Many a slip between the cup and the lip:

The effects of default-based nudges on

pro-social behavior and attitudes.

Alexia Gaudeul1 & Magdalena Kaczmarek2

Georg-August-Universitt, Gttingen
Institute of Psychosocial Medicine and Psychotherapy,
University Hospital Jena

May 24, 2016

Kassel

Nudges
Any aspect of the choice
architecture that alters
behavior in a predictable way
without forbidding any options
or significantly changing their
economic incentives (Thaler &
Sunstein, 2008)
Supposedly in a way that
people, after careful
consideration, would consider
to be in their best interest (pro
self vs. pro social?)

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The Nudgee

The Nudger

The Nudge

Wealth,
Health, and
Happyness!!!

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Nudges and why they are needed

Gap between long term goals and short term behavior
System 2 (Reasoning, Explicit):
Goal oriented & reflective
Requires cognitive engagement
Driven by values and intentions

System 1 (Intuitive, Implicit):

Automatic and affective
Requires no or little cognitive
engagement
Driven by immediate feelings and
triggered by our environment

Intervention
Changing Mind:
Alter beliefs and attitudes
through information
Motivate with prospect of future
benefits

Intervention
Altering social and physical
environments to make certain
behaviors more likely
Social norm feedback (taxes)
Changing defaults (organ
donation
Altering physical environments
(Ikea, supermarkets)

Results: Modest effectiveness

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Nudges: Many domains of applications

Legislation

Nudging

Ban smoking in public places

Increase price of cigarettes

Smoking

Regulate pricing through duty or

minimum pricing per unit

Alcohol

Ban industrially produced trans

fatty acids

Increase duty on petrol year on

year (fuel price escalator)
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Make non-smoking more visible

through mass media campaigns
communicating that the majority
do not smoke and the majority of
smokers want to stop

Serve drinks in smaller glasses

Diet

Make salad rather than chips the

default side order

Physical
Activity

Make stairs, not lifts, more

prominent and attractive in public
buildings
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Nudges: Examples

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Nudges: Examples

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What about the nudgee?

The nudgee might rebel!

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What about the nudgee?

Limited research from the perspective of the nudgee (the person
being nudged).
Do they prefer overt or covert nudges?

(Felsen et al., Public attitudes towards overt and covert nudges,

Judgment and Decision Making, 2013)
People prefer conscious decisional enhancements

What do they think about the nudge?

(Gunnlaugsson, Informed Nudges, 2014)

Revealing manipulation neg. affects acceptance of the intervention

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What about the nudgee?

Who wants to be nudged?
(Pedersen et al , Who wants paternalism?, Bulletin of Economic Research,
2012)
Attitudes towards nudges are not linked to self- control, but attitudes
towards strong paternalism are.

What do they think about the nudger?

(Kataria et al, Paternalism with Hindsight , Social Choice and Welfare,
2014)
Consequential stand on paternalism, punishment when outcome is bad

Do nudgees stop thinking about their choices?

(de Haan & Linde, Good Nudge Lullaby , 2011)

Do nudgees start ignoring or avoiding nudges?

(Damgaard & Gravert, The effect of deadlines on charitable giving , 2016)

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Research questions
and hypotheses
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Research questions
How does the nudge affect peoples perception of charities and
of the nudged behavior?
Can a one-time nudge change peoples mind about the
desirable action?

or do they react to it mechanically, i.e. once the nudge is gone, the

behavior is also gone?

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Nudge Change in attitude

Attitude

cdf attitude
Nudge

Threshold for contribution

People

In this case, the nudge leads to a change in attitude

possible longer term effect.

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Nudge Pressure to contribute

Attitude
cdf attitude

Threshold for contribution

Nudge

People

In this case, the nudge works by making it easier to contribute

less likely to survive

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Hypotheses
H1: The default option is more likely to be chosen at the time of
application
H2: Attitudes towards or against the charity and the nudging
institution will be shaped by resisting or yielding to a nudge.
H3: Pledges in the second phase will reflect attitudes generated
in the first phase.
H4: People who are nudged towards charity giving will be less
committed to actually donate than people who decided to do
so against the nudge.

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The experiment
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The experiment
1st Phase

People are offered 2 to fill a survey.

Four treatments:

Pledge

Nudge to pledge.
Nudge to keep.
Nudge to pledge with choice.
Nudge to keep with choice.

2nd Phase: Free choice to pledge or keep 2 again.

3rd Phase: Collect money (4) and contribute.

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Pledge

Donation

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The experiment
3 days

Randomized
emails to 3762
subjects
(Max Planck
Orsee database)

3 days

2 weeks

Questionnaires and Filler Tasks

Questionnaires and Filler Tasks

Demographic variables, Questions

regarding attitudes to risk, fairness
and trust, Big Five, CRT.

Demographic variables , Questions

regarding attitudes to risk, fairness
and trust, Big Five, CRT.

Manipulation

Manipulation

1. No nudge (n=210)
2. Nudge (n=190)
3. No nudge with choice (n=191)
4. Nudge with choice (n=195)
5. Control (n=202)

1.
2.

Attitude Measures

Attitude Measures

towards charity
towards the nudger (MPI)
towards the nudge

towards charity
towards the nudger (MPI)
towards the nudge

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No nudge (1&2; n=346)

No nudge with choice (3&4;
n=330)

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2 weeks

Payout
(N=460)

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Attitude to the charities

1. I would like to know more about the charity (+)
2. I think the work of the charity is important (+)
3. I am interested in the work of the charity (+)
4. I am indifferent about the work of the charity (-)
5. I think the work of the charity has got meaning (+)
6. There should be more charities like . . . (+)
7. The charity makes good use of its money (+)
8. The charity wastes its money (-)
9. My opinion of the charity is positive (+)
10. The charity contributes in an important way (+)
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Attitude to the nudge

1. I would like to have the opportunity to contribute in future
experiments (+)
2. I would contribute money to charities in future experiments (+)
3. I felt forced to contribute (-)
4. I am happy with my decision (+)
5. I do not like this campaign for donations (-)

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The sample
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Demographics and consistency in answers

First period

Second period
consistency

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99%

Female

65%

100%

German

95%

100%

Education

56% Abitur
22% Bachelor

96%
98%

Parents
education

34% Both Abitur

27% One Abitur

96%
97%

26% Village
36% Town
33% City

92%
82%
89%

Age

Environment

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Findings
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Pledges and donations

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Pledges and donations

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Immediate effect of nudge

Result 1: Participants who were nudged to pledge were almost
twice more likely to pledge donations to charities in the first
phase of the experiment. This confirms hypothesis 1.

In treatments with a choice of charities: 37.9% of 190 participants

pledged in the treatment with a default to pledge vs. 19.8% of 212
participants if the default was to keep.
(two-sample test of proportions, z-statistic=-4.02, p<0.001).

In treatments with a choice of charities: 36.4% of 195 participants

pledged in the treatment with a default to pledge vs. 21.8% of 193
participants if the default was to keep
(z-statistic=-3.18, p<0.001).

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Effect on attitudes
Result 2: Nudges did not affect attitudes of pledging or non
pledging participants. This goes against Hypothesis 2.

Index of attitude to charities with a Cronbach's alpha taking values from

0.86 to 0.92 depending on the charity.
Whether with choice of charities and whether pledged or not, no
difference in attitude to charities depending on if there was a nudge to
pledge or a nudge to keep.

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Persistence of the nudge

Result 3: Participants who were nudged to pledge in the first
phase were neither more nor less likely to pledge in the second
phase. This confirms hypothesis 3.

Without choice of charities, 21.6% of participants who were nudged to

pledge in the first phase pledged in the second phase, compared with
20.1% if they had been nudged to keep
(z-statistic=-0.33, Pr(Z<z)=0.370).

With choice, 22.6% pledged in the second phase if nudged to pledge in

the first phase, compared with 23.7% if the nudge was to keep in the
first phase
(z-statistic=0.24, Pr(Z<z)=0.595).

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Commitment to pledges
% of participants coming to collect
Pledged 4

Pledged 2

Pledged 0

Nudge to keep

28,0%

42,9%

56,4%

Nudge to pledge

29,4%

46,2%

67,3%

Nudge to keep
Choice of charities
Nudge to pledge
Choice of charities
Total

43,3%

35,3%

60,7%

22,2%

47,1%

64,9%

30,4%

43,2%

61,9%

Note: Good correspondence between pledges, recall of pledges and actual

donations
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Commitment to pledge
Result 4: Nudging participants to pledge to a charity did not
make those who pledged less likely to collect. This contradicts
hypothesis 4. However, nudging to pledge did make nonpledging participants less likely to collect.

Subjects who pledged in the nudge to pledge treatments were not

less likely to come collect the money than those who pledged in the
nudge to keep treatments.
But subjects who did not pledge in the nudge to pledge treatments
were more likely to come collect the money than those who did not
pledge in the nudge to keep treatments.

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Summary, discussion
and conclusion
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Summary and discussion

Strong impact of default nudges on individual pledging
behavior,

but neither do those pledges predict long-term commitment,

nor do they translate into actual giving.

Yielding to a nudge was not associated with better attitudes to

charities but neither did not yielding lead to hardening in the
attitudes of participants.

because the nudged behavior did not generate significant cognitive

dissonance to be compensated for by changes in attitudes?

Nudges worked only at the margin, on people close to

indifference? no long-lasting effect of the nudge.

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Summary
In terms of actual donations, pledging default does not lead to more
commitment to pledge among pledging participants, but to more
commitment not to pledge among non-pledging participants.

revealed effect of nudges on attitudes?

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Conclusion
Decisions can be guided towards the preferred outcome for
those people who do not hold strong preferences against it.
Those who resist a nudge may become more committed to that
resistance.
Nudges are better accepted if there is some leeway in how to
respond to the nudge.
Default nudges are effective for specific and limited alterations
of behavior, but are not enough for transformational changes in
values and attitudes needed for long-term success.

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