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Ari Spiesberger

Philosophy Final
5/2/16
Our duties to animals.
Animal Rights is a subject of contention even today. There are laws based on
attitudes and morals towards animals and how they should be treated. Western
philosophers have for a long time taken a stance towards animal rights based on
their own personal philosophies and views of the world. Kant, is one of these
philosophers and his views on categorical imperative have created his view on the
ways animals should be treated. More specifically his views are backed behind a
direct reason, that is more interesting than the view itself. Kant states that; Our
duties towards animals are merely indirect duties towards humans (Kant, 1932:
239). I believe that Kant is incorrect on his idea that we have no direct duty to
animals, and all treatment to animals is simply indirectly a way to better humans.
Kants thesis is not simple and needs explanation. Kant is suggesting that we
ought to treat animals well, so that when we are dealing with humans we are in
practice. Kant argues this by placing Humans on a podium and that to humans we
have bound duties. Kant then goes on to say that our ability and expression of these
duties is our humanity, which is not concrete, and can be affected by our actions.
When dealing with animals we see that then, treatment with duty, is a way to
improve our humanity. This allows us to make moral choices based on Kants
understanding of duty to man.
To make this clear, it should be broken down. Kant has one very important
assertion of animals at the beginning of his writing. Since they are not part of the
kingdom of Moral legislators, we do not owe them anything (Kant 1932: 239). Kant
suggests we have no direct reason to treat animals any way or another because
they are not Moral legislators. Kant does say though that animal nature is
analogous to human nature (Kant 1932: 240). Therefore, if a dog does well for his
master, his master should do well for him after the dog is no longer useful out of
respect for human nature in animal nature.
Kant furthers this idea by saying that when we are inhuman to animals we
become hard to our fellow men as well. The universal treatment of humans must be
placed on animals as well because the nature of animals is analogous to humans. It
is by recognizing this nature in animals, despite our lack of direct value for them,
that we learn to become humane to men as well. Kant reflects on the engravings of
another, and how the engravings show a child pinching a dog, then the grown man
running over a child in his cart, finally murder. This is a depiction of cruelty all
starting from the treatment of animals. This argument solidifies Kants initial
proposition of Our duties towards animals are merely indirect duties towards
humans.
Although I agree with Kants position on treating animals well and with
respect, I disagree on his reasons why. I believe that our treatment of animals is
owed directly, not indirectly in the form of building our humanity and highmindedness towards man. I believe that the morality of men is not based on what
we owe to each other. Kant has suggested that we owe nothing to animals because

they are not moral legislators i.e. they do not have the ability to make moral
intelligent choices. I believe that this takes a view that is too broad. Kant has
assumed that our moral legislation is valuable because we can rationalize, and I
believe this is arrogant. I think that we owe animals direct duty because we do not
know that our rational way is the best, and therefore must be most moral by
treating all with direct respect out of understanding for the pain and happiness of all
creatures.
Peter Singer in his articles on Practical ethics stumbles upon the same ideas.
He suggests that it is moral to eliminate discrimination, as it is generally agreed
upon as the right thing to do. This is a basic principle of equality. Singer suggests
that There are important differences between humans and other animals, and
these differences must give rise to some differences in the rights that each have.
Recognizing this obvious fact, however, is no barrier to the case for extending the
basic principle of equality to nonhuman animals (Singer 1989: 4). So yes, although
a dog cannot understand certain rights that we as humans have, the rights of a dog
to live and enjoy life are just like ours, in different terms and equality based on
humility, shows us that we should show individual duty to the dogs rights, as we do
to our own on this matter. These basic ideas of equality make up much of the moral
development in the world, as it has gone socially. If at one point we were to suggest
that all white males were moral legislators, and move to all people in the world are
moral legislatorswhy not animals?
As Singer has suggested, although we are not looking at the same species
having exactly the same rights as us, it is even acknowledged by Kant that we have
some of the same traits. These analogous traits are our rights as they should be a
dogs rights. Although this may seem odd, the idea of women having voting rights
was at one point considered just as ridiculous. By this logic we should be moral to
animals directly understanding morality in the view of equality. I see Kants view of
imperative affecting his ideas of animals in a way that is useful but under thought
and misunderstood, and conclude that there is a more effective moral philosophy to
dealing with this problem that offers a more centered complete solution that is
discussed above. Our duties towards animals, then, are directly involved in our own
morality and moral progress, not an indirect motion towards mankind.

1) Singer, P. (1989). All Animals Are Equal. In T. Regan (Ed.), Animal rights and
human obligations (2nd ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
2) Kant, I. (2007). We have only indirect duties to animals. In L. Pojman & L. Vaughn
(Eds.), The moral life: An introductory reader in ethics and literature (pp. 877-888).
New York, NY: Oxford University Pres

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