CIVIL REV 1 - Arranged CODAL Provisions Per Atty Legaspi Outline

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
Joyette A.Vias |||2016 ||| Page __
PART I - PRELIMINARY TITLE; HUMAN RELATIONS, PERSONALITY, DOMICILE

PART I.A Preliminary Title; Human Relations; Personality; Domicile; NCC
Article 2 of NCC, as amended Laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion
of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.
Art. 5. Rules and regulations. Labor Code - The Department of Labor and other government
agencies charged with the administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts
shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations. Such rules and
regulations shall become effective 15 days after announcement of their adoption in
newspapers of general circulation.
Sec. 3(1) & 4, Ch. 2, Book VII, Administrative Code of 1987 SECTION 3. Filing.(1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law
Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of
effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not
thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons.
SECTION 4. Effectivity.In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not
inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date
of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in
cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must
be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate
measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them.
BSP Circular 799 interest rate - Sec. 1. The rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of
any money, goods, or credits and the rate allowed judgments, in the absence of an express
contract as to such rate of interest, shall be 6% per annum.
NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC. v DND (2013)
FACTS: By virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos P. Garcia reserved parcels of land
for the Fort Bonifacio. Pres. Marcos amended the same (Proclamation No. 2476) and
excluded areas known as Libingan ng mga Bayani and some barangays and declared it open
for disposition. At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a
handwritten addendum, which reads: P.S. This includes Western Bicutan". However, the
handwritten addendum was not included when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the
Official Gazette. This written addendum was the basis of the petitioners to claim that all
Western Bicutan is included in the reclassification of portions of Fort Bonifacio as disposable
public land.
ISSUE:
HELD: Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended.
xxx all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by
the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution.
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Cojuangco v Rep (2012)

FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD: The publication, as further held in Taada, must be of the full text of the law since the
purpose of publication is to inform the public of the contents of the law. Mere referencing the
number of the presidential decree, its title or whereabouts and its supposed date of
effectivity would not satisfy the publication requirement.
In this case, while it incorporated the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement by reference, Section 1 of
P.D. 755 did not in any way reproduce the exact terms of the contract in the decree. Neither
was a copy thereof attached to the decree when published. x x x the PCA-Cojuangco
Agreement shall be treated as an ordinary transaction between agreeing minds to be
governed by contract law under the Civil Code.
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PART I.B Retroactivity of Laws; Vested Rights; Arts. 3 & 4, NCC; Arts. 105 & 256,
FC; Art. 40, FC; SC AM 02-11-10
Article 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.
Art. 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the regime of
conjugal partnership gains shall govern their property relations during marriage, the
provisions in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application. The provisions of this
Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between
spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already
acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256.
Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
Art 40. FC. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
AM 02-10-11 RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARIAGES AND
ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
Cases:
Rotairo V Alcantara
FACTS: Rovira Alcantara (Rovira) filed suit for the recovery of possession of a parcel of land
in Cainta, Rizal. Said property was formerly owned by Roviras father, and Alfredo C. Ignacio,
who mortgaged the property to Pilipinas Bank and Trust Company (Pilipinas Bank) in 1968. A
part of the land was sold to Ambrosio Rotairo (Rotairo) who completed his payments.
Alcantara and Ignacio defaulted in their loan obligations causing Pilipinas Bank to foreclose
the mortgage on the entire property. Pilipinas Bank was the highest bidder. Pilipinas sold it to
Rovira, who happens to be the daughter of Alfredo.
ISSUE: whether P.D. No. 957 is applicable in this case.
But the more crucial issue before the Court is who, as between the petitioners and Rovira,
has better right to the property in dispute
HELD:
The retroactive application of P.D. No. 957 to transactions entered into prior to its enactment
in 1976 is already settled. In Eugenio v. Exec. Sec. Drilon, which involved a land purchase
agreement entered into in 1972, the Court stated that the unmistakeable intent of the
legislature is to have P.D. No. 957 operate retrospectively. Moreover, the specific terms of
P.D. No. 957 provide for its retroactive effect even to contracts and transactions entered into
prior to its enactment. In particular, Section 21 of P.D. No. 957 XXX "..shall be incumbent
upon the owner or developer of the subdivision or condominium project to complete
compliance with his or its obligations as provided in the preceding section within two years
from the date of this Decree XXX" (RATIO for 2 years: provides the developer the opportunity
to comply with its obligation to notify the buyers of the existence of the mortgage, and
consequently, for the latter to exercise their option to pay the instalments directly to the
mortgagee)
In this case, the contract to sell between Rotairo and Ignacio & Co. was entered into in 1970,
and the agreement was fully consummated with Rotairos completion of payments and the
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execution of the Deed of Sale in his favor in 1979. Clearly, P.D. No. 957 is applicable in this
case.
Nevertheless, such concomitant obligation of the developer under Section 21 did not arise in
this case. It must be noted that at the time of the enactment of P.D. No. 957 in 1976 and as
early as 1974, Pilipinas Bank had already foreclosed the mortgage and bought the properties
in the foreclosure sale. There was, thus, no mortgage to speak of such that Rotairo should be
notified thereof so that he could properly exercise his option to pay the instalments directly
to Pilipinas Bank.
Rovira is not a buyer in good faith.
Notwithstanding the preceding discussion, the Court finds that Rovira cannot claim a better
right to the property because she is not a buyer in good faith.
xxx
Under different circumstances, the prior registration of the mortgage between Pilipinas Bank
and Alcantara and Ignacio, and Rovira's subsequent purchase of the subject property would
have been valid and binding, and could have defeated Rotairo's unregistered claim over it.
But given Rovira's privity with her father Victor C. Alcantara and the fact that she had actual
knowledge of the disposition of the property and Rotairo's possession thereof, her
acquisition of the property cannot be upheld.
Garcia-Quiazon v Belen (2013)
FACTS: This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo
Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseos common-law wife-Belen and
common law-daughter Elise. The petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia GarciaQuaizon (Amelia) (WIFE). Elise impugned the validity of Eliseos marriage to Amelia by
claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the
latters marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito).
ISSUE:
HELD: In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the
source of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void
marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. It must
be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the
law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in Nial v.
Bayadog applicable... xxx void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either
party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties xxx
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise (as compulsory heir), whose
successional rights would be prejudiced by her fathers marriage to Amelia, may impugn the
existence of such marriage even after the death of her father. The said marriage may be
questioned directly by filing an action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising
it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such
as in the case at bar.
Quiao v Quiao (2012)
FACTS:
Parties were married in Jan 1977, thus the operative law was the Civil Code. In October
2000, Rita Quiao filed a complaint for legal separation against Petitioner Brigido Quiao. The
RTC rendered a decision declaring their legal separation. RTC defined Net Profit Earned as
the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of
each spouse and the debts. The NPE was ordered to be forfeited in favor of the common
children because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net
profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.
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Petitioner went to the SC. Petitioners argument: Since the property relations between the
spouses is governed by the regime of Cojugal PG under the Civil Code, he has acquired
vested rights over half of the properties of the CPG, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code
(All property of the CPG is owned in common by the husband and wife). Thus, he has a
vested right over half of the said properties, even after the promulgation of the Family Code.
He also claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code,
instead of Article 102. He argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other provision
under the Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of
legal separation.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the respondent's marriage
the operative law is already the Family Code the applicable law in so far as the liquidation
of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family
Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. The latter provision is applicable
because according to Article 256 of the Family Code [t]his Code shall have retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
Civil Code or other law.
xxx
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do not depend upon events
foreign to the will of the holder, or to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is
immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency.
XXX
From the foregoing, the petitioner's claim of a vested right has no basis considering that
even under Article 176 of the Civil Code, his share of the conjugal partnership profits may be
forfeited if he is the guilty party in a legal separation case. Thus, after trial and after the
petitioner was given the chance to present his evidence, the petitioner's vested right claim
may in fact be set aside under the Civil Code since the trial court found him the guilty party.
Juliano-Llave v Rep (2011)
FACTS: Sen. Tamano and Zoraydas marriage was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil
and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage relationships at that time
between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950. Tamano married
Zorayda believing that he had validly divorced his first wife per Muslim Code.
ISSUE:
HELD:
PD 1083 (Code of Muslims which allows divorce) cannot benefit Estrellita. Muslim Code took
effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot retroactively override the Civil
Code which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and
Zorayda. The former explicitly provided for the prospective application of its provisions
unless otherwise provided.
Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal personalities to file the declaration
of nullity of marriage. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits to only the husband or the wife
the filing of a petition for nullity is prospective in application and does not shut out the
prior spouse from filing suit if the ground is a bigamous subsequent marriage. XXX
xxx in a void marriage, in which no marriage has taken place and cannot be the source of
rights, any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without
prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.
***The rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."
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Ablaza v Republic (2010)

FACTS: On October 17, 2000, the petitioner (brother) filed a petition for the declaration of
the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late
brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato alleging that it was celebrated without a
marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950. He insisted that
his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him
to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making
him a real party in interest. RTC dismissed the case ruling that petitioner is not the proper
party being not a party to the marriage being impugned. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to seek the declaration of
nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother.
HELD: YES
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. xxx A.M. No. 0211-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on
August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined
only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.
xxx
Marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December 26, 1949. xxx The
old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare
the nullity of a marriage, and when. HOWEVER, the plaintiff must still be the party who
stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic
in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the
real party in interest.
xxx
Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresencianos brother and surviving heir.
Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material
interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the
suit.
Duenas v Santos Subd Howeowners Assoc (2004)
FACTS: Members of the Santos Subd Howeowners submitted to the petitioner (owner) a
resolution asking her to provide within the subdivision an open space for recreational and
other community activities, in accordance with the provisions of P.D. No. 957, as amended
by P.D. No. 1216. Petitioner, however, rejected. CA declared that PD 957 has retroactive
application.
Petitioner ascribes error to the appellate courts decision. She points out that there is no
retroactivity provision in the said decree. Hence, it cannot be applied retroactively pursuant
to Article 4[28] of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The same holds true for P.D. No. 1216,
which amended Section 31 of P.D. No. 957 and imposed the open space requirement in
subdivisions. Petitioner stresses that P.D. No. 1216 only took effect on October 14, 1977 or
more than ten (10) years after the approval of the subdivision plans of Cecilio Santos.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Non-development of the subdivision is not present in this case, nor any allegation of nonpayment of amortizations. Further, we have held in a subsequent case that P.D. No. 957, as
amended, cannot be applied retroactively in view of the absence of any express
provision on its retroactive application.
Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided. Thus, it is necessary that an express provision for its retroactive
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application must be made in the law. There being no such provision in both P.D. Nos. 957
and 1344, these decrees cannot be applied to a situation that occurred years before their
promulgation.
(Also) In P.D. No. 1216, nowhere do we find any clause or provision expressly providing for its
retroactive application. Basic is the rule that no statute, decree, ordinance, rule or regulation
shall be given retrospective effect unless explicitly stated. Hence, there is no legal basis to
hold that P.D. No. 1216 should apply retroactively.
Guy v CA (2006)
Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of
Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati City on October 29, 1992, prompting them to file a
petition for letters of administration before the RTC of the estate of the latter. The legit son
of the deceased prayed for the dismissal of the petition. He asserted that his deceased
father left no debts and that his estate can be settled without securing letters of
administration pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court; that they have already
waived their hereditary rights per Release and Waiver of Claim executed; and private
respondents should have established their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime
of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: WON respondents can no longer prove their filiation as Article 175 of FC as they
should have established their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of the parent
HELD: NO
In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived their successional
rights because they are yet to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the
deceased. xxx
(W) agree with the Court of Appeals that a ruling on the same would be premature
considering that private respondents have yet to present evidence. Before the Family Code
took effect, the governing law on actions for recognition of illegitimate children was Article
285 of the Civil Code, to wit: ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may
be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may
file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority; xxx
We ruled in Bernabe v. Alejo that illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the
Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are given the
right to seek recognition for a period of up to four years from attaining majority age. This
vested right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code.
Bernabe v. Alejo (2002)
Illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect and whose
putative parent died during their minority are given the right to seek recognition for a period
of up to four years from attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken
away by the passage of the Family Code.
Ty v CA (2000)
FACTS:
Sps Edgardo Reyes and Anna Villanueva had 2 wedding ceremonies: March 29, 1977 - civil;
August 27, 1977 - church
****April 4, 1979 --- Edgardo married Ofelia Ty******(before declaration of void 1 st marriage)
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August 4, 1980 - QC declared married as null and void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage
license and lack of consent of the parties, respectively.
Edgardo married Ofelia twice: civil in 1979 and church in 1982
On January 3, 1991, Edgardo filed a Civil Case to Ofelia Ty be declared null and void stating
that at the time he married Ofelia the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not
been issued.
The Pasig RTC granted and declared his marriage to Ofelia as null and void ab initio. The CA
affirmed. It ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage (to Anna Maria)
must first be secured before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted.
ISSUE: WON the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a subsequent
marriage can be entered into validly
HELD: Generally YES, unless prejudicial to vested rights.
Article 40 of said Code expressly required a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage
"Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
The provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case, for to
do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner (Ofelia) and of her children. The Family
Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. In the present case,
that impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent.
Also, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in
1979, before Wiegel case. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza
and Aragon. The first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and
consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a
second marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondents second
marriage to petitioner is valid.
*Ruling in Wiegel Case: There is a NEED for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void
marriage.
Rep. v. Miller (1999)
FACTS:
On July 29, 1988, spouses Claude and Jumrus Miller, both Americans, filed with RTC a
petition to adopt the minor Michael Magno Madayag. The minor, 1 yr old at the time of
petition, is the legitimate son of Marcelo S. Madayag, Jr. and Zenaida Magno. The minor has
been in the custody of respondents since he was barely a month old.
On May 12, 1989, the trial court granted the petition for adoption and ordered that the
minor's surname shall be changed from "MADAYAG" to "MILLER". The Solicitor General, in
behalf of the Republic, interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the
FC, as they are aliens, are generally prohibited to adopt.
ISSUE: WON the court may allow aliens to adopt a Filipino child despite the prohibition under
the Family Code, effective on August 3, 1988, but the petition for adoption was filed on July
29, 1988, under the provision of the Child and Youth Welfare Code which allowed aliens to
adopt.
HELD: YES.
An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the
time of the filing of the petition, acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the
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subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him. Consequently, the enactment of the
Family Code, effective August 3, 1988, will not impair the right of respondents who are aliens
to adopt a Filipino child because the right has become vested at the time of filing of the
petition for adoption and shall be governed by the law then in force.
"A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events
foreign to the will of the holder. The term expresses the concept of present fixed interest
which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action,
or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent
and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny."
"Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but
also an exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested."
Atienza vs. Brillantes (1995)
FACTS:
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, in Manila. One day,
when he went home, he saw respondent in his bed whereas the respondent stated that he is
cohabiting with Yolanda. Thereafter, complainant claims that respondent is already married
to Zenaida Ongkiko.
Respondent denies stating that his marriage to Zenaida was not a valid marriage for lack of
marriage license and that the latter already left him for 17 years. With this, he alleges that
he has validly married Yolanda in 1991.
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him
considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of
the Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family
Code.
ISSUE: WON Article 40 does not apply if the date of first marriage was before the effectivity
of the FC
HELD:
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the
Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly
true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right
that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude
their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural
laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected
(Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that as a general rule no
vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).
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PART I.C Article 8; Stare Decisis; Case Law; Art. 36, FC

Article 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a
part of the legal system of the Philippines.
FBDC v CIR (2014)
...the issues here have already been passed upon and resolved by this Court En Banc twice,
in decisions that have reached finality, and we are bound by the doctrine of stare decisis to
apply those decisions to these consolidated cases, for they involve the same facts, issues,
and even parties.
xxx
The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere, which means "to abide by, or adhere to,
decided cases," compels us to apply the rulings by the Court tothese consolidated cases
before us. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, "when this Court has once laid down a
principle of law as applicable to a certainstate of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and
apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the same; regardless of whether the
parties and property are the same."113 This is to provide stability in judicial decisions, as
held by the Court in a previous case.
xxx
we cannot depart from the legal precedents as laid down by the Court En Banc. It is provided
in the Constitution that "no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision
rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en
banc."
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Ting v Velez-Ting (2009)

To be forthright, respondents argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos
and Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare
decisis is no longer new. The same argument was also raised but was struck down in Pesca
v. Pesca, and again in Antonio v. Reyes. In these cases, we explained that the interpretation
or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is
enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different view is
adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who
have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith, in accordance therewith under
the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."
PART I.D Arts. 15-17, 50-51, NCC; Art 26, FC; Rules 103,108; Civil Register (Arts
407-413 NCC); Divorce, Art 71, 119, 175, 144, NCC; Doctrine of Processual
Presumption; Secs 24, 25 Rule 132
Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
(9a)
Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is stipulated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (10a)
Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall
be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
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Article 50. For the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile
of natural persons is the place of their habitual residence.
Article 51. When the law creating or recognizing them, or any other provision does not fix
the domicile of juridical persons, the same shall be understood to be the place where their
legal representation is established or where they exercise their principal functions.
Art. 26. FC. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
RULE 103: Change of Name
Section 1.
Venue. A person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to
the Court of First Instance of the province in which he resides, or, in the City of Manila, to the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
Section 2.
Contents of petition. A petition for change of name shall be signed and
verified by the person desiring his name changed, or some other person on his behalf, and
shall set forth:
(a)
That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is
filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing;
(b)
The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;
(c)
The name asked for.
Section 3.
Order for hearing. If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance,
the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the
hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order be published before the hearing at
least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general circulation
published in the province, as the court shall deem best. The date set for the hearing shall
not be within thirty (30) days prior to an election nor within four (4) month after the last
publication of the notice.
Section 4.
Hearing. Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the
petition. The Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of
the Government of the Republic.
Section 5.
Judgment. Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the
order that such order has been published as directed and that the allegations of the petition
are true, the court shall, if proper and reasonable cause appears for changing the name of
the petitioner, adjudge that such name be changed in accordance with the prayer of the
petition.
Section 6.
Service of judgment. Judgments or orders rendered in connection with this
rule shall be furnished the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the court issuing
the same is situated, who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.
RULE 108: Cancellation Or Correction Of Entries In The Civil Registry
Section 1.
Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register,
may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto,
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with the Court of First Instance of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located.
Section 2.
Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid grounds,
the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births: (b)
marriage; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i)
acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of
citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
Section 3.
Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is
sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
Section 4.
Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.
Section 5.
Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his
opposition thereto.
Section 6.
Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceeding is brought may
make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the
preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
Section 7.
Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an
order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the
judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in
his record.
CIVIL REGISTER
Article 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register. (325a)
Article 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1)
Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage;
(6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions;
(9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name. (326a)
Article 409. In cases of legal separation, adoption, naturalization and other judicial orders
mentioned in the preceding article, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the court which issued
the decree to ascertain whether the same has been registered, and if this has not been
done, to send a copy of said decree to the civil registry of the city or municipality where the
court is functioning. (n)
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Article 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall
be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein
contained. (n)
Article 411. Every civil registrar shall be civilly responsible for any unauthorized alteration
made in any civil register, to any person suffering damage thereby. However, the civil
registrar may exempt himself from such liability if he proves that he has taken every
reasonable precaution to prevent the unlawful alteration. (n)
Article 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a judicial order.
(n)
Article 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed
by special laws. (n)
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by
Philippine law.
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or
relative community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other
regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern
the property relations between husband and wife.
Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under article 191.
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not
married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both
of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.
Doctrine of Processual Presumption - The foreign law, whenever applicable, should be proved
by the proponent thereof, otherwise, such law shall be presumed to be exactly the same as
the law of the forum.
Rule 132: Presentation of Evidence
Section 24.
Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in
paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of
the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines,
with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is
in foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service
of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office.
Section 25.
What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or
record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that
the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The
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attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be
the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
Orion Savings Bank v Suzuki (2014)
It is a universal principle that real or immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of
the country or state where it is located.xxxx (A)ll matters concerning the title and disposition
of real property are determined by what is known as the lex loci rei sitae, which can alone
prescribe the mode by which a title can pass from one person to another, or by which an
interest therein can be gained or lost. This general principle includes all rules governing the
descent, alienation and transfer of immovable property and the validity, effect and
construction of wills and other conveyances.
xxx
On the other hand, property relations between spouses are governed principally by the
national law of the spouses. However, the party invoking the application of a foreign law
has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is a question of fact to be
properly pleaded and proved as the judge cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He
is presumed to know only domestic or the law of the forum.
To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court.
xxx
In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean law on the
conjugal ownership of property. It merely attached a "Certification from the Embassy of the
Republic of Korea" to prove the existence of Korean Law. This certification, does not qualify
as sufficient proof of the conjugal nature of the property for there is no showing that it was
properly authenticated bythe seal of his office, as required under Section 24 of Rule 132.
Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual
presumption comes into play, i.e., where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is
not proven, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as Philippine Law.
Ando v DFA (2014)
Prior to petitioners marriage to Masatomi Y. Ando, petitioner was married to Yuichiro
Kobayashi, a Japanese, in 2001, and that though a divorce was obtained and granted in
Japan, with respect to the their (sic) marriage. Petitioner applied for the renewal of her
Philippine passport to indicate her surname with her husband Masatomi Y. Ando but
she was told at the DFA that the same cannot be issued to her until she can prove by
competent court decision that her marriage with her said husband Masatomi Y. Ando is
valid until otherwise declared. Records showed that there is no showing that petitioner
herein complied with the requirements set forth in Art. 13 of the Family Code that is
obtaining a judicial recognition of the foreign decree of absolute divorce in our country.
With this, she filed directly with the SC based on Rule 63 of Rules to compel DFA,
instead of exhausting admin remedies, first.
(Under RA 386, for the DFA to issue a passport to her under her second husbands
name)...for petitioner to obtain a copy of her passport under her married name, all she
needed to present were the following: (1) the original or certified true copy of her marriage
contract and one photocopy thereof;
(2) a Certificate of Attendance in a Guidance and Counseling Seminar, if applicable; and
(3) a certified true copy of the Divorce Decree duly authenticated by the Philippine
Embassy or consular post that has jurisdiction over the place where the divorce is obtained
or by the concerned foreign diplomatic or consular mission in the Philippines.
Noveras v Noveras (2014)
David and Leticia are US citizens who own properties in the USA and in the Philippines.
Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the Superior Court of California in June 2005
wherein the court awarded all the properties in the USA to Leticia. With respect to their
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properties in the Philippines, Leticiafiled a petition for judicial separation of conjugal
properties.
Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required
certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were
not presented.
xxx
Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption as the lower courts did with respect
to the property regime of the parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter
because, to begin with, divorce is not recognized between Filipino citizens in the Philippines.
Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally
married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation.
xxx
Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the California properties of David and
Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real property as well as
personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. Thus, liquidation
shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.
Lavadia v Heirs of Luna (2014)
FACTS:
Atty. Luna was married to Eugenia. After almost 2 decades, they entered into a written
agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT"
dated November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve and
liquidate their conjugal partnership of property. In 1976, Atty. Luna obtained a divorce
decree of his marriage with EUGENIA in the Dominican Republic. Thereafter, Atty. Luna
married Soledad.
When Atty. Luna died in 1997, Soledad filed a complaint alleging that Luna's
condominium unit, law books, office furniture and equipment were acquired during the
existence of the marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through their joint efforts
that since they had no children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said properties
upon the death of ATTY. LUNA.
RTC declared that Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept over the
condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of
the Registry of Deeds of Makati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna
should be changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN
LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna". CA said that "EUGENIA, the first wife,
was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the latters death on July 12, 1997. The
absolute divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA in the Dominican Republic did not
terminate his prior marriage with EUGENIA because foreign divorce between Filipino
citizens is not recognized in our jurisdiction."
ISSUE:
HELD: Atty. Lunas first marriage with Eugenia subsisted up to the time of his death.
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in
the Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the
solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil
Code continued to follow the nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating
to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad. Pursuant to the
nationality rule, Philippine laws governed this case by virtue of both Atty. Luna and
Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997
terminated their marriage.
From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the
present, absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the
Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained
even under the Family Code, even if either or both of the spouses are residing abroad.
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***Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted
by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of the first
marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign
country lacks competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the
assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.
Republic v Olaybar (2014)

Here, the issue raised by petitioner is whether or not the cancellation of entries in the
marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108
proceeding. Verily, petitioner raised a pure question of law.
xxx
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries
in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is
clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil
status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be
adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia in 1986, the Court has
repeatedly ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a
petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by
the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding." An appropriate
adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where
all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have
been given opportunity to demolish the opposite partys case, and where the evidence has
been thoroughly weighed and considered.
xxx
...a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry
of marriage in the civil registry. xxx While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to
determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court
where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of
respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already
been admitted and examined.xxx the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage
void as there was no marriage to speak of.
Fujiki v Marinay (2013)
1. Applicability of AM 02-11-10 (Decl. of Nullity of Marriage)
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to
the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Also, in
LLave case, it does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.
xxx
..where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove
the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the
foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact.
2. Doctrine of lex nationalii
The effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment
in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with
domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that
"[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the
rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for
effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting
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CIVIL LAW REVIEW I

its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and
legal capacity of such citizen.
3. Admittance of Foreign Judgment / Divorce
Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled
on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the
policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations, as well as respecting the
jurisdiction of other states.
xxx
While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize
a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to
capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce
decree abroad.
xxx
Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its
effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil
Code.
4. Correction of Entries in the civil registry (Rule 108)
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it
may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides
that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right,
or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a persons life which are
recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of
public consequence such as birth, death or marriage, which the State has an interest in
recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that
"[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself,
as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."
xxx
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay.
5. Correction of entry did not substitute action to invalidate marriage
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage xxx
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry
entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country. xxx A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an
action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of
a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under
foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize
a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of
the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
6. Article 26 Effect of foreign Divorce decree
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Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of
a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the
validity of the dissolution of the marriage.
xxx
Van Dorn v. Romillo declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in
her own country if the ends of justice are to be served."
Catalan v Catalan (2012)

FACTS: Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce in
the United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage with petitioner
Merope Catalan. After he died, Merope and Louella Catalan-Lee (daughter with 1st wife), respectively
filed a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration. Respondent Louella alleged that petitioner
was not considered an qualified on the ground that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against
petitioner, that Merope was already married to Eusebio Bristol.
ISSUE:
HELD:
It is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain the rightful
party to be issued the letters of administration over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
(REMANDED to RTC for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained following the
prescribed Rules)
In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and
divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of
its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing
or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either:
(1) an official publication; or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document.
If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued
by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas (2010)

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment
that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera
explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a
judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means that the foreign judgment
and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the
aliens applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in
another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or
defense.
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Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas (2010)

Facts: Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen, who acquired Canadian
citizenship, married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina. Due to latter's affair, Gerbert
divorced her in Canada.
2 years later, Gerbert wanted to marry another Filipina. He went to the Pasig City Civil Registry
Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage certificate.
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC but it was denied on the ground that Gerbert was
not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as
he is a naturalized Canadian citizen; that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under
the paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for him or her to be able to remarry
under Philippine law.
ISSUE: W/N the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens
HELD: NO.
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated
into the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. In
both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of marital rights after
a foreign courts divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized
that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise
capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a
similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree),
whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.
Bayot v. Court of Appeals (2008)
Rebecca (American at that time) and Vicente were married on April 20, 1979. But in 1996,
Rebecca divorced him in the court of Dominican Republic which issued Civil Decree No. 362/96,
ordering the dissolution of the couple's marriage. On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another
petition before the RTC of Muntinlupa for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground
of Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity. Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim
contracted another marriage, and Rebecca commenced several criminal complaints against each
other.
ISSUE: Issue: WON, Petitioner has a cause of action to nullify her marriage with respondent
- Sub: WON, the subsequent acquisition of petitioner of Filipino Citizenship invalidates the
divorce decree that she previously obtained.
Validity of Divorce Decree
We find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97 valid. First, at the time of the divorce, as above
elucidated, Rebecca was still to be recognized, assuming for argument that she was in fact later
recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public documents as an American
citizen. At the very least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her American
citizenship to govern her marital relationship.
Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of
America, a country which allows divorce.
xxx
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce can
be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the
national law of the alien spouse.39 Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an
American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any
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of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly
authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.
xxx
Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce
Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res
judicata effect in this jurisdiction.
Republic v. Orbecido (2005)

Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse" under the laws of
his or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes
Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the
Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits
because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
Twin elements for the applicability of the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:
x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Van Dorn v. Romillo (1985)
Court declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served."
Morigo v People (2004)
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete got married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work
and in 1991 she filed petition for divorce in Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo
married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the
ground that there was no marriage ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy and
moved for a suspension of arraignment since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial
question in the bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with
Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in good
faith.
xxx
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio
and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the
marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court
thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 322 and 423 of the
Family Code. xxx "This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that
such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally
married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete.
Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage
being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the beginning." The contract
of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect.
Roehr v. Rodriguez (2003)
FACTS:
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Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German, married respondent Carmen Rodriguez, Filipina, on

December 11, 1980 in Hamburg, Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified in Negros
Oriental. On August 28, 1996, respondent filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage but
was denied. Petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of Hamburg in 1997.
In view of said decree, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on May 20, 1999 on the ground that
the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or suit as a decree of
divorce had already been promulgated dissolving the marriage of petitioner and private
respondent. It was granted.
Private respondent filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case proceed
for the purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of the
properties between petitioner and private respondent. It was granted for that purpose.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she assumed and retained
jurisdiction over the present case despite the fact that petitioner has already obtained a divorce
decree from a German court
HELD: No.
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in
our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children,
must still be determined by our courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a
foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be
shown that the parties opposed to the
judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section
50 of the Rules of Court.(now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for
the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of
Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in
rem, a foreign judgment merely
constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to
proof to the contrary.
In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to
challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as
res judicata with regard to the rights of petitioner to have parental custody of their two children.
The proceedings in the German court were summary. The divorce decree itself states that neither
has she commented on the proceedings nor has she given her opinion to the Social Services
Office. Unlike petitioner who was represented by two lawyers, private respondent had no counsel
to assist her in said proceedings. More importantly, the divorce judgment was issued to petitioner
by virtue of the German Civil Code provision to the effect that when a couple lived separately for
three years, the marriage is deemed irrefutably dissolved. The decree did not touch on the issue
as to who the offending spouse was. Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain
custody of the children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine
the issue of parental custody, care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the
children. This is in consonance with the provision in the Child and Youth Welfare Code that the
childs welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and
custody.
On the matter of property relations, basic is the rule that a court shall grant relief warranted by
the allegations and the proof. Given the factual admission by the parties in their pleadings that
there is no property to be accounted for, respondent judge has no basis to assert jurisdiction in
this case to resolve a matter no longer
deemed in controversy.
In sum, we find that respondent judge may proceed to determine the issue regarding the custody
of the two children born of the union between petitioner and private respondent. Private
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CIVIL LAW REVIEW I

respondent erred, however, in claiming cognizance to settle the matter of property relations of
the parties, which is not at issue.
Recio v Recio (2001)
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera (1989)

the Court held that a divorce obtained in a foreign land as well as its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality principle on the matter of status of
persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely show that he
is not liable to give support to his son after the divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is
placed on petitioners allegation that under the second page of the aforesaid covenant,
respondents obligation to support his child is specifically stated, which was not disputed by
respondent.
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera (1989)
The Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was
held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his
Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance of the marital bond had the effect of
dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would
not affect or cast obloquy on the other."
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO vs ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM (2014)

Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage
in Holland on September 25, 1990, but ended ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce
Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through
her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from respondent. However, respondent
refused to receive the letter.
xxx
Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law
xxx
we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 19534 of the New Civil Code
in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 of the New
Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are
concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies
to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are
governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties.
xxx
Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties
are governed by their personal law, i.e., the laws of the nation to which they belong even
when staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15).
xxx
This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioners son
altogether.
xxx
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It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands
does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during
or after the issuance of a divorce decree)xxx
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved.
In view of respondents failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the
doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law
involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is
the same as our local or domestic or internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands
as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant
case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of
parents to support their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
PART I.E. Human Relations; Abuse of Rights; Unjust Enrichment; Malicious

Prosecution; Independent Civil Action; Arts 1724; 2142; 2154; 2164; 2176; NCC
Article 19. (Abuse of Rights) Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith.
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Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 22. (Unjust Enrichment). Every person who through an act of performance by
another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the
expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
Article 23. Even when an act or event causing damage to another's property was not due to
the fault or negligence of the defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the
act or event he was benefited.
Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of
his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not
constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and
other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life,
place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.
Article 1724. The contractor who undertakes to build a structure or any other work for a
stipulated price, in conformity with plans and specifications agreed upon with the landowner, can neither withdraw from the contract nor demand an increase in the price on
account of the higher cost of labor or materials, save when there has been a change in the
plans and specifications, provided:
(1) Such change has been authorized by the proprietor in writing; and
(2) The additional price to be paid to the contractor has been determined in writing by both
parties.
Article 2142 (Quasi-contracts). Certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the
juridical relation of quasi-contract to the end that no one shall be unjustly enriched or
benefited at the expense of another.
Article 2154 (Solutio Indebiti). If something is received when there is no right to demand it,
and it was unduly delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it arises.
Article 2164 (Other Quasi-Contracts). When, without the knowledge of the person obliged to
give support, it is given by a stranger, the latter shall have a right to claim the same from
the former, unless it appears that he gave it out of piety and without intention of being
repaid.
Article 2176 (Quasi-delicts). Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and
is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Loria v Munoz, Jr (2014)
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Loria received P2,000,000.00 from Muoz for a subcontract of a government projectto

dredge the Masarawag and San Francisco Rivers in Guinobatan, Albay. However, contrary to
the parties agreement, Muoz was not subcontracted for the project. Nevertheless, Loria
retained the P2,000,000.00.
xxx
Under Article 22 of the Civil Codeof the Philippines, "every person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of
something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to
him." There is unjust enrichment "when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of
another, or when a person retains money orproperty of another against the fundamental
principles of justice, equity and good conscience."
Generally, parties to an illegal contract may not recover what they gave under the
contract.68 Under the doctrine of in pari delicto, "no action arises, in equity or at law, from
anillegal contract[.] No suit can be maintained for its specific performance, or to recover the
property agreed to be sold or delivered, or the money agreed to be paid, or damages for its
violation. xxx An exception to the doctrine is "when its application contravenes wellestablished public policy." In Gonzalo, this court ruled that "the prevention of unjust
enrichment is a recognized public policy of the State."
Rosete v Briones (2014)
The petitioners' remaining point of contention is their claim for reimbursement. Sad to say,
this Court cannot order a refund of Teodorico's overpayments.
First of all, NHA - the recipient of the overpayment - cannot be ordered to make a refund,
since Teodorico never prayed to recover from it; in all his submissions - from the NHA, the
OP, the CA, and all the way up to this Court - he consistently sought reimbursement only
from his co-awardees, not the NHA.
Secondly, the specific amount of overpayment is not fixed or determinable from the record;
this being the case, it cannot be determined how much exactly each of Teodorico's coawardees owes him.
Thirdly, this Court is not a trier of facts; it cannot go out of its way to determine and analyze
from the record what should be returned to Teodorico, nor can it receive evidence on the
matter. Suffice it to state that petitioners are indeed entitled to be indemnified for paying for
the value of the subject lot and the real property taxes thereon over and above what was
awarded to them, pursuant to Article 1236 of the Civil Code, which states that "[w]hoever
pays for another may demand from the debtor what he has paid, except that if he paid
without the knowledge or against the will of the debtor, he can recover only insofar as the
payment has been beneficial to the debtor." They may also recover from the NHA, applying
the principle of solutio indebiti.
Alano v Magud-Logmao (2014)
Whether respondent's sufferings were brought about by petitioner's alleged negligence in
granting authorization for the removal or retrieval of the internal organs of respondent's son
who had been declared brain dead.
Petitioner acted prudently by directing his subordinates to exhaust all reasonable means of
locating the relatives of the deceased. He could not have made his directives any clearer. He
even specifically mentioned that permission is only being granted IF the Department of
Surgery has complied with all the requirements of the law. Verily, petitioner could not have
been faulted for having full confidence in the ability of the doctors in the Department of
Surgery to comprehend the instructions, obeying all his directives, and acting only in
accordance with the requirements of the law.
Sesbreno v CA (2014)
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CIVIL LAW REVIEW I

Sesbreos main contention is that the inspection of his residence by the VOC team was an
unreasonable search for being carried out without a warrant and for being allegedly done
with malice or bad faith.
Was Sesbreo entitled to recover damages for abuse of rights?
VOC team had the continuing authority from Sesbreo as the consumer to enter his
premises at all reasonable hours to conduct an inspection of the meter without being liable
for trespass to dwelling (pursuant to paragraph 9 of the metered service contract entered
into between VECO and each of its consumers).
xxx
Paragraph 9 clothed the entire VOC team with unquestioned authority to enter the garage to
inspect the meter. The members of the team obviously met the conditions imposed by
paragraph 9 for an authorized entry. Firstly, their entry had the objective of conducting the
routine inspection of the meter. Secondly, the entry and inspection were confined to the
garage where the meter was installed. Thirdly, the entry was effected at around 4 oclock
p.m., a reasonable hour. And, fourthly, the persons who inspected the meter were duly
authorized for the purpose by VECO.
Although Balicha was not himself an employee of VECO, his participation was to render
police assistance to ensure the personal security of Constantino and Arcilla during the
inspection, rendering him a necessary part of the team as an authorized representative.
xxx
The constitutional guaranty against unlawful searches and seizures is intended as a restraint
against the Government and its agents tasked with law enforcement. It is to be invoked only
to ensure freedom from arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of State power.xxx In sum, the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts
committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion by the government.
xxx
Article 19 of the Civil Code23 sets the standards to be observed in the exercise of ones
rights and in the performance of ones duties, namely: (a) to act with justice; (b) to give
everyone his due; and (c) to observe honesty and good faith.
xxx
Although the act is not illegal, liability for damages may arise should there be an abuse of
rights, like when the act is performed without prudence or in bad faith. In order that liability
may attach under the concept of abuse of rights, the following elements must be present, to
wit: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty, (b) which is exercised in bad faith, and (c) for
the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
California Clothing, Inc (CCI) v. Quinones (2013)
In this case, petitioners claimed that respondent failed to make payment for the black jeans
(GUESS).
It was, therefore, within their right to verify from respondent whether she indeed paid or not
and collect from her if she did not. However, the question now is whether such right was
exercised in good faith or they went overboard giving respondent a cause of action against
them.
xxx
Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in
the exercise of legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acted in
bad faith, with intent to prejudice another. Good faith refers to the state of mind which is
manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain
from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. Malice or bad faith,
on the other hand, implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a
dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.
xxx
It is evident from the circumstances of the case that petitioners went overboard and tried to
force respondent to pay the amount they were demanding. In the guise of asking for
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CIVIL LAW REVIEW I

assistance, petitioners even sent a demand letter to respondents employer not only
informing it of the incident but obviously imputing bad acts on the part of respondent.
xxx To malign respondent without substantial evidence and despite the latters possession of
enough evidence in her favor, is clearly impermissible. A person should not use his right
unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise, he opens himself to liability.
Spouses Hing v Choachuy (2013)
The right to privacy is the right to be let alone.
xxx
An individuals right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to
his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the
public or deny them access. The phrase "prying into the privacy of anothers residence,"
therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers as
private.
xxx
In Ople v. Torres, we enunciated that "the reasonableness of a persons expectation of
privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited
an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as
reasonable."
xxx
Based on the ocular inspection, the Court understands why petitioner Hing was so unyielding
in asserting that the revolving camera was set up deliberately to monitor the on[-]going
construction in his property. The monitor showed only a portion of the roof of the factory of
Aldo. If the purpose of respondents in setting up a camera at the back is to secure the
building and factory premises, then the camera should revolve only towards their properties
at the back. Respondents camera cannot be made to extend the view to petitioners lot. To
allow the respondents to do that over the objection of the petitioners would violate the right
of petitioners as property owners. "The owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a
manner as to injure the rights of a third person."
Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. vs Legaspi (2013)
Petitioner paid respondent US$81,320.00 in the pre-execution conference plus attorneys
fees of US$8,132.00 (permanent disability compensation) pursuant to the writ of execution.
The June 29, 2011 CA Decision, however, modified the final resolution of the NLRC and
awarded only US$60,000.00 to respondent.
xxx
As the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represented a reasonable settlement, it
is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind.
Respondent agreed to the stipulation that he would return the amount paid to him in the
event that the petition for certiorari would be granted. Since the petition was indeed granted
by the CA, albeit partially, respondent must comply with the condition to return the excess
amount.
The Court finds that the Receipt of the Judgment Award with Undertaking was a fair and
binding agreement. It was executed by the parties subject to outcome of the petition. To
allow now respondent to retain the excess money judgment would amount to his unjust
enrichment to the prejudice of petitioner.
Beumer v Amores (2012)
Petitioner (Dutch) married to Filipino, which marriage was later annulled; claims half of the
whole purchase price of 2 lots of the conjugal properties.
It held that Helmut Muller (foreigner) cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity
where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the prohibition
against foreign ownership of Philippine land24 enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the
1987 Philippine Constitution. xxx Surely, a contract that violates the Constitution and the
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CIVIL LAW REVIEW I

law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal effect at
all.
xxx
Neither can the Court grant petitioners claim for reimbursement on the basis of unjust
enrichment As held in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a foreigner seeking monetary
reimbursement for money spent on purchase of Philippine land, the provision on unjust
enrichment does not apply if the action is proscribed by the Constitution.
xxx
Re: Article 22 (unjust enrichment) does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed
by the Constitution or by the application of the pari delicto doctrine. xxx it is founded in
general principles of policy, which the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real
justice, as between him and the plaintiff.
xxx
To be sure, the constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of Philippine
land and not to the improvements built thereon, such as the two (2) houses standing on Lots
1 and 2142 xxx
Padalhin v Lavina (2012)
Whether defendant-appellant intended to prejudice or injure plaintiff-appellant when he did
the acts.
xx
We rule in the affirmative. Defendant-appellants participation in the invasion of plaintiffappellants diplomatic residence and his act of ordering an employee to take photographs of
what was inside the diplomatic residence without the consent of the plaintiff-appellant were
clearly done to prejudice the latter. Moreover, we find that defendant- appellant was not
driven by legitimate reasons when he did the questioned acts. As pointed out by the court a
quo, defendant-appellant made sure that the Kenyan Minister of Foreign Affairs and the
Filipino community in Kenya knew about the alleged illegal items in plaintiff-appellants
diplomatic residence.
xxx If it were true that Lavina kept ivories in his diplomatic residence, then, his behavior
deserves condemnation. However, that is not the issue in the case at bar. Nestor violated
the New Civil Code prescriptions concerning the privacy of one's residence and he cannot
hide behind the cloak of his supposed benevolent intentions to justify the invasion.
PART I.F. Unfair Competition; Art 28, NCC
Article 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor
through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or
highhanded method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers
damage.
WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION vs JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION (2014)
[respondent] discovered that [petitioner] had been manufacturing and distributing the same
automotive parts with exactly similar design, same material and colors but was selling these
products at a lower price as [respondents] plastic-made automotive parts and to the same
customers.
xxx
In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must have two characteristics:
(1) it must involve an injury to a competitor or trade rival, and
(2) it must involve acts which are characterized as "contrary to good conscience," or
"shocking to judicial sensibilities," or otherwise unlawful; in the language of our law, these
include force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or highhanded method.
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CIVIL LAW REVIEW I

Here, both characteristics are present.

First, both parties are competitors or trade rivals, both being engaged in the manufacture of
plastic-made automotive parts. Second, the acts of the petitioner were clearly "contrary to
good conscience" as petitioner admitted having employed respondents former employees,
deliberately copied respondents products and even went to the extent of selling these
products to respondents customers.
PART I.G. CIVIL PERSONALITY; BIRTH; DEATH; Arts 40-42, 390-1, 712, 777, NCC;
Arts 41, 96&124, 99&126, 142, FC; Sec 2, Rule 92, RRC
Article 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is
inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the
power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
Article 40 (Natural Persons). Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be
considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the
conditions specified in the following article.
Article 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is
completely delivered from the mother's womb. However, if the foetus had an intra-uterine
life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after
its complete delivery from the maternal womb.
Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death.
The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by
contract and by will.
Article 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by
law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the
law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder,
partner or member.
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CIVIL LAW REVIEW I

Presumption of Death
Article 390. After an absence of 7 years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still
lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after
an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of 75 years, an absence of five
years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.
Article 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of
the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing,
who has not been heard of for 4 years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for 4
years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence
has not been known for 4 years.
Article 712. Ownership is acquired by occupation and by intellectual creation.
Ownership and other real rights over property are acquired and transmitted by law, by
donation, by testate and intestate succession, and in consequence of certain contracts, by
tradition.
They may also be acquired by means of prescription.
Article 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of
the decedent.
Art. 41. FC. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage
shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for 4 consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is
danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.
Ownership, Administrative,
Enjoyment and Disposition of the Community Property
Art. 96. FC. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to
both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five
years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of
the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person,
and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
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Dissolution of Absolute Community Regime

Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138.
Administration of the
Conjugal Partnership Property
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five
years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of
the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person,
and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership Regime
Art. 126. The conjugal partnership terminates:
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138.
Art. 142. The administration of all classes of exclusive property of either spouse may be
transferred by the court to the other spouse:
(1) When one spouse becomes the guardian of the other;
(2) When one spouse is judicially declared an absentee;
(3) When one spouse is sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction; or
(4) When one spouse becomes a fugitive from justice or is in hiding as an accused in a
criminal case.
If the other spouse is not qualified by reason of incompetence, conflict of interest, or any
other just cause, the court shall appoint a suitable person to be the administrator.
Section 2. RULE 92 (Venue: Guardianship) Meaning of word "incompetent." Under this
rule, the word "incompetent" includes persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or
who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write,
those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not
being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes,
cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming
thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation.
Alabang Devt Corp v Alabang Hills Vill. Assoc. (2014)
ADCorp wanted to enjoin AHVAssoc from the construction of a multi-purpose hall and a
swimming pool on one of the parcels of land still allegedly owned by ADC without the latter's
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consent and approval. AHVAI denied ADC's asseverations and claimed that the latter has no
legal capacity to sue since its existence as a registered corporate entity was revoked by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on May 26, 2003; that ADC has no cause of
action because by law it is no longer the absolute owner but is merely holding the property
in question in trust for the benefit of AHVAI as beneficial owner thereof.
xxx
Petitioner's corporate registration was revoked on May 26, 2003. xxx The subject complaint,
however, was filed only on October 19, 2006. xxx Petitioner filed its complaint not only after
its corporate existence was terminated but also beyond the three-year period allowed by
Section 122 of the Corporation Code.
CONTINENTAL STEEL Manuf. Corp. v Arbitrator Montano (2009)
Resolution ORDERING Continental Steel to pay Hortillano his bereavement leave pay and
death benefits (re: his unborn child)
xxx
The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal
definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires
personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born.
Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death.
xxx
Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death. Moreover,
while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death,
it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die.
xxx
Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As Continental
Steel itself defines, a dependent is "one who relies on another for support; one not able to
exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid of someone else." Under said general
definition, even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillanos child could not
have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother,
Hortillanos wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions in question
that the dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or the
parent, brother, or sister of a single employee. The CBA did not provide a qualification for
the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have acquired civil
personality, as Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification, then child shall be
understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mothers
womb.
Duenas v Santos Subd Howeowners Assoc (2004)

Under Section 1, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, only natural or juridical persons, or
entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. Article 44[25] of the Civil Code
enumerates the various classes of juridical persons. Under said Article, an association is
considered a juridical person if the law grants it a personality separate and distinct from that
of its members.[26] The records of the present case are bare of any showing by SSHA that it
is an association duly organized under Philippine law. It was thus an error for the HLURB-NCR
Office to give due course to the complaint in HLURB Case, given the SSHAs lack of capacity
to sue in its own name. xxx Mere allegations (must be averred) of membership in a
federation are insufficient and inconsequential. The federation itself has a separate juridical
personality and was not impleaded as a party in HLURB Case nor in this case. xxx Hence, for
failing to show that it is a juridical entity, endowed by law with capacity to bring suits in its
own name, SSHA is devoid of any legal capacity, whatsoever, to institute any action.
NOTES:
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I

PART I.H. Domicile; Arts 50-51, NCC; Arts 68-69, FC; Residence v Domicile;
Annulment or Nullity of Marriages AM 02-11-10 SC; Settlement of Estate;
Election Laws
Article 50 (Citiz & Domi). For the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations,
the domicile of natural persons is the place of their habitual residence.
Article 51. When the law creating or recognizing them, or any other provision does not fix
the domicile of juridical persons, the same shall be understood to be the place where their
legal representation is established or where they exercise their principal functions.
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
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Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the
court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad
or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption
shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family.
Residence v Domicile
(Jalosjos v COMELEC (MR))
To be an actual and physical resident of a locality, one must have a dwelling place where
one resides no matter how modest and regardless of ownership. The mere purchase of a
parcel of land does not make it ones residence. The fact that the residential structure where
petitioner intends to reside was still under construction on the lot she purchased means that
she has not yet established actual and physical residence in the barangay, contrary to the
declaration of her witnesses that she has been an actual and physical resident of Brgy. Tugas
since 2008.
RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF
VOIDABLE MARRIAGES (AM 02-11-10 SC)
Section 4. Venue. - The Petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city
where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the
date of filing. Or in the case of non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the
Philippines, at the election of the petitioner.
RULE 73 (Venue and Process)
Section 1.
Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedents is an inhabitant
of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be
proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the (PROPER COURT
MTC/RTC of the place) in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant
of a foreign country, the PROPER COURT in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the
place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in
a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
Garcia-Quiazon v Belen (2013)
Elise, then represented by her mother Ma. Lourdes, a natural child of Eliso, who died without
a will on December 12, 1992, filed a Petition for Letter of Administration of the estate of
Eliseo before the Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas City. She also impugned the validity of his
fathers marriage to Amelia. According to her, the marriage was bigamous because at the
time of his marriage to Amelia, there was a prior and valid subsisting marriage of Eliseo to
one Filipito Sandico. The petition was opposed by Amelia and her children, Jenneth and
Jennifer, who alleged that venue was improperly laid, as Eliseo died in Capas, Tarlac as
shown by his Death Certificate, the petition should have been filed there as it was his
residence at the time of his death.
xxx
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the
estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides
at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
NOTES:
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I

estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court in the
province in which he resides at the time of his death xxx
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." xxx It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.
Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same
meaning. As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing
more than a persons actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency.
xxx
While the recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs of a decedents residence at
the time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on the courts. Both the
RTC and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting
themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in 1995. This finding
is consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of
properties against Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that
their marriage is void for being bigamous.
Jalosjos v COMELEC (MR) (2013)
...sole issue of who between the vice-mayor and the second placer shall assume office
pursuant to the final determination of petitioner's ineligibility to run for office
xxx
To be an actual and physical resident of a locality, one must have a dwelling place where
one resides no matter how modest and regardless of ownership. The mere purchase of a
parcel of land does not make it ones residence. The fact that the residential structure where
petitioner intends to reside was still under construction on the lot she purchased means that
she has not yet established actual and physical residence in the barangay, contrary to the
declaration of her witnesses that she has been an actual and physical resident of Brgy. Tugas
since 2008.
xxx
A temporary stay in a strangers house cannot amount to residence.
xxx
Petitioners stay in the house of Mrs. Yap in Brgy. Punta Miray, on the other hand, was only a
temporary and intermittent stay that does not amount to residence. It was never the
intention of petitioner to reside in that barangay, as she only stayed there at times when she
was in Baliangao while her house was being constructed. Her temporary stay in Brgy. Punta
Miray cannot be counted as residence in Baliangao.
Morigo v People (2004)
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete got married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work
and in 1991 she filed petition for divorce in Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo
married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the
ground that there was no marriage ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy and
moved for a suspension of arraignment since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial
question in the bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with
Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in good
faith.
xxx
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio
and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the
marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court
thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 322 and 423 of the
Family Code. xxx "This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that
such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage.
NOTES:
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The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally
married. xxx Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio,
the two were never married "from the beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears
no legal effect.
xxx
The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage
and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity.
Bayot v CA (2008)
Vicente, a Filipino, and Rebecca, an American, were married with son, Alix.
Dominican Republic issued decision in Civil Decree No. 362/96 ordering the dissolution of the
marriage. The same court also issued Civil Decree No. 406/97 settling the couple's conjugal
property in Muntinlupa in March 4, 1997.
She then filed in Makati a declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of
Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity.
She sought dissolution of the
conjugal
partnerships of gains with application for support pendente lite for her and Alix. She also
prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix.
Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the
petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce.
Issue:
Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by Rebecca in Dominican Republic is valid.
Validity of Divorce Decree
We find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97 valid. First, at the time of the divorce, as above
elucidated, Rebecca was still to be recognized, assuming for argument that she was in fact
later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public documents as an
American citizen. At the very least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her divorce,
her American citizenship to govern her marital relationship.
xxx
Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United
States of America, a country which allows divorce.
xxx
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce
can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under
the national law of the alien spouse.39 Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly
an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and
allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce
decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.
xxx
Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce
Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res
judicataeffect in this jurisdiction.
Limbona v COMELEC (2008)
FACTS: Norlainie Mitmug Limbona, her husband, Mohammad G. Limbona, and Malik "Bobby"
T. Alingan were mayoralty candidates in Pantar, Lanao del Norte during the 2007
Synchronized National and Local Elections. Malik filed a petition to disqualify Mohammad for
failure to comply with the residency requirement. Malik filed another petition to disqualify
Norlainie also on the ground of lack of the one-year residency requirement. Norlainie filed an
Affidavit of Withdrawal of Certificate of Candidacy and she also filed a petition to dismiss the
disqualification since the petition to disqualify had become moot and academic. The
Commission granted the withdrawal.
NOTES:
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I

On the other hand, Mohammad G. Limbona was disqualified; such resolution of the
Commission became final and executor. Consequently, Norlainie filed a new certificate of
candidacy as substitute candidate for Mohammad which was given due course by the
Comelec en banc. Malik filed a second petition for disqualification against Norlainie. the
elections, Norlainie emerged as the winning candidate and accordingly took her oath and
assumed office. On September 4, 2007, the Second Division of Comelec disqualified
Norlainie on three grounds: lack of the one-year residency requirement; not being a
registered voter of the municipality; and, nullity of her certificate of candidacy for having
been filed at a place other than the Office of the Election Officer.
ISSUE: Whether or not Norlainie has established her domicile in Pantar considering her place
of birth and also considering the domicile of her husband.
HELD: No. The Comelec correctly found that petitioner failed to satisfy the one-year
residency requirement. The term "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with
"domicile," which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. The manifest
intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to exclude a stranger or newcomer,
unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the
latter, from an elective office to serve that community.
For purposes of election law, the question of residence is mainly one of intention.
Three rules are, however, well established: first, that a man must have a residence or
domicile somewhere; second, that where once established it remains until a new one is
acquired; and third, a man can have but one domicile at a time.
In order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence
in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old
domicile. A persons "domicile" once established is considered to continue and will not be
deemed lost until a new one is established. To successfully effect a change of domicile one
must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention
of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one, and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi
coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice
must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the
residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
We note the findings of the Comelec that petitioners domicile of origin is Maguing, Lanao
del Norte, which is also her place of birth; and that her domicile by operation of law (by
virtue of marriage) is Rapasun, Marawi City. The Comelec found that Mohammad,
petitioners husband, effected the change of his domicile in favor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte
only on November 11, 2006. Since it is presumed that the husband and wife live together in
one legal residence, then it follows that petitioner effected the change of her domicile also
on November 11, 2006. Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code provide:
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement,
the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live
abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However,
such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the
family.
NOTES:
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I

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Joyette A.Vias |||2016 ||| Page __

PART I - PRELIMINARY TITLE; HUMAN RELATIONS, PERSONALITY, DOMICILE

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I

Cojuangco v Rep (2012)

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Ablaza v Republic (2010)

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PART I.C Article 8; Stare Decisis; Case Law; Art. 36, FC

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Ting v Velez-Ting (2009)

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Republic v Olaybar (2014)

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Catalan v Catalan (2012)

Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas (2010)

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Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas (2010)

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Republic v. Orbecido (2005)

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Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German, married respondent Carmen Rodriguez, Filipina, on

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Recio v Recio (2001)

Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera (1989)

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO vs ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM (2014)

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PART I.E. Human Relations; Abuse of Rights; Unjust Enrichment; Malicious

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Loria v Munoz, Jr (2014)

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Loria received P2,000,000.00 from Muoz for a subcontract of a government projectto

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Here, both characteristics are present.

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Dissolution of Absolute Community Regime

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Duenas v Santos Subd Howeowners Assoc (2004)

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