Edwards Medieval Theories of Distinctions

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MEDIEVAL THEORIES OF DISTINCTION
Sandra Stanton Edwards

A DISSERTATION
in
Philosophy
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
of the University of Pennsylvania in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy*
1974
Supervisor of Dissertation
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
74-22,834
EDWARDS, Sandra Stanton, 1944MEDIEVAL THEORIES OF DISTINCTION.

University of Pennsylvania, Ph.D., 1974
Philosophy
University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan
1974
SANDRA STANTON EDWARDS
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
TNTBX
Abelard, Peter, 20, 253

Accident, (see Substance)
Act (and potency), 62-63
Albertus Magnus, 255
Alexander of Hales, 20, 254-255
Angels, 73-74
Aquinas, St. Thomas, 5, 6, 11, 14-17, 20, 21, 22, 30-86, 186, 190, 191,
204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 211, 216, 218, 222, 229-31,
234, 242, 244, 256-335
Aristotle, 1, 2, 3, 33-34
Austin, J.L., 7
Bochenski, I.M., 48
Boethius, 1, 252
Bonaventure, St., 20, 21, 87-105, 209, 210, 219, 222-3, 225, 336-357
Common nature, 163-165
Concept, 27, 176, 196
Difference, analogical, 33, 34; essential, 102-104; formal, 37-43; generic,
53,34; material, 35-37; specific, 33, 34; numerical, 33, 34,
64, 169
Distinction, 1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 12, 22, 30-34; adequate, 146-148; of attri
butes, 91-98, 225; formal, 136-146, 150-151, 157-166, 172-174,
184-186, 212, 226-227; intentional, 110-118, 208, 225-226;
modal, 28, 148-149, 213-214, 228; rational, 4, 10, 13, 20, 21,
27, 32-33, 47-59, 79-83, 98-102, 107-109, 152-153, 174-178,
190-196, 207 , 213, 222; rea.', 4, 10, 13, 20, 21, 27, 32-33,
35-47, 61-78, 88-91, 105-107, 120-127, 129-151, 153-157, 170172, 180-190, 201-207, 214-215, 218-221; res and ratio. 178-179;
secundum quid. 135-151, 153-157; simpliciter, 129-135, 157-160;
verbal, 59-61
Durandus of St. Pourcain, 3, 212, 376-377
iii
iv
Base easentiae & esse existentiae, 116-118
Essence, and existence, 66-71, 74, 120-126, 182-183
Essence, and individual, 71-73, 74
Form (see Matter)
Formality, 137-145
Francis Mayron, 167, 429-430
Geach, Peter, 236-239
Genus, and difference, 161-163, 188-190
Gilbert of Poiree, 20, 252
Giles of Rome, 20, 120-127, 183, 202, 206, 212, 219, 371-375
God, 74-77, 79-82, 92-98, 99-102, 159-161, 190-195, (see also Trinity)
Godfrey of Fontaines, 212, 376
Haecceity (see Common Nature)
Henry of Ghent, 11, 20, 105-119, 202, 204, 208, 209, 211, 220, 223, 225-226,
358-370
Hugh of St. Victor, 254
Identity (see also Difference, Distinction, Unity), 3, 5, 6, 7, 229-235;
relative, 236-249
Intentio. 110-118
Intuitive cognition, 134-135
John of St. Thomas, 3, 5, 377-378
Johnson, WJB., 246
Lemmon, E.J., 76n
Lewis, C.I., 54n, 108
Matter (and form), 43, 64-65, 88-90, 105, 154-156, 180, 204
Modi se habendi. 91-98
Moore, G.E., 247-248
Object, formal and material, 154n
Ockham, William of, 5, 5, 11, 18-20, 21, 22, 169-199, 202-205, 209, 210, 215,
214, 216, 217, 221, 224, 227-228, 252-254, 255, 240-241,
451-478
Owens, J., 69
Perry, J,, 238
Peter Damian, 255
Peter John Olivi, 378-379
Peter Lombard, 255
Petrus Thomas, 450, 167
Potency (see Act)
Primo diversa, 155-156, 165
Principles, 14, 15, 16
Quine, W. V., 238, 246
Richard of St, Victor, 254
Ross, J.F., 81
Scotus, John Duns, 5, 11, 17-18, 21, 128-168, 184-186, 188, 204, 205, 206,
209, 210, 212, 215-216, 217, 220, 226-227, 231-232, 241,
390-429
Soul, 77-78, 159, 205-206
Stokes, M. , 6
Stout, 0., 247-248
Suarez, Franciscus, 5, 10, 27-30, 202, 213, 215, 221, 224-225, 228, 240, 241,
242-243, 244
vi
Substance (and accident), 44, 65-66, 103, 156-157
Supposition, 192-195
Terms (connotative and absolute), 175-176, 182, 194
Tertullian, 2, 252
Transcendentals, 200
Trinity, 1, 8, 74-77, 90-98, 172-174, 205, 240
Unitive containment, 141-145
Unity (see also Identity), 5, 229-255, 245
Universsils, 16, 17, 18, 19, 69-71, 163-165, 183-186
Van Fraassen, 54
Vollert, C., 4
Wiggins, D., 239
Wolter, A., 209
TABUS OF CONTENTS
Index.......................................... iii
Bibliography.................................... .
Introduction
1. General Survey............................. 1
2. Agreement and disagreement amongthe
philosophers. ............................ 10
3. Sources of disagreement
A. Aquinas................................14
B. Scotus................................ 17
C. Ockham..........
.....18
4. Development of thetheories.................. 20
3. Nature and methodsof inquiry.......
22
6. Suarez's treatment......................... 27
Chapter I; St. Thomas Aquinas
1. General survey.......................... ..*30
2. The real distinction.................
35
A* The material difference.................. 35
B. The formal difference............
37
C. Other real distinctions................. 43
3. The rational distinction.................... 47
A. The meaning of "ratio/'........
.47
B. The process of knowing................... 50
C. The nature of the rationaldistinction...... 53
D. Foundations of rational distinctions
....54
E. Summary............................... 57
4. The verbal distinction...................... 59
5. Applications of these distinctions............61
A. The real distinction...... ............... 61
B. The rational distinction................. 78
6. Conclusion.........
83
Chapter II: Minor Philosophers
1. St. Bonaventure............................ 87
A. General survey......................... 87
B. The real distinction.......... ........88
C. The distinction of attributes............ 91
D. The rational distinction................. 98
B. The essential difference................ 102
F. Conclusion....
................... 104
2. Henry of Ghent..................
105
A. The real distinction............
105
B. The rational distinction................ 107
C. The intentional distinction............. 110
D. The uses of the intentionaldistinction.... 116
118
B. Conclusion.............
vii
viii
3.
Giles of Rome............................ 120
Chapter III: John Duns Scotus

1. General survey.........
............128
2. The real distinction...................... 129
km Real simoliciter..................... .129
B. The real distinctions secundum quid...... 135
i. Formal distinctions............. ...*136
ii. Other distinctions secundum quid..... 146
C. Summary.......
149
3. The rational distinction................... 152
4* Applications of the distinctions.......... .*153
A. The real distinction................... 153
B. The formal distinction................. 157
5* Conclusion.............................. 166
Chapter IV: William of Ockham
1. General survey.......................... .169
2. The real distinction......... ............ 170
3. The formal distinction..... .......
172
4. The rational distinction.................. 174
5. The distinction between res andratio........ 178
6. Summary
........
*.... 179
7. Applications of these distinctions.......... 180
A. The real distinctions................. 180
B. The rational distinction...............190
8. Conclusion.............................. 197
Chapter V: Conclusion
1. Comparative summary.................. .....200
2. Accounts of identity and unity............. 229
3. Distinctions and identity................ ..236
Appendix...................................... 250
Early philosophers........................... 252
St. Thomas Aquinas......................... ..256
St. Bonaventure............................. 336
Henry of Ghent............................... 358
Giles of Rome........
371
Godfrey of Fontaines........................ ...376
Durandus of St. Pourcain...........
...376
John of St. Thomas.......................... 377
Peter John Olivi..................
378
John Duns Scotus..............................380
Francis Mayron
......................... 429
Petrus Thomas. .................
430
William of Ockham...............
.431
TABIS OF CHARTS
Real distinction
Aquinas......................................... 218
.219
Bonaventure..........
Giles of Rome............................
219
Henry of Ghent................................... 220
Scotus......
*.................... 220
Ockham................................
221
Suarez.
....................
.221
Rational distinction
Aquinas............................
.222
Bonaventure................................
222
Henry of Ghent............
.....223
Scotus.......................................... 223
Ockham......................
..224
Suarez.................. *.................
224
Other distinctions
Bonaventure...................................... 223
Henry of Ghent...................
223
Scotus.
...........
*............ .226
Ockham...........
.227
228
Suarez.....................
ix
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38 vols. Paris:
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Alexander of Hales: Suama Theologies. 4 vols, Florence: ad Claras Aquas
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Aristotle: The Works of Aristotle, ed. W.D. Ross.
12 vols. London: Oxford
University Press, 1955.

Austin, J.L.: Sense and Sensibilia. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964
Baudzy, Leon: Lexioue Philosophiaue de Guillaume d*Ockham* Paris: Lethiel*
leux, 1958.
Bochenski, I.M.:
M0n Analogy," in Inquiries into Medieval Philosophy, ed.
J. F. Ross. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing Co., 1971.

Boethius:
In Porphvrium Commentarium. in Patrologia Latina;. ed. Migne,
vol. 64. Paris, 1844.

Bonaventure:
Opera Omnia. 8 vols. Florence: ad Claras Aquas, 1882. 1
Bridges, Geoffrey G.:
Identity and Distinction in Petrus Thomae, O.F.M.
St. Bonaventure, New York: Franciscan Institute, 1959.

Cajetan: nnmmflnta-rv to Being and Essence. Tr. L. Kendzierski and F. Wade.
Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1964.
Cunningham, F.A.:
"St. Thomas on Distinctions," New Scholasticism, 36, 1962
PP. 279-312.
Dun* Scotus, John:
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16 vols.
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: Opera Omnia, ed. C. Balic. Vatican: 1950-
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Geacb, Peter*
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Gilbert of Poiree* Be Hebdomadibus. in Patrologia Latina, ed. Migne, vol.
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* Theorems on Existence and Essence, tr. Michael V. Murray.
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13th ed. Freiburg: Herder, 1961.
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theque S.J., 1961.
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xii
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Levis, C.I.S in Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation. LaSalle, 111.}

Open Court, 1967.
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Venice, 1320; rept. Frankfurt/Main: Minerva, 1966.
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Selections from Medieval Philosophers.
2 vols.
Hev York} Scribners, 1938.

Moody, Ernest} The Logic of William of Qckfcya. Mew York: Russell &
Russell, 1963.
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Particular?" in Philosophical Papers. Mew York} Collier, 1962.

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} Quotlibeta Septem. Strasbourg, 1491; rept. Lou
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^jwmua
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Peter Abdl&rd: Theologia Christiana in Patrologia Latina, ed. Migne,
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Sane F," Phil.Rev.. 79*2 (April) 1970,pp. 181-200.
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Peter Lombard* Senteatiarua in Patrologia Latina, ed. Migne, vol. 192.
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venture, N.I.* Franciscan Institute, 1957.
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of Vies. 2d
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i Word and Object. Cambridget H.I.T. Press, I960.
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xiv
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: Qpmacula
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____________ * Traotatus de gpirituallfrus Creatuyia, ed. L.W.Keeler.
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The Catholic University of America Press, 1969*
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pp. 725-736.
IHTRODUCTIOH
1. General Surrey
Beginning with the thirteenth century, most major medieval phil
osophers developed theories of distinction or accounts of the ways in
which one entity can be distinct or different from another* Such
theories are to be found in the works of Aquinas, Bonaventure, Scotus,
Oakham, Suarez, and many minor philosophers* There seem to have been
at least two sources for such theories Aristotle's discussions of
numerical, specific, and generic sameness and difference, and theologi
cal discussions of the nature of the Trinity.* Commentaries on Aris
totle's classifications of sameness and difference often focused on the
problem of universals, while commentaries on the Trinity focused on the
problem of how three distinct divine Persons could share one essence*
The problems are not unrelated, and while they were originally handled
separately, from the thirteenth century on attempts were made to present
unified theories of distinction which would apply to the solution of
both problems*
The term "distinction" appeared first in discussions of the
Trinity, usually contained in commentaries on Boethius's treatise On the
Trinity,
and was only later used to signify any type of difference,
Âristotle, Metaphysics. Belta 7, 1016b 53, Topics. I, 7*

1
2
diversity, or otherness* The following words of Tertullian are echoed
by Peter Abelard, Peter Damian, Peter Lombard, Hugh of St. Victor,
Bichard of St. Victor, Alexander of Hales, Albertus Magnus, and many
others!
The Son is not other than the Father by diversity,
however, but by distribution; nor other by division,
but by distinction. 2
Until the thirteenth century, discussions of the problem of universals
usually involved the use of words like "difference,1* "diversity," and
3
"otherness," but not the word "distinction."
Medieval philosophers accepted Aristotle*s belief that every
thing which is, is one, i.e. that 'being' and 'one* are convertible
4
notions. They also followed Aristotle in believing that 'same' and
'other* (or 'distinct') are transcendentals convertible with 'being*
qua 'being*:
. . . other in one sense is the opposite of the same
(so that everything is either the same as or other
than everything else). . . . 'Other or the same'
can therefore be predicated of everything with re
gard to everything else but only if the things
are one and existent, . . . 5
Scotus is in substantial agreement when he says, "Every being compared
^Tertullian, Liber Adversus Praxeam. Ch. IX, in Patrologia Latina
ed. Migne, vol. 2 (ParisYl844)
3
See, for example, Boethius and Gilbert of Poiree in the Appendix.
Âristotle, Metaphysics. Gamma, 2, 1003b 22.
Âristotle, Metaphysics. Iota, 3, 1054b 14ff.
3
with every other being is either the same as that or diverse; 'same' and
'diverse' are therefore contraries immediately agreeing with 'being' and
convertible with it" (74,75) And Ockham notes that "just as anything re
lates to being, so it relates to unity. And consequently it relates to
being distinct or indistinct" (45).
Sameness or identity is a type of unity and1distinction (which
was often described as the negation of unity see Aquinas 6,7 and
Suarex, p. 16) a type of multiplicity. This notion, too, is derived from
Aristotle who says that "sameness is a unity of the being either of more
than one thing or of one thing when it is treated as more than one" and
that things axe other if they are "more than one."^ Wherever then there
are many entities, these are distinct in some way.
Because of this intimate relation between being and unity, same
ness, and distinction, the kinds of being that there are determine tha
kinds of unity, sameness, and distinction according to many medievals*
John of St. Thomas (l) says that "Unity and distinction must follow upon
the order and intelligible character of being." Being was usually
divided into two types by medieval philosophers, real or mind-independent
being, and conceptual or mind-dependent being (ena rationls). This deter
mined the division of identity and distinction into real and conceptual
types. Durandus of St. Pourcain acknowledges this when he says, "Since
'same' and 'different' divide 'being', so just as 'being* is taken in two
ways, 'identity' and 'difference' (are each taken in two ways]" (l).
Âristotle, Metaphysics. Delta, 9, 1018a, 5ff.
So there axe real distinctions or differences which exist independently
4 '
of the intellect and its operations, such as distinctions obtaining be

tween two things or the principles of these things.
There are also dis-
tinctions which are either wholly or partly manufactured by the intellect.
Purely conceptual or rational distinctions (distinctio rationis or distinctio secundum rationem are the usual Latin equivalents) have no foun
dation outside the intellect, while distinctions partly created by the
mind and partly founded on the nature of things are conceptual distinctions
with real foundations.
Aquinass conceptual distinction of divine attri
butes, Bonaventures distinction of attribution, Henry of Ghents inten

tional distinction, and the distinction of reasoned reason of Suarez
and the later Thomists are of the latter sort.
Because of the connection between being and distinction, the
theory of distinctions of any particular medieval philosopher provides a
key to his conception of beings
The main reason why a philosopher's theory of distinc
tions is important is that his solution to the problem
of distinctions is a key to his concept of being. For
distinctions are based on the nature of being; there
fore a metaphysicians view of the nature of distinc
tions leads to an understanding of his doctrine of being
itself. 8
An understanding of a philosopher's theory of distinctions is also impor
tant to an understanding of his solutions to various metaphysical problems
such as that of universals.
Also any philosophers theory of distinctions
provides a key to the understanding of his notions of identity.

The division of distinction into the real distinction (distinctio
secundum rem) and the conceptual distinction (distinctio secundum rationem)
was clearly made as early as Alexander of Hales, although there are occas
ional earlier mentions in Gilbert of Poiree and others. See Appendix.
8Cyril Vollert, Introduction to Suarez's On the Various Kinds of Dis

tinction. p. 12.
"Distinction* has often recently been defined as a negation of

identity, and similar definitions are either explicitly or implicitly
Q
given by medieval philosophers*
Aquinas says, "those are distinct one
of which is not the other" (l).
(Aquinas distinguished between the "is"
of predication and the "is" of identity (147) and, since there can be a
distinction between two relata one of which is truly predicated of the
other, it would appear that he here means to deny or negate the "is" of
identity and not the "is" of predication (62)). Scotus and uckham use
"distinction" and "nonidentity" almost interchangeably.
Suarez says that
distinction consists formally in a negation and notes that where things

are really distinct, there is "no vestige of real identity in them".1^
John of St. Thomas also describes the real distinction as "a negation or
absence of identity" (3)
Although the above sort3 of description are common to medieval
philosophers, it is frequently the case that unity and identity are de
fined in terms of negations of division or distinction.
Suarez says,
"unity implies a negation of division, and is therefore opposed to multi

tude which arises from division or distinction."*1 Aquinas describes
numerical unity as a lack of distinction or division (3,50), and says
that things which are one or the same in species or genus are undivided
with respect to species or genus (7,48,50). Unity is the absence of
%ee, for example, Michael Eesnick Elementary Logic (H.Y.: McGraw
Hill, 1970), p. 360s "Two objects are distinct if and only if they are
not identical." Also D. Kalish and R. Montague, Logic (N.Y.: Harcourt,
1965). p. 217.
^Francis Suarez, On the Various Kinds of Distinctions, trans. Cyril
Vollert (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1947), p. 16, p. 17.
11-Suarez, p. 16.
6
multiplicitywhich arises from some division or distinction; sameness is
the lack ofa type of division or distinction. Michael C. Stokes has
summed this relation up as follows;
Things are called 'one' in species, genus, or simply in
kind, just because one cannot divide or distinguish the
kind of one from the kind of the other. . . Things are
called one by continuity because one cannot use a gap
. . . to distinguish more than one thing in the whole.
There are various ways in which things can be distin
guished from each other; if two of them cannot in one
way be distinguished, then as far as that way is con
cerned they are one thing. 12
Because of these descriptions of unity and identity in terms of
lack of distinction, it would appear that, for Aquinas and Suarez at
least, distinction is a more fundamental notion than either unity or
identity. That is. it is more fundamental in the sense that we under
stand unity and sameness by means of multiplicity and distinction. This
is also supported by the fact that identity was regarded as a relation
(see Aquinas. 6). A relation, however, obtains between at least two
relata, and for there to be two or more relata, there must be some dis
tinction between them.
The very fact that each of the philosophers discussed in this
paper developed a theory of distinctions indicates the fundamental impor
tance of distinction for each of them. Types of identity are normally
discussed by them only in connection with types of distinction. Bxcept
for occasional comments on numerical, specific, and generic identity, the
types of identity which would correspond to the types of distinction
discussed are only infrequently treated. That is, each philosopher
^Michael C. Stokes, One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy (Washing
ton, B.C.* Center for Hellenic Studies, 1971), P* 12.
provides a careful analysis of statements like "x and y are really dis
tinct,* but little attention is given to analyses of the corresponding
statements such as "x and y are really identical.* It may have been
assumed that, once a type of distinction had been analyzed, the corres
ponding type of identity could be easily constructed because it would
amount to an absence of such a distinction.
It may have been thought
that, with words like same,* identical," and "one,* the negative uses
"not the same,""distinct," "many," wear the trousers in J.L. Austin's
sense.
13
That is, we may attach a definite sense to the assertion that
things are identical, the same, or one in some way only by a considera
tion of the ways in which they might not have been the same, identical,
or one. To say that "x and y are identical" is to exclude possible ways
in which x and y might have been distinct; to say that "x and y are one"
is to exclude possible ways in which x and y might have been many. While
medieval philosophers sometimes say that entities are distinct because
they are not the same in some way, they more often say that entities are
the same or one because they are not distinct or many in some way. for
each of them then a theory of distinctions is also a theory of identity
and to some extent a theory of unity.
The problems which seem to have motivated medieval philosophers
to develop theories of distinction were those the solution of which re
quired a reconciliation of some identity with some distinction. These
problems were either metaphysical or theological in nature. On the meta
physical side there was the problem of universals how can many numeri^J.L. Austin, Sense and Senaibilia. (N.Y.: Oxford U. Press, 1964),
p. 70.
cally distinct things somehow he the same or similar in nature? And how can
one and the same individual have different characteristics or fall under
different concepts? On the theological side there was the problem of the
Trinity how can many distinct supposits share one essence? And the
question of divine attributes such as goodness and mercy how can one
simple and indivisible deity have many distinct characteristics? There
are obvious parallels between the metaphysical problems and the theological
problems and solutions for the metaphysical problems were quite often
adapted to the solution of the theological problems. The solutions re
quire explanations of how .some types of distinction are compatible with
some types of identity. The usual division of distinction and identity
into real and conceptual types provided such explanations for many phil
osophers, for conceptual distinction is compatible with real numerical
unity of relate according to them, while a real distinction is compatible
with conceptual or rational identity of relata. Bach philosopher's
solution involved certain variations of his own on these ideas. Other
problems, such as the problem of the distinction of the powers of the
soul, were recognized, and theories of distinction were adapted to handle
these as well.
Theories of distinction can thus be regarded as accounts of the
different ways in which things differ (and derivatively of the different
ways in which things can be the same or one). A distinction can obtain
between any two entities, e.g. Peter and Paul, Peter and Lassie, Peter
and the Biffel Tower, re and yellow, the rectangularity and whiteness of
this paper, Peter and the color red. The members of each pair are non
identical, for it is just as true to say "Peter is not identical with
9
Paul," as it is to say "Peter is not identical with Lassie," "Peter is not
identical with the Eiffel Tower," "The rectangularity of this paper is not
identical with the whiteness of this paper," or "Peter is not identical
with the color red." The members of each pair are different but the differ
ences are not entirely comparable.
The ways in which Peter differs from
Paul are different from the ways in which Peter differs from the Eiffel
Tower, but they are less different from one another than from the ways in
which Peter differs from yellow or the rectangularity of this paper from
the whiteness of this paper.
If an account of these different ways of
differing cannot be located in the nonidentity they all have in common,

then it must be found either in the relata themselves, or in the proper
ties b7 which they differ in each case. That is, an account will be
governed by the nature of the relata, i.e. whether they are individuals,
properties, or an individual and a property, or it will be governed by
the nature of that with regard to which the relata differ,
Medieval philosophers were concerned with classifying such dif
ferences according to similarities they exhibit, providing theoretical
descriptions for these hinds of differences, and outlining conditions
necessary and sufficient for a particular hind of difference to obtain
between relata. They were also concerned to show how such differences
either obtain independently of the mind or are created by the mind, and
in the latter case how we can determine the extent of the role which the
mind plays.
Not only were hinds of distinction classified according to simi
larities and differences they exhibit, but so were hinds of sameness or
10
identity* Suarez remarks that
. . . if we consider relative sameness between things that
are really distinct* and then compare the identity where
by Peter is the same as himself with the identity where
by he is the same as Paul* we can say that the identities
are really diverse since one is a sameness of thing* the
other a sameness of reason. 14
These theories have a great deal of historical importance for the
understanding of the metaphysics of medieval philosophers. They may also
have some contemporary interest in relation to theories of identity and
solutions to problems similar to those confronting the medievals.
2* Agreement and disagreement among the Philosophers
The theories of distinction developed by Aquinas* Bonaventure,
Henry of Ghent* Giles of Rome* Scotus, and Ockham differ widely in their
applications to the solution of standard problems* but there are several
areas in which most of them agree. All* for example* accept the division
of being into rational or conceptual beings (entia rationia)
beings orprinciples of real beings.
of bothreal
Consequently all provide
and conceptual distinctions.
and real
accounts
Inone form or another most of
them accepted some type of distinction of an intermediate nature. Such

a distinction is caused partly by our manner of apprehending objects* and
partly by some real difference existing outside the intellect. The object
of the distinction is usually one thing or substance which is disposed to
form diverse concepts in the understanding*
One of the areas of greatest disagreement is the exact nature of
the real foundation for such intermediate distinctions. There was no dis-
^Suarez, p. 63.
XI
pute over instances where the foundation was some real difference of
principles such as that of matter and form in a thing, but in cases where
the distinction obtained between two aspects of a thing which did not
really differ in that thing, questions arose as to how those aspects were
related to the thing in question. Aquinas maintained that these aspects
are virtually in a thing because of the powers such a thing has, i.e. the
vegetative and animal powers in a man.
But they are not really different
parts of the man because of his unity and simplicity (he has one and not
many substantial forms).
Henry of Ghent maintained that such aspects are
in the thing but only potentially different from one another until this
thing is considered by an intellect and compared with other things. The
aspects become actually different in the thing only as a result of some
mind's distinguishing them on the basis of such a comparison.
In either
case, these aspects (call them A and B), are not different in the thing
(call it a) apart from some intellect's comparing with other things b,
and in which A and B are really different (e.g. when Jj.has A but not B,
and has B but not A, or conversely)
In contrast to Aquinas and Henry, Scotus maintained that such a
difference of A and B in must be real. A and B are really different
aspects of a, what he calls "formalities" They differ in independently
of any intellect's comparison of with other objects. The distinction
here is the formal distinction which is real, but not as great as the
numerical distinction of two things (see Chapter 3). The formal distinc
tion was challenged on many points. William of Ockham, while holding that
there is a type of formal difference between Persons of the Trinity, cate
gorically denied that such entities as formalities exist.
Other philoso
12
phers such as Giles of Rone, Godfrey of Fontaines, Durandus of St* Pour*
cain, flatly rejected the possibility of there being a type of distinction
which is neither a distinction of things nor a distinction of ways of con
ceiving the same thing*
Disagreements among medieval philosophers arose in two other areas.
First, medieval philosophers disagreed as to how certain particular dif
ferences were to be classified* For example, is the difference between
the intellective and volitive powers of the human soul more like the real
distinction between Peter and Paul, or is it more like the conceptual dis
tinction between Peter's humanity and animality? Second, they disagreed
as to what constituted the evidence by which two extremes or relata were
discovered to differ in some particular way. That is, different responses
are given to the following questions: how do we determine that & and b
differ really (or conceptually, or formally, etc.), and what conditions
must be fulfilled for there to be a real lor conceptual, or formal, etc.)
distinction between & and b? Some philosophers maintained that for & and
to differ really it was necessary that each be capable of existing apart
from the other.
Others maintained that this condition is n t only neces
sary but sufficient as well. Still others use the more general condition
of opposition of & and b,with regard to some property F.
The two areas of disagreement are interrelated, for the conditions
given for each type of distinction determine how particular cases are to
be classified.
Likewise the grouping together of particular cases of dis
tinction because of similarities they exhibited determined what conditions

would be necessary and/or sufficient for a type of distinction to obtain
between extremes. Disagreements in all of the areas mentioned were usually
13
due to differences in the metaphysics of the philosophers concerned*
Ockham's conceptualism* for example* caused him to give conditions for
real distinctions which would have been unacceptable to a realist like
Scotus* As a result* Ockham frequently classifies as real particular
distinctions which Scotus would classify as formal*
With regard to the real distinction* there was agreement over
which particular distinctions were to be classified as real in many in
stances* while there was some disagreement both over the general descrip
tion and the evidence needed to prove that a particular distinction was
real. For example* there was disagreement between Scotus and Ockham as
to whether every real distinction must be a distinction between things*
but there was general agreement that numerical distinctions were real*
Lists of conditions for each type of distinction varied* Some philoso
phers, as already indicated* took the mutual separability of the relate
as evidence for their real distinction* while others took the opposition
of the relata as evidence*
There was general agreement also as to the description of a con
ceptual distinction as one which does not exist entirely independently of
the intellect.
Usually conceptual or rational distinctions were sub
divided into two types those which were purely mental, and those which
were conceptual yet had real foundations. The conditions given as neces
sary and/or sufficient for each type of conceptual distinction varied from
philosopher to philosopher* and there was great disagreement as to whether
some particular distinction was conceptual only or whether it had a real
foundation. Finally* there was much disagreement as to the general descrip
tions for each type of conceptual distinction.
14
3* Sources of Disagreement
The metaphysics of various medieval philosophers differ, and these
differences are in large part responsible for the disagreements indicated
above. Each philosopher has certain general goals of his own and certain
problems that he is attempting to resolve. Adjustments are often made in
his theory of distinctions in order that such problems may be resolved in
accordance with his basic metaphysical assumptions.
It is sufficient for
this Introduction to indicate briefly how different solutions to one par

ticular problem,
the problem of universals, affect the different theories
of distinction of the major philosophers.

A. Aquinas
Certain pairs of intrinsic principles of things are fundamental to
the metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas.
One member of each pair is re
lated to the other member of the pair as act i3 related to potency (that
in a substance which is related as form actualizes that in a substance which
is related as matter, etc.). Corporeal substances are composed of both
matter and form, substance and accident, essence and existence. Each such
individual substance has its own form, but the forms of several individuals
qua forms may be indistinguishable.
For example, Peter and Paul are differ
ent individual men, but if their human forms are considered in abstraction
from their materiality, these forms are indistinguishable.
being menr Peter and Paul fail to differ.
In regard to
On the basis of this lack of dif
ference, the mind can form the concept 'man' which includes only what is
indistinguishable in Peter and Paul qua being men, and which is applicable
to both. Forms in things are many, not one, and universality arises only
15
through the understanding*
But if Peter and Paul are indistinguishable with regard to fonn,
what is it that makes them different individuals? Aquinas's answer is that
signate matter (matter existing under determinate dimensions) is the principle of individuation in corporeal substances*
Such matter has quantity
and thus "matter existing under these dimensions is distinguished from that
vhich is under other dimensions" (14) - Such matter is also a subject which
is not received by anything in the way that form is received by matter* Be
cause of the matter and dimensive quantity in a corporeal substance each is
an individual* i.e. each is undivided in itself and divided from everything
else (3). Because of the difference in dimensive quantities of matter, the
matter of Peter has a different spatial location and different accidents of
other sorts from the matter of Paul. Their forms are individuated by com
position with signate matter (in a derivative sense of "individuated") so
that Peter's humanity is not Paul's humanity.
Since he rejects the doctrine
of universal hylomorphism, Aquinas needs a different principle of individu

ation (or "individualization") for spiritual substances.
It is the form of
each substance which is proper to it alone that marks it off from other
spiritual substances.
Such substances are specifically, not numerically,
distinct from one another*

In corporeal and spiritual substances alike there is a composition
of essence with existence, and when several substances are indistinguish
able as to essence, e.g. when all are humans, they differ not only with
respect to matter or form but also with respect to their acts of existence.
The existence of Paul is not the existence of Peter although both are men.
In order to account for both the possibility of universality and
16
the possibility of singularity, what are related in a thing as matter and
form (and what are related in a thing as essence and existence) must be
really different.
If matter and form were really identical and only concep
tually different in Peter, Peter would have nothing in common with Paul.
His form would be peculiar to him. And if the essence humanity were really
identical with the individual Peter and his existence, the concept 'man*
would not be applicable to other individuals such as Paul or John*
Universality is accounted for by one member of each pair, singu
larity by the other member of the pair.
Peter and Paul are specifically
the same because their forms qua forms are indistinguishable. They are
numerically different because the signate matter of one has a different
dimensive quantity from the signate matter of the other. Such principles
are not themselves things or beings, but composites of such principles are
things or beings. The real distinction must be interpreted then in such
a way as to account for distinctions of principles in things as well as
distinctions between things and substances. For example, such principles
are not mutually separable according to Aquinas. So mutual separability
cannot be a necessary sign for a real distinction of relata. Opposition,
or what today might be called discexnibility, is used by Aquinas a neces
sary condition for a real distinction.
Since act and potency are funda
mentally and ultimately opposed, so are the analogous members of the fol
lowing pairs of principles: matter and form, substance and accident, es
sence and existence.
Most other real distinctions, e.g. numerical, and
specific distinctions, are founded on real distinctions between such prin

ciples.
Conceptual or rational distinctions on the other hand are not
always reducible to such distinctions of principles, but are either wholly
17
or partly founded on distinctions made by the intellect*

B. Scotus
Buns Scotus agrees with Avicenna and Aquinas that specific natures
such as humanity are neither one cor many of themselves but are indifferent both to unity and multiplicity, and to universality and singularity.
15
Such natures really exist in things, but universality and singularity must
both be accounted for. A nature is not singular of itself, hence it lacks
the numerical unity of an individual.
But it must have some kind of unity
in order that universal concepts, which are basic to science, not be fic
titious. Our concepts of humanity and equinity and the like must each cor
respond to some unity on the part of a nature as it exists in things.
Scotus concludes that a nature as it exists in things has a real unity which
is less than numerical unity. Consequently there is a real foundation in
things for a specific concept.
Universality is accounted for by the fact
that such natures can be understood by the intellect apart from any indi
viduating conditions. Singularity is accounted for by the fact that the
nature is "contracted to each individual which has this nature. The
nature exists in the individual as a real being which i3 less than a numeri
cal being. Scotus calls such a being a formality. A formality is less than
a form it is not a thing and cannot exist apart from the thing to which
it belongs. Anti one form can contain several formalities as the specific
form contains formalities of genus and difference. The nature is contracted
to the individual by an individual difference (haecceltaa) which also is
a formality of the thing. These two formalities, neither of which has numeriAquinas, Be Snts et Essentia, ed. Boyer(Rome: Universitatis Gregorianae, 1966), p. 30.
18
cal unity of itself, are formally distinct. A formal distinction is a dis
tinction of formalities within an existing substance.
A distinction of formalities is, in many respects, similar to a dis
tinction of things.
Both distinctions obtain independently of the mind and
the relata of both types of distinction cause distinct formal objects in the
understanding. The two types of distinction differ in that the relata of a
distinction of things are mutually separable, while the relata of the formal
distinction are neither separable from each other nor from the thing to
which they both belong. Not only nature and haecceity, but also the powers
of the soul, God's attributes, transcendentals convertible with 'being,'
divine Persons, and genus and specific difference in a thing, are formally
distinct. For Scotus, the real distinction must then be described broadly
enough to include not only a distinction between things, but also a dis
tinction between two formalities of a thing. Thus his realism, his belief
that common natures must be real beings, leads Scotus to modify the real
distinction and elaborate a subdivision of it which will help account for
both the fact that we have universal concepts which have real foundations,
and the fact that singular beings exist.
C. Ockham
Scotus adopted the formal distinction in order to explain both how
natures become universal and how they become singular. Villiam of Ockham,
on the other hand, takes singularity as given and seeks an explanation only
for universality. Everything that is, is singular or numerically one and
this applies as much to entia rationis or concepts as it does to real beings.
For Ockham there is then only one type of difference, a numerical difference
19
between singulars.
Still we can distinguish between distinctions in which
the relata are both things, distinctions in which the relata are both
concepts, and distinctions in which one relatum is a thing and the other
a concept.
Since there are no beings which are not singular, there is no such
being as Scotus's formality with its unity less than numerical unity.
Ockham rejects the formal distinction in all but certain theological con
texts, and even in these it is interpreted as a peculiar kind of distinc
tion between things. There are no common natures existing in things, hence
universals can only be concepts founded on similarities exhibited by singu
lar beings. A universal is a sign
formed by the understanding which is
applicable to, or predicable of, many singulars. There is no unity in the

singulars themselves,which corresponds to the unity of the universal, for
there is no common nature existing independently of the mind.
If every being is singular, then every being is logically indepen
dent of any other singular being.
One singular can exist independently of
another singular at least by divine power, for no contradiction is involved

in separating such entities.
Separability of relata constitutes both a
necessary and a sufficient condition for any difference of singulars accord

ing to Ockham.
Through these examples it can be seen how the metaphysics of differ
ent philosophers lead them to different solutions to common problems, and
also to different answers to certain fundamental questions about distinctions,
e.g. if a and b, differ, and and differ, are these two differences the
same or are they different? Are there several kinds of difference or dis-
20
tinction, or only one kind? Which cases of differences fall under each
general type? Disagreements on these and other points often have their
roots in the diverse metaphysical systems of the philosophers and the
strategies they employ to resolve many problems*
4*
Development of the Theories
The terminology of theories of distinction, i.e. "real distinc

tion," "rational distinction," etc., seems to have come into general use
only in the thirteenth century.
Peter Abelard, writing in the first half
of the twelfth century, rarely uses the term "distinction" and, although
he refers to numerical, essential, and definitional differences, he makes
no attempt to classify such differences as either mind-independent or
mind-dependent.
Occasional hints of the later division of distinction
into two types appear in the works of philosophers like Gilbert of Poiree
(see Appendix), and Alexander of Hales writing shortly before Bonaventure
and Aquinas is already using the terminology that they will use (see Ap
pendix). Aquinas and Bonaventure are already thoroughly familiar with the
terminology. For them a real distinction is mind-independent, and the sign
of such a distinction is the discernibility of the relata with regard to
some property. Their successors Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent charac
terize a real distinction as one obtaining between things independently
of the mind*
Scotus attempts to characterize a real distinction broadly
and subdivides it into a distinction between things and a distinction be

tween formalities of one thing.
Both Aquinas and Bonaventure acknowledge two types of rational dis
tinction the distinction which is purely conceptual, and the distinc
tion which has some real foundation outside the intellect. As indicated
above, there is some dispute as to the exact nature of the real foun
dation for the latter type of conceptual distinction. Scotus transforms
the rational or conceptual distinction with a real foundation into the
formal distinction thus making it more real than conceptual. After Scotus,
the dispute usually takes the form of inquiring whether some type of dis
tinction is possible which is intermediate between the real and the
rational.
But the so-called "intermediate" distinctions in question (the
intentional, the formal, etc.) are usually classified by their proponents

as either rational or real (when "real" is understood as equivalent to
"mind-independent"). The question should then be whether there is or can
be a type of being (e.g. a formality or some objective counterpart of a
concept which does not represent the whole reality of a thing) intermediate
between a thing and a concept.
Scotus, Olivi, and others admit such real
beings, while other philosophers such as Ockham reject all such intermedi
ate types of being.
The development of the medieval theories of distinction is to
some extent progressive. For example, the earlier philosophers do not
devote much attention to theoretical descriptions of the different ways
of differing that they acknowledge, but such descriptions are important
for Scotus and Ockham. Also Aquinas and Bonaventure are more inclined
to include their accounts of ways of differing in their solutions to
various problems which concern them. Aquinas makes little attempt to
describe distinctions apart from these contexts.
Bonaventure, on the
other hand, offers clear descriptions of ways of differing, but he re

lates them to various theological problems in such a way that it is dif-
22
ficult to isolate his descriptions from these contexts.
Most early accounts of ways of differing are also incomplete.
Aquinas occasionally mentions differences which he does not classify as
either real or rational, while Bonaventure neglects to classify many in
stances of differences which are not of theological interest.
By Ock
ham's time (the early fourteenth century) theoretical descriptions have

become clear and precise and are usually isolated from discussions of
particular problems. That is. Ockham's descriptions of ways of differing
are designed to apply to cases other than those he specifically discusses.
He clearly outlines his descriptions, his classifications, and the condi
tions for each type of distinction, and every distinction mentioned is
classified as either real, rational, formal, etc. Part of the reason for
his greater clarity and precision may be the amount of effort he expends
criticizing the work of his predecessors.
5. Nature and Methods of Inquiry
The purpose of this paper is to provide a detailed examination of
several of these medieval theories. With the exception of a few works
dealing with particular philosophers, the problem of distinctions in medie
val philosophy, although often referred to, has not been fully treated since
Suarez published hi3 treatise on distinctions in 1597.
16
Mention of theories
of distinction is most often made in connection with the problem of universals.

Thus Allan Wolter, in discussing Scotus's realism, presents a brief discus16M. Grajewski, The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus: G. Bridges,
Identity and Distinction in Petrus Thomae; "The Formal Distinction" by A.
Wolter; "Distinction according to St. Thomas" by F.A. Cunningham. See
bibliography for more complete information.
23
sion of distinctions in general as well as a discussion of Scotus*s for
mal distinction in particular, and relates the formal distinction to a
detailed analysis of Scotus*s position on universale.
17
Other writers on
medieval philosophy such as Mclnerpy, Weinberg, Maurer, and Gopieston

nmirw similar mention of theories of distinction in connection with the
problem of universals and the various attempted solutions.
An under
standing of theories of distinction is important to an understanding of

medieval philosophy in general, and this paper represents an attempt to
remedy the past neglect of these theories.
Attention in the text of the paper is focused upon the theories
of several major figures in medieval philosophy, i.e. Aquinas, Scotus,
and Ockham.
Some attention is also devoted to lesser figures with inter
esting theories such as Bonaventure, Giles of Rone, and Henry of Ghent.

The following works by Aquinas were consulted: Sunma Theologies (Migne
edition), Summa Contra Gentiles (Leonine edition), Super Libros Sententiarua (Vives ed.),De Potentia Dei (Vives ed.), J)e Base et Essentia (ed.
Boyer), De Spiritualibus Creaturis (ed. Keeler), De Veritate (Vives ed.),
In Metaphvsicam Aristotelia Commentaria (Cathala ed.), In Aristotelis
Librum de An-tum Commentaria (Pirotta ed.), Expositio super Librum Boethii
de Trinitate (ed. Decker), with occasional references to other works. All
references to Bonaventure are from the Opera (Quaracchi ed.). The major
works consulted in this collection were the Commentaria in Quatuor Libros
Sententiarum. the Breviloauii. and the Guaestiones Disputatae de livsterio
17
1962).
Allan Wolter, "The Realism of Scotus," Journal of Philosophy. (Nov.,
24
Trinitatis. Henry of Ghent1s Quolibet and Sumaa Quaestionem OrdinArium
were consulted, as well as Giles of Rome's Theorems on Existence and Es
sence (trans. Murray). Most of Scotus's passages on distinctions are
found in the following works: Reportata Parisienais (Wadding ed.), Com
mentaria Oxoniensia (Vatican and Wadding eds.),
Quaestiones Subtilissimae
in Metaphyaicam Aristotelis (Wadding ed.,), and feuodlibeta (Wadding ed.).

Finally, the following works by Ockham were consulted: Summa Logicae
(ed. Boehner), Quotlibeta Sentem (Louvain ed.), and the Scriptum in Librum
Primum Sententiarum Qrdinatio.
A separate chapter has been devoted to each of the three major
figures, and discussions of several lesser figures are found in a fourth
chapter.
Similar procedures have been followed in each of. these chapters.
First, material has been extrapolated from the works (listed above) of each
philosopher in which mention is made of distinctions. A description of
the philosopher's theory, based on these extrapolations, is then presented.
Second, the conditions or signs for each type of distinction are isolated
from discussions of particular problems, examined, and outlined. An
attempt is made to determine which conditions the philosopher considers to
be necessary, which sufficient, and which both. Third, each philosopher's
theory of distinctions, i.e. his theoretical descriptions of the ways of
differing, his classifications of various examples, and the conditions he
gives for each way of differing are examined in the light of his metaphys
ical system and the particular problems he is trying to solve with his
theory. This is important in view of the fact that each philosopher has
his own strategy his theory of distinctions is designed to solve certain
problems of a metaphysical or theological nature which confront him.
25
Finally, the applications of each philosopher's theory to the problems he
was trying to solve are examinedThe concluding chapter is devoted to several aspects of; these
theories:
l) a comparison of the various theories; 2) a construction of
theories of identity corresponding to the theories of distinction; 5) the

relation of these theories to contemporary philosophy. With regard to 3)
similarities between some of the medieval theories and contemporary
theories such as Geach's which attempt to justify the relativity of iden
tity are noted. The reasons presented by Wiggins and others for rejecting
this relativity thesis are noted and imply also the rejection of aspects
of medieval theories such as Aquinas's and Scotus's.
It is pointed out
that with some modification these medieval theories can be regarded as

providing different criteria rather than different kinds of distinction
and identity and that 3uch criteria still play a central role in metaphys
ical theories.
An Appendix is provided at the end of the paper which gathers to
gether the textual quotations necessary for an understanding of medieval
theories of distinction.
These passages are difficult to come by and have
not been gathered together before.
Consequently the Appendix may serve
as a useful tool for anyone wishing to examine critically either the state
ments made in this paper, or other treatments of distinction such as that
of Suarez. This Appendix does not, of course, provide a complete catalogue
of every discussion of distinction made by any of the philosophers dis
cussed in this paper.
The passages in the Appendix are organized according to author (and
subject insofar as this was possible).
For example, all the major passages
from Aquinas's works are grouped together. Within this section, all the
passages relating to the real distinction are grouped together, all the
passages relating to the rational distinction are grouped together, and
so on. Each passage is given a number. For example, each passage from
Aquinas, together with its English translation, is numbered consecutively
beginning with the number 1. There is a separate grouping of quotations
for each philosopher, and in each case passages within the group are
numbered consecutively beginning with the number 1.
In the text itself,
references to these passages in the Appendix are cited within parentheses

in the text, e.g. Bonaventure (27,34)* This means that the appropriate
passages are those numbered 27 and 34 in the section of the Appendix
devoted to Bonaventure.
When a direct quotation is made in the text, the
first number within parentheses indicates the number of the passage which
is quoted in whole or in part. Any subsequent numbers within the same
parentheses indicate other relevant passages by the same author. When
another author is also cited, his name is given before the numbers of the
relevant passages in his section, e.g. Aquinas (2l); Scotus (67)*
Belov each passage in the Appendix, the source of the passage
is given. For example, a passage from Scotus might be from 1 Ox., d.2,
a.3, n. 17 (Vatican I, p. 354). This means that the passage is from
Scotus's Commentaria Qxoniensia. Book I, distinction 2, question 5, num
ber 17, Vatican edition of Scotus's works, volume I, page 354. More de
tails concerning the exact sources are located in the Bibliography, e.g.
authors' full names, full titles of works, editions, place of publication
and date of publication, etc. A list of abbreviations used in such Appen
dix citations is included at the beginning of the Appendix.
Most of the
27
translations in the Appendix are my own, and where they are not, this
fact is noted*
6* Suarez's Treatment
One of the few works devoted exclusively to the theory of dis
tinctions in general is Francis Suarez's On the Various Kinds of Distinc
tions. first published as part of his Disputationes toetaphvsicae in 1597*
In this work Suarez examines some of the theories of his predecessors for
the purpose of ascertaining just what sorts of distinctions there are. He
is particularly interested in determining whether there is some kind of
distinction, for example a formal distinction, intermediate between a real
distinction (understood as a distinction between things) and a purely ratio
nal distinction.
Suarez adopts the real distinction of things, the distinc
tion of reasoning reason (purely conceptual distinction), and the distinc

tion of reasoned reason (conceptual distinction with a real foundation) of
the later Thomists. He criticizes and finally rejects distinctions like
Scotus's formal distinction on the grounds that such a distinction can be
adequately accounted for by the distinction of reasoned reasons
. . . many things are distinguished in objective concepts
according to our point of view, although they are only
mentally distinct through inadequate concepts, . . . .
All these can be distinguished in definition by a mere
mental distinction, whenever a definition does not
adequately represent a thing as it is in itself, but as
it is exhibited in a concept of ours. 13
18
Suarez, p. 27. The objective concept mentioned is the counterpart

of the formal concept. A formal concept represents a thing outside the
intellect. An objective concept is a concept only derivatively it is
the reality represented by the formal concept. This division goes back
to Aquinas who said that a ratio could be in the mind as the significate
of a word, and in a thing also when the ratio is a likeness of a thing (42).
28
Suarezs's innovation is a modal distinction, i.e. a distinction
either between two modes of one thing, or between a thing and its mode.
Modes "are something positive and of themselves modify the very entities
by conferring on them something that is over and above the complete es19
sence as individual and as existing in nature." Thus the inherence of
a quantity in a substance would be a mode of this quantity. This dis
tinction is a real one in that the difference between two modes or a mode
and the thing modified exists independently of the intellect.
It can be
called a "distinction from the nature of the case" (ex natura rei) al
though it is not as great as a distinction between two things.
Once he has described real, modal, and rational distinctions in
general, Suarez sets out certain conditions or "signs" for each type of
distinction.
In so doing he rejects certain signs proposed by his pre
decessors and contemporaries for the same distinctions* Thus he says

that the mutual separability of two things is a sufficient, but not a
necessary, condition for the real distinction of these things. A non
mutual separability of extremes is sufficient to show that one of these
extremes is a mode and the other a thing. An absence of any such signs
for real distinctions is sufficient to show that a distinction is
+
i 20
conceptual.
There are several respects in which Suarez's treatment differs

from the treatment given distinctions in this paper. First, Suarez does
^Suarez, p. 28.
20Ibid.. pp. 40-61.
29
not attempt an historical analysis of theories of distinction. He refers
to the history of such theories and to particular earlier philosophers
only in the discussion concerning the possibility of an intermediate dis
tinction, although he frequently cites his predecessors elsewhere on cer
tain points. He makes no attempt to present the theoretical descriptions,
classifications, and conditions given by a philosopher like Aquinas, nor
does he often compare one such theory with another.
Second, Suarez's
goal throughout his treatise is to develop his own theory of distinctions,

and any discussions or criticisms of other philosophers' theories are
incidental to this purpose.
In this paper, analyses of various medieval philosophers' theories
are of primary importance.
Furthermore, these theories are amined in re
lation to the metaphysical theory of each philosopher.
CHAPTER I
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

(1225-1274)
1. General Survey
Aquinas says that the notion or ratio of distinction contains

negation, "for those are distinct one of which is not the other" (1,2).
There are several ways in which one entity can be distinct from another.
Every corporeal substance, for example, although one and indistinct
in itself, is distinct from all other substances in its matter and
form and act of being (3).
But it is still true that such substances
are often identical with one another in certain other respects.
If
two things x and y agree in some respect and are nonidentical in some
other respect, they are said to be "different."
For example, two men
differ in that the matter of each exists under different dimensions,

but they are the same insofar as each has a human form.
Where "x" and
"y" signify things, and "F" and "G" signify properties of things,
difference may be described as follows: (x)(y)x differs from y^-fr
(3 F) (Fx & Fy) & 0^5x & -Gy) v (Gy & -Gx)]Q . Both x and y have the
property F, but either x has the property G while y does not have G,
or y has G while x does not have G.
Because both x and y have F and
not both have G, such things must be composite: "It is necessary that
what differ be composite in some way, since they differ in something
and agree in something else"(4,5).
Simple entities or principles,
however, are said to be diverse rather than different because they

30
31are nonidentical of themselves and agree in no respect (24).
If x
and y are diverse, there is no univocal predicate "F" which is true

of both, or (x)(y) Qx is diverse from y 4 r f -(3 F)(Fx & Fy)Q .
Diversity is an absolute notion, because if x and y are
diverse, then they are simply nonidentical and not nonidentical only
with respect to some property F.
Difference, however, is relative to
some respect or respects in which two entities are nonidentical.
Two
things may be the same in both being squares, for example, but differ
in color, for "all that differ differ in something" (5,4).
Whether
they are diverse or merely different, two things may be distinguished.

Host entities are different from one another, not diverse, and
this is due to the fact that they are composed of intrinsic principles
which are telated to each other as potency is related to act, e.g. the
principles matter and form, essence and existence, substance and
accident.
It is by means of such principles that these entities both
agree with, and differ from, one another.
Aquinas says that the
principles themselves are diverse because they provide the ultimate

foundations for most differences.
They cannot themselves be different
from one another because they are simple, not composite.

difference dividing a
Substantial
pecies, and God and prime matter are also said
to be diverse:
It must be said that simple things do not differ
by some other differences, for this is true of
composites. For a man and a horse differ by
differences of rationality and irrationality,
which differences indeed do not differ more from
each other by still other differences. Hence
. . . they are not properly said to differ but
to be diverse. Whence, according to the Philo
sopher, . . . "diversity is said absolutely, but
all that differ differ by something." (5)
32
Substantial differences, as that by which members of different species
of a genus differ, are ultimate and do not owe their nonidentity to
something further, e.g. a form, in eabh of them.
God and prime matter
are diverse in the God is pure act, prime matter pure potency, and
act and potency are diverse of themselves.
Two basic kinds of unity and plurality (or indivision and
division) are associated with the notion of difference.
In the first
place, things may be many and different in being although they are one
in some respect such as Peter and Paul who are numerically different
individuals although they are one insofar as both are men.
In the
second place, there may be one thing which the intellect treats as
many in order to grasp some relationship, as when Peter, who is one
individual, is regarded both as this man and as the richest man in
town(6).
Aquinas says that in the first case, Peter and Paul are
"simply11 many and one only "after a fashion" (secundum quid); in the
second case he says that this man and the richest man in town are
"simply" one and many only "after a fashion" (79).
This account of unity and multiplicity provides two ways of
considering sameness and difference.
Since unity and multiplicity,
and sameness and difference, are closely related pairs of notions, an

alternative way of expressing what Aquinas has said concerning unity
would be to say that many individuals or beings can be really differ
ent but conceptually the same when they can be subsumed under the same
concept, and that an individual which is really one can be considered
as "falling under" several differing concepts.
In this way Aquinas
implicitly (i.e. without using the terms "real difference," "rational
33
difference," etc.) introduces the division of difference (and sameness
also) into real and rational types.
A real .difference is a difference
of things which are many in being, or of principles of such things.
rational difference is a difference between a being considered under

one concept and the same being considered under another concept.
Real
sameness is sameness in subject (numerical sameness), while rational

sameness is sameness in concept.
Aquinas also introduces the two types of difference by con
trasting one with the other as when he points out that the difference
between a subject and its essence which is real in a creature can be
only rational in God.
Occasionally Aquinas uses Aristotles division of sameness and
difference into numerical, specific, generic, and analogical types.
Numerical difference is the difference between two beings whose
material elements differ, while numerical sameness is sameness in
matter or subject.
Specific difference is the difference between
beings belonging to different species (their definitions differ'where

they have definitions), while specific sameness is the sameness of two
numerically different individuals falling under the same concept (and
having the same definition of essence). Generic difference is the
difference between beings belonging to two genera or categories of
being, while generic sameness is the sameness of two specifically
different entities which fall under the same generic concept. Finally,
analogical sameness is the sameness of two beings which differ
generically but "agree in something according to proportion," as a
substance and a quality differ but agree in being according to
34
proportion (24,25).
There is no analogical difference because beings
which '.'agree in no respect" are said to be diverse, not different

(although things or principles which are diverse are also said to be
analogically the same in some respect, e.g. a substance and an
accident).
Peter and Paul differ numerically as do Peter and his cat.
Peter and Paul are, however, specifically the same since both fall
under the specific concept 'man1. Peter and the man sitting in the
corner are numerically the same.
Peter and his cat are numerically
and specifically different because they do not fall under the same
specific concept.
They are generically the same since both fall under
the generic concept 'animal'.
A substance and a quality are generi
cally different but analogically the same.
Beings which are different
in one way need not be different in the other ways.
Things which are
numerically different may, but need not, be specifically hence generi

cally the same; two beings, such as two accidents of one subject, may
be specifically different but numerically the same, and so on (24,26).
While the Aristotelian division of difference and sameness is
useful in some respects, it does not exhaust the possible kinds of
difference and sameness.
Most rational differences are not accounted
for, nor are many differences which obtain independently of the

intellect accounted for, e.g. the difference between two divine
Persons.
The real-rational division, since it is broader, is also
the more useful and replaces the Aristotelian in most of Aquinas's

works.
35
2. The Real Distinction
The real distinction in general is never given any complete
treatment by Aquinas, nor are the conditions for the distinction ever
sharply outlined.
In fact, the phrases "real distinction" and "real
difference" rarely occur outside his discussions of the Trinity.
The
two types of difference said to exist "in things" (in rebus, 21) are
the material and formal differences.
Only two conditions are given
by which we may recognize such differences in created substances

quantitative division and formal division which implies opposition.:
" . . . a distinction of some /i.e. substances or things/
from each
other can only be because of a material or quantitative division, or

because of a formal division" (2,21).
A.
The Material Difference
Quantitative or material division is found among corporeal

beings where there are numerically different members of one species,
or numerically different members of different species (2,21).
In the
former case, such things are indistinguishable with regard to their

forms alone (insofar as both are dogs, Lassie and Rover do not differ)
and with regard to the definitions of their essences (12,49,102).
But
"the matter of this is distinguished from the matter of that" (10,12,

14,18).
That is, the matter belonging to Lassie, the matter that
makes Lassie this dog rather than another, is proper to her alone just
as the matter belonging to Rover is proper to him alone.
According to Aquinas, the basis for this division is "the
36
division of quantity, according as matter existing under these
dimensions is distinguished from that which is under other dimensions"
(14,2,13,17,18,19,22).
Such matter is called "signate matter."
Un
like the intelligible matter of mathematical entities, signate matter

has a precise spatio-temporal location.
A thing partly composed of
such matter becomes a "this," a>being with a definite location in

space and time, an individual which can be designated or pointed to
because it is marked off from all other material things.
Signate
matter provides the foundation for the sensible qualities of a thing

its color, size, shape, etc.
In Aquinas's terminology, such matter
makes a thing undivided in itself and divided from all others it makes
it an individual (17).
Thus Aquinas explains how Lassie and Rover, who are both dogs .
and consequently fall under the same specific concept, are two and
not one because Lassie has this flesh and these bones, while Rover has
that flesh and those bones.
There are different quantities of matter
in each (11,23).
Not only is the matter of each corporeal thing proper to it
alone, but the substantial(or accidental) form individuated by this
matter must exist under the quantitative dimensions of the matter.
Hence it is distinct from similar forms existing under other quantita
tive dimensions:
Forms which are capable of being received in
matter are individuatecl through matter which
cannot be in another /i.e. signate matter/
. . . . Truly a form in itself, unless some
thing else prevents, can be received by many
individuals. (16,15)
37
the form whiteness, for example, would be one and not many were it to
be separated from every material object (96).
Through composition
with signate matter, it becomes the form of an individual, i.e.

whiteness becomes the whiteness of this paper or that wall.
This
alone makes for a difference of forms, a numerical diversity of

whitenesses, humanities, etc. (15).
Considered in abstraction from
such individuating conditions, whiteness or humanity is conceptually

one.
The canine nature of Lassie differs from the canine nature of
Rover because Lassies matter makes her this dog, while Rovers matter
makes him that dog.
We recognize differences based on matter only through some
difference of characteristics or sensible qualities arising from such
matter.
Matter itself is not intelligible to us although accidental
forms of the individual are: "Those . . . which agree in species, are

distinguished only through accidental differences, . . . "
(24,25).
We recognize Lassie and Rover to be different because Lassie is

brown, large, etc. while Rover is small, black, etc.
But these
accidental characteristics have their foundations in the signate

matter of each dog.
B.
The Formal Difference
Since there are real distinctions which are not founded on any
material principle, quantitative division is a sufficient but not a
necessary condition for a real distinction.
Quantitative division of
itself cannot, for example, account for the difference between the way
two men differ and the way a man and a fox differ.
In created
38.
substances composed of matter and form, either principle can form the
basis of a distinction and consequently Aguinas recognizes formal as
well as material differences: "For two beings to be understood as
distinct, it is necessary for their distinction to be understood
through something intrinsic to each, e.g. either through matter or
through form in created things." (27).
Opposition is basic to any kind of formal difference: "A
distinction, however, of some things having at least one generic nature
cannot be through formal division except by reason of some opposition"
(2).
But opposition is also a necessary condition for any type of
real distinction for Aquinas says of Gods absolute properties that

they "are not opposed to each other, whence they are not really
distinguished" (32), and in general a necessary condition for any type
of distinction:
Wherever there is some distinction, some
opposition of a negation and an affirmation
must be found. For what differ according to
no affirmation and negation are wholly indis
tinct because it is necessary that in regard
to everything one would be as the other, and
thus they would be wholly the same and in no
way distinct. (30)
What is this opposition of affirmation and negation?
Else
where Aquinas lists four types of opposition:

Something . . . is contraposed or opposed to
another, either by reason of dependence . . .
and so the relata are relative opposites, or
by reason of removal, because . . . one relatum
removes the other, which . . . happens in three
ways. For either one removes the other totally,
leaving nothing, and this opposition is negation;
or one removes only the subject of the other, and
this is privation; or one removes the subject and
39
genus of the other, and this opposition is
contrariety. (35)
A master and his only slave stand in a mutual relation, i.e. the
master is the master of a slave and the slave is the slave of the
master.
If there is a master, there is a slave, and conversely if
there is a slave there is a master.

relation is destroyed.
Should either cease to exist, the
If the master dies, the person who was the
slave ceases to stand in the relation being-a-slave-of (provided that

he does not automatically become the slave of some other person
through hereditary rights); if his only slave dies, the person who was
master ceases to stand in the relation being-a-master-of. Another way
to express the same matter is to say that the terms "master" and
"slave" are correlatives.
The relata are mutually dependent; they are
also relatively opposed for ordinarily master and slave cannot be the
same person.
Their relation then is asymmetric if x is the master of
y, then y is not also the master of x.

Negation or contradiction is the opposition between mutually
exclusive predicates one of which is the negation of the other, e.g.
"white" and "not white."
things may have.
It is not an opposition between properties
For Aquinas negations are not real beings but only
beings of reason (34).
Contradictory opposition is an opposition of
predicates or the rationes they signify.
A property and the complete
lack of that property are opposed privatively, e.g. having sight and
blindness (lacking sight). Absolute properties belonging to the same
genus such as black and white, square and round, sweet and sour, are
opposed as contraries.
40
Aquinas maintains that contradiction is the principle and
cause of the other three types of opposition.
In each case of
opposition it can be said that the ratio of one extreme implies the
negation of the ratio of the other.
This seems to mean that if the
definition of one extreme were given it would be made clear that it

excluded from the extension of this definition.
White and black are
opposed as white and not-white, blind and sighted are opposed as

sighted and not-sighted, father and child are opposed as father and
not-father.
(The converse is also true in each case black and white
are opposed as black and not-black, etc.) (33,37).

On the other hand, it appears that every contradiction is
founded on some opposition of contraries, relatives, or privatives,
because
The truth of any negative proposition in existing
things is founded on the truth of an affirmation
. . . and therefore it is necessary that every
difference which is through the opposition of
affirmation and negation be reduced to a differ
ence of some affirmative opposition. (2)
When it is said "Peter is not white," this is true only because he is
black, red, or some other color.
There must be something positive in
things which accounts for the opposition of affirmation and negation.

The foundation of the opposition of rationes signified by predicates
is contradiction, but the truth of contradictory propositions is

founded on the fact that what the subjects of the propositions signify
have properties opposed privatively, relatively, or contrarily.
In general, Aquinas's statement that "Wherever there is some
distinction, some opposition of a negation and an affirmation must be
41
found" comes to this (30).
If there are beings or principles a and b,
there must be some property or characteristic F which a has and b

lacks, so that the predicate "F" can be truly affirmed of a and truly
denied of b.
If this were not so, there would be no difference
discernible between a and b so they would be one rather than two.

For Aquinas, distinction entails discernibility.
He is affirming the
counterpart of the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles which

holds that, for every x and every y, if the property of x is also a
property of y and conversely, then x and y are identical.
There are three relations that can obtain between properties,
forms, and accidents of things:
. . . some things are always combined and it is
impossible for them to be separated. . . . Again,
some things are separated and it is impossible for
them to be combined, for example, black and white,
and the form of an ass and that of a man. Again,
some things are open to contraries, because they
can be combined and separated, as man and white
and also running. (38)
The word "thing" here refers to such properties or accidents.
In the
first case, the presence of one property in a thing entails the

presence of the other in the same thing.
An example would be the
properties of humanity and rationality.
It is more correct to say
that "being human" entails "being rational" because "rational" is part

of the signification of "human."
Consequently the extensions of these
predicates are so related that whatever belongs to the extension
of
"human" also belongs to the extension of "rational" (but not neces

sarily conversely). Hence there is no possibility of a thing belong
ing to the extension of "human" but not to the extension of "rational"
42.
there is no possibility of separation in this sense.
In the third
type of case, two properties or forms F and G are compossible in one

thing because they can belong to the same subject at the same time.
But they can also be separated they need not go together.
The
corresponding predicates do not entail one another, e.g. "man,"

"white."
The extensions of the terms may overlap but need not.
distinction of subjects a and b is not possible through such predi

cates (31).
Solely by the. fact that "That man is white" and "John is
a man" are true propositions we cannot determine that "that man" and
"John" refer to different things rather than to one and the same thing.
In the second case, the properties of forms F and G will be
opposed in one of the three ways mentioned above, and the correspond
ing predicates "F" and "G" will be opposed as affirmative and negative.
From this it follows that F and G cannot exist simultaneously in one
and the same subject.
If F and G are opposed, the notion or ratio 'F'
implies '-G, or the notion or ratio 'G' implies '-F1. Since this is
so, the extensions of the predicates "F" and "G" are mutually
exclusive nothing can belong to both.
That is, "(3x)(Fx & Gx)"
cannot be true, for this would be tantamount to either "(3x)(Fx &

-Fx)" or "(3 x)(Gx & -Gx)" being true, and either would violate the
fundamental principle that contradictories cannot be true at the same
time of the same subject, or "-<^(3x)(0x & -0x)."
Although opposition of a sort is implied by the material
distinction in that the matter of this individual is not the matter of
that individual, and differences of accidental characteristics follow
from this difference in matter, it is used chiefly to explain the
distinction between immaterial beings such as forms, between intrinsic

principles of things, and between divine Persons.
"For in things
removed from material distinction . . . none are found to be distin

guished except through some opposition" (28).
In formally distinct
things there may be an opposition of accidents as when one thing is

white and another is not white, but there must also be opposition
through something essential or intrinsic to each extreme.
Thus
members of different species differ through essential (per se)

differences such as rationality and irrationality as in the case of a
man and a dog.(29).
Where x and y are subsistent beings, and F and G
are properties signified by first intention predicates, the principle

of opposition above is an adequate sign of the real distinction of x
and y.
That is, if "Peter is white" and "Paul is black" are true, we
have grounds for inferring that there is a real distinction between

the men referred to by "Peter" and "Paul."
C.
Other Real Distinctions
There are also real distinctions between intrinsic principles

of things, e.g. matter and form, neither of which are things or beings.
Despite the fact that opposites mutually exclude each other, Aquinas
does not intend that a real distinction always preclude union of its
extremes in a subject.
Matter and form, substance and accident, are
opposed as correlatives, but still they function together to consti^

tute substances or things.
What are related in a thing as matter and
form are opposed as potency and act and consequently on^t depends upon
the other: "Potentiality is nothing but a capacity to act or to be
acted upon; it essentially involves a relation to actuality and can

only be defined in such terms" (84).
That in a thing which functions
as matter requires the form of the thing for its actualization, and
that in a thing which functions as form must actualize some potency.
Correlative principles are not the same as contraries.
If x
and y are contraries, then they are properties belonging to the same
genus, and the presence of x in a thing excludes the simultaneous
presence of y in a thing for reasons explained in the last section.
If x and y are correlative principles, however, they are mutually
related and can belong to the same thing.
When a thing has x, it
also has y (except when x or y is act, for act can exist without
potency as in the case of God), but a thing does not have both x and
y in the same respect at the same time.
For example, if a thing is
potentially white, it is not also actually white, but it can be

potentially white and actually black.
One and the same thing can be
in potency in one respect and in act in another respect.

Concerning the opposition of substance and accident Aquinas
says, "there can be no medium between substance and accident; for they
are contradistinguished by affirmation and negation, viz., according
to being in a subject and not being in a subject" (39).
Despite the
opposition, in most cases a substance has accidents, and (except in

the Eucharist) accidents always belong to some substance.
Although
they must function together, they do not, by virtue of their opposi

tion, constitute one and the same principle.
There are other instances of real distinctions.
Incorporeal
substances such as two angels are really distinct, as are a corporeal
substance and an incorporeal substance such as a man and an angel.

Subsistent relations (the three Persons of the Trinity) are also
really distinct.
Absolute properties within one substance are really
distinct as forms: "Absolute properties . . . in created things do

not subsist, although they are really distinguished from one another,
just as whiteness and sweetness (are distinguished]!" (32). A created
substance and its essence are really distinct.
There is a real
distinction between the essence of the soul and its operative powers,
and a real distinction between soul and body in a creature.
There appears to be little unity to the above list.
Although
Aquinas never explicitly says this, the extremes of all the examples
of real distinctions cited are real beings or principles of real
beings.
Is the real distinction a difference of real beings or
principles which obtains independently of the mind?
Unlike many of
his successors Aquinas never presents such a general description, nor

has he explicitly characterized all possible distinctions of real
beings or intrinsic principles of such beings.
For example, no
mention is made of the distinction between a corporeal thing and its

matter; the distinction between an accident of one thing, e.g. the
whiteness of Peter, and another thing, Paul; the distinction between
a substance which is created and its existence; and so on.
Are these
real distinctions also, and if so how do we determine that they are?

It may be that the principle of opposition (affirmation and negation)
can be called on at this point, but even this does not seem to be a
reliable guide.
Opposition is said to be a necessary condition for
any sort of distinction.
What are not opposed, e.g. the properties
46
whiteness and triangularity, can exist together in the same thing
(31).
But Aquinas goes on to say that the properties whiteness and
sweetness, which are not opposed according to his own admission, are
really distinguished (32).
Aquinas's theory of the real distinction is then inadequate
in several respects.
First, he never gives a general description of
the real distinction which could be applied to examples he does not

discuss.
Secondly, perhaps because he lacks such a description, he
does not discuss or mention all possible cases of real distinctions.

Thirdly, although he states that, "Wherever there is some distinction,
some opposition of a negation and an affirmation must be found" (30),
at times he seems to admit real distinctions where there is no
apparent opposition (31,32).
Even if opposition is taken as necessary
for a real distinction to obtain, it is not sufficient unless there is

some indication as to what sort of beings the extremes of the distinc
tion must be.
No sufficient conditions such as the separability of
extremes used by later philosophers seem to have been explicitly given

by Aquinas for the real distinction.
The following conditions for the real distinction are
constructed from Aquinas's unsystematic discussions of the distinction.
It has been assumed that the principle
of opposition is a necessary
condition despite Aquinas's occasional statements to the contrary, and

that, coupled with the list of specifications as to what sorts of
things the extremes of the distinction can be, the principle is also a
sufficient condition.
Where a and b are such that either:
47
1) a is a subsistent relation and b is a subsistent

relation, or
2) a. is an intrinsic principle of substance and b^ is
an instrinsic principle of the same substance, and
a^ is related to h by the act-potency relation, or
and
3) a
Id
are created substances and the matter of a^
and the matter of b^ are contained under different

dimensions, or
4) a is a form (substantial or accidental) and b^ is
a form (substantial or accidental), or
5) a is a created substance and b^ is the essence of <i,
or
6) a_ is an essence (created) and b^ is an operative
potency of a, or
7) a_
and
Id
are operative potencies of the same essence
then a_ and Id are really distinct iff:

there is some predicate "F" which is true of
and some predicate "G" which is true of Id,
and either 1) the ratio of "F" implies the
negation of the ratio of "G" or 2) the ratio
of "G" implies the negation of the ratio of
"F". (In short, (3F)((Fa & -Fb) v (Fb &
-Fa)) ).
a_
3.
The Rational Distinction
A. The Meaning of "ratio"

The word "rational" in the expression "rational distinction" is
derived from the Latin word ratio which has many meanings but is
48
defined by Aquinas in this context as "the 'conception of the intellect
of the thing signified by a word" (40).
In another place he remarks
that "Words are signs of concepts and concepts are likenesses of

things, and so it is clear that words are related to things they
signify by means of concepts" (46).
This relationship Bochenski has
recently described in the following manner: "the name a. means in the

language JL the content f_ of the thing x" (where "content" means ratio,
and "thing" means res).21
In the case of things that have definitions, a ratio corresponds
to this definition (43).
The ratio man*, for example would be the
same as the definition of the word "man."
That is, this ratio
corresponds to the intelligible nature of man, and this nature includes

being an animal,
having the ability to reason, etc.
It does not
correspond to signate matter or individual accidents such as whiteness

or being a philosopher which are incidental to the nature of man.
It
corresponds to what is essential to being a man, i.e. the human form

and common matter.
A ratio is general, then, since it corresponds to
the definition of an essence and includes nothing proper to an

individual.
The ratio 'man' may be derived from the individual Peter,
but there is no definition, hence no ratio, of Peter.

A ratio has a dual existence.
First of all, it is a concept
formed by the understanding as described above (41).
Second, a ratio
can exist outside the intellect in things: "A ratio . . . is said to
21
*1. M. Bochenski, "On Analogy," Inquiries into Medieval

Philosophy, ed. James F. Ross (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing
Co., 1971), p. 100.
be in a thing in so far as there is something in a thing outside the

soul that corresponds to the concept of the soul as a significate
corresponds to its sign" (43).
An essence as it exists in corporeal
creatures is individuated by signate matter so that this essence

cannot be received by the intellect knowing it in the same manner that
it exists in a thing.
As apprehended by the intellect, the essence is
abstracted from such signate matter and received according to the mode
of the recipient, i.e. in an immaterial fashion (59).
The human
essence as it exists outside the intellect exists in individuals like

Peter, John, Richard, but the intellect can abstract this essence from
such individuals. The result is the ratio
said to
'man', and such a ratio is
havean immediate foundation in things existing outside the
soul (42,46).
In this way there is truth in the intellect because the
concepts it has conform to, or are likenesses of, things existing

outside the intellect.
There are other types of ratio, however, which do not have
immediate foundations in things outside the soul, and these are
simply beings of reason:
There is a certain conception of the intellect,
or ratio, to which a thing itself which is outside
the soul corresponds . . . there is a certain con
ception or ratio to which a thing as understood
corresponds. Just as a thing outside the soul
corresponds to the ratio 'man' or the concept
'man, so only a thing as understood corresponds
to the ratio or concept of a genus or a species
(44,42,45).
The foundation of the ratio 'man' is something having the human
essence.
Butthe ratio 'man' can also be regarded as
a species and
there is nothing corresponding to this species outside the soul.
50
There are many individual men indistinguishable as to essence, but
there is no one thing, a species, which they all have in common: "For
in distinct singular things there is no nature numerically one which
can be called a species, but the intellect apprehends as one that
attribute in which all singulars agree as men" (50,48,49,51).
The
ratio 'man' regarded as a species has a relation to all individual

men existing outside the soul because it is a likeness of each, and
everyone of them.
"And from this, that it has such a relation to all
individuals, the intellect devises the notion of species and attributes

it to human nature" (47).
Likewise nothing outside the soul corres
ponds to a ratio like 'animal' regarded as genus.
Members of
different species dogs, cats, birds, etc. all have animal natures
and the ratio is abstracted from them and is a likeness of each of
them.
Medieval philosophers often call concepts or rationes with
immediate foundations in things "first intention concepts" while
concepts or rationes like those of species or genus which have only
proximate foundations in things are called "second intention concepts."
Words signifying first intentions are truly predicable of individuals,
e.g. "Peter is a man," but words signifying second intentions are
truly predicable only of first intentions, e.g. "Man is a species,"
and never of individuals.
B.
The Process of Knowing
There are three operations of the intellect according to

Aquinas: apprehension of quiddities, composition and division, and
51
reasoning.
The first operation of the intellect is that by which the
essence or quiddity of a thing is apprehended.

to such an essence.
A ratio corresponds
Nothing extraneous or accidental to the essence
is apprehended by this operation.
But by the first operation, the
attributes properties and accidents of an individual can be appre

hended by separate acts.
Thus the intellect can apprehend the human
essence of Peter, then by another act it can apprehend his whiteness,

then his shape, andso on.
A ratio can correspond to the essence of
the individual, andseparate rationes can correspond to each of his

attributes.
Thus any object existing outside the soul is apprehended
by several successive acts of the intellect, and this piecemeal

apprehension is dueto the nature of the intellect itself:
. . . the human intellect does not at once, in
the first apprehension, receive a perfect know
ledge of a thing. But it first apprehends some
thing belonging to the thing, for example the
quiddity of the thing, (the quiddity is the first
and proper object of the intellect), and then it
understands the thing's properties and accidents
and relations which are outside the essence of
the thing. (52,53-56)
In so apprehending any object in a fragmented fashion, the
human intellect is contrasted with divine and angelic intellects. God
and angels understand at once, in one act, the essence of anything and
everything that belongs to that thing.
Successive acts of understand
ing are not necessary there is only one simple act of knowing.
But
unlike God and angels, the human intellect begins its knowledge with
the senses which provide it with phantasms.
The agent intellect acts
on these phantasms, making them intelligible by abstracting the

intelligible species in them which are likenesses of forms that exist
52
in things outside the intellect.
In representing one form of an
object, the intelligible species does not at the same time represent
another form.
Thus it is impossible for the human intellect to grasp
all aspects, all forms, of an object in one act (52,53).
The divine
intellect, which is always in act, can attain perfection all at once,

but this is not possible for human intellects which must move from a
state of potency to a state of act.
Because of the successive and fragmented way the human intellect
comes to know things, a second operation of the understanding is
needed.
This is the operation of composition and division which forms
the basis for our making affirmative and negative propositions ('53-56,
60).
By an act of composition, the intellect puts back together again
the different concepts it has of one object, and the result is the
affirmative proposition.
For example, if the rationes man and
white have been abstracted from Peter, they can be reunited via the
affirmative proposition "This man is white" said of Peter.
The
proposition will be true just in case what predicate and subject

signify are really united in Peter.
"Composition in the intellect
is a sign of the identity of those that are compounded" (57, 58,59,62,

63,65).
If, on the other hand, several rationes are abstracted from
several different things, the intellect divides the rationes and the
result is the negative proposition.
If Peter is not black, the
rationes man derived from Peter, and black abstracted from some
thing else, can be truly divided or separated via the proposition
"Peter is not black."
The proposition will be true just in case what
subject and predicate signify are not really united in Peter.
53
C.
The Nature of the Rational Distinction
Sometimes Aquinas speaks of two rationes as being distinct;

"the ratio 'man' is other than the ratio 'white*"(62); "the ratio
'wisdom* is not the ratio 'goodness'"(131).
But of course, as
accidents of the understanding, two rationes are really distinct.
distinction of rationes can also correspond to a difference of things

or principles of things.
But ordinarily a rational distinction is
founded on our different ways of conceiving one and the same object or
thing.
Affirmative propositions, for example, signify a distinction
of this sort:
. . . in any true affirmative proposition it is
necessary that predicate and subject signify
what is really the same in some way, and ration
ally diverse. And this is as clear in propositions
in which the predicate is accidental as in those
in which the predicate is substantial. For it
is manifest that "man" and "white" are the same
with regard to subject and differ rationally, for
the concept 'man' is different from the concept
'white'. And likewise when I say, "A man is an
animal," for what is a man is truly an animal,
for in the same subject is the sensible nature
from which it is called an animal, and the rational
nature from which it is called a man, whence even
here the predicate and the subject are the same
according to their supposit, but are rationally
diverse. (62)
In the proposition "A man is white," the rationes signified by subject
and predicate differ although both belong to one and the same thing for
one and the same thing can have both the substantial form of a man and
the accidental form whiteness.
falls undertwo
But in this case, the subject signified
different concepts neither of which belongs to the
other. Thatis, the definition of "white"
is not part of the
54definition of "man" or conversely.
In the language of C. I. Lewis,
the intensions of the predicates can be said to be different or, in

the language of Van Fraassen, the contents of the predicates can be
said to be different.
22
The extensions or denotations of these
predicates can overlap, however.

animal" the case is different.
In the proposition "A man is an

Here the subject can be said to
include contensively or intensionally the predicate, for "animal" is

part of the definition of "man."
In the first example, the rationes
conjoined in the thing are conjoined accidentally, hence the prediction

is accidental (per accidens). In the second example, the rationes
are essentially conjoined because in the thing itself there is only
one substantial form corresponding to both of them.
The resulting
predication is essential (per se) (24-26,62,64-71).

D.
Foundations of Rational Distinctions
Most rational distinctions are, in one way or another, founded

upon some real difference.
This happens either 1) because of the way
in which the human intellect comes to know things, or 2) because an

object of the understanding eminently contains many perfections in
itself.
22
C. I. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (LaSalle,

111.: Open Court, 1962), pp. 39-41; Bas C. Van Fraassen, "Meaning
Relations among Predicates," Nous, 1, No. 2 (1967): "The content of
a predicate is the set of predicates which are, by the definition
of F, true of a thing of which F is true. Thus G belongs to the
content of F (G is contensively included in F) if the conventional
definiens of F is a conjunction of G and some other predicates."
55
The fragmented process by which the intellect comes to know

objects existing outside the soul has been outlined above.
Because
the intellect must know a thing in this successive fashion, it forms

distinct concepts of it which correspond to some real diversity within
the thing.
This real diversity is either of accident and accident,
substance and accident, or matter and form: "Our intellect forms

diverse concepts in order to know subject and accident, and in order
to know diverse accidents" (61,75).
Different types of predication
correspond to the diverse kinds of composition of principles iri a

thing:
A double composition. . . . is found in a material
thing. First there is the composition of form and
matter, and to this the composition of the intellect
by which the shole universal is predicated of a part
corresponds. For genus is taken from common matter,
difference which completes the species is taken from
the form, the particular is taken from individual
matter. Second, there is the composition of
accident and subject, and to this real composition
there corresponds the composition of the under
standing according to which an accident is predicated
of a subject, . . . However, the composition of
the intellect differs from the composition of a
thing, for those that are compounded in a thing
are diverse. The composition of the intellect,
however, is a sign of the identity of those that
are compounded. (95)
It is because of such real diversities within a thing, and because of
the way we come to know such things that these things can be rationally
distinguished.
Rationes corresponding to such real diversity can be
united by the intellect which forms affirmative propositions, and such

propositions signify both the diversity of rationes and their unity in
one thing or subject.
Sometimes "a rational difference is not reduced to some
diversity in a thing, but to its unity which is intelligible in diverse

ways" (75).
The foundation of such a rational distinction is partly
the eminence of the object of the understanding which, without any real
diversity on its part, contains many perfections.
It is also partly
due to our successive manner of coming to know a thing.
The distinction
of Gods attributes is such a rational distinction, as is the distinc

tion of "souls" in a living creature.
We come to know creatures before
we come to know God, and in creatures perfections such as wisdom and

justice are really distinct.
Thus we form distinct concepts of these
perfections and predicate the concepts of God.
But, while God contains
the corresponding perfections, he does so with simplicity and unity for

there is no real diversity in him of substance and accident, accident
and accident, etc.
Likewise in a living creature there is, according
to Aquinas, no real diversity of substantial forms.
The intellective,
sensitive, and vegetative souls in a man are not really distinct, for
example.
But there are creatures which lack one or more of these
"souls", e.g. a beast which has the sensitive and vegetative, but lacks
the intellective.
Because these three "souls" do not always go
together, the intellect can form distinct concepts of them and then
predicate these concepts of a creature like man.
Still there is no
diversity in the creature corresponding to the diversity of concepts.

There is only one substantial form which virtually contains the other
souls:
It is not necessary to accept a diversity iri
natural things according to the diverse concepts
or logical intentions which follow our way of
understanding, because one and the same thing
57
can be apprehended in diverse ways by reason.
Therefore, because the intellective soul
virtually contains that which the sensitive
soul has and still more, reason can consider
separately what belongs to the sensitive power.
(74)
It appears that for Aquinas, there are no rational distinctions
which are not somehow based upon real distinctions in the ways indi
cated above.
There are nominal or verbal distinctions, but these do
not meet the general conditions for rational distinctions.
They will
be treated separately below.

E. Summary
Aquinas extends the principle of opposition to rational
distinctions in the following manner: if two relata "differ according
to the understanding, it follows that something can be affirmed of
one which is denied of the other, and consequently that what one stands
for is not
what the other stands for" (72).
Aquinas gives few
examples of how this principle is to be applied.
Sometimes the defini
tion of one relatum implies or includes something lacking in the

definition of the other relatum, for example: "the relation really
existing in God is the same as the essence, and does not differ except
according to a ratio of the understanding, according as a reference to
an opposite is implied by 'relation* which is not implied by the word
'essence'" (73).
Thus the content of one ratio differs from the
content of the other ratio the corresponding predicates differ in

intension or content also.
In a similar fashion the ratio 'one'
contains the notion of indivision which is lacking in the concepts
58
'being1, 'good' and 'true' despite the fact that the corresponding
predicates have exactly the same extensions.
Although rationes which are distinct differ in content so that
something can be truly affirmed of one and truly denied of the other,
it does not follow that the thing which has these rationes or which
corresponds to them exhibits this same opposition.
If Peter is both
one and a being, and if the ratio 'one' contains some notion of
indivision, and the ratio 'being' does not contain a notion of
indivision, it does not follow that Peter is both undivided and not
undivided.
Utilizing the principle of opposition for concepts and the
different types of real foundations for rational distinctions, the
following conditions can be constructed for rational distinctions
according to Aquinas:
Two things or principles of things are rationally distinct
if they are really distinct.
When one thing a_ is such that it is conceived under several
concepts A and B (because of our way of coming to know a)
and either
1) A and B are rationes which correspond to some real
diversity of principles in a_ such as substance and
accident, matter and form, or accident and accident,
or,
2) A and B are rationes corresponding to no real
diversity in a_ but to some real diversity outside a_
(as when A belongs to
1b
but not c a n d B belongs to
59
but not b^j and Is and
are really distinct) .
then a. is rationally distinct from itself iff

there is some predicate "0" which is true of A and false
of: B, or false of A and true of B / i . e .
(3 0)((0A & -0B)
v (0B & -0A))J.

4.
The Verbal Distinction
There is a third type of distinction occasionally mentioned by

Aquinas and that is the verbal distinction obtaining between two
synonyms such as "tunic" and "cloak," "man" and "rational animal," or
between two proper names for the same object such as "Cicero" and
"Tully."
Synonyms according to Aquinas are words which have the same
meaning because they signify the same ratio: "Those words are said to
be synonyms which signify one thing according to one concept" (76);
"although names that are predicated of God signify the same thing,
they are not, however, synonyms because they do not signify the same
concept" (79,77,78).
The contents of such predicates are identical
according to the above definition of "content," and the extensions,

i.e. the classes of things of which the predicates are true, are also
identical.
In Aquinas's terminology, the predicates signify the same
ratio and the same things.

Aquinas occasionally remarks that where there is a distinction
which is merely verbal, whatever is true of one relatum (but not the
word or sign for this relatum) is true of the other: "In these . . . it
is necessary that whatever is true of one be also true of the other
because they are wholly the same really, and differ only nominally" (80).
60
This is not, however, true of
the signs for such relata.
For example,
the predicate "has three letters" is true of the word "man," but false
of the expression "rational animal."
But such words insofar as they
are signs agree in all semantic properties such as reference and

meaning.
Because their extensions or references are identical, if
"man" is truly predicated of the thing Peter, then "rational animal" is

also truly predicated of Peter, and conversely.
Likewise, if "man1
signifies a creature which has intellective, sensitive, and vegetative

powers" is true, so must "'rational animal signifies a creature which
has intellective, sensitive, and vegetative powers" be true.
Two synonyms may differ in properties which are not semantic,
e.g. orthographical properties.
In any two synonyms, the order of
letters differs, as do the actual letters.
Thus the word "man"
contains three letters the thirteenth, the first, and the fourteenth
in that order.
The phrase "rational animal" contains fourteen letters.
Likewise the etymologies of the two words or expression differ.
"Man"
is of Anglo Saxon origin, "rational animal" is of Latin origin. 'Prag

matic properties may differ also, i.e. the properties a word or
expression has in relation to the users of the language in which it
occurs.
Thus a person can understand a word such a "man" and still be
ignorant of the meaning of the expression "rational animal."
That is,
he may agree that the statement "Socrates is a man" is true, but wonder
about the truth of the statement "Socrates is a rational animal."
Since Aquinas provides no detailed treatment of the verbal
distinction, it is difficult to determine whether he would extend its
application as Scotus does to the distinction between two grammatical
61
forms of the same word (forms such as the genitive, nominative, etc.
which show the grammatical role of the word in a sentence this is
more obvious in Latin where homo, hominis, homines are all grammatical
forms of the same word), or the distinction between two logical forms
of the same word (forms which change the logical role of a word, e.g.
the concrete form "man" and the abstract form "humanity" the former
usually denotes concrete individuals, the latter denotes an essence of
individuals).
On the basis of the information Aquinas gives and the elabora
tions made above, the following construction of conditions for the
verbal distinction may be made:
"A" and "B" are verbally distinct iff:
1) "A" and "B" have the same intension and the same
extension (that is, "A" and "B" have all their semantic
properties in common),
2) "A" has some orthographical, pragmatic, or other property
which "B" does not have (or conversely).
That is, where
"0" stands for some orthographical, pragmatic, or other

non-semantic property,
(30)((0 "A" & -0 "B") v (-0 "A"
& 0 "B")).
5.
Applications of These Distinctions
A. The Real Distinction

There seem to be two purposes for Aquinass theory of distinc
tions: first, to account for the fact that the same beings can be both
distinct in some respects (for example, numerically), yet identical in
other respects (for example, specifically); second, to account for the
62
fact that one and the same being can be rationally distinct from itself,
when an individual is subsumed under different concepts.
There were
two related theological problems to be solved: how one and the same
divine essence can be shared by three really distinct supposits, and
how one indivisible divine nature can exhibit distinct attributes.
In several places Aquinas expresses his belief that certain
types of identity or unity are compatible with certain types of
distinction:
. . . sameness is a unity or union, either
because those that are said to be the same are
many according to being, yet the same in so far
as they agree in some one respect, or because
they are one according to being, but the
intellect uses this unity as many in order to
understand a relation. For a relation can only
be understood to hold between two extremes.
(6,7)
Things that are many in being are really distinct although they can be
rationally (i.e. specifically or generically) the same or one.
Extremes
which are one in being are really the same thing although they can be
rationally distinct or many.
Several pairs of diverse principles are employed by Aquinas to
account for the fact that many really distinct individuals can have
the same nature or essence.
They are matter and form, substance and
accident, essence and existence.
The members of each pair are related
to each other as potency to act.
Any corporeal being is a composite
being in these three ways.
That in a thing which is related as matter
is in potency to that in the thing which is related as form.
For
example in living creatures, body is related to soul as matter (potency)

to form (act) (87).
The substance of a thing is potential to the
63
reception of accidental forms.
The essence of a creature is in
potency to the reception of being.

As ultimate explanatory principles act and potency are simple,
indefinable, and repugnant to each other in the sense that one and the
same thing cannot be both actually x and potentially x at the same
time.
An acorn is potentially but not actually an oak tree, while an
oak tree
is actually and not merely potentially an oak tree.
The
acorn is
both actually an acorn and potentially an oak (82,83).
Act
and potency are correlatives: "For potency, according to what it is,

implies a certain relation to an act, for it is a principle of acting
or being acted upon.
Whence it is necessary that acts be placed in
the definitions of potencies" (84).
A potency is that in a thing
which isincomplete and determinable, while act

which completes and determines some
potency.
is that perfection
Thiscorrelative
opposition accounts for the real distinction in a composite thing

between any two principles related as potency to act.
Neither
principle is an entity in its own right the members of each pair

function together to constitute one substance or thing.
But such
principles are real, that is they are not merely creations of our
understanding, because they are fundamental to the explanation of
other distinctions.
Individuals which are the same in some respect but different
in other respects, for example those that are numerically different
but specifically the same, must be composite:
It must be said that what differs, properly
speaking, differs in something, whence we
inquire about differences where there is
64
agreement. And because of this,
necessary for what are different
composite in some way since they
something and agree in something
(4,5,24)
it is
to be
differ in
else.
If two individuals are the same with regard to x, and different with
regard to y, each must be a composite of x and y, and x and y must be
really distinct in each of them.
That in which corporeal individuals
of the same species differ is signate matter; that in which they agree
is specific form.
Matter under determinate dimensions, that matter
which determines a thing to such and such a spatial and temporal

location so that is is "this" rather than "that," is the principle
of individuation in creatures of the same species. Aquinas explicitly
rejects the solution offered by Boethius and others that the numerical
distinction of two individuals is accounted for by the fact that one
has a certain collection of accidents while the other has a different
collection of accidents.
An individual, according to Aquinas, is a
substance which is "indistinct in itself and distinct from all others"

(3).
We may recognize such an entity and distinguish it from other
entities by means of its accidents, but these distinctions of

accidents are founded upon a distinction of substances (27).
Sub
stances are distinct from one another even apart from their accidents.
Matter under determined dimensions accounts for the numerical
diversity of things.
That in any thing which gives actuality to such
matter and makes it to be the sort of thing it is, is form.
Form
makes this matter the matter of a ship rather than a rock, form makes
the matter of a human rather than the matter of a dog or some other
sort of thing.
That in a thing which functions as form is really
65
distinct from that in the same thing which functions of matter.
Because of this real distinction, several numerically distinct
individuals can agree as to form, i.e. can be the same sort of thing.
It is partly to solve the problem of universals that Aquinas must
maintain the distinction between matter and form in a thing to be
real.
This solution will be examined below.
Substantial change, that
change which occurs when the same matter undergoes an alteration in

substantial forms, also requires such a real distinction.
Were there
no real distinction in a thing between material and formal principles,

substantial changes would be impossible for the matter of a thing could
not endure through any change in forms of the thing.
The material element of a thing is, by itself, unintelligible
to us.
The intellect is an immaterial faculty which receives
according to its own mode.
What is known must then be immaterial.
The principle of intelligibility of a thing is its form.
Such a form
can be abstracted from matter by the intellect and it is such a form

in abstraction that the intellect understands (90).
received by the intellect is a ratio or concept.
This form as
Where forms of
things are similar as they are in members of the same species, the
ratio in the understanding is the same for all of them.
That is, any
number of men, for example, can be understood through the ratio man'
abstracted from any one of them.
Together the formal and material principles of a thing comprise
its substance.
A substance consists of one substantial form informing
a determined quantity of matter (as far as corporeal beings are

concerned).
In opposition to
the Franciscans, Aquinas maintains
66
that there is only one such form.
It is this form which gives being
to what is formed, and that which gives being must be one (141).
There can, however, be a plurality of accidental forms in anything.
One substantial form makes it one and the sort of thing it is, while
accidental forms perfect a thing in diverse ways giving it shape,
color, etc.
When the substantial form of a thing is destroyed, the
thing itself is destroyed, but one and the same substance can undergo
many changes in its accidental forms.
The same substance which is red
today may be green tomorrow, the same person who is small today may be
large several years from now.
Since matter is unintelligible in
itself, and since many things can be indistinguishable with regard to

substantial form, it is through their collections of accidents that we
commonly distinguish individuals of the same sort.
That is, we
recognize this book to be distinct from that because this is red, tall
and thick, while that is blue, tall and thin.
The most important distinction within a thing so far as r;
Aquinas's theory of universals is concerned is that between the
essence of a thing and its aot of being or existence.
The essence of
a thing is related to its being as potency is related to act: "the

nature constituted from matter and form is as potency with regard to
its being inasmuch as it is receptive of being" (96,101).
The
essence-existence relation is more extensive than the matter-form

relation because it is found even in spiritual creatures which have
form but no matter.
There is a distinction between essence and
existence in a creature because of the contingency of the latter.
being which receives existence from another does not exist necessarily.
67
Consequently God, as the only necessary being, is the only entity in
which essence and existence are identical.
In all creatures, the two
must be really distinct.

Aquinas gives several reasons for regarding the distinction
between essence and existence in creatures as a real one.
First, the
essence of a thing can be conceived without either its existence or

its nonexistence being known (97).
That is we can know what the word
"phoenix" means without knowing whether there are any actually

existing creatures to which the word "phoenix" refers.
Second, any
created being, as created, must derive its existence from another.

If essence and existence were only rationally distinct in a creature,
however,
any
essence would
exist of itself.
But only God is identical
with his
act
ofbeing, and
he-,alone accounts for his own being (99).
The distinction must reflect the radical differences between contin

gent beings and the one necessary being:
Everything, therefore, which is after the first
being, since it is not its own being, receives
being in something and through this being is con
tracted to the thing. And so, in any creature,
the nature of a thing which participates in
being, and that in which it participates, are
different . . . . (96)
Third, "Being . . . as being, cannot be diverse.
It can, however, be
diversified through something which is outside being, just as the

being of a stone is other than the being of a man" (98,99).
existence
or being is one and not many.
Of itself,
It becomes the existence of
a man or the existence of a stone, etc. only by being contracted to the

human essence in Peter or the stone essence in this piece of quartz.
If there are many beings, the act of being of each of them must then
68
differ from the essence of each; if existence were identical with the
human essence, for example, only humans would exist.
Fourth, if
essence and existence were one and the same in any creature, there
would be no common natures.
If humanity and to-exist-as-man were
identical in some individual such as Peter, "man11 would lack the

community necessary for it to be predicable of other individuals such
as Paul and Mary (100) :
. . . all that are in one genus share in the
quiddity or essence of the genus, which is
predicated of them on account of what they are.
For the existence of a man is not the same as
that of a horse, nor is the existence of this
man the same as the existence of that man.
And so it is necessary that in things which
are in the same genus existence and essence
differ. (112)
When several individuals are indistinguishable as to essence, the
principles of essence and existence must differ in each of these
individuals.
An essence or nature in itself is neither one nor many.
It
is not one for if it were, it could not be predicated of many

individuals.
But since it is predicated of many individuals, it
must be identical with each of these individuals.
The unity and
being of an essence would stand in the way of its complete identifi

cation with an individual.
Consequently, an essence is not one in
itself, nor does it have being of itself:

A nature . . . according to its proper notion
. . . if it were asked whether that nature so
considered could be said to be one or many,
neither must be allowed. Because each is outside
the notion of humanity, and each can be an
accident of it. For if plurality belonged to its
69
notion, it could never be one; nevertheless
it would be one according as it is in Socrates.
Similarly, if unity belonged to its notion,
then the nature in Socrates and in Plato would
be one and the same and could not be multiplied
in many beings. (142)
Where there
prevents
is no unity, there is no being.
Consequently nothing
an essence from being completely identified withany
individual belonging to that essence:

Because it has no being of its own whatsoever,
the essence when taken without precision can
be predicated of every individual that comes
under it . . . . It can be perfectly and
adequately identified in reality with any and
every individual that comes under it, for it
presents no being of its own that would render
it at all different from any one of them, or
that would make it in any way a different thing
when it is known and so becomes existent in the
mind.23
Because it has no unity, and no being, of its own, an essence must
receive its existence, and the existence it receives is really
distinct from it.
This real distinction between the essence of a thing and its
existence provides the key to Aquinass account of universals.
essence in itself is neither one nor many.
An
It becomes many in
becoming the essence of many individuals of the same sort.
It
becomes one as it is considered by an intellect in abstraction from all

the individuating conditions that accompany it in creatures.
In no
sense is the essence really one in several individuals of the same
23Joseph Owens, "Common Nature: A Point of Comparison between

Thomistic and Scotistic Metaphysics," in Inquiries into Medieval
Philosophy, ed. J. F. Ross (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing
Co., 1971), p. 201.
70
i
sort: "human nature is not found in individuals according to unity

as if it were one essence agreeing with them all" (47) and "if this
is a man and that is a man, it is not necessary that they have
numerically the same humanity, . . . " (49,50).
All that is necessary
is thattheseindividuals should be indistinguishable

essence.
Ifthey are so
indistinguishable,
with regard to
then they can be
apprehended through one ratio or concept:

For human nature itself has a being in the
intellect as abstracted from all individuating
conditions, and therefore it has a uniform
relation to all individuals which, are outside
the soul according as it is equally a likeness
of all of them, and brings all into cognition
insofar as they are men. And from this, that
it has such a relation to all individuals, the
intellect devises the notion of species and
attributes it to human nature . . . . (47)
The essence thus has a rational unity or identity which is, in this
case, the unity or identity of a species.
The relation of identity
here obtains between several really distinct individuals, i.e. men,

each of which has its own essence.
In forming such a rational unity or identity, the intellect
abstracts those conditions in corporeal beings which individuate an
essence, making it in one case the essence of this thing, in another
the essence of that, etc.
These conditions are signate matter and
the accidents which follow on a thing's being material.
This
abstraction is made possible by the real distinctions between the form

of a thing and its matter, the substance of a thing and its accidents.
There is no falsification involved in such abstraction.
The things
considered by the intellect really have essences, although in each of
71
them the essence is accompanied by various individuating conditions.
But when these individuating conditions are left out of consideration,
the things are really indistinguishable and can be comprehended
through one and the same concept.
An essence then really exists only
in individuals each of which has its own essence.
It is universal
only as it is comprehended by an intellect which abstracts from those

conditions which make it the essence of this or that individual.
Not only can numerically distinct individuals give rise to one
specific concept in the intellect, but numerically distinct members
of different species can cause one generic concept in the understand
ing which is formed by abstracting from the essential differences of
these things.
This man and that dog can both be conceived through the
ratio 'animal' which is formed in abstraction from the specific

differences of rationality and irrationality.
Generic identity Is a
rational relation obtaining between distinct members of different

species, and the generic concept is equally a likeness of all of
these insofar as they are indistinguishable in some respect.
An individual and its essence are really identical, i.e. they
are one and the same thing.
But the notion of an essence does not
include anything extrinsic to that essence, that is it does not

include those conditions which make it the essence of this individual.
The essence of a thing considered in itself with precision from all
individuating conditions is really distinct from an individual thing.
A definition of the essence of a material substance must omit all
reference to individuating matter and accidents for such matter is not
intelligible or definable, and the notion of an accident is not
72
included in the definition of an essence (25,102,104-106).
individuallike Socrates only his essence, his
Theindividual
In an
humanity, is definable.
Socrates, who is a composite of matter and form with
many accidents, is not definable:

This happens, however, in all things which have
their form in matter, because there is in them
something besides the principles of the species.
For the nature of the species is individuated
through matter, whence the individuating principles
and accidents of the individual are outside the
essence of the species. And therefore there
happen to be found under one species many individuals
which, although they do not differ in the nature
of the species, differ however according to their
individuating principles. And because of this in
all things that have their form in matter, a thing
and what belongs to it are not entirely the same.
For Socrates is not his humanity. (107,111)
A real distinction must obtain between the definable essence of
a thing and its individuating principles because, if an essence such
as humanity were to include the individuating matter and accidents of
an individuallike Socrates, it would be proper to Socrates
alone just
as this matter and these accidents are, and consequently in no way

common to other individuals.
Socrates would not have humanity in
common with Plato and, if the essence of every individual were proper
to it alone, there would be no general concepts and no predicates
predicable of many individuals:
For that whence Socrates is a man he can share
with many, but that whence he is this man can
only agree with one thing. If, therefore,
Socrates were a man through that through which
he is this man, just as there cannot be many
Socrates, so there could not be many men.
(100,17,107)
73
Since many individuals can be indistinguishable as to essence
and in that sense can "share" the same essence, and since an essence
cannot include that which makes an individual this individual, such
an essence as it prescinds from individuating conditions must differ
really and not merely mentally from the concrete individual which has
this essence.
A real difference here does not mean a real separability
between essence and supposit.
An essence like humanity does not exist
except as it is realized in individuals.
The essence of a thing is
that by which a thing is the sort of thing it is, but an individual

includes not only the essence but individuating principles as well
(in the case of corporeal bieings). For this reason, the essence,
when it is taken in precision from all individuating conditions, is
not truly predicated of any individual, i.e. "humanity" is not truly
predicable of Socrates.
The essence without such precision, signified
by a concrete noun like "man" is, however, truly predicable of

individuals because it implicitly
contains reference to matter
(108,109).
Unlike his contemporary Bonaventure, Aquinas does not have a
doctrine of universal hylomorphism.
Spiritual creatures such as
angels do not have some "spiritual matter" which accounts for there
being a multitude of such entities.
An angel is a composite of
essence and existence, but it is pure form with no admixture of

anything material.
As a result, there is no numerical difference
among angels, but only a formal difference.
Since the form of any
angel is not received in matter, the whole specific form exists in the
angel and each angel constitutes a species to itself.
It follows
74
that essence and individual do not differ in an angel, because there
can be nothing there external to the essence of the species (20,25).
Because an angel receives its existence from another, however, it is
a composite of act and potency (i.e. of existence and essence), and
in this way it differs from God.
Creatures differ from God in two ways.
First, a
creature is a composite of principles while God is completely simple.

In him there is nothing material, nothing accidental.
act.
He is perfect
Second, God accounts for his own being becuase he is his own
existence.
The distinction between essence and existence is God, and
also the distinction between essence and supposit or Person, is

rational only.
In God there is nothing outside the essence to
individuate and multiply that essence so there is complete identity

between the essence and each of the Persons (111). The terms
"essence" and "relation" have, however, different significations, for
"essence" signifies God absolutely, while "relation" implies some
reference to another (73).
Also a supposit is something indistinct
in itself and distinct from other supposits, but an essence can be

shared (110).
God's essence is shared by all three Persons, but the
Father's paternity is not a property that other supposits can share.

The basis for making rational distinctions in God between essence and
existence and essence and supposit seems to be the real distinctions
between these principles found in creatures.
These are then rational
distinctions with real foundations.

The problem of how three divine supposits can be distinct yet
share the same essence is similar to the problem of how several
75
numerically distinct individuals can be specifically or generically
identical.
The solution of the problem must be different, however,
because of the peculiar nature of the Trinity,
According to the
Nicene Creed, the Son and Holy Spirit are "of one substance with the
Father," coequal and coetemal.
This essential identity is real, not
merely rational, for if it were rational only the three Persons would
constitute three distinct deities.
But the distinction among the
Persons must be real also for it if were only rational, the Son could
not be both divine and human.
Here then there is no real distinction
with rational identity, but a real distinction and a real identity in

essence.
Aquinas regards the three Persons as three subsistent relations.
Relation is the only means of distinguishing them, for if they were
distinct with regard to something absolute there would be a distinc
tion in essence (116).
A relation inhering in a creature is an
accident, a further modification of the substance, but God is complete

and determinate and requires no accidental modifications.
Relations
in God cannot then be accidents but must be subsistent entities:

"Relations accidentally inhere in created things . . . in God they are
the divine essence itself . . . ." (117)
Each subsistent relation is rationally distinct from the
essence but really distinct from the other relations.
This distinc
tion is based not on any difference with regard to matter or form for
there is none, but on the opposition resulting from relational
properties.
It is of the notion of a relation to be to something
(ad aliquid), i.e. a relation has two terms.
If x and y are related,
76
then x is related to y (and ordinarily y is related to x). There is
then a relative opposition between x and y, at least if the relation
A /
in question is asymmetrical and irreflexive.
The extremes must be
distinct things if x is the father of y, x and y cannot be the same

thing (35).
Since the relation is real, the distinction must be real
also:
Since, therefore, there is really a relation in
God, . . . it is necessary that opposition really
be there. Relative opposition, however, includes
distinction in its notion, whence it is necessary
that there be a real distinction in God, not indeed
according to that absolute thing which is thd.,
essence, in which there is the highest unity and
simplicity, bat according to a relative thing
/i.e. a Person/. (81,115-117)
The relations in God generating, being generated by, proceeding from,
are all asymmetrical
and irreflexive.
Consequently the extremes
of the relations are relatively opposed and really distinct.

The rationes of the relations may also be opposed.
The ratio
of the relation being-the-father-of-y implies the negation of its

correlative, being-the-son-of-y, and conversely.
An analysis of what
the relation paternity implies reveals that one and the same thing
cannot be both father and son of some other thing nor can one thing
be either father or son of itself, so the relation is asymmetrical and
irreflexive.
If then the relation of paternity is a property of the
Father, and if the relation of filiation is a property of the Son,
0/
E.J.
183: ". . . a
between x and
asymmetric if
flexive . . .
and x; thus R
Lemmon, Beginning Logic (London: Nelson, 1965) , pp. 180,

relation R is asymmetric if, forany x and y, if R holds
y then R does not hold between y and x; in symbols, R is
and only if .. . (x)(y)(Rxy> -Ryx)" and "R is irreif for any x, it is not the case that R holds between x
is irreflexive if and only if . . . (x)-Rxx."
77
Father and Son will be really distinct because of the opposition of
their relational properties:
. . . the many Persons are many subsistent
relations really distinct from one another.
A real distinction among divine relations,
however, occurs only by reason of relative
opposition. Therefore it is necessary that
two opposed relations belong to two Persons.
(114,115)
Although it is not explicitly called such, the distinction
between the essence of the soul and its powers seems to be real:
"the powers of the soul are not the essence of the soul" (118).
The
reasons Aquinas gives have to do with opposite characteristics

possessed by essence and powers: the soul is actual when it exists
while the powers are actual only when they operate, i.e. the soul can
be in act when the powers are not operative (118); since it is the
substantial form of a living thing, the soul of a thing is one while
the powers are many (123-126); some powers are powers of parts of the
body, while others (e.g. the intellective) are not, but "one and the
same act can be the act of a body and also be separated from the body"
only if there is some diversity (118).
For these reasons, the powers
are distinct from the essence of the soul as its accidents or natural
properties (119,120).
The powers of the soul are distinguished from one another by
their acts, and the acts in turn are distinguished by their objects.
Where the objects, and consequently the acts, are specifically diverse
the powers are also specifically diverse (114), although they may
belong to one of the three genera, i.e. the vegetative, the sensitive,
or the intellective.
These genera
do not constitute distinct souls
78
because any creature has only one such form and, in the case of a man,
this makes it to be rational, sensitive, and vegetative:
. .a
more perfect form gives to matter whatever the vegetative soul gives
to plants, and whatever the sensible soul gives to brutes, and still
more (123-26).
B.
Aquinas was also concerned to show how a thing which is really

one can be rationally distinct.
Socrates, for example, can be
conceived of as the husband of Xanthippe, the teacher of Plato, the

philosopher who drank the hemlock, etc.
Socrates as the husband of
Xanthippe is really identical with, but rationally distinct from

Socrates as the teacher of Plato.
There is only one thing, but this
thing is subsumed under distinct concepts.

Aquinas has already shown how rationes can either have, or fail
to have, real foundations.
When the rationes have foundations which
are real, as for example when they correspond to accidental or sub

stantial forms in a thing, their distinction has a real foundation.
The rational distinction between a man conceived of as black and the
same man conceived of as fat has a real foundation in the real distinc
tion between two accidental forms in the man.
On the other hand, the
distinction between a-thing donteived of under-a-specific concept and

the same thing conceived of under a generic concept does not have such
a real foundation in a thing.
It has, however, a remote real founda
tion in the real distinction between different things which are

similar.
Genus and species are not real beings but rather mental
79
beings derived from the ways in which distinct things can be
indistinguishable:
. . . since an animal may be that which is truly
a man, the distinction of the animal nature from
man is not according to a real diversity of forms,
as if there were one form through which it is an
animal, and there is superadded another through
which it is a,man, but according to intelligible
notions . . . . For, since genus and species
signify certain intelligible intentions, a real
distinction of forms is not necessary for a
distinction of species and genus, but only a
mental distinction. (126,74)
A creature has only one substantial form, but other creatures can have
similar forms, and because of this similarity they can be conceived
under one ratio. Several men are completely indistinguishable as to
essence, and one specific concept, 'man*, is equally a representation
of all of them.
A man and a dog are indistinguishable in some
essential respects, i.e. in having sensitive and vegetative powers,

and one generic concept, 'animal', represents them both. The intellect
is responsible for the comparison and for the distinction between the
specific and generic concepts.
In God there are no real distinctions of form and matter,
substance and accident, accident and accident.
and unites all perfections in himself.
God is most simple
Still the names we apply to
him are not synonymous because they signify distinct rationes.

According to Aquinas, our knowledge is first derived from our senses.
Consequently the first objects of knowledge are creatures.
Our
concepts of perfections are derived from perfection we experience in

creatures, and perfection words primarily signify these perfections as
they are found in creatures.
Since the perfections in creatures are
80
really distinct, the concepts we form of them are different.
As a
result, when we apply these concepts to God, they do not have the
same content, nor do the words for perfections have the same meanings.
These words are truly applicable to God, not because he contains
distinct properties or forms, but because he really has these
perfections in a unified manner:
. . . even in God there can be found a distinction
of rationes which really and truly are in him . . .
which indeed are all really one and differ rationally
which is preserved in property and truth according
as we truly say God is wise and good, and not only
in the understanding of the one reasoning. (77)
The foundation of this rational distinction in God is twofold.
First, there is an object of the understanding which contains all
perfections in a transcendent way while remaining itself completely
one and simple.
Aquinas says, "whatever perfection is in a creature
is in the creator as in a cause, but in a more excellent way because

something is in a cause in a more noble way than it is in an effect"
(129).
A creature may be wise, but God as the cause of wisdom in
the creature can also be said to be wise.
But in God, wisdom belongs
to the divine essence, while wisdom in a creature is only an accident.

Also the creature receives its wisdom from another; God's wisdom is
not received, nor is it limited by matter.
God, as the cause of
perfections in creatures, can be said to contain these perfections

virtually because of his ability to produce them (130).
In a similar
way, the sun is said to contain heat and dryness virtually because it
can produce these effects.
But, although a predicate like "wise" is truly predicated of
81
both God and some creatures, it is not predicated of both in the same
way.
It is predicated analogically, and not univocally, in the
statements "God is wise" and "Socrates is wise," because, while the

same perfection is signified in each case, the manner of signifying
differs.
"Wise" delimits a creature because it signifies an
accidental modification distinct from the essence, but it delimits

God in no way and does not signify anything distinct from his essence.
The analogy here is that of proper proportionality:
God is related
to his wisdom in a way similar to that in which Socrates is related

to his wisdom.
That is, there are certain acts God performs and on
the basis of these acts he is said to be wise; there are certain other
and different acts Socrates performs and on the basis of these he is
said to be wise.
Because of the great difference in their natures,
different things participate in a property according to the different

modes of being appropriate to their natures.
his essence and being are identical.
God's being is necessary
A creature is contingent its
existence is received and is really distinct from its essence.
25
A second foundation for this distinction is our limited and

deficient way of understanding.
The human intellect is incapable by
nature of apprehending any object completely through one concept.
The
successive steps by which we come to know a thing were sketched above

(pp. 50-52).
The quiddity of a thing is apprehended in one concept,
while its accidents and properties are apprehended in separate,

distinct concepts.
Consequently the human intellect cannot apprehend
James F. Ross, "Analogy as a Rule of Meaning for Religious

Language," Aquinas, ed. Anthony Kenny (N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1969).
82
God through one concept.
God is known indirectly through creatures
and we must apprehend his attributes successively after the pattern

of our knowledge of creatures.
Only God and angels can apprehend a
substance in one simple set of intuition:

. . . the human intellect must necessarily
understand by means of compounding and dividing.
For, since the human intellect ascends from
potency to act, it bears a certain likeness
to general things which do not have their
perfection at once but acquire it successively.
And likewise the human intellect does not at
once in the first apprehension receive a
perfect knowledge of a thing . . . the angelic
and divine intellects have at once perfect
knowledge of things. (52,46,77-79,131,132)
Statements about God are then both meaningful and true
meaningful because the predicates affirmed of God signify real
perfections in God; true because God contains the perfection signified
although in his they are really one and not many.
In a broad sense, all rational distinctions are founded on
our way of coming to know things through successive steps.
It is this
that accounts for the fact that one thing is known through several
concepts.
Usually, too, there is either some real distinction as a
foundation in the thing considered, or some real distinction in other

things to which the thing in question is compared.
For example, there
is no real distinction between vegetative and sensitive souls in a dog,

but there are creatures which have the former and lack the latter.
The concept 'living' is founded on the indistinguishability of several
things insofar as these things have vegetative powers; the concept
'animal' is founded on the indistinguishability of several things all
of which have sensitive powers, etc.
The concepts 'living' and
83
'animal1 differ because these two genera of powers do not always
accompany each other they may be separate in really distinct things.
The sort of distinction between 'living' and 'animal' in one creature
corresponds to the distinction of attributes in God.
In neither case
is there a real distinction in the thing itself, but that thing

virtually contains several powers.
These powers are distinguished by
the mind on the basis of their real distinction in other entities.

6.
Conclusion
Aquinas discusses three sorts of distinction the real, the

rational, and the verbal.
A real distinction obtains either between
things, or between principles of a thing which are related as act to

poetncy.
A rational distinction either has a real foundation or has
no real foundation (no examples of the latter sort are mentioned;

possible a distinction between two fictions would be of this sort).
Real distinctions obtain independently of the intellect in the sense
that their relata are not created by the understanding.
Rational
distinctions are at least partially created by an understanding

intellect.
However, Aquinas offers no precise description of these
distinctions, nor does he provide complete sets of conditions for each.

Separability of relata is never given as a general sign for the
real distinction of things as it was to be by later philosophers like
Giles of Rome, Ockham, and Suarez.
Insofar as any distinction
consists in a negation it can be said to imply the separation of its

extremes: ". . . if I abstract 'man' from whiteness saying, 'The man
is not white,' I signify that there is a real separation . . . ."
84
between man and whiteness (60,63).
But this separation applies also
to rationes one of which is not the other.
Many distinctions hold
between extremes which are not separated in the sense that one exists
apart from the other and which are not separable even by divine power,
for example the distinction between two Persons of the Trinity or the
distinction between an individual and its essence.
Aquinas's theory of distinction seems designed to help solve
the problem of universals, and certain theological problems.
The
problem of universals is seen as one requiring an explanation of how

really distinct things can be identical in some respect.
The solution
involves showing how rational identity is consistent with real

distinction, i.e. how really distinct things can be identical in
some respect.
The solution involves showing how rational identity is
consistent with real distinction, i.e. how really distinct things can
be identical in concept.
This in turn requires that things which are
really distinct be composites of matter and form, substance and

accident, and/or essence and existence.
Only if things are composite
can they be both distinct from one another in some respect, and
identical with one another in some other respect.
A related problem
is the explanation of how one and the same thing can fall under
different universals.
The solution to this problem requires showing
how real identity (identity with regard to thing) can be consistent

with a distinction of concepts.
The solution is based on our manner
of knowing things and on the ways in which we compare things with one
another.
Sometimes the ways in which we distinguish concepts of a
thing correspond to real distinctions within the thing, sometimes
85
they do not.
Insofar as he was able, Aquinas seems to have connected his
solutions to the theological problems with his solutions to the
metaphysical problems.
The distinction between divine Persons is
regarded as a distinction between things which share an essence or

nature, and the distinction of divine attributes is regarded as a
distinction based on our need to understand a thing through distinct
concepts of that thing.
But there are important differences.
The
three divine Persons are not merely rationally identical in the way
that two horses are rationally or specifically identical because they
can be conceived through the same ratio. The Persons are both really
distinct and really identical as to essence.
Nor is their distinction
from one another founded on any real distinction of principles in each

of them.
They are not composites of matter and form, and their
distinction is based on their relative opposition to one another.
The
distinction of attributes, however, bears a close resemblance to the

distinction of generic and specific concepts of one thing.
In neither
case is there a real distinction in the object of the distinction.
In
both cases the object virtually contains many perfections, although a

creature does so through its substantial form while God does so through
his essence.
In both cases we apply to one thing distinct concepts
derived from real distinctions found in creatures other than the one
under consideraLion.
There is consequently a fairly unified treatment of the rational
distinction.
The distinction of divine attributes does not require
special conditions.
The real distinction between divine Persons,
86
however, as well as the distinction between the soul and its powers,
do not follow the same pattern as the other real distinctions cited.
Opposition alone, and not any of the intrinsic principles of things,
accounts for these distinctions.
Because the conditions for each type
of distinction are not clearly expressed, and because there is no

general description of each type of distinction, it is difficult to
extend Aquinas's theory to examples he does not discuss.
For example,
what kind of distinction obtains between a thing and a fictitious

being, or between any being and a non-being?
Are the distinctions
between a thing and its existence, Peter's matter and Paul's form,
real or rational and how do we tell?
One of the problems seems to be that Aquinas never himself
presents any unified discussion of distinctions.
Any mention of a
distinction of a particular sort is usually made in connection with

the solution of some problem and enough information is provided to
handle that problem.
Later philsophers like Scotus, Ockham, and
Suarez were to concentrate more on the development of clear theories

of distinctions which could be systematically applied to individual
cases other than the ones explicitly discussed.
CHAPTER II
MINOR PHILOSOPHERS
1.
ST. BONAVENTURE
(1221-1274)
A.
General Survey
Bonaventure discusses three types of difference, the real, the

rational, and the attributional. Two general conditions are important
in determining the type of difference obtaining between two relata:
1) whether one relatum can be truly predicated of the other, and 2)
whether the same predicate can be truly affirmed of both relata.
With
these two conditions in mind, Bonaventure describes the three types of

difference as follows: the real difference obtains between two relata
which are such that "one is not predicated of the other" truly, while
some predicate "F" is truly affirmed of one relatum and truly denied
of the other; the difference of attribution obtains between relata
which are such that "although one may be able to be predicated of the
other . . . something, however, is predicated of one and not the
other"; the rational difference obtains between relata which are such
that one "may be predicated of the other, and ./all/ the same predi
cates may be affirmed of both" relata truly (1,2,38).
When Bonaventure says that one relatum may be truly predicated
of the other, he has in mind what he calls "predication through
identity" as distinct from predication through inherence (42).
For
example, the divine essence is attributionally distinct from each

87
88
Person, but the statement, "The essence is the Father," is a true
predication through identity.
Here the "is" of identity rather than
the "is" of inherence, because no form or ratio is signified as

inhering in the subject.
In the case of the real difference, to say
that one extreme cannot betruly predicated of the other is to say

that no identity statement uniting the two, e.g. "Socrates is Plato,"
is true.
B.
The Real Distinction
According to Bonaventure, thereis a composition of matter and

form not only in corporeal beings, but in every being except God (who
is distinguished from creatures in being pure act or form without any
admixture of potency). The matter in question here is not the signate
or quantified matter of Aquinas, but merely the potential element in
any created being.
Thus there can be spiritual matter in angels just
as there is corporeal matter in animals, for no angel is pure act.

Matter and form function together as principles of individuation.
Neither matter, which is common to all creatures, nor form, which can
also be shared by many creatures, can individuate by themselves (15).
The following reason is given by Bonaventure: "An individual is a
'this something.1
That it should be 'this' it has principally from
matter by reason of which a form has a position in place and in time.

That it should be 'something' it has from form.
being and also has existence.
For an individual has
Matter gives existence to form, but
form gives to matter the act of being" (16).
A form makes a thing to
be the kind of thing it is, e.g. a man, a rock, a tree.
The matter
89
which is made into this kind of thing is responsible for giving the
thing spatial and temporal location.
This man (or this rock, or this
tree) must then be a combination of both elements.
Bonaventure
rejects the theory of Boethius that individuation is due to a collec

tion of accidents, i.e. that Peter and Paul are different individual
men because Peter has accidents of whiteness, tallness, etc. and
Paul has accidents of blackness, tallness, etc.
A difference of
accidents in this fashion is merely indicative of some prior differ

ence of substances:
Individuation is from the communication of matter
with form, and must be known through a collection
of accidents . . . . Setting aside accidents and
properties, which do not make individuation but
show it, individuation is from intrinsic principles
according as they constitute one subject in which
the whole being of a thing is established. And
because an individual is constituted from the
conjunction of those principles, the form of the
whole, which is the specific form, results . . . "
(17,18,19)
The reason that there are different collections of accidents is that
there are different substances to begin with, and such substances
differ both through their matter and form.
But, since we know
substances through their accidents, we recognize real differences of

members of the same species on the basis of their difference with
regard to accidents.
Since an individual or substance is the result of the addition
/or "appropriation^/ of form to matter, Bonaventure calls a numerical
difference either a difference through addition, a difference through
matter, or a difference through quality (because of our way of
recognizing it): "For the principles of a thing, when they are
90
conjoined, are appropriated to each other and make an individual.
But being discrete or being distinct from another follows on this
/appropriation/,
and countability arises from this, and so does an
accidental property following on substance" (20,21).
From the fact
that matter and form together constitute an individual, it follows

that this individual is one in number and numerically different from
all other individuals.
Like Aquinas, Bonaventure uses the possession of incompatible
properties by the relata as a condition for their real distinction.
If the relata differ numerically, they have different accidents, and
consequently we can recognize their difference or distinguish them.
When one extreme has an absolute (as opposed to relational) property
or quality, and the other has an absolute property which is opposed to
this (as when one is white and the other is black) , there is a distinc
tion of these two things through quality (22,23).
Unlike Aquinas,
Bonaventure does not explain this opposition, i.e. whether it is

relative, privative, contrary, or contradictory opposition.
the examples he gives are of contrary or relative opposites.
Most of
It may
be that properties opposed in any of the four ways indicate a real

difference of those things to which they belong, for one and the same
substance cannot be at one time the subject of opposite properties.
A real numerical difference cannot exist in God who is not a
composite of matter and form.
The real difference in God between two
Persons can only be a difference through origin or relation: ". . .by

reason of relation there is a distinction because nothing is referred
or ordered to itself" (40) . It is the nature of relations to have two
91
extremes or more.
In the case of some mental relations, the extremes
need not be really distinct, but the extremes of real relations must
be really distinct.
Every real relation would then be irreflexive.
If one Person originates from another, as the Son originates from the
Father, there must be a real distinction between the two (23,23,26).
Opposition governs real distinctions through relation also: "just as
. . . distinction through quality is a true distinction and according
to thing (secundum rem) so the distinction through true origin is a
true distinction.
For just as one thing cannot together be white and
black, so one and the same thing cannot produce itself" (22).
Two men,
says Bonaventure, can also differ through origin, when one is a parent
of the other.
Two angels, however, are distinct only through quality
and not through origin, because they differ as substances and their
formal properties differ, but one does not originate from another (23).
The following conditions seem to indicate a real distinction
according to Bonaventure:
a and b are really distinct iff:
1.
a and b are substances and (3 F) (Fa. & -Fb) , or
2.
(3 R)((Rab v Rba) & R is irreflexive) .

C.
The Distinction of Attribution
The distinction of attribution is a distinction as to "ways of

being disposed" (modi se habendi). In introducing it, Bonaventure
sets the stage for many of his Franciscan successors who were to
acknowledge the possibility of a distinction which was neither strict
ly real nor merely rational in nature.
Several characteristics of
92
this distinction can be recognized.
First, a difference of attri
bution is a difference within a thing, i.e. the extremes really

constitute one thing.
of these extremes.
Secondly, a true identity statement may be made
Thirdly, some predicate may be truly affirmed of
one extreme, and truly denied of the other.

The main use Bonaventure makes of the distinction of attribu
tion is to give an account of how there can be both sameness and
difference, unity and plurality, in certain beings like God.
Bona
venture accepts the orthodox interpretation according to which God is

such that each divine Person Father, Son, Holy Spirit is really
different from each of the others, while bach Person is identical with
the divine essence.
"According to this /distinction/ . . . unity and
plurality are understood in it /the deitj/ unity according to what is

absolute, plurality according to what is relative" (3).
The essence '
of God is said to be absolute because God bears no relation to any

other essence.
But each Person is related to each of the others, and
by virtue of these relations each Person is really different from each

of the others.
In order to understand what Bonaventure means when he says that
the divine essence is absolute while each of the Persons is relative,
one must examine the predicates involved.
affirmed of anything in a derivative sense.
The word "essence" is not

That is, nothing is said
to be an essence because it stands in certain relations to other things.

But the predicates "Father" and "Son" are relational.
A thing is said
to be a father, or a son, because of certain properties it has through
93
being related to something else.
God is said to have an essence
because of what he is, but God is said to be the Father because of

the property of paternity.
A Person has a property that the divine
essence lacks:
Communicability and incommunicability are not
opposite properties, but they differ as having
a property and not having a property, for because
a Person has a relative property, it is therefore
distinguished and incommunicable, but because the
essence lacks that property, therefore it is
common_and communicable to many, and_ therefore
they /iê. the essence and a Person/ are not
/really/ distinguished from each other. (4)
The predicates "Father" and "Son" are limited in application.
The
Persons are denominated by these predicates because of the properties

they have.
Hence the predicate "Father" is applicable to that Person
with the property of filiation.

to one Person.
A relative property here belongs only
It cannot be shared with another, and is that which
distinguishes the Person it belongs to from the other Persons.
But
God is not called an "essence" because of some property he has, hence

"essence" is not limited in application.
All Persons share in the
essence although they do not share relative properties.
Although a
predicate true of one Person cannot be truly predicated of the other

Persons, "essence" can be truly affirmed of each Person using the
"is" of identity, i.e. "The Father is the essence," "The Son is the
essence," etc.
Bonaventure makes it clear that the essence and a Person are
not distinguished because the essence has some property opposed to
the relative property of the Person.
The type of opposition of
properties appropriate to the real distinction has no place in the
94
distinction of attribution.
Still opposing predicates can be predi
cated of essence and Person, e.g. "The essence is communicable and

the Person is not communicable."
cability in the essence.
But there is no property of communi-
There is merely a lack of incommunicability
because the divine essence lacks every limitation (9,10,4).

There is nodifference between divine essence and a Person as
far as
absolute modes of being are concerned.
That is, a Person is
not an
accident of God, nor is it a separate substance.
Any differ
ence in a thing as to absolute modes of being implies some composition

within the
thing,but there can be no composition in the deity who is
most simple(2,3).
The difference
is solely one of relative modes of
being or relations (modi se habendi) (5,6).

each of the
Each person is related to
otherPersons, but the essence itself lacks any relations:

A Person has to be related and compared to
another, the nature doesn't. Hence something
can be attributed to one which is not attributed
to the other. Nor . . . does it follow from
this that there is in them some composition or
diversity according to essence or being, for it
suffices that the diversity be only according to
relation. (10,6)
Because each Person bears a relation to each of the others, it is

really different from each of them.
But a Person is not a thing
really different from the essence.
The relational property which
distinguishes one Person from the other is a thing in relation to

these other Persons, but only a relative mode in relation to the
essence:
A property of a Person . . . is truly a thing
through comparison with the Person from which it
distinguishes the Person to which it belongs,
because it really differs from that, just as the
95
Father is really distinguished through his
paternity from the Son. However, through
comparison with the Person in which it is,
or even with the divine essence itself, it
is only a mode. (8,7,12,13,14)
How can one and the same property (or the ratio of a property )(12)
really distinguish one Person from another, but not really distinguish
a Person from .he essence?
The answer seems to be the lack of a
property in the essence which would be opposed to the property in a

Person.
According to the conditions for the real distinction, the
things distinguished must have opposing absolute or relational

properties.
A difference of attribution is also said to obtain outside God:
. . ./there is/ rational diversity in the
divinity . . . through having a property
and not having that property, and that
does not introduce a distinction nor does
it cause one extreme not to be predicated
of the other. It does, however, cause some
thing to be predicated of one which is not
predicated of the other, as is clear in the
case of Peter and man. Peter is an individual,
man is not an individual, and, however, "man"
is truly predicated of Peter. (9)
This type of distinction between Peter and 'man' differs from the
distinction between divine essence and Person.
Here "man" is said to
be predicated of Peter, but the predication cannot be one of identity.

It must be predication through inherence because the human form inheres
in the individual Peter.
relative term.
Nor is either term here "Peter", "man" a
The only similarity seems to be that 'man' may be
said to be communicable insofar as there are many individuals all

having human nature.
That is, there are many individuals sharing or
participating in the same nature, just as the Persons participate in
96
divine nature.
And the individual Peter, like each of the Persons is
not able to share his distinguishing properties with others.
But
there seems to be no difference as to relative modes of being between

Peter and 'man*. Perhaps then it is not necessary for one extreme of
the distinction of attribution to be a relative mode of the other.
If there are only two conditions for the distinction of
attribution, the predicability of one extreme of the other either by
inherence or by identity and the attribution of something to one
extreme and not to the other, then the distinction of attribution will
obtain wherever extremes are united in some one thing so that a
proposition uniting them is true although the extremes differ as to
characteristics.
Hence Peter and 'man* differ by attribution because,
while it is true to say "Peter is a man," it is also true to say

"Peter is an individual" and "Man is not an individual."
'Man* is a
ratio communicable to many other individuals, not an individual (4).

It is never completely clear whether Bonaventure intends the
distinctions of attribution to be real or rational in nature.
That is,
does the distinction consist in recognition of some difference exist

ing independently of mental activities, or does the mind partly create
the difference?
The distinction of attribution agrees with the real
distinction in that in both cases something is truly predicated of one

extreme and not truly predicated of the other, i.e. (3F)(Fa & -Fb) .
But it differs from the real distinction in that the difference is
found\ within
one thing although it does not seem to be founded upon
any real diversity or composition in this thing.
Nor is one extreme of
the distinction of attribution really separable from the other as would
97
often be the case with extremes which are really distinct.
tremes seem, on the contrary, to be totally inseparable:
The ex
"And this
difference does not mean thatone extreme may be reomved from the
other" CIO).
Yet Bonaventure's remarks that something corresponds to this
distinction on the part of the thing distinguished (. . . j j - t j is not
only in our understanding, but is also in the thing" (11); "something
/real/ does so correspond" (2)) indicated that if the distinction is
not fully real, it has some sort of real foundation at least in the
thing.
Bonaventure says thatit is "Less than the first ]_the purely
real/, because according to the first essential diversity and composi

tion is understood.
Greater than the second /the purely rational/
because according to that no distinction at all is understood in a

thing" (3,1,11).
Still, at times he calls the distinction of attribution a
"rational" distinction: "Paternity is not really other than the
essence /of God/ since paternity is the essence.
rationally other" (12,17).
It is however,
In comparison to the divine essence, a
Person is not a thing but only a mode or ratio (as 'man* may be
considered a mode or ratio of Peter and other individual men). If
there is to be a real foundation for the distinction of attribution,
such rationes must really exist in the thing, but not as really
distinct- parts of the thing.
Bonaventure makes no attempt to clarify
the exact nature of the foundation.

The distinction of attribution seems then to be a type of
rational distinction with a real foundation.
In the examples he gives,
98
it is a distinction in which at least one extreme is a ratio, but the
conditions given do not rule out the possibility that both extremes
may be rationes. Later Franciscans were to clarify and develop this
sort of intermediate distinction.
The conditions explicitly given by
Bonaventure seem to come to this:

a
arid A are distinct by attribution (where a is a thing and A
is a mode or ratio of a) iff:

1. There is some predicate which is true of a^ and false of
A, or false of a and true of A,
2. one extreme can be predicated of the other truly either
by identity or by inherence,
3. there is a real foundation in a_ for the distinction.
If it should be the case that a distinction of attribution can obtain
between a thing considered under one ratio and the same thing consider
ed under another ratio, these conditions would of course have to be
altered.
D.
A rational distinction obtains between two rationes of the

understanding (rationes intelligendi (36,38); modi intelligendi (3)).
In calling them rationes of the understanding, Bonaventure seems to
intend to contrast them with the modal rationes or modi se habendi of
the distinction of attribution.
The conditions given for the rational
distinction are two: one extreme is "truly predicated of the other," and
all the same predicates are truly predicated of both extremes (1,2).
According to the standard definition of identity, the second condition
99
implies the identity of the extremes of this distinction:
Bonaventure applies the rational distinction to the divine
attributes which differ, he says, only according to our manner of
understanding God.
It is described as a difference "from the part of
our apprehension" (2).
In one place he describes it as a difference
obtaining between terms which have different connotations: "Truly the

third difference is the least (less than the real and attributional)
because it is in what are connoted.
For, although one extreme may be
predi: :ted of the other, and the same can be predicated of both, they
do not, however, connote the same, nor is each understood through the
same means" Cl) In saying that one ratio connotes something the
other doesn't, Bonaventure implies that the corresponding predicates
have different intensions or contents Csee p. 49, n. 15).
The meaning
of "God's magnitude" is not identical with the meaning of "God's

substance."
How then can Bonaventure's remark that "nothing is
predicated of magnitude which cannot be predicated of substance" (38)

be true?
This statement requires some modification.
If "infinite"
is truly predicated of God's magnitude, then it is also truly predi

cated of God's substance, wisdom, etc., for these are really the same
thing.
But "is believed by John to be infinite" may be truly predi
cated of God's magnitude, yet falsely predicated of God's substance

because of John's deficient knowledge of God.
If we consider the
expression "God's magnitude," "God's substance," we might say, follow

ing Quine, that Bonaventure's statement holds only for those predi
cates which do not render the occurrences of the expressions "God's
100
magnitude," "Gods substance" referentially opaque.
26
Predicates
which have this effect are those pertaining to certain psychological

states such as believing, knowing, doubting, fearing, etc., modal
predicates concerning necessity and possibility, and other of a
similar nature.
Such predicates will be referred to as R-predicates
below.
Like Aquinas, Bonaventure believes that divine attributes like
magnitude and substance differ because we first understand creatures
and then apply concepts derived from creatures to God: "Our intellect
understands them /essential divine properties/ through diverse con
cepts" (.36), and "a plurality in creatures answers to that way of
being known . . . . whence, because we understand the power and wisdom
of God through diverse things, we give him diverse names" (37),
"because God is not only known through diverse things, but also through
all genera of things" (3).
Hence we call God "God" through the mode
of substance, "great" through the mode of quantity, "good" through

the mode of quality, etc.
But, although we apply these diverse names
to God, there is no real difference in God corresponding to the

diversity of names such as "God's magnitude," "Gods goodness."
Gods
goodness, greatness, etc. are all one and the same being:
. . . just as in us wisdom, power, and will are
truly beings and the causes of things which come
from us, so in God they exist also, but . . .
they are one. And, although they are one,
because our intellect cannot comprehend the
infinity of that substance, nor express it
26
Willard V. 0. Quine, "Reference and Modality" in From a
Logical Point of View (N.Y.: Harper & Row), 2d ed. revised, pp. 139159.
101
through one word, therefore we understand

God through many modes and express his
nature through diverse names. (35)
The predicates "great," "good," etc. have different connotations or
meanings when predicated of God because they originally signify
diverse categories in creatures.
Like Aquinas, Bonaventure bases this
distinction of attributes in God on both the deficiency of the created

intellect
and the infinity of Gods nature.
Can this distinction be called a purely mental distinction?

Bonaventure says that it is the least of the three kinds of distinc
tion "because nothing on the part of the thing corresponds to it" (2)
and "it is more from our part than from God's" (36), i.e. there is no
corresponding real difference in God.
lacks a real foundation.
But this does not mean that it
God really has the perfections signified by
the predicates, although they are one in him and not really diverse.
And the names of God connote some real diversity outside God, hence
they are not synonymous.
Although many questions concerning the rational distinction in
general may remain unanswered, a construction of conditions for this
distinction based upon what Bonaventure has said concerning the
rational distinction in God, may be made:
When one thing a. is such that it is conceived through several
concepts
A and B (because of our way of understanding a^ and not because
any real difference between A and B in a), then a_ conceived
under A and a_ conceived under B are rationally distinct iff:
1. a conceived of through A and a. conceived of through B can
102
be be truly predicated of each other through identity (or "Aa

Ba" is true),
2. Any predicate true of i conceived under A is also true of a_
conceived under B (with the exception of R-predicates
mentioned above),
3. "A" and "B" have different connotations.
That is, "A"
connotes b^ and "B" connotes c_, and Id and <c are really
distinct.
Bonaventure does not make clear whether he acknowledges the
existence of a rational distinction which has no real foundation, nor
does he mention a purely verbal distinction between different expres
sions which are synonymous. Nor is it clear how the above conditions
would be extended or amended to handle other types of rational distincttion are the conditions for the rational distinction in God between
attributes the same as those for rational distinctions in creatures?
E.
The Essential Difference
There is another type of difference obtaining between principles

of one thing.
It is not clear whether this essential difference is
real, rational, or some other sort.
One example of such a difference
is that between the matter of a thing and its form.
Such a difference
would appear to be mind-independent, but it cannot be "real" as

Bonaventure understands that term, for "whatever are really distin
guished are distinguished either by origin or by quality" (29).
Principles of a thing such as matter and form do not have qualities,
nor does one originate from the other, although it may be that
103
something is truly predicated of one and not truly predicated of the

other.
Bonaventure says that the difference between the substance of a
thing and an accident of that thing is essential (per essentiam).
Since the condition he gives for such a distinction is the separabili
ty
of the relata, he seems to imply that the essence of the substance
differs from the essence of the accident.
What differ essentially
can be separated from each other at least by God, i.e. one can continue
to exist after the other has ceased to exist:
It must be said that through a miracle it can
happen that accidents exist without a subject
or a substance. For, since they differ essen
tially, God can separate them through his
power without any inconvenience . . . . they
are inseparable according to a natural power
. . . . (31)
Also: "they.differ essentially, and therefore one can be corrupted and
removed without the other /being corrupted/" (32).
Bonaventure, along
with other Franciscans, probably regards matter and form as essenti

ally different in the same way.
For an essential difference to obtain then, each extreme must
have its own essence and be capable of subsisting through divine power.
Two men would thus be essentially different.
The three Persons,
however, while really different, cannot be essentially different for

they all share one essence.
It appears then that essential and real
differences are two distinct types of difference, although they often

overlap so that sometimes the same things are both really and essentially
different.
Both differences appear to obtain independently of the mind.
104
The following conditions for the essential distinction can be

constructed:
a
and b^ are essentially distinct iff:
1. a. has an essence and b^ has an essence,

2. the essence of a the essence of b^
3. either a and b^ can exist in separation from each other,
or a can be destroyed without b^ being destroyed and
conversely, at least by divine power.
F.
Conclusion
Bonaventures theory of distinction is inadequate in several

ways.
Since his interest is mainly in distinctions that can be said
to exist somehow in God, his account of each distinction is colored

by the peculiarity of the theological applications he makes so that it
is difficult to see how such distinctions would apply elsewhere.
The
conditions given for each of the three major types of distinction seem
to be restricted to distinctions of this kind in God and do not apply
to every possible distinction of the same kind.
The condition given
for the rational distinction, that both extremes have exactly the same
predicates true of them, would make this distinction, for example,
virtually inapplicable to creatures which do not share the unity of
the divine essence.
The conditions given for the real distinction
limit it to a distinction between subsistent beings.
Principles of
things are not then really distinct, and the exact manner of their
distinction is never fully explained.
105
The theory is also incomplete.
What type of distinction
obtains between powers of the soul, or between these powers and the
essence?
The distinction cannot be essential, nor can it be real.
Bonaventure says that the powers differ in the genus of potency (39)
but this does not tell us whether
the distinction is rational or
attributional or some other kind.
What kind of distinction obtains
between two rationes of one and the same creature, e.g. animality and
rationality in a man?
What kind of distinction obtains between two
verbal expressions signifying the same ratio? What kind of distinc

tion obtains between a genus and its species?
2.
HENRY OF GHENT
(d. 1293)
A.
Three types of difference are mentioned by Henry of Ghent the

real, the rational, and the intentional.
His remarks on the first two
are brief, for his interest seems to lie in explicating and applying
the intentional difference to the solution of certain problems.
A real difference (differentia re) is a difference obtaining
between two things.
Henry defines a thing as an "absolute nature and
essence, having an exemplary notion in God, and suited to exist by

divine operation, whether it be a composite thing such as a man or a
donkey, or whether it be a principle of such a composite such as
matter or form, or whether it be universal or particular" (1,3).
thing is something that corresponds to a divine idea.
It is something
106
that couldexist at least by divine power and
consequently its idea
involves no contradiction (for even God could not make a round square
exist).
The essence of a man can have such an exemplary idea in God,
and God can produce a creature representative of this idea.
Prior to
the act of creation essences exist as ideas in the divine mind.
But
in speaking of "absolute natures" Henry does not intend to exclude

relations from the class of things.
Substances and qualities are
things, but so are relations (4).

Separability of extremes is a sufficient, but not a necessary
condition, for a real difference between them:
Some truly differ really, either by something
absolute on the part of both, or by something
relative at least on the part of one . . . .
absolute, such as those that differ in nature,
e.g. matter and form, and God can separate
these. (4)
Presumably the non-relational beings are separable if their separation
would entail no contradiction.
Some relations can be separated from
the substances in which they inhere when they are founded on some
accident in the substance.
For example, the relation of similarity
between Socrates and Plato may be founded on the color of each of them.
Such a relation, like the accident on which they are founded, is
separable from Socrates, and separable from Plato.
Thus if Socrates
became black and lost his white color, the relation of similarity he
had to Plato would be lost.
Other relations are founded on the essence
or nature of a thing itself and not on some accident of it.
Such a
relation even God cannot separate from its foundation while the thing
remains, because this would be tantamount to separating a thing from
107
itself.
An example of such a relation is that which living implies
to the essence of being (essentiam entis). In a living creature, such

a relation is founded on the essence of the thing itself (4).
Where
separability of extremes is possible, such separability would appear

to be mutual, i.e. x can continue to exist if y is destroyed, and
conversely.
The following conditions are those given by Henry for the real
distinction:
a. and lj are really distinct iff:
1. a is a thing and b is a thing (either substances or prin
ciples of substances),
2. either a and b^ are separable in that God can preserve one
independently of the other so that one can exist apart from
the other, or a is a relation founded on the essence of b^
and a and b_ are inseparable even by God,
3. a / b ,
B.
The rational distinction with no real foundation is given only

a limited scope by Henry: " . . . those differ by reason only which are
really the same and form the same concept, but in a diverse way, such
as a definition and what is defined" (5,2).
Thus his rational
distinction is not a distinction between two different conceptions of

one and the same object as was usually the case for Aquinas and Bona
venture. The extremes of this rational distinction of Henry's are
different modes of one and the same concept, as 'man' and 'rational
108
animal are different modes of the same concept.
The expression
"rational animal" is just the definition of "man."
The difference
between the modes is this: the mode of the definition makes explicit
those essential notes which are implicitly contained in the concept
of what is defined.
In other words, "rational" signifies the differ
ence, and "animal" the genus, of the species signified by "man."

purpose of the definition is clarification.
The
Peter, when he is regard
ed as a man, is regarded in a more "confused" way than when he is

regarded as a rational animal.
Saying that "man" just means "rational
animal" merely elucidates the meaning of the predicate and the concept
it signifies.
A better way of describing the distinction might be this.
Two
predicates differ rationally when they signify the same concept (the
two predicates must differ as to type, and not only as tokens of one
type). It can be said that they have the same content or intension
(see note 15, p. 49), although they signify this content in different
ways, e.g. confusedly and distinctly.
In Lewis's terminology, we may
say that the defining predicate delimits the intension of the predi27
cate defined (e.g. "rational animal" delimits the intension of "man").
Sameness of extension will be a necessary condition for a rational
difference, for if there is only one concept involved, whatever falls
under it as it is considered under one mode will also fall under it as
it is considered under another mode.
Thus everything which is a man is
27Lewis, Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, p. 41.
109
also a rational animal and conversely.
This is what Henry means when
he says thattwo modes of the same concept are "really the same" (5).
Sameness of extension is not, however, a sufficient condition for a
rational distinction because exactly the same class of being can fall
under two entirely different concepts (this is true of the concepts
'featherless biped' and "rational animal').
The extremes of the rational distinction are inseparable:
And these are in no way separable from each other
because they are individibly in a thing and in
the understanding, and such cannot be separated,
neither according to external reality nor
according to the understanding, just as the same
thing cannot be separated from itself. (5)
Thus, if F and G are rationally different in the following ways, (x)
(Fx
Gx) is true.
Nothing can belong to the extension of one
predicate and not belong to the extension of the other.

bility is not only real, but logical as well.
a man who is not a rational animal.
The insepara
Even God cannot make
This would involve a contradiction
since the one concept entails the other.

The following conditions for the rational distinction can be
constructed:
F and G are rationally distinct modes of the same concept iff:
1. "F" and "G" are predicates and signify F and G respectively,
2. "F" is the definition of "G" or conversely,
3. "F" and "G" signify the same concept (i.e. they have the
same intension or content),
4. "F" entails "G" and "G" dntails "F" (or
5. F
(x) ( F x G x ) > ,
G.
110
C.
The Intentional Distinction
Although much in Henry's treatment of real and rational

differences was later adopted by Scotus (1266-1308) and others, the
intentional difference was Henry's main contribution to the theory of
distinctions.
He describes an intentio as follows: "an intentio is
. . . something belonging really to the simplicity of some essence,

something which is suited . . . to be conceived without some other
/intentio/ which likewise belongs to the thing and from which /the
first intentio/ does not differ as an absolute thing" (7).
An
intentio, in other words, is a ratio which has a real foundation

in a thing.
The intentiones had of one thing correspond to the
different ways of conceiving the thing.
The intentional distinction
differs from the rational distinction in that the extremes of the

latter are two modes of the same concept and are identical in exten
sion and intension.
But intentiones are such that while two of them
may overlap in extension and intension, they are not identical.
The
intentional distinction differs from the real distinction in that the

extremes of the former are only intentiones of one and the same thing
( 6).
Henry remarks at one point that "whatever differ intentionally
differ rationally, but not conversely" (6).
This would be impossible
given the strict interpretation of the rational difference above.
He
may here be using "rational difference" in a broader sense as a

difference which results partly from the activity of the intellect.
The intentional difference is at least a rational difference
Ill
(using "rational difference" in the broader sense) with a real founda

tion, for Henry says: " . . . those are intentionally diverse which,
founded on the simplicity of the same thing, form of themselves
diverse concepts which are understood to be diverse because of this,
that one of them excludes the other either totally . . . or in
part . . . " (6,8).
In saying that they are founded on the simplicity
of the essence of a thing, Henry implies that no real difference of

matter and form or other principles in the thing corresponds to the
difference ofintentiones.
The intentiones are of the essence of the
thing, but not as distinct parts of the thing until some mind
considers the thing and draws out these intentiones through an act of
comparing that thing with other really different things:
Whence an intentio is not said to be something
in a thing as it is outside /the mind/, but
only as it falls in the actual consideration of
an intellect considering /what is/ really one
as two intentionally, /and this/ is truly two
intentionally and not fictitiously. (6)
The intentiones are really in the essence but only potentially
different until some intellect "draws them out" and distinguishes
them.
This distinguishing is accomplished by a comparison of the
thing in question with other things in which there is a real difference

of such aspects.
For example, the intentiones 'rationality', 'animal-
ity', and 'life' are only potentially distinct in Peter until someone
considers the various functions that Peter performs and compares these
functions with the functions of other living creatures.
Peter is seen
to be like plants in his ability to nourish himself, to reproduce, to

grow, etc. although the plants lack the further abilities of sense and
112
reason that Peter has.
Peter is seen to be like the beasts in his
abilities to sense and to live although they lack his ability to reason.
Vegetative, sensitive, and rational powers are thus really different
in some other creatures because one thing can have one power and lack
the others, etc.
Turning again to Peter, three powers can be distin
guished in him, and three intentiones correspond to these.
Now that
the intellect has considered Peter and compared him with other
creatures, it can actually distinguish these three intentiones which
were previously only potentially distinct in Peter.
As is the case with the rational difference, the intentional
difference can be regarded as a difference of predicates.
It is the
extensions of the predicates "rational," "animal," "living," which

are seen to differ in the above process of comparison because the
classes of things to which they apply differ.
Plants are included in
the extension of "living" but excluded from the extension of "animal."

Beasts are included in the extensions of "animal" and "living," but
excluded from the extension of "rational," etc.
Because the exten
sions differ, the intellect discovers that the intensions (in Lewis's
sense) must differ also.
What are "really diverse in diverse thing"
must be somehow distinct in Peter.

A difference of extension is said by Henry to be necessary for
a difference of intentiones:
Whence I say those differ intentionally
which form diverse concepts of themselves
one of which does not entirely include the
other, and which are only of those that are
really diverse in diverse things even if
they are really the same in the same thing.
113
For whatever are such, one of them happens
to be understood without the other . . . (8)
The intentional difference is mental in that it requires some mental
activity in order to be effected, and real in having a foundation in
the simple essence of a thing which can perform many different
functions and in corresponding to a real difference in other things.
Another important characteristic of the intentional distinction
is the exclusion of one intentio by another from which it differs:
"one of them excludes the other either totally, . . . or in part . . ."
(6).
It is clear that Henry does not mean by exclusion some incompat
ibility of the intentiones in question.
These intentiones must belong
to the same thing because an intentional difference is always a

difference within one thing, so there is not then the sort of exclusion
of one contrary by another, or of one contradictory by another (e.g.
whiteness and blackness; whiteness and not-whiteness). Henry gives
examples of intentiones which totally exclude each other in his sense
and two of these are the intentiones of a genus and a difference such
as 'animal' and 'rational' in a man.
Since he contrasts intentional
and rational distinctions on this point, it is useful to turn again

to predicates.
According to Henry, two predicates only rationally
distinct do not exclude each other in any ways.

extensions are identical.
Their intensions and
It would seem fair to say then that if one
intentio excludes another wholly, this means that the meanings or

intensions or contents of the corresponding predicates, e.g. "animal1,"
"rational," are different and neither is included in the definition of
the other.
Their extensions will differ also but still overlap.
The
114
classes to which the predicates apply are not mutually exclusive.

In other cases, one intentio only partially excludes the other.
The concept of one intentio includes the other, but not conversely, as
the concept of a species includes the concepts of a genus and a
difference, but not conversely" (7).
Thus the concept man includes
the concept 'animal* in its definition, and the concept 'rational* as

well, but neither 'rational' nor 'animal' includes 'man'.
In other
words, the intension of "man" includes the intensions of "animal"

and "rational."
The following relations seem to obtain: the
intensions of "man" and "rational animal" are identical; the inten

sions of "animal" and "rational" do not overlap; the intensions of
"man" and "animal" (or "rational") overlap but are not identical (to
say that one overlaps the other means that one is included in the
definition of the other).
When one intentio includes another in its
definition, either it adds more to the intentio it includes, as "man"

adds the notion of rationality to animality, or it includes the other
exactly but expresses it more nobly, as "living" includes the notion
of being because living is a noble form of being.
Henry further supports the above interpretation when he says
that intentiones which are mutually exclusive (in his sense of
exclusion) can be separated in that something can be one and not the
other as a beast can be an animal and not rational.
entail the other, in other words (8).
One does not
Intentiones which are such that
one includes the other partially are such that the one included in the
definition of the other cannot be separated from the including intentio,
e.g. there is no man who is not also an animal animality cannot be
115
separated from humanity.
But the reverse can occur, i.e. that
intentio which is included can be found in separation from the includ

ing intentio. Thus many animals are not men.
but not conversely.
"Man" entails "animal,"
Henry also says that intentiones differing in the
first way can be understood in separate acts, while those differing in

the second way cannot be separately understood (8).
At least in the first type of intentional difference an intentio
cannot be predicated of the other abstractively: " . . . neither of
those extremes is predicated of the other . . . nor is a genus
predicated of a difference, nor conversely, except by reason of a
subject to which both belong" (8).
Thus it is true to say of Peter
who contains the intentiones 'animal1 and 'rational', "This animal is

rational."
But if animality and rationality are abstracted from any
subjects, it is not true to say either "Animality is rationality" or

"Rationality is animality" (where the "is" now is the "is" of identity).
Since there is no identity of meaning,, then "animality" and "rationali
ty," the abstract forms of "animal" and "rational," can be united in an
identity statement truly only insofar as the corresponding intentiones
belong to one and the same thing (8).
The following conditions hold for the intentional distinction:
A and B are intentionally distinct in a thing x iff:
1. A is an intentio and B is an intentio,
2. A ^ B,
3. Either A does not entail B and B does not entail A (i.e. the
intension of the predicate "A" is not part of the definition
of "B" or conversely), or A entails B, but B does not entail
116
A (i.e. the intension of "B" is included in the definition

of "A," but not conversely),
4.
the extensions of the predicates "A" and "B" overlap but

are not identical,
5.
A and B belong to the essence of something, x, but are not

actually distinct in x until some intellect compares x with
other really distinct things in which A and B are really
distinct.
6.
A and B are inseparable in x by any power.

D.
The Uses of the Intentional Distinction
Intentional distinctions in which one extreme excludes the other

(in Henrys sense) are said to obtain between the rational, sensitive,
and vegetative powers in any creature that has more than one of these,
and between the genus and the difference in any specific form (7,8).
Intentional differences in which one extreme is partially included in
the other obtain between any species and its genus or difference,
between any subject and its nature, and between living and being in a
living creature (7).
The most interesting use that Henry of Ghent makes of the
intentional difference is to account for the difference between the
being of essence (esse essentiae) and being of existence (esse exis
tentiae) in any creature.
The Thomistic real distinction between
essence and esse is rejected because a real distinction, according to

Henry, holds between extremes which are substances and accidents, and
essence and esse are neither.
Also, if there were a real distinction
117
between the two, creation ex nihilo would be impossible.
At creation
an essence is made to exist, but if there is a real distinction, there

is also separability and the essence could pre-exist prior to its
receiving existence.
But this is absurd.
If they are really distinct,
then each could be created separately, but this is also absurd since
an essence would still exist without having received existence.
Henry's solution is to maintain that essence and existence are created
at once, in one act.
They are not then really distinct, but only
intentionally distinct.
The essence of anything can have both a being of essence and a
being of existence.
The first is the intelligible being an essence
has insofar as it is an idea in the divine mind and a possible being.

The being of existence is the being an essence has once it has been
created or made an effect of God (10).
The two types of being differ
only intentionally:
There is a . . . relation in the essence of any
creature, which is implied by the word esse and
which is actually founded on this essence. For
this esse does not agree with the essence by
that ratio by which the essence is an essence,
because then that esse could not not be, just as
an essence is able not to be . . . but the esse
agrees with the essence by that ratio by which
the essence by that ratio by which the essence
is an effect of God, and this ratio is outside
the intentio of the essence as it is an essence.
Because of which . . . in any creature essence
and . . . esse necessarily differ by intentio,
because of which . . . esse cannot be predicated
in abstraction of essence through identity . . .
(10,11)
The esse here mentioned is the esse existentiae which cannot be
completely identical with the essence to which it belongs, or that
118
essence would never be able not to exist.

difference of ratio.
There must at least be a
An essence has a being of existence insofar
only as it has been created.
The being of existence does not belong
to the intentio 'essence' there is a difference of meaning according

to which "essence" and "existence" cannot be predicated of each other
truly in abstraction from some concrete thing which is both.
Thus the
sentence "This essence is this existence" may be true when "this"

refers to Peter, but the abstract sentence "Essence is existence" is
not true because of the intentional difference.
A thing described as
having an essence differs from the same thing described as having an

existence for to have an essence means to have a corresponding idea in
the divine mind, while to have an existence means to have been created
by God.
E.
Conclusion
Henry of Ghent's theory of distinctions was taken over by

Scotus who rejected some of it and refined much of it.
Thus Henry's
general descriptions of real and rational distinctions are kept, but

greatly clarified.
Scotus's formal distinction is, to a large extent,
a revamping of the intentional distinction to suit the needs of

Scotus's own metaphysical assumptions.
Scotus objected in particular
to Henry's contention that intentiones are only potentially distinct in

a thing until some mind attends to them and draws them out and actually
distinguishes them.
According to Scotus, such intentiones must be
actually different in a thing before a mind considers them.
The result
of making such changes in the intentional distinction is the formal
119
distinction which is clearly a real distinction for Scotus, and not

merely a rational distinction with a real foundation as for Henry.
In his treatment of the real distinction, Henry takes a step
not taken by Aquinas and Bonaventure.
Principles of things matter
and form, substance and accident are now called things.
This idea
was adopted by both Scotus and Ockham and such principles are now
granted their own natures and existences.
Giles of Rome, a contempor
ary of Henry, went even farther and maintained that essence and
existence were also things.
According to Giles, such an assumption
is necessary if there is to be creation for otherwise essences, not

being really distinct from existences, would exist necessarily.
Henry, however, believed that his intentional distinction better
accounted for the possibility of creation than did the real distinction.
While Henry seems to have taken greater care than his prede
cessors with his descriptions and conditions for the three types of
distinction, his theory is still incomplete.
Is there a rational
distinction which corresponds to a real difference of things?
If so,
then the description of the rational distinction as a distinction

between two modes of one concept must be revised (as has been pointed
out, Henry sometimes seems to use the expression "rational distinc
tion" ambiguously). What kind of distinction obtains between the soul
and its powers, or between a thing and a ratio or intentio
thing?
of the
What kind of distinction obtains between two modes of different
concepts?
120
3.
GILES OF ROME
(1247-1316)
Giles of Rome contributed to the theory of distinctions through

his real distinction between the essence and existence of a thing.
In
this he is directly opposed to Henry of Ghent and others who thought

the distinction to
be of some intermediate sort.
According to Giles,
just as the fact of generation reveals a real distinction between the

matter and form of a thing because the same matter can undergo many
changes of form, so the fact of creation reveals a real distinction
between essence and existence in a thing because an essence can either
exist or not exist (1).
This real distinction between essence and existence is not the
real distinction of Aquinas.
For Giles, a real distinction is always
a distinction between things (such metaphysical principles as essence

and existence are called "things" by Giles). In a key passage, Giles
ignores all other conditions and makes the actual separation of two
extremes a sufficient condition for their real distinction:
. . . some objects can be separated actually;
others only in thought. Therefore, in the way
in which we find objects separated in that way
they are distinct from each other. If, there
fore, they are separated only in thought then
they are rationally distinct; if they are really
separated, they are really distinct. And although
there is some doubt whether these objects which
are really distinct are also really separable,
there cannot be a doubt that those which are
really separate are really distinct. (2)
What Giles seems to mean is this.
Two rocks, for example, can be
actually separated in the sense that one can be destroyed while the
121
other continues to exist.
Also, if they happened to be united, each
can continue to exist after this union has been destroyed.
But a
genus, like 'animal', is never separated from its species in this way.
It is possible to consider the genus 'animal' without at the same time
considering a species like 'man'.
That is, one can consider that
which all animals have in common without considering men in particular.

But this does not mean that the genus and the species can exist in
separation from each other for they are not things in the way that
rocks are things.
Genus and species are mental beings (3).
Since
they cannot be separated outside the mind, they are rationally distinct.
The two rocks, however, are really distinct because they can be really
separated.
The real separation or separability of two extremes is ....
then a sufficient sign of their real distinction.
The condition is not
necessary for it is possible that two extremes are really distinct yet
really inseparable (e.g. the divine Persons, or the soul and its
powers).
In saying that the essence of a thing and its existence are
really distinct because they are really separable, Giles does not mean
that an essence can be found without an existence, or that an
existence can be found which is not the existence of some kind of
thing.
The kind of separability involved here can be determined by
examining the nature of creation:

If, indeed, an essence were always joined to an
existence, it would always possess an existence
and it would never be able not to exist. There
fore, because sensible natures are able not to
exist or because they are not always joined to
existence, because they begin to exist sometime,
122
we can say that they are In potency to

existence and that they have no /sic/
essence really distinct from existence. (2)
The separability is of two things which are not always united, not
of two things which exist independently of each other.
An essence
and an existence are only united at the moment of creation when a

particular essence receives existence.
and does not always have existence,
Since it receives existence
an essence can be said to be
really distinct from its act of existence.
It is also separated from
this existence when it is destroyed.

Unlike Henry of Ghent, Giles thinks that creation requires the
real distinction of an essence and its existence.
If the two were
really identical, every essence would exist of itself and continue

to so exist.
There would be neither creation nor destruction.
But
doesn't this real distinction mean that an essence could somehow be

before it receives existence?
No, says Giles, for both essence and
existence are created at once (11).
Essence and existence must also
be distinct in creatures in order that they may be distinguished

from God.
God exists necessarily because his essence and existence
are really identical.
An immaterial substance which has no material
potbftcy would also exist necessarily if it did not receive an

existence really distinct from its essence.
The contingency of
creatures requires the real distinction of essence and existence in

them.
An intentional distinction between extremes which are insepar
able does not save either the possibility of creation or the possibi
lity of contingency.
Not only is this distinction real in the sense that it obtains
123
between extremes independently of any intellect's consideration of

them, but it is also a distinction between things.
Giles often refers
to "those who think that existence is not a thing really distinct

from essence" in order to refute them, and he notes that "just as
matter and quantity are two things, so essence and existence are two
really distinct things . . . existence is an actuality really distinct
from and added to the essence . . . " (9).
His reasons for considering
them to be things are not entirely clear.
He may intend to call any
two extremes which are really separable distinct things.
He may be
using "thing" in a loose sense to mean any being or principle not

created by the mind.
Or he may be thinking, as many of his contempor
aries did, that a real distinction or difference is by definition a

distinction or difference of things.
Thus Godfrey of Fontaines says,
"That . . . something should differ really from something and not be

another thing or include another thing, implies a contradiction" (God
frey, 1).
This idea has etymological origins, for the Latin word
realis is derived from the Latin word for thing, res.

That Giles at least accepts the second point of view and sharply
divides reality into the real and the rational can be seen from the
following:
It does not seem that there is some middle way of
differing between real differing and rational dif
fering because we either signify many things by one
name, or we signify one thing by many names, or
many things by many names . . . . If truly we
signify the same thing by many names, there can only
be a difference of reason. If truly we signify
many things by many names, it is necessary that
there be a real difference . . . . If two words
signify diverse things, the things they signify
differ really. (10)
124
Neither is a being or substance, although both are actualities.
There
is no existence without an essence, and essence without existence can

have reality only as an idea in God's mind.
Giles gives other reasons for maintaining that the essence and
the existence of a thing are really distinct.
First, a nature or
essence can be understood even though we do not know whether it is

exemplified in any existing singulars, as Aquinas has proved in De
Esse et Essentia. But the fact that one extreme can be understood
without the other being also understood is only a sign of a rational
distinction.
Some reference must also be made to the actual separa
bility of essence and existence, e.g. "an essence can really be

separated from an existence because a created essence can really lack
every kind of existence so that it possesses no actual existence at
all" (3).
Secondly, when a nature is known without its also being
known whether it is exemplified in any existing individuals, it is

known as universal, not as particular.
One can grasp what it is to
be a phoenix, for example, without knowing whether there are any

phoenixes existing in the world.
One is then acquainted only with the
universal "phoenix" and not with any particular phoenix.
Giles claims
to have proved elsewhere that universals cannot exist of themselves

but must exist as exemplified by individuals.
Now if essence and
existence were really identical, a universal would exist as such

contrary to what he claims to have proven.
Hence, "it follows that no
material nature is its own existence" (4).
Thirdly, there is a
relation between an essence and that agent from which it receives its
existence.
No
potency (and the essence is in potency to existence)
125
brings itself into act:

Therefore, just as matter, which is in potency to
form and by the agent is changed into act by form,
is really distinct from its form, so the form and
essence, which are in potency to existence and by
the agent acquire existence, are really distinct
from their existence. Therefore, because the
essence is related to the agent from which it
acquires existence, it necessarily follows that
it is not its own existence but is really distinct
from existence. (5)
In the case of creatures, existence is produced by God and united with
the essence of a thing which receives it.
That which the agent
produces must be really distinct from that to which the agent unites
it.. Of these three ways, the first and third apply equally to
material and immaterial substances, while the second is applicable
only to material beings for the forms of immaterial substances are not
exemplified in many material singulars (6).
Giles gives still other reasons for the real distinction
between essence and existence.
Essence and existence in a thing are
distinct as potency and act, for just as form is the actuality and
perfection of matter, so existence is the actuality and perfection of
essence.
Also, created things can either be or not be there is no
necessity to their existing or not existing.
They are in potency to
existence, and nothing in potency to something actualizes itself as

Aquinas (Aquinas, (83,84)) has shown.
are limited and imperfect beings.
Finally, separate substances
But if essence and existence were
really identical in them, each would be perfect and infinite.
Since
such substances are not limited by matter, there is potency in them

only insofar as they receive existence.
But if they did not have to
126
receive existence from another, they would have no limitation and

would be self-existing (8).
But only God can be self-existing, per
fect, and infinite.

The following conditions seem to hold for the real distinction:
a
and I? are really distinct if a_ and h are or can be separated
and iff:
1. a and b are things,
2. a. ^ Id.
Giles's treatment of the real distinction is sketchy because he
is concerned with it only to prove that a real distinction obtains
between essence and existence in a substance.
Consequently his
account is inadequate in certain other respects.
If two relata are
actually separated or could be so separated so that at some time they

cease to be united, then we have a sure sign that they are really
distinct.
But Giles acknowledges that two relata may be really dis
tinct and still not really separable (2).
No way is provided for
determining that such a distinction is real.

that the relata are things?
creations?
Also how do we determine
By determining that they are not mental
But how is this to be done where there is no possibility >
of really separating them?
Giles's treatment is inadequate because of
his neglect of types of real distinction other than that obtaining

between separable things.
Very little is said by Giles concerning the rational distinc- .
tion.
The possibility of understanding one extreme without also under
standing the other is a sign of a rational distinction between these

extremes.
But once again the condition is only sufficient, not
127
<
necessary, and no means is given for recognizing a rational distinc

tion between extremes which are not separately understandable.
This
does indicate, however, that what are really separable and distinct
are also rationally distinct, for an essence can be understood apart
from its existence or non-existence in signular things.
What the
extremes of a rational distinction must be is never specified.
At
one point Giles speaks of a genus and its species as being rationally
distinct (3), at another point he says that there is a rational dis
tinction when "we signify the same thing by many names" (10).
Because
of the sketchiness of his account, no list of conditions for the

rational distinction can be constructed here.
CHAPTER III
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

(1266-1308)
1.
General Survey
Scotus, like most other medieval philsophers, divides

distinctions into two general categories, the real and the rational.
Unlike many of them, however, he considerably extends the scope of
the real distinction to include not only a distinction between formal
aspects or formalitates within one being.
The latter distinction
differs both from Aquinas's rational distinction with a real foundation

and from Henry of Ghent's intentional distinction in that neither
Aquinas nor Henry believes such rationes or intentiones to be distinct
or different before any mind considers them.
God, according to Aquinas,
really contains goodness and power and the like, but they are not
-diverse forms in him nor do they differ in him in any way before the
human intellect considers them.
Henry of Ghent believes that intenti
ones are potentially, and not actually, different in a thing prior to

an intellect's consideration of this thing.
For Scotus, however, the
difference between formal aspects or rationes is a real difference and

a real distinction can be based on such a difference.
With this
extension of the real distinction go both a revision of the nature of

the rational distinction with a real foundation and a precise delimita
tion of the scope of the purely rational distinction.
A further
distinction is added, i.e. the distinction between a formality and its

128
129
Intrinsic mode, but it is by no means evident whether Scotus intends

this to be regarded as a formal or as a purely rational distinction.
Although Scotus inherited the general notions of real and
rational distinctions from his predecessors, there appears in his
works perhaps for the first time an attempt to give precise descrip
tions of these distinctions and to make the real-rational classifica
tion exhaustive.
A real difference is defined as "any difference
naturally prior to any act of reason" (12), and a rational difference

is defined as "a difference naturally posterior to an act of the
possible intellect" (1).
There is no room for another general type of
difference or distinction, but these definitions are broad enough

to permit certain refinements to be made within their boundaries.
Scotus recognizes a different kind of difference which obtains neither
between things nor between beings of reason and, since it is a differ
ence independent of the mind, it can be included within the class of
real differences.
It is usually called the formal difference.

2.
A.

Real Simpliciter
Since Scotus has defined a real difference as one which is not

caused by an act of the understanding, the mind-independence of a
difference is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for classi
fying it as a real difference.' He subdivides the category of real
difference into the real difference simpliciter (or perfect real
difference), and the real difference "after a fashion" (secundum quid).
130
The real difference simpliciter is often called a difference
between things, and its extremes "are not simply the same according to
their actual, proper, and determinate existence" (14,9,11,13).
Each
has actual existence, and not merely potential existence in another

thing (as an oak, for example exists potentially in an acorn); each
has formal or proper existence and not merely the virtual existence
that an effect has in its cause (as a house, for example, exists
virtually in the mind of the architect who will build it); and each has
existence that is determinate and not confused (as the existence of an
egg, for example, is confusedly in the batter mixture) (14).
An
extreme of the perfect real difference must exist in act as a kind of

thing it is, and it must be individuated both from other things of
the same kind and from things of different kinds.
Since all three of the above characteristics apply equally to
the extremes of the real differences secundum quid, a fourth must be
added to distinguish the two.
The fourth condition is that the
extremes of the perfect real difference must be completely nonidenti

cal.
Understood in the light of Scotuss remarks on the formal
difference (which is consistent from the complete identity of its

extremes insofar as they belong to the same thing), this seems to mean
that if x and y are really different simpliciter then they cannot be
identified through their union in some subject from which they are
inseparable.
That is, the extremes of the perfect real difference
cannot be identified in the way that intellect and will can be identi
fied through their union in Socrates.
Two really different things or
principles, such as matter and form, can be united in some subject like
131
Socrates, but they are not inseparably united in this subject, i.e.
they are not "unitively contained" in Socrates as are Socrates's
intellect and will.
For Scotus, the separability of the relata of a difference is
a sufficient condition for their real difference, for it is a sign
that each relatum has actual, proper, and determinate existence, and
that the relata are nonidentical in the way indicated above.
Separa
bility is also a necessary condition as far as absolute beings (i.e.

beings, such as substances and certain accidents, which do not depend
on other beings except God for their existence) are concerned: " . . .
of those distinct in absolute being, one is able without contradiction
to exist without the other" (55,40).
Two absolute beings are separable
then if and only if their actual separation would entail no contradic

tion.
Aquinas and Bonaventure used the reverse approach to prove a
real difference between x and y by showing that the identity of x and

y in one
subject would involve a contradiction.
God, who can do
whatever is not contradictory, according to Scotus can conserve one

absolute being in existence without the other: ". . .an absolute
entity which is from God alone can be conserved by God without some
other posterior absolute entity" (64).
There is no contradiction
involved in Plato's existing without Socrates, or in Plato's existing

without his left hand.
But even God cannot cause humanity to exist in-
separation from either animality or rationality.

The actual or possible separation of two relata is a sufficient
condition of a perfect real difference between the relata.
Such
relata could be separated from each other (if they are united) and
132
each continue to exist, at least by divine power.
And if the relata
are absolute beings, then they are separable from each other, at least
by divine power.
In general, the real difference simpliciter obtains
between relata which are things (9).

Opposition of relata is a sign of their distinction.
The only
type of opposition that Scotus mentions is contradictory opposition:

". . . contradiction said of some /beings/ is a way of concluding
/their/ distinction" (67).
It is sufficient condition for any distinc
tion, including the real distinction simpliciter. But there is a

difference between contradictory opposition as a sign of a real dis
tinction and contradictory opposition as a sign of a rational distinc
tion, for Scotus says, ". . . a distinction of reason only is not
sufficient to preserve opposites to agree with the extremes apart from
every operation of the intellect" (17).
Relata which are not really
different may be opposed only because of the manner in which they are
considered by the mind.
But a rational difference between extremes
cannot make this opposition real.
No explanation is given of contra
dictory opposition but probably Scotus understood it much as his

predecessors had.
That is, two relata x and y are opposed contradic
torily if and only if some predicate"F" is true of one and false of the
other.
In a derivative sense, the properties signified by those
predicates ("F" and "-F") can be said to be opposed also.

Scotus says that contradictory predicates agree with the divine
essence and any divine Person, e.g. the essence is "communicable" while
a Person is "incommunicable" because it cannot share its unique rela
tive property with another Person.
Such opposition is said to obtain
133
"outside every operation of the intellect."
Scotus may mean, as
Aquinas meant, that apart from any operation of the mind there is
some property F and some other property G and that one extreme has F
and the other has G, and that the ratio 'F' contains the negation of
the ratio 'G' or conversely.
Examples of such properties might be
whiteness and blackness, squareness and roundness, communicability

and incommunicability.
That such an opposition cannot be wholly
rational in nature Scotus shows using the example of the divine essence
and a Person:
There is not, . . . some entity existing before
every act of the understanding which is communi
cable (but not through an act of the intellect),
and another entity which is incommunicable of
itself (so, namely, that it is contradictory to
say it communicates), unless there is some distinc
tion between this entity and that before an act
of the understanding, . . . (6)
Thus a real opposition requires a real distinction between its extremes.
There are several problems with Scotus's treatment here.
First,
it is difficult to see how any contradictory opposition can be

completely mind-independent since such opposition consists in a
negation and any negation is a being of reason.
Things and properties
are just what they are and are not opposed as affirmation and negation
apart from our understanding of them: ". . . every denial is intellig
ible only in terms of some affirmation" (70).
Thus "Fa" is true
because the thing signified by "a" has the property signified by "F",
but:(-F)b"
is true because what "b" signifies has some property G, H,
etc. different from F.
It is a mind which understands that the ratio
of G, H, etc. implies the negation of F.
Second, Scotus frequently
134
states that real distinctions, and some oppositions, "precede" any

activity of an intellect considering them.
But how do we determine
that they precede such intellectual activities?
The answer may lie in
Scotus's theory of intuitive cognition:

Intuitive cognition . . . is of an object as the
object is present in actual existence, either in
itself or in another which eminently contains the
whole being of the former. Therefore, what are
known intuitively as distinct formal objects^
are such that either one is eminently contained
in the other, or each according to its proper
existence terminates an act of understanding it
. . . and so they have some distinction before
every act of understanding. (7,8,12)
Intuitive cognition of a formal object is immediate and certain
the understanding knows the object through the object itself and not
through something else.
Thus, since it immediately moves the intellect
the object is known by the intellect with certainty the object is

known as it actually exists.' Because we have an intuitive cognition
of an object, we can be certain that it exists and exists in the
manner in which it is known (71-73).
Therefore an intellect, when
presented with two formal objects in distinct acts of intuitive cogni

tion, immediately knows these objects to be different, and different
prior
to its apprehension of them.
There is also intuitive cognition
of singulars and so it seems that a real distinction whether simple
28A formal object is that which the intellect knows immediately

and per se. It is an object. It is an object as that object is
intelligible, and is the means of knowing a material object. Color,
for example, is a formal object by means of which a material body is
understood. One and the same thing can give rise to many formal
objects. Thus Socrates is understood as man, animal, substance, etc.
Cf. Josephus Gredt, Elementa Philosophise Aristelico-Thomisticae.
(Rome: Herder, 1961), I, 7.
135
or secundum quid is a distinction between objects known in separate

acts of intuition which differ prior to this intuitive cognition.
This seems to be the basis then for Scotus's calling such distinctions
distinctions "preceding any activity of the intellect."
But, while
properties of things can be known intutitively, Scotus has already

said that a negation is only known through an affirmation.
We can
have intuitive knowledge of blackness and whiteness, but do we also

know intuitively that black is not white?
It would seem that negation
requires an act of judgment, i.e. that the intellect, having intuitive

ly apprehended blackness and whiteness, must then go on to judge that
black is not white and conversely.
Contrary properties can belong to
things prior to an intellect's consideration of them, but contradic

tory opposition seems to exist only after an operation of the under
standing.
In summary, the real distinction simpliciter is a distinction
between things which differ prior to any activity of the intellect
distinguishing them.
The relata are completely nonidentical in the
sense that if they are united in something, they are still separable
from each other by divine power if each is an absolute being (and not,
for example, a relation).
Each extreme has its own actual, proper,
and determinate existence.

B.
The Real Distinctions Secundum Quid
The real distinctions secundum quid or "after a fashion" share

certain characteristics with the perfect or simply real distinction.
The relata are also real beings each of which has actual, proper, and
136
determinate existence, but there is this difference the distinction of
the extremes of the secundum quid differences is consistent with their
identity in something which inseparably contains both: "diversity,
however, in all three of the first conditions /i.e. actual, proper,
and determinate existence/ with the preservation of identity, is a
distinction secundum quid" (14).
The extremes of these distinctions
are neither separable from one another nor from the things which
contains both, even by divine power (31).
This is the sense of
"identity" Scotus intends here identity through union in some thing.

Rationality and animality in Peter are really distinct "after a
fashion," but also identical in that both are contained in Peter and
neither can be removed from Peter without his ceasing to be a man
(18,25,27,29,39,59).
Such inseparability is a necessary condition for
all real distinctions after a fashion.

i.
Formal Distinctions
There are at least two and perhaps three types of real distinc
tion after a fashion: the formal distinction, the adequate distinction,
and perhaps the modal distinction.
It is the first, the formal, that
receives Scotus's greatest attention.
In describing the distinction,
he emphasizes that the formal distinction is founded on an objective

difference consistent with the unity or identity of its extremes in a
thing.
Such differences are not accounted for by the real distinction
simpliciter because the extremes are not distinct beingsbut integral

parts of one being, e.g. the intellect and will in the human soul.
Nor
are they accounted for by the purely rational distinction because the
137
extremes differ more than do two grammatical or logical modes of the
same word.
The extremes of the formal distinction are not two things, but
they are thing-like.
That is, if per impossibile one could be separ
ated from the other and from that being in which both are contained,
"each really, actually, properly, and determinately would exist with
out the other" (14,9,27).
This is so because "one is outside the
reality of the other . . . just as if they were two things, although

in a way through identity these two realities are one thing" (11).
Each of these conditions must be separately examined.
1)
Scotus says first of all that in the formal distinction,
one extreme is "outside the reality of the other . . . just as if

they were two things."
The extremes of the formal distinction are not
things, but a distinct type of real being called formalities, formal

rationes, or realities.
Formalities are in things independently of
the intellect, i.e. they are not created by the understanding.
Each
formality or reality is a formal aspect or perfection of a thing and

can give rise to a concept in the understanding.
There are several
respects in which formalities may be said to be thing-like.
Scotus
says, ". . . to each reality as it is in that one thing there agrees

that which is the proper principle of such a reality just as if it
were a distinct thing" (9).
First, then, each has its own quiddity,
and the formal quidditative concept of one extreme is not that of the
other in a formal difference, nor does the quidditative concept of one
extrema include that of the other.
This means that one is not defined
in terms of the other, for a definition gives the quiddity of something.
138
If A and B are formalities, they are distinct if the definition of A
is not part of the definition of B, and conversely: "one (A) is not
of the formal ratio of the other (B) so that if it (B) were defined,
it (A) would not belong to the definition of (B); . . . " (47,10,15,16,
24,26,27,39,65).
(This would also hold if the "Afs" and "B's" were
interchanged). This is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition

for the formal distinction for Scotus says that two distinct things
(e.g. matter and form, which for him are things) can be quidditatively
distinct.
Second, two formalities are known through two distinct acts of
the understanding, just as are two things.
Concerning the distinct
formalities of genus and difference in a thing, Scotus says:

The species, forming two concepts of genus and
difference, not only causes two numerically
distinct acts in the understanding, but causes
two actual or habitual notices having proper
distinct acts, and so distinctas if those two
objects were two things outside the under
standing . . . (12)
Two formalities can be known through two acts of intuitive cognition.
Third, if per impossibile two formalities were separated from
each other and that thing in which they are united, they would consti
tute distinct things:
. . . it is the same reality from which the
differentia in whiteness is taken, and from which
a proximate genus such as color, and sensible
quality, and qaulity are taken. _And, although
they would_be different things /if each existed
on its own/ they are unitively contained in
whiteness. (22)
Each formality of a thing has its own proper principle so that if it
could exist apart from this thing which contains it, it too would have
139
its own existence and essence.
Each divine Person, for example, would
constitute a god, rationality by itself would exist as a spiritual

substance, etc.
The counterfactual statement above implies that
formalities are not merely potential beings or fictions.
They are
actual beings just as things are, except that they exist only as
unitively contained in a thing or essence they are perfections of a
thing, not things themselves (non res sed rei).
In summary, two formalities are distinct from each other in a
way similar to that in which two things are distinct, because the
quiddity of one is not the quiddity of the other or a part of the
quiddity of the other.
Thus their definitions are distinct, and one
is "outside the reality of the other."
Like two things, two formali
ties can provide the foundations for distinct acts of intuitive cogni
tion.
Finally, if they were not unitively contained in a thing, they
could be separated from this thing and from each other, and if per
impossibile this were to happen, they would exist as distinct things
(21,22,27,31).
2)
Next Scotus says that two formalities of one thing are one
thing "in a way through identity."
The identity intended is not the
simple identity of Tully and Cicero where there are merely two names
or descriptions of one and the same individual.
Two formalities of
a thing "are not the same as each other . . . except because of a third
with which they are the same" (25).
Their quiddities and definitions
differ but they are formalities of the same thing.
Thus "This animal
is rational" is a true statement when "this" refers to Peter or some

other man, because any man unitively contains the formalities
140
animality and rationality.
But if these formalities are abstracted
from such a thing, they are no longer identical in any way.
statement like "Animality is rationality" is false, however, because

"animality" can be defined without reference to "rationality" and
converselyi
. . . conceiving what are abstracted by ultimate
abstraction, a quiddity is conceived without
reference to anything which is outside the proper
concept of the quiddity. So, therefore, in
conceiving the extremes, there will be no truth
in uniting them unless the quiddity of one
extreme be precisely the same as the quiddity of
the other extreme. (25,24,27)
The notion animality' contains no reference to anything external to
the definition of "animality."
To paraphrase C. I. Lewis, we may say
that an abstract term like "animality" merely names a property or

formality, while a concrete term like "animal" applies to individuals
characterized by animality.
29
Thus in "Animality is rationality,"
"animality" and "rationality" both name formalities and these

formalities are not identical because their quiddities differ.
But in
"This animal is rational" said of Peter, "animal" and "rational" do

not name formalities, but apply to the individual man Peter who is
characterized by both animality and rationality.
In creatures two distinct formalities cannot be predicated of
each other (more correctly, they cannot be truly united in an
identity statement).
In God, however, the intrinsic mode of infinity
is united to the ratio of each divine perfection, e.g. wisdom, power,

truth, goodness, and this identity in mode permits us to identify such
^Lewis, p . 42.
141
perfections even when they are ultimately abstracted from the divine
essence.
Thus both "infinite wisdom is infinite goodness" and "This
infinite being is good and wise" are true statements (50,51).

3)
When Scotus says, "these two realities are one thing," he
means that two or more formalities or realities of a thing are

unitively contained in that thing.
This containment constitutes their
only identity and distinguishes them from things like matter and form
which are really separable although together they can constitute one
substance.
Unitive containment is the type of union several formali
ties have when they are formalities of the same thing or essence.
It
requires both the unity and distinction of those formalities that are
contained in a thing or essence:
Unitive containment is not of those that are
entirely the same because these are not united.
Nor is it of those which remain distinct by
that distinction by which they were distinct
before their union. But what are really one
remain, however, formally distinct, . . . (18,
24,56)
What are the same in all ways are not said to be "united" because they
are simply one, e.g. Tully and Cicero.
Tully and Cicero are one and
the same person, not two parts or aspects of one thing (the names
"Tully" and "Cicero" differ but do not refer to distinct things or
formalities). To say that two beings are united implies that they
really differ in some way.
be unitedeither.
unity. Each
A pile of
What are totally diverse are not said to

rocks forms an aggregate, but not a
individual rock can still be removed from the pile.
Relata that are unitively contained in a thing or essence are both the
same (because they constitute one thing or nature) and different
142
(because the formality of one is not identical with the formality of
the other). Thus animality and rationality are unitively contained
in a man's essence, intellect and will are unitively contained in the
essence of the human soul, haecceity and nature are unitively
contained in an individual.
Unitive containment is a union of relata which differ but are
inseparable from one another and the thing or essence containing them.
Such containment explains why, if two formalities are known in two
acts of intuition "just as if those two objects were two things out
side /the soul/", we know that they are not two things (12).
There
must be some awareness that these formalities are inseparably united

in one thing, and that their actual separation from this thing and
from each other would constitute a contradiction.
Scotus often says
that two formalities of a thing are "really one" or "really the same"
or "really identical" (eadem realiter, 15; idem identitate reali, 18;
cum identitate reali, 20; etc.).
And "real identity" is defined as
follows:
. . . universally what so agrees with something
that it would be a complete contradiction for
the former to be without the latter, the former
is really the same as the latter. (40)
Apparently then two formalities of one and the same thing cannot be
separated even by divine power.
Thus Scotus remarks that ". . .in
others unitively contained, there is no real, nor even potential,

separation" (21).
If Socrates is human, he must be characterized by
both animality and rationality for the definition of "man" is

"rational animal."
If something is a being, it must also be one,
143
true and good since the concepts of being, unity, truth and goodness
are convertible.
If a thing has a human soul, it must have rational,
sensitive, and vegetative powers.
Even God cannot remove rationality
from a man for this would involve a change in the kind of thing it is.
Socrates without animality or rationality would cease to be a man.
There is a type of separability consistent with a formal
distinction.
In some cases a formal distinction is recognized through,
this separability: " . . . whenever two /extremes/ are so related to

each other that one happens to be found without the other, one is not
of the ratio of the other, . . . " (66).
rationes or definitions.
Two formalities have distinct
If one can be unitively contained in some
thing without the other also being unitively contained in this thing,
such separability is a sufficient condition for their distinction.
Animality, for example, is unitively contained with rationality in any
man, but not unitively contained with rationality in a dog or a cow.
Nothing in the definition of "animality" requires that it be united
with "rationality."
The condition is not a necessary one for intellect
and will are formally distinct in Peter and not separable in this
fashion. On a linguistic level, the fact that the extensions of two
terms do not contain exactly the same things implies that the
intensions of the terms differ.
"Animal" and "rational" differ thus
in extension and consequently in intension and definition.
Conse
quently the formalities named by the corresponding abstract terms

"animality" and "rationality" will differ also.
Although Scotus insists that it is a real distinction, he says
that the formal distinction can also be regarded as a mental
144
distinction:
It can, however, be called a difference of
ratio *, not because ratio' is taken for a
difference formed by the intellect but because
'ratio* is taken for the quiddity of a thing
according to which the quiddity is an object
of the intellect. (9)
It can also be thought of as a virtual distinction, but not in the
same sense in which a virtual distinction in a thing is said to be
the foundation for the conceptual distinction with a real foundation
of Aquinas.
In the case of the formal distinction, there is "one
thing havingvirtually,
because
or pre-eminently as it were, two realities,
toeach reality as it is in that one thing there agrees that
which is the proper principle of such a reality just as if it were a

distinct thing" (9).
When Aquinas says that rational, vegetative, and
sensitive souls are virtually distinct in the human soul, he does not
mean that there is some real difference there of forms, etc.
One
thing can perform many functions and the intellect distinguishes these
"souls" on the basis of a comparison of these functions with some real
difference in other creatures.
But the realities of which Scotus
writes are really different within the thing that virtually contains '
thems and this real difference of realities provides the basis for a
formal distinction.
The formal distinction as well as the simply real distinction
can also be regarded as mental distinction in the sense that some
intellectual activity is required to make any distinction:
Another greater distinction is in the intellect
when it conceives two formal objects by two acts,
and either diverse things correspond to those
objects as when a man and an ass are understood,
145
or one thing corresponds outside the intellect,
as when color and separation /disgregativum/
are understood. (7)
A difference of formalities in a thing outside the intellect is known
through a difference of formal objects apprehended intuitively,
"neither of which is eminently contained in something" (8,7).
For
this reason, Scotus often classifies the formal distinction as

rational.
In considering the distinction between Gods essence and each
of the three Persons, Scotus indicates that contradictory opposition
is another sign of the formal distinction:
There is not, . . . some entity existing before
every act of the understanding which is communi
cable (but not through an act of the intellect),
and another entity which is incommunicable of
itself (so, namely, that it is contradictory to
say it communicates), unless there is some
distinction between this entity and that before
an act of the understanding, . . . . (6)
His reasoning must be the same as it was for the simply real distinc
tion above.
Contradictory opposition of formalities in a thing,
however, is consistent with their inseparable union (unitive contain

ment) in that thing.
In summary, the formal distinction can be considered in two
ways: 1) as a distinction of two realities in a thing outside, the
intellect; 2) as a distinction of formal objects in the intellect.
In the first way, it is clearly a real distinction; in the second way
it can also
regarded as a mental distinction.
The extremes of the
distinction are formalities or realities each of which has actual,

proper, and determinate existence just as a thing does.
But unlike
146
things, these extremes are really united in a thing outside the soul
in such a way that they are inseparable from it and one another.
Abstract terms which name two formalities of one thing cannot be
truly united in a proposition of identity.
The corresponding concrete
terms can be united in a true proposition insofar as each denominates^

that thing in which both formalities are contained.
Both contradictory
opposition and the type of separability discussed above are signs for
the formal distinction in a thing.
The following examples of formal distinctions are given by
Scotus: a common nature and haecceity in a thing are formally distinct;
the powers of the soul in a thing are formally distinct; being and its
transcendental attributes are formally distinct; the powers of the
soul are formally distinct from the essence of the soul; genus and
difference in a specific form are formally distinct; Gods attributes
are formally distinct, as are the divine Persons.
ii.
Other Distinctions Secundum Quid
Of the secundum quid in general Scotus says, "there is a

double nonidentity,
(14).
formal nonidentity and adequate nonidentity . . . "
Adequate nonidentity he describes as a relation obtaining
between extremes of such a nature that either one exceeds the other,
or the unity of one extreme exceeds the unity of the other extreme.
One can exceed the other in either of two ways which are not mutually
exclusive: one extreme can exceed the other in predication and non
convertibility (the extension of the corresponding terms are such that
one has greater extension than the other, e.g. "animal" is predicable
147
of more things than is "man"); or one extreme can exceed the other in
perfection as man exceeds animal because as a rational being man
approaches more closely to the divine being than does a non-rational
animal (14).
Scotus uses adequate nonidentity to account for the distinction
between a specific formality and the formalities of genus and differ
ence which are essential parts of the specific formality.
Here the
former exceeds both of its parts in both ways mentioned above.
Such
a distinction is not formal because one extreme, e.g. "humanity", is

defined in terms of the others.
Since adequate nonidentity is discussed by Scotus only briefly
in one work, the Reportata Parisiensia, it is difficult to characterize.
The following generalizations, however, seem to follow from his
treatment of all secundum quid distinctions.
First, the extremes of
an adequate distinction each have actual, proper, and determinate

existence and may be identified through their unitive containment in
some thing or essence.
Thus the extremes are inseparably united in
this thing or essence.
Second, the extremes are not distinct
formalities but two formalities related to each other as part to whole.

A specific formality and genus or difference are adequately distinct,
as are the divine essence and each personal property, and the soul
and each power.
In general, an adequate distinction is a distinction
between a formality and that essence which unitively contains it.

Third, the formal objects by which such extremes are known are such
that one eminently contains the other (7).
Thus the formal object
'man1 eminently contains the formal object 'animal', etc.
148
Adequate and formal distinctions seem to be compatible in a
thing.
That is, according to Scotus the soul and its powers are
adequately nonidentical (14), and also formally and quidditatively

distinct (27).
The distinction between a formality and its intrinsic mode
appears to be a real distinction, and if it is, it qualifies as a real
distinction secundum quid rather than a real distinction simplieiter.
Scotus himself does not classify it, but later Scotists such as Francis
Mayron clearly
considered it to be real
and frequently refer to itas
"the distinction from the nature of the case" (distinctio ex natura.

rei; see Mayron, ref.. (1)).
But, although an intrinsic mode is
usually defined as a grade, qualification, or further determination

of a perfection, the modal distinction is usually described by Scotus
in terms of concepts.
There are two types of concepts of perfections,
the perfect or proper, and the imperfect or common:

. . . when some reality is understood with its
intrinsic mode, that concept is not so ultimately
simple but that that reality can be conceived
without that mode. But then the concept of that
thing is imperfect.
It can also be conceived
under that mode, and then the concept of that
thing is perfect, . . . (52)
Being, for example, is a univocal concept equally applicable to God
and creatures.
But the proper and perfect concept of Gods being
includes the intrinsic mode of infinity, for God's
being is unlimited,
while the proper concept of a creature's being includes the mode of

finitude because a creature is limited.
In many other respects the distinction between a formality and
its intrinsic mode seems to be conceptual, for the extremes are
149
inseparable except on a conceptual level.
That is, there is no mode
like infinity existing by itself apart from some formality, nor is

there some formality which is neither finite nor infinite, although
a formality can be thought of apart from any such mode.
Contrasting
this distinction with the formal distinction Scotus says, "but the
concepts of a genus and a difference require a distinction of reali
ties, not only of the same reality perfectly and imperfectly
conceived" (52).
The distinction then between two formalities is a
greater distinction than that between a formality and its mode be

cause the extremes of the former are distinct realities existing
independently of the mind.
Also the addition of a mode to a
formality does not destroy or alter that formality, and it cannot

make one formality include another (48,49,53).
Addition of an
intrinsic mode to a formality is not like the addition of another

formality.
The ratio of the formality to which the mode is added
remains unaltered whether it be considered under the mode of infinity

or under the mode of finitude, or under some other mode.
Still it appears that an intrinsic mode must be a real entity
of some sort, since it is by means of such modes that God and
creature, as beings, are distinguished.
For God is infinite and
necessary being, while a creature is a finite and contingent being.

The distinction between formality and mode must be real or there
would be no real difference between divine being and created being.
C . Summary
The conditions for the real distinctions so given by Scotus
150
may be summarized as follows:
a
1.
and
(or A and B, or A and M) are really distinct iff:
a and
Id(or A and B,
or A and M) differ independently of
any intellects consideration of them,

2. a and b^ (or A and B, or A and M) each have actual, proper,
and determinate existence,
3. O ( 3 F) ((Fa & -Fb) v (Fb & -Fa))
(or
O(3
0)((0
A & -0B) v(^B
& -<0A)) or 0 ( 3 0). ((0A & -0M) v (0M & -0A)),
4. either:
a) a
andb^ are simply really distinct as in I, or
b) A
andB are really distinct secundum quid as inII, or
c) A
andM are modally distinct as in V.
I. a and Id are distinct by a perfect real distinction

(simpliciter) iff:
5. a and b^ are things,
6. a. and b^ are separable from each other so that each
one can exist independently of the other, at least
by divine power,
7. a ^
b.
II. A and B are really distinct secundum quid iff:

8. A and B are formalities,
9. A and B are unitively contained
insome thing, x,
hence inseparable from each other and from x even

by divine power,
10. A B,
11. A and B are either formally or adequately distinct.
151
III.
A and B are formally distinct iff:

12. Conditions 1-3 and 8-10 hold,
13. 0 ( 3 y)((Ay & -By) v (By & -Ay)), i.e. it is
possible that A be found in a thing, y, without
B, and conversely,
14. "A" is not part of the definition of "B" and
conversely, i.e. A and B differ quidditatively
and if A were realized in y without B, and B
were realized in a thing z without A, then y
and z would differ essentially.
15. If per impossibile A and B were separated from
the thing x which unitively contains them, they
would constitute distinct things.
IV.
A and B are adequately distinct iff:

16. Conditions 1-3 and 8-10 hold,
17. A unitively contains B or conversely,
18. Either A exceeds B in predication (i.e. the
extension of "A" includes the extension of "B"
and more) or in perfection, or B so exceeds A.
A and M are modally distinct iff:
19. Conditions 1-3 obtain,
20. A is a formality and M is an intrinsic mode of
A and the concept of A with its mode M is a
perfect concept,
21. A =fr M.
152
3.
Concerning the rational distinction Scotus says, "in the intel

lect there is manifest a double difference, namely ]_a. difference/ of
ways of conceiving and fa. difference/ of formal objects" (8).
The
distinction of formal objects in the understanding is the rational

counterpart of the real difference.
Either two different things such
as a cat and a dog correspond in the extra-mental world to these

formal objects, or only two formalities of one and the same thing
correspond to the formal objects, e.g. the formalities of animality
and rationality in a man (2,7).
There are then four types of distinc
tion: 1) a real distinction of things, 2) a real distinction of

formalities; 3) a rational distinction of intentiones or formal objects;
4) a purely rational distinction between modes of one concept (13).
3) is the rational counterpart of 1) and 2).
Scotus's notion of the purely rational distinction may have
been derived from Henry of Ghent who gives a similar though less
thorough treatment of it (pp. 96-98).
Since the rational distinction
with a real foundation (above,(3)) is real for Scotus in the sense

that it is recognized, but not created by the understanding, the
place allotted to the purely rational distinction is small.
It is
merely a distinction between two modes of one and the same concept.
Scotus discusses two ways in which one and the same concept
can be conceived under different modes.
First, it may be conceived
under two logical modes, e.g. the abstract and concrete modes, and in
this way the concrete mode signified by "man" differs from the
153
abstract mode signified by "humanity."
Second, it may be conceived
under two grammatical modes, e.g. the modes of the nominative and
genitive cases (2,7).
There is no corresponding real difference of
things or formalities. That is, everything which can be called a man

is also something which has humanity and vice versa.
Whatever can be
referred to by a word in the nominative case can also be referred to

by the same word in the genitive case.
The general characterization Scotus gives is that the purely
rational distinction is "a difference naturally posterior to an act of
the possible intellect considering the same object under different
rationes . . ." (1).
Here it differs from rational distinctions of
formal objects which correspond to real differences for such differ-:

ences naturally precede acts of the intellect considering them.
The conditions for the rational distinction in general seem to
be:
A and B are rationally distinct iff:
1. A and B are distinct only posterior to the consideration of
some intellect,
2. either
a) A and B are both formal objects in the understanding, or
b) A and B are both modes of one concept C (i.e. logical or
grammatical modes),
3. A * B.
4. Applications of the Distinctions
A.
These distinctions can best be understood by examining the
154
contexts in which they are employed.
Like his predecessors, Scotus
regards the difference between matter and form in a thing as a real

one.
Matter is no longer regarded as completely potential, but as an
entity with its own positive reality (62,63).
Thus, like form, matter
is knowable in its essence although the created intellect recognizes

it only through the process of change in which matter remains stable
while one form replaces another (62).
Since matter has its own
essence and exists independently of its cause, it would be contradic

tory for it to have no act of existence by which it is an essence.
Essence and existence, according to Scotus, are really identical (62).
Insofar as matter has both:
. . . it is not a contradiction for matter to be
without any substantial or accidental form . . . .
Something distinct and absolute and prior to
another absolute thing can without contradiction
be without that other. Matter is an absolute
distinct being, and prior to any form, . . .
Therefore it can exist without another absolute
entity. . . . (64)
Matter is thus a subsistent entity, a thing.
Neither its essence nor
its existence are dependent upon any form the two are logically
independent and completely separable since each is a positive reality
capable of existing on its own.
Not only is the distinction between matter and form a real one,
but it is a real distinction of a peculiar
kind.
The process of
explanation must be finite if we explain the difference between two

things x and y by saying that they differ in some characteristic or
principle z which x has and y lacks, although y has a characteristic
or principle w which x lacks, then we can ask in turn in what
155
characteristics z and w differ, and so on.
It is necessary, therefore
to postulate an end to this process and Scotus does this by assuming

the existence of primo diversa, ultimately diverse elements in things
which are the final reasons for the differences of these things:
. . . some things are ultimately diverse, namely
diverse by themselves, which completely agree in
nothing. So in all differences which are diverse
but . . . one in some way, it is necessary to find
some totally diverse elements by whichthings
differ. Otherwise we would proceed to infinity.
(41)
There are then two kinds of real difference simpliciter, i.e.
a difference between ultimately diverse elements which differ absolute
ly of themselves, and a difference which is founded on such ultimately
diverse
elements in its extremes although the extremes are not them
selves ultimately diverse.
An example of the first is the difference
between matter and form, and an example of the second is the difference
between two men, a difference which is founded on what is peculiarly
singular in each man.(i.e. the individual difference in each).
What are ultimately diverse are completely opposed.
For
example, "act is . . . the opposite of potency, and in this way /act

and potency/ divide all being" (58,61).
The concepts or rationes
act and potency' are completely different, and consequently matter

and form, which are related as potency and act, are completely opposed:
"For if /form/were of the ratio of matter, it would not be compatible
with it to receive being" (62,61).
The opposition here is between
correlatives which can still join together to constitute an individual

which is numerically one.
Matter and potency are disposed to receive
form or act, while form and act are received by matter and potency.
156
Scotus calls such a relationship between correlatives an "agreeing
proportion" (Proportio conveniens) because act and potency, form and
matter, although diverse are of themselves disposed to form a being
which is one in essence (per se). Not all primo diversa are correla
tives, however.
Substantial differences and individual differences
(haecceities) are also ultimately diverse.
The former account for
the real difference between two things of different species while the
latter account for the numerical difference between two members of
the same species.
The separability of matter and form in any change is also a
sign of their real difference: "If A is changed while B remains,
then A and B differ essentially /within the thing that undergoes the
the change/" (54).
There is a real difference because matter, B,
remains while one form, A, is replaced by another.

Substance and accident also differ essentially, for a substance
can undergo many changes of accidental forms, e.g. the substance of
Peter undergoes a change in size as he grows, ages, etc. and all such
changes are incidental to Peter's essence which remains the same
throughout the changes.
Substance and accident are also opposed as
correlatives, for substance is defined by Scotus as "that to which it

agrees not to inhere, or to which it is repugnant to inhere" in
another, while accident is defined as "a nature to which inherence
agrees" (57).
A substance, like Peter, is subsistent it exists of
itself and not as dependent on or as part of, another. But an accident

such as color exists only through inhering in some substance.
There is
no subsistent color, size, etc., but only the color, size, etc. of some
157
substance.
Since substance and accident are separable in change
they are really different in anything.

Franciscan philosophers had commonly acknowledged a plurality
of substantial forms in created things, and Scotus was no exception.
He uses separability to prove that there must be a special form of
the body really distinct from the form of the soul in a living creature:
The body remains while the form of the soul does not remain /after
death/.
And therefore universally in any animate thing it is necessary
to postulate that form by which the body is a body, and another by

which the thing is animate (69) . Upon death the soul leaves the
body, but the body is not immediately destroyed and this fact seems
to show that there must be two distinct forms rather than the one
substantial form postulated by Aquinas.
B.
The Formal Distinction
The real distinction simpliciter obtains between beings each

of which has its own positive reality, i.e. its own essence and
existence, and which are such that the essence or existence of one
being does not entail the essence or existence of the other.
This
is proved by the fact that one such being can continue to exist in
separation from the other, while the fact that they are really distinct
shows that they are separable from each other.
Such a real distinction
does not obtain between an individual and its nature, nor between a
thing's essence and its existence, because these extremes are not
absolute and separable beings.
Scotus's account of the real distinc
tion simpliciter makes it impossible for such a distinction to obtain
158
between certain extremes because these extremes have a unity which
would be destroyed if each were regarded as an absolute positive
entity.
The distinctions between powers of the soul, divine attri-1

-
butes, passions of being, a common nature and an individual differ

ence, must then be of another sort.
To account for this other type of difference or distinction,
Scotus used the notion of a plurality of forms in a thing but altered
it to account for the unity such relata as the powers of the soul have.
He says, "Anything common and however determinable can still be
distinguished, however much it may be one thing, into many realities
formally distinct of which this is not formally that (23).
These
formalities are form-like in that each has its own actual, proper,
and determinate existence exactly as does a form, but they lack the
ability forms have to be separated from the individuals to which they
belong.
There are several reasons for the development of the formal
distinction.
One was the need Scotus saw to maintain the objective
difference between some relata while accounting for their partial

identity through unitive containment in an essence.
The rational
distinction as Scotus understood it could not handle such differences

because of his assumption that of distinction between formal objects
understood intuitively required a distinction on the part of a thing.
Nor could the real distinction simpliciter handle such differences
because it entails a destruction of the essential unity of a thing in
which it is found.
A real distinction simpliciter in Scotus's terms
would make the three divine Persons three distinct deities, would
159
necessitate postulating a plurality of souls in a man, and so on.
The formal distinction between powers of the soul, e.g. the
intellect and the will, is analogous to that between the passions of
beings, e.g. unity, truth, and goodness.
"Just as . . . being
unitively contains the rationes one, true, and good, and others, so
the soul unitively contains these powers although they are formally
distinct" (15).
The powers are not distinct from one another as
essential parts would be since they are all unitively contained within
the essence of the soul which is operative by their means (24).
The
essence of the soul is their subject, just as being is the subject

of its passions, and the powers are related to the soul as its propria,
or properties following on its essence.
Scotus rejects a perfect real
distinction between the powers because these are neither separable from
one another nor from the soul itself, and it is unnecessary to postu
late a real plurality where a lesser one will suffice.
But the distinc
tion between powers is not only rational because the definition of

"intellect," for example does not include any reference to the will
or to any other power (27,14).
There is also an adequate nonidentity
between the soul itself and its powers because the soul includes, but
is not included by, any of these.
The distinction between divine attributes is related to the
distinction of powers in the created soul.
A real distinction of
some sort, and not merely a rational distinction, is required because

of the fact that opposing predicates can be affirmed of these perfec
tions prior to any consideration of them by an intellect:
For a distinction of reason only does not suffice
160
to preserve opposites to agree with the
extremes outside every operation of the
understanding. For it is conceded that the
Father speaks by intellect or memory and not
by will, and that he spirates by will and not
b^ intellect, and many such. Therefore they
/perfections in God/ are distinguished really
only after a fashion. (17)
Perfections such as wisdom and goodness which are founded on this
intellect and will will thus be formally distinct from one another.
Their distinction is clearly real:
The understanding composing this: 'Wisdom is
not formally goodness,1 does not cause the
truth of this composition by its collative
act, but finds the extremes in the object
from the composition of which a true act may
be made. (53,46)
Furthermore these perfections are infinite, and no relation of reason
is either simply such or formally infinite (46).
A relation of reason
such as a rational distinction is limited by the mind which causes it

and, since no created intellect is infinite, no creation of such an
intellect is infinite.
On the other hand, the distinction cannot be
simply real forthis would destroy the unity and simplicity of the
divine essence by making for some composition of forms within the
deity.
Unlike creaturely perfections, divine perfections are such
that one may be truly predicated of the other even in abstraction
from their subject.
This is due to the fact that each such formality
is infinite: "Infinity is the reason for their identity" (51,50).

There can be many finite creatures but only one infinite being so that
all infinite perfections must be identical in the sense of belonging
to one and the same thing.
But while it is true to say, "Infinite
161
wisdom is infinite justice" by virtue of the fact that both are God,
the- concepts 'wisdom' and 'justice' remain distinct.
Concepts of
perfections such as being, wisdom, justice, power, etc., are univocal

they apply equally to God and to creatures, and concepts proper
either to God or creatures are formed only by the addition of intrin
sic modes to the concepts.
The concept of finite power is proper to
creatures, while the concept of omnipotence, which includes the

intrinsic mode of infinity, is proper to God alone.
Such concepts
are derived first from creatures because our knowledge begins with
creatures.
When all limitations are removed from the concepts,
however, they are neutral in reference requiring the addition of modes

which imply either limitation (finitude, contingency, etc.) or no
limitation (infinity, necessity, etc.) to be proper to either creatures
or deity.
creatures.
Scotus also uses these modes to distinguish God from

God is necessary and infinite being, while creatures are
contingent and finite beings.

"Just as the divine essence contains infinite perfections, and
contains all unitively so that they are not different things, so a
created essence can unitively contain some perfections" (29).
The
perfections Scotus is referring to are those of the genus, difference,

and haecceity of a thing.
These are all really identical in the
sense that they are unitively contained together in one thing: "Granted
a genus and a difference are not formally the same because the ratio
of the difference does not include the formal ratio of the genus,
they are however really or identically the same" (39).
Henry of Ghent
had postulated an intentional distinction between a genus and a
162
difference which had only a potential foundation in the thing and
required the activity of an intellect considering the thing and
comparing it with other things for its actualization.
This intention
al distinction comes under attack by Scotus when he says:

In conceiving a genus, either something really
in the species is conceived, or nothing, and
likewise regarding the difference. If nothing,
then these concepts appear fictitious and not
real, . . . If something, either something the
same and then the concept will be the same, or
something else, and then there will be in a
thing some difference prior to the difference
of concepts. (12)
A merely potential difference is insufficient here because a distinc
tion between formal objects in the understanding implies some real
distinction prior to this understanding: "Objects naturally precede
acts and a distinction of objects a distinction of acts" (12).
There
must then be something in a thing corresponding to the genus and the

difference, otherwise these concepts are mere fictions or they are
modes of the same concept.
Corresponding to the concepts 'animal' and
'rational' there must be distinct aspects of a man, for "animal" and

"rational" are predicated of a man essentially because they are parts
of the definition of the predicate "man."
The genus and the differ
ence of a thing are distinct prior to our intuitive cognition of them

then "just as if they were two things" (11).
Together the formalities of a genus and a difference constitute
the formality of the specific nature.
There is an adequate distinction
between each of them and the specific nature, since each of them exceeds
the species in predication.
That is, a genus like "animal" is predi
cated of more things than is the species "man."
The specific nature,
163
often called the common nature by Scotus, has its own unity which,
according to Scotus, is real but less than numerical.
Such a unity is
indifferent either to existing as universal or to existing as singular.

That the common nature has a unity at all is presupposed by the fact
that a specific concept such as 'man' can be abstracted from Socrates
and Plato, and not from Socrates and a stone.
If there were no
corresponding unity in things, "in knowing something of universals

we would know nothing of things, but only of our concepts . . ." (1,
38).
It follows that this unity cannot be only mental; it also cannot
be numerical for in this case the nature would not be common to many
individuals but would belong to one singular alone, i.e. the common
nature humanity in Socrates would be numerically identical with
Socrates and really distinct from the common nature of humanity in
Plato.
Since a common nature must, according to Scotus, have some
reality, and since "being" and "one" are convertible, the common
nature has its own appropriate unity for "to any grade of real being,
there corresponds a real unity" (1).
The common nature as it exists in singular things is not
universal universality accrues to an essence only as it is understood
by some intellect.
could not be common.
But it is not of itself singular either, or it

The fact that a nature like humanity exists as
the humanity of Socrates or the humanity of Plato, or some other

individual, is accounted for by something extrinsic to the nature and
this Scotus calls an individual difference or "thisness" (haecceitas).
A haecceity-is also a formality of a thing and it contracts the common
nature to the individual of which it is a haecceity.
164
The distinction between common nature and haecceity in an
individual can in no way be simply real, for if it were, it would
follow that the common nature could exist of itself as the nature of
no individual, and that an individual could exist of itself without
being an individual of any definite kind.
This is, of course, absurd,
but the distinction cannot be merely mental or the nature would be

really identical with one individual and not common to many.
"But
this is formally a singular entity, and that is formally an entity

of the nature, nor can these two realities be two things . . . but
they are always realii_I.es in the same thing, . . . formally distinct"
(23) .
Using the formal distinction, Scotus can explain both the
singularity and the universality of the common nature while still
retaining its reality.
The inseparability of the extremes of the
formal distinction is manifest here the nature can never be found

separated from all singulars except in the understanding, nor can a
singular ever be found which has no nature.
But their difference is
not destroyed by their real identity in any being.
Of the nature
Scotus says, "although it is never really without some of them /i.e.

singulars/,
it is, however, not some of them itself, but is natural
ly prior to all of those . . . " (34).
And because it is prior and one
of itself and indifferent to both singularity and universality it is

not repugnant to the nature to be found in the understanding
abstracted from all singulars (34).
The haecceity, and not matter or accidents, is Scotus's prin
ciple of individuation.
Matter cannot serve to individuate things of
165
the same species because of its potentiality and indeterminateness.
Also some beings which differ from each other contain no matter, e.g.
angels.
Nor can form serve because numerically distinct individuals
can agree with regard to substantial form.
"Therefore this entity is
not matter or form, nor .the composite inasmuch as any of them is the
nature.
But it is the ultimate reality of the being which is matter
or form or composite" (29).
There is a haecceity in each individual
substance, that which makes it this man or this chair or this tree,
which accounts for its singularity and its distinction from all other
individuals of the same kind.
Thus no matter how similar two individ
uals may be, they are still numerically distinct.
These ultimate
differences are primo diversa, ultimately diverse elements: "Since . .

. singulars are different, they are reduced to primo diversa. Those
are not nothing, not accidents, nor nature, therefore some entity
determinative of the nature, as individual properties . . . ." (65)
The problem of universals provides a good example of how
different ways of differing are necessitated by metaphysical assump
tions.
If it is assumed that the common nature must be a real being,
but that it can neither be a thing nor a principle such as matter or

form, and if it is further assumed that some entity in an individual
which is neither matter nor form must account for the fact of individ
uation, then the manner in which these two entities differ must be
suited to their natures.
The real distinction will not suffice because
common nature and individual difference are not things nor are they
separable from the thing to which they belong, nor will the rational
distinction suffice because this would make both common nature and
166
individual difference merely modes of one and the same concept.
both points of view absurdities result.
From
Since both are real beings,
an objective, i.e. mind-independent, distinction between them is

required, and since they are less than things because inseparable
from one another and the thing to which they belong, a new type of
real distinction must be sought.
examples.
The same is true of the other
The powers of the soul are not simply mental constructions;
on the other hand they are not separable from the soul and from each
other.
It remained for a critic like Ockham to show that such a way
of differing is not needed because the problems it is designed to

solve can be accommodated in other ways.
5.
Conclusion
The theory of distinctions developed by Scotus remedies many

of the weaknesses of the earlier theories, but it is still incomplete
in several important respects.
Some points are inadequately explained.
For example, what sort of being is an intrinsic mode?
Is it, like
a formality, a kind of real being, or is it merely a modification of

a concept?
The answer is important for it will conclusively deter
mine whether the modal distinction is real or rational.

unitive containment is not fully explained.
The nature of
What is it about unitive
containment in a thing or essence that makes the formalities so con

tained inseparable from one another and from the- thing?
Does every
formality unitively contained in a thing have its own corresponding

unity just as the specific nature in a thing has a unity which is real
but less than numerical?
If so, it would seem to follow that every
167
formality contains further formalities of unity, truth, goodness, and

being, since everything that is is one, true and good.
Some of the problems that will appear in Ockham's theory are
already apparent in Scotus's.
essence and existence.
Matter exists as a thing with its own
But things are absolute and separable from one
another (at least by divine power) for the existence of one does not
imply the existence of another.
What then constitutes the unity of
an individual when its matter and substantial and accidental forms are
such that God can cause one to exist in separation from the others?
That is, why is an individual like Socrates one individual?
Finally, there are several possible kinds of distinction not
accounted for in Scotus*s theory, e.g. a distinction between a thing
and a concept of that thing, a distinction between a thing and a
formality, between a thing and an intrinsic mode, between a formality
and a concept, and between two intrinsic modes of a formality, such as
necessity and infinity.
A theory which accdunts for all the possible
relations is more complicated that Scotus's theory would indicate.

For example, theories developed by later Scotists such as Francis
Mayron and Peter Thomas contain at least seven different types of
distinction (Mayron, 1,2; Thomas, 1).
Despite these difficulties, Scotus's theory of distinctions
contributed to the development of medieval theories of distinction in
general by providing a clear definition of both "real distinction" and
"rational distinction."
These definitions clearly separated the two
types of distinction and were to be employed in some form by most later

philosophers.
Also Scotus's conditions for each type of distinction
168
were clearly outlined, making his treatment of distinctions a more
systematic and thorough one than those of his predecessors.
His
treatment of the formal distinction in particular clarified many of

the obscurities in Bonaventure's treatment of the distinction of
attribution, Henry of Ghent's treatment of the intentional distinction,
and Olivi's distinction of rationes reales. These three earlier
"intermediate distinctions had much in common with the formal distinc
tion but Scotus is the first to provide a clear account of both the
foundation and the conditions for such a distinction, and the first to
maintain that such a distinction is real.
CHAPTER IV
WILLIAM OF OCXHAfe
( d. iy*9)
1,
General Survey
William of Ockham acknowledges four types of distinction*
a real
distinction between things, a faraal distinction, a rational distinction,

and a distinction between & thing and a being of reason.
At least two of
these are reducible to a distinction of things, for the formal distinction

is described in a manner which indicates that its extremes are, according
to Ockham, things or res, and the rational distinction or distinction
between beings of reason is always founded upon some real difference.
Whether they are real or not, all the above distinctions are
numerical distinctions between individuals of one type or another (with ,
the possible exception of the formal distinction).
This follows from
Ockham's conscientious application of the convertibility of -'being" and

"one" from which he concludes that "everything outside the soul is really
singular and numerically one" (l), and from his further assumption that
concepts or beings of reason are singular acts of understanding (or sin
gular qualities of the mind according to another interpretation) which
are universal only in signification,
"An intentlo of the soul signifying
many things outside [the soul] is truly and really singular, and numeri
cally one, because it is one and not many things, although it signifies
many things" (4),
In general*
169
It must be held without doubt that any existing thing

imaginable Is of itself and without any addition a
singular thing and numerically one, , , , singularity
is a passion agreeing immediately with everything, (10)
2.
The Beal Distinction
The real distinction Is usually characterized as a distinction

between things or real beings (all real beings are things j see (23)).Every
real being is a singular thing which is either a substance (either immaterial
or a composite of matter and form), or a quality (l, 2, 10).
Consequently,
every real distinction will be a distinction obtaining between numerically

different things.
The individuals which are the extremes of the real distinction are
such that each is logically Independent of the other.
That is, the existence
of one thing does not entail the existence of another thing, nor decs the
destruction of one thing entail the destruction of another thing unless
there is some relation of dependence obtaining between the things i "Every
singular thing can be annihilated without the annihilation or destruction
of another singular thing on which it is no way depends; , , , " (7),
This
is particularly obvious where one thing is distinct in place and in subject

from another thing (17).
Thus the extremes of the real distinction are
separable because one extreme can exist without the otheri
"when some
things are so related that one remains while the other does not remain, then
those things are really distinguished? (2).
An actual separation of extremes is then a sufficient condition

for their real distinction, as is the possibility of their separation,
for "Every absolute thing, distinct in place and in subject from another
absolute thing [i.e. substance or qualityj, can exist without that other
through absolute divine power" (17).
Ockham is anxious to preserve the
171
absolute freedom of God.
God can do anything that does not constitute a
contradiction, hence he can separate any two logically independent beings.

Vhen beings are so separable, they are really distinct things, even though
they now exist in union with one another.
Closely related to the condition of separability of extremes is
the condition of contradictory opposition which Ockham calls "the most power
ful way to prove a distinction of things" (28).
When one and the sane
predicate is truly affirmed of one subject and truly denied of another sub
ject, those subjects must be distinct Individuals.
If the subjects are
things existing outside the understanding and not concepts, the distinction
is a real one.
The separability of two extremes can provide a foundation
for the affirmation and negation of the same predicate of distinct things i
It follows formallyt A is, and B is not, therefore
there is some distinction of things or of concepts,
or of a thing and a concept . . . [for example] if a
substance exists and an accident does not exist, it
follows that they are not one thing but distinct
things either actually or potentially. (26, JO)
Contradictory opposition is both a necessary and a sufficient
condition for a distinction in general.
true, what a and b are must be distinct.
If 'Ta" is true, and H-Fb is

From the above passage it can be
seen that such opposition is as much a sign of a rational distinction, or

a distinction between a thing and a concept, as it is a sign of a real
distinction.
It can be a condition for the real distinction in particular
only if it is first determined that the subjects of contradictory predicates

are real beings (26),
A real distinction then is a distinction between numerically differ
ing individuals or things.
Because the extremes are real beings, Ockham
says that the distinction obtains independently of any mental activity can-
cerning -the extremes*
172
", . . every such distinction is a real distinction
and no noire depends on the intellect than the entity itself depends on the
intellect" (31),
Since any distinction involves seme nental activity, that
he must nean here is that the extremes of the real distinction differ prior
to being distinguished ty the intellect, and this difference is the basis
for their distinction.
Every difference is a relation, and a relation
according to Ockhaa is nothing over and above its extremes.
If the extremes
are real beings then, it follows that the difference Itself exists indepen
dently of the intellect also (20),
3,
The Formal Distinction
The real distinction between two individuals is the only kind of

real distinction to be found among creatures.
According to Ockhaa there
are no formalities or rationes reales in things which are really, but not
numerically, distinct.
The mystery of the Trinity, however, compels Ockhaa
to admit a formal distinction between the divine essence and each subsistent
relation or Person,
But even here he describes the distinction in terms of
things',' not formalities s "when one simple thing is many things" there is a
formal distinction between the simple thing (jhere the divine essence} and
each of the many things (hero the three Person^} that it ls^ll).
The mystery of the Trinity consists in the fact that the divine
essence is identical with each of the three Persons, but the three Persons
are not identical with one another.
So, using the "is" of identity,' we
can truly say "The essence is the Father," "The essence is the Son," "The
essence is the Holy Spirit," According to the transitivity principle for
the identity relation, or the dictum that "two things identical with some
third thing are identical with each other, " we should be able to say truly
that "The Father is the Sen," "The Son is the Holy Spirit," etc., but these
175
are false statements for the three Persons are really different from one
another. Through his formal distinction, Ockham attempts to account for
such problems:
. . . in God, the divine essence is three Persons and
is any of those Persons and, however, one Person is not
another. And to say that the essence and a Person are
formally distinguished is only to say that, according to
one meaning, the essence is three Persons and a Person
is not three Persons. Likewise I understand nothing else
by this proposition, "The essence and paternity are for
mally distinguished" than "The essence is filiation and
paternity is not filiation and, however, the essence is
paternity" . . . And so universally, for it to be true
that some things are formally distinguished is only for
something to be truly affirmed of one and truly denied
of the other, and, however, one of those things is truly
affirmed of the other . . . But this can only occur when
one simple thing is many things, just as the unique
divine essence is three Persons. . . . (ll)
Thelast part of Ockham's statement
may be interpreted as follows.
The principle of distinction given above (p. l) was this: (x)(y)^Qp)((Px

& -Fy) v (Py & -Fx))4Wjj7 * 311(1 this is equivalent to: (x)(y)^2""3F)((Fx &
-Fy) v (Py & -Fx))-^x^y_7 & /xj4y-^(=|F)((Fx: & -Py) v (Py & -Px)27^. An instan
tiation of the first conjunct of this latter form of the principle would be:
((Fa & -Fb) v (Pb & -Fz))-âjb. Now, if we let "a" stand for the divine
essence, "b" stand for divine paternity, and P" stand for the property of
being identical with the divine filiation, ((Fa & -Pb) v (Fb & -Pa)) is true
because the divine essence is identical with divine filiation and divine
paternity is not identical with divine filiation.
It should follow then that
the essence is not identical with divine paternity, i.e. "a^b" should be
true.
But "a^b" is false according to Catholic theology.
A special distinc
tion is thus required which will be consistent with l) a contradiction

obtaining between the extremes of the distinction, and .2) the identity of
both extremes.
This is the formal distinction:
174
. . far it to 'be true that m m things ear* fanally
distinguished la only fat something to ha truly affirmed
of one and truly denied of the other, sad, however, one
of thoee things is truly affirmed of the other, (U)
Ccnoerning this formal distinction Ockham says, "it is most difficult to
understand aad must not be posited except where faith compels" (31),
Where
the Trialty is oonoerned, laws of logic do not always hold true.

The formal distinction is then a distinction one extreme of which
is a thing whioh is really aany things, and the other extreme of which is
one of these many things.
It is not, then, a numerical distinction because
essence and Person are not distinct individuals.
Contradictory opposition
is used as a sign of the formal distinction, but this opposition must be

here consistent with the identity of the extremes.
4,
According to Ockhaa, a distinction always requires two extremes t

"properly speaking, if something is distinguished, it is distinguished from
another" (43),
Properly speaking then a rational distinction is a distinc
tion between definitions or descriptions of terms < "diverse words are ratio
nally distinguished because they have diverse descriptions" (4-3),
can speak of a rational distinction in an improper sense also.
But we
In this
sense a rational distinction is a distinction between two ratlones which

correspond to only one thing.
Since there is only one thing here as object
of the distinction, Ockhaa believes there cannot rightly be said to be two

extremes.
Properly speaking then two terms are rationally distinct if their
definitions differ.
This distinction is also numerical, aad real (43).
is founded upon a real distinction of things.
That is, two terms have
different definitions because of some reel diversity of the things they
It
signify.
175
Improperly speaking, one thing is said to he rationally distin
guished from itself because it corresponds to diverse concepts.
But it
must not be thought that these ratlanes or concepts are really in the thing,
or in any say really Identical with it or with each other as Aquinas and
Scotus believed.
Such beliefs confuse two distinct levels of reality.
Ratlones are beings of reason, or signs predicable of many real beings, aad
this is the way that many
of them can
correspond to one andthe same things
Thus one and the same thing really, and without alteration
and without any diversity or plurality on the part of the
thing, corresponds to diverse ratlones or concepts just as
a thing which is signified corresponds to diverse signs. (4-3)
As signs, ratlones cannot
be in things, nor can one be saidto "really be"
the other unless they are
in fact the
same sign.
Any rational distinction is founded on some real distinction t "I

say that there can never be a distinction of concepts unless because of seme
real distinction, and this either of things in the same thing, or of things
totally separate or formally distinct" (53)*
There can be a rational dis
tinction corresponding to a real difference of individuals, but there are

other ways in which real distinctions can found rational distinctions.
One
way has to do with connotative terms and the corresponding concepts, and
this way will be explained below.
Some terms are connotative, others are absolute.
Ockham defines an
absolute name as follows t "Names merely absolute are those which do not
signify something principally and something else or the same thing secon
darily" (72),
Whatever they signify, they signify principally.
"animal" signifies men, cows, apes, etc. equally and principally.

not signify one first and the other secondarily,
Thus
It does
A connotative name, on
the other hand, "is that which signifies something primarily aad something
secondarily" (7l).
Its definition contains a direct reference to something,
176
and an Indirect or oblique reference to something else, A connotative
tern like "rational directly signifies nan and indirectly signifies that
by which a nan is rational, the intellective soul,
"White" directly signi
fies the thing which is white and indirectly signifies the quality or
accident whiteness by which the thing is white.
"Anlaal, on the other
hand, directly signifies a nan or an ape, etc. aad indirectly signifies

nothing.
Two terns then which directly signify the sane thing in a propo
sition, can differ in their connotations or secondary significations. "One,*

"true," "good" all directly signify the saae thing and are convertible, but
"true" connotes an act of understanding, "good" connotes an act of will,
etc.
What such terns connote are then really different, for an act of
understanding really differs from an act of will and so on. Terms predicated
of God like "wise" and "just directly signify God aad connote some real
diversity in creatures.
There can be another type of rational distinction founded upon a
real difference.
Terms which are absolute, e.g. "man" and "animal" can
correspond to ratlones of one and the same thing, yet they differ In their
extensions, for the extension of "anlaal" is larger than the extension of
"man" (53)
In both of the above ways concepts or ratlones of one thing
signified by such terms can be distinct because of some real distinction

outside that thing.
Since concepts are singular acts of understanding (or qualities of
the mind) they are numerically distinct from one another.
They can be said
to be really distinct, but Ockhaa is usually careful to maintain a distinc

tion between real beings and mental beings which are signs of real beings.
Thus he often writes of "distinctions of things or distinctions of beings
of reason." Although both beings of reason and real beings are singulars,
there is a fundamental difference in the types of singulars they are. Beings
177
of reason are dependent on a mind for their existence aad are signs of real
or rational beings t real beings axe not dependent on a mind for their exis
tence, nor are they signs of other beings.
Still Ockhaa calls both types
of being res or things, and even describes first and second Intentions as
being really distinct frcn each other (33)*
The other conditions Ockhaa gives for the rational distinction axe
the saae as those he gives for the real distinction.
If the relata of a
distinction are beings of reason, contradictory opposition is a sign that

they are distinct!
"if one being of reason is understood, e.g. a, and b
which is a being of reason is not understood, it follows that they are

distinct beings of reason" (26),
If a person can have the concept 'rational*
without also having the concept 'animal' in his understanding, these two are
distinct concepts.
Such contradictory opposition is based on the separabi
lity of the concepts in an understanding.
They are, in other words, indepen
dent if one can be comprehended without the other.

other.
Neither entails the
This separability in the understanding must be based on some real
difference!
"That, however, a and b be one thing, and a not be really dis
tinguished frcn b, and, however, that the intellect divide a from b under
standing a and not understanding b or conversely, is impossible" (25).
This does not mean that two really distinct things correspond to every dis
tinction of concepts, for ''one, * 'true,' and 'good' are distinct concepts
but in no way are there three corresponding things.
The corresponding
terms merely connote distinct actsi e.g. of knowing ("true") and of willing
("good").
Ockham's Intention seems to be to criticize some philosophers who
regard ratlones as real beings existing in things.
If A and B axe concepts,
then they are not one thing but two, i.e. two signs, and signs are in no
sense really identical with (the same thing as) what they signify.
This
Interpretation is supported by the fact that the above statement occurs
178
within the context of answering negatively the question "Can something real
he rationally distinguished ffcom something real?"
Ockham does not mean
that any two distinct concepts must signify two real individuals.
They can
signify one and the sane thingt hut as concepts they are in no way identical
with that thing.
Although Ockhaa says frequently that all rational distinctions must
have some real foundation, he does seem to admit mental distinctions of
another sort.
There is, for example, a mental distinction between essence
and existence in a thing, hut there is no question of a corresponding dis

tinction of things.
The terms "essence" and "existence'* merely signify the
same individuals although one does so as a noun, the other as a verb (52, 60).
Ockham seems then to recognize a distinction, similar to Scotus*s and Henry's,
between two grammatical modes of one concept, although he never discusses
such a distinction or its conditions in detail.
5.
The Distinction Between Res and Ratio
The distinction between a res or thing and a ratio or concept is

merely mentioned in passing and not treated in any detail.
Strictly apeaking
it is neither real nor rational, hut a kind of intermediate distinction

(31, 32).
But since every real being and every rational being is singular,
such a distinction is numerical, and contradictory opposition is used as a

condition*
"If a is outside the soul, and b is not outside the soul hut
only objectively in the soul, it follows that a and h are distinguished as

a real being and a being of reason" (26).
The extremes would also he
separable from each other, for a thing can exist without a concept of it
existing in some mind, and it is possible for God to originate a concept in
the understanding without there being any real correspondent for that concept.
179
6, Stannary
The following conditions can be given for the four distinctions
recognised by Ockhaa t
a and b (or A and B# or a and A) axe distinct ifft
1,
a aad b (or A and B, or a and A) are singular
beings,or a
is nany things and b is m e of those things,

2,
either I, II, III, or IV obtains.

I.
a and b are really distinct iff t
3. a and b are real beings or things,

k.
a and b are distinct independently ofanyintellect's

consideration of then,
55 there is sane contradictory opposition between a and

b in that "F is truly affined of a and truly denied
of b or conversely, i.e. &F)((Fa A -Fb) v (-Fa & Fb)),
6. a and b are separable, i.e. one can exist independently

of the other, at least by divine power,
II,
A and B are rationally distinct iff

7.
A and B are concepts or beings of reason (A" aad "B

are predicates),
8. Sone one thing, a, is both A and B,

9.
Either
i)
"A" and "B" directly signify the sane thing and

connote, or indirectly signify, really distinct
things, or
ii) The extensions of "A" and "B" differ,
10. (30)((l& & -jfe) v (-Jik & jfe)).

11,
A can Tbeuunderstood independently of B, and conversely.
180
III,
a aad A are distinct as thing and conceptiff i

12.
-**) v (-jfe & ffc)),
13.
14.
IV.
is a thing and A is a concept
and A can exist independentlyof each other.
a and b are formally distinct iff t

15.
is God and b is God,
16. "a is the same thing as bN is a true statement,

17.
&F)((Fa & -Fb) (Fa * Fb))*
18.
a and b are distinct independently of any intellect's

consideration of them.
7,
Applications of these Distinctions

A.
The Heal Distinctions
With the exception of the formal distinction which applies only

to God, every real distinctian obtains between singular beings which exist
independently of the intellect.
Such real beings are either substances,
e.g. this pencil and this paper, or the particular natters or forms of such
substances.
The matter of this paper is a singular entity and really dis
tinct from the matter of that paper) the farm of this pencil is singular and
really distinct from the form of that pencils
"In a particular substance
nothing is wholly substantial except particular form and particular matter

or something compounded from Such" (3).
The particular matter and form of
each substance are also numerically distinct singulars t "Nothing is matter

except what receives in Itself an absolute form really distinct . . . from
this matter" (18).
are another type*
Substances are but one type of absolute being.
Qualities
"aside from absolute things, namely substances and quali
ties, nothing is imaginable either actually or potentially (2).
181
Since real beings are all absolute things, each Is Independent of
any other and can exist In separation from all others by divine power,
AH
individuals are logically Independent of, aad separable from, one another.
There Is no contradiction Involved In God's preserving Plato's whiteness
without Plato, or Plato's natter without his fora, etc,
Ockham -then gives
separability with regard to existence as a condition for the real distinc

tion!
what are so separable that one can exist without the other by divine
power are really distinct singulars, and conversely.
Contradictory opposi
tion with regard to predicates is also a condition, and separability of

extremes can provide the foundation for such contradictory opposition,,
"Every absolute thing, distinct in place and In subject from another abso
lute thing, can exist without that other through absolute divine power
(l7, 6, 7, 22).
When extremes are separable In this way, it can be affirmed
that one exists while the other does not exist, and the opposition between
"A exists and "B does not exist is a sign of a real numerical distinction
between A and B.
Every real distinction outside God Is thus a numerical distinction
between real individuals which are independent of and separable from one
another,
Contradictory opposition of some sort IS a condition for any type
of distinction, but separability of extremes with regard to existence In space

or time Is a sign of a real distinction between extremes.
On the other
hand, inseparability of extremes Indicates an absence of a real numerical

distinction between those extremes.
and qualities are real beings.
Of all the categories, only substances
Relations- quantities, habits, etc, are not
regarded as real beings by Ockhaa for, If they were real beings, they would
have to be singulars and consequently separable by divine power from all other
singulars.
Then it would follow that a relation could exist without any
182
real foundation and without any extremes; a quantity could exist as the
quantity of nothing! etc,
God could preserve the relation of paternity
without there being any creatures which were either parents or children,
without there being among creatures any act of one creature generating
another.
These consequences are unacceptable, and Ockhaa reduces these
categories to the categories of substance or quality,
A term signifying
a substance directly signifies this substance only and connotes nothing,

"Man" directly signifies men and does not indirectly signify anything
else.
Relation words, quantity words, and the like, are connotative
terms, however, and connote something else while they directly signify
substances or qualities t
For not always is there a corresponding distinction be
tween significant words and mental intentions, and the
things signified, , , . these categories are distinct,
but the things signified by these categories are not
correspondingly distinguished, but that the same thing
(at least sometimes) is signified by diverse predicaments,
although not in the same manner. (55)
The relation word "father not only stands for a man, but connotes his son,
because the relation paternity must obtain between a father and a child.
Several tanas can directly signify one and the same thing, as "man" and
"father" can, yet differ in that they signify it in different ways or
because they indirectly signify different things.
A plurality of concepts
or terms does not always then correspond to a plurality of things.

The same type of thinking prompts Ockham to inject a real distinc
tion between the essence of a thing and its existence.
Since the extremes
are neither substances nor qualities they cannot be real beings.
Further
more, what are really distinct are really separable, but it is inconceivable
that even God should be able to preserve an essence without its existence
183
or conversely t ", , , if they Here two things it would not involve a con
tradiction for God to conserve an essence in the world without its existence,
or conversely , . , each of which is impossible" (22),
An essence would
then exist without its existence, and them would be an existence which is
not the existence of anything.
The terms "essence" and "existence" signify
the same things according to Ockham, although "essence" does so as a noun,

"exist" does so as a verb (60),
They are no more two things than are
"essence" and "essence" (although as linguistic terms they are, of course,

numerically distinct singulars).
The criticisms leveled by Ockhaa against
this real distinction do not, however, affect the position of Aquinas who
shared with Ockhaa neither the assumption that all real distinctions obtain
between things, or the assumption that what are really distinct are also
really separable by divine power.
The distinction is a non-mental distinc
tion between real principles of one thing and neither of these principles
is an entity in its own right.
Even Giles of Rome did not hold that a
things essence and its existence were separable in Ockham's sense.
When
Giles says that essence and existence are separable, he means only that an
essence does not always have existence, that it is given existence when
God creates a thing of this essence and that it loses existence when it is
destroyed.
Neither essence nor existence can bi preserved by God apart
from their union in a thing (except insofar as an essence can continue to

be an idea in the divine mind).
It is clear now why Ockham had no room in his theory for a real
formal distinction within a thing.
Since singularity is a passion agreeing
immediately with every being, he does not need to account for the fact of
singularity by any device such as Scotus's individual difference in a thing.
It is rather universality that must be accounted far, and this can be done
184
without postulating the existence of a real common nature In Individuals.
There is then no need for a formal distinction between a thing's individual
difference and its nature.
The Scotistic formal distinction is attacked by Ockhaa on several
counts.
First, If a formality is a real entity, given Ockham's assumptions,
it most be singular, i.e. have a numerical unity*

unity is numerical (20),
"...
every real
This would make a formality a thing, but no
thing is composed of several other things unless these be matter and fora,
or substance and quality,
"There can never be any kind of distinction
outside the soul in creatures unless where there are distinct things (23)*
Consequently, if the formalities that comprise a thing are neither sub
stances nor qualities, they are not real beings.
Secondly, a common na
ture, through its contraction to this or that individual, would be numeri

cally one.
That is, humanity through its contraction to Socrates would be
numerically one.
But nothing which is numerically one can exist simulta
neously in many Individuals,
Humanity, however, exists also in Plato,
Aristotle, etc. This conclusion follows because of Ockham's rejection ;of

any real but less than numerical unity.
Scotus had said that the nature
has a unity which is real but less than numerical f derivatively, as it is

contracted to this or that individual difference, a nature is singular.
But it is not this nature as singular through contraction to Plato which
is identical with the nature contracted to Socrates,
A nature exists in
many individuals through its real but less than numerical unity, and not
through the numerical unity it acquires as it is contracted to one indivi
dual,
Ockham goes on to say that if the nature is numerically one, then
it would be multiplied when singulars of this nature are multiplied, or

it would remain numerically one of itself.
numerically many and no longer one.
In the former case, it is
In the latter case, numerically one
185
and the sane thing would exist simultaneously in different places, e.g.
human nature would exist in Socrates and also in Plato (l).
This is
impossible.
Thirdly, if the nature were a singular thing, an individual dif
ference would also be a singular thing and the two would be numerically
distinct.
But if this were so, according to Ockham the nature could exist
apart from the individual difference and conversely.
Numerically distinct
entities axe separable by divine power an individual difference would

exist without being the individual difference of any nature, and a nature
would exist without any individuals of that nature (6). Fourthly, contra
dictory predicates would be true of one and the same thing if common
nature and individual difference were contained in one substance.
This
substance would then be both common through having a nature and proper
through the individual difference which contracts the nature to this indivi
dual (8, 9, 56).
Finally, Scotus uses contradictory opposition between
extremes as a sign of their formal distinction within a thing.
But if the
formal distinction is a type of real distinction obtaining between real

beings which are formalities but not things, then the most reliable sign
for a real distinction between things is lost.
For, from the fact that
contradictories are truly predicated of two real beings, it would not be

possible to determine whether the distinction in question is a real numeri
cal distinction or a real formal distinction (4l).
Such objections do not, however, meet Scotus on his own ground.
All depend upon assumptions made by Ockham but not by Scotus that all beings
are singular entities, that numerical unity is the only type of real unity,
that the only real beings are either substances or qualities separable by
divine power.
186
ay such means, the Scotistic theory of unlvers&ls Is rejected, and
with it the formal distinction within a thing,
Ockham uses other arguments
to reject the moderate realist approach of Aquinas,
While not acknowledging
that the nature in Itself has any kind of unity, Aquinas believed that really
distinct things of the same nature have a rational identity or unity (spe
cific or generic).
Each thing has its own individual essence, but in so
far as all are not distinguishable with regard to essence, all can be known
through the same concept or ratio, which bears the same relation of likeness
to each of them.
Such a ratio the intellect abstracts from a concrete
entity, i. e, the form of a thing is known without any of its individuating

conditions being apprehended,
Where there are two rationas of one thing,
it is not necessary that there be a corresponding real distinction within

the thing.
The concepts 'man* and 'Animal' are formed on the basis of
different kinds of lndistlngulshability among things, but in an individual

man there is no real distinction between humanity and anlmality,
Ockham
rejects the possibility of such abstractions t "That, however, a and b

be one thing and a is not really distinguished from b, and however that the
intellect divides a from b understanding a and not understanding b, or
conversely, is impossible" (25),
Hatter and form in a thing can be sepa
rately understood as can substance and accident.

distinct and separable by divine power.
Such extremes are really
There is no mental separability,
as the theory of abstraction maintains, without some corresponding real

separability,
Aquinas's notion of a rational Identity obtaining between really
distinct things with indistinguishable natures is also rejected.
no rational Identity between really distinct entities:
There is
"Nothing real is
rationally the same as Itself or smother thing . . . " (27).
Socrates and
187
Plato do not agree with regard to hunan nature* i.e. they can in no way be
said to be one in nature or identical in nature,
Ockham concludes that "no universal . . , is something existing
outside the soul in any nay, but all that which is universal and predicable
of many things from its nature is subjectively or objectively in the mind*
and . , , no universal is of the essence or quiddity of any substance . . ."
(5). A universal is a concept under which many individuals fall* or a term
which can signify and stand for many Individuals in a proposition.
concept* a universal is a natural sign of individuals.
As a
It is formed by a
process of intuitive cognition and resembles the individuals it signifies.

Since there is no nature shared by many individuals* what is the basis for
the application of such a concept or tern to many things? Ockham sayst
, . , from this itself, that Socrates and Plato differ by
themselves only numerically* and Socrates through his sub
stance is most like Plato* all else having been circum
scribed* the intellect can abstract something common to
Socrates and Plato which will not be common to Socrates
and whiteness. Nor ought another cause be sought except
that Socrates is Socrates* and Plato is Plato* and each
is a man . . . . (35)
And*
Socrates* through his Intellective soul* agrees more with
Plato than with an ass. . . . it ought not ie be conceded
that Socrates and Plato agree in something which is of
their essences* but it ought to be conceded that they
agree by some things* because by their forms and by them
selves. (58)
The similarity of things is a basic fact.
Some things just resemble
other things because their substantial or accidental forms are similar.
The
humanity of Socrates belongs to Socrates alone* and the humanity of Plato

belongs to Plato alone.
and Plato share or agree.
There is no community, nothing in which Socrates

The humanity of each is particular.
Because they
are similar* however* the intellect naturally forms a concept based on this
188
similarity, and this concept can serve as a sign of these things and any
other similar things.
The corresponding tern is truly predicated of each
thing it signifies, and the things it signifies axe singular entities.
It
can stand personally for any of these singulars in a prepositions
"this
noun 'man* signifies nothing except that which is a singular nan.
And
therefore it never stands for a substance except when it stands for a par
ticular man, , , , this noun man* equally . , , signifies all particular
men" (72).
In a proposition like "Han is common to many," however,' "man1*
does not have personal supposition, for no singular thing is cosnen to many.
It can have either material supposition, in which case the proposition means
that the term Mnan:: is predlcable of many singulars, or it can have simple
supposition, and then it means that the concept "man* applies to many sin
gulars,
In no case does "man" signify or stand for a common nature,

Scotus not only regarded the specific nature of a thing as a for
mality of that thing, but considered the genus and difference which comprise
the species to be formalities of the thing as well (together they make up
the formality of the species).
For Ockham there can be only a rational
distinction between a genus and a difference or between a genus or differ

ence and a species.
Genus, species, and difference are only concepts.
There axe degrees of resemblance among things.

on the basis of mare remote similarities,
A specific concept is formed
A species is an intentlo or
concept predicable of many individuals essentially (n quid).
Han is a
specific concept predicable of numerically distinct individuals like Socrates

and Plato because it signifies the essence of each individual.
A genus is
an intentlo which is truly* predicable of individuals also, and it is predi

cable of all that the species is predlcable but predlcable of other indivi
duals an well (68, 69), A difference is an intentlo predicable of all
189
Individuals of which the species is predicable, but predlcable of them in
auale and not in quid.
That is, it principally signifies the whole object,
but also connotes a part of the object.
Terms which signify genera and
species are absolute (see pp. 157-158 above), while terms signifying differ
ences axe connotative because they principally signify individuals but
secondarily signify parts of individuals, i.e. that by which each Individual
is appropriately called by this term.
"Rational" principally and directly
signifies individuals like Socrates,' and secondarily and indirectly signifies

that by which each is rational, i.e. the rational soul of each (70).
Genus and difference are not then intrinsic parts of the species as
Scotus maintained.
The species is not an essential part of a thing.
Species,
genus, difference are not real beings of any sort for if they were, accord
ing to Ockham they would have to be either substances or qualities.
They
are not qualities and, since none of them can exist in separation from seme
individual they are not substances either.
Genus, species, and difference
are concepts so related that the extension of the generic concept contains
the extension of the specific concept and mare, while the extension of the
specific concept contains (at least partially) the extension of the concept
of the difference.
All these concepts and the corresponding terms signify
individuals, i.e. each signifies "all individual things contained under

it" (69),
cepts.
Because they signify many individuals, they are universal con
Such universals are either qualities of the mind or acts of the
understanding depending on which theory of Ockham is used.
In either case,'
each is a singular being,' i.e. a singular quality or a singular act.
Uni
versality comes only through the ability each has to signify many individuals.
As concepts or as terms any two universals differ from each other numerical
ly.
190
. , any universal Is truly and really singular, be
cause . . . an intention of the soul signifying many
things outside the soul is truly and really singular
and numerically one because it is one and not many things
although it signifies many things, (if)
In addition,' each universal is distinct from the individuals it signifies
as a concept or mental being is distinct from a real being.
Here again the
distinction is numerical although the extremes are different types of being.

B.
The national Distinction
The rational distinction as understood by many of his predecessors

and contemporaries is criticized by Ockham insofar as it violates the sharp
distinction he wishes to maintain between real and mental beings.
For the
most part his objections are directed against such statements as the follow
ing by Aquinasi
There is even in God to be found a distinction of rationes
which really and truly are in God, such as the ratio of wis
dom and the ratio of goodness and the like.' which indeed are
all really one and differ by ratio. . . . (Aquinas,' 77)
How if these two rationes are really in God, as Aquinas maintains, then
according to Ockham's theory they are things hence singular entities numeri
cally distinct from each other.
This would destroy God's simplicity for
the deity would have numerically distinct parts.
If, on the other hand,
these rationes are merely mental beings, then they cannot be said to be God
or to be inGod.
They cannot be really in God but distinguished only through
the activities of the intellecti
if they are in God, they are things) if
they aê not real beings but mental beings or concepts, they are not in God*
. . , when it is said that the ratio of wisdom is other
than the ratio of goodness, either 'ratio* there stands
for some thing outside the soul or for sens being of
reason. If in the first way, therefore if the rationes
of wisdom and goodness are different, it would bm
necessary that they be other as things, and so they will
be distinct things. If in the second way, therefore
191
the ratio of wisdom is not really in God nor is it really
God, Therefore these attributes are not really the divine
essence itself. If it is responded to these reasons that
those attrlbutal rationes are in God from the nature of
the thing but saw not distinct except through the operation
of the intellect and therefore they are really the divine
essence itself but are only distinguished through the operation of the intellect, , , . Against i when some are
entirely uniformly related before an act of the intellect
and after, either they are always distinguished or never.
But divine wisdom and goodness are always uniformly re
lated before an act of understanding and after, for no
change is caused in then from this alone that they are
understood. Therefore if they are in no way distinguished
before the work of the intellect, then they are not dis
tinguished after it, (44)
If rationes are real beings, then they must be things and distinct from one
another as things t "There can never be any kind of distinction outside the
soul In creatures unless where there are distinct things (23, 64),
If,
on the other hand, ratlones are merely beings of reason, then they are nei
ther really identical with a thing or with each other,
A ratio or concept
is a sign and no sign is Identical with another sign or that which it sig
nifies,
The conceptual and real levels must be kept distinct.
and difference are passions immediately agreeing with being.
Identity
If two beings
are real, then they are either really identical or really different.
If
two beings are conceptual, then they are either mentally identical or men
tally different.
There can be no mixing of the two levels i "Nothing real
is rationally distinct froa something real" (27),

Ockham has another reason for rejecting the real identity of ratlo
nes. Aquinas frequently said that an affirmative proposition, if true, sig
nifies some rational diversity of'-mhat subject and predicate signify and
their real identity in a thing.
The sort of real identity signified results
froa the inherence of a form in a subject i "The term in the subject position
is taken materially, that is for a supposit.
Truly the tern in the predicate
192
position Is taken formally, that is for a satyrs signified" (Aquinas, 1391^1) , This kind of real identity depends in some sense on the existence
of real universals, which Ockham rejects.
or natures, according to him.
There are no real universals
It is not the case that each of our concepts
of a thing corresponds to sons diversity of forms within that thing,

Ockham handles true affirmative propositions using his theory of
the supposition of terms.
For the truth of an affirmative proposition, "it
is not necessary that subject and predicate be really the same, nor that the
predicate really be in the subject or really inhere in the subject, nor that
it be really united to the subject outside the soul . , ." (65).
What is
necessary is that the subject term and the predicate term signify, and stand
personally for, the same thing, "because through such a proposition it is
only denoted that the thing implied
thing implied
by the predicate . ,
by the subject is really the same as the

(66),
There are three ways in which a term in a proposition can stand for,
or have supposition for, something.
First, subject and predicate terms can
stand for what they signify, whether these be things existing independently
of the mind, beings of reason, or spoken or written words.
subject and predicate both have personal supposition.
In such a case
Second, a subject
term in a proposition can stand for a mental being (although it does not
signify a mental being), e.g. in "Han is a species," "man" stands for the
concept man and not for men existing outside the soul.
term has simple supposition.
In such a case the
Third, a subject term can have material
supposition in a proposition when it stands for a spoken or written sign

(although it does not signify such a sign), as in "Han is a noun," "man
signifies the word "man," not the thing man nor the ratio 'man.* (57)
When the two terms in an affirmative proposition stand for and sig
nify one and the same thing, the proposition is true.
When the two terms
193
stand simply for different concepts of one and the sane things
"If they
stand simply . . . thus they are not one thing or one nature, hut they
say the sane nature and are distinguished from each other as two concepts.,,
because they signify the sane thing and nature in different ways" (59) In
the proposition "Han is an animal," when the subject and predicate terns
stand personally far things which are men and animals, the proposition is
true because everything which is signified by "nan" is also signified by
"animal" and the tens stand personally for the same things.
Still the
concepts 'man' and 'animal* differ, and the proposition is not tame when
"man" and. "animal" have simple supposition.
It is never necessary then for
Ockham to say that two ratlones are rationally diverse yet really identical.
The necessary identity is accounted for by a logical device which requires
none of the metaphysical assumptions made by previous philosophers such as
Aquinas.
Ockham also believes that it is contradictory to imagine, as many
proponents of this type of rational distinction do, that one thing can
somehow actually be many distinct ratlones i "that something which is one
and the same should be truly and really those which are rationally distin
guished so that it does not correspond to them as what is signified corres
ponds to its signs, but should be those that are rationally distinct, is
impossible" (4>3).
This would amount to saying that one thing is also
really many things, since a ratio existing outside the mind would have to
be a thing.
Such a possibility is admissible only in the case of the
Trinity.
Ockham finally rejected the possibility that ratlones of attributes
night really be in God, but not distinct until considered by some intellect.
A rational distinction requires a real difference as its foundation.
If
194
ralata are not different before the intellect considers then, then they are
not different after the intellect considers them.
Ockham's cun solution to the distinction of divine attributes in
volves regarding these attributes in two different says.
bute is a perfection which is really in God.
First, an attri
Second, an attribute is a
predicable true of the divine essence and each of the Persons.
If ire under
stand thee in the first nay, then attributes are neither really nor concep
tually distinguished because God is nost simple and completely one.
If we
understand them in the second way, then the attributes are signs and as
signs cannot be said to be God because no sign is identical with the thing
it signifies (46),
siders him.
God is wise, good, etc, even if no intellect ever con
But "wise" is only predlcable of God truly if there is some
intellect to form the concept 'wise* on the basis of an abstraction from

created wisdom (*<9),
In other words, God is knwwn by us from creatures,
and the concepts we apply to him are first derived from perfections in
creatures.
There are no such concepts unless there are minds to fora
them.
The many terns predicated of God are not synonymous, even though
they all signify the same reality.
secondary signification.
They all differ in connotation, or
In propositions like "God is wise," "God is just,"
"wise" and "just" directly signify the deity, but "wise" connotes one
accident in creatures, and "just" connotes another.
Since such terms are
first applied to creatures which are understood before God, and since the
accidents connoted are really distinct in creatures, the connotations of
the terras differ even when they are applied to God although there is no
corresponding real distinction in God (51)i
Whence if there were some name imposed which precisely sig
nified the divine essence and nothing else, without
any connotation of anything, and similarly if there

were another name imposed to signify in the same way the
divine will, those names would be simply synonymous names
and whatever would be predicated of one in the same way
would be predicated of the other. (67)
While every rational distinction is founded on some real distinc
tion, it is not true that a distinction of signs always implies a dis
tinction of things signified:
It must not, however, be said that just as these in
tentions or words are distinct among themselves because
one is not the other, that as many things as correspond
to them are distinct, because there is not always a
similar distinction between words and intentions signi
fying in the soul and among those signified. (55)
This means that, while a rational distinction entails some real distinc
tion, there is not a one-one correspondence between the relata that are
rationally distinct, and those really distinct foundations.
There is a
rational distinction between the concepts 'true' and 'good' for the terms
"true" and "good" directly signify the same things but connote differently,
i.e. "true" connotes an act of understanding while "good" connotes an act
will.
It is not necessary that there be some real distinction within the
thing signified
there is no distinction of forms corresponding to the
truth and goodness of a thing, nor is there any real distinction in God
corresponding to the distinct predicates we apply to him. There is no
real distinction in a thing corresponding to the distinction of generic
and specific concepts such as 'animal' and 'man', although the exten
sions of these concepts differ.
Ockham's rational distinction is then a distinction between par
ticular kinds of being, i.e. signs or concepts.
Many signs or rationes
can correspond to one and the same thing because they all signify it al
though they do so in different ways. The double meaning given "ratio" by
196
Scotists and Thomista is rejected. A ratio is not both a concept and a form
(or formality) of a thing.
It is an eng rationis only. On Ockham's inter
pretation rationes cannot be in things any more than signs can be identical
with what they signify.
The relata of a rational distinction must be con
cepts or other mental beings a thing cannot be rationally distinct from it

self as other philosophers had maintained:
Nothing is really distinguished from something unless it
is a thing and not a concept, . . . Nothing is distinguished
rationally from something, therefore, unless it is a con
cept, . . . Nothing real is rationally the same as itself
or another thing, . . . Therefore, in the same way nothing
real is rationally distinct from something real. (27)
Ockham makes a clear distinction between things and beings of reason that
signify such things. Although both things and beings of reason are sin
gular entities, and both real distinctions and rational distinctions are
numerical, real beings differ from rational beings in many ways. For
example, a rational being can signify many things, but a thing itself is
not a sign of other things.
A rational being depends for its existence
on some mind, while a thing existB independently of mental activity.

Nonetheless, because beings of any sort are, according to Ockham,
singular entities, all are either numerically distinct from or numerically
identical with one another. Real and rational distinctions are subdivisions
of numerical distinctions made according to the types of singular beings
that the extremes are. The extremes of any such distinction are separable
by divine power and opposed with regard to some predicate which is true of
one and false of the other.
Only the formal distinction in God cannot be
assimilated to this pattern because of the peculiar nature of the deity who
is both one thing and three things, i.e. one essence and three Persons.
197
8,
Conclusion
Ockham's theory of distinctions clearly shows the close connection,

between the types of being and unity a philosopher acknowledges, and the
types of distinction and Identity he acknowledges.
If everything that exists
in any sense is singular, then there is no place for formalities, real

natures, or real ratlones in an ontology.
Consequently there is no place
either for the Scotistlc fomal distinction or for the Thcaistic rational
distinction with a real foundation.
these devices are unacceptable.
The accounts of universals which utilize
There can be no common nature and individual
difference in a thing which are distinct oily formally.
There can be no
rational identity of sevecftl really distinct individuals as Aquinas main

tained.
There can be no real identity of several formalities or ratlones.
There can be no natures shared by distinct things according to which we

might call these things identical, nor can there be any substance shared by
many formalities or ratlones according to which we might call these really
identical.
The solution of the problem of universals according to Ockham lies
not in some type of being which bears a relation of identity to many indi
viduals, but in the function of singular entities which are concepts or
words.
Neither a word nor a concept is identical with what it signifies,
and each can signify many really distinct things.

signification which provides the solution.
It is this function cf
The foundation for the applica
bility of a word or concept to many really distinct things lies in the simi
larity of these things.
They share nothing, nor are they identical, but
they may resemble one another sufficiently for us to subsume them under the
same concept and apply the same term to then,
Ockham thus adopts a form of the resemblance theory to account for
198
universality.
If a thing x is human, and a thing y is human, there is
nothing identical in x and y, nothing they have in common.
Nor can we say
that x and y are conceptually identical because both are subsumed under the
concept 'human*.
Only concepts, and not things, can stand as the relate of
conceptual identity.
Nothing accounts for the similarity of x and y.
Both
are radically singular and resemble each other simply because x is what it
is and y is what it is.
By holding the singularity of things basic and unexplained so that
everything that is is numerically one, the similarity of things must also
be a basic fact which is unexplained.
The only -type of distinction admissible
is a distinction between two singulars whether these be things or concepts

or a thing and a concept.
The only admissible type of identity is the nu
merical identity of two things or two concepts.
Only God remains unaccounted
for and the mystery of the Trinity requires the acknowledgement of a formal
distinction not created by the understanding to account for the nonidentity
of three Persons who are yet identical in essence.
Ockham's theory of
distinction and identity to this point is homogeneous, i.e. the same princi
ples operate throughout.
Unlike Scotus and Aquinas he cannot account for
the mystery of the Trinity within the context of his theory and must
provide a special account of it.
Another difficulty with Ockhams theory is his apparent inability
to account for the unity of an individual.
Any individual thing is composed
of a number of numerically distinct individuals separable both from it and

from one another.
The natter and form of a thing are themselves things,
and hence singular and separable from each other by divine power.
is true of the substance of a thing and most of its qualities.
The same
And not only
199
are aatter and fora distinct, tut for living creatures at least there is
more than one substantial form and these forms are numerically distinct (39).
The powers of the soul in things that have souls a n also really, i.e. nu
merically,' distinct.
What is it that unites all of these really distinct
and separable individuals into Socrates or Plato? What Bakes this aatter
the aatter of Socrates rather than the aatter of Plato?
What distinguishes
the unity of Socrates from the unity of a mere aggregate like a pile of
rocks?
If each constituent is a thing and singular of itself, then Socrates
is an aggregate of many singulars.
If each of these singulars is Socrates
of itself, then there are many Socrates.
If they are not each Socrates of
themselves, then they must all become Socrates through their union.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
1.
Comparative Summary
Beginning with certain common assumptions, medieval philosophers

arrived at theories of distinction which are in many respects diverse.
Their common assumptions may he summarized as follows.
If sameness and
difference are transcendentals of being qua being, then the kinds of dif
ference and the kinds of sameness are determined by the kinds of bfcing
that there are.
Any subdivision of one type of being requires a subdivi
sion of the corresponding types of difference and sameness.
For Scotus,
the postulation of a type of being which is real but less than a thing means
the further postulation of a type of difference which is real but leas than
numerical and the postulation of another type of sameness as well.
For
Ockham, on the other hand, the assumption that every being is singular
means that every difference is numerical.
Different ways of differing are then explained by the different
kinds of being that there are.
If there are two kinds of being, then there
must be at least two kinds of difference
(and probably three, because not
only do entitles of the same type differ
from one another,
different types differ also).
but entitiesof
That is, once it is admitted that the world
consists of real beings (and their principles) and mental beings or concepts,
it follows that there must be a difference and a sameness of real beings,
a difference and a sameness of mental beings,
and at least
a differenceof
a real being and a mental being.

While agreeing on the general division of being, sameness, and dif
ference or distinction, the philosophers discussed disagree on many other
200
points.
201
There is disagreement as to the general descriptions of the types
of distinction, the conditions given as necessary and/or sufficient for

each type of distinction, the classification of examples, and the existence
of a "middle" distinction.
The expressions "x is really distinct from y"
and "x is rationally distinct from y" are used hy Aquinas, Bonaventure,
Scotus, etc. but such expressions do not have exactly the same meaning for
each philosopher.
Also these philosophers sere faced with the solution of
similar problems, e.g. how does God differ from his creatures?
Peter*s animal! ty differ from his rationality?
how does
how does Peter's intellect
differ from his will? how do the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost differ?
accounts for universality?
what accounts for individuation?
what
But their
manner of classifying such differences differs, and even when there is

general agreement that, for example, matter and form are really distinct,
the precise nature of this distinction is not the same for all the philoso
phers discussed.
As has been already indicated, such differences in
treatment are often due to differences in metaphysical outlooks and the

strategy each philosopher adopts to solve the problems confronting him.
With regard to the real distinction, there seems to be a general
agreement that the real distinction is one which exists independently of
any mental activity although Scotus is the first to describe the real distinc
tion in this fashion.
Perhaps Aquinas, Bonaventure, fienxy of Ghent, and
others thought this too obvious a matter to be worth stating because the
real distinction is almost always contrasted with the mental or rational
distinction.
In emphasizing this description, Scotus was concerned to
construe "real distinction" broadly enough so as to include the various real

distinctions "after a fashion.
202
The conditions most often given for the real distinction are the
following!
the relata are both things| the relate axe somehow opposed to
each other | the relata are separable from each other at least by divine
power if not by natural means,
the philosophers discussed,
None of these conditions is accepted by all
Aquinas never uses the first condition since
he believes that there are real distinctions between intrinsic principles

ef things such as natter and form. and these principles and such principles
are not things in the sense of being individuals or suppesits.
Nor dees he
use separability as a condition since the relata ef sons distinctions he

classifies as real are clearly not separable, e.g, the intrinsic principles
of a substance or the divine Persons,
For him and for Bonaventure, the
opposition or the relata with respect to sone predicate is a nore inpertant

condition since such opposition of the relata Indicates that these relata
cannot be either one and the sane individual or one and the sane principle.
In contrast, Henry of Ghent, Giles of Rone, and later Suarez wore to employ
the separability of relata as the main condition for the real distinction
to the exclusion of opposition,
of the above conditions.
Scotus and Ockham were to keep all three
Separability was important as a condition for
them because of their eaphasis upon divine power and freedom.
What are
really distinct from one another (except for Scotus*s distinctions after
a fashion^ should be separable in the sense that nothing prevents God from
conserving one in existence apart from the other.
Ockham seems to have been the only one to draw a connection between
opposition and separability.
There are two different meanings Of "separable"
such that two things x and y can be said to be separable if either l)

can continue to exist after y has been destroyed or conversely or 2)
x
x and
y can continue to exist after any union between them has been destroyed.
203
Spotting only of the first kind of separability, Ockham sayst
It follows formally i a is and b is not, therefore there
is some distinction of things or of concepts or of a
thing and a concept. An exaaple of the firsts if a sub
stance exists and an accident dees not exist, it follows
that they are not one thing but distinct things. . , .
Therefore, as appears universally, from affirmation and
negation of the same a real non-identity can be inferred.
The expressions "exists" and "does not exist" are opposed as affirmation
and negation so that if it is true that a exists and that b does not exist,
then a and
b cannot be the same thing.
of here as a kind of opposition.
Separability seems to be thought
The same would hold for the second kind
of separability, for if a exists at place^ (or at time^) and b does not

exist at places (or at time^) then "exists at place^" and "does net exist
at place^" are true of a and b respectively and consequently a and b are
distinct things according to Ockham's principle of contradictory opposition.
But while separability can be construed in this way as a kind of opposition?
opposition does not imply separability for according to many aedievals some
things or principles (e.g, the divine Persons) are opposed but not separable
in either of the above senses.
Many of the differences of interpretation given the expression "x
is really distinct from y" by aedieval philosophers can best be seen through
an examination of the examples they treated.
None of them denied that the
distinction between the two individual creatures was real, but there are vast
differences in their handling of the problem of individuation,
Aquinas
saw signats matter or ?attsr under definite dimensions as the principle of

individuation so that two individuals differ because the quantity of matter
in one is not the same as the quantity of aatter in the other,
Through such
signate matter substantial and accidental forms are individualized,
Scotus
204
felt natter of this sort to be inadequate to account for individuation, and
developed his theory of the haecceity or individual difference which is a
formality in a thing which contracts a common nature so that it becomes the
nature of this singular being,
Ockham, who felt that singularity was a
basic fact, saw no need to account for individuation and stated that two
individuals are numerically distinct of themselves.
In the example of indi
viduation then the different metaphysical outlooks of these philosophers

clearly govern their solutions to the problem how two individuals are really
distinguished from each other.
Another example on which there is much agreement is the distinction
between matter and form.
The distinction is almost universally regarded as
a real one but analyses of a statement like "Hatter is really distinct from
form vary,
Aquinas, following Aristotle, considered matter and form to be
the components of a created substance and these principles are related to

each other as potency to act.
Neither is in itself a thing or a being to
gether they constitute a thing or being.
They are mutually dependent and
neither is separable from the other while the thing they constitute exists.
The facts of substantial change indicate that the distinction between these
principles is not created by the mind but is real.
Ghent, a different analysis is evident,
By the time of Henry of
Henry says that to both matter and
form there correspond ideas in the divine mind, hence by definition both
matter and form are things because each has its own essence.
Although mat
ter could be defined as the potential element in a substance, Aquinas never

speaks of matter as having an essence of its own.
But according to Henry,
matter and form, as things, are even separable frcm each other at least by
the power of God (Henry, 4).
Scotus and Ockham followed Henry's lead, and
Scotus treats matter not as something merely potential but as a positive
205
reality knowable in its own essence (Sotus, 62,
63),
Unlike Aquinas,
Scotus grants both its ovm essence and its own existence to aatter.
For
Aquinas it was the composite of form and aatter which received existence.
Finally, form and matter are absolute things according to Ockham and exist
as the particular form or the particular matter of this or that singular.
The divine power is affirmed aatter and form are substantial things and
can be separated by God so that either can continue to exist without the
other (2),
With such later treatment of intrinsic principles like matter
and farm it became easier to construe every real distinction as a distinc

tion between two things because the relata were separable positive enti
ties.
There are other examples which are not always classified as real
distinctions.
One such example is the distinction between divine Persons.
All philosophers call this distinction "real" in a broad sense of the term
since orthodoxy demanded that the distinction not be one created by the
mind.
But for some like Scotus the distinction was a real formal one,
and not a distinction between things,
Aquinas, who never used separability
as a condition for the real distinction, could construe the distinction as

one between subsistent relations or things.
This distinction is based upon
the relative opposition these Persons exhibit.
On the other hand Scotus,
who used separability as a condition far the real distinction slmpllclter

regarded the distinction of Persons as a formal one and secured the insepa
rability of these Pearsons by means of the doctrine of unitive containment
of formalities in an essence.
The distinction between the soul and its powers is considered real
by Aquinas because of the kind of opposition exhibited by the relata the
soul is one, the powers are many; the soul may be operative while a power
is not operative, etc. (Aquinas, 118).
206
The sane distinction is formal for
Scotus because of his general belief that a real distinction of things should
act be postulated where a lesser one will suffice and because the powers of
the soul are not separable parts of the essence as things would be.
Once
Aquinas can utilize the real distinction here because he does not use
separability of extremes as a condition for their real distinction.
The
essence and existence of a thing are really distinct for Aquinas because
these principles serve the purposes of distinguishing-Sod fren creatures
and distinguishing individuals which share the sane essence.
Scotus had
other means of accomplishing these purposes using intrinsic modes and the
formal distinction, and Ockham regards the distinction as a merely verbal
one.
Because of all these divergences, each philosopher's theory of
distinctions must be examined before we can tell whether two philosophers
mean the same thing when they claim that "x is really distinct from y".
Sometimes there seems to be more difference when the classification is
the same than when it is different.
Thus Aquinas's and Scotus*s analyses
of "matter is really distinct from form" appear more divergent than their
analyses of the distinction between divine Persons which the former classi
fies as real and the latter as formal.
The use of separability as a condition seems to be one of the main
reasons for this divergence.
A philosopher who does not employ this condi
tion will class together certain ways of differing which another philosopher
who accepts this condition would place in different classes.
Aquinas clas
sified many examples as real which later philosophers classified differently

because for them the lack of separability of the extremes indicated that the
distinction could not be a real one and that the extreaes could not both be
things.
207
Giles of Rome appears to have been caught between two periods as
he attempted to reconcile Aquinas's distinction between essence and exis

tence with the separability of extremes of a real distinction.
The result
is that essence and existence, like matter and form, are regarded as things
rather than intrinsic principles of things.
Partly because of the emphasis
on divine power and the consequent insistence on the separability of really

distinct things by divine power, Scotus resorts to the formal distinction
to account for differences which are not created by the mind but whose
extreaes sure nonetheless not separable as two things are separable.
Re
jecting the formal distinction, Ockham retains a real distinction which is

always a distinction between separable singulars and all differences
which do not conform to this pattern are classified as rational.
After considering all the above differences, it may well be asked
whether the various treatments of the real distinction have anything in
common.
The general nature of the real distinction seems to be the same
in all these treatments, i.e. the real distinction is one which is discovered
but not created by the intellect,
Relata which are really distinct differ
independently of whether they are thought of by some intellect.
Whatever
more it may be for a particular philosopher, it is at least a distinction

of things, and, whether separability of relata is a necessary condition for
the real distinction, it is at least a sufficient condition.
Things, which
are separable from each other at least by divine power are really distinct,
although it is not always the case that for every philosopher discussed
a real distinction is always a distinction between such separable things.
Like the expression "x is really distinct from y", the expression
"x is rationally distinct from y" also lends itself to different inter
pretations,
For a philosopher who acknowledges two types of rational dis-
208
tinetion, it may mean either that the distinction between x and y is merely
mental, or it may mean that there is some real foundation for this distinc
tion which is still a distinction originating in large part with the mind.
The rational distinction, even more than the real distinction,
shows a wide variation from philosopher to philosopher.
This is partly
due to the introduction by some philosophers of an intermediate distinction,

for distinctions like the formal and the attributions! are usually designed
to handle many of the problems other philosophers handled using a rational
distinction with a reel foundation.
Consequently a philosopher like Aqui
nas classifies the distinction between divine attributes as a rational dis

tinction with a real foundation (the distinction of reasoned reason of
Suarez and later Thoaists) while Scotus classifies the same distinction as
formal.
Vhere an intermediate distinction is introduced, the role of the
rational distinction is usually reduced.
For Henry of Ghent and Scotus,
a rational distinction in the strict sense is a distinction between two

modes of one and the same concept.
Some philosophers developed intermediate distinctions because of
certain deficiencies they found in the traditional rational distinction
with real foundation.
Actually such intermediate distinctions are not
intermediate in the sense that they are somehow neither real or rational,
but intermediate in the sense that they are neither distinctions of things
nor distinctions wholly manufactured by the mind.
Scotus, for example,
was critical of certain aspects of the rational distinction with a real

foundation as it was developed in Henry of Ghent,
As he says, "That
opinion does not deny an intentional difference, but makes something in

a thing necessarily correspond to it (13).
Two formal objects in the
understanding correspond to some distinction which is independent of the

understanding (12).
It is not sufficient to say, as Henry does, that
209
intentions in a thing are only potentially distinct prior to their consi
deration by an intellect which draws then out and actually distinguishes
then,
Ockham in turn rejected the Scotistic formal distinction but deve
loped a formal distinction of his own to handle the peculiar distinction

between the one divine essence and the three divine Persons,
The need for some distinction which would be neither wholly ra
tional in nature nor a real distinction between things was, as Wolter has
noted, to save "the objectivity of concepts that express a partial insight
but not the whole truth about a reality which lacks really distinct parts,
. , , "3 Thus Aquinas found a conceptual distinction with a real founda
tion between divine attributes as did Ockham and Bonaventure, while Scotus
thought this distinction to be a formal one.
It could in no way be a dis
tinction between real parts of the deity, but neither could it be merely a
mental construction for in that case an understanding of perfections in
creatures would provide us with no knowledge of God, and it would be false
to speak of God's power as distinct from his wisdom or goodness,
Aquinas
and Henry of Ghent saw the same kind of situation with regard to the
"grades of being" within a creature and utilized a conceptual distinction
with a real foundation between these grades rather than postulate a plu
rality of substantial forms in a creature.
Finally Scotus saw a similar
situation with regard to the soul and its powers, the common nature and
individual difference in a thing, and the Persons of the Trinity.
Ockham
rejected such distinctions insofar as they implied the existence in things

of non-numerical ratlones or formalities.
Unlike these predecessors Ock
ham did not accept the belief that such rational distinctions as that
^g^VAllan B, Wolter, "The Realism of Scotus," Journal of Phil., (1962),
210
between grades of being in a creature require some directly corresponding
distinction in reality.
Several distinct concepts can correspond to one
and the same thing provided one.connotes something the others don't and
there need be no distinction of forms or formalities or intentions in the
thing itself.
In general, the points of disagreement are as follows.
Concerning
the purely rational distinction, there is disagreement as to whether such

a distinction exists at all.
Ockham thinks not, for he says, "there can
never be a distinction of concepts unless because of some real distinction"

(53).
Of course many philosophers did not regard this as a distinction be
tween concepts, although the distinction is created by the mind.
Thus
Suarez says that the distinction of reasoning reason is between two instan
ces of the same concept, while Henry and Scotus speak of a rational dis
tinction as one between modes of the same concept,
Aquinas seems to think
that there is a rational distinction between a thing and itself according

to two considerations of it (Aquinas, 8),
Among those who acknowledge
purely rational distinctions, there is general agreement that such dis

tinctions have no real foundations but are completely created by the
intellect.
Generally where there are two concepts involved in the distinc
tion, the distinction
is
Saiv
n lt u
bvm b
jlS & I
fu u u u a M v u .
ThO
O u
such real foundations focuses on the question whether the objective aspects
of a thing which are distinguished differ prior to their consideration by
the intellect,
Scotus says they do, and consequently the formal distinction
is a real one,
Aquinas says that no distinction within the object under
consideration is necessary so long as some real distinction outside this

object corresponds to the distinction of concepts.
There is no real dis
tinction of attributes in God our concepts of these attributes differ be-
211
cause the analogous perfections In creatures arise from really distinct
forms.
The distinction of divine attributes is not real then, but it does
have a real foundation.

seems to concur.
Suarez, Kith his distinction of reason reason,
Henry of Ghent insists that there need be only a poten
tial distinction of intentions in a thing prior to the consideration of

the mind which effects the distinction.
There is disagreement between
Ockham and his predecessors on several points.
He rejects the possibility
of there being formalities in things (as Scotus thought) or rationes in

things (as Aquinas and Henry of Ghent thought) because of his assumption
that every real being is singular and such beings by their nature are not
singular,
A ratio is not an aspect of a thing, but a sign of many things,
Aquinas's tendency to speak of a thing as rationally distinct from itself

when it is conceived under distinct concepts is criticized.
Two real
beings are really distinct, two concepts or mental beings are rationally
distinct, and there is no overlapping of the two levels (42, 44).
Finally there is disagreement as to how certain examples are to be
classified.
For Aquinas, Bonaventure, and Ockham the distinction of divine
attributes is a rational one with a real foundation while for Scotus the
distinction is formal.
Animal!ty and rationality in a man are also dis
tinct by a rational distinction with a real foundation for Aquinas, Henry,

and Ockham, and formally distinct for Scotus.
there is less agreement.
With regard to other examples
The formal distinction Scotus finds between the
powers of the soul and between the divine Persons is a real distinction
according to the others.
The distinction between the divine essence and a
Person is a conceptual distinction with a real foundation for Aquinas, a

distinction of attribution for Bonaventure, and a formal distinction for
212
Scotus and Ockham (although their treatments of the formal distinction are
very different),
It must also be pointed out that some philosophers like Giles of Rome,
Godfrey of Fontaines, Durandus of St, Pourcain, and many others completely
reject the possibility of a distinction which is neither a distinction be
tween tilings nor a rational distinction.
Their arguments are directed pri
marily against the formal distinction and focus on the impossibility of

there being a type of being intermediate between a thing and a concept.
Once again many of the differences among these philosophers dis
cussed must be attributed to their differences in metaphysical outlook.
Ockham's disagreements with other philosophers usually result from his
assumption of the singularity of all being.
For this reason he finds both
the formal distinction of Scotus and the rational distinctions of Aquinas

unacceptable.
Scotus's development of the formal distinction to improve
on both the rational distinction with a real foundation and the intentional
distinction reflect his realism.
If the common nature is a real being with
a unity which is real but less than numerical, its distinction from the
principle of individuation in a thing, the haecceity, must be real but less
than a distinction between things.
Once developed, this formal distinction
could be used to handle other problems for which the previous distinctions
of Aquinas and Henry seemed inadequate.
As has been mentioned, the use of
separability of the extremes of the real distinction as a condition for

this distinction also seems to have provided motivation for developing socalled intermediate distinctions.
According to Scotus, and to some extent
Ockham, there are distinctions which obtain Independently of the mind but
whose extremes are not separable even by divine power.
Henry of Ghent's
development of the intentional distinction may have arisen partly from his
213
dispute with Giles of Rone over the type of distinction between essence and
existence in a thing.
A real distinction between essence and existence
would make creation ex nlhllo inpossible according to Henry.
Thus he pos
tulates the being of essence and the being of existence of a thing which
are really identical and created by Cod in one acty but which are inten
tionally distinct.
Because of this intentional distinction the two ex
tremes are not so Identical that it would be impossible for an essence not
to exist.
Despite the numerous disagreements, there is general agreement among
the philosophers that a rational distinction of whatever sort is to seme
extent the creation of an Intellect,
A merely rational distinction is one
which, however it is described, has no real foundation.
A rational distinc
tion with a real foundation is partly the work of the intellect, although
there is some real foundation for the distinction of concepts.
foundation is will depend on the individual philosopher.
What the
The formal dis
tinction of Scotus may be considered as a conceptual distinction of this

sort (he sometimes refers to it this way) so long as it is remembered that
there is a one-one correspondence between the distinct concepts or formal
objects and distinct real formalities in a thing.
Several other types of distinction do not fit the above patterns,
e.g. the modal distinctions of Scotus and Suarez, and the distinction be
tween a thing and a concept of Ockham.
These were developed to handle
particular problems the philosophers saw.
Thus Scotus needed the distinc
tion between a formality and an intrinsic mode to account for the fact that
concepts of perfections are univocal between God and creatures, but the
being of God, for example, is different from the being of creatures in that
the former is infinite and necessary while the latter is finite and contin
gent,
214
Ockham, although he does not discuss It much, used the distinction
between a thing and a concept to round out his system if there are things,
and there are concepts or signs, then there must be possible a distinction
between a thing and a concept.
In general, the medieval philosophers discussed admit that things
differ in different ways.
All of them acknowledge at least a real distinc
tion between things and sane sort of conceptual distinction.
But their
theories of distinction differ because each uses his theory to solve cer
tain problems in accordance with his own metaphysics.
Some of the metaphy
sical (and theological) assumptions affecting these theories are considered

below.
The importance of separability of relata as a condition for the
real distinction seems to increase with the emphasis that is placed upon
preserving the absolute power and freedom of God.
Ockham, who carries
this emphasis to its logical conclusion, remarks thuss
"I believe in God,
father almighty} which I understand thus, that everything which does not
involve a manifest contradiction is to be attributed to the divine power
(72),
All things which are really distinct then are really separable by
divine power, and all things that are really separable are really distinct.
Really distinct things are opposed to each other as Ockham has shown.
It
is not then contradictory for them to exist in separation from each other
it would in fact be contradictory for them to be the same thing.
The
results of this approach to the real distinction are often strange.
My
sight of a rose and the ross itself axe really distinct, consequently God
can make the former exist without the latter and conversely.
The whiteness
of this paper can be preserved in existence without the paper, while an

object like this paper can be preserved without any properties at all.
215
A universe full of such really distinct things could prove strange and
unpredictable If God chose to effect all the separations of which he is
theoretically capable and the status of knowledge and science would seen
to be extremely precarious.
If separability is used as a condition for
the real distinction without being accompanied by the condition of oppo

sition, the result is that no sure sign for a real distinction is available.
This Is Suarez's positions
"Therefore a sure sign of a real distinction
is hardly forthcoming when things are such that naturally they are always
and necessarily found to be really united to one another, and have not thus
far been separated by divine intervention,^
It is necessary to examine
each particular case in terms of its perfection, essential nature, and

function.
Suarez admits separability then as a sufficient, but not a ne
cessary condition for a real distinction.
Opposition of relata and not
their separability was the important sign of a real distinction for Aquinas
because of his refusal to countenance intrinsic principles of substances
as separable entities,
however.
Other problems appear to result from this condition,
If a thing, x, is blue at t^ and a thing, y, is green at t2, then
x and y would seem to be really distinct things because "is blue" is true
of x at tj and "is not blue is true of y at t^.
But it is possible that
x and y are one and the same entity.

Scotus's realism and his belief in a one-one correspondence between
concepts in the understanding and realities is the foundation of his theory
of distinction.
If one and the same object causes distinct formal objects
in the intellect then there must be some corresponding distinction of

realities in the thing, and if these realities could not be separable from
each other and the object, then they are not distinct as two things but
Suarez, On the Various Kinds of Distinctions, p. 55.
distinct in some other way.
216
Intuitive cognition is cognition of objects
as they exist outside the understanding! and a distinction of objects so

intuited implies a real distinction of some sort prior to cognition.
Such
isomorphism between thought and reality was rejected by Aquinas and Ockham
with the result that both accept a mental distinction which has a real
foundation but which does not stand in a one-one relation with any real
distinction,
Scotus's solution to the distinction of divine attributes
utilizes the formal distinction and appears to make God some sort of com
posite! a difficulty which is overcame by the introduction of intrinsic
modes attaching to formalities.
The identity of the divine attributes in
the divine essence is preserved by the fact that the modes of infinity and
necessity attach to all divine formalities.
Aquinas and Ockhamt however,
are faced with maintaining that our knowledge of God is somehow deficient
and inadequate since we must understand God by many perfections which are
not many, but really one essencey in the diety.
Other relations between theories of distinction offered by the dif
ferent philosophers and their metaphysical assumptions have already been
investigated in preceding chapters.
No two theories of distinction offered
are the same and this divergence among the philosophers directly reflects
their different approaches to the question of what kinds of being there
are.
Things differ in different ways because there are different kinds of
being there are things, and concepts, and perhaps formalities.
There are
differences which obtain independently of the work of the mind which nay
or may not be apprehended by some mind, and there are differences which are
wholly or partially created by the mind and various signs or conditions are
presented to help in understanding whether a particular difference is real
or mental.
Theories of distinction and metaphysical outlooks work together
217
intimately in the sense that if a difference between the two xelata can
be shown to be mental and not real, then there are grounds for claiming
that the relata themselves are not real,
A much debated example was the
distinction between a thing and its nature,
(hi the other hand, if a dif
ference between two relata can be shown to be real and not only mental, then
there is a basis for claiming that the relata are real beings.
That is, a
knowledge of the kinds of being the relata of a distinction are will indi
cate what kind of distinction obtains between them} but if the nature of
these relata is not already known, an examination of their distinction may
serve to illuminate what kinds of being they are,
Ockham sought to prove
that common nature and haeccelty were not real beings by showing that their
distinction could not be real because the extremes did not satisfy the se
parability condition.
Scotus, however, tried to show that the distinction
could not be rational so that the relata must be some kind of real beings.
In this way then theories of distinction are of assistance in understanding
a philosopher's beliefs concerning being.
They also provide the key to an
understanding of each philosopher's ideas concerning identity and unity, for

distinction is the negation of identity.
Consequently there is a type of
identity corresponding to each type of distinction as its negation.
There
is also a corresponding type of unity since things which are not distin
guished in some respect may be said to be one in that respect.
Differences
in the treatment of distinctions then are closely connected with each philo
sopher's treatment of being, Identity, and unity and reflect basic differ
ences with regard to metaphysical assumptions concerning the kinds of things
there are.
BEAL DISTINCTION AQUINAS

Teaming logy___
Conditions
realis distinctio
differna re
Where .a and are such that either:
Examples
1) & is a subsistent relation and jb is a subsistent divine Persons

relation, or
(references: 27-33> 114-117)
2) and b are intrinsic principles of the same sub- matter and form,
stance, and is related to b by the act-potency essence and ex
relation, or
(refs.: 82-101)
istence, substance
3) a and are created substances and the natter
and accident
of ^ and the matter of _b are contained under
different dimensions, or
(refs.:2,10-14,17-25) any two created
individuals
4) & is a form (substantial or accidental) and b is
a form (substantial or accidental), or
any two members of
(refs,: 2,12,13,21,24,25)
diff. species
5) a is a created essence and b,is the essence of
A, or
(refs.: 102,104-111)
6) is a created essence and b is an operative
soul and one of its
potency of a, or
(refs.7118-120)
powers
7) & and t> are operative potencies of the same
powers of the soul
essence,
(refs,: 121-126)
then a, and are really distinct iff:
there is some predicate F* which is true of a and
some predicate "G" which is true of b, and either
l) the ratio of "P" implies the negation of the *
ratio of *0", or 2) the ratio of "G* implies the
negation of the ratio of *". (in short, Qp)
((Pa fc-Fb) v (Fb & -Pa)) ). Refs.: 2,28-33,36.
218
BEAL DISTINCTION BONAVENTUKE

Conditions
Terminology
distinctio secun ja and _b are really distinct iff}
dum rem, realis
1) a and jb are substances and (3F)((Fa & -Fb)
distinctio
y (Fb & -Fa)), or
2) a and b are subsistent relations and
@R)(Rab t Rba & R is irreflexive).
(Refs.i 15, 22-26)
Examples
any two creatures
divine Persons
there also seems to be an essential distinction matter and form, sub

as follows:
stance and accident
a and Jo are essentially distinct iff:
T) a. has an essence and )> has an essence,

2) the essence of a / the essence of b,
3) either a, and Jb can exist in separation
from each other, or g can be destroyed
without Jo being destroyed, and conversely,
and least by divine power. (Refs.} 51,32)
BEAL DISTINCTION GHS OF ROf
TftTminologg
differre re
Conditions
a_ and Jb are really distinct if a, and b are,
or can be, separated, and iff:
Examples
1) a and b are things,

2) aft.
(RefS.x 2,10)
matter and form, essence

and existence, two
creatures, etc.
IV)
VO
REAL DISTINCTION HENRY OF GHENT

Tftpminnlaffir
differre re
Conditions
and J> are really distinct iff:
1)a is a thing and b is a thing (either substances
or principles of substances),
2)either sl and b^ are separable in that God can pre
serve one independently of the other so that they
can exist apart from each other, or a. is a rela
tion founded on the essence of jb and ja and jb are
inseparable even by God,
3)a^b.
Examples
matter and form,
two individuals
Peter and.his simi
larity to Paul
(Refs*: 1,3,4)
HEAL DISTINCTION SCOTUS

Terminology
Conditions
differentia re (Only the conditions for the real distinction simplialis or rerun,
citer are given below),
distinctio real* ti and _b are really distinct iff:
is
1) a_and b differ independently of any intellect's
consideration of them (Ref*: 6)
2) a. and b_ each have actual, proper, end deter
minate~existence, (Ref.: 14)
3) <> &F)((Fa & -Fb) v (Fb & -Fa)), (Ref.: 67)
4) a is a thing and jb is a thing, (Refs.: 8,9)
5) a, and Jj are separable from each other so that
each can exiat independently of the other, at
least by divine power. (Ref.:55)
Examples
matter and form,

substance and
accident, two
creatures
220
HEAL DISTINCTION OCKHAM

Terminology
distinctio ex
natura rei, dis
tinctio rerun or
realia
Conditions
a_ and _b are really distinct (excluding the formal distinction) iffj
Examples
1) a and b are real beings or things, (Refs.: 23,
any two substances or

qualities
26,27)7
2) and Jb are singular beings (Refs.: 2,10),
3) 7 and 7 are distinct independently of any in
tellect's consideration of them, (Ref.: 3l)
4) &F)((Fa A -Eb) v (Fb A -Fa)), (Refs.: 26,28,
29)
3) a, can exist independently of or conversely,
or a, can be destroyed while _b remains.or con
versely, at least by divine power. (Refs.: 6,
7,22,26,28)
REAL DISTINCTION SUAREZ
Terminology
Conditions
(All references are to On the Various Kinds of
Distinction)
a and la are really distinct iff:
1) a, and are both things, (Ref.: p. 16)
2) the distinction between a and b. exists prior
to any mental operation l[kef.: p. 2l)
221
and a. and b_ are really distinct if:

3) a can exist after b,has ceased to exist, or
conversely, and <1 and b can continue to exist
after their union*has Been dissolved. (Refs.:
pp. 41-46,55-57)
Examples
RATIONAL DISTINCTION AQUDUS

Terminology
differunt ratio*
no; diversusi
secundum ratio*
nem
Conditions
When one thing a, is such that it is conceived
through several concepts (a and b ) because of
our way of coming to know a, and either
1) A and B are rationes corresponding to some
real diversity of principles in a, or
(Refs.i 95,75)
2) A and B are rationes corresponding to no real
diversity in ii but to some real diversity out
side a (as when A belongs to Is but not , and
B belongs to .c but not Jb, and Jb and _c are
really distinct), or (Refs.*74777-797126-132)
3) A and B correspond to no real diversity,
(Refs.* 6,8)
then a is rationally distinct from itself iff*
there is some predicate *fa which is true of
A and false of B or conversely (or |jrf)
((fa * -fa) v (fa & -fa)).
(Refs.: 72,73)
Examples
matter and form, sub

stance and accident
divine attributes;
metaphysical grades
in a creature
a thing and itself
RATIONAL DISTINCTION BONAVENTURE

Terminology
differentia quan
tum ad rationes
intelligendi,
differre a parte
nostrae appre*
hensionis
Conditions
When one thing a is such that it is conceived
through several concepts A and B because of our
way of understanding a, and not because of any
real difference between A and B in a, then e
conceived under A and conceived under B are
rationally distinct iff*
l) a conceived of through A and <1 conceived of
through B can be truly predicated of each
Examples
divine attributes
other through identity (i.e. Aa=Ba),

(Refs.: 1,2)
2) all predicates true of a conceived under A are
also true of a conceived under B (except Rpredicates). "(Refs.: 1.2)
3) "A" and B" have different connotations. That
is, "A" connotes b_ and "B connotes c, and Ja and
jo are really distinct. (Ref.: l)
RATIONAL DISTINCTION HENRY OF GHENT
Conditions
Terminology
differre rations F and G are rationally distinctmodes of thesame
concept iff:
1) F" and G" are predicatesandrespectively signify F and G.
2) "F" is the definition of G" or conversely.
3) F and G" signify the same concept (i.e. they
have the same intension or content).
4) F" entails G and conversely (or (xXFrJ-frGx)),
5) Fyfc. (Refs.: 2.3)
Examples
any definition and
the term defined.
e.g. "man* and
"rational animal
RATIONAL DISTINCTION- SCOTUS

differentia
rationis
A and B are rationally distinct iff:

1) A and B are distinct only posterior to the con
sideration of some intellect.
2) either
a) A and B are both formal objects in the under
standing. or
b) A and & are both modes of concept C (i.e. logi
cal or grammatical modes),
3) A&.
(Refs.: 1,2,7,13)
*man' & 'humanity*
RATIONAL DISTINCTION OCKHAM

Terminology____ Conditions
distinctio ratio- A and B are rationally distinct iff*
1) A and B are concepts or beings of reason ("A"
nis
and mBn are predicates)*
(Refs.: 26,3l)
2) Some one thing, a, is both A and B, (Ref.*43)
3) Either
a) "A" and "B" directly signify the same thing
and connote or indirectly signify really
distinct things, or
b) the extensions of "A" and "B1* differ,
(Refs.* 25,53)
4) &tf)((& & -jfc) v (ffe & -*k), (Refs.* 26,41)
5) A can be understood independently of B, and
conversely. (Refs.* 26)
Bxamplea
divine attributes,
transcandentals
RATIONAL DISTINCTIONS SUAREZ
224
A and B are rationally distinct (i.e. their dis

tinction originates in the mind) iff either:
1) There is a distinction of reasoning reason be
tween A and B iff*
a) there is no foundation for the distinction
in the object, but the distinction originates
solely in the mind,
a thing & itself
b) A and B are the same concept repeated,
(Refs.: pp. 18,60)
or
2) There is a distinction of reasoned reason be
tween A and B iff:
a) A and B are inadequate concepts of one and
the same thing,
b) A and B are objective concepts which are in-
separable even by God's power,

c) the distinction has a foundation in a thing, either
in the eminence of the object whose reality is not
exhausted in one concept, or by some reference to
other things which are really distinct,
d) there is no sign of either a real or a modal dis
tinction between A and B. (Refs.) pp. 18,60)
OTHER DISTINCTIONS BONAVENTURE
Terminology
differentia
secundum modos
se habendi; dif
ferentia attri
butions
C o n d i t i o n s ____________
a_ and A are distinct by attribution (where a is a
Thing and A is a mode or ratio of a) iff)
1) there is some predicate which is true of a, and
false of A, or conversely, (Refs.) 9,l)
2) one extreme can be truly predicated of the other
either by identity or inherence, (Refs.) 1,9)
3) there is a real foundation in a for the distinc
tion. (Refs.) 1,2,?,ll)
Examples
divine Person and
the essence
OTHER DISTINCTIONS HENRY OF GHENT

differre inten
tions
225
A and B are intentionally distinct in a thing iff)

1) A is an intentio and B is an intentio,
"souls" in a creature
2) Aj&,
3) Either A does not entail B or conversely (i.e.
genus & difference
ease esaentiae &
the intension of the predicate "A* is not part
esse existentfae
of the definition of "B" or conversely), or
A entails B, but B does not entail A (i.e. the
intensions of NBtt is included in the definition
of "A*, but not conversely), (Refs.) 6-8)
4) the extensions of "A" and "B" may overlap but are
not identical, (Ref.) 8)
5) A and B belong to the essence of a thing,a,

but are not actually distinct in anuntil some
intellect compares a with other really distinct
things in which A and B are really distinct,
(Refs.) 6,7)
6) A and B are inseparable in a by any power,
(Ref.s 8)
OTHER DISTINCTIONS SCOTUS

Terminology
non identit&s
formalia, plures realitates
formaliter distinctas
Examples
Conditions
A and B are formally distinct iff:
soul 4 its powers
1) A and B differ independently of any intellect's
divine attributes
genus 4 difference
consideration of them, (Refs.: 6,7,8,12)
powers of soul
2) A and B each have actual, proper, and determinate
existence, (Refs.x 14)
divine Persons
nature 4 haec3)0(3tf)((dA 4 Hfe) v (flfo 4 HÂ)), (Ref.: 67)
ceity
4) A and B are formalities,
5) A and B are unitively contained in something, a,
hence inseparable from each other and from a, even
by divine power, (Refs.: 18,25,27,29,31,39,59)
6) A?B,
7) 0&y)((Ay 4 -Ry)v(Ry 4 -Ay)), i.e. it is possible
that A be found in a thing, y, without B, and con
versely,
(Ref.: 66)
8) A" is not part of the definition of HB" and con
versely, i.e. A and B differ quiddit&tively, and
if A were realized in y without B, and B were re
alized in a thing z without A, then y and z would
differ essentially, (Refs.: 9,10,15,16,24,26,27,
39,47,65)
9) if Per jmpossibile A and B were separated from the
thing a which unitively contains them, they would
constitute distinct things. (Refs.:11,12,22,21,27,31)
ro
to
CT\
nonidentitas
adaequata
This distinction uses the same conditions 1-6

above* with the addition of the following to
replace 7-9 above*
A and B are adequately distinct iff:
1-6 above obtain,
7) A unitively contains B or conversely,
8) Either A exceeds B in predication (i.e.
the extension of *AM includes theextension
of "B" and more) or in perfection (or B so
exceeds A)
(Ref.: 14)
The modal distinction seems to use conditions 1-3
above with the addition of the following:
A and B are modally distinct iff:
1-3 above obtain,
4) A is a formality and Mis anintrinsicmode
of A and the concept of A with its mode M
is a perfect concept,
5) a/m .
(Refs.* 48,49,52,53)
any formality /
and an intrinsic mode
OTHER DISTINCTIONS OCKHAM

Terminology
distinctio formalis
Conditions
a and b, are formally distinct iff:
T) a ilT many things and b,is one of these things,
"(Refs.* 11,12,14)
*
2) a is God and b is God,
3) "a is the same thing as bH is true, (Refs.: 11,13)
4 ^?)((Fa & -Pb) v (Fb & -Fa)), (Refs.* 11,13)
5) a and b are distinct independently of any intel
lects consideration of them. (Refs.: 24,3l)
Examples
divine essence
andPerson
res distinguitur a rations
a and A are distinct as thing and concept iff:

1) a is a singular thing and A is a concept (also
a singular thing)
2) &*)((& & -*) v (fk & -*)),
3) a and A can exist independently of each other.
7kefs.; 31,32)
OTHER DISTBiCTIONS SUAREZ
Conditions____________________________________ Examples_________
Terminology
a and 1> are modally distinct iff:
a quantity and its
modal distinc
tion, distinction 1) either a is a thing and b is a
mode of a, or inherence
from the nature
conversely, or a. and b are two modes of the
of the case
same thing,
2) either:
a) a cannot be conserved in separation from b
X*or conversely) even by God, or
b) a, can exist without b. existing (or con
versely) but neither can exist apart from
some thing jc,
3) a, and _b are distinct prior to any operation of
the intellect. (Refs.: pp. 27-36,44-46)
228
t
229
2.
Accounts of Identity and Unity
Since medieval philosophers were not nearly as meticulous in set

ting out the conditions for types of identity as they were in setting out
conditions for the kinds of distinctions, there are comparatively few pas
sages in which any philosopher offers a complete analysis of real, rational,
or formal identity.
It is therefore often necessary to assume that real
identity, for example, is simply an absence of a real distinction and ap

proach an analysis of the trouser words "same" and "identical" through an
understanding of the ways in which relata can be said not to be the same or
identical.
Aquinas acknowledged a real distinction between singular things,
the principles of things, etc.
For him, however, real identity and real
unity are not simply the absence of real distinction and plurality.
Real
identity is the identity of an individual} it is numerical identity, the

identity of an individual substance which is not further distinguished into
other individuals.
Real or numerical unity is the unity of an individual
which is not divisible into further individuals (50).
Extremes, e.g. di
verse rationes. are said to be really identical or really one when they
comprise the same subject or supposit (62, 77 78).
This interpretation
leads to the peculiar result that principles such as matter and fora which
are really distinct can yet be really identical insofar as they constitute*
one and the same substance.
Although comprised of really distinct intrin
sic principles related as act to potency, an individual substance cannot

be broken down further into these elements and consequently retains a real
or numerical unity.
A rational distinction according to Aquinas is one obtaining between
a thing conceived under one ratio or called by one name and the same thing
230
as conceived under another ratio or called by another name (8),
The relata
are simply or really the same and such a relation of a thing under one con
cept to Itself under another concept is one of reason only.
The same thing
is distinguishable as to concepts or names, yet indistinguishable as to

substance*Since a ratio is said to be -the definition of a word, such a
thing can be said to fall under different definitions, i.e. a definition of
what it is for this paperweight to be red and a definition of what it is
for this paperweight to be square would be different although one and the
same object is both red and square.
Rational identity is not simply the absence in a thing of any dis
tinction as to concepts as might at first be thought.
Rather for Aquinas
rational identity is the identity of several really distinct -things which

fall under one concept, of things which would have the same definition of
essence.
Specific and generic identity are both rational for "Those are
called specifically one . , , whose ratio, i.e. definition, is one (12),

Their definition is the wmhIv ultd they are disposed to be known through the
same general concept.
Each man, for example, has his own humanity, but
insofar as it is conceived by the intellect the humanity of this man is

indistinguishable from the humanity of that man*
. . . what is specifically one is undivided because it is
a single object of knowledge and acquaintance. For in
distinct singular things, there is no nature numerically
one which can be called a species, but the Intellect ap
prehends as one that attribute in which all singulars
agree. Hence the species, which is distinct in distinct
individuals in reality, becomes undivided when apprehended
by the intellect. (50)
The concept is equally a likeness of this man and that man qua men.
The
generic concept 'animal' is equally a likeness of this man and this cat and
that dog, etc. insofar as they are animals.
Unlike the relation of real
identity, the relation of rational identity is real because its relata are
231
real Individuals existing outside the soul (8, 9)*
Since these individuals
are indivisible with regard to a generic or a specific ratloi they constitute

a rational unity (7),
In the broadest sense, a real distinction for Scotus is any dis
tinction obtaining Independently of intellectual activities, whether the
extremes be complete things or merely formalities of one thing.
Real iden
tity is usually mentioned in reference to the formal distinction whose

extremes are said to constitute one thing.
Formalities of one and the same
thing are really distinct (or extramentally distinct) yet really identical
because they cannot be further distinguished into individual substances.
It is their unitive containment in a thing which constitutes their real identity (11, 18, 20, 23)#
The real separability of relata having been
given as a condition for their real distinction, real inseparability is

the condition given for the real identity of extremes it would constitute
a contradiction to say that one of these extremes existed in something
without the other (40),
Separable principles of a thing such as matter
and form are also things, and cannot properly be said to be really iden
tical.
Several senses can be given to the expression "x is formally iden
tical with y" according to Scotus.
In one sense, extremes are formally
Identical or formally one when one extreme includes the other in its formal
concept or definition (10, 15).
Presumably then the formality 'man* is
formally identical with the formality 'animal* because the definition of

'man' includes 'animal' in its concept.
This is not an adequate identity
which can work in the opposite direction for 'man' is not included in the
definition of 'animal'.
A two-way formal identity would hold between 'man*
and 'rational animal'.
232
Scotus does not appear to use the expressions "formally identical"
or "formally one with regard to several individuals with the same common
nature.
These have a rational Identity and a rational unity,
Relata are
rationally distinct according to Scotus when they are either known through
distinct formal objects in intuitive cognition, or when they are modes of
one and the same concept.
It would follow then that really distinct things
known Intuitively through one and the same formal object of the understanding
would be rationally identical.
In its broadest sense, a real distinction for Ockham is one which
obtains independently of the intellect between things.
Thus the formal dis
tinction between divine essence and each Person of the Trinity is real.
In
its narrowest sense, a real distinction is a distinction between singulars

which are separable from each other by divine power. .Real Identity would
then seem to be the identity of a singular which cannot be further broken
down into other singulars.
Although the matter and form of a thing are
things in their own right capable of existing in separation from each other,
they are still said to be really one because they constitute one singular
(25).
But if each is separable and really distinct from the other, matter
and form are also singulars and each would have a real numerical unity of
its own (20).
But, since every relation has two extremes, and since Ockham
will not allow that the same thing can be really distinguished from itself
because of the real composition of matter and form in it (5*0* it may b
that the only real identity he would acknowledge would be that identity
between two distinct things such as matter and form which constitute one
individual substance.
That is, Ockham may not acknowledge the possibility
of saying that one thing is identical really with itself.
233
There is no possibility according to Ockham of saying as Aquinas
does that one thing under one concept is rationally distinct from itself
under another concept,
Nor is there any possibility of saying that several
distinct things which fall under one concept are rationally identical.
Only
things are the relata of real distinctions or real identities) only concepts
or beings of reason are the relata of rational distinctions or identities.
It is possible then to say that the concepts 'man' and 'rational animal'
are rationally Identical but not possible to say -that several men are ra
tionally identical.
It is possible to say that the concepts 'man' and 'goat'
are rationally distinct, but not that this man conceived as white is ration
ally distinct from the same man conceived as musical.
One and the same con
cept can be a sign of many really distinct individuals just as one predicate
can be truly predicable of many distinct individuals.
But in no sense are
these things identical with each other or with the concept or predicate
(42, 5*0.
These types of identity and unity, as well as the corresponding
types of distinction, are constructed in part at least around solutions to
the problem of universale.
Ockham, who denied the existence of real common
natures in things, excludes any kind of identity obtaining between distinct

singulars existing independently of the mind.
Singular things can be similar
of themselves so that one and the same concept or predicate can be a sign
of all of them, but they are not the same.
There is no rational identity
of singulars as Aquinas claimed, nor is there any real but less than numeri
cal unity in singulars as Scotus thought.
Only one type of identity and
one type of distinction obtain between things (except in the case of the
Trinity which cannot be fitted in to this over-all pattern).
Things are
really distinct if and only if they are separable by divine power and Some-
234
thing can he truly affirmed of one and not truly affirmed of the other.
Things are really identical if and only if they are inseparable by divine
power and whatever is truly affirmed of one is truly affirmed of the other.
Aquinas acknowledges the rational distinction of a thing which is
really one, and the rational identity of several things that are really
distinct.
The essence or nature of several things which agree in species
is not one in any sense, but things of the same species exhibit an identity
Insofar as they are knovable through one concept.
Several really distinct
things are indistinguishable in certain respects, e.g. species or essence,

quality, etc.
Scotus went farther and postulated a real but less than nu
merical unity of the nature to provide the foundation in reality for this
type of rational identity.
If really distinct things are both really distinct and rationally
identical in some respect or respects as both Aquinas and Scotus thought,
then provision must be made also for a distinction within a thing between
that by which a thing is distinct from others and that by which a thing is
the same as others.
There must be in a thing something which accounts for
the individuation of several things of the same kind or character, and some
thing which accounts for their identity in kind or character.
For Scotus
the haecceity of a thing accounts for its singularity, and this haecceity
contracts the common nature to make it the nature of this individual.
in a thingthere are then
With
the two formalities of haecceity and nature which
aredistinctindependently of any
operation of the intellect.
Aquinas admit
ted no real distinction within a thing between matter, the principle of indi
viduation in corporeal things, and the essence as it does not prescind from
Individuating matter 3
. . , the essence , , . can be perfectly and adequately iden
tified in reality with any and every individual that comes
235
under it, for it presents no being of its own that would
render it at all different from any one of them, or that
would make it in any way a different thing when it is
known and so becomes existent in the mind.32
Ockham, who has no need for a nature existing in things, has no need
either for a principle of individuation.
Singularity is a passion that
agreesimmediately with everything that is. Things are not the same in
nature
in any way for the humanity of Socrates is a singularas Socrates.
There is no distinction in a thing then between what makes it singular and

different from others, and that which makes it the same as others in some
respect. A thing is a real singular and a universal is a rational singular
and they are distinguished as what is signified and the sign which signi
fies it. The distinction between Socrates and the concept 'man* is numer
ical, but it is not a distinction which occurs in any way within Socrates.
In summary, every type of distinction discussed has some corres
ponding identity (with the exception of Ockham's distinction between con
cept and thing). Discussions of these types of identity are fragmentary,
but in general each type of identity consists in the lack of some type of
distinction between extremes.
Such lack of one type of distinction is not,
however, incompatible with the presence of some other type of distinction.

Really distinct things are, for Aquinas and Scotus, rationally identical
when they "agree" in some respect, i.e. they are indistinct with respect
to some concept although distinct as things. An absence of a distinction
between things yields real identity which is, however, consistent with a
distinction of one thing according to concepts or formalities.
32
Joseph Owens, "Common Nature," in Inquiries into medieval Philoso
phy. ed. J.F. Ross, (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing Co., 197l),
p. 201.
236
3.
Distinctions and Identity
Peter Geach has recently developed a theory about the nature of

identity which bears some resemblance to medieval theories of distinction,
Greach maintains that identity is relative rather than absolute.
Thus he
says t
I maintain it makes no sense to judge whether x and y are
"the same" or whether x remains "the same" unless we add
or understand some general terra the same F, That in ac
cordance with which we thus judge as to the Identity, I
call a criterion of identity! , , .33
When one says"x is identical with y," this, I hold, is
an incomplete expression; it is short for "x is the same
A as y," where "A" represents some count noun understood
from the context of utterance or else, it is just a
vague expression of a half-formed thought.3^
There is, according to Geach, no such relation as just "being-the-same-as,"
There are only relations such as "being-the-same-F-as" or "being-the-sameG-as" where ,rF" and "G" are general terms.
For example, there is the re
lation "being-the-same-raan-as", the relation "being-the-same-car-as", etc,

"x is the same F as y," Geach says, does not split up into "x is an F
(and y is an F" and "x is the same as , . , yn) * ^
He goes on to say that "on my own view of Identity I could not ob
ject in principle to different A*s being one and the same B,"-^ For example,
x and y could be the same type-word, but distinct token-words; x and y
33Peter Geach, Reference and Generality. (Ithaca* Cornell Univ. Press,
1962), p. 39.
o/<
-rTeter Geach, "Identity, Review of Metaphysics. XXI, no, 1 (Sept.,
1967), P. 3.
35deach, Reference and Generality, pp, 151-2.
^Geach, Ibid.. p. 157.
237
could be the sane man, but different official personages.
This could happen
because of Geach's belief that Leibniz's Law, the Indiscemibility of Iden

ticals, does not hold absolutely for identity.
As usually expressed, the
Law states that if x and y are identical, then whatever is true of x is also
true of y and conversely, or
. Geach maintains that such
indiscemibility obtains only relative to the ideology (i.e. set of predi

cables) of some Theory T,
That is, x and y may be indiscernible with regard
to the ideology of T, but discernible with regard to the larger ideology of

theory T',
Two linguistic expressions may be indiscernible in T, for ex
ample, when we cannot give in T "different descriptions for two tokens of

the same type word."
However, if T's ideology is broadened so that we can
do this, then these two expressions are no longer indiscernible in the

broader theory T',
Identity and indiscemibility are thus relative to seme
theory T.37
There are opponents of Geach's theory who support an absolute inter
pretation of identity according to which "x is the same as y" is not ambi
guous and who maintain that the indiscemibility of relata is one of the
OQ
formal properties of the notion of identity.
(Other formal properties
are usually taken to be reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity).
Where
one or more of these properties is missing, these opponents prefer to call

the relation concerned something else besides "identity."
Like Quine,
37Geach, "Identlty," pp. 5-6.

3For example* David Wiggins, Identity and Spatio-Temporal Conti
nuity. (Oxford* Blackwell, 1967)$ Sydney Shoemaker, "Wiggins on Identity"
in Munitz, pp. 103-117 J John Perry, "The Same F," Phil. Hevlew, LXXIX, 2
(Apr., 1970), pp. 181-200} D, Gabbay and J, Moravcsik, "Sameness and
Individuation," Journ. of Phil.. LXX, 16 (Sept. 20, 1973) PP. 513-526.
258
nest of them believe that "identity, properly so-called, knows no grada
tions.
Most of these opponents admit, however, that egressions of the
form "x is the same as y" may be indeterminate in truth value, becoming
determinate only with the addition of seme general term .*F", For example,
if a man says "what I fished in today is the same as what I fished in yes
terday," the truth-value of his statement is indeterminate until we knew
whether he means "what I fished in today is the same river as what I fished
in yesterday," or "what I fished in today is the same river-stage as what
I fished in yesterday."
In the first case his statement may be true if he
was fishing, for example, in the Potomac both times.

his statement is probably false.
In the second case
But when we supply a general term F" to
get "x is the same F as y" rather than "x is the same as y, we are not
dealing with some particular kind of identity which is ldentlcated by
"the same F,"
"F" merely supplies a criterion of identity by helping us to
identify the referents of the relation.
The criterion of identity for
rivers is different from the criterion of identity for river-stages.
But
the relation of identity does not vary, and if x and y are identical then
they are indiscernible and cannot be the same F but different G's,
Perry
has summarized this approach as follows t

The view I advocate, and which I believe to be Frege's, is
that the role of the general term is to identify the refer
ents not to identify the "kind of identity" asserted. Ac
cording to this view, x and y cannot be the same F, but
different G'si if x and y are the same F, then the relation
of identity obtains between x and y, and any statement that
denies this is false. Inparticular, nodenialof identi
ty of the form "x and y are different G's"can be true.
39Qulne ~Woird and Object, p. 203.
^^Perry,
"The Same F," p. 185.
Wiggins and Shoemaker seem to he in agreement with Perry here,
239
Wiggins,
for example, says that "on pain of indefiniteness, every identity statejLf
ment stands in radical need of the answer to the question sane what?
Some of the positions adopted by the medieval philosophers with
regard to identity and distinction are similar to Geach's position.
Aqui
nas, Scotus, Henry of Ghent, and Suarez do not go so far as to relativize

identity and distinction with respect to general terms as Geach does, but
they do seem to believe that there ere "kinds" of identity and distinction,
and that some "kinds" of identity are compatible with some "kinds of dis
tinction.
For example, real identity is compatible with formal distinction
for Scotus; for all of them, numerical distinction is compatible with spe
cific Sameness, etc.
The "kinds" of identity or sameness acknowledged are
generally real, rational and sometimes formal and modal identity.
There
are corresponding "kinds" of distinction.

There are also indications that some of these philosophers do not
accept Leibniz's Law without some modification.
While Aquinas, for example,
makes the general statement that "What are the same are so related to each
other that what is predicated of one is also predicated of the other" (138),
in his treatise on fallacies he adds the qualification that this principle
holds only where the relata are both really and rationally the same (80),
Does it hold with some modification where the relata are only really (or
only rationally) the same? Aquinas does not say, but we can imagine how
numerically distinct things which are specifically the same might be indis
cernible with respect to species, while relata which are really the same
but rationally distinct might be indiscernible with regard to all "thingproperties" but discernible with respect to "ratio-properties".
^Wiggins.Îdentity and Spatio-temporal Continuity, p. 27.
It is not
240
clear, however, how Aquinas would reconcile his statement In 138 with his
general theory of distinctions.
Transitivity of the identity relation also holds only with some
modifications,
Aquinas says:
That argument holds, that whatever are the same as some
third thing are the same as each other, for those that
are really and rationally the same such as a tunic and a
cloak. It does not, however, hold for those that differ
rationally, , , (8l)
There is one example in particular that this modification is designed to

handle:the Father is the
same as the divine essence, and the Son is the
same as the divine essence, hut we cannot say that the Father is the same
as the Son,
While Father and divine essence are really the same, there is
a rational distinction between Person and essence.

distinction then between San and divine essence.
There is also a rational

The move to the conclusion
that the Father and the San are really the same is thus blocked.
Other medi
eval philosophers took similar steps to handle the peculiar case of the one
God in three Persons,
Suarez offers a summary of the relativization thesis:
, , to be really the same excludes being really other,
but does not exclude being other modally or mentally.
Conversely, to be the same in concept, does not exclude
being really distinct or other, because reason unifies
in concept things that are really other, just as, on the
contrary, it distinguishes in concept things that are
really the same, ^2
"Same" and"other" are opposed, but only "as compared with the same kind
of distinction or division,"
Neither he nor Scotus deals with the effect
on Leibniz's Law or the transitivity of identity or distinction.

Ockham alone of the mediavals discussed appears to reject the
relativization of identity and distinction,
A real distinction can obtain
between x and y, but it is not compatible with the rational identity of x

42
Suarez, pp. 64-65.
and y.
241
A rational distinction can obtain between x and y, but it is not
compatible with the zeal identity of x and yi
", . . just as rational dis
tinction and rational identity are related to beings of reason, so real

difference and real identity are related to real beings." (54)
The point
of distinguishing between real identity and distinction and rational iden

tity and distinction is to identify the relata of an identity or distinction
relation as real beings or as mental beings.
Only the formal distinction,
restricted to God, could be called a different "kind" of distinction.
Ock
ham is the only medieval philosopher besides Aquinas to insist on dlscemibility or opposition as a formal property of distinction x and y are dis
tinct only if some predicate is truly affirmed of x and truly denied of y,
or truly affirmed of y and truly denied of x*
"So universally, wherever
there is some distinction or nonidentity, there it truly happens that some

thing is affirmed of one and truly denied of the other extreme" (4l).
It
appears that he would then also regard indiscemibility as a formal property

of identity (except for the identity of divine Person and essence).
While some medieval philosophers seem to have adopted positions si
milar to Geach's in some reppects, there are important differences.
Thus
many of them distinguish between what they call absolute sameness or same
ness simply taken, and sameness "after a fashion" (secundum quid), or rela
tive sameness.
Suarez attributes the following theory to Scotusr
"Abso
lute sameness he calls that whereby a thing is said to be the same am it

self, because in this case no reference to another thing is implied) and
relative sameness he calls that whereby one thing is said to be the same
as another . , . these two samenesses are really distinct,
Relative
sameness would probably be sameness which consists of a rail relation
^^SuarezJTp. 63,
242
such as that obtaining between two numerically distinct members of a species
or genus.' Absolute sameness could be only a rational relation because the
extremes are not two distinct things,
Aquinas does not speak of sameness simply taken and sameness after
a fashion, but he does make a similar distinction regarding unity which he
might be willing to extend to sameness since sameness is a kind of unity.
hit
Things that are simply one or undivided are undivided in essence, thus they
are simply one and many only "after a fashion" (as the teacher of Plato and
the husband of Xanthippe are simply one and many after a fashion).
Things
that are simply many or divided are divided in essence but may be one or
undivided "after a fashion" (as a dog and a cat are simply many but one
after a fashion insofar as both belong to the same genus) (7),
By an exten
sion of these principles, sameness simply taken would be sameness with regard,
to essence) sameness after a fashion would be a real relation obtaining be
tween several distinct things which agree in some respect.
Aquinas does
once speak of sameness simply taken where he says that there are not really
two extremes to the relation, but the intellect treats one thing as two in
order to designate a relation of the same thing to itself,.(6),
Finally, Suarez makes the following distinctions.
Sameness simply
as such, he says, can be understood in two ways, either relatively or nega^*The medievals had only one word for both "sameness" and "identity"
and that is identltas taken from the word idem or "same." The word identitas was thus often used where we would speak of a kind of sameness that
is not identity, Aquinas rarely uses the word identltas. He prefers to
say that things are the same according to thing 1secundum rem) or according
to reason (secundum ratlonem). or perhaps the same by thing (re) or by
reason (ratlone). Scotus and Ockham, however, freely use the word identitaa. Thus Scotus mentions "real identity", "formal Identity," etc.
243
If sameness is regarded as a relation, then sameness simply as such
tively.
is a relation obtaining between really distinct things, e.g, generic or spe

cific sameness.
If sameness is regarded negatively as lack of division, then
the sameness by which a thing is the same as itself is sameness simply as

such, for here there is a complete lack of division.
Speaking relatively,
the sameness of a thing with itself is sameness only in a qualified sense

because there is no real relation involved.
Speaking negatively, the sane
ness which is lack of division of two things in a concept is sameness in a

qualified sense because there is lack of division only in one respect.
In
this case, conformity in a concept is properly called "sameness" only with

regard to relata which are substances.
Where the relata are qualities it
is called likeness, and where they are quantities it is called equality.^

Real numerical identity seems to have been the paradigm case of
identity taken absolutely or simply.
tinction of a thing from itself.
This is the lack of division or dis
Regarded as a relation, it is merely men
tal for the fact that there are two relata in "x is numerically identical
with y" is due to ike intellects activity.
However, there are clearly in
stances where real numerical identity is not a rational but rather a real
relation.
For example, the identity of matter and form, substance and
accident, essence and existence in a supposit are numerical sameness for

Aquinas, but in each case there is a real composition of principles,
Sco
tus speaks of the real identity of two formalities such as the common na
ture of a thing and the thing's Individual difference, but these formalities
axe real entities although they are unitively contained in one subject.
Even where numerical identity is a rational relation, Leibniz's Law
would still not apply to the extremes, at least for philosophers like Aquinas
^Suarez, p. 6^.
244
who accept the Principle of Opposition or Discemibility for distinctions.
If the extremes of this rational relation axe two considerations or rationes
of one axd the sane thing, then according to Aquinas, something can be truly
affirmed of one yet truly denied of the other.
Indiscemibility would seem
to be applicable to the extremes only where these are not only really, but
also rationally, the same, as for example where the extremes axe synony- .
mous "This man is the same as this rational animal, "A garment is the same
as a piece of clothing", etc.
Some medieval philosophers seem to have taken the position that
Identity and distinction are relative, that statements of the form "x and
y are the same in one way, but distinct in another way" (e.g, the same
rationally, distinct really} really the same, rationally distinct, etc.)
are legitimate.
Most of them do not regard indiscemibility and transi
tivity as formal properties of identity or sameness.
All of those discussed
except Ockham seem to believe that there are different "kinds" of identity
and distinction rather than merely different criteria of identity and dis
tinction.
At the same time, they believe that some kinds of identity and
distinctionhave a stronger claim

than others.
to the title "identity" or "distinction"
Real numerical identity, for example, seems to be more pro
perly an identity than rational identity.

One reason for -the adoption of the above positions seems to be the
Aristotelian conception of sameness as a kind of unity.
Aquinas says that
" . . . sameness is a unity or union (6) and Suarez makes the following
statementt
But when we speak of "the same" negatively, we mean what
is not diverse or distinct from another, almost in the
sense in which "nothing" differs from "one", except that
"one" implies a negation of division in itself, whereas
"the same" implies a negation of division from itself,
or from that object with which a being is said to be
245
identical. For this reason Aristotle says , , , that sane
ness is a kind of unity in being,^
More exactly, saneness is unity in substance, but there is both first sub
stance and second substance, i.e. the concrete substance and the nature of
the substance.
The first is numerical Identity, the unity of the supposit;
the second is generic or specific identity which is rational according to

Aquinas, real but less, than numerical according to Scotus.
A concrete sub
stance is numerically one if it is not further divided into other substances

and it is numerically the same as itself because not divided or distinguished
from itself.
Generic and specific unity consist of lack of division with
regard to genus or species and things are generically or specifically the

same if they do not differ with regard to genus or species.
More broadly,
wherever things are not distinguished or divided in some respect, they are
one or the same in that respect.
If a and b each has some property F, then
a and b are the same in this respect, although they may differ in some other
respect.
That is, "Fa & Fb" may be true, and "Ga & -Gb" (or "Gb & -Ga")
may also be true.
Unity in one respect is only opposed to plurality in
this same respect, not to plurality in some other respect.
Sameness in
some respect is then only opposed to distinction in this respect and not
to all distinction.
Another reason is the doctrine that sameness and distinction are
passions of being.
Any being is both the same as itself and distinct from
all other beings.
If there are different kinds of being, it seems to fol
low that there are different kinds of sameness and distinction.
There are
both real and rational beings, thus there are both real and rational iden
tities and distinctions,
^Suarez, p. 62.
246
In one sense, in regarding sameness and distinction as passions of
being, the nedievals were saying what contemporary philosophers have also
said whan they Maintain that there is no entity without identity (a remark
attributed to Quine),
If there is an entity, we should be able to know
when on two different occasions we have the same entity and not two different
entities.
Existence also presupposes distinction as W. E, Johnson has
noted,^ For an entity to exist means that that entity stands out from
other entities,
Ve should be able to tell when, on the same or different
occasions, we are confronted with two distinct entities rather than one.
Does this then mean that where there are different kinds of being,
e.g, classes, propositions, etc., there are also different kinds of iden
tity and distinction?
If Geach's opponents who maintain that identity is
an absolute and unambiguous notion are correct, it does not.
At best it
means that there are different criteria of identity (and distinction) but
only one kind of identity (and distinction).
This identity has the formal
characteristics of the indiscemibility of the relata of the relation, trans

itivity, symmetry, and reflexivity (distinction would have at least the
formal property of the disceznibillty of its relata).
The criteria of identity and distinction will differ far different
kinds of things, and it is not always easy to determine what these criteria
are.
One example is the problem of determining what the criterion of iden
tity would be for intensional objects such as attributes or propositions

should one admit them to an ontology.
The criterion of Identity for
classes, on the other hand, is clear two classes are identical when and
only when every member of one is also a member of the other.
Where a cri
terion of identity is lacking, there is reluctance to admit the kind of

entity in question into an ontology,
47
1
w.E. Johnson, Lo/ac (N.Y.: Dover Publications, 1964), Part I, p. 197,
247
Another controversy concerning criteria of Identity and distinction
is found in some recent discussions concerning the status of properties or
qualities of things.
Are the criteria of identity and distinction for in
dividuals the same as those far properties or qualities of individuals?

That spatial and/or temporal location provides the criteria for individuals
is uncontroversial individuals are identical if and only if they exist at
the same spatial location at the same time.
If, on the other hand, x is
in location P^ at time t and y is in location P2 at time t, then x and y

are distinct individuals.
Now if x and y both have the quality of yellow
ness, is the yellowness of x numerically distinct from, or somehow identical

with, the yellowness of y?
G, F, Stout has maintained that natures, qua
lities, characters, etc, of things are as particular as the things they

characterize!
A character characterizing a concrete thing or individual
is as particular as the thing or individual which it char
acterizes, Of two billiard balls, each has its own par
ticular roundness separate and distinct from that of the
other, just as the billiard balls themselves are distinct
and separate.^
Spatial separation is the criterion of distinction for the two billiard
balls) it is also the criterion of distinction for the properties of these
balls,
G, E, Moore, in "Are the Characteristics of Particular Things Uni
versal or Particular?", has challenged Stout's position by denying that the

criteria of identity and distinction for properties of particulars are the
same as those of or the things themselves!
"Professor Stout must be
assuming that absolutely specific characters can really be 'locally sepa

rate* in the same sense in which 'concrete things' are so, and 'temporally
F, Stout, "The Nature of Universals and Propositions" in Studies
in Philosophy, ed. J, N, Findlay (London: Oxford U. Press, 1966), p, 7.
248
Moore says that
separate* in the same sense In which events are sot .
It is true in a sense that the color of x is locally separate from the color
of y in that xs redness is over there and y's redness is hare.
But as qua
lities only, there is no such distinction between x's color and y*s color.
The colors are identical though locally separate in the sense that one belongs
to a particular which is locally separate from the particular to which the
other belongs.
It is thus possible to say that one and the sane color is
in two places at the sane time, although this cannot be truly said of a
particular.
According to Moore, the criteria for the identity and distinc
tion of particulars or individuals are different from the criteria for the
identity and distinction of properties of particulars.
According to Stout,
the criteria for particulars and properties are the same.

If transitivity, symmetry, reflexivity, and the indiscemibility
of identicals are formal properties of identity, they are not however of
themselves sufficient to determine in a particular case whether we are
dealing with an identity relation or some other relation.
Medieval the
ories of distinction can be regarded as attempts to provide different cri

teria for distinctions (and sometimes incidentally, for identity).
That
is, we can reject the claim that "being rationally the same as (or distinct
from)", "being really the same as (or distinct from)", "being formally the
same as (or distinct from)", express different kinds of identity and dis
tinction irreducible to some absolute identity or distinction.
We can
treat these expressions as divisible into, for example, "being a ratio"

and "being the same as (or distinct from)", "being a thing" and "being the
same as (or distinct from)", etc.
For erven if identity and distinction
^G, E, Moore, "Are the Characteristics of Particular Things Univer

sal or Particular?" in Philosophical Papers (N.Y, * Collier, 1962), p, 26.
249
are absolute and unambiguous notions characterized, by the aforeentioned
formal properties, the criterion for the identity of things may differ from
the criterion for the identity of concepts.
There may even be subdivisions
of this criteria the criterion for the identity of persons may differ from
the criterion for the identity of ships j the criterion for specific identi
ty may differ from the criterion for generic identity.
Differences in the
sorts of things there are may still be reflected, not in different kinds of
identity and distinction, but in different criteria for identity and dis
tinction,
The role of terms like 'rationally, and "really" in the above
formulae would thus serve to identify the referents of the relations and
would not marfc off kinds of identity and distinction.
Acceptance of the traditional formal properties of identity and
distinction means a rejection of some aspects of the medieval theories of
distinction.
There are not different "kinds of identity and distinction,
and what the medievals called by these names might better be called some
thing else.
That numerical identity, for example, which is actually a real
relation between constituents of one supposit, is not identity but perhaps

unity through composition.
Specific and generic identities are not identi
ties obtaining between things, but might be regarded as identities obtaining

between, for example, the nature of one thing and the nature of another
thing.
The conception of identity as a kind of unity appears to be respon
sible for some of the medieval confusions and should be rejected.

The criteria provided by medieval philosophers may still, however,
be of interest.
Such criteria are still of importance to the problem of .
individuation and the problem of universals where the question remains whe
ther there is only one kind of being hence one criterion of Identity and one
criterion of distinction, or whether there are several kinds of being and
several criteria.
APPENDIX
The following appendix contains passages quoted or cited in the
text of the paper together with their English translations. Each pas
sage by an author is given its own number. The same number is cited in
the text of this paper within parentheses, e.g. (Aquinas 12). At the end
of each passage in the appendix the source of the passage is given, e.g.
I Sent., d.2, q.3 Opera Omnia. Wadding ed., vol. VI, p. 481. Abbreviations
used in these citations are as follows*
a.
a
ad 2
article
column a (after a page number)
reply to objection 2
column b (after a page number)
chapter
distinction
folio
number
Part
page
Prologue
question
recto
volume
verso
b
c
d.
fol.
n.
P.
P
Prol.
q
r.
V.
V
The title of a work is given first in the citation, e.g. I Sent, (a list
of abbreviations for such titles appears at the beginning of each section
of the Appendix).
The exact location of the passage follows, e.g. d.2,
q.3. The edition of the work is given next.
In the above example, the
passage is to be found in the Wadding edition of the Opera Omnia, vol. VI,
p. 481. The sample citation above then means that the preceding passage
is from the first book of the Sentences, distinction 2, question 3, in the
Wadding edition of the Opera Omnia, vol. VI, page 481. Roman numerals
before or after abbreviated titles, as in I Sent.. or 1'leta. IV, refer to
books, e.g. first book of Sentences, fourth book of the Metaphysics, etc.
250
251
Capital letters A,B,C, EE, etc. occasionally follow a page number.
These refer to marginal notations given in some early editions of works.
They serve to pinpoint the exact location of a passage on a page.
Unless otherwise indicated, all translations in the Appendix are
my own.
EARLY PHILOSOPHERS
252
TWptlT.LTAN
. . noil tamen divereitate alium Filium a Patre, sed. distribution*; nec

divisions alius, sed distinctions . . . (Liber Adveraua Praxeam. Ch. IX,
Patrologia Latina, ed. Migne, vol. 2, p. 164 S)
The Son is not other than the Father by diversity, how
ever, but by distribution; nor other by division, but
by distinction.
BOETHIUS
Tribus enim modis unumquodque vel differre ab aliquo dicitur, vel alicui
idem esse, id est genere, specie, nunero.
(in Porpfayrium Coaaentarium II.
Patrologia Latina, cd. Migne, vol. 64, p. 96A.)

For anything is either said to differ from something or
to be the same as something in three ways, i.e. by genus,
by species, by number.
GILBERT OF POIREE
Quoties idem, toties diversum dicitur. Idem autem tribus modis. Quare
diversum etiam eisdem tribus, id est, vel genere, vel specie, vel numero
dicitur.
(in Librum de Trlnitate. Pat. Lat.. ed. Higne, vol. 64, p. 1263C)
"Diverse" is taken in as many ways as "the same." "The
same", however, is taken in three ways, whence "diverse"
is also taken in the same three ways, i.e. either by
genus, by species, or by number.
Aliquod opus, et aereum dicitur, et humanum, et triangulum. Sed aereum

atque
Vmnctiim,
in eo quod est, diverse tamen rations. . . . (he Hebdomad
ibus. Pat. Lat.. ed. Migne, vol. 64, p. 1309B)

Some work is called both a brass thing, and human, and
triangular. But brass and human in a subsistent thing
are diverse by ratio.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission
253
PETER ABELARD
Personam itaque hoc loco diversam ab altera dicimus, eo quod diffinitione
ab ea disjungatur, . * , ut videlicet hoc sit hujus proprium quod non sit
illius proprium.
Quae quidem propria superius sunt distincta.
(Theologia
Christiana III. Patrologia Latina, ed. Migne, vol. 178, 1256D)

And so we say in this place that a Person is diverse
from another because it is disjoined from it by defin
ition, . . . so namely that this is a property of
this Person but not a property of that. Which proper
ties are more distinct.
. . . illae tres personae per vocabula distinctae.
(Theol. Christ. IV,
Pat. Lat.. ed. Migne, vol. 178, p. 1261 D)

. . . those three Persons are distinct through their
names.
ESTER DAMIAN
Distinguere quippe compellimur in divinitate personas, . . . (De Fide
Catholica. Ch. V, Pat. Lat.. vol. 145* P 27)
Certainly we are compelled to distinguish the Per
sons in the deity, . . .
PETER LOMBARD
Convenientius tamen tres illae personae proprietatibus tantum distingui
dicuntur, . . . (Sententiarum I. d. 19, in Pat. Lat.. vol. 192, p. 578)
More conveniently, however, are those three Persons said
to be distinguished by properties, . . .
254
HUSH OF S3). VICTOR

. . . in sancta Trinitate aunt quaedam nomina distinguentia personas, aunt
et alia uaitaten naturae vel substantiae significantia, . et haec
nomina significant proprietates quibus personas distinguuntur.
(guam
Tract. I, ch. VI, Pat. Lat.. ed. Migne, vol. 176, p. 53)
. . . in the holy Trinity there are certain names dis
tinguishing the Persons, and there are others signi
fying the unity of the nature or substance, . . . and
these (the formed) names signify the properties by
which the Persons are distinguished.
RICHARD OF ST. VICTOR
. et quilibet eorum per se solus sit a ceteris duobus . . . distincta
propriatate discxetus.
(De Trinitate IV, ch. 9# p. 171)
. . . any of the Persons through itself alone is discrete

from the other two by a distinct property.
AIKXAMBR OF HAIRS
. . . esse indistinctum dicitur secundum substantiam, dietineturn secundum
relationem, . . . (Sumaa Theologies I. Inq. 1, tr. 1, q.3, ch. 1, Quaracchi, vol. I, p. 51 A)
. . [the Persons} are said to be indistinct according
to substance, distinct according to relation, . .
. . . est differentia secundum rem et est differentia secundum intelligentiae rationes. (Ibid* Pars 2- Inq, 2, tr. 2, sec. 1, a.i. a.2, p. 579A)
. . . there is a difference according to thing and there
is a difference according to a ratio of the understanding.
Unde cum dicitur quod 'persona distinguitur a persona', hoc est dicere
quod haec non est ilia.
(ibid.. tr. 3 sec. 1, q. un., p. 672B)
255
Whence when it is said that 'a Person is distinguished

from a Person,' this means that this Person is not
that Person.
ALBERTOS MASWUS
. . . attribuitur . personae . . . distingui ab alia; . . (Sunups
Theologiae I. Trac. 9, q. 39 a.l, part 1, Opera Omnia, vol. 17, p. 219 A)
. . . it is attributed . . . to a Person . . . to be
distinguished from another; . .
Considerate igitur essentia divina in se, omnino indistincta est, persona
vero in se distincta est suis proprietatibus. . . . essentia, substantia,
subsistentia, persona differunt in creatura, re, et nomine: sed in divinis
diffenmt ratione. (Compendii Theolpgjgae Yeri.tatig I, c. XIII, $o*&
Omnia, vol. 13, p. 9 A & B)
When therefore the divine essence is considered in itself,
it is completely indistinct; truly a Person in itself is
distinct by its properties. . . . Essence, substance, sub
sistence, person differ in a creature really and nominal
ly, but in God they differ rationally.
256
St. Thomas Aquinas
Abbreviations of works cited*
De An*
In Aristotelis Librum de An-ima Commentarium. ed.

?irotta, Mariettif 1948
De Bnte
De Bnte et Essentia, ed. Boyer, Rome, 1966
De Mat, Gen.
De Natura Generis
De Pot.
De Potentia Dei
De Prin. Nat.
De Principiis Naturae, ed. Pauson, Louvain
De Quat. Opp.
De Quatuor Oppositis
De ffrin.
Expositio super Librum Boethii de Trinitate. ed.

Decker, Brill, 1965.
De Ver.
Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate
Meta.
In taphyaicam Aristotelis Commentaria. ed.

Cathala, M&rietti, 1935
Perih.
In Libros Peri Hermenias Expositio
Bgftt.
In Octo Libros Phvsicorum Expositio
Post. An.
In Libros Posteriorum Analyticorum Expositio
Quaest. de An.
Quaestiones de Anima
Quaest. Quod.
Quaestiones Quodlibetales. ed. Spiazzi
SCG
Summa
Sent.
In IV Libros Sententiarum. Vives ed.
Spir. Creat.
Tractatua de Spiritualibus Creaturis. ed. Keeler
ST
Summa Theologica- two editions, Migne and Blackfriars
Opera Omnia
two editions: Vives, 1889; Leonis XIII, 1918-
Contra Gentiles. Leon. ed.
Opuscula Philosophica ed. Spiazzi
257
(1)
Sed in ratione distinctionis est negatio; distincta enim sunt quorum unum
non est aliud.
(SCG I, ch. 71* Leon, ed., Opera Omnia, vol. XIII, p. 206a)
But in the notion of distinction there is negation, for
those are distinct one of which is not the other.
(2)
. . . Distinctio aliquorum ab invicem non proprie potest esse nisi vel
propter divisionem materialem seu quantitativam, vel propter divisionem
formalem. Distinctio secundum materialem et quantitativam divisionem invenitur in corporalibus rebus, in quibus ejusdem speciei sunt individua
plura ex eo quod forma speciei in diversis partibus materiae secundum quantitatem divisionis invenitur; . * . Distinctio autem aliquorum habentium unam naturam saltern generis, per divisionem formalem esse non potest nisi
ratione alicujus oppositionis. Unde invenimus quod cujuslibet generis dif
ferentiae sunt oppositae. * . Ubi ergo non est oppositio relative in divinis, non potest esse realis distinctio, . . . Nec potest dici quod ad
talem distinctionem faciendam sufficiat oppositio affirmationi3 et negationis, quia talis oppositio sequitur distinctionem non autem distinctionem
causat, cum existens ab altero distinguatur per aliquid sibi inhaerens substantialiter vel accidentaliter; quod autem hoc non sit hoc, sequitur ex hoc
quod distincta sunt.
Similiter etiam patet quod veritas cujuslibet negati-
vae in existentibus supra veritatem affirmativae fundatur; sicut veritas

hugus negativae: Aethiops non est albus, fundatur supra veritatem hujus affirmativae: Aethiops est niger; et ideo oportet omnem differentiem quae est
per oppositionem affirmationis et negationis, reduci in differentiam ali
cujus affirmativae oppositionis.
(De Pot., q. 10, a.5, Opera Omnia, Vives
ed., vol. XIII, p. 315-516.)
258
A distinction of some things from each other cannot pro
perly be unless either because of a material or quantita
tive division, or because of a formal division. A dis
tinction according to material and quantitative division
is found in corporeal things in which there are many indi
viduals of the same species, on account of which the spe
cific form is found in diverse parts of matter according
to a quantitative division; . . . A distinction, however,
of some things which have one nature at least generically,
cannot be through a formal division except by reason of
some opposition. Whence we find that the differences of
any genus are opposed. . . Therefore, where there is no
relative opposition in God, there cannot be a real distinc
tion, . . Nor can it be said that an opposition of an af
firmation and a negation suffices to make such a distinc
tion, because such an opposition follows on distinction and
does not, however, cause a distinction, since what exists
from another is distinguished through something inhering in
it either substantially or accidentally. However, because
this is not this, it follows from this that they are dis
tinct. Likewise it is also clear that the truth of any
negation in existents is founded upon the truth of an af
firmative, just as the truth of this negative proposition:
"An Ethiopian is not white," is founded upon the truth of
this affirmative: "An Ethiopian i3 black" and, therefore
it is necessary for every difference which is through the
opposition of affirmation and negation to be reduced to a
difference of some opposition of affirmatives.
(3)
Individuum autem est quod est in se indistinctum, ab aliis vero distinctum.
(ST. Ia. q.29, a.4, Migne ed., vol. l)
An individual, however, is what is indistinct in itself and
truly distinct from all others.
(4)
.dicendum
quod differens proprie acceptum aliquo differt; unde ibi
quaeriturdifferentia ubi est convenientia. Et propter hoc oportet differ

entia esse composita quodam modo, cum in aliquo differant, et in aliquo
convenient,
Sed secundum hoc, licet omne differens sit diversum, non tamen
omne diversum est differens, . . Nam simplicia diversa sunt se ipsis;

non autem differunt aliquibus differentiis, ex quibus componantur; sicut
homo et asinus differunt rationali et irrationali differentiis; de quibus
nori est dicere quod alterius aliis differentiis differant.
259
(ST la, q.90,
a.l, ad 3, Migne ed., vol. 1, p. 1364)

It must be said that what differs, properly speaking, dif
fers in something, whence we inquire about differences
where there is agreement. And because of this, it is nec
essary for what are different to be composite in some way
since they differ in something and agree in something else.
But according to this, although all things that differ are
diverse, however not all things that are diverse are dif
ferent, . . . For simple things are diverse of themselves,
not . . . do they differ by some differences from which they
are compounded, as a man and an ass differ by the differ
ences of rationality and irrationality, which is not to say
that they differ further by other differences.
(5)
. . . dicendum quod simplicia non differunt aliquibus aliis differentiis;
hoc enim compositorum est; homo enim et equus differunt rationali et irrationali differentiis; quae quidem differentiae non differunt amplius ab
invicem aliis differentiis; unde . . . non proprie dicuntur differre, sed
diversa esse.
Unde secundum Philosophus 10 Metabh.. diversum absolute
dicitur. sed omne differens aliquo differt. Unde . . . na teria prima et

Deus non differunt, sed sunt diversa se ipsis; unde non sequitur quod sint
idem. (St la. q.3 a.8, ad 3, Migne,ed., vol. I, p. 635)
It must be said that simple things do not differ by sone
other differences, for this is true of composites. For a
man and a horse differ by differences of rationality and
irrationality, which differences indeed do not differ more
from each other by still other differences, whence . .
they are not properly said to differ but to be diverse.
Whence, according to the Philosopher in the 10th book of
the Metaphysics, diversity is taken absolutely, but all
that differ differ by somethxng." Whence . . . prims mat
ter and God do not differ but are diverse of themselves,
whence it does not follow that they are the same thing.
(6)
. ..identitas
est unitas vel unio; aut ex eo quod ilia quae dicuntur idem,
sunt plurasecundum esse, et tamen dicuntur
idem in quantum in aliquo uno
260
conveniunt. Aut quia sunt unum secundum esse, sed intellectus utitur eo
ut pluribus ad hoc quod relationem intelligat.
relatio nisi inter duo extrema*
Nam non potest intelligi
Sicut cum dicitur aliquid esse idem sibi-
ipsi* Tunc enim intellectus utitur eo quod est unum secundum rem ut duobus* Alias eiusdem ad seipsum relationem designare non posset*
Unde pa-
tet quod si relatio semper requirit duo extrema* et in huiusmodi relationibus non sunt duo extrema secundum rem sed secundum intellectum 3olum,
relatio identitatis non erit relatio realis, sed rationistantum, secundum

quod aliquid dicitur idem simpliciter.
Secus autem est, quando aliqua duo
dicuntur esse idem vel genere vel specie.
(Meta* V, lectio 11, n. 912)
. . . sameness is a unity or union, either because those

that are said to be the same are many according to being,
yet the same in so far as they agree in some one respect
or because they are one according to being, but the intel
lect uses this unity as many in order to understand a re
lation. For a relation can only be understood to hold
between two extremes. This is the case when something is
said to be the same as itself, for then the intellect uses
what is really one as two, or it could not designate a re
lation of the same thing to itself. Whence it is clear
that if a relation always requires two extremes, and in
such relations there are not really two extremes but only
rationally two, the relation of identity will not be a
real relation, but only a rational relation, according as
something is said to be simply the same. It is otherwise,
however, when some two are said to be the same either in
genus or in species.
(7)
.
. .dicendum quod nihil prohibet id quod est
uno modo division, esse alio
modo indivisum: sicut quod est divisum numero, est indivisum secundum speciem;
etsic contingit aliquid esse uno modo unum, alio modo multa.
Sed
tamen sisit indivisum simpliciter, vel quia est indivisum secundum id

quod pertinet ad essentiam rei; licet sit divisum quantum ad ea quae sunt
extra essentiam rei, sicut quod est unum subjecto, et multa secundum acci
261
dentia; vel quia est indivisum in actu, et divisum in potentia, sicut
quod est unum toto, et multa secundum partes; hujusmodi erit unum simpli
citer et multa secundum quid. Si vero aliquid e converso sit indivisum
secundum quid, et divisum simpliciter, utpote quia est divisum secundum
essentiam, et indivisum secundum rationem, vel secundum principium, sive
causam; erunt multa simpliciter, et unum secundum quid; ut quae sunt mul
ta numero, et unum specie, vel unum principio.
Sic igitur ens dividitur
per unum et multa, quasi per unum simpliciter, et multa secundum quid,
Nam et ipsa multitudo non contineretur sub ente, nisi contineretur aliquo
modo sub uno.
(ST la. q.ll, a.l, ad 2, lyligne ea., vol. 1, p. 679)

It must be said that nothing prohibites that which is
divided in one way from being undivided in another way,
just as what is numerically divided is specifically un
divided. And so it happens that something is one in one
way, many in another way. But, however, if it be simply
undivided, this is either because it is undivided accord
ing to what belongs to the essence of the thing (although
it is divided according to what lie outside the essence
of the thing, just as that which is one in subject, and
many according to its accidents), or because it is undi
vided in act, and divided in potency, as what is one as
a whole and many according to its parts. Such will be
one simply and many after a fashion. If truly something
is conversely undivided after a fashion, and simply di
vided, in so far as it is divided according to its es
sence and lationally undivided, or undivided according
to principle or cause, they will be many simply and one
after a fashion, as what are numerically many and speci
fically one or one by principle. Thus, therefore, being
is divided through one and many as if through one simply
and many after a fashion. For a multitude itself would
not be contained under being unless it were contained in
some way under unity,
(8)
* . . relatio quae importatur per hoc nomen idem est relatio rationis
tantum,
si accipiatur simpliciter idem quia hujusmodi relatio non potest
consistere nisi
in quodem ordine quem ratio adinvenitalicujus adseipsam
262
secundum aliquas ejus duas considerations.
Secus autem est cum dicuntur
aliqua eadem esse, non in numero, sed in natura generis sive speciei,
(ST la, q.28, a.l, ad 2, Migne ed,, vol. I, p. 858)
The relation which is implied by this word "same" is only
a relation of reason, if we mean simply the same, because
such a relation can only consist in a certain order which
reason devises of something to itself, according to some
two considerations of it. It is otherwise, however, when
some extremes are said to be the same, not numerically,
but in the nature of a genus or a species.
(9)
Dicitur autem aliquid simpliciter idem, non secundum seipsum, sed per re
lationem ad aliquid quod est alterum: vel rations aut nomine tantum, si
cut si Marcum dicamus idem Tullio vel vestem indumento: aut est alterum
secundum rem, sicut si dicamus "Socrates Platoni est idem specie et equus
bovi est idem genere." (De Divinis Nominibus XI. n.911, Vives ed., vol.
XXIX)
Something, however, is said to be simply the same, not ac
cording to itself, but through a relation to something
which is either rationally or only nominally other tnan it,
just as if we say Marcus is the same as Tully, or clothing
is the same as garments. Or it is really other, as if we
said "Socrates is specifically the same as Plato" and
"A horse is generically the same as a cow."
(10)
Si enim materia hujus distinguitur a materia illius, necesse est quod vel
forma sit principium distinctions materiae, ut scilicet materiae sint
diversae propter habitudinem ad diversas formas; . . . vel materia erit
principium distinctions formarum.
Nee potest dici materia haec alia ab
ilia nsi secundum distinctionem quantitativam, quae non habet locum in

substantiis incorporeis, cujusmodi sunt Angelus et anima.
(ST la, q.75,
a. 7, Migne ed., vol. I, p. 1210)
265
For if the matterof this is distinguished from the matter
of that, it is necessary either that form be the principle
of the distinction of matter (namely so that matters are
diverse because of their relations to diverse forms) . . .
or that matter be the principle of the distinction of forms.
Nor can this matter be said to be different from that ex
cept according to a quantitative distinction which has no
place in incorporeal substances such as an angel and a soul.
(11)
Manifestum est autem quod natura communis distinguitur, et multiplicatur
secundum principia individuantia, quae sunt ex parte materiae.
(ST la,
q. 76, a.2, ad 5, Migne, vol. I, p. 1218)

It is clear, however, that the common nature is distin
guished and multiplied according to individuating princi
ples which come from the part of matter.
(12)
Ponit aliam divisionem.unius, quae est magis logica; dicens, quod quaedam
sunt unum numero, quaedam specie, quaedam genere, quaedam analogia. Numero quidem sunt unum, quorum materia est una. Materia enim secundum quod
stat sub dimensionibus signatis, est principium individuationis formae.
Et propter hoc ex materia habet singulare quod sit unum numero ab aliis di
visum. Specie autem dicuntur unum, quorum una est "ratio" idest definitio.
Nam nihil proprie definitur nisi species, cum omnis definitio .ex genere et
differentia constet.
Unum vero genere sunt, quae conveniunt in figura "praedicationis," ide3t
quae habent unum modum praedicandi.
. . . semper posterius sequitur ad praecedens et non convertitur.
(Meta.
V, lectio 8, nn. 876-878,880)

He makes another division of unity which is more logical,
saying that certain things are numerically one, some are
specifically one, some generically one, some one by analo
gy. They are indeed one numerically whose matter is one.
For matter, according as it stands under signate dimensions,
is the principle of the individuation of form. And be
264
cause of this, a singular is numerically one and divided
from other singulars because of its matter.
Those are called specifically one, however, whose "ratio."
i.e. definition, is one. For nothing is properly defined
except the species, since every definition consists of a
genus and a difference.
Those are t ruly one in genus which agree in a figure of
"predication," that is, which have one way of predicating,
. . . the posterior ways of being one always follow the
preceding ways, and not conversely.
(15)
. . . dicendum quod sub aliquo communi est aliquid dupliciter:
uno modo
sicut individuum sub specie, alio modo sicut species sub genere.
Quando-
cumque igitur sub una communi specie sunt multa individua, distinctio
multorum individuorum est per materiam individualem, quae est praeter
naturam specie; et hoc in rebus creatis. Quando vero sunt multae species
sub vino genere, non oportet quod rormae quibus distinguuntur species ad
invicem, 3int aliud secundum rem a forma communi generis. Per unam enim
et eandem formam hoc individuum collocatur in genere substantiae, et in
genere corporis, et sic usque ad specialissimam species.
(Spir. Creat..
a.l, ad 9, p. 15)
It must be said that something is under some
common
in two ways; in one way just as an individual is under
a species, in another way as a species is under a genus.
Whenever, therefore, there are many individuals under
one common species, the distinction of many individuals
is through individual matter which is outside the nature
of the species. And this is so in created things. When
truly there are many species under one genus, it is not
necessary that the forms by which the Bpecies are dis
tinguished from each other be really different from the
form of their common genus. For through one and the same
form this individual is placed in the genus of substance,
and in the genus of body, and so all the way to the most
special species.
265
(14)
Distinctio autem materiae a materia non invenitur nisi duplex*
Una
secundum propriam rationem materiae, et haec est secundum habitudinem ad

diversos actus: cum enim materia secundum propriam rationem sit in potentia,potentiaautem ad actum dicatur, necesse
actuum,attendatur distinctio in
est quod secundum ordinem
potentiis et materiis. Et hoc modo ma
teria inferiorum corporum, quae est potentia ad esse, differt a materia

caelestium corporum, quae est potentia ad ubi.
Secunda autem distinctio
materiae est secundum divisionem quantitatis, prout materia existens sub

his dimensionibus distinguitur ab ea quae est sub aliis dimensionibus*
Et prima quidam materiae distinctio facit diversitatem secundum genus.
. . . Secunda autem distinctio materiae facit diversitatem individuorum
in eadem specie,
(ibid.. a.8, p. 93)
A distinction, however, of matter from natter is found in

only two ways: one according to the proper notion of mat
ter, and this is according to a relation to diverse acts,
for since matter according to its proper notion is in
potency, however potency is related to act, so it is
necessary that a distinction in potencies and matters be
understood according to the order of the acts. And in
this way the matter of inferior bodies, which is in po
tency to existence, differs from the matter of celestial
bodies, which is in potency to place. The second dis
tinction of matter, however, is according to the division
of quantity, according as natter existing under these di
mensions is distinguished from that which is under other
dimensions. And indeed the first distinction of matter
makes for generic diversity. . . . However, the second
distinction of matter makes for diversity of individuals
in the same species.
(15)
. . . differentia formae, quae non provenit nisi ex diversa dispositions
materiae, non facit diversitatem secundum speciem, sed solum secundum
numerum.
Sunt cnim diversorum individuorum diversae formae secundum ma-
266
teriam diversificatae.
(ST la, q.85 a.7, ad 3# Migne ed., vol. I, p.1330)
The difference of forms, which only results from differ

ent dispositions of matter, does not make a specific
diversity, but only a numerical diversity. For there are
diverse forms of diverse individuals diversified accord
ing to matter.
(16)
. . . formae quae sunt receptibiles in materia, individuantur per materiam, quae non potest esse in alio, cum sit primum subjectum substans:
forma vero, quantum est de se, nisi aliquid aliud impediat, recipi potest
a pluribus.
Sed ilia forma quae non est receptibilis in materia, sed est
per se subsistens, ex hoc ipso individuatur, quod non potest recipi in

alio: et hujusmodi forma est Deus.
(ST la. q.3, a.2, ad 3 Migne ed.,
vol. I, p. 627)
Forms which are capable of being received in matter are
individuated through matter which cannot be in another,
since it should be the first supporting subject. Truly
form in itself, unless something else prevents, can be
received by many individuals. But that form which is
not receivable in matter but is -per se subsistent, is
individuated from this only, that it cannot be received
in another. And God is such a form.
(17)
Est . . . de ratione individui quod non possit in pluribus esse . . .
individuationis principium est quantitas dimensiva. Ex hoc enim aliquid
est natum esse in uno solo* quod illud est in se indivisum et divisum
ab omnibusaliis.
.
.. (STIII,
Divisio autem
accidit substantiae ratione quantitatis,
q. 77, a.2, Migne ed., vol. Il)

It is . . . of the notion of an individual that it not be
able to be in many . . . the principle of individuation
is dimensive quantity. For from this something is suited
to be in only one thing, because it is undivided in itself
and divided from all others. Division, however, occurs
by reason of quantity, . .
267
(20)
. * . essentiae rerum compositarum ex eo quod recipiuntur in materia designata multiplicantur secundum divisionem eius, unde contingit quod aliquae sint idem specie et diverse numero.
Sed cum essentia simplicis non
sit recepta in materia, non potest ibi esse talis multiplicatio; et ideo
oportet ut non inveniantur in illis substantiis plura inclividua eiusdem
speciei, sed quotquot sunt ibi individua, tot sunt species, . . . (De
Bnte. ch. 5, Boyer ed., p. 38)
The essences of composite things, since they are received
in designated matter, are multiplied according to its
division. Whence it happens that some things are speci
fically the same and diverse numerically. But since the
essence of a simple thing is not received in matter, such
multiplication cannot be there, and therefore it is
necessary that there not be found in those substances
many individuals of the same species, but as many indi
viduals as there are, so many are the species, . . .
(21)
Duplex enim distinctio invenitur in rebuss una formalis, in his quae differunt specie; alia vero materialis, in his quae differunt numero tantum.
Cum autem materia sit propter formam, distinctio materialis est propter
formalem.
Unde videmus quod in rebus incorruptibilibus non est nisi unum
individuum unius speciei, quia species sufficienter conservatur in uno;

in generabilibus autem et corruptibilibus, sunt multa individua unius
speciei. . . . Distinctio autem formalis semper requirit inaequalitatem,
quia, . . . formae rerum sunt sicut numeri.
(ST la, q. 47, a.2, Black-
friars ed., vol. VIII, p. 98)

A twofold distinction is found in things, one is a formal
distinction among things differing in species, the other
is truly a material distinction in those that differ only
numerically. Since matter exists because of form, how
ever, a material distinction exists on account of a for-
268
mal distinction. Whence we see that in incorruptible
beings there is only one individual of one species,
because a species is sufficiently conserved in one be
ing. In generable and corruptible beings, however,
there are many individuals of one species. . . . A for
mal distinction, however, always requires inequality
because . . . the forms of things are like numbers.
(22)
Principium diversitatis individuorum eiusdem speciei est divisio materiae
secundum quantitatem. . . . (SCG II, ch. 49, Opera Omnia. Leon, ed., vol.
XIII)
The principle of diversity of individuals of the same
species is the division of matter according to quantity.
(23)
Reapondeo dicendum quod nomen proprium cujuslibet personae significat id
per quod ilia persona distinguitur ab omnibus aliis. Sicut enim de ratione
hominis est gnima et corpus, ita de intellectu huius hominis est haec
anima
et hoc corpus . . . his autem hie homo ab omnibus aliis distingui
tur. Id autem per quod distinguitur persona Patris ab omnibus aliis, est
patemitas.
(ST la. q. 33 a.2, Migne ed., vol. I, p. 897)

I answer, that it must be said that the proper name of
any person signifies that through which that person is
distinguished from all others. For just as soul and
body belong to the notion 'man,1 so this soul and this
body belong to the notion of this man . . . this man
is distinguished from all others, however, by these.
That, however, through which the Person of the Father
is distinguished from all others is paternity.
(24)
Dicuntur enim aliqua diversa specie, quorum species sint plures, sicut
asinus et bos. Quaedam vero dicuntur diversa numero, quia differunt
secundum materiam, sicut duo individua unius speciei.
Quaedam vero di
cuntur diversa secundum "rationem substantiae," idest definitionem de-
269
clarantem substantiam rei. Contingit enim quaedam esse idem numero, sci
licet subjecti, sed diversa ratione, sicut Socrates et hoc album.
Et propter hoc, quod modis dicitur idem, tot modis diversum. . . .
Diversitas enim generis includitur in diversitate speciei. . . . aliquid
proprie dicitur differens secundum quod aliqua duo quae sunt "aliquid idem
entia," idest in aliquo uno convenientia, sunt diversae: sive convenient
in aliquo uno secundum numerum, sicut Socrates sedens a Socrate non sedente:
sive conveniant in aliquo uno specie, sicut Socrates et Plato in homine:
sive in aliquo uno genere, sicut homo et asinus in animali* sive in ali
quo secundum proportionem, sicut quantitas et qualitas in ente. Ex quo
patet, quod differens omne est diversum, sed non convertitur. Nam ilia
diversa, quae in nullo conveniunt, non possunt proprie dici differentia,
quia non differunt aliquo alio, sed seipsis. Differens autem dicitur,
quod aliquo alio differt. Secundum modus est prout differens communiter
sumitur pro diverso, et sic differentia dicuntur etiam ilia, quae habent
diversum genus, et in nullo communicant.
. . .ea vero, quae conveniunt in specie, non distinguuntur nisi per accidentales differentias, ut Socrates albus vel justus, Plato niger vel musicus; quae vero conveniunt in genere et sunt diversa secundum speciem, dif
ferunt differentiis substantialibus: . . . (Meta. V, lect. 12, nn.913-917,
Cathala)
For some are said to be diverse whose species are many, as
an ass and a cow. Some truly are said to be numerically
diverse because they differ according to matter, such as
two individuals of one species. Some truly are called di
verse according to "the notion of substance," i.e. the
definition declaring the substance of a thing. For it
happens that some are numerically the same, namely in a
subject, but rationally diverse, such as Socrates and
270
this white thing*

And because of this, there are as many ways of being di
verse as ways of being the same. . . . something is pro
perly said to be different according as some two beings
which are Mthe same in some way,1* i.e. agree in something,
are diverse. Either they agree in something numerically,
as Socrates sitting and Socrates not sitting, or they
agree in some one species, as Socrates and Plato agree in
the species man, or they agree in some one genus, as a man
and a donkey agree in the genus animal, or they agree in
something according to proportion, as quantity and quality
agree in being. Prom which it is clear that everything
different is diverse, but not conversely. For what are
diverse agree in nothing, and cannot properly be called
different because they do not differ in something else,
but differ of themselves. That is called different, how
ever, which differs by something else. In the second
way, "different" is commonly used for "diverse," so even
those are said to be different which have diverse genera
and share in nothing.
. . . truly those which agree in a species are not distin
guished except through accidental differences, just as
Socrates who is white or just and Plato who is black or
musical. Those which truly agree in a genus yet are spe
cifically diverse differ by substantial differences. . . .
(25)
Nam natura speciei individuatur per materiam:unde principia individuantia
et accidentia individui sunt praeter essentiam speciei. Et ideo contin
git sub una specie.; inveniri plura individua: quae licet non differunt in
natura speciei, differunt tamen secundum principia individuantia. Et
propter hoc in omnibus habentibus formam in materia, non est omnino idem,
et res et quod quid est eius. . . . In his vero quae non habent formam in
materia, sicut sunt formae simplices, nihil potest esse praeter essentiam
speciei; quia ipsa forma est tota essentia. Et ideo in talibus non possunt
esse plura individua unius speciei, nec potest in eis differre res et quod
quid est eius.
(De An. Ill, lectio 8, n. 706, ed. Pirotta)

For the nature of the species is individuated through mat
ter, whence the individuating principles and accidents of
the individual are outside the essence of the species. And,
therefore, many individuals which, although they don't dif-
271
fer in their specific natures, differ, however, according

to individuating principles, happen to be found under one
species. And because of this, in all beings that have
their forms in matter, a thing and its essence, are not
entirely the same. . . . In these truly, which do not have
their forms in matter, e.g. simple forms, nothing can be
outside the essence of the species, because the form it
self is the whole essence. And, therefore, in such beings
there cannot be many individuals of one species, nor can
a. thing and its essence differ in them.
(26)
Quaedam enim sunt idem numero sicut Socrates et hie homo, demonstrato
Socrate.
Quaedam sunt diversa numero, sed idem in specie, sicut Socrates
et Plato, qui,licet conveniant in specie humana, differunt

Quaedamautemdifferunt
tamen numero.
specie, sed sunt idem genere; sicut homo et asi-
nus conveniunt in genere animalis.
Quaedam autem sunt diverse in genere,
sed sunt idem solum secundum analogiam; sicut substantia et quantitas,. . .

Eorum igitur quae sunt idem numero, sicut Tullii et Ciceronis, Eorum
autem quae sunt idem specie, sed diversa numero, etiam materia et forma non
est eadem numero sed specie, sicut Socratis et Platonis. Et similiter
eorum quae conveniunt secundum analogiam tantum, principia sunt eadem
secundum analogiam tantum, sive proportionem.
(be Prin. Mat., ch. 6,
ed. Pauson, pp. 101-104)

For some things are numerically the same, such as Socrates
and this man (pointing to Socrates). Some things are nu
merically diverse but specifically the same, such as So
crates and Plato who, although they agree in the human
species, differ, however, numerically. Some things, how
ever, differ specifically but are generically the same,
such as a man and an ass which agree in the genus animal.
Some things, however, are generically diverse but are
the same only analogically, such as substance and quanti
ty , .
Therefore, those are numerically the same such as Tully
and Cicero. However, even the matter and the form of those
that are specifically the same but numerically diverse
are not numerically but specifically the same, such as
Socrates, and Plato. And likewise those that are gener-
272
ically the same have principles which are generically the
same, such as the soul and body of a horse and the soul
and body of a donkey which differ specifically but are
generically the same. And likewise, the principles of
those that agree only according to analogy are the same
only according to analogy or proportion*
(27)
. ..dicendum quod in quibuscumque pluribus invenitur aliquid commune,
oportetquaerere aliquid distinctivum.
Unde
cum tres personae conveni
ent secundum essentiae unitatem, necesse est quaerere aliquid quo distinguantur, ad hoc quod plures sint. . . . ad hoc quod aliqua duo distincta intelligantur, necesse est eorum diatinctionem intelligi per aliquid
intrinsecum utrique, sicut in rebus creatis, vel per materiam, vel per
formam. . . . Unde cum in essentia conveniant, relinquitur quod per relationes personae ab invicem distinguantur.
Secundo quia distinctio in di-
vinis personis non est sic intelligenda, quasi aliquid commune dividatur,
quia essentia communis remanet indivisa; eed oportet quod ipsa distinguentia constituent res distinctas.
(ST la, q. 40, a.2, Migne ed., vol. I,
pp. 949-949)
It must be said that, wherever there is something common
to many things, something distinctive must be sought.
Whence, since the three divine Persons agree according to
the unity of the divine essence, it is necessaiy to in
quire by what they are distinguished so as to be many.
. . . For two beings to be understood as distinct, it is
necessary for their distinction to be understood through
something intrinsic to each, as in created things either
through matter or through form. . . . Whence, since they
agree in the divine essence, the Persons must be distin
guished from one another through their relations. Second
ly, because a distinction in the divine Persons must not
be understood in such a way that something common is di
vided, because the common essence remains undivided; but
it is necessary that those distinguishing factors consti
tute distinct things.
(28)
In rebus enim, remota materiali diatinctione, . . . non inveniuntur aliqua
273
distingui nisi per aliquam oppositionem. . . . Oportet . . . huiusmodi
distinctionem per aliquam oppositionem fieri. Non autem oppositions af
firmstionis et negationist quia sic distinguitur entia a non entibus.
(SCG IV, ch. 24, Opera Omnia. Leon. ed., vol. XV, p. 9l)
For in things removed from material distinction. . . .
none are found to be distinguished except through some
opposition. . . . '"[in divine Person^} it is necessary
. . that such a distinction be made through some opp
osition, not, however, by opposition of affirmation and
negation because in this way beings are distinguished
from non-beings.
(29)
Quaecumque conveniunt in aliquo communi, si distinguantur ad invicem,
oportet quod distinguantur secundum aliquas differentias per se, et non
per accidens, pertinentes ad illud communes sicut homo et equus conveni
unt in animali. et distinguuntur ab invicem, non per album et nigrum,
quae se habent per accidens ad animal, sed per rationale et irrationals,
quae per se ad animal pertinent; quia, cum animal sit quod habet animam,
oportet quod hoc distinguatur per hoc quod est habere animam talem vel
talem, utputa rationalem vel irrationalem.
wanifestum est autem quod
Filius et Spiritus Sanctus conveniunt in hoc quod est esse ab alio, quia
uterque est a Patre: . . . (ibid.. p. 92)
Whatever agree in something common, if they are distin
guished from each other, must be distinguished accord
ing to some e ssential, and not accidental, differences
belonging to what is common, just as a man and a horse
agree in the genus animal, but are distinguished from
each other, not through white and black which are acci
dentally related to the genus animal, but through
rationality and irrationality which belong essentially
to the genus animal. Because, since an animal is what
has a soul, it is necessary that it be distinguished
through having such or such kind of soul, e.g. a ratio
nal or an irrational soul. It is clear, however, that the
Son and the Holy Spirit agree in this, which is being
from another, because both come from the Father. . . .
274
(30)
Ex hoc autem quod in Deo est essentiae unitas et relationum distinction
manifestum fit quod nihil prohibet in uno Deo opposita quaedam inveniris
ilia dumtaxat opposita quae relationis distinctionem consequuntur, ut
generans et genitus. quae opponuntur ut affirmatio et negatio.
Ubicumque
enim est aliqua distinctio, oportet inveniri negationis et affirmationis

oppositionem*
Quae enim secundum nullam affirmationem et negationem dif
ferunt, penitus indistinctae sunt: oportet enim quod quantum ad omnia unum
esset quod et alterum, et sic essent penitus idem, et nullo modo distincta.
(SCG IV, ch. 14, Opera Omnia. Leon, ed., vol. XV, p. 58)
However from this, that in God there is unity of essence
and distinction of relations, it should be made clear that
nothing prohibits certain opposites from being found in
God, at least those opposites which follow a distinction of
relations such as generating and generated which are rela
tively opposed, and being generated and being ungenerated
which are opposed as an affirmation and a negation. Whereever there is some distinction, some opposition of a nega
tion and an affirmation must be found. For what differ ac
cording to no affirmation and negation are wholly indis
tinct, because it is necessary that in regard to everything
one would be as the other, and thus they would be wholly
the same and in no way distinct.
(31)
Quae enim nullam oppositionem habent ad invicem, simul esse possunt in
eodem, unde per ea distinctio causari non potest: album enim et triangulare, licet diversa sint, quia tamen non opponuntur, in eodem esse dontingit.
(SCG IV, ch. 14, Opera Omnia, i^son. ed., vol. XV, p. 9l)
For what have no opposition to each other can be together
in the same thing, whence a distinction cannot be caused
through them. Thus 'white' and 'triangular,' although
they are diverse, still, because they are not opposed to
each other, can be in the same thing.
275
(32)
. . proprietates absolutae in divinia, ut bonitas et sapientia, non op*

ponuntur ad invicem; unde neque realiter distinguuntur.
Quamvis ergo
eis conveniat subsiatere, non tamen sunt plures res subsistentes,
quod est
esse plurespersonas. Proprietates autem absolutae in rebus creatis non

subsistunt, licet realiter ab invicem distinguantur. ut albedo et dulcedo.
Sed proprietates relativae in Deo et subsistunt et realiter ab invicem
distinguuntur, . . . Unde pluralitas talium proprietatum sufficit ad pluralitatem personarum in divinis.
(ST la. q. 30, a.l, Blackfriars ed.,
vol. VI, p. 66)

Absolute properties in God, such as goodness and wisdom,
are not opposed to each other, whence they are not really
distinguished from each other. Therefore, although sub
sistence agrees with them, they are not, however, many
subsistent things for such is to be many Persons. Ab
solute properties, however, in created things do not sub
sist, although they are really distinguished from each
other, just as whiteness and sweetness. But relative pro
perties in God both subsist and are really distinguished
from each other. . . . Whence a plurality of such pro
perties suffices to make a plurality of Persons in God.
(33)
Opposita enim secundum quodcumque oppositionis genus impossibile est simul
existere.
Quod quidem contingit ex hoc, quod alterum oppositorum de sui
ratione habet negationem alterius.
Sicut de ratione caeci est quod sit
non videns. Et de ratione nigri, quod non sit album. Et similiter de

ratione filii est quod non sit pater ejus cujus e3t filius.
(ftleta. X,
lectio 6, n. 2041, Cathala ed.)

It is impossible for opposites of any kind o? opposition
to exist together. This happens because one of the op
posites ha3 the negation of the other in its notion,
just as not-seeing is of the notion of blindness, and
not being white is of the notion of blackness, and like
wise it is of the notion of a son that he not be the
276
father of that person of whom .he is the son.
(34)
Nam negatio vel privatio non est ens naturae, sed rationis, . . . (Meta. IV,
lectio 4* Cathala ed., n. 560)
For a negation or a privation is not a being of nature
but a being of reason.
(35)
Aliquid enim contraponitur alteri vel opponitur aut ratione dependentiae,
qua dependet ab ipso, et sic sunt opposita relative.
nis, quid scilicet unum removet alterum.
Aut ratione remotio-
Quod quidem contingit triplici-
ter. Aut enim totaliter removet nihil relinquens, et sic est negatio.
Aut relinquit subiectum solum, et sic est privatio. Aut relinquit subiectum et genus, et sic est contrarium.
(Meta. V, lectio 12, n. 922,
Cathala)
Something is contraposed to another or opposed to it
either by reason of dependence by which it depends on it,
and so they are relative opposites, or by reason of re
moval, because namely, one removes the other, which in
deed happens in three ways. For either it removes it
totally, leaving nothing, and thus this opposition is
negation; or it removes only the subject, and thus it is
privation; or it removes the subject and the genus, and
thus this opposition is contrariety.
(36)
. . oppositae propositiones non verificantur de eodem secundum unum et
idem tempus. Et per consequens ex hoc patet, quod neque etiam contrarie
possunt simul verificari de eodem. Et hoc ideo, quia omnis contrarietas
dicitur secundum privationem, semper enim alterum contrariorum est pri
vatio. Et hoc palam est, si quis velit rationes contrariorum removere
ad primum principium.
De ratione enim nigri est privatio albi.
Cum
igitur privatio sit quaedam negatio habens subiectum determinatum, mani-
277
festum est, quod si contraria de eodem verificarentur, oporteret quod
affirmatio et negatio simul verificarentur de eodem.
(Meta. XI, lectio
6, n. 224-3, ed. Cathala)

Opposite propositions are not true of the same thing at
one and the same time. And consequently it is clear from
this that contraries cannot be verified at once of the
same thing. And this is so because all contrariety is
understood according to privation, for one of the contrar
ies is always a privation. And this is evident if one
wants to reduce the notions of contraries to a first
principle. For the privation of white belongs to the
notion of black. Since therefore a privation is a cer
tain negation having a determinate subject, it is clear
that if contraries were true of the same thing, it would
be necessary for an affirmation and a negation together
to be true of the same thing.
(37)
. . . incontradictione, quae est principium oppositionis, .
d.5., q.l,
.. (I Sent..
a. 1, ad 1, Vives ed., vol. VIl)

. . . in contradition, which is the principle of oppo
sition, . . .
(38)
. . . quod auaedam semper componuntur, et impossibile est ea dividi; sicut

animae rationali coniungitur natura sensitiva semper, et impossibile est
quod dividatur ab ea, ita scilicet quod anima rationalis sit sine virtute
sentiendi,licet e converso posset esse anima sensitiva sine ratione.
Quaedam vero sunt divisa, et impossibile est ea componi, sicut nigrum albo,
et formam asini homini.
Quaedam vero se habent ad contraria, quia possunt
componi et dividi, sicut homo albus, et etiaa currens.
(Meta. IX, lectio
11, n. 1899)
. . . that certain things are always joined together, and
it is impossible for them to be divided, just as a sensi
tive nature is always conjoined to a rational soul and it
is impossible for it to be divided from that so that the
rational soul should lack the power of sensing (although
278
conversely the sensitive soul can be without the rational).
Certain things are truly divided and it is impossible for
them to be joined, e.g. black and white and the form of a
man and a donkey. Certain things truly are related to con
traries because they can be joined together and divided,
e.g. man, white, and also running.
(59)
. . . there can be no medium between substance and acci
dent; for they are contradistinguished by affirmation and
negation, viz. according to being in a subject, and not
being in a subject. (ST la, q. 78, a.l, ad 5, Blackfriars
ed, their translation, vol. Xl)
(40)
Ratio enim quam significat nomen, est conceptio intellectus de re significata per nomen.
(ST la, q. 13, a.4, Migne ed., vol. I, p. 710)

For the ratio which a name signifies is the conception of
the intellect of the thing signified by the name.
(41)
Intellectus, per speciem rei formatus, intelligendo format in seipso quamdam intentionem rei intellectae, quae est ratio ipsius, quam significat
diffinitio . . . (SCG I, ch. 55* Leon, ed., vol. XIII)
The antellect, formed through the species of a thing, in
understanding forms in itself a certain intentio of the
thing which is understood, and this is the ratio of the
thing which a definition signifies.
(42)
Aliquando enim hoc quod intellectus concipit, est similitudo rei existentis extra animam, sicut hoc quod concipitur de hoc nomine ',homo; et talis
conceptio intellectus habet fundamenturn in re immediate, inquantum res
ipsa, ex sua conformitate ad intellectum, facit quod intellectus sit verus,
et quod nomen significans ilium intellectum proprie de re dicatur.
Aliquando autem hoc quod significat nomen non est similtudo rei existentis
extra animam, sed est aliquid quod cansequitpr ex modo intelligendi rem
279
quae estextra animam;et hujusmodi sunt intentiones quas
intellectus
nosteradinvenit . . . Ratio dicitur esse in re, inquantum significatum

nominis, cui accidit esse rationem, est in re; et hoc contingit proprie
quando conceptio intellectus est similitudo rei.
(I Sent.. d.2, q.l,
a.3, Vives ed., Opera Qmnia, vol. VII, p. 37)

For sometimes this that the intellect conceives is a like
ness of a thing existing outside the soul, such as this
that is conceived with regard to this noun "man." And
such a conception of the intellect has an immediate foun
dation in a thing inasmuch as the thing itself, from its
conformity with the intellect, makes the intellect true,
and then that noun signifying that concept is properly
applied to a thing.
Sometimes, however, this that a noun signifies is not the
likeness of a thing existing outside the soul, but is
something which follows from the way of understanding a
thing which is outside the soul, and such are intentiones
which our intellect devises . . . a ratio is said to be
in a thing inasmuch as the significate of a word, which
happens to be the ratio, is in a thing. And this happens
properly when a concept of the intellect is the likeness
of a thing.
(43)
. . . ratio, prout hie sumitur, nihil aliud est quam id quod apprehendit
intellectus de significatione alicujus nominis; et hoc in his quae habent
definitionem, est ipsa rei definitio, , . . Nec tamen hoc nomen "ratio"
significat ipsam conceptionem, quia hoc significatur per nomen rei; sed
significat intentionem hujus conceptionis, sicut ex hoc nomen "definitio"
et alia nomina secundae impositionis. Ratio . . . dicitur esse in re in
quantum in re extra animam est aliquid quod respondet conception! animae,
sicut significatum signe.
(ibid.. pp. 36-37)
. . . A ratio, according as it is understood here, is

nothing but what the understanding apprehends concerning
the meaning of some word, and this is the definition it
self of a thing in those that have definitions. . . . Nor
. . does this word "ratio" signify a concept itself, be
cause a concept is -signified through the name of a thing*
280
But it signifies the intentio .of this concept, as does
this name "definition," or other words of second im
position. A ratio . . . is said to be in a thing inso
far as there is something in a thing outside the soul
that answers to the concept of the soul as a significate
corresponds to its sign.
(44)
Ex hoc quod intellectus in seipsum reflectitur, sicut intelligit res existens extra animam, ita intelligit eas esse intellectas; et sic sicut
est quaedam conceptio intellectus vel ratio, cui respondet res ipsa quae
e3t extra animam; ita est quaedam conceptio vel ratio, cui respondet res
intellects secundum quod hujusmodi; sicut rationi hominis vel conceptioni
hominis respondet res extra animam; rationi vero vel conceptioni generis
aut speciei, respondet solum res intellects.(l)e Pot., q. 7,
Omnia.
a,6, Opera
Vives ed., vol. XIII, p. 230)

From this, that the intellect is reflected on itself, just
as it understands things existing outside the soul, so it
understands them to be understood. And so, just as there
is a certain conception or ratio of the intellect to which
a thing itself which is outside the soul corresponds, so
there is a certain conception or ratio to which a thing as
understood corresponds. Just as there corresponds a thing
outside the soul to the ratio or conception 'man,' so only
a thing as understood corresponds to the ratio or concep
tion genus* or'species.'
(45)
. . . intellectui respondet aliquid in re dupliciter.
Uno modo immediate,
quando videlicet intellectus concipit formam rei alicujus extra animam

existentis, ut hominis vel lapidis. Alio modo mediate, quando videlicet
aliquid sequitur actum intelligendi, et intellectus reflexus supra ipsum
considerat illud.
Unde res respondet illi considerationi intellectus
mediate id est mediante intelligentia reis verbi gratia, intellectus in

telligit naturam animalis in homine, in equo, et multis aliis speciebus;
281
ex hoc sequitur quod intelligit earn ut genu3. Huic intellectui quo intel
lectus intelligit genus, non respondet aliqua res extra immediate quae sit
genus; sed intelligentiae, ex qua consequitur esta intentio, respondet
aliqua res.
(De Pot., q.l, a.2, ad 10, upera Omnia. Vives ed., vol. XIII,
P 4)
Something real corresponds to the understanding in two ways.
In one way immediately when, namely, the intellect con
ceives the form of some thing existing outside the soul, such
as a man or a stone. In another way mediately when, namely,
something follows an act of the understanding and the in
tellect reflected on itself considers that. Whence a thing
corresponds to that consideration of the intellect mediately,
that is by means of an understaning of the thing, e.g. the
intellect understands the animal nature in a man, a horse,
and in many other species. Prom this it follows that it
understands it as a genus. Something outside the soul does
not correspond immediately to this concept by which the
intellect understands the genus there is nothing outside
the soul which is the genus. But something does correspond
to the concept from which this intentio follows.
(46)
. . . voces sunt signa intellectuum, et intellectus sunt rerum similitudines; et sic patet quod voces referuntur ad res significandas mediante
conceptione intellectus.
Secundum igitur quod aliquid a nobis intellectu
cognosci potest, sic a nobis potest nominari. . . . Deus in hac vita non
potest anobis videri per suam essentiam, sed cognoscitur a nobis ex
creaturis. . . . Sic igitur potest nominari a nobis ex creaturis; non
tamen ita quod nomen significans ipsum exprimat divinam essentiam, secun
dum quod est; sicut hoc nomen, homo, exprimit sua significations essen
tiam hominis, secundum quod est; significat enim ejus definitionem declarantem ejus essentiam; . . . (ST la. q. 13, a.l, Migne ed., vol. I, p. 705)
Words are signs of concepts and concepts are likenesses
of things, and so it is clear that words are related to
things they signify by means of concepts. Therefore, ac
cording as something can be known by us by a concept, so
282
it can be named by us. . . . God in this life cannot be
seen by us through his essence, but is known to us from
creatures. . . .So, therefore, he can be named by us
from creatures not, however, so that a name which signi
fies him expresses the divine essence according to what
it is, sis thisname "man" by its signification expresses
the essence of man as it is, for it signifies its defi
nition which declares its essence; . . .
(47)
. .
munitasesset
deratione universalis est unitas et communitas. . . . Si enim com

de intellectu hominis, tunc in quocunque inveniretur human-
itas, inveniretur communitas; . . .

Similiter etiam non potest dici quod ratio generis vel speciei accidat
naturae humanae secundum esse quod habet in individuis; quia non invenitur
in individuis natura humana secundum unitatem, ut sit unum quid omnibus
conveniens; quod ratio universalis exigit.
Relinquitur ergo quod ratio speciei accidat naturae humanae secundum illud
esse quod habet in intellectu.
tellectuabstractum ab omnibus
Ipsa enim natura humana habet esse in in

individuantibus, et ideo habet rationem
uniformem ad omnia individua quae sunt extra animam, prout aequaliter est
similitudo omnium et inducens in cognitionem omnium, inquantum sunt homi
nes. Et ex hoc quod talem relationem habet ad omnia individua, intel
lectus adir.venit rationem speciei et attribuit sibi, . . . haec natura
intellects habeat rationem universalis secundum quod comparatur ad res
quae sunt extra animam, quia est una similitudo omnium; tamen, secundum
quod habet esse in hoc intellectu vel in illo, est species quaedam in
tellects particularis. . . . Et quia naturae humanae, secundum suam absolutam considerationem, sed est de accidentibus, quae consequuntur earn
secundum esse quod habet in intellectu; ideo nomen speciei non praedicatur
de Socrate, . . . (De Ente. ch. 4, Boyer ed., pp. 31-33)
283
Unity and community belong to the notion of a universal*
. . . For if community belonged to the concept 'man,'
then community would be found in whatever humanity was
found. . . .
Similarly, it also cannot be said that the notion of
genus or species happens to human nature according to
the being that it has in individuals, because human
nature is not found in individuals according to unity
as if it were one essence agreeing with them all, which
the notion of a universal requires.
It remains, therefore, that the notion of species happens
to human nature according to that being which it has in
the understanding. For human nature itself has a being
in the intellect as abstracted from all individuating
conditions, and therefore it has a uniform relation to all
individuals which are outside the 30ul according as it
is equally a likeness of all of them, and brings all into
cognition insofar as they are men. And from this, that
it has such a relation to all individuals, the intellect
devises the notion of species and attributes it to human
nature. . . . This nature as understood has the notion of
a universal according: as it is compared to things which
are outside the soul, because it is one likeness of all
these; however, according as it has being in this intel
lect or in that, the species is something particular which
is understood. . . . And, because it agrees with human
nature according to its absolute consideration that it be
predicated of Socrates, and the notion of a species does
not agree with it according to its absolute consideration
but concerns accidents which follow it according to the
being that it has in the intellect, therefore the noun
"species" is not predicated of Socrates, . . .
(48)
Naturae communi non potest attribui intentio universalitatis nisi secundum
esse quod habet in intellectu: sic enim solum est unum de multis, prout
intelligitur praeter principia, quibus unum in multa dividitur; unde relinquitur quod universalis secundum quod sunt univsrsalia, non sunt nisi
in anima.
Ipsae autem naturae, quibus accidit intentio universalitatis,
sunt in rebus. Et propter hoc nomina communia significantia naturas ipsas

praedicantur de individuis, non autem nomina significantia intentiones.
(De An. II. lectio 12, n. 380, ed. Pirotta)
284
The intentio of universality cannot be attributed to the
common nature except according to the existence that it
has in the intellect. For in this way only is it one of
many, i.e. according as it is understood without the
principles by which one is divided, into many. Whence it
happens that universals, as universals, exist only in the
soul. The natures themselves, however, to which the in
tentio of universality happens, are in things, and be
cause of this, common names signifying natures themselves
are predicated of individuals, but not, however, names
that signify intentiones.
(49)
Non enim oportet si hoc est homo, etillud homo, quod eadem sit humanitas
numero utriusque, . . . sed quod hoc similetur illi in hoc quod habet
humanitatem sicut illud: unde intellectus, accipiens humanitatem non se
cundum quod est huius, sed ut est humanitas, format intentiones communes
omnibus.
(II Sent., d. 17,q. 1, a.l, Opera Omnia.
Vives ed., vol. IX)
If this is a man and that is a man, it is not necessary

that they have numerically the same humanity, . . . but
one is like the other in this, that it has humanity just
as that does. Whence the intellect, taking humanity
not as it is the humanity of this one but as it is in
itself, forms an intentio common to all men.
(50)
Numero quidem indivisibile est ipsum singulare, quod non potest praedicari
de multis.
Specie autem unum, est indivisibile, quod est unum secundum
scientiam et notitiam. Non enim in diversis singularibus est aliqua

natura una numero quae possit dici species.
Sed intellectus apprehendit
ut unum id in quo omnia inferiora conveniunt. Et sic in apprehensions

intellectus, species fit indivisibilis, quae realiter est diversa in di
versis individuis.
(Meta. X. lect. 1, n. 1930, Cathala)
Indeed the singular itself is what is numerically indi

visible, because it cannot be predicated of many. That
which is specifically one is indivisible, however, be
cause it is one according to knowledge and conception.
For in diverse singulars there is not numerically one
285
nature which could be called the species, but the intel
lect apprehends as one that in which all of the singulars
agree. And so in the apprehension of the intellect a
species, which really i3 diverse in diverse individuals,
is made indivisible.
(51)
Ipsa igitur natura cui accidit vel intelligi vel abstrahi, vel intentio
universalitatis non est nisi in singularibus; sed hoc ipsum quod est intel
ligi vel abstrahi vel intentio universalitatis est in intellectu. . . .
Humanitas quae intelligitur non est nisi in hoc vel in illo homine; sed
quod humanitas apprehendatur sine individualibus conditionibus, . . .
(ST la, q. 85, a.2, ad 2, iiiigne ed., vol. i)
The nature itself, to which being understood or being
abstracted or the intentio of universality are acciden
tal, is only in singulars. But this, that it is under
stood or abstracted or the intentio of universality
comes from the intellect. . . . Humanity which is under
stood is only in this or in that man. But that humanity
may be apprehended without individual conditions, . . .
(52)
. . . intellectus humanus necesse habet intelligere componendo et dividendo.
Cum enim intellectus humanus exeat de potentia in actum, simili-
tudinem quamdam habet cum rebus generabilibus, quae non statim perfectionem suam habent, sed earn successive acquirunt. Et similter intellectus
humanus non statim in prima apprehensions capit perfectam rei cognitionem;
sed primo apprehendit aliquid de ipsa, puta quidditatem ipsius rei, quae
est primum et proprium objectum intellectus; et deinde intelligit proprietatem et accidentia, et habitudines circumstantes rei essentiam. . . . In
tellectus angelicus et divinus statim perfecte totam rei cognitionem ha
bet.
(ST la, q. 85, a.5, riigne ed., vol. I, p. 1326)

. . . the human intellect must necessarily understand
by means of compounding and dividing. For, since the
286
human intellect ascends from potency to act, it bears a
certain likeness to generable things which do not have
their perfection at once but acquire it in successive
steps. And likewise the human intellect does not at once,
in the first apprehension, receive a perfect knowledge
of a thing, but it first apprehends something belonging
to the thing, for example the quiddity of the thing (which
is the first and proper object of the intellect) and then
it understands the properties and accidents and relations
of the thing which are outside the essence of the thing.
. . . the angelic and divine intellects have at once per
fect knowledge of things.
(53)
. . . unumquodque cognoscit (beus) per simplicem intelligentiam, intelligendo essentiam uniuscuiusque.
Sicut si nos, in hoc ipso quod intelli-
gimus quid sit homo, intelligeremus omnia quae de homine praedicari possunt.
Quod quidem in intellectu nostro non contingit, qui de uno in
aliud discurrit, propter hoc quod species intelligibilie sic repraesentat unum quod non repraesentat aliud. Unde, intelligendo quid est homo,
non ex hoc ipso alia quae si insunt intelligimus, sec secundum quamdam
successionem. Et propter hoc, ea quae seorsum divisim intelligimus,
oportet nos in unum redigere per modum compositionis et divisionis, enuntiationem formando.
(ST la, q. 14, a. 14, Blackfriars, vol. IV, p. 52)
[God] knows anything through a simple understanding, by

understanding the essence of anything, just as if we, in
understanding what a man is, were to understand all that
can be predicated of man. Indeed this does not happen
in our intellects which run from one to another because
of this, that an intelligible species represents one ob
ject in such a way as not to represent another. Whence,
in understanding what a man is we do not also understand
what inheres in a man, but only according to a certain
succession. And because of this, those that we under
stand separately and dividedly, we must bring back to
gether through the way of composition and division, by
forming a proposition.
(54)
. . . in intellectu componente et diyidente comparatur praedicatum ad sub-
287
jectum. . . . si intellectus statim in apprehensione quidditatis subjecti
haberet notitiam de omnibus quae possunt attribui subjecto, vel removeri
ab eo; nunquam intelligeret componendo et dividendo, . . . (ST la, q. 58,
a. 4, Migne ed., vol. I, p. 1084)
In an intellect's compounding and dividing, the predicate
is compared to the subject. . . . if the intellect had
notice at once in the apprehension of the quiddity of the
subject of all that can be attributed to the subject or
removed from it, it would never understand by means of
compounding and dividing.
(55)
Una duarum operationum intellectus est indivisibilium intelligentia: in
quantum scilicet intellectus intelligit absolute cuisque rei quidditatem
sive essentiam per seipsum, puta quid est homo vel. quid album. . . . Alia
vero operatio intellectus est secundum quod huiusmodi simplicia concepts
simul componit et dividit.
(Perih. I, 3, n.3, Vives, vol. XXIl)
One of the two operations of the intellect is the under

standing of indivisibles inasmuch, namely, as the intel
lect absolutely understands the quiddity or essence of
anything through the essence, e.g. what is a man, or
what is white, . . . Truly another operation of the in
tellect is the composition and division of such simple
concepts.
(56)
Compositione enim et divisione opus non esset si in hoc ipso quod de aliquo apprehenderet quid est, haberetur quid ei inesset vel non inesset.
(SCG I. ch. 58, Opera Omnia. Leon, ed., vol. XIII)
For the understanding would not work by composition and
division if, in apprehending the essence of something,
it apprehended what inheres or doesn't inhere in it.
(57)
. . . compositio intellectus est signum identitatis eorum quae componuntur.
(ST la, q. 85, a.5, ad 3, Migne ed., vol. i)
288
Composition of the intellect is a sign of the identity of
those that are compounded.
(58)
Et ideo rei identitatem proponit per compositionem verbalem, quae est
identitatia nota. . . . ita quod si quae est diversitas in compositione,
ad intellectum referatur, unitas vero ad rem intellectam.
(SCG I, ch. 36,
Opera Omnia. Leon, ed., vol. XIIl)

And therefore it makes know the identity of a thing through
verbal composition which is a sign of identity . . . so
that diversity in the composition is referred to the intel
lect, unity is referred to the thing understood.
(59)
Praedicatio enim est quiddam quod completur per actionem intellectus componentis et dividentis, habens fundamentum in re ip3am unitatem eorum quo
rum unum de altero dicitur.
(he Ente. ch. 3, ed. Boyer, p. 33)
Predication is a certain activity which is completed

through the action of the intellect composing and di
viding, having its foundation in a thing by means of
the unity of those one of which is predicated of the
other.
(60)
. . . duplex est operatio intellectus.
Una, quae dicitur "intelligentia
indivisibilium qua cognoscit de unoquoque, quid est. Alia vero, qua

componit et dividit, scilicet enuntiationem affirmativam vel negativam
formando. Et hae quidem duae operationes duobus, quae sunt in rebus,
respondent,
Prima quidem operatio respicit ipsam naturam rei, secundum
quam res intellects aliquem gradum in entibus obtiner, sive sit res completa, ut totum aliquod, sive res incompleta, ut pars vel accidents.
Secunda vero operatio respicit ipsum esse rei, quod quidem resultat ex
congregatione principiorum rei in compositis vel ipsam simplicem naturam
rei concomitatur, ut in substantiia simplicibus. Et quia veritas in

tellectus est ex hoc quod conformstur rei, patet quod secundum hanc secundam operationem intellectus non potest vere abstrahere quod secundum rem
coniunctum est, quia in abstrahendo significaretur esse separatio secun
dum ipsum esse rei, sicut si abstraho hominem ab albedine dicendot homo
non est albus, significo esse separationem in re. . . . Hac ergo operations
intellectus vere abstrahere non potest nisi ea quae sunt secundum rem
separata, ut cum dicitur: homo non est asinus. Sed secundum primam oper
ationem potest abstrahere ea quae secundum rem separata non sunt, non
tamen omnia, sed aliqua. . . . Sic ergo intellectus distinguit unum ab altero aliter et aliter secundum diversas operationes; quia secundum opera
tionem, qua componit et dividit, distinguit unum ab alio per hoc quod intelligit unum alii non inesse.
In operations vero qua luielligit quid est
unumquodque, distinguit unum ab alio, dum intelligit, quid est hoc, nihil
intelligendo de alio, neque quod sit cum eo, neque quod sit ab eo separa
tum. . . . Sic ergo in operatione intellectus triplex distinctio invenitur.
Una secundum operationem intellectus componentis et dividentis, quae
separatio dicitur proprie; et haec competit scientiae divinae sive metaphysicae. Alia secundum operationem, qua formantur quiditates rervua,
quae est abstractio formae a materia sensibili; . . . Tertia secundum eandem operationem quae est abstractio universalis a particular!; . . .
(pe Trin.. q.5 a.3, ed. Decker, pp. 182-186)
The operation of the understanding is twofold: one, which
is called the "understanding of indivisibles," by which
it knows what anything is; the other by which it compounds
and divides, sc. forming affirmative and negative proposi
tions. And indeed these two operations correspond to
things in two ways. The first operation indeed relates
to the nature itself of a thing, according to which the
thing understood obtains some grade among beings, whether
290
it is a complete thing such as a whole, or an incomplete
thing, such as a part or an accident. The second opera
tion truly relates to the being itself of a thing, which
indeed results from the congregation of principles of a
thing in the case of composites, or accompanies the sim
ple nature itself of a thing in. the case of simple sub
stances. And, because the understanding is true as it
conforms to a thing, it is clear that, according to this
second operation of the understanding the intellect can
not truly abstract what are really conjoined because in
so abstracting, separation according to the being itself
of a thing would be signified, just as if I abstract man
from whiteness, saying "The man is not white,'* I signi
fy that there is a real separation. . . . By this opera
tion of the understanding, therefore, it can truly only
abstract those that are really separated, as when it is
said that "A man is not a donkey." But, according to
the first operation, it can abstract those that are not
really separated not all, however, but some. . . . So,
therefore, the intellect distinguishes one from the other
differently according to its diverse operations, be
cause according to the operation by which it composes
and divides, it distinguishes one extreme from the other
through this, that it understands one as not inhering in
the other; truly by the operation by which it understands
what anything is, it distinguishes one extreme from the
other when it understands what this is while it under
stands nothing about the other, neither that it exists
with the former nor that it is separate from the former.
. . . So therefore a triple distinction is found in the
operation of the intellect: one according to the opera
tion of the intellect composing and dividing, which is
properly called separation, and this agrees with divine
knowledge or metaphysics; another according to the oper
ation by which quiddities of things are formed, which is
the abstraction of a form from sensible matter; . . .
the third according to the same operation, and this is
the abstraction of a universal from a particular.
(61)
Intellectus noster diversas conceptiones format ad cognoscendum subiectum
et accidens, et ad cognoscendum diversa accidentia.
(Be Ver. II, 7,
Opera Omnia. Vives ed., vol. XIV)

Our intellect forms diverse concepts in order to know
subject and accident, and in order to know diverse ac
cidents.
291
(62)
Licendum quod propositions affirmativae possunt vere formari de Leo. Ad
cujus evidentiam sciendum est quod in qualibet propositione affirmative
vera oportet quod praedicatum et subjecturn significant idem secundum rem
aliquo modo, et diversum secundum rationem. Et hoc patet tarn in propo
sitionibus quae sunt de praedicato accidentali quam in illis quae sunt de
praedicato substantiali.
Manifestum est enim quod homo et albus sunt idem
subjecto et differunt ratione; alia enim est ratio hominis et alia ratio
albi. Et similiter cum dico, Homo est animal, illud enim ipsum quod est
homo vere animal est; in eodem enim supposito est et natura sensibilis, a
qua dicitur animal, et natura rationalis, a qua dicitur homo; unde et hie
etiam praedicatum et subjectum sunt idem supposito, sed diversa sunt
ratione.
Sed in propositionibus in quibus idem praedicatur de se ipso, hoc aliquo
modo invenitur, inquantum intellectus id quod ponit ex parte subjecti trahit ad partem suppositi, quod vero ponit ex parte praedicati trahit ad
naturam formae in supposito existentis, secundum quod dicitur quod praedicata tenentur formaliter. et sub.iecta materialiter.
Huic vero diversitati quae est secundum rationem, respondet pluralitas
praedicati et subjecti; identitatem vero rei significat intellectus per
ipsam compositionem.
Leus autem in se consideratus est oionino unus et
simplex; sed tamen intellectus noster secundum diversas conceptlonea

ipsum cognoscit, eo quod non potest ipsum, ut in se ipso est, videre.
Sed quamvis intelligat ipsum sub diversis conceptionibus, cognoscit ta
men quod omnibus suis conceptionibus respondet una et eadem res simpliciter. Hanc ergo pluralitatem quae est secundum rationem, repraesentat
292
per pluralitatem praedicati et subjecti; unitatem vero repraesentat intel
lectus per compositionem.
(ST la, q. 13, a.l2,Blackfriars ed., vol. Ill,
P. 94)
It must be said that affirmative propositions can be
formed truly about God, for the evidence of which fact
it must be known that in any true affirmative proposi
tion it is necessary that predicate and subject signi
fy what is really the same in some way, and rationally
diverse. And this is as clear in propositions in which
the predicate is accidental as in those in which the
predicate is substantial. For it is manifest that "man"
and "white" are the same with regard to subject and dif
fer rationally, for the concept 'man' is different from
the concept 'white.' And likewise when I say, "A man
is an animal," for what is a man is truly an animal,
for in the same subject is the sensible nature from which
it is called an animal, and the rational nature from
which it is called a man, whence even here the predicate
and the subject are the same according to their supposit,
but are rationally diverse.
But in propositions in which the same thing is predicated
of itself the situation is in some way the same inasmuch
as the intellect gives that which occurs in the subject
position the part of the supposit, and truly that which
occurs in the predicate position the form of a nature
existing in supposits, according to which it is said that
"predicates are taken formally, and subjects materially."
Truly to this rational diversity there corresponds the
plurality of subject and predicate; the intellect truly
signifies the identity of the thing through the composi
tion itself. God, however, considered in himself is
entirely one and simple, but our intellect knows him ac
cording to diverse concepts because it cannot see him
as he is in himself.
But, although it understands him under diverse concepts,
it knows, however, that one and the same thing simply
corresponds to all the concepts. Therefore, this ratio
nal plurality the intellect represents through the plu
rality of predicate and subject; it truly represents
the unity through the composition.
(63)
Si consideremus ea quae sunt circa intellectum secundum se, semper est
compositio ubi est veritas et falsitas; quae numquam invenitur in intel
lectu nisi per hoc quod intellectus comparat unum simplicem conceptual
293
alteri.
Sed si referatur ad rem, quandoque dicitur composition quando-
que dicitur divisio.
Compositio quidem quando intellectus comparat unum
conceptum alteri, quasi apprehendens coniunctionem aut identitatem rerum

quarum sunt conceptionea; divisio autem quando sic comparat unum concep
tum alteri ut apprehendat res esse diversas. Et per hunc etiam modum in
vocibus affirmatio dicitur compositio inquantum coniunctionem ex parte
rei significat;negatio vero dicitur divisio inquantum significat rerum
separationem.
(Perih. I, 3# n.4, Vives ed,, Opera Omnia, vol. XXIl)

If we were to consider those that concern the understand
ing according to itself, there is always composition
where there is truth and falsity, and composition is only
found in the understanding through its comparing one sim
ple concept with another. But if composition is referred
to a thing, sometimes it is called composition, when
indeed the intellect compares one concept with another
as if apprehending the conjunction or identity of the
things of which they are concepts; sometimes it is
called division, however, when it so compares one con
cept with another so that it apprehends the things to
be diverse. And in this way also affirmation in words
is called composition inasmuch as it signifies a conjunc
tion
on the part of a thing; negation is truly called
division inasmuch as it signifies a separation of things.
(64)
Multa sunt coniuncta secundum rem, quorum unum non est de intellectu
alterius sicut album et musicum coniunguntur in aliquo subiecto, et
tamen unum non est de intellectu alterius; et ideo potest unum separatim intelligi sine alio. Et hoc est unum intellectum esse abstractum
ab alio.
(Phvs. II, 3* n. 5, Opera Omnia. Vives ed., vol. XXIl)

Many are really conjoined one of which does not belong
to the concept of the other, just as white and musical
are conjoined in some subject and, however, one does
not belong to the concept of the other, and therefore
one can be separately understood without the other.
And this is for one concept to be abstracted from the
other.
294
(65)
. . . homo et album sunt diversa secundum rationem, licet sint idem subiecto.
(Meta. IV, lectio 7, n. 622, Cathala)

. . . man and white are rationally diverse although they
may be in the same subject.
(66)
Quae attribuuntur alicui eidem secundum diversas formas, praedicantur de
invicem per accidens: album enim dicitur esse musicum per accidens, quia
Socrati accidit albedo et musica.
(SCG II. ch. 58, Opera Omnia. Leon, ed.,
vol. XIII)
What are attributed to the same thing according to di
verse forms, are predicated of each other accidentally.
For a white thing is said to be musical accidentally,
because whiteness and musicalness are accidents of
Socrates.
(67)
. . . considerandum est, quod eorum quae sunt in rebus coniuncta, contingit unum sine altero intelligi, et vere, dummodo unum eorum non sit in
ratione alterius.
Si enim Socrates sit musicus et albus, possumus intel-
ligere albedinem, nihil de musica intelligendo.
Non autem possum intel-
ligere hominem nihil intelligendo de animali, quia animal est in ratione

hominis.
Sic ergo separando secundum intellectum, quae sunt secundum rem
coniuncta modo praedicto non contingit falsitas.
(De An. Ill, lectio 7,
n. 781, ed. Pirotta)

We must consider that, of those that are conjoined in
things, one can be understood without the other truly
when one of them does not belong to the concept of the
other. For if Socrates were musical and white, we could
understand whiteness without understanding anything
about musicalness. I cannot, however, understand man
without understanding animal, because animal is part of
the concept 'man.' So, therefore, when we mentally
separate what are really conjoined in the aforesaid
way, there is no falsity.
295
(68)
Ea vero quae sunt coniuncta in rebus intellectus potest distinguere ,

quando unum eorum non cadit in ratione alterius.
(Perih. I, 10, n.4,
Opera Omnia. Vives ed., vol. XXII, p. 30)

Truly those that are conjoined in things the intellect
can distinguish when one of them does not fall in the
concept of the other.
(69)
Nihil enim prohibet duorum ad invicem coniunctorum unum intelligi ab
sque hoc quod intelligatur aliud.
(De An. Ill, lectio 8, n. 717, Pirot-
ta ed.)
When two things are conjoined, nothing keeps one of them
from being understood without the other being understood.
(70)
. . . ea quae sunt sola ratione distincta, nihil prohibet de se invicem
praedicari:
sicut dicimus principium esse finem, quia punctum unum secun
dum rem eat principium et finis, licet ratione differat; . . . (De Pot..
q. 7, a.ll, Opera Omnia. Vives ed., vol. XIII, p. 245)
Nothing hinders those that are only rationally distinct
from being predicated of each other, just as we say
"The beginning is the end," because a point which is
really one is the beginning and the end Jof a line] al
though beginning and end differ rationally.
(71)
Ea vero quae solum ratione differunt, de se invicem praedicantur: verum
enim dicetur quod divina voluntas est intellectus eius, et e converso.
(SCO IV, ch. 24, Opera Omnia. Leon, ed., vol. XV, p. 92)
Truly those that differ only rationally are predicated
of each other. For it may be truly said that God's will
is his intellect and conversely.
296
(72)
. . . in quantum essentia et persona in divinis differunt secundum intelligentiae rationem, sequitur quod aliquid possit affirmari de uno quod negatur de altero; et per consequens quod supposito uno non supponatur alterum.
(ST la, q. 39 a.l* ad 2, Migne ed., vol. I, p. 930)
The divine essence and a Person differ according to the
understanding. It follows that something can he affirmed
of one which is denied of the other, and consequently that
what one stands for is not what the other stands for.
(73)
. . . manifestum est quod relatio realiter existens in Deo est idem essentiae secundum rem, et non differt nisi secundum intelligentiae rationem,
prout in relatione importatur respectum ad suum oppositum, qui non importatur in nomine
essentiae.
(ST la, q. 28,a.2, Migne ed., vol. I, p. 860)
And so it is evident that the relation really existing in

God is the same as the essence, and does not differ ex
cept according to the understanding, according as by
"relation" is implied a reference to sin opposite which is
not implied by the word essence."
(74)
. . . non oportet secundum diversas rationes vel intentiones logicas, quae
consequuntur modum intelligendi, diversitatem in rebus naturalibus accipere;
quia ratio unum et idem secundum diversos modos apprehendere potest.
Quia
igitur . . . anjma intellectiva virtute continet id quod sensitiva habet,

et adhuc amplius, potest seorsum ratio considerare quod pertinet ad virtutem sensitivae quasi quoddam imperfectua et materials; et quia hoc invenit
commune homini et aliis animalibus, ex hoc rationem generis format; . . .
(ST la, q. 76, a.3 ad 4, Migne ed., vol. I, p. 1222)
It is not necessary to accept a diversity in natural
things according to the diverse concepts or logical in
tentiones which follow our way of understanding, because
297
one and the same thing can he apprehended in diverse ways
by reason. Therefore because the intellective soul vir
tually contains that which the sensitive soul has and still
more, reason can consider separately what belongs to the
sensitive power as something material and imperfect, and
because it finds this common to man and other animals,
from this fact it forms the concept of a genus.
(75)
. . . pluralitas rationis quandoque reducitur ad aliquam diversitatem rei,
sicut Socrates et Socrates 3edens differunt ratione; et hoc reducitur ad
diversitatem substantiae et accidentis; et similiter homo et aliquis homo
ratione differunt; et haec differentia reducitur ad diversitatem formae
et materiae, quia genus sumitur a materia, differentia vero specifics a
forma; unde talis differentia secundum rationem repugnat maximae unitati
vel simplicitati.
Quandoque vero differentia secundum rationem non redu
citur ad aliquam rei diversitatem, sed ad unitatem rei, quae est diversimode intelligibilis; et sic ponimus pluralitatem rationum in Deo, unde
hoc non repugnat maximae unitati, vel simplicitati.
(De Ver.. q.3, a.2,
ad 3* Opera Omnia. Vives ed., vol. XIV, p. 392)

Sometimes a plurality of concepts is reduced to some real
diversity, just as Socrates and Socrates sitting differ
rationally, and this diversity is reduced to the diversity
of substance and accident. And likewise man and some man
differ rationally and this difference is reduced to the
diversity of form and matter because the genus is taken
from matter and the specific difference is taken from form.
Whence such a rational difference is repugnant to unity
or simplicity. Sometimes truly a rational difference is
not reduced tonsome diversity in a thing, but to its unity
which is intelligible in diverse ways, and so we place a
rational plurality in God, whence this is not especially
repugnant to unity or simplicity.
(76)
.. . nominasynonyma dicuntur
nem; . . .(ST
quae significant unum secundum unam ratio
la, q. 13, a.4, ad 1, iaiigne ed., vol. i)
298
Those words are said to be synonyms which signify one
thing according to one concept.
(77)
. . . multiplicitas nominum potest dupliciter contingere.
Vel ex parte
intellectus, quia cum nomina exprimant intellectum, contingit unum et

idem diversis nominibus significari, secundum quod diversimode in intel
lectu accipi potest. . . . Item, multiplicitas nominum potest contingere
ex parte rei secundum quod nomina rem significant; et inde veniunt nomina
exprimentia id quod in Deo est.
In Deo autem non est invenire aliquam
realem distinctionem nisi personarum, quae sunt tres res; et inde venit
multiplicitas nominum personalium significantium tres res.
Sed praeter
hoc est etiam in Deo invenire distinctionem rationum, quae realiter et

vere in ipso sunt, sicut ratio sapientiae et bonitatis, et hujusirodi,
quae quidem omnia sunt unum re, et differunt ratione, quae salvatur in
proprietate et veritate, prout dicimus Deum vere esse sapientem et bonum,
et non tanturn in intellectu ratiocinantis;et inde veniunt diversa nomina
attributorumjquae omnia quamvis significant unam rem, non tamen signifi
cant unam secundum unam rationem; et ideo non sunt synonyma.
(I Sent..
d. 22, q.l, a.3, Opera Omnia. Vives ed., vol. VII, p. 28l)
A multiplicity of names can occur in two ways: either
from the part of the intellect because, since names ex
press the understanding, one and the same thing can be
signified by diverse names according as it can be di
versely accepted by the intellect; . . . likewise a
multiplicity of names can occur from the part of a thing
according as names signify the thing, and in this way
arise the names expressing that which is in God. In
God, however, there is not to be found some real dis
tinction except that of the Persons which are three
things, and from thence comes the multiplicity of per
sonal names signifying the three things. But besides
this, there is also a distinction of notions to be
found in God, and these really and truly are in him,
such as the notions of wisdom and goodness and such,
299
which indeed are completely one really, and differ
rationally, which is preserved in property and truth
according as we say God is truly wise and good, and
not only in the intellect of the one reasoning. And
from this fact we get the diverse names of the attri
butes which, although they all signify one thing,
do not, however, signify it according to one concept
and therefore are not synonyms.
(78)
Ratio enim quam significat nomen est conceptio intellectus de re significata pernomen.
Intellectus autem noster, cum cognoscat Deum ex crea-
turis, format ad intelligendum Deum conceptiones proportionates perfectionibus procedentibus a Deo in creaturas: quae quidem perfectiones in
Deo praeexi3tunt unite et simpliciter, in creaturis vero recipiuntur di
vise et multipliciter.
Sicut igitur diversis perfectionibus creaturarum
respondet unum simplex principium repraesentatum per diversas perfectio

nes creaturarum varie et multipliciter, ita variis et multiplicibus sonceptibus intellectus nostri respondet unum omnino simplex, secundum hujusmodi conceptiones imperfecte intellectum. Et ideo nomina Deo attributa,
licet significant unam rem, tamen quia significant earn sub rationibus
multis et diversis, non sunt synonyma.
(ST la, q. 13, a.4, Migne ed.,
vol. I, p. 710)
For the ratio which a word signifies is a conception of
the mte llect of the thing signified by the name. Our
intellect, however, since it knows God from creatures,
in order to understand God, forms concepts proportioned
to the perfection proceeding from God to creatures,
which perfections indeed pre-exist in God simply and with
unity, but in creatures are truly received in a divided
fashion and with multiplicity. Therefore, just as one
simple principle represented variously and multiply
through the diverse perfections of creatures corresponds
to the diverse perfections of creatures, so one thing
completely simple, imperfectly understood by such con
cepts, corresponds to the varied and multiple concepts
of the understanding. And therefore the names that are
attributed to God, although they signify one thing, how
300
ever, because they signify it under many diverse concepts,
are not synonyms*
(79)
. . quamvis nomina de Deo dicta eamdem rem significent, non tamen sunt
synonyms* quia non significant rationem eandem* Nam sicut diversae res
uni simplicirei quae Deus est similantur per formas diversas, ita intel
lectus noster per diversas conceptiones ei aliqualiter similatur, inquan
tum per diversas perfectiones creaturarum in ipsum cognoscendum perducitur. St ideo de uno intellectus noster multa concipiens non est falsus
neque vanus: quia illud simplex esse divinum huiusmodi est ut ei secun
dum formas multiplices aliqua similari possunt, . . . Secundum autem di
versas conceptiones diverse nomina intellectus adinvenit quae Deo attribuit.
Bt ita, cum non secundum eandem rationem attribuantur, constat ea
non esse synonyma, quamvis rem omnino unam significent: non enim est eadem nominis significatio, cum nomen per prius conceptionem intellectus
quam rem intellectam significet.
(SCG I, ch. 25, Opera Omnia. Leon. ed.,
vol. XIII, p. 109)

Although names that are predicated of God signify the same
thing, they are not, however, synonyms because they do not
signify the same concept. For, just as diverse things are
assimilated through diverse forms to the one simple thing
which is God, so our intellect in some fashion is assimi
lated to him through diverse concepts inasmuch as it is
brought to know him through the diverse perfections of
creatures. And therefore our intellect conceiving one
thing by many concepts is neither false nor empty, because
that simple divine being is such that some can be assimi
lated to him according to many forms. . . . However, accord
ing to these diverse concepts our intellect devises diverse
names which it attributes to God. And so, since they are
not attributed according to the same notion, they are not
synonyms although they signify a thing which is completely
one. For the signification of the names is not the same
since they signify him in different ways.
301
(80)
Quaedam enim sunt quae omni modo sunt eadem secundum substantiae rationem
ut ve3tis et indumentum; . . . in his. . . necesse est quod quicquid verum
de uno sit, sit etiam verum de alio, eo quod talia sunt penitus eadem
secundum rem et differunt secundum nomen solum; . . . (De Fall., n. 677-8,
Opusc. Phil., ed. Spiazzi)
For some are entirely the same according to the notion of
substance, e.g. a garment and a piece of clothing. . . .
In these . . . it is necessary that whatever is true of
one be also true of the other because they are wholly the
same really, and differ only according to name. . . .
(81)
Dicendum quod ex eo quod aliquid alicui attribuitur oportet quod attribuantur ei omnia ilia quae sunt de ratione illius; sicut cuicumque attribuitur
homo, oportet quod attribuatur ei rationale.
De ratione autem relationis
est respectus unius ad alterum secundum quem aliquid alteri opponitur re

lative.
Cum igitur in Deo realiter sit relatio, . . . oportet quod real-
iter sit ibi oppositio. Relativa autem oppositio in sui ratione includit
distinctionem.
Unde oportet quod in Deo sit realis distinctio, non quidem
secundum rem absolutam quae est essentia, in qua est summa unitas et simplicitas, sed secundum rem relativam.
. . . argumentum illud tenet, quod quaecumque uni et eidem sunt eadem sibi
invicem sunteadem, in his quae sunt idem
re et ratione, sicut tunica et
indumentum; nonautem in his quae differunt ratione. , .
. (ST la, q. 28,
a.3, Migne ed., vol. I, p. 86l)

It must be said that because something is attributed to
something it is necessary that all those which belong to
the concept of the former be attributed to the latter,
just as "rational" must be attributed to whatever "man"
is attributed. Relation of one extreme to the other ac
cording to which something is relatively opposed to an-
302
other is part of the concept of relation. Since, there
fore, there is really a relation in God, . . . it is
necessary that opposition really be there. Relative op
position, however, includes distinction in its notion,
whence it is necessary that there be a real distinction
in God, not indeed according to that absolute thing which
is the essence in which there is the highest unity and
simplicity, but according to a relative thing [i.e. a
Person]
That argument holds, that whatever are the same as some
third thing are the same as each other, for those that
are really and rationally the same such as a tunic and
a cloak. It does not, however, hold for those that dif
fer rationally. . . .
(82)
. . . materia aliquod ens in potentia tantum; quia forma, in quantum for
ma, est actus; id autem quod est in potentia tantum, non potest esse pars
actus; cum potentia repugnet actui, utpote contra actum divisa.
(ST la,
q. 75, a.5, Migne ed., vol. I, p. 1206)

. . . matter is some being in potency only, because form
as form is act. That, however, which is only in potency
cannot be part of an .act, since potency is repugnant to
act inasmuch a3 it is opposed to act.
(83)
Non autem est possibile quod idem sit simul in actu et in potentia secun
dum idem. . . . (ST la, q.2, a.3, Blackfriars ed., vol. i)
It is not possible, however, for the same thing to be
both in act and in potency at the same time in the same
respect. . . .
(84)
Potentia enim, secundum hoc ipsum quod est, importat habitudinem quamdam
ad actum: est enim principium quoddam agendi vel patiendi: unde oportet
quod actus ponantur in definitionibus potentiarum.
(lec. 6, n. 304)
. . . omnia quae sunt in potentia patiuntur et moventur ab activo, et

existente in actu; . . . (l)e An.. II, lect. 10, n. 357)
505
For potency, according to what it is, implies a certain
relation to an act, for it is a certain principle of
acting or being acted upon, whence it is necessary that
acts be included in the definitions of potencies.
. . . all that are in potency are acted on and moved by
something active existing in act; . . .
(85)
. . . the potency of matter is nothing else but its
essence. (ST la, q. 78, a.l, ad 2, Blackfriars their
translation, vol. XI)
(86)
Es3e . . . per se convenit formae, quae est actus.
Unde materia secun
dum hoc acquirit esse in actu, quod acquirit formam; secundum hoc autem
accidit in ea corruptio, quod separatur forma ab ea.
(ST la, q. 75, a.6,
i'iigne ed., vol. I, p. 1206)

Being . . . belongs to form, which is act, through it
self, Whence matter acquires being in act when it ac
quires form; corruption happens to it, however, when
form is separated from it.
(87)
. . . licet anima sit per se subsistens, non tamen sequitur quod sit
composita ex materia et forma; quia per se subsistere potest convenire
formae absque materia.
Cum enim materia habeat esse per formam, et non
e converso, nihil prohibet aliquam formam sine materia subsistere, licet

materia sine forma esse non potest.
(Spir. Creat.. a.l, ad 6, Keeler
ed., p. 14)
Although the soul subsists through itself, it does not
however follow that it is composed of matter and form,
because to subsist through itself can belong to a form
without natter. For, since matter has being through
form, and not conversely, nothing prohibits some form
from subsisting without matter although matter cannot
exist without a form.
304
(88)
Quaecumque enim ita se habent ad invicem quod unum est causa esse alter-*
ius, illud quod habet rationem causae potest habere esse sine altero,
sed non convertitur. Talis autem invenitur habitudo materiae et formae,
quod forma dat esse materiae; et ideo impossibile est esse materiam sine
aliqua forma; tamen non est impossibile esse aliquam formam sine materia.
Forma enim, in eo quod forma, non habet dependentiam ad materiam; . . .
(De Ente. ch. 5, ed. Boyer, p. 377)
For what are so related to each other that one is the
cause of the other's existence, that which has the re
lation of a cause can exist without the other but not
conversely. In such a way matter is related to form,
because form gives being to matter. And, therefore, it
is impossible for there to be matter without some form.
It is not, however, impossible for some form to exist
without matter, for form, as form, does not depend on
matter.
(89)
Materia enim non potest per se existere sine forma per quam est ens actu,
cum de se sit in potentia tantum; ipsa etiam non est hoc aliquid nisi
per formam per quam fit actu.
(Meta. VII, lectio 2, n. 1292)
For matter cannot exist through itself without the form

through which it is an actual being, since matter of it
self is only in potency; it is not even "this something"
except through the form through which it is actualized.
(90)
Forma enim est separabilis ratione, quia potest intelligi sine materia
sensibili individuante; materia vero non potest intelligi sine intellectu
formae, cum non apprehendatur nisi ut ens in potentia ad formam.
(Meta.
VIII, lect. 1, n. 1687, Cathala)

For form is mentally separable because it can be under
stood without sensible and individuating matter. Truly
305
matter cannot be understood without form, since it is
only apprehended as being in potency to a form.
(91)
Materia quidem est, quae secundum se non est hoc aliquid, sed in poten
tia tantum ut sit hoc aliquid. Forma autem est, secundum quam iam est
hoc aliquid in actu. Substantia vero composita est, quae est hoc aliquid.
Dicitur enim esse hoc aliquid, id est aliquid demonstratum quod est completum in esse et specie; et hoc convenit soli substantiae compositae in
rebus materialibus.
(be An. II, lectio 1, n. 215, ed. Pirotta)
Indeed matter is that which according to itself is not

'this something'* but only in potency to be *'this some
thing.** Form, however, is that according to which "this
something" is now in act. A composite substance is
truly that which is "this something." For that is said
to be "this something" which is something pointed to
that is complete in being and species and this is true
only of a substance which is composite (insofar as
material things are concerned).
(92)
. . . substantia actu existens . . . de materia praedicatur . . . de denominativa praedicatione, per quern modum accidentia de substantia praedicantur.
Sicut
nfm
haec est vera: homo est albus, non autem haec: homo
est albedo, vel: humanitas est albedo, ita haec est vera: hoc materiatum
est homo, non autem haec: materia est homo, vel: materia e3t humanitas.
Ipsa ergoconcretiva sive denominativa praedicatio ostendi, quod sicut
substantia est aliud per essentiam ab accidentibus, ita per essentiam
aliud est materia a formis substantialibus.
(Meta. VII, lect. 2, n. 1289,
ed. Cathala)
Substance existing in act . . . may be predicated of
matter . . . by denominative predication, in the same
way that accidents are predicated of substance. For
just as this is true, "A man is white," but not this,
however, "A man is whiteness," or "Humanity is white
306
ness," so this is true, "This material thing is a man,"
but not this, "flatter is a man" or "Matter is humanity."
Therefore concretive or denominative predication shows
that, just as substance is essentially other than acci
dents, so matter is essentially other than substantial
forms.
(93)
. . . in hoc consistit ratio accidentis, quod sit in subjecto . . .
omne subiectum comparatur ad suum accidens ut potentia ad actum. . . .
(Spir. Creat.. a.3> ed. Keeler, pp. 42-43)
The notion of accident consists in its existing in a
subject. . . every subject is compared to its accident
as potency to act. . . .
(94)
Accidens enim non separatur a substantia, sed substantia potest separari
ab accidente.
(Meta. VII. lectio 2, n. 1291, ed. Cathala)

For an accident is not separated from a substance, but
a substance can be separated from an accident.
(95)
. ..compositioni et divisioni intellectus respondet quidem aliquid ex

parte rei;
tamer, non eodem modo se habet in re sicut in intellectu.
In
tellectus enim humani proprium objectum est quidditas rei materialis, quae
sub sensu et imaginations cadit.
re materialis
Invenitur autem duplex compositio in
prima quidem formae ad materiam; et huic respondet compo
sitio intellectus, qua totum universale de sua parte praedicatur.
Nam
genus sumitur a materia communi, differentia vero completive speciei a

forma, particulare vero a materia individuali.
Secunda vero compositio
est accidentis ad subjectum; et huic reali compositioni respondet compo

sitio intellectus, secundum quam praedicatur accidens de subjecto, ut
cum dicitur: Homo est albus. Tamen differt compositio intellectus a
307
compositione rei; nam ea quae componuntur in re, sunt diverse; compo

sitio autem intellectus est signum identitatis eorum quae componuntur.
Non enim intellectus sic componit, ut dicat quod homo est albedo; sed
dicit quod homo est albus, id est, habens albedinem.
Idem autem est
subjecto quod est homo, et quod est habens albedinem. Et simile est de
compositione formae et materiae.
Nam animal significat id quod habet
naturam sensitivam; rationale vero, quod habet naturam intellectivam;

homo vero, quod habet utrumque; Socrates vero, quod habet omnia haec cum
materia individuali. Et secundum hanc identitatis rationem intellectus
noster unum componit alteri, praedicando.
(ST la, q. 85, a.5, ad 3,
Migne ed., vol. I, p. 1327)

. . . something on the part of a thing corresponds to
the composition and division of the intellect; however,
these are not disposed in the same way in thing and
intellect. For the human intellect's proper object
is the essence of a material thing which comes through
sense and imagination. A double composition, however,
is found in a material thing. First there is the com
position of form and matter, and to this the composition
of the intellect by which the whole universal is predi
cated of a part corresponds. For genus is taken from
common matter,difference which completes the species is
taken from the form, the particular is taken from indi
vidual matter. Second, there is the composition of ac
cident and subject, and to this real composition there
corresponds the composition of the understanding ac
cording to which an accident is predicated of a subject,
as when it is said, "A man is white." However, the com
position of the intellect differs from the composition
of the thing, for those that are compounded in a thing
are diverse. The composition of the intellect, however,
is a sign of the identity of those that are compounded.
For the intellect does not so compose as to say "Man is
whiteness," but to say "A man is white," i.e., something
having whiteness. That which is a man and that which
has whiteness are, however, the same in subject. And it
is the same concerning the composition of form with mat
ter. For "animal" signifies that which has a sensitive
nature, "rational" what has an intellective nature, "man"
what has both, "Socrates" what has all these plus indi
vidual natter. And because of this identity, our intel
lect compounds one with the other predicating one of the

other.
(96)
. . . primum ens, quod Deus est, est actus infinitum, utpote habens in se
totam essendi plenitudinem, non contractam ad aliquam naturam generis vel
speciei*
Unde oportet quod ipsum esse eius non sit esse quasi inditum
alicui naturae, quae non sit suum esse, quia sic finiretur ad illam natur
am.
Unde dicimus quod Deus est ipsum suum esse. Hoc autem non potest
dici de aliquo alio.
Sicut enim impossibile est intelligere quod sint
plures albedines separatee; sed si esset albedo separata ab omni subiecto et recipiente, esset una tantum; . . . Qmne igitur quod est post pri
mum ens, cum non sit suum esse, habet esse in aliquo receptum, per quod
ipsum esse contrahitur; et sic in quolibet creato, aliud est natura rei
quae participat esse, et aliud ipsum participatum. . . . Unde in rebus
compositis est considerare duplicem actum et duplicem potentiam.
Nam
primo quidem, materia est ut potentia respectu formae, et forma est ac

tus eius. Et iterum, natura constituta ex materia et forma, est ut poten
tia respectu ipsius esse, in quantum est susceptiva eius.
(Spir. Great..
a..l, ed. Keeler, pp. 11-12)

. . . the first being, which is God, is infinite act inas
much as it has in itself the whole fullness of being not
contracted to some generic or specific nature. Whence it
is necessary that its being not be a being placed in some
nature which is not its being, because thus it would be
limited to that nature. Whence we say that God is his own
being. This cannot, however, be said of any other being,
for just as it is impossible to understand that there are
many separated whitenesses, but if whiteness were separ
ated from every subject and recipient, it would be only
one; . . . Therefore everything which is after the first
being, since it is not its own being, receives being in
something through which its being is contracted to it.
And thus in any creature, the nature of a thing which par
ticipates in being and that in which it participates are
different. . . . Whence in composite things a double act

and potency must be considered. First, matter is as
potency with regard to form, and form is its act. Like-*
wise, the nature constituted from matter and form is as
potency with regard to its being, inasmuch as it is re
ceptive to it.
(97)
Quidquid enim non est de intellectu essentiae vel quidditatis, hoc est adveniens extra, et faciens compositionem cum essentia; quia nulla essentia
sine his quae sunt partes essentiae intelligi potest.
Omnis autemessentia
vel quidditas potest intelligi sine hoc quod aliquid intelligatur de esse
suo:
possum enim intelligere quid est homo vel phoenix, et tamen ignorare
an esse habeat in rerum natura. Ergo patet quod esse est aliud ab essen
tia vel quidditate, nisi forte sit aliqua res cuius quidditas sit ipsum
suum esse; et haec res non potest esse nisi una et prima, . . . (De Bnte.
ch. 5 ed. Boyer, pp. 39-40)
For whatever does not belong to the concept of an essence
or quiddity comes to it from outside and makes a composi
tion with essence, because no essence can be understood
without its parts. Every essence or quiddity however,
can be understood without its existence being understood.
For 1 can understand what a man or a phoenix is, and be
ignorant, however, of whether a man or a phoenix exists
in the nature of things. Therefore it is clear that ex
istence is other than essence of quiddity, unless there
is perhaps something whose essence is its existence.
And this thing can only be one and first, . . .
(98)
Quia etiam in his quorum esse non est subsistens, quod inest existenti
praeter esse eius, est quidem existenti unitum, non autem est unum cum
esse eius, nisi per accidens, inquantum est unum subiectum habens esse
et id quod est praeter esse: sicut patet quod Sorti, praeter suum esse
substantiale, inest album quod quidem diversum est ab eius esse substantiali; non enim idem est esse Sortem et esse album, nisi per accidens.
310
. . . Esse autem, inquantum est esse, non potest esse diversum: potest
autem diversificari per aliquid quod est praeter esse; sicut esse lapidis est aliud ab esse hominis.
lllud ergo quod est esse subsistens,
non potest esse nisi unum tantum . . . Deus est suum esse subsistens.
Nihil igitur aliud praeter ipsum potest esse suum esse.
Oportet igitur
in omni substantia quae est praeter ipsum, esse aliud ipsam substantiam
et esse eius.
(SCG II. ch. 52, Opera Omnia. Leon, ed., vol. 13, p. 387)
Because even in these things whose being is not subsistent, what

inheres in an existent besides its being is indeed united to the
existent, but is not, however, one with its being except acci
dentally inasmuch as it is one subject having being and that
which is outside being. As it is clear that white, which indeed
is diverse from his substantial being, and is outside his sub
stantial being, inheres in Socrates. For being Socrates and
being white are not the same except accidentally. . . . Being as
being, however, cannot be diverse. It can, however, be diversi
fied: through something which is outside being, just as the being
of a stone is other than the being of a man. Therefore that which
is subsistent being can only be one . . . God is his subsistent
being. Nothing, therefore, except God can be its being. It is
necessaxy, therefore, that in every other substance the sub
stance and being be diverse.
(99)
. . ipsum esse Dei distinguitur et individuatur a quolibet alio esse,
per hoc ipsum quod est esse per se subsistens, et non adveniens alicui
naturae quae sit aliud ab ipso esse.
Omne autem aliud esse quod non est
subsistens, oportet quod individuetur per naturam et substantiam quae in

tali esse subsistit. Etin eis verurn est quod esse
esse illius per hoc quod
hujus est aliud ab
est alterius naturae; . . . (De Pot., q. 7, a.2,
ad 5, Opera Omnia. Vives ed., vol. XIII, p. 218)

. . . the being of God is distinguished and individuated from
any other being through this, that it is being subsisting through
itself, and not coming to some nature which is other than its be
ing. Every other being, however, which is not subsistent, must
be individuated through the nature andsubstance which subsists
in such a being.
And in those beings,it is true that the being
311
of this is other than the being of that because they

are of different natures. . . .
(100)
I4anifestum est enim quod illud unde aliquid singulare est hoc aliquid nullo modo est multis communicabile.
Illud enim unde Socrates est homo mul-
tis convenire potest, sed id unde est hie homo non potest convenire nisi
uni tantum. Si ergo Socrates per id esset homo per quod est hie homo,
sicut non possunt esse plures Socrates ita non possent esse plures homi
nes.
(ST la, q. 11, a.3, Uligne ed., vol. l)

For it is clear that that by which something singular is
"this something" is in no way capable of being shared with
many things. For that whence Socrates is a man he can
share with many, but that by which he is this man can be
long only to one. Therefore, if Socrates were a man
through that through which he is this man, then just as
there cannot be many Socrates, so there could not be
many men.
(101)
In omni autem creato essentia differt ab ejus esse, et comparatur ad ipsum
sicut potentia ad actum, . . . (ST la, q. 54, a.3 Migne ed., vol. I,
P. 1059)
However in every creature essence differs from the exis

tence of the thing, and is compared to the existence as
potency to act, . . .
(102)
. . . Deus est idem quod sua essentia, vel natura. Ad cujus intellectum,
sciendum est quod in rebus compositis ex materia et forma necesse est quod
differant natura vel essentia, et suppositum; quia essentia vel natura
compreherdit in se ilia tantum quae cadunt in definitions speciei; sicut
humanitas comprehendit in se ea quae cadunt in definitione hominis; his
enim homo est homo, et hoc significat humanitas, hoc scilicet quo homo e3t
homo. Sed materia individualis cunt accidentibus omnibus individuantibus
313
ipsum non cadit in definitions speciei; non enim cadunt in definitions
hominis hae cames, et haec ossa, aut albedo, vel nigredo, vel aliqua
hujusmodi; unde hae cames et haec ossa, et accidentia designantia hanc
materiam non concluduntur in humanitate, et tamen in eo quod est homo,
includuntur; unde id quod est homo, habet in se aliquid quod non habet
humanitas; et propter hoc non est totaliter idem homo, et humanitas; sed
humanitas significatur ut pars formalis hominis, quia principia definientia habent se formaliter respectu materiae individuantis.
quae nonsunt composita ex materia et forma,
In his vero,
in quibus individuatio non
est p e r materiam individualem, id est, per hanc materiam, sed ipsae formae
per se individuantur, oportet quod ipsae formae sint supposita subsistentia, unde in eis non differt suppositum et natura.
(ST la, q.3 a.3,
Kigne ed., vol. I, p. 62)

God is the same as his essence or nature; to understand
this, it must be known that in things composed of matter
and form, it is necessary that nature or essence and the
supposit differ. Because the essence or nature compre
hends in itself what falls under the definition of the
species, just as humanity comprehends in itself what
fall under the definition of "man," for it is by these
aspects that a man is a man, and "humanity" signifies
this, namely, by which a man is a man. But individual
matter with all the individuating accidents does not
fall under the definition of the species, for this flesh
and these bones, or whiteness, or blackness, or anything
of the sort do not fall under the definition of "man,"
whence this flesh and these bones, and accidents desig
nating this matter are not included in humanity, but
they are included in what a man is, whence that which is
a
>ab in itself something which humanity does not
have. And because of this, a man and humanity are not
totally the same, but humanity is signified as the for
mal part of man, because defining principles are related
formally with regard to individuating matter. Truly in
these things which are not composed of matter and form
in which individuation is not due to individual matter,
i.e. this matter, but the forms are individuated through
themselves, it is necessary that the forms themselves be
subsisting supposits whence in them supposit and nature
do not differ.
313
(103)
. . . esse uniuscujusque est ei proprium, et distinctum ab esse cujuslibet
alterius rei; . . . (De Pot., q. 7, a.3 Opera Omnia. Vives ed., vol. XIII,
p. 220)
The existence of anything is proper to it and distinct
from the existence of any other thing.
(104)
. . . persona et essentia omnino re in Divinis non distinguantur.
In illis
enim, in quibus aliud est essentia, quam hypostasis vel suppositum, opor
tet quod sit aliquid materiale, per quod natura communis individuetur et
determinetur ad hoc singulare. Unde illam determinationem materiae vel
alicujus, quod loco materiae se habet, addit in creaturis hypostasis supra
essentiam et naturam; unde non omnino ista in creaturis idem sunt,
(i
Sent., d. 54, q.l, a.l, Opera Omnia. Vives ed., vol. XXXIV)
A Person and the divine essence are not at all really
distinguished. For in those things in which the essence
and the hypostasis or supposit are different, there must
be something material through which the common nature
is individuated and determined to this singular. Whence
in creatures, the hypostasis adds onto the essence or the
nature that determination of matter or something that
takes the place of matter. Whence these are not entirely
the same in creatures.
(105)
. . differt res et quod quid est, sive suppositum et natura; nam in
significations naturae includitur solum id, quod est de ratione speciei;
suppositum autem non solum habet haec, quae ad rationem speciei perti
nent, sed etiam alia, quae ei accidunt; . . . (ST III, a. 2, a. 2, Migne ed.,
vol. IV)
314
A thing differ? from its essence, or a supposit from its
nature. For in the notion of the nature is included
only what belongs to the notion of the species. The sup
posit, however, not only has what belongs to the notion
of the species, but also what are accidental to the sup
posit.
(106)
Homo . . . qui habet humanitatem, potest aliquid aliud habere, quod non
sit de rations humanitatis, sicut albedinem et hujusmodi, quae non insunt
humanitati, sed homini.
(De Pot., q.7, a.4, Opera Omnia. Vives ed., vol.
XIII)
A wan . . . who has humanity, can have something else
which does not belong to the notion of humanity, e.g.
whiteness and the like, which do not inhere in humanity
but in a man.
(107)
Hoc autem contingit in omnibus habentibus formam in materia, quia in eis
est aliquid praeter principia speciei.
Nam natura speciei individuatur per
materiam unde principia individuantia et accidentia individui sunt praeter

essentiamspeciei. Et ideo contingit sub una specie inveniri plura indi
vidual quae licet non differant in natura speciei, differunt tamen secundum
principia individuantia. Et propter hoc in omnibus habentibus formam in
materia, non est omnino idem, et res et quod quid est eius.
non est sua humanitas.
Socrates enim
(De An. Ill, lectio 8, n. 706, ed. Pirotta)
However this happens in all things which have their forms

in matter, because in them there is something besides the
principles of the species. For the nature of the species
is individuated through matter, and thus the individuating
principles and accidents of the individual are outside the
essence of the species. And therefore it happens that
many individuals are found under one species, and these do
not differ specifically, but they do differ, however, ac
cording to their individuating principles. And because of
this, in all things that have their form in matter, a thing
and what belongs to it are not entirely the same. For Soc
rates is not his humanity.
(108)
Quia para non praedicatur de toto, hinc est quod "humanitas" nec de homine nec de Socrate praedicatur. . . . Essentiam hominis significat hoc
nomen ffhomo" . . . ut totum, inquantum scilicet non praescindit designs*
tionem materiae sed implicite continet earn et indistincta, . . . et ideo
praedicatur hoc nomen "homo" de individuis; . . . (De Ente. ch. 3 ed.
Boyer, p. 27)
Because a part is not predicated of a whole, hence it is
that "humanity" is neither predicated of a man nor of
Socrates. . . . This noun "man" signifies the essence
of man. . . as a whole, insofar, namely, as it does not
prescind from the designation of matter but implicitly
and indirectly contains it, . . . And, therefore, this
noun "man" is predicated of individuals, . . .
(109)
. . . humanitas significatur ut quo aliquid est homo, et albedo quo ali
quid est album; . . . et ideo huiusmodi abstracts nihil alienum in se
habere possunt. Aliter autem se habet in his quae significantur in concreto. . . * Albedo vel humanitas significatur per modum parti3, et non
praedicantur de concretis, sicut nec sua pars de toto; . . . (in Boeth.
de Hebdom.
II, Opera Omnia. Vives ed., vol. LXIl)

. . . humanity is signified as that by which something is
a man, and whiteness that by which something is white;
. . . and, therefore, when such essences are abstracted
they can have nothing foreign in themselves. It is other
wise disposed, however, in those which are signified in
the concrete. . . . whiteness or humanity are signified
through the mode of a part and are not predicated of con
crete things just as a part is not predicated of a whole.
(110)
In creaturis autem essentia realiter differt a supposito; et ideo nullum

aotus proprie de essentia praedicatur, nisi causaliter.
In Divinis
autem essentia realiter non differt a supposito, sed solum ratione, sive
316
quantum ad moaum significandi: quia suppositum est distinctum et essentia
est communis,
(i Sent., d.5 q. 1 a.l, Opera Omnia. Vives ed., vol. VII,
p. 81)
In creatures, however, the essence really differs from a
supposit, and, therfore no act is properly predicated of
the essence except causally. In God, however, the es
sence does not really differ, but differs only rationally
or as to mode of signifying, from a supposit, because a
supposit is distinct and the essence is common.
(Ill)
. ..persona
aliud significat, quam natura. Natura enim significat es-
sentiamspeciei. quam significat definitio.
St si quidem his, quae ad
rationem speciei pertinent, nihil aliud adjunctum inveniri posset, nulla

necessitas esset distinguendi naturam a supposito naturae, qupd est individuum subsistens in natura ilia. . . Contingit autem in quibusdam rebus
subsistentibus inveniri aliquid, quod non pertinet ad rationem speciei,
scilicet accidentia et principia individuantia, sicut maxime apparet in
his, quae sunt ex materia et forma composita. Kt ideo in talibus etiam
secundum rem differt natura et suppositum, non quasi omnino aliqua separ
ata, sed quia in supposito includitur ipsa natura speciei, et superadduntur quaedam alia, quae sunt praeter rationem speciei; . . . Si qua vero
est res, in qua omnino nihil aliud est praeter rationem speciei vel na
turae suae, sicut est in Deo, in ea non est aliud secundum rem suppositum
et natura, sed solum secundum rationem intelligendi, quia natura dicitur,
secundum quod est essentia quaedam, eadem vero dicitur suppositum, se
cundum quod est subsistens.
(ST III, q. 2, a.2, Mgne ed., vol. IV, p.26)
"Person" and "nature" do not have the same meaning, for

"nature" signifies the essence of a species which is sig
nified by a definition. And indeed, if nothing else is
found to be adjoined to what belongs to the notion of the
species, there would be no necessity for distinguishing a
317
nature from a supposit of the nature which is an individu
al subsisting in that nature. . . . in certain subsisting
things, however, there happens to be found something which
does not belong to the notion of the species, namely acci
dents and individuating principles, as especially appears
in these things that are composed of matter and form.
And, therefore, in such things nature and supposit differ
even really, not as if they were entirely separated things,
but because the nature of the species itself is included
in the supposit along with other things which are outside
the notion of the species and superadded to it; . . . if
there istruly a thing in which there is nothing at all
outside the notion of the species or its nature, as is
the case with God, in that thing the supposit and the
nature are not really different, but they differ only ac
cording to the understanding, because the same being is
called a nature according as it is a certain essence, and
a supposit according as it is subsistent.
(112)
. . omnia quae sunt in genere uno, communicant in quidditate, vel essen
tia generis, quod praedicatur de eis in eo quod quid est; differunt autem
secundum esse; non enim idem est esse hominis, et equi, nec hujus hominis
et illius hominis, et sic oportet quod quaecumque sunt in genere, differant in
eis esse, et quod quid est, id est, essentia.
In Deo autem non
differunt. . . . (ST la, q.3 a.5 Migne ed., vol. I, p. 63l)

. . . all that are in one genus share in the quiddity or
essence of that genus, which is predicated of them on ac
count of what they are. The differ, however, according
to existence. For the existence of a man is not the
3ame as that of a horse, nor is the existence of this
man the same as the existence of that man. And so it
is necessary that in things which are in the same genus,
existence and essence differ. In God, however, they do
not differ. . . .
(113)
Haec autem materia demonstrata est sicut recipiens illam naturam communem.
Et ideo "natura vel "essentia" significatur dupliciter; scilicet ut pars,
secundum quod natura communis sumitur cum praecisione cujuslibet ad natur
am communem non pertinentis; sic enim materia demonstrata supervenit in
318
compositionem singularia demonstrati, sicut hoc nomen "humanitas," et sic
non praedicatur, nec est genus, nec est species, sed ea formaliter denominatur homo; vel significatur ut totum, secundum quod ea quae ad naturam
communem pertinent, sine praecisione intelliguntur; sic enim includitur in
potentia etiam materia demonstrata in natura communis, et sic significatur
hoc nomine "homo," et significatur ut quod est.
Et utroque modo invenitur
hoc nomen "essentia." (i Sent., d.23, ql, a.l, Opera Omnia. Vives ed.,
vol. VII, p. 282)
This demonstrated matter, however, is as a recipient of
the common nature. And, therefore, "nature" or "es
sence" is signified in two ways; namely as a part ac
cording as the common nature is taken with precision
of anything not belonging to it, (for thus demonstrated
matter supervenes in the composition of a demonstrated
singular), e.g. this word "humanity," and it is not
predicated nor is it genus or species, but it is that
which "man" formally denominates; or it is signified
as a whole according as what belong to the common na
ture are understood without precision from the nature,
for thus even demonstrated matter is potentially in
cluded in the common nature, and thus the essence is
signified by this word "man," and is signified as that
which is. And this word "essence" is used in both
senses.
(114)
. . . plures personae sunt plures relationes subsistentes ab invicem
realiter distinctae. Realis autem distinctio inter relationes divinas
non est nisi ratione oppositionis relativae. Ergo oportet duas rela
tionesoppositae ad duas personas pertinere.
(ST la, q. 30, a.2, Migne
ed., vol. I, p. 874)

The many Persons are many subsisting relations really
distinct from one another. A real distinction among
divine relations, however, occurs only by reason of
relative opposition. Therefore it is necessary that
two opposite relations belong to two Persons.
519
(115)
. . dupliciter considerari relatio in. divinis: vel per comparationem ad
essentiam, et sic est ratio tantum; vel per comparationem ad illud ad quod
refertur, et sic per propriam rationem relationis relatio realiter distinguitur ab illo. Sed per comparationem relationis ad suum correlativum op
position distinguuntur personae, et non per comparationem relationis ad essentiam: et ideo est pluralitas personarum realis et non tantum rationis.
(I Sent., d.2, q.l, a.5, Opera Omnia. Vives ed., vol. VII, p. 41)
There are two ways of considering relation with regard to
God: either through comparison with the essence, and thus
a relation is only a notion; or through comparison to
that which is related, and so a relation, through the
proper notion of relation,is really distinguished from
that to which it is referred. But the Persons are dis
tinguished through a comparison of a relation to its cor
relative opposite, and not through a comparison of a re
lation to the essence. And, therefore, the plurality
of Persons is real and not merely rational.
(116)
Non enim est possibile dicere quod secundum aliquid absolutum divinae
personae ab invicem distinguantur, quia sequeretur quod non esset trium
una essentia.
Quidquid enim in divinis absolute dicitur, ad unitatem
essentiae pertinet. Relinquitur ergo quod solum relationibus divinae

personae ab invicem distinguantur.
Relationes autem personas distin-
guere non possunt, nisi secundum quod sunt oppositae.
(ST la, q. 36,
a.2, ttigne ed., vol. I, p. 914)

For it is not possible to say that the divine Persons
are distinguished from each other according to something
absolute, because it would follow that the three would
not be one essence. For whatever is absolutely said
about God belongs to his essence. It remains, therefore
that the divine Persons are only distinguished from each
other by relations. Relations, however, cannot distin
guish the divine Persons unless they are opposed.
320
(117)
. . . relationes in rebus creatis accidentaliter insunt, ita in Deo sunt
ipsa essentia divina. Ex quo sequitur quod in Deo non sit aliud essentia
quam persona secundum rem, et tamen quod personae realiter ab invicem dis
tinguantur. Persona enim, . . . significat relationem prout est subsistens
in natura divina. Relatio autem ad essentiam comparata non differt re, sed
ratione tantum. Comparata autem ad oppositam relationem habet virtute oppositionis realem distinctionem. Et sic remanet una essentia, et tres per
sonae.
.. .relationes ipsae non distinguuntur ab invicem, secundum quod
sunt realiter idem cum essentia.
(ST la, q.39, a.l, Migne ed., vol. I,
p. 930)
Relations accidentally inhere in created things; so in
God they are the divine essence itself. Prom which it
follows that in God the essence and a Person are not
really different, however the Persons are really dis
tinguished from one another. For "Person'* . . . signi
fies a relation according as it subsists in the divine
nature. A relation, however, does not differ really,
but only rationally, as compared to the divine essence.
Compared, however, to an opposite relation, it has, by
virtue of the opposition, a real distinction from that.
And so one essence remains three Persons. . . . The re
lations are not distinguished from each other accord
ing as they are really identical with the divine es
sence.
(118)
. . . quidam posuerunt potentias animae non esse aliud quam ipsam eius
essentiam: . . . Sed haec positio est omnino impossibilis.
Priao, quidea, quia impossibile est quod alicuius substantiae creatae,
sua essentia sit sua potentia operativa. . . . sicut autem ipsum esse
est actualitas quaedam essentiae, ita operari est actualitas operativae
potentiae. . . . Unde, cum in nulla creatura suum operari sit suum esse,
sed hoc sit proprium solius Dei, sequitur quod nullius creaturae opera-
321
tiva potentia sit eius essentia; . . .
Secundo, . . . quia essentia una est; in potentiis autem oportet ponere
multitudinem propter diversitatem actuum et obiectorum.
Oportet enim
potentias secundum actus diversificari, cum potentia ad actum dicatur.

. . . idem apparet ex potentiarum differentia, quarum quaedam sunt quarumdam partium coprois actus, . . . quaedam vero non sunt actus alicuius par
tis corporis, ut intellectus et voluntas.
Quod non posset esse, si poten-
tiae aaimae non essent aliud quam eius essentia; non enim potest dici
quod unum et idem possit esse actus corporis et separatum, nisi secundum
diversa. (Soir. Creat.. a.11, ed. Keeler, pp. 140-141)
Some people posit that the powers of the soul are not
other than the essence of the soul: . . . But this
position is entirely impossible. First, indeed, be
cause it is possible for the essence of some created
substance to be its operative potency. . . . However,
just as existence itself is the actuality of a certain
essence, so to be operative is the actuality of an
operative power. . . . Whence, since in no creature
Eire being operative and existing identical, but this
is true only in God, it follows that in no creature
is the operative power its essence. . . . Second, . . .
because the essence is one; it is necessary, however,
to posit a multitude of powers because of the diver
sity of acts and objects of the powers. For it is
necessary for powers to be diversified by acts, since
potency is related to act. . . . the same appears from
the difference of powers, some of which are acts of
certain parts of the body, . . . some truly are not
acts of some part of the body, e.g. intellect and will.
This could not be if the powers of the soul were not
other than the essence of the soul. For it cannot be
said that one and the same thing can be the act of a
body and separate from it except according as it is
diverse *
. . . potentiae animae non sunt ipsa eius essentia,
(p. 142)
The powers of the soul Eire not the essence of the soul.
(119)
Unde si potentiae animae non sunt ipsa essentia animae, . . . sequitur
322
quod sint accidentia in aliquo novem generum contenta. Sunt enim in secunda specie qualitatis quae dicitur potentia vel impotencia naturalis. . . .
Sic igitur potentiae animae sunt medium inter e ssentiam animae et accidens, quasi proprietates naturales vel essentiales, . . . (Ibid.. p. 142)
Whence, if the powers of the soul are not the essence of
the soul itself, . . . it follows that they are accidents
contained in one of the nine categories. F o r they are
in the second species of quality which is called natural
potency or impotency. . . .
So, therefore, the powers of the soul are intermediate
between the essence of the soul and an accident, being
like natural or essential properties.
(120)
Manifestum est igitur quod ipsa essentia animae non est principium immediatum suarum operationum, sed operatur mediantibus principiis accidentalibus.
Unde potentiae animae non sunt ipsa essentia animae sed proprietates eius.
(ftuaest. de An. q.12. pp. 181-182)
It is evident, therefore, that the essence of the soul
itself is not the immediate principle of its operations,
but it operates by means of accidental principles.
Whence the powers of the soul are not the essence of
the soul itself, but its properties.
(121)
. . . potentia, secundum illud quod est potentia, ordinatur ad actum.
Unde oportet rationem potentiae accipi ex actu ad quam ordinatur; et per
consequens oportet quod ratio potentiae diversificetur, ut diversificatur
ratio actus. Ratio autem actus diversificatur secundum diversam rationem
objecti; . . . (ST la, q. 77, a.2, Migne ed.. vol. I, p. 1237)
. . . a potency, according to that which a potency is, is
ordered to an act. Whence it is necessary that the no
tion of a potency be taken from the act to which it is
ordered. And consequently, it is necessary that the no
tion of a potency be diversified as the notion of the act
is diversified. The notion of an act, however, is diver
sified according to the diverse notions of its objects.
323
(122)
Genera vero potentiarum animae distinguuntur secundum objects. . . . Alicujus enim potentiae animae objectum est solum corpus animae uniturn; et
hoc genus potentiarum animae dicitur vegetativum; . . . Est autem aliud
genus potentiarum animae quod respicit adhuc universalius objectum, sci
licet omne corpus sensibile, . . . Est autem aliud genus potentiarum ani
mae quod respicit adhuc universalius objectum, scilicet non solum corpus
sensibile. . . . (33? Ia, q. 78, a.l, Migne ed., vol. I, pp. 1246-7)
The genera of powers of the soul are distinguished accord
ing to their objects. . . . for of some powers of the soul
the object is only a body united to the soul, and this
genus of powers of the soul is called the vegetative ge
nus; . . There is, however, another genus of powers of
the soul which has regard for a still more universal ob
ject, namely every sensible body, . . . There is another
genus of powers of the soul which has regard for a still
more universal object, namely, not only sensible body,
but all being.
. . . diversae animae distinguuntur secundum quod diversimode operatio
animae supergreditur operationem naturae corporalis. . . Est ergo quae
dam operatio animae quae in tantum excedit naturam corpoream, quod neque
etiam exercetur per organum corporale; et talis est operatio animae r.ationalis. Est autem alia operatio animae infra istam, quam quidem fit
per organum corporale, non tamen per aliquam corpoream qualitatem; et
talis est operatio animae sensibilis; . . . Infima autem opcxaiionum ani
mae est quae fit per organum corporeum, et virtute corporeae qualitatis.
. , et talis est operatio animae vegetabilis.
(ibid.. p. 1246)
The diverse souls are distinguished according as the oper

ation of the souls diversely surpasses the operation of a
bodily nature . . . . There is, therefore, a certain oper
ation of the soul which so far exceeds bodily nature that
it is not even exercised through a bodily organ, and such
is the operation of the rational soul. There is, however,
another operation of the soul below this which is indeed
made through a corporeal organ but not through some bodily
quality, and such is the operation of the sensible soul;

. . . The lowest operation of the soul, however, is that
made through a bodily organ and by virtue of a bodily
quality . . . and such is the operation of the vegetable
soul.
(123)
Relinquitur ergo quod in homine sit tantum una anima secundum substantiam,
quae est rationalis, sensibilis et vegetabilis.
. . . forma perfectior dat materiaeaquicquid dabat inferior et adhuc
amplius.
Unde anima rationalis dat corpori humani quicquid dat anima vege
tabilis plantis, et quicquid dat anima sensibilis brutis, et ulterius ali

quid. Et propter hoc ipsa est in homine et vegetabili3 et sensibilis et
rationalis.
Huic etiam attestatur quod, cum operatio unius potentiae
fuerit intensa, impeditur alia operatio, et etiam fit redundantia ab una

potentia in aliam, quod non esset nisi omnes potentiae in una essentia
animae radicarentur.
(Quaest. de An. q.ll, p. 172)
It remains, therefore, that in man there is only one soul

according to substance and this i3 rational, sensible,
and vegetable.
. . . The more perfect form gives to matter whatever the
inferior gives, and still more. Whence the rational
soul gives to the human body whatever the vegetable soul
gives to plants, and whatever the sensible soul gives to
brutes, and something else. And because of this there
is in niAn the vegetable, the sensible, and the rational.
The following also attest to this: when the operation of
one power is intense, another operation is hindered; and
there is a redundancy from one power to another, which
would not be unless all the powers were rooted in one
essence of the soul.
(124)
Unde dicendum est quod nulla alia forma substantialis est in homine nisi
sola awimq intellectiva, et quod ipsa sicut virtute continet animam sensitivam et nutritivam, ita virtute continet omnes inferiores formas, et
facit ipsa sola quidquid imperfectior.es formae in aliis faciunt.
(ST la,
q. 76, a.4, Migne ed., vol. I, p.1224)

Whence it must be said that there is no other substantial
form in man besides the intellective soul, and that, just
as it contains the sensitive and nutritive souls, so it
virtually contains all the inferior forms and does by it
self alone whatever more imperfect forms do in other be
ings.
(125)
Quae enim sumuntur a diversis formis, praedicantur ad invicem; vel per
accidens,
si formae non sint ad invicem ordinatae, puta cum dicimus,
quod album est dulce; vel si formae sint ordinatae ad invicem, erit praedicatio
per se in secundo modo dicendi per se; quia subjectum ponitur in
definitione praedicati, . . . Si ergo alia forma sit a qua aliquid dici

tur animal, et a qua aliquid dicitur homo: sequeretur quod vel unum horum
non possit praedicari de altero nisi per accidens, si istae duae formae
ad invicem ordinem non habent; vel quod sit ibi praedicatio in secundo
modo dicendi per se, si una animarum sit ad aliam praeambula.
Utrumque
autem horum est manifeste falsum; quia animal per se de homine praedi
catur, non per accidens; homo autem non ponitur in definitione animalis,
sed e converso. Ergo oportet eamdem formam esse per quam aliquid est
animal, et per quam aliquid est homo; . . . Inveniuntur enim rerum spe
cies etformae
dif'ferre ab invicem secundum perfectius et minus perfec-
tum; sicut inrerum ordine animata perfectiora sunt inanimatis, et animalia plantis, et homines animalibus brutis, . . . (ST_la, q. 76, a.3,
Migne ed., vol. I, p. 1221)
For what are taken from diverse forms are predicated of
each other, either accidentally if the forms are not
ordered to each other, for example when we say "This
white thing is sweet," or, if the forms are ordered to
each other, the predication will be essential in the
second mode because the subject is put in the defini
tion of the predicate, . . . If, therefore, there be
one form by which something is called an animal and another

by which something is called a man, it would follow that
either one of these could not be predicated of the other
except accidentally, if those two forms did not have an
order to each other, or that there is predication there
in the second mode of essential predication if one of the
souls were a preamble to the other. Each alternative is,
however, clearly false because "animal11 is predicated of
"man" per se and not accidentally. "Jflan," however, is not
put in the definition of "animal," but conversely. There
fore it is necessary for that to be the same form through
which something is an animal and a man; . . . For the
species and forms of things are found to differ from each
other according to the more and the less perfect, just as
in the order of things the animate are more perfect than
the inanimate, animals are more perfect than plants, and
men are more perfect than bea3ts, . . .
(126)
Dicendum quod . . . forma perfectissima det omnia quae dant formae imperfectiores et adhuc amplius; . . . non intelligatur haec distinctio in
formis secundum essentiam, sed solum secundum intelligibilem rationem.
. . . cum animal sit id quod vere est homo, distinctio naturae animalis
ab homine non est secundum diversitatem realem formarum, quasi alia forma
sit per quam sit animal, et superadditur altera per quam sit homo; sed
secundum rationes intelligibiles. . . . Cum enim genus et species signi
ficant quasdam intentiones intelligibiles, non requiritur ad distinctionem speciei et generis distinctio realis formarum, sed intelligibilis
tantum.
(Spir. Creat.. a.3, ed. Keeler, ad 2, 3, P 45)

It must be said that . . . the most perfect form gives
all that more imperfect forms give and still more; . .
. . this distinction is not understood to be an essen
tial one of forms, but only a rational distinction.
. . . since aruanimal may be that which is truly a man,
the distinction of the animal nature from man is not
according to a real diversity of forms, as if there were
one form through which it is an animal, and there is
superadded another through which it is a man, but ac
cording to intelligible notions. . . . For, since genus
and species signify certain intelligible intentiones,
a real distinction of forms is not necessary for a dis
327
tinction of species and genus, but only a rational dis
tinction.
(127)
Sunt enim quaedam relationes quae sequuntur actionem intellectus, sicut est
de relatione identitatis et de genere et de specie et huiusmodi, in quibus
nulla est diversitas nisi quam facit intellectus.
(De ttuat. Qpp..Qpusc.
Phil., ed. Spiazzi, p. 594)

For there are some relations which follow, the action of
the understanding, such as the relation of identity and
the relation of genus and,of species, and the like, in
which there is no diversity except that which the under
standing makes.
(128)
. . * est tantum in ipsa apprehensions rationis conferentis unum alteri;
et tunc est relatio rationis tantum; sicut cum comparat ratio hominem animali ut species ad genus.
(SJT la, q. 28, a.l, Migne ed., vol. I, p. 858)
. . . it is only in the apprehension of reason comparing

one to the other, and then it is only a relation of
reason, just as when it compares the concept of man to
that of animal as species to genus.
(129)
. . . quicquid perfectionis est in creatura, est in creatore tamquam in
causa, sed excellentiori modo; quia nobiliori modo est aliquid in causa
quam in effectu.
In creatura autem differunt realiter.
Seel quia alia
est ratio sapientiae, et bonitatis, ideo haec attributa differunt ratione,

quia ratio nihil est quam intentio in intellectu perceptibilis, quae per
nomen rei alicujus vel per ejus definitionem significatur.
Haec autem
differentia, sive pluralitas, contingit turn propter defectum intellectus

nostri, turn propter eminentiam divinae naturae.
Propter perfectionem
enim essentiae divinae et imperfectionem intellectus creati, quod in Deo

est per modum simplicitatis et unitatis.-concipitur ab intellectu per
328
modum diversitatis et multiplicitatia: ideo perfectiones attributorum
quae in Deo sunt idem, diversis conceptionibus apprehenduntur ab intellectu.
Quia enim intellectus humanus accipit a creaturis, in quibus
sunt hujusmodi perfectiones diversae: ideo has perfectiones in Deo existentes, in quas devenit per perfectiones creaturarum, diversimode apprehendit.
(i Sent,, d.2, a,l, a.2, Opera Omnia, vol. XXX, p. 23)

Whatever perfection is in a creature is in the creator
as if in a cause, but in a more excellent way, because
something is in a cause in a more noble way than it is
in an effect. In a creature, however, they differ
really. But, because the concepts 'wisdom' and 'good
ness' are different, these attributes differ rationally,
because a concept is ndthing but a perceptible intentio
in the intellect which is signified through the name of
something or through its definition. However, this dif
ference or plurality occurs as much because of a defect
of our understanding as because of the eminence of the
divine nature. For, because of the perfection of the
creatures in which there are such diverse perfections,
therefore it apprehends in diverse ways these perfections
existing in God to which it comes through the perfections
of creatures.
(130)
Sic enim omnes perfections in rebus aliis inventas Deo attribui diximus
sicut effectus in suis causes aequivocis inveniuntur.
tus in suis causis sunt virtute, ut calor in sole.
Qui quidem effec-
Virtus autem huius-
modi nisi aliqualiter esset de genere c&loris, sol per earn agens non
sibi simile generaret. Ex hac igitur virtute sol calidus dicitur, non
solum quia calorem facit, sed quia virtus per quam hoc facit, est aliquid
conforme calori.
Per eandem autem virtutem per quam muitos alios effec
tus in inferioribus corporibus, utpote siccitatem. Et sic calor et siccitas, quae in igne sunt qualitates diversae, soli attribuuntur per unam
virtutem.
Ita et omnium perfectiones, quae rebus aliis secundum diversae
329
formas conveniunt, Deo secundum unam eius virtutem attribui est necesse.
Quae . . . non est aliud a sua essentia. . . * (SCG 1, ch. 39, Opera Omnia.
Leon. ed.f vol. Xlll)
For thus all perfections found in other things we said to
be attributed to God, just as effects are found in their
equivocal causes, which effects are indeed virtually in
their causes just as heat is in the sun. But, unless
such a power were in some way of the genus of heat, the
sun acting through it would not generate something simi
lar to the sun. Therefore the sun is called "hot' from
the power, not only because it makes heat, but because
the power through which it makes this is something adapted
to heat. Through the same power, however, it makes other
effects in inferior bodies, for example dryness. And
thus heat and dryness, which are diverse qualities in
fire, are attributed to the sun through one power. So
it is necessary to attribute all perfections which be
long to other things according to diverse forms, to God
but according to one power which . . . is not other than
his essence. . . .
(131)
. . nobilitas omnium creaturarum inveniatur in Deo nobilissimo modo et
sine aliqua imperfectione: et ideo quae in creaturis sint diversa, in
Deo propter summam simplicitatem sunt unum.
Sic ergo dicendum est, quod
in Deo est, sapientia, bonitas et hujusmodi, quorum quodlibet est ipsa

divina essentia, et ita omnia sunt unum re. Et quia unumquodque eorum
est in Deo secundum sui verissimam rationem, et ratio sapientiae non est
ratio bonitatis, inquantum hujusmodi,
relinquitur quod sunt diversa ra-
tione, nontantum ex parte ipsius ratiocinantis, sed ex proprietate

ipsius rei:et inde est quod ipse non est causa rerum omnino aequivoca,
cum secundumformam
suam producat effectus similes, non univoce, sed
analogice; sicut a sua sapientia derivatur omnis sapientia, et ita de

aliis attributis, . . . (i Sent., d.2, q.l, a.2, Opera Omnia, Vives ed.,
vol. VII, p. 34)
330
The nobility of all creatures is found in God in the most
noble fashion and without any imperfection, and therefore
what in creatures are diverse are one in God because of
his highest simplicity. So, therefore, it must be said
that in God there is wisdom, goodness, and the like, any
of which is the divine essence itself and so all are
really one. And because everyone of them is in God ac
cording to its highest notion, and the notion of goodness
is not the notion of wisdom as such, it follows that they
are rationally diverse, not from the part of the one
reasoning only, but from the property of the thing itself.
And thence it is that it is not entirely an equivocal
cause of things, since according to its form it produces
similar effects not univocally, but analogically, just as
from his wisdom all wisdom is derived, and so on for the
other attributes.
(132)
. . . pluralitas rationum contingit ex hoc quod res quae Deus est, superat intellectum nostrum.
Intellectus enim noster non potest una conceptio
ns diversos modos perfectionis accipere: turn quia ex creaturis cognitionem

accipit, in quibus sunt diversi modi perfectionum secundum diversas formas:
turn quia hoc quod in Deo est unum et simplex, plurificatur in intellectu
nostro, etiam si immediate a Deo reciperet; . . . impossibile est quod
conceptio intellectus creati repraesentet totam perfectionem divinae
esBentiae.
Unde una re visa diversas conceptiones formaret, et diversa
nomina imponeret. . . . Quod autem Deus excedat intellectum nostrum est

ex parte intellectus nostri, quid deficienter se habet ad earn comprehendendam. . * . Et ideo pluralitati istarum rationum respondet aliquid in
re quae Deus est; non quidem pluralitas rei, sed plena perfectio, ex qua
contingit ut omnes istae conceptiones ei aptentur.
(ibid.. pp. 38-39)
The plurality of concepts is due to the fact that the

thing which is God exceeds our understanding. For our
understanding cannot receive diverse modes of perfection
by means of one concept, as much because it gets its
knowledge from creatures in which the diverse modes of
perfections come from diverse forms, as because that
which is one and simple in God is multiplied in our
351
understanding even if it is immediately received from

Sod; . . . it is impossible that a concept of a created
intellect should represent the whole perfection of the
divine essence. Whence it would form diverse concepts
for one thing perceived and would impose diverse names
on it. . . . However, that God exceeds our understand
ing is due to our understanding which is deficiently
disposed.to comprehend him. . . . And, therefore, to
the plurality of these concepts something in the thing
which is God corresponds, not indeed a multiplicity of
things, but his full perfection because of which all
these concepts are appropriate to him.
(135)
Ab aeterno creaturis non existentibus, . . . fuit verum dicere quod [beus}
est sapiens, bonus et hujusmodi.
(ibid.)
From eternity, even if creatures did not exist . . . it

would be true to say that God is wise, good, and the like.
(134)
Quandoque vero relatio in una ?xtreaorum est res naturae, et in altero est
res rationis tantum: et hoc contingit quandocumque duo extrema non sunt
unius ordinis; . . . (ST la, q.13, &7, Migne ed., vol. I, p. 716)
Sometimes truly a relation in one of the extremes is a
natural thing and in the other it is a being of reason
only, and this happens whenever the two extremes are
not of the same order. . . .
(135)
Tunc enim aliquid est unum re et rations multiplex, quando una res respondet diversis conceptionibus et nominibus, ut de ea verificentur; si
cut punctum, quod cum sit una res, respondst secundum veritatem diversis
conceptionibus de eo facta, sive prout cogitatur in se, sive prout cogitatur centrum, sive prout cogitatur principium linearum; et hae rationes
sive conceptiones sunt in intellectu sicut in subjecto, et in ipso puncto
sicut in fundamento veritatis istarum conceptionum.
(I Sent., d.2, q.l,
a.3, ad 6, Opera Omnia. Vives ed., voir-VII, p. 40)
332
For then something is really one and rationally multiple
when one thing corresponds to diverse concepts and names
as are verified of it, just as a point which, since it is
one thing, answers truly to diverse concepts made of it
either according as it is considered in itself, or as it
is considered as a center, or as it is considered as the
beginning of lines. And these concepts are in the intel
lect as in a subject, and in the point itself as in the
foundation of the truth of those.concepts.
(136)
. . ens est duplex: ens scilicet rationis et ens naturae. Ens autem
rationis dicitur propriet de illis intentionibus, quas ratio adinvenit in
rebus consideratis; sicut intentio generis, speciei et similium, quae
quidem non inveniuntur in rerum natura, sed considerationum rationis consequuuntur.
(Meta. IV, lectio 4, n. 764, ed. Cathala)

Being is of two sorts: namely being of reason and being of
nature. Those intentiones which reason devises in the
things it considers are properly called beings of reason,
e.g. the intentio of genus, species, and the like, which
indeed are not found in the nature of things, but follow
the consideration of reason.
(137)
Quaecumque sunt idem, ita se habent, quod quidquid praedicatur de uno,

praedicatur et de alio.
(ST la, q.40, a.l, ad 3 Migne ed., vol. I,p. 947)
What are the same are so related to each other that what
is predicated of one is also predicated of the other.
(138)
Terminus in subiecto positus tenetur materialiter, idest pro supposito;
positus vero in praedicato tenetur formaliter, idest pro natura significata.
(ST III,
q.
16, a.7, ad 4, Migne ed., vol. IV, p. 180)
A term in the subject position is taken materially, i.e.

for a supposit. In the predicate position a term is
taken formally, i.e. for the nature signified by it.
(139)
Praedicatum semper significatur inesse subiecto.
(i Sent.. d.4, q.2, a.2,
333
Opera Omnia. Vives ed., vol. VIl)
A predicate is always signified to inhere in a subject.
(140)
Dicitur autem hie affirmatio compositio, quia significat praedicatum inesse subiecto.
(Meta. IX, lectio 11, n. 1898, ed. Cathala)

Affirmation, however, is called composition because it
signifies a predicate to inhere in a subject.
(141)
. . . nihil est simpliciter unum nisi per formam unam per quam habet res
esse.
(ST la. q. 76, a.3, Migne ed., vol. I, p. 1222)

Nothing is simply one except through one form through
which the thing has its being.
(142)
Natura . . . secundum rationem propriam . . . si quaeratur utrum ista na
tura sic considerata possit dici una vel plures, neutrum concedendum ests
quia utrumque est extra intellectum humanitatis, et utrumque potest sibi
accidere.
Si enim pluralitas esset de intellectu eius, numquam posset
esse turn, cum tamen una sit secundum quod est in Socrate.
Similiter, si
unitas esset de intellectu et ratione eius, tunc esset una et eadem na

tura Socratis et Platonis, nec posset in pluribus plurificari.
(De Ente.
ch. 4, ed. Boyer, p. 30)

A nature . . . according to its proper notion . . . if
it were asked whether that nature so considered could
be said to be one or many, neither must be allowed.
Because each is outside the notion of humanity, and each
can be an accident of it. For if plurality.-.were of its
notion, it could never be one, since it would be one ac
cording as it is in Socrates. Similarly if unity were
in its notion, then the nature in Socrates and in Plato
would be one and the same and could not be multiplied
in many beings.
(143)
Universalis autem causa et prima omnium entium Deus est, non solum substantiarum, sed etiam accidentium . . . unde secundum naturae ordinem acciden
tia a principiis substantiae dependent, ut sine subiecto esse non possint.
Tamen per hoc non excluditur quin Deus quasi causa prima possit acciden
tia in esse servare, substantia remota.
(Quaestiones Quodlibetales.
Quod. 9, q*3, Spiazzi, 183)

However the universal and first cause of all beings is
God, not only of substances, but even of accidents . . .
whence according to the order of nature, accidents de
pend on the principles of substance, so that they can
not be without a subject. It is not, however, excluded
through this that God as first cause should be able to
preserve accidents in being once their subject is re
moved.
(144)
Cuiuslibet enim potentiae ratio est secundum ordinem ad actum; unde necesse est, si actus sint diversi secundum speciem, quod potentiae habeant diversam rationem speciei.
(De An. II, lectio 4, 269, ed. Pirotta)
For the ratio of any potency is ordered to an act, whence

it is necessary, if acts are specifically diverse, that
powers be specifically diverse.
(145)
. . . omnis forma in supposito singular! existens, per quod individuatur,
communis est multis vel secundum rem vel secundum rationem saltern; sicut
natura humana communis est multis secundum rem et rationem; natura autem
solis non est communis multis secundum rem sed secundum rationem tantum;
potest enim natura solis intelligi ut in pluribus suppositis existens.
(ST la, a.13, q.9 Blackfriars ed., vol. Ill, p. 82)
Every form existing in a singular supposit (through which
this form is individuated) is either really or conceptual
ly common to many, just as human nature is both really and
conceptually common to many îndividuals"J. The nature of
335
the sun, however, is not common to many really but only
conceptually, for the nature of the sun can be under
stood. as existing in many supposits.
(146)
Substantiva significant non tantum formam sed etiam suppositum formae,
unde possunt praedicari ratione utriusque; et quando praedicantur ratione suppositi dicitur praedicatio per identitatem, quando autem ratione
formae dicitur praedicatio per denominationem sive informationem, et
haec est magis proprie praedicatio quia termini in praedicato tenentur
formaliter . . . (ill Sent., d.5* Vives ed., vol. X)
Substantive terms signify not only forms but also suppos
its of forms, whence they can be predicated by reason of
either mode of significationJ * And when they are predi
cated by reason of supposit, the predication is that of
identity; when however l*y reason of form, it is called
predication through denomination or in-formation, and
this is more properly predication because here terms in
the predicate position are taken formally . . .
336
Bonaventure
Abbreviations of works cited*
Brev.
Breviloauii
Q. Map. de Hyst. Trin.
Quaestiones Bisputatae de Mvsterio Trinitatis
Sent
Commentaria in ttuatuor Iibros

Sententiarum
Quar.
refers to the Quaracchi edition

of the Opera Omnia
(1)
Et propterea sunt ibi tantum tres modi differendi, scilicet secundum modos
esaendi sive emanandi, sicut differt persona a persona; secundum modos se
habendi.
sicut differt persona et essentia quia una persona ad alteram
refertur, et ideo distinguitur, essentia vero non refertur ad alteram, et

ideo non distinguitur secundum modos etiam intelligendi, sicut differt
una proprietas substantialis ab altera, ut bonitas et sapientia. Prima
differentia est maior, quae possit reperiri in divinis; est enim in suppo3itis, ita quod unum non dicitur de altero. Secunda differentia est
Tninrvr- quia est in attributis; licet enim unum possit dici de alio, ut
persona de essentia, aliquid tamen dicitur de una, quod non de altero,
ut* persona distinguitur et refertur, essentia vero non. Tertia vero
differentia est minima quia est in connotatis.
Licet enim unum de altero
dicatur ad invicem, et idem possit dici de utrisque; non tamen idem connotatur utrobique, nec per idem intelligi datur utrumque. Ex primo
modo differendi oritur pluralitas personarum; ex secundo modo pluralitas
praedicationum substantialium et relativarum; ex tertio pluralitas proprietatum essentialium et notionum. . . . (Brev. P. I, ch. IV, Quar.,
337
vol. V, p. 213)
And therefore there are there Q n God} only three ways of
differing, namely according to modes of being or emanat
ing as one Person differs from another Person; according
to modes of relating, as a Person differs from the essence
because one Person is related to another and is therefore
distinguished from that, but the essence truly is not re
lated to another and therefore is not distinguished; also
according to modes of understanding, as one substantial
property differs from another such as goodness and wisdom.
The first difference which can be found in God is greater
for it is in supposits so that one is not predicated of
the other. The second difference is lesser, because it
is in the attributes. For, although one extreme can be
predicated of the other, as a Person of the essence, how
ever something is predicated of one and not the other,
e.g. a Person is distinguished and related, and the es
sence is truly not distinguished and not related. Truly
the third difference is the least, because it is in what
are connoted. For although one extreme may be predi
cated of the other, and the same can be predicated of
both, they do not, however, connote the same, nor is each
understood through the same means. From the first way
of differing the plurality of Persons originates, from
the second way the plurality of substantial and relative
predications arises; from the third way, the plurality
of essential properties and notions originates.
(2)
. . . differre ratione est tripliciter.
Uno modo a parte nostrae appre-
hensionis. sicut differunt in Deo bonitas et magnitudo. Alio modo . . .

est secundum differentiam attributionis. quia aliquis modus ponitur circa
unum vel attribuitur uni, qui non attribuitur alteri; et sic differunt
ratione essentia et persona et notio. Tertio modo . . . est differre
secundum pluralitatem distinctionis. quae non inducit diversitatem in es
sentia vel natiara, tamen tsntam inducit differentiam, quod unum non dici
tur de altero; et sic differt ratione persona a persona, et proprietas a
proprietate: Et prima quidem differentia secundum rationem est minima,
quia nihil ei respondet a parte rei; sed ultimae respondet.
(ad 2)
Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod haec tollit summam simplicitatem; dicendum,
338
quod differentia rationis ouaedam fundatur super quid absolutum sive substantiale sive accidentale, quaedam super respectum sive modum se habendi.
Et prima differentia omnino repugnat simplicitati, et non potest esse in
Deo; secunda vero non repugnat. . . . Dicendum ergo, quod proprietates
personales sunt respectivae. non absolutae: et ideo possunt differre ratio
ne respectuum; . . . (ad 5)(l Sent., d. XXVI, a. un., q.l, Quar., vol. I,
P. 453)
To differ rationally happens in three ways: in one way from
the part of our apprehension, just as goodness and great
ness differ in God; in another way . . . according to a
difference of attribution, because some mode is placed
about, or is attributed to one extreme which is not at
tributed to the other, and thus essence and Person and
notion differ rationally; in the third way . . . there is
a difference according to a plurality of distinction, which
does not introduce diversity into the essence or nature,
but only introduces a difference, that one is not predi
cated of the other, and so Person and Person, and pro
perty and property differ rationally. And indeed the
first rational difference is the least because nothing
on the part of the thing corresponds to it. But something
does so correspond in the last two differences.
To that it is objected that this removes the highest sim
plicity from God. It must be said that some difference
of reason is founded on something absolute, either sub
stantial or accidental, and some difference of reason on
something relative or a manner of relating. And the first
difference is entirely repugnant to the divine simpli
city and cannot be in God. But the second is truly not
repugnant . . . It must be said, therefore, that the per
sonal properties are relative, not absolute, and there
fore they can differ from one another by reason of re
lation . . . .
(3)
Uno modo dici diversimode attenditur secundum diversum modum essendi.
qui est per se et per accidens: et hoc quidem modo non est dici diversi
mode in divinis, quia ista diversitas modi ponit diversitatem essentialem in re dicta; et quantum ad hoc unus solus modus dicendi est in Deo.
Nam omnia quae dicuntur de Deo, sunt ipse DeuSêt eius substantia.
339
Alio modo dici diversimode est secundum diversum modum intellieendi. qui
quidem attenditur secundum aliam et aliam rationem sive medium cognoscendi; et sic non tantum est dici diversimode
in nominibus divinis, im-
mo omnimndp. quia Deus non tantum cognoscitur per diversa, immo per omnia
rerum genera: et sic nomina dicta de Deo, quaedam dicuntur per modum sub
stantiae . ut Deus;
quaedam per modum ouantitatis. ut magnus: quaedam per
modum nuftlltatiH. ut bonus; et sic de aliis omnibus. Tertio modo did

diversimode est secundum diversum modum se. habendi: quod quidem attendi
tur quantum ad absolutum et ad comparatum sive relatum; et hie quidem mo
dus diversitatis minor est quam primus, et maior quam secundus. Minor
quam primus, quia secundum primum attenditur diversitas essentialis et
compositio; maior quam secundus, quia secundum ilium nulla omnino attendi
tur in re distinctio. Secundum autem istum modum attenditur in eo unitas
et pluralitas: unitas secundum absolutum, pluralitas secundum respectum.
Et quantum adhunc modum aunt solum duo modi dicendi, scilicet secundum
substantiam.ut ilia quae dicuntur ad se, et secundum relationem. ut ilia
quae dicuntur ad aliquid.
Quia vero haec non dicunt alium modum essendi.
ideo haecpraedicantur de illis
et sunt unum; et quia dicunt alium modum
se habendi. ideo secundum ilia unitas, secundum haec pluralitas.
(l Sent..
d. XXII, a. tin., q.4, Quar., vol. I, p. 398a)

In one way Mto be said diversely" is understood as to di
verse modes of being which are essential and accidental,
and indeed in this mode "to be said diversely" is not in
God because that diversity of mode places an essential
diversity in the thing mentioned, and as to this there is
only one mode of predication in God. For all that is
said of God is God himself and his substance.
In another way "to be said diversely" is according to a
diverse mode of understanding which indeed is taken ac
cording to different concepts or means of knowing. And
so not only is there diversity in divine names, but
rather in every way because God is not only known through
340
diverse things* but rather through all genera of things.
And so names predicated of God are predicated through
the mode of substance, e.g. "God," some through the
mode of quantity, e.g. ffgreat," some through the mode of
quality, e.g. "good," And so of all others.
The third way of "saying diversely" is according to a
diverse mode of relating, which indeed is understood as
to what is absolute and what is compared or related, and
indeed this manner of diversity is less than the first,
and greater than the second. Less than the first, be
cause according to the first essential diversity and com
position is understood. Greater than the second because
according to this mode unity and plurality are understood
in God, unity according to what is absolute, plurality
according to a relation. And as to this mode, there are
only two modes of predicating, namely according to sub
stance, as what are said to themselves, and according to
relation, as those that are related to something else.
Because truly these latter do not indicate another mode
of being, therefore these are predicated of the former
and are one with them. And because they indicate dif
ferent modes of relating, therefore there is unity accord
ing to the former and plurality according to the latter.
(4)
. . . communioabilitas et incommunicabilitas non sunt oppositae proprietates, sed sic differunt, sicut habere proprietatem, et non habere.
Quia enim peraonft habet proprietatem relativam, ideo distinguitur et est
incommunicabilis; sed quia essentia caret ilia proprietate, ideo communis
est, et communicabilis pluribus; et ideo non distinguuntur ad invicem.
Vel potest dici, quod communicabilitas non est proprietas distinguens
etiam in creaturis; unde quamvis homo sit commune, et Petrus proprium,
non tamen impeditur, quin homo dicatur in Petro; . . . (i Sent.. d.34,
q. un., a.2, n. 7, Quar., vol. I, p. 5Slb)
Communicability and incommunicability are not opposite
properties, but they differ as do having a property and
not having a property. For, because a Person has a re
lative property, it is therefore distinguished and in
communicable. But, because the divine essence lades
that property, therefore
being shared with many. And therefore they lessence
541
and a Person] are not distinguished (really] from each
other. Or it can be said that communicabflity is not
a distinguishing property even in creatures. Whence,
although man is a common term, and "Peter is a pro
per term, it is not, however, impeded that "man" be
predicated of Peter . . .
(5)
. . . Pater et Filius non differunt in natura. id est, non differunt diversitate naturae; nihilominus tamen differunt a se invicem re, et ab
ipsa essentia vel natura differunt ratione vel attributione. Aliquid
enim attribuitur personae. quod non naturae, et e converso.
(ill Sent..
d. 5, a.l, q.l, ad 2, Quar., vol. Ill, p. 123a)

The Father and the Son do not differ in nature, i.e. they
do not differ by diversity of nature, nevertheless they
differ from each other really and they differ from the
essence or nature itself by reason or by attribution.
For something is attributed to a Person which is not at
tributed to the nature, and conversely.
(6 )
. . . persona et essentia . . . nec omnino eadem nec omnino alia, sed
eadem re, non eadem rations . . .non quia inter deitatem et patemitatem
sit differentia secundum essentiam vel secundum esse, sed secundum se
habendi rationem, quia Pater dicitur ad alterum, essentia vero minime.
(& Di8P de MLvst. Trin.. q.2, a.2, ad 10, Quar., vol. V, p. 67)
A Person and the divine essence . . are neither entirely
the same nor entirely diverse, but are really and not ra
tionally the same . . . not because there is a difference
according to essence or being between the deity and pater
nity, but there is a difference according to a ratio of
relation, because the Father is related to another, but
the essence is not related to another in any way.
(7)
Differentia autem secundum rationem est, quia essentia non oritur ab es
sentia nec se habet ad aliam essentiam; sed persona bene oritur a persona
342
et se habet ad illam. . . . Quoniam igitur modus se habendi ad alium et
oriendi ab alio non ponit compositionem in persona secundum rem, sed
distinctionem realem ab alia persona: ideo modus ille comparatus ad es
sentiam, cuius est, modus tantum est; comparatus vero ad ilium ad quern
est, cum faciat distinctionem secundum rem, vere res est;et ita uno mo
do facit differre re, alio modo rations,
(l Sent., d.34, a. un., q.l,
Quar., vol. I, p. 588a)

There is a difference, however, according to reason be
cause the essence is not originated from an essence; nor
is it related to another essence. But a Person origi
nates from a Person and is related to that. . . . Since,
therefore, the mode of relation to another and origina
ting from another do pot make composition which is real
within a Person, but only a real distinction of that Per
son from another Person, therefore that mode compared to
the essence to which it belongs is only a mode; truly
compared to that toward which it is directed, since it
makes a real distinction with that, it is truly a thing.
And so in one way it makes a real difference, in another
a rational difference.
(8)
. . proprietas personae. . . . Per comparationem ad personam a_ qua distinguit, vere res est, quia realiter ab ilia differt, sicut et realiter
distinguitur per pateraitatem Pater a Filio; per comparationem autem ad
personam, in qua est. seu etiam ad ipsam essentiam, modus tantum est,
. . . (Q. Disp. de Myst. Trin.. q.3, a.2, ad 13, Quar., vol. V, p. 78a)
A property of a Person . . . is truly a thing through
comparison with the Person from which it distinguishes
the Person to which it belongs, because it really dif
fers from that, just as the Father is really distin
guished through his paternity from the Son. However,
through comparison with the Person in which it is, or
even with the divine essence itself, it is only a mode.
(9)
. . . diversitas rationis dupliciter est in divinis.
Uno modo per
343
habere diveraas proprietates; et illud inducit distinctionem, et sic
differunt ratione nec praedicantur de eodem, ut Pater et Filius; alio
modo est per habere proprietatem et non habere: et illud non inducit dis
tinctionem nec facit, quod unum non praedicetur de altero; facit tamen,
quod aliquid dicitur de uno, quod non dicitur de altero, ut patet in
Petro et homine: Petrus est individuum, homo non; et tamen homo vere praedicatur de Petro.
(l Sent., d.5, a.l, q.l, ad 1, Quar., vol. I, p. 113a)
There is a double rational diversity in the deity; in one

way through the having of diverse properties, and that
brings in a distinction, and so. the extremes differ ratio
nally and are not predicated of the same thing, e.g.
Father and Son; in another way, through having a property
and not having that property, and that does not introduce
a distinction nor does it cause one extreme not to be
predicated of the other. It does, however, cause something
to be predicated of one which is not predicated of the
other, as is clear in the case of Peter and man. Peter
is an individual, man is not an individual and, however,
"man" is truly predicated of Peter.
(10)
Differentia vero quantum ad modos se habendi est in personis ad essentiam
relatis.
Quoniam enim oriri est ipsius personae, non essentiae; ideo
persona refertur et se habet ad alteram, essentia non; et hinc est, quod

una distinguitur, scilicet persona, et non altera, scilicet essentia.
Et ex hac differentia non fit, quod una removeatur ab altera, fit tamen,
ut possit
aliquid
dici de persona, quod non dicitur de essentia, et e
converse.
. . . persona referri habet et comparari ad aliam, natura vero non: hinc
est, quod aliquid potest attribui uni, quod non attribuitur alteri; nec
tamen e x hoc sequitur, quod sit in eis compositio vel diversitas secun
dum essentiam vel esse: sufficit enim, quod sit solum secundum se_habere.
. . . persona cum altera convenit secundum'essentiam, differt autem
344
secundum proprietatem; proprietas autem ilia comparata ad essentiam est
tantum modus essendi. qui est idem quod essentia, secundum id quod est,
quia essentia est ipsa proprietas, differt autem secundum id ad quod;
et quia compositio venit secundum id in quo, distinctio secundum id ad
quod: . . (ad 10, ll)(Q. Disp. de Myst. Trin.. q.3 a.2, Quar., vol. V,
p. 76b, 78a)
Truly a difference as to modes of relating is in the
Persons in relation to the essence. For, since to be
gin belongs to a Person itself, not to the essence,
therefore a Person is related, and related to another,
but the essence is not. And this difference does not
mean that one extreme may be removed from the other.
It may mean, however, that something can be predicated
of a Person which cannot be predicated of the essence
and conversely.
A Person has to be related and compared to another, the
nature doesn't. Hence, something can be attributed to
one which is not attributed to the other* Nor . .
does it follow from this that there is in them some
composition or diversity according to essence or being,
for it suffices that the diversity be only according to
relation.
A Person agrees with another Person according to the es
sence, but it differs according to a property. A proper
ty, however, is only a mode of being when compared with
the essence, and is the same as the essence according to
that which is. because the essence is the property. It
differs, however, according to that to which it is di
rected. And,because composition comes according to that
in which, distinction according to that to which. . . .
(11)
. . . qualis sit haec diversitas, aut secundum rem, aut secundum modum in
telligence; dicendum, quod secundum modum se habendi. qui non tantum est
in nostro intellectu, sed etiam in re.
(i Sent.. d.22, a.un., q.4, ad 3,
Quar., vol. I, p. 398b)

. . . of what kind is this diversity [between essence and
relation] either real, or according to a manner of under
standing it must be said that it is a diversity accord
ing to manner of relating, which is not only in our under
standing, but is -also in the thing.
545
(12)
. . . pateraitas non est aliud re ab essentia, quoniam patemitas est es
sentia; est tamen aliud ratione, . . . ratio ilia per comparationem ad
essentiam non est nisi modus, sed per comparationem ad illam personame
est res. Et hoc patet, quoniam habere essentiam ab alio et non habere
non dicit rem aliam, sed solum modum; habere autem ab alio et habere non
ab alio dicit realem differentiam, quia nulla res est a se et ab alio.
(I Sent., d. 19, P.II, a. un., q.2, ad 4, Quar., vol. I, p. 559b)
The paternity is not a thing other than the essence,
since the paternity is the essence. It is, however,
rationally different. . . . The ratio of paternity
through comparison to the essence is only a mode, but
through comparison to another Person it is a thing.
And this is clear since having and not having an es
sence from another do not indicate different things,
but only a mode; however having and not having from
another indicate a real difference because no thing is
both from itself and from another.
(15)
. . . hoc quod est esse Deum et esse Patrem. quamvis non differant quan
tum ad essentiam vel modum essendi. differunt tamen quantum ad modum se
habendi. qui vere est in divinis, scilicet absolutum et comparatum; . . .
( 1 Sent., d.32, dubium 1, Quar., vol. I, p. 565)
Being God and being the Father, although they don't dif
fer as to essence or mode of being, differ however as to
absolute and comparative modes of relating which are
truly in God.
(14)
. . , proprietas est persona et in persona, quia idem est per essentiam
sive modum essendi. differt tamen quantum ad modum se habendi. (i Sent..
d. 33, a. un., q.l, Quar., vol. I, p. 573a)
A property is a Person and is in a Person, because it is
the same as the Person through essence or mode of being,
however it differs from it as to mode of relating.
346
(15)
Sed cum in Deo et creaturis sit distinctio suppositorum aliter est in Deo
quam in creaturis. Distinctio enim suppositorum maior est quam distinc
tio accidentalis; unde quamvis innotescat per accidentia* tamen non fit
per accidentia. . . . cum non fiat per accidentia . . . fiat ab origine.
. . . quando unum differt ab altero* quia emanat ab eo; idem enim a se
emanare non potest. . . . non potest esse in creatura* scilicet distinctio
solum per originem; nam nulla creatura potest alteri totam suam essentiam
dare. Si ergo dat partem* necesse est* quod alia differentia sit ibi
quam originis; et ideo est differentia ab originali principio. Haec autem
non est forma in se*
quia dicit quid communicabile, nec materia in se*
quia dicit quid indistinctum: ergo hoc facti forma, ut adveniens materiae.
Quia enimadveniens materiae accipit partem* non totam materiam*
hinc est,
quod ipsam distinguit, et ipsam distinguendo trahitur in partem et limitatur et fit hie et nunc et unum numero et particulars. (i Sent., d. 19,
P. II, a.un., q.2, Quar., vol. I, pp. 358-9)
But* although there is a distinction of subjects in God
and in creatures* it is otherwise in God than in crea
tures. For a distinction of subjects is greater than an
accidental distinction* whence, although it may be known
through accidents, it is nothowever caused through acci
dents. . . . Since it is not made through accidents . ..
it may be caused by origin . . . when one extreme differs
from another because it emanates from it. For the same
thing cannot emanate from itself. . . . A distinction
through origin alone cannot be in creatures, for no crea
ture can give to another itswhole essence. If, there
fore* it gives the other a part of its essence* it is
necessary that there be there differences besides that of
origin, and consequently a difference from original prin
ciple. This latter, however, is not form in itself be
cause form indicates something communicable, nor is it
matter in itself, because matter always indicates some
thing indistinct. Therefore form makes this difference
as it joins with matter, for because in joining with mat
ter it makes a part of matter, and not the whole, hence
547
it is that it distinguishes matter, and in distinguish
ing it is contracted in part and limited and makes a
being existing here and now, numerically one, and par
ticular.
\
. . individuum est hoc aliquid. Quod sit hoc, principalius habet a ma

teria. ratione cuius forma habet positionem in ,loco et tempore. Quod sit
aliquid. habet a forma. Individuum enim habet esse, habet etiam existere.
Bxistere dat materia formae* sed essendi actuum dat forma materiae.
(II Sent.. d.3 PI, a.2, q.3 Quar., vol. II, pp. 109-110)
An individual is a "this something." That it should be
"this" it has principally from matter, by reason of which
a form has a position in place and in time. That it
should be "something" it has from form. For an individual
has being and also has existence. Matter gives existence
to form, but form gives the act of being to matter.
(17)
Individuatio est ex communications materiae cum forma, et innotescere ha
bet per accidentium collectionem. . . . circumscriptis accidentibus et
proprietatibus, quae individuationem non faciunt. sed ostendunt. individu
atio est a principiis intrinsecis, secundum quod unum constituunt suppos
ition, in quo totum esse rei stabilitur.
Et quia ex concursu illorum
principiorum constituitur individuum et resultat forma totius, quae est

forma specifics; . . . (ill Sent.. d. 10, a.l, q.3, Quar., vol. Ill,
p. 231b)
Individuation is from the communication of matter with
form, and has to be known through a collection of acci
dents. . . . Setting aside accidents and properties which
do not make individuation but show it, individuation is
from intrinsic principles according as they constitute
one subject in which the whole being of a thing is estab
lished. And because an individual is constituted from
the conjunction of those principles, the form of the
whole, which is the specific form, results. . . .
348
(18)
.
.. nec est individuatio nisi ez coniunctione formae cum materia; . . .
(ll Sent.. d.3i P.II, a.2. q.l, Quar.. vol. II. p. 120a)
Nor is there individuation except from the conjunction of
form with matter.
(19)
.
.. individuatio consurgit ex actuali coniunctione materiae cumforma;
.. (II Serf.. d.3 P.I a.2, q.3, Quar., vol. II, p. 109b)
Individuation arises from the actual conjunction of mat
ter with form.
(20)
Individuatio autem est ex principiorum indivisione et appropriations; ipsa
enim rei principia, dum conjunguntur, invicem se appropriant et faciunt
individuum.
Sed ad hoc consequitur esse discretum sive esse distinctum
ab alio, et surgit ex hoc numerus, et ita accidentalis proprietas consequens ad substantiam.
(II Sent.. d.3 a.l, q.2, Quar., vol. Il)
Individuation, however, is from the indivision and appro

priation of principles. For the principles of a thing,
when they are conjoined, are appropriated to each other
and make an individual. But being discrete or being dis
tinct follow on this, and number arises from this, and
so does an accidental property following on substance.
(21)
Nec potest habere veritatem, quod distinctio individualis sit ab accidentibus, cum individua different secundum substantiam, non solum secundum
accidens; . . . (ibid.)
Nor is it true that individual distinction is due to ac
cidents, since individuals differ according to substance,
not only according to accident.
(22)
. . . Distinctio per qualitatem est in creaturis, nec potest esse sine ad-
349
ditione, quia haec distinctio habet ortum ex additione materiae ad formam.
Distinctio autem per qualitatem dicitur, quando unus distinguitur ab alio
per proprietates absoluta3. ut patet, cum unus est albus, et alter niger.
Distinctio per originem est, cum unus producit, et alter producitur. Et

quemadmodum distinctio per qualitatem vera distinctio est et secundum
rem. ita distinctio per veram originem vera est distinctio.
Sicut enim
unus non potest simul esse albus et niger, ita non potest unus et idem
producere se ipsum.
(I Sent., d. 34* a. un., q.l, Quar., vol. I, p. 587)
A distinction through quality is in creatures, nor can it

be there without addition, because this distinction arises
from the addition of matter to form. A distinction, how
ever, through quality is said to be when one thing is dis
tinguished from another through absolute properties, as
is clear when one is white and the other is black. A dis
tinction through origin is said to be when one produces
and the other is produced. And just as a distinction
through quality is a true distinction and a real distinc
tion, so a distinction through true origin is a true dis
tinction. For, just as one thing cannot be both white
and black, so one and the same thing cannot produce it
self.
(23)
. . . tribus modis distinguitur persona a persona, scilicet origine tan
tum. qualitate tantum. origine et qualitate simul.
Primus modus est in
divinis, secundum in angelicis spiritibus, tertius in hominibus. Homi

nes enim distinguuntur ab invicem qualitate propter diversitatem acci
dentium et proprietatum, quibus unum individuum ab altero discernitur;
origine vero, quia unus homo ab alio nascitur. Angeli autem, quia dif
ferunt substantiis et proprietatibus formalibus, di*i.nguuntur qualitate;
sed quia unus ab alio non procedit, non distinguuntur origine. Per
sonae autem divinae, quia omnino unum sunt in substantia et forma et nul
la habentaccidentia, non
distinguuntur qualitate. sed sola origine; ilia
55o
autem origo est ipsius personae non per aliquid aliud, sed per se ipsam,
ita quod, sicut Deus se ipso intelligit et est suus intellectus, ita
Pater se ipso generat et est ipsa generatio, . . . si ergo est ibi veriasima est personalis distinctio.
(Quaest. Disp. de Myst. Trin.. q.3, a.2,
Quar., vol. V, pp. 75-76)

Person is distinguished from person in. three ways} namely,
by origin only, by quality only, by origin and quality
together. The first way is in God, the second is in an
gelic spirits, the third is in man. For men are distin
guished from one another by quality because of a diversi
ty of accidents and properties by which one individual
is discerned from another, by origin truly because one man
is bom from another. Angels, however, because they dif
fer by substances and formal properties, are distinguished
by quality. But, because one does not proceed from an
other, they are not distinguished by origin. Divine Per
sons, however, because they are entirely one in substance
and form, and have no accidents, are not distinguished
by quality but only by origin. That origin, however, is
of a Person itself, not through something else, but
through itself so that, just as God understands Himself
by Himself and is His understanding, so the Father gen
erates by himself and is his generation, . . .If, there
fore, there is there the truest origin, there is there
the truest personal distinction
(24)
. . . distinctio secundum oppositas qualitatds praesupponit distinctionem
secundum substantiam. quia oppositae qualitates non possunt esse in eodem
et secundum idem; . . . (ill Sent.. P. II, a.2, q.l, Quar., vol. Ill,p.85)
A distinction according to opposite qualities presupposes
a distinction according to substance, because opposite
qualities cannot be in the same according to the same.
(25;
. . . diversitas dupliciter potest venire: vel ex additions, vel ex ori
gins * Ex additione t cum est diversitas in proprietatibus absolutis, quae
diversae sunt in diversis, ut albedo in Petro et nigredo in Paulo; et haec
551
privat simplicitatem, quia ponit compositionem.
Est alia diversitas
veniens ex sola origine. ut puta, quia una persona emanat ab alia, dif
fert ab ea; et haec non repugnat simplicitati, quia nullam ponit compo
sitionem,
sed solum ordinem et respectum ad alium; et haec non proprie
dicitur diversitas, sed distinctio et discretio,
(I Sent., d. 8, P.II
a. un., q.l, ad 2, Quar., vol. I, p. 166a)

Diversity can come in two ways: either from addition or
from origin. Prom addition, since there is diversity
in absolute properties which are diverse in diverse
things, as whiteness in Peter and blackness in Paul, and
this deprives a being of simplicity, because it makes
composition. There is another diversity coming from
origin only, as for example because one Person emanates
from another it differs from that. And this is not re
pugnant to simplicity, because it makes no composition
but only order and a relation to another. And this is
not properly called diversity, but distinction and dis
cretion.
(26)
. . . in emanations divinarum personarum debet attendi originalis dis
tinctio et plenissima communicatiox originalis distinctio. quia necesse
est, ea quae communicant in natura distingui vel per materiam. vel per
originem.
Per materiam distingui personas est impossibile, quia ubi
est talis modus distinguendi, est compositio et variatio et formae multiplicatio, . . . Et ideo necesse est distingui per originem sive habitudinem: . . . (i Sent., d. 7, a. un., q.2, Quar., vol. I, p. 139b)
In the emanation of divine Persons original distinction
and fullest communication must be understood, original
distinction because it is necessary that those things
which share in a nature be distinguished either through
matter or through origin. It is impossible for the
Persons to be distinguished through matter, because
where there is such a way of distinguishing, there is
composition and variation and multiplication of forms,
all of which are entirely repugnant to God. . . . And
therefore it is necessary for them to be distinguished
through origin or relation.
352
(27)
. . . triplicem differentiam in creaturis* . . . Prima est substantiae*
virtutis. et operationis. sive substantiae et accidentis; secunda est
differentia suppositi et essentiae; tertia est differentia entis et esse.
(I Sent*, d. 8, P.II, a. un., q.2, Quar., vol. I, p. 168a)
. . . a triple difference in creatures* . * . The first
is of substance, power, and operation, or of substance
and accident; the second is a difference of subject and
essence; the third is a difference of being and existence.
(28)
Materia enim differt a forma, et constat quod se ipsa differt ab ea* . . .
materia differt a Deo se ipsa. . . .Causa . . . distinguitur a causato,
ens actu ab ente in potentia: . . . (I Sent.. d. 19, P.II, a. un., q.3,
Quar., vol. I, p. 362)
For matter
fers from
from God.
is caused,
differs from foim, and it happens that it dif

it by itself. . . .matter differs of itself
. . . A cause . . . is distinguished from what
being in act from being in potency.
(29)
. . . quaecumque distinguuntur realiter aut distinguuntur origine. aut

qualitate. . . .(De Scientia Christi. q.3, Quar., vol. V, p. 13, f.9)
Whatever are really distinguished are distinguished either
by origin or by quality.
(30)
. . . si realiter differunt, aut sicut res absolutae. aut sicut respectus: . . . (ibid.. f. 14)
If they really differ, they do so either as absolute, or
as relative, things.
(31)
Dicendum, quod per miraculum potest fieri, quod accidentia sint sine sub-
353
iecto sive substantia*
Cum enim differant per essentiam. potest Deus sine
omni inconvenientia per virtutem suam ilia separare. . . . sunt insepara

bles secundum potentiam naturalem. . . . (IV Sent.. d.12, P.I, a.l, q.l,
Quar., vol. 17, pp. 27Q-1)
It must be said that through js. miracle it can happen that
accidents exist without a subject or substance. For,
since they differ essentially, God can separate them
through his power without any inconvenience. . . . They
are inseparable according to a natural power. . . .
(32)
. . . alia bona naturalia essentialiter differunt; et ideo unum potest
corrumpi et tolli sine altero.
(IX Sent., d.25, a.2, q.l, ad 3, Quar.,
vol. II, p. 830b)

Other natural goods differ essentially, and therefore
one can be corrupted and removed without the other.
(33)
Ad hoc enim quod aliqua principia constituent aliquid, oportet quod principia sint differentia, sint dependentia. sint imperfecta, sint etiam
difformia.
Si enim essent omnino conformia et perfecta, non possent ali
quid constituere, quia ex duobus entibus actu nihil fit.
(i Sent., d.8,
P. II, dubium 6, Quar., vol. I, p. 176)

For to this, that some principles constitute something,
it is necessary that the principles be different, depen
dent, imperfect, even unlike. For if they were entirely
alike and perfect, they would not be able to constitute
something, because from two actual beings nothing may be
made.
(34)
. . . nulla est oppositio formarum, nisi considerentur respectu eiusdem
temporis; et impossibile est, quod idem subiectum eodem tempore sit album
et nigrum; . . . (I Sent., d. 9, a. un., q.2, vol. I, p. 183)
354
There is no opposition of forms unless they be considered
with respect to the same time. And it is impossible that
the same subject be white and black at the same time.
(35)
Et . * . omnia quae in nobis reperiuntur per diversitatem, omnia, inquam,
in Deo nobilius per omnimodam reperiuntur ic.ntitatem, nihilominus tamen
secundum omnimodam perfectionem et veritatem.
Unde sicut in nobis sapi-
entia. potentia. et voluntas est vere ens et causa rerum, quae a nobis
sunt; sic et in Deo sunt, sed tamen unum sunt. Et quamvis unum sint, quia
intellectus noster non potest infinitatem illius substantiae comprehendere necper unum verbum exprimere;
etdiversis
ideo multis modis intelligimus Deum
nominibus exprimimus; .. . (l Sent., d. 45, a.2, q.l, Quar.,
vol. I, p. 804)
And . . . all that are found in us through diversity,
all, I say, are found in God in a more noble way through
complete identity, nevertheless according to complete
perfection and truth. Whence, just as in us wisdom,
power, and will are truly beings and causes of things
which come from us, so in God they exist also but, how
ever, they are one. And, although they are one, be
causeour intellectcannot comprehend the infinity of
that substance nor express it through one word, there
fore we understand God through many modes and express
his nature through diverse names.
(36)
Differentia vero quantum ad rationes intelligendi est in proprietatibus
essentialibus quae omnino idem sunt, sicut veritas et bonitas; tamen
noster intellectus intelligit per diversa et sub alia ratione et alia,
et ideo aliter nominat; et haec est minima differentia, quae possit inveniri circa divina, quia magis est ex parte nostri quam Dei.
(. Disp.
de ftivst. Trin., q.3, a.2, Quar., vol. V, p. 76)

A difference truly as to concepts of the understanding
355
is in the essential properties which are entirely the
same, such as truth and goodness. Our intellect, how
ever, understands them through diverse concepts and
therefore it names them otherwise. And this is the
least difference which could be found concerning God,
because it is more from our part than God's.
(37)
Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si venit a parte intelligendi solum, ergo
talis nomina sunt vana; dicendum, quod non venit ab hoc solum, quoniam
illi rationi innotescendi respondet pluralitaa in creaturis, et in Deo
respondet vera unitas complectens illam totam pluralitatem.
Unde quia
intelligimus Dei potentiam et sapientiam per diverse, diversimodi nominamus; et quia in Deo est vere sapientia et potentia, ideo non est ibi
vanitas. (ISent.. d.22. a. un., q.2, ad 3, Quar., vol. 1, p.
394b)
To that which is objected, that if it Qj,.e. distinction

of properties in GocQ oomes only from the part of the
understanding, therefore such names are empty, it must
be said that it does not come from that alone, since
a plurality in creatures answers to that way of being
known, and in God a true unity embracing the whole
plurality corresponds to such names. Whence, because
we understand power and wisdom of God through diverse
things, we give him diverse names. And because wisdom
and power are truly in God, therefore the names are not
empty.
(38)
. . . quamvis secundum rationem loquendi vel intelligendi a parte nostra
m agn i t u d o
in divinis dicatur per modum quantitatis, et deitas per modum
substantiae, tamen a parte rei nulla est omnino differentia.

de magnitudine dicitur, quod non dicatur de substantia.
Nihil enim
(I Sent.. d. 19,
P. I, dubium 3, Quar., vol. I, p. 351a)

Although according to our way of speaking and understand
ing magnitude in God is spoken of through the mode of
quantity, and deity through the mode of substance, how
ever, on the part of the thing there is no difference at
all. For nothing is predicated of magnitude which cannot
356
be predicated of substance.
(39)
. . . potentiae animae nec adeo sunt idem ipsi animae, sicut sunt eius
principia intrinseca et essentialia, nec adeo diversae. ut cedant in
aliud genus, sicut accidentia, sed in genere substantiae sunt per reductionem. . . cum potentiae simpliciter non dicant aliam essentiam quam
substantiam animae, quod non sic differunt essentialiter ipsaa potentiae,
quod sint diversae essentiae. . . . sed differre essentialiter in genere
potentiae. ita ut dicantur diversae potentiae sive diversa instruments
eiusdem substantiae,
(il Sent., d. 24, P. I, a.2, q.l, Quar., vol. II,
p. 560)
Powers of the soul are not as much the same as the soul
itself as are its essential and intrinsic principles,
nor so diverse as to fall into another genus, as acci
dents do, but they are in the genus of substance through
reduction. . . since the powers simply do not indicate
an essence other than the substance of the soul because
the potencies do not differ essentially so as to be di
verse essences. .. . but to differ essentially in the
genus of power so as to indicate diverse powers or di
verse instruments of the same substance.
(40)
. . . generatio in divinis . . . facit realem distinctionem inter generantem etgeneratum. . . . ratione relationis est distinctio, quia nihil
ad se referturnec ordinatur.
(I Sent.. d. 9, a. un., q.2, Quar., vol. I,
p. 183a)
Generation in God . . . makes a real distinction between
what generates and what is generated. . . . by reason of
relation there is a distinction, because nothing is re
lated or ordered to itself.
(41)
[Concerning predication in God): Aut idem praedicatur de eodem etc.;
357
dicendum, quod aliquando idem est re. diversum tamen secundum rationem
intellieendi et dicendi. ut bonitas est substantia; aliquando idem
secundum substantiam. diversum secundum modum se habendi. ut persona est
substantia, sive relatio est substantia, et Deus generat; * . . (I Sent..
d. 54, a. un., q. 2, ad 5, Quar., vol. I, p. 591)
Either the same is predicated of the same, etc. It must
be said that sometimes "same" here means "really the
same but diverse according to a ratio of understanding
and saying," as is the case when we say "Goodness is sub
stance" (i.e. "God's goodness is (the same as) his sub
stance]. Sometimes "same" means "the same according to
substance, but diverse according to a manner of relating"
as is the case when we say "The Person is the substance,"
or "A relation is the substance," and "God generates."
(42)
Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum res naturae praedicetur de natura (in
God); dicendum, quod praedicatione per identitatem utrumque de altero
praedicatur, nec est compositio in ratione formae nec in ratione mater
iae; si autem per inhaerentiam, tunc commune praedicatur de proprio, ut
Pater est Deus.
(ibid.. ad 6)
To that which is asked, whether a thing beloi
nature may be predicated of the nature (in Gi
be said that each is predicated of the other by predica
tion through identity, nor is there composition there by
reason of form or by reason of matter. If by predication
through inherence, however, then the common is predicated
of the proper, as in "The Father is God."
358
Henry of Ghent
Abbreviations of works cited:
Quod,
Quodlibeta. Paris, 1518, 2 vols.,

Bibliotheque S.J. reprint
S.Q.O.
Summa Quaestionuin Ordinarium. Paris, 1520

Franciscan Institute rept., 2. vols.
(1)
Res . . . quidquid est natura et essentia aliqua absoluta, habens rationem
exemplarem in Deo, nata ezistere in ezistentia operatione divina, sive sit
compositum ut homo, asinus, sive sit principium compositi, ut materia, for
ma, sive fuerit universale, sive particulare.
(Quod. V, q. 6, 238r)
A thing . . . is whatever is some absolute nature and es

sence, having an ezemplary notion in God and suited to
exist by a divine operation, whether it be a composite
thing such as a man or a donkey, or whether it be a
principle of such a composite such as matter or form, or
whether it be universal or particular.
(2)
Ratio . . modus aliquis rem, sub quo nata est concipi determinate abs
que eo quod concipiatur sub alio, sub quo similiter nata est concipi, et
hoc sine omni eius differentia re vel intentione, ita quod idem re et
intentione conceptum diversis modis concipiendi dicitur differre secundum
rationem, inquantum concipitur uno illorum modorum, et non alio, sicut
patet in conceptione definitionis et definiti. . , . (Ibid.)
A ratio is . . . some mode of a thing under which it is
suited to be conceived determinately without being con
ceived under another mode under which it is likewise
suited to be conceived, without any real or intentional
difference on its part. So that what is really and in
tentionally the same and conceived by diverse modes of
conceiving is said to differ rationally inasmuch as it
is conceived by one of those modes and not by another,
as is clear in the conception of a definition and a
conception of what is defined.
359
(3)
Unde re differunt quaecunque diversas naturas et essentias important
secundum rem, sive fuerint simplicia, ut materia et forma, sive com
posita, ut homo et asinus. Re vero sunt eadem, quaecunque eandem rem
sive simplicem sive compositam important,.. . .Res autem . . . est
fundamentum intentionum et rationum.
intentiones et rationes diversae.
Super idem enim re fundantur
(Quod. V, q.6, K,L 16lr, vol. I)
Whence those differ really which really imply diverse

natures and essences, be these simple as matter and
form, or composite as a man and a donkey. Those are
truly really the same which imply the same thing,
either simple or composite. . . . A thing, however,
. . . is the foundation of intentiones and concepts.
For diverse intentiones and concepts are founded on
what is the same thing.
(4)
Quaedam verodifferunt re, et hoc vel absoluta ex parte utriusque, vel
relata saltern
ex parte alterius. Absoluta, ut quae sunt aliud et aliud
in natura sicut materia et forma et ista deus posset separare. Re non

absoluta sed relata differunt aliqua dupliciter: aut enim relatio fundatur in natura et essentia rei, aut super aliquod accidens in re et
talis relatio secundo modo potest separari ab absoluto sicut accidens
potest super quod fundatur, . . . Relatio vero primo modo secundum rem
inseparabilis est a re ipsa re manente, sicut res ipsa inseparabilis est
a seipsa.
(S. Q. 0.. a. 27, q.l, vol. I, fol. 161)

Some truly differ really either by something absolute on
the part of both, or by something relative at least on
the part of one. Absolute, as those that differ in na
ture, e.g. matter and form, and God can separate these.
By relative and not absolute thing some differ in two
ways: for either the relation is founded on the nature
and essence of a thing, or on some accident in a thing.
And such a relation in the second way can be separated
360
from what is absolute just as an accident can be separ
ated from that on which it is founded, . . . A relation
truly in the first mode is really inseparable from the
thing (in a way that the thing would remain without
the relation) just as a thing itself is inseparable from
itself.
(5)
. . . Dicendum quod differentium quaedam differunt secundum rationem tantum, ut definitio et definitum: et ista nullo modo sunt separabilia quia
idipsum sunt in re et in intellectu indivisibiliter et talia separari non
possunt nec secundum rem extra, nec secundum intellectum.
Sicut neque i-
dem potest separari a se ipso. . . . Dico autem differre ratione sola

quaecunque eadem re sunt et formant eumdem conceptum sed modo diverso, ut
sunt definitio et definitum.
Definitum enim de intentione speciei format
conceptum confusum et compositum.
Definitio vero format conceptum eius-
dem determinatum et distinctum per partes.
Definitum enim significat
totam quiddam et indefinitum, ut circulus.
Definitio autem ipsius divi-
ditur in singularia et in partes compositi, . . . (S.ft.Q.. a. 27, q.l,

vol. I, fol. 161-162)
It must be said that of those that differ, some differ
only according to reason, as a definition and what is
defined differ. And these are in no way separable from
each other because they are indivisibly in a thing and
in the understanding and such cannot be separated, neither
according to external reality nor according to the under
standing, just as the same thing cannot be separated from
itself. . . .1 say, however, that those differ by reason
only which are really the same and form the same concept
but in diverse ways, such as a definition and what is de
fined. For the defined, according to the intentio of a
species, forms a composite and confused concept. A def
inition truly forms a determinate and distinct concept
of the same thing through its parts. For what is defined
signifies a certain and indefinite whole 3uch as a circle.
The definition, however, is divided into singulars and
into parts of the composite.
361
(6)
* . . diversa intentione sunt quae fundata in simplicitate eiusdem rei diversos de se formant conceptus.
Qui ex hoc intelliguntur esse diversi quod
unus eorum alterum excludit vel totaliter, . . . vel in parte. . . . Et

differunt differentia secundum intentionem ab illis quae differunt secundum
rem et similiter ab illis quae differunt secundum rationem tantum, quod
haec in eadem simplici re fundantur, non sic ilia, ut forma generis et dif
ferentia in forma speciei.
Ita quod ilia res in significato utriusque in-
tentionis continetur secundum alium et alium modum concipiendi in quo conveniunt cum differentibus sola ratione. Sed in hoc differunt quod in diversis secundum intentionem unus conceptus secundum unum modum excludit
alium secundum alium modum. Non sic autem differentia sola ratione. . . .
quaecunque differunt intentione differunt ratione, non econverso. . . .
differunt intentione quia ut sunt in re absolute non perfecte habent suam
differentiam sed solum ut res ilia cadit in consideratione intellectus
circa idem concipientis illos diversos conceptus actu suo dividendi quae
secundum se sunt indivisa, et ut in simplici intelligentia tantum unicum
conceptum formant, . . . Idcirco res eadem in se et absolute in perfecto
actu non habet compositionem huiusmodi intentionum nisi virtute et quasi
in potentia tantum. . . . Unde et intentio non dicitur esse aliquid in
re ut est extra sed solum ut cadit in actuali intellectus consideratione
considerantis unum in re ut duo intentione quod vere non fictitie duo est
intentione.
(Quod. V, q. 12, vol. I, fol. 171r T-Y)

Those are intentionally diverse which, founded in the sim
plicity of the same thing, form of themselves diverse con
cepts which are understood to be diverse because of this,
that one of them excludes the other either totally, . . .
or in part. . . . And those that differ intentionally dif
fer from those that differ really and likewise from those
that differ only rationally, because those differing in
562
tentionally are founded on the same simple thing, e.g.
the form of a genus and a difference in the form of a
species, not so those that differ really; so that that
thing signifies hy each intentio is contained accord
ing to different modes of conceiving, and in this
those that differ intentionally agree with those dif
fering only rationally. But they differ in this, that
in those which are intentionally diverse, one concept
according to one mode excludes the other according to
another mode. This is not so, however, with those that
differ only rationally. . . . Whatever differ intentio
nally differ rationally, hut not conversely. . . .
They differ intentionally because, as they are in a thing,
they do not have their difference absolutely and perfect
ly, but they have it only as the thing falls in the con
sideration of an intellect conceiving those diverse con
cepts concerning the same thing, by its act of dividing
what are undivided according to themselves and which
form only a unique concept in a simple intelligence. . . .
For that reason one and the same thing in itself, and ab
solutely in perfect act, does not have such a composition,
of intentiones except virtually and as if in potency
only, . . . Whence an intentio is not said to be something
in a thing as it exists outside the understanding, but
only as it falls in the actual consideration of an intel
lect considering what is one thing as two intentionally,
which two are truly not fictions.
(7)
Sed appellatur hi.c intentio aliquid pertinens realiter ad simplicitatem
essentiae alicuius, natum precise concipi absque aliquo alio a quo non
differt re absoluta, quod similiter pertinet ad eandem. . . . Sed in
eis quaeintentione differunt sunt gradus secundum differentiam maiorem
et minorem.
De eis enim quae sunt idem re in eodem, aliquando sic for-
mantur conceptus diversi, ut neutrum eorum in suo conceptu alterum in

cludet, ut sunt conceptus diversarum differentiarum quae concurrunt in
eodem, sicut sunt in homine rationale, sensibile, vegetabile inquantum
differentiae sunt. Et similiter conceptus generis et differentia quae
constituunt simplicem speciem sicut sunt animal et rationale.
istis duobus modis est maxime differentia intentionum.
Et in
Sunt et alii
quatuor modi in quibus minor est differentia quia conceptus unius intentionis includit alterum, sed non econverso,ut conceptus specie! concep
tum generis et differentiae, non autem econverso.
vivere in creaturis, conceptum esse, non econverso.
Similiter conceptus
Similiter conceptus
suppositi sicut hominis, conceptum naturae, ut humanitatis, non autem

econverso. Et similiter conceptus respectus sicut entis conceptum essentiae, non econverso. . . . diversitas intentionum non potest esse nisi
inter ilia quae uniuntur in eodem secundum rem ita quod conceptus unius
penitus excludit conceptum alterius, et econverso . . . vel ita quod aliauid quod est in conceptu unius excluditur extra illud quod est in conceptu alterius, . . . (Quod. V, q.6, L-N, vol. I, fol. I6lv)
But here an "intention" means something belonging really
to the simplicity of some essence, something which is
suited precisely to be conceived without some other which
likewise belongs to the same thing and from which it
does not differ as an absolute thing. . . . But there
are grades according to greater and lesser difference
in those which differ intentionally. For of those which
are really the same in the same thing, sometimes diverse
concepts are so formed that neither of them includes the
other in its concept, such as the concepts of diverse
differences which concur in the same thing, just as
rational, sensible, vegetable are in a man insofar as
they are differences, and likewise the concepts of a
genus and a difference which constitute a simple species,
such as 'animal* and 'rational.' And in these two modes
there is the greatest intentional difference. There are
another four modes in which there is a lesser difference
because the concept of one intentio includes the other,
but not conversely, as the concept of a species includes
the concepts of a genus and a difference, but not con
versely; likewise the concept 'living' includes the con
cept 'existence' in creatures, not conversely; likewise
the concept of a subject like 'man' includes the concept
of a nature like 'humanity,' not however conversely; and
likewise the concept of a relation like 'being' includes
the concept of 'essence,' but not conversely. . . . A
diversity of intentiones can only obtain between those
which are really united in the same thing so that the
364
concept of one
and conversely
the concept of
concept of the
wholly excludes the concept of the other,

. . . or so that something which is in
one is excluded from that which is in the
other, . . .
(8)
Quaedam vero differunt intentione, ut diversae differentiae unius speciei
quae in eodem separari non possunt quia cadunt in idipsum re, ut vegetativum sensitivum in bruto; sed in diversis possunt separari, secundum
quod in plantis est vegetativum sine sensitivo et in brutis sensitivum
3ine rationali. . . . Unde et dico differre intentione quaecunque de se
formant diversos conceptus quorum unus non includit omnino alterum, qui
non sunt nisi eorum quae in diversis sunt diversa re, etsi in eodem 3unt
idipsum re.
Quaecunque enim huiusmodi sunt, unum eorum contingit intel-
ligi sine altero quaecunque vero non sunt huiusmodi, ut in deo esse et
viviere, substantia et relatio, unum eorum non contingit intelligi esse
in aliquo sine altero, nec econverso.
Non enim est esse dei nisi sit
vivere, nec divina essentia nisi .sub relatione in aliqua persona, nec
econverso, et ideo talia ad invicem comparata sola ratione differunt.
Cum autem de eis quae sunt idem re in eodem, et in diversis sunt diversa
re, diversi conceptus formantur, hoc contingit dupliciter.
Diverse enim
re in diversis aut sunt diversa ut res extra intellectum existentes. . . .

huiusmodi differentia aut est duorum omnino absolutum, aut alterius respectivi fundati super absolutum . . . differunt in eodem essentia et esse
eius actuale. . . .Si vero diversa intentione sunt diversa re in diversis
extra intellectu, eorum conceptus diversi aut omnino sunt diversi, aut
3unt tantum diversi in parte ita quod aliquod conceptus unius includitur
in conceptum alterius.
Primo modo diversae differentiae quae coincidunt
in unam et eandem formam simplicem specie!; . . . neutra illarum praedi'
%5
catur de altera inquantum sunt differentiae. . . . nec genus praedicatur

de differentia, nec econverso, nisi in ratione suppositi.
Si vero sint
diversi conceptus in parte, tunc conceptus unus omnino includit alium et

non econverso.
Sed hoc contingit dupliciter aut enim unus includit al
terum, aliquid amplius illi superaddendo, aut unus includit alterum praecise, sub gradu tamen nobiliori ipsum exprimendo. Primo modo differt con
ceptus speciei a conceptu generis et similiter a conceptu differentiae et
ideo differunt intentione.
Secundo modo intentione differt conceptus esse
simpliciter a conceptu eius quod est vivere quia vivere in re vivente super
conceptum ipsius esse nihil amplius continet in suo conceptu sedpraecise
exprimit conceptum esse illius, . . . (S.tt.O.. a.27, q.l, vol. I, fol. 161162)
Some truly differ intentionally such as diverse differences
of one species which cannot be separated in the same thing
because they fall in that thing itself, such as vegetative
and sensitive differences in a brute. But they can be
separated in diverse things according as in plants there
is the vegetative without the sensitive, and in brutes the
sensitive without the rational. . . . Whence 1 say those
differ intentionally which form diverse concepts of them
selves one of which does not entirely include the other,
and which are only of those that are really diverse in
diverse things even if they are really the same in the
same thing. For whatever are such, one of them happens
to be understood without the other; whatever truly are
not such, such as being and living in God, substance and
relation in God, one of them cannot be understood to
exi3t in something without the other, nor conversely. For
there is no being in God unless there is living, nor is
there a divine essence unless it is under a relation, nor
conversely, and therefore such, when compared with each
other, differ only rationally. Since, however, diverse
concepts are formed of those that are really the same in
the same thing and really diverse in diverse things, this
happens in two ways. For what are really diverse in di
verse things are either diverse as things existing outside
the understanding. . . . such a difference is either of
two entirely absolute things, or of one relative thing
founded on something absolute . . . an essence and its
actual being differ in the same thing. . . . If truly
566
.those which are intentionally diverse are really diverse
in diverse things outside the understanding, their con
cepts are either entirely diverse, or diverse only in
part so that something belonging to one concept is in
cluded in the concept of the other. In the first way
diverse differences which coincide in one and the same
simple specific form; . . . neither of those extremes is
predicated of the other insofar as they are differences
. . . nor is a genus predicated of a difference, nor
conversely, except by reason of a subject to which both
belong. If truly they are partly diverse concepts, then
the concept of one entirely includes the other, and not
conversely. But this happens in two ways for either one
includes the other adding something more to that, or one
includes the other exactly, however expressing it under
a more noble grade. In the first way the concept of a
species differs from that of a genus, and likewise from
that of a difference, and therefore they differ intentio
nally. In the second way the concept of being simply
differs intentionally from its concept of living,' be
cause living in a living thing contains nothing more in
its concept than does the concept 'being,' but precisely
expresses the concept of that being, . . .
(9)
.
. ,diversitas rationum vel intentionum non habet esse in actu perfecto
circa rem nisi ex consideratione intellectus. . . (Quod. V, q. 41, B,

vol. I, fol. 153v)
A diversity of concepts or intentiones does not have
being in perfect act in a thing except from the con
sideration of an intellect.
(10)
. . . respectus ad aliud differt intentione a re super quam fundatur:
. . . Similiter patet in essentia cuiuslibet creature et respectus importati nomine esse in actu qui fundatur super ipsam esse enim non convenit essentiae ratione qua essentia est: quia tunc non posset non esse
sicut non potest non esse essentia. . . . Sed esse convenit essentie
ratione qua est effectus dei, qua ratio est extra intentionem essentie,
ut est essentia.
Propter quod secundum praedicta necessario differunt

4
intentione in qualibet creatura essentia, et respectus in ipsa fundatus
sub nomine esse propter quod per identitatem non potest istud esse praedicari in abstractione de essentia. . . . (Quod. V, q. 6, Z, vol. I, fol.
163)
A relation to something differs intentionally from the
thing on which it is founded. . . . There is a similar
relation in the essence of any creature implied by 'the
word "esse" which is actually founded on this essence.
For this esse does not agree with the essence by that
ratio by which the essence is an essence, because then
that esse could not not be, just as an essence is able
not to be . . . but the esse agrees with an essence by
that, ratio by which the essence is an effect of God, and
this ratio is outside the intentio of the essence as it
is an essence. Because of which, according to the afore
said, in any creature the essence and the relation in it
founded under the name "esse necessarily differ by in
tentio. because of which . . . esse cannot be predicated
in abstraction of the essence through identity. . . .
(11)
Quia . . . res ab eodem respectu habet quod sit in se essentia et natura
quaedam, et quod conveniat ei esse essentiae, scilicet ex respectu ad
rationem divini exemplaris, ut non de novo ipsi essentiae adveniat suum
esse proprium quod dicitur esse essentiae, sicut ei de novo advenit esse
existentiae,non est ita planum
quod esse essentiae sit alia intentio ab
intentione ipsius essentiae, . . .Ex quo enim res habet rationem exemplarem in Deo, non potest esse quia in se sit natura et essentia quaedam
participans esse essentiae. . . . (S.Q.O.. a. 21, q.4)
Because . . . from the 3ame relations a thing is in it
self an essence and a certain nature, and the being of
essence agrees with it, i.e. from the relation to the
divine exemplary notion. So that it3 proper being, which
is called "the being of essence" does not come to the es
sence itself anew, as the being of existence comes to it
anew. It is not so clear that the being of essence is
intentionally different from the essence, . . . For from
the fact that a thing has an exemplary notion in God, it
cannot be without there being an essence or nature in it
participating in the being of essence. . . .
368
(12)
Nec plus dicenda est ratio sapientie esse in deo ex respectu ad creaturas
quam ipsa existentia sive substantia . . . nec cognoscit substantiam vel
essentiam dei, nisi ex manuductione ad essentiam et substantiam creaturae,
et ex respectu ad earn. Et tamen plane absurdum est dicere, quod non est
ponere substantiam in deo, nisi ex respectu . . . ad substantiam creature:
. . . Secundum naturam ergo et secundum rectam rationem intelligendi priores sunt rationes attributorum in deo, quam in creatura: * . . Quare neque pluralitatem eorum, et distinctionem per respectum ad creaturas ullo
modo sumere oportet: . . . divina essentia cum concipitur secundum ratio
nem sue simplicitatis secundum se absque respectu et comparatione ad cre
aturas, nulla omnino distinctio vel pluralitas concipi potest in ipsa:
sed solummodo unicus simplex conceptus formatur de ipsa unico simplici
vocabulo exprimendus: . . . Est igitur in deo omnimoda unitas absque ra
tione pluralitatis in divina essentia: ut res est secundum essentiam considerata: . . . sed tamen est in ea multitudo, inquantum intellectus cir
ca ipsam negotiatur, distinguendo penes se quae sunt in essentia adunata.
. . . omnia enim in suo significato includunt divinam essentiam ne sint
vana. . . . Ex quo patet clare, quod non aumitur rationum differentia in
deo ex comparatione ad extra: . . . si sapientia et bonitas non dicantur
esse in deo et differentia ratione, nisi quia sunt bonitas et sapientia
in creatura re differentia . . . similiter non dicentur in deo esse et
differentia ratione essentia et sapientia: nisi quia sunt in creatura
sapientia et essentia re differentia . . . quod absurdum est dicere time
enim deitas non diceretur essentia nisi ex respectu ad essentiam creatam:
. . . Cum . . . diversitas rationum est in re, scilicet ex mera operatione
569
intellectus,tunc non requiritur respectus ad aliquid extra: sed secundum
quod unam et eandem rem in se ipsa, ut scilicet habet esse in suo concep
tu, considerat vel sub ratione definitionis explicantis partes rei, vel
sub ratione definiti coadunantis eas et per hunc modum accipitur differen
tia rationum in attributis divine essentie absque omni respectu ad aliud.
(ftuod. V, q. 1, vol. I, fol. 152-154)
The notion of wisdom is no more said to be in God because
of a relation to creatures than is his existence or sub
stance . . . (a creature! does not know the substance or
the essence of God except from a manuduction to the es
sence and substance of a creature and from a relation to
this. And, however, it is clearly absurd to say that no
substance is to be placed in God except because of a re
lation . . . to the substance of a creature * . . Ac
cording to nature and the right way of understanding, the
notions of attributes are prior in God to those in crea
tures. . . Whence it is not necessary to take their
plurality and distinction from a relation to creatures
in any way. . . . The divine essence, when it is con
ceived according to its highest simplicity, according to
itself without any relation to or comparison with crea
tures, no distinction or plurality at all can be conceived
in it, but only a unique simple concept is formed of it,
expressed by a unique simple word. . . . There is, there
fore, in God complete unity without cause of plurality
in the divine essence, as the thing is considered accord
ing to its essence . . . but, there is a multitude in it
inasmuch as the intellect is employed about it distin
guishing what are united in the essence. . . . For all
(attributes) include in their meanings the divine es
sence, nor are they empty. . . . From which it is clear
that a difference of concepts in God is not taken from
a comparison with something outside God: . . . if wis
dom and goodness are not said to be in God and to dif
fer rationally unless because goodness and wisdom dif
fer really in creatures . . . Likewise in God essence
and wisdom should not be said to differ rationally be
cause wisdom and essence differ really in creatures - , which is absurd, for then the deity would not be called
an essence except from relation to a created essence.
. . . Since . . . a diversity of rationes is in a thing,
namely, from the operation of the intellect alone, then
a relation to something outside the thing is not needed,
but only a consideration of what is one and the same
thing in itself under the notion of a definition expli
cating the parts of the thing, or under the notion of
what is define4-uniting them, and in this way the differ-
375
rence of notions in the attributes of the divine essence
is understood without any relation to another being.
(13)
. . . oportet distingui in deo secundum rationem intellectum et voluntatem, et eorum operationes: et per consequens cetera attributa:
ut sunt
scientia, . . . veritas et huiusmodi, ex parte intellectus: amor, . . .

bonum et huiusmodi ex parte voluntatis.
(Quod. V, q.l, P, vol. I, fol.152)
Intellect and will must be rationally distinguished in God,

and their operations also, and consequently other attri
butes, such as knowledge, . . . truth and such on the part
of the intellect, love, . . . good and such on the part of
the will.
(14)
. . . distinctio et pluralitas secundum rationem in attributis, fundamentum
est pluralitatis emanationum personalium.
(Ibid.)
The distinction and plurality according to reason in the

attributes is founded upon the plurality of personal ema
nations.
371
Giles of Rome
E &E
De Esse et Essentia. Minerva rept.,1968
Theorems
Theorems on Existence and Essence,

trans. M.V. Murray
(1)
And just as when the composite is generated, matter and
form are generated, so when an existent is created, es
sence and existence are created. . . . and just as mat
ter is really different from form so essence is really
different from existence. . . . Therefore, . . . as gen
eration in these things is the reason why we recognize
two different natures, sd., matter and form, so we can
affirm about creation in regard to those things which are
created, saying, that creation is the reason why we rec
ognize that there are two different entities in creatures,
scl., existence and essence; . . . (Theorems V, pp.35-6)
(2)
exists, except the First Being, is not
its own existence, but it has an essence really distinct
from existence and by reason of the former it is a being
and by reason of the latter it is an existent.
Everything that
We ought to note, . . . that some objects can be separ

ated actually; others only in thought. Therefore in the
way in which we find objects separated in that way they
are distinct from each other. If, therefore, they are
separated only in thought then they are rationally dis
tinct; if they are really separated, theyoare really dis
tinct. And although there is some doubt whether those
objects which are really distinct are also really separa
ble, there cannot be a doubt that those which are really
separate are really distinct. If, indeed, an essence
were always joined to an existence, it would always pos
sess an existence and it would never be able not to exist.
Therefore, because sensible natures are able not to exist
or because they are not always joined to existence, be
cause they begin to exist sometime, we can say that they
are in potency to existence and that they have no Csic]
essence really distinct from existence. (Theorems. XII,
pp. 61-62)
372
(3)
. . . if a genus is separated from any species and from

any difference, it is only separated in thought, because
in thought we can know the quiddity of a genus without
at the same time knowing any species or any difference:
actually, however, such a separation is impossible be
cause the genus is not a thing really distinct from any
of the species; but an essence can really be separated
from an existence because a created essence can really
lack every kind of existence so that it possesses no
actual existence at all. Consequently, we must conclude
that a created essence is really distinct from its ex
istence. (ibid.. p. 63)
(4)
The second way of inquiring into the same question is
based upon the relation that these sensible natures
have to the individuals in which they exist. . . . all
these natures are so present in individuals or in pri
mary substance, that if these first substances were de
stroyed it would be impossible for any of these to ex
ist. When we know a material nature without the exis
tence which it has in this or that individual we know
it as a universal, . . . Wherefore, if universals can
not exist of themselves, . . . it follows that no ma
terial nature is its own existence, because if a mater
ial nature were its own existence it would have its
existence of itself and it would not obtain it from an
other. (ibid.. pp. 63-64)
(5)
The third way of explaining this same question is based
upon the relation of these natures to their agent. An
agent always makes a thing to be in act for what it is
in potency. . . . matter signifies potentiality and no
thing more, and existence signifies act and nothing more,
but form means that which lies between potency and act
and in some way signifies both of them. For form signi
fies act in relation to matter and it signifies potency
in relation to existence. . . . Therefore, just as natter,
which is in potency to form and by the agent is changed
into act by form, is really distinct from its form, so
the form and the essence, which are in potency to exis
tence and by the agent acquire existence, are really dis
tinct from their existence. Therefore, because the es
sence is related to the agent from which it acquires ex
istence, it necessarily follows that it is not its own
existence but is really distinct from existence, (ibid..
pp. 64-65)
373
''
(6)
Wherefore, we must understand that the first and third way,
namely, a created essence in relation to the intellect by
which it can be known without its existence, and in rela
tion to the agent by which it has existence, are ways of
stating universally that everything that is, except the
First Being, is not its own existence but as an essence
distinct from its existence. For not only can material
things be known without their existence, but intelligences
can also be known in the same way, and they also have
their existence from another. . . . But the second way,
i.e. concerning individuation, is not common but particu
lar. For separate substances are essentially individual,
because, since they are not forms that are received in
another, as in matter, they are individuated in them
selves. . . . These three ways, therefore, prove that es
sence is really distinct from existence, because both in
the order of thought and reality an essence is able to
be and not to be. (ibid.. p. 65)
(7)
. . . if it is self-existing existence, it is an exis
tence that is total and perfect, having within itself the
whole reason of its existence. But if it is an existence
that is received in another, it must be contracted, par
ticularized and limited by the potency of that in which
it is received, (ibid.. p. 26)
. . . in the existence itself these three, reception in
another, participation, and limitation, are inseparably
associated: for every existence received in another must
be participated and limited: and the remaining three also,
perfect, self-existing, and infinite, are inseparably
connected; for every existence that is not received in
another, but existing in itself, must be perfect and in
finite. (Theorems. I, p. 25)
(8)
Because a created nature is able to be or not to be, it is
not its own existence, but is in potency to existence.
For nothing is in potency to itself and nothing receives
itself, and nothing, by receiving itself, is generated or
produced or created. . . . And because act and potency are
in opposition to each other, and one is not the other,
the existence which is united to essence in creation has
the notion of act and the essence which receives the ex
istence has the notion of potency, and one is not the other
but they are really different.
. . . If, therefore . . . it did not receive an existence
374
which is really distinct from it, it would be its own

existence, for the existence would not be received in
another, and, consequently, it would be self-existing.
But every being of this kind is perfect and infinite.
Therefore the existence of these is not participated
but perfect and infinite.
. . . if any created nature would be its own existence,
it would not participate in another; it would be abso
lutely simple and, consequently, absolutely unchangeable
by its own nature, . . . (Theorems. V, pp. 37-38)
(9)
tfe will say, therefore, that just as matter is formally
extended by quantity, so essence formally exists by
existence. And, just as natter and quantity are two
things, so essence and existence are two really distinct
things. Therefore, existence is not a union of essen
tial parts, nor a relation to an agent, nor a determi
nation of essence which is not really distinct from it
and with which it does not constitute a numerical unity,
but, as is clear from what has been said, existence is
an actuality really distinct from and added to the es
sence from which existence and essence everything, ex
cept the First, is composed. (Theorems. XIX., p. 99)
(10)
. . . non videtin* quod sit aliquod differre medium inter differre re et
ratione quia vel uno nomine significamus plura vel pluribus nominibus
significamus unum vel pluribus plura. . . . Si vero pluribus nominibus
significamus idem non potest ibi esse differentia nisi rationis.
Si
vero pluribus plura oportet quod sit differentia rei. Esse enim et
essentia sunt plura vocabula.
Vel ergo dicunt eandem rem vel non.
stat quod non est dare medium.
Con
Si dicunt eandem rem vel dicunt earn eo
dem modo et tunc sunt sinonyma et significativa talium vocabularum nec

re nec ratione differunt. Sed si dicant eandem rem non eodem modo non
differunt re sed ratione tantum.
Si res divereas dicant differunt re.
(E & E, q.9)
. . . it does not seem that there is some middle way
375
differing between real differing and rational differing,

because we either signify many things by one name, or we
signify one thing by many names, or many things by many
names. . . . If truly we signify the same thing by many
names, there can only be there a difference of reason.
If truly by many names we signify many things, it is
necessary that there be a real difference, for "exis
tence1* and "essence" are many words. Therefore, either
they mean the same thing, or they do not no middle
way is given. If they signify the same thing, either
they do so in the same way and then they are synonyms
and what is signified by such words differ neither
really nor rationally. But if they signify the same
thing but not in the same way, they do not differ real
ly but onlyorationally. If they signify diverse things,
they differ really.
(11)
And just as when the composite is generated, matter and
form are generated, so when an existent is created, es
sence and existence are created . . . the existence alone of creatures, is not created, because it does not
exist just by itself, but is the term of and the reason
for creation, for a thing is created in so far as it
has existence. (Theorems. V, p. 35)
376
Godfrey of Fontaines
(1)
Quod enim aliquid differat realiter ab aliquo et non sit res alia nec rem
aliam includat implicat contradictoria.
Sicut enim quae differunt ratio
ne diversas rationes oportet importare et qui ponit quod aliquid differat

ratione ab aliquo et non sit alia ratio vel non includat aliam rationem
quam illud, implicat contradictoria; ita quae differunt realiter, diver
sas res importare oportet, et qui ponit quod aliquid differat realiter ab
aliquo et non sit res alia nec aliam rem includat manifeste contradictionem includit.
(Quodlibetum VII, q.5* Les Philosophes Beiges, vol. II,
pp. 304-305)
For that something should really differ from something,
and that it not be another thing, nor include another
thing, implies a contradiction. For, just as those that
differ rationally must imply diverse rationes. and who
ever posits that something differs from something ratio
nally and is not another ratio nor does it include an
other ratio besides that, implies a contradiction, so
what differ really must imply diverse things, and whoever
says that something differs really from something, yet
is not another thing nor does it include another thing,
manifestly includes a contradiction.
Durandus of St. Pourcain
(1)
. . . cum idem et differens dividentes, sicut ens dupliciter accipitur, sic
identitas et differentia. Ens autem uno modo accipitur pro omni illo quod
habet esse in re extra . . . omni operatione animae vel intellectus, et
istud vocatur ens reale. Alio modo accipitur ens pro eo quod non habet
aliquam entitatem, nisi per operationem intellectus, quia sic concipitur,
ita quod sic concipi est totum suum esse . . . et istud est ens in anima,
seu ens rationis. Et proportionaliter est aua,edam identitas et differentia
377r
realis, et quaedam solum secundum .rationem, quia ilia differunt realiter
quae differunt ex natura rei existentis extra animam circunscripta omni
operatione intellectus et per oppositum ilia quae sunt in re .extra et
praedicto modo non differunt, sunt idem realiter, ratione vero differunt
ilia quae sunt plura entia rationis . . . vel unum et idem re cui competunt diversae rationes, . . . (i Sent., d.33, q.l Venice, 1571, vol. I,
p. 89r a)
. . . since "same" and "different"divide "being," so
just as "being" is taken in two ways, "sameness" and
"difference" are each taken in two ways. In one way,
however, "being" is taken for all that which has being
really outside. . . every operation of the soul or
intellect, and this is called "real being." In an
other way "being" is taken for that which does not
have any entity except tnrough the operation of the
intellect because it is so conceived that to be so
conceived is its whole being. . . . and this is being
in the soul or "being of reason." And proportionally
there is some real identity and difference, and some
identity and difference which is only rational. Be
cause those differ really which differ from the na
ture of the case existing outside the soul apart
from every operation of the intellect. And, on the
contrary, those which are in a thing outside in the
aforesaid fashion are really the same. Those differ
rationally which are many beings of reason . . . or
one and the same thing to which diverse rationes
belong, . . .
John of St. Thomas
(1)
Unity and distinction must follow upon the order and
intelligible character of being. There are no more
than two kinds of being and it is contradictory to
posit a being intermediary between real being and
being of reason; consequently, there cannot be more
than two kinds of distinction. (The Material Logic.
q.2, a.3, p. 77)
(2)
The distinction of reasoning reason . . . is entirely
concerned with the way of signifying and conceiving.
378
(p. 79)
. . . the distinction of reasoning reason is not so much
of a distinction as the distinction of reasoned reason.
The former owes its names to its originating exclusively
in the mind that understands or reasons, whereas the lat
ter also has a foundation in the object itself, (p. 80)
The distinction of reasoned reason doest not presuppose,
on the part of the object, any actual distinction re
sulting from the nature of the thing. . . . When the dis
tinction . . . is actually made, conceptions of the in
tellect bring about a diversity of objective concepts
which does not pertain to real existence but to the way
of existing proper to the object and the represented.
(p. 81)
. . . the distinction of reasoned reason treats the ex
tremes in such a fshion that not all features revealed
by one concept are also revealed by the other; . . .
(p. 82)
On the part of the object the foundation of the distinc
tion of reasoned reason is a virtual distinction or a
certain loftiness of the thing which in its unity con
tains in some sort of existence several intelligible
features or perfections; on the part of our intellect
the foundation of the same distinction is imperfection
and inability to conceive adequately all these features
of the object; hence the fact that they are attained in
diverse concepts and compared, (ibid.. p. 84)
(3)
The real distinction can be described, in generic terms,
as a negation or absence of identity independent of any
insight or fiction elicited by the intellect. (Material
Logic, q.2, a.3 p. 77)
Peter John Olivi
Vocant autem rationem realem ad differentiam rationum quae in solis modis
intelligendi consistunt, . . . Ad differentiam igitur istarum vocant ratio
nes reales illas quarum veritas plenarie est in re, ita quod ex modo in
telligendi vario non attribuuntur rebus, sed potius ex ipsa natura et
veritate reali, . . . et omnes hae rationes essentialiter sibi competunt
et in ipso esse naturaliter consistunt. . . . intendunt etiam per hoc significare quod una ratio non significat essentiam totaliter, unde ipsa
secundum quod significatur per uriam, non significatur per aliam; . .
579
(Quaeationes in Secundum Librum Sententiarum. VII, Quaracchi ed., vol. I,
pp. 154, 155, 145)
However they call it a difference of real rationes in
contrast to a difference of concepts which consists
only in the way of understanding something, . . . In
contrast to this difference, they call those "real
rationes11 whose full truth is in a thing so that they
are not attributed to things from various ways of un
derstanding the things, but rather they are so attribu
ted from the natures themselves and the real truth of
things, . . . and all these aspects belong essentially
to a thing and naturally consist in its being. . . .
they also intend to signify through this that one such
aspect does not completely signify the essence of a
thing, but one such real ratio signifies something
that another (belonging to the same thing] does not
signify. . . .
580
John Duns Scotus

Meta.
Quaestiones Subtilisslmae in Metaphysicam Aristotelis
Ord.
Ordinatio (first book of Oxford

Sentences)
Qpua Oxoniense
gs.de Ms,
Quaestiones super Libros Aristotelis

de Anima
Quod.
Quaestiones Quodlibetales
R.P.
Reportata Parisiensia
Vat.
Vatican edition of the Ordinatio. etc.
Wadd.
Wadding's edition of the Opera Omnia
Wolter
Philosophical Writings, trans. A. Wolter
(1)
Differentia ergo rationis stricte loquendo, est differentia posterior
naturaliter actu intellectus possibilis, considerantis idem obiectum sub
alia, et alia ratione; et hoc sive ilia differentia sit obiecti existentis in intellectu in actu secundo; sive habitualiter per habitum derelictum ex actu concipiendi: . . . (Meta. VII.
q.
19, n.6, Wadd., vol. IV,
p. 728a)
A difference of reason, strictly speaking, is therefore a
difference naturally posterior to an act of the possible
intellect considering the same object under different
concepts* And . = = either that difference is of an ob
ject existing in the intellect in the second act, or ex
isting habitually through a habit left from the act of
conceiving.
(2)
. . . duae sunt differentiae in intellectus una intelligendo obiectum formade quod est intra, sive extra sibi correspondent una res, vel duae, tan-
381
quam terminans extra, sicut patet: albedo in re extra accipitur ab una re,
et tamen aliud est obiectum foimale in intellectu de conceptu coloris dif
ferentiae suae, non obstante quod una res simplex extra correspondet utrique; et similiter unius rei possunt esse duo modi Logicales diverse, vel
duo modi Grammaticales; Logicales, ut homo, humanitas. Grammaticales, ut
homo, hominis. ita quod una est distinctio obiectorum formaliter conceptorum, et alia est distinctio ex differentia modorum concipiendi.
(R.P.
I, d. 45, q.2, n. 11, Wadd., vol. XI, 1, p. 234a )

There are two differences in the understanding: one, in
understanding a formal object which is inside the under
standing, but as if terminating outside the understanding.
For either one or two things correspond to it outside,
just as it is clear that the whiteness in a thing outside
the understanding is taken from one thing, and yet the
formal object in the intellect of the concept of the dif
ferentia of color is different, notwithstanding the fact
that one simple thing outside corresponds to both formal
objects. And likewise there can be two diverse logical
and grammatical modes of one thing, e.g. logical: "man,"
humanity;" grammatical: "man," "of a man*.So that one
is a distinction of objects formally conceived, and the
other is a distinction from a difference of modes of con
ceiving.
(3)
. . . differentia rationis, quae est, quando res non est nata facere, ni
si unum conceptum: qui tamen potest concipi sub diversis modis concipi
endi.
(Meta. VII. q. 19, n. 4, Wadd., vol. IV, p. 727b)

. . . a difference of reason, which is when a thing is
only suited to make one concept which, however, can be
conceived in diverse ways.
(4)
. . . quidquid intellectus causat sine actione obiecti circa obiectum

praecise virtute propria intellectus, et hoc loquendo de obiecto ut ha
bet esse cognitvmi in intellectu praecise et de intellectu ut considerans
382
est, illud est praecise relatio rationis.
(Ord. I, d.2, P.2, q.1-4, Vat.,
vol. II, p. 353)

Whatever the intellect causes concerning an object, but
without the action of that object, precisely by the pro
per power of the intellect (speaking of the object as
it has cognitive being in the intellect precisely, and
of the intellect as it is considering the object), that
is exactly a relation of reason.
(5)
. . potentia collativa potest objectum suum comparare ad aliud, et in
eo sic comparato causare respectum rationis, qui non inest ex natura rei,
sed ex actu potentia: . . . (Ox. Ill, d. 26, q. un., n. 13, Wadd., vol.
VII, 2, p. 631)
A collative power can compare its object with another,
and in what is so compared cause a relation of reason
which does not really inhere in the object, but comes
from .the act of the power.
(.Numbers 6-11 come from the same source and all deal with the distinction
between the divine essence and each of the three Persons of the Trinity)
(6)
Non enim videtur intelligibile quod essentia non plurificetur et supposita sint plura nisi aliqua distinctio ponatur inter rationem essentiae
et rationem suppositi. Et ideo ad salvandum istam compossibilitatem praedictam, oportet videre de ista distinctione.
(n. 388)
Et dico sine assertione et praeiudicio melioris sententiae quod ratio qua

formaliter suppositum est incommunicabile (sit a) et ratio essentiae ut
essentia (sit b) habent aliquam distinctionem praecedentem omnem actum in
tellectus creati et increati.
(n. 389)
Hoc probo sic: primum suppositum formaliter vel realiter habet entitatem
communicabilem, alioquin non posset earn communicare; habet etiam realiter
583
entitatem incommunicabilem, alioquin non posset esse positive in entitate
reali suppositum. Et intelligo sic 'realiter1, quod nullo modo per actum
intellectus considerantis, immo quod talis entitas esset ibi si nullus
intellectus essent considerans; et sic esse ibi, si nullus intellectus
consideret, dico 'esse ante omnem actum intellectus'. Non est autem
aliqua entitas ante omnem actum intellectus ita quod non per actum intel
lectus, communicabilis, et alia entitas de se sit incommunicabilis, ita
scilicet quod sibi contradicat communicari, nisi ante actum intellectus,
hoc est, non praecise per intelligere, sit aliqua distinctio inter hanc
entitatem et illam; . . . (Ord. I, d.2, P.2, q. 1-4, Vat., vol. II, pp.
349-350)
For it does not seem intelligible that the divine supposits are many and that the divine essence is not mul
tiplied, unless some distinction is placed between the
concept of the essence and the concept of a supposit.
And, therefore, to preserve the aforesaid compossibility,
it is necessary to examine that distinction.
And I say, without assertion and prejudice of a better
opinion, that the concept by which a supposit is formal
ly incommunicable (call it a), and the concept of the
essence as essence (call it b) have some distinction
preceding every act of a created or an uncreated intel
lect.
I prove this thus. The first supposit has communicable
being formally and really, otherwise it could not com
municate it. It also has really incommunicable being,
otherwise a supposit could not be positively in a real
being. And I so understand this word "really'* to mean
"not through an act of an intellect considering it."
Rather, such a being would be there if no intellect
were considering it. And to so be there even if no
intellect were considering it I call "being before
every act of the understanding." There is not, how
ever, some entity existing before every act of the un
derstanding which is communicable (but not through an
act of the intellect), and another entity which is in
communicable of itself (so, namely, that it is contra
dictory to say it communicates), unless there is some
distinction between this entity and that before an act
384
of the understanding, i.e. a distinction which does not
arise from the understanding.
(7)
. . . distinctio una in intellectu est penes diversum modum accipiendi idem
obiectum formale, et hoc sive concipiendo grammatice, ut 'homo', 'hominis',
sive logics, ut .'homo' et 'hie homo'; alia distinctio, major, est in in
tellectu, concipiendo duobus actibus duo obiecta formalia, et hoc sive
illis correspondeant diversae res, ut intelligendo hominem et asinum,
sive una res extra, ut intelligendo colorem et disgregativunu
Cognitio autemintuitiva est obiecti ut obiectum
(n* 392)
est praesens in existen-
tia actuali, et hoc in se vel in alio continente eminenter totam entitatem

ipsius; ergo quae cognoscuntur intuitive ut obiecta formalia distincta,
vel unum continetur eminenter in alio, vel utrumque secundum propriam existentiam terminat actum ut est eius. Nihil autem intrinsecum personae
divinae proprie continetur in aliquo eminenter, . . . igitur quaecumque
intrinseca sunt diversa obiecta formalia intuitiva, secundum propriam
existentiam actualem terminant intuitionem ut obiecta, et ita habent aliquam distinctionem ante actum intelligendi.
(ibid.. n. 394, pp. 351-352)
One distinction in the intellect concerns diverse ways

of taking the same formal object, either conceiving
grammatically, as 'man*', or "of a man", or conceiving
logically, as "man" and "this man." Another greater
distinction is in the intellect when it conceives two
formal objects by two acts, and either diverse things
correspond to those objects as when a man and an ass
are understood, or one thing corresponds outside the
understanding, as when color and separation are un
derstood.
Intuitive cognition, however, is of an object as the
object is present in actual existence, either in it
self or in another which eminently contains the whole
being of the former. Therefore what are known intui
tively as distinct formal objects are such that either
one is eminently contained in the other, or each ac
cording to its proper existence terminates of itself .
585
an act of understanding of it. However, nothing intrin
sic to a divine Person is properly contained in some
thing eminently, . . . therefore, what are intrinsic
diverse formal intuitive objects terminate intuition as
objects according to their proper, actual existence, and
so they have some distinction before every act of the
understanding
(8)
Dico quod tarn in rebus quam in intellectu differentia maior manifesta est,
et ex ilia concluditur frequenter differentia minor, quae est immanifesta,
sicut ex differentia creaturarum concluditur differentia idearum in in
tellectu divino, . . In re autem manifests est distinctio rerum, et
hoc duplex, suppositorum scilicet et naturarum; in intellectu manifests
est differentia duplex, modorum scilicet concipiendi et obiectorum formalium.
Ex dictis concluditur differentia hie intenta, quae est immanifesta, nimirum quia minima in suo ordine, id est inter omnes quae praecedunt intellectionem.
Concluditur autem ex differentia reali sic: distinctio divin-
orum suppositorum est reali3; ergo cum non possit idem eodem formaliter,
quod est aliquid sui, convenire realiter tanturn, sic quod non ex illo
distingui, et differre realiter tantum, sic quod non illo convenire . . .
concluditur aliqua differentia vel distinctio essentiae in qua supposita
conveniunt ab illis rationibus quibus supposita distinguuntur.
Similiter secunda via: ex differentia obiectorum formalium quorum neutrum
continetur in aliauo eminenter, et hoc in intellectu intuitive considerante,
concluditur aliqua differentia ante actum intellectus eorum quae cognoscuntur intuitive,
(ibid.. nn. 396-599, pp. 353-355)

I say that, in the intellect as much as in things, there
is a greater difference which is manifest, and from this
a lesser difference which is not manifest is often in
ferred, just as from a difference of creatures a differ-
386
ence of ideas in the divine intellect is inferred, . . .
In this, however, there is a manifest distinction of
things, and this is twofold, namely of supposits and of
natures. In the intellect there is manifest a double
difference, namely of modes of conceiving and of formal
objects.
From what was said, the difference here intended is in
ferred which is not manifest, undoubtedly because it is
the least in its order, that is, among all those which
precede the understanding. It is concluded, however
from a real difference in this way. The distinctionnof
divine supposits is real, therefore since the same thing
should not be able to agree really only with what is for
mally the same as it so as not to be distinguished from
that, and to differ really only so as not to agree with
that . . . some difference or distinction of the essence
is inferred, in which the supposits agree by those rationes by which the supposits are distinguished.
Likewise the second way: from a difference of formal ob
jects neither of which is eminently contained in some
thing, and this in an intellect considering them intui
tively is concluded some difference before an act of the
intellect between those that are known intuitively.
(9)
Sed numquid haec distinctio dicetur realis?
Respondeo: non est realis actualis, intelligendo sicut communiter dicitur,
'differentia realis actualis' ilia quae est differentia rerum et in actu,
quia in una persona non est aliqua differentia rerum propter simplicitatam divinam; et sicut non est realis actualis, ita non est realis potentialis, quia nihil est ibi in potentia quod non est in actu.
'Potest ahtem vocari 'differentia rationis', sicut dixit doctor quidam;
non quod 'ratio' accipiatur pro differentia formats ab intellectu, sed
ut 'ratio' accipitur pro quiditate rei secundum quid quiditas est obiectum intellectus.
(n. 401)
Vel, alio modo, potest vocari 'differentia virtualis', quia illud quod
habet talem distinctionem in se non habet rem et rem, sed est una res,
387
habeas virtual!ter sive praeeminenter quasi duas realitates, quia utrique

realitati ut est in ilia una re competit illud quod est proprium principium tali realitati, ac si ipsa esset res distincta: ita enim haec realitas distinguit et ilia non distinguit, sicut si ilia esset una res et
ista alia.
(Ord. I, P. 2, q.1-4, nn. 401-402, Vat., vol. II, pp. 355-6)

But can't this distinction ever be called real? I answer,
it is not actually real, understanding a 'real actual dif
ference' as it is commonly understood as that which is a
difference of things and in act, because in one Person
there is no difference of things because of the divine
simplicity. And just as it is not a real actual differ
ence, so it is not a real potential difference because
there is nothing there [in Go<Q in potency which is not
there in act.
It can, however, be called a 'difference of ratio', as a
certain doctor said, not because ratio is taken for a
difference formed by the intellect, but because 'ratio*
is taken as the quiddity of a thing according to which
the quiddity is an object of the intellect. Or, in an
other way, it can be called a 'virtual difference' be
cause that which has such a distinction, in itself does
not have two things, but is one thing having virtually
or pre-eminently as it were two realities, because to
each reality as it is in that one thing, there agrees
that which is the proper principle of such a reality
just as if it were a distinct thing. For so this reali
ty distinguishes and that does not distinguish, just as
if that were one thing and that another.
(10)
Voco autem identitatem formalem, ubi illud quod dicitur sic idem, includit illud cui sic est idem, in ratione sua formali quiditative et per se
primo modo.
In proposito autem essentia non includit in ratione sua for
mali quiditativa proprietatem suppositi, nec e converso. Et ideo potest

concedi, quod ante omnem actum intellectus est realitas essentiae qua est
communicabilis, et realitas suppositi qua suppositum est incommunicabile;
et ante actum intellectus haec realitas formaliter ncn est ilia, vel, non
est formaliter eadem illi. . (Ibid,. pp. 356-357)

I call that formal identity, however, where that which is
said to be the same in this way includes that to which it
is thus the same in its formal quidditative concept, and
includes it essentially in the first manner. In what was
proposed, however, the essence does not include the con
cept of the property of the supposit in its formal quiddi
tative concept, or conversely. And therefore it can be
conceded that, before any act of the intellect there is
the reality of the supposit by which the supposit is in
communicable. And before an act of the intellect, this
reality is not formally that reality, or is not formally
the same as that reality.
(11)
Ista differentia Ql.e. the formal difference} manifestatur per exemplums
si ponatur albedo species simplex non habens in se duas naturas, est
tamen in albedine aliquid realiter unde habet rationem coloris, et aliquid unde habet rationem differentiae; et haec realitas non est formali
ter ilia realitas, nec e converso formaliter, immo una est extra realitatem alterius formaliter loquendo sicut si essent duae res, licet
modo per identitatem istae duae realitates sint una res.
Hoc autem exemplum licet aliqualiter sit simile ad propositum (quoad hoc
scilicet quod identitas realis non necessario concludit identitatem formalem cuiuslibet quod est in sic eodem ad quodcumque quod est in ipso),
non tamen est omnino simile, quia aliqua compositio est in albedine, li
cet non rei et rei, tamen quails non concederetur in Deo, propter nonidentitatem formalem.
(ibid., p. 358)
The difference Q,.e. the formal differencej is made evi

dent through an example. If a simple species, e.g.
whiteness, is posited, which does not have two natures
in itself, there is however in whiteness something real
whence it has the ratio of color, and something whence
it has the ratio of difference. And this reality is not
formally that reality, nor is that formally this. Rather
one is outside the reality of the other, formally speak
ing, just as if they.were two things, although in a way
589
through identity these two realities are one thing.
However this example, although in some ways it is similar
to that proposed (as long, namely as this, that real iden
tity does not necessarily imply formal identity of any
thing which is in the same thing to whatever is in itself,
is true), it is not, however, entirely similiar because
there is some composition in whiteness, although not of
two things, because of formal non-identity. This composi
tion cannot be conceded to be in God.
(12)
Dicunt quidam, quod in re sufficit differentia intentionis, quae nullam
differentiam nec compositionem actu ponit in re, sed tantum potentialem,
sic quod ipsa nata est facere diversos conceptus in intellectu de se.
Ita quod ista differentia actu est solum in intellectu concipiente, . . .
concipiendo genus, aut concipitur aliquid rei in specie, aut nihil; simili
ter de differentia: si nihil, isti conceptus videntur fictitii, non reales
. . . si aliquid, aut aliquid idem, et tunc erit idem conceptus; aut ali
quid aliud, et tunc erit in re aliqua differentia prior differentia conceptuum. . . . species formando duos conceptus generis, et differentiae,
non tantum causat duos actus in intellectu distinctos numero, sed causat
duas notitias actuales, vel habituales, habentem objecta propria distincta:
et hoc ita distincta, sicut si ilia duo objecta essent duae res extra . . .
omnis differentia prior naturaliter omni actu rationis, videtur differentia
realis . . . objecta naturaliter praecedunt actus, et distinctio objectorum,
distinctionem actuum; maxime quando haec illam causat, ut hie ponitur; ergo
differentia intentionis, quae est in conceptibus, concludit priorem in objectis, quae erit realis. . . . Quaero igitur, an istis notitiis sognoscat intellectus objective aliquid in re? si nihil, fictio est; si idem,
ergo objectum idem est: nisi dicas, quod una res extra facit formaliter
duo objecta in intellectu: et tunc non videtur quod res, vel aliquid rei,
390
sit objectum, sed aliquid factum a re: si aliud, habetur propositum, quia
differentia ante conceptus.
(Meta. VII. q. 19 nn. 4,5, Wadd., vol. IV,
pp. 727-728)
Certain people say that an intentional difference, which
puts no difference or actual composition in a thing, but
only potential composition, suffices in a thing to suit
it to make diverse concepts of itself in the intellect,
so that that difference in act is only in the conceiving
intellect, . . . in conceiving a genus, either something
of the thing in the species is conceived, or nothing, and
likewise concerning difference. If nothing, those con
cepts appear fictitious and not real . . . if something,
either something the same, and then the concept will be
the same, or something else, and then there will be in a
thing some difference prior to the difference of concepts
. . . The species, forming two concepts of genus and dif
ference, not only causes two numerically distinct acts in
the understanding, but causes two actual or habitual no
tices having proper distinct acts, and so distinct as if
those two objects were two things outside the understand
ing . . . every difference naturally prior to any act of
reason appears to be a real difference . . . objects
naturally precede acts and a distinction of objects ad
distinction of acts, especially when this causes that as
is here posited. Therefore, a difference of intentio
which is in concepts implies a prior difference in ob
jects which will be real. . . . I ask, therefore, if the
intellect should know by these notices [genus and dif
ference]! something which is objectivelyin a thing? If
nothing, they are .fictions. If the same thing, there
fore the object is the same unless you say that one thing
outside the understanding formally makes two objects in
the intellect. And then it does not appear that a thing,
or something belonging to a thing, is the object, but
rather something made by the thing. If other, the pro
posal is granted because there is a difference prior to
that of concepts.
(13)
Ista opinio non negat differentiam intentionis, sed ponit sibi necessario
correspondere aliquam in re: et ita ponit quadruplicem differentiam, duplicem realem, rerum, et rationum realium;et duplicem rationis scilicet
intentionis, et rationis stricte sumptam, quod si differentia intentionis
391
non requirat differentiam rationum realium in actu, sed sufficiat quod

in potentia sit in re, et in actu in intellectu in esse primo, ut prius
expositum esti qui potest capere, capiat,
(ibid., n. 10, p. 729)
That opinion [i.e. that in 12) does not deny an intentio

nal difference, but makes something in a thing necessari
ly correspond to it. And so it puts a fourfold differ
ence a double real difference of things or of real rationes, and a double rational difference, namely of intentiones and of rationes strictly understood. Because,
if an intentional difference does not require a differ
ence of real rationes in act, but it suffices that it
i.e. the intentionalj be in a thing in potency, and
actually in the intellect in first being, whoever can un
derstand that, let him.
(14)
Dico quod essentia et relatio sic distinguuntur, quod ante omnem actum in
tellectus haec proprietas distinguitur ab essentia secundum quid, sed dis
tinctio realis aliquorum secundum quid potest intelligi dupliciter.
Uno
modo, ut haec determinatio secundum quid referatur ad realitatem, .'. .

Alio.modo potest haec determinatio secundum quid referri ad distinctionem,
ut sit sensus, quod essentia et relatio ex natura rei distinguuntur secun
dum quid, et sic est verum quod distinctio essentiae et relationis est
rei simpliciter, et distinctio secundum quid. . . .
Ilia ergo distinguuntur perfecte, quae secundum esse eorum actuale, proprium, et determinatum, non sunt eadem simpliciter; et ilia distinguuntur
secundum quid, quae non habent identitatem simpliciter, sed tantum non
identitatem secundum quid: . . .
Ad hoc quod aliqua simpliciter distin-
guantur, requiruntur quatuor conditiones. Prima est, quod sit aliquorum

in actu, et non in potentia tantum: quia non distinguuntur ea, quae sunt
in potentia in materia, et non simpliciter, quia non sunt in actu.
Se-
cunda est, quod sit eorum, quae habent esse formale. non tantum virtual:
ut effectus sunt in causa virtualiter, et non formaliter. Tertia est,
quod sit eorum, quae non habent esse confusum, ut extrema in medio et
miscibilia in mixto, sed eorum quae habent esse distinctum propriis actualitatibus. Quarta, quae sola est completiva distinctionis perfectae, est
non idehtitas. . . . diversitas autem in omnibus tribus primis conditionibus salvata identitate, est distinctio secundum quid, . . .
Potest autem essentiae et relationis distinctio vocari distinctio ex natura
rei, quia ita est non identitas eorum secundum quid, ac si utrumque ex
natura rei actualiter proprie et determinate existeret sine alio. . . .
ibi est duplex non identitas, non identitas formalis, et non identitas
adaequata, et utraque est non identitas secundum quid, quia simul stant
cum identitate simpliciter; . . .
. . . non sunt eadem identitate adaequata, cuius sunt ilia, quorum neutrum excedit alterum, sed est praecise illud, et nec maius, nec minus,
ut definitio et definitum. Non-adaequata identitate dicuntur ilia, quorum
unum excedit alterum, vel unitas unius excedit unitatem alterius, ut se
habet animal ad hominem; . . . excessus autem unius respectu alterius,
et non adaequate, potest intelligi dupliciter: vel secundum praedicationem, et non convertibilitatem, et sic se habent animal et homo inadaequate, quia animal praedicatur de pluribus quam homo.
Alio modo secundum virtutem, et perfectionem, et sic homo excedit animal
ut forma materiam.
Primo modo proprietas transcendit essentiam, quia de
pluribus praedicatur. . . . Sic in creaturis sunt aliqua simpliciter eadem,

et tamen non identitate adaequata; quamvis enim potentia animae sit sim
pliciter eadem, cum ipsa anima, in qua est, non tamen adaequate eadem
illi, quia non est tota anima secundum suas potentias, . .
Item, quia non est identitas formalis essentiae ad relationem, nec e con-
595
verso, ideo non oportet quod quicquid convenit formaliter uni, conveniat
alteri, . . . (R.P. I, d.33, q.2, nn. 8-14, Wadd., vol. XI, 1, pp. 186a187a)
I say that the divine essence and a divine relation are
so distinguished that, before any act of understanding,
this property is distinguished from the essence after
a fashion.' But a real distinction after a fashion can
be understood in two ways. In one way, as this deter
mination 'after a fashion' is related to reality, . . .
In another way this determination 'after a fashion' can
be related to distinction in the sense that the essence
and a relation are really distinguished after a fashion,
and so it is true that the distinction of essence and
relation is simply real, and a distinction after a
fashion. . . .
Therefore, those are perfectly distinguished which, ac
cording to their actual, proper, and determinate exis
tence are not simply the same. And those are distin
guished after a fashion which do not have identity sim
ply, but only nonidentity after a fashion. . . .
For some beings to be simply distinguished, four con
ditions are necessary. The first is that the distinc
tion be of some beings in act, and not only in potency,
because those that are potentially in matter are not
distinguished and not simply distinguished because they
are not in act. The second is that it be of those which
have formal, and not only virtual, being as effects are
virtually and not formally in a cause. The third is
that it be of those which do not have confused being as
extremes in a middle, and mixables in a mixture, but of
those which have distinct being by proper actualities.
The fourth is nonidentity which completes only a per
fect distinction. . . diversity, however, in all three
of the first conditions, with the preservation of iden
tity, is a distinction after a fashion.
The distinction of the essence and a relation can, how
ever, be called a distinction from the nature of the case
because there is non-identity of those relata after a
fashion, as if each really, actually, properly, and determinately could exist without the other. . . . There is
double non-identity formal non-identity and adequate
non-identity and each is nonidentity after a fashion,
because they are both consistent with identity simply
understood. . . .
. . . They are not the same by adequate identity, which
394
is identity of those neither of which exceeds the other,

and each is exactly the other and neither more nor less,
such as a definition and what is defined. By non-adequate identity is meant the identity of those one of
which exceeds the other (or the unity of one exceeds the
unity of the other), just as animal is related to man.
. . . An excess, however, of one in relation to the
other extreme, non-adequately, can be understood in two
ways, either according to predication and non-converti
bility, and so animal and man are related inadequately
because 'animal1 is predicated of more than is "man, " or
in another way according to-power and perfection and
thus man exceeds animal as form exceeds matter. In the
first way, a property transcends the essence, because it
is predicated of many. . . . Thus in creatures some ex
tremes are simply the same, however not the same by ade
quate identity. For although a power of the soul is sim
ply the same as the soul to which it belongs, it is not,
however, adequately the same as that because it is not
the whole soul according to its powers, . . .
Likewise, because there is no formal identity of the di
vine essence and a relation, nor conversely, therefore
it is not necessary that whatever agrees formally with
one should agree formally with the other, . . .
(15)
Dicuntur autem aliqua non habere identitatem formalem, quando unam non est
de per se et primo intellectu alterius, ut definitio, vel partes definitionis de intellectu definiti; sed quando neutra includitur in formali
ratione alterius, licet tamen sint eadem realiter, sicut ens et unum
dicuntur eadem. . . formalis enim ratio entis non est de per se intel
lectu unius, cum unum sit passio, et passio non sit de formali intellec
tu subiecti, et tamen sunt eadem, realiter, . . . (R. P. I, d.33, q.2,
n.ll, Wadd., vol. XI, 1, p. 186b)
Some extremes, however, are said not to have formal
identity when one does not belong to the essential con
cept of the other as a definition or the parts of a
defintion belong to the concept of what is defined;
but when neither is included in the formal concept of
the other although . . . they are really the same, as
being' and 'one' are said to be the same . . . for the
formal concept of 'being* is not of the essential con-
cept of 'one,' since 'one' is a passion and a passion

does not belong to the formal concept of the subject
but, however, they are really the same, . . .
(16)
Dicoautem
aliquid es3e in alio ex natura rei, quod non est in eo per
actumintellectus negociantis, nec
per actum voluntatis comparantis, et
universaliter, quod est in alio non per actum alicuius potentiae com
parantis. . . .
Dico autem esse formaliter tale, sive esse in alio formaliter quod non
est in eo potentialiter, ut album in nigro; nec virtualiter, ut effectus
in suacausa est.
Nec hoc dico formaliter esse in aliquo quod est in eo
confuse, . .. sed
dico esse formaliter in aliquo, in quo manet secundum
suam rationem formalem, et quiditativam, et esse tale formaliter est includere ipsum secundum suam rationem formalem praecissime acceptum.
(R.P. I. d.45, q.2, n.5, Wadd., vol. XI, 1, pp. 232-233)
I say, however, that something is really in another which
is in it, but is not in it through an act of the negoti
ating intellect, nor through an act of the will comparing
it with another, nor in another in any way through an
act of some comparing power. . . .
I say, however, that something is formally such, or is
in another formally, which is not in it potentially (as
white is potentially in black), nor in it virtually (as
an effect is virtually in its cause). Nor do I say that
that is formally in something which is in it confusedly,
. . . but I say that something is formally in something
in which the former remains according to its formal and
quidditative concept. And to be something formally means
to include this something according to the latter's for
mal concept precisely understood.
(17)
. . . cum vera identitate, . . . stat tamen aliqua distinctio ex parte rei
secundum quid sola enim distinctio rationis non sufficit ad salvandum opposita convenire eis praeter omnem operationem intellectus, conceditur
396
enim quod Pater dicit intellectu sive memoria, et non. voluntate, et quod
3pirat voluntate, et non intellectu, et multa talia; ideo distinguuntur
secundum quid tantum a parte rei.
(R.P. I, d.45 q.2, n.9, Wadd., vol.
XI, 1, p. 233b)
. . . with true identity /*"in God7 . . there stands, how
ever, some distinction after a fashion on the part of the
thing. For a distinction of reason only does not suffice
to preserve opposites to agree with the extremes outside
every operation of the understanding. For it is conceded
that the Father speaks by intellect or memory and not by
will, and that he spirates by will and not by intellect,
and many such. Therefore /perfections in God/are distin
guished really only after a fashion.
(13)
. . . continentia unitiva, non est eorum quae omnino sunt idem, quia ilia
non uniuntur; nec est eorum quae manent distincta, ista distinctione, qua
fuerunt distincta ante unionem: sed quae sunt unum realiter, manent tamen
distincta formaliter sive quae sunt idem identitate reali, distincta
tamen formaliter, . . . (Ox. II, d.16, q. un., n. 17, Wadd., vol. VI, 2,
p. 772)
Unitive containment is not of those that are entirely
the same because these are not united. Nor is it of
those that remain distinct by that distinction by
which they were distinct before their union. But what
are really one, however, remain formally distinct; or
what are the same by a real identity yet formally dis
tinct, . . .
(19)
Continentia unitiva non est omnino ejusdem, ita quod idem omnino contineat se unitive, nec etiam omnino distincti; requirit igitur unitatem et
distinctionem. Est igitur continentia unitiva duplex.
Uno modo sicut
inferius continet superiors essentialia, et ibi contenta sunt de essen

tia continentis; . . . Alia est continentia unitiva quando subjectum uni-
397
tive continet aliqua, quae sunt quasi passiones, sicut passiones entis non
sunt res alia ab ente, quia quandocumque determinatur ipsa res, est ens
vera et bona. . . . (R.P. II, d. 15, q. un., Wadd., vol. XI, 1, p. 348b)
Unitive containment is not of those that are entirely
the same so that what is completely the same thing would
unitively contain itself, nor is it even of those that
are entirely distinct. It therefore requires both unity
and distinction. Therefore there are two kinds of uni
tive containment. In one way there is unitive contain
ment as an inferior contains its essential superiors
/"e.g. as a man contains animality and rationality]7
and there those that are contained are of the essence
of the one containing; . . . In the other way there is
unitive containment when a subject unitively contains
what are as passions of it, just as the passions of
being are not different things than being because when
ever a thing itself is determined, it is a being and is
true and good. . . .
(20)
. . . unitive autem non continentur quae sine omni distinctions continentur, quia unionon est absque omni distinctions.
Nec unitive continentur
quae simpliciter realiter distincta continentur, quia ilia multipliciter,

seu dispersim continentur; ergo hoc vocabulum unitive. includit aliqualem
distinctionem contentorum, quae sufficit ad unionem; et tamen talem unionem quaerepugnet omni composition!, et aggregation! distinctorum, hoc
non potest esse, nisi ponatur non identitas formalis cum identitate reali.
(Ox.
IV, d. 46, q.3 n.4, Wadd., vol. X, p. 265)

Those, however, are not unitively contained which are
contained without any distinction, because there is no
union without some distinction. Nor are those unitively
contained which are contained as simply and really dis
tinct, because such are contained as many or separately.
Therefore this word "unitivelyn includes some distinc
tion of what are contained and this suffices for their
union and, however, such a union which is repugnant to
all composition and the aggregation of what are distinct
cannot be unless formal non-identity is posited with a
real identity.
398
(21)
. . . in aliis unitive contentis, non est separatio realia, nec etiam

potentialis; sic natura cui intellectus tribuit intentionem speciei,
quae dicta est esse in re, est communis: sicut commune est potentiale in
re: nunquam separatur ab alia perfectione unitive secum contents, vel
ab illo gradu, in quo accipitur differentia individualis. Cum etiam
nunquam fiat in rerum natura nisi sub determinato gradu, nunquam est
ab illo separabilis, quia ille gradus cum quo ponitur, est secum unitive
contentus.
(Meta. VII, q. 13, n. 19 Wadd., vol. IV, p. 706a)

In others unitively contained there is not real nor
even potential separation. Thus the nature to which
the intellect attributes the intentio of a species,
which was said to be in a thing, is common just as
what i3 common is potential in a thing. It is never
separated from another perfection unitively contained
with it, nor from that grade in which the individual
difference is taken. Although it is still never made
in the nature of things except under a determinate
grade, it is never separable from that grade because
that grade in which it is placed is unitively contained
with it.
(22)
Est igitur continentia unitiva duplex.
Uno modo sicut inferius continet
superioria essentialia, et ibi contenta sunt de essentia continentis;

sicut eadem est realitas, a qua accipitur differentia in albedine, et a
qua genusproximum, ut color, et qualitas sensibilis,
et qualitas; et
quamquam essent res aliae, unitive continentur in albedine.
Alia est
continentia unitiva, quando subiectum unitive continet aliqua quae sunt

quasi passiones, . . . (Meta. IX, q. 5, n. 5, Wadd., vol. IV
Unitive containment is, therefore, of two kinds. In

one way just as an inferior contains its essential
superiors, and there those that are contained belong
to the essence of the container, just as it is the
same reality from which the differentia in whiteness
399
is taken., and from which a proximate genus such as color,

and sensible quality, and quality are taken. And, al
though they would be different things /if each existed
on its own_7 they are unitively contained in whiteness.
In anotherway there is unitive containment when a sub
ject unitively contains some which are like passions of
xt, . . .
(23)
. . . quodlibet commune, et tamen determinabile, adhuc potest distingui,
quantumcunque sit una res, in plures realitates formaliter distinctas,
quarum haec formaliter non est ilia:
singulariss
sed haec est formaliter entitas
et ilia est entitas naturae formaliter, nec possunt istae
duae realitates esse res et res, sicut possunt esse realitas,..unde acci
pitur genus, et realitas unde accipitur differentia, ex quibus realitas
specifics accipitur: sed semper in eodem sive parte, sive toto, sunt
realitates, eiusdem rei formaliter distinctae.
(Ox. II, d.3, q.6, n.15,
Wadd., vol. VI, 1, p. 413)

Anything common and however determinable can still be
distinguished, howevermuch it may be one thing, into
many realities formally distinct of which this is not
formally that. But this is formally a singular entity
/i.e. individual difference^/ and that is formally an
entity of the nature. Nor can those two realities be
things, as can be the reality whence a genus is taken
and the reality whence a difference is taken, from which
the specific reality is taken. But always in the same
thing, either partly or wholly, they are formally dis
tinct realities of the same thing.
(24)
. . . sicut ergo ens continet unitive rationem unius, veri, et boni . . .
sic anima continet potentias istas unitive, quamquam formaliter sint dis
tincta.
Praeterea, accipio hanc propositionem positam in principio
primi Sentent.: Quaecumque habent aliquam distinctionem realem, si essent separata realiter, illam distinctionem habent secundum rationem,
400
ubi non sunt distincta realiter: sed ens et unum si eesent separata, essent distincta distinctions quiditativa reali: igitur et nunc habent illam formalem distinctionem et quiditativam secundum rationem:
Quaecunque
habent aliquam ordinem inter se, ubi sunt distincta realiter, eundem ordinem habent ubi sunt unitive contents. . . . (n. 17)
Sic ergo possumus accipere de intellectu, et voluntate, quae non sunt par
tes essentiales animae, sed sunt unitive contents in anima, quasi passio
nes eius, propter quae anima est operativa; non quod sint essentia eius
formaliter, sed sunt formaliter distinctae:
idem tamen identice, et uni
tive, . . . (n. 18)

. . . quantumcunque istae perfectiones sint unitive in essentia, ex quo
tamen non sunt quiditative in essentia, non sequitur in abstracto quod
hoc sit illud:
sicut animal est de ratione quiditativa hominis, et tamen
non sequitur quod unum abstractive praedicetur de alio:
haec enim est
falsa, humanitas est animalitas. Accipiendo autem concretive, sic unum

praedicatur de alio, ut homo est animal: sic etiam potest dici, quod intellectivum est volitivum.
(n. 2l)
(Ox. II, d. 16, q. un., Wadd., vol.
VI, 2, pp. 772-774)

Therefore, just as 'being' unitively contains the notions
of 'one', 'true', and 'good' . . . so the soul contains
those powers unitively, although they are formally dis
tinct from one another.
Moreover, I accept this proposition posited in the begin
ning of 1 Sent.: whatever have some real distinction if
they be really separated, have that distinction according
to reason where they are not really distinct. But 'being'
and 'one,' if they were separated, would be distinct by
a real quidditative distinction according to reason.
Whatever have some order among themselves where they are
really distinct, have the same order where they are uni
tively contained.
So therefore, we can treat of the intellect and the will,
which are not essential parts of the soul but are uni
tively contained in the soul as passions by which the
soul is operative. Mot that they are formally its es
sence, but they are formally distinct, although iden
tically the same, . . .
. . . howevermuch those perfections are contained uni
tively in the essence (from which fact it does not fol
low, however, that they are quidditatively in the es
sence) it does not follow that in the abstract this
is that, just as animal' is of the quidditative con
cept 'man' and, however, it does not follow that one
is abstractively predicated of the other. For this
is false; "Humanity is animality." Taking it concretively, however, so one is predicated of the other,
as in "A man is an animal." So it can even be said
that the intellective power is the volitive power.
(25)
.... in creatura non est aliqua praedicatio per identitatem, quae non
sit formaliter, et ideo nunquam fuit tradita . . . in divinis autem est
vera praedicatio per identitatem, in abstracto, et tamen non est for
malis.
(n. 218)
Ratio huius . . . est . . . quia concipiendo abstractum ultima abstrac

tions, concipitur quiditas absque habitudine ad quodcumque quod est extra
propriam rationem quiditatis; sic ergo concipiendo extrema, nulla est
veritas uniendo ea nisi praecise quiditas unius extremi sit eadem praecise quiditati alterius extremi. Hoc autem non contingit in creaturis,
quia ibi, abstrahendo illas realitates quae sunt in eodem (puta realitatem generis et differentiae) et considerando eas praecissime, utraque
est finita et neutra perfecte eadem alteri; non enim sunt alio modo eadem
inter se nisi propter terium cui sunt eadem, et ideo si abstrahantur a
tertio non remanet causa identitatis eorum, et ideo nec causa veritatis
propositionis unientis extrema ilia. Haec ergo est falsa 'animalitas
est rationalitas,1 et e converso, et hoc quaecumque praedicatione, quia
non tantum extrema non sunt formaliter eadem, sed nec vere eadem; quidi-
462
tas enim haec praecise est potentialis ad quiditatem illam, et non est ea
dem illi nisi propter identitatem ad tertium a quo abstrahuntur: . . .
(n. 219) (Ord. I, d. 8, P.I, q. 4, Vat., vol. IV, pp. 274-275)
In a creature there is no predication through identity
which is not formal, and therefore was never treated
. . . in God. There.is, however, /"in God_7true predi
cation through identity in abstraction but~it is not,
however, formal.
The reason for this . . . is . . . because, in con
ceiving what are abstracted by ultimate abstraction,
a quiddity is conceived without reference to anything
which is outside the proper concept of the quiddity.
So, therefore, in conceiving the extremes, there will
be no truth in uniting them except the quiddity of
one extreme be precisely the same as the quiddity of
the other extreme. This, however, does not occur in
creatures because there, if we abstract those reali
ties which sire in the same thing, e.g. the reality
of a genus and of a difference, and consider them ex
actly, each is finite and neither is perfectly the
same as the other. For they are not the same as each
other in another way than because of a third with
which they are the same and therefore, if they are
abstracted from the third, there remains no cause
for their identity, and therefore no cause of the
truth of a proposition uniting those extremes. This,
therefore, is false: "Animality is rationality, and
conversely, and this is so in any predication be
cause not only are the extremes not formally the same,
but they are not truly the same. For this quiddity
is precisely potential to that quiddity and is not
the same as that except because of their identity
with a third from which they are abstracted: . . .
(26)
. . . quando aliquid praedicatur de aliquo abstracto ultimata abstractione
praedicatione formali, ad hoc quod proposito sit vera requiritur quod
praedicatum sit de formali intellectu subiecti, ita quod sit vera 'per
se primo modo' . . . . Quando igitur est abstractio ultimata et praedi
catur aliquid formali praedicatione, propositio non est vera nisi praedi
catum sit de formali intellectu subiecti et per se primo modo; . . . (Lee.
I, d. 5, P I, q* un., Vat., vol. XVI, p. 417, p. 418)
When something is predicated of something else which has

been abstracted by ultimate abstraction and the predi
cation is formal, in order for the proposition to be
true it is necessary that the predicate belong to the
formal concept of the subject, so that it is true per
se in the first way. . . .
When, therefore, there is ultimate abstraction and
something is predicated by formal predication, the
proposition is not true unless the predicate belongs
to the formal concept of the subject and per se in
the first way.
(27)
. . . potentiae non sunt res aliae, sed sunt unitive contentae in essen
tia animae.
Similiter non sunt potentiae idem formaliter, vel quiditative, nec inter
se, nec etiam cum essentia animae, nec tamen sunt res aliae, sed idem
identitate.
Ideo talia habent talem distinctionem secundum rationes for-
males, qualem haberent realem distinctionem, si essent res aliae realiter

distinctae. . . . Vel potest dici quod quantumcumque sint idem realiter
in essentia animae, tamen quiditative, et formaliter distinguuntur. Et
ista diversitas impedit praedicationem unius de alio.
Si igitur ab in-
tellectivo, et volitivo abstrahantur intellectus, et voluntas, si est

ibi aliqua distinctio formalis, unum non praedicatur de alio, sicut nec
animalitas de humanitate, quamquam includatur in illo:
sed ratione uni-
tatis realispotentiarum in essentia animae haec erit vera, intellectivum

est volitivum in causa, etsinabstrahantur intellectus, et voluntas ab eo,
quod est causa unitatis, neutrum de alio verificatur.
(R. P. II, d. 15,
q. un., Wadd., vol. XI, 1, pp. 348b-349b)

The powers of the soul are not different things, but
are unitively contained in the essence of the soul.
Likewise the powers are not formally or quidditatively
the same as each other, or as the essence of the soul.
Nor, however, are they different things, but they are
404
the same by identity. Therefore such extremes have such
a real distinction if they were really distinct things,
Or it can be said that, howevermuch they be really the

same in the essence of the soul, they are however dis
tinguished quidditatively and formally. And that diver
sity impedes the predication of one of the other. If
therefore, intellect and will were abstracted from the
intellective and volitive powers, if there is there some
formal distinction, one is not predicated of the other,
just as animality is not predicated of humanity although
it is included in humanity. But, by reason of the real
unity of the powers in the essence of the soul, this
will be true in the cause: "the intellective is the
volitive," although if intellect and will be abstracted
from that which is the cause of their unity, neither is
verified of the other.
(28)
. . . ut entitas quiditativa est naturaliter prior ista entitate, ut est.
. . . ergo ista entitas non est materia, vel forma, nec compositum, in
quantum quodlibet istorum est natura, sed est ultima realitas entis, quod
est materia, vel quod est forma, vel quod est compositum; . . . (Ox. II,
d. 3, q. 6, n. 15, Wadd., vol. VI, 1, p. 413)
As a quidditative entity is naturally prior to that
entity ^~i.e. to the individual difference_7t so is
this. . . . Therefore, that entity is not matter or
form or a composite inasmuch as any of those is the
nature, but it is an ultimate reality of the being
which is matter or form or a composite.
(29)
Sustineri ergo potest opinio ilia, de identitate reali sic, quod sicut
essentia divina infinitas perfectiones continet, et omnes continet uni
tive, sic quod non sunt aliae res: sic essentia create potest aliquas
perfectiones unitive continere: . . . in creatura quaelibet perfectio
contents limitata est, et limitatior essentia continente secundum totalitatem; . . . ideo quaelibet potest dici pars perfectionis, non tatamen realiter differens quod sit alia natura, sed alia perfectio realis,
alien!tate, inquam, non causata ab intellectu: nec tamen tanta quantum In
telligimus, cum dicuntur diversae res, sed differentia reali minori, si

vocatur differentia realis omnis non causata ab intellectu.
(Meta. IV,
q. 2, n. 24, Wadd., vol. IV, p. 587a)

That opinion concerning real identity can, therefore, be
sustained in this way, because just as the divine essence
contains infinite perfections, and contains all unitively
so that they are not different things, so a created es
sence can unitively contain some perfections. . . . in
any creature a perfection which is contained is limited,
and more limited by the containing essence according to
the totality. . . . Therefore any of these can be called
part of a perfection. They are not, however, really dif
ferent so as to be other natures, but other real perfec
tions t?y an otherness which, I say, is not caused by the
intellect. Not, however, as great as the distinction we
understand between diverse things, but a real lesser dif
ference, if we call "real'* every difference not caused
by the intellect.
(30)
Cuicumque enim gradui reali entitatis, correspondet realis unitas.
(Meta.
VII, q. 13, n. 19, Wadd., vol. IV, p. 706a)

For to any grade of real being there corresponds a real
unity.
(31)
. . . contradictio includitur, quod separetur propter unitivam continentiam.
(Meta. VII, q. 13, n. 20, Wadd., vol. IV, p. 706a)

. . . for it to be separated includes a contradiction be
cause of its unitive containment.
(32)
. . . quod est universale, est in re. . . . aliter in sciendo aliqua de

universalibus, nihil sciremus de rebus, sed tantum de conceptibus nostris.
. . . (Meta. VII. q. 18, n. 10, Wadd., vol. IV, p. 725b)
. . . what is universal is in a thing. . . . otherwise, in
knowing something of universals, we would know nothing of
406
things, but only of our concepts.
(33)
. . . est unitas extra animam minor, quam numeralis, ut specifica. Et ideo
ipsa non est de se hac. quia si sic, ei repugnaret esse ad plura, . . . ex
se non habet hoc esse singulare, nec esse universale; sed natura potest
habere esse sub universalitate, ut in anima, et potest habere maiorem unitatem realem, quam specificam, ideo neutrum est ex se, quia non est uni
versale, quia essentia ut est in anima, ut considerata ab anima est obiectum, igitur de se non est universale, quia non de se est intellects,
. . . (n. 11)
. . . universale in actu non est nisi in intellectu, quia non est actu
universale, nisi sit unum in multis, et de multis, ita quod de multis
est aptitudo promxima universalis in actu; quia non potest haberi in actu
universale, quo ipsum est dicibile de alio sic, hoc est hoc; nisi per intellectum. Tamen ista unitas realis media inter numeralem, et rationis,
non est differentia universalitatis, quia hoc est actu dicibile de multis,
sed solum est indifferentia, secundum quam non repugnat sibi esse hoc, et
hoc simul. Tamen non potest secundum istam realem unitatem minorem esse
simul hoc, et hoc, nisi in conceptu in intellectu, quod non est ex parte
sui, quia haec equinitas est natura, quae non habet unde repugnat sibi
esse in hoc, et esse in isto, sed determinatur per singularitatem advenientem.
Unde non potest simul esse in hoc, et in isto, ideo ista communi-
tas non est universalis complete.

. . . . Sic nec omnis unitas realis minor unitate numerali est universalis,
sed est unitas naturae praesuppositae operationi intellectus, et ideo in
tellectus movetur magis ad abstrahendum unum conceptual specificum a Socrate
407
et Platone, quam a Socrate et lapide, et ideo intellectus causat universalitatem, tamen illis naturae habenti minorem unitatem non repugnat ex se esse
in multis, . . .
Dico, quod ista unitas est naturae, ut est in uno supposito, non ut in ordine ad aliud, neque in duobus simul.
. . . Sic haec unitas minor de se est hac numero. non essentialiter, sed
tantum denominative; sed haecceitas est numero haec essentialiter. . . .
Et sic dupliciter dicitur ilia unitas minor, una, quia essentialiter est
una unitate minori numerali , et tamen denominative est una numero, quia
in hoc uno numero.
(n. 12) (R. P. II. d. 12, q. 5, Wadd., XI, 1,pp.328-9)
There is a unity outside the soul, such as specific unity,

which is less than numerical. And therefore it is not
this thing of itself because if it were, it would be re
pugnant for it to be in many, . . . from itself it does
not have this singular being, nor universal being. But
the nature can have being under universality as it ex
ists in the soul, and it can have a greater reail unity
than specific unity. Therefore of itself it is neither,
because an essence as it exists in the soul, as it is
considered by the soul, is an object. Therefore it is
not universal of itself because it is not understood
of itself, . . .
A universal in act is only in the intellect, because a
universal is not in act unless there is one in many and
of many, so that the proximate aptitude of a universal
in act is to be predicable of many. Because a universal,
can only be in act, so that it is predicable of another
in this way: This is this, through the understanding.
However that real unity intermediate between numerical
unity and conceptual unity, is not a difference of uni
versality, because a universal in act is predicable of
many. But it is only an indifference according to which
it is not repugnant to theunity to be both this and
that. It cannot, however, be both this and that accord
ing to that lesser real unity except in a concept in the
understanding, because being such does not arise from its
part. Because this equinity is a nature which does not
have anything which makes it repugnant to it to be in
both this and that, but itis determined to this or that
through singularity which happens to it. Whence it can
not be both in this and in that, therefore that community
is not completely universal.
Thus not every real unity less than numerical unity is

universal, but the unity of a nature which is presup
posed by the operation of the understanding is, and
therefore the understanding is moved to abstract one
specific concept from Socrates and Plato, and not from
Socrates and a stone. And therefore the understanding
causes universality. However, it is not repugnant to
that nature which has the lesser unity of itself to be
in many things, . . .
I say that that unity belongs to a nature as it is in
one supposit, not as that supposit is ordered to an
other, nor in two supposits together.
Thus this lesser unity of itself is numerically and not
essentially this singular. But it is so only denominatively. But the haecceity is numerically this singular
essentially. . . . And so that lesser unity is spoken
of in two ways: one, because it is essentially one by
that unity less than numerical, and however, it is denominatively numerically one because it is in this which
is numerically one.
(54)
. . . aliqua est unitas in re realis absque omni operatione intellectus,
minor unitate numerali sive unitate propria singularia, quae unitas est
naturae secundum se: et secundum istam unitatem propriam naturae, ut
natura est; natura est indifferens ad unitatem singularem: . . . non est
ex se una unitate numerali: nec plures pluralitate opposita illi unitati:
nec universalis . . . nec est particularis de se: licet enim nunqum sit
realiter sine aliquo istorum: non tamen est de se aliquod isotrum, sed
est prius naturaliter omnibus istis. . . . ipsa natura est de se indif
ferens ad esse in intellectu, et in particulari, ac per hoc ad esse uni
versale et singulare . . . non est natura de se universalis, sed quasi
universalitas accidit illi naturae secundum primam rationem eius, secundum
quam est obiectum: ita etiam in re extra; ubi naturae est cum singularitate, non est natura ilia de se terminata ad singularitatem; sed est prior
naturaliter ilia ratione contrahente ipsam ad singularitatem illam; et in-
409
quantum est prior naturaliter ipso contrahente, non repugnat sibi esse
sine illo contrahente: . . . . (Ox. II. d.3 q.l n. 7, Wadd.., vol. VI,
1, P. 357)
There is some real unity in a thing without any opera
tion of the understanding, and this unity belongs to a
nature according to itself and is less than numerical
unity or the unity proper to a singular. And accord
ing to that unity, proper to the nature as nature, the
nature is indifferent to singular unity. . . . it is
not from itself one by numerical unity, nor is it
many by the plurality opposed to that unity, nor is it
universal . . . nor is it particular of itself. For,
granted it never really exists without some of those
/particulars/ it is not, however, of itself something
of them butis naturally prior to all those. . . . the
nature itself is of itself indifferent to existing in
the intellect and to existing in a particular, and
through this to being universal and to being singular
. . . The nature of itself is not universal but it is
as if universality happens to that nature according to
its first concept, according to which it is an object
/of the intellect_7, and even in a thing outside the
intellect where the nature exists with singularity, the
nature is not of itself determined to singularity but
is naturally prior to that ratio contracting it to that
singularity. And inasmuch as it is naturally prior to
that contracting formality, it is not repugnant to it
to exist without that contracting formality. . . .
(35)
. . . naturae in se non repugnat forte separari ab omnibus gradibus individualibus; quia intelligendo naturam sine illis, non includitur contradictio; tamen in es3e repugnat sibi, quod separetur ab omnibus: non
autem quod separetur ab hac: . . . hon ergo potest fieri nisi sub aliquo
gradu individuali, quare iste non potest differre re: . . . its stat inseparabilitas propter continentiam unitivam.
(n. 20)
. . . si loquamur realiter; humanitas quae est in Socrate non est humanitas quae est in Platone, . . . Si autem circumscribamus differentiam hinc
inde, sic ut nec natura intelligitur una maxima unitate in se, sed tantum
410
ilia imitate minori, quae est communis: sic nec est divisa ab humanitate
Platonis divisione numerali, nec aliqua quia non specifics: . . . (n.2l)
(Meta. VII. q. 13, Wadd., vol. IV, p. 706)
It is perhaps not repugnant to the nature in itself to be
separated from all individual grades, because a contra
diction is not included in understanding the nature with
out these. However it is repugnant to it to be separated
from all those in being, but not, however, to be separated
from this individual. . . . It cannot therefore be made
except under some individual grade from which it cannot
differ really. . . . so inseparability stands between them
because of their unitive containment.
. . . if we spoke really, the humanity which is in Socra
tes is not the humanity which is in Plato, . . . Hence if
we circumscribe the difference from there so that the na
ture is not understood by a great unity in itself, but
only by that lesser unity which is common, thus it is
neither divided from the humanity of Plato by a numerical
division, nor by another because not by specific unity.
(56)
. . . naturae in isto propria unitas est minor unitate numerali: , . .
U. 9)
. . . quia cum unitate minori sine contradictions potest stare multitudo
opposita unitati maiori, quae multitudo non potest stare cum unitate
maiori.
Omne ens reale secundum qhod tale, habet unitatem aliquam realem,
quia licet albedo secundum se, non sit una numero, vel plura . . . nec
sit una, ita quod unitas sit intra quidditatem; tamen albedo secundum se,
est unum aliquid, sed natura secundum quod natura, est ens reale, ergo
est unum aliqua unitate realiter: non unitate individuali, quia tunc omnis
unitas realis esset numeralis, quia tarn ilia, quae est naturae, quam ilia,
est suppositi. . . . omne diversum est in se unum, quia unum ab alio divisum, igitur si non realiter unum in se, diversitas eius, ut sic non est
realis.
(n. 10)(Meta. VII. q. 13, Wadd., vol. IV, p. 701a)
411
The proper unity of the nature in that is less than
numerical unity. Because, a multitude opposed to the
greater unity can stand with the lesser unity without
contradiction, which multitude cannot stand with a
greater unity.
Every real being, according as such,has some real unity
because, granted whiteness according to itself is not
numerically one or numerically many . . . nor is it one
so that the unity is within its quiddity. Whiteness,,how
ever, according to itself, is one something. But a na
ture as a nature is a real being. Therefore it is one
by some unity really not by individual unity, be
cause then every real unity would be numerical, that
which belongs to the nature as much as that which.be
longs to a supposit. . . . Everything diverse is one in
itself, because one is divided from another. Therefore,
if it isn't one in itself, thus its diversity /"from
another_7is not real.
(37)
/if there were no unity which was real but less than numericalx j
Turn, quia tunc omnis diversitas realis esset aequalis . . . quia tunc
nihil esset in re, quare intellectus magis abstraheret aliquid unum ab
i3tis, quam ab illis, nec quare haec unius speciei, ilia tantum unius
generis, sed essent universalia praecise fictiones. Turn, quia diversi
tas secundum quid, non infert illam, quae est simpliciter: ergo nec
rationis differentia infert realem, differentia specifics infert numeralem. . . . Item, nullo existente intellectu, realis est similitudo
huius albi ad illud album secundum albedinem; ergo aliqua realis unitas
est proximum fundamentum huius relationis, quia relatio realis non fundatur super ens rationis formaliter, . . . (Meta. VII, q.l3 a. 10,
Wadd., vol. IV, p. 70l)
/"*if there were no unity which was real but less than
numerical^/ Then, . . . all real diversity would be
. .. because then there would be nothing real
f qual
* om which the intellect would abstract something one
rather than from something else, nor from which these
belong to one species, those only to one genus, but
universals would, be precisely fictions. Then, because
412a diversity "after a fashion" does not imply a real

diversity simpliciter. therefore neither does a dif
ference of reason imply a real difference, nor a spe
cific difference a numerical difference. . . . Like
wise the likeness of this white thing to that white
thing is real by nothing existing in the intellect.
Therefore, some real unity is the proximate founda
tion of this relation, because a real relation is
not formally founded upon a being of reason, . . .
(38)
. . . naturae lapidis existentis in iste lapide, unitas propria realis
sive sufficiens, est minor unitate numerali. . . . quia si nulla est
unitas realis naturae minor singularitate, sed omnis unitas alia ab
unitate singularis, est unitas rationis tantum: igitur nulla erit uni
tas realis minor unitate numerali: consequens est falsum. . . . (n.2)
. . . relatio tamen non est realis, nisi habeat fundamentum reale, et
rationem proximam fundandi realem: ergo unitas, quae requiritur in fundamento similitudinis relationis est realis: non autem est numeralis, quia
nihil unum et idem est simile, et aequali sibi ipsi.
(n.3)
. . si omnis unitas realis est numeralis: ergo omnis diversitas realis

est numeralis; . . . omnis diversitas numeralis inquantum humeralis est
aequalis, et ita omnia essent aeque distincta: et tunc sequitur quod non
plus potest intellectus abstrahere a Socrate et Platone aliquod commune
quam a Socrate et linea: et esset quodlibet universale purum figmentum.
(n.6) (Ox. II. d.3 q.l, Wadd., vol. VI, 1, pp. 335-337)
The proper real or sufficient unity of the nature of a
stone existing in this stone is less than numerical
unity. . . . because if there were no real unity of a
nature less than singular unity, but every unity dif
ferent from the unity of a singular were only concep
tual unity, then there will be no real unity less than
numerical unity. The consequent is false. . . .
A relation, however, is not real unless it has a real
foundation, and a proximate real ratio of founding.
Therefore, the unity which is required in the founda-
413
tion of likeness is real* It is not, however, numeri
cal, because nothing which is one and the same is like,
and equal to, itself.
. . . if every real unity is numerical, therefore every
real diversity is numerical; . . . every numerical di
versity insofar as it is numerical is equal, and so all
would be equally distinct from one another. And then it
follows that the intellect can no more abstract some
thing common from Socrates and Plato than from Socrates
and a line. And any universal would be a pure fiction.
(39)
. . . licet genus et differentia, non sint idem formaliter, quia ratio
differentiae non includit rationem formalem generis, tamen sunt idem
realiter, vel identice; quandocumque enim aliqua sunt idem formaliter,
si iungantur sine medio, est ibi nugatio, ut color albedo, non tamen,
si sunt idem identice solum, et non formaliter, ut color albus. . . .
(ft. de An. 21. n. 12, Wadd., vol. II, p. 567b)
Although genus and difference are not formally the seme
because the concept of a difference does not include
the formal concept of a genus, they are however really
or identically the same. For wherever, some extremes
are formally the same, if they are joined without a
medium, there is nonsense as in "color whiteness";
not, however, if they are only identically and not for
mally the same, as "white color". . . .
(40)
Universaliter enim quod convenit alicui sic, quod omnimoda contradictio
sit illud esse sine hoc, hoc est idem realiter illi: et per oppositum,
ubi non est omnimoda contradictio, non oportet esse omnino; . . .
(Quod.. q.3 n. 15, Wadd., vol. XII, p. 82)
For universally, what so agrees with something that it
would be a complete contradiction for the former to be
without the latter, the former is really the same as
the latter. And oppositely, where there is not a com
plete contradiction, it need not be entirely so.
414
(41)
Hotandum ergo, quod sicut aliqua primo sunt diversa, scilicet se totis,
quae videlicet in nullo conveniunt; sic in omnibus differentibus, quae
sunt diversa . . . oportet invenire aliqua quibus differant, quae se
totis sunt diversa, aliter procedetur in infinitum: . . . (Meta. VII,
q. 13, n. 18, Wadd., vol. IV, p. 705a)
It must be noted therefore that, just as some things
are ultimately diverse, (namely diverse by themselves),
which of course agree in nothing, so in all things
which differ which are diverse . . . it is necessary
to find some things totally diverse by which they dif
fer. Otherwise we would proceed to infinity.
(42)
. . . distinguentia ultima sunt primo diversa. . . . (R.P. I, d. 7, q.3
n. 3, Wadd., vol. XI, 1, p. 70b)
Ultimate distinguishing elements are ultimately diverse.
(43)
. . . omnis distinctio reducitur ad aliqua primo diversa, quae essent
distincta, si per impossibile essent ab omnibus aliis separata; ergo
ista distinctio est per aliqua talia, quae essent distincta, omnibus al
iis per impossibile praetermissis, quae etiam seipsis sunt primo diversa;
. . . (Ord. I, d. 13, q. un., n. 3, Wadd., vol. II, p. 895)
Every distinction is reduced to some ultimately di
verse elements which would be distinct if, per im
possibile. they were separated from everything else.
Therefore that distinction is due to some elements
which would be distinct if, per impossibile, all
others were omitted, and these are even ultimately
diverse of themselves.
(44)
Quaecunque non sunt primo diversa, aliquo sui distinguuntur, quia quae se
totis distinguuntur, sunt primo diversa.
Si enim non sunt primo diversa,
sed aliquid idem, entia; tunc non eo distinguuntur, quo sunt idem, sed
415
aliquid idem enita; tunc non eo distinguuntur, quo sunt idem, sed aliquo
sui, quo non sunt idem; . . . (Qrd. I, d.26, q. un., n.2, Wadd*, vol. V,
2, p. 1095)
Whatever are not ultimately diverse are distinguished
by something in themselves, because what are wholly
distinguished are ultimately diverse. For if they are
not ultimately diverse, but the same beings, then they
are not distinguished by that by which they are the
same, but by something in themselves by which they are
not the same.
(45)
. . . in proprietatibus essentialibus una praedicatur de alia, quia quaelibet est formaliter infinita, et ita facta abstractione qualibet etiam
a subjecto, vel a fundamento, semper manet sufficiens ratio identitatis
eorum, et quare unum praedicatur de alio relative; proprietates vero
relativae non sunt formaliter infinitae, sed tantum identitate ratione
subiecti; vel fundamenti, et ideo licet sint idem cum essentia, vel
persona, tamen quando abstrahuntur ab istis, aufertur ratio identitatis
eorum, et per consequens neutrum potest praedicari de alio.
(R. P. I,
d. 33 q.3 n. 10, Wadd., vol. XI, 1, p. 189a)

In essential properties of God_7, one is predicated
of the other because any of them is formally infinite.
And so, when any abstraction of these has been made,
even from their subject or from a foundation, there
always remains a sufficient cause of identity between
them, whence one is predicated of the other relatively.
The truly relative properties are not formally infinite,
but only infinite by identity by reason of their sub
ject or foundation, and therefore, although they are
the same as the divine essence or a Person, however,
when they are abstracted from those, the cause of their
identity is removed and consequently neither can be
predicated of the other.
(46)
. . . perfectiones essentiales in divinis sunt in re ante operationem
416
intellectus* Si enim essent causatae per operationem intellectus, nulla
esset perfectio simpliciter nec perfectio formaliter infinita, sicut nec
relatio rationis est perfectio simpliciter nec perfectio formaliter in
finita; . . . Item, si essent causatae per operationem intellectus earum
distinctiones, ita quod solum differrent secundum rationem, non magis dif
ferent voluntas et sapientia quam sapiens et sapientia, quia haec differunt secundum rationem.
(Lectura I. d. 8, P. I, q.4 Vat., col. XVII, p.62)
Essential perfections in God are in God prior to an opera

tion of the understanding. For if they were caused through
an operation of the underatandiag, then no perfection would
be simply such nor would a perfection be formally infinite,
just as a relation of reason is neither simply a perfec
tion nor a perfection which is formally infinite. . . .
Likewise, if they were caused through an operation of the
intellect, concerning their distinctions, so that they
differred only rationally, will and wisdom would no more
differ than do "wise" and "wisdom" because these differ
rationally.
(47)
Et intelligc per non identitatem formalem aliquorum, quando unum non est
de formali rations alterius, ita quod si defineretur, non pertineret ad
definitionem eius; igitur per non identitatem formalem intelligo non iden
titatem quiditativam non pertinerentem ad definitionem alterius, si de
fineretur.
(R.P. I. d.45, q2, n. 11, Wadd., vol. XI, 1, p. 254a)

And by the formal non-identity of some extremes, I
understand that one is not of the formal concept of
the other, so that if the first were defined, the
second would not belong to its definition. There
fore, by formal non-identity I understand quidditative non-identity in which one extreme would not be
long to the definition of the other if that were deffined.
(48)
. . . productiones distinguuntur se ipsis formaliter.
Generatio enim se
417
ipsa formaliter est generatio, et spiratio se ipsa formaliter est spiratio, et ex rationibus formalibus eorum impossibile est generationem esse
spirationem. . . . tota ratio formalis unius, est non eadem toti formali
rationi alterius.
(n. 77)
. . . originative distinguuntur a suis principiis (intellectu scilicet et

voluntate), quae non tantum distinguuntur ratione, . . . Sed intellectus
non est formaliter voluntas ex natura rei, et cum infinites addita alicui non destruat formalem rationem eiusy intellectus infinitus non est
formaliter voluntas infinitas . . . (Ord. I. d. 13, q. un., n. 80, Vat.,
vol. V, pp. 105, 108)
The divine productions are formally distinguished by them
selves, For generation by itself is formally generation,
and spiration by itself is formally spiration, and from
their formalities it is impossible for generation to be
spiration. . . . the whole formality of one is not the
same as the whole formality of the other.
They are distinguished by origin by their principles
(namely intellect and will) which are not only rational
ly distinguished, . . . But the intellect is not formal
ly the will from the nature of the case, and since in
finity added to something does not destroy the formality
of that to which it is added, the infinite intellect is
not formally the infinite will. . . .
(49)
Sunt igitur in re ante operations intellectus, et tamen una perfectio for
maliter non includit aliam, ita quod non sunt idem formaliter nec habent
identitatem formalem.
Cuius probatio est: quando duas rationes quarum
una non includit aliam, quidquid non variat rationem earum non facit quod
una includat aliam formaliter; sed formalis ratio sapientiae in communi,
ut communis est Deo et creaturae, non includit formalem rationem bonitatis ut similiter communis est;
igitur quodcumque additum non variat ratio-
418
nem unius et alterius* non facit quod una formaliter includit aliam. Sed
addere infinitatem sapientiae, non variat rationem sapientiae secundum se*
sed tantum dicit modum intrinsecum eius; igitur infinitas non facit quod
sapientia in divinis formaliter includat bonitatem.
(Lectura I, d. 8*
P. I, q.4, Vat., vol. II, p. 63)

They /divine perfectionsJ therefore are in God before
an operation of the understanding, and however one per
fection does not formally include smother so they are
not formally the same nor do they have formal identity.
The proof of this is: when two concepts are such that
one does not include the other, whatever does not vary
the concept does not make one formally include the
other. But the formal concept of wisdom in common, i.e.
as it is common to God and creature, does not include
the formal concept of goodness which is similarly com
mon. Therefore anything added which does not vary the
concept of either does not make one formally include the
other. But to add infinity to wisdom does not vary the
concept of wisdom according to itself, but only says an
intrinsic mode of it. Therefore infinity does not^make
wisdom in God formally include goodness.
Cum semper maneat in ipsa ratio infinitatis semper manet ratio identitatis.
(Quod.. q.5, Wadd., vol. ill, p. 219b)

Since the ratio of infinity always remains in it /"in God/,
the ratio of identity always remains /between perfectionsyT
(51)
Infinitas est ratio identitatis eorum.
(Ord. I. d.8, q.4, Vat., vol. IV)
Infinity is the reason for their /divine attributes'^/

identity.
(52)
. . . quando intelligitur aliqua realitas cum modo suo intrinseco, ille
conceptus non est ita simpliciter simplex quin possit concipi ilia reali
tas absque modo illo, sed tunc est conceptus imperfectus illius rei:
potest etiam concipi sub illo modo, et unc est conceptus perfectus
419
illius rei, . . . (n. 138)
Requiritur ergo distinctio, inter illud a quo accipitur conceptus communis

et inter illud a quo accipitur conceptus proprius, non ut distinctio realitatis et realitatis sed ut distinctio realitatis et modi proprii et
intrinseci eiusdem, quae distinctio sufficit ad habendum conceptum
perfectum vel imperfectum de eodem, quorum imperfectus sit communis et
perfectus sit proprius.
Sed conceptus generis et differentiae requirunt
distinctionem realitatum, non tantum eiusdem realitatis perfecte et imperfecte conceptae.
(n. 139) (Qrd. I, d. 8, P.I, q.3, Vat., vol. IV,
pp. 222-223)
When some reality is understood with its intrinsic mode,
that concept is not so ultimately simple but that that
reality can be conceived without that mode. But then
the concept of that thing is imperfect. It can also be
conceived under that mode, and then the concept of that
thing is perfect. . . .
Therefore, a distinction is necessary between that from
which the common concept is taken, and that from which
the proper concept is taken, not as a distinction of
reality and reality, but as a distinction of a reality
and a proper intrinsic mode of the same, which distinc
tion suffices for having a perfect or imperfect concept
of the same thing, of which the imperfect is common and
the perfect is proper. But the concepts of genus and
difference require a distinction of realities, not only
of some reality perfectly and imperfectly conceived.
(53)
. . . inter perfeetiones essentiales non est tantum differentia rationis,
hoc est diversorum modorum concipiendi idem obiectum formale (talis
enim distinctio est inter sapiens et sapientiam) . . . . (n. 19l)
Est ergo ibi distinctio praecedens intellectum omni modo, et est ista,
quod sapientia est in re ex natura rei, et bonitas in re ex natura rei
sapientia autem in re, formaliter non est bonitas in re.
Quod probatur, quia si infinita sapientia esset formaliter infinita boni
420
tas, et sapientia in communi esset formaliter bonitas in communi.
Infini
tas enim non destruit formalem rationem illius cui additur, quia in quocumque gradu intelligatur esse aliqua perfectio, . . . non tollitur for
malis ratio illius perfectionis propter istum gradum, . . . (n. 192)
Hoc declaro, quia 'includere formaliter* est includere aliquid in ratione
sua essentiali, ita quod si definitio includentis assignaretur, inclusum
esset definitio vel pars definitionis . . . est igitur aliqua non-identitas formalis sapientiae et bonitatis, in quantum earum essent distinctae
definitiones; si essent definibiles.
Definitio autem non tantum indicat
rationem causatam ab intellectu, sed quiditatem rei; est ergo non identitas formalis ex parte rei, et intelligo sic, quod intellectus componens
istam 'sapientia non est formaliter bonitas', non causat actu suo collativo veritatem huius compositionis, sed in obiecto invenit extrema, ex
quorum compositione fit actus verus.
(n. 193) (Qrd. I, d. 8, P.I, q.4,
Vat., vol. IV, pp. 260-262)

Between essential perfections in God there is not only
a rational difference, that is, of diverse ways of con
ceiving the same formal object (for such a distinction
is between "wise" and "wisdom"). . . .
There is, therefore, a distinction there preceding the
understanding in every way, and it is this, that wisdom
is really in God, and goodness is really in Goa wis
dom in God, however, is not formally goodness in God.
Which is proved, because if infinite wisdom were formal
ly infinite goodness, then wisdom in common would be
formally goodness in common. For infinity does not de
stroy the formality of that to which it is added, be
cause there is understood to be some perfection in any
grade, . . .
the formality of that perfection is not
removed because of this grade, . . .
This I declare, because "to include formally" is to in
clude something in its essential concept, so that if the
definition of that which includes were assigned, that
which is included would be the definition of the former,
or part of the definition . . . There is therefore some
421
formal non-identity of wisdom and goodness, inasmuch as
they would have distinct definitions, if they were de
finable, A definition, however, not only indicates the
concept caused by the understanding, but also the quid
dity of a thing. There is therefore formal non-identity
on the part of the thing, and I understand it so, that
the understanding composing this: Wisdom is not formal
ly goodness," does not cause the truth of this composi
tion by its collative act, but finds the extremes in the
object, from the composition of which a true act may be
made,
(54)
. . . si A transmutatur manente haec differunt essentialiter.
Hoc medium
est de loco de materia respectu formarum, de substantia respectu quantitatis,
(Meta. IV. q.2, n. 26, Wadd., vol. IV, p. 587b)

If A is changed while B remains, then A and B differ es
sentially. This medium concerns the place of matter with
respect to forms, and of substance with respect to quan
tity.
(55)
* . . distinctorum in entitate absolute, alterum potest esse absque contra

dictions sine altero.
(Ox. IV, d. 49,
2, n. 14, Wadd., vol. X, p. 538)
Of those distinct in absolute being, one is able without

contradiction to exist without the other.
(56)
. . . sed realis differentia ponitur habere gradus. Est enim maxima naturarum, et suppositorum. Media naturarum in uno supposito. Minima di
versarum perfectionum, sive rationum perfectionalium unitive contentarum
in una natura.
(Meta. VII. q. 19, n. 8, Wadd., vol. IV, pp. 728b-729a)

But a real difference is observed to have .grades. For
the greatest is of natures and supposits, the middle is
of natures in one supposit, the least is of diverse per
fections or perfectional rationes unitively contained
in one nature.
422
(57)
Substance: . . . cui convenit non inhaerere, vel cui repugnat inhaerere

Accident: . . . natura cui convenit inhaerere. . . . (Quod.. q.3 n. 19,
Wadd., vol. XII, p. 83)
Substance: . . . that to which it agrees not to inhere,
or to which it is repugnant to inhere . . .
Accident: . . . a nature to which inherence agrees. . .
(58)
. . . actus et potentia dividunt ens et quodcumque entis genus.
. . . actus est differentia opposita potentiae. et hoc modo dividit omne
ens.
(Qrd? I, d. 26, q. un., n. 33, Wadd., vol. II, p. 1114)

Act and potency divide being and any genus of being.
Act is opposed by difference to potency, and in this way
they divide all being.
(59)
. . . idem nullo modo potest ad aliud esse, nisi ad aliud ratione, quia
inquantum simpliciter idem, intellectus utitur uno, ut duobus.
(Meta. V,
q. 12, n. 4, Wadd., vol. IV)

"The same" can in no way be related to another except
rationally, because inasmuch as a thing is simply the
same, the intellect treats one thing as two.
(60)
Nam Socratis ad se non est perfects identitas, quia rationis tantum, et
ita omnis talis est ens secundum guide nec Socratis ad Platonis est per
fects identitas, quia non fundatur in perfecta imitate: hie autem Patris
ad Filium identitas est perfecta quantum ad fundamentum, quia Patris ad
Filium est perfecta unitas, et perfecta realis identitas, quia realis
423
distinctio est, et sufficiens extremorum.
(Qrd. I, d.31, q. un., n. 5,
Wadd., vol. II, p. 1216)

For the identity of Socrates with himself is not perfect
because it is only rational, and so every such identity
is a being "after a fashion." Nor is the identity of
Socrates with Plato perfect identity because it is not
founded on perfect unity. However this identity of the
Father with the Son is perfect as to its foundation be
cause there is perfect unity of the Father with the Son,
and perfect real identity because there is a real and
sufficient distinction of the extremes.
(61)
. . . actus et potentia propria sunt primo diversa, quia si aliquid esset
eiusdem rationis in alterutro, ut si in actu, quantum ad illud, non pri
mo actuaret, sed reciperet actum: si in potentia, quantum ad illud, non
reciperet, sed actuaret, igitur proprius actus, et propria potentia sunt
primo diversa. . . . (R.P. II, d. 12, q.8, n. 4, Wadd., vol. XI, 1, p. 332)
Act and proper potency are ultimately diverse, because
if something were of the same ratio in one of the two,
e.g. if in act, as to that act would not actuate but
would receive act; if in potency, as to that potency
would not receive but would actuate. Therefore proper
act and proper potency are ultimately diverse.
(62)
. . . quomodo materia realiter distinguitur a forma. . . . dico, quod
sunt omnino alterius rationis, et primo diversa.
yuod probo sic: actus,
et potentia, quae sunt principia entis, sunt primo diversa: materia et

forma sunt huiusmodi: ergo.
Si enim esset eiusdem rationis cum materia,
non competeret sibi dare essej
et si materia esset eiusdem rationis cum
forma, non competeret sibi recipere esse. Si etiam aliquid formae includeretur in materia, forma quantum ad hoc non esset apta nata recipi,
sed magis recipere: et sic forma non esset primum receptum, sed aliquid
eius esset non receptum sed receptivum, eodem modo, si aliquid materiae
424
esset inclusum in forma, ipsa non esset primo receptiva, sed recepta,
Quomodo igitur ex quo sunt duo principia distincta, et primo diversa,

possunt constituere aliquid unum simpliciter: . . . quia in ilia constitutione non requiritur similitudo in natura, sed proportio conveniens,
quae potest esse inter primo diversa*
Dico igitur quod mihi iest contradictio, quod materia sit terminus creationis, et pars compositi, et quod non habeat aliquod esse, cum tamen sit
essentia.
Quod enim aliqua essentia sit extra eausam suam, et quod non
habeat aliquod esse, quo sit essentia: est mihi contradictio.
(n. 16)
Dico igitur, quod materia, secundum se in sua essentia est cognoscibilis,

sed non a nobis.
Primum patet, quia omnis entitas absoluta in se, est
cognoscibilis: materia est huiusmodi: ergo.
Habet enim ideam in Deo,
. . . (n. 20) (Ox. II. d. 12, q.l, Wadd., vol. VI, 2, pp. 674-676)
How matter is really distinguished from form: . . . I
say that they are entirely of different concepts, and
ultimately diverse. Which I prove thus. Act, and po
tency, which are principles of being, a re ultimately
diverse, matter and form are such, therefore. . . .
For if form were of the same notion as matter, it would
not agree with it to give being; and if matter were of
the same notion as form, it would not agree with it to
receive being. If something of form were even included
in matter, the form as to this would not be auited to
be received, but rather to receive. And thus form would
not be the first that is received but something of it
would be receptive, not received. And in the same
fashion, if something of matter were included in form,
matter would not be what is first receptive, but would
be received, . . .
How, therefore, can something simply one be constituted
from what are two distinct and ultimately diverse prin
ciples? . . . Because in that constitution, similarity
in nature is not required, but an agreeing proportion,
which can be among those that are ultimately diverse.
I say, therefore, that it seems a contradiction to me,
that matter should be a term of creation, and part of a
425
composite, and that it should not have something of being
while, however, it is some essence. For that some essence
should exist outside its cause, and that it not have some
being by which it is an essence, is to me a contradiction.
I say, therefore, that matter, according to itself in its
essence, is knowable, but not by us. The first is clear,
because every entity absolute in itself, is knowable.
Matter is such, therefore . . . For it has an idea in God.
(65)
. . . materia dicit entitatem aliquam positivam extra intellectum, . . .
(Ox. II. d. 12, q.l, n. 13, Wadd., vol. VI, 2, p. 672)
Matter says some positive entity outside the understand
ing,$
(64)
. . non est contradictio materiam esse sine forma quaecunque substanti
al^ et accidentali. . . . Absolutum distinctum et prim alio absoluto,
potest esse sine contradictione, sine illo: materia est ens absolutum dis
tinctum, et prius forma quaecunque, substantiali scilicet et accidentali:
igitur potest esse sine alio absolute, . . . Quod enim materia sit quid
absolutum entis patet; quia facit compositionem realem, et absolutum,
. . . sed entitas absoluta, quae est a solo Deo, sine alia aliqua entitate absoluta posteriore potest conservari a Deo; . . . (Ox. II, d. 12,
q. 2, n. 3, Wadd., vol. VI, 2, p. 682)
It is not a contradiction for matter to be without any
substantial or accidental form. . . . Something absolute
and distinct and prior to another absolute thing can
exist without that other without contradiction. Matter
is an absolute distinct being, and prior to any form,
namely substantial and accidental form. Therefore it
can exist without another absolute being, . . . For that
matter is something absolute is clear enough, because
it makes a real and absolute composition, . . . But an
absolute entity which is from God alone, can be con
served by God without some other posterior absolute en
tity.
426
(65)
Cum . . . singularia sunt differentia* ipsa reducuntur ad primo diversa;
ilia non sunt nihila, non accidentia* non natura: igitur aliqua entitas
determinativa naturae, ut proprietates individuales . . . sed ista proprietas individui nunquam est res alia a forma specifica, tamen semper
est non idem formaliter, licet aliquid possit continere unitive utrunque.
. . . formalitas individui contrahit quiditatem ad aliquid extra quidtatem, quia omnino alterius rationis.
(R. P. II, d. 12, q.8, n. 34,
Wadd., vol. XI, 1, pp. 331-332)

Since . . . singulars are different, they are reduced
to something ultimately diverse. Those latter are not
nothing, nor accidents nor the nature, therefore they
are some beings determinative of the nature, such as
individual properties. . . . but this property of an
individual is never a different thing from the specific
form, however it is always not formally the same,
granted something can unitively contain both. . . The
formality of the individual contracts the quiddity to
something outside the quiddity, because it contracts
it to something of a completely different ratio.
(66)
. . . quandocumque duo sic se habent ad invicem, quod contingit reperire
nniim sine altero, unum non est de ratione alterius, licet e converso.
Quia enim contingit reperire animal sine homine, ideo homo non est de
rationeanimalis, licet e converso.
(Super Libros Elenchorum. q. 19,
n, 1,Wadd.,vol. I, p. 240)
Whenever two beings are so related to each other that
one happens to be found without the other, one is not
of the concept of the other, although the converse may
be true. For because 'animal' happens to be found with
out 'man* f ~ i.e. there are animals which are not men_7*
therefore "man* is not part of the concept 'animal*,~
although the converse is true.
427
(67)
.
..contradictio dicta de aliquibus, est via concludendi distinctionem,
..(Ox. II, d. 1, q.4, n. 21, Wadd., vol. VI, 1, p. 73)

Contradiction said of some beings /"i.e. the predication
of contradictory predicates of two beings_7 is a way of
inferring their distinction.
(68)
.
..essentia,
et eius existentia in creaturis se habent sicut quidditas
et modus: ideo distinguuntur.
(Quod., q. 1, n. 4, Wadd., vol. XII, p.5)
Essence, and its existence, are related in creatures as

are a quiddity and a mode. Therefore they are distin
guished.
(69)
. . . forma animae non manente, corpus manet; et ideo universaliter in

quolibet animato, necesse est ponere illam formam, qua corpus est cor
pus, aliam ab ilia, qua est animatum.
(Ox. IV, d. 11, q.3 n. 54, Wadd.,
vol. IX, p. 653)

The form of the soul not remaining, the body remains.
And therefore universally in anything animate, it is
necessary to posit that form by which a body is a body
as different from that by which it is living.
(70)
For every denial is intelligible only in terms of some
affirmation. It is also clear that we can know nega
tions of God only by means of affirmations; for if we
deny anything of God, it is because we wish to do away
with something inconsistent with what we have already
affirmed. (Ox. I, q.2, trans. Wolter, p. 18)
(71)
. . . ista inquam intellectio potest proprie dici intuitive., quia ipsa
est intuitio rei, ut existentis et praesentis.
(Quod.. q.6, Wadd., vol.
XII)
428
I say this intellection can properly be called intuitive
because it is an intuition of a thing as present and ex
isting*
(72)
. . . aliqua cognitio est per se existentis, sicut quae attingit obiectum
in sua propria existentia actuali.
(Ibid*)
Some cognition is essentially of an existing thing, just

as that which has to do with an object in its proper and
actual existence.
(73)
. . . cognitio intuitiva non est tantum singularis, inquantum est cognitio
intuitiva, sed essentialiter est ipsius naturae, ut existentis est.
(R.P.
IV, d. 45, q*3, Wadd., vol. XIIl)

Intuitive cognition is not only of a singular insofar
as it is intuitive cognition, but it is essentially
of a nature itself insofar as it /i.e. the nature_7
exists.
(74)
Item, omne ens omni enti comparatum aut est idem aut diversum; idem et
diversum ergo sunt contraria immediata circa ens, et convertibilia.
Sed
ens rationis est distinctum contra reale, et non est passio convertibilis
cum ente extra animam, quia ens reale potest esse sine ente rationis; ergo
identitas non est ens rationis.
(Meta. V, q. 12, n.4, Wadd., vol. IV
Likewise, every being compared to every being is either

the same or diverse. Therefore 'same' and 'diverse* are
contraries immediately following on being, and converti
ble. But a being of reason is distinct from a real be
ing, and is not a passion convertible with being outside
the soul because a real being can exist without a being
of reason. Therefore identity is not a being of reason.
(75)
. . . quia idem et diversum condividunt totum ens.
(Meta. IV, q. 1, n.8,
vol. IV )
429
. . . because 'same* and 'diverse' divide all being.
(75)
Dicendum quod idem et diversum sunt contraria, quia idem est quoddam unum,
et diversum quoddam multum.
(flieta. X, q, 7, n. 2, Wadd., vol. IV
It must be said that 'same* and 'diverse' are contraries,

because 'same' is a certain one, and 'diverse' a certain
many.
Francis Mayron
(1)
Quatuor sunt gradus distinctionum non fabricati ab intellectu sive ab
anima.
Prima est distinctio essentialis . . .
quando quiddita3 cum sua
ezistentia est distincta ab alia quidditate cum sua ezistentia. Secunda

est realis . . . quae est inter rem et rem. Tertia est formalis et ista
inter quidditatem et quidditatem. . . . (ûarta est distinctio non quidditatis et quidditatis, sed quidditatis et modi intrinseci, . . .
(I Sent.. d. 8, q.l, Venice ed., p. 430)
There are four grades of distinction not fabricated by
the intellect or by the soul. The first is the essen
tial distinction.. . . when a quiddity with its ezistence is distinct from another quiddity with its ezistence. The second is real . . . which is between two
things. The third is formal and this is between two
quiddities, . . . The fourth is not a distinction of
two quiddities, but of a quiddity and its intrinsic
mode, . . .
(2)
. . . modi distinctionum sunt septem, auoniam quae distinguuntur aut dis
tinguuntur ratione, aut ex natura rei, aut distinctione formali, aut dis
tinction reali, aut distinctione essentiali, aut distinctione se totis
subiective, aut distinctione se totis obiective. . . . (Tractatus Formali
430
tatum. Venice ed., p. 265 D)
There are seven modes of distinction, since what are dis
tinguished are either distinguished by reason, or from
the nature of the case, or by a formal distinction, or by
a real distinction, or by an essential distinction, or by
a subjective distinction, or by an objective distinction.
Petrus Thomas
(1)
. . . quaedaum est distinctio essentiae et essentiae, quaedam sicut rei
et rei, alia realitatis et realitatis, alia realitatis et rei, alia formalitatis et formalitatis, alia formalitatis et rei, alia modi intrinseci
et eius cuius est.
(Quodlibet, q. VII, Franciscan Institute, p. 120)
. . . there is a certain distinction of essence and es

sence, a certain distinction such as between two things,
another distinction of reality and reality, another of
reality and thing, another of two formalities, another
of a formality and a thing, another of an intrinsic mode
and that to which it belongs.
431
William 0** O^Vhnjin
Abbreviations of works citedI
EJ.
Expos-itiQ Porohvri
O.P. & T.
Opera Philosophic* gt Theologies.

2 vols., ed. G. Gal
OJP.
Opera Plurima. 4 vols., Gregg

reprint
Qbb&*
Quotlibeta Seotem. Bibliotheque

S.J.
S.L.
Si m m Logicae. 2 vols., ed. P.

Boehner
Other works citedJ

Baudry, Lexiaue Philosophioue de QniT.laiimfl d*Oakham
McKeon, Selections from Medieval Phjloprmherg. vol. 2
Moody, The Logic of William of Ockham
(1)
. quaelibet res singularis se ipsa est singularis. . . singularitas immediate convenit illi cuius est, igitur non potest sibi convenire
per aliquid aliudj igitur si aliquid sit singulars, se ipso est sin
gulars*
. . . sicut illud quod est singulare non potest per aliquid addition
sibi fieri universale vel commune- ita illud quod est commune non potest
per allquid sibi additum fieri singulars; igitur quidquid est singu
lare per nihil additum est singulare se ipso. . . . omnis res extra
animam est realiter singularis et una numero, quia omnis res extra
animam vel est simplex vel composite.
(I Sent., d.2, q.6, O.P. & T..
452
vol. II, p. 196)
. . . any singular thing is singular of itself. . . .

singularity agrees immediately with that to which it
belongs, therefore it cannot agree with them through
something else. Therefore, if something is singular
it is singular of itself.
. just as that which is singular cannot be made
universal or common through something added to it,
so that which is common cannot be made singular
through something added to it. Whatever is singular,
therefore, is singular through nothing added to it.
. . everything outside the soul is really singular
and numerically one, because everything outside the
soul is either simple or composite.
(2 )
praeter res absolutaa, scilicet substantias et qualitates, nulla
res est imaginabilis, nec in actu nec in potentia.
(S.L. I, c.4-9, vol.
I, p. l/)l)
. . . aside from absolute things, namely substances
and qualities, nothing is imaginable either actually
or potentially.
(3 )
. . . quaelibet res seipsa vel per aliquod sibi intrinsecum distinguitur, a quocumque distinguiturj sed alia est humanitas Sortis et alia
Platonisj ergo seipsis distinguuntur, non ergo per differentias additas.
. . . in substantia particular! nihil est substantiale penitus nisi
forma particularis et materia particularis vel aliquod compositum ex
talibus.
(Salia I, Co 16, vol. I, pp. 50-51)

. . . anything is distinguished from anything from
which it is distinguished by itself or through some
thing intrinsic to it. But the humanity of Socrates
and the humanity of Plato are different. Therefore
they sire distinguished by themselves, and not there
fore through differences added to them.
. . . in a particular substance, nothing is wholly
433
substantial except the particular form and the par
ticular matter, or something compounded from such
QprinciplesJ.
U)
. . 'singulare1 3ignificat omne illud, quod est unum et non plura
. . . universale est quaedam qualitas mentis praedicabilis de pluribus
quodlibet
universale est vere et realiter singulare*
Quia
sicut quaelibet vox quantumcumque communis per institutionem est vere

et realiter singularis et una numero, quia est una et non plures, ita
intentio animae significans plures res extra est vere et realiter sin
gularis et una numero, quia est una et non plures, ita intentio animae
significans plures res extra est vere et realiter singularis et una
riumero, quia est una et non plures res, quamvis significet plures res.
(S.L. I, c. 14, vol. I, p. 4 4 )
. . 'singular' signifies all that which is one and
not many a universal is a certain mental qual
ity predicable of many any universal is truly
and really singular, because just as any word however
common through institution, is truly and really singu
lar and numerically one, because it is one and not
many, so an intentio of the soul signifying many things
outside the soul is truly and really singular and
numerically one because it is one and not many things,
although it signifies many things.
(5)
. . . nullus universale . est aliquid existens quocumque modo extra
animam, sed omne illud quod est universale praedicabile de pluribus ex
natura sua est in mente vel subiective vel obiective, et . . . nullum
universale est de essentia seu quidditate cuiuscumque substantiaej
. . . (X Sent.. d.2, q*4, 0 P & T. vol. II, pp. 291292)
434
. . no universal is something existing outside
the soul in any way, but all that which is universal
and predicable of many things from its nature, is sub
jectively or objectively in the mind, and . . . no
universal is of the essence or quiddity of any sub
stance; . . .
(6)
. . . omnis res prior alia re realiter distincta ab ilia potest esse
sine ea . . igitur potest esse sine re singulari.
(I Sent., d.2,
q.4, O.P. & T.. vol. II, p. 115)

Everything which is prior to another thing really dis
tinct from it can exist without that other . . .
Therefore it (i.e. a universal] can exist without a
singular thing.
(7)
. . . omnis res singularis potest adnihilari sine adnihilatione vel
destructions alterius rei singularis a qua in nullo dependet; . . .
(Ibid.. p. 116)
Everything singular can be destroyed without the de
struction or annihilation of another singular thing
on which it in no way depends.
(8)
o . essent tot res realiter distinctas in quolibet singulari quot
stmt universalia praedicabilia univoce de sodem.
(Ibid.. p. 119)
(if there were a formal distinction between nature

and individual differenc0 There would be as many
really distinct things in any singular as there are
universals univocally predicable of the same thing.
(9)
. . . tunc eadem res esset simul in diversis locis. . . (Ibid..

p. 121)
lf there were a common nature formally distinct
from individuals] . then the same thing would be
435
in diverse places
(10)
Est autem tenendum indubitanter quod quaelibet res imaginabilis existens est de se sine omni addito res singularis et una numero, ita
quod nulla res imaginabilis est per aliquod additum sibi singularis,
sed ista est passio conveniens immediate omni re.
(E.P.. Proemium)
It must be held without doubt that any existing

thing imaginable is of itself and without any ad
dition a singular thing and numerically one, so
that nothing imaginable is singular through some
thing added to it, but singularity is a passion
agreeing immediately with everything fie. a
transcendental of being'3
(11)
Nec valet dicere, quod humanitas Sortis distihguitur non realiter a
Sorte sed tantum formaliter, quia talis distinctio non est ponenda
in creaturis, quamvis possit aliquo modo poni in divinisj et hoc quia
in creaturis impossibile est invenire unara rem numero, quae sit reali
ter plures res et quaelibet illarum, sicut est in Deo. Nam in Deo
essentia divina est tres personae et est quaelibet istarum personarum,
et tamen una persona non est alia.
Et non est aliud dicere, quod es
sentia et persona distinguuntur formaliter secundum unum intellectum,

nisi quod essentia est tres personae et persona non est tres personae.
Similiter nihil aliud intelligo per istam; Essentia et paternitas
distinguuntur formaliter,' nisi istam propositions!"? 'Essentia est
filiatio et paternitas non est filiatio, et tamen essentia est pater
nitas. ' . . . Et ita universaliter, quod de aliquibus verificari distingui formaliter non est aliud, quam de uno istorum aliquid vero affirmari et de reliquo vere negari, et tamen unum illorum vere affir-
436
mari de reliquo Sed hoc non potest umquam contingere, nisi

quando una res simplex est plures res, sicut unica divina essentia
est tres personae, . (S.L. II, c.2, vol. II, p. 228)
Nor is it valid to say that the humanity of Socrates
is not really, but only formally, distinguished from
Socrates, because such a distinction must not be
placed in creatures although it may in some way be
placed in Godo And this is so because in creatures
it is impossible to find numerically one thing that
is really many things and any of those things, as
is the case in God. For in God, the divine essence
is three Persons and is any of those Persons and,
however, one Person is not another. And to say
that the essence and a Person are formally distin
guished is only to say that, according to one mean
ing, the essence is three Persons and a Person is
not three Persons. Likewise I understand nothing
else by this proposition* "The essence and pater
nity are formally distinguished" than "The essence
is filiation and paternity is not filiation and,
however, the essence is paternity." . And so
universally for it to be true that some things
are formally distinguished is only for something to
be truly affirmed of one and truly denied of the
other and, however, one of those things is truly
affirmed of the other. . . . But this can only
occur v&en one simple thing is many things, just as
the unique divine essence is three Persons. . . .
(12)
. . manifestum est quod aliquid vere praedicatur de illo termino
essentia ut stat personaliter quod non praedicatur de paternitate ut
stat personal, iter et tamen paternitas et essentia ut stant personali
ter non distinguuntur quia in re quae denotatur non est aliqua alia
distinctio quam dicta est.
Sed bene sequitur quod essentia supponit
pro aliqua re quae est plures personae.
Et paternitas supponit. pro
aliqua re, quae non est plures personae.

o . extrema contradictionis bene possunt verificari de diversis
437
quorum imum supponit pro re quae est plures res relative Aliud sup
ponit pro re quae non est plures res relative. . . (Quot. I, q.2,
a2r & v)
It is evident that something is truly predicated of
that term "essence as it stands personally which is
not predicated of "paternity" as it stands personally
and, however, that "paternity" and "essence" as they
stand personally are not distinguished because in the
thing which is denoted by the terms there is no other
distinction but that which was indicated. But it
follows that "essence" stands for something which is
many Persons, and "paternity" stands for something
which is not many Persons.
Extremes of a contradiction may well be verified of
diverse things, one of which stands for a thing which
is many relative things, the other of which stands
for a thing which is not many relative things.
(13)
Haec vocatur distinctio formalis quando aliqua res est unum distinctorum formaliter et non aliud, sicut Filius est essentia et non est
Pater,
ideo essentia et Pater distinguuntur formaliter.
(Quot. 1,
q.3, a3r)
That is called a formal distinction when something
is one of several formally distinct things and not
another, just as the Son is the essence of God end
is not the Father, therefore the essence and the
Father are formally distinguished.
(14)
. . . quando unus terminus supponit pro re quae est tres res relativae.
Et alius supponit pro re quae non est tres res relativae et
sic distinguuntur formaliter quia nihil aliud intelligo per distinctionem formalem. . . . (Quot. 1, q.2, a3r)
Vfaen one term stands for a thing ufaich is three
438
relative things, and the other stands for a thing

which is not three relative things, so they are
formally distinguished, because I understand no
thing else by "formal distinction#"
(15)
Et ita patet,quod non debet dici, quod humanitas Sortis distinguiturformaliter

bus:
a Sorte et non realiter.
Et eodem modo est de tali-
'Animalitas distinguitur ab homine, 11 et sic de aliis.
autem talis distinctio formalis non sit ponenda in creaturis,

o2, vol. II, p. 228)
And so it is clear that one ought not to say that
the humanity of Socrates is formally, and not
really, distinguished from Socrates. And the same
may be said concerning such expressions as 'Ani
mal!ty is distinguished from a man". . horever,
such a formal distinction must not be placed in
creatures, . . .
(16)
Ad istud argumentum posset dici quando aLiquid idem vere affirmatux*

et vere negatur simpliciter et absolute sine additions aiicuius modi
syncategorematici, tunc contingit inferre nonidentitatem realem, et
ideo simpliciter sequitur: a non es^
identitas realis.
k es^> igitur est ibi non-
Similiter sequitur: sapientia divlna est sapien
tia divina, bonitas divina non est sapientia divinaj igitur distin
guuntur realter vel non sunt idem realiter.
Sed quando aliquid cum
aliquo modo syncategorematico affirmatur et negatur, non requiritur

non-iaentitas realis sed sufficit non-identitas formalis.
in proposito.
Nam haec est vera:
Ita est
sapientia divina est formaliter
sapientia divina: Hoc non sufficit, quia ita sunt ista contradictoria
'ess formaliter sapientia divina, non esse formaliter sapientia di

vina', sicut 'esse sapientia divina et non esse sapientia divina'j
igitur ita ex ista contradiction contingit inferre non-identitatem
realem sicut ex ilia* Vel qua ratione tu dicis quod ex ista non
contingit inferre non-identitatem realem, eadem facilitate dicam ego
quod nec ex ilia*
Ideo propter istam rationem dico quod sapientia divina omnibus modis
est eadem essentiae divinae quibus essentia divina est eadem essentiae
divinae * * . nec est ibi penitus aliqua distinctio ex natura rei vel
etiam non-identitas Cuius ratio est, quia quamvis talis distinctio
vel non-identitas formalis posset poni aeque faciliter inter essentiam divinam et sapientiam divinam sicut inter essentiam et relationem,
. non credo earn esse faciliorem ad tendendam*
Unde universaliter dico quod unquam de aliquifcus verificatur distingui
formaliter nisi propter distinctionem realem, quando scilicet de uno
illorum vere dicitur quod est aliqua res et de reliquo vere dicitur
quod non est ilia res, sicut relatio et-essentia distinguuntur formali
ter, puta essentia et paternitas, quia videlicet essentia est filiatio
et paternitas non est filiatioj . unum illorum est aliqua res absoluta vel relativa et alterum non est ilia res, sicut essentia est
Filius et Pater non est Filius, . . . ex quo sunt una res . . . et
quando est possibile, tunc non est ponenda. . . . Et ideo cum omnis
res quae est essentia est etiam sapientia et bonitas divina
. . . ideo essentia divina et bonitas divina . . . nullo modo distin
guuntur. . . . Propter hoc etiam non debet poni
distinctio formalis
440
in creaturis, quia ibi nulla una res simplex est plures res distinctae
realiter. . . . (I Sent., d.2, q.l, O.P. & T., vol. II, pp. 16-19)
To that argument it can be said that when the same
thing is truly affirmed and truly denied, simply
and absolutely, without the addition of some syncategorematic mode, then real non-identity is in
ferred. And, therefore, this follows simplys a
is not and & is, therefore there is some real non
identity between a and b. This likewise follows:
divine wisdom is divine wisdom, divine goodness is
is not divine wisdom, therefore they are really dis
tinguished or are not really the same. But when
something with some syncategorematic mode is af
firmed and denied, real non-identity is not required
but formal non-identity suffices. And so it is in
the aforesaid example, for this is true: divine
wisdom is formally divine wisdom, and this likewise,
divine goodness is not formally divine wisdom. This
does not suffice, because these are also contradic
tories: "to be formally divine wisdom, not to be
formally divine wisdom," just as "to be divine wis
dom" and "not to be divine wisdom." Therefore, if
real non-identity is inferred [i.e. "to be divine
wisdom" and "not to be divine wisdom'QjSO is it in
ferred from this [^to be formally divine wisdom"
and "not to be formally divine wisdom*} Or if you
say that real non-identity is not inferred from the
latter, with the same facility I say that it is not
inferred from the former.
Therefore, for this reason I say that divine wisdom
is the same as the divine essence in all ways in which
the divine essence is the same as the divine essence.
.... nor is there any real distinction or even non
identity at all. The reason for this is that, al
though such a real distinction or formal non-identity
can be placed equally easily between the divine es
sence and divine wisdom, as between the essence and
a relation, . . . I do not believe it to be more
easily maintained* . . .
Wience I say that universally some things are never
verified to be formally distinguished unless because
of a real distinction, when namely it is truly said
of one of those extremes that it is something, and
of the other it is truly said that it is not that
thing, just as a relation and the divine essence
are formally distinguished, e.g. the essence and
441
paternity* Because, of course, the essence is filia

tion and paternity is not filiation; . one of
those is some absolute or relative thing and the other
is not that thing, just as the essence is the Son and
the Father is not the Son, from which they are
one thing and when it is not possible, then it
must not be placed there. . . . And, therefore, since
everything which is the divine essence . . . is also
the divine wisdom and goodness, . . . therefore the
divine essence and divine goodness . are in no
way distinguished. . Because of this also, a for
mal distinction should not be placed in creatures be
cause there no one simple thing is many really dis
tinct things.
>
(17)
. . . omnis res absoluta, distincta loco et subiecto ab alia re absoluta, potest per divinam potentiam absolutam existere sine ilia,
. (I Sgnt^, Frol., q. 1,
Xaj vol. X, p. 38)
Every absolute thing, distinct in place and in sub

ject from another absolute thing, can exist without
that other through absolute divine power*
(18)
. nihil est materia nisi quod recipit in se formam absolutam distinctam realiter ab ista materia.
(E.P.)
Nothing is matter except what receives in itself an

absolute form really distinct . . . from this matter.
(19)
Et ilia materia et forma semper distinguuntur realiter.
(E.P. fol. 87b)
And that matter and form are always really distinguished.
(20)
. . omnis unitas realis est numeralis quod illo modo omnis diversitas
realis est numeralis.
(I Sent., d.2,
q.6, P.P. & T.. vol. II, p.210)
Every real unity is numerical because in that way

every real diversity is numerical*
442
(21)
omnis distinctio vel est realis, vel formalis, vel rationis,
(Quot, I, q, 3, a3r)
Every distinction is either real, or formal, or
rational
(22)
. . quando aliqua 3e habent quod unum manet alio non manente, ilia
distinguuntur realiter; . . .
(I Sent,, d.l, q,3, 0,P & T. vol. I,
p. 407)
When some things are so related that one remains
while the other does not remain, those are really
distinguished; .
(23)
. in creaturis numquam potest esse aliqua distinctio qualiscumque
extra animam, nisi ubi res distinctae sunt; , . (S.L. I, ch. 16,
vol. I, p, 49)
There can never be any kind of distinction outside
the soul in creatures unless where there are dis
tinct things,
(24)
. . distingui ex natura rei potest accipi dupliciter: Proprie et
tunc ilia quae distinguuntur ex natura rei sunt plura quorum unum non
est realiter et essentialiter alterum.
Vel potest accipi improprio
quando, scilicet, est aliqua res absoluta quae est plures res relativae et est aliqua res quae est ilia absoluta ita quod tamen ipsa
non est plures res relativae.
(Quot. 1, q,2, a,2)
To be distinguished really can be taken in two ways:
445
l) properly, and then those that are distinct are many,

one of which is not really and essentially the other?
or 2) it can be taken improperly when, namely, there
is some absolute thing which is many relative things
and there is something which is absolute so that, how
ever, it is not many relative things.
(25)
dico quod adunata in re sunt aliqua multa distincta realiter,
facientia tamen unum in re, sicut se habent materia et forxna, subectum et accidens, et huiusmodi? et de talibus verum est quod intellectus potest separare vel dividers ea, hoc est, potest intelligere
unum non intelligendo reliquum, quamvis unum non sit in re sine reliquo, vel, secundum intentionem Commentatoris, aliquando unum non
possit esse sine reliquo. . Unde dicit: w3htellectus natus est
dividereadunata in esse id est quae faciunt unum in esse sive in
re in ea ex quibus componitur, quamvis non dividantur in esse? sicut
dividit materiam a forma et formam a composito ex materia et forma*n
IntaLligit igitur tantum de rebus distinctis, et hoc est bene possibile.
Quod tamen | e t b
sunt una res, et a non distinguatur realiter
ak, et tamen quod intellectus dividat a et
intelligendo g non
intelligendo b, vel e converso, est impossibile.
( I Sent., d.2,
q.3, O.P. & T.. vol. II, pp. 89-90)

I say that united in a thing there are many which are
really distinct yet which make really one entity, just
as matter and form are related, and subject and acci
dent and the like. And of such it is true that the
intellect can separate or divide them, that is it can
understand one and not understand the other, although
one may not be in a thing without the other. Or,
according to the intention of the Commentator, some
times one cannot be vu^nout the other, . . Whence
444
he says, "The intellect is suited to divide what

are united in being that is, what make one in
being or in a thing into those from which it is
composed, although they be not divided in beingj
just as it divides matter from form and form
from the composite of matter and form." He under
stands this, therefore, only of distinct things,
and here it is quite possible. That, however,
a and
be one thing and a is nt really distin
guished from ), and however that the intellect
divides a from b understanding a and not under
standing b, or conversely, is impossible.
(26)
. sequitur formaliter* a st i k non si> igitur est ibi aliqua
distinctio rerum vel rationum vel rei et rationis.
Exemplum primi:
si substantia est et accidents non est sequitur quod non sunt una res
sed distinctae res vel in actu vel in potentia.
ens rationis intelligitur, puta a
intelligitur,
Similiter, si unum
quod est ens rationis, non
sequitur quod sunt distincta entia rationis.
Simili
ter, si a st extra animam et > non est extra animam sed obiective
tantum in anima, sequitur quod a i M distinguuntur sicut ens reale
et ens rationisj igitur, ut videtur universaliter ex affirmatione et
negatione eiusdem contingit inferre non-identitatem realem.
(I Sent..
d.2, q.l, O.P. & T.. vol. II, p. 15)

It follows formally* a is and b is not, therefore
there is some distinction of things or concepts or
of a thing and a concept. An example of the first:
if a substance exists and an accident does not ex
ist, it follows that they are not one thing but
distinct things either actually or potentially.
Likewise, if one being of reason is understood, e.g.
a and J>, which is a being of reason is not understood,
it follows that they are distinct beings of reason.
Similarly, if a is outside the soul, and is not
outside the soul but only objectively in the soul,
445
it follows that & and b are distinguished as a real

being and a being of reason. Therefore, as appears
universally, from.affirmation and negation of the
same a real non-identity can be inferred.
(27)
. . . identitas vel distinctio consequitur ipsa extrema, ipsis positis
in esse; igitur si extrema ipsa in nullo penitus varientur ante operationem intellectus et post, semper uniformiter distinguunturj sed
sapientia et bonitas divina in nullo penitus variantur per operationem inellectus; igitur ipsa per intellectum non distinguuntur.
. nihil distinguitur realiter ab aliquo nisi sit reseet non ratio,
vel saltern alterum distinctorum debet esse res; igitur nihil distin
guitur ab aliquo secundum rationem nisi sit ratio vel alterum sit
ratio; . . . nihil reale est idem sibi ipsi vel alteri rei secundum
rationem, quia nihil est dictu quod homo et asinus sunt idem secundum
rationem et non realiter, vel quod homo et homo sunt idem secundum
rationem; igitur eodem modo nihil reale est distinctum secundum ratio
nem ab aliquo reali. . . . quidquid est idem secundum rationem potest
esse distinctum secundum rationem et e converso. . . . sicut nullum
ens rationis est idem vel distinctum realiter a quocumque ente ratio
nis, ita nihil reale est idem vel distinctum secundum rationem a quo
cumque reali et per consequens a nullo quod est realiter ipsa essentia
divina.
Et eodem modo sapientia, quae realiter Deus est, non distin
guitur secundum rationem a bonitate quae Deus est.
(I Sent., d.2,
q.2, P.P. & T.. vol. II, pp. 64-66)

Identity or distinction follow the extremes them
selves (they being posited as existing). Therefore,
if the extremes themselves are not altered at all
either before or after the
446
operation of the intellect, they are always uniformly

distinguished. But divine wisdom and goodness are
altered in no way through the operation of the intel
lect, therefore they are not distinguished through
the intellect.
Nothing is really distinguished from something unless
it is a thing and not a concept, or at least one of
those that are distinct ought to be a thing. Nothing
is distinguished rationally from something, therefore,
unless it is a concept, or one is a conceptJ
Nothing real is rationally the same as itself or an
other thing, because nothing is said that a man and
an ass are rationally and not really the same, or
that a man and a man are rationally the same. There
fore, in the same way nothing real is rationally
distinct from something real. . . . Whatever are
rationally the same can be rationally distinct and
conversely. . . . Just as no being of reason is real
ly the same as or really distinct from any being of
reason, so nothing real is rationally the same as
or rationally distinct from anything real. . .
Therefore, the divine essence is neither rationally
the same as, nor rationally distinct from, anything
real, and consequently not from anything which is
really the divine essence itself. And in the same
way, wisdom which is really God is not rationally
distinguished from the goodness which is God.
(28)
* . contradictio est via potissima ad probandum distinctionem re
rum.
Igitur si in creaturis . . . potest omnino idem vere negari
et vere affirmari, nulla distinctio realis potest probari in eis.

Confirmatur, quia omnia contradictoria habent aequalem repugnantiam;
sed tanta est repugnantia inter esse et non esse quod si a et b non
est, sequitur quod b non est g; igitur sic de quibuscumque contradictoriis.
(i Sgntjjj d.2, q*6,
vol. H, p. 174)
Contradiction is the most powerful way of proving

a distinction of things. Therefore, if in crea
tures . . . what is totally the same can be truly
denied and truly affirmed, no real distinction can
be proved in them. It is confirmed, because all
447
contradictories are equally repugnant. But so great
is the repugnance between being and non-being, that
if a is, and b is not, it follows that is not 3 .
Therefore, so it is with any contradictories*
(29)
. . . universaliter in creaturis talia contradictoria, vel affirmatio
et negatio eiusdem, nunquam verificantur nisi propter non-identitatem
realem.
(I Sent., d.2, q.l. P.P. & T.. vol. I, p. 21)

Universally in creatures, such contradictories, or
iffirmation and negation of the same predicate, are
never verified except because of a real non-identity*
(30)
. in creaturis nulla est talis distinctio formalis.
Sed quaecumque
in creaturis sunt distincta, realiter sunt distincta et sunt res distinctae, siutrumque illorum sit vera res*
tales modiarguendi
Unde, sicut in creaturis
numquam negari debent: Hoc est A, hoc est B,
ergo B est A,' nec tales: 'Hoc non est A, hoc est B, ergo B non est A,'
ita numquam debet negari in creaturis, quin quandocumque contradictoria
verificantur de aliquibus, ilia sunt distincta, nisi aliqua determinatio vel aliqtiod 3yncategorema sit causa talis verificationis, . . .
(S.L. I, c. 16, vol. I, p. 51)
There is no such formal distinction in creatures, but
whatever are distinct in creatures are really distinct
and are distinct things, if each of them is truly a
thing. Whence, just as in creatures such ways of ar
guing ought never to be denied: 'This is A, this is B,
therefore B is A,* nor such This is not A, this is B,
therefore B is not A,' so it ought never to be denied
in creatures that, whenever contradictories are veri
fied of some things, those are distinct unless some
determination or some syncategorematic term should be
the cause of such verification, . . .
448
(31)
. dico quod exeepta distinctions vel non-identitate formali quae
est ex natura rei et quae est difficillima
ad intelligendum et quae
non est ponenda nisi ubi fides compellit, nihil distinguitur ab ali
quo nisi sicut ens reale ab ente reali; et omnis talis distinctio est
distinctio realis, nec plus dependet ab intellectu quam ipsa entitas
dependet ab intellectu*
Vel distinguitur sicut ens rationis ab ente
rationis, et omnis talis distinctio est distinctio rationis, quae

identitatem realem simpliciter excludit, sicut ens rationis non potest
esse ens reale.
Vel distinguitur sicut ens reale ab ente rationis
vel econverso; et ista distinctio stricte et proprie nec est realis

nec rationis, sicut nec ipsa distincta nec sunt entia realia nec entia
rationis, sed est quasi media, quia unum extremum est ens reale et
aliud est ens rationis; qualiter autem debeat voeari non euro ad praesens , quia hoc est in voluntate loquentium.
(I Sent*, d.2, q.3,
0J>. & T.. vol. II, p. 78)

I say that, except for formal distinction or non
identity, which is real and which is most difficult
to understand and which must not be placed except
where faith compels us, nothing is distinguished
from anything except as a real being is distinguished
from a real being, and every such distinction is a
real distinction, and no more depends on the intel
lect than the entity itself depends on the intellect;
or it is distinguished as a being of reason is dis
tinguished from a being of reason, and every such
distinction is a rational distinction which simply
excludes real identity just as a being of reason
cannot be a real being; or it is distinguished as a
real being is distinguished from a being of reason
or conversely, and that distinction strictly and
properly speaking is neither real nor rational, just
as the distinct extremes themselves are neither real
beings nor beings of reason. But it is like a middle
distinction, because one extreme is a real being and
the other is a being of reason. Just how it should
be called, however,
do not care at the present,
because this is up to the speaker*
(32)
. * . aliqua est distinctio quae stricte nec est realis nec rationis,
sicut quando res distinguitur a ratione*
Tamen quantum ad propositum
dico quod distinctio realis est duplex* una quae est distinctio rerum;
alia est distinctio qua unum, puta b, non est formaliter a, et dicitur
distinctio realis quia est ex natura rei, sed primo modo non est
realis.
Ideo nego istam consequentiam: omnis res est ens reale vel
ens rationis, igitur omnis distinctio vel est realis vel rationis*
Est enim distinctio media, quamvis inter ens reale et ens rationis
non sit medium.
. . distinctio formalis vocatur quando unum non est de per se intel
lectu alterius vel aliquid competit uni aliquo modo quod non alteri,
sive hoc sit in materia sive in forma; hoc . . . in solo Deo est possibile. . . . distinctio formalis praesupponit identitatem realem,
distinctio autem realis nullam identitatem praesupponit, et ideo quam
vis in aliis distinctionibus contingat vere negare unum ab alio, non
tamen in distinctione formali. . . . essentia et relatio distinguuntur
formaliter. . . . (I Sent., d.2, q.ll, P.P. & T. vol. II, pp*370-372)
There is some distinction which is strictly speaking
neither real nor rational, such as when a thing is
distinguished from a concept. As to the proposal,
however, I say that a real distinction is twofold*
one idiieh is a distinction of things, another which
is a distinction by which one, e.g. b, is not for
mally
and it is called a real distinction because
it is from the nature of the case, but it is not
real in the first way. Therefore I deny that conse
quence, e.g. everything is a real being or a being
of reason, therefore every distinction is either
real or rational. For there is an intermediate dis
tinction, although^there is no intermediate between
450
between a real being and a being of reason. . . .
That is called a formal distinction when one ex
treme is not of the essential concept of the other,
or when something agrees with one extreme in some
way but not with the other and this may happen
either in matter or in form. Thi3 . . . is only
possible in God. . . . a formal distinction presup
poses non-identity, and therefore, although it may
happen in some distinctions that one extreme is
truly denied of the other, this is not the case, how
ever, in the formal distinction. . . . Divine es
sence and a divine relation are formally distin
guished.
(33)
I say that as well the first intention as the second
intention is truly an act of understanding, for by
the act can be saved whatever is saved by the fic
tion. For in that the act is the likeness of the
subject, it can signify and stand for external
thingsj it can be the subject and the predicate in
a proposition} it can be genus, species, etc. just
as the fiction can. Wherefore it is clear that the
first and second intention are really distinct, for
the first intention is the act of understanding sig
nifying things which are not signs. The second in
tention is the act signifying first intentions.
Therefore they are distinguished. (Quot. 4, q.19,
trans. McKeon, vol. II, pp. 390-391)
(34)
The same form in number is not extended and unex
tended, material and immaterial} but the sensitive
soul in man is extended and material, and the in
tellective soul is not, for it is all in aLl, etc.
(Quot. 2, q. 10, trans. McKeon, vol. II, p. 401)
(35)
. . ex hoc ipso quod Sortes et Plato seipsis differunt solo numero
et Sortes per substantiam suam est simillimus Platoni: omni alio
circumscripto potest intellectus abstrahere aliquid commune Sorti
et Platoni: quod non erit commune Sorte et albedini nec est alia
causa quaerenda nisi quia Sortes est Sortes et Plato est Plato et
451
uterque est homo* . non debet concedi quod Sortes et Plato in
aliquo conveniunt nec in aliquibus sed quod conveniunt aliquibus
quia seipsis et quod Sortes convenit cum Platone non in aliquo sed
aliquoquia seipso.
(I Sent*, d.2, q.6,
EE, O.P.. vol. Ill)
From this itself, that Socrates and Plato differ by

themselves only numerically, and Socrates through
his substance is most like Plato, all else having
been circumscribed, the intellect can abstract
something common to Socrates and Plato which will not
be common to Socrates and whiteness. Nor ought an
other cause to be sought except because Socrates
is Socrates and Plato is Plato and each is a man.
. . . It should not be conceded that Socrates and
Plato agree in something nor in some things, but
that they agree by some things because they agree
by themselves, and that Socrates agrees with Plato,
not in something, but by something, because he
agrees with Plato by himself#
(36)
. . dicuntur aliqUa . . . esse primo diversa quando unum immediate
et primo negatur ab alio.
Et ideo quando unum non immediate negatur ab
aliquo ita quod negativa composita ex eis non sit immediata tunc sunt
differentia et non tantum diversa.
Et isto modo omnia individua
eiusdem speciei sunt primo diversa quia ex eis componitur propositio

immediata negativa.
Similiter omnes species contente immediate sub
aliquo genere sunt primo diversa quia ex eis componitur propositio

immediata.
Et ideo Sortes et Plato sunt primo diversa isto modo sed
Sortes et iste asihus non sunt primo diversa quia haec est immediata*
"Sortes non est Plato. Haec autem noh est immediata* 11Sortes non
est iste asinus quia haec est immediatior* "nullus homo est iste
asinus." . . . Differentia sunt ilia quando aliquid communius altero
est medium concludendi negativam in qua unum negatur ab altero sicut
452;
iste homo et iste asinus differunt quia homo est medium tale et
similiter asinus.
Nam iste sillogismus est bonus:
"Nullus homo
est asinus, iste homo est homo, ergo iste homo non est iste asinus."
(Ibid.. FF)
Some things are said to be ultimately diverse when
one is immediately and first denied of the other.
And therefore when one is not immediately denied
of something so that a negative proposition com
posed from them is not immediate, then they differ
and are not only diverse. And in this way lull in
dividuals of the same species are ultimately di
verse, because from them an immediate negative
proposition is composed. Likewise all species im
mediately contained under some genus are ultimately
diverse because an immediate proposition is com
posed from them. And therefore Socrates and Plato
are ultimately diverse in this way, but Socrates
and this ass are not ultimately diverse because
this is immediate: "Socrates is not Plato," however
this is not immediate: "Socrates is not this ass,"
because this is more immediate* "No man is this
ass." . . . Those are different when something more
common to one is the means of concluding a negative
proposition in which one is denied of the other,
just as this man and this ass differ because "man"
is such a means, and likewise "ass." For this
syllogism is good* "No man is an ass, this man is
a man, therefore this man is not this ass."
(37)
. . . in animali sit tantum una forma sensitiva que elicit omnes
istas operationes: cum tamen forma non est indivisibilis sed divisibilis in parte eiusdem rationis: quia forma sensitiva in quolibet
animali sicut pono extenditur . . . ita una pars animae sensitivae
perficit unampartem materiae et alia eiusdem rationis per omnia
perficit aliam partem . . . stat quod potentiae sensitivae aliquo
modo distinguuntur ab invicem sicut partes eiusdem formae . . . et
ista distinctio est realis: quia potest una pars formae manere quae
453
dicitur tuia potentia: et alia pars totaliter destrui. . . . (II Sent,,
q, 26, E, O.P.. vol. IV)
In an animal there may be only one sensitive form
which elicits all those operations* however, seeing
that a form is not indivisible but divisible into
parts of the same ratio, because the sensitive form
in any animal is extended as I posit . . so one
part of the sensitive soul perfects one part of mat
ter and the other of the same ratio perfects another
through all . . . It stands that the sensitive powers
are distinguished from each other in some way as
parts of the same form. * . , and that the distinc
tion is real because one part of the form can remain,
because of which fact it is called one potency, and
the other part be totally destroyed.
(38)
. . potentia animae potest dupliciter accipi*
uno modo pro omni
necessariorequisito ad quemeumque actum vitalem tanquam causa partialia . . .
primo modo . . . ille dispositiones distinguuntur real
iter inter se et ab anima sensitiva constat* ex quo sunt accidentia

absoluta* . . . Alio modo precise pro illo quod se tenet a parte
animae elicientis tanquam principium partialem. . . . non distinguun
tur sicut res et essentiae distinctae* nec inter se nec ab anima
sensitiva. . . .
(Ibid.. D)
A power of the soul can be taken in two ways. In
one way, as a partial cause for every necessary
requisite to any vital act . . . the first way
. . . it is well-known those dispositions are
really distinguished from one another and from the
sensitive soul of which they are absolute accidents.
. . . In another way precisely for that which is
held as if a partial principle from the part of the
eliciting it. . . . they are not distinguished as
things and distinct essences, neither from each
other nor from the sensitive soul. . . .
(39)
. . . in homine sunt plures formae substantiales* saltern forma
454
corporeitatis et anima intellect!va# . (II Sent*. q.9, CC, O.P*
vol. IV)
In many there are man,," substantial forms, at least
a form of corporeity and the intellective soul. * .
(40)
distihguuntur realiter saltern partialiter: quia licet eadem sit
substantia numero quae potest intelligere et velle, tamen intelligere
et velle sunt actus distinct! realiter. . . (II Sent.. q. 24, K,
O.P.. vol. IV)
They are really distinguished at least partially be
cause, although the substance which can understand
and will is numerically the same, however to under
stand and to will are really distinct acts.
(41)
. . . unum argumentum quod est aequaliter contra distinctionem vel
non-identitatem formalem ubicumque ponatur.
Et arguo sic: ubicumque
est aliqua distinctio vel non-identitas, ibi possunt aliqua contra

dictoria de illis verificarij sed impossibile est contradictoria verificari de quibuscumque, nisi ilia vel ilia pro quibus supponunt sint
distinctae res vel distinctae rationes sive entia rationis vel res
et ratio; sed si omnia ilia sint ex natura rei, non sunt distinctae
rationes nec res et ratio; igitur erunt distinctae res#
Maior est
manifests, quia si a et b non sint idem omnibus modis, tunc sunt istae ambae varasi a est idem ^ omnibus modis, et b non est idem &
omnibus modis, ita quod esse idem a omnibus modis, et non esse idem a
omnibus modis verificantur de a et
. . . ita universaliter ubi
cumque est aliqua distinctio vel non-identitas, ibi vere contingit

aliquid affirmari de uno et vere negari ds reliquo.
Minorem probo,
455:
quia omnia contradictoria habent aequalem repugnantiam inter se*
Tanta enim est repugnantia inter animam et non-animam, asihum et
non-asinum, quanta inter Deum et nonDeum sive inter ens et nonens.
as wellJ
if contradictories were to prove formal distinctions
ita perit omnis via probandi distinctionem vel nonidenti
tatem realem inter quaecumque.
(I Sent., d.2, q.l, O.P. & T.. vol.
I, pp. 14-15)
One argument which holds equally against the formal
distinction or nonidentity wherever it may be
placed is this. And I argue thus:wherever there is
some distinction or nonidentity, there some contra
dictories can be verified of those that are distinct.
But it is impossible for contradictories to be veri
fied of anything unless the latter, or those for
which they stand, are distinct things or distinct
concepts or beings of reason, or a thing and a con
cept. But if all those of which contradictories are
verified are real, they are not distinct concepts
nor are they a thing and a concept, therefore they
will be distinct things. The major premise is evi
dent, because if a and are not the same in all
ways, then these are both true: "a is the same as &
in all ways, and
is not the same as a 1
ways, so that to be the same as a I11 311 ways1* and
not to be the same as a in all ways are true of a
and
. . . So universally, wherever there is some
distinction or nonidentity, there it truly happens
that something is affirmed of one and truly denied
of the other extreme. I prove the minor premise:
because all contradictories have equal repugnance
to each other. For the repugnance between soul and
not-soul, ass and not-ass, is as great as that be
tween God and not-God, or between being and not-being.
. /""if contradictories were to prove a formal
distinction as w e l l s o every way of proving a
real distinction or nonidentity between any ex
tremes vanishes*
(42)
.quantumcumque intellectus fabricet diversas rationes circa
eandem rem nunquam dicetur quod haec res distinguitur rations a se
ipsa, sed quod haec ratio distinguitur ratione ab ilia rations. * .
456
Et ita numquam aliqua res distinguitur a se ipsa ratione propter
diversitatem rationuxn quae non sunt ipsa, sicut nec distinguitur
realiter a se ipsa propter diversitatem rerum quarumcumque quae
non sunt ipsa.
Nec secundum sufficit, quia si aliqua res sit ali-
ter et aliter conceptibilis, aut illud quod concipitur est idem om

nibus modis sive concipiatur uno modo sive alio, ita quod illud quod
est obiectum nullo modo nec secundum rem nec secundum rationem multiplicatur.
(I Sent.. d.2, q3> O.P. & T.. vol. II, ps 76)

Howevermuch the intellect fabricates diverse con
cepts concerning the same thing, it may never
be said that this thing is rationally distinguished
from itself, but only that this concept is ratio
nally distinguished from that concept. . . And so
nothing is ever rationally distinguished from it
self because of a diversity of concepts which are
not really it, just as it is not really distinct
from itself because of a diversity of some things
that are not it* Nor does the second suffice, be
cause it something is conceivable in different ways,
either that which is conceived is the same in all
ways, or that is conceived in one way or another
so that that vfoich is the object is multiplied in
no way, either really or rationally.
(43)
. . sciendum est quod distingui ratione non est aliud quam habere
diversas diffinitiones seu descriptiones. . . . distingui ratione
dupliciter accipitur.
Uno modo proprie secundum quod convenit diver-
sis quae habent diversas descriptiones Isto modo nomina diversas

distinguuntur ratione quia habent diversas descriptiones.
Ex quo
patet quod sicut distinguuntur ratione ita possunt distingui realiter.

Si dieis quod tune' quomodo intelligitur illud commune dictum quod
aliqua non distinguuntur realiter sed tantum ratione.
Dico quod an-
tiqui intelligunt sic illud dictum quod de aliquibus terminis sumptis
457
significative praedicatur esse idem realiter et non distingui reali
ter et tamen de eisdem terminis dicitur distingui ratione.
Aliter
accipitur distingui ratione improprie secundum quod competit uni et

hoc est improprie distingui quia proprie loquendo si aliquid distin
guitur ab alio distinguitur.
Et sic distingui ratione est habere
diversas rationes sive correspondere diversis rationibus.
Sic unum
et idem realiter non variatum sine omni diversitate pluralitate quae

ex parte rei correspondet diversis rationibus sive conceptibus sicut
res significata correspondet diversis signis.
Et sic deus dicitur
distingui ratione quia correspondet diversis conceptibus sine omni

distinctions ex parte sui, . . Sed quod aliquid unum et idem reali
ter sit vere et realiter ilia quae distinguuntur ratione ita quod
non correspondet eis sicut signatum suis signis sed sit ista dis
tincta ratione est impossibile. . . . Dico ergo quod attribute di
vina distinguuntur ratione quia attributa non sunt nisi quaedam praedicabilia mentalia vocalis vel scripta nata significare et supponere
pro deo quae possunt naturali ratione investigari et concludi de deo.
(Quo_t. 3, q.2)
It must be known that to be distinguished rationally
is nothing else than to have diverse definitions or
descriptions. . . . to be distinguished rationally
is taken in two ways. In one way properly, accord
ing as it agrees with diverse things which have di
verse descriptions. In that way diverse words are
rationally distinguished because they have diverse
descriptionsj from which it is clear that, just as
they are rationally distinguished, so they can be
really distinguished. If you say then, how is
that common dictum, that some extremes are not
really but only rationally distinguished, understood?
I say that the ancients understand that saying in
this ways that "to be rationally distinguished" is
predicated of the same terms. According as it agrees
with one thing, "to be distinguished rationally" is
458
taken improperly . . . because properly speaking, if
something is distinguished, it is distinguished from
another. And to be rationally distinguished thus is
to have diverse concepts or to correspond to diverse
concepts. Thus what is really one and the same thihg,
without alteration and without any diversity and plu
rality on the part of the thing, corresponds to di
verse rationes or concepts, just as a thing which is
signified correspond to diverse signs. And thus God
is said to be rationally distinguished because he cor
responds to diverse concepts without any distinction
on his part. . . . But that something which is one
and the same really should be truly and really those
which are rationally distinguished so that it does not
correspond to them as what is signified corresponds
to its signs, but should be those which are ratio
nally distinct, is impossible. . . . I say, therefore,
that divine attributes are distinguished rationally
because attributes are only certain mental, vocal, or
written predicables suited to signify and stand for
God, which can be investigated and concluded of God
by means of natural reason.
(44)
. .quandodicitur 'alia est ratio sapientiae et alia
bonitatis,*aut
ente rationis.
est ratio
ratio ibi supponit pro re extra animam, aut pro aliquo

Si primo modo, igitur si sit alia ratio sapientiae
et alia ratio bonitatis, erit necessario alia res sapientiae et alia

res bonitatis, et ita erunt distinctae res.
Sic secundo modo, igitur
ratio sapientiae non est realiter in Deo nec est realiter Deusj igi
tur ista attributa non sunt realiter ipsa divina essentia.
Si
dicitur ad istas rationes quod istae rationes attributales sunt in

Deo ex natura rei sed non sunt distinctae nisi per operationem intelleetus, et ideo sunt realiter ipsa divina essentia sed solum per
operationem intellectus distinguuntur; unde in Deo ex natura rei est
bonitas et sapientia^ sed bonitas ilia non distinguitur a sapientia
ex natura rei sed tanturn per operationem intellectus, ita quod intel
lectus causat istam distinctionem et reducit earn de potentia ad actum*
459
Contra: quando aL iqua omni mode uniformiter se habent ante actum intel
lectus et post, vel semper distinguuntur vel nunquam; sed sapientia
divina et bonitas semper uniformiter se habent ante actum intellectus
et post; nulla enim variatio causatur in eis ex hoc solo quod intelliguntur; igitur si nullo modo distinguuntur ante operationem intel
lectus, nec post.
(I Sent., d.2, q.2, P.P. & T.. vol. II, p. 56)
Mien it is said that the concepts 'wisdom* and 'good

ness' are different, either "concept there stands
for a thing outside the soul, or for some being of
reason. If the first, therefore if the concept
'wisdom' and the concept 'goodness' are different,
it will be necessary that wisdom and goodness be
things, and so they will be distinct things. If
the second, therefore the concept 'wisdom' is not
really in God, nor is it really God. Therefore
these attributes are not really the divine essence
itself
If it is said to these reasons that those attributal
concepts are really in God, but are only distinct
through the operation of the intellect, and there
fore they are really the divine essence itself but
only distinguished through the operation of the
intellect whence in God there is really goodness
and wisdom, but that goodness is not distinguished
from wisdom but only through the operation of the
intellect, so that the intellect causes that dis
tinction and reduces it from potency to act.
Against this: when some relata are related complete
ly and uniformly both before and after an act of
the intellect, either they are always distin
guished, or never. But divine wisdom and divine
goodness are always uniformly related both before
and after an act of the intellect, for no change
is caused in them merely from their being under
stood. Therefore, if they are in no way distin
guished before the operation of the intellect,
they are not distinguished after it.
(45)
. ubicumque est aliqua multitudo, ibi est aliqua distinctio;
sed attributa secundum omnes sunt plura; igitur aliquo modo dis-
tinguuntur inter se et etiam ab essentia, . . . nihil quod realiter

est divina essentia distinguitur ratione a quocumque quod est reali
ter divina essentia; igitur attributa non distinguuntur ratione inter
se et a divina essentia si sint realiter divina.essentia. . . Antecedens probo primo sic: esse idem vel distinctum sunt passiones im
mediate convenientes illi cui conveniunt, et per consequens sibi
conveniunt omni alio circumscripto; igitur si aliquid quocuinque modo
distinguatur ab aliquo, utroque illorum existente modo sibi conveniente, semper distinguitur ab eo omni alio circumscripto et secundum
se; igitur si unum attributum distinguitur ratione ab alio, utro
que illorum posito circumscripto omni opere intellectus distinguitur;
sed si utrumque illorum sit divina essentia-realiter, utrumque illorum
erit modo sibi convenienti omni opere intellectus circumscripto, et
per consequens distinguitur ex natura rei et non sola ratione.
Ante-
cedens patet quia sicut unumquodque se habet ad ens, ita se habet

ad unum, et per consequens ad esse distinctum vel indistinctum; ergo
sicut unumquodque quod est realiter extra animam et se ipso et
immediate formaliter ens et non per aliquid extrinsecum, ita e t . i t
m u m et distinctum se ipso et immediate distinctum a quocumque exis
tente consimiliter extra animam, a quo distinguitur quocumque modo;
et non per aliquid extrinsecum, et per consequens circumscripto omni
opere intellectus.
(I Sent.. d.2, q.2, P.P. & T.. vol. II, pp.63=4-)
Wherever there is some multitude, there is some

distinction. But divine attributes, according to
everyone, are many. Therefore they are distin
guished in some way from one another and even
from the divine essence. . . . Nothing which is
really the divine essence is rationally distin
guished from anything which is really the divine
461'
essence* Therefore the attributes are not ratio
nally distinguished from one another and from the
divine essence, if they really are the divine es
sence* . I prove the antecedent first thus*
td> be the same or distinct are passions immediately
agreeing with that with which they agree, and con
sequently they agree with it when everything else
is taken out of account. Therefore if something is
in any way distinguished from something, each of
them existing in a way appropriate to it, it is
always distinguished from it, all else having been
removed from consideration, and is distinguished
according to itself. Therefore, if one attribute
is rationally distinguished from another, each of
those posited is distinguished apart from every
work of the intellect. Bu.t if each of them is
really the divine essence, each of them will in a
way agree with the essence apart from every work
of the intellect, and consequently be really and
not rationally distinguished from each other. The
antecedent is clear because, just as anything re
lates to being, so it relates to unity. And conse
quently it relates to being distinct or indistinct.
Therefore, just as anything which is really and of
itself, outside the soul, immediately and formal
ly a being, and not a being through something ex
trinsic to it, so it will be one and distinct of
itself, and also insnediately distinct from anything
similarly existing outside the soul from which it
is in any way distinguished, and not through some
thing extrinsic to it, and consequently apart from
every work of the understanding.
(46)
perfectio attributalis potest accipi dupliciters uno modo pro
aliqua perfectione simpliciter divina sit quae realiter Deusj alio
modo pro aliquo praedicabili vere de Deo et de omnibus tribus personis coniunctim et divisim.
Primo modo dico quod non sunt plures
perfectiones attributales, sed tantum est ibi nna perfectio indistincta re et ratione, . . . Secundo modo dico quod non sunt
nisi quidam conceptus vel signa quae possunt praedicari de Deo, et
magis proprie deberent dici conceptus attributales vel nomina
462
attributalia quam perfectiones attributales, quia proprie perfectio non
est nisi res aliqua, et tales conceptus non sunt proprie res, . . . sed
nec conceptus plures nec nomina sunt divina essentia; igitur talia attributa non sunt realiter divina essentia.
(I Sent., d.2, q.2, O.P.& T.
vol. II, pp. 61-62)

"Attributal perfection** can be understood in two ways.
In one way as some perfection simply divine, which is
really God. In another way as some predicate true of
all three Persons conjointly and dividedly. In the
first way, I ssy that there are not many attributal
perfections, but there is only one perfection which is
really and rationally indistinct, . . . In the second
way, I say that there are only certain concepts or
signs which can be predicated of God, and they ought
more properly to be called attributal perfections, be
cause properly speaking a perfection is only some thing,
and such concepts are not properly things, . . . But
neither many concepts nor many names sure the divine es
sence. Therefore such attributes are not resilly the
divine essence.
(47)
. . . omnis perfectio simpliciter est independens ab operatione intellectus
sicut a respectu ad creaturam quamcumque. . . . (Ibid.. p. 6l)
Every perfection simply is independent of the operation
of the intellect as well as from any relation to any
creature.
(48)
. . . si aliquo modo distinguuntur, aut ilia ratio est ibi ex natura rei,
et ita erit distinctio ex natura rei; aut non est ibi ex natura rei, et
per consequens ratio attributalis non est in Deo ex natura rei, et per con
sequens non est realiter Beus.
Si nullo modo distinguuntur, igitur idem
est dicere 'alia est ratio sapientiae a ratione bonitatis,* et dicere

'alia est sapientia a bonitate,' quod est absurdum.
(l Sent., d.2, q.2,
P.P. & T.. vol. II, p. 59)
If they /"*attributes 7 are in some vv distinguished,

either tKat concept of an attribute_7is really there
/""in God 7, and so it
distinction of attributal
concepts /will be a real distinction. Or it is not
really tEere and consequently the attributal concept
is not really in God and consequently it is not really
God. If they are in no way distinguished, "the concept
of wisdom is other than the concept of goodness," and
"wisdom is other than goodness," mean the same, which
is absurd.
(49)
. . . dico quod ipsa sapientia, non quae est attributum sed importata per
attributum, vere et realiter sine comparatione ad extra sine omni operatione intellectus , . . est ipse Deus. Sapientia tamen quae est attri
butum non est realiter in Deo, et ilia quae est attributum non posset
esse nisi esset aliqua res distincta realiter.
Supposito tamen quod illud
attributum nec esset nec posset esse nihilominus Deus esset vere sapiens
et eadem sapientia quae nunc est sapiens. . . . Ista tamen propositio,
"Deus estsapiens," in quae praedicatur unum attributum; non esset vera
nisi esset aliqua sapientia creata vel in re vel in intellectu divino;
et ita illud attributum non esset si non esset aliqua distinctio realis
possibilis; ilia tamen sapientia quae Deus est nihilominus esset.
(i
Sent., d.2, q.2, P.P. & T.. vol. II, pp. 71-2)
I say that wisdom itself, which is not an attribute but
which is implied through an attribute, is truly and real
ly God himself without comparison to anything external
to God and without any operation of the intellect. Wis
dom, however, which is an attribute, is not really in
God, and that which is an attribute cannot be unless it
is some other thing really distinct. Supposing, however,
that that attribute neither were nor could be, neverthe
less God would be truly wise and wise by the same wisdom
by which he is now wise. . .. That proposition, however,
"God is wise, in which one attribute is predicated,
would not be true unless there were 30me created wisdom
either really or in the divine intellect. And so that
attribute would not be if there were not possible some
real distinction. That wisdom, however, which is God,
464
would nevertheless exist.

(50)
. . . sed attributa, quae sunt conceptus.
Si conceptus sint tantum entia
rationis, time ilia attributa distinguuntur inter se sola ratione, quia

sunt plura entia rationis, sicut plura entia realia distinguuntur realiter.
Sed ab essentia divina distinguuntur sicut entia rationis ab ente reali,
et ideo non sunt realiter nec formaliter ipsa divina essentia praedicantur
tamen vere deipsa essentia divina, quia pro ipsa vere supponunt.
Si
autem conceptus sint aliqua entia realia, sicut aliqui ponunt . . . tunc
attributa distinguuntur realiter inter se et ab essentia divina; quae
tamen vere praedicantur de ipsa essentia divina, quia pro ipsa vere sup
ponunt sicut voces vere praedicantur de aliis a quibus distinguuntur
realiter. . . . Si autem attributa dicuntur quaedam nomina attributalia,
tunc distinguuntur realiter inter se et ab essentia.
(I Sent., d.2, q.2,
P.P. & T.. vol. II, p. 66)

But attributes, which are concepts, if concepts are only
beings of reason then those attributes are distinguished
from one another rationally because they are many beings
of reason, just as many real beings are really distin
guished. But they are distinguished from the divine es
sence just as beings of reason are distinguished from a
real being, and therefore they are not really or formally
the divine essence itself, however they are truly predi
cated of the divine essence because they stand for it.
If, however, concepts are some real beings, as some say
. . . then attributes are really distinguished from each
other and from the divine essence, which however are
truly predicated of the divine essence itself because
they truly stand for it as words are truly predicated of
others from which they are really distinguished. . . .
If, however, attributes are said to be certain attributal
names, then they are really distinguished from each other
and from the essence.
(51)
Concedo tamen quod si non essent aliqua distinctio realiter vel in Deo vel
455
extra non possent attributa dici distincta.
Sed si essent distincta et
importarent aliquid quod est realiter divina essentia essent pure synonyma.
Et ita concedo quod omnia attributa vel connotant aliqua distincta reali
ter vel sunt communia aliquibus distinctis realiter. . . . (i Sent., d.2,
q.2, P.P. & T.. vol. II, pp. 70-71)
I concede, however, that if there were nothing really
distinct either in God or outside him, the attributes
could not be said to be distinct. But if they were dis
tinct and implied something that is really the divine
essence, then they would be purely synonymous. And so
I concede that all attributes either connote something
really distinct or are common to some things that are
really distinct. . . .
(52)
. . . dico quod nunquam potest esse distinctio conceptuum nisi propter
aliquant distinctionem a parte rei; et hoc vel rerum in eadem rem, vel
rerum totaliter disparatarum, vel distinctorum formaliter. Et ideo dico
quod de Deo non essent distincti conceptus nisi esset aliqua distinctio.
. . . Quando ergo dicitur 'unum, verum, bonum, etc. dicunt distinctas
conceptus et tamen non sunt distincta entia*, dico quod connotant distinc
ta: quia verum connotat actum intelligendi, bonum actum volendi; et nisi
connotarent aliqua distincta realiter non essent distincta conceptus. Si
militer, conceptus superior et inferior distinguuntur, quia unum importat
plures res quam alius.
(I Sent.. Prol., c.2, a.2, P.P. & T.. vol. I,
pp. 127-128)
I say that there can never be a distinction of concepts
unless because of some real distinction, and this either
of things in the same thing or of things totally separ
ate or formally distinct. And, therefore, I say that
there would not be distinct concepts of God unless there
were some distinction. . . . When, therefore, it is said
"one, true, good, etc. say distinct concepts and, however,
are not distinct beings," I say that they connote distinct
things because "true" connotes an act of understanding,
"good" an act of willing. And unless they connoted some

things really distinct they would not be distinct con
cepts. Likewise, superior and inferior concepts are dis
tinguished because one implies more things than does the
other.
(53)
Non sunt plus esset et existentia duae res quarn essentia et essentia.
(S.L. Ill, II, c. 27, in Baudry)
Being and existence are no more two things than are es
sence and essence.
(54)
. . . quaero utrum aliquid reale possit distingui secundum rationem ab
aliquo reali. . . . Ad quaestionem rejpondeo, . . . quod nihil reale po
test distingui nec esse idem ratione cum aliquo reali, ita quod sicut
distinctionrationis et identitas rationis se habent ad entia rationis,
ita differentia realis et identitas realis se habent ad entia realia, et
hoc forte non excludendo distinctionem formalem et identitatem. . . . Ideo
dico quod nulla res nec a se ipsa nec a quacumque alia potest distingui
vel esse eadem secundum rationem.
Hoc probo sic: si eadem res vel a se
ipsa vel ab alia re differret ratione, hoc non esset nisi propter diversae rationes fabricatas circa eandem rem vel easdem res, vel quia aliter
et aliter concipitur eadem res ab intellectu.
Sed primua non sufficit,
quia sicut intellectus potest formare diversas rationes circa eandem rem,
ita causa realis potest formare diversas res realiter distinctas circa
eandem rem; sed non obstante quod circa eandem rem et in eadem re fiant
res diversae realiter distinctae numquam dicetur quod ilia res realiter
distinguitur a se ipsa, sed quod praecise illae re3 factae vel aggregatae ex ilia una re et duabus rebus factis distinguuntur realiter; sicut
si in lacte ficant albedo et dulcedo, numquam- propter hoc dicetur quod lac
467'
distinguitur a se ipso realiter, sed quod albedo distinguitur realiter a
dulcedine, et aggregatum ex lacte. . . . (I Sent.. d.2, q.3, P.P. & T..
vol. II, pp. 74-76)
I ask whether something real can be rationally distin
guished from something real. . . . I answer . . . that
nothing reeil can be rationally distinguished from, or
rationally the same as, something real. So that, just
as rational distinction eind rational identity are re
lated to beings of reason, so real difference and real
identity are related to real beings, and this perhaps
not excluding formal distinction and identity. . . .
Therefore, I say that nothing by itself, nor through
anything else, can be distinguished rationally from, nor
be rationally the same as itself.
This I prove . . . thus: if the same thing, either by
itself or by something else, were to differ rationally
from itself, this would be only because of diverse con
cepts fabricated about the same thing or things, or be
cause the same thing is conceived in different ways by
the intellect. But the first is not sufficient, be
cause just sis the intellect can form diverse concepts
concerning the same thing, so a real cause can form di
verse things really distinct concerning the same thing.
But despite the fact that diverse things really distinct
are made about the same thing and in the same thing, it
is never said that that thing is really distinguished
from itself, but that precisely those things aggregated
of, or made from that one thing and made from two things
are really distinguished. Just as, if whiteness and
sweetness were made in milk it is never said because of
this that milk is really distinguished from itself, but
that the whiteness is really distinguished from the
sweetness, and the aggregate of these is distinguished
from the milk, . . .
(55)
. . . ilia praedicamenta non sunt res extra animam distincte realiter in
ter se ita quod non est imaginandum quod sicut homo, asinus et albedo
sunt tres res extra
animam
distincte totaliter ita quod nihil quod est
unum illorum vel pars essentialis unius illorum est reliquum vel pars
essentialis reliqui ita sit substantia, quantitate, relatione, et sic
de aliis ita quod substantia quantitas et relatio sint tres res realiter
distincte ita quod nihil quoc est substantia vel pars substantie est quan
titas
vel pars quantitatis, et consimiliter econverso quantitas est una
res distincta realiter et totaliter a substantia relatione et quaiitate

et quod substantia et quantitas et relatio et actio etc. sint res distinc
te realiter et totaliter inter se. Sed est intelligendum et imaginandum
quod hec sunt distincte voces et distincte intentiones in animae seu con
ceptus significantes res extra non tamen est dicendum quod sicut ille in
tentiones sive voces sint distincte inter se quia una non est alia quod
tot res correspondentes eis sint distincte eo quod non semper consimilis
distinctio est inter voces et intentioney in anima significantes et in
ter ipsa significata, sed sic est dicendum quod ilia predicaments sunt
distincta, non tamen consimiliter distinguuntur res significate per ipsa
predicaments sed eadem res (saltern aliqua) significatur per diverse predicamenta quamvis non eodem modo.
Quia aliquando eadem res significatur
per iinum predicamentum sine connotatione alterius rei vel plurium rerum
et sine connotatione quod ipsa sit alia res vel non sit alia res et
generaliter sine omni connotatione vel consignificatione plurium rerum
verbi gratia predicamentum substantia importat istum hominem sicut quamlibet aliam substantiam et nihil connotat quando autem dico pater hoc
predicatum pater quod est unum conceptual sub predicamento relationis im
portat ilium hominem qui est pater connotando filium suum quia impossibile
est inteiligere quod sit pater nisi intelligatur quod habeat filium et ita
est de diversis predicamentis.
(Expositio Aurea. ch. 7, quoted by Moody)
It should be understood that the categories are not things

outside the mind really distinct from each other, and it
should not be imagined that just as man, ass, and white
ness are three things outside the soul entirely distinct
s = = that it is the same with substance, quantity, rela
m
tion, and so on, or that substance, quantity, and rela
tion are three things really distinct such that nothing
that is a substance or part of a substance is a quan
tity or .part of a quantity, . . . But it is to be under
stood and imagined that these are three distinct words,
and distinct intentions of the mind, or concepts, signi
fying things outside. It is not however to be said that
just as these intentions or words are distinct from each
other, because one is not the other, that there are as
many distinct things corresponding to them. For not al
ways is there a corresponding distinction between signi
ficant words and mental intentions, and the things signi
fied. But this is to be said: that these categories are
distinct, but; the things signified by these categories
are not correspondingly distinguished, but that the same
thing (at legist sometimes) is signified by diverse predi
caments, although not in the same manner. For some
times the same thing is signified by one of the predi
caments without connotation of any other thing, or of
several things, and without connoting that it is itself
another thing or not another thing, and in general with
out any connotation or con3ignification of several
things* For example, the predicament of substance is a
sign of this .Jan, as of any other substance you please,
and it connotes nothing. When however I say "father,"
this predicate "father" which is one of the terms in
cluded in the category of relation, stands for that man
who is a father, by connoting his son for it is im
possible to understand that he is a father unless it is
understood that he has a son; and thus it is with the
various predicaments. (Moody's translation, pp. 131-2)
(56)
Sed ista opinio /"that of Scotus with regard to universals_/cmnino improbabilis mihi videtur. . . .
/if common nature and individual difference are formally distinct in a
creature 7* eadem res non est communis et propria; sed secundum eos
/"i.e. the ScotistsJ
differentia individualis est propria, universale au
tem est commune; ergo nullum universale et differentia individualis sunt

eadem res.
Item, eidem rei creatae non poasunt convenire opposita; commune autem et
proprium sunt opposita; ergo eadem res non est communis et propria, quod
470
tamen sequaretur, si differentia individualis et natura communis essent

eadem res.
Item, si natura communis esset eadem realiter cum differentia individuali,
ergo tot essent realiter naturae communes, quot sunt differentiae indivviduales, et per consequens nullum eorum esset commune, sed quodlibet es
set proprium differentiae, cui est eadem realiter.
Item, quaelibet res seipsa vel per aliquod sibi intrinsecum distinguitur,
a quocumque distinguitur; sed alia est humanitas Sortis et alia Platonis;
ergo seipsis distinguuntur, non ergo per differentias additas.
(s.L. I,
c. 16, vol. I, pp. 49-50)

But that opinion appears entirely improbable to me. . . .
the same thing is not both common and proper, but accord
ing to them, the individual difference is proper, and the
universal however is common. Therefore no universal and
individual difference are the same thing.
Likewise, opposites cannot agree with the same created
thing. "Common" and "proper" however are opposites.
Therefore the same thing is not both common and proper
which, however, would follow if the individual differ
ence and the common nature were the same thing.
Likewise, if the common nature were really the same as
the individual difference, then there would be as many
common natures as there are individual differences, and
consequently none of them would be common, but any would
be proper to a difference with which it is really the
same.
Likewise, anything is distinguished, either by itself or
through something intrinsic to it, from whatever it is
distinguished. But the humanity of Socrates and the hu
manity of Plato are different. Therefore they are dis
tinguished by themselves, not therefore through any added
differences.
(57)
. . . de suppositione, quae est proprietas conveniens termino, sed numquam nisi in propositions.
(S.L. I, c. 63, vol. I, p. 175)
Suppositio personalis universaliter est ilia, quando terminus supponit pro
4711
suo significato, . . .
Suppositio simplex est, quando terminus supponit pro intentione animae,
sed non tenetur significative. . . .
Suppositio materialis est, quando terminus non supponit significative,
sed supponit vel pro voce vel pro scripto.
(s.L. 1, c. 64, vol. I, pp.
177-178)
. . . concerning supposition, which is a property
agreeing with a term, but only when the term is in a
proposition.
Personal supposition is universally that had when a
term stands for what it signifies, . . .
Simple supposition is had when a term stands for an
intentio of the soul, but is not held significatively,
iYlaterial supposition is had when a term doe3 not stand

significatively, but stands for either a spoken or a
written word.
(58)
. . . Sortes per animam suam intellectivam plus convenit cum Platone
quam cum asino, et se toto plus convenit cum Platone quam cum asino.
Unde de virtute sermonis non debet concedi, quod Sortes et Plato con
veniunt in aliquo, quod est de essentia eorum, sed debet concedi, quod
conveniunt aliquibus, quia formis suis et seipsis, . . . (S.L. I, c. 17,
vol. I, p. 53)
Socrates, through his intellective soul, agrees more with
Plato than with an ass, and by himself agrees more with
Plato than with an ass. Whence concerning the power of
words, it ought not to be conceded that Socrates and
Plate agree in something which is of their essence, but
it ought to be conceded that they agree by some things,
because by their forms and by themselves.
(59)
. . . ens et unum, si supponant personaliter, potius sunt una res et Tina
natura quam dicant eandem naturam; et si sic supponant, non aliter distin-
472
guuntur ens et unum quam ens et ens, unum et unum. Si autem supponant
simpliciter vel materialiter, sic non sunt una res nec una natura, sed
dicunt eandem naturam et distinguuntur inter se sicut duo conceptus vel
duo nomina quae non sunt synonyma, quia aliter et aliter significant ean
dem rem et naturam, . . . (i Sent., d.2, q.5 P.P. & T.. vol. II, p. 9l)
"Being1* and "one", if they stand personally, are rather
one thing and nature than say the same nature. And if
they so stand, "being" and "one" are no more distinguished
than are "being" and "being", or "one" and "one". If,
however, they stand simply or materially, thus they are
not one thing, nor one nature, but they say the same
nature and are distinguished from each other as two con
cepts or two names which are not synonymous, because
they signify the same thing and nature in different
ways.
(60)
. . . dicendum est, quod entitas et existentia non sunt duae res sed . . .
res et esse idem et eadem significant, sed unum nominaliter et aliud verbaliter . . . ita esse non est alia res ab entitate rei. . . . (S.L. Ill,
2, c. 27)
It must be said that entity and existence are not two
things but . . . "thing" and "being" signify the same
although one does so as a noun, the other as a verb
. . . So being is not a different thing from the enti
ty of a thing. . . .
(61)
Dicitur accidens separabile quod, 3tante subjecto, potest prius vere affirmari et postea vere negari ab eodem. Accidens vero inseparabile
dicitur illud quod, stante subjecto, non potest prius vere affirmari et
postea vere negari,
(Sxpositio Aurea. in Baudry under "Accidens")
That is called a separable accident which, its subject

remaining, can be first truly affirmed and afterwards
truly denied of the same subject. An inseparable acci
dent truly i3 called that which, the subject remaining,
cannot first be truly affirmed and afterwards truly
473 <
denied of the subject.
(62)
Accidens separabile est, quod per naturam auferri potest sine corruptions
subjecti. Accidens autem inseparabile est istud, quod per naturam aufer
ri non potest sine ccrruptione subiecti, quamvis per divinam potentiam.
(S.L. I, c. 25* vol. I, p. 75)
A separable accident is that which can be naturally re
moved without the corruption of its subject. An in
separable accident, however, isr.that which cannot be
naturally removed without the corruption of its subject,
although it can be so removed through divine power.
(63)
. . . non est consimils ordo rerum et conceptuum correspondentium; quia
rerum correspondentium conceptui animalis et conceptui hominis non est
ordo superioris et inferioris sed alius ordo; et tamen istorum conceptuum
est talis ordo. . . (i Sent.. Prol., q.2, P.P. A T.. vol. I, p. 125)
There is not a similar order of things and
of
thecon
cepts corresponding to them, because thereis not an
order of superior and inferior of the things corres
ponding to the concept *animal1 and to the concept
'man*, but another order. And, however, there is such
an order of those concepts. . . .
(64)
. . . in re non sunt tales distinctae rationes, quia tunc essent res distinctae.
(Ibid.. q.8, p. 208)

There are not such
then they would be
distinct concepts in a thing because

distinct things.
(65)
. . . ad veritatem talis propositionis singularis, . . . non requiritur,
quod subiectum et praedicatum sint idem realiter, nec quod praedicatum
ex parte rei sit in subiecto, vel insit realiter ipsi subiecto, nec quod
474
uniatur a parte rei extra animam ipsi subiecto sicut ad veritatem
istius: 'Iste est angelus', non requiritur, quod hoc commune 'angelus'
sit idem realiter cum hoc, quod ponitur a parte subiecti, nec quod in
sit illi realiter, nec aliquid tale sed sufficit et requiritur, quod
subiectum et praedicatum supponant pro eodem. Et ideo si in ista: 'Hie
est angelus1, subiectum et praedicatum supponant pro eodem propositio
est vera. Et ideo non denotatur, quod hie habeat angelitatem, vel quod
in isto sit angelitas, vel aliquid huiusmodi, sed denotatur, quod M e
sit vereangelus, non quidem quod sit illud praedicatum, sed quod sit
illud, pro quo supponit praedicatum.
(s.L. II, c.2, vol. 2, pp. 224-5)
For the truth of such a singular proposition, . . . it

is not necessary that the subject and the predicate be
really the same, nor that the predicate really be in
the subject, or inhere really in the subject itself,
nor that it be really united outside the soul with the
subject just as for the truth of this: "This is an
angel", it is not necessary that this common term
"angel" be really the sameas this wMch is placed on
the part of the subject, nor thattit be really in that
or something such, but it is necessary and sufficient
that the subject and predicate stand for the same tMng.
And therefore it is not denoted that this has angelity,
or that angelity is in this or some such, but it is
denoted that this is trulyan angel, not indeed that it
is that predicate but thatit is that for which the
predicate stands.
(66)
Omnig affirmativa vera requirit identitatem praedicati cum subiecto.
Hec propositio potest habere duplicem intellectum quorum unus est quod
subiectum et praedicatum vere sunt unum et idem et ille intellectus simpliciter est falsus. . . . Alius est intellectus . . . quod omnis pro
positio affirmativa vera requirit ad veritatem suam quod subiectum et
praedicatum significent idem et supponant pro eodem et ille intellectus
475
est verum quia omuis propositio vera affirmativa est vera per identitatatem rei significate per subjectum et praedicatum quia per talem propositionem non denotatur nisi quod res importata per subiectum sit eadem
realiter cum re importata per praedicatum. . . . (Quot. 3, q.5 5v)
'Every true affirmative proposition requires the iden
tity of predicate with subject." This proposition can
have a double meaning, one meaning of which is that
the subject and the predicate are truly one and the
same, and that meaning is simply false. . . . The other
meaning . . . that every true affirmative proposition
requires for its truth that the subject and predicate
signify the same and stand for the same, and that mean
ing is true, because every true affirmative proposition
is true through the identity of the thing signified through
subject and predicate, because through such a proposi
tion it is only denoted that the thing implied through
the subject is really the same as the thing implied
through the predicate. . . .
(67)
Unde si esset aliquid nomen impositum quod praecise significaret divinam
essentiam et nihil aliud sine omni connotatione cuiuscumque, et similiter
esset aliud nomen impositum ad significandum eodem modo divinam voluntatem, ilia nomina essent nomina simpliciter sinonima et quicquid praedicaretur de uno eodem modo praedicaretur de reliquo.
(i Sent., d.45, q.l,
P.P.. vol. 17)

Whence, if there were some name imposed which precisely
signified the divine essence, and nothing else, without
any connotation of anything, and similarly, if there
were another name imposed to signify the divine will in
the same way, those names would be simply synonymous
names, and whatever would be predicated of one would be
predicated of the other in the same way.
(68)
. . . genus non est aliqua res extra animam de essentia illorum, de quibus praedicatur, sed est quaedam intentio animae praedicabilis de multis,
476
. . Ista autem intentio, quae est genus, non praedicatur de rebus extra
animam, quia illae non subiiciuntur, sed praedicatur de signis tedium
rerum, . .
X, c.^0, p. 6l)
. . . a genus is not something outside the soul belong*
ing to the essence of those of which it is predicated,
but it is a certain intentio of the soul which is predi
cable of many things, . . . However, that intentio
which is the genus, is not predicated of things outside
the soul, because those are not subjects of propositions,
but it is predicated of the signs of such things, . . .
(69)
Differt autem ista intentio
species
ab intentions, quae est
genus, nontamquam totum a parte, quia realiter et proprie loquendo nec

genus estpars
speciei, nec species est pars generis.
Sed in hoc dif-
ferunt, quod species est communis ad pauciora quam genus suum, ita quod
genus est signum plurium et species pauciorum. Unde sicut hoc nomen
animal' significat plura, quia significat omnia animalia, hoc autem
nomen 'homo' significat pauciora, quia significat tantum homines, . . .
Nec etiam species est realiter in individuo; tunc enim esset pars individui, quodmanifestum est esse falsum: Turn quia nec est materia nec
forma; turnquia aliquasint individua, quae non habent partes, . . .
sed est signum individui, immo significat omnes res individuales contentas sub ea.
(S.L. I, c.21, pp. 63-64)
f~
However, that intentio i.e. the species differs from

the intentio which i3 the genus, not as a whole differs
from a part, because really and properly speaking a genus
is not part of a species, nor is a species part of a
genus. But they differ in this, that the species is com
mon to fewer things than is its genus, so that the genus
is a sign of many and the species is a sign of fewer
things. Whence just as this noun "animal" signifies many
things because it signifies all animals, this noun "man",
however, signifies fewer because it signifies only men,
. . . Nor is the species also really in sn individual,
for then it would be a part of an individual which is
477
clearly false, as much because it is neither matter nor

form, as because some individuals don't have parts,
. . . but it is a sign of an individual, rather it sig
nifies all individual things contained under it.
(70)
. . . differentia non est de essentia rei, sed est quaedam intentio
animae praedicabilis de contentis non in quid. . . . Sed differentia est
quoddam praedicabile proprium uni speciei et non conveniens alteri, et
vocatur differentia essentialis, non quia est de essentia rei, sed quid
exprimit partem essentiae rei et nihil extrinsecum rei. . . . Sst igi
tur differentia quaedam intentio animae exprimens determinatum partem
rei praedicabilis in quale de eisdem, de quibus species, cum qua con
vertitur, praedicatur in quid.
(S.L. I. c.23, PP. 68-70)
. . . a difference does not belong to the essence of a

thing but is a certain intentio of the soul predicable
of what are contained under it, but not predicable of
them in quid. . . . But a difference is a certain predi
cable proper to one species and not another, and it is
called an essential difference, not because it is of
the essence of a thing, but because it expresses a part
of the essence of a thing and nothing extrinsic to the
thing. . . . A difference therefore is a certain inten
tio of the soul expressing a determinate part of a
thing, predicable in quale of the same things of which
the species (with which it is converted) is predicated
in quid.
(71)
Nomina mere absolute sunt ilia, quae non significant aliquid principaliter, et aliud vel idem secundario, 3ed quidquid significatur per idem
nomen, aeque primo significatur; sicut patet de hoc nomine 'animal,'
quod non significat nisi bcves et asinos et homines et sic de aliis
animalibus, et non significat unum primo et aliud secundario, . . .
Nomen autem connotativum est illud, quod significat aliquid primario et
aliquid secundario, . . . Sicut est de hoc nomine 'album;' nam habet
478
definitionem . . . in qua una dictio ponitur in recto et alia in obliquo.
Unde si quaeras, quid significat hoc nomen 'album,' dicas, quod ista
oratio tota, 'aliquid informaturn albedine' vel 'aliquid habens albedinem.'
(S.L. I, c. 10, pp. 33,34)
Words merely absolute are those which do not signify some
thing primarily and something else or the seme thing secon
darily, but whatever is signified through the same word
is equally signified primarily, as is clear concerning this
word "animal" which only signifies cows and donkeys and
men and so for other animals, and does not-iSignify one
primarily and another secondarily, . . . A connotative
word, however, is that which signifies something primarily
and something secondarily, . . . Just as is the case con
cerning this word "white", for it has a definition . . .
in which one expression is placed directly and the other
is placed obliquely. Whence if you ask what this word
"white" signifies, you should say that it signifies this
whole expression: "something informed by whiteness" or
Wsomething having whiteness."
(72)
Dicendum est, quod talia nomina praecise significant res singulares.
Unde
hoc nomen 'homo* nullam rem significat nisi illam, quae est homo singularis; et ideo numquam supponit pro substantia, nisi quando supponit pro
homine partieulari. Et ideo concedendum est, quod hoc nomen 'homo' aeque
primo significat omnes homines particulares; . . . (S.L. 1, c. 17,
Boehner ed., p. 54)
It must be said that such nouns precisely signify singu
lar things. Whence this noun "man" signifies nothing
except that which is a singular man. And therefore it
never stands for a substance except when it stands for
a particular man. And therefore it must be conceded
that this noun "man" equally first signifies all par
ticular men . . .

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MEDIEVAL THEORIES OF DISTINCTION

Sandra Stanton Edwards

EDWARDS, Sandra Stanton, 1944MEDIEVAL THEORIES OF DISTINCTION.

University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan

SANDRA STANTON EDWARDS

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

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