Abstract

This report tells the story of the Rostraver Gardens Ice Rink collapse. Photographic evidence, material
research, code review, and calculation data have been gathered here to explain the cause of this
dramatic event. Many contributing factors have been determined in this case, including: improper
detailing, inadequate maintenance, and undersized members. However, it is the opinion of the
authors that the ultimate cause of the collapse was water penetration issues in the glued laminated
arches around the connection to the concrete foundations.
Introduction
On February 10, 2015, three heavy timber glued laminated arches supporting the roof of the
Rostraver Gardens Ice Rink collapsed. This report will provide a thorough investigation of the various
components involved in this catastrophic failure. Useful information about the materials and original
construction has been extracted from the photographs and original drawings provided. Prevalent
historical research of the weather conditions leading up to the collapse, code requirements, and
assumptions regarding materials used at the time of the original design has also been procured. An
informed model has been created to compare the stresses in the material under the loads used in the
original design and the loads present at the time of collapse. Using this evidence, a conclusion
regarding the ultimate cause of collapse has been discerned to a reasonable degree of engineering
certainty. Finally, any dissenting or minority opinions have been listed for completion.
Discussion
In a report published by the American Institute of Timber Construction, historical design values for
structural glulam are discussed. This report states that several changes have occurred to the methods
used for determining design values for this particular product over time. For instance, prior to the late
1960s the tensile strength of lumber was assumed to be much higher than it actually was. By 1970
almost all lumber grading agencies had significantly reduced their design values for tension parallel to
grain (AITC 2007). Modulus of Elasticity was also assigned to species regardless of grade prior to 1971
(AITC 2007). Since the Rostraver building was designed in 1965, it is reasonable to consider that the
glulam arches may have been undersized due to these erroneous assumptions of material properties
and strength.
Browsing the photos provided by the forensics team, signs of water damage were immediately
observed on the glulam beam ends as well as the steel at the connection to the concrete columns.
The wood was discolored and warped [Figure 1], and lines of rust ran down the face of the concrete
foundation from the steel base shoe [Figure 2]. The source of this damage is likely inadequate
moisture barrier installation or maintenance.

Figure 1. Discoloration and warping of beam end 11

suggesting water damage to the member

Figure 2. Rust running down the concrete foundation further

suggesting moisture control issues

As shown in the figure below, the recommended method for protecting glulam beams exposed to the
elements is the use of a metal cap [Figure 3]. Indeed, in the photos of the actual structure, metal caps
appear along all beam ends exposed to the elements. However, an interruption in the metal cap was
noted in beam end 9r [Figure 4]. This break in the water penetration system likely resulted in a
significant degradation of the material and loss of strength along the member.

Figure 3. Diagram showing recommended use of metal caps

(Adapted from:
http://www.corma.cl/_file/material/conecciones-madera-laminada-apa-feb-2007-co
nexiones-madera-laminada-biblioteca.pdf
)

Figure 4. Photograph showing cut in

metal cap along beam end 9r

Furthermore, aside from a metal cap, the full recommended detail shows other elements including
the use of a sealant. It is unclear from the photos whether or not a sealant was even used; however,
as discussed previously in a presentation by Brian Rose on Wall Water Barriers, all water barrier
systems require constant surveillance and maintenance by the buildings owner (Rose 2015). Sealants
typically have a lifespan of just five to ten years (Rose 2015). It is recommended that the forensics
team request further information about the construction of these beam ends and ask the owner
about their daily upkeep.
Returning to the beam ends for further observation, the steel base shoe connection began to look
suspicious. At first, it was suspected that the shoe lacked a drainage slot. However, since the shoe
does not fully encase the beam at the base, water can freely drain at the bottom edge. Therefore, this
is not a likely cause of failure.
The shape of this connection does, however, appear to be susceptible to a different mode of failure.
As shown in the figure below, a beam to bearing connection that does not fully cover the edge of the
beam is susceptible to differential drying patterns [Figure 5]. This is because the end grains of the
wood, which leak water very rapidly, are partially closed off and partially left exposed. Therefore, the
top and bottom portion of the beam dry much more rapidly than the middle portion of the beam
covered by the connection plate. This results in increased tension stresses perpendicular to the grain
and loss in shear strength of the member. Indeed, this type of fracture along the beam at the top and
base of the connection plate can be seen in a number of the beam ends [Figure 6]. Therefore, this is a
very likely cause of failure.

Figure 5. Correct and incorrect beam-to-bearing connections with the result - a

split in the member - of incorrect detail
(Adapted from:
http://www.corma.cl/_file/material/conecciones-madera-laminada-apa-feb-2007conexiones-madera-laminada-biblioteca.pdf
)

Figure 6. Small cracks forming above

and below plate likely due to end
grain exposure

Data
As stated previously, two models were devised for structural analysis of the glulam arches. The first
model analyzed the structure according to the original design loads. It was discovered from this
analysis that the stresses in the members were slightly above the current design values for structural
glulam timber.
The largest stress in the member designed in this manner under uniform load is axial compressive
stress. Modeled as a three-hinge arch, the bending moment is zero throughout the member. The
shear force perpendicular to the member is also shown to be negligible, about 1.35 kips [Figure 7].
The axial force induced in the member by the support, however, is about 674 kips, which generates
2170 psi of axial compressive stress along the grain of the member. According to AITC design values
for structural glulam, only two grades of timber could support this load [Appendix A]. Therefore, it is
likely that these members were slightly undersized. However, this does not explain why the structure
did not fail earlier in its life. Therefore, it is not actually the foremost cause of the failure.

Original Design (1965)

* From the Douglas Fir Use Book (1958)

Figure 7. Reaction calculations for the member under original design loads

The second model was based on observations of the elements present at the time of collapse. Historic
weather data suggested that wind was not a likely factor in the collapse since the maximum wind
speeds were below fifteen miles per hour on the day of the collapse (Wunderground). It was also
noted from the photographs that there was some ice damming on one side of the arch [Figure 8].
Therefore, the density of the snow was increased to accommodate for this condition. The density of
the snow was selected from the figure on the next page and assumed to be firn [Figure 12]. This
assumption was made to be conservative since the snow is not actually likely to be this dense.
By approximating the height of the snow from the photographs, an estimated value for the snow load
was obtained [Figure 11]. This value was compared to the design value for snow load according to the
latest version of ASCE-7 [Figure 10]. Since Rostraver, PA is a snow load case study region, case study
data has been included in this report [Figure 9]. The estimated value was found to be 5 psf higher
than code requirements. Therefore, it seemed possible that the snow was a probable cause of the
collapse.

Figure 8. Ice on the gutter above the arches

(Source:
http://www.wpxi.com/gallery/news/viewer-pictures-of-ice-hockey-aren
a-collapse/gLFZ/#1031520)

Actual Case at failure time (2/10/2015)

Figure 9. Snow load case study data

Figure 10. Final value of snow load according to ASCE-7-10

From Observations

*400 Kg/m^3 assumed for this cas

e
Figure 11. Estimated value of actual snow load

Figure 12. Snow Density Values

(Source:
http://sciencelearn.org.nz/Contexts/Icy-Ecosystems/Looki
ng-closer/Snow-and-ice-density)

Indeed, according to the final calculations, the stress at the time of collapse was very close to the
stress under the ultimate original design load [Figure 13]. Therefore, it is plausible that the cause of
the failure was the load itself pushing the structural members beyond their limits. However, the
numbers show that the original design values calculated are still slightly greater. Therefore, it is
reasonable to state that the structure should have been able to support this load, and there must
have been another reason for the collapse.

Conclusion
In conclusion, the authors of this report have determined to a reasonable degree of engineering
certainty that the cause of the Rostraver Gardens Ice Rink collapse was water damage to the glued
laminated arches due to a poor water barrier system. An alternate theory suggests that the
connection plate was not adequately detailed.

References
1) AITC. 2007. Design Values For Structural Glued Laminated Timber In Existing Strcutures, Tech.
no. 26. American Institute of Timber Construction. Centennial, Colorado. Web. 7 Dec. 2015.
<
http://www.aitc-glulam.org/shopcart/Pdf/aitc_tn_26-2008.pdf
>.
2) Rose, Brian S. "Wall Water Barriers 101." AE 537 Guest Lecture Series. Walker Building, State
Colelge. 15 Sept. 2015. Lecture.
3) "Snow and Ice Density."
Science Learning Hub
. Web. 7 Dec. 2015.
<http://sciencelearn.org.nz/Contexts/Icy-Ecosystems/Looking-closer/Snow-and-ice-density>.
4) Wunderground. Weather History for KAGC: Weather Underground, Web. 7 Dec. 2015.
<
http://www.wunderground.com/history/airport/KAGC/2010/2/14/DailyHistory.html?req_cit
y=Belle+Vernon&req_state=PA&req_statename=Pennsylvania&reqdb.zip=15012&reqdb.magi
c=1&reqdb.wmo=99999&MR=1
>.

Appendix A