Sunteți pe pagina 1din 25
Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis Elements of the Sociology of Corporate Life Gibson Burrell Lecturer in the Department of Behaviour in Organisations, University of Lancaster, England Gareth Morgan Associate Professor of Organisational Behaviour and. Industrial Relations, York University, Toronto @ HEINEMANN PORTSMOUTH, NEW HAMPSHIRE Heineman Edens! Boks In $B Cour Sec, Porat Now Maps (380. Gticolan ages Geogho te word © Ginn Beal and Gareth Morgan, 179 t9 90 919293 9876 orgs insu sco, Contents List of Figures List of Tables Acknowledgements iniradastion PART I: IN SEARCH OF A FRAMEWORK Assumptions about the Nature of Socal Science The Strands of Debate Analysing Assumptions about the Nature of Social ‘Science 2 Assumptions about the Nature of Society “The Order-Confiet Debate “Regulation” and “Radical Change 3. Two Dimensions: Four Paradigms “The Nature and Uses of the Four Paradigms The Functionalist Paradigm The Interpretive Paradigm ‘The Radical Humanist Paradigm The Radical Stucturalist Paradigm Exploring Socal Theory PART Il: THE PARADIGMS EXPLORED 4 Functionaist Sociology ‘Origins and Toellectual Tradition ‘The Structure of the Paradigm Social System Theary Interactionism and Social Action Theory Integrative Theory Objectivism ‘The Underlying Unity of the Paradigm ‘5 Functionlist Organisation Theory Theories of Organisation within the Functionalist Paradigm Social System Theory and Objectivism ‘Theories of Bureaucratic Dysfunctions 4 a a % 0 102 106 18 m1 1B et i Comemts ‘The Action Frame of Reference Plualist Theory Debate within the Funetionalist Paradigm 6 Interpretive Sociology (Origins und Totellectual Tradition “The Structure of the Paradigm Hermeneutics Solipsism Phenomenolony Phenomenological Sociology ‘The Underlying Unity of the Paradigm 7 ‘The Interpretive Paradigm and the Stady of Organisations Ethnomethodological Approaches to the Study of ‘Organisational Activities Phenomenological Symbolic Interactionism and the ‘Study of Organisational Activites ‘The Phenomendlogical Challenge 1o Contemporary Organisation Theory Phenomenological Approaches to the Study of ‘Organisational Siuations: Problems and Dilemmas Radical Humanism ‘Origins and Intellectual Tradition ‘The Structure of the Paradigm Grtcal Theory ‘Anarchist Individualism French Existentialism ‘The Underlying Unity of the Paradigm 9 Anti-Organisation “Towards Alternative Realities ‘Towards an Anti-Organisation Theory 10. Radical Stuctoalism (Origins and Intellectual Tradition “The Structure of the Paradigm Russian Social Theory Contemporary Mediterranean Marxism Conflict Theory “The Underlying Unity of the Paradigm 11 Radical Organisation Theory ‘Rascal Weberian Approaches 10a Radical ‘Organisation Theor Maraian Sirucuralist Approaches to a Radical (Organisation Theory 261 270 us 29 2a 2a 209 502 306 310 3 310 36 33 ne ui up ast 365 a7 Conentsv ‘Towards the Further Development of Rascal ‘Organisation Theory 385 PART II: CONCLUSIONS 12 Future Directions: Theory and Research 395 Bibliography 03 Index a List of Figures 1.1 A scheme for analysing assumptions about the aatre sf socul sence 3 31. Four paras fo the analysis of social theory 2 42 Imeliectual iuences ypon the funcuonaist paradigm 7 433. Therour sociological puradians 2 A The main school of osunational analysis 0 4:1 Some possible types of system models a S11 Functionaist approaches tothe study of oganisations 131 52 Thedevelopmen of socal system theory and ajetviom 124 53. Scheme for interpreting complains and reduced work fffocivenees bs 4 SthemefOr interpreting complaints invlbing social nter ‘loin of employee at List of Tables 2.1 Two theories of society “onder” and “confit is 32 Thevesulaton radical hangs dimension Is S1 The utr aed plait ews of ineress, cont and power 2m 8.1 Cra! theory cena concepts an orientations 2889 SA Key dimensions of arnative relies 8 5.2 Towards the deiton of ant-ovgaisaton theory 320-3 ICT The unity ofthe rade structurist atk upon Osan {ston theo. 56-7 11.2 Some dferences in emphasis betwen Marxian sins ‘uals and rascal Webern approaches To rats] pasion theory as 11.3 ‘The radical Webrian vow of interests, sonfict and power sa Acknowledgements ‘We have worked on this ook at a pace which has varie from the imensctothe intolerable and as aconsequence wehaveaskedand ceived a great deal of ou families und friends. We owe to them fina preat debt of thanks, In particular we wish thank Christine Burrell for her considerable patience, help and encouragement, Snhich were sretched up toand sometimes beyond the limits. Our Srork owes much 10 our colleagues and students et Lancaster, pentcularly those in. the Department of Behaviour in Brganisations, where the stimulating and convivial combination of {ical enguiy, friendship and dehate has been a major feature of cur enterprise "The ideas expressed inthe book are the proiuct of extensive iscission and as such are to be seen 2s shared. However the esponsibility forthe production of the manuscript in is present Form hos fallen largely upon Gareth Morgan, who has undertaken the task of converting early drafts into a finished text and of Jmposing silisticunity on the work asa whole. Needless tosay.in the spin of our endeavour, responsiblity, credit and blame are jointly assumed "Thanks are die t9 Jean Atkinson, Janet Fisher, Joy Howson. ‘sue Lawrence and Lynne Rymarz for typing various sections of the manuscript, The aswstance of the Socisl Science Research {Coonelsin sponsoring field research which contributed tomany of the ideas presented here is rateflly acknowledged, ‘Gibson Burrell would ike to resister his gratitude to his mother and family, especially to Christine who, while the Book was Being written, ced twins in and ex wero while he merely carried Books i ind ex irs ‘Gareth, Morgan wishes. to extend, special thanks and appreciation to his parents Hrs and Rachel Morgan, oral that they have given. We also nish to thank the following publishers for permission to reproduce extracts from their hooks on the pages indicated: Harvard University Press: F.J. Roethlisberger and W.l Dickson, Management and the Worker (1938). on pp. 134, 136-7, 137-8. and Figs. 53 and $4 on pp. 135 and 137. Houghton Miflin Company: A. Rose, Human Behavior and Socal Processes (1982), 00 pp. 79-80 John Wiley & Sons, Ine. PM. Blau, Exchange and Power in Sovial Life (1964), on pp. 89,9 Merlin Press Lid.’ P. Thevenar, What is Phenomenology? (1962), on p- 241 Methuen and'Co Lid: Jean-Paul Saree, Being and Nothingness (1966), on p= 305, Penguin Books Lid’: Steven Lukes, Emile Durkheim: His Life “and Work: A Historical and Critical Study (1973), 00 Bp. 4556, Prentice-Hall, In. L.A. Coser, Georg Simmel (1965), 00 pp. "30,71 72 Routledge and Kegan Paul Lid.: John Rex, Key Problems in Sociological Theory (1961), on ph 353 University of Chicago Press: He Blumer, The Sociofosical Imptiation of he Thought of GH. Seas 196). 09.7 Gibson Burrell, Gareth Morgan Tancaster Deemer 1978 Introduction “This book, which has devoured the lst wo years of eur ives is the product ofaendship and intelectual partnership. Tt began as linings ea which grew ith sch strength hat developed into way of ecng' tas changed the ways in which we think thout social theory and wehope that wld the same or others “The book simended tocanly and help overcome what seem to be some of the major sources of confson within the social Senoes atthe presen time, Intly had aft specie obec: tive to attempt t relate theories of organisation to ther wider Sociological content. In the course of development however hs Gndeavour widened in scape and. evolved into an enterprise ‘Embracing many aspect of philosophy and socal theory in gen ral As such it now stands asa discourse in social theory af felevance to many sosial since disciplines, of which hone nthe enerl area of oransation studies ~ industrial sociolon ream ation theory, erpansational psyehology and industrial relations ‘Mhre but special eases by which we llstrate our general themes. ‘Gurpropesitions tha social theory canuseullybeconceivedin terms af four key paradigms based upon ‘ferent sets of Inetathcorcteal assumptions about the nate of social scenceand the nature of society. The fur paragms are founded pon mut- rly exclusive views ofthe socal world. Each sands ins Ov Tigh and generates its own distinctive analyses of soil, With regard tothe study of organisations. for example, each paredigm eertes theories and perspectives which are in fundamental ton to those generated in ater paradis. “PRfch am nals of socal theory brags us facet face with the nature ofthe assumptions which undersniteciffrent approaches tosocial scence It cts through the surface detal which dresses, thany socal theories to what fundamental in determining the stayin which we ses the world which wear purporting o aac Ttsteestes the cuca oe played by the scents frome ofr. nce inthe generation of socal theory and research, “The situation with regard fo the fed of organisation studies at tn presenttime, ws nother soi science dcipines, that avast Invroduction ix proportion of theory and research is located within the Bounds of {st one of the four paradigms to be considered here Indeed. the Bulk ofits located within the comest of arelativey narrow fangs cof theoretical possibities whith define that one petadign, Ts Bo xaageration, therefore, to suggest that the soca scientific ene. rise in genera Is built upon an extremely arrow set of ‘meatheoreial assumptions. This concentration of efor In t ‘eltvely narrow arca defines wht fe sally egarded the dominant orthodoxy wathin subject. Because hisrthodony 90 dominant and ane tadherets often akettfor granted argh and selfeviden, Rival perspectives within the se paradigm of ‘Sulsdeits bounds appears satelites defining alternate points of ‘ew, Their impact upon the orthodoxy. however. rarely very Simian. They areseldom strong enough oestaish thereto ee ssanvihing aetna some devant eof approaches. Asa Fest the possiblities which they offer ae rarely explored. Tet, alone understood. i ee In order to understand alternative points of view itis important that a theorist be fly aare of the assumptions upon whieh his ‘wn perspectives based. Sich an appreciation volves anil lectuat journey which takes him outside the realm of hs own familar domain. Tt requires that he become sare ofthe Dou. aries which define his perspective It sequtes thathe journey ino theunexplored. trues that becomefuriar wih paradigms vwhicharenothis own. Only then can he lok back and appreciate inal measure the peste nate of his starting pra. “The Work presented here san stem to tke the student of ergansations ito realms which he hat probably not explored before. Iisa journey upon which we, ihe authors: unwtnay enbarked ay result ofcenain nagging doubts and ncertaney Sout the uty and vality of much contemporary theory and esearch in our subject. We were concerned about the way Th ‘thich tudes organisational activites ha generated mountains Of theory and research which seemed to have no obviou ks buside narrow discipline areas. We were Concerned about the essentially ephemera mature of our sujet, We mere converted thou! the academic sectarianism reflected at various tines in open hosts, osthsike sndfferense and. generally pose auaty Aialogue and debate between essentially related shoals of thought In shot, we felt tht ur subject ren cae fore cose examination of theassumpions upon which ts based witha view to seeing tin anew, and hopefully refreshing, ight. Our book essence presents an account of our journey anda record ef te x Inroduction copasiony andi which ave emer ‘oa ‘We began our enterpdse by considering how we could dls tinguish between diferent approaches to. the study of trganisations. The view that al thores of erganisationare Based tipo philosophy of science an a theory af society" seemed (0 ‘Zour time and again in ou conversations and we soon found it “Tefming to major dimensions of analysn- Although oreanisation theorntarenotalways very expt about he base assumptions ‘thichinform ther pont of views iis clara they al takea stand neti these seus, Whether they are aware of or ot they Sine to thir subject study aframe of reference whieh eflect 4 Aol series of assumptions about the nature ofthe social word Int the way im which might be invested. “Our attempt to explore these ssnbmptions fed us int the realm cf soci philosopny, We were confronted with probes of onto ‘ny and epistemology and other nuen which rarely receive con- SMeration witin the Bld. of organisation studles. AS. we Investiznted these issues we found that hey underpinned the gre Pilosophicel debates. between sociel theorists from val Jellestual traditions. We reased thatthe orthodoxy in our si Jettvashasedin essence upon jst one ofthese tradition, and that ‘he satelite perspectives which ve had observed as surrounding the othodocy, meres in fac derived ftom quite a separate inclectual source. We realised that they were altempting 0 iiclate_points of view which derived Yrom diametrically ‘opposed assumptions about the sie natre ofthe socal world, srEoninly they subsrbes to gute diferent assumptions about ihe very nate of the sosialscenie enterprise isl. ininestgatingassuimptions with egardo the nature of osety wwe were, alstsabe operat on emer ground. The sosoly OF ein hd Fated pom the ordre debate Sthether solalogy empnasies he “problem of order” or the ‘robe of confit and change’. Byte ate Tos the debete Bad ‘en pronounced dead and these two views of society were seen tharly au we aspects ofthe seme problems. in reviewing the irate flevaut to this debate we Became inreasingly con ined tha ithad met» premature death. Whilst it was cles that Weer sociologists hadconvinced themselves thatthe problem Gf cone could be subsomed under the problem of order theonss cose ths tadon.paruculaly those intersted ia Mirsist theory, were actively engaged inthe development of {Wcilthcores which placed the problems of confit and change st ‘Re oreltonva ther analysts Athough academe soctlogsts and Ineroduction xi Mars social hess appeared content work in sation lanoring the contradictory perspectives vhich they presented seemed that any adequate alysis of theories of sctety must ake these sval perspectives ilo account ‘Our journey into Marxist erature took us into yet another new realm as far 88 out inital interests were concerned. We were Surprised “to find. striking parallels between. intellectual developments wihin Marxist theory and academic sociology. We found that the assumptions about the mcure of socal scence which had divided academe socologiss nt ferent schools of thought aso divided Marsisttheorss, In that realm, foo, he dominant theoretical framework was sureounded by satelite Schools of thought offering rival explanation, Pursuing these diions to their source, wefound tha they emerged from precisely ine same Bounds of social philosophy wbich had undersriten ‘vergent clement within sosology eet esame lea that the tval radtions emphasising orders opposed. "conflict shared the same pedigree as far ss thei roots aocal philosophy were concerned. Deriving. from similar’ assumptions about ihe ‘ontologies! and epistemelogial stats of socal scence, they had then wedde to fundamentally ferent frames of eference with regard to the nature of society Given these crosfinkages Between iva intllctal trations, i became clear tous that our two sets of assumptions could be counter posed to produce an analytical scheme for sting socal theories in general theta set of assumptions defined four basic paradigms Feflecting ite separste Views f Social reali, On tempting {orelate thi scheme tothe social science hterature We oundthat we possessed an excemey powerfl tool for negotiating cut way through ferent subject ren, and one which mae sense fa great deal of the confusion which characterises much con temporary dehate within the social sciences. The scheme offered ise as aformof intelectual map upon which socal theories could belocated according to ther source an tradition. Theories ately if ever appear out of thin ai: they usually have a well established history Behind them, We found that our intellectual map allowed 48 to trace ther evolution. Theale fel into place according 9 their ongins. Where eval otllestual traditions had been fused Aistinetive hybrid versions seemed to appear. What had fist, offered ise asa simple classicatory device for organising the erature now presented itself a an analytical tale ported Us tovards ne eas of investigation, Itallowed unto apprtse and valate theories aginst the Backcoth ofthe intelectual tadion ii Invraduetion which they sought to emulate. Hallowed ust identify embryonic Theores and aniipte potential ins of development. It allowed {to write ths book in the Following chapters we seck 0 present our analytical sche and tue negate way gh the erature on SOSA theory and ongunisaional analysis, We have aimed 1 Semritascleary and rectly ss wecan whist avoiding the pi SFoversipiiation, Hut the concepts of one paradigm cannot Shay be interpreted in terms of those of anther. To understand ‘Thew param one has to explore tom the tside, in terms of iso distinctive problematic Tous, whist we have mae every ifort present our account as pany ax posible as far asthe use ‘Stine English language is concerned. we have necessarily had fo ‘raw upon concepts which may at imes Be unfamilar “Theremalning chapters Part! define he nature of oor two Key mensions of analysand the parsGigms which aise within ther ‘founds. Ths analysis we poerseamumbe oftssues and make much se of rough dchotomsatons asa meas of presenting out ise, We doso ot mercy forthe purposes of classiaton, but to fargca workingtoot Weadvocateurschemessaheunsticdevice father than sea set of rip definitions Tn Part It we put our analytical framework ito ope cath of our Tour paradigms we conduct an analysts Sel heoy an ten prea herey f re {hs wider background: Each of the paradigms fs rated i terms onctent witht own dsc frame of reference: No.attempt ide to eis am crate rom a pepectve guide he srg, Such enticsm sll oo ean) sefe-defeating, since it {ovalyirected atthe foundatons of the paradigm ise. A four paradigms can suecesuly be demolshed in these terms. {Wiad we sek todo i todevelo the perspective characterise of the paradigm and draw out some of fe implications for socal Ilyas: Iso doing mc have found tat we are frequent able to Strengthen the concetuasaion which each paradigm generates {stares the sty of organisations is concerned, Our guiding rule iastbcen to seek to offer something to each paradigm within the tor ofits own problematic. The chapters in Par, therefore, te essentally expository in natures They seek to provide a Setated framework upon whch fare debate igh frilly be based Par Il presents short conchasion which focuses upon some of tne principal esses which emerge fom our analysis PART I: IN SEARCH OF A FRAMEWORK 1, Assumptions about the Nature of Social Science Cental toour thesis the ides that ‘al href rasan are tesedupomaphitonony of scence anda thay ofvectey tne hator we wth to address cursehes tothe ht aspect ft thes and o examine some ofthe phsephiea sumptions hic ern iferent approaches to sacl sents, We shall Saye a nena tance sca scence nme four sts af saute related fo ontology eset ‘human nature and methodology. we sf ‘Alfsoialsclentst approach thw via expt orimp assumption about the ttre ofthe sacl word and the way ‘hich it may be invented Pts there ae assumption an ‘sumptions whtehconcer the vary sseice of the phenomena under investigation. Social. sclentists, for ae fce with bane onal question: whether the ‘be invenipitednexternl tothe dividual = tnposing itfenndviaaconsiaueness from heute protect individual conciousness wether walt ofan abject nature, othe prot finda cognition; whether isa fhven ‘out there’ the worl or the producto one's min Ashetted ith thin ontological Rate, sa second et of ‘ssumptons of an epistemological nature. Those are ssumpions about the round knowledge = bout how one ih Dino Understand the word and communieate ts as Krewe 0 fallow human bing These setmpion cna dea for example. about what forms af knowlege can be cbained ani ow ones Sort whatistobereenrdedss tne rommnistobe regarded {Siu deed ts dchotomy ete and sel pe Suoposes a cerainepstemehogeal stance ti preicated upon a view ofthe mtr of knowledge sit whether. for cxanple ts Poste to deny and commune the nats of knowledge as Erne hard tel and apabio eng transmit nant, tr whether hnowadge ie ofasuct masubjectver sil en transcendent kind, hosed on enpeence and init ofa 2. Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis nique and essentially personal nature. The epistemological Sssumpttonsin these instances determin extteme postions nthe iSoueof whether knowledgeis something which ean eacquired on the one hand, or something which hes to Be personally exper ienced onthe othee “Assotated withthe ontological and epistemological issues but conceptually separate fom them, e/a third set of assumptions oncerning huotan note an ih particular, he felationship felween human beings and she environment, All social selene, tlealy, must be predicated upon this type of assumption, since Ftuman fe is essentally the subject and sbject of enquiry. Thus, ‘Re can identity perspectives in social sience which ental view ‘human beings respondingins meskanitor even determinstic {ahion fo he stuattons encountored in her external word. This view tends tobe one in which human beings and thei experiences ‘We reparded ws product cfihe environment: oe in whichinumans are conditioned by their exert creumstancs, This extreme perspesive canbe contrasted with one which attest human Tes much more creative roe: with perspecuve where ree Wilotupies tne centro the stage: where mans retarded asthe ‘Seutor of his environment the conller a opposed to the con ile, the muster rather than the marsonette Ih these two {atime views of the elationship Between human beings and thelr Shvironment we are Wentying a areat philosophical debate feween the advocates deteminism oh te one hand and NSluntaism onthe other. Whilst there are social theories which lore ocachof hve exremes, a we shale the asumpons Si many soca scientists are pitched somewhere in the range bexween The tree se of assumptions outlined above have. det implications of methodological nature. Each one has portant onsequencesforthe way in wbich one aitempis investigate snd ‘dain knowledge" abou the soeal wort Dilferent ontologies, Spistemologis and models of human nature ae ely to iene Stel seentste towards diferent methodsogies, The possible fange of chose ndeod so large that what sreparded sy scence bythe tational natural seins covers but sal range of ftiions I is possible, for example. te idenfy methodologies ployed in socal science eneach which treat the social werld HEE the natural worl as being hard real and exteral 1 the invite and others which view it as belag of much sie, personal and tore subjective quaky Tome subscribes tox view ol the former kind, which eats the Assumptions about the Nature of Socal Science 4 social worldasifit were ahard, external, objectivereality,then the Scientific endeavour is ikely to focus upon ananalysis of ation: Ships and regulates hetwcen the varius elements which it com prises, The concer, therefore. is with theidentiieation and dein tion of these elements and withthe discovery of ways in which these relationships canbe expressed. The methodological issues of Importance are ths the concepts themselves, thet measurement and the identification of underlying themes. This perspective ‘expresses itself most forcefully in seach for Univers las Which explain and govern the reality which is being observed one subserbes tothe alternative view af social reality, which siresses the importance of the subjective experience of individuals inthe creation ofthe socal world, then the Search for understand: ing focuses upon diferent issues and approaches them in diferent \kays. The principal concernis with an understanding of the way in Which the Individual creates, modifies and interprets the word in Uhich he or she finds himself: Theemphasisin extreme cases tends tobe placed upon the explanation and understanding of what is Unique and particular te the individual rather than of what is general and universal. This approach questions whether there {exists anexternal reality worthy ef study. In methodological terms itis an approach which emphasises the relativistic nature of the social world fo such an extent that it may be perceived a8 ants Scien! by Fetrence fo the ground rues commonly apie in ‘aeogaphic |+——methedsiogy————{__Nonathene Face Asshemeforamlysngssumpton abouthe msure of scassese 4 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis In this brief sketch of various ontological, epistemological, ‘human and. methodological standpoints which characterise lanproashes to socialsciences, we have Sought to lustrate t80 broad and somewhat polarised perspectives. Figure 1.1 seeks to ‘depict these in & more rigorous fashion interme of what we shall describe asthe suhjetive-objectve dimension. It identifies the {oor sets of sssbmptions relevant to our undersianding of social Science, characterising each by the descriptive labels under which they have been dehated in the erature on socal philosophy. In| the following section af this chapter we wil review each ofthe four debates in necessarily brief but more systematic terms. ‘The Strands of Debate Nominalism-realism: the ontological debate! ‘These terms have been the subject of much discussion in the literature and there afe great areas of controversy surrounding them. The nominalist positon revolves around the assumption thatthe soci world external toindiidual cognition ismade up of| nothing more than names, concepts and labels which are used to Stnicturereabity. The nomnalist does not admitto there beingany “real structure {0 the world which these concepts are used to describe. The "names" used are tegarded as arifcial creations ‘whoue utility is based upon their convenience as tools for deserit- ing, making sense of tnd negotiating the external world. Nominal- ism often equated with conventionalism, and we will make no distinction between thems Realism, on the other hand, postulates that the socal world external to individual cognition fsa teal world made up of hard, tangle and relatively immutable stctures. Whether OF not We label and perceive these structures, the realists maintain they tl exist as emprieal entities, We may nol even be aware of the fxistence of certain crucial strictures and therefore have 10 names" or concepts to articulate them. For the realist, the social orld exists independently of in indviall's apprectation oi ‘The individual is seen as being born nto and living within a socal “world which has reality of ts asm, Tis not something whieh the {nvidia creates—it exists “ut there’ ontological iis prior to the existence and consciousness of any single human being. For the realist the social sword hasan existence which i a hard and scanerete ws the natal worl.” Assumptions about the Nature of Social Science S Anti-positivism-positivism: the epistemological debate* Ikhas been maintained thatthe word “poss ke the word "aoangess" has become more of derogatory epithet than a stl deserpive soneep'* Welntend to use there nthe later sense, asadescrnve concept which ane we tcharactenten Torii tye. epntembigs Most of the. eseptony of Poutvrmin current sage eet to one or more ctthe omg Cpistemoloal ant methodological dimension of ut aheme fo Saljsing assumptions with reper to soil scence also Sometimes miikeny eqstt wth empl Suh conations Stond sie ous and conrbute to the Use ofthe tern in Serestry seme ‘Weise “pontvat” here to sharacterseeistemelogies which seco explain and prediet what happens ithe soe old bY Scarchingorreguacies and casa latonsips between com situen elements, Positintepatemology inessence base opon the tadona apronshen which dorinte the natural scleness Poise ay eters tems of dead spprench, Some would shim. for example, tat hypothesised eprns con he vere byanateaate expenmentl research programme: Other wo maintain thet hyptenes can only he aed and never demon fated tobe “ue"® However both verfeatonsss and fa Stcatonsi would accept that he erwin knowledges essen tly a comulatve proce ia whichne insight are aed to the "ning sock of krowege and false bypotheses clminted, “The epntomolgy of nt posto may ake varius fr ut istry stain he utty ofa search for awe onary ‘ealariesinthewordof soci afar Forthean-potost ne Social words enemy rlaincand can ony We understond fromthe posto view of teindvidal who aesecty nvlved inthe ates uhich setae sacs, Ant-poitts eet he Sandpoint of the “observer, whch, ch “putemolog, sts val vantage pont for unestanding haan feivites. They minisin that one can ony "understand by @ecupyina he frame of eferene of he prsant nation, One fs to understand fro the ide rather ta he tse, Ferm ths poim of view sol sconce i sen as beng essen sieve han a scve camps: Ay tend to reject the notion thar slence san ponerte obetive knowledge of any kind.” wee 6 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis Voluntarism—determinism: the ‘human nature’ debate Ideographic-nomothetic theory: the method- ological debate ‘Tas one Sa eiy ondrstand the sci word by oan fst seen see amestinins cbet apne Assumptions about the Nature af Social Science 7 ‘quantitative techniques for the analysis of data, Surveys, questionnaires, personality. tests ‘and. standardised research instruments of all kinds are prominent among the tools which ‘comprise nomathetic methodology." Analysing Assumptions about the Nature of Social Science ‘These fur seis of assumptions with regard tothe nature of social science provide an extremely powerful tool forthe analysts of Social theory, In-much of the iterate there fs a tendency to onfate the issues which are involved. We wish toarguchere that considerable advantages accruefrom treating these four scandy of scienifte debate as analytiealy distinct, While in practice there is ftena strong relationship between the postions sdopted on each ofthe fur strands, assumptions about each san in fact ate considerably. 1 worth examining ths pont in ore “The extreme postions on eachof the four strands ae reflecedin the two major ineletl traditions which have dominated soca Selence over the lst two hundred years. The first of hese is Usually described as “sociological positivism’ In essence this fefects the stem to apply models and nth devved trom the aural setences tothe study of bumen afar Ie teats Ine cosa wworlasifit were the natural world, adopting ‘elit approach {o ontology, This is backed up by "postvist™ epistemology, relatively “deterministic” views of human natire andthe use 08 ‘nomotheic™ methodologies. The second intelectual tradition, that Germanideatis stands incomplete oppestiontothis. essenceltis based upon the premise tha the late realty ofthe universe les in “spinor dea" rather thon inthe data Of sense Deteetion. Icis essentially “nominais ins approach to social fealty. In contast to the nara sciences, it steses the Sse suhjectve nate of human alas, denying the ut and relevance of the models and methods of natural science to Sluis. in this realm. Iti “antpostivst in eplstemoly ‘voluntanst" wih regan to human nature and it favours Wee sraphic method asa foundation for socal analysis. Sostlogieal Poshivism and German idealism this define the cbjectve and Subjective extremes of our model “Many sociologists and organisation theorists have ben brought up within the taditon ‘of sociological posts, without 8 Sociological Paradigms and Organiserional Analysis ‘exposure tothe base tenets of German idealism. Soval scence for them is seen a consonant with the configuration of assumptions which characterise the objective extreme of ur model. However, ‘ver the last seventy yeurs of So there has been an increasing Fneraction between these two traditions, particularly ata socio: philosophical level As a result intermediate points of view have Emerged, each with its own distinctive configuration of Sssumptions about the nature of social science. They have all Spasined theories, ideas and approaches characteristic of their iimermediate position, As we shall argue in later chapters, Adevelopments in phenomenclogy, ethnomethodology and the fiction frame of reference are to be understood in these terms ‘These perspectives, whist offering theit own special brand of insightshave also often been used as latching pads for attacks on| sociological positivism and have generated a considerable amount of debate between rival schools of thought. The nature of this ‘lebae can only be fully understood by grasping nd appre ‘the ciferent assumptions which underwrite the competing p of view Its our contention that the analytical scheme offered here ‘niles one 10 do precisely this. It is offered not as a mere ‘hasiieatry deviee, but as an important tool for negotiating Social theory Tedraws attention to key assumptions. allows one to focus on precise neues which diferentate socio-scientiic fpproaches. 1t draws attention to the degree of congruency bpetween the four sets of assumptions about social science which ‘characterise any given theorists point of view. We offer it here as the first principal dimension of our theoretical scheme for ‘analysing theory in general and organisational theory in pater. For the sake of convenience we shall normally refer to as the ‘subjective objective” dimension, two descriptive labels which perhaps captire the poinis of commonality between the four Analytical strands, Notes and References 1. Fora further discussion ofthe nominalism—realism debate, sce Kolakowski (1972) pp. 1516 2, Kolakowski (1972). pp- 158-9. In its most extreme form ‘nominalsm does not Fecognise the existence of any world ‘ulside the realm of individual consciousness. This is the Solipsist position, which we discuss in more detailin Chapter Assumptions about the Nasure of Social Science 9 Fora comprehensive review of realism’, see Keatand Urry 0979), pp. 27-48. They make mich of the distinction Between positivism’ andreas but 1s they admit nese terms are ued in someshat unconventional way Fora further discussion ofthe positivism ant postvism debate see, for example, Giddens (1079) and Wale (1572). Giddens (578), 9.1 See, for exami, Poppe (1963) For'a good illustration of an ant-posivist view of sience, See Dovgls (19708), pp. 3-48 ‘The human nature debate ints widest sense involves many cher issues which we have not referred to here, The precise ‘model of man to be employed in any analytical scheme, however, iv underwritten by assumptions which rect the ‘oluntarism- determinism ntue in ane way or another, We have isolated this element of the debate here a way of treating at its most basic level a necessary assumption of all Soia-sciente theories which purport tosssoun for human Actives. Detaled propositions with regard tothe precise Explanation of human actviies elaborate in one way oF another this hase theme For an excallet discussion of the nature ofthe idcographic approach to soil science, see Blumer (963), chef Is important co emphasise here that both nomotheic and ‘Meographic methodologies can be emplayed ins deductive andinductve sense Whist he inductive-deductive debate im science ina subject of considerable interest and importance, we do not se it as being central tothe four mensions suggested here as 4. means of distinguishing between the naureof soil science theories. Tha noi Standing remo a portant metal ef felevanee to both sociology and. organisational analysis within the context of the assummplions explored here 2. Assumptions about the Nature of Society {All appoaches tothe study of society are located in frame of Fefeneat oe Hnd or ante, eam hers etait {ier perspective, nse and problems worthy of stu} an Sregenerlly based upona whole sc of asumptons wich ret {para view ofthe nanue ofthe subject under investigation. ‘The last twenty yes or so have witnessed a numberof attempts nthe prt of Sonahogats to delineate the differences which Sparse various schools of thought an the mct-socioloical "Stumplions which they rllect. The Order—Conflict Debate Dahrendort (1959) and Lockwood (1986), for example, have Soueht to distinguish between those approaches to sociology ‘which concentrated upon explaining the nature of socal order and auilbrum on the one hand, and those which were more con ‘cemed with problems of change, confit and coercion in socal Structures on theother. This istinctionhasreesiveda great deal of| tention and has come to be Known as the “order—coafict ‘debate’ The “order theorists’ have greatly outnumbered the ‘con flict theorists and as Dawe has observed, the thes that socio logy is centrally concerned withthe problem of social order has become one of the discipline's few orthodoxies. [tis common a8 8 basic premise to many accounts of sociological theory which btherwise difer considerably in purpose and perspective’ (Dawe, 1970, p. 20). Many sociologists now regard this debate as dead or as having. been a somewhat spurious non-dehate in the first place (Cohen, Te Silverman, 1970; van den Berghe, 1969) Tauenced by the work of writers such as Coser (1956), whopointedto thefunctional tspects of social conflict, sociologists have been able to incorpor ite conflict asa variable within the bounds of theories which are Assumptions about the Nature of Society 11 primarily geared towards an explanation of social order. The Approach advocated by Cohen, for example, cleasy illustrates ths: He takes his pont of departure from the work of Dahrendort and elaborates some of the central ideas in the order—confict, Aebate to present two models af society, which re characterised intermsof competing sets of assumptions which atribute to social systems the characteristics of commitment, cohesion, solidarity, Consensus, reciprocity, co-operation. integration, stability and persistence on the one hand, and the characteristics of coercion, ‘vision, hosly,dissensus, conflict, malintegration and change fn the ther (Cohen, 1968, pp. 165), ‘Cohen's central eritcisms that Dahrendor is mistaken treat ing the order and confit models as being entirely separate. Hein effect suggests that itis possible or theories toinvolve elements of both models and that one need not necessarily incline to one or the other. From this poiat of view, the order and confit views of Society ae But two sides ofthe same coin; they are not mutually exclusive and thus do aot need tobe reconciled. The force ofthis Sort of argument has been very powerful in diverting attention away rom the order_confit debate. Inthe wake of the so-called ounter-culture movement of the late 1960s andthe failure of the 1968 revolution in France, orthodox sociologists have become ‘uch more interested in and concerned with the problems ofthe individual as opposed to those of the ‘siricture” of society in general. The influence of “subjecivist™ movements such as Phenomenology, ethnomethodology and ation theory, which we feferred to in passing in the previous chapter, have tended to ‘become much more attractive and mare worthy of attention. AS 8 ‘result, interest in continuing the conflct—order debate has sub- Sided under the inluence of sses relating tothe philosophy and methods of social science Our contentionhereis that fone reviews the intellectual source and foundations of the arder—confict debate, one Is forced 10 fonclude that it has met a premature death’ Dahrendorf and Lockwood sought to revitalise the work of Marx through their ritngs and to restore it to-a central place in sociological theory, For the most part Marx had heen largely ignored By leading sociologists, the influence of theorists suchas Durkheim, Webet and Pareto having been paramount. Inerestingly enough, these latter three sociologists ae all Very much concerned with the problem of socal order: its Matx whoispreaccupied with therole ‘of conflict asthe driving force behind sosial change. Statedin this, ‘ray, therefore, the order--conflict debate is underwtten bY 3 12 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis difference between the perspectives and concerns of leading social theorists of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Modern Sociology has done litle more than articulate and develop the basic themes initiated by these pioneers of social analysis. To state that the order-conflict debate is “dead” of a ‘aon-debate’ Is thus to ifnot ignore, substantial differences between the work ‘nd, for exampie, Durkheim, Weber and Pareto, Anyone Wwith the work ofthese theorists and aware ofthe deep ‘vision which exists between Marxism and sociology is forced to “admit that there are fundamental differences, which are far from being reconcile." this chapter therefore, we wish tore-evaluate the order conflict issue with a view to identifying a key dimen- ‘on for analysing the assumptions about the nature of society feflected in diferent social theories. In order to doo letus return to the work of Dabrendort, who seeks to set out the opposing Issues in the following ler “The integration theory of socety as splayed bythe work of Parsons “ndotersinsuranctonlst, founded on a mumbo 55m tone ofthe felling te Gh ‘Beery sui e elavely persistent, sable structure of (2) Ever sci is wll tated ratte of elements 3 Evey Semen int soiey Bort fonction, omfers acon {cuit oi maltenance ta em (4) Bte anton til str Hse on consensus what I have eal the oer theory of sovicty can also be {duced 0 sal numberof bans tne, abou here again these ‘Ssunpttons overompiy and overstate the case Go Beery society at every poi subject o processes of chang; Soci hang celta (a) Every Sougy aspays at every point dssesuy and conic Soci conti sete (0) Every lement ina sovtety renders a consibution 10 ite tegration an change a Extrysocte tetas on hecoecionof some oftsmembersby bine tDubrengor, B59" pp. 1-2) “The opposing adjectives which Dabrendor's schema suggests for stingushing approaches to the study of society can be conve ently brought torether in the form ofa table, as follows! f i t Assumptions about the Nature of Society 1% Table 2.1 ‘Two theories of society: ‘order’ and ‘onfit” of society emphasise: ‘Cocion” ‘As Dahrendor admits, this concepusisatonis something ofan cversimpification, and whist providing a very Useful tool for oming to grips wii theffereaves betwen the vo standpeints tsopentothe posit of misinterpretaton in thatth ferent adjectives mean diflerea things to diferent people. Nowhere Is this more evident than inthe Way in which the notion of confce tas been treated im the socolagis! literate. Since Cores demonstration f the functions a social confit, for example, the foleof confit as an integrating mechanism bas revsivedm great teal of attention. Ineffect, the whole notion of conic hes ofc been incorporated within the notion cf ntegration. Dahrendorts integration conflict dimension has been convenenly telescoped so that it fs Brought within the bounds of scilogy'statonal oncern for the explanation of order The fallacy’ ofthis positon becomes clear itane considers certain extreme forme of Cont, suchas class conflict, revoltion and wa, which cam only he Incorporated in the intepratonist model bythe widest stetch of ‘one's imagination. Examples sich a these suasest tha it mi Tending to equate ths type of macrostrutural Sonic with the functional conflict identified by Coser There's an important ‘question of degree involved here, which emphasises the dangers a the dchotomisation of integreion and confit realistically the Aistincio between the two's much oreo sontinvum than the mony of wniters have recognised. ‘Another stand of the Dehrendorf scheme which can be regarded a somewhat problematic les inthe dtinction between onsensut and coercion. At frst sight the distinction appeas fbvious and clear-cut, focusing upon shared values on the ome hhand and the imposition of some Sort of force om the ater. On closer inspection thereis a certain ambiguity. Where dothe shared Salues come from Are they acquired autonomously or maposed ‘some members afsociety by ethers? This question denies Re MM Sociotogical Paradigms and Organisational Analysis possibilty that consensus may’e the product of the use of some Form of coercive force. For example, as C. Wright Mill has pointed out, What Parsons and other grand theorists call ‘value Drientations” and “normative structure” has mainly to do with mister symbole of legitimation’ (1959, p46). "A normative siretire here ~ what Dahrendort would view a8 consensis is treated as system legitimising. the power Structure. From Mill's point of view, it reflects the fact of| omination, in other words, shared values may be regarded not so much as anindex of the degree of integration which characterises a Soviety as one. which reflects the success of the forces of ‘domination ns society prone to disintegration. From one point of View, extant shared ideas, valics and norms are something Coe preserved; from another, they represent a mode of domination From which man needs to be released. The consensus/ coercion ‘imension ean thus be seen as focusing upon th issue of social Control, Consensus ~ however it may arise ~ is identified in Dahrendort's scheme as something independent of coercion, This ive believe to bea mistaken View since, as suggested above, it ignores the possibilty of form of coercion which arises through the contol of value systems. In distinguishing between stability and change as respective features ofthe order and conflict models Dahrendod is again open tomisincerptetation, eventhough he explcily states that he does hot intend fo imply tht the theory of order assumes that societies fre stile. His concern isto show how functional thearies are ‘essentially concerned with those processes which serve to fnainisin the patterns of the system as @ whole. In other words, functional theries are regarded as stati in the sense that they are Concerned with explaining the satus quo. In this respect conflict theories are clearly of a diferent nature: they are committed to land seek to explain, the process and nature of deepseated Structural change im society as. opposed to change of « more Superfcialand ephemeral kind. The act thatall functional theories fecognise change, and that change isan obvious empirical reality in everyday ife, has led Dahrendorts categorisation in relation 10 Stability and change to ose its potential radical force and inl fence Ican be argved tht liferent labels ae required to identify Danvendorts two paramount concerns: frst that the order view of| society is primarily status quo orientated; second, that i deals with change of a fundsmentally efferent nature from that with Which confit theorists are concerned.” Dahrendort's notions of functional co-ordination and dis Assumptions about the Nature of Society 1S ‘egrasion can be seen as constituting one of the most powerful stands of thought which distinguish the order and conflict per- spectives, Here again, however, there is room for misinterpret tion. The concept integration in Dahrendor!'s work derives from ‘hefunctionalists’ concern with he contribution which constituent tlemens ofa system make tothe whole. In many fespectthisis an ‘versimpliieation. Merton (148) introduced the idea of manifest nd latent functions, some of which may be dysfunctional forthe integration of society" Again. Gouldner (1939) writing shorty alter the publication af the German edition of Dahrendor's work, ‘Suggests that various parts ofa system may have a high degree of Autonomy and may contribute very litle By way of integration to ‘he system as whole. The term functional co-ordination is thus something of an oversimpliication and, given the existence of the Points of view expressed above within the functionalist camp self ics not surprising thatthe concept of ‘disintegration’ should be seen at relevant and capable of being used from a functional Sandpoint. Disintegration’ can be very easily Viewed as an inte- ‘rationist concept and, 25 with other aspects of Dahrendort = Scheme, this dimension has offen been telescoped and brovght Within the bounds ofthe theories of order. For this reason ft may ‘well have been clearer ifthe position of confict theory on this dimension had been presented in more radical and distinctive terms. Thereis muchin Marxian theory, for example, which refers to the notion of ‘contradiction’ and the asc sncompatiity be {ween dfferent elements of socal structure, Contradiction implies heterogeneity, imbslance and essentially antagonistic and divergent social forces. I thus stands atthe opposite pole to the {concept of functional co-ordination’, which must presuppose basic compatibility between the elements of any given system. To argue that the concept of contradiction can be embraced within fnetional analysis requires either an set of flth or atleast & considerable leap of imagination ‘Dahrendort's work has clearly served a very useful purpose in identifying» aumber of important strands of thought distinguishing theorists of order from theorists of confit. However, 35 will be apparent from the above discussion, in many respects the dis "nctons whichhavebeen drawnbetweenthetwometa-theories do notgofar enough. In particular, the insights of some twenty years fof debate ‘suggest that the characterisation of the. conflict Perspective has not been sufficiently radical to avoid confusion ‘wth the “integrationist perspective. This has allowed theorists of| order to meet the challenge which Dahrendorf's scheme presents 16 Sociological Paradiems and Organisational Analysis to their frame of reference within the context of their omder- ‘orientated mode of thought. In order tillustrate this point, let us| Fetutn tothe work of Cohen (1968) referred to earlier. Tnadvocating his viewpoint Cohen sppesrsto be misinterpreting the distinction between the two models. His interpretation of ‘concepts telescopes the different variables fat a form in which they can be seen as consistent vith each other. I effect his whole analysis reflects an attempt t0 incorporate the conflict model ‘within the Bounds ofthe contemporary theory of order. He thus Toses the radical essence ofthe conflict perspective andis able to rela thatthe two madels ae not mutually exclusive and do not need to be reconciled. He argues that the two models are not ifenuine alternatives and in effet suggests that each is no more than the reciprocal of the other. He's therefore able to leave Dahrendorts analysis with the central concern of his book ~ the problem of order ~ largely intact. The incorporation of confit fio the bounds of the model of order "de-emphasises. is importance ® Inline with the analysis which we presented earlier, we argue thatthe attempt tereduce thetwomodsls toa commontbase ignores the fundamental differences which exist between them. A confiet theory based on deep-seated structural conflict and concerned ‘with radical wansformations of society is not consistent with a functionalist perspective. ‘The differences between them, therefore, are important and worthy of distinction in any attempt toanalyse social theory. With the benefit of hindsight, itis possible tosee that many of the misinerpreiations which have arisen have ‘done s0 because the models in Dahrendort's analysis were not ‘Sfficienty differentiated. We wish to propose, therefore, that ‘certain moiifications be made in order to articulate the differences na more explicit and radical form. Since much of the confusion has arisen because of the ambiguity of the descriptions associated With the two models we wish to suggest the use ofa somewhat slfferent terminology. ‘Regulation’ and ‘Radical Change’ (Our analysis has shown that the order—coniet distinction sin ‘many senses the most problematic. We suggest, therefore, that it ‘Should he replaced as central theme by the notions of regulation’ and ‘radical change’ Assumptions about the Nature of Society 17 We introduce the term ‘sociology of regulation” to refer tothe writings of theorists who are primarily concerned to provide ‘explanations of soviety in terms which emphasise is underlying unity and cohesiveness. Iisa sociology whichis essentially cone termed withthe need for regultion in human affairs: the Basie {questions which itasks rend to focus upon the need to understand Uwhy society is maintained as an entity Taterpts to explain why Society tends tofold together rather than fll apart. Tes intrested in understanding the social forces which prevent the Hobbesian Vision of "war of all aginst all becoming a reality. The work of Durkheim withits emphasis upon the nature af social cohesion and solidarity, for example, provides a clear and comprehensive ilustration of a concern for the sociology of regulation, The ‘sociology af radical change’ stanes in stark contrast tothe ‘sociology of Fegulation in that its basic concern is to find explanations for the raical change, deep-seated structural con flict, modes of domination and structural contradiction which its theorists see as eharacterising modern society. It. sociology ‘which is essentially concerned with man's emancipation from the siruetutes which mit and stunt his potential for development The basic questions which it asks focus upon the deprivation of man. both material and psychi. Itisoften visionary and Utopian iathat itTooks towards potentiality as much as actualy tis concerned ‘with what Is possible rather than with wat is: with alternatives Father than with acceptance of the status quo. Intheserespects its 85 widely separate and distant from the sociology f relation a= ‘he sociology of Marx is separated and distant from the sociology of Durkheim ‘The distinction between these two sociologies can perhaps be best illustrated in schematic form; extreme points Of view are counter posed in order to highlight the essential differences between them, Table 2.2 summarises the situation, ‘We alfer this regulaionradical change distinction as the second principal dimension of our scheme for analysing social theories. Along with the subjective—objective dimension developed inthe previous chapter. we present is 8 powerful ‘means for identifying and analysing the assumptions which under lie social theories in general “The notions of “regulation? and “radical change” have thus far been presented ina very tough and extreme form. The twa models illustrated in Table 22 should be regarded as ideal-typical formulations. The seven elements which we have identified lent themselves toa much more rigorous and systematic treatment in| 18 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis which their overall form and natures spelt out in detail. We delay this ask unt laterchapters. Here. we wish toaddress ourselves the broad relationships which exist between the socicloges of regulation and radical change. We maintain that they present fundamentally different views and interpretations ofthe nature of society They reflect fundamentally different frames of reference. ‘They present themeeives, therefore as alferative models Tor the analysis of social processes, "To present the mols in this way i toinvite criticism along the lines ofthat levelled at Dehrendor's work. For example it could be suggested thatthe two models re the reciprocals of eachother oso more than two ses ofthe same coin and that relationships Table 22 “The reguation—radical change dimension Te clos of RADICAL CHANGE (© Coneanese 1) Mover of damnation (3) Seca migrant (3) Comadeaon (ey seed ()Emapsgaton (Assi @ Potenaiey Notes 2° “consensus? we mean voluntaty snd ‘spontancous" agree ‘ment of opinion Phe term "ced satisfaction is used to refer tothe Focus upon Satisfaction of individual or system ‘needs™. The sociology of Fegulation tends to presume that various social characteristics can bbe explained in relation to these needs, It presomes that itis possible to identify and satisfy human needs within the context of Existing social systems, and tht society reflects these needs. The “Soncept of “deprivation” on the other hand rooted ia the notion that the social “system” prevents human fullment; indeed that "deprivation is created as the result of the sianes quo. The socal system" is not seen as satifying. needs but as eroding’ the possiblities for human Talent. Tis rooted in the notion that city has resulted in deprivation rather than in gain. Assumptions about the Nature of Society 19 between the sub-lemens of each model need aot be congruen, ‘hats, an analysis may pay attention to elements of both "The" answer 10 eth esiticisms. follows uur. defence of Dahrendor's work. To conte the two models and teat them as, ‘atiations ona single themes tonore or at ett tounderplay te fundamental diferences which ext between team, Whilst it nay bepossibltouse cach model ina dted form andtnus obtain two analyses ofthe mide ground which proximate each ther. they tustremainessemll Separate since they ate based upon oppes- Ing assumptions. This. a0 we have illustrated, Yo discuss the Tinetions of soil conflicts to commit oneself to the sociology of regulation as opposed to that frail change. However close ‘one's positon might be to the middle ground, would seer that fone mbst alvays Be committed tome side more than another. The fundamental dstinetions between he soioogies of regulation and radical change will become clear from our analyte of thelr intellectual development and constvent schools of thought in later chapters. We conceptualise these two broad soviloncal Derspectvesinthe form ofa polarised dimension, recognising tha ‘hile variations within the vontext ofeach are possible. the Petspectiveserenecensrl separate anddsintromeach other Notes and References |. Among the numerous theorists primarily concerned with the problem of order, Dave cites Parsons (1989), Nisbet 1957), Bramson (1961), Cohen (1968), and Aron (1968) For a discussion of the Marxism versus social science debate, see Shaw (1975). The division between Marxist theorsis and onthadox sociologists is now so desp that they either ignore each other “completely, or indulge inn ‘exchange of abuse and acevsation regarding the politcal conservatism of subversiveness commonly associated with thet respective poiats of view Debate about the intellectual strengths and weaknesses of their opposing standpoints is conspicuous by its absence 3. Later im this chapter we suggest thatthe descriptions of| “eoncern with the starus quo" and “concern or radical amze’ provide more acute views othe aus volved 20 Sociological Paradiems and Organisational Analysis 4. Dabrendort acknowledges Merton’s distinction between latent and manifest functions but does not pursue the con- sequence of “dysfunctions for the concept of integration (Dahrendort, 1959, pp. 173-9) 5. Other ‘order’ theorists who have addressed themselves 0 Dabrendort's model tend to follows a similar path in the attempt to embrace conflict theory within thei perspective See, for example, van den Berghe (1969), 3. Two Dimensions: Four Paradigms In the previous two chapters we have focused upon some of the key assumptions which characterise ifferent approaches to social theory. We have argued that it is possible to analyse these {approaches in terms of two key dimensions of analysis, each of hich subsumes a series of related themes I has been suaaested that assumptions about the nature of science canbe thoueht of ferms of what we call the subjeciveobjectve dimension, ad !sssumptions about the nature of society in terms ofa feglation radical change dimension. In this ehapter we wish to discuss the relationships between the two dimensions and to develop a cohen ent scheme forthe analysis of social theory ‘ve have already noted how sociological debate since the late 1960s has tended toignore he distinctions between the ta dimiers sions ~ inparticular how there ha been a tendency to focus upon {ssues concerned with the subjecuve objective dimension ante ignore those concerned with the regulation radical change dimension, Interestingly enough, this focus of attention hes

S-ar putea să vă placă și