determine whether infringement had taken place. He noted
that the essence of the invention was not, as had been found by His Honour Judge
Ford in the Patents County Court, the mechanically simple way of mounting and
moving the pusher plate, but was rather the interleaving and severing assemblies.
The sole purpose of the pusher plate was to push complete packets of cut strands
laterally and that the variant did, albeit in a different way.204 The skilled reader
would therefore understand that some means was necessary to remove the cut
199
Otton LJ simply concurred without more, but Balcombe LJ issued a statement (ibid, at 605) that
left no doubt on the matter: I agree with my Lords comments on the dicta contained in the judgment of
the court in PLG Research . . . [citation omitted]. I agree with his judgment in Assidoman . . . [citation
omitted], as followed by Jacob, J, in Beloit [citation omitted], that the Catnic purposive approach does
truly represent the via media called for by the Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 of the E.P.C.
200
See [1995] RPC 585 at 594.
201
The irony of arguing for a purposive construction of the words of a judge attempting to do away
with purposive construction was apparently lost on counsel.
202
Above, n 200, at 594.
203 Ibid, at 595.
204 Ibid, at 598.
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strands and that in the apparatus of the invention that was done by the pusher plate;
but he would not understand that the way the pusher plate was mounted was an
essential requirement of the invention.205
This is a most significant turn in the analysis, as the court demonstrates that an ex
ante obviousness test is being incorporated into the assessment. Therefore, it
utilises the fact that the purpose of the pusher plate could obviously be achieved by
other means, as evidence that the patentee must have intended their claim to cover
them. In other words, despite the claims being clear on the mechanism of the apparatus, the court was willing to adopt clear a equivalence analysis. Whilst laudable in
one sense, as clearly protecting the inventors contribution to the art, the fact that it
was not specifically identified as a departure from, or extension to, the status quo is
regrettable as it impacts upon the ex ante predictability of the approach.
Furthermore, as Cole explains, Aldous LJ reasoning demonstrates that the court is
prepared to substitute its own technical analysis of the proper scope of the invention for that provided in the main claim.206 It is hard to see where this fits in with the
original Catnic approach to construction.
The irony is, therefore, that by using the obviousness of a substituted element as
an indicator of the interpretation that should be placed on the claim, the court in
Kastner adopts reasoning more in line with the German approach to construction
than the Court of Appeals overt attempts in PLG (which Aldous had so roundly
condemned) could manage. Moreover, construction of the claim based on consideration of what the skilled addressee would understand had been made obvious in
light of the patents teaching provides an eminently predictable approach to claim
construction. However, the benefits of such a move are offset by the fact that the
departure from conventional wisdom was not made explicit in the judgment. By
concealing the change within apparent adherence to the word of Catnic the court
demonstrates only that in certain cases it may be willing to substitute its own understanding of the technology for the distinct wording of the claims. This does nothing
for the predictability of the approach as it does not create anything approaching a
rule for others to follow.
The decision therefore adds to the problems experienced under British claim
interpretation: it appears that the tests applied can be bent to any shape that the
court desires by manipulation of the relevant features of the skilled addressee and
by hindsight determination of what they must have known at the date of publication. In Catnic it was the level of the skilled addressee that enabled Lord Diplock to
provide the categorical interpretation of the claim term extending vertically so as
to catch the defendants infringement. In Improver, the fact that the patentee had
not experimented with rubber rods provided evidence that they had therefore
intended the claim to exclude variants. In PLG at first instance, Aldous J had used
the fact that the defendants departure from uniplanarity could have affected the
end products of the extrusion process to back up his finding of non-infringement.
205
206
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331
Yet, in all of these cases the courts could have come to the opposite conclusion by
taking a different view of the teaching of the patent, as indeed the Oberlandesgericht
did in its decision in Improver v Remington. Without firm guidance on the approach
that should be taken under the Catnic formulation to rein in these differing interpretational perspectives, unpredictability reigns. Indeed, Lord Hoffmann hints at
this deficiency in the test he helped shape when he states:
Courts make two kinds of attempt to escape from the rigidity if structures like . . . [the
Improver questions]. One is to explain and elaborate them. . . . The other way of escape is
to cheat. That, on the whole, is what the English courts did. . . . One sometimes felt that
they pretended to apply the Improver-questions but had really made up their minds
[already].207
However, as noted, the fault is not entirely with the courts; the problem is inherent within the questions themselves, but is exacerbated by an apparent confusion
within the philosophical guidance on the resolution of ambiguity.
So Catnic Lives on . . .
The years following the decision in Kastner v Rizla are relatively empty of substantive claim interpretation cases at the appellate level. Catnic/Improver had clearly
been accepted, in form if not exactly substance. Therefore, the cases that we do see
in which construction was discussed are, in the main, straight applications of the
test and are consequently of little interest to our investigation. The silence on substantive examination of the provisions was broken, however, by the appeal in
Wheatley (Davina) v Drillsafe,208 a decision to which we now direct our attention.
The case is notable not only for the fact that it opened up the debate and re-branded
the questions (Catnic/Improver became the Protocol questions), but also because it
represents another subtle shift in the degree of protection accorded to the patentee.
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retractable probe, or spindle, within the cutting tool. The spindle was utilised as an
anchor only until the cutting ring had a good enough grip not to wander, after this,
and before the tanks skin had been breached, the spindle was withdrawn so that the
cutting ring itself was the first thing to penetrate the tank. The decision therefore
revolves around the interpretation of the phrase centre-less hole cutter within the
claims.
The issue proved to be divisive, with Aldous LJ in the minority, considering that
the defendants method did fall within the patents claims, and Sedley and Mance,
LJJ, coming to the conclusion that it did not. Despite this difference of opinion, the
majority accepted that Aldous exposition of the law as accurate; they simply
doubted the reasoning he used to get to his conclusions.
A Radical Approach?
Aldous LJ began his judgment by referring to the problems that the patented invention set out to solve, thereby placing the grant firmly in context.209 He then looked
to the alleged infringements. The defendants had employed three methods. The
first (method 1) was accepted by all parties to fall within the contested claim, as the
cutting apparatus was centre-less in the literal sense of the word. Method 3, on the
other hand, employed a guiding drill of the type disclosed by the prior art and therefore shared its spark-related problems; this was clearly outside of the claim.
However, it was method 2, outlined above, utilising a retractable guiding probe, that
presented the main point of contention: was this within the scope of the patent as
interpreted?
Moving to examine the applicable law, Aldous LJ began by considering the
British provisions on infringement, namely ss60 and 125 of the 1977 Act, before
turning his attention to Article 69 EPC and the Protocol. He summarised the effect
of the latter by stating that it outlaws what can be termed strict literal and also liberal interpretation using the claims as a guideline. The correct approach is to
achieve a position between those extremes. In pursuing this goal: So far as the
patentee is concerned it is important that the claim should be interpreted in
accordance with his intention.210
He continued, stating that the Improver questions, better called the Protocol
questions211 can be utilised as an aid in the process of assessing objectively what
meaning the words of the claim were intended to convey. Whilst this rebranding
exercise is interesting, it simply reflects the accepted view that the Improver formulation did indeed toe the middle line advocated by the Protocol. It is therefore easily
dismissed as little more than a PR exercise. The same cannot, however, be said of
Aldous LJs next statement, which pulls together various strands of argument that
209
Indeed, the structure he adopts clearly points to a finding of infringement from the very begin-
ning.
210
211
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he appears to have been slowly developing in his judgments since Southco. The
result is altogether more radical.
Therefore, in what probably forms the most significant statement in the case,
Aldous LJ proclaimed that:
It is reasonable to infer, absent express words to the contrary, that the patentee intended to
include within his monopoly what can be termed immaterial variants, in the sense that they
were not material to the way the invention worked. . . . However, third parties have to be
considered and, therefore, they should not be held to infringe if it was clear that such a
variant was not intended to be within the ambit of the monopoly, either because of the
words chosen or because it would be seen to have materially affected the way the invention
worked.212 (emphasis added)
Thus, whilst adhering to the form of the Protocol (nee Catnic/Improver) questions, Aldous LJ, provides a subtle shift in the focus of protection.
As noted above,213 the restriction on the objective view of the intention of the
patentee laid down in Lord Diplocks original test provides one of the main grounds
for criticism of the decision. The precise logic of presuming that the patentee must
have meant to exclude all variants unless this cannot have been their intention, as
was the position under both purebred Catnic and Improver tests, was never entirely
clear. Aldous Js statement in Assidoman that: The court does not resolve doubt in
favour of the patentee or in favour of a strict or literal interpretation,214 can now be
seen to find its feet as the interpretative presumption is removed. Any doubt that
could have arisen is therefore reduced to a question of whether the teaching of the
patent covers the alleged infringement. This doubt is resolved, as a question of fact,
when answering the first Protocol question: Does the variant have any material
effect on the way in which the invention works?
This cements the change in focus established in Kastner and, although still not
explicitly advanced as a change of direction, allows us to see that we see what could,
and perhaps should, have been done overtly by the Court of Appeal in PLG. For,
rather than removing the comfort of the Catnic/Improver formulation, a tried-andtested favourite of the judiciary, simple alteration of the presumptive burden within
the test enables a more benevolent interpretation to be adopted. Modification of
this burden also radically changes the focus of the questions, front-loading the
assessment onto the first two and relieving the third of much of its impact.
Therefore, the teaching of the patent becomes critical, as the key element in the test
is now whether the variant has a material effect on the way in which the invention
operates. As Aldous notes, echoing Hoffmann Js comments in Improver, the answer
to this question depends on the level of generality at which one describes the way
the invention works.215 However, whereas Hoffmann J had then used this fact to
promote the importance of the final question, in his opinion the only one to raise
the issue of construction, Aldous utilised it to shift focus onto the first question.
212
213
214
215
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216
217
218
219
220
221
222
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terms of art. They have been used by the patentee to distinguish the conventional cutter
. . . and the prior art.223
However, as noted, this had effectively been presaged by consideration of the first
question. The issue of construction had therefore moved. This conclusion is reinforced by Aldous LJs classification of the Protocol questions as simply an aid to the
decision which requires the claims to be interpreted to give fair protection and reasonable certainty.Applying the Protocol directly, therefore, he stated that the patent
disclosed a method of creating a hole in a tank in situ with a cutter and a tap with no
pre-penetrating parts. Fair protection would enable the patentee to monopolise
just that . . . That would also give reasonable certainty.224
This approach to the problem is interesting, as it reveals primary recourse to the
Protocols directions in order to determine the ambit of the claim. Therefore, a literal interpretation is identified and the construction the court adopts is then moved
away from this position. The change of direction from Improver is thus complete,
for under this formulation it is not acceptable to ask the final questionWould the
reader skilled in the art nevertheless have understood from the language of the
claim that the patentee intended that strict compliance with the primary meaning
was an essential requirement of the invention?as the primary, literal, meaning is
abandoned. This said, the formula is still used.
As well as raising questions concerning the point of applying the
Improver/Protocol questions when construction is so clearly undertaken outside of
their influence, this approach also raises a small issue of interpretation of the
Protocol itself. The view taken, that a literal construction is outlawed, is not strictly
correct, as the language used simply refers to acontextual interpretation, ie without
recourse to the description and drawings, being prohibited. This still leaves open
the possibility that the specification could be clear that a literal approach was
intended. The position is not quite as clear-cut as Aldous LJ suggests. However, taking the teaching of the patent so clearly into account is an admirable step towards an
objective and predictable approach, which avoids the presumptive pitfalls inherent
in Hoffmann Js original reinterpretation of Catnic.
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Mance LJ gave the issue far lengthier consideration, but came to the same conclusion: there was no infringement. Utilising reasoning very similar to that
of Hoffmann J in Improver, Mance focussed on the fact that the patentee had
apparently not considered other ways of anchoring the rig that also avoided prepenetration. Thus:
when conceiving and describing their invention, the appellant patentees did not contemplate the introduction of any central device, serving to centre the hole cutter. Either the
idea of a centring device which did not pierce the integrity of the tank did not occur to
them or, if it did, they put it aside for reasons which must have seemed good at the time.
. . . If the appellants had seen this possibility, and intended to cover it, as a worthwhile
development, I have no doubt that they would have expressed themselves differently and
made that intention clear.227
Therefore, despite accepting Aldous LJs interpretation of the law, Mance LJ,
seems to consider that the absence of specific reference to central anchoring was
sufficient to suggest that they had not intended, for whatever reason, to include
variants of the type employed by the defendant within their scope of protection.
Consequeltly we return to the position under Improver wherein the presumption
that Aldous had so clearly stated should be exercised in favour of the patentee, and
that Mance had agreed was an accurate statement of the law, is reversed in application. Thus, the fact that the defendants variant was not within the strict language of
the claim was taken to be evidence that the patentee had intended to exclude it.
Welcome to literal interpretation.
Turning to the Protocol questions, Mance LJ noted that they were no more than
aids to assist to arrive at the proper purposive construction228 before concluding
that the first two should be answered in the patentees favour. The result to the third,
however, was tainted by the fact that the appellants:
did not realise or consider that there was any or any workable solution, involving the use of
a centrally positioned centralising drill or device, which would resolve the problem of penetration into the tank while at the same time avoiding the problem of wandering. . . . The
applicants inventiveness involved, but was limited to, the recognition that penetration
could usefully be achieved by the annular cutter.229
As Dunlop states, the majority on the Court of Appeal believed that the patentees failure (which the court interpreted as being a matter of choice) to claim some
broader formulation was the overriding consideration.230
Comment
The appeal in Wheatley v Drillsafe provides clear illustration that even where a single court considers a patent, and therefore all of those presiding over the issues have
227
228
229
230
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access to the same expert witnesses and agree on the same legal tests, differences of
opinion can still arise. The majoritys approach is, however, somewhat lamentable,
especially given Aldous LJs benevolent formulation of the main legal points; however, given the British courts past practice, it is far from surprising.
Aldous LJs reversal of the presumption of intention, endorsed by the rest of the
court, is most significant. It can be seen as a final gathering together of the strands
laid down in his earlier judgments, in PLG, Assidoman and Kastner in particular,
concerning the approach that should be taken to limitations in the claims. By
examining the inventions contribution to the art, the skilled addressee is able to
work out what these limitations mean, and is then able to determine if the defendant has produced something that falls within the scope of the claims. This provides
a more intellectually satisfying way of interpreting the patent than simply asking
whether the court considers that the skilled addressee would understand the patentee to have intended strict compliance with the primary meaning of the words
used to be an essential requirement of the invention. It also reduces the unpredictabilities inherent in asking the court to guess how this hypothetical person
would interpret the claims, by providing guidance on what their thought processes
should be. The problem, however, is that by front-loading the interpretation and
asking what the patent teaches before moving on to the first Protocol question, the
claims effectively need to be interpreted before being put into the formulation that
is supposed to be used to interpret them. Therefore, the Catnic/Improver/Protocol
formulation is, in reality, a sham used to justify the construction that has already
been arrived at. Seen in this manner, Aldous LJs direct application of the Protocol
is perhaps the more honest method of supporting the conclusion that has been
reached.
By adopting an investigation that centres on the teaching of the patent and the
inventors contribution to the art, Aldous LJ effectively manages to align English
and German practice in a manner that is far more acceptable than the Court of
Appeals incomplete formulation in PLG. By adopting a clear structure to the investigation, looking at what the patent discloses to the skilled addressee and mapping
this on to the claimed subject matter, the test allows the patentee to create an exclusive territory that is linked to their contribution to the art. As Aldous LJ noted in
relation to the disclosures in Wheatley, the patent claimed a manner of creating a
hole in a tank with a cutter and a tap with no pre-penetrating parts:
Fair protection would enable the patentee to monopolise just that. . . . That would also give
reasonable certainty. A skilled reader would realise that method 2 used the inventive idea
disclosed in the patent. . . . Thus, he would realise that he was using the patentees invention, which he had sought to claim in words chosen to distinguish his cutter from what was
conventionally used and the prior art mentioned in the patent.231
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claims are still the manifestation of the patentees intention, and still form the
boundary of protection; an interpretation contrary to their wording, or that
entirely vitiates a claim element cannot be accepted. However, the skilled addressee
evidently interprets the claims based on the teaching of the rest of the specification.
Therefore, the patentee should only be restricted to the primary meaning of the
wording used where a more benevolent interpretation is clearly inconsistent with
their expressed intention. This application represents a truly purposive construction: looking at the patent from the point of view of the problem that is to be solved
and protecting the inventive concept as bounded by the claims. However, to borrow
Franzosis phrase, even if the courts were to adopt this approach across the board,
we should not expect uniformity because of that.232
Mance LJs approach, for example, whilst adhering to the bones of Aldous LJs
exposition of the law, clearly follows the orthodox route. His judgment discusses
fairness in the context of certainty, so that the appellants inventiveness is seen to be
limited to that which, in the courts opinion, was explicitly asked forin this case
hole cutters without a central spindle.233 The implicit argument here seems to be
that to expand the patents effect beyond this point would be to add an uncertain
degree of protection, and that this would not be fair to the patentee or to third parties. Therefore, the monopoly shadow cast by the patent should be limited to that
explicitly claimed, and no more. In this context Mance LJ notes that: if the appellants had seen [the possibility of a non-penetrating centre spindle] . . . and intended
to cover it, as a worthwhile development, I have no doubt that they would have
expressed themselves differently and made that intention clear.234 Thus, whilst
deferring to Aldous LJs account of the law, the majority appear to believe that, as
this was an invention in a mature field of technology, the patentee235 could easily
have conceived that there might be different methods of achieving the main innovative aim, ie avoiding pre-penetration of the tank, and that these should have been
explicitly claimed. Mance LJs approach therefore comes perilously close to assessing the invention with hindsight and asking why the claims did not expressly
include such an obvious variant within their scope of protection. Whilst it is
accepted that this is essentially the same path as was trodden by Hoffmann J in
Improver, it views the failure to claim as being a matter of choice which simply cannot be correct. It also leads us, as Dunlop points out, to a question that is critical to
some of the most recent judgments: What if the draftsman could not possibly have
envisaged the variant at the time of filing?236
Thus, despite the courts acceptance of Aldous modified version of the law
potentially marking a significant advance in the manner in which a patent is to be
232 Franzosi,Three European Cases on EquivalenceWill Europe Adopt Catnic? (2001) 32 IIC 113,
at 123.
233 The reader will note the parallels between this approach and the comments of those patent attorneys adopting what was described as the traditional view in ch 4, above. See text accompanying n 25
therein.
234 Per Mance, LJ, in Wheatley v Drillsafe, n 208, above, at 155, para 85.
235 Or at least the person drafting the patent.
236 See Dunlop, n 230, above, at 345.
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Systemic Change
339
Systemic Change
Despite having reigned supreme for so long, cracks were starting to appear in the
Catnic faade. The split in the Wheatley court emphasises the disparate means that
were being used to get round its formulaic constraints. In many respects, and in
many cases, it appears that the court had actually made up its mind long before the
reasoning had been worked through, and had then bent application of the test to fit.
If a narrow interpretation was thought appropriate then the fact the patentee had
not investigated an area, or had investigated it and had still not claimed it, or had
drawn a distinction somewhere in the specification could be used as evidence that a
strict construction had been intended. On the other hand, if a benevolent approach
was thought fitting then the teaching of the patent, the choice of the skilled
addressee, or analysis of the specification would inevitably reveal this to be appropriate. The same set of facts could therefore provide wildly differing outcomes
depending on the judges view of the function of the patent grant. This was clearly
not a new problem at the time of Wheatley, yet by following the formula of
Catnic/Improver the courts were able to state that they were adopting a position
sanctioned by the Protocol, which trod the infamous middle line between the cliffface of literalism and the chasm of using the claims only as guidelines. Such was
comfortable, if nothing else. However, such comfort was clearly ebbing, as is evident
from both Aldous and Mance LJJs comments that the Protocol questions were simply aids to assist arrival at the proper purposive construction.
Therefore, given the split in philosophies that can be detected within the Court of
Appeal in Wheatley, and the fact that Aldous new approach favoured an up-front
construction effectively requiring interpretation of the claims before they could be
fed into the Protocol questions, it was really only a matter of time before the courts
began to eschew them entirely. Unsurprisingly it was Aldous LJ who led the charge.
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Thus, in Pharmacia v Merck,237 a case concerning a patent for a non-steroidal antiinflammatory drug, he declared that whilst The Protocol questions are normally a
useful tool to arrive at the middle ground required by the Protocol. . . . [T]his is a
case where the difficulties in application outweigh the advantages.238 In providing
his judgment, he therefore chose to refer directly to the combination of fairness and
certainty laid down in the Protocol itself.
The claims of the patent in this case referred exclusively to the hydyoxy, or enol,
form239 of the active pharmaceutical compound, however the compound was tortomeric240 and had another form (called the keto form)241 that was inevitably produced when the compound was placed in solution. Aldous LJ accepted that this did
not fall within the primary meaning of the claims, however, he was of the opinion
that, in order to provide the fair protection demanded by the Protocol, it was reasonable to take into account the actual use of the product and what this would
entail. Thus, the skilled addressee would appreciate, utilising their common general
knowledge, that the inevitable result of actually taking the enol form was the
creation of the other tautomer in solution. This conclusion was appropriate
notwithstanding the fact that third parties would see that the keto form was not
specifically mentioned in the claim, as they would know that the enol would exist in
interconvertible equilibrium with the keto form. Aldous LJ reasoned that if, as had
been suggested by the defendants, the claim were restricted to the tautomer specifically mentioned, then claims to chemical compounds would have to be construed
using literal interpretation outlawed by the Protocol.242 In this case, once more, the
wording of the Protocol is subtly mistreated in order to arrive at this conclusion.
The Protocol simply outlaws an acontextual reading based on the words dictionary
definitions, and not a literal interpretation per se. However, the point is clear; common sense is preferred to strict logic.
Arden LJ came to the same conclusion and found infringement, although her
path was more conventional in that she followed the Protocol questions. Her
approach takes the presumptive burden that Aldous laid down in Wheatley to heart,
as she noted of the third question that: she did not agree with the judges holding
that the natural conclusion to draw is that constituents not mentioned were
expressly excluded. That cannot be a general rule. It would mean that the terms of a
patent could never include an unspecified variant.243
237
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Systemic Change
341
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literal meaning of the claims is augmented by recourse to the teaching of the patent.
Admittedly Aldous LJs approach is provided in the context of asking how the
skilled addressee would interpret the claim based on the teaching in the specification and their own common general knowledge, but the effect is the same.Although
adoption of a two-stage test may be considered acceptable if undertaken openly, it
is another matter where it appears, as here, to be adopted by stealth.
Furthermore, by focussing on the obviousness, or otherwise, of the variant/
substitution in question at the date of publication, we once again find difficulties
arising where the alleged infringement is in some way inventive over the claimed
product or process. In such a case we face similar problems to those experienced
under the Catnic/Improver/Protocol questions, notably an apparent inability to find
infringement of pioneer inventions. The problem occurs, as Dunlop explains,
because by anchoring construction of the claim at the date of its publication, the
question of obviousness poses a hypothesis in which the later variant is viewed
through the eyes of the skilled person at an earlier date.247 This then raises the
question of exactly how much this person should be told about the operation of the
variant to enable them to assess whether it utilises the principle of the claim. Are
they, for instance, told that it works in the first place, or is this left for them to deduce
on their own on the basis of common general knowledge available at the time?
Moreover, identification of the fact that the variant works in the same way, or
utilises the patents inventive concept, is dependent upon the level of generality with
which the working of the invention is described in the claim. This is significant, for
not only does it mean that pioneer advancements 248 will be at a disadvantage
because at the time of their creation techniques in the area would, by definition,
have suggested only narrow routes down which to progress, but also there may be a
perception at this time that a particular avenue, obvious in hindsight, would not
work. Therefore the very inventions that most need the patent system for their existence are paradoxically the ones that still, even under Aldous LJs apparently broadening formulation, gain the least protection under it.
This, in essence, is what occurred in Kirin-Amgen.249
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343
PhDs with several years experience in gene technology, molecular biology and cell
biology, respectively. It would also include two laboratory technicians well
acquainted with gene technology and biochemical techniques.250 The method
described by the patentee entailed production of the protein utilising genetic engineering techniques whereby the DNA sequence encoding EPO was isolated and
cloned outside of the host cell before being inserted into it for production. The
alleged infringement utilised very different means to achieve the same result. Rather
than isolating the DNA sequence, it used a process known as gene activation.
Starting with a cell in which the EPO gene was already present but dormant,251
switched off by a negative regulatory element (NRE), the defendants technique
introduced a nucleotide sequence that effectively overrode the NRE and switched
on the gene. This caused the cell to produce EPO.252
Due to the complexity of the technology, the first hurdle to overcome was in
understanding what exactly the patentee claimed to have invented, and therefore
what the alleged variant was. At first instance, Neuberger J, as he then was, considered that the patents claims did not literally cover the defendants process as the
fundamental difference between the techniques used by the parties lay between
isolating and cloning an encoding exogenous sequence and transfecting a host cell
with it, and inserting an exogenous promoter and facilitating sequences into a host
cell to switch on the endogenous coding sequences.253 The Court of Appeal
agreed, but noted that to stop the analysis here hid the real difference between the
invention and the . . . [defendants] technology.254 In other words, simple identification of the reason that the defendants product did not fall within the literal scope
of the claims did not, in this case, identify the variant. Therefore, when Neuberger J,
had referred to the fundamental difference between the claim and the alleged
infringement, and from that had concluded that the variant in the defendants
process was that the EPO-encoding DNA has not been isolated and the encoding
DNA is not in a host cell 255, he had not gone far enough. In reality, according to
the senior court, the variant was found in the fact that whilst the patent claimed a
DNA sequence suitable for expressing EPO when introduced into a host cell, the
defendant had used an endogenous sequence which was activated in situ by the
introduction of a construct to switch the gene on.
When applying the Protocol questions, Neuberger J had concluded that the
first questionwhether the variant has a material effect on the way in which the
invention worksshould be answered in the negative. In each case, one has . . . an
identical string of DNA, namely the encoding regions of the EPO gene, expressing
250
All in all, a long way from Lord Diplocks builder. See the first instance judgment of Neuberger J
[2002] RPC 1, at 456, para 143.
251
This is the case in the majority of human cells, and for the majority of genes.
252
The reader will appreciate that this is a very basic description of the relevant techniques. For a
more in-depth discussion see; n 249, above, at 39-50, para 12 of the judgment, discussing the discovery
and production of EPO; 57-9, para 36, for a discussion of the defendants technique.
253
Above, n 250, at 161, para 612.
254 Above, n 249, at 62, para 49.
255 Above, n 250, at 163, para 619.
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Conclusion
345
After concluding that there could be no infringement, the Court of Appeal considered whether this outcome was consistent with the middle line demanded by the
Protocol. It concluded that it was:
The patentee could not monopolise the gene per se as that existed in nature. The patentee
therefore monopolised the DNA sequence encoding for EPO when isolated and in that
respect was suitable for use to express EPO in a host cell. As of 1984 such a monopoly
would have seemed to give fair protection. To seek to monopolise use of the sequence when
not isolated by inserting a construct into a human cell would provide a monopoly not
properly supported by the description in the specification. We also believe that third parties could reasonably expect that if they did not use a DNA sequence for insertion into a
host cell, there would be no infringement.260
Conclusion
Use of the filing date as the point at which the assessment for the Protocol questions
is made is an interesting development in the Court of Appeals thinking. As noted
above in relation to Catnic, assessment as of the publication date made no real sense
when the aims/functions of the patent grant were taken into consideration.
Therefore, in one respect, the Court of Appeals insistence on the filing date is a positive step, as it aligns determination of scope with the incentive function of the
patent. However, although on a stronger intellectual footing than interpretation at
publication, assessment at this date can still be seen to unfairly prejudice the pioneer
innovator. By definition, things that could not have been considered to work at the
date of application but which utilise the teaching of the patent (and are later shown
to work) cannot infringe under the purposive construction.Yet perversely they may
do if they fall within the literal meaning of the claims. Moreover, the shift brought
about by Aldous LJs comments in Wheatley and the resultant modification of the
presumptive burden will simply not assist those cases in which the assessment fails
at the first or second question.
Furthermore, the flexibility of the Court of Appeals approach, which allows it to
both narrow and expand the construction of the claim depending on its perception
of the teaching of the patent, is significant. Therefore, whilst advocating interpretation at the priority date it demonstrates a tendency to adopt a hindsight determination of the contribution of the patent when identifying the technical advance it
represents in the art. This has a large effect on the issue of scope. As Neuberger J
stated, here the patentee had made a breakthrough:he cloned the DNA responsible
for the manufacture of EPO,261 and this was important. Therefore at the time of the
patent the advance was huge. It was only later when more subtle and efficient techniques became available that the contribution made by the patentee can be seen in
260
261
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context, as the first step on a longer journey. The court therefore appears to be doing
one thing whilst saying another. Interpretation is apparently undertaken at the date
of priority and yet subsequent dealings evidently can be seen to influence the outcome of the interpretative investigation. The fact that the technological follower has
utilised techniques obviously equivalent at the time of infringement to profit from
the patentees teaching is seen to devalue and restrict the initial advance. However,
the fact that someone else has done the same thing with equivalent means does not
necessarily alter the value that the initial advance actually represents.
This point brings us back to the justifications for the patent system, discussed in
chapters three and five, above. In terms of providing incentives or rewards for innovation, the extent of protection should either relate back to the original advancement or should extend to cover techniques made obvious in its light. However, there
is a palpable feeling that in the context of pioneer advances, such as in Kirin-Amgen,
the court primarily views the patent as a barrier to the free operation of others in the
field.
Perhaps the view taken by the Court of Appeal in Kirin-Amgen can be justified on
the basis that where others take the teaching embodied in the grant, then they have
unfairly profited from the work of another and should be stopped. Yet, if only the
inspiration has been taken there can be no infringement. Seen in this light, this
aspect of the patent system bears a striking resemblance to copyrights ideaexpression dichotomy. If the teaching of the invention, as identified by the court, is
taken then there is infringement, however, if it is only the idea or inspiration that has
been relied upon then this is outside of the patents scope. This approach to the
claims would, however, have been easier to swallow if the principles were clearly
articulated rather than being dressed up as adherence to what had now become outmoded application of the Protocol questions.
This point aside, interpretation as of application (if actually applied) does, as
Dunlop notes, appear to be consistent with Biogen v Medeva,262 where the House of
Lords held that the date at which the sufficiency of the disclosure should be assessed
is the priority date. This is because a variant cannot fall within the scope of the claim
if such scope would not have been supported by the description at the filing date.263
However, whilst this is one interpretation that can be placed on the information
function of the patent, it fails to take into account the fact that the specification continues teaching long after it is filed. This is significant if it is accepted that one of the
justifications of the system is that it encourages disclosure of information that may
otherwise be kept secret.264 Isolating this teaching and effectively freezing the information that the patent contains at the priority date may therefore be argued to
represent a wholly unrealistic approach which fails to appreciate the impact that
subsequent developments may have, particularly on the scope of pioneer inventions.
Yet none of the economic or theoretical arguments concerning the patent grant,
which may have helped navigation of this quagmire, were entertained in the case.
262
263
264
[1997] RPC 1.
Dunlop, n 230, above, at 349.
See further, text accompanying n 130 et seq in ch 3, above.
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Conclusion
347
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issue of equivalence was approached by asking if the teaching of the patent rendered
variants immediately apparent.
By manipulating the prejudices and standards within the investigation, and by
concentrating on what the court perceived the inventions contribution to the art to
be, Aldous LJs machinations were revealing the Protocol questions, as he had rebranded them, as an elaborate smokescreen used to justify a construction that the
court had already arrived at by other means. However, he had also revealed the
potential for a philosophical split between those that saw the patentees contribution as determinative of the degree of protection they deserved, and those that
instead focussed on a more literalistic interpretation of the outlines drawn in the
claims. To the latter, construction was a matter of first impression,265 whereas the
former may be seen to concentrate more intently on the fact that the problem to be
solved, and the inventive contribution that the patentee had provided as a solution,
flavours interpretation of the claims. Thus, in reality, the extent of protection at this
time may have been seen to depend almost solely on what the court believed the
skilled addressee should be told about the significance of the claim wording itself,
which in turn was almost exclusively reliant on the make-up of the court that heard
the case. Predictability had been lost. Uncertainties inherent in the original Catnic
and Improver formulations had therefore been substituted for an approach that was
even more volatile.
Seemingly the only guidance being given at this point related to how the patent
should not be interpreted, ie literally, and even this was based on subtle misinterpretation of the Protocols language.Any other position appears to have been fair-game
as long as it stayed within sight of the claims. The patents scope of protection outside of its literal incarnation was therefore difficult, if not impossible, to determine
without a trip to court. Yet all of the covert reinterpretation of Lord Diplocks original formulation that had been undertaken had been performed in the name of the
Protocol, and was deemed to be in line with its demands.
However, this is not the end of the matter, for the parties in Kirin-Amgen were
granted leave to appeal to the House of Lords, and appeal they did.
265
See, eg, the comments of Sedley LJ, in Wheatley v Drillsafe [2001] RPC 133, at 151, para 68.
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10
Kirin-Amgen and Beyond
Cast Adrift on an Sea of Uncertainty?
The British courts have dealt effectively with colourable evasion, but they have failed to
deal satisfactorily with the question of equivalents and it is in that respect that the new
European law needs careful study.
Beton & Heimbach,Claim Drafting and SignificanceAn Anglo-German
Industrial View, in Kemp (ed) Patent Claim Drafting and Interpretation
(London, Oyez Longman, 1983), at 434.
Introduction
With the appeal in Kirin-Amgen 1 pending before the House of Lords, patent claim
interpretation in the UK was in disarray. The inadequacies of the original Catnic 2
formulation had been perpetuated and magnified, with some additional problems
thrown in for good measure. Decisions twisted and turned. In particular, Aldous
LJs judgments post-PLG 3 demonstrate a meshing together and reinterpretation of
the provisions laid down in Catnic which, by the time of his decision in KirinAmgen, can be seen to be taking the law in a new direction. By continually restating
the provisions, each time in subtly expanded or altered form, and by manipulating
the application of the tests that had been laid down, judicial freedom had been substituted in place of consistency. Moreover, direct application of what the Protocol
was considered to demand of the determination of scope 4 had effectively led to a
two-stage test being adopted wherein a literal interpretation was augmented by
recourse to a purposive construction. Yet none of this had been made clear or
explicitly acknowledged as a change of direction. Conflicting messages abounded.
1 Kirin-Amgen v Transkaryotic Therapies Inc [2003] RPC 31 (CA), discussed in text accompanying
n 25060 in ch 9, above.
2 [1982] RPC 183. The House of Lords decision in the case is discussed in text accompanying n 3164
in ch 9, above.
3 [1995] RPC 287. Aldous judgments following this case are discussed in text accompanying n 169 et
seq in ch 9, above.
4 Whether this is a strictly correct interpretation of the Protocol is another matter, see the discussion
in text accompanying n 224 in ch 9, above.
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In addition, it was unclear under the prevailing tests whether the patent was to be
viewed primarily as something that deserved reward or whether it should instead be
viewed as a barrier to the free operation of others in the field. Indeed, there is significant confusion on this point within Aldous own judgments; in Kirin-Amgen for
example, the patent appears to be treated as a barrier, perhaps due to its pioneering
status, whereas in Wheatley there is clear evidence of a reward-based determination
of scope. The criteria underpinning the choice of which approach to adopt was
never made explicit in these, or indeed any other, decisions. The patentee, therefore,
and equally their competitors, was left with an intractable problem of attempting to
second-guess the approach that the court would take. Predictability was compromised.
The House of Lords acceptance of the appeal in Kirin-Amgen was therefore most
timely.
In the Interim
However, in the period between the appellate courts judgments in Kirin-Amgen, a
differently constituted Court of Appeal, without Aldous at the helm, had the opportunity to consider issues of construction in the context of an altogether simpler dispute. The appeal in Technip France SAs Patent 5 concerned an application for
revocation combined with a counterclaim for infringement of a patent related to
laying flexible pipes offshore. When considering the question of infringement,
Jacob LJ began by reminding himself, and the court, of the main principles that
underpinned this area of the law. He produced an eleven point list of what he
believed to be the central points.6
The list begins with a gentle reminder that the overarching principle when considering a patents construction is, in fact, found within Article 69 EPC, which dictates that the extent of protection is to be determined by the terms of the claims.7
The Protocol simply forms a gloss to this key provision. Article 69, dictates that the
claims must be interpreted in light of the description and drawings that accompany
them: In short the claims are to be construed in context.8 When interpreting the
claims in this manner, the inventors purpose is divined from the rest of the specification.9 It further follows that the claims must not be construed as if they stood
alone;10 purpose is vital to a sensible construction. However, it has to be remembered that the inventor may have several different, and competing, purposes
depending on the level of generality of his invention. It is the core inventive concept
5
6
7
8
9
10
[2004] RPC 919. The dispute is also known as Rockwater Ltd v Technip France SA.
The list is provided in para. 41 of the judgment. Ibid, at 950-3.
Ibid, at 950, para 41. Point a) in the list.
Ibid, point b).
Ibid, point c).
Ibid, point d).
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In the Interim
351
(or the generalised concept of the invention) and not necessarily any of the specific
embodiments that provides the purpose for construction of the claims.11 If another
embodiment, or concept of the invention, is chosen,one is in danger of being unfair
to the inventor. Jacob LJ explains this point by making reference to his earlier judgment in Tickner v Honda Motor Co Ltd,12 in which he stated that:
You learn the inventors purpose by understanding his technical contribution from the
specification and drawings. You keep that purpose in mind when considering what the
terms of the claim mean.You choose a meaning consistent with that purposeeven if that
involves a meaning which, acontextually, you would not ascribe to the word or phrase. Of
course in this exercise you must also be fair to the patenteeand in particular must not
take too narrow a view of his purposeit is the widest purpose consistent with his teaching which should be used for purposive construction.13
By explicitly laying out the core provisions as he understood them, Jacob, LJ, was
clearly attempting to begin a tidy-up of the loose ends left post-Kirin by the Court
of Appeal; he was laying the cards on the table. Indeed, it is apparent that by adopting this style of judgment, Jacob is far more cautious about the process of claim
interpretation than Aldous had become in the approach to his retirement. However,
the statement that fairness to the patentee means providing the widest purpose
consistent with his teaching is significant in its effect. By interpreting the patent in
this manner, Jacob appears to be clarifying the distinctions implicit in Aldous more
recent judgments. Therefore, the skilled addressee is to interpret the purpose of the
patentees claims by examining the teaching of the patent, to enable them to see
what has been disclosed. Thereafter, the actual interpretation of the wording used in
the claims must be considered in light of this purpose. However, where there is a
degree of ambiguity as to the construction, the benefit of the doubt should be given
to the patentee as they would logically have wished for the broadest possible scope
that was consistent with the principles they teach. If, on the other hand, a broad
interpretation to the extent of the teaching cannot be upheld on the language of the
claims then it must have been the patentees intention to confine their protection
more narrowly.14 Therefore the suggestion is that the path required by the Protocol
towards interpretation of Article 69 EPC is, once again being trodden. However, this
time, the line taken is slightly clearer. Of course, this still does not answer the question of when the claims are to be interpreted, and nor does it cope with the issue of
after-arising equivalents,15 or entirely eradicate the potential for sleight-of-hand
manipulation of outcome, but it is a step in the right direction in that it makes the
courts thinking more explicit.
Jacob LJ did not, however, stop here, for the list continues. Therefore, if the patentee has included what is obviously a deliberate limitation in his claims, it must
11
12
13
14
15
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have a meaning. One cannot disregard obviously intentional elements.16 This may
potentially have a narrowing effect on the patents scope of protection, as it again
invites the question if it was so obvious then why didnt the patentee claim it
directly? In addition, the courts ability to provide a clear answer on this point once
more depends upon the direction from which it approaches the patent grant;
whether as reward or restriction.
Point h) on Jacobs list, the statement that: where a patentee has used a word or
phrase which, acontextually, might have a particular meaning (narrow or wide) it
does not necessarily have that meaning in context,17 adds nothing significant to the
discussion, as it is simply a restatement of the principles already espoused in point
b)the claims must be construed in context. However, the example that is provided to illustrate this point again demonstrates adherence to the principle that it is
the widest purpose consistent with the patentees teaching which should be used for
purposive construction. Referring to Catnic he noted that in this case the word vertically meant vertical enough to do the job (of supporting the upper horizontal
plate),18 and not geometrically vertical. Thus fitting in with what the patentees
advance in the art was seen to have been.
It is at this point in his discussion that the Improver/Protocol questions also get
their first mention. They are classified as being of particular value when considering
the difference of meaning between a word or phrase out of context and that word or
phrase in context. However, as Jacob LJ asserts, once the word in context has been
focussed upon, the questions do not assist in resolution of the ultimate inquiry:
what does the word or phrase actually mean, when construed purposively?
As, by its very nature, this latter question is only possible to satisfy when the language is read in context, the meaning that could be ascribed to a word out of context
should never be the focus of the court. Indeed, given the investigation within Article
69 must always be directed to what the claim term means to the skilled person taking into account the description and drawings, the issue of what any particular word
may mean somewhere else simply never arises.
Jacob had voiced concerns over ascribing an acontextual meaning to the words
used in the claim and then moving on from this position when writing extra-judicially in 2003. His view on previous Court of Appeal decisions in which this sort of
approach was habitually adopted was clear; such analysis was pointless since Art 69
is aimed at the contextual meaning19 and nothing more.
Thus described, the Protocol questions were simply an aid in placing the variant
in context. The question that remained, however, was whether the holistic purposive test could be considered to provide protection as a doctrine of equivalents or
whether it was better understood as relating to mere colourable evasion of the
claim. Jacobs next point referred directly to this question:
16
17
18
19
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In the Interim
353
It further follows that there is no general doctrine of equivalents. Any student of patent
law knows that various legal systems allow for such a concept, but that none of them can
agree what it is or should be. Here is not the place to set forth the myriad versions of such
a doctrine. For my part I do not think that Art 69 itself allows for such a conceptit says
the extent of protection shall be determined by the terms of the claims. And so far as I can
understand, the French and German versions mean the same thing. Nor can I see how the
Protocol can create any such doctrine.20
Thus, a doctrine of equivalents was placed firmly outside of the scope of the
Protocols influence. The construction of a claim could, however, still lead to the
conclusion that technically trivial or minor differences between it and the corresponding elements of the alleged infringement fell within its scope of protection;
but this would have to be based on a purposive interpretation and not on the basis
of equivalency per se. In other words, minor differences could be covered because
that is the fair way to read the claim in context.21 Nothing, however, was said of previous cases, such as Kastner v Rizla,22 where skilful manipulation of the patents
teaching had enabled the court to overcome potentially problematic deviation from
the claim terms, and which could easily be described as importing a doctrine of
equivalents by the back door. Thus, by simply shutting out explicit reference to any
doctrine that extended protection outside of the wording of the claims, the court
perpetuated the uncertainties created by prior decisions.
Furthermore, it is clear that, in order to work out if a variant is technically trivial
or minor, it is necessary to understand what the wording of the claim means out of
context, as otherwise the triviality of a deviation cannot be apparent. Assuming,
that is, that the variant still lies within the teaching of the patent, as otherwise it
could not be treated as a variant at all. Therefore in essence, despite Jacobs earlier
comments about the irrelevance of ascribing an acontextual meaning to the wording of the claim, his later statements can be seen to reinstate the importance of
obtaining this definition. Thus, we return to a two-stage pith and marrow test
wherein a literal construction is augmented by the fact that technically trivial, perhaps better referred to as inessential, differences can still fall within the patents
scope of protection. On the other hand, however, if a word has clear meaning in the
context in which it is used then the court is not able to go against that meaning . . .
Unless, of course, as in the Pharmacia23 decision, discussed in chapter nine above,24
the court views context as more important than the precise language chosen.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, we see that this could still be the case under Jacob
LJs direction as the patent must be construed in light of the widest purpose consistent with [its] . . . teaching. The test appears, therefore, to have moved full-circle
so that we are still in a position where, to misquote Humpty Dumpty: when the
20
21
22
23
24
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patentee uses a word, it means just what the court chooses it to mean, neither more
nor less.25
Jacob LJ ends his list by noting that Purposive construction leads one to eschew
what Lord Diplock in Catnic called . . . the kind of meticulous verbal analysis in
which lawyers are too often tempted by their training to indulge. Pedantry and
patents are incompatible.26 However, the difference between a pedants view of the
claims and the courts determination of whether an element is deliberate limitation
is not entirely clear. In the end it probably depends upon which side of the bench
you are sitting.
Comment
As far as tidying up the law in this area, Jacob LJs attempts in Technip are somewhat
lacking. Whilst the points in his list are clearly accurate statements of the positions
that can be adopted, they do not really deal with much of the insecurity and unpredictability that the Court of Appeals constant restatements of the law in previous
cases had caused. Additionally, the tension inherent in requiring a position to be
adopted that, on the one hand, appears to invite a construction based on the the
widest purpose consistent with [the patentees] . . . teaching, whilst, on the other,
demands a hunt for technically trivial or minor differences before protection will
be granted, is also not adequately dealt with in the judgment. The former statement
appears to elevate us to a position wherein the purpose of the teaching is promoted
over the objective assessment of what the claims mean to the person skilled in the
art, yet the latter again concentrates on elements made essential by those claims and
suggests application of pith and marrow by another name. However, whilst
colourable evasions are adequately provided for, equivalents are, once again, left out
in the cold. As Beton and Heimbach stated when writing about the British tradition
of claim interpretation just after the passage of the 1977 Act; The British courts
have dealt effectively with colourable evasion, but they have failed to deal satisfactorily with the question of equivalents and it is in that respect that the new European
law needs careful study.27 The outright rejection of equivalency as a means of determining infringement in Technip demonstrates that this view of the British system
was just as applicable in 2004 as it was 20 years earlier.
Moreover, the purposive approach advocated in Technip demonstrates the same
potential for malleability as the Court of Appeals previous attempts at reexpression under Aldous LJs guidance. Therefore, despite an ex post analysis of the
outcome of the case appearing satisfactory, due to what appears to be simple application of the accepted law, ex ante predictability of result was still low. Whilst the
25 The original quote reads: When I use a word, Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone,It
means just what I want it to mean, neither more nor less. Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass,
(Bloomington, 1st World Library, 2005 (reprint)) ch 6.
26 Above, n 5, at 9512, para 41, point k) in the list.
27 Beton & Heimbach, Claim Drafting and SignificanceAn Anglo-German Industrial View, in
Kemp (ed) Patent Claim Drafting and Interpretation (London, Oyez Longman, 1983), at 434.
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A Protocol Remastered
355
overall approach was settled, the underlying principles upon which that approach
was based had still not been made apparent in any coherent manner. Unification
and clarification was urgently required.
A Protocol Remastered
However, at this point in time, other factors can also be seen to be vying for attention. At a Diplomatic Conference of the (then) 20 Member States of the European
Patent Convention, held in Munich in November 2000, the text of the EPC was
amended. The new text, imaginatively called the EPC 2000, was finally accepted by
the Administrative Council of the European Patent Organisation on 28 June,
2001.28 This text was to enter into force not more than two years after the 15th
Contracting State (of the then 20) had deposited its instrument of ratification.29 In
June 2002, seven weeks before the Court of Appeals decision in Kirin-Amgen, the
European Patent Office issued a statement suggesting that the ratified text was
expected to enter into force at some point between mid-2005 and mid-2007.30 The
ratification criterion was finally fulfilled when Greece deposited its instruments on
13 December, 2005.31 The EPC 2000 will therefore enter into force at some point on,
or before, 13 December 2007.
Under the new text, Article 69 and the Protocol were amended. Notably, paragraph 1 of the former now simply states that the extent of protection conferred by a
European Patent shall be determined by the claims, as interpreted by the description and drawings. The contentious reference to terms/inhalt/teneur 32 of the claims
was expunged by the Diplomatic Conference. The Protocol, however, underwent
more radical alteration. It was split into two Articles, the first of which, entitled general principles, remains primarily unchanged from the previous formulation. It
now reads:
Article 69 should not be interpreted as meaning that the extent of the protection conferred
by a European patent is to be understood as that defined by the strict, literal meaning of the
wording used in the claims, the description and drawings being employed only for the
purpose of resolving an ambiguity found in the claims. Nor should it be taken to mean that
the claims serve only as a guideline and that the actual protection conferred may extend to
28
See originally, http://www.european-patent-office.org/epo/dipl_conf/pdf/em00003a.pdf. The
European Patent Office has recently published a special edition of the Official Journal of the EPO, which
includes the full text of the EPC 2000, implementing regulations and transitional provisions. Available
at: http://www.european-patent-office.org/epo/pubs/oj007/01_07/special_edition_1_epc_2000.pdf .
29
See Art 8 of the Act Revising the Convention on the Grant of European Patents (available online at:
http://www.european-patent-office.org/epo/dipl_conf/pdf/em00003a.pdf).
30
See http://www.european-patent-office.org/news/info/2002_06_07_e.htm.
31
A table showing the status of accession and ratification to the new text of the EPC can be found
online at http://patlaw-reform.european-patent-office.org/epc2000/status/index.en.php.
32 In, respectively, the English, German and French versions of the original document. See the discussion in text accompanying n 1013 in ch 7, above.
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what, from a consideration of the description and drawings by a person skilled in the art,
the patent proprietor has contemplated. On the contrary, it is to be interpreted as defining
a position between these extremes which combines a fair protection for the patent
proprietor with a reasonable degree of legal certainty for third parties.33
However, the wording finally adopted by the Administrative Council is considerably tamer in its effect. It reads:
For the purpose of determining the extent of protection conferred by a European patent,
due account shall be taken of any element which is equivalent to an element specified in the
claims.
The retreat from the originally proposed wording is lamentable, especially given
the UKs general reticence over adopting an interpretative regime that provides
effective protection for equivalents. In terms of harmonisation potential there is
also a significant difference between merely having to take due account of the vague
notion of elements equivalent to those specified in the claims and actually defining
what is meant by the term. The lack of any reference to the date of interpretation
adds to this problem as it enables perpetuation of the discrepancy between the UKs
insistence on publication as being the relevant time for construction and the
German courts utilisation of priority.34
As noted in chapter seven, above, it is critical that a harmonised European
approach to claim interpretation is found, and this means more than simply aligning the language of the tests that are to be applied. It is therefore irrelevant that
Germany has begun to adopt a Catnic-like construction, or the UK may be seen to
be moving towards providing broader protection based on the technical teaching
of the patent, if the underlying rationales of protection are left untouched. The orig33
34
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357
inal revised text of the Protocol went far further towards achieving this aim of harmonisation than the accepted, watered-down, version. It therefore most regrettable
that the original amendments were considered unacceptable to the member states
at the Administrative Council.
This said, the new language of the Protocol does at least go some way towards
identifying common threads of harmonisation that still need to be effected. Explicit
mention of protection for equivalents is a notable example that it may have been
hoped should provide the impetus for British reconsideration of this topic. It is
therefore with the impending changes to Article 69 EPC and the Protocol in mind
that we turn our attention to the House of Lords decision in Kirin-Amgen itself.
35
36
37
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Rich & James,Case CommentPatents: Claim Construction [2005] EIPR N42, at N42.
Kirin-Amgen v Transkaryotic Therapies Inc [2005] 1 All ER 667 at para 19.
Ibid, para 20.
Ibid, para 21.
Ibid, para 25.
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359
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invention and to mark a clear boundary to separate their exclusive territory from
the prior art. As such, Lord Hoffmann reminded the court that the language
[the patentee] . . . has chosen is usually of critical importance.51 He continued,
explaining that the conventions of language, word-meaning, and syntax, enable the
expression of meanings with great accuracy and subtlety. The skilled man, he said,
will understand this and will assume that the patentee has chosen his language
accordingly.52 Therefore, as Hlder neatly summarises, according to Lord
Hoffmann The purpose of a patent specification is to describe and delineate the
invention for the person skilled in the art. The patentee is responsible for the words
since he can freely choose them.53
Whilst in many ways this is an elegantly simple and attractive argument, which at
first impression appears to be so self-evident as to be a statement of the obvious, it
does have the slightly perverse effect of promoting an acontextual interpretation of
the claims, as the patentee is now presumed to have been using words in their
accepted fashion. Therefore, despite Lord Hoffmanns acceptance that the first sentence of the Protocol rejects giving the words their natural and ordinary meaning
based on standard dictionary definitions, syntax and grammar, in favour of viewing
them in context.54 And notwithstanding acknowledgement that the patentee is trying to describe something which, at any rate in his opinion, is new; which has not
existed before and of which there may be no generally accepted definition55, the
assumption appears to be that a literal interpretation will be forthcoming unless
this cannot have been the drafters intention. However, this view is never made
express. Thus, the contradiction inherent in these divergent approaches inevitably
causes confusion as it is now unclear which is to take precedence. Moreover, the
outcome under any could also depends on what the skilled addressee is told about
the manner in which the claims are to be construed, and what the patents primary
purpose is understood to be.
This confusion is further enhanced by conflicting statements on the purpose of
the specification.At one point his Lordship explains that the person skilled in the art
reads the specification on the assumption that its purpose is to both describe and to
demarcate an invention56, whilst at another he volunteers that the purpose of the
specification . . . is no more nor less than to communicate the idea of the invention.57 There is a gulf of difference between the skilled addressee being told that the
specification they have in front of them for interpretation fulfils one or the other of
these purposes. The former suggests an approach akin to the traditional British
view where the claims mark the outer boundaries of protection, yet the latter is
51
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361
essentially what the Germans traditionally understood by the term general inventive idea. Indeed, Lord Hoffmann himself recognises this point earlier in his judgment when he states that the old, pre-EPC, German approach was to treat the claims
as a point of departure . . . in determining the extent of protection, for which the
criterion was the inventive achievement . . . disclosed by the specification as a whole.
. . . What mattered [at this point in time] was the . . . inventive concept.58 Therefore,
despite the fact that we are told that purpose and meaning are different, and that the
skilled addressee is employed as a standard to determine what the patentee would be
understood to mean, this meaning, under the purposive interpretation disclosed in
Kirin-Amgen, is heavily influenced by what the addressee is told of the purpose of
the specification itself.
In addition, at one point Lord Hoffmann states there is no presumption about
the width of the claims. A patent may, for one reason or another, claim less than it
teaches or enables.59 However, when combined with his Lordships later assertion
that a conclusion that [the patentee has] . . . departed from conventional usage obviously needs some rational basis60, and the statement that the skilled addressee is
aware of conventions of syntax, grammar and word-meaning and will assume that
the patentee has chosen his wording accordingly,61 we see that the effect of the judgment is the very opposite of what is being said. We therefore may deduce that, in
stark contrast to the position advocated by the German courts, Lord Hoffmann is
viewing the patent as a restriction on the free-operation of others in the inventive
area in question. However, this is never explicitly stated to be the case. Nevertheless,
again we arrive at the feet of Lord Diplocks statement that:
persons with practical knowledge and experience of the kind of work in which the invention was intended to be used, would understand that strict compliance with a particular
descriptive word or phrase appearing in a claim was intended by the patentee to be an
essential requirement of the invention so that any variant would fall outside of the monopoly claimed, even though it could have no material effect on the way the invention worked
. . . [unless it is clearly] apparent to any reader skilled in the art that a particular descriptive
word or phrase used in a claim cannot have been intended by a patentee, who was also
skilled in the art, to exclude minor variants62 (emphasis added)
In this context, Lord Hoffmann therefore disagreed with Jacob LJs statement in
Technip that, in order to be fair to the patentee, one must use the widest purpose consistent with his teaching.63 Noting that this seemed to confuse the purpose of the
utterance with what it would be understood to mean.64 However, this is precisely
58
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what the purpose allows the skilled addressee to divine. His Lordship clearly requires
that the wording of the patent is to be interpreted in context; therefore purpose and
meaning are inseparable unless context is ignored. The problem is that by shying
away from adopting presumptions over the width of the claims based on the purpose
of the utterance, the scope for returning to a literal, acontextual analysis of the words
is increased. We return to Lord Porters analysis wherein if the language used is clear
the court has no freedom to depart from it, as the meaning takes precedence over the
purpose to which the language was put.After all,a conclusion that [the patentee has]
. . . departed from conventional usage obviously needs some rational basis.65
65
66
67
68
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363
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not play a decisive part in defining the limits of protection (emphass added).74 The
Protocols guidance on the interpretation of Article 69 is almost an exact replica of
the drafting Committees statement; requiring that literalism should be abandoned
and that the claims should not serve merely as guidelines. Neither Article 69 nor the
Protocol actually says anything about outlawing interpretation outside of the
claims, as long as the extent of protection is still determined by their terms. The two
concepts are clearly not, as Lord Hoffmann implies, necessarily synonymous.
Whilst the word determined can be recognised as relating to an exact boundary, it
can also be understood to describe a position wherein a conclusion is reached via
reasoning or investigation, in other words, where it can be deduced.75 Under the
latter interpretation the claims still play a decisive part in the determination of protection.
Notwithstanding these problems and questions over the correctness of this
approach, Lord Hoffmanns comments make it clear that if a variant is not expressly
claimed, then the court will not be prepared to indulge the patentee by giving him
equivalents protection for an element that does not directly fall within the claim
language.
74 Quoted from Armitage, Interpretation of European Patents ibid, at 814. See also Armitage,
Origins of Relevant Provisions of the Munich and Luxembourg Conventions, in Kemp (ed), Patent
Claim Drafting and Interpretation (London, Oyez Longman, 1983) (Armitage, Origins in Kemp) at
715.
75 See Determine in Trumble & Stevenson (eds), Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford, OUP,
2002; 5th Ed).
76 Reproduced in text accompanying n 34, above.
77 Above, n 39, at para 49.
78 Ibid, at para 52.
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365
than in others,79 the Protocol questions were stated to have value in guiding the
court in its equivalents analysis. However, this value should not be overstated. Lord
Hoffmann is clearly of the opinion that the primary consideration is the notion of
purposive construction: this forms the bedrock of patent construction, universally
applicable.80 The Protocol, on the other hand, is a protocol on the interpretation of
article 69, and not on the interpretation of claims.81 The questions are therefore not
considered to form a legal rule. They are intended to be used as guidance in appropriate cases, but would only be of assistance in certain cases.As Curley and Sheraton
state: In particular, when dealing with patent claims relating to new technology,
they might be inappropriate and lead to a wrong result, as had happened at first
instance in the Amgen case.82
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid at para 25.
Curley & Sheraton,The Lords Rule in Amgen v TKT [2005] EIPR 154, at 156.
Above, n 39, at para 63.
Ibid, at para 64.
Ibid.
Ibid, at para 65.
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But the present case illustrates the difficulty of applying the Protocol questions
when no such question arises.87
The combination of these statements is a little confusing. To begin, Catnic was
not concerned with figures, numbers, or strictly angles: the term was extending vertically. Vertical is not an angle,88 and its use in the claim was clearly not the same as
if the patentee had specified extending at 90 from. In addition, if the Protocol
questions are simply guidelines for applying [the principle of purposive construction] . . . to equivalents89, as Lord Hoffmann states, then what is the equivalent of a
number in a claim? As noted in chapter seven, above, the standard approach of the
English courts is to treat numbers as being accurate to two significant figures90
unless this was clearly not the patentees intention.91 Therefore, any degree of tolerance is usually fixed. This conclusion is further compounded by Lord Hoffmanns
earlier comments that the conventions of language, word-meaning, and syntax,
enable expression with great accuracy and subtlety, and therefore the addressee will
understand this and will assume that the patentee has chosen his language accordingly.92 Therefore, given the exact nature of a numerical range, and the fact that
extension outside of the claims is expressly prohibited, there is actually no room for
approximation. For example, a concentration of 1015 g/dm3 of an ingredient in a
given solvent would directly cover concentrations in the range 9.5015.49 g/dm3
because, to the degree of specificity laid down in the patent, this is 1015 g/dm3. No
approximation is involved. Therefore, beyond the conventional meanings there can
be no further tolerance that will fall within the language of the claims.
This confused argument aside, the point is relatively clear: where there is no question of whether a word used in the claim has been utilised in a strictly conventional
or somewhat looser sense, the Protocol questions are liable to lead their user into
error. In Lord Hoffmanns view this was exactly what had happened to the judge at
first instance in Kirin-Amgen. As there was no suggestion that the phrase an exogenous DNA sequence for encoding EPO could have a broader meaning which would
encompass the defendants activation of an endogenous sequence, the Protocol
questions were irrelevant. By the time the reader had considered whether the patent
was claimed at a level of generality that would make it immaterial whether the
sequence was exogenous or not, the question of construction had been answered.
His Lordship therefore favoured the Court of Appeals approach. He explained
that, rather than viewing the invention as the discovery of the sequence of the EPO
87
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gene,93 it had thought that the invention was a way of making EPO.94 Seen in this
light, it was apparent that a process for making EPO that worked in a different way
could not have fallen within the scope of the claim. Lord Hoffmann agreed, stressing once more that there was really only one essential question to ask: what would
a person skilled in the art have understood the patentee to have used the language of
the claim to mean? Everything else, including the Protocol questions, is only guidance to a judge trying to answer that question. However, he then cautioned that
there is no point in attempting to utilise these questions if they could only sensibly
be answered by first construing the claim to find out what it means.In such a case
and the present is in my opinion such a casethey simply provide a formal justification for a conclusion which has already been reached on other grounds.95
Of New Technology
However, before expressing a firm conclusion on the issue of claim construction,
Lord Hoffmann first discussed the impact of new technology on the case. He summarised the patentees argument as inviting an interpretation of the claim that
included any DNA sequence, whether exogenous or endogenous, which expresses
EPO in consequence of the application to the cell of any form of DNA recombinant
technology.96 In other words, they had attempted to claim any way of making EPO
by recombinant gene technology. The patentee alleged that this was justified for, at
the time of the invention, they had provided the only way of making EPO in this
fashion; it was only later that technology had moved on and other pathways had
been made available. If the claim was limited to the single pathway used, and could
not be construed in sufficiently general terms to include methods unknown at the
priority date, then the value of a patent would be destroyed as soon as any new manner of reaching the same result was invented.
In reply to this, Lord Hoffmann stated that he did not dispute that a claim may,
upon its proper construction, cover products or processes which involve the use of
technology unknown at the time the claim was drafted. The question is whether the
person skilled in the art would understand the description in a way which was sufficiently general to include the new technology.97
There was considered to be no difficulty in principlewith the possibility of interpreting general terms in the claims to cover embodiments that were not known at
the time of drafting. This was, in Lord Hoffmanns words, something One
frequently does in construing legislation.98 As Cole notes,99 this is clearly illustrated
93
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Therefore, as Cole explains:It will be apparent that when construing statutes, the
UK courts are prepared both to give words figurative rather than literal meanings
. . . and to depart from specific wording. . . . Their willingness to do so is greater for
newly developed circumstances than it is for circumstances existing when the
statute was enacted. Purposive construction of patents could in principle give similar results.102 However, cases in which this has been done are very rare. Lord
Hoffmanns comments in Kirin-Amgen are unlikely to change this.
Returning to the decision in hand: despite having dismissed the Protocol questions as merely guidelines that were more helpful in some cases than others, and
not at all helpful where there was no word capable of being interpreted in a narrow
or loose manner, the issue of whether new technology falls within the scope of the
claims was stated to be linked to a dispute over the meaning of the second Protocol
question.103 Lord Hoffmann explained that the problem revolved around whether
the skilled addressee, when assessing if it would have been obvious that the variant
worked in the same way, should be told that the variant worked at all. He noted that,
depending on the type of invention under consideration, this piece of information
could in itself be determinative of the investigation. Therefore if a claim referred to
a second medical use of a specified compound and the question was whether this
could be interpreted to cover derivatives of that compound, to ask the skilled
addressee whether, assuming that the derivatives worked, they worked in the same
way (ie had the same effect) would have been to beg the question.104 All this inves100 [2003] 2 AC 687. This case is also referred to by Lord Hoffmann in Kirin-Amgen, n 39, above, at
para 80.
101 Ibid, at 695, paras 89.
102 Above, n 99, at 1001.
103 Above, n 39, at para 81.
104 This is a condensed version of the facts of American Home Products Corporation v Novartis
Pharmaceuticals UK Ltd [2001] RPC 159, referred to by Lord Hoffmann in Kirin-Amgen, ibid, at para 82.
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tigation did was to once again highlight the inadequacies of the Protocol questions
themselves. It was therefore conceded that perhaps a better answer to the dispute
over the second Protocol question is that new technology is another situation in
which the Protocol questions may be unhelpful.105
When considering whether the claims encompass such variants the skilled
addressee must, therefore, without further guidance or recourse to a doctrine of
equivalents, answer the question of whether the description was, at the priority date
of the patent, general enough to enable newly invented technology to fall within the
scope of the claims. In practical terms, this presents a problem that is almost
inevitably answered in the negative. In many cases the addressees viewpoint is
tainted by the simple fact that at the priority date of the patent they would not consider it obvious that something not yet invented actually worked at all.
Therefore, in cases of truly groundbreaking technology, we see a strange phenomenon being perpetuated. The context of the patent is viewed with hindsight in
order to determine what the patentee has, at a later date,106 been seen to have
invented. This hindsight assessment is then used in order to calculate the scope that
the skilled addressee would, at the date of the patent (whether publication or priority), have interpreted the claims to provide for the patentee. This scope is not capable of expansion under a doctrine of equivalents so that the inventor may receive
reward commensurate with their contribution to the art, as this would be to extend
protection outside of the claims. The addressee may, however, consider that new
technology could fall within the scope of the claims if the language used is sufficiently general to allow this. Yet bearing in mind the date of assessment, this is
unlikely.
Therefore, by adopting a single-stage test for the interpretation of claims, not
only must the inventor of a pioneer advance contend with the spectre of Biogen
insufficiency,107 but due to the lack of obvious variants at either priority or publication dates, they will also be tied to a narrow interpretation of their claims.
Justification for adopting this approach appears to be drawn from perception of the
patent as a monopoly right; its grant an exception to an otherwise outright prohibition.108 However, this is never expressed in as many words. The closest we come to a
statement of this policy is found within the dictum of Chadwick LJ in Dranez
Anstalt v Hayek:109
105
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The grant or registration of a patent confers a monopoly. The statutory monopoly can be
justified on the grounds that it is necessary (for a limited time) in order to encourage
inventors, and those who fund them, to apply their skills and resources in developing
products and processes from which the public will benefit.110
Whilst somewhat lacking as full justification for the adopted approach, this may
help shed some light on the general perception of the patent right in the UK.
Patents on pioneer advances, by definition inventions that make a spectacular
technological contribution, pose significant problems when faced with this viewpoint. At the time of their priority the distance between patent and prior art is great.
Additionally, at this point in time, the patentees contribution to the art, which may
include the fact that the result can be achieved or that the invention works at all, may
be massive. It could be expected that these factors would conspire to produce a
broad interpretation. However, when faced with fear of monopoly, the opposite
conclusion is forthcoming. The patentees actual contribution therefore takes second place to the rest of societys apparent right to operate unencumbered. Whilst in
one sense this is clearly admirable as a concept, it must not be forgotten that but for
the patentees contribution the public would not be operating in that area at all:111
this is especially the case where a pioneer advance is concerned. Yet the perceptual
prejudice that flows from viewing the grant as an exception to be closely restrained
can be seen to colour the courts view of the claims, resulting in a warning to the patentee: dont claim too broadly or youll get something that you didnt disclose. It also
sets up a preference for narrow interpretation when it comes to infringement.
In considering these restrictions, timing is important. The discussion of whether
the patent is broad or narrow is invariably undertaken in the light of subsequent
events, notably the fact that another way to do the same thing has been invented or
discovered. However, at the point of the invention the inventors way was the only
way, this is why it was pioneer. The patentee is therefore sandwiched between
opposing forces that squeeze the grant and render reward based on their contribution to the art inapplicable.
The irony is that the first person to disclose the pathway that others follow may
actually be seen to have revealed far more at the time that they made their original
breakthrough than would be the case in hindsight. However, it is the latter factor, the
fact that someone else has come up with another way of doing the same thing as the
patentee that will inevitably be in the mind of the court when considering issues of
scope. Thus, despite claiming otherwise, the grant will always be viewed with hindsight bias. The fact that someone else has later done the same thing using new (and
now equivalent) techniques is used to demonstrate that the inventors contribution
to the art was not as great as they thought it was at the point of their invention.
However, the problem with this assessment is that the contribution of the first
person to view something in a particular way is not always easy to quantify after the
110
111
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event. When new becomes old, and old becomes accepted, the contribution of the
pioneer often gets swallowed in the race to advance.
If there is clear policy reason why the system should prejudice against such innovations then this should really be explicitly voiced, otherwise it is failing an important, and wide-ranging, field of invention. Despite superficially addressing the issue
of infringement by after-arising technology, the appeal in Kirin-Amgen does not
remedy this defect.
In this case, Lord Hoffmann was of the opinion that there was no infringement.
To interpret the patentees reference to exogenous as including endogenous
would, to borrow Armitages phrase,112 have done violence to the contextual language of the claim.
Comment on Kirin-Amgen
Let us be clear: there are many positive points about the results of the House of
Lords investigation of the issues in Kirin-Amgen. The clarification of the Protocol
questions status as guides, to assist in answering the overall question of what the
skilled addressee would understand the claim wording, assessed in context, to
mean, is welcomed.After all, one of the main criticisms raised of the approach of the
Court of Appeal in the string of cases leading up to the Lords judgment in KirinAmgen was that the classic three-element test was simply being used as a manner of
officially justifying a conclusion reached by other means. Therefore, the decision
can be seen to have made significant steps towards tidying the loose-threads left in
the wake these earlier cases and their constant restatement of the law. The approach
advocated by Lord Hoffmann is also arguably more easily intelligible than that
applied before: there is less of a smoke and mirrors feel about the investigation as a
whole when the question is laid bare.
Reduction of the assessment to a simple question of how the claim terms would
be understood by the suitably skilled addressee is clearly a beneficial step. Indeed,
when the decision is analysed it is evident that the vast majority of Lord Hoffmanns
comments are individually sensible: of course the claims determine the scope of
protection the patentee is to enjoy, is that not what Article 69 EPC demands? Of
course we must adopt a position wherein the resultant interpretation is externally
verifiable and reproducible. To approve any other approach would be to invite
capriciousness and unpredictability. Of course we must look at the issue of claim
construction through the eyes of an objective viewer, versed in the technology in
question, who will then reveal what the language used by the patentee actually communicates. As Meier-Beck indicates, this is a position without alternative.113 To do
112
Armitage,Interpretation of European Patents, n 44, above, at 815. The quote referred to is reproduced in text accompanying n 46, above.
113 Meier-Beck, The Scope of Patent ProtectionThe Test for Determining Equivalence (2005) 36
IIC 339 at 341.
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rectly) identified as having grown out of despair with the literal approach to claim
interpretation.119 It is painted as an alternative pathway to pith and marrow. The
problems of allowing the patents scope of protection to escape from the terms of
the claims are then discussed. It is here that the sleight of hand occurs; blink and you
may miss it. The American picture of protection unbounded by the patent claims
distracts the readers attention from what has just been said:once the monopoly has
been allowed to escape from the terms of the claims, it is not easy to know where its
limits should be drawn.120 The implication is that as soon as equivalents protection
begins to allow deviation outside of the wording of the claims the patents scope
immediately becomes unbound by them. This is simply not correct. Moreover, nor
is the conclusion that Article 69 firmly shuts the door on any doctrine which
extends protection outside the claims.121 To adopt this position is to take a very narrow view of what it can mean to determine. Finally, it is evident that the road to
equivalency need not inevitably end in disaster. It is simply illogical to argue that the
US system entertains a doctrine of equivalents ergo the doctrine of equivalents is
responsible for the state of the US system. As any scholar of US patent law will tell
you, the doctrine of equivalents is just one of many concerns. Furthermore, would
it not be possible to learn from anothers mistakes even if this were the case?
There is also confusion in the judgment. Confusion, for example, about what the
purpose of the specification and the claims is: at one point the person skilled in the
art reads the specification on the assumption that its purpose is to both describe
and to demarcate an invention122, whilst at another its purpose is is no more nor
less than to communicate the idea of the invention.123 As noted above, there is a gulf
of difference in the patentee being told either one or the other of these as functions
of the communication that they are asked to interpret.
However, it is Lord Hoffmanns pre-emptive strike at the amendments (not yet in
force) to the Protocol that provides perhaps the most concerning aspect of the
Kirin-Amgen decision. The problem arises from the repercussive effects that these
comments have on other elements of the patent system directly related to scope.
Repercussive Effects
For the majority of this work, we have considered the issue of claim construction
almost entirely in the context of infringement, for it is here that the influence of
Article 69 EPC and the Protocol are of supreme importance. However, it is clear that
this is only half of the story, for under the current approach it is accepted without
question that the same core interpretation must be adopted for the purposes of
both infringement and validity. Indeed, if the situation were otherwise, the logic of
119
Whilst it can function in this manner, its roots demonstrate a different lineage. See text accompanying n 319 in ch 6, above.
120
Above, n 39, at para 39.
121
Ibid, at para 44.
122 Ibid, at para 33.
123 Ibid, towards the end of the same para.
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applying the Gillette defence,124 for example, would be lost. With this in mind, Lord
Hoffmanns requirement that equivalency be taken directly into consideration
when determining the common general knowledge of the skilled addressee presents
a problem.
Whilst it is perfectly acceptable for the addressee to utilise their common general
knowledge when deciding what a claim, read in context, would mean for the
purposes of assessing infringement, it is another matter entirely to do this when
considering generic validity per se. The reason for this is that a clear distinction
must be drawn between novelty and inventive step.
Section 2 Patents Act 1977 (the 1977 Act) clearly defines an invention to be new if
it does not form part of the state of the art, whilst s3 states that an invention involves
an inventive step if it is not obvious in light of the same. However, the whilst the core
of the state of the art is defined by s2(2) of the 1977 Act as comprising all matter . . .
which has at any time before the priority date of that invention been made available
to the public . . . by written or oral description, by use or in any other way, there is a
supplementary definition that applies for novelty only. Therefore, s2(3) adds that
the state of the art also includes matter contained in previously filed but, at the priority date of the later application, unpublished, patents.125 As noted, this is only for
the purposes of novelty, s3 expressly disregards prior art falling within s2(3) from
consideration for the purposes of inventive step.
In the vast majority of cases, the distinction between novelty and inventive step
will be of relatively little importance, for the prior art in question will fall under the
definition in s2(2) and it will be possible to attack the patent under both heads.
However, in a small proportion of actions, such as the House of Lords most recent
pronouncement in the area of novelty Synthon v SmithKline,126 the distinction is
critical. In this case, the element of prior art that was alleged to anticipate the patentees claims fell under s2(3), in that it was a prior unpublished application at the
point at which SmithKline applied for their grant. As such, the attack on the later
patents validity had to be conducted solely on the basis of a lack of novelty.
Inventive step could not be an issue.127
By adopting the Kirin-Amgen approach to the construction of claims, the House
of Lords in Synthon exposes the problem with treating equivalents as falling within
the contemplation of the skilled addressee under a single-stage test. The reason for
this is that it would traditionally be perceived that obvious equivalents of the prior
art should fall to be considered under the heading of inventive step and not under
novelty per se. In the words of Sachs LJ, in General Tire v Firestone,128 quoted with
124 A defence first laid down in Gillette v Anglo-American Trading (1913) 30 RPC 465 wherein the patentee is placed on the horns of a dilemma between arguing for a broad enough construction to catch the
defendants conduct and trying to avoid such a construction if it will lead to a counter-claim that the
patent is invalid.
125 Including applications for which, providing they went at least as far as publication.
126 [2006] 1 All ER 685.
127 See s3 of the Act which clearly states that: An invention shall be taken to involve an inventive step
if it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art, having regard to any matter which forms part of the state
of the art by virtue only of section 2(2) above (and disregarding section 2(3) above).
128 [1972] RPC 457.
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132
133
134
135
136
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377
(d) It further follows that the claims must not be construed as if they stood alonethe
drawings and description only being used to resolve any ambiguity. Purpose is vital to
the construction of claims.
(f) Nonetheless purpose is not the be-all and end-all. One is still at the end of the day
concerned with the meaning of the language used. Hence the other extreme of the
Protocola mere guidelineis also ruled out by Art 69 itself. It is the terms of the
claims which delineate the patentees territory.
(g) It follows that if the patentee has included what is obviously a deliberate limitation in
his claims, it must have a meaning. One cannot disregard obviously intentional elements.
(h) It also follows that where a patentee has used a word or phrase which, acontextually,
might have a particular meaning (narrow or wide) it does not necessarily have that
meaning in context.
(i) It further follows that there is no general doctrine of equivalents.
(j) On the other hand purposive construction can lead to the conclusion that a technically trivial or minor difference between an element of a claim and the corresponding
element of the alleged infringement nonetheless falls within the meaning of the element when read purposively. This is not because there is a doctrine of equivalents: it
is because that is the fair way to read the claim in context.
(k) Finally purposive construction leads one to eschew what Lord Diplock in Catnic
called . . .the kind of meticulous verbal analysis which lawyers are too often tempted
by their training to indulge.137
The adoption of this framework as a de facto test guide the court appears to have
been made complete with Pumfrey Js decision in Halliburton Energy Services v
Smith International.138 In this case he referred directly to Jacob LJs list of points laid
down in Technip, stating that he would set out that useful list of applicable principles. However, he then took responsibility for modifying principles (e) and (f)
slightly to take account of the single criticism that Lord Hoffmann makes of this list.
Points (e) and (f) were therefore amended to read:
(e) When ascertaining the inventors purpose, it must be remembered that he may have
several purposes depending on the level of generality of his invention. Typically, for
instance, an inventor may have one, generally more than one, specific embodiment as
well as a generalised concept. But there is no presumption that the patentee necessarily intended the widest possible meaning consistent with his purpose be given to the
words that he used: purpose and meaning are different.
(f) Thus purpose is not the be-all and end-all. One is still at the end of the day concerned
with the meaning of the language used. Hence the other extreme of the protocola
mere guidelineis also ruled out by Art 69 itself. It is the terms of the claims which
delineate the patentees territory.139
137
Ibid. Note that there is no point (e) as in Jacob LJs original list this was the one point that became
subject of Lord Hoffmanns criticism. See text accompanying n 53, above.
138 [2006] RPC 25.
139 Ibid, at 55, para 68 of the judgment.
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Conclusion
So has a clear position been adopted? The divergence of approaches in the lower
courts suggests that not all are happy with the lack of structure left in the wake of
Kirin-Amgen. As far as investigations go, asking what the skilled addressee considers
the claims to mean speaks volumes in terms of common sense. However the lack
of expression of the guiding principles or underlying rationales for the adopted
position147 could legitimately be argued to have a disruptive effect on the predictability of outcome. By providing the tribunal with more power to come to its
140
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Conclusion
379
own, essentially unguided, conclusion, we return to Blanco Whites fears that under
Catnic the skilled addressees view of the claims will be substituted for the Courts
own idea of what would then have been seen to be essential to the effective operation of the invention.148 If anything, this danger is greater under Kirin than before.
However, this degree of flexibility appears to be an inescapable consequence of
entrusting questions of interpretation to a hypothetical person. Yet the alternative,
asking what the words mean acontextually, is a highly artificial and unfair process,
notwithstanding the fact that it is expressly disavowed by the Protocol.
Equally, reduction of the assessment to a series of essential points and presumptions does not really assist in making things clearly accessible, especially when those
presumptions are wrapped in layers and sub-layers of unexpressed principle.
Individual elements of Jacob LJs list from Technip (as amended) can be seen to pull
the investigation in different directions based on how the court appears, but never
says, it views the grant.Although certainly clearer than Aldous LJs subversion of the
Protocol questions, the potential for sleight-of-hand manipulation is still significant. Moreover, if the convoluted structure of the three Protocol questions has
merely been replaced by an 11 point checklist, then simplification of approach has
not really been achieved. This is especially galling when it appears that the Technip
formulation adds essentially nothing to Article 69 EPC and the Protocols own
demands for interpretation.149 The claims still must be construed in context, in
light of the description and the drawings, and in a manner that treads the delicate
border between fairness and certainty.
However, there is essentially nothing in any of the decisions that we have looked at
that overtly considers the principled question of where this border should lie. We have
discussion in Lord Hoffmanns judgment in Kirin-Amgen itself about the dangers of
an over-broad interpretation and the need for certainty from the point of view of both
patentee and third parties, but there is relatively little that distinguishes this from
bright-line arguments advocating literalism of approach. From the point of view of
providing for free competition, it is self-evident that the border should be as clear as
possible, however, as Meier-Beck explains,the most clearly visible border is not identical with the optimum border.150 Therefore, departing slightly from the views of Lord
Hoffmann on this point, as Armitage notes, in order to secure fair protection for the
patentee it may be necessary for the claims to be stretched in interpretation so as to
correct forgivable drafting oversight (no draftsman of claims is perfect) or failure to
foresee possible variants of the claimed invention (no draftsman is omniscient).151 In
other words, in economic terms there must be considered to be a trade-off between the
opposing constraints of fairness and certainty. This principle balance is required to be
struck by Article 69 EPC and the Protocol; however, in addressing the issue we expose
these provisions greatest weaknessestheir own imprecision.
148
Blanco White, Patents for Inventions (London, Stevens & Sons, 1983; 5th Ed) at 2-104.
Notwithstanding, of course, the fact that the Protocol is classified as having a bearing on the interpretation of Art 69 and not on the interpretation of the claims per se.
150 Meier-Beck, n 113, above, at 340.
151 Armitage,Interpretation of European Patents n 44, above, at 815.
149
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Therefore, because the language used in Article 69 and the Protocol is itself capable of being interpreted with varying levels of literalism, different standards can be
applied when operating under the same test. As Lord Hoffmann himself has stated,
No one has ever made an acontextual statement, yet this principle seems to have
passed him by when considering interpretation of these provisions of the EPC. By
taking a literal view of the meaning of determined within Article 69, for example,
he was able to conclude that it firmly shuts the door on any doctrine which extends
protection outside the claims.152 However, looking at the purpose of the provision
it would have been perfectly possible to come to precisely the opposite conclusion;
to understand it as being satisfied providing the patents extent of protection is
deducible from the claim terms. Indeed, failure to realise that Article 69 EPC and the
Protocol are not acontextual statements any more than the terms of a patents
claims could be argued to be, opens up the latters construction to disharmony
within a European system in which the purpose of the grant is viewed differently in
different states. Ironically, therefore, Lord Hoffmanns own dedication to purposive
construction helps to illustrate why his comment that there is essentially no difference between the German and English treatment of equivalents (When Dr Peter
Meier-Beck very kindly sent me comments on a draft of the Amgen [decision] a couple of years ago and explained the German approach to equivalence, I told him that
the only difference there seemed to be between us was that I was brought up on
the 1960s Oxford philosophy of language and he was brought up on Hegel.153) is
incorrect. As noted in chapter seven, above, the interpretative traditions lying
behind the practices of the English and German courts are so disparate that it is
sufficient to doubt the integrity of any apparently harmonised, yet objectively
unpoliced, common position.
Therefore, whilst there was a time when both the German and British states had
the absolute right to self-determination on issues patent, and neither ones
approach could have been said to be any more right, or wrong, than the other, this is
no longer an accurate statement to make. Both are wrong unless they conform to
each others models. As justice is inextricably linked with the legitimate expectations of the parties it is not sufficient for a construction to appear to be the same on
the surface if the foundations are different. The problem is that a European
centralised application and grant process now gives rise to an expectation of a
European centralised interpretation, and this is something that the current incarnation of the EPC does not adequately provide for. Therefore, as stated in chapter
seven, either the underlying rationale of protection must be harmonised or there
must be conformity mandated from above.
Whilst it could be argued that the House of Lords comments in Kirin-Amgen have
enhanced the clarity of the UKs approach to the interpretation of claims, the decision has not gone any way towards remedying the pre-existing gulf in interpretative
freedom between the 1960s Oxford philosophy of languageand Hegel. Yet in order
to achieve harmonisation in Europe, this is precisely what needs to occur.
152
153
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11
A Summary
When I use a word, Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, It means just
what I want it to mean, neither more nor less.
Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass, ch 6.
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A Summary
made the first tentative steps towards a modern grant in which the invention is
described and the scope of protection demarcated by the patentee themselves.
The historical account of patents in England also enables us to see some of the
problems that have dogged the system since its inception. Therefore we noted the
odious monopolies granted in Elizabeths Reign, and the continuation of abuses
under James I, that lead to the Statute of Monopolies. As we have seen, the Statute
was enacted in response to some of the more problematic grants of the day and
declared all monopolies to be contrary to the law and utterly void.1 Patents for
invention were excused from the rigours of this ban,2 but it is clear to see where the
view that they must be narrowly construed as an exception to an otherwise outright
condemnation of monopolies originates.
The intense debate that surrounded the mobilisation of the anti-patent movement in the mid- to late-nineteenth century provided the backdrop for a discussion
of some of the classical justifications of patent protection. This period in time was
one of intense dissatisfaction with the operation of the system; patents were expensive, unreliable and often seen as a barrier to the progress of industry. The debate
therefore provides a valuable snapshot of a point at which the grant had to be justified in order to maintain its existence. In addition, it provides evidence of a view that
rendering temporary monopoly to the creators of new things may actually inhibit
the progress of technology by providing a disincentive to invent, due to fear of
litigation. It therefore enables us to see the other side of the coin, and begin to appreciate the effects that patent protection may have on downstream innovation.
Therefore, in seeking rationalisation of the grant, two distinct views are seen to be
in evidence by the end of the nineteenth century. The first is that of the patent as a
tool of commercial leverage, as reflected in the works of Smith, Bentham, Mill and
others, and upon which most of the modern theory can be seen to be based. The second is that of the patent as a constraint on trade, the old monopoly argument,
demonstrated by Macfie, Rogers, Grove and the other abolitionists. What is clear
from the progress of the debate is that an unregulated market was seen by the majority on both sides of the argument to be unsuitable for the fostering of inventive
activity. Where the views differed, however, was in the choice of the best arrangement for that encouragement. At this point in time the legal system was ill equipped
to deal with property in the intangible, and therefore restricted it as one would
restrict title deeds to land; requiring the invention to be defined accurately and precisely. This sentiment is reflected in the words of Lord Russell in his famous dicta in
EMI v Lissen when stating [w]hat is not claimed is disclaimed.3 However, the
underlying justifications for providing monopoly protection remained constant;
patents were a method of safeguarding inventors from the pressures of competition
in order that an economic reason to invent (whether it be incentive or reward) and
to disclose that invention could be found.
1
2
3
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383
The nature of the patentee, and invention itself, had, however, undergone significant changes by the end of the anti-patent debate. The image of the lone inventor
was fading, replaced by a new corporate structure of research and development.
Therefore, whilst the overriding justification for the patent system can historically
be seen to be the idea of individual encouragement, this was changing. In essence
the justificatory theories were becoming more abstract; there was a move away from
focussing on invention towards innovation. As a consequence of this shift, and also
due to increasing numbers of patents, the specification had assumed a far more central role in the grant. Thus, s5(5) of the Patents Act 1883 introduced a requirement
that the patentee explicitly claim what they consider to be their invention.
The topic of the claims was picked up in chapter four when we considered the
process of drafting the specification and gained insight into some of the reasons for
seeking protection in the first place. Therefore, we looked at factors that determine
the intrinsic scope of the grant, and saw the problems that face the patent attorney
when creating the document. The discussion highlighted the fact that the traditional view of the patent may not provide an accurate measure of its effect. In
particular, it emphasised that the grant is often sought for purely economic reasons
connected with getting innovation onto the balance sheets. Therefore, it was perhaps misleading to ask what the purpose of the patent system is before examining
its effect. In other words, rather than asking what the system aims to do, the key
question may well be what does the system actually do? The answer to this question
clearly has an impact on the scope that should be accorded to the grant, for it focuses
attention on the dominant justifications for protection.
This issue was discussed in chapter five, when we considered the effect of the
patent grant by examining some of the simple economics of supply and demand. In
addition, we looked at the patent as monopoly argument, and were able to conclude
that, despite providing monopoly power, the grant is far from what may be called an
economic monopoly. However, such misbranding of the effects of the patent add to
the prejudice with which it is viewed. Thus, in the same way that the monopoly rhetoric was utilised so effectively by the abolitionists in the ant-patent debate, it still
finds use today to apparently justify a narrow scope of protection.
Following on from our discussion of the monopoly theory of patent protection
we examined some of the modern rationales that have been advanced to justify
extending patent protection to new and innovative technology. At this point,
Scherers topology of invention was introduced as a method of assessing the effects
of various post-classical theories of patent protection. However, it was noted that,
far from providing any sound appreciation of the purpose or effect of the patent
system, the various economic constructs are all lacking in certain aspects. In
particular, they all appear to be theoretical without practical applicability, based, as
they are, on a small number of non-randomly selected cases. The most modern
theories can be seen to have moved on to consider the effects of portfolios and clusters of patents rather than individual grants. This is clearly important from the
point of view of explaining patentee behaviour and demonstrating what can be
considered to add value to the patent bundle; however, these theories, which almost
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A Summary
by definition concentrate on the ex post use of granted patents, offer precious little
to assist in ex ante justification of the system. Therefore, whilst they do provide a
platform for further consideration of a model in which strength of numbers can
dramatically outweigh a simple aggregation of the value of individual grants, even
this approach to the patent system gets us little further than the point at which we
left the classical theories.
Therefore, by the end of our consideration of chapters three, four and five
(Patents within the Market Economy), it was clear that the patent systems primary
purpose is as a commercial tool and thus finds justification based on maintenance
of the status quo. This is not to say that the other theories play no part in the provision of patent protection, but rather that once a system is in operation it is actually
impossible to say whether it operates to the net benefit or detriment of the state.
Therefore, the question of scope should cease to be one of finding the best level of
protection given the justification of the grant, and move to be more a matter of personal choice, based on what best suits the current technological standing of the
nation. With this in mind, it is clear that the one size fits all approach of harmonisation, in which developing countries have developed states IP systems imposed
upon them, lacks intellectual rigor.
In part two, we moved to consider the manner in which a patents scope of protection is determined in three of the worlds main Patent Office centresnamely
the US, Japan and Europe (picking Germany and the UK as the states for comparison). In a far more graphic manner than the more theoretical chapters, these
comparative studies highlighted the patent cannot be viewed in isolation; it must be
seen in the institutional and administrative environment in which it operates. In
this context the Japanese experience is particularly enlightening as it proves that significant progress can be made in the face of, or perhaps because of, narrow protection. The patent clusters that were prevalent in Japanese practice before reforms
expanding the scope of protection often operated to the detriment of the foreign
patentee. However, the process of incremental advancement that the narrow grant
made possible was one of the key factors in Japans technological explosion. Just as
early British grants encouraged importation of foreign ideas, so too the Japanese
system survived on the assimilation of overseas pioneer inventive effort.
In contrast, both the German and the US patent systems traditionally provided
rather broad protection; the latter by way of the doctrine of equivalents, and the former by utilising central definition theory and protecting the general inventive idea.
However, in both cases there are restrictions on the degree of latitude with which the
claims are to be interpreted. In Germany, this came from the Patent Offices strict
requirements for the form in which the claim was to be drafted, and in the US it
comes from the application of restrictive doctrines such as prosecution history
estoppel. In neither case does a beneficial construction of the claims render the
interpretation too uncertain for the underlying principles of the patent system to
operate as long as the rules relating to construction are known.
This really is the vital point evident throughout the foregoing discussion:
predictability is the key. The patent system can only achieve its desired aims and
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385
objectives, whatever they may be, if the process is transparent. Institutional practices surrounding the grant can, and do, operate to gain the maximum benefit from
whatever principles are currently utilised to mark the bounds of protection. In
chapter four, for example, we saw that the majority of patent attorneys interviewed
in connection with this work approached the claims assuming that they would be
interpreted in a literal sense. This has to be correct from their perspective, as it
would be negligent of them (if nothing more) to rely on a beneficial interpretation
somewhere later down the line to justify cutting corners. However, this bright-line
approach is not necessarily one that provides the optimum degree of protection. As
Armitage states, in order to secure fair protection for the patentee it may be necessary for the claims to be stretched in interpretation so as to correct forgivable drafting oversight (no draftsman of claims is perfect) or failure to foresee possible
variants of the claimed invention (no draftsman is omniscient).4 A balance must
therefore be struck that provides for the underlying rationale of the grant, protecting its utility as an item of commerce and yet also ensuring that the historical virtues
of the system in encouraging and rewarding innovation and disclosure are not
undone. Predictability is therefore key.
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A Summary
other party has charged them with infringement. The reasonable expectation of
each is that they will win; otherwise the case would be settled.6
However, this circularity only applies when there is no objective standard against
which to measure reason: in other words, where the underlying purpose of protection is not made clear. This is the essential problem with the Protocols approach:
whilst mandating a pathway that must be trodden when interpreting the degree of
latitude that should be given to the interpretation of Article 69 EPC, it does nothing
to align the Contracting States underlying approaches to the treatment of the
patent. Therefore, the point from which the patent is viewed, whether as legitimate
reward or as obstruction to free operation of others, is objectively unpoliced.
In terms of progressing towards a centralised European position, the British
approach to claim interpretation has come a long way from the pseudo-literal
constraints of the House of Lords decision in EMI v Lissen,7 wherein acontextual
interpretation ruled. Catnic itself played a large part in this modernisation of
approach, however, as noted, it also created a suspect legacy of narrow tests and
dubious presumptions that hindered development of the law. The subsequent discussion of Lord Diplocks test in Improver v Remington8 served not only to reformulate the questions, but also to highlight some of their most restrictive criteria.
Subsequently, however, under what Turner describes as the guise of loyalty to
Catnic9 it is possible to detect a subtle shift in the courts interpretation of the
patent towards more liberal construction. In this manner, the advances made by
Aldous LJ in the string of cases running from Kastner v Rizla10 to Kirin-Amgen11 in
the Court of Appeal were, in one aspect at least, fulfilling the policy of patent protection as the patentees reward saw the prospect of being increased by more liberal
interpretation. Unfortunately, however, this came at a cost: unpredictability.
As we saw in chapters two and three, the essential historical justification for the
patent system is that it is an efficient form of advancing the technological standing
of the state. However, this fundamental rationale can only be effective, indeed will
only remain true, when the justification for providing that level of protection is
clear; unfortunately the ground-shifting that had occurred in the Court of Appeals
judgments under Aldous LJ, was not. The modifications that were instituted, which
allowed the judge more flexibility in deciding the outcome of individual cases by
extolling an inventive step requirement as the focus for construction, had been
undermining the traditional view of the patent as incentive. With this view
weakened, and reward considerations entering the equation, the objectivity of the
interpretative exercise was also damaged as it was no longer clear which, if any, justification was to maintain precedence. A position was reached wherein it was uncertain whether the patentees contribution would be deemed such that protection
6
7
8
9
10
11
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387
12
Referring to the case of Cutting Knife I (Schneidmesser I) [2002] GRUR 515. English translation
available in [2003] ENPR 309. The case is discussed in text accompanying n 14453 in ch 7, above.
13 [1990] FSR 181.
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A Summary
So Where Now?
This study has highlighted that various approaches to claim interpretation can provide the stability and predictability of outcome that services the patent systems
underlying historical purpose: to promote technological improvement within a
state. In relation to the construction of claims, the Japanese system graphically
illustrates that breadth of protection is essentially irrelevant if the outcome of the
interpretative exercise is predictable. Consideration of this experience also allows
exploration of the dangers to the domestic market of imposing a foreign legal
standard relating to the patents extent of protection before that state is technologically ready to accept it. In the same manner as the British system was allowed to grow
unencumbered by external pressure, so the Japanese approach is a classic example
of what you can do when standards are controlled internally. The creation of a fully
formed patent system takes many years to effect, and the most important part of this
journey is in the process of growth itself. Just as it would be inappropriate to deny a
composer a period of imitation in the development of their craft, so too a period of
teething is not simply beneficial to the growth of a sustainable domestic IP market,
it is essential. Imitation is as critical in the technological growth of a country seeking to develop as it is in the training of an artist, writer, or musician. However, whilst
in the creative arts this inspiration is viewed favourably, even called apprenticeship,
in the realm of technology it is called piracy.
Once states have matured, and accelerated progressplaying technological
catch-upis no longer an issue, then inter-state trade of ideas and exportation of
technology must become the focus. At this point in time, harmonisation measures
such as the European Patent Convention become important. However, once a state
willingly moves into a position wherein it is no longer solely responsible for its own
patent policy, it has a certain responsibility to toe the line. Spengler goes some way
towards expressing this point when he states that: It is inappropriate to decline to
co-operate on the achievement of legal unification whenever ones own solution has
not been chosen as the model for that of the Community.14 However, this does not
really go far enough: ultimately it is inappropriate to decline to co-operate when
you have signed up to harmonisation measures in the first place.
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So Where Now?
389
completed at this latter date, otherwise non-infringement and lack of novelty could
not be alternatives from a logical point of view15
However, interpretation solely at this date would do a great disservice to the creators of certain types of invention, notably those that would be classified as having
pioneer status. As explained in chapter ten, above, the inventors of this type of
invention face innumerable problems due to the lack of evident equivalents at the
priority (or publication) date of the patent. In addition, they also face significant
issues even under Lord Hoffmanns one compulsory question in Kirin-Amgen due
to contamination by hindsight bias. To bastardise slightly the words of Lord Russell
in Non-Drip Measure Co v Strangers Ltd: Nothing is easier than to say, after the
event, that the thing was obvious and involved no invention16 except, perhaps, that
the technical contribution to the art was small. When viewed with hindsight the
tendency is to examine the inventive territory and to identify what, in the light of
subsequent advances, the patentee can be said to have contributed. However, the
outcome of this investigation may be very different to that which the patentee, or
indeed the rest of the world, would have considered the inventive advance to have
been at the date that the claims were penned. Therefore, once more, dates become
an issue. Not only is the time of construction decisive from the point of view of
determining protection for equivalent technology, but it also has critical impact
upon the teaching the patent can be seen to embody, and therefore the context from
within which the skilled addressee should be interpreting the claims. In both cases
pioneer advances are at a disadvantage.
Attention clearly needs to be paid to this matter, as otherwise innovations that
could be the most valuable to society are in danger of progressing unrewarded.
In addition, the Kirin-Amgen approach to equivalents appears to be significantly
out of line with certain readings of Article 69 EPC and the new text of the Protocol.
This needs addressing. There is no clear reason, other than that derived from the
apparent British perception of the patent, stemming from the Statute of
Monopolies itself, as an exception to an otherwise absolute prohibition on monopoly, for this to be the case. As long as the scope of protection is immediately apparent from the claims when read in context then there is no reason to treat them in the
absolute fencepost manner that they currently are.
A Modest Proposal
Under the EPC, Article 69 dictates the prominence that the claims are to enjoy in
determination of the patents scope of protection. This currently states that the
extent of protection conferred by a European patent . . . shall be determined by the
terms of the claims. Nevertheless, the description and drawings shall be used to
interpret the claims.
15
Hlder,Exogenous Equals Endogenous? Claim Construction After the Amgen Decision (2006) 37
IIC 662 at 667.
16 (1943) RPC 135, at 142.
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A Summary
This provision says nothing about the prudence, or not, of applying a two-stage
test of construction. It also, contrary to what Lord Hoffmann states, says nothing
about whether protection is allowed to extend outside of the wording of the claims.
Determined is clearly capable of more than one interpretation, but if the underlying purpose of the draftsmans language is investigated then it becomes apparent
that far from demanding a strict fencepost interpretation wherein the claim wording marks the outer boundary of protection and extension beyond this point is not
allowed, the word deserves a more liberal interpretation. As Armitage has
explained, the language chosen for Article 8 of the Strasbourg Convention17, upon
which Article 69 EPC was based, seeks to lay down a principle for interpreting
claims which is somewhere between the system in which claims may be interpreted
strictly according to the letter and that in which they do not play a decisive part in
defining the limits of protection (emphasis added).18 Given this history, the
requirement that scope be determined by the claims is clearly able to be satisfied if
they constitute not only a point of departure but the decisive basis for the determination the scope of protection.19
There is, therefore, no reason to limit the analysis of the scope of the claims to a
one-stage analysis. Given validity is not considered under a one-stage test (unless,
that is, the approach of the House of Lords in Synthon is followed to its logical conclusion), it would seem perverse to insist upon single-stage analysis of the scope of
the patent at any other point. The notion of novelty is clearly supplemented by
ensuring that not only must the invention be new in the sense of that precise
embodiment never having been seen before, but it must also be really new, in the
sense of not being obvious to the person skilled in the art. There is no reason to suggest that the same approach could not be adopted for purposes of infringement. We
appreciate that the prior art has two levels of influence on the surrounding technological field, so why would it be impossible to consider the same when the looking
inwards to the patent rather than outwards to existing methods?
If equivalents are understood to lie outside of the wording of the patent, ie forming an adjunct to the primary degree of protection, then a purposive interpretation
of the claims becomes a clear element within the determination of scope per se.
In other words, the claims may be interpreted in a purposive manner and then
their scope of protection may be supplemented by consideration of equivalents that
are obvious at the date of infringement of the patent. This approach would assist in
providing clear reward to the patentee of pioneer advances, and would also not
compromise the notion of predictability. Indeed, if anything it would enhance this
latter concept as it would have the benefit of avoiding the need for an artificial investigation into what the court believes the skilled addressee would have considered
the scope of the claims to have been at the date that the patent was filed. Whilst the
17
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To Conclude
391
core scope of the patent would be tied to this moment in time, there is nothing to be
gained from entering into a speculative enquiry of what equivalents the patentee
had in their contemplation at the point of drafting. The discussion in chapter four
clearly illustrates that if something is thought of that would fall into this category
then it enters the patent as an expressly claimed element.
This approach also has the benefit of acknowledging that hindsight determination of the patents effective scope of protection is practically unavoidable.
Recognition and embrace of this factor, rather than simply pretending that it is not
a problem and that the patentees foresight definition of the invention is all that
informs the court, enhances the predictability of the process of interpretation. It
avoids the need to enter into a speculative investigation of what the patentee could
have meant by the words that they used at some point in the past and moves on to
consider what they currently mean. The expansive effect of this investigation is, of
course, still bounded by the prior art so that the patents zone of protection should
not be able to distend into areas that would not have been new or inventive at its priority date. However, with this small qualification, the assessment would be reduced
to consideration of an easily understandable and eminently predictable set of
equivalents. Adopting this approach would not have any impact on the development of subsequent technology, for the patentability criteria would still apply in the
same manner. We would still ask if, at the priority date of the later invention,
the earlier invention rendered it old or obvious. However, this would also provide
the investigation for purposes of infringement as well.
Pioneer inventions would therefore get the protection that they rightly deserve
and the yawning gap between the incentive and reward functions of the patent
would be closed. Moreover, the court still has the opportunity, should the situation
dictate, to say that the allegedly infringing technology is so far changed from that
disclosed in the patent that it falls outside of its teaching and cannot therefore be
monopolised.
To Conclude
Implementation of the amended text of the EPC represents a golden opportunity to
reconsider patent law, and to finally relate the construction of the claims to a clearly
comprehensible and predictable standard. It provides the chance to amend the UKs
current position and finally bring it into line with Germanys arguably broader view
of the reward the patentee deserves. And it provides opportunity to give full and
detailed consideration to some of the issues that we have discussed in this text. It
would be regrettable if these opportunities were missed.
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28/8/07
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INDEX
Abramovitz, Moses, 140
Adams, John, 53
Alexander, Jay, 144, 150, 15660
Alps, 245
Ancient Greece, 23
anti-patent debate:
1829 Select Committee on Patents, 41-2, 62,
78, 83
1851 Select Committee on Patents, 76, 79, 81,
142
1871 Select Committee on Patents, 63, 72, 76, 78
1872 Select Committee on Patents, 76-7
abolitionist sentiment, 70-2, 75-9, 83-5
background to the debate, 62-4, 86
exchange theory and, 81-85
free trade, 61, 71
generally, 5989, 1823, 382
German model, 74, 77, 2278
incentive theory and, 73-81
international dimension, 268
legal confusions, 64
lessons, 889, 92
natural right theory and, 66-8
public benefit and, 78
reward theory and, 68-73
United States, 221
Armitage, Edward, 308, 359, 371, 390
Armstrong, William, 75, 77
Arrow, Kenneth, 143
Assidoman case:
acceptance, 32831
approach to construction, 3246, 333
facts, 323
Aston, Theo, 76
Atkinson, William, 193
Averley, Gwen, 53
Bacon, Francis, 38
Ball Spline case:
appeal, 2812
decision and impact, 27887
facts, 280
fallout, 2823
original decision, 281
prior art defence, 282, 283
recognition of equivalents, 279, 282, 287
subsequent cases, 2837
Barzel, Yoram, 147
Bassinger, Kenneth, 220
418
28/8/07
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Page 418
Index
Cubitt, William, 76
cumulative research, 1435
Dam, Kenneth, 133, 168
Darcy, Lord, 37
Davies, D Seaborne, 33, 47, 48, 49
demand, prices and, 11920
distributive justice, 723
drafting claims:
amendment, 97, 21014
communicating with the inventor, 1003
German prescriptions, 239, 322
imprecision, 1056
methodology, 58, 1068, 211, 322
scope, 97106
UK freedom, 234
Duffy, John, 1456, 1489
Dunlop, Hugh, 336, 338, 342, 346
Dutton, H, 66, 70
economics
see also theories
arguments for patent system, 1357
basics, 11931
costs, 1258
demand curve under competition, 1213
elasticity, 1201
marginal revenues, 1245, 127
monopolies, 12931
price and demand, 11920
profits, 12831
classical justifications, 59, 6585, 137
early economic analysis, 612, 137
post-classical justifications, 13769
The Economist, 712, 79, 834
Edward III, 28
Eisenberg, Rebecca, 139
Elizabeth I, 29, 337, 59, 75, 267
Ellesmere, Lord Keeper, 38
Engel, Friedrich-Wilhelm, 24950
EPC 2000:
commencement, 355, 373
ratification, 355
Epilady case,
acceptance of test, 31416
facts, 307
generally, 30716
German law and, 3079, 31213, 319, 322
German litigation in, 2234, 241, 2469
interim hearing, 3079
Protocol questions, 3319, 3523
rejection, 31931
substantive hearing, 30913
three-stage test, 31012
uncertainties, 322
equivalents:
EPC clause, 151, 356
German interpretation of claims, 232, 309, 363
28/8/07
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Page 419
Index
evident equivalents, 232
general inventive ideas, 232, 2367, 2712,
316, 321
technical teachings, 2345, 253
Japanese recognition of, 27987, 282, 287, 363
UK law, 349, 353, 354, 375
Kirin-Amgen case, 3624, 3645, 3723, 374,
389
post-Kirin, 377
equivalents (US):
after-arising equivalents, 2046
CAFC, 1909, 20911, 21619
creation, 190
formative years, 1936
pro-patent bias, 168, 191, 1956, 220
Corning Glass, 199
English critique of US experience, 363, 373
equity, 1934, 196, 197
expansion, 1912
Festo case, 175, 193, 20719, 227
file wrapper estoppel, 175, 1923, 195, 197,
198, 2013, 20811, 21619, 363
Graver Tank, 18390, 203, 204, 235
Hughes Aircraft, 1914, 196, 197, 201, 202
justification for, 1745
narrowing of, 1969, 206
origin, 178-80, 182, 183-5, 3623
Patent Act 1952, 1878, 198
Pennwalt, 1969
prospect theory and, 150
public policy, 196
reverse equivalents, 114, 182, 1969, 206
Supreme Court jurisprudence, 2007, 21216
tight control, 244
triple identity test, 178, 185, 206
uncertainties, 186, 192, 1936, 1989, 213, 216,
220, 221
Warner-Jenkinson, 2007
estoppel see prosecution history; equivalents: file
wrapper estoppel
European Patent Convention:
Article 69
amendment, 3557
fairness and predictability, 2556
Formstein, 2423
history, 2246
post-Kirin, 3767, 37980
scope of claims, 223
text, 3634, 38990
UK Patents Act 1977 and, 292
clarity, 109
equivalents and, 151, 356, 389
harmonisation of laws, 227, 255, 309, 3567,
359, 380, 388
languages, 225, 240
literal interpretation, 114, 225
peripheral definition, 224
Protocol on the Interpretation of Art 69
419
420
28/8/07
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Page 420
Index
guilds, 24
gunpowder, 36
Hantman, Ronald, 1856
harmonisation:
Anglo-German, 387
EPC, 227, 255, 309, 3567, 359, 380, 388
future, 38891
Germany, 226, 227
proposal, 38991
Husser, Erich, 2301, 234, 238
Heald, Paul, 161, 164
Hegel, Georg, 309, 380
Heimbach, Karl, 349, 354
heroes, inventors as heroes, 80, 183
Hideyori, 262
Hideyoshi, 262
Hindmarch, William, 81, 82
hindsight, 160, 205, 238, 301, 330, 338, 342,
345, 36970, 389, 391
history of patent law:
anti-patent debate, 59, 624, 1823
early monopoly grants, 245
Germany, 22633
guilds, 24
role of history, 59, 381
Statute of Venice (1474), 24, 257, 176
UK see history of UK patent law
United States, 17590
history of UK patent law:
19th century see anti-patent debate
administrative reforms, 63
early grants, 2830
Elizabethan period, 29, 307, 74, 75,
267
abuse of monopoly, 20, 336
categories of monopoly, 345
common law, 367
consideration, 31-2, 45-7, 55
novelty, 31, 50
revocation clauses, 323
working clauses, 312, 50, 81
generally, 2856
James I, 3742, 47
Book of Bounty, 38, 39
Liardet v Johnson, 524
Nasmith case, 46, 4752
Patents Act (1883), 88, 383
Protection of Inventions Act (1851), 63
Statute of Monopolies (1623), 3954
issues of court jurisdiction, 435,
51
summary, 3812
Holden, Isaac, 76
Hlder, Niels, 302, 360, 3889
Holdsworth, William, 33
Honricke, Gerard, 46
Hulme, E Wyndham, 28, 31, 46, 49
28/8/07
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Page 421
Index
Iesayu, Tokugawa, 262
Improver case: see Epilady case
incentive to invent theory, 7381, 89, 93, 1357,
347, 370
industrial applicability, 94
Industrial Revolution, 73, 80
intentions:
defendants, US case law, 2023
German law, 230
purpose of claims, 380
UK law
Catnic case, 297
post-Kirin, 3767
Tickner v Honda, 351
Wheatley v Drillsafe, 333, 337
international patent law, 878
internet searches, 1045
inventive step, 94, 238, 374
Italy, 23, 257
James I, 378, 47
Japan:
daimyo, 2612
end of isolation, 263
feudalism, 2613, 268
imperial rule, 264
institutional collectivism, 2735
interpretation of claims see Japanese
interpretation of claims
isolationism, 2613
Meiji period, 2634, 274
patent law see Japanese patent law
technological progress, 265, 268, 275, 279, 289
Tokugawa shogunate, 263, 2645, 267
Japanese interpretation of claims:
Ball Spline case, 27887
appeal, 2812
facts, 280
fallout, 2823
original decision, 280
prior art defence, 282, 283
recognition of equivalents, 279, 282, 287
subsequent cases, 2837
test, 283
equivalents, 279, 282, 287, 363
essential elements, 2836
legal certainty, 260
narrow protection, 169, 173, 187, 260, 2879,
322
sub-literal approach, 260
Japanese patent law:
history
1871 Regulation, 2645
1885 Patent Ordinance, 26570
1899 Patent Ordinance, 2701
1909 Patent Ordinance, 270
1921 Patent Ordinance, 270
1959 Patent Ordinance, 25960, 2756
421
28/8/07
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Page 422
422
Index
trade-off, 131
motivations:
credibility, 1645
non-profit motivations, 138
patent counts, 1635
patentees, 957, 115, 1634
rationale of patenting, 937
Schumpeter, 138
moulded curbstone, 2415
Moy, Carl, 196
Nasmith case, 46, 4752, 55
natural right theory, 668, 138
Nelson, Richard, 149, 1516, 158
Netherlands, 27, 183, 224, 358
Nobunaga, Oda, 262
non obstantibus clauses, 51
Noonan, William, 18990, 194
novelty:
drafting claims, 58
Elizabethan grants, 31, 50
inventive step and, 374
Patents Act 1977 definition, 374
prior art and, 1036
requirement, 94, 103, 374
research, 1045
Statute of Monopolies, 103
substantial novelty, 150
Oddi, Samuel, 139, 142, 159, 160, 167, 168
oligopolies, 122
opportunity costs, 1256
Oxford philosophy of language, 309, 380
packaging, 323
Palmer, Roundell, 72
Parchomovsky, Gideon, 165
Paris Convention (1883), 88, 268, 26970
patent attorneys:
costs, 62
double agents, 115
function, 113
literal v liberal views, 10817
Patent Cooperation Treaty, 276
patent grants:
monopolies see monopolies
totemic value, 93
validity, 106, 107
Germany, 2334
United Kingdom, 233
patent-induced theory:
critique, 1412
generally, 13842
scope issues, 1401
Patent Office (UK):
examination time, 112
searches, 105, 106
patent portfolios, 1635
28/8/07
16:21
Page 423
Index
patent system:
19th century administration, 63
economics see economics
efficacy, 78, 112, 136
history see history of patent law
justification see theories
operation, 1
public perceptions, 912
purposes, 21
patentability requirements:
industrial applicability, 94
inventive step, 94, 238, 374
novelty, 94, 103, 374
patentees:
breakdown of communications, 1003
familiarity with patenting process, 211, 212,
215
financial might, 104, 112, 113, 11516, 215
motivation to patent, 957, 1634
narrow-mindedness, 100
shifting profile, 80, 183, 383
patents as signals theory, 160, 1636
Penrose, Edith, 66, 70, 723, 80, 85, 878, 161
peripheral definition:
EPC, 224, 358
meaning, 78
Switzerland, 224
UK, 79, 174, 224, 358
US, 174, 1803, 186, 187
pharmaceuticals, 98, 102, 133, 340, 3423
pioneer patents:
biotech, 1501
Catnic question and, 301, 342
Germany, 231, 238
individual inventions, 116
Japan, 261, 286
Kirin-Amgen case, 346, 350, 36771
proposal, 391
scope of patents, 1534, 1589
UK weaknesses in respect of, 89
US equivalents doctrine and, 17980
piracy, 261, 268, 269
playing cards, 37
PLG case:
Catnic challenged, 31723, 347
interpretation under Protocol, 3268
Pohlmann, Hansjoerg, 25
Political Economy Club, 70
Posner, Richard, 61, 119
predictability:
English 18th century, 45
German law, 232, 239, 244, 248, 250, 252,
2556, 3089, 316
prospect theory, 150
requirement, 2, 385, 3901
UK law, 30810, 3223, 328, 3301, 335, 337,
339, 341, 344, 3478, 350, 354, 356
Catnic, 302, 303, 320
423
28/8/07
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Page 424
424
Schffle, Albert, 71
Scherer, F.M, 13940, 141, 149, 150, 154,
383
Schiedame, John of, 29
Schumpeter, Joseph, 89, 1378, 143, 145,
2745
scope of patents:
determinants of intrinsic, 97106, 116
breakdown of communications, 1003
importance of knowledge, 99100
prior art issues, 1036
timing, 989
Japanese certification trials, 2712
monopoly effects, 131-5
motivation to patent, 95-7
narrowing by amendment, 97, 21014
patent-induced innovations, 1401
prospect theory, 14951
race-to-invent theory, 1526
rent-dissipation theory, 15860
Scotchmer, Suzanne, 143
searches, 1045, 11213
secrets, 815, 162
Shapiro, Carl, 145
Shavell, Steven, 136
Siemens, Ernst von, 767, 268
Sijp, C, 235
Silberston, Z Aubrey, 65, 93, 153, 167
Smith, Adam, 56, 60, 61, 62, 69, 72, 86, 382
Smith, Douglas, 148
soap, 345
Solow, Robert, 140
Sony Walkman, 273
Spain, 36
specification see claims
Nasmith case, 46, 4751, 55
Liardet v Johnson, 524
Spence, William, 81, 82
Spengler, A, 294
starch, 35
Statute of Monopolies (1623):
abuses preceding, 612
aftermath, 423
caveats and, 48
commentary, 401, 134
generally, 3954
jurisdiction issues, 435, 51
novelty, 40-1, 103
origin, 3940, 612
significance, 412, 110, 389
uncertainties, 50, 63
Statute of Venice (1474), 24, 257
Stirling, J, 83
Strasbourg Convention, 224, 225, 390
Strawbridge, Douglas, 196
Sturtevant, Simon, 467, 49
substitutes, 95, 1201
Switzerland, 74, 76, 224
Index
Takahashi, Korekiyo, 259, 2656
Takenaka, Toshiko, 187, 198, 2267, 229, 250, 260,
267, 271, 2723, 275, 279, 286
Takura, T, 260
Taylor, Christopher, 65, 93, 153, 167
technical teachings, 2345, 253, 337, 351
Technip principles, 3767, 378, 379
telegraphy, 183
theories:
basic claim theory, 78
classical economics, 59, 6585, 386
exchange for secrets theory, 815, 300
incentive to invent theory, 7381, 89, 93,
1357, 347, 370
natural right theory, 668, 138
patents as contract, 815, 98, 110, 3001
reward by monopoly theory, 6873, 93,
229, 231, 248, 255, 299, 309, 346, 347,
350
French patent law, 667
German v English approaches, 380
inadequacies of economic theory, 1668
post-classical economics, 13769, 3834
patent-induced theory, 13842
patent signals, 160, 1636
problems, 1602
prospect theory, 14551, 153, 157
race-to-invent theory, 1516
rent-dissipation theory, 144, 15660
public benefit, 78, 94, 147, 161
UK judicial approach to patents, 3468, 350,
370
timing:
date of publication, 3013, 345, 346, 356
drafting claims, 989
pioneer patents, 370
trade secrets, 162
TRIPS, 2, 259, 289
Turner, Brian, 243
Turner, Jonathan, 299
Turner, Thomas, 67, 76
UK Intellectual Property Office see Patent Office
(UK)
UK interpretation of claims:
Catnic see Catnic case
Patents Act 1977, 291-4, 305
pith and marrow doctrine, 12-21, 255, 293,
296, 297, 304, 305, 347
post-EPC
Assidoman case, 3236, 32831, 333
Catnic attempted rejection of, 31631
Improver case, 30716
Kirin-Amgen see Kirin-Amgen case
PLG case, 31723, 3268
post-Kirin cases, 3768
post-PLG, 323-31
pre-Kirin-Amgen period, 34957
28/8/07
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Page 425
Index
Protocol questions, 292, 298, 320, 3268,
3319, 3434, 347, 3478, 350, 3523,
3589, 3646, 371, 376, 37880
Synthon case, 3745, 390
systemic change, 33942
Technip principles, 3767, 378, 379
theoretical views, 3468, 350
transition, 291, 292, 2934, 303, 320
Wheatley v Drillsafe, 3319
precursors and development, 457
19th century bureaucracy, 86
19th century weaknesses, 89
acceptance of practice, 512
Liardet v Johnson, 524
Nasmith case, 46, 4752, 55, 3812
non obstantibus clauses, 51
uncertainties, 50, 63, 78
purposive construction, 2, 174, 291, 297, 304,
306, 338, 3767, 3901
traditional position, 821, 91
EMI v Lissen, 10, 19, 359, 382, 386
EPC and, 255, 293, 296
exceptions to general rule, 1112
immaterial variations, 1221
literal view, 114, 226, 386
narrow constructions, 358
peripheral definition, 79, 174, 224
pith and marrow, 1221, 293, 296, 297, 347
policy considerations, 1921
Rodi & Wienenberger case, 1820, 296, 297
Van der Lely case, 1418, 19, 295
UK patent law:
claims see UK interpretation of claims
EPC ratification, 291
filing requirements, 1, 322
history see history of UK patent law
jurisdiction of courts, 233
Patents Act 1977, 2912
transitional provisions, 291, 292, 293, 320
Patents County Court, 315
purpose, 8, 21
validity proceedings, 233
United Kingdom:
claims see UK interpretation of claims
history of patents see history of UK patent law
Industrial Revolution, 73, 80
patent law see UK patent law
United States:
California gold rush, 148
claims see equivalents (US)
first to invent paradigm, 98
history of patent law, 17583
central definition, 17880
Constitution, 173, 176, 187, 213, 240
Patent Act 1793, 177
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