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08 Cases:
JONAR SANTIAGO vs. ATTY. EDISON V. RAFANAN
A.C. No. 6252, October 5, 2004
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
Complainant Jonar Santiago, an employee of the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology, lodged a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Edison Rafanan before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines alleging, inter alia, that Atty. Rafanan violated Rule
12.07 and Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when the latter
executed an affidavit in favor of his client and offered the same as evidence in a case where
he is actively representing his client. The complaint also alleged that after the hearing of the
case, respondent accompanied by several persons waited for Complainant and after
confronting the latter disarmed him of his sidearm and thereafter uttered insulting words
and veiled threats.
In his answer, respondent denied having disarmed the complainant and uttered
insulting words nor veiled threats against the latter. He however admitted that he executed
an affidavit in favor of his client and offered the same as evidence in a case where he is
actively representing his client but interposed the defense that lawyers could testify on
behalf of their clients "on substantial matters, in cases where [their] testimony is essential to
the ends of justice." Complainant charged respondents clients with attempted murder.
Respondent averred that since they were in his house when the alleged crime occurred, "his
testimony is very essential to the ends of justice.
The IBP, while finding that administrative offense was committed by respondent for
violating the notarial law, recommended the dismissal of the complaint for alleged violation
of Rule 12.07 and Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
insufficiency of evidence. Hence, the present action was commenced.
ISSUE:
May a lawyer testify on substantial matters relative to the cause of the party which he is
actively representing in a case without violating the Code of Professional Responsibility?
HELD:
YES. Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not disqualified from being a witness,
except only in certain cases pertaining to privileged communication arising from an
attorney-client relationship. The reason behind such rule is the difficulty posed upon lawyers
by the task of dissociating their relation to their clients as witnesses from that as advocates.
Witnesses are expected to tell the facts as they recall them. In contradistinction, advocates
are partisans - those who actively plead and defend the cause of others. It is difficult to
distinguish the fairness and impartiality of a disinterested witness from the zeal of an
advocate. The question is one of propriety rather than of competency of the lawyers who
testify for their clients.
Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from being witnesses and at the same
time counsels for a cause, the preference is for them to refrain from testifying as witnesses,
unless they absolutely have to; and should they do so, to withdraw from active management
of the case.
Rule 13 Cases:
JUDGE ESTRELLITA M. PAAS vs. EDGAR E. ALMARVEZ
A.M. No. P-03-1690. April 4, 2003
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
FACTS:
Pasay City Metropolitan Trial Court Judge Estrellita Paas administratively charged
Almarvez, a Court Aide/Utility Worker, with discourtesy to his fellow employees, neglect in
performing duties (by not maintaining the cleanliness around the court premises and often
being absent from work), and solicitation of money (from prisoners before serving them their
Release Orders, and from litigants by offering to divulge confidential information in advance
of its unauthorized release).
The Court found that the aforementioned charges were not supported by evidence
since those who filed affidavits as evidence against Almarvez were not presented at the
hearings. The only offense which Almarvez was found to commit was inefficiency in the
discharge of his duties. Thus he was suspended for 3 months.
Almarvez had filed a counterclaim alleging that Judge Paas ordered him to undergo a
drug test after the latter had already filed an administrative complaint against him.
Regarding this, the court held that this elicits the suspicion the Judge is just fishing for more
evidence to support the administrative case she had already filed against Almarvez. This
was held to constitute conduct unbecoming of a member of the judiciary, for which Judge
Paas should be duly reprimanded.
In a separate case for inhibition of Judge Paas in a criminal case, it was found that
Judge Paas husband, Atty. Paas, who is a private practitioner, was using his wifes office
address in his law practice, particularly in a criminal case he was handling which was
docketed at an RTC also in Pasay. In support of this charge, documents were submitted such
as 1) a Notice of Appeal signed by Atty. Paas, and 2) notices from Pasay City RTC, and from
the Supreme Court
This was admitted by Judge Paas, but she claims that this was done only to ensure
and facilitate the delivery of those notices.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Paas and Atty. Paas should be penalized for allowing the latter to use
the office of the former as his return address in his private practice.
HELD:
YES. Using the Judges address is a subtle was of sending a message that Atty. Paas is
the husband of a judge in the same building and should be given special treatment by other
judges or court personnel. In SC Administrative Circular No. 01-99, it was stated that court
officials and employees must never use their officesfor any other purpose that for court or
judicial functions.
Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge should avoid impropriety in all
activities and shall not allow the use of the judicial office to advance the private interests of
others.SC Circular No. 3-92 prohibits the use of halls of justice for residential or commercial
purposes. It is unprofessional and dishonorable to misuse a public office to enhance a
lawyers prestige. It violates canons3, 10, 13, and 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
On his part, Atty. Paas was guilty of using a fraudulent, misleading, and deceptive address
that had no purpose other than to try to impress either the court in which his cases are
lodged, or his client, that he has close ties to a member of the judiciary, in violation of the
following rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility; Canon 3, Rule 3.01, Canon 10, Rule
10.01, Canon 13, Canon 15 and Rule 15.06.
The need for relying on the merits of a lawyers case, instead of banking on his
relationship with a member of the bench which tends to influence or gives the appearance of
influencing the court, cannot be overemphasized. It is unprofessional and dishonorable, to
say the least, to misuse a public office to enhance a lawyers prestige. Public confidence in
law and lawyers may be eroded by such reprehensible and improper conduct.
the justice sector, where respect for the rule of law is at all times demanded from a member
of the bar.