BuletinPompieri1 2015

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Publicaie editat de
INSPECTORATUL GENERAL PENTRU SITUAII DE URGEN
Fondat 1955
Apare semestrial
Nr. 1/2015
COLEGIUL DE REDACIE:
Preedinte: colonel dr. Nicolae CORNEA
Redactor-ef: colonel Valentin UBAN
Secretar de redacie: colonel dr. ing. Cristian DAMIAN
www.igsu.ro/publicatiidespecialitate
Copyright: I.G.S.U.
Drepturile asupra materialelor publicate aparin autorilor
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CUPRINS
Seciunea I
Lucrri cu caracter profesional
1. Aprarea mpotriva incendiilor. Concept. Elemente de conformitate. Partea a II-a,
autori: colonel lector univ. dr. ing. Garibald Popescu, colonel conf. univ. dr. ing. Emanuel
Darie, Academia de Poliie Al.I. Cuza, Facultatea de Pompieri ................................................. 6
2. Energia termic a pmntului, autori: student sergent Drago Colezea, colonel lector
univ. dr. ing. Corina Blan, Academia de Poliie Al.I. Cuza, Facultatea de Pompieri ............. 11
3. Securitatea la incendiu a tunelurilor rutiere din Europa, autori: student sergent Daniel
Milu, locotenent-colonel instr. mil. princ. I drd. ing. Ionel-Alin Mocioi, colonel conf. dr.
ing. Manuel erban, Academia de Poliie Al.I. Cuza, Facultatea de Pompieri ......................... 17
4. Performane specifice ale cldirilor cu aglomerri de persoane, autori: student sergent
Marian-George Pierinaru, colonel conf. univ. dr. ing. Manuel erban, Academia de Poliie
Al.I. Cuza, Facultatea de Pompieri ........................................................................................... 25
5. Management i strategii n activitatea de aprare mpotriva incendiilor la o instituie
public AFER, autori: Eugen Brbulescu, Sorin-Radu Achimescu, Gheorghe
Moldoveanu, Bogdan Vintil, Viorel Lucaci, Autoritatea Feroviar Romn AFER. .............. 33
6. Instalaie de stingere cu dioxid de carbon utilizat la o zon de uleiere, autori: student
sergent Dan Lazr, colonel conf. univ. dr. ing. Manuel erban, Academia de Poliie Al.I.
Cuza, Facultatea de Pompieri...................................................................................................... 37
7. Elemente de protecie pasiv i activ a fabricilor de anvelope, autori: student sergent
Mihai Clinescu, colonel conf. univ. dr. ing. Manuel erban, Academia de Poliie Al.I.
Cuza, Facultatea de Pompieri...................................................................................................... 43
8. Instalaii de stingere a incendiilor cu cea de ap pentru fabricile de prelucrare a
lemnului, autori: student sergent Bogdan Smolinschi, locotenent-colonel instr. mil. princ. I
drd. ing. Ionel-Alin Mocioi, colonel conf. univ. dr. ing. Manuel erban, Academia de Poliie
9. Proiectarea i realizarea unei arpante din lemn, autori: student sergent Anatoli Foca,
cpitan lector univ. dr. ing. Drago-Iulian Pavel, Academia de Poliie Al.I. Cuza,
Facultatea de Pompieri .................................................................................................................. 57
10. Instalaii de stingere a incendiilor cu sprinklere cu preacionare, autori: student
sergent Dan Colniceanu, colonel conf. univ. dr. ing. Manuel erban, Academia de Poliie
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11. Instalaii fixe de stingere a incendiilor cu spum la parcurile de rezervoare cu capac

fix de lichide combustibile, autori: student sergent Alexandru Iacob, colonel conf. univ. dr.
ing. Manuel erban, Academia de Poliie Al.I. Cuza, Facultatea de Pompieri ......................... 77
13. Utilizarea dispozitivului automat destinat stingerii incendiilor BONPET la o instituie
public AFER , autori: Eugen Brbulescu, Florin Preda director general EXAL GRUP
SRL Sltioara, Olt Autoritatea Feroviar Romn AFER ...................................................... 83
14. Sisteme de detecie i semnalizare a incendiilor de la bordul aeronavelor de transport
persoane, autori: colonel conf. univ. dr. ing. Manuel erban, locotenent-colonel instr. mil.
princ. I drd. ing. Ionel-Alin Mocioi, Academia de Poliie Al.I. Cuza, Facultatea de Pompieri ...... 86
15. Aspects of insurance against fire, autor: senior lecturer Gabriela erbnoiu, PhD, Al.I. Cuza
Police Academy ........................................................................................................................................... 94
16. Les Sapeurs-Pompiers et les Expressions Idiomatiques, autor: lector univ. dr. MelaniaGeorgiana Ghiescu, Al.I. Cuza Police Academy .............................................................................. 101
17. The contribution of hydro-informatics to the refilling capacity evaluation of small
reservoirs under semi-arid conditions, autori: agriculturist M.Sc. Aglaia Vlachopoulou,
Program Director; dr. Dimitrios Emmanouloudis, Department of Forestry and Natural
Environment, Technological Educational Institute of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, Greece ....... 108
18. Basic principles of fire line personnels safety in forest fires, autor: Michail Chalaris,
Chemist, Ph.D., Head of Strategic Planning, Hellenic Fire Corps Athens, Grece ...................... 118
19. Lessons of the red sludge disaster in Hungary, 2010, autor: dr. Antal Papp, colonel Ph.D.,
College Professor, Director of Disaster Management Training Centre, Budapest, Hungary ............ 123
20. Influence of inlets of rooms by the use of shevs, autor: assoc. prof. eng. Radoslav
Kartov, Ph.D., Faculty of Fire Safety and Civil Protection, Academy of the Ministry of
Interior, Bulgaria ......................................................................................................................... 133
21. Distance learning comparison of two forms of knowledge transfer. Research results,
autor: maj. Tomasz Zweglinski, PhD, MA Fire Eng. Civil Protection and Civil Defense
Division, Internal Security Department, Civil Safety Engineering Faculty, The Main School
of Fire Service, Warsaw, Poland ................................................................................................. 141
22. Risk management in emergency situations in Serbia, autori: Nenad Zivkovic, Ljiljana
Zivkovic, Dusica Pesic, Milan Blagojevic, University of Nis, Faculty of Occupational
Safety, Serbia .............................................................................................................................. 149
23. Separation distance between buildings in function of fire protection, autori: Dusica
Pesic, Darko Zigar, Ljiljana Zivkovic, Nenad Zivkovic, Milan Blagojevic University of Nis,
Faculty of Occupational Safety, Serbia ....................................................................................... 161
Seciunea a II-a
Lucrri cu caracter tiinific
24. Modelarea conveciei termice la curgerea peste o plac plan, autori: student sergent
Daniel-Viceniu Constantin, colonel conf. univ. dr. ing. Emanuel Darie, Academia de
Poliie Al.I. Cuza, Facultatea de Pompieri .............................................................................. 172
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25. Utilizarea simulrii numerice ca metod pentru alegerea sistemelor de stins incendii,
autori: student sergent Lucian Dumitru, colonel conf. univ. dr. ing. Manuel erban, lector
univ. dr. ing. Liviu-Valentin Blnescu Academia de Poliie Al.I. Cuza, Facultatea de
Pompieri ...................................................................................................................................... 178
26. Identificarea i analizarea hazardurilor/riscurilor de accidente. Metode de prevenire.
autori: colonel drd. Florin tefan, cpitan dr. Iulian-Narcis Nicolae, Inspectoratul pentru
Situaii de Urgen erban Cantacuzino al Judeului Prahova ............................................... 186
27. Optimizarea soluiilor de evacuare a fumului i gazelor fierbini din parcaje
subterane, autori: locotenent ing. Cristian Andrei Micu, locotenent-colonel dr. ing. Drago
Rou, Inspectoratul pentru Situaii de Urgen Mihail Grigore Sturdza al Judeului Iai ...... 193
28. Fenomene fizico-chimice interfizice privind suprafaa materialelor metalice la
depunerea de straturi superficiale, autor: drd. ing. Victor Ionescu ........................................ 206
Seciunea a III-a
Varia
29. Aplicaii ale unor probleme de extrem n teoria riscurilor. Partea a II-a, autori:
student frunta Samuel Bila, student frunta Andrei Oprea, student frunta Claudiu Stan,
colonel lector univ. dr. ing. Garibald Popescu, colonel conf. univ. dr. ing. Emanuel Darie,
Academia de Poliie Al.I. Cuza, Facultatea de Pompieri ........................................................ 219
30. Evaluarea unor limite pentru care se utilizeaz cos
; aplicaii conexe (partea

5
5
I), autori: student frunta Lucian-Cristian Mircea, student frunta Samuel Bila, student
frunta Teodor Maxim, colonel lector univ. dr. ing. Garibald Popescu, colonel conf. univ.
dr. ing. Emanuel Darie, Academia de Poliie Al.I. Cuza, Facultatea de Pompieri.................. 226
31. Evaluarea unor limite pentru care se utilizeaz cos
i sin
i sin
; aplicaii conexe (partea

5
5
a II-a), autori: student frunta Lucian-Cristian Mircea, student frunta Samuel Bila, student
frunta Teodor Maxim, colonel lector univ. dr. ing. Garibald Popescu, colonel conf. univ.
dr. ing. Emanuel Darie, Academia de Poliie Al.I. Cuza, Facultatea de Pompieri.................. 233
32. 180 de ani de la nfiinarea primei uniti de pompieri militari din Romnia Iai
1835, autor: cpitan Elena-Silvia Bolohan, Inspectoratul pentru Situaii de Urgen Mihail
Grigore Sturdza al Judeului Iai .............................................................................................. 238
Seciunea I
LUCRRI CU CARACTER PROFESIONAL
APRAREA MPOTRIVA INCENDIILOR. CONCEPT.

ELEMENTE DE CONFORMITATE
Partea a II-a
Colonel lector univ. dr. ing. Garibald POPESCU
Colonel confereniar univ. dr. ing. Emanuel DARIE
Academia de Poliie Alexandru Ioan Cuza, Facultatea de Pompieri
Abstract: The article presents general and specific elements related to the concept of organizing the
activities of fire protection in the context of the current objective reality.
Keywords: Concept, Organization, Organization, Management, Fire Protection, Compliance, Fire,
Objective Reality.
1. TERMINOLOGIE SPECIFIC
Control intern control de prevenire n domeniul: situaiilor de urgen, securitii i
sntii n munc etc., realizat cu personal specializat/autorizat al entitii economice, private/de
stat, instituie etc.
Control extern control de prevenire n domeniul: situaiilor de urgen, securitii i
sntii n munc etc., realizat cu personal specializat/autorizat al I.S.U., I.T.M.
Neconformitate nendeplinire a unor cerine legale, standarde, proceduri, cu
prevederea/neprevederea unor msuri cu un anumit specific: prevenire/stingere a incendiilor,
securitate i/sau sntate n munc etc., care pot s afecteze funcionarea unei organizaii.
Incendiu fenomen fizico-chimic care relev existena simultan a trei stri fundamentale
de transfer de cldur: radiaie, convecie, conducie (formularea este adevrat pentru dezvoltare
i propagare incendiu).
Organizaie companie, corporaie, autoritate, operator economic, instituie etc., public
sau privat care admite structur administrativ proprie; organizaia este supus sistemului de
management relevat de SR OHSAS18001/2008.
Utilizator persoan fizic sau juridic care folosete un bun, cu orice titlu, n interesul
su, al altuia sau n interes public.
Realitate obiectiv realitate curent raportat la un spaiu public definit de granie
naionale, materializat prin activiti, procese tehnologice, relaii ntre membrii societii, ntre
care coexist i se genereaz riscuri/pericole cu diferite niveluri; existena riscurilor/pericolelor
deriv din potenialul pe care realitatea obiectiv curent n care trim l are, determinate de modul
cum se dezvolt, coexist etc., fiind caracterizat de mediul nconjurtor, construcii, instalaii,
mentalitate, nivel de pregtire al populaiei/membrilor unei societi/naiuni etc.
2. DOCUMENTE PRINCIPALE PRIN INTERMEDIUL CRORA SE GENEREAZ
MATERIALIZAREA CONCEPTULUI DE APRARE MPOTRIVA INCENDIILOR N MOD
PUNCTUAL I HOLISTIC
Aplicarea n mod conform a prevederilor reglementrilor specificate anterior, implic
elaborarea unor documente (acte de autoritate, proceduri etc.) cu referire la aprarea mpotriva
incendiilor, care se emit de ctre persoanele prevzute de legislaia n vigoare (administratorul
operatorului economic, conductorul instituiei, persoane delegate etc.).
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Principalele documente, necesare dar nu i suficiente pentru materializarea unui

management pentru organizarea activitilor de aprare mpotriva incendiilor, ntr-un operator
economic, instituie public etc., sunt:
regulament de ordine interioar (documentul include cadrul general al problemelor cu
referire la respectarea de ctre salariai a activitilor de prevenire i stingere a incendiilor);
dispoziie scris referitoare la responsabilitile comisiei de specialiti n domeniul
aprrii mpotriva incendiilor;
dispoziie scris/proceduri pentru implementarea de instruciuni proprii/specifice i
obligaiile unor categorii de personal de pe locurile de munc cu referire la aprarea mpotriva
incendiilor;
dispoziie scris /proceduri pentru reglementarea lucrului cu foc deschis;
dispoziie scris pentru reglementarea fumatului i evidenei locurilor organizate pentru
fumat;
dispoziie scris/proceduri pentru activitile de instruire a personalului de pe locurile de
munc;
dispoziie scris/proceduri pentru emiterea de reguli i msuri n domeniul aprrii
mpotriva incendiilor la utilizarea, manipularea, transportul i depozitarea substanelor
periculoase;
documente scrise care relev convenii/contracte cu referire la rspunderile ce revin
prilor n domeniul aprrii mpotriva incendiilor;
dispoziie scris pentru numirea cadrelor tehnice sau a personalului de specialitate cu
atribuii n domeniul aprrii mpotriva incendiilor i atribuiile care revin acestora;
dispoziie scris/proceduri pentru aplicarea unor msuri specifice de aprare mpotriva
incendiilor pentru perioadele de timp caniculare/secetoase;
dispoziie scris/proceduri pentru aplicarea unor msuri specifice de aprare mpotriva
incendiilor pentru perioadele de timp cu temperaturi sczute/reduse;
dispoziie scris/proceduri referitoare la modul cum se realizeaz controlul respectrii
normelor specifice n domeniul aprrii mpotriva incendiilor de ctre persoanele abilitate/cu expertiz;
ghid/manual cu proceduri de executare a controalelor la instalaiile care doteaz
anumite spaii de lucru (gaze, ap, climatizare, instalaii electrice etc.);
dispoziie scris pentru identificarea/nominalizarea punctelor vital-vulnerabile n caz de
incendiu/explozie;
plan de intervenie n caz de incendiu/explozie; proceduri;
dispoziie scris/proceduri referitoare la activitatea de aprare mpotriva incendiilor n
cazul calamitilor naturale i msurile care se impun pentru nlturarea efectelor negative
generate de acestea;
dispoziie scris/liste cu substanele periculoase care se utilizeaz n activitile curente;
dispoziie scris/proceduri referitoare la modul de executare a controlului intern de
prevenire i stingere a incendiilor pe locurile de munc;
elaborarea fiei obiectivului conform prevederilor normelor generale de aprare
mpotriva incendiilor;
elaborarea/ntocmirea de proceduri, punerea n aplicare a planurilor de intervenie i de
evacuare a persoanelor n caz de incendiu;
elaborarea/ntocmirea de proceduri i modul cum particip personalul de pe locurile de
munc (reacia acestora) la simularea de exerciii tactice de intervenie, organizate potrivit
dispoziiilor legale;
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identificarea riscurilor de incendiu/explozie i a naturii acestora n raport cu diferite

destinaii/locuri de munc;
evaluarea riscurilor de incendiu/explozie n raport cu diferite destinaii/locuri de munc;
controlul riscurilor de incendiu/explozie n raport cu diferite destinaii/locuri de munc;
ntocmirea/elaborarea unor planuri de msuri ca urmare a controalelor de prevenire
intern (identificarea n raport cu locurile de munc a deficienelor la normele de prevenire i
stingere a incendiilor);
ntocmirea/elaborarea unor planuri de msuri ca urmare a controalelor externe
realizate/executate de ctre personalul specializat al I.S.U. n cadrul operatorului economic,
instituiei etc.
3. OBSERVAII PENTRU DOCUMENTELE CARE FAC REFERIRE LA RISC

Un caz particular al modalitilor de materializare a documentelor specificate la punctul 2 l
reprezint metodele de identificare i evaluare la risc de incendiu, care sunt definite n principal, de:
Legea nr. 307/2006 art.19 Legea aprrii mpotriva incendiilor;
O.M.I.R.A. nr. 210/2007 pentru aprobarea Metodologiei privind identificarea, evaluarea
i controlul riscurilor de incendiu.
Aplicarea metodelor de identificare i evaluare la risc de explozie nu rezult n mod direct
ca fiind o cerin n raport cu cele dou acte normative specificate, aceasta fiind, n fapt, o
neconformitate sau o inadverten a prevederilor acestor reglementri.
Din acest punct de vedere, este necesar corelarea actelor normative specificate, cu O.M.I.
nr. 163/2007 pentru aprobarea Normelor generale de aprare mpotriva incendiilor care face
referire n textul su i la riscul de explozie.
Acest concept este relevat teoretic/practic i de existena/coninutul juridic i tehnic ale
unor acte normative, prescripii tehnice, standarde etc., n vigoare, dup cum urmeaz:
SR EN 1127-1:2003 Atmosfere explozive. Prevenirea i protecia la explozii. Partea I:
Concepte fundamentale i metodologice;
SR EN 13821:2003 Atmosfere potenial explozive. Prevenirea i protecia la explozii.
Determinarea energiei minime de aprindere a atmosferelor praf/aer;
O.M.T.C.T. nr. 176/2005, pentru aprobarea Reglementrii tehnice Normativ pentru
proiectarea, executarea, verificarea i exploatarea instalaiilor electrice n zone cu pericol de
explozie, indicativ NP 099-04 cu modificrile i completrile ulterioare, publicat n Monitorul
Oficial al Romniei, partea I, nr. 418 din 18 mai 2005;
O.M.T.C.T. nr. 2231 din 27 decembrie 2005, pentru modificarea i completarea anexei la
O.M.T.C.T. nr. 176/2005, privind aprobarea Reglementrii tehnice Normativ pentru proiectarea,
executarea, verificarea i exploatarea instalaiilor electrice n zone cu pericol de explozie,
indicativ NP099-04 cu modificrile i completrile ulterioare, publicat n Monitorul Oficial al
Romniei, partea I, nr. 418 din 18 mai 2005;
H.G. nr. 752/2004, privind stabilirea condiiilor pentru introducerea pe pia a
echipamentelor i substanelor protectoare destinate utilizrii n atmosfere potenial explozive,
publicat n Monitorul Oficial al Romniei, partea I, nr. 499 din 3 iunie 2004;
O.M.M.S.S.F. nr. 476/2004 privind aprobarea Listei standardelor romne care adopt
standardele europene armonizate referitoare la echipamente i sisteme protectoare destinate
utilizrii n atmosfere potenial explozive;
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NP 099-04 ca Normativ pentru proiectarea, executarea, verificarea i exploatarea

instalaiilor electrice n zone cu pericol de explozie, aprobat prin O.M.T.C.T. nr. 176/2005,
publicat n Monitorul Oficial al Romniei nr. 418 din 18 mai 2005, modificat i completat cu
O.M.T.C.T. nr. 2231/2005, publicat n Monitorul Oficial, partea I, nr. 95 din 01 februarie 2006.
Rezult c este necesar s se introduc n legislaia curent care face referire la aprarea
mpotriva incendiilor i identificarea, respectiv evaluarea riscurilor de explozie.
Din punct de vedere conceptual, identificarea i evaluarea riscurilor de incendiu i
explozie implic abordarea att punctual/individual, ct i holistic/global a riscurilor pentru
diferite situaii, stri, mprejurri etc., n conexiune cu sisteme, subsisteme, entiti economice,
industriale etc., cu raportarea la noiuni cum sunt: iniiere, dezvoltare, propagare.
Se consider c n cazul exploziilor unor materiale/substane combustibile/inflamabile
(vapori de lichide combustibile, gaze inflamabile, pulberi/prafuri etc.) sau ale unor materiale
necombustibile (recipiente de gaze neinflamabile sub presiune etc.) termenul dezvoltare este
sinonim cu termenul propagare.
Spre exemplu, abordarea punctual i holistic n cazul unei identificri, respectiv unei
evaluri la risc de incendiu/explozie, implic abordarea teoriei/analizei de risc inclusiv din punctul
de vedere al conceptului de securitate i sntate n munc.
n acest sens, din punct de vedere axiomatic, se fac urmtoarele observaii:
un accident de munc individual sau colectiv poate s genereze iniierea, dezvoltarea,
propagarea unui incendiu;
un incendiu care se dezvolt i se propag poate s genereze un accident de munc
individual sau colectiv;
un accident de munc individual sau colectiv poate s genereze iniierea,
dezvoltarea/propagarea unei explozii;
o explozie poate s genereze un accident de munc individual sau colectiv.
Msurile de prevenire, care se aplic n raport cu condiiile de necesar i suficient, trebuie
s permit generarea unui control al riscurilor/pericolelor, astfel nct s nu se dezvolte stri de
pericol potenial/iminent.
Filosofia teoriei riscurilor rezid din faptul c strile de pericol, prin natura obiectiv a
potenialului lor de dezvoltare, pot fi controlate prin aplicarea unor msuri de prevenire adecvate i
imediate/operative.
Starea de pericol potenial/iminent reprezint o stare avansat n funcie de timp i spaiu,
n raport cu starea de pericol.
Metodele de evaluare la risc se subscriu legislaiei n vigoare pentru drepturile de autor i
reprezint drepturi intelectuale pentru persoanele fizice care le-au creat.
4. CONCLUZII
Actele normative, reglementrile tehnice, juridice etc., care se refer la aprarea mpotriva
incendiilor, genereaz n textul lor o multitudine de cerine (msuri, reguli etc.) care trebuie
respectate n mod conform/necondiionat de ctre persoanele fizice i/sau juridice n raport cu
domeniul specificat.
n prezent, legislaia n vigoare stabilete doar n cteva dintre cazuri modul cum se
ntocmesc unele documente necesare managementului organizrii activitilor de aprare mpotriva
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incendiilor pentru operatori economici, instituii etc. (plan de intervenie, permis de lucru cu foc,
fi individual de instructaj n domeniul situaiilor de urgen etc.).
Este necesar, n acest mod, s se realizeze un ghid cu documente i/sau proceduri care s
admit caracter unitar, conform cu cerinele realitii obiective curente.
Documentele puse n discuie permit personalizarea lor i conform cu legislaia n vigoare,
odat ntocmite (redactate, elaborate, aprobate etc.) se subscriu legislaiei referitoare la drepturile
de autor.
BIBLIOGRAFIE
[1]***Legea nr. 307/2006 Legea aprrii mpotriva incendiilor, Monitorul Oficial al Romniei,
partea I, nr. 633 din 21.07.2006.
[2]***O.M.I. nr. 163/2007 pentru aprobarea Normelor generale de aprare mpotriva incendiilor,
Monitorul Oficial al Romniei, partea I, nr. 216/29 martie 2007.
[3] Stomff, S. Ghid pentru implementarea sistemului de management al sntii i securitii
ocupaionale, ediia a II-a, Editura Standardizarea, Bucureti, 2009.
[4]***O.M.I.R.A. nr. 210/2007 pentru aprobarea Metodologiei privind identificarea, evaluarea i
controlul riscurilor de incendiu, Monitorul Oficial al Romniei nr. 360 din 28 mai 2007.
[5] Popescu, G., Vlaia, S., Guzu, A. Aprarea mpotriva incendiilor. Concept. Organizare.
Elemente de conformitate. Conferin cu participare internaional, Instalaii pentru construcii
i confortul ambiental, ediia a 23-a, 4-5 aprilie 2014, Timioara, Editura Politehnica,
Timioara, 2014.
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ENERGIA TERMIC A PMNTULUI

Student sergent Drago COLEZEA
Colonel lector univ. dr. ing. Corina BLAN
Abstract: The present study shows the exploitation of the thermal energy of the Earth using heat
pumps. This occurs in a closed cyclic process, changing the state of aggregation of a
refrigerant agent. The heat pump provides the necessary technical requirements for using
more efficiently the solar energy as ecological heat for the heating and the preparation of
the hot water for consumption.
Keywords: Heat, Geothermal Energy, Pump, Depth, Renewably.
1. INTRODUCERE
n ri precum Germania, Italia, Islanda, Indonezia, Mexic i S.U.A., energia termic a
pmntului se utilizeaz de muli ani, fiind un concept de energie pentru nclzire i producere de
energie electric.
Fig. 1 nveliurile principale ale Pmntului [1]
n funcie de adncimea de foraj, se face o distincie ntre energia geotermal profund (ce
se gsete la peste 400 m sub pmnt) i energia termic de mic adncime.
Energia termic profund este folosit att pentru generarea energiei electrice n centralele
electrice, ct i ca energie termic pentru reelele termice n producia industrial sau nclzirea
locuinelor. Un avantaj al acestei surse de energie este temperatura constant a pmntului
indiferent de anotimp.
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n locurile unde straturile de ap au o temperatur ridicat (depete 100C) acestea se pot

utiliza direct. n funcie de debit i temperatura apei termale, energia hidrotermal este utilizat n
generarea energiei termice i electrice.
Energia termic de mic adncime utilizeaz cldura din straturile superioare ale
pmntului.
Acest proces nu utilizeaz apa termal n mod direct, ci se folosete cldura cedat de
aceasta printr-un schimbtor de cldur. [2]
Temperatura pmntului la adncimi mici difer n funcie de condiiile climatice, cu ct
coborm mai adnc n interiorul scoarei terestre temperatura crete, variaia acesteia realizndu-se
treptat doar n funcie de adncime.
Fig. 2 Distribuia temperaturii n sol [2]
Energia geotermal de care dispune pmntul poate fi exploatat ca energie termic cu

ajutorul pompelor de cldur.
2. POMPE DE CLDUR
2.1. Avantaje
Pompele de cldur reprezint un sistem fiabil i nepoluant pentru instalaiile de nclzire,
n plus reduce costurile cu nclzirea ntre 40% i 80% fa de sistemele clasice.
Locul unde este instalat pompa de cldur va fi un loc curat, fr a produce cenu sau
gaze toxice, utilizatorul putnd s acorde ntrebuinri multiple ncperii respective.
12
Energia latent stocat n aer, ap sau sol este folosit de pompe pentru a obine un nivel de
temperatur dorit, iar schimbtoarele de cldur recolecteaz energia mediului nconjurtor.
Pompele de cldur reprezint la ora actual cel mai modern sistem de nclzire. Dup
cuptoarele cu lemne i crbuni, nclzirile centrale cu petrol sau cocs, pompa de cldur a ajuns s
nlocuiasc centralele pe gaze n din ce n ce mai multe cazuri [3].
n ziua de azi, lumea trebuie s exploateze toate resursele naturale de care dispune i s
fructifice resursele regenerabile pentru a crea un mediu propice pentru generaiile viitoare.
2.2. Teoria pompelor de cldur
Acest tip de energie geotermal este caracterizat prin nivelul relativ sczut al
temperaturilor la care este disponibil i poate fi utilizat numai pentru nclzire, fiind imposibil
conversia acesteia n energie electric.
Principiul nclzirii termodinamice dup care funcioneaz pompele de cldur se bazeaz
pe transformarea cldurii de temperatur sczut n cldur de temperatura ridicat. Aceasta are loc
n cadrul unui proces ciclic nchis, care modific starea de agregare a unui agent frigorific. n figura
urmtoare va fi redat schematic ciclul de rcire al unei pompe de cldur (evaporare, comprimare,
condensare, expandare).
Fig. 3 Ciclul de rcire al unei pompe de cldur [4]
Agentul de lucru din instalaie trebuie s aib cldur intern mare i s se evaporeze la
temperaturi mici. La folosirea agenilor de lucru siguri (R407C, R404A, R410A, R134A etc.)
instalarea se face direct. Agenii de lucru inflamabili (R290 i alii) nu mai sunt aa de rspndii din
motive de siguran [3].
2.3. Clasificarea pompelor de cldur
Clasificarea pompelor se poate face dup:
Domeniul de utilizare:
nclzire, rcire, preparare apa cald, ventilarea ncperilor, dezumidificare, recuperare
cldur etc.
13
Sursa de cldur:
cldura solului, a apei freatice, aerul exterior, aerul de evacuare etc.
Mediul sursei de cldur saramur/ap, ap/ap, comprimare direct/ap, aer/ap,
aer/aer etc.
Construcie:
compactare, split;
loc de instalare;
pomp de cldur cu comprimare sau absorbie;
dup acionare (motor electric sau pe gaz);
dup numrul de trepte [3].
Solul reprezint un mediu eficient, care acumuleaz energie din radiaia solar i indirect
din ploi i din aerul din atmosfer.
Cldura este preluat prin intermediul unor circuite ngropate n sol, care primesc cldur i o
cedeaz vaporizatorului pompei de cldur. Vaporizatorul pompei de cldur poate fi montat direct n
sol. Circuitele din sol sunt compuse din schimbtoare de cldur (colectori), pompe de circulaie a
agentului, vase de expansiune, sisteme de distribuie a agentului n colectori, dispozitive de aerisire.
Agentul din circuitele ngropate n sol are proprietile unei soluii apoase de tip antigel,
deoarece variaia temperaturii la adncimi mici ale solului n funcie de anotimp poate provoca
disfuncionaliti n funcionarea sistemului.
2.4. Pompe de cldur pentru nclzire saramur/ap, ap/ap
Utilizarea unui sistem saramur/ap se folosete pentru nclzirea monovalent (folosind n
special cldura solului), precum i pentru rcire, recuperarea cldurii i prepararea apei calde.
Acelai rol l joac i pompele ap/ap.
Ciclul frigorific este alctuit n general dintr-un compresor ermetic (piston pentru operare
extrem de silenios) cu sigurana integrat intern pentru suprasarcin, schimbtor de cldur din
oel inoxidabil cu plci ca evaporator, condensator i ventil de expansiune. Fluxul circuitului de
rcire (figura urmtoare) trebuie izolat complet de pierderi de cldur i de condens.
Fig. 3 Ciclul de rcire al unei pompe de cldur saramur/ap, ap/ap [3]
14
Agenii folosii n instalaii sunt ageni fr clor, care nu au un efect negativ asupra
stratului de ozon.
n funcie de productor partea electric este integrat sau extern. Reglarea cldurii este
adesea integrat. Reglarea cldurii, comandat de microprocesor, are rolul de a aciona n cazul
modificrii vremii sau n funcie de sarcin. Curba de nclzire, precum i diferitele funcii sau
programe se pot seta individual.
Solul reprezint sursa de cldur ideal pentru instalaiile care funcioneaz monovalent.
Solul stocheaz energie solar i se regenereaz cu ajutorul apei de ploaie. Astfel, chiar i pe timp
de iarn avem suficient energie la ndemn datorit stratului de zpad. La folosirea sondelor de
adncime se utilizeaz un volum mai mare de sol i astfel cantitatea de energie termic este
considerabil mai mare.
Instalaia sursei de cldur (disipatorul de cldur n mod de funcionare pentru rcire)
const n acel sistem format dintr-un colector distribuit plat sau dintr-o sond de sol, sub forma unor
sisteme nchise.
Sunt folosite trasee din plastic, suficient de rezistent pentru a evita deteriorrile cauzate de
ocuri mecanice. Instalarea se face diferit n funcie de caz, cu respectarea pailor, a instalaiilor
productorilor, dar i a autorizaiilor obinute [3].
Fig. 4 Sisteme de captare a cldurii. [5]
3. CONCLUZII
Tehnologia pompelor de cldur poate reduce considerabil emisiile de gaze cu efect de
ser care sunt produse ca urmare a arderii combustibililor fosili n cazanele pentru nclzire [3].
Alegerea corect a sursei de cldur i a sistemului de distribuie a energiei termice la
regimul de funcionare al pompelor de cldur conduce la funcionarea sigur i economic a
15
instalaiilor de nclzire cu pompe de cldur. Pompa de cldur ofer premisele tehnice necesare
pentru a folosi eficient energia solar sub form de cldur ecologic pentru nclzirea i prepararea
apei calde de consum.
Instalaiile de nclzire cu pompe de cldur realizeaz consumuri energetice minime n
exploatare i reprezint cu siguran o soluie de viitor pentru optimizarea energetic a cldirilor din
ara noastr [6].
BIBLIOGRAFIE
[1] http://cimss.ssec.wisc.edu
[2] http://www.renewables-made-in-germany.com
[3] Karl Ochsner, Pompe de cldur pentru tehnica nclzirii, Ghid practic pentru instalatori i
proiectani, Editura MATRIX ROM, Bucureti, 2011.
[4] http://www.panourisolare-online.ro
[5] http://www.ecology.md
[6] http://www.tehnicainstalatiilor.ro
16
SECURITATEA LA INCENDIU A TUNELURILOR RUTIERE DIN EUROPA

Student sergent Daniel MILU
Locotenent-colonel instr. mil. princ. I drd. ing. Ionel-Alin MOCIOI
Colonel conf. univ. dr. ing. Manuel ERBAN
Abstract: This article presents the main safety measures in road tunnels in Europe. It is also specified
the role and importance of fire extinguishing equipment in the tunnel, and the presence of
air ventilation systems.
Keywords: Road Tunnel, Safety Measures, Air Ventilation, Extinguishing Equipment.
1. GENERALITI
Tunelurile cu o lungime de peste 500 m sunt structuri importante care faciliteaz
comunicarea dintre zone mari ale Europei i joac un rol decisiv n funcionarea i dezvoltarea
economiilor regionale.
Realizarea unui nivel de protecie uniform, constant i ridicat pentru toi cetenii europeni
n tunelurile rutiere, nu poate fi realizat n msur suficient de statele membre i, n consecin, din
cauza nivelului de armonizare solicitat, poate fi realizat mai bine la nivel comunitar. Recentele
accidente din tuneluri subliniaz importana acestora din punct de vedere uman, economic i
cultural.
Unele tuneluri din Europa, date n exploatare cu mult timp n urm, au fost proiectate ntr-o
perioad n care posibilitile tehnice i condiiile de transport erau foarte diferite de cele actuale.
Astfel, exist mari diferene n ceea ce privete nivelul de securitate i aceast situaie trebuie
remediat.
Securitatea n tuneluri necesit cteva msuri legate, printre altele, de geometria tunelului
i de modul n care a fost proiectat, de echipamentul de securitate, inclusiv indicatoarele de
circulaie rutier, gestionarea traficului, instruirea personalului din cadrul serviciilor de urgen,
gestionarea incidentelor, furnizarea de informaii ctre utilizatori n privina celor mai bune moduri
de comportare n tuneluri i mai buna comunicare dintre autoritile de resort i serviciile de
urgen, cum ar fi: poliia, pompierii i echipele de salvatori.
2. MSURI DE SECURITATE N TUNELURI RUTIERE

Msurile de securitate care urmeaz s fie aplicate ntr-un tunel se bazeaz pe o analiz
sistematic a tuturor aspectelor sistemului compus din infrastructur, exploatare, utilizatori i
vehicule.
Sunt luai n considerare urmtorii parametri:
lungimea tunelului;
numrul de galerii;
17
numrul de benzi de circulaie;

geometria profilului transversal;
traseul profilului longitudinal i traseul n plan;
tipul de construcie;
traficul unidirecional sau bidirecional;
volumul traficului pentru fiecare galerie (inclusiv distribuia temporal);
riscul de congestie (zilnic sau sezonier);
timpul de acces pentru serviciile de urgen;
prezena i procentajul vehiculelor grele pentru transportul de mrfuri;
prezena i procentajul traficului de mrfuri periculoase, precum i tipul de mrfuri
periculoase transportate;
caracteristicile drumurilor de acces;
limea benzii de circulaie;
aspecte privind viteza;
mediul geografic i meteorologic.
n cazul n care un tunel are o caracteristic deosebit n privina parametrilor anterior
menionai, se efectueaz o analiz a riscurilor, pentru a se stabili dac sunt necesare msuri de
securitate i echipamente suplimentare pentru a se asigura un nivel ridicat al securitii n tunel.
Aceast analiz a riscurilor ia n considerare posibilele accidente, care afecteaz, n mod clar,
securitatea utilizatorilor de drumuri n tuneluri i care s-ar putea produce n timpul etapei de
exploatare, precum i natura i dimensiunile consecinelor lor posibile [1].
2.1. Galerii de evacuare n caz de pericol i ieiri de urgen
n tunelurile noi fr band pentru staionare de urgen, se realizeaz culoare pietonale de
urgen, aflate sau nu la un nivel mai ridicat dect carosabilul, pentru a fi folosite de utilizatorii
tunelului n cazul defectrii unui autovehicul sau n cazul unui accident.
Fig. 1 Culoar pietonal de urgen, aflat la un nivel mai ridicat dect carosabilul
Prevederile anterioare nu se aplic n cazul n care caracteristicile constructive ale tunelului

nu permit aceast msur sau o permit numai cu condiia unor costuri disproporionate, iar tunelul
este unidirecional i este echipat cu un sistem de supraveghere permanent i de nchidere a
benzilor de circulaie.
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n tunelurile existente n care nu exist nici band pentru staionare de urgen, nici culoar
pietonal de urgen, se iau msuri suplimentare i mai severe pentru asigurarea securitii.
Ieirile de urgen permit utilizatorilor s prseasc tunelurile fr vehiculele lor i s
ajung ntr-un loc sigur n eventualitatea unui accident sau a unui incendiu, asigurnd, n acelai
timp, accesul pietonal n tunel pentru serviciile de urgen. Exemple de astfel de ieiri de urgen
sunt urmtoarele:
ieiri directe din tunel spre exterior;
conexiuni ntre galeriile tunelului;
ieiri spre o galerie de urgen;
adposturi cu o galerie de evacuare separat de galeria tunelului.
Fig. 2 Ieire de urgen i Panoul de urgen n Daishi Tunnel
Fig. 3 Un traseu de evacuare de urgen tunel n tunelul Mont Blanc la frontiera franco-italian
Se prevd ieiri de urgen, n cazul n care o analiz a riscurilor relevante, inclusiv ct de

departe i ct de rapid circul fumul n condiiile locale, arat c ventilarea i alte cerine legate de
securitate sunt insuficiente pentru a asigura securitatea utilizatorilor de drumuri.
n tunelurile noi se prevd ieiri de urgen n cazul n care volumul traficului este mai
mare de 2.000 de vehicule pe band de circulaie.
n tunelurile existente cu lungime mai mare de 1.000 m, cu un volum al traficului de peste
2.000 de vehicule pe band de circulaie, se evalueaz fezabilitatea i eficiena realizrii unor noi
ieiri de urgen.
19
n cazul n care sunt prevzute ieiri de urgen, distana dintre dou ieiri de urgen nu
depete 500 m. Se utilizeaz mijloace adecvate, cum ar fi uile, pentru a mpiedica fumul i
cldura s ajung la galeriile de evacuare din spatele ieirii de urgen, astfel nct utilizatorii
tunelului s poat ajunge n securitate n exterior, iar serviciile de urgen s poat avea acces n
tunel [1].
2.2. Iluminatul
Iluminatul normal este realizat astfel nct s asigure conductorilor auto o vizibilitate
adecvat att ziua, ct i noaptea n zona de intrare, precum i n interiorul tunelului.
Iluminatul de securitate este realizat pentru a permite o utilizatorilor tunelului o vizibilitate
minim n vederea evacurii tunelului n vehiculele lor n eventualitatea unei avarii a sistemului de
alimentare cu energie electric.
Se asigur iluminatul de evacuare, cum ar fi balizajul pentru evacuare, la o nlime de
maximum 1,5 m, care s ghideze utilizatorii pentru evacuarea tunelului pe jos, n situaii de urgen [1].
Fig. 4 Iluminat normal in tunelul Abu Dhabi
2.3. Ventilaia
Proiectarea, construcia i operarea sistemului de ventilaie trebuie s in seama de:
controlul poluanilor emii de vehiculele rutiere, n condiii normale de trafic i n
condiii de trafic de vrf;
controlul poluanilor emii de vehiculele rutiere n situaiile n care circulaia este oprit
ca urmare a unui incident sau unui accident;
controlul cldurii i fumului n cazul unui incendiu.
20
n tunelurile cu lungime mai mare de 1.000 m, cu un volum al traficului mai mare de 2.000
de vehicule pe band de circulaie, se instaleaz un sistem mecanic de ventilaie.
n tunelurile cu trafic bidirecional i/sau aglomerat, ventilaia longitudinal este permis
numai dac o analiz a riscurilor arat c aceasta poate fi acceptat i dac se iau msuri specifice,
cum ar fi gestionarea adecvat a traficului, distane mai scurte pn la ieirile de urgen,
dispozitive de evacuare a fumului instalate la anumite intervale.
Sistemele de ventilaie transversale sau semitransversale se utilizeaz numai n tunelurile
n care este necesar un sistem mecanic de ventilaie, iar ventilaia longitudinal nu este permis.
Aceste sisteme trebuie s poat evacua fumul n caz de incendiu.
n cazul tunelurilor cu trafic bidirecional, cu un volum de trafic mai mare de 2.000 de
vehicule pe band de circulaie, mai lungi de 3.000 m, cu un centru de control i sistem de ventilaie
transversal sau semitransversal, se iau urmtoarele msuri n ceea ce privete ventilaia:
se instaleaz dispozitive cu clapet pentru aspirarea aerului i a fumului, care pot
funciona separat sau n grup;
viteza longitudinal a aerului este monitorizat constant, iar procesul de direcionare a
sistemului de ventilaie (dispozitive de ventilaie, ventilatoare etc.) este ajustat n consecin. [1]
Fig. 5 Ventilaie transversal n tunel rutier
Fig. 6 Ventilaie longitudinal n tunel rutier
21
2.4. Alimentarea cu ap
Toate tunelurile trebuie s aib alimentare cu ap. Hidranii se amplaseaz lng gurile
tunelurilor i n interiorul acestora, la intervale de maximum 250 m. n cazul n care nu este
disponibil o surs de alimentare cu ap, este obligatoriu s se verifice dac poate fi pus la
dispoziie n alt mod o cantitate de ap suficient.
3. SISTEME DE MONITORIZARE
n toate tunelurile cu centru de control se instaleaz sisteme de monitorizare video i un
sistem capabil s detecteze n mod automat incidentele de circulaie (cum ar fi vehiculele care s-au
oprit) i incendiile.
n tunelurile care nu au centru de control se instaleaz sisteme automate de detectare a
incendiilor, n cazul n care funcionarea sistemelor de ventilaie mecanice destinate controlului
fumului difer de funcionarea automat a ventilaiei pentru controlul poluanilor.
Fig. 7 Sistem monitorizare wireless
Sistemele de monitorizare n tuneluri sunt, de asemenea, larg rspndite n ntreaga lume.

Parametrii cei mai solicitai pentru a monitoriza calitatea aerului din interiorul tunelurilor: fluxul de
aer pentru vizibilitate i o gam larg de gaze (CO, CO2, NO2, O2, SH2 i PM-10).
n acest moment, multe dintre aceste sisteme sunt instalaii cu fir. Prin implementarea de
reele cu senzori wireless s-ar economisi bani, s-ar reduce timpul de instalare, ar crete nivelul de
securitate la incendii.
22
Vnturile puternice, de peste 10 m/s, realizeaz vrtejuri de fum i gaze fierbini n tuneluri
rutiere, astfel c temperaturile maxime nu se nregistreaz ntotdeauna la nivelul focarului de
incendiu.
FibroLaser este un detector de temperatur care msoar att convecia, ct i radiaia,
asigurnd un sistem de detectare i localizare a incendiilor cu fiabilitate i siguran ridicat.
Din ce n ce mai frecvent, pe viitor, traficul rutier se va muta n subteran cu scopul
de a crea artere rutiere mai eficiente i pentru a diminua aglomeraia i poluarea din orae.
Persoanele, vehiculele i infrastructura trebuie s fie protejate mpotriva incendiilor cu eficien
maxim.
Detectoarele FibroLaser sunt instalate la nivel mondial, n unele dintre cele mai importante
tuneluri rutiere, asigurnd:
detectarea rapid i localizarea precis a focarului de incendiu iniial pentru activarea
selectiv a sistemelor de supraveghere video, de ventilaie, precum i acionarea instalaiilor de
stingere a incendiilor;
detectarea mrimii i direciei de propagare a incendiului, informaii care sunt eseniale
pentru o aciune rapid i corespunztoare a serviciilor intervenie [2].
Fig. 8 Monitorizare FibroLaser
Cel mai lung tunel rutier din lume se afl n Norvegia, la Laerdal (fig. 9), i se ntinde pe o
distan de 24,5 kilometri, de peste 30 de ori mai mare dect lungimea tunelului.
Tunelul norvegian a fost inaugurat la finalul anului 2000 i este prevzut cu o serie de
sisteme de securitate, potrivit CNN. Astfel, pn i simpla atingere a stingtoarelor situate de-a
lungul tunelului la o distan de 125 de metri declaneaz o alarm care le va indica oferilor care
tranziteaz tunelul s ntoarc i s ias din tunel.
De asemenea, exist telefoane de urgen amplasate la fiecare 250 de metri, dar i 15 puncte de
ntoarcere special concepute pentru autobuze i camioane. Tunelul de la Laerdal a costat 114 milioane
23
de dolari (105 milioane de euro), iar la vremea inaugurrii traficul estimat era de circa 1.000 de
vehicule pe zi. De altfel, n Norvegia se afl dou dintre cele mai lungi zece tuneluri rutiere din
lume, lungimea cumulat a acestora fiind de circa 35,9 kilometri [3].
Fig. 9 Tunelul de la Laerdal
4. CONCLUZII
Tunelurile lungi, dei au avantaje extraordinare n sensul c pot scurta distanele parcurse
de oferi, pot fi extrem de periculoase n cazul unor incendii, n contextul n care fumul toxic se
ventileaz foarte greu.
Dup cum rezult n mod clar din lucrarea realizat de Comisia Economic pentru Europa
a Organizaiei Naiunilor Unite (CEE-ONU), conduita utilizatorilor de drumuri reprezint un aspect
decisiv al securitii n tuneluri.
Msurile de securitate ar trebui s permit persoanelor implicate n incidente s se salveze,
s permit utilizatorilor s acioneze imediat, astfel nct s previn consecine mai grave, s asigure
aciunea eficient a serviciilor de urgen, s protejeze mediul i s limiteze daunele materiale.
Meninerea unui nivel ridicat al securitii necesit ntreinerea adecvat a sistemelor de
securitate din tuneluri. Ar trebui organizat un schimb sistematic de informaii ntre statele membre
ale UE n privina tehnicilor de securitate moderne i a datelor privind accidentele/incidentele.
Unul dintre cele mai cunoscute accidente petrecute ntr-un tunel rutier este cel din tunelul
Mont Blanc (11,6 kilometri) din martie 1999. Dup ce un camion ce transporta margarin i fin a
luat foc i s-a oprit la kilometrul 6,7 pe sensul de mers dinspre Frana spre Italia, 39 de persoane iau pierdut viaa. Incendiul a fost stins dup dou zile i au fost atinse temperaturi de 1.000o C. Timp
de trei ani, tunelul, care este unul dintre cele mai mari din lume, a fost nchis, n urma acestui
eveniment.
BIBLIOGRAFIE
[1]
[2]
[3]
Directiva 2004/54/CE.
http://www.buildingtechnologies.siemens.com
http://archive.is/
24
PERFORMANE SPECIFICE ALE CLDIRILOR

CU AGLOMERRI DE PERSOANE
Student sergent Marian-George PIERINARU
Abstract: This paper presents the specific features of overcrowded buildings, according the normative
P118 which have the purpose of reducing fire risk, as well as reducing the loss of both
human lives and/or material damages in case of such a situation.
Keywords: Overcrowded Buildings, Evacuation, Firewall, Fire Risk.
1. INTRODUCERE
Specificul i particularitile constructive ale cldirilor cu aglomerri de persoane impun
condiii riguroase pentru acest tip de construcii.
Evacuarea utilizatorilor are o importan deosebit ntruct numrul mare de persoane i
prezena unor fenomene asociate incendiului conduc la apariia unor efecte negative (panic,
pierderi de viei omeneti etc.).
2. NOIUNI GENERALE DESPRE CLDIRILE CU AGLOMERRI DE
PERSOANE
ncperile cu aglomerri de persoane sunt ncperi n care se pot afla simultan cel puin 50
de persoane, fiecreia dintre acestea revenindu-i o arie de pardoseal mai mic de 4 m.
Sala aglomerat, categorie distinct a ncperilor cu aglomerri de persoane, reprezint o
ncpere sau un grup de ncperi care comunic direct ntre ele prin goluri (protejate sau
neprotejate) n care suprafaa ce-i revine unei persoane este mai mic de 4 m i n care se pot
ntruni simultan cel puin 150 de persoane (sli de spectacole, sli de ntruniri, ncperi pentru
expoziii, muzee, cluburi, cinematografe etc.). n situaia n care acestea sunt situate la parter, se
consider sli aglomerate cele cu mai mult de 200 de persoane.
Dup destinaie, slile aglomerate pot fi de categoria S1 sau S2, conform tabelului nr. 1, iar
corelaia admis ntre amplasarea i categoria slilor, numrul de locuri i nivelul de stabilitate la
foc al cldirilor cu sli aglomerate este prezentat n tabelul nr. 2. [2]
Categorii de sli aglomerate
Sli
Destinaia slii aglomerate
aglomerate
S1
Teatre, sli de spectacole, circuri, expoziii comerciale etc.
S2
Tabelul nr. 1
Sli pentru proiecii cinematografice, cantine i restaurante, sli de lectur, muzee,

expoziii permanente de art, auditorii, sli de ntruniri, de dans, de concert, de sport, de
ateptare, vestiare, de cult, discotec, magazine cu mrfuri combustibile etc.
25
Corelaia admis ntre amplasarea i categoria slilor, numrul

de locuri i nivelul de stabilitate la foc al cldirilor cu sli aglomerate
Amplasarea slii aglomerate
Categoria
salii
Sal independent sau constituind un

compartiment de incendiu distinct
Sali aglomerate comasate, ntr-o cldire fr alte
destinaii
Sal aglomerat nglobat n cldiri cu alt
destinaie
S1
S2
S1
S2
S1
S2
Tabelul nr. 2
Capacitatea (numrul maxim de
locuri) n funcie de nivelul de
stabilitate la foc al cldirii
I
II
II
Nelimitat
5.000
1.500
Nelimitat
2.000
6.000
3.000
1.200
Nelimitat
Nelimitat
1.500
3.000
2.000
1.000
5.000
3.000
1.200
Numrul de niveluri supraterane admis n cldiri cu sli aglomerate pentru poriunea n

care publicul are acces, n conformitate cu categoria slii aglomerate este prezentat n tabelul nr. 3
Numrul de niveluri supraterane admis n cldiri cu sli aglomerate
(poriunea n care publicul are acces)
Tabelul nr. 3
Categoria
Numrul maxim de niveluri supraterane admis n cldiri cu aglomerri de persoane avnd
slii
nivelul de stabilitate la foc
I
II
III
S1
Nelimitat
5
2
S2
Nelimitat
3. AMPLASAREA CLDIRILOR CU SLI AGLOMERATE

Cldirile cu sli aglomerate trebuie s fie uor accesibile din drumurile publice,
asigurndu-se condiii corespunztoare pentru desfurarea operaiunilor de stingere precum i a
celor de salvare a persoanelor. De asemenea, este necesar ca autospecialele de pompieri s aib
acces la cel puin 50% din perimetrul cldirii.
Curile interioare i spaiile dintre cldirile cu sli aglomerate pot fi luate n considerare
pentru evacuarea persoanelor n caz de incendiu, dac au limea suficient pentru trecerea
numrului de uniti de trecere rezultat din calcul (vezi Dimensionarea cilor de evacuare), dar nu
mai puin de 6,00 m.
Corelaia admis ntre amplasarea i categoria slilor, numrul de locuri i nivelul de stabilitate
la foc al cldirilor cu sli aglomerate este prezentat n Tabelul 2, iar numrul de niveluri supraterane
admis n cldiri cu sli aglomerate (poriunea n care publicul are acces) se regsete n tabelul 3. [2]
Cldirile cu sli aglomerate nu se comaseaz cu alte cldiri. Acestea se amplaseaz astfel
nct s nu permit propagarea incendiilor de la/spre cldiri nvecinate sau, n cazul prbuirii, s nu
afecteze obiective nvecinate prin respectarea distanelor minime de siguran prevzute n tabelul
4, ori compartimentndu-se prin perei rezisteni la foc alctuii corespunztor celei mai mari valori
a densitii sarcinii termice (q), dar nu mai puin de REI/EI 180.
Distane de siguran
Tabelul nr. 4
Distane minime de siguran (m) fa de cldiri sau compartimente de incendiu
Nivelul de stabilitate
avnd nivelul de stabilitate la foc
la foc
I-II
III
IV-V
I-II
5
7
9
III
7
8
10
IV-V
9
9
12
26
4. EVACUAREA UTILIZATORILOR DIN CLDIRILE CU SLI AGLOMERATE

Evacuarea utilizatorilor n condiii de siguran i ntr-un timp scurt este o cerin deosebit
de important de care trebuie s se in seama atunci cnd este proiectat o astfel de construcie.
Una dintre cele mai importante cerine ale evacurii utilizatorilor din cldirile cu sli
aglomerate este asigurarea a cel puin dou ieiri de evacuare distincte i judicios distribuite pentru
fiecare nivel al slilor aglomerate, precum i pentru nivelurile de loji i balcoane cu numrul de
persoane mai mare dect cel corespunztor unui flux. Aceast cerin este obligatorie i n cazul
foaierelor, bufetelor, garderobelor, cu aria mai mare de 100 m.
n figurile 1 i 2 sunt prezentate modaliti de stabilire a cilor de evacuare pentru slile cu
aglomerri de persoane. [3]
Fig. 1 Ci de evacuare din sli aglomerate
n cazul slilor aglomerate cu scene sau podiumuri, circulaia de evacuare trebuie

organizat astfel nct publicul s se deplaseze n direcia opus scenei, ntruct este strict interzis
evacuarea utilizatorilor prin/pe sub scen sau podiumuri.
27
Pentru scenele prevzute cu cortin de siguran, buzunarele scenelor cu o arie mai mare
de 100 m i fosele pentru orchestr cu mai mult de 50 de persoane se prevd obligatoriu dou ieiri
de siguran distincte de cele ale slii. Pentru scenele fr cortin de siguran i pentru fosele care
au o capacitate mai mic dect cea menionat anterior, este permis ca una din cile de evacuare s
treac prin sala aglomerat.
Fig. 2 Ci de evacuare din sli aglomerate
Buzunarele scenei i depozitele au cel puin o cale de evacuare n care traseul este separat
de scen.
Cile de evacuare ale balcoanelor i lojelor nu au traseul prin sala aglomerat.
28
Pentru asigurarea unei evacuri rapide i n condiii de siguran sunt impuse condiii,
specifice cldirilor cu sli aglomerate, precum:
mobilierul se fixeaz de pardoseal pentru a fi evitat rsturnarea acestora. Excepie de la
aceast regul fac slile de ntruniri cu o capacitate maxim de 200 de locuri cu condiia
solidarizrii scaunelor sau bncilor ntre ele pe pachete de minim 3 rnduri, lojile cu
maxim 24 de scaune mobile, expoziiile i saloanele de dans;
pe culoarele de evacuare nu se admit trepte n lungul spaiilor libere de trecere dintre
rndurile de scaune;
uile de pe traseul de evacuare trebuie s se deschid n sensul evacurii, i s nu aib
proeminene care ar putea ngreuna trecerea persoanelor;
scrile de evacuare a persoanelor din slile aglomerate pot avea rampe directe spre subsol
n condiiile n care acestea asigur accesul la spaii destinate publicului;
scrile exterioare folosite pentru evacuarea din slile aglomerate trebuie s aib nlimea
treptei de maxim 17 cm, iar limea treptei s fie de minim 28 cm. Acestea sunt alese
respectnd condiia 2h+lA62-64 n care h este nlimea treptei, iar l reprezint
limea treptei;
n faa ieirilor la nivelul terenului trebuie asigurat un spaiu liber pentru persoanele care
se evacueaz;
spaiul liber de trecere dintre rndurile de scaune trebuie s fie de minim 45 cm.
5. GABARITELE CILOR DE EVACUARE

Limea liber minim necesar pentru fluxurile de evacuare sunt stabilite n raport cu
numrul acestora, astfel:
0,80 m pentru 1 flux;
1,10 m pentru 2 fluxuri;
2,50 m pentru 5 fluxuri.
6. DIMENSIONAREA CILOR DE EVACUARE

Calculul cilor de evacuare (pentru mai mult de cinci persoane) const n determinarea
gabaritelor necesare i stabilirea lungimii traseelor, astfel nct s se asigure evacuarea rapid din
cldire, n timpul normat.
Numrul de fluxuri/uniti de trecere ce trebuie asigurate pentru evacuarea persoanelor se
determin cu relaia (1):
N
Ut
C
(1)
n care avem:
U t reprezint numrul uniti de trecere (fluxuri);
N reprezint numrul de persoane care trebuie s treac prin calea de evacuare;
C este capacitatea normat, de evacuare a unei uniti de trecere.
29
Rezultatele obinute din relaia de mai sus (1) se rotunjesc la numrul ntreg imediat
superior.
7. CAPACITATEA DE EVACUARE C
Capacitatea de evacuare C a unui flux de evacuare este prezentat n tabelul 5
Capacitatea de evacuare din slile aglomerate
Tipul slii aglomerate i nivelul de
Nr. crt.
stabilitate la foc al cldirii
1.
Sala aglomerat tip S1
2.
Sal aglomerat tip S2
Tabelul nr. 5
Capacitatea de evacuare C
( numr de persoane )
I-II
50 (70 )
III
35 ( 50 )
IV-V
25
I-II
65 ( 100 )
III
50 ( 75 )
IV
35
V
25
Valorile din parantez, din tabelul 5, sunt pentru circuitele de evacuare din interiorul slii
aglomerate pn la uile de evacuare ale slii respective.
Lungimile maxime admise pe traseul parcurs pe cile de evacuare, implicit i timpii de
evacuare sunt prezentai n tabelul 6. [2]
Pentru stabilirea timpului (lungimii) necesar pentru evacuare nu se iau n considerare
traseele prin foaiere i holuri, acestea considerndu-se la rndul lor sal aglomerat, determinrile
fcndu-se separat pentru spaiile respective.
Timpii de evacuare din slile aglomerate
Tabelul nr. 6
Timpii de evacuare ( lungimea maxim a cii de evacuare )
Categoria
Nivelul de
n interiorul slii pn
De la ua slii aglomerate n exterior,
slii
stabilitate la foc al
la o u a slii
pn la scara sau degajamentul protejat
aglomerate
cldirii
aglomerate
secunde
metri
secunde
metri
Sala S1
I-II
80
32
88
50
III
60
24
63
38
IV-V
30
12
37
25
Sala S2
I-II
100
40
88
50
III
80
32
63
38
IV
60
24
40
30
V
30
12
25
25
8. CONDIII CONSTRUCTIVE ALE CLDIRILOR CU SLI AGLOMERATE

Datorit specificului i a particularitilor constructive, cldirile cu sli aglomerate trebuie
s respecte anumite reguli. Pereii rezisteni la foc, cortina de siguran, trapele de evacuare a
fumului au rolul de a micora riscul de producere a incendiilor n aceste spaii.
n cazul acestui tip de construcii este recomandat desfumarea mecanic din cauza
pericolului pe care l prezint fumul, n special panic creat la apariia acestuia. Trapele pentru
evacuarea fumului sunt poziionate, de regul, n buzunarele scenei.
30
Locul cel mai expus pericolului de incendiu este scena cu toate anexele sale
(buzunarele scenei, sub scen, instalaiile de manevrare a decorurilor etc.). Din acest motiv este
recomandat ca deasupra scenei amenajate i sub scen s nu se amenajeze ncperi cu alte
destinaii, depozite de materiale combustibile i nici ateliere cu risc mare sau foarte mare de
incendiu. Pentru intervenia n cazul izbucnirii unui incendiu la prile superioare ale scenei i
la subsolul acesteia se asigur accesul prin case de scri nchise sau prin scri exterioare. Uile
de acces trebuie s fie EI 45-C5 Sm.
Acoperiul casei scenei i structurile de rezisten a pasarelelor i a grtarelor scenei se
execut din materiale A1 sau A2-s1d0. Golurile de acces la pasarele se protejeaz cu ui rezistente
la foc EI 90-C5 Sm echipate cu dispozitive automate de nchidere. Grtarele pasarelelor pot fi
realizate din materiale A1, A2-s1d0 sau B-s1d0. Pereii i planeele care separ scena i buzunarele
acesteia de anexele ei au rezisten la foc minim EI/ REI 90. Golurile dintre casa scenei i anexele
sale se protejeaz prin ui sau alte elemente de protecie cu rezisten la foc de minim EI 45-C5 Sm.
Planeele care separ scena sau buzunarele scenei de alte ncperi situate deasupra lor este de
minim REI 120. [2]
Pentru a mpiedica propagarea incendiului, slile aglomerate trebuie separate de restul
cldirii prin perei A1 sau A2-s1dO cu rezisten la foc de minim EI 180 i planee corespunztoare
nivelului lui de stabilitate de foc, dar nu mai puin de REI 90. Planeele nivelurilor intermediare din
interiorul slilor aglomerate (loji, balcoane, platforme) trebuie s fie A1 sau A2-s1dO cu rezisten
la foc n funcie de nivelul de stabilitate la foc al cldirii, ntruct unele produse ale arderii, precum
i fumul se concentreaz n special spre prile superioare ale ncperii, constituind un mare pericol
pentru spectatorii aflai n loje i balcoane. Planeele peste subsol sau demisol au rezisten la foc n
funcie de nivelul de stabilitate la foc al cldirii, dar nu mai puin de REI 90. Pentru a preveni
propagarea flcrilor unui incendiu izbucnit la scen, n pereii rezisteni la foc ce separ sectorul
slii aglomerate de scena amenajat, n afar golului portal se admite practicarea a cte dou goluri
de circulaie (unul pentru fiecare parte a scenei), protejate cu ncperi-tampon care au uile
rezistente la foc EI 45-C5 Sm. n cazul slilor prevzute cu cortin de siguran, aceste goluri se
amplaseaz n afara poriunii de perete din dreptul slii, astfel nct s nu conduc direct din scen
n sala aglomerat sau n cile de evacuare a publicului. i n aceast situaie golurile trebuie
protejate prin ui rezistente la foc, dar cu o valoare diferit EI 90-C5 Sm.
Pereii care separ depozitele cu materiale i produse combustibile i atelierele anexe cu
risc mare i foarte mare de incendiu fa de restul cldirii, trebuie s fie REI 180 i fr alte goluri
dect cele strict necesare circulaiei. Acestea se protejeaz cu ui rezistente la foc EI 90-C5 Sm.
Cortina de siguran are rolul de a despri compartimente de incendiu. Aceasta trebuie s
poat fi cobort n cel mult 40 de secunde, automat i prin comand de la distan i manual.
Proiecia de filme i diapozitive trebuie s se fac din cabine special amenajate atunci cnd
se utilizeaz mai mult de un aparat de proiecie, precum i la o eventual proiecie de filme pe baz
de nitroceluloz, iar n cazul izbucnirii unui incendiu n aceast ncpere se acioneaz automat
aprinderea luminii n sal.
Pereii i planeele unei astfel de ncperi, precum i ale depozitelor i anexelor sale trebuie
s fie A1 sau A2-s1d0 cu rezisten la foc de minim EI 120, respectiv REI 60 pentru planee. Astfel
de cabine de protecie nu trebuie s comunice direct cu sala n care se afl publicul dect prin
intermediul vizetelor de protecie i observare protejate cu geamuri E30 sau prin intermediul unor
ncperi-tampon prevzute cu ui cu o rezisten la foc de minim EI 15-C3 Sa. Calea de evacuare
prevzut obligatoriu poate fi comun cu una din cele destinate publicului.
31
Finisajele pe cile de evacuare trebuie s respecte clasele de reacie la foc a cilor de

evacuare corespunztoare destinaiilor i nivelurilor de stabilitate separat pe diferite destinaii ale
construciei.
Elementele decorative interioare, finisajele, precum i tratamentele termice i acustice ale
slilor aglomerate, pot fi minimum C-s1d0 sau executate din lemn i ignifugate cel puin pe partea
neaparent, inclusiv scheletul de montare i respectiv A2FL-s1 la planee. Este recomandat ca
distana dintre finisaje sau tratamente acustice i pereii-suport s nu fie mai mare de 15 cm, golurile
astfel realizate se mpart prin diafragme (pot fi din lemn ignifugat), n celule cu dimensiuni maxime
de 3,00 x 3,00 m, astfel nct s se evite formarea de cureni favorabili dezvoltrii incendiilor.
9. CONCLUZII
Noile condiii impuse de normativul P118/2-2013 instalaii de stingere a incendiilor,
asigur o protecie mrit a cldirilor cu aglomerri de persoane, n special, n zonele destinate
utilizatorilor, indiferent c este vorba de public sau personal.
Prin urmare, este deosebit de important s respectm condiiile constructive impuse de
normativul mai sus-menionat, pentru a reduce posibilitatea producerii unor evenimente cu impact
negativ.
BIBLIOGRAFIE
[1] Pompiliu Blulescu, Prevenirea incendiilor n cldiri cu aglomerri de persoane, Bucureti,
1998.
[2] Normativ privind securitatea la incendiu a construciilor indicativ P 118-1-2013, proiect
redactarea a II-a.
[3] *** Normativ privind proiectarea slilor aglomerate cu vizitatori cerine utilizatori, indicativ NP
006 1996.
32
MANAGEMENT I STRATEGII N ACTIVITATEA DE APRARE

MPOTRIVA INCENDIILOR LA O INSTITUIE PUBLIC (AFER)
Eugen BRBULESCU (ef SPSU)
Sorin-Radu ACHIMESCU (inspector protecie civil)
Gheorghe MOLDOVEANU (cadru tehnic PSI)
Bogdan VINTIL (responsabil cu pregtirea medical)
Viorel LUCACI (responsabil cu redactare documente i planuri)
Autoritatea Feroviar Romn (AFER)
Abstract: This paper demonstrates the importance of the work in emergencies to protect life, property
and the environment in general by the department of prevention of the Emergency Service of
AFER. In the same time, the work raises awareness of risks to which we are subject, in the
studied area, i.e. the knowledge of behavioral rules disaster.
Keywords: Management, Strategy, Fire Safety Activity, Public Institution, Romanian Railway
Authority (AFER).
1. INTRODUCERE
La nivel de AFER gestionarea situaiilor de urgen se realizeaz de ctre Compartimentul
de prevenire al Serviciului Pentru Situaii de Urgen AFER, care are ca scop principal prevenirea i
reducerea gravitii consecinelor unui eveniment, precum i pentru a elimina sau diminua pericolul
producerii unor situaii de urgen, n spaiile n care i desfoar activitatea salariaii AFER, prin
msurile stabilite n Programul anual cu activitile care se desfoar la nivel de AFER, referitoare
la pregtirea salariailor n domeniul situaiilor de urgen (protecie civil i aprare mpotriva
incendiilor) prin instructaje i antrenamente practice de alarmare, evacuare, adpostire, intervenie
i prim-ajutor, care se desfoar la locurile de munc ale acestora.
Toate documentele elaborate de ctre SPSU i aprobate de ctre conducerea AFER,
respectiv de ctre Inspecia de Prevenire IGSU la nivel de sector i municipiului Bucureti, se
transmit la toate compartimentele din cadrul AFER, n vederea instruirii salariailor i menionarea
n fiele individuale de instruire.
Personalul desemnat cu organizarea i gestionarea situaiilor de urgen (protecie civil i
aprare mpotriva incendiilor), la nivel de AFER, a urmat cursurile de specialitate i este atestat n
domeniul situaiilor de urgen, conform legislaiei n vigoare, care prevede obligativitatea
ncadrrii cu personal de specialitate angajat/voluntar (ef SPSU, Inspector de protecie civil,
Cadru tehnic PSI, Responsabil cu pregtirea medical etc.), din rndul salariailor proprii.
La realizarea lucrrii s-au folosit cunotinele i materialele puse la dispoziie de Catedrele
de Management i Specialitate ale Centrului Naional de Perfecionare a Pregtirii pentru
Managementul Situaiilor de Urgen (UM nr. 0490 Ciolpani), sub coordonarea domnului colonel
dr. Niculae Stan i Serviciul Prevenire Sector 1 din cadrul Inspectoratului pentru Situaii de Urgen
Dealul Spirii al Municipiului Bucureti, sub coordonarea domnului colonel Gheorghe Niculescu,
coordonatorii cursului postuniversitar Evaluarea riscului de incendiu pentru construcii i
instalaii organizat la Facultatea de Inginerie a Instalaiilor din cadrul Universitii Tehnice de
33
Construcii Bucureti, reprezentai de ctre domnul conf. univ. dr. ing. Mihnea Sandu, domnul
maior dr. ing. Ionel Puiu Golgojan i domnul prof. univ. dr. ing. tefan Vintil, respectiv de
organizatorii sesiunilor de comunicri tiinifice n cadrul Facultii de Pompieri, domnul conf.
univ. dr. ing. Emanuel Darie i domnul lector univ. dr. ing. Garibald Popescu.
Lucrarea s-a realizat pe baza studiilor efectuate n domeniul prevenirii dezastrelor naturale
sau antropice, respectiv prin monitorizarea riscurilor care pot declana situaii de urgen i
evaluarea activitilor de instruire a personalului din zona studiat (AFER).
Scopul lucrrii este de a analiza ntr-un mod unitar, sistematic, a situaiilor de urgen care
pot avea loc n aria studiat i de a prezenta modalitile practice de prevenire i intervenie n zona
studiat. n atingerea acestui scop, lucrarea abordeaz aspecte concrete ale activitilor desfurate
n caz de urgene civile n aria studiat, precum i activitatea de intervenie i cea de prevenire.
Obiectivul este de a determina soluiile optime de minimizare a urmrilor riscurilor naturale i de
prevenire, prin condiionri specifice a riscurilor antropice.
Prin aciunile de prevenie ntreprinse n gestionarea situaiilor de urgen, la nivel de
AFER, n funcie de tipurile de risc, cu accent pe cutremur i incendiu se urmrete
reducerea/eliminarea numrului de victime i pagube materiale. Principalele obiective vizate sunt:
creterea capacitii de aciune a salariailor prin informare, n scopul prevenirii
producerii situaiilor de urgen, dar si autoaprrii;
comunicarea eficient n timpul i dup producerea situaiei de urgen;
dezvoltarea capacitii de a planifica i de a gestiona comunicarea privind hazardele i
situaiile de risc prin integrarea comunicrii la toate nivelurile, prin stabilirea
responsabilitilor i prin realizarea instruirii salariailor dup tipul de risc la care sunt
expui n funcie de specificul activitii pe care o desfoar (locul de munc);
creterea nivelului de nelegere privind riscurile majore, care pot aprea la AFER,
precum cutremurele i incendiile;
dezvoltarea unei colaborri reale ntre salariai i implicarea acestora n mod planificat
n programele de informare i voluntariat;
responsabilizarea efilor locurilor de munc care rspund de organizarea activitii i
de instruirea salariailor pe linie de situaii de urgen (protecie civil i AII), ct i a
salariailor care trebuie s cunoasc locurile unde se afl stingtoarele i hidranii,
respectiv modul de utilizare a acestora;
gestionarea i administrarea corect a cldirilor i instalaiilor aferente acestora
(energie electric, gaze, ap etc.), respectiv a utilajelor i echipamentelor tehnologice.
Conductorii locurilor de munc rspund de organizarea activitii i de instruirea
salariailor, pe linie de situaii de urgen (protecie civil i AII). Acetia au obligaia s i-a toate
msurile de nlturare a eventualelor deficiene n gestionarea zonelor cu risc ridicat de producere a
incendiilor (tablouri electrice, centrale termice, instalaii tehnologice, depozite, arhiva, biblioteca,
birouri, laboratoare i standuri de ncercri, curtea interioar, rampa pentru reziduurile menajere,
locurile amenajate pentru fumat etc.), respectiv informarea salariailor cu privire la locurile unde se
afl stingtoarele i hidranii, ct i modul de utilizare a acestora.
Activitatea de instruire a personalului, care se desfoar la nivel de compartiment, se
realizeaz pe baza documentelor transmise ctre compartimente, de ctre inspectorul de protecie
civil i responsabilul PSI, ct i a exerciiilor de evacuare i intervenie, n cazul producerii unui
cutremur, respectiv incendiu, efectuate n AFER. Instruirea personalului i consemnarea n fiele de
instruire periodic se realizeaz la datele conforme specificului fiecrui compartiment, pe baza
tematicii specifice activitii desfurate (locului de munc).
34
Scopul activitii de instruire a personalului, desfurate pe linie de situaii de urgen (PC

i AII), este de a mbunti instruirea salariailor, prin informare, comunicare n scopul dezvoltrii
capacitii de gestionare a situaiilor de risc prin integrarea comunicrii la toate nivelurile, prin
stabilirea responsabilitilor i a modalitilor n care trebuie s acioneze, n caz de necesitate.
2. MSURI NTREPRINSE LA NIVEL DE AFER

n conformitate cu prevederile Legii Proteciei Civile nr. 481/2004, republicat, Legii nr.
307/2006 privind aprarea mpotriva incendiilor i celorlalte acte normative (OMAI, Norme,
Dispoziii etc.), care reglementeaz desfurarea activitii pe linie de situaii de urgen (protecie
civil i aprare mpotriva incendiilor), n vederea prevenirii i reducerii gravitii consecinelor
unui eveniment, precum i pentru a elimina sau diminua pericolul producerii unor situaii de
urgen, n spaiile n care i desfoar activitatea salariaii AFER, n cadrul Programului cu
activitile care se desfoar la nivel de AFER, privind pregtirea salariailor n domeniul
situaiilor de urgen prin instructaje i antrenamente practice de alarmare, evacuare, adpostire i
prim ajutor, cu aprobarea conducerii AFER s-au organizat i desfurat exerciii pentru limitarea i
nlturarea urmrilor unui dezastru natural (cutremur de pmnt) i a efectelor complementare ale
acestuia (avarii la reelele de utiliti, incendii, explozii, avarierea construciilor etc.), pentru
limitarea i nlturarea urmrilor unor incendii, respective de alarmare i evacuare a personalului
AFER.
Planurile exerciiilor au fost realizate conform modelelor elaborate de ctre Catedra de
Pregtire de Specialitate a Centrului Naional de Perfecionare pentru Managementul Situaiilor de
Urgen (UM nr. 0490 Ciolpani).
Cu ocazia acestor exerciii s-a prezentat, n mod practic, care sunt etapelor unei intervenii
la stingerea unui incendiu cu ajutorul hidrantului (ntinderea furtunurilor, conectarea acestora etc.)
i cum se manevreaz stingtoarele, respectiv procedura privind acordarea primului ajutor
premedical victimelor unui dezastru, cu ajutorul echipamentului (materiale sanitare, trgi etc.) de
ctre grupa medical.
n conformitate cu prevederile art. 131 din Normele generale de aprare mpotriva
incendiilor, aprobate cu OMAI nr. 163/2007, privind echiparea i dotarea cu mijloace de aprare
mpotriva incendiilor, n spaiile care aparin AFER, s-a realizat amplasarea stingtoarelor de
incendiu i a dispozitivelor automate destinate stingerii incendiilor (BONPET). Totodat, s-au
achiziionat echipamente specifice executrii interveniilor, n conformitate cu Planul privind
dotarea cu echipamente, dispozitive i materiale necesare la executarea interveniilor n situaii de
urgen.
2. CONCLUZII
Prevenirea se planific i se organizeaz pe baza identificrii i evalurii riscurilor, a
analizei fenomenelor ipotetice sau produse de procese i fenomene naturale reale sau de activiti i
aciuni umane. Prin aceast lucrare s-a ncercat o nou modalitate de abordare a identificrii i
evalurii riscurilor naturale i antropice, n vederea asigurrii unui rspuns rapid de protecie i
contracarare a efectelor negative. Toate activitile i msurile ntreprinse pentru prevenire, etapele
35
acestora, caracterul lor permanent, naintea producerii evenimentelor generatoare de situaii de

urgen, pe timpul derulrii aciunilor de protecie i salvare, precum i n perioada reabilitrii i
nlturrii efectelor sunt n strns corelare cu analiza factorilor care au generat situaia de urgen
n cauz.
Activitile de prevenire n situaii de urgen sunt abordate i sub aspect legislativ, care
urmresc introducerea cadrului legal pentru activitatea de identificare, evaluare i analiz a
pericolelor poteniale prin aprecierea probabilitii de apariie a lor i a consecinelor pe care le
genereaz.
Considerm c lucrarea demonstreaz importana activitii desfurate n situaii de urgen, pentru
protejarea vieii, a bunurilor materiale i a mediului n general, de ctre Compartimentul de
prevenire din cadrul Serviciului pentru situaii de urgen AFER i contribuie la contientizarea
riscurilor la care suntem supui, n aria studiat, respectiv pentru cunoaterea regulilor
comportamentale n caz de dezastre.
36
INSTALAIE DE STINGERE CU DIOXID DE CARBON

UTILIZAT LA O ZON DE ULEIERE
Student sergent Dan LAZAR
Abstract: The present articles presentation of a fire extinguishing solution implemented in a pipe
factory. The fire extinguishing method chosen was using carbon dioxide with local action.
The protected area is used for oiling the pipes as fail safe.
Keywords: Carbon Dioxide, Local Action, Concentration, Fire Extinguishing.
1. INTRODUCERE
Dioxidul de carbon este o substan special de stingere a incendiilor, un gaz incolor i
inodor, care nu arde i nu ntreine arderea.
Ca substan de stingere a incendiului, are urmtoarele caracteristici:
nu distruge obiectele i materialele stinse;
ptrunde n orificiile materialului aprins (fiind mai greu dect aerul);
este ru conductor de electricitate;
nu se deterioreaz prin stocare ndelungat;
nu este sensibil la aciunea temperaturilor sczute.
Aciunea de stingere a CO2 const n reducerea concentraiei de oxigen sau a fazei gazoase
a combustibilului incendiat din atmosfera incintei respective, pn la o valoare a concentraiei de
oxigen la care combustia (arderea) nceteaz.
Se utilizeaz pentru stingerea substanelor combustibile care prin ardere nu furnizeaz
oxigenul necesar combustiei, sau sunt caracterizate prin ardere de suprafa (nu se utilizeaz pentru
stingerea incendiilor n profunzime).
Sistemele de stingere cu CO2 sunt extrem de eficiente. Ele pot utiliza gazul prin
modalitatea de inundare total, dar dioxidul de carbon este de asemenea singurul agent gazos care
poate fi utilizat i prin aplicare local.
Dioxidul de carbon poate fi depozitat fie n cilindri de oel de nalt presiune (sisteme de
stingere HPCO2=50 bar), fie n rezervoare uoare de perete refrigerate, la presiune joas (sisteme
de stingere LPCO2=25 bar). [6]
Avnd n vedere c inhalarea de CO2 poate fi toxic pentru oameni, acesta se folosete mai
mult pentru protejarea urmtoarelor zone sau spaii:
camerele transformatoarelor i zonele cu pericol electric;
arhive;
camere de servere i tehnic de calcul;
generatoare electrice;
industria tipografiei;
37
fabrici de prelucrri mecanice.

Stingerea incendiilor prin inundare total se realizeaz prin inundarea ntregului spaiu a
incintei protejate cu dioxid de carbon, astfel nct concentraia de oxigen s scad n timpul cel mai
scurt posibil, sub valoarea de meninere a arderii (de la 21% sub 15%).
Spre deosebire de sistemul de stingere prin inundare total, sistemul de stingere cu
inundare local asigur o inundare cu dioxid de carbon pe suprafee limitate. Aceast soluie se
adopt la stingerea incendiilor de suprafa, n special de lichide combustibile sau materiale
combustibile solide, n incinte unde nu sunt asigurate condiii pentru realizarea inundrii totale. Se
recomand la protecia i stingerea bazinelor de clire, transformatoarelor i n cadrul altor procese
tehnologice.
Punerea automat n funciune a instalaiilor fixe de stingere a incendiilor cu dioxid de carbon
poate fi cu acionare pneumatic, mecanic, electric, pneumo-mecanic, electric combinat cu
pneumatic (pentru sistemele de joas presiune), electric combinat cu pneumo-mecanic (pentru
sistemele de nalt presiune) sau cu alte sisteme de acionare.
2. INSTALAIA DE STINGERE CU DIOXID DE CARBON UTILIZAT NTR-O

HAL A UNEI FABRICI DE EVI
Lucrarea de fa prezint o instalaie de detecie, alarmare la incendiu i comand stingere
realizat n zona de uleiere a unei fabrici de conducte metalice. Aceast instalaie complex
detecteaz, atunci cnd n zon nu este personal, nceputul de incendiu prin intermediul
detectoarelor de flacr (conform standardului EN 54-7) i activeaz sistemul de alarmare local i
un dispozitiv telefonic cu mesaje prenregistrate.
Atunci cnd personalul este prezent n zon, dispozitivul de detecie nu semnalizeaz,
comanda sistemului de stingere fcndu-se manual, n dou faze (alarmare i comand stingere).
Zona n care se face protecia contra incendiului cu gaz tip CO2 este o zon de depozitare a
baloilor de conducte metalice, provenite din zona de fabricare, conducte care vor fi protejate prin
scufundarea acestora n bazine de ulei prenclzite la o temperatur de 35-400C, dup care acestea
se vor lsa la uscare, formndu-se pe ele o pelicul de ulei de protecie.
Uleiul scurs n timpul procesului de uscare formeaz o pelicul subire, n cuva de reinere,
cu grad mare de inflamabilitate, motiv pentru care a fost necesar instalaia de stingere cu CO2.
Uleierea conductelor se face ntr-o poriune a halei de producie, o zon deschis. Din
aceast cauz se va da o atenie mrit att la procesul de declanare a sistemului, ct i la procesul
de evacuare a personalului din imediata apropiere a zonei protejate nainte de declanarea
sistemului. O atenie deosebit trebuie acordat i sistemului de evacuare a gazelor toxice dup
declanarea i oprirea stingerii.
2.1 Descrierea instalaiei
Instalaia automat de stins incendiu este compus dintr-un sistem mecanic, care asigur
depozitarea substanei de stingere, transportul i deversarea lui n zona protejat i un sistem
electronic, care asigur declanarea manual a sistemului mecanic.
a) Funciile instalaiei automate pentru detecia i comanda stingerii incendiului:
Detecia automat a incendiului n spaiile supravegheate i protejate de incendiu
pe perioada lipsei personalului din zona protejat;
Comanda manual de declanare a agentului de stingere;
38
Semnalizarea acustic i optic n caz de alarm de incendiu;

Trimiterea unui mesaj telefonic la unitile de dispecerizare;
Comanda electric a electroventilului pentru declanarea eliberrii agentului de
stingere;
Supravegherea permanent a tuturor circuitelor electrice ale instalaiei de stingere;
b) Componena instalaiei electrice de automatizare:
Unitate central de comand (Echipament de control i semnalizare);
Detector de flacr;
Declanator manual de comand instalaie de alarmare (rou) FAZA 1;
Declanator manual pentru declanare manual a stingerii (galben) FAZA 2;
Siren electronic avertizare incendiu FAZA 1;
Clopot avertizare incendiu FAZA 2;
Lamp stroboscopic avertizare incendiu.
8
4
16
7
6
6
6
6
F. N.
6
1
2
6
15
6
10
2
Panou ventilaie
(opional)
13
Inst.Exhaustare
(opional)
Monitorizare sist.
detecie incendiu
9
11
12
14
17
Fig. 1 Elementele componente ale instalaiei de stingere

Legend: 1. Unitate central (Echipamentul de control i semnalizare) tip. C-TECH EP203; 2. Cablu alimentare
220V.c.a.; 3. Detector flacr; 4. Siren tip. ROSHNI pentru prim detecie; 5. Siren tip CLOPOT 6 FLASH (LED)
pentru indicarea semnalizrii acustice; 6. Cablu incendiu (2x2x0,8+E); 7. Buton alarm incendiu; 8. Declanator manual
deversare CO2; 9. Duze refulare CO2; 10. Reea conducte distribuie; 11. Furtun conectare conducte distribuie;
12. Ventil manual declanare butelie CO2; 13. Ventil electric declanare butelie CO2; 14. Presostat; 15. Indicator
declanare; 16. Cale de transmisie Mesaj telefonic; 17. Butelie CO2.
39
c) Realizarea instalaiei electrice de automatizare:

Instalaia electric de automatizare este alctuit dintr-o unitate central de comand
(echipament de control i semnalizare), care detecteaz nceputul de incendiu, acioneaz instalaia
de stingere pe zona sa de detecie i semnalizeaz evenimentele acustic, optic i printr-un circuit
telefonic.
Pentru detecia automat a nceputului unui incendiu este prevzut o zon de detecie de
unde sunt preluate semnalele (alarm la incendiu, defect) de la un detector de flacr convenional.
Echipamentul de control i semnalizare activeaz sistemul de alarmare i pe cel de apelare
telefonic. Acest sistem este activ doar n afara orelor de program.
Pentru declanarea manual a efecturii stingerii, pe perioada orelor de program, s-a
prevzut un Declanator manual declanare stingere (de culoare galben) amplasat pe panoul
frontal al unitii centrale de comand.
Pentru alarmarea acustic i optic n cazul apariiei unui incendiu s-au prevzut dou
circuite ce acioneaz astfel:
FAZA 1 de alarm
atunci cnd este acionat declanatorul manual de alarmare de
culoare roie.
FAZA 2 de alarm
atunci cnd este acionat declanatorul manual de comand
stingere de culoare galben.
Suplimentar este prevzut un sistem de semnalizare acustic i un dispozitiv de apelare
telefonic, active n cazul n care detectoarele de flacr intr n alarm n FAZA 1.
Ca element de detecie a fost folosit un detector de flacr tip Siemens. Carcasa
detectorului ncastreaz n ea 2 senzori piroelectrici i o fotodiod cu silicon:
Senzor A: senzorul piroelectric A reacioneaz n spectrul 4-4,8 nm;
Senzor B: reacioneaz la radiaie infraroie din gama 5,1-6 nm;
Senzor C: msoar radiaia solar din spectrul 0,1-1,1 nm.
Principiul de funcionare a detectorului se bazeaz pe analiza strii celor 3 senzori, un
senzor msurnd lungimea de und a monoxidului de carbon fierbinte, ceilali doi msoar
interferena radiaiei de und.
Calculul ariei monitorizate se va realiza, avnd n vedere figura 2.
Fig. 2 Aria monitorizat de un detector de flacr
40
Aria monitorizat de acest tip de detector se calculeaz [2], utiliznd formula urmtoare
a = d/31/2
(1)
Distana monitorizat d se calculeaz cu formula:
3. REGULI PRIVIND UTILIZAREA I NTREINEREA SISTEMULUI

O bun utilizare a sistemului este posibil prin respectarea unor norme de baz, dintre care
amintim:
nu se vor lsa geamuri deschise nesupravegheate deoarece n zonele armate curenii de
aer pot genera alarme false (mai ales n perioadele cu intensificri ale vntului);
nu vor fi lsate n funciune, nesupravegheate, aparate de nclzire cu funcionare
intermitent;
nu se vor instala aparate de ventilaie sau condiionare a aerului fr a consulta n
prealabil proiectanii instalaiei;
orice modificri ale destinaiei spaiului sau a compartimentrii vor fi aduse la
cunotina celor ce au proiectat instalaia de detecie i alarmare pentru a analiza dac
soluia tehnic permite efectuarea acestora.
Lucrrile de mentenan i verificrile se vor realiza de firma executant i vor consta n:
verificarea unitii centrale (echipament de control i semnalizare) i a surselor
auxiliare;
verificarea senzorilor i a dispozitivelor anexe ale sistemului;
verificarea legturilor cablate ale sistemului;
tergerea de praf i curarea componentelor active ale sistemului;
verificarea general mpreun cu beneficiarul a funcionrii sistemului.
4. RISCURI PRIVIND UTILIZAREA INSTALAIEI DE STINGERE CU DIOXID
DE CARBON
Dioxidul de carbon prezint riscuri mari pentru personalul existent n zona protejat cu o
astfel de instalaie de stingere.
ntr-o atmosfer care conine 3-4% dioxid de carbon utilizatorul ncepe s respire mai
rapid, iar la concentraii mai mari de 9% i pierde cunotina. La concentraii de circa 20% moartea
poate surveni n 20-30 minute.
Astfel, deversarea unor cantiti mari de dioxid de carbon, lipsa de oxigen i vizibilitatea
redus n incinta inundat (cauzat de ceaa care se formeaz), constituie un pericol pentru sntatea
i viaa personalului ce deservete acea zon.
O persoan intoxicat cu dioxid de carbon poate fi salvat, dac n primele minute de pierdere
a cunotinei este scoas din mediul toxic i dus ntr-o zon cu aer curat. Dac victima nu respir n
continuare i nu i se simte pulsul se ncep procedurile de respiraie artificial i masaj cardiac.
41
5. CONCLUZII
Dioxidul de carbon ca substan de stingere este larg cunoscut i are proprieti de stingere
compatibile cu cele ale apei. Totodat, practica a dovedit faptul c dioxidul de carbon este o
substan de stingere curat, dup o stingere cu CO2 fiind necesar doar o ventilare a spaiului
incendiat i nlturarea deeurilor arse.
Datorit calitilor sale, dioxidul de carbon este folosit la stingerea unei palete largi de
incendii din clasele A, B sau C cu cteva excepii, precum i a incendiilor de instalaii electrice sub
tensiune.
Un aspect important ce trebuie luat n considerare la proiectarea unei astfel de instalaii
este c inhalarea acestui gaz, chiar i la nite concentraii mici, poate provoca asfixierea
(insuficient oxigenare a sngelui).
Fcnd o paralel ntre eficien i periculozitate observm c dioxidul de carbon utilizat
ca substan de stingere a incendiilor reprezint una dintre cele mai convenabile variante de
instalaii de stins incendiul, ndeosebi n incintele unde nu se gsesc persoane a cror via poate fi
pus n pericol. n toate locurile unde se utilizeaz dioxidul de carbon ca substan de stingere exist
riscul ca oamenii s fie afectai.
Ca msur de siguran, n interiorul incintelor protejate supuse inundrii cu dioxid de
carbon se afieaz vizibil indicatoare corespunztoare de avertizare, panouri inscripionate (standard
de referin ISO 3864/1, 2, 3, 4 i ISO 7010), cu urmtorul text: n caz de alarm, incendiu sau
de degajare a dioxidului de carbon, prsii imediat incinta PERICOL DE MOARTE! [3].
Totodat, pe feele exterioare ale uilor incintelor n care sunt amplasate recipiente (butelii)
cu dioxid de carbon, se inscripioneaz: Atenie! strict interzis accesul persoanelor neautorizate,
depozit de dioxid de carbon PERICOL DE MOARTE! [3].
BIBLIOGRAFIE
[1] *** - Normativ privind securitatea la incendiu a construciilor, Partea a II-a Instalaii de
stingere, indicativ P118/2-2013.
[2] S.C. INSTALSOMET S.A. Instalaii i sisteme automate de detecie i stingere.
[3] *** - Normativ privind securitatea la incendiu a construciilor, Partea a II-a Instalaii de
stingere P118/2-2013 Instalaii fixe de stingere cu dioxid de carbon, 14.94, 14.95 pag. 113.
[4] Norme U.L. pentru stingerea incendiilor NFPA 12, 12A, 12B, 13, 15, 16.
[4] http://www.gecomar.ro/sisteme-stingere-incendii-co2.php
[5] http://www.tenaris.com/romania/ro/default.aspx
[6] http://www.cruman.ro/instalatii-stingere-co2.html
42
ELEMENTE DE PROTECIE PASIV I ACTIV

A FABRICILOR DE ANVELOPE
Student sergent Mihai CALINESCU
Abstract: Taking into account the imminent fire risk, there are certain measures that are taken into
consideration. These measures apply to the performance criteria of a building, enforcing in
this way the presence of the security indicators. Fire defence is made by using both active
and passive ways of protection. Both of them have an essential role in settling the general
norms of defence and they define the principles, criteria and technical conditions for
reassuring the essential conditions for buildings, systems and designs as well as rules and
general measures for preventing and closing a fire.
Keywords: Fire Risk, Security Indicators, Active Protection, Passive Protection.
1. INTRODUCERE
Cauciucul este un produs industrial macromolecular, fabricat din latex natural sau derivai
petrolieri, cu o larg utilizare n toate ramurile industriale. Latexul este o dispersie coloidal n care
particulele de cauciuc cu diametrul de 0,5 m sunt separate prin precipitarea accelerat cu amoniac
sau precipitat de la sine ca urmare a unui proces de oxidare n timp.
Cauciucul etilen-propilenic, obinut din copolimerizarea etenei cu propen, are proprieti
superioare cauciucului natural sau a celorlalte cauciucuri sintetice; este stabil la oxidare, rezistent la
aciunea agenilor atmosferici i flexibil la temperaturi sczute (-5000 C). Ca produse obinute avem
anvelope, curele, benzi, nclminte, jucrii, furtunuri etc. Dup obinerea polimerului sub form
de latex, acesta este separat de monomerul nereacionat, i de celelalte substane, prin filtrare sau
degazare. Latexul, care este de fapt cauciucul, este supus stabilizrii i apoi coagulrii, n prezena
clorurilor sau sulfailor de sodiu, potasiu, calciu etc.
Monomerul nereacionat este reintrodus n instalaie, la prima operaie a procesului
tehnologic. Latexul stabilizat poate fi folosit pentru fabricarea vopselelor rezistente n ap,
uleiurilor, iar cel coagulat (elastomer) la fabricarea mnuilor, jucriilor, esturi cauciucate, cu
pHlatex = 7,2. n urma procesului de oxidare pH latexului scade la valoarea de 6,2.
Compusul de baz al latexului este izoprenul: (C5H8)n.
Procesul de vulcanizare reprezint creterea elasticitii i rezistenei mecanice prin
introducerea sulfului n structura izoprenului, rezultnd puni de sulf. Procesul are loc la o
temperatur de 460 C cu coninut redus de sulf, 1-2%. Dac procentul de sulf este mai mare, raport
1:1, la temperatura de 110-120 C se obine ebonita.
Prelucrarea cauciucului presupune tratarea acestuia pentru obinerea diferitelor materiale.
Materii prime utilizate la fabricarea cauciucului:
cauciucul natural sau sintetic;
acceleratori de vulcanizare;
vulcanizani;
43
antioxidanti;
plastifiani;
colorani;
solveni;
armturi textile, metalice;
hrtie;
adezivi.
2. ELEMENTE DE PROTECIE ACTIV I PASIV A FABRICILOR DE

ANVELOPE
2.1. Stingerea incendiilor la fabricile de cauciuc
La fabricile productoare de obiecte de cauciuc se asigur stingerea incendiului cu
spum, pulberi stingtoare, gaze inerte i ap pulverizat. La cauciuc brut se vor utiliza jeturi
compacte de ap refulat prin tunuri i evi cu ajutaje mari, iar dup reducerea intensitii de
ardere se va aciona cu apa pulverizat si spum. Deschiderile instalaiilor i ale elementelor de
construcie se rcesc cu ap.
La nevoie se iau msuri de evacuare a cauciucului (produselor) din compartimentul
incendiat i din cele vecine, folosind personalul i mijloacele din obiectiv (autoncrctoare,
transportoare, electrocare).
2.2. Protecia activ
2.2.1. Instalaii de protecie activ mpotriva incendiilor
Adoptarea instalaiilor de combatere a incendiilor face parte din msurile de protecie
activ pentru reducerea riscului de incendiu a construciilor, instalaiilor i amenajrilor, precum i
pentru securitatea utilizatorilor. Din aceast categorie fac parte urmtoarele instalaii de stingere:
Instalaii de stingere cu ap a incendiilor:
instalaii de stingere a incendiilor cu sprinklere;
instalaii de stingere a incendiilor cu sprinklere deschise;
instalaii de stingere a incendiilor cu hidrani de incendiu interiori i exteriori;
coloane uscate;
instalaii de stingere a incendiilor cu ap pulverizat;
instalaii de stingere a incendiilor cu cea de ap.
Instalaii de stingere a incendiilor cu substane speciale:
instalaii de stingere a incendiilor cu dioxid de carbon;
instalaii de stingere a incendiilor cu azot;
instalaii de stingere a incendiilor cu substane de tip FM 200;
instalaii de stingere a incendiilor cu inergen;
instalaii de stingere a incendiilor cu argon;
instalaii de stingere a incendiilor cu substane tip ECARO;
instalaii de stingere a incendiilor cu aerosoli;
instalaii de stingere a incendiilor cu spum;
44
instalaii de stingere cu pulberi a incendiilor;

instalaii de stingere cu abur a incendiilor.
2.2.2. Instalaii de stingere a incendiilor cu sprinklere
Aceste instalaii au rolul de a detecta, semnaliza, localiza i stinge incendiul, folosind
apa ca agent de stingere. Superioritatea acestor instalaii fa de celelalte sisteme automate de
protecie cu ap este determinat, n special, de faptul c sprinklerele se declaneaz individual
i acioneaz numai asupra ariei incendiate, evitnd, astfel, udarea inutil a zonelor necuprinse
de incendiu.
Instalaiile cu sprinklere trebuie s fie oportune n timp real, adic s intre automat n
funciune, la parametrii necesari pentru a limita/localiza incendiul i a aciona suficient la stingerea
incendiului.
Sprinklerele sunt dispozitive care au o dubl funcie; de detectare de incendiu i de
dispersare a jetului de ap asupra suprafeei protejate sub form de picturi.
Sprinklerul este compus din trei pri principale:
corpul sprinklerului prevzut cu un filet exterior destinat montrii la reeaua de conducte
cu un ajutaj interior pentru debitarea apei prevzut cu scaun de etanare;
deflectorul, alctuit dintr-o form special (rozeta, paleta etc.) fixat de corp printr-un
bra sau cadru la o distan fa de refularea apei. Are rolul de a dispersa apa n mod regulat i de
aceeai mrime a picturii de ap n mod egal pe toat suprafaa protejat;
dispozitivul de nchidere compus dintr-un ventil inut forat de scaunul de etanare a
orificiului de refulare a apei de un element de declanare.
Elementul principal al acestor instalaii de dispersare a apei l constituie capul de sprinkler,
dispozitiv care se declaneaz individual n funcie de temperatura mediului ambient. El asigur
dispersia apei sub form de picturi acionnd asupra ariei incendiate. n funcie de elementul de
declanare sunt utilizate curent urmtoarele categorii de capete sprinkler:
sprinklere cu aliaj fuzibil (figura 1) avnd urmtoarele clase de declanare evideniate
prin culoarea lichidului: pn la 750 C necolorat, ntre 760 C i 930 C alb, ntre 940 C i 1210 C verde,
ntre 1220 C i 1410 C albastru, ntre 1420 C i 1820 C rou i mai mare de 1820 C negru;
Fig. 1 Sprinkler cu aliaj fuzibil [6]
sprinklere cu bulb care au orificiul nchis cu o fiol umplut cu un lichid avnd

coeficientul de dilatare ales n funcie de temperatura de declanare; uzual temperaturile de
declanare sunt evideniate prin culoarea lichidului (figura 2): pentru 57 0 C portocaliu, pentru
45
680 C rou, pentru 790 C galben, pentru 93 0 C verde, pentru 1410 C albastru i pentru 182 0 C
violet. [6]
Fig. 2 Corespondena dintre temperaturile de declanare la sprinklerul cu bulb i culorile acestuia
Fig. 3 Sprinklere cu bulb [6]
Temperatura de declanare a sprinklerelor este temperatura la care ajunge ambiant i la

care dispozitivul de blocare (aliajul fuzibil) al sprinklerului se desface i permite curgerea apei prin
orificiul acestuia.
2.2.3. Instalaii de stingere a incendiilor cu hidrani de incendiu interiori i exteriori
a) Instalaii de stingere a incendiilor cu hidrani de incendiu interiori
Hidrantul interior este un robinet cu ventil de tip colar cu corpul din alam sau font
avnd, n mod obinuit, diametrul de 50 mm.
Pentru formarea, dirijarea i mprtierea jetului de ap, hidranii interiori se prevd cu
echipament de serviciu compus din furtun cu racorduri mobile la capete i eav de refulare (figura 4).
[6]
Furtunul plat curent utilizat pentru hidranii interiori este flexibil i are dimensiuni de 50 mm,
cazuri n care el se pstreaz uscat, racordat sau nu la robinet. Lungimea nominal a furtunului plat nu
trebuie s depeasc 20 m.
46
Fig. 4 Hidrani interiori echipai cu furtun flexibil, plat
n multe ri se utilizeaz pentru dotarea cldirilor i instalaii cu hidrani interiori echipai

cu furtun semirigid, avnd, de regul, diametre de 25 mm sau 33 mm, aflai permanent sub presiune
(figura 5). [6]
Fig. 5 Hidrani interiori echipai cu furtun semirigid
Acest tip de hidrani sunt cuplai permanent la furtun i la duza de refulare iar, din acest
motiv, ei permit o manevrare rapid i uoar (chiar de ctre persoane neinstruite n mod special)
nefiind n mod obligatoriu necesar derularea complet a furtunului n caz de incendiu. Lungimea
maxim a furtunului semirigid trebuie s fie de 30 m.
b) Instalaii de stingere a incendiilor cu hidrani de incendiu exteriori
Instalaiile cu hidrani exteriori sunt mijloace de baz pentru stingerea cu ap a incendiilor.
Hidrantul este o armtur care permite racordarea, la conducta de alimentare cu ap, a liniilor de
furtun i debitarea apei pentru combaterea incendiilor.
47
Hidranii de incendiu exteriori pot fi:

hidrani subterani (figura 6); [6]
hidrani de suprafa.
Fig. 6 Hidrant exterior subteran
Incintele civile i industriale se prevd, de regul, cu hidrani exteriori, excepie fcnd

anumite cldiri cu pericol redus de incendiu care au dimensiuni i capaciti mici.
Reelele de ap ce alimenteaz hidranii se execut, de regul, comune cu cele pentru apa
de uz menajer sau industrial. Reele separate se admit numai din considerente de aprare mpotriva
incendiilor. Reelele hidranilor exteriori pot fi:
de nalt presiune; n aceast situaie, stingerea incendiilor se poate face direct de la
hidrani;
de joas presiune; intervenia se poate face numai cu ajutorul unor pompe mobile de
incendiu (motopompe sau autopompe). Reelele de joas presiune trebuie s asigure pe timpul
incendiului o presiune liber la hidrani de minim 7 m H2O.
2.3. Protecia pasiv
Msurile de protecie pasiv intervin asupra incendiului nc din faza de proiectare prin
nsi structura i/sau elementele componente ale cldirii sau instalaiei, nefiind necesare operaiuni
48
speciale pe timpul desfurrii incendiului (elemente rezistente la foc, produse cu reacie la foc
controlat, desfumare natural). [5]
Sistemul de protecie pasiv la incendiu (sau controlul activ al incendiului) controleaz
incendiul i efectele sale prin: structura i/sau componentele construciei (nefiind necesare
operaiuni speciale pe timpul desfurrii incendiului).
2.3.1. Instalaii de detecie i semnalizare a incendiilor
Echiparea cldirilor cu instalaii de detecie i semnalizare a incendiilor se realizeaz n
vederea asigurrii securitii la incendiu a utilizatorilor i construciei, prevenirii incendiilor i
interveniei n timp util n caz de apariie a incendiilor.
Instalaiile de detecie i semnalizare a incendiilor trebuie s asigure: [2]
detectarea incendiilor att pe cile de circulaie, ct, mai ales, n spaiile i ncperile
auxiliare, precum i n acele ncperi n care incendiul ar putea evolua fr a fi observat n timp util;
anunarea incendiului la punctul de supraveghere permanent, automat i/sau prin
declanatoare manuale de alarm, sau la serviciul privat pentru situaii de urgen;
alarmarea operativ a personalului de serviciu, care trebuie s organizeze i s asigure
prima intervenie i evacuarea utilizatorilor;
avertizarea ocupanilor (utilizatorilor) din cldire asupra pericolului de incendiu i
transmiterea de instruciuni (mesaje) pentru evitarea panicii.
n figura 7 este reprezentat schema de principiu a unei instalaii de detecie i semnalizare
a incendiilor. [2]
Fig. 7 Schema de principiu a unei instalaii de detecie i semnalizare a incendiilor
Echipamentul de control i semnalizare (figura 8) este o component a unei instalaii de

semnalizare a incendiului care poate fi utilizat, dup caz, pentru a recepiona semnale de la
detectoarele conectate, a determina dac aceste semnale corespund unei condiii de alarm, a indica
o condiie de alarm acustic i optic, a indica locul izbucnirii incendiului, a nregistra, dac este
posibil, oricare din aceste informaii. [2]
49
Fig. 8 Echipamente de control i semnalizare
Declanatorul manual (figura 9) reprezint dispozitivul prin intermediul cruia se poate

semnaliza manual, de ctre om, apariia unui incendiu. [2]
Declanatoarele manuale se utilizeaz din urmtoarele motive:
prezint o construcie simpl;
au siguran ridicat n exploatare.
Fig. 9 Declanatoarele manuale
Declanatoarele manuale din spaiul protejat:

trebuie s aib aceeai metod de funcionare i, preferabil, s fie de acelai tip;
se marcheaz clar, vizibil, pentru a putea fi difereniate de dispozitive prevzute n alte
scopuri;
se amplaseaz n locuri vizibile (figura 10), uor accesibile, de preferin lng u, la
intrarea n casa scrilor sau la ieirea din aceasta i, n general, n punctele de circulaie obligatorie
n caz de evacuare; [2]
pot fi amplasate lng spaiile care prezint riscuri mari de incendiu
Fig. 10 Exemplu de amplasare a declanatoarelor manuale
50
2.3.2. Ignifugarea materialelor de construcii

Ignifugarea ca operaiune de tratare a materialelor si produselor pentru construcii are ca
scop creterea rezistenei la foc prin reducerea vitezei de propagare a flcrii pe suprafaa
materialului, precum i necesitatea existenei unei surse cu energie minim de aprindere mai mare.
Prin ignifugare se ntrzie aprinderea materialelor combustibile, dar nu se elimin posibilitile de
ardere a materialelor protejate.
Produsele de ignifugare, denumite produse ignifuge, se aplic:
pe suprafa (vopsele cu medii de dispersie solvent, ap; vopsele termospumante;
structuri de termoprotecie grund i vopsea);
prin impregnare (soluii de ignifugare prin impregnare).
Realizarea acestei operaiuni de protecie pasiv numit ignifugare se stabilete n funcie
de importana i vulnerabilitatea construciei i condiiile de combustibilitate normate.
Aceast operaiune nu este recomandat n situaia n care materialele combustibile se afl
n contact permanent cu atmosfera umed (umiditate mai mare de 70%).
3. CONCLUZII
n ceea ce privete aprarea mpotriva incendiilor se pot adopta o serie de msuri
organizatorice, att din punct de vedere al construciei cldirii, ct i din cel al instruirii
personalului. Instalaiile de detecie, semnalizare i stingere, mijloacele de protecie activ/pasiv
sunt elemente de baz, care mbrac ntreaga cldire n una, n care securitatea la incendiu ocup un
loc primordial.
Controlul activ al incendiului este asigurat prin echiparea construciilor, instalaiilor
tehnologice i amenajrilor cu instalaii pentru stingerea incendiilor cu: hidrani exteriori i interiori,
sprinklere, sprinklere deschise, precum i cu instalaii cu ap pulverizat, spum, pulberi, gaze
inerte i hidrocarburi halogenate sau nlocuitori de haloni.
Sistemul de protecie pasiv la incendiu controleaz incendiul i efectele sale prin:
structura i/sau componentele construciei, nefiind necesare operaiuni speciale pe timpul
desfurrii incendiului.
BIBLIOGRAFIE
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
Blulescu P., Stingerea incendiilor, Editura Tehnic, Bucureti, 1981.

erban M., Sisteme de detecie i alarm la incendiu, Editura M.A.I., Bucureti, 2009.
Calot S., Lencu V., erbu T., Protecia mpotriva incendiilor, vol. 1, Bucureti, 1998.
Farca D., Protecia activ mpotriva incendiilor, Revista Pompierii Romni, nr. 9/1990.
Normativ de siguran la foc a construciilor indicativ P 118-99, Bucureti, 1999.
51
INSTALAII DE STINGERE A INCENDIILOR CU CEA DE AP

PENTRU FABRICILE DE PRELUCRARE A LEMNULUI
Student sergent Bogdan SMOLINSCHI
Abstract: The present paper present a model aimed to highlight the advantages of using installation of
firefighting water mist for wood processing factories.
For the first time, I start with some generalities about this type of firefighting equipment.
Then, I presented the operating mode of installations for firefighting water mist using an
atomization gas and, also, some features of this equipment. Finally can be see that this type
of firefighting installation offers a very good protection for wood processing factories.
Keywords: Discharge Nozzle, Atomization Gas, Thermal Activation, False Triggering.
1. INTRODUCERE
Instalaia de stingere cu cea de ap ofer o soluie nou n protecia mpotriva incendiilor,
nsumnd proprietile pozitive ale sistemelor de stingere cu gaz i ale celor cu sprinklere.
Avantajul sistemului de stingere cu cea de ap fa de celelalte sisteme de stingere este c operaia
de stingere decurge mai repede, dat fiind faptul c reacia la foc este mai rapid.
n aceast lucrare vor fi prezentate componentele i caracteristicile instalaiilor de stingere
cu cea de ap, scond n eviden avantajul utilizrii acestora pentru protecia ntreprinderilor de
prelucrare a lemnului.
2. GENERALITI PRIVIND INSTALAIILE DE STINGERE A INCENDIILOR

CU CEA DE AP
Instalaiile de stingere a incendiilor cu cea de ap se prevd pentru:
protecia elementelor de structur ale cldirilor, cum ar fi grinzi, stlpi etc.;
protecia echipamentelor instalaiilor tehnologice a recipientelor pentru lichide
combustibile cu temperaturi de inflamabilitate a vaporilor mai mari de 60C i gaze inflamabile,
a motoarelor cu ardere intern, precum i a gospodriilor de cabluri electrice cu izolaie
combustibil;
protecia mpotriva radiaiei termice, emise de un incendiu nvecinat, pentru a limita
absorbia cldurii pn la limita care previne avariile sau micoreaz gravitatea efectelor acestora;
stingerea incendiilor de materiale combustibile solide (lemn, hrtie, textile, materiale
plastice etc.);
prevenirea formrii unor amestecuri explozibile n spaii nchise sau n spaii deschise,
prin diluarea amestecurilor explozive sau a scprilor de gaze ce pot forma amestecuri explozive.
52
Utilizarea instalaiilor de stingere a incendiilor cu cea de ap este recomandat n situaii

n care cldirile ce trebuie protejate dispun de rezerve de ap limitate sau alimentarea cu ap a
acestora se face cu restricii.
Instalaiile cu cea de ap se recomand pentru limitarea i stingerea incendiilor de clas
A, B i/sau C.
Acest tip de instalaii de stingere nu este recomandat, n cazurile n care apa refulat prin
duzele de pulverizare a apei formeaz, n contact cu substanele combustibile care ard, amestecuri
toxice sau explozive.
n principal, o instalaie de stingere cu cea de ap se compune din urmtoarele elemente:
sursa de alimentare cu ap;
rezervoare sau recipiente pentru stocarea rezervei de ap necesar stingerii incendiilor;
staia de pompare a apei, care asigur circulaia apei din rezervoarele de stocare, prin
reeaua de conducte, la duzele de pulverizare;
reeaua de conducte de alimentare cu ap a duzelor de pulverizare;
duze de pulverizare a apei;
armturi, aparate i dispozitive de comand, siguran i control;
instalaia proprie de detectare, semnalizare i comand n caz de incendiu;
surse de alimentare cu energie electric.
Instalaiile de stingere, care funcioneaz cu ap i aer sau azot comprimat pentru formarea
ceii de ap, sunt prevzute, n plus fa de cele clasice, cu cteva componente:
bateria cu butelii de aer sau azot comprimat;
dispozitive de acionare a bateriei cu butelii de aer sau azot comprimat;
conducte de distribuie pentru aer sau azot comprimat;
armturi de nchidere, siguran i control pentru aer sau azot comprimat.
Dup modul de formare a ceii de ap, se disting dou tipuri de instalaii:
instalaii cu pulverizare direct a apei reci, la presiunea apei din conduct;
instalaii cu pulverizarea apei reci folosind un gaz de atomizare (aer sau azot
comprimat);
n cazul pulverizrii directe a apei, instalaia este plin cu ap rece sub presiune pn la o
supap de comand i control, acionat de sistemul de detectare a incendiului. n caz de incendiu,
detectoarele transmit semnalul la centrala de detecie i semnalizare, care verific autenticitatea
semnalului i, n caz afirmativ, comand deschiderea supapei. Astfel, apa sub presiune va ajunge la
duzele de pulverizare, prin conducte, formndu-se ceaa de ap.
Funcionarea instalaiei care folosete un gaz de atomizare difer de primul caz. n aceast
situaie, instalaia este plin cu ap rece sub presiune pn la duzele prevzute cu dispozitive de
activare termic. Dac aceste dispozitive sesizeaz izbucnirea unui incendiu, vor deschide automat
orificiile de refulare a duzelor, la o temperatur prestabilit de productor, iar apa din conducte va fi
pulverizat prin duze formnd ceaa de ap.
Acest tip de instalaie poate fi realizat n dou sisteme:
cu o reea de conducte plin cu ap rece sub presiune pn la supapa de comand i
control, iar din acest punct pn la duze cu aer sau azot comprimat;
cu reele de conducte distincte, de ap rece, respectiv aer sau azot comprimat, de la care
se alimenteaz fiecare duz, prin conducte de racord.
53
3. INSTALAII DE STINGERE CU CEA DE AP CU PULVERIZAREA APEI

RECI FOLOSIND UN GAZ DE ATOMIZARE
Reprezentarea schematic a unui sistem de producere a ceii de ap cu joas presiune n
baza a dou fluide (ap i mediu de atomizare) este prezentat n figura urmtoare:
Fig. 1 Sistem de producere a ceii de ap cu joas presiune n baza a dou fluide
Legend:
1 suport din oel;
2 tuburi de aer comprimat unul principal i trei
secundare;
3 valve de control ale tuburilor;
4 valve pneumatice de deschidere a tuburilor;
5 presostat cu supap de siguran;
6 van principal cu deschidere prin solenoid;
7 vane de deschidere manual;
8 colector de gaze;
9 reductor de presiune;
10 valv acionat cu aer;
11 conduct de aer ctre duza de refulare;

12 conduct de ap ctre duza de refulare;
13 valv acionat cu aer;
14 valv de joas presiune cu solenoid;
15 valv de declanare manual;
16 manometru, valv de siguran i ventilare;
17 rezervor de ap de joas presiune;
18 filtru, scurgere, ajutaj de cuplare;
19 presostat, alarmare n timpul funcionrii.
Modul de funcionare a instalaiei este urmtorul: sistemul de detecie transmite un

semnal care comand deschiderea vanei principale (6), prin deschiderea vanei se permite aerului
comprimat din tubul principal s circule ctre robinetele pneumatice de deschidere ale tuburilor
secundare, aerul din tuburile secundare, ct i cel din tubul principal este colectat apoi de
colectorul de gaze (8), gazele trec apoi prin reductorul de presiune (9). O parte din gazele de
joas presiune trec mai departe ctre vanele de acionare cu aer (10) i (13) pentru permiterea
apei i aerului (mediu de atomizare) s ajung la duzele de refulare, o parte din aer are rolul de
a intra n rezervorul de ap de joas presiune pentru a fora apa s ias afar ctre duzele de
refulare i o parte din aer are rolul de mediu de atomizare i va circula ctre duze mpreun cu
apa, dar pe conducte separate.
54
Duzele de pulverizare trebuie s fie marcate de productor cu principalele lor caracteristici

tehnice, i anume: tipul duzei, diametrul orificiului de refulare i protecia anticoroziv.
Temperatura nominal de declanare a duzelor prevzute cu sistem de activare termic
trebuie s fie mai mare dect temperatura maxim a mediului ambiant n care sunt montate n
scopul evitrii declanrii false.
Dup timpul de rspuns al duzelor cu funcionare automat prin sistem de activare termic,
acestea pot fi: cu rspuns termic rapid, special sau standard.
Protecie suplimentar la coroziune, cum sunt materialele cu rezisten mare la coroziune,
vor fi folosite n atmosfere foarte corozive.
Acolo unde poate aprea nfundarea sistemului cu corpuri strine, sistemul va fi dotat cu
duze de descrcare, valve de siguran sau alte mijloace aprobate pentru folosin.
Fig. 2 Duz instalaie cea de ap
Duzele cu activare termic vor fi colorate n funcie de temperatura standard de activare.

Stocul de piese de schimb vor include toate modelele de piese instalate dup cum urmeaz:
pentru sistemele care au mai puin de 50 de duze nu mai puine de 3 duze de rezerv;
pentru sistemele care au ntre 50 i 300 de duze se prevede cel puin 6 duze de rezerv;
pentru sistemele care au ntre 301 i 1000 de duze se prevede cel puin 12 duze de
rezerv.
Temperaturile standard individuale de activare a fiecrei duze sunt prezentate n tabelul 1.
Temperaturile standard individuale de activare a duzelor
Temperatura
maxim a
mediului ambiant
(C)
Temperatura de
activare a duzei
(C)
Clasificare
temperatur
38
57-77
ordinar
66
107
149
79-107
121-149
163-191
191
246
329
204-146
260-302
343
Tabelul nr. 1.
Cod culoare
Culoare bulbului
de sticl
intermediar
nalt
extra nalt
incolor
sau neagr
alb
albastru
rou
galben/verde
albastru
mov
foarte nalt
ultra nalt
ultra nalt
verde
oranj
oranj
negru
negru
negru
55
oranj/rou
4. AVANTAJELE UTILIZRII ACESTUI TIP DE INSTALAIE LA FABRICI DE

PRELUCRARE A LEMNULUI
Utilizarea unei instalaii de stingere cu cea de ap la o ntreprindere de prelucrare a
lemnului prezint anumite avantaje. n primul rnd, n compartimente de incendiu n care exist praf
de lemn produs prin tierea i finisarea lemnului, acest tip de instalaie poate asigura splarea
atmosferei din interior i, n acelai timp, scderea riscului de explozie prin reducerea compoziiei
de praf de lemn din aer sub limita inferioar de explozie.
Un alt avantaj al adoptrii instalaiei de stingere cu cea de ap n acest domeniu l
reprezint proprietatea acesteia de a proteja anumite zone cu riscuri mari de incendiu de celelalte
zone. Astfel, n caz de incendiu, un compartiment de incendiu n care sunt depozitate, de exemplu,
lichide inflamabile, va fi protejat de radiaia flcrilor i se va limita propagarea incendiului, evitnd
riscul de explozie. Totodat, instalaia poate proteja o cale de evacuare a unui compartiment de
incendiu n care i desfoar activitatea un anumit numr de persoane, oferind un grad de protecie
pn ce acestea se vor autoevacua.
BIBLIOGRAFIE
[1] Normativ privind securitatea la incendiu a construciilor, Partea a II-a, Instalaii de stingere,
Indicativ P 118/2 2013.
[2] AndreiBogdan MUREAN, Lucrare de diplom Modelarea i simularea curgerii fluidelor
prin instalaiile de stingere a incendiilor cu cea de ap.
56
PROIECTAREA I REALIZAREA UNEI ARPANTE DIN LEMN

Student sergent Anatoli FOCA
Cpitan lector univ. dr. ing. Drago-Iulian PAVEL
Abstract: This paper presents the civil construction domain and more specific the wood frame roofs
used in habitable attics.
In the next pages are presented:
the advantages and disadvantages of using wood in constructions, comparing with other
materials;
the components of a frame roof;
the natural ventilation of a habitable attic and a frame roof, followed by an example of
calculations;
calculation hypothesis used in roof frame projections.
Keywords: Wood, Attic, Frame Roofs, Construction, Elements.
1. INTRODUCERE
n ultimii ani, n Romnia, s-a dezvoltat construcia caselor din lemn, vilelor, caselor de
vacan i de weekend i continu s fie n dezvoltare. Acest lucru se datoreaz att modificrilor
care au avut loc n societatea romneasc, ct i a posibilitilor financiare ale persoanelor.
Majoritatea acestor construcii sunt amplasate n zone rurale, n zone pitoreti, dar i la marginea
zonelor urbane unde poluarea este sczut.
Muli dintre proprietarii acestor construcii au ales case cu mansarde locuibile realizate cu
arpante din lemn, cu scopul de a crea un volum mai mare de spaiu locuibil pe aceeai suprafa de
construcie i pentru obinerea unei flexibiliti la partea superioar a construciei, utiliznd materialul
lemnos, fapt care nu trebuie neglijat, innd cont de aciunile care se pot exercita asupra construciei.
Utilizarea lemnului n construcie, ca i cazurile menionate mai sus, ne oblig s studiem o
serie de avantaje i de dezavantaje, precum i comportarea acestuia la diferite fenomene (incendiu,
umiditate, ncrcri etc.). Toate acestea au un rol important att la proiectarea i realizarea
construciilor din lemn, ct i la protecia acestora.
2. LEMNUL CA MATERIAL DE CONSTRUCIE

2.1 Avantajele i dezavantajele lemnului utilizat n construcie
Lemnul a jucat un rol de baz n istoria construciilor, fiind utilizat din comuna primitiv
pn n zilele noastre, avnd multe avantaje, poziionndu-l n scara materialelor valoroase.
lemnul este un material ecologic: consumul de energie de la recoltare pn la prelucrarea
sa n forma utilizat n construcii este mic n comparative cu alte material cum sunt:
betonul, oelul, crmida etc. Nu genereaz deeuri poluante i se poate recicla uor;
57
lemnul are rezistena relativ superioar altor material folosite n construcii (raportul
greutate/rezisten);
ineria termic, corelat cu rezistena la transmisia termic este foarte bun;
ambalarea elementelor presupune costuri sczute n comparaie cu alte materiale, fiind
disponibile o gam foarte variat de elemente de asamblare;
se poate constitui n elemente prefabricate care au proporiile superioare (elemente
lamelare, diverse materiale compozite etc.);
confer siguran n caz de cutremur, constituindu-se structuri cu flexibilitate ridicat;
confer siguran n caz de incendiu, comparativ cu alte material cum este oelul,
acesta meninndu-i capacitile portante pn la 60 minute n funcie de tratamentele
aplicate, seciunea elementelor etc.;
se poate folosi cu succes n combinaie cu alte materiale, astfel se ntlnesc structuri
mixte cum ar fi: lemn-metal, lemn-beton;
permite mbuntirea proprietilor portante prin pretensionare i armare;
exist metodologii clare de proiectare i verificare care s confere siguran. La nivelul
Uniunii Europene mai sunt n vigoare: Frana NF B 52-001, Elveia SIA 164,
Germania DIN 4047. n Romnia, sunt n vigoare normele europene, n paralel cu cele
romneti NP 005-03, NP 005-06-2009, NP 019-2003, STAS 856-71, SR EN 380;
execuia rapid i utilizarea imediat, fr timpi de ateptare, a mansardei realizat din
lemn (comparativ cu elementele de rezisten din beton armat la care este necesar
execuia structurii din oel, turnarea betonului i ateptarea ntririi acestuia);
introducerea n realizarea mansardei a unor elemente de construcie tipizate, cum ar fi:
popii, panele, cpriorii, cletii (moazele), contravnturile etc. cu mbinri realizate prin
chertare;
utilizarea materialului lemnos provenit dintr-un bogat potenial forestier de care
dispune Romnia;
scderea preului de cost al construciei innd cont de factori cum sunt reducerea
greutii proprii a construciei, scderea timpului efectiv de lucru i execuia rapid.
Lemnul, ca produs natural, de natur organic, avnd structura neomogen i anizotrop pe
lng caliti are i o serie de inconveniente i dezavantaje, cum ar fi:
variabilitatea foarte mare a caracteristicilor att ntre specii, ct i n cadrul aceleiai
specii ca urmare a unor surse de variabilitate foarte diverse;
variaia caracteristicilor mecanice i fizice pe diferite direcii fa de direcia fibrelor;
datorit neomogenitii structurii lemnului rezistenele sunt diferite n lungul
trunchiului lemnului i pe seciune transversal, variaia acestora fiind cuprins ntre
10 40%;
influena mare a umiditii asupra caracteristicilor fizico-mecanice, a dimensiunilor i
durabilitii lemnului. Spre exemplu, variaia umiditii de la 5 pn la 15% duce, la unele
specii de lemn, la scderea cu aproape de 2 ori a rezistenei la compresiune. Creterea
umiditii favorizeaz, de asemenea, degradarea biologic a lemnului, n special datorit
aciunii ciupercilor i creeaz probleme de sntate pentru ocupanii construciilor;
sortimentul limitat de material lemnos att n ceea ce privete dimensiunile seciunii
transversale, ct i n privina lungimilor. Folosirea unor elemente, sub form de grinzi
sau stlpi, cu dimensiuni transversale mari (de obicei, peste 20 cm) sau cu lungime
mare (peste 5-6 m) duce, de multe ori, la preuri ridicate. Aceast deficien se poate
58
elimina prin folosirea unor elemente compuse sau a unor elemente realizate din
scnduri ncleiate;
defectele naturale ale lemnului (defecte de form i structur, crpturi etc.), defectele
cauzate de ciuperci, insecte sau de unele substane chimice, precum i efectele
fenomenelor de contracie i de umflare reprezint inconveniente importante ale
materialului lemnos de construcie;
degradri produse de ciuperci i insecte atunci cnd nu exist un tratament
corespunztor mpotriva acestora. [1]
Cunoaterea proprietilor fizice i mecanice de durat ale lemnului prezint o importan
practic deosebit pentru proiectarea i realizarea construciilor din lemn.
2.2 Lemnul n comparaie cu alte materiale
n comparaie cu alte materiale, valorile absolute ale rezistenelor lemnului sunt relativ
mici. Din punct de vedere al valorilor de utilizare n construcii, poziia lemnului este n unele
cazuri superioar altor materiale cum este metalul. Aceste aprecieri sunt bazate pe aa-numitele cote
de calitate obinute prin raportarea unei anumite rezistene la densitatea materialului lemnos. Cotele
de calitate situeaz lemnul n rndul materialelor deosebit de valoroase.
n tabelul nr. 1 se arat poziia reciproc a diferitelor materiale din punct de vedere al
cotelor de calitate. Se poate vedea c, n funcie de solicitrile la care sunt supuse materialele,
acestea au proprieti diferite i pot prezenta avantaje sau dezavantaje.
Cote de calitate ale diferitelor materiale [2]
Tabelul nr. 1
59
3. ACOPERIUL TIP ARPANT DIN LEMN

3.1. Definiii
n Dicionarul Explicativ al Limbii Romne noiunea de arpant este dat ca fiind un
schelet format din piese din lemn, de metal sau de beton armat, care susine nvelitoarea unui
acoperi i permite realizarea formei acestuia.
arpanta reprezint elementul de nchidere situat la partea superioar a construciei, avnd
att un important rol practic prin protejarea cldirii de intemperii, ct i un rol estetic, contribuind n
mare msur la aspectul construciei, respectiv i contra efraciei. De altfel multe din construciile
din lemn se individualizeaz prin forma arpantei. arpanta se compune din structura de rezisten,
stratul suport al nvelitorii i nvelitoare.
arpanta este una dintre principalele piese ale acoperiului, sprijinind nvelitoarea i
celelalte elemente. De-a lungul timpului au aprut mai multe tipuri de arpante, n funcie de
materialul din care sunt construite i de complexitatea lor.
3.2 Structura arpantei din lemn
Fig. 1 Elementele arpantei [3]
1) Tlpile sunt grinzi cu seciunea rectangular, dispuse sub popi sau alte piese ale
arpantei, cu latura mare pe vertical, avnd rolul de a repartiza sarcinile transmise de arpant la
planeul de susinere.
2) Popii sunt elemente solicitate la compresiune vor fi executai din lemn ecarisat.
mbinarea dintre popi, tlpi i pane se face cu cep, iar mbinarea cu contrafiele se face cu prag.
3) Contrafiele sunt piese nclinate ntr-un sens sau n ambele sensuri, solicitate la
compresiune sau la ntindere, avnd rol de a ridigiza arpanta, asigurnd o mai bun trimitere a
sarcinilor la piesele componente. mbinarile contrafielor cu piesele arpantelor se fac cu prag.
4) Panele sunt piese orizontale aezate n lungul acoperiului care se reazem pe popi.
Rolul panelor este de a prelua i a transmite sarcinile din nvelitoare la arpant prin intermediul
cpriorilor.
60
Dup locul unde sunt aezate sunt denumite astfel:

pan de coam (pan de creast) la partea superioar a arpantei;
pan intermediar (pan curent) pe generatoarea versantului;
cosoroab (pan de streain) pan aezat pe zidurile exterioare ale cldirii.
5) Cpriorii sunt elementele care preiau sarcinile acoperiului, greutatea nvelitorii, a
zpezii .a. Sunt montai perpendicular pe poala nvelitorii, pe linia cu cea mai mare pant, aezai
la distane egale unul de cellalt. Cpriorii se reazem la poal pe cosoroab, iar la coam pe o pan
sau unul pe cellalt. Vor fi confecionai din lemn ecarisat.
6) Cletii au rolul de a consolida arpanta i sunt elemente solicitate la ntindere. Se
execut din perechi de scnduri sau dulapi, care se fixeaz pe ambele pri ale pieselor pe care le
consolideaz (cpriori i popi). Cletii se fixeaz, de obicei, ntre popi mpiedicnd rsturnarea
acestora. mbinarea cletilor cu piesele pe care le consolideaz se pot realiza prin chertare.
Elementele secundare ale arpantei din lemn sunt:
astereala format din scnduri alturate de 1824 mm grosime i 1220 cm lime,
dispuse paralel cu streaina i rezemnd pe cel puin trei cpriori, de care se prind n cuie;
uneori astereala se realizeaz din materiale derivate din lemn;
ipcile de lemn (seciuni de 1,8x4,84,8x4,8 cm), aezate la distane derivnd din tipul
de nvelitoare utilizat i care se reazem pe cpriori.
3.3 mbinri folosite n prezent. Plcuele conectoare
Plcuele conectoare sunt fabricate din oel moale galvanizat special pentru structurile de
rezisten. Multe tipuri comune de plcue multicui se folosesc astzi pentru mbinri: M20 de 1,0 mm,
M200 de 2,00 mm i unele plcue conectoare speciale, inclusiv eclisele metalice (figura 2.).
Diferenele de fabricaie ale cuielor (dinilor) produse prin tantarea specific pentru fiecare tip de
plcu, n asociere cu diferenele de grosime i lime a oelului folosit, permit o serie variat de
parametri de proiectare pentru fiecare model de plcu conectoare. Mai mult, existena unei game
foarte variate de dimensiuni pentru fiecare tip de plcu ofer proiectantului un sistem foarte
flexibil de proiectare difereniat pentru fiecare mbinare necesar.
Pentru a satisface dificultile puse de condiiile agresive de mediu la care sunt supuse
acoperiurile cldirilor agricole sau industriale, sau n scopuri decorative n cazul fermelor
prefabricate expuse, tipul M20 de plcue conectoare cu o gam mai restrans de dimensiuni este
disponibil n 20 de calibre de oel inoxidabil.
Fig. 2, 3, 4 mbinri tipice [4]
61
4. VENTILAREA MANSARDEI LOCUIBILE

4.1 Ventilarea natural a mansardei
Prin ventilarea natural se nelege schimbul de aer realizat ntr-o ncpere sub aciunea
combinat a doi factori:
vntul;
diferena de temperatur dintre exterior i interior.
Ventilarea natural a mansardei poate fi organizat sau neorganizat.
Cnd ptrunderea aerului exterior are loc prin neetaneitile i rosturile elementelor de
construcie (ui, ferestre) ventilarea natural se numete neorganizat.
Dac n ncpere sunt practicate deschideri speciale cu dimensiuni determinate, amplasate
la anumite nlimi i care pot fi nchise i deschise dup necesiti, se realizeaz o ventilare
natural organizat.
4.2 Subventilarea i tehnica eliminrii condensului [5]
Acoperiurile mansardate trebuie realizate cu materiale care satisfac cerinele prevederilor
din ara noastr. Pentru mrirea confortului interior peretele termoizolator trebuie astfel conceput ca
datorit difuziei vaporilor n structura peretelui i pe partea interioar s nu apar condens. Din
acest punct de vedere, cei mai sensibili sunt pereii nclinai. Pentru eliminarea vaporilor i apei
condensate trebuie realizate orificii de aerisire. nclinaia acoperiului, sub nvelitoare trebuie pus
folie. n funcie de tipul foliei trebuie s realizm unul sau dou straturi de ventilare. Apa
condensat n stratul superior trebuie condus ori n jgheab, ori pe tabla de eliminare condens la
streain, altfel o s avem daune n structura cldirii.
n cazul folosirii foliilor impermeabile trebuie realizate dou straturi de ventilare:
primul ntre nvelitoare i astereal;
al doilea ntre folie i termoizolaie.
Grosimea primului strat de ventilare coincide cu nlimea contraipcilor care trebuie alese
n funcie de nclinaia acoperiului astfel nct subventilarea s se poat realiza i n zilele cnd nu
bate vntul. Rolul stratului de ventilare ntre igl i astereal este s usuce iglele i ipcile de
eventuale infiltraii ale apei.
Al doilea strat are rolul de a elimina condensul de pe partea inferioar a primei folii care e
impermeabil. Aceast umiditate este principalul factor pentru realizarea celui de-al doilea strat de
ventilare, altfel umezeala rmne sub folie i va fi absorbit de termoizolaie, n acest fel scznd
gradul de izolare termic i apare n partea interioar a structurii mucegaiul. Al doilea strat trebuie
realizat ntre cpriori, folie i termoizolaie. Al doilea strat nu poate lipsi n cazul folosirii foliilor
impermeabile.
n acest caz, condensul trece prin folie i se elimin prin stratul de ventilare ntre folie i
partea inferioar a iglei. Astfel nu se umezete termoizolaia, iar prin eliminarea celui de-al doilea
strat de ventilare poate s creasc nlimea termoizolaiei i se simplific realizarea detaliilor de
execuie.
62
Fig. 5 acoperi rece
Fig. 6 acoperi cald
Exemplu:
n situaia urmtoare este prezentat cum se calculeaz seciunea stratului de ventilare n
cazul unui acoperi n patru pante. De obicei, se utilizeaz contraipci cu dimensiuni 30/50, astfel
grosimea stratului de ventilare aproximativ 2,5-3 cm, conform DIN 4108 [5].
nvelitorile cu dimensiuni diferite trebuie s le calculm separat:

(1)
(2)
I.
Poriunea arpantei A: determinarea seciunii minime de ventilare.
(3)
Determinarea grosimii de ventilare (m), l=5 cm limea contraipcii, distana ntre axe 100 cm.
(4)
Grosimea minim a stratului de ventilare este 2,11 cm.
63
II.
Streain:
(5)
Limea streinii este de 8 m:
(6)
Pentru determinarea grosimi minime a stratului de ventilare lum 200 cm /m. Banda de
aerisire scade seciunea liber cu 50%.
2
(7)
Acest rezultat este pentru poriunea de arpant A i C.
III.
Limea streinii este de 12 m:
(8)
2
Pentru determinarea stratului minim de ventilare lum 200 cm /m.

l=limea cpriorilor, distana interax 100 cm:
(9)
Acest rezultat este pentru poriunea de arpant B i D.
IV. Coame, muchii:
La suprafeele A i C trebuie determinat grosimea stratului la muchii (la o gur de
ventilare)
(10)
n cazul muchiei de 6,58 m:
(11)
(12)
V. La suprafeele B i D, determinarea grosimii stratului se dermin ca i la suprafeele A i C:
m=0,08 cm.
La suprafeele B i D mrimea grosimii stratului de ventilare minim:
(13)
n cazul coamei de 4 m:
(14)
64
(15)
Elementele care scad dimensiunea stratului de ventilare (contraipci, cpriori, astereal...)
trebuie sczute
5. IPOTEZE DE NCRCARE
n calculul construciilor se ia n considerare posibilitatea de acionare simultan a mai
multor ncrcri, grupate n funcie de posibilitatea de apariie concomitent, urmnd a se gsi cea
mai defavorabil situaie pentru elementul de construcie respectiv.
La calculul arpantei (astereal, cpriori, pane) se consider urmtoarele ipoteze de
ncrcare:
ipoteza 1 ncrcare permanent + ncrcarea din zpad;
ipoteza a 2-a ncrcare permanent + presiune vntului + 1/2 din ncrcarea cu
zpad;
ipoteza a 3-a ncrcare permanent + ncrcarea util concentrat.
Ipoteza 1
a a a
b cos
g1x g px g zx g p
a
a
a
g g g g b sin
py
zy
p
1y
Ipoteza a 2-a
p
p
b cos 2 [daN / m]
b sin cos [daN / m]
a
1 a
a
a
g 2 x g px 2 g zx g vx g p b cos
g a g a 1 g a g a g b sin
vy
2 y
py
p
2 zy
Ipoteza a 3-a
g 3x
a
g 3y
P3ax
a
P3 y
pz
b cos 2 p v b [daN / m]
2
pz
b cos sin [daN / m]
2
g apx g p b cos , [daN / m]

g apy g p b sin , [daN / m]
(16)
(17)
(18)
P cos , [daN ]
(19)
P sin , [daN ]
6. CONCLUZII
Concluziile generale care se desprind din aceast lucrare sunt umtoarele:
mansardele locuibile prevzute cu arpante din lemn determin reducerea
semnificativ a ncrcrii proprii a construciei, datorit folosirii lemnului n structura de rezisten
a arpantei, comparativ cu alte materiale de construcie, cum ar fi betonul sau metalul;
execuia rapid i utilizarea imediat, fr timpi de ateptare;
65
introducerea n realizarea arpantei a unor elemente de construcie tipizate, cum ar fi:

popii, panele, cpriorii, cletii, contravntuirile, cu mbinri tipice, folosind plcuele conectoare,
care ofer o rigidizare i stabilitate puternic;
scderea preului de cost al construciei innd cont de factori cum sunt reducerea
greutii proprii a construciei, scderea timpului efectiv de lucru i execuia rapid.
BIBLIOGRAFIE
[1] Dr. ing. Fekete-Nagy Luminia, Structuri din lemn.
[2] Drd. ing. Marius Giurgiu, Studiul privind optimizarea structurilor lamelare compuse din lemn,
utilizate n construcii.
[3]http://www.mitek.ro/sarpanta-din-lemn-sau-accoperis-din-lemn-ce-este-sarpanta-si-ce-este-acoperisul/
[4] http://www.conectorilemn.ro/despre-conectori.html
[5] DIN 4108 Wrmeschutz und Energie-Einsparung in Gebuden (Protecie termic i economia
de energie n cldiri).
[6] Normativ privind proiectarea construciilor din lemn (revizuire NP 005-96), indicativ NP 005-03.
66
INSTALAII DE STINGERE A INCENDIILOR

CU SPRINKLERE CU PREACIONARE
Student sergent Dan COLNICEANU
Colonel conf. univ. dr. ing. Manuel SERBAN
Abstract: This paper presents the description and operation of the actuated valve with preaction trim
situated in a sprinkler installation with double synchronized preaction. Also this article is
intended to be useful for those who want to consolidate their knowledge in area of sprinkler
installations.
Keywords: Sprinkler, Clapper, Double Synchronized, Alert and Control Valve, ECS.
1. INTRODUCERE
Instalaiile de sprinklere cu preacionare dublu sincronizate sunt instalaii de tip ap-aer n
care supapa de control i semnalizare este activat de un sistem automat de detectare i semnalizare
a incendiului i de declanarea sprinklerelor. Sistemele dublu interblocate sunt proiectate astfel
nct supapa de control i semnalizare s opereze numai la detectarea parametrilor diferii ai
incendiilor de ctre mecanismul de declanare. Dac apare un singur eveniment declanator se va
auzi o alarm sonor ns supapa nu va funciona i apa nu se va elibera dect la detectarea unui al
doilea eveniment declanator. Sistemele dublu interblocate sunt, de obicei, utilizate n sistemele de
refrigerare unde apa care intr n sistemul de sprinklere, precum i descrcarea accidental a apei
sunt de o importan deosebit. [1]
2. SUBANSAMBLUL DE PREACIONARE
2.1. Descrierea supapei de control i semnalizare
Supapa de preacionare gestioneaz alimentarea cu ap la intrarea n evile i sprinklerele
unui sistem. Sistemul de preacionare este, de obicei, monitorizat cu ajutorului aerului comprimat
sau nitrogenului n vederea detectrii de scurgeri n sistem. Supapa de control i semnalizare este un
aparat de control i semnalizare cu clapet zvort i diferenial mic i dispune de o diafragm
unicat cu acionare direct care separ partea de alimentare cu ap a sistemului de partea de
preacionare cu sprinklere a acestuia. Mecanismul cu nchidere ine clapeta nchis cu ajutorul
presiunii apei de alimentare din amonte de robinetul principal de control. Dac presiunea din
camera diafragmei este eliberat, zvorul se retrage din clapet i supapa este activat. Designul
unic cu diferenial mic, zvor i actuator al supapei permite autoresetarea acestuia fr a se mai
demonta capacul.
Supapa permite ca apa s acioneze un clopot hidraulic de alarmare i/sau alarme electrice
de presiune care rmn active pn ce debitul de ap este ntrerupt.
67
Supapa are o presiune de lucru nominal de 300 psi (2065 kPa). Presiunea necesar de aer
este de 13 psi (90 kPa).
Supapele de preacionare nu au nevoie de un robinet de control separat n sistemul de
preacionare. Ele dispun de un design cu curgere rectilinie care asigur un debit superior i o
pierdere mic de presiune. Corpul supapei are un profil care permite montarea unui robinet de golire
care s completeze sistemul.
Supapa dispune de acces simplu la toate piesele sale componente din interior n vederea
unei ntreineri facile. Toate piesele componente interioare sunt demontabile.
ntreinerea i service-ul se pot face fr a demonta supapa din poziia sa de funcionare.
Garnitura de cauciuc de etanare a clapetei poate fi nlocuit cu uurin fr a demonta clapeta de
pe supap. Profilul supapei permite montarea unui robinet de golire sau a accesoriilor din toate
configuraiile disponibile. Supapa este protejat cu vopsea pe exterior i interior pentru a se crete
rezistena la coroziune a acesteia.
Subansamblul supapei de preacionare include un robinet de testare a alarmei care permite
aceast testare fr reducerea presiunii din instalaie. Supapa de preacionare trebuie amplasat ntrun spaiu n care temperatura s fie meninut la o valoare mai mare de 4C tot timpul anului, ferit
de intemperii, temperaturi de nghe sau deteriorri. [2]
n figura 1 este reprezentat o supap de control i semnalizare [1], iar n figura 2 modul de
montaj al acesteia n cadrul unei instalaii cu preacionare dublu sincronizat. [4]
Fig. 1 Supap de control i semnalizare
2.2 Funcionarea supapei de control i semnalizare

Sistemul cu preacionare utilizeaz o supap de preacionare care controleaz intrarea apei de
alimentare n evile i sprinklerele sistemului de preacionare. Supapa de preacionare este prevzut cu
o clapet cu fa de cauciuc. Clapeta vine n contact cu inelul scaunului de la supap, inel prevzut cu
orificii de acces n camera intermediar a ACS-ului. Clapeta se afl n contact cu zvorul care, la rndul
su, se afl n contact cu diafragma (figura 3). n poziia neutr, presiunea apei de alimentare din amonte
68
de robinetul de alimentare este meninut la o valoare constant n camera cu diafragm care ine clapeta
n poziie nchis. Apa st n diafragm datorit unuia din mecanismele de declanare (pneumatic,
hidraulic sau electric). La sesizarea unui eveniment declanator n sistemul de preacionare presiunea
apei de alimentare din camera cu diafragm este eliberat.
Fig. 2 Instalaie cu preacionare dublu sincronizat
Aceast eliberare de presiune face ca zvorul s se deplaseze n poziia deschis, lsnd

astfel clapeta s pivoteze liber i apa s ptrund n sistem. Apa va curge prin toate sprinklerele
deschise din sistemul de evi. De asemenea, apa va intra i n camera intermediar a supapei prin
orificiile din inelul scaunului.
Din camera intermediar, apa va trece n conducta de alarm activnd astfel alarmele din
sistem. Aceste alarme vor suna pn la oprirea fluxului de ap. n acest caz, clapeta cu arc a supapei
revine n poziie nchis i supapa va funciona ca un clopot de alarm pn ce sistemul va fi repus
n funciune ca sistem de preacionare.[2]
Fig. 3 Prile componente ale supapei de control i semnalizare
69
2.3. Declanarea pneumatic/electric a instalaiei de stingere

Sistemul cu preacionare electric/pneumatic este format dintr-un sistem de declanare
electric (ventil electromagnetic omologat, panou electric i senzor corespunztor) i un sistem de
sprinklere presurizat pneumatic. Supapa se va activa numai dac apare o pierdere de presiune n
sistem i dac se detecteaz electric un eveniment declanator. n cazul n care exist o pierdere de
presiune i sistemul de sprinklere nu dispune de detecie electric, supapa va intra n funciune
numai dac se detecteaz un al doilea eveniment declanator. Astfel, apa nu va curge dac sistemul
de sprinklere este deteriorat accidental. n plus, supapa nu va funciona dac exist o detecie, dar
nu exist pierdere de presiune n sistemul de sprinklere. Alarmele se vor declana n ambele cazuri
i vor alerta utilizatorul c exist o situaie de detecie a unui parametru asociat unui incendiu.
Poziiile de funcionare ale supapei cu acionare pneumatic sunt prezentate n figura 4, iar
n figura 5 este prezentat schema de funcionare a valvei deluge cu acionare hidropneumatic n
poziie de ateptare i poziia de lucru. [3]
Fig. 4 Poziiile de lucru ale supapei cu acionare pneumatic

a. poziia de ateptare; b. poziia de funcionare; c. poziia dup ncetarea funcionrii instalaiei
d. poziia de ateptare
70
Fig. 5 Schema de montare a supapei cu acionare pneumatic

(a. poziia de ateptare, b. poziia de lucru [3])
Legend:
1 corpul valvei deluge; 2 clapeta de reinere a valvei (diafragm); 3 dispozitiv de blocare a diafragmei;
4 robinet de golire a instalaiei; 5 clapet de sens; 6 dispozitiv de semnalizare a prezenei apei; 7 filtru;
8 robinet de golire a instalaiei de detectare; 9 manometer; 10 robinet de testare a instalaiei de semnalizare;
11 robinet de golire a instalaiei de semnalizare; N.D. robinet normal deschis; N.. robinet normal nchis.
Declanarea hidraulic poate fi cu acionare pnemumatic, un actuator de presiune sczut

(figura 6).
Actuatorul de presiune sczut este amplasat pe subansamblele supapei de control i
semnalizare i are rol de declanare. Diafragmele mpart actuatorul de presiune sczut n trei
camere. Camera de aer superioar controleaz activarea, iar camerele inferioar i median
acioneaz ca o supap hidraulic.
La pornire, aerul din sistem este aplicat camerei superioare a actuatorului de presiune
sczut. Dac se trage n sus de manonul aerisitorului automat, camera superioar se seteaz
manual. Presiunea aerului din camera superioar ine nchis aerisitorul automat i exercit presiune
pe etanarea hidraulic a camerei mediane.
La deschiderea conductei de ncrcare a diafragmei, apa intr n camera inferioar a
actuatorului de presiune sczut. De aici, apa trece n camera median printr-o deschidere, camera
fiind presurizat de ctre presiunea de aer din camera superioar. Deoarece zona din jurul
diafragmei inferioare (expus presiunii apei n camera median) este mai mare dect zona camerei
inferioare, aceasta rmne izolat etan. Apa nu curge ctre ieirea actuatorului de presiune sczut,
iar presiunea alimentrii cu ap creeaz o etanare hidraulic.
Dac presiunea aerului din sistem scade la 7 psi (48 kPa), fora exercitat de ctre arcul de
comprimare n aerisitorul automat este mai mare dect fora exercitat de ctre aer n camera
superioar. Astfel, aerisitorul automat se deschide i toat presiunea aerului din camera superioar
este evacuat.
Diafragma superioar elibereaz presiunea apei n camera median a actuatorului de
presiune sczut, fapt care permite diafragmei inferioare s se ridice i apa s curg dinspre intrare
spre ieire. Aceast curgere a apei elibereaz presiunea din conducta de ncrcare cu diafragm a
71
supapei, permind retragerea diafragmei. Clapeta supapei se deschide, iar apa curge n sistemul de
sprinklere. [2]
AERISITOR
NSPRE
ATMOSFER
INTRARE AER
IEIRE
INTRARE
Fig. 6 Vedere n seciune a actuatorului de joas presiune pneumatic. [2]

Legend:
1 manon aerisitor automat; 2 urub aerisitor automat; 3 ansamblu aerisitor automat; 4 camera superioar;
5 resort ondulat diafragma superioar; 6 resort ondulat diafragma inferioar; 7 ochi ieire; 8 camera
inferioar; 9 ansamblu diafragm interioar;10 sit filtru; 11 entanare filtru; 12 ansamblu filtu; 13 ochi
intrare; 14 camer median; 15 ansamblu diafragm superioar.
2.4 Declanarea electric (Electric-Pneumatic/Electric) a sistemului de stingere

Declanarea electric-pneumatic/electric se face cu dou dispozitive care transmit
semnal electric, un detector de incendiu (figura 7) i un comutator de presiune sczut montate n
sistemul de sprinklere. Ambele dispozitive electrice sunt cablate pe un panou de comand omologat
(ECS), n configuraie inter-zonal. Panoul de comand electric acioneaz un ventil
electromagnetic montat pe pistonul supapei. n cazul n care se activeaz un dispozitiv ca urmare a
detectrii unui incendiu i nu exist pierdere de presiune n sistemul de sprinklere, panoul de
comand nu va anclana ventilul electromagnetic i supapa nu va funciona. [2]
ECS-ul nu va anclana ventilul electromagnetic i supapa nu va funciona dac exist
pierdere de presiune n sistemul de sprinklere ca urmare a deteriorrilor sau activrii unui
sprinkler i nu exist o detecie de incendiu. Supapa va funciona numai dac exist att un
eveniment de detecie a unui incendiu, ct i o pierdere de presiune. Dac la echipamentul de
comand se primesc ambele semnale, acesta va anclana ventilul electromagnetic. Acest lucru
72
va face ca presiunea apei de alimentare din camera cu diafragm a supapei s fie eliberat i apa
s ptrund n sistem. [2]
Fig. 7 Detectoare de incendiu utilizate pentru acionarea supapei. [3]
Subansamblul de preacionare electric/pneumatic poate fi cu autoconversie (figura 8).

Subansamblul de autoconversie este compus dintr-un modul cu solenoid de nchidere i un
actuator de joas presiune. Subansamblul de autoconversie monitorizeaz alimentarea electric la
panoul de comand pentru alarme de incendiu (ECS) i asigur permanent protecia mpotriva
incendiilor n cazul unei cderi de tensiune fr descrcarea bateriei de rezerv.
Dac survine o cdere de tensiune, modulul cu solenoid de nchidere primete un semnal
electric instantaneu pentru a se deschide. Modulul rmne n poziia deschis fr consum
suplimentar de curent. Acest lucru permite ca ECS-ul s monitorizeze n continuare sistemul i s
declaneze alarme n cazul unui incendiu pn ce bateria de rezerv se descarc sau se restabilete
alimentarea de la reea.
n poziia deschis, aerul poate circula prin modulul cu solenoid de nchidere ctre
actuatorul de joas presiune i convertete sistemul n starea non-interblocat. O pierdere a debitului
de aer n sistem sau un semnal electric de la ECS va permite activarea supapei de preacionare i
umplerea cu ap a sistemului de conducte cu sprinklere. Sistemul continu s acioneze ca o supap
de control i semnalizare uscat pn ce se restabilete alimentarea de la reea. La restabilirea
alimentrii electrice, modulul cu solenoid de nchidere primete un alt semnal instantaneu de la ECS
pentru a se nchide. Sistemul de preacionare revine la modul de funcionare normal. Resetarea
manual a sistemului nu este necesar. [2]
Actuatorul electric/pneumatic este un dispozitiv monobloc folosit la acionarea supapelor
de preacionare cu subansamblu uscat electric/pneumatic dublu-interblocat i cu autoconversie.
Diafragmele mpart supapa n patru camere. Camerele superioar i median-superioar controleaz
activarea, n timp ce camerele inferioar i median-inferioar acioneaz ca o supap de control al
apei.
La ncrcarea sistemului, aerul sub presiune intr n camera median-superioar a
actuatorului. Prin tragerea n sus a aerisitorului automat, amplasat pe subansamblul (figura 9), se
stabilete presiunea aerului n aceast camer. Apa sub presiune din conducta de ncrcare cu
diafragm intr n camera superioar, iar solenoidul normal nchis, ncorporat n actuatorul,
stabilete presiunea apei. Nu este necesar activarea solenoidului pentru a seta sistemul.
73
Fig. 8 Subansamblul de autoconversie. [2]

1 furtun flexibil din oel mpletit; 2 modul cu solenoid de nchidere; 3 manametru aer la subansamblu de
autoconversie; 4 robinet manometru; 5 actuator de joas presiune; 6 ansamblu 3 n 1 filtru/supap/drosel;
7 filtru; 8 drosel; 9 presostat de aer pre-reglat ansamblul de autoconversie.
Presiunea aerului din sistem din camera median-superioar exercit o for de nchidere a
diafragmei din camera median a actuatorului. n plus, presiunea de alimentare cu ap exercit o
for pe diafragma median prin intermediul unui piston care face legtura ntre diafragma
superioar i cea median. Aceste presiuni nchid calea apei din camera median-inferioar. Dac
conducta de ncrcare cu diafragm este deschis, apa intr n camera inferioar a actuatorului; dup
aceasta, apa trece prin orificiul de intrare n camera median-inferioar. Diafragma median reine
apa n camera median-inferioar. Presiunea de alimentare cu ap din camera superioar mpreun cu
presiunea aerului din sistem din camera median-superioar in nchis diafragma median-inferioar.
Deoarece zona din jurul diafragmei inferioare (expus presiunii apei n camera median) este mai
mare dect zona camerei inferioare, aceasta rmne izolat etan. Apa nu curge ctre ieirea din
actuatorul, iar presiunea apei de alimentare genereaz etanarea hidraulic.
Dac presiunea aerului din sistem scade la 7 psi (0,5 bar), resortul de comprimare al
aerisitorului automat exercit o for mai mare dect cea exercitat de presiunea aerului din camera
median-superioar. Astfel, aerisitorul automat se deschide i toat presiunea aerului din camera
median-superioar este evacuat. n aceste condiii, actuatorul nu se va activa, deoarece presiunea
apei din camera superioar menine fora de nchidere pe etanarea cu ap a camerei medianinferioare. De asemenea, dac a avut loc un eveniment de detectare electric, solenoidul camerei
superioare se va activa i va elibera presiunea apei din camera superioar. Actuatorul nu se va
activa, deoarece presiunea aerului din camera median-superioar exercit o for de nchidere pe
etanarea hidraulic a camerei median-inferioare. Actuatorul se va activa doar dac apare o
detectare electric sau o pierdere de presiune a aerului din sistem. n aceste condiii, fora de
nchidere de pe etanarea cu ap a diafragmei median-inferioare este anulat, iar presiunea apei din
camera median-inferioar este eliberat. Acest fapt permite ridicarea diafragmei inferioare i
curgerea apei ctre ieirea din actuatorul. Aceast curgere a apei elibereaz presiunea apei de la
74
diafragma supapei de preacionare i permite retragerea diafragmei. Clapeta supapei de pre-acionare se

deschide, iar apa curge n sistemul de sprinklere.
Fig. 9 Vedere n seciune actuator de joas presiune electric/pneumatic.[2]
2.5 Declanarea pneumatic/pneumatic a sistemelor de stingere

Sistemul cu declanare pneumatic/pneumatic este format dintr-un actuator pneumatic
dublu care controleaz supapa. Supapa va funciona numai dac se activeaz sprinklerele att pe
conducta pilot, ct i n sistem. Dac sprinklerele se activeaz numai pe conducta-pilot sau numai n
sistem (fr deschiderea unui sprinkler n cealalt parte), supapa nu va intra n funciune. Deoarece
sistemul pneumatic/pneumatic utilizeaz dou sisteme de detecie pneumatic separate nu este
nevoie de un panou de declanare electric (ECS). Un sprinkler deschis va declana alarma de
presiune sczut n toate situaiile. [2]
3. CONCLUZII
Instalaiile cu preacionare ofer o siguran mai mare n exploatare fa de cele clasice de
tip ap-ap i aer-aer. Att sistemele simplu sincronizate la care apa ptrunde n reea dup
declanarea unui detector, ct i cele dublu sincronizate la care apa ptrunde n reeaua de sprinklere
numai dup declanarea att a dispozitivelor de detectare, ct i a sprinklerelor, pot funciona n
condiii de temperatur sczut, ele putnd fi amplasate n sisteme frigorifice unde temperatura este
foarte sczut sau n locuri de o importan deosebit n care materialele se pot deteriora n contact
cu apa. Astfel, o declanare accidental a unui cap de sprinkler ar produce pagube materiale
semnificative.
75
Pentru a evita o descrcare accidental a apei n spaiul protejat se vor folosi elemente de
declanare care folosesc pentru a transmite semnalul pneumatic/electric la parametri diferii ai
incendiului, respectiv sprinklere care sunt sensibile la un anumit prag de temperatur i detectoare
de fum.
Timpul de rspuns al instalaiilor poate fi setat n funcie de riscul la incendiu modificnd
temperatura de declanare a fiolei care ine anclanat sprinklerul sau prin folosirea unui detector cu
un anumit prag de declanare i implicit un anumit timp de transmitere a semnalului electric.
Sistemele dublu sincronizate ntrzie cel mai mult refularea apei deoarece intrarea apei n
reeaua de sprinklere va fi comandat atunci cnd valva primete cele dou semnale, respectiv cel
de la sprinkler i cel de la detectorul folosit. n schimb, la sistemul simplu sincronizat, n momentul
n care detectorul semnalizeaz incendiul, valva permite ca apa s intre n sistem, dar va fi refulat
doar atunci cnd declaneaz sprinklerul din zona incendiat.
ACS-urile care funcionau n cadrul sistemelor clasice au fost nlocuite cu supape de
control i semnalizare. Aceste supape sunt mult mai eficiente deoarece atunci cnd presiunea din
reea scade sub 7 psi (0,5 bar) diafragma se deschide la maxim, permind apei sa ajung la capul de
sprinkler ntr-un timp foarte scurt. ACS-urile clasice funcionau pe acelai principiu hidraulic doar
c nu aveau un prag de declanare a diafragmei, astfel ntr-un sistem cu un numr mare de
sprinklere o scdere de presiune mic la un sprinkler ndeprtat nu activa ACS-ul, n acest caz,
riscul fiind foarte mare.
Cele trei tipuri de instalaii cu preacionare dublu sincronizat prezentate n acest articol se
pot folosi n diferite domenii n funcie de riscul la incendiu, astfel ele pot proteja spaiile prevzute
n normativele care fac precizri la echiparea cldirilor cu instalaii de sprinklere, ct i orice spaiu
care se dorete a fi protejat mpotriva incendiilor.
BIBLIOGRAFIE
[1] SR EN 12845/2009, Instalaii fixe de lupt mpotriva incendiului. Sisteme automate de
stingere tip sprinkler Calcul, instalare i ntreinere.
[2] www.victaulic.com
[3] M. erban, L. Burlacu, L.V. Blnescu, Sisteme de stingere a incendiilor cu valve de tip
Deluge, Conferina cu participare internaional SIGPROT, Bucureti, 2005.
[4] L. Burlacu, M. erban, Instalaii sprinkler cu preacionare, Conferina cu participare
internaional SIGPROT, Bucureti, 2005.
76
INSTALAII FIXE DE STINGERE A INCENDIILOR CU SPUM

LA PARCURILE DE REZERVOARE CU CAPAC FIX
DE LICHIDE COMBUSTIBILE
Student sergent Alexandru IACOB
Abstract: In an industry that deals with large volumes of flammable materials, the risk of fire is always
present. Foam fire protection systems are implemented in oil storage tanks. Fire-fighting foam is
foam used for fire suppression. Its role is to cool the fire and to coat the fuel, preventing its
contact with oxygen, resulting in suppression of the combustion.
Keywords: Refinery, Storage Tank, Foam, Fire Protection System.
1. INTRODUCERE
Instalaiile fixe de stingere sunt folosite la protejarea spaiilor i proceselor tehnologice n
care sunt prelucrate, depozitate i vehiculate lichide inflamabile. Aceste instalaii de stingere sunt
utilizate n industria petrochimic, rafinrii, la depozite de lichide combustibile i gaze, parcuri de
rezervoare, hangare pentru avioane etc.
Legislaia din ara noastr oblig dotarea parcurilor de rezervoare i a rezervoarelor de
lichide combustibile cu instalaii de stingere cu spum pentru reducerea riscului de incendiu. [2]
2. PARCURILE DE REZERVOARE
Parcurile de rezervoare reprezint un ansamblu format din mai multe rezervoare, ce au
legtur prin conducte cu rampele de expediere i instalaiile tehnologice.
Parcurile de rezervoare se compun din rezervoare, cuve de retenie, conducte de legtur,
instalaii de stingere a incendiilor fixe i mobile, instalaii de rcire i protecie a rezervoarelor,
instalaii de transport i transvazare, rezervoare cu ap pentru combaterea incendiilor, drumuri de
acces.
Dup poziia rezervoarelor fa de suprafaa solului acestea sunt:
rezervoare de suprafa (figura 1);
rezervoare semi-ngropate;
rezervoare ngropate;
rezervoare subacvatice;
rezervoare plutitoare.
Dup forma geometric acestea sunt: cilindrice (orizontale sau verticale), sferice (figura 1),
elipsosferice, sferoidale, conice, paralelipipedice i de forme speciale. [3]
77
Fig. 1 Rezervor sferoidal neted, n form de pictur
Rezervoarele cilindrice verticale cu capac fix reprezint categoria n care sunt incluse
majoritatea rezervoarelor aflate n exploatare (figura 2).
Fig. 2 Parc de rezervoare cilindrice verticale cu capac fix
Principalele substane combustibile rezultate din rafinarea ieiului sunt: benzin, motorin,
petrol lampant, gudron i pcur.
Incendiile din parcurile de rezervoare de lichide combustibile sunt n general de lung
durat i complexe, necesitnd un numr important de fore i mijloace, precum i cantiti mari de
substane de stingere.
3. SPUMA
Spuma a fost i este substana stingtoare principal de stingere a produselor petroliere,
depozitate n rezervor sau scurse i acumulate n strat n caz de avarie la rezervoare, cuve de retenie
i instalaii tehnologice.
78
n funcie de modul de generare, spumele se clasific n:

spum chimic faza dispers este dioxidul de carbon, generat de reacia chimic dintre
o substan bazic (bicarbonatul de sodiu) i una acid (sulfat de aluminiu), iar mediul de dispersie
este apa;
spum mecanic faza dispers este aerul, iar mediul de dispersie este apa, n care s-a
dizolvat n anumite concentraii, 3-6%, spumant.
Spuma chimic se utilizeaz la stingerea incendiilor de produse petroliere i de materiale
combustibile solide, care nu reacioneaz cu soluiile aprinse ale srurilor.
Spuma mecanic este cea mai folosit substan de stingere n domeniul proteciei
rezervoarelor de lichide combustibile. Emulsia de ap i spumogen se realizeaz n amestectoare
de linie, pompe i pe liniile de furtun. Spuma se formeaz n evile generatoare de spum sau
deversoare de diferite tipuri.
Coeficientul de nfoiere al spumei, notat cu E, reprezint raportul dintre volumul spumei i
volumul de soluie spumant.
n funcie de coeficientul de nfoiere, spumele se mpart n: [2]
spume de joas nfoiere, 1 < E 20;
spume de medie nfoiere, 20 < E 200;
spume de nalt nfoiere, E > 200.
Efectele de stingere al stratului de spum deversat peste suprafaa liber a unui lichid
combustibil (figura 2) sunt urmtoarele:
rcete parial suprafaa aprins;
mpiedic ieirea vaporilor n zona flcrilor i astfel continuarea procesului de
ardere;
oprete accesul oxigenului n zona flcrilor;
se creeaz pe suprafaa substanei care arde o izolaie termic (mpiedic afluxul de
cldur din zona de ardere) (figura 3). [3]
IZOLEAZ COMBUSTIBILUL
DE FLACR
MPIEDIC ACCESUL
OXIGENULUI
LICHID COMBUSTIBIL
RCETE COMBUSTIBILUL
I PEREII
REDUCE EVAPORAREA
Fig. 3 Aciunea de stingere a spumei mecanice
79
n figura 4 sunt prezentate fazele aciunii de stingere a unei instalaii fixe de stingere cu
spum mecanic la un rezervor incendiat. [4]
Fig. 4 Aciunea instalaiei de stingere cu spum la un rezervor de benzin
4. INSTALAIA FIX DE STINGERE CU SPUM LA REZERVOARELE CU

CAPAC FIX
Pentru asigurarea proteciei mpotriva incendiilor a rezervoarelor de lichide combustibile,
de diferite capaciti, acestea se prevd cu instalaii fixe de stingere i rcire.
Din punct de vedere al alctuirii constructive a instalaiilor de stingere a incendiilor cu
spum, acestea pot fi:
fixe;
semifixe;
mobile. [5]
Instalaiile de stingere a incendiilor cu spum fixe sunt instalaii la care toate componentele
sistemului de stingere cu spum i pentru furnizarea soluiei spumante sunt instalate permanent
(figura 5).
Instalaia fix de stingere cu spum cuprinde: [2]
1) Surs de alimentare cu ap;
2) Surs de alimentare cu spumani;
3) Aparate de dozare a consumului de spumani (preparare a soluiei spumante);
4) Generatoare de spum corespunztoare ca numr i capacitate (figura 6);
5) Reea de transport i distribuie a substanei de stingere (conducte de soluie i conducte
de spum);
6) Capete de spum prin care substana de stingere este debitat i dirijat ntr-un mod
corespunztor n zona protejat;
7) Dispozitive de acionare de la distan a diferitelor utilaje tehnologice (pompe, robinete
sau clapete din instalaii etc.).
80
Fig. 5 Schema instalaiei fixe de stingere cu spum mecanic la un rezervor
Schema instalaiei de stingere cu spum se adopt n funcie de:

obiectul protejat (spaiul interior sau exterior, rezervor sau cuv etc.);
procedeul utilizat pentru prepararea soluiei i debitarea spumei n zona incendiat;
coeficientul de nfoiere al spumei.
Fig. 6 Generator de spum medie tip GWP:

1 duz de pulverizare a soluiei spumante; 2 corpul generatorului;
3 reele duble pentru producerea spumei; 4 cap de refulare a spumei.
n figura 7 este prezentat n detaliu o camer de spum. Aceasta are un rol foarte
important n funcionarea instalaiei, dar i la verificarea funcionrii acesteia.
Fig. 7 Camer de spum:

1 corpul camerei; 2 capac detaabil; 3 conducta de intrare a spumei;
4 deversor de spum; 5 dispozitiv de etanare (blind).
81
Conducta de intrare a spumei (3), din figura 6, este prevzut cu o flan pentru fixarea sa
pe peretele rezervorului i una pentru montarea camerei de spum. Conducta de intrare a spumei se
fixeaz prin sudur sau cu uruburi pe peretele rezervorului, prevzut la rndul lui cu o flan
special.
n cazul deversoarelor tubulare, deflectorul are forma unei curbe care se monteaz la
captul conductei de intrare a spumei, prin sudur sau filet.
La marile rezervoare, conducta deversorului poate lipsi, camera de spum atandu-se
direct la flana special a rezervorului. Montajul se realizeaz cu sudur sau cu uruburi. n acest
caz, deflectorul, realizat ca pies detaat, din tabl, se monteaz n interiorul rezervorului n faa
orificiului conductei de ieire a spumei.
Deflectorul de tabl poate fi alctuit dintr-una sau din dou piese. Deflectorul este executat
din dou piese i poate fi montat i din exteriorul rezervorului.
Printr-un procedeu simplu se pot monta din exterior i deversoare tubulare, dac se lrgete
corespunztor orificiul practicat n peretele rezervorului i flana special.
5. CONCLUZII
Riscul de incendiu este mare n parcurile de rezervoare datorit prezenei unei cantiti
foarte mari de substane combustibile. Rezervoarele cilindrice cu capac fix sunt cele mai utilizate
tipuri de rezervoare pentru depozitarea lichidelor inflamabile.
Spuma mecanic este substana stingtoare principal folosit la protecia parcurilor de
rezervoare i la stingerea incendiilor de produse petroliere. Pentru a proteja mediul nconjurtor, n
ultimii ani s-a trecut la utilizarea pe scar larg a spumelor biodegradabile i la eliminarea spumelor
chimice.
Legislaia din ara noastr oblig dotarea rezervoarelor de lichide combustibile cu instalaii
de stingere cu spum. [2]
Numai atunci cnd deflectorul are forma i montajul corect, deversorul poate s-i
ndeplineasc rolul su complex de a contribui la reducerea vitezei fluidului, la mbuntirea
repartiiei sale n plan orizontal pe peretele rezervorului i, n principal, la reducerea fenomenului de
imersie a spumei n stratul de lichid combustibil incendiat.
BIBLIOGRAFIE
[1] Mocioi Ionel-Alin, Curs Substane de stingere.
[2] *** Normativ privind securitatea la incendiu a construciilor, Partea a II-a Instalaii de
[3] erban Manuel, Curs Instalaii de stingere a incendiilor.
[4] Frusinoiu Valentin, Securitatea la incendiu a parcurilor de rezervoare de lichide combustibile.
[5] *** Reabilitare i modernizarea instalaiilor de stingere cu spum la rezervoarele pentru
depozitarea produselor petroliere.
[6] http://www.gepro.ro/documentatie_psd/servicii/proiectare/instalatii_de_stingere.pdf
82
UTILIZAREA DISPOZITIVULUI AUTOMAT DESTINAT STINGERII

INCENDIILOR BONPET LA O INSTITUIE PUBLIC (AFER)
Eugen BRBULESCU (ef SPSU)
Florin PREDA (director general EXAL GRUP S.R.L. Sltioara, Olt)
Autoritatea Feroviar Romn (AFER)
Abstract: This paper demonstrates the importance of the work in emergencies to protect life, property
and the environment in general by the department of prevention of the Emergency Service of
AFER. In the same time, the work raises awareness of risks to which we are subject, in the
studied area, i.e. the knowledge of behavioral rules disaster.
Keywords: Management, Strategy, Fire Safety Activity, Public Institution, Romanian Railway
Authority (AFER).
1. PREFA
Lucrarea Utilizarea Dispozitivului Automat destinat Stingerii Incendiilor BONPET la o
instituie public (AFER) a fost elaborat de ctre domnul Eugen Brbulescu, eful Serviciului
pentru Situaii de Urgen, constituit n cadrul AFER, mpreun domnul Florin Preda, director
general Exal Grup S.R.L. (distribuitorul autorizat al dispozitivului automat BONPET n Romnia),
pe baza aplicaiei studiului de caz realizat la Autoritatea Feroviar Romn AFER, unde s-au
montat un numr de 25 de buci dispozitive BONPET.
Prin aceast lucrare se ncearc prezentarea unei abordri ct mai cuprinztoare a
cunotinelor asimilate n domeniul situaiilor de urgen, de ctre personalul de specialitate din
cadrul Serviciului pentru situaii de urgen, i transmiterea acestora, respectiv implicarea
colectivului de salariai ai AFER, la pregtirea n acest domeniu vital pentru supravieuire.
La nivel de AFER gestionarea situaiilor de urgen se realizeaz de ctre Compartimentul
de prevenire al Serviciului pentru Situaii de Urgen AFER, care are ca scop principal prevenirea i
reducerea gravitii consecinelor unui eveniment, precum i pentru a elimina sau diminua pericolul
producerii unor situaii de urgen, n spaiile n care i desfoar activitatea salariaii AFER, prin
msurile stabilite n Programul anual cu activitile care se desfoar la nivel de AFER, referitoare
la pregtirea salariailor n domeniul situaiilor de urgen prin instructaje i antrenamente practice
de alarmare, evacuare, adpostire, intervenie i prim ajutor, care se desfoar la locurile de munc
ale acestora. Toate documentele elaborate de ctre SPSU i aprobate de ctre conducerea AFER,
respectiv de ctre Inspecia de Prevenire IGSU la nivel de sector i municipiului Bucureti, se
transmit la toate compartimentele din cadrul AFER, n vederea instruirii salariailor i menionarea
n fiele individuale de instruire.
Personalul desemnat cu organizarea i gestionarea situaiilor de urgen (protecie civil i
aprare mpotriva incendiilor) la nivel de AFER, a urmat cursurile de specialitate i este atestat n
domeniul situaiilor de urgen, conform legislaiei n vigoare, care prevede obligativitatea
ncadrrii cu personal de specialitate angajat/voluntar (ef SPSU, inspector de protecie civil, cadru
tehnic PSI), din rndul salariailor proprii.
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La realizarea lucrrii s-au folosit cunotinele i materialele puse la dispoziie de Catedrele

de Management i Specialitate ale Centrului Naional de Perfecionare a Pregtirii pentru
Managementul Situaiilor de Urgen (UM nr. 0490 Ciolpani), sub coordonarea domnului colonel
dr. Niculae Stan i Serviciul Prevenire Sector 1 din cadrul Inspectoratului pentru Situaii de Urgen
Dealul Spirii al Municipiului Bucureti, sub coordonarea domnului colonel Gheorghe Niculescu.
n calitate de coautor al lucrrii dl. Florin Preda, director general Exal Grup srl
(distribuitorul autorizat al dispozitivului automat BONPET n Romnia), a pus la dispoziie
cunotinele i documentele caracteristice acestui produs premier pe piaa romneasc.
Aplicarea managementului preveniei n gestionarea situaiilor de urgen care pot s apar
la o instituie public (AFER) se realizeaz n scopul dezvoltrii, susinerii i mbuntirii
modalitii de gestionare a resurselor umane i materiale i pregtirea/educarea personalului de
intervenie, care trebuie s rezolve problemele aprute n urma declanrii evenimentelor
periculoase.
2. DISPOZITIV AUTOMAT DESTINAT STINGERII INCENDIILOR BONPET

Tehnologia revoluionar de stingere a incendiilor, parametrii foarte buni de acionare,
posibilitile de amplasare fr intervenii majore asupra spaiului protejat i caracteristicile tehnice
ale Dispozitivului Automat Destinat Stingerii Incendiilor BONPET l recomand a fi utilizat n
majoritatea spaiilor nchise:
zone cu tehnica de calcul (calculatoare, reele de calculatoare, bnci de date, sisteme de
informatizare si arhivare, tuneluri de cabluri etc.);
zone pentru echipamente de telecomunicaii (centrale telefonice, staii radio-TV, centre
de comunicaii, reele telefonie GSM etc.);
industrie (camere de comand cu calculatoare de proces, zone cu sisteme automatizate,
linii automate de producie, echipamente de producere a curentului electric, laboratoare, cuptoare
uscare/vopsire, depozite, centre de distribuie a apei reci, calde i a agentului termic, staii de
pompare, staii de transformare sau de acumulatori, reele de distribuie a combustibililor, panouri
electrice i de comand, sisteme de semaforizare, mijloace de transport terestre, aeriene si navale,
containere sau alte spaii nesupravegheate etc.);
comer/instituii publice/spaii de locuit (camere de tezaur, depozite de documente,
muzee, biblioteci, arhive, sedii administrative, magazine, hoteluri, apartamente, vile, garaje,
depozite, sisteme de colectare selectiv a deeurilor etc.).
Dintre avantajele utilizrii Dispozitivului Automat Destinat Stingerii Incendiilor BONPET
enumerm:
stingerea focului este extrem de rapid, viteza de stingere fiind de ordinul secundelor;
acioneaz prin inhibarea chimic a procesului de ardere;
nu este toxic pentru oameni, animale sau plante i nu afecteaz mediul nconjurtor;
este un produs ecologic, biodegradabil i nu depreciaz stratul de ozon;
nu este coroziv;
n cazul mutrii n alt spaiu, cheltuielile de repoziionare i instalare sunt reduse;
nu depinde de surse externe de ap, energie electric sau presiune;
aciunea agentului de stingere este independent de cantitatea de oxigen i poate aciona
fr probleme la altitudine sau n zone cu concentraie sczut de oxigen;
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cheltuielile de ntreinere sunt nule;

nu necesit ntreinere sau control pe toat durata de via fa de alte sisteme de stingere
a incendiilor convenionale;
utilizarea produsului nu necesit cunotine de specialitate, fiind accesibil oricrei
persoane;
asigur protecie mpotriva unui incendiu 24 h/24 h;
reducerea polielor de asigurare;
protejarea investiiei de capital.
Dispozitivul Automat Destinat Stingerii Incendiilor BONPET poate fi utilizat n trei
moduri:
2.1 Stingere automat
n cazul unui incendiu, coninutul Dispozitivului Automat Destinat Stingerii Incendiilor
BONPET i mrete volumul sub efectul temperaturii, iar presiunea n cretere sparge pereii
subiri de sticl ai acestuia.
Astfel, agentul de stingere inund zona protejat unde i va exercita capacitatea de
stingere intensiv.
Acest mod de utilizare este destinat stingerii incendiilor accidentale i provocate n spaiul
protejat.
2.2 Folosirea ca echipament manual i individual de stingere a incendiului
n acest caz, Dispozitivul Automat Destinat Stingerii Incendiilor BONPET poate fi extras
din suport i aruncat n zona incendiat.
Agentul de stingere dispersat prin spargerea dispozitivului acioneaz rapid si eficient.
2.3 Stingerea incendiului prin diluarea agentului de stingere a incendiilor BONPET
cu ap
Prin diluarea agentului de stingere dintr-un Dispozitiv Automat Destinat Stingerii
Incendiilor BONPET cu 8-10 litri de ap, capacitatea de stingere a focului se mbuntete
substanial.
Eficiena soluiei rezultate este pstrat timp de 24 ore de la spargerea dispozitivului.
Datorit duratei lungi de via, a cheltuielilor nule de ntreinere i a garaniei de 10 ani de la data
livrrii, investiia n Dispozitivele Automate Destinate Stingerii Incendiilor BONPET reprezint o
cheltuial minim n comparaie cu protecia oferit.
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SISTEME DE DETECIE I SEMNALIZARE A INCENDIILOR

DE LA BORDUL AERONAVELOR DE TRANSPORT PERSOANE
Abstract:This paperwork presents briefly the importance of the fire detection and signalization
installations installed on passenger aircrafts. Also, it is presented a fire detection and
signalization system based on gas detection resulting from the burning materials composing
all materials existing in an aircraft of this type and it is presented, too, a method of
protection of main compartments of an aircraft.
Keywords: Aircraft, Fire Extinguish System, Fire Detection, Smoke Detection.
1. GENERALITI
Dezvoltarea aviaiei n ultimele trei decenii, prin realizarea unor avioane de pasageri de
mare capacitate, prin diversificarea i extinderea domeniilor de utilizare a aeronavelor, a putut fi
posibil att datorit unor progrese considerabile nregistrate n domeniul aerodinamicii, a
instalaiilor de bord, ct i n domeniul sistemelor de propulsie. Ansamblul instalaiilor de bord
joac un rol foarte important n obinerea unor performane superioare de zbor, n creterea
fiabilitii aeronavei i a securitii zborului, n asigurarea ndeplinirii misiunii pentru care este
proiectat i destinat aeronava.
Pentru combaterea incendiilor produse la aeronavele aflate n zbor au fost proiectate i
aplicate o serie de instalaii de detectare i stingere, cu funcionare automat sau n regim manual.
La toate tipurile moderne de aeronave, n funcie de sistemele de stingere adoptate, au fost stabilite
msuri de intervenie i prioriti n aplicarea acestora pentru combaterea efectelor incendiilor
survenite i mpiedicarea dezvoltrii lor.
Sistemul de detecie, semnalizare i stingere a incendiilor la bordul unei aeronave
reprezint un sistem de siguran automat avnd un rol deosebit de important n ceea ce privete
monitorizarea i intervenia prompt i eficient n cazul izbucnirii unui incendiu n
compartimentele aeronavei.
2. NECESITATEA INSTALAIEI DE DETECIE, SEMNALIZARE I STINGERE

DE LA BORDUL AERONAVELOR
Riscul cel mai ridicat, n ceea ce privete producerea unui incendiu la bordul unei aeronave, l
prezint motorul, deoarece combustibilul este pompat din rezervoare n sistemul de alimentare i apoi n
camerele de ardere, unde temperatura depete, n zona de ardere, 2.0000 C. De asemenea, temperatura
de intrare a gazelor arse n turbin ajunge s depeasc n mod curent 1.0000 C.
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Pentru a se prentmpina apariia unui incendiu la motor, constructorii folosesc table de

protecie realizate din aliaje de metale, care au punctul de topire foarte ridicat (molibdenul,
tungstenul, tantalul, titanul etc.), table cu care protejeaz celula avionului din zona de amplasare a
motorului (motoarelor).
Celula avionului este strbtut att longitudinal (fuzelajul), ct i transversal (aripa) de
sute de conductoare electrice. Pentru ca un eventual scurtcircuit s nu conduc la incendiu i pentru
a avea ct mai puine surse de incendiu la bordul avionului, se utilizeaz foarte mult materialele
ignifuge pentru izolaia conductoarelor, dar i a altor elemente constructive, pentru a nu exista riscul
de propagare a incendiului.
Toate elementele metalice ale avionului care se afl n micare reciproc sunt legate ntre
ele prin mbinri metalice flexibile (metalizate), ceea ce elimin posibilitatea formrii curenilor
electrostatici, n special n zbor, n atmosfer agitat. Pentru a ndeprta curenii electrostatici de pe
suprafaa avionului sunt prevzute descrctoare electrice (statoeclatoare) la capetele planurilor i
ampenajelor, precum i la crucioarele trenului de aterizare, pentru descrcarea electricitii statice
n timpul rulajului.
Cu toate msurile luate de prevenire a apariiei unui incendiu, s-a prevzut suplimentar, la
bordul avionului, o instalaie de detecie, semnalizare i stingere a incendiilor pentru ca n cazul,
foarte puin probabil, de apariie a unui incendiu, acesta s poat fi imediat localizat i stins.
Aceast instalaie are rolul de a detecta, semnaliza i stinge apoi incendiul aprut la bordul
avionului. Este alctuit din instalaiile fixe de stingere a incendiilor la motoare sau la rezervoarele
de combustibil i mijloace de stingere a incendiilor portabile, pentru stingerea incendiului n
cabinele avionului sau compartimentele destinate cltorilor.
3. DETECTOARE DE FUM I DETECTOARE DE INCENDIU CU SENZOR DE

GAZ
n prezent, noile tehnologii de detectare a incendiilor la aeronave sunt n stadiu de
evaluare. Scopul acestor evaluri i teste este acela de a reduce drastic rata alarmelor false i
mbuntirea siguranei n exploatare a avioanelor de transport persoane. Sunt n faza de testare
tehnologii moderne pentru detectoare de gaz, dispozitive de vizualizare (detecia incendiilor prin
camere de luat vederi) i tehnologii pentru multisenzori (detecia simultan a cel puin doi parametri
asociai incendiilor).
Un sistem de protecie la incendiu ntr-o aeronav include protecia la foc activ i cea
pasiv. Protecia la foc pasiv este realizat prin utilizarea materialelor de construcie neinflamabile
(sau ignifugate) n toate zonele aeronavelor incluznd cptuelile, cablurile, finisajele etc. Sistemul
de protecie activ la foc se compune din: detectoare de fum conectate la un echipament de control
i semnalizare i instalaie de stingere a incendiilor cu ap pulverizat, cea de ap sau gaze inerte
(de exemplu, azot). Multe spaii ale aeronavelor sunt echipate cu sisteme de detecie a incendiilor
(detectoare): compartimentele de marf, compartimentele de instalaii electrice i toaletele. Cea mai
important i cea mai critic zon este compartimentul mrfurilor care nu este accesibil n timpul
zborului.
Pentru aplicaii la sol, care includ i protecia cldirilor, noi tipuri de detectoare de incendiu
cu multisenzor sau cu senzor de gaz au fost proiectate i realizate n ultimii ani. Principalul scop al
utilizrii acestor detectoare este acela de a reduce numrul alarmelor false. De asemenea, rata
alarmelor false la aeronave i consecinele acestora trebuie s fie reduse drastic. Exist cteva
87
restricii i cerine adiionale care vin odat cu noile aplicaii la aeronave. Pentru ca noua tehnologie
de detectoare de incendii s fie folosit la aeronave este necesar revizuirea testelor de
validare/integrare.
La EADS1 (European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company) Airbus, sunt analizate
tehnologiile noi n ceea ce privete detectoarele de incendiu pentru aplicarea acestora la aeronave,
n scopul mbuntirii siguranei alarmelor i pentru a prevedea mijloace complementare de
nregistrare a focului i fumului n compartimentele aeronavelor.
3.1 Zone protejate mpotriva incendiilor la aeronave
a) Toaletele
Protecia la incendiu a toaletelor este realizat cu un detector de fum lng priza de
evacuare a aerului i cu un stingtor automat de incendiu, care se va activa n momentul deteciei
fumului de ctre detector. n cazul activrii unei alarme de incendiu, ua toaletei poate fi deschis i
un membru al echipajului stinge incendiul cu un stingtor portabil obinuit. n figurile 1 i 2 este
prezentat schia unei toalete i locul de instalare a detectorului de fum.
Fig. 1 Schia unei toalete de avion i amplasarea detectorului
Perete despritor
Aerisire
Detector de fum
Grilaj
Tavanul toaletei
Fig. 2 Instalarea n toalete a detectorului de fum
b) Compartimentul instalaiilor electrice

n compartimentul instalaiilor electrice sunt amplasate aproape toate instalaiile electrice
necesare navigaiei i, n general, bunei funcionri a aeronavei. Compartimentul este amplasat n
partea din fa a avionului (figura 3).
n cele mai multe tipuri de aeronave, compartimentul nu este accesibil n timpul zborului.
Numai n aeronavele Airbus exist un mic capac pentru accesul echipajului n caz de necesitate.
Compartimentul este ventilat forat, aerul extras din compartiment trece printr-o conduct comun
1
EADS este o companie european n domeniul aerospaial, format la data de 10 iulie 2000 prin fuziunea Arospatiale
Matra din Frana, Construcciones Aeronuticas SA (CASA) din Spania, i Daimler Chrysler Aerospace AG (DASA)
din Germania.
88
de aer, monitorizat de detectoare de fum ce vor indica apariia fumului n tubulatura de extracie
(figura 3). n figura 4 este prezentat modul de instalare a detectorului de fum.
Detectoare de fum la bordul aeronavei
Fig. 3 Schema compartimentului instalaiilor electrice

Conduct de aerisire
Corpul
detectorului
Conduct cu guri
Conduct
Detector de fum B
Perete despritor
Fig. 4 Modul de instalare a detectorului de fum
c) Compartimentele de marf
Compartimentele cu un pericol mai mare de apariie a incendiului ale aeronavei n care
sunt instalate, de asemenea, detectoare de fum, sunt compartimentele de marf sau cele destinate
bagajelor.
La aeronavele de transport persoane, aceste compartimente sunt amplasate n mod obinuit,
pentru majoritatea tipurilor de aeronave, sub cabina destinat pasagerilor, astfel: un compartiment n
partea din fa a aeronavei i un compartiment n partea din spate. n timpul zborului,
compartimentele sunt inaccesibile (izolate) pasagerilor sau echipajului (figura 5). [3]
Asta nseamn c n cazul semnalizrii unui incendiu n aceste compartimente, pilotul nu
are posibilitatea s verifice direct dac alarma este real sau fals. Manevra pe care pilotul trebuie
s o fac, ca urmare a activrii unei alarme de incendiu, este s pun n funciune instalaia de
stingere i s aterizeze ct mai curnd posibil, eventual pe un aeroport improvizat.
Un pericol n plus l reprezint marfa transportat sau bagajele care nu pot fi verificate de
comandantul aeronavei. Cu toate c sunt restricii n ceea ce privete mrfurile transportate, exist
totui posibilitatea ca surse de aprindere periculoase s ajung n avion n aceste compartimente. [3]
89
Ca substan de stingere pentru instalaiile de la bordul aeronavelor a fost folosit halonul,

dar acesta a fost interzis prin Protocolul de la Montreal, iar din anul 2003 s-a trecut la utilizarea ceii
de ap sau a gazului inert ca substan de stingere a incendiilor la bordul aeronavelor.
Compartiment
de marf-fa
Compartiment
de marf-spate
Detectoare de incendiu cu
senzor de gaz
Fig. 5 Amplasarea i instalarea detectoarelor de incendiu cu senzor de gaz n compartimentele de marf

ale aeronavelor Airbus [3]
3.2 Componentele sistemului de detecie i principiul de detecie utilizat

Semnalul procesat de detectoarele de fum din dotarea aeronavelor folosete momentan n
seria de aeronave produse de Airbus algoritmi de msurare, a caracteristicilor parametrilor fumului,
special dezvoltai. [2]
Folosind frecvenele specifice ale radiaiei, modulaie i corelare n domeniul de timp se
permite diferenierea ntre parametrii specifici de fum. Sistemul central de detectare al aeronavei
const n detectoare de fum amplasate n diferite puncte vulnerabile ale acesteia i Unitatea central
de detecie a fumului (SDCU)2 care controleaz i citete semnalul emis de detectoare, precum i
integritatea liniei de legtur a instalaiei de detecie i semnalizare.
O diagram bloc a arhitecturii sistemului de detecie i semnalizare realizat pentru protecia
aeronavelor de transport persoane Airbus A380 este prezentat n figura 6. Din motive de siguran,
detectoarele de fum din compartimentul de marf i compartimentul instalaiilor electrice sunt
instalate n perechi. Fiecare pereche de detectoare este alimentat de o surs dubl de energie
electric, una de baz i alta de rezerv. Un detector din pereche este instalat pe primul circuit
(circuitul A) al SDCU, iar cellalt, pe cel de al doilea (circuitul B).
SDCU testeaz fiecare pereche de detectoare i circuite, verific dac acestea funcioneaz
(continuitate, alimentare corect etc.) i acioneaz n caz de alarm (desfoar algoritmul integrat
de funcionare n aceste situaii) de la un singur detector de fum care se activeaz.
n situaia n care un detector intr n stare de alarm SDCU sesizeaz acest lucru i
comand automat apoi oprirea instalaiilor de ventilare i nclzire (dac aeronava este prevzut cu
2
Similar ca funcionalitate cu Echipamentul de control i semnalizare din componena instalaiilor de detecie i

semnalizare clasice, dar realizat special pentru protecia aeronavelor.
90
asemenea instalaii), pentru a preveni rspndirea fumului i gazelor rezultate din ardere i pune n
funciune instalaiile de stingere din compartimentul n care s-a activat (a trecut n stare de alarm)
detectorul (detectoarele).
Ciclul A
Baterie
Surs de
energie
Baterie
Surs de
energie
Detectoarele din
compartimentele de
pasageri
Detectoarele din
compartimentul de
marf
Unitatea
central de
control a
detectoarelor
de fum
Detectoarele din
toalete
Detectoare opionale
Ciclul A
Ciclul B
Avertismentele afiate n cabin
fum n compartimentul de marf fa

fum n compartimentul de marf spate
fum n compartimentul pasagerilor
Detectoarele din
compartimentele de
pasageri
Detectoarele din
compartimentul de
marf
Detectoarele din
toalete
Detectoare opionale
Ciclul B
Fig. 6 Schema ciclului detecie a fumului la aeronava de tip Airbus A380
3.3 Detectoare de incendiu cu funcionare pe principiul msurrii absorbiei de gaze

Southwest Sciences3 a dezvoltat o nou metod de detecie folosind spectroscopia
absorbiei optice pentru detecia focului. Nuana gazelor produse de nceputurile de incendii sunt
detectate prin msurarea absorbiei optice, folosind echipamente simple: diode cu emisie de raze
infraroii (LED). Senzorii de acest tip complet echipai i montai pe aeronave vor rspunde rapid la
un eventual incendiu, numrul de alarme false este zero (n urma numeroaselor teste efectuate n
laborator, dar i pe aeronave), sunt mici, uori, folosind puin energie i avnd posibilitatea
autotestrii, prin intermediul SDCU sau individual. Reducerea numrului de alarme false se obine
3
Companie din S.U.A. nfiinat n anul 1985 cu scop de cercetare fundamental i aplicat n domeniul tiinelor
fizice.
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prin msurarea concentraiilor gazelor n scopul detectrii nceputurilor de incendiu. Aceast nou
viziune de detector cu multiparametri a fost analizat ce centrul tiinific NIST (National Institute of
Standards and Technology)4.
Gazele analizate de cei de la Southwest Sciences sunt CO, CO2, acidul cianhidric (HCN) i
acetilena C2H2. Monoxidul de carbon (CO) este important de analizat, deoarece nu se gsete n
mediul ambiant n cantiti mari, ceea ce permite sistemului de detecie automat s confirme cu o
precizie mai mare existena unui incendiu, n plus, pe timpul incendiului se degaj n cantiti mari
CO dect cel existent la nivelul ambiant, de la 350 ppm la 1500 ppm. De asemenea, arderile
mocnite produc mari cantiti de CO. Prin monitorizarea att a CO, ct i a CO2 se reduce numrul
alarmelor false deoarece concentraia acestor gaze n timpul arderii este cunoscut i evident diferit
fa de concentraia emis de ncrctura biologic. Acetilena nu se gsete n mediul ambiant, la fel
ca i acidul cianhidric, acestea fiind emise n timpul degradrilor termice ale plasticului i spumei,
prezena lor indicnd cu siguran existena incendiului.
Acest sistem de detecie utilizeaz LED-urile ca surs de lumin pentru senzor, avnd
avantajul de a fi ieftine, durabile i mici ca dimensiuni (5 mm diametru). Lumina emis de aceste
LED-uri au lungimea de und de 0,85m i o putere de 11W. Fiecare LED are un deflector de
form parabolic. Schema principiului de detecie pentru acest sistem este prezentat n figura 7.
Fig. 7 Principiul echipamentului de detecie a incendiului
Sistemul folosete dou LED-uri a cror lumin trece printr-o celul de absorbie nainte de
a ajunge la detectorul propriu-zis. Semnalul pre-amplificat de la detector poate fi captat direct sau
folosind o plac tip analog-digital montat la nivelul unui computer personal.
4. CONCLUZII
Tehnologia prezentat este folosit n msurarea concentraiei gazelor cheie care pot
aprea n cazul unor incendii n aeronavele de transport persoane, i nu numai. Folosirea LED-urilor
ofer o monitorizare continu n situaiile n care se cere o alternativ de detecie ieftin i de
dimensiuni mici, n spaiile aeronavelor de transport mrfuri. Folosind mai multe LED-uri,
4
http://www.nist.gov/
92
echipamentul are capacitatea s compare msurrile absorbiei pentru fiecare din gazele prezente,
mrind probabilitatea de a sesiza nceputurile de incendiu.
Echipamentul poate de asemenea fi folosit n alte locaii inaccesibile, cu pericol de
incendiu. El poate fi uor implementat la un sistem sofisticat de supraveghere, aa cum are n dotare
un Boeing, mrind securitatea n caz de incendiu, indiferent de zona de apariie. Datorit
caracteristicilor sale poate fi folosit cu uurin i n: depozite, zone industriale, cldiri de birouri de
mari dimensiuni, zone comerciale. De asemenea, pentru navele spaiale, oferind detecie pe toat
perioada misiunilor spaiale. Tehnologia prezentat este eficient la monitorizarea calitii aerului,
privind prezena unei largi game de gaze, n aproape orice spaiu.
BIBLIOGRAFIE
[1]. Gavriliu V., Ene N., Enescu E., Popescu Gh., Avionul de transport modern i instalaiile de la
bord, Editura Tehnic, Bucureti, 1994.
[2]. Gottuk, D.T., Peatross, M.J., Roby, R.J., and Beyler, C.L., Detecia avansat a incendiilor
folosind Algoritmi de alarmare cu multisenzor, Conferina Internaional despre Detecia
automat a incendiilor AUBE 99, 11th, Martie 16-18, 1999, Gerhard Mercator University,
Duisburg, Germany, Luck, H., Editor, pp. 237-246, 1999.
[3]. Blake D., Detecia incendiilor n compartimentele de marf a aeronavelor, Conferina
Internaional privind nlocuirea halonilor ca substane de stingere a incendiilor, mai 2000,
Atlantic Hotel, Bremen, Germania (gzduit de EADS Airbus GmbH).
[4]. http://www.air-rescue.com
[5]. http://www.boeing.com
[6]. NFPA 402M, Recommended Practice for Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting Operational
Procedures for Aircraft Fire Departments.
93
ASPECTS OF INSURANCE AGAINST FIRE

Senior lecturer Gabriela erbnoiu, Ph.D.,
Al.I. Cuza Police Academy
Abstract: This article deals with aspects of insurance against fire, without being designed to be
exhaustive, at the same time offering a perspective on the topic, starting from the
premise that a fire insurance contract is a legally binding agreement under which one
party, known as the insurer, undertakes to indemnify the other party, the insured, in the
manner and to the extent agreed, against loss by fire, and ending with the idea of
insurability which is brought about instead of conclusions. This is a teachable idea too,
as our future graduates will be professionals in the field of firefighting, some of them
will work with insurance companies, but reality remains that they should also take
ethical responsibility in the operational departments of the Ministry. Insurability is a
teachable discipline considered to be complementary to the English course for
firefighters I published, related to.
Keywords: Fire Insurance Scheme, Taking Responsibility, Fire Coverage, Essentials of A Contract,
Fire Damage Repair, Capacity of the Parties, Types of Fire Insurance Policies, A Claim
For Loss, Legality.
1. THE FIRE INSURANCE CONTRACT

A fire insurance contract is a legally binding agreement under which one party, known as
the insurer, undertakes to indemnify the other party, the insured, in the manner and to the extent
agreed, against loss by fire. It is essential that the insurer's obligation to make good the destruction
or the damage should not merely be incidental to some other obligation. Where in a lease or
contract of bailment, the tenant or bailee gives an undertaking to make good any loss occasioned by
fire, this is obviously subsidiary to the main purpose of the agreement and the contract is not one of
insurance at all.
Moreover, even when a contract is one of insurance and fire risks are covered it is not
necessarily governed by fire insurance law. If, for instance, the contract covers a vessel or cargo
against loss caused by perils of the seas as well as fire, the contract is one of marine insurance. On
the other hand, an insurance evidenced by a policy in the usual marine form, if substantially against
fire risks only, must be treated, for purposes of the Assurance Companies Acts, 1909 to 1946, as a
fire insurance contract.
2. ESSENTIALS OF A CONTRACT
The essential features of a contract are:
1. An offer, intended to create legal relations, must be communicated to the offeree either
by words or by conduct.
94
2. The offeree must accept the offer in its completeness before it lapses or is revoked. If the
offerer indicates the manner in which the offer is to be accepted, the offeree must adopt that
manner.
3. There must be evidence of the intention of the parties to enter into a contractual relation.
This may be provided by the formal procedure of making the promise under seal, or it may be by
the existence of consideration.
4. The parties must be recognized by the law as having the capacity to contract.
5. The consent of the parties must be real; that is to say, the parties must not have been
threatened, unduly influenced, deceived or misled in a manner which would nullify their agreement.
6. The subject-matter of the contract must be legal and possible.
If one of these essentials is missing, the contract is void, voidable or unenforceable,
depending upon the circumstances. A void "contract" is a contradiction in terms for it never can be
a contract. A voidable contract is valid but, at the option of one of the parties can be avoided. An
unenforceable contract is also valid, but cannot be enforced in court because of some evidential
defect, i.e. a lack of evidence required by statute.
3. FIRE INSURANCE LAW

An offer to enter into a contract of insurance may come from either the insurer or the
prospective insured. The offer must be something more than a readiness to negotiate, such as may
be expressed in an advertisement; it must be a complete proposition which needs only to be
accepted by the other party. During the course of negotiations, offers may be made first by one and
then by the other party. For example, a property owner makes an offer if he submits a proposal
which simply requires acceptance: if, however, the insurer responds by offering to accept it subject
to some alterations in the normal terms, he is really making a counteroffer which the property
owner is free to accept or reject.
The issue of a prospectus or proposal form does not constitute an offer. Usually the
sending of a completed proposal form by an intending insured does constitute an offer which may
be accepted or declined, but where it is sent to an insurer merely to provide a description of a risk
and to enable him to prepare a quotation, it is one of the stages in the negotiations and the offer will
in all probability proceed from the insurer in the form of a quotation of the rate at which he is
prepared to accept the risk.
An offer does not need to set out in detail all the terms of the proposed insurance. It is none
the less complete if all the terms are known or determinable by some method other than future
agreement. An offer made through the post is not effective until it is received either by the offeree
or his agent.
4. ACCEPTANCE
A response into which new terms are introduced, even though it purports to be an
acceptance, is not so, but a counter offer, which in its turn needs to be accepted. An offer, once
rejected, cannot be accepted unless it is renewed. Acceptance concludes the contract; that is the
legal way of saying that the time when, and the place where, the contract comes into existence are
determined by the time and place of acceptance. The insurance may not come into force
95
concurrently; it may be effective as from a specified date or as soon as a condition has been
performed. In this complex context, LAPSE OR REVOCATION OF OFFER and FORM OR
CONSIDERATION are details that wont be dealt with in this article. The evidence required by law
that the parties intended to enter into contractual relation is provided either by the signing, sealing,
and delivery of a deed, or by the existence of consideration, i.e. some quid pro quo. Because of the
formality involved in executing a deed, the law is satisfied that the parties intended to be bound by
their agreement. A deed (or specialty contract) is delivered by handing it to the other party or
someone on his behalf, or by uttering words expressing an intention to make the deed operative. It
is called an escrow if the delivery is made subject to a condition which must first be fulfilled before
the deed becomes operative. Fire insurance contracts are not usually made under seal because of the
additional work involved in executing a deed. The normal fire insurance contract is, therefore,
dependent for its validity upon the presence of consideration and, lacking the formalities of a deed,
is called a simple or parol contract.
In return for the insurer's undertaking to indemnify the insured, the latter generally pays a
premium which is charged at a rate per cent on the sum insured. When the members of a mutual
insurance association are liable to contribute to losses as they arise, however, the liability of each is
the consideration for the right to an indemnity. Every consideration must be a present act or a
present promise. A present act is called an executed consideration and a promise is called an
executory consideration. The law takes no account of the adequacy of consideration, but it must be
real and possess some value. It is not real if already the party from whom it passes is obliged to
render it, either because of a public duty or by reason of a previous contract with the other party. In
any action where the plaintiff alleges the existence of a contract, he must be able to show the giving
of consideration to the defendant.
5. CAPACITY OF THE PARTIES

Limitations are placed upon the capacity of certain persons to contract; these will be
considered only in relation to fire insurance.
Aliens. At common law, enemy aliens cannot enter into contracts with British subjects
during war. Whether a person is an enemy depends upon the place where he voluntarily resides and
not upon his nationality. Thus, a British subject may, by his voluntary residence in enemy territory,
become an enemy. In time of war it is usual to supplement the common law with Trading with the
Enemy legislation which makes it an offence to enter into contracts with enemies, and under this
legislation the term "enemies" may apply even to persons whose residence is not in enemy territory.
Traitors and Felons. Persons convicted of treason or felony have no capacity to contract
until they have served their sentence, been allowed out on licence, or received a pardon.
Lunatics. The management of the affairs of a lunatic, who is so found by inquisition, is
vested in his "committee/' A committee may make a binding contract on behalf of a lunatic. A
lunatic not so found by inquisition usually has a receiver to attend to his affairs. If any insurance is
necessary, the receiver will be permitted to charge the premium to the estate. A lunatic who himself
enters into a contract is bound by it, unless it can be shown that he was wholly incapable of
understanding what he was doing and the other party was aware of that fact.
Drunken Persons. A drunken person may also avoid a contract with a party who was aware
of his inability to understand the nature of the act.
96
Corporations. Corporations created by Royal Charter are not restricted in their contractual
capacity. If they exceed their express limitations, their actions will be binding, but their charter
becomes liable to forfeiture. Corporations created by, or in pursuance of, a statute cannot enter into
contracts which are inconsistent with, or not incidental to, the objects for which they were created.
Such contracts are said to be ultra vires.
Infants. An infant i.e. a person under twenty-one years of age may enter into a contract of
insurance provided, when considered as a whole, it is for his benefit. If it is not beneficial, he may
avoid it and recover the consideration. Recovery is not possible, however, where he has received
any benefit under the contract.
Married Women. Since the Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act, 1935,
marriage does not affect the contractual capacity of a woman.
Insurers. By reason of the Assurance Companies Acts, 1909 to 1946, only certain persons
or bodies may carry on the business of fire insurance in Great Britain.
6. REAL CONSENT
An agreement does not exist unless both parties have a common intention. The
circumstances which throw doubt on the genuineness of an agreement are mistake, fraud,
innocent misrepresentation, duress, and undue influence. Certain kinds of mistake render a fire
insurance contract void; fraud, innocent misrepresentation, duress, and undue influence make
the contract voidable by the party aggrieved. The only instances of mistake which do invalidate
a contract are:
(a) mistake as to the nature of the contract, the mistake being due to the fraud of a third
party,
(b) mistake as to the identity of the other party, where personal considerations are of the
essence of the contract,
(c) mistake as to the intention of the other party, the mistake being known to that party,
(d) mistake by both parties as to the existence or identity of the subject-matter of the
contract.
Mistake as to law gives no right to relief except where it is a mistake as to foreign law or as
to a private right.
Fraud occurs when one party makes a statement of fact knowing it to be false, or without
belief in its truth or recklessly, without caring whether it is true or false, provided, in each case, the
party making the statement intended that it should deceive and be acted on and it is successful in
inducing the other party to enter into the contract.
Innocent misrepresentation of a material fact which ought to be known to the party in fault
gives the other party a right to avoid the policy. In addition, there are some special kinds of
contract, of which fire insurance is one, in which each of the parties must not only not be guilty of
misrepresentation of a material fact, but must also disclose all such facts to the other. These
contracts are known as contracts of uberrima fides the utmost good faith.
Duress is actual or threatened violence or imprisonment against the person of the
contracting party or spouse, parent or child, with the object of inducing the contract by coercion.
Undue influence is the improper use of any power arising from the relative positions of the
parties.
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7. LEGALITY
If the subject-matter of a contract is illegal either at common law or by statute the contract
will be void. Such circumstances seldom arise in connection with fire insurance. The insurance of a
brothel has been held illegal.
A fire insurance is a contract under which the insurer in return for a consideration
(premium) agrees to indemnify the insured for the financial loss which the latter may suffer due to
destruction of or damage to property or goods, caused by fire, during a specified period. The
contract specifies the maximum amount, agreed to by the parties at the time of the contract, which
the insured can claim in case of loss. This amount is not, however, the measure of the loss. The loss
can be ascertained only after the fire has occurred. The insurer is liable to make good the actual
amount of loss not exceeding the maximum amount fixed under the policy.
A fire insurance policy cannot be assigned without the permission of the insurer because
the insured must have insurable interest in the property at the time of contract as well as at the time
of loss. The insurable interest in goods may arise out on account of (i) ownership, (ii) possession, or
(iii) contract. A person with a limited interest in a property or goods may insure them to cover not
only his own interest but also the interest of others in them. Under fire insurance, the following
persons have insurable interest in the subject matter:
Owner
Mortgagee
Pawnee
Pawn broker
Official receiver or assignee in insolvency proceedings
Warehouse keeper in the goods of customer
A person in lawful possession e.g. common carrier, wharfinger, commission agent.
The term 'fire' is used in its popular and literal sense and means a fire which has 'broken
bounds'. 'Fire' which is used for domestic or manufacturing purposes is not fire as long as it is
confined within usual limits. In the fire insurance policy, 'Fire' means the production of light and
heat by combustion or burning. Thus, fire, must result from actual ignition and the resulting loss
must be proximately caused by such ignition. The phrase 'loss or damage by fire' also includes the
loss or damage caused by efforts to extinguish fire.
The types of losses covered by fire insurance are:
o Goods spoiled or property damaged by water used to extinguish the fire.
o Pulling down of adjacent premises by the fire brigade in order to prevent the progress
of flame.
o Breakage of goods in the process of their removal from the building where fire is
raging e.g. damage caused by throwing furniture out of window.
o Wages paid to persons employed for extinguishing fire.
The types of losses not covered by a fire insurance policy are:
o loss due to fire caused by earthquake, invasion, act of foreign enemy, hostilities or
war, civil strife, riots, mutiny, martial law, military rising or rebellion or insurrection.
o loss caused by subterranean (underground) fire.
o loss caused by burning of property by order of any public authority.
o loss by theft during or after the occurrence of fire.
o loss or damage to property caused by its own fermentation or spontaneous combustion
e.g. exploding of a bomb due to an inherent defect in it.
98
loss or damage by lightening or explosion is not covered unless these cause actual
ignition which spread into fire.
A claim for loss by fire must satisfy the following conditions:
o The loss must be caused by actual fire or ignition and not just by high temperature.
o The proximate cause of loss should be fire.
o The loss or damage must relate to subject matter of policy.
o The ignition must be either of the goods or of the premises where goods are kept.
o The fire must be accidental, not intentional. If the fire is caused through a malicious or
deliberate act of the insured or his agents, the insurer will not be liable for the loss.
Types of Fire Insurance Policies:
o Specific policy:- is a policy which covers the loss up to a specific amount which is less
than the real value of the property. The actual value of the property is not taken into
consideration while determining the amount of indemnity. Such a policy is not subject
to 'average clause'. 'Average clause' is a clause by which the insured is called upon to
bear a portion of the loss himself. The main object of the clause is to check underinsurance, to encourage full insurance and to impress upon the property owners to get
their property accurately valued before insurance. If the insurer has inserted an average
clause, the policy is known as "Average Policy".
o Comprehensive policy:- is also known as 'all in one' policy and covers risks like fire,
theft, burglary, third party risks, etc. It may also cover loss of profits during the period
the business remains closed due to fire.
o Valued policy:- is a departure from the contract of indemnity. Under it the insured can
recover a fixed amount agreed to at the time the policy is taken. In the event of loss,
only the fixed amount is payable, irrespective of the actual amount of loss.
o Floating policy:- is a policy which covers loss by fire caused to property belonging to
the same person but located at different places under a single sum and for one
premium. Such a policy might cover goods lying in two warehouses at two different
locations. This policy is always subject to 'average clause'.
o Replacement or Re-instatement policy:- is a policy in which the insurer inserts a reinstatement clause, whereby he undertakes to pay the cost of replacement of the
property damaged or destroyed by fire. Thus, he may re-instate or replace the property
instead of paying cash. In such a policy, the insurer has to select one of the two
alternatives, i.e. either to pay cash or to replace the property, and afterwards he cannot
change to the other option.
I would like to conclude by saying that, even when a contract is one of insurance and fire
risks are covered, it is not necessarily governed by fire insurance law. If, for instance, the contract
covers a vessel or cargo against loss caused by perils of the seas as well as fire, the contract is one
of marine insurance. On the other hand, an insurance evidenced by a policy in the usual marine
form, if substantially against fire risks only, must be treated, for purposes of the Assurance
Companies Acts, 1909 to 1946, as a fire insurance contract.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] A Law Dictionary: Adapted to the Constitution John Bouvier (books.google.ro) 1843. By
fire, Marsh. B. 1, c. 12, s. 3. 4. By capture, see tit. Capture; Marsh. Ins. B. 1, c. 12, s. 4;
2 Caines's C. Err. 158; 7 Johns. R. 449; 13 Johns. R. lfil; 14 Johns.
99
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
Enterprise Risk Management, May 7, 2013.

Group Rating Methodology, May 7, 2013.
Insurers: Rating Methodology, May 7, 2013.
Macmillan, 2006, English Dictionary for Advanced Learners.
Methodology for Linking Short-Term and Long-Term Ratings for Corporate, Insurance, and
Sovereign Issuers,May 7, 2013.
[7] Nonsovereign Ratings That Exceed EMU Sovereign Ratings: Methodology and Assumptions,
June 14, 2011.
[8] Rating Government-Related Entities: Methodology And Assumptions, Dec. 9, 2010.
[9] Rating Implications Of Exchange Offers and Similar Restructurings, Update, May 12, 2009.
[10] Ratings Above The Sovereign--Corporate and Government Ratings, April 12, 2013.
[11] S&P's Insurance Industry and Country Risk Assessments Offer a Global View of the Forces
Shaping Insurance Markets, May 22, 2013.
[12] erbnoiu, Gabriela (coautor), English for Modern Policing, Editura Ministerului de Interne,
Bucureti, 2002.
[13] erbnoiu, Gabriela, English Course for Firefighters, Editura Ministerului de Interne,
Bucureti, 2012.
[14] erbnoiu, Gabriela, English for Business and Professions, Editura OSIM, Bucureti, 2002.
[15] Standard & Poor's Ratings Definitions, May 30, 2013.
[16] Stanton, Nicki, 1995, Comunicarea, Societatea tiin i Tehnic SA, Bucureti.
[17] www.fireinsurance law
100
LES SAPEURS-POMPIERS ET LES EXPRESSIONS IDIOMATIQUES

Lector univ. dr. Melania-Georgiana GHIESCU
Acadmie de Police Al.I. Cuza, Bucarest
Rsum: Les expressions idiomatiques peuvent tre dfinies comme les constructions ou les locutions
formes de deux ou de plusieurs mots qui ont un sens par leur tout et non par chacun des
mots qui les composent. Elles sont particulires une langue et nont pas ncessairement un
quivalent littral dans une autre langue.
Dans cet ouvrage on se propose de prsenter quelques expressions idiomatiques quon peut
rencontrer dans le domaine du management des situations durgence. Mme si elles
nappartiennent pas la terminologie spcialise, elles doivent tre connues par tous les
sapeurs pompiers, parce que, par leur travail ils entrent en contact avec des gens
ordinaires, qui prfrent utiliser le langage familier et beaucoup dexpressions idiomatiques
que les sauveteurs doivent connatre pour pouvoir mener bon fin leur travail.
Mots cl: Sapeurs pompiers, Expressions, Idiomes
Les expressions idiomatiques peuvent tre dfinies comme les constructions ou les
locutions formes de deux ou de plusieurs mots qui ont un sens par leur tout et non par chacun des
mots qui les composent. Tous ces mots ne doivent pas tre dissocis, pour pouvoir garder le sens
entier de lexpression.
Le mot idiomatique est un adjectif qui signifie caractristique dune langue ou dun
5
idiome et on peut ainsi comprendre que les expressions idiomatiques sont particulires une
langue et nont pas ncessairement un quivalent littral dans une autre langue: elles sont tellement
propres une langue, un parler, quil sera ... difficile, sinon impossible, de les traduire telle quelle,
lidentique6. Cest pourquoi, pour pouvoir comprendre leur sens, il faut connatre premirement
la culture et lhistoire du pays qui les a enfantes: Et souvent, pour en comprendre lorigine il
faudrait embrasser toute la culture du pays qui leur a donne le jour7.
La langue franaise est riche en expressions idiomatiques. Certaines dentre elles
ressemblent nos images quand dautres en prennent le contre-pied ou nont plus rien voir avec
nos propres rfrences8.
Selon le sens des mots qui entrent dans leur composition, les expressions idiomatiques
peuvent tre classifies en plusieurs catgories. On parle ainsi:
des expressions comportant un lment du corps humain: - avoir un cur dor tre
dvou et gnreux ; se lever du pied gauche tre de mauvaise humeur ; tourner le dos
quelquun cesser de le frquenter ; entre quatre yeux en tte tte ;
5
Le mot idiome dsigne le parler spcifique dune communaut donne, un moment donne, correspondant un
mode de pense spcifique, tudi dans ce quil a de particulier par rapport au dialecte ou la langue auxquels il se
rattache (Marie Dominique Pore Rongier, Le petit livre des expressions idiomatiques , Editions First, Paris, 2009).
6
Marie Dominique Pore Rongier, Le petit livre des expressions idiomatiques, Editions First, Paris, 2009, p. 26.
7
Idem, p. 30.
8
Idem, p. 44.
101
des expressions en relation avec lhabillement: - cest cousu de fil blanc cela ne
trompe personne ; ne pas mettre des gants agir sans protection ;
des expression comportant le nom dune couleur: - avoir le sang bleu tre noble ;
avoir le feu vert avoir lautorisation de faire quelque chose ; crit noir sur blanc chose
vidente, qui peut tre observe immdiatement ;
des expressions comportant un nombre, une unit de mesure ou une lettre: - faire les
cents pas aller et venir pour tromper lattente ; entre quatre murs se sentir enferm dans
une situation, dans un endroit ; aux quatre coins du monde partout ;
des expressions comportant un nom danimal: - crier au loup avertir dun danger ;
verser des larmes de crocodiles afficher une douleur feinte ; avoir une faim de loup avoir
trs faim ;
des expressions comportant un lment naturel: - un feu de paille quelque chose qui
dure peu ; tre comme un poisson dans leau se sentir laise, dans une situation, dans un
endroit ;
des expressions en relation avec la maison, la cuisine: - couter aux portes - tre
curieux et indiscret ; ouvrir une fentre sur donner une chance quelquun pour avoir du
succs ; chanter comme une casserole chanter faux ;
des expressions qui traduisent un sentiment ou une attitude: - en pincer pour tre
amoureux de ; un coup de foudre une passion violente et soudaine pour quelquun ou quelque
chose ; jouer des coudes faire tout le possible pour russir ce quon se propose ;
des expressions en relation avec le monde: - tous les chemins mnent Rome
moyens diffrents; effets pareils .
En ce qui concerne le domaine du management des situations durgence, les
expressions idiomatiques peuvent tre classifies aussi en plusieurs catgories. On a ainsi des
expressions qui sont utilises par les sapeurs-pompiers pendant leur travail et qui tirent lorigine
de lhistoire de ceux-ci, des expressions qui utilisent des termes rencontrs dans le domaine du
management des situations durgence, mme si prsent ces expressions nont aucune liaison
avec ce domaine et des expressions qui peuvent tre utilises aussi par les sauveteurs tant
donn le fait que par la nature de leur travail ils doivent intervenir dans de nombreuses
situations, pour sauver et protger les personnes, les biens et lenvironnement, ou pour lutter
contre les prils ou les consquences des accidents de toute nature (accidents, catastrophes
naturelles etc.).
1. EXPRESSIONS QUI SONT UTILISEES PAR LES SAPEURS-POMPIERS

PENDANT LEUR TRAVAIL ET QUI TIRENT LORIGINE DE LHISTOIRE DE
CEUX-CI
Sauver ou prir cette expression est la devise des sapeurs-pompiers de Paris, partir
de 1942, avec ladoption de linsigne rglementaire et exprime la dtermination du sauveteur
sublimer son acte en sengageant volontairement au pril de sa vie 9. En ce qui concerne son
origine, on a dit, premirement que sous loccupation, on a lanc au Rgiment le concours de
trouver une devise reprsentative pour leur travail. La maquette retenue a t celle du caporal chef
9
www.pompiersparis.fr
102
Clment, qui a eu lide dassocier les initiales S & P pour fusionner la devise Sauver ou Prir
avec Sapeurs- Pompiers 10 .
Une autre histoire de cette devise, plus ancienne cette fois, est lie lorigine au sauvetage.
Elle figurait sur des mdailles de rcompense dcernes par des socits de sauvetage vers 1830.
Elle apparat aussi en 1868, comme titre dun priodique destin aux sauveteurs de France, intitul
donc Sauver ou Prir .
On dcouvre aussi cette devise dans les photographies de 1880 -1890, quand les grads et
les sapeurs se font volontiers photographier en buste ou en pied et le photographe agrmente le
portrait dattributs corporatifs qui rappellent lactivit de lutte contre lincendie et de sauvetage des
soldats du feu. Le plus tonnant est de voir figurer, en partie suprieure des tirages, un drapeau
franais dans les plis duquel est inscrite la devise Sauver ou Prir 11.
Mais on rencontre cette devise bien avant dans la culture du corps des sauveteurs parisiens.
De cette manire, lors de la cration officielle de lamicale des anciens pompiers de Paris en 1927,
celle-ci avait pour devise Sauver ou Prir. On la retrouve aussi dans le titre dun pome anonyme
en hommage aux morts au feu, lu linauguration de cette amicale12.
a dcale! Avant dutiliser les Vhicules de Secours et dAssistance aux Victimes
(VSAV) ou les clbres Echelles Pivotantes, les sapeurs-pompiers allaient aux incendies avec les
pompes vapeurs et les pompes bras, tirs par les cheveux. Pour pouvoir partir le plus vite aux
interventions, les casernes taient construites en pente et on plaait des cales sous les roues des
pompes vapeur, lorsque aucun dpart en intervention ntait annonc13.
Lexpression a dcale provient donc du verbe dcaler, qui avait le sens denlever les
cales, pour pouvoir partir aux incendies, et est synonyme avec partir en intervention, mme si le
temps des pompes vapeurs et bras est loin.
Mort au feu! Il sagit dune phrase triste et malheureusement toujours dactualit,
parce que le nombre des sapeurs-pompiers morts pendant les interventions sallonge danne en
anne. Ainsi, chaque lundi au rassemblement, dans les Brigades des Sapeurs-pompiers de Paris on
a lhabitude de lire dans un ordre chronologique la liste de toutes ces personnes, pour attirer
lattention des soldats sur limportance de la vigilance et des mesures lmentaires quils doivent
respecter pendant les interventions auxquelles ils participent ou lors des exercices quils
effectuent14.
Tu tombes, on tombe! cest une rplique devenue clbre, aprs la diffusion du film
Backdraft, dans lequel il sagissait de deux frres qui partageaient la mme passion, la lutte contre
le feu. Bien que cette expression soit une rplique de cinma, elle est reprsentative pour tous les
sapeurs-pompiers qui doivent tre trs unis, pour pouvoir mener bon fin leur travail et qui doivent
tre caractriss par un esprit de cohsion et de dvouement.
10
Ibidem.
Ibidem.
12
Ibidem.
13
www.le-pompier-de-demain.e-monsite.com
14
Ibidem.
11
103
2. EXPRESSIONS QUI UTILISENT DES TERMES RENCONTRES DANS LE

DOMAINE DU MANAGEMENT DES SITUATIONS DURGENCE, MEME SI A PRESENT
CES EXPRESSIONS NONT AUCUNE LIAISON AVEC CE DOMAINE
Fumer comme un pompier bien qu prsent cette expression idiomatique nait
aucune liaison avec le travail des sapeurs pompiers, son sens tant de fumer beaucoup, davoir
une forte tendance la cigarette, son origine est quand mme lie leur histoire.
Une premire explication de lapparition de cette expression est due au fait quautrefois,
les sapeurs - pompiers utilisaient des pompes vapeurs pour envoyer de leau dans les tuyaux, et
leur utilisation produisait beaucoup de fume.
Une autre explication prend les racines lpoque o les vtements ignifugs nexistaient
pas et on utilisait des uniformes fabriqus de tissus en coton ou en laine qui senflammaient
rapidement au contact du feu. Pour pouvoir viter cet incident, les sapeurs-pompiers se faisaient
asperger deau avant dentrer dans un endroit enflamm. A la fin de lintervention leurs vtements
fumaient, et cette image est reste depuis pour caractriser les personnes qui fument beaucoup15.
Cette expression a connu plusieurs variantes, parmi lesquelles fumer comme une
locomotive ou fumer comme un sapeur.
Une expression pareille est boire comme un pompier, qui a le sens de consommer une
grande quantit dalcool. Elle trouve ses racines dans le fait que les sapeurs-pompiers utilisent une
grande quantit deau pour teindre les incendies.
Jouer les pompiers de service cette expression a le sens dintervenir avec tous les
moyens pour sauver une situation compromise et fait penser au travail des sapeurs-pompiers, qui
dans les situations les plus difficiles font tout leur possible pour russir sauver la vie des
personnes qui ont besoin de leur aide.
Il ny a pas de fume sans feu le sens de cette expression est que dhabitude il y a une
cause pour tout ce quon nous dit, pour tout ce qui nous arrive, mme si on ne veut pas le
reconnatre. Lassociation du feu et de la fume est donc une reprsentation de la relation de cause
effet, parce quon ne peut pas parler de la fume sans avoir un feu allum.
Etre dans le feu de laction signifie simpliquer activement dans une action, au
moment o celle-ci est au top ou au plus haut, pris par ladrnaline de la situation. Cette expression
tire lorigine du sens figur du mot feu, qui dsigne un phnomne ardent, dexcitation.
Jouer avec le feu vouloir faire des choses dangereuses, sans tenir compte du mal qui
risque en dcouler. Dans ce cas le feu reprsente le diable, qui dans limagination humaine est le
symbole du mal et qui peut nous conduire vers le malheur et nous faire subir les consquences de
nos actes, de notre comportement.
Sauver sa peau le sens de cette expression est dessayer de se sauver dune situation
difficile, voire dangereuse. Elle est forme partir du mot la peau qui, partir du XIIe sicle
dsigne les tissus vivants qui recouvrent le corps humain et donc dans un sens figur elle reprsente
mme la vie humaine.
15
Ibidem.
104
Avoir lair dun accident de chemin de fer cette expression renvoie une personne
qui se trouve dans un tat triste et piteux ou qui a un aspect lamentable et catastroph. Ses origines
remonte la premire guerre mondiale, quand beaucoup de soldats ont t mutils, surtout au
visage. Certains dentre eux ont t appels par Georges Clemenceau pour tmoigner de latrocit
de cette guerre et grce eux, plusieurs associations ont essay daider les mutils de la face en
organisant des jeux dont le gain leur serait vers comme la loterie nationale.
Dater davant le dluge lexpression parle dune personne qui ennuie avec ses rcits
interminables, qui remontent une priode lointaine. Elle fait allusion au dluge de la bible, priode
pendant laquelle il a plu sans cesse quarante jours et quarante nuits. Il sagit dune catastrophe
lgendaire qui sest produite une poque trs lointaine et si recule que la mmoire en aurait perdu
le compte des annes.
En catastrophe le sens de cette expression est dagir dune manire soudaine et
dangereuse, sans prendre des prcautions. Elle tire lorigine du dictionnaire des sous-mariniers qui
plongeaient en catastrophe. Elle a t utilise aussi dans la terminologie de laviation pour parler de
ce quon appelle les atterrissages en catastrophe et prsent elle est entre dans le langage courant
pour voquer une action soudaine, effectue sans prendre de prcautions au pralable.
3. EXPRESSIONS QUI PEUVENT ETRE UTILISEES AUSSI PAR LES

SAUVETEURS ETANT DONNE LE FAIT QUE PAR LA NATURE DE LEUR TRAVAIL
ILS DOIVENT INTERVENIR DANS DE NOMBREUSES SITUATIONS, POUR SAUVER
ET PROTEGER LES PERSONNES, LES BIENS ET LENVIRONNEMENT, OU POUR
LUTTER CONTRE LES PERILS OU LES CONSEQUENCES DES ACCIDENTS DE
TOUTE NATURE (ACCIDENTS, CATASTROPHES NATURELLES, ETC.)
Tirer la sonnette dalarme le sens de cette expression idiomatique est dattirer
lattention sur un possible danger. La personne qui tire la sonnette dalarme est la personne qui
donne lalerte, qui annonce un danger potentiel. En ce qui concerne son origine, elle provient du
signal dalarme des trains qui avait le rle darrter le train lorsquil sagissait dun danger.
Crier au loup cette expression se base sur la mtaphore du loup, symbole du mal dans
les contes pour les enfants. Elle renferme lide de prvenir dun danger quelconque et tire ses
origines du fait quautrefois la population vivait la campagne et avait la tendance de crier la vue
du loup, pour prvenir dun danger imminent dont il fallait se protger. Dans linconscient
populaire, le loup est le symbole du danger et lhomme craint toujours de se retrouver face lui.
Sauver les meubles le sens de cette expression idiomatique est de sauver lessentiel,
lorsquun dsastre se produit. Elle est forme du verbe sauver ( faire chapper quelque grave
danger 16) et du nom les meubles qui, au XIIe sicle dsignait tous les biens qui pouvaient tre
dplacs. Ainsi, lexpression sauver les meubles signifie sauver les biens qui peuvent permettre
de survivre, de ne pas tout perdre, mais seulement dans le cas o la vie des personnes nest pas mise
en danger.
16
Dictionnaire Le Petit Robert, Paris, 1991, p. 1.770.
105
Garder son sang froid cest une expression qui signifie garder son calme, sa prsence
desprit, sa matrise de soi, dans toutes les circonstances. Dans leur travail, les sapeurs-pompiers
doivent toujours rester calmes, mme sils se trouvent dans des situations trs difficiles, pour
pouvoir prendre les meilleures dcisions.
Voler au secours de quelquun lexpression est forme partir du verbe voler, qui,
au XIIe sicle avait le sens d aller trs vite, dune telle vitesse quon semblait ne pas toucher la
terre 17. Il y a donc lide de rapidit qui prime, le dsir dtre, en un instant, dans un autre endroit,
o on a besoin de nous : Le vol reprsente la force du dsir : dsir dannuler la distance, dsir plus
fort que la ralit, dsir qui, comme on dit, nous donne des ailes 18.
Donc cette expression a deux nuances: elle reprsente premirement la vive ardeur de celui
qui aide et en mme temps lurgence du secours qui doit tre apport aux personnes trouves en
difficult. Dici on arrive la conclusion que le sens de cette expression est de sempresser pour
porter assistance quelquun, chose dailleurs faite par les sapeurs-pompiers qui ne doivent pas du
tout attendre avant de partir pour une intervention, parce que dans leur travail cest une question de
temps, dheures, de minutes et mme de secondes parfois.
Planche de salut cette expression remonte au XIVe sicle est reprsente le dernier
moyen pour chapper un grand ennui ou une catastrophe. Pour les victimes des accidents et des
catastrophes, lapparition des sauveteurs peut reprsenter une vraie planche de salut , lespoir
dtre sauv et de rester en vie. Dailleurs, le sens de lexpression provient de la planche laquelle
saccroche un naufrag, pour essayer de sauver sa vie et du nom salut , qui provient du verbe
saluer qui autrefois avait le sens de souhaiter quelquun de rester en vie ou en bonne sant.
Venir la rescousse le sens de cette expression est daider quelquun qui se trouve en
difficult ou de venir au secours, laide de quelquun. Elle est forme a partir du nom
rescousse qui, dans le droit maritime a le sens de reprendre lennemi le navire ou les biens
quil a pris et donc, dans le domaine du management des situations durgence elle peut renvoyer
aux personnes ou aux biens qui sont sauvs par les sapeurs pompiers.
Avoir une crise de foie la signification de cette expression est davoir des problmes
de digestion au point de ressentir des nauses. Cest une expression propre aux pays latins qui sert
dcrire un malaise qui na aucune liaison avec le foie, dont les pathologies sont plus dangereuses.
Elle repose donc sur une simple croyance et non pas sur un fait scientifique.
Rendre lme la signification de cette expression est de mourir et tire ses origines de
la religion chrtienne o lme dsignait le souffle du mourant avant de passer de vie trpas. Selon
la religion chrtienne, lme appartient Dieu, son crateur, qui elle doit tre rendue au moment
de la mort pour tre juge.
Avoir un pied dans la tombe le sens de cette expression est dtre sur le point de
mourir et renvoie la mtaphore de la vie reprsente par une marche qui aboutit la tombe avec
pour dernier pas la glisse du deuxime pied dans le trou.
17
18
Idem, p. 2113.
www.rfi.fr
106
Souffrir mille morts il sagit dans ce cas dune souffrance extrme comparable au
fait de mourir mille fois comme si la mort reprsente la pire des souffrances. Le fait de multiplier
par mille les souffrances mortelles est une sorte de rhtorique qui exprime lide de supriorit.
On ne veut pas faire un inventaire de toutes les expressions idiomatiques quon peut
rencontrer dans le domaine du management des situations durgence, chose dailleurs impossible
tant donn leur grand nombre, mais seulement dattirer lattention sur leur existence, parce que par
leur travail, les sapeurs-pompiers entrent en relation avec des gens ordinaires, qui prfrent utiliser
le langage familier et beaucoup dexpressions idiomatiques que les sauveteurs doivent connatre
pour pouvoir mener bon fin leur travail.
BIBLIOGRAPHIE
[1] Marie Dominique Pore Rongier, Le petit livre des expressions idiomatiques , Editions
First, Paris, 2009.
[2] Dictionnaire Le Petit Robert, Paris, 1991.
[3] www.le-pompier-de-demain.e-monsite.com
[4] www.dictionnaire.reverso.net
[5] www.pompiersparis.fr
[6] www.rfi.fr
[7] www.fr.cyclopedia.net
107
THE CONTRIBUTION OF HYDRO-INFORMATICS

TO THE REFILLING CAPACITY EVALUATION OF SMALL RESERVOIRS
UNDER SEMI-ARID CONDITIONS
Agriculturist M.Sc. Aglaia VLACHOPOULOU
Program Director, Dr. Dimitrios EMMANOULOUDIS
Department of Forestry and Natural Environment,
Technological Educational Institute of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace,
Agios Loukas, Kavala 65404, GREECE
Abstract: The Island of Thasos, in Greece, has been affected, many times, by the natural phenomenon
of forest fires. Consequences of these fires were the cremation of large quantities of wood
volume, the degradation of the ground and stripping with the risk of desertification. The
need to suppress the forest fires in the most quickly and effective way management, led to
draw using the hydro-informatics, a GIS-based decision support system which is a multiobjective, hierarchical and network model, for finding the suitable positions to construct
reservoirs for fire fighting. The methodology includes the construction and analysis of
various parameters, raster files, to a central data base, containing the information layers
of: the catchment basins, the hydrographic and road network, the digital terrain model, the
allocation of existing reservoirs and the fire risk zones. Combined with measurements in the
field such a methodological approach provides a complete proposal and a database to fight
the forest fires.
Keywords: Forest fires, Fire management, Geographic Information Systems (G.I.S.), HydroInformatics, Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis, Hierarchical models, Small reservoirs, SemiArid conditions
1. INTRODUCTION
One of the dominant elements of the physical environment is the forest ecosystem which
contributes to improving the quality of human life and economic or social development of the
society. The fire forest occurrence in an area brings in the natural environment severe
environmental/ecological impacts, and significant economic, aesthetic and social impact on the
lives of people living in the wider burned area.
Forest fires, also known as wildfires, vegetation fires, grass fires, brush fires or bush fires
depending on the type of vegetation being burned, are natural disasters consisting of an
uncontrolled fire which contribute to forest loss, and can be a great danger to people who live in
forests as well as wildlife. Forest fires are generally initiated either by natural processes or by
human activity and can burn thousands of square kilometres. Although are included in the natural
disasters, in reality, are a key feature of the life cycle of forest ecosystem and a regeneration factor,
when appearing at normal rates.
Climate change in conjunction with the semi arid conditions of the Mediterranean led to
increased forest fires over the last decade.
108
Every year, especially during the summer, an average of 500, 00 ha burned in the Northern
Mediterranean sub-region. Despite all the efforts made to minimize this catastrophic phenomenon,
in Greece, the problem shows to be escalating significantly. The statistics of burned forest area is
alarming. An average of 523,582 hectares of forest and farmland is burned annually. The largest
annual disasters recorded in 2000 reached 1,600,071 ha. Most burned areas were identified during
the period 1996-2000 with an average annual value 699,619 acre [1].
All Mediterranean countries were challenged to reduce the increase of wildfires with
research and investment for fire suppression in the most efficient manner. The Greek government in
a way to reduce the fire outfitted an army of fire-fighters and a fleet of aircrafts. During the 197787, fire protection claimed 10-15 percent of the entire budget of the Greek Forest Service [2]. More
efforts and more money invested in buying expensive fire equipment, mainly aircrafts, and during
the 1991-1997 the expenditures on fire protection, reached up to 18-26 percent of the entire budget
of the Forest Service [3].
The island of Thasos has been hit several times by forest fires. In 1984 first devastating fire
is manifested that scorched about 2.000 hectares, next year in 1985 there are most devastating fires
of modern times and burned 12.000 hectares, including the area that burned in 1984. With
skimming the fire that broke out in 18 August 1989, 7.000 hectares of public forest burned while
risking human lives.
The aim of this study is valid fire suppression, using the water resources of the island.
Initially effort was made to collect all the necessary data from competent services and
measurements, which were made in the field to record the provision of streams during the summer
months. Then, created a digitized map of the island and a database adequate to support the map,
which helps in taking decisions to construct small reservoirs in reach spots (laterally from the beds
of streams, which through small dams will be fed by the waters of the streams even at times when
there is a small flow), that can be used from fire fighting vehicles, when no other way of refilling is
feasible.
In this research, using the hydro-informatics, the investigation and assessment of flow
capacity of streams in areas of the island that have a high rate of fire occurrence took place. The
choice of implementation methodology such as Hydraulic Simulation and Multi-Criteria Decision
Analysis (MCDA), was based on their ability to provide low-cost reliable and accurate flow
estimation of streams and refilling capacity of the reservoirs. Combined with measurements in the
field such a methodological approach can provide a complete proposal and database to fight the
fires with satisfactory results, and use the results in other applications for the sustainable
management of forests.
From all of the above, it seems clear enough the vital role of the GIS to fight forest fires.
The Forest Service will be able to take proper and timely decisions, not only with the required paper
maps and other related outputs of the area, but also with the knowledge of the spatial data, the
existence of accessible roads and the places where fire fighting vehicles can use and pump water.
GIS provides a mechanism to centralize and visually display critical information during an
emergency [4].
2. STUDY AREA
The study area is the island of Thasos, located in Northern Greece, opposite to the coast of
Eastern Macedonia. It is the most Northern Greek island and 12th largest by area (Fig. 1).
109
Figure 1 The location of the study area (Island of Thasos) in Greece.
It has a surface 378.84 km while the perimeter is around 102 km. Extends from 24o30 to
24 48 East and 40033 to 40049 North. The shape of the island is almost rounded in length from
North to South of 24 km and a width of 19 km. The terrain is mountainous but not particularly
rugged; rising gradually from coast to centre and its highest peak is Psarion or Ypsarion with
altitude 1,203 m.
The island according to the geological map of Greece of the Institute Geo-logical Mineral
Exploration is a part of Rhodope massif. The hydro geological unities of the island are mainly
classified into the following formations: (a) metamorphic rocks, (b) marbles and (c) sedimentary
rocks (at the hilly and semi-hilly parts of the coastal parts) [5]. Groundwater potential of the
metamorphic rocks (apart from marbles) is rather limited; with the majority of the groundwater
wells which are installed at these areas having a discharge of 8-18m3/h [5]. The discharge of the
mountainous springs is most of the cases approximately 2m3/h, with annual fluctuations which
respond to the annual precipitation [6].
The climate of the island of Thasos differs from other Aegean islands ravaged by northerly
winds with little rainfall. The island receives more southerly and rarely northerly winds of mild
intensity, while the northern part of the island receives a double amount of rainfall than the south.
The climate is characterized as strongly Mediterranean, along the coastal and as a soft
Mediterranean inland.
The average annual temperature is approx. 15.8oC and the average annual precipitation is
approximately 770 mm. The meteorological conditions directly affect the appearance and behaviour
of forest fires, while they contribute to the study of the risk of forest fires. The recording of
meteorological parameters is extremely useful for the prevention, control and suppression of forest
fires.
0
2.1 Forest Fires in Thasos Island

From the year of 1984 and onwards, Thasos has suffered a number of major forest fires in
the interior of the island, which posed the greatest risk in forests. According to the management
research of the Forest Service of Thasos, woodlands constitute the 74% of the island area, with
287.750 acres, while from 1984 to 2000 and after, repeated savaging fires the remaining forest area
amounted to 28.000 acres (Fig. 2).
110
Figure 2 A comparison of the total burned area from the year of 1984 and onwards [7].
3. METHODOLOGY AND MATERIALS

3.1 General
In regard of this research piloted a system of hydro-informatics to monitoring, evaluating
and improving the management of data for effective fire suppression. Its architecture involves an
integrated framework of GIS and MCDA technology systems equipped with interactive
communication capabilities. Hydro informatics is a strongly inter-disciplinary field, which links
water and environmental problems with various computational modeling methods and fast
developing information and communication technologies.
The last few years have witnessed an enormous interest in application of GIS in hydrology
and water resources. The increased interest, in a large measure, is in response to the growing public
sensitivity to environmental quality and management. The GIS technology has the ability to
capture, store, manipulate, analyze, and visualize the diverse sets of georeferenced data. On the
other hand hydrology is inherently spatial and distributed hydrologic models have large data
requirements. The integration of hydrology and GIS is therefore quite natural. The integration
involves three major components: (1) spatial data construction, (2) integration of spatial model
layers, and (3) GIS and model interface. GIS can assist in design, calibration, modification and
comparison of models [8].
The following schematic string of concepts describes the methodology that followed:
Primary
Hydrologic
Data
Use
G.I.S
of
Expert
Choice
Multiple
Criteria
Decision
Analysis
MCDA
Fire Risk
Zone Map
Results
Evaluation
Map with
possible
positions
of
reservoirs
Sustainable
Forest
Management
Suppress Forest
Fires
Figure 3 Schematic string of concepts to suppress forest fires.
111
3.2 Materials
As reference was used a topographic map of the island of Thasos, of the Military
Geographic Service in scale 1:50000. The collection of the cartographic data can be achieved by a
number of alternative procedures: extant maps through digitizing or scanning, photogrammetric
procedures or terrestrial surveying measurements.
Using the program ArcGis 9.3, georeferenced the topographic map and digitized the
information containing in this map. Results of all, was the creation of a data base containing the
information layers of: basins, hydrographical and road network, the distribution leaning, the digital
terrain model, the allocation of existing reservoirs, the land use allocation and the settlements.
Furthermore, was placed on the map the points of the field measurements, with the use of
GPS. With the aim of evaluating the data, through the method of MCDA and for calculating the
weight of the individual factors based on method of analytic hierarchy process, used the software
Expert Choice 2000 edition.
3.3 Primary Hydrologic Data Research Studies in the Field
The recognition of the field and then mapping it requires the effective management of the
phenomenon of forest fires in all stages (prevention, protection, suppression and rehabilitation).
Based on the hydrological network of Thasos and in the fire frequency at the last thirty years, were
selected for research five major streams, which are: the streams of Rachoni, Prinos, Maries
Genna, Limenaria Kastrou Lakos and Theologos Dipotamos (Fig. 4).
The research in the field served to the recognition of the basin of the streams, in order to
find the existence of continuous or minimal flow, during the semi-arid conditions; in the summer, as
well as, to find a suitable location for the implementation of metering streams. The assessment of
the flow of the streams is the main variable in choosing the positions of the small reservoirs, using
the G.I.S program.
Research in this field, in conjunction with the methodological application, the hydrological
approach and the hydraulic simulation, is a complete proposal in the suppression of forest fires,
with satisfactory results, which depend on the scale of the fieldwork and the quality of the data
collected or generated.
Figure 4 A 3D View from the total area of the five study major streams.
112
3.4 Methodology of the Creation the Map with the Positions of the Reservoirs
The methodology that followed for the creation of the thematic map with the positions of
the reservoirs is the development of empirical models or stochastic models. The empirical models
are the models, where the structure is determined by the observed relationship among experimental
data. It is necessary to understand the parameters that effect in the building of a model and taking
these parameters into account in depend of their importance.
Every parameter in the contribution of the model is not equal and some parameters play
more significant role than others.
With the use of GIS, made the analysis of the variables and the mainly spatial aspects, such
as topography (slope, D.E.M.), hydrographical network (the distance from the main streams and the
density of the drainage network), road network (the distance from the reservoirs and the streams),
fire risk zone map, existing reservoirs for fire suppression, flow capacity of the main streams, by
applying spatial analysis techniques, in order to select the proper site for the construction of small
reservoirs while refilling them, will be made by the flow of the streams.
The process includes the construction and analysis of many files (grids) with different
parameters to a central data base. The entire procedure is divided into two parts. The first part deals
with the construction of the grid with size pixel 20X20 m, for each of the variables, while the
second part; analyze these grids and reclassifies using the extension Spatial Analyst. In each of the
parameters, analyzed the influence way on the placement of the reservoirs and calibrated according
to the size of a scale, mainly from one to four or more, depending on their impact to the
construction of the reservoirs (Table 1).
Table 1 The parameters, that affects to the placement of the reservoirs and the weight rates
with the type of the effect.
Distance from the Hydrographical
Network
0 20 m
20 - 40 m
40 60 m
> 60 m
Weight
Rate
3
2
1
0
Distance from the Road Network
Weight Rate
0 25 m
25 - 45 m
> 60 m
3
2
1
Distance from the Existing Reservoirs
Weight Rate
>1000 m
0 - 1000 m
2
1
Slope
Weight Rate
5%
10 %
15 %
20 %
30 %
40 %
50 %
>50 %
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
113
Class Name Effect

Very High
High
Moderate
Low (Not Ideal)
Class Name Effect
High
Moderate
Low (Not Ideal)
Class Name Effect
Very High
Very Low
Class Name Effect
Very High
High
Moderate
Low
Very Low
Bad
Very bad
Rejected
The final stage of this plan is the design of an advanced tool to interface a multi criteria
decision analysis support system, for the timely provision of solutions at critical situations. This tool
is responsible for proposing the appropriate placement of the small reservoirs to suppress forest
fires in an efficient way. In the hydrographical and the road network, to each parameter was used
the command Multiple Ring Buffer and identified the zones of influence or Buffer Zones,
depending on the influence of each factor. The command Multiple Ring Buffer creates a new
feature class of buffer zones using a set of buffer distances. The new features may be dissolved
using the distance values, or as a set of individual values (ArcGIS help menu). Thus, were created
influences zones depending on the distance to the networks, because each zone has its own value on
the construction of the reservoirs.
Defined the weight factor for each zone and created a new field to the attribute table,
according to their effect placed the weight rate. Subsequently became a reclassification of the held
information to four risk categories: low, moderate, high and very high. The new raster levels for
each pixel have taken the relevant price ratio (Fig. 5). For the reclassification followed the manual
classification method. Normally we use this method if we want to emphasize particular patterns by
placing breaks at important threshold values, or if we need to comply with a particular standard that
demands certain class breaks.
Figure 5 The Hydrographical and the Road Network map after the reclassification
and according to the weight rates. Right of the maps: detail of the Buffer zones.
In the parameter existing reservoirs, was also used the same methodology through the
command Multiple Ring Buffer and identified the zones of influence, depending on the distance
from the existing reservoirs. The reclassification made in two rate categories: very high and very low.
While, to the parameter slope, became a reclassification of the slope in eight rate categories, from the
3D Analyst command, and depending from the slope percentage. The greater the slope of a region
means the harder is the construction of the reservoirs. On the other hand, the refilling of the small
reservoirs with the natural flow of the steams depends on the appropriate slope of the region. (Fig. 6)
Figure 1 The existing reservoirs and the slope map, after the reclassification
and according to the weight rates.
114
To achieve best results, preceded the creation of a fire risk map of the island and it was
used as a key factor for the final thematic map.
The software that was used for calculating the weight of individual factors, based on the
method of Analytic Hierarchy Process, is the Expert Choice. The AHP is a MCDA making method
that helps the decision-maker facing a complex problem with multiple conflicting and subjective
criteria [9]. The AHP and Expert Choice software engage decision makers in structuring a decision
into smaller parts, proceeding from the goal to objectives to sub-objectives down to the alternative
courses of action.
Decision makers then make simple pair wise comparison judgments throughout the
hierarchy to arrive at overall priorities for the alternatives. By reducing complex decisions to a
series of one-on-one comparisons and then synthesizing the results. The most widely used method
for performing these comparisons is the use of scale Saaty (1972) [10]. AHP is based on four steps:
problem modelling, weights valuation, weights aggregation and sensitivity analysis.
According to this method, one of AHPs strengths is the possibility to evaluate quantitative
as well as qualitative criteria and alternatives on the same preference scale of nine levels [9]. These
can be numerical, verbal or graphical. The method permits a hierarchical structure of the criteria by
focusing on specific criteria and sub-criteria when allocating the weights. (Fig. 7).
Figure 7 Calculation of the weighting factors with the use of the Expert Choice 2000 edition.
The next step is the combination of the spatial factors on the basis of the weights that
correspond with the help of GIS with the following equation:
PR = Wj Xj
(1)
Where PR: the positions of the reservoirs, W: the size of each variable, X: the weight of
the criterion, j: the number of criteria affecting in the proper placement of the reservoirs for the
suppression of forest fires.
Result of all the above, is the creation of a digitized map, with the possible positions of the
reservoirs, where in conjunction with hydraulic calculations, document the results and evaluating
the refilling capacity from the stream discharging.
4. RESULTS
All weighted layers were overlaid together with different coefficient and an AHP map was
created for planning the locations of the fire fighting reservoirs. In the GIS environment and
through the command Raster Calculator:
PRM = (0.276 * HN + 0.243 * RN + 0.192 * S + 0.176 * FR + 0.113 * ER)
115
(1)
Where PRM = the positions of the reservoirs map, HN = Hydrographical Network map,
RN = Road Network map, S = Slope map, FR = Fire Risk map and ER = Existing
Reservoirs map.
The new classified map of the study area contains a new level of information grouped into
four classes, namely: very good, good, medium and bad, depending on the effective placement of
the reservoirs. Applied the classification method of "natural breaks to separate the class boundaries
and for grouping our data set.
Advantage of this method is that one important purpose of natural breaks is to minimize
value differences between data within the same class. Another purpose is to emphasize the
differences between the created classes [11]. To isolate the most ideal places became a
reclassification of the map with smaller range in the value very good (Fig. 8).
Figure 8 Thematic map showing the scenario with the possible positions of the reservoirs,
for suppressing forest fires. With the red color are the most ideal positions after the reclassification.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The method adopted in this paper is derived from the combined use of the technology of
GIS and the empirical calculations, for estimating the refilling capacity of the reservoirs, after the
field measurements. Geographic Information Systems were used to construct and to analyze various
raster files for various factors variables, and eventually to identify the areas of interest, i.e. those
116
that meet all the relevant criteria. Followed the appropriate weight of these factors according to their
contribution to construct the reservoirs, and concluded that this method is much reliable for
generating the final thematic map with the reservoirs positions.
The improvement and development of the model used, should aim to create an integrated
strategy for addressing and managing forest fires. While for achieving more reliable results require
further study, after using the GIS method, for the construction of reservoirs concerning the geology
of the area and manufacturing of small hydraulic works.
REFERENCES
[1] K. Tsagari, G. Garetsos, and N. Proutsos, Greece Forest Fires 1983-2008. Athens: WWF
Greece and ETHIAGE IMDO & TDP, 2011, pag. 56.
[2] S. Pyne, World Fire. The Culture of Fire on Earth. Weyerhaeuser Environmental Books,
University of Washington Press, Seattle and London, 1997.
[3] Hellenic Ministry of Agriculture, 2001: www.minargic.gr/, December 2001.
[4] R. Johnson, GIS Technology for Disasters and Emergency Management. Esri, White Paper,
2000.
[5] Th. Tzevelekis, I. Gkiougkis, Chr. Katimada, I. Diamantis, Book Section, Quantitative
investigation of water supply conditions in Thassos, N. Greece. Advances in the Research of
Aquatic Environment., Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011, pag. 53-60.
[6] . Diamantis, Th. Tzevelekis, Hydrogeological and hydrochemical conditions in the coastal
alluvial fans of Thasos island. Proceedings of the 2nd Hellenic Hydrogeological Conference.
Bulletin of Cyprus Association of Geologists and Mining Engineers, 6, 1992, pag. 131-148.
[7] D. Kontos, Ch.Marouglianis, St. Tsoupra, The revival of the forest after the destructive fire in
the island of Thasos. Speech processing, done within the world forestry day, kavala, Greece,
2006.
[8] V. P. Singh, & M. Fiorentino, Geographical information systems in hydrology. Dordrecht,
Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996.
[9] A. Ishizaka, & A. Labib, Analytic hierarchy process and expert choice: Benefits and limitations.
OR Insight, 22(4), 2009, pag. 201-220.
[10] D.Emmanouloudis, D.Myronidid, C. Ioannou, Flood risk analysis in Thasos Island with the
combined use of Multi-Criteria Analysis AHP and Geographical Information System (GIS).
Innovative computer applications in agriculture and the environment, Thessaloniki: EPEGE, 2,
2008, pag. 103-116.
[11] Geographic Information Technology Training Alliance (GITTA), Statistics for Thematic
Cartography, 2011. http://www.gitta.info - Version from: 25.2.2011
117
BASICS PRINCIPLES OF FIRE LINE PERSONNELS

SAFETY IN FOREST FIRES
Michail CHALARIS, Chemist, Ph.D.
Head of Strategic Planning, Hellenic Fire Corps
4, Mourouzi Str, GR-10674, Athens, Greece
Abstract: Fighting forest fires is a dangerous and exhausting work. As the safety of all employees is of
utmost importance, fire fighting and safety training must be given to all employees prior to
being assigned to fight wildfires. In this paper presented Safety Rules referring to
interventions of staff at Forest Fire which will be enlisted to Memorandum Actions for
such fires and must be kept under at least regular review (based on acquired experience and
suggestions of any person anyway involved). These rules do not restrain the first
responsible from undertaking initiative of extra "insurance" measure, if he judges that he
should do so, to protect the life and health of the staff and even canceling some individual
intervention actions of high risk.
Keywords: Health and Safety, Forest Fires, Firefighters, Safety Rules
1. INTRODUCTION
The first and highest call of a firefighter is the safety of those they are sworn to serve. To
answer that call, it is essential that firefighters understand how to protect themselves so they can
protect others. Moreover, the safety of personnel is the most weighty duty of every head (Officer
Response) in any incident; safe personnel defines directly and unilaterally the successful
management of every case.
An accident at the forefront of fire incident provokes complications and multiplies effects
(domino) that hinder the extinction/rescue, as it actually influences the psychophysical performance
of all who intervene. Whats more we end up spending more time, using more personnel and means.
The following quoted Safety Rules referring to interventions of staff at Forest Fire
which will be enlisted to Memorandum Actions for such fires and must be kept under at least
regular review (based on acquired experience and suggestions of any person anyway involved).
These rules do not restrain the first responsible from undertaking initiative of extra
"insurance" measure, if he judges that he should do so, to protect the life and health of the staff and
even canceling some individual intervention actions of high risk.
2. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

2.1 General safety personnel rules in forest fires
The response to forest fires relates to the fact that each fire incident involves complex and
unpredictable risks; the head officer must pay full attention and have a complete and clear view of
what is happening. Beyond this, all staff must be focused on the situation to avoid hazards for the
safety and health. They must also transmit directly every relevant information.
118
Particular attention will be given to compliance with the following general rules:
I. The leader must ensure that he and his staff are not psychosomatically exhausted, as
they need to maintain their strength to deal with any unforeseen situation or imminent
danger (eg to escape and/or retreat). He must therefore cater for his or for the personnel
s replacement in time.
II. Discipline and immediate information-sharing is a key safety factor.
III. Staff improperly dressed must be removed and return to mission wearing the necessary
emergency equipment, personal protective equipment and outfit that has been granted/
provided with. Proper clothing is an essential safety factor when fighting forest fires and
the head officer must check if the staff carries properly the fire-intervention outfit and in
whole the equipment has been distributed.
IV. Persons acting under the state of intense emotion should be removed and only return
when they are able to calmly cooperation on the incident
V. Head officer should ensure adequate staffing; Media (vehicles, tools, etc.) and materials
(fire extinguishing, fuel etc.).
VI. No one of the staff ever works alone or without visual contact with at least another one
(who is involved in the incident even in a small rate). The most advanced members of
the personnel/ the first in line must always have a good wireless communication with
those who stay back and of course with the Fire Truck.
VII. Two independent escape routes must always be at disposal, as there is always the
possibility of a blockade, since the velocity of a fire fluctuates and its direction alters
according to the regular changes of the conditions and can trap us.
VIII. Changes of the wind intensity and direction, as well as its relative humidity, are likely to
require change of the response plan, as it affects the process of combustion, the intensity
and speed of the spread of fire. In order for such an alternative plan to be applied, the
staff needs to be directly and constantly updated to avoid dangerous situations.
IX. In case the staff is not familiar with the terrain and its particularities or if there is no
good visibility (smoke or night), then there is an increased risk of injury (falls, branches,
snakes, abandoned ammunition etc.) so all movements must be done more carefully.
X. Fighting fire in an area with inclination may involve certain hazards: flaming materials
may flow from higher places towards the personnel or fire to be transmitted by through
spotting at lower points than the personnel and threaten them. Again, there should be an
assessment of the response feasibility from areas such inclination or from another point
with better conditions. Interference responding from points that favor the phenomenon
of the chimney should be particularly avoided.
XI. When we have phenomenon of spotting we may end up trapped between two fires. We
all need to be aware constantly of the possible movement of the fire front, the local
intensity and direction of the wind, the adopted tactics and progress. The
communication of all the personnel during the incident must always be good. To avoid
simultaneous emission of two or more users and to confront better the incident, the
person holding the overall coordination and operational responsibility has priority to
cordless calls over the others. Only in case of imperative necessity or particular risk,
communication can be stopped or if a third person occupies the communication channel
(eg. serious injury, accident, trapping in fire etc). In all cases the order of radio silence
has the meaning absolute and immediate to all fire departments and stakeholders.
XII. Incomplete understanding of the orders may lead to incorrect handling of the fire and
put the staff at risk.
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2.2 Specific rules in case of trapping in a forest fire

I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
Fear is actually a friend, always sobering and creative; however it should never evolve
into terror and even worse to panic with senseless and irrational behaviors.
To avoid exposure to radiation, protect in cavities or cracks in the soil, in water (pool,
water tank, bowl, streams, etc.) behind a rock, tree trunks or other bulky object that can
provide thermal cover.
Wells and / or caves should not be used as the oxygen they contain may be consumed.
If you need to escape from a burned area do not delay.
Choose a location where the flame height is no more than 1.5 m and a maximum width
9m within the burnt area.
Scroll to burnt area or region without inflammable materials, yet wherever you have
considerable thermal comfort (decrease radiation even with wet or not cloth, means and
materials) and breathable (even from breathing apparatus) air.
a) If requested, pass as quickly as possible by regions of high temperature or radiation.
b) If the flames are too high create burnt area and enter for protection from radiation.
c) If you do not have time to escape lay on ground face-down and cover your body in
the most convenient way (sleeves down and collar of the uniform raised, use a fire
refuge if provided etc.), so that the chances of survival are greater.
d) Do not run unless the routing is safe.
e) Put a wet towel or cloth in front of your nose; it helps to avoid inhalation of dense
smoke, to cool and filter the air in case the intensity of thermal radiation is low. Non
valid in the opposite case.
If trapped near fire truck:
a) Do not hesitate to leave your vehicle if getting away is doubtful, while there is other
safer escape route.
b) Inform your head officer that you were exposed at danger.
c) Call -through the coordinator officer- the aerial means to throw rescue shots and to
guide you to a safe place.
d) Drive the vehicle in an area where there are no combustible materials beneath or
around it.
e) When you move into burnt area with the vehicle, activate the vehicle s selfprotection, as the engine may turn off automatically if left for a long time through
dense smoke.
f) In absolute trapping:
Get inside the vehicle tank when it is filled with water (the filler port allows access) if
you can trust your capability in it, since the temperature in there is not expected to
increase significantly. A prerequisite for this action is to ensure an adequate amount of
oxygen for breathing. To ensure certain amount of oxygen, appropriate breathing
apparatus is necessary to work well when submerged in shallow, while the door of the
tank is not closed. Then, even if parts of the vehicle ignite (eg rubber, plastics, etc.), but
it is clear that the external radiation has been tolerated (the front / flames have passed
and the place is considered as burnt), exit the tank (in a manner already arranged before
entering, via e.g. scale). This action is should be avoided when water in the tank
exceeds 42 degrees Celsius (42o C), because the human body as there is danger of
stroke or fainting, resulting to drowning, heat stroke or getting burnt.
120
Enclosed inside the cabin of the vehicle covering interior glass surfaces with
materials such as wet jackets, sleeping bags, blankets, etc., and definitely keep
respirators and masks with filter ready for use; also have a lumen in use in the cabin
(if there is water and after window through installation is being traversed has been
covered with wet materials). It is advisable to cover (if possible) with wet materials
the supply piping and the fuel tank of the vehicle and remove from the place any
other liquid fuels (containers and machines of internal combustion).
As soon as you estimate that acceptable and sustainable conditions have been restored
around you, your priority is to escape to a safe area, in order to achieve your self - rescue. Then,
once considered to have survived and feel safe, inform (others in hierarchy) and examine the
possibility of rescue vehicle and equipment.
Note that the choice of the two above actions for self-rescuing is extremely risky.
2.3 Specific rules against risks from shots of aerial means
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.
IX.
There must be good communication between ground forces and air means, and direct
permanent staff briefing.
Measures that make visible to the aerial means the presence of ground staff (reflective
vests and lit beacons vehicles).
Removal of personnel 60 meters perpendicular to the direction of the aircrafts shots
and 200 m along with the direction.
Intense caution in areas where retardant liquids have been used, because these are very
slippery especially on rocks or logs.
Lay on the floor face-down with the helmet on the head if you're in the shot-area, with
your head towards the direction from where the air means comes. Take cover behind
thick tree trunk only for the moment of shot (an exception to the rule of the preceding
paragraph II), so as not to be seen by the pilot, always wearing a helmet and any bodyprotective you have.
Place your tools in distance or throw them away, while expecting a shot, so you do not
get hurt in case they explode. Generally, look after so that any objects or branches are
blown towards you at the moment of the shot.
Hold onto something solid not to get carried away by the water.
Put your head towards the direction from where the aircraft is coming, wearing a helmet
or using any suitable cover and do not run to escape unless there is a safe escape route.
After the incident is over, and since the equipment and / or clothing are soaked with
retarder foam or other kinds of foams, the personnel needs to clean the equipment and
change dirty clothing-footwear before entering the vehicle.
3. RESULTS
All the aforementioned specific rules followed - executed and implemented according to
the components judgment as appropriate and they are being properly materialized; forest fires are
dynamic phenomena and one is never identical to the other, since even a small change of a single
parameter significantly alters its form the scene and of course indicates to (de facto) a state of
emergency.
121
Even improvisation is useful, which is a common process regarding the first stage of an
emergency which is rather common during the first stage of the emergency, since no project can
accurately predict each situation and all possible effects. Improvisation, however, must be based on
fluent knowledge of these basic safety principles.
Fire line personnel are expected to conduct their fire-fighting activities in a safe and
professional manner with the highest regard for the safety of themselves and others. Therefore the
present context must be included to the training program of the services as a training protocol.
Due to the fact that safety of fire line employees is of utmost importance we must prefer to
use professional fire fighters who are physically fit and trained in fire behavior and fire safety.
Un-trained, un-fit fire fighters can be dangerous to themselves and others.
REFERENCES
FFNet, Forest Fire Net, Vol 3, Special Issue with the proceedings of the teleconference: Short
and long term health impacts of forest fire smoke on the fire-fighters and the exposed
population, uropean Center for Forest Fires of the Council of Europe (ECFF), October 2005.
[2] Statheropoulos . and Goldammer J.G., Vegetation Fire Smoke: Nature, Impacts and
Policies to reduce negative consequences on humans and the environment, European and
Mediterranean Major Hazards Agreement (EUR-OPA), 4th International Wildland Fire
Conference, Sevilla, Spain, 13-17 May 2007.
[3] CEPA, Canadian Environmental Protection Act, National Ambient Air Quality
Objectives of particulate matter Part 1, Science Assessment document. Minister Public
Works and Government Services, ISBN 0-662-26715-X, Cat. No. H46-2/98-220-1E, 1999.
[4] Sandstrm T., Nowak D. and Van Bree L., Health effects of coarse particles in ambient
air: messages for research and decision-making, Eur. Respir. J., 26 (2005) 187-188.
[5] Statheropoulos . and Karma S., Complexity and origin of the smoke components as
measured near the flame-front of a real forest fire incident: A case study, J A. Appl
Pyrolysis, 78 (2007) 430-437.
[6] Statheropoulos M, Karma S, Analytical methods for air quality monitoring in a forest fire,
ON-SITE Analysis & Homeland Security proceedings, January 28-31, Baltimore, U.S.A., 2007.
[7] Reinhardt T.E., Ottmar R.D., Hanneman A.J.S., Smoke exposure among fire-fighters at
prescribed burns in the Pacific Northwest. Res. Pap. PNW-RP-526. Portland, OR: U.S.
Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Research Station 2000, 45 pp.
[8] Pinto J.P. and Grant L.D., Approaches to monitoring of air pollutants and evaluation of
health impacts produced by biomass burning. Health Guidelines for Vegetation Fire EventsBackground Papers, Lima, Peru, 6-9 October 1998, WHO/UNEP/WMO, 1999: 147-185.
[9] US NWCG, US National Wildfire Coordination Group, Fire Use Working team, Smoke
Management Guide for prescribed and Wildland fire, In: Hardy CC, Ottmar RD, Peterson
JL, Core JE, Seamon P. editors, December 2001, 226 pp.
[10] Fowler C.T., Human health impacts of forest fires in the Southern United States: A literature
review, J. Ecol. Anthrop., 7 (2003) 39-59.
[11] Chapman R.L., Dawes G.S., Rurak D.W. and Wilds P.L., Breathing movements in fetal
lambs and the effect of hypercapnia, Physiol., 302 (1980) 19-29.
[12] WHO/UNEP/WMO, Health Guidelines for Vegetation Fire Events - Guideline document.
In: Schwela DH, Goldammer JG, Morawska LH, Simpson O, editors. 6-9 October 1998,
Lima, Peru, 1999, 219 pp.
[1]
[13] Statheropoulos M., Dokas I. and Karma S., Risk assessment of forest fire smoke, using
Cause-Problem-Symptom analysis, FFNet, 4 (2006) 130-142.
[14] FFNet, Forest Fire Net, Vol 5, Forest fires in Greece during summer 2007: The data file of
a case study
122
LESSONS OF THE RED SLUDGE DISASTER IN HUNGARY, 2010

Dr. Antal PAPP, Colonel Ph.D.
College Professor, Director of Disaster Management Training Centre, Budapest, Hungary
Abstract: This paper aims at providing an informative fact-based description of how a tragic incident may
serve as a lesson to our specialists as well as provide guidelines and revelations with the
intention of improvement. On 4 October 2010, in the early afternoon, the wall of the sixteen
meter high dyke of cassette X of the slurry (sludge) reservoir of the alumina plant in Ajka,
belonging to MAL Company, breached. People felt it was a doomsday, because they had lost
their beloved ones, homes, tokens of memory. Although there was no ready scenario to manage
the disaster the intervention forces managed to normalize the situation. A decision,
unprecedented in Europe and in the world was made by introducing State control over the
privately owned MAL. It has been performed in a way and quality that other countries have
shown interest to learn about the method. You can read the summary of the heroic efforts made
by several thousands of Hungarians and it is a reminder for us to avoid similar disasters.
Keywords: Cassette, Reservoir, Sludge, Breach the Dyke, Intervention Forces, State Control, Disaster
1. INTRODUCERE
Hungarys most severe industrial ecological disaster so far occurred on 04 October 2010,
when the western dyke of cassette X of the sludge reservoir on the site of the Hungarian Aluminium
Production and Sales Plc (MAL), a private company, breached. Consequently, the mixture of
approximately one million cubic meters of red sludge and alkaline water inundated, through the
Torna Creek, the lower parts of the settlements Kolontar, Devecser and Somlovasarhely. The
strongly alkaline and caustic industrial sludge flooded a large area causing inestimable human,
economical and ecological damages. Ten people were killed during and after the sludge flow,
almost 300 persons needed medical healthcare, 120 of them were hospitalized. The last injured
patient left the hospital on 02 December, 2010. According to the reviews, the sludge flow in the
three settlements dilapidated more than 300 residential properties. The number of harmed people
was over 700, the red sludge covered agricultural area of 1017 hectares.
123
2. INTERVENTION AND RESCUE

The Government immediately and decisively took measures to respond to the situation.
The primary and most important task was to ensure safety of the population, protect human lives
and to explore human risks. In the following, the elimination of damages in built-up areas started.
The Hungarian Parliament approved the extension of the emergency declared by the Government
on 06 October from 15.00 hours in the areas of Veszprm, Gyr-Moson-Sopron and Vas Counties.
At the site of the sludge disaster, firefighters from the town Ajka, competent by their area
of operation, arrived already in the 8th minute after the alert. Later, when the situation worsened and
extended, the director general of National Directorate General for Disaster Management (NDGDM)
ordered fire fighters, disaster management and civil protection personnel from other parts of the
country to deploy to the incident cite. The main responsibilities on the site were rescuing and its
coordination, organizing population protection, controlling the work of the response personnel,
distributing earthmoving machines and other vehicles, providing protective equipment and
124
organizing logistics. The collection of information, the clarification and updating of response
personnel and intervention equipment by their functions and numbers, their deployment to the
incident site, the compilation of reports on the events and tasks performed became systematic.
The affected area was closed by the Police, the traffic was regulated through checkpoints,
and only the residents were allowed to enter the settlements. A considerable number of the
population fled to their relatives from their damaged properties, however, the municipalities and
charitable organizations provided lodging for victims, so nobody was left without a shelter even
temporarily. The injured were looked after by the Ambulance Service or by other medical
institutions at their treatment points, clinics and nearby hospitals.
In the region of Kolontr and Devecser, for instance on 06 October 2010, 84 fire fighters
with 12 vehicles, 4 Emergency Detection Teams (EDT) with 12 persons, 103 police officers with 22
vehicles, 174 military personnel with 39 vehicles, 29 persons with 20 vehicles from the personnel of
disaster management and civil protection, 149 civilian persons with 43 machines, NPHMOS
(National Public Health Service) with 5 persons and 2 vehicles and 50 workers of MAL
participated in the elimination of the consequences of the disaster. The total number was 606 people
with142 units of equipments. Some two weeks later, on 20 October 2010, 1,125 persons with 292
vehicles and machines participated in the relief efforts. In November, a total of 8,535 persons and
4,881 units of equipment were working on the incident sites.
3. WATER QUALITY REMEDIATION

The rapid steps of water quality control could result to prevent the contamination reaching the
Danube. The temporary protective dykes were constructed within three months and currently the
implementation of facilities ensuring complete protection is drawing to a close. The basic strategic goal
of the water quality control was to stop the pollution reaching the Danube River, since threatening the
water source would have caused long-lasting damages. 8 water management regional directorates
participated in the in the protection, during the first week the average number of persons amounted to
170. Partial detention and neutralization of the spilled 1.5 million cubic meters alkaline (13.5 pH) was
carried out in 21 built-up places on the Torna Creek and the Marcal River. The chemical
decontamination (neutralization) was realized by dosing gypsum (23,500 tons of rea-gypsum) and acetic
acid (1,800 cubic meters) on 15 scenes, for the mechanical protection 11 bottom lines were established.
(In accordance with the EU regulations a material over11.5 pH is classified as dangerous due to its
corrosive effect.)
4. INTRODUCING STATE CONTROL

On 11 October 2010 the Hungarian Parliament amended the Law on National Defense and
Army (2004 Act No.CV). According to 197/A section of this Act state supervision could be
extended to business entities, on behalf of the Hungarian State acts the government Commissioner.
This legislative amendment gave the opportunity after the red sludge disaster to carry out state
supervision of MAL. The Parliament urgently discussed the proposal and called for urgent
publication of the President of the Republic. The amendment of the Act came into force on
12 October 2010. The Governments aim was to relaunch the safe production of the plant as soon as
possible after the obligate downtime following the disaster, avert another eventual incident and start
125
the necessary mitigation of the damages. Another objective was to facilitate the continuous safe
operation of the plant as one of the largest employers in the region without loss of assets and
observing the authoritative rules.
The Government regulation says that the government Commissioner acts on behalf of the
State. Its competences and tasks are:
1 Review the financial position of the enterprise
2 Approve and countersign the commitments of the enterprise
3 Decide the matters within the competence of the supreme decision making body in the
context of the disaster situation. Forthwith about his decisions he informed the senior executives of
the enterprise. This law did not affect the main decision making right of the enterprise.
4 Financial and economic injunctions can be initiated against the enterprise.
After creating the necessary legal criteria, the Government issued its Decision on the
appointment and tasks of the government Commissioner acting on behalf of the Hungarian State
during the State supervision of MAL, appointing LTG Dr. Gyrgy Bakondi government
Commissioner on 12 October 2010. His assignment was valid for up to two years. The activity of
the government Commissioner was directed by the Prime Minister, he was responsible for his
activities to the latter. His work was assisted by two deputies, the supervisors and experts.
5. CHANGE IN TECHNOLOGY
At the MAL alumina plant the bauxite is produced by dissolution process. This method
was developed by Karl Joseph Bayer in 1887. 90% of the worlds alumina production has been
manufactured by this technology. The resulting main product is alumina; the by-product is red
sludge with high iron (iron III-oxide) content and characteristic colour which contains both fluids
and solids. The fluid and solid components are separated by sedimentation and filtration. In March
2011 a new so-called dry process technology was introduced in which the sludge water content was
reduced to 30%. This high pressure filtrated materials consistence is earthy, wet solid to the touch.
As a result of the technology development the liquid emission has been eliminated, there is no free
fluid phase in the reservoir, which may leak.
During the more than eight months of State supervision, the Government Commissioner
cooperated with the management and owners of MAL. He strove to maintain close contacts with the
administration and the specialized authorities. Based on this cooperation it became possible to
eliminate the uncontrolled risk in human resources and ecology.
126
6. LESSONS
RECONSTRUCTION
OF
RESCUE,
DECONTAMINATION,
DEMOLITION
AND
To direct the rescue tasks the Operation Staff, the Supervisor for Population Protection and
Reconstruction, Governmental Coordination Centre for Reconstruction (GCCR) (from 4 November
2010), later the Disaster Management Staff for Reconstruction (DMSR) (from 1 July 2011) work on
the scene. From 15 October 2011 the Operational Staff of Veszprm County Disaster Management
Directorate controlled the deferred jobs, basically the secondary damages.
The protection management, the regional and local Protection Committees from the
beginning performed their tasks in order to protect the public of the settlements.
To recover the population compensation contracts were concluded. 110 victims could
move into newly built houses, who had chosen the residential park, 121 victims bought used
properties and 121 applied for cash compensation (in 53 cases for financing the reconstruction).
In accordance with the regulation issued by the Ministry of Interior the mitigation of
damages in movables organized by local governments extended period of time. Five hundred
ninety-six contracts were signed with 333 victims.
According to the plans by 4 October 2011, on the first anniversary of the red sludge spill, a
memorial park was inaugurated in Devecser, set up in memory of the victims of the disaster. Until
the end of the year 2011 the National Directorate General for Disaster Management arranged for
376 rightly accepted settlement of claims.
7. THE ACTIVITY OF THE GOVERNMENTAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE

When the disaster occurred the Governmental Coordination Committee (GCCE) was
alerted. It started the operation in the National Situation Evaluation Centre in the building of the
Ministry of Interior. According to the 1999 Act No LXXIV the representatives of the bodies of
127
national competence participated in continuous change work schedule. Summary of the sectoral
information, records of the available capacities, knowledge of the material, expertise and human
resources enabled the quick decisions for the leadership of the disaster management, the ministry
and the government. The operation of this reporting system facilitated the assessment of the
situation, the reports and the authoritative information to the media.
The background work was done by the industry bodies, the databases and laboratories were
available. Scientific institutions and boards performed essential jobs (e.g. GCC Scientific Council,
the University of Pannonia, the Sopron University) in identifying the vulnerability, the protective
actions and technologies.
The Operative Staff of GCCE ended his work on 3 November 2010; its duties were taken
over by the Governmental Coordination Centre for Reconstruction. In what follows its reports were
attached as enclosures to the National Directorate General for Disaster Management Central Duty,
on the base of these reports the director general submitted reports to the Minister of Interior.
8. THE ACTS OF THE SCIENTIFIC COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTAL

COORDINATION COMMITTEE
Receiving the request of the director general of NDGDM, to establish the decisions the
specialists of the Scientific Council of GCC and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences assisted the
work. Mr. Tams Nmeth the president of the Academy led the seats of the scientific council and its
sessions, institutes and experts with field experiences were invited to assess the impact of the sludge
effect on the buildings, to measure the soil contamination, to devise the possible rehabilitation of
the waters. The scientific council systematically worked together with the leadership of the disaster
management. With their accurate and authentic information, it was possible to get reasonable
picture of the event, to prevent guessing and rumours.
To ensure effective collaboration in the field of protection against disasters the leaders of the
NDGDM and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences signed a cooperation agreement. On 1 March
2011, a conference was held in the Academy with Implications and Experiences of Red Sludge
Disaster title.
9. NECESSITY OF THE ONE-PERSON LEADERSHIP

Without delay, to control and direct the elimination of the consequences of the industrial
disaster, the Government established an Onsite Operations Staff from the personnel of disaster
management. In the work of the staff relocated in Devecser, all the disaster management organs
took their share. The activities of intervention forces managed to normalize the situation in the
affected area.
The government primacy, the one-person leadership in protection and the support of the
staff were guaranteed. The Police and the Hungarian Defence Forces played important role in
safeguard public security.
On the authority of the Ministry of Interior, the director of NDGDM decided about the
entities and material assets, mobilization of the state reserves for the protection and directing
additional disaster manager officers to the site.
128
On 4 November 2010, the Operational Staff was replaced by the Governmental

Coordination Centre, the leader of which performed executive tasks as one-person, subordinated to
the director general of NDGDM. Assignment to this post corresponded to the impending
amendment of the Disaster Management Act.
10. THE ACTIVITIES OF THE OPERATIONAL STAFF ON THE SCENE

The primary actions on the scene were saving human and material resources, deployment
of intervention equipments and rescue forces (medical service, police and military forces) to the
incident site, controlling the work of the response personnel, distributing machines and other
vehicles and informing the media. Also responsibilities were protection of population, roads
decontamination, searching for corpses, collection of animal carcasses, pumping cellars, collecting
corroded gas cylinders. Another objective was, within a short time to prevent the red sludge
contamination reaching the Danube, to prevent harming to the aquatic environment.
In the initial period the Operational Staff in Kolontr settlement was installed in front of
the mayors office in a bus of the disaster management, the logistic base was settled in the local
community centre, the Operational Staff in Devecser seated in the Town Hall.
It was imperative to set up a command post in Kolontr because this settlement was the
most heavily damaged, people died here, and there was a second possibility of a dyke burst (the
northern wall of cassette X ).
It was continuous to gather and clarify information in order to have necessary response
personnel and equipments on the site. The information administration about the events and the
performed tasks enabled giving further information and writing reports.
The area was closed, nobody was left without a shelter even temporarily, and the injured
were treated by the Ambulance Service or by other medical institutions. Feeding those in need was
resolved three times a day at provisionally set up kitchens, initially here worked mainly volunteers.
Hundreds of personals and equipments participated in the rescue and decontamination
operations right from the start. In October on average daily 772 personals and 198 equipments
performed the tasks, even in the first period the total number of personals was 1336 and the
equipments was 292 a day: the staff of the disaster management, military forces, fire service, water
management, medical service, transport and rail workers. In addition the MAL Company sent
50 shovel workers to the scene.
The three Emergency Detection Teams (EDT) from Veszprm, Fejr and KomromEsztergom counties, on 6 October 2010 as a first step, started the detailed list of damaged properties
(that time 292 buildings), recorded the residential list, compared the data with the local office and
registered the staying places of the residents. According to the local document office there were
956 inhabitants affected.
In Devecser two decontamination points were set up. The National Ambulance Service
operated a medical point in the Palace Garden where they treated the injured. People working in the
restricted area were provided with protective clothing and equipments by the disaster management.
The population was informed through loudspeakers, leaflets and by the local television channels
about the situation, the possible ways of reducing the health risk and the rules of conduct that have
to be followed.
The Emergency Detection Teams and fire fighters collected and disposed the industrial and
house hold gas cylinders that had been damaged by alkali. The carcasses of dead animals were
129
collected under control of the Central Agriculture Office. A collection point for damaged vehicles
was designated nearby the railway station. Animal rescue organizations started the medical
treatment and feeding of injured animals then delivered them to animal shelters.
11. THE ACTIONS OF GOVERNMENTAL COORDINATION CENTRE FOR

RECONSTRUCTION (GCCR)
In order to coordinate the regional tasks and the on-site management the GCCR established
four working groups in the field of operation management, legal, reconstruction and logistics.
Withdrawing the state of emergency, on 30 June 2011, the director general of disaster management
operated a smaller number of Disaster Management Staff for Reconstruction until 14 October 2011.
The Operation Management Working Group was responsible for organizing and
controlling decontamination (disaster management and fire officers were designated as street
commanders), providing further information for the population, alerting system, transportation,
construction official duties, demolition jobs,
technical supervisor tasks, evacuation
organization, registration of the evacuated population, coordination of population return to the
original domicile.
The Legal Working Group prepared and made grant contracts in connection with
construction and reconstruction of buildings, used homes buying and financial supports. Based on
expert advice they organized the compensations for institutes and ventures, provided legal
assistance for those in need.
The tasks of Reconstruction Working Group were the development and management of
accurate records of damages about the damaged, demolished, reconstructed, newly built or
purchased properties and they registered the claimants. In collaboration with the Legal Working
Group they also notified and called up the public to declare and sign contracts.
The actions required from the Logistics Working Group were to maintain the work of the
GCCR by supplying technical and protective equipments for the implementing personnel,
coordination of the necessary repairs of technique, participation in the records of charity donations,
its storage and distribution. They also supervised the movable properties compensation.
In Devecser a rented guest house, called Pine Tree Pension hosted the GCCRs operation
work where the needed IT and management tools were installed. This command post provided
facilities for the controlling tasks, keeping briefs, client services and for accepting the legal claims
of the inhabitants suffered damage.
On behalf of the Municipality the Reconstruction Working Group signed contracts in
596 cases for cash and in-kind compensation, treated 333 notified claims, approved 172 in-kind
compensations (supporting replacement of furniture). Sixteen citizens demands were rejected.
12. MEDIA
It was an unprecedented scale of interest by the media. The remaining intact parts of
Kolontr were almost totally occupied by the domestic and international journalists and by their
vehicles mounted with satellite dishes. TV crews and reporters caused potential accident hazards on
the damage area. Because of the classified period, for the order of the general director of NDGDM
the commander of the Operational Staff regulated the movement of the staff of the media.
130
Attendants took the press representatives to the damage sites in groups. At the gate of the closed
area a press point was set up, the broadcast units were sent outside the work area.
Inter alia on the spot filmed the BBC, the CNN, the Japanese TBS television, the German
ARD, the Deutsche Welle, the Austrian ORF Burgenland, the French AFP news agency, the
Aljazeera English and the German ZDF public television.
The government Commissioner, the members of the state supervision and the head of
GCCE welcomed Ms. Annemie Turtelboom the Foreign Minister from Belgium and Kristalina
Georgieva the Commissioner of the EU Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management. On 6 May 2011
Janez Potocnik, from the European Commission for Environment, on 23 May 2011 the civil
protection directors of the European Union member states payed their respects. But delegations
arrived also from Vietnam and Taiwan.
The new residential park was allowed to view in every construction phase. Those who
were victims, in organized format could visit the parts of some settlements in Bereg where some
years ago, after a major flood new houses had been built up.
Having regard the strong interest, the government Commissioner underlined for the media
that the MAL Company switched to dry technology which is particularly import in terms of
population safety.
13. EXPERIENCES
The Red Sludge Disaster has been the most severe industrial catastrophe in Hungarys
modern history. Given the number of casualties, injured, human and material damage it surpassed
the effects of natural disasters.
Based on the governments cohesive and decisive actions, the rescue was implemented
professionally with the national leadership control of the Ministry of Interior and the disaster
management.
131
Drinking water sources and the Danube has not contaminated. Reliable defence works
have been constructed to prevent an eventual dyke breaching, the contamination of outlying and
inhabited areas has been returned to the cassettes of the MAL Plc.
The Governmental Coordination Centre of Reconstruction was constantly organizing the
properties restoration, reconstruction and mitigation. During the construction of the new residential
area they realized the regional architectural style, the rural type of living space.
The cooperation in the management between the ministries, branches and national bodies
was outstanding. The governmental coordination in the disaster management tasks worked well.
The disaster mobilized significant social forces and intentions to help.
The major numbers of damaged properties have been demolished, for the purpose to
replace them the government created a new type of resolutions.
The effective management of events required personal control and responsibility and the
introduction of a new concept of disaster management law. In this term the need was expressed by
the government and the Ministry of Interior.
During its eight months the State supervision of MAL private company has been
successful and achieved its goal.
The financial compensation of mitigation demanded the employment of large number of
teams working on legal affairs.
In the emergency situation the local municipalities met the obligations, and fulfilled the
requirements. More attention should be taken to the training of their leaders, in order to perform the
regulations on higher level. The necessity of safety desk officierss work is supported by the
experiences of the disaster management work of Devecser Municipality.
Protection work consumed approximately 33 billion HUF. A new type of cooperation was
established between the charity organizations and social organs. The rehabilitated areas, the
memorial park in Devecser and the national memorial site in Kolontr are the scene of national
solidarity.
The interest shown by the media from the all parts of the world was continuously intensive
therefore there was a need to develop the regulation of the information and communication.
Those participating in the rescue work, fire fighters, disaster management and civil
protection officers, policemen, soldiers, paramedics, experts of water management, environmental
professionals and civilians demonstrated their courage and devotion.
During the long-lasting remediation and reconstruction work the official staffs were able to
cope with the extra load, the GCCE staff has developed specialized competences, also the
intervening professionals of the disaster management.
All these experiences should be applied in further trainings, in scientific researches and
with any future emergencies or disasters.
132
INFLUENCE OF INLETS OF ROOMS BY THE USE OF SHEVS

1
Assoc. prof. eng. Radoslav KARTOV, Ph.D..

Faculty of Fire Safety and Civil Protection, Academy of the Ministry of Interior, Bulgaria
Abstract: The influence of inlets of rooms by the use of Smoke and heat exhausted ventilation systems
(SHEVS) is analyzed. The relation of effectiveness of SHEVS in function of inlets is clarified.
The accent is on the velocity in inlets of natural and power SHEVS. The requirements for
inlets in different countries are compared. Suggestions on improving the efficiency of their
usage are made.
Keywords: SHEVS, Smoke Vent, Volume Exchange, Inlets, Outlets, Velocity
Fire fatalities are smoke fatalities. Fires are the reason for the death of about 300.000
people every year. Vast majority (over 95%) of them are in low and middle income countries. Rates
of fire-related burn deaths in these countries are 5.5 deaths of 100.000 people per year. This is
nearly six times higher than the 0.9 deaths of 100.000 people per year in high-income countries.
Despite this, the facts there are also troubling 12 people die and another 120 are seriously injured
daily even in the developed European countries [1]. Meanwhile, the losses from fires are estimated
at 1% of the GDP of the countries in the developed world. Specialists have long been aware that
the reasons for these facts lie primarily in the influence of the smoke products. During the last
decades this negative tendency is getting stronger and stronger and is before 70% of the victims
have dies because of the smoke and not the fire, now the number of victims reaches 90% [2].
In this connection, on average, we could claim that the victims in the fires are victims of
the smoke. These facts impose for applying special measures for the struggle against the smoke.
One of the most efficient and practically approved measures is the Fire ventilation or affirmed as a
concept in the late 90s Smoke and Heat Exhausted Ventilation Systems [SHEVS]. Applying of
SHEVS in Bulgaria is being realized since June 2010 [3]. The new requirements led to essential
changes in the concepts of architects and engineers in the construction of buildings. Securing of the
buildings and guaranteeing of the efficiency of these systems is immediately connected with their
accurate measuring. Vital element in this connection appears to be the inlets, through which there is
a flow of fresh air in the premises. Its goal is compensating of the exhausted in natural or in a
forceful way the smoke gases.
During a fire in a premise the air balance is disturbed. This is determined by the additional
amount of smokes, which occurs because of the burning of the flammable materials and their
expansion under the influence of the temperature.
Lout Lin Lm Lex , kg / s........................................................(1)

where:
Lout volume of exhausted smoke gases, kg/s;
Linl volume of the incoming in the premise fresh air, kg/s;
Lm volume of the burning material, kg/s;
Lex - volume of the expanding smoke gases, kg/s.
133
In order for the balance to be restored enough quantity of air is needed. In this case only,
will there be and effective elimination of the smoke, due to the difference in the temperatures,
density of the heated surfaces and the surrounding air. In this connection, in the norm documents a
serious attention is paid to the inlets. When measuring the areas of the inlets and the outlets in the
natural SHEVS and the debits with mechanical SHEVS, of a great importance is which moment is
being observed the process of burning. If SHEVS start functioning in a later phase, it should be
expected that the air pump would work more efficiently, due to the stronger gravity pressure.
Essential disadvantage in this case, however, would be the larger amount of smoke, due to the
enlarged area of the fire and a larger amount of smoke products, due to their expansion.
Lex 353
Vr
Tr 2
, kg / s..............................................................(2)
where:
- velocity of increasing of the temperature of the gases in the premise, K/s;
Vr - volume of the premise, m3;
Tr average temperature in the premise, K
In a timely functioning of SHEVS, the volume of the incoming fresh air would be
comparable to the volume of the exhausted smoke. The volume of the incoming air will replace the
mass of the exhausted smoke products, ergo, the system will be balanced. In this case, it could be
assumed that both the velocity of the exhaustion of smoke and the velocity of the incoming air
would be juxtaposible in equal areas of the inlets and outlets. The aerodynamic free area of the
inlets could be defined in this way:
out Fout 2 g H y amb r h 353

Fin
Vr
Lm
Tr2
in 2 g y vent amb r amb

2
, m 2 ....................... 3
where:
in coefficient of the outgo through the inlets;
out coefficient of the outgo through the smoke vents;
Fin area of the inlets, m2;
Fout area of the outlets, m2;
height of the area free of smoke, m ;
H height of the premise, m;
hvent height of the inlet, m;
amb density of the outer air, kg/m3;
r average density of the air in the premise, kg/m3;
h density of the exhausted through the smoke vents gases, kg/m3.
The efficiency of the exhausted gases is immediately connected to both the volume of the
incoming air and the places, from which it comes in, in order to replace the smoke products.
Keeping in mind that during a fire the gases balance is disturbed, in order for it to be
equalized, the debit of the incoming air must be significantly larger than it is in normal conditions.
134
Securing of areas for the inlets larger for these of the smoke vents would guarantee also a
smaller velocity of the incoming in the premise air.
Enlarging the area of the inlets is also connected with a certain problems for investors and
builders. Theoretically the larger opening attracts the plane of equal pressure. Enlarging the area of
the smoke vents will have a favorable effect on the rescuing activities when there is a fire in a
premise. What would happen, if we enlarge the area of the inlets? Theoretically, if the area of the
inlets for clean air is excessively enlarged, the smoke layer would drop. The practice shows that to
certain frontier, the enlarged area has a positive effect on the exhaustion of the smoke products. In
connection to this, the European norms require aerodynamic free area of the inlets to be at least with
50% more than the aerodynamic free area of the smoke vents in the largest smoke zone (smoke
section) in the premise[4]. Similar requirement is accepted in the German norms for development of
SHEVS (RWA) [5]. The norms of the European insurers foresee the inlets to have a geometrical
area which is at least 2 times larger, compared to the aerodynamic area of the smoke vents in the
largest smoke section [6]. The Hungarian requirements are related to the geometrical area of the
inlets to be at least two times equal to the geometrical area of the smoke vents in the largest smoke
section [7].
Keeping in mind that during a fire, air will be coming in both through the additional vents
and through the insolidities in the premise, in the Bulgarian norms is set that the aerodynamic area of
the inlets must be at least equal of this of the smoke vents in the largest smoke section. Similar are
the requirements in the French and Austrian norms [8,9].
When the inlets cannot insure directly clean air in the premise with the required SHEVS,
an exception is made, for the air to come in through the adjoining premise, contacting with the
atmosphere. When estimating the area of the required inlets, first the equivalent area of the parallel
and then of the subsequently set inlets must be estimated. The so obtained equivalent area must not
be smaller than the aerodynamic area of the smoke vents in the largest smoke section.
in , Fin , eq 1F1 2 F2 ... n Fn , m 2 .............(4)

eq
in , Fin , eq 1/
eq
1
1
1
..
, m 2 ..................(5)
2
2
2
2
2
2
1 F1
2 F2
n Fn
where:
in,eq equivalent coefficient of the outgo through the inlet;
Fin,eq equivalent area of the inlets, m2;
1,2..n coefficients of the outgo for paralleling and subsequent set vents;
F1, 2..n areas of the paralleling and subsequently set vents, m2
Many discussions in the practice brings up the unclearness regarding the maximum speed
of the incoming air. While the speed, with which the smoke products are removed in the atmosphere
is of no importance, for the speed of the incoming air there are limitations due to the possible
danger from mixing the clean air with the smoke products, negative influence on the intensity of the
burning, as well as problems with the evacuation.
Preventing the mixing of the clean air with the smoke products, as well as their cooling off
is in function of the placement of the vents for clean air. Basic rules in this connection are one and
135
the same vent are not to be used both as an inlet and an outlet, as well as not to be used as incoming
air in a premise through the natural aperture and via ventilators. Aiming at effective smoke
exhaustion the inlets (constantly open or opening by signaling from SHEVS) it is needed for them to
be placed as close to the floor as possible, or maximally far away by the vertical from the smoke
vents. For the insuring if a clear frontier between the incoming clean air and the smoke layer, a
minimal distance of 1 meter between the upper end of the inlet and the lower end of the smoke layer
is needed. In this case the higher speed, with which the clean air comes in the premise (when the
smoke vents are located in the roof) would actually be of positive influence on the aerodynamics of
the processes in the premise, keeping in mind that the air exchange in proportional both to the
difference in the temperatures of the air and the smoke gases, as well as to the wind pressure.
L in Fin out Fout
2 amb r Pwin Pwout Hg amb r

, m / s...(6)
in 2 Fin 2 amb out 2 Fout 2 r
where:
Pwin wind pressure of the inlet, ;
Pwout wind pressure in the outlets,
Illustrated in fig.1: is the impact of the higher speed of the wind on the position of the tabular of
equal pressures in a premise, with a different placement of the inlets.
Fig. 1 Impact of the wind pressure on the position of the tabular of the equal pressures
In all cases, however, aiming at avoiding vortex, incoming air must not be aimed directly
at the smoke layer.
136
Problems would arise in not insuring this minimal distance and with speed of the incoming
air higher than 1 m/s. Such speed would lead to turbulence of the air streams and would impediment
the emission of the smoke products. This is why in predicted side smoke emission, the faade
smoke vents must be placed mandatory on at least two facades, possibly on the opposite sides. The
same requirement concerns the inlets. Uncovering the vents (inlets/smoke vents) must be controlled
by a wind plant, which in a speed higher than 1 m/s uncovers the vents from the faade of the
building against the wind.
If a minimal distance of 1 m between the inlets and the outlets is insured, the vents for clean
air are allowed to be placed on only one faade.
The limited requirement in the European norms of maximum project speed of the incoming
air of 5 m/s concerns only the cases, in which it is anticipated for the air to come through airs and
emergency exits, through which it is anticipated for people to use. It is in the doors higher speed will
ultimately lead to difficulty with evacuation [4,10,11]. The literature sources point out that the
measurements of the actual speeds on pedestrians showed as a whole (despite some discomfort for
some separate individuals), that their movement is not seriously impeded in speed slower than 10 m/s.
It must not be forgotten that after the inlets, the value of the speed will abruptly drop and
with that there will be less problems regarding the misbalancing of the system and the intensifying of
the burning. According to the German norms, in order to avoid a wind vortex, the speed of the
incoming air in the vent when there is a mechanical SHEVS must not exceed 3 m/s [5]. The French
norms require a speed of 5 m/s with a mechanical incoming of air [8].
If there are obstacles for the implementation of the mentioned requirements, a compromise
for effective smoke exhaustion would be realized via the using of horizontal barriers above the inlet
or vertical barriers placed 3 meters from the inlets, which would insure a bigger confrontation and so
a slower speed of the incoming clean air.
The practice in Bulgaria during the last years showed that the slower set speed (2 m/s) of
the incoming air creates obstacles for builders and investors. In this connection the requirement is
brought to this, in the case of forced feeding ventilation, the air does not come in the premise with
speed higher than 5 m/s.
The clean air may also come through the smoke vents (on the roof of the premise) of a
neighboring smoke reservoir, if enough distance of minimum 5 meters to the opening through which
the smoke will be exhausted is insured. Due to its high intensity, this air is expected to fall to the
level of the floor of the premise and thus to replace and lift the exhausted smoke products. Aiming to
avoid the possible mixing with them, it is necessary the smoke barrier to be stipulated at a distance at
least 1 meter below the lower level of the smoke layer.
The air comes in a burning premise from one side due to the fact that, on one hand, the fire
need oxygen to continue its burning and on the other hand from the difference between the static
pressures and the wind pressure.
In the air exchange accomplished under the influence of the temperature difference, the
speed of the incoming air is in function from the height of the premise, the smoke-free zone and the
densities of the air and the smoke gases.
in
where:
hd - height of the inlets, m;
2 g amb r y d
2
amb
137
, m / s.................................................(7)
In figure 2 is shown the change of the speed in inlets in different heights of the premise
and the smoke-free areas.
=f(H,Y)
10
9
80%
70
60
50
,m/s
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
H,m
0
0
10
12
Fig. 2 Speed of the air under the influence of the temperature difference in an inlet
From the graphics it is evident that the speeds of the air are higher in set more shallow
smoke layers. This leads to more intensified air exchange and thus to higher speeds of the air in the
inlets. The speeds also increase with the increasing height of the premise. As a whole, up until
premise heights to 5 meters, the speeds of the air are below the set norms of 5 m/s. Keeping in mind
that maximum speed in the inlet is 8,65 m/s, we can conclude that this would not lead to problems
with evacuation of the premises. The speed with which the air comes in the premise is to a large
degree influenced from both the inlets and the vents for smoke products exhaustion. This
dependency may be expressed by the equation (8):
in
2 Hout Fout r g amb r

, m / s.................................................(8)
in 2 Fin 2 amb out 2 Fout 2 r amb
2
After some replacements are made, for the speed in the inlet we find the following
dependency:
in
2,127 HFout 2
, m / s.............................................................(9)
0, 434 Fin 2 0, 222 Fout 2
Equation (9) shows that the connection between the speed in the inlets on one hand and the
height of the premise and the area of smoke vents on the other is proportional, unlike the connection
with the area of the inlets.
If the maximum admissible speed in the inlets is 5m/s, thus for the area of the inlets we get
the following dependency:
Fin 0,303Fout 2,127 H 5,555 , m2 ....................................................(10)
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Equation (10) in this case gives us the connection between the inlets and the outlets in
different heights of the premise. This connection is represented in table 1 with the coefficient kin.
Table 1
H,m
kin
<3
0,273
3-4
0,521
4-5
0,683
5-6
0,814
6-7
0,926
7-8
1,026
8-9
1,117
9-10
1,201
> 10
1,556
From the table it is evident that for insuring the elimination of the smoke products in
premises with greater heights, the necessity of foreseeing larger by area inlets is obl igatory.
For premises with heights up to 7-8 meters, though, it is enough the area of the inlets to be
equal to the one of the outlets. For the work of the air pump to be guaranteed in higher
premises, the aerodynamic free area of the inlets must exceed this of the smoke vents. This
assertion is this more accurate when the smoke free zone is considered close to the maximum
admissible. In this connection, the European, the German, the norms of the European insurers
and many others is foreseen for the area of the inlets to exceed from 1,5 to 2 times the area of
the smoke vents.
With a maximum admissible speed of 2 m/s, a considerable growth of the area of the inlets
is observed. This dependency may be observed in table 2.
Table 2
H,m
kin
<3
1,78
3-4
2,1
4-5
2,37
5-6
2,62
6-7
2,84
7-8
3,05
8-9
3,25
9-10
3,43
> 10
4,23
If the areas of the inlets are set to be at least equal to these of the outlets, then the speed
with which the air comes into the premise will be in function with the height of the premise.
in 1,8 H , m / s.........................................................................(11)
This dependency is represented in the table 3.
Table 3
H,m
in,m/s
<3
3,11
3-4
3,6
4-5
4,02
5-6
4,41
6-7
4,76
7-8
5,09
8-9
5,4
9-10
5,69
> 10
~ 7,5
In such approach (Fin=Fout) for premises with heights up to 8 meters, the speed of the
incoming air will not exceed the limitation values for successful evacuation of 5 m/s. A bit
heightened discomfort will be observed during an evacuation from premises with greater height.
However, it must be stressed one more time on the fact that this heightening of the speed will be
insignificant and will not impact the passing over through the exit doors, from which fresh air will
come in.
CONCLUSION:
Debatable requirements regarding the inlets have been examined and they will bring more
clarity both for the designers of the SHEVS and for the bodies of the national fire safety control and
the insurers, responsible for the life and health of the people and securing of the buildings.
The part of the inlets in realization of the air exchange in the premise during a fire, or
exhaustion of the smoke products is essential and the underestimation of this fact would
139
compromise the purpose of SHEVS. The effective work of SHEVS will be guaranteed in minimal
areas of the inlets corresponding to the outlets and with speed in them of 5m/s.
Literature:
[1] World Health Organisation (WHO),2011. Burn Prevention Success Stories Lessons Learned
online. Accessed Sept. 20.2011.
[2] RWA today, Effective Smoke Control and Natural Ventilation Combined, ZVEI Fachverband
Sicherheitssysteme.
[3] -1971, 29 2009.,
, .96/2009.
[4] CEN/TR 12101-4:2009, Smoke and Heat Control Systems Part 4: Installed SHEVS
systems for smoke and heat ventilation, 30 Jan 2010.
[5] DIN 18232, Rauch- und Warmefreihaltung, Berlin, 2003.
[6] Natural smoke and heat exhaust systems (NSEVS), planning and installation, Comite
European des Assurances 4020, February 1999.
[7] MSZ 595, Epitmenyek tuzvedelme. Fogalommeghatarozasok, Hungar, 1994.
[8] Instruction Technique 246, Relative au desenfumage, Des E.R.P., Paris, 2004.
[9] ONORM H 6029, Luftungstechnische Anlagen, Brandrauchabsaug Anlagen, Austria, 2009.
[10] Morgan H.P, Design Methodologies for Smoke and Heat Exhaust Ventilation, BRE, London,
1999.
[11] Bosley K., The Effects of Wind Speed on Escape Behaviour Through Emergency Exits, FRDG
research report 53, London, 1992.
140
DISTANCE LEARNING
COMPARISON OF TWO FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER.
RESEARCH RESULTS
Maj. Tomasz ZWEGLINSKI, Ph.D., M.A. Fire Eng.
Civil Protection and Civil Defense Division
Internal Security Department
Civil Safety Engineering Faculty
The Main School of Fire Service
Warsaw, Poland
1. INTRODUCTION
Since a bit more than 10 years the technological and communication revolution after its
successes in industry, and broader in global economy, finally reached the island called education. For
most of us that was quite hard to imagine that there could be other method of teaching than the
traditional one we grew up on in schools and got used to that by heart means a teacher plus a blackboard
plus a chalk. Quite slowly but surely in many teaching centers, institutes and other educational
establishments started to use new technologies to implement something what is called remote teaching
or distance learning method. Among them the most popular seems to be e-learning which is defined as a
use of electronic media and information and communication technologies (ICT) in education.
E-learning is broadly inclusive of all forms of educational technology in learning and teaching.
E-learning is inclusive of, and is broadly synonymous with multimedia learning, technology-enhanced
learning (TEL), computer-based instruction (CBI), computer managed instruction, computer-based
training (CBT), computer-assisted instruction or computer-aided instruction (CAI), internet-based
training (IBT), web-based training (WBT), online education, virtual education, virtual learning
environments (VLE) (which are also called learning platforms), m-learning, and digital educational
collaboration. These alternative names emphasize a particular aspect, component or delivery method.1
As it's shown above, the educational method has been developed a lot for recent years and
worked out a broad classification and divisions to different kind of e-learning sub-methods mainly
due to technology used and tools available. E-learning includes numerous types of media that
deliver text, audio, images, animation, and streaming video, and includes technology applications
and processes such as audio or video tape, satellite TV, CD-ROM, and computer-based learning, as
well as local intranet/extranet and web-based learning. Information and communication systems,
whether free-standing or based on either local networks or the Internet in networked learning,
underly many e-learning processes.
Such a rapid development of the method as well as more and more common worldwide usage
of it in broad pallet of users (from children to adult, from kindergarten to universities education) prove
that there is some sense in that process. Why? Looking for a reason to the growth of the method we
may easily enlist advantages of distance learning, or more specific e-learning, which are:
lower costs of education process per student (you can study at home, no costs of
transportation, no costs board and lodging while studying at university, etc.);
lower costs of education for the training center (no need for face-to-face meeting of
teachers and students, at least limited number of them)2
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easy access to training materials in digital version (no limits for time of the day/night, no
limits to the particular place as long as there is an access to internet).
Many of the identified advantages reflect on the limitation of the costs of the educational
process as well as on making easier and more common access to knowledge, or perhaps better
saying is to educational materials which could be presented in less or more interactive way. If some
of the main e-learning added values are limitation of the costs of education, broader target group of
trainees (more common access to education) there arise at least two questions.
The first question concerns the universal problem of quantity or quality. If we enlarge a
number of recipients of the knowledge (quantity increases), thanks to communication technologies,
what about their qualifications achieved in the process - is quality increasing as well (?), perhaps in
specific conditions quantity and quality could be directly proportional(?). Is that kind of education
able to be an relevant alternative to the tested and proven face-to-face relation teacher-student
(master-trainee relation)?
Dont we miss too much from quality running e-learning education? In this area a lot of
different questions arise which are present challenge for many researchers in the field. It seems that key
aspect of this problem leads as to the issue of motivation of particular student and secondly to
preparation of tailor-made educational materials for specific target groups of students (so called profile
of the groups e.g. the youth will expect different kind of educational materials than the old).
It means that the entire technological aspect is only a frame, necessary but still a frame,
which enables the e-learning running while the key issue still stays in psycho-pedagogical aspects
as motivation, relevant materials (designed for specific receiver/trainee) which stay the same
nevertheless they concern traditional or modern (e-learning) methods of education. Therefore there
is a need to put a question what kind of educational materials (in what form) should we use
towards what kind of target groups to achieve best quality results in the e-learning process?
Another aspect I want to rise is whether the e-learning method could be a tool for
increasing level of public security? Since the civilization development brings us threats which are
more and more often defined us uncertainties (terrorism, climate changes and its consequences
more dynamic and not expected natural disasters, environment degradation, etc.)3, many scientists
emphasize a role of society resilience as a possible way of counteraction to new threats. Resilience
is defined as the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize while undergoing
change so as to still retain essentially the same function, structure, identity, and feedbacks4.
Having said that society resilience constitutes an ability of the society to identify on time
critical changes in its surrounding to prevent and avoid negative consequences of critical situations.
Furthermore when crises happens the society posses the ability to properly respond, sustain its
crucial roles and effectively rebuild societal, economic and environmental capacities. Building
society resilience is a long and challenging process which requires a lot of efforts of authorities as
well as the society itself (e.g. through non-governmental organizations). One of weapons we have in
hand building society resilience, however, which needs time, is broadly disseminated knowledge
among population concerning threats we are exposed to and ways of handling them.
Uncertainty which is a feature of todays threats causes that authorities are not able to fully
cover potential risks (authorities are not able to put a policeman on each street nevertheless which
country it concerns democratic or autocratic, east or west, rich or poor) being by law responsible
for security. Therefore common and wide spread education could be a reasonable countermeasure to
threats we face right now which enables building society resilience giving added value especially to
these elements which circled in green (see chart 1 especially green ellipses). Due to that what was
said above perhaps these roles could be fulfilled by e-learning method?
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Chart 1 Schematic process of risk management (Source: FP7 Acrimas Project)
2. METHODOLOGY
Article presents a part of findings of the author which were a subject of PhD thesis in 2012. The
idea of the thesis was to compare two forms of educational materials (educational movie and a manual)
trying to find out which of them is more effective in case of distance learning. These forms of materials
were chosen since it seems that they are still most popular forms which are used to bring knowledge from
transmitter (tutor, teacher, author) to receiver (student, pupil, trainee). Source of knowledge used for
the research was a US educational movie on Chlorine Emergencies an overview for first responders
published by US Chlorine Institute in 2007. On base of it there was a manual prepared in one to one of
knowledge contained (perhaps better say information contained) in the material.
Afterwards these two materials were up-loaded on internet platform where public could
download the material and learn from it about chemical threats (particularly chlorine), however, to
do that each person had to specify his/her profile based on following criteria: profession, education,
age, sex and result of ex-ante reception test. The test was fulfilled by respondents before they
enter the main research process to enable a division of them onto two groups: 1/ with basic first
respond knowledge, 2/ with advanced first respond knowledge. It means that in total there were
5 criteria of group division taken in the research process.
Task of a respondent was to register on the platform (assigning on the criteria mentioned
above), fulfill the ex-ante reception test, choose one form of education materials (movie or
manual) and learn from that. Afterwards the respondent was obliged to fulfill pedagogical test no. 1
(right after watching/reading the educational material) and to repeat fulfilling the pedagogical test
no. 2 after 2-month-time from the training (test no. 1 and 2 had the same questions, however,
questions and answers were relevantly mixed to avoid automatic answers from particular
respondent who did the test before) see Chart 2 below.
Timing of the research process
2 days
ex-ante reception test

day of the training
pedagogical test no.1
pedagogical test no.2
statistic research
2 months
3 months
Chart 2 Timeline for the research process
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It is worth to mention that the internet platform gave also some flexibility (what is by the way a
feature and a strength of e-learning above mentioned) in timing of fulfilling the process by respondents.
They were more less free on choosing date of entering the process as long as they keep the
set timeframes in between times shown on the Chart 2. The overall idea of the research process
which was shortly described above is presents in Table 1 below.
Table 1 Overall concept of the research process
Data collected as a consequence of the above shown process were processed due to
statistical methods with a use of SPSS Statistica program.
There were statistical tests of significance carried on in the research process to identify
relations/tendencies in between different kind of educational forms vs. different profiles of
respondents. The adequate statistical tests of significance were selected on a base of below
presented algorithm (Chart 3). In the research process there were 3 specific tests selected:
t-Student for dependent group - the same group (movie or manual) made the pedagogical
test no. 1 and no. 2 (searching on time as disturbance factor for the group);
t-Student for independent groups groups using movie or manual were different (nobody
learned both from movie and manual) searching on educational form;
U Manna-Whitneya (research methodology allows using this kind of test as a second try
if t-Student test for independent groups does not gives clear picture of relations in
between groups or a tendency in this relation).
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Division due to scale of dependent

variable
Interval and quotient scale
Ordinal scale
Nominal scale
Evaluation of normality of distributionn
Yes
No
Independent
Character of the
groups comparison
Character of the
groups comparison
Character of the
groups comparison
Independent
Dependent
Dependent
Independent
Dependent
Number of the group

<29
Test t-Student
for independent
groups
30<
Test t-Student
for dependent
groups
Test chi
Test McNemara
Test Wilcoxona
Evaluation
homogeneity of
distribution
Test
KomogorowaSmirnoffa
Equality of
variance assumed
Equality of variance
not assumed
Test
U Manna-Whitneya
Chart 3 Algorithm to select a statistical test of significance due to research process conditions
The above described research process was designed to undertake an effort of answering
following problematic questions:
Problem 1: What is an influence of different forms of knowledge transfer (movie/manual) on
level of knowledge achieved by students directly after a distance learning training?
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Problem 2: What is an influence of different forms of knowledge transfer

(movie/manual) on sustainability of the knowledge in particular timeframe from the
training carried out?
Problem 3: Is there a difference between achieved knowledge level and sustainability of the
knowledge depending on particular respondents groups profiles (age, education, sex etc.).
These few detailed research questions (for the article reasons here presented 3 questions
selected out of 7 formulated in the thesis) should lead to an answer for the main research problem
which was a question how to prepare and conduct a distance learning training to achieve an
optimal effectiveness of the educational process? Solution of the problem should at least partly
fulfill the aim of the research which was an increase of distance learning trainings quality,
especially those which are carried out in the field of safety and security issues.
3. RESULTS
Table 2 and Table 3 present findings gained in the research process. These tables show and
analyze of data collected from the process including pedagogical tests (no. 1 and no. 2) average
results.
The analyze proves that more effective form of distance learning seems to be the training
movie (see column 1 Table 2). The finding is reliable since the test significance under 0,01 (p<0,01)
entitle us to assume that proven tendency in this relation could be transmitted on broader groups of
society. Training movie has been also found as a better form of education than a manual in further
research conducted due to the groups criteria division (see Table 3). There are two exceptions from
the rule that movie is better than manual. These are laymen (based on profession criteria
Table 2) and +30 (age criteria Table 3) groups where was notified that for these particular groups
manual seems to be more effective tool than a training movie, however, number of the respondents
in the laymen group in this case seems to be extremely low to make further conclusions (n=2).
Second finding concerning the fact that manual is more appropriate for the older groups (+30) could
be explained that people in this age are much more used to traditional form of learning (manual)
which they grew up on being in primary and secondary school when computers where not so much
popular and easy accessible tool as today.
To conclude we may assume that training movie seems to be a better tool for a target group
of students who are
not beginners in the subject being learnt;
university educated;
relatively young (under 30);
males.
In some columns there are acronyms (NAO not able to observe) which informs that in
this particular criteria there were not respondents to be validated. Since participation in the research
process was not obligatory, not managed by the researcher (everybody could take part in the process
/ selection of the respondents was random) in some groups there were not respondents registered
what decreased the value of the process in some cases.
Considering the disturbing factor which is time from the training course, there was a
factor of knowledge level decrease formulated. This number shows how big is a decrease of
knowledge level in between pedagogical test no.1 and pedagogical test no.2. The finding from the
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research is that the above specified optimal group (see above criteria) will also keep the level of
knowledge longer than other groups (characterized with other criteria).
In order to achieve longer sustainability of the knowledge, we should have used rather a
training movie than a manual for the above specified group.
Table 2 Table of results/findings for experts/laymen division criteria
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Table 3 Table of results/findings for education, age and sex division criteria
A conclusion for the article would a bunch of considerations. One of requirements which
we are facing right now in education is rapid development of economy and industry which
generates jobs. Therefore we need to be able to achieve new knowledge as fast as possible, when it
is being created in reality of galloping innovations to keep self-attractiveness on jobs market. It
seems that these high requirement could be fulfilled only with e-education which could be cheap,
easy accessible and common. There are of course problems we are facing also for researchers on
this topic. For example it could be frustrating when you notice that the object of your research
(Internet) is developing and changing much faster than noticeable by a researcher conducting a
research process. Whatever more we say there is at least one certainty business and research
together are aiming at the same direction which is Internet.
REFERENCES
[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/E-learning
[2] A. Chmielewski, A. Wodecki, Pomiar efektywnoci systemu e-learningowego w szkolnictwie
wyszym, Polski Uniwersytet Wirtualny, Uniwersytet Marii Curie-Skodowskiej in Lublin,
Katowice 2004, pp. 223.
[3] U. Beck, World Risk Society, On the Search for Lost Security, Scholar, Warsaw 2012.
[4] B. Walker, D. Salt, Resilience Thinking, Sustaining Ecosystems and People in a Changing
World, Island Press, USA 2006.
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RISK MANAGEMENT IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS IN SERBIA

Nenad ZIVKOVIC
Ljiljana ZIVKOVIC
Dusica PESIC
Milan BLAGOJEVIC
University of Nis, Faculty of Occupational Safety, Serbia
Abstract: This paper presents a system of risk management in emergency situations in Serbia. The
organizational structure of the system of risk management in emergency situations is
based on a model of an integrated system of protection, rescue and emergency
management. The main carriers of these activities for all emergency situations of natural
and technical character are: Department for Emergency Situations of Serbia and Sector
for Emergency Management with the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia.
The aim of this paper is to answer whether the development of the conception of
protection in emergencies has created the conditions for building a society resilient to
disasters in the Republic of Serbia.
Keywords: Emergency Situations in Serbia, Integrated System of Protection, Rescue and Emergency
Management
1. DEFINING RISK AND EMERGENCIES

Risk is an objective (mathematical) or subjective (inductive) possibility of danger actually
turning into an event. It points to the degree of possible loss (damage) depending on the exposure to the
risk. It can be represented as a function of probability of the risk and the degree of vulnerability. The
process of risk management, with the goal of minimizing the risk, requires an assessment of the risk.
Risk assessment is the overall process of identification, analysis and evaluation of risks. To be efficient
and sustainable, risk assessment should be integrated at all levels of protection and rescue, and it should
be supported by the authorities. The methodology of the assessment of the risk caused by natural
occurrences or activity of people, in other words the occurrence of emergencies, is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1 Process of Risk Assessment [1]
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The definition and classification of emergencies are determined by various types of

hazards which jeopardize the security and which may lead to emergency situations in a particular
territory. Therefore, when the regular activities (prevention, operating and other) cannot prevent and
eliminate the consequences caused by hazards, then dangerous situation assumes the character of an
emergency.
According to the type of origin, there are natural, technical-technological, and war
emergencies, in other words types of hazards, Figure 2.
Figure 2 Classification of Emergencies [2]
It is very difficult to formulate a single, comprehensive and precise definition of an

emergency to cover all of their features and characteristics. The United Nations treats an emergency
situation (except war) as a consequence of a disaster, which is defined as a serious break in the
functioning of a society, which causes human and material losses or impairment of the natural
environment, which disables a country to use its resources for survival in the affected environment.
Emergency Situations Act defines the meaning of the term emergency situation as the
state when the risks and threats or consequences of disasters, emergencies and other situations
dangerous to the population, environment and property, are of such a degree and intensity that
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their occurrence or effect cannot be prevented or eliminated by regular action of authorities, which
is why it is necessary to use special measures, power and resources with enhanced mode to mitigate
and eliminate them.
According to the Ministry of Interior, on the territory of Serbia, about 700 people are killed
per year in emergency situations such as fires, technological accidents, explosions, etc, and material
damage is significant, as well. In emergencies, when risks and threats to the population,
environment and property are of such intensity that they cannot be prevented or eliminated by the
regular action of the authorities and services, special measures and security forces are applied. It is
obvious that an emergency situation can turn into a state of emergency if the risks and threats or
consequences of disasters, emergencies and other situations dangerous to the population,
environment and property reach such a degree and intensity that specific measures prescribed by
the regime of emergency situations for the elimination of crisis and danger are insufficient. Thus, an
emergency situation becomes, in fact, a specific, less severe form of the state of emergency [1].
2. NORMATIVE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SYSTEM

At the end of 1990s, several major fires (Smederevo Ironworks - the cold rolling mill,
Simpo - furniture factory in Vranje, etc.) suggested that the former normative and organizational
structure of the fire protection and emergency action system does not meet the needs of the society.
The overlapping competence of the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense, the unclear and
nonfunctional relations between the state bodies and territorial units bodies, the lack of
corresponding normative regulations in this area, as well as the obsolescence of the Act on the
Protection against Natural and Other Major Disasters from 1977, and the Fire Protection Act from
1988, pointed to the necessity of establishing a new approach in this area an integrated system of
emergency management [2].
This strategic aim was achieved with the Emergency Situations Act and the new Fire
Protection Act, whose objectives are the protection of human life, environment and property, and
not only from fire, explosions and accidents, but also from various types of natural disasters,
technical and technological disasters (floods, earthquakes, landslides, storms on land, droughts,
avalanches, traffic accidents, accidents in mines and tunnels, etc.).
The principles that the integrated system of protection and rescue is based on are: the right
to protection, solidarity, publicity, preventive care, responsibility, gradualism in the use of power
and means, as well as an active policy of equal opportunities.
For the purpose of the efficient implementation of the acts mentioned above, there are
several other sub normative acts, such as regulations: the Regulation on the Composition and Work
of the Department for Emergency Situations; the Regulation on the Classification of Objects,
Activities and Land into Fire Risk Categories; the Regulation on the Mandatory Tools and
Equipment for Personal, Mutual and Collective Protection against Natural and Other Disasters; the
Regulation on the Content and Manner of Making Plans for the Protection and Rescue in
Emergency Situations; the Regulation on the Implementation of Evacuation.
Furthermore, a series of ordinances is applied: the Ordinance on the Conditions to Be
Fulfilled by Legal Personalities Registered to Train People Who Work on Fire Protection; the
Regulations on Special Training and Examination in the Field of Fire Protection; the Ordinance on
the Manner of Preparation and Content of the Plan on the Fire Protection of the Autonomous
Region, Local Authorities and Entities Classified in the First and Second Category of Vulnerability;
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the Regulation on the Organization and Method of Use of Specialized Civil Protection Units; the
Ordinance on Amending the Ordinance on Technical Standards for the Protection of High Buildings
from Fire; Regulations on the Organization of Fire Protection According to the Fire Risk
Categories; the Regulations on the Content of Information on Emergency Dangers, Measures and
Procedures; the Regulations on the Professional Firefighting Units of the Local Government. The
authorized and qualified legal personalities for the protection and rescue in the Republic of Serbia
are being determined.
The National Strategy for the Protection and Rescue in Emergency Situations was passed
in 2011. The basis for the adoption of this strategy is the Emergency Situations Act, which defines
the establishment of the integrated system of protection and rescue, as well as other national and
international documents such as: the National Programme for the Integration of the Republic of
Serbia into the European Union; the National Sustainable Development Strategy; The National
Security of the Republic of Serbia Strategy; The Millennium Goals of Development (defined by the
members of the United Nations), as well as the Hyogo framework for the activities in the period
between 2005 and 2015, as a planning document of the United Nations for the disaster risk
reduction (Hyogo Framework for Action-HFA). The Internal Security of the European Union
Strategy and the European Union strategy for Supporting Disaster Risk Reduction the Developing
Countries were also taken into account during the development of the National Strategy for the
Protection and Rescue in Emergency Situations.
The purpose of the adoption of these strategies is the protection of life, health and property
of citizens, the protection of the environment and cultural heritage of the Republic of Serbia, which
defines certain national coordination mechanisms, guidelines of the programs for the reduction of
disasters caused by natural occurrences, and the risk of accidents. The National strategy clearly
defines a vision which, in the process of changes, is intended to motivate the action in the right
direction, while the stated mission directs the strategic development and provides a timeline for the
action. The vision of the strategy is a developed, comprehensive, efficient and effective system for
the reduction of the risk and consequences of natural and other disasters via integrated emergency
management in the Republic of Serbia, which contributes to increased security and sustainable
development in the region. The mission of the strategy is to create conditions for building a
society resistant to disasters via the development of an integrated and efficient system for the
protection and rescue in the Republic of Serbia by 2016. The National Strategy should provide an
efficient and effective system for the protection and rescue through strategic areas which are
harmonized with the Hyogo framework for action. Strategic objectives are defined within the
strategic areas, and they are described in detail in the Action Plan which defines the carriers of
implementation, performance indicators, timelines for the implementation and the necessary
financial resources.
Since the National Strategy for the Protection and Rescue in Emergency Situations and the
Fire Protection Strategy have been adopted, the next steps to be implemented are the Risk
Assessment and Protection and Rescue Plans, based on the various levels.
The European Union established the Community Civil Protection Mechanism with the
Council Decision 2007/779/EC. The Mechanism aims to facilitate cooperation in the interventions
of assisting civil protection in emergency situations when the preparedness of the country affected
by disaster is not sufficient for an adequate response due to insufficient available resources. As it is
stated in Article 10 of this decision, the Mechanism is open for the participation of the candidate
countries, and having in mind the fact that the process of Serbia's accession to the European Union
started, one of the priorities of the National Strategy is the inclusion of the Republic of Serbia in the
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Mechanism. The Global policy in the field of disaster risk reduction, as well as national efforts for
the prevention and elimination of consequences of emergency situations, are especially necessary
and productive at the regional level. Therefore, the National Strategy provides the possibility of
effective regional cooperation, taking into account the increasing need of mutual response to the
challenges.
Emergency Situations Act defines emergency management, while disasters risk
reduction is not mentioned. The Act on Amendments and Supplements to the Emergency Situations
Act has expanded the area of organization and establishment of the system of protection and rescue
in Serbia in a way which, in addition to the established system of emergency response, enables a
policy of strengthening the nation's resilience to disasters on a daily level and establishes an
efficient system of preventive protection against disasters. Furthermore, the Act extends the
authority of the Republic Department for Emergency Situations to coordinate the work of all the
subjects of the protection and rescue system in the matters of organization, planning, preparation
and implementation of measures and activities for disaster risk prevention and reduction, protection
and rescue, including the exchange of information, knowledge and technology; which provides the
basis for promoting the Republic Department for Emergency Situations to the National Platform for
Disaster Risk Reduction.
The National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction is usually a national council or forum,
which brings together a number of different, mostly national, key stakeholders. It represents and
promotes disaster risk reduction at all levels, from local to national and international, and through a
coordinated approach with the expert analysis of priority topics and areas, it advises and proposes
joint actions and measures through a participatory decision-making process. The aim of the
platform is to contribute to the establishment and development of a comprehensive national system
of disaster risk reduction, depending on the needs and possibilities of individual countries.
Therefore, the Act on Amendments enables the formation of a body which represents all the key
subjects that may be of importance for the protection and rescue system, either directly or indirectly
(whether their function may influence the decision-making, or they are leaders of professional
services that can be engaged in the response to an emergency situation), as well as the
representatives of public agencies and others with a role in this important domain. In addition, such
a body must be authorized to issue a response in time, while in the period of regular sessions it can
participate in the creation of the system of protection and rescue by making decisions and
recommendations.
For the purpose of the efficient implementation of the Emergency Situations Act and the
Fire Protection Act from 2012, the Regulation for the Determination of the General Plan for Flood
Control in the Period Between 2012 and 2018 was passed. The General Plan for Flood Control
established the measures to be taken preventively and during the arrival of high water (external and
internal), the manner of the institutional organization of flood control, duties, responsibilities and
authorizations of the heads of defense, institutions and other entities responsible for flood control,
ice and flooding inland waters, the method of observation and recording of hydrological and other
data, etc. Moreover, the Regulation on the Local Government of the Professional Fire Units was
passed, which determined the minimum number of firefighters as well as the technical equipment
and training of the professional fire brigades, founded by the local government.
The adoption of the Fire Protection Strategy for the Period Between 2012 and 2017
was of particular importance to risk management in emergency situations. The overall aim of
the Strategy is to improve fire protection by taking preventive actions and applying the
measures for the security of all subjects, and informing citizens. The main objective of the
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Strategy is the creation of new and improvement of existing conditions for the overall economic
and social progress based on a long-term improvement of fire protection. Therefore, taking into
account the concept of sustainable development, the Strategy aims to introduce fire protection
in all other strategic plans of the Republic of Serbia, and therefore integrate fire protection in all
areas of the strategy of the Republic of Serbia; and later in all the policies, programs, and
development plans and projects. The sectors and geographical areas of the Strategy where the
organizational and technical objectives of fire protection should be achieved are: normative
regulations, preventive protection, an area of cooperation between all the factors, especially the
cooperation with international stakeholders, consideration of capacity in knowledge, skills and
necessary equipment.
The criteria for fire risk management are also included in the existing technical regulations,
such as: Regulation for the Protection of Storage Fire and Explosion; Regulation on Technical
Norms for Fire Protection of High Buildings; Regulation on the Construction of the Liquefied
Petroleum Gas Plant and on Storing and Transferring Liquefied Petroleum Gas; Regulation on
Building Stations for Fuel Supply of Motor Vehicles, Storage and Refueling and more. The primary
importance in terms of determining the set of criteria of fire risk, the policies contain most
vulnerable objects, such as plants for the production, processing and storage of flammable liquids
and gases, objects where a great number of people gather and spend time, industrial facilities of
capital importance, defense industry and more.
3. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF SYSTEMS

The idea which unified all the activities aimed at the protection of life, health and property,
the preservation of the conditions necessary for life and preparing to overcome the situations in case
of fire, natural disasters, hazardous materials effects and other states, was realized in 2009, when
the Sector for Emergency Management was established under the Ministry of Interior.
The focus of the Sector for Emergency Management is the strengthening of institutional
structures and capacities for preventive action in case of emergencies.
The organizational chart of the system of risk management in emergency situations in the
Republic of Serbia is shown in Figure 3.
According to the Emergency Situations Act, the Republic Department for Emergency
Situations represents an operational, professional body established by the Government and it is in
charge of the affairs of protection and rescue in emergency situations coordination and
management. The Republic Department consists of the Minister of Interior as the chief of the
Department (whose function is the Head of the Sector for Emergency Management) and the
members of the Department. The members of the Department are: the members of the Government,
ministers and their associates in whose scope of work are actions in the field of public
administration and local self-government, defense, health, agriculture, waterpower engineering and
forestry, work and social policy and the environment protection, foreign affairs, transportation and
telecommunications, construction, mining, energy, media, finance, trade and services, and
professional employees of the Ministry of Interior, the Army of Serbia, the Serbian Red Cross and
Serbian Mountain Rescue Service. Also, the members include the representatives of the Republic
Hydrometeorological Institute of Serbia and Republic Seismological Bureau, public companies and
other legal entities, charities, civic associations and institutions which engage in the protection and
rescue in emergency situations. Professional, operational, administrative and technical tasks
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important for the functioning of the Department are carried out by the organizational units of the
Sector for Emergency Management.
Figure 3 The organizational chart of the system of risk management in emergency situations in the
Republic of Serbia
Sector for Emergency Management organizes and implements activities to protect life,
health and property of citizens, the preservation of the necessary conditions for life and preparation
to overcome the resulting situation during natural disasters and technological accidents and other
dangerous situations, which are the result of natural and anthropogenic factors.
Sector for Emergency Management performs normative, administrative, organizational,
technical, preventive, technical, educational, informative acts for the organization, planning,
implementation, control of the measures to protect life, health and property of citizens, and the
protection of the environmental conditions necessary for life and preparing to overcome situations
in case of fire, natural disasters, technical and technological accidents, effects of hazardous
materials and other conditions.
According to the Emergency Situations Act, emergency management represents a joint
activity of the Sector for Emergency Management and local government representatives in order to
react easily and fast in such situations. The role of the Sector is to coordinate the activities of all the
government institutions in the protection of people and their property. In this respect, the main
objective of the Sector for Emergency Management is further improvement of the service, and
strengthening of institutional structures and capacities for preventive action and minimizing risks.
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Department for Prevention aims to unite all the preventive actions to protect life, health
and property of citizens. It is responsible for the inspection and control of the facilities with the aim
of protecting them from fire and explosion, which includes the location approval, technical
documentation and technical reception of facilities under construction, inspection control of
facilities in operation from the standpoint of fire and explosion protection. The Department is also
responsible for overseeing the production, sale and transportation of flammable and explosive
materials, as well as the investigation in the event of a fire or explosion. The basis of operation of
the Department for Prevention is the Fire Protection Act. The structure of the Department for
Prevention is shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4 The structure of the Department for Prevention [2]
Department for Fire and Rescue Units coordinates the operation and use of fire and
rescue units on the entire territory of the Republic of Serbia. Fire and Rescue units are the first to
act in the protection and rescue of people, material and cultural property in the event of natural
disasters, technological accidents and disasters. These units work closely with other departments of
the Ministry of Interior - Directorate of Police (Gendarmerie - units and Diving Center of
Gendarmerie, Helicopter Units, Traffic Police, etc.), Army of Serbia, institutes, centers, agencies
and other services, if there is a need for their participation with the aim of a joint response to
emergencies. The structure of the Department for Fire and Rescue Units is shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5 The structure of the Department for Fire and Rescue Units [2]
Department for Risk Management is the holder of the Assessment of the risk of accidents
(technical and technological accidents), which is an integral part of the National risk assessment.
Through the Department for Risk Management, the Sector organizes the work of the centers for
observation, information and alarm, where the data about the situation in areas relevant for the
156
protection and rescue system in the Republic of Serbia are being collected and processed
continuously (24 hours). The Department coordinates the activities in emergency situations and
provides technical assistance to the emergency departments and other participants in the protection
of people and property in emergency situations.
Figure 6 The structure of the Department for Risk Management [2]
Under this Department, the Division for Hail Protection and Division for Weather
Modification Methodology were formed.
Also within this administration, five special regional teams for rescue in the event of
earthquakes and ruins were formed in Belgrade, Novi Sad, Ni, Kraljevo and Valjevo and they
consists of the members of the Gendarmerie and the Sector for Emergency Management.
In the Republic of Serbia, there is no unique number that people can dial in case of an
emergency, but each emergency service has its own emergency number and dispatching center (192
- police, 193 fire department, 194 - ambulance), whose coordination is not very efficient. Also,
system identification/locating of the caller is not functional (making the rapid response of
emergency services difficult) and the database for tracking all hazards, events, emergencies and
disasters is not well-developed.
Department for Civil Protection is the carrier of the National Plan for the Protection and
Rescue in Emergency Situations and part of the National Risk Assessment. Furthermore, through the
Department, the Sector forms and equips specialized civil protection units (teams for rescuing from
rubble, on water and under water, teams for RHB protection, rescuing from heights and depths, for
care, medical assistance, etc.). Within the Department for Civil Protection there is a special Division
for Unexploded Ordnance UXO, which performs the destruction of unexploded ordnance. Civil
protection is above all the organization responsible for reviewing and preparing for the protection in
emergencies, defining a strategy of protection and rescue, developing feedback information based
157
on experience, etc. Civil Protection has an advisory role to play as a technical counselor of the state
related to the protection from disasters.
Civil protection units (specialized units and units of general purpose) are formed, equipped
and trained as the operating forces for performing the tasks of civil protection. These units are
formed in accordance with the Risk Assessment for the Republic of Serbia.
Figure 7 The Structure of the Department for Civil Protection [2]
National Emergency Training Centre provides and implements training and professional
advancement of all the structures of protection and rescue system for preparation, planning, and
reacting in emergency events and situations in accordance with the Law and European standards.
Figure 8 The structure of the National Emergency Training Centre [2]
Department for Emergency Management in Belgrade performs tasks which are

normative, administrative, organizational and technical, preventative, educational, informative, etc,
for the organization, planning, implementation, control measures to protect life, health and property
of citizens, and environmental conditions necessary for life and preparation to overcome situations
in case of fire, natural disasters, technical and technological accidents, effects of hazardous
substances and other dangerous situations of major proportions that may endanger the health and
lives of people and the environment, or cause severe damage, and tasks of assisting in rectifying the
consequences (reduction and rehabilitation) caused by emergencies.
158
Figure 9 The structure of the Department for Emergency Management in Belgrade [2]
By adopting the Regulation on the Organization and Work of the Emergency Departments,
the legal basis for education departments at all levels has been created - from the republican level to
the level of local government. Furthermore, the Department for Emergency Management AP
Vojvodina was formed, city departments for emergency management in Belgrade, Kraljevo and
Loznica and Municipal Department for Emergency Situations in Prijepolje and Ljubovija.
4. CONCLUSION
Completing and uniting the appropriate matter in the Act involved creating the basic
normative bases for the harmonious and the timely response of many government agencies and
non-state subjects in emergency situations and, consequently, for the efficient protection and rescue
of people and property in such situations, while respecting the guidelines and suggestions of the
United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR).
By establishing the integrated system of emergency management, specifying the
management and executive functions of the subjects of the system, and concentrating the
professional tasks protection and rescue in the Sector for Emergency Management, the legal
conditions for the implementation of the necessary preventive and operational measures were
created, as well as for the fulfillment of the tasks of protection and rescue of people and property
from the consequences of natural and other disasters, as well as the recovery of these consequences.
The normative and structural organization of the system of risk management in emergency
situations in the Republic of Serbia provides the prerequisites for disaster risk reduction and
creation of a society resistant to disasters.
Acknowledgement: The paper is a part of the research done within the project III43014.
159
REFERENCES
[1] Sekulski D., et al.; On Methodology for Risk Assessment of Events with Catastrophic
Consequences, Faculty of Technical Sciences, Novi Sad, 2012., str. 45.
[2] Jugovic S., The Real Position of the Emergency Department in the Republic of Serbia,
Criminal Police Academy, Beograd, 2013, str. 121.
[3] Emergency Situations Act ("RS Official Gazette", No.111/2009).
[4] Fire Protection Act ("Official Gazette of RS", No.111/2009).
[5] Fire Protection Act ("Official Gazette of RS", No. 37/88) and ("RS Official Gazette",
No. 53/93, 67/93, 48/94 and 101/05).
[6] Act on Amendments and Supplements to the Emergency Situations Act ("RS Official
Gazette", No.111/2009, 92/2011 and 93/2012).
[7] National Strategy for the Protection and Rescue in Emergency Situations ("RS Official
Gazette", No.86/2011).
[8] Rulebook of the Professional Fire Brigade Units and Local Government Units ("Official
Gazette of RS", No. 18/2011).
[9] Strategy for Fire Protection in the Period Between 2012 and 2017 ("RS Official Gazette",
No.21/2012).
160
SEPARATION DISTANCE BETWEEN BUILDINGS

IN FUNCTION OF FIRE PROTECTION
Dusica PESIC
Darko ZIGAR
Ljiljana ZIVKOVIC
Nenad ZIVKOVIC
Milan BLAGOJEVIC
University of Nis, Faculty of Occupational Safety, Serbia
Abstract: In most cases, the fires from residential building to adjacent buildings spread through the
exterior openings. Determination of the optimal separation distance between buildings is a
task of economic and safety analyses, although it is known that increasing separation
distance increases fire protection of an adjacent building, but decreases the cost
effectiveness of urban solutions. Great efforts have been made in order to find a
compromise between these two aspects, and for this reason, several methods for
determining the separation distance between buildings in terms of fire protection have been
developed. In this paper, the methods for determination of the separation distance between
buildings have been given, and the simulations results of fire spreading from the burning
building to an adjacent building obtained by software package Fire Dynamics Simulator
have been presented.
Keywords: Fire Spread, Separation Distance, Legislation, Simulation, Incident Heat Flux, Temperature
1. INTRODUCTION
Fire spread between the buildings and expected consequences are dependent on the fire
severity, distance between the buildings, fire resistance of external walls and the risk that occupants
in the adjoining building are exposed to.
The spread of fire from a burning building to an adjoining building can occur in a number
of different ways. The available data indicate the fact that in most cases, the fire from residential
building to adjoining buildings spread through the exterior openings. Flame and radiative heat come
out through windows or other openings in the facade of a burning building.
Ignition due to radiation is the most common way of fire spread between the buildings. The
parameters that influence the heat transfer by radiation from a burning building to a receiving
surface of adjoining building are projections of flames from openings, the emissivity of the flame
and the configuration factor, as well as the distance between the buildings. Radiative heat flux at the
exposed facade of adjacent building is very important parameter too.
There is no internationally accepted method for design of the buildings that takes into
account the external fire spreading between buildings. National building codes are generally based
on more or less prescriptive provisions, without background about the origin of the provisions. In
most building codes and calculation methods for fire spread, a value of 12.5 kW/m2 is used as the
maximum tolerable level of radiation at the exposed facade to external fire.
Taking into account that there is a possibility of fire spread from a burning building to an
adjoining building, the minimum safe separation distance between buildings should be determined.
161
Minimum separation distance depends on the fire severity, percentage of opening in the exposed
wall, and the ratio of width to height or height to width of buildings. In most building codes,
different calculation methods for determining safe separation distance between the buildings and
acceptable unprotected areas have been given.
With the rapid development of computer technology, Computational Fluid Dynamics
(CFD) modeling is widely used for fire studies nowadays. In order to determine safe separation
distance between two residential buildings, Large Eddy Simulation (LES) method of the software
package Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) has been used in this article.
2. CODES WITH REGARDS TO EXTERNAL FIRE SPREAD BETWEEN

BUILDINGS
In many countries, the separation distances between residential buildings are recommended
in different building codes.
The requirements in England regarding external fire spread are set out in the Building
Regulations, Part B - External fire spread [1]. The code recommends the methods for calculating the
separation distances between buildings.
The objective of the calculation methods is to make sure that the building is separated from
the relevant boundary by at least half the distance at which the total radiant heat flux received from
all unprotected areas in the external wall would be 12.6 kW/m2. This is based on the assumption
that the emitted radiation from the unprotected areas in the wall is 84 kW/m2 for buildings in the
residential, office and recreation purpose groups, and 168 kW/m2 for buildings in the commercial,
industrial, storage or other non-residential purpose groups. The method is also called the mirror
image concept, which means that another building is located on the other side of the relevant
boundary (Fig. 1).
Figure 1 The mirror image concept
With a properly designed sprinkler system installed in the building, the separation distance
D/2 from the relevant boundary may be halved. However, the distance to the boundary is not
allowed to be less than 1.0 m.
The distance from the relevant boundary and the maximum acceptable unprotected areas
are calculated using two methods.
Method 1 should be used for dwelling houses, flats and other residential buildings.
Furthermore, the external walls should not be longer than 24 m and the building height no more
162
than three levels. The minimum distance from the relevant boundary to the sides of the building and
the maximum acceptable unprotected areas are shown in Table 1.
Table 1 Separation distances and maximum unprotected areas (method 1)
Minimum distance X between external wall and
relevant boundary, [m]
1
2
3
4
5
6
Maximum acceptable unprotected

area, [m2]
5.6
12.0
18.0
24.0
30.0
No limit
Figure 2 shows the principles of method 1 and the distance to the relevant boundary.
Figure 2 Principles of method 1
Method 2 can be used for any building, regardless of the purpose group of the buildings.
However, buildings should not be higher than 10 m. The distance from the relevant boundary to the
side of the building and the amount of acceptable unprotected areas are presented in table 2.
Table 2 Separation distances and maximum unprotected areas (method 2)
Separation distance between external wall and relevant
boundary, [m]
Residual, office, assembly,
Shop, commercial, industrial,
recreation buildings
storage, other non-residual buildings
1
1
2
2.5
5
5
10
7.5
15
10
20
12.5
25
Maximum unprotected
area as a percentage of
total wall area, [%]
4
8
20
40
60
80
100
In the United States of America, the code which determines separation distances between
buildings is the NFPA 80A Recommended Practice for Protection of Buildings from Exterior Fire
Exposures [3]. The scope of the NFPA 80A is to protect combustible material on the outside as well
as the inside of a building exposed to an external fire source. Separation distances are determined
assuming that the facades are made of cellulosic materials, with the ability to withstand ignition
when exposed to a maximum radiation level of 12.5 kW/m2. Table 3 sets out guide numbers that
should be used when determining the separation distances between buildings. To be able to
163
determine a guide number from the table, it is necessary to know the fire severity, percentage of
openings in the wall and the ratio of the width-to-height or height-to-width of the compartment.
Table 3 Guide numbers for determination of separation distances (NFPA 80A)
Fire severity
Guide number
Percent openings
Ratio width-to-height or height-to-width
Light Moderate Severe 1.0 1.3 1.6 2.0 2.5 3.2 4 5
6 8 10 13 16 20
25 32 40
20
10
5 0.36 0.40 0.44 0.46 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51
30
15
7.5 0.60 0.66 0.73 0.79 0.84 0.88 0.90 0.92 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
40
20
10 0.76 0.85 0.94 1.02 1.10 1.18 1.23 1.27 1.30 1.32 1.33 1.33 1.34 1.34 1.34 1.34 1.34
50
25
12.5 0.90 1.00 1.11 1.22 1.33 1.42 1.51 1.58 1.63 1.66 1.69 1.71 1.71 1.71 1.71 1.71 1.71
60
30
15 1.02 1.14 1.26 1.39 1.52 1.64 1.76 1.85 1.93 1.99 2.03 2.08 2.08 2.08 2.08 2.08 2.08
80
40
20 1.22 1.37 1.52 1.68 1.85 2.02 2.18 2.34 2.48 2.59 2.67 2.80 2.80 2.79 2.80 2.81 2.81
100
50
5 1.39 1.56 1.74 1.93 2.13 2.34 2.55 2.76 2.95 3.12 3.26 3.36 3.43 3.48 3.51 3.52 3.53
60
30 1.55 1.73 1.94 2.15 2.38 2.63 2.88 3.13 3.37 3.60 3.79 3.95 4.07 4.15 4.20 4.22 4.24
80
40 1.82 2.04 2.28 2.54 2.82 3.12 3.44 3.77 4.11 4.43 4.74 5.01 5.24 5.41 5.52 5.60 5.64
100
50 2.05 2.30 2.57 2.87 3.20 3.55 3.93 4.33 4.74 5.16 5.56 5.95 6.29 6.56 6.77 6.92 7.01
60 2.26 2.54 2.84 3.17 3.54 4.93 4.36 4.82 5.30 5.80 6.30 6.78 7.23 7.63 7.94 8.18 8.34
80 2.63 2.95 3.31 3.70 4.13 4.61 5.12 5.68 6.28 6.91 7.57 8.24 8.89 9.51 10.05 10.50 10.84
100 2.96 3.32 3.72 4.16 4.65 5.19 5.78 6.43 7.13 7.88 8.67 9.50 10.33 11.15 11.91 12.59 13.15
In order to calculate the required separation distance, the guide number should be
multiplied with the lesser dimension of the width and height exposed to fire, and then add 1.52 to
take into account the flame projections out of openings and prevent ignition due to flame
impingement on the exposed building. Separation distance, D, could be calculated from the
following equation
D gZ 1.52
(1)
where g is guide number from table 3, Z is lesser dimension of width and height of the exposing fire.
In Serbia, separation distances between buildings are proposed by the Law on Fire
Protection, the Law on Planning and Construction, Regulations on general conditions of the lots
and building and contents, conditions and procedure for issuing acts on zoning requirements for
buildings, Regulations on technical norms for fire safety of high-rise buildings, as well as
Technical recommendation for structural fire protection for residential, business and public
buildings.
Regulations on general conditions of the lots and building and contents, conditions and
procedure for issuing acts on zoning requirements for buildings [4] prescribe the minimum distances
between the objects. The distances between multi-storey buildings and buildings that are built in a
row must be equal to at least half of the height of a higher building. If the buildings at the opposing
side facades do not contain windows, the distance can be reduced to a quarter of the height of a
higher building. This distance cannot be less than 4 m if one of the buildings walls contains
windows. The minimum distance between family housing must be 4 m.
Regulations on technical norms for fire safety of high-rise buildings [5] require that, if the
opposing walls of the adjacent buildings have the openings through which the fire could spread
from one building to another, the minimum distance between these openings should be determined
by calculation. If the calculation is not possible, the distance should be half of the height of a higher
building.
Technical recommendation for structural fire protection for residential, business and public
buildings [7] prescribes the metodology for determination of the separation distance between the
buildings. Considering the possibility of fire spread, the separation distance between buildings (i.e.
their nearest windows) can be determined by the conditions necessary for ignition of the curtains on
164
the window of the adjacent building caused by the flame radiation through the windows of the
burning building. At the same time, during time interval of 30 min, radiative heat flux on the curtain
area must be less than 8 kW/m2. Separation distance, D, can be calculated from the following
equation.
H
D a cos A 4
(2)
2
where a is window factor, H is height of a higher building, A is windows areas.
3. NUMERICAL MODEL
3.1 Methodology
FDS, developed by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is now a
popular CFD tool in fire related researches. It consists of hydrodynamic model, combustion model
and model of thermal radiation. Hydrodynamic model solves numerically a form of the Navier
Stokes equations for thermally driven flow and thermally expandable, multicomponent mixture of
ideal gases. The governing equations are [2]:
Conservation of mass
u m b'''
(3)
t
which is often written in terms of the mass fractions of the individual gaseous species, Y
Y Y u D Y m ''' m b''',
(4)
t
Conservation of momentum
u uu p g fb ij
(5)
t
Transport of sensible enthalpy
hs hsu Dp q ''' qb''' q ''

(6)
t
Dt
Equation of state for a perfect gas
RT
p
(7)
M
where is density, u is velocity vector, u = [u,v,w]T, T is temperature, D is diffusion coefficient, Y
is mass fraction of th species, m ''' is mass production rate per unit volume of species by
chemical reactions, m b''', is mass production rate per unit volume of species by evaporating
particles, p is pressure, g is gravity vector (0,0,-g), fb is external force vector, ij is viscous stress
tensor, hs is sensible enthalpy, q '' is heat flux vector, q ''' is heat release rate per unit volume from a
chemical reaction, qb''' is energy transferred to the evaporating droplets, is dissipation rate, R is
universal gas constant (8.314 J/molK), M is molecular weight of the gas mixture and t is time.
Equations presented above can be treated as Direct Numerical Simulation (DNS) or
Large Eddy Simulation (LES). For DNS, the dissipative processes of viscosity, thermal
conductivity and material diffusivity are computed directly. In LES, the large-scale eddies are
resolved while those smaller than the grid cell sizes, also known as sub-grid scale (SGS) eddies,
165
are modeled. This is based on the assumption that the smaller eddies contribute small quantity
of the total kinetic energy of the flow. On the SGS, the model uses a refined Smagorinsky
sub-grid turbulence model to predict the sub-grid scale motion of viscosity, thermal
conductivity, and material diffusivity [6].
The combustion model is based on the mixture fraction concept, which is quantitatively
represented by the fuel and the products of combustion. There is a two-step chemical reaction of
combustion, as follows:
'
Cx H yOz Na M b vO' 2 O2 vH 2O H 2O vCO
vCO CO vSS vN 2 N 2 vM M
'
vCO
CO 2 O2 CO 2
(8)
(9)
where vk is stoichiometric coefficient of species k.

The radiative transport equation for an absorbing, emitting, and scattering medium is
( x, )
'
'
'
s I ( x, s) k ( x, ) s ( x, )I ( x, s) B( x, ) s
(s, s ) I ( x, s )d
4 4
(10)
where I ( x, s) radiation intensity at wavelength , s is direction vector of the intensity, k ( x, ) is

local absorption, ( x, ) is scattering coefficients, B ( x, ) is emission source term, describing how
much heat is emitted by the local mixture of gas, soot and droplets/particles.
3.2 Model configuration

FDS requires the inputs as follows: geometry of the facility, computational cell size,
location of the ignition source, heat release rate, thermal characteristics of materials and boundary
conditions.
For simulation of fire spread, two one-floor residential buildings with dimensions of 9.4 m
x 7.4 m x 6.3 m (length, width and height, respectively) have been designed. In order to reduce the
volume of 3-D simulation domain, only the part of the building where the possibility of fire spread
was investigated has been designed (Fig. 3).
The surfaces of the walls and ceiling of the buildings were covered with gypsum boards.
Floors in the premises and stairs were covered with synthetic carpets. Fire load of the burning
building consisted of wooden tables, chairs, kitchen furniture, cabinets, as well as upholstered beds
and armchairs. Both buildings had wooden roofs, wooden doors with dimensions of 1.6 m x 2.0 m
and windows with dimensions of 1.2 m x 1.2 m. At the burning building, the glasses on the door
and windows at the ground floor were cracked in 120 seconds of simulated time, while the glasses
of upstairs windows were cracked in 180 seconds. Due to the fact that the examined scenario was
aimed at determining the minimum conditions necessary for ignition of the window curtains on the
adjoining building, the windows of the adjoining building were covered with cotton curtains with a
flash point of 280 C. Gauge of incident heat flux and temperature gauge were placed on the
curtains within the building in which the possibility of fire spread was investigated. The properties
of the used materials are given in table 4.
166
Figure 3 The 3-D simulation domain

Table 4 Properties of materials
Material
gypsum board
carpet
spruce
pillows and
curtains (cotton)
Thickness,
m
Density,
kg/m3
0.013
0.006
0.028
1440
750
450
Thermal
conductivity,
W/mK
0.48
0.16
-
40
400
290
360
Combustion
velocity,
kg/m2s
0.05
-
280
0.03
Flash point,
C
The heat release rate of a fire is generally quantified by the fire source area and heat release
rate per unit area. For this investigation, the fire source with dimensions 0.6 m x 0.6 m was in the
kitchen. The heat release rate per unit area was 360 kW/m2.
When applying LES simulation, the grid size is a key parameter which has to be considered
very carefully, because it should be appropriate to produce reliable simulation results. The size of
the grid cell generally depends on the heat release rate of the fire source and the air properties.
These factors are combined to give a characteristic fire diameter D* , which is defined as follow [2]
2
5
Q
*
D
c pT g
(11)
where, Q is heat release rate, cp is specific heat, is ambient air density, T is ambient air
temperature, and g is acceleration due to gravity.
In general, the better the numerical solution of the equations is obtained, when the finer the
numerical grid is. For this investigation, the grid was 0.1 m x 0.2 m x 0.1 m in the three spatial
directions (x-, y- and z- direction).
The ambient temperature was set to 303 K in the whole computational domain. The
instantaneous or real perpendicular wind was specified, e.g., an initial velocity boundary
condition of 0.3 m/s with a uniform profile was set at the right side of the simulation domain. The
top and the other three sides of the domain were all set to be naturally opened in order to simulate
the real conditions for open space.
The simulations were carried out for different conditions. The possibility of fire spread for
the cases of distances between buildings 3.2 m, 4.0 m and 4.8 m was investigated here. The above
mentioned distance values were chosen in order to examine the validity of Serbian legislation under
which the separation distance between the buildings for these types of residential buildings must not
be less than 4 m.
167
4. RESULTS
Case 1: Buildings distance of 3.2 m
140 s (glass is cracked)
170 s (fire spreads to adjacent

building)
200 s (both buildings are on fire)
Figure 4 Growth and spread of fire at buildings distance of 3.2 m
140 s
170 s
200 s
Figure 5 Temperature regime of fire in the vertical plane x = 1.6 m
Figure 6 Incident heat flux and temperature of the curtain surface at lower window
203 s (upper window is on fire)
215 s (lower window is on fire) 373 s (both buildings are on fire)
Figure 7 Growth and spread of fire at buildings distance of 4 m
168
203 s
215 s
373 s
Figure 9 Incident heat flux and temperature of the curtain surface at upper window
163 s (fire spread on the roof)
207 s
700 s
Figure 11 Growth of fire without spreading to adjacent building
163 s
207 s
169
700 s
4. DISCUSSION
On the basis of the results presented, it can be concluded that fire spread from the burning
building to the adjacent building in cases when their separation distances were 3.2 m and 4.0 m. In the
case when the distance between buildings was 3.2 m, fire spread by igniting the curtains on the lower
window in 170 seconds, while in the case when the distance between buildings was 4.0 m, fire spread in
203 seconds by igniting the curtains on the upper window.
Serbian legislation requires that separation distance between buildings should be 4.0 m as a
function of fire protection. However, the results of simulations showed that the distance between
residential buildings of 4.0 m is not safe separation distance for fire spread from a burning building to an
adjacent building.
In case when distance between the buildings was 4.8 m, the fire did not spread. However, the
analysis of the results of incident heat flux showed that its value in specific time intervals was 12.0 kW/m2,
which is very close to the adopted values of critical heat flux of 12.5 kW/m2 in building codes in many
countries.
It should be noted that this research did not include the presence of wind which strongly
influences the fire spread. The dimensions of the windows in the building were 1.2 m x 1.2 m, but the
analyses of many experimental investigations proved that window area had crucial influence on the
radiative heat transfer. Quantification of these aspects of the described problem could be a subject
of further investigations.
Acknowledgement: The paper is a part of the research done within the project III43014.
REFERENCES
[1] Approved Document B, Section B4 External fire spread, The Building Regulations 1991, 2000
edition, Department of the Environment and the Welsh Office, HMSO, London, 2000.
[2] McGrattan K, Hostikka S, Floyd J, Baum H, Mell RRW, McDermott R, Fire Dynamics
Simulator (version 5.4) Technical Reference Guide. National Institute of Standards and
Technology, Washington, 2009.
[3] NFPA 80A: Recommended Practice for Protection of Buildings from Exterior Fire Exposure, National
Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA, 2001.
[4] Pravilnik o optim uslovima o parcelaciji i izgradnji i sadrini, uslovima i postupku izdavanja akta
o urbanistikim uslovima za objekte za objekte za koje odobrenje za izgradnju izdaje optinska,
odnosno gradska uprava ("Sl. glasnik RS", br. 75/2003)
[5] Pravilnik o tehnikim normativima za zatitu visokih objekata od poara ("Sl. list SFRJ",
br. 7/84, "Sl. glasnik RS", br. 86/ 2011)
[6] Smagorinsky J, General circulation experiments with the primitive equations. The basic
experiment. Mon Weather Rev 91(3):99164, 1963.
[7] Tehnika preporuka za zatitu od poara stambenih, poslovnih i javnih zgrada, Savezni
zavod za standardizaciju, Beograd, Srbija, 2002.
170
Seciunea a II-a
LUCRRI CU CARACTER TIINIFIC
171
MODELAREA CONVECIEI TERMICE LA CURGEREA

PESTE O PLAC PLAN
Student sergent Daniel-Viceniu CONSTANTIN
Colonel conf. univ. dr. ing. Emanuel DARIE
Abstract: The present work refers to the study of both free and forced convection heat transfer using a
heated plate. Our measurements aimed to obtain the temperature distribution along the
plate at equilibrium for different input powers of the heater and several values of the angle
of the plate. There are taken into account the free and forced convection regimes.
Keywords: Convection, Thermal Conductivity, Heat, Plate, Nusselt Number.
1. INTRODUCERE
Cldura este definit ca fiind energia transferat datorit existenei unei diferene de
temperatur. Ea se transfer de la regiunile cu temperatur mai ridicat ctre regiunile cu
temperatur mai sczut. n mod obinuit, ne referim la diferitele tipuri de mecanisme de transfer de
cldur ca fiind moduri de transfer de cldur prin conducie, convecie i radiaie.
Convecia, uneori identificat ca fiind un mod distinct de transfer de cldur, se refer la
transferul de cldur de la o suprafa de separare la un fluid n micare, sau la transferul de cldur
printr-un plan de curgere n interiorul unui fluid n micare. Dac micarea fluidului este indus de
ctre o pomp, o suflant, un ventilator sau unele dispozitive similare, procesul se numete
convecie forat.
Dac apare micarea unui fluid ca urmare a diferenei de densitate produs de diferena de
temperatur, procesul este numit convecie natural sau liber.
n aceast lucrare autorul urmrete s stabileasc distribuia cmpului de temperaturi de-a
lungul unei plci plane pentru diverse unghiuri de nclinaie a acesteia, n regim de convecie
forat, precum i liber.
2. ECUAIILE GENERALE ALE CURGERII CONVECTIVE

n cazul conveciei libere sau naturale, viteza de curgere depinde att de proprietile
mecanice ale fluidului din sistem, ct i de procesele de transfer termic ce pot aprea. Convecia
liber este produs de ctre forele tip Arhimede care rezult n urma diferenelor de densitate din
fluidul aflat n acest proces. n majoritatea situaiilor, gradienii de densitate sunt produi de ctre
variaiile de temperatur din fluid. Exemplele de convecie liber includ un termosifon n bucl
nchis de unic faz (cazul unui reactor nuclear imediat dup cderea pompelor), un perete Trombe
(un dispozitiv de nclzire solar pasiv), i micarea vibrant a aerului fierbinte deasupra oselelor
n timpul zilelor toride de var.
172
Diferena esenial ntre convecia liber i cea forat se exprim cel mai bine prin
ecuaiile care guverneaz cele dou moduri de convecie. Ecuaiile stratului-limit pentru cazul
conveciei libere laminare de-a lungul unei suprafee verticale nclzite sunt (neglijndu-se disipaia
vscoas i gradienii de presiune):
Energia:
Impulsul:
(1)
unde
este coeficientul de expansiune termic,
. Un lucru important de subliniat
este faptul c aceste ecuaii sunt cuplate. n cazul conveciei forate, ecuaia de impuls nu include
termenul referitor la fora de tip Arhimede, i de aceea nu depinde de gradienii de temperatur din
interiorul fluidului.
3. STUDIU EXPERIMENTAL PRIVIND CONVECIA LIBER I FORAT

3.1. Descrierea dispozitivului experimental
Fig. 1 Stand experimental
173
3.2. Cazul conveciei libere

Se studiaz convecia liber orientnd mai nti placa plan ntr-o poziie vertical i fr a
se folosi un ventilator. Se seteaz puterea nclzitorului i se monitorizeaz temperatura suprafeei
pn ajunge ntr-o stare staionar. Setrile de putere se fac n apropierea valorii maxime.
Acest proces de nclzire este posibil s dureze aproximativ 40-45 minute. Dup ce
nclzitorul atinge o stare staionar, se nregistreaz temperaturile suprafeei i temperatura
mediului ambiant. Se nregistreaz tensiunea de intrare a nclzitorului, precum i semnalul de
ieire al senzorului de flux termic sau al termocuplului utilizat. Cu ajutorul msurtorilor
mrimilor termice de intrare se poate calcula fluxul de cldur pe suprafa, q'' in W/
prin
mprirea puterii de intrare cu aria suprafeei. Trebuie avut n vedere c nclzitorul are dou
fee. Trebuie, de asemenea, s se verifice dac cele dou metode pentru determinarea lui q'' sunt
n bun concordan una cu cealalt. Dac diferena depete 10% i msurtoarea efectuat cu
ajutorul unui senzor de flux termic indic o valoare mai cobort trebuie s se reduc semnalul
de intrare de cldur de la nclzitor. Fr a se modifica puterea de intrare se schimb orientarea
plcii plate. Din nou se atinge starea de echilibru pe suprafa i se nregistreaz temperaturile
i ieirea n tensiune de la senzorul de flux termic (sau de temperatur). Se iau cel puin dou
orientri diferite.
Aceste experimente viznd convecia natural trebuie s fie realizate n medii linitite.
Eventualii cureni prin ncpere pot afecta rezultatele experimentale.
3.3. Cazul conveciei forate
Se pstreaz puterea de intrare la aceeai valoare i se pune placa n poziie vertical dup
care se pune n funciune ventilatorul la turaie mic. Cu ajutorul unui anemometru se nregistreaz
viteza fluxului incident peste nclzitor. Se ateapt pn se atinge starea de echilibru termic, i se
nregistreaz temperaturile i fluxul de cldur.
Se nregistreaz, de asemenea, condiiile pentru cel puin trei viteze diferite ale
ventilatorului. Timpul de nclzire trebuie sa fie mai scurt dect n cazul condiiilor de
convecie liber. De asemenea se va efectua cel puin un experiment n care placa s aib o
nclinare diferit.
4. ANALIZA ADIMENSIONAL A TRANSFERULUI TERMIC

Numrul Nusselt, Nu, este definit dup cum urmeaz:
(2)
unde h este coeficientul de convecie,
este lungimea caracteristic,
si
sunt
temperaturile peretelui i ambientului, i k este conductivitatea termic a fluidului. Numrul
Nusselt poate fi un numr local,
unde
este distana de la captul plcii pn la punctul
de interes ( =x) i
este temperatura n acel punct
, sau valoarea medie
,
stabilit prin luarea n considerare a ntregii lungimi a plcii(
i a temperaturii medii.
Temperatura medie este de cele mai multe ori greu de definit, i astfel se ia n considerare
174
temperatura la jumtatea lungimii (

la x=L/2). n cazul conveciei libere, criteriul
adimensional dominant este numrul Rayleigh,
Ra =
Coeficientul de expansiune termic pentru un gaz ideal este egal cu inversul temperaturii
absolute a fluidului. Toate proprietile trebuie s fie evaluate la temperatura filmului,
n cazul conveciei forate laminare (

termic constant, numrul Nusselt local teoretic este:
) peste o suprafa aflat la un flux
(3)
iar valoarea medie este:
(4)
Pr este criteriul adimensional Prandtl al fluidului, (Pr=0,7 pentru gaze). Pentru convecia
liber laminar a aerului peste o plac vertical ( 0<
<
), valoarea medie este:
(5)
5. ASPECTE TEORETICE PRIVIND INTERPRETAREA REZULTATELOR

EXPERIMENTALE
Se poate arta c pentru convecia liber laminar peste o plac vertical, ecuaiile (1)
admit o soluie de similitudine, care combin cele dou variabile independente ntr-una singur.
Pentru aceste ecuaii soluia este dup cum urmeaz. Se definete criteriul adimensional Grashoff
prin:
(6)
i fie:
(7)
n continuare se poate arta c viteza vertical u poate fi calculat n termenii unei funcii
f
care depinde numai de
(8)
175
iar profilul de temperatur poate fi determinat cu ajutorul temperaturii adimensionale:

(9)
. Introducnd aceste definiii n ecuaiile (1) i simplificnd,
care, de asemenea, depinde numai de

ecuaiile devin:
(10)
(11)
Condiiile la limit sunt:
f(0)=
(0)=0 ;
(12)
)=0 ;
(13)
Aceste dou ecuaii difereniale ordinare pot fi rezolvate numeric pentru o anumit valoare
specificat a numrului Prandtl al fluidului. [1]
6. STRATUL-LIMIT TERMIC
Dup cum este cunoscut, soluia de similitudine a lui Blasius pentru viteza n stratul limit
poate fi extins astfel nct s includ calculul distribuiei de temperatur din stratul limit termic.
Este de asemenea important de subliniat referitor la coeficientul de transfer termic c acesta depinde
de numrul Prandtl i de poziia de-a lungul plcii. Se introduce urmtoarea mrime adimensional
corespunztoare temperaturii T(x,y):
(14)
reprezint temperatura suprafeei plcii plate, iar
faa superioar a plcii. Ecuaia de energie satisfcut de mrimea
este temperatura curentului de pe

este:
(15)
Mrimile u si v sunt componentele vitezei dup axa Ox i respectiv Oy, iar
este
coeficientul de difuzivitate termic. Folosind elementele teoriei stratului-limit se poate neglija
derivata a doua n raport cu x a lui
fa de derivata a doua n raport cu y. n cazul mrimilor u si v
avem reprezentarea lor n termenii funciei lui Blasius f(

176
, i se va presupune c
, unde
este variabila de similitudine a lui Blasius. Avnd n vedere toate cele prezentate mai sus se poate
obine urmtoarea ecuaie pentru
:
(16)
Rezolvnd aceasta ecuaie, se folosesc urmtoarele condiii la limit:

(17)
Tratnd ecuaia (16) ca ecuaie de ordinul 1 n
se obine urmtoarea soluie:
(18)
Integrnd nc o dat pentru a obine mrimea
punctul
i folosind faptul c
se anuleaz n
se obine:
(19)
Se poate evalua C punnd condiia ca
s tind la 1 atunci cnd
. Astfel obinem:
(20)
Substituind aceast expresie n ecuaia (19) obinem:
(21)
7. CONCLUZII
n aceast lucrare autorul prezint cteva aspecte teoretice privind fenomenele de transfer
termic prin convecie. Se propune un montaj experimental n vederea msurrii principalilor
parametri caracteristici acestor fenomene. Astfel, se are n vedere determinarea distribuiei de
temperatur de-a lungul unei plci plate, aflat n stare staionar, pentru diferite valori ale puterii
nclzitorului i diferite unghiuri de nclinare ale plcii. Se va avea n vedere studiul att al
regimului de convecie liber, ct i al celui de convecie forat, precum i compararea rezultatelor
astfel obinute cu cele din literatura de specialitate.
BIBLIOGRAFIE
[1] Incropera F.P. and DeWitt. D.P. Fundamentals of Heat and Mass Transfer. John Wiley and
Sons, New York, 1985.
[2] Holman J.P., Heat Transfer. McGraw-Hill, New York, 1981.
177
UTILIZAREA SIMULRII NUMERICE CA METOD PENTRU

ALEGEREA SISTEMELOR DE STINS INCENDII
Student sergent Lucian DUMITRU
Colonel confereniar univ. dr. ing. Manuel ERBAN
Lector univ. dr. ing. Liviu-Valentin BLNESCU
Abstract: The present study is a model aimed to obtain values for water spray temperatures necessary
for efficient firefighting process. Deepening thermal and physical studies of spray
evaporation processes have resulted in obtaining geometrical parameters, nozzle diameter
and angle dispersion, in conjunction with water spray pressure and temperature.
Keywords: Experimental Setup, Water Spray, Concentration, Fire Extinguishing, Simulation.
1. INTRODUCERE
Protecia mpotriva incendiilor este o problem deosebit de complex, studiat n continuu
n vederea perfecionrii. Dei variantele de soluionare sunt diferite pe plan internaional, sunt
recunoscute ca elemente de baz trei categorii principale:
elemente de protecie pasive elemente i materiale de construcie specializate pentru
asigurarea proteciei la foc;
elemente de protecie active instalaii automate de semnalizare i stingere a incendiilor;
elemente pasiv-active mijloace destinate interveniilor la incendii, acionate manual.
2. INSTALAII DE STINGERE CU AP
2.1. Instalaii de stingere cu sprinklere
Instalaiile de stingere cu sprinklere se utilizeaz n combaterea incendiilor cu scopul de a
obine:
stingerea incendiilor n ncperi cu pericol mare de incendiu, unde, din cauza
propagrii rapide a flcrilor sau din alte considerente, nu pot fi utilizate cu eficien
alte sisteme de stingere;
localizarea incendiilor prin realizarea unor perdele de ap cu care se protejeaz goluri din
pereii despritori, poriuni din ncperi cu pericol de incendiu, exteriorul cldirilor i
altele similare, mpiedicnd propagarea incendiului;
rcirea suprafeelor bunurilor ce pot fi afectate de cldur n caz de incendiu.
Tipuri de instalaii:
instalaii de stingere cu sprinklere n sistem ap-ap;
instalaii de stingere cu sprinklere n sistem ap-aer;
instalaii de stingere cu sprinklere n sistem mixt.
178
2.2. Instalaii de stingere cu cea de ap

Apa sub form de cea are capacitatea de a stinge incendiile unde se degaj o mare putere
calorific: incendii de lichide inflamabile, gaze (hidrocarburi, solveni), de echipamente electronice,
cabluri, lemn, hrtie.
Este cel mai simplu i ieftin sistem de stingere, utiliznd o mic cantitate de ap.
Domeniile de utilizare sunt multiple, i anume:
depozite de lichide combustibile;
posturi trafo;
rezervoare cu gaze;
tuneluri de cabluri etc.
Componentele principale ale instalaiilor de stingere a incendiilor cu cea de ap sunt
urmtoarele:
surse de alimentare cu ap;
rezervoare pentru stocarea rezervei de ap necesar stingerii;
staia de pompare a apei din rezervoarele de stocare prin reeaua de conducte pn la
capetele de pulverizare;
reeaua de conducte de alimentare cu ap a capetelor de pulverizare;
capetele de debitare a apei sub form de cea;
armturi,aparate i dispozitive de comand,siguran i control;
instalaia proprie de detectare, semnalizare i comand n caz de incendiu;
sursele de alimentare cu energie electric.
3. COMPUTAIONAL FLUID DYNAMICS (CFD). GENERALITI

CFD este o tehnic de proiectare i analiz complex cu ajutorul calculatorului. Folosind
CFD, putem construi un model de calcul ce reprezint un sistem sau dispozitivul de studiat. Se
aplic ecuaiile generale ale curgerii fluidelor pentru a obine mrimile curgerii i fenomenelor
fizice asociate.
n general, CFD creeaz posibilitatea simulrii curgerii turbulente, a transferului de cldur
i mas, a curgerilor multifazice, a reaciilor chimice, a interaciunii fluid-structur i a fenomenelor
acustice.
Primele coduri CFD au fost dezvoltate pentru industria aerospaial n anii 1960. De
atunci, utilizarea CFD s-a rspndit la toate industriile legate de mecanic fluidelor direct sau
indirect. Astzi, utilizatorii industriali importani ai CFD includ industriile de automobile, energie,
turbomaini, chimie, mediu i multe altele.
3.1. Programul ANSYS
ANSYS este un program CFD (computational fluid dynamics), utilizat pentru a simula
fluxul de fluide ntr-o varietate de aplicaii. Produsul ANSYS CFX le permite inginerilor s testeze
sisteme ntr-un mediu virtual. Acest program extensibil a fost aplicat la simularea apei care curge pe
lng coca navei, motoare cu turbin de gaz (inclusiv compresoare, turbine i arztoare),
aerodinamica aeronavelor, pompe, ventilatoare, aspiratoare etc.
179
Programul ANSYS CFX i are rdcinile n programele CFX-TASCflow (dezvoltat de ctre

Advanced Scientific Computing (ASC), de la Waterloo, Ontario, Canada) i CFX-4 (a fost anterior
Flow3D, dezvoltat n Marea Britanie i comercializat la sfritul anilor 1980 i nceputul anilor 1990).
3.2. Crearea geometriei modelului (GEOMETRY)
Pentru realizarea simulrii s-a ales un model de cap de pulverizare utilizat n instalaiile de
stingere cu cea de ap, acesta fiind montat n poziie vertical cu deflectorul n jos. Acest cap de
debitare s-a desenat n programul Ansys folosind dimensiunile reale (figura 1).
Fig. 1 Geometria modelului de sprinkler ales
3.2.1. mprirea n elemente finite (MESH)

innd cont c un computer poate executa doar operaii matematice simple, acestea trebuie
aduse la o form algebric, adecvat programrii. Aceast transformare este cunoscut drept
discretizarea ecuaiilor.
Stabilitatea calculului numeric a ecuaiilor discretizate nu poate fi prevzut analitic, ea se
demonstreaz n practic. Aceast stabilitate este pus la ncercare, n special, n zona
discontinuitilor. Att ecuaiile lui Euler, ct i ecuaiile Navier-Stokes admit discontinuiti.
Odat stabilit forma domeniului de analiz, acesta trebuie desenat i ulterior discretizat
(figura 2). Discretizarea la sprinkler s-a fcut de 0.1 mm, pe focar de 1 cm, iar la pereii camerei de
1 dm (face sizing).
Fig. 2 mprirea n elemente finite
180
Tabel cu numrul de elemente finite care formeaz ntregul domeniu
Tabelul nr. 1
Domeniu
Noduri
Elemente
Default Domain
862734
3378320
3.2.2. Aplicarea condiiilor la limit (SETUP)

Condiiile la limit sunt restricii impuse pe frontierele domeniului de analiz. Aceste
restricii pot fi de dou tipuri:
condiii la limit de tip Dirichlet (numite i eseniale), n care se impun valorile variabilei
dependente pe frontiera specificat;
condiii la limit de tip Neumann (numite i naturale), n care se impune gradientul
variabilei dependente n direcie normal pe frontiera specificat.
Dac pe frontiera specificat se impun att condiii Dirichlet, ct i Neumann, este vorba
despre condiii de tip Cauchy. Dac pe frontiera specificat se impun combinaii liniare de condiii
Dirichlet i Neumann este vorba despre condiii de tip Robin. Dac pe diferite pri ale frontierei
domeniului se impun condiii la limit de tipuri diferite se spune c este vorba despre condiii mixte.
Condiiile la limit din simulare sunt urmtoarele (figura 3):
analysis tipe se alege un timp de rulare a simulrii de 180 s;
domeniul include ntregul ansamblu de component, n aceast opiune se definesc
particulele att de aer, ct i de ap (particule care alctuiesc jetul de fluid) particulele folosite sunt
particule mici cu diametrul de 400 microni, particule medii cu diametrul de 600 microni i particule
mari cu diametrul de 900 microni;
inlet curgere subsonic cu viteza de 2.6 m/s, 3 tipuri de particule avnd vitez egal i o
temperatur de 250 C;
focar este o suprafa de 1 m2, creia i se aplic o temperatur de 4000 C cu o radiaie
de 8.000 W;
perei (fr for de frecare, particulele cad perpendicular pe podea);
podeaua avnd o temperatur de 250 C;
nlimea de amplasare a sprinklerelor este de 2,2 m;
sprinkler sunt definite toate prile componente ale capului de pulverizare.
Fig. 3 Aplicarea condiiilor la limit n programul Ansys
181
3.2.3. Rezolvarea ecuaiilor (Solutions)

n cadrul acestei etape, programul rezolv calculele fr intervenia utilizatorului pe baza
condiiilor la limit impuse n etapa anterioar. Este singura etap care se execut fr intervenia
utilizatorului.
n figura 4 este reprezentat graficul soluiilor impuse de condiiile la limit.
Fig. 4 Rezolvarea ecuaiilor n programul Ansys
3.2.4. Afiarea rezultatelor (RESULTS)

Afiarea rezultatelor se realizeaz n urma efecturii calculelor matematice din etapa
anterioar. Aceast etap este foarte important deoarece ajut la interpretarea rezultatelor n funcie de
parametrul ales. S-a ales secionarea cu un plan n poziie vertical prin axa de simetrie a focarului.
n figura 5 se observ o temperatur ridicat n aproape toat ncperea aceasta fiind n
jurul focarului de aproximativ 4000 C.
Fig. 5 Seciune cu un plan vertical dup 5 secunde de la declanarea sprinklerului
182
n figura 6 se observ c temperatura din ncpere a nceput s scad, temperatura din focar
a sczut cu aproximativ 1000 C.
Fig. 6 Seciune cu un plan vertical n zona focarului dup 15 secunde de la declanarea sprinklerului
Fig. 7 Seciune cu un plan vertical dup 25 secunde de la declanarea sprinklerului.
183
Dup lichidarea incendiului, temperatura din zona incendiat a ajuns aproape de aceeai
valoare cu temperatura ambiental, cu excepia focarului.
Fig. 10 Seciune cu un plan vertical dup stingerea incendiului
n figura 11 se observ variaia temperaturii interioare, pe nlime deasupra focarului pe o

perioad de la 0 la 180 s.
Temperatura aerului din ncpere dup 30 de s este de aproximativ 240o C, iar n partea de
sus a ncperii este mult mai mic. Se observ faptul c la t=60 s are loc o cretere brusc a
temperaturii la nivelul plafonului datorit faptului c la contactul particulelor de ap cu focarul are
loc o evaporare brusc a acestora transportnd o parte din cldura focarului ctre plafon.
184
Din simulare rezult c este suficient o funcionare a sprinklerului timp de 300 s ca s se

realizeze stingerea complet a incendiului.
Fig. 11 Variaia temperaturii deasupra focarului
4. CONCLUZII
n practic, este important s se aleag, n funcie de tipurile de materiale protejate, dar i de
tipurile probabile de focar, instalaii de stingere care produc un diametru mediu al picturilor ce vor avea
durata de via necesar pentru ca acestea s ajung i s se evapore chiar n zona de ardere.
Picturile fine de ap realizeaz un schimb termic cu energia produs n zona de
combustie, mpiedicnd creterea temperaturii. Acest schimb de energie este proporional cu
suprafaa acoperit de picturile de ap nu cu volumul acestora. La un volum egal, cu ct picturile
sunt mai mici, cu att suprafaa pe care se realizeaz schimbul energetic este mai mare.
Un efect secundar este scderea concentraiei de oxigen. La apropierea picturii de ap de
focarul incendiului, aceasta se va evapora treptat, expandndu-se de aproximativ 1.600 ori,
nlturnd astfel oxigenul. Norul de picturi de ap filtreaz radiaia infraroie, mpiedicnd astfel
creterea temperaturii, dar joac i rolul unui izolant i mpiedic dispersia fluxului termic.
Utilizarea programelor de simulare numeric a fenomenelor care se produc n spaiile n
care pot avea loc incendii, dar i de simulare a funcionrii diverselor tipuri de instalaii de stingere
a incendiilor este n avantajul proiectanilor, arhitecilor, dar i a utilizatorilor, aducnd un plus de
siguran i securitate oamenilor, bunurilor materiale i mediului.
BIBLIOGRAFIE
[1] *** - Normativ privind securitatea la incendiu a construciilor, Partea a II-a, Instalaii de
[2] *** - Computaional Fluid Dynamics.
[3] http://www.ansys.com/Support/Training%20Center/Courses/Introduction%20to%20ANSYS%
20CFX-
185
IDENTIFICAREA I ANALIZAREA HAZARDURILOR/RISCURILOR DE

ACCIDENTE. METODELE DE PREVENIRE
Colonel drd. Florin TEFAN
Cpitan dr. Iulian-Narcis NICOLAE
Inspectoratul pentru Situaii de Urgen
erban Cantacuzino al Judeului Prahova
1. INTRODUCERE
Accidnt, accident, accidentl, accidentalitte, accidentre, accidentt. Cu
semnificaia sa general, accidentul (lat. accidens, accidentis; fr., engl. accident assurance contre
les accidents, accident insurance; germ. Akzidens; it. accidente) se nelege ca fiind evenimentul
(uneori incidentul!) fortuit, imprevizibil, neateptat i, de obicei, neplcut, care survine n decursul
unei aciuni, putnd s-o perturbe, respectiv care ntrerupe mersul normal al lucrurilor, provocnd
avarii/avarieri, deteriorri fizice (inclusiv rniri, mutilri etc.) sau chiar distrugeri (inclusiv
decesul!), adeseori percepute ca fapt ntmpltor, de regul, banal, care cauzeaz anormalitatea
(inclusiv nenorocirea!). Cu semnificaie singular, prin accident se mai nelege: nsuirea
trectoare, neesenial a unui lucru (fil.); neregularitatea terenului/solului (geogr.); modificarea
ntmpltoare a unui sunet, fr caracter de lege (accidentul fonetic lingv., n sintagma); alteraia
(pl. accideni muz.), respectiv semnul care indic aceast modificare a intonaiei unei note
(muzicale!); fenomenul neateptat care survine n cursul unei boli (accident vascular med.) etc.
Accidentul tehnic/tehnologic (pl. accidentele tehnice/tehnologice) se definete ca fiind
evenimentul (incidentul!) ntmpltor i neprevzut, survenit n decursul funcionrii, procesrii,
exploatrii etc. conforme (normale) sau neconforme (anormale), a unui(ei) element,
componente, structuri (portante), subsistem sau sistem (tehnic, tehnologic etc.), care cauzeaz o
cedare (terminologie fiabilist!), deteriorare sau avarie/avariere.
Aa cum se definete n capitolul introductiv i cum se trateaz n mod explicit n Anexa II,
partea IV/A, a Directivei SEVESO II, raportul de securitate va demonstra caracterul adecvat al
msurilor luate prin identificarea sistematic a scenariilor posibilelor accidente majore i a
evenimentelor (cauzelor lor) declanatoare. De regul, scenariile se bazeaz pe presupunerea
pierderii containerului de securitate, dar nu toate scenariile sunt neaprat de acest tip,
autodescompunerea, izbucnirea ulterioar a unui incendiu sau a unei explozii pot fi, de asemenea,
relevante n astfel de cazuri.
n principal, reperele corespunztoare pentru identificarea i analizarea hazardurilor/
riscurilor de accidente sunt urmtoarele:
A) descrierea detaliat a scenariilor accidentelor majore posibile i probabilitatea apariiei
lor manifeste sau condiiile n care apar, incluznd un rezumat al evenimentelor care ar putea juca
un rol n declanarea fiecruia dintre aceste scenarii, cauzele fiind interne sau externe
subsistemului/sistemului vizat;
B) evaluarea mrimii i gravitii consecinelor accidentelor majore identificate, incluznd
hri, imagini sau descrieri echivalente, artnd zonele care sunt predispuse la a fi afectate de acele
accidente, obiecte ale prevederilor articolelor 13(4) i 20 din Directiva SEVESO II;
186
C) descrierea parametrilor tehnici/tehnologici i a echipamentului folosit pentru securitatea

subsistemelor/sistemelor.
n oricare proces de analizare/analiz a hazardului/riscului, principalele succesiuni sunt:
identificarea pericolelor hazardurilor; selectarea scenariului privind accidentul/evenimentul
nominalizat; evaluarea probabilitii scenariului (riscului) corespunztor; evaluarea
consecinelor scenariului corespunztor; ierarhizarea riscurilor; fiabilitatea i disponibilitatea
sistemelor de securitate. [1]
Referitor la identificarea pericolelor hazardurilor, exist o serie de instrumente pentru
evaluri sistemice i sistematice, care sunt selectate n funcie de complexitatea cazului individual.
Mai mult, nivelul de detaliu cerut depinde de utilitatea preconizat a raportului de securitate. Pri
eseniale din identificarea pericolelor hazardurilor sunt indicaii referitoare la metodele de
identificare folosite, domeniul de analizare/analiz i constrngerile asociate. Identificarea
pericolelor hazardurilor este urmat de desemnarea scenariilor cu accidente de referin, care
constituie baza pentru a determina dac msurile de securitate, actuale sau prevzute, sunt adecvate.
Pentru evaluarea probabilitii (riscurilor) i consecinelor scenariilor, care reprezint pai
eseniali n procesul de analizare/analiz a hazardurilor riscurilor, pot fi urmate abordri destul
de diferite, care toate implic metodologii n general clasificabile ca fiind [2-5] fie calitative
(semi)cantitative, fie deterministe probabiliste.
2. METODOLOGIILE CALITATIVE/(SEMI)CANTITATIVE
Probabilitatea de apariie i consecinele unui scenariu de accident major pot fi evaluate:
n termeni calitativi folosind categorii, bunoar deosebit de probabil i pn la extrem
de improbabil pentru probabilitate, respectiv de la extrem de grav i pn la neglijabil pentru
consecine;
fie n termeni (semi)cantitativi prin furnizarea de cifre (evenimente pe an, numr de
accidente pe an).
n general, alegerea fie a abordrii calitative, fie a celei (semi)cantitative este puternic
influenat de filozofia specific a culturii securitii n sistemul fiecrui stat membru al U.E. Mai
mult, se bazeaz pe nivelul informaiilor detaliate i al datelor disponibile, de asemenea, pe nivelul
rigorii i ncrederii cerute pentru acceptul reglementativ. Este probabil ca profunzimea i tipul
evalurii hazardului riscului s fie proporionale cu natura pericolelor de accident major
prezentate de amplasament, cu mrimea posibilei pagube, cu complexitatea procesului/
procesrilor/exploatrii activitilor i cu dificultatea n deciderea, respectiv justificarea caracterului
adecvat al msurilor de control al hazardului riscului adoptate. Natura mai simpl a abordrii
calitative const n aceea c poate s funcioneze numai cu un indicator al riscului i nu constituie
caracterizarea sa numeric. Costurile de urmare a unei analize (semi)cantitative detaliate sunt,
oricum, mult mai mari i trebuie s fie apreciate n raport cu posibilele beneficii. n plus, pentru
multe situaii, gsirea datelor corecte i de ncredere, pentru a realiza o analiz (semi)cantitativ
complet, poate fi foarte dificil. n aceast din urm situaie, adoptarea unei abordri etapizate ar
putea fi o strategie rezonabil. O astfel de abordare ncepe, de obicei, cu o evaluare calitativ la un
nivel al sistemului/instalaiei, care este apoi folosit ca proces iniial de diagnosticare. Fiind realizat
aceast evaluare, evident, rezultatele ar trebui s fie analizate pentru a se decide dac ar fi benefic
o analiz cantitativ mai amnunit. [1]
187
n unele i anumite alternative, procesul de selectare a scenariilor pentru analizare/analiz a

hazardului riscului ia n considerare, n mod implicit, probabilitatea de derulare a unui anumit
scenariu (cu un principiu general asupra considerrii n contextul consecinelor; considerarea unor
scenarii foarte improbabile, dar cu consecine foarte mari). Bunoar, cnd cauza (evenimentul)
declanatoare (declanator) este considerat() ca fiind foarte improbabil, atunci scenariul ar putea
fi considerat ca noncredibil i, astfel, de neluat n seam pentru analizare/analiz ulterioar.
Asemenea abordare particular este, evident, un tip de abordare calitativ.
Pentru evaluarea consecinelor, practica normal sugereaz c anumite consideraii
cantitative sunt, de fapt, indispensabile (limite-prag, curbe de izorisc etc.), mai ales n cazul
scenariilor cu riscuri/consecine mari. Desigur, aa ceva este deseori necesar pentru activitile
asociate cu planificarea de urgen i cu planificarea teritorial.
3. METODOLOGIILE DETERMINISTE/PROBABILISTE
Distincia n aceast privin este mai greu de definit. Dei definiiile sunt larg folosite n
mai multe domenii de inginerie industrial, ele depind n mare msur de aplicarea specific i nu
exist ntotdeauna o nelegere coerent a lor.
n contextul analizrii/analizei pentru siguran securitate mpotriva accidentelor
majore, sensul abordrii probabiliste este relativ clar i este asociat cu evaluarea care ia n
considerare, n mod explicit, probabilitatea i consecinele unor episoade de accidente posibile ntr-o
manier integrat.
Diagrama papion (figura 1) ar putea fi folosit pentru a descrie scenariile cu accidente
majore, pentru a include cauzele fundamentale.
Abordarea determinist este, n general, asociat cu evaluarea siguranei securitii
entitii n ceea ce privete consecinele unui subset-limit, prestabilit, de episoade cu accidente. n
acest sens, abordarea determinist presupune c un scenariu a fost selectat i c se cunosc deja
toate datele referitoare la acesta. Ca i cu anumite abordri calitative, incertitudinea asociat cu
probabilitatea apariiei este luat n considerare n mod implicit, n procesul de selecie a
scenariului, dar nu este luat n considerare n procedura efectiv de evaluare. n partea cea mai
important, incertitudinea este luat n considerare prin introducerea unor coeficieni/factori de
siguran/securitate vizavi de riscul hazardul de explozie, respectiv vizavi de riscul hazardul
de emisie de substan(e) periculoas(e).
Fig. 1 Diagrama papion (PCS pierderea containerului de securitate).
188
Centrul diagramei papion reprezint evenimentul pierderii containerului de

securitate (PCS) evenimentul de vrf. Partea stng prezint cauzele globale posibile, care
ar putea conduce la apariia evenimentului de vrf. Barele verticale din partea stng a
papionului se refer la msurile care sunt stabilite pentru a preveni emiterea de substane
periculoase, de asemenea, la msurile pentru a controla factorii de extindere. Partea dreapt a
papionului descrie desfurarea posibilelor avarii consecine, care rezult din evenimentul de
vrf. Barele verticale din partea dreapt a papionului se refer la msurile de prevenire ca
evenimentul de vrf s duneze oamenilor, mediului i instalaiilor. Astfel, m surile sunt
instaurate pentru a controla emisiile i posibilii factori de extindere, de asemenea, pentru a
limita consecinele acestora (bariere, diguri, echipament rezistent la explozie, sisteme de
protecie mpotriva incendiilor etc.).
Urmtoarea list nonexhaustiv prezint cele mai relevante tipuri de evenimente care
descriu consecinele urmririi PCS evenimentului de vrf (avaria): incendiu fulger; incendiu
la rezervor; jet de foc; ENV/UNCV (explozie a norului de vapori); nor toxic; EELF/BLEVE
(explozie expansiv a fluidului lichid/lichefiat n fierbere); poluarea solului/aerului/apei. A se nota
c asemenea evenimente pot surveni: n uniti de proces/procesare; n uniti de
depozitare/stocare; n conducte; n uniti de ncrcare/descrcare; n transport de substane
periculoase pe amplasament.
Substanele periculoase pot fi prezente n diferite stri fizice (temperatur, presiune, form
agregat). Raportul de securitate trebuie s demonstreze c, dintre aceste elemente de scenarii
posibile, au fost selectate scenariile relevante. Selecia poate urma strategii, precum: probabilitatea
evenimentului; consecinele; ct de cuprinztor sau de reprezentativ este scenariul.
Scenariile cu accidente majore pot servi diferitelor scopuri, astfel:
1. pentru a demonstra c, n practic, un anume scenariu nu mai prezint pericol de
accident major, datorit msurilor existente;
2. pentru a demonstra c anvergura efectelor unui anume scenariu a fost limitat, datorit
msurilor de protecie existente;
3. pentru a demonstra eficiena i eficacitatea msurilor de diminuare instaurate;
4. pentru a stabili dac activitatea ar trebui s fie considerat ca fiind de neacceptat;
5. pentru a stabili dac sunt necesare msuri ulterioare de diminuare, care sunt relevante
n mod specific n cadrul raportului de securitate.
Pentru scopurile 1 sau 2 este necesar s se ia n considerare cauzele posibilului accident,
cele mai relevante dintre acestea fiind cele menionate n continuare.
Cauzele operaionale sunt determinate conform metodologiei alese; cel puin,
urmtoarele ar trebui luate n considerare:
limitele parametrilor proceselor/procesrilor fizice i chimice;
pericolele n decursul modurilor specifice de operare (pornire/oprire);
avariile la containerul de securitate (PCS n figura 1);
avariile i defectele tehnice/tehnologice ale echipamentului i sistemelor;
efectele de expulzare de la alte echipamente;
factorii umani care implic procesarea, exploatarea, testarea i mentenana;
incompatibilitatea i contaminarea chimic;
sursele de aprindere (ncrcare electrostatic etc.).
Cauzele interne pot fi asociate incendiilor, exploziilor sau emisiilor de substane
periculoase la instalaii, n cadrul entitii pe care raportul de securitate o acoper i care afecteaz
189
alte instalaii, conducnd la ntreruperea procesrii/exploatrii normale (ruperea unei conducte de

ap ntr-un turn de rcire, astfel ducnd la ntrerupere n capacitatea de rcire pe amplasament).
Cauzele externe de luat n considerare, n principal, sunt urmtoarele:
impactul evenimentelor ( incendii, explozii, emisii toxice etc.) asupra entitilor
nvecinate (efectele Domino), de asemenea, asupra strii entitilor tere, reelelor de
transport .a.m.d.;
transportul de substane periculoase n afara amplasamentului drumuri, ci ferate,
conducte, navigaie, arztoare de ulei sau de gaze, aer etc.);
interdependena tehnic/tehnologic funcional cu sistemele active ale entitilor
nvecinate:
conductele i alte utiliti comune;
reelele i centrele de transport drumuri publice, ci ferate, aeroporturi etc.);
sursele de pericole naturale precipitaii extreme, vnt, furtuni, fulgere, inundaii,
alunecri de teren, activitate seismic etc., respectiv ceea ce constituie PNDDT
Pericol Natural Declanator de Dezastre Tehnologice;
posibilele atacuri teroriste, care ar putea afecta securitatea entitii vizate;
alte cauze, asociate proiectrii, structurrii constructive i construciei propriu-zise,
managementului securitii tehnice/tehnologice, care pot viza, totodat,
managementul ciclului de via al entitii, echiparea, dezafectarea, modificrile de
echipament sau de proces/procesare, sistemul de permise de munc, mentenana etc.
Evenimentul de vrf i cauzele asociate acestuia se constituie n ceea ce, de regul i
dup caz, se denumete arbore de cedare/defectare/deteriorare/avariere /evenimente/etc. sau se
regsete n partea stng a papionului din figura 1, n figura 2 exemplificndu-se un eveniment
ipotetic aa-zis nerestricionat.
Pentru a decide asupra probabilitii manifeste a fiecruia dintre scenarizrile conturate,
judecata logic i legic primordializeaz eficiena msurilor tehnice, pe de o parte, i
aciunile/,,msurile de intervenie uman, pe de alt parte. [6]
Tipologia global a msurilor respective ar putea face distincie ntre cele care sunt
funcional permanente i independente de stadiul procesului/procesrii tehnic/tehnologice (evident,
toate msurile pasive sunt permanente!) i cele care sunt activate de stadiul procesului/procesrii
tehnic/tehnologice evident, acestea din urm putnd fie s dezactiveze aciuni (sisteme de blocare,
de prevenire a anumitor aciuni de la a fi ndeplinite elemente de securitate privind exploatarea
sigur a proceselor), fie s iniieze una sau mai multe alte aciuni ( deschiderea unei supape de
siguran, oprirea de urgen etc.). ntotdeauna, msurile activate necesit o secven de detectarediagnosticare/diagnostic-acionare/aciune, care spre realizare presupune folosirea hardware-ului, a
software-ului i a aciunilor umane, n mod individual sau n combinaie, astfel fiind constituite
blocurile de msuri.
Mai detaliat, se poate vorbi despre:
A) msuri pasive de hardware (nu este necesar niciun mecanism n ceea ce privete
securitatea un dig de protecie n jurul rezervorului, o ngrdire pentru o reinere total); msurile
pasive de hardware au un grad destul de mare de valabilitate;
B) msuri active de hardware (necesit o surs extern de energie, pentru a ndeplini
funcia de securitate, dar opereaz fr implicarea omului opriri automate, sisteme de rcire de
urgen);
190
C) msuri pasive comportamentale (comportament ce const n pstrarea distanei fa de

zonele delimitate, reinere de la atingerea sau modificarea componentelor sistemului
tehnic/tehnologic, iar acest comportament constituie el nsui o msur fr implicarea hardware-lui
pstrarea distanelor de securitate, zonele interzise, zonele n care fumatul este interzis);
D) msuri active comportamentale (comportament ce const n a aciona, n moduri
diferite, la momentul interacionrii cu pri periculoase din sistemul tehnic/tehnologic, iar acest
comportament constituie el nsui o msur fr implicarea hardware-lui evacuarea n cazul unei
alarme de incendiu sau a unei alarme toxice, metode sigure de munc n cazul utilizrii substanelor
chimice);
E) msuri mixte, cnd att hardware-ul, ct i comportamentul sunt implicate, respectiv i
n teorie, cnd orice combinaie de A i/sau de B cu C i/sau cu D este posibil, dar unde
combinaia lui B cu D este cea mai important, datorit faptului c B i D interacioneaz ( rutine
de oprire cauzate de avertizri).
Fig. 2 Exemplificare ilustrativ pentru un eveniment ipotetic aa-zis nerestricionat
n mod normal, procedurile de decizie pe baza abordrii deterministe consum mai puin
timp i sunt mai potrivite pentru multe cazuri. Aceast abordare ar putea fi, n mod sigur,
considerat ca acceptabil pentru toate sistemele/instalaiile care nu sunt caracterizate printr-un grad
ridicat de complexitate. Abordarea determinist este, de obicei, asociat cu criteriile de decizie
bazate pe consecine i este, de asemenea, extrem de asociat cu folosirea termenilor calitativi, n
vreme ce abordarea probabilist se asociaz mai mult cu elemente cantitative i este prevzut ca o
metodologie bazat pe risc.
Tabelul 1 prezint o imagine general asupra diferenelor principale dintre cele dou
categorii de abordri determinist i probabilist fr a implica pretenia unor definiii unice i
complete ale elementelor menionate.
n prezent, metodologiile folosite n diferitele state membre ale UE nu intr, ntotdeauna,
ntr-una dintre aceste dou categorii generale, dar ar putea aparine unei combinaii ntre cele dou,
n funcie de pasul individual de analiz care este implicat. De exemplu, pentru unele metodologii, o
abordare determinist poate fi folosit pentru selecia scenariilor semnificative (abordarea celui
mai ru caz posibil), n vreme ce o abordare probabilist ar putea fi folosit pentru evaluarea
eficienei msurilor de securitate i pentru definirea unei strategii de reducere a riscului. n mod
191
special, unele consideraii ca cele referitoare la evenimentele declanatoare rare (atacuri

intenionate) sau forme specifice de consecine (de mediu) ar putea fi supuse numai unei descrieri
calitative. Pot fi fcute i alte distincii posibile ntre metodologiile existente i acestea difer vizavi
de distincia strict calitativ/cantitativ sau determinist/probabilist. De exemplu, n unele
metodologii, riscul de la diferitele surse/cauze este cumulat pentru a evalua riscul total. [1]
Tabelul nr. 1
Diferene principale ntre metodologiile de abordare
privind prevenirea hazardurilor/riscurilor
Meniunile
Abordarea determinist
(,,bazat pe consecine)
Abordarea probabilist (,,bazat

pe risc)
Criteriile de decizie
Consecine (avarii, pagube etc.

exprimate n cifre absolute)
Risc de avarii, pagube etc.
Evenimentele
declanatoare
Evenimente preselectate; evenimentele

Caut s ia n considerare toate
n afara acestei liste nchise nu sunt
evenimentele relevante, posibile n
luate n considerare
cadrul procedurii
Descrierea avariei
O singur avarie postulat
Mai multe avarii postulate
Conduita operatorului
Considerare calitativ, n funcie de caz
Erorile de diagnosticare/ /execuie

sunt luate n considerare numeric
Caracterizarea analizei
,,Conservativ
(principiul preventiv)
Caut s fie posibil ct mai realist
Aprecierea incertitudinii
,,Factor de securitate fix

(valoare discret)
Evaluare numeric a riscului

(distribuia valorilor)
n acest caz, eficacitatea msurilor este evaluat ca ntreg i reducerea riscului este obinut
printr-un studiu al sensibilitii. La alte metodologii, analiza este efectuat prin luarea n considerare a
fiecrui posibil eveniment declanator, pe rnd, mpreun cu scenariul rezultant al accidentului
(abordarea riscului unic). n acest ultim caz, limita superioar a riscului este cea care rezult de la cel
mai mare risc individual. Asemenea abordare permite efectului pe care l are fiecare msur, n parte,
care a fost pus n practic, s previn apariia unui accident major i s limiteze consecinele sale.
BIBLIOGRAFIE
[1] Pavel A. .a. Rezervoare petroliere, vol. 3, Bucureti, Editura ILEX, 2013.
[2] Goose M.H. Al Measures Necesary under the EC Seveso II Directive, Demonstration of
Safety, Step by Step, Crown Copyright, 2004.
[3] Anderson G. .a. On the Aggregation of Local Risk Models for Global Risk Management,
2005, Apr.
[4] Sobh Mahmoud Using Strategic Risk Analysis in Investment Projects, n: Economy and
Trade Scientific Magazine, 2002.
[5] Brsan-Piu N., Popescu I. Managementul riscului. Concepte, metode, aplicaii, Braov,
Editura Universitii Transilvania, 2003.
[6] Witty R., Scott D. Disaster Recovery Plans and Systems are Essential, Gartner First Take,
FT-14-5021 [Stanford, CT], Gartner, Inc., 2001.
192
OPTIMIZAREA SOLUIILOR DE EVACUARE A FUMULUI

I GAZELOR FIERBINI DIN PARCAJE SUBTERANE
Locotenent ing. Cristian Andrei MICU
Locotenent-colonel dr. ing. Drago ROU
Inspectoratul pentru Situaii de Urgen Mihail Grigore Sturdza al Judeului Iai
Abstract: This paper presents a study of how to establish, from project phase, the optimal solution for
a smoke exhaust facility using jet fans, for an underground parking garage.
1. INTRODUCERE
Lucrarea de fa reprezint o continuare a articolului Evacuarea fumului din parcaje
subterane din Buletinul Pompierilor nr. 1 din 2013, fiind prezentate acum concluziile unui studiu
de caz.
Motoarele cu ardere intern, n funcionare consum cantiti nsemnate de oxigen
producnd gaze care conin CO i ali compui toxici (bioxid de sulf, aldehide, acroleina,
benzopirina, oxizi de azot, aliaje de plumb). Aceste gaze sunt periculoase pentru sntatea uman,
n funcie de durata de expunere i de concentraia lor.
2. PREZENTAREA MODELULUI PE CARE SE VA EFECTUA STUDIUL DE CAZ

Se va realiza un studiu de caz pentru un hotel cu 2S+P+8E. Parcajul subteran are dou
niveluri, fiecare avnd o suprafa de 6.620 m2 i o capacitate total de 272 locuri de parcare.
Parcajul subteran este dotat cu instalaie de stingere a incendiilor cu sprinklere, hidrani interiori i
perdele de sprinkler tip deschis pentru protecia golului rampei de acces ntre nivelurile parcajului.
Ambele niveluri ale parcajului subteran au patru ci de evacuare distincte (case de scri), protejate
prin SAS (ventilat n suprapresiune). Accesul n parcajul subteran se face de la cota 0 printr-o
ramp de acces cu dou sensuri direct n primul nivel al parcajului, iar la nivelul 2 al parcajului
subteran, accesul se face prin alt ramp de acces cu dou sensuri.
193
Fig. 1 Modelul 3D realizat pe baza planurilor de arhitectur
3. CALCULUL NECESARULUI DE VENTILARE PENTRU UTILIZAREA N

SITUAIE DE NORMALITATE A SISTEMULUI DE VENTILARE19
Ventilarea parcajelor se bazeaz pe un proces de diluie, debitul de aer proaspt introdus
trebuie s asigure reducerea concentraiei de gaze la limita valorilor admise. Ventilarea se realizeaz
n aa fel nct coninutul de CO la o nlime de 1,5 m de la nivelul pardoselii s fie mai mic sau
egal cu 0,001% n interval de o or. La pornirea unei maini, CO din aer ajunge la 0,0035-0,004%.
Dac schimbul de aer este bine realizat, CO se disipeaz repede. Un motor produce o cantitate mai
mare de CO cnd este rece dect atunci cnd este cald.
Norma VDI 2053-1987 i normele altor ri consider c diluarea monoxidului de carbon
este acoperitoare i pentru celelalte nociviti.
Asociaia German a Inginerilor recomand urmtoarele valori de emisie ale motoarelor (e):
Tabelul nr. 1 Valori de emisie ale motoarelor
Motor cald
Motor rece
e - cantitatea de CO emis [g]

S < 80 m
80 m < S < 500 m
0,008*S
7,6
0,89 * S0,49
unde S reprezint distana medie parcurs de autoturism n interiorul parcajului subteran.

n conformitate cu standardul german VDI 2053, formula de calcul pentru cantitatea de
emisii de CO este:
unde:
P = procentul de locuri de parcare eliberate sau ocupate pe or (frecven de parcare);
n funcie de destinaia cldirii, pot fi folosite urmtoarele valori aproximate ale lui P:
Tabelul nr. 2 Frecvena de parcare
Destinaia cldirii
Complexe de locuine
Centre comerciale
Blocuri de birouri
Centre de sport
Teatre
19
Frecven de parcare (P)

20-60%
70-150%
50-70%
100%
100%
German Standard VDI 2053:2004 - 1 Air treatment system for car parks.
194
e = cantitatea de emisie a motorului [g];

CO = densitatea CO [kg/m3]; CO = 1,16 kg/m3 la o temperatur de 200 C.
Debitul de aer necesar ventilrii:
2
COadmis= concentraia admisibil de CO n ppm;
COext= concentraia de CO n aerul exterior n ppm;
COext=10-20 ppm pe strzi cu circulaie medie;
COext=30 ppm pe strzi cu circulaie intens de autovehicule;
COext=0-5 ppm n zone rezideniale;
fg=factor de sistem, variind de la 1 la 1,5, astfel:
fg=1 pentru sistemele tip jet;
fg=1,25-1,5 pentru sistemele ce utilizeaz tubulatur;
Unde:
n1= numrul de locuri de parcare ce trebuie ventilate la nivelul considerat;
n2...nn=numrul de locuri de parcare accesate prin intermediul n1;
S1 = distana medie parcurs pn la n1;
S2...Sn = distana medie parcurs pn la n1 de ctre autoturisme ce intr/ies n2...nn;
Din geometria parcajului subteran, rezult c distana cea mai mare parcurs de un
autovehicul pentru a parca n cel mai ndeprtat loc fa de punctul de acces este de 291 metri.
Parcajul subteran va fi ventilat cu sistem de ventilatoare tip jet.
P=50%;
n1=136 locuri de parcare (subsol 1);
n2=136 locuri de parcare (subsol 2);
Distana medie total condus (S) se calculeaz ca fiind suma dintre jumtate dintre
distana parcurs (sn), distan pentru manevrele de parcare (sman) i lungimea de intrare/ieire
ramp (srmp).
Sn = (sman + 0,5 * sn + srmp);
srmp = 35m;
sman = 10 m;
s2 = 134 m;
s1 = 112 m;
S1 = 10 + 0,5 * 112 + 35 = 101 m;
S2 = 10 + 0,5 * 134 + 35 = 112 m.
Pentru mainile care pleac din parcajul subteran (au motorul rece), avem:
4
5
Se consider: COadmis= 50 ppm (jumtate din concentraia minim ce are efecte asupra
organismului uman);
COext=10 ppm, hotelul fiind amplasat ntr-o zon cu circulaie medie;
fg=1 pentru sistemul de ventilare cu ventilatoare tip jet;
195
6
Qiesire=25,67 m3/h;
Pentru mainile care intr n parcajul subteran (au motorul cald), avem:
7
8
Qintrare=2,5 m3/h;
Qtotal=Qieire+Qintrare=25,67 m3/h + 2,5 m3/h = 28,17 [m3/h/autoturism];
Se adopt Qtotal= 30 [m3/h/autoturism];
Debitul de aer necesar ventilrii ntregului parcaj subteran este:
Qtotal parcaj= Qtotal*272=8160 m3/h = 2,26 m3/s;
Se va adopta un debit total de evacuare necesar dilurii noxelor de 9000 m3/h (2,5 m3/s).
Debitul de admisie:
Q admisie = 0,75 * 9000 m3/h. = 6750 m3/h= 1,87 m3/s;
4. CALCULUL NECESARULUI DE VENTILARE N CAZUL UTILIZRII N

SITUAIE DE INCENDIU A SISTEMULUI DE VENTILARE
Conform prevederilor Normativului de securitate la incendiu a parcajelor subterane pentru
autoturisme, indicative NP 127:2009, evacuarea fumului n caz de incendiu prin tiraj mecanic se
asigur prin guri de evacuare a fumului dispuse la partea superioar a fiecrui nivel i guri de
admisie a aerului la partea inferioar, asigurndu-se un debit de extracie a fumului de minimum
600 m3/h pentru fiecare autoturism, dac spaiul este echipat cu instalaii automate de stingere tip
sprinkler.
Calculul debitului de extracie n caz de incendiu:
Qevac incendiu = 600 m3/h * numrul de locuri de parcare = 600 m3/h * 272 = 163 200 m3/h =
45,3 m3/s;
Debitul admisiei mecanice a aerului n caz de incendiu trebuie s fie 75% din debitul
evacuat, cu o toleran de plus sau minus 10%.
Qadmisie incendiu=0,75 * Qevac incendiu = 0,75 *163 200 m3/h=122 400 m3/h = 34 m3/s;
5. SIMULAREA FUNCIONRII SISTEMULUI DE VENTILARE CU AJUTORUL

UNUI SOFT CFD
Simularea funcionrii instalaiei de ventilare se poate face cu ajutorul programelor de
tipul computational fluid dynamics, att pentru situaia n care sistemul este utilizat pentru
diluarea noxelor rezultate de la autoturisme, ct i n caz de incendiu. Scopul acestui studiu este
de a gsi soluia optim, n care s se realizeze cu resurse minime cele dou funcii ale
sistemului. ntruct cele dou funcii vor fi asigurate de acelai sistem, dimensionarea acestuia
196
se va face n funcie de cea mai defavorabil situaie, i anume n cazul producerii unui incendiu
n parcajul subteran. Pentru a realiza acest lucru se vor adopta mai multe ipoteze (scenarii) care
vor fi analizate n vederea stabilirii modului de asigurare a cerinelor eseniale de calitate ale
construciei.
n simulrile efectuate, condiiile iniiale ale mediului utilizate au fost cele normale
(temperatura ambiental interioar i exterioar = 200 C, presiunea iniial n parcajul subteran =
presiunea atmosferic = 101325 Pa, umiditatea relativ = 40%, viteza vntului = 0 m/s, acceleraia
gravitaional = 9,81 m/s2).
Pentru construcia modelului 3D au fost definite materialele ca fiind suprafee inerte
(suprafee care accept schimb de cldur) i au fost definite deschideri, conform planurilor de
arhitectur.
n scopul reducerii timpului de calcul s-a studiat ventilarea nivelului doi al parcajului
subteran, definind domeniul de calcul doar pentru acest nivel.
Reeaua de calcul (mesh) a fost definit din celule cu dimensiunea 0,4 m x 0,5 m x 0,25 m,
rezultnd un total de 331.000 celule. Rezultatele cele mai bune se obin cu dimensiuni ct mai
sczute ale celulelor, ns timpul de calcul crete foarte mult. Pentru realizarea simulrilor s-a
utilizat softul FDS (Fire Dynamics Simulator), cu interfaa sa grafic Pyrosim, dezvoltat de ctre
Institutul Naional de Standarde i Tehnologie NIST din S.U.A, iar timpul de calcul pentru fiecare
variant adoptat a fost de aproximativ 16 ore.
n simulri, suprafaa incendiat a fost definit ca fiind supraa echivalent a unui
autovehicul (2,5 m x 4 m).
5.1 Varianta I Ventilarea i desfumarea mecanic a parcajului subteran utiliznd
2 ventilatoare de introducere, 14 ventilatoare jet i 2 ventilatoare de evacuare
n aceast variant s-au utilizat
dou canale de introducere a aerului
proaspt i dou canale de evacuare. Pentru
introducere au fost folosite dou
ventilatoare cu un debit de pn la 35 m3/s,
iar pentru evacuare au fost folosite dou
ventilatoare cu un debit de pn la 47 m3/s.
Pentru a determina zonele n care
aerul are tendina s stangneze se va
considera situaia n care toate ventilatoarele
funcioneaz. Gurile de introducere sunt
amplasate la partea inferioar a parcajului,
cu latura superioar la maxim 1 m de
pardoseal, iar gurile de evacuare n
treimea superioar a pereilor parcajului.
Pentru dirijarea aerului n interiorul
parcajului subteran au fost folosite 14
ventilatoare tip jet, definite mai sus.
Amplasarea acestora s-a fcut conform Fig.
Fig. 2 Varianta I amplasarea ghenelor de

introducere, evacuare i a ventilaroarelor tip jet
197
t = 100 s
t = 150 s
Viteua la z = 2,5 m
Viteza la z = 1m
t = 50 s
Fig. 3 Varianta I studiul distribuiei vitezelor
Rezultatele obinute sunt prezentate sub forma variaiei spaiale a vitezei maselor de aer n
parcajul subteran.
Din analiza CFD a distribuiei vitezelor pentru varianta I se observ faptul c ventilatoarele
tip jet amplasate lng ghenele de introducere a aerului n parcaj nu sunt eficiente. n consecin,
ventilatoarele tip jet amplasate n acea zon vor trebui ndeprtate, pentru a nu consuma inutil
energie. Aerul are tendina s se ntoarc spre punctele de admisie, printr-un vortex. Astfel, noxele
sau gazele fierbini se vor deplasa ctre punctele de admisie a aerului n loc s fie evacuate prin
ghenele de evacuare. De asemenea, se observ c aerul are o vitez redus ntre cele dou ghene de
introducere a aerului (0,14 m/s). Viteza aerului la nlimea de 1 m este mai mic de 1 m/s ntr-o
proporie destul de mare din suprafaa total a nivelului considerat al parcajului.
Urmare a acestor observaii, se va recurge la o repoziionare a ventilatoarelor tip jet i la
redistribuirea gurilor de introducere i evacuare.
5.2 Varianta II Ventilarea i desfumarea mecanic a parcajului subteran utiliznd 4
ventilatoare de introducere, 12 ventilatoare jet i 6 ventilatoare de evacuare
1. Situaia n care sistemul este folosit pentru diluia concentraiei de CO
n momentul n care concentraia monoxidului de carbon trece de pragul admis de 50 ppm,
detectorul de CO transmite semnal de alarm ctre centrala de detecie a monoxidului de carbon
(C.D.). Aceasta transmite semnal de acionare ctre unitatea central de control a sistemului de
ventilare (U.C.C.). U.C.C. comand:
Pornirea ventilatoarelor de desfumare la capacitate de 50%;
Pornirea ventilatoarelor tip jet/impuls la treapta nti (debit de 1 m3/s);
198
Viteua la z = 1,75 m
Ventilatoarele tip jet transport

noxele prin inducie pn la ghenele de
evacuare. Timpul de funcionare a
sistemului va fi n funcie de scderea
concentraiei de CO la nivelul acceptat (sub
50 ppm). n cazul n care concentraia din
compartiment crete n continuare (pn la
100 ppm) cu sistemul n funciune, se va
emite o alarm de evacuare a parcajului i
pornirea ventilatoarelor la capacitate
maxim.
Fig. 4 Varianta II amplasarea ghenelor de

introducere, evacuare i a ventilatorarelor tip jet
t = 50 s
t = 100 s
t = 150 s
t = 200 s
Fig. 5 Varianta II distribuia vitezelor pentru situaia n care sistemul e folosit pentru diluia
concentraiei periculoase de CO
n vederea realizrii economiei de energie i pentru a transporta pe drumul cel mai scurt
noxele i/sau gazele fierbini, parcajul va fi mprit n dou zone de detecie. Ventilatoarele
utilizate pentru transport vor fi reversibile. n funcie de zona n care este detectat concentraia
crescut de CO de ctre instalaia de detecie a monoxidului de carbon, sau de zona n care este
detectat incendiul de ctre instalaia de detecie i semnalizare a incendiului, acestea vor comanda
unitii centrale de control ale instalaiei de ventilare/desfumare, direcia n care este necesar a se
transporta noxele/fumul, ctre cel mai apropiat punct de evacuare. Acest lucra va realiza localizarea
i limitarea propagrii noxelor/fumului n zone neafectate.
2. Situaia n care sistemul este folosit pentru desfumare.
n aceast variant, avem 4 guri de introducere a aerului, fiecare cu un debit de 8,5 m3/s i
6 guri de evacuare cu un debit de 8,5 m3/s (conform calculului efectuat la punctul 3, pentru situaia
199
de incendiu debitul necesar de admisie fiind de 34 m3/s i cel de evacuare de 45,3 m3/s), amplasate
conform Fig. . S-au utilizat 12 ventilatoare tip jet i o parte din acestea au fost repoziionate fa de
varianta anterioar. Acestea funcioneaz la un debit de 1,95 m3/s.
Detectoarele de fum vor transmite semnal de alarm ctre centrala de detecie incendiu
(C.D.I.). C.D.I. transmite semnal ctre serviciul privat pentru situaii de urgen i ctre unitatea
central de control a sistemului de ventilare (U.C.C.). U.C.C. comand ntr-un interval de maxim
60 de secunde:
pornirea ventilatoarelor de pe ghene la turaie maxim;
pornirea ventilatoarelor tip jet la treapta a doua;
semnal luminos i sonor pentru evacuarea parcajului.
Ventilatoarele tip jet transport fumul prin inducie pn la ghena de evacuare, de unde va
fi preluat de ctre ventilatoarele montate pe ghen. n caz de incendiu, oprirea sistemului se face
doar manual.
t = 100 s
t = 150 s
Viteua la z = 2,5 m
Viteza la z = 1,75 m
Viteza la z = 0,5 m
t = 50 s
Fig. 6 Varianta II studiul distribuiei vitezelor
n urma acestei simulri se observ o distribuie acceptabil a vitezelor n parcaj, fiind

eliminate/limitate zonele n care aerul are o vitez redus de deplasare sau stagneaz. Fa de prima
variant a sistemului, aceasta folosete mai puin cu dou ventilatoare tip jet, iar ventilatoarele de
introducere i evacuare sunt mai multe, dar de o capacitate mai mic, deci mai ieftine.
200
t = 100 s
t = 150 s
Varianta II
Viteua la z = 2,5 m
Varianta I
Viteua la z = 2,5 m
t = 50 s
Fig. 7 Comparaia distribuiei vitezelor la z=2,5 ntre varianta I i varianta II
Pentru a valida varianta II a configuraniei sistemului, se va simula producerea unui

incendiu la un autoturism.
t = 50 s
t = 100 s
t = 150 s
t = 175 s
t = 200 s
Propagarea fumului
t = 25 s
201
Temperatura la z = 1,75 m
Temperatura la z = 2,5 m
t = 25 s
t = 50 s
t = 100 s
t = 150 s
t = 175 s
t = 200 s
t = 25 s
t = 50 s
t = 100 s
t = 150 s
t = 175 s
t = 200 s
202
Vizibilitatea la z = 1,75 m [m]

Viteza la z = 2,5 m
t = 25 s
t = 50 s
t = 100 s
t = 150 s
t = 175 s
t = 200 s
t = 25 s
t = 50 s
t = 100 s
t = 150 s
t = 175 s
t = 200 s
Fig. 8 Analiza scenariului de incendiu cu instalaia de desfumare
Putem observa c dup t = 125 secunde putem aprecia c instalaia de desfumare reuete
s localizeze propagarea fumului i a cldurii n alte zone ale parcajului, meninnd o vizibilitate
acceptabil (30 m), uurnd astfel aciunea de intervenie a forelor specializate. n acest caz,
temperatura aproximativ la nivelul grinzilor este de 1000 C fa de 1150 C n situaie ventilrii
natural organizate.
Pentru a aprecia varianta cea mai bun din stadiul de proiect CFD, se stabilesc urmtorii
indicatori de performan:
I1 = raportul dintre uniformitatea vitezei i numrul de ventilatoare tip jet folosite (cu
ct e mai mare raportul cu att soluia este mai economic);
I2 = viteza medie n seciunea considerat;
203
I3 = viteza minim n seciune (valoarea negativ reprezint modificarea direciei

maselor de aer);
I4 = uniformitatea vitezei (raportul dintre viteza minim i viteza medie);
I5 = temperatura medie n situaia de incendiu dup un timp stabilit (dup localizarea
propagrii efluenilor);
I6 = timpul de localizare a propagrii efluenilor incendiului (gradientul de propagare a
efluenilor);
I7 = vizibilitatea n cazul producerii unui inceniu [m];
I8 = distana de transport a noxelor/fumului pn la punctele de evacuare (performaa
crete cu scderea distanei de transport indicator ce se poate mbunti prin realizarea zonelor de
detecie/evacuare i o distribuie judicioas a punctelor de evacuare);
I9 = pstrarea liber a cilor de evacuare n cazul producerii unui incendiu.
Aceti indicatori nu sunt restrictivi, putnd fi definii i alii n funcie de aspectele
urmrite. De asemenea, numrul soluiilor studiate poate fi mrit.
Stabilirea soluiei optime se face ntocmind o ierarhizare a acestora, acordnd puncte
pentru fiecare scenariu n parte, n funcie de indicatorii de performan stabilii.
Tabelul nr. 1 Cuantificarea indicatorilor variantelor de ventilare
Varianta I
Varianta II
I1
0,0085
0,0208
I2
1 m/s
0,88 m/s
I3
0,12 m/s
0,22 m/s
I4
0,12
0,25
I5
55 C
50 C
I6
180 sec
120 s
I7
>25 m
>25 m
I8
s-au
adoptat 2 zone n
ambele variante
2/4
I9
Total
s-au
adoptat 2 zone n
ambele variante
3/4
12
17
Din tabel se observ c varianta II este cu 41% mai eficient fa de varianta I.
CONCLUZII
Pentru stabilirea soluiei optime se pot defini indicatori de performa. Acetia se
cuantific pentru fiecare soluie n parte i se face un clasament al soluiilor. Cea care obine cele
mai multe puncte este soluia care se va adopta i optimiza.
Din perspectiva managementului valorii (totalitatea activitilor de natur managerial care
urmresc perfecionarea produselor i proceselor prin prisma relaiei dintre valoare i utilitate pe
deoparte i consumul de mijloace pe de alt parte), se pot utiliza metode de analiz a valorii pentru
a evalua fiecare element al instalaiilor de ventilare/desfumare (analiza valorii este o metod care i
204
propune s realizeze pentru produs, proces, proiect sau serviciu, parametrii tehnico-funcionali,
tehnico-economici i estetici aa cum sunt cerui de necesitile sociale, cu cele mai mici costuri).
Domeniul n care a fost elaborat lucrarea este de actualitate i reprezint o problem
major, astfel nct ofer multe posibiliti cercetrilor ulterioare. Direciile de cercetare pentru
viitor legate de optimizarea instalaiilor de ventilare/desfumare sunt:
mbuntirea algoritmilor de calcul pentru modelarea numeric a micrii

neizoterme i a evoluiei concentraiei poluanilor n parcaje subterane;
aplicarea metodelor de analiz a valorii pentru ventilatoarele tip jet.
BIBLIOGRAFIE
[1] Assessment of Vehicle Fires in New Zealand Parking Buildings By Yuguang Li Supervised by
Michael Spearpoint, Fire Engineering Research Report 04/2, May 2004.
[2] Prof. dr. ing. Mihai Nagi, Ventilarea i climatizarea cldirilor ndrumtor aplicativ,
Colecia Student.
[3] McGrattan, K., Klein, B., Hostikka, S., Floyd, J., Fire Dynamics simulator (Version 5) Users
Guide. NIST Special Publication 1019-5, January 2008.
[4] Forney, G.P., Users Guide for Smokeview Version 5 A Tool for Visualizing fire Dynamics
Simulation Data. NIST Special Publication 1017-1, January 2008.
[5] Normativ de securitate la incendiu a parcajelor subterane pentru autoturisme indicativ NP
127: 2009, Monitorul Oficial nr. 74/02.02.2010, partea I.
[6] German Standard VDI 2053:2004 - 1 Air treatment system for car parks.
[7] Code of practice on functional recommendations and calculation methods for smoke and heat
control systems for covered car parks - BS 7346-7:2006, England.
[8] Protection incendie dans les btiments Conception des systmes dvacuation des fumes et
de la chaleur (EFC) des parkings intrieurs - NBN S 21-208-2, Belgia.
[9] SR CEN/TR 12101-5:2007 Sisteme de control a fumului i gazelor fierbini. Partea 5: Ghid
de recomandri funcionale i metode de calcul pentru sisteme de ventilare pentru evacuarea
fumului i gazelor fierbini. ASRO, 2005.
205
FENOMENE FIZICO-CHIMICE INTERFIZICE

PRIVIND SUPRAFAA MATERIALELOR METALICE
LA DEPUNEREA DE STRATURI SUPERFICIALE
Drd. ing. Victor IONESCU
Orice suprafa metalic solid este caracterizat prin microgeometrie (ondulaii i

rugoziti) i defecte de suprafa (microfisuri, pori, capilare) ntre ele neexistnd o separare net,
unele putnd s le conin i pe celelalte, dup cum se pot transforma unele n altele. Forma unei
suprafee este generat de forele interatomice i n interiorul corpului solid, de forele dintre atomii
de suprafa i de forele exterioare, ponderea cea mai mare n formarea suprafeei avnd-o ultimile.
ntre suprafee i mediu exist un schimb continuu de atomi prin evaporare cu exteriorul i
prin difuzie cu interiorul.
Considernd o suprafa metalic de 1 cm2, numrul de atomi care se evapor ntr-o
secund, n, este dat pe baza teoriei cinetice de relaia (1.1):
n=p(2.m.k.T)
(1)
unde: p = presiunea atomului; m = masa atomului; k = constanta lui Boltzmann; T = temperatura
absolut.
La temperatura camerei, raportul dintre numrul de atomi care se evapor i suprafaa unui
atom este de ordinul a 103. De exemplu, n cazul wolframului a crui presiune de evaporare la
temperatura camerei este de p = 10-40 atm., numrul de atomi care se evapor este n = 10-20
atomi/cm2s, iar durata medie de rmnere a atomilor la suprafa este de 1037 sec.
Rezult c, la temperaturi de 200 C, atomii de la suprafa au o stabilitate apreciabil,
executnd numai o micare de vibraie n jurul poziiei lor de echilibru dinamic. La temperaturi mai
mari dect jumtate din temperatura de topire, au loc att micri pe orizontal, ct i pe vertical n
planul suprafeei, modificndu-i forma, aceasta nemairmnnd perfect plan.
Problemele suprafaelor corpurilor solide metalice sunt complicate i mai mult de
prelucrrile mecanice efectuate pentru obinerea formei.
n cazul suprafeelor rectificate mecanic, se remarc un strat superficial, n care nu se mai
poate pune n eviden structura cristalin a metalului.
Acest strat amorf a primit denumirea de strat Beilby i se comport ca un lichid vscos ce
niveleaz neregularitile suprafeei.
Suprafeele de separare ale grunilor cristalini au dimensiuni considerabile. De exemplu, un
cub de aluminiu cu latura de 10 mm conine 6x106 cm2 de suprafee de contact care au, n general,
energii libere diferite. Aceste suprafee sunt mrite i mai mult de goluri, incluziuni sau fisuri.
Considernd numai energia cinetic a electronilor care se gsesc inclui n interiorul
metalului ca ntr-o cutie n care exist un cmp potenial constant i mai mic dect cel exterior,
conform principiului lui Pauli, energia gazului de electroni, EN, va fi:
EN =
(l2+n2+p2)
unde: l,n,p = numere cuantice care determin diferite niveluri de energie a electronilor.
206
(2)
a=
(3)
*
unde: h = constanta lui Planck; N = numrul de electroni; m = masa efectiv a unui electron; S =
latura cubului de material care conine N3 electroni.
Conform teoriei elementelor finite:
S(N) =
=
(4)
unde: M = numrul de procente n interiorul unui octant pozitiv sferic cu raza r i are valoarea dup
Vinogradov:
M=
(5)
7/5
n care: O = termen rezidual n funcie de (r) .
Numrul de puncte care se gsesc ntr-un domeniu cuprins ntre r i r+dr este egal cu
dM(r). nlocuind valoarea lui M i efectud integrarea, rezult:
(6)
Valoarea razei R se obine din relaia:
N3=2x[
Rezult: R=bN, unde b = (3/ )1/3.

Valoarea energiei cinetice a gazului de electroni va fi:
EN = a x
(7)
Primul termen din parantez reprezint energia volumetric a gazului de electroni, al doilea
termen proporional cu N2 reprezint energia cinetic suplimentar a electronilor ca urmare a
existenei suprafeei, iar al treilea termen, o corecie n funcie de numrul de electroni.
Dac V este volumul metalului (cub cu latura a), A sunt suprafeele sale (6a2) i
= densitatea gazului de electroni, atunci:
N3 = V x
+ a3 x
(8)
N2 =
Neglijnd termenul rezidual, relaia energiei cinetice va fi:
EN
(9)
Tensiunea superficial este energia suplimentar a electronilor raportat la unitatea de

suprafa.
(10)
i dac n locul gazului de electroni se utilizeaz numrul de atomi n unitatea de volum, Cs,
determinat de relaia:
(11)
unde: NA numrul lui Avogadro; z = numrul de electroni liberi pentru fiecare atom;
G = greutatea atomic;
= densitatea metalului.
207
Se obine pentru
relaia:
= 5,6 x 104 x
(12)
Suprafaa metalic ideal curat este caracterizat printr-o energie liber mrit (tensiune
superficial mrit) i metastabil din punct de vedere termodinamic.
Trecerea ntr-o stare stabil se face prin acumularea moleculelor de o anumit spe n
stratul superficial, cunoscut sub numele de absorbie, acumulare care conduce la micorarea
energiei libere (valoarea tensiunii superficiale scade la minim).
Suprafeele metalice ideal curate au o existen foarte scurt (fraciuni de secund) n
ruptura materialului sau n primele momente dup prelucrarea mecanic. Orice suprafa metalic
real este caracterizat prin existena i compoziia straturilor superficiale care depind de condiiile
termodinamice (p, T) i de natura mediului nconjurtor. n plus, o suprafa metalic real este
caracterizat printr-o anumit geometrie (rugozitate + ondulaii), suprafaa real de contact a dou
corpuri solide fiind mult mai mic dect suprafaa total (Sc/St 106). Pe suprafaa materialelor
metalice se desfoar majoritatea proceselor funcionale tehnice: micri, susineri, mbinri,
modificndu-se chiar geometria n timpul utilizrilor.
n fiecare material se nate un cmp de tensiuni i deformaii specifice i dependent de
timp. Suprafaa materialelor metalice este locul interaciunii i eliberrii la nivel macroscopic a
cmpurilor exterioare la care este supus materialul (de temperatur, presiune, electromagnetice etc.)
cu acelea interioare.
Interfaa (grania, frontiera) care le separ este fizic real, avnd dimensiuni geometrice
definite de starea material n care se gsete: solid, lichid, gazoas, plasm sau clusteri.
Condiia existenei unei interfee solid-solid este dat de posibilitatea redistribuirii atomilor
din cele dou solide. Se pot imagina urmtoarele cazuri:
Sistemul are n ansamblu energia liber minim n raport cu orice alte stri posibile.
Interfaa este rigid deoarece deplasrile datorate variaiilor de temperatur, compoziie sau/i
presiune nu se pot dezvolta.
Starea este de anexisten comun.
Sistemul are o energie liber mai mare dect starea stabil de energie minim. Prin
interfa se produc continuu modificri ctre echilibru.
Dac nc exist o barier energetic ntre cele dou solide, apare necesitatea unei activri
cu o energie exterioar pentru realizarea trecerii n starea stabil.
Posibilitile de redistribuire a atomilor se pot realiza prin difuzie sau prin germinare i
cretere. Difuzia este favorizat n solid de prezena defectelor reelei (vacane, dislocaii).
Existena vacanelor este compatibil cu echilibrul termodinamic deoarece mrete att
energia intern
, ct i entropia
. Energia liber
(13)
ar putea fi micorat pe calea apariiei de vacane n corpul solid. O suprasaturare cu vacane face ca
acestea s se poat reuni pe plane cristaline determinate n care procesul de coexisten a unui solid
cu altul este maxim.
Pe de alt parte, vacanele se pot deplasa ntr-un corp solid ca urmare a unei energii de
activare Q i a existenei unui numr de atomi n cu energia Q.
208
Aceti doi parametri depind de natura forelor de legtur din solid i de distribuia
rezultantei cmpurilor energetice n corp, deoarece la temperaturi mai mari de 0 K unii atomi pot
avea energii foarte mari, iar alii energii foarte mici.
Influena fenomenelor fizico-chimice asupra calitii stratului depus
La interfa matrice metalic material complementar i materialul de adus metal de
baz se desfoar procese fizice i chimice complexe, care se infleneaz reciproc i care pot
schimba n sens favorabil sau negative calitatea piesei pe care se face depunerea, n cazul nostru
paleta de turbin.
n principiu, interfaa care apare ntre matricea metalic i materialul complementar,
respectiv material de adus i material de baz, poate fi de patru tipuri:
nereactiv i fr zone de penetrare;
nereactiv i cu zone de penetrare;
reactiv;
difuziv.
n timpul operaiei de pulverizare n jet de plasm, apar interfee reactive i difuzive. n
afara acestor fenomene de formare de diveri compui chimici la interfa, de penetrare i difuzie,
interaciunea fizic se manifest prin aciunea forelor de tensiune superficial sau a celor de
segregare.
De asemenea, trebuie luate n considerare forele de atracie temporare dintre atomii
particulelor i ai aliajului lichid, ionizai diferit. Mrimea acestor fore este determinat de
polarizabilitatea atomilor. Energia potenial ntre doi atomi liberi, E1,2 se poate calcula folosind
ecuaia lui London:
E1,2=
(14)
unde:
constantele de polarizabilitate ale celor dou materiale; I1, I2 energiile de ionizare;
R distana dintre polul inductor i cel indus.
Dac fiecare strat monoatomic este alctuit din atomi de acelai tip, atunci:
Wad = n x E1,2
(15)
unde: Wad energia de adeziune ca urmare a forelor de dispersie; n numrul de perechi de atomi
pe unitatea de suprafa.
Structura interfeei depinde i de modul de relaxare a tensiunilor interne care apar ca
urmare a diferenei dintre coeficienii de dilatare termic ai metalului i stratului depus, sau a
efectului de frecare creat de stratul depus i care pot conduce la apariia microfisurilor.
Interaciunea chimic, n general, poate fi reprezentat de reacia care are loc ntre atomii A
ai metalului lichid i atomii B ai stratului superficial al solidului (particul sau substrat) conducnd
la formarea compusului chimic AmBn:
mA + nB = AmBn
(16)
Influena interaciunii chimice este mai puternic dect cea de natur fizic i depinde de
poziia metalului n tabelul periodic.
Gradul de umectare a unei particule solide de ctre un lichid se apreciaz pe baza
determinrii unghiului de contact
care intr n ecuaia lui Young:

(17)
209
sau:
cos =
unde indicii s,l,g se refer la solid, lichid respectiv gaz.
(18.)
Deci coeficientul de umectare este direct proporional cu tensiunea superficial a fazei

lichide i depinde i de valoarea unghiului de umectare .
Suprafaa particulei poate fi neregulat i pentru a avea n vedere variaia unghiului de
umectare, se introduce n ecuaie un factor de rugozitate acesta devenind:
K=
(19)
unde: =1 pentru suprafee perfect netede; =2,2 pentru suprafee cu grad mare de rugozitate.
Energia de adeziune Wa, definit prin relaia lui Dupr:
Wa=
(20)
devine, dac se folosete ecuaia lui Young:

Wa=
(21)
Dar
se poate determina prin metoda picturii depuse pe o plcu, prin msurarea
parametrilor geometrici ai picturii i introducerea valorilor obinute n formula:
(22)
unde:
densitatea topiturii; g acceleraia gravitaional; X parametrul orizontal al picturii,
care reprezint din axa mare a elipsei circumscrise; Z parametrul vertical al picturii, sau
semiaxa mic a elipsei circumscrise. Exist i alte relaii empirice pentru determinarea tensiunii
superficiale. Pentru aluminiu
=10,5 [N/m].
Aluminiul formeaz carburi, dar prezena stratului de alumin (Al2O3) la suprafaa topiturii
mpiedic realizarea unui contact direct ntre cele dou componente, nrutind astfel condiiile de
umectare (WaAl
1000 J/m2).
Fierul reacioneaz puternic cu carbonul formnd carburi, iar energia de adeziune W a
2000 J/m2.
Desfurarea reaciilor de la interfa modific n timp interfaa ntr-o suprafa de
separaie metal-carbur. Mrimea forei implicate n transferul particulei din faza gazoas n faza
lichid este dependent de proprietile fizice ale celor dou componente i de caracteristicile de
umectare a particulelor solide de ctre metalul lichid.
n cazul unei particule sferice, pentru a ptrunde n topitur, aceasta trebuie s strbat o
distan egal cu 2r (r fiind raza particulei).
Fora total care acioneaz asupra particulei la intrarea n baza lichid va fi:
=F1+F +Fa
(23)
unde: F1 fora de inerie; F fora determinat de energia superficial; Fa fora ascensional.

Dac axa y a sistemului xOy asociat particulei are sensul pozitiv spre suprafaa topiturii,
particular va fi ncorporat dac
i va pluti dac
210
Fora de inerie se determin cu relaia:

F1 = mp x ap,
unde: mp masa particulei, ap acceleraia particulei.
(24)
Fora determinat de energia superficial se determin cu relaia:

Fa =
unde: Ap suprafaa total a particulei; E =
tensiunea interfazic particul-lichid.
(25)
tensiunea interfazic particul-gaz;
Deoarece, la echilibru, dup ecuaia lui Young:

,
(26)
fora determinat de tensiunea superficial va fi:

(27)
sau pentru o particul sferic se obine:
,
unde,
tensiunea superficial a topiturii;
masa particulei.
unghiul de umectare;
(28)
densitatea particulei;
Pentru o particul de form cubic se obine:

(29)
Deci, pentru o particul de form oarecare, putem considera valabil relaia:
(30)
unde: K1 coeficient de form.
Fora ascensional este dat de relaia:
unde:
Fa =
volumul particulei;
densitatea fazei lichide;
(31)
acceleraia particulei.
Deci, fora necesar pentru ca particula s ptrund n topitur va fi:

(32)
Dac se noteaz:
(33)
unde:
fora determinat de diferena dintre densitatea particulei i a aliajului lichid.

211
Ecuaia forei totale devine:

,
(34)
Analiznd ultima relaie, avem urmtoarele situaii:

a) n condiiile de umectare (
dac
0;
)
. Particula va fi nglobat n topitur.
dac
.
Particula va fi nglobat n topitur, n funcie de valoarea acceleraiei acesteia (cazul
nostru).
dac
=0
b) n condiii de neumectare (
dac
Particula va fi nglobat sau nu n topitur, n funcie de valoarea acceleraiei acesteia.
dac
0
Particula va pluti la suprafaa topiturii.
dac
Particula va pluti la suprafaa topiturii.
La depunerea n condiii a Al2O3,
Din condiia
(
(la limit) rezult acceleraia minim necesar pentru nglobare
):
,
(35)
de unde:
(36)
Valoarea acceleraiei critice este determinat de caracteristicile fizice ale particulei i de
condiiile de umectare. Valoarea acestei acceleraii se modific dac se ia n considerare i influena
stratului de oxizi format la suprafa. Pentru un regim tranzitoriu (dvp/dt0), ecuaia de micare a
particulei solide (pppl) de form sferic n lichidul staionar de pe suprafaa paletei va fi:
mx
(37)
unde: dvp/dt acceleraia particulei; Fa fora arhimedic; G greutatea particulei; FR fora de
rezisten la naintare.
Dup un timp, cu creterea vitezei crete i fora de rezisten la naintare, acceleraia
anulndu-se.
212
FR=Fa-G,
(38)
sau:
,
unde:
(39)
coeficient de rezisten la naintare; g acceleraia gravitaional.
Din condiia de echilibru a forelor care acioneaz asupra particulei, se obine pentru
viteza particulei, expresia (ecuaia lui Rottinger):
,
unde coeficientul de rezisten la naintare se determin pe baza relaiei lui Oseen:
(40)
(41)
n regimul laminar de deplasare a particulelor solide, caracterizat prin valori subunitare ale
numrului Reynolds, ataat particulei, (Rep<1), coeficientul de rezisten la naintare se determin
prin relaia:
,
(42)
Fora de naintare devine deci:
(43)
unde: - vscozitatea lichidului.

Viteza particulei va fi:
,
(44)
numit relaia lui Stokes.

Aceast relaie neglijeaz prezena altor particule n topitur i este valabil pentru
dimensiuni ale particulei mai mici de 0,01 mm. Pentru ca rezultatele referitoare la viteza
particulelor s se aproprie de situaii reale, se pot folosi diferite expresii ale legii lui Stokes. Astfel,
dac se are n vedere prezena mai multor particule n topitur, se recomand utilizarea relaiei:
v=
(45)
unde:
viteza particulei, determinat cu relaia lui Stokes;
concentraia volumetric a
particulelor; K coeficient de distribuie a particulelor (K = 1,3 1,9).
n cazul unei solidificri dirijate dup o singur direcie, cu o interfa solid-lichid plan la
nivel macroscopic i o particul de form sferic, dac se neglijeaz posibilele deplasri determinate
de diferena de densitate, analiza termodinamic a procesului de transfer a particulei dintr-o faz n
alta, se poate face pe baza variaiilor de energie liber.
La trecerea particulei din poziia 2 n 3 i din 3 n 4, variaiile de energie liber
i
se pot exprima astfel:
=
unde:
=
,
reprezint tensiunile interfazice particul-solid i solid-lichid.
213
(46)
(47)
Variaia total de energie liber
F, rezult prin nsumarea celor dou ecuaii:

23+
34=
ps
(48)
> 0, particular este
pl
Dac
< 0 , particular este nglobat n faza solid, iar dac
rejectat continuu n faza lichid din faa frontului de solidificare.
Deci, n general, cnd frontul de cristalizare vine n contact cu o particul insolubil pot s
apar dou situaii distincte:
materialul solidificat reine particula;
materialul solidificat nu nglobeaz de la nceput particula, care este mpins n faza
lichid.
Analiza fenomenului numai pe baze termodinamice nu este suficient deoarece, uneori,
previziunile fcute pe suport ternodinamic sunt confirmate de practic. De aceea, analiza mai exact
a fenomenului se face pe baze cinetice, lundu-se n considerare urmtoarele aspecte:
natura forelor de respingere dintre particula solid i frontul de solidificare;
mecanismul transferului de mas;
influena particulei asupra configuraiei frontului de solidificare.
Un astfel de model (propus i dezvoltat de tefnescu D.M.) analizeaz efectul pe care l
produce prezena unei particule asupra configuraiei solid-lichid i stabilete condiiile n care
particulara va fi inclus sau nu de la nceput n faza solid.
Se presupune c matricea are aceeai conductivitate termic m n stare solid i lichid,
care, ns, poate fi diferit de conductivitatea termic a particulei p. Pentru determinarea cmpului
de temperatur, se folosete ecuaia de transfer termic conductiv, scris n coordonate cilindrice.
(49)
Condiiile la limit cuprind:

gradientul de temperatur G n direcia z este constant;
temperatura la interfa particul-matrice prezint continuitate (TP = Tm);
bilanul termic la interfa (r=R, unde R este raza particulei) se exprim prin egalitatea:
m x
r=R=p x
r=R;
(50)
temperatura de referin T0=(Tm)r=R, r

Prin rezolvarea ecuaiei difereniale, innd cont de condiiile la limit, rezult:
TM=T0-
Tp=T0 -
(51)
(52)
unde: K=
Modelul este simplificat deoarece nu ia n considerare cldura latent de solidificare i
variaia cu temperatura a proprietilor termofizice.
n funcie de valoarea K, izotermele care sunt perpendiculare pe liniile de flux termic vor fi
concentrate pe particule (K>1), vor ocoli n parte particula (K<1) sau nu vor fi afectate de prezena
acesteia (K=1).
214
Prezena unei particule cu p< m n faa frontului de solidificare, va reduce fluxul local de
cldura dintre faza lichid i la interfaa lichid-solid, n dreptul particulei va aprea o proeminen
de material solidificat care tinde s mping continuu particula n lichid. n aceste condiii, suprafaa
de separare lichid-solid nu se mai menine plan, rezultnd o dezvoltare celular sau dendritic a
fazei solide.
Asupra particulei aflate la distana d (cteva distane atomice) fa de frontul de
solidificare, acioneaz forele descrise n continuare:
1) Fora gravitaional FG, depinde de diferena dintre densitile particulei i aliajului
lichid
:
FG =
,
Sensul de acionare a acestei fore este dat de semnul diferenei
(53)
2) Fora de rezisten la naintare FR, pentru o interfa perfect plan are forma:
Ve=
unde: vscozitatea dinamic a lichidului; v viteza de deplasare a particulei n topitur.
Dac se admite faptul c n dreptul particulei interfaa nu este perfect plan, ci reprezint o
suprafa sferic, avnd o raz de curbur R1, FR se exprim astfel:
xxvx
FR=6 x
sau, innd seama de egalitatea: K=
(54)
FR=6 x
xxvx
K2,
(55)
3) Fora determinat de energia interfazic F1, pentru o interfa plan rezult din
relaia:
F1=2 x
(56)
(57)
unde:
=
unde:
; a0 =
(rp i rm sunt razele atomice ale materialului particulei
0 =
ps
pl i materialul matricei); n = exp.(n=2 7). Dac se ine seama de curbur, de raza R1 i dac a0 + d
i a0 + d
, fora determinat de energia interfazic are forma:
F1 = 2 x
Pentru
(58)
, la echilibru rezult:
FG + F1 FR = 0
(59)
Deci:
x
de unde rezult vitez de echilibru ve:
215
, (60)
ve=
,
(61)
La viteze v de deplasare a limitei de separaie solid-lichid mai mari dect vcr, particular va
fi nglobat de la nceput n faza solid.
Efectul de mpingere al materialului dispersat spre limita de grunte (v vcr), efect negativ,
se micoreaz la creterea fraciei volumetrice de particule, care determin mrirea vscozitii
topiturii. Influena razei particulei asupra vitezei critice de solidificare, s-a determinat pe cale
experimental, rezultnd dependena:
vcr x R2 = ct.
(62)
unde: z =0,28 0,90
Un rol important asupra fenomenelor de respingere sau de nglobare l are forma particulei.
Dac suprafaa de separaie este celular o mare parte dintre particule sunt prinse i reinute
la limita dintre cristale, n timp ce restul sunt respinse. n urma acestui proces rezult o ordonare a
materialului dispersat sub forma unor iruri paralele.
n cazul solidificrii dendritice, particulele de dimensiuni mici sunt nglobate n spaiile
dintre ramurile dendritelor, iar cele de dimensiuni mai mari sunt respinse n lichid.
Caracterul distribuiei poate fi apreciat printr-un coeficient de neuniformitate
definit
astfel:
,
(63)
unde: n densitatea de particule; k numrul de seciuni transversal analizate; m numrul de
zone analizate pe fiecare seciune; S i I seciunile de la partea superioar, inferioar a probei. n
cazul ideal a unei repartizri perfect uniforme,
CONCLUZII
Studiul efectuat evideniaz c o importan deosebit i o necesitate o are calitatea, sub
toate aspectele, a suprafeei pieselor respectiv stratului superficial, din punct de vedere fizic, a
tensiunilor remanente, precum i a proprietilor mecanice i tehnologice.
Proprietile fizico-chimice ale stratului superficial caracterizeaz rezistena la uzur,
coroziune, eroziune etc.
n cazul cercetrii de fa depunerea prin pulverizare a stratului superficial de Al203,
avnd n vedere c particula lichid de alumin este proiectat cu vitez mai mare pe suprafaa
rugoas a piesei (suprafaa rece), iar timpul de contact este foarte scurt, principalul fenomen privind
aderena este ancorarea.
BIBLIOGRAFIE
[1] Calea Gheorghe, Tehnologia materialelor, I.P.B., 1988.
[2] Constantinescu Maria, Protecia anticoroziv a metalelor, Editura Tehnic, Bucureti, 1979.
[3] Dunamita T., Producerea i utilizarea atmosferelor controlate pentru tratamente termice,
Editura Tehnic, Bucureti, 1976.
216
[4] Irimia Ioan, Cercetri teoretice i experimentale preliminare privind cresterea disponibilitii
unor componente din circuitul ap-abur al centralelor electrotermice prin tehnologii de
acoperiri funcionale, referat nr. 3; U.P.B., Facultatea de Ingineria si Managementul
Sistemelor Tehnologice, Tehnologia Materialelor i Sudare; aprilie 2004.
[5] Leca A. s.a., Proprieti termofizice i termodinamice, vol. 1 i 2, Editura Tehnic, Bucureti,
1994.
[6] Mateescu Gheorghe, Tehnologii avansate, straturi subiri depuse n vid, Editura Dorotea, 1998.
[7] Negoiu Dumitru, Tratat de chimie anorganic, vol. I i II; Editura Tehnic, Bucureti, 1972;
[8] Pavel Alexandru, Oboseala termologociclic, Editura Tehnic, Bucureti, 1996.
[9] Pietsch Kar-Heinz, Tratarea suprafeelor. Strat metalic coninnd PTFE pentru piese puternic
solicitate; Maini i Management, octombrie 1996 (articol preluat din Maschinen Market,
nr. 52 IB04654), pag. 6-7.
[10] Safta Voicu Ionel s.a., Defectoscopie nedistructiv industrial, Editura Sudura, Timioara,
2001.
[11] Schelbert Ernest s.a., Matchad Prezentare i probleme rezolvate; Editura Tehnic, Bucureti,
1994.
[12] erban Mihai, Raport tiinific nr. 1 Stadiul actual al tehnologiilor de acoperire superficial
a materialelor, 2005.
[13] Trziu Mircea, O nou metod pentru controlul nedistructiv al sudurilor, Sudura ASR, nr. 4/2000.
[14] Ursu Costel, Raport tiinific nr. 1 Cercetri teoretice i experimentale privind creterea
disponibilitii unor elemente utilizate n evenimente de stingere a incendiilor, 2010.
[15] Vermean Elena, Chimie metalurgic, Editura Didactic i Pedagogic, Bucureti, 1981.
[16] --- SR EN ISO 10289; CT157, Metode de ncercare la coroziune a acoperirilor metalice i a
altor acoperiri anorganice pe substraturi metalice.
[17] --- SR ISO 9224, Coroziunea metalelor i aliajelor; Corozivitatea atmosferelor.
217
Seciunea a III-a
VARIA
218
APLICAII ALE UNOR PROBLEME DE EXTREM

N TEORIA RISCURILOR.
PARTEA a II-a
Student frunta Samuel BILA
Student frunta Andrei OPREA
Student frunta Claudiu STAN
Abstract: In this article, thirteen applications are developed in algebra and calculus necessary for the
assessment of the extreme. Applications are required to use numerical methods in risk theory.
Keywords: Numerical Value, Extreme
Aplicaia nr. 1
Se consider funcia f : R R dat prin f x x 2 a x 2 , a 0 . S se evalueze exact
valoarea minim a funciei f x .
Rezolvare
Derivata nti a funciei f x este:
f ' x 2x 2a x 3 .
Derivata a doua admite expresia:
f ' ' x 2 6a x 4 0, , a 0 ,
deci funcia f admite un minim dat de
(1)
(2)
f ' x 0 x 4 a .
Valoarea minim a funciei f este:
(3)
min . f a a , a 0
(4)
Aplicaia nr. 2
Dac x, y, z R i x y z 3 s se evalueze exact cea mai mic valoare pe care o poate
lua expresia x 2 y 2 z 2 .
Rezolvare Soluia 1
Deoarece:
x 2 y 2 z 2 x y z 2xy yz zx
2
9 2 xy yz zx xy yz zx
219
(5)
3 xy yz zx 9 xy yz zx 3.
(6)
nlocuind n relaia de mai sus rezult:
x 2 y 2 z 2 x y z 2xy yz zx 9 2 3 3 .
(7)
z 3 x y,
(8)
Soluia 2
Din:
nlocuit n
f ( x, y) x 2 y 2 z 2 ,
(9)
rezult
f ( x, y) x 2 y 2 (3 x y) 2 2x 2 2 y 2 6x 2xy 6 y 9 .
(10)
atunci:
f ( x, y )
4x 2 y 6 0 ,
x
2 f ( x, y)
4 0;
x 2
2 f ( x, y )
2 0;
y 2
f ( x, y)
2x 4 y 6 0 ,
y
(11)
(12)
Rezult c:
x y 1 z 1,
(13)
sunt puncte de minim pentru funcia f care admite valoarea 3.
Aplicaia nr. 3
Dac x, y, z R i x y z 1 a, a 0,1 s se evalueze exact cea mai mare valoare pe
care o poate lua expresia xy yz zx .
Rezolvare
Din:
x y z 1 a x 1 y z a .
(14)
atunci :
f ( y, z, a) xy yz zx y(1 y z a) yz z (1 y z a)
y 2 z 2 y(1 a) z(1 a) zy .
(15)
Rezult :
f ( y, z, a)
2 y 1 a z 0 ,
y
2 f ( y, z , a )
2 0 ;
y 2
(16)
f ( y, z, a)
2 z 1 a y 0 ,
z
2 f ( y, z , a )
2 0 .
z 2
(17)
De mai sus rezult:

yz
1 a
.
3
(18)
atunci:
x 1 y z a
220
1 a
.
3
(19)
n aceste condiii, maximul este:
xy yz zx
(1 a) 2
, a 0,1
3
(20)
Aplicaia nr. 4
Dac a, b R i a 2 b 2 1 s se evalueze exact cea mai mare valoare pe care o poate lua
funcia f ( x, y ) a b ab .
Rezolvare
Din:
a b2 a 2 b 2 2ab 0 a 2 b 2 2ab ab 1 2 ,
(21)
pentru
a 2 b2 1.
(22)
Pe de alt parte:
a b2 a 2 b 2 2ab 1 2ab ,
(23)
i cum
ab 1 2 a b 2 a b 2 .
2
(24)
atunci:
a b ab 1 2 2 .
Cea mai mare valoarea pe care o poate lua f ( x, y ) este 1,91.
(25)
Aplicaia nr. 5
Fie
x, y R
x y 1 . S se evalueze exact valoarea minim a expresiei
f ( x, y) x y .
2
Rezolvare Soluia 1
Din:
2 xy
x y
, x, y 0 ,
xy
x y
2
(26)
rezult
xy
( x y) 2
.
4
(27)
n acelai context:
x 2 y 2 ( x y) 2 2 xy ( x y) 2 2
( x y) 2 ( x y) 2
.
4
2
(28)
Rezult astfel:
min . f ( x, y ) 0,5 .
221
(29)
Soluia 2
Se utilizeaz funcia de gradul al II-lea. n aceste condiii, funcia din text devine:
(30)
f ( x, y) x 2 y 2 x 2 (1 x) 2 2x 2 2x 1 f ( x) .
Derivata nti admite expresia:
(31)
f / ( x) 2(2x 1) ,
cu soluia ecuaiei sale
(32)
f / ( x) 0 x 0,5 .
Deoarece coeficientul termenului cu gradul doi este pozitiv, relaia (1) admite un minim
egal cu:
min . f ( x, y ) 0,5 .
(33)
Aplicaia nr. 6
Fie
x, y 0
x y 1 . S se evalueze exact valoarea minim a funciei
f ( x, y) x y .
3
Rezolvare Soluia 1
Din:
x y 1 y 1 x ,
(34)
3
x3 y3 x3 1 x 3x 2 3x 1.
(35)
rezult
Deoarece coeficientul lui x 2 este pozitiv, rezult c funcia:
f x 3x 2 3x 1 ,
admite un minim dat de
x 0,5 ,
care implic un minim al funciei din text egal cu 0,25 .
(36)
(37)
Soluia 2
Din:
x y 1 y 1 x ,
(38)
rezult
3
x 3 y 3 x 3 1 x 3x 2 3x 1 .
Derivata nti a funciei admite expresia:
f x 3x 2 3x 1 ,
este
de unde pentru
(39)
(40)
f ' x 6 x 3 ,
(41)
f ' x 0 x 1 / 2 .
(42)
Deoarece:
f // x 6 0 ,
rezult c funcia f admite un minim dat de
f 1 / 2 1 / 4 .
222
(43)
(44)
Aplicaia nr. 7
Fie x, y, z R i x y z 1 . S se evalueze exact valoarea cea mai mic pe care o poate
lua funcia f ( x, y ) x 2 y 2 z 2 .
Rezolvare
Deoarece:
x 2 y 2 2xy; y 2 z 2 2 yz; z 2 x 2 2zx ,
(45)
prin adunare membru cu membru rezult
x 2 y 2 z 2 xy yz zx x 2 y 2 z 2 x y z 3 1 3 ,
2
i deci
min x 2 y 2 z 2 1 3 .
(46)
(47)
Aplicaia nr. 8
Dac 4x 2 y z 0 , x, y, z 0 , s se evalueze exact valoarea i natura extrem a funciei
f ( x, y) y 2 4xz 1 .
Rezolvare Soluia 1
Deoarece:
y 2 4xz 1 2 16 x 2 8xy 1 ( y 2 4x) 2 1 1 ,
(48)
min .( y 2 4xy 1) 1 .
(49)
rezult
Soluia 2
Se utilizeaz calculul cu derivate exacte i/sau pariale.
Aplicaia nr. 9
Se d funcia f ( x, y, z ) log 2017 [log 5 ( x 2 y 2 z 2 2 x 2 2 y 2 9)] . S se evalueze
exact valoarea minimului funciei f pentru x, y, z R .
Rezolvare
Se observ c expresia din paranteza logaritmului se poate reevalua prin punerea sa sub
forma:
(x 2)2 ( y 2)2 z 2 5 .
Minimul logaritmului se atinge atunci cnd expresia de mai sus devine minim.
(50)
Minimul se obine pentru:
x y 2 i z 0 ,
i admite valoarea 0.
223
(51)
Aplicaia nr. 10
Se consider funcia f ( x) 1 3 1 x x 1 , x R . S se evalueze exact cea mai mic
valoare pe care f o poate avea. pe domeniul su de definiie.
Rezolvare
Domeniul maxim de definiie al funciei f este dat de condiia:
(52)
x 1 0 x [1, ) .
Funcia admite un minim dac i numai dac expresia din modul este nul, respectiv:
1 3 1 x x 1 = 0 x x 1 = 0 x 2 ( x 1) 0 ,
(53)
x1, 2 0 i x3 1.
(54)
de unde rezult
Se accept doar valoarea x 1 , de unde rezult:
f (1) 2 .
(55)
Aplicaia nr. 11
Se consider funcia f x x b x , x 0, b 0 . S se evalueze exact valorile x R pentru
care se realizeaz extremul funciei f i valoarea acestuia.
Rezolvare
Derivata nti a funciei f admite expresia:
(56)
f ' x 1 b x 2 .
Derivata a doua a funciei f este:
(57)
f ' ' x 2b x 5 0 , b 0 .
n aceste condiii, extremul este un minim dat de valoarea numeric a soluiilor ecuaiei
f ' x 0 n funcia f.
Soluiile ecuaiei:
f ' x 0 ,
(58)
sunt:
x1, 2 b ,
(59)
x1 b .
(60)
de unde se accept doar

atunci:
b 2
b.
(61)
Aplicaia nr. 12
1
Se consider integrala I ( x 2 a bx ) 2 dx , a, b R . S se evalueze exact cea mai mic

1
valoare posibil pe care o poate lua integrala.

224
Rezolvare
1
I ( x 2 a bx ) 2 dx ( x 4 a 2 b 2 x 2 2ax 2 2abx 2bx 3 ) dx

3
x5
x3
x4
2
2 x
2
a
x
2
a
abx
3
3
2
5
Fie:
1
(30a 2 10b 2 20 a 15b) .
1 15
1
f (a, b) (6a 2 2b 2 4a 3b) ,
3
(62)
(63)
atunci
f
1
0a ;
a
3
f
3
0b ;
b
4
2 f
0 ;
a 2
2 f
0.
b 2
(64)
(65)
n concluzie:
a 1 3 , b 3 4.
Rezult c cea mai mic valoare posibil este
(66)
43
.
72
Aplicaia nr. 13
Dac x, y R i x y 1 , s se evalueze exact extremul funciei f ( x, y) xy .
Rezolvare Soluia 1
Funcia din text se mai scrie:
f ( x, y) xy x(1 x) x 2 x .
Deoarece coeficientul termenului lui x 2 din funcia:
f ( x) ax2 bx c ,
este negativ, rezult c se pune n discuie existena unui extrem dat de:
1
f / ( x) 0 2x 1 0 x .
2
Extremul este un maxim deoarece:
f // ( x) 2 0 .
Valoarea extremului este egal cu 0,25 .
(67)
(68)
(69)
(70)
Soluia 2
Deoarece:
x y
1
1
xy xy xy ,
2
2
4
max. f ( x, y) 0,25.
rezult
(71)
(72)
BIBLIOGRAFIE
[1] Popescu, G., Evaluarea riscurilor. Aplicaii matematice, Editura Matrix Rom, Bucureti, 2013.
225
EVALUAREA UNOR LIMITE
PENTRU CARE SE UTILIZEAZ cos I sin
APLICAII CONEXE
PARTEA I
Student frunta Lucian-Cristian MIRCEA
Student frunta Teodor MAXIM
Abstract: The article develops 17 applications in Algebra, Trigonometry and Calculus to solve cos
and sin
using numerical values and. Applications are required to use numerical methods
in risk theory.
Keywords: Numerical Value, Trigonometric Limit, Application.
Aplicaia nr. 1
S se evalueze valorile numerice pentru cos
, sin
, cos
10
, sin
10
Rezolvare
Deoarece:
sin
2
3
2
,
cos
cos
10
10
2 10
(1)
se deduce c
cos
2
cos
sin sin
cos . cos
10
10
10
10
10
10 10
cos 2
sin 2 2 1 cos 2 cos
10
10
10
10
10
cos 2 cos 2
1 2 cos sin 3
4 cos 3 3 cos .
10
10
10
10
10
10
cos
(2)
Atunci:
sin
Relaia (3) se scrie:
2 sin cos
4 cos3 3 cos .
10
10
10
10
10
4 cos 3
10
3 cos
226
10
2 sin
10
cos
10
(3)
0
4 cos 2
3 2 sin
0 0 / : cos 0
10
10
10
10
4 sin 2
2 sin 1 0 .
10
10
Ecuaia (4) admite soluiile:
cos
sin
10
1 5
.
4
(4)
(5)
Deoarece:
5 1

0 sin
0,30 .
0, sin
10
10
4
10 2
Pe de alt parte:
1 cos
5 cos 1 2 sin 2 = 1 5 0,80 .

sin 2
10
2
5
10
4
Din relaiile anterioare, se deduce c:
sin
1 cos 2
10 2 5
0,58 .
4
(6)
(7)
(8)
Deoarece:
10 2 5

0,58 .
0, sin 0 sin
5
4
5
5 2
(9)
Atunci, din:
cos 2
10 2 5
.
4
(10)
10 2 5

0,95 .
0, cos 0 cos
10
4
10
10 2
(11)
10
sin 2
10
1 cos
10
1 sin 2
10
Deoarece:
Aplicaia nr. 2
S se evalueze valorile numerice pentru tan
Rezolvare
Din aplicaia nr. 1, rezult:
sin
5 0,58 0,725 ;
tg
0,80
5
cos
5
sin
10 0,30 0,31 ;
tg
10
0,95
cos
10
ctg
ctg
10
, ctg
cos
tan
10
, ctg
10
5 0,80 1,38 ;
0,58
sin
5
cos
(12)
10 0,95 3,16 .
0,30
sin
10
227
(13)
Aplicaia nr. 3
S se evalueze valorile numerice pentru sin
20
, cos
20
, tg
20
, ctg
20
Rezolvare
Rezult:

sin sin cos sin cos
cos sin
20
4
5
5
4
2
5
5
4 5
0,71 0,80 0,58 0,15 ;
sin
cos

cos cos cos sin sin
cos sin
20
4
5
5
4
2
5
5
4 5
0,71 0,80 0,58 0,98 ;
(14)
sin
20 0,15 0,15 ;
tg
20
0,98
cos
20
ctg
20
cos
(15)
20 0,98 6,53 .
0,15
sin
20
(16)
Aplicaia nr. 4

cos sin
5
5
S se evalueze limita lim
.
n
n
n

sin cos
5
5
Rezolvare
Limita din text devine:
0,58 n
n
n

cos sin
0,80
(0,58) n (0,80) n
5
5
lim
lim
lim
1 .
n
n
n
n
n
n (0,80) (0,58)
n
n

0
,
58
sin cos

1
5
5
0,80
(17)
Aplicaia nr. 5

S se evalueze limita lim tg .
n
10
n
Rezolvare
sin
n
n
0,30
10

n
lim 0,31 0 .
lim
Limita din text devine: lim tg lim
n
n
n
n
0,95
10

cos
10
228
(18)
Aplicaia nr. 6

S se evalueze limita lim tg .
n
5
n
Rezolvare

sin
n
n
0,58
5

n
. lim 0,72 0 .
lim
lim tg lim
n
n
n
n
0,80 n
5
cos
5
(19)
Aplicaia nr. 7

sin cos
10
10
.
n
n
n

sin cos
10
10
n
Rezolvare
0,30 n
n
n

sin cos
0,95
(0,30) n (0,95) n
10
10
1 .
lim
lim
lim
n
n
n
n (0,30) n (0,95) n
n
n

0,58
sin cos

1
10
10
0,95
Aplicaia nr. 8

a sin cos
10
10
, 0 a b 1.
n
n
n

b sin cos
5
5
Rezolvare
a sin cos
a (0,30) n (0,95) n
10
10
lim
lim
n
n
n b (0,30) n (0,95) n
n

b sin cos
10
10
n
229
(20)
a 0,30 n
0,95 0,95
lim
1.
n
n
b 0,30
0,95 0,95
(21)
Aplicaia nr. 9
2 0,58 sin
2 0,58 cos
5 .
5
Rezolvare
2 0,58 sin
n
lim
2 0,58
5 lim 2 0,58 0,58 lim 0,58 1 .

n 2 0,58n (0,58) n n 3 0,58 n 3
cos
5
n
(22)
Aplicaia nr. 10
sin
cos
sin 2
cos 2
... sin n
... cos n
5 .
Rezolvare
sin sin 2 ... sin n

2
3
n
0,58 0,58 0,58 ... 0,58
5
5
5
lim
lim
n 0,80 0,80 2 0,80 3 ... 0,80 n

cos cos 2 ... cos n
5
5
5
0,58 1 0,58
n
1,38 1 0,58
1 0,58
0,34.
lim
lim
n 4 1 0,80 n
n 0,80 1 0,80 n
1 0,80
(23)
Aplicaia nr. 11
tg
ctg
tg 2
ctg
... tg n
... ctg
230
5
n
Rezolvare
tg tg 2 ... tg n
2
3
n
5
5
5 lim 0,725 0,725 0,725 ... 0,725
lim
n
n 1,38 1,382 1,38 3 ... 1,38 n

ctg ctg 2 ... ctg n
5
5
5
0,725 1 0,725
1 0,725
lim
n
n
1,38 1,38 1
1,38 1
0.
3,63 1,38 1
2,63 1 0,725
lim
(24)
Aplicaia nr. 12
n
1 5
5 1
arccos
arcsin
4
4
arccos 10 2 5 arcsin 10 2 5
4
4
Rezolvare
lim
1 5
5 1
arccos
arcsin
4
4
arccos 10 2 5
0,62 n 0,31n
n 0,31n 0,62 n
0,31 n
0,62 1

n
0,62
1 0,5
lim
lim
1.
n
n 0,5n 1
n
0
,
31
0,62 n
1
0,62
Aplicaia nr. 13
S se rezolve ecuaia cos x
1 5

, x 0, .
4
2
Rezolvare
Din aplicaia nr.1, rezult x
Aplicaia nr. 14
S se rezolve ecuaia sin x

5
10
lim n n
n
n

10 2 5

arcsin
10 5
lim
10 2 5

, x 0, .
4
2
231
(25)
Rezolvare
Din aplicaia nr. 1, rezult x
Aplicaia nr. 15

, x 0, .
10 2 5
2
10 2 5
S se rezolve ecuaia tgx
Rezolvare
10
Aplicaia nr. 16
S se rezolve ecuaia tgx

, x 0, .
2
1 5 10 2 5
1 5 10 2 5
Rezolvare
20
Aplicaia nr. 17
k
10 2 5
S se evalueze limita lim arccos
.
n
4
k 1
k n
Rezolvare
k
n
k
k n
2 3
10 2 5

lim arccos
lim lim ...
n
n
n 5
4
5 5
5
k 1
k 1 5
k n

lim
n

1
5 5
1
.
5
(26)
BIBLIOGRAFIE
[2] Cota, A., Rado, M., Korthy, E., Rduiu, M., Popa, F.E., Vornicescu, F., Matematic, Manual
pentru clasa a X-a, Geometrie i trigonometrie, Editura Didactic i Pedagogic, Bucureti, 1987.
232
EVALUAREA UNOR LIMITE PENTRU CARE SE UTILIZEAZ

cos
I sin
APLICAII CONEXE
PARTEA a II-a
Student frunta Lucian-Cristian MIRCEA
Student frunta Teodor MAXIM
Abstract: The article develops 12 applications in Algebra, Trigonometry and Calculus to solve cos
and sin
using numerical values and. Applications are required to use numerical methods
in risk theory.
Keywords: Numerical Value, Trigonometric Limit, Application.
Aplicaia nr. 1
sin
cos
sin 2
10
cos 2
10
10
10
... sin n
10 .
... cos n
10
Rezolvare
sin sin 2
... sin n
n
0,30 0,30) 2 ... 0,30
10
10
10
lim
lim
n
n 0,95 0,95 2 ... 0,95 n
cos cos 2
... cos n
10
10
10
0,30 1 0,30
n
0,42 1 0,30
1 0,30
0,02 .
lim
lim
n 19 1 0,95 n
n 0,95 1 0,95 n
1 0,95
(1)
Aplicaia nr. 2
tg
ctg
10
10
tg 2
ctg 2
10
10
... tg n
10
... ctg n
233
10
Rezolvare
tg tg 2
... tg n
n
2
10
10
10 lim 0,31 0,31) ... 0,31
lim
n
n 3,16 3,16 2 ... 3,16 n
ctg ctg 2
... ctg n
10
10
10
0,31 1 0,31
n
0,45 1 0,31
1 0,31
lim
0,30 .
lim
n 1,46 3,16 n 1
n 3,16 3,16 n 1
3,16 1
n
(2)
Aplicaia nr. 3

tg ctg
20
20
.
n
n
n

tg ctg
20
20
n
Rezolvare
0,15 n
n
n

1
tg ctg
n
n
6,53
0,15 6,53
20
20
lim
lim
lim
1 .
n
n
n
n
n
n 0,15 6,53
n
n

0
,
58
tg ctg
1
20
20
0,95
(3)
Aplicaia nr. 4
sin
cos
20
20
sin 2
cos 2
20
20
... sin n
... cos n
20 .
20
Rezolvare
sin
sin 2
... sin n
n
2
20
20
20 lim 0,15 0,15) ... 0,15
lim
n
n 0,98 0,98 2 ... 0,98 n
cos cos 2
... cos n
20
20
20
0,15 1 0,15
n
0,176 1 0,15
1 0,15
lim
4 10 3 .
lim
n 49 1 0,98 n
n 0,98 1 0,98 n
1 0,98
234
(4)
Aplicaia nr. 5
tg
ctg
tg 2
20
20
ctg 2
... tg n
20
20
20 .
... ctg n
20
Rezolvare
tg
tg 2
... tg n
n
0,15 0,15) 2 ... 0,15
20
20
20
lim
lim
n
n 6,53 6,53 2 ... 6,53n
2
n
ctg
ctg
... ctg
20
20
20
0,15 1 0,15
n
0,176 1 0,15
1 0,15
0.
lim
lim
n 1,18 6,53 n 1
n 6,53 6,53n 1
6,53 1
n
(5)
Aplicaia nr. 6
S se demonstreze c tg
20
sin
20
Rezolvare
n textul aplicaiei nr. 3, s-a utilizat faptul c:
tg
sin
0,15 ,
20
20
(6)
calculul fiind evaluat cu dou zecimale.

n realitate, exist o oarecare diferen.
O metod de rezolvare este aceea de a calcula cu 3 zecimale valorile cerute.
atunci:
sin
cos

sin sin cos sin cos
cos sin
20
4
5
5
4
2
5
5
4 5
0,707 0,809 0,587 0,156 ;

cos cos cos sin sin
cos sin
20
4
5
5
4
2
5
5
4 5
0,707 0,809 0,587 0,986 .
(7)
(8)
Rezult:
sin
20 0,156 0,158 ;
tg
20
0,986
cos
20
ctg
20
235
cos
20 0,986 6,320 .
0,156
sin
20
(9)
Aplicaia nr. 7
sin n
tg n
20 .
20
Rezolvare
sin n
n
0,156
20
lim
lim
lim 0,98 n 0 .
n
n
n
0,158 n
tg n
20
(10)
Aplicaia nr. 8

S se evalueze limita lim th .
n
40
n
Rezolvare
n
20
e 1

lim th lim
0,0783786 n 0.
. lim
n
n
40
e 20 1
(11)
Aplicaia nr. 9
n 1
n 1
S se evalueze limita lim cth .

n
40
Rezolvare
n 1
lim cth
n
40
n 1
n 1
20
n 1
e 1
1
12,75 12,75 .
lim
n
e 20 1
Aplicaia nr. 10

sh n ch sin
5

.
n

n
ch ch cos
5

236
(12)
Rezolvare

ch n ch cos
5
ch n ch 0,58
sh n 1,97

lim
lim n
lim n
0.
n
n sh sh 0,80 n ch 2,09
n
sh sh sin
5

(13)
Aplicaia nr. 11
k
1 5
.
n
4
k 1
Rezolvare
k n
n
k
k n
2 3
1 5

lim arccos
lim lim ...
n 5
n
n
4
5 5
5
k 1 5
k 1
k n

lim
n

1
5 5
1
.
5
(14)
Aplicaia nr. 12
k
10 2 5
.
n
4
k 1
Rezolvare
k n
n
k
k n
2 3
10 2 5

lim arccos
lim lim ...
n
n 10
n
4
10 10
10
k 1
k 1 10
k n

1
10 10
lim
n
1
10
1
.
10
(15)
BIBLIOGRAFIE
[2] Cota, A., Rado, M., Korthy, E., Rduiu, M., Popa, F.E., Vornicescu, F., Matematic, Manual
pentru clasa a X-a, Geometrie i trigonometrie, Editura Didactic i Pedagogic, Bucureti, 1987.
237
180 DE ANI DE LA NFIINAREA

PRIMEI UNITI DE POMPIERI MILITARI DIN ROMNIA
IAI 1835
Cpitan Elena-Silvia BOLOHAN
Inspectoratul pentru Situaii de Urgen Mihail Grigore Sturdza Iai
REZUMAT:
Articolul prezint un succint istoric al formrii, n anul 1835, a primei uniti militare de
pompieri din Romnia, sub numele de Roata de pojarnici a oraului Iai, i o trecere n revist a
dezvoltrii armei pompierilor i activitilor acestora, pn n prezent.
1. INTRODUCERE
Istoria consemneaz nc de prin secolul al XVII-lea numeroase focuri care au afectat n oraul
Iai, fcnd scrum, deopotriv, bordeie i curi boiereti. Amestecate n chipul cel mai bizar cu putin,
conacele trainice, de piatr, erau alturi de csue pitice, acoperite cu paie, stuf sau indril, acoperiuri
n pericol s duc vlvtaia focului mai departe, chiar i la cea mai nensemnat scnteie. Prjolurile
cptau proporii nspimnttoare, rspndindu-se rapid din mahala n mahala, fr ca vreo mn
omeneasc s poat interveni la timp. n urma unui astfel de prpd oraul rmnea pustiu, cocioabele
numai scrum, iar n praful ulielor puinii supravieuitori i jeleau soarta.
2. PRIMELE ORGANIZRI
n asemenea mprejurri, stpnirile vremii se ndrtniceau s fac oleac de ordine i
s ncropeasc msuri pentru ca urmtorul foc s nu mai aib aceleai urmri.
Aa se face c, pe la 1777, Divanul Domnesc a dat grija focurilor n seama podarilor
oraului, care aveau datoria de a interveni n grab ntr-o astfel de situaie.
n anul 1809, la sesizarea Administraiei ruse, Divanul Moldovei ia msuri pentru
ntmplare de foc: se cumpr caii necesari i sacalele cu ap, tulumbe de la Kiev, se nmulete
numrul hornarilor, iar locuitorii sunt obligai s vin cu uneltele lor i s ajute la stingerea focului.
Pe la 1815, prin hotrre domneasc, toate mnstirile din Iai trebuiau s aib, n mod
obligatoriu, 6 czi pline cu ap, gata s fie utilizate n caz de pojar, 6 cngi i 6 topoare. De
asemenea, erau interzise construciile din lemn i pstrarea unor cantiti nsemnate de pcur sau
praf de puc n dughene.
Cinci ani mai trziu, catagrafia oraului Iai consemna, ntre slujitorii Agiei, primii
15 tulumbagii i 8 apari, acestea constituind primele ncercri de organizare a ceea ce astzi numim
unitate de pompieri.
238
3. VESTITORUL DIN TURNUL GOLIEI

n mai multe rnduri oraul a fost mistuit de flcri necrutoare. Primul mare incendiu s-a
petrecut n 1821, pagubele pricinuite fiind de nemsurat, fiindc tulumbagiii Agiei n-au acionat,
fugind care-ncotro s-i salveze viaa.
Documentele vremii arat apoi c, la 1822, au ars peste 250 de case, 11 biserici i ase
sinagogi.
irul prjolurilor a continuat cu marele foc de la 19 iulie 1827. La 1827, iulie n 19 a fost
focul cel mare n care s-a topit ispisoace ale pmntului, afltoare n arhiva Vistieriei i a
Divanului, ce se inea de condicarul Curii sau iuzbaa, scria cronicarul Manolache Drghici.
Acest din urm eveniment a determinat autoritile timpului ca rudimentarele
organizri ale tulumbagiilor s ias din letargie i s porunceasc att msuri pentru prevenirea
incendiilor, ct i grabnica aprovizionare a oraului cu cele trebuitoare hranei i reconstruciei
locuinelor distruse. Multe dintre necurmatele focuri ntmplate la Iai erau cauzate de ri
voitori i vagaboni..
De aceea, stpnirea mrete numrul oamenilor necesari la mnuirea tulumbelor,
organizeaz aprovizionarea cu ap prin nmulirea sacagiilor i aparilor, iar n turnul Goliei, care
era mult mai nalt atunci, se aaz un vestitor. Oraul era supravegheat pe baza cmpului vizual.
Unde se vedea c iese fum nefiresc, erau anunai pojarnicii.
4. MSURI DE PREVENIRE A INCENDIILOR

Regulamentul Organic pus n aplicare n Moldova la 1 ianuarie 1832 este documentul care
statornicete primele msuri de aprare a oraelor mpotriva incendiilor: Spre a se feri oraul de
primejdia focului, la care a fost supus n attea rnduri, se vor lua toate msurile feritoare
obicinuite la asemenea mpregiurri, din care cea dinti msur este prevzut prin legiuire ca s
fie ndestulare de ap n orae. Osebit de aceasta, 4 havuzuri de piatr, largi i ncptoare de ap,
se vor zidi n pieele oraului, unde vor sta i sacalele i uneltele focului ntru pstrare.
Documentul mai prevedea nfiinarea unei bresle de tulumbagii, alctuit din 24 de oameni,
condui de un cpitan, scoaterea cantitilor mari de materii arztoare din ora (cherestea,
pcur, stuh, fn), iar locuitorii oraului s aib pe la casele lor unelte trebuitoare n cazul unei
ntmplri de foc: funii, cngi, scri, czi cu ap.
Dei prevzute n mod expres, aceste msuri nu au fost puse n aplicare, uneltele fiind
stricate, iar interesul Sfatului Municipal n a le repara, extrem de sczut.
Astfel c focurile au continuat nestingherite s decimeze oraul. La 25 iunie 1833 un foc
mare, pornit din mahalaua Ttrailor, a fcut scrum 262 de case i 2 biserici, ns autoritile i
marii boieri nu s-au trezit din nepsare nici n acest ceas, averile lor fiind adpostite de ziduri sigure
de piatr.
Despre incendiul izbucnit n Ttrai gazeta Albina Romneasc scria: ngustimea
ulielor, mulimea csuelor fr siguranie fcute i negrijirea de a acoperi casele cu oale sau cu
tabl n acest feliu repede pind din vale n deal, flacra n al ei curs cuprindea bordeie, biserici,
i care i n culme ajungnd, s-au dezbinat n dou ramuri, una spre Sf. Vineri, alta spre Beilic.
Totui, aceast ntmplare nefericit avea s mite ct de ct lucrurile i, mai ales,
atitudinea autoritilor. La ordinul generalului Kisselef, Sfatul administrativ propune nfiinarea unei
roate (companii) de pojarnici, nzestrat cu toate uneltele necesare n caz de foc.
239
n noiembrie 1833 se ntocmete un proiect pentru formarisirea Comandei de foc, supt

numire de pojarnici, pentru oraul Ei. Aceast roat era alctuit din 3 ofieri, 9 unterofieri
(subofieri), 2 barbancici (cei care aveau grij de cai), 90 de soldai pojarnici i un conoval (fierar).
Se hotrte, tot atunci, construirea a 12 maini pentru adus ap, fiind angajai n acest scop
2 meteri din Iai, Carl Rihter i Iohan Kapusanschi, cu preul de 800 de lei maina. Tot ei se
angajeaz s fac i 100 de cofe.
Tulumbe noi de la Petesburg sunt aduse la Iai cu boii, de la Sculeni. Pentru ca pojarnicii
s nu umble pe jos pn la sacale i tulumbe, se construiete i o droag pentru transportul lor.
Proiectul este naintat spre aprobare Cancelariei Domneti la 3 ianuarie 1835, iar pe 22 mai
este consemnat oficial existena i funcionarea roatei.
5. ROATA DE POJARNICI PRIMA COMPANIE DE POMPIERI

De la 15 mai 1835 roata a nceput s funcioneze, sub comanda cpitanului Bacinschi i
a locotenenilor Racli i Mcrescu.
Pojarnicii au fost luai de la diferite arme. La nceputuri n-au existat ofieri de pompieri ca
formaie: unul era cavalerist, altul infanterist, altul artilerist. Primul cpitan-comandant de pompieri
consemnat la Iai a fost Bacinschi, cel al crui nume l poart astzi o strad din ora.
Pojarnicii ieeni aveau la dispoziie 76 de cai, 24 de sacale, 4 tulumbe i 5 crue.
Anexa la Regulamentul de nfiinare a roatei prevedea c toate instrumenturile de pojar
trebuie inute sub acoperi vara, iar iarna la loc ferit de nghe. De asemenea, paharele de aram
de la tulumbe trebuiau unse cu seu dup fiecare utilizare, la fel ca i furtunurile, care erau
confecionate din piele.
C lucrurile fuseser organizate n stil cazon, ct se poate de serios, o dovedete i faptul c
proiectul aprobat la 1835 prevedea i portul unei uniforme specifice: vor avea mundire, dup
forma de pedestrime a Miliiei... cu guler vnt i cu 6 bunghi albi. Pantalonii cu postav sur,
czceti, cu vipisca vnt.
6. LA NIVEL NAIONAL
Treptat, lucrurile au nceput s intre pe un fga normal, iar companiile de pojarnici s fie
nfiinate n mai toate oraele Moldovei. Acestea se aflau n subordinea Ministerului Trebilor
Dinluntru (Ministerul Afacerilor Interne), iar pe plan local rspundeau n faa Eforiei.
Dup Rzboiul de Independen s-a hotrt desfiinarea pompierilor i, timp de 10 ani,
toate cazrmile asigurau prin rotaie acest serviciu. Dup civa ani autoritile au neles c nu se
poate funciona astfel, mai ales c avuseser loc incendii puternice, i s-au reintrodus companiile de
pompieri.
Caracterul militar i structura organizatoric specific aveau s fie ntrite prin naltul
Decret Regal nr. 702/1874, care modifica Legea pentru organizarea armatei: pompierii intrau n
subordinea Ministerului de Rzboi ca uniti i subuniti n compunerea artileriei teritoriale. Tot
atunci, Batalionul de pompieri Iai devenea baterie de artilerie.
Dup Rzboiul de Independen, cele 14 baterii de pompieri-artileriti au trecut n
subordinea regimentelor de artilerie, pn n 1912 cnd, prin naltul Decret Regal nr. 2222, s-a
nfiinat Inspectoratul Pompierilor Militari.
240
7. DEZVOLTARE I MODERNIZARE
Procesul de reform a instituiei pompierilor s-a reluat odat cu numirea colonelului
Gheorghe Pohrib ca inspector general al pompierilor (ntre 1920 i 1937). Prin pasiune i
competen, acesta a reuit s mbunteasc dotarea companiilor de pompieri din oraele mari ale
rii, cu cele mai performante maini de stins incendii. n dotarea pompierilor militari se regseau
autospeciale, materiale i accesorii necesare salvrii persoanelor de sub drmturi, degazrii,
ridicrii i distrugerii bombelor neexplodate, ntiinrii populaiei, primul ajutor medical etc.
Pregtirea efectivelor proprii i a populaiei lua proporii, la exerciiile de aprare pasiv
participnd cele mai nalte autoriti ale statului, inclusiv regele Carol al II-lea. Eforturile care s-au
depus au determinat ca, pe durata celui de-al Doilea Rzboi Mondial, pompierii militari s-i
ndeplineasc n cele mai bune condiii misiunile. Pe timpul bombardamentelor sovietice de la
nceputul rzboiului i atacurilor aviaiei anglo-americane, sub ploaia de bombe i foc, pompierii
militari au strnit admiraia i recunotina populaiei i autoritilor vremii.
Perioada postbelic aducea modificri importante: Comandamentul Corpului Pompierilor
Militari redevenea Inspectoratul General al Pompierilor i pe teritoriul rii existau Grupuri de
pompieri.
Comandamentul Pompierilor Militari i mai apoi Inspectoratul General al Corpului
Pompierilor Militari au nfiinat i coli de pregtire pentru personalul propriu: Facultatea de
Pompieri din Bucureti, care pregtete astzi, n cadrul Academiei de Poliie Alexandru Ioan Cuza,
ofierii inspectoratelor pentru situaii de urgen i coala de Subofieri de Pompieri i Protecie
Civil Pavel Zgnescu de la Boldeti.
n 2004 Romnia a adoptat un modern i complex mecanism de prevenire i gestionare a
situaiilor de urgen, adaptat cerinelor standardelor NATO i ale Uniunii Europene: Sistemul
Naional de Management al Situaiilor de Urgen. Acesta cuprinde cadrul legal i instituiile menite
s asigure, n mod unitar i integrat, aprarea vieii cetenilor, a bunurilor i a mediului mpotriva
provocrilor din ce n ce mai frecvente i cu efecte devastatoare determinate de dezastre pe plan
global i regional.
8. POMPIERII DE AZI
Fotii pojarnici ieeni intervin astzi n toate situaiile de urgen. Ordonana de Urgen a
Guvernului nr. 21/2004 consfinete reforma sistemului naional de management al situaiilor de
urgen din Romnia.
De-a lungul anilor, mai multe distincii au ncununat activitatea pompierilor militari ieeni.
Ca un omagiu adus instituiei, unitatea a primit n anul 1995 Drapelul de Lupt i denumirea
ntemeietorului acesteia Mihail Grigore Sturdza.
n anul 2000 Drapelul de Lupt a fost decorat cu Steaua Romniei n rang de Cavaler.
n 2004, la profesionalizare, n conformitate cu prevederile art. 23 din H.G.R. nr. 1492
privind principiile de organizare, funcionarea i atribuiile serviciilor de urgen profesioniste,
odat cu nfiinarea Inspectoratului pentru Situaii de Urgen al judeului Iai, i Drapelul de lupt
acordat Grupului de Pompieri Militari Iai a devenit drapel al tradiiilor.
Prin unificarea Grupului de Pompieri Mihail Grigore Sturdza al Judeului Iai cu
Inspectoratul de Protecie Civil al Judeului Iai, s-a creat o structur cu atribuii complexe,
Inspectoratul pentru Situaii de Urgen Mihail Grigore Sturdza al judeului Iai. Organizai n
241
structura Inspectoratului pentru Situaii de Urgen, pompierii militari au adugat la clasica

intervenie de stingere a incendiilor, i multe alte misiuni: de descarcerare, acordare a primului
ajutor medical, limitare i nlturare a efectelor produse de situaiile de urgen, intervenia la
inundaii, cutremure sau alunecri de teren i alte catastrofe.
Obiectivul de baz al Inspectoratului pentru Situaii de Urgen al judeului Iai este s
asigure, ntr-o concepie unitar i cu profesionalism, rezolvarea problemelor operaionale ce
vizeaz aprarea vieii, a bunurilor i protecia mediului, monitorizarea tipurilor de risc, efectuarea
analizei i evalurii situaiei operative, organizarea interveniei, a activitilor specifice de medicin
la dezastre, de asisten medical de urgen i descarcerare prin:
asigurarea unor intervenii prompte, cu eficien maxim, ncadrate n timpii de rspuns
stabilii la nivel european;
reducerea pierderilor de viei omeneti, a pagubelor materiale i a efectelor negative
asupra mediului;
meninerea la niveluri acceptabile a riscurilor posibil a fi prognozate;
asigurarea aceluiai grad de protecie a cetenilor, indiferent de zona unde s-ar afla pe
teritoriul judeului;
realizarea unei repartiii judicioase a forelor i mijloacelor pe principiul timpului de
rspuns.
n prezent, Inspectoratul pentru Situaii de Urgen Mihail Grigore Sturdza al Judeului
Iai are patru subuniti operative de intervenie: dou detaamente de pompieri n municipiul Iai, o
secie de pompieri n municipiul Pacani i o staie de pompieri n oraul Trgu Frumos. n scopul
reducerii timpului de rspuns i a eficientizrii aciunilor de intervenie n situaii de urgen, s-au
nfiinat i dou puncte de lucru n localitile Hrlu i Rducneni.
n anul 2011, n cadrul Inspectoratului pentru Situaii de Urgen al judeului Iai s-a
realizat Dispeceratul integrat ISU-SMURD-SAJ; obiectivul principal al dispeceratului l reprezint
asigurarea unui sistem integrat de reacie n scopul rezolvrii cu operativitate i eficien a
apelurilor de urgen preluate prin 112. Prin nfiinarea Dispeceratului integrat s-a realizat alocarea
eficient a resurselor i aplicarea unui management unitar tuturor forelor i mijloacelor implicate n
rezolvarea solicitrilor cetenilor, n scopul salvrii vieii i bunurilor acestora.
9. DOTAREA CU ECHIPAMENTE I UTILAJE DE INTERVENIE

Inspectoratul pentru Situaii de Urgen Iai are astzi n dotare echipamente i mijloace de
intervenie performante destinate stingerii incendiilor, acordrii primului ajutor medical i salvrii
vieii din diferite medii ostile.
Dotarea Inspectoratului pentru Situaii de Urgen este ntr-un permanent proces de
rennoire, cu autospeciale dintre cele mai moderne, necesare asigurrii unor intervenii eficiente i
asigurrii gradului de securitate a salvatorului i a celui salvat.
Complexitatea interveniilor solicit la maxim capacitile fizice i profesionale ale
pompierilor, care uneori au pltit preul suprem pentru salvarea semenilor lor.
Viaa de pompier militar nu este uoar. Ea oblig la multe privaiuni i ofer puine
privilegii, pentru c pompierul este prezent nu doar ca s salveze, ci i s aline suferina celui care la chemat n ajutor. Cel mai adesea anonim, el este eroul cotidian care vine n ajutorul semenilor i i
apr de ameninarea catastrofelor.
242
Riscndu-i viaa pentru a o apra pe cea a aproapelui su, pompierul este astzi printre cei
mai iubii ceteni, iar el se mndrete cu asta.
La 15 mai 2015 prima unitate de pompieri militari din Romnia a mplinit 180 de ani de
existen n slujba cetenilor, srbtorii n prima sptmn a lunii mai prin mai multe manifestri
aniversare, ntre care o impresionant parad militar, n cadrul creia Inspectoratul pentru Situaii
de Urgen a primit noul Drapel de lupt al unitii.
Aprecierea de care se bucur activitatea pompierilor ieeni n rndul cetenilor,
recunoaterea muncii de ctre autoritile locale reprezint un imbold pentru continuarea
glorioaselor tradiii ale unitii.
BIBLIOGRAFIE:
[1] Pagini din istoria pompierilor, Muzeul Pompierilor, 1976.
[2] Panuru, Ion, File din istoria pompierilor romni, 1983.
[3] Istoria pompierilor militari bucureteni, Bucureti, 1996.
[4] Revista Pompierii Romni colecia 1990-2014.
243
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11. Instalaii fixe de stingere a incendiilor cu spum la parcurile de rezervoare cu capac

; aplicaii conexe (partea

31. Evaluarea unor limite pentru care se utilizeaz cos

; aplicaii conexe (partea

APRAREA MPOTRIVA INCENDIILOR. CONCEPT.

Principalele documente, necesare dar nu i suficiente pentru materializarea unui

identificarea riscurilor de incendiu/explozie i a naturii acestora n raport cu diferite

3. OBSERVAII PENTRU DOCUMENTELE CARE FAC REFERIRE LA RISC

NP 099-04 ca Normativ pentru proiectarea, executarea, verificarea i exploatarea

ENERGIA TERMIC A PMNTULUI

Fig. 1 nveliurile principale ale Pmntului [1]

n locurile unde straturile de ap au o temperatur ridicat (depete 100C) acestea se pot

Fig. 2 Distribuia temperaturii n sol [2]

Energia geotermal de care dispune pmntul poate fi exploatat ca energie termic cu

Fig. 3 Ciclul de rcire al unei pompe de cldur [4]

Fig. 3 Ciclul de rcire al unei pompe de cldur saramur/ap, ap/ap [3]

Fig. 4 Sisteme de captare a cldurii. [5]

SECURITATEA LA INCENDIU A TUNELURILOR RUTIERE DIN EUROPA

2. MSURI DE SECURITATE N TUNELURI RUTIERE

numrul de benzi de circulaie;

Prevederile anterioare nu se aplic n cazul n care caracteristicile constructive ale tunelului

Fig. 2 Ieire de urgen i Panoul de urgen n Daishi Tunnel

Se prevd ieiri de urgen, n cazul n care o analiz a riscurilor relevante, inclusiv ct de

Fig. 4 Iluminat normal in tunelul Abu Dhabi

Fig. 5 Ventilaie transversal n tunel rutier

Fig. 6 Ventilaie longitudinal n tunel rutier

Fig. 7 Sistem monitorizare wireless

Sistemele de monitorizare n tuneluri sunt, de asemenea, larg rspndite n ntreaga lume.

Fig. 8 Monitorizare FibroLaser

Fig. 9 Tunelul de la Laerdal

PERFORMANE SPECIFICE ALE CLDIRILOR

Sli pentru proiecii cinematografice, cantine i restaurante, sli de lectur, muzee,

Corelaia admis ntre amplasarea i categoria slilor, numrul

Sal independent sau constituind un

Numrul de niveluri supraterane admis n cldiri cu sli aglomerate pentru poriunea n

3. AMPLASAREA CLDIRILOR CU SLI AGLOMERATE

4. EVACUAREA UTILIZATORILOR DIN CLDIRILE CU SLI AGLOMERATE

Fig. 1 Ci de evacuare din sli aglomerate

n cazul slilor aglomerate cu scene sau podiumuri, circulaia de evacuare trebuie

Fig. 2 Ci de evacuare din sli aglomerate

5. GABARITELE CILOR DE EVACUARE

6. DIMENSIONAREA CILOR DE EVACUARE

Sala aglomerat tip S1

Sal aglomerat tip S2

8. CONDIII CONSTRUCTIVE ALE CLDIRILOR CU SLI AGLOMERATE

Finisajele pe cile de evacuare trebuie s respecte clasele de reacie la foc a cilor de

MANAGEMENT I STRATEGII N ACTIVITATEA DE APRARE

Scopul activitii de instruire a personalului, desfurate pe linie de situaii de urgen (PC

2. MSURI NTREPRINSE LA NIVEL DE AFER

acestora, caracterul lor permanent, naintea producerii evenimentelor generatoare de situaii de

INSTALAIE DE STINGERE CU DIOXID DE CARBON

fabrici de prelucrri mecanice.

2. INSTALAIA DE STINGERE CU DIOXID DE CARBON UTILIZAT NTR-O

Semnalizarea acustic i optic n caz de alarm de incendiu;

Fig. 1 Elementele componente ale instalaiei de stingere

c) Realizarea instalaiei electrice de automatizare:

Fig. 2 Aria monitorizat de un detector de flacr