Pakistan and the Nuclear Security Summit

Process
Muhammad Faisal
Research Fellow, Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad

The fourth nuclear security summit - the biennial conclave of heads of

governments from around the world - concluded recently in Washington,
DC. The final summit focused on securing nuclear materials, preventing
nuclear terrorism, strengthening national and international nuclear security
regimes, and charting a future course of action to ensure that nuclear
security is accorded highest priority by states around the world.
The idea of the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) was advanced by US
President Barack Obama during his 2009 Prague speech, when he termed
the danger of nuclear terrorism as one of the most immediate and extreme
threats to global security. This assessment emerged from the sharp
increase in the quantity of fissile materials in the world, and potential risk of
non-state actors acquiring small quantities of radioactive and weaponsusable fissile material.
The three previous NSS have focused on reaffirming nuclear security as a
national responsibility, while fulfilling international obligations, securing all
nuclear and radioactive materials including nuclear-weapons-usable
material, accounting for HEU and reprocessed plutonium, and converting
HEU to LEU, where viable. Leaders have also looked at the global nuclear
security system and the international safeguards to control spread of fissile
materials.
Since 2012, seven states have removed nuclear materials from their
territories and more than a dozen states have taken steps to reduce their
stockpiles of fissile materials and strengthen security of the materials they
possess. Today, only 25 states in the world have one kilogram or more of
weapons-usable fissile materials. Thus, the number of states with sensitive
and dangerous nuclear materials has decreased substantially. This is
significant progress since the commencement of the NSS process.
During the Prague speech, President Obama had pledged to secure all
vulnerable nuclear materials in the world within four years, but this goal has
not been achieved yet. Primarily because critical international legal
agreements that have the capacity to increase the security of potentially
vulnerable fissile materials are not in force. The 2005 Amendment to the
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) has not
come into force yet. In the past few weeks, state parties have ratified the
amended CPPNM. At the fourth NSS, the remaining states announced their
willingness to ratify it at the earliest. As of 4 April 2016, two more
adherences are required for entry into force, which will contribute to the
strengthening of nuclear security around the world. These processes are
expected to be completed in a few weeks.
Pakistan has also been an active participant during the NSS process.
Pakistani Prime Ministers have led national delegations at the first three
summits. However, in the wake of the tragic terrorist attack in Lahore, days
prior to fourth Summit, PM Sharif had to stay back at home. A high-level

delegation from Pakistan attended the Washington Summit, which reflects

the level of attention being paid to issues related to nuclear security and
challenge of nuclear terrorism.
In recent years, Pakistan has been confronted with a deteriorating internal
security environment due to spill over of the war in Afghanistan. Challenges
to secure nuclear facilities, materials and arsenal have grown manifold. In
parallel, Pakistan has also invested in a rigorous nuclear security regime to
ensure maximum security of its nuclear installations and materials.
Guarding its nuclear facilities, weapons and materials is the supreme
national interest of Pakistan. The security of these weapons and associated
infrastructure has, therefore, been the top priority of the government.
Pakistan has invested in raising specialised divisions backed by a dedicated
force equipped with high-end technologies to ensure physical protection,
material control and accounting, transport security, and personnel reliability.
It is an all-encompassing nuclear security regime. Pakistan has also
deployed Special Nuclear Material Portals on major entry and exit points to
check the illicit transportation of fissile materials. A specialised Centre for
Excellence (CoE) to build a nuclear security culture and maintain
consistency has also been set up.
At the Seoul Summit, Pakistan offered to open its Nuclear Security Training
centre for other states, which would allow it to be a regional and global
centre of learning and training. The International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), in collaboration with Pakistan, has conducted af ew expert-level
training courses at Pakistans CoE. Pakistan has repeatedly expressed its
resolve to enhance nuclear security and engage with the international
community to promote nuclear safety and security.
The NSS process provided Pakistan an opportunity to engage with the
international community at the highest political level. However, Pakistan
maintains that institutionalising the NSS process is not advisable, as it
considers nuclear security to be a national responsibility. As the 2016 NSS
Summit marked the end of the NSS process, its Communique reaffirmed the
the essential responsibility and the central role of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) in strengthening the global nuclear security
architecture IAEA will be the lead international organisation in
implementing the Action Plans of the NSS process. Moreover, ministeriallevel meetings will ensure continued political momentum on nuclear
security.
States have also agreed to maintain an international network of experts
who were part of the NSS process. It would have been prudent to
institutionalise such a network with a permanent secretariat within the IAEA
with the inclusion of the broader community of states. Such a secretariat
would have institutionalised the NSS process at the diplomatic level for
future engagements.
Pakistan, while seeking to broaden its engagement with IAEA on nuclear
security, can also adopt international guidelines on nuclear security as its
national law, after reviewing them according to Pakistans requirements.
Legislation on nuclear security akin to the Strategic Export Control Act of
2004 (which also follows the NSG and other international guidelines) would
go a long way towards addressing questions that are frequently raised.

Nonetheless, Pakistan has engaged the international community at the

highest political level to address apprehensions and to ensure the safety
and security of its fissile materials at all cost. For Pakistan, nuclear security
goes beyond the NSS process, and is directly linked to national security of
the country.