OF

MANUAL

SCHOLASTIC

MODERN

PHILOSOPHY
By
MERCIER

CARDINAL
And
PROFESSORS

LOU

PHILOSOPHY,

T.

INSTITUTE

HIGHER

THE

OF

OF

VAIN

Authorized

and EighthEdition,by
Translation,

PARKER,

M.A.,

L.

With
P.

Preface
Ph.D.

COFFEY,

Professor of

S. A.

and

ETHICS,

by
(Louvain)

Ireland
at Majnooth College,
Philosophy

VOL.
NATURAL

O.S.B., M.A.

PARKER,

II

THEOLOGY
HISTORY

WITH

LOGIC,

(THEODICY),
OF

FACSIMILE

PHILOSOPHY

LETTER

LONDON

KEGAN

PAUL,

TRENCH,
ST. Louis

TRUBNER
:

B.

1917

HERDER

"

CO,

LTD.

obstat

Nihil

J.

Imprimi
E.

Almond,

Cuthbertus

potest

Butler,

Cuthbertus

die

obstat
C.

deputaius.

Can

Vic.

Surmont

Gen.

Westmonasterii,

second

7-

Edm

This

19*

S.T.D.

Imprimatur

OJ

Junii,

O.S.B.

Schut,
Censor

Italian

Angl.

Congr.

Prases

Abbas

Nihil

O.S.B.

this,

work

(two

Jour

editions)

translation

Italian.

die

has

Proj.

24

editions

French
and
been
de

Septembris,

Wutj

have

already

been

published,

well

as

as

translations.

Spanish
made

1917.

from
has

the

fourth

amplified
iv

the

French

History,

edition,
and

with
has

read

the

aid
the

of the

proofs.

CONTENTS

THE

OF

VOL.
Prefatory
Preface

letter

to the

GENERAL

from

Cardinal

Mercier

Edition

English

INTRODUCTION
Cardinal

by

P.

by
TO

MANUAL

I.
to

the

Coffey,

Translators

Ph.D.

PHILOSOPHY

Mercier

(A Theory

COSMOLOGY

by

D.

Nys, S.T.B.,

Ph.D.

(A Theory of Organic Being)

PSYCHOLOGY
Mercier

Cardinal

by
CRITERIOLOGY

by

of Inorganic Being)

(A
Cardinal

Theory

Mercier

of

'

Thought-Being

'

Certitude)

or

METAPHYSICS

GENERAL

ONTOLOGY

OR

by

(A Theory

Cardinal

THEOLOGY

by

Cardinal

OR

THEODICY

(A Theory of

Ph.D.

Arendt,

SPECIAL

of Right Thinking)

(A Theory

of Right Living)

(based

upon

Cardinal

Mercier's

Notes)

ETHICS

by J. Halleux,
OF

by

(A Theory

ETHICS

A.

HISTORY

Being]

Mercier

ETHICS

by

First

Mercier

Cardinal

GENERAL

General)

II.

LOGIC

by

in

Mercier

VOL.
NATURAL

of Being

de

M.

Ph.D.

(Other Theories)

PHILOSOPHY

Wulf,

Synopsis

in the

Glossary

of Scholastic

form

Ph.D.,
of the

LL.D.,

J.U.D.

Principal

Terms,

by

G.

Theses

Simons,

Ph.D.

Index.
ILLUSTRATIONS.
of

Portrait

His

Eminence

Cardinal

Mercier, from

photograph

Five

Physiological

Facsimile

of

by

Pardon
I.

Frontispiece,Vol.

Brussels

Letter

Vol.

Plates
from

Cardinal

Mercier
V

I.

To

face

pp.

331-330.

Frontispiece,Vol.

II.

Volume

of

AnalyticalContents

II
PAGE

NATURAL
INTRODUCTION

of

Meaning

branches

the

among
treatise

THEOLOGY

(3)

natural

of

place
of

"

...

The
CHAP.

I.

the

PART

The

Its

theology
(i)"
(2) Division

philosophy

Existence
OF

IDEA

God

of
THE

DIVINE

BEING

idea
Infinite
God
idea
of an
of a
(4) The
Supreme
Being,
of the
moral
superior to the world, the guardian
order, is an
idea
of absolutely simple perfection ; and
is therefore
sufficient
natural
to provide
a
theology with
object (5) Triple
proper
"

"

of

process
A

neither

process

CHAP.
ART.

I.

fallacious

and

useless

nor

THE

II.

CRITICAL

OPPOSED
General

elimination

attribution,

sketch

THE

(7)

EXISTENCE
OF

PROOF

GOD

THE

GOD'S

OF

(6)"

....

OF

EXAMINATION

TO

transcendence

DOCTRINES
EXISTENCE

and
of
(8) Positivism
agnosticism
(9) Criticism
Criticism
of Comte's
Law
of the
agnostic position (10)
Three
the
it produces
Stages and
agnostic mentality
(n)
Criticism
of traditionalism
Criticism
of ontologism
(12)
(13)
Criticism
of
the
New
of
Examination
Philosophy
(14)
the religion of Sentiment
(15)
"

"

the

"

"

"

'

'

"

ART.
I.

"

II.

THE

THE

ONTOLOGICAL

ST.

OF

ARGUMENT

Criticism
II.

PROOFS

(18)

AUGUSTINE'S

ST.

OF
.

ARGUMENT

ESSENCES

THE

ANSELM

FROM

Statement

EXISTENCE

of

the

GOD

Statement
.

(17)
.

KNOWLEDGE

OUR

criticism

and

OF

"

.29

POSSIBLE

OF

(19)

argument

III.

PROOFS

OF

Thomas's

EXISTENCE

THE

OF

proofs
(21)

GOD

General

statement

of

32

St.

drawn
from
(20)
Argument
metaphysical
this
Objections
against
argument
(22)
drawn
from
efficient
Argument
causality
(23)
Argument
drawn
from
the
of
contingency
Conclusion
beings
(24)
to these
three
common
A
proofs (25)
corollary (26)
Argu
ment
drawn
from
the
of
in
manifested
grades
perfection
drawn
from
the
beings (27) Argument
order
of the
universe
A
note
Scientific
(28)" Corollaries
(29)
(30)
proofs for the
existence
of
God
Proof
from
the
consent
(31)
of
common
mankind
Proof
from
the
(32)
higher aspirations of mankind
Proof
from
drawn
moral
(33)
obligations (34)
movement

15

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

...

vi

35

ANALYTICAL

CONTENTS

vii

PAGE

The
CHAP.

II

Nature

of

God

METAPHYSICAL

THE

I.

PART

ESSENCE

GOD

OF

of the question
metaphysical essence
(35) Solution
Proof
of St. Thomas's
subsistens
ipsum esse
(36)
of
the
Criticism
opinion (37)
opinions opposed to St. Thomas's
thesis (38)
of

Meaning
'

Deus

"

'

est

"

"

60

...

CHAP.

INTIMATELY

IDEAS

II.

OF

THAT
I.

OF

WITH

GOD

GOD
OF
:
Meanings of simplicity(40)
absolutely simple (41) Corollaries (42)

SIMPLICITY
is

II.

CONNECTED

ESSENCE

THE

INFINITE
is

Proof

"

that

God

.65

"

PERFECTION

GOD

OF

Meaning of

perfection(43)

I. God

"

meaning (44) and proof (45) II.

Himself
all the
perfections belonging to His
is infinite in perfection:
Corollary (47) God
and proofs (49) Objections (50)
perfect :

God

"

unites

in

works

(46)
meaning (48)

"

"

69

"

III. IMMENSITY
IV.

ABSOLUTE

V.

ETERNITY

VI.

GOD

OF

Meaning (51) and proof (52)

IMMUTABILITY
GOD

OF

UNICITY

GOD

OF

GOD

OF

Meaning

(54) and

Meaning

Proof

God

that

is

PART

The
Nature

and

action

(57)
"

CHAP.

I.

Intellectual

79

....

proof (53)

proof (55)
a

84
86

....

unique being (56)

88

III

Activity

of God

and

Life

of

God

in God

THOUGHT

(58)

91

....

GOD

IN

life of God
(59) God's knowledge is the actual com
all things actual
knows
prehension of His nature
(60) God
and
possible (61) The divine ideas (62) The objects of the
divine knowledge (63) God
possesses a knowledge of possible
God
the
things (64)
knowledge of vision
(65)
possesses
in which
Manner
the object of His
God
knows
knowledge of
that
of His
simple intelligence (66), and
knowledge of
vision
(67) The difficult question of divine foreknowledge
and
the freedom
of the creature
(68)
"

"

"

"

"

'

'

"

"

'

'

'

'

"

CHAP.

II.

WILL

IN

93

GOD

Meaning (69)

Proof
that in God
formal
there is a will (70) The
object of the will of God is the goodness of the divine essence
be a
(71) Whatever
participatesin the divine goodness can
the
loves
secondary object of the will of God
(72) God
goodness of His essence
necessarilyand the goodness of created
and immutability of God
things freely (73) Freedom
(74)
of God
and
Goodness,
justice,liberality,
(75) The
mercy
omnipotence of God (76)
"

"

"

"

"

"

"

....

108

CONTENTS

ANALYTICAL

viii

PAGE

CHAP.
works

The
I.

CREATION

created

by

neither

refutation

III.

THE

(77)

of

God
;

part

nor

OF

"3

"

(78) Historical theories concerning

has been
world
(79) The world
The
world
is
refutation
of dualism
(80)
"

the

to

"

"

emanation

an

(81)"

of
alone

God

divine

the

(82)

created

"

Substance

create

can

Meaning (83) Everything

by God (84)

GOD

of creation

of monism

has

;
.113

of

need

conserved

DIVINE

GOVERNMENT

Universal

Providence

providence

providence and
sovereignty of
government of
CONCLUSION

'

Extra

God

CONSERVATION

being

ad

Meaning

relation

the

II.

'

of God

WORK

THE

III.

God

and

the

God

of

universal

are

free-will

the

and

(85)"
"

government
God

government

and

particularprovidence (86)

and

(87)
(88)
"

of creatures

"

of evil in the

presence

world

The
The
The

(89)

121

J32

......""""""

LOGIC

INTRODUCTION

:
"

Final

Definition

logic (i) Material

psychology and

of

Difference

(2, 3)

causes

logic (4)"
metaphysics and logic
art
an
(7) Divisions of

between
(5) Difference
and
practical science

cause

"

(6)" Logic
logic (8)

formal

and

"

between

"

.135

CHAP.

EFFICIENT

THE

I.

CAUSE

of intellectual
Principles and nature
fundamentally identical, although
and
reasoning made
possible by
concepts (n)

LOGICAL

OF
acts

Intellectual

(9)
"

manifold
the

ORDER

(10)

abstract

acts

Judgment

"

character

of
"

CHAP.

MATERIAL

THE

II.

ART.
I. THE

CAUSE

OF

LOGICAL

ORDER

CONCEPTS

I.

The
CONCEPT
THE
:
concept in
QUALITIES OF
with
to
it (14)
in
regard
logic (13)" Questions arising
logic
The
categories or logicalpredicaments (15) The predicables
(Z6) Comprehension and extension of concepts (17) Subor
dination
of ideas in respect of extension
(18) Comparison of
of identity and
ideas in respect of comprehension : Relations
opposition (19)

OBJECT

I4I

AND

"

"

"

"

"

...

"

II. DIVISION

CONCEPTS
OF
:
Principles of division (20) ; I.
according to content
(21) ; II. According to their
of representing their
object (22) ; III. According
of their formation
manner
(23)
II.

ART.
I.

THE

OBJECT

(24)
II. DIVISION

OF

QUALITIES

AND

The

"

ten

TERMS

parts
(26)

...

of

OF

THE

*44

Divided
manner

to

the
.152

TERMS
TERM

speech (25)

The

object of

the term
154

.156

ANALYTICAL

CONTENTS

ix

PAGE

CHAP.

III.

ART.
I. THE

I.

OF

"

"

i.

OF

AND

AND
JUDGMENT
judgment and

of the

JUDGMENT

OF

CAUSE

JUDGMENT

THE

Place

(28)

FORMAL

THE

MEANING

II. KINDS

THE

THE

ORDER

PROPOSITION

PROPOSITION

THE

Definition

proposition in thought (29)

PROPOSITION

AND

LOGICAL

157

"

of Simple Propositions : I. Division

Classification
according to
matter
Two
kinds
of
in
matter
(31)
judgment
(32)
necessary
Other
nomenclature
according to form
(33) II. Division
of
the
(34) Import
predicate of proposition (35) III.
Division
according
according to quantity (36) IV. Division
to quality (37)
159
of complex
Classificationof Compound
Propositions: Division
propositions (38)
164
"

"

"

"

"

"

"

2.

III.

RELATIONS

PROPOSITIONS
(39) Equivalence (40)
(41) Opposition and subordination
(42) Rules
concerning the truth and falsityof opposed propositions (43)
and
of subordinate
inferences
propositions (44) Immediate
(45)
BETWEEN

"

"

Conversion

"

"

"

ART.
I. NATURE

II.

165

REASONING

REASONING
OF
SYLLOGISM
of reasoning
AND
OF
THE
: Nature
and
(47) The
syllogism and its terminology (48) Nature
of the necessity of
logicalbasis of the syllogism (49) Nature
syllogisticprinciples (50) Logical first principles (51)
moods
of
the
of
the
Figures and
syllogism (52) Rules
syllogism (53) The rules of the syllogism and truth (54)
"

"

"

"

"

"

"

II. VARIOUS

"

i.

KINDS

SYLLOGISM

OF

Basis

of classification

(55)

170

.178

Classification
of Syllogisms accordingto their Form
(56) : Varieties
of the
and
rules of the
categorical syllogism (57) Nature
hypothetical syllogism (58) Conjunctive and
disjunctive
syllogisms(59) The exclusive syllogism (60) The dilemma
(61)

Classificationof Syllogisms according to

syllogism and its truth- value (62)

182

"

"

"

"

2.

DIFFERENT

KINDS

into

"

OF

certain

DEMONSTRATION

their

Matter

I. Fundamental

79

The

division

strictlyscientific demonstration
(63) Con
(64) Proof of fact and causal demon
stration (65) II. A prioriand a posterioridemonstrations
(66)
III. Circular
or
regressive demonstration
(67) IV. Other
accidental
forms
of demonstration
.183
(68)
PROBABLE
ARGUMENTS
from
(69) : I. Arguments
analogy
(i)
or
enthymeme,
(2) analogical induction
analogy, (3)example
186
(70) II. Hypothesis (92) III. Argument from authority (71)
ERRONEOUS
ARGUMENT
FALLACIES
AND
(74),
(73) : Of induction
and of deduction
187
(75)
ditions

of

and

the

"

latter

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

ART.

Knowledge
I. FACTORS

IN

III.

system

THE

...

SCIENTIFIC

SYSTEMATIZATION

(76) Systematization
"

SYSTEMATIZATION

OF

of

knowledge (77)

our

KNOWLEDGE

I. Definition

(78) Kinds of definition (79) Definition formed

by analysis,
or
by analysis and synthesis combined
(80) Rules for defini
tion (81) II. Division, the necessary
concomitant
of definition
(82) Rules for division (83)
.192
"

"

"

"

"

...

191

CONTENTS

ANALYTICAL

PAGE

II. METHOD

Synthetic method
sciences
of
the
(86) Stages of
experimental
(85) ii Method
induction
Methods
of
inductive
the
(88)
(87)
process
induction
of
induction
of
(90)
grounds
Logical
Object
(89)
Induction
and the syllogism (91) Statistics and induction
(92)
of philosophy
method
III. Analytico-synthetic
(93) Method
J96
(94)
I.

(84)

scientific methods

Diversity of

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

CHAP.

Logic

THE

IV.

attainment

the

and

science

(96)

of

(95) Definition

knowledge

of scientific

ORDER

LOGICAL

OF

CAUSE

FINAL

"

204

..........

ETHICS
The
:
object of
specialethics (2)

INTRODUCTION
ethics

and

CHAP.

209

I.

PRELIMINARY

NOTIONS

LAST

END

Good

and

Nature

and

Evil

END

OF

natural

tendencies

MAN
; the

end
Kinds

(5)
"

good (4)
end
(6)
"

of

"

211

NATURE

HUMAN

OF

NATURAL

Diversity of natural
Kinds
of good (7)
II. THE

Ethics

of

THE

I.

general

General

Theory

"

.......

PART

of

(i) Meaning

ethics

subjectively and

has

I. Man

reallya last natural end (8) II. Man has only one natural end
(9) III. Regarded indeterminately and in the abstract, it is
his happiness (10) IV. Regarded in the concrete, the objective
end is not in any thing created, but it is in God
(11) V. Man
enters
into possessionof his happiness by an act of his intellect
is realized
(12) VI. Subjective beatitude
by an act of the
intellect
and
Corollaries
speculative
(13)
(14) Summary
conclusion
in
Beatitude
the
A
(15)
present
difficulty(16)
life (17); Conditions
for the realization
of happiness (18) A
difficulty(19) Accidental
qualities of happiness (20) The
end of man
is a supernatural end (21) No contradiction
in the
conception of a natural happiness (22)
.214
"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

CHAP.
I.

MEANING

PROOFS

AND

liberty (24)
INFLUENCE

OF

"

nature

and

influence

OF

of free-will

PASSIONS

THE

question (26)

of material

of external

the

causes

causes

Meaning

of
224

WILL

Statement

influence
on

on

WILL

THE

(25)

FREE-

ON

of

Extent

FREE-WILL

FREEDOM

OF

Proofs

"

II.

II.

of

free-will

free-will

(27)
(28)
"

of

the

sensitive

man's
Nature

of the
225

....

CHAP.
I. MORAL

GOOD

good

moral

or

evil

THE

MORAL

real, intrinsic

ORDER
distinction

Distinction

between

moral

between

goodness
explained ultimately by
influence (31)
divine extrinsic,positive

of

badness
human

EVIL

AND

and

III.

human

(30)
"

actions

not

and
any
.

229

CONTENTS

ANALYTICAL

xi
PAGE

FOUNDATION

II.

DISTINCTION

THE

OF

GOOD

MORAL

BETWEEN

AND

conformity or non-conformity of actions

of
end
(32) Corollary (33) Sources
supreme
social well-being the
individual
nor
morality (34) Neither
worth
of moral
measure
(35) Criticism of individualistic (36)
of
of
social
utilitarianism
and
Spencer's
(37) Criticism
and
evolutionist theory (38) Sociological
pragmatist theories
(39)
EVIL

natural

The

with

our

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

III. THE

LAW

MORAL
eternal

subject to a natural
of
(41) Nature
(43),namely, in human

natural

and

law

IV.

MORAL

V.

THE

"

moral

"

(42),and basis of it
reason
ultimately in the practical

(40) The
obligation
(44) and

law

is

Man

law

nature

of Providence

(45)

240

CRITERION

SUBJECTIVE

MORALITY

OF

Moral

distinct

from

of

natural

the

VI.

THE

of

able

VII.

doctrine

(54)
"

first commandment
be

must

done

after

of the

of

the

evil

and

Kantian

demanded

"

trial

of

happiness

of

of merit

law

of

Basis

the

duty (55)

his

conclusion
244

....

ORDER

MORAL

THE

(57),and

The

unreason

of moral

principles and

OF

moral

"

upon

is not

categoricalimperative (56)

the

(53)

positive pain

doctrine

(51)
reward

Eternal

(52)

time

of

loss of

Kantian

the

sanction

Some

infliction

CHARACTERISTICS

NATURAL
teristics

life insufficient

eternal

to

Outline
the

Notion

LAW

of

in addition

concerning

the

moral

Charac

act

(58)
"

(59)
(60)
any
? (61)
Good
and
(62) The good
Duty
the supreme
end
(63) Degrees of goodness or of wicked
in human
acts
(64) Pessimistic
Morality (65) Indepen
Morality (66) Secular or Lay Morality (67)

morally
ness

MORAL

present
punishment

of

dent

accumulated

241

Criticism

and

'

sense

"

and

practicalreason,
law, is that good

the

eternal

Christian

"

No

"

adequate explanation (49)

no

the

THE

OF

"Those

sinner

race's

the

and

(48)

(50)

SANCTION

or

intellect

utilityoffer

principleof

avoided

the
of

experiences
First

'

postulate

to

evil

and

good

of our
practical reason
'
instinct ' or
moral
moral
a

distinguishedby judgments
need

"

of merit

'

indifferent

"

'

there

Are

'

acts

'

"

"

"

"

"

"

CHAP.

Meaning

of

conscience

conscience

IV.

Directive

(68)
"

(69)

and

249

of

obligatory powers

.239

II

Special Ethics :
Theory of Right and

CONSCIENCE

PART

INTRODUCTION

Duty

Definition
of natural
law
:
(70) Its distinctive
of natural
law to positive law (72)
(71) Relation
Corollary (73) Originof rights(74) Kinds of right (75)
"

character

"

"

"

CHAP.
I. RESPECT

236

(46, 47)

VIRTUES

231

OF

Lawful

HUMAN

"

I.

RIGHTS

LIFE

self-defence

OF

THE

Foundation

(77)

....

263

INDIVIDUAL
of

the

right

to live

(76)
"

.270

ANALYTICAL

xii

CONTENTS
PAGE

right to work
(78) Liberty to choose
of
a
opinion (80) Liberty of con
profession (79) Liberty
science (81)

II. RESPECT

LIBERTY

OF

The

"

"

"

272

.........

: Definition
(82) Limits of ownership (83)
right of ownership (84) Ownership founded on
social conventions
and on
legislation(85) Ownership founded
labour
The
from
on
man's
(86)
right of ownership derived
nature
Outline
and
criticism
of
the
doctrine
of
(87)
(88)
(89)
therefrom
and
conclusion
communism,
(90) Outline
(91)
criticism
and
of collectivism
(92) of the doctrine
Reply to
objections brought against the capitalistic
regime (93) Titles
to
property : I. Occupancy
(94) ; II. Prescription (95) ;
III. The rightto make
The rightof inheritance
a will ; IV.
(97)
279

III. RESPECT

PROPERTY

OF

Basis

"

"

of the

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

CHAP.
I.

II.

PURPOSE

RIGHTS

OF

the

OF

THE

INSTITUTION

THE

OF

MARRIAGE

OF

of the

good

MEMBERS
:

Second

(99)

THE

First end
end

FAMILY

of

marriage

of

spouses
marriage : the
of children
their education
and
(100) Education
procreation
is physical, intellectual, moral
and
religious(101) Corollary
"

"

"

(102)
II.

PERPETUITY

III. THE

FAMILY
the

AND

State

GENERAL

II.

PANTHEISTIC

III. THE
IV.

THE

STATE

THE

THE

VI.

THE

Principle(103)
"

Relations

THE

between

OF

SOCIAL

OF

THEORY

OF

OF

STATE

THE

THE

CHRISTIAN

CONTRACT

ORGANISM
OF

THE

STATE

THE

"

The

Philosophy
"

the

systems

philosophy

of
of

Brahmanas
the

China

in

society (115)
Authority (117)

of

"

"

335

of the

India
of
and

the

PHILOSOPHY

and

utilityof
(3)

the

treatise

341

later Sanskrit

(8)

of

Nature

of

Philosophy (4) Hymns

328
333

OF

Division

PART

of

Con

of civil

HISTORY

Philosophy (2)

The

the

328

(113)

Introductory (i)" Meaning

of

(108)

"

INTRODUCTION:

RIGHT

Interpretations of

"

OF

325

....

CONCEPTION

OUTLINES

and

....

DIVINE

and foundation
(114) Nature
Origin of Authority (116) The
role
Limits
of sovereignty (118)

losophy

family

32

STATE

(107)

POSITIVE

OF

SOCIAL

THE

dividual

Indian

the

(104)

325

INSTITUTION

AN

History

Divorce

(106)

THEORY

THEORY

RIGHTS

tract-Theory (109-112)
V.

323

III.

NOTIONS

STATE

BOND

(105)

CHAP.
I.

MARRIAGE

THE

OF

316

the
of
or
.

and

China

Rigveda (5) The

the
Upanishads

Phi

"

Hindu
.

period
.

(6)"

(7)
"

The
-343

xiii

CONTENTS

ANALYTICAL

PAGE

PART

Philosophy

Greek
Periods

of

Greek

II

philosophy (9)
I.

CHAP.

PHILOSOPHY

PRE-SOCRATIC

Characteristics
schools
group

CHAP.

and
subdivision
(10) First
(n)
Pythagoras (12) School
of pre-Socratic schools
(14) The
"

"

"

GREEK

PHILOSOPHY

pre-Socratic

of
group
of Elea

(13)
Sophists (15)

"

II.

345

....

FROM

"

Second
.

346

TO

SOCRATES

ARISTOTLE
I. SOCRATES

Characteristics

"

II. PLATO

Life

of

Greek

"

Ethics

"

ARISTOTLE

Life

"

Ideas

Aesthetics

and

(19) Physics
.350
(22)
"

character

(26)

ality (27) Physics (28) Psychology (29)

Ethics

"

"

III.

"

FROM

RISE
General

THE

OF

Stoic

(39)
"

End

"

of

division

Greek

features

(36) Systems
"

fifth

and

century

Plotinus

philosophy (40)

PART

remarks

"

III

(41) Patristic philosophy during

of the
Augustine (43) Writers
Pseudo-Dionysius (44)
"

lastic

"

369

IV

Philosophy

the philosophy of the Middle

on
Ages
philosophy (45) Division of the philosophy of
Ages (46)

General

363

"

(42)

Mediaeval

leading up to neo(38) Porphyry

...

St.

"

Nemesius

LEADING

Philosophy

division

centuries

IT

Neo-Platonism

Patristic

first three

SYSTEMS

AND
TO

PART

General

"

and

(37)

THE

TO

"

UP
character

352

School

NEO-PLATONISM

Platonism

third
of the
(31) Schools
(32), Epicurean School,
and
Sceptic Schools (33) Eclecticism (34)
neo-Pyrrhonic School (35)
-359

Peripatetic School
Scepticism of the

General

SCHOOL

division

and

"

IV.

Actu

(30)

ARISTOTLE

OF

NEO-PLATONIC

centuries

second

CHAP.

DEATH

THE

characteristics

and

"

his

of

Pure

"

"

division

and

philosophy (24) Logic (25) Metaphysics

CHAP.

349

General

(23)

of the

Theory

or

(20) Psychology (21)

"

III.

period

......

Dialectic

(18)

this

philosophy during
(17)

of Socrates

(16) Philosophy

and

Scho

the Middle

375

CONTENTS

ANALYTICAL

xiv

PAGE

CHAP.

FIRST

I.

PERIOD

MEDIAEVAL

PHILOSOPHY

PHILOSOPHY

WESTERN

I.

ART.

OF

characteristics
of Scholasticism
Main
VIEW
:
during this
period (47)" Organization of philosophical schools
(48)
Philosophical literature (49) Division of this period (50)

I. GENERAL

"

"

II.

WESTERN

PHILOSOPHY

TURIES

"

TENTH,

NINTH,

IN

ELEVENTH

AND

CEN

"

Philosophy : The
question of Universals
(51)
(52)
Non-Scholastic
Philosophy : John Scotus Eriugena (53)
Philosophy and TheologicalControversies (54)
"

St.

Anselm

" 2.
" 3.

382

.384
.385

III. WESTERN

"

379

Scholastic

i.

PHILOSOPHY

IN

CENTURY

TWELFTH

Scholastic

"

Philosophy : Realism
formulae
(55) Anti- Realist
of
Moderate
Realism
(57) The dawn
(58)
of Salisbury (59) Alan
of Lille
of St.(60) Hugh
Victor
."....
(61)
385
Non-Scholastic
Philosophies (62)
.389
The
Theological Movement
of the Twelfth Century : Schools
of
Scholastic
Theology (63) Mystic schools (64)
389

i.

"

Abelard

(56)
John
"

"

"

"

"

" 2.
" 3.

"

....

ART.

II.

Philosophy

BYZANTINE

AND

the

among

Philosophy among

CHAP.

II.

Armenians,
the

MEDIAEVAL

Arabs

(68)

survey

I.
II.

GENERAL

PERIPATETICISM
Albert

IV.

CONFLICT

Great

Paris
V.

JOHN

VI.

LOGICIANS
tive

Latin

III.

Averrojsm

393

(72)"

Alexander

.394

of Hales

(73)
.400

GREAT

THE

AND

THE

of

ST.

AND

THOMAS

Aquinas (76)
OLDER

Thomism

"

.403

SCHOLASTICISM

(77)
"

Eclectics

"

of

4o6

(79)

grammarians

ART.

(69)

(74)

GRAMMARIANS

AND

THIRTEENTH

synthesis (71).

Its precursors

supporters

SCOTUS

391

PHILOSOPHIES

Scholastic

THOMISM
and

"

THE

of this renaissance

University (78)

DUNS

IN

(75)" St. Thomas

BETWEEN

Adversaries

Syrians (66)

GENERAL

ALBERT

OF

the

The

and

Jews (67)

SCHOLASTIC

(70)"

SCHOLASTICISM
St. Bonaventure

"

III.

II.

VIEW

OLDER

Causes

"

ART.

I.

PHILOSOPHY

Persians
and

PHILOSOPHY
CENTURY
ART.

General

ORIENTAL

(80)

Petrus

Hispanus

and

the

NON-SCHOLASTIC

(81)" Sigerof Brabant

specula

.408

......

PHILOSOPHERS

(82)

ANALYTICAL

IV.

ART.
Neo-Platonic

MINOR

(84)

CHAP.

III.

MEDIAEVAL

I.

SCHOLASTIC
The

(86)

fifteenth
NON-SCHOLASTIC

School

III.

PHILOSOPHIES

CURRENTS

MINOR

(95)
Nicholas

"

IV.

General
I.

sketch

division

OF

The
and
-413

(94) Develop
"

Eckhart

(97)

THE

"

Master

(91)

.416

and

German

.418

RENAISSANCE

PERIOD

(98)

419

PHILOSOPHIES

NEW

of Cusa

PHILOSOPHIES

Averroism

PHILOSOPHY

OF

Mysticism (96)
CHAP.

Ockham-

fourteenth

the

Latin

"

The

Thomism

"

413

philosophy (87)
"

of

(88)

(90)

"

of Ockhamism

ment

THE

THE

of Ockham

II.

of Scholastic

(92) Mysticism
(94)

centuries

OF

Decline

Scotist

(89)" The
Aegidian School

HALF

School; William

ites

Roger

CENTURY

DURING

FIRST

PHILOSOPHY

Terminist

410

PHILOSOPHY
AND

FIFTEENTH
outline

direction

"

FOURTEENTH

General

CURRENTS

(83) Experimental
Lully (85)

Raymond

"

xv

PHILOSOPHICAL

direction

Bacon

CONTENTS

OF

RENAISSANCE

THE

Revival

of

General

features

and

the

systems of antiquity (100)

The
naturalistic
movement
and
social
law
(101) Natural
(102) Protestant
philosophy and
mysticism (103) Theism
the philosophy of religion(104) Scepticism (105)
or
(99)
"

"

"

"

"

"

II.

SCHOLASTIC

PHILOSOPHY

schools

General

(107)

Spanish

ings between
century (109)

Scholastics

"

CHAP.

I.

Outline

(in)

I.

DESCARTES

II.

CARTESIANISM

MODERN

(no)

"

CENTURIES

IN

431

KANT

General

sketch

"

"

The

(126)

PHILOSOPHY

sketch

(128)

(130)

Ethics

"

(127)
IN

THE

Leibniz

(115) Mysticism
"

(118)

"

(124)

Reaction

"

(125)
"

435

EIGHTEENTH

AND

School

School

Thomas

(119)

earlier

The

Associationist
Hume

Scottish

Deism

"

432

CENTURY
Occasionalism

SEVENTEENTH

THE

John Locke
(121) The
Berkeley (123) David

"

BEFORE

SEVENTEENTH

THE

PHILOSOPHY

FRENCH

(112, 113)

BACON

"

IV.

432
FRANCIS

"

Law

Seventeenth

PHILOSOPHY

OF

tionalism

the

Philosophy

division

and

AND

ENGLISH

in

426

disciplesof Descartes
(114)
Spinoza (117)
(116) Baruch
III.

"

scientists

and

Modern
character

420

Scholastic
(106) Ancient
(108) Misunderstand

Scholasticism

PART

General

"

Hobbes

(120)
(122) George
against sensa
"

"

Ethics

and

Natural
439

.......

EIGHTEENTH

CENTURY

General

Speculative sensism (129) Religiousphilosophy

law
(132)
(131) Natural
"

"

....

446

CONTENTS

ANALYTICAL

xvi

PAGE

V.

PHILOSOPHY

GERMAN

KANT)

philosophy

The

"

Wolff

and

(138)

The
of

(133)

"

(135)
history
Philosophy

"

in

Wolff

(141)
Faculty

Reason
The
Critique of Pure
(140)
philosophy
Reason
(142)" Critique of the
Critique of Practical
Sentiment
or
(143)
Judgment

"

"

PHILOSOPHY

GERMAN

PHILOSOPHY
HALF

FIRST

THE

DURING

454

...

POST-KANTIAN

III.

CHAP.

OF

NINETEENTH

THE

immediate
The
disciples and
(144)
Idealism
Fichte
Critical
of
Kant
(146)
(145)
opponents
idealism
and
(149)"
logical
Schelling
(148)" Hegel
(147)
Realism
Critical
The
Schopenhauer
(151)
(150)
Hegelians
School
The
Herbart
Psychological
(154)
(153)
(152)
CENTURY

General

449

KANT

I.

"

OF

PHILOSOPHY

THE

of

philosophy

Reaction
(137)
popular form

of

(LEIBNIZ
(134)
sentiment
(136)
against Leibniz
(139)
TO

of

school

The

"

The

"

II.

CHAP.

Critical

sketch

school

aesthetic

The

THE

IN

General

CENTURY

EIGHTEENTH

sketch

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

II.

FRENCH
THE

tic

FROM

CENTURY

sensualism

New
ENGLISH

ITALIAN

of

PHILOSOPHY

IN

The
(161)
positivism
SPANISH

AND

Philosophy

of

in

(163)

PHILOSOPHY

school

(157)
(159)
"

CENTURY

(164)

Philosophy

(162)

"

476

....

in

Italy

(165)

"

480

(166)

Spain

471

General

Associationism

School;

OF

461

Materialis

"

Positivism

"

Evolutionism

"

(155)
Eclectic

the

(158)

NINETEENTH

THE

Scottish

"

English
IV.

"

MIDDLE

THE

TO

sketch

General

and

phases

sketch

REVOLUTION

THE

Spiritualism
ontologism
positivism (160)

(156)

Traditionalism

"

III.

PHILOSOPHY
NINETEENTH

APPENDIX

Philosophy

Contemporary
Favourite

(167)
problems
philosophy

Scholastic

SYNOPSIS

IN

DOCTRINES
GLOSSARY

INDEX

THE

FORM
MAINTAINED

OF

PHILOSOPHIC

"

Tendencies

and

systems

(168)

"

THESES

OF
IN

TERMS

Neo-

481

(169)

THE

STATING

THE

MANUAL
....

PRINCIPAL

488
5"5

528

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

OR

THEODICY

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

philosophy. Speculative
(2)what oughtto be this is practical
of
the
nature
movement, of quantity,
philosophyinvestigates
the treatises that correspond,
have
Hence
of substance.
we
namely,physics,mathematics and metaphysics.
If we ask what is the placeof natural theologyin speculative
philosophy,we find that it belongs both to physicsand to
proof
metaphysics, (i)To physics,because the fundamental
"

of the existence

consideration

in the

see,

of the First

is to be

Being

of movement

found,
the

or

as

we

shall

transition from

observe it in the thingsthat

to actuality,
as
we
potentiality
the particular
within our experience
was
come
; and movement
of the physicsof the ancients.
(2)To meta
subject-matter
is
because
the First Cause, the real existence of which
physics,
in no way needs
made
known
to us by the fact of movement,
the intervention of a beinganterior to itself for the explanation
of its existence and its activity
; for it has in itselfall the per

fections that constitute it.

It

to actuality
; or,
potentiality
terms

of the

admit

can

to

use

Scholastics,it is in

of

no

transition from

the concise and

no

expressive

moved, but it is the

sense

Unmoved.

Being does not admit of being other than it

of passing from
is, of the possibility
potency to actuality,
it is whollyand entirely
actual,actus purus ; and consequently
of materiality;in other
admits
neither of potentiality
nor
the
words, it is immaterial
(Gen. Metaphysics,123). Now
formal
objectof metaphysics,we saw
(3),is substance con
Since

the First

sidered

without

istics which

any

reference

to

change

or

to those

character

being as
investigates
It
immaterial
immobile.
negatively or
positivelyand
follows,then, that if we take the division of philosophyac
cordingto the ancients,natural theologyis not reallya distinct
branch of study : the existence of God is the ultimate
con
the
clusion,
highestflightof the study of physics,and the
of generalmetaphysics
study of His nature is an application
to a particular
being,the Being that is absolutelyperfect.
We conclude,then, that there is no special
science
philosophic
are

proper

to

matter

"

it

"

of God.

Moreover,
of its
we

to

distinct science would

requirea

formal

object

specialprinciples.Yet all the concepts that

form regardingGod
can
not
are
applicableexclusively
All our
Him, at least in regardto their positive
content.
own

and

INTRODUCTION

positive, proper
that

concepts
the

within

comes

whatever

immaterial

beings,

applications of

be
the

about

have

the

negative ones

around

its

call

Hence,

as

far

so

the

of

also

positiveis shared
has

theology

adequately
we

possess

finite and

by

formal

no

imper

contingent

and

notions

the

them

the

and

are

origin

make
all

finite

the

may

God

concepts

them

from

we

to

and

proportionately

object

to

own.

the

principles

which

from

fundamental

the

are

different

between

the

from

analysis of

the

and

where

can

be

is

there

the

no

For,

relations

that

which

formal

object

formal

study
the

it to

are

principles

of

establishes

in

science

of the

out

drawn

previously

object special to
to

sets

mind

the

it has

concepts

principles peculiar

no

this

God.

applicable exclusively to

science

and

of

from

analogical.

best

at

only

drawn

knowledge

world

content

it is

as

natural

beings,

Again,
not

particular, can

extension

of

knowledge

in

material

can

material

human

which

God

being

be

characteristic

concerning

previously

all the

by eliminating

are

represents.
about

have

the

the

in

God,

to

that

beings

in

and

us,

form

we

God

we

down

limit

we

ally apprehended
fections

notions

apply solely to spiritualbeings

we

applicable

concepts

world

material

experience (Psychology, 90).

our

concerning

immaterial

an

ideas

The

and

world

material

of

scope

the

from

drawn

are

positive

Therefore

question

science, there

the

it

constitute

special

science.
Natural

physics
the

the

in

Cause,

study
3.

far

so

as

and

it is

to

of

of

physics
it is

metaphysical,

principles
existence

the

and

to

application

an

general metaphysics
is made

which

meta

known

the

to
to

of

us

by

of movement.
of

Division

existence
the

concepts

First

both

theology, then, belongs

of

God

activityof

correspond

the

Theology.

Natural
;

the

it

inquires

First

three

Cause.

chief

into
To

the

Theodicy

"

nature

these

parts of natural

three

of

proves

the

and

into

problems

there

God

theology.

PART

The

Before

attempting

first

define

which

is

first
the
"

with

part
one

the

what

the

be

of

Natural

existence

the

prove
to

are

we

to

dealing

to

by

of

proof.

Theology

of God.

the

idea

our

we

of

of

existence

understand

object

with

God

of

Existence

divide
the

divine

God

we

Sovereign

the

Accordingly
into

Being
this

chapters,

two

Being

must

the

other,

CHAPTER

IDEA

The

4.

God,

God

whether

in
in

next,

the

it ;

We

as

lastly,
of

races

find

instinctively
'

we

consciousness

and

in

Master
all

God

first

individual

;
to

serve

entertained

by

God
all

disposes

'

'

expressions

such

use

God

Thank

not,

or

'

'

God

only

that

belief

professing

reflection

any

that

implies
will

the

which

names

not.

or

is

regarded

things,

whose

groups

of

as

Supreme

the

wisdom

penetrates

things.

and

There

the

Elohim,
the

the

groups

either

Allah,

of

in

meaning

all4

of

upon
3.

hearkens

civilized

past

and

from

(e.g.
the

the

the

again,

De

present,

Being

agree
there

indicate

(El,

permanence,

self-same

when

the

dyut,

root

shining
who

in

one,

in

called

0"nro/"u, I invoke).

Quatrefages,

religious

peoples,

the
a

the

Sanskrit

the

heaven,
or

God

in both

universe

the

else

or

remains

petition (0"0'sfrom

savage
in

who

radiant

studied
and

group)

(Zev?

of

for

Semitic

the

that

shown

stand

that
Master

Supreme

group)
to

words

Being

Anthropologists
have

the

Semitic

change

Indo-Germanic

the

the

beam,

to

of

of

power

languages,

Philologists have

roots

immutability

midst

well-defined

two

are

Indo-Germanic.

the

these

the

This

whose

2.

who

the

whether

men,

knows

the

religious notions

the

without

to

religion

of

distinction,

it exists, in

as

with

mankind.

that

Would
'

revealed

know

may

spontaneous

and

different
1.

with

study

our

begin

without

men

original significationof

the

portray

God

of

it should

all

to

common

acquainted

are

notion

place,

is

amongst

if

but

methodical

be

is to

is found

perfection,

environment

infinite

an

"

every

Christian

that

they

This

in

theology

of

notion

Himself

of

notion

The

God.

Infinite

an

in

live

who

natural

the

of

possessing

those
of

Idea

BEING

DIVINE

THE

OF

conceptions

Lang,
of

Chantepie)
the

that

everywhere,

is to

be

found

the

various
both
idea

in
of

EXISTENCE

THE

OF

GOD

above
the order of mankind,
powerful divinities,
who
reward good and punish evil.
It is the philosopher's
task to ascertain whether this univer
from
a
sallyaccepted notion comes
purely anthropomorphic
mind
whether
there really
exists
or
tendency of the human
several beings which
one
or
correspond to it. Whatever

one

more

or

will be ex
the existence of God, which
may be said about
must
first establish the following
amined
in Chapter II, we

proposition.
5. The

Idea

the Guardian

of
of

the

Supreme
Moral

Perfection

Natural

Theology with

these

terms

and

Order,

; and

Simple

prove

is
a

Being, Superior
is

therefore

Idea

an

of

an

Sufficient

We

Proper Object.
"

the

to

Absolutely
to

have

World,

the

to

provide

explain

proposition.

idea of God is sufficiently

: An
our
argument
briefly
it comprisesan
characteristic of its objectwhen
absolutely
although the spontaneous idea of
simple perfection.Now
God we
does not contain the explicit
have described above
notion of the Infinite,nevertheless it comprisesseveral per
those of absolute
fections that are absolutely
simple,especially
of immutabilityin the midst of change, and of a
sovereignty,
being who is guardian of the moral order. An idea such as
this is sufficient to provide natural theology with
a
proper
formal object.
is this

Put

Perfections

are

of different kinds,

as

has

been

shown

in

distinguishbetween
Metaphysics (174, 175). We
mixed, simple and
absolutely**
simple perfections,(i) The
first kind formally contain an
imperfection,
e.g. the power
is the characteristic perfection
of man.
of reasoningwhich
is one
which
does not, by
(2)A simple perfection(simplex)
its very definition,
imply any imperfection,
yet at the same
of intelligence
time does not exclude it ; e.g. the perfection
of life. (3)By an absolutely
or
(simpliciter
simple perfection
whose
one
simplex)is meant
concept formally excludes all
of God
The perfections
belong to
imperfectionwhatsoever.
this third category. They are
characteristic of the divine
Being, since in them we can find neither trace of admixture
General

nor

of limitation.

Nevertheless, the

recognize in God
the result of

which
absolutelysimple perfections

either

from

spontaneous knowledge

philosophic
argumentationdo

not

contain

or

in

we
as

an

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

io

of this

is

of perfection.It
infinity
that

we

draw

from

these

perfection.The

eminent

Actuality is

of pure

nature

deduction

idea

concepts the

of

character

the
explicit
way
only by a further

contained

found

in them

first

infinite
in

an

implicit
way.
According

and

to Descartes

the

who
ontologists

follow him

is
and proper concepts of what
positive
of the Infinite. For, with them, the
immaterial, especially
notion of the Infinite is primordial
; arguing as they do that
finite bespeaks limitation, and that limitation is a
the idea
negative idea that entails a previousacquaintancewith the
positiveof which it is the denial : hence the idea of God is
In his
and proper one.
well as a positive
as
a primary idea
that it is by a
Descartes argues
Meditations metaphysiques,
way of limitation appliedto this primordialconcept we have
mind

the human

has

'

'

of the Infinite that

we

all finite

know

beings ; the

human

mind

primarilyconscious of the subsistent Infinite Being.

The truth
Descartes' theory of innate ideas is erroneous.
that the formal
in Psychology (90-97),
is, as we have seen
is abstract
which underlie
natures
objectof our intelligence
what
But none
of the notes that
we
perceiveby the senses.
be
can
formallybelong to the world perceivedby our senses
is

predicatedin the
Descartes

himself

same

sense

allows

of the divine

Being, which

and
is supersensible

even

infinite. Not

and proper notions of the mind

can
then, of the positive
be appliedas such to God, nor, in consequence,
can
they give
one,

natural

theology the formal object which it demands.

have but a negativeand analogicalknowledge of what

can

by

nature

We
is

spiritual.

is capable only of
of man
intelligence
It is clearly
forms.
receivingfinite intelligible
impossiblefor
form to represent the Infinite in a positive
any finite intelligible
Our finite intelligence,
and proper way.
then, cannot conceive
idea of the Infinite. The Beatific Vision,the promise
a proper
faith givesus of lifeeternal,cannot
be by means
of concepts. It
is not given to imperfect
beings such as we are to reach God by
the way
We
suggested by Descartes.
must, therefore, fall
back on the longeryet more
secure
way taught by the Scholastic

Again,

the

finite

system.
Kant
existence

was

aware

of

an

of

line of argument for establishing

the
Infinite God
which
proceeds first to assert
a

NATURAL

12

simple(5),or,

more

and the

aspects one
7. This

THEOLOGY

strictly,
they manifest to us under
absolute perfection.
same

Process

Fallacious

neither

is

be made

may

they

are

meaning

or

as

transcendence.

and

Useless.

nor

The

objection

the different notions of the divine

that

given

they

to

this method

by

us

and

concepts represent one

the

are

formalityor

same

essence

either without

for either these

erroneous

are

"

of this threefold process

is raised by the employment

difficulty

of attribution,elimination

different

different

else formali

In the first
quite different from one another.
; in the
hypothesisthere is no ground for any multiplicity
inasmuch
their
second hypothesis,
as
they lead us into error
ties that

are

which
is
cannot
represent the divine essence
multiplicity
above compositionof any kind.
This difficulty,
long ago put by Duns Scotus againstthe
teachingof St. Thomas, can be solved onlyby attendingto the
virtual incomplete
distinction that exists between
the different
that we
attribute to the divine Being. Let us
perfections
recall what has been said on the subjectof distinctions (General
48).
Metaphysics,
and these are either
Distinctions correspond
to compositions,
real or existing
onlyin the mind, (i)A compositionisreal when
quite independentlyof any consideration by the mind it
this thing and
of things; it exists between
impliesa plurality
that thing,inter rem
be a
et rem.
In order that there may
real

it is not at all necessary that the things,though

distinction,
distinct, be reallyseparable.By their very nature
they

be

incapableof existing
apart from one
they may be in realitydistinct,e.g. essence
thought and the facultyof thinking. (2) We
may

distinction

concepts
one
reason
same

when

of the

of pure
or

reason,

or

more

as

well

as

be either

the

reason

mind,

material

than
explicit

of pure
rational animal,

logical

logicaldistinction may
virtual one.
(a) It is one

are,

have

existence,
different

thing.

same

and

yet

several

in

rationis ratiocinantis when

formal

be
may
tinction

there

and

another

the

between

object,although
the

Thus

one

there

concepts of

(b)A logicaldistinction

tinctio rationis ratiocinatae when

concepts have

the two

other.

of

is virtual

pure
the

of them
is

and

man
or

dis

dis-

concepts have the same

material objectbut not the same
formal object
; they regardone
and the same
entity,but they view it under different aspects
the

distinct formalities

or

OF

EXISTENCE

THE

"

for

as,

GOD

example,

13

the

distinction be

of the soul. Further,

and the simplicity
spirituality
this logical
virtual distinction may be completeor incomplete
the formal objectof each of these distinct
when
(a)complete,
distinguish
concepts is realizable separately,
e.g. the rnind can
the

tween

"

in the

of the human

case

soul its intellectual,

its animal

and

distinct
when
each formally
vegetativelife; (p)incomplete
object implicitly
comprisesthe others.
the divine
With
these terms
defined, we recognizeamong
divine
incompletevirtual distinction. The
perfectionsan
be represented
to us by
which is simplein itself,
essence,
may
concepts which have a formallydistinct content ; nevertheless,
the formal objectwhich each of these concepts representscon
tains in an implicit
the objects
manner
represented
by the other
concepts. Moreover, the divine perfectionsare attributed
to an
infinite being ; each of them because it is infinite must
comprisethe others. The virtual distinction that we recognize
between
the divine perfections
must, then, be imperfector
incomplete2.
For the very reason
that this distinction is incomplete,
our
knowledge of the divine Being is not, in the first place,falla
cious ; for the concept of each perfection,
since it implies
contains all the other perfections.Our
infinity,
implicitly
knowledge would be untrue only if it representedas distinct
those perfections
which constitute a real unity.
In the second place, this notion of the perfectBeing is
anythingbut useless ; for each concept which goes to form it
brings before us, in an explicit
some
different
aspect
manner,
its

of the

If

divine

essence.

inquirewhat

we

is the real foundation

virtual distinction that

find that

we

viewed

in

it

we

make

between

certainlycannot

be

absolute manner,
for God
composition; but it is to be found
viewed

in

an

relativemanner

the

for this

incomplete
of God,
perfections

in the

divine

in Himself
in

the

essence

is above

divine

all

essence

that
the world,
relatively,
God
is the primary efficient cause
well as the
as
to our
intelli
supereminent archetypalcause, and relatively
and
is the essence
of material beings,
gence whose proper object
whose
of knowing, being abstract and
manner
fragmentary,
a

is,to

"

of which

The

same

attributes

of

incomplete virtual distinction

being. Gen. Metaphysics.76,

is seen

amongst

the transcendental

On

which

creation

in

maintained

and

surround

that

created
mind

as

the

once

nature.

us

true

God,

the

primary

and

rise

we

them.

foundation

and

wisdom,

and

intelligence

then,

of

useful,

to

from

idea

inasmuch

and

archetypal

that

composite

that

we

piece

in
of

rise
the

the

God

order

we

cosmos

infirmity
of

the

the

glance

this

nature

From

the

single

of

the

see.

we

at

account

know

only

can

we

in

taking

God.

of

fection
mind

from

it

prevents

is

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

I4

to

of

the

as

He

the

His

the

cause

is

of

knowledge,
together

human
to

established

idea

of

of

power

per

relations

finality

contingency
of

simple

of

the

God's

beings

God

regarded
created

which

concerning

who

by

the

things,
is

at

His

CHAPTER

EXISTENCE

THE

ART

DOCTRINES

General

terial
human

mind

the

truth

(3)
God

reach

reasoning,
divine

chiefly by
deals

God

for

His

existence

fundamental

impulse

or

does

himself

must

at

least

of God's

and
most

must

other

with
akin

the

a
a

of

means

proof

rest

those

examine

to

Rev.

these

who

various

affirm

we

Action),
Elan

God

Being.

every

Him3.

subjective
the

of

not

vital

the

and

each

of

do

(la Pens^e-

source

but

experience

on

but

abundant

of Himself,

vital

reasoning,
calls

method

no

we

Thought- Action

the

is

there

the

latter,

the

Bergson

of

whatever

to

existence
of

process

any

speak briefly of

has

man

(5) Lastly,
the

make

we

affirmation

sentiment.

proofs

for

the

teachings

and

existence
show

of
both

has
some
affinity with
Philosophy
positivism
evolutionistic
monism
reducible
to
an
ultimately
;
of
Heraclitus.
See
idealism
and
the
phenomenalism
Hegelian
Le
(Reprint
probleme de Dieu
d'apres la Philosophic nouvelle.
1908.)
Neo-Scolastique, Louvain,

respects

Kantianism

BALTHASAR,
from

by

of God,

that

expounded

as

According

God's

upon

intuition

Philosophy

question

God,

of discursive

ontologism

to

Roy.

dealing directly with

we

In

the

is also

existence

Before

God,

Le

reality which

which

afford

not

within

New

demonstrating

intuitivelyby

that

is in the

of

asserts

method

immediate

an

reduce

and

that

based

ontologism

use

may

speciallywith

available
prove

there

Bergson

to

view

the

of faith

of

object

the

existence

the

act

an

hand,

have

(4) We

content

only by
other

we

holds

proving

neccesary

that

essence.

positive
who

it is not

but

of

incapable
the

be

imma

the

that

asserts

(2) Traditionalism

On

THE

PROOF

particular, cannot

received

be

can

revelation.
to

in

God

is

THE

(i) Positivism

"

knowledge.

since
this

and

OF

EXISTENCE

GOD'S

Sketch.

world,

GOD

TO

OPPOSED
OF

8.

OF

EXAMINATION

CRITICAL

I.

II

the

New

it is

15

i6

NATURAL

and
possibility
divine Being.

the

the

THEOLOGY

of provingthe
necessity
On

existence of the

this

question of the
school is divided
existence of God we find that the positivist
The
deals with the possibility
of our
into two groups.
one
knowledge of what is immaterial and, by way of consequence
only,of our knowledge of God in particular
; the other deals
directlywith the questionof the existence of the Supreme
Being.
who deny that we have any notion about
Those positivists
the immaterial
on

Agnosticism.

and

9. Positivism

which

"

is of scientificvalue base their

different considerations.

Some

set

out

argument

with

simple

affirmation which

self-evident and
they maintain is perfectly
must
mind
be taken as a postulate,
namely, that the human
is capable of thinkingonly in positiveideas. With
regard
to the soul,God; and in general
all thingsthat are not clothed
with material conditions,they professa necessary ignorance,
sometimes
waiving the questionwhether they exist or not,
sometimes
denial. Other
disposingof them by a categorical
dominated
philosophers,
by Kantianism, put forward as their
for eliminating
all idea of the immaterial
from human
reason
thought the fact that there is a law of our understanding
enforcingthis. It is part,indeed, of the Kantian system that
scientificwhich are synthetic
are
only those of our cognitions
a priori
judgments, and these are conditioned by pure intui
tions of time and space,
As what
is immaterial
is, by its

nature, withdrawn
human

mind

from

have

cannot

conditions, it follows that

such
a

scientific

knowledge

the
such

of

beings.
Those

whose purpose is a direct criticism of the

philosophers
knowledge that we affirm we can have of God, rest their con
tention chiefly
considerations of fact. Accordingto Comte
on
the historyof ideas as shown
to us both in the development
of ages and in the life of each
mind
ceptions of the human

by a law
ledge,he

his famous

'

individual reveals that the

con

governed in their progress

are

law of the three

stages '. Our know

says, passes through three successive stages. The
first is the theological
stage, in which the mind is inclined to
absolute

"

cognitions: phenomena

resultants of the direct action of

and, in consequence,

as

regarded by it as the
supernaturalfree agencies,

subjectto

are

no

fixed law.

This

is the

THE

OF

EXISTENCE

GOD

17

everything is ascribed to deities. Subsequent

to this is the metaphysicalstage, when
is no longer
recourse
had to supernatural
of phenomena,
realitiesfor the explanation
but instead to invisible powers
or
forces,which are nothing
than abstractions accredited with reality.Lastlycomes
more
the
a
stage, the positivestage, at which the mind recognizes
of attainingabsolute notions, of knowing the
impossibility
of phenomena, and
inmost causes
confines itself exclusively
to gaininga knowledge of the invariable relations of succession
and similarity
which unite them.
It is not
the place here to appraisethe worth
of Kant's
criticism and of his unproved claim that our knowledge has no
scientific value except as formulated
in synthetic a priori
period when

judgments.4We
agnosticismand
10. Criticism

confine

must

the

our

positivismof

of the

attention

an

order.

Agnostic Position.

attain

refutation of

The

agnosticasserts
all examination
concerning

"

self-evident,that
what

is of the

may ask, is it thus evident without any

of human
extent
knowledge that the mind

But,

into the

Comte.

prioritruth, anterior to
the object of our
knowledge, and as
rise above
cognitivefaculties cannot
as

to

we

our

sensible

inquiry
cannot

immaterial

beings,should such happen to exist ?

The objectof intellectual knowledge is simplything,
something;
the intellectual apprehends what-a-thing-is,
quiddity,being
(Psychology,88). A very elementary introspection
proves
material being,is the
this, that being, and not necessarily
it is not
:
object of intelligence
being, thing,as material
which it grasps, but simply as being ; its objectis not neces
But
are
we
sarilycharacterized by material conditions.
far from
learn from an elementary
assertingthat what we
our
inquiry about our cognitivefacultywarrants
declaring
that we
able to know
immaterial
are
; it
being positively
only shows that it is incorrect to infer,as do the positivists,
that material thingsare the only objectof intellectual know
ledge5. Their postulatetherefore is both a prioriand gratui
tous.

to

If indeed after mature

reflection we

find that the material

world

that immaterial
requiresfor its adequateinterpretation
to what
thingsalso exist,we shall not be wrong in listening
our

reason
"

informs

us

about

those immaterial

things.

See Criteriology,
39, 40 ; and cp. Crit. gen. (Cours Superieur),98
Cp. Crittriologit
gtntvale (Cours Sup6rieur), 116.

f
.

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

i8

of the Spenceriantype may

rejoinby assert
positivist
ing that, granted it is a prioriand arbitraryto rule out all
immaterial beingsfrom the domain of knowledge,stillany such
knowledge we may acquireof such beings,and therefore of
The

littlewe
the

Unknowable
do

We

scientific value ; only

and weight can
of extension, number
of

be

any

of certain and
positivescience
subject-matter
of God is only enough to let us know that
know

the

'

cannot

in terms

is known

what
be

Being,

divine

the

He

is

'.

wish

not

the

which

is concealed

admit

that

to

under

important aspect of

an

material

world

truth

the

objection.We

above

the

finds in the

mind

our

deny

the

readily
object

capabilities
; sensible things
And
in a proper
and
what
know
are
we
positiveway.
where
if the
un
philosopher in defining his terms
doubtedly there is scope for what is arbitrary calls scientific
which
only those representations
possess these character
be the objectof
the immaterial
cannot
istics,then assuredly
which

is

its

proportionateto

"

"

science.

But, having said this,we

above

notions

the

forgetthat, over and

concerning the material world,

must

have

we

never

and negative
capable of possessinganalogical
We
are
not, indeed, able to predicate
conceptionsof God.
of Him
also to material beings;
what is common
positively
have
taken originally
nevertheless these concepts which we
of a
from the material world of things we
refine by means
process of negationwhich eliminates from them
every element
in a posi
of imperfection.Without
what
signifying
strictly
in reality
is peculiar
tive manner
to God, these concepts are
to Him
alone, and thus they afford us a true know
applicable
ledgeof the divine Being.
minds

our

11.

are

Criticism

of Comte's

Law

Agnostic Mentality itproduces.

"

'

of the

Comte

Three

Stages

endeavoured

'

and

the

to establish

law of the three stages on various considerations : (i)The

generalhistoryof the sciences shows that this law reallyexists.
his

All

'

knowledge has

gone
of human

three stages
is corroborated
man

hood

marks

prey

an

reveals in its

every

is

by

through or is stillgoing through these

thought. (2) The historical argument
argument from analogy. The life of

to

course

three

credulityand
metaphysicalillusions.
that

of

successive stages. Child

belief. Youth
theological
Mature

age

turns

man

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

20

before he reached

the

his two

elaborated

final

stage of his thought in which

Critiques.
logicalproof of

Again, Comte's

the

from

stages derives all its value

'

the three

of
necessity

the

'

he

law of

his

empiricalproof.
it would
be a petitio
Isolated from history,
principii.For he
the assertion that the first hypotheseswhich the human
makes
mind
constructed were
theological.But on what
necessarily
does

of nature
structs

read

theory into

some

hypothesisconcerningthe

some

to the

this

facts, that he

con

of the connexions

nature

and

experi

verification of this

theory,this

premature

theological,and
'

'

accustomed

his

directs his observations

bindingfacts togetherand
ments

It is true that the observer

he base his assertion ?

grounds does

primitiveman

'

indeed,

as
'

anomalous
to

adopt

hypothesis; it is true that

provisionaryhypothesis,may be
Spencer remarks, certain un

some

phenomena
theory of

well have
led
may
this kind : but there

is

had to
our
was
nothing to warrant
saying that recourse
such
an
explanationas a general rule.
takes it for granted, without
Moreover, Comte
offering
adequate proof, that the positivestage of knowledge is the
final and
'

law

yet this is an essential part of his

historical
stages '. What
apart from

perfectone, and

of

the

considerations

three

"

is the

proof he adduces ? That, on the one

co-exist with theological
hand, positive
cannot
or
explanations
metaphysicalones, since they are mutuallyexclusive ; and that,
the other
on
hand, positivescience cannot
precede or be
since the human
inferior,
mind is subjectto a law of indefinite
and
is this an
retrogressionis impossible.But
progress
of knowledge,
adequate proof ? Why may not the perfection
the final stage,be a synthesis
of all,theological,
metaphysical
and positive
?
And
for
what
there
the assertion
grounds are
that progress
is indefinite and that it is impossiblefor the
human

race

without

"

to

fall back

proof,and

assertion

mere

pretendedlaw of the three

stages is merely a corollaryof a non-proven
postulate; or
it is an attempt at proof based on the historical grounds that
and metaphysicalexplana
everywhere and always theological
tions have
claimed
one,

and

It is

as

in this

this is

Either

case

his

given way to positiveones

a logical
proof is found

apart

from

to

in which
be

historical observation

interesting,
moreover,

to

note

that

case

reallyan
has

no

what

was

empirical

value at all.

for the foundation

EXISTENCE

THE

OF

GOD

21

to a necessary
positivismComte had to have recourse
of the mind
to bind
and universal law, namely the necessity
from this
facts together
by a theory,in order to prove precisely
that there are
such things as necessary laws but only
no
A
less constant.
associations that are
more
or
positivist
of
what
he
what
cannot
about
is,
can
ought
speak
pronounce

of his

to be.

Though

as

of fact the

matter

'

law

of the

three

stages

'

even
majorityof philosophers,
by
it
has
of
consider
the positivists
left
a heritage
themselves,
yet
who
able influence.
are
engrossedin the study
Many thinkers

has

been

of the

abandoned

natural

the

by

sciences and

confine themselves

the

to

of

use

experimentalmethods, consider every metaphysicalor religious

of the positive
inquiry as vain and illusory.The method
to consist in a completedisregard
for any
sciences they make
their method, they assure
has
such speculation.And
us,
proved its value. To it we are indebted for those marvellous
which have enlarged
conquests in the realms of the unknown
man's horizon both in knowledge and in action.
And to Comte,
it is said,belongsthe gloryof all these modern
achievements
;
to him
for
must
the founder of positivism
be grateful
as
we
of observation which has exercised such
revealingthe method
a
powerfulinfluence on the various branches of the sciences.
But is it reallytrue that the credit is due to the positive
method
extolled by Comte
for the progress in the sciences
which

is the

objectof

?
blessings

This

the

Comte

Pasteur

French

showed

and

what

play.

Comte

left him

phenomenon

their

times.

to

consider

antecedent

is the real

is pure

amongst them

the manifold

not

is the

sophistry,

to

to the

face with

antecedents

in which

allowing an
cause

to

of the

source

InauguralAddress

conditions

complex
method, by

great part

method
positive

put the observer face

in the

This

in

the

This confusion

in his celebrated

Academy.

nature

which

of abundant

source

due

created between

experimentalmethod,

discoveries of modern
as

and the

eulogy of positivismis

the confusion which

and

admiration

our

of the

of

they find

inquiry into
phenomenon

less legiti
enables us merely to pass, more
or
explained,
mately,from what has been to what can be. The experimental
method, which alone is of value in the physicalsciences, starts
to be

out,
menter

on

the

contrary, from

endeavours

to

directive idea

verifyby

his

study

which
of the

experi
phenomena.
the

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

22

He

varies

appears

he sets

of
intensity

subject to

are

the

method
positivistic

which

under

conditions

modifies

the result that his conclusions

with
passive,

the

The

others.

in certain

leaves the observer

phenomenon

certain antecedents, and

aside

action

the

which

under

the conditions
artificially

the

phenomenon

studyingpresentsitself; the experimentalmethod leads

him actively
to search for the laws that natural agents obey.
of a positive
that the dream
remember
Finally we must
science supplantingphilosophyin every
respect has already
he is

passed

writers

other

on

'

the

Poincare*, Duhem,

H.

of fashion.

out

of
critique

the sciences

'

have

and

Roy

Le

done

much

proud claims made by scientists. Metaphysical,

have
ethical and
again taken their
speculations
theological
sciences,which
proper placebeside and above the experimental
fail to satisfy
mind.
of the human
the ultimate questionings
to humble

the

12. Criticism

Traditionalism.

of

of traditionalism

There

"

are

two

schools

(i)The radical school who regardthe human

as
reason
incapableof demonstrating the existence of God,
which they make the objectof an act of faith based on a primi
tive revelation handed
to us by society. Since the coming
on
of Christ this revealed deposit
has been entrusted to the Church.
(2)The

likewise maintain

semi-traditionalists who

first instance

unaided

is

reason

that

in the

incapableof attainingto

knowledge of the existence of God, but differ from the former

school by professing
that after a revelation of the fact it is now
to demonstrate
possible
by rational proof.
To establish their fideism the traditionalists point chiefly
to the errors
in the historyof philosophy. De Bonald,
shown
the

able

to a
them, had recourse
We
cannot
think, he says, without
psychological
argument.
words ; and to create language man
had to think and, conse
most

quently,must

thinker

amongst

alreadyhave

vicious

circle.)Since reason
language and of making an
own,
man

it is necessary
to have
recourse

of which

We

we

see

rationalism
of the

many

receive
that
the

weakness
errors

by

for the
to

had
was

act

(An evident
in itselfincapableof creating
of thought which is reallyits

the

faith.

way

of

reaction

traditionalists took
human

displayedby

of words.

explanationof these activities in

primitiverevelation,the teachings

by

of the

use

the

mind.

from
most

The

revolutionary
exaggeratedview
a

truth

is that

historyof philosophyare

the
no

THE

EXISTENCE

OF

GOD

cogent proof of the total incapacityof

radical conclusion

of
speculations

the laborious

that

than

nothing more
established

could

the truth.

towards

But

there

that

assert

we

such

to take

Such

reason.

all thinkers

delirium.

long

one

our

if it could
justified

only be

would

23

in all ages

were

if this

were

Only
has

be shown

been

no

progress
of the
view
pessimistic

great systems of philosophyis absolutelyto falsify

history.
Revelation
the

serve

it is

but

show, the
As

we

morallynecessary for humanity to pre

ethical truths it has inherited ;
body of speculative
In any
not physically
shall
case, as we
necessary.
existence of God cannot
be simply the object of an

of divine faith.

act

of

is indeed

de Donald's

to

language,which

maintained

he

be due

must

(whichit is not given us

here

existence,he solved

discuss)of

to

how

origin

the

appeal to

an

revelation,

to

that the very thorny

remark, in the first place,

may

into

from

argument

problem

language came

by induction but purelya priori.

if we
And even
grant, in spiteof all that is to be said to the
contrary, this first premiss of his argument, namely, that
languagetogetherwith all the notions that it embodies could
result

only

from

divine

of the human

members

not

teaching made

race

the

to

still to remark

have

we

known

first

(a)that

be
a revelation : the former
teachingis not necessarily
may
the appealmade
of his disciple,
by a master to the intelligence
whilst
the latter is an
appeal to the faith of a believer.
(b) That, if we suppose the human mind to be absolutely
incap
able,a revelation is not sufficient to explainhow we are able to
a

arrive at

If

God.

certain
receive

we

blind credence
the

claims

but

that

and it is

only by

ourselves

about

the

on

knowledge

assertion

revealed

only after

this

of

the

the

This

"

have

authorityof God8.

We

say
of that

finite ;

the

rational

adviscly on
authority.
former, which

supernatural gift.

reason

authorityof

The

we

by
can

traditionalism

about
faith ;

satisfy
is based

totallyincapable. The
objectof his faith by relyingon

knowledge

the

that

of

act

an

is

reason

the

our

of

nature

be received

to

Yet
credibility.

that

and

satisfied ourselves

have

we

admits
believer,in reality,
that he has

existence

truth, this is not by

has
proposition

the exercise

its

of the

act, then, presupposes

very
of God's existence and of the

God

and

not

on

the evidence

of credibility,
are
latter,the motives
is the motive
of faith, is unlimited, and

which

we

necessarily
faith

is

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

24

69). Therefore
(Criteriology,
the proposition
succeed in establishing
traditionalism can never
that the existence of God is acceptedby faith; it drives man
back to an agnosticposition.
that
the other hand, by recognizing
Semi-traditionalists,
on
carried on, in spiteof
the reason
has a limited capacity,
are
themselves, to the same
opinionas we uphold ; for by logically
followingout their conclusions they are forced to acknowledge
that a proofof the existence of God is possible.
Their

of

fact

historical

proofunder

the

intellectual

existence of God
which
that

is that

contention

this

enables
it has

revelation

accept as

truth

attainingby

its

proof become

their

less.

already known,

truth

own

is necessary
is in itself
the

unknown

arrive at

can

rational truth

the

knowledge

revelation.

that

which

reason

reason

But
guidanceof the lightof revelation.
operationof the mind which discovers the
is intrinsically
the operation
as
just the same

it to

of

human

the

acquiredby

revelation of

the

our

Undoubtedly, after the

intellectual faculties are capable

power, the extrinsic difficultiesof

But since the discursive act of the
for the attainment
same

the act

as

it follows

that

of

truth hitherto

by which
to

we

prove

grant that

reason

this last operationis also to admit

to make
power
of producing the first operation. The
its intrinsic capability
has

the

intermediate

which
position

up

is untenable

to

that

of

fall back

to

the semi-traditionalists have

taken

either
logical,

return

they must,

radical

if

they are

traditionalism

and

agnosticscepticism,or

else

ultimate

the concession
consequences
of the Scholastics
rationalistic position

proofof

therefore

they

they
and

must

have

ultimately
carry

made

to its
to

the

acknowledge that

God's existence is

possible.
of proving
After this conclusion regardingthe possibility
God's existence, we
school,
must, against the ontologistic
of demonstrating
show the necessity
it.
a

13.

Ontologism. According to the teaching of

of a syllogism
but
and Gioberti,God is not the term

Criticism

Rosmini

of

"

objectof an intuition. This immediate knowledge of the

divine Being is primordialin man
; only subsequentlyare
of a comprehensiveview
contingentbeings known, by means
and
through which the mind directlysees the divine essence
in it the eternal archetypesof all created beings.
This theory is based by its proponents chieflyon
two
the

EXISTENCE

THE

arguments
sented

which

gain

can

as

this

the

afterwards

be true, it must

to

in the

But

order

all created

and

order of

knowledge,we
contingentbeings.

Ontologism

1.

25

sets

from

out

an

His

know

from

knowledge only

objectknown.
primary Being

also in the

of fact does

matter

(2) For knowledge

the

GOD

that God should

(i)It is quiteimpossible
any finite form ; consequentlythe human

under

gence,

OF

in

vision.

conformitywith

of real

beings, God

first know

and

God

theory of

erroneous

is

posterior.So

thingsare
must

existence,

immediate

an

be

be repre
intelli

ideas.

have shown
else
as
we
objectof the intelligence,
forms
where
as
89), consists in the intelligible
(Psychology,
To
see
apprehended in the world presentedto our senses.
The

proper

God

is the

limitations

the

of the
which

have
we
processes
have first drawn
we

attests
if

Moreover
should
in the

of

immaterial

know

can

ence

life of grace.
supernatural
our
knowledge in this present life
beings only by applying,by means
alreadyspoken of (6),the notions
from the material world.
Experi

goalpromised by faith to

Under
we

constitutes the Beatific Vision, which

is in Himself

He

as

that

we

have

no

the

infinite

intuition of the

Being.

could

the very essence

of God, we
gaze upon
by the enjoyment of this supreme happinessbe absorbed
of God
contemplationof the inexhaustible perfections
we

and lost in the love of the infinite Goodness.

our

minds

and

we

would

not

should be

anything else.

more

Since

be

subjectto

At

the least

same

time

about

God,

the

error

certain of His existence than

such

consequences

are

belied

of that of

by facts,

the

follow stands condemned.

theoryfrom which they necessarily
In the second place,the ontologists
2.
at fault in their
are
logic: (a) They maintain that God can in no way be repre
sented in our
knowledge by a finite form.
Undoubtedly this
is true if it is a questionof a knowledge that is positive,
proper
and adequate; but this is no argument againstour
attainment
of knowledgeof God that is analogical
of
and negative,by means
finite forms,
(b)Again, truth by its very definition is the con
formityof the mental cognitionwith the thingknown, and from
this they argue that the order in which our
knowledge arises in
the mind must necessarily
order in which things
follow the precise
reallyexist. But this inference they draw from the definition
of truth

is unwarrantable.

tion does

requirethe

The

truth

of

conformityof this

an

individual

cogni

cognition with

the

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

26

thing cognized;
particular
to be true, there is

of its

order

but

need for

no

logicalsuccession.

system of

for the
to

us

our

cognitions

representeverythingin

Such

is needed

condition

the
for

of our
scientific system, not for its truth : a
perfection
thingis true when what we say of it is in conformitywith what
affirm of God, although it is by
What
it is ontologically.
we
from the world
and drawn
mediate
ideas which
are
originally
and Last
is that He is the First Cause
of sensible experience,
End
of this world
(5).
the

14.

Roy8,
'

of the

Meaning

'

is infinite

becoming.
',becoming. In so far

God

movement

According

"

The
as

7.

'

Philosophy

New

essence

He

has

to Le

realityis
alreadybecome
of

divine ; in so far as He will

continue to developHimself, He is the transcendent
ceaselessly
within

divine.
of

He

us,

Now

is the

immanent

I have

within

becoming, of
and

more

more

I feel within

tendency to become

immediate

myself an

This supremacy
of the moral law which
myself constitutes the affirmation of the existence

atheists
himself

properly soan
aspiration

is better ; or rather, we
should say, every
one
of atheism whensoever
he is doing what
season

what

experiencesa
is evil and

perfect,

more

moral.

There
.of God.
are,
accordingly,no
feels within
called, since every man
towards

and

more

intuition

advancing towards the ideal. The only true

is an incessant becoming,conscious of itselfin varying
reality
as
degrees and this is known
Thought-Action(la PenseeAction). Our reasoningas it were
congealsthis continuous
not

"

flow of

To use
the meta
realityand so changes its nature.
phoricallanguage of this philosophy,realityis a continuous
curve,

reasoningis

movement

the

tangent which

mind

any moment
its utilitarian
at

stops its

or
owing to
practical
this is matter ; it
and breaks it up
tendency scatters reality,
then unifies by reasoningthese scattered elements
that were
created by Thought- Action.
echo
Here we have as it were
an
of the underlying
fundamental
of the one
and eternal
continuity
becoming which is the only reality,
namely, Thought- Action.
and reason
Besides matter
it is necessary to posita directive
element
which
draws u- on to perfection this is the principle

'

'

"

"

Here

we

confine

ourselves

to

some

fundamental

criticisms.

For

further

details,see

BALTHASAE,
op. cit.
8
E. LE ROY, A New
Philosophy: Henri
" Norgate, London,
1913).

Bcrgson, tr.

V.

Benson

(Williams

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

28
from

shrink

not

this

extreme

consequence

and

its

utters

so

condemnation.

own

We

ourselves

confine

here

must

to

fundamental

these

Philosophycannot establish the affirma

tion of God by a vital experiencewithout
reducingGod to the
Him
of what
is
level of finite things,and thereby despoiling
The

criticisms.

New

divine.
15.

of the

Examination

is

immanence
The

sophy.

The

"

word

prominent in present-dayphilo
extraordinarily
cannot
New
get
Philosophy tells us that man
of consciousness

his states

beyond

Religion of Sentiment.

has

; he

an

intuition of the

thought and
operationwhich is at once
between
action.
Other
thought and
philosophersdistinguish
of God
and they positthe existence
sentiment
by virtue of a
purelysubjectivesentiment which cannot be reduced to thought.
The development of these ideas is to be ascribed partlyto the
action
influence of Protestantism, partlyto the disintegrating
of the
Critiqueof Pure Reason ',and partlyalso to the vague
impression that everythingis subjectto a law of rhythmic
evolution, that nothing is absolute, and that truth is but the

real

virtue

by

of

an

'

fruit of the will 9.

It is sufficient for

problems

which

to

reflectingreason

to

us

the
must

remark

study

that

in the

solution

gives rise

of consciousness

always have

the

last

of the

word.

the

Feeling

is blind ; it is the provinceof

of its very nature
that it is right. Man
be obliged to admit
to show
can

sentiment

or

reason

God

to Him

proves His existence.

if he

only

is meritorious

viction.

The

classical

free-thinker, that
throw

only

in his lot

on

The

if it is founded

pieceof

advice

that

on

reason

Pascal

pays

and
gave
he

con

to

the

should
of his reason
use
any
the side of religion,
as
preferableto taking

without

oppositeside,is obviouslyof no avail.

criterion by which
to judge the
truth

the
a

worship man

doctrine ; sentiment, unless

powerlessto decide.

it makes

an

Reason
or

the

appeal

alone

affords

falsityof
to reason,

is

and
this conception the ideas of Renan
fallingunder
Catholic
advocates
certain degree, the ideas of some
a
of a new
of Pascal
apologetic which they associate with the name
; they dis
the part played by the reason
in religiousquestions and
particularly
parage
in the question of God's
existence, and place undue
emphasis upon the part
the
the
will
and
feelings.
played by
9

We

may

Sabatier, and

rank

even,

as

in

THE

ART.

II.

16.

THE

OF

PROOFS

THE

of this Article.

Division

and
a posteriori,
priori,
is one
that proceedsfrom
a

for

sequent. Such,

OF

EXISTENCE

GOD

EXISTENCE

Proofs

"

(a)An

effect,from

to

cause

instance, is

OF

of three

are

simultaneo.

29

GOD

kinds

"

prioriproof
to

reason

con

the
syllogismestablishing
goodness of the end of the universe by startingout from the
idea of a first Cause infinitely
wise and good, (b)An a posteriori
proof goes to work in just the oppositeway, from an effect
to a cause
or
principle.Such, for example, is the proof,in
of the soul from the immaterial
psychology,of the spirituality
of the acts of the mind and the will, (c)An a simultaneo
nature
is the proofof one
demonstration
thingby another which is not
it in reality
but
is conceived
distinct from
which
by the
mind
as
preceding it : e.g. the immortalityof the soul
This threefold division
demonstrated
as
by its spirituality.
of proofs,it is clear, is founded
the relation that exists
on
between
and the way
in which
thingsas they are in reality

they
It

unfold

themselves

is not

in

difficult to

concepts.

our

see

that

is

there

form

only one

of

and valid for the existence of God, namely,

proofthat is possible
an
a posteriori
proof. For, in the first place,we cannot con
ceive of any a priori
proof; it would be absurd to suppose a
although
beinganterior to the First Being. In the second place,
an

known
this
state

that

simultaneo
in

demonstration

has

been

put forward,

that

ontological
argument of St. Anselm,
shall
We
conclusion.
argument leads to no justifiable
and examine
it,and then pass on to review the proofs
are
capableof demonstratingthe existence of God.
I. THE

17.

the

history as

ARGUMENT

ONTOLOGICAL

Statement

of

the

Argument.

"

OF

The

ST. ANSELM

celebrated

argument

brieflyfor
mulated
thus : Every man
possesses the concept of that being
which is the greatestpossible.But existence in the ontological

to

which

order is

St. Anselm

has

given

perfection.Therefore

law of contradiction,grant that

which
possible,

conclude
This

then

is

we

the

name

has

be

may

must, unless

being which

has
absolutely
perfect,

that God

argument

his

this

we

violate the

is the

greatest

perfection.We

does exist.
been

taken

up

by various well-known

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

30

philosophersDescartes10,Bossuet, Leibniz. This last, who

in the argument,
could not
weakness
help feelingsome
tried to strengthenit. He gave it a new
foundation, in the
if He
of the divine essence.
is,
God, he alleged,
possibility
if
it
is
is possible, so
His essence,
can
only exist of Himself.
it comprises
it is realizable but inasmuch
not inasmuch
as
as
in
in itself existence.
Consequently,if the divine essence
involved is possible,
God must
which existence is necessarily
does exist.
exist. But It is possible.Therefore God
18. Criticism
of the OntologicalArgument.
i. In general.
The idea we
have
of an
absolutely perfectbeing we form
form it by apprehendingthe
that is to say, we
synthetically,
various perfections
in creatures, subtractingall limitations
and imperfections
from such ideas, and then combining them
togetherinto a single
concept,which is that of the divine being.
Now
to argue
deductivelyfrom this idea, to analyse this
syntheticnotion of God, is to do nothingelse than to unwrap
"

"

"

again the
from

elements

that

analysisof

the

'

idea

our
'

the note

of

of God

could

only have

notion

'

'

of

proved
*"

it

infinite

used
in

this idea

of

if in

two

further

'

to

infinite

we

introduced

been

forming it
Outside

arguments

these

for God's

could

not

'

draw

synthetic

our

three

'

existence

either

had

we

Hence

it.
never

can

into

it

seen

or

hypotheses

existence.

the idea

me

form

'

For the idea of the

of God.

postulatedit.

or

Descartes

(1) I have
But

existence

originallywent

of God, i.e. of the Being that

have
had its origin in me,
since

is
I

perfect.
infinitely
am

limited

in my

give a causal explanation of this

the existence
of God.
This
idea, to admit
(Third Meditation.)"
argument
would
be valid if the idea that we
have
of God
represented the Infinite to us
But
this is not so, as we
have
in a positive and
already seen.
proper way.
finite
finite
idea
of
the
Infinite
is
causes.
explained
by
My
truths
these two
(2) I exist and I have the idea of the perfectBeing. From
of fact it is easy to draw
existence.
For if I had given my
a proof of God's
being to myself, I should have given myself all the perfectionsof which I can
being.

conceive.
lie with

Therefore

Therefore
God.

And

am

the

forced, in order

reason

further

of my

it is not

to

existence
difficult to

cannot
see

that

lie with
there

me

is

no

but

must

power

in

for a
being even
preserve
The
contingent nature, then, of our
being requires the
existence
of a necessary
Being. (Principlesof Metaphysics, 20 and 21.)
the proof
The
second
part of this argument comprises, in a confused
way,
which
here
drawn
from
shall
later
Still
we
we
becoming
explain
(21).
may
that the fact of our
idea of God
existence
and our
object against Descartes
which
is not at all the basis on
we
expect to found the argument from
may
of
contingency. Whilst it is true that we have not in ourselves the reason
to know
this not by observing with Descartes that
own
our
being, we come
the notion
if a being which
of the infinite had
given itself its own
possesses
itself
to
it
without
it
would
have
limits
such
a line of thought
:
being
given
any
is
that
it
for
to
would
at
least
a
itself,and this
cause
possible
being
presuppose
involves
the absurd
supposition that a being can be anterior to itself.

by which we
single moment.
us

are

able

to subsist

or

ourselves

in

"

THE

EXISTENCE

it could not have been

had

professontologism;
existence.

God's

GOD

31

advocate

an

from

in the

In the
of

act

very

he

has

as

this would

be

questionis of proving
it is equallyimpossible,
place,
syntheticconceptionof God,
the

moreover

second

forming

of St. Anselm's

admittingthat

intuition of this existence,inasmuch

an

to

Now

there.

shrink
certainly

would

argument

OF

the

is in
His existence ; for this,as we
say, is just what
question. And the third hypothesis,which is the only one

to

prove

left,namely, that in forming our idea we postulatedthe exist

of God, would make the argument a glaring
ence
petitio
principii.
It is
2. In
particular. (a)The argument of St. Anselm.
"

refutingthe argument of so able a thinker

merely to observe that he jumps quiteunjustifi

sufficient for

not
as

"

St. Anselm

ably from
himself

considered

that

contained
necessarily
Consequentlyhe did

in the

existence

left him

St. Anselm

order
ontological

is

in the very concept of the infinite Being.

not consider that he was
leapingthe abyss

separatesthe ideal order from

that

Indeed

the ideal order to the real order.

unmoved.

For

him

the

the

real,and this objection

premissfrom

which

he

was

was
starting
alreadyrelated to the real order.
is based on
It
this major :
The reasoningof St. Anselm
is necessary to conceive the perfectBeing as existing
'. This
'

we

do not

to contradict.

venture

Consequently the
is illogical.
From

the

based, all that

be inferred with

can

He

antecedent

the

followingconsequent :
infinite Being includes real

then

goes on
exists '. This

perfectBeing

'

on

which

his

that

existence

inference

reasoningis

concept of

the

under

infer

the real order is

regard to

Given

to

pain

tradiction,if this Being exists, this existence

the

of self-con

belongs

to

It

'

'

in the proposition
predicate existence
must
be united to the subject perfectBeing by a necessary
did not
St. Anselm
nexus.
perceivethat the necessityof
real existence which
our
concept of infinityincludes is only
a hypothetical
necessity.If I conceive the most perfectpos
existent.
sible being, I can
only conceive it as necessarily
But this is no proofthat it really
exists.
(b)The argument as emended
by Leibniz. As the divine
is possible,
and this essence
includes existence,it follows
essence
and
necessarily,

the

'

'

"

that the divine

St. Anselm's
flaw

as

essence

argument

before.

exists

so

runs

is clothed.

Leibniz

confuses

the
It has
the

new

the

form

in which

same

essential

various

kinds

of

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

32

(Gen.Metaphy
alreadydistinguished
is different
that intrinsic possibility
sics,19). We have seen
The former we may call a non-impossi
from extrinsic possibility.
the
of contradiction between
in other words, the absence
bility,
The latter impliesthe exist
that constitute an essence.
notes
for the production
of a being which is the sufficient reason
ence
of
that is intrinsically
of an
essence
possible
; or, in the case
the Being that does not admit of being produced,the presence of
for us to positthe existence of this being which we can
a reason
not know
properly.Hence, when Leibniz asserts that the divine
is possible,
he cannot
conceived
by the intelligence,
essence,
be either to
to its extrinsic possibility,
be referring
as this would
at issue,or to lapseinto the fallacy
presuppose the very question
He must
be speaking
of St. Anselm
that we have justrefuted.
it is true to say that if we saw
Now
onlyof intrinsic possibility.
in the idea of God's
that there was
no
positively
repugnance
existence, we should ipsofacto be seeing His existence. For
and proper view of
should have to possess a positive
this we
His essence
which impliesexistence : and this would be to fall
that we
possibilities

into

the

Our
when
we

priorino

for

reason

more

admit.

not

affirming

argue from the negative and analogicalconcept that

possess of God is this,that we do not see that He is impos
we

So

that He

Indeed

long, however,

exists,we
it is from

possibility
; and
of those
direct

existence that
we

see

made

of

as

II.

ST. AUGUSTINE'S

the

we

for

reason

asserting

is intrinsically
possible.

draw

our

notion

of intrinsic

the

the

Thus

despitethe

of God,
possibility

conceals the
logic,

analysis

fundamental

same

argument of St. Anselm.

Statement

and

ARGUMENT

necessary

FROM

POSSIBLE

ESSENCES

Criticism

of the

of metaphysicaltruth
the

no

positive
way the intrinsic possibility
have
and nature
whose
we
properties

in

of his

flaw

notes

have

we

affirm that He

cannot

apparent correctness

19.

as

beings alone of
knowledge (Gen.Metaphysics,20).

Leibniz

that

nor

does

possiblethan for affirmingthat He is impossible.

of mind
is absolutely
negative ; all that we can say

state

sible.

have

we

himself

is

God

that

fact

Leibniz

that

ontologism

pointof

In

have

the

OUR

KNOWLEDGE

Argument.

"

Neither

OF

the

laws of criteriology
objective
of possiblesnor their unlimited
possibility
nor

THE

immediate

supply an

number

OF

EXISTENCE

GOD

reason
sufficient

necessary and
The
truth, St.

ofa

independentof
truth, but

It is

existences.

then, be
for the

Being.
infinite
Augustine somewhere
all contingentbeings.

of the truth.

33

It is

for

says, is
No

in itself,

one

speaks of

one

anterior

norm

the existence

to

my
all created

immutable, eternal, necessary.

It cannot,

explainedby a contingentexistence ; there must be,

explanationof its notes, a Being that is necessary,

eternal,infinite.
This

line of argument

same

followed

was

St. Bona venture

by

adopted by Bossuet, Balm"s, and d'Hulst. And most

Scholastics allow its validity.Fr. Lepidi especially
modern
and in the extramental
in the objectivity
sees
realityof ideal
truth the stumbling-block
of Kantian
philosophy.
and

opinionthat

The

tions ',that

Bossuet

in

put forward

metaphysicaltruth, or

ifthe truth
it

should

-f

'

is the truth of

be

of

the world

God Himself, seems

something divine, even
from the error
of ontologism. For would
'

of his

one

EleVa-

is
possibles,

far removed

not

it not

God, when

'

follow that

apprehend

we

in Himself

? Such a consequence
seeingGod
has not escaped modern
exponents of the argument, who are
is not God
that this world of possibles
in asserting
explicit
Himself but only an
of God.
Alongsidethe world of
effect
existences there is,they say, the world of metaphysicaltruth,
of the abstract essences
of possible
being,equallyreal with it
althoughnot existential ; and the notes of necessity,
eternity,
of this world would directly
lead us, by virtue of the
universality
of causality,
to affirm the existence of God, since in
principle
we

other

no

way

and

are

to

The

the
logic,

number
2.

and

11

account

then to ask ourselves if we

recourse
1.

we

Such

to

may

without

explainthem

not

conditional and
essences

that

of

not

absolute.

belongto the
actual beings;

realm
or

as

of

assertions
logical

the

old Scholastics

and
criticism of the argument, see
London), pp. 89-95, and S. REINSTADLER,
Philosophic Scholasticae (Herder, London), II, pp. 232-235.
a

is the

God11.

Possible

For

notes.

immutabilityof truth, the necessityof the laws of

of possibles
and their unlimited
necessary possibility

are

not

for these

to examine
It behoves
version of the argument.
us
of possible
the characteristics and nature
essences,

modern
what

can

fuller statement

Ontology (Longmans,

P.

COFFEY,
Elementa

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

34

would

have

expressedit, Necessitatem habent hypotheticam

in praedicandoet non
in essendo '.
absolutam
Now
this necessityof relations can be adequatelyexplained
by the facultyof abstraction and universalization which our
finite and
(Psychology,89-92).
contingent mind
possesses
'

It does not;
for the

then^ constitute the immediate

existence of

sufficient

reason

and, in

Being absolutely
necessary

con

happens is this : the mind leaves

sequence, infinite. What
notes
side all the individuating
of a thing and
on
one
so
constitutes

which

norms

posited are

once

conditions
dependentof contingent
ence.

Whether

that
possible
there would
would
The

I exist

I should
be

or

and

not, 2+2

exist.

even

regarded

of

our

still make

If,however, there

as

in

very exist
4, it is still

were

no

mind,

truth and

would not make

2+2
4 ; there
be no possibles
that I exist.
not be possible
; it would
objectionmay be raised that preciselybecause 2+2
no

and
make
I am
necessarily
necessarily
possible,
4, because
finite intelligences
there is demanded
are
a neces
contingent,
should always make
so that 2+2
sary and infinite intelligence
4 and that it should always be possiblethat I exist. We
replythat if we know that God exists,we know also that the
truth is always presentbefore Him
do
; but that as long as we
not know
the fact of His existence (thisis the very point in
question)we have quitean adequateexplanationof the truth
that 2+2
always make 4 because in our very statement of it
of the proposition
we
always to be pre
suppose the two terms
makes
sented to some
Since my
mind
other.
or
intelligence
abstraction

from

siderations,it

the conditions

space in its con

it is in possessionof these

of time

and

granted that
terms, that always and everywhere2+2=4.
In our
opinion,to give to the ideal world a realityoutside
the mind that conceives it is to multiplybeingswithout neces
of the ideal order is sufficiently
sity; and the objectivity
safeguardedagainstthose who hold a purely subjectiveview
that are drawn from the
by the presence in the mind of essences
Kant's view is that we
sensible world.
activelyconstitute
that guide us in its search are
the truth, since the principles
abstract our
a priori
; it is sufficient to replyto him that we
that we
are
passivein the elaboration
concepts from reality,
of them

and

sees,

of the

relations that

39 f.).
(Criteriology,

unite

them

to

one

another

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

36

: what
it,do acquirethis perfection
happens is that
possessing
determinate
is made
by its actuality. This
potentiality

actualityis

activityof efficient causality; it

formal cause
gives to a being by

the

not

which
perfection

the

this

And

trinsic self-communication.

is the
in

an

which
perfection

com

be essential or accidental : thus food is

pletesa being may
digestedand transformed into the very substance of the man that
his intelligence.
takes it ; a thought received by a pupilperfects
II. Now
a
being in a state of potency is not able itself to
be

or
principle

the

receivingthis

before

it acquires. For
perfection

of the

source

determination

formal

being is without

the

of its perfection
that it is itself the principle
suppose
to the
is to assert that it alreadypossesses it. This amounts
To

it.

sayingthat the being which isin potentiality

and does not yet possess it,already
to receive some
perfection
to
potentiality
possesses it. Consequentlythe passingfrom
other
actualitycan be explainedonly by the action of some
being alreadyin actuality.

self-contradiction

III. Now
cannot
at

of

series of

mount

ad

up

without
infinitum,
itself has in

which

first term

beings each subjectto

external action

an

coming
acquiredthe

ever

no

way
For not

to

stop

essential

of these moved
it.
that characterize
one
perfections
of
would
have in itself the reason
beings,taken individually,
would
which
it receives, and the same
be true
the perfections

with

regard to

in this whole
which

ment

the whole

series

series which

could

we

not

in it communicates

they go

find the

form, for

to

of
principle

itself from

the

being to

one

even

move

another.

could
have
not
Consequently these formal determinations
produced themselves, and we are forced, for the explanation
of the passingfrom potentiality
observe
to actualitywhich
we
in the

beings around

is the

of
principle

being

His

there is

no

us,

to have

it and

who

to

recourse

does

not

receive

Being
any
this

who

other

Being
perfections.And as in
there is no poten
metaphysicalmovement
possible,

Theologica.
The

from

essential

own

since His formal determinations

; and
tiality
in passivepotentiality,
Re is purely actual or
Such is the first proofdevelopedby St. Thomas
'

First

We

give

first and

motion.

things are

the
most

It is certain

in motion.

are

not

Pure

received

Actuality.

in his Summa

text.

manifest
and

way is the argument

that
evident to our
senses

Whatever

is in motion

is moved

from
some

by

THE

another, for nothing can

for
potentiality
whereas
"

motion

37

except it have

it is
as

being moved

it is actual.

nothing else than

mean

we

which

inasmuch

moves

"

GOD

be in motion

towards

that

thing

OF

EXISTENCE

the

By

reduction

of

into a state
of
something from a state of potentiality
actuality.Nothing, however, can be reduced from a state
unless by something
of potentiality
into a state of actuality,
Thus that which is actually
alreadyin a state of actuality.

wood, which is potentially

fire,makes
hot, to be
and changes it. It is not
hot, and thereby moves
actually
hot,

as

that the same

thing should be at once in a state of
possible
from the same
point of view,
actualityand potentiality
but only from different pointsof view.
What
is actually
hot cannot
be only potentially
hot ; still,
simultaneously
it is simultaneouslypotentially
It is therefore
cold.
impossiblethat from the same
point of view and in the
and mover,
same
or
way anything should be both moved
that

it should

motion
which

be

must

itself. Therefore, whatever

move

put in motion

it is put in motion

also must
another

needs

be

be itself

put in motion

again. This

by

another.

is in

If that

by

put in motion, then this

by another, and that by

because
infinity,
then there would be no first mover,
and, consequently,
no
other mover
that
seeing
only move
subsequentmovers
inasmuch
as they are
; as
put in motion by the first mover
the staff only moves
because it is put in motion by the
cannot

go

on

to

"

hand.

Therefore

put in motion
to be God

To

by

13.

:
(I) There
recapitulate

(II)The
11

'

it is necessary to arrive at a First Mover,

other ; and this everyone understands
no

'

Pyima

Certum

est

of

reason

autem,
enim, et

quod

the

are

formal

are

determinations

moved

which

'

they

sumitur
via est, quae
ex
parte motus.
in hoc mundo
: omne
autem,
constat, aliqua mover!
nisi secundum
alio movetur.
Nihil enim
quod
movetur,
et

manifestior

sensu

ab
movetur,
in potentia ad illud, ad quod movetur
autem
: movet
Movere
enim
nihil aliud est, quam
educere
quod est actu.
in actum.
De potentia autem
non
potest aliquid reduci
est

aliquod

'

beings that

aliquid,secundum
aliquidde potentia
in actum,

nisi per

ignis,facit lignum, quod est

calidum
in potentia, esse
actu
calidum, et per hoc movet, et alterat ipsum.
Non
autem
idem,
est possibile,ut idem
sit simul in actu et potentia secundum
sed solum
in actu, non
secundum
diversa ; quod enim
est calidum
potest simul
esse
calidum
in potentia,sed est simul frigidum in potentia. Impossibileest
vel
et motum,
idem, et eodemmodo
ergo, quod secundum
aliquid sit movens
moveri.
ab
alio
quod moveat
oportet
seipsum : omne
ergo, quod moveatur,
Si ergo id,a quo movetur,
illud
moveatur,
oportet et ipsum ab alio moveri, et
ens

in actu

sicut

calidum

in actu, ut

38

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

acquireis

in themselves

found

not

(Ill) To

explain how

necessary

to

these

it is therefore

acquired it

perfectionsare

admit, outside the series of agents that

would

go to form
which
comes

they

the

movement

then

admit

before
of

the existence

all movement,

d'etre of
must

Cause, withdrawn

of
principle

is itself the

which

raison

experience. We

our

motor

action.

moved, the total

give the

not

is

moved,

are

external

agent that is not itself subject to any

Because, if there existed only beings that are

an

series that

extrinsic.

its

from
deter

own

minations.
It is

importantto
It leads

argument.

that
perfections

of this
scope and validity
to place at the head of each series of
the exact

grasp
us

find before

we

in the world

us

formal

cause

plenarydegree these perfections.But it

does not prove that these pure actualities placed at the top
of each series of perfections
in such a way as to con
converge
in assert
stitute only one being. We are not at all yet justified
ing that there is one first Being or that there are man)* first
Beings. A further analysisof the notion to which this argu
leads us is necessary for our enlightenment on this point.
ment
In the same
cannot
we
immediately state the manner
way
in which the perfective
itself to the sub
communicates
reality
itself in
ject it perfects.Does the first Being communicate
to the potentiality
that it perfects
? Or is not this
trinsically
that

in

possesses

mode

"f communication

of pure

Actualityrequirethat
it

that

being
being

itself

be answered
We

completes in
of

one

the

is

alio

hie autem

baculus

non

devenire

ad

movet,

aliquod

intelliguntDeum
The

non

et
movens,
movent
non

secunda

above

Dominican

the

nature

determine

the

moved

eminent

an

series ?

and

manner

These

not

as

only

questions can

this

fundamental

the power

est

procedere

is also

in infinitum,

formal

quia

sic

may
from

we

their

from

other
a

meta

drawn

one

non

perfection,
esset

aliquod

nee
quia moventia
aliquod aliud movens,
per consequens
nisi per hoc, quod sunt mota
sicut
a
primo movente,
nisi per hoc, quod est motus
est
a
manu
; ergo necesse
hoc
et
moveatur
omnes
nullo
primum movens,
quod a
;

'.

Summa
Theologica,I, q. 2, a. 3.
of the following translations
most
are
translation
of St. Thomas
(Washbourne, London,
and

it

From

one.

follow, the

to act

from

drawn

argument

causalityof beings, the

contingency. For
ab

it should

arguments that

two

conditional

primum

the

also that

note

physicalmovement
the

not

by analysis.

must

deduce

does

impossible,and

taken

from

1914).

the

EXISTENCE

THE
and
the

again existence
argument

that the formal

has

the

same

which
cause

value

is

GOD

OF

39

perfective
actuality.In

is based

on

the

communicates
when

consequence
intrinsic determinations

to the

applied to

being in potentiality

action

and

existence

also.
22. Objections to the Preceding

Argument.

"

(a)The principle

be put in this form : A being

difficulty
may
that passes from potentiality
to actuality
does not find in itself
but in some
of the perfection
other being the reason
that it
or
acquires,
Quidquid movetur ab alio movetur ; but this prin
which
is the stapleof the argument given above, admits
ciple,
of exceptions. For there are
some
beings which pass from
however
being subject to any
potency to actualitywithout
external agency, e.g. livingbeings,
the characteristic of which
lies in the spontaneityof their immanent
The
action.
cell
nourishes
itself,and is certainlythe principleof its own

of movement.

nutrition.

objectionrests on the false assumption that life is

certain French
spontaneous in its activity
spiritualist
; and
are
philosophers
quitewrong in maintainingthat the charac
teristic of a livingbeing consists in this. The truth is that it
of action, not
immanence
spontaneity. In it the
possesses
is identical with the subjective
in other
efficient cause
cause,
the
is the same
words, the subjectthat receives the activity
as
that produces it ; but in the whole scale of living
principle
beingswe do not find any spontaneous action which is not sub
ordinated to an external influence.
The vegetableacts only
in consequence
of certain actions coming from outside itself.
Animal
excitation
life presupposes
caused
by the external
world and received by the sensitive cognitional
faculty. The
of man
mind
has knowledge only when
determined
concur
will is
his
the
active
and
and
intellect
the senses
rentlyby
;
solicited by the good which his mind
puts before it. After
excitation of this kind the livingbeing reacts, it acquires
an
a
perfectionnot possessedbefore, and this reaction which
is distinct from the action undergone this increase of actuality
find its adequate explanation only in the pre-motionof
can
the Being that is pure Actuality. This pointwill be explained
The

'

"

"

in detail in the last

more
we

are

part of this treatise. The objection

does not, then, in any way overthrow
the
considering
'

principleQuidquid movetur

ab

alio movetur

'. The

passage

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

40
'

'

from

power
tion exterior

'

to

act

'

in

livingbeingpresupposes

excita

an

facultythat acts and beyond this excita

tion itselfthe pre-motionfrom the first Cause.
that the founda
(b)The New Philosophyraises the objection
tion of being is nothing static but movement,
becoming ;
change is the fundamental, necessary reality.Reality is
continuous becoming and being is perpetual
spring'. The
to grant that if all move
advocates of this theory are willing
to

the

'

'

'

ment

necessarilybe derived

must

from

of explanation
would
principle

the ultimate

But
only in a supreme Unmoved.
-movement
as
thingsare themselves self
there is

furtherneed

no

something static,then
the

as

found

be
certainly
is

case

otherwise,

nothingbut movement,

and

theyreceived it.

to ask how

reply to this objectionis that a solution of this kind

of the
leads logically
to the denial of the objectivevalidity
of the
principleof sufficient reason
analysis,
or, in ultimate
of contradiction.
For, to become is to acquiresome
principle
thing. A thingcannot become what it alreadyis. And since
nothing can give itself what it does not already possess, it
must
receive it from some
being that does possess
necessarily
from some
it,and ultimately
beingwhich has not itself received
be
it from
this want
of having would
another
otherwise
traced from one
to another
and there would never
indefinitely
The

"

be

end.

an

Unless, then,

we

are

to introduce

contradiction

into the very heart of metaphysicsand to maintain

that reality
is self-contradictory,
of movement
must
we
positat the source

Unmoved

an

Being.

23. Argument

drawn

Efficient

from

which forms
metaphysicalreality
subordinated
causalitywhich we
surround

that

phrase. We
other

'

us,

Causality." I.

the basis of this

observe

can

in istis sensibilibus

', to

use

The

proofis

in

the

the

things

St. Thomas's

on
beings acting ; they depend essentially
for
activityand for the very being which
agents, both

is the

see

gives

out

heated

only
a

the

earth

the

sun.

II. Now

the

plantgrows
from

which

none

of its own
principle
involve

activity.For example, a pieceof coal

heat with
which
it has previouslybeen

of their

source

and

flowers and

it draws

of these
causal

the contradiction

causes

bears

nourishment

can

contain

fruit
and

by
the

within

means

of

rain and

itself the

activity.For, to suppose this would

of asserting
the one
hand that it
on

THE

depends for
the

activityon

it is not

that

other

its

of its

reason

OF

GOD

extrinsic

an

41

and
principle,

the

on

subjectto any external action since it has

in itself. Moreover, to say that
efficiency

own

efficient cause

an

EXISTENCE

of
principle

is the

its

being is to assert
dependent also for

own

before it exists ; it is therefore

its very being upon some
extrinsic to itself. A conditional
cause
efficient cause,
then, presupposes the action of a distinct being.
it acts

that

III. It is useless

to

series of

dependent

far from

solving the

series can

do

no

the other

On

make

to

either
and

merely
difficulty
than

is

therefore forced
'

The

conclusion

of

extrinsic

an

efficientcausation.

There

is

in which
indeed, possible)
is

which
go

intermediate
the

there be
no

be

cause,

no

it

same

Cause

find there is an

order of

(neitheris it,

known
is found

thing

be

to

the

priorto itself,
to
it is not possible

it would

be

followingin
whether

only.

one

and

cause,

cause,

take

To

the effect. Therefore, if

there will be

efficientcauses,

any

inde

efficient

case

away

among
nor

formalityof

several,or

is to take

first cause

ultimate

as

cause.

we

so

is

of the ultimate

cause

cause

cause

no

so

give the

of the intermediate

cause

is the

the intermediate

away

there

the

of itself; for

order, the first is the

the

causes

impossible.In efficientcauses
because in all efficientcauses
infinity,

to

on

that

is from
way
In the world of sense

efficient cause

of

is to

which

"

second

causation.

infinite

An

subordinate
dependent on some
dependent upon itself. We are

is thus

to the

all action

cause

it is

or

"

pendent of

it.

complicatethe problem indefinitely.

other

any
ourselves ;

in the series and

cause

imagined

cause

renews

singlecongeries,gives rise to a dilemma

distinct from
cause
dependent on some

whole

as

new

hand, mentallyto unite the chain

independentof

solution

since each

causes,

more

of them
the

down
causalityad infinitum

trace

If in efficient

intermediate.

it is possible
there will be no first
to go on to infinity,
efficientcause, neither will there be an ultimate effect,nor
causes

any

intermediate

false.

14

'

Secunda

via
esse

est

est

ordinem

ex

it is necessary
to which everyone
ratione

sliquid sit

possibile,quod
seipso,quod est impoesibile:
tibus

procedatur

cam:

in infinitum,

to

givesthe

efficientium,

non

est

name

Invenimus

nee

efficiens sui

autem

quia

put forward

efficientis.

causae

causarum

is

; all of which

causes

Therefore

Efficient Cause,

sensibilibus

efficient

tamen

ipsius,quia
possibile,quod in

in omnibus

causis

plainly
First

'14.

of God

in istis

enim

invenitur,
sic esset
causis

efficientibns

nee

prius

efficienordinatis

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

42

of the world
having
possibility
with
Thomas
St.
Some
existed ab aeterno.
great philosophers,
establish by reason
cannot
that we
at their head, maintain
have had a beginning. If the world
alone that the world must
had a beginning in time, there must
evidentlyexist an eternal
Here

self-subsisting
Being
nothingness nothing
could

historyof

the

could

establish

if

life

it

But

of

complete
if science

even

of this world

as

we

geologicaldata, etc., could

that

at

law

the

of

the forces of the world

could

alone

reason

find
trace

certain stage of the

if
impossible,

fact that

as

for out

come.

show

was

far-off ages,

originin

an

have

past and

the

evolutions

cosmic

could

commencement

caused

have

to

that the actual state

demonstrate

it had

the

speak of

must

we

had

have

be

never

entropy
that

sure

other state of
endlesslyprecededby some
of data.
which
science is entirelyignorant through absence
of the question
it is imprudent,seeingthe difficulty
In any case
with
of uncertainty of the best philosophers
the
and
state
the questionof the existence
regard to these matters, to identify
this state

world

the

the

b2yond

not, it is necessary

or

series of caused

causes,

even

if such

uncaused

Cause.

problem is

of

the existence

by

existed

always

has

an

us

there is to be found the

in another

is to say,
it did not seem

But

adequatereason

he calls such

passage

se, that

solved

not

similar

causes,

causes

to him

is in the

there

whole

causes

causae

in

singlecause
for example a

only
reality

primum
sive

est

causa

tantum

unum

medii,

et

medium

est

autem

causa,

remota

causa

primum

falsum.
omnes

Cp.

Sum.

in causis

Ergo
Deum

est

necesse

nominant

Theol
,

I, q. 46,

ponere
'.
a.

aliquam

Sum.
2, ad

number

of the workman

ultimi, sive media

non

erit

sint

prirna csusa
efficientem

causam

2,

plura,
si

non

Sed, si
efficiens,

mediae, quod patet

emcientes

Theol., I, q.
7.

which

effectus ; ergo,
removetur
erit ultimum, nee
medium.

emcientibus, non
in causis emcientibus,
procedatur in infinitum
erit nee
effectus ultimus, nee
ct sic non
causae

fuerit

causes

againper accidens,as
keep breakingin the hands

that

series of

say, in a series of exactly

limit. In this case
be any

ever

sum

is to

is replaced
againand

of hammers

in

impossiblethat

need

there

;
of the dependentcausality

subordinatae per
dependent in the very act of causing15.

dependent per accidens,that

11

infinite,

be

of times.
proposingit an endless number
says that reason
passage just quoted St. Thomas
in which
in the series of causes
to regress to infinity

the

forbids

quam

posit,

to

the fact of

In

esse

Whether

of the World.

that of the commencement

with

of God

not

was

a.

3.

primam

NATURAL

44

substances

yet these

THEOLOGY
indebted

are

to

some

other

being for

of itself
soul, which
(e.g.the human
is naturallyincorruptible)
also be that there is a
; it may
finds its explanationin itself.
necessity
necessary being whose

their necessary

being

of

nature

this sort, which

has

its

of

source

being

within

itself,is then inevitablyarrived at by a second syllogism.

The argument, however, can well be shortened
by the omission
of

middle

namely, the beings whose necessityis

from
contingentbeings to
dependent, and we pass directly
the being that is necessary
by itself. This is what we have
of our
done in the statement
proof.
and necessity,
The third way is taken from possibility
We
find in nature thingsthat could either
and runs
thus.
exist or not exist,since they are found to be generated,and
then to corrupt ; and, consequently,
they can exist,and
for these alwaysto exist,for
then not exist. It is impossible
time
that which can
one
day cease to exist must at some
to
have not existed. Therefore, if everythingcould cease
exist,then at one time there could have been nothingin
one

term,

'

existence. If this

were

true, even

now

there would

be noth

ing in existence, because that which does not exist only

beginsto exist by something alreadyexisting/Therefore,if
in existence,it would have been im
time nothing was
at one
possiblefor anythingto have begun to exist ; and thus even
be in existence
is absurd.
which
now
nothing would
but there
Therefore, not all beings are merely possible,
must
exist something the existence of which is necessary.
caused
by
Every necessary thing either has its necessity
It is impossible
in
to go on
to infinity.
another, or not.
things which have their necessitycaused by
necessary
another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient
but postulatethe existence of
Therefore we cannot
causes.
and not re
some
being having of itself its own
necessity,
ceivingit from another, but rather causing in others their
speak of as God '|16.
necessity. This all men
"

'

et necessario
ex
possibili,
(quae tails est). Ines.se, cum
quaedam, quse sunt possibiliaesse, et non
et
inveniantur
et
esse,
generari
corrumpi,
possibilia
quaedam
per consequens
et non
esse.
omnia, quae sunt talia, semper
Impossible est autem
esse, quia
Si igituromnia
est.
sunt possi
non
esse, quandoque
quod popsibileest non
etiam
Sed si hoc est verum,
nunc
bilia non
esse, aliquando nihil fuit in rebus.
Si
nihil esset, quia quod non
est, non
incipitesse, nisi per aliquid,quod est.
modo
fuit
ibile
sic
et
nihil
fuit,
quod
eese,
impose
aliquid
irciperet
enr,,
igitur
Non
entia sunt
nihil esset : quod patet esse
falsum.
possibilia,
ergo omnia
16

venimus

Tertia

enim

via

est

sumpta

in rebus

GOD

OF

EXISTENCE

THE

45

:
(I) There are beings which begin to be.
recapitulate
for by some
(II)These contingent beingsare only accounted
(Ill)No explanationof their
being external to themselves.
dependent existence is found by endlesslytracing a series of

To

do

beings that
Therefore

we

itself the

reason

their raison

contain

not

posita Being

must

d'etre in themselves.

which

shall contain

existence, in

of their

word,

within

necessary

Being17.
Common

25. Conclusion

into

sible to merge
from
do

which

uncaused

Is it evident
of its own
a

that

pure
The

being ?

three

Is it pos

arguments

contingency,presentingas they
differing
only in the pointsfrom
other, inasmuch

as

an

Actualitydraws

from

itself the

reason

will appear if we try to conceive

of all potentialitysuch is Pure Actuality

is devoid

beingthat

"

exist of itself. Is the first also involved

must

cause

Proofs.

these

involve each

conclusions

last two

Three

they start

The

and

reasoningand

same

these

singleconclusion

action

movement,

the

to

answer

"

:
explanatory,sufficient reason
such a being is inconceivable, since the purely Actual Being,
it contingent,would be at one time only capableof being,
were
actuality.
potentialto existence,and thus not simplyand solely

"and

yet is

There

is,then,

own

conclusion

common

developed,namely, that

have

we

its

not

contains within itselfthe

reason

the three

to

there

exists

arguments

Being

existence and

of its own

which

action,

all actual, so that it is potential

are
perfections
to receiving
further reality.
no
in deciding
These proofs,however, do not yet warrant
us
whether the Being which is purelyActual is infinite or finite,
of uniquenessor involves many
whether it has the perfection
further points will be determined
actualities. These
pure

and

sed

whose

necessarium
autem
in rebus.
Omne
necessarium
est autem
Non
habet.
necessitatis aliunde, vel non
causam
habent
in
in
infinitum
necessariis,
procedatur
quae

oportet aliquid

vel habet

causam

esse

suae

possibile,quod

necessitatis, sicut

suae

nee

in

dictisin ipso art.): ergo necesse

habens causam
necessitatis
non

quod
17

is

say

subject

raison

other

that

d'etre in

mately
cannot

to

call it

Deum'.

other

some

reducible

words,

efficientibus,ut

est ponere

Sum.
Theol., I, q. 2, a. 3.
but is not self -existent
and, in consequence,
exists,
being
to saying that it has its
change and destruction, is tantamount

dicunt

omnes

To

probatum est (in jam

aliquid,quod sit per se necessarium,
aliis :
necessitatis
aliunde, sed quod est causa

causis

to

the

synthetic a

esse

being. The principleof sufficient reason

Kantian
The
principle of contradiction.
and
since
esse
non
a
between
a se
esse
priori,

ab alio,it is evident

that

there

is

no

middle

term.

is ulti
school
se

or, in

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

46

by

of what
analysis
acquiredabout

careful

that

have

we

the

that

againstKant

in these first notions

is contained

We

may

transition from

the

God.

also here

remark

Being necessarily

order to the Infinite Being does not

ontological
This latter
argument.
appeal to the ontological
the concept of the greatest possible
being to the

existent

in the

involve

an

jumps from
factof its real existence. But in the argument which we are
that the necessary
first demonstrate
putting forward, we
further analysis
reveals must,
Being exists,and then whatever
by the very fact of this previousdemonstration, refer to the
real order ; for our
concepts are not in their buildingup or
in their further analysisthe resultants of subjectiveforms,
not a priori
are
syntheses.
now

able

to

proofsof the existence of God

important moral consequence

which

we

26.

We

Corollary.

"

religion. If

are

we

are

indebted

have

namely,

;
to

draw

first

the

from

the

three

established,an
foundation

Being for

of

essential

our

our
activityand our existence, there is a moral
perfections,
of worshippingthat Being. The act of worship
on
us
obligation
whereby we confess that God alone is He who is and that our
are
essentiallydependent upon Him
being and perfections

of

is that

mental

act

of this

manifestation

external

the

the

embraces

soul that it is subordinate

of the human

internal avowal
and

adoration, which

And

adoration.

to Him

avowal, is the funda

religion.

of natural

the Grades
mani
of Perfection
from
Argument drawn
of this proof is as
fested in Beings. St. Thomas's
exposition

27.

"

follows

:
"

'

in

The

is taken

fourth way

from the

beingsthere

things.Among

are

gradationto

some

more

and

'

be found
less

some

'

'

'

less
and
more
good, true, noble, and the like. But
are
predicatedof different things,according as they re
semble in their different ways something which is in the
degree of most ',as a thingis said to be hotter according
as it more
nearlyresembles that which is hottest ; so that
'

is truest,

something best,some
something which is utter
thing noblest, and, consequently,
most
trulythey
being; for the truer things are, the more
there is

something which

exist. What
in that

is most

genus ;
of heat, is the

as

cause

of all
genus is the cause
is the most
completeform

completein any
fire,which

whereby

all

things are

made

hot.

EXISTENCE

THE

Therefore

there

beings the

cause

perfection
; and
At first sightSt.
notice in

beings which

OF

GOD

47

also be

something which is to all

of their being,goodness,and every other
must

this

Thomas's
the

are

'

call God

we

18.

to be this : We
proof seems
objectof our knowledge a gradu

scale of

ated

:
virtue, nobleness, goodness, etc.,
perfections
appear before us in varyingdegrees. But we judge the degree
of perfection
that we
find,according as it approximatesto or

falls away

from

type. Therefore, since

supreme

parativepresupposes

this
superlative,

com

every

ideal of

perfection

exist.

must

To

proofthe objectionmight very well be raised that

this absolute perfection
the standard
for judg
which
we
use
as
realized in the things we
know,
ing the degree of perfection
is merely a concept of our
mind.
Is there not latent in St.
Thomas's
proof the old fallacyof the ontological
argument,
the existence of this ideal in the mind to its ex
a jump from
such

istence in the real order ?

As

proof,we think, has in the mind of

Aquinas quiteanother meaning 19 :
I. We discover that in beingsthere are graduatedperfections.
II. The
limitation of virtue, goodness, nobleness, etc.,
shows that these perfections
do not belong to the beings of
a

matter

of fact the

"

themselves,in virtue of their essences.

that which makes
it is
a being what
"

in

For
cannot

an

be

Essence

"

i.e.

partlyverified

is
being ; the perfection
possessedin virtue of its essence
not a
or
wholly present or else not at all : a being is a man
and
cannot
be partly a man.
man,
Conversely,anything
a

that is
cannot

its reason
11

less
that admits of more
or
way
belongto it in virtue of its essence, but must have for

present in

being in

than

somethingelse other

the

For

essence.

it would

'

Invenitur
ex
Quarto,via sumitur
gradibus, qui in rebus inveniuntur.
et sic de
et
et
minus
nobile,
et
bonum,
verum,
aliquid magis,
aliis hujusmodi.
de diversis, secundum
Sed magis, et minus
dicuntur
quod
sicut
est :
ad
magis
appropinquant diversimode
aliquid, quod maxime
calidum
Est igituraliquid,
calido.
est, quod magis appropinquat maxime
maxime
et per consequens
quod est verissimum, et optimum, et nobilissimum,
dicitur
2.
Nam
sunt
ut
ens.
maxime
maxime
sunt
Metaph.
entia,
vera,
quae
omnium,
est causa
dicitur maxime
Quod autem
tale in aliquo genere,
quae
omnium
sunt
illius generis ; sicut ignis,qui est maxime
calidus, est causa
entibus
calidorum, ut in eodemlibro
dicitur.
Ergo est aliquid,quod omnibus
Deum
'.
est causa
dicimus
hoc
et
esse, et bonitatis, et cujuslibetperfectionis,
enim

Sum.
11

in rebus

Theol., I, q.
Our

2,

a.

3.

interpretation is founded
especiallySum. cont. Gent., II, c. 15,

other

on

and

De

passages

Potentia, q. 3,

from
a.

5.

St.

Thomas,

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

48
indeed

be

is likewise the formal

wisdom

it is true to say that this

by virtue of its essence,
it and

causal

III. But

have

have

found

in the

the extrinsic

seen

in the fact that

by existence,and
material

communicated

intervention

the

of

the

the

three

action.

above, it is

arguments

essence

is the

in
why the perfections

reason

actualityof

in which

cause

some

inde

limited,viz. their dependence on an extrinsic

yet to inquirewhat is the intrinsic reason.

being are
We

been

explanationto posita being which

the Being we call God.
perfections,

of its own

We

it has

that

for their

necessary
reason

itself.

established

have

we

of wisdom.

no

of

is

wisdom

for supposing an
justification
caused by an extrinsic
perfections

is

finitely
long series
As

but

than

there

which

by

of the absence

reason

consequentlypresupposes

agent other

that

in a limited degree
perfection
does not belong to the being
perfection

find

Wherever, therefore,we

to

to hold that

contradiction

is that

is limited

This

it is received.

is

cause.

It is

is actualized

which

existence

case

by

the

where

of Scholastic metaphysics:
apply the generalprinciple
ad modum
Receptum est in recipiente
recipients.A being's
it is its role to
existence is limited to the essential perfections
of a being is the intrinsic reason
The receptivity
make actual.
must

we

it is not

why

being
its

correspondsto
for this
who
is

itself but

is self-existent and receives not

limitation

no

We

be careful

drawn

St. Thomas

by

fections of
head

to

things.

of each

much

its

it is finitein its existence.

reason

must

just that

or
potentiality,

subjectto

the

has

being which

receptivity.It

God,

on

the

His existence from

in His essential

is

contrary,
another,

perfections.

notice the limits of this argument

from the degrees observable in the per
to

In the first place,he

series of

does

say that at
there is a being
not

graduated beings
eminent
which
degree their essential type.
possesses in an
This is the realisticconception of Plato, not the thought of the
The
latter asserts
that the perfections
we
Angelic Doctor.
in
world
find in varying degrees
the
mind
carry our
up to
absolute

the principles
of these limited perfec
as
perfections,
tions in the world.
Secondly,he makes no further statement
united
these total perfections
in a single
to whether
as
are
Being or whether there exist several beings each possessing

EXISTENCE

THE

perfectionsin

certain

28.

the

drawn

Argument

That

GOD

degree,or

there is order

whether

even

adapted to

make

one

Order

the

from

there

Universe."

abundantly manifest ;
activities composing the world
and
are
and enduring whole.
This
harmonious

and
free
intelligent
conceived its design,then to have chosen

demands

the

of

is

universe

in the

elements

many

order

49

absolutely
perfectbeings.

several

are

supreme

OF

have

first to

cause,

an

to carry it into

execu

it is not.
or
necessary cause
If it is necessary, the existence of God is proved. If it is con
and
to a necessary
cause
tingent,it leads us in its last analysis

tion.

thus

this

Now

again

the

to

come

we

is either

cause

Being.

divine

"

is the

Such

Summa

develops in his

that St. Thomas

argument

fifth

Theologica.

of the
is taken from
fifth way
the governance
such
world ; for we see that thingswhich lack intelligence,
natural bodies, act for some
as
purpose, which fact is evi
1

The

actingalways,or nearlyalwaysin the

dent from their

so

way,
not

Hence

the best result.

to obtain

as

it is

same

plainthat

do they achieve
but designedly,
fortuitously,

their pur

fulfil some
cannot
intelligence
pur
in
endowed
with
unless
it
is
directed
some
being
by
pose,
is shot to its mark
and knowledge ; as the arrow
telligence
being exists by
intelligent
by the archer. Therefore some
whom
all natural
things are ordained towards a definite

purpose
We

lacks

Whatever

pose.

and

this

beingwe

first establish the

must

'

call God

20.

and

major

the

minor

of this

argument.
I. We
order

of the

Order
to

have

the notion of order

alreadyexamined
universe (Gen. Metaphysics,169 ff.).

unity. By

the

kinds of order, that

of subordination

elements

or

constitute

In the second

the

leading in some
way
of unification we
distinguishtwo
principle

manifold

supposes

and

elements

of co-ordination
order.
teleological
the

parts of

the elements

are

one

means

all

or

sesthetical order, that

In the first the different
and

the

same

arrangedin

view

whole.
of

one

viasumitur
enim.quod alicua,
: Videmus
rerum
ex
gubematione
natnralia, operantur propter finem,
cognitione carent, scilicet corpora
modo
operantur,
aut
quod apparet ex hoc, quod semper,
frequentius eodem
red
ut consequaritur id, quod
a
casu,
Unde
est optimum.
patet, quod non
ex
intentione perveniunt ad finem.
habent
Ea autem,
cognitior.em,
quae non
non
tendunt
in finem, nisi directa ab aliquo cognoscente et intelligent, sicut
naturales
res
sagitta a sagittante; ergo est aliquisintelli^ens,a quo omnes
ordinantur ad finem, e* hcc dicimus
Sum.
Deun~
Theol., I, q. 2, a. 3.
80

'Quinta

quae

'

NATURAL

50
and

the

end.

same

In

order ; for every

same
are

arranged

so

tend

realize the

to

which

is

which

is

these
reality

form

harmonious

one

end.

same

but

are

order

The
of the

static,exists in view

aspectsof the

two

for action.

being is made

to

as

THEOLOGY

order

The

elements

whole, and they

of co-ordination,
of subordination,

dynamic. Now
turning to order in the universe we
notice the followingvarious ways
it is exhibited :
in which
(a) Every livingorganism displayswonderful order in the nice
adjustment of its various parts. All its organs are perfectly
arranged and work togetherfor the welfare of the whole living
"

being.

Each

elements
nected

is made

too

organ

displayingforces

and

subordinated

organism.

This

class of

of

number

immense

an

different yet so intercon

to subserve the good of the entire

that

as

of

up
are

orderliness that

phenomena presentsan

order
that has refer
one
particular
ence
only to the individual beingof which it is a characteristic.
(b) Furthermore, thingsdo not fulfil the end of their being
in a
of isolation. They are
bound
state
up with certain
other thingsand in such a way
that their mutual
adaptations
we

term

may

present

absolute

an

"

orderliness which,

an

as

distinguishedfrom

the

above,

order. An example is to be
particular
found in the wonderful
proportionexistingbetween the anato
of the eye and the physiological
mical structure
working of
and its physical
the visual organ on the one
hand
agent, light,
be called relative

may

the other,

on

(c)There

are

discernible

classes

stillwider

even

combinations, the different kingdoms of beingswhich exhibit

further mutual
static and dynamic. The interdepend
relations,
of

of

ence

all the

parts

universal order.

The

of

world

the
is

constitutes

universe
a

instinct with

poem

and displaying
a marvellous
life,
harmony, known
the

as

basis

The

Cosmos.
of

the

is

fresh

constant.

ment,

the

The

universe

individual

the

revelation

Lastly, this order, absolute and

universal, is not a passingphase
and

action and

to the Greeks

existence of order in the universe

physicalsciences,and

scientific progress

relative

and

order,

of

(d)

particularand

something continuous

is animated

characters

this

relative,
but

result

invariable
of

is the

the

with
scenes

incessant
shift

move

rapidly;

yet in the perpetualflux types remain constant, ends do not

alter,the good alike of individuals and of the whole steadily
continues
To

to be

attained.

guard againstany misconceptionof

the

meaning

of these

their nice
and

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

52

proportions,imply

act

an

of will that

that

the

conceived

carried it into execution

has

this

be

must
designingcause
and will,//
(b)And
gence

mind

agent endowed

an

offers

chance

no

in the universe.

of the relative order manifest

To

is,

; that

intelli

with

better

plan

explanation
take

but

one

example : the breathingof animals and the action of chlorophyl

in plantskeeps our
atmosphere constantlyadapted to the life
of both
kingdoms. The chemical bodies composing the air
in themselves
indifferent to forming either a useful or a
are
be accountable
noxious admixture, and therefore they cannot
for this effect. Neither are plantsand animals if left to them
selves the sole causes, for there is nothingto stop plantsfrom
indefinitely
absorbingthe carbonic acid with their green parts
and animals from breathingit out in unlimited
quantities,
order
of which
and thus militating
the
against
very relative
their jointaction is an example. The only sufficient reason
of the phenomena of this kind is to be found once
again in
of the beings themselves
outside
which
a
cause
controlling
exhibit

this order,

immense

drama
that

scenes

universe taken

(c)The

where

succeed

the

one

whole

is like

an

of the innumerable

generalsuccess
is secured

another

as

by

the harmonious

settingand developmentof all its parts. This likewise requires

for its adequatecause
an
as
intelligence
designer, (d) Finally,
the evolution

and

of the world

numberless
well-nigh

counts

yet in these similar though

not

identical

phases,

situations

there

the

of parts which is conducive

that interplay
reappears
welfare of the whole.
Here
the inadequacy of chance

the

most

apparent

the

sake

of

ever

; for the

cosmic

to

is

order is

persistent
despite
in it,despitethe
the multiplicity
of parts that are concerned
varietyof phases in which it manifests itself. Suppose, for
argument, that

action did
particular
what
preventedthis

order

the next

The

must

have

be

moment

sought

in

for a

to account

at

indifferent to any
combine
harmoniously;

elements

some

moment

some

from
reason

supreme

broken up at
being hopelessly
of the persistence
of this order
controllingforce,and since we

phenomenon

which

undoubtedlyevidences

have a lifethat is endowed

and will,this being must
intelligence
and
with
will. Hence
to the general
come
we
intelligence
which
conclusion that the only cause
explainsthe order we
observe

in nature

throughoutthe

is to be found

in

which
principle

universe the combination

of elements

determines
and

beings

THE

towards

the

good

EXISTENCE
of

OF

GOD

53
and

of kingdoms
species,

of the

whole

even

if you

universe.
III. Now

such

it to be

allow

presuppose
Itself the
29.

only contingentin
existence

the

of Its

reason

Corollaries.

efficient cause
world

intelligent,
voluntarycause,

an

i.

"

own

We

of

anterior

being and
have

of the wonderful

around

an

its nature, must

necessarily

Being

of Its

own

that

has

perfection.

established the existence of

order

which

an

is in

observe

we

in

this cause
whether
questionnow
is reallydistinct from
out
the designwhich is being worked
and the end to which it is progressing.If this exemplary cause
and this final cause
which
have
to postulate
been bound
we
the

are

We

us.

in their nature, then

efficient cause
from which

necessary

necessary

proceeds. If they
necessary
shall have

cause

are

they

are

the

contingent,they

identical with

order of the universe

must

depend

on

it is in this latter that

and, consequently,

to placethe designand
ultimately

universe, for

creatures

intervention

of the

can

neither exist

necessary

cause.

the

We

nor

the purpose
act

thus

we

of the

without
come

the

to

the
ac

the efficient,
knowledge a necessary Being that is at once
exemplary and final cause of the world He has brought into
being.
next
2. The
argument
questionin this physico-theological
is whether
the controlling,
of the universe
ordinatingcause
is one
In reference to this questionwe may
or many.
remark,
in the first place,that there is no
need to postulateseveral
designersin order to explainthe tendency towards the good
that we
observe : one alone is sufficient. In the second place,
from
the unity of the order which
reveals the
the cosmos
over
legitimateinference is that it is a singleGod who presides
the governance
of the world.
it is possible
to con
Certainly
ceive two beingswith identically
end in view in their
the same
of
means
rulingof the world and using exactly the same
But
it would
to assert the
be gratuitous
bringingit about.
actual existence of two such beings: if the end and action of
the two governingcauses
are
identical,one of them is useless.
Hence we have here at least a presumptionin favour of there
beingonly one God.
30. Note.
The proof we
have just developedis not merely
an
inclined to think so,
argument from analogy. If some
are
the reason
is to be found in the faultyexposition
given of
"

NATURAL

54

THEOLOGY

this

They argue that we judge the

proofby certain authors.
intellectual capacity of our
fellow-men
by the adaptation
of the means
they choose to their ends, that order or adaptation
is an
indication of intelligence
; that the universe manifests
order ; therefore,etc.
Argument of this kind need
supreme
cause
no
misgiving. The example given embodies
simply
of
the
of
order
the
which
a
on
singleapplication
principle
physico-theological
argument is based ; the real argument is
that

arranges

which

and

from

St. Thomas

beingsas

arguments which
31.
we

ment

on

is not

then

that

the

towards

such

the earth

of the
these

as

Existence
:

that

of

had

of

and

over

life has

had

shows

that

above

cosmic

the

condensation

and

in time,

been

reached.

nature
scientific

of matter
first place,

still less for intellectual life;

commencement
have

proofs

commence

entropy

equilibriumwould
considerations

The

God."

of

simpleintrinsic evolution
accountingfor vegetablelifein the
; that

equilibriumof

an

have

that

the

for sensitive life and

law

in

are

infrequentlybrought forward.

not

Proofs

capableof

and

must

are

that

proofsfor the existence of

draws from the different
aspectsof being
other
some
whole, we must notice briefly

are

Scientific

refer to

elements

can

of sufficient reason.
principle
After having thus examined

God

between

only be explained by a cause

them
(Gen. Metaphysics,
by its intelligence
argument is based not on analogy but on the

ff.). Our

171

obtains

indifferent

themselves
which

which

order

the

the actual

or

forces tend

proves that they

else that state of

These

and

valuable

are

universe

indications
is

there

kindred

something

explains this acquisitionof forces and directs this

evolution.
They are different aspects of a process of reality
which is not self-explanatory
; but by themselves
they have
unless supportedby the philosophical,
no
metaphysical
cogency
that this principle
of explana
argument which demonstrates
be pure Actuality,
must
tion taken to its last analysis
necessary
first
subsistent
and
Cause,
Perfection,
highest Intel
Being,
ligence.

which

32. Proof

drawn

In the fact that all

God
and
we

some

see

from

the Common

races

of

men

of Mankind.

acknowledge the

spontaneousdeclaration

this, they argue, cannot

think, calls for two remarks.

Consent

"

existence of

part of humanity,
be fallacious. This argument,
on

the

EXISTENCE

THE

GOD

OF

55

of ages many
erroneous
therefore
and
entertained,
a unanimous

In the first place,

duringthe

course

have been
conceptions
verdict is not always infallible. Nevertheless,for psychological
reasons
special
weight does attach to this universal testimony
It is a question,
Pascal
as
regarding the existence of God.
well observes, that is of the utmost
importance. It
very
has

that there is

Master

itself from

ate

spiteof

that

seem

the

assertion that God

proofsof
In

here

no

mere

time

exists.

mental

or

God's

and

races

then, in

through

is

This

for

energy

for

has

who

man

examining

is

which

argument

an

intrinsic

the

existence.
ideas of God vary very
place,since human
different peoples,this argument
does not in

the second

among
realitydemonstrate
more

brief,we

than

more

that

is above

there

higherbeings rulingthe destinies

have to guard against two excesses

is sometimes

made

to

prove
value.

too

much,

33. Proof

from

the

Higher

one

men

of mankind.

In

the argument
sometimes
it is

and

Its real value

despisedas having no
a presumptionthat valid proofsdo exist.
'

If

anthropomorphism
are
proofswarranting

but perfectly
sound
extrinsic,

much

or

have

we

the

law.

all

punishes

sought to liber

ever

moral

morallycertain indication that there

indirect and

who

of every temperament, learned and unlearned,

all acknowledgingthe existence of God,
illiterate,

but

not

of the

find among

bias,we

life if he knows

men

cultured and
it would

passionhas

this Guardian

this natural

all times

out

Human

man's

his service and

claims

who

he does amiss.

what

the direction of

great bearing on

is that it

Aspirations of

supplies

Mankind.

"

'

in te
writes
requiescat
St. Augustine, and we
find the echo in the Melanges philosophiquesof the unfortunate Jouffroy, All earthlysatisfaction
graduallyexhausts itself and ends in disappointmentand dis
gust '. Man, it is argued,has been made for the true and the
when
virtue will be clasped
good ; he yearns for that yet-to-be
in the embrace
of happinessand its present divorce for ever
ended.
Such happinesscan
only consist in the contemplation

Irrequietumest

donee

nostrum

cor

'

of the true, and

therefore exist.
Granted

that

since the true

Is this

human

flaw, undoubtedly God

activities. But

can

we

valid

must

proof?
vitiated

nature' is not
must

alone He

in God

is found

exist

as

postulatethat

the
our

by

end
nature

radical

some

of its
is

so

higher
made

56

NATURAL

THEOLOGY

Is it not

it that we know
because it is God who made
precisely
it is a perfectproduction ?
How, in consequence,
we
can
affirm the existence of God
by basing it on the needs of our
?

nature

It is true

alone

man

But

this is

with

it more

can

we

of all creatures

would

only an argument

from

than

Again, why
world

We

have

need

we

exist,

not

be

irremediablyunhappy.
carries
analogy that scarcely

of God

the

as

is necessary

led back

thus

are

did

probability.

except because He

nature

that, if God

say

as

an

satisfaction of

our

explanationof

the

examine

to

the

traditional

proofs of God's existence, and to weigh in the light of

objectiveevidence of the principleof sufficient reason
motives leadingus to positHis existence.
34. Proof

is

he

then

law

so

eternal

the

as

and

and

Man

"

to

avoid

feels that

evil.

God

the

Legislator.
all-powerful
that
this
all,
proofdoes not demon
God.
It merely declares that the man
God
has already admitted
obligation
imposes His will. The certitude of

first of

existence of

admits

who

practise
good

to

remark,

must

strate the

Obligation.

the

there can
be no law.
exist,for without a legislator
universal,so imperiousas the moral law presupposes

supreme,

We

Moral

from

morally bound

must

drawn

the

moral

Legislatorwho

God's existence is the

same

as

that of the moral

law.

With

the

spectacleof nature and humanity before his eyes man

spon
taneouslyacknowledges that there is a higher Being who
obligeshim to do his duty. If the existence of God is not
is a pure illusion,
and
of moral obligation
admitted, his feeling
there is no
further questionof duty. This proof,if it were
but a simultaneo (16),
like the
valid,would not be a posteriori,
argument
In

of St. Anselm.

place,the fact of moral obligationcould,

in our
opinion,be sufficiently
explained without having
to a divine Legislator.Human
nature
because it is
recourse
natural tendencyafter the true and
human, strives by its own
the good. To fail in its human
dignity,to disregardthe re
quirementsof justicetowards our fellow-men, is self-degrada
the

tion, and

second

be used

may
end

;
"

or

so,

in two

senses.

own

Either

law.

For

it is the

the word
ordinance

'

law
of

'

for gaininga special

this or that means
prescribes
its own
it is the natural tendency of a being towards
laws. Now
to say
e.g., we speak of chemical or physical

superiorwho
end

fallingshort of its

EXISTENCE

THE
that the law of

Legislator,is to

supreme
'

'

law

that

used

be

cannot

when

intimate

second

in itself. And

what

in this it would

57

law

in

and

this

word

surely is

not,

or

no

were

the

case

wish U

we

feel

offendingagainst the

are

merely considered

nature

that

seem

if there

our

sense,
we

is wrong
we
requirementsof our human
do

we

that

suppose

in the

GOD

be

not

question. Whether

the whole

beg

to

would

nature

our

OF

there

is

sufficient

obligationwhich is yet consistent with the

play of liberty,since the good that is presented to us in the
conditions of our
present lifealways carries with it at the same
of doing wrong.
time the possibility
if considered
Certainly,
for

reason

real

of

this
ontologically,

law

until

that God

are

we

of this.

For

does

God

exists

be ignorant
perforce
His will openly as do

must

we

manifest

not

of God, but

work

but He ingrainsit in the

legislators,
nature
(Ethics,40). Hence it appears

human

of

aware

is the

nature

our

very
that

tendencies

special
a divine
argument can be drawn from moral obligation
requiring
Legislatorfor its immediate
explanation. The proof which
is adduced
is not an independentone, but is reducible to the
fourth developedby St. Thomas
(27): namely, that our con
our

science

informs

virtuous, and
of

Being
Being

sary
see here

that

us

therefore

must

more

have

or

less

share

Goodness.

feel himself

cannot
a

we

are

is subsistent

who

also

we

to be

good, more
of the

Moreover
under

no

as

or

perfections
the

neces

we
obligation,

aspect of contingencyor
particular

less

can

of movement.

Furthermore, the argument may take the form of a considera

tion of man
he
as
a whole, not
simply of the moral obligation
him
but also of a tendency
recognizesas incumbent
upon
towards
a reward, or
as
sanction,of virtue.
happinessprecisely
The performanceof duty we feel must
lead to completehappi
consist in the contemplation
of God in another
which must
ness

life (Ethics,
10-13),or if not, if there
would

nature

be

an

were

no

sanction,our

moral

imperfectproduction,and

we

might just

well set at

ourselves to
naught the call of duty and abandon
the pleasuresof the senses
and of the present life as surrender
these enjoyments to follow the strait path of duty. Pre

as

sented

God
man,
21

the ethical argument for the existence of

of
to the proof from the natural aspirations

in this form

is reducible
and
These

theyarc

to

subjecttherefore
different

be treated

points
ex

to the

cannot

in
professo

be
the

same

criticisms ai.

fully discussed

largerwork

on

here

in

this

manual

Natural Theology*

CHAPTER

THE

35.

METAPHYSICAL

which

whether
or

ESSENCE

the

number

of

its

of

subjects

it is

latter

concerns

in

second

united, and, in this

sense,

this
it

stantial

essential

and

life

of

need

and

on

seen

the

to

From

the

so

many

or

analysis

substance,

misleading
further

and

that
sub

logical
made

about

Thus

and

et

specific differ
For

properties
them

of

all

to

good
being
avoid

implicitly,
difficulty

without

may

that

say

given explicitly,but

reasoning

the

animalitas

the

contain

of

up

can

essence.

all the

con

defining

we

rationale,

genus

it must

may

and

matter

whole

set

parts.

be

we

essence.

may

essence

type.

physical parts

metaphysical

of

fixed

necessary,

single

(animal

that

one

indissolubly

are

clearness

and

these

cannot,

and

of

as

proximate
as

that

primary

physical

only

combination

material

sake

reason

indeed

as

namely,

the

metaphysical

being defective
them.

discover

and

an

or

relation

is the

really distinct

is its

regarded

definition

that

is

essence

the

are

man

not,

its

comprising

which

perfections

the

it into

by analysing

of

is

applied.

as

appears

logical parts,

or

rationalitas)

sical

an

view,

type

also, for

metaphysical
sensitive

be

can

relative

essence

in

say,

it constitutes

this

consider

sistency,

The

and

may

we

whole

of

its constitution,

form

But

it

or

expressing

by

into

enter

is to

essence

notes

define

that

point

of

number

When

former,

the

beings

contingent

from

regarded

itself,absolutely,

here, every

us

certain

of

matter

no

comprehension.

this

From

so

be

which

to

world

of

essences

knowledge,

our

the

From

extension,

regarded

its

in

notes

view.

of

point

side

ence

in

merely possible, may

absolute

of

GOD

The

"

object

exist

really

OF

Essence.

Metaphysical

form

they

are

the

of

Meaning

things

problem
essence

different

of

before

God,

from

us

what
every

is to

ascertain

is that
other

which

what
makes

being, just

as

is the
God

metaphy
what

sensitive

He

is,

life and

make

reason

scale of
At

to be

man

OF

NATURE

THE

to hold

and

man

61

GOD

distinct

placein

the

beings.

first

sight

may

be

to

appear

futile,

absolutely simple perfectionof

the

in

that

seeing

question

the

God

complexity,and therefore no matter for analysis.

However, since the supereminent perfectionof the Infinite
Being is in our thought equivalentto a metaphysicalwhole
for us to make
it is quitepossible
of a very vast comprehension,
of the essences
of
like that we make
a logical
analysisof God
define them
finite things when
we
by their metaphysicalparts
which
constituents the reality
and so reduce to fundamental
endeavour
they each severallycontain. Consequently our
here is to ascertain what from our point of view is that divine
the explicit
concept of which takes precedenceover
perfection
is

there

no

'

'

all others
from

analysisof this
belonging tc
perfections

the

all the

mere

of the

36. Solution

Four

sistens'.
"

and

Descartes
the

'

Deus

deserve

The

2.

of the

attention

follow

Leibniz

the

make

preferencefor
of

School

divine

Duns

Esse

Sub-

have

been

intensive
God

of

that

fundamental attribute
possibleperfections.
3. Billuart24 and

in

thought

of

consist

in

to

highestpower,
extensive

an

sense.

philosophyand seem
absolute goodness.
Scotus23 places the characteristic

in the

essence

their

raised to

attributes

the

of God

essence

understood
say, to infinity
Some, however, hark back to the Platonic
to have

deduce

may

Ipsum

est

is to

that

that

so

Being.

our

philosopherswho

of all His

sum

that

we
perfection

the divine

Question:

answers

modern

The

first

Being,

supreme

question32.

this

given to
1.

characteristic of the

the

as

Thomists

some

i.e. in

infinityof God,
is the

which

of

recent

thought.
commonly, with St. Thomas,

of

root

all

it

make

date

consist in intellectual
4. But

more

of God

essence

is considered

lie in the

to

the
very

metaphysical
being

of

God,

is in
exaggerate the importance of this discussion, which
it
seen:s
chief
Its
merit,
realityonly a simple question of scientific method.
if philosophers
to us, is that it emphasizes the simplicityof God, inasmuch
as
11

We

should

constrained

are

perfection from
viction

a.

that

"

In

24

Cursus

i.

at

not

by

the

this
bottom

or

very
that
these

Sent., dist. 3.
Theol., I, Diss.

limits

of the

human

mind

particularaspect, they
divine
perfectionsare
2,

a.

2,

"

2.

"

Cp. GONET,

at

to
once

but

one

study
and

the

divine

their

evince

the

Clypeus,Tr.

con

same.

I. Disp. 2,

NATURAL

62

THEOLOGY

'

'

irreceptum or, to adopt a Latinism commonly made use

St. Thomas
of, in His aseity,esse a se'K.
says :"
Absolute being,that is to say, beingconsidered as including
the whole
of being, surpasses both the perfection
perfection
of life and
other
definite perfection.And
therefore
every
absolute being contains eminently in itself all other perfec
is here speaking of the
tions '. It is clear that St. Thomas
absolute Being,esse irreceptum,esse a se, for he immediately
adds :
But being which is received in particular
things that
of being but have a limited
do not possess the whole perfection
being,as the being enjoyedby a creature, is less perfectthan
that which has a determined
added to it. This is why
perfection
the pseudo-Dionysius
beings are more
perfect
says that living
esse

'

'

'

beings which

than

more
intelligence

this

proof should
to

proper

place in
and

larger treatise

presumingas

it does

truths

on

theless it will be convenient

existence is

in the

and

of the

have

we

To

yet

the

drift of it,

existence

It

that actual

it is shown

metaphysicalessence

actual absolute

Never

to establish.

to notice the

here

part of

that

second

of

is the

God,

whole

metaphysicalessence.
Actual

I.

not

"

parts,in the first of which

falls into two

absolute

enjoy its full force

of reasonings
a
sequence
by itself as here,
appear

Opinion.

its

find

'

those

than
perfect

of St. Thomas's

37. Proof

with
beings endowed
which are merely living 28.

life and

exist without

absolute

God.

We

existence

being is

itself the

that

have

seen
of
Actuality,Necessary Being.
essence

"

Since

of its

reason

belongs to
the

the

First

metaphysical
Being is Pure

it is evident

that

such

existence,it is unwarrantable

postulateoutside of this being a priorand further reason

for its actual perfections
Must it not be that
and existence.
is essentially
who
one
Being must be Actual Being ? Does
in here ?
not the principle
of identity
come
to

""

Zigliarahas

were

intended

with

but

tried to reconcile

to

doubtful
have

complete
success

it.

each
; he

the two
other

appears

(Summa

last

opinions and

to show

that

they

his attempt
to have met
seems
; but
rather
to have
the discussion
evaded

Phil., Vol. II, p. 325.)

simpliciteracceptum, secundum
quod includit in se omnem
perfectionem
essendi, praeeminet vitae et omnibus
perfectionibussubsequentibus.
Sic igituripsum esse
bona
praehabet in se omnia
subsequentia. Sed si consideretur
habent
ipsum esse, prout participaturin hac re vel in ilia,quae non
totam
sed
sicut
habent
est
esse
essendi,
esse
perfectionem
imperfectum,
sic
manifestum
est
esse
cum
cujuslibetcreaturae
perfectionc
;
quod ipsum
Unde
superaddita est eminentius.
Dionysius dicit, quod viventia sunt meliora existentibus, et intelligentia
viventibus
'. I-II, q. 2, a. S.^ad.2.
than
*

to

'

Esse

ended

THE
absolute

Actual

2.

God.

OF

NATURE

is

existence

GOD

63

the

whole

metaphysical

be

existent,to be subessentially
is ground for a sufficient and explicit
sistent absolutely,
distinc
tion between
God
and contingent
things; secondly,from such
shall presently
absolute essential existence,as we
be
see, can
deduced
by analysisand reasoningall the divine perfections,
and intelligence37.
even
includinginfinity

of

essence

to
Firstly,

"

Criticism

38.

Thesis.

The

"

is

what

the

of

other

requiredfor

Opinions Opposed

St.

to

opinionswe have mentioned

a true
metaphysicalessence

Thomas's

fail to

give

of the divine

Being.
of the

Each

1.

first

the
perfections

opinion constitutes

anterior to this union

Those

who

of which

essence

of

accordingto this
God, is evidently

itself.

of God
consist
metaphysicalessence
absolute goodnesscan
to the sumtotal
only be referring
they lay themselves open
perfections
; consequently

in His
of His
to the

make

the

criticism

same

the notion of

and

the

union

the Cartesian

as

goodness is

view above.

Moreover,

superaddedto the notion of

one

being

is not

priorto it.
of God is not a principle
which reveals to us
2. The
infinity
the necessity
of the existence of the self-subsistent Being, but
it is a conclusion to be inferred from this necessity
as
itself,
wili be seen
presently.
that the metaphysicalessence
Billuart maintains
3. When
of God
and

be found

must

in the most

under
labouring

Thomas, between
God

and

(see 36,
2T

abstract

the

passage

which

makes

spoken

of

fore, that

form

Therefore
'

Esse

His

it is

est

actualitas

spoken

in subsistence, he is

of

subsistence

concrete

is His

to

'

is that

Existence

says

goodness or humanity
existing. It is necessary,

; for

of

as

is

only

there

essence,

in Him

Existence

omnis

he

it,in the
is distinct from
which
there is
God
in
since
Therefore,
potentiality.

stand
to

Essence

actual

nature

as
actuality
it follows that
potentiality,

no

for this when

reason

relation

same

us

contingentexistence of creatures
Further,
quoted from the Summa).

or

actual, when
existence should
as

to

and

gives the

every

realityknown

ideas, alreadyexposed by St.

essential and

the

the

St. Thomas

of

confusion

be found

it cannot

consequentlythat

noble

formae

does

essence

not

existence.

differ from

'.
vel

naturae

non

enim

bonitas

vel

esse.
Oportet
significaturin actu, nisi prout significamus
est aliud ab ipso sicut
igiturquod ipsum esse comparetur ad essentiam
quae
sequitur quod
actus ad potentiam.
Cum
igiturin Deo nihil sit potentiate,

humanitas

earn

non

est

aliud

in

esse

'.

Sum.

Theol., I. q. 3,

eo

essentia

quam
a.

4.

suum

esse.

Sua

igitur essentia

est

suum

how

the

It

could

is

do

this

(2)

opinion

Conclusion
before

brings

Who

am

Israel

He

Ait

sum

18

sic

formam
et

enim

Unumquodque

sed

denominatur

ipso,

cum

Unde

in

est

se

deficit

intelligit,
minus

dicuntur
"

Totum

modo

Deo

enim

in

seipso

infinitum

minatur
essendi

determinat,

pelagus

Significat
esse

enim
non

et

omnibus

et

esse

in

Et

dicit

de

ipsum

habet

indeterminatum."

se

habet

; sed

Tertio
"

praesenti

hoc

vel

et

hoc
futurum

qui

nomen,

ad

indeterminate

infinitum.

praeteritum

enim

vero

ex

maxime
'.

ejus

lib.

quoddam

qui

ideo

est.

pelagus

nomine
nullum

est,

9)

I, cap.

est,

alio

Deo

nomina

proprie

magis

determodum
nominat

consignificatione.

proprie
Sum.

de

quod

fid.,

Et

omnes.

autem

aliqua

tanto

velut

esse

con-

secundum

nominibus,

Quolibet
rei

id

quanto

(Orth.

dicuntur

Deo

si

rationem.

viae,

circa
ideo

univer-

vel

Intellectus

absoluta,

et

Damascenus

quae

substantiae

substantiae

determinet
est.

se

communia
et

comprehendens

sed

novit

cognoscere

in

magis
Unde

modus

aliquis

Deus

ejus
;

statu

4),

Deum.

secundum

in

ejus

art.

3,

nominat

propter

ipsum.

enim

ipsa

(q.

communia

ipsum

supra

modum

quo

nobis.

principalius

substantiae

essentiam

quemcumque

determinata,
de

Quod

sed

Secundo
minus

pro-

sit

Dei
est

"

sunt

vos

Non

esse

28.

'

maxime

est

proprie

determinant

et

Dei

maxime

aliquid

informant

ipsam

potest

non

cum

forma.
vel

addunt

ratione

qui

sum

ad

me

ostensum

supra
hoc

sua

tamen

quodammodo

noster

ut

nomina

alia

Unde

esse.

nomina

alia

Omnia'enim

vertantur

ipsum

Ego

of

people

signincationem.

sui

He

replied

the

you.

triplici

est,

He

misit

est

propter

conveniat,

inter

qui

qui

quidem

alii

quod

est

salitatem.

cuius

nulli

Israel,

to

and

which

that

to

say

me

(4).
God

Moses,

by

sent

nomen,

Primo

aliquam,

hoc

manifestum

ipsum

Hoc

"

"

essentia,

sunt

'

14.

Dei.

nomen

filiis

is

shalt

thou

(o "5i/) hath

dices

Ill,

signincat

quod

is

Who

Exod.,

prium

(Jahweh)

am

former

the

to

connotes

essence

advo

the

maintaining

asked

when

back

God

intelligence

words,

properly

metaphysical

known

other

driven

which

name

concept
of

this

that

ourselves

are

we

His

us

made

Himself
I

The

in

ultimately

which

that

to

or

fact

the

subsistent

are

the

to

all-powerfulness

of

virtue

essentially

or

of

cates

in

lead

such

as

and

eternity

only

so

intelligence

of

immensity,

infinite

one

notion

the

can

of

'

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

64

Theol.,

de

Deo

I, q.

dicitur,
13,

a.

CHAPTER

of

attributes

God,

of

question

the

which

derive

we

known

formal

as

they

of

fact

be

41.

types
and

virtual

is

of

or

Simple.

Absolutely

and

this

motion
from

and

be

unless

since

in

we

find

and

Sum.

Mover

difference,

are

no

previously
It
;

has

is

and

Theol., I, q. 3,

extended

in three

shown

induction.

Prime

19

can

of
;

from

composition

and

these

compound,

are

according
of

any

distinguishable by
object

the

in

may

Him

there

in

natural

a.

(v)

'

God

(a) Because

else,

been

already proved

that

3, ad

i.

65

unmoved.

we

do

accident.
a

body

no

by something

the

strictly

nor,

is not

moved

Himself

of

(iii)nature

and

substance

parts.

ways

beings

existence,

(vi)

none

are

form,

and

induction.

from

Argument

i.

"

parts, (ii)matter

there

idea

the

which

(i) extended

God

simple

composite things

merely

that

genus

of

speak

can

con

we

object independently

composition

speaking,

being unique.

simplicity

the

under

His

mind.

personality, (iv) essence

(i) In

of

immutability,

distinct

are

are

aspects

the

by

.that

parts

mind,

the

His

We

29. By

'

in the

absolutely simple,

find

not

things

different

the

viewed

is

or

by

God

God

of

'

like the

were

really distinct

are

consideration
reason

they

knowledge

our

union

the

mean

as

though

as

the

GOD

idea

composition

of

on

follows

as

of

OF

The

"

absolute

St. Thomas

are

character

or

Simplicity.

negation

the

things only

we

of

Meaning

of

They

SIMPLICITY

THE

called

immensity,

unicity

His

I.

by

God.

of

THAT

GOD

sometimes

thought

the

infinity, His

eternity, and

ceive

OF

are

complete
essence

His

simplicity,

40.

which

notions,

These

39.

WITH

ESSENCE

THE

OF

His

CONNECTED

INTIMATELY

IDEAS

II

as

body

is in

is evident

God

Therefore

is the
it

is

66

NATURAL

clear God

THEOLOGY

body, (b)Because the First Being must of

necessityactuallyexist, and in no way remain in a state of
potentiality.Although in any singlething that passes from
the potentiality
of potentiality
to a state of actuality,
a state
is prior in time
to the actuality; nevertheless, absolutely
is priorto potentiality
is in
speaking,actuality
; for whatever
actual
can
by some
potentiality
only be reduced into actuality
being. It has already been proved that God is the First Being.
there should be any
It is therefore impossiblethat in God
But
because
body is in potentiality,
potentiality.
every
is continuous, formally considered, is divisible to
whatever
that God should be a body.
infinity
; it is therefore impossible
(c)Because God is the most noble of beings, It is impos
sible to admit that any body is the most noble of beings 30.
and form.
(ii)There is in God no composition of matter
is composed of
To quote St. Thomas
again : (a) Whatever
and form is a body ; for extended
dimensions
the
matter
are
is not a body ; therefore
But
God
first quality of matter.
and form,
He is not composed of matter
(b) Matter is neces
But
God is pure Actuality
sarilyin a state of potentiality.
Hence
it is impos
(Actus Purus), without any potentiality.
81.
sible that God should be composed of matter and form
There is in God
no
(iii)
compositionof nature and person
that is to say, there is no need to add any
alityor hypostasis,
of God to make
Him
individual Being
an
thingto the essence
conceive
of an
never
(cp. Gen. Metaphysics,87-91). We
is not

'

'

'

""

'

Deum

non

esse

tripliciterostendi
patet inducendo

corpus,
ut

movet
non
motum,
corpus
autem
supra (q.2, art. 3)
manifestum
est quod Deus

quod

Deus
est

est

primum

potest. i" Quia nullum

est
per singula. Ostensum
movens

immobile.

Unde

2"

est, id quod est

Quia necesse
in potentia. Licet enim
in uno
et
primum ens, esse in actu, et nullo modo
eodem
quod exit de potentia in actum, prior sit tempore potentia quam
actus,
simplicitertamen
prior est actus quam
potentia ; quia quod est in potentia
in actum, nisi per ens
reducitur
Ostensum
noj"
actu.
est autem
(quaest.
supra
primum ens.
Impossibileestigiturquod in Deo
praec., art. 3) quod Densest
in potentia. Omne
sit aliquid
autem
est in potentia ; quia continuum, in
corpus
hujusmodi, divisibile est in infinitum.
quantum
Impossibile est igiturDeum
esse
in entibus, ut ex
3" Quia Deus est id quod est nobilissimum
corpus.
dictis patet. Impossibile est autem
in
nobilissimum
esse
aliquod corpus
non

corpus.

"

"

entibus
11

'

'.

ST. THOMAS,

Sum.

Theol., I, q. 3,

a.

i.

(a) Omne

et forma
est corpus ; quantitas enim
compositum ex materia
dimensiva
est quae
materiae.
Sed
Deus
est corpus,
ut
non
primo inhaeret
ostensum
est (art.
praec.).Ergo Deus non est composite ex materia et forma.
est id quod est in potentia. Deus
est purus
(b) Materia
autem
actus, non
habens aliquidde potentialitate. Unde
impossible est quod Deus sit compo"

situs

ex

materia

et forma

'.

Loc. cit.,
a.

2.

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

68

; in which

they form
Yet they may
accidental union.
substantial but
an
not
a
be in potentiality
relativelyto the whole which they form ;
for they are
actually united after having been in potenti
form

together and

bound

possibleunion.
is in
there
potentiality

ality
and

'

Him

in

since

But

to

accident

group

case

God

there

composition of

no

is

no

substance

34.

So, again, every composite thing is posteriorto its

But God
is the
component parts and is dependent on them.
'

3.

Being 35.
Every compound presupposes
'

first

beingthat has made it ;

compound is the union proceedingfrom several parts.
But these parts which are in themselves multiplecome
together
of
under
another
action
form
the
to
a unityonly
unifying
being.
be need of another
If God were
a compound there would
being
made
to have
him.
He could not have compounded himself ;
'

4.
for a

no

being

be

the

is

compounds

would

then
'

Cause

of

contradiction

which

have

another

an

case

being priorto itself. But

being is its efficient cause.

efficient cause

and

would

not

would

there

be

being
God

the

first

36.

42. Corollaries.
of the

since in this
itself,

unto

cause

"

i.

It is impossible
to

givea

strict definition

'

divine

be defined,
Being (Logic,78-81). God cannot
for every
definition is by genus
and
difference'37.
specific
God and creature
not distinguished
differ
are
by any specific
which we
ences
can
predicateof them as though they belonged
to the same
; whence,
genus ; they differ by their whole reality
'

strictly
speaking,we
34

'

In
enim
non

say

there

is

difference between

pmni composite oportet esse

et potentiam.
actum
Non
enim
plura
aliquid ibi sit actus et aliquid potentia.
non
uniuntur, nisi quasi colligatavel sicut congregata :
in quibus etiam
simpliciter,
ipsae partes congregatae

possunt simpliciterfieri

Quae

cannot

quae
sicut
sunt
fuerint in

actu
sunt

sunt
unum

unum,

nisi

Sunt
enim
unitae
potentia respectu unionis.
in actu, postquam
nulla est potentia ; non
potentia unibiles. In Deo autem
est igitur
in eo aliqua compositio '.
36
Item
omne
compositum posterius est suis componentibus et dependens
eis.
Deus
ex
est primum
autem
'. I, q. 3, a. 7.
ens
36
Omnis
compositio indiget aliquo componente
; si enim
compositio est,
ex
secundum
pluribus est. Quae autem
sunt
se
non
conveplura,in unum
niunt, nisi ab aliquo componente
Si igiturcompositus esset Deus,
uniantur.
haberet
enim
componentem
; non
ipse seipsum componere
posset, quia nihil
est causa
sui ipsius; esset enim
prius seipso,quod est impossibile. Compoest causa
nens
autem
emciens
erficiencompositi. Ergo Deus haberet causam
tem
esset causa
; et sic non
prima '. Cont. Gent,, I, 18.
'

'

if

Cont. Gent., I, 25.

THE

GOD

OF

NATURE

69

marks
complete diversity
; diversity
difference a relative opposition38
opposition,
but

them

absolute

an

'

Care

2.

the

be

must

pregnant saying

that

the

true

'

of

'

est, quae

esse
'

prets thus

non
plariter,

; which St. Thomas

super esse est, Deitas
omnium
effective et
Deitas dicitur esse

exem-

40.
spirit

pure

INFINITE

II. THE

PERFECTION

Perfection.

of

Meaning

inter

39.

'

per essentiam

autem

is

3. God

43.

meaning be given to
Esse omnium
Catholic theology :

taken

Our

"

GOD

OF

imagination naturally

monad
represents a simplebeing as an unknowable
very akin
to an abstraction,but reflection tells us that God is called simple
is all that

He

because

quiaquidquidhabet
We

then

have

St. Thomas

(II) God

'

has.

est

'

ideo

Deus

simplex dicitur

41.

ascertain

God

what

He
perfection
that God

answers

is

has, that
in His

possesses

is to

say,

simplicity.

and therefore good

(I)perfect,

all

perfectionto
is infinite
in perfection.
possesses

God
(III)

hoc

to

plenitudeof

what

He

found

in creatures

when it is
thingis perfect
for its action
completelymade, when it has everythingpossible
and natural requirements(Gen. Metaphysics,173). When
we
do not signifydirectly
the
we
say that a thing is perfection
of its rank, but its intrinsic mode
of being,the manner
nobility
that it has, whatever
in which it possesses the properties
be
the degreethat it occupies
in the scale of beings. The question
therefore whether
God is perfectis in other words this : Does
God
His
nature
actuallypossess all the perfectionwhich
that He enjoys
implies? or on the contrary is the perfection
?
capable of being increased, is it yet further perfectible
44.

'

I. God

is Perfect.

Perfectum

dicitur cui
'

38

'

Deus
eidem

et

esse

Sum.

40

Cp.

41

quod

creatum

est sit

non

generi)additis, sed

quam
sed diversa esse
/ Sent.,dist. 3,
39

id

diversum

q. i,

a.

2, ad

enim

modum

est
perfectus,
'

suae

quae-

43.

aliquibus differentiis utrique (tanunde

nee
differre,
proprie dicuntur

ipsis :
est

sit

Optimo modo

differunt
se

secundum

Deus

utrum

quaerere

Deus

utrum

nihil deest

'

perfectionis;
rere

We

"

say that

be

absolutum,

sed

diiferens

relativum

'.

3.
8, ad

i.
Theol., I, q. 3, a.
Gent., I, 18, 3, and 20, 5.
De
ST. AUGUSTINE,
Civitate Dei, II,

Cont.

7me Conf.
42
ST. THOMAS,

Sum.

Theol., I, q. 4,

a.

10

3 ; and

MONSABR",
CAJETAN,

Cow/, de
Comment,

N.-D.,
in h.L

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

7o
45. Proof.

is pure actuality; the perfectionwhich He

But
all potentiality.
from
perfectibility
pre

God

"

is removed

has

'

Existenti in potentiadeest
:
supposes a certain potentiality
in actu
ut sic
id quod in actu esse
potest : existenti autem

perfectionof
enjoys the plenitudeof

nihil deest' ^

Therefore

but
perfectible

He

the

God

is

His

natural

longer

no

per

fection.
II. God

46.

belonging

to

that

Works.

His

are
perfections
because
perfect,

found

united

possesses

"

Himself

in

be

It must

He

Hence

in God.
He

'

lacks not

is

any

all the Perfections

said that

spoken of

excellence

as

all created

universally

which

be
may
the consideration

from
in any genus.
This may be seen
whatever
exists in any effect must
perfection
effective

either in the

be found

in a
or
formality,
eminent
more
degree. It is plain that the effect pre-exists
virtuallyin the causative agent. Although to pre-existin
of a material
is to pre-exist
the potentiality
in a more
cause
and an agent
imperfectway, since matter as such is imperfect,
such is perfect
in the causative
as
; still to pre-exist
virtually
in a more
agent is not to pre-exist
imperfect,but in a more
Since God is the first effective Cause of things,
perfectway.
of all things must
the perfections
in God in a more
pre-exist
eminent
line of argument
Dionysiusimpliesthe same
way.
by sayingof God : It is not that He is this but not that, but
in the

that He
'

is

cause

all,as the

Nothing

cause

of all

except inasmuch

acts

'

same

44.
it is in

: action
actuality
measure
actualityin the agent.
It is impossibletherefore for any effect that is brought into
than is the actuality
being by action to be of a nobler actuality
of the agent. It is possible
however
for the actuality
of the

therefore

43
44

CAJETAN,
'

Dicendum

in

of the

loc. cit.

quod

in

Deo

sunt

Unde
et
perfectionesomnium
rerum.
deest ei aliqua nobilitas,quae inveniaquidem ex eo considerari potest quia quidquid

universaliter perfectus,quia

dicitur
tur

follows the

as

Et

aliquo genere.

hoc

non

est in effectu, oportet inveniri

in causa
perfectionis
eamdem
modo.
rationem, vel eminentiori
Manifestum
virtute in causa
autem
agente. Praeexistere
praeexistit

effectiva
est enim

in virtute

vel

secundum

quod

effectus

agentis
praeexistereimperfection modo, sed perfection ; licet praeexisterein
materialis sit praeexistereimperfectiorimodo
potentia causae
; eo quod materia,
inquantum hujusmodi, est imperfecta ; agens vero, inquantum hujusmodi,
est
sit prima causa
Deus
perfectum. Cum
ergo
effectiva rerum,
oportet
omnium
rerum
perfectiones praeexistere in Deo
secundum
eminentiorem
Et hanc
rationem
modum.
tangit Dionysius (De div. nont., cap. 5, lect. i),
dicens de Deo, quod
non
quidem hoc est, hoc autem
est ; sed omnia
non
est
'. ST. THOMAS, Sum. Theoi., I, q. 4, a. 2.
ut omnium
causa
non

est

"

"

causae

THE

effect to be less

perfectthan

of
actuality

the

the

actingcause,

as

to which

be found

in God

(though the

proofused

ning (4 f.)on

the

dicated of God
possesses in
in creation.

actuallyis in any
eminentlythan

that

much

more

is not

converse

is God, of Whom

which

to one
cause
ultimately
Everythingtherefore

true); God then

in connexion
way

leads

us

the

with what

supereminentway

other

in the

thing itself

said

creatures

conclusion

all

things.
thing must

are

is most

we

of
perfections

to the

reducible

everything is

category of efficient causation

This

71

the part of the object

be weakened
action may
on
which it is spent. Now
in
it is terminated, or upon

inasmuch

the

GOD

OF

NATURE

'

perfect*5.
at the begin

that the Divine

to
perfections

all the

be pre

can

Being

be found

teachingthat St. Thomas

developsin
Theologica(de bono
Question5 and Question6 of the Summa
in communi, de bonitate Dei)is only a more
express statement
of the divine
the perfection
of the precedingtheories about
than give as a
Being. Hence there is no need to do more
corollarythe leadingideas of these Questions.
Goodness
and being are
1.
reallythe same, and differ
is clear from
the followingargument.
only logically
; which
The formalityof goodness consists in this,that it is in some
is what
way desirable. Hence the Philosopher
says : Goodness
all desire. It is clear that a thingis desirable in so far as it is
'.
perfect
perfection
; for all desire their own
Since goodness is that which all men
desire,and since
2.
this has the formal aspect of an end, it is clear that goodness
impliesthe formal aspect of an end '.
Corollary. The

47.

"

'

'

'

3.

Good

is attributed

fections flow from

good

as

all

He

is in God

Him
as

to
as

from

'

Nihil

as

the uni vocal, cause

in the first,but not

things,it must be in Him

is called the Supreme Good

45

alldesirable per
Therefore
their first Cause.

God, inasmuch

of

excellently
; and therefore

more

Bonum

Summum

or

'.

actu ; actio igiturconsequitur

igitureffectum, qui per action em
sit actus
educitur, esse in nobiliori actu quam
agentis. Possibile est tamen
effectum
sit actus
causae
imperfectiorem esse, quam
agentis,eo quod actio
In genere
autem
causae
potest debilitari ex parte ejus in quod terminatur.
efficients fit reductio
ad unam
dicitur, ut ex dictis patet,
causam,
quae Deus
a quo
sunt
omnes
Oportet igiturquidquid
res, ut in sequentibus ostendetur.
modum

actu

in

actus

agit nisi
in

in quacumque
ilia ; non
autem

est
re

Cont. Gent., I, 28.

secundum

quod
Impossible

agente.

re
e

est

alia, inveniri
converse.

(Trs.RICKABY,

Of

in

est

in

Deo

multo

igitur Deus

God

and

His

eminentius,

quam

sit

perfectissimus '. Id.,

Creatures, p. 22.)

Est

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

72
'

by His

God alone is good

4.

its

good according to
creature
to no
by
ordered

essence

own

of all

He

things.

5.
much

is the

God

as

He

end ; but

His

as

Himself

is the

it is manifest

Hence

God

alone

that

Essence

own

therefore

'.

Essence

good from the Divine Goodness, inas

first exemplary,efficient and final principle

Everythingis

'

is not

...

by His
every kind of perfection
alone is good by His own
Himself

has

for He

Existence

is His

anything else

to

last end

Essence

alone

in whom

perfection.

its

Everythingis called
But
perfection
belongs
it belongs to God
only,

Essence.

own

called

goodness'46.

of all

III. God

48.

in

Infinite

is

Perfection.

ideas

The

"

finite

derived from
material extension,
are
originally
infinite
and then appliedby analogy to the goodness and perfection
of spiritual
we
beings. When
say, then, that God is infinite,
of the divine Being
that the goodness or perfection
we
mean

and

is not

has
finite,

limits.

no

when
as
we
distinctly,
compare
is
size or perfection.There

being so good and

more
perfectthan
of

i"

'

better way

Bonum

et

tantum.

there

gettinga

of

is a

by saying: God
be

cannot

it is not

if it is

beings of different

more

no

conceive

do not

better

or

in the

againstreason
it to

be

inferior

to suppose
self-contradictory
to anything else 47.

an

infinite

for
perfect,

be

is inferior

being that
*'

Whilst

He.

finite being,even

rationem

or

then

perfectthat

so

another, it would

to

two

distinct idea of the infinite than

clear and

case

limit itself we

Now

idem
secundum
sunt
sic
Quod
patet. Ratio
ens

differunt

; sed

rem

enim

boni

sit

secundum

consistit, quod

in hoc

bonum
aliquid appetibile.Unde
est quod omnia
Philosophus dicit quod
Manifestum
est autem
appetunt".
est appetibilesecun
quod unumquodque
dum
omnia
quod est perfectum ; nam
appetunt suam
perfectionem '. q. 5,

a.

"

i.

2"

'

Cum

bonum

finis,manifestum

3"

'

Bonum

effluunt ab eo
sicut in prima
modo.

4"

Et
'

propter hoc

etiam

omnium

suam

ad
rerum.

perfectionem
essentiam

suam

omnia

quod

est

per

Sic ergo
bonum

quod
'.

bonum

cum

sit in
q. 6,

a.

eo

autem

sit in Deo,

excellentissimo

2.

Unumquodque

Perfectio

enim

nulli create

dicitur

competit

essentiam, sed soli Deo, cujus solius essentia est suum

esse.
aliud ordinatur
sicut ad finem, sed ipse est ultimus
finis
Unde
manifestum
est quod
solus Deus
ha bet omnimodam

nihil

secundum
'.

suam

essentiam.

Et

ideo

ipse

solus

est

bonus

per

Ibid., a. 3.

'

5"

oportet,

essentiam.

perfectum.

rationem

Ibid., a. 4.
finisimportat
omnes
perfectiones desideratae

univoca,

summum

habeat

autem

'.

inquantum

suam

hoc

appetunt,
rationem

non

dicitur

est bonus

secundum

secundum

quod

omnium

causa

Solus Deus

bonum

Ipse

sit

est quod bonum

Deo
attribuitur,
sicut a prima causa.

dicitur
bonum
bonitate
Unumquodque
divina, sicut primo principle
exemplari, effective et finali totius bonitatis '. Ibid.,a. 4.
47
Infmitum
sed non
quantitatem sequitur
potest infinitas Deoattribui
nisi secundum
spiritualemmagnitudinem : quae quidem spiritualis
magnitude
'

NATURE

THE

OF

GOD

73

This

of which we
have been speaking,we
attribute
infinity,
in the first placeto the divine Being,then to the divine per
God is the absolute pleni
: the divine Being is infinite,
fection
tude of being ; God
He is eminently
is infinite in perfection,
all pure perfection,omnis
perfectio
simplex'.
First we
call to mind
the leadingthesis
49. Proof.
must
'

"

all

which

on

God

first discussion

our

furnish

does not

with

based

was

that

idea of

our

positivecharacteristic,but
48.
God and creatures
to distinguish
by way of negationwe come
to try to establish a proof
It would then be againstall reason
contain
the conclusion of which
would
a
positiveconcept of
the manner
of God's existence ; any
and show directly
infinity
be ruled
argument that makes such a claim must
necessarily
it will not
of court.
Nevertheless
be sufficient merely
out
is the

He

could

God

that

to prove

first

us

limited Himself, and, since

have

not

Being,could

any

been

have

not

limited

by

another

being priorto Himself ; the point is to establish that intrin

God knows
limit.
no
sically
First Argument. The
i.
leading idea of the fundamental
"

'

Since the

divine

is His

but

is summed

of St. Thomas

argument

Being

is not

perfect49.
develops this proof under

Summa

is clear that

two

in

lines

anything

God

Himself

'

is infinite and

He

in these

being received

Being,it

subsist ent

own

up

Gentiles

contra

'

God

than

more

is not

one

other

than

form
His

in the
self-ex

infinitely
being,and by this
perfect
is wanting.
being to whom no kind of perfection
Indeed a being is endowed
with perfection
in the measure
which it has existence,e.g. a man
would have no perfection

istence ; He
I mean
the

is therefore the

'

in

ad

quantum

priae

naturae

duo

attenditur, sell, quantum

bonitatem

sive

minus

album

etiam

magnitude virtutis
magnitudinum una

quo

in

eo

quantum ad proaliquid magis vel

compleatur ; pensatur
et

potentiam
Diciturenim

completionem.

modum

secundum

ad

sua

albedo

Harum
magnitudine virtutis vel facto rum.
autem
aliam
hoc ipso quod aliquid
ex
consequitur ; nam
in actu est, activum
est ; secundum
completur,
igiturmodum
quo in actu suo
est modus
virtutis ; et sic relinquiturres spirituales
magnitudinis suae
magnas
dici secundum
mole
modum
in his quae non
suae
completionis : nam
magna
Ostendendum
est igitursecun
est majus quod est melius.
sunt, illud omne
dum
Deum
infinitum
hujus magnitudinis modum
quia nullus est peresse,
fectionis suae
terminus, sive finis,sed est summe
perfectus '. Cont. Gent.,
ex

I, 43

; cp.

48
49

SUAREZ,

De

Deo, lib. II, c. i,

2 ; ST. THOMAS,
Cum
divinum
esse

Cp.
'

subsistens,manifestum
Theol., I, q. 7, a. i.

n.

5.

Cont.
non

est

Gent., I, 14.
sit esse
receptum

quod ipse

Deus

in

aliquo, sed ipse sit suum

et perfectus.'

sit infinitus

esse

Sum.

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

74

in virtue of his wisdom

; and

wisdom

if he

of his other

so

wise

by his
the degreeof
its perfections,

himselfmade

not

were

perfections.Whence

thing has determines the degree of

and the limits of the being of a thing determine the limits
perfection.Therefore if there is a being which has the
being that

of
perfection

of being,no
perfection

Being which is its own being must

of being ; justas if whiteness be sup
perfection

the total

have

posed

would

of whiteness

white

and degrees
properties
to any particular
be wanting to it ; whereas
degreesof whiteness may be wanting, and
of the

self-existent, none

be

to

thing

some

the

this because

can

the

Now

to it.

wanting

be

total

whatsoever

kind

any

of its

receives

subjectwhich

is

the whiteness

imper

fect,since it receives this whiteness conformablywith the limita

tions of its
full

the

to

own

not

wholly

according
entirely

and

God, who be
being possesses being in all its fullness,

of
perfection

is His

He

cause

and

nature

own

Therefore

whiteness.

perfection.
wanting in any possible
belong to a
Moreover, justas every dignityand perfection
thing in proportionas it has being, so any defect is found in
that it lacks being. So in regard to God,
it in the measure
from
justas He has being wholly,so is He wholly removed
non-being ; for in proportionas a thing is being,it is removed
from
non-being. Therefore defect of any kind has no place
be

cannot
'

wholly perfect. On the other

hand, things whose being is limited are imperfectnot because
in itself,absolutely,
of being considered
of the imperfection
but by this that they do not possess being in all its fullness ;
they have received being in a
they are imperfectbecause
and inferior grade 50.
particular
in God

is

consequentlyHe

'

'

60

Deus

fectum.
nobilitas.
nulla

qui
Et

Omnis

"

enim

et sic de

aliud

enim

nobilitas

esset homini
Sic ergo secundum

alio.

specialem

Nam

modum

nobilior

vel

suum

quam

universaliter

nobilitas

in nobilitate.
hoc

est

non

dico

essendi, ei nulla virtus

Sed rei, quae
est suum

modum

quo

secundum

non

ut
non

per-

habet

nobilitatis

deesse

is esset

albedinis.

Deus

dicitur
cui

potest, quae
secundum
albedinis
modum

ad

competit

deesse
suum

aliquem

secundum
tota

virtus

rei conveniat.

essendi

virtute

modus

suus

esse

alicui
totam

nihil ei de

est

esse,

contrahitur

albedinis

potest,ex
recipit,et

potestadeesse
defectu
fortasse

igiturqui
esse,
posse
totam
virtutem
probatum est, habet esse secundum
ipsius esse ;
Sicut
aliqua nobilitate, quae alicui rei conveniat.
potest ergo carere
et perfectioinest rei, secundum
omnis
nobilitas
quod est, ita omnis

supra

autem

res

secundum

esse, competit esse

aliqua albedo separata,
alicui albo aliquidde virtute
posset. Nam
secundum
recipientisalbedinem, qui earn
; sicut

tem

ens

alien jus generis

perfectum,
suum
esse
cujuscumquerei estsibi secundum
;
ex
sua
sapientia,nisi per earn sapiens esset,
deest

non

esse
quod suum
nobilitatis,majorem vel minorem,
minus
nobilis.
Igitur si aliquid est

res,

universaliter

est

esse,

cui

totum

est

totum

suum

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

76

in the fullness of being. Therefore, the

thing participates
self-subsistent being which is not a subjectrealized or realizable

in which

and

the

subjectto

is not

is

there

presupposedbefore existence,
which universally
have mentioned

essence

no

cause

we

inevitablylimits creatures ; it is outside every conceiv

able limit 51,it does not participate
by way of degree at all in
being but it is itself the absolute fullness of being, (b)The

and

proof may

same

subsistent

assume

being, were

reasonable

different form

all

not

represent Him

to

it would

but
perfection,

If God, the

unreasonable

be

it

only would
of being
susceptible

being, not

as

to

selfbe

and

of

represent Him

every form and every

actual only if we
nature
can
; goodness or humanity are
say
that they are
It is necessary, then, that existence
existent.

otherwise.

is

there

in

to

of

is the

is

52.
actualityto potentiality

as

distinction between

no

God, His

really distinct
'

His

The

existence.

His

Therefore

self-subsistent

Being is then

it, in
in God

Now

existence ; in the
is the first thing conceivable

existence, which
'

thing that it is possibleto conceive.

it follows that in Him
no
potentiality,
from

from

and

essence

which

essence,

being, is identical with

actualityof

which

essence,

relation

same

case

Existence

stand

should
the

'

is the

Since in God

is His

essence

is

there

does not

essence

last

differ

existence

'

53.

all

the fullness of being.

being,
II. Next we say that the infinite Being is infinite
in perfection.
and dignityaccording
Proofs: (a) A being has perfection
in which
to the measure
it is ; and imperfectionaccording
'

the

to

in which

measure

it is not

'

54. But

God

is the

fullness

of

being. Therefore He is being comprisingall the modes of

being,being in every respect, and consequentlyHis being
51

As

to

conceive

we

exclude

from

an

words

and

idea
to

tionis Deum
q. i,
52

a.
'

2, ad

Esse

humanitas

the

Infinite

by way of negation of
being limitations of which

subsistent

consider

to

attempt

derive

the

limits

of

some

other

kind

than

the
we

those

finite,we
have

no

of which

may

not

concept
we

can

from

would
be to play with
things that exist or are intelligible
Dicimur
in fine nostrae
attempting the impossible.
cogni'. ST. THOMAS,
In Boeth. de Trin.,
ignotum cognoscere
tamquam
be

'

i.

est

actualitas

significaturin

omnis

formae
nisi

vel

naturae,

non

enim

bonitas

vel

actu,
esse.
prout significaturearn
Oportet
ad
ab ipso
est aliud
essentiam
igitur quod ipsum esse
comparetur
quae
sicut actus
ad potentiam '. ST. THOMAS,
Sum.
Theol., I, q. 3, a. 4.
68
Cum
est aliud in
igiturin Deo nihil sit potentiate,sequitur quod non
essentia quam
Sua igituressentia est suum
eo
suum
esse.
'. Ibid.
esse
64
Sicut omnis
nobilitas
et
perfectio inest rei, secundum
quod est, ita
omnis
defectus
inest ei, secundum
est '. Id., Cont.
quod aliqualiternon
'

'

Gent., I, 28.

embraces, without

OF

NATURE

THE

limits,every

any

GOD

pure

77

perfection.(6) The

the existence
contingentperfection
presupposes
of a pure actuality
correspondingto it which possesses this
Now
to affirm the existence of a per
perfection
essentially.
is to affirm
fection such that it is in a state of pure actuality
that this perfection
is identical with the subsistent Being.
is
in a state of pure actuality,
Therefore all-perfection,
when
God
is the
who
identical with the subsistent being. Hence
is the
He
Now
subsistent being is eo ipso all-perfection.
of being. Therefore He is the plenitude
of all perfect
plenitude
ion ; He is infinite in perfection.
an
a
priori
2. Second
Argument. Our first argument was
is drawn
of God ; the following
one
(Sio'ri)
proofof the infinity
from a psychological
fact, namely the necessary and supreme
55.
tendencies of the soul towards the Infinite
towards
The soul by its higherfaculties spontaneously
aspires
what
is more
and more
perfect; no finite thing can satiate

existence of

"

'

the desires of the mind

infinite. Now

the

'

; the soul of man,

there

are

two

then, tends towards

alternatives

either this

of
to it or it is a matter
corresponding
illusion. If it is illusory,
then we
face to face with an
are
fact : we
of man,
the spectacle
a small and
see
inexplicable
whom
feeble creature
all the powers of body, mind and heart,
combined
with the refinement
of art, not only fail to satisfy
but ever
to a deepersense
awaken
of emptinessand disappoint

tendencyhas

real end

'

'

ment

; and

we

should therefore have

to conclude

that, whilst

'

66

Intellectus noster ad infinitum

in intelligendo
extenditur, cujus signum
quod qualibet quantitate finita data intellectus noster majorem excogitare
intellectus
nisi esset
ad infinitum
esset haec ordinatio
possit; frustra autem
infinita ; oportet igituresse
aliqua res intelligibilis
aliquam rem intelligibilem
Deus
dicimus
infinitam, quam
Deum.
et hanc
rerum,
oportet esse maximam
igiturest infinitus '.
Omni
finito potest aliquidmajus cogitari; ex quo
declaratur
quod intel
lectus noster
habet
Intelinfinitatem
sui
quandam
intelligibilis.
respectu
Omni
est
autem
ligibileautem
res.
actus, cum
potentiae respondet suus
dicatur.
Cum
sit actus
et perfectio
potentia ad actum
igiturintelligibile
Infiniti autem
infinitam.
intellectus,oportet ponere aliquam rem
intelligibilem
nihil agat ultra seipsum '. Id.,
principium non
potest esse aliquid finitum cum
est

'

Cont.

Gent., I, 43.
intellectus
finitum, desiderium
quietare potest, quod exinde ostenditur, quod intellectus quolibetfinito dato, aliquidultra molitur apprehendere ;
unde
qualibet linea finita data, aliquam majorem molitur apprehendere, et
'

Nihil

similiter

in numeris,
et haec
est
'. Ibid., Ill, 50.

ratio

infinitae

additionis

in numeris

et lineis

mathematicis
6t

Essai
that

VAN
sur
one

WEDDINGEN,
la

Elements

Raisonnes
de
S. Anselme, pp. 307 and
struck by the oft recurrence

philosophicde

cannot

but

be

Religion, p.
This

374.
author

320.
of the noblest

Cp.

also

remarks
minds

to

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

78
and

harmony

monstrosity in

more,

will under

good

of the

form

human

satisfythem.
infinite Being who

Conse

the form

intellect under

the

nay

of the

will

the existence of what

proves
quently there must reallyexist an
our

world,

anomaly,

an

tendencies

natural

soul

object of

of this

nature.

fact, then, of these

The

beings

master-pieceof creation, is

alone, the

man

lower

the

finalitygovern

of the true, and

and

is the

since

of

our

dependence of

with infinity,
the only being that can
any kind is incompatible
be identified with the infinite is God ; therefore God
whom

livingand caringfor us is infinite.

of Krause, lays the
50. Objections. Tiberghien,a disciple
charge of assertinga contradiction againstthose who maintain
conceive

we

as

"

that

is infinite and

God

the world.

distinct from

he argues, must
be all that is ; for,if we
thingoutside of or beside God, He would

in that
But

the advocates

is not

distinct from
Infinite is not

of his

final

(b)in

the

any

since
infinite,

parts.

of the dualistic

infinite57.

argument

of His

and

be

not

(a) in

the

meanings in
that

sense

be, in the ineffable super-eminenceof His

reason

conceive

be divided into two

realitywould

two
replyby distinguishing

miss

could

infinite,

positionmaintain that God

is,for they postulate
a created world
as a reality
Him
; therefore they are guiltyof sayingthat the

all that

We

of

the whole

case

The

being and

own

of all that

cause

the

the

the

nature,

the

formal

efficient exemplary

supreme

that the Infinite must

pre

Infinite must

is outside of Him,

there

major

grant

we

be

that is to say
formally,
must
constitute, all that exists, we
intrinsically
deny. In
the same
his minor ; and accordingly
way we contradistinguish
sense

refuse assent

to the conclusion.

St. Thomas
'

foresaw

The

beingwhich

other

beings and
But

stance.

from

other

St. Anselm's

57

See

and

65.

He

works

50 and

The

such

with
as

author

objection:

same

that it is distinct from

clearlynot

stone

or

'.

wood.

And

is that the objectiveelement

such

vivid

all

entity,is a finite sub

and is reallydistinct

infinite substance

reason

them

of the

is

an

subjective notion

the

nature

not

is not

to

propounded the

possess their
is of such a nature

beings ;

appears

the

sophie,pp.

does

argument.

the infinite

envelop

is of

God

sequentlyGod

and

clearness

that

its

to

Con

this he

in the

light

idea of

seems

to

well, p. 307.

passim, especiallyIntroduction
Esquisse de Phil. Mor.,

54 (Brussels,1888), and

" la Philopp.

48, 54,

THE

NATURE

OF

'

replied: Because God exists

predicateinfinityof Him, He
all other

from
'

Him

beings and

its nature

by

is such

nature

every

surpasses

but

do

we

is determinate

of

reason

not

be

distinct

confounded

with

to the

assent

we

other

some

being is finite which

not

be
necessarily

must

must

we

that that
proposition
is determined and distinct from other beings,
which is exclusive of the
realizes a perfection

beingis finite which

of
perfections

79

Himself, because

must

they

68. In other words,

because

of

GOD

and

not

allow

distinct from

that

that

all others

exclusive

perfectionbut because its

that it embraces
all modes
of being,and thus
other being because it compriseseverything
some

eminentlyin its absolute substance.

A rejoinder
might be made : Finite beings are not pure
of reality.Since
endowment
non-entity,
they have their own
this is so, there is no reason
why they should not be added to
the infinite being. But if this addition were
made, we should
have a total which is greater than infinitywhich is absurd.
Therefore the infinite impliesa contradiction.
To this we replyby denying the supposition
which underlies
the major. Addition
is possibleonly of terms
which
are
"

units of the

same

Being, and

creatures

genus

; and

between

God, the transcendent

that

enjoy only an existence analogous

to that of God
there is nothing common
in the same
genus :
therefore the supposed addition is intrinsically
impossible.
such an addition intrinsically
Furthermore, even were
possible,
which we
do not allow, the resultant would
be more
beings,
that is to say more
natures
as
opposed to nothing,not more
excellence ; in fact it would
being,i.e.more
imply
necessarily
of any
less excellence,inasmuch
kind
as
a
being susceptible
of compositionwould
be inferior to that whose
absolute sim
plicity
permits of none.
III. THE
51.

Meaning

of

IMMENSITY

Immensity.

"

For

OF

GOD

being to
its activity
upon
a

be somewhere,

that is to say, for it to exercise

other beings,
is certainly
a
therefore,since both spiritual
perfection
; and
*8

tiam.

Ergo
R.

'

Quod

ita

Sed

Deus

Deus

non

Dicendum

receptum

in

substansecundum
est aliud, est finitum
quod non
enim
est aliud.
est hoc et non
Non
est lapis nee
lignum.
est infinitus secundum
substantiam.
quod ex hoc ipso quod esse Dei est per se subsistens non
est hoc

aliquo, prout

et alia removentur

ab

eo

'.

dicitur

Sum.

infinitum,

distinguiturab

Theol., I, q. 7,

a.

i, ad

3.

omnibus

aliis

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

8o

God
perfection,

only somewhere, to have a

sphere of action in space like
definite
be circumscribed by ambient space like
to be

However

possess it.

must

too

this

have

substances

created

material

and

limited presence and a

to
and stillmore
spirits

which
imperfection

apply to
the Being without division or limit. In order to gain as com
which corre
pletean idea as possibleof the divine perfection
sponds to the presence of a created being in space, we must
in turn
examine
(i)on what grounds, (2)to what extent, (3)

material bodies,impliesan

in what

manner,

of His

must

we

This

works.

in which
analysingthe manner
in freeingthis conception
then
is present and
find included
element
of imperfectionthat we

creature

from

midst

the

reason,

will consist in

examination
a

is

God

that

say

fundamental

(4) for what

present in

cannot

every

in it.
In

i.

wider

a
expression,
being is said
active influence,
and in this sense

of the

sense

of its
present by reason
presentto the objectsunder
within
to the things falling
and in the
strictly
present only where
attribute to

He

thingsby

these

God.

and

which

His

Power, inasmuch

He

more

of the

different

God

created, which

knows

even

expressiona being is
The presence that we
substantially.

has

He

works

on

attribute to

must

we

creature

it is

the control of its power, and

the scope of its perception
;
sense

proper
it is

be

to

grounds, we

and

can

is

He

naturallypresent to the
preserves in being,which
'

governs.

Therefore, God

all

is in all

subjectto
His Power
; He is in all thingsby His Presence, as all things
bare and open to His eyes ; He is in all thingsby His
are
Essence,inasmuch as He is the cause of existence to all things 59.
as

things are

'

'

God

is in all things ; not,

accident ; but as
an
it works.
God
.

indeed, as part of their essence,

agent is present to anythingupon

an

causes

existence

they first begin to exist,but

existence.

present

'

Sic

sunt

et

I, q. 8,

long

as

Deus

is most

est

in

intimate

omnibus

thing exists,God
of existence.
to

which

thing and

must

Now
what

be

exist
is at

omnia
ejus
per potentiam, inquantum
praesentiam in omnibus, inquantum omnia nuda
adest
aperta oculis ejus ; est in omnibus
per essentiam, inquantum
ut causa
est (art.i) '. ST. THOMAS,
essendi, sicut dictum
Sum.
Theol.,
ergo

potestatisubduntur
omnibus

as

as

thingsnot only when

they are preservedin

long as

it,according to its mode

is what
(esse)

ence

69

to

Therefore

as

in

nor

a.

3.

; est per

NATURE

THE

the very
mination

bottom

of all

things,inasmuch

is in

of whatever

as

thing. Hence

thingsintimately60.
Further, omnipresenceor ubiquityis

2.

81

GOD

it is the final deter

it must

be that God

'

is in all

'

OF

an

to
is in every
place; which means
First,He is so in all things as givingthem

God

attribute of God.
exist

everywhere.

being,and power,
and operation; for He is in every placeas givingit existence
inasmuch
and locative power.
Also, thingsplacedare iriplace,
as
they fillplace; and God fillsevery place; not, indeed, like
inasmuch
as it does not
a body ; for a body is said to fillplace,
of another
suffer the co-presence
body ; whereas by God
being in a place,others are not thereby excluded from it ;
indeed, by the very fact that He givesexistence to everything
in every place,He fillsevery place 61.
of
quotationjust cited also indicates the manner
3. The
God's
continues :
Al
everywhere. St. Thomas
presence
though corporealthingsare said to be in anything as in that
which
contains them, nevertheless
spiritual
things contain
those thingsin which they are ; as the soul contains the body.
Hence also God is in thingsas containingthem ; nevertheless
by a certain similitude to corporealthings,it is said that all
6a.
thingsare in God, inasmuch as they are contained by Him
Incorporealthingsare not in placeby contact of dimensive
quantity,as bodies are ; but by contact of power 63. Hence
'

'

'

'

'

60

'

Deus

est in omnibus

'

quidem sicut pars essentiae, vel sicut

in rebus,
causat
esse
quod agit. Deus
solum
non
quando primo esse incipiunt,sed quamdiu in esse conservantur.
Quamdiu igiturres habet esse, tamdiu
oportet quod Deus adsit ei secundum
modum
habet.
Esse
cuiillud quod est magis intimum
esse
autem
est
quo
inest ; cum
sit formale
omnium
libet,et quod profundius omnibus
respectu
in re sunt.
Unde
'.
rebus
et intime
quae
oportet quod Deus sit in omnibus
accidens, sed sicut agens

I, q. 8, a.
61

'

Deus

rebus,

adest

non

ei in

i.

est in omni

loco, quod est esse ubique. Primo

quidem sicut est
rebus, ut dans eis esse, et virtutem, et operationem, sic etiam
est in omni
loco, ut dans ei esse, et virtutem
locativam.
Item, locata sunt in
loco in quantum
locum
sicut
omnem
replent locum
; et Deus
replet; non
dicitur replerelocum, inquantum
non
compatitur secum
corpus, corpus enim
aliud corpus,
sed per hoc quod Deus
excluditur
est in aliquo loco, non
quin
alia sint ibi ; imo
locatis
loca, quod dat esse omnibus
per hoc replet omnia
loca '. I, q. 8, a. 2.
quae replentomnia
82
Licet
in aliquo sicut in continente, tamen
corporalia dicantur esse

in omnibus

'

continent
spiritualia

in quibus sunt ; sicut anima

continet
Unde
ea
corpus.
est in rebus, sicut continens
Tamen
similitudinem
res.
per quamdam
omnia
in Deo, inquantum
continentur
ab ipso '
esse
corporalium dicuntur
I, q. 3, a. i, ad 2.

et

Deus

63

sicut

'

Incorporalia non

corpora,

sunt

sed per contactum

in loco

per contactum
virtutis '. I, q. 3,

quantitatisdimensivae,
a.

2, ad

i.

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

82

according as their power can extend itself to one or to many,

it is in one
or
to a small thing,or to a great one
; in this way
M.
'As
the
soul is
and in a small or largeplace
in many
places,
'

in every
in each one

whole
and

'

in all

whole

part of the body, so is God

things

65.

omnipresence of God is a simple corollaryof His

priorto His
immensity which is a higher absolute perfection
It belongs to anything to be everywhere
creative activity
:
be every
it must
absolutely(perse)when, on any supposition,
alone.
For whatever
This properlybelongs to God
where.
if an infinite number
of placesare supposed,even
were
number
supposed besides what already exist, it would be necessary
4. The

'

that God

should be in all of them

; for

exist

nothing can

except

by Him'66.
Although
tion of God's

and

proper
we

an

positive
representa

conceive

can

eminent

there must

that

perfec

some

manner,

local presence gives to finite

absolute exigence that involves

what

intrinsic and

beings, some
or

Being, in

correspondsto

tion that

immensity,yet

be in the infinite

His

form

cannot

we

substantial presence in all the worlds that He has created

His omnipotence,His omniscience
will create, where
ever

action
providential
supreme
of God.
52. Proof of the Immensity
His

and

have

be

to

exercised.

The

proofof the immen

sity of God is evident from what we have just said. The
infinite Being comprises every
absolutelypure perfection
;
the
; therefore
immensity is an absolutelypure perfection
"

infinite Being is immense.

Proofofthe minor premiss: To be endowed with an absolutely

to possess a perfection
which excludes
means
pure perfection
that can
detract from it. Now
the presence
all imperfections
it is something positive,
of a thing somewhere, inasmuch
as
is a perfection
without
; immensity is justthis same
perfection
that are
the other impairing elements
mixed
with it when
64

ad

'

quod

Secundum

ejus se potest extendere

virtus

vel ad

secundum

hoc

substantia

magnum,
vel magno
'.
vel pluribus locis,et in loco parvo
'
""
Sicut anima
est tota in qualibet parte

parvum

omnibus
""

'

et
Per

singulisentibus
convenit

ad

unum

vel ad

incorporea

Ibid.,ad.

multa,

est in

uno

2.

corporis,ita Dens

totus

est in

'.

Ibid., ad. 3.
ubique alicui, quando

esse
tale est qnod, qualibet
Deo
positione facta, sequitur illud esse ubique. Et hoc proprie convenit
;
etiamsi
loca
infinita
quia quotcumque
ponantur,
ponerentur
praeter ista
Deum
nisi per
esse
sunt, oporteret in omnibus
; quia nihil potest esse
quae
ipsum '. I, q. 8, a. 4.
se

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

84
they oppose

consequentlyis

action itself and

therefore, in order

and

between

nexion
action

back

on

to

substantial

the

to an

appears

the

condition
prerequisite

is

there

be

by proofsthat

con

necessary
of God
and

His

either to go
the one
and

necessary
is anterior to both

to establish each

object

posteriorto

presence

would

thingswithout, it
which
some
principle

other, or else

the

not

that

show

to

of God

presence

deals with

creative action

His

that

; the
illogical

seems

mutually

are

independent.
Moreover

think

we

teaching of St.

in agreement

are

we

Thomas

the

on

with

the

of creation.

act

whole

True, the

be brought againstus :
have alreadyquoted may
we
passage
God is in all things,
as an
agent is present to what it acts upon.
'

every agent should be united to what

is immediatelysubjected
touch
to its action and that it should

it is necessary

For

it

his

by

67. But

'

moved
of

way

as

any
the

in

to this

in

the

spot

universe

created

divine

object

by

reasons

act

in

reason

which

consequently,
this wise : Just

their presence
manifests itself in the
to

us

in asserting
that
us
justifies
analogically

eminent

an

they

objects reveals

Being comprisesin

sponds in

where

action of God

the

St. Thomas

an

con

corporealagents presupposes

to
legitimate

of exterior

action

reply that

action of

The

immediate

agent moving and

an

we

it is
hypothesis,

place,so

Himself

to the

way

the

something which corre

denoted by the local
perfection

of finite agents68

presence

IV.
53.

between

analogy.

their presence
on

it follows that

operation. Whence

is necessary

tact

that

THE

Meaning

without

ABSOLUTE

and

comment

Proof.
the

"

IMMUTABILITY
We

concise

cannot

and

do

clear

OF

GOD

better

than

statement

give
of

St.

Thomas.
God is immutable

i.

is

God
above

6 7

'

enim

that there is

what

it is shown
precedes,

contingere.
Cp.
\

some

(a)First,because it was
first Being,whom
call God
we

that
shown
; and

est in omnibus

Deus
omne

mutatio

From

immutable,
altogether

I, q. 8, a.
88

'

agens
Unde

rebus, sicut agens adest ei in quod agit. Oportet

conjungi ei in quod immediate
virtute illud
agit, et sua
et
simul '.
probatur quod motum
movens
oportet esse

i.

Cont.

Gent., II, 16, 7, and

'

17.

Quod

creatio

non

est motus

nequc

THE

NATURE

OF

GOD

85

be purely Actual
(Actus Pur us),
Being must
that potentiality
without
; for the reason
any potentiality
is absolutely
posteriorto actuality.Everything which is in
Hence
it is
way a potentiality.
any way changed,is in some
for God to be in any way change
evident that it is impossible
is moved,
able,
(b)Secondly, because everything which
remains as it was
as
term, and passes away
as
regardssome
what
other
term
is
from
moved
whiteness to
; as
regardssome
in substance ; thus in everything
blackness, remains the same
kind of compositionto be found
which is moved, there is some
above that in God there is no composition;
It has been shown
for that He is absolutely
simple. Hence it is manifest that God
be moved,
cannot
(c)Thirdly,because everythingwhich is
moved
somethingby its motion, and attains to what
acquires
is Infinite,compre
it had not attained previously.As God
hending in Himself the plenitudeof perfectionof all Being,
extend Himself to any
He cannot acquireanything new,
nor
He
not
extended
was
previously.Hence
thing whereto
69.
motion in no way belongsto Him
immutable : Thus in every creature
2. God alone is absolutely
to change either as regardssubstantial
there is a potentiality
existence,as in the case of thingscorruptible
; or as regards
locality
only,as in the case of the celestial bodies [which in the
considered
incorruptible]
physicsof the ancients were
; or
of their
as
regardsthe order of their end, and the application
with the angels; and
powers to divers objects,as is the case
taken together
further the whole order of creatures
is capableof
beingchanged,since the Creator has power to maintain them in
this first

that

'

'

existence

or

to annihilate them.

But

as

God

alone

is in

none

of

Deum
omnino
immutabilem
esse
:
praemissis (q.2, a. 3) ostenditur
all
ostensum
est
esse
(loc.cit.)
quod primum ens, quod
Quidem, quia supra
dicimus
actum
Deum
ens
oportet esse
; et quod hujusmodi primum
purum
absque permixtione alicujus potentiae ; eo quod potentia simpliciter est
modo
Omne
autem
est aliquo
mutatur,
quod quocumque
posterior actu.
modo
in potentia. Ex
aliquo modo
patet quod impossibileest Deum
quo
mutari." 2" Quia omne
quod movetur, quantum ad aliquid manet, et quan
de
albedine
in nigredinem,
movetur
tum
ad aliquid transit ; sicut quod
Et sic in omni
manet
substantiam.
secundum
eo
quod movetur, attenditur
est autem
aliqua compositio. Ostensum
supra (q.3, a. 7) quod in Deo nulla
manifestum
est compositio, sed est omnino
est quod Deus
simplex. Unde
motu
moveri
suo
non
quod movetur,
aliquid acquipotest. 3" Quia omne
sit
rit,et pertingitad illud ad quod prius non
pertingebat. Deus autem, cum
in
totius
se
omnem
infinitus,
plenitudinem perfectionis
comprehendens
esse,
in aliquid ad quod prius non
se
non
potest aliquidacquirere ; nee extendere
sibi competit motus
'. I, q. 9, a. I.
pertingebat. Unde nullo modo
68

'

Ex

i"

"

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

86

mutable, it belongsto Him

these

ways
immutable

V.

to

The

"

clearer there stands out

concept of it becomes

our

at once
eternity
imperfection.In

without

duration

These

(b)limit, (c)vicissitude.

ment,

by

'

the Scholastics

of
possession

(a)commence

has been

become

universally
perfect

Eternityis the full and

life ; Interminabilis

interminable

an

of

features have

since Boethius

fixed in the definition which

received

altogether

idea of

its distinctive characteristics the absence

as

be

to

GOD

OF

Eternity.

as

everyone

proportionas

ETERNITY

THE

of Divine

54. Meaning

appears

alone

70.

'

vitae tota

perfectapossessio'.
Let us go through the ascendingscale of contingentbeings
in such a way as to eliminate one
by one from our concept of
that are found
in them.
the duration of God all imperfections
stand corporeal
substances,which (a)come
1. At the bottom
the result of a natural
moment
as
into being at a particular
acci
combination, (b) constantlymanifest
or
disintegration
later their
or
dental changes (phenomena),until (c) sooner
combines
or
decomposes under the action of
very substance
simul et

extrinsic action, to

some

form

one

or

more

substances

new

(temporaryduration, tempus).
2. Higher in the scale come
spiritual
beingswhich, though
unchangeablein their substantial nature and therefore natur
(a)are no less subject to variations in the
allyimperishable,
development of their faculties,and (b)are dependent at each
the omnipotence of God
for their preservation
in
moment
on
received

(c)at
life (permanentduration,aevum)

the

have

being they

this

dependence involves

of their

the commencement
It does

not

here

us

concern

succession of real
positive
parts
parts (St.Bona venture)or simplya succession of possible
(St.Thomas, Suarez) in the duration of a spiritual
being.
is
matter
such
the
condition
of every
as
a
offad
3. Although
substance, yet it is not repugnant to the mind to
spiritual
whether

'

70

dum

Sic

esse

tantum
et

virtutis

communiter

potestate est
rum

creatura

est

potentia

ad

mutationem

sicut corpora
corruptibilia: vel secundum
vel
secundum
ordinem
(sicut corpora
coelestia)
;
substantiate

applicationem

creaturae

omni

igiturin

esse

sit mutabilis,

et

non

diversa, sicut in angelis;

ad

sunt

mutabiles

esse

earum.

proprium ejus est

secundum

Unde,
omnino

vel
esse

ad

et universaliter

potentiam creantis, in
cum

Deus

immutabilem

nullo
esse

istorum
'.

secun-

locale

finem,
omnes
cu

jus

modo-

Ibid.,a.

2.

OF

NATURE

THE

GOD

87

spiritcreated from all eternityand raised at the

of its end ; such a being would
first instant to the possession
neither date of origin
know
nor
change in action from the point
end ; but does it follow
of view of the enjoyment of its supreme
conceive

that it would

be eternal

be ; for

allowingthat
variation in its acts and no real development
there were
no
would
in the duration of its existence,such a favoured
spirit
stillalwaysbe liable to annihilation and, consequently,
radically
speakingit
Strictly

subjectto

the law

would

not

even

of successive duration.

this negativeidea that we have of eternity

perfect
and unvaryingexistence
must
raise the factof this perpetual
we
to the heightof an
however
of a spirit,
great such a dignity,
and exclude; as beingintrinsically
essential right,
incompatible
with the nature
of an eternal being,not only the fact but even
of a commencement,
of an end, or of any kind
the possibility
In order

of
'

series of successive

to

events

in the

of its existence.

course

'

my

God,' writes St. Augustine, Thy years neither

come

departingthrust out
by coming years,
Thy years are one
away.
day ; and Thy day is not daily,but To-day,seeingThy To-day
for neither doth it replace
to-morrow,
gives not place unto
yesterday. Thy To-day, is Eternity 71.
of God
It follows from what
have said that the eternity
we
is absolute,that is to say, independentof all relation to time,
justas His immensity is independentof all relation to space ;
nor

go ;

they stand

together,nor
for they pass not

are

'

and

therefore the

and

the future of His

from

His

co-existence of God
creatures

is

with

the

past,the present

following
only a corollary

eternity72.

71

Confessions,XI,

72

'

Conveniens

13.
definitio

dicens
ponit Boetius
perfecta possessio'.
Sicut in cognitionem simplicium oportet
venire
nos
per composita, ita in
venire
cognitionem aetemitatis
oportet nos
per tempus ; quod nihil aliud
est quam
secundum
numerus
motus
prius et posterius. Cum enim in quolibet
sit successio, et una
motu
hoc quod numeramus
prius
; ex
pars post alteram
et posterius in motu,
apprehendimus tempus, quod nihil aliud est quam
numerus
In eo
autem
prioriset posteriorisin motu.
quod caret motu, et
eodem
modo
se
habet, non
est accipere prius et posterius. Sicut
semper
igiturratio temporis consistit in numeratione
prioriset posteriorisin motu,
ita in apprehensione unifo mutatis
extra
con
motum,
ejus quod est omnino
sistit ratio aetemitatis.
Item
dicuntur
ea
tempo re mensurari, quae princiin tempo re, ut dicitur (Phys., lib. IV, text. 70). Et
pium et finem habent
hoc ideo, quia in omni
eo
quod movetur, est accipere aliquod principium et
est omnino
Quod vero
aliquem finem.
immutabile, sicut nee successionem.

quod
'

aeternitas

est

aetemitatis

interminabilis

vitae

est

ea

tota

quam
simul

et

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

88

'

is Eternal.

God

55.

"

idea of

The

eternityfollows

immu

from
the idea of time follows movement,
as appears
as
tability,
is supremely immutable, it
God
the preceding. Hence
as
supremely belongs to Him to be eternal. Nor is He eternal
eternity,whereas no other being is
only : but He is His own
its

duration,

own

His

own

VI. THE
56. Proof.
that there

"

are

show

not

and

cannot

i" Ex

finem

aut

hoc

quod

GOD

OF

polytheismis

be several

and

error

an

the

gods answering to

Being.
habere
id

notificatur
potest. Sic ergo ex duobus
est in aeternitate, est interminabile, id est
2" Per hoc
terminus
ad utrumque
referatur.

quod

principio et fine carens

; ut
ipsa aeternitas successione

?uod

that

may

principium

nee

aeternitas

UNICITY

We

concept of the supreme

ita

essence,

'

alone

God

own

Eternity really and

properly
follows
for
God
alone,
eternity
immutability.
74.
is absolutely
immutable

in

speaking is
And

is His

He

as

is

God

'

Eternal.

is

alone

God

existence.

own

'

His

is He

so

Being, and hence

eternity 73.

uniform

own

is its

other

no

as

simul

caret, tota

existens

'.

Sum.

Theol.,

i.
q. 10,
'
In tempore
a.

est duo
considerare, scilicet ipsum tempus, quod est succesDicitur
aeternitatis
sivum, et nunc
tempo ris quod est imperfectum.
ergo
temtota simul, ad removendum
nunc
tempus ; et perfectaad excludendum
poris '. Ibid., ad 5.
'

aeternitas
sit mensura
esse
permanentis, secundum
quod aliquid
hoc recedit ab aeternitate.
permanentia essendi, secundum
Quaedam
sic recedunt
autem
est subjectum
a
permanentia essendi, quod esse eorum
transmutationis, vel in transmutatione
consistit,esse hujusmodi mensurantur
tempore, sicut omnis motus, et etiam esse omnium
corruptibilium. Quaedam
recedunt
minus
in trans
vero
a
nee
permanentia essendi ; quia esse eorum
mutatione
habent
est
consistit, nee
subjectum transmutationis
; tamen
transmutationem
adjunctam vel in actu vel in potentia : sicut patet de
naturam
angelisqui habent esse intransmutabile
pertinet,
quantum ad eorum

Cum

recedit

transmutabilitate

cum

ligentiarum
surantur

quod

secundum

et affectionum

aevo,
mensurat

et

electionem,
loco

est medium

quod

rum

inter

et

Et

aeternitatem

intel-

transmutabilitate

cum

modo.

suo

ideo

et

hujusmodi
Esse

tempus.

men

autem

est
mutabilitati
aeternitas, nee
mutabile, nee
adjunctum.
habet
in se prius
autem
non
tempus habet prius et posterius ; aevum
et posterius,sed ei conjungi possunt ; aeternitas autem
habet
non
prius neque
posterius,neque ea compatitur'. I, q. 10, a. 5.
78
Ratio
aeternitatis consequitur immutabilitatem,
sicut ratio temporis

Sic ergo

'

consequitur motum,
maxime

aeternus, sed
est

non

suum

74

'

litatem

Deus

esse.

Aeternitas

dictis

'.

'.

Solus

suum

I, q.
solo

autem

Ibid., a. 3,

nulla

tamen
est

proprie in

et

vere

patet (art.praec.). Unde

competit esse aeternum.
cum

;
autem

aeternitas

sua

consequitur.

superiusostensum

ex

sibi maxime
aeternitas

est sua

essentia, ita

sua

ut

immutabilis,

10,

alia

a.

Deo

Deus

res

sit

uniforme.

esse

cum

Nee
sua

Deus

sit

solum

est

duratio, quia

Unde

sicut

est

2.

est

quia

est omnino

aeternitas

immutabi

immutabilis,

ut

est

NATURE

THE

OF

GOD

89

alreadyseen that the unity of plan and purpose

it affords an in
that is manifested by the universe as we know
of Him who presides
75.
its governance
dication of the unicity
over
which
This affords a presumption in favour of His unicity,
confirm by two arguments.
we
may
We

have

From

1.

fact that God

the

is His

self-subsistence.

"

It is

impossiblethat the actual beingof an individual,e.g. my own

communicated
to
personalbeing,should be shared by'others,
is absolutelyand
the divine nature
several. But
entirely
actual
it is
identical with His
Therefore
personal
being.
impossiblethat the divine nature should be shared by several
gods.
of gods would only be possible
if
In other words, a plurality
the divine

were

essence

type,distinct

from

His

existence,that

could be identified with several

could be realized,and

or
species

individuals

fallingwithin it. But the divine

type capableof being shared by several
Being is not a specific
individuals.
Therefore there can
only be one God T6.
Infinite simplicity
is identical with infinite unity; in virtue
of His infinite simplicity
God not only is one
God, but that
the whole of
And
as
uniquenessis His essentially.
oneness,
of God is His actual being,there is nothing in it
the essence
that can
to several, nothing that
is not
be communicated
numericallyone and unique.
that there should be two infinite
2. It is impossible
beings,
with

several

different from one

another
or
suppose them
lutelyalike. For if we suppose them to be different,one
whether

has

we

that
perfection

the other

lacks, and

is,to say the least,not infinite. If we

perfectlyalike, we are faced with two
75

Cp. Sum.

'

enim

Deum

quod

Theol., I, q.
esse

illud unde

sed
pptest,
Si ergo

id, unde

Socrates

per

enim

plures Socrates, ita non

venit Deo.
Nam
ipse Deus
Theol.,I, q. 3,
'

Natura

a.

unde

3 ; q. n,

a.

them

alternatives

to

be

either

Socrates

hoc

aliquid,nullo

modo

est

est
multis

communicari
homo, multis
nisi
uni tantum.
communicari,
potest
hie
sicut
est
non
homo,
quod
possunt
per
autem
Hoc
conpossent esse plures homines.
est'.
est sua
Sum.
natura, ut supra ostensum

est hie homo,

id esset homo,

esse

suppose

a.

aliquidsingulareest

Illud

communicabile.

then

therefore the latter

3 ; Cont. Gent., I, 42, 3 and 6.

Manifestum
stratur
ex
ejus simplicitate.

n,

demon

unum

abso

est

non

3.

in
Deus, aut est per seipsam individuata
significatahoc nomine
hoc Deo, aut per aliquidaliud.
Si per aliud, oportet quod ibi sit compositio ;
si per seipsam, ergo impossible est quod alteri conveniat.
Illud enim
quod
est individuationis
principium, non
potest esse pluribus commune.
Impossi*
bile est igitur
esse
plures deos '. Cont. Gent., I, 42,

former

for
of

d'etre

77

'Deum

sic
ergo

Si
uni
ille
esse

ergo

quod
in

quo

plures

and

that

has

4,

a.

2)

quod

esset
deos

Si

privatio,
'.

Sum.

autem

non

ejus

comprehendit
oporteret

eos

simpliciter

esset

Theol.,

I,

q.

se

differre.

n,

a.

then

totam

alterieorum

that

77.

Ostensum

perfectionem

Aliquid

perfectus.
3.

raison
eminent

an

perfectionis.

perfectio

esset,

the

beings

in

the

longer

no

be

in

infinite

infinitate

hoc

is

conclude

We
two

In

not.

God

comprise,

being.

ex

is

definitely

must

be

it

or

latter,

the

must

Deus

dii,

plures
alteri.

non

He

cannot

probatur

essent

In

so

exists

there

unum

(q.

supra

essendi.
veniret

that

be

to

God

on

infinite.

order

esse

enim

dependent

not

hypothesis

any

est

is

in

all

is

everything

degree,
in

it

case,

infinite,

Et

infinite

second

the

est

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

90

ergo

con-

deesset.

Impossibile

NATURAL

92

it

is

buted

be

attributed

order,

and

endowed

with

enjoy

of

the

the

being

perfect

of

sion
than

only
of

the
in

divine

the

actual

own

directs

therefore

belong

it

is

This

its

therefore

good

infinitely

belongs

to

infinite

the

good

cannot

can

find

that

something

the

to

must

definition

is

it

life

infinite

of

possession
and

in

love,
is

essence

Him

posses
be

other

its

this

such

good
way

that

activity

intelligibility

the

its

intellection,

own

its

its

lovableness,

love.

Therefore

there
the

inspires

Author

essence.

infinite

thought

understood,

good.

divine

the

But

infinite

an

their

endowed

perfect

So

intellectual

this

imperfection

any

are

most

is

contin

that

by

the

design
order

(b) Among

some

of

it

reasons

this

of

(c) Beatitude

must

And

Cause

wherefore

enjoying.

and

Being.

without

will

attri

manifests

(28).

are

possession

of

capable

positive,

purely

there

be

may

positive

world

first

will

perfections,
conscious

three

the

and

and

thought

and

is

that

world

this

same

full

is

know

imperfection;

an

account,

The

(a)

intelligence
in

power

for

Him

to

this

on

moreover,

we

with

beings

gent

(5) and,

And,

contain

formally

not

perfection

God.

to

must

does
"

simple

and

will

and

knowledge

THEOLOGY

in

are

works

that

God

thought

exterior

are

to

and

love
and

God,

this

this

love

thought

them.

According

to

this

into

three

chapters

The

work

of

God

very
:

brief

Thought

(III).

argument
in

God

divide

we

(I)

Will

in

Part
God

III

(II)

CHAPTER

words

in other
in itself

in

or

Considered
sist

Life

Intellectual

59.

in

knowledge
its object.
subjectively,in
of

of

of

of

reasoning, for

process

is

there

substance

known

truths

from

to

of

succession
of

act

exhausts

Considered

ledge is,primarily,of the very

of all other things that exist or
God's

60.

Nature.

divine

the

of

actual

being understood
divine

the

actual

the

Now

object

of this

rests

is

its

which

object.
know

and, secondarily,

Comprehension
on

no

and

of

His

simplicity of the
intellective
potentiality
the

intellection

being

divine

the

God,

intellection

one

Being

exist.

Actual

to

are

substance,

of

may

there

determined

being

essence.

actual

fore

God

act

an

say

in its term,

nature

the

proposition
In

Being.

capable
is His

This

i.

"

is

Knowledge

is to

of
intelligibility

glance the whole

looked
at
objectively,

at

nor

series

perfection there
multiplicity of acts
knowledge is a single

nor

that

comprehension,

adequate

entire

divine

The

action.

goes

in whom

in God

ideas, for in

of abstract

divisions

no

fruit

ratiocination

and

unknown,

perfectly His own

knowledge
fragmentary

neither

nor

truth

is

is it the

nor

con

there

God

faculty of

the

not

potentialitythere is no intellectual growth

abstractive
employs a
an
operation which

no

again is it
of compositions and
who
is actually and
is

faculties

and

composition
a

in

God,

considered

does

itself, it

faculty, since

be

science, may

or

life of

intellectual

-The

God.

of

His

exercise

the

GOD

IN

THOUGHT

or

the

actual

His

intellection

understanding
same

thing.

and

There

intellection, is also

intellection.

infinityof the divine perfection. This

intelligible
essence,
infinityof perfectionimplies (a)an infinitely
of knowing, and
(c) a union of the power
(b)an infinite power
of knowing
its infinitelyperfect object in such
with
a
way
and
the one
that there
is an
adequate correspondence between
the other.
Consequently the exercise of the power of knowing
2.

It

rests

on

the

93

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

94
is proper to
of this
perception
that

Being, in
divine Being.

of the

'

physics,Bk. XII,

'

Possible.

and

Actual

all Things

knows

God

61.

Being consists in the adequate

word, in a comprehensive view

infinite

an

God

that

lays down
this opinionhe

Aristotle

"

In

Meta
know

can

followed

by his
and Averroes, the pleabeing
Avicenna
Arabian
commentators,
urged that the knowledge of a secondary objectis incompatible
with
the absolute
perfectionof the divine Being : an act
the knower,
which perfects
of knowledge, they argued,is one
other objects
besides His essence,
and therefore,
did God know
His perfection
would be due to something else than His essen
tial perfection.A second argument is that, in order to know
would
such
objects,the divine intelligence
require to be
sort of intelligible
determined
impres
by them, to receive some
in
and
this
sion from
them
would
imply potentiality Him,
;
He is pure Actuality.
Aristotle concludes that
whereas
Finally,
nothing but

there

apparent after

on

established

The

Creator

and

has revealed

to

considered

were

Further, it would

be

to know.

our

own

will

thesis.

physico-theological
argument
us

and purpose.
actingwith intelligence
beingsHe has called into existence were
of the

than

which
misunderstanding,

have

we

posteriori
proof:

for the existence of God

was

it is better not to know

is founded
objection

more

1.

In

thingsthat

some

are

This
be

Himself.

Author

an

Therefore

at

of nature

least the

present to the thought

suitable for existence.

as

arbitraryto

that

suppose
to His

only

the

mind, since the

beingsactuallycreated were
present
beings which have been created, having been so by an act of
must
have been chosen from all possible
free-will,
beings. God
alia a se ', i.e. everythingthat has been
therefore knows
created or could have been created by Him.
2. A
prioriproof: God's knowledge of His nature would
not be
comprehensive if it did not know this nature under
'

'

all the
the

to

'

aspectsunder which it is knowable.

divine

in an
fectly78,
78

would

of

in terms.

be

of ways

writer, Pieralisi,maintains
divine

the

necessarilybe

diction

it should

indefinite number

Franciscan

of imitations

that

nature

essence

infinite ; and

This

because

yet

objection is

Now

imitable, albeit imper

by

an

that

it is not
of such

production of an
playing with

mere

possibleto speak
divine exemplar

infinite is
words.

fact that the

be

'

indefinite number

copy

St. Thomas
St. Augustine nor
overlooked
the
adequately imitated, yet they did not hesitate
of creatures
being the imagines et similitudines Dei
neither

not

it is essential

to
'

or

contra

Certainly
Infinite

can

regard the possibility

the
vestigiaDei ',
'

THE
of creatures

this

ACTIVITY

OF

is
instability

the divine nature.

GOD

95

intrinsic characteristic of

an

follows,then, in the first placethat the

It

'

'

would
not be
knowledge of the divine essence
comprehensive
if it perceivedthis essence
absolute object
as
an
exclusively
time
at the same
without
seeing it under the indefinitely
of intelligible
great number
aspects that it presents as the
of all the possible
imitations of the divine
exemplary cause
is
know
Being. In the second place,that what He must
the formal
and proper
being that creatures would possess if
they existed ; for this formal and proper being is that by
which the creature
images the divine Being,it is the expression
of the mode according
imitates the essence
to which the creature
of its Creator.
And
in the third place,that He possesses a
alike
distinct knowledge of creatures
; all the perfections,
in their
essential and accidental,which their being represents,
generic,specificand individual essence
; all without
any
exceptionare before the thought of God in their proper for
malities because all without
definite
exceptionare so many
imitations of the Being whose
God
imitability
compre
'

hends '.
Before
correct

He

passingon

to

say

God

knows

remark
the

that

almightycause of all His creatures.

the supereminentexemplary causes

of creation

before He

them.

creates

sees

Hence

we

posterioriargument,

He

Him

sees

of all the ideal

types

as

the second

alone

gives the

causal

of the

of beings distinct from God.

intelligibility
objectionof Aristotle and his Arabian commentators
the ground before this explanation.
Whilst thingsoutside

reason

The
fallsto
God

but

For

that actually
the power
given our first proof as an

Himself
have

strictly
thingsbecause

it is not
of

essences

is the

self as

that

must

we

are

less not

the

objectof

the divine

knowledge, they

are

neverthe

of
determining
principle
superaddedto the essence
determina
God, after the manner
of the accidental intelligible
tion which completesthe potential
intel
facultyof the human
lect when as yet it is intrinsically
101 f.).
incomplete(Psychology,
The divine essence
by itself correspondsto the intelligible
impressionor speciesthat the later Scholastics have called
speciesimpressa ; in other words, it is in itself its own
determiningprincipleof intellection, medium
quo intellectionis ; whilst it is also itself the intelligible
counterpart,
the
which
the
speciesexpressa ', or that in
cognoscibility
'

'

'

'

'

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

96
of

thingis manifested,

real

'

in quo

medium

objectiverelucet

'.
quidquidest intelligibile
and

objectof

derived

St. Thomas

when

Moreover,

the

a
distinguishes
primary object
divine knowledge, he does not

suppose that in God there is any process of discursive reasoning;

dis-currere
for this
impliesa succession of cognitiveacts
"

"

which

singleact which
in alio

62. The

(a) the

has

Ideas.

Divine

connotes

which

sees

whatever

sees

"

the

'

idea

reasons

thought

knowledge

and, in this
connexion

necessary

An

"

essential

present to

are

divine

aliud ; the
the divine essence

olio ad

proceed ex

'

in

essence

'

things,

of

God, and

"

with it.

Scholastic

of

is

language

rationes rerum,'

(b)their

formal

So that, whilst
thingsto be created.
is considered as a subjective
the
form,
speciesintelligibilis
the idea is the objective
terminus of the divine intuition. The
is single
former in God
manifold, inasmuch
; the latter are
and having an indefinitely
as
thingsbeingmanifold to infinity
of mutual
relations of causality,
etc.,
finality,
great number
modes
the
distinct
which
infinite
to
so
are
according
many
of the divine Being is imitable.
perfection
It must
not
be thought,however, that these ideas are
so
is identical with that of
realities in God ; their reality
many
divine
considered
the
the supreme
essence
as
archetype of
character

models

as

of

'

'

things;

God

of its role
of God

of
'

in His

as

the
archetype,

what

is distinct from

own

divine
Him

extra

'.

In

this

sense

the

essence

under

actual

the mind

guiseof a

multitude

the

which

ideas of the

Everything
left vague, comprisesobjectsthat
various groups.
which
One distinction,

can

can

be

be

produced

divine

intellect

The

expression
purposely
into
distinguished

Knowledge.
'; which we
possible

and

in virtue

presentsto

in number.
many
63. The
Objects of the Divine

'

But

essence.

objectsresembling those
intelligible

ad

are

them

sees

"

have

have

alreadynoticed,is that between

the- primary object of the divine knowledge,namely, the very
nature
of God
considered absolutely,
and the derived object
or the derived objects,
namely, what God knows in His essence
considered
These

thingsas
at

some

as

imitable

we

'

ad extra'.

objects of this secondary knowledge

well as thingsexistent which have come
definite

moment

of

time.

'

are

possible
into

being

Possibles ', whether

ACTIVITY

THE

GOD

OF

97

reference to actual existence

considered without

or

form
exclusive)

sive
excludingit (sivepraecisive

definitely

as

object

the

objectum
simple intelligence,
scientiae simplicis
Things which have existed,
intelligentiae.
exist or will exist, form the objectof intuitive knowledge,
objectum scientiae visionis.
In the controversies that have taken placeabout the know
intermediate
ledgeof God there is the further questionof an
knowledge', scientia media, which deals with objectstermed
d
conditional futurables ', that is to say, thingswhich wou
call

Schoolmen

the

what

of

'

'

have

existed

action

of

some

or

should

of

knowledge

exist if,under

would

or

take

definite

cause

place.

Those
that

maintain

'

had

taken

who

advocate

taking

place,were

this third kind

futurables

conditional

knowledge of

conditions,the

certain

'

do

not

',seeing
intelligence
futurables
and
not
that they are
mere
possibles; or
under God's intuitive knowledge of vision ',seeingthat they
do not belong to the class of definite and true future things;
theymust then be ranked, they say, as the objectof a knowledge
these other two, in a sense
distinct from
midway between
them : they are the objects
of a scientia media.'
The
is sometimes
called
knowledge of simpleintelligence
also necessary knowledge,since its objectis not conditioned by

fall either under

the

'

pure

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

any

'

free act

either

the

on

part of

God

'

or

on

the

part

of the

'

as
free
knowledge of vision is also known
knowledge, since its objectis dependent on the free fiatof
the creative act ; the intermediate knowledge againappears
distinct from these other two, since its objectconsists in those
but
thingsof the future that are dependent on human liberty
order of
considered as belongingto the purely hypothetical
free conditional future
things,called by the Scholastics
things'.
also distinguish
In God
we
a
knowledge,
speculative
may
the objectof which is the divine nature and the possibles
which
not and
will be realized,from a practical
know
are
never
ledge,which directs either the will or the activity ad extra

creature

the

'

'

'

'

'

of God.
64. God

possesses

Knowledge

of

Possible

Things.

"

Of

be distingushed
two kinds (seeGen. Meta
may
is verified when
physics,18 f.). Intrinsic possibility
an
object
there
possibility

presentselements

which

from

the

of
compatibility

their nature

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

98

extrinsic

the existence
means
possibility
of a cause
possible.
capableof producingwhat is intrinsically
whatever
is
the
of
is
In
God
who
case
almighty
intrinsically
is also extrinsically
possible.
possible
The
ad
divine ideas are types that are formallyimitable
allow

of existence

'

',outside the divine

extra

perfectly.Therefore
'.

extra

But

is to know

He

is

there

these ideas

'

imitable

are

contradiction

no

knows

'

formallyimitable

as

that these ideas

to know

that

them

knows

God

Now

essence.

in the

ad

ad
'

extra

existence

of

thingsthat imitate the model ideas conceived by the divine

things as intrinsically
intelligence
; in brief, it is to know
possible^
His Nature
Further, God knows
adequatelyand sees it allpowerful,capable of realizingthings after the archetypal
Now
to know
conceives.
ideas which His intelligence
Himself
is to know
is intrinsically
what
as
possible
capableof realizing
God sees possible
the extrinsic possibility
of things. Therefore
thingsboth in their negativeand in their positive
possibility.
65.

God

'the

possesses

of

Knowledge

omniscient

with

regard to

and

with

infallible knowledge every

knows

going to

be

embraces

past or
present
events

performed.

The

everythingwhich
future.
or

With

past does

take

He

sees

the

knowledge

them

all in

happen

knowledge of
for

would

us

God, however,

not

place,but

will

all that

date

advance,

His

of vision would

which

vision that

He

of the

is
has

present,

knowledge
that

of

our

these

knowledge is unchangeable
from

that

so

His

future

free act

be

is

God

"

in the

the actual time

from

because

Vision'.

be

this

point of view

named
appropriately
after our manner
of thinkingand speaking as that of prevision.
It embraces
all things that take
place,whether
necessary
the
free-will
of
Yet
chief
the
or
on
man.
dependent
point
of interest is mainly in reconciling
the infallible certitude of
with man's freedom of action,and therefore
this foreknowledge
the thesis we
to establish will deal mainly with free
have now
more

future acts.

perfectRuler of this universe,and in

high place is occupiedby beingsthat are endowed
God

is the

this universe
with

intel

ligenceand free-will. To establish this order and to maintain

it,two things are obviously indispensable,
namely the know

ledgeof

the end

the attainment

of the universe
of this end

and

and

of the
in order

means

to

suitable

for

guarantee this

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

loo

'

futures

'

futurables
to

seems

others

'

exclude

conditione

freedom

The
(futurabilia).
of
the possibility

by

of

those
'

scientia media

sub

(futura essent

called

are

'

of His

invention

the

futures

conditional
or

'

reallyfuture, free contingent

are

(futura contingentia)
;

for
responsible
'

effects

of these

Some

free?

'

free

possibili),
these

acts

infallible knowledge of

an

the

understand

let us
difficulty
Revolution
of 1789. We
consider the example of the French
know the causes
which, in the lightof after events, explainthe
revolution
the philosophy of the eighteenth century, the
:

in their

them

of the

abuses

These

etc.

To

causes.

of Louis
XVI,
regime, the weakness
supply us to-day with the sufficient reason

ancient

causes

of that
why the men
But
making event.
knowledge of these

time

acted

so

no

with

one

the

even

that

and

would have been able to predictwith

setting,
the effect which they have produced.To say
foresight

in their
infallible

whole

done

could have

one

antecedents

the

that

the

that

who

men

clearlymanifested

to

brought

been

have

consequent

about

free but

that any

to the

assertion

in themselves
; and

it would

Revolution

the

bringingit about, and

able to avoid

not

be tantamount

that necessitated their

reason

not

would

so

the event

of
would

Similarlywith

necessary.

epoch-

thorough

most

in themselves

both

causes,

bringabout

to

as

the

follow

'89 were
appear
all the

free actions of my individual life : does the adequateknowledge

of my
faculties,my temperament, my character,
nature, my
the circumstances
will, necessarily
affectingmy
imply an
infallible knowledge of my
I
I

at this moment

am

complex state
otherwise

than

would

be

free

the

example, the

to

not

power

But

and

the circumstances

"

no

necessary

though

anyone
knowledge both my

could

never

on

them.

How

than

an

granted that, on
which

have

connexion

and

be certain of

eventuallymake.

led

with

should know
nature

would

such conditions

nothingmore

meaning.

shall

have

write

to

any

he

for

act

write ?

If the

affirmative,it would follow that, given my

previousto my decision,I am powerlessto decide

write still remain

that

as,

is in the

answer

have

"

performingin writingthese lines,which

persuade myself I

dom

free act

as

decision to
my
these ?
My free

illusion,
a word
the contrary, my
to my

me

this

without
nature

present action

action, it follows then

with the most

the conditions

readingin

them

possible
perfect
of its operation,
the

decision I

ACTIVITY

THE

OF

GOD

101

Molina,
perhaps insoluble difficulty,
other
have
introduced
the
scientia
Lessius and
theologians
follows : The Apostle Peter
of God.
media
as
They reason
and denied his Master.
He
yieldedto the voice of a woman
need not have done so ; he denied Him
freely. Since he has
that he would
true from all eternity
denied Him, it was
deny
which
reflects all truth,
Him.
The divine essence,
necessarily
is a mirror in which
the divine intelligence
apprehends the
of
truth, Peter denies his Master at a certain precisemoment
history'. The divine knowledge has thus for its necessary
solve this real and

To

'

'

'

objectall the eternal

truths

that

connected

are

with free actions

is for God the

in the future ; in other words, the divine essence
means
(medium in quo) by which He knows free future events.

divine

the

Moreover

ditional future events

it

as

reason,

represents the

essence

with the

same

of

con

clearness,and for the

same

representsthat of absolute

truth

in the future.

events

This

explanation,they say, enables us to reconcile God's

infallibleknowledge of vision with the perfectfree-will on the
part of the objectof His knowledge 79.
Unfortunately their explanation is quite indefensible.
(a)In the first place,the existence of an eternal truth in the
of free futures if they are
considered without reference
case
to the divine intelligence
is a mere
fancy. Truth depends
; it is a transcendental
upon reality
property of being. Where
beingdoes not exist there is no truth. Leave out of considera
tion the divine intelligence,
Peter previousto the
and where was
"

decree

According to
of creation

objectof

"

the

to the eternal
'

view

our

; before

scientia
vision

we

the

media

"

If the will decides

knowledge

knew

such

follow that

the

and
it has

all truth
divine

essence

the divine
a

truth
as

which

free act
act is
decree

not

knowledge

would

has

an

such

conditions

come

essence

be

and

also

the

not

proposition in
But

after

the

be

infinite.

future
true

unless

which
the

this
divine

represented it, it would

complete representation of

eternal truth

same
thing happens with regard to
from
all eternity,since it is
intelligible

such and
So from

before

conditionallyfuture, and the

it is counted
as
being present

free act, the

is eternal.

divine

the

would

temporal existence,

'The
are

; after the

posit,in time,

to

though
ledge.

the

the

of God.

decision is expressed has

all truth

regard
decree

conditional
from

about, this determinate

The

future

for the divine

events

actj

know

"

they

eternity that, should

choice

would

be made.

true that Peter the Apostle when

eternity it was
questionedby the
Jews should
Master.
deny his divine
Similarly,one of the two following
from
true
is tempted by the ser
propositionswas
eternity : If the first man
the
pent, he will yield ; or again, when
will
tempted by
serpent, the first man
not yield. If propositionsare
true from
all eternity God
know
them
must
as
they are in themselves (inseipsis)
'. DUPONT,
Thtodicte, These LVII, pp. 101102.

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

102

first century
he

in existence,he could

not

was

in God

eternal truth

an

intellectus humanus

is

The

'

truth.

no

moment

for

Etiam

dicerentur

res

Sed

divinum.

intellectum

which

there is
God, eternally

esset, adhuc

non

since

act

an

truth.

outside

but

consequentlythere

nothing : and
in ordine ad

of

And

exists and thinks, there is room

that God

that it is admitted

exist.

put forth

not

foundation
ontological

the

be

should

did not

; he

Nowhere

A.D.

si

si

verae,

uterque intellectus,

veriauferri,nullo modo
intelligeretur
impossibile,
80. (b)In the second place,even
tatis ratio remaneret
sup
t
ruth
it
were
eternally
existing, would
posingthat an objective

quod

est

'

be

not

for God's

term

unless

thought

influence

we

that

suppose

it

His

But
such
intelligence.
is untenable, since God cannot
be subjectto the
a supposition
It is then in God Himself,ab intm, that
action of any cause.

exercises

look for the

must

we

This

active

an

although

they

unum,

divine

the

to its definite act

nevertheless

tating motion,

determined
antecedently

not

are

man

say, and
appliesthe free-will of man

ad

knowledge.

find in the decrees of the divine will.

the free acts of

Although

of the divine

reason

Thomists

reason

on

divine motion

it pass, although in a manner

of willingto
from
the power

is

There

infallibleconnexion

an

free act of

the human
the freedom

between

Far

from

of the free act, the divine motion

voluntary causes

because

being

is proper

God

does

not

the

"

seipsum

trium

movet

tatis, quod sit prima

aliquidsit
est

prima

bus

causis

movendo
riae ; sed

does not

in all
to

of this

movens

movendo
causas

of

libre

the

'

nature

causas

et

per liberum
necessitate

de

est

sicut

voluntarias.

quin actus earum

aufert
quin actiones

arbitre

(chap. 8), has

fundamental

reason

ad

nee

ejus.

causa

Et
sint

earum

facit: operatur cnitn in unoquoque

Theol., I, q. 83, a. i, ad 3.

this theory and

being

thingin them

in eis

Bossuet, in his Traiti du

exposition

non

liberty,

actions of

homo

hoc

aufert

voluntarias,
Sum.

quia

sui id quod liberum

est
requiriturquod sit prima
non

liberty

'

of this very

sui motus
:
Non
tamen

et naturales
eas,

potius hoc

'.
proprietatem

causa

destroy

ffl.

2.

a.

agendum.

alterius

causa

causa

ad

and

thingsaccording
By moving

each.

operates in each thingaccordingto its own

De veritate,
ST. THOMAS,
q. 7,
'
arbitrium
est causa
Liberum

""

the divine motion

deprivetheir
cause

volition.

compromising the

works

that

necessi

of

act

is the first cause

God

voluntary; but rather is He

for He

the

will,although the former

of the latter.

says St. Thomas,

of
to the mode

is not

is necessary
to the
consistent with its

will to make

freedom,

which

motion

hoc

Deus

arbiliber-

quod
igitur

sicut naturalinaturales
sint

secundum

remarkably

which

ita

volunta-

underlies

ejus
clear
it :

ACTIVITY

THE

OF

GOD

103

theory respects both the divine omnipotence and

This latter

But
the created will ; and herein lies its merit.
which reconciles the two
does it offer any rational explanation

libertyof

the

fail to

We

it does.

how

terms

think

that in this delicate

see

We

questionit is

led rathei

are

to

franklyto

necessary

No explanationyet
reason.
incapacityof human
have not even
to give satisfaction ; and we
put forward seems
Bossuet
solution.
the hope of ever
satisfactory
findinga more
said the very last word on this subject:
to us to have
seems
the

avow

'

conclusion

My

evident

thingsare

two

reason

'

is,'he says,

by

that

is,that

; one

other is,that the actions which

do

we

the natural
we

are

lightof
free,the

included

are
freely

in

which has means

to con
providence,
duct them to its purposes.
Nothing can throw doubt on
these two importanttruths, because both are established by
which it is impossible
to overthrow
reasons
; for whoever
knows
anything of God cannot doubt that His providence
well as His foreknowledgeextends to everything; and
as
reflects on his own
his own
whoever
nature will recognize
freedom with such plainevidence that nothingcan succeed
in obscuringthe conviction he has of it. It is easy to see
that two truths established by such convincing
reasons
can
not be destructive of each other, for truth cannot
destroy
the decrees of divine

difficultit may be to succeed in recon

truth ; and however
is
them, the failure to understand such high matters
ciling
no

in regardto the truths

certainty
so plainly.
we
recognize
Really,if we had to abandon
free-will on account
of God's providenceor God's

which
either
'

for

reason

Freedom

has

diminished

its place in the soul,' he says,

has the power

to choose, but further

God, who is the immediate

choice, and
duce

it in its ultimate

choice must
for there is
which

does

it is,the

God, and

nothing

in the

hold

from

not

thingis,the

from

come

"

more

it must

more

This

act.

being

as

"

of

exercise

freedom,

our

being

act

the

all that

it has.

than

God.

; it follows

So, our

then

soul when

we

this very

exercise

being and

all

perfection,it
and
use

in each

free

is God

renders

the

worthy

"

who

efficacyof
even

to

His

that

act

God

God.

if then

phrase

free acts ',

from

perfection;

the infinite
the

immediately

comes

act

there
of the

the

which

it is

will :

being

it has,

more

any
actual

regard it as actually
under

is the

the

of

maker

being
description
"

if

all

and

is any

placed in

divine

granted that

it be

action, that is of His will, reaches

qualityby

divine
actual

more

that

of choice, is for that very

reason
more
be unintelligible
unless
before. This would

it was

choice, that

actual

the

Now,

the soul

as

of
of its power
needs pro
must

be included
in the
must
however
small the degree of

exercisingits power
action

inasmuch

only

actual

such

it will have

get from

not

the

cause

ultimate

creature,
God

during

'

"

any
free " ;

one

may

the category of

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

104

of free-will,
should
we
providenceon account
where
to begin,so necessary
are
they both, so

evident

the ideas

are

God,

the

on

completeof
'

Let

cannot

we

anywhere, if we
which

we

their

source

reconcile

discover when

except

that both

so

of

questionthose

use

our

reason

known

truths

only have

can

and truth
itself,

reason

cannot

has its source

that
principle

some

on

should not be able to start

together,since all the difficulties

we

in the nature

be attacked

more

as

We

to call in

were

much

certain,to find difficulties

most

are

overcome.

cannot

we

which

in

itself.

reason
'

we

man

attribute

we

equallyincontestable.
in
even
be, then, that it is possible,

conclusion

of which

attribute to

we

considered

be

must

our

matters

which

other

and

sure

; for if reason

questionthat which
hand
experienceis so

that which

truths

these

them

to set above

should appear
to

about

have

we

know

not

I do not

whether

know

we

grounds for believing

comprehend exhaustively
is no
left to be
difficulty

have

that there is any truth which we

and in such a way
that there

solved ; but even

though there be some
thus thoroughlycomprehend, it would
that all truths
if

mistaken

in the

are

same

truths that
be rash
We

case.

soon

can

to presume

be

should

all knowledge as
rejected

we

we

as

no

less

found

we

baffled ; for such is the nature of our mind that it

is necessary for it to pass by degreesfrom what is clear to
minds

our

what

is

ful,and
counters

obscure, and from what is certain

that without

former

the
rejecting

the latter. Whenever

we

is doubt

to what

begin to

soon

as

it

as

must

we

reason,

en

that we can have knowledge of matters

grasp this principle,
whose
issues and
nevertheless escape
the
consequences
range of our
be this : that

The
intelligence.

first rule of

logicshould

our

of any truths which we

for certain,whatever difficulty
know
be in recon
there may
of them
with others ; we must, so to say, hold
some
ciling
on
tightlyto both ends of the chain, though we cannot see
the middle

of

we

must

it,nor

not

loose hold

follow it with

eyes from

our

'

look about for means

Still,
we
may
truths,providedwe are determined
them

; whatever

hold
actually

happens

must

does not attend

our

not

of
not

in the search

"

end

these
reconciling

to abandon

the

good

be let loose,merely because

pursuitof some

to end.

other.

"

any
which

of
we

success

Disputarevis,

THE

ACTIVITY

GOD

OF

105

obest,si certissima praecedatfides ", said S. Augustine.

nee

of
Followingthis thought we proceedto search for means
free-willwith the decrees of Providence.
We
our
reconciling
the different views held by theologiansin
enumerate
may
82.
the hope of findingsomething which will satisfy
us
'

Before
to

passingto
objection.

an

68. A

Difficulty:

dom

of Free

God

foresees with

the

We

"

made

have

the

reply

must

we

of God

Foreknowledge

Acts.

Future

the divine will

study of

the

the

and

Free
that

statement

knowledge free future acts.

of knowledge impliesthat between
this
But the infallibility
knowledge and its object there exists a necessary connexion
which

be

cannot

be

they

as

other

do the

forming as they
must

infallible

an

it is.

than

objectof

foreknown

are

future

Therefore

acts

divine infallible knowledge

and, in consequence,

it would

either the future acts are

Briefly,
entirely
necessary, and then the divine knowledge is explained
only at the expense of human
liberty
trulyfree
; or there are
be infallibly
seen
acts, and then they cannot
by God.
M
of the Summa
Certain writers,led by a passage
Theologica
if
read
which,
we
aright,they misinterpret argue thus :

seem,

necessitated.

are

"

"

With

God

is like to

present. God
summit

is neither

there

of

past

hill upon a
passingaround its foot.

man

future, but

nor

looks

who

plainbelow

where

down
he

eternal

an

from

the

travellers

sees

travellers pass at different times

various pointsof the circumference, but the onlooker who

by

them,

sees

exists

only in

the created

one

things;

another, but the

the divine

co-exists with all the moments

And

when

BOSSUET,

plungesinto

man

his act, for the

82

all simultaneously.
So it is with God.

along, centuries succeed

pass
and

them

sees

The

that

reason

see

Men

movement

thought is eternal

of time.
a

river before my

him

eyes,

plunge in, cease

to

does
be

op. cit.,ch. 4.
quae sunt in tempo

solum
Deo ab aeterno
re sunt
praesentia,non
rationes rerum
apud se praesentes, ut quidam dicunt, sed
qua habet
quia ejus intuitus fertur ab aeterno supra omnia, prout sunt in sua praesentialitate.
Unde
manifestum
est quod contingentia infallibiliter a Deo
cog83

ea

'

Omnia

ratione

noscuntur,

in

sentialitatem,
parata '. Sum.

quantum
et

tamen

subduntur
sunt

Theol., I, q. 14,
videt illos qui post eum
veniunt
;

intuetur,simul

videt

omnes

suam
conspectui secundum
praecausis
comsuis
proximis
contingentia,
Ille qui vadit per viam, non
art. 13, c.
viam
totam
sed ille qui ab aliqua altitudine

divino

futura

transeuntes

'

"

per viam

'.

Ibid., ad

3,

io6

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

free act ?

do
Similarly

the acts

free because

God

which

God

takingplace
cease
Evidentlynot.
In this reply is the key to the solution of the difficulty,
but
it requiresto be properlyhandled.
The principle
involved
influences its object;
is right: Knowledge neither creates nor
to be

it

it such

merely knows
it

knows

such,

as

as

it is

as

them

sees

if it is

; if it is

necessary

sees

event, it

necessary

free,it knows

it

as

free event.
may
suppose the
quiteright,in puttingit in the
When

certain and

possesses

has

definite

is

event

order, the
ontological

place only because

knowledge of

the

free ; therefore

or
necessary
But, in the

event

knowledge to be faithful,it is
logicalorder,to argue : A mind

we

certain

the event

of fact.

matter

it

event, be

an

knowledge

of the

real.

was

it is a questionof reconciling
when
the
Consequently,
foreknowledgeof free events with the freedom of these
the only special
to be solved is to know
by what
difficulty

events,

something which

present

to the mind

This

before God

or,

actual

It

not

does God

what

to

seems

us

to be

in its own

the

determined

be in communication
Our

all

present

immutably and
grant
willingly

succession in the

in terms

being,has

this non-existent

it is not

as

We

cannot, then, say that the

thingshad an entityin
explainhow they could be

much

them.

contradiction

future
to

be

has

are

them

see

for its term

has

God

same,

knowledge of

future act, considered

present. We

of time

course

acts

thought
the real difficulty
stillremains
: how
are
things
yet exist present to the divine thought ? In

But

do

in the

is the

which

Free

by merely stating:

is not, there cannot

there

which

solved

another

one

the
eternally
of God.

be

means

of God.

succeed

yet exist in itselfcan

not

is not
difficulty

which

this

does

certain

with

an

to

say

existence in the
of God

omniscience

entity. Moreover,

present,it would
of

by them,

cannot, it would

mind

if

even

be necessary
which, inas

the term

that

seem,

them.

conclusion is that the

of
determiningprinciple

the divine

think
we
only be within God Himself. What
have
already suggested. We have adopted the

knowledge can
this

is

we

opinionwhich
free acts
their

in

free mode

holds
His

that

Will

to

God
cause

sees

the

them

of being. Certainlyit

of future

occurrence

to

exist

according

is difficult to

to

reconcile

II

CHAPTER

WILL

Meaning.

69.

which

faculty by

the

its

creature

This

object.

To

will the

towards

union

of desire

rise to

enjoyment, delight.

God

the
is

divine

is

will

of

act

in

of

In

divine

the

perfect

of

will with

will

or

volition.

of
of

is desire

being
satis

the

its

object gives
find

appetition

human
the

act

of will constitute

this

act

of the
is

will there

love

created

will with

the

reality.

desire, because

no

of

elements

transcendental

same

faculty

tendency
possess

towards

object

an

act

faculty of will, the good,

; the

place

no

distinguishbetween

the

the

not

union

the

manifold

these

as

of

The

it does

faction

In

good

constitutes

good which

by

to

union

the

is to love.

good

have

we

will, the

we

faculty tends,

the

which

In the

"

GOD

IN

always

will there
want

no

the

plenary

present,

en

joyment.
Although
yet

apply

we

its

it

to

by

simplicity in

this

recognize

we

of

way

fullness, the

distinction

character

of the

will.

is

perhaps

stand

It
God

superfluous

analogous

experience

object,

it the

secondary

objects

loving because
In

God,

the

divine

Not

that

nothing

is

the

it loves

its formal

essence

loves

wanting

the

these
to

Him

of

; if He
108

in

nothing

in
we

sadness

aversion,

of

objects,

secondary

which

for

formal

to

The

is

will

the

receiving
will

the

its

objects.

itself

of

capable

the

capable

object.
His

secondary
goods

is

passions, which

by uniting

goods

composite

the

there

under

to

Goodness.

or

it is

primary object

the

God

which

better
on

or

classes

two

which

good

are

hate,

"

material

and

that

infinite

the

perfection

add

to

evil

with

is the

primary object

of

from

founded

emotions,

of

is concerned

primary

gives

human

account

on

will

The

the

to

is excluded

all evil

or

human

in order

analogy,

will,

divine

the

objects
order
is

goodness of
created
goods.

will is the
are

to

pleased

acquire them,
to

love

them,

for

this

ACTIVITY

THE

He

is because

wishes to

est sui

bonum

God

In

70.

givethem
diffusivum.
there

is

Will. -We

OF

GOD

the

good

have

forward

ning of Chapter I, brought

109
is self-diffusive
"

already,at

two

the

based

reasons

prove that there is a will in God : (i)the

which has
a Cause
reignsin the universe requires

which

begin
fact

on

order which

designedand

the existence of beingsendowed

with
brought it into effect ; (ii)
which
and free-will proves-^hat there is a Cause
intelligence
both
possesses in a supereminentmanner
A third reason
will, (iii)
be deduced
may
of

attributingsupreme
the
indeed
perfection,

intellect knows

the

object before

an

and free
intelligence
from the necessity
God.
Happiness is a
the
perfections.Now

happiness to
of

sum-total

good,

but

its function

the will rather

is to

present it

itself to seek union

than

as

with

for that identification with it

it ;" it is for the will to make
of which the fruit is enjoyment. Therefore God, who is supreme

ture

call will.

we

form

in the

which
perfection

that

happiness,
possesses

St. Thomas

crea

thus

presents the argument

:"

tendency the substantial form

of the human
(intentio
body involves a tendency of nature
induces a sensitive
naturae) ; knowledge acquiredby the senses
appetite,that of the intelligence
givesrise to an intellective
to be
appetite: therefore the divine knowledge would seem
followed by a love towards
the object of it on the part of God,
Every

carries with

of

case

it

"

'

and

this constitutes

71.

The

of the

Formal

Object

Essence.

Divine

of will.

act

an

"

'

of the

As

in

Will

God

of

Goodness

is the

God, the self-subsisting

Being,

is

nothing accidental,His will is identical with the sub

stance
of His divine Being. But His will is not distinct from
the objectHe loves,otherwise this objectwould
be an accidental
determination
produced in His will by the good. Therefore
the objectHe loves is the substance
of His divine Being.
of the divine will is necessarily
infinite,
Again, the perfection
and this could not be so unless the good that He loves is infinite.

there

If God
His

own

would

"which

is

His nature.

speak

compare

by

infinite self but

else,He

to

drawn

not

were

be subordinate

of His

power

Thus

it is that
as

all

the Summum
'

expressionsle bon

love

towards

to something
drawn
necessarily
it
to that and dependent upon

suppositionthat conflicts

of God

the

were

the

with

have

races

Bonum,
Dieu

'

'

the

shown
as

true
a

preference

Goodness

Goodness

idea of

knows

itself:

',etc.

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

no

72. Whatever

participates

in the

Goodness

Divine

be

can

Secondary Object of the Will of God." God is the Author of the

world, and far from having made it without a purpose He has
Therefore

disposed all things with wisdom.

whatever
good exists in His created
loves His

God

it is

to which

extent

of love to

communicable
imperfectly,

goodness,in
a

God

Himself, in
In the

sented

to

far

it

of

of His

whole

forces Him

nature

loves Himself

to

as

an

love

necessarily.

be with
created will,the act of volition may
of the finite nature
of the good which is pre

under

it is
as

necessarily,and the

God who comprehends Himself

Consequently,
there is nothingin His nature
which is not

account

"

so

but

necessary

"

word, He

case

goodness
in

is
Beings freely. i. The first
proposition
therefore all in Him
is an
: All is good in God, and

that

sees

on

the communication

not

Essence

of His

of Created

object of love ; the

held

objectof love, but

loves the Goodness

easy to prove
objectof love.
is

divine

creatures, is for the

to

contingent beings is

to

the

of His will.

Goodness

He

Whence

creatures.

to

it is communicable

as

necessary

goodness

freeact
73.

far

so

will of God

love.

say, to the full

In itselfit is an object
to

degree,but further,it is an objectof love

goodness is to a certain degree,though ever

His

as

of this

willed

infinite

an

inasmuch

objectof

an

has

works.

that is
infinitely,

essence

He

an

"

object of

it falls short

in

aspect

one

"

love ;

it is not

created will,then, is able to love

or

so

far

under
an

not

as

it

presents its

another

aspect
"

object of love. The

to love an
object,that

is,its love of finitegoods is not a necessary love. In the case

of God, this dualityof aspects in the infinite goodness of the
divine

is not

essence

Himself

must,

we

possible
;

see, be

whence

necessary

the

of God

love

for

love.

Again, the happinessessential to God requiresthat He has

not merely the facultyof enjoyingwhat
is His good, but also
that He has the actual enjoyment of it. Therefore
God has
not the freedom
of lovingor not lovingHimself, but He loves
Himself
2.

with

with

The

necessary love.
second proposition
may
a

be

proved

thus

God

loves

necessary love only His essence, for this is an infinite

good which adequatelycorrespondsto what we may call the
infinite capacityfor enjoyment in the divine will ; and no
a

created

good is capableof adding anythingto

the infiniteGood,

THE

ACTIVITY

for the will of God, which

is

created

any

produced

always substan
accidental perfection

designedthe

on

hand

the other

world

the will which

exercise its activity

did not

purpose and consciousness ; the supreme

of nature must
directed the will of the Author

without
which

and

Yet

good.

in

act of volition

an

receive any

cannot
accomplished,
tially

from

GOD

OF

intelligence
accordingly

good,or God could not have willed

it ; but it could not have presentedit as a good necessary to
since creation is able to add nothingto
His divine happiness,
who
is all-good.
the essential and perfecthappiness of God
which directed the will of
Therefore the supreme
intelligence
to Him
of all thingspresentedthem
the Author
as
a
good
though not as a good lovable by necessitybut with a free
presentedcreation

have

as

love.
In this connexion
that

the

and

divine

observation
Cajetan's

will is neither

is worthy of notice,
nor

necessary

free

(necessity

freedom

but is a tran
being two imperfectperfections),
scendental perfection
which
excludes both
the imperfections
inherent in the necessity
of creatures
and those inherent in their
whatever
freedom, and comprisesin a supereminent manner
goodnessboth the one and the other contain.
74. Freedom
and
Immutability of God.
Although God
wills His works freely,
and for all,without
He wills them once
ever
revokingor modifying the free decree of His will. God
has no reason
from willing
to cease
what He wills,or to will at
the present time otherwise than He has alreadywilled. His
"

15

'

Prima

necessaria

simpliciter,
magis proprium
superior utraque.
ut dicatur
enim simpliciter
Necessitas
vocabulum, quam
quod est causalibera.
repugnat libertati : contingentia vero
imperfectionem in libertate importat,
in I Sent. dist. XXXVIII,
quia ponitmutabilitatem. Et idcirco divus Thomas
causare
vocabula, negat Deum
praeveniens inepta modernorum
contingenter.
Cum
enim
regularesit,quod superiuspraehabet in se unite quae in inferioribus
sunt
est ut causa
prima, superiornecessariis et continsparsa,
consequens
et modum
gentibus,praehabeat in se, non formaliter sed eminenter, naturam
et conecessariarum
et contingentium, et sit causa
causarum
utrarumque,
Et
modos
earum.
operetur utrisquead earum
proprios effectus secundum
omnis
videtur
necessaria
aut contingens, stupepropterea nos, quibus
causa
necessariis
non
sit communis
mus,
causa
praevalentes videre quomodo una
et contingentibus immediate.
Sed si elevemus
mentis
oculos in excellentius
cessat stupor, et omnia
causae,
genus
eminentioremque causandi
modum,
modum
consonant
ilium
in caligine,non
intuentes
remaneamus
; quamvis
intrinsece
modos
illabens, cunctis juxta suos
quo omnibus
cooperatur. Et
hoc est valde
attendendum
in hujusmodi materiis.
Deus,
Appellaturtamen
vel ejus scientia causa
non
necessaria, propter necessitatem
simpliciter,sed
immutabilitatis quae
in eo, etiam
formaliter
salvatur
'.
inquantum causa,
CAJETAN, Com. in Sum. Tkeol., I, q. 14, a. 13, n. 24.

neqne

causa,

contingens,

proprie loquendo,

sed

nee

est

causa

habemus

Nee

"

NATURAL

112

remains

will

it

75.

remains

always

Goodness,

what

immutably,

always,

therefore

THEOLOGY

it

it

is;

free,

is

and

free.

Liberality,

Justice,

Mercy

After

God.

of

"

studied

having

divine

the

siders

different
it

the

when

justice,

goodness,

76.

of

Omnipotence

effects

its

and

work

has

that

pen
Now

the

this

general

also

for

this

man

in

other

judges
This

words,
;

God
in

consideration

omnipotence.

and

reason

short,

that

His

such,
the

is

is

power

able

God
leads

freely
is

as

e.g.

by

which

we

speak

we

conceived

has

in

it

God,

the

bodily

to

will

hand.

but

dependent

not

in

organs

identical.

are

His

that

for

only

perfect,

is

accomplish

hap

at

not

will

to

may

not

are

infinitely

all

call

God.

design

He

in

execution,

place

no

that

reason

his

out

find

can

causes,

will

it into

carry

carrying

special

more

God

good

to

kind

priori

instrumental

upon

In

of

this

for

means

want

good

judged

God's

say,

Hence

man

"

con

we

view

of

mercy

When

God.

Thomas

is to

(q. 21).

liberality,

of

St.

of

nature

observes,
of

point

the

the

that

he

love,

and

19),

q.

good,

its

This
to

judging

I,

to

20).

q.

according

names

regard
of

Dei,

(Deamore

united

as

will

divine

the

(Summa,

volition
will

divine

the

love

of

act

of

object

the

intellect

omnipotent.
us

to

the

works

of

the

divine

\\

CHAPTER
THE
Works

77. The

'

of God

of life within

GOD

OF

WORK
Ad

'.

Extra

Theologiansexplain,

"

faith,that there is in God

teachingof

the
following

III

fullness

Himself, the mystery of the personalTrinity

Unity of nature. In contradistinction to this divine

and the works which
lifead intra,theyspeakof the operations
know belongto Him
the Creator
we
as
by the lightof reason
The works of creation do not justify
of the world.
us in assert
ing that there are more
persons than one in God ; they only
in God a supreme
lead us to recognize
Cause endowed
with
these
Of
will
and
divine
intelligence,
operations
thought
power.

in the

and will
them

are

two

actions,and it is not essential to

immanent

that there should be any

external resultant ; but the ex

demands
terminus ad extra,
a
necessarily

ercise of His power

outside Himself, for it is not immanent
The power
and
(II),

of God

governs it

created the world

but transitive.
it in being
(I),
preserves

(III).
I. CREATION

78.

Meaning of Creation."

exercise their activity

upon

The

agents which

givenmatter

or transform
theymodify it accidentally

it as necessary for their

work upon it. Now we may
from this dependencewith
use

Again,consider that

as

we

see

subject;

at work

whether

it substantially,
they

for they are onlyable

activity,

when

conceive

regardto
a

man

an
a

to

action which is freed

presupposedmatter.

exercises

an

immanent

for example,
when
activity,

he thinks or loves,
he puts his powers
into exercise,and his activity
bringsabout an interior per
fectionwhich these powers therebyacquire.This allows us to
conceive

an

action which

is not

the

perfectible
powers,
no
but alreadyin
way potential
but which

of
puttinginto operation

is the exercise of facultiesthat

113

state of actual

are

perfection.

NATURAL

H4

Creation

the

means

THEOLOGY

which

act

both

excludes

the utilization

matter, and the actualization of the passive

pre-existing
perfectible
powers of the agent. It is usuallydefined as
prosui
In
ductio ex nihilo
et subject! 86.
terms, we may
positive
the production of a substance
define it as
accordingto the
of its being'. The creative act is opposed to the act
totality
of

'

'

"

which

of

materials,or,
phrase of the Scholastics,which
makes

of matter,

in

use

'

eductio

use

draws

upon

potentiamateriae

of the well-known

to make

the

potentiality
sense
explained

',in the

Cosmology,74.
this notion of creation to work

With

(i)that

God

created

something distinct
Theories

concerning

the

chief historical theories

God

to

doing

world
with

away

problem we

the

are:

God
at

are

not

an

to show

consequentlyis
emanation, and

create.

can

The

the

and

have

we

world, (ii)which

Himself

from

that He alone
(iii)
79.

the

upon,

Relation

of God

to the World."

of
concerningthe relationship
(i) Atheistic materialism, which, by
and
suppressingone of the terms of
is no real attempt
present considering,

(2)The doctrine of creation,in which the world

is conceived as having been freelyproduced by God not only
in itsform but also in its very matter.
dualism,
(3)Philosophical
which allows to the world a necessary
existence independent
of God.
It has received its most
completeexpressionin the
at

solution.

of the

doctrine

world
The

theory, which

has

only an

giventhe

now

on

century it found
of

doctrine
The

id
the

more

time

other

us

more

126.

enjoyed a great
We
have
briefly

it (56)87.
reject

hand, is still full of vitality.In

its appearance

in

Italywith Giordano
In the seventeenth
'

'

very felicitous ; a is better, for nothingness is not

In the termino
point of departure, terminus a quo.
subjectum denotes the material cause, subjectamateria ;
means
production which does not presuppose
any subject.
see
Metap hy siquegenerate, cours supe"rieur,
ample treatment

quo, but
Scholastics
ex

creation

For

125 and

it is

systematicexpressionin the geometric

Spinoza,and it thrives again to-day under the

prepositionex

source,

87

one

in the firstdays of the Renaissance.

Bruno

that

the

world it made

the modern

so

as

pantheism.
at

historical interest.

that make

reasons

Pantheism,

logy of

and

dualistic

vogue,

84

or,

known

the refutation of dualism

The

(4) Pantheism

to-day,monism, a theorythat God and the

and the same
substance.
one
are
entirely
doctrine of creation can be proved directly,
and indirectly

commonly

by

Manicheans.

is not
a

u6

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

and

its

of the

propositionwe

the essential

Moreover,
and

infinite.

and

finite.

the

self-subsistent it would

matter

were

already established (56)concerning

Divine Being.

have

unicityof

involves the contradiction

which

with God,
co-eternity

Yet

bodies

Hence

matter

be immutable

manifestlycontingent,changing

are

be

cannot

self-existent.
'

'

must
not
frequentexpression eternal matter
be the occasion of a pitfall.
read
it in this
Matter
we
as
in the abstract ;
in general,
matter
matter
phrase always means
whereas
actual matter
is always in some
body and all material
bodies are
subjectto change and transformation.
It is along the lines of the arguments justindicated that we

Note

that the

refute Gnostic

must

to consider
81.

The

Divine

is neither

Refutation

Part

nor

of

Monism.

historyof philosophyunder

the other

in

World

indeterminate
of

account

law

being

of the

Emanation

an

Monism

"

forms, the

one

appears

idealistic,

of its internal

doctrine

'

(a)is due

originof thingsto

evolution,is

becoming
to

Absolute

called the

'

all

ever

"

consist

which,

on

progressively

things.

thought between
Being. And (b),by making

confusion

being in generaland
God

two

the

makes

itselfand
differentiating
This

then

realistic.

Idealistic monism

an

It remains

dualism.

Manichean

pantheism.

or

Substance.

in the

I.

monism

or

of

the supreme
subjectto the law of becoming,it denies the real nature

of God

as

the pure

Actualitywhose

existence

we

claim to have

demonstrated.
the objectof the first conceptionof the
(a)Being in general,
of comprehension; and it has, conversely,
mind, has a minimum
of potential
a maximum
extension,inasmuch as it is capableof
being attributed to whatever exists or may exist. Being that
is pure Actuality,
of
maximum
the contrary, connotes
on
a
whilst it has no extension, either actual
positiveperfection,
or
be identified with any
potential
; it is itselfand it cannot
thing else. Being in generalis an abstract entitywhich, as
such, cannot have an existence in nature : it exists only in the

mind

that

thinks of it and

puts it in relation

to the

individual

by one it identifies it. Pure Actuality

exists by itself,
independentlyof our thought, or of that of any
finitespirit
whatsoever.
To both, to indefinite being and to the
Divine Being,we do jn faciattribute a characteristic which we
subjectswith which

one

by one
predicatedof

the

and

know

same

former

the

OF

ACTIVITY

THE

117

but
;
namely simplicity
meaning entirelynegative,

name,

it has

GOD

compositionwhich is due to the extreme

poverty of abstract and universal being ; whilst in reference
is something very positive,
to the latter,to God, simplicity
of perfection
such that, in its absolute
it stands for a plenitude
indivisible unity,it surpasses all the accumulated
perfections
of created things.
(b)To confuse abstract and universal being with the divine
Being is to deny the true nature of Him whose existence we
to affirm and
endeavoured
have
prove by arguments drawn
it is

from

an

the

spontaneous dictates of

of the

and
races.

If

is at

our

individual

generalexpressionof feelingamong
must
the result of our
investigations

thingelse than
who

of

absence

once

reasoned

mature

conviction

conscience

the different
to

come

that

God

any
exists

Actuality,necessary and infinite Being,

all hope of beingable to demonstrate
Himself which is the objectof Theodicy

pure

may as well renounce

the existence of God

we

(Oeov$iKTrj\
2.

is

Realistic monism

of creation

we

have

more

directly
opposed to

justdiscussed.

the doctrine

Monism, under

this

form,

thingsto be so many parts or manifestations of the Divine

Reality. Here we have not a theory which sets out from the
in order to arrive by some
of reality
minimum
illogical
process
of it from being in generalto the Absolute ;
at the maximum
it supposes
from the Being which
sets out
which
but one
asserts
all
to keep its infinity,
infinite and, in its endeavour
this aim
identical with it. With
realityto be substantially
it bringsforward various considerations that are rather objec
tions to the doctrine of creation than positivearguments :

sees

"

of the idea of creation ; (ii)

the
understanding efficient causalityif action

(i)the unscientific
of
impossibility

character

has to pass from an agent to an objectthat is substantially

in
the
involved
contradiction
it ; (iii)
distinct from
sup

posing an
reality.

infinite being which

Pantheism, whatever
fallfoul of two

the form

embrace

it assume,

(a)the changes

that

must

take

the whole

of

necessarily
placein the

(b)the consciousness of individual personality.

it is ; it can
what
know
(a)A necessary being is necessarily
change. Yet the fact of change is manifest throughoutthe

universe,and
no

facts

does not

modalities

realities of nature

the

Therefore

universe.
or

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

n8

Being.
beingsof

parts of the necessary

nor

The

independent,infinite.
they
dependent, finite. Therefore
God

is

not

are

phases

not

are

this world

are

substantially

identical with God.

(b)Nothing
myself,or that

world

in the

persuade

can

me

that

not

am

of somebody else. The

self-expression
of myself the word
use
ego in opposition
very fact that I can
that I am
is non-ego, implies
to whatever
myself,that my being
that I am
This personalconsciousness
is incommunicable.
distinct from what is not myself is the great stumbling-block
I

the

am

of monism.

in the way

Furthermore, the
ward

have

tradicts

considerations

little weight :

very

contrary, the notion of

of creation.
we

As

(i)The

"

it
prejudice,

does

have

we

which

monists

idea of creation

contradict

not

bring for
con

On

reason.

the

is identical with that

perfect
causality
developedthis thought already(80),

repeat it here.
Causal
action, indeed, raises
(ii)
will not

an

intricate

problem

of

generalmetaphysics. But we may note that if there is a

in understanding how
acts
substance
one
difficulty
upon
in understandinghow
a
another, there is no less difficulty
substantial agent influences an accident reallydistinct from
itself or how one
act upon
another part of
part can effectively
There
whole.
the same
are
only two ways of escapingfrom
either to deny all efficient causality this is
:
the difficulty
the
to deny all real distinction between
occasionalism
or
"

"

of the

substance

universe

complete phenomenalism.

and

its manifestations, which

Yet

monism

refuses to

is

recognize

either of these alternatives.

(iii)The

existence

of

beings which were

independentof the divine Being would certainlyput a limit
but He is not limited by the fact of
to this Being'sperfection,
the power
to produce creatures that are dependent
possessing
Himself.
must
we
on
remember, is not a collection
Infinity,
and imperfections,
it is a singlereality
of perfections
which
all that is not itself.
contains in a supereminentmanner
82.

God

Alone

itself

can

one

Create."

or

Here

more

we

embark

upon what has

tradition holds

thorny question. Catholic

that creation belongsonly to God.
Further, Catholic philo
in saying that only God in point of
sophers are unanimous

proved

ACTIVITY

THE

OF

GOD

119

fact has created ; they are also of one mind in thinkingthat

the power
of creatingin
is capable of exercising
creature
no
cause.
principal
They add that
action of God,
to become, under the sovereign
a creature
were
in a creative act, it would
instrumental cause
necessarily
an
the
that it
if
for
of
have a limited sphere
reason
action, only
it is
itself. But
could not create
they question whether
to be an instrumental
cause
impossiblefor a secondarycause
an

independentway

of

to

come

and

creative act which

as

makes

limited number

of creatures

forth from
is

St. Thomas

the

holds

Suarez

is often

There

view this

nothingness.
of the opinion that
oppositeview.
brought forward in
does

argument which

not

it is

whilst
impossible,

favour

of St. Thomas's

conclusive

seem

non-entityand beingthere is an infinitedistance

infinite power
can
an
bridge. Against such
"

however,

we

that

the

distance

urge
infinite ; it is measured

may

Between

this

; and

only

argument,

an

between

non-entity

the finite reality

by
being is not
which is opposed to non-entity.
thus :
Kleutgen,in commentating upon St. Thomas, reasons
of
have a mode
God
must
being infinite in all His perfections
perfect. This mode of
causality
proper to Himself, infinitely
causalitycan only be the action which is independent of all
material cause,
namely creation. Therefore the creative act
belongsto God alone 88.
and

11

'

St. Thomas

actio

nisi

presents his argument thus : Creare non potest esse propria

Dei.
effectus
in universaliores
Oportet enim universaliores

solius

reducere.

priorescausas
ipsum esse. Unde

et

causae,

hoc

vel

creatio

quae

Inter

oportet quod

Producere

Deus.

est

sit

tale, pertinet ad rationem

autem

omnes

effectus

universalissimum

est

et universalissimae
in quantum
est
absolute, non
Unde
manifestum
est quod

proprius effectus primae

autem

esse

creationis.

ipsiusDei.
quod aliquidparticipetactionem propriam alicujusalterius,
virtute propria,sed instrumentaliter, in quantum
non
agitin virtute alterius
instrumental
secunda
Causa autem
non
causae
participat actionem
supenisi in quantum
rioris,
per aliquidsibi proprium dispositiveoperaturadeffectum
principalisagentis.
Illud autem
quod est proprius effectus Dei creantis, est illud quod praeabsolute.
Unde
omnibus
aliis ; scilicet esse
non
supponitur
potest aliquid
aliud operari dispositiveet instrumentaliter
creatio
ad hunc
effectum, cum
sit ex aliquo praesupposito quod possitdisponi per actionem
non
instrumentalis agentis. Sic igiturimpossibile
conveniat
est quod alicui creaturae
creare
virtute propria,neque
'. Sum.
instrumentaliter, sive per ministerium
neque
'

est

propria

actio

Con tin gitautem

'

TheoL, I, q. 45,

Kleutgen
be the
that

sums

effect of

a.

5.
the

thought of
secondary causes
only

particularkind

up

; but

inasmuch

as

St. Thomas
in the

they

in this

'

way

respect that they

have beingthey must

:
are

Things

can

of this

or

be the effects

sight this argument

first

At

appears

insufficient.

upholds the opinionof Suarez might rejointhat

of action
that creation is a mode
as
a principle
alone, when this is the very questionat issue.

who
down

God

it is laid

proper to
Granted

only
originand

that

One

causal power that is proper to Himself, and even

which is independent
be a creative cause
God can

has

that God

universal

in its

remains

creative

and

limited

whether

action of God
or

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

120

in its

object;

the

dependenton
causality
in its action impliesa

questionstill
the sovereign
contradiction

not.

Yet

this

objectionof

Suarez

would

A
superficial.
making a singleobject

appear

which has the power of

secondarycause
pass from non-beingto being would have the intrinsic power
call
we
of creatingeverything. For in respect of what
may
of passing
that is to say, of their potentiality
this creatability,
from
non-being to being, all objectsare alike. An agent
capableof producingone of them has in its nature the power
that the
Suarez
all. And
of producing them
even
recognizes
it be regardedas a
power to create everythingcannot, whether
a subordinate
belong to a creature.
cause
or
as
one,
principal
Therefore

it must

be true

that God

alone

can

create

89.

is that a cause
thought of St. Thomas
belongs to a higherorder only on the condition that it has a
of action which properlybelongs to itself. The extent
mode

The

fundamental

which

to

this

cause

is

pointis

the essential

is
applicable

the nature

of

secondaryimportance;
Now

of its action.

the mode

of action proper to God can

only be creation,for all exercise
it ; it alone does
other than creation presupposes
of activity
not

presuppose
being the most

causality.Therefore creation,
perfectpossibleoperation,belongs properly

any

anterior

when
who
a thing is created
produces all things. Now
nothing,it is produced in respect of its being,not only in
Therefore
its production is entirely
so far as it is this or that particularthing.
the fact that
from
Whence
conclude
first
Cause.
the
the effect of
just as we
from
to
the
that
He
has
all
God
nothing, so
produce
things
power
produces
the effect of
be
from
is
what
can
infer
that
we
nothing
only
produced
may
Him who
produces all '. Philos. Scholast., Diss. IX, 1012.
""
Facultas
the argument
thus :
quaevis in
Palmieri
very aptly expresses
formali
sub
extendere
suo
objecto
materialia
omnia
ea
objecta se potest
quae
continentur.
objectum potestatis creativae est ens ut ens,
jAtqui formale
in id
causa
est ens
ergo
; quae
producibile,sive ens ex nihilo emciendum
:
ferri potest,potest versari circa ea
omnia, quae sunt ex nihilo producibilia
'. Institutions
philoomnes
ideoque potest substantias
possibilescreare
Theologia, th. XXXVIII.
sophicae,

of the
or

supreme

produced

Cause

from

'

THE

the first Cause

to

OF

cannot

be shared

and

GOD

121

by

being of

any

Being 90.

the divine

from

different nature

ACTIVITY

II. CONSERVATION
83.

of Conservation.

Meaning

succeeds

non-being;

to

By

"

the

of creation

act

conservation

by

being
being already

Conservation
is the act
existent perseveres in its existence.
in the existence which creation
by which created thingspersist
has conferred

upon

'

It is therefore known

them.

as

continued

creation '.
annihilation

By

it would
a

tive action
have

should
is thus

impossiblethat

real term,

God

as

Annihilation

for it is

soon

as

existence.

beingin

not

about

come

total destruction

the

mean

we

and

to

thing;

to maintain

cease

to be

seen

posi

no

positiveaction should

positiveaction

suppose

terminatingin nothingnessis

annihilation

of

an

evident

of

contra

diction.

Everything created

84.

God.

of this world

Things
beingwhich they have
"

will that

to

being

should

it should

persistin

of conservation
.

beingsis,says
their
sunt

'

Ordo

effectus

is to

will that

create.

is to

To

conserve.

The

act

DIVINE

and

GOVERNMENT

Government.

"

The

conservation

of

St. Thomas,

being

the first effect of the divine govern

ordered towards
the good is the second.

effectus

in bono, et motio
90

dependence
of a being

necessary prolongationof the act of

91.
It is the first effect of God's government

85. Providence

Duo

be

the follow

in
every moment
To will the essence

existence

III. THE

'

therefore,

'

'

is not,

in being at
persistence
at

by

is the

creation.

ment

being conserved

present moment

ing moment.
Everything is
the omnipotence of God.
on
and

of

essentially
contingent. The

are

at the

of their

the sufficient reason

Need

has

effectuum

scilicet conservatio
gubernationis,
ad bonum

earum

est

secundum

'

rerum

92.

ordinem

causarum.

Primus

autem

aliis effectibus praesupponitur et ipsum

ipsum esse, quod omnibus
non
praesupponit aliquem alium effectum ; et ideo oportet quod dare esse in
solius secundum
hujusmodi, sit effectus primae causae
quantum
propriam
virtutem
'. ST. THOMAS,
Qq. disput.De Pot., q. 3, a. 4.
fl
MoNSABRfe, Conferencesde Notre-Dame, 1876, 19 Conf.
92

est

Sum.

Theol., I, q. 103,

a.

4.

NATURAL

122

Providence
which

'

"

in

93.

'

est

designconceived by the divine intelligence

ratio ordinis rerum
all thingsreach their end
divina praeexistens
mente
proprie Providentia
is the

makes

in finem

THEOLOGY

is the realization in time of this scheme

Government

of divine

providence.
The questionis discussed whether
providenceis formally
act of intelli
act of God's
alone or at once
an
an
intelligence
and will. The two
opinionsare not so different from
gence
St. Thomas
another
would appear at first sight. When
one
as
attributes the plan of providenceto the divine intelligence,
in the divine will :
a
presupposes
purpose
end for His work, and providenceis the
supreme

God

he

order

the
'

which
is not

world

substances

real will

made

when

'

',says Monsabre,
relation to

without

bring about

this end.

collection of

another, without

one

conceptionof

incoherent

an

wills

direction

singlewhole in which each

thinghas its own placeand by working towards its own perfec
of the whole.
tion concurs
To see the
towards the perfection
ends, to regulate
placeof each thing,to assignto it its particular
all the particular
ends towards
a
generalend, to dispose,to
decree, to apply the means
by which all the ends are attained,
04.
such is the act of providence: in short,it is to govern
towards

determined

It is

end.

'

"

Universal

86.

have

goodness and

of creatures

God

that

already seen

essential

and

Providence

that

Particular

Providence.

necessary love His

enjoysfreedom in the creation

loves with
He

share
a
receive,though imperfectly,

who

We

"

in the

effects of His infinite goodness.

God

has

no

of

need

is sufficient for Him.

His

own

He

does not

goodness, but in order

munication
the

anything ;

of the

ultimate

order to make
of intrinsic

end

divine

own

create

by

essential

'

finis

creation

we
speak
perfection,

of it

propter quern
as

'

The

it.

creatures

God

goodness

in order to increase

to communicate

goodness to

of creation,

it clear that

His

receives

com

is therefore
'

;
no

the extrinsic

and

in

increase

glory of

God'.
with a view to the supreme
all creatures
end,
arrange
to endow
to the realization of
with the means
them
necessary
this end, is the objectof universal providence.
To

93

Sum.

84

Loc.

Theol., I, q.
cit.

22,

a.

i.

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

124

clearlyshows a government of the world,

house manifests the design and action
justas a well-arranged
who
has arrangedit 96.
of one
where all seems
to depend
Again,in the world of moral beings,
and on the play of human
the initiative of personalfreedom
on
of God, although it is en
passions,the sovereigndominion
manifest

in nature

'

manifestations
in mystery, is still not without
leads him.
existence 97. Man
acts by himself and God

of its

shrouded

The

88.

Whilst

universal
master

two

truths

of his

actions

own

by

is

man
sovereign,

and

him

We

exercised

the governance

the

and

of God

Sovereignty

Free-will

in His works

God

free,and
how

of Creatures,"

can

needs

this freedom
we

be

makes

reconcile these

?
doubt

for

have

alreadygiven
of being able to arrive at a fully
(67,68) of the possibility
reconcile them.
satisfactory
explanationwhich will positively
and infallibly
what
human
God must
actions
know
perfectly
much

very

"

reasons

we

"

will be.
which

of His

Each

action, just as

every

arranged with

view to

sary that all such

how
the action
can

if it is not
Him

on

wait

for

of

indeed

decisions

our

cause

by
?

whole

His

an

98

to

work

beforehand.

Now,

which

influence

God, who
be

absolutelydependent
is infinitely
wise, cannot

in order

made

to

the

arrange

and

shall do, it is necessary

we

be

for this it is neces

His government ".

Further, it is not sufficientthat God should merelyknow

generalplan of

in

is of its very nature

free-will is, be known
beforehand,

our

foreknows

part of

being that exists,must

every

determined

who

generalend ; and
should be known
activity

indifferent,as

forms

creatures

that He

should

have

sure

what
way

of

enim
in rebus naturalibus
evenire
quod melius est, aut semper
pluribus. Quod non
contingeret,nisi per aliquam providentiam res
naturales
dirigerentur ad finem boni, quod est gubernare. Unde
ipse ordo
manifesto
certus
demonstrat
rerum
sicut si quis
:
gubernationem mundi
intraret
bene
domum
ordinatoris
ordinatione
ex
ordinatam,
ipsa domus
rationem
Theol., loc. cit.
perpenderet '. Sum.
""

'

Videmus

in

aut

"7

MoNSABRfe,

9*

'

ad

utrumque

praecipue
libet,cum
quam
sunt
9"

per

se

haec

futuri

autem

sunt,

vocantur

dependent ex libero
quae
sit quasi in potentia, non

aliam

hujusmodi

op. cit.,19* Conf.

effectus

Quidam

causam

effectus

in

accepti '.

Cp. MoNSABRt,

quorum

causae

indifferentes

contingentia ad utrumlibet,
arbitrio.

Sed

se

ut

habent
sunt

ilia

ad utrum
quia ex causa
progreditur aliquiseffectus. nisi per ali
determinatur
ad aliud ; ideo
magis ad unum
quam
causis quidem ad utrumlibet
nullo modo
cognosci pos-

De verit.,q. 8, a. 12.
op. cit.,20* Conf., p. 83.

leading our

acts

anything else

direct action

125
this be

can

of the

said to

divine

will

be
the

on

will ?

human

of

reconcile the freedom

To

GOD

And

their ends.

to

than

OF

ACTIVITY

THE

with

man

sovereigntyof

the

of the
as well as
providenceis the work of the theologian
connected with the deep problem
for it is intimately
philosopher,
will here confine ourselves to a brief
of predestination.
We
sketch of the principal
attempts that have been made towards
God's

its solution.
of the
by the majority of the theologians
Society of Jesus, chieflydesirous of safeguardingthe part
of creation,attributes
of human
freedomin the generaleconomy

Molina, followed

God

to

The

'.

taneous

school defends

Thomist

'

he calls

which

concurrence,

indifferent ',

'

simul

stricter theory,which

for safeguardingthe absolute sove

they think indispensable
of Providence ; they attribute to God a motion anterior
reignty
to the free determination
of the created will,and this they name
a
pre-motion'.
(a)It is the opinionof the Molinist school that God co-oper
in some
ates with the creature
generaland indefinite way.
This generalco-operation
definite and particular
becomes
by
'

the

action of each

person,

but in such

and
produced is simultaneously
the proper act of the created
will has a priority
of nature

this concurrence,
wills from all
creature's

from

from

is to make
in this

or

to be

the act of God

those

which

acts

providence,

to this

accordance

the creature

brought that

be

act of free

an

of

concurrence

and

God

with

His

will himself

if the initiative

the creature, if the proper part the creature plays

of the indifferent concurrence
of the divine will
use
we
pleasure,

shall have

to say that

action of God subject to its

supreme
is the absolute sovereignty
of providence

makes

decisions.

own

to the

the action

that

the side of God, amounts

that direction at its

the creature

both
totally

eternityto accomplishin

freedom

way

agent. Further, as

freelyperform.
To this the objection
may
comes

the

How

safeguarded?

Molinists meet
eminent
creatures.

power

this
of

objection by urging that God has

leads
persuasionwhereby He infallibly

Sometimes

fellow-men that he
to
beingpossible

acts

man

with

is
a

so

kind

sure

of

of his influence

on

without
infallibility,

say that he has over-ridden

their freedom.

an

His

his
it

If

I26
a

THEOLOGY

NATURAL
has

man

belong

great
God, who
so

to

activities of

all the influences that

will and

our

does
persuasion,
most
intimatelyall
of

power
knows

not

this also

the

different
act

may

upon

it?
to analysethe
reply,however, that if we come
discover in it the compositionof two
we
persuasion,

this

To

we

power of
distinct acts, and

say that the firstis the direct and

It is I who
of the second.
efficacious cause
yieldto the per
its efficaciousness.
If God's
determine
suasion, it is I who
cannot

we

of persuasion,
than His power
sovereigntyis nothing more
I am
able to shake myself free from His action ; and, if I
is entirelymy
act
own
yieldto it, since my determination
and the radical reason
of the good that I may
do and of the
merits that I may
acquire,this good and these merits cannot

be ascribed

to

any

efficaciousness

supreme

part of the

the

on

first Cause.

(b)The

school makes

consist in this,that

God

Cause
He

Thomist

of all

does not

things,and
produce in

us

sovereigntyof

is,in the strictest way,

He
He

absolute

the

be so, in this
not only our
being and
cannot

the

first

opinion,if
our

powers

also the very acts which result from the use of our powers.
Hence
in every created agent that acts God acts ; no being
is able to accomplishits natural action unless by the influence
but

of His
ever

be

divine power

perfectwe
moved
by

no

cause,

not

even

one,
spiritual

suppose it to be, is able to act except it

that is always absolutely
This motion

may
God.

necessary to every created nature, is a motion

will. Unless such a motion is received by our
in truth

say that God

in the last
to

is the author

analysis,
every

action of

of all that
ours

is

imparted to
will

we

belongs to

the

cannot
us,

for,

somethingbelonging

us.

In the well-known
De

how

question,Q.

Potentia, St. Thomas

divine

providence in

sums

up

7, of his opusculum
his views on the action of

3, art.

'

Sic ergo Deus

followingwords :
est causa
actionis cujuslibetinquantum dat virtutem agendi,
et inquantum conservat
earn, et inquantum applicatactioni,
alia virtus agit'. According
et inquantum ejus virtute omnis
to this teaching,the action of providencetherefore comprises
four elements : (a) God
creates, and accordinglyHe is the
author
of every
the powers
active power ; (b)God
conserves
He

has

created ;

the

(c) God

'

moves

to

action

'

these

active

THE

(d)God

powers

is subordinate

cause

It

instrumental

an

Doctor, the action of God

Dominican

the

one.

of the

Angelic

characteristics of what

all the

has

secondary

every

that, according to the mind

clear

seems

as

127

to which

Cause
principal

is the

GOD

OF

ACTIVITY

'

called

have

'

pre-motion or
'.
rather, in a less happy phrase, physicalpredetermination
But the idea of freedom
seems
quite inconsistent with a
motion
who
What
of this kind.
are
we
goingto say to the man
commentators

'

assures

it to
transferring

are

To
'

that he has dominion

us

another

this claim in favour

Certainlya

exclusion

has

man

all necessary

be the

is in the

in the

St.
liberty

that

of its

we

:
replies

be the first cause

of it.

natural

causes

to

the

that

the

not

necessary

movement,

own

world, both

Thomas

his acts, but

over

Though it is

cause

that it should

everythingthat
endowed

of human

dominion

and

acts

own

cause

of the first Cause.

free-will should

his

over

it is not
God

at

moves

and

causes

with free-will ; and justas His motion does not stand

of the acts of natural causes
being natural, so it
way

does not stand in the way of free causes

stillbeingfree. Indeed
His pre-motionmakes
to be so, because
them
God works in
each being accordingto its own
Not
nature.
only does the
divine

will

the

cause

action,but It also
the

to
were

in the

which

in this

be

not

'

free '.

God

God

In

word, the divine motion

one

ea

Cum

Cum

quae

our

evil is not

igiturvoluntas
Deus

vult

divina

sed
fieri,

et

"

voluntatis

necessitas, sed

modum

suum

20e Conf
op. cit.,

Does

sinful acts ?

The

"

sit efficacissima,non

quod

eo

modo

fiantquo
quidem

motae, quae indifferenter

manet
libertas ; sicut etiam

infallibiliter
operatur ; et
contingenter,inquantum
secundum

raised

be

it is a
reality,

Theol., I, q. 19, a. 8. 'Deus

movet
propter efficaciamvirtutis moventis, quae
naturam

necessitate 10".

all qua causa

efficax fuerit ad agendum,
secundum
id quod fit,sed etiam secundum

tantum
.

share in

is

not

answer

this
lies

is the firstCause of the whole

comprise,but
non

manner

perform an
appropriate

secondary agent, in such a way that

there something repugnant to the divine pre-motion
act which
It causes
free will to accomplish,
such an
our

doctrine make

'

to

moves

it to do it in the

causes

but does not

infallibly
efficacious
Once
again the objectionmay

1QO

It

of the

nature

would

act

being

deficere
se

actions
our
reality
privationof reality.

effectus

sequitur causam,
ftendivel essendi.
sequitur quod fiant
vult '. Sum.
ea
fieri

modum
solum
Deus

immutabiliter

voluntatem
non

potest ;

sed

propter

ad diversa, non
inducitur
omnibus
providentia divina

habet

in

tamen
a causis
contingentibus proveniunt effectus
Deus
movet
omnia
proportionabiliter,
unumquodque

'.

De

Malo, q. 6, art. unico, ad

3.

Cp.

128

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

This

privationof beingbelongsto

but

to

alone

us

which

it cannot

Just

of my
soul, the principle
limb

if I

as

the

to

limp,it

but

movement,

defective causes,

are

attributed

be

be defective.

cannot

who

us

to

first Cause

is not

to my

malformed

my
be

failure to walk
attributed ;
properlymust
my
if I sin,it is not to God, the first and indefectible cause
of

so

that

my

actions,but

my

sin must

to

me

free-will that

responsibility
belongs

the

good

there

is in my

101.

'

Molinist and

the

part of my

whole

for
only responsible

is

God

the

on

The

be attributed.

material act of sin

Both

failure

to the

Thomist

theory raise difficulties

they do not giveany answer

the

franklyavow,
that
completelysatisfactory.And, we may add, that the
prolongedcontests these arguments have excited bear witness
is rightin urging us to grasp
to their insufficiency.
Bossuet
firmlythe two ends of the chain, although we do not see all
the links of argument by which they are
united.
We
hold
of God, in the other
in the one hand the truth of the sovereignty
which,

to

must

we

is

the truth of the free-will of

invisible link alluded

If it should

man.

happen

that the

by Bossuet, which unites these two

we
never
badly constructed by human
opinion,
may

truths be

to

theless rest assured that there is

After all,it is not

flaw in the work

no

that
astonishing

of God.

relations of God

the

to

the

of
world, of the essential Being to contingent subjects,
the Infinite and the finite,
should be envelopedin obscurity.
On

otherwise.

stand

must

World.
and

working

then

fact ; there

is a victim

man

How

can

we

necessary

101

very
muth

ably
S.

divine

and

are

to

evils
physical

and
suffering,

Thomas

Defensio doctrinae

moral

et

"

The

attacks

of Frs.

Docinna

Yet

in the

means

how

the existence of evil

phenomena

of nature,

evil defileshis conscience.

these

three

forms, with the

providence?

Conf

op. cit.,20"

S. Thomae

world

is infallible

government

in the

reconcile evil,under

against the

of Evil

in the choice of its

attributes of God's

MoNSABRfe,
"

of the

there be evil in the world

can

the

on

by

in its end

holy both

be

solve all the

of its action

and

its very claim.

of God and
the Presence

condemned

The

"

divine nature

the

Government

89. The

it cannot

must

we

mysteriesof

is

surelyall recognizethat
philosophywhich should claim to

reflection

Thomistic

Scheeman

and

Praemotionis

de Praemotione

view

has

been

defended

Frins, S.J.,by Dummer-

Physicae (Paris, 1886),

Physica (Louvain, 1895).

and

ACTIVITY

THE

The

lies in the

answer

OF

GOD

129

followingconsiderations

"

Physicalevil is the privationof the perfectionthat is

Malum
est aliquid,
to a particular
nature
sed
non
proper
Malum
est privatio
est privatioalicujusboni particularis
;
the accidental
debitae perf
ectionis 102.Now these privations
are
1.

'

"

'

'

'

Particular ends

effects of the clash of the laws of nature.

exigenciesof

are

generalorder
of nature.
Who
will deny that God
can
permit for the
generalorder and the beauty of His work, that a being which
is defective should give way, that an inferior good should be
sacrificed to a highergood ?
To do so would be to contradict
sacrificed
accidentally

to

the

the

'

'

wisdom

103.

is only a relative evil ; it can be and

Suffering,
moreover,
often is a good, if we
take into consideration all the circum
the supreme
end of life,
If comfort were
stances.
griefwould
but man
has an end higherthan earthly
out of place,
be certainly
enjoyment, a moral and religiousend. Consequently,it is
whether
a
grieffurthers or retards
questionof ascertaining
these higher aims.
If it is compatible with these aims, if
it furthers them, grief,
far from being an evil, can
be
even
either a condition or a means
of acquiringthe real good of
Yet
human
nature.
experience bears witness that grief,
it be a privationor endurance, detaches
the heart
whether
2.

from
free

the

play to

character
is not
'

trammels

life of the senses,

has a deep influence
aspirations,

the moral

and

bind

that

the

draws

it to

soul to

in life'sluxuries that God

Bonum

virum

God.

man
'

habet

him

tests and thus

by severe
prepares him
periturin dura, sibi ilium praeparat 104.

the

on

Seneca

As

looks for the

in deliciis non

Deus

leaves

says : It
of good will
"

but

He

proves
Ex'

for Himself

"

'

3. Moral

evil cannot

says, whatever
referred to God
is a
of

is
as

10*

positivein
what

to

is

; but

in

De

Malo,

q. i,
'
Cum

a.

act
so

far

i, and

a.

St. Thomas

of sin must
as

it proceedsfrom
right,

free-will ; thus it is that moral

ST. THOMAS,
MONSABRE,

As

God.

the material

its first Cause

from

falling
away
our

be attributed

evil,which

such

an

be
act

the defect
is

defect

2.

provisor totius entis,

ipsius providentiam pertinet ut permittat quosdam defectus esse in aliuniversi
perfectum. Si
quibus particularibusrebus, ne impediatur bonum
'. Sum.
enim
universe
omnia
deessent
mala
bona
impedirentur, multa
lo*

22"

Conf

"

ad

Theol., I, q. 22, a.
104
SENECA, De

2, ad

2.

Providentia.

Deus

sit universalis

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

I3o

in the

of

act

of all

Cause

tive action

good 105.

on

evil exists not

part, but

God's
'

Moral

attributed

be

never

can

man,

of His

to

God, the first

in virtue of

and
permission,

this per
vult mala

neque
neque vult mala fieri,
mala fieri; et hoc est bonum
sed vult permittere
fieri,

mission is a
non

"

free-will of

The

immoral

for
obliged,

to
free-will,

fections.

man

which

act

be

Deus

it would

that

evil,so
cannot

good

cease

He

is

from

is the

was

the
or

holy,but

'

106.

that is responsible
for moral

cause

involve

posi

contradiction

to

speak

of

an

God
produced without freedom.
sake of hinderingman's abuse of his
to suspend the exercise of His per
He is free,omnipotent,wise, as well

Now
all these attributes of God
exceedinglybounteous.
are
intimatelyconnected with one another, and they must
manifestation.
attain their end, namely their legitimate
God's
will it before everything
holiness,which wills the good, must
to
else,before that good which would consist in our inability
as

sin.
If God

were

obligedto prevent

longerhave the freedom

it is His

which

all moral

evil,He

would

no

to choose from all possible

worlds the one

good pleasureto create, for the

reason

that there

possible,
namely the world in which He sees
only beings that are perfect. To expect that man's freedom
be abused, would
should
be to demand
never
necessarily
useless miracles of the divine omnipotence. For it is the law
that every being acts accordingto its nature, and it is in the
of a defectible being that it should have the power
nature
to
fail. And yet the objection
demands
we
that
are
considering
overruled
this
God should have
law of nature from all eternity.
of evil
sound, the possibility
Further, if the objectionwere
would make
good impossible: every good would have to be
withheld
lest,by the fault of him who receives it,evil would
And therefore God could not givemen
follow.
life
necessarily
which is a good,free-will which is
which is a good,intelligence
is a good, because some
creatures
a good, His assistance which
might abuse these divine gifts.
and the
Finally,evil indeed may exist,yet the infallibility
would
holiness of God's government
only be compromised
be

would

only one

mala
est entitatis et actionis in actione
delectus
sed
ibi
est
non
causatur
quod
;
deficiente '. Sum.
secunda
Theol., I, q. 49, a. 2, ad 2.
106
Id.,I,-q.19, a. 9, ad 3.
IDS

sicut

"

in

reducitur

Quidquid
causam

Deo, sed

in Deum
ex

causa

in

bear

we

the

of

natural

objective

be

led

that

bears

which

much

confront

facts

God's
realms

shall

of

can

by

of

then

solution

real

known

the

to

character,

the

many

be

never

we

found

philosophical.

exclusively

is

which

investigation

from

us

is

part

belonging

adequate

an

it

as

but

more

supernatural

that

understand

to

problems
by

fact

and

such

forms

alone,

reason

creation,

universe

entire

the

that

mind
of

light

work
of

THEOLOGY

NATURAL

I32

Conclusion

is

God
Him

we

For

this

of

Seneca
flee

to

end

and

108

mum

quidquid

'

to

said

bonum,

of

quid
et

agimus'.

'

thy

thine

Epistola

sit,
totius
LXXI.

life

aut

vitae

the

whole
to

from

activity.
aspirations
moral

Sovereign

the

our

wishest

on
'

all

our

thou

as

eyes

whole

fugiendum

propositum

devote

oft

So

and

Him

to

must

we

fix

find,

purpose

Quoties

Him

to

faculties

our

End

Supreme

our

direct

must

we

has

or

being,

our

reason

and

Beginning

receive

soul

our

As

First

our

life.

know

what

Good,

the

108.

quid

petendum

respice.

Illi

scire
enim

voles,
consentire

ad

sum-

debet

INTRODUCTION
Definition

1.

which

needs

of

Logic.

exist

to

Logic

"

in

reflexstudy of

is the

reasoning processes for them

is laid down
definition
(i) what

this

(material
elaboration
end

the

of

in

materials

consists

of

Logic.

various

But

reasoning.

In

"

orderliness, this

(formal cause)
aims

broad

mind

of the

acts

"

materials

the

sense

apprehension, judg

10).

apprehension the mind

represents to itself
affirming or denying anything about
things without
this act
of conception, or
concepts resulting from

hension,

are

affirming
consists
a

denying

ing

inference

or

in such
is the

ing

one

or

names

thing

of

(2)
is

another

The

or

them.

appre
of

act

judgment

it

the objects of two

concepts
establishing between
of identity or non-identity, of agreement
or
disagree

Its outward

ment.

a
common

way

combination

is the
that

and

is the

expression

new

judgment

(3) Reason

proposition.
of two

or

of the

syllogism

The

is formed.

complete expression

judgments

more

simplest

reason

process.

3.

expressed by

terms.

one

in

relation

the

or

only

are

(i) By
The

(3)

attainment

the

"

; and

strictly,they

speak

to

apprehension (3 and

of

more

of

introduced

be

this

this elaboration

In

subject-matter

must

what

(2)

which

the

and

acts

order

object) ;

Cause

logic are

ment

is the

truth.

to

us

more

(finalcause).

Material

2.

the

towards

of truth

of

or

cause

which

into

materials

logic, the

lead

to

elaborate

and

inferences

judgments,

our

order

the

Formal

point
Books

Cause

of view

of

Logic.

from

which

The

"

formal

logic regards

object
acts

of

logic

of the

or

mind

for study
consultation
or
Institut
Mercier, Logique (5th ed., 1909,
supe"rieur de Philosophic
Lou
vain).
P. Coffey, The
Science
of Logic, 2 vols. (Longmans,
London,
1912).
London,
JOYCE, Principles of Logic (Longmans,
1908).
2nd
Introduction
to Logic (Clarendon
ed., 1916).
JOSEPH, An
Press, Oxford,
2nd
A Manual
WELTON,
ed., 1904).
of Logic, 2 vols. (Tutorial Press, London,
An
Text-book
MELLONE,
of Logic (Blackwood,
Edinburgh.
Introductory
1902).
"

Card.

135

LOGIC

136

for being arranged in order

or
suitability
adaptability
gathered into bodies of truth, such as are the various

is their
and

specialsciences

and

the

science of Philo

fundamental

more

sophy itself. Indeed the building up of our knowledge is a

progressivework : the mind has first to apprehend the mani
fold aspects of reality
one
by one before it can put its frag
in one
mentary explanationstogether and co-ordinate them
The first elaboration of our
syntheticwhole.
simpleideas is
the

work

of

materials

judgment ; judgments

supply the

in their turn

for inference ; finally,

since a single
reasoningprocess
furnish a full knowledge of a thing,inferences become

does not

the materials

of

for the construction

This

scientificsystem.

by the mind, this introduction of order

into its own
acts, this marshallingof its ideas with a view to
attainingtruth, is what is meant
by logicalorder, the order
facit
with which logicdeals :
ordo quern ratio considerando
in proprio actu '.

buildingup

of ideas

'

4. Difference

deal

may

different

pointof

between

with

the

Psychology
same

of
properties

view.

it

In such

and

Logic.

the acts

to be

is said

there

case

(or indeterminate)object,whilst
formal (ordeterminate)
object.
has

studies

object provided that each

and so* approaches it from a

material

Psychologyalso

Several sciences

"

of the human

common

one

has

each

different

mind

its

as

proper
part of

its material

ciselyas

object,but it does not claim to study them pre

does logic(formalobject). To psychologythey are

vital acts whose

and

nature

have
geneticprinciples

to be inves

tigated. Logic, on the other hand, considers them only in so

far as they have a cognitional
import,are abstract and universal
and
furnish the materials for those
representations
of objects,
relations which the mind
formulates
in judgments and infer
builds up into a scientific system. As in all the
other sciences that deal with the world of reality,
in psychology
and

ences

order
it is

is the

condition

the
object,
object of logicis
an

sine

very
the

qua

-non

of the

science

; in

logic

thing logicstudies : since the proper

form itselfwhich knowledge-building

requires.
5. Final

of

Cause

Logic." The

systematization of the results of

secure

truth

Before

in

our

ulterior end
our

for

which

reasoningmakes,

the
is to

knowledge.

explaininghow

logicdirects

its acts

towards

truth,

INTRODUCTION

judgment and

not

truth

that

remember

must

we

belong
that

to

the

Now

Jabberwocky
the claim

to

as

sun,

error

are

qualitiesof

is

mentions
long as a man
some
imaginativeobject)

or

Truth
right or wrong.
or
propositionthat the
real (Criteriology,
6).

of

the

As

is

say that he
the statement

can

one

and

of the concept.

the
only a singleobject(e.g.
no

137

logicto

lead

the

and

exists,

sun

'

mind

error

truth

to

',

as
one
thought that the meaning is that logic,
sciences. Obviously
science,can take the placeof all the special
the mind
it cannot
each of the specialsciences enlightens
:
in regardto the special
and so the man
objectit contemplates,
all is far better equipped for making a true
versed in them
who
merely knows logic. There is,
judgment than the man
of
however, another way of gettingat all truth than by means
the successive and collective study of the separate sciences,
which is very different,namely, that way
in which
a
more
Indeed, it is a law of
generalscience aids a less generalone.
our
thought that the simplehelpsus to understand the com
in the matter
of knowledge
plex (Gen. Introduction,2) ; now
simplicityand universality
always go together: therefore
the most
general sciences are those which have the simplest
throw
light on any more
object,and so can
complex or
particularobjectsto which they can have application.In
this sense
it is a
it is that logicleads to truth, inasmuch
as
the content of all the other
generalscience because it regulates
sciences,because they have all to be drawn up accordingto
its laws.
It has an objectof the extremest
and of
simplicity
the widest extension
being of the mind ',ens rationis,as we
will proceed to explain.

it must

be

not

"

"

'

"

6. Difference

another

science which

since it touches
science
treat

between

"

Metaphysics

and

"

has all beingfor its object,

and

all knowledge,also merits the

name

namely metaphysics. Metaphysics and

of all

they treat
their proper

being,they

of it from
formal

There

Logic.

have

different

common

material

is

therefore,

of

general

logicalike
object;

points of view, they have

but
each

object. The former considers real being,

regardedformally as it is in itself
(ENS REALE) and possessing
real attributes. Logic studies the same
being.formallyconsidered
it is in the mind
and pos
as
entity,
(ENS RATIONIS),as a logical
mental attributes bestowed on it by the mind
and in virtue
sessing
to the process ofthought.
of its beingsubjected

LOGIC

I38

can
capable of existing,
it is thought about, as a concept in

existingor

Anything, whether
thought

When

about.

of its

result

such,

as

tions such

they

as

universal.

are

as

Between

objectsit is possibleto establish rela

conditions
of things
concrete
particularizing

universal

and

abstract

and

object,it is abstract

mental

object of intellectual thought

being an

the

clothed with attributes which

becomes
mind, it necessarily
the

be

the

as

outside

are

do

mind

the

not

of

allow

mental

one

attribute of another
the predicate
or
object
object becomes
its
relation
the
to
fulfils
of
of thought which, on account
first,
of ideas give
and
extension
the role of subject
; the content
rise to relations of identityor non-identity
; judgments are
and
for all
the material
formed, reasoning processes ensue,
mental
these various
operationsis throughout one and the
same
namely, being : not real being,as it is in itself and
ens
independent of thought, but being-as-it-is-in-the-mind,
"

rationis, i.e. under

attach to it
We

see,

science

of

as

aspect and

the

with

attributes

the

that

objectof thought.

an

then, that

metaphysics is

whereas

reality
; logicis

universal

the

science

universal

the
of

know

our

ledgeof reality1.
7. Is

Logic

Science

practicalscience

only at

knowledge

one,

on

the

with

view

of the

action

to

or a
logica speculative

of its

nature

hand, furnishes

other

Is

"

speculativescience

"

Art

an

or

or

to

some

is

which

one

object;

aims

practical

knowledge of its object

'

ulterior purpose

finis

actio '.
speculativae,veritas ; finis operativaeseu practicae,
The logiciandoes not contemplatethe acts of his mind merely
for the pleasure of knowing the relations they bear to one
another, but with a view to using this scientific knowledge
for the

direction

further

this sense,

science.

and
But

without

not

if

of the

reason,

view

broader

operationsof his
logicis said to be
is taken

and

the

mind.

In

practical

direction

of the mind
is considered as indeed
operations
but a step towards the knowledge of all truth, it may
then be
said to be a speculative
science. This is the standpointof St.

logicgivesto

The

relations

the

studied

the attention
of the mind
intentiones
', objects of
from
learns

the
of

in logic are
not
the ontologicalrelations on
first of all falls,first or direct mental
views '
first abstraction, but logicalrelations
which
a

juxtaposition of two abstract objects or ideas and which

intentiones
', objects of
only upon
reflecting, secundae

abstraction.

which

primae
arise

the

'

mind

second

LOGIC

140

The

strictly
it

of

matter

of

chapter

material
III

Chapter

in

the

will

order.

of
In

tion
'

[Logica]

per
et

logic

the

four

and

in

scilicet
errore

in

of

directiva
homo

procedit

of
of

text

will

order
Thomas

cause)

(efficient

cause)

cause)

'.

wish

to

into
observed

of

considered

of

logic

quoted

ipso

actus
actu

the

rationis
rationis

utility
order

in

5.

is
in

at

logical

the

of

logic

studies

and

arrive

cause

establishment

ipsius
in

In

inferences,

formal

cause

St.

word,

II).

be

to

of

we

be

this

the

(formal

(final

if
the

final

introduced

rules

drawing

word,

(IV)

the

causes

the

the

terms,

in

(Chap.
be

to

first

"

systems,

philosophy

of

est

quam
sine

scientific

has

the

judgments,

chapter

(1)

which

and

order

make

The

I).

concepts

logical

investigated

operations,

Mention
of

last

and

mental

be

truth

science

our

of

up

knowledge

to

of

forming

this

we

introduced

be

belongs
shall

(Chap.
with

deal

must

itself

order

the

building

the

of

cause

materials

these

order

here

yet

chapter
will

order

logical

psychology,

proper

which

of

cause

preliminary

into

the

of

treatise

the

material

with

efficient

the
domain

the

to

the

the

of

study

made

in

our

footnote

on

(material
ordinate

defini
p.

139.

cause)
et

faciliter

CHAPTER

and

Principles

9.

principle or
made

stance

of

of soul

up

principle is

and

The

"

is the

acts

; their

body

intellectual

the

proximate

remote

human

sub

immediate

or

faculty (Psychology, 153).

it is shown

psychology

In

intellectual

our

ORDER

Acts.

Intellectual

of

Nature

source

LOGICAL

OF

CAUSE

EFFICIENT

THE

of the

all acts

that

mind

their

owe

object of sensation
sense-experience. The
beginning to some
material
thing,
sense-perception is always a determinate
or
of

made
of

this

conception

it is

considered

which

it is

universal

applicable

or

is round
on

space

in

shape

my

table

is

of

notion

circumstances
at

of

matter

judgment,

All

"

be

may

shape

form

can

determining

by

which
no

particular

what
when

or

when

whatsoever,

made,
sound,

or

much

so

one

all bells

way,

accidental
The

or

where

features

forms
"

(a)

or

act

that
"

it will be

apprehension
the

which
mind

the

of

or

have

to

"

secured

of

some

different

determine.

conception

an

what

certain

have

of interest

kind

same

understanding

considers
141

apprehension,

mind-

the

although they

modalities

When

or

Fundamen

are

fundamentally

are

est

of

acts

intuition

quid

first

"

Manifold,

though

the

reasoning

thing is, quod

of

Acts,

intellectual

an

ferent

they

possess

may

Identical.

i.

all these

from

and

brass

time

But

quite determinate.

general

material

what

Intellectual

tally

in

particular moment

abstracts

of

exist.

may

10.

act,

in

least

qualitiesthey
they

that

subjects.

occupies

particularizing attributes

or

represent,

this

at

is made

pleasing tone,

the

consequently

of individual

which

touch,

of

and

bell

and

see

with

outside

existing actually
number

any

All this is

at it.

looking

names

when

to

universal,

particularizingconditions

the

really endowed

object

the

and

is abstract

proper

from

apart

bell, which

This

thought

(abstrahere, separatim considerare),and

mind

am

of

or

possessing these qualities;

and

matter

for

assumes

dif

it different

object independently

LOGIC

142

surroundingobjectsit

of the

(b)This

of the

bute
or

attention

to

its attributes taken

object,but

teristics which
mental

directed

be

objectindependentlyof

of the

essence

may

acts

is said

are

as

acts

others united with it,

any

whole,

considered

individualize
called

give attention to it.

either to one
singleattri
to

they constitute the

as

apart from

it in the

world

of abstraction,

of

those

charac

: such
reality

(c)Abstraction

is

(d) Abstraction is also a work

generalization,
of analysis
is
or
a mental
process by which an objectknown
decomposed into its several notes or attributes, (e)The act
by which these notes, previouslyconsidered apart, are re
united or gatheredtogetherby the mind is called a synthesis.
conceived successively
are
(/)When two objects
by the mind and
to exist between
a relation is perceived
them, this apprehension,
rather
this double apprehension,is called a comparison.
or
is an intui
(g)The direct perceptionof some
existingreality
of
tion. The words percept,perception,
used in the case
are
in contrast with concept, conception,
which
existingrealities,
refer to ideal objectsof things considered
apart from their
the mind
has for its objectacts of the
existence,
(h) When
its spiritual
soul, especially
acts, apprehensionis then termed
consciousness,
(i)Finally,the act by which the mind con
ceives that one
another is known
as
as
objectis not the same
distinction (Gen. Metaphysics,48). By
object id quod
understand
whatsoever
be
can
ob-jiciturcognoscenti we
for an act of thought.
matter
act of judgment consists in predicating
2. The
one
object
that two
of another, in recognizing
objectspreviouslyappre
hended
in mutual
are
agreement or disagreement. It is an
of
act of apprehensionhaving as its formal objectthe identity
the terms
of two previousapprehensions
apprehensio
; it is an
to
complexa or complexorum as opposed
simpleapprehension,
apprehensioincomplexaor incomplexorum.
is a series of judg
or
inference,
3. Reasoning,ratiocination,
the reason
It is a process by which
two
ments.
compares
terms
between which it does not yet perceive
extreme
a relation
of identity
to exist,with a third common
term
in order to dis
cover
by this comparison whether or not they are identical.
Apprehension in its manifold forms, judgment, and reason
kind of act, namely
ing,are fundamentallyone and the same
into what a thingis. They are all
an
apprehensionof or insight
the

basis for

'

'

"

"

alike

of

acts

its

possesses

their
consequence

the

object

in

in

of

mind

in

can

nature

they

species.
latter
and

term,

quod

ad

"

See

mental

of

the

that

it

is

is,

incon

another

for

or

example,

and

tree

not

any

of

be
are

is

that

affirmed

attributed

to

of

makes

intentio

Metaphysics,
ARISTOTLE,

we

is

the

see

result

is, it is found
individuals,

them

of

(universale
this

or

class-natures,1
possible,

later,
of

apart

abstracting.

species

reasoning

shall

the

mental

of
predicated
one
idea's
of things
our

or

entire

an

representative

as

virtue

in

apprehension

other

of

abstraction

same

Abstraction

of

in

of

that

predicated

be

universality

'.

it

this

power

multitude

be

may

requires,

General

in

beings
of

quality

affirmed
lies

answer

is universal,

concept

be

can

regarding

the

abstractive

Hence

virtue

The
of

power

may

thing

one

notes,

realized

sequitur

praedicantur

this

made.

is

the

this

things
In

the

is

tree

in

individual,

Socrates,

how

then,

judgments

another.

as

; this

else

has

found

abstraction

and

to

the

by

existing

affirmed

be

another.

judgment

of

our

intellect,

Possible

it is

could

being

arises,

praedicando).

genus

called

individuality

individualizing

be

may

it

being

Every

"

another,

not

real

one

the

that

and

no

when

In

or

and

question

from

be

143

6.

another

fact

Concepts.

attributed
and

tree

The
of

such

way

himself

other

ORDER

made

are

incommunicable

own

that

ceivable

is

of

is itself

order

any

LOGICAL

faculty,

same

Reasoning

Character

Abstract

actual

the

and

Judgment

11.

in

and

one

OF

understanding.

or

reason

CAUSE

EFFICIENT

THE

of

genera

inasmuch

universal

abstraction

whole

middle
:

abstrahi

universalitatis.

26.
Anal,

'

Non

singularia

pr., I, 27.

de

aliis

sed

alia

de

ipsis

II

CHAPTER

12.

into

which

consist
these

in

articles

with

(Art. I)

alike

the

THE

The

13.

OBJECT

the

is but

step forward

as

chief

only

in

far

so

as

subdivisions,

QUALITIES

for

the

towards
to

the

sion
as

with

logic is

to

the

of

act

(5) ;

they

they

occasion

of

of

and

logic

with

enunciated
which

expressed

or

the

by

ject (id quod

in

far

so

of truth,
not

"

concerned,

the

materials

For

truth

and

with

then,

for

true

direct

notio

them

appertain

error
or

apprehen

concepts

judgments

are

business

the

can

simple conception

to

is

and

(4)

they

as

predicate

or

mind

the

as

appears

concepts

judgment,

subject

only

inference

and

judgment

deals

the

of

of

role

acts

erroneous

and

precisely
are

the

ones.

ideas

or

term,

CONCEPT

judgment

judgment,

new

elements

are

judgment,

furnish

Concepts
of

mental

logic

of

respec

simple apprehension

act

mind,

attainment

the

Both

and

concept

subjicibilisvel praedicabilisin enuntiatione.

of

materials

dealing

THE

OF

Since

"

the

fulfillingthe

of

capable

of

act

two

logic,
which

that

(Art. II).

terms

which

CONCEPTS

Logic.

materials

supplies
the

of

cause

elementary

in

I.

AND

in

Concept

of

of each.

ART.

I.

The

materials

out

introduced,

qualitiesof

and

content

be

to

that

and

of

allow

kinds

the

has

the

By

"

material

the

in order.

arrange

ORDER

understand

we

order

concepts

tively with
and

to

Chapter.

aliquid fit): by

quo

studying

are

this

anything

(id ex

that

then,

of

LOGICAL

OF

of

Division

cause

it is made

we

and

Object

material

or

CAUSE

MATERIAL

THE

are

predicated
predication is
'

the

verb

est

subjectum

to

then
of

in

another

made.

be

logic

', the

and

The

copula.

attribution!
144

nexus

vel

the
the

thought-object
thought-object
between

Together

is

them
the

sub

praedicationi) and

MATERIAL

THE

known

are

the extremes

prehension.

logiconly
consider

The

"

in

145

limits of the assertion.

or

Logical Questions

14.

ORDER

(idquod praedicaturvel attribuitur)

(termini)of a proposition,
being indeed

the terms

as

LOGICAL

OF

attribute

or
predicate

the

CAUSE

concept,
far

so

it then

in these two

the

Act

of

Simple

Ap

just said, finds a placein

or
predicate. Let us
subject

have

we

it acts

as

from

arising

as

roles

:"

of a proposition
is always ultimately,
subject
though
ultimate analysisonly, an
individual.
Propositionsmay

The

1.

in

indeed have

subject,and in fact often have, an abstract

this abstract type is always itself the
cases

their

as

type, yet in such

other previoussubject. This is so for two

predicateof some
the first objectof thought
reasons
: (a)because
psychologically
is drawn
from sense-experience,
and the senses
can
only grasp

callyonly an
term

what

"

the

on

being
with

one

and

Aristotle calls

one

hand

but

to

himself

to

ontologiof the

first substance

irpuTrj overia,

it is attributable

hand

incommunicable

no

other

individual ; and (b)because

individual is a subjectin the strict sense

is concrete

at what

since

"

other, individuality

no

another, Socrates

being

identical

(Gen. Metaphysics,26), and

the

on

it is the

subjectof abstract, universal concepts

of it on various titles7.
which can
be predicated
of illustration the proposition
Consider by way
Snow
:
melts in the sun'.
'Snow', a generalor universal idea, is
abstract subject. But what
does
an
? This
snow
mean
to be white and falling
to the ground
somethingwhich I perceive
in lightflakes and I feel cold to my
This white, cold
touch.
this white, cold, flaky
:
thing that falls in flakes is snow
is a
thingis a first subject; and of this firstsubject snow
'

'

'

'

'

predicate. The generalor abstract

the

subject of

idea

further

of
predicate,
in-the-sun '. This analysis
of the terms
trates how there is always a first term
a

individual subject (roSt

n) and

'

'

snow

'

next

becomes

attribute

the

of

'

'

melts-

illus
proposition
which is originally
an
a

the mind

attributes

to

which

two

special questions: (a)

does it state of the subject?

all the
2.

What

'

predicationsit makes.
The
predicate furnishes
does it mean

Omnium

possint universe

eorum,

or

convey

quae

; what

stint, alia sunt

praedicari, velut

Cleon

ejusmodi,

Callias, et
solis sensibussubjicitur,
de ipsisautem
alia praedicantur
et homo
est et aniirans
*. ARISTOTLE, Anal. pr.t I, 27.
et

ut

de

millo

alio

vere

singulariset quod
; uterqueenim illorum

res

LOGIC

146
in

And

have

we

answer

the

of

study

the

logicalpredicamentsas

the classification of

times

does it

called,

it be

must

way

(b)How

or
predicables

15. The

attributed
of

ways

Categories

belong

This

it ?

to

to

the
or
categories,

is some
predicates

the
is

subject,in what
question of the

predicating.
Logical Predicaments.

or

"

There

is of

in detail all the pre

distinguishing
dicates of the immense
mind
varietyof judgments the human
is capable of making. What
Aristotle attempted to do was
to a number
of heads or types of predication
to reduce them
in order to see how many
(typus praedicationis)
reallydifferent
of predicates,
aspects of a subjectmight be indicated by means
each type constituting
kind.
a
category of ideas of the same

course

discovered

He
of

of

question here

no

great headings, supreme

ten

under
predication,

one

or

be

can

types

or

genera,

of which

other

arranged

general notion we can conceivablyuse in inter

possible
pretingor judgingthe individual thingsor subjectswhich come
in the course
of our
mental
experience.
up for investigation
follows
:
They are as
every

"

Substance

1.

This

something our

'

is

'.

snow

'

our

is an

senses

abstract

say,

or

second

substance.

perceiveas white, cold and flaky

of the
abstract notion representative

senses
'

Snow

subjectwhich

is to

that

"

tell us has attached

to it the accidental
'

determinations

'

expressedby the adjectives white ', cold ',

the mind
designatesany concrete
flaky'. When
subject
roSe
the
senses
a
perceivedby
by
concept signifying
is
its substance
it
to
of the
it
or essence,
a predicate
applying
'

"

"

firstcategory,f)ovo-ia,

By

of

way

"

"

"rri.

contrast

to

individual

subject,TT/WOT^ ovo-ta,
predicationsare ultimately

prima substantia, of which all

made
(14),the category of substance
substantia

secunda

; for

whilst it

can

is called Sevrtpa ov"r"a,

serve

as

the

subjectof

or
attributes,it yet itself presupposes
predicates
logical

crete

con

subjectto which it refers.

other nine heads

"

we

The

of

predication
represent accidental
of these modes
determinations 8. Now
of being apper
some
to the individual subject
tainingto substance are INTRINSIC
attributed : two of them, quantity
to which they are
two
(e.g.
cubits in size)and quality(e.g.
inherent
white, learned),
are
2.

For
convey

the

by

difference
our

between

substantial

logicalpredicates,see

essence

General

and

accidental

Metaphysics, 83

f
.

essence

LOGIC

148
the essence,

which

are

ut
contingentaccidents (contingit

called

sint,a-vfjL^/SfjKos)
or
simply accidents 10.
admit
The first class,essential predicables,
For

the

objectof
essence
specific

the

of

subdivision.

the individual

the intellect is not

but

essence

of abstract,
represents by a number
universal concepts. Species(tfSos),
then, designatesthe sumtotal of the abstract,universal notes that togethermake
up an
essence

the

as

constitutive
form

that it

mind

human

of the

speciesas

are

whilst
(ycvos),

genus

it u.

knows

the

others, and

Thus

those

all other

"

and
species
To

its two

the

three

constitutive

find

we

are

essence

of

subjectwhich

necessary accompaniment
exist apart from it. Indeed

it,and

in

say

we

specific
type when it belongs
question,is universally
present
is constant

it is realized,and

though

to the species in
exclusively

instance

in allfivepredicables.

have

we

added

be

of

can
never
consequence
to
thingis proper,or peculiar,

whenever

differentia.

must
predicables

those determinations
are
Properties
of its

and

parts,genus

of essential

kinds

property and accident,and

throughout in

every

'

proprium dicitur quod convenit soli alicui speciei,

the facultyof learningto read and
et semper '. Thus
is proper to man
is proper to immaterial
; incorruptibility

omni
write

is proper
to
strict acceptation,
property and essence
substances

sion;

limitation

when

tible with

the

essence

with

latter case, when

true

to
sively

the

three

it is
quality,

however

of the

of

one

verified by

may

species

therefore

speciesof the
the
(differentia,
difference
specific
Sta""o/"a).
genus, are
of essential predicablesthere are three distinct kinds

same

not

of these notes

also to other

common

differentiate it from

to it,which
peculiar

Such

not

to which

qualityhas

property ; when,
specific
type, but is
opportunity here

In

have

same

property, it is not

true

it attaches.

one

in
or

for

The

term

less strict

sense

this, its
exten

is not
conver

property
in this

of the characteristics

two

instance, it belongs exclu

to be found

for

the

mentioned

conditions

be used

reason

creatures.

neither

universally

(necessary
confusing ontologicalaccident
is
which
with
logicalaccident
contingent)
which
to properties,and
and
is therefore
immediately opposed to essence
it is predicated ; what
is predicated as acci
relative to the subject of which
dental of one
subject may be predicated of another as essential.
11
the
be on
his guard against confusing logicalspecies,
must
The
student
natural
have
used
in
which
with
the
term
of
we
defined,
same
just
meaning
which
are
it designates a group
of individuals
science. In the latter case
interse fertile.
10

or

There

is

which

is

opposed

to

substance

all

constantlyin

nor

to be

doctor

CAUSE

MATERIAL

THE

or

always,yet

there

found

and

called

be

speciesonly, can

be called

in this

property:

him

to

that
does

sense

have

to

is

property what

thus

proper to
of a species

sense,

belongingto beings of

not

it is proper

that

Porphyry say of man

legs. So, too, may

149

type

individual

in every

that

is,in this

mathematician

ORDER

of
beings representative

Similarlya qualityfound

man.

LOGICAL

OF

two
to

common

of a species
and to them only,but which
representatives
belongs to them merely for a time ; for instance,accordingto

all the

Porphyry, it is proper
The

to

white hair in old age.

quality,or accident (O-V/Z/^/^KOS,
to have

man

accidental

common

opposed to proprium),may
a
qualitythat is not a pro
As a positive
definition Porphyry
perty in the strict sense.
to the absence or presence
says that an accident is that quality
of a subjectis indifferent, accidens est
of which the essence
id quod adest et abest praeter subjecti
corruptionem '. He
be constant
or
goes on to say that this accidental qualitymay
and at another
at one
time be sleeping
animal may
not : an
opposed to r"oi/,accidens commune
best be defined negatively,
as

'

not

that

noted

not

property. As
a
property and
induction

sufficient to enable

is not

observation

shall

we

Mere

property.

to decide

is

what

between

is the

objectof scientific
employment of experimental

the

demands

us

be

must

later,the discrimination

see

is accidental

what

and

qualityis

constant

every

it

Hence

always black.

remains

raven

methods.
17.

the

notice

comprehension and
The comprehensionof

extension.
idea

an

or, as

"

its connotation, implication,

intent
to be contained

in it. If

its connotation

or

teristicswe

have

we

the notes
drawn

by

See

or

scope

of

take

as

intension13

or

an

variouslytermed,
"

or

it embodies
abstraction

Vol. I, p. 5, footnote.

or

notes

is its

are

the various

from

'

man

of

',

charac

individual
an

con

discovered

instance the idea

applicationof
the number
application,

extension, denotation,

sphere

it is

characteristics

of the

tent, the sum-total

11

"

there exist certain relations of sub

predicables
for the rightunderstandingof which it is necessary
two
logicalqualitiesof abstract concepts, namely

their

The

Between

Concepts.

different

ordination
to

of

Extension

and

Comprehension

man.

idea, is its

subjects to

LOGIC

150
it is

which

or

be

can

in

applied or,

other

words,

which

to

it

extends.

concept is thus

abstract, universal

The

considered

as

'

'

whole.
The concept
whole and as a logical
man
metaphysical
viewed as to its comprehension i.e. as comprisingthe notes
and reason,
is a metaphysical
of corporeity,
life,sensibility
whole
made
metaphysicalparts (Gen. Meta
up of so many
of all
46). Viewed in its extension, i.e.as predicable
physics,
it forms
a
past, present, future and merely possible,
men,
taken distributively
whole of which men
the logical
are
logical
totus
and
omnis
correspond
parts. The two Latin words
exactlyto this distinction.
An idea is of greater or less comprehensionin proportionto
"

'

'

it includes.

of notes

the number

'

It has

'

greater or less

exten

proportionas it may be appliedto a largeror smaller

of the concept vary
number
of subjects.These two qualities
the greaterthe comprehension
the less the extension,
:
inversely
sion in

vice

and
If

we

versa.

two

compare

18.

ideas

some

than

Ideas

others, among

in

scale.
the bottom
logical
of no subjectand
which is predicable
of all predication.Immediatelyabove
At

asserted of the individual.

there

of the subaltern
be

may

proximate

by

Relations
or

of

so

those

of

man

and

Non-identical

is the ultimate
this

subject

the

comes

species

the

general of all, the

most

as

the

subordination.
of their

Respect

Opposition.
"

their contents

or

Two
are

ideas

the

rational animal

Comprehension.
same

are

are
or

identical
different

identical ; not

animal).

ideas

liquidand sugar)or

in

and

man

and

is individual substance,

subjoinedtable, known
essential
predicablesof

the

of Ideas

accordingas
different

(e.g.the ideas of

category

same

immediate, subaltern

or

their mutual

and

Identity

application

The

highestor supreme genus.

Porphyry's tree, shows
Comparison

the

Next

intermediate, surmounted

19.

certain

are

the genus which is predicated

speciesand the individuals. Of genera

many,

category of substance

of wider

to
referring

concepts

there is a

both

there

of their Extension."

Respect

universal,i.e.are

more

are

that

ideas.

of

Subordination

respect of their extension

shall discover

the

relations between

ideas in

more

comprehension we

and

As

or

compatible (e.g.those of
and solid).
those of liquid
incompatible
(e.g.
are

either

MATERIAL

THE
Genus

OF

LOGICAL

ORDER

151

Substantia

generalissimum

Differentia

Genus

CAUSE

Corporea

Incorporea

(Angel)

subalternum
.

Differentia
.

Genus

subalternum

Insensibile

Sensibile
.

proximum

Differentia

(Mineral)

Vivens

Differentia

Genus

Inanimatum

Animatum
.

Rationale

(Vegetable)

Animal

Irrationale

of ideas or
Incompatibility
oppositionis of four kinds :
contradictory,
privative,
contrary and relative.
1.
Contradictory
oppositionexists between two ideas when
of them
is
inasmuch
one
as
they have nothingin common,
less than
nor
being and the other nothing,one is neither more
the negation of the other (e.g.white and not -white, just and
not -just).
is the absence
of a perfectionin a subject
2. Privation

LOGIC

152

'

its nature

it, negatio alicujusformae

of possessing
blindness
is the priva
in subjecto apto nato habere illam
(e.g.
of life).But it is not merely synonym
tion of sight,
as is death
does not possess sight,
with negation or absence
ous
; a mineral

capableby

'

deprivedof

be said to be

it cannot

but

it.

3. Contrary oppositionexists between

series of thingsbelonging to the same

if

degrees of lightare

the

white,

same

and

courage

cowardice, are

4. Relation

relative

or

which

series,the

two

Contrarietyexists

exist at the

both

instance,

time

same

in

sickness, justiceand injustice,

all

examples.
oppositionexists

when

ideas

two

for their

dependent

each other
upon
and son, of double

of father

For
a

of

extremes

genus.

contraries.

are

things which cannot

subject: health and

between

two

mentally representedas

black and

extremes,

the

meaning ; e.g.
half, of knowledge

and

are

the

ideas

and

that

is known.

II. DIVISION
of Division.

Principles

20.

(I)according

aspect, seized upon

manner
according
and
(III)according to

bases

these

such

are

the

concept,

be divided
may
i.e. the particular

mind, of the knowable

the

by

the

to

Concepts or ideas

"

objectof

the

to

CONCEPTS

OF

of
the

thing ; (II)
object known
;
of their formation. But
divisions are
not
mutually

representingthe
manner

that

the

exclusive.
I. Ideas

21.

divided

are

according

tion of the
the
even

the

on

which

those

gendered

is

common

or

with

or

genericidea

other

the content

they

of

;
an

divi

in the forma

individual,the concept en
e.g. the idea of Caesar, of Napoleon
it

other

speciesof
and
idea

thingsunder

all share

an

an

an

object as
of the

represen
it possesses

species
specific

same

genus, it is either a
it is universal.
Further,

same

in both

in common,

of

individuals

the

may
the

determinate

less

a
conveys
such
notes
only

either with

in

goes so far as to grasp all

object is possessedof, including

idea

tation,embodying

conceive

that

constitute

the

If, however,

is

If abstraction

singularone

Tran

i.

This

degreesof abstraction involved

concept.

determinations

Content."

singularideas.

and
scendental,generic,
specific
sion based

to

cases

less full ; the mind may

aspect of those characteristics that
be

even

that

are

possessedby

all

beings

of the universe,in
'

one

goes
notions

scendental

verum,
aliquid,

ing one

that

not

'

confuse

to

characteristics of

all the

latter

does not
'

Of

these

collective

they

may

swims) ; or they may

tinct,containingalong with other

'

idea.
former

at

least all

confused,

be

represent the objectin

distinguishit from

to

to

must

care

of the intellect. The

scope

enable

which

form

the

object,or

as

us

unum,

as

universal

so
indistinct,

animal

an

as

'

with

an

less full in their content

are

indefinite and

fish

'

collective

coming within the natural

that

considered

are

inadequate ideas.

and

Adequate

those

res,

'

'

embody

'

omnem
categoriam ',
genus,
all the categories. These
tran

several individuals

when

153

transcendental

is called
them
whole, the idea representing
such is the idea of
people', army '. But

idea ;
be taken
2.

omne

beyond
are
only six in number : ens,
37 ff.).
bonum
(Gen.Metaphysics,

its extension

Note

enim

ORDER

be

word, its concept may

transcendit

"

LOGICAL

OF

CAUSE

MATERIAL

THE

notes

all others

way

(e.g.

be clear and dis

to other

common

things

and differentiating
thingrepresented
which breathes only
it from all others (e.g. fish as the animal
through its gills).
An
idea is complex if it is
3. Complex and simple ideas.

the

to
peculiar

note

some

'

'

made

of several

up

'

dicate ; thus
'

'

'

both

are

man

elements

each

of which

divided

are

an

according

the

There
term

of

and

abstract,

concrete idea ;
thing reallyas a strictly
improperly used to signifya note or qualityas

is
is

pre
and

Manner

their

to

representing their Object, chieflyinto concrete

and negative,
positive
proper and analogous.
1.

'

'

is such

just man
simpleideas.

22. II. Ideas

stand as
may
idea.
But
just

no

such

'

'

in a subject
white
: for instance,the idea
existing
represents
concrete
a
subject. Whereas
qualityas belongingto some
in reality
the so-called abstract idea (although all ideas are
something existing
abstract)represents a note as if it were
apart from a subject; it is the result of the mind singlingout
and disregarding
that it is the note
note
or
some
abstracting
whilst
of a subject: e.g.
whiteness ', animality'. Hence
'

the

concrete

idea

'

is the

abstract idea results from

upon
2.

result
a

of

double

one

abstractive

act, the

abstraction,is consequent

reflection.
A

positiveidea

is

of attributes that it

one

which

represents a thing by

reallypossesses

'

e.g.

life',

'

means

light'.

LOGIC

154
idea is one which
negative
emphasisingthe absence
'

darkness
to it : e.g.
3. A positiveidea

gives us knowledge of
of a qualitywhich does

'

', death '.

it connotes
is proper when
qualitywhich is distinctive of the

that is,some

thingby
not belong

property,

it is

being as

if it denotes an
idea is analogical
in reality.An
positively
objectthat is beyond the grasp of the mind and requiringfor
its representation
a
comparison with something else known

form an analogous idea of

proper knowledge : thus we
lifein God from our
knowledge of created life,and of the pre

with

of

sence

from
spirits

idea

our

of the

of bodies

presence

in

space.
III. Ideas

23.

Formation
immediate

according
and

immediate

into

intuitive when

or

itselfunited

divided

are

intellect

to the

in
representation

it.

mediate

an

second

from

unlike

or

intuitive

cursive

it is proper or
objectwhich* serves~to make the

the

is of like

known

are

objectdepends for its being

beingknown, the apprehension

upon another objectalso

idea is said to be mediate.
And

analogical
accordingas

Ideas

at least itself produces its own

or

known
or

ideas.

of their

object of apprehensionis

the

When

the Manner

to

knowledge,
knowledge.

in this

case

nature

to

mediate

it.

distinct

As

is sometimes

called dis
i

ART.

OBJECT

I. THE
24. The

TERMS

II.

AND

QUALITIES

OF

-Terms

Object of the Term."

TERM

THE

or

names

are

vocal

of objectsas they are conceived by the mind ;

signsexpressive
they are not the expressionof subjective
concepts as such nor
of thingsas they are in nature, in themselves
; but they stand
the mind
conceives them, they denote
for thingsprecisely
as
referuntur ad res significandas
mediante
objectsknown : voces
sun
',for instance,does
conceptioneintellectus 13. The word
'

'

not

idea of

stand for our

does not

word

refer

'

sun

but for the

to
directly

the

of nature, since for ages the word

round

18

our

planet

St. THOMAS,

"

Sum,

which

sun

as

connoted

is evidentlynot

Theol., I. q. 13,

a.

i.

itself; and

sun

yet the

it exists in the order

a

body

true

that revolved

of the

sun

itself

156

LOGIC

II. DIVISION
26.

Division

noticed

of

called

are

either

and

if the

either

are

terms,

latter,they
and

or

few

have

we

remarks

Common

terms

and

universal

generic or specific.

are

specificterms

analogical,according
division

singular.
simply general
or

common

transcendental

Generic

ing

to

divisions

for.

are

ones

the

Although

"

concepts apply in general also

Terms

1.

Terms.

of

TERMS

OF

univocal, and

are

to

distinction

transcendental

based

follow

the

on

of terms.

Terms

of the same
name
by means
they
the
essential
definition
same
designate things which verify
:
the name
animal
is applied with identically
the same
mean
and cow,
inasmuch
both
as
ing to man
comply with the defini
tion of sentient
are
living being. Terms
equivocal when
by
of the same
means
name
they designatedifferent things giving
in its
dog
respectivelydifferent concepts : e.g. the name
2.

univocal

are

'

when

'

'

application

to

animal

an

and

to

'

constellation.

Terms

are

in the mind
are
analogical when
they stand for things which
represented by concepts that are only partly the same
; thus,
when
bodies
and
of spiritsthat they occupy
we
say of material
space,

the

in

but

same

3.

like

Terms,

They

6. Terms

direct,

'

genus

concepts,

concrete

vey

in

the

i.e.

are

used

not

are

simple

are

of the

abstract

or
'

latter

vice

and

direct

complex,

or

whiteness

the

'

former

'

white

'.
'

negative:

e.g.

may

be

death

',

used

'

immor

render

to

versa.
'

reflex:

or

', species
'

'

e.g.

substance

',

'

', are

man

reflex.

are
are

those

which

con
by themselves
and
thus
are
capable by themselves
subject or predicate (e.g. man
');

Categorematic terms
a
complete meaning
role of
the
fulfilling

syncategorematic terms
in conjunction with some

of

positiveterm

7.

of

'

space

worded.

that

are

'

and

sense.

positive or

are

tality'. Note
negative idea

'

occupy

analogous

an

single-or many4. They are

is an
example,
5.

'

words

'

are

those
other

term

which

require
'

(e.g.

every

to

',

be

'

none

used

').

CHAPTER

THE

FORMAL

27.

CAUSE

Introductory.
its

into

The

"

acts, the

own

The

work.

attach

and

together
thus

and

of

construct

we

which

this

the

to

logic seeks

which

in

will

judgment

studied

is

proposition (I),the

ART.

THE

28.

OF

Definition.

pression of
^.bout

the

else

something

omnis

every

oratio

something

but

JUDGMENT

is
'

not

it states

entreaty 14.

assertion

ARISTOTLE,

and

the
pro

judgments

Every

PROPOSITION

THE

is

announcing
est

may
IV
157

something
'

something,
signifies

""ao-is ^wi/r) o-^ai/n/oj, but

imperative

an

announcement
take

and

ex

enunciativa

oratio

utterance

verbal

the

something.

no

cc.

PROPOSITION

which

propositio

makes

Penhermenias,

and

judgments

AND

utterance

nothing

it

14

an

announce

signification,yet
'An

(Art. I)

judgment

THE

significativa',

does

utterance

the

subdivisions,

three

existing between

AND

calls it.
est

of

division

the
of

proposition,

judgment,

formation

(III).

THE

The

"

uTTo^avo-t? Aristotle
'

relations

JUDGMENT

MEANING

of

nature

upon

divisions

main

main

into

falls

judgments

logical system

three

first

divisions

propositions

I.

I. THE

the

various

positions (II), various

between

The

the

progres

reasoning bearing

progressive

establish.

to

to

formally

complex

into

divided

threefold

dealing respectively with

and

science.

view

we

elaborate

more

be

when

up

of

train

by putting judgments

build

we

with

mind

the

by

already said,

Next,

the

call

we

chapter

corresponding
order

them

ORDER

order

judgment,

subject.

of

have

we

is

step

Lastly, by

reason.

knowledge
Now

is,as

comparing

object

one

to

LOGICAL

of its ideas

arrangement

first

predicate

OF

introduction

acquisition of knowledge,
sive

III

V.

an

term

is not
;

signifies
without

likewise

affirmativeform

an
or

LOGIC

158
; all

form
negative
of these
two
the

terms

'to

be

at
proposition,

notion,

is true

29. The

we

define

may

the

of

that

utterance

an

whilst

Indeed

paniesthese
of
subsisting,
and

the

perhaps
shape of

"

the

in

Proposition

chief act towards

to

acts

which

which

of its leaves

"

of

forth, there

so

am

accom

"

I have

of external

of

object

some

apprehension of

which

acts

branches, the roughness

and

refer them

can

successive

qualitiesof this tree

and

its trunk

subjectfrom

by

attributes

several

simultaneous

seizes

mind

the sensible

attributes apart

of these

and

Judgment

our

of its bark, the colour

something

gatheredmy
and

my

abstract

consideration

shape, roughness, and

mind
in my
them
attributing
this indeterminate
subject which I am
tryingto describe,
sayingthat they belong to it,to judgingthat a tree is what

colour

to

propositionas

thought converges, but in pointof fact there

thought which does not terminate in an act of judg
of

the
perceiving,

to

onlyis the judgment the

Not

"

knowledge

notes

of

"

simple apprehension the

of

up

predicate,S and P connected

by
feature of the
'. Looking then at only one
analysis of
property disclosed by the mere

Place

the progress
is no act of
ment.

assertion is made

An

false.

or

Thought.

'.

combinations

are

subjectand

"

verb

the

enunciations

elemental

assertions

complex

more

"

is

reallytantamount

to

they togetherconnote.
this testimony
The study of language supports and amplifies
For the invention

is nothingbut to
of a name
subject
apply a concept, under the form of language,to some
which
I denote in an indeterminate
way by the demonstrative
that '. As an instance in point,the etymo
this or
pronoun
wolf ',lupus,Sanskrit Vrka, shows it to mean
logy of the word
there
wolf
that which tears in pieces ; to call the animal
fore is nothing but to apply an abstract concept to something
otherwise
indeterminate, to apply to this subjectthe attribute
of the act of lacerating.

of consciousness.

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

II. KINDS

OF

JUDGMENTS

AND

'

PROPOSITIONS
Some

propositions
are
simple,consistingonly of subject,attribute and copula;
others are complex or composed of several simplepropositions
that are
allow
connected.
in some
Simple propositions
way
30.

General

Division

of

Propositions.

"

FORMAL

THE

of

i.

159

the

related

as

is,and

it

than

former,

is the

the

is

two

apparent

'

or

it may

mutually
previously
judgment. Now
the

Schoolmen,

be in materia

on

con-

', when

matter

the

the

be other

absolutelycannot

the mind

to

"

terms

of

in necessary
terms

Matter.

considered

nomenclature

necessaria

between

connexion

the

use

in materia

tingenti.It

to their

the

to
proposition,

be

according

assertion of this relation in the

the formal

may

divided

are

is meant
proposition
subject and predicatebut

of

matter

(I),

of Simple Propositions
Classification

I. Propositions

31.

ORDER

quality(IV).

and
(II),quantity(III),

"

to

LOGICAL

fourfold classification,
namely,accordingto their matter

form

By

OF

CAUSE

analysis

mere

independentlyof all experience: e.g. 2 + 2

4.
is in contingentmatter
the connexion
A proposition
when
certain
the two
terms
is such that it depends upon
between
conditions in the order of contingentbeingsand consequently
be stated previouslyto the experienceof it : e.g.
cannot
The contingent
freezes at 32 deg.Fahrenheit.
water
judgment
takes
of which
cognizancemust not be thought to be
logic
is a
without the characteristic of necessity
15,but its necessity
in necessary
conditional one, whilst that of the judgment
Both judgmentsare necessary,
matter
is an absolute necessity.
but only the one kind is necessary in the sense
of in necessary
of the terms,

'

'

'

'

'

'.

matter

'

'

is knowable
by itself,
propositionin necessary matter
propositio
per se nota ; whereas the contingentproposition
depends for its being known upon something else beyond the
terms
of the proposition,propositio
mere
per aliud nota '.

The

'

'

'

Kinds

32. Two

class of

one

the

between

considered

Judgment

of

judgments

'

Matter.

Necessary

in necessary

is necessary

terms

in

matter

'

the

in its essential elements, is the

connexion

the

either because

subject,

term

same

In

i.

"

as

the

for instance
as
judgment of identity,
that
i +
is an equilateral
i
a square
quadrangle', 2
inasmuch
the*
because the subjectincludes the predicate
as
or
of the subject,
latter is some
element in the essence
e.g. 'a
'. In both cases
is intelligent
', a man
square is a rectangle

predicate which
"

is

'

'

'

"

'

18

within

The
the

particularjudgment
scope

of science

'in

contingent

scientia

non

est de

matter'

does

not

singularibus.

fall directly

LOGIC

160

the

of the

comparison

mere

sufficient to

make

two

judgment

their connexion

necessityof

the

of the

terms

is

evident

is necessary
because
involves the subject,
and in consequence
the predicate
necessarily
In

2.

second

the

connexion

class the

bringingit into its definition. This

called of
so
happens when the predicateis a property strictly
but something necessarily
the subject,i.e. is not its essence
resultingfrom it. Thus the definition of the predicate be it
simple or disjunctive when
juxtaposed with the essential
without

be denned

cannot

"

of the

notion

Let

terms.

two

'

number

'

number

up the necessary
illustrate this :
(a)

connexion

subjectshows

is

is

by

each
groups
the elements

us

'

Five

"

propositionwith
definition

one

containing the

is

of the

prime

a
'

simple predicate. Prime

which
be splitup into
cannot
a

of units 16.

number

same

of this definition is not

to be found

Now

in

the number

5,

is it the essential definition of 5 that it is a prime number

nor
analysethe notion,split5 up into groups so as to have 24-2
and

it

immediatelybecomes

5, inasmuch

'

either odd

The

or

'

attribute

not

even

is either odd

duo

dicendi

lf

prime

or

same

is

be

may

although

even,

of number,

necessary
unity excepted inas

number,

number, is divisible or
kinds

two

PER

SE

number

is

'

of

17,*a0

'

necessary
followed

herein

who

Schoolmen,

ACCIDEXS,

PER

the

to be either odd

; for every

for these
the

dicendi

But

property

by two,

not

even.

given by
modi

reckoned

or

name

that

into the definition

enter

it is not

as

The

'

of number

resultant
much

is it even

nor
'

said of attribute
it does

'

odd

of number

notion

is a

even

1,

'

it is

as

can
prime number
its necessarily
agreeingwith the number
is
property of it. (b) Every number
with a disjunctive
proposition
predicate.
is not
comprehended in the essential

be defined without

not

evident

; but

Aristotle, was

in contrast

ovro,

propositions
the

to

modi

Kara

generally defined

one

as

divisible

only by

itself and

unity.
'

17

Per se dupliciterdicitur.
Uno
cujus praedicatum cadit in definitione
animal

enim

in definitione

cadit

enim

modo

hcr.ai-iis. Et

quia

propositio per

dicitur

subjectisicut ista
id

Homo

quod

est

est

se,

animal

in defmitione

alicujus aliquo modo

causa
praedicata
ejus,in his quae sunt per se, dicuntur
dicitur propositio per se, cujus e contrario
subjecti. Alio modo
est
subjectum ponitur in definitione
praedicati; sicut si dicatur : Nasus
esse

causa

simus,

vel

et

nihil aliud

tum

par
est

numerus

causa

est
est

par
quam

praedicati'.

simum
numerus

enim

nihil aliud

ST. THOMAS,

De

est

quam

nasus

curvus,

habens, et in istis subjec

anima, lib. II, lect. 14.

medietatem

LOGICAL

OF

CAUSE

FORMAL

THE

ORDER

161

necessityof the connexion is

sometimes
accord
sometimes
mediately,
apparent immediately,
difficult.
or
ing as the analysisof the terms is straightforward
and in no way
matter
But this is an entirely
affects
subjective
be

It must

that

the

of the connexion.

the nature
33.

added

the

for

Nomenclature

Different

Same

Pro

Division.-

also called absolute or meta

in necessary matter
are
positions
distinct from conditional or physical
as
physicalpropositions,
seeingthat their objectis metaphysicallynecessary and
ones,
independentof the conditions belongingto contingentbeings.
by way of
They are also called rational or pure propositions
by itself,pure reason, is capable of
emphasisingthat reason
perceivingtheir truth ; contingent propositionsare then
experimental or empiricalinasmuch as the knowledge of them
depends upon an acquaintance with fact.
Lastly,since the days of Kant the two classes of propositions
called a priori and
a
are
or
posteriori,
again,
respectively
analyticand synthetic. It is very important to notice that
and
in Kantian
these terms
post-Kantian philosophybear a
from that used in Scholastic philosophy
different signification
18.
of this deep-rooted
difference between
The extent
the
neces
and
contingentjudgments of Scholasticism and the
sary
is a matter
analyticand syntheticjudgments of Kantianism
which
(40).
engaged our attention in Criteriology
**

'

'

34.

II.

Propositions

are

divided

to their

according

Form."

of

the union

subjectand predicateprecisely
it is realized in the assertion of the judgment.
be affirmative
or
I. A
negative19,
proposition
may
according
the mind declares that the predicatebelongs,or does not
here

Form
as

as

18

The

means

(op. cit,,p.

JOYCE

Scholastic

53) thus succinctlycontrasts

52,

definitions

The

"

Analytic proposition is one in

the
which
either
predicate is conof the subject,
tained in the intension
of the
or the subject in the intension
predicate.
in
A Synthetic proposition is one
of subject and
which
the connexion
is

the

"

Analytic proposition is one

which
the predicate is contained
the definition of the subject.

in
in

A
in

Synthetic proposition is one

the predicate is not
conin the notion of the subject.

which

tained

"

of the terms.

intension
"

in

involved

not

definitions

An

An

predicate

modern

:"

TRS.

negative proposition
'

affirmative

one

'

e.g.

This

similarly an
;
generous
is not
Man
affirmative
: e.g.
'

may

sometimes

assume

the

infallible '.

'

The

world

is not

of

appearance
'

'

is

lacking in generosity
apparently negative proposition
man

means

be
may
infinite '.

an

is not

really

LOGIC

162

must
be united (comand accordingly
subject,
with itao.
not united (divisio)
or
positio)
is the modalityof judgments or
2. Closelyallied to form
which qualifies
the union of predicate
and
the particular
manner
subject. On this score judgments may be divided into apodeicassertoric, and
problematic omnis protic, empirical or

the

belong,to

'

"

continetur,ut
eo
positio

inesse,aut

aut

necessario inesse,aut

ai.
enuntiet
ut insit,
contingere
(which must not be confused with
proposition
apodeictic
in necessary matter) asserts that the predicate
the proposition
either necessarily
belongs to, or else is necessarily
repugnant
have a first cause
',
to, the subject: e.g. The world must
for the world to exist by itself'.
It is impossible
declares that the predicate
The assertoric proposition
belongs
X
matter
of
fact
Mr.
died
: e.g.
to the subject
as a
yesterday'.
which
is founded
The
on
simple
problematicproposition,
'

posse
The

'

'

'

is a
possibility23,
of

non-occurrence

with

tentative declaration

determining

'

cause

e.g.

appointed commander-in-chief
35. Import
tion.

intension

The

"

the

form

upon
tion

they are

tive

one.

and

by nature
possiblethat

of the

extension

Predicate

Mr.

is

of

Proposi

of the

: in an
proposition
inverse proportion
to what

of the

in

connected

'.

Logical Value

or

It is

or

occurrence

that is not

event

some

of the

predicatedepend
affirmative proposi
they are in a nega

affirmative
propositionthe predicateis taken
accordingto the whole of its comprehension, althoughthis be
and according
less than the comprehension of the subject,
All the' notes of the predicate,
to part only of its extension.
but
taken togetheror separately,
are
appliedto the subject,
in
the subjectneed not, and in fact does not, stand precisely
virtue of the enunciation for more
than a part of the objects
i.

In

an

Every proposition announcing something (P) about a subject (S) effects

union
(compositio)of S and P. The question is here concerning
to the subject or not.
whether the predicatebelongs objectively
ST. THOMAS,
88

mental

Periher., lect. III.

In
ai

12

ARISTOTLE,
Analyt. pr., I, 2.
Aristotle does not mean
By possible
understands

St. Thomas
determinatum

est

solum

the
ad

same
esse

here
'

Dicitur

but contingent.
not-contradictory,
necessarium
quod in sua natura

autem
; impossibile

quod

est

determinatum

autem
est omnino
determina
quod ad neutrum
; possibile
ad
sive
habeat
tum, sive se habeat magis ad unum
se
alterum,
aequalitcr
quam
ad utrumque, quod dicitur contingens ad utrumlibet
'. In Periher.,lect. 14, n. 8.

solum

ad

non

esse

LOGIC

164
of the universal

the particular,
for inasmuch
over
proposition
is contained in the universal a knowledge of
the particular
as
the latter impliesa virtual knowledge of the former, while the
is not

converse

true.

Propositions are divided according to their Quality.

37. IV.

"

false according as the connexion

is in conformityor not
subjectand predicate

Propositionsare

true

declared between

or

with fact ".

of Compound Propositions($
Classification

" 2.
38. Division

Complex

of

Propositions. The

compound,

"

or

is reallyan assertion containing

complex,proposition
of Port
several simple propositions. Of these the logicians
six kinds in which it is immediatelyevident
Royal enumerate
that there is more
than one
and four where
this
proposition

better

is less evident.

requiredfor
The

i.

Let

us

establish the

define and

conditions

their truth.

first six

copulativedisjunctive

propositionsare

conditional,
causal, relative and adversative.
there are
in which
(a) A copulativepropositionis one
several subjectsor several predicates
joinedby the affirmative
'

'

is
negativeconjunctions and or nor '. This proposition
true onlywhen
each of its partsis true. In the case where the
is also called a r emotive
conjunctionis negativethe proposition
proposition.
is one
in which there are two
(b)A disjunctive
proposition
alone of which can
be true : e.g.
one
incompatiblepredicates,
Every free action is morallygood or bad '. For such a pro
to be true the two members
must
be so opposed to each
position
of no middle proposition.
other as to admit
is one
which contains two parts
(c)A conditional proposition
linked togetherby the conjunction if ; the firstpart containing
or

'

'

the condition istermed

'

e.g.

If the

soul

is

is true
proposition
if the antecedent
soul

were

(d)A
18

By

the

'

the second the consequent;

antecedent,

it is
spiritual,

immortal

of

the consequence involved is true, even

and consequent are false : e.g. If the animal
'

qualityof

called

form, i.e. whether

rather

of words

than

kind

when

it would be immortal
'.
spiritual,
causal proposition
is one made
up of

the

This

'.

of

proposition many
it is affirmative

importance.

authors
or

two

understand

negative.

The

parts joined
what

we

have

questionis one

FORMAL

THE

OF

CAUSE

LOGICAL

165

ORDER
'

conjunctionsignifyinga cause : e.g. Logic is studied

truth is sought'. To this class belongs the reduplica
because
tive proposition
: e.g.
Evil, as evil (or qua evil),is not
it is not sufficient that
For all these propositions
attractive'.
that one should
the two partsbe true but also,and in particular,
by

'

of the other.

be the real cause

expresses a relation,
of this dependsthe truth of the proposition
:

is
relative proposition

(e)A
and

on
'

e.g.

the accuracy
As a man
lives,so
adversative

(f)An
contains

or

one

does he die '.

which
propositionis^one
judgments separatedby some

discretive

or

different

more

which

one

'

'

'

conjunction,but ', as ', nevertheless ',etc. : e.g.

Happinessdepends not upon riches but upon virtue '. For its
truth such a proposition
depends both on the truth of the parts
and on the opposition
them.
set between
called sometimes
four other kinds of propositions,
2. The
which are in appearance
simple but in
propositions,
exponible
comparativeand
realitycompound, are exclusive,exceptive,
desitive propositions.
or
inceptive
which asserts that an
is one
(a)An exclusive proposition
attribute belongs to one
subjectonly : e.g. God alone is to
adversative
'

'

be loved for His

own

sake '.
which affirms

is one
(b)An exceptive
proposition

subjectbut

'

with

restriction

All virtues admit

e.g.

of

an

excludingpart

excess

an

attribute of

of its extension

'.

except the love of God

(c)A comparative
propositionis one which not only asserts
that a thing possesses certain attributes but that it possesses
them in a greater or less degreethan some
other thing: e.g.
'

Wisdom

is better than

riches/

and desitive are

(d)Inceptive
that

those

certain

attributes

thinghas commenced
Slaveryceased
e.g.
'

assert
respectively
ceased to enjoy certain

which
or

in the British Dominions

in

1834 '"
Each

of these four

judgmentsand

propositions
reallycontains

therefore is not

III. RELATIONS
39. Relations

bear
to

between

different relations to

distinguish,
namely
opposition.

and

true

BETWEEN

unless both

two

separate

parts are

true.

PROPOSITIONS

Propositions. Propositions may

"

it is necessary
of ^l^alencet
conversion,subordination
one

another

which

LOGIC

166
40.
said

of

Equivalence

expressionwhilst
example, All men

in

not

Conversion

41.

propositionsare

logicalvalue.

'

', No

immortal

are

men

Propositions. Conversion

of

in their

another

one

and

meaning

mortal

are

Those

"

differ from

which
equivalent

be

to

Propositions.

For

'

24.

consists in

"

so

that the new

transposingthe two terms of a proposition
pro
if
thus obtained is true
the original
is.
one
position
is convertible since both
(a)A universal negativeproposition
No
universal : e.g.
mineral
its terms
are
performs vital
actions is as true as
Any beingperformingvital actions is not
'

'

'

mineral

'.

is likewise convertible
proposition
(b)A particular
affirmative
that both terms
for the same
of equal extension :
are
reason
with reason
sensitive beingsare endowed
', Some
e.g. Some
these
with reason
"are sensitive '. In both
beings endowed
is evident ; the two terms
the conversion
cases
are
clearly
transposable.The questionarises whether these are the only
'

two

'

The

cases.

consider that

if we

(c)In

the

not

real

is

individual
stance

would

answer

first

"

place,the

term, which

singularpropositions

concrete,

determined,

or

basis of attribution.

a
'

Peter is wise
say that
Peter ',the term
Peter
'

subject.
(d)And in the

of

ultimatelyrepresents a

as

serve

'

conversion

since

conversion

',cannot

to be in the affirmative

seem

or
'

One

is in

'

first sub

Thus, when

of the class of wise

spiteof

the

is

men

conversion

still

the

second

tion allows of conversion

in the

universal

but only on
change places,
made
subject be limited in

may
when

are

men

sensitive

'

the

is
predicate

are
predicate

conversion

Thus

'

All

'

', but the

called,per accidens, conversion
there is,however,
propositions
which

its extension.

become
sensitive beings are
Some
may
conversion is imperfector, as it is otherwise

men

and

proposi
affirmative
that subjectand predicate
sense
the condition that the predicate

place,a

is not

of

an

by
one

Among

exception,namely

essential definition and

equal extension.

true

limitation.

In other

conversion, because

that in

subject
imperfect

thus
'

cases

these

'

instead of the two

The
used by many
term
Latin
writers and
adopted by Mill and Mansel
equipollence. The process of changing a proposition into its equivalent
is commonly
known
as
obversion, the new
proposition being spoken of as the
and
obverse of the originalproposition,the obverUnd
(cp.converse
14

is

TRS.

FORMAL

THE

OF

CAUSE

beingsimplysubstituted

terms

definition of conversion, one

LOGICAL

ORDER

167

for each other, accordingto the

term

(P) is altered by having its

restricted.

extension

42. Relations

of

Opposition

and

Subordination.

These

"

rela

give rise to four different classes

propositions
contrary, subcontrary
propositions,
namely contradictory,

tions between
of

The

subaltern.

and

first two

alone

present the characteristic

relative

opposition.
propositionsare said to be contradictories if they
other as to exclude a middle proposition.
are
so opposed to each
They differ both in form and in quantity. Compare, e.g.,
of true

(a)Two

'

All

white

are

men

'

with

'

Some

men

are

not white

'

25.

said to be contraries which have the

are
propositions
thus so
universal quantity but differ in form, and are
same
being true. Com
opposed as to allow of a middle proposition
All men
are
just and No men are just ; between these
pare
two extreme
a third or middle
propositions
proposition
may be
not just'.
are
true, that Some men
(c)Propositionswhich differ in form only and are each
Some
in quantity,are subcontraries : e.g.
are
men
particular
just', Some men are not just'.
form but of different quantities
of the same
(d)Propositions
subalterns : e.g. All men
are
are
are
just ;
just', Some men
is just', Some
not just'.
or again, No
are
man
men
to make
of the conventional
It is the custom
of logicians
use
letters A E I O to symbolizepropositions
under their double
aspect of quantityand form :"
A stands for a universal affirmative proposition.
E stands for a universal negativeproposition.
I stands for a particular
affirmative proposition.
0 stands for a particular
negativeproposition.

(b)Two

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

different modes

The
of

diagram will serve to show the

following
M
and contrary opposition
:
contradictory
"

11

ARISTOTLE,

""

'

Universalis

Pcriherm.,

contrariae, sicut Omnis

universalis
negatio non

designat
ponit
tiva

et

extremam

hoc

c.

VI.

(propositio)affirmativa,
homo
solum

est

removet

distantiam,

pertinetad

Justus,Nullus

ration

in
em

et

universalem

negativa sunt
Justus; quia scilicet

universalis

homo

est

affirmationem,

inter contraria.
sicut medium
negativa sehabent
affirmationem
negatio non
plus facit, nisi quod removeat
In Periher.,lect. n.
et

sed

etiam

quantum negat totum, quod affirmatio

affirma
et ideo particularis
contrarietatis,
.

In contvadictoriis
.

'.

ST.

THOMAS,

i68

LOGIC

CONTRADICTORIES

A
All

are

men

Q
Some

just.

O,

men

are

just.

not

.A

I
Some

No

are

men

just.

concerning the Truth

Propositions. i. Contradictories
43. Rules

"

both

false,since

of the other.
versa

that

Hence

if it is true

:
'

is

one

Some

traries cannot
would

be true

true

the

negation

other is false,and

both be true, but both may

the

at

be

just',it cannot

are

men

be true, for if they

both

both

All

false.
one

',stillmore

just', or which
propositionNo
tion
But
the
out

All

men

the

'

"

of
falsity

It may
its being true that

3. Subcontraries
Both may
be true
not

just

Every

be untrue
'

that

All
'

No

men

are
are

imply

not

'

compare

just

'

Some

that
Some men
suppose it untrue
No men
are
just must be true
'

44.

Rules

Some

men

Propositions.

"

The

tivelysubordinate
the

are

concerning

universals

just

are

men

not

the

men

some

one

"

men

without

group of men
both cannot

be false,

be false

if

we

just',the contradictory

are

; stillmore,

and

to their universals

false.

Some

just',

are

then, must

is the

it be

subcontrary.

Falsity of Subordinate

I and
particular
propositions

impliesthat

be
'

just',which

Truth

be

; there may

with

not.

be found in

; justice
may

'

that

proposi

the truth of

both be true, but both cannot

may
:

'

'

true

just'. The

are

But
being the virtue of another group.
for were
they so the two contradictories would

'

is

is not

man

is the contrary of the

does
proposition

though all men

'

All
'

just
just,even

not

are
'

'

not

are

men

that

just'.

are

just,even

are

just

are

men

contrary.

men

Some

men

'

'

'

'

is it false to say that

to the same,
No men

comes

be true

If it is true

time.

same

If it is false to say that

man

vice

the contradictories

were

just',the contradictory Some

are

nor

be false. Con

'

men

Opposed

just'.

not

Contraries cannot

2.

'

both
less than

or

of

Falsity

cannot

is true, the

one

that

are

men

and

nothing more

if

are

men

CONTRADICTORIES

just.

and

E.

are

The

of the subalterns ; but

respec
truth

of

the truth

THE

CAUSE

FORMAL

OF

LOGICAL

ORDER

169

of the subalterns does not entail that of the universals.

Again,

ifthe particulars
the universals ; but falsity
so
are
are false,
of the particulars
of the universals does not imply the same
27.
too

45. Immediate

Inferences.

inference

real

"

conclusion

the

different terms, and that

three

or
propositions
premissesof

that in a
presently
results from
a
comparison of
this comparison is made
in two

an

seen

When,

argument.

the case, it is permissible

to draw

is sometimes

as

It will be

directlyfrom

however,
conclusion

singleassertion,the reasoningis

eduction.

immediate

Such

inferences

inferenceor
able through the conversion, opposition,
and

called

are

an

obtain

subordination

propositions.TKefrules we Have justgiven are sufficient

be made.
guide to show how these inferences may legitimately
of

ART.
46.

II.

REASONING

Introductory. In the presentchapterwe

the orderlyarrangement of our knowledge or,
the

are

"

formation

as

we

considering
have

said,

logicalorder. In the first article we saw

how concepts are arrangedin the judgment, and terms
in the
proposition.We then classified judgments before making a
comparison of them.
Judgments,however, are only elements
in a stilllargersystem of thought : from judgments that we
of a
alreadyknow we proceed to a new judgment by means
discursive process called reasoningor inference.
This process,
whether expressed in words or in writing,
is known
the syl
as
logism. In this Article we have therefore to consider first
and next (II)
(I)the nature of reasoningand of the syllogism,
the different forms they may
assume.
17

and
The
the

In the

case

negation lies
typicalcases

of

not

of

followingsquare
S is necessarily P
(S must be P)

S is

possibly P
be P)

(S may

affirmation
propositionsthe contradiction between
of the proposition but with the verb.
the attribute
modal
propositionsare best seen from
opposition between

of modal

with

"

^^XTTTD
ATM^TTMDTTTC
CONTRADICTORIES

rnvTT?
AnirTfVRTFq
CONTRADICTORII

S is not

(g need

necessarilyP
not
be p)

PossiblY p
(S cannot ^ p)

s is not

LOGIC

170

I. NATURE
47.

Nature

of

REASONING

OF

Reasoning.

AND

The

"

SYLLOGISM

THE

of all progress in know

truths are known
some

end

ledgeis the attainment of truth. Now

of truths
others mediatelythrough the medium
immediately,
that have been immediatelyapprehended. Those of the one
kind, which give rise to the second, are termed principles
;
of the

those

other, consequences

principles.The

or

from

passage

conclusions

to
principles

flowing from
conclusion

is

reasoning.
it therefore asserts a predi
proposition,
it is quiteapparent that the predicate
cate of a subject. When
is evident (Criteriobelongs to the subject,the proposition
logy,52). Evidence may be immediate, i.e. when the objective
is immediately
and the subject
connexion
between the predicate
apprehended,and in this case the certitude engenderedis also
called immediate.
Or, as is the case in most of our judgments,
it may
be mediate ; it may
only after the mind has
appear
As

conclusion

made

of

use

one

is a

or

comparisonbetween
furnishes mediate
of

reasoning. It

the

terms, i.e. common

middle

more

subjectand predicate:

certitude

is known

what

or

is this kind of evidence

as

which

terms

of

such evidence
the certitude

is characteristic

of conclusions.
of comparisons
why we have to proceedby means
is the disproportion
between the complexityof knowable
existing
to know
thingsand the relative feebleness of our mind striving
The

reason

28.

them

of reasoning or
ratiocination is a perfection,
power
call it a mixed perfection
because
yet such that metaphysicians
it impliesimperfection
that is to say, because
; perfection,
The

is better than

to be able to arrive at the truth

to remain

to have

it is a circuitous

consists in the
of

18

tum

'

Discursus

rationis

discursus

intellectu

erat

be established

two
as

as

Reasoning, then,
concepts the S and P

Terminology.
of

and

"

conclusion

"

"

with

common

ad intellecincipitab intellectu et terminatur

semper
intellectis
enim
ex
procedendo
quibusdam
; et tune
perficitur,
quando ad hoc pervenimus ut intelligamus id

rationis

ratiocinamur

quod prius

its

comparison

judgment to

to reason

inasmuch
ignorantof it,and imperfection
it.
and difficultway of attaining

Syllogism and

48. The

not

ignotum.

procedit'.

Quod

ST. THOMAS,

ergo
Sum.

ratiocinamur, ex aliquo praecedenti

Theol., II.,q. 8, a. i, ad 2.

LOGIC

172

ABC

has

two

sides

equal;

therefore this

anglesequal '.
Reasoning is the bringingof

triangleABC

has

two

under
the
definite
subject
that something
extension of an abstract type in order to infer
which
is predicable
of the abstract type as such is likewise predicable
of
this definite
subject.
is a necessary proposition,
The major of the syllogism
assert
ing that the predicateof the conclusion (the qualityof having
some

angles equal) is necessarilyconnected with

middle term
(triangle
having two sides equal). As

two

an
an

abstract
abstract

concept the middle term is not actuallyuniversal but capable

of becoming universal,of being universalized ; that is to say,
further act of reflection it may

be

as predicable
recognized
of a species
of one or of several or of all the subjects
or a genus.
that the middle term
extends
In the minor the mind preceives
has two sides
to the subjectof the minor
(thatthis triangle
therefore the mind
equal). When
puts major and minor
it perceives
that
together and regards them simultaneously,
the predicateof the conclusion
(having two angles equal)
which belongs necessarily
to the middle
term
with
(triangle
two sides equal)belongslikewise to the subjectof the conclusion

by

which

of the middle

fallswithin the extension

it

perceivethe necessary connexion

predicateof the conclusion, which

it set out

term

between

the

is the advance

; thus

does

subjectand
of

thought

to achieve.

mental act of universalization.

a
syllogismis essentially
The principle
which it is founded may be enunciated thus :
on
Whatever
is necessarily
predicable
of an abstract subject the
middle term"
also of every subject
is predicable
under the
falling
The

"

extension

of

the middle

From

term.

this it is clear that

the

in the

syllogismbetween the extremes

and the middle term
the comprehension
on
depends at once
of the
and on the extension of the terms.
In the major, one
extremes, the predicate of the conclusion, is connected
with the middle term in respect of comprehension
: quaecumque
connexion

sunt
same

its

established

eadem

uni tertio sunt

middle

term

extension,and

on

eadem

inter

is considered

from

this

se.

related

score

In

the minor, the

the

point of

to the

second

view

of

extreme,

de subjecto
Quidquidaffirmatur
abstractim considerate,
ejus
affirmandumest de omnibus et singulis
uno
verbo, universaliter. Quidquid negatur de
inferioribus,
the

subjectof

the conclusion

"

LOGICAL

OF

CAUSE

FORMAL

THE

ORDER

173

subjectoabstraction consider ato, negandum est de omnibus et

inferioribus
singulis
ejus,uno verbo, univer saltier30.
Although the syllogismwe have taken as an example leads
be easily
to an affirmative conclusion,the analysis
applied
may
to one
in a negativeconclusion 31.
resulting
50. The

Necessity of SyllogisticPrinciples."

of the

Nature

major premissand servingas the

foundation
of a syllogismis sometimes
metaphysicaland
absolute in character (e.g.the example justanalysed),
some
times it is physicalor natural and consequentlydependenton
ascertained (e.g.
conditions which must be empirically
the law
that water has its maximum
densityat 4" Centigrade).
In the first case
the predicateattributed to the subject
The

generallaw stated

of the

conclusion
of the

essence

that

Here

subjectof

In the second

else

or

necessityof

the attribute is

case
a

law

part of the
property of

or

necessary

applying this predicate

is absolute.

the conclusion

in virtue of

term

term

the

whole

either the

connotes

middle

essence.

to the

in the

which

predicatedof
to be

had

has

the middle

ascertained

by
subject is

experience; accordinglyits predicationof the

These laws empirically
ascertained
hypothetically
necessary.
in
discover
of reasoning known
we
as
by the method
duction, as will be pointed out in a subsequent part of this
treatise.
51.

Logical First Principles. The

we
syllogism,
proving force from a
"

have

its cogency
or
proposition.The questionarises,Whence

does this

tion

may

seen,

derives

itself derive

its

logicalvalue ?
reasoning. Yet, as

previousprocess of
infinite series of
an
(52-54),
be

never

be

sure

have

we

inferences

You

just

necessary

say

proposi
from

Criteriology
could
is impossible,
or we
we

certain conclusion.

saw

in

There

must

then

for our
which serve
as
propositions
starting-points
reasoning processes, propositionswhich themselves do not
stand in need
called logical
of demonstration.
These
are
and they assert simple relations between
first con
principles,
some

cepts.

80

This

COFFEY,
S1
see

For

view
The
an

of the

Science

analysisof

largeedition

nature

of the

syllogism is explained more

of Logic, I, p. 301 f ."

; also

the

made
objections

58.
Criteriology,

fully by Dr.

TRS.

by J. S.

Mill

against the syllogism,

LOGIC

174

There
1.

The

2.

The

52.

kinds of

:
principles
logical
of each particular
formative principles
science
of all thought.
regulativeprinciples

are

two

"

Moods

Figures and

the

of

Aristotle's

In

Syllogism.

"

terminology the figures (c-x^ara)of the syllogismare the

different forms which the syllogism
assume
according to
may
the relations the middle

is the

Fig.i. The middle term

predicateof the minor.
Fig. 2. The

middle

bears to the two

term

is the

term

subjectof
predicateof

extremes

:"

major and

the

both

premisses.
premisses.

Fig.3. The middle term is the subject of both

The syllogisms
which are
possiblein these different figures
if we
regard the quantity universal or particular and the
foim
affirmative or negative of the proposition,
are
styled
the moods
of the syllogism.The
of such possible
number
be
combinations, independent of their logicalvalues, may
"

"

"

"

reckoned

as

256 moods.

But

there

this number

among

are

only twenty-fourin which a conclusion is derived, and of these

five though valid are useless ; in all therefore there remain, as
valid and useful,nineteen moods
viz. :
of the syllogism,
All, EAE, EIO
(indirect)AAI, EAE, All, AEO, IEO
2nd figure
AGO, EAE, EIO
: AEE,
3rd figure: AAI, All, EAO, EIO, IA1, OAO

figure: AAA,

ist

specialrules for each

figure,
logicians
usuallygiveeightrules applyingto the syllogism
in generaland expressing
the nature of reasoning.
RULE
esto triplex:
i. Terminus
medius, majorque, minorque.
In the syllogism
there must
be three terms, neither more
nor
with a
less. For reasoningis the comparison of two terms
53. Rules

of the

Syllogism.
"

Besides

"

common

third term

first two

terms

are

in order to discover
related
logically

whether

to each

other.

or

how

the

This rule

by defect,that is,if onlytwo terms are used ;

than three be employed, (a) An
or
by excess, should more
instance of a syllogism
of only two terms is that in which one
of the premissesis tautological
:
Every effect has a
e.g.

may

be violated

'

cause.

The

universe is

an

effect.

Therefore

the universe

has

Consequentlythis first rule is violated by all the

fallacies known
Petitio Principii
as
or
Begging the Question.
contains more
than two terms when one of them
(b)A syllogism
a

cause

'.

THE

FORMAL

CAUSE

is

ambiguous, inasmuch as
meanings is equivalentto
have

the

brain

for

brain

for its organ

organ
RULE

LOGICAL

which

term

two

ORDER

be used

can
'

terms

175

Acts

e.g.

of

An
act
which
organ.
Therefore
is material.
acts
of
the middle

'

term,

having

in two

thought

their

material '. Here

are

OF

has

the

thought

the brain

for

\ is equivocal.
Latius

2.

conclusio

hoc

vult ;

non

(terminosextremes) quam
praemissae
better: Aeque ac praemissaeextendat

or

conclusio voces; the extremes

in the conclusion
must be the same
in the premisses. The conclusion expresses the result of
as
the

comparison made

this.

in the

premisses. It

cannot

Were

beyond
compared

go

it to do so, it would pass from the terms

in the premissesto some
other and would thus violate Rule
the observance
RULE

of which

3. Aut

semel

is

aut

for
indispensable

iterum

medius

for this rule is easily

understood

reason

rightreasoning.

generalityesto.
after

i,

The

"

of
analysis

an

the

of

reasoning(49). The middle term must be taken

at least once.
If not, ifit is used twice as particular,
universally

process

should

we

in each

be certain that the

never

partsof the extension taken

and in consequence
certain
different,
never
the syllogismhad
not four terms
(Rule i). E.g. All

that

case

not

were

'

metals

This

heavy.

are

substance

is

'

metal

substance
where

"

either of the

premisses. This

Ab

omnes.

uno

disce

RULE

4.

middle

heavy.

Therefore

this

'

heavy is not a universal in

is often tersely
fallacy
expressed:

medium

Nequaquam

is

'

capiatconclusio fas est.

The

"

It belongs
appear in the conclusion.
to the conclusion to apply to the two extremes
the result of the
term

must

not

comparison effected
middle

in the

Hence

term.

were

premissesbetween
the middle

term

and

them

the

brought into

the

conclusion the purpose of the reasoningwould not be attained.

RULE
affirmancesnequeunt generare negantem.
5. Ambae
"

From

affirmative

two

be drawn.
not

but

observed
it cannot
RULE

both

If two

agree
;

premissesa negativeconclusion

ideas agree

with

if there

be denied

one

is

an

with

the

same

can

never

third,they

can

another, all other rules being duly

identityaffirmed

in the

premisses,

in the conclusion.

6.

Utraquesi praemissaneget,nil inde sequetur. Where

of drawing a
premisses are negative,there is no means

conclusion.
excluded

"

The

from

being that, if two

middle term, they cannot

reason

extremes

be

are

connected

both

by

LOGIC

i;6

of this exclusion with each

reason

that

the

term

same

related
definitely
the

are

through

middle

term

related

or

of this

the medium
two

extremes

givesus no
that they are

conclusion at all about

RULE

middle

middle

new

be

term

to affirm

warrant

Hence

term.

from

excluded

are

certain

either that

they are

related to each other, to make

not

any

them.

Pejorcm sequiiursemper

7.
conclusion

middle

agreement or disagreementto be
to each
other, and so a conclusion

not

or

fact that

mere

other

some

happen

of their

account

on

reached

which

terms

by comparison with

may

found

two

Yet it may
excluded from one

other.

conclusio

partem.
"

'

The

'

weaker
necessarilytakes after the
premiss.
The meaning of this may
be expanded into :"
the conclusion must
(1)If one of the premissesis negative,
be negative.If A and B are two ideas of which A agrees with
C and B does not, we can never
assert positively
and certainly
that A

agrees with B.

the conclusion must

of the premissesis particular,
be particular.
be negative
For, since both premissescannot
(Rule 6),there are only two possiblecases, viz. where both
premissesare affirmative and where one is affirmative and one
negative, (a)If both premissesare affirmative,then their two
must
(35,i) as well as one subject(bysupposition)
predicates
and only one
Now
be particular,
term is left to be universal.

(2) //

by Rule

one

Therefore

we

that the middle

know

neither

premisses. And
conclusion

of the

term

must

be

universal.

once

be

universal

in the

they cannot, therefore,be

universal

in the

extremes

(Rule 2), i.e. the

can

conclusion

be

particular.
the premisses
(b)If one premissis affirmative and one negative,
will contain two
universal terms, viz. the predicateof the
which by
negative premissand the subjectof the proposition
is universal.
Further, the conclusion is negative,
supposition
that its predicate
is universal.
which when
this term
Now
so
in the conclusion is universal,is not the middle term
predicate
(Rule 4) ; and therefore the
term, and
must

be

which

the extreme

in
particular

ticular also in the

the

must

becomes

subjectin

premissesand,

conclusion

i.e. the

'

particular.Examples are : All men

is not a material being. Therefore
conclusion would

be

justthe

be the middle

other universal must

same

if one

are

the conclusion

in consequence,
conclusion has
material

is not

onlyof

the

par
to

be

beings. A
man

'. The

propositions

FORMAL

THE

both universal and

were

CAUSE

is

negative:

Therefore

man.

OF

is not

LOGICAL
'

No

ORDER

men

are

177

pure

'

spirit;

pure

spirits.

'

or

'. In a word, when

spirit.Therefore B is not a man
the conclusion is particular.
one
premissis particular,
RULE
8. Nil sequitur
geminis ex particularibus
unquam.
be drawn.
From
conclusion
two
can
particular
premissesno
Since both premissescannot
be negative(Rule 6),only two
: either both
combinations, as above, are possible
premisses
affirmative,or one is affirmative and the other negative.
are
(a) In the first case, all the terms are particularthe two
of affirmative proposi
because they are predicates
predicates
tions ; the two
subjectsby supposition.Hence there is no

is

pure

"

"

distributed

middle

violation of Rule
be drawn.

can

Some

term, it is

universal

once

there is

conclusion
consequentlyno legitimate

3, and

Take

not

as

instance

an

'

Some

men

rich.

are

'

ignorant Therefore some rich men are ignorant

Were such a syllogism
valid,one might prove in a similar way
rich men
that some
are
(b)In the second case the pre
poor,
misses contain only one universal term, namely, the predicate
of the negativepremiss. But as the conclusion is negative,
is universal,and if it is so in the conclusion,that
its predicate
also be so in the premisses. Hence the middle term
term must
which is not the predicate
of the conclusion (Rule4) is par
ticular both times in the premisses,
and Rule 3 is againviolated
to the prejudiceof any
conclusion.
are
E.g. Some men
men

are

"

"

'

learned.
men

are

Some

laid down
not

Rules

'

virtuous.

which

"

of the

do

Syllogism and

than

more

connexion

learned

some

correctness

Truth."

The

rules

just

of the inference and

The
logicalself-consistency.
antecedent and consequent is quite

ensure

between

thingfrom

Therefore

is obviouslynonsense.

only safeguard the

logicalconnexion
another

not

are

not virtuous

54. The

do

men

the truth of the

consequent

; for the neces

things posited and the thing

necessarily
followingfrom their being positedthrows no light
of the premissesin which those first
upon the truth or falsity
of the conclusion is to
thingsare posited. The truth or falsity
be determined
by the two following
generalrules :
i. If the
premissesare true, the conclusion will be true :
Ex vero
The conclusion is nothing
non
sequiturnisi verum.
than
of the
statement
relations perceivedin the
more
a

sary

between

the

"

premisses;

what

has

been

acknowledged

to

be

true

in the

LOGIC

178
be

premisses must

when

equally true

stated

in

the

con

clusion.
lead to a false
premissescannot
of a doctrine
conclusion,it follows that it is a legitimate
disproof
of its consequences.
or
Thus,
theoryto argue from the falsity
condemned
be
its
for example, atheism may
conse
justly
by
From

the fact that

quences.
2. If

true

premisses are false the conclusion is

false : Ex falso sequitur
but not necessarily,
quidlibet.
generally,
All men
minerals.
Aristotle gives the example :
All
are
both

or

one

'

minerals
'

All minerals

no

horse is

an

animal.

of

may

mineral '.

Therefore

all

'All horses

no

may

is an

horse

is

man

are

men

animal.
animals.

are

horse '.

arrive at

Hence

is a mixture
of
statement
original
because
the element of truth prevails,
or
in the long run
each other.
counteract

false antecedent

is not

enough

that

certain number

drew

many

for the

may
proof of

For

theoryto

argument drawn

an

doctrine

No

man

by

the

is
use

truth and
two

falsehoods

consequent, it

true
or

error

theory to

show

to be

from

experimentally,
figmentof his imagina

of
consequences
to show that all its con
the

true.

are

II. VARIOUS
55. Basis

Therefore

verified them

be conclusive it is necessary

sequences

'.

true : e.g. New

of its consequences
are
conclusions from his theory of emissions con

cerningthe nature of lightand

yet the theoryitselfwas found
tion.

have

animals

conclusion,either

correct

the

Since

ton

No

animals.

are

false premissone

because
and

Therefore

animals.

are

of

KINDS

Classification.

"

OF

We

SYLLOGISM.

may

several
distinguish

syllogisms
accordingas we consider the form
and the matter
of syllogisms.The form of a syllogism
is its
mode
of arriving
at a consequence,
structure, its particular
apart
of the actual
from any consideration of the truth or falsity
premisses; its matter, or the material aspect of the syllogism,
is the propositions
it is made
up of, which are either true or
shall consider in
false. In the two following
subsections we
turn both these two pointsof view, oiform and of truth.
the
from
induction
differ essentially
does not
Scientific
syllogism. Analogy and example, which
logiciansusually
different kinds of

LOGIC

i8o

sufficient to warrant

is not
this circumstance
reality
a
specialplace as a distinct

form

its having

of the

syllogism.With
Aristotle,however, it did mean
something reallydifferent,
which has onlya probableconclusion (70,i).
namely a syllogism
Rules

and

Nature

58.

the

of

Hypothetical Syllogism.

"

is one in which the major is a conditional

syllogism
hypothetical
E.g. If the soul is simple,it is incorruptible
proposition.
; but
'.
the soul is simple; therefore it is incorruptible
The major simplyaffirms a necessary connexion
between the
of the soul) and
what
is conditioned
condition
(simplicity
Granted
this necessary
connexion, the
(incorruptibility).
rest of the argument proceeds as
of
an
ordinarysyllogism,
which the minor is the antecedent of the conditional proposi
'

the conclusion

its consequent.
important feature of the hypotheticalsyllogismis in

tion and
The

premissis equivalentto an absolute affirma

If the soul is simpleit is incorruptible
tive proposition
: thus,
',
is equivalent to
All simplesouls are incorruptible
'. And as
is not convertible (41),
the two
a universal affirmative
proposition
followingrules for the hypothetical
syllogism
may be deduced :
the

This

major.

'

'

condition

the

(i) Affirm

conditioned

the

Londoner, you
fore you

propositionor
are

British.

consequent and you

or

-'

you are a Londoner, you

British.
Therefore
are
you

neither

case

is the

If you
are
Londoner.
There

"

conditioned

not

or

you

antecedent

But

may

proposition
you

are

'.

But

affirm

the

Londoner

affirm

'

British.

are

true

converse

are

must

you

the condition

deny

If

not

in

But

must

and

consequent

you
(2) Deny the

British '.

are

antecedent

or

without having to affirm the condition,

proposition
and deny the condition without having to deny the consequent.
matter
Note that (a)it may happen, owing to the particular
of the conditional proposition,
that the truth of the consequent
conditioned

involves that

the

between
'

if

'

antecedent

between

than
^'presumption

been
59.

of the

indicates that

connexion

tried

equal '. (b)The conjunction if

are

in the mind

express

'

E.g. If
'

its radii

ence

of the antecedent.

there

them, and
a

nqx^us

of necessary
Not

in this

strict inference.

it expresses rather
had
E.g. If this man

case

'

opinion'.
Disjunctive Syllogisms. A conjunctive

he
by ill-fortune,

Conjunctive and

figureis a circle,
does not always

depend
infrequently
consequent.
is only a partial,
or
a contingent

speaker a
and

'

would

be of another
"

FORMAL

THE

in which

is one
syllogism
i.e.

that if one

so

in London.

York

'.

Such

Therefore

argument

an

181

major is a conjunctive
proposition,
between
two
incompatibility
cases,

simultaneouslyin

were

ORDER

'

the other is thereby denied.

is affirmed

be

could not

LOGICAL

OF

the

positsan

which

one

CAUSE

London

and

New

E.g. You
York.

you could not have

is reducible to the

been

You
in New

hypothetical

laws.
syllogismand is subjectto the same
A
disjunctive
syllogismhas a disjunctivepropositionfor
its major, i.e. a propositionthat positsinstead of a simple
alternatives which
are
entirelyexhaustive.
incompatibility,
this form of syllogismrequiresthe observance
of the
Hence
followingrules : (i) The disjunctionposited in the major
the minor affirms one
of the
must
be exhaustive.
(2)When
of the disjunction,
the other member
members
members
or
For example :
must
be denied in the conclusion,and vice versa.
This act of swearing
All free acts are morallygood or bad.
is not morallybad ; therefore it is morallygood '. Or, It is
bad ; therefore it is not good'. Or, It is good ; therefore it
"

'

'

'

is not bad
The

60.

'.

'

It is not

good

; therefore it is bad

Syllogism is

Exclusive

in which

one

'.

both

premisses

'

exclusive

propositions.E.g. Only spiritual

beings are
alone
is free '.
Therefore man
alone is spiritual.
This syllogismmay
be splitup into two
one
propositions,
negativeand one affirmative : Spiritual
beingsare free. Man
is spiritual.
is free. All free beings are
Therefore
man
not spiritual.
There
are
spiritual.All beingsother than men

are

free.

Man

'

"

fore

they

61. The

tion

as

minor.

are

not

free '.
is

Dilemma

major

with

two

combination
or

of

disjunctiveproposi

conditional

more

First the

as
propositions
are
disjunction

of the
members
particular
excluded
by successive partialconclusions ; whereupon the
as
a
generalconclusion follows that the disjunctive
proposition
whole is inadmissible.
It is a livelyand
of
effective form
argument : the adversaryis left to choose one of two alterna
tive propositions
he chooses he is proved to be
and whichever
The validity
of the argument requiresthe observance
wrong.
of the rules applyingto disjunctive
and to hypothetical
syllo
to
such
members
of
be
allow
the major must
as
gisms : (i)The
of no other possibility,
they must be exhaustive or complete'.
which make
(2)The two hypothetical
syllogisms
up the minor
'

must

each

lead to

conclusion

and

to

one

and

the

same

con-

LOGIC

i82

that in

suppose

God, we

forced to accept one

are

sions that
Him

He

to have

wisdom

was

fool

been

fool

reconcile

His

renunciation

Jesus Christ

both

Since

istherefore

tallyreducible

ambitious

most

be
easily

can

can

shown
to the

the

conclu
impossible
But

impostor.

an

if

reconcile the

we

doctrine with

life and

madman

or

or

other of the

or

fool,how

displayedin His

istics of

It

'

example of the dilemma is this : If we

spiteof His own attestations Jesus Christ is not

A celebrated

elusion.

If He

suppose

penetrating

the character

impostor,how
His humility and

was

claims

we

an

with

alike inadmissible,

hypothesesare

Messiah,the Son of the LivingGod'33.

fundamen
are
syllogisms
or
typicalsyllogism.
categorical
that the

above

" 2. Classification
of Syllogisms
accordingto their Matter
The

62.

of view

its Truth-

and

Syllogism

value.

"

From

the

point

divided accordingto the rela

are
syllogisms
tion their propositions
bear to truth.
As judgments and pro
positionsare certain, probable or erroneous,
syllogismsare
likewise demonstrative, probableor erroneous.
1. A
judgment is certain when the mind firmlyadheres to
what
it knows
to be the truth : the syllogism
leadingto this
of matter,

certitude is
2.

site

demonstration.

longas the mind remains undecided between two oppo

adhering to either of them,
judgments without definitely
As

it is in suspense
though without

other, it has

opinionis
tion

the

to

doubt.

or

When

it is inclined towards

absolutely
adoptingit to the

one

exclusion

side,
of the

opinion: the syllogismwhich results in an

varies in propor
probableone, and its probability
of the motives
which solicit this partial
cogency
an

of the mind.

adherence
3. The
with the
called
The
ments

oppositeof truth, the disagreementof a judgment

thing known, is error, and arguments producingit are
sophisms or fallacies.
various
of demonstration
kinds
and
probableargu
well as the more
call for closer
as
common
fallacies

attention.

88

The

dilemma

must

parts,'which
pronouncing upon each

successive
the

conclusion

which

was

'

reasoning by
consists
in enumerating all the species of a genus,
of them
in turn and then assertingof the whole
genus
not

valid

be

confused

for each

with

method

of the parts.

of

KINDS

DIFFERENT

tific Demonstration.

at

premissesthat

from

which

by

In

certain conclusion.

into Certain

Demonstration

"

are

183

ORDER

DEMONSTRATION

OF

Division

I. Fundamental

63.

LOGICAL

OF

CAUSE

FORMAL

THE

is

and

StrictlyScien

process of reasoning
arrive logically
certain we

stricter

it is

sense

syllogism

'

know, i.e. to know

the cause
we
givesus
that this cause
is really
and that
the cause
of a thing,to know
it 84.
be otherwise than we
know
therefore the thing cannot

that

to know

which

'

syllogismwhich leads to a certain

conclusion.
scientific
givesa strictly
64. Conditions

for

and

conclusion

Demonstration.

Scientific

"

which

that

In

dealing

Aristotle enumerates

of scientificdemonstration

with the nature

the demonstrative

be between

first distinction,
then, must

Our

be true, ultimate,
conditions, that the premissesmust
immediate, better known than, and priorto, the conclusion, and
the

as

the

cause

True

1.

lowed

by

be the

of its truth.

reason

or

arrive at

to

will set out from true

a valid demonstration
premisses,

natural

not

demonstrable, in the

themselves

strations of

admit
are,

3.
not

to form

science have

first link of which

true

premisses

for its true conclusion.

source

Ultimate,that is,partakingof the

2.

from

conclusion

true

never

Since it is the aim

of the truth in the conclusion.

cause

of demonstration

as

be fol

although false premissesmay sometimes

their falsity,
true conclusion (54),
as
such, can

consists of

of demonstration.
in
consequently,

as

that

sense

it

were

premissesthat

These

ultimate,

relation to those which

Immediate, of such

nature

of firstprinciples,

nature

that

all the demon

singlechain, the

do not

themselves

first,premisses

or

follow"

they

are

Self-evident,

requiringany proof.

4. The cause
order or
logical

or

the

35

reason

of

of

order

the

conclusion,not

knowledge,but

only in

also in the

the

onto-

order.
logical
since the
5. Prior to the conclusion,
of the conclusion.
the cause
or
reason

premissesmust contain
need be
The priority

of nature.
only a priority
6. Better

known

reasoningis to
84

ARISTOTLE,

31

For

lead
Anal,

this distinction

than
us

from

post., I,
see

the

conclusion, because

the better known

2.

Gen.

Metaphysics,165.

the

aim

of

to the less known

LOGIC

184

theoryof Aristotle's has reference

to the ontological
order.
In the subjective
order the fact of
is priorto the idea of its essence
form by abstrac
we
experience
to the universal.
tion from it ; we
the particular
pass from
But in the world of reality
the nature of a thingis priorto its
sensible manifestations, law controls what
happens and is
necessary for its explanation.
65. Proof of Fact and Causal Demonstration.
Corresponding
the syllogism
to the fundamental
distinction between
leading
to a certain conclusion
scientific demonstration
and strictly
is the Aristotelian division into proofof fact and causal demon
or

unknown.

that this

Note

"

stration.
The

former, demonstration
'

'

on,

'

demonstratio

quia or quod
'),is a proof that

'

that ',not
because
(where quia signifies
something is, without any explanationhow
is Cajetan understands
The
to have both
existential signification.
'

Causal
the other

so.

copulativeand

demonstration, Sid", demonstratio propter quid, on

hand, shows the immediate

the intrinsic

and

it is

why

or

'

on
(dpxn oiicaa)

reason

cause

of the

thingproved,

of which

account

it is so ;

it is therefore

scientificdemonstration.
strictly
A proofwhich givesan extrinsic or a general
reason
the connexion
between
subjectand predicateis
demonstration
Sid", propter quid,but belongsto
proofsof fact.
66. II. A

which

Priori

and

Posteriori

Proofs.

"

to

not

explain
a

real

the class of

distinction,

This

modern

logicians
preferto use in place of the one we
have justbeen considering,
is not such a strict one, yet has a
An a prioriargument is one
foundation
in nature.
in which
the middle term is priorin reality
of the con
to the predicate
or
clusion,one which proceedsfrom the cause
reason
(a causa
vel ratione quae in se est prior,a priori)
to effect or result (ad
effectum vel rationatum). In an
a
posteriori
argument the
Examples
progress is just the reverse, beingfrom effect to cause
An
immaterial
are
: of the a priori
subjectis incorruptible.
The human
'.
soul is immaterial.
Therefore it is incorruptible
.

'

"

Of the
demands
The

argument
posteriori
a

cause

other than

universe is such that at

Therefore there is
universe '.

cause

'
"

Whatever

commences

itselfto account
some

for its existence.

time it commenced

accountable

to exist

to exist.

for the existence of the

To this division

OF

CAUSE

FORMAL

THE

demonstration

prioriproof or

with

they

term

quasi a

an
They mean
one
thing from

about

is not

which

another

185

ORDER

simultaneo.

derives its conclusion

argument which
its connexion

what

add

authors

some

LOGICAL

distinct from

it in

be conceived of in thought
but is such that it cannot
reality,
An example is the
the thoughtof the other.
without involving
of in endeavouringto prove
made
use
argument St. Anselm
the existence of God from the concept of the most
perfect
being.
67.

III. Circular

Demonstration.

Regressive

or

Reason

"

to
again from cause
This
effect,in order to explain the latter by the former.
circular or regressive
as
proof,for the mind
process is known
it were
as
completesa circle by coming back to the effect from
it started its reasonings.This argument, unlike the
whence
existence
valid ; the undoubted
vicious circle(75,
26),is perfectly
is as
but its nature
of the phenomenon
is the starting-point
confusedly
; in the second
part of the process
yet only known
of the thing but only after it
the mind starts from the nature
distinct notion of it ; the latter is then used
has acquireda more
at first.
to explainthe effects observed

from

ascends

68. IV.

effect to

Accidental

Other

indirect demonstration

and

to extrinsic circumstances

is direct

monstration

descend

to

cause

of Demonstration.

Forms

This

than

to

is

the

i.

"

distinction due
of

nature

Direct
rather

things. De
it

(likeall those yet enumerated) when

straightforward
way that the conclusion
is virtually
contained in the premisses. It is indirect when
is
assent
considerations are appealedto and positive
subjective
givento the truth of the conclusion on account of the necessity
of rejectingits contradictory.Free-will is thus indirectly
This
of determinism.
proved from the absurd consequences
is called reductio per impossibile
latter kind of demonstration
shows

or

in

clear and

reductio ad absurdum.
2.

Absolute demonstration

is that

which

adequate of itself

is

is true for everybody ; relative or

carry conviction and
ad hominem
that which may be materially
false but is sufficient
to

to convince

opponent36.
particular

3. In contrast
demon siratio
88

E.g.

Our

Aristotle mentions

to scientificdemonstration
a

Lord's

is

signo or per signum, which

reply

to

those

who

censured

for

Him

his
Sabbath
by asking which of them would not rescue
bath.
For other examples see JOSEPH., op. cit.,p. 550.
"

ox

or

TRS.

extrinsic

an

healing on
ass

on

the

the
Sab

186

LOGIC

from

proof drawn
proved. An
below

circumstances

external

of this kind

example

to

the

of extrinsic

thing to
proof

be

occurs

(71).

These
all be

accidental

can
secondary forms of demonstration
classified accordingto the fundamental
distinction of

demonstrations

"m

or

and

demonstrations

PROBABLE
69. Probable

ARGUMENTS
for

have

Arguments

Ston.

one

or

both

premisses

and a conclusion which in conse

only probablepropositions
quence is only as certain as the premisses. For a classification
first heading all that falls under the
a
we
may
group under
generalterm arguments from analogy the Aristotelian enthyinduction,example,and inferences drawn from
analogical
meme,
the calculus ofprobabilities
; under a second heading,hypothesis;
"

under
70.

third,argument from authority.

I. Arguments from Analogy.
i. The
a

"

argument drawn from probabili

say, from signsor symptoms which are

to Aristotle's definition is

ties or

'

signs

; that is to

enthymeme according

'

an

regarded as properties
inevitably
belongingto the subject
to which
they are attributed,but probably do belong. This
in daily life. E.g.
kind of argument is extremely common
in this par
Most
act through self-interest. Therefore
men
ticular case
Peter is actingthrough self-interest'.
not

'

2.
we

Analogicalinduction or analogy:
shall see later (85-91),
singlesout

from

the many

among

various accidents

Scientific induction, as
some
a

natural
substance

property
manifests,

that the property in question

certainty
is the basis of a generallaw.
Analogicalinduction or analogy
is a similar method
of argument, excepting
that the conclusion
is not certain but only probable. Thus
are
we
making use
of it when
we
argue from the knowledge that two objectsor
to the
in common
phenomena have actuallycertain qualities
in common
other qualities
likelihood of their also possessing
it infers with

and

from

not

yet known.
abuse

to

by

by

This argument, it should be noted, is liable

resemblances
between
things being exaggerated,

differences

taken
3.

from

for valid

being overlooked,

grounds of

or

mis

by metaphors being

inference.

induction
Example : Both scientific and analogical
an
empiricalfact to its natural sufficient reason,

work
or

its

LOGIC

i88

is drawn

conclusion

from

premisseswhich

the

does not

logic
case
allyfollow from
reasoning
should be called erroneous
argument, and in the latter a. fallacy.
is deceiving
is a paralogismif the reasoner
Further, a fallacy
of the term,
himself,and a sophism,in the presentacceptation
to deceive another.
when
he is consciously
reasoningfalsely
in General."
73. Fallacies
Following John Stuart Mill we
fallacies into two main groups.
classify
may
fallacies : These
Fallacies of simph inspection
1.
or
a priori
and generalizations
which
fallacies are
are
popular maxims
taken
for granted,usuallywithout
discussion and therefore
at least ambiguous if not
and which are
without
suspicion,
that ideas correspond
An example is the principle
erroneous.
the logical
to the ontological
to things,
order
a preconception
of the chief supports of pantheism. Again,
which becomes
one
the fallacyby which
rationalism endeavours
to substantiate
its denial of revelation,namely, the a priori
of one
repudiation
of attainingknowledge along with
methods
the
or
more
a

In the former

them.

the false

"

assertion that whatever

simultaneous

Fallacies

itself:
and

in

known

an

arbi

is

trarilyselected way
statement
unqualified
liberty.
2.

is not

Or, again,the
entirelyunknowable.
that man
has the rightto unrestrained

of inferenceor fallacies in

the

reasoningprocess

These

themselves
into fallacies of induction
arrange
fallacies of deduction, the latter comprising verbal and

formal fallacies.
74.

of Induction.

I. Fallacies

placed all

fallacies

Under

"

this

to be

heading are

occurring in inductive

reasoning whether
of the argument
preliminaries

they are concerned with the

of observation)
with the actual reasoningprocess
or
(fallacies
of generalization,
itself (fallacies
viz. of interpretation
and of
illicitinduction)
.

i.

must

Fallacies
be

of facts ;

conclusion

the

of observation
fruit of

For

induction

trustworthyand

to

be scientificit

sustained

observation

a
very often it happens that the desire to reach
leads to assertions which trespassbeyond the limits

justified
by

observation.

observation,
by seeingwhat

Induction
is wished

may

be vitiated

for,not what

is as

by
a

matter

Haeckel
discovered his primary moners
:
so
reality
Huxley his famous Bathybius. Or by non-observation,by

of

failure to

see

what

it would

be inconvenient

to see

mat-

and
the

thus false

THE

OF

CAUSE

FORMAL

LOGICAL

ORDER

189

theories see only what pointsto the identity

of the
biological
cellin all kingdoms of life.
These
consist in a wrong
:
2. Fallacies
of interpretation
of the facts observed.
The observation is per
interpretation
fect, but through the influence of some
preconceivedtheory
is
undue
attached
to
facts. An instance
the
an
significance
in point is the inference,from the fact that forms of energy
energy, that all material
includingenergiesdeveloped in a nervous
energies,
subject
be reckoned

can

of mechanical

in terms

the

accompaniment of sensation,emotion, or spontaneous

or of the thoughtprocesses and volition,
are nothing
movement,
but mechanical
energies.
when
3. Fallacies of illicitinduction : Example is abused
under observation to another
case
we
pass on from a particular
without first having taken care
inductive
to discover by an
be traced back to the same
natural
argument that they can
as

cause,

'

Ab

uno

'. In

omnes

similar way

false use

may

analogy37.

of

be made

disce

75. II. Fallacies

arise from

the

of Deduction.

meaning

of

it

"

Verbal

i.

fallacies.These

being altered from what

being used in different senses.

word

words
was
or from
originally
The most
importantare :"
is the
This fallacy
or
(a)Equivocation
ambiguityof terms.
in a syllogism
of a word which has a double meaning or the
use
employment of some
badly defined phrase in two different
',
acceptations.Flagrantoffenders are such words as liberty
', evolution ', rationalism ', liberalism ', socialism '.
equality
The ambiguity introduces a fourth term into the syllogism.
(b) The fallacyof composition.This consists in taking
'

'

'

'

together in the conclusion

the

premisses;

whole

what

'

'

what

not

was

taken

together in

of the
affirming
parts taken distributively.

in other words, this consists in

is true

only of the
Gospel records that

the
Thus, when
walk, the deaf hear ',the statement

blind see, the lame

is true only if the clauses
'

The

understood

not if collectively.
disjunctively,
(c)The fallacy
ofdivision is justthe oppositeof the preceding
what
and consists in predicating
of thingsdistributively
fallacy,
is true of them onlywhen taken together. Thus I might argue,

are

87

Some

headings.

inductive

fallacies

can

be

under
ranged indifferently

several of the

LOGIC

igo
'

is

Five

But

singlenumber.

two

and three

five.

are

There

38.
singlenumber
2. Fallacies of ratiocination : (a)Begging the question(petitio
principii).This is a fallacywherein something yet unproved
in the course
is implicitly
of the argument as though it
assumed
were
alreadyproved. It may take different forms : the very point
be assumed
at issue may
be taken for granted; the whole may
whereas
the whole
a
part has to be proved ; or a part when
requiresproof; or each of the parts of the whole to be proved ;
it may be some
connected
with
or
pointof doctrine necessarily
the pointat issue.
(b)Vicious circleis reallythe same
fallacy,
except that it not
of unproven
what is to be proved but makes
use
only assumes
Thus did Descartes
for the proof of each other.
propositions
the Divine Veracityby an
appeal to self-evidence and
prove
then justify
self-evidence by the Divine Veracity.
(c)Fallacyofaccident consists in confusing(a)what is accidental
what is relatively
with what is essential,
true with what is
or
(/3)
true, for instance,absolutely
absolutely
condemning a practice
because of the abuses to which it givesrise.
concomitance
or
(d) Fallacy of false cause,
(a)Here mere
fore two

'

and three

are

"

succession

for true

is mistaken

causal relation

propter hoc, oiposthoc,ergo propterhoc

for identity
: cum
hoc, ergo ipsum hoc.

fallacyof confusingcondition

and

hoc, ergo

cum

again,concomitance
Akin to this is the
(ft)
and
or
a partial
cause

or

cause,

the total cause.

of many
questionsis the combination
if only one
would suffice,whereas
answer
in reality
more
are
required. Thus if it is asked : Has the
honourable
gentleman ceased beatinghis wife ? the question
he been
to a
Has
impliesan answer
previousquestion:

(e)Fallacy of many
questionstogetheras

'

'

'

beating his wife ?

(/)Evasion of
much,

too

the

question (ignoratioelenchi).This

real

of three

be

fallacymay

'

kinds

little,
or
something

the

argument

may
irrelevant
and
quite

prove too
beside the

point39.
88

Caius
88

E.g.
loves
To

is for those

Heaven

his friends.

this

list of

common

dictum

speaking

it is

itself may

be either true

the

first of which

alone

who

and

forgivetheir

Caius

enemies.

will go to Heaven
'. TRS.
fallacies may
be added
the paradox.

contrary
or

their friends

love

Therefore

false.

to

There

"

Strictly
in
and
d"5"tav),
opinion (irapb.
accordingly two kinds of paradox,

received
are

strictlydeserves

the

name.

Thus

the

statement

FORMAL

THE

ART.
76.

is

Knowledge

System.

ORDER

191

SYSTEMATIZATION

SCIENTIFIC

III.

LOGICAL

OF

CAUSE

"

The

construction

of

know

our

gradual process : concepts are united

to form
judgments ; judgments are marshalled into syllogisms;
furnish new
conclusions,fresh piecesof knowledge,
syllogisms
fragments of a largerwhole ; all the several inferences,sub
ordinated and co-ordinated among
themselves, togetherform a
which
science. A science is,then, a whole body of propositions
stand together (o-wrny/xa,
a
system) onjDne basis. Its unity
of its having one formal object.
belongsto it by reason
ledge is

As

the

soon

of

work

as

have

we

the definition of the

of the

or

essence

of a thing,we begin to make

some
simple,general
properties
known
as
(= beginnings)or axioms,
propositions,
principles
and from these the mind proceedsto deduce various conclusions.

primaryconclusions lead on to others, which

quently either directlyor indirectlydependent

These

conse

are

the
upon
completescientificedifice

and so on, until we have a

principles,
firstfurnished by the
constructed upon the principles
entirely
of our knowledge
analysisof the subject.This systematization
is the supreme
end or aim of logic.
77.

Systematization of

factors which
'

modi

tres

go to form
'

sciendi

us

There

"

of
systematization

us

with

conclusions

to

on

Knowledge.

from

As

them.

division.

and

principles
; and

three

are

knowledge,

our

definition,demonstration

"

furnishes
Definition
carries

our

demonstration
definition has

thingis and to show us in what it differs from

thingsof another speciesof the same
genus, a differentiation or
of definition.
aid or concomitant
division is an indispensable
of these three
We
of one
have alreadyspoken sufficiently
to tell us

what

factors, viz. demonstration.

only

functions

the

We

have

of definition and

ditions

requiredfor
shall inquirehow

their lawful

therefore

to

division and

employment (I).

consider
the

After

con

this

processes have an
applicationin the several specialsciences and in philosophy,
i.e.we shall consider method in generaland the different methods
we

these

factors

or

mental

peculiarto different groups of sciences (II).

'

All

minds

better

to

reality.
"

stands

equal

are

'

(a

suffer evil than

In

for

loose

mere

sense,

statement
to do it ' is
which

perversity of

of Helvetius) is

real

paradox

;
not

'

Far

in
so
only prima faciea paradox, and
is of no importance here, paradox sometimes
expression or a cynicism born of ill-humour*

LOGIC

I92
I. FACTORS

IN

78. I. Definition.
what

SYSTEMATIZATION

THE

definition of

"

Definition has

it is.

thingis

twofold

KNOWLEDGE

OF

function

of

statement

inasmuch

as, in

ideas for us, it states the elements

of which they are made
know
can
things more
up so that we
function,it provides
accurately
by them ; and, as its principal
the first place,
it clears

foundation

thing is
and

but

further

knowledge

everythingis demonstrable, so not every

of further analysis
Analysisis susceptible

definable.

on,

so

which

on
starting-point

or

be built up.
Now
justas not

can

our

later

or

sooner

get down

we

which

notions

to

analysisinto simpler ideas : such, for

instance, are the ideas of unity', number', the basic ideas
These
ideas provide the materials for the
of arithmetic.
definitions or first principles
whereon
the construction of the
refuse

submit

to

to

'

'

Kinds

79.

meaning
ing
in

Real

its

either

word

ideas and

our

to

of

of Definition.

its conventional

to

2.

40.

science rests for its foundation

whole

or

explainsthe
definition
its etymology or accord

Its purpose

use.

declares
definition

essence

Verbal

accordingto

avoid the

so

i.

"

us

clear

of ambiguity.
possibility
what
a thing is,either according

of its accidents

some

is to make

or

of its natural

some

properties.
gives a full statement
(a) Essential definition
is inasmuch
The

essence

it makes

as

of

ideas

are

hope

to know

all others, is however

universal

and

must

or

thing

essence.

it is this

thing

individual,whilst

89-91);
(Psychology,

this essence,

definitions with

its inner nature

particular
thing,that whereby

distinct from

and

known

of what

we

can

be content

therefore
in

our

our

never

essential

essence
declaringthe genericor specific

of

thing.
(b)Accidental
essence
specific,

As the generic,and still less the

definition:
of a thingis not evident to us at once, we take
note first of its qualities,
regardlessof whether they are natural
be called,
or
accidental, and this general descriptionmay
definition '.
though somewhat
inaccurately,a
descriptive
'

'

40

beginnings or principlesof the sciences are improvable definitions.

what
makes
known
something is ; thus mathematics
postulates
means,
starting-pointa knowledge of what unity is,of what odd number
The

Definition
as

and

its
so

on

'."ARISTOTLE,

Analyt. post.,II, 3.

which

notes

LOGICAL

representsthe thingby

it

When

OF

CAUSE

FORMAL

THE

taken

as

ORDER

193

of all the accidental

means

belongonly to it,it is called

group

definition.

accidental

the mind
these qualities
From
:
(c)Natural definition
which
by a process of induction, discover one or more
and the definition is
i.e.properties;
qualities,
necessary
a

an

can,
are

then

natural definition.
definitions

The

zoology,etc., are
definitions,or

best

the

natural

is formed

80. Definition

which

Synthesis. A science is rational

its principles
are furnished by pure
observation.

In

of fact

The

Analysis

experimentalaccording
reasoningor by induction

or

rational science definition is obtained

deductive
synthetic,

seldom

we

is strictly
scientific

process, whilst in
science the process is first of all analyticand
Let us explain.

by

Essential

by Analysis or by Combined

"

from

definitions.

in matter

ideal to which

an

reallyit is the only one

philosophical.

and

as

chemistry,mineralogy,botany,
most
accidental
part descriptive,

Yet

attain.

and

for the

at

definition is rather

in

used

rational sciences:

experimental
synthetic.

an

then

sensible data

From

presented to
us
by generalobservation we abstract very simple ideas (de
which we immediatelyproceed to put together
composition),
i.

and build into more

and more
(synthesis)
complex ideas. The
elementaryideas are wider in their extension than the notion
in which they are all united by the act of synthesis,
their sum
is more
restricted in itsapplication
than iseach of them individu
restricts its objectand pro
ally; thus synthesis
progressively
vides it with a definition
a
(opos6/3107x05,
boundary). Take,
for example, the definition
Three is the first odd number
'.
Each
of the simple ideas belongs to other numbers
besides
three ',but the union of them narrows
down their application
'

'

to the

of
is

'

number

three

'

and

thus defines it.

the extension

As

concept is restricted in proportionas its comprehension

notes is
fuller,
synthesisor the binding together of many
a

therefore

direct process of definition,

justas, we may remark
it is an indirect method
of elimination or division.
incidentally,
The

attribute

'

odd

'

excludes the number

taken
out

in its double

all other numbers

being the oppositeof the attribute

'

two

'. The

meaning

word
'

of

except ng

'

'

first
'

first
two

'

and

'

which

"

'

prime

and^'three

'.

'

',

even

may
'
"

be
rules

Hence

LOGIC

194

combined

when
other

than
is

concept

three ', they

'

firstodd

apply

exclude

all numbers

it alone ; the

to

compound

adequate definition of it.

an

sciences or sciences of observation like

experimental
but only after analysis.
as a final process
employ synthesis
The

2.

wise

Before
of

'

'

the attributes

define life we

can

we

'

being called
of which

virtue

We

all.

ourselves

they

are

left with

all immanent

abled

the

"

tinue

and

the

differences
'

vital

'

is in

them
there

(nutrition,

and
intellectual)

or

characteristic

common

of

distinctive features

definition of the

this definition will start another

began,

predicatedof

term

we

that

what

we

that

"

Im

the definition of life.

elimination

form

to

us

be

can

kinds

operations(Psychology,10, 11).

is therefore
activity

Division

find out

sentient

their

the various

whatever

thought

volition,whether

find

manent

try to

which
operations

the

cognitionand

in

to

attribute

same

eliminate

be among

may

living',and
the

to observe

have

has

"

element.

common

division from

where

en

Now,

the

analysis

For instance, to con

the process is renewed.
characteristic of life,viz.
example, the common
so

different in
action, is discovered to be specifically
and volitional lifewhether sentient
nutritive life,
in cognitional

immanent

or

intellectual.
to the

genus

Science

are

directions.

forms

from

the

species.

This alternation of
in other

legitimately
passes again

be continued

and synthesis
analysis
may
Besides forms

of transitive

of immanent

activity
;

from

there
activity

these

the

mind

ab

activity
; this is the
character
is a differentiating
genericelement, and immanence
of the two characteristics
istic : the placing
together(synthesis)
stracts

the
(analysis)

makes

the

that

are

definition,the

related

tracks down

"

combination

of the

In this way
genus and differentia.
through all these speciesa genus which
so

eventually elements

type that is
are

reached

analysis,and which therefore are

formative principles
of all sciences.
The fundamental
part played by
edifice is clear.

notions

two

analysis

as

wide, and
increasingly
until

feature

common

and

more

which

becomes

more

defy

simple,
further

first definitions and

the

definition in the scientific

In the sciences of observation

no

less than

in

decompositionof
a thing through a graspingof its simplest
attributes, together
with their union or synthesis
with which it is to be identified.
the rational sciences definition consists in

LOGIC

196
'

'

'

'

('prime in both senses)

prime '. And the firstodd number
three '.
appliesonly to the number
sciences the process is justthe opposite,
it
2. In the positive
here division leads up to definition. For
is first analytical
:
animal
instance, first of all the different activities of vegetable,
'

and

to

common

observed, and the characteristic

these several divisions discerned,namely,immanent
substances

human

activity.The
analysed,and

are

different kinds

two

their

of

are
activity

foundation

common

or

in their turn

supreme

is

genus

activity.Thus step by step reason

passes
from
of a division
the speciesto genera, from
the members
of their divisibility.
to the reason
When, however, the common
has been reached, the mind reverts
again to the sub
principle
jectsanalysedin order to obtain a completesyntheticview of
the formal division of the genus into its species.
Definition and division are, then, intimately
bound
up with
In rational sciences division is subsequent to
each other.
there is first a superficial
definition ; in experimentalones
division leadingup to the formation of the essential definition,
and then this definition becomes
ground for a stricter,formal
division than the provisional
informal
with which
the
one
analysisbegan.
discovered

83. Rules
serve

ing

be

to

Division.

for

"

Division, like definition,has

to

double purpose
is to helpin establish
: its chief purpose
scientific orderliness in our
knowledge, and its secondary
a

to make
purpose
of view, to aid

clear

thinkingeasier.

From

the first

point

scientific arrangement,

be
(i) division must
and, as far as possible,
logically
progressive
complete,
positive.
And to be a real help to clear thinking,
it needs to be (2)com
clear and methodical 41.
plete,

II. METHOD
84.

Diversity of
'

means

road

Scientific
towards

or

way
leading to scientific knowledge.
the

science to

which

sometimes
synthetic,
41

We

to make

may
too

too little

add, from
few

the Port
the

is

accordinglysometimes

rather

we

Royal logicians,
that,

say that the

may
'

it is

it is to make
too many
; the
other is to distract the mind
'.
as

(/xefoSos)

method is the way

; scientific
of
It varies with the nature

and

analytic.Or

divisions

light,whilst

it leads

Method

Methods."
'

one

as

great

mistake

fault is to throw

THE

ORDER

197
of both

42.
synthetic
analytico-

This

of the

section will treat

in (I)the
respectively

"

as

plesin

arithmetic
necessary

tion, deduce

new

different methods

employed
experimental

abstract sciences, (II)the

sciences,and (III)
philosophy.
The
85. I. Synthetic Method.
such

LOGICAL

of scientificknowledge is really
a combination

method
it is

OF

CAUSE

FORMAL

and

geometry,

matter, and
truths

rational

and

start

or

deductive sciences,

with

certain

princi

from
so

these, taken in conjunc

define, as they advance, the

of ideas is
The march
objectsunder consideration.
from simple to compound, from the more
general to the less
general; in a word, the method is synthetic.The mental act
the elements
also
which combines
expressedin the definition
time effects the division of the objectdefined and
at the same
is the chief factor in all deductive proof. As an example, let
of the angles
us
suppose as alreadyestablished that (a)the sum
side of a straight
line by other straight
lines is
made
on
one
equal to two rightangles; (b) the internal alternate angles
lines by a line cuttingthem are
made with two parallel
straight
straightline may be drawn to any given
equal ; (c)a parallel
straightline : the combination of these three propositions
furnishes the discoveryof a new
relation,the equalityof the
with two rightangles.
three anglesof a triangle
of the Experimental Sciences.
86. II. Method
The experi
sciences start with the observation of con
mental or positive

various

"

crete

The

facts in order to formulate

progress here is from

to the
particular

the

the laws which

complex

the method

them.
govern
from the
to the simple,

is

analytic.
variations displayedin the pheno
ftIn spiteof the numerous
of the natural world, it needs but a superficial
observa
mena
tion to show that these variations are governed by certain con
It is the objectof the empirical
sciences
stant generallaws.
to determine
these laws of phenomena and the nature of the
with
the observation
of
things observed.
They commence
facts at once
complex and variable,and end when they have
discovered the simple elements of their compositionand the
stable laws governing their variability.
This
method
of
The

general:

used in the building up of a science.

are
analytico-syntheticmethods
with
didactics
the methods
of imparting science
to
do
here
or
nothing
to others.
See large edition, Logique, I, p. 378 f.,and
P. COFFEY,
Science of
Logic, II, p. 14 f.
42

We

have

LOGIC

ig8

the complex, in other words, analysis,

when
simplifying
is called induction.
sidered in its completeness,
Hence
sciences

are

known

purelyrational

are

Stages

87.

inductive,in contrast

as

of the

or

deductive

from effects to their

ment

Induction

"

is

; it consists first in

cause

these
which

sciences.

Process.

Inductive

with those

con

of the cause, and through them

the properties
the law of its action is understood.
finally

an

argu

determining

its nature, until

It includes

four

separatesteps :

"

1.

Observation

of the

senses.

and under
gen

of certain facts which

For

example, the

varied circumstances

(H) combines

with another

fall within

chemist

that

fixed

the scope

observes

repeatedly
fixed quantityof hydro
quantityof chlorine (Cl)

compound, HC1.
scientist supposes that the observed
2. Hypothesis. The
of purely
phenomenon cannot be due to a constant repetition
fortuitous coincidences,and that therefore a sufficient
reason
of the reactingbodies.
lie in the nature
must
Accordingly
scientific
he makes
a
hypothesisas a provisional
explanation
to form

definite

of the facts observed

3. The

43.

of the hypothesis,
which
verification

is the

most

important part of the inductive argument, is sometimes made

decisive
by the more
by further observation, sometimes
process of experiment, (a)By observation : he considers what
his hypothesistrue and looks
would be the implications
were
to see if these results are actually
:
present, (b)By experiment
than witness what happens ; he may
the scientist does more
bring an active influence to bear upon phenomena ; he may
the various agents concurringto pro
vary by artificialmeans
them in accordance with
duce a complex phenomenon, directing
the

idea
preconceived

which

As soon
4. Deduction.
possessedby H and Cl. of

he set out to check.

the mind

the property
recognizes
of
combiningin the fixed proportions
its observations,
i and 35-5, it goes further and, after verifying
each time that H
draws the generalconclusion : Henceforth
in the proportionsi and 35-5 and subjected
and Cl are mixed
to the action of the
sun's rays hydrochloricacid will be
formed, accompanied by the disengagementof 22 calories the
molecule-gramme
as

43

For

COFFEY,

fuller treatment

op. cit.

of

hypothesissee

the

largerLogique, p. 345

f ., and

LOGICAL

ORDER

199

steps raise specialpointsfor consideration,

various

These

OF

CAUSE

FORMAL

THE

(i)In reference to the observation of facts and their verification

by experimentwe must describe the methods of induction. (2)
from the facts obtained by observa
made
The generalization
the real grounds
tion and experimentleads us to ask : What
are
of induction ?
(3)The deduction which is the final stage of
induction leads us to inquireinto the relations between deduc
tion and

induction.
of Induction.

88. Methods

the methods

usuallyenumerate
concomitant

Following J.

"

of

S. Mill

agreement,of

variations,of residues,and

logicians
of
difference,

jointmethod.

The

the

ones.
principal
1. Method
of Agreement: When the phenomenon the nature
in different cases
and each different
of which is in question
occurs
that circumstance
has only one
circumstance
in common,
case
of the phenomenon.
is probablythe sufficient reason
the phenomenon under
When
2. Method
:
of Difference
in one
of two cases
and not in the other,
occurs
investigation

first three

and

are

in both

all the.circumstances

cases

are

identical

save

one

which
present in the first and absent in the second, that
circumstance
is the total or partialsufficient reasonjjof
j the
is

phenomenon.
made up
3. Method ofResidues : This is a compound method
from a
When
modified.
of the two
precedingones
slightly
phenomenon that part is subtracted which is known by previous
inductions

to be

the

effect of certain antecedents, the residue

phenomenon is caused by the remainingantecedents.

the variations
of Concomitant Variations : When
4. Method
of a phenomenon correspondto the variations of a determinate
antecedent, it is to be presumed that the phenomenon and ante
effect and
cedent are connected, immediatelyor mediately,
as
of the

Mill observes that tin'smethod

cause.

where

the

happens

foregoingmethods

when

the

cause

are

of the

of

has its chief

no

in

use

cases

avail,as indeed mostly

phenomenon

be

cannot

com

isolated.
pletely

JointMethod
precedingmethods.
5.

89.

This is

Object of Induction.

fix the law of

cause

of the

derived

from

some

"

chemical

simultaneous

The

use

of

lead

experimentswhich

combination

of the

some

deal with

the

and
body, for they reveal its properties
the formal cause.
They also determine

us

to

formal

these

what

are

is

LOGIC

200

the material

of the chemical

cause

proportional quantitiesof the

fix the

They

may
tendencies

the

which

according to

as

the

they

elements.

component
of the

finalcause

also regard the

inasmuch

compound

combinations

combinations

or

take

place.
Nevertheless

be

the

particularobject of
of the train of observations
the purpose
is really
investigation
and the same, namely,to ascertain some
one
propertyof a being
and ultimatelythe law of
nature
and through this its specific
its activity.Inductive research, then, aims at the discovery
of causes
(proofof fact,on) or at what lies deeperthan this,the
discoveryof the laws of nature and the definition of natural
Sion).
types (demonstration
of Induction.
The problem connected
90. Logical Grounds
with induction
be stated thus : From
particularfacts
may
whatever

cause

"

formulates

induction

observed instances
what

on

ground

tion is found

is

by

cases),we
particular
a

are

nothing else

be

bodies which

that where

forces that

not in

than

and

the

differ from
reality

tive methods

we

observed
The

find

consider

variable

are

the

ever

solu

always
same
(a

experiment in all
in arguingthat there must
justified

the

be

union, and that this sufficient reason

natural

is to be found

Induction

certain

and

tendencyon

verified not

only but always and everywhere

91.

we

combination

observation

for this

reason
sufficient

can

and

harmonious

fact established

from

argue

instances yet to be
possible
such a procedure legitimate
?

of elements
form

we

to all

in the consideration

able number

unitingto

general law

as

Syllogism.
"

the

ascertain

in the

the

cases
particular

generallaw 44.

Scientific induction

syllogism.By
is the

what

part of

the

does

of the induc

means

of

cause

48

observed

an

methods, being reducible to

of the hypo
those of agreement and difference,
are
applications

phenomenon,
thetical
have

and

by the inductive
the presumed cause

syllogism.Again, when

established
is in truth

menon

inductive

these

the fact that

its real

that this is not

we

show

by

its nature

to

cause

indifferent

an

manifest

(which is a

certain

cause

methods
of

we

pheno
demonstration
6Vt),
but

property,to

determined

one

act

according

argument has already been developed in Critenology,63.

is no
of complete
question here of perfectinduction, or induction
is not a scientific method.
enumeration, which
Cp. Logique, 331 f and COFFEY,
Science of Logic, Vol. II, p. 48 f.
44

This

46

There

.,

THE
to

in

law.

FORMAL

Such

OF

CAUSE

LOGICAL

demonstration

ORDER

201

likewise be

may

expressed

syllogisms.
92. Statistics and

Induction.

"

aim

The

of scientificinduction

fixed law of
certaintythe existence of some
Now
nature.
frequentlyit may happen that we have before
of facts which though obviouslygoverned
us
a great multitude
at
by certain laws are yet so complex that the mind cannot
is to infer with

once

discern their various

note

down

all the

In other words,

tory

or

list of

we
a

the

facts and
draw

As

causes.

step forward

of facts wherein

great number

may

they display.

coincidences

statistics.Statistics form

up

we

an

inven

tabulate

we

accordingto their relative frequencyor coin

indication of a natural
some
hope of discovering

in classes

them

cidence in the
connexion.

sufficient

reason

for the

constant

recurrence

of these

phenomena undoubtedlyliesin the nature of the objects,

less know, which
but we may
much
not be able to conjecture,
natural properties
the key to the law as yet undiscovered 46.
are
this
When
the thoughtfulobserver is able to detect among
medley of facts which antecedents are constant (method of
and which
agreement),which exclusive (method of difference),
the variants of intensity,
he is then on the brink of knowledge :
he is able to form a scientific
and to verifythis
hypothesis,
by the work of induction.
93. III. Analytico-SyntheticMethod.
We usuallydistinguish
two
scientific methods, the syntheticof the rational sciences
and the analytic
of the experimentalsciences. The distinction
feature of
that synthesis
is the dominant
is valid in the sense
the first group and analysis
of the second ; but neither method
is employed exclusively
The first self-evident
in either group.
which the rational sciences are based necessarily
on
principles
preliminaryobservations ; on the other hand,
presuppose some
the results obtained in the positive
sciences by analysisand
induction prepare
the way
for later deductive
or
synthetic
All science indeed aims at the knowledge of things
processes.
Causal demonstration
through their causes.
(propterquid)
"

"

We

constancy

find
that

cases

in which

indicates

it is

law.

impossible

You

use

may
of a dozen

to
a

discover
die that

from
is

facts

the

perfect
"

any
its faces

casts 3 and 5 will each turn

up
three times, 2 and 4 twice, i and 6 only once.
The
probabilityof the recur
and yields
of contingentphenomena
be made
the subject of calculation
rence
can
its
value,
and
the
results.
For
calculus
of
logical
interesting
probabilities
Bernouilli's theorem
Poisson's
and
laws of numbers,
see
Logique, p. 352 f.

with

the usual

markings

to

"

and

LOGIC

202

strictlyscientific. The particularsciences which

contemplatenature under one or other of its several aspects
mechanics, chemistry,optics,etc. aim at reducing their
of mathematics
conclusions to terms
and metaphysics. In
then, there is one and one onlyscientificmethod, namely,
reality,
the analytico-synthetic,
inductive and deductive
the combined
is

alone

"

"

method.
94. Method

of

The

Philosophy.

analytico-synthetic
method
is that of all philosophical
speculation.Philosophy
is the science of beingin general,
of all being,
and therefore its
scope includes both the ideal order and the empiricalorder.
in order subsequently
Both of them it traverses first analytically
to combine
the results synthetically
and thus offer a rational
explanation. In this sense is to be read Aristotle's definition
alreadyquoted (Gen.Introduction,4) : philosophyis the science
of thingsthrough their ultimate causes,
or
again,the science
founded
In

on

each

"

the universal
of

its

order.

branches

physics philosophy avails

"

same

"

physics, mathematics,

itself of the

meta

inductive-deductive

method.

physicsof the ancients has been replacedto-dayby

cosmology and psychology. Cosmology working from the
results of the physical,
chemical
and mineralogical
sciences
at the general conclusions
arrives inductivly
that corporeal
substance is composed of matter and form and that it produces
certain distinctive activities. By these principles
philosophy
both
of corporealactivity
the nature
explainsdeductively
and
the varietyand stability
of the laws which regulateit.
in psychologythe observation of phenomena warrants
Similarly
lifeis a material
the induction that the first subjectof human
compound informed by an immaterial soul ; and this conclu
for the synthetic
sion,which forms the principle
phase,enables
to understand
the proper objectof the human
intellect,
us
the complex character of man's lifewith the mutual dependence
of the activities of body and soul.
is bound
2. The
philosophyof mathematics
up in practice,
and
:
no
reasonably so, with the science of mathematics
1.

The

mathematician
from

which

tions are
the

separates his theorems

ever

they

needed

to

of
principles

are

deduced.

Certain

from

the axioms

elementary observa
become

suggest the axioms, and these in

turn

the

deduced

synthesesfrom

which

are

the

CHAPTER

THE

95.

FINAL

CAUSE

and

Logic

The

ordering

ings

that

form

is

what

of

the

Definition

as

whole,

and

Such

The

truth,

ultimate
extrinsic

"

alone
of

understanding

scientific

with

and

scientific

knowledge,
the

apart

are,

and

stances,

the

from

formally,

of

principles

whence

deduced.

These
founded

in

law
'

later

generating
on

its formal

of

the

of
is
to

this, that
all

one

from
of its

reason

science

be

is

their

form
The
the

unity

of

principles of
object.
204

This

to

most

what

deals

Science

dictum.
is

Science

science, considered

are

the

furnish

first definitions

propositions

of

circum

favourite
whole.

own

know

to

'

action.

one

at

collect

to

variable

and

Aristotle's

thought
matter

science, it is

savant

(b)

their

the

universal

must

true,

of reflective

contingent

propositions.

consists

form

mediately

up

such,

as

of

their

the
universal
only with
(d) Systematically arranged

body

fruit

province

aim

is the

what

uni

or

is, manifestly

is the

cannot,

The

way.

make

(c) Necessary,

is not

and

as

objects formally lacking

therefore

particular facts

to

body

of its action.

laws

certitude

concerned

is

as

so

intrinsic

the

give

that

science

certain, necessary

(a) Objectively evident,

unified

of

knowledge

define

may

which

things

Yet

logic.

contrast

immediately

and

subject

evidence

selves

truth.

propositions

prepare

intellect.

by

evident,

drawn

of the

these

say

Certain
faith

of

end

"

reason

guarantee

no

though

We

"

are

are

of the

nature

is

arranged systematically

as

which

properties and
be

which

well

versal,

We

intrinsic

scientia, science, the

of Science.

propositions

the

of

name

the

and

judgments

our

man's

"

Knowledge.

object is.

an

96.

of

knowledge

deserves

of

ORDER

Scientific

ideas

our

logician therefore

certain

of

is the

science

of
orderly arrangement
is the
which
final object

of the

of

systematization

this

end

LOGICAL

OF

Attainment

the

or

to

go

IV

synthetically

science

are

object is, if

them
not

the

at

essence,

the

fore
the

nature

Such

CAUSE

FINAL

THE

least

intimate

is

"Vrt)
the

of

ideal

LOGICAL

property
of

reason

(rt" n'

unity

natural

OF

the

of

the

unity

of

of

object.
a

perfect

ORDER

science.

real
science

205

subject.
is

the

There
essence,

ETHICS

INTRODUCTION*
I. The
of

Object

of

Ethics"Ethical

philosophyis

practical philosophy (Gen. Introduction,7

deals

with

These
is

the

order

acts

of the

the

order

that

We

may

be

to

will

man,

and

free-will.
2.

those

subject

are

are

words,

of the

under

which

cerned

into

moral

moral

of

and

Special

ethics
in

acts.

ethics.

order

is

considers
towards

be

to

investigatesthe
order

particular

but

the
his

duties

of

about.

conditions
the

conditions

is called

God,

to

hand, takes
the

moral

; it examines

when

right

special

as

con

relating

other

According

towards

man

fellow-men, it

of

former

it is not

variety of situations in which

brought

control

The

naturally does, find himself placed

special requirements which
flow from
them

the

end

an

philosophy is

and

may,

peculiar

to

the

Moral

special

Special ethics, on

the

view

acts.

right

to

in

acts

those

and

Ethics."

and

will

object

of human

mean

with

moral

of the

it

"

acts

reason

general and

various

consideration

agent

direction

it will conform

the

produced

called

act

we

20)

its formal

it treats

acts

also

general

with

different

are

object

that

and

free acts

in these

human

are

the

Ethics

into

treats

By

which

to

These

General

livided

its material

say, in other

i.e.

in the

is to be established

"elation to their ends.

to

realized

department

towards

ethics

himself

religious,personal,

or

social

or

cinics.

Books

for

study

consultation"

or

ien^e
of,E"!?s'vols2

"GilI" Dublin'

1909-1917).

3rdV

",
nd

of Modern

Socialism

Ethics

Examined

Justificati-

(Benziger,

of

New

,900).

Rights) (MacYork,

3rd

cd..

(tr. Gettelman,
^eace

and

War

Herder, St. Louis, 1904)

(The Principles of International

Morality)

Non-Scholastic"
Tutorial
"^(Cliye;
1

209

Press, London,

5th ed., 1915).

yth ed., 1007).
Outlines
(Macmillan, London, 5th ed., 1902).

L,

London,

CHAPTER

NATURAL

THE

Nature

tion

existence

line,

one

disposal
is that

and

the

make

towards

one

of which

its nature.

word,

the

substance

and

internal

the

intrinsic

Nature,

in
est
we

the

with

the

object

being

is attracted

other

term

activity

towards

between

this
e

materialiter

Further,

realizes
To

est

its

end

suo

reality one

final

and

the

of

it

the

in

denotes

primary

defines

as

its

aim

or

agent

We

seeking

it.

Bonum

whether

one

or

the

of the

direction

relation

the

is

activity of

use

the

either

end

which

being

natural

good.

special

this

is that

good

the

consider

of indifference

which
or

end

of any

matter

being

conformity

of
Finis

et

bonum,
seu

(Gen. Metaphysics, 66-75).

convertuntur

since

or,

conceptu formaliter distincta, objectivetamen

good

perfectivum, it

itself to

strive

It is

we

The

tendency

towards

as

end

made,

or

nature

determinate

being.

is its end

according

The

Aristotle

activity of

the

natural

appetunt.

that

bonum

the

end.

within

This

their

movement.

of this

good

at

tendency

meaning,
it has

as

forces

be done

its natural

activity.

towards

tendency,

or

omnia

quamvis

far

so

principle of

first

conformity

say

in

of

principle

called

quod

being

along

inclination

inherent

primary

then, impresses upon

direction,
is also

of

its

In

or

to

comes

cujus gratia aliquid fit. The

its one
is called
end
being towards

of their

direction

aim

supreme

sub

observa

our

various

many

the

first moment

continuous

anything

of

under

the

id

one

None

"

come

from

steady

they

sake

Good.

The

have

converge

for the

End

aimlessly

that

so

MAN

NOTIONS

sense

they

OF

manifestations

various

in any

act

Natural

and

whose

stances

END

PRELIMINARY

I.

4.

is the

is clear

of

source

that

full, by following the

after

its

natural

and

the

same

thing.
212

and

self-perfection,

being perfects itself,or

the

good

all

to

impulse

perfect

of its nature.

itself

are

in

THEORY

A
5.

Diversity of Natural

being

it

namely, according as

from

the

external

; and

natural

movement

whereas

body

by

tendency is
a

merely

of movement

is

its movement,

to

an

The

way.

different

wholly
subjectof the

the

subjectof

it in any

to

the first kind

the

that

cause

itself contribute

contribute

pulse does not

sopherscalled

ways,

of self-direction
power
In both cases the movement

of this is that

does
is

inclination^of
any

enjoys the

reason

that

213

be exercised in two

may

communicated

movement

EVIL

The

"

this fundamental

proceedsfrom

which

end

directed.
it or is passively

towards

AND

Tendencies.

its natural

towards

GOOD

OF

extrinsic im
older

philo

natural, the second

violent.
natural movement

itself is

quitedifferent accordingas
it is or is not precededby a knowledge of the end towards which
it is tending; the latter is simply natural, the former natural
also,but in addition voluntaryor spontaneous.
But

alone directs his actions in the full

Man

since he alone

freelyorder

can

which is assignedto him, he

his will.

sense

He

of the word,
knows

the end

freelydirect himself towards it

by suitable means, or, freelybut culpably,turn himself from it.
The end is called proximateor immediate
6. Kinds of Ends.
to a higher end
it is subordinated
when
; it is the last or
can

"

The last end

supreme end when it is related to no ulterior end.
i.e.in the intention of the agent
may be the last subjectively,
the last in

aiming at it,or
natural

ends

without
7.
I.

and

in
reality,
The

means.

order of
ontological
when
meant
we
speak

the

latter is

of the last end.

qualification

Kinds

of

Good.

The

be
will may
in itself; such

of good.
three kinds
distinguish
disposedtowards an objectconsidered as
"

We

objectis an absolute good. It may also

but as leading
tend towards an object not as good in itself,
towards
ulterior good ; such an objectconstitutes a relative
an
The absolute good is an end
a useful good.
good, bonum utile,
for the will,the relative good is only a means.

good

2.

By

good is

virtue of
a

source

an

law, the attainment of the

psychological
of pleasureto the conscious subject. In

time seek
good objectthe will may at the same
the pleasurewhich it will experiencein the attainment
of that
object. The good objectitselfis called the objective
good ; the
pleasurewhich its possessionbringsto the subjectis bonum
delectabile the agreeablegood.

after
striving

"

ETHICS

2i4

which

good objecttowards

3. The

the will under

is inclined,is called bonum

of

the

guidance

honestum.

rightreason
When
speakingof the natural tendency and of the end of a
the beingin the fullness of its nature.
being,we are considering
Thus
while man
tendencies, so that
certainly
possesses many
ends
as
we
particular
might even
say that he has as many
has

he

has

he
being and activity,
end only.

II. THE
In

LAST

this section
and

end

considered

faculties,yet when

only

shall

we

; next

one

HUMAN

OF

show

tendency, one

NATURE

that

shall

we

fullness of his

fundamental

one

END

in the

has

man

determine

natural

one

what

that

end

is.

End.

Natural
an

Thesis

First

8.

by

an

end.

to

an

end

which

are
definition,

we

either this end is

of

one

and

Really

it is

an

first

the
hypothesis

Last

satisfied with
necessarily
to a higherend.
Human

performed with a view to

these acts performed with a view
acts

will call A.

One

of two

results follows

thesis stands

proved.

In the

second, the

questionis simply put further back, for we have to

regardto B what we have alreadyasked respectingA
last end

end in which the will is at rest, or

supreme
the will refers to a higherend B.
In the

which

end

will is

further relation

suppose

us

Subjectively

human

no

their very
Let

has

Man

I. The

"

bears

end which

acts,

of the will

or

is it subordinated

to

ask
:

with

is it the

further end

C ?

be that the end B is related to another

end C, and
It may
that there should be no
limit to
C to D, but it is impossible
of ends

this subordination

subordinated
end

to

one

except under

to

another,

higher end.
so

the influence of

that

In

does

one

series of ends
not

act

as

an

another, the suppressionof

last end, desirable in itselfand capableof evoking the others,

involves the abolition of every intermediate
tendency and
of
consequentlythe impossibility

there must

exist

any

end which
supreme
the will through the

power of moving
If there
dinated ends.
'

were

no

moral

action.

in itself the

possesses

medium

last end,

Hence

of the

subor

nothing would

be

desired, nor would any action have its term, nor would the
first
no
intention of the agent be at rest ; while if there were

thing among

those that

are

ordained

to the

end, no

one

would

THEORY

GOOD

OF

EVIL

AND

anything,and counsel would

*.
continue
but would
indefinitely
natural
II. There exists in reality
a supreme
begin to work

at

215
have

term,

no

'

'

acts

end

for human

'.

varietyof faculties,
different
of which
each
finds its expressionin specifically
actions ; yet it also laysdown, with no less emphasis,that man
In a
is a singlesubstantial being,one
nature, one
person.
of action,
word, there are in man
secondaryprinciples
many
but all proceedfrom one
primary principle.Now, every prin
towards an end.
Hence,
cipleof action tends by its activity
the primary principle
of action tends towards a primary end,
of action can
tend only
and the secondaryor derived principles
This
this primary end.
towards
end
to
subordinate
an
primary end is the natural end of man, his natural good, the
of all his progress towards perfection.
cause
(ratio)
This may be more
to
from the fact that, were
we
seen
clearly
human
natur$ capable of being without an end, we
suppose
should
have
have
would
to admit
disorder againstwhich
a
the
to be set the perfectorder
of the universe, especially
of
is the crowning work
who
pre-eminentdignityof man,
Psychologyteaches

that

man

possesses

nature.

It

is,moreover,

that
suppose
nature, should have

to
impossible

Being,the Creator of our

tendency which could never
9. Second

Thesis

wise
infinitely

put in

us

natural

find its fulfilment.

has

Man

an

only

One

Natural

End.

'
"

It is

time
impossiblefor one man's will to be directed at the same
is because,
to diverse things,as last ends.
The
first reason
since everythingdesires its own
desires for
a man
perfection,
his ultimate end, that which
he desires as his perfectand
crowninggood. It is therefore necessary for the last end so to
fillman's
to
appetite,that nothing is left beside it for man
desire. Which
is not possible,
if something else be required
for his perfection.Consequently it is not possiblefor the

appetite so to tend
perfectgood *.

to

two

things,as

though each

were

its

'

'

esset ultimus finis,nihil appeteretur,nee

aliquaactio terminaretur,
in his
esset primum
non
quiesceret intentip
agentis. Si autem
consunt ad finem, nullus
quae
inciperetaliquid operari, nee terminaretur
silium, sed in infinitum procederet '. ST. THOMAS,
Theol., I-II,q. i, a. 4.
Sum.
2
ad diversa
sehabeat
simul
Impossibile est quod voluntas unius hominis
sicut ad ultimos
fines.
Prima
ratio est, quia cum
appetat
unumquodque
suam
finem
perfectionem, illud appetitaliquisut ultimum
quod appetit ut
nee

Si non

etiam

'

ETHICS

216
last

The
that

end, St. Thomas

Hence

desire.

If

ends.

second

good

10. Third

is

nothing left

it follows that

anything beyond
or

end

second

Thesis

The

Indeterminately and

in the

This is

rather

conclusion

fulfilall

so

as

desires

our

object of further

an

have

cannot

we

good satisfies our

one

will seek

the

it there

outside

tellsus, must

two

or

desires to the full,how

?

And

purpose

of

would

Human

Nature,

regarded

Abstract, is the Happiness of

than

could

serve

End

what

last

more

thesis

man."

requiring
proof.

It is

givesfull satisfaction to his natural

tendency ; it is the completegood which excludes evil under
VIall its forms and fulfilsall the aspirations
of human
nature ; and
nhis is the definition of happiness
Beatitudo,cum
sitperfectum
malum
desiderium implet'.
excludit el omne
bonum, omne
But in what
does this complete and all-sufficing
good in
What
consist ?
is the objectcapableof providingman
reality
with perfecthappiness?
clear that

the end

of

man

"

'

"

Fourth

11.

is in

End

Thesis
Created

Regarded
Good

in the

Concrete, the Objective

; it is in God.

Negativeargu
The
ment."
com
objectcapable of making us happy must
must
be secure
pletelysatiate all our desires ; its possession
and assured ; and this object must
be attainable by all. But
in no created good are all these conditions verified. Therefore
created good can be the adequateobjectof our happiness.
no
Proof of the minor : There are three kinds of goods : those
of the body, those of the soul, and external goods. But all
these goods have a threefold deficiency
which
renders them
powerlessto constitute man's beatitude : they are so in
satisfied anyone ; they are of
complete that they have never
so

no

short duration

without

and

so

unstable that

no

"

one

i.

can

possess them
limited
so
are

anxietyand fear of losingthem ; they

that they can
of people.
be possessedonly by a small number
No
created good, then, can
verifythe conditions of man's
beatitude.
Furthermore, a union of all these different
objective
goods would be equallypowerlessto make man
perfectly
happy,
of each class is not due to the quantitybut
for the insufficiency
to the intrinsic qualityof these goods.
sui ipsius. Oportet igiturquod ultimus
perfectum et completivum
impleat totum hominis appetitum, quod nihil extra ipsum appetendum
ad ipsiusperfectionem
relinquatur; quod esse non potest, si aliquidextraneum
in
sic
tendat
duo
non
potest esse
requiratur. Unde
appetitus, ac si
quod
perfectum ipsius'. Id., Sum. Theol., I-II, q. I, a. 5.
utrumque sit bonum
bonum

finis ita

THEORY

GOOD

OF

AND

EVIL

217

Positive argument. The objectin which our

nature
finds
other than God Himself, the Uncreated
its absolute rest is none
2.

"

Good.

For

be

object can

an

the

adequate

of man's

cause

happinessonly on

condition that it realizes the whole

of which

man

naturallycapable;

condition

verified.

is

Proof of the

minor

subservient
manifestly

organicand

Man's

and

to his intellect and

only in

perfection
God

is this

sensitive powers
are
will. The will in its

only after the exercise of the intellect,

under the attraction of the objectwhich this latter presents to
it. We must
then conclude that the perfection
of our nature
is
of the intellect. Now
connected with the perfection
primarily
the
the most
perfectionof the intellect demands
perfect
of
its
formal
the
i.e.
knowledge possible
object,
synthetic
the
all
material
essences
knowledgeof
of
things,through their
and
laws, togetherwith the
supreme cause, of their properties
realitiesthat are con
knowledge of the supersensible
analogical
nected with them.
the completedevelopment
Or more
briefly,
is the knowledge of the First Cause, the
of the mind's activity
of the order of the universe. Here, then, at lengthwe
principle
have an objectcapableof making man
happy.
is he to come
into possession
How
of this object? By what
to him
will the objectivebeatitude communicate
his
means
subjective
happiness?
turn

into action

comes

12. Fifth

Happiness

Thesis

by

Man

Act

an

into

enters

of his

the

Intellect.

"

of his

Possession

Human

with

nature

in
of many
faculties finds its highestperfection
the exercise of these faculties ; for action is the complement of

its endowment

the

of
capacities

The

subject.

sense-faculties

subordinate

must
perfection

intellect and

highest endowment,

man's

are

his will.

With

which

be connected
happinessof man
divided on
are
Philosophers
attributes happiness to both
former

and

may

Duns

Scotus

for the intellect,

the

between

be,

intellectual

the

be attained.

faculties

Thomas

to

It is evidently
by the exercise of the latter that man's

faculties.

Two

are

these
we

are

three
of

is

only

of these must

his

viz.

the supreme

this

question. St.

intellect and

Bonaventure

will, whilst

St.

for a singlefaculty the

argue
latter for the will. The difference
"

one

of

opinion that

standpoint. However
it is in the

exercise

this
of the

ETHICS

2i8

intellect that

the

of human

end

supreme

is

nature

formally

realized.

Proof. The
jectiveend of
be
tially
The

in

human

its beatitude

tendencyof
tendency in
be in

will

with

second

act

an

its end

formallyinto

posses

of the

For

will.

we

activityof the will : 'he

and the gratification
of this

when,

moment

having passedfrom

of repose.
has the passage
How
to the second been brought about ? Clearly

change must have

with regardto its

been

the first state

its

essen

the will at one

moment
to
suppose
towards its end, and
of tendency,of movement

state

produced in

of the
disposition

the

end ; and what could such a change be

will except its being brought into contact

of the

case

must

Now

in the

enters

in the

states

its first state, it is in

from

be

cannot

its end.

consider it againat

some

nature

the will towards

state

this end

sub

the

of the intellect.

distinguishtwo

may

constitute

Therefore

nature.

by which

act

sion of

human
act

an

of the will cannot

exercise

"

of

made
representation
by the act
im
Hence the act by which human
of the intellect ?
nature
of its supreme
end, the act by
mediatelyenters into possession
which the taking possessionof the supreme
end is actually

good by

means

brought about, is an
If it is true
in

of intellect.

act

that the act which

is

its end

possessionof

an

the human

soul

act, it remains

to be

formallyputs

intellectual

is

whether
this
inquired,as a last analysis,
of the practical
intellect.
or
speculative
Thesis

13. Sixth
Act

of the

Subjective

Speculative Intellect.

"

Beatitude

There

are

an

act

is realized

of the

by

an

three considerations

in support of this assertion : (i)God is not the object of the

practicalintellect. (2)Contemplationof the truth is sought
for its

own

sake

considered

are

them
that

and
man

the other hand, acts of the

on

with

view to the end for which

realizes them.
comes

14. Corollaries.

nearer
"

i.

to

Two

reason
practical

the will pursues

intellect
(3)It is by the speculative
beings superiorto himself.
points are established : (a)God is

the supreme
nature,
objectiveend of human
(b)The means
nature
attains its supreme
objectiveend is the
by which human

contemplation of God.
subjectiveend of human
end
only a subordinate
expresses it.

contemplation is, then, the

it is
nature
; yet, to speak strictly,
'finissub fine', as St. Thomas
This

"

ETHICS

220

always

have
we
actually and consciously.What
established is that every good for the will is either the perfect
else a particular
or
good itself,
good which can be the objectof
it is related to the perfect
will only inasmuch
as
our
good. It
is in this sense
that the desire of the SovereignGood
inspires,
each
at any rate implicitly
and virtually,
of our acts of volition,
17. Beatitude
in the Present
Life.
During his earthlylife
does not experience
that completedevelopmentof his being
man
the soul with the
which allaysall desire and want
and endows
imperturbablerepose of happiness. Beatitude in the full sense
is possible
Nevertheless,in a restricted
only in a life to come.
with the conditions of our
sense, happinessis not incompatible
earthlylife. ( Some are said to be happy in this life,either on
of the hope of obtaining
account
happinessin the life to come
;
of happiness,
account
of a certain participation
or
on
by reason
of a kind of enjoyment of the SovereignGood '.
Men esteem
that there is some
kind of happinessto be had in this life,
on
of a certain likeness to true happiness. And
thus
account
3.
in their estimate
they do not fail altogether
willed

"

'

'

'

18. Conditions

have

we

explainedand

cerningthe
what
1.

of man's

essence

first condition

of

Happiness.

proved the fundamental

the conditions

are

The

the Realization

for

is the rectitude of the will

the will bears to its supreme

cludes the love of the means
which conduce
of the

and

of the end

only if the

ordered

relatingto

means

love of the

be realized.
sinlessness.

or

end

naturallyin

to it.

But

it will be

the love

rationally

is subordinated

means

con

to consider

happinessis to

love that

that

thesis

beatitude, it remains
which

on

Now

"

to

the

end ; and this subordination

of the love of the
to that of the end is simply the rectitude of the will.

of the

love
means

Thus

the rectitude of the will is

state

of beatitude.

condition

of the conditions

one

of the

of

perfecthappinessis securityagainst
its loss. Perfect happiness requiresthat the natural ten
dencies of the will shall be satisfied. But these aspirations
are
co-extensive with our intellectual knowledge,and this does not
2.

"

dae

'

Another

Beati

aliquiin hac vita vel propter spem beatitudinis

vita, vel propter aliquam participationem beatitudinis

dicuntur

in futura

boni

summi

aliqualem
aliquam beatitudinem,
et

sic

non

ex

toto

Theol., I-II, q. 5,

a.

fruitionem.

propter
in

3, ad

sua
i

"

Homines

aliquam

aestimatione
and

ad

3.

reputant

similitudinem
deficiunt

in

verae

'.

ST.

hac

adipiscensecundum
vita

esse

beatitudinis

THOMAS,

Sum.

THEORY

confine existence and

abstracts

from

existence

and

happinesscannot
or

in other

cannot

respectsmay

its happinessmust

Thus

EVIL

221

limited duration

the

natural

be satisfied if the

but

desire of

happiness

lost.

Besides, the soul

which

AND

happinesswithin

all time-limits.

be limited

may

GOOD

OF

endure

enjoy a singlemoment's
happiness
be perfect,
unless it is certain that

for

ever.

3. Is the union of the soul and the body also a necessary

condition of the state of perfecthappiness?
(a)It is certain

the

If the

body

is not

essential to

the

happinessof the soul.

(b)On the other hand, since the union of soul and body is natural,
cannot
admit that the reunion of the body with the soul
we
be an
obstacle to
after the dissolution of the compound can
that the reunion of the
happiness, (c)Indeed, it seems
perfect
of human
to the exigencies
nature.
soul and the body answers
that

organism did

human

not

contribute

its share

to

the

of the noblest faculties of the soul,we should be right

perfection
of the human
in concludingthat the union
compound is
172).
againstnature (Psychology,
in the Thomistic
Here, however, we are met by a difficulty
explanation.
19. A
Gentes

Difficulty. St. Thomas

"

'

The

human

soul

writes in the Sumnta

becomes

more

portionas it frees itselffrom the trammels

the highestknowledge consists in knowing

Contra

perfectin
of the body.
whatever

pro
For

is most

by the ardour
with which the will restrains the animal passions. It would
then, that the soul,far from beingdissolved by its separa
seem,
tion from the body, finds its perfection
in this very separation
'.
inevitable that in
The first answer
is that it is by no means
the human
body should impede the expansionof the
every case
of the soul ; these hindrances are an accidental
higheractivity
the
of the imperfections
of the body which
consequence

immaterial, and

soul
spiritual

moral

has for the

rectitude

is measured

present at its service.

the absolute and

between
carefully
distinguish
be
the relative perfectionof a separated soul. It cannot
denied that a purelyspiritual
mode
of knowledge is,absolutely
speaking, superior to the psychologicalprocess which is
But a process
of bodily organs.
dependenton the concurrence
of cognitionwhich is too elevated may
be a relative imperfection
for a soul that is not raised to so noble a state of perfection.

We

must

next

ETHICS

222

20. Accidental

of

Qualities

Happiness

demand

certain

of the dead, which

we

almighty yet

perfect

are

acci

the

generalresurrection
will be brought about by an

suppose

intervention

natural

state of

which
qualities

happinessseems
dental and complementary, (a)After
to

The

"

of

Divine

Providence

(Psychology,172), the sensitive faculties,no longer hampered

will exercise their
by the countless infirmities of the present life,
activities in

far

so

this is compatiblewith

as

the free

play of the
empire of the will

will be

higherfaculties. They

subjectto the
in such a way that the most
perfectharmony will rule in all the
of life; the human
manifestations
body will receive from
beatified

the

soul

increase

of

perfection,
glory and joy.
will find a place of
(b)Thus constituted in beatitude man
his interior state.
existence befitting
And
(c)most probably
to him
will also find there the joyspeculiar
as
a social being.
21. The
made

of Man

End

accordingto

him,

he would

is

Supernatural

of pure

state

he directed his

had
to

an

the moment

of his creation God

might

all his

to

had been

the end

then

proposed

been able to be the possessor of

is not.
have been we know
From

But

and

If man

have

so

beatitude.

first man,

what

"

(Psychology,
173),and

nature

towards
aspirations

even

End.

in matter

descendants,

of fact
a

assignedto the
destiny,
supernatural

destinyabove the exigenciesof all created

At the same
nature
and beyond its power of attainment.
time
He
the supernaturalmeans
them
which were
requisite
gave
that

is to

say,

for the realization of this end.

the

22. Does

of

Natural

Happiness

Involve

destinyis in point of fact a supernatural

know
since we
one
possible,
; such a destinyis intrinsically
that it is actuallya reality.May we, then, stillspeak of a happi
To be happy is to be in possession
that is purelynatural ?
ness
of a good which givesfull satisfaction to the desires of the will,
is capable,
and if it is admitted that human
nature
by super
that a
it would seem
natural aid, of knowing God
intuitively,
discursive knowledge of God cannot
suffice for man's happiness.
has been
made
One attempt at solvingthis difficulty
by
the
in
condition
the
of
nature
which
declaringthat
pure
for
it would have been utterly
objection
impossible
supposes
intuitive
of a supernatural
to conceive the possibility
man
even
Contradiction

Conception
"

Our

"

"

vision
summary

of

the

Infinite.

assertion has

We

doubt, however,

sufficient foundation.

whether

this

THEORY

A
It

seems

Reason

here

necessary

is in

in

his

make

to

EVIL

223

distinctions

some

(i)

certaintythat the
natural
exigencies

surpasses the
Man
creature.
would

Essence

of every
capabilities

found

AND

position to establish with

vision of the Divine

and

GOOD

OF

not

then

have

inclination (appetitus
innatus
seu
any
naturalis)
callingfor the vision of the Divine Being as its final
nature

perfection.(2)Without

could not
lightof revelation man
have convinced
himself of the positive
of the vision
possibility
of God
of the essential capacityof a rational creature
to
nor
bear such an intense felicity.
On the contrary, he would
surely
have concluded
that the vision of God was
beyond the reach of
created nature.
the condition
God

with

the

It is reasonable
of pure

we

the will of man,

in

nature, is incapableof

categoricalabsolute

(3)Nevertheless

that

to say

are

will

the vision of
willing
elicitus efficax).
(appetitus

inclined to think

that

unaided

natural

of obtain
might easilyhave conjectured the possibility
ing from the divine Omnipotence an intuitive knowledge of the
have
this would
followed a conditional desire
Deity. From
elicitus inefficax),
a
velleity',a hope, rather than a
(appetitus
But under the guidance
will,of the sight of God.
categorical
of the wisdom
proceedingfrom his reason, his will might have
kept this desire within the limits ordained by the plan of
it to
the
subordinated
Providence, and might have
higher
absolute desire of maintainingthe order of the universe which
reason

'

is the

expressionof the will of God.

conception of a natural happinessis
After

these

whether
merit

The

the

the

considerations

attainment

of the

in

the

natural

happiness reduces
happiness of a being consists

supreme

end.

in the

absolute

Now
sense

doubtless
of

the

no

the

way

question

of

name

it follows

Hence

end

itself to

contradiction^

of

does
a

that the

ascertaining
or

matter

does

not

of words.

possessionof its
supernaturalend alone is,

word,

in

the

end
supreme
of things in which
the

of

an

find
intelligent
nature, in the real order
we
ourselves placed. Yet the natural end, which
in a possible
order
of things might have
the complete and
constituted
exclusive end of man,
is also,in a legitimate
yet relative sense,
end
that is to say, one not subordinated
to a higher
a supreme
end.
Thus there is nothing to prevent the attainment
of the
natural
less
end being called happiness,though in a sense
complete than that of the supernaturalend.
"

II

CHAPTER

FREE-WILL

23.

and

Object
has

nature

been

consists

order
natural

be

that

is

there

devoted

the

to

has, however,

doctrines
moral

liberty in
been

in

of

aspects

order

moral

this

to

essen

presupposi
then,

must,
of

question

section

second

of

are

moral

chapter

liberty
it

various

the

deal

to

of

influence

the

the
act

the

man's

Psychology (112-120),

in

and

that

human

the

in

of

end

see

on

preliminary

that

liberty

rests

As

treated

philosophy, especially

certain

order

of free-will.

established,

there

of

subject.

the

recall

to

the

existence

The

"

shall

we

of

physical

the

study

us

Later

very

already

for

will suffice

the

from

Chapter.

subordination

the

But

tiallydistinct
tion

discussed.
in

end.

of this

Division

with

passions

the

on

in

special importance

free-will.

MEANING

I.

24.

of

Meaning

ing determination,
from

exterior

an

production,
judgment
since
can

it

they
always

have

to

are

this

always

will

the
in

formally

by

judgments

of

assent

will.

for

but

of

facts

for

free-will,

of

their

object,

particular, contradictory

will

and

to

is

the

faculty

the

it alone

mind.
to

Consequently

put

an

end

the

judg

abstract
acts

its

refuse

to

or

Our

free

The

law.

indetermination

an

in the

comes

necessary

to

determined,

influenced

determination

antecedents

root

all necessitat

internal

some

WILL

THE

excludes

particular, individual

be

the

its

has

it resides

undetermined

belongs

from

upon

OF

free act

whether

or

depends

it is true,

ments,

The

"

matter

no
cause

Liberty

assent.

Liberty.

FREEDOM

OF

that, given all the

is such

act

PROOFS

AND

to

the

and
it

in

determination.
Moral

objects

liberty
considered

in

their

of

relation
224

choice
to

different

between
the

end

of

rational

nature.

moral

AND

EVIL

225

in man
the faculty
of choice between
Indeed, it implies
good and evil, but this power is a weakness and an

of
imperfection

free,and

are

free-will.

our

of Free-will.

25. Proofs
we

GOOD

OF

THEORY

study of

the

consciousness

Our

"

the free act

informs

givesus

that

us

the

inner

good exercises an irresistible

determining action upon us, since it correspondsadequately
will. But with particular
with the capacityof our
goods this
be willed ; for they are means
These
is not the case.
may
of the whole good (summum
towards the attainment
bonum)
real goods. They need not be willed,
and on this account
are
the final determina
since they are not the good. Hence when
tion is made, it does not proceedmerely from the objectbut
must
depend on the will ; this facultytherefore controls its
volition (Psychology,
own
115).

II. THE

26.

universal

The

of this fact.

reason

INFLUENCE

Statement

always involves
of desire

the

of
a

OF

Question.

judgment

the part
the intellect and
spiritual,
act

their

action

PASSIONS

THE

on

the

on

The

"

exercise

of

liberty

part of the intellect and

of the will.

will

the

FREE-WILL

ON

Now

depend

an

althoughthey are
for the

exercise of

the sensitive faculties. These

latter are
upon
and normal
therefore subordinate to the integrity

organicand
functioningof

libertydepends in its
exercise on the same
material conditions.
This dependence is
when
the case
the free act is not simplyan act of the
especially
will (actuselicitus)
but an
act of an
organicfacultyresulting
from a command
of the will (actusimperatus).
27. Extent

the

of the

Hence

organism.

Influence

Material

Causes

fortunate

individuals

of Man's

Free-will.

on

who

is beyond
irresponsible,

That

"

owing

to

Nature

Sensitive

there

are

and

certain

derangement

mental

of
un
are

disputed.
That there are others who, whilst able to form correct judg
ments
on
speculativematters, are incapable of resisting
solicitations to evil, does not contradict any
point of our
doctrine but seems
rather to be established by experience.It
not
be even
impossiblethat there exists,as Lombroso
may
'

professed,

criminal

sistibly
given over

doubt

and

type ', that

to crime

who

can

has

never

monsters

irre

recognizedby

certain

is to

be

been

say,

ETHICS

226

and pathological
characteristics. Such
anatomical, physiological

characteristics

criminals.

most

Further,

we

less

more

or

may

also

numerous

admit,

this assertion rests must

which

experimentson
caution, that

be found

to

are

person
lose
the
use
suggestion

among
though the

be handled

with

under
the influence of hypnotic
may
of his liberty.All these facts are not

with the theory of free-will,

the exceptiondoes
as
incompatible
not disprovethe rule.
Beyond these exceptionsjust mentioned, the passions or

lower

emotional

do
generally

states

than

and

external

weaken

material

agents do

not

moral

liberty.
here with
We
not
concerned
the passionswhich
are
are
consequent upon the free act, since so long as they are con
sequent upon it they cannot affect its nature : they are rather
indication of the intensityof the will's action and are
an
But of the antecedent passionsthe case
of its reaction.
subjects
more

is otherwise.

act

is in the

direction

same

to it. When
will,sometimes in opposition
they
in the direction of the will,it would
seem
they ought to

that

as

their action

Sometimes

of the

increase the

rather
liberty

Self-control,the

case.

it ; but

weaken

than

characteristic feature

such
of

is not

the

freedom, is

lost in

the
proportionas sensible emotion increases. When
is there
to the higher,
appetitepullsin opposition
liberty

lower

by lessened,but
it is made
that

which

entirelyto
have

we

if not
exert

may

the soul's

ing

the

it is not

real power
absolute is none

lay down

to

of control

Either

through change
activity,
Or

generalrule that

over

our

testifies
clearly

passions;

one

limited.

We

the less real because

it in different ways.
other

as

consciousness

Our

cease.

will to

passions.

true

of

indirectly,
by diverting
thought, throughapply

through exciting other

the
will directlyacting on

objects,even

directly,
by

to strengthenthem
passions,

the
or

to

repress
third way,

them,

at least to

perhaps the most

effectual : by conjuring
some
appropriate
up in the imagination
under
the sensitive appetite
its influence
object and retaining
would have us
until the new
passionneutralises what reason
Or

certain extent.

yet by

combat.
The

organic or

habits
heredity,

immense

material

of life,climate

influence

on

and
temperament
temperature, have all an

conditions

and

the functions

of

of

our

sensitive nature

and

the will ; but apart from certain anomalous

on
hence, indirectly,

ETHICS

228

understand

to

us

agents
and

sensitive
We

out

and

which

of

has

that
has

man

share

be

especially

action

exercised

between
a

states,
and

in

clear

control

complete

intermediate

passions

Their

it.

must

is

always

through

the

leads

material
indirect
medium

view
of

free

fully

the

of
his

in

act

the

of

carrying

"

the

of

morality

will

and

the

his

conduct

entirely

act

"

and

responsibility

lacking

their

it

and

agents

will

our

upon

appetite.
then,

see,

appetite

external

affect

to

since

sensitive

the

how

able

are

remote

the

of

influence

The

4.

in

which

the

spiritual

the

determination

freedom,
the

faculty
of

there

and

senses

of

our

are

the

will,

activity.

possible
the
each

reason,

strive

many
the
for

CHAPTER

MORAL

THE

moral

the

and

Object

29.

other, of the

order

distinction

of

foundation

arise from
of the

law

moral

Natural

of the

T. MORAL
There

Good

is

ness.

Certain

"

and

Evil.

things

right, other
itself upon

imposes

certain

are

virtue
with

things

vice, the

consciousness.

trjith,
every

can

which

virtues, which

(v) Our

the

moral

knowledge
law

(vii)

between

Moral

from

conscious

consciousness
and

it is

good

as

this

distinction

Similarly there

evil, justiceand

and

of which

before

of

code

impossible

injustice,
to

passions
be

found

of

in

human

this

the

contest

"

in

spite of

that

Hence,

229

of

evil

is

necessity,

the

contrary

sufficient

reason

objective manifestatipjL_pf

truths

reason

data

and
of

notes

which

origin and

human

circumstances.

such

interests

compelling

merely

capacity

and

good

between

and

the

confirms

with

us

"

only
of

Induction

"

persistence

better, of

or

contingent
natural

(ii)The

law,

wrong,

distinction

The

"/

presented

solicitations
it

good

truth

argument.

universality and
for

about

in

sincerity.

Inductive

always

moral

irresistible evidence.

with

judgments

and
any

2.

us

We

consider

evil ;

drawn

our

and

bad

as

shall

Distinction

before

come

evil.

EVIL

Argument

i.

"

the

law.

AND

Intrinsic

Real,

Moral

and

GOOD

and

moral

of

moral

morality

and

law

sanction

of

of

of human

treats

we

(iv)The

moral

of the

(vi) The

and

(iii)The
;

philosophy

good

good

goods

certain

characteristics

30.

The

"

to

between

observance

the

act

part

distinction

this

to choose

obliges us

free

of the

this second

study

(i) The

Chapter.

this

of

Division

relations

to

now

ORDER

comprises two parts : the one

is the psychological condition

act

liberty, which
have

III

to

are

anterior

independent

of

short

of

denying

know

the

truth, and

to

all
the

of

ETHICS

230

admit
must
we
logically
professing
scepticism,
that4hei
moral good^angLeyiLisjQ.unded
f
distinction between
on Jhe_yery
thus

doubt

No

]facts
\

the

of

allows

but

siderable ;

of
application
divergencesand

moral

variations
of

ideas

the root

all

the

more

and

good

unjust,of lawful and unlawful, are

\among

to particular
principles

at all times

same

leads to the end

definition that which

call wrong
Now
nature.

there

others unsuitable to human

evil there
of

the nature
The

Divine.

"

writers

Many

for

Goodness

in

explained

Positive

or

Influence, whether

think

that

on

education.

the civil law the foundation

and

Puffendorf

before him

free will the

of

power

Badness

of

Analysis by

Human

even

or

purely positiveinfluences

this

created by
prejudices
that

and

traditional

as
or

an

Montaigne thought it enough

decree of God.^

made

moral

is founded

its Ultimate

distinction,such
social conventions
or
laws,
possessions,
account

can

oppositionto the end

some
objectssuitable,

6. Therefore between

the

between

is not

Extrinsic

any

rightis by

rational nature

distinction which

drawn

be

things.

Distinction

Actions

Human

be

be

must

nature

must

of man's
is in

whatever

we
conversely,

31.

and

peoples.
"

good and

con-

evil,oL.jusl_,aiid

argument may
argument. Another
3. Deductive
itself. The good or
from the study of human
nature

of human

less

or

Hobbes
of

and

pre
absolutelyfree

appealto

to

It would

Descartes, attributed

creatingthe

both

Rousseau

morality.

distinction made

the

seem

to God's

by

us

good and evil.

In the first place,this distinction is not explainedby any
human
influence,
(a)The nature of good and evil,as presented
and reproduced in the invincible con
consciousness
to our
victions of the human
that the dis
race, has alreadyshown

between

moral

the

tinction between

of certain actions
Tightnessand wrongness
all positive intervention
is independent
or
system of
that is local,particularand changingl
government. JA cause
cannot
explainan effect that is universal,generaland constant.!
of

(b)It

is useless to have

commands

of

of
exigencies
"

ST. THOMAS,

an

absolute

monarch,

Gent., Ill,

Hobbes
or

with

;~such commands

social contract

Cont.

with

recourse

c.

129.

to the

or

despotic
to

the

contracts

do

Rousseau

not

OF

THEORY

themselves

ex

possess,

GOOD

EVIL

AND

an
hypothesi,

231

intrinsic goodnessLgind

coniinunicate^iLlQ^tJieaets-~w4uch_it is
consequently cannot
their purposejo regulate.
/ In the second
place,this distinction does not rest on a free
decree

of the

opinionthat
depend on the

The

Will.

Divine

good and evil

tinction between

leads to inadmissible

(a)God

consequences

of contracts

blasphemy, perjury,violation

the dis

makes

free will of pod

and

make

then

might
the

like obli

morally good would be

obligatory,and even heroism would be a duty forced upon us.
(c)If all moral law owed its originto a free act of the sovereign
for us to
be necessary
will of God, a positiverevelation would
gatory upon

discern

the

clusions

difference
these

as

is

(b) Whatever

us.

good and evil. Such

principlefrom which

between

condemn

the

con

they

follow.
logically

II. THE

FOUNDATION

OF

GOOD
32.

The

the

Natural

our

Supreme

Distinction

If the

"

Good

good

tendency of a being, the moral

tendencyof the rational nature
perfectshimself.

Now

the

and

Evil

of

Non-conformity

or

end

MORAL

BETWEEN

EVIL

AND

between

Conformity
End.

DISTINCTION

THE

answers

good

is what

of

our

natural
to

answers

and is that

man

on

with

Acts

our

to the

is what

of

is founded

by which

rational nature

the
he

is the

knowledge and love of God togetherwith the joy that results

from this knowledge and love.
Hence
a
morally good act is *
one
which, whether
or indirectly,
helps us to know and 1!
directly
of our 1
love God, and in so doing contributes to the perfecting
is the *J
rational nature
a thing is morallygood which
; similarly,
objectof a morally good act.
to the
Moral evil,on the other hand, is what is in opposition
to
end of our rational nature
; it is the act which is prejudicial
the perfecting
of our rational nature, or it is the object of this
withdraws
act ; in its ultimate
us
analysisit is whatever
from the perfectknowledge and love of the Supreme Being
and

from

What,

the
as

happiness which
matter

nature

connexion

or, what

comes

acts should

of fact,is the criterion

of the intrinsic morality of

it in the

these

an

action ?

of this action
to the

same,

with

Do
the

bring us.

by

which

we

not

we

judge

always find

of
perfection

in its connexion

with

our
our

ETHICS

232

end ?

supreme

We

look upon them

We
esteem

we
us.

condemn

dignityas

and

licentiousness,

vices,because they degradeand disgrace

temperance and chastityas true virtues,
as

they ennoble

because

drunkenness

us

and

to

answer

the

demands

of

our

men.

or
is, at least implicitly
act which contributes to the gloryof God, justas
an
virtually,
the majesty of God.
Hence,
every bad act is an offence against

33.

Corollary.

"

St. Thomas
it cannot

worthy

Every good

act

that every morally bad act, inasmuch

as
be referred to God, the last end of creation,is blame
teaches

in His

34. The

sight7.

Sources

of

Morality.
"

There

are

thingswhich
action,namely,

three

goodnessor badness of a human

and the end.
the circumstances
the formal object,
of the goodness
is the firstdeterminant
I. The formal object
not
action.
of a human
or badness
By formal objectwe mean
of a thing,but the reality
considered absolutely,
the reality,
looked at in reference to the moral act, as bearinga relation of
of the
of conformity with the end
conformity or want
of money
rational nature of the agent. Thus a sum
unjustly
acquiredis the objectof an act of theft, whereas the same
bestowed
freelyon the poor becomes the objectof an
money
8.
act of almsgiving
P/2. The objectivecircumstances of time, place and person
determine

the

likewise contribute their share to the

Thus

act.
wrong

than

to steal five

from
shillings

to steal the same

amount

character
poor man
from a rich
a

of the moral
is

greater

one.

the extrinsic purpose contributes to the perfection

Finally,
Thus to givean alms from a religious
of an act.
or imperfection
motive is an act which presentstwo distinct kinds of goodness,
3.

Sum.

Theol., I-II, q. 21, a. 4.

Bonum
actionis, sicut et
Sum.
Theol, I-II, q. 18, a. 2.
attenditur ex plenitudine essendi vel defectu ipsius. Pricaeterarum
rerum,
autum, quod ad plenitudinem essendi pertinerevidetur, est id quod dat
mum
naturalis habet speciem ex sua forma, ita actio
res
rei speciem. Sicut autem
Et idepsicut prima
sicut
termino.
et motus
ex
habet
speciem ex objecto,
attenditur
ex
forma, quae dat speciem ei, ita et
sua
bonitas rei naturalis
et a
unde
prima bonitas actus moralis attenditur ex objectoconvenient!:
Et sicut in rebus
vocatur
bonum
ex
genere, puta uti re sua.
T

ST. THOMAS,

ST.

'

THOMAS,

quibusdam

consequitur formam
est, si res generata non
primum malum
loco
sed
hominis, ita primum
homo,
si
aliquid
non
generetur
puta
specificam,
est quod est ex objecto, sicut accipere aliena,
in'actionibus moralibus
malum
modo
ex
et dicitur malum
loquendiquo
genere, genere
pro specie accepto, eo

naturalibus

dicimus

humanum

genus

totam

humanam

speciem *.

the

GOOD

OF

THEORY

AND

intrinsic to the act, that of

one

EVIL

233

succouringthe needy,the

members.
lovingChrist in His suffering
in
in its
good, it must be so
itself,
totally

that of
other extrinsic,
For

act

an

of these conditions
'

Bonum
The

ex

make

is sufficient to

malum

integracausa,

absence

The

in its circumstances.

and

motives

to be

ex

the

act

bad

one

one

defectu '.

quocumque

well be raised here whether

questionmay

of any

there is such

non-moral act : is every human

act
or
indifferent
either good or bad ? This is a subjectof contro
necessarily
schools. Accordingto St. Thomas
the theological
versy among
indifferent is impossible.Though
act that is really
a human
there are human
acts which, if we consider their object
only,are
neither good nor bad, yet taken in their concrete reality
together
with their end and the circumstances
determiningthem they
either moral or immoral 9 (61).
are
necessarily

thing as

an

Individual

35. Neither
of Moral

Worth.

nor

Hobbes

"

Social

and

in

Well-being

generalall

school consider
positivist
pleasureof the presentlife,to be

modern

the

is,the

is the

Measure

the adherents

of

well-being,that

man's

the sole motive-force

of

goodness of an
conformitywith
standard of right

since the
consequence,
in its relation of
action consists for everyone
all

our

In

actions.

pleasureand pain are the

Well-beingthus becomes the ultimate

his supreme
and wrong.

end,

criterion of

morality.
such as
Littre*,Herbert
Spencer,
positivists,
in this, that they have
and
Huxley, differ from Hobbes
of the community for
attempted to substitute the well-being
the egoistic
pleasureof the individual.
The

later

36. Criticism

of Individualistic

notice firstof all that itwould

Utilitarianism."

involve

I.

We

may
maintain
contradiction to

pleasureis the first objectof all voEtion. As a matter of

fact,pleasureresults from volition,which?7therefore naturally
precedesthe pleasurethat it begets.
relative to the individual person and
2. Pleasure is essentially

that

"

the

Alexander

proposition:

disconveniens
est

VIII
'

condemned

naturae

transgressiolibera divinae
vel ignorat vel de
est oflensa

aeterna
0.

1290

Dei, neque
'.

dignum
(Herd.er,London),

poena

morale

seu

erroneous

humanus

theologicum veroet mortale

legis. Philosophicum, quantumvis grave, in
actu
Deo
non
cogitat,est grave peccatum sed

peccatum
See

and

est actus

rash,dangerous

scandalous,

rational! et rectae

illo qui Deum

non

as

philosophicum

Peccatum

ration!

mortale

DENZINGER,

dissohrens

amicitiam

Dei

neque

Enchiridion Symbolorunt,ed, 1911,

ETHICS

234

of Hie.. It cannot

varies with the different circumstances

a

criterion by which

enabled

one
distinguish
thing or
from
another as
right
intrinsically

are

we

furnish

to

and
objectively
and intrinsically
wrong.
objectively
considered
Moreover,
pleasure
3.

action

as

and

is left out of account

reason

discrimination, is

without

teaches

us

it is followed

that

simply as pleasure, if
it is indulgedin recklessly
and

self-destructive,for

experience

transforms

by pain or

itselfinto

pain. This principleof moral hedonism or egoism is, then,

suicide.
and leads to logical
self-contradictory
for pleasure
to substitute utility
An attempt has been made
the principle
of morality. But the useful is not an end ; it
as
in view of an end.
Hence the questionarises
is only a means
good
again : What is the end ? Is it pleasure? Or is it some
that
the
considered
in
its
different from
is,
good
pleasure,
relation of conformityor non-conformitywith the end of our
utilitarianism is reallythe
rational nature ?
In the first case
is not the universal
as hedonism
same
; in the second, pleasure
and fundamental
criterion of good and evil.
of Social
37. Criticism
Utilitarianism.
According to this
"

theory man

seek the

of

humanity.

amelioration
1.

if I

But

welfare of the

must

the

to make

am

greatestnumber,

happinessof

another

the

principle

of my
happinessand the directingforce of my conduct in
in what
is it not of the first importancethat I should know

happiness of
nature

my

of man's

neighbour consists
supreme

end is

The

questionof

deferred
accordingly

the

but

life,
the
the
not

answered.
of happinessfor humanity, we
principle
cannot
acknowledge it to be the universal and primordial
criterion of the distinction of moral good and evil. For, (a)
such a criterion is not universal : for moralityis anterior to the
that
organizationof any society.My conscience tells me
quite apart from any consideration of the happinessof the
community there are certain thingsthat are evidentlygood
that in
and
others evidentlybad.
It is clear to everyone
and the like,do not derive
temperance, blasphemy,parricide,
2.

Whatever

their malice

be the

from

social relations,and

any

that

even

the desert island,or in the narrow

on
man
proverbial
familylife,these acts would retain their degradingor
character,

(b) Such

criterion,even

within

the

for the

circle of
immoral

limits in

ETHICS

236

to the realization of this supreme

conduce

everybody should know

several that
be

the best.

this final

complicatedthan

more

state, or if there
Now

what

equilibrium of

is to constitute the ultimate

of the

And

existence

evolution ?

in
equilibrium

of

each

individual would
these

is thus

equationsand
to himself

judgment of

the

with

view

to

which

his

criterion of

Sociological and

of

Pragmatist

them,

rightto

sub

follow, or, perhaps,

pleasureand interests.

own

to the rational nature

conformable

in

this final

to solve

the

phase

were

his conscience,either in

back

compelled always to come

pleasureand egoism, or
the rational good, that is

criterion of

39.

of

to the conclusions

rejectthem

One

the form

stillreserve

equationsto

order to assent
to

suppose

there

to put
intelligence
sufficiently
prodigious

an

state

mit

that

could
all the

forces of the universe which

cosmic

are

the

to

else to

variable

invariable

the

to the

to say,

good

as

man.

of

Systems

Morality.
"

and others of the socio

Levy-Bruhl,Durkheim
logicalschool of morality,our judgments on the value of
human
actions are the product of social environment
and vary
since our fundamental
with it. This theoryis erroneous,
moral
judgments are the same
always and everywhere, and are
therefore not affected by the vicissitudes of social life.
For pragmatists,
as William
James and Schiller,the moral
of the
ideal is lived in the collective consciousness by reason
which it procures.
As a moral system pragmatism falls
utility

According

under

to

weight of

the

againstevery
varies

with

the

criticism

same

be directed
may
howsoever
regarded,
Utility,

utilitarian system.
every

individual.

Consequently the pragmatist

conceptionof morality cannot escape

subjectivism.
purelycapricious
III. THE

which
his

Rational

discern

and

Nature

and

reject what

what

Law, that is,to

know

to

is contrary

"

towards
no

some

exception ;

human
Directs

end, and its law is

he

to

to

it.
"

an

it, as
i.

tend

is likewise set towards

the
by influencing
activity

towards

as

to

inclination
it.

his end.
reason

well

of

Argument from

has within it an

to

Inclination

will the End

and

conduces

analogy. JEverybeingin this world

of

condemnation

the

LAW

MORAL

Subject to a Natural
habitually disposes him
is

40. Man

as

Man

This

is

end

and the will ;

THEORY

OF

and this influence exercised

of

by the

natural

is called the

man

GOOD

AND

end

law.

EVIL
the

upon

Therefore

237

higherfaculties
is under

man

natural law.

Argument from consciousness.

2.

carries him

higherattraction
reason
pointsout

Man

"

towards

on

weakness

own

practiceof

world

virtue and

view and have

which

his

from Providence.

chosen

for
self-reproach
that is given by the

that follows

the shame

His free act, God

by

good

after

the satisfaction

hence

Argument drawn

3.

the

that

him, and he yieldsto evil solicitation only

to

by overcoming interior resistance and

his

is conscious

have

must

Before

"

set Himself

adapted to

means

an

evil act,

creatingthe
end in

some

its realization.

Being

wise, He could not be deceived with regard to the

infinitely
relation of proportionbetween
and its end ; being
a creature
infinitely
holy,He approved and willed this necessary relation ;
powerful,He was able to bring it into being
being infinitely
of the
accordingto the capacity of the respectivenatures
God has therefore given to created beings
agents He created.
I anjmpulse towards their ends, a principle
whichvdirects their
tEe
eternal designsj3fHjs_PipjyirjMactivities in confonrirty^with
Y\ dence ; in a word, He must have mrplanted jineach created
"tlnTTTaTufaT'
law
be inl
must
agent the natural law. Now
K

The

the constitution

with

harmony

natural law

and free,cannot

implanted in
be, then,

of the
man's

subjectunder
nature, which

fatalisticlaw

on

its

sway.f

is rational

the contrary,il

"

must-con^istjnan intellectual tendency to formjsomeprinciples

ft
I
an3~"Tn
^which,
oj^e^sonjwithlgertainty, an^impulse
..without
it towards \
wfllTinclines
forcingjDr
necessanlydet"nrTmrrig~the
the real good appreHendeBT^y
the intefl*c"
41. The

Eternal

\ law is meant

Law

and

the

the destination,

as

Law."

Natural

conceived

by

B^lhe-^"*"rt/
Divine

Wisdom,

I of alijTfgliirpg
of
tn +*"?irregppc fiv^ pndvand_the_adaptation
I thpir activities
Lex aeterna nihil aliud est quam
:
tgJftpTTL
'

ratio divinae

is the

quid

homini
10

quod

ST.

in the free rational creature

'

vitandum.
in creatione
THOMAS,

est directiva omnium

10.

of this eternal law

expression
Lex naturalis
yafagallaw :

intellectus insitum
et

'

et motionum

actuum

The

secundum
sapientiae

non

est aliud quam

lumen

Deo, per quod cognoscimusquid agendum

Hoc

lumen

et

hanc

'.

Stftw. Theol., I-II, q. 93,

a.

j.

legem dedit Deus

ETHICS

238
its

Regarded under
in

up

this

generalform

fundamental

prosequendum,

dictum

natural

Bonum

vitandum

malum

et

the
'

'.

law

is summed

faciendum

est

et

of
^4-4s-4he_fun,ctien

dra^^fnHD^4la"-J6ist jpjjnciple b"(3i4rrLmejdiate-^ind

to

Treason
mor^e

orless rejnQteaie^ucJj^njjthat-Avin
to guide the will
serve

life.
itCcoiiduei-tliiougli

in

With
and
moral

duty. It remains
obligation.
Nature

42.

tains

also

(a)is

not

tical ;

there

of law

the notion

examine

to

of Moral

is bound

the

Obligation.
"

hypotheticalbut

obligation
origin of

idea of

con
obligation
necessityproper to duty

of

(c)is not

of
and

nature

The

necessity. The
physical but moral ; (b)is
that

that

up

theoretical but

not

prac

absolute.

practical,
imperative necessit
is

mnrqjly _good and

How
43. Foundation

Christian
of

are

oi freel

such

reconcile

to

we

oJL

notions

Obligation. In the opinionof most

since the time of Kant, moral
duty admits

of Moral

moralists

"

possibleexplanation,
namely the authority of God,
the supreme
is of the
order as He
Legislator of the moral
physical. If there is a difference of opinionit is only on the
His intellect,His will,or
question whether it is His essence,
only

His

one

intellect and

character

to the moral

What
moral

the

the

are

duty

without

will combined,

power

this

which

on

There

"

lawgiver,nor
and right to

gives the obligatory

law*

arguments

is based

which

be law,

cannot

command

without

issue commands
and

right

th

to

commaiidsJLhat

issue

to

alone

And

separates us from
'

the theories of

independent morality

'

as

'

the

reminded,

are

superiorwho has
his subjects. Npjw

1 f"b]
p]p_j}f
ftjprinci
jgajjgn
of
moral
theological
duty is
interpretation
^mnr

we

in God
1uJT^yjilur_;
find

interpretationof

the

autonomy

then

do

we

secondly,the
only
of

one

which
'

reason

and

put forward

by the rationalistic

this

necessityof choosing
explained above, and

schools.

However,
between

the

autonomous

quently
LThomas

we

it would

seem

to

us,

theologicalmorality, as
Conse
us.
morality is in no way forced upon
the opinion of St.
prefer to follow_unreservedly

which

makes

the

morarobligati

OF

THEORY

GOOD

AND

EVIL

239

who
rules alLJthings
tfre inteiligence_ofjjod
by His Provi

dence.
-

Moral

44.

Obligation

Nature-

Human

elements

"

The

has

moral

its

Explanation

and

Foundation

of obligation
has
necessity

in

three

(i)t]^jDhysicjJ_jiec^^

completegood, and, as a correlative,the physicalimpossibility

of willingwhat
is not
does not appear
to be our
or
good
110) ; (2)the physicalnecessityof discovering
(Psychology,
both (a)by the attention of the
sooner
or later-and
repeatedly,
of the principle
mind and (6)by the spontaneous application
of
to our
actions and to our dependentand finite nature,
causality
that as our
real good can
only be completelyfound in the
of God, the realization of the happinesswhich we
possession
demands
the entire employment of our
necessarily
pursue
in the service of God.
nature
(3)The physicallibertyof ful
our
filling
duty. Although there is an evident objective
the completehappinesswe
connexion between
will
necessarily
and our
performance of the moral good and of the service of
God, nevertheless our performanceof the moral good and the
service of God is not subjectto that necessitating
law which
to seek our
us
own
obliges
happiness. From this it follows that
the imperativeness
of duty is consistent with libertyin its
performance. For in the conditions of this present life the
of the service of God is
performanceof the good and especially
attended by obscurityfor the intellect and by fear,toil,and
for the will,so that this latter faculty,
of which the
privations
adequateobjectis the total good, may not always will what is
its true good.
of willingour
Hence it is the physicalnecessity
good and of
seeingin what it will be realized in the life to come, combined
of choosingthe concrete
with the liberty
objectwherein it is in
that com
fact found realized,which gives to the duty of man
moral necessity
of attributes included under the name
plexity
'

'

'

or

moral

This
after

our

obligation'.

moral
true

moral

end, but also

to
particular

will in

necessityobligesour
as

consequence

to

use

seek
the

have
We
a
specialnatural
leading to the same.
lead us to
which
the means
facility
disposingus to know
the Scholastics called
which
our
habit
end, a facility
or
habitus principiorumrationis practicae or, more
briefly,

means

'

'

'

'

'

'.
synteresis

ETHICS

240
We

therefore

can

that

say

human

is

nature

law

unto

of doing good
that it bears within itself the obligation
itself,
the soul's own
and avoidingevil,inasmuch
as
tendency to
wards its completegood puts upon the will,enlightened
by the
of willing
judgments of the reason, the moral necessity
practical
the supreme
the good that is uprightand, in its final analysis,
is realized.
good in which its completegood and perfection
45. The
and

Ultimate

Distinction

of the

Reason

Obligation and
consequently of Moral
God ; it is formally in the Practical Reason
destined
Beings to a Necessary Last End

in
has

who

briefly,in the
His

Himself

accordinglyknows

are

related to His essential goodness,and

of

as

beings He

He

being must

how

Providence^

of

knows

He

essence.

own

Reason

Practical

the

should

He

the

relations

necessary

between

these

Divine

Being.
'

Mind

of

the eternal law '.

are

conceived

as

Such

good and evil,and

obligation.

of moral

IV.
46. Moral

Virtue.

"

MORAL

As

rational nature,
and

immediate

it

good

man.

and

The

11

'

tern.

prius
q. 92,

given, good u.
est

Cum

law

a.

i.

by

consists

law

the end

called moral

are

is to lead

its

in

of man's

virtue

is

result from
virtues.

subjectsto
makes

effect of law is to make

proprium legis,inducere

igiturvirtus

effectus

foundation

of the natural law

that
qualities

virtue is that which

since

'

Hoc

goodness of the
by the Divine

the moral

dictated

acts

habitual

it follows that the proper

it is

exist

that the direct

may
say with St. Thomas
him who observes
effect of the law is to make

effect of law

proper
virtue

must

we

of the moral

observance

reason
practical

VIRTUES

regard for

performance of good

the

Himself, it is

is the ultimate

of the distinction between

and

good.

Being,who

which

essential

the

relations

These

His

subordination

and

creatures

knows

to create
power
that every created

sees

perceiveby

not

more

has

alone is the necessary and infinite good.

to exist distinct from
If God wills creatures

impossiblethat

or,

necessary

for its end the Divine

have
necessity

of Him

God

"

is

Law,

Evil, and

found

Good

between

an

the
'

The

their proper

its

good,
subject

those to whom

habitual

disposition,

subjectos ad propriam ipsorum virtusequiturquod pro-

sit quae
facit bonum
habentem,
legisest bonos facere eos quibus datur '.

Sum.

Theol., I-II,

THEORY

either received

The latter

the will,

virtues

Some

easier.
activity

are

Principal Moral

47.

is added

makes

of the rational soul and

powers

EVIL

AND

normal

48. We

distinguish between

the Commands

and
of

exercise of

It is readily
admitted

"

SUBJECTIVE CRITERION

THE

natural

others
perfectthe intellect,

virtues

V.

the

to

the

virtues.

moral

Virtues.

the

hingeupon four fundamental or

fortitude and temperance.
prudence,justice,

moral

241

(infused
virtue)or acquiredby

God

from

GOOD

(acquiredvirtue),which

individual

its

OF

Moral

Practical

Reason.

and

the

of

cardinal virtues

MORALITY

OF

Good

the Prohibitions

that the

Evil, between

Natural

Law,

by

The

practicalreason
passes judgments on the conformityor non-conformityof an
The uprightnessof an
act with a determined
end.
act lies
in the relation of subordination
which this act has
objectively
to the end of our
rational nature.
Therefore the judgment
which estimates this relation must
be the subjective
criterion
of the goodnessor badness of moral acts.

Judgments

49. There
or

lutionist

Origin

Moral

for

account

'

to

that

the

the

in the Course

concerned

"

This

Nervous

ideas and

kind

of

our

instinct

faculties,or

is at

once

The

Evo
their

owe

made

us

Insufficient

and

have

parts. The

comprises two

attribute the

overrulingour

an

first is

originof

our

good either to some

cognitiveand appetitive
of the soul, or again to a

attraction towards

affective power
termed
specialfaculty,sui generis,
to

Order.

Moral

Moral

Intellect to

the

Modifications
'

with those theories which

moral

from

con
Utility,gathered and
History, which by arousing

of

of Human

thesis

'

Nature

Principles of Morality

Beings Organically Moral

Erroneous.

distinct

of the

Experiences

Corresponding

us

'

Sense

"

in Human

to suppose

Knowledge

our

Theory

solidated

into

Need

no

'

Instinct

in

is

our

the

the

'

moral

sense

'.

The

theory of organicmorality'.
Proof of the firstpart. The theory of Moral Sentiment
breaks down before an introspective
of the testimony of
analysis
conscience.
For when
we
analysea moral sentiment we learn
that ultimately
it is always subjectto the practical
judgment

second

part deals with

of the

mind, which

the

'

approves it according
More
as its objectagrees or disagrees
with man's natural end.
the arguments brought forward by the adherents of this
over
either condemns

or

ETHICS

242
the

and persistent
spontaneity,
universality
energy of
the moral conscience
undoubtedly establish the fact that we
have a natural and constant
towards moral good,
disposition
but they prove nothingmore.
Proof of the second part. The theory of organicmorality

theory
"

"

'

is insufficient and

erroneous.

It is insufficient :

1.

ciple. We have to
is a true
disposition
or

if it

puts

then

ask

English

own

; if the

as
persistence
they obsess
to know
moreover,
teresting,

and

deceive

how

it affirms

self-destructive when

itself

eventuallyto our
to explainthe origin
of these
and
their universality
and

ancestors,

our

It is

the evolutionist
that

be in

theoryis not

the moral

from

apart

erroneous

is

conscience

its fundamental

the
or
disposition,
instinct,or again this

a nervous
identifying

an

It would

us.

illusion.

simply an

with

are
a
persons who
is true, the theory of

case

reduces

second, it is necessary
in

not

deluded

If the first

evolutionists

hallucinations

2.

of

of those

impulse is

prin
this organic impulse or
the good and of our duty,

whether

manifestation

to hallucinations.

prey
the

instinctive

an

in the state

us

'

animal

of

structure

of

error
an

organ,

instinct itself with

faculty or habit, the evolution of moral ideas and

spiritual
sentiments, invented by the EnglishNaturalists,is in manifest
oppositionto experience, (a)If our moral ideas and propen
of the
due solelyto the hereditarydispositions
sities are
that morality so
about
does it come
often
organism,how
imposes a duty upon us, and that the will has the power of
the

acting contrary to
herited ?
(b) Man's

instincts which

has

nature

our

in

is

constantly discoveringnew
relations in the moral order, more
complex applicationsof the
laws of rightconduct.
we
By what right can
deny to our
this same
ancestors
faculty of judging right and wrong,
which
find daily exercised by our
we
duty and prohibition,
reason

selves ?
50.

The

sequently
Good
et

First
the

must

First

scribed and

and

importance to

Evil

et Malum

between
what

of

the

Commandment

done

prosequendum,

discriminate

of

be

Principle

good

Practical
of the

Natural

avoided.

'

vitandum

'.

and

Bonum
"

what

Law,
est

The

con

is that

faciendum

intellect has to

evil, between

is prohibited
by the natural
know

and

Reason,

law.

what
It

is the first principle

of the

is pre

is,then,

practical

ETHICS

244

VI.
The

51.

SANCTION

THE

Moral

OF

demands

Law

MORAL

THE

Sanction.

LAW

Considered

"

ob

and
the sanction of a law consists of all the rewards
jectively,
punishments attached to the performanceor to the violation of
is the promulgationof
it ; considered formally,the sanction
and
this system of rewards
punishments reserved for those
who

transgress the law.

law, by its very definition,is concerned

observe

or

moral

The

with

judg
performed ; it is a collection of practical
Now
ments.
can
man
perform an action only under the aspect
of its being a good, and can
reasonablywill no good but what
all the particular
is his good in reality. But
goods that are
the objectof his desires are such reallyonly in virtue of being
actions

to

be

subordinated

it follows

Whence

good.

have been inconsistent with the wisdom

would
not

to his supreme

been

established

happiness or
violation

of the

the

on

law

moral

and

hand

one

the

on

also have

happinessto him as
reserved unhappinessfor

assured

it,and have

the
In

other.

Providence, in imposingthe moral

Divine

had

between

indissoluble connexion

an

misery

of God

that

it

there
man's

practice or
other

words,

law upon man,

must
reward if he observed

him

in

punishment if he
Sanction

violated it.
52.
Moral

the

During

Law, but

Present

Life

it is Insufficient.

there

is

As

far

as

"

the

the

for

present life is

:
concerned, four kinds of sanction are usuallydistinguished
(a) The natural sanction, which consists of the natural con

of

actions ; health,comfort and success, generally

and disease,
follow temperance and diligence,
whilst weakness

sequences

both

in

(6)The

our

mind

and

in

body,

interior sanction

satisfaction

which

results

of

are

the

from

normal

the

voice
the

result of vice.

of conscience,

fulfilment

of

the

or

duty,

the

consequent upon an unworthy act ; the sense of honour

or of shame, self-approvalor self-condemnation
; the joy of being
united to God by love, the misery of being separated from Him
by grave sin. (c)The legalsanction, or the system of rewards
remorse

and

established
penalties
(d)The publicor
by positivelaws,
social sanction of praiseor
blame
or
from others, of esteem
omnia
ratio

ilia facienda

vel

practica naturaliter

TheoL, I'll, q. 94,

a.

2"

vitanda

pertineant ad praecepta legisnaturae,

'. ST. THOMAS,
apprehendit esse bona humana

quae
Sum,

THEORY

GOOD

OF

discredit,gloryor infamy which

to

AND

EVIL

attaches

245

in different

degrees

external actions.

our

That

the

moral

is not

law

its sanctions

without

during the
goodness is seldom

present life is proved by the dailyfacts that

without its reward and wrongdoing its chastisement, and
man's

conduct

have

mentioned.

arraignedbefore

is

the

that

different sanctions

we

present sanctions are insufficient. For, to be

trulyadequate, a sanction requiresto be (a)universal,that is,
it must
bad one
leave no good action without its rewalxTTno
it must
without its chastisement ; (b)proportionate,
exactly
the merit or demerit of the agent ; and (c)efficacious,
meet
that
Yet

is, it

these

sufficient influence upon

man's free-will to
of the fundamental
general the maintenance

have

must

guarantee in
of
principles

Now

be

to

of the

none

present life verifies

offered in this

sanction,then,

order.

moral

the

adequate must

sanctions

all these

conditions.

be found

elsewhere, in

A
a

future life.
53.

After

know,

ness.

"

what

Time

of

of trial ;

alreadyremarked

have

by

reason

and

eternally

will be deprived

the Wicked

We

Trial, the Length

will be

Virtuous

the

and

Life

itself can

we

shall

tell

rewarded

for

in
about

of which
in

Happi

Psychology(171)upon
the

length of
presentlyinterrogatethe same
us

not

Future

of their

ever

do

we

our

time
source

joysand painsof the body in the other life. Here,

in view supreme
have particularly
and
or eternal happiness
we
misery. But the questionis reallyonly about eternal misery,
be
since, as we have alreadypointed out, happinesscannot
complete except on the condition that it is eternal.
With
before us, philosophycan
regard to the proposition
establish two points: (i)
The idea of eternal punishmentis not
about

the

contrary

to

reason

; God

can

inflict on

for certain grave

man

eternal damnation,
If
a supreme
(ii)
delinquencies
of the providential
order of the
consider the exigencies
we
must
universe, God
give a sanction to the moral law by
eternal punishment. If,
the guiltya supreme
on
inflicting
with
therefore,He can and must punish grave transgressions
eternal chastisement, it is a logical
conclusion that the guilty
an
or

mortal

will in fact be for

Proof that God

punishment. The
"

ever
can

unhappy.
visit the

essence

guiltywith

of the sin

we

term

supreme eternal

mortal, of sin in the

ETHICS

246

of God
repudiation

strict sense, liesin the

himself into

of the

one

own

free choice

and

of the

such

summum

himself

state

And

if a

of his

man

state until the very end of his

of his privation
of
the cause

flows

allows events
of mortal

naturallyfrom

it.

to take their course,

sin will be for

in

ever

unhappiness.

Sin incurs

debt

the

But

order.

effect

of

punishment through disturbingan

remains so long as the cause
remains.

long as the
punishment must

Wherefore
debt of

last end.

happiness which

dies in

who

man

state of
'

in
persists

it follows that if God

Hence
the

of his
repudiation

trial,he becomes

his end

'

our

By this sin,then, man

freelyputs
that
of
right order, namely,
contrary to
state^

into

life of

is

ultimate end.

',our

bonum

who

so

disturbance

of the order remains

needs remain

also.

Now

the

disturbance

:
reparable,sometimes irreparable
i
s
defect which destroysthe principle irreparable,
because
a
be saved, defects can
be repairedby
whereas
if the principle
of sight
virtue of that principle.For instance,if the principle
be destroyed,
sightcannot be restored except by divine power ;
of sightbe preserved,while there arise
whereas, if the principle
these can be remedied
certain impediments to the use of sight,
by nature or by art. Now in every order there is a principle
whereby one takes part in that order. Consequentlyif a sin
destroysthe principleof the_or der whereby man's will is subject

order

is sometimes

of

an

to

God, the disorder will be such

as

to be considered

in itself,

to repairit by the power

of
although it is possible
irreparable,
of this order is the last end, to which
Now
the principle
God.
sins turn man
adheres by charity. Therefore whatever
man
considered in them
from God, so as to destroycharity,
away
selves,incur a debt of eternal punishment 13.
'

'

18

Peccatum
Manente

ordinem.
ordinis

remanet,

hoc

ex

autem
necesse

inducit
causa,
est quod

rationem
manet
remaneat

quod pervertit aliquem

poenae,
effectus : unde
quamdiu perversitas
reatus

poenae.

Pervertit

autem

quandoque quidem reparabiliter,

irrepaquandoque autem
aliquis ordinem
rabiliter.
principium, irreparabilis
Semper enim defectus, quo subtrahitur
salvatur
est ; si autem
principium, ejus virtute alii defectus repararipossunt,
sicut si corrumpatur
potest fieri visionis reparatio
principium visivum, non
salvo principio visivo, aliqua impedimenta
nisi sola virtute divina ; si vero
vel per artem.
visioni, reparari possunt per naturam
adveniunt
Cujuslibet
ordinis
est aliquod principium per quod aliquis fit particeps illius
autem
Et ideo si per peccatum
ordinis.
corrumpatur principium ordinis quo volunetsi
erit inordinatio, quantum
Deo
subditur
est de
tas
se, irreparabilis,
ultimus
divina.
virtute
ordinis
est
autem
Principium
hujus
repararipossit
Et ideo quaecumque
inhaeret per charitatem.
finis cui homo
peccata avertunt

est de
Deo, charitatem auferentia quantum
Sum.
ST. THOMAS,
Theol., I-II, q. 87,

poenae'.

se, inducunt
a.

3.

"

De

reatum

aeternae

malo, q. 7,

a.

i.

THEORY

OF

GOOD

EVIL

AND

247

Proof that the order of God's Providence demands that the

guiltyshould be eternally
deprivedof happiness. Libertyis only
"

property of

end ; it is subordinate to
too has, and must
liberty

being a

attach the

abuse

of

human

will is not

its

own

higherthan itself. Hence

normallymaintain, the character
end

an

end.

our

if Divine

But

Providence

its
of

did not

privationof our end to the proper

this libertywould
lose its
liberty,

the

or
possession

the

or

use

to

means

The

will.

the human

our

of

since then the proper use or the

being a means,
abuse of moral liberty
would bear no real influence on our final
destiny. Therefore Divine Providence must vouchsafe happi
to the good as a recompense
for virtue and deny it to the
ness
bad as a punishment for crime.
The above argument is corroborated
by the consideration
that eternal reward
and eternal punishment are necessary if
the observance
of the fundamental
laws of moralityis to be
efficacious.
made really
character

54.

from

End

Happiness suffer

the

posed
mortal
to

Reason.

to

sin

creatures

he should
that

only turns

should

to

fit the

away

from

Pain

be

of

source

Loss

is not

crime.

Now

op

by

but also adheres

God

his real end, which

freely

the Eternal

of Positive

must

who

Sinner

It is reasonable, then, not

deprivedof

creatures

the

in addition

Infliction

his end.

as

be

must

Punishment

"

not

man

that

Teaching

his Last

turns
of

Christian

The

is

only that

God, but also

positivepunishment for

him.
the
Secondly,

sin.
The
in

But

no

one

who

man

purpose of punishment is to deter

fears to lose that for which he has

turns
deliberately

losingit.

Chastisement

includes the infliction of

55.

Outline

moral

of the

no

desire.

no

distress

onlyif it

positive
punishment 14.
Doctrine

of Moral

Duty.

"

The

observes, is universal, absolute and

is universal,absolute and necessary cannot

'

some

thingsof experience.Moral obligation

j
all
to
anterior
experience,
to[
principle

'

priori form.

What

l"

name

from

Kant
obligation,

is therefore due to

and

will then deserve the

Kantian

necessary. What
derive its origin
from the
an

from his last end has

man

is this pure

in consequence
ST. THOMAS,

form

which

is alone

has

no

empiricalconnexions

capable of being

Cont. Gent., Ill, c. 145.

universal

and

ETHICS

248

'

It is the principle
from
Act as if the maxim
:
necessary ?
which you act were
to become
through your will a universal

law

of nature

can

serve

as

'

',or

in accordance

Act

This

universal law '.

with

maxim

which

is the well-known

absolute!

called in contradistinction to an
so
categorical
imperative,
hypothetical imperativewhich, according to Kant, though
regarding a real objectis subordinate to a contingent con
If you will this or that, then you must
dition :
proceedthus
or

'

or

'.

so

The

of the will consists in not allowingitselfto be

perfection
:
influenced by any other motive except the absolute imperative
itself. This independenceof the will with regard to any real
of submittingitself to none
motive of action, this power
but
is what
the categorical
Kant calls the autonomy
imperative,
of practical
reason
',the pure self-determination of the rational
'

will,or, in

'

word,

freedom

is the exclusive

',which

of

source

morality,understandingtherebyof good and virtue.

it is contradictory
to wish to
According to this principle,
make the moral law efficacious by the incentive of reward or by
the

fear of
the

touch

Likewise

punishment.

has its

conscience,which

the

legal sanction

play in

cannot

an

interior

province

aloof from

that

there is

and

law

all influence of civil power, so

essential separationbetween
moral

But

this does not

mean

to say

law to be without

sanction

contradiction

there

formed

that

of

in view

for

should

that

right15.
regarded the moral

Kant

although
be

radical

and

he says

moral

that

which

act

it is

is per

through fear of a punish

generalterms in view of happiness,yet it is no
ment, or in more
less true that
virtue is worthy of happiness '.
By combining this principlewith the fact that in the present
life virtue is not
always rewarded, Kant is brought to the
the law of justice
life where
a future
necessityof postulating
and judge
reigns,and where consequentlya sovereignlegislator
a

or

recompense

'

will establish

indissoluble

an

connexion

between

virtue

and

happiness.
analysisof moral
the
the fundamental
laws of that spiritualism
duty, to justify
validityof which he had impugned in his speculative
philosophy.
Thus

16

did Kant

Kant

which
demands

is

makes
a

of

matter

endeavour, by

difference
of

means

of

an

voluntary obedience to the moral law

conformity of external action to the
regardless of disposition.TRS.

between

and
disposition,

positive law, which

is

"

56.

GOOD

Good

Moral

Law.

Moreover

Argument

are

definition

Evil may

and

moral

be

the
False.

rule is

EVIL

AND
is

Categorical Imperative

The

which

his

OF

THEORY

Moral

no

distinguished,

Principles

nor

249
Standard
is it

which

on

Kant

by
True
bases

Proof of the firstpart : By its

judgment, and therefore
practical

"

judgment concerning the relation of an act with its end. But

the Kantian
theory of a moral act does away with the idea of

Consequentlyit makes any relation of an act

and therefore rules out any true norm
end impossible
of
to an
morality.
which is the essential
Proof of the second part : Obligation,
note of a law, is a certain necessity,
put upon the will,of freely
But it is inconceivable that the
actingin a determined way.
will should be drawn to act except by a final cause, that is,by
Hence
the cate
of a good to be willed.
the representation
imperativewhich claims to exclude all real final causes
gorical
will cannot
the sphere of the moral
from
produce any real
and consequentlyis not a law in the proper sense.
obligation
Proof of the third part : It is not true that the notes of
that are characteristic of the moral
and necessity
universality
the data of experience
derive their origin from
law cannot
faculties of
when
these are
put to the service of the spiritual
man's soul (Psychology,
89-92).
real end.

any

It is not

true

that human

nature

the
consequence
consist in an
consists or can

that

in

Finally,it is not
natural

attraction

true
we

is or

perfectionof
absolute

that

reason

end, and

be its own

can

practicalreason

the

autonomy.
forbids

us

to

follow the

enjoyment of our
desire of this enjoy

experiencetowards

the

only necessary that the

it com
ment
should be rightlydirected, in order to make
patiblewith the higheststandard of moralityof which human
is capable. Our
love when
nature
perfectlyordered seeks
God, our objectiveend, primarilyand above all things,and
the
results from
that subjectivehappinesswhich
secondarily
of God.
possession

happiness;

VII.

it is

NATURAL

CHARACTERISTICS

57. Characteristics
the

of the

Moral

distinctive characteristics of

known.
versally

OF

Law.

THE

"

MORAL
The

moral

being immutable

ORDER
law

and

has

uni

ETHICS

250

do not
we
say that the moral law is immutable
that the matter
which the moral obligation
regardsnever

When

1.
mean

we

changes ; but

in

that

this matter

as

moral

precepts of the

the

far

so

From

modification.
any
of the moral law
application

subject to

circumstances

of time

and

to

common

natural

reason

all ;

the same,

it cannot

concern

be

this it follows that

the

general,independent of the
and place,and in this sense
is eternal
it binds every man
in possession
of his

is

at what

matter

no

which

law

remains

time he may

live

he

where

or

dwell.

may

Being immutable, it does

careful

be

must

not

certain abstract

admit

not

of

exceptions. Yet we
objectivelaw itself with

identifythe

to

of which

formulae

make

we

use

for the purpose

and which,
expressionas possible,
the generalityof cases, allow of
16.
additions and restrictions for particular
cases
moral
The
law is nniver^Uy known ; it is sufficiently
2.
of reason
has come
who
to the use
promulgated that no man
be ignorant of it without
for his ignorcan
being responsible
an
giving it as accurate
being enunciated to meet

of

Indeed

"uce.

denote

not

the

; he

reason

that

grant

this is

moral

end, and

time

at

his

years at which we
it signifies
: but

the

his actions should

the

does

which

have

he

capableof
in regard

has

become

agent.

derived

is

first

conclusions

of

conclusions 17. The

remote

of invincible

or

between

made

immediate

or
principles

law, and
error

reason

capable of using

the

to

come

general distinction

before

enough

subordination

moral

their

child is

'

the age of

age .of reason

he has it in his power
to reflect and is

he has

the
perceiving
to

well

reasons

when

the time

which

at

age

'

For

truism.

moral

the

of
possibility

natural

ignorance appliesonly

principles,

to

remote

con

clusions.
of
universality

The

of the moral

law

18

Cp. SUAREZ,

17

In
se

per
facienda

the
ratio
;

De

has been

naturalis

sicut

c.

St. Thomas

13, n. 6-10.
writes:

patrem

tuum

sunt
Quaedam autem
observanda
a sapientibusjudicantur esse
tamen
indigeantdisciplina,
qua minores
Coram
cano
capite consurge, et honora
.

Sum.

et

quae

Theol., I-II, q.

100,

a.

i.

of the

'

Quaedam
dijudicat esse

cujuslibet hominis

Honora

furtumfacies.

promulgationand
proved above.

II,
legibus,

strain

same

the

matrem,

et

statim
quae
vel non
facienda
occides ; Non
Non

sunt,

subtiliori consideratione

; et ista sic sunt

a

knowledge

de

lege naturae,

sapientibusinstruantur,

personam

rationis

senis ; et alia

sicut

ut

illud^:

hujusmodi

'.

ETHICS

252

giving of

has

person

is it that

How

the

on
recompense
merited.
What

part of him

is the

before

whom

of this title ?

foundation

rightorder exacts that a good action done

to another
should
be requitedby the bestowal
of something
equivalentlyor proportionally
good, and that an evil one be
have been
punished with an evil return ? Several answers
suggested.
That God who
of
providentially
arranges for the observance
the primary laws of morality should
direct our
conduct
by
of
of
is
rewards
and
means
a
system
easily
punishments,
it
is
these grounds that we
base our
understood, and
on
proof
of the necessity
of the reality
of the sanction
and, consequently,
of the moral

the

law

(51ff.).But

account
be, does it sufficiently

may

merit and
in

ments

demerit

Must

moralityin

valid this first

however

answer

for the intrinsic nature

of

be recompenses
and chastise
that the law may
be kept, or do

there

order

and chastisements
recompenses
kept or violated ?

exist because the law has been

By pushing his theory of disinterested moralityto excess,

Paul Janet goes so far as to deny that the hope of a recompense
the fear of a punishment can
of
be a legitimate
motive
or
This is of

action.

course

an

exaggeration. Reward

legitimatemotive, the final cause

however, be acknowledged that, in

of

moral

order

the

act.

of

can

be

It must,

merit
finality,

is anterior to recompense,
and that it must
be considered in a
it.
certain sense
since it demands
the cause
of the recompense
of merit is an ap
the recognition
According to Taparelli,
plicationof the laws of symmetry, proportionand unity21.
But

transferringto the order of aesthetics a problem

which belongs to morals.
Certainlythe moral order, too, has
its laws, its harmony and its beauty ; but the questionwe must
if the
ask is how
would this beauty be disregarded
precisely
to whom
a
good action is done failed to reckon its
person
'

this is

merit
The

'

at its proper

followingconsideration

solution.

All the

by right redound
out

11

of

value.

will

good accruingto
to

benevolent

the

author

an

act

of the

intention he turns

Saggio teoretico di dtritto natuvale, I, c.

et juris nat., c. 2, n. 56.

view, Instit. eth.

perhaps help

6.

towards

must, it would
act.

his

When

good

Liberatore

seem,

therefore

action to the

also takes

the same

THEORY

GOOD

OF

AND

EVIL

253

deprivinghimself of
profitof his neighbour,he is really
thing that is his own ; and instead, the person to whom

some

the

done, without his own

personalcontribution to the
Whereas
good effect,acquiresa good which is not his own.
service

is

so-called effectively
restores with a mathematical
justice
strictly
the equalityof strict rights,the recognitionof merit
precision
is the approximate estimate
of an
exchange of goods and

profitswhich

hardly be

could

estimated

in

of strict

terms

person benefited confesses and acknowledgesthat

the equalityof things has been altered in his favour : accord

justice. The

will be anxious

inglyhe

that it should

be restored

behalf of

on

his benefactor,since such is the natural order of

it be

impossiblefor

him

do

to

restoringthis equality,he will

guiltyof

miserable

things.Should
anything towards effectively
to be

least,unless he wishes

at

acknowledge
ingratitude,

in his mind

the

Merit and the

good action by which he has been benefited.
recognitionand reward of it are therefore reallyan application
of justice
in the wide meaning of the term.
has
how
These explanations help us
to understand
man
not, if
'

What

hast

faculties
from

the hand

giftsof

61.

Are

Thomas

of
are

that

hast

thou

For,

received ?

not

'

The

perform our virtuous actions are gifts

God, and consequentlythe good works them
their fruit are, by their principal
title,also

by which

selves which
the

thou

God.

before

merit

speak precisely,
any

we

we

God.
Acts

any

that

Morally

Indifferent

althoughcertain

acts

W7e

"

only in

considered

St.

with

hold

relation

specific
objectare neither good nor bad, yet if taken in
their concrete
reality,with the end and circumstances deter
to their

'

moral or immoral
(34). It
mining them, all acts are necessarily
happen that the objectof an action does not include some
may
to the order of reason
thing pertaining
; for instance, to pick
and the like :
up a straw from the ground,to walk in the fields,
'.
and such actions are
indifferent according to their species
Since it belongsto the reason
to direct ; if an action that pro
'

ceeds from

by

that

evil.
reason

needs

But
;

deliberate

fact

reason

alone, repugnant

if it be

directed to

wherefore

it

be either directed

quently every

human

is
or

end, it is,

be not directed to the due

to
a

and

reason,

due

end

action

directed to
that

specifically

it is in accord

good.
specifically
not

is

due

it must

Now

end.

proceedsfrom

with

Conse

deliberate

ETHICS

254

'

62.

Good

Janet
The

'

and

be

good

or

moral

good

tical

it

judgments

of

duty occupy
the genericor

reason

time

he does act
is not

he must

actuallyto
or
rather, materiallygood ;
good only when such an act
end of the moral
Good

it would

be

field if moral

same

formal

acceptationof
the

to

is bound

man

with

do

everythingthat

he

has

to

do

what

do

every
But

them.

is

the

prac
to

never

rules of conduct, and

in accordance

act

bound

the proper
63. The

for

to these

anything which is contrary

the

is conformable

what

means

"

take of this ?

we

and

goodness is taken in
as

make

"

should

view

word, inasmuch

amongst others
duty and the good co

"

Tiberghien
What

writers

Duty '. Many

24

and

extensive.

man

individual,must

2a.

'

bad

in the

if it be considered

reason,

specifically,
materially

is

is necessary for the realization of

order 25.

the
good,Tightness,
moral
law, are words which have a meaning only in respect
of our
end, it follows that every rightact is implicitly
supreme
and virtually
But
act that contributes to the gloryof God.
an
and

the

End.

Supreme

"

As

human
act
every
the actual or express

that

to conclude
illegitimate

morallygood unless inspiredby

intention of givinggloryto God 2C.
Can the glory of God
be the supreme
object of our will ?
Is it not physically
this
should subordinate
necessary that we
to the desire of our
own
happiness? No ; it is not necessary.
A will rightly
ordered embraces
what is objective the
at once
other than the objective
end which rules it beingnone
supreme
the subjectivehappiness which
and
is the
glory of God
of the possession
of this objective
natural
end.
concomitant
Nor must
we
forgetthat the moral act is free,and that being
be

cannot

"

"

'

11

Contingit quod objectum

actus

non

includit

aliquid pertinens

rationis, sicut levare festucam

dinem

ad

or-

de terra, ire ad campum

etc.
et tales
indifferentes
sunt
'. Sum.
actus secundum
Theol., I-II, q. 18,
speciem suam
rationis sit ordinare, actus
ratione
deliberativa
8.
Cum
a
a.
procedens, si
finem
sit
debitum
hoc
ad
ex
ordinatus,
non
ipso repugnat rationi, et habet
.

'

rationem

mali

rationis, unde
vel
a

non

ordinetur

deliberativa

si

ad debitum
ordinetur
rationem
Necesse
boni.

finem, convenit

vero

habet

ad debitum

ratione

finem.

procedentem,

Unde

est autem

necesse

in individuo

'. Ibid., a. 9.
La Morale, II, ch. II.
de Vhumanitk,
Les commandements

est

omnem

"
14
11

86

Theol., I-II, q. 94,

Ibid., q. 60, a. I.
Sum.

a.

3.

ne

comm.,

ordinetur

actum

hominis

consideratum,

vel malum

p.

128.

ordine

cum

vel

quod

bonum

esse

GOOD

OF

THEORY

Now

free it is the result of reflection.

to

he himself, together with

that

see

subordinate
essentially

255

reflection leads
all that

he is and

givingof gloryto

the

to

EVIL

this essential subordination

wills that

he

AND

and
tained,he wills the rightorder of things,

man

man

has, is

God.

When

be

should

main

capable of

is certainly
reflecting
capable of willingthis 27.
64.

of Goodness

Degrees

is evident

that

or

good

Wickedness

in Human

evil admit

and

Acts."

It

of

degrees. To
to the various principles
have recourse
estimate them we must
which we have alreadyshown to
both objectiveand subjective
rectitude (34). After having laid down
the
constitute moral
:
proposition
Neque omnia bona opera, neque omnia peccata
shows that for determiningthe degree
sunt paria',St. Thomas
both

'

goodness or malice of an
subject,its conformitywith
of

act

the

of the will,and
intensity
the act 28.
inspires

the

of

take

must

we

into account

its

judgment of reason, the degree

of the virtue which
perfection

philosophyof Schopenhauer
Hartmann
is a congeriesof arbitraryhypotheses,
and von
from the theory
borrowed
often mutually contradictory,
some
of materialistic evolution,others from pantheism.
is the key of the universe is a will,
which
The principle
is the
absolute, unconscious, and free. The ultimate reality
65. Pessimistic

Morality.
"

individual

One- All ; the

assertions without proof.)
unconscious

The

is relative

ago it was
for how
hypothesis,

moment

and

free)and
can

is

(a

fatalistic

of

pleasure(mere
?).
'

not-yet-satisfied
be

of effort cannot

end

negation or denial of the

'

"

of this if it is unconscious

it know

ideas). Hence the

effort is illusory.Whence

attained ;
arrive at the

(an hypo

contradiction

has for its sole end

But the effort of will is pain,the ache of the

(a confusion

(Mere

illusion.

an

will is effort

of the absolute

manifestation

thesis)which

The

it follows that

must

we

will itself. The

to search
then, is only a will that is striving
painfully

world,
for

an

impossible
happiness(gratuitousand contradictoiy).
As for moral duty,it liesin willing
the good of others through
motives
own

27
"

of

good.
Swm.
Cont.

sympathy and altruism

This

renunciation

TheoL, I-II, q.
Gent., III.

c.

23, a.
140.

and

and

in

of one's

7.

ceasingto

own

good

will one's

will

bring

ETHICS

256
about

universal

brotherhood

and

lead all

absolute

to

men

unity.
From

these

conclude

that

but

theories it would
suicide is

avoid

to

adduces

such

moral

logically

must

we

obligationbindingupon

universal

that

seem

annihilation

all ;

Schopenhauer
'

it is not

Suicide is the
an
answer
:
phrase,though
negation only of life,not of the will-to-live '. Von Hartmann,
the most
energeticof Schopenhauer's disciples,
argues to the
a

the annihilation of the

for
necessity,

collective

cosmic suicide.

evolution towards
66.

of
will-to-live,

This

Independent Morality.
"

term

stand

for any
which is
rationalistic,
may

theory of morality,whether deistic or

religion. Catholic doctrine merely
independentof all positive
the lessons taught by experiencewhen
it
sums
up accurately
both in the
proclaims the universal and constant inferiority
those peoples
knowledge and practiceof the moral law among
aid of revelation and grace.
who
without the supernatural
are
The doctrine of the relative necessity
of Revelation
which finds
its application
equallyin the moral as in the purelyspeculative
order
is briefly
extract
summed
from the
up in the following
"

"

Council
indeed

of

Vatican

the

be attributed

to

divine,are

'

that

of themselves

not

To

this divine

those

things which, in

beyond reason

in the

presentcondition of the human

with firm certainty
and with
difficulty,

no

matters

be known,

can

by all men,

race,

it is

Revelation

admixture

even

without

of error

'

zg.

To-day, however, the term

IndependentMorality is more
generallyused for the attempt to build up a system of ethics,
both

in

the

regard to

knowledge

of the moral

and

law

its per

and entirely
formance, which is purelyphilosophic,
independent
of God.

Now

system without

moral

God

is

it is

as

erroneous

as

impracticable.
In

the

first

imperative in
to

say,
towards

end

an

atheistic

an

ultimate

the

as

is

place there
term

which

good and

all

of

no

for the
justification

conceptionof

life. Take

away,
absolute, that is

volitions,an
and all
subsists of itself,
our

moral

our

deliberate volitions

our

cease

aspirations
to have

any

tribuendum
quidem est, ut ea quae in rebus
non
sunt, in praesenti quoque
generis
impervia
per
omnibus
humani
conditioned
expedite,
firma cevtitudine et nullo admixto errore
Enchiridion
Symbolorum, ed. 1911, n. 1786.
cognosci possint'. DENZINGER,
89

'

divinis

Huic

divinae

humanae

revelation!

rationi

se

OF

THEORY

GOOD

EVIL

AND

257

to
object. We cannot conceive the absolute obligation
unless there
in other words, duty
will what is morallygood
or
be, beyond all contingentgoods that I may
may not will,a
which is an end in itself,
good which is not contingent,
namely

final

"

"

God.

Secondly,the study of

theologyshows

natural

absolute

exists,in the ontologicalorder, an

of

whole

the

moral

loves Himself

with

Himself

He

can

though in
fection

has

is

vain

establish

the other?

an

the

one

that

there

on

which

the

fact that

the

God

only in view of
capable of sharing,

that

are

Himself, His infinite Per

31.

expect the moral

to

to the idea of God.

For

be

law

to

how

is the

guaranteed if
sufficiently
that a justand powerfulGod will sooner
eternal harmony between
virtue and
hand, and between vice and misery on

moral

certitude

happinesson

hope

recourse

of the

no

later

beingswho

far different from

without

observance

*",so

love

necessary

His infinite Goodness

or

observed

or

depends,namely

love those

way

Finally,it

man

order

fact

us

law

be

to

(51ff.).

Lay Morality.
Independent Morality,in the
second meaning of the word, is called by preferenceto-day
Lay Morality. Aiming at the suppressionof God, it claims to
67. Secular

have

found

it has

or

"

substitute for God.

assumed

during the

last few

which

forms
principal

The

be

years may

summarized

under three heads.

The

i.

tract and

Theory of Solidarityputs
debt

as

fact of his birth

forward

volition

the basis of the moral

is bound

man

by both

idea of

the

these

by

con

the

mere

ties alike with

societyin general which puts at his disposalan immense

capitalaccumulated
by generationsof his ancestors, and with
his immediate
neighbours whose services he is continually
receiving.This, however, offers no foundation for the moral
A
in point of fact there is no such contract.
as
obligation,
10
11

ST. THOMAS,
Sic'At Deus

/ Dist., 45,
cognoscendo

'

a.

i.

cognoscit omnia quae sunt ab

vel
similitude
inquantum
quaedam veritatis ejus ; ita etiam volendo
habent
amando
essentiam
ab
vult
omnia
sunt
inquantum
eo,
suam,
quae
similitudinem
bonitatis
id quod est volitum
primo ab eo est
ejus. Unde
suam

sunt

co

bonitas

tantum.
ordinat Deus

Alia

sua

quidem
suam

essentiam

assequatur,

aliquam

divinas

faciente*.

au

creaturas

sed

ut

tern

vult in ordine

in finem

ipsae

bonitatis

creaturae

bonitatis acquirant, quod

Ibid., a.

2.

ad bonitatem

divina
esse

suam.

Non
.

quasi per eas bonitatem

operatione similitudinem
posset, nisi eo volente

suae,

non

et

ETHICS

258

contract

No

individual.

heirs

it

of

make

idea

the

of

its

from

of

which

society,

members,

debt

claims

it

regards

superior

represented

by

as

in

the

use

of

origin

with

in

duty
distinct

person

and

we

so-called.

moral

natural

no

and

the

see

them,

to

the

properly

to

freely.
by

has

anybody,

any

into

contracted

forebears

and

Theory

been
inheritance

the

incurring

not

are

Sociological

The

2.

we

has

nature

everybody

to

it is entered

when

generations

of

belongs

it

bind

furthermore,

And

discoveries

the

this

of

engagement

and

exist

only

can

of

right

command.
But

itself

it

has

the

right
and

welfare,

If

it.

it.

right

this

on

ground

conduces
do

only

find

laws

because
it

because

individual's

the

to

in

the

not

but

in

end

no

is not

simply,

what

in

has

it, this

obeys

command

to

it

from

distinct

being

individual,

the

individual

the

real

Moreover,
of

good

command

to

is it

nor

person

the

absolute

the

has

for

exists

for

dividual

composing

individuals

the

it

is not

society

ultimate

their

justification.

of

'

The

3.

moral

the

and

develop

bers

of

is

dard

of

our

tradictory
in

repress

equally
the

doomed

by

this

to

first

ways
order

we
'

human
?

conduct
?
to

nature

failure.

And

with

as

idea

of

man's

realize

to

foundation

the

submission

ourselves,

individuals,

and

his

to

maintain

to

then

as

mem

belong.
'

nature

is

which

Do

not

moralists

are

not

the

further

of

the

for

looks

morality

said, is

which

to

of

in

ourselves,

forms

other

it is

end,

society

What

Theory

imperative

Our

nature.

'

Nature

the

those

Independent

strive

serve

of
to

Morality

the

as

it

interpret

instincts

harmony
we

to

stan

in

con

endeavour

we

to

given

nature

our

foster
this

Like

?
too

seems

all

ETHICS

260

variable,we

and

readilyunderstand

can

Where

direction of conscience.
it would

marks

of mathematical
But

whether

act

an

is

be

good

or

done

expect all the clear

to

when

the
or

it is good

bad would

or

is in doubt

reason

bad, lawful

whether

in doubt

unlawful

To

evil is to do evil,since the will must

evil. No

the act in

who

he

knowledge that

and

it.

(a)If

is bad

act

he succeeds

act when

be

to

doubtful whether

that he is able

and

that it is his

in his efforts,
we

of

conclusion

endeavour

that

to do

to abstain

brought back

are

succeed

not

lead to

the

bound

or

duty

his efforts do

conviction

the

to

good
good or

himself to arrive at certain

resolvingthe doubt, they will nevertheless

result,namely,

an

and must

placed must

so

exert

hypothesis, (b)If

first

the

to

must

alone

good

The immediate

the act is good and

it,or else that the

from

bad.

happens

his doubt

to solve

therefore,may

man,

questionis good or

this is that

choose

do

be to will

evil indifferently
; and to hold the will indifferent to

eschew

cha

evidence 33.

is to

what

act when
or

even

is of such

matter

be unreasonable

racter

2.

the

that the will follows the

important

an

is

case

in

invincibly

that is to say, to the certitude that the moral character

doubtful,
What
then
of the act, its goodness or badness, is doubtful.
?

be done

must

I abstain

Must

from

action

expedient,but no solution. May

the questionof my knowing
on
precisely
unlawful, in this particularcase, for

not

an

This

doubt

the

be

bear

it is lawful

whether
me

would

abstain

to

or

from

acting?
Since it is to
moral

conduct,

doubt

take

the

it goes

the

safest

the

the

pretext that
33

'

Certitudo

to

course

est

semper

it may

improbable; shall

objectivemanifestation

non

is this ?

Is it

there is least

one
adopt definitely

this manifestation

in

when

danger of sin ?
probable,that is, the

in which

is

directingmy

I must

Which

side.

of

be the least
may
of truth
to the manifestation

that the safest

it is reasonable
account

one

duty

saying that

course

least conformable

happen

without

reasonable

most

the safest course,

Yet

that has fallen the

reason

is

quaerenda

side without
of the

in omni

say that
taking into

we

truth, under

incomplete?
materia

Reason

even

in actibus

the
can

enim

humanis, super quibus constituimtur

judicia et exiguntur testimonia, non
demonstrationis, eo quod sint circa contingentia et
potest haberi certitude
ut in pluribusveritatem
variabilia, et ideo sufficit probabiliscertitudo
quae
TheoL, I-II, q. 70,
attingat,etsi in paucioribus a veritate deficiat '. Sum.
a. 2.
Cp. I-II, q. 96, a. i, ad 3.

by

indirect process

an

reflex
a

OF

THEORY

principle
get

or, to

GOOD

use

an

rid of the doubt

direct solution,and

thus

arrive at

AND

EVIL

261

acceptedexpression,by a
to be incapable
of

it knows
a

conscience

that

is prac

certain. We
or
tically
put this process in the
definitely
may
form of a syllogism
:"
A man
does not sin formallywhen he prudentlyjudgesthat
he is doing a lawful action.
Now
when, after a serious effort,
he is not convinced
that an act is unlawful, he can
prudently
regardit as lawful. Hence when the direct doubt concerning
the moral character of an act is invincible,
a man
can
indirectly
form a deliberate and certain conscience that the act is rightand
lawful.
whole

consists
difficulty

in

knowing when a judgment

the moral character of an act is really
on
prudent. Two points
controvertible : (i)that a judgment favourable
to the
are
goodnessof an act is prudent when it has against it only an
the other hand that it is
on
apparent or a futile reason, and (ii)
which rise up in favour of a law
imprudent when the reasons
to which it is opposed show
a very
high degreeof probability.
The
rigoristschool rejectthe one and the lax school the
The

'

'

other.

'

Between

these two

extremes

there

are

'

various shades of

the chief of which are represented

opinion,
by the Probabilists ',
the
and the
Probabiliorists '.
Equi-probabilists
The common
opinionof the present-daymoralists who are
of pure
Probabilists
is that an
known
act is
by the name
that the moral agent can
rest the
formallylawful the moment
lawfulness of his act on
a
even
seriouslyprobable reason,
higherones,
supposingthat there are equal reasons, or even
against it. The Probabiliorists hold that a probableopinion
the contradictory
to be prudent when
reason
ceases
appears to
with the
have a higher or even
a
simply equal probability,
result that, accordingto them, in the case
of a conflict of
opinions of this kind the more
probable or safer must
in practice prevail.Finally,the
taking
Equi-probabilists,
a
midway positionbetween the Probabilists and the Pro
maintain
with the first that a probablereason
babiliorists,
remains sufficient for a prudent judgment in spiteof a contrary
and
opinionwhich rests onlyon a less or even equalprobability,
'

'

'

concede

ought to give way, in the

contradictoryjudgment that rests upon

to the latter that

prudence,to

'

probability.

it

name
a

of

higher

ETHICS

262

Without

all

them

probable,

may

judgment

of

be

is

judgment
conscientia

in

ever

precise

something
in

person

in

not

the

law

of

84

'

tamen

recedat,

and

an

all

in

Quamvis

id
ab

accipitur
recedet

accepts

depart

The
.

simply

quod

opinion

Thomas
his

with

mind

law

the

'

omnem

eventum,

die

errante

sed

fi
A\
AJ

this

to

in

of

these

may

God,
God

of

this

he

will

depart

does

the
; and

law

from
bind

not

it binds

but

tat

conscientia

ipsa

ut

Dei.

lex

erronea

Dei

; et

Conscientia

ideo,

se

per
non

'

sit

consonum

non

erronea

it lasts

whilst

only

ligat

dum

manet

'.

De

veritate,

loquendo,
ligat
q.

17,

34.

legi Dei,
si ab

simpliciter

...

in

Utrum

real

conscience

erroneous

be

erroneous

the

as

from

an

may

conscience

erroneous

it

that

replies

up

more

so

obligation

sums

or

truth,

that

to

common

cases,

lege

St.

accordance

if he

God.

of

systems

probable

the

maintain

to

and

nevertheless

error

'

it

is

simple

matter

Although

strictly speaking,

so,

liget

'

terms

be

can

affirmative,

the

on

different

which

with

permissible

erronea

question

dictate

formed

is it

or

be

whatever,

conscience

these

difficulty

disagreement

in

Now

erroneous.

to

opinion

Any

of

discussion

ourselves

confine

will

we

into

entering

a.

4.

hex:
et

PART
Ethics

Special

II
of

Theory

Right

and

Duty

its wide

sense

Natural

INTRODUCTION
70.

of

Definition

Law

Natural

Law.

Right comprises all

or

In

"

rules

the

of conduct

which

are

deduced
from
the moral
form
the
law, and which
logically
basis of our rightsand duties both with regard to our neighbour
Natural
understood
is the
and societyin general. Thus
Law
Social Morality. But in a more
the
restricted sense
same
as
stands
for that part of social morality
Natural
Law
term
duties arisingfrom
which treats of our
justice. It therefore
derived
designatesall the rules of conduct which are logically
'

from

'

moral

the

enforced

by

law

coercive

71. Distinctive

monly said
Law

by

ever

the

This

whose

Character

of

that the Natural

be

be, may

in all times and

different nations.

is

Law.

"

It is

distinguishedfrom

com

Positive

according to different

all

peoples.
objectionwe must needs

among

The

We

Natural

its immutability. Its precepts are

provokes an
objection drawn from

an

"

the

Law

its universality
and
same

execution, if need

measures.

statement

here,
among
varies

and

the

of moral

evolution

it
conceptionof justice,

races,

countries and

law in

answer

ideas
is

said,

ages.
it would

such as
itself,
present
replythat the natural
not
itselfto a perfectly
illumined and uprightconscience, must
be confused with men's
opinions. The conscience of peoples
as

well

of individuals

as

race

does

Yet

variations

science, are

no

Certain

are

rational

obscured.

The

human

possessedof all moral truths at once.

in opinions,just as much
in morality as in
prejudiceto the constancy of natural laws.

nature

of their very essence

in conformity with our
and
others
are
opposed to it. There are a

number

of relations

and

agent which

the

become

become

not

acts

may

derived
are

from

the

very essence
independent of time and
263

of the acts
space.

In

ETHICS

264
this

the

sense

Natural

which

Law,

formulates

them, is im

and universal.

mutable

Furthermore, although it may

institutions

condemned

not

are

that

happen

certain

absolutelyby

the

acts

moral

or

law

onlyunder certain conditions,this does not militate against

of the moral law and prove it self-contradictory
the uniformity
:
it
the
circumstances
in identically
same
invariablysanctions
the same
or condemns
things.
but

72. Relation

of Natural

to Positive

Law

Law.

Our obedience

"

is due to

obedience

social

Social life is demanded

laws because such

positive
life in its full development.
Hence

nature.

our

or, what

nature

will of

; but the natural

us

it is of

sovereignclaims

to

of
kind

of itselfconstitute the

cannot

own,

for

since
legislator,

condition

to the same,

comes

law, enjoinsa respect for the commands

The

is

human

of

source

by

natural

legislator.

different from

no

of

true

our

obligation

law, beingdictated by God, does possess

obedience.

our

important conclusion follows : No one

must
obey a positivelaw that clearlycontradicts the funda
of the moral law.
In such circumstances
the
mental principles
inalienable rightsof the individual conscience must be resolutely
73.

Corollary. An
"

vindicated
Such

againstthe

declaration may

application.This

of any

claims
be

form

thought by

of absolutism.
to be

some

dangerous

however, only furnishes

objection,

reason

and for carefully

making a lightuse of its application
gauging its extent, not for repudiatingit. Moreover there is
no
questionhere of the rightto rebel or to refuse obedience to a
consider prejudicial
interests. Nor is there
to our
law we may
opinionsabove submission to law.
questionof rankingour own
But, unless we are preparedto subscribe to absolute scepticism
must
of
in morality,
we
principles
grant that the fundamental
the natural law are sufficiently
clear to the rightconscience of
for not

the

individual.

normal

admitted
principles
fore, we
lay down

sincere
matter

As

of

matter

of
by the generality
is that

if, after

fact

we

see

What,

men.

these
there

serious,impartialand
the conclusion, no
at

arrives
examination, anyone
whether
law bids him
true or false,that a positive

what

is

obey

it.

by
reprehensible
In

moralityof

the

case

the

where

moral
a

law, he is bound

doubt

law, the question should

exists

not

to

concerning

the

in favour

of

be decided

authority,seeingthat its specialfunction is

do

to

the
interpret

natural
upon

OF

THEORY

law.

AND

the refusal of obedience

But

DUTY
is

by authority. It is useless to
that be
rights of the
prescriptible
powers
is more
claims of society. What
sacred than
commanded

invoke
'

'

the father
to do

son

his children ?

over

what

is

Yet

if

265

duty incumbent
immorality of what is

of the

is convinced

who

anyone

RIGHT

and
the

father

criminal,the latter would

the

higher

authorityof
to bid

were

have

im

the

the

his

rightto

disobey. If the moral law imposes restrictions on paternal

much
how
the authorityof the State ?
on
more
authority,
Any doctrine which bases the authorityof the civillaw on the
is destructive of the rights
will of one man
or
on
a body of men
of the individual.
There is a higherlaw than human
laws, one
'

written

the tables of the heart

on

individual

always has

cf rulers.

In vindication

the

',in the

of which

name

the

rightto protest againstthe tyranny

of this rightthe martyrs shed their

Wood.

Origin of Rights.

74.

"

individual

principlesof
by Kant, must

the

tical

These

the

reason.

(55). Reason

rightsderived from
The

reason

"

will,we

priori

are

told

itself to the

imperativesof the prac

imperatives,
just like the judgments of

conform

speculativereason,

mind

Are

i.

bids

arise from
us

the

constitution

respect the human

of the

person, whose

perfectionis his liberty.Hence this is the imperative

all our juridical
judgment that, accordingto Kant, summarizes
in such a manner
that the free
Act externally
:
obligations
exercise of thy will may be able to co-exist with the freedom of
all others,accordingto a universal law
35.
than
this
Surely,however, there is nothing more
vague
one

'

'

formula.

If the

of the

human

absolute,I shall respect this autonomy

sense

exercising
my
know

as
liberty
;
fullyas possible

limit but my might.

of himself.
Hence
an

no

same

between
extend
are

autonomy

person
in
my

is in

true

myselfonlyby
rightthen will

say the
everyone else may
inevitable conflict will arise

And

will try to
activityof individuals,each of whom
Two
consequently,
rightsindefinitely.
hypotheses,

the
his

possible:

either the

strongest will impose his will

on

the
in

person, by its triumph

one, will suffer violation in the other ; or else a compact will be
entered into between
the individuals for the purpose of fixing
of the human
weakest, and the liberty

'"

HASTIE,

The

Philosophy of Law,

p.

46 (Clark, Edinburgh, 1887).

ETHICS

266

Thus
the theory in
sphere of activityfor each one.
question is reducible either to the sanctioningof a reign of

the

force

to

or

either

case

matter

of

social contract

existence

the

as

the

of natural

ultimate

basis

of law.

rights is denied.

fact,the Kantian

anti-social.

If

conceptionof the human

without prejudiceto
cannot

man

himself
dignity,make
humanity, which social

subservient

somehow

the
life implies,

the

to

In
As

person is
his own

claims

of

of the individual's

use

behalf of all is

obviouslyimpossible.
of respecting
a question
a liberty
If,on
hand,
is
limits
which
in some
requiredefinition :
way limited, these
it is not enough to lay down
that the liberty
of each must
be
of all. The principles
reconciled with the liberty
which
will
bring about this reconciliation must be stated as well. Thus
on

powers

it is

the other

Kant's

is,to say the least,too vague 36.

formula

as
rightsderived from the impersonalreason
identified
with the State ? This theory,held by Hegel, Schelling
and their
solves the problem of the originof rightsby the use
disciples,

2.

Are

"

pantheisticprinciples.The

of

substance
State is
The

of the

only a

Universe, and

mode

is

Absolute

this substance

is mind.

aspect of the absolute

or

will of the State,not

but
arbitrary

with

one

or

divine

tlie

The
reason.

regulated
according
of reason,
to the immutable
creates rights.
principles
This theory is open to all the arguments that may be brought
against pantheism in general. It is a denial of the individual
of his rights
elevates civillaw to an
and, consequently,
; it even
absolute sovereignty.
in any hedonistic principle
? Utilitarian
3. Do rightsoriginate
theories. The egoistic
seekingfor self-satisfaction or for wellbeing is,according to Hobbes, the supreme law of our actions.
The state of nature that was
was
priorto all social organization
Men
a state of warfare.
hearkeningto the voice of their own
interests agreed to make
concessions.
reciprocal
By common
consent
they set up an authoritywith the purpose of regulating
each one's sphere of action and thus of avoidingconflicts. The
as

as

"

edicts decreed

therefore, have
"

as

due

What

Kant

does

universal

for this end

constitute Law.

their immediate

also say :
law ' ; but

'

no

Act

foundation

in accordance

action

bears

liberty-?

Yet

what

which

unless

rights,

will of

in the

maxim

this character

respect to the libertyof everybody else.

is

with

and

Law

can

it is done

is due

serve

with

to another

268

ETHICS

relations which
as

individuals and constitute them

obtain among
from
the biological
laws
societydo not differ essentially

which

bind cells

togetherinto one livingbody. The theoryof

the social organism, as thus expounded, is a development of
the materialistic conception of the individual
through its
criticism may
applicationto a collective being. The same
therefore be raised againstit. We shall have occasion later to
examine
its political
consequences.
6. Rightsare founded immediatelyon the moral law inasmuch
this is the expression
as
of our nature,
of the intrinsic exigencies
and mediatelyon the Divine Will.
which
T,hisis the explanation
"

adopt.

we

believe that it is the moral

we

of rights. Yet

isjthe
; source
resolve

Kant

With

itself into

our

law,

maintain, does

we

not

priorijudgments arisingfrom the con

and without
any objectivevalidity.The
the expressionof essential relations
are

stitution of the mind

of
principles

this

law which

reason

in

determined

is not

; our
wJi^^xjslJbeiween-things

reason

the formation

(e.g.
any blind necessity
force of objective evidence

of its

judgments by

by a prioriforms) but by the

when
(Criteriology
24-40). Hence
of conduct in our dealings
with other

it

order

an

of relations

Is""by

Man

this

result

there

perativeswhich
Positive Law

Law,

to

on

Thus

exigenciesof

arise from

it.

law, have

their

law

But

metaphysicalsource
Kinds

of

as

"

From

enjoined by

are

the

of

Natural

its execution

and

system of laws is based,

the

of the relations which

and

consequentlythe
be

must

of the Divine

Rights

im

or

of
being the expression

God, it

of the Natural

Rights.

is

nature, and

our

as

therefore

function

The

to enforce

nature

our

originfrom
the guidance

acting under

Law.

the entire

the moral

law

practicaljudgments

what
interpret

its violation.

inherent

the

of

number

constitute the Natural

is to

maintain,

75.

moral

with that social nature.

developits consequences,

to check
we

which_are derived frorn_our veiy_nature.

him to live in accordance

teaches

it does but formulate

men,

^a social being. The

nature

rules

certain
prescribes

the

Divine

moral

Will,
is the

Reason, which

Law.

distinguishedinto

those

of

individual,those of the familyand those of the community.

Individual

Right determines

exist between

being made of
regulatesthe

individuals

the

of

such, without

as

ties of kindred
relations

relations that

or

any
ties.
political

justicewhich

exist

or

may

consideration

Family Right

exist between

the

parties
the

family

subjects

and

of

view

of

Public

We

units.

the

Natural

state

Right

of

Right
Law.

shall

by

the

concerns

study
examining

DUTY

269

between

and

different

between

rulers,

divisions

principal

conjugal

the

group.

moral

many

in

living

AND

RIGHT

OF

THEORY

relations

of

between

considered

states

in

members

as

turn

each

of

them

from

the

so

these

point

CHAPTER

RIGHTS

Individual

Right,

justice which

been

has

cellence

possession of

the
This

end

implies the

faculties, and

sequently

the

right to

towards

The

the

forms

He

of

his

of

subject

lawful
of

we

of

By

the

unjust

the

and

right

of

of

right

to

controversy,

to
as

two

we

of

during

his

perfection,

such

The

means

then,

animal.

an

live.

human

lawful

by

the
con

not,

that

right assailed.

love.

state

than
may

aggressor

self-defence

it

of

in

implies

his

sacrifice

ex

highest

our

for this

more

the

in

soul, and

We

it

Ethics

of

it

out

may

ground

"

safeguarding

work

to

justify the

resistingan

principles of
the

the

the

it consists

as

our

is much

as

In

which

towards

fellow-men.

another

can

end

of

tend

must

live.

Self-defence.

for

he

to

motives

that

needful

and

an

is created

man

right

personality is

moral

mean

Since

the

life of

the

Lawful

77.

therefore

General

perfection ;

deepest aspirations

welfare

human

higher

of

of

for

In

complete functioning

happiness,

act

the

dispose

we

and

has

He

the

"

by contemplation

our

others,

LIFE

Live.

Good

full and

happiness.

our

perfection

Absolute

of

rights.

end, inasmuch

other

political

or

property.

three

is created

man

consequently

of

satisfaction

life.

the

to

neighbour,

well-being

HUMAN

OF

Right

every

surpasses

the

his

family

any

of these

treat

the

that

shown

of

obligations of

to

life,liberty and

RESPECT

of

Foundation

the

regard

respect

of

shall

we

I.

76.

to

us

matters

present chapter

said, indicates

independent

are

especially in the

INDIVIDUAL

fulfil with

must

binds

Justice

THE

have

we

man

which

obligations
ties.

OF

Only
life.

self-defence
force

as

is

application

particular cases
shall
briefly
now

explain.
i.

The

May

the

defence

theory upheld

of one's

by

possessions ever
Penal

some

270

Codes

?
justifyhomicide
and
adopted by

THEORY

writers

many
it is
the

to his

life. Now

the

property and

second

aggressor,
the two
between

the

or

rightof

that

reason

At

things.

the

opiniongrant that the

himself be despoiled
: assault

when

even

the

rightof

the aggressor

first. One

to his

of

an

proportionexists

no

need not

owner

stand

property very

upon

the

it is accom
person
of violence against the
acts

upon
grave

it is

not

may

time, however, those

same

this

by and let
closelyresembles assault
panied with threats or
owner,

particular
case,

rights:

two

outweighsthe

271

property sacrifice the life even

of

for

unjust

maintain

far

the

DUTY

In this

conflict between

therefore in defence

who

AND

givesa negativesolution.

argued,there is
owner

RIGHT

OF

when

for
questionof goods indispensable

his subsistence.

According
moralist De
other

means

ever,

that

to the

other

opinion,held by

to kill a thief if there is no

Lugo,
of defendingone's possessions
; provided,how

the

goods

in the

are

not

matter

case

at issue it is not

of very little conse

the higher interests of

ground

aggressor a punishment proportionate to

intentions,but rather of preventing him from

injury. The
to make

attempt

an

property.
remain

aggressor

We

cannot

without

puts himself

gressor, he is no more
to be able to react

allow

his

the

which

of
fallacy

Must

the

innocent

an

refuse

wayman,

rightwhich

our

The

committing an

attacks

who

man

he

than

constrains

protect our

threatens

is

brute force,againstwhich

we

according

the

to

as

and

measure

to

unjustly

us

he

rights. Inasmuch

The defence of
necessary.
fact that a criminal forces
that with

evil of his

the

is in the wrong.
It is he who
his life,
if we
wish to
upon

defence.

outside

for his

opinion
questionof inflicting
upon

the

us

Spanish

it is allowable

quence, for motives of charityas well as

social order justify
this exception. The
is this

the famous

ag

an

ought
manner

stoppedby the
to do him
us
a greater injurythan
clear
he threatens us.
An example will make
reasoningon which the oppositeopinionrelies.
a

rightmust

traveller,whose
to

defend

not

be

life is demanded

himself

rather

than

by

high

kill his ad

not, and all are agreed on this point; and

Certainly
when
the aggressor at the moment
though by killing
is yielding
be exposinghis
to his criminal impulse,he may

versary ?
this even
he

soul to eternal
world
quence

the

damnation.

preservationof

than

And
this

the salvation of

yet

to

believer in the next

earthlylife is
soul.

of far less

conse

ETHICS

272
2.

that he has made

ever

attack

to

me

his mind.

up

is

He

unawares.

make
he may
any moment
have time to defend myself.

At

ambush
caused
kill me

with

revolver

to turn

me

day

some

out

and

to kill me

has decided

man

cocked
of my

He

has made

attempt

an

Only
;

wait

my
yesterdayhe
It is

the

what

all his

on

me.

life before

lyingin

was

quite certain

offensive.

plans

for

circumstance

chance

doubt

no

always lying in

way.
take

if I do not

is

there

alone
he will

In this

case

of lawful defence ?
may
my state be called one
Most
authors
replyin the negative; for the
But

yet commenced.

not

De

Lugo

has

aggressionhas
another
opinion: I

that my
lawfullybe on the defensive from the moment
In the hypothesisthis is
gravely menaced.
right becomes
already so. My life is exposed to certain and imminent
danger. One expedientalone is open to me, to slayinstead of
who
being slain. He is already an aggressor against me
can

resolves

to kill me

amount

to

he may

at any

and

has

commencement
moment

take

for this purpose

taken steps which
of actuallydoing the deed, and
me

II. RESPECT

by surprise.
OF

LIBERTY

duty of preservingand developinghis life confers on

the right of putting his faculties to an
external use,
man
providedthat in doing so he acts in accordance with the moral
is
law and the just precepts of public authority. A man
his neighbour's
infringing
libertywhen he prevents him from
doing an act which is lawful for him, or when he forces him to
do an act which he has the rightof not doing.
78. The Right to Work."
Man
has the rightto labour, that is,
to apply his activity
to external thingsand to make
a general
of his being,either for his own
of the energies
use
advantage or
for that of others.
Such a rightis evident.
But it is necessary
not to confuse this rightto work, in the
above, with the pretended rightto be given work, which
sense
would put on the State the obligation
of providinga scope for
The

the activities of each.

State has, of course, to protect the

to
againstany coercion ; it has even

The

rightsof the individual

providein generalthe conditions
But

it cannot

protectorto

be
see

said that

it is

that in every

favourable

to their exercise.

part of its duty

case
particular

as

such

universal
conditions

THEORY

shall be
these

conditions, and

ticular

falls

supplied. It

tiative and

effort.

RIGHT

OF

on

State

273

to

bring about

be the work

of

personal ini

cannot

Should

providence for each.

DUTY

the individual

this must

The

AND

itself to be

set

it do so, it would

par
the

run

risk of

besides takingupon itself

crushingall privateenterprise
an
impossibletask.
79. Liberty to choose
Man has the rightnot
a Profession.
but also to do so in the
only to make use of his natural activity
Now
nascent
our
way most suitable to his natural capabilities.
aptitudesgenerallymanifest themselves through tendencies
and tastes, that is,by inner experiencesthat escape all external
observation.
the individual is the only one
is
Hence
who
should
ultimatelyable to judge of what direction his activity
"

take, since he alone is conscious of his

often

these

will

disclose

him

to

inclinations.

own

his

natural

Very

avocation

of mistake.
although,of course, there is always the possibility
Some peoplethink they have natural qualifications
which they
have not, and consequentlyturn out not only useless to the
But far more
serious
community but perhaps even a burden.
would
if a regime existed which
be the consequences
denied
to individuals the free choice of their

own

This

career.

belongsto us as rational and free beings. By endowing

this qualitynature
has empowered us to choose our
own
in life. It is for

developingour
must

This

to

us

decide

faculties.

first and

The

foremost

is
principle

pation in life.

the

what
work

devolve

ground

Yet, it may

best

libertyof

of

himself.

choice of

objected,this freedom

be

walk

perfection

individual

the

with

us

means

of individual

on

for the

the

are

choice

occu

has

not

always been recognizedas the rightof the worker : for cen

turies slaverywas
the lot of the majorityof men.
To understand
the institution of slaveryfrom the point of
view

of Natural

absolute

Right, we

slaveryand
a

human

person,

as

this form

of

without

forth the

denunciations

slaverywithout
Seneca,

enjoyeth the

same

dieth

as

thou

'

the

rightsto live,to

the

Stoics
of the

'

seed

as

it called

thou

Whom

same

create

condemn

authors

All modern

Of old
qualification.

of the
is born

By

serfdom.

chattel, destitute of the essential

to acquireproperty, etc.
family,

slave ',wrote

difference between

the

note

mitigatedslavery or

firstthe slave is accounted

of
rights

must

callest

he
thyself,

air, liveth and

sky, breatheth the same
'. And
Epictetus: There is no slave
thyself
'

ETHICS

274

by

nature,

of

beasts

only, is

protests wrought

of

being devoid

the

save

this

But

'.

true

these

appreciablechange

no

of men,

; not

reason

late

in the

and

but

solitary

conditions

of

We
know, on the other
pagan world.
hand, that Aristotle sets himself to justify
slaveryby the needs
slaves

throughout

the

of the

social order

Not

into two

A.

the former

to

latter he

rights,the
admits

the

conceptionof

'

and those who

intellectual,

work

risen to

having

Fouillee, Aristotle is led to separate

classes,those whose occupation should be chiefly

rights/writes

natural
men

'

that

elsewhere

should

alone

devote themselves

does

he

condemns

allow

civil and

slavery'.

to

the slave does

'

to manual

political

Still Aristotle

partakeof

reason

'.

enduring influence of Christian ideas to effect

the gradualchange from slaveryto serfdom, and so to prepare
It needed

the

the

perfect freedom.

for

way

was
Christianity

it remains

true

no

doubt

that it

Though

seconded

was

the

the

influence

by certain economic

of

forces,

motive
preponderating

power
fail to recognizethis would

in

be
bringingabout the change. To
supremelyunjust. The slaveryof the ancient world received
in the
its death-blow
slave and patrician
the day when
met
depthsof the catacombs to partakeof the MysticBanquet.
^Serfdom is a mitigatedform of slavery,or rather it is
radicallydifferent from it. The personalityof the slave
becomes
recognized; he is acknowledgedto possess inalienable
He
is no
longer part of his
rightsin virtue of his nature.
master's goods,able to be sold or even
put to death ; he has the
worship,to receive a
rightto marry, to take part in religious
Only is he denied the rightto choose his
wage for his labour.
occupation,he is bound all his life to the service of a master
and to the working of the soil. Yet such a position
procures
and
his having work
for him certain advantages; it ensures
from
of subsistence, and frees him
the means
anxiety with
regardto the future. What view are we to take of the morality
of this mitigatedform of slavery?
it outright. Others would allow it,
authors condemn
Some
the
provided that it is grounded on a free contract between
villein and

his lord.

worker

should

himself

and

let out

is

they say,
for
his services
life in order
no

Teason,

why a
to put

family beyond the reach of the uncertainties

By doing so it is true he gives up once and for

his

of the future.
all

not

There

he
part of his liberty,

renounces

his

rightof takingup

ETHICS

276
his voice

though with

"

metaphysic,he
'In

morality.

the

know,

we

end could

also

the moral

maxim,

my

and

could

own

eyes

lead to the

nothing

would
principles
surrender

on

them

which

acquirepractical
of

precept is at the

can

it should

God, and
shake

be
in

this

be overthrown
without

life.

future

cognisant of other
unity of ends under

same

that

that

is

one

no

in the existence of

I feel certain that

'

that

commanding

reason

all my moral
and I cannot

possibleunder

of God

existence

the

is

firmlyestablished,and, according
thus

believe
inevitably
and

obey

must

As, then, the moral

law.

says, 'action
the moral
law

with all other ends, and

which

conditions

is here

for certain

know

is, I

that

for
indispensable

are

belief,he

only condition is

namely,
validity,
I

beliefs that

of moral

case

one

agree

against the claims of

emphatic in proclaimingthe duty of
"

to certain

absolutelynecessary,
all points. The end
to all

less

no

to assent

man

every

was

little logic

too

at

time

same

so,

I shall

future

life,

belief,because
the same
time,

becoming hateful

in my

37.
of

the rightto be
opinion,then, does not mean
and moral questions. As in other fields,
indifferent to religious
more
so
even
emphaticallyhere, eagerness for the truth must
in the whole
of man's mental progress.
be the rulingprinciple
Kant's
To
forcible expression,I cannot
surrender
use
the principles
and beliefs that my
declares to be of
reason
sovereignimportance from the moral point of view without
self-condemnation.
own
Religious
incurring thereby my
indifference,therefore,far from being a natural right,is the

Freedom

violation of the most

May

we,

then, in this age

of intellectual

againstwhosoever

anathemas

doctrine

sacred of duties.

as

ourselves, or may

happens
we

resort

not

anarchy, hurl
to

hold

the

to force to make

our

same

them

it is
that
We
Certainlynot.
say
being to assent to the
undoubtedly the duty of every intelligent
of knowing it. But it is
truth accordingto his opportunities
quite possiblethat under the prejudicesof education or by
is false.
in good faith adopt what
other influences a man
may
The assent of the mind to doctrine is not always determined
by
It is generallythe highlycomplex resultant of
evidence.
mere
of
the observation
subjectiveconditions that entirely
escape

prevail over

others.
37

The

Critiqueof

others

tribunal of
Pure

Reason,

man's

tr. F.

Max

conscience is a sanctuary into

Miiller,II, p. 710

(London, 1881).

which

no

one

of another's

opinionsis

alone searches

To

enter.

may

reins

the

RIGHT

OF

THEORY

form

sincerity
delicacy.God
have

he thinks

as

coercive

use

we

277

of the

We

heart.
soon

as

anyone
Still less may

ourselves.

estimate

an

the

therefore, to condemn
from

DUTY

of the utmost

matter

and

AND

right,

no

differently
To

measures.

persecutionwould be not only odious but absurd.

Not by force but by persuasionare ideas propagated. Christ
the world by the sword,
to conquer
did not send His disciples
to them
to go and
was
as did Mohammed
; His onlyinjunction
resort

to

teach.

Respectfor the opinionsof another consists

good faith when we think him to be in error,
him either repudiatewhat
constraint to make
true

or

approve

what

in

presuming his

and

in

usingno

he believes to be

he believes to be false.

But

this

respect

opinionsis inspiredby no such idea as that all doctrines are

of the same
metaphysicalvalue, and that man is allowed to look
all with the eye of indifference or to pleasehimself
them
upon
which he will accept. As rational beingsthe duty is incumbent
upon us of seekingthe truth with sincerity.Only such a duty
is a matter
wholly between the individual conscience and God.
that is to say, one
It does not constitute a juridical
obligation,
which falls within the scope of publicAuthority.
2. Manifestationof opinions. The
publicationof opinions
through speech,writingor action should be under the control of
that this is necessary for the
but onlyin the measure
legislation,
for

"

publicgood.
In the first place,every

true

doubtful

or

opinionought

to be

expression.For to influence thought is as much

the sphere of a man's
to control things. Social life
as
activity
does not mean
simplythe interchangeof economic productions,
allowed

free

but also of views

and

social and

rightto

and

ideas.

is endowed

Since

with the

to the minds

communicate

by

discussion.

judgments,in
The

State

of its citizens to manifest

the
of

belong to

has the

the truths

the

benefit of his

be free to

own

in

giveexpression

they may be checked

therefore recognizethe rights

order that

must

their ideas

the State.

rational

nature

of his fellow-men

of absolute truth, it has

depositary
The supreme
discussion.
silencing

does not

by

facultyof speech,he

he possesses and thus to give them

tellectual fruit. He should, moreover,
to his doubtful

is

man

and
not

views.
the

direction

As

it is not

sovereignpower
of man's

mind

ETHICS

278
the

With

that of the

only

questionwe are here treatingis closelyconnected

The rightto teach is
of trainingthe young,
liberty

State cannot
is

form

another

of the

claim

right to express
monopoly of teaching.

one's

ideas.

Private

alike in the intellectual

great factor in progress,

sphere. The action

encouraging and,
protecting,

of the State must

economic

where

The

enterprise
as

in the

be limited to

seconding the

necessary,

it supplantit. The State has

must
initiative of others ; never
no
rightto mould all its citizens in one type, or to obligethem
all to think
in the
his

body

no

Yet

of

pretext of bringingabout

the

politic.It

genius,into

like that
has

alike,on

this idea

was

absurdities.

the worst

thinking,is derived

direct connexion

which

from

led

perfectunity
Plato, with all

The

right of teaching,

human

and
personality

with the mission

of the State.

diffuse one's

limitations.
opinionshas some
which is the interpreter
of the natural
In the publicAuthority,
be recognizedthe
law and the guardian of social order, must
right to repress the diffusion of opinionswhich are clearly
freedom

to

inimical to the

general peace.

Intervention

in the

matter

of

the most
by even
opinionshas been allowed as a final resource
liberal legislations.
Examples of abuse are not wanting ; but
that
this only means
libertyrequiresserious safeguards.
between
a
However,
dogmatism or a sectarianism that is
and a liberalism that authorizes the
intolerant and persecuting,
diffusion of the most subversive ideas,there is surely
mean.
a just
but com
This mean
can
scarcelybe determined theoretically,
in fixingit in practice.
will not have much
sense
mon
difficulty
other questions,
defer to the dis
we
Here, as in many
may
of those who
are
cretionary power
appointed to see to the
welfare of society.
of conscience we mean
81. Liberty of Conscience.
By liberty
with the
the rightevery man
possesses of actingin accordance
"

dictates of his

own

conscience.

rightis injured(a)by incitinganother to do wrong by

example, counsel or threat ; (b)by forcinghim to do some
thing which he believes to be forbidden ; (c)by preventinghim
be done.
from doing what he believes must
Is the rightof actingin accordance with one's conscience an
This

absolute

right?

It is,when

the voice of conscience is clear and

with
right. If,however, it is a question of interfering
conscience, it is certainlylegitimateto oppose
any

false
of its

OF

THEORY

RIGHT

AND

DUTY

279

lawful

rightsand interests
of publicorder.
If a religion
would be directlysubversive
or
human
sacrifices or other immoral
to prescribe
practices,
were
Authority would be evidentlyright in taking active steps in
would

which

manifestations

damage

spiteof respect for

the

of
liberty

endeavour

an

end

to

put

conscience

such

to

libertyof conscience

adopt

restricted in the

be

may

no
practices,

should

strong the good faith of those who

; it would

have

how

matter

them.

Hence
of

case

to

false

conscience.
But

coercive

other

adherence

to

doctrine which

For,

accept.

to

measures

repudiatea

him

make

be had
recourse
may
in order to obtain

account

no

on

to

III. RESPECT

the

"

he feels bound

belief which
we

OF

by

conscience

alreadysaid,it is by

have

38.

its dominion

extends

truth

not by violence,that
persuasion,

82. Definition.

person'sexternal
to
nor
internallyrepudiates,

he

repeat what

persecutionor

to

PROPERTY

with ownership,is
Property,as synonymous
animal
and to dispose of an
or
thing for a

rightto use
end without the interference of any other person.
legitimate
from the rightof disposal,
The rightof use, as distinguished
is the power
recognizedin law of puttinga thing to any use
that

does not

involve

transformation.

Any

destruction,

transfer,or

its

of these effects shows

Limits

conceived

of

laws and

have
Jurists and economists
ownership as the right of absolute

the

he chooses

does

no

with

this

When

it is said

injuryto

heresy to
rebel
time

be

that

lawful, it must

be

only against God but

entirelyon Christianity.
had

anti-social

This is how
rightsof another.
law.
the point of view of positive

effects.

also

that

he

against

him

the

upon
society,based

heretic

was

one

lies his

heretic

the

looked

In this fact alone

repression of

the

maintains

Aquinas

added
To

do what
may
he observes established
owner

the

St. Thomas

not

sin which

opinion,an

thing so long as

ownershipis regarded from

18

rightof

Ownership."

right of
disposal.According to
soever

the

that

radical

actions characteristic

disposalhas been exercised. They are

of the sovereign
of ownership.
power
83.

or

as

it

who
reason

was

at

as

committed
for

that
a

justifying

of our
for he expressly recognizes that some
such
as
conscience
alone, notably
for the individual
obligationsare matters
the
in
constraint
of
duties to God.
he
Moreover,
proscribes every measure
case
of those who
are
strangers to the true faith, on the ground that no one is

civil

measures

of

repression;

bound to give an enforced

On this
to dogma.
assent
Droit Naturcl ; ORAHAY,
La Politiquede Saint Thomas.

questionsee

CASTELEIN,

280

ETHICS

But

moral

the

law

laysimportant restrictions on the power

of an owner.
law does not deny the existence of
The positive
these restrictions ; it merely omits to consider them for reasons
of the publicgood. It could not reasonablybe expectedthat
should
be made
regulations
concerningthe administration of
privatewealth or concerningthe enjoyment of goods in par
Such
ticular cases.
interference would
give rise to the worst
abuses.

Yet

certain

the

the

positivelaw

refuses to

stillbe

punish may

of the moral law.

infringements
of the rightof ownership arise partlyfrom

limitations

The

which

acts

of

nature

goods committed

the

partlyfrom our
social being.

to

nature, which

own

In the firstplace,
we

must

Providence

dominion, and

our

of

is that

rational and

the designof divine

disregard
thing. To destroya thing out of
not

concerningeach
in view for oneself or for others,
with no purpose
mere
caprice,
it
is certainly
to disregard
its end ; stillmore
make
so, if we
to
serve
gratifyillicit desires. The same
principlemust
regulate
inanimate

deserve

for
suffering,

unnecessary
h
as
been
never
suffering

only

as

of some
consequence
kindness to animals,
much

materialism.

animal
proper

willed

marked

so

is

or

an

worthy

of

for

out

as

end

an

in

unavoidable
remark

praisein

these

that

days, is

Whilst

of

as

our

made
as

one

that

of the old spiritualistic

principles
is with
of evolutionary
the principles
the first certainly
will not recognizethe

kith and

own

by God.
of his own,
it should
be

with

strugglefor

existence and

Secondly,the

that

moral

But

yet belonging to
if
subdued, even

this does

of nature

the non-survival

law

forbids

Man

is

us

to

social

use

mean

that

social function, as
clusively

some

would

has

furtheringhis

his
own

personal life

to

development and

race,

which

decrees

the

it is

the

of the weaker.
our

possessionsfor
behave

must

ownership has

own

destroyed,in

not

suppose.
consider, he

his

in it

regard

lower

being and

not

individual

sees

materialist should

great law

purelyselfishmotives.
such.

kin, nevertheless it

If the

accordance

as

animal

that

reason

on

inflict

not

may

Creator

condition
It

good.

the

than

more

Creator, and

of the

the

by

necessary

it

philosophy than

creature

they,

consistent with the

more

animal

For

greater respect. We

them

itself but

animals.

forth the power

things,show

this account
upon

of

treatment

our

an

Since

ex

the

aim

at

happinessby

the

can

OF

THEORY

RIGHT

AND

DUTY

281

goods ; only he must never

forgetthat he is a
social being as well. By doing this,he will not play a merely
he will share with
selfish part. If he possesses a superfluity,
disposalof

who

those

his

of the

in want

are

bare

necessaries

will put
as a person of wealth
position
influence over
a great moral
exercising
84. Basis

of the

at his

of life.

dispoala

His
of

means

others.
A distinction must

Right of Ownership."

be

rightor the rightof a definite person

to a definite thing and the rightin the abstract, the general
has of becoming an owner.
By the_basisof
power every man
from which the abstract right
ownershipis meant the principles

made

questionis therefore : Can

over
things, and why

The

is derived.

dominion

claim

given.

are

the concrete

between

others

base the

Some

labour

on

ourselves, consider that it is derived

inasmuch

man,

85.

Various

righton social conventions

again,and with these we

others

legitimately

man

from

the

very

Social Conventions

and

answers

and laws,
associate
nature

of

he is a person.

as

founded

Ownership

on

on

Legis

common
originally
Everything, it is argued, was
whose
set up a legislator
property. By a social compact men
In
mission it should be to apportionthe wealth of the earth.
this way was
ownership established. Its foundation is there

lation.

"

and

fore in the social contract

in the laws

established for its

execution.
Whatever
view

be the value of this

may

it is quitecertain
history,
problem proposed. The ultimate

cannot

of

liein the social contract.

that

it does not
of

foundation

Men

the

theory from

could

never

pointof

solve the

ownership

have

set out

the rightto dispose

previously
of them, that is to say, the rightof ownership,at least the
which
abstract right; they could not agree to share goods over
precede
they had no right. Ownership must therefore logically

to divide

goods,if they

had

not

the social compact ; instead of being derived from it,it must

effect
An agreement may
furnish the basis for the contract*
the transference
create
86.

of

right,or regulateits use,

an

Ownership founded
argument

on

Labour.

"

can

it

This is a

conceptionvery

to do duty
that is very often made
against the present order of things; for all
one

legitimate
ownership,it is said, must
must

never

one.

widespreadto-day,and
as

but

be the reward

of

man's

effort.

depend upon

labour and

Labour, however,

cannot

282

ETHICS

be

shown

be

to

transforms

ultimate

the

basis

of

this

right. Labour

adapt them to our needs or to make

further production. In this respect it is
them
useful towards
which is a way of
what we have called above an act of disposal,
our
sovereigncontrol over the things. Hence labour
asserting
is not the foundation of ownership; it is an exercise of it and
rightto disposeof the goods of the earth.
presupposes the general
I cannot claim to transform
anythingby my labour if I do not
firstof all possess the rightof making it serve
my purpose, that
of it. Again, would anyone
forbid me
is,the rightof disposing
to

thingsso

wild

eat

to

as

I found

fruit which

Would

effort ?

pluck without

and

hand

to

anyone
path it

deny

happened
if I

that

to

picked

property from
that I found it ?
the moment
Could anyone
depriveme of it on
the sole ground that it had not yet been worked
by my
upon
diamond

uncut

an

up

on

my

my

was

industry? Labour, it must be confessed, is

of ownership. A thing does not become
source
put forth

have

exigenciesof my
of it before
possession

certain

to

obtain
I may

and

nature

I have

uncut

diamond

Furthermore, the theory we

it answers

been

able to

labour
wealth

why I

simply picked up.

combating finds its refuta

are

it.

follow from

his

only what

then, about

produced. What,
My labour never created

why

I have

that would
tion in the very consequences
stated that a man
own
legitimately
may
has

because

else. This is the reason

anyone
eat the wild fruit I have pluckedwithout effort and

the
appropriate

may

mine

it,but rather because

labour upon

my

the ultimate

not

land

personal
natural

and

the land ; I cannot

It is

therefore

disposeof it,nor reclaim it and cultivate it,since that too is a

of it. For a similar reason
I may
not trans
of disposing
way
of the raw
in
labour
materials that are
form by my
any
dispensablefor the productionof every objectthat is made.
This argument is equallytrue of a collective body : the earth
and

materials

raw

were

Thus

individual.

no

every

of personalas
proscribed,

well

individual.

as

The

kind
well

disallows

produced by
87.

The

The

earth

man

the

of

landed

as

by

body than by

ownership is

human

through inanition,if deference

which

created

more

race

is to

be

ownership of

found

to

an

be

property, collective

as

simply perish
paid to the principle
everythinghe has not
must

his labour.

Right
and

of

Ownership

its wealth

were

derived

made

from

for the

Man's
use

of

Nature.
man.

"

This

ETHICS

284
Outline

88.

the

of

of

Doctrine

Communism.

Communists

"

rightto live and to work

their perfection,
and therefore they have the same
rightto
By natural law, then, the earth and
goods of this world*
that all

assert

is the

wealth

the

have

men

same

patrimony of

common

the whole

At

race.

for
the
its

first,

by a jointownership, they belonged to everybody. Accord

ing to the theory of Hobbes, such a state of affairs would beget
incessant warfare ; with a view to what
was
obviouslytheir
interest,they exchanged, by

common

regime of

tract, the

Criticism

89.

theoryis based on
the world.
They
"

of
a

for

communism
the

Doctrine

of

one

not

meant

to be

social

con

privateownership.

Communism.

of

falseconception
of the

are

of

means

"

This

I.

of the goods of

nature

possessedpromiscuously

truth which no one

Surelythis is a common-sense
of doubting in practice.In addition, we
have
would
dream
of
himself was
alive to the necessity
just seen that Hobbes
puttingan end to the state of jointownershipwhich he imagined
obtained.
originally
Articles for personaluse and consumption,and also instru
of production,
have but a limited utility
ments
; they cannot,
therefore,be used by everybody. And the land itselfwill only
who
makes it fertile by the sweat
yieldits wealth to the man
of the soil evidentlyimplies
of his brow.
cultivation
Now
at least by the community, if not by the in
appropriation,
dividual.
If the whole of the earth belongedto everybody in
who, pray, would care to devote his capitaland his
common,
labour
of property which
to the exploitation
somebody else
and possess ?
If to individuals,
could immediatelyafter come
a
singlyor together,we allow the right of establishing
per
abode
and of buildinga settlement
manent
a given estate
on
time
and putting it under cultivation, we
at the same
are
admittingthat a real and true ownership is legitimate. By the

by

all

very

men.

act

by which

man

exchanges

nomad

life for

settled

necessityalso takes possessionof the soil. The

hence
ground then occupiedor put under cultivation ceases
forth to be at the disposal
else.
of anyone
of production and
Thus
land, no less than instruments
for individual possession.
articles of consumption, is matter
one,

Such
since

Hence

of

he

ownership is conformable
the

very nature
it can
in no way

of the

with

the

designsof Providence,

things themselves

be admitted

demands

it.

that the natural law is the

THEORY

basis of,or
is

sanctions,

even

repugnant

OF

the

to

RIGHT

of

nature

of

state

AND

DUTY

ownershipwhich

common

things.

285

Hobbes

and

the

com

munists

forgetthis elementary truth when they proclaim the

to everything.
primordial
rightof every man
2. The
pretendedcommunity of goods has never existed as an

historical fact. There

was

"

exploredtracts of land

doubt

no

time

when

vast

un

lay free for the first

occupier. In this
negative way, in so

in a
entirely
far as they belonged to nobody. But the earth was
in a
never,
of land by
possessedby all men.
positive
sense,
Appropriation
of history. A hunting
families or tribes dates from the dawn
tribe has alreadytaken possessionof a pieceof
or
a pastoral
land as soon as it prevents a neighbouring
tribe from trespassing
sense

they were

upon

it.

Private

but

common,

of land

ownership

usurpationof

would

seem

be

to

simply the

patrimony of the tribe as a whole. Whilst

the bulk of the tribe would
by the
preferthe nomad state, living
chase or the rearingof flocks, a family would
settle down
on
small
of
the common
some
land, and rely
relatively
part
very
of subsist
the produce of its cultivation for their means
on
39. Such
would
in no
settlement
ence
a
injurethe
way
rightsof the community ; it would be done with tacit if not
and
for its greater advantage. For
by
expressedconsent
itselfin one spot a familywould relinquish
in favour of
settling
the community its rightsto hunting and to pasturage over
a
largerarea than the particular
plot of which it
very much
claimed to be the exclusive owner.
Beyond this, it would
furnish

the

fruitful

very

beingfollowed by
reclaimed

and

other

thus

example
groups,

become

for

owing

to

the land would

its initiative

be cleared and

capable of providingfor

very

much

largerpopulation.
to the
would lead logically
reasoningof the communists
If the
denial of all ownership,
collective as well as individual.
earth belongsto everybody, an individual cannot call the very
3. The

"

violatingthe rights of
is equallytrue of the family,of the
whatsoever
nation.
Any appropriation

smallest

part of it his

others.

This

statement

even

of the

tribe,and
is

privativein

89

See

so

far

as

LEROY-BEAULIEU,
1908).

(Murray,London,

own

what

without

is

from

is withdrawn
appropriated

Collectivism, tr. and

abbrev.

by

Sir

A.

Clay

286

ETHICS

the

of others.

use

littlewhether

It matters

the reservation

of

goods be made in favour of one individual or of many.

are
violatingthe most elementary
Accordinglycommunists
logicwhen they allow national ownership after denying the
rightto the individual because of the pretended primordial
to everything.
rightof every man
makes
the natural law self-contradictory.
The
4. Communism
be self-contradictory
if it gave
natural law would
a
us
right
that would
necessarilyinvolve by its use the violation of the
also be self-contradictory
It would
if at one
rightof another.
time as it confers a rightit bids us renounce
and the same
it,
this case
Now
would be verified here
either entirely
or in part.
if we grantedthat a positive
rightof ownership is conferred by

the

"

nature

all

on

and

men

everybody would

be entitled

he would
each article,
at the

the

law

same

rightof
would

have

time would

it extends

that

equallywith

the

either have

so

else to

without

own

violating

these conditions the natural

this violation,or

allow

to

goods. Since

everyone

be able to do

not

all

rightto disposeof it,yet

same

neighbour. Under

his

to

absolutely

forbid the exercise of man's

that he
right,or at least demand
it by some
kind of transaction.
should partially
Each
remove
and
of these solutions impliesan essential oppositionof rights,
consequentlya fundamental contradiction in the natural law.
that universal
Once again. It is admitted
community of
of the earth
would
be an
im
utter
goods and especially
of incessant con
therein the source
Hobbes
saw
possibility.
"

"

flicts. But

could

how

the state

of nature

be

one

such

as

to

being developed? Is it
conceivable that the moral law should give individuals rights
which by their use must
assuredlylead to a state of warfare ?
To be true to his theory,Hobbes
had to deny that man
is by
is a fact,it is clear that
nature
sociable. But if his sociability
of thingswhich is destructive of all social lifecould not
a state
prevent the

resources

be founded

on

nature

give to
things.

all

men

not

90.

that

Conclusion.
the

his human

dominion

of nature

itself. Hence,
the

From

"

from

same

the

effective

above

conclude, nature

we
or

property, that is

to

say, the

power

positive
rightto

considerations

rightof ownershipwhich every

is not a concrete
personality
over
everything; but it is
of

does

man

has

all

it is clear

in virtue of

positiverightto
the abstract
right of
of
becoming an owner
or

RIGHT

OF

THEORY

AND

yet belongingto anyone

things not

DUTY

287

freelyceded by

or

their

legitimate
possessors.
is not

Our

proof,however,
granted without much
clear and

without
there

cultivate

doingan

are

it may
yet complete. Certainly

that
difficulty

Robinson

his desert island

injuryto the

for

rightswhich were
subsequentlybecame

and

the individual

may

advantage

own

rightsof the human

natural

some

his

Crusoe

be

But

race.

at firstexercised

function

by

of Public

Authority. Such, for instance, as the right of procuring

reparationfor an unjust injury. Now may not the rightof
propertybe numbered

such

among

these ?

rightsas

Is not the

to-daymerged in the community, in this advanced

stage in the economic development of nations ? This is the
questionthat now demands our attention.
In sayingthat the basis of ownershipliesin the very nature of
have shown
that appropriation
of the soil can be made
we
man,
be made
for the benefit of the individual ; but it may
equally
In fact we
for the good of a corporate body of individuals.
that collective ownership of land was
anterior in more
know
regionsthan one to privateownership. In the case of a
civilized peopleought not the first form to be substituted again
for the second ?
This is the questionwhich remains to be
individual

examined.
91. Outline

of the

Doctrine

theoryin

The

of Collectivism."

question is sketched by Schaffle in his booklet entitled The

is summed
Quintessence
of Socialism 40. Its programme
up in
the three
the

items
following
of

means

the nationalization

production,the refusal

to allow

and the
any productivecapital^
state of all economic
Such
concerns.
own

would
reasons

92.

be

which

we

Criticism

of

to

the

Collectivism."

i.

system
and

all

individual to

any

administration

rightsof man,
will developin turn.

contrary

of land and

we

this

by

the

maintain
many
for]

Collectivism is incom

and
both theoretically
with the liberty
and
patible,
practically,
dignity
of the human
person. Man, we have already said, has
the rightto realize to the full his own
and to use for
personality,
this end the goods which
has put at his disposal.
Providence
Now
how can he perfecthimself except by the exercise of his
"

faculties ?
40

1911,

The

development of

the

individual is therefore

(Allen,London, gth ed., 1906.) A supplement to this

entitled
The Impossibilityof Social Democracy.

was

publishedin

288

ETHICS
is

which

work

exactlyhis

knows

his

may

conduct

such

means

end.

is the

who

only one

him, then,

With

path along which

his

it is his business likewise to

him

given

has

his true

reason

that

he

end, by freelychoosing

the best suited for the fulfilment of his

appear
it follows that the individual is not for societybut

as

individual.

societyfor

the

favourable

for his

It must

provide an

development.
protectit and secure

it must
initiative,

Far

environment

from

him

paralyzinghis
sphereof action as

possible.

as

Can it be maintained
this end ?
certain

One

that

would

is

their attitude

State to be

owner

of the

management

loud

are

personalrightsof

the

whether

collectivistregimewould

be led to think

collectivists who

respectfor
seen

God

himself towards

Hence

wide

decision lie of the

wants.

own

He

tendencies.

be best directed, and

will
activity

determine

and

wants

own

ultimate

the

must

himself.

personalto

from

so

in

of

the statements

their
But

man.

further

of
protestations
it remains

to be

To requirethe
logicalone.
of all land and capital,
to have the entire
productionand the distribution of wealth,
a

presideover all functions of social life,like the brain over

if logicis to count
for anything,to desire
organiclife,is surely,

to

individual

the

that

should

abdicate

his

submit

will and

own

completelyas possibleto the rulingof the State.

be given to the State without
Such a power and part cannot
in a proportionate
degree the libertyof the citizen.
lessening
Every collectivist who follows out his opinionsto their logical

himself

as

conclusion

desire the effacement

must

of the individual before

superiorunit which is the community.

the individual is no
brain of the body politic,

the

contradiction

and

therefore exists between

the full ideal of

Yet

suppose
lectivism is not

individual
would

in

we

duction

officials

would

of

thingsto

the
be

than

have
wants

cell.

collectivist ideal

with

sake
the

of argument

that

personallibertyof

theory, in practice their harmonious

collectivistState would

ment

for the

inconsistent

permanent working of
The

the

more

liberty.
admit

col
the

alliance

impossible.The orderlyand
machinery so complicatedas that of the
of
requirenothingshort of a discipline

nevertheless be found

iron.

If the State is the

to be

appointed to organize the national pro

The assess
to be given absolute
powers.
to

be

satisfied,and

made, the allotment

accordinglyof

of labour, the

the

distribution

THEORY

of

OF

all have

would
products,

RIGHT

to

AND

depend on

DUTY

289

the supreme

will of the

State.
We

that

reminded

are

this will,though supreme,

need

not

be arbitrary; but the whole

it
point is whether
necessarily
the State
would be so in practice.In estimating
requirements,
it its duty, we
are
would make
told, to consult the consumers

is there to this effect ?

would

But

and consider their needs.

In

it do

What

so

guarantee

difficultieswould
brief,the practical

and weighty. We
further
be very numerous
are
that the collectivist regime would not interfere in any

be found

to

informed

of profession.But here againwe have

liberty
which is valued above
that this liberty,
assurance
no
every
absolute
would
be
safeguarded againstan
effectually
thing,
going to organizethe national
authority. If the State were
production,would it not previouslyhave to determine the
of industry?
of hands to be employed in each branch
number
To-day,althoughthe individual is free in theoryto choose his
occupation,he very often meets with obstacles that make a
them onlyby persevering
choice impossible.He can
overcome
effort and if he is really
qualified
by nature with the necessary
well tested.
gifts. In a word, a man's callingin lifeis generally
force of circumstances
Thus, in the existingstate of society,
the part of privateliberty.
correct any capriceon
But, under
be nothing except the ruling
the proposedregime,there would
of authority
to prevent persons from changing their occupation

with

way

man's

at will.

division of labour,

The

being freelyarranged,would

Man
has a strong dislike for uni
be unstable.
necessarily
formity; he is pleasedwith variety; he is ever ready to fancy
Thus the staff
to his own.
that the lot of others is preferable
of workers
How,
be exposed to incessant variations.
would
pray,

conditions

in such

could

the

collectivist State

fulfilits

task?
The

questionhas

socialism
to

as

enough
duce

number

41

How

been

'

In what

more

and

RENARD,

great

are

to raise the
severe

sur

of workers
too

nor

called the
of

standard
test

force those

Etude

appositelyput by

is the army

neither too

be

follows

41

'

in

small ?

le socialising.

be

regulatedso

He

answers

as

it will be
professions
to intro
knowledge required,

liberal

selection that

less

to
'

apologistfor

an

capable to

would
fall back

lessen
on

the

other

ETHICS

290

of
occupations'. In the case
would
pay a higherremuneration
But

is not

other

occupations

in those that

the

State

less popular.

are

this

equivalentto admittingthat the State would

indirect
methods
for procuring a
dis
adopt multifarious
tribution

of labour

choice of

no
occupation,

of State

number

engage in any
by the State.

less than

who

would

made
would

the

able to

judge in

be the

to

comes

the

of

the matter
for any

not

or

set

same,

given

committee

What
up of persons appointedby the State.
guarantee
there be in such a regime for the choice of one's occupa
It is true

tion ?

that

posts that
freedom

of education

of small

moment.

is allowed, this power

People

acknowledged that

more
very much
system which has as

How

of

domain

that
principle

not

no

And

come

it must

of the

be

abuses

appointments.
be under

shall engage

one

in any

public authority!

even

it would

Here

do not

few

abuses

such

the consent

thought.

at all.

with

of the State would

supremacy

such

Then

present system State inter

would

numerous
a

really

influence.

often determine

too

all without

occupationat
in the

in the

favouritism

and
partiality

of the land

is attended

in this matter

is

a liberal pro
several examinations, some
of

the law

even

where

take up

intending to

between

again,there
under the cognizanceof

The

of the State

independent of all government

that as
are
professions
very many

are

vention

in countries

But

appointments.

the choice

fession have
which

to the

State

are

to-day the State laysdown the

liberal professions
and to certain

even

conditions of admission

be

be

would

one

is fitted

this person
State or, what

The

that

unless he fulfilled the conditions

decidingwhether
career

So

the

officials. No

employment
But

best ?

fixingof the individual's

ultimatelydepend on the good-willof a

requirements,would
certain

it decides

according as

more

formidable

only have the

productionwould
monopoly of education, but also every literary
to its control, since for its publication
have
to be submitted
would

recourse

have

along
printing-house
duction

Thus,

only

life of the whole

of the
Now

with

be under

would
not

be had

to

the

nation

to

all the

State

the
other

would

life but

be under

press.
instruments

For

the

of pro

of the State.

the management

economic

not

also the

the

intellectual

sovereigndirection

publicauthorities.
who

or

what,

granted such absolute

indeed, is the State

powers

that it should

be

ETHICS

292

and
requirehabits of regularity
direction in the highest degree ?
Imagine some
of share
of
number
a
society,composed
great

enterpriseswhich

commercial
of

unity

anonymous

holders
the

of whom

none

changing
crowd

would

is determined

nomination

whose

swayed by

direct interest in the

of

be to invest one's

follyit

What

views.
political
in such a concern
capital

all kinds

this is

Yet

It is quite evident
picture of the collect!vist State.
rivalryof partiesand fluctuations in publicopinionwould
baneful

most

There

would

effect upon
only be one

that

society.

discipline.

Thus

regime,by puttingthe
guardianshipof the State and

absolute

him

of all the liberties he

a

individual under

the collectivist

the

than

life of the

economic

have

of preventingdisorder and
way
crushingthe citizens under the yoke of an

anarchy, namely, by
iron

the

of

the votes

by

of

success

all be
which must
enterprises
ever
managed by a personnelnecessarily

at once,

and

any

for many

business, formed

undertaken

have

disparagementof

of the

reasons

natural

law.

why

enjoys to-day,would
be

system would

be

; and
personality

his human

such

robbing
nothing less

indeed

this is

contrary

to

one

the

regime,far from furthering

social progress,would be a greatobstacle to it. That the system of
individual ownershipis superiorto a collectivistregime such as
have
described
is demonstrated
we
by arguments both from
2.

The

establishment

of any

such

"

historyand psychology.
(a)Argument from history. Collective ownership has existed
in many
places and everywhere it has always evolved into
privateproperty. A system of allotments has followed that of
the working and
land, periodicre
enjoyment of common
distributions have tended to become
less and less frequent,and
perpetual possession or ownership has eventually replaced
this evolution was
Now
temporary possessionor usufruct.
It
in time with the progress made
in land cultivation.
parallel
to
became
as
a
numerous,
population grew more
necessary,
"

abandon

the wide-area

cultivation of former

times.

This fact

increasingly
an
necessityof allowing the worker
longer, and eventuallya perpetual,ownership. The incon
veniences of the villagecommunity explain its disappearance.
shows

But

the

these

inconveniences

were

trary, they belongedto the very

not
essence

accidental
of such

; on
a

the

con

system. As

OF

THEORY

RIGHT

AND

DUTY

293

soil

of the

requiredmore
capitaland greater
indis
labour, the incentive of personal ownership became
pensable. In the villagecommunity it very often happened
the soil would neglect
the cultivation of his
that the worker
on
the cultivation

allotment

for redistribution

time

the

as

drew

near

in consequence
obligedto devote
lengthy period of time to gettingthe exhausted

possessor

was

Hence, under such

fit condition.

siderable loss of time

and

It

energy.

ownership. This evil consequence

the village
community would be
under

back

to

con

was

remedy

placeto perpetual
was
always found in

gave

much

very

only would

aggravated

more

the cultivator

he worked, but the result of his labour

the soil which

own

less

redistributions became

which

Not

collectivist regime.

land

new

or

to
precisely

was

periodsbetween the
usufruct
eventuallymere

longer,until

more

system, there

the

this evil that

the

not

would

be
personal profit. For the produce would
gatheredinto the granariesof the State and apportioned to the
citizens in exchange for other proceeds of labour.
argument. If we look into the nature of man
(b)Psychological
it is easy to understand
why a system of collective ownership is
be

not

his

to

"

to be

not

that of

to
preferred

privateproperty.

For

most

men

great law of work there is needed the stimulus of

of
and
personal interest, the hope of self-aggrandisement

to

obey

the

provisionfor

the future
these

dispensewith

can

of the

family.

motives

and

Those

take

men

few who

are

to their work

solely

good of others. Such will

of an exceptional
nature.
Now, need we say
always be men
that individual
potent incentives
ownership providesfar more
be given by collective ownership ?
to work
Far,
than would
then, from beinga help to social progress, the establishment of
be simply
It would
be a great drawback.
collectivism would
to an elementaryform of economic
a return
arrangement which
has disappeared
under the development of cultivation.

from

of

sense

duty

for the

or

To attain its maximum

be free,and,
worker
him.
ones

as

himself,or

By

this

which

we

do not

initiativeand

mean

man
over

the

but

that selfish motives

that

is in earnest
what

with

agree
play in human

we

part they
over

labour

must

in the interests of the

at least in the interests of those

acknowledgingthat
A

productivenesshuman

rule, be undertaken

obeys,

man

very great.

of

what

he does

it is his interest to make

endeared

to

the

only

Hobbes

in

conduct

is

are

of his
a

own

success.

ETHICS

294
Work

which

natural
most

is not

taste

under

but
be

cases

under

done

simply

under

of self-interestor
of constraint

the

goad
productive. The

less

much

the stimulus

who

man

compulsion will,if opportunityallows, be

server,

and

will put forth the minimum

of

who

is

an

or

the slave.

one

wage-earner

has

owner

an

The

had

personal gain; they

with

this

eye-

The

work

When

matter.

became

allowed then

were

mere

of effort.

the

very poor, their

with the offer of

stimulatingthem

to

recourse

works

advantage over that of the

slaveryof times past affords a

singularlyinstructive example in
qualityof the work done by slaves
masters

by

will in

put by their savings

to

view

liberty.Col
eventuallyto purchasingtheir own
would
this in replacingvoluntary
exactly reverse

lectivism
labour

by compulsory labour, and would thus rob the worker

of the mainspringof his energy.
In the first place,
competitionamong privateproducerswould
to State monopoly.
giveway in every branch of human activity
Yet

drawbacks,
competition, notwithstanding certain
recognized by all to be one of the most powerfulfactors
economic

the

History proves that

progress.
and
greatest undertakings are

inventions

action but rather

not

in

fruitful

most

due

is

to

public

which
privatemanagement and initiative,
is ever
kept on the alert by the stimulus of competition.
Secondly,whilst privateproducers in their rivalrywith one
another
naturallystrive to vary their productionsand invent
to

effective and

more

would

oppositecourse

an

and

ments,
And

as

necessary

of

matter

time

every

to

never

of manufacture,

be the

fact,what

invention

new

methods

policyof a collectivist State,

as far as possible
uniformityin all require
improve upon the methods alreadyin use.

introduce

namely,to

economical

more

arise

difficultieswould

immense

importance should make

reorganizeits system of labour.

for the State to

of any

it

the pro
Furthermore, besides suppressingall competition,

posed regime would deprive the individual

enrichingeither himself or his relations. It
forbidden
and

to

heirs.

for him

to

acquire any

work

them

for his

Yet

it cannot

be

denied

fortune,if not for himself

great
No

number
matter

of

cases

what

may

own

the

of the

hope of
strictly

production,

to his
on
pass
desire to build up a

them

the

at least for his

mainspringof

of

means

profitor
that

of any
would be

children,is in
a

man's

very

activity.

be said to the contrary, the idlers of

THEORY

OF

RIGHT

AND

DUTY

295

small
class. How
a
relatively
many
life
of
toil
of
with
lead
a
no
their own
thought satisfying
parents
but because
wants
they are looking to the future of those
How
dependent upon them.
people does not this one
many
When
at
thought keep from takingthe pleasantpath of ease.
lengththey have made their mark in life,
they stillwork on to
that has cost them
the position
make
much.
In his
secure
so
strugglefor the manifold necessities of life,obligedto provide a
of livelihood for himself and his family,harassed
with
means
has a powerful incentive to
anxietyfor the future, every man
under
work.
Quite otherwise,however, would be his position

community

the

are

the collectivistsystem
would

he

have
he

Indeed,

placeto

is

worker
the

be

be his own,

not

less for himself

working

is to

; that

community

would

prospect of bequeathing it

no

would

his business

than

personal interest

say,

to

and

anyone.
for the

would

give

generalinterest,the influence of which upon the

admittedlyvery much less powerful. The State, as

mere

of

of all wealth, would

owner

in order to live ; but

everybody to work
lackingin natural incentives,would
better results than

powers, and

one

in

of the slaves in

that

3. Collectivism would
no

not

way

to

compel

this enforced

labour,

be

likelyto produce

previousages.

the State

impose upon

in accordance

able

be

course

task

beyond its

with its natural

mission.

It is easy enough to form

a
an
prioriconceptionof the
working of the collectivist machinery,but the aspect of things
"

looked at from
a
practical
changes very considerablywhen
in
of
arise
Difficulties
which
view.
theory
point
immediately
not

were

economic

contemplated.

We

functions which

the

will examine
new

brieflythe

regime would

lay upon

chief
the

State.

(i)First of all,it would be the duty of the State to determine

what thingswould
The first questionthat
have to be made.
presents itself is how

to make

objectsand objectsof luxury.

distinction between

necessary
This, it will be admitted, is no

when
there is the questionof recon
especially
it with each man's liberty
to settle his own
requirements.
ciling
These requirements are constantlyvarying and become
more
in proportion
numerous
becomes
as
man
highly civilized.
more
were
use
originally
Thingswhich to-dayare articles of common
objectsof luxury. The State would have to reckon with this

easy

matter,

fact if it is not to hinder all economic

progress.

It would

not

296

ETHICS

be sufficient to make

be

articles of

sary articles and

subjectedto

varied ; and for this

Even
then its purpose
division between
for such
and

an

cultured

more

all,a list of the thingsto

into the two

Such

of officialswould

army
would

is

required.
*

and

42. Since

what

'

asserts

No

per
line of

is

merely useful,
societygrows richer

competent in this
the necessityof submitting
is

one

no

draw

to

competent

is necessary

matter, this socialistwriter

be

scarcelybe attained.
'

neces

accordingas demands

change according as
'

classes of

classificationwould

revision

constant

what

line must

for

luxury.

George Renard,

', says

son

and

once

to divide them

produced, and

have to be

out,

it to the

that there should

judgment of everybody '. He means
be an
all the parties concerned
to fix
understandingamong
the minimum
standard
of livingwhich
the community would
to providefor each individual.
This, he adds, would
engage

be

laid down

in

Constitution

the

by the

whole

of the

citizen's economic

that

It would

community.

would

be

up
of declaration

kind

rights. Thus, in order

a luxury,might
ago was

which
a few years
bicycle,
tool
use
as the errand-boy's

drawn

be

that

into

come

the artisan's convenience

or

the

to

get

to his

work, a revision of the Constitution would be necessary !

intro
be the issue of this referendum
Further, what would

duced

for the purpose

What

is there

impatientfor
and
the

of

would

that

for the

clamour

greatest comfort

(2)The

State

be

not

in

would

demanded

would

the

the

commissariat

what

moment

of

an

culations to be made,
is not

whole
every

question of

nation,

day.

sleep in

'

to

administration
victuals for the

*2

Op. cit.

without

morrow.

To

produced.

powerful aid

but

kind

do

this,it

of statistics.

difficultiesof

cities,
nay, of a
that
too
rations, and

of immense

provided with

having

only the

the immense

are

but

army,

London's

peace

not

in the field. Imagine the cal

army
the details to be foreseen ! Here there

an

be

by the masses,
of gold ?
Each

delicacies in food and

to determine

be

for

man

clothing.

have

quantityof the things to

to
naturallyhave recourse

think

the age

choicest

also the

But

rightsof

economic

reignof
oft-promised

the

all would

the
settling

'

Leroy-Beaulieu,can
individual or the public

millions ', wrote

either
the

least
.

the

anxiety

about

People who

the

know

arrival of

nothing of

and

economy
political

hand,

the other

of

the sake

give

never

in the

consumes

concerted

yet

spiteof

various

to the

to
sibility

assume

disastrous

what

And

departments

jointaction

the

of

"

the least

in

"

no

to be

have

of
for the purpose
life. What
of economic

consequences

innumerable

difficulties to be
practical

WThat

on

43. What

'

their needs

attending

formed

committees

by

undertaken

Yet,

all its conscious

guided by personalinterest,would

individuals each

various

division,for instance,for

less effective

the

none

general

all of the

day

no
foresight,
easy task in providingfor
to-dayhappens spontaneouslythrough

way

the

to

the State has to transfer

it has, in

manoeuvres,

297

twenty-fourhours.

brigade or

DUTY

thought

notice that when

we

of men,

few thousands

AND

to produce each

welfare, still continue

articles that Paris

RIGHT

OF

THEORY

respon
!

overcome

in calculation

error

entail !

would

(3)But the undertaking of the eollectivistState would remain

yet unaccomplished. After the catalogue of articles to be
would have
producedhad been drawn up, a method ofproduction
have to
of hands would
to be organized. A sufficient number
and yet, we must
remem
be providedin each singleindustry,
ber,the State must allow everybody to follow what he considers
have
already agreed that
to be his natural calling. For we
then as
of choice of occupationwould be justa" much
freedom
now

would
eollectivistorganization
above.

uniform

everywhere

the

for the

hands
State

would

direct

there

toil

obligedto

indirect.

or

with

meet

ambitions

same

rougher
be

which
difficulty

the

here

Yet

on

the

resort

this

be

would
land
to

could

would

everybody
or

in the

coercive
not

even

produce
prefer

of

dearth

willing
The

mines.

measures,

be

the

noticed

have

we

system of trainingfor all would

office work, and

or
literary

and

of progress ;

condition

either

attempted

these
and resistance. To overcome
arousingill-feeling
it would
certainlybe necessary in the end to establish an iron
that would annihilate individual personality.
discipline
(4) Once the workers have been drafted into the several
industries,the State has to supervisewhat is being done by
the task assigned
each person in order to see that he is fulfilling
without

to

this purpose it would

The workers would
of officials.

him.

army

*8

For

Op. di.

be

necessary

then

to create

an

find realized,under

ETHICS

298

they had little expected,the much-vaunted

equality. To-day, at least in the majorityof cases,
form

ivist

work

pro
of interference,
for there is the spur of

any need
personalinterest to keep the worker
ceeds

ideal of

without

have

regime we

(5)Again, the

that this would

seen

State would

But

at work.

have

have

ceased

to exist.

the distribution

to undertake

On

in the collect-

this

social
pointespecially
istic writers displaythe greatest variety of opinions. Several
been
have
formulae
suggested. Among socialistic theorists,

of wealth

for the

'

some

say

to

community.

each

his needs

according to

'

others

'

to

each

'

combine
accordingto his labour
; whilst others again would
both these principles,
without, however, showing how this is to
there are some
who speak of
be carried out in practice.Lastly,
remuneration
to all workers.
givingthe same
is essentially
to each according to his needs
The formula
Man's
needs are
well-nighinfinite,and they become
vague.
'

definite

more

civilization.

And

well

as

Again,

all needs

would

as

would

what

with

numerous

more

State would

? The

needs

'

have

to

be reckoned

have

step in

to

be

progress
considered

to settle this

equal ?

as

Then,

as

Schaffle

of all progress and

be the enemy
liberty.Perhaps the State would order each citizen to draw
list of all his wants

be the result of such

?
an

as

question.

admits, socialism would

a

of

the

all
up

difficultto guess what would

And
then, if each did receive

It is not

inquiry.

his

what
the
needs, where would be, no matter
task he had to fulfil,
the stimulants to labour ?
Equally vague is the second formula, to each according to

accordingto

'

his labour

'.

How

According

to

the

If so, how

In
'

this

the

effort and

is the merit in each

all would

Here

could

be

connexion

of labour

value

moral

the

individual

arbitrary,with
the

socialist

merit
case

free scope

G.

Renard

be

determined

worker

of the

to be estimated

for favouritism.

frankly writes

experiment will show that, since it is im

be necessary
in terms of effort,it may
to reckon directly
possible
to base the calculation on its visible and tangible
results,that is
the work accomplished 44. But by doing this we
to say, on
the principle
of giving to each
renounce
according to his
labour ', for the visible and
tangibleresults by no means
They largely
always correspondto the effort of the worker.
It may

be

that

'

'

"4

Op

cit.

ETHICS

300

of remuneration

for human

portionateto the

length of labour-time

Effort

quantity of coal extracted

greater or less according as the

is

accessible

In

not.

or

the

first

is

in the

more

same

is

seam

the

case

no

pro
it is to the result

than

The

obtained.
time

effort.

space

easily

more

of

amount

of

labour

less.
considerably

expended was

cannot
examples will show that the Marxian principle
be easilyreconciled with the claims of socialism to remunerate
labour more
equitably. Take the example of two bushels of

Some

wheat

in the barren
respectively
grown
fertile lowlands.
Let the figures10

hillydistrict

and

the

and

for the

of labour

amount

be

requiredin

the two

will
average
is to settle the rate of wages in

Since this average

7! hours.

5 stand

in

The

cases.

regions,it is abundantlyevident that all the advantage

is with the growers
in the fertile plains. Their competitors,
in their struggleagainst greater difficulties,
will have worked
twice as hard ; and yet they will not receive higher pay.
As a
second
example take two industrial labourers
engaged on
both

the

of work.

different kinds

The

tryingconditions and therefore

and precisely
this account
on
he, in spiteof this fact,content
his

effort

less time

took

of

work
will

than

greater recompense

the

very

less time.

much

himself with less reward

this

of the principle
of Marx.
consequence
his flock in sweet idleness from dawn
a

under

requirea greater intensity,

takes

Yet

is done

one

would

be

Must
because

logical
The shepherd watching
tillevening would
receive
the

is

health

whose
glass-blower

quicklyruined.
Then, again,how

is Marx's

to
principle

be

appliedwhen

it is a

questionof mental labour, which is more

exhaustingand cannot
kinds of physicallabour at a low
be endured
so
long as some
tension

receive

Would

the

higher wage

mechanic
than

the

who

watches

over

engineer,the artist,the

machine
man

of

letters,etc. ?

might lead one

consequences
social value of the articles produced
These

consumer

or

basis for the distribution of

be in the first place to go

collectivist doctrines,that

would
the

as

look

to

to

the

rather
needs

wealth, but

to

the

of the
to do

so

of
contrary to the very essence
with the present
part company

regime preciselybecause
prices are regulated not by work
but by the law of supply and
demand
value
secondly
; and
would

leave the difficultiesunremoved

which

the

masses

would

THEORY

ministerial

impose

upon

would

not

be

task

show

301

falls in wages

action

that

collectivism would

its powers.
And this task
with
the function of public

must

supersede

not

the contrary, should

possibleprivateinitiative

that

of

The

working

and

machinery, and

various

State

of the soil

flagrant violation of existingrights.

and mines, the making of implements
general the progress achieved in the
the

industry,are
privateenterprise.They

of

to individual skill and

initiative,

the

State assert

has

in

itself the

of

master

that

in the

it

higher

alreadyshown

community would gain nothing by the

regime which would deprive labour of all
short time to

personal
rightcould

to

what

it be

the

lead in

of the

not

all this wealth

have

we

due

By

Would

no

work

are

effort.

itself produced ?
way
claims of the community ?
Yet

would

be

never

of human

branches
but

in

in

safeguard
and always
necessarily

the essential factor in social progress.

need hardly say, collectivism could
we
(6)Finally,

except by

the

facilitateand

on

"

established

settled

beyond

all consistent

at

dividual,but,
as

DUTY

of rises and

these

as

the State

authority. Its
far

AND

decisions.

considerations

Such

as

RIGHT

againstthe acceptance

make

by

OF

that

establishment

of

its incentives

and

generalwealth.
Should the objectionbe raised that the existing
titles of owner
of usurpation of
ship are nullified by the undeniable cases
with the
be rejoinedthat surely prescription
wealth, it may
labour
of generations superadded is not an
empty plea in
if you reject
of the existingstate of things. And
justification
vitiate
flaw must
then the same
fundamental
ever
prescription,
national
it does
individual
must
as
ownership. For we
not

the

decrease in the

puttingof the land under cultivation and

subsequent improvements that have gradually increased

forgetthat

its value

represent the

and

these

who

acted

should

before

the

not
us

made

generations were
without
we

be

generations,

of individual

up

persons

Why
gone

particular
pieceof land was
else again some
other party sold
included the increased value
of

of

the State.
from
inducement
any
have
the rightfulheirs of those who

This

expend

efforts

accumulated

my

capitaland

leavingit

some

day

my

upon

my
for

me

given to
it.

ancestors,

by

me

it to

he had

labour
to

left

it ; I, in my

The

children has

or

pricewhich
turn,

cherished

given zest

hope
to

my

ETHICS

302

efforts.

It

decessors.

owned

the

was

Yet

the

it is

some,

The

else

should

lifetime,or
would

will the

entail

about

my

pre

rightfully

it among
be

its

imagined

indemnifying the

State should

pay

of

considered

been

of

out

their

transac

Where,
From

funds ?

the

ex

during their

rent

them

graduallybuy

ever

raise

State

numbers

is

the financial difficultiessuch

have

But
possessions.

property

on

true, talk

propriatedowners.

such

urged

flagrantviolation

more

had

that

steps in and

firmlyestablished

rightsmost

tion

that

deny

State

Could

!
possessions
Yet

will

Who

resolve

same

pray,

the

tax
necessary
that is to say, from the pocketsof those who are to be
payer
indemnified ! Besides, the sums
paid to the expropriated
"

would

owners

be of

avail

no

except for

the

purchaseof

articles

conditions,then, they would

not be getting
any compensationat all. In fact,it would be a
indemnification
words, the
confiscation, not an
; in other
of

consumption

or

In such

use.

collectivist regime would

have

to be

established in defiance of

all existing
rights.

Reply

93.

Regime.
because
natural
these

"

Objections brought

to

First

The
:
objection

by it
sources

allowed

of wealth

to their

things were

meant

to
own

the

work

selfish

furnish the

to

is

regime
capitalistic

are

some

against the Capitalistic

land

unjust,

and

advantage.

means

the
But

of subsistence

further, they are not the

No individual,there
productof the labour of the individual.
for

the

fore,may

whole

human

; and

race

be the exclusive

owner

of them.

Reply : It is true that the land has to providenourishment

it is of im
for everybody. But, preciselyfor this reason,
its being
which secures
portance that the system should prevail
as
productiveas possible.That system is the one which is
founded
on
privateproperty. For under any other regime the
worker

is without

the motives

that will stimulate him

to make

he is the first to reap the benefit

of his labour, as is only just; but the whole community too
shares in the fruit of it.
the soil productive. Of

Again,if the
it is not
the

the

individual

course

himself may

fruit of his labour, as

not

much

possess land because

may

be

said about

community.
Thirdly,collectivism would not guarantee to everybody an
of the soil,any more
than the prevailing
actual possession

simplybe replacedby

DUTY
of

farmers

303

to-day would

publicofficials.
dense
a
populationwhere
how
could all have
prevailed,
of

number

AND

and

landowners

The

does.

system

RIGHT

OF

THEORY

Finally,in a country with

system of a division of labour

the
an

could hope for is

of the land ? The most
one
possession
profit
that the community should reap the greatest possible
is the case
under a regime of
Such
its exploitation.
from
privateproperty : it affords greater incitements to work, and
of the soil will be increased and
therefore the productiveness
with it the wealth of the community.
The capitalistic
Second objection
:
regime is unjust,because
to each accordingto his
instead of being true to the maxim
of riches depend on the mere
the acquisition
labour ',it makes
actual

'

argument is
writingsof Lassalle.

developedat lengthin the

Reply : Certainlyit is
in

But

world.

this

of wealth

distribution

renders to others '.

of his
in

another

his

making

to the

For

To

make

more

claim

employer. The clever inventor

has
properly received his
very

difficult and

strenuous

very

to

has

who

deserts.

ordinary

life of the

Will it be said

is

ownershipto

service

and

by

effort than

of talent ?

man

reward

time

meritorious.
perhaps more
in givinga higherreward
is guiltyof an injustice

labourer

that the State

who

to his work

new

object,has manifestly no

an

fortune
the

the services he

his

from

Nevertheless
manual

labourer

that

accordingto

to each

givesmore
inexperience

greater wage
made

desirable

'

in the words

be formulated

reason

everybody should
his merit and efforts as far as is possible
the dominant
principlegoverning the
is that of commutative
justice.It may

of

receive the reward

found

be

to

This

circumstances.

of

chance

of moral
even
use

be

it need
legitimate

merit

service

though due merely

to

is censurable

of chance

not

be
necessarily

rendered

may

the

still be

fortuitous circumstances.

only in

the

case

of the

in life
making his position
and
to exempt himself from
who
in this way
endeavours
It is not right to say that every
Nature's law of labour.
reward
received must
depend simply and solelyon the re

man

who

trusts

merit.
cipient's
fortune and

prise.

bad

Is it not

talents above

to
solely

Where

it alone

in this

case

for

would

matters

end ?

play their part in every human

by nature
by chance that one man is gifted
fortune

his fellows ?

Good
enter

with

ETHICS

304

And

circumstance

fortuitous

happen that
of genius on

man

to be allowed

enrichingthe
done by a man

entirely

some

his way
to a
his talents to

to turn

whilst he is

account,

own

puts

Is he not

great discovery?
his

does it not

often

again,how

whole

of

societyby

is the exclusive
discovery? No work
efforts ; a number
of factors always come
product of his own
will.
into play that are quiteindependentof the human
his

If

of

intervention

the

vitiates

chance

of riches by
property, then the acquisition

condemned

be

equallywith

that

by

it draws

the land it

must
corporation

individual.

an

merely the good fortune of a peoplethat

vine-growing? Is it to be said,then, that
injusticebecause

title to

man's

profitfrom

Is it not

soil is

the

good

nation commits

for
an

of
fertility
special

the

occupies?

Furthermore, Lassalle clearly

exaggerates the part playedby
in

chance

economics.

For

skill, etc.,
professional

economy,

difference to the
later the

of

means

the chances

of

success

an

did

indeed

when

become

industry and
of

matters

enterprise?

We

to notice

have

in this world

ourselves
safeguarding

in

against

of misfortune.

divorce labour
: Capitalism by strivingto
objection
and capital
For some
of another.
at the mercy
puts one man
of productioninto their hands
and thus
men
get all the means
in a positionto lay down the law to their fellow-men.
are
Reply : First of all,is it unjust for capitalnot to belong to
Third

labour

or,

labour

of another

not

in other

words, for
An

one

to be

man

affirmative

is

answer

find any proofof it.

I allow you the usufruct

of my
land
again,I invite you to

benefited

by

the

we

do

given but

in consideration

of

co-operatewith me in
its cultivation.
This co-operation
is freelygiven by you in
What
rightis
exchange for certain emoluments
agreed upon.
certain

here
any

charge,or

violated

advantage

Where

is the

whatever

from

?
injustice
the labour

not reap
If I may
of another, I must,

making everythingthat I require. For

by his
justlike the capitalist
profits
producer,every consumer
neighbour'sefforts,with the aggravating circumstance that he
his purelypersonalneeds, whilst the capitalist
does so to satisfy
further the
sets afloat other
that in the long run
concerns
then, myselfset about

interests of the

whole

tage is taken by

one

man

community.

In both

cases

of the efforts of another

man.

an

advan
Are

we

THEORY

RIGHT

OF

AND

DUTY

305

logicaland decry every kind of division of labour, every

exchange of services and material advantages ?
to be

divorce

The

become

the collectivistregime,whilst at

under
reality

always the

would

labour

capitaland

of

Under

case.

proposedsystem the
have
always to avail
State.

the

implements belonging to

It is true

joint-ownerof such things,but only in

as a starvingbeggar is the proud owner
Such
a
right is a purely theoretical
would
position

present this is not

workman

the

cultivates the field would

of

be that

actual

an

himself of the
he would

infinitesimal

an

of the

who

be

degree,

publiccommons.
In

one.

practice his

wage-earner.

mere

who
reignsthe man
capitalism
of productionholds sway
the rest of
over
possesses the means
But would not all those paid by the State be subjectto
men.
from whom
the rule of the supervising
officials,
they would have
Such
a dependence would
to beg the dailynecessaries of life ?
We

be

it said

hear

direct.

more

even

privatehands,

the

employer. But

he

as

To-day

when

sole manufacturer

But

system.
;

; for it is indeed

one

of fact

matter

; the

owners

the

industries

many

great

farmer

has

and

in

are

of land

amount

would

are

merely a

rightto

sole merchant.

the

in the

often

an
new

same

of

theory,but
cultivated
by its

matter

is

be

then

of
root-principle

labour

to-day capitaland

is their combination

nor

so

labour

separationof capitaland

absolute

hands

where

oppressedworker may at least seek another

to enjoy this opportunity
would cease
as soon

the State became

This

that

the harvest, and

the

agricul

the workmen
capital. Even
themselves
become
by the formation of co
capitalists
may
operativesocieties. It is lawful for them conjointlyto acquire
them
to use
of production and
by their savings the means
tural

to

implements

their

his

own

profit. They
already existing.

common

of societies
The

are

present system does

binations.

What

is the

reason

not

may

shareholders

also become

exclude

any

of these

why work-peoplemost

com

frequently

preferto live under a system in which capitaland labour are

on
separated? Why does the thriftyartisan seldom embark
?
capitalistic
Why does he preferto look for other
enterprises
investments ? Undoubtedly because he judges them to be safer.
it possible
Fourth objection
The
:
capitalistic
system makes
for some
to enrich themselves
by levying a percentage on the
fruit of the labour

of others.

ETHICS

306

allied to the
argument is very closely

This

answered.
have

It

representsthe

above

of Marx's

sum

articles of

use.

labour

produce

to

Marx

have

we

just

objections. We

the

exchange-valueof
commodities
by the normal labour-time requiredfor their
of finding
production. According to him, it is the only means
of things,and so of fulfilling
the require
a common
measure
should
of commutative
ments
justice,by which
everyone
receive in exact proportion
the
as he gives. For looked at from
the needs
standpointof their use- value,i.e.their fitness to satisfy
have no standard of comparison,
of the consumer,
commodities
measure.
they do not admit of being reduced to any common
the priceof an
article higher or lower
Marx
therefore makes
accordingas the labour-time requiredfor its productionshall be
the
greater or less. It is accordinglyeasy to see whence
The capitalist
is a man
who with
derives his wealth.
capitalist
his ready money
purchasesgoods in their raw state and then
to
sellsthem at a higher price. In this way he uses his money
And
how does he manage
this ? By
produce more
money.
who work up the raw
material into
the labour of his operatives
seen

that

one

says

Marx,

article

equal

Suppose,
an

necessaries of life for

measures

one

day.

employee work
value
pocketthe surplus-

He

makes

own

it
in

which

value

does the

What

six hours

his

requiressix
to

hours

that

of

of the

do
capitalist

extra, and puts into his

they produce.

Thus

we

see

is accumulated
from
what
capitalist
belongs to his employee.
Reply : We have alreadyreviewed Marx's theory of value.
it is impossibleto leave out of
in which
The questionis one
of things. Commutative
the utility
account
justicedoes not
exact
a mathematical
equalitybetween the things exchanged.
violated so long as each of the parties,
of its principles
None
are
and knowledge of the matter
in hand,
acting with full liberty
considers that he has received a compensationfor the advan
that

the

of the

wealth

tages he has ceded

of

use-

Hence

account

must

be taken

value.

Marx

keeps in view

namely labour,
a

to the other.

matter

and

that

merely

the labour

of fact the commercial

complex result
the
operatives,

of

one

number

of the

factors of wealth,

of the

value of

employee. But as
thingsis the extremely

of factors

the

labour

of the

work

of the

machines, the qualityof the

materials,the needs

of the

consumer,

the

fluctuations

raw

of the

3o 8

ETHICS

of land

which

mined
95.

one

should

of the work

done.

by

the very

II.

Prescription.

the transfer

of

nature

property

of

or

it is immediate,
over

and

definite

clearlydeter

be

prescription(usucapio)is meant
any other real rightby possession

By

"

by civil law. Sometimes

it requires
extend
a possession

fulfils certain conditions

which

ing

desires to possess

fixed

sometimes

period of time.
basis of

?
The question
prescription
be looked at from the point of view of the authoritywho
may
legalizes
prescription
; or from the point of view of the bene
that is,of the one
who has entered into possession.
ficiary,
is the action of the legislator
who
i. How
justifiable
prevents
from
claimant
his
after
owner
or
an
a certain
asserting rights
lapseof time ?
An
allows
who
owner
(a) Presumption of abandonment.
considerable time to elapse without
reclaiminghis property
when
he might easilyhave
done
so, is presumed to have
his rightto it. At a giventime he ceased to consider
renounced
What

rational

is the

"

it

his.

as

From

that

'

it became

moment

res

nullius

'

and

therefore liable to be the property of the firstoccupier; that is,

in the

case

at

issue,of its present possessor.

is allowed by civil law

(b)Presumptionofnegligence. A man
that may
to employ measures
to his recovering
lead eventually
his own
rights; but it requiresthat privateindividuals should
look after their own
to be
interests. This requirementis seen
not
unreasonable
when
consider that a too lengthy delay
we
would complicatethe task of the publicauthorityand perhaps
endanger other rightsthat ought to be respected. An owner,
therefore,who does not take proceedingswithin the available
time, though he knows that he is empowered to do so and is
of the legalconsequences
of his attitude,may
be justly
aware
his claim to his right. If this
presumed to have abandoned
"

has

not

been

his intention

negligencedepriveshim

can

we

of the

at least understand

rightto

that

his

the aid of the

summon

law.

(c)Argument from equity. The

"

retains
money
it as

an

and

article for several

labour

to preserve

possessor

in

good

has devoted his

years and who
and improve it,who has reckoned

part of his fortune and regulatedhis expenses

might perhapssuffer serious

faith who

loss if he

were

accordingly,

obligedto

restitution.

THEORY

law

The

OF

considers that

RIGHT

AND

careless

the

DUTY

309

ought

owner

suffer the

to

neglect. Why should injurybe sustained by

the possessor in good faith who is in no way blameworthy ?
in the
(d)Argument from publicutility.Positive legislation
is also justifiable
of usucaption and
matter
on
prescription
tends
Such
to further
legislation
grounds of publicutility,(i)
penalty

of his

"

property, for,in the first place,as we

In
have said, it encourages
vigilanceon the part of owners.
the second
place,it gives security,after a certain time, to
administration
efficient

who

anyone

has

condition for the

of

good

small

no

article in

acquiredan

of transfer.

ordinaryway
matter

of

good

is clearly
a
security

Such

of

administration

necessary
For

property.
hold

who

those

importance that

in the

faith and

it is

property

of
always have to be reckoning with the possibility
beingbroughtagainstthem by others,thus abruptly
proceedings
disturbingthe peace of their possessionand robbing them
of the fruit of their labour.
Lastly,it prevents articles that

should

not

been lost and

have

whose

to be

continues

owner

from

unknown,

neglected,without anyone being able to

remaining indefinitely
transactions.
make
of them,
use
(ii)It facilitates commercial
A purchaser cannot
always be inquiringinto the previous
who
pur
historyof objectsexhibited for sale. Yet the man
chases an article in normal circumstances
ought to be able to

rely on

the

regulationsin
for the
46

years

of

longer take

the

law

the

price

which

prevented that

to

hand

48

with

to

This
'

is the

no

consistentlywith

But

exception that if
object in an open market

has

man

its

in the

or

where

occasioned, should

be

often
of

thing

(iv)Finally,in
laid down

supposed

by

law

canon

title,such

as

that

had

long

passed from

specialcircumstances,

some

'

or

lost may

or

three

objectsof the like nature are

to restitution only on being paidby the owner
be
lawsuits would
he
paid, (iii)Many

period

colorable

stolen

been

restore.

be allowed

hand,

After

this

makes

would

standingclaim

transactions.

of his property. Such

recovery
the available period,
obligesthe possessor

bought a stolen or lost

ordinarycourse of business
sold,he is bound

such

has

what

good faith simply

purpose,

as

for the

action

action,if taken within

in

of

promoting
of

owner

purchaser. Consequently
made
are
by the law
prescription

title

his

the matter

purpose
the

of

value

for movable

sale in

an

open

art 'cles

market.

"

possessed
TRS.

ETHICS

310

for social peace so indispensable

for the
ofpublicorder. For example, after a revolution

makes
prescription
establishment

re-

it

happen that a great deal of property has been usurped and,

to the
a lapseof several
years, there is no way of restoring
The dispossessedfamilies are perhaps not to
owners.
rightful
may
after

be found

titles to

; the

ownershiphave
in the

originally
usurped has

was

of

destroyed; what
time passed through

of

course

series of possessors in good faith,who have each

acquired it through the ordinary channels of con

the hands
in

been

turn

veyance, and have

labour
and money.

perhapslargelyincreased
In

such

its value

by

their

state of affairs it behoves

the

to a situation the
publicauthorityto give a legalrecognition
due to violence and
usurpation. Here
originof which was
of
is a method
settlement made
prescription
necessary by the
The
need
of recognizing
force of circumstances.
such
some

method

becomes
land

of the

apparent if we

more

occupiedwas
primitivepeopleswho

the

from

even

now

lost

at

one

dwelt

remember

time
on

taken

it.

that most

by violence

All trace of them

; the

however, of which they

injustice,
the victims does not keep such lands from ever
were
beingmade
of by future generations. Eventually there arises the
use
of creatingnew
rightsto supersede the old ones, and
necessity
been

has

long ago

the basis for them

is to be found

from
Prescription
(a)The possessorin

the

2.

free from

conscience

another,

right.
In such

If,by
lost

The

law

of

has

is not

made

to

limitation,it forbids

seen,

an

is that commercial

of occupancy.

of the possessor.

residuaryheir

are

not

in

restoringthe possessionof
to enforce his
legalmeans

help the

be without

stolen property after

or

no

view
his

of

duty

owner

it would

case

point of

faithand

the

if the

even

acts

have

we

bad

in the duration

possessor

in bad faith.

whatever.
any justification
the rightful
for
to sue
owner

appointed time,

the reason,

transactions demand

this

as
"

it

the possessor in bad faith in enriching

himself at
of another.
the expense
No possessor in bad faith,then, can in
conscience claim the aid of the civil law as a title to his pos

is not

to abet

session 47.

(b)With

regard

generally allow
47

English

condition

for

to

that

the
he

possessor in good faith, moralists

law
apparently does
prescription. TRS.
"

avail

may

not

himself

of

prescription,

expressly require good

faith

as

THEORY

OF

RIGHT

AND

DUTY

311

providedthat his good faith has lasted beyond the expirationof

law.
the legalperiod. This was
granted by the ancient canon
If,as may be, civil law requiregood faith only at the time that
possessionis taken, we think a distinction should be made
between

two

claimed

his

cases

(i)It

goods within
the opportunityof doing

Presumption
The

shown.

to
practice

may
that the
we

of

is

is the

why

he

allowed

Here

action.

of his
It

negligenceis quite evident.

have
as
we
fullyjustified,
had

right. He

follows,then,

good faith may

happen that the

the

intention,

consequence
himself of pre

as

avail

in

does not

owner

know

of his

the stated

presumption

no

owner

that his attitude is tantamount

present possessor

has

had

is

it.

in
possessor
scription,(ii)It may
who

appointedtime, althoughhe
His

aware

renounce

the

not

so.

renunciation

say, to

that

has

renunciation

owner

happen

may
the

goods. This is the reason

time to elapse without
taking

of renunciation

Is the

exists.

to know, after the expiration

possessor in good faith who comes
of the legaltime, that he holds what belongs to another, bound
to restitution ?

suffer

would

It would

that he is not

seem

injury. Why,

some

we

if by

ask, should the

may
of a situation that has

possessor in good faith suffer by reason

arisen from some
negligenceon the part of the real
is the

latter who

himself to be robbed
possessor

is bound

injuryto

no

himself

or

himself

goods

his

; for if

It

think, if this would involve

merely be enriching

not, he would

of the owner,

which

owner

wanting in vigilanceby allowing

goods to be lost. Nevertheless the

restitution,
we

to

at the expense

of stolen

been

has

he
restoring

instance, in the

as, for

their present possessor

has

case

acquired

gratuitously.
96. III. The

Right

to make

Will."

The

rightto

make

will is

rightto disposeof one's goods in view of the time after one's

This rightis not a simplecreation of the civil law, but
death.
is a natural rightderived from human
justas the
personality,
rightof ownership of which it is an aspect.
he is with reason,
has the right to look
Man, endowed
as
forward into the future, the right to act with a view towards
the

some

He

purpose
may,

tion.

By

that

will not

be

realized

take steps to
accordingly,
so

doing he

rational creature

is not

for himself alone ; but

will be
made
he must

secure

until after his death.

its eventual

realiza

actingas a rational being. For a

to live simply in the presentand
have

an

eye

to the

future, and

ETHICS

3i2
not

his

to

of
especially

follow him,
to his

legitimate.It

it is

for

goods
it is

who

has entrusted

part of his

the

its sacred character

why

to look to the

nature

is not

personalexistence

respectedby all,and

reason

no

would

brief,man

In

time when

be

to

are

make
disposalof his
may
he shall himself have passedaway, since

be violated.

should

of those

Providence

whom

must

furnishes

of its author

death

those

that

to

the act of will which

If the end is legitimate,

care.

secure

alone, but

future

own

future,and the limit of his

co-terminous

with that

'

The dead
says,
They have moulded

Taine

of his desires

rightsin

the

the character
societyof the living.
this society. We enjoy the heritage
they have left,only on

of

and

intentions.

condition

As

that

consider
may
of goods,it is

We
ance

of the

cannot

act of

yet been made.

not

is

To

that
arbitrarymanner,
partiesis essential. It
that

of the other.

The

is

his acceptance, the

is,then,

mutual

no

consent,

of the

simultaneous

of

consent

if the

enough

wish

legateehas

goods takes place.

objectionsupposes, in quitean

the

are

we

his desire

expresses
the part of the

the latter makes

that

consent

case

that the testator

When

answer,

we

mutual

presupposes
be said to exist in the

no

this

Every convey

i.

the

acceptanceon

the

'.

objections:

longerliving. There
consequentlyno conveyance

former
and

argued,

the time

bequeath,the

to

certain

parties.This

considering. At

their testament

out

carry

we

have

action of

of the testator

the

two

follows

one

continues

to hold

subsequentretraction take place,until the

fixed by his
his life. It becomes
irrevocably
that moment
it furnishes a rightof acceptance

good, supposingno
last moment

of

demise, and from

which

the

legateemay

legateeby

his

testator.

We

has not

been
for

neous

claim.

acceptance givinghis
have

transfer

of

consent, then, exists,the

But

be

to

property

of the

parties

to be simulta

it needs

that

of the

to the wishes

consent

notice that the action

onlyto

simultaneous.

Mutual

be

legitimatemust

proved.
2.

Another

force

until the

disposeof
a

has

man

for the
A

objectionmay

use

his

goods at

who

to do
power
of the livingand

has

testament

urged

that

since

will has

no

dead, he is in reality
intending to

time

no

last will and

person

is

testator

be

when

he has ceased

to exist.

this,for the things of this world

cannot

is

an

completecontrol

be controlled
act
over

of

by

are

the dead.

by a
property.

made
disposition

himself and

But

his

RIGHT

OF

THEORY

AND

DUTY

313

grant that the effects of this act do not take place

may
have
until after his death ; but, as we
justsaid, we are not
We

in denyinga
justified
he has ceased to

rightof providingfor a time when

orderinghis affairswith a view to any

the

man

be, and of

end

which, though he will not live to see it realized,is an

of fact,any act by which a person
honest one.
As a matter
of
disposes
after his

goods will produceeffects that

his

lifetime.

own

If I sell some

immediately afterwards,

law

the

changed hands

and
definitely

fact that

made

The

new

I who

could

owner

for ever,

the

is

the legalvalidity
of
nullify

not

effects continue
dead.

character

death

man's

These
is

who

one

does

now

what
uprightand legitimate,
that

inviolable

acquired an

intention

necessarily

character

and

this

which
on
equallywith the reasons
rightI have given you by leaving you my

continues

it is based.

the volun

rightto

in virtue of the intention of

his purpose was

intended
and whatever

involved, has

his

the acts of his lifetime.

Because
he

ever

independentlyof the
alreadypassed away.

deceased.

now

long

of my
property and die
will consider that it has

bargainhave
appealin support of

tary action of him who

will continue

The

to exist

property continues to be yours after my death.

then, that a real rightis conferred by a man's

We

conclude,

last will and

testament.
3. The

further

the testator does

yet belongto

on

legateewho,

we

be raised,that the
after his demise

him

suppose,

may

property of
nor

does

it

is ignorantof the

giftbequeathedis,then, a res nullius until such time

of it and hands it
he accepts it. The State takes possession
the
to the legatee. He, therefore,holds his rightsfrom

will.
as

objection
may
not belongto

The

State.

legateethe rightof
This righthas
acceptingthe offer that has been made to him.
been assigned
to him by the testator when
actingin
exclusively
It follows, then, that the
the full possessionof his faculties.
We

that

answer

property is not
at the

the

at all at the mercy

the State.

the

of the firstchance

comer,

nor

It is

right of actual ownership

strict sense

on

ear-marked
alreadydefinitely
legatee. Unquestionablyhe does not yet enjoy

of
disposal

in favour of the

the will confers

of the

or

word, but rather

ship ; or more
as
we
strictly,
accepting the offer that has

have
been

rightof property in the

rightof owner
a potential
shown, he has the right of
This right is
him.
made

the

ETHICS

3i4

bound

to be

being classed
The
does

value

effect

not

word

of

a
a

it is

since

acceptance

97. IV. The

will in the eyes of the law is that, whereas

it
transfer of property in the strict sense
of the
unilateral

the

on

property

nullius.

res

as

and is a bar to the

all others

respectedby

act, yet it confers

the

rightof

legatee.
of Inheritance.

Right

"

The

rightof

inheritance

is

enjoysof having a share in the patrimony of

anyone
he is united by the ties of kinship.
to whom

that which
another
Two

theories

The

first makes

presumed
that

it

concerning the foundation of this right.

rest solelyon
the
the right of inheritance

exist

of the

It presupposes
his wish to leave his patrimony to his children,or,

intention

was

deceased

person.

presumption is fully
to be found
affection which is generally
of the same
members
family. The rightof inheritance
among
a will.
is,then, directlyconnected with the rightto make
The second theory asserts that the father of the familyis not
of the familypatrimony. These possessions
the sole owner
are
both
whose
members
the ends of a society
intended to serve
are
parents and children, and not the parents only. Thus, the
failingthem, to the
justified
by the mutual

father

is not

next

of kin.

This

is the

able, although he

interests alone
property, to disposeof it in his own
divert it from its end, which has a social character

duty
which

of

it
administering

he is at

the head

once

is not

consequence,

therefore the children

and

all the

alreadyhave

of

property, in
it is

group.
certain rightto it

joint
And

during

rightis suspendedwhile
the father,
them, but especially
this

parents

have

duty of the sovereignmanagement of the interests of

community they represent. On the death of the parents
rightof the children comes,
ipsofacto,into effect ; and this

the
the

is the

of

; he has the

the

are

Both

of the

; he cannot

community

The

possession
;

members

parents. But

alive.

of the

protector.

his exclusive

possessionbelongingto
the lifetime of the

in the interests

of the

administrator

the

rightof inheritance.
From
this theory importantconsequences
follow : the father
is found
of the family
wanting in his duty as administrator
patrimony if he dissipateshis fortune, and in this case the
of the law.
children ought to be allowed to claim the protection
is another
There
of no less importance : that a
consequence
father has not an absolute
liberty,which leaves him without

CHAPTER
RIGHTS

OF

sum-total

and

children

on

to the familyas the

rightpertaining
exist between
relations in justicewhich

defined the

of

husband

FAMILY

THE

OF

MEMBERS

THE

have

98. We

II

those
wife

the

on

hand, and

one

parents and

between

family in its wide meaning com

prisestwo societies : the one, arisingfrom wedlock, formed by
the partners in life ; the other, arisingfrom
ties of consan
guinity,formed by the parents with their children. The
which constitute the first are derived from a free
relationships
the

contract, yet
Those

The

which,

one

constitute

which

fact of the

other.

shall see,

we

as

the second

their

have

originin

OF

INSTITUTION

THE

MARRIAGE

OF

The

family,in the wide sense, comprisingboth

the parentalsociety,
has been instituted for a
good of the married coupleand the good of the

the

99. First End

and

man

each

wife

as
perfection

the

of the

Family

united

are

in view

their
well

own

as

dividual
The

by

as

When

Spouses."

is the

partner in life. This

to

moral

being

another, each

one

by sharingin

their in

of

resources

common

instincts,besides being designed

of

for

It is in their

inasmuch

as

some

children.

securingthe perpetuityof the race,

happiness legitimatelysought by those

means

wedlock.

in

natures.

element

most

end

double

marriage,they have
well-beingand their own

of the other

and

conjugal

the

of

bonds

of their

that

of the

Good

individual

satisfaction of human

nature

an

The

the

by

complement, as it were,
physical,intellectual

the

why they give themselves

reason

the very

procreationof children.

I. PURPOSE

and

annulled.

be

cannot

it

important
measure

case

an

accompanies
functions
the

element

the

of human

in their

fulfilment

life,and

of

in

perfection

one

tends

of
to

of passion. However,
importunities
316

is

the

allay
this

element

OF

THEORY

have

not

must

RIGHT

DUTY

AND

317

preponderating influence.

Sensual

must
to a highermotive,
gratification
always be subordinated
for if this is sought as an exclusive end, the worst excesses
may
result. The union of marriage is not that of merely material
To be of one
natures.
organisms but of persons with spiritual

flesh is but

of human
100.

to

means

closer union

of soul.

This

the

dignity

personality
requires.

Second

of the

End

Family

The

of Children

Procreation

familyis instituted also partlyin

the interest of the child.
It must
providethe conditions for his
and development so long as he is unable
maintenance
to take
of himself ; for only graduallydoes the human
care
being
of his faculties. In infancy and in
attain to the possession
adolescence
he requires
a constant
protection.The periodof
and

their

youth

Education.

be

must

To

of

one

parents above
and

tectors

The

"

guidance.

all others

falls the

of their child.

educators

of

duty
This

being the

is not

pro

difficult to

in bring
Together they have been instrumental
being a human
person like to themselves, possessing
and
right both to life and perfection
imprescriptible

understand.

ing into
the

same

yet incapableof providingfor himself.

a

turn

one

unless

to

obtain

to

the

those who

assistance
the

are

To

to

which

of his

authors

such

should

whom
he

has

being ?

right

their

To

into being
his life is due ; by bringing him
instrumentality
they have taken upon themselves the duty of providingthe
for his

means

what

given

life that
and

weakness

the

parents

dictate of

intention

the

been

were

abandoned

is not

in this

of Nature.

we

Not

the heart

all else the

vocation

understand

them

the

the natural

education

The
his

former.
law

his natural

to

the law

procreation.
latter, they
is the

This
of

without

great purpose

father,and still more

instincts

impellingthem

reason

the clearest manifestation

see

of the

of the
she

has
in that
to

of

seek

offspring. To parents has

of nurturingthe children, because they
better than any other, they love them

welfare

given the

A child is not

responsiblefor the

of
responsibility

mother, deeply rooted

before

once

premature death.

in fact

logic,and

implantedin

to

at

from
naturallyand logically

the

Furthermore

be

may

devoted

shirk

cannot

can

he

child follows

As

development. Such is
begun
undertaking once

his full

rightorder would require. An

not be relinquished
before it is completed.

must

of

preservationand

of their

318

ETHICS

than

more

affection

solicitude

them.
such

to

is

mother,

nascent

Indeed, do

not

"

in their

indeed,
Who, more

of

entering into
aspirationsand
inherit

the

soul

children.

their

of

of the

To

the

but

are

very
even

be

to

the

parents belongs the

who

the

are

the masters

most

of

that

the

delegatesof an
opinionsthey are

whose

their

of

; but

continue

course

doubt

No

of others

of choosing those as masters

responsibility
reliable as well as the most
proficient
; to

remembering that they

higher than their own,

and

child, of

character

very

flesh of their flesh ?

not

greater

father

directingtheir

frequentlyparents requirethe assistance

it devolves
them
then
on
primarilyto
educators

bring
than

the
of

reciprocated

turn

will

Who,

children

they

are

receive

task ?

capable

diviningits
parents

and

other

any
from

authority
bound

to

respect.

preciselydoes

But

what

101.

Education

the

to

education

of

nature

religious.
Physicaleducation looks to
provide a healthyenvironment
with

the body,
exercising
of constitution

nesses

normal

body. They
life.

moral

faculties

and

do

have

Whilst

and

so

of the

and

It must

body.

of

method
weak

harmonious

furtheringthe

and

parts.

simply

also

the

on

relaxation

affordinga

regard

strengtheningany

to

reaction

faculties.

may

wiselychosen

contribute

not

we

directing

aesthetic,moral

and

the health

of its various

development

Physicalexercises
the

these

view

Religious.

child's natural

physical,intellectual

as

and

of the term, consists in

sense

the development of
furthering

According

comprise?

of education

Moral
Physical,Intellectual,

is

"Education, in the wide

and

the work

to

to the

health of

intellectual and
the

mind, they

of the will by teachingit

time the power
strengthenat the same
to fight againstinclinations to laziness,and
they lessen the
incentives

to

passion.

Intellectual education

those

faculties that

beautiful.

and

garded

in this latter

in

help

to

on

truth

the

to

other

development of

object the
to

true

foster

and

many
the
on

Re

is called instruction.

faculties
one

the

aesthetic

acquisitionof knowledge.

the

the

the

with

give and

aspect education

co-operation of

of
acquisition
memory,

for their

have

It is its function

tastes

The

is concerned

hand

is

required for

the

and

the

the

The
intelligence.

senses

first

supply the

upon
then, have

the

this

For

does

not

consider

he

reason

or

senses

the

that

he

first,

recognize
neglecting

must

Whilst

to
principally

of the

319

activity.The

trainingof
development of

the education
will look

DUTY

the teacher

of dependencein the faculties.

order

an

place,and

subordinate

AND

latter exercises its

the

which

data

RIGHT

OF

THEORY

not

the memory,
he
the intelligence.
has

fulfilledhis

character.
On the
duty by givinghis teachingan encyclopedic
contrary, his first care is to avoid overburdening his pupilwith
would
of facts and studies which
make
it im
multiplicity
possiblefor his ideas to develop. Development is a slow
Reflection takes place
quietudeof mind.
process and requires
of matter
normallyin inverse ratio to the amount
put forward
life is short and the field of knowledge
Human
by the teacher.
To try to learn everythingis to court
is immense.
the risk

of

The

the

but

moment

erudition

but

of education

which

then

we

of habits of
It must

enable

his natural
his

and

one

of

judgment.

to stock the mind

with

account

the

pupil.
utilitarian point of
The

means.

some

him.

The

the

day

inclinations and

life lead

for

view

formation

the sole end of intellectual education.

be identical for all and

not

cases,

that any
?
By no

to follow

one

abilities and

positionin

must

for

each

is not

of
capacities

of education

thought is not

formed

for the

effort of reflection,
due

to understand

is to be left out

enriched

knowledge preferenceis given to

the

to the

course,

be

be

capable of thought. Accordingly

of human

necessitate

beingpaid,of
Are

it

make

to

the branches

among
those

memory
would
not

mind

primary purpose

would

the

knowing nothing ;

to which

career

the circumstances

schooling that

is

of

given

; it will vary in different

the pupilis destined or not

each

especially
accordingas
the liberal professions.

which
form
possess certain rudiments
the basis of all intellectual culture and are one of the conditions

Nevertheless

for

sharingthe

minimum

life of

which

children.
the

all must

And

parents are
it would

rightto interfere in

rightof

civilized society.This

the child

in

seem

part of the parent.

In

bound

that

publicauthority has

of

fact,the spiritand the tendencies

such

as

they are,

the

or

theory scarcelyanyone

deny

But

in order to

remissness

to

this.

to procure

it remains

to

would

of the modern

here

safeguardthe

selfishness

inquirewhether

the

for their

duty

the last resort

againstany

constitutes

as

on

the

be found
a

matter

State

of compulsoryeducation, as
principle

being
it is

ETHICS

320

does

imposed by law,
In such

interests.
that

imperil certain

not

resistance

case

higher rights and

would

greater evil might be avoided.

to

seem

Whatever

be

lawful

answer

may
deal

given, the education enforced by the State can only

of knowledge that is strictly
with that minimum
indispensable.
of each
must
be
one
Beyond this the intellectual education
suited to the avocation
he is likelyto follow.
The rightwhich
best suited to his tastes and
each person has of choosinga career
be

abilitiesstands

opposed to

legalcompulsionin

any

this delicate

matter.

is
Lastly,the heart of man
moral aspirations.
Education
is indeed

which

his nature

the

of religious
and
well-spring
then develop this side of
must
highest of all. As moralityis

the

meaninglessif divorced from the idea of the Absolute" the

object of religionthe moral upbringing of anyone
proper
education
its foundation.
have religious
must
as
By the first
"

the law which

he will be shown

taught how

be

the second

he will be shown

sovereignsanctions

the

it,and

to

strengthenedagainstthe

will be

by

to conform

their children this moral

govern his conduct, he will

for this end his will-power

must

allurements

the

august

the

senses;

originof this law and

it rests.

which

on

of

Parents

owe

to

and

education, and this both

religious
because the latter have an inviolable right to attain to their
supernaturaldestiny,and because societyat large has an
the words
interest in the preservationof beliefs which, to use
Taine, lend the strongestsupport

of

102.

Corollary.

authorityhas
is not,

"

been

It follows

to the social instinct.

from

instituted for the

therefore, absolute

above

the

are

parental

of the children.

It

restrictions upon

it

good

there

that

arisingfrom its very end. That end is to make it possiblefor

of the child to attain their full develop
the rightsand capacities
this obligationupon
With
ment.
them, the parents will not
put any obstacle in the way

providedthat
wisely tested. A
child

allowed
the

who

marriage state, they must

parents may
counsellors.

put

this vocation

man
young
free choice of their

is to

an

share

has been

and
own

career

must

woman

young
; if

they feel called

be free in the choice of

fortunes

the

in life of their
calling
indicated and
clearly

of the natural

of

their

life.

veto

on

the

choice

of their

to

partner

Undoubtedly

only as
they
may
children.
They

interfere in such matters,

quiterightly
Only under the stress of higher reasons

absolute

be

but

RIGHT

OF

THEORY

AND

DUTY

321

vanityor self-interest to stand in the

happiness. Far from thwarting the child in
way of his lifelong
his way
make
the exercise of his rights,
parents must
easy.
And
hence the father has the duty of administering
the family
but
patrimony,not for the satisfaction of his own selfish caprices,
allow

not

must

of

motives

of those whom

that the future

to the end

to his

entrusted

Divine

Providence

be

providedfor.
their children
impliesas

guardianshipmay

parents towards
counterpart the rightsto obedience, respect and
The

of

duty

the latter towards

has

its

affection from

them.

II. PERPETUITY

MARRIAGE

THE

OF

BOND

Principle. Marriage is an indissoluble contract, because

it is founded
love, not indeed upon love that is merely
upon
alone is
sensual, but upon a love that is rational, which
103.

"

of the

worthy

dignityof

Such

man.

love

is not

superficial
;

the sway of reason

it is not content
with outward
that are by their nature
but it has the grasp
qualities
fleeting,

beingunder
of

should
without

condition

sentiments

the

another.

one

date

never

The

creation

an
requires

father and
a

mature

These

reserve,

precisely

are

devotion, as is fitting,
they plighttheir troth

to

idea of

The

regard

of

the

the
the

As
very

second

union,
end

as

dallyingwith

becomes

manifest

of

on
co-operation

the

part of the

joint labour of theirs extends

even
during the whole of their

This

periodof

many
years,
few may
life,however

be the

new

births at different

family. Children, although arrived

freed from
not on
that account
are
emancipation,

ties that bind

may

put upon

justice. Hence

gettingof

them
them
the

children

treason.

more

intervals in the
of

future

some

family life : the pro

The rearingof a child
children.

constant

mother.

at

their mutual
they make
entertainingof a thought,

conjugaltie

upbringing of

active and
of the

the

future

some

couple when

young

possiblerupture

their minds.

consider

and

without

vague,

we

sovereignlove.

it

is that

nature

self-surrender

animate

perpetuityof

still if

Its very

with

crosses

however

over

they would

vows,

it is

that

sincere mutual

enduring.

demands

It

last.

is

that

substance

to their

parents. The

claims of

at the age

all lawful

gratitude

imperious obligationsbinding
parental societyconstituted by
is

perpetual. Hence
necessarily

in strict
the

be

too

the

ETHICS

322

is the

conjugal societywhich

dissolution

The

well.

perpetualas

basis of the
of the

foundations

the very
104. Divorce.
bond

ask,

having

of the economy
of the
The principle

"

been

certain

be

must

latter would

shake

of the former.
of
perpetuity

the

conjugal

established,is it permissible,
we

thus

disturb it under

to

former

given circumstances

must

Many

have
legislators

thought so.
We
divorce by mutual consent, divorce
distinguishbetween
for incompatibility
of temper, and again divorce for adultery,
crueltyand ill-treatment. It is evident that divorce by mutual

of temperament,
not
incompatibility
it,is nothing
withstandingthe legalformalities that accompany
of the per
short of a direct negationof the whole
principle
petuity of the marriage tie. For matrimony would then
that
in part,any other contract
or
resemble, entirely
certainly

consent,

for

or

is rescindable

the

to

the

from

that

of
possibility

engage
Reason

in wedlock

under

as

such

play a
be

such

very

have

lesser

would

consequences.

be to expose
It would
en

engagements

fact ill-suited unions.

separationlater

would

passionwould

upon

it

greatest possibleextent

of the

of

treat

baneful

most

contracted, and

would

To

will.

at

societyto
courage

mere

lightly
Aware

those

on,

less fear of the

intendingto
of love.
deceptions

part in their decision,the blindness

predominant.
conditions

would

entered
marriage once
assuredly stand con

of
less chances of endurance.
As soon
as the burdens
siderably
conjugallife began to weigh heavilythe thought of freedom
of obtainingit
would
be quick to suggest itself ; and the means

would
new

be at hand.
union

oppositionin
violence

or

for divorce.

make

to
a

the

thousand

other
And

be easy for the one

desirous of a
life of the other intolerable,to offer

It would

ways,

misdemeanours
how

perhaps

even

that could be

would

to

force acts

urged

desire to

as

of

plea

a
again
new
marriagebe reprehensiblewhen it was aiming merely to
bring about a situation that was
perfectlyregularand sanc
If both
tioned by the law ?
to them
partiescould reserve
of
of going back on their word in the event
selves the power
their failure to find the happiness they had anticipated,
we
should have to recognizethat they have the rightto entertain
in
and to dream
such a possibility
of some
happier partnership
Thus the wicked thought could find a free entrance
the future.
there and
into their minds, nothingwould prevent it lingering

the

contract

ETHICS

324

has

society

of

result

legislation,

created

is

taneously,

is

of

tions

free
less

law,

so

then,
said,

it

they

have

right
of

is

is

the

relationship

also

the

rights

quite

are

of

the

to

be

office

overridden

right

of
to

duties
of

that

the

sole

the

parents

choose

if officialdom

of

nor

the
of

teacher

those

to

of

bring
who

arrogates

any

their

themselves.

from

parents.
child.
their

shall
to

These
of

assist
itself

due

not

this

to

mutual

State

the

it

up

parents

is

Hence

the

origin

generation

son

must

the

way

law.

the

arising

family,

obliga

between

and

it.

mutual

positive

fact

father

of
the

the
for

authority

claim

and

in

very

independent

autonomy

the

education.

from

settle

parties

existing

may

pecuniary

have

They

law

marriage

in

not

spon

civil

the

the
is

and

man

acts

the

for

it

origin

of

then,

sanction

yet

Marriage,

Love

that

relations

their

have

love.

contracting

the

the

its

lay

the

not

its members

love

provision

As

the

substitute

is

of

its

to

above.

obligations.

of

derived

relationship
respect

these

juridical

the

are

offspring.
the

duties

order

parties,

of

cause

do

in

it, and

with

children

relations

family

Although,

make

engagements

their

and

obedience

mutual

of

essence

contracting
or

Still

the

public,

as

the

foundation
the

and

the

on

formalities

connexion

in

ments

the

considered

have

we

command.

certain

recognized

be

of

by

not

ordain

may

of

rights

resting

contract

Freedom

wife.

what

from

follows

said,

we

the

are

nor

for

family

it.

by

This

the

on

institution

the

Nevertheless

laws.

in

claim

certain

must

endeavour
It

must

As

we

children,
them.
a

to

not,
have

and
This

monopoly

III

CHAPTER
THE

NOTIONS

I. GENERAL
and

Definition

106.

Rights of

The

Division."

juridicalrelations

all those

by

constituted

STATE

THE

OF

RIGHTS

the

which

State

form

the

should

it

What

the

are

duties

of the

relations

with

citizens

of the

should
principles

What

State ?

the

functions ?

in viewr of these

assume

rightsand

the

the

unite

governingpower in the civil society.

?
and end of this society
nature
"What is the origin,
of the publicauthority?
the functions
are
accordingly

governedto

are

What
What

What

regard

are

to

the

guide international relations ?

civil societyto the religious

?
society

this
inasmuch
as
they not only concern
questions,
of a general import,belong to
state but are
that particular
or
Various solutions
the sphereof the philosophyof Natural Law.
All these

have

offered.

been

Absolute, which

regard

Some

is to

the State

identified with

be

an

as

the

aspect of the
of

substance

beings. Others regard it, if not as God, at least as directly

instituted by Him, making the political
regime to be of divine
positivelaw. Others again,on the contrary, assignit a purely
human
origin,
regardingthe State as the result of individual
A fourth view sees in the civil
wills freely
united by contract.
societya real organism, the product of an evolution which
embraces
it

as

shall

an
now

the whole

of nature.

institution at
examine

each

once

of these theories in turn.

II. PANTHEISTIC
107. The

others recognize
Whilst, finally,
divine.
and
We
natural, human

THEORY

Spirit-State." This

political
philosophyof

Hegelin modern times

The
philosophy of

its chief

Plato

STATE

Plato

coloured

in ancient

the
and

exponents.

borders
325

THE

idea
pantheistic

old world.

the
are

OF

on

pantheism

in

more

ETHICS

326
respects than
universe

teaches
with

informed

are

that

teaches

universal

that

Thus

parts of the

and
psychic principle,

is but

emanation.

an

universal

the

to

the different

of

kind

soul of the individual

this the
also

He

one.

ideas

And

there

of

of
he

correspond

is contained

in
pantheism
of ideas
the theories he holds concerning the objectivereality
of human
and the constitution
beings. The theories put for
but a logicaldevelopment of this
ward in The Republicare
Every philosophywith pantheistictendencies is bound
germ.
essences.

germ

to
sphere of politics,

lead, in the

the

absorptionof the
individual by the State.
Indeed, pantheism is by its very
definition the negation of human
personality.
Plato is led to this theory of State absolutism by another
train of thought, namely, his conceptionof the moral
ideal.
with harmony and unity. It is found in
Justiceis synonymous
to

the individual

when

the

holds

reason

sovereigncontrol

over

when
the
faculties ; it is found in the city-state
wills of all and each of the citizens are in absolute subordination
all the

other

of the

that

to

superiorbeing
unity of
theory is to

and

of

with

the social
efface

property,and

goods.

In

State supreme

city-state
may
is the

Such

nothing
He

does

existence

more

in the

is the

is led

to

to substitute

breaks
source

of

is,as

abolish

family and

private

community of wives and

conception,he would make the

for them

of education

well

as

as

of conscience,

all the citizens thinkingalike the

unityof

the

perfectas possible.

ideal of Plato's absolute

than

families

autonomous

the

in all matters

as

it were,

up its unity,as also does

of inequality
and conflict.

this

be

this
precisely

possiblethe personality

keepingwith

that with

in order

which

the State

body.
completelyas

The

is

of its own,
namely, the cohesion
Hence
the aim of Plato's political

he says,
city-state,

privateproperty
Consequently he

bodied

as

of the State
that

seen

end

an

individual.

the

within the

of

it is

Thus

subordination.

aim

The

State.

State.

He

that
emphasize the principles

customs

not, however,

and

institutions

the
identify

State

of Greece

reallydoes
were

and

em

Rome.

deityof the
into har
possible

with the

universe ; his objectis to bring it as far as

accord
chief characteristic,
with the divine being whose
mony

ing to him, is unity.

With Hegel, who here follows Schellingand Fichte, the case is
Inindivualistic at first,in his later writings he
otherwise.

THEORY

RIGHT

OF

AND
'

professedthe completestpantheism.
'

is the

ness.

social

that

substance

DUTY

The

arrived

has

It is the rationnel of itself and

...

terrestrial

divinity48.
'

Here

find

we

327

State ', he

says,
self-conscious

at

for itself

it is
.

the

State

has

become

aspect of the Absolute

an

which, according to Hegel, is the

substrate of all things,the universal substance, of

common

individual

which

minations.
in the
the

beings

of time

being at

so

assumed

so

that

preciseperiod.
monarchy, appears as

constitutional

deter

or

different manifestations of
many
of these forms had necessarily
to come

are

divine life. Each

into

modes
many
which the State has

different forms

The

course

but

are

representsthe life of the Absolute

Yet

the

the

as

latest,namely,

best.

thus

Hegel

progress towards

what

is better.
The

State

thus

blended

with

the

universe is not, therefore,a human

would

seau

have

being founded

it.

it is the

substance

institution,such

It is anterior

them

by

eternal

Rous

as

to individuals.

from

Far

of
principle

very

of the

their sub

sistence.
Since the State
end

own

is identical with the divine essence,

superexaltedabove

all other

self-destruction it cannot

use

interests of individuals.

Yet

their

libertyand

State must

be viewed

subsistence

own

their

Again, since

as

as

source

againstits decisions

the

subserve

its function

to

protect

is that

end.

divine
of all

being,its

rightsand

individual

no

own

the
Hegel'sanswer
organicand livingunityhaving its

an

its one

its

Without

authorityto

is not

goods

it is the

law, the
sovereign

its

ends.

it has its

be of any avail.
All these logical
consequences

on

the

Therefore

all duties.

rightfounded
of

be

will must

nature

can

pantheism,alreadydeve

referred by Hegel to their meta

lopedby Plato, are expressly
physicalprinciple.The theory of the Spirit-State
was
given
this
of Schelling
its radical formula.
It falls to the
by
disciple

ground

on

againstpantheism
substance

of the

account

of

in

general.

beings,if human
it becomes

appearance,
not
the supreme

law

criticisms

same

If the

Absolute

that

the

brought

are

is not
than

is more
personality

manifest
nor,

that

will of the

consequently, the

source

the real
mere

State
of

rights.
48

HEGEL, Philosophyof Right, trans, by Dyde (Bell,London,

1896)

is
our

ETHICS

328
III.

STATE

THE

INSTITUTION

AN

AS

POSITIVE

OF

DIVINE

RIGHT
This

from

the

jurisprudenceof the
in its logical
is it
seventeenth century. Especially
implications
The
ruler
closelyallied to the theory we have just noticed.
impersonatesthe State, whilst he himself holds his office by
to God alone
direct divine right. He is then responsible
directly
and need give no account
to his subjectsfor his government.
interest of the monarch, namely, the consolidation
The political
108.

and

theory

as

the individual

rightsof

The

interests.

'

is known

the

conceptionthat

absolute

is

monarchy,
of the

theocracies
incorrect
'

of his power,
dominates
all other
the
raison d'Etat '. Before his

extension

the

comes

All power

Its

originis

its behalf

from

cometh

yield.
under
State, existing
must

East.

appeal in

to

superiorclaims
the form

divine institution recalls the

He

God

',because,

of

words

the

to

as

shall

we

an

ancient

Christian.

not

of

It is

St. Paul,
see

later,

The truth which

quiteanother signification.
: they do
one
they positis not an historical but a philosophical
in the first instance publicauthority
not pretend to teach how

these words

have

established,but what

was

IV.
109.

its claims to

are

THEORY

THE

SOCIAL

OF

our

obedience.

CONTRACT

Interpretations of the Contract-Theory.

According to

"

this

its rightsto a contract, either

theory civil societyowes
expressedor tacit,that has been freelyentered into by its
It has been
different senses.
members.
explainedin many
it in favour of an absolute monarchy, others in
Some
interpret
of an
favour
absolute democracy, others again in favour of

individualism.
Hobbes
these

devoted

himself

interpretations
; the
Owing

Rousseau.

to

other

of the

development

two

from

come

great confusion

the

to

the

first of

writingsof
thought dis

the

of

played in his works, the author of the Social Contract is at once

of the individualistic ideas of the liberal school
the originator
and

also

of

the

absolutist

tendencies

of

certain

democratic

theories of that time.

110.

First

monarchy
as

was

Interpretation
viewed

by

divine institution.

of the

the

Contract-Theory." Absolute

of
legists

Hobbes

made

the seventeenth

it

human

century
institution,

RIGHT

OF

THEORY

on

an

contract, and
original

grounds.

As

founded

is at bottom

man

warfare, which

egoist. The

an

he

of nature

state

to all thingsinvolved
rightof every man
To put an end to this reignof anarchy

contract

found

to

instincts remained

permanent

Power

in

menace

sovereign.
irresponsible
the

as

or

norm

backs ;

of

type

the ruler

complete submission
gain the

once

be

must

given to

free

were

strong

and
single
appeared

thus

it had

its draw

authority. Yet

his

abuse

doubt

No

government.

might

breast and

monarchy

Absolute

nevertheless selfish

repress them
restingin the hands of a

a Power
required,

was

primeval

agreedby

men

human

spiteof all in the

to society. To

of

state

incessant conflict.

an

But

commonwealth.

was

impossible.The

all progress

made

329

it on utilitarian
justified
started with the principle
that

said,he

have

we

DUTY

AND

even

so,

him, for,let revolution

to a state of
upper hand, you have a return
is the worst of all evils. Far better,all things

warfare, which
than the re-establish
considered,to have the abuse of authority
of the

ment

original
anarchy.
Interpretation. Under

111. Second

"

the influence of ration

societyis due to
this time
interpretation,

alistic philosophythe idea that

received

contract

new

primordial

in favour

of

the
had laid down
Rationalism
libertyand individualism.
It
in philosophythat the individual is autonomous.
principle
mind from
appeared as an attempt to emancipate the human
all authority
of thought and morality. From
alike in matters
the spheresof religion
and philosophythe individualistic con
science. There it fostered
ceptionpassedinto that of political

liberalism,and drew
which

contract

Since

conclusions

free,the social

it imposes upon
obligations
of nature.
state

of

to offer

In this

front

men

cannot

us

theory the

which
felicity
common

the

opposed to
directly

were

is born

man

from

state

were

theory of

those

state

of Hobbes.

with

the

be considered

manifold
as

state

as
represented
giveup in order

is

of nature

compelledto

againstthe

the social

evils that threatened

them

they may lawfullyreturn

whenever
they judge it expedient. Such at least is the
who
developedall the con
reasoningof Fichte (1762-1814),
from the rationalistic
science that arose
sequences in political

from

without

state

to

which

idea.
Rousseau
as

man
primitive
(1712-1778)had alreadyrepresented

perfectly
happy

and

completelyfree

to

follow his natural

ETHICS

330
for in them
instincts,
of

advent

there

trace of evil.

no

But

with the

mutual

and the conflicts of

jealousies
vice. Humanity
speciesof human

societycame

self-interest

was

and

every
became
State
corruptedby the very fact of social education.
authority,
by opposing in countless ways the instincts of our
nature, has vitiated our whole being.

Nevertheless
self

his life to

expose

is

commonwealth

is

indispensable.Left to him
struggle against the forces of destruction

cannot

man

which

the social state

peril.

constant

evil,but

It follows that

the

evil to which

humanity must
submit if it is to survive.
It is a burdensome
without
necessity
doubt, yet one that is inevitable. But although the primitive
the less they
conditions of our race
can
no
longerobtain, none
remain
far as
ideal to which the political
state should
as
an
as
conform.
And this is the reason
why government is
possible
founded
From

an

freedom

on

and

must

an

this the liberal school

in reference to the
in reference

its exercise to all.

assure

has

basis
juridical

deduced
of

one
principles,
the other
publicauthority,

two

to its purpose.
'

The
of
free consent
expressedthus :
and only source
of all lawful authority'.
one
If man
is by nature
independent,if it is contrary to his nature
to submit
to the authorityof another, laws have no
obligatory
the
In
other
force except by his own
consent.
no
can
way
rightsof power be reconciled with those of liberty.Since the
consented to by
political
regimeis the result of a contract freely
all the citizens,
in obeying its behests they are in reality
only
themselves.
obeying
the function of the public
The second
principleconcerns
has
made
man
independent,and
authority. Since Nature
of his thoughts and acts, the publicpower must
absolute master
As it is
the greatest possible
freedom.
guarantee to everyone
of rationalism to accept any guidance
contrary to the principle
from constituted
authorityalike in matters intellectual as well
The

first may
individuals is the

as

moral,

so

State is not

be

it is consistent to assert
in any

way

to direct the

that

inglythe

function

would

of the

function

action of individuals

as

of the

but

State is not

guarantee that the rightsand

protected. This

the

simply to safeguardthem from

hinder their free development. Accord

regardsany ideal whatever,

obstacles

that

is the train of

to

libertyof
thought in

but
civilize,
the
the

only to

citizens shall be

writingsof

Kant.

ETHICS

332

which, Rousseau
total

transfer

community
dominion

'.

'

says,
of each

reduce

associate,with

all his

rights,to

the

community acquiresthe supreme

the dispenser,
the
everything; it becomes

over

merely the holders

alreadymade out for

State and, in

namely, the

to one,

the

Hence

of all

citizens
case

themselves

general,for

goods.

In all this

find

we

all the

of the collectivist
pretensions
all attempts of publicpowers against

of privateproperty.
principle
has
By becoming a citizen a man

the

existence.

For

Rousseau

lost his

even

informs

us

that

'

own

the mission

is to transform
each individual,who by
legislator
unit, into a part of a larger whole from
solitary

individual in

certain

measure

receives

individual

his life and

of the

himself is
which

his

this

being'.

The

to have
pantheistic
conceptionof the ancient state seems
said.
to be
more
inspiredthese lines. But there is even
the independenceof religious
in asserting
from civil
Christianity
authorityhad liberated the human conscience from the yoke of
the State.
would replacethat yoke. Imbued
like
Rousseau
the philosophers
of old with the idea of unity,he even
con

ceived the notion

of

officialbelief which

an

upon everybody under the

it would be difficultto find a more

impose

absolutism
Criticism

the State

ought

to

penalty of death. Surely

completeconceptionof the

of the State.

of
attemptingto reconcile the natural liberty
the individual,supposed to be unlimited, with the authority
possessedby the State, Rousseau
utterlyfailed in two points.
all
he made
First,by misconceivingthe social nature of man,
is not
his rightsdependent upon
the body politic.If man
naturallysocial,the relations arisingfrom the mutual rights
which

bind

in the human

In

citizen to citizen have

conventions

Consequentlythere
law reignssupreme.
conclusion

that

is

no

In

Rousseau

no

foundation

in nature

but

by the civil laws.

such thingas natural right; the civil
fact,as we have seen, this is just the
that

are

himself

formulated

draws.

argument in the teaching

of the
Social Contract
logicallyleads to anarchy. He
makes
the sovereignty
possessedby the laws rest on the free
I am
will of the individual.
bound
to obey the laws simply
because I have willed it. But why can
I not change that act
of will ?
Why, if I cease to will in any particular
case, should
In the second

place,another

'

my

present state of mind

line of

'

be any

less effective than

my

former

one

which

RIGHT

OF

THEORY

AND

DUTY

333

higher principleof authorityis appealed to

to abide
obligesme
by the engagements I have con
If

some

it is

tracted, then

longer

no

obligations.Their

be

must

source

principle.Rousseau
where he
is possible
obligation
the

was

binds

who

creates

elsewhere, in

quite

scendent

Fichte, who

good-will that

my

failed

to

is but

my
tran

some

that

see

no

bindinghimself.

enfant terrible of individualism before

he

pantheist,accepted this conclusion of Rousseau's

teaching. He allowed also that everybody has the right of
Kant, without relinquishing
returningto the state of nature.
the idea of the social contract, recognizedthat if anarchical
became

all individual rightsas well as

to be avoided
are
consequences
be based on the immutable
the contract itself must
of
principles

caused

that

reason.

It

contract

in order to guarantee
that demanded
from

was

reason

reason

Yet

its terms.

founded

was

Kant

had

the

?
personality

of human

THEORY

V.
113. Statement

organism
influenced

It is

OF

and

their

rightto speak

of

social order

the absolute

set up

SOCIAL

autonomy

Criticism.

idea that

The

"

ORGANISM

societyis

an

That
Plato
was
altogethera novel one.
in the State, as in
by it we see by his distinguishing
of

his

nutrition,defence

teachingsof

disciples
; but

in

our

put forward

and

elaborated

in all its

writingsof Lilienfeld,SchafHe
We are told by Spencerthat
of evolution.

Under

consolidated

to form

of lifearose

and

the

clearly
in the
details,especially

the

more

Spencer.

phenomena

its force
the

control.

time, under

own

Herbert

all

and

and
Physiocrats,

the

influence of certain scientific theories,it has been

became

of

is not

Hegel and

law

rights; it

certainly
questionable.

Later it appearedagain in the

the

each the faithful execution

THE

the individual,the functions

in

protectionfor

nature, after having

on

the individuals to make

governed by
primitivenebula
are

the first combinations

planets,
matter, and elemental
inorganic

from
spontaneously
under this same
Now
types graduallygave birth to all others.
law of evolution individuals are brought togetherto form social
of Spencer have, we
organisms. And these expressions
may
well believe,much
than a mere
meaning. For
more
figurative

he viewed
the

the life of

organic life of

societyas

man,

not

different from
essentially

proceedingfrom

the

same

factors,

ETHICS

334

developingitselfaccordingto

the

the
laws, and presenting

same

essential functions.

same

It is easy
mutual

The

dividual

to

mere

less than

no

of

the

unit

in

an

aggregate

materialism.

is

whole, he being

to

no

with

this

theory the
individual and societyshould be
social organism reduces
the in

pantheism,impliesthe

individual

: the
sonality

accordance

the

of the old-world

statement

social

between

theory
a

in

how

see

relations

stated.

ism,

to

than

more

We

it is
see

denial
an

societyjust what

simply a

re

that material
of human

per

lost in the

atom

cell is in the

the

in regard to the State no more

than those
organicbody, his rights
of the cell in regard to the organism. Spencer would
doubt
no
protest against such a conclusion as unfair ; still,
logicis in

exorable.

If

aggregation and
isolated, that

assured

are

we

concentration
social

life in

passes through the same

then must
not conclude
we

by

the

State is the

that
of
the

phases

consists in the
progress
units which
at first
were

course
as

that the

the

of

its

life of the individual,

absorptionof

evolution
goal of political

the cell constitutes the whole

stages of organiclife,
the

being,it
in the
plified

fact
in

in

the

the individual
In the

earliest

substance

of

completeindividual by itself. This is exem

of primordial
and unicellular types, and in
case
cell until embryonic development begins. But
any
higher organic forms of life,when
development is

complete,the
an

is

development

cells

autonomous

livingsubstance.

are

whole

If,then, the individual stands

the cell to the whole

in inverse

aggregated that instead of each being

they are but the lowest element in the

so

organism, social progress

to

societyas

will be measured

development of individual liberty.

We
thus see how ill-suitedare Spencer's
conceptionsof liberal
ism and of society
as
an
organism. Schaffle,startingfrom the
at collectivism. As
same
arrives,and quitelogically,
premisses,
nothing can be performed in the organism except through the
in
action of the nervous
system, so nothing can be accomplished
societyexcept under the action of the State. As the centre of
control it will preside
the least functions of the social
over
even
the least
the brain presidesover
as
body, in the same
way
functions

proportionto

of the human

the

body.
The
discussion of this theory really depends on
opinions
the
is
whether
The
whole
to
belonging psychology.
question
individual,who is also the social unit, is not something more

than
us

AND

such
aggregationof cells,

mere

RIGHT

OF

THEORY

DUTY

335

materialists

as

would

have

It will suffice here to notice that their denial of

any
leads,when appliedto political
science,to the
principle

believe.

further

radical

most

sophy

of man's

VI.
114.

Himself

Individual.

"

traditional

philo

fall together.

OF

STATE

THE

The individual is

by

nature

social

being.
personalbeing: He

excels

which

or

the

CONCEPTION

CHRISTIAN
of the

personaland
is

stand

nature
spiritual

THE

Nature

Man

Liberty and

absolutism.

other

every

inasmuch
,

of mankind.

He

as

Such

an

has

been

created

for

an

end, since it is identical with

is the
end

objectof

the

end
God

knowledge and

love

perfectionand
because
his perfection,

the

impliesthe

the
happinessof the rational creature :
knowledge of God is the highestto which we can attain,and the
is the most
love which this inspires
noble of all ; his happiness,
because the possessionof this objectappears
the goal of the
as
of the human
soul.
We see, then, how the
deepestaspirations
of man
is logically
idea of the personality
bound
of
up with one
the essential dogmas of the Christian religion,
namely,the dogma
of his supernatural
Father
destiny. Being children of the same
who is in heaven, redeemed
Saviour, called to the
by the same

celestial inheritance,men

same

of the

Man

all brethren

essential

rights. In this we
personality.
is likewise a social being: This

same

human

are

the Doctors
totle and

of the

Plato but

have

possessors

the true

is the

Church, here in accord

also with

and

not

idea of

teaching of all
only with Aris

the essential doctrine

of Christi

anity. For by its visible organization,by its precepts of

and of charity,
justice
by its dogmas of the divine Fatherhood,
of saints, the
originaljustice,
redemption and communion
Christian religion
and, consequently,
proclaimsthe solidarity
the sociability
of all mankind.
115. Nature

Civil

societyor
the State is not a superiorbeing, some
transcendental reality
having an end of its own 49. It is constituted by the personal
members
the
who unite to form it ; but yet it is not exclusively
product of their individual wills. Its foundation is indeed in
49

The

See

Pope

and Foundation

of Civil

the encyclicals of Pope Leo XIII,

and the People. C.T.S., London.

Society.
"

especiallyReturn

Novarutn,

trans.

ETHICS

336

partakesof the objectiverealityof nature, for in

the first placethe rightsand duties which it implies
find in their
last analysis
their support and their supreme
sanctions in the
moral law ; and secondly,civil society
responds to the needs of
It

nature.

human

Nevertheless

nature.

does

nature

determine

not

the

it shall take ; it leaves that to circumstances

and to the
It fosters needs and instincts in men,
will of man.
and
by

form

followingthese they coalesce into

the natural
foundation
But, finally,
another,

august than

more

disclose
necessarily

nature

social

of
For

nature.

designsof

the

organization.
societypresupposes

the

exigenciesof

the Author

of nature.

The

State, then, because demanded

by nature, organized by
willed by God, is at one and the same
time an institution
man,
and divine.
natural, human
116. Origin of Authority." Societyexists by the will of God,
and

therefore obedience

of

will of God, for this obedience

existence.
determine

Yet

He

does

its

subjectsto
is

necessary

intervene

not

authorityis by

in any

condition

the

of its

specialway

to

It is for men
to
authorityshall assume.
settle in accordance with particular
circumstances.
Any form
of government is lawful so long as it is properlyadapted to

what

form

fulfilthe mission
117. Role

of the State.

of Public

Authority.
"

Civil

composingit.
is indispensable
to them

which

various

needs

of their existence

their faculties and

generalconditions
ment,

conditions

to
personality

for

if

the

happinessand

our

which

we

isolated effort,is the end

cannot

to look to the

they are

the earth

on

for the

It furnishes that environ

sake of the individuals

ment

societyexists

and

develop
provide the
develop
perfect
to

full. To
for

our

establish and

maintain

of civil society,
namely, the

by

common

societyis
As the public
other than to direct it towards its end.
none
good impliesthe reignof peace and concord and consequently
is to
the first function of authority
a mutual
respectof rights,
that our rights
secure
are
respected.But it has a further duty
to discharge
weal consists
as
part of its mission : the common
not only in the absence of injustice,
but it also presupposes a
weal.

state

the role of the

Hence

of affairs such

individual's
faculties.

To

will favour

as

rightsand

further the

bring this

publicauthorityand

in

publicauthorityin

about

the

the

full exercise of the

development of
on
duty incumbent

proper

is the

proportionas

its power

is

his
the

greaterthan

all

118.

having

as

Limits

tensions

'

civilization
"

of absolutism

is meant

'

as

337

when

the State is

its mission.

its insistence

by

DUTY

Christianity
opposes

Sovereignty.

of

AND

This is what

privateinitiative.

described

RIGHT

OF

THEORY

the

on

the

pre
the

rightsof

individual,of the familyand of religious

society.
The

only in
which

God

and its commands

will of the State is supreme

far

so

is the
rather

tion of the

they

as

of
expression
than

conformity with

in

are

the divine Will.

the natural

law,

It is better to

obey

As, then, the natural law is the founda

men.

rightspossessed
by

follows that these

obligatory

the individual and

be

rightsmust

respectedby

is instituted for the

seeing that this power

the

the

family,it
publicpower,

very

purpose

of

guaranteeingtheir exercise. In virtue of this higher law,

which in reality
is the divine Will, the individual has the right
of pursuinghis own
personaldestinywhich involves his happi
and his perfection.He has therefore the rightto act and
ness
of his natural powers.
to make
From
this may be judged
use
of the State.
mission
what are the limits of the
civilizing
Man's
is essentially
his own
work, for, as it
self-development
impliesthe full play of his personalpowers, his own initiative
must
guide them and his own effort put them forth. Thus a
Far from trying
proper sphere of action must be left to him.
and
to suppress
privateaction, the State must encourage
foster it in every way.
with its
We thus see how Christianity,
is opposed
fundamental
doctrine of a higherdestinyfor man,
'

'

to the ideal of the collectivist.

members
of the familyare like
rightspossessedby|the
wise not created by the State.
Marriage accordingto the
Christian conceptionis a free contract givingrise to certain
The

inviolable engagements

positivelaw
children

and

are

also

this basis the

on

independentof

the

that

have

the

relations between

sanction

parents and

claim to mould
and

Plato

vocation

divine
their

Founded
natural.
highest sense
existence that is
family enjoys a juridical
in

the

the civil law.

It has

its

own

end

and therefore its own

itself,

dissolve it and

of

rights.The State has no

usurp its place. The Christian State
the character and destinyof men,
as

proper

to

power
makes

to
no

Aristotle

It respectsthe natural
the education of
leaves to them

prescribedthat it should do.

of the

parents and

their children.

There is a third restriction laid

on
by Christianity

the power

ETHICS

338

of

State.

the

civil

exercise
the

to

is

individual

tainly

it

whose

influence

act

of

liberty
The

of

Caesar

are

not

teach

the

'.

act

of

laid

has

and
of

spiritual

but

voluntary

per

in

the

character

foundations

the

one,

of

State

the

the
Cer

power.

constraint

essentially

the

Christianity

this

of

faith

of

the

sword

twofold

that

that
but

He

by

sent

the

how
and

Caesar's
His

Founder

the

read

we

are

and

jurisdiction
from

come

Scriptures

things

', and
the

by

one

hand

of

true

conscience.

the

God's

and

of

incompetence

the

soul

faith,

In

religion.

not

this

but

power,

their

one

secular

the

however,

conscience

the

of

and

entrusted

the

on

way

yoke

essentially

the

State

this

another

proclaiming

separation

nature

to

of

under

is

of

the

the

and

spheres

the

In

from

it

By

governance

bodies,

authority

Christianity,

respective

other.

freed

brings

suasion.

of

the

on

religious

hands.

same

distinct

two

Church

the

their

denned

clearly

has

in

rested

power

times

pre-Christian

In

apostles

preaching

of

Jesus
God

to
to

of

the

the

voluntary

the

Christian
'

said,
the

things
the

conquer
word

Render

'

that
world

Go

and

INTRODUCTION*
1.

It

Introductory.
"

is

obviously a

of

matter

little

no

the historyof
of a summary
to present in the form
difficulty
of different philosophers
the very varied teachings
and systems.
intended to be only an outline to be
The following
pages are
and on
this account
critical
filled in by oral instruction
a
of

examination
1.

omitted

criticized or

various
should

Reference

doctrines
be

made

has
to

been

designedly

treatises in the

the

particularview is further developed

brought into relation with Scholastic doctrine.

where

Manual

the

and

2. Meaning

Utility of the History

of

or

By
analysis

Philosophy.

"

and
a statement
History of Philosophywe mean
of the genesisof the different philosophical
systems which have
This inquiryinto their logical
been put forward.
antecedents
the

and mutual
obtain

Books

is useful and necessary

connexions

of what

thoroughlycomplete grasp
for

(a)if we
the

wish to

great minds

of

:
study or consultation
History of Philosophy (Ginn, Boston, 1903). A concise manual
for the whole of the history.
A
WINDELBAND,
History of Philosophy (trs.Tufts, Macmillan, London,
A
work.
larger
1901).
Greek
BURNET,
Philosophy, 2 vols.
(Macmillan, London,
1914) ; or his
shorter work, Early Greek
Philosophy (London and Edinburgh, 1908). For
the special epochs of Greek
philosophy, see also Zeller's works, various

W.

"

TURNER,

volumes, translated.
DE
WULF, History of Medieval

Philosophy(trs.Cofiey,Longmans,

London,

1909).
HOFFDING,
History of Modern
Philosophy,2 vols. (trs.Meyer, Macmillan,
London, 1900),Modern
Philosophers(trs.Mason, Macmillan, London, 1915).
MERZ, History of European Thought in the Nineteenth
Century, 4 vols.

alreadypublished (Edinburgh,
1

Most

of the

statements

philosophyhave
in the
especially
footnotes
The

the

been
one

most

translators

1904,

given in
developed and

mentioned

important

etc.).
following outlines of the history of
justifiedin the author's larger works,

the

above.

In

this Manual

philosophical works

of

the

he

has

different

added

as

writers.

made
additions
to
the list with
some
regard to the
English philosophers; and they hold themselves
responsiblefor indicating
the English sources
for the further study of various
In
systems and writers.
some
cases
to Dr. Turner's
they are indebted
History of Philosophy, as they
also for some
are
ideas incorporated,and approved by the author
of these
Outlines,in paragraph 164. TRS.
have

"

M.S.P.-VOL.

II.

341

Z2

OUTLINES

342

world

the

as

seeing

aid

great

to

(c) It

is

of

neo-Scholasticism

by

us

better

in

an

its

judge

to

allows

shall

works

side

with

it, and

thus

in

Finally,

(d)

better

it

enables

which

philosophy,

on

attaching

out

system.

by

be

is

sift

to

us

side

set

we

are

doctrine

contradict

value,

degree

increasing

ever

which

modern

understand

to

to

systems

doctrinal

It

philosophy

on

of

philosophical

each

us

reality

rival

with

comparison

position

of

(b)

in

help

or

setting

it.

of

will

views

question

historical

contained

which

PHILOSOPHY

OF

special

any
the

that

truth

means

on

appreciation

an

elements

the

HISTORY

thought

have

whole,

THE

OF

importance

to

history.
3.

of

Division

Following

Treatise.

the

"

of

cession
four

in

periods
will

treatise

Philosophy
and

day

the

fall
II.

Mediaeval

and

Appendix.

the

mention

of

history

into

general
of

the

Parts

Latin

and

Greek

cycles

IV.

features

chief

we

I.

Modern
of

systems

accordingly

Indian

Philosophy

and
III.

in

vogue

at

this
Chinese

Patristic
A

Philosophy.
philosophy

suc

distinguish

may

and

philosophy,

main

four

Philosophy
of

summary

philosophical

different

historical

the

the
will

brief

present
form

an

PART
The

Philosophy.

"

India

of

Philosophy

4. Indian

of all

form

dominant

The

China

and

Indian

philosophy2is pantheism. The writingswhich express it may

under
three periods: (i) The period of the
be distinguished
hymns of the Rigveda, B.C. 1500-1000 ; (2) Period of the
Brahmanas,

1000-500

B.C.

500 to the present

B.C.

5.

of the

Hymns

(3) Later Sanskrit

Rigveda.

The

"

ancient

which

the manifold

6. The

Indo-Germanic

of the universe

phenomena

and of the

the Brahmanas

of divine

the first part

forms

which

various forms

the numberless

itselfunder

Philosophy of

as

pantheism accordingto

civilization,
developsa cosmic

single
being manifests

Indians

of the

monument

collection of

is the

Veda

writingslooked upon by orthodox

originand authority. The Rigveda,which
is the most

Period,

day.

sacred

of it and

Hindu

or

present.
Upanishads.

"

Upanishads,two other
form :
parts of the Veda, pantheism takes a psychological
what constitutes our individuality
(atman) and
fundamentally
the
that of all things is absolutelyidentical with Brahman,
and
eternal being who
is above
all time, space, multitude
In the Brahmanas

becoming.
they

are

later

and

is the

Brahman

all absorbed.

with

down

soul.

to

Atman

To

with

contact

alone knowable
with which

man

arrive

so

at

See MAX

1887) ;

DE

the

the whole

one

and

it is not

infinite atman
essence

the

in him
is

consciousness

plants,until

of nature

it

is endowed

sufficient to be

in

or

self is clothed and

by sloughingselfhood

to

and

individual ego with the infinite.

MULLER,

The

Systems of Indian
Philosophy (London, 1899) ;
York, 1884),Hindu Heterodoxy (Calcutta,
POUSSIN, The
(UniversityPress,
Way to Nirvana
Six

Philosophy(Funk, New
LA

monistic

earth, and

atman

things and

empiricalrealitywhich is multiple,finite and

through the envelope
; it is necessary to pierce

the
identifying
BOSE, Hindu

or

that

unite oneself to its ineffable

of all

source

present in the elements, the

reaches

in the

on

VALLEE

Cambridge, 1917).
343

OUTLINES

344

The

7.

HISTORY
the

of

Systems

systems which

numerous

spiritof

the

THE

OF

orthodox

the

Hindu

PHILOSOPHY

Period.

Amongst the
conformity with
"

developed in

were

called
books, and for this reason
are
Vedanta, Nyaya, Vaiseshika, Sankhya,

Vedic

(Mimamsa,

Yoga),the

OF

The philosophy
important is the Vedanta.
of this is that the phenomena which inferior science knows
are
in
Brahman
in which all
or
merely illusions ;
realityatman
and without attributes.
thingsare confounded is unknowable
The
end of life is the higherknowledge of our
identitywith
Brahman.
This knowledge is obtained by mysticalrevelations
and alone can
free us from the transmigration
of souls.
of
Alongside these orthodox theories we meet a number
heterodox
systems which set aside the teachingof the Vedas,
and of these the most
This doc
widespread is Buddhism.
is connected
of Sakya-Muni,
with the name
trine, which
reduces itselfto a moral pessimism ; it teaches that in order to
get free from the miseries of life and also from metempsychosis
have to look for happinessin an impersonalrepose.
This
we
of all Oriental philosophies,
does not
repose, which is the dream
consist,as in the case of Brahminism, in the absorptionof the
soul in God, but in what is vaguelycalled Nirvana
or extinction,
and

most

which

consists

according

and accordingto
personality,
happiness.
8. The

Philosophy of China.

philosophical
systems
1.
a

The

doctrine

is

in

another

state

some

find in China

We

"

of

in annihilation

view

one

of

three

positive

principal

(born in

of Lao-Tse

first,intelligent
Being

teaching

to

from

completed by

B.C.

the world

whom
moral

recognized

604),who

theory

emanates.

of

His

irreproachable

purity.
2.

The

(born in

doctrine of Confucius

collection of moral

dicta which

B.C.

contain

551),an

incoherent

littlethat is remark

able.
3.

which

Buddhism,

into China
seventh

the

century

beginning of
A.D.,

and

our

which

mysticism of
of Eastern
philosophies

thought
The

at

from

banned

was

of the

Those
by outside contact.
to-day are an unbroken and
greatest antiquity.

era

India

and

introduced

into Tibet in the

and

constitutes the fundamental

the lamas.

Asia have
which
pure

are

remained
to

be

met

tradition from

uninfluenced
with
times

there

of the

PART
Greek
9.

Periods

of

Greek

II

Philosophy
Philosophy.

Philosophy comprises the

six

"

The

centuries

period

before

and

of

Greek
the

six

be subdivided
into the four
may
the basis of the successive dominant
points

centuries after Christ, and

following
periodson
of view
1.

From

Thales

of Miletus

to

Socrates

(seventhto

beingmainly cosmological.
tury),
and
Aristotle (fifth
2. Socrates, Plato and
mainly psychological.
3. From

School

the death

(from

A.D.),when
4. The

end

of the

fourth

century

B.C.

to

the

third

ethical.

were

(from the third century A.D., or

systems leadingup to neo-Platonism, from the

neo-Platonic

School

of the first"
century B.C., to the end

the sixth

centuries),

of Aristotle to the rise of the neo-Platonic

the tendencies

includingthe
end

the

fourth

fifth cen

century A.D.),marked

by

345

of Greek

tendencies

to

Philosophy in

mysticism.

CHAPTER

SOGRATIG

PRE

Thales

(From

Socrates, seventh

to

Characteristics

10.

philosophers
non-ego,

the

questions

changes
what

or

was

did

raised.
succession

the

constant

it

enter

of

during

later

particular notice
Heraclitus

things.

Hence

(fifth century).
first

comprising

First

11.

Group

looked

lonians

infinite

air

endowed

of which

for

Pre-Socratic

the

foundation

THALES

schools

the

of Heraclitus,

second, the

; the

be

(about

(about

588-524),

DIOGENES

of

APOLLONIA,

OF

fluidityand

the

capable

concrete

MILETUS

OF

elements,

in

(about 624-548 B.C.),

MILETUS

OF

to

things

ANAXIMANDER

intelligence for

thought

were

of

ancient

The

Schools."

MILETUS

OF

ANAXIMENES

(about

Pythagoras
from

Samos

notably

His

doctrine

lonians

See

of

for

with

and

his

School

of

explaining

mobility
genesis

the

things.

12.
went

Eleatic

the

respective cosmic

the

of all

and

for
(cwretpov)

matter

611-547),

were

for

Water

principle.

School

of

time

the

to

only

view-point

the

groups

up

B.C.

School.

Atomist

air

lonians

are

succession

shifted

two

there

chiefly engrossed

manifest

who

find

Here

centuries,

of the

one

world,

discover

to

attempt

which
sixth

taken

we

old

the

Pythagorean

the

and

the

was

to

them.

second

seventh

the

concern

among

the

was

Greek

psychological aspect of
to investigate
was

beings, and

element

attention
was

chief

external

the

to

the

upon

earliest

The

"

attention

Their

the

questions;

two

their

not

fifth century B.C.)

to

Subdivision.

and

confined

and

the

PHILOSOPHY

to

his

BURNET,

Italy.

sojourn

marks

that

larger work,

to

of

Early
Greek

580

the
the

Greek

in

story of his

The

Egypt

Eleatics.

All

Philosophy
vol.
346

are

to

travels

teaching
can

and

(London

I, Thales

century)

established

the

things

the

numerous

not

from

transition

Philosophy,

of

end

to

570

or

Plato

be

facts.

of

the

reduced

Edinburgh,
(1914).

1892),

to

or

OUTLINES

348

OF

HISTORY

THE

OF

PHILOSOPHY

together in his system of physicsT the organicideas oj mechan

ism, but

this

Abdera,

authoritative
whole

is

corpusclesor

atoms

differentiated

by

for the

is that

'

of

composed
which

are

their form

and

of cosmic

whole

whirling motion

of empty

space

which

made

of

an

in the

only

LEUCIPPUS

was

DEMOCRITUSS

exponent

of matter

account

of which

founder

the

treated

adequately

was

school

and

of

its most

(about 460-370). The

innumerable

multitude

of

homogeneous, but
qualitatively
size,and by their combination
becoming. Atomic movement

',and

the action

results from

the existence

of

gravity. The psychology of

is merely a chapter of this physical mechanism.
Democritus
The soul of man,
like his body, is an aggregationof atoms, but
subtile and
more
lighter. Sensation and thought are only
atomic
vibrations, provoked by certain material emanations
travel through the exterior
from the objectsperceivedwhich
medium
and
into the sense-organs
enter
(theory of atomic
e?Sa"Aa).
images or species,
of mechanism,
ANAXAGORAS9
adherent
(500-428),another
considered
matter
as
an
originalconglomeration of particles
'

are

There

are

agency

up

of all the different substances

parts of all in all things '.

minute

these

and

homceomeries.
particles
determines

which

the

diverse

The

of the universe.

Aristotle

moving

has
and

combinations

called

guiding

of matter,

corresponding to the different bodies of the universe, is an

immaterial, intelligent
being.
15.
The
Sophists. The
nature-philosophershad concen
their attention
the external
world,
trated
exclusively on
without
the knowing subject. A group
taking into account
of controversialists seized on this popular physicalphilosophy
"

and

showed

that

it leads to the

known

they became

as

destruction

Sophists.

of all

scepticism has
it is inspiredonly by

Their

independent or absolute value, since

philosophy of Heraclitus or that of Parmenides.
the sophistswere
PROTAGORAS
(born at Abdera,
GORGIAS
(480-375).

Hepl "f"6aeus
',

Ilept

knowledge

The
about

no

the

chief of

480) and

II

CHAPTER
FROM

PHILOSOPHY

GREEK

SOCRATES

TO

ARISTOTLE

(Fifthand fourthcenturies B.C.)

I.

of Greek

16. Characteristics
"

The

Greek

Philosophy during
its

genius reached
Hitherto

centuries.

fourth

SOCRATES

in

maturity
had
philosophers

Period.

this

fifth and

the

studied

only the
investigations

their
Henceforth
external world, the non-ego.
and
concerned
were
they studied
primarilywith man,
external

world

the

dependent on

as

the

knowing

faculties of the

subject.
17.

of

Philosophy

lived at the time

glory under
He

Socrates.

Athens

when

and
Acu/zwi/^

denouncing the
condemned
Socrates
rests

on

to

he

vices

drink

the

is known

(born about

470)

zenith

of its

the

nothing

inspiredfrom

ceased

of Athenian

to

be

on

the

of his life.

high (the
'gad-fly',

society. In

399

he

of

His

method

was

hemlock.

taught under

what

little or

moralist
never

10

risingto

was

know

We

Pericles.

presents the figureof

Socratic

SOCRATES

"

as

the

form

dialogue.

the Socratic induction

the cardinal

point of all science is the forming of generalintellectual repre

sentations of things,and this can be attained by observation

ordinary dailylife. His philo

sophy is above all a system of morality,and the fundamental
of his ethical teachingis the reduction of virtue to
principle
knowledge : to possess science,i.e. universal notions, is to act
morally. To know is not only,as Plato and Aristotle taught,
the condition which must
precedeall moral conduct ; but the
possession of genuine universal ideas itself actually con
stitutes the moralityof our conduct.

of concrete

10

experiencesof

ZELLER, Socrates

and

our

the Socratic Schools

349

(trs.Reichel, London,

1885).

OUTLINES

350
The

OF

HISTORY

THE

PHILOSOPHY

OF

great influence of Socrates is the result of his original

this conception Plato

conceptionof knowledge. From
Aristotle elaborated new
philosophical
syntheses.

and

II. PLATO
18. Life.

At the death

"

of his master

sailed for

first to Megara, then

347) went
Cyrene.

Socrates, PLATO

Egypt

(427-

later for

and

After

remaining eightyears at Athens, he went to

the disciples
he encountered
of
reside in Italy (388),where
to the court of Dionysius
Pythagoras; thence he went to Sicily,
the Elder.

On

his return

Athens, Plato founded

to

school in

gymnasium of the Academy.

Aristotle distinguished
In the philosophy of his master
dialectics,ethics and physics. This form of classification is
found
in Plato, but it correspondswith his
not
explicitly
thought u. The keystone of the Platonic philosophyis the
ethics and
Idea : dialectic studies the Idea in itself; physics,
conduct
aesthetics consider its applications
to nature, to human
and to artistic productions.

the

19. Dialectic

Plato's
called

is the

"

Theory of

or

Ideas.

Dialectic

"

"

the word

is

and this itself is

objectivereality,
is appre
which
(efSos,
tSea).This reality,
of

science

Idea

the

the

by our abstract, universal, necessary and immutable

to our
is not able to exist in the world known
representations,
where
senses
contingent and
everything is particularized,
It exists outside and above the sensible
unstable (Heraclitus).
im
world.
Idea exists by itself; it is necessary,
The
one,
mutable
(Parmenides). This theory of the Idea is an extreme
applicationof exaggeratedrealism, which invests real being
with the attributes of being as it is in the mind : to each of our
there correspondsan
abstract representations
Idea-being.
real world
The
being thus modelled after the world of
arranged like our repre
thought,the Ideas are hierarchically
hended

sentations

At

of them.
is enthroned

essences,

the

the

Idea

is the final

ideal life ', which

of the

apex

Good,

of the

and

cause

ascending scale of
'

the

the formal

of the

sun

cause

of

all things.
11

Plato

has

left

thirty-fivedialogues.

His

TimaeuSj theJPhaede, the Republic, the Laws,

Uorgias,the
the Older

Thecetetus, the

Academy

Sophist,the
(trs.Alleyne, London,

Dialogues (London and

New

York,

the

Parmenides.

principal

1888) ; JOWETT,

1892).

works

are:

the

Politics,the Philebus, the

See" ZELLER,
Plato and
Translation

of the

PHILOSOPHY

GREEK

sovereignIdea, the Idea of

Demiurge who
personaland intelligent

relations of the

The

God, the

world, such

Plato

describes Him

obscure

problems of

as

of the most

with

able to maintain

Physics.

20.

the

regarded as

The

i.

"

It

laws

of the Idea of

of the visible world.

Plato

Ideas ;

the

givesa monopoly of realityto

the objectsof opinion,are
things,

prefer

seems

the sensible world.

and

one

independentsove
of change ; and
that
of all things,
the
cause

providentruler
Ideas

directs the

two

formal

is the final and

whilst the former

latter is

Platonism.

the

the Good, to

Timaeus, present

the co-existence

Hermann

alike free from

reigns,both

in the

God, the diarchyof

of

and

Good

the

351

sense-perceived
only partialand incomplete
He explainsthingsby matter
of the Ideas.
manifestations
is the
Matter or non-being (^ "/),which
and world-soul.
shapelessand invisible element, the receptaclein whose
bosom
sensible phenomena are
evolved, is space, or place
devoid ofall content 12. The Soul of the world is an alloyof two
'

'

elements

which

calls the

he

probablythe
Qdrepov),
link between

Idea and

sensible

the

of

visible

body

invisible soul, which

circular movement,
ancients,and is endowed

(ravrovand

other
is the

connecting
and
thus
He
the supersensible.
huge animal (fwoi/)
composed of a

the world

by

the

Matter, and

makes

and

kind

and

one

latter sets it in motion

the
symbol of the perfectamong
with intelligence.
2. Structure
of the corporealworld. Corporeal substances
consist of configurations
of simplebodies (water,air,fire,
earth),
the

which
as

are

be considered

to

pure

material

differences in arrangement
motion which determines their
must

so

sections of space and do not form

The phenomena of nature
mass.

of

and

small material

as

regular geometrical figures; and

pure

are

not

come

from

surfaces

these

are

the

outcome

simple bodies, and

groupingsis extrinsic to
In

of

the boundaries

the

of

world-soul.

the

but

masses

this Plato

them

shows

himself a mechanist.
21.
to

Psychology. The teachingof Plato

centre

round

theory of

intellectual

throughout
by his dialectic of the
I. Theoryof knowledge. Since
in

11

Historians
'

are

in Plato's

not

agreed

as

philosophy.

to

the

man

may

be said

inspired
cognition,

Ideas.
the Ideas

the sense-world,the consideration

matter

on

"

of

proper

are

not

immanent

phenomenal thingscan
interpretationof

the

term

OUTLINES

352

lead

never

have

to

us

HISTORY

THE

OF

OF

of immutable

knowledge

reality.But
infers that

Plato
knowledge of this reality,

PHILOSOPHY

face in

as

we

have

we

previous
as
existence ; and he regardssensible perceptions
servingonly
dormant, previousknowledge and as exercising
to re-awaken
no
properlyso called on the acts of our intelligence.
causality
2. Nature
ofthe soul. The body is a hindrance to the free con
templationof the Idea. The soul here below suffers a state of
to set itself
and is ever
violence contrary to its nature
striving

contemplated the

Man

free.

face to

to the charioteer

be likened

thus

may

of Ideas

world

drives

who

againto a monster composed of different

to
In spite of this antinomy, Plato endeavoured
natures.
interaction of body and soul by dividing
explainthe reciprocal
and immortal
the soul into two
intelligent
parts, the one
and perishable,
and in its
and the other unintelligent
(vovs),
and a lower or
made
turn
up of a noble part (the will,0v/xos)
less noble part (all
purelyorganicactivities).
of two

team

horses,

and

22. Ethics

or

Aesthetics.

The

"

Ideas

contemplationof the pure

from the body.
separation

Plato

ethics of the individual and

the

compilesa complete code

public)in which the individual

he

It is the

it.

same

of

by

the

soul

of art

consequentlybut

the shadow

are

state

of

background the

is sacrificed to the State.

in the elements

imitations

aspects. Works

in

family,but on the other hand

of politics
or
publicethics (Re

the Good, inasmuch

as

consists in the

man

leaves in the

beautiful resides in order and

The

end

of

as

which

it is

form
of its

one

things,and
(Ethics,107)

of sensible

shadow

III. ARISTOTLE
23. Life.

"

ARISTOTLE13

Stagira(whencethe name
384, and for twenty years studied philosophy
The
second important fact of his life
Plato.

in B.C.
Stagirite)
at the school of

is his
18

and

sojourn at

the

born

was

of

court

at

Macedonia,

he

whither

was

vols.' (trs.Costelloe
2
See~ZELLER, Aristotle andithe~:Earlier
Peripatetics,
chief
works
I.
His
are
:
London,
Muirhead,
Logic, collected later
1897).

of the Organon ; the Categories; the treatise On Interpreta

Reasonings. II. Philo
Analytics; the Topics; Sophistical
the
Book
and
the natural
sciences : the Physics ; the
on
sophy oi nature
the
Generation
and
Heavens
the Book
on
Corruption ; the Meteorology ;
;
III. Metaphysics : the Meta
History of Animals ; the treatise On the Soul.
Nicomachean
the Politics, the Athenian
Ethics
the
IV.
:
Ethics,
physics.
under

the

tion ;

the

name

two

"

"

"

Constitution.
work

of his

The

Greater

pupils.

See

Ethics

various

and

the

Eudemian

translations.

Ethics

are

probably the

GREEK

PHILOSOPHY

353

in 342 to direct the education of Alexander the Great.

only in 335 or 334 that he opened at Athens the Peri

summoned
It

was

School.
patetic

He

Alexander, and died

24.

General

was

forced to take

after
flight

at Chalcis in the year

Character

and

Division

the death

of

322.
of his

Philosophy.
its
full value, and
speculative
knowledge

to
Aristotle gave
elaborated a complete
philosophical
system,based

"

on

the two-fold

analysisand synthesis.The method of proceeding

by observation, inauguratedby Socrates and timiolly
applied
scientificbasis
established
on
a
by Plato, was
by Aristotle. In
stores of materials
fact,after having gatheredthose immense
him the firstscholar of antiquity,
which made
he constructed
the whole of
a generalsynthesis,
so vast
capableof explaining
that he earned for himself the rightto be known
as the
reality,
prince of ancient philosophy. Everything that is, is the
that he
objectof Philosophy,or science in the higher sense
givesthis word.
science par excellence,is the investigation
of
or
Philosophy,
the principles
of things (Metaph.,I, i, 981). It
and causes
includes (i)the theoretical sciences : physics,or the study of
subjectto change ; mathematics, or the study
corporeal
things,
of extension ; metaphysics,
called theology
or first
or
philosophy,
the study of being conceived of as incorporeal
and unchange
able. (2)The practical
sciences : ethics,
economics and politics,
the second often running into the third.
And
(3) the pro
ductive or poetic
the vestibule of philosophy,
sciences. Logic,
to
which he devoted special
attention, must also be added.
25. Logic. Aristotle was
the creator
of logicor, as he called
it,the analytic of the mind, for he was the first to make out
a whole system of the laws which
the human
mind must followin
order to acquirescientific
demonstration,
knowledge. Scientific
and the syllogism
which is its basis, teach us to discover the
of thingsand their causes
essence
: they constitute the main
topicof Aristotle's logic. But both these processes of the mind
presuppose a study of the more
elementaryoperationsinto
which they are resolvable,namely, conceptionand judgment.
The syllogism
of the
enables us to see whether
the predicate
conclusion is contained in the comprehensionof a third idea,
method

of

"

'

which

'

includes in its extension the subject of the conclusion

(Logic,
49).

To

from
joinideas by deducingthe particular

general,to co-ordinate and

to subordinate

conclusions

the

according

OUTLINES

354

THE

OF

HISTORY

OF

PHILOSOPHY

is the mental process whereby

degreeof their universality,
scientificknowledge.
come
we
upon
26. Metaphysics.
Metaphysicsis the science of being,con
In real being there is an
sidered as such (Tfc
element
ov, T) 6V).
which
of becoming
is stable (Parmenides)and
element
an
of Plato he conceives
and the
real
not
as
(Heraclitus),
in individual and
sensible
existingapart but as immanent
objects.
Aristotle classifiesbeingsin ten categories
or
highestclasses,
to the

"

'

of which

the

two

'

fundamental

are

substance

and
(ovo-to)

e.g. Socrates is a substance ; the virtue of Socrates is

An
accident belongs to different categories
accident.
:

accident
an

quality,quantity, relation, place, time, posture (^to-flat),

habitus)14,activity
possessionresultingfrom change (2x"v,
In
and
passivityimplied in change (VOKIV
Trao-xetv).
the scope of the Peripatetic
order to understand
metaphysics,
it is necessary to set side by side with this division,which is of
and potentiality
the static order, the classification of actuality
based on the becoming of being. Every change impliesthe
state to another
state.
Suppose the case of a
passage from one
being B, passingfrom the state a to the state b. The analysis
of this passage requiresthat B alreadypossesses in a the real
of its change to b ; before being b, it was
capableof
principle
act ',is then its presentperfection,
or
becoming b. Actuality,
the degree of being (IvreAexeia,eVreXes exeiv).
Potentiality,
is
the
to
receive
aptitude
perfection
potency or
power,
actualization
The
from
or
a
potential
passage
(8wa/us).
*cai

'

TO

state

to

actual

an

state

112 fL).
(Gen.Metaphysics,
Three
important theses

follow from
the

compositionof
The

called

of

the

motion

or

movement

Peripateticmetaphysics
and potentiality
:
actuality
form (28),the compositionof

the distinction between

matter

and

universal and individual,the

I.

is

theory of

theory of

the four

causes.

form, although it belonged

metaphysicalsense inasmuch as

and

matter

takes a
to physics,
originally
of change as such.
it is an explanation
Movement,
or
change,
substrate
(matter)
requiresan amorphous or undetermined
determination
which receives some
(form). The first of these
of all that is potential
elements is the principle
; the second, of

14

Concerning

KeurOai and

fa"

see

Logic, 15.

HISTORY

THE

OF

OUTLINES

356

OF

four kinds of movement

PHILOSOPHY^

genesisand disappearance
of substantial compounds, qualitative
change or alteration,
and
decay,and local movement.
quantitative
change of growth
their generationand
Since terrestrial substances
dis
owe

There

are

their transformation

to

appearance

that

necessary

should

there

into

in them

be

another, it is

one
a

permanent sub
(q -rrp^rrj
{;%?),

namely first or
primary matter
identical throughout the various stages of the
stratum,
another

principle
peculiarto

substantial

form

(etSos)The
.

each

of these

one

becoming

of

and

process,

stages,namely

forms

in matter

is

inevitable purpose, which nature

unceasingly
tends to realize,
but of the final terminus of which Aristotle has

regulatedby
clear

no

an

conception.

Of substances
and

there

classes,celestialand terrestrial,

two

are

of these is different.

More

perfectthan ter
restrial bodies, celestialsubstances (fixed
stars and planets)
are
swayed by a circular movement
(themost perfectaccording to
and not subjectto genera
the ancients)
immutable
; they are
tion or corruption. The special
natural element of which they
in
constituted is ether,a substance which is purelytopical
are
its nature
(Metaph.,VIII, iv, I044b.),and therefore cannot
the

nature

be classed

as

Earth, water, air and

fifth element.

the four elements

whose

transformation

explain
are
productions

and admixture

every productionof terrestrial bodies, and these

accounted
for by the agency of the celestialbodies.

is finite,
singleand

fire are

The

world

eternal.

in particular
sublunarybodies, organismsand man
a
specialplace,and thus we are led to Aristotle's
occupy
psychology.
29. Psychology.
its originas a science to
Psychology owes
Aristotle. To him the soul appeared as the first actuality
of a natural
(entelechy)
possessedof life
body potentially

Among

"

0? $VX*1^(TTL e^TfXc'xeia
77 TT/OCOT??
o-w/mros
it is the substantial form

the first matter

of the

livingbeing,as

the

II,i)

',

body

is

of the latter.

Though radically
one,

the

expressionthrougt
of all specific
principles

soul finds its

faculties of various kinds, which

vital

""WIKOU. De Anima,

are

the

phenomena : nutrition,sensitive and

and locomotion.
appetition,

rational

knowledge

tb
knowledge,whether sensitive or intellectual,
requires
of an objectand the subject,the first exercising
:
concurrence
All

PHILOSOPHY

GREEK

357

This double phase of

determinatinginfluence on the second.
and
knowledge the action of the objecton the human
faculty,
is something of the psychical
the re-action of the latter
its form, whether
be
order.
Sense-knowledge whatever
"

"

"

through the external

senses,

sensible

the

common

sense,

the memory,

or

the

and
us
imagination presents
particular
of things; whilst the intelligence,
by a
contingentproperties
their reality
apart from their
process of abstraction,perceives
individual characteristics and the limits imposed by time and
This is the reason
them.
why, along with the
space upon
which receives a stimulus from without,
passiveunderstanding

the

there is

an

to

"

active intellectwhich

in

with the

concurrence

sense-

knowledge engendersthis stimulus, the final resultant of which

is in the passiveunderstandingan abstract knowledge of what
exists outside in concrete
and
passible

active intellect is im

The

imperishable.Aristotle's theory of the

obscure points and is full of
presents many

alone

intellects

two

form.

is

difficulties.

exactlyits relations with the

body ; since the soul is the form of the body, it is its intrinsic
determiningprinciple.To Aristotle psychology is not the
as composed of body
studyof the soul (asto Plato),but of man
The

definition of the soul states

and soul.

performs without the

intrinsic and immediate
of the organism, the
concurrence
involves
is spiritual
intelligence
(vors)
; and its immateriality
its immortality.The theory of immortalityhas raised amongst
By

the

reason

of the functions

of

commentators

difficulties
which

which

Aristotle

it

controversies ;

endless

it presents arise from

the

the

completeseparation

passive intellect and the active

intellect. The latter alone is imperishable,
and consequently
of
doubt shrouds
the
a
question of the personal nature
he

makes

between

the

immortality.
30.

Ethics."

ordinate

to

Practical

philosophy makes

the direction of conduct.

The

knowledge sub
subject-matterof

to his
relationship
last end, and the latter consists adequately
in the harmonious
exercise of all the faculties (including
the sensitive faculties)
and formallyin the development of the highestactivities,
namely those of the intellect.
Aristotle givesa twofold series of virtues,tke dianoetic or

ethics is the acts

of the individual

in their

and

reason,

of

elements
ethical
His
a

the

Wealth

reason.

This

the

but

is

is

the

study

(fa'a-ci

State.

he

of

PHILOSOPHY

speculative
depend

does

gives

not

them

on

exclude
a

theoretic

or

the

practical
from

secondary

being
place.

eudaemonism.

rational

the

on

he

pleasure

happiness,

OF

which

virtues

and

being
is

depend

moral

system

Politics

sociable

society

which

virtues

intellectual

HISTORY

THE

OF

OUTLINES

358

social

-n-oXiTiKov

activity.
fwov),

and

Man

the

is

perfect

by

nature

form

of

III

CHAPTER
PHILOSOPHY

GREEK

ARISTOTLE

TO

THE

RISE

PLATONIG

(From

the end
General

THE

FROM

DEATH

OF

OF

THE

NEO

SCHOOL

ofthe fourthcentury B.C.

Characteristics

to the third

Division.

and

century A.D.)

The

predomin
of moral speculation
is the fundamental
feature of philo
ance
with
sophy after the death of Aristotle,and this deals chiefly
thus
questionsof personalconduct, theoretical speculations
taking a subordinate place.
The beginningof the third century B.C. shows us four great
schools in existence : the Peripatetic
School, the Stoic School,
the Epicurean School, and the New
Academy which perpetu
31.

ated

the

Platonic

For

tradition.

"

century and

half these

by side, each followingout its own

ideal in completeindependence. But after the second half of
the second century B.C. the disciples
departedfrom the absolute
purityof doctrine professedby the founders of the respective
Eclectics.
schools. We
say in generalthat they were
may
of the New
Eclecticism was
above all the fruit of the scepticism
Academy ; in its turn it gave rise,during the last years of the
firstcentury B.C., to a new
which for two
form
of scepticism,
centuries enjoyeda parallel
development with eclecticism.
different schools

32.

The

Centuries

ran

side

Philosophical Schools
B.C. 15.
"

I. The

immediate

School.

Stoic

(about 342-270),the founder

Third

the

of

of the

and

Second

OF

CITIUM

ZENO

"

school, CLEANTHES,

his

(about
who popularizedand
j 281-208),
systematized Stoic thought,
I were all principally
the
moralists, although they advocated
successor

(about 331-251),

study of physicsin so far

The
physics of the
pantheistic,
deterministic.
15

as

CHRYSIPPUS

it is related to ethics.

Stoa

is

Material

See ZELLER, Stoics,Epicureans and

359

materialistic,dynamistic,
bodies

Sceptics;

and

are

the

Eclectics.

only

real

OUTLINES

360

OF

HISTORY

THE

PHILOSOPHY

OF

: and
beings(materialism)
by bodies we must understand not
etc., which
cognitions,
only substances, but the properties,
affect them, so that the Stoics admit interpenetration
of bodies
in the same
of internal
SAwv). A principle
place (jcparisSi'
force inheres in matter
air or
(dynamism), namely, warm
the different degreesof
; and
atmospheric currents (Trveiyxa)
tension (TOVOI)
of this heat
explainthe different changes of
bodies.
This Trvev/xa is one
throughout its manifold activities
(monism) ; it is the supreme plasticforce (AoyosorTrc/a/mriKos
and its generative
action producesin the world a closed system
of necessarily
connected
phenomena, each of which is repre
sentative of a certain stage of a fatalistic evolution (deter
minism).
of all our
Sensation is the source
thought being
cognitions,
elaborated
collective sensation.
The
or
nothing but an
is the convincing force or
of certitude
criterion
power
which
of
a
winning our
(KaraX^TrrLKov)
representation
possesses

firm adherence.

Human

acts,

determined.

all other

just as

The

soul is

human

cosmic

events,

ephemeral emanation

an

the divine irvevpa, and is material.

Man has knowledge of the laws of the universe

compels him

to submit

of the will to act in

without

regard to

contrary
from

the

one

Virtue is

conformitywith
Between

does not

good

admit

The
significance.

wise

indifference for every

motive

he

his

reason

suppresses

of the
man

that

to which

fate

self-determination

evil there is

true

will

radical

degrees,and

the passage
Virtue is obligatory,

to the other isinstantaneous.

for since it is the natural form

cosmic

and

of

of

knowledge of the
The only evil is to

our

other motive.

any

to reason.

which
opposition,

himself.

fatally

are

it has

of man,
activity
professesan

has

not

passionsand

its

absolute
in the

source

becomes

apathetic,

i.e.passionless.
33.
a

II. The

school

of

influence
ism

philosophyat
over
a periodof

preservedunchanged

founder.
favour

At

De

the

end

Return

(94-54)was
Natura,

EPICURUS

"

more

and
a

that it had received from

second
the

an

six centuries,Epicurean

than

the form

(342-270)opened

Although it exercised

Athens.

of the

alike in the Greek

LucRETius16
18

School.

Epicurean

century

Roman

B.C.

world.

it

gained

The

discipleof Epicurus.

its

poet

Still

GREEK

PHILOSOPHY

361

flourishingschool in the third century A.D., its popularity

in the fourth.
Several of its theories survived
began to wane
after its disappearance,
and fragments of its teachings
even

broughtto lightagainin the Middle Ages.

from the
Epicurusonly studied nature in order to free man
beliefs in God and death bring upon
fear which superstitious
His physicsis a revival of the materialistic mechanism
him.
were

of Democritus.

And

yet the

movement

is not caused

of atoms

exclusively
by the action of their weight. He was influenced
and conferred on
the freedom of man
by the need of explaining
of turningaside
the clinamen
the atom
a discretionary
power
of Lucretius
owing to which it swerves
slightly
accordingto
its whim, from the vertical direction which is givento it by the
action of gravity. All knowledge both in its originand its
"

"

the very existence of sensation is a sure

for its objectis not the exterior thing,
criterion of its object,
nature

but

is sensible,and

the

this thing produces in

representation

mechanical

soul, and

of the

movement

us.

it is free.

Will is
Unlike

the

morality,the Epicurean ethics is a defence

of individualism and egoistic
well-being.Yet this individual
which is the supreme
pleasure,
good, consists rather in repose
satiation of
of mind and the absence of painthan in any positive
the soul. Thus Stoicism and Epicureanism,
so different in their
definition of happiness.
and the same
arrive at one
principles,
III.,IV. The PeripateticSchool of this periodcontinued the
ethics
with logic,
teaching of Aristotle and dealt especially
the
and physics(STRATO OF LAMPSACUS) The Sceptic Schools
school of PYRRHO
the Second or Middle
OF ELIS
(about360-270),
PITANE
(315-240); and
OF
Academy, formed by ARCESILAUS
the Third or New
Academy, formed a century later by CARNEADES
CYRENE
OF
(213-129) are of secondary importance.
34. Eclecticism.
(From the latter halfof the second century
and
B.C. to the third century A.D.) The Stoic, Peripatetic
Scepticschools developedside by side with Athens as their
The result
their teachingscoalesced.
centre, until eventually
authors may be classified,
was
a body of eclectic doctrines whose
accordingto their main tenets and in spiteof mutual infiltra

Stoic determinist

"

"

"

tions, with

one

other

or

of the four

tendencies
principal

of

post-Aristotelian
philosophy. In the selection of their theories
the Eclectics of this
them

towards

the

periodwere

the convergence
of life ; and for them

guided by

ends
practical

of
the

criterion

supreme
sciousness

dependently
voice

is

This

reminds

With

of

us

of

17

tonism

; with

of

ANDRONICUS
from

60

Tyrannic

grammarian
and

master,

posterity has
A.D.), whom
although he dissociates himself on
and

Aristotelianism
35.

end

The

leans

Scepticism

of the first century

Pla-

and

of
B.C.

towards
the

that

; to

Athenian

of the

with

some

works

APHRODISIAS
the

called

the
as

school

in collaboration

OF

of

Aristotle, such

of the

complete edition

200

18

mind

leader

all ALEXANDER

above

philosophy

Stoicism

on

published

who

B.C.,

40

Latin

the

the

RHODES,

OF

to

to

of commentators

group

associate

may

Academy, CICERO
(106-43 B.C.),
had a talent for accom
originality,

having any
modating Greek thought

Peripatetics,a

eclec

the

without

who,

of

interior

again

that of the Stoics, the

admixture

it in

peremptory

are

we

con

of

An

in this

and

eclecticism

of

forms

that

have

we

its dictates

and

: with
prominent names
SENECA
(d. 65 A.D.), an

some

immediate

our

conviction

subjectivism;
scepticism.

different

the

is

objectivityof knowledge.

itself heard,

commands.

PHILOSOPHY

OF

convergence

instinctive

of all real

makes

ticism

this

of

it, the

of

HISTORY

THE

OF

OUTLINES

362

the

of the

(about
Aristotle,

second

important points from

materialism.

neo-Pyrrhonic

School.

scepticismreappeared

with

"

At

the

AENESI-

19,who

real and universal

a
professedin express terms
of certitude
All his objectionsagainst the possibility
doubt.
circle round
the idea that, since our
representationsare only
have
criterion of truth.
relative, we can
no
Consequently, we
must
necessarilyabstain from forming a judgment. At the
EMPIRICUS
of the second
end
gathered
century A.D., SEXTUS
DEMUS

together

in

scepticschool
of

arguments

17

Letters

animi
18

to

long treatises20 the

some

they form a repertory, detailed but

against all forms of dogmatism.
;

Lucilius,

tranquillitate,De
Academica,

malorum,

De

complex

De

Quaestiones naturales,

ira, De

of the

ill arranged,

consolatione, De

dementia.

natura

De
officiis,

De

work

deorum,

republica,

19

Tlvppwveioi\6yoi.

20

Phyrrhonii Hypotyposes.

De
De

divinatione,

legibus.

De

finibus

bonorum

et

OUTLINES

364

PLUTARCH

APULEIUS

the authors

of

work

the

of

subordination
infinite God

been

(about 160),

datingfrom

handed

down

at

the end

under

of the

the

name

series of

of

Judaictheologyand

PHILO

the

Jew

Greek

philosophy

(30 B.C.-50 A.D.)21.

He

absolute

of the Holy Scriptures,

the
infallibility
of philosophyto theology,
and the dualism of the

and the finite world.

action

God's

the world

on

takes

placethrough the agency

(Suva/Acts),
proceedingfrom

intermediarypowers

Aoyo?,which

Divine

lectures Galen

151/2, CELSUS, NUMENIUS

have

completefusion

proclaimedthe

works, MAXIMUS,

TRISMEGISTUS.

of HERMES

was

whose

ALBINUS,

of the well-

author

minor

numerous

series of works

third century, which

The

of

in

Smyrna

at

PHILOSOPHY

OF

(48-125A.D.),the

MADAURA,

OF

tended

HISTORY

CHERONEA

OF

biographiesand

known

and

THE

OF

he identified with the

angels of

the

of
the

Judaic

and the daemons

of the Greek religion.The religious
religion
mysticism of Philo is very definite and full ; the trammels of
the body prevent us from knowing God
except in the mani
festations of Himself, but ecstatic illuminations and prophetic

enable us
may
38. Neo-Platonism.

states

Platonism
and

to

God

see

Plotinus.

such
"

as

He

is in Himself.

dominant

The

idea

of

neo-

from
withdraw
religiousmysticism. Man must
the world of sense, and approach God by a series

is

conquer

this mysticalconception he developed a

stages. From
completesystem of metaphysics,which is a kind of emanationof

At

ism.

the

time

same

neo-Platonism

is

an

of Greek

of the various systems

since it interpretsin a mystico-religious
sense

cretism

which

or

mixture

originalsyn
philosophy,

all the theories

precededit.

PLOTINUS

(205-270 A.D.)

was

the

founder

and

the

most

of neo-Platonism.
An
Egyptian by
representative
His works,
circle at Rome.
birth, he directed a philosophical
after having undergone a previousrecension at the hands of his
Eustachius, were
publishedby Porphyry under the
disciple
The
of Enneads.
name
philosophy of Plotinus evolved
gradually. Considered in its most syntheticform we may

brilliant

it up in two

sum

fundamental

ideas.

and sensible world is formed by

intelligible
the
principle,
process of emanation from a supreme
i.

21

The

Commentaries

on

the Old

Testament.

an

eternal

source

of

PHILOSOPHY

GREEK

all reality.The

(a)At the summit

to
perfections

of all

descendingscale

reality
reignsThe

Transcendent

Essence.

preme

an

ineffable

of emanations

in its nature,

One

or

the Su

it possesses

degree (positive
theology);

hand, since all the

the other

on

the

One, Intelligence,
The^World-Soul, Matter.

The

are

degreesin

365

notes

we

attribute to The

all
but
One

may say, from this second pointof view, that

and without any attribute (negative
is indeterminate

we
analogical,

are

One

The

theology).The One consciouslysheds around itself Intelli

its substance and so diminishingits
gence, not by diffusing
own
being,but by permeating,it would seem, by its activity
of this generation
is
The nature
that to which it givesbirth.
is
of the obscure pointsin his teaching, (b)Intelligence
one
itself. This
that by which
the One
Primary Being knows
being less perfectthan The One by virtue of the pro
vovs,
act of knowledge
absorb in a single
decadence, cannot
gressive
is dispersed
into
the energy communicated
to it ; this energy
of ideas. The vor? or second principle
a multitude
necessarily
produces(c)the World-Soul, which is of a hybrid nature, pos
sessed of ideas and containingalso wavelets of the universal
lifeor
forces which are scattered forth in the sensible
plastic
world.
Indeed, it is the World-Soul that generates (d)Matter,
its plasticforces appear.
which
is merely the place where
The divine genera
Plato held.
Matter is non-being,
/x?)
ov, as
tion reaches a stage when
it is weakened
by the successive
'

'

emissions,and its limit

exhaustion

or

of

or

final necessary

that beyond
reality,

anythingless real.
If we
inquirewhether

this

stage is this non-being

which

philosophyis

there cannot

form

be

of pan
the One

which
say that it is so if Intelligence
: in any
begets is regarded as one of its energies
voluntarily
effusion from Intelligence
is a necessary
the rest of reality
case

theism,

and
2.

we

may

hangs upon the Mind's thought.

exercise
The mystic return of the soul to God by the perfect

the
gradually mounts
activity.The mind
ascendingdegreesof metaphysicalreality.First of all it sees
only the world of phenomena, then it attains to contempla
tion of the vovs, and finally
rests in ecstatic and unconscious
of knowledge is pro
union with The One.
The perfection
the world of the
from
portionateto its purification
(KaOapo-is)
and the fullness of knowledge brings about
senses,
supreme
of

intellectual

OF

OUTLINES

366

HISTORY

THE

OF

PHILOSOPHY

happiness. Plotinus firmly insists upon the personalityof

of bringingabout
the
man.
Religion,since it is the means
ecstatic union more
occupiesa placein the mysticismof
easily,
Plotinus

that

his

continued

successors

enlarge. Religionand philosophybecame

39. Porphyry.
Among the immediate
is
(232/3-304)
of

the most

and

one

the

same.

Plotinus

He

remarkable.

to

more

of
disciples

"

PORPHYRY

and

more

popu

emphasized its
and ascetical character
between
man
religious
by establishing
and
The
One a series of intermediarydeities. He also em
phasizedthe confusion we have spoken of between philosophy
neo-Platonic
survival for many
and
a
religionwhich was
the first of a long line of neo-Platonic
He
centuries.
was
commentators
Aristotle : his introduction to the Categories
on
23
of Aristotle
acquired a great celebrity.Neo-Platonism,
indeed, regarded the study of the Organon of Aristotle as an
introduction to the philosophyof Plato.
40. End
of Greek
re
Philosophy. Porphyry's successors
tained nothing of neo-Platonism
but a mystic craving after
the supernatural.The Syrian Jamblichus, for example, built
the foundations
of neo-Platonism
international pantheon
on
an
of pagan
took an
deities. Later neo-Platonism
encyclopedic
larized

the

teaching

his

2Z, and

master

"

character

and

its attention

confined

the commentaries

to

of

Aristotle.
The

philosophersof

the three

chief centres

Athens, Alexandria

the

gatheredtogetherin
empire : Constantinople,

last centuries

of the Eastern

THEMISTIUS, in the second half of the fourth

worthy of
century, is the onlypersonality

Constantinople.At
thinkers

were

the

PROCLUS

school

note

of Athens

the

in the school of
most

brilliant

who
systematizedthe
(410-485),
and
emphasized his monistic and

24

philosophy of Plotinus
and SIMPLICIUS, a
mysticteachings,

commentator

on

Aristotle,

by Justinianin 529
celebrated
migrated to Persia. The most
philosopherat
After him,
of Proclus.
Alexandria
was
AMMONIUS, a disciple
under the influence of JOHN PHILOPONUS,
at the beginningof
who

when

the school

the

sixth

century, the

evolution
22
13

84

'

towards

A0o/tytaiTrpis
ra
Wvayuyr) els ras

of Athens

school

was

of

closed

Alexandria

underwent

Christianity.
voyrd.

called
'A/)t"rrorAous
KaTrjyopias,

also

T"V
irepl

Trtvre

an

PHILOSOPHY

GREEK

influence

The

mediaeval

philosophy,
in

directions

which

Accordingly

Western.

Fathers

in

philosophy

Byzantine

the

"

the

Greek

of

of

between

the

Middle

Ages.

the

Church
Greek

367

we

which

philosophy

be

may

it showed

itself

philosophy,

in

find

it in

marks

and

the

throughout

seen

in
the

three

principal

Asiatic

and

philosophy

of

in
the

the

transitional

period

the

philosophy

of

the

PART

III

Philosophy

Patristic

General

41.

speculations

of

fragmentary

as

served

the

of

religious philosophy

spects, since they lived

ideas

and

We

divide

first three

to

Council

of

In

mental

of

dogmas

of

manner

extended

from

into

philosophy

Council

of Nicea

of doctrinal
42.

Gnosticism,

current

to

which

See

the

of

God

SCHMID,

St. Louis,

thought

periods,basing

two

of the

period
seventh

the

included
Church

to

the

funda

from

century,

the

period

second

The

(692),and

Council

rise to

gave

in which

fixed.

the

Trullan

Lives

was

time.

The

and

of

Works

Three

principal heresy

syncretic alloy
matter,
way

of

the

dualism

essential

producing by

Manual
and

the

First

the

during

was

principle of good,

DENHEWER,

to

Philosophy

centuries,
at

evolution

the

faith became

the

Greek

the

the

was

era

development.

Patristic

Christian

was

fourth

the

re

ancients.

325),

the

other

with

permeated

(from the foundation

in

Nicea

The

essentially

was

dogma.

their

by them,

Patristic

centuries

the

philosophy

the

on

and

unity

confound

which
religious controversies
The
first period, which
speculative discussions.
division

our

establish

accentuated

Church

the

civilization

of the

colouring

may

in

of

and

religious questions.

subservient

influenced

were

the

kept

of

Fathers

the

religious

to

want

way
to

of

speculative aspect

philosophy
a

neo-Platonism

from

inherited

and

maintain,

than

eyes,

this

the

to

to

their

in

patristic period

The

tendency

hence

25, incidental

upon

in their

truth

philosophical

origin

called

were

purpose,

dogmatic

fullness.

with

they

The

"

Church

their

owed

were,

other

no

defend

and

they

Division.

of the

Fathers

the

which

controversies

they

and

Features

the

Centuries."
of

the

Greek
of

principle of

of emanation

early
ideas

God,

the

evil ;

the

series

of

St. Louis,
1899) : BARof Patrology (trs. Schobel,
Shahan,
Herder,
Church
the
Fathers
(trs.
of
of the

1908).
369

370

OUTLINES

Eons

less and

less

HISTORY

THE

OF

perfect;

the mixture

in the world

material elements

PHILOSOPHY

OF

such

of the divine

the

are

and

the

theories
principal

metaphysicand

of the Gnostic

cosmogony.
third century Gnosticism
was
violentlyopposed by
Christian school of Alexandria, of which the leaders were

In the
the

(diedpriorto 216) 26 and ORIGEN

directed his vigorousmind
former
2T. The
chiefly
(185-254)
to working out a system of natural theology,
anthropologyand
ethics,in agreement with Christian dogma. He established
of God and
defended the theory of
nature
the transcendent
of the soul and the moral freedom of
creation,the spirituality
CLEMENT

OF

ALEXANDRIA

man.

43.

St.

Augustine.

"

sophy belongthe
ST.

GREGORY

St.

of ST. GREGORY

names

sopherof

but

by

period.

St. Ambrose

celebrated Fathers

of the most

he also stands

the Patristic

to Catholicism

(331-394),
M
(about

all that of ST. AUGUSTINE.

above

Church,

NYSSA

OF

ST. AMBROSE
(329-390),

Augustineis not only one

of the

periodof Patristic philo

second

the

NAZIANZUS

OF

340-397)and

To

the greatest philo

in 354, he was
converted

out

Born

as

baptizedhim in
Hippo (395),where he held

of Milan, who

387. We find him again later at

the episcopaloffice with
great

renown

until his death

in

430".
Augustine gatheredtogetherand reduced to a concise
and he is one of the
of antiquity,
form the intellectual treasures
destined to be passed
chief media by which these treasures were
He was
well acquaintedwith neoworld.
down to the modern
of
his method
Platonism, and to it he owed his psychology,
consciousness,his excessive dis
investigation
by the human
and a great
tinction between the sensible and the supersensible
number
of his teachingsconcerningGod.
Before reachingits completeform the philosophyof Augus
St.

tine,

as

he

himself

tells us,

underwent

progressive

; 2
Ilai5ayuy6i
*7

TLeplapx"v.

ministrorum.
officiis
from a philosophicalpoint of view are : Confessionum
libri II I
libri XIII,
his autobiography (about 400
A.D.); Retractationum
he had at
doubts
whose
Contra
A cademicos, directed
against the neo-sceptics,
animae ;
de immortalilate
time
shared
one
; Soliloquiorum libri II ; Liber
anima
et ejus
De
arbitrio
De
libero
De
De quantitateanimae
;
magistro ;
;
of
St.
works
Trinitate.
all
the
Augustine
and
Dei
De
Ciiitate
De
Nearly
origine
;
have
been translated
(ed. Schaff, Buffalo, 1886-92 ; Library of the Fathers,
Oxford, 1844-47; etc.).
28

Hetaemeron,

8t

His

De

principalworks

of

OF

OUTLINES

372

souls.

our

departurefor
be taken

in

us

are

passages,

lightwithin

divine

celebrated and

many

elements

to refer to other

notably to
drawn

HISTORY

There

of the

diation

THE

his

theory

OF

PHILOSOPHY

is the

which

us,

of St.

Augustine's
teaching,
For

depthsof the soul ; God

and
the seal leaves its impressin wax,

from
as

the inmost

occasion

point of

endless controversies,must

origin of ideas.

of the

this irra

however, where

ideas

are

implantsthem
the

senses

are

of their

genesis(Plato).
The will playsa more
predominatingrole in our psychiclife
than the intellect,
inasmuch
as
purityof its desires is a con
of some
truths the
dition of knowledge,and because in the case
be secured only by the will's intervention.
mind's assent
can
The
will is morally free. Evil is not a real element existing
side by side with the good (Manicheism),
of
but is the privation
only the

the

good.

St.
human
is the

ardent
44.

of

Augustine'smanner

freedom

the
reconciling

of the

will with the divine government of man

by grace, which
subjectof some
very difficult texts, has given rise to

controversy.
Writers

Dionysius.
"

The

Century. Nemesius.
Nemesius, Bishop of Emesa, wrote
of the

Fifth

Pseudo-

at the end of the

fourth century or at the beginningof the fiftha populartreatise

entitled Trepl
which is an adaptationto dogma
dvBpioirov,
""vo-eo"s
of

an

From
most

eclectic psychologyand
the

point of

view

important writer

of

Grecian

mode

of his influence
the

of

on

fifth century

thought.

the

future, the

is the

author

the
of St. Dionysiusthe Areopagite,
known
by the name
falsely
discipleof St. Paul. Long controversies have been waged
that we
concerningthe real identityof this writer. It seems
must
placehis writingsat the end of the fifth or at the be
ginningof the sixth century. They did not appear before the
The
conference
at Constantinople.
time of the great religious
treatises of the PsEUDO-DiONYSius
The Divine Names, Mystion
The CelestialHierarchy,
The EcclesiasticalHierarchy,
calTheology,
to the
largelyinspiredmysticism and scholasticism down
The
time of the Renaissance.
philosophywhich we find in
and of
the thought of God
these writingscentres
around
influences are mani
Neo-Platonic
mysticalunion with Him.
of particular
fest not only in a great number
teachings,both
but also in his terminology and
and mystical,
philosophical
and his
Nevertheless the author rejects
formulae.
pantheism,

PHILOSOPHY

PATRISTIC

based

mysticism,
the

which

the

among
them
The

in

an

of

thinkers

orthodox,

the

their

to

mediaeval

race,

Middle

times.

than

mode

The
written

Ages
in

sometimes

their

Christian.
had

Pseudo-Dionysius

later

of

is

grace,

philosophers

account

belong

on

373

the
of

who

veiled
caused

fifth

thought

confusion

sometimes

heterodox,

interpret
sense.

century,
and

in

terms

their

both

on

influence,

PART

IV

Mediaeval
General

45.
and

Remarks

Scholastic

Middle

and

largenumber

of

unfortunate

to

which

We

mention

may

mediaeval

between

published in great numbers

there

were

only in
Though

West

indeed

the West

and

the

of

have

also at

Scholasticism
with

that also which

Ages, at
whether

which

associate the greatest

and destined
the best systematized

was

we

may

that

throughout

at

East also

course

of the Middle

philosophical
systems that were
anti-Scholastic or, if
teaching was

produced

nothingat

all in

Scholasticism with
mistake of

new

length in

in the

view

of

Middle

Scholastic

of Scholasticism

the

in Italian

outlined

and
375

the

Middle

To

you
West

and

which

op

the

had

confuse

Ages is the

whole.

philosophy

WULF, History of Medieval

authors, Scholasticism Old and
in 1913

Byzantium

Scholasticism.

philosophyof

the

consider

Ages systems

the

with

we

that

with

DE

Historyappeared

if

common

confusinga part

Confusion

same

the

deal with

to

posed
it, whose
prefer,non-Scholastic. This is true
alone,but we must
also remember

the

East.

stage of its development we consider it,

the heightof its gloryor in its decadence, Scholas

to

by

in the

philosophyin

dominant

the

was

this not

whatever

ticism had

The

closely

some

and

Byzantium

Middle

in the

the less only one

gloriousfuture, it was none
philosophical
systems belonging to the Middle

of many
Ages. This is so true

80

ones

the most

out

at

that

different character, and

very

but

that

shown

philosophical
systems,

many

others
interrelated,

2.

the chief

philosophyand Scholastic
have
which
recentlybeen

historical works

"

to have

Ages

dispelling.

need

names,

Middle

Concerning the philosophyof the

Scholastic philosophy30 there exists a very
which are due
misconceptionsand prejudices

philosophy.The
Ages

of the

Philosophy

"

confusions.

Confusion

1.

the

on

Philosophy.

Ages

Philosophy

and

Scholastic

followingpages is discussed
Philosophy, trs. Cotfey ; cp. also
New.
Enlarged editions of the
in the

German.

OUTLINES

376

OF

THE

HISTORY

OF

PHILOSOPHY

theology.The princesof the Scholasticism of the thirteenth

marked
the distinction between philosophy
century have clearly
and theology. Their philosophy,
like every philosophy,is a
of the whole or of part of
reason
study by the lightof human
the problems which are presentedby an endeavour
to explain
"

the

order of the universe

through its ultimate

Their

causes.

in so far as it is dogmatic,is a body of teachings

made
theology,
known
revelation of God.
It is certain that these
by a positive
two
notions, though ill-defined at the beginningof the Middle
well since the twelfth
Ages, were
clearlydistinguished
very

century.
What

greatest share in perpetuatingamong

historians of the present day the misleadingconceptionwhich
makes

has

had

the

Scholastic

philosophybut a department of the history

is the misunderstanding
of religions,
of the mediaeval
principle
that philosophyholds a position
subordinate to that of theo
define Scholastic philosophyas
to
logy. This has led some
that philosophywhich is under the direction of the dogmatic
ancilla theologiae,
teachingof the Catholic Church, philosophia
and others to call Scholastic all philosophysubjectto any
31. We certainly
admit that in the Middle
dogma whatsoever
relations with theology: not only
Ages philosophyhad some
relations of common
originand of methods of instruction which
in vogue in a civilization very different from our
also relations of co-ordination
and of subordination.
were

ordination, inasmuch
of in

philosophical
arguments
apologetical
purposes, and on
as

theologyfor
although it existed
philosophy,
use

tributed
method
of

in
or,

theologyto
as

rationcs,as

form

as

an

what

Of

were

co

made

this account

science, con

autonomous

is known

but

own,

as

the dialectic

called in the twelfth century, the method

distinguishedfrom the use of auctoritates or the
it was

Of subordination,since philosophy,
whilst
method.
scripture
with the positive
of a dogma,
demonstration
having no concern
contradict any dogma : a thingwhich
might never
negatively
of the Universityof Paris expressedby for
the regulations
contra
of philosophy to
determinare
bidding any master
fidem.'
Nevertheless, these connexions between theologyand
difference
philosophydo not at all detract from the real specific
'

in the
81

Thus

nature

of the two

it is that

Scholasticism

we

hear

of

(Carra de Vaux)

sciences,and in order
a

and

Jewish
of

Scholasticism

Protestant

to

bring home

of
(Zeller),

Scholasticism.

an

Arabian

PHILOSOPHY

MEDIAEVAL

377

far it is incorrect to introduce

to ourselves how

the

primacy of theologyinto the definition of Scholastic

it will be sufficient to notice
of the tenets

many

the

on

Scholasticism

of mediaeval

at their Aristotelian origin

; and on
philosophical
systems in the Middle

that
have

the

Ages,

great

direct

no

but

hand

other

philosophy,

is evident if we

with the truths of faith,as

concern

hand

one

idea of

glance

those

even

all

that

that

to establish their
opposed to Scholasticism, endeavoured
agreement with dogmatic truth.
Scholastic philosophyand an ancient
3. Confusion between
Scho
philosophical
system. The prejudicethat would make
were

"

servile counterpart of Aristotelianism

dissipated.The influence of Aristotle
finally

lasticism
been

has

mere

was

now

very

less so, especially

before
real ; but that of St. Augustinewas
no
the time of St. Thomas
Aquinas. St. Augustineserved as the

channel

by

passedon.

which

neo-Platonic

Not

mention

of Democritus

to

and

teachings to

the

sy st ematization

Platonism
especially
made

great benefit

which

false

or

put down

one-sided
as

held in honour

was

mechanism
of

traces

of all the traditional

its

characteristic

own

philosophyand its didactic

and of
of the syllogism
use

schola,school),came

views

date

from

the Renaissance,

and
theologians

scholastic all the

all the

Ages such as it knew them at the time,

them.
The epithet scholastic ', which
the beginningof the Middle Ages (from

Middle

it thoughtit knew

as

show

were

tongue, etc.32.

of the
philosophers
or

thought

"

These

both

use

of

Scholastic
between
4. Confusion
methods
its formal procedure,
its
the Latin

of

the
Pythagoreanism,

Scholasticism

their influence.

tendencies

at

'

to have

contemptuous

meaning

at

the

in some
way
signify
vague
sneered
at
whose
language people
any philosopher-theologian,
and of whose teachingthey knew nothing. The same
happened
in architecture with
the epithet 'gothic'. But
owing to
which
recent
historical works
these long-standing
prejudices
were
so
unjustto the philosophyof the Middle Ages are now
all but dissipated.
fortunately

end of the fifteenth century and

"

One

Greek,
of

or

might

as

Kantianism

certain

Scholasticism.

well

define

Grecian

to

Philosophy as

the philosophy that

as
speciallycompiled glossary, as

can

the

philosophytaught

conceive

with

in

the aid
only
such a definition for

be studied

OUTLINES

378

of

philosophy
West,

the

of

but

all

different

the

in

philosophy
of view

point
marked

teenth

but

which

decadence
of the
and

until

more

distinguished

regain

for it the

without

success.

the

falls into
to

of the

end

the

teenth

century)
of

half

fifteenth

mediaeval
fifteenth

With
the
East.

periods

century)

these

history

seventeenth

divisions
of

all

it had

that

the

to

of
;

modern

sides

their

by

new

to
were

philosophy

of its

the

ninth

glory (thir

(fourteenth

philosophy

middle

efforts

(from

of

the

century

mediaeval

(4) period

of

Philosophy.

sixteenth

decadence

duration.

the

Modern

(2) period

its

of

languished,

all

lost, but

thir

the

signs

Scholasticism

the

this

briefly

long

From

of

century

in

were

on

the

trace

to

riches

of

there

in

of

it may

the

not

of

and

From

this

thirteenth

fifteenth.

century)

(3) period

philosophy
to

tried

East

divisions

the

(i) period of formation

twelfth
;

able

elaboration

assailed

was

it is clear

better

preceded

forerunners

minds

account

Period.

was

in the

predominance

above

four

glory

it

the

were

Some

From

which

seventeenth

because

so

which

systems

the

into

of the

century

about

came

fifteenth
the

Mediaeval

unfolded

fourteenth

the

the

in

in Western

; and

development,

painful

in the

Byzantine,

taking

renaissance

its

simultaneously

representative

are

The

Ages."

centres

most

of its

of

Middle

important

we

Scholasticism
time

the

Western,

by

and

long

the

in

Already

that

period

the

of

one

is

of the

scientific

the

century

genius

most

phases

general

epoch

an

called

be

the

Scholasticism

of

PHILOSOPHY

numerous

Therefore

age.

position

in

out,

far

by

Scholasticism
the

in

and

OF

developed

Ages

philosophies,

first is

the

of

central

three

of

Philosophy

Middle

the

these

philosophy
ideas

HISTORY

Byzantium

at

Oriental,

the

of

Division

46.

THE

OF

first

and

transition

from

(second half

of the

century).
of Western

philosophic thought

philosophy
at

we

Byzantium

shall
and

connect
in

the

OF

OUTLINES

380

THE

century.

We

coherence

in the very

bear upon

Scholasticism

look

must

OF

HISTORY
for the

PHILOSOPHY

principalcause

varied influences which

:

of this in

were

brought to

preponderating
group

of Platonic-

Augustinianideas together with a group of Aristotelian ideas.

And further,mingledwiththese two groups wefind the influence,
less important but very real, of various
other
theories
We
Pythagorean, Epicurean, Stoic, neo-Platonic, Arabian.
a
say of the philosophyof this periodthat it resembled
may
"

crucible in which

materials

of very

varied

kinds

fused

were

together.
48.

Organization of Philosophical Schools.

Middle
and

Ages

there

in these

two

were

even

or

three

"

Far back

in the

types of schools 36,

teaching of philosophytook a prominent

placealong with the teaching of the other sciences. These
were
(i)the monastic schools,each comprisingthe schola in
terior

or

the

for

claustri,reserved

exterior,open

the

monks,

and

the

schola

cathedral or
lay students ; (2)the episcopal,
capitularschools ; (3) the court or palace schools, scholae
of which
the most
celebrated was
the
palatinaeor palatii,
Palatine court of the Prankish kings. The celebrity
of these
schools dates from Charlemagne,who
encouraged their erec
who
tion,and from ALCUIN
(735-804),
organizedthem.
Amongst the most famous schools we may mention those of
York
(England),of Liege,Tournai (the Low Countries),of
Fulda (Germany),of Rheims, Tours, La on, Compi"gne,
Chartres
and Paris (France),of Monte Cassino (Italy).

In

to

schools

these

there

taught (i) the

were

liberal arts,

comprisingthe trivium (grammar, rhetoric,dialectic or logic)

and the quadrivium(arithmetic,
geometry, astronomy, music) ;
(2)the natural and historical sciences ; (3) philosophy; (4)
theology.
The commentary
author
or expounding of the text of an
(lectio]
was

the first and

the

works

exchange

we

of

natural

form

of

teaching,and it was based on

The
below.
the
or
disputatio,

shall mention
views

between

and

master

pupils,made

its

in the twelfth century. We

also find at an early
date attempts at a systematic instruction on particular
ques

appearance

tions.
the

"

This

time

became
systematization

of Abelard.

Cp. Mullinger,Schools

And

we

of Charles

must

the Great

dominant
note

how

feature from

philosophical

(London, 1877).

PHILOSOPHY

MEDIAEVAL

arguments and
49.

Philosophical Literature.

Organon

and

known,

was

about

Physics. Plato

known

other

hand

upon

Aristotle

was

there

of

writers

(470-570) and

DORUS

Greek

On

the

be

authors

were

or

Pseudo-Dionysius.and

the

the

greatest

considered

philosophicalthought of the
CAPELLA
of Carthage(middle of
38

of his

commentaries

numerous

were

had

line may

new

until the

parts of works of
considerablyused, and

of the Church

especiallySt. Augustine

his Timaeus.

Works

Lucretius

amongst the Fathers

only the

evidence

have

The

etc.

translations.

and

Cicero, Seneca

which

by Porphyry (the Isagoge),by

Victorinus,

Latin

entiretynot

we

only by

Plato

and

Boethius, Marius

only in

this time

in circulation

were

those

Of Aristotle's works

"

this in its

twelfth century ; and

read

intermingledwith

questionsare
theology.

belong to

381

Middle
the

fifth

Three

renown.

directingthe
Ages" MARTIANUS
century)37,CASSIOas

(480-525)39, the last

BOETHIUS

two

Theodoric, king of the Goths.

The twelfth century being the
50. Division
of this Period.
the present periodmay
goldenage of the schools of philosophy,
be subdivided
into two
parts : the one, Western philosophy
in the ninth,tenth and eleventh centuries (I)
; the other, Western
of

being ministers

"

philosophyin

the twelfth

(II).
order we
To this division accordingto a chronological
add another
division accordingto the ideas contained
systems of philosophy; in each of these two periodswe
make
and

distinction between

those

that

are

not.

the theories that

This

the

objectiveconformity or
theories of a philosophyhave
of

the

Scholasticism

of

want

Satyricon;

88

De

artibus

of

shall

Scholastic

conformity that

with the fundamental

the

in the

classification will be based

thirteenth

from
down
teachingshanded
40.
completedand crystallized

87

are

shall

the

nuptiisMercurii et Philologiae.
liberalism litterarum ; De
disciplines

the

tendencies

century, when

early Middle

on

Ages

the
were

De
ac

institutionc divinarum

litter
arum.
89

Translations

of the

Isagoge of Porphyry

and

of various

works

of Aristotle,

Isagoge,the Categoriesand the

De interpretations
of Aristotle, the Topics of Cicero ; originaltreatises on
and
categorical
hypothetical syllogisms,division, definition, topicaldiffer
ences
De
consolations
;
philosophiae.
40
For the justification
of this criterion see the author's History of Medieval
Philosophy,
p. 146 f
notably

the

Organon

commentaries

on

the

382

OUTLINES

OF

II. WESTERN

HISTORY

THE

PHILOSOPHY

51. The

thought

i.

THE

OF

Scholastic

Question of Universals.

universals.

NINTH, TENTH

AND

Philosophy
"

The firststagesof Scholastic

problem of
follow step by step the gradual ex
can
different controversies,the development of a

the

were

PHILOSOPHY

CENTURIES

ELEVENTH

"

OF

We

pansion of the
psychologyand
main
problem

of discussion

outcome

with it the slow elaboration

which

reached

of the

of

its final form

solution of the
in the

twelfth

century. The earlyScholastics did not clearlysee the many

The problem did not
aspects that this questioninvolved.

springup spontaneouslyin the Middle Ages, but was forced

the attention of philosophers
by an obscure text of the
upon
Isagogeof Porphyry,the meaning of which was made stillmore
obscure by the vague and scarcelyconsistent commentaries
Do genera
of Boethius.
The questionPorphyry asked was
:
exist as thingsin the world of reality,
and species
or are
they
mere
products of the mind (sivesubsistant,sive in nudis intellectibus positasint)
? The
Scholastics took up the dis
cussion as it stood justin these terms, that is to say, they
looked merely at the objectiveaspect of the questionand
neglectedthe psychological
point of view ; they asked simply,
Do
the objectsof our
concepts, that is to say, speciesand
exist in nature
are
or
they merely ab
(subsistentia),
genus,
?
stractions of the mind
(nuda intellecta)
Simply : Are they,
or
are
theynot, things? Those who repliedin the affirmative
received the

of realists; the other party

name

were

known

as

anti-realists.

(ninth century)41,
principalrealists werel|FREDEGis
REMIGIUS
OF AUXERRE
(tenthcen
(ninthcentury)42,GERBERT
a man
tury) *3,who was remarkable in his time as a logician,
of learningand a humanist, and ODO
TOURNAI
OF
(eleventh
century)44. They established a strict parallelismbetween
and to each
being and thought, and attributed to each species
shared by all the
universal essence
a
(subsistentia),
genus
The

subordinate

individuals.

41

De

42

Commentaries

43

Letters

44

De

nihilo et tenebris.
; De

on

Donatus

rationali

peccato oyiginali.

et

and

Martianus

rations uti.

Capella.

MEDIAEVAL

By anti-realistswe
followed

who

PHILOSOPHY
those who

mean

commonsense

ERIC

MAURUS,

RHABANUS

not

are

The

exists.

alone

opposed realism,those
agreed with Aristotle in

and

maintaining that universals

dividual

383

OF

thingsand

anti-realists of
AUXERRE

that the in
this

period"
(ninthcentury)*5, or

of the sententia
(born about 1050), the originator
did not get beyond the simple negativereplyto the
vocum
propounded by Porphyry. The last
incomplete dilemma
did not solve the problem of the relation
in particular
named
between the universal and the thoughtin the precise
that
sense
word
understand
the
nominalism.
We do not find
now
by
we
broached in the texts of his which we possess.
this question
dialecticians gave rise in some
The quarrels
quarters
among
at once
and
to
to argumentations
superficial degrading reason.
BESATE
Men
like ANSELM
OF
(eleventhcentury)*8 must be
rather than philosophers.
regardedas sophists
realism considered only the real element in our
Extreme
; anticoncepts and attributed to it an actual universality
ROSCELIN
"

realism

on

the other hand, under its firstforms, may

be summed

do not exist in a uni

up in the negativethesis that essences
of these theories gave only an
Each
versal state.
imperfect
solution of the problem of universals ; but whilst the former
vitiated

was

truth

by

which

radical flaw,the latter was

destined

was

adequateformulae

were

to

found

become

Abbot
of
(1033-1109),
Archbishopof Canterbury,was the firstto
works

full

clear and

as

more

to clothe it.

52. St. Anselm

his well-known

of
expression

the

47,to combine

Bee

and

afterwards

an

attempt, in

make

the truths

so

far reached in

philosophy. He expressedin Augustinianterms, exact but

faith and reason
the relations between
(credeut
incomplete,
basis,he
ut credas),
and, on a metaphysical
intelligas,
intellige
formed a system of theodicywhich embraced
all the problems
is inseparably
of philosophy. The
of St. Anselm
name
connected
with one
specialargument for the existence of
God : the famous ontological
argument examined in Natural
Theology (17). Following the thought of St. Augustine,
Anselm
treated of the simplicity,
immutabilityand eternity
46
16

47

Commentaries
Rhetorimachia.

on

dialectical

Monologium, Proslogium,

Trinitatis (againstRoscelin),De
De libero arbitrio,Cur
Deveritate,

problems.
Liber

apologeticusad

incavnatiove
Deus

homo

insipientem,De

fide

Verbi, Dialogus de gramntatico,

?(on redemption and atonement).

OF

OUTLINES

384

of

of God,

and

ledge;
of the

exemplarism, and

In

between

of

OF

He

was

the

and

thought, and

he

questionsconcerningthe genesisof
lines as St. Augustine.

the

"
53. John

Scotus

2.

Non-Scholastic

Eriugena

truth

know

and

treasured

frankly realistic in

psychology he recognized the

sensation

PHILOSOPHY

divine

theories became

these

Scholastics.

mind.

HISTORY

THE

patrimony
his tone

of

essential distinction
dealt with
ideas

along

of

many
the

same

Philosophy

of Irish
(800/15-877),

birth

(Eriu-

gena),must be regardedas the father of the anti-Scholasticism

of this period. His main work
De Divisione Naturae contains
indeed the principles
of a pantheistic
philosophy such as we
find in neo-Platonism.
thus :
metaphysicalteaching may be summarized
There is only one being,God, from whom
all things proceedby
In this
series of substantial emanations
a
(participationes).
there are four stages : (a)Nature neither
process of emanation
He
created nor creating,
i.e. God as the originof all things,
as
and
exists unknown
uncreated
to Himself ; (b)Nature
even
i.e.God as He knows
within Himself the primordial
creating,
of all thingsthat are to appear
causes
as
phenomenal or visible
existences ; (c)Nature
created
but not
creating,i.e. the
externalization of God
in genera,
speciesand individuals
the world of phenomena
all contingentthings,corporeal
or
or
being only theophanies
incorporeal,
unfoldingof the divine
substance; (d)Nature neither creatingnor created, i.e. God
1.

His

"

"

the ultimate

as

an

the

of the Universe.

of God ;
as
a projection
psychologyhe regardsman
has
of cognition,
in addition to his ordinarymethod
man
of knowledge
intuitus gnosticusin which for the acquisition
follows a process parallel
to the evolutionary
reason
stages

2.

and

term

In his

of the divine substance

Eriugena, by confusing religionand philosophy,

interpretedthe Scripturesand dogmas of the Church in a
His
symbolic and naturalistic sense.
philosophy exercised
a
profound influence on the development of Western thought
antiin
the
Middle
Ages. By his pantheism he was
Scotus

Scholastic,inasmuch
God

and

His creatures

Scholasticism.

as

is

the
one

substantial

distinction between

of the fundamental

of
principles

PHILOSOPHY

MEDIAEVAL
indications

Other
found

in the

refuted

De

form

of anti-Scholastic
Mundi

Constitution
of human

385

teachingsare

of the

to

be

Pseudo-Bede, who

monopsychism upheldby

of his

some

contemporaries.
" 3.
54. Their

TheologicalControversies

Philosophyand
Bearing

The

Philosophy.

on

"

discussion of several

of the theo
questionswas the natural outcome
philosophical
transubstantiation
logicalcontroversies on
predestination,
of certain
endeavour
and the dogma of the Trinity. The
such as Berengariusof Tours
and Roscelin, to
dialecticians,
placedialectic beyond all authorityprovoked a reaction on the
part of a group of theologians Peter Damian, Otloh of St.
Emmeram,
Manegold of Lautenbach
(eleventhcentury) who
declared themselves
less hostile to all philosophy.
more
or
Peter Damian
notablywould not tolerate philosophyexcept as
of dogma, and it was
he who popularized
subservingthe cause
the much-abused
ancilla theologiae.Yet
principle
philosophia
it was
with Lanfranc, the champion againstBerengarius,
that
find developing a
we
more
accommodating tendency in
theologywhich was destined to issue in what became known as
He
the dialectic method.
was
ready to admit the value of
profane studies, but always requiredphilosophy to be the
of theology.
handmaid
"

"

III. WESTERN

PHILOSOPHY
"

55.

Realism.

character
and

on

i.

Scholastic

CENTURY

TWELFTH

THE

Philosophy

twelfth century stamped a well-defined

social
mediaeval
thought, fixingthe religious,
"

The

artistic outlook

features of

IN

of the

peopleswhich

West

were

and
to

now

the

moulding

predominant

the

take

national

life.
place in political
The

schools

of Chartres

and

intellectual tournaments.

century Chartres

the

was

graduallyeclipsedby
became
Middle
The

by

the end

In

the

were

centres

first half

of

focus of culture, but

that

of the

Paris

of

the

schools

of

of
the

stirring
twelfth

its fame

was

Paris, which

of the
century the first university

Ages.
time

was

one

of

extraordinaryactivityin philosophic

OF

OUTLINES

386

revival

of

complex and

took up with

universals,and the discoveryof the

the

logicfomented

on

realism

extreme

quite

vigourthe
books

new

the discussions.

first half of the

the

During

PHILOSOPHY

very

Scholasticism

dissimilar movements.

of Aristotle

OF

displayeditself in

thought, which

problem of

HISTORY

THE

twelfth

century

WILLIAM

witness

we

a
4S

CHAMPEAUX

OF

he may
much
however
have been inconsistent in
(1070-1120),
his terms, taught,at Paris,that universals are contained in each
of which
individual thing,the essence
is identical in all and
universal in character.
At Chartres, which was
a
stronghold
49
CHARTRES
of realism,BERNARD
OF
(diedabout 1125)professed
a realism
very akin to the ancient Platonism, by attributing
and species.His disciple,
a real universal existence to genera
OF

humanist

movement

God

the

as

51

CONCHES

50

CHARTRES

THEODERIC

for which

later

Formulae.

of the

problem

faithful to the

of

Under

"

this term

of universals

set

collection

theory.

of

alike

All

the

many

brought
which,

principle
individual subject

from

out

the

the

theory

of the

status of WALTER

52,that of the
as

were

century and

twelfth

Boethius,

BATH
OF
respectusof ADELARD
those known
OF
or
MORTAGNE,

the

study

group

we

which

speciesare nothingbut the

regardedunder different
aspects; such is

as

the

to

and

that genera

OF

time followed the lines

applied himself

first half of the

mind

WILLIAM

ethics.

56. Anti-Realist

in the

the

famous, regarded

was

creature.

every
(about1080-1154)for some

physiology,
cosmologyand

forward

of

existential act

of his teachers, but

solutions

Chartres

of

soul

(died 1155), the

theory and
indifference

attack

realism ;

extreme

steps towards a
final solution of the question; their lack of greater precision

despitetheir

shades

will be understood
historical

was

57. Abelard

Liber

49

De

60

51

when

setting53.

death-blow

48

of difference,they

once

The

they are
who

one

were

placedin

gave

extreme

their proper
realism its

Peter Abelard.
as
(1079-1142),

sententiarum, treatises

on

critic of

more

than

ordinary

dialectics.

expositionePorphyrii.
Eptateuchon, De inventione rhetorica ad Herennium.
naturis
de
Magna
philosophic*,Dragmaticon

philosophiae,Summa

philosophorum.

moralium
62

De

58

See

ments

on

et diver so, Quaestiones naturales.

History of Medieval
Philosophy by the
this subject,p. 187 ff.

eodem

author

for further

develop

OUTLINES

388

OF

Chartres
He

and

HISTORY

57

works

remarkable

two

THE

as

inveighedagainsta
who

leader

the

elegant writer

the most

obscurantists

OF

PHILOSOPHY

of the

of the

humanism

of

twelfth century.

of cavilling
grammarians and
group
at the destruction of all learning(the

aimed

the first to undertake

Cornificians)
; but beyond this he was
a
historyof the philosophical
thought of his times, and he
furnished an
solution of the questionof universals,in
exact
treatingwhich, he said, the world had grown old,takingmore
'

time
the

to

solve it than

earth

He

'.

the

also

Caesars

took

conquer and govern

study of psychological

took

to

the

up

that of the faculties and acts of the soul.

questions,
especially
Though we find in his psychology certain Aristotelian prin
it is substantially
that of St. Augustine. |
ciples,
in which
The work
the Platonic-Augustinian
psychology
appears

in its

et
Spiritu.
regard as
period.

60.

purest and

Anima
the

of ALCHER

manual

of Lille58

Alan

subtle

Salisbury,a

didactic form

most

of

is the Liber
which

CLAIRVAUX,

OF

psychologyfor

together Platonic,Aristotelian

and

of all the known

formed

we

may
this first mediaeval

(about 1128-1202) was,

dialectician,who

de

like

collected

John of

and

fused

neo-Pythagoreanelements,
the whole
but transformed
by a Christian conception. He
clothed all his ideas in a poetical
garb, and his style,
elegantin
its imagery,is often allegorical
and ill-adapted
to express his
thought clearly.His attacks againstthe Cathari in defence of
and immortalityof the soul form the most
the immateriality
His psychologyis drawn
entirely
importantpart of his work.
from St. Augustine.
of St.- Victor
61. Hugh
(1096-1141)presents to us a per
sonalitywhich is at once
philosopher,
dogmatic theologian
review
and mystic. His Didascalicon is a sort of encyclopedic
imitators.

His

sciences and

exegesisof

individualistic sense

the

the model

57

the
6t

Entheticus

the monistic

formulae

of

Tractatus

in

an

J. Scotus Eriugena.
out a new
phase in
as

he

renounces

experience.His

dogmate philosophorum,de septem Septenis,and especially

the Metalogicus.
contra
hereticos,ars catholicae ftdei,theologicaeregulae,antialso a mystic.
He was
planctu naturae.
de

Polycraticus and

claudianus, de

numerous

corrected
Pseudo-Dionysius

proofsof the existence of God open

the historyof Scholastic theodicy,
inasmuch
a
priorimethods and takes his stand upon
psychologyalso is Augustinian.
His

for

MEDIAEVAL

"

is subversive

creature

Philosophies

-Scholastic

essential distinction

the

or

man,

Non

of

389

Philosophy. Every
of the soul,the personality
denies the spirituality

theory which
of

Non-Scholastic

2.

Forms

Various

62.

PHILOSOPHY

lasticism,and

must

Hence

of the

"

between

fundamental

be referred

to

God

and

the

of Scho
principles
other philosophical

some

the Scholastics
classifyamong
who
professesmaterialism, transmigrationof souls,
anyone
atheism or pantheism.
Materialistic Epicureanism manifests itselfin certain of the
in their
teachingsof the Cathari and the Albigenses,
especially
denial of the after-life of the soul ; but the principal
forms of
anti-Scholasticism belong to the pantheism which was
due to
the influence of J. Scotus Eriugena. Namely : (i) The pan
theism of the school of Chartres, represented
OF
by BERNARD
BENE
TOURS 59. (2)The pantheism of AMALRIC
and the
OF

system.

Amauritian

Sect

in all

manent

we

ideas survived

that

"

things.

Joachim

de

Amalric
we

exists is
of Bene

Floris

contact

with

"

theories

similar

schools

various

by

" 3. The
63. Schools

Tomis, id

councils

of Scholastic

which

and

is

have

more

expounded by
the Evangelium
DINANT
(closing

of
OF

is the

most

absolute

identical in all

Divisionibus,was

Movement
Theological

Scholastic
"

est de

is im

having recourse

errors

and

"

His work,

God

died in 1,204, but his

by the author
Aeternum.
(3)The pantheism of DAVID
of the twelfth century),which
years
God is the primary matter
materialism
De

and

one

find certain sects

deifyhumanity

point of

one

all that

him, and

to his theories to

than

cannot

things.
proscribedfor

lost.

now

of the TwelfthCentury

In the twelfth century

clearlydistinct from Scholastic

Theology.

theology stands
and the two queens
philosophy,

"

wisdom

enjoy an
absolute autonomy as two distinct sciences.
Theology rose to
a very notable
position; great schools developed,and progress
made
was
in two
important respects the codification of
libri senmaterials under
the form
of Sentences (sententiae,
dialectic method
',
tentiarum)and the introduction of the
tised side by side with what
be called the scriptural
may
of mediaeval

"

'

89

De

mundi

univevsitate.

OUTLINES

390

but

method,
method

THE

OF

HISTORY
it.

subsidiaryto

OF
The

PHILOSOPHY

object

the rational character

to find out

of

dialectic

the

of every

dogma, so
that
auctoritates,
Scriptures,
might have the
rationes.
The distinction between
support of a true apologetic,
these two
terms
appeared first in the writingsof Peter of
later in those of Thomas
Poitiers and
Aquinas ; it is of con
was

of the
the authority

siderable

importance.

applicationof

The

rise to

and

controversies

ardent

some

dialectic method

the

theologygave

to

served

to

divide theo

parties. Whilst a certain group of

rigorist
theologiansentirelyopposed its introduction into the
realm
of theology (54),the majority allowed it, althoughin
of scriptural
to the method
strict subordination
interpretation.
distinct

logians into

latter in their turn

These

regarded philosophy

who

one,

of

name

of

as

the

Master

Poitiers)
;

the

of the

true

the

forerunners

We

may

group

of the

was
(whose disciple

III),of

of Gilbert de la Porree

Mystic Schools.

science
the

the

is to

give an

"

The

aim

who

were

genius and

were

of the

thirteenth

century.

three

schools

Abelard

of

Ardens).
: Radulfus
(disciple
of mysticismas a speculative

of the relations

account

between

direct communication

sake,

own

Bandinelli, the future Alexander

(Hugh and Richard, and Robert of

Roland

St.-Victor at Paris

Melun), and
64.

round

these

was

Scholastic

the

great minds

them

it for its

cultivated

theologians.It

of
representatives

his

Peter
disciple
fullyrecognizedthe value of

itselfand

called academical

be

in the

Sentences, and

other, who

study in
philosophical
may
the

merely

: the
groups
being useful for

dogmas of the Church,

practicaltheologians(e.g.Peter Lombard,

the

known

classed in two
as

the rational element

bringingout
merit

be

may

the

soul

brought
and

about

God

and

by
to

thingsby the union thus effected.

If the Scholastics were
not to lay themselves
open to the
charge of being illogical,
they could not admit a mysticismthat
of the natural order ; for accordingto their theory of
was
explainthe

ideas the

universal order of

reason

is able to know

only through the medium

knowledge of
analogical
communication

God

of sensible

and

the will to love Him

experience.But

the Infinite does not

with Him,

which

constitute

such
a

an

direct

phenomenon of
mysticismbelongs

is the central

Catholic
mysticallife. For this reason
Whilst
to the supernaturalorder.
in the eyes of theologians
mysticism is distinct from Scholastic philosophy,it is not
the

PHILOSOPHY

MEDIAEVAL

391

find that the great Scholastic

with it. In fact,we

incompatible
of the Middle
Ages
philosophers

the

at

time

philo
sophers, dogmatic theologians and mystic theologians.In
of mysticismwas
the School of
the twelfth century the centre
and RICHARD
St.-Victor,where Abbots HUGH
were
conspicuous
were

same

leaders.
ART.

BYZANTINE

II.

AND

65. Byzantine Philosophy.

of

the decree

ORIENTAL
Banished

"

PHILOSOPHY

from

Athens

in 529

by

Justinian,Greek

philosophyfound a home in the

capitalof the Eastern Empire during the whole of the Middle
not
Ages. But the work of this Byzantine philosophywas
was
chieflyencyclopedicand its
very fruitful ; its character
from
in the
borrowed
Plato (such as Arethas
representatives
tenth, Michael

Psellus in the eleventh

(such as Photius
century),and it

had

schism

Greek

The

in the

the

in 1204 put

its

West, and

the

own.

misunderstand

of endless

source

from

the crusades

end

an

East

of
individuality

the

contact

civilizations

two

until
superficial,

marked

no

(858),the

ings,separated the
between

century)or from Aristotle

ninth, Joannes Italus in the eleventh

during this period was merely

and the takingof Constantinople

to the intellectual isolation of the East.

66.

and Syrians.
Philosophy among the Armenians, Persians
"In Armenia, we meet
the name
of a celebrated translator of
ARMENIAN
Aristotle,DAVID THE
(about 500 A.D.).

In

Persia, the

of

court

Chosroes

of
togetherthe last representatives

gathered
the
philosophy,

Anoshervan

the

Greek

of neo-Platonists
SyrianDAMASCIUS, SIMPLICIUS, and a number
driven from Athens, but the philosophical
created
movement
by these Greek scholars was destined to be short-lived.
The Syrianshad a direct inheritance of philosophical
thought

from

Greece, and

Edessa, Resaina

and

number

handed
Chalcis)

to the Jews,
indirectly

(of the schools

of translators

various

on

works

of

Arabians, and

to the

of Aristotle, Porphyry,

Galen,etc.
67.

Philosophy among

for three and

blend

of the

unbounded

half centuries had

and
a

Jews.

admiration, and
the

emanation

existence of man's

"

The

philosophyof

Arabians

their

own,

they had an
neo-Platonic
teachings. Their
the extraof the spheres and

philosophyof Aristotle,for

theories about
human

the Arabians

intelligence
gave

whom

colouring
specific

OUTLINES

392

OF

HISTORY

THE

OF

PHILOSOPHY

explanationof the universe. Most of the Arabian

in harmonizingphilosophy
concerned chiefly
were
philosophers
with Mussulman
dogma.
ALKINDI
(t about 873),ALFARABI60 (t 950),and above all
their

to

AviCENNA61
of those
The
to

who

have

processionof the

givea

the chief

(Ibn Sina, 980-1036),are

monistic

claim

to be

spheresas

representatives

called Oriental

understood

to his
signification

philosophers.

Avicenna

by
and
philosophy,

the active intellect the last to be formed

tends

he makes

in the series of genera

these pantheistic
tendencies by
tions ; yet he counterbalanced
he distinctly
a psychologythat is individualistic and
taught a

personal immortality.
In the West, the

of AVERROES

name

62

(Ibn Roshd, 1126-

His admiration of Aristotle amounted

all others.
198)eclipsed
almost to worship. The intelligence
of the spheres,the eternity
of matter, the monism
and potentiality
of the human
intellect
(both active and passive)and the denial of personalim
mortality,are the chief characteristics of his teaching. He
his philosophyaccord
made
with the Koran
by giving an
of its texts.
allegorical
interpretation
under the influence of
Jewish philosophydevelopedchiefly
The most
the Arabians.
AVICEBRON
notable personality
was
1

(Ibn Gebirol, about

1020-1070),the

of

author

treatise Fons

Vitae, greatlyvalued by the Scholastics of the thirteenth

emana
century, in which he expounds a system of pantheistic
and
From
the One
God
inspiredby neo-Platonism.
of all reality,
a cosmic
spirit
Being,who is the source
supreme
composed of matter and form is derived ; from the unchange
and
of these two
of matter
able generativepower
principles
form there spring,
by a series of intermediaries,all the beings
of the universe, each having in itself,besides the common

tions

cosmic
these

matter
are

individual

the

and form, its own

constituents

thing.

With

associate that of MOSES

derived matter

of the
the

name

MAIMONIDES

and

form, and

perfectionof
specific
of

Avicebron

each

may
the last
(1135-1204),

63

we

of Jewish philosophy.
great representative
"e
the
Commentaries
on
intellectu et intelligibili.

Posterior

DC

Analytics;

ovtu

scientiarum,

De

Shifd (calledby the Scholastics

Metaphysics, Najdt, Book
Sufficientiae)
of Theorems,
Guide
to Wisdom.
62
de substantia
Destructio destructions, Quaesitain libros logicaeAristotelis,
81

orbis.
""

Guide

of the Doubting.

II

CHAPTER

MEDIAEVAL

CENTURY

THIRTEENTH

General

Survey.

thirteenth

The

"

GENERAL

I.

ART.
68.

THE

IN

PHILOSOPHY

century

the

was

golden

of mediaeval

seen
philosophy and its greatest splendour was
held
the
in the
in the preceding century, France
West.
As
literature.
in art
and
well
in philosophy, as
as
hegemony
Towards
of the
the end
twelfth
philosophy
century Western
the
into contact
with
came
Arabian,
Jewish and Byzantine

age

philosophiesand
part played by
such

Samuel

as

65, were

mon

entirelyto
the
Ben

dormant

genius lay

Tibbon

until

West

the

and

Renaissance

the

compilations (Nicephorus Blemmides

In

; whilst

repeat Averroes
and

did

Scholasticism

not

Ben

Gerson

Falaquera,

64,

Jewish writers,

the

historical

The

advantage.

own

concluded

Arabians

to

content

its

Salo

Byzantine
produced only
the

George Pachy meres).

without

triumph

battle
to
against powerful rival theories.
struggle ; it had
This chapter will deal with
(i) Scholastic philosophy (Art.II) ;
minor
(2) non-Scholastic
philosophies (Art. Ill) ; (3) some
the
about
(Art. IV). First, a word
philosophical currents

scientific

and

of

renaissance

philosophical

thirteenth

the

century.
69.

Causes

which

movement

of

i.

causes

The

Latin

most

the

The

Gate

the

brilliance

West

may

in the

first years

attributed

be

to

"

introduction

of

treatise

66

such

wide-spread

rapid and

on

Opinions
of the

into
from

treatises
the

through

West,

the

Greek

the

or

from

the
the

medium
Arabic

of
and

philosophicalworks, notably the

Aristotle
(Physics,Metaphysics and
of

great number

important

64

in

This

"

with

century

translations

Hebrew,

Renaissance.

appeared

thirteenth

the

three

of this

of

Soul),

the

of Philosophers.

Heavens.
393

Greek

scientific

works,

the

OUTLINES

394

OF

THE

HISTORY

OF

PHILOSOPHY

treatises of Avicenna, Averroes, Avicebron

and a
philosophical
number
of pseudo-Aristotelian
productions,
apocryphal but
translations made
evidently of Alexandrine
origin. The
from the Greek are the most
directly
perfect.Robert Grosseof Messina
and
Bartholomew
teste, Henry of Brabant,
William
de Moerbeke
(f 1286),among many other
especially
The
translations
made
translators,deserve specialmention.
from

the Arabic

bulk

of them

Hebrew

or

the

were

are

of

work

lators,organized by Raymond,

1151),

best

the

GUNDISSALINUS
Michael

Paris,Oxford
the

Herman

creation

place

and

of

trustworthy. The
celebrated collegeof trans

Archbishop of
them

Gerard

the German

of the

66.

Toledo

(1126-

DOMINICUS

being
of Cremona

and, later,

also be mentioned.

should

those
universities,particularly

Cambridge,which

honour

less

amongst

GuNDiSALVi.

or

Scot and

The

2.

known

much

of

studies
gave philosophical
at the beginning of the

Though

thirteenth century the writingsof Aristotle were

several times
prohibitedby ecclesiastical authority,little by little these
to be

facultyof
Aristotle into the course
of teaching. Thus
arts admitted
in
this facultythe scholar studied
philosophy,and after being
licentiatusand magister,
baccalaureatus,
progressively
proceeded
in the facultyof theology.
to his course
censures

came

3. The

foundation

Dominicans

and

members

overlooked

of the

the

the universities.

from

1255 the

Orders, the
great Mendicant
Franciscans, which
compelled their
two

sciences and

study the

to

and

established

themselves

at

The

of the thirteenth
prominent philosophers
bodies.
Followingthe lead
century belongedto these religious
and
Franciscans, and perhaps to
given by the Dominicans

their influence, great

established
for the secular

counterbalance
afterwards

brated of which

the Sorbonne

was

ART.

II.

SCHOLASTIC
I. GENERAL

70.

General

philosophy,which
of thinkers
""

See

DRANE,

Characteristics

in various

RASHDALL,

and

(1253).

PHILOSOPHIES
VIEW
and

countries,reached

Universities

Christian Schools

in Paris

graduallybuilt

was

shortly
collegeswere
clergy,the most cele

Division.
up

by

"

Scholastic

the collaboration

its culmination

in the

of Europe in the Middle Ages (Oxford, 1895) ;

(London, and ed., 1881).

Scholars

OUTLINES

396

of these

OF

THE

HISTORY

systems became

Scholastics

less

OF

time

as

steadilyeliminated

from

PHILOSOPHY

went

and

on,

their

the

great

teachingall incon

opinions.
2. The
Peripateticism
of the Albertino-Thomistic School. A
in character, was
more
new
movement,
franklyPeripatetic
introduced
by the philosophyof Albert the Great. This St.
Thomas
developedinto a fixed and magnificentform, at the
of the theories hitherto held in
time overthrowingmany
same
sistent

"

in the schools.

honour

with the older Scholasticism.

Thomof Thomism
3. Conflict
ism at once
the opposition
of the older
encountered
necessarily
"

Scholasticism,for it rejectedmany
theories

inconsistent with its

as

issued in the

formation

of three

groups : the irreconcilable

the loyaland whole-hearted
supporters

points,adherents

some

themselves
4. The

School.

"

from

and

5. A
71.

the

lines of the

last years

thirteenth

of

was

both from St. Thomas's

agreement

about

sum-total of these

a
we

founded

thought

older Scholasticism.

the multitude

varying degrees by

others,

thirteenth

the

"

century there

on

the Franciscan

and

and grammarians.
group of logicians
The
Scholastic
all the
Synthesis. Above

disagreementamong
in

views

system of philosophywhich

Peripateticism,
yet deviated

on

ways.
Scotus

Duns

Scotus, in the

century, formulated

traditional

of

of
Peripateticism
Duns

of eclectic thinkers,Thomists

in various

innovators

promiscuous
principles.The struggle

own

opponents of Thomism,
of Thomism, and finally
a group
on

of the current

was

all

call the

of

of Scholastic doctors of the

of

tone

common

alike, and

number

matters

there

mind, shared

reigned a

tacit

doctrines ; the
Scholastic synthesis,
which we

of the

cardinal

alreadyspoken of in its abstract character and its gradual

This synthesis
in the
formation.
reached its full expression
thirteenth century. It will suffice here to outline its principal
have

doctrines.

knowledge is now
systematizedin all its stages,the
sciences as the foundation, theologyat the summit,
particular
philosophyholding an intermediate place. The distinction
between
philosophyand theology,which we have already
spoken of, involves their mutual
independence and the
Human

autonomy
distinction

of the elements
still allows

proper to each ;
the subordination

yet this recognized

of

philosophyto

MEDIAEVAL

PHILOSOPHY

397

sciences still follow the Aris

philosophical
is stillregarded as the
totelian classification. The
Stagirite
favour with which
undisputedmaster of logic,and the special
logic is regarded in the thirteenth century explainshow
dialectic pervadesthe study of the science of grammar
which
in character.
henceforth becomes
speculative
Metaphysicsis given the placeof honour in the Scholastic
curriculum.
Eminently deductive, it studies not only the
substance
of sensible beings,
but beingas such, investigating
it
in its static reality
and in its becoming. The theory
at once
of the actual and the potentialoccupiesa central position,
closelyconnected with which are the questionsof the com
positionof substance and accidents, of matter and form, of

theology. The

and

and
existence ; the
individual, of essence
of the
alone exists,and the universal character

universal
individual
mental
The

concept is due

to the action

science of natural

theology is closelyassociated

metaphysics. Reason proves the

of being as manifested
imperfection
and
things. God is pure actuality,
of the

finite to the

of the mind.

existence
in the

with

from

of God

the

contingentworld

of

the absolute subordination

Infinite is made

clear

by

the

theories of

exemplarism,creation and providence.

the movement
or
change of bodies and
Physicsinvestigates
its divisions. The
and
disappearanceof sub
appearance
stances
are
(in
explainedby their composition of matter
determinate
element) amd form (determiningelement) ; a
rhythmic evolution governs the becoming of forms and directs
the cosmos
final end, known
towards
a
by God, which is
world is neither
other than His external glory. The
none
infinite

nor

eternal,and God

was

able to create

the

universe

perfectthan it is.
Psychology is regarded as a subdivision of physics. Man,
composed of body (matter)and soul (form),excels all other
of the higher activities
of the possession
beingsby his privilege
is
of intellectand will. His knowledge of extra-mental reality
for man
knows
sensible or intellectual,
not only the concrete

more

and

individual

abstract
All

our

and

by

universal

by

abstract ideas have

our

means

their

senses

(thisoak)

of his intellect

originin

also the

but

(theoak).

the sensible
'

'
"

nihil

but we possess
priusnon fuerit in sensu
a
faculty of understanding (passiveintellect)

est in intellectu quod

besides

of his

means

"

OUTLINES

398

THE

OF

HISTORY

PHILOSOPHY

OF

intellect)
facultyof abstracting(active
by
sensible

object (thisoak) engenders

of which
height,life,etc.),the content

individual

and

of which

(e.g.
representation
is strippedof all the

determinations

concrete

the power

that

found

are

in the

real thing. This character of the idea constitutes its

existing
and serves
the chief argument for the survival
as
immateriality
and immortalityof the soul.
The

of will follows

'

that of the intellect

upon
nisi praecognitum
and appetition
is sentient

act

"

nihil

'

volitum

tellectual accordingas it follows sensation

certain conditions,free and

appetitionis,under
makes

of his

master

man

thought.

or

destiny. Indeed,

in

or

"

Rational

this freedom

like every

natural

being we have an end, namely, our true good, which we

morallyobligedto strive after, although it is in our power
from

turn

Man's

are

to

it.

natural

development of

happiness
his

be

must

result of the

the

higheractivities knowledge
"

full

will ; it

and

and love Him

in His
should know
design that man
through the possessionof a perfect
knowledge of sensible

God's

was

works

and

nature

its forces ;

but

realized ; the Creator has

grace and therefore will
resulted from

have

the

thirteenth

doctrines

we

have

abstraction,by
moral

the

as

from

though stilldistinct
The

of

Thus

century

has
possibility

been

not

designed to elevate man's nature by

replace the happiness,which would

the work

of the divine Essence.

this

direct intuition

philosophyis regardedin

avenue

to

moral

are

only an

theology,

it.
sketched
briefly

abstract

epitome,a skeleton, as it were, which was clothed with flesh

and lifeby each concrete
system, yet they portray the essential
features of a conceptionof the world which
to the
was
peculiar
Middle

Ages.

of Scholasticism.
Descriptive
definition
ticism is a pluralistic
philosophy,not
The

substantial

distinction between

and creatures,
ality,
makes
potentiality,
theism.

We

cannot

Scholastics took
the

tenets

which

borrowed

from

compositionof

matter

and

universal, the

substantial

monistic

God, who

system.

is pure

Actu

emphasize

to eradicate

First of all Scholas

and
compositionof actuality
of pan
uncompromising enemy

are

it the

"

too

much

the

great

care

the

tendency from
every pantheistic
the Arabian
philosophers.The
form, of the individual
distinction

between

the

and

the

subject

PHILOSOPHY

MEDIAEVAL

knowing

the

who

satiates all its faculties,

are

God

and

between

and

object known,

399
the

beatified soul

Scholastic
many
and are rather
incompatiblewith monism
teachingsabsolutely

express

which

into

came

Averroes,

direct

In

conflict

with

the

account

metaphysicsthe

of substance, which

of

of the many
for establishing
man's

on
especially

the Scholastics used

cosmos.

of individualism

declarations

so

an

individualism

monopsychism

lines of argument
in the
sovereignty

Scholastics

is very

far

the doctrine
professed
from
removed
exaggerated

distinct from every

relativism,since each being is itself,
and

it is accidental

to

of

its nature

it be

that

other,

known

by us.
regardscontingentbeing is

metaphysicalstandpointas
and form,
and potency, matter
a moderate
dynamism (actuality
and
essence
existence),and this dynamism regulatesthe
From
and
disappearanceof natural substances.
appearance
another
point of view they give the world of matter an evolu
their evolutionism
: but
interpretation
tionaryand ideological
form and does not extend to the formation
is onlyof a mitigated
reconciles
of specific
essences
; the doctrine of innate purpose
the immanent
tendency of beingstowards their ends with the
Theodicy is creationist and
providentialgovernment of God.
the first beginning
to be infinite,
personalist;God is shown
and last end, the controller and judge of each, the principal
efficient cause
of all things,and notablythe co-operator with
in his acts of thought. In psychology this telic con
man
optimism of the Scholas
ceptionexplainsthe epistemological
Their

tics : man's

intellect,since it

was

for the truth, attains

made

knowledge of things such as they are in themselves,

; in fact it could not be other
though in an imperfectmanner
wise when they regardhis mind as a spark,as it were, from the
less
not
Sensations, too, are
unfailinglight which is God.
when
infallible,
they present before us their proper object.
and if we turn
The whole Scholastic theory of ideas is objectivist,
from the critical pointof view to the geneticpointof view we
innatist nor
not
that it is experimental
or
see
empiricist,
since the supersensible
idealist. It is,above
all,spiritualist,
to

the

character of

abstraction
of moderate
nature

is based
intellectual representations

our

; and

again we

realism

inasmuch

as

beingswith
correspondto them.

of extra-mental

conceptswhich

observe

their

on

standpointto

it reconciles the

be that

individual

the universal nature

The

mental

of

our

spiritualism
ideological

OF

OUTLINES

400

of the

OF

PHILOSOPHY

Scholastics is reflected in their theories of the nature

of the soul and

these

as

HISTORY

THE

and
its origin

and
immortality,

in such

matters

opposed to materialistic philosophy.

they are absolutely

Their

based as it is on
their psychological
and meta
logic,
value
the
physicalteachings,placesgreat
analyticoupon
ethical
Their
method.
and
synthetic
philosophyis libertarian,
in their eudaemonistic
its optimismis expressed
tenet that the
is attained through the highestactivities of his
end of man
higherfaculties.
All these characteristics are
mutuallycomplementary and
bound
are
another, for the doctrinal
inseparably
up with one
departments which they severally
portray form one whole like
the members
of an organism. Few are the historical systems
of philosophy
which can
claim to be such a studied endeavour
such a bid for unity,
to obtain harmony or make
which indeed
of quietudeto the human
mind.
is the source
To attain this,
Scholasticism looked for the goldenmean
between extremes
in
all the problemsit strove to solve ; and this moderation found
in their realism,their dynamism, their evolu
its expression
their theoryof the union of body and
tionism,their ideology,
between
and
soul, of the compatibility
duty and happiness,
their conception,
at once
objectiveand subjective,of the

beautiful.
If

we

can

the
appreciate

fact that the Scholasticism

of the

thirteenth century took the central placein the evolution of

ideas in the Middle Ages, that it unified,completedand con

teachingshanded down from previouscenturies,

of the philosophy
the inspiration
that it was
of succeeding
even
centuries,and representsthe zenith of the gloryof mediaeval
shall easilyunderstand
that this system
Scholasticism,we
solidated the

deserves par excellence to bear the

II.

THE

72. Its Precursors.

"

OLDER

name

of

'

Scholasticism '.

SCHOLASTICISM

DOMINICUS

GUNDISSALINUS, whom

we

67

alreadymentioned, was an eclectic compiler whose

in metaphysics
and psychology,
Aristotelianism,especially
was
have

tainted with neo-Platonism.

the

was

"

De

mundi, De

His classificationof the sciences

of a genuine onward
starting-point
division

philosophiae,De

unitate,De

amma.

immortalitate

movement

anitnae, De

alike
procession*

MEDIAEVAL

PHILOSOPHY

and
didactic and scientific,

led to the

philosophical
study such as we
Great and Thomas
Aquinas.
M
WILLIAM
OF AUVERGNE
(t1249)should
the elaboration of the new
as
representing
of

but

lacks cohesion.

his work

and
actuality

but
potentiality

theory. He

the emanation

of psychology; he gave
useless and had recourse

73. Alexander

of

made

find it in Albert the

be

coupledwith him
teach
Peripatetic
acceptedthe theory

certain concessions

to the

to

Hales,

to

Augustinianschool

up the active intellectwhich

specialillumination

of
principles

of the

knowledge

our

He

adhered

division of the

exact

more

of

branches

ings ;

401

he

thought

of God

for

demonstration.

(f 1245), may

Franciscan

be

Theologica
regardedas the first great Scholastic. His Summa
and philosophical,
which
was
a
synthesisat once theological
of nearlyall the philosophical
made
use
thought of Aristotle
and the Arabians, yet was
wanting in that unityand harmony
of teachingwhich
characterizes every reallygreat work.
In
his metaphysicswe find the two importanttheories known
later
the Franciscan
theories,namely the compositionof matter
as
and form of all contingent
substances
beings,even of spiritual
(Avicebron),and the pluralityof substantial forms. His
to
psychologyrepresents a vigorous but fruitless endeavour
the traditional doctrine of St. Augustineconcerning
harmonize
human

and

nature

Aristotle and

JOHN

DE

theory of ideas which sprang

RocHELLE69
(born about 1200) was

the
LA

of the

renowned

new

of the

of
disciples

numerous

also in touch

was

its faculties with the definition of

with

Franciscan

ROBERT

school

important place in

the

at

and

The

Oxford.
of

numerous

as

from

it.

the

most

of Hales, and

70,the organizer

GROSSETESTE

progress

commentaries
translations,

Alexander

in

man

latter held

an

thought owing to his

opusculaon physics,

metaphysicsand psychology.
74.

St.

Bonaventure

representativeof

the

(1221-1274) was
older

Franciscan

the

brilliant

most

school,

taking

his

in theology
time as his friend St. Thomas
at the same
mastership
(1257),and afterwards becoming General of his Order and
Cardinal.
Whilst upholding the old traditional teachingsof

""

De

""

De

70

De
trinitate,

universo, De

anima.
See DE
MARTIGNE,

1888) ; STEVENSON,

La

Robert

immortalitate

animae, De

anima.

Scholastiqueet les traditions Franciscaines (Paris,

Grosseteste, Bp, of Lincoln (London, 1899).

OUTLINES

402

OF

THE

HISTORY

OF

PHILOSOPHY

Augustineand beingin agreement with the leadingthinkers

of his time concerning many
theories,
important Peripatetic
of his own
he gave them an interpretation
71. He held the two
of Alexander
of Hales
and
great metaphysical doctrines
harmonized
them
more
closelywith the distinction between
His proofsof the existence of God
and potentiality.
actuality
have an Augustiniantouch, but on some
other pointshe was
of St. Thomas
to the mind
nearer
; he upheld the theory of
exemplarism without sharingthe strange views of those who
for our
account
to a
syntheticknowledge of God by recourse
He held to the creation of
specialillumination of the mind.
the world in tempore,and explainedits evolution by the theory
of rationes seminales.
His psychology is Aristotelian except
of man
that his views on the nature
coloured by the Fran
are
ciscan tendencies of his metaphysics. St. Bonaventure
in
was,
of the school of contemplative
addition, one of the great lights
and it is as such that he has been held in great venera
mystics,
tion by posterity.
St,

influence of St. Bonaventure

The

immediate

MATTHEW

successors

1240-1301),JOHN PECCHAM73
74

TOWN

the

are

lastic

of
75

WARDBY

TAISE76.

the

Franciscan

were

condemned

drew

up

body

'

humani

73
74
75
'"

anima
per

at

the

rationalis
se

and, later,RICHARD
As

add

the

old

the

names

or

MIDDLE-

OF

belongingto

may

(1235

Scho

of the first
KIL-

JOHN OLIVI 77,whose

Council

of Vienne

definition of the
seu

doctrines

it
1311, when
union of soul and
in

intellectiva est

forma

corporis

et essentialiter '.

in

IV

lib. sententiarum
P.
Lombardi
;
Quaestiones dis
mentis a c
paupertate); Breviloquium ; Itinerarium
artium
De reductione
ad theologiam.
;
Commentaries
the Sentences
on
; Quodlibet,Quaestionesdisputatae.
Quodlibet,Quaestionesdisputatae.
Quodlibet,Quaestionesdisputatae.
De ortu et divisions philosophiae.
De

(especiallyDe

unitate formae, De

voluntate.
77

AguASPARTA72

school, notably ROBERT

PETER

well-known

the

Commentavii

putatae
72

Dominican

OF

TARANOF
Archbishop of Canterbury,and PETER
And
intellectual tendency
finallyto this same

belongsthe

Deum

known.

tendency of thought we

Masters

71

best

of his

outlived him, and

Quodlibet.

materia

caeli,De

aetevnitate mundi,

De

intellects et

OUTLINES

404

OF

THE

HISTORY

PHILOSOPHY

OF

neo-Platonic

(Arabian)and Aristotelian doctrines,yet without

creating a complete fusion of these disparate
successfully
If

elements.
of his

ULRIC

was
disciples

76.

Thomas

St.

of Scholastic

Order

can

except St. Thomas

we

OF

Aquinas,the

notable

most

80.

STRASSBURG

(1225/27-1274),the prince alike

theology81,entered the Domini
1258 began his publicteaching

Aquinas

philosophyand
in

and
in
1243
having taken his

mastershipin theology in 1257.

He went
to Italyin 1260, and then returned in 1268 or 1269 to
He
died at the age of
in 1272.
Paris, which he left finally
his way
to Lyons, whither
on
forty-eight,
Gregory X had
Paris,

at

summoned

him

General

by his great talents

to assist

at the work

of the

Council.

his chair
that drew round
exposition
crowds
of seculars and regulars
alike is particularly
apparent in
his largerworks.
His language is always clear and simple,
and
rigidlyprecise; his method systematicand free from glosses
and
the
short
and
to
digressions; his explanationsare
receive only the attention they
point; minor considerations
and steadfastly
deserve, so that his thought can travel straight
towards
its end, and to this end
he makes
everythingelse

His brilliant talent for

converge.
The
essential tenets

of St.

treated

place in

in their proper

Philosophy,and
them

it would

synthesishave

Thomas's
the

therefore

course

be

been

of

Manual

of the

to repeat
superfluous

here.

The

most

consists in

synthesis
noteworthy feature of the Thomistic
of
the several doctrines,
the harmony and unification

Summo

80

De

$1

Summa

bono

Summa

theologica
;

Summa

theologica.
philosophica contra

on
disputatae,Quodlibeta; Commentaries
interpretation,Analyt. poster.,Physic., De

rupt., Meteorum,
Commentaries
Boethius

De

on

De
the

anima,
Book

hebdomadibus

Parva

several

caelo et mitndo,

Quaestiones

treatises
Generat.

De

et

De
cor

naturalia, Metaphysic., Ethic., Politic. ;

of Causes, on
the
and
De
Trinitate ;

Four

Books

of Sentences,

on

Opuscula : De ente et essentia,

De
spiritual,creaturis, Df
separates,
principio naturae, De motu cordis,De

substantiis
aeternitate mundi, De
unitate intellectus contra Averrotstas, De
De
mixtione
natura
elementorum,
materiae, De
De

regimine principum.
See VAUGHAN,
Life and
in 2 vols., Longmans,
work

Gentiles

Aristotelian

principio individuationis;

De

Gates, London,
Life

of S.

also La

1890, and

Thomas, by Pere
philosophic morale

(The original
abridged form, Burns "
Publication
Catholic
Society, New
York.) Also
Philosophes;
Sertillangesin the series Les Grands
de Saint Thomas
d'Aquin (Paris,1916).
Labours

London,

of S. Thomas
1871 ; or

of Aquin.

in

MEDIAEVAL

PHILOSOPHY

405

masterlyco-ordination of the dominant ideas, in the

call
we
complete correlation of all the parts. What
may
is here more
fullyrealized than in any other
scholasticity
the reason
system ; and this is precisely
philosophical
why
of
the
is
most
of
Thomism
one
mediaeval
signalproducts
o
f
is
secured
thought. This solidarity doctrine
by a deep
fundamental
theories
of
understanding of the common

in the

their fusion with

Scholasticism and
to

elements

new

strengthenthe cohesion of the system.

theories St. Thomas

new

breaks

with

calculated

these
By introducing

the

tradition of the old

emphasizesthe close relations of philosophy

of forms by unity of the
and theology; he combats
plurality
substantial principle
; to the
hylomorphic composition of
substances he opposes the doctrine of subsisting
forms
spiritual
and the Peripatetic
conceptionof matter ; for the theory of
rationes seminales he substitutes the passive evolution
of
matter
of the
theory of the identity
; againstSt. Augustine's
Scholasticism

he

of the

substance

soul with

its faculties he

advocates

that

of

their real distinction,and

inan
against his voluntarism
tellectualist conceptionof the psychic life. And
we
might
other
is
well.
mention
He
bold
and
as
questions
many

thorough in his innovations,

follow to

logical
consequences

In this he rises above

his friend.

At the

of his

sure

no

matter

ground, fearless

whither

both Albert his master

same

and

time he is moderate

in his scientificrelations with others he

never

they may

to

lead.

Bonaventure

and tolerant,and
tries to propagate

his views

by sharp and imperiouscontroversy but always by

calm persuasion
bear testimony
; such adversaries as Peccham
to his pacific
and dignified
bearingin the midst of the most
ardent controversies.
Although personalin his choice of new
the genius
doctrines and eclectic in his details and illustrations,
of the AngelicDoctor is most
akin to that of Aristotle. But
far is he from
so
followingthe Averroi'sts in their servile
abdication of personalthought that he proclaimsthe argument
from human
authorityto be the last and weakest of all argu
(locus ab
enlargedthe scope
ments

auctoritate
.

est

infirmissimus).He

tradition and developedits

Peripatetic
in the direction of a very pronounced individualism.
teachings
In fine,he succeeded in welding the main
of Aristotetenets
lianism and the most
important doctrines given to us by
St.

Augustine.

of the

406

OUTLINES

IV.

THE

THE

OF

CONFLICT

HISTORY

OF

PHILOSOPHY

THOMISM

BETWEEN

AND

OLDER

THE

SCHOLASTICISM
and

Adversaries

77.

introduced

novations

in

Scholasticism, and

of WILLIAM

Thomae

of individuation

along with

in the
the

unity of
The
is

opposition cul

of the

year
his

condemned

the

older

MARE

LA

This

TEMPLIER

(March 7)STEPHEN

For at Paris

DE

in

strong op

of tracts.

notably those

in officialcensures,

minated

violent storm

The

"

brought up
teachingon

masters

againstThomism.

manifesto

veritable

aroused

his
particular

CorreptoriumFratris

Thomism.

of

St. Thomas

occasioned

form

substantial

by

part of the

the

positionon

Supporters

1277.

theory

of the

Averprincipal
the name
thus associating
of
ro'ists,
by an unworthy manoeuvre
in a common
with his adversarySigerof Brabant
St. Thomas
And at Oxford (March 18) Robert Kilwardby
condemnation.
and then John Peccham
(in1284),both Archbishopsof Canter

bury, used their influence

the masters

urge

teachings.
called
uncompromising opposition

This

of St. Thomas's

resolute advocates
Dominican

the whole
In the

same

year
unitate Formae

wardby

and

the

thirteenth

LESSINES

OF

defend

to

Oxford

him

masters.

forth

numerous

and

notablyfrom 1278
Thomistic
philosophy.

wrote

treatise entitled

againstthe attacks of Kil

The
prohibitionsof his
or

withdrawn, and

were

Thomism

Communis.

78. Eclectics

death

steadily
grew, until by the close of the
honoured
with the title of
century Aquinas was

of
prestige

Doctor

censure

espousedthe

Order

GILES

cause

teachingsgraduallyfailed in their force

the

to

of his

number

De

to

errors

University. During the years from the

of Paris

"

to the

of St. Thomas

commencement

of the

teachingof

of the masters
of the Universityof Paris,
many
M
(died1293),Godfrey of Fontaines B
notablyHenry of Ghent
Duns

Scotus

(died after 1303) and Giles of Rome84

eclectic philosophers.Of these, the one
with

Thomism

was

GODFREY

intellectualism,even

more

Summa

in

most

FONTAINES, who
than
St. Thomas,
OF

theologica
; Quodlibet. See
(Louvain, 1894).
"2

(died 1316), were

DE

WULF,

Etudes

sur

sympathy

emphasized
but
parted
Henri

de Gand

83

Quodhbeta.
Quodlibeta,De ente
philosophiaeessentialibus.
s*

et

essentia, De

regimine principum,

De

pariibus

MEDIAEVAL

with him

PHILOSOPHY

407

questionof the distinction between

and existence,althoughhe did not subscribe to any of
essence
The
most
the Augustiniantheories.
HENRY
OF
originalwas
the body itselfhas a form
GHENT, who maintained that in man
besides the spiritual
soul, though in all other substances he
held to the unityof form as did St. Thomas
; that certain truths
known
and existence
are
by divine illumination ; that essence
not
are
reallydistinct ; and that the will is the sovereign
facultyin the life of the soul. GILES OF ROME professesan
eclectic Thomism
to certain Augustinian
; his attachment
his teachingwith doubts and inconsistencies.
theses disfigures
company

on

V.
79. John

Duns

British Isles and

and

at

DUNS

JOHN

whole

line of

new

Franciscan

into fashion

Scoxus

Scotus85 (1266 or

at
professor
became
Cologne (1308),

and traced out

the

the

1274-1308),a native of the

Oxford
(1294),at Paris (1304)

the leader of

thought in

Order

which

his power

powerfulschool

for

some

centuries

entangled. He brought
sui generis; his personal

became

that was
Peripateticism
to the
geniusgave an originalstamp even
theories which survived in his philosophy.

Endowed

earlier Scholastic

Scotus employed
great criticalacumen,
in demolishingother systems. The
positive,con
with

very

developed than the

emphasis on the
negative,critical side. He laid extreme
distinction between
theology and philosophy. Taking from
his
he openly appealed,a theory which
Avicebron, to whom
predecessorsattributed to St. Augustine,he considered every
and form ; and matter,
created beingto be composed of matter
structive side of his

the

as

philosophyis

indeterminate

common

(materiaprimo prima),to

less

element

be endowed

of

with

contingent beings
real unity though

matter
numericallyone, since every being has its own
of forms in
(against
Avicebron). He also admitted a plurality
the same
being : of forms, that is to say, subordinated to one
and the same
another, constituting
thing,but according to
one
a
irreducible 'formalities',
which differ by a distinctioformalis
not

parte rci
"

but
88

distinction that

partlyboth.

This

is neither

celebrated

simply logicalnor

distinction of Scotus

Commentaries
Oxoniense,
on
Aristotle, Opus
Theoremata, Reportata Parisiensia, Quodlibet.

De

rerun

real

points,
principio,

OUTLINES

408
in
or

and

one

the

any

alone appears
in such

way
with
together
a

of white

form
'

formal

HISTORY

OF

PHILOSOPHY

individual substance, to the

same

forms
objective
reallyin it,indepen

realized in it,and
86. In real nature
act of the mind

formalities that

dentlyof

THE

OF

or

are

and
disappears,

that

the

in it the formalities

constitutes

one

'

all the others, in the

thing is

only

the individual

same

with

one

are

united

unityof individuation
way that the specific
the

nature

of colour '.

'

distinction in the

objectitself he introduces also

into his natural theology. In psychologyhe admits in addition
to our abstract and universal knowledge of thingsan antecedent,
reveals to us in a confused manner
intuitive knowledge which
of the
the concrete, singular
being ; he asserts the superiority
This

will

over

the

intellect.

He

besides his intellective soul,

considers

that

there

is in

man,

which
corporeitatis

forma
gives
the body
organicperfection
; and regardsit as impossible
the immortalityof the soul by the Peripatetic
to demonstrate
a

its

arguments.
characteristic and

element
in the philosophyof
original
Duns
Scotus, and the key for the understandingof his system,
is its formalism ',which colours his Peripatetic
teachingsand
not
impregnateshis whole system. By it he took up a position
of
but also againstthe representatives
onlyagainstSt. Thomas
school.
The
the older Franciscan
metaphysic of Scotus is
mainly a subtle analysisof the individual being, and the
positionhe takes with regard to the pluralityof objective
what
realities is an endeavour
is real
to interpret
or
principles
Scotus and
in the singularbeing. Despitecertain differences,
Aquinas are much allied in thought in this and also in many
other questionsconcerningwhich the divergencyof teachings
in these two
princesof mediaeval Scholasticism has hitherto
been much
exaggerated.
The

'

VI.

80.

Petrus

A number

of

attention

to

the

Hispanus

GRAMMARIANS

AND

and

Speculative Grammarians.

the

"

philosophersof the thirteenth century devoted their

of
which occupied a placeoutside the arena
logic,

great controversies.

PETRUS

""

LOGICIANS

HISPANUS.

Cp. Opus Oxon.t I,

This

81 ;

The

most

curious

I, 170.

celebrated

invasion

of these

of grammar

was

by logic

MEDIAEVAL
is

of notice.

worthy

duced

PHILOSOPHY

Towards

the

end

409

of the

century it pro

real

Paris

of language. Some
of the
philosophies
speculative
grammarians like Sigerof Courtrai and Michael of
Morbaix
went
beyond reason, but the treatise entitled Grammatica Speculative*
of Duns
Scotus and others of the kind are
achievements
not to be passedwithout
notice.
certainly
at

81.

NON-SCHOLASTIC

III.

ART.

Averroism.

Latin

The

"

PHILOSOPHERS

most

complete and

important

system in the thirteenth century opposed to Scholastic philo

Averroism.
Those who
sophy was
thought that they could
find the

mind

true

of Aristotle in the

of the

commentaries

Arabian

philosopherdefended a group of doctrines that were

anti-Scholastic.
The chief of these were
follows :
distinctly
as
intellect and monopsychism : a
(i)The unity of the human
doctrine incompatible
with the Scholastic theoryof ideas,of the
intrinsic union of body and soul, and of personality.(2)The
denial of personalimmortality. (3) The
production of the
world by a series of intermediary
the
beings and, consequently,
denial of divine

things;

Providence

in the

of

government

and

men

for the first cause,

and simple,can
being immaterial
and
produce immediately only a singlebeing,an intelligence,
this producesanother, and so on.
is the
The world of sense
productof the last celestial intelligence
; wherefore God has no
for a world that is not immediatelydependenton Him.
concern
These

theories

destructive

are

creation,providence,the
of the

concurrence

(4)All

causes.

with

God.

This

world

and

(5)A

cosmic

is

also of

of things in being, the

preservation

first cause

these

with

productionsare
denial

the

of

doctrine

of the Scholastic

of the

freedom

the

of

action

necessary

and

secondary
co-eternal
of the

contingent nature

of the

of God.

creative act

determinism, and denial of

psychological
moral responsibility.
and
For the phenomena of the heavens
the conjunctionsof the planets
that succeed
the events
govern
one

another

there

is

an

and

on

the earth

endless

and

the destinies of the human

of civilizations and
repetition

the Christian religion,

including
governed by the
the stellar cycles. This psychological
determinism
the ethical

system of Scholasticism.

(6)The

race

religions,
of

recurrence

overthrows

theory

of

'

the

',by which

truths

two

ing that
vice

THE

OF

OUTLINES

410

they

is true in

what

This

versa.

HISTORY

OF

divorced

it in order

(f before

Siger of Brabant

Latin

schools

theology; the Averroists

philosophyaccord with the
the

1300) was

leader

of the

followed by Boethius
1270, and was
Bernier of Nivelles and several masters
of the

and

facultyof

of the

about

Averroism

the Dacian

of the

denial

they held.

Catholic faith which

82.

to

and
theology,

of the Scholastic view

their

to make

faith,assert

be false in

is tantamount

of contradiction,as well as
principle
mutual
relations of philosophyand

introduced

from

reason

philosophymay

theory

PHILOSOPHY

arts

Paris.

at

of the

soul

The

agitationsin the
of Averroism87,

pleaderof the cause

he directed his attacks
contra
praecipuosviros in philosophia
'. The
Albertum
the two
et Thomam
rivalrybetween
pro
is
in
De
Unitate
's
Intellectusand
tagonists conspicuous Aquinas
De Anima
Intellectiva. The latter's philosophywas
not
Siger's
but
anti-Scholastic ; and both aca
merely anti-Thomistic
moved
demic and ecclesiasticalauthority
was
by the progress of
and

brilliant

'

Averroism

that it

so

condemned

was

in 1270 and
to refute it.

the Scholastics bestirred themselves

it survived

the

appearance

later.

ART.

MINOR

IV.

83. Neo-Platonic
this current

Aristotelian
Platonic

Direction.

as

have

we

and

that

of

essence

all alike

Yet

times

writings,is

in,the works

Platonists ;

we

opposed
positively
OF

FREIBURG,

series

of

works88

*T

De

anima

De

luce et

gntium

not

which

master

at

reveal

Thomistic

more

is

only

him

The

and
neo-

less with

great difference,
neo-Platonism

theory, which

regard
Paris

in
or

absent

of the thirteenth

individualism.

to

DERIC

88

may

not

as

ancient

the

the monist

combated
expressly
hence

represent

moulded

were

there

between

already said,

well

as

harmonize

to

theories.

Proclus's

CURRENTS

who
philosophers

the world

made

of mediaeval

re

the doctrines of the earlier Scholastic

elements, but

settingand

The

"

conceptionof

certain Alexandrian

shall find its

we

PHILOSOPHICAL

of ideas admit

ism into their

century, and

thirteenth

1277, ano^ a^
Nevertheless

their

is the

from, but
century

neo-

philosophyas

Dominican

THEO-

1297, has left a

scientist and
both

about
as

De aeternitate mundi, Quaestiones naturales.

intellectiva,
et motoribis caelorutn, De cognitiont
ejusorigine,De intelligentiis

separatorum.

OUTLINES

412

OF

THE

HISTORY

OF

PHILOSOPHY

charge

of Averroism

well

is intuitive,
for the universal elements
sensible,cognition

as

yet

existingin individual
in

philosopherof

other

hand

intellectual,
as

extra-mental

universal

minds

our

the

on

objectsproduce directly
determinations
No other
(species).

the thirteenth

century dared

to approve

of this

to the old realism.

return

aimed

Bacon

and
originality,

at

his

mentalityis profoundly

different from that of the other Schoolmen, for his intuitionism,

questionof universals,his theory

of the

his solution

and his traditionalism,

colouredhis
active intellect,

of the

Scholasticism

entirely
personal. He reduced philosophyto
and in spiteof his professed
an
apologetic,
respect for Aristotle,
of his philosophyor assimilated
imbibed the true spirit
he never
In spiteof all that has been
tenets.
any of its fundamental
written in his favour, we must
recognize that both the philo
sophy and the theologyof Bacon laggedbehind the intellectual
with

character

of his time.

movement

With

scientific works

the

of Peter

those

of

of

Roger

Maricourt, of Henry Bate,

EnglishFranciscan

whose

Roger Marston,

be grouped
may
and of the aforesaid

Bacon

work

presents many

similarities.
85.

Lully91 (1235-1315), another

Raymond

Franciscan,

system of theosophyin which, the better to refute

the Averroist
theory of the two truths ',he maintained that
of faith beingrational,reason
and should
the whole content
can
elaborated

'

the mysteriesof religion.The

everything,even
element
work is the planning
in his philosophical
other original
which sets out from
method
of the Ars Magna : to the analytic
and rises to a knowledge of the super
sensible observation
he wished
to add as the complement
sensible world (ascensus),
method
to knowledge a synthetic
(descensus)
; by combining

demonstrate

all these deductions

one

would

then

have

foundation

for the

Ars Magna
The
was
questionwhatsoever.
but also to yieldnew
intended not only to aid the memory
from
the
positiveknowledge ; in this it differs essentially
method
of Scholasticism,which guidesus
analytico-synthetic
to create
in the pursuitof knowledge but makes
no
pretensions

solution

of any

knowledge.

91

Declaratio

per

modum

sequaciumopiniones;

Ars

dialogicontra
magna.

aliquorum philosaphorumet

eorutn

CHAPTER

III

PHILOSOPHY

MEDIAEVAL

AND

FOURTEENTH

DURING

FIRST

FIFTEENTH
Outline.

General

86.

century and

fourteenth

settled down

1453

the

GORAS,

lethargiccondition.

VI

of

Latin, notablyLEVI

the

south

translatingAverroes

BEN

and

CANTACUZENUS

Jews livingin

The

their work

Devoid

of all

(about 1347), NICEPHORUS

Emperor JOHN

CABASiLAS93.
tinued

CENTURY

PALAMAS92

GREGORY

THE

OF

commentating the two great philosophers

The principal
writers
all its inspirations.

on

furnished it with

were

HALF

Byzantinephilosophythroughout the
until in the fall of the Greek Empire in

into

it went
originality,
who

"

THE

(born about

GERSON

NICHOLAS

of France

from

GRE-

con

Hebrew

to

1288).

philosophy that progress of thought

continued to be conspicuous. As in the former periodwe may
in turn : Scholasticism
examine
(I); Non- Scholastic sys
tems
thought (III).
(II); some
secondarylines of philosophical
It is in the

Western

I. THE
87. Decline

followed

of Scholastic

combined

to undermine

the Schoolmen

from

or

abused

that

closelyon

did

of these
not

methods

nothing to

check

Philosophy." The periodof decline

its influence

times, who
the

growth

departed
originality,
synthesisthey had inherited,

teaching and
the

glory. Several causes

(i) The incompetence of

of its greatest

understand
of

PHILOSOPHY

SCHOLASTIC

lacked

technical
of

an

language, and

excessive

attention

did
to

compendiums ; schools multiplied

in number, but they were
thinkers.
deficient in original
(2)The
decay of the spiritof study both in the universities and in the
shortened and every
At Paris the course
orders.
was
religious
dialectic.

"3

It

was

the age of

Wpo"r"j)-rroiroLta.
refutation oi the Hypotyposes Pyrrhonienses.

413

OUTLINES

414

OF

THE

OF

HISTORY

PHILOSOPHY

rise of other
facilitygranted for taking degrees. The
of philosophic
the current
universities dissipated
thought so
that Scholasticism,whose
development was intimatelybound
of Paris,was
involved in its fall.
up with that of the university
of new
(3)The gradual encroachment
systems which assumed
attitude towards the philosophyof the Schoolmen.
an
aggressive
and
At the beginningof the fourteenth century the Thomist
Scotist schools monopolized attention,but a third school was
to rival both

soon

88. The

the Terminist

"

Terminist

School

School.
As

of Ockham."

; William

reac

againstthe excessive formalism of the Scotists,this new

and treatingall
philosophyaimed at completesimplification,
as
useless,it devoted its particular
metaphysicalspeculations
attention to logical
problems and exaggeratedthe importance
of
of dialectic ; and by considerablylimiting the number
truths considered
as
capable of demonstration
by reason, it
came
dangerouslynear to scepticism.
WILLIAM
OF OCKHAM,
a conspicuous
figureat Paris about 1320,
the real founder 94 of the terminist school, although the
was
of St.
for this new
prepared by Durandus
theory was
way
of Duns
Pourcain and Petrus Aureolus.
Faithful to the spirit
made philosophyand theology departmentsof
Scotus, Ockham
study quiteseparate from one another, regardinga number of,
as
questionshitherto considered
belongingto both (e.g.the
existence of God) as the exclusive provinceof the latter. He
tion

denied

distinction

the

the

between

universal

and

the

in

dividual ; the latter alone, he said,exists,and the universal is

form to which no realitywhatever
a purelymental
corresponds
in nature.
have

The

mind

real value

no

elaborates

outside

in
place(supponere),
we

has

intuitive

knowledge

this direct concept,

touch

with
a

of

the

things to

conceptualism. Yet the mind

thingsexistingapart from us, and

as

of

in the

case

of the

world.

sensation,puts

us

in

Every cognitiverepre

(terminism)which, as such, takes the

object signified.All willing,even
spontaneous

signor

place of the
is free,and
activity,
"*

merely holds

mind, of the multitude

the extra-mental

sentation is

soul which

universal

; the

these

attribute it ; this is

which
an

the

us

concepts but

abstract

is not

term

the will is identical with

distinct from

its faculties.

the
The

essence

of the

immateriality

Commentaries
Super guatuor libros sententiarum, Quodlibeta,
(Expositioaurea
super totam avtem vetevem), Tractatus logices.

on

Aristotle

MEDIAEVAL

PHILOSOPHY

415

of the soul cannot

be demonstrated by reason
spirituality
He gave logica renewal of popularity,
alone.
adoptingall the
of Petrus Hispanus,and thus
prolixdivisions of the Summulae

and

for the extravagant dialectic of his successors.

In brief,the characteristic features of Ockham's
philosophy

the
prepared

way

his

terminism,
conceptualist
excessive emphasis he laid

consist in his
the

and

on

theory of
logic,the

the

sign

scientia

rationalis.
89. The

Ockhamists.

teachingsobtained

noveltyand

reaction Ockham's

in the Paris schools of the four

success

which

fifteenth centuries

and

teenth

As

"

all official prohibitions

The tenor of these prohibitions

powerlessto withstand.
make
it clear to what an extent the disciples
had
(1339-1346)
what extravagancies
gone beyond their master, and especially
he would not
they had introduced into dialectic which even
The
have
countenanced.
dangerousand anti-Scholastic ten
this philosophygave birth (95)gives the
dencies to which
of these censures.
explanation
were

chief Ockhamists

The

after

Paris

at

advocated

1359),who

deter minist

suggeststhe later teachingof Leibniz

OF

wrote

commentary

noteworthy chieflyas
physicsand mechanics.
90. The

Scotist

the

School."

on

of
university
With
(1350-1425).
ALBERT

OF

Ockham's

logicbut

numerous

works

author^of
Scotus

Duns

INGHEN

of the

Heidelberg;the mystic PETER D'AiLLY97

also associate
this school of thought we
must
SAXONY, who

(died

psychology which

; MARSILIUS

first rector

the

became

(died1396),who

JOHN BURIDAN

were

the

became

is
on

official

of the four
Order, but his disciples
Francis of Mayron,
teenth and fifteenth centuries,particularly
teacher in the Franciscan

his formalism

accentuated
At

the

time

same

like
confusing,

their

multipliedhis abstractions.
and
cumbersome
language became
and

their method,

they contributed,

and

than the terminists,to the decadence

91. Thomism.

"

fifteenth centuries

the

best

The

Cistercians,Carmelites

and

"6
"
17
""

Summa

many

followers.

traditions

OF

Commentaries
logicac,
Quaestionessupra quatuor libros sententiarum.
on
on

the

Dominicans

NEDELLEC",

de dialectica,Compendium

Commentary
Commentary

Sentences, Tractatus

de anima.

the Sentences, Quodlibet.

teaching.

of Scholasticism.

the
especially

HERVE

less

during the fourteenth

This school continued

and

brought it

of Scholastic

no

on

JOHN

Aristotle.

OUTLINES

416

OF

CAPREOLUS"

HISTORY

THE

OF

CARTHUSIAN

Princeps ThomisDENIS
THE
(1389-1459),
l
GERSON
(1364-1429)were
10"

FLORENCE

OF

and

(1402-1471)

of
philosophers

real merit.

The

is

fifteenth
monumental

The

centuries.

took

placein

part in the

the fourteenth

Libri
of

reperto^

last also took

two

great revival of mysticismwhich

and

called

(about 1380-1444),

tarum, ST. ANTONINUS

PHILOSOPHY

Defensionum of Capreolus
all the teachings of Thomism

brought into comparison with Scotism and Ockhamism, but

unfortunatelyit is not free from certain defects of method
which

the Scholasticism

mar

of the decadence.

of Thomism
appliedthe principles
that had recentlyarisen, and his
for the history of the economic

fourteenth

and

92. The

fourteenth

the

various

social

questions

contains valuable

work

and

social theories

data
of the

fifteenth centuries.

Aegidian School.

in

to

St. Antoninus

"

As

offshoot of Thomism,

an

there

Aegidian school proper,

which faithfully
perpetuatedthe traditional teachingsof Giles
of Rome.
Gregory of Rimini (died 1358) caused a doctrinal
schism by striking
He had a
Ockhamism.
out a line towards
following,but about the middle of the fifteenth century unity
of the AugustinianOrder by
the members
restored among
was
to the teachingof Giles of Rome.
a return

arose

93.

This

an

Fourteenth

of the

Mysticism

Fifteenth

and

epoch of a vigorousawakening

the

was

century

the
teaching. The best known
among
Bl. John Ruysbroeck (1293-1381),
and

and

Denis

the

Carthusian, mentioned

II. NON-SCHOLASTIC
94. Latin

formidable

Averroism.

"

fifteenth centuries, and

"

of

mystic life and

orthodox
mysticsare
Gerson, Peter D'Ailly

above.

PHILOSOPHIES

Averroism

rival of Scholasticism

Centuries.

continued

to be

the

most

throughout the fourteenth and

despitethe

of

censures

authorityand

oppositionof each succeeding generation of doctors, it

gaineda growing number of supporters. At Paris the
steadily
the

99

100

Libri

dcfensionum.

Commentary

on

the

Sentences

fideicatholicae, Compendium
de fidecatholica.

Summa
1

Centilogium de conceptibus,De
logica.

physicaecum

and

on

the

De

philosophicum
modis

consolatione of Boethius,
and

theologicum,Dialogon

De
significandi,

concordantia

meta-

MEDIAEVAL
of Averroism

undisputedleader
JOHN

JANDUN

OF

in his

who

or

in the

John

fourteenth

century

was

(deGenundo,
Ganduno),
expounded its theories, especially

truths, with

two

417

of Ghent

works

numerous

the

of

that

PHILOSOPHY

de

undisturbed

frankness.

He

declares himself the ape of Aristotle and Averroes, the imperfect

work ; he professes
imitator of their perfect
a blind ipsedixitism
and

makes

pretence of being original.From

no

fourteenth

the

century

"

indeed

and

until the

the

end

of

seventeenth"

Italy,and

of

the universityof Padua,

especially
of Averroism.
It adopted the teachingof
remained
a hotbed
John of Jandun, and franklyacknowledged its indebtedness to
the founder
Pietro D'Abano
him.
was
(died1316),a physician,
north

the

of this school.

Development of Ockhamism.

95.

in germ

contained

by

by

him

but

philosophyof Ockham
and

seized upon

were

his terminist

Thus

others.

The

anti-Scholastic doctrines which

many

formulated

never

"

theory of the

were

developed

sign served

as

of

radical subjectivism,
most
a
development
which asserted that we know
only the mental sign or term and
Such
not the thing signified.
teachings as these show us the
from
was
reason
why Ockhamism
proscribed
by various censures
moreover,
1339 to 1346. Many heterogeneous elements were,

pretext for the

admitted
The

into this school of

who

important system

most

of THOMAS

BRADWARDINE

taught

man's

he

NICHOLAS
the

was

the

theistic determinism

at Oxford,
a professor
(1290-1349),
of
is the sovereignnorm
free-will of God
3

actions ;
of all our
cause
necessitating
destroyed human
libertyby reducing freedom to
and

the

volition.

spontaneous
and

the

that

nature

thus

thought.

OF

of

promoter

condemned

in

of arts at Paris in 1340

which was
anti-Scholastic movement

AUTRECOURT,
an

master

1346, openly professedthe

most

radical sub

jectivism.The Cistercian JOHN OF MIRECOURT, condemned

of Bradwardine, arrived
from the determinism
I347, starting
the conclusion

Guido

that God

is

even

the author

of sin.

in
at

certain

of Medonta) professed
an
pantheism.
explicit
(Aegidius

Commentaries

De

causa

Dei

(between 1338 and

Sentences, a Summa

on

divers

treatises of Aristotle

and

Averroes.
ad suos

Mertonenses
Pelagium
the
on
Commentaries
Treatises
mathematics,
on
1346),
scientiarum.
theologicaor Sutnma

contra

et de

virtute causarum,

OUTLINES

4i8

THE

OF

III.

HISTORY

OF

CURRENTS

MINOR

PHILOSOPHY

PHILOSOPHY

OF

Systems of secondaryimportance,which, whilst retaininga

of Scholastic
doctrines, assimilated various
large number
principles
foreignto it,may be classed in three groups : (i)the
German
mysticismof Master Eckhart and his school ; (2)the
theosophic mysticism of Nicholas of Cusa ; (3)the theosophy
of Raymond of Sabunde.
96.

Eckhart

Master

German

Mysticism.

MASTER

"

a Dominican
(about 1260-1327),

of Hocheim

HART

and

of

ECK

Cologne,

metaphysicand a mysticismwhich it is difficult

however
much
its author
to free from the reproach of pantheism,
4. He distinguishes
strove
to deny the allegation
and
essence
existence in contingent
beings,but in placeof sayingthat God
propounded

gives their existence

existential act.
of

he

maintains

Eckhart

Master

popular mysticism,known

with which

we

was,
as

associate such

may
Suso

God

that

moreover,

the
men

'

as

German

BL.

HENRY

theism.

The

consciousness

Docta

Infinite is inaccessible to human

of

our

Ignomntia.

contradictions

own

God

will be

Mysticism',
(1290-1361)

TAULER

(about 1300-1366).
97. Nicholas
of Cusa
(1401-1464),whose
the coming break-upof the world
foreshadowed
invented
a
farrago of mysticism,theosophy
and

is their very
the promoter

work

almost

of

speculation,

and

quasi-pan-

reason,

and

this

ignoranceconstitutes true wisdom,

is the source
of all reality,
and
all

found

to

(coincidentia
oppositorum).The

merge

and

universe

coincide
contains

in

Him

explicitly
'

theoall things being divine

implicitly,
phanies '. He strenuouslydefends himself againstthe charge
of pantheism,but certainly
his orthodoxy is only preservedat
of his logic.
the expense
RAYMOND
OF SABUNDE
(died1432),the author of a Theologia
Natumlis, takes up againthe theosophy of Lully,a rationalism
to the Middle
Ages, which is a product of an
belongingstrictly
exaggeratedview of the Christian faith ; an attempt to de
of Nature but also the book
not only the book
cipherby reason
of Scripture.
what

God

contains

in German,
and
of sermons
an
important Latin work
great number
Liber
the
propositionum)
tripartitum(comprising
Opus
*
docta ignorantia,Apologia doctae ignorantiae,De
De
conjecturis.
4

OF

OUTLINES

420

HISTORY

THE

century and the sixteenth

in

connexion

I. NEW
General

99.

PHILOSOPHIES
and

Features

dence

governed almost

sance

gave

Scholastic
of

which

the

to revive

the

their archaic

link

furious

for this

the

which

to

systems

Renais

against

war

purelynegativepoint
schools, which

these

between

varied directions.

the most
the

attempts

yearningfor indepen

"

all declared

no

under
first,

Antiquity

forms.

of

impetus

the

introduced, there

Renaissance
of
philosophies
besides

But

Nature

time

other

systems

set

and

Greece

close connexion

were

under

Rome

to the

this return

up

for

admiration

blind

past, there

immediatelydevelopednew lines of work which

and Social Right their chief objectof study.

almost

same

was

study in turn (I)

(II)the different

RENAISSANCE

THE

Division.

philosophy. Except

developedin
At

OF

all the

birth, and

contact, there

con

during this period.

of Scholasticism

forms

con

shall

Renaissance, and

systems of the

new

was

the

philosophy. We

tinuation of mediaeval
the

what

for modern
philosophy;
way
with
what
preceded,they are a

coming, they prepared

sidered

in relation with

viewed

PHILOSOPHY

OF

made
the

At

between

the sole
as
religionand philosophy with, however, reason
beliefs.
arbiter of religious
at length as a
Scepticismcame
of Renaissance
final phase in this long and painfulparturition

ideas.
100. Revival

of the

leadingforms

The

Systems of Antiquity.
"

attempt was made to bringout a direct restoration

follows :"
of the systems of Greece and Rome
were
as

in which

i.

an

Cult

of Classical Philology.The

Renaissance

"

who

called themselves

'

of
representatives

the

of

',enamoured

humanists

beauty of classical Latin, delivered the first and most

crushingattack on the Scholastics,who henceforth were dubbed
Peripatetics; confusingthe substance and form of Scholas
who
ticism in a common
they judged that men
reprobation,
the

'

'

unable

were

think.
'

The

to

humanists

dialectic ',which

constructive

write

aimed

at

replacing

'

unable

scholastic

'

at from

view

rhetoric ; looked
their work is valueless.

the

humanists

LORENZO

VALLA

for them

point of
philologists
amongst

also, in consequence,

were

Dialecticae disputationescontra

meant

Anstotelicos.

were

The

to

by
a

chief
7

MEDIAEVAL

PHILOSOPHY

421

AGRICOLA*
(1407-1459), RUDOLPH
(1442-1485)and
ViVES9 (1492-1540); and the most
PETER
influential,
RAMEE10
(PetrusRamus, 1515-1572).
Platonism.

2.

PLETHO

DE

LA

From

enthusiastic
1450 to 1550 Italybecame
for Plato.
GEORGIOS
GEMISTOS, later known

"

in its admiration
as

Louis

(1355-1450),
inspiredCosmo

Platonic

Academy
(1433-1499)became

Florence, where

at

brilliant

de' Medici to found

later MARSILIO

figure. But

FICINO

a
ia

this Platonism

of these two
so
disciples
pertinaciously
Aristotle
to
was
opposed
generallyonly a badly devised neoBessarion13 (1403-1472)looked for a
Platonism.
Cardinal
of reconciling
the differences between
Aristotelians and
means
Platonists by urging that the great Greek
differed
masters
rather than by the substance of
from each other by the method
their teaching: an idea which has often been defended
since
which

the

numerous

that time.

Aristotelianism.

3.

"

Against Plato

another

pitted

party

not indeed the Aristotle of the Scholastics which

Aristotle,

they
considered a mere
travesty,but the true Aristotle ; in reality,
of Aristotle's teaching. And
they gave only an interpretation
themselves
into two groups, one interpreting
further,they split
him accordingto Averroes, the other according to Alexander
of
Aphrodisias.The question of the immortality of the soul
provided the chief bone of contention, the former who were
upholders of monopsychism (81) advocating an impersonal
the
immortality,

perisheswith
of

latter the view

body, as a form disappearson

compound (34); they all denied Providence

freedom

the

of the

human

will.

The

soul

that the human

entirely

the dissolution
as

well

school at

Averroist

as

the

Padua

represented
beginning of the sixteenth century was
AcmLLiNi14
chieflyby ALEXANDER
(1463-1518),ZIMARA
(t 1532) and NiFO15 (Niphus,1473-1546).The last carried on
the

at

very ardent controversy with POMPONAZZI

leader of the Alexandrists whose centre was

8
8

10
11

inventione dialectica.
corruptarum artium.
Dialecticae institutianes.
De Platonicae
atgue Aristotelicae philos.differentia.
causis

Theologia Platonica

13

In

calumniator

14

De

De orbibus.
intelligentiis,

16

De

intellects

14

at

the
(1462-1524),
Bologna.

De

De

12

works

16

em

et

de animarum

immovtalitate.

Platonis.

demonibus, De

immprtalitateanimae.

of Averroes.
Tractatus

de immortalitate

animae, Defensorium.

He

also

edited

the

OF

THE

HISTORY

OF

This

in

its ancient

form

OUTLINES

422

fc$4.Stoicism.

"

17

LIPSIUS

JUSTUS

PHILOSOPHY

advocated

was

who
(JoestLips, 1547-1606),

by
followed by

was

of theism.
representatives

many

and
The theories of Democritus
5. Atomism.
of PETER
GASSENDI
resuscitated in the works

Epicuruswere
18
(1562-1655)

p|101.

of

"

was

chief characteristics
which

amounted

the Renaissance.

It

"

should

displayedthree

phenomena
high praisegiven to occult

cult ; the

naturalism

of natural

observation

the

to

which

sciences

form

Movement.

special
product of

Naturalistic

The

supply

wanting in the
simple observation of nature ; the tendency towards pan
theism which by excessively
to deifyit.
exaltingnature came
features

These

fested in
in three

the

In

though

movement,

we
varying degreesby its devotees, whom
may
classes accordingas they gave prominence to

mani
group
one

or

DA

VINCI

artist and

an

of

science

stands the

of
striking
personality
(1452-1519),who, besides being a genius

class apart, however,

LEONARDO

savant, led

mechanics

the

conceptionshe borrowed
ideas
(t 1390). His philosophical
in the form

of

elaborate

an

More

physics.

and

towards

way
from

scientific

than

was

of them.

other

as

to

common

were

what,

are

the

than

of

one

Albert

set down

modern

of

his

Saxony

casuallyrather

system.

character of the naturalistic movement

was
empirical
best representedby Telesio and
Campanella. TELESIOIS
who
an
was
originalthinker and may justlybe
(1508-1588),
i.

The

called

founder

the

maintained
cold and

that

of

two

heat, make

the

naturalism

of

the

mutually exclusive immaterial forces,

of passive matter, the
up the totality
of

cold, the heavens

that all particular
included, owe
beings,man
earth

being

the

of these

contact

Renaissance,

centre

two.

And

further, each

that

of heat, and

their

originto

the

element, having in

is endowed
with
a
tendency to self-preservation,
by which it wards off the destructive influence
facultyof feeling
sensation
of the element
a
opposed to it : thus he made

itself

cosmic
each

17

18

phenomenon.
individual thing

accordance

In
is

compound

with
of

this
heat

ad stoicam
Manuductio
philosophiam.
Aristotelicos
Exercitationes
paradoxicae adversus

anticartesianae.
Epicurii; Disquisitiones
l"
De natuva
rerum
juxta propria principia.

De

theory
and

vita

that

cold, he

et

moribus

MEDIAEVAL

PHILOSOPHY

423

of animal and human

life as a breath of
regardedthe principle
which
animal spirit)
circulates in the body.
air (spiritus,
warm
this vitalism
CAMPANELLA20
and
(1568-1639)took over
it into a metaphysic,by attributing
to being as such
amplified
of life,feeling
and
desire.
the triple
properties(primalitates)
of political
He also outlined an ideal scheme
government.
sciences
of
cabalistic
the
The
occult
2.
theosophy,
practice
of
medical
a
astrology,magic, alchemy enabled
group
"

"

such
scientists,

21

(1493-1541)and CARDANUS22
thought.
system of speculative

PARACELSUS

as

to develop a
(1501-1576),

in
pantheistic
tendency of naturalism is exemplified
made
who
the creature
PATRIZZI M (1529-1597),
a continuation
of the being of the Creator, a divine
becoming ad extra
is a
with
the Blessed Trinity which
becoming ad
parallel
Mr a '. At the same
time he developedthe thought of Telesio,
regarding all individual beings as owing their originto the
This became
action of lightand heat.
a complete pantheism
24
God
BRUNO
in GIORDANO
entirely
(1548-1600),who made
3. The

'

'

'

immanent

in the universe,and

fellback

on

theory of

world-

the
explanationof the diversityfound among
of this one
accidents
various beings,
which he regardedas
and only substance.
The awakening of the spirit
102. Natural
and
Social Law.
institutions of Rome
of nationality,
the study of the political
within the
of patriotism
and Greece, the kindlingof the sense
different states, gave a stimulus to the growth of the philosophy
soul

for

an

'

'

"

of national
person.
In II

social law, based

and

Principe of

State

was

not

an

end.in

the

itselfbut

the

study

of the

(1469-1527)and

MACHIAVELLI

noteworthy Discorsi,

more

on

mediaeval
an

human

his

theory that

institution

even

the

affordingmen

happinessin
criticism. In its place the
future life,encountered
a
severe
that the
from antiquity,
author
sketched
a
theory, borrowed
is
State is itself an
end ; that the prince,in consequence,
the conditions

not

bound

would

which

in his

enable them

ruling by

any

to

secure

considerations of honour,

partes quatuor,
philosophiaeinstaurandae, Realis philosophic
metapartes quinque, Universalis philosophic*seu
physicarum rerum
juxta propria principiapartes tres.
21
Opus paramirum, De natura rerum.
20

Prodromus

Philosophiaerationalis
12

De

18

Nova

varietate rerum,
de universis

24

De

monade,

numero,

De

subtilitate.

philosophia.
et

figura; Dell' infinito,universo

dei mondi.

424

OUTLINES

OF

HISTORY

THE

if the good of
crueltyor injustice,
should
that moralityand
religion

Machiavelli

had

in
especially

the state

raised

in

his

OF

PHILOSOPHY

the State
be

be furthered

can

subservient
vision

immediate

of Florence,

that

so

politics.

to

actual

events,

the issues which

he

generaland philosophical.
real initiator of the new
The
theory of social right was
BL. THOMAS
MORE
(1480-1535); his Utopia25,an imaginary
with the ideas of Italian
ideal republic,
whilst being imbued
were

rather

than
political

Platonism, exactly reflects the

mutual

independence of

attitude

on

the

aspirationsof

new

Church

and

his age

State, and

part of the State towards

the

"

the

neutral

Churches.

GROTius26

(Hugo de Groot, 1583-1645),born in Holland,

where
led to indifference,thoroughly
the religious
had
wars
and reduced
them
to system, so that
developedthese principles
of the
he may
be regardedas the great Renaissance
legislator
He
laid emphasis on
natural right
natural and social law.
recognizesas agreeing with man's
(jusnaturale)or what reason
social nature
; he placed the originof societyin the social
contract

or

deliberate

the

the State for their

agreement

of individuals

to

create

recognizedthat the people

have the rightto delegateto a representative
their sovereign
with the prerogative,
according to one interpretation,
power,
of being able to withdraw
it which
is the theory of revolu
tion in germ,
but according to another
the delegationis
He made
human
irrevocable.
a complete distinction between
rightbased on reason, and divine rightbased on revelation, and
thus advocated
indifference on the part of the State.
religious
own

welfare ; he

"

"

103.

Protestant

Philosophy

and

discussions brought about by

logical

counterpart in

the

domain

of

Mysticism.

"

the Reformation

The
had

theo

their

principle
private judgment in
determining religious

philosophy.

The

underlying Protestant theology was

in
interpretingthe Scripturesand
dogma. If then each one considered himself free to devise a
system of dogma for himself, we might expect that he would
in which he
try to bring it into harmony with a philosophy,
had a stillgreater liberty
of thought. Hence
the philosophical
multifarious and often
were
systems of early Protestantism
contradictoryneo-Platonism, Stoicism, Aristotelianism, pan
theistic mysticism.
"

1"

De

*"

De

optima vei publicae stttu

jure belli et pacts.

sive de

nova

insula

Utopia.

MEDIAEVAL

PHILOSOPHY

425

but his dogmatic

philosopher,
teaching presupposed a philosophy. Certain of his disciples
and the reformed
sought to establish a harmony between reason
of dogma.
The chief were
scheme
Zwingliand Melanchthon.

(1483-1546) was

Luther

no

(1484-1531),the great

ZWINGLI

Swiss

reformer,

was

ardent

an

conceptions,
support his religious
particularly
and sanctification,
he had recourse
his theory of justification
humanist.

and

neo-Platonic

the

to

To

Stoic

of

philosophy,both

which

immanence
the deification of man
and
suggestedpantheistic
when
regenerated by the sovereign good. MELANCHTHON
creative genius but an
not
a
(1497-1560)was
adapter of
Aristotle to the service of Protestant
theology,an Aristotle
with Platonic and Stoic elements, and
interspersed
very much
he compiled from his Logic,Physicsand Ethics,
the manuals

remarkable
title of Pr

for their

order

clearness,earned

and

for him

the

acceptorGermaniae.

pantheisticconception,already brought forward by

the
mystic anthropology of Sebastian
Zwingli, dominated
27
the thought of Bohme.
Franck
(1500-1542),and especially
^
books
or
brought up without
(1575-1624),
JACOB BOHME
the
influence, conceived a mysticalphilosophy,
any humanistic
of
of which consists in a metaphysicalexplanation
originality
the co-existence of good and evil in the world : there is an
The

in God,

eternal dualism
The

necessary.

theism),and
or

evil,which

proper
soul

human

is

to
an

His

appearance
free-will may

with
being endowed
of
are
primordialqualities

104. Theism,

the

or

of the

conflicts born

and

nature

its

have
religion

God,

in

their

that

of God
to

turn

religious

Philosophy of Religion." The

Reformation

the
reality
content

is

(pan
good

being.

inspireda certain group of

the
a reconciliation between

writers to attempt to bringabout

their conviction
various churches, for it became
of

therefore

that

all forms

concerning
identical notwithstanding the

same

essential truths

dogmatic expression.Theism was, too, in

of the Renaissance, for
agreement with the independentspirit
than naturalism appliedto religion.Just
it was
nothing more
had given rise to a systematic
of human
nature
as an
inspection
used for the
alone was
philosophyof Natural Law, so reason
diversityof

27

Par ado xa,

""

Aurora

GnadenwAhl.

their

De

arbor

scientiae boni et mali.

der Seele, My sterium magnum,
von

(1610),VierzigFragen

Von

Aer

THE

OF

OUTLINES

426

OF

HISTORY

PHILOSOPHY

it was
that
Thus
matters.
unfoldingof all ideas on religious
of followers,not only among
theism gathered a vast number
Protestants, but in generalamongst all engaged in the Re
of Rotterdam
ERASMUS
naissance
movement.
(1467-1536)
if purified
Christ
of
the
that
teaching
propagated the theory
the religionof Plato,
from its accretions is identical with
COORNHERT
Cicero and Seneca.
(b.1522)in Holland reduced
to all
all the dogmas of Christianity
to elements
common
of names
A crowd
might be mentioned of those whom
religion.

this theism
105.

seduced.

Scepticism.

multitude

The

"

of

contradictions

in

re

led men
to doubt
and scientific questions
ligious,
philosophical
This scepticism
of the capacityof the mind to discover truth.
of the Renaissance
not
a
thorough and positive
period was
of attaining
criticism of the possibility
certitude,but rather a
of all existing
practicalconclusion against the sufficiency
systems of thought. It marked the stage of transition between
the Middle Ages and the development of modern
philosophy;
with
the sophism
of
in
it
and
had many
this
points similarity
constructive
of the Greeks, for both preparedthe way
for new
MON
thought. The best known
scepticsof this time were
w
CHARRON30
TAIGNE
(1541-1603). The
(1533-1592) and
philosophiesaffords some
bankruptcy of the Renaissance
explanationof the rapid spread of the ideas of Descartes and

Francis

Bacon.

II. SCHOLASTIC
106. General.

Except by

"

became

less and

reached

its lowest

For

this the

less

PHILOSOPHY
few brilliant minds, Scholasticism

represented,and ignoranceof the system

depth at

Scholastics

of the seventeenth

the end

themselves

were

century.

largelyresponsible

in
attacked
opponents. When
all their positions
by the allied systems of the Renaissance,
because
they offered no defence, principally
they made the

by

their attitude towards

double

mistake

philosophyand
107.

and

Ancient

of

ignoringboth

the

of the
progress
Scholastic
Schools.

Essays (trs.Cotton

80

De

stillcontinued.
and

Florio).

historyof contemporary
particularsciences.

the

Scotist schools

la sagessBt

their

"

Thomist, Terminist
Among the first,FRANCIS
The

OF

OUTLINES

428

THE

OF

HISTORY

PHILOSOPHY

divine
maintainingboldly againstthe theory of immediate
36
of the people constitutes the
right that the free consent
title of authority. Under the direction of P. FONSECA
original
the

Jesuitsat

commentary

Coimbra

carried to

the

on

successful

issue

immense

an

philosophy of Aristotle,known

as

the

Cursus
In
Conimbricensium.
or
Collegium Conimbricense
with
the names
of VASQUEZ37
Italy we meet
(1551-1604),
ALAMANNi38
MAURUS39
and
SILVESTER
(1559-1634)
(16191687).
The
a profound change, which
Spanish restoration worked
of Scholastic philosophywhen
was
a testimonyto the vitality
handled
by capablemen.
Unhappily this revival was neither
widespread nor enduring. And other groups of Scholastics
continued to compromise the good name
of Scholasticism by
rise to
an
ignorance of scientific questions,which
gave
lamentable
misunderstandings.
109.

and
Scholastics
Scientists in
Misunderstanding between
the Seventeenth
Century. The great discoveries of Copernicus,
and Lavoisier revolution
Galileo,Kepler,Newton, Torricelli,
"

ized

physicaland mechanical astronomy, physics,chemistry

and
time Descartes, Newton
biology; whilst at the same

and

Leibniz

reconstructed
the

meant

mathematics

destruction

of

the

on

concerning
Middle Ages were

scientific theories

celestialand terrestrial

part and
When
the

parcel of

physicswhich in the
the acceptedconceptionof

Copernicusand
geocentric
system
discoveries

such

and

the

Galileo substituted

heliocentric for

of

of

new

stars, the

old

solid,the stars immutable

',passedaway for ever.
incorruptibilia
heavens

the

universe.

the

revealed
astronomy, and the telescope
the spots of the sun, the phases of Venus

as

existence

All this

basis.

new

are

conceptionsthat the
et
and
ingenerabilia
'

Such theories

as

these

interwoven, albeit
by long-standingtradition become
of
and loosely,
with the fundamental
artificially
principles
it seemed that
generalmetaphysicsand cosmology. To some
over
so bound
they were necessarily
up togetherthat to throw
had

the

old scientific conceptions meant

ancient
s*
"

Such

philosophy. Such, however,

as

James

I of

England

had

Disputationesmetaphysicae.

38

Summa

*"

Quaestionum philosophicarum

was

not

the

of the
necessary

arguments.
supported by theological

TRS.
*7

the abandonment

philosophica.
libvi IV.

MEDIAEVAL

science
observation

clear

relating

to

ness

followers

of

entirety

the

sacred

the

the

the

aberrations

philosophy,
or

fall

of

science

and

oak

because
latter
to

it

in
had

remove

of

keep

to

it

some

fell

defenders.

the

all

twig
through

off

both

on

want

to

its

the

the

of

of

vitality

stand

must

the

fell

but

to

giant

the

whilst

crown,

it

men

proved

foolish

deprive

might

be

Scholastic

and

tried

on

were

involve

between

former

it

cannot

the

inevitable

hands

if

its

responsibility
on

that

branches

rotten

withered
not

science

became

in

themselves

misunderstanding

metaphor,

We

the

declared

Scholastics

the

fought

Eventually

adherents
the

threw

ardent

would

upon

mediaeval

the

Thus

together.

irresistible

default

its

since

be

that

of

who

which

in

readi

as

edifice.

brought

they

zeal

defend

cosmos,

of

stone

ques

these

to

the

in

and

this,

the

whole

the

scientists,

new

of

and

former

the

of

of

that

then,
of

remove

downfall

complete

ridicule

the

to

show

attempting

conception

monument,

principles

to

to

was

and

Instead
in

necessary

principles

of

validity

of

constitutional

these

sciences,

persisted

Aristotelian

surprised,

all

Aristotle

was

mediaeval

groundwork

great

organic
of

latter.

the

renounce

its

the

solid

that

applications

everlasting

of

the

between

particular

the

ruins

All

philosophy.

to

the

sustain

to

arbitrary

quite

of

429

unimpaired

distinction

maintaining

its

of

tions

stood

sufficient

doctrines

many

midst

the

still

there

make

in

for

consequence,

PHILOSOPHY

pretence
of

its

life.

through

PART
Modern
110.

General

Character

Philosophy
and

Division.

of the
work
philosophical
philosophyis
negative,modern

feature of the
it

was

constructive

thought

Numerous

"

Whilst
Renaissance

marked

systems have

the

leading
was

that

chieflyby its
been developed,

an
independencefrom dogmatic control.
majorityasserting
stronglycon
Many of them had great influence and were
structed.
They varied much in character, for it is a mark of
the modern
thought. This
mentalityto prideitself on original
favoured by the growth
individualistic tendency was
especially
of language.
and diversity
of national spirit
A predominant place has been
given to psychology and
problem focusingthe chief
epistemology. The epistemological
of knowledge,
attention,the questionof the originand validity
which
the Scholastics solved by a metaphysicaltheory of
has
been
treated by modern
philosophy from an
finality,
has
analyticaland psychologicalstandpoint. Since Kant
orientation to the study of epistemologyand has
given a new

the

exercised

decisive

influence, we

Modern
best divide
may
the pre-Kantian(Chap. I),

Philosophy into three periods:

the philosophy of Kant
(Chap. II),and
(Chap.III). We add a few words also on
the present day.

431

the

post-Kantian

the

philosophyof

CHAPTER

MODERN

(Seventeenth
Outline.

111.

Descartes

of human

use

only

the

attaining
with

which

to

piricism

which

trines

Bacon,

the

of

system

Descartes,

quite

the

Cartesian

in

predominant

DESCARTES

Descartes40

scientists

of his

where

his

time,

an

teaching

And

Germany,

BACON

in very

at

with

Paris
a

but
very

of
Or-

is satu
direct

original
The

em

doc

(IV)

France

FRANCIS

only
met

in

(V).

was

funda

elementary

influence

(1596-1650)

of

(II).

offshoot

indirect

AND

not

the

in

way

rise

centuries.

clearly marked,

had

the

from

the

at

Novum

of several

(III) and

England

is

by

not

influence

the

century

spiritgave

which

Rene

Countries,

through

made

method,

mcthode

la

Descartes,

eighteenth

so

the

Scholasticism,

seventeenth

the

Leibniz,

I.
112.

of
of

spread
and

not

of

the

de

and
aimed

two

new

traditional

the

quickly developed

seventeenth

although

but

The
of

discovery

(Discours

thought

him,

from

systems

from

philosophy
the

the

gave

emphasizing

experiment),

knowledge.

the

certitude

to

The

ganon).

of

source

different

mentally

descent

by

were

acquisition and in the subsequent

the latter inaugurated the empirical

namely,

purpose,

former

The

movement

(ffmciptaf observation,

sensation

rated

(I).

Philosophy

the

knowledge

tendency

same

Modern

of

Bacon

(ratio)in

reason

eighteenth centuries)

rationalistic

the

to

of

rights

Francis

and

impetus

and

founders

The

"

KANT

BEFORE

PHILOSOPHY

it,

find

we

the

where
from

in

that

of

close touch

with

also

Low

warm

in the

reception.

48
Discours
de
la mfthode,
de
Meditationes
philosophia, Principia
prima
Descartes
I'dme.
Consult
des
Traite
de
MAHAFFY,
philosophiae,
passions
on
and
London,
(Edinburgh
Influence of Descartes
1884) ; CUNNINGHAM,
of Meditations
Trans,
Metaphysical
Speculations in England
(London,
1876).
of
criticism
For
and
and
Ross
Objections, Haldane
(Cambridge,
1912).
Descartes'
17.
method,
see
Criteriology, 15,

432

MODERN
the

1649,at

In
went

Descartes

set

discover

to

method

new

this he

on

His

method.

new

Descartes

"

proceeded

sought

which

from
principle,
single

Queen Christina

of

Sweden, he

of

to
attaining

to build

his

up

philosophy.

entire

on

out

433

he died.

where

truth, and

all knowable

1.

invitation of

Stockholm,

to

PHILOSOPHY

base

to

it would

all

knowledge
to deduce
possible

be

To discover this
entire system of truths.
one
geometrico
of calling
into doubt
he used the method
(universal
principle
of
alike
internal
methodic doubt) all acts of human
knowledge,
etc. ;
consciousness, of external sensations,of first principles,

more

he

and

went

even

might vitiate. Yet,

known

by

he

doubt

the very
upon
evil genius

certitude

the

'

'

said

some

he made
illogically,

most

doubt

this universal
was

throw

to

as

the faculties,which

of
capability

asserted

far

so

of his

intuition in his act of

exceptionin

one

existence he

own

thought

'

Cogito,

'

of his new
the firstapplication
he made
method, and
ergo sum
in this he found his criterion of certitude,namely, that a clear

thinginvolves the
and, he went
rationalism),
thing (realism,
distinct intuition of

and

which

consciousness

do, then,

to

to

to

appears

existence

fact of my

me

his

certain

my

'

existence

certain, he

am

Cogito,ergo

'.

sum

have

been

given

to

am

Himself.

God

by

me

the idea

certain of the existence of the world, for I have

could

have

not

distinct ideas
error

can

the

second

are

world, and
deceived
true since

beings can

who

has

Furthermore,

me.

they have

God

as

called
to

be

and

of himself.

substance, which

need
called

nothing

God

this idea

given me

all clear

the intellect.
him
alone

he defined

only inasmuch

In

of the nature

strictly

can,
as

that

which

created

else for its existence

substances

and

for their author, and

only from the will,not from

place,these intuitions informed

God, of the world

exists

God

come

be
speaking,
so

external world.

existence,for I have the idea of the infinitely

is priorto that of
I see
that this idea, which

of this external

of

of the

own

must
imperfection,
am

to

of God's

perfect,and
I

had

him, in the first place,of the existence of

himself,of God, and

of

the

distinct

clear and

"

intuitions assured

argued,

as

of

distinct ideas.

these clear and

arrange
construction of his system. These

The

distinct

certainty.All he
system of philosophywas

gathertogetherand
2.

act

absolute

givesme

construct

every

on,

clear and

as

of that

existence

as

they

are

HISTORY

THE

OF

OUTLINES

434

OF

PHILOSOPHY

Corporeal
independent of any other being besides God.
of
sensible
the
made
is
not
qualities(secondary
up
reality
in extension
but
consists
attribute to them,
we
(the
qualities)
it is something essentially
extended,
;
primary quality)
of his mathematical
divisible and continuous (evidence
infinitely
since the

and

bent) ;

of movement

notion

is not

contained

in

is extrinsic to body (cosmic mechan

body, movement
ism, vortex
theory). In dealingwith psychology he defines
of the ego is thought
; the essence
or the ego as a res cogitans
man
of

that

for him

which

or,

extension

Between

and

union

; the
patibility

with

is synonymous

thought

of soul

or

there

ego,

it, the conscious

is

res

absolute

an

act.

incom

with body, a
cogitans

Hence
Descartes
one.
purely mechanical
displaysa tendency to reduce all psychicphenomena to states
and to lessen the part played by the will
of consciousness
this involves
; and
(supremacy of the intellect over the will)
of regardingall non-conscious
activities as
him in the necessity
extended and mechanical
phenomena (theoryof animal spirits,
animal automatism, theoryconcerningthe passions).
Bacon
after being raised to a high
113. Francis
(1561-1626),
positionunder Elizabeth and James I, fell into
political
extensa, is

res

devoted

disgraceand
two

chief works

new

method
His

1.

certain

which

41,in which,
which

on

method

new

he

for

the certitude of science.

to base

consisted, first of all, in regardingas

system

idols ',the

of

work

not

must

thought but

unknown

of

sources

to

the

common

data

of

he

proceeded to interpret
be judgednot by the content
and
by the accurate
precise

appearances,

of inductive

passingwere

or

applyingscientific induction

by
experiencestrippedof
His
nature.
corporeal
formulation

'

all phantoms

Next,

of his

looked

fallswithin the scope of sensible experience,

understood
not
ordinary experiencebut that

excluded

error.

like Descartes, he

of

only what

which

by

his life of solitude to the elaboration

methods,

which

to the Scholastics

we

may

note

in

To these methods
.

absentiae,graduum.
praesentiae,
the
Bacon
laid down
2. In the construction of his philosophy
physics,
principlesof a materialistic naturalism, in which
psychologyand social philosophyalike show the domination
of a mechanical
necessitywhich excludes any teleological

he gave

41

See

De

the

names

of tabulae

organon
dignitateet augmentis scientiarum ; Novum
to the edition by FOWLER
(Oxford, 1889).

Introduction

scientiarum.

cannot
'

OF

OUTLINES

436

Mysticism.

PHILOSOPHY

'

the universal Reason

116.

OF

things in themselves but only in God,

', the placeof minds '.
The
foregoingtheory that knowledge

material

see

HISTORY

THE

"

PASCAL43
from
God is found also in BLAISE
directly
convinced
who, startingfrom Cartesian principles,
(1623-1662),
is incapableof arrivingat the complete
himself that reason
comes

truth and

faith

or

the criterion of truth

therefore
'

has

the heart

of which

reasons

lie in sentiment

must

the mind

itselfknows

nothing'. We find a similar tendency in POIRET (1640-1719).

But religious
mysticismmet with no great favour in France.
little following.The
most
but
Occasionalism, too, had
striking
developmentof Cartesianism was due to a fusion with
it of other elements by Spinozaand Leibniz.
117. Baruch
Spinoza44 (1632-1677)
belongedby birth to a
and studied in turn
colonyof PortugueseJews at Amsterdam
and the Cabbala, Descartes, Giordano

the Talmud
Bacon

and

at
finally

the

In order

to

by his co-religionists
wandering life and settled

Excommunicated

Hobbes.

for his heterodox

Bruno, Francis

views,

led

he

Hague, where

he died.

the

overcome

antinomy

between

extension and

thought,Spinozathought the solution lay in consideringboth

Here he
these attributes to belongto a single
substance,God.
took
Descartes' definition of substance in its most
rigorous
meaning, and herein showed himself a pantheist.Then from
the idea of God he deduced more
a completesystem
geometrico
of thought concerning
the universe.
God, considered

in Himself

and

as

is the substance
infinite,

devoid of determination
(naturanatumns). But He
absolutely
exist onlyas assumingattributes that are necessary to Him ;
can
but we know
these attributes are very numerous,
only two of
them, namely, extension and thought, which appear side by
side though in varying degrees in all things,which are thus

expressionsof God

or

divine modes.

God

as

so

determined

to

being (naturanaturata)unfolds Himself

and in this
according to an absolute mechanical necessity,
for
theory Spinozafinds no placefor the concept of finality,
involves prevision,
and
so
destroys the necessary
finality
of the extension-mode
and the thought-mode. In
parallelism
of
infinity

an

43

Lettres

44

Ethica

modes

of

; Pensees.
provinciates
De intellects*
;
geometricodemonstrates ; Tractatus politicus
Consult
Wolf.
Hale
emendations
White,
trs.
: part
by Elwes,
(unfinished)
POLLOCK,
Spinoza, his Life and Philosophy (2nd ed., London, 1899) ; and
CAIRO, Spinoza (London, 1903).
more

MODERN
is

PHILOSOPHY

437

longeran anomaly in nature, for our

are
regarded as followingone another with a
with the modes of objectsrepresented
blind necessity,
parallel
in the same
but without any causal efficiency
our
; and
way
and moral
actions take placenot freelybut fatally,
activities
are
propositionsof
geometrical
explainedjust as if they were
lines,surfaces and bodies '. This view appliedto morality
and in natural rightadmits of
leads to the denial of all liberty,

this system man

mental states

no

'

virtue

distinction between

no

and

force.

brute

With

selfishness of the individual

Spinozaregardsthe

responsible

as

Grotius

Hobbes,

and with
passions,
of ending this. The reward
of civil societyas a means
ment
of a moral life consists in a
and crown
mysticalintuition '.
^Spinoza'sphilosophycontains many inconsistencies and is
not understood
; it was
by his
open to different interpretations
into favour only in the following
contemporariesand came
of the

for the warfare

the establish

'

century.
45

118. Leibniz

he

only with
but also
contemporaries,
not

conversant

was

and

the individualistic

towards

return

of

called the founder

has been

his

thinker and
original
philosophyin Germany, marks a

who
(1646-1716),

with

totle,and

was

an

tendency
the
with

of Descartes.

philosophyof
that

Descartes

of Plato and

Scholastic system, which

the

But

he

Aris

spoke

of in

ignorant
high praise. Further, he was by no means
the discoverer
science of his day, and is distinguished
as
of

terms

of the

appliedto mechanics.
life,and
time he was
activelyengaged in political
the
himself as the ideal of his diplomaticcareer

of the

differential

At

same

the

put before

calculus, which

he

In 1700
bringingtogetherall the various churches.
of Sciences at Berlin.
he founded
the Academy
The
leading idea of Leibniz's monadology is a dynamic

dream

of

conceptionof

the universe

and

are

thought

but

aggregate of monads
is ruled

ments
I.

The

monad

by

in

forms
or

De

151 ; Gen.

force,and

activity
;

the

extension

world

forces ; the series of mechanical

monad

is

an

move

is with

is immaterial

reference

to

the

and
rest

de la
calculo philosophico; Systeme nouvrau
Dieu
bonte
de
la
Essais
et
de
Theodicee
sur
(trs.Latta) ;
Critical
Consult
RUSSELL.
New
Essays (trs.Langley).
sen

; Monadology
engine du mal ;
Expositionof the Philosophy of

of its

is

force-substance
or
itself

scientia universali

nature

substance

final purpose.

and each
indestructible,
**

Met., 85; Nat.

Leibnitz

Theol., 18, 86.

(Cambridge,1900).

See

Psych., 117,

OUTLINES

438

THE

OF

HISTORY

OF

PHILOSOPHY

perfectly
independentbeing,for the monads, as he expressedit,
have no windows
by which they can experienceor exercise
is impenetrable
influence ; the monad
both
; it is endowed
with
of resistance within
the limits of its being
a
power
'

'

virtue

(vis resistendi,matter) by
to

appears

by

of

which

be, extended, and also with

virtue of which

it

develops its own

it is, or

rather

purely internal

power

individual nature

(form,

soul,

entelechy). Its activityis essentially

representation;

each

state

of the

life is in itself

monadic

precedingand succeedingstates.
succeed

organicbond and
harmony, in such a way that
have

an

monad

the

all

these

representations
they
continuity,
any
all are regulatedby a pre-established

without

another

one

Because

expressive of

its

break

the end

of

of the monad

is attained ;

followingits innate dream '.

another
Monads
differ from one
accordingto their power of
which admits of varying degrees of clearness
representation,
of the monad, from obscure
to the perfection
or
proportionate
distinct
totally unconscious
representationto clear and
and
conscious
But
representationthat is fully conscious.
unconscious
states differ not in nature
but only in degrees of
clearness,and in this Leibniz departsfrom the view of Descartes
who
Man
identified
representationwith consciousness.
has unconscious
less conscious perceptionsand
distinct
or
perceptionsor ideas ; from the first he insensibly
passes to
distinct ideas
which
the second, for there is nothing in our
has not previouslybeen
of in the obscure regions of
dreamt
goes

on

'

course

'

soul '.

the

Thus,

whilst

Leibniz

allows

that

we

have

an

empiricaland

experimentalknowledge (truthof facts)by the

side of rational and deductive knowledge (eternaltruth),he
considers the second as the gradual development of the first.
2.

The

order which

exists between

the monads

is accounted

for

by which there is an uninterrupted

by (i)the law of continuity,
lower
monads
to souls and
minds, each
graded series from
from the next by a very small difference (influence
beingdiffering
of the infinitesimal calculus),
accordingto the axiom natura non
facit saltum
; (2)the pre-established
harmony, or divine arrange
ment
are
so
adapted
by which the activities of the monads
'

'

'

'

to

one

another

the cosmic

no

causal

efficiency,

correspondwith, the
other, and there results a perfect
harmony in
in representing,
by virtue
system ; (3)their activity

changes in
changes in every

the

that, whilst they exercise

one

are

to,
parallel

or

PHILOSOPHY

MODERN
of which

monadic

each

'

is

state

439

livingmirror

'

of the whole

universe.
3. Leibniz

to the study of all

appliedthese generalprinciples
to
man.
beings and
particularly
Body and soul

different
have

direct influx

each

other, but

adjusted as two
clocks which keep perfectly
in time (Geulincx,Malebranche).
Besides
',which in the language of to-day
petites
perceptions
no

on

are

'

would

be

ideas,and

called

subconscious

mental

states,

has distinct

man

in this he is

To act
superiorto all simplemonads.
morallyis to follow intellectual representations
; these follow
a
harmony, and therefore Leibniz
necessarily
pre-established
he
The
beautiful
upholds a psychologicaldeterminism.
regardsas a dull and less conscious perceptionof the order

'

of the universe.
4

There
.

exist

must

monad,

supreme

God, since his

non-

plea). He has
created
the
best
(cosmologicaloptimism).
of
Leibniz also endeavoured
the positive
to harmonize
religions
the various churches
with natural religion.
The whole philosophyof Leibniz displays
a powerfulunityof
the great
which makes
it worthy of a placeamong
conception,
philosophy. The trend of
systems in the historyof modern
of the eighteenth
thought amongst the German
philosophers
century was deeplyaffected by his system.
existence is inconceivable

Descartes'

(whichwas
possibleworld

III. ENGLISH

PHILOSOPHY
EIGHTEENTH

119.

by

General

Sketch

several currents

of Francis
sualism.

Bacon,
This

of

sensationalism, has

SEVENTEENTH

AND

CENTURIES

influenced

^."English philosophywas
thought,but

which

term,

THE

IN

Hobbes

with

together
reference

most

of all by the

took

the

empiricism

name

of

sen

sensism
its synonyms
know
the origin of human

with

to

or

objectivist
sensualism
also materialism)and subjectivist,
according
(called
which
this theory held to be the only
as
sense-perception,
of knowledge, was
source
regarded as establishingor not
the real existence
of things outside the subject
establishing
ledge,and

""

in this connexion

See LESLIE

STEPHEN,

appearedin

English Thought

in the

two

forms,

EighteenthCentury (1876

OUTLINES

440

THE

OF

HISTORY

perceiving. It developed
a
displaying

in

varietyof

vast

OF

PHILOSOPHY

England

shades, as

under

two

both

stages

forms,

of the

same

logicalevolution.

sensualism
Subjectivist
brought about a
the part of Reid and the
on
very strong reaction, especially
Besides these theories dealingwith questions
Scottish school.
notice also various theories on moral
of epistemology,
must
we
and religious
of the
questionswhich were the natural outcome
sensualist philosophy.
Hobbes47 (1588-1679),
120. Thomas
who
the friend of
was
also acquainted
Bacon, Gassendi, and Campanella, and was
with

and

Mersenne

Cartesians

other

at

Paris, endeavoured

and developthe fundamental

bring out clearly

to

ideas of Bacon's

naturalism.

Theory of knowledge. All knowledge is derived

1.

from

and this has its source

in sensation
experience(empiricism),
and
in
even
(sensualism).Sensible qualities,
representations
time
and
this
objectivereality
; logically
space, possess no
should have led him to subjectivism,
but he reverted instead
to the

materialism

of Bacon.

Philosophy,by his definition,is the science

of bodies, and physicsthe study of the movement
of atoms
a
and
movement
laws
regulatedby mathematical
necessary
2.

Materialism.

"

(Descartes)without
sidered

psychology as
which

movements,

intervention

any
he

dealingwith
divided

of final
the

into two

He

causes.

human

body

and

con

its

classes,the theoretical

practical(volitionalacts). The will

he regarded as passiveand
dependent upon knowledge (cp.
of
Descartes'
knowledge, 112); and in this shows
supremacy
moral
determinist.
himself as
The
instinct of self-pre
a
servation alone guides our
actions ; but men
agreed for the
sake of puttingan end to the clash of individual self-interests
have
to unite in a civil society(Grotius),and
accordingly
the

and
(sensations)

invested

officials with

state

sovereignauthoritythe
rights,even

to

the

tions,except where

individual

must

powers.

forego

Before
all his

this
own

convic
renouncinghis religious
government does not impose a state

extent

the

autocratic

of

religion.
; De
corpore politico; Leviathan, or the Matter, Form
LESLIE
Ecclesiastical and
Civil. Consult
Commonwealth,
of
Hobbes
Will and
Free
Four
STEPHEN,
(1904) ; Jos. RICKABY,
English Phi
losophers(Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and Mill)(London, 1906).
47

and

On

Nature

Human

Power

PHILOSOPHY

MODERN

John Locke48

121.

and

Oxford

had
(1632-1704)

affairs,he
political

turmoil of

suite of William
founder

of

of

in

1689 in

the

be

must

philosophy. To
attemptingthe solution
sensist

the

before

necessary,

He

Orange.

the
escape
to Holland, where

England

to

at

To

himself

betook

and returned

his chief works

he wrote

scientific education

Descartes.

and

Bacon

studied

441

regarded as the
him
it appeared
of any other philo

sophicalproblem, to determine what is the originand what

of human
the validity
knowledge.
1. The
originof knowledge. Locke devoted the first book of
in the
there are no innate principles
his Essay to provingthat
'

49. The

'

mind

of

sheet

mind

of the

clean

Aristotle).All knowledge

of

(tabularasa

paper

child resembles

new-born

is

experience,which he teaches is twofold : ex

ternal, namely sensation or the perceptionof the external
and
of the senses,
internal, namely
phenomena by means
of the activitydiscernible in
reflection or the consciousness
This internal experience
sensation.
comprisesseveral activities
which tend to combine
together,and so
simplerepresentations
make
comparing and com
complex ideas by reflecting,
in germ).
bining (association-theory
2.
Validityof knowledge. After having laid it down as a
reflections,including
principlethat neither sensations, nor
teach us anything about the external
complex representations,
introduced
into this subjectivisma twofold
world, Locke
derived

from

'

'

'

'

modification

(Descartes):

he affirmed the

of bodies, such
primary qualities
he

the

admitted

existence

real existence of the

extension,

as

of substances,

althoughwe
complex representations,

as

remain

etc.

(112);

and

objectsof some
ignorantof their

nature.

inconsistencies

These
character

this

which
jectivism,
122.

the

or

"

The

sensism
objectivist
Berkeleyand Hume

Associationist
of

transformation

Essay

Christianity;

concerning
The

Human

Conduct

School."

system

en

49

According

idea

of

the

'

to

the

erected into

The

transitional

system.

association of

'

Understanding

of the Understanding ;
John Locke ; ses theories

terminology
'

ideas

',

into complex
simplerepresentations

of seventeenth

Reasonableness
of
Treatises on Govern

The
Two

et
politiques

'

and

influence

leur

eighteenth centuries,
'

for
the name
ideologue
knowledge
; hence
synonym
'
French
materialists
and
idealiste ' for sensationalists.
is

sub

towards

tended

Consult
BASTIDE,
Angleterre (Paris,1907).

ment.

'

Locke's

gave

'

for

some

OUTLINES

442

OF

of which

ones,

be

to

came

traces

the

confined to the
PETER

BROWN

OF

HISTORY
to be found

are

PHILOSOPHY

in Locke

and

others,soon

objectof specialstudies. These at first were

of the origin
of our consciousness.
investigation
of
(f 1735) made a study of the formation

representationsand
HARTLEY50

DAVID

THE

of
JOHN GAY
(1704-1757),who

associationist school

volitional acts.

of

that

founder

the

was

of the

out
psychology in England, worked
these
conceptions,and found a constant
correspondence
between
and
antecedents
conse
physiological
psychological

of

albeit the two

quences,

sets of facts he asserted to be irreducible.

JOSEPH PRIESTLEY51
(1733-1804)
gave
of
pretation
Hartley'spsychologyby

materialistic inter

his

teachingthat the
from the physio
state does not differ in nature
psychological
and that consequently
logical,
psychologyis merely the physics
of the

He

nerves.

tried

to

reconcile

his

theories and

these

beliefs by having recourse

to the doctrine that what
religious
is true in theologymay
be false in philosophy,
and vice versa
(cp.the two truths of Averroes, 81).
123. George Berkeley52
Anglicanbishopof Cloyne,
(1685-1753),
Locke's principle
that our
set out from
knowledge extends to
his own
ideas only and arrived at a subjectivism
:
peculiarly
he maintained
that all thingsare ideas and the external world
the qualities
attribute to matter, primary as well as
or
we
than
clusters or aggregates of
secondary,are nothing more
call
mental
we
representationswhich
things ; mind'

'

alone

phenomena

exist

"

esse

percipi.

est

whilst

But

matter

of these repre
the subjects
which are
exist,spirits
God ; and because
sentations have an existence,and especially

does

He

not

exists and

before

has

and

given

arranged them
(cp.Malebranche, 115).
us,

and
in

there

has

Hume53

124. David

wrote

io

De

81

Hartley's Theory

motu,

sensus

order, these
born

was

of his works, did

; his treatise

et idearum

of

in

who
(1711-1776),

several

attractingattention

that
representations

all the

Human

on

not

Human

must

at

come

be true

Edinburgh

succeed

at

first

Nature, he tells

generatione.
Mind

on

the

Principlesof

Association

of

Ideas.
58

Treatise

concerning the Principlesof Human

Knowledge ;
Dialogues. Consult FRASER, Berkeley (Edinburgh and
1894), and Selections from Berkeley (London, 1891).
Vision
"*

Treatise

on

cerning
cerning

Human

Consult

LESLIE

the

Human

Nature, which

Understanding,
Principles of Morals.
STEPHEN,

later

Dissertation

op. cit.,and

on

he

recast

th"

Theory of

Philadelphia,
Enquiry

con

Passions, Enquiry con

Literary.
Political, and

Moral,
RICKABY,
op. cit.

Essays,

into

New

OUTLINES

444

in the mind

THE

OF
of God

and

mind

in the human

PHILOSOPHY

'.
its effects
This

Scottish school.

of the

OF

and immutably present

universally

are

far-reachingin

More

HISTORY

the reaction

was

the

on

part

directed

chiefly
againstthe
In place of
Hume.

was

ideological
conceptionsof Berkeley and
sensationalism this school professed a theory of
subjectivist
of dogmatic
innate ideas which
permitted the attainment
within us instinctive judgments,which
have inborn
truth : we
of

the truths

together form

common

and

sense

which

have

'

Reid

expressedit, All knowledge

be built upon
that are
selfand all science must
principles
who
has common
evident ; and of such principles
every man
is a competent judge '. These judgments come
into play
sense
in questionsof morality,
social life and religion.The
chiefly
and
of this school was
THOMAS
founder
chief representative
there
REID56
and
also belonged to it ADAM
(1710-1796),
FERGUSON
JAMES OSWALD
(1727-1793),and espe
(1724-1816),
STEWART57
whose
doctrines found
DUGALD
(1753-1828),
cially
in America
and France, with the
great favour, particularly
eclectics.
spiritualistic
The
Natural
Law.
126. Ethics and
study of psychological
problems naturallyhad its counterpart in questionsdealing
real

objectiveimport

as

"

with

ethics and

natural

tinguishedwriters

very
the

of

an

innate

to the

theory
an

of moral

innate

58

with aesthetic

called it conscience ; and

An

69
60

Moral

some

of

improved

Inquiry into

of

the Human

; arid

man

sentiment
and

Philosophy.

made

(120)was

vindicated

once

on

the

of ad
group
the good to be
a

willed for its

to be

one

Mind

on

our

60

HUTCHESON

FRANCIS

Principlesof
Essays on the Active
the

the Intellectual Powers

of Man
on
;
Mind.
Elements
of the Philosophy of the Human
Characteristicks
of Men, Manners, Opinions and

Analogy of Religion.
Inquiry into the Original of

at

'

identified this sentiment

(1671-1713)
5fl
(1692-1752)
enjoyment ; BUTLER

Essays
68

law, based

sentiment

SHAFTESBURY

good

moral

inclinations
egoistic

objectof

of the

67

MORALISTS,

'

existence

sake.

""

of dis

number

selfish system
againstHobbes, whose
strenuouslyopposed. The Cambridge school

herents

own

whilst others

of Hobbes

Reaction

altruisticand

the

BRITISH

the

as

were

it.

upon
i.

known

the sensism

attacked

whom

There

law.

Ideas

(1694-1747)

Common
Powers

Sense

',

of Man.

Times.

of Beauty

and

Virtue, System of

PHILOSOPHY

MODERN

aesthetic

an

these aesthetic moralists

reduced

their

development

with

several aesthetic sensists,

such as
and Edmund
Burke (1730-1797),
who
(1696-1782)

Home

Henry

in

Parallel

taste.

445

the

were

beautiful to

agreeablesensation. Hobbes's
morality of pleasuremet also with livelyoppositionfrom
61
CLARKE
SAMUEL
for his con
(1675-1729)"well known

troversy with

Leibniz

"

an

who

for the

sought

basis of

goodness

correspondenceof our actions with the nature of things.

2. Sensism
appliedto ethics found its first expressionin a
utilitarianism.
MANDEVILLE62
theory of egoistic
(1670-1733)
found individual self-interest to be the source
of all activity,
BENTHAM63
whether personalor social; JEREMY
(1748-1832)
the principle
of morality is
formulated
that the end
the
and that
greatest happinessof the greatest number
every
virtuous action results in the balance of pleasure ; but he
maintained that each one's primary care
should be for his own

in

the

'

'

'

'

welfare.

in

Sensism

its second

form

became

an

altruistic

utilitarianism which

bringsinto consideration sympathy or a

of participating
in the joys and
of others
sorrows
power
ADAM
SMITH M (1723-1790)
its chief representative.
These
was
of utilitarianism continued
two
currents
to develop in the
English ethical conceptionsof the nineteenth century, par
in James Mill and John Stuart Mill (162 and 163). It
ticularly
may

be added

the founders
127. Deism.
than

the

that

of

Smith

and

Bentham

are

reckoned

amongst

political
economy.

"

English deism,

Renaissance, which

or

left

free-thought,went

further

and

tolerant

men

indifferent

attack on all positive

and made
an
religion
(104),
in placeof which it substituted,according to its view
religion,
of an
naturalism or philo
inborn religious
a universal
sense,
about
sophicalreligion. This consists in personalspeculation
The leader of
God's existence and the immortalityof the soul.
Lord HERBERT
CHERBURY
this movement
OF
was
;
(1581-1648)
TiNDAL66 (1656and
MATTHEW
JOHN ToLAND65
(1670-1722),
and others represented
1733),Lord BOLINGBROKE
(1672-1751)
in matters

81
81
88

For

of

Demonstration

of the Being and

English Utilitarians,3 vols. (London, 1900).

Sentiments
Wealth
Theory of Moral
of Nations.
; The

STEPHEN,
84
66
"8

Attributes of God.

Vices made
Public
Fable of the Bees, or Private
Benefits.
Introduction
and
to the Principlesof Morals
Legislation; Deontology.
consult LESLIE
the modern
founded
English utilitarianism
by Bentham
The

Christianitynot Mysterious.
Christianityas old^asthe Creation.

446

OUTLINES

OF

the deistic side in

THE

HISTORY

OF

PHILOSOPHY

great controversy with the upholdersof

orthodoxy.
With
made

deism
in the

universe,which

the

view

reconcile the

to

all theists

commonly

very

noteworthy attempts

some

eighteenthcentury

conceptionof
mechanical

associate

must

we

teleological

favoured, with the

held after the time

of Galileo

and

Kepler alike by the followers of Descartes and the English

empiricalschool. Newton, who had given a great impetus to
the mechanistic
theoryby his formulation of the universal law of
nevertheless an advocate of a cosmic theology,
was
gravitation,
and in this he stood side by side with Leibniz ; thus we see the
century allied

greatest geniusesof the seventeenth

two

foes of the

claims of the

excessive

the

as

conceptionof

mechanical

the universe.

IV. FRENCH

PHILOSOPHY

128. General

Sketch.

(II)underwent
found

as

enjoy

to

universal

France

Cartesianism, which

entire system in France

lingered,and

the

On

mechanism.

became

in many

the

other

is

as
no

have

we

seen

longerto

be

in the

the

eighteenthcentury ;
to survive the longest

one

considerable

most

CENTURY

EIGHTEENTH

THE

profound changes,

many

of its tenets

some

and

an

"

IN

other

influence

was

that

of

hand, the philosophyof

respectspermeated with English

after Voltaire had taken

himself
empiricism,especially
upon
sensism
to popularize
it. This French
appeared not only in
in materialism, but also it
its speculative
forms, especially
became
a
popular philosophyspread throughout the masses
the one hand and to morality
on
and, by beingappliedto religion
and social lifeon the other,it quicklydechristianized the people
of 1789.
for the Revolution
and prepared the way
129.
Before
Speculative Sensism.
developing into an
absolute
materialism, the sensist philosophyshowed itself in
that
of subjectivism
the two
extremes
forms, between
many
that know
denied all reality,
and dogmatism that postulated
ledgecould be attained by the use of the faculties.
67
i. Non-materialistic sensism was
represented
by CONDILLAC
(1715-1780).He reduced all knowledge to external sensation,
and regardedconsciousness,even
in its most complex states, as
"

nothing more

than

transformed

sensation ; for this purpose

instituted his classical comparison of the statue.

"7

Essai

sw

de
I'origine

la connaisance

humaine

His

view

Traite des sensations.

he
of

MODERN

PHILOSOPHY

447

value
of sensation is a strange blending of
cognitional
he regards sensible qualities
sensism, inasmuch
as
subjectivist
with
as
dogmatism, for he admits the
having no reality,
objectiverealityof spatialdeterminations ; and he even
of
the immaterial
includes spiritualism
nature
by recognizing
find similar contradictions
in the theory of
the soul. We
68
BONNET
CHARLES
(1720-1793).
the

Materialistic sensism,which

2.

eighteenthcentury, is the doctrine

but

and

sensuous

to

are

be

found

strikingbook
in which
with

machine

L'homme

movement

of

LA

that nothing exists

that

knowledge

no

principles
(i)in the
implications
METTRIE
(1709-1751),

all their various

with

is

there

These

material.

realitybut

no

he teaches

that

in the

in France

dominant

was

psychicphenomena

endowed

matter

except

nothing more

are

higherfunctioningof the nervous

system ; and that
mechanical laws.
all man's activities are governedby necessary
and
Such so-called spiritual
entities as the soul, human
liberty
evil ; the atheistic State
is an
God, are a delusion ; religion
advocated
by Bayle (130)is the ideal of society; the purpose of
lifeis egoistic
pleasurewhich we should hasten to enjoy before
it is too late and the
comedy of life is at an end '. (2)In a
of articles in the famous
Encyclopedia (Dicgreat number
than

the

'

'

'

tionnaire Raisonne

publishedin

was

Arts

des Sciences, des

Paris

between

the

et des

years

Metiers)which
under

1752-1772

of
then
(1717-1783),
DIDEROT
arrogated to
(1713-1784). The
encyclopedists
en
themselves
the title of
'. (3) In the work
philosophers
which
titled Systeme de la nature
was
publishedunder the
in 1770, but was
chieflyfrom the
pseudonym of Mirabaud

the

direction

first

of

D'ALEMBERT69

70

'

of D'HOLBACH

pen
the

and
(1723-1789),

materialists of the end

the

theories

mechanistic

of the
of

be called the bible of

may

eighteenthcentury.

(4)In

scientists such

FON-

many

73
and
(1657-1756),BUFFON
(1708-1788)
who
those
(1735-1820). The
oppositionbetween

TENELLE71

mechanistic

view

logicalview,

'

of the universe

and

cause-finaliers ', to

underlies all the controversies of this

"*
"

70

Essai

7a

use

Voltaire's

periodboth

Pcnstes

;
philosophiques

Pensees

et de Diderot

sur

sur

la

teleo-

expression,

de
I'interpretation

(posthumous).
pluralitydes mondes.
Histoire naturelle generateet particulicre.

Entretien

held

in learned and

;
Palingtntsiesphilosophiques.
psychologic
preliminaire.

de d'Alembert

ROBINET

held

who

de
Discours

Entretien
71

those

as

la

nature

448

OF

OUTLINES

THE

HISTORY

and is an
circles,

unlearned
naturalism

evidence

eighteenthcentury.

of the enthusiastic cult of

characteristic

is the

which

PHILOSOPHY

OF

of the

of the

whole

Religious Philosophy." The^French philosophyof this

century assimilated and accentuated the rationalistic criticism
130.

English sensualist philosophershad brought against

for the widespread
positivereligions
;t and this accounts

that
all

the

hatred
forms

which

of Catholicism

became

dominant

the

in all

note

of

religious
philosophy.
BAYLE
the
1.
(1647-1706),
Religiousscepticism,PIERRE
laid it down
author
of the Dictionnaire historique
et critique,
as
all
revealed
but
that
not only
even
a principle
dogma
religion,
is as a matter
of natural religion,
of
every teachingin favour
Yet
he
fact and by its nature
incompatiblewith reason.
professedhimself
of
sistency
that

vice

what

sought to reconcile the incon

theory of the two truths, namely

believer,and

his

position
by the
is true in philosophymay
His influence

versa.

for
pernicious,

most

was

theologyand

false in

be

of his

many

paid attention first and foremost to the absurdityof

all religious
He was
belief which he had put before their minds.
in completely divorcingreligionand
largely instrumental
reason
beingabsurd, moralitywas
; and in consequence, religion
followers

made

to

became

rest

on

rationalistic basis and

atheistic State

an

possible.

Theism.

VOLTAIRE

73

(1694-1778),
althougha very versa
tile and often a very
writer, takes his place in
superficial
He
of theism.
the historyof philosophyas a representative
popularizedthe views of Locke, and whilst he agreed in more
than one
pointwith the materialistic view, he did not hesitate
others.
After having taken upon himself
to oppose it on many
in particular,
to demolish
all positive
and Catholicism
religion
2.

he

elaborated

incoherent

an

his different works.

he sometimes
of the

tect

for

spoke

men

not
71

in the

exist,we
Lettres

sur

same

should
les

of Him

way

Encyclopedia.

as

be under

Candide

believer

God

as

in God's

the motive

existence, but
conduct
deterrent

police: If God did

of inventinga God '.
necessity
'

de

la

philosophicde

Newton

sur
I'optimisme; Dictionnaire
after having quarrelledwith the other
ou

as

law-courts and

Elements

the Archi

as

for honest

order,and necessary
the

varied in

which

Nature, sometimes

as

of social

Anglais;

portee de tout le monde;

(1764),which he wrote
famous

was

world, sometimes

the foundation

and

He

theory about

mis

la

philosophique
authors

of the

PHILOSOPHY

MODERN

theories advocated

The

3. Atheism.

by

449

La Mettrie,d'Holbach,

of a
etc., raised atheism to the standard
and belief in God
which it is idle to dispute,

but

only by the educated

unworthy and harmful.
not

Ethics.

131.

by

to be

came

the

masses

deductions

ethical

The

"

also

demonstrated

of

psychologyappear in the writingsof HELVETius74

who carried egoism to its extreme
consequences
time

endeavoured

he

dividual
'

of

sentiment

terialism
effect

French

many
'. The

honour

and
political

Law.

sensualist

(1715-1771),
; at the

same

selfishness of the

by

an

the

appeal to

ethical aspect of
classes,where its

growing

in

ma

only

with

discontent

the

of affairs at the time.

social state

Natural

lower

the

aggravate the

to

the

of the

appealedmostly to

was

132.

welfare

the

with

reconcile

to

regarded
a
thing

as

the

thesis

The

"

movement

establish

to

the

in

75

(1689-1755)
point of view which MONTESQUIEU
had treated in its application
to political
philosophy,JEAN
76
JACQUES ROUSSEAU
(1712-1778)developedin its bearing on
of nature,
Natural Right and social philosophy. The
state
life ; the
in which man
is naturally
good, consists in a solitary
dividualistic

social state,based
of

on

labour, individual

contract, has led to the division

ownership,inequalityof station in life,
mutual

happiness. A return to the

but men
is now
state of nature
impossible,
may approach to it
far as possible
as
by abandoning artificialculture and society
conventions, and by ensuring that each shall possess the
inalienable rightsand freedom with which nature has endowed
etc., and

him,

so

has

that

put

end

an

let

without

to
personality

to

develop his
may
built
sentiment Rousseau
he

hindrance

or

On

full.

the

this

natural

ethical system and a philosophyof

lifetime his ideas permeated the masses
an

up

coming of
V.

GERMAN

General

PHILOSOPHY

IN

Sketch.

"

The

eighteenthcentury lacked both

the first place,
most
74

De

**

Lettres

'"

and

hastened

his
the

the Revolution.

(LEIBNIZ
133.

religion.During

of its

CENTURY

EIGHTEENTH

THE

KANT)

TO

philosophy of the
and depth, (i)In
originality
German

systems

were

derived from

Leibniz's

I'esprit.
Persanes

Lanouvelle
Heloise
Ethics, 74, 111 i;

De
;

des lois.
I'esprit
De

control

social; Emtle

ou

sur

I 'education.

See

OUTLINES

450

monads

theory of

sentimental
and

OF

HISTORY

THE

OF

the school of

; thus

certain eclectic writers

Wolff, the aesthetic and

of the

school,the advocates

PHILOSOPHY

philosophyof history

developedisolated,and

sometimes

No one
revived his system
secondary,theories from Leibniz.
in its entirety. (2) On the other hand, a reactionary
move
ment
against certain exaggerated principlesin Leibniz's
philosophy encouraged the development of an
empirical
the
of
due
influence
the
which
to
was
philosophy
English
schools.
(3)German
philosophyformed an earlyalliance with
and received a considerable impetus from a sudden
literature,
and assumed
a popularform.
awakening of artistic feeling
77
of Wolff."
WOLFF
School
CHRISTIAN
134. The
(1679-1754),
who
he fell
at Halle University(1706),where
was
a professor
I of Prussia and was
William
into disgraceunder
later rein
of Leibniz's philosophyand
ardent admirer
an
stated, was
of it. He started
endeavoured
to givea systematic
exposition

division of truths

Leibniz's

with

him

departed from

but

between

he

them;

of fact and

a
by asserting

maintained

that

eternal

truths,

distinction of nature
every

object

can

be

and
We
find
empirically
by way of pure deduction.
78
similar conception in TSCHIRNHAUSEN
(1651-1708),who
a
This
parallelismconcerning the
perhaps influenced him.
classifica
of knowledge he made to be the basis of a new
sources
tion of the philosophical
sciences,which in great part is still
admitted
to-day. According to this, the theoretical sciences
comprisegeneralmetaphysicsor ontology,and specialmeta
physics; this latter admitting of subdivision into natural
and
deductive
empirical
theology or theodicyand teleology,
and
the
natural sciences. This
psychology,rational cosmology
known

attempt

at

classification constitutes

feature in his contribution

Leibniz's

marshallingof
Wolff

founded

philosophyto
individual

135.

The

Leibniz had
77

noteworthy

most

in itselfis

philosophy,which

to

ideas after

method

that

is often

pedantic.

times

most

the

school and

all

may
in the

be

called the

of
professor

eighteenthcentury.
Germany
his disciples
was
Baumgarten.
among

Aesthetic

placedthe

School.

"

aesthetic

In

the

human

The

consciousness

as midway
impression

between

Logica, ontologia,cosmologia,psychologiesrationalis, theologianaturalis,

'jus
universalis, jus naturae,
gentium ; Vevnunftigt

philosophiapractica
Gedanken.
"
Medicina

mentis.

452

OUTLINES

HISTORY

THE

OF

interprets
historyfrom

which

PHILOSOPHY

OF

the

standpointof the organic

effected by Lessingand Herder,
was
race
unity of the human
also intimately
who besides beingphilosophers
associated
were
in the eighteenth
with the intellectual culture of Germany
81
(1729-1781)applied this theory of
century. LESSING
historical evolution to the study of religions,
regardingall the
in the historyof the world as so many
successive and
religions
perfect phases of one
82
HERDER
(1744-1803)extended
more

historyof

the human
evolution

necessary
138. Reaction

race,

the

and

past

and

the

this view

to the

endeavoured

was

and

whole

to show

it had

what

against Leibniz

religiouslife.

same

of the

that

by

to be 83.

Wolff."

protest

was

of Wolff againstthe deter

disciples
minism
and
of Leibniz
the pedantic formalism
of Wolff's
philosophical
teaching. RUDIGER
(1673-1731)and CRUSIUS
(1712-1776)took the lead in judging and condemning the
of the deductive
method, as incapableof
exaggerated use
if the experi
affordingan explanationof the world of reality
is ignored. This departurefrom the system of
mental
method
raised

by

Leibniz

the

immediate

the influence of the

created, under

French

English and

of empiricalideas, which
current
was
a
philosophies,
hardly
and
confined
to
chiefly descriptive
original
psychology. The
English philosophyalso had an influence on a series of religious
which
less philosophical
however
in their nature
were
disputes,
than in England, because
in Germany men
less able to
were
throw

off their adherence

controversies

that

we

to the various creeds.

can

trace

It

was

in these

beginnings of

the

biblical

criticism.
139.

Philosophy

in

Popular

Form.

"

To

completethis

sketch

philosophyit is necessary to add that THOMASIUS

Enwho
is considered
the first of the German
(1655-1728),
the apostleof a popular and
', became
practical
lighteners
middle-class
common
philosophy based on an appeal to
of German

'

'

sense

'.

His influence made

notably on

artists and

itself felt

writers,and

was

on

all classes of minds,

thus

instrumental

in

81
Translation
of the New
Essays of Leibniz ; Erziehung des Menschcn
geschlects
;
TheologischeStreitschriften.
82
Auch
eine Philosophic der Geschichte
der Menschheit
; Philosophy of the
History of Mankind
(trs:Churchill).
88
Similar
ideas had
by the Italian philosopher
already been put forward
Vico
the
middle
the
In
of
(1668-1744).
eighteenth century there also ap
(1697-1770)
peared, in Germany, the first historians of philosophy Brucker
Tiedemann
and
(1748-1803)
"

PHILOSOPHY

MODERN

philosophical

the

giving

men

of

eighteenth

eclipsed

Leibniz

with

century

by

between

At
of

Goethe

the

the

of

of

literary

great

further

philosophy,
works

the

awakening

(1749-1832)
and

poetry
which

the

of

giving

these

great

enjoyed.

genius

Compared

works
and

popularity

the

latter

characteristic

was

period.

the

alliance

the

cemented
the

the

(1759-1805)

Schiller

scholars

to

of

romanticism

German

the

that

veneer

productions

intellectual

453

the

giant

pale

all

German

other

into

personality

insignificance,
of

Kant.

philosophers
and

in

all

the

were

CHAPTER
PHILOSOPHY

THE

Critical Philosophy.

140.

berg,

where

II
OF

Kant

"

philosophyand

the

born

was

applied himself

he

in 1724 at

the

study
During the

to

sciences.

natural

KANT

of

Konigs-

theology,

first

part of

his

he set himself to assimilate,and even

career
philosophical
theories of modern
adopted as his own, the principal
thought,
and
and
those
of Leibniz, Wolff
later on
Crusius,
especially
of Locke

those

in the

when,

was

and

and

Hume,

midst

Rousseau.

of all these

The

second

stage

influences,the
conflicting

originality
developed84 ; after thirtyyears'
personalreflection this appeared before the world in 1770,
in which
given a public chair of philosophyat
year he was
Konigsberg. This he held until 1797. He died in 1804.
The new
philosophyof Kant was givenby himself the name
transcendental
of Critical Philosophy; it is also known
as
criticism. By the analysisof the concept of knowledge he
traits of his

claimed

to

own

find

out

what

be

must

the

of the

structure

cog-

what the conditions in the undisturbed

faculty
faculty,
of
and
what
limits
the
which
precede knowledge,
finally
division of faculties
certitude.
Adhering to the new tripartite
theoretic
of the. speculative
or
(136),he made in turn a critique
of the practicalreason
will,and of the facultyof
or
reason,
sentiment or, as he termed it,of judgment (Urtheilskraft).

nitional

'

'

141.

The

Kant's

of

Pure

Reason.

i.

"

critical

knowledge.
84

Critique

Chief

philosophy deals with

Such knowledge consists

works

of

the

of

This

first

theory

of

body

of

part of

scientific

universal,

second
the 'critical'
period of Kant's career:
Miiller ; also Meiklejohn), Fundamental
(trs.Max
and
Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals
Critique of Practical Reason
(trs.
The Philosophy
Abbott) ; CritiqueofJudgment (trs.Bernard) Consult WATSON,
of Kant
Explained (MacLehose, Glasgow, 1908) ; CAIRD, The Critical Philo
sophy of Kant, 2 vols. (MacLehose, Glasgow, 1889). We pass over here the
and the writings of the first period of his life.
dogmatic philosophy of Kant
Crit. 27, 32, 39 f. ; Log., 33 ; Gen. Met., 109 ; Ethics,55 f
See
74, 80, 111 f. ;

Critiqueof

Pure

"

"

Reason

.,

Nat.

Theol., 5, 9.
454

MODERN

judgments.

necessary

itself

concerning

was

PHILOSOPHY

The

first

the

455

question, then,
of

nature

to

necessary,

present
universal

judgment.
'

'

The

analytic judgment,accordingto Kant, is one in which

be asserted
the predicatecan
of the subject upon
the mere
analysisof the latter ; and this he regarded as having no
scientific value
(againstLeibniz).Similarlywhat he
strictly
termed
the
a posteriori
synthetic
judgment,which bases the
and subjectupon
union of predicate
sensible experience,
some
though without the latter containingthe former, he considered
since experienceis by its nature
to be also unscientific,
con
tingentand variable,and cannot be the foundation of knowledge
which is formed
by laws, that is,of necessary and immutable
judgments (againstHume). Only the
synthetica priori
has
and
is
scientific
value
a
judgment
capableof regulating
and
of experience
the world
: it is,in
universally
necessarily
of our
fact,a judgment wherein the mode
joiningsubjectand
is a priori,
that is to say, determined
predicate
by the structure
of our
faculties and not by experience.
arises concerning the nature
A second questionconsequently
'

'

'

'

of

faculties of

our

attain.
they may
understandingand
The

2.

and

certitude to which

of the

reason.

impressionof

our

the

internal,in Kant's system, makes

external and

in

of all knowledge. This is elaborated

matter

sensibility,

distinguishedbetween

Kant

faculty of sense-knowledge.The

both

senses,

knowledge

; and

us

this first

prioriforms or determinations
of the faculty,
which
namely time
belong to the structure
and
representingall objects as
space, the external senses
elaboration

extended

is due

in space,

the
of

intuition

into which

the

received.

are

in space and

'

the internal

and

prioriconditions

a
our

two

another

succeeding one

as

to

in time.

sensation of

an

time

and

they

are

pure

moulds,

so

states

thus

are

'

to

internal and

our

external

forms

speak,
senses

impressionformed

objectis an

time.

inasmuch
forms of sense-perception,
objective,that is to
necessary, are

every sensible impressionappears

time ; yet, as these forms belong
the

(reineAnschauungen)

These
and

Space

of sensation

impressionsof

all conscious

senses

their
faculty,

value

is

as

they are universal

say,

in

every

in
necessarily

entirelyto

only phenomenal ; in

the

man

space
structure

other

words,

and
of
we

OF

OUTLINES

456

HISTORY

THE

PHILOSOPHY

OF

right to apply to things themselves

accordance
with which
they appear before
have

no

The

matter

content

or

the

in
properties

us.

is
elaborated, or the impression,

thus

incapableof teaching us anything at all of the inner nature of

the extramental
it is in us,
world, since every impression,
as
The
the
is 'informed'.
or
thing-in-itself
noumenon,
by
contrast

with

thing such

always

must

nomenon,
x

the

does

as

remain

it appears
an

unknown

to

us

and

or

the

phe

unknowable

delay to investigate
thoroughly the
this impressionand its sufficient reason.
understanding (Verstand). The intuitions of sensi

Kant

and

originof
3. The

not

bilitywhich furnish us with sensations in space and time

of
(matter)are elaborated in their turn by forms or categories
establish manifold relations between
the understandingwhich
Hence
second kind of elaboration.
these sense-experiences.
a
Judgments of the Transcendental
Analytic,or inquiry into
of thought as distinguished
from sensa
the a priorielements
tion, are the expressionof these relations or syntheses and
constitute science,the only rational knowledge of the sensible
The types of the relations necessarily
established by
world.
human
independentlyof any experience
intelligence,
every
between
the sensible intuitions and governing
(hence a priori),
twelve in number, namely : unity,plurality,
all are
them
to the
quantity of judgments and corre
totality(referring
sponding to universal, particularand singular judgments);
to the qualityof judg
negation,limitation (referring
reality,
and correspondingto affirmative,negativeand infinite
ments
and
judgments); subsistence and inherence, causality
depen
to the kind of relation between
dence, reciprocity
(referring
to categorical,
subjectand predicateand corresponding
hypo
and
thetical and disjunctive
judgments); possibility impossi
and contingency
and
e
xistence
non-existence, necessity
bility,
to the modality of judgments and
(referring
correspondingto
assert oric and apodeictic
judgments).
problematic,
and

Mathematics
sciences

the

in mathematics

direct experience,but

natural
our

from

sciences

are

the

only

human

intuitions do not result from

some

some

imagined experience,e.g.

intuition

lines in space ; in the natural sciences,the

and the
is direct, is related to things. Mathematics

natural

sciences

imagine points and

and
categories,

build

their

up

sensible

judgments are

intuitions

priorilaws.

according

to

PHILOSOPHY

MODERN
of the most

One

by
a

isthat
importantof these categories

is meant

which

457

that between

consequent phenomenon

an

antecedent

construct

we

of

causality

phenomenon

relation of

and

dependence

of the other.
judge the one to be the cause
determinations
of the pure under
Since the categories
are
and thus scientific
cannot
we
standing,
apply them to things,
knowledge of the world is the productof our mental organiza
the mind
know
tion ; of things-in-themselves
can
nothing.
is insoluble.
Accordinglythe problem of the nature of reality
of a judgment we
Kant speaks of the objectivity
When
must
and universality
bear in mind that he means
the necessity
with
and extends to all the
all minds
which it imposes itself on
of experience.The condition of this objectivity
cases
possible
he declares to be the
transcendental
apperceptionof the
ego', that is to say, that over and above the empiricalcon

and

'

is variable

sciousness,which

and

individual,there

super-individualconsciousness, which

is the

same

be

must

in

all men,

in itself,
and unknowable
and of which the intuitions of
priori
of the understandingare but the
and the categories
sensibility
a

functions.

(Vernunft). Since

4. Reason
the

only to
Yet

we

are

ourselves

scientific

knowledge extends

world, the super- sensible is unknowable.

obligedto conceive it,since we experiencewithin
sensible

of

need

the

phenomena

that

with

some

unconditioned

world

and

the

are

the

and

soul,unconditioned

into relation the

phenomena

and,
respectively,

above

relative

and
bringing conditioned
into
objectsof our cognitions

absolute
wholes

the

realities. Thus
with which

of the external and

these, God, whom

relation

we

we

internal
conceive

bring
senses
as

the

of these two, are the three pure ideas or a priori

supreme cause
These ideas no longerapply to any
forms of the pure reason.
thing material that is the objectof experienceand they have

value.
only a subjective
scientific knowledge stops at the threshold of
part in the
super-sensible
reality.But this occupiesno mean
by
Kantian
seeing that theoretic life is dominated
To

moral
142.

sum

up

system,
his second Critiquewill show
life,
as
The

Critique

of

Practical

us.

Reason."

Knowledge

or

actual
with our
experiencehas nothing in common
conduct forms a domain
moral experience
; the direction of our
analysesthought ; in the
apart. In his first CritiqueKant

theoretic

second

THE

OF

OUTLINES

458

HISTORY

OF

PHILOSOPHY

analysesaction, and to determine

the same
on
regulatemoral conduct he proceeds,
he

first treatise,
to
then

get

determine

to

clear

as

in the

moralityand

which

conditions

the

lines

of the idea of

meaning

which

laws

the

it presupposes.
there exists an
obligation

That
obligation.
finds that it
conscience attests, but in analysingit Kant
our
does not consist in a precept, applyingin a particular
case, nor
in a hypothetical
I
wish
that if
to
imperative,which means
obtain a certain good known
by experienceI must act thus or
1.

so.

Idea

of moral

The

moral

command

is

and

men

'

worth

The

2.

moral

man

as

'

imperativethus
'

'

Act

Act

as

of

out

if the

Act

obedience.

accordingto
for thine

reverence

maxim

which

from

thou

through thy will a universal law of

(cp.Stoicism,32).
The existence of the
postulatesof Practical Reason.
become

to

were

nature

'

unconditional

exacts

it is the law

the law because

'

and

this formal

expresses

actest

any utilitarian motive and universally

in all cases, one
which
givesno external

for its commands

reason

own

is to say,

that
categorical
imperative,

independentof

valid for all

He

law

law involves

without

which

as

the reality
of
corollary

moral

conduct,

as

so

certain conditions

defined, would

no

be

possible.These guarantees, which we cannot prove but must

postulate,restingthem on the consciousness that thou canst,
for thou ought est ',are demanded
and
reason,
by the practical
threefold,
are
(i) Freedom, or the autonomy of the practical
'

the

reason,

does

follow any

not

ing to

self-determination

pure

the

ditioned

by

an

because

which

before

reason,

empirically
givenimpulse,but

law

moral

of the rational will.

is the

such

law.

acts

The

This

accord

theoretic

con
as
phenomenon
appears
phenomenon (categoryof efficient

every

antecedent

freedom
and
the conception of
ignores human
causality),
finality.(2)Immortalityof the soul. A second postulateis the
of
conceptionof the highest good. Virtue or the observance
as
duty is not the same
happiness, but virtue is worthy of
it. Since the
demands
happinessand the moral consciousness

present life does

realityof
(3) God,
reward
Kant

and

not

for

future
an

for moral

conceived

fulfilthis

not

life,and

authoritative
conduct
the

in external

demand,

we

this involves
voice

must
a

postulatethe

third

impliesa

:
postulate
law-giverand

rewarder.

moralityof
conduct, and

an

act to rest in the intention

thus

natural

law, which

is

460

OUTLINES

it

By

but

of

beautiful

is

calm

beautiful

definite

is

when

comparison

86

the

the
deal

we

had,

English

in

remarkable
the

an

as

the
a

it

moral

on

it

law
of

of

for

give

to

the

the

the

is

object

of

concept
satisfaction

calm

is

sentiment,
'

impression
all

beyond

great
of

sense

the

faculty,

the

humiliating
what

literature

Kant

on

on

is

the

ethics

Coleridge
the

'

gives

of

influence

especially

(1795-1881),

of

of

exalted

the

85.

chapter,

system

not

with

face

influence

unparalleled

exponents,

Carlyle

to

following
of

more

too,

face

sentiment

aesthetic

rise

gives

ultimately

but

supremacy

Christianity

it

not

our

which

finality,

known

all

attributes

play

not

senti

for

satisfaction

does

were

understanding

our

Besides

which
of

of

nature

is

faculty

free

the

to

procure

are

the

gives

first

at

is

of

sublime

to

The

This

this

if

The

complex

the

it

beautiful

the

relation

states.

indication

an

for

vanish.
it

sublime

serene

but

design,

would
for

is

please

to

the

satisfaction.

gives

made

nature

and

and

disinterested

their

representative

our

their

in

is

it

beautiful

The

things

and

which

PHILOSOPHY

OF

phenomena

harmony

faculties.

HISTORY

THE

apprehend

we

of

ment

OF

of

origin
than

one

as

(1772-1834),
the

to

the
of

tendency
dogmatic

Wordsworth

English-speaking

with

thought,
in

see

literature,

German

of

philosophical

difficult

not

and

assertion

his

regard

to

truth.

He
his

through
(1770-1850)
world.

TRS.
"

III

CHAPTER
POST-KANTIAN

PHILOSOPHY

(Nineteenth
Century)
I.

GERMAN

PHILOSOPHY

DURING

NINETEENTH
144.

General

sophy

of the

It took

Sketch.

nineteenth
time

OF

THE

CENTURY

century

before

HALF

influence of Kant

The

"

FIRST

THE

it

upon the philo

scarcelybe exaggerated.

can

felt outside

Germany, but
there it was
and gave birth during the first three
immediate
decades of the century to several original
systems, and as its
result German
before.
This
geniusrose to a heightunknown
some

was

the time also of

had

much

in

common

provide

them

are

was

great development of romanticism, which

with the

movement.
philosophic
The
various disputesranged chieflyabout
two
points in
Kant's teaching,
and the transcendental
the noumenon
apper
which
have
new
we
ception(141),concerning
attempts
many
Kant
the a
made
to formulate
critical philosophy, (i)
a
of the mind,
forms of knowledge to belong to the structure
priori
which
these forms elaborate ;
but not the experimentalmatter
to him
an
the production of sensible impressionsremained
to
which
are
enigma, since things-in-themselves
necessary

selves to solve this

the

to be

itself,and

much

as

thereby

Critical Realists
themselves

and

transcendental
the

problem by taking a

world-in-itself.

matter

same

tion, was
German

Kant's

unknowable.

The

so

product of

denied

sensible

affirmed

the mind

existence

the

their

experimental

of

as

the form-in-

noumena

impressionsto
real

them

attitude towards

new

Critical Idealists made

the

referred

set

successors

existence.

the

things-in(2) The

consciousness
apperceptionor super-individual

for all men,

to

which

Kant

had

devoted

littleatten

given a preponderatingplacein the thought of his

disciples.Most of them transformed his doctrine by
461

462

OUTLINES

HISTORY

THE

OF

PHILOSOPHY

OF

the transcendental
interpreting
apperceptionin a monistic
sense,
regardingit as identical for all men, the universal Ego
or
Spirit.
In classifying
derived from
the German
Kant,
philosophies
and
if we
leave aside his immediate
disciples
opponents, we
consider

may

Kantianism.

As

greatest transformation of
reaction, in some
respects, againstthis

the criticalrealism

was

represented by Fichte,

the first and

Hegel as

and
Schelling

idealism

critical idealism

the

of

Schopenhauer

Herbart.

and

endeavoured
who
to
Lastly,there was a group of psychologists
vindicate
against the exaggerations of this metaphysical
but even
criticism the rightsof individual experience,
their
so

evidence

unmistakable

showed

conclusions

of

Kantian

impress.
145.

system of Kant

new

by

Disciples and

Immediate

The

to
original

too

was

be

Kantianism, and
versities of

it

whence

in

Tinged

Germany.

the

spread into

time

short

called

was

with

The

"

fullycomprehended

his first disciples.

They first of all formed

universityof Jena,

of Kant.

Opponents

other

school

second
the

at the

of

home
other

doctrines,the

uni
new

philosophyinfiltrated into the theory of natural law (FEUERBACH), of history(SCHLOSSER) and the historyof philosophy
Kant's
(TENEMANN and BUHLE). The most notable among
first followers
SCHILLER
of the

with

S7

(1758-1823) and the

former
developed several

REINHOLD

were

(1759-1805)

The

Critiqueof
regard

the

to

Reason, but abandoned

Pure

maintaining

noumenon,

Kant's
that

poet
ideas

position
things-in-

explainthe originof our

experimentalimpressions.The latter took from Kant only
of the beautiful,accord
his aesthetic theories.
The impression
ing to Schiller,resides in the contemplationof sensible ap
their
when
we
by with perfectunconcern
pearances
pass
them
scientificelaboration and make
an
objectof disinterested
passing
a
pleasureas if all were
play ; and this is not a mere
phase but occupiesa very largeplace in the psychic life:
is onlytrulyman
when
at play '.
man
On the other hand, Kant
with a very lively
met
opposition
themselves

are

in order

necessary

to

'

'

'

86

Das
87

Bohn

Versuch

einer

Fundament
On

des

the Sublime;

Library).

neuen

Theorie

des

menschlichen

Vorstellungsvermogens

philosophischen Wissens.
Letters

upon

the

Aesthetical

Education

of Man:

(trs.

MODERN

several reviews

and

Hamann

him.
which

Herder

and

contradictions

started

were

divided

he

PHILOSOPHY

up

which

object of combating

criticized the minute

reasonableness

of

Reinhold

and

recognizedby
implicitly

was

the

by the attacks of SCHULZE

MAIMON"
of whom
Kant could
(1754-1800),
adversaries,none
understood him so well.

tiated

Critical

Idealism.

the
nou-

Jacobi's criticisms

forciblysubstan
and SALOMON
(1761-1823)

146.

divisions into

psychic life. Jacobi pointed out

lay hidden in his theory of the

(136, 137). The

menon

with

463

that, of all his

say

Two

critical
principlessum
up
idealism : (i)The world of things-in-themselves
is the product
of our
faculties of representationjust as is the phenomenal
world ; the matter
of our
cognitions
equallywith their form is
of the representing
derived from the structure
ego, who creates
for himself an objectof knowledge.
(2)All psychicfunctions
the self-development
of a principle
are
(which correspondsto the
transcendental apperceptionof Kant), but there exists onlyone
"

psychic principlefor the whole of humanity, and thus this

or
Mind, is the onlyexisting
principle,
reality
(monism).
147. Fichte
(1762-1814)became
acquaintedwith the Kantian

philosophyat Leipzig,and
He

knew

the

Master

at

Konigsberg.

philosophy Jena, and

there from 1794 to 1799 elaborated
an
original
system to which
""
he gave
the name
doctrine
of Wissenschaftslehre
(literally
of science '); this he
modified
in subsequent works 81. He
founded
became the first rector of Berlin University,
which was
succeeded

Reinhold

in the chair

of

at

'

in 1810.
of activity.The
idealism
or
Wissenschaftslehre
absolute and universal Ego is a tendency to act, infinite and
unbroken
acting for itselfand through itself (dasThun
activity,
des Thuns),and in actingit converts
its own
states into objects
of knowledge and
self-consciousness.
by reflection becomes
The
three stages :
of becoming self-conscious covers
process
I.

The

(i)thesis
and
08
8'
te

as

the ego

Aenesidemus
Versuch

Versuch
;
Transcendentalphilosophie

der

existing

(2) antithesis
"

System

der

einer

neuen

Grundriss
Wissenschaftslehre
;

gesammten

Wissenschaftslehre ;

lehre ; Das

itself as

it

(anonymous).

einer

Grundlage

lichen

'

positsitself ',i.e.it knows

identical with itself (Ich
Ich) ;
"

Erste

Sittenlehre

und
:

xweite

(part

trs.

Einleitung in
Kroeger, The

die

der

Logik.
eigenthum-

Wissenschafsof Know

Science

ledge).
91

Die

Works)

Grundzuge
Reden

an

des

gegenwartigen Zeitalters (trs.Smith, Fichte' s Popular

die deutsche

Nation.

464

OUTLINES

THE

OF

positswithin

HISTORY

itself the

object

an

be

must

be

in mind

but

the Fichtean

that

universal

the

it is limited

'

not

world

as

ego

'

not

means

it

(and

the

self-consciousness)
becomes

determined

and

world,

the

"

borne

that

aware

the

absurd) but
;
(3) synthesis the
representation

of

individual

PHILOSOPHY

i.e. it creates

non-ego,
world-in-itself (which would

the

OF

by

the

non-ego,

i.e.

object representedin and before the Mind

(theoreticor
representativeego),and that the non-ego is limited and deter
mined
have a division
we
by the ego (practical
ego). Hence
of the Wissenschaftslehre
into two parts : (a) The Theoretical,
which studies the developmentof knowledge. As every conscious
act, accordingto Fichte, entails reflection on a previousact, the
the

first acts

of

the

Fichte

maintains

is the

fruit of

These

sensible

mind

be

cannot

that

the

and

ones,

thus

generation of experimentalmaterial

unconscious

an

conscious

self-determination

of the

ego.

impressions are then elaborated according to

all the apparatus of the a prioriforms
of
of the pure reason
Kant,
(b) The Practical,which shows that if the ego is inces
this is because
santlycreatingto itself objectsof representation
it is a tendency to act, and
without resistance or an
object
opposed to it,it would not act ; the ego is theoretic or knowing
it is practicalor acting,that is to say, it
because
precisely
in order

represents a non-ego
foundation

knowing

is the
is

absolute need
is the

Such

need

of the

ego

which

Fichte

gave

sense

autonomy

or

the

"

for the

serves

which

is

'

2.

he draws

second

the

that

of the ego,
morality lies.

own

accomplishment
'

for further

The

this

other
of

from

the

than

duty.

the absolute and

Kantian

It is

practicalreason.

of its

positingof

morallywhen
motive

value

no

to

self-determination

sake,
activityfor activity's
which

act, and

to

duty.

primacy of

represented has

it. The
ultimate
upon
of the intelligence
to be

act

impulse

absolute

new

doctrine of the
in this

incessant

of the

to

precisely
impelledto
Nature

material

as

The

universal

as

individual

Ego

of every
insufficiency

"

acts

action

activity.

idealist

system of Fichte introduced

the idea

Since
reflection or the funda
Being, God.
mental
activityof the Ego is by its very definition a turning
back upon something anterior to itself,
it follows that, to explain
there must
be at the beginning an absolute and
its possibility,
immutable
form of reflection,but
principle
; this is not a mere
of

an

absolute

PHILOSOPHY

MODERN

knowing or reflection is nothing else but a

and phenomenal continuation
of the Absolute.
actuallyfounding a school,Fichte greatlyinfluenced

Conscious

God.

necessary

Without

Schellingand Hegel.
at Jena from 1798,
a professor
Schelling (1775-1854)was
first taught side by side with his master
Fichte, but he
of

thought

the

465

148.

and

at

until
colleague,
went

he

is marred

Hegel

as

and
disciple

From

opponent.

an

great

no

Jena

he

finallyto Berlin (1841),

His philosophic
work

success.

unity,for it comprised

of

its want

by

had

universities,and

with

met

he

Later

also became

he

different

to

where

him.

with

broke

soon

at

least five

systems.

Physicalidealism91 (1797-1799)is only a development of

1.

part of the Fichtean

one

is

nature

tion.
to

It is

rhythm

the
of

stages
Thus

nature.

moral

merely a
it as
own

evolution and

of absolute

various

Science', namely that

did

nature
;

not

purposiveness,
through
different kingdoms

constitute

which

value

of

account

an

Doctrine

product of mind representa

psychical
of unconscious
Spiritpassing,
according

it is

as
spirit,

'

the

with

as

possess,

the

Schellingadvocated

Fichte,

recognitionof

and the study of it for its

product of spiritual
activity
sake.
His philosophy had
considerable influence,the
a
a

more

because

so

unity

of

romantic

life

cosmic

the

scientists of

theories

the

schools, with

held

were

which

he

evolution

absolute
in

high
in

It succeeded

time.

his

of the

in

was

revival

esteem

gaining over
close

touch.

by

and
the
the
And

of

Spinoza'steaching
which resulted from the polemicalwritingsof Lessing. The
is endowed
with one
vital principle
conceptionthat the cosmos
and
in
is found
in the teaching of his immediate
disciples
further, it benefited

OKEN

from

the

NOVALIS

(1749-1832)and

(1779-1851),GOETHE

(1772-

1801).
Transcendental

2.

ceived

under

the

second

form

which

by

9 *

eines
93

complete
Ideen

tu

cincr

idealism** (1800-1801),con
the
influence of German
romanticism, was
or

aesthetic

It is marked

Schelling's
philosophytook.

fusion

of romanticist

Philosophicder

Natur

idealist

and

Von

der Weltseele

w
teachings

Erster

Entwurf

Systems der Natur philosophic.

Der

transcendentale

Idealismus

Vorlesungen

ubcr

die

Philosophic

der

Kunst.
94

This

had

(1772-1829).

already

been

begun

by

Novalis

and

especiallyby Schlegel

466

OUTLINES

the aesthetic
all its

OF

the absolute

PHILOSOPHY
is the

Ego

of
principle
which reduces to unitythe
both the theoretic and the practical
ego ; and
of art is the ego producingitself most
perfectly.

the basic function

activities,

the work

Certain
as

HISTORY

production of

operations of
hence

THE

OF

romanticists, such
'

the

'

humorists

romantic

'

or

SCHLEGEL

as

ironists ',drew

and

SOLGER,

the conclusion

known
that

the

ego of the

poet, invested with the prerogativesof the

Ego, produces for the sake of production itself,

absolute
without

any

for the content

concern

of the work

of art

or

public

judgment.
This

second

conscious
both

in

system

ego,

as

of

Schellinggives an

the first did of the non-ego.

of the

account

Later he united

third system.

3. Absolute

idealism

or

the

95
(1801philosophyof identity

1804). Schelling
graduallymodified the subjectiveidealism of
Fichte by giving nature
real value
a
independent of con
sciousness or spirit
common
; he then sought for some
ground
anterior
and
from
consciousness
to
both
nature
or
principle
which

he

defined

could deduce

it as

both

; this he

called the Absolute

and

identityof the real and the ideal. One of his

Oken, symbolized it by the symbol + o. The
contemporaries,
Absolute
developsitself in a twofold seriation, the real and
the ideal,and the pointsof similarity
between
Schellingand
the neo-Spinozismbecome
marked.
more
Later the philosophyof identity
form
assumed
new
a slightly
by the Absolute beingregardedas not indifferent but endowed
of
and Ideas.
with Intelligence
KRAUSE
one
was
(1782-1832)
his many
followers who adopted this system, and put it in an
originalform
theism

and

the

'

as

panentheism

divine

'

in which

he tried to fuse pan

identityof being and

personality.The
taken up by Hegel and Schleierthought was
very effectively
and the latter a religious
macher, the former givingit a logical
SCHLEIERMACHER
direction.
(1768-1834)acknowledged that
attain to any direct knowledge of God we have
whilst we cannot
that we are interpenetrated
a feeling
by the Absolute, and it is
this religious
sentiment
which
keeps the balance of all the
faculties and is the foundation of morality.
offreedom"1
(1804-1813).In this system
4. The philosophy
"8
96

lichen

Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophic.

Philosophic und Religion; Untersuchungen iiber
Freiheit.

das

Wesen

der

mensch-

OF

OUTLINES

468

THE

HISTORY

OF

PHILOSOPHY

organics(life).(3)^Thephilosophyof Spiritor

Mind

(Geist)

t"

studies

conscious

the

of

return

the^Idea

This is the most

itself in

upon

of

original
humanity.
Hegel'sthought.
part
The
philosophy of Spiritcomprises three parts : (a) Psy
traces the stages of
Spirit,
chology,or the study of Subjective
the
individual
spirit,through
knowledge through which
of thesis, antithesis and
multifold contradictions
synthesis,
of its identitywith the universal and
gains a consciousness
science of Objective
absolute Spirit, (b) The
Spirit,or of
and various manifestations
of
humanity, reviews the many
social lifeand the development of these.
The highestrealiza
tion of objective
mind is the State,by which he means
not any
determined
state, but the gradual evolution of civil society.
(c)The science of Absolute Spiritconsiders mind as it becomes
of mind), in religion
of
in art (contemplation
(representation
mind),and in philosophy(theconcept of mind).
Hegel regarded the world as necessarily
being what it is,
exist only in its becoming, and this becoming
since Spiritcan
evolves accordingto a logical
necessity.Thus we see how the
all his thought and
colours
historical conceptiondominates
and humanity, which is
every detail in his whole study of man
the supreme
becoming of the Idea.
followers,and they
Hegel had many
the special
faithful adherents
to his thought, except on
were
soul,
problem of God and the personal nature of the human
The
which
so-called
over
they divided into two
camps.
150. The

Hegelians.
"

'

(1784-1861)and
rightwing ', to which belonged GOSCHEL
admitted
BAUER
the personality
of God
and the
(1809-1882),
soul, whilst others, such
personal immortalityof the human
RUGE
as
(1802-1880)and FEUERBACH
(1804-1872;in later
life became
maintained
that God is a universal
a
materialist),
substance
and impersonal. Many others,WEISSE
(1801-1866),
and
FICHTE
ULRICI
the
(1797-1879)
(1806-1884),
younger
followed

Hegel

for the

sundry pointsand
151.

various

extra mental

"8

The

creature,
derived

made

from

"

differed from

of
personality

Critical idealism

as

the

worked
theories

elaborated

concessions in the direction

of

out
by Giinther, a personal God
both
of Hermes^
condemned
by the

Hegelian teaching.

him

on

98.

God

in its

allowingthe

of reality.Critical realism
objectivity

dualism
and

part, but

affirmed the

Critical Realism.
forms

most

claimed
and

to

monistic

Church,

were

PHILOSOPHY

MODERN

469

Kantian

by concedingreal existence
principles
Monism, which is not Kantian, was
to things-in-themselves.
adopted by Schopenhauer, but not by Herbart, whilst others
movement.
inaugurateda psychological
152. Schopenhauer
(1788-1860)obtained his doctorate at
be

to

return

(where he
Jena, and went to live at Dresden and at Weimar
staff at Berlin
knew
Goethe) until he joinedthe professorial
(1820). He retired to Frankfort in 1831, where he remained
tillhis death.

elegantwriter and

An

World

The

chief work

idealism,and

at the

mordent

Will

as

and

critic,he undertook
Idea

"

time, working

in his

violent attack

on

material

supplied
cosmic
original
synthesis.The
of the
In treating
thing-in-itself.

same

on

by Kant, he elaborated an
and
world is representation
it appears
that
to us, he shows
world as
or
as
representation
fact of consciousness,is dependent
the primordial
representation,
of the faculties,
forms belongingto the structure
the a priori
on
namely, time, space and causality.In treatingof the world
and
as
realityhe maintains the existence of a thing-in-itself
Of

will.

identifies this with

of will

the nature

we

can

Therefore

to phenomena.
nothing except by opposition

know
it must

time and
is dependent on
representation
space, the will is independentof the forms of time and space,
but is one
it is not subjectto multiplication
(monism) ; and
since it is unhampered by the laws of efficient causality and
be

that, since

said

thus

without

acts

bounds

or

Leben)

infinite activity
(Willezum
not

are

the effect of will but

of effect and

cause

Therefore, too,

phenomena

and the relation

its objectivization,

things-in-themselves.
down, Schopenhauer proceedsto their

does

not

laid
principles

These

; it is blind and

cessation,it is free

extend

to

application(a)in nature, includingman,

every part of which,
in its higher or lower order, he sees to be only different types of
that the beautiful
will ; (6) in aesthetics, where
he shows
the
volitive energies of matter, and
realizes in a higher way
'

'

'

that the

with

the

intuition

Die

'

genius

world-in itself 10" ;

doctrine of

99

of

Welt

pessimismon
als Wille

und

is able to

put

us

in direct contact

(c)in morality,where

he

restlessness in the will,and

Vorstelhmg (trs.Haldane

and

bases
looks

for

Kemp).

in his
to translate
Especially
musical
compositions this insatiable self-expressionof will, the thing-in-itself,
made
was
Wagner (1813-1883).
by Richard
100

is this

achieved

in

music.

An

effort

OF

OUTLINES

470

nirvana

THE

HISTORY

the cessation of

or

OF

PHILOSOPHY

in the

sorrow

negation of

act

every

of will.
of Schopenhauer was
HARTVON
disciples
MANN
who, in his Philosophyof the Unconscious
(1842-1906),
written later,assigneda part to reason
and voluminous
works
whilst maintainingthe primacy of will,and expressedhimself
less pessimistic
salvation not in mere
by foreseeing
personal
Chief

the

among

asceticism

in collective social effort.

but

Herbart1

(1776-1841),a professor at
admitted, againstFichte and Hegel,the existence
153.

(Realen)for

themselves
it would

not

in-themselves

the
But

'.

appear
such
are

that

reason

if the world

'

did not

he

Gottingen,
of things-in-

consider

not,

were

that

things-

they appear ; they are immutable

and they are
and always keep their identity,
not affected by
etc. ;
any of the contradictions involved in extension,causality,
and
in fact, inherence
than
succession are
nothing more
relations which we
set up between
thingsand which do not
He abandoned
the monistic concep
affect thingsthemselves.
tion of Schopenhauer and the majorityof the German
criticists
by maintainingthe multiplecharacter of realities (Realen).
In applyingthese principles
the
to psychologyhe conceived
and its faculties and acts as pure
soul as a simplereal essence,
the soul and

relations between

theory of

of
plurality

the fundamental
Herbart

tion

influence

themselves
The
among

other

faculties and

and

are

which

we

the

He

rejectedthe

as
regarded representation
The theory of education,

in

way

creators, shows
which

that

educa

unfold
representations

associated.
Herbart
may

and

ZIMMERMANN,

of the

one

was

of
disciples

later

on

mention

LAZARUS,

Comparative
Volkerpsychologie,
154. The

Realen.

function of the soul.

of which
can

as

became

an

DROBISCH,
who
or

Psychological School.

"

importantgroup,
and

STEINTHAL

inauguratedthe
Folk- Psychology.

so-called

In addition to the two

main

metaphysicalcurrents of post-Kantian philosophythere was a

asserted the claims of individual
who
group of psychologists
psychology,and emphasized the
experienceand of descriptive
value
chief

of Kant's
one,

and

first researches.

he maintained

FRIES

that internal

(1773-1843)was
informs
experience

the
us

zuv
Psychologie (trs. Smith) ;
Hauptpunkte der Metaphysik ; Lehrbuch
ah
Wissenschaft.
Psychology
Kritik der Vernunft.
als evidente Wissenschaft,Neue
System dcr Philosophic
1

MODERN

PHILOSOPHY

of the a priori
forms which
very directly
of the world, and
this same
conscious

existence

471

regulateour

elaboration

feelingteaches

the

us

Others, such as BENEKE

things-in-themselves.
failed to detect in the data of consciousness
(1798-1854),
elements
of knowledge.
presence of a priori
II. FRENCH

PHILOSOPHY

MIDDLE
155.

OF

General

materialistic
France.

course

with

which
spiritualism

of

of

full attention

French

of certain

still the

in

form

predominated in

through the writingsof

the

Scottish

cases

showed

received

the

of this period.
philosophers
thought reappeared under a

Sensualism.

France

an

Catholic

which
positivism,

very great success.

156.
Materialistic

the

part of

philosophy. In
growth of rival

ontologism,which

line of

sensist

of

some

German

this eclecticism witnessed

and

the

on

in

philosophy in

theories

Cartesianism, and
of

THE

Revolution

dominant

blended

TO

the

CENTURY

reaction

influence
superficial

of time

seductive

the

the

was

systems in traditionalism
Later

Until

"

met

soon

REVOLUTION

THE

NINETEENTH

THE

sensualism

school with elements

signs

FROM

Sketch.

This

eclectic

of

at

was

"

the end

such

with

destined to meet

school

This
of the

of

thought
eighteenthcentury

the Revolution

of
partisans

as

DE

CONDORCET4
SAINT-LAMBERT

(1757-1820)and DE
(1743-1794),DE VOLNEY
(1716-1803),who
applied the principlesof

life. CABANis6
political
whilst
extended
them
to the field of epistemology,
(1757-1808)
GALL
(1758-1828) and BROUSSAIS
(1772-1832)thought that
in phrenology an
experimental proof
they had discovered
of their materialistic psychology. On the other hand, we have
other
in certain
the first signs of a reaction
physiologists,
and
Montpellier,
notably in the Schools of Medicine at Paris
;
(1734-1806)
(1711-1802)and BUCHEZ
representedby BICHAT
a
and
time
TRACY
the same
at
DESTUTT
(1754-1836),
DE
of Condillac,and DEGERANDO
corrected the exaggerated
disciple
view of the physiological
sensists,that the originof our psychic

materialism

de

to

Lehrbuch

Esquisse d'un

natural

law

and

der

Psychologic als Naturwissenschaft.

humain.
tableau historiquedu progrds de I'esprit
6
La
loi naturelle ou principesphysiques de la morale, dtduits
I'homme
et de I'univers ou cattchisme
du citoyenfran^ais.
'
Les rapports de physique et du moral de I'homme.

de I'organisms

OUTLINES

472

HISTORY

lies purelyin sensation, by

states

and

THE

OF

so

preparedthe

way

157.

Spiritualism

of the

OF

PHILOSOPHY

sensism
system of ideological

for Maine

de Biran.

Eclectic

School.

Maine

"

de Biran

is

commonly considered as the first representativeof the

Victor
school, of which
psychologico-spiritualistic

French

became

Cousin

the

gave

unrivalled

the

sualism.

of

name

leader.

made
eclecticism,

Although its
system, they were

uniform

knowledge

school, to which

at

did

all

not

on

sen

follow

any
t
hat
intellectual
asserting

in

one

vigorousattack

adherents

reduced

be

cannot

sensation, that immaterial

soul and God, do exist,and that
to

substances, notablythe human

moralityhas

This

Cousin

basis.
was
spiritual
Psychological
introspection
the chief method
employed in this spiritualistic
philosophy.
MAINE
BIRAN 7 (1766-1824)emphasized the activityof
DE
the will as the fundamental
function of our
being and per
and
herein found
the boundary between
sonality,
psychical
and physiological
life. He regarded the will as giving us a
consciousness
not
only of our own
activitybut also of a
a

coming from

resistance

without, and

voluntaryeffort which bringsbefore

and

substance,

AMPERE

and

the

ROYER-COLLARD

of

this attention

classification which

capacity for

of

awareness

the notions of

us

elements

other

(1775-1836)confined

it is this

causality
a
metaphysic.
chieflyto the

intelligenceenjoys8.

the

the immediate
(1763-1845),

precursor of Cousin,
and Ampere by intro

completedthe views of Maine de Biran

ducing the psychological
teachingof the Scottish school, and
which
inaugurated in France a philosophyof common
sense
prevailedagainst the sensist school.
VICTOR
COUSIN 9 (1792-1867),
the leader of the spiritualistic
enabled by lecture courses
at the Sorbonne
school, was
(1815and
1820) and influence subsequentlygained in academical
life to secure
the triumph of his eclectic system during
political
the

first half of the

consolidate
various

into

portance

to the

paths,and

new

initiator of this

For

this

His

century.

system truths

one

systems.

nineteenth

Nouvelles

considerations

Essai

sur

la

"

Cours

de I'histoirede la

sur

France.

to

in
up and down
attached
great im

he

reason

DegeYando may

study in

was

scattered

historyof philosophy,wherein
with

design

He

les rapports du

be

he

opened

considered
his

meant

physique

et du

as

out

the

philosophyto
moral.

philosophicdes sciences.
moderne
philosophie

Du

vrai, du beau

et du

bien.

MODERN

be eclectic,
but in
and

more

to

more

PHILOSOPHY

473

it was
not and
reality
be a particular
system,

could
and

be

not

it came

it is apparent that

in his classification of historical systems into sensualism,

mysticism, scepticismand idealism he gave a preferenceto

even

idealism.

Next

he

took

later
up the ideas of Royer-Collard,
the teachings
of Hegel,and finally
he arrived at a spiritual

on

isticsystem of his

which,

own,

as

combination

vague

of the

theories of the Scottish school, Descartes and Royer-Collard,

makes the observation of the phenomena of consciousness the
of all philosophy;
starting-point
the true, the

kind of

by a

of the

Of

good, space

and

the

time,

mysteriousrevelation

soul,God, the beautiful,

all made

are

which

is an

known

to man

work
inexplicable

reason.

the

of Cousin
disciples
who
JOUFFROYIQ (1796-1842),

THEODORE
tuated

the

numerous

the

Cartesian

tendencies

of

still further

school

the

is

known

best

accen

its psy
that of

and

The
exclusive
method
method.
chological
was
same
DAMIRON11
SAISSET18
(1794-1862),GARNIER12
(1801-1864),
and BARTHELEMY
SAINT(1814-1863),
JUL. SIMON (1814-1896)
HILAIRE
(1805-1895).
158. Traditionalism
the

on

and

part of the French

Ontologism.
Catholics

There

"

was

reaction

againstmaterialism

and

rationalism
the

duringthe firsthalf of the nineteenth century, but

the power of our
systems embodying it unduly depreciated

intellectual faculties.
Traditionalism
which

the

was

first and

most

powerful form

in

it

time a reaction against

appeared,being at the same
eclectic spiritualism.
DE BONALD
(1754-1840),the founder of
the traditionalist school,lived duringthe periodof the Revolu
but its theory of the
tion, and opposed not only its excesses
originand mission of social power by putting forward the
his
14. In his theoryof philosophyhe showed
Catholic position
originality
mostly in regard to the genesisof ideas. Before the
human

could

reason

attain to any

there

truth

was

needed,

as

God.
condition, a primitiverevelation from
prerequisite
Moreover, even
language itself,as well as these fundamental

sentiments

10

Les

11

Essai

sur

du

beau

I'histoire de la

et du

11

Traite

des facultts de I'dme.

l"

Essai

de

14

des

sublime

philosophicen

Cours
France

de droit naturel.
XIX's.

an

Philosophic religieuse.
sur
legislation
primitive; Recherches philosophises
connaissances ^morales. See Psych.,98; Crit., 24; Nat.
La

les

premiers objets

TheoL,

12.

OUTLINES

474

OF

truths, must

have

transmitted
the

revealed

been

down

HISTORY

THE

PHILOSOPHY

OF
to

have

They

man.

been

of tradition

the medium

throughsociety,
de Bonald
maintained,
oppositionto
theory of social contract, to be primordialand
by

originof which

Rousseau's

in

natural.

JOSEPH

thought of
scribed
alism

15

MAISTRE

DE

(1754-1821)followed

de Bonald.

rather

Catholic

by proclaimingthe

of every

tradition,which

capableof knowing.

Church

the individual

After

as

political

(1782-1854)sub
tradition

of
epistemological
principles

the

to

16

MENNAIS

LA

DE

the

up

the sole

himself is in

left to

being regardedfor

depositary

long time

as

for
the leader of the Catholic party in France, and well known
his personalfriendship
with Lacordaire, Montalembert
Gerbet,
etc., he at

with his friends and

length broke

to the decisions

refused to submit

; the final phase of his

of the Church

philosophy,

showed
evidence
Esquissed'une philosophic,
of pantheistic
tendencies.
of the traditionalist
The principles
BAUTAIN
carried on by BALLANCHE
teaching were
(1776-1847),
and BONNETTY
(1798-1879),who in 1830 started
(1796-1867),
the Annales
de philosophie
chretienne.
Ontologismwas another form of reaction. Its characteristic
in God.
doctrine was
that we see the objectof our ideas directly
It was
broached
in France by such men
as
a theorywhich
was
in Italyin the
Fabre d'Envieu, but found its best defenders

developedin

as

of

person

of

Ubaghs.

different
159.

his

It

was

of the

censures

Positivism.

it had assumed

into

in this

AUGUSTE

COMTE

An

enthusiastic

See.

passed from the extravagant

periodof the French Revolution

duringthe

seductive

problems :

Holy

Sensualism

"

form

more

(1801-1852) and in Belgium in that

broken, together with traditionalism,by

Gioberti

new

form

as

appearance

was
(1798-1857)

advocate

of

the

solution to
it was

known

the founder

social

epistemological
as

of

positivism.
positivism.

teachings of

SAINT-

with
however, he subsequently
whom,
(1760-1825),
he opened at Paris in 1826 a Cours de philosophie
quarrelled,
i.e.
17,published 1830-1842. Only what is positive,
positive
only facts which are accessible to observation by the external
senses,
according to Comte, be the object of scientific
can,

SIMON

16

Soirees de Saint-Peter sbourg.

I'indifference
matiere de religion.
sur
en
17
Abbrev.
trs. Harriet
Martineau, The Positive
See Natural Theology, "1
11

Essai

Philosophy of

A.

Comte.

OUTLINES

476
his

than
one

HISTORY

THE

OF

PHILOSOPHY

In his

study of the individual he endeavours to

that nervous
and consciousness are nothing more
activity
two aspects of the same
phenomenon, and that psychiclife
continual flow of sensations necessarily
connected
with

psychology.

show

is

OF

As

regards social life,as

literature,art

and

interconnexion

of

he explainsthe
politics,
social facts by the influence

another.

one

efficientsof race,
form
the

environment

of determinism.
of

study

These

colossal erudition

and

observations

not

himself

the victim

III. ENGLISH
161.

wonderful

two

IN

Scottish

followers of

All this is in

a
reality
to
applies

NINETEENTH

THE

shows

CENTURY

the

The

the latter became

former

submerged in

constituted

some

unable

were

of French

eclecticism

the

conspicuouswas

or

German
SIR

criticism.
WILLIAM

the vaster

dominant

the

Of the

School; Associationism.-"

Dugald Stewart

admitted

soon

numerous

the

to maintain

the influence

brilliance of the Scottish school,others fell under

most

shows

beginning of the nineteenth

rival schools of philosophy,
the Scottish
At

"

conceptionsof positivismwhich
philosophy.
162. The

co

talent for observation,yet his

school and the Associationist school.

alien elements, and

of the three

always complete and he sometimes

of his own
preconceptions.

Sketch.
were

and

appearance

same

PHILOSOPHY

General

century there

time.

itself in

he also
principles
working out his theory he

history. In
are

and

it manifests

Amongst

the latter
21

HAMILTON

(1788-

in
the teachings of Reid and
1856),who combined
With Reid, he agreedthat inner
an
original
system of his own.
of certain knowledge, and that
experienceis the only source
the
this testimony of consciousness
points out in particular
of Kant

world

existence of the external

also reveals the limits of
mind

of the human

to

ditions of time and space

unconditioned
of the
'

11

Discussions

on

; with

Kant, that consciousness

knowledge,and proves the inability

think anything except under the con
our

:
'

science,therefore, has
Infinite and

Philosophy,Literature

and

no

Absolute.

Education

knowledge
MANSEL

Lectures

on

Meta

of Sir William
Logic. Consult J. S. MILL, Examination
Hamilton's
Philosophy (5th ed., London, 1878).
"
Psychology ; Metaphysics or the Philosophy of Consciousness ; Philosophy
Limits
of the Conditioned;
of Religious Thought. Sir James Mackintosh
here as adhering in certain respectsto the
be
mentioned
must
also
(1765-1832)
School.
His
Scottish
principal philosophical works : Dissertation on the
Progress of Ethical Philosophy; Discourse on the Law of Nature and Nations,

physics;

Lectures

on

MODERN

(1820-1871),the
agnosticisminto

best

known

of

477

his

disciples,
brought this
theology,
making a still
sceptical
employment of Kant's theory of

the service of revealed

stronger and

more

knowledge.

This

tined

PHILOSOPHY

unknowableness

of the

Absolute

was

des

play an important part in other philosophical

ten
dencies in England,e.g. in the system of Herbert Spencer
(164).
Associationism
into
was
favour by THOMAS
brought again
to

BROWN23

(1778-1820),who

burgh, but parted company

he gave

as

beliefs.

necessary

JAMES

MiLL34

Bentham's

with

largerscope

with

was

inasmuch

universal and

our

influential in this direction

who
(1773-1836),

collaborators.
and

at Edin

the Scottish school

association in

to

Still more

physiological
aspect

Dugald Stewart

In

the

was

made

important of

most

psychology

was

he

neglected

the association of

the

conscious

our

states, a process in which we play no active part,account

for the
whole of our psychiclife ; outside the succession of internal and
external

phenomena

Bentham's
With

doctrine that

J. S.

associationism
163.

nothing exists.
moral

Mill,brought up

enlargedits

English Positivism.

value

In ethics

he

reasserted

is identical with

in his father's school

of

utility.

thought,

horizon.

England

"

is the

second

home

of

the teachingsof
positivism.Its advocates here extended
Comte
by combining with them associationist theories and
of any
side : the existence
accentuatingthe epistemological
which
denied was
Comte had definitely
no
supersensible
reality
longerruled out of court, although unknowable, but declared
if not actual.
possible
the most influential in
JOHN STUART MILL K (1806-1873)
was
in England. In psychologyhe found the
spreadingpositivism
laws of association of succession, contiguity and similarity
sufficient to account
for the formation
of our
psychicstates.

He
and

maintained

that

rejectedall

experienceis

priorior
body to

the sole

intuitive
'

of

source

knowledge,

knowledge

and

was

thus

of sensa
possibility
tions
and mind
the series of actual and possible
states '.
to
for
The supersensible
is possiblebut unknowable
: a position

obligedto

reduce

'

*"

Inquiryinto

of the Human

the

permanent

'

the Relation
Mind.

"

Analysis of

16

of Cause

and

Effect;

Lectures

on

the

Philosophy

the Phenomena
Mind.
of the Human
Hamilton's
Philosophy ;
System of Logic ; Examination
of Sir William
Utilitarianism (i3th edition, 1897). See DOUGLAS,
/. 5. Mill (1895),Ethics
58; Logic,88
of J. S. Mill
(1897) ; RICHABV,
op. cit. Also Criteriology,
Ethics, 74,

478

OUTLINES

HISTORY

THE

OF

PHILOSOPHY

OF

which

coined the
Huxley, followed by American
positivists,
word
agnosticism'. In keeping with his main thought Mill
created
a
logic. He held that the fundamental
positivist
axioms
of logicand mathematics
are
merely generalizations
from experience
is nothingbut
invariable and
; that causation
unconditional
that all knowledge deals with
;
sequence
and judgment is only an association of sensations ;
particulars,
kind of inference,from particulars
he recognized only one
to
is not a valid form of
and taught that the syllogism
particulars,
his
proof. His reallyimportant contribution to logicwas
formulation
of the rules and methods
of experimental
inquiry.
In ethics he adhered to the Benthamite
of
the
principle
greatest
more
happiness of the greatest number, but was
genuinely
and
altruistic in his interpretation
laid greater stress on the
than
Bentham's
on
qualitative
quantitativefactor in moral
'

'

'

calculation.
As

respects
BAIN

of
representative

another

follower

the

Mill, must

of

be

in many
ALEXANDER

school, and

same

mentioned

is known
for
psychologist
chiefly
science and as the
availinghimself of current physiological
of the theory of psycho-physical
originator
parallelism.
164. Evolutionism.
The idea of developmentfrom simpleto
complex was appliedto historyby Herder, to astronomy by
Laplace,to zoologyby Buff on and Lamarck, to anatomy and
Baer
and
to geology by Lyell. The
embryology by von
restricted meaning which
the
historyof evolution in the more
DARWIN
of CHARLES
word bears to-day begins with the name
deserves mention in the historyof philosophy
who
(1809-1882),
because of the new
point of view which his discoveries, estab
lished. His
struggle for
provisionalhypothesis of the
became
in his Origin of Species
existence
known
to the world
(1859); and in the Descent of Man he appliedthe evolutionary
theoryto the originof the human
species.He did not profess
who
(1818-1903),

as

"

'

'

to

for the

account

the

first

beginningof

of modern

WALLACE

higher
26

Mental

The

selection

ethics

or

the

(1822-1913)was
powers
Senses

and

Moral

of the

human

did

dogmatize

laid the

by referringthe

strugglefor
more

mind

diffident
in the

Emotions
the Intellect ; The
See Psychology,
56.
Science.

and

he

Darwin

variation.

evolutionistic

natural

to

originof life,nor

and

about

foundation

moral

existence.

feeling
A.

R.

including the
general process of
of

the

Will

Manual

of

PHILOSOPHY

MODERN

development, and
principle.JOHN

he^ allowed
TYNDALL

479

more

to

scope

teleological

GEORGE
(1820-1893),

ROMANES

HUXLEY

(1848-1894)and THOMAS
appliedDarwin's theoryto

the

(1825-1895)and
different departmentsof

others

natural

science.
for HERBERT

It remained
to make

to attempt
(1820-1904)

embracing all the human

philosophical
application
the aim
of his SyntheticPhilosophy,
this was
the

sciences ;
plan of which
1.

SPENCER

General

he announced

in 1860

What
principles.

external and

internal

:"

be

cannot

apprehendedby

is unknowable.

senses

This unknowable,

he is fain also to call force, exists, although

which

in what

know
which

it consists,since

it appears.

These

we

can

we

only the

know

modes

knowable

the

are

and

do
modes

not

in

the ego and the

in virtue of two

they are reducible to unity

running through the whole of Spencerianthought"
principles
the persistence
of the relations of
of force, or the persistence

non-ego,

its manifestations,and

another, or the evolution of force,which is not a

limited, as in the Darwinian
theory, to livingbeings

tions into
process

but

manifesta

of these

the transformation

one

extends

all

to
'

announces

as

an

reality.The
integrationof

law

of

evolution

concomitant

and

matter

Spencer

of motion, during which the matter

dissipation
passes from an
indefinite incoherent
homogeneity to a definite coherent
and during which the retained motion
undergoes
heterogeneity,

paralleltransformation
(FirstPrinciples," 144).
2.
Application of these principles. Spencer applied his
of these laws in the
colossal erudition
to the working out
various departments of human
knowledge : first in the in
organic world, then in the organic,which is only a necessary
who is
in man,
further development of the former, and finally
the most
perfectbirth of nature's travail. In his psychology
'

of the
the

individual

he

transformation

states, and

their

sensation.

It

unknown

life,
the genesisof psychical
investigated
of

nervous

association.

correspondsto

force" the

The
a

phenomena

into

conscious

conscious

state

is noticed

double

manifestation of the

composed of external
aggregate composed of concepts

strong aggregate

sensations,and the weak

and volitions,the latter being the result of the evolution of
the former.

Between

is a certain correlation

the external fact and

the internal there

realism).
(transformed

In

sociologyhe

480

OUTLINES

OF

studied the social nature

the

phenomena

ethics,or

the

the

sense

moral

of

HISTORY

THE

of man,

and

of the
religion,

science

traced

of

evolution

family and

product of
life, and

of

evolution

is

through

politics.In

discovered

he

regulatingconduct,

is itself a

general development
egoism to altruism.

PHILOSOPHY

OF

that

followingthe

i.e.
progressive,

from

is that
which
highest conduct
conducts to
the greatest breadth, length and completeness
of
life '.
Sub-human
justice requiresthat each individual
should
receive his share of the goods and evils which are the
The

'

'

'

of his structure

consequence
is a monument

of

and

erudition,but

conduct.

Spencer'ssystem

it is rather

of art than

work

system of truth.

ST. GEORGE
defender
cile the
of

MIVART

of theistic evolution

1900),who

defended

what

ethics,that the virtue of

IV.
165.

as
unique position

he

as

hypothesiswith the
staunch
philosophy. Another

of utilitarian ethics

ponent

inasmuch

evolutionistic

Christian

of

held
(1805-1900)

JAMES

was

is known
an

PHILOSOPHY

Italy. Hegelianism was

"

as

sought

to

recon

essential doctrines
theist and

op

MARTiNEAU27

(1805the preferential
theory

action consists in its motives.

IN

ITALY
for

AND

long

SPAIN
time

the

leading

the officialcircles.
tendency in philosophical
thought among
28
VERA
and D'ERCOLE
the chief leaders.
were
(1813-1885)
29
A placeapart must
be assignedto GIOBERTI
(1801-1852),
who
of ontologism ; and to
was
a
recognizedrepresentative
30
ROSMINI
who created an original
(1797-1855),
system derived
from
in its theory of ideas.
ontologism,remarkable especially
More
taught,
recentlypositivismhas been systematically
and has a considerable following
in Italy.
166.

Spain.
"

In the middle

of the

nineteenth

century there

largeKrausist school represented

by DEL Rio 31
especially
in
But the most
name
(t 1869)and SALMERON.
distinguished
modern
(1810-1848),an
original
Spain is that of BALMES32
thinker
with
whose
doctrines have
points of contact
many
was

Scholasticism.
87

Types of Ethical Theory.

de philosophichegelienne.
29
Introduzione
allo studio delta filosofia
Del bello ; Del buono.
;
30
Nuovo
sull'
delle
idee; Theodicy (trs.Signini).
saggio
origine
PALHORI^S, Rosmini
(Alcan, Paris, 1908).
31
Sistema
de la filosofia.
*2
Fundamental
Philosophy (trs.Brownson).
28

Essai

Consult

APPENDIX

Contemporary
Problems.

Favourite

167.

interest
philosophical

and,
questions,

among

of

Philosophy
It may

"

to-day

only because he
because
especially

the

was

he demonstrated

modern

states

upon

to all who

where

the

have

fundamental

experimental research

ground

chief

originatorof critical formalism,

the

Moreover,

the

round

centres

of first settlingthe
urgency
the limits of human
knowledge.

him

said that

psychological
round the question
particular
left a prevailing
influence,not

these, in

Kant, indeed, has

of certitude.

be

scientist

come

after

question of

into

joins hands

but

psychical
with

the

philosopherhas led to the creation of a new branch of study,

This
finds
now
a
physiological-psychology.
place in the
syllabusof nearly every modern
university.It originatedat
Leipzig,with the school of Wundt, and Wiirzburg,and has
rapidlybeen taken up all over Europe and in America.
The great favour shown
to psychology has accentuated
the
subjectiveside of aesthetics, the objectiveand metaphysical
of which
of our
element
contemporariesrefuse to
many
recognize. Among
the

Kantian,

formed

in

or

in vogue
first of all note
must
we
theory that aesthetic judgment is only

theories
the

accordance

with

the

functions
'

of

our

mind,

and
'

particularlythe aesthetic of sympatheticfeeling

of Einfiihlung
or
(literallyfeelingoneself into '). This is the
Lee and others,
theory,supported by Lipps,Volkelt, Vernon
that the beautiful consists in the projectionof our
own
feelings
into a natural object or a work
of art ; after we
have invested
it with this new
meaning, we then take pleasurein beholding
it. There is also a theory, put forward
in France
by Lalo,
which
from sociological
premissesconducts by another path to
the conclusion
that the beautiful is a psychicalimpression.
Benedetto
in Italy likewise arrives at aesthetic sub
Croce
jectivism.
even

more

'

481

OUTLINES

482
The

OF

THE

excessive

HISTORY

OF

PHILOSOPHY

attention to

psychologyhas had, too, a

detrimental influence on other branches
of philosophy. In the
first placeit has led to the unjust ostracism of metaphysics.
And
the domain
of logic,
it has invaded
where
beside
similarly
the ancient logicor dialectic there has risen a mathematical
and still more
or
symbolic logic(Peano, Pierce,Mitchell,etc.),
which purposes to study no longerthe
recentlya geneticlogic,
fixed laws of thought but the changing process of mental life
and its genesis(Mark Baldwin).
life has appeared, especially
In the field of ethics new
in
connexion
with social questions,
the principles
of which
are
for
moral
the
matter
school
philosopher.The sociological
claims that only the social side of human
conduct is worthy
of attention ; that the old-fashioned
moral
theory with its
static notions of duty and virtue must
giveplaceto empirical
laws that are subjectto social evolution,and the whole validity
of which
the approbation they receive in a
is derived from
community (Sidgwick,Huxley, Leslie Stephen, Durkheim,
aesthetic reduces judg
Levy-Bruhl): justas the sociological
ments
concerningthe beautiful to judgments which vary from
same

social group
age to age and from one
As for the history
of philosophy,
not
studies
specialized
in the treatment

and

and

also

arisingfrom

and

works

Oriental

the

the

the clash of the multitude

distrust which

this confusion

produced by Deussen, on
philosophy; by Zeller, on the Greek

that of modern
Tendencies

bred.

has

been

have

by Windelband,
168.

be

the confusion

Denifle, Haureau,
on

This may

impulse given by the schools of

progress in historical study in general,

of doctrines

and

question.
philosophical

of any

by
chiefly
Hegel,by the

by

Notable

onlyhave very extensive

it dailyfinds a largerplace

made, but

for

accounted
Cousin

been

to another.

Indian

by

Mandonnet, on the mediaeval ;

Fischer, Boutroux, Delbos, Hoffding,

Baumker,
Kuno
times
and

"

to mention

Systems.

"

but

It is

few

no

names.

easy

to

matter

at the beginningof the twentieth century

segregate philosophies

into well-defined groups.

Positivism
the easiest to recognize,
but they are
contributions

of their individual

and

neo-

marked

exponents.

Kantianism

are

by the personal
It might be safe

have
general that positivismand neo-Kantianism
produced a prevailing
atmosphere of phenomenalism, which is
in

to

say

no

doubt

due

to the

fact that

and
positivism

neo-Kantianism

484 OUTLINES

OF

doctrines

Kantian

THE

HISTORY

OF

(Otto Liebmann,

PHILOSOPHY

Hartmann,

von

Paulsen,

and the
Dilthey,Natorp, Eucken, the immanentists
empirico-criticists)
French neo-criticism,
represented
by Renouvier, bore a close
to the second
Critiqueof Kant, and broughtin a special
affinity

Remke,

voluntarism.

form

of

troux

and

Fouillee

Kant.

to

are

Ravaisson

with

who

Vacherot, Secretan, Lachelier, Bouall in

greater or lesser degreesindebted

follows

Bouillier and

Caro

to

tianism

has

monism

been

drawn

by

Paul

Kantian

philosophique
sources.

professorsin

many

Janet,

last heirs to the

his Testament

from

welcomed

Biran.

of the

one

was

of Cousin, professes
in
spiritualism
adherence

de

Maine

Kan
official

of education.

centres

in
Many of those who side with Kant and the positivists
proclaimingthe bankruptcy of science look for the founda
of the will. This
tion of certitude in an imperativedemand
is inadequate to provide firm
voluntarism
bases for the
theoretic sciences either of ethics or social philosophy,
since
later reflection is brought to bear on the worth of
or
sooner
this need of livingand of willing
and, in so far, reason
again
'

the supreme
arbiter of certitude.
Germany and France Kantian philosophyhas

becomes
From
the

over

'

whole

In

world.

critical idealism, connected

those

of T.

manifest

for

England

which

with

has

are

been

3. Monism

Green

given

the

spread

birth to

prominent

most

Bradley. In America
Emerson, Harris, Everett and Royce have helped to spread
On
idealism.
the other hand, Shadworth
Hodgson, as also
Adamson, have returned to a form of realism; and James
Ward
givesprominence to the function of the will. In Italy,
with Benedetto
Croce and Gentile a neo-Hegelianmovement
names

H.

it has

some

and

years.

is discernible

as

substratum

in

the

critical

who
Kantians
philosophyof a great many
regard the thingin-itself as numericallyone.
And the same
tendencies are to
be observed in some
such as W. K.
evolutionarypositivists,

Clifford,G. Romanes
The

at

stress

he

G. T. Ladd.

monistic

of Lotze
and

and

on

conceptionis also to be found in the philosophy

is as changeable,
the thought of whom
(1817-1881),

times
the

reduces

as

obscure,

mechanical
atoms

to

as

value

that

of Fichte.

of the

After

phenomena

spiritualrealities

and

laying

of nature,

absorbs

their

CONTEMPORARY
in
multiplicity

the

PHILOSOPHY
of

unity

485

singlesubstance

thought,

or

is God.

which

4. Pragmatism, which William

the criterion
to the fore, makes

of Harvard

has

brought

of the truth

of any theory,to
it belongs,to consist in the practicableness

domain

whatever

James

Schiller has
of its consequences.
under
the name
at Oxford
same

advocated
recently
of humanism.

much

the

Inasmuch

as

pragmatism makes out the true to be something relative and

criticism as
changeable,it falls under the weight of the same
be directed againstall utilitarian philosophy.
may
5. Under

the

general

of neo-realism

name

mediatelyprecedingthe war have witnessed

growth of a philosophywhich confesses to
'

'

realities

in themselves

which

certain relations the exterior

of that world
These

are

world

represent

the real existence

and

of

and

in

become

in others the

knowledge

England. Perry in America).

of
reaction
agaii^t the excess^

phenomenalism
positivist

',and

neutral

of

existence

the

in

(Bertram! Russell

systems

admit

'

years im
the rise and rapid
the

in

Kantianism

neo-

thingsoutside of

far

so

In

us.

as

they
than

more

approach to neo- Scholasticism.

6. A special
to be assignedto two philosophers
placerequires
Nietzsche and Bergson.
Nietzsche (1844-1900)is a moralist whose
writinghas had a
His theory
in Germany.
wide influence for evil,principally
respect they mark

one

an

"

with

starts

practisedby

that there is

supposed distinction
of

men

the servile herd

war

which

moral

one

the strong, and another

and
is dictated by weakness
and

code

by

code

pityand

slave
so-called
The
morality has pre
self-abnegation.
it
have
Nietzsche would
vailed owing to Christianity
; but
morality, which according to him
replacedby the master
'

'

'

'

is the
who

end

towards

reckons

judgments

which

we

of

either

naught

value, and

of

violence and

pity or

will enforce

of
frightfulness

the

tend.

must

pain

'

'

The

over-man

will create

new

by

their acceptance

war.

in
combating Kantianism
He
France
by giving to external realityits true value.
creative evolution ',
endeavours
to explain the world
by a
of which the human
mind
is a product,but only a very imper

Bergson has

the

great merit

of

'

fect

one,

and

higher kind
Le

Roy

are

the
of

immediate

knowledge

his well-known

data
'

or

of consciousness

intuition '.

supporters.

MM.

yieldus

Wilbois

and

OF

486 OUTLINES

THE

has

losophy

Scholastic

it received

abandoned,
of

PHILOSOPHY

Although

"

been

never

OF

Philosophy.

Neo-Scholastic

169.

HISTORY

phi

vigour
century (from
new

nineteenth
quarter
Cornoldi, etc.)33,and acquired a
Liberatore, Taparelli,
last

the

about

that

this time

of Pope
pontificate

the

from

impetus

the

speak
began

can

we

of it

Leo

Neo-

as

or

new

XIII.

It is from

Modern

Scholastic

from
this time to accommodate
Philosophy, since it
itselfto the thought of our own
day. This it has been able to
characteristic orientations ; namely,
do owing chiefly
to two
in the first place,
by its contact with the natural sciences and its
to providean explanationof the material and moral world
care
by its
; and, secondly,
by studying the facts in their entirety
all other

with

contact

philosophiesand
theirs by attention to

contemporary

the

the
comparisonof its own solutions with
historyof philosophy.
and
not
Scholastic philosophyis an
Modern
a
objectivist
philosophy,because it makes a place for realities
subjectivist
which are not pure creations of our
mind, althoughit recog
nizes

It

knowing.
find out

to

does

laysdown

imperfections of

if the real exists,it

that

that

have

can

we

and

of it,least of all of substances

critics againstneo-Scholasticism
arise from

and

It is also

belongs to

it

adequateknowledge
reproaches of

The

causes.

aimed

are

Yet

us.

us

at its

metaphysics

misapprehension of it.

intellectualist

an

an

of

manner

our

aspects it reveals itself to

what

under

maintain

not

and

limitations

the

philosophy,
by

which

we

mean

to

and
most
knowledge is the fundamental
perfect
life.
of
activity psychical
Lastly,it is worthy of remark that neo-Scholasticism tends
and
the philosophyof Catholics.
more
more
to become
ever
Indeed, it has replacedthe systems of Ontologism, Tradition
which have all been weighed
alism and Cartesian spiritualism
that

say

88

See

The

PERKIER,

Revival

of Scholastic Philosophy

1909) ; BESSE,
(Louvain, 1902) ; COFFEY,

Century (New York,

et Louvain

to De

Appendix
Modern
Thought
rendered

De

Scholastic

Mandate,

in Cath.

Scholasticism
Univ.

greatest service

Prominent

many.
neo-

the

Wulf's

among

Deux

Bulletin
to

those

the
who

centres

du

Philosophy
Old

and

the

the Sciences
;

Nineteenth

thomiste, Rome

mouvement

and

New

in

PACE,

at

Louvain ;
and

St. Thomas

(1896). Kleutgen, S.J.,had previously

of Scholastic
philosophy in Ger
"

cause

have

contributed

to

the

success

of the

are
Zigliara,O.P., Lepidi, O.P., De Maria, S.J.,
etc. ; in Germany,
Satolli,
Lorenzelli,
Pesch, S.J.,and in
S.J.,

movement

In England Scho
Sulpician M. Farges, Sertellanges,O.P., etc.
been
developed notably by Jesuit writers, and in America
especiallyby the professorsof the Catholic University.
France

lasticism

the

has

CONTEMPORARY

found

and

PHILOSOPHY

Yet

wanting.

it must

487

be

not

thought

appeal to Catholics lies in their Catholicism

its conception of the
but

cannot

interest

world

and

of human

loyaland

every

; on

the

that

its

contrary,

life is such

that

it

unprejudiced mind, quite

independentlyof religiousbeliefs : the theories of this neoof just that

Scholasticism,because they are philosophic,
are
worth
convince
much
reason
us
as
can
they possess. Even
those who do not subscribe to the rejuvenated and more
fully
of
consider
neo-Scholasticism
them
completedsyntheses
worthy
of serious discussion.

Let

add

us

the

first home

at

the

Institut de

been

has

ment

that

founded

establishment

present Cardinal Primate

and

Europe

"

NOTE

ON

the Grand

move

at Louvain, an
Philosophic
and
directed
by Mgr. Mercier, the
of Belgium. It has now
spreadthrough

into America

THE

of the neo-Scholastic

34.

PUBLICATIONS

OF

INSTITUT

THE

DE

Besides

PHILOSOPHIE.

Philosophie,and this Manual, the Institute has been publish

Revue
a
ing quarterly
neo-Scholastiquede Philosophie. The same
topics,it is
interestingto note, have found expression in France in the Revue de Philosophic,
the Revue
Thomiste
the Revue
des Sciences
and
philosophiqueset theologiques,
in Germany
in the Jahrbuch fiir Philosophie und spekulativeTheologieand the
Tomista, and in Italy
Philosophisches Jahrbuch, in Spain in the Ciencia
founded
review
in the Rivista
di filosofia
neo-scolastica.
The
Louvain
was
the see
his
to
elevation
edited
him
until
Mercier
and
by Mgr.
personally
by
of Malines.
of the present editor, Prof, de Wulf,
It then passed to the hands
and was
the point of publishing its S^rd number
on
(August, 1914) when the
broke

war

In
texts

the
the

on

de

out.

1901

Wulf.
de

Cours

Nine

Institute

undertook

Philosophy of
volumes

so

have

far

Lessines

(de Wulf), Godefroid

Brabant
(Mandonnet), Siger de
(de Poorter).

publish

to

the Middle

or

edit

Ages, under

the

series

direction

of studies
of Prof,

or

de

appeared, consistingof the works of Gilles

Fontaines
(de Wulf and Pelzer), Siger de
de Tournai
Courtrai
(Wallerand), Guibert
de

de
three or four years ago : the Annales
transla
arid
and
M.
a
Noel,
of
Mgr. Deploige
editorship
Of the latter have
appeared
and notes, of Aristotle.
tion, with commentary
to the
introduction
the first book
of the Metaphysics by G. Colle and
an
individual
works, besides
few other
mention
To
a
Physics by A. Mansion.
is perhaps
Les Origines de la Psychologiccontemporaineof the Cardinal, which

Two
other series
I'Institut,under
the

also

were

started

publications,there are psychological

especiallydealing with its experimental
Thiery
and
MM.
Defourny and Harmignie on presentby Mgr. Deploige
day problems of natural law and social philosophy ; by M. Noel on epistea book
mology ; by M. Balthasar on metaphysics ; and M. de Wulf announces
his
revised
has
M.
the
whilst
on
Nys
philosophy of art as already in the press,
The
of
physics.
the
to
it
and
accommodated
new
requirements
Cosmology
Institute was
enjoying a period of great and fruitful activitywhen the stormcloud
of war
learn, the material property
burst over
it. Fortunately, as we
the best-known

of his almost

works
by MM.
side ; works

has not been swept

that
it will soon

search.

"

TRS.

away,
be

numberless

Michotte,

and

so
once

that

all sincere

again

the

of the
of
centre

devotees

busy

truth

must

hope

philosophicalre

SYNOPSIS
IN

MAINTAINED

DOCTRINES

PRINCIPAL

THE

STATING

THESES

OF

FORM

THE

IN

THE

MANUAL

Cosmology
I. There
\/

theory,called

kinds

two

are

philosophicatomism

purely scientific,called
II. The

of atomism

one

metaphysical

mechanism

or

atomism

chemical

of mechanism

theory

the

other

(9-11).
reconciled

be

cannot

with

the

chemistry notably with the constancy of atomic

accompanying
weights, affinity,valency, the phenomena
of the same
chemical
combination, and the recurrence
simple
of

facts

and

"

compound

species(12-21).
is

III. Mechanism
of

incompatiblewith

the

ascertained

(22,23).
crystallography
mechanical
explanationof gravity and

IV. The

of gaseous
V. Local
of
nor

Every

IX.

is it

effect ; it is neither
bodies

cause

into matter

and

form

involves

substantial

dependent
intrinsically

form

upon

is divisible

substance

real
and

distinction

substantial

one

may

be

made

form

between

The

(48).
material

its

quantity (57).
X. All the parts of an extended thing are themselves
and in consequence
divisible indefinitely
(58).
XI.

capable

transmissible

(38-48).

(49).
VIII. Every being has only

matter

force, nor

(30-34).

compositionof

contradiction
VII.

is not

mechanical

transformable

qualities

inadequate (25-27).

movement

producing a
VI. The

no

is

bodies

the

results

parts of

whole

are

(59).
488

not

actual

but

extended

parts
potential

PSYCHOLOGY
XII. The

forces

or

powers

of

489
material

beingafford grounds

for various

distinctions beingmade among

them
specific
(67-71).
XIII. The
essential unity of a chemical
compound is a
fundamental
of the Scholastic theory (80-82).
tenet
XIV. The Scholastic theory is in harmony with all the facts
of chemistryand physics(83-95).
XV. The order of the universe and the unityof living
beings
furnish a cogent proofof the Scholastic theory (96-101).
XVI.
The arguments drawn
from
the specific
of
diversity
to exist
propertiesand from the oppositionthat appears
certain properties
of matter
between
furnish only incomplete
proofsof the Scholastic theory (106).
XVII.
is irreconcilable with
several
Dynamic atomism
ascertained
XVIII.

facts

(108,109).

There

is formal

extension

in the

material

world

(113-116).
XIX.
forces

The

body

is not

force

nor

collection of

(117,118).

XX.

Actio

in distans is

'

XXI.
terius

of

essence

Tempus est
(132,133).

'

XXII.

Real

numerus

(121).
physicalimpossibility
motus
secundum
prius et pos-

is a relation of distance in three dimensions

space

(144,145).
II

Psychology
I. Vital
inasmuch

acts

differ from

they

as

are

the

actions

of

inorganicmatter

whilst the latter

immanent

are

transitive

(10).

organiclife is a material nature (13).

is a hyper-physical
II. Sense-perception
operation; that is
to say, it is of a higher nature
than any of which inorganic
of the vegetablekingdom are
bodies or organic substances
The

firstsubjectof

capable. Nevertheless
its subject (50,51).
as
III. Sensuous
natural

appetency

tendencies

theless it is
IV. As

an

the

it is

of brute

in
essentially

is

of

bodies and

material

higher order
of

than

organ
the

vegetables.Never

organic faculty(68,69).
animal

puts forth spontaneous movements,

i.e.

THESES

490
the

movements

nature,
life

likewise

so

does

of his

exercise

in the

man

is of

of which

determiningreason

psychical
sensuous

(75).

V. The

first subjectof

is material.

It is of

is a singlesubstance,
sensibility
that of the

than

higher nature

which

vegetable

(78-81).
VI. The

formal

common

objectof

being. Its

the intellect is

objectis derived from sensible things, but is abstract

and capableof becoming a universal notion (88-92).
intellect
is a passivefaculty potential
VII. The intelligence
proper

"

"which

has

action

(96).

is effected

and

tion

by

extrinsic

some

intellective power
to intellection
efficient cause, namely,by the imagina

double

immaterial

an

by

of the

determination

The

to intellection

determined

to be

active intellect

abstractingforce, or

(101).
As

soon

the

as

intellective
effected

ceptualdeterminant
from

to act ; it

power

facultyis presentedwith

by

the

con

it passes
to itselfwhat
a

double

cause,

knows, that is,expresses

thing is (103).
its

things, and
reflection (104).
sensible

VIII.

own

soul knows

The

it knows

its

acts

acts

(107). It

its

existence

own

that is,by
indirectly,

God

composition,
negationand transcendence
of necessary
IX. The will is a principle
of free acts (111-115).
a principle
X. Pleasure

through its

through reflection upon

nature

own

knows

directlythe quidditiesof \j
nature
secondly and through

first and

intellect knows

The

is the resultant

of every

own

its

the process of

(108).
(110). It is also

acts

conscious

that
activity

perfect (121). There is no

subjectivelyand objectively
but such states appertain
specialfacultyof emotion or feeling,
to the appetitivefaculty(122).

is

XL
have

alone

Man
no

nature

XII.

such

between
Man's

(137).

His

control

over

XIII.

The

XIV.

The

has

abstract, universal

ideas, whilst animals

ideas ; consequentlythere is
and animal
man
(125-127).
various

free will has

the other
ego is
human

one

have

acts
a

an

influence upon

reallyefficient though

activities of his soul

substance

soul is

difference of

one

not

another

absolute

(138).

(141).

although its highest

spiritual,

THESES

492

questionof

certitude is not

and without
suspects a priori

who
know

truth

(16);

the way

only does not open

wrongly extends to some
without
VIII.

The

theory

of

the mind's

doubt

rests

'

three

of

kind

to any

which

of
propositions

doubt, and
any
value (17).

have

reasons

upon

of the

doubt

reason

universal

the

nor

not

to

the universal

sceptic,
to
ability

Descartes, which
but
certainty,
it is impossible
which are
quite

of

'

primary truths is useless

the
three primary truths
'

as

'

since
are
scepticism,
not fundamental
(18-19).
premissesof all our demonstrations
of the mind
when
IX. The legitimate
state
attacking the
either
a
priori
problem of knowledge consists in not affirming
its ability
the truth, but in examining
its inability
to know
or
acts and, accordingly,
by reflection the value of our cognitive
of our
cognitivefaculty(20).
X. As soon
as
we
begin to examine our knowledge,we find
which
be proved
cannot
there are some
immediate propositions
yet compel our assent (22).
The
XL
criterion of truth for our immediate
judgments of
be extrinsic,nor
the ideal order must
nor
not
subjective,
mediate, but it must be intrinsic,objectiveand immediate
(23).
immediate
XII. In those certain judgments which are
we
it is apparent
attribute the predicateto the subjectbecause
that the predicate
belongsto the subject,and not
objectively
because
the natural constitution of our
cognitive
exclusively
facultycompels us to do so (33).
be asserted that truths
it must
XIII. Againstthe positivists

refutation of

of the ideal order

have

universal value

(36-38);

and

against

that analytic
judgments convey information, and
firstly
of the sciences are
principles
secondlythat the fundamental
not synthetica priori
judgments (40).
and
forms which furnish our
XIV. The intelligible
predicates
which we
attribute to the subjectsof our
judgments are en
dowed
with objective
(43-45).
reality

Kant

XV.

We

time

are

data

of

XVI.
are

assert

not

prioriforms

but

ideas of space and

notions abstracted from the
the

that
are

experience(47,48).
do
Principles

self-evident
XVII.

would

against Kant

be

Truths

not

requireto

be

demonstrated,

as

they

(53).
of

consciousness

unreasonable

to

call them

proof,but
question(55).

admit
in

of

no

it

GENERAL
value

The

XVIII.

METAPHYSICS

of deductive

rational sciences is not

Stuart

Mill

knowledge of

the

existence of

world

(60).
logicalfoundation

The

tendency substances
definite

undermined

attain certain

can

the external

XX.

reasoningemployed in the
by the criticism of John

(58).

We

XIX.

493

have

of

induction
of which

account

on

is the

natural

they demand

properties(63).

XXI.

the senses
By their own
power
incapableof attainingcertitude (64).

XXII.

The

are,

strictly
speaking,

is able

by inductive argument to obtain

certain knowledge with regard to the permanent properties
of
sensible objects(65).
XXIII.

reason

motive

The

indirect but evident

XXIV.

The

extrinsic and

of historical certitude is

one

is

which

is

(67).
of the certitude of faith is

motive

one

evident, namely, the authority of

not

which

witness

(68).
XXV.

The

compatible with
free

XXVI.

the

act

There

arisingfrom

evidence

XXVII.

Immediate

criterion of truth

supernaturalfaith
as

act

of certitude

certitude of faith

and

the

is

remains

obscurityof its object(69).

distinct kinds

two

are

of

inasmuch

its freedom,

of the intrinsic

account

on

of

certitude

is the

evidence

certitude

(70).

first and

fundamental

(71).
IV

Metaphysics

General

object of metaphysicsis
things (7).
I. The

II. Two

elements

need

to

be

the

substance

in
distinguished

of sensible i

substance

thingitselfand that in virtue of which it exists,or, essence

actualizes L
which
is that
and
existence
(13). Existence
essence
(14).
The essence
of a thing is that which constitutes it what it is ;
indeterminate
subject which
in relation to existence it is an
from existence (15).
receives its ultimate determination
considered as not existing
III. Possible being is an essence

the

in nature

IV.

but

There

capable of
are

two

so

existing(18).

kinds

of

intrinsic
:
possibility

and

THESES

494

extrinsic. The

constitutive notes
of another
essence

V. The
existence

The

of

an

of contradiction

in the

the existence
; the latter implies

essence

for the

reason

existence

of

an

is intrinsically
(18).
possible

ultimate
of God

basis of

the sensible

absence

sufficient

being as

which

is the

former

basis of

is the
being'sextrinsic possibility

(19).

an

essence's intrinsic

world

considered

is to be found
possibility
and
abstractly
analysedby

in
the

(20,21).
intelligence
VI. The

individual

in space (25).
VII. The formal

is

reason

known
principally
of the

by

its dimensions

of
individuality

entity(26).
of individuation
VIII. The principle
of quantity (29).
foundation

being is its

own

IX. There

is primary matter

is a* real distinction between

essence

and

as

the

existence

(32,33).
X.

There

are

six transcendental

of being :
properties

thing,unity,distinction,truth and goodness

bonum
aliquid,verum,
(38).
"

ens,

essence,

res,

unum,

non-being,distinction and indefinite

receive from
arise from the different impressions
we
plurality
two
more
or
objects(40).
of a being (41).
XII. Unity is the undividedness
XIII. The notion of unity is antecedent to that of definite'
(43).
plurality
XIV. Metaphysical
are
compositionand physical
composition
with the substantial unityof a being (50,51).
not incompatible
XV.
Transcendental
unity is to be distinguishedfrom
predicamentalunity (55).
truth is a relation of conformitywith an
XVI.
Ontological
ideal type abstracted from sensible reality
(61).
the
The good has two
XVII.
as
aspects : it is what serves
natural tendency (67)and it is the adaptationof
objectof some
a being to its end
(68).
XL

ideas

The

of

ontologicalorder a thing is the object of a

natural tendency because it is good ; and it is good because it
desirable is
In the logical
order the
is adapted to its end.
priorto the suitable (69).
XIX. Good thingsare suited to the nature of a being because
XVIII.

In the

'

'

'

they

are

so

many

'

means

whereby

it

can

realize its end, and

GENERAL

METAPHYSICS

consequentlytheir goodness is derived

it

make

for the nature

possible

495

from

to attain.

the

good

Hence

the

end

they
only way

them as relative
explainthe goodnessof thingsis by referring
absolute goods (70).
goods to one or more
end is the principle
The
of perfectionfor the nature
XX.
which tends towards it : it is the first principle
of actuation of
its passivepowers
(71).
XXI.
Evil is essentially
it is the
relative,inasmuch
as
of a good (75).
privation
XXII.
Between
being and its transcendental
properties
virtual distinction (76).
there is an incomplete

to

XXIII.

mind

The

XXIV.

the
identity,

middle

three

are

(83).

exists in itselfand

action, is called

existence and
with

is the

considered

Substance,

as

subjectof accidents (84).

complete in itself for

or
; when
hypostasis
suppositum,

it
intelligence,

perfectionof

racteristic

first

substances

are

A substance

XXVI.

com

(79).

There

endowed

principlesfrom
notions (78).

the principle
:
of
principles
principleof contradiction and the principleof

There

XXV.

its first

the transcendental

parisonof

excluded

obtains

is

called

called

hypostasisis

an

cha

person. The

subsistence

(88-91).
XXVII.

An

itselfbut

a
presupposes
It is preferable
to
XXVIII.

same

of
actuality

does

being which
subjectin which

is

accident

existence

as

hold

not

it exists

that

an

the substance

subsist in

(92).

accident has

the

which it determines

(93).
of its accidents

XXX.
powers

to

is

of action
The

be found

some

(94-95).

There

XXXI.

and

substance

A real distinction exists between

XXIX.

substance

real distinction between

and

its

(104).
for the

foundation

in the

classificationof faculties

adequate distinction

of their formal

objects

(105).
XXXII.
XXXIII.
in the

There
The

abstract

are

real relations

of
principles
without

(109).

change

reference

to

or

movement,

any

considered

material determina

(112, 113). By movement

actualityand potentiality
of a subject
the actuality
in metaphysics is to be understood
that is formallypotential (115).

tions,are

'

'

THESES

496
XXXIV.

Every

thingmoved

the

distinct from

mover

(116).

Both

XXXV.

requiresa

movement

Latin

the

words

potentiaand actus have a

double meaning : potentia
or
passiva, subjectiva,
potentiality,
from potentiaoperativa,
be distinguished
of action
must
power
actus,
faculty,correspondingto the difference between
of perfection,
and
meaning actualityor an intrinsic principle
or

meaning action, the

actus,

XXXVI.
in

have

common

XXXVII.
and

by

to the

faculty(119).

of

being studied by metaphysics

analogousness(126)
.

receives

cause

it constitutes

and

matter,
The

of movement

XL.

the substantial

is

cause

its union

by

kind

communicated
intrinsically

is the

extrinsic,active principle

created agent is in the

of

concept

the stimulus

upon

action

The

something
XLIII.

'

'

movement

is

patient(144).
applicableto im

of created

its formal

as

in

the

not

becoming

of

(148).
the

metaphysicalsense

be stated thus

causality
may

agents has

resultant

Understood

action does

evokingit (146).

The

existent

existence is not essential exists in virtue of

principle

thingto'which
action external

some

(151).
'

and

Besides formal, material

XLIV.

also entails final

XLV.

There

XLVI.

The

of which

final

The

cause

may
is done or

the

end

'

move

causality(152).

causalityof

attraction which
in the

efficientcauses,

is intrinsic finality
in nature

something

XLVII.

and

substance

(135).

action, with the restriction that such

XLII.

ment

sub

compound

new

with it constitutes

efficient cause

action of

The

manent

to it

form,

(139).

The

XLI.

formal

The

XXXIX.

of

with

its union

determinate

react

certain

material

The

XXXVIII.

kinds

of

(133).

stance

of

various

The

exercise

be

defined

made
the

exercises

consequent tendency

(152).
as

that

for the sake

(153).
final

consists

cause

in

an

the appetitive
power
upon
in that power
it
towards

(154).
XLVIII.

Nature

is

substance

considered

of the operations
principle
proper
produces or undergoes them (155).

intrinsic first
which

as
precisely

XLIX.

Law

is the

internal,fundamental

to

the

the

being

determination

in

NATURAL
of which

virtue

to realize

Natural

L.

accidental

substance,

and

causes

causes

exemplary

LI. The

follows in

exemplary

be

from
distinguished

(157).
is the

cause

telligentefficientcause
LII. The

(156).

effects must

effects

and

497

of action,tends
firstjjprinciple

as

end

determinate

THEOLOGY

extrinsic formal

type which

producinghis

is at

cause

mental

once

effect (162).

efficient and

an

in

an

final

Its

peculiarcausality
consists in its being an extrinsic formal cause
(163).
there is only an
the four causes
LIII. Among
analogical
resemblance
(164).
and causes
the same
are
LIV. Ontological
things;
principles
and

cause

elements
the

are

LV.

material

are

of

reasons

The

elements

denned

adaptationof things

the exact

as

is understood

in

two

senses

and aesthetic order, or, in other words, order of

order of co-ordination

and

subordination

and

causes
principles,

causes

(168). Order

ends

order
teleological

LVI.

cause.

things (165).

has been

Order

their

to

an

in the universe

order

(169).
the existence of final

proves

(170).

causes

Perfection

LVII.

everythingthat

means

befits the nature

of

being (173).

conditions of the beautiful,

objective
due order, and splendour(178).
or
perfection,
namely,integrity
LIX. Beauty is that qualityof a work whereby,on account
LVIII.

of

There

three

are

which

it is related is

LX.

Art

need

parts,an

ideal type to

given intense expressionand

made

to

(179).

excite admiration

not

religious
purposes
law

of its various

happy co-ordination

be used

; but

as

it is not

an

instrument

beyond

the

for moral

paleof

or

the moral

(180).

LXI.
relative
LXII.

The

internal

of
finality
The

of thingsis the
finality

of the

this constitutes its order (181).

relative end of the universe should be

the universe

immanent

from
distinguished

foundation

the

transcendent relative end

(182,183).

Natural
I. The

idea of God

It is sufficient and
with its proper

is that of
necessary

object(5).

Theology
absolutelysimpleperfection.
natural theology
for providing

an

THESES

498

of
absolutelysimple perfections
of the tripleprocess
the Divine
we
essence
acquireby means
and
transcendence
of attribution, elimination
(6). This is a
method
of procedurewhich is neither misleadingnor useless (7).
be proved.
III. The existence of God
can
is not selfwhich
(a) Agnosticismis based on a principle
evident (10).
of the Three Stages finds no support in the
Law
(b)Comte's

knowledge of

II. Our

the

'

'

historyof

science

or

of

and
philosophy,

development of the individual ; it

logicalproof (11).
their progress
(c)The natural sciences owe
mental

mental

method,

Comte

and

not

the

to

verified in the

it is not

is without

to

positivemethod

failures of

minds

some

to arrive at

the existence of

prove, as the theory of traditionalism

it (12).
to demonstrate
incapacity
does not

our

experi
extolled by
the

(11).

(d)The
God

any

existence of God

IV. The

must

be

maintained,

proved.

(a)Ontologism is based on a false theory of ideas,and it is

contradicted by experience(13).
New
Philosophy is powerlessto establish the affir
(b)The
of the true God
mation
(14).
(c) Mere subjective sentiment is no foundation for real
religion(15).
V. The
only valid proof of the existence of God is an
one
a posteriori
(16). The ontological
argument of St. Anselm
of Begging the Question (17,18).
involves the fallacy
from
VI. St. Augustine's argument
our
knowledge of pos
'

'

sible

God

essences

is not

an

immediate

proof of

the

of

existence

(19).

VII.

proofof

analysisof metaphysicalmovement

An

the existence of God

VIII. An

analysisof

furnishes

(21).

the efficient causalityof natural

agents

proof of the existence of God (23).

IX. An
analysis of the contingency of beings furnishes a
proof of the existence of God (24).
in
manifested
X. An
analysisof the degrees of perfection
beings furnishes a proof of the existence of God (27).
XL An analysisof the order of the universe furnishes a proof
of the existence of God
(28).

furnishes

XII.

The

scientific proofsof the

existence

of God

are

not

THESES

500
The

XXXIII.

primary

His

goodness of
XXXIV.
may have
XXXV.

its

God's

secondary material object the

will is the

will of God

partakes of the divine goodness (72).

loves the goodness of His Essence necessarily,

whatever
God

has

freelythe goodness He

and

object of

(71).

essence

own

For

formal

communicated

to

created

beings (73).
XXXVI.

God

Inasmuch

by

His will remains

as

love

us

XXXVII.

to its

good, it

(74).

is called

omnipotent(76)
by God (80-81).
(82).
being conserved by God
.

world

The

XXXVIII.

free decree of His will

attached

divine will is

The

(75)

has

been

can

create

alone

God

XXXIX.

changes the

never

The

world

world

is

has

created

need of

in

being (84).
XL.

The

subjectto

the action of divine

providence

(85,86).
XLI.

of God

providenceand government

The

are

universal

(87).
XLII.

The

God

sovereigntyof

and

the free-will of creatures

equallycertain facts ; but none of the theories yet advanced

how
to show
they are mutually compatibleis entirelysatis
factory(88).

are

XLIII.
with

existence of evil in the world is not irreconcilable

The

God's

providenceand government

(89).

VI

Logic
I. Logicis the reflex
in

our

processes

study of

judgments, inferences
for them

II. Considered

to lead
as

the

us

order

the
and

more

to truth

materials

which

of

needs to exist

elaborate

reasoning

(1).
knowledge, concepts

are

of
predicatesthat fall within one or other of the ten categories
thought (14-15).
III. Judgment is the attribution of a predicate
to a subject

(28).
Judgments

in contingent
either in necessary matter
or
attaches to the subjectby a
matter, accordingas the predicate
which is inde
necessary or a contingentbond, i.e. by one

pendent

or

are

not

of

experienceand

of the

existence

of

things.

LOGIC
kind

of

judgment

The

former

and

the latter of the

Reasoning

IV.

immediate

is

is the basis of the rational

experimentalsciences
a

(31-33).

whereby the mind passes from

to a mediate
principles
judgment or
it

logicalform

The

sciences,

process

judgments or

conclusion.

50I

is the

syllogismor
things being posited (inthe pre
follows (in the conclusion)
misses) something else necessarily
simply from their being posited (ARISTOTLE, Anal., Pr. I,i)
(47,48).
'

discourse

in which

assumes

certain

'

V. The
ciated

as

objectivefoundation of the syllogismmay

follows : Reasoning is the bringingof some

be

enun

definite

subjectunder the extension of an abstract type in order to

is predicable
of the abstract type
infer that something which
of this definite subject(49).
is likewise predicable
as such
of the laws that serve
of the
VI. The necessity
as
principles
and
absolute,sometimes
metaphysical
syllogismis sometimes
and natural and so dependingon conditions that have
physical
ascertained (50).
to be empirically
VII. Every science has as its startingpointscertain first
first judgments, which
are
or
immediatelyevident,
principles,
and indemonstrable

(51).
VIII. First principles
enunciating the simple relations of
being and non-being direct and control not only every science
but every judgment of the mind
(51).
necessary

sets

is

Scientific demonstration

IX.

out

premisses that

from

certain
logically

conclusion.

certain

are

The

which

reasoningprocess
leads

and

premisseson

to

it rests

which

the
than
better known
true, ultimate, immediate,
of its truth
reason
or
conclusion,priorto it, and the cause
be

must

(63,64).
X.

Essential

the foundation

XL

Deduction

definition,which
of science
the

or

states

what

something is,is

(79,80).
of reasoning,which
synthetic_meth.od

which
is one
employed in the rationalsciences,
in necessary matter, and enables
certain principles

is that

with

begins
one

by

relations and thus

new
to deduce
process of combination
define what is progressively
presentedfor explanation(85).
of reasoning,which is
method
the
XII. Induction

analytic

or

that

employed in
beginswith concrete
with

the

the

formulation

experimentalsciences, is

facts furnished
of laws

by observation

one

which

and

(86). Scientific induction

ends
is

THESES

502
ascends
process which
which
these facts are
XIII.

method

The

deduction

facts to the nature

manifestation

the

of the

(90).

philosophyis combined

of

things of

induction

and

(94).

XIV.

Science

is

maticallyso
mediately or

form

whole, and

one

mediately from

the intrinsic

its action

propositionswhich are evident,

universal, as well as arranged syste

and

to

as

of

body

certain, necessary,

furnish

from

the

of its

reason

which

of the

nature

drawn

are

and
properties

im

subject and
of the laws

of

(96).

VII

Ethics
last natural end '(8,
and really
one
9).
subjectively
the end of
II. Regarded in the abstract and indeterminately

I. Man

human

of

consists in

nature

III.
end

has

Regarded

intrinsic

distinction

conformity

want

or

of external

(11).

causes

affect

can

responsibility
(27,28).
and
evil is real ancT
good

moral

end

circumstances

VIII. Neither
value
The

to
logically

evil is founded
action

our

on

with

the
our

(32).

object,the
of moral

good and
conformity of

of

moralityof

act is determined

human

the end

and

individual

social

nor

by its formal
for which
it is done (34).
well-beingis the measure

(35-37).

evolutionist
the

theory

negationalike

of

of

Herbert

moralityand

rightand wrong (38)

X. Man is subjectto a natural law,
which
habituallydisposeshim to know

between

leads

Spencer

of all distinction

and

nature

rejectwhat
XI. The
in human

but in God

between

VII. The

rational

the objective
definitely

(30).

VI. The

IX.

and

distinction between

V. The

good
and

senses

destroyingfree-will

without

and

created

in any
action of the

IV. The

happiness (10).
concrete

is not

man

supreme

in the

is

what

contrary

moral
nature

that

leads to it,as

to it

is,to

and
well

an

will the end

as

of his

to discern

and

(40).

and
obligationhas its explanation

(44).

inclination

foundation

ETHICS
XII.

ultimate

The

evil, and

and
found

in God

dence

(45).

XIII.
'

formallyit is

is

instinct

XV.

'

or

During
After

in
'

good
law, is

of Provi

human

nature

distinct from

sense

of the moral

of the natural

the

order

(49).

law is that

good

(50).

present life there is a sanction for the moral

time

the wicked

(52).

trial,the length of which

of

cannot

we

will be

determine, the virtuous

life and

practicalreason

suppose

evil avoided

the

obligationand

knowledge

our

it is insufficient

XVI.

to

moral

for

and

done

law, but

distinction between

in the

first commandment

The

be

must

need

no

'

intellect to account
XIV.

of the

reason

consequentlyof moral

There

moral

503

rewarded in a future
eternally
deprivedfor ever of their happiness

will be

(53).
XVII.

his last end

from

turns

happinesssuffer
to

doctrine

Christian

The

must

the

in addition

inliiction of

the

that

sinner

to the

freely

who

eternal loss of

pain is
positive

not

opposed

reason

(54).

XVIII.

imperativeof Kant is no moral

categorical
by which moral good and evil may be distinguished,
The

standard
is it

nor

XIX.

moral

true

moral

The

law

(56).

is immutable

law

and

to all

is known

(57).

Independent Morality are not

conclusions (66,67).
to impracticable
true, and lead logically
XXI.
By the natural law the individual possesses in justice
XX.

Theories

certain

of

Secular

or

duties in respect of his neighbour indepen

natural or political
(70-74).
relationship

rightsand

dentlyof

any
One

justiceto respectthe good of another,

in respect of his life,his libertyand his property
particularly
(76-77).
to follow
XXIII.
Liberty impliesthe right to work (i.e.
one's
to have
own
opinions,and to act
some
profession),
accordingto one's conscience (78-81).
XXII.

XXIV.

is bound

The

in

rightof property

human

is derived from

nature

(87).
XXV.

The

standing of
make

of communism

theory
the

dignityand

The

theory

freedom

goods of

on

this world

misunder

and

would

(88,90).
self-contradictory

the natural law

XXVI.

of the

nature

is based

of

of collectivism is inconsistent with the

man

; and

its realization would

hinder

THESES

504

social

and

capacities
XXVII.
the

and

progress

of

The

of

the

XXIX.

in

education

theism
which

it

According

constituted

this

its

of

draws

its

He

the

from

God

wills

is

of

aspect

an

the

as

for

pan
to

system

basis

juridical

which

lead

of

is

understood,

or

Since

society
of

patient

inadmissible

to

XXXV.

activity,

civil

of

of

its

State

nor

may
nor

is

which

it

is

society

interfere

members

of

in

the

society,

He

of its

to

provide

existence

(116).

for
the

wills

also

undetermined

that

and

man,

(114, 115).

condition

no

the

role

of

good
of

the

authority

opportunity

for

(117).
not

the

God

has

of

nature

instituted

and

rights

take

of

authority

may

the

existence

it, it follows

respect

The

is in

is

society

and

persons

designs

the

civil

conception

individual

the

of

form

composing

development

Christian
of

authority

the

ensure

education,

the

foundation

origin

of

leaves

individuals
to

of

the

Its

As

XXXIV.

is

all

union

own.

existence

but

the

on

called

requirements

criticism

same

explicit

to

the

by

XXXIII.
the

rests

(109-112).

XXXII.

reality

the

(101-104).

places

either

interpretations,

conclusions

bond

Spirit-State

which

theory

contract,

several

is

marriage

(99, 100).

the

on

the

to

of

marriage

children
the

(94-97).

(107).

The

free

and

(91, 92).

prescription,

occupancy,

children
the

its

beyond

function

institution

the
of

of

subject

belongs

XXXI.
in

is

and

of

the

theory

natural

are

the

spouses

of

The

XXX.

of

and

the

its

task

inheritance

of

perpetuity
of

State

property
and

spouses

love

the

with

purpose

The

rational

to

testament

XXVIII.

good

titles

the

upon

incompatible

The

right

impose

take

place

the
of

religion

place

parents
of

its

in
members

of

individual

their

duty
(118).

of

GLOSSARY

PHILOSOPHIC

OF

THIS

Glossarywas
Index, partly to

in the

intended

student

the

save

French
the

essential definitions
he

as

aid to

an

revise his work

can

the

ideas he has read

principal

of

Latin

and

of

lacks

unearthing

down

Manual

the

exhaustive,

not

and
test by
as
a
memory,
discover if he understands

diffuse form.

more

series of
means

and
in

an

the

fully

addition

The

from
the works
of St. Thomas
definitions,chosen
or,
other
of
from
his
has
authentic
one
stated,
or
interpreters,

when

been

edition,which

trouble

meaning of technical words explainedup

but chieflyto give him a useful, though
of which

TERMS

adopted in

in order

initiate the

to

the ideas

with

accordance

student

into the

of Latin

use

Let it be added

mediaeval

the Preface,

developedin
that

into the

and

will often

Index

the

terminology.
this necessarily
incomplete Glossary
helpfulwhere

prove
deficient.

proves

TRS.

"

substantive, a being which is self-sufficientin its

exists
As an adjective,that which
existence
(Nat. Theol., 36)
(logical
sense)without requiring
sense),or is known
(metaphysical
with
to be connected
something else or with something already

Absolute

As

known

in this

oppositeof
dens

as

same

'

unconditional

Absolutum
(Gen.Met., 111).
(In IV Metaph., 1. 19).

relative

ab alio

Abstraction

it is the

sense

operationby

An

which

the

is the

and

est

'

non

depen-

to

intellect expresses

thing whilst ignoring those determinations

such a particular
it such
of it which
make
and
thing (Introd.,
Abstrahere
2, 17 ; Psych., 89, 91, 101 ; Criter.,44 ; Log.,9).
a
speciem intelligibilem
phantasmatibusest considerare naturam
individualium
principiorumquae
specieiabsque consideratione
Theol,
I, q. 85, a. i,
(Sum.
per phantasmata repraesentantur
ad i).
itself the

of

essence

'

'

Accident
ceived

of

That

which

except

as

cannot

exist and

dependent

upon

some

which

cannot

be

con

presupposed being

(Gen. Met., 82).

mode
of
natural
An
ontologicalaccident is a reality whose
est res
Accidens
being (Gen. Met., 92).
existingis in another
cui debetur
in alio
(In IV Sent., dist. 12, q. i, a. i, sol. i,
esse
or
necessary
either contingent
ad 2). Ontological accidents
are
(Cos.,52).
'

'

505

GLOSSARY

506

of the

is the contingentmode
predicables,
in which a predicate
Acciis related to a subject(Log.,16, 3).
inesse praetersubject!
dens est quod contingiteidem inesse et non
T.
c.
viii).
corruptionem (Sum. Log., i,
A

accident,
one
logical

'

'

Act, Action

produced in
in

Regarded as a result,action is a change or movement

being (Gen.Met., 144). Actio et passioconveniunt

'

habitudines
secundum
motus, differunt tamen
(Sum. Theol.,I, q. 28, a. 3). See passion.

substantia

una

'

diversas

Regarded

as

actuation

action is the

something

related

it is what

from
principle
puttinginto use

or

something

makes

it

which

to the

of the

to

power

do

something

become

to

proceeds,

it was
not (virtus)
which previously
(Gen. Met., 118, 119, 148).
Potentiae activae respondet operaticvel actio in qua completur
potentiaactiva (In I Sent.,dist. 42, q. i, a. i, ad i).
Immanent
action is action which has its final result in the agent
'

'

which is terminated in
the agent (Psych.,10 ; Gen. Met., 145).

itself; transitive action is that

other

than

Actuality, Act
thing possesses
'

definition

the

'

The

intrinsic principle
on

account

being

some

of which

degree of perfection; or, another

perfectionwhich fulfils the capacityof a per
a

certain

to receptive
being. Actualityis opposed to potentiality,
Omnis
act us, perfectio
potency or 'power (Gen. Met., 114).
est
(Sum. Theol.,I, q. 5, a. 3).
quaedam
is perfection
Pure
actualityis what
simply, a being whose
i
s
limited
(Nat. Theol.,2, 36, 45).
by no potentiality
perfection
In the terminology of the Middle Ages actus purus, being that is
esse
imparticipatum,
purely actual, is expressedas esse irreceptum,
subsistens (Gen.Met., 117, 126 ; History,27).
esse
according as it is
Actuality is termed firstor second actuality
of a potentialsubject,or a subsequent,
the first determination
determination
of a subject already relativelydeteraccessory
mined (Gen.Met., 117fL).

fectible

'

'

'

Aesthetics

Met.,

Alteration

qui est

the

beautiful

; Gen-

(Introd,,8

f.).

176

change,

philosophyof

The

that

in

change
does

not

of

affect the

vocatur
qualitate,

therefore

quality, and
'

accidental
'

being. Motus
(In V Physic.,1. 4).

substance

alteratio

an

of

Analogical, Analogous : Analogicalknowledge is knowledge of

something through a proper knowledge of something else which
is

its nature

by

Gen.
also

different

from

it but

because

of certain

resem

(Log.,22; Psych., 87;

capable
Met., 126). A term which expresses an analogicalidea is
called analogical,
or
Analoga sunt
anakgcus (Log.,26).

blances

is

of

representingit

'

deficiunt ab unitate seu

convenientia
absoluta et solum
modo
convenientiam
habent
relative,id est, juxta proportionem
commensurationem
seu
(JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, Log., II, q. 13,
quae

'

a.

3)-

GLOSSARY

508

attributes may
be placed
The
categoriesare
are
logicalcategories.
ontological
ten classes of being into which
realitymay be divided and

under

the

of which

other

or

one

these

"

the

these

correspond to the logicalcategories(Gen. Met., 97 ;

ad diversa
Log., 15). Oportet quod ens contrahitur
genera
diversum
secundum
modum
praedicandi qui consequiturdiverwhich

'

diversum

secundum

guuntur

praedicamenta quia distinpraedicandi (In V

Dicuntur

essendi.

modum

sum

'

modum

Metaph., 1. 9).
forms of
are
According to Kantian philosophythe categories
of knowledge constitute
the understandingwhich with the matter
42).
intelligible
objects(Crit.,
something depends upon, either for its being
Illud est propriecausa
for its becoming (Gen. Met., 165).
or
sine
non
alicujus
potest (Sum. Theol.,Ill, q. 86, a. 6).
quo esse
a
There are four kinds of cause.
cause
thing
By the efficient
id
fit
it
be
what
is
to
:
a
(Gen.Met., 139).
comes
quo aliquid
to action ; for the
is drawn
the efficientcause
By the finalcause
id cujus gratiaaliquid
sake of it something is done or is made,
combine
fit (Gen.Met., 152-3)
The material and formal causes
is the
constituents of a material
as
being : the formal cause
intrinsic principle
of which it is
that by reason
of its perfection,
it is, id quo ens
what
est id quod est
(Gen. Met., 135) ; the
of
material cause,
or
subjective cause, is the subjectreceptive
id ex
it is that out of which a thing is made,
the formal cause,
fit
in
133
existit
et
Introd.,
forma
5)
(Gen.Met.,
;
quo aliquid
quo

Cause

Whatever

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

Certitude
'

Certitude

non

tellectus ad
Or

firm adherence of the mind to

determinatio
est aliud quam

The

'

unum

(JOHN

and
explicitly

more

connexion

:
proposition

seu

adhaesio

Log.,II, q. 26,

ST. THOMAS,

OF

in

one

with

the

a.

in-

4).

solution of the

the firm
be defined as
may
evident truth after reflection and

criteriological
problem certitude
of the mind
adherence
because
relation of
a

to

an

the two
identityor conformitybetween
firmitas
dicitur
Certitude
8)
proprie
perceived(Crit.,
adhaesionis virtutis cognitivae in suum
cognoscibile(In III
is

terms

'

'

Sent.,dist. 26, q.
certitude

The

2, a. 4).
of faith and

historical certitude

to non-evident
through
propositions
another's authority or of a coincidence
67 ; see evidence,faith).
monies
(Crit.,

assents

of

Compound

The

in

12}
relig.,

'

mixtione

propriam

'

respectively

extrinsic motive
of facts and testi

possessingsubstantial unity and

combination
of simple indecomposable

resultant,

of
proper qualities,
elements (Cos.,89).
convertitur

are

the

unum

a
'

Quando
tertium

Quandocumque
completa,

non

est mixtio

utrumlibet

miscibilium

(Contra impugn. Dei cult, et

fit mixtio aliquorum differentium
retinet unumquodque
qualitatem
'

(In II Sent., dist. 30, q. 2,

a.

i).

GLOSSARY

509

of constitutive notes discovered

The sum-total
:
Comprehension
in the concept of a thing (Log.,
by analysis
17).

Concept

result of

The

of

act

an

simpleapprehension(Psych.,

'

Log., 21).
Quandocumque
format, quod
quoddam intelligibile
unde et mentis conceptus nominatur
c. 3)105;

Condition

That

requiredfor

which

without

the efficient cause

intelligi

intellectus actu
est

quaedam prolesipsius,
contra Grcecos
(Declaratio

'

lending a positiveinfluence is
to produce its effect (Gen. Met.

140).
Conscience

definitive judgment of the practicalreason

The
rectitude or obligationof an act here and now
to

concerningthe
be

act alreadyperformed (Ethics,

or of an
nihil aliud est quam
scientiae ad
applicatio
ut dirigensipsum vel per modum
examinationis

performedor omitted,

68)

'
.

Conscientia

aliquem actum

quae jam acta

Verit.,q. 17, a. i).

sunt

eorum

'

(Sum. TheoL, I-II, q. 19,

for

In general a name
Consciousness
:
internal states, whether
of a sensuous
Conscientia est actus quo scientiam

or

'

applicamus (Sum. TheoL, I,q. 79,

call sense-consciousness

they kept

the

13).

a.

Schoolmen
for a

consciousness

the term

ad

What

ea

agimus

quae

should
sense, and

to-day

we

called internal

knowledge of

of the
internal state.
In this strictest sense,
of itself,
self-consciousness,it is synomymous
word

character.

supersensuous

nostram

'

of one's

awareness

an

5 ; De

a.

an

intellectual

mind's
with

knowledge
modern

the

apperception(Psych.,30-50).

Contingent

which

That

has

of its existence ; what

reason

tingensest quod potestesse

a- 3).

et

not

in

its

essence

may

be

but

need

'

esse

non

sufficient

the
not

'

be.

Con-

(Sum. TheoL, I, q. 86,

Continuum
The property of matter in virtue of which the parts
:
of a given quantityare such that the boundary of one is identical
est, cujus
with that of another
(Cos.,52. 122). 'Continuum
'

partes

ad

terminum

unum

copulantur (In

communem

Physic.,1. i).
Contradictory : Opposition between
opposed that they have nothing In

two

terms

which

so

are

(Log.,19).

common

III

C"

n-

middle

to exclude

any
are
so
opposed as
propositions
tradictory
propositio,
et
Universalis
particulars
proposition(Log.,42).
'

(Sum.
contradictionem
opponantur, opponuntur secundum
uniTheoL, I-II,q. 77, a. 2, obj.3). Enuntiatio quae significat
'

si

'

versale

opponitur contradictorie
si una
particulariter,

saliter sed
vero

sit

Contraries

ei quae
earum

non

universignificat

sit affirmative, alti

negativa (In I Perih.,1. 19).

'

Oppositionbetween

belonging to the
trary when they

same

are

two

extremes

of a seriesof things

(Log.,19). Propositions
genus
affirms what
both universal and the one
are

con

the

GLOSSARY

5io

'

denies of the same

subject. Universalis affirmativa et
universalis negativa sunt contrarie quia universalis negativanon
affirmativam
universalem
sed etiam
solum
removet
designat
other

in

distantiam

extremam

ponit et

quod affirmatio
negat totum
notionem
et ideo parcontrarietatis,

quantum

pertinetad

hoc

ticularis affirmativa et negativase haberit sicut medium

inter
the subject in the two
contraria
(In I Perih., 1. n). When
'

is particular,
they
opposed propositions
(Log.,42)
propositions

called

are

sub-contrary

Conversion
such

true

the

(Log.,41).

'

in
proposition

if the

originalpro
quae aequaliter
Anal., 1. 31).

true

Convertuntur

'

Substantial

of

terms

is
proposition

new

praedicantur (cp.In

invicem

se

the

that

way

positionwas
de

interchangeof

The

I Post.

change considered

disappearance
replacedby another (Cos.,72).
de esse
in non
Corruptioest propriecomposititransmutatio
esse
(In II Sent.,dist. 19, q. i, a. i, ad 2). Corruptionis the cor
relative of substantial generation(^.r.).
in its entirety(Gen.
Creation
The production of a substance
:
totam
Creatio est productioalicujusrei secundum
Met., 147).
nullo
substantiam,
Theol.,
I,
(Sum.
suarn
praesupposito
Corruption
of

one

substantial

form

that

as

the

is

'

'

'

'

q-

65, a. 3).

Criterion!

standard

by which

to

truth from
distinguish

error

1,23 i.).
(Crit.,
Deduction

process

in
principles
one

knowledge which starts from

and by their combination
matter

necessary
relations between
to discover new

definitions

(Log.,85;

certain

of

Introd.,16).

them
See

and

to form

enables
scientific

synthesis.

the
definition expresses what this is which
word
defined designates. Essential definition gives a full state
of what
ment
a
thing is,inasmuch as it declares its inner nature
(In IV
(Log.,79). 'Definitio est oratio indicans quid est res
termini
aut
naturam
rei
1.
Definitio
oratio
est
Physic., 5).

Definition

Verbal

'

'

(JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, Log., I, c. 3).

significationem
exponens
is improperlycalled definition,is the
w
hich
definition,
Descriptive
of qualities
which allow us to
designationof a thing by a number
its
it
into
nature
(Log.,79).
recognize without givingan insight
A
Demonstration
:
syllogismwhich engenders true knowledge.
Demonstratio
est syllogismusfaciens scire
(In I Post. Anal,
'

'

'

i.4).
Causal demonstration,St"m,leads to the

knowledge of a particular

Demonstration, vn,
cause.
thing by
for our
extrinsic reason
having
a remote
or proofof fact,
supplies
is
admit
that
to
(Log.,65; Introd.,16).
something
of an
A prioridemonstration deduces
the existence and nature
demonstration
effect from a knowledge of its cause
; a posteriori
its
effect (Log.,
that
of
from
proceedsto a knowledge of a cause

indicatingits immediate

GLOSSARY

66)

Demonstratio

'
.

dicitur propter quid : haec est

D
emonstratio
simpliciter.
effectum
dicitur
per

priora
per
demonstratio

that of the

cause

deeper

2,

haec

est per

ea

quae

sunt

prioraquoad

is the

combined

employment of a
existence of the effect
is reached, and then from the knowledge of the
knowledge of the effect is obtained (Logic,
67).

method

from

the

method
analytico-synlhetic
A

(Logic,
93).

mental

process which consists of

of cognitiveacts representingthe various notes of

cession

'

nos

2).

a.

prioriproofs :

It is also called the

Discursive

causam

demonstration

and
posteriori

cause

per

quia,et

(Sum. TheoL, I, q.
Circular

5II

suc

thing
through relations being established between
them
Discursus intellectus atten(Log.,3; Nat. TheoL, 61).
ditur secundum
hoc quod unum
per aliud cognoscitur (Sum.
rationativa vel
TheoL, I, q. 58, a. 3, obj. i). Adhuc
tune
discursiva est nostra consideratio quando ab uno
considerate in
aliud transimus
For
c.
(ConL Gen., I, 57).
an
oppositeprocess,
and

their unification

'

'

'

'

see

intuition.

Distinction

ledge.

Oppositionbetween

In

positionis

narrower

it

sense

and
perceived,

may

acts of know

things,objectsor
the

means

be defined

as

this op
of know

whereby

act

that

act

ledge by which the mind opposes two or more

thingsor two or
of
the
more
same
thing (Gen. Met., 43). Distincta
concepts
est aliud
non
sunt, quorum
(Cont.Gen., I, c. 71).
unum,
Real distinction is that which exists between
different objects
they exist
independentlyof our
knowledge, either because
of
a whole.
because they are the physicalparts
or
separately
Logicaldistinction is that which the mind conceives in one and
the same
thing owing to its having different concepts whereby to
(cum fundamento
represent it. It is virtual or founded on reality
is
in re) if the difference of the concepts
justified
by the very
nature of their objects; but it is purelylogical,
or purelythe result
mind
of reasoning,
if it is entirely
the work of the
(Gen.Met., 48 ;
Nat. TheoL, 7).
Distinctio realis est remotio identitatis,quae
'

'

'

fictione intellectus.
datur a parte rei sine apprehensioneseu
Distinctio vero
rationis quae beneficio intellectus fit et in re non
datur.
distinctio rationis in distinctionem
Dividi solet haec
rationis ratiocinantis
et rationis ratiocinatae. Ilia prima did
in re
solet distinctio quae
fingiturab intellectu sine fundamento
et intelliet ita solum
significandi
est distinctio quoad modum
funda
ab intellectu cum
dicitur formata
gendi ; secunda
vero

in

mento

'

re

Distributive

QOHN

OF

ST. THOMAS,

Expressing
propositionappliesto each
:

the universal

Doubt

clearlythe

subject.

that
and

It is

the

Log., II,q.

2,

a.

predicate of

3).
a

universal

all of the individuals denoted

opposed to

by

collective.

does not perceive

the mind
suspense when
terms
of two
relation
of identity or non-identity

state

of

GLOSSARY

512

It is said to be

(Crit.,
8).
motives
when

in favour
motives

the

Dubitatio

motum
significat
principaliter

contradictions
17, q. i,

a
negativedoubt when there are no
decision either way ; and a positive
doubt
in favour of each side are
of equal value.

of

cum

formidine

'

(In

4).

a.

Eminently

:
(eminenter)

contains

utramque partem
III Sent.,dist.

supra

determinandi

analogous

an

The
lower

perfectionin

predicatea
'

in which

manner

higher perfection

perfection(Nat. Theol.,5, 6). To

a
supereminent way of a thing
"

'

praedicareper eminentiam
(De Pot., q. 9, a. 7, obj. 2)
it with that thing, because
to identify
it possesses some
"

that includes the

perfection

of

is
perfections

Emotion

An

agreeableto the
See
End

known

as

means

higher

attributed to it. This attribution

the process of transcendence.
one

organic modification that

subject and perceivedas

is
such

agreeable or dis
(Psych.,66, 122).

passion.
See final cause.

Equivocal

have

is

equivocalwhen

nothing in
(Log.,26; Gen.
diversa
(Sum. Theol.,I,q.

'

'

Essence

That

it

thingswhich
designates
but the name
common
by which they are called
Met., 126).
Aequivocarum est omnino ratio

term

13,

a.

10).

thing is constituted this kind of thing

and
Essentia
not that 'Gen. Met., 15).
proprieest id quod significatur per definitionem
(Sum. Theol.,I, q. 29, a. 2). Quando
variatur aliquidde essentia rei,non
est eadem
res
(In IV Sent.,
dist. 22, q. 2, a. 3).
:

whereby

'

'

'

'

Evidence

propositionsthe truth of which is

Ilia videri dicuntur quae
8).
apparent to the intellect (Crit.,
intellectum
movent
nostrum
ad
sui cognitionem
per seipsa
(Sum. Theol.,I-II,q. I, a. 4). It is immediate or mediate according
the truth of the proposition
is apparent as soon
as
the terms
as
been
or is apparent only after they have
comprisingit are known
with
other
51
compared
intermediaryterms (Crit., L).
:

qualityof

those

'

'

Extension

of

an

idea

The

number

of

subjectsto which

it can

be

17).
applied(Log.,
Faith
is

Assent

determined
formally not evident
:

that
by an act of will to a proposition
(Crit.,
'68). Intellectus assentit alicui
'

electionem
voluntarie declinans in unam
quamdam
partem
in aliam, et si sit cum
certitudine absque formidine
magis quam
alterius partis,erit fides
(Sum. Theol.,II-II,q. i, a. 4). See
per

'

certitude.

Finality : The immediate effect of the final cause, the tendency

of a thing towards
its end.
It is intrinsic or immanent
it
when
arises from the nature of the thing that tends to realize its end ;
it is extrinsic when
it comes
not from the
from some
other thing reallydistinct from

thing but
(Gen.Met., 152 f.)

nature
it

of

GLOSSARY
Form

An

5I3

intrinsic

determining,perfectiveprinciple
(Gen. Met.,
significatur
perfectiouniuscujusque rei
Est actus
et Ess., c. 7).
dans esse rei (JOHN OF ST.
Nat. Phil.,I, q. 4, a. i). See formal cause.
'

formam

'Per

113).
(De Bute

'

THOMAS,

substantial form is

substance, namely
'

Forma

all other

facit

substantialis

substances

'

esse

accidental form is one

An
constituted (Introd.,
5; Gen.

facit esse

non

5 ; Cos.,44).
(Introd.,
simpliciter (Sum. Theol., I,

It is the correlative of

6).

a.

q. 77,

of the constitutive elements of a

which
makes
it a specific
being and

one

that

differentiates it from

'

sed
simpliciter

primary matter.

determining a substance already

Met., 113). 'Forma
accidentalis
tale aut tantum

esse

aut

aliquomodo

'

(Sum. Theol.,I, q. 77, a. 6).

informingform is one which requiresfor its natural existence
to exist in conjunction with matter.
It is synonymous
with
substantial form but opposed to separated form.
A separated
form is one which need not be united to another
se

habens

An

in
principle

Sum.

order

Theol.,I, q.

and

7,

able

be

to

a.

; Gen.

separatedform

the

to

receive

existence

actual

Met., 117).

(cp.

informingform
called respectively
incompleteand

are

The

completeforms.
Formally

In

See formal

determinate

formal

cause,

Generation

process of a
transmutatum

The

several

opposed

materially.

to

object,reduplicative.

The
of a new
substantial form in the
appearance
est
substantial change (Cos.,
74).
Quando (aliquid)
'

subaccipiataliam formam
quod materia
simplex generatio et corruptio (De General.,

ita

stantialem, erit
I. I- 5).
Genus

manner

'

of constitutive

sum

notes

which

are

common

to

species(Log.,16). Genus logicum est id quod

in eo
quod quid
pluribusspecieifferentibus
'

different

'

praedicatur de

(JOHN

OF

Log.,II, q. 7,

ST. THOMAS,

a.

i).

object of a being'snatural tendency ; what cor

(Gen. Met., 67, f. ;
responds to the exigenciesof its nature
Bonum
est id
Ethics,4; for different kinds see Psych.,109).
quod omnia appetunt (In I Nic. Eth., 1. 7).

Good

The

'

'

permanent qualitybelonging to the nature or to the

spiritualfaculties of a subject and disposingit favourably or
unfavourablyin respectof its end (Gen. Met., 101). Habitus
bene vel male
dicitur dispositio
difficilemobilis secundum
quam

Habit

disponitur
dispositumaut
(ARISTOTLE, Met., V,

c.

20

secundum

se

aut

in ordine

ad

aliud

'

Categ.,c. 6).

Hypostasis : A firstsubstance that is completein itselfand part of

significat
Hoc nomen
hypostasis
other being (Gen.Met., 88)
no
de
pluribus
potest
substantiam
individuam, id est quae non
praedicari (De Pot., q. 8, a. 3).
'

'

GLOSSARY

514

ol facts observed
(Log.,
explanation
Hypothesis : A provisional
absolutam
vericontinet
enunciatio
non
87)
Hypothetica
sed
in
demonstratione
significat
tatem, cujus cognitiorequiritur
I
1.
Periherm,
ex
(In
esse
i).
verum
suppositione
aliquid
'

'

Idealism

respects contradictory of

some

different systems that

designatingtwo

word

the

doctrine that
philosophic

each

human

In

other.

mind

know

can

are

in

general,the
only ideas.

objectiveif ideas are regarded as Platonic ideas or

realist idealism). It is subjective
universal essences
or
(Platonic
from the very constitution
forms resulting
if ideas are subjective
of the mind (modern or subjective
(Psych.,97 ; History,
idealism)
19; Crit.,42-59).
with exemplary cause,
As synonymous
the mental
Idea :
type
effect
realizes
e
fficient
cause
some
after which
an
intelligent
Idea est forma quam
aliquisimitatur ex
(Gen. Met., 162)
sibi finem
intentione agentisdeterminante
(De Verit.,
q. 3, a. i).
the mental representation
with concept (q.v.),
As synonymous
of a thing*
Image : See phantasm.
is

Idealism

'

'

Immanent

action.

See immanent

in itself an
Considered
Independent of matter.
or
being contains neither constitutive nor
spiritual
parts (Psych.,143).
integrant,quantitative

Immaterial
immaterial

Imperative
law

The absolute,necessary
:
(Categorical)

which,

in

Kant's

system,

serves

as

and

universal
of the
truths of

foundation

the

the fundamental
and indirectly
justifies
obligation
27 ; Ethics,55 ; History,142).
ethics and religion
(Crit.,
Indeterminate
Indefinite
(Gen.Met., 43).
:
A subsisting
Individual
:
being that is completein itself and
moral

communicable
Individuum

est

(Psych.,158;

another

to

'

quod

est in

se

Gen.

indistinctum, ab

in

Met., 27, 89).

aliis vero

dis-

(Sum. Theol.,I, q. 29, a. 4).

Individuation
(principleof): That which constitutes a nature an
individual,i.e. complete in itself and incommunicable, and, in
it possible
for it to be realized
the case of material beings,makes
the
whilst
distinct
in a number
of beingsthat are really
specifically
in masame
(Gen.Met., 28 f.). Formae
quae sunt receptibiles
tinctum

'

'

est recepnon
teria,individuantur per materiam ; quae autem
tibilis in materia, individuatur
per seipsam (Sum. Theol.,I,
'

q. 3,

a.

2, ad

3 and

4).

A process of knowledge which starts with the obser

Induction
:
different accidents exhibited by a substance
vation of the many
and discovers which of them
are
invariablyconnected and reveal
the presence of a
property (Crit.,61 ; Log., 86 f.). This is
induction
as
distinguishedfrom complete induction.
scientific
In syllogismoaccipitur
cognitioalicujusuniversalibus notis ;
'

in inductione
sunt

manifesta

autem
'

(In

concluditur

universale
I Post. Anal., 1. i).

ex

singularibus
quae

GLOSSARY

516
'

'

of the Schoolmen
(Gen.Met., 156).
of the
scientific conclusion,it is the expression
in which a thing acts or exists.
and invariable way
constant
eternal law is the destination, as conceived
The
by divine
ends, and the adapta
Wisdom, of all creatures to their respective
Lex
nihil aliud est
aeterna
tion of their activities to them.
akin

to the word

Considered

as

proprium

'

ratio

quam
omnium

The

secundum
sapientiae,

divinae

'

motionum

et

actuum

directiva

est

a.

i).

free rational creature of

naturalis non
est aliud quam

in
expression

natural law is the

quod

(Sum. Theol.,I-I I, q. 93,

the

'

Lex
this eternal law (Ethics,
41).
nobis a Deo
intellectus insitum
lumen
'.
vitandum
et
quid
quid agendum
The moral law, in general,is the norm

per

quod cognovimus

according to which

himself to attain his purpose in being. In

man
ought
restricted sense, it is an ordinance promulgated for the
a
more
for the good order of some
common
good by one who is responsible
Quaedam rationis ordinatio ad bonum
society(Ethics,50)
to conduct

'

ab

commune,

qui

eo,

(Sum. Theol.,I-II,q. 90, a. 4).

Liberty : A qualityin virtue of which
several concrete
goods that the reason
will
Moral

the will

can

choose

'

between

puts before it and

universal,complete good towards

to realize
the

habet, promulgata

communitatis

curam

the
partially
inclined (Psych.,Ill f.).
is necessarily

judges
which

exercised in respectof moral acts ; it

different objects
of
the faculty
choosing between
in relation to the end of man's rational nature (Psych.,

is freedom
liberty

is therefore

considered

119;

Ethics,24).

Materialism
of

is not purelyand

anything which

Mathematics

science

The

object,a property

to

place in material

quantity,

all

prescindsfrom

things and

property

on

which

common

Gen. Met., 1).

abstraction
Mathematical
take

of the existence
principle
95)
simply material (Psych.,
has
quantity as its formal
9 ;
material beings (Introd.,

system that is a denial

fixes the

'

all.

them

to

common

sensible changes that

mind on intelligible

Mathematica

in
intelligibili,
continua
quantitasabstracta a
quantum in intellectu remanet
sensibili quantitate (De III Anima, 1. 8).

abstrahunt

materia

sed
sensibili,

non

materia

'

Matter

See material

Primary

matter

cause.
one

of the

two

material substance, being the one

determination
without
any specific
substantial form ; or in short, an

subject (Cos.,38;
nominatur
intellecta

and

receives

quod
praeter omnem
'

tamen

Met., 113, 132).

substantiae ut
speciem et formam
est

(De Spirit.Great.,q.

susceptivaet
i, a.

it from

indeterminate,

est in genere

privationem,quae
vationum

Gen.

of a
constituent elements
is of itself entirely
which

i).

the

perfectible

prima
potentiaquaedam
et etiam praeter
et priformarum

'Id

materia

GLOSSARY
Second
matter,
material substance

5I7

sensible body : a
completelyconstituted
that is naturallyendowed
with

or

quantitative

for determination by accidental

forms, but
forms
such
5, 2; Gen. Met., 132). 'Materia
only (Introd.,
by
sensibilis dicitur materia
corporalis,secundum

parts

be

can

matter

quod subjacet

scilicetcalido
sensibilibus,
qualitatibus

duro
frigido,

et

et molli et

'

hujusmodi (Sum. TheoL, I, q. 85, a. i, ad 2).

Metaphysics : The science which has for its formal .objectbeing
that is positively
or
negativelyimmaterial (Introd.,
9; Gen.
Met., 1,3).
Philosophusin metaphysicadeterminat de ente in
communi
et de primo ente quod est a materia separatum
(De
Gener. et Corrupt.,Proaem.).
of attainingscientific knowledge (Log.,84 f.).
Means
Method
:
circular demonstration.
See Analytic,synthetic,
'

'

Monism

pantheism.
The
moral
qualitycharacterizing
the
relation
philosophy,namely,
See

Morality

of moral

of

the end

act with

human

habet
philosophia

of

the

object

conformityof

(Ethics,
1, 2, 32, 34).

'

Moralis

proprium,scilicet considerare operationes

hoc

ut ordinantur

humanas

man

and

acts

invicem

ad

et ad

finem

'

(In I Eth.,1. i).

of a subjectthat is formallypotential
actuality
'Motus
dicitur actus imperfecti,
id est exis(Gen. Met., 115).
tentis in potentia (Sum. TheoL, I, q. 18, a. i).

Movement

The

'

kinds

'

Motus

est solum

in istis tribus generibus, scilicet,

quantiteet ubi (In V Physic.,\. 4) :
qualitate,
and
successive
continuous
local movement
or
receptionof new
in qualityor alteration
positionsin space (Cos.,26) ; movement
in
in
consists
which
receivingnew
qualities
; movement
(q.v.),
loss of a
increase and diminution, the acquisition
or
or
quantity,
est
in
nominatur
Motus
of
certain amount
matter,
qui
quantitate
There

are

three

"

'

'

speciesquae
1.
Physic., 4).

secundum

(In V
Natural
and

suas

That

which

sunt

augmentum
the

correspondsto

'

et decrement

of
exigencies

um

nature

'

of action.
to its proper manner
Aliquiddicitur naturale
convenit
(Sum. TheoL, I-II,q. 34, a. i).
quod naturae

ex

'

eo

Nature

Synonym

for substance

considered as
a
principleof
of the
first principle
intrinsic,

the
or,'more
precisely,
to
the being which producesor
that are proper
operations

action ;

under

naturae
significat
them
(Gen. Met., 87, 155). Nomen
ad
ordinationem
vel
ordinem
habet
essentiam rei secundum
quod
propriamoperationemrei (De Ente et Ess., c. i).
'

goes

'

In Kantian
which
the thing in itself,

Noumenon

to phenomenon
philosophythe opposite

the

understandingcannot

attain to

nor

42).
represent (Crit.,
Object (of a faculty): That to which
applied. Objectum non est materia
'

quam

habet

et
'

speciem (Sum.

the exercise of

facultyis

circa
qua, sed materia
quodammodo rationem formae in quantum dat
TheoL, I-II,q. i^, a. 2, ad 2).
ex

GLOSSARY

5i8

objectof knowledgeis that wherein the act of knowledge

by which it is completed (Log.,10). Objectum
terminat et perficit
ipsamet est finisejus (In I Sent.,
operationis
dist. i, q. 2, a. i, ad 2).
The material object is something of which the special
pointof
is not
determined
whilst
the
view for consideration
formal
;
object is that specialpoint of view from which a thing is dealt
4, note 10).
with by a faculty(Introd.,
The proper object of a facultyis what falls immediatelywithin
The

rests

'

and

'

attainment

for the

and

its range

proper objectis somethingit

of which

it is made

im

the

attain to except

through the
of
medium
object. Proprium (id est formalc)
proper
alicujus
potentiaeest illud sub cujus ratione omnia
objectum
ad
referuntur
potentiam (Sum. Theol.,I, q. i, a. 7).
cannot

'

the

'

relation of conformity between

an
Objectivity (real): The
and
mental
of
of
some
knowledge
reality
object
independent
22 i., 41 f. ; Psych.,45).
(Crit.,
representation
of freely
Obligation (moral) : The practical
imperativenecessity
is
and
is
of
what
what
doing
avoiding
morallygood
freely
morally
evil (Ethics,
41)
.

circumstance

Occasion
:
favourable

combination
free cause

or

action of
per accidens

of circumstances

(Gen. Met., 141).

est quae
Quaedam causa
aliquidoperatur, non
ad
effectum
tamen
ejusoperatiousque
conjunctum
pertingit
dicitur proprieoccasio
et talis causa
(In I Sent.,dist. 46, q. i,
Occasio nominat
causam
a. 2, ad 3).
per se insumcientem
sed inducentem
(In IV Sent.,dist. 38, q. 2, a. i, ad 4).
the

to

'

'

'

'

Occasionalism
cause

and

quod

History,115).
habet

creatura

naturalium,

effectuum

scilicet,quod

praesente

simply afford God

creatures

(Gen. Met., 149;

nulla

theory that God is the

The

that

sed

creatura

(id

creatura

non

est

'

Quidam

aliquam
quod Deus

and only efficient

occasions for acting

one

erraverunt

actionem

in

productione

effectos, ita
causat
effectum,
hos

causat

agit, sed
occasione

putantes

Deus

'

praesentiaecreaturae)

(Cont.Gent.,Ill, c. 69).
Operation

Synonymous

the action of an immaterial

actus
rei, etiamsi exterius

operatiointellectus

'

(In

used for
(virtus).
Preferably
faculty. Operatiodicitur quilibet

with action

'

est
sicut intelligere
II Sent.,dist. 12, in fine).
transeat

non

Assent to a probableproposition,
the state of the
or
it inclines to one
of two contradictory
mind when
propositions,
the
other.
but without definitely
excluding
Opinio significat
cum
intellectus qui fertur in unam
contradictionis
actum
partem
formidine alterius (Sum. Theol. I, q. 79, a. 9, ad 4).

Opinion

'

'

Pantheism
is only one

and cosmological
doctrine that there
The metaphysical
substance and the phenomena of the world are parts

GLOSSARY

519

of it

(substantial!*!
pantheism)or manifestations of it (dynamic
of the spirit
pantheism)or subjectiverepresentations
taken
as
and only substance
the one
(idealist
Inasmuch
as
pantheism).
the

substance

one

is God,
comprisingall reality
it is also called monism

pantheism ;

called

this substance

that
principle

mental

by

this

is one.

Erroneous
in
forma non
qui peccat

Paralogism

is

system

of its funda

reason

reasoning(Log.,
72). See sophisms Ille
est syllogismussed paralogismus,
id est
syllogismus (In I Post. Anal., 1. 22).
'

'

apparens

Participation

quid,habens

'

See pure Actuality.

aliquidaliud adjunctum,

Quod

totaliter est ali-

non

dicitur
proprieparticipare

'

(In I Metaph., 1. 10).

Passion

From

the

viewpointof efficiency,
passionis
considered

of the efficient cause

'

Met., 119, 144).

1.

'

5).

Passio

Actus

vocatur
passivi

agentis in

effectus

est

in the

being

acted
'

the result

(Gen.
Physic.,

upon

(In III

passio
patiente (Sum. Theol.,
'

I-II,q. 26, a. 2). See action.

From

the

and
quality,

viewpoint,
metaphysical
passionis the
denotes
every qualitywhich modifies

third kind

of

subject by

sumitur pro
some
change (Gen. Met., 106).
fitalteratio (In V Metaph. 1.20).
secundum
qualitate
quam
In psychology,
passion denotes an intense inclination of the
sensible appetiteaccompanied by organic modifications ; a
'Passio

material

'

for what is now

commonly called emotion (Psych.,66).
synonym
Passiones propriedicuntur operationes
appetitussensitivi quae
transmutationem
secundum
sunt
organi corporalis (In II
'

'

Eth.,1. 5).
In

ethics,passionmeans

intense

an

inclination of the sensible

free-will and lesseningthe

act (Ethics,
27)
of
a moral
power of the will in the performance
Dicitur
quando passiosensitivae partisperpassio (perfecta)
habeat
ut
non
rationem
immutandam
ad
tingit

precedinga
appetite,

decision of the

'

usque
arbitrinm

liberum
Perfection

The

super

(Sum. Theol.,q. 46, a. 7,

'

earn

of
possession

whatever

is suitable to

ad
a

3).
beingin

contains all perfections a

is that which
perfection
43 f.).
supereminentway (Gen. Met., 173, 174; Nat. Theol.,
nobilitas
Dicitur universaliter perfectus,
(cui)non deest aliqua
Absolute
'

quae

inveniatur

in

aliquo genere

is
Infiniteperfection

which

that

'

(Sum. Theol.,I, q. 4, a. 2).

bounds
(A at. Theol. }
has no

48). 'Infinitum dicitur aliquidex eo quod non

(Sum. Theol.,I, q. 7, a. i). Esse infinitum est
'

praehabens in

entis sed
ad aliquod genus
fectionem
(Sum. Theol.,I, q. 25,
'

Person

a.

se

est
non

totius

An

88).
(Sum. Theol.,I, q. 29,

a.

I,

esse

per-

23).

individual substance of a rational nature

individua
'Persona
est rationalis naturae

fimtum
hmitatum

obj.et passim).

(Gen.BM.,
substantia

GLOSSARY

520
Petitio

principii

supposingat the

fallacyof 'begging the question/ of

beginningthe pointto be proved (Log.,75).

or
image
sense-representation,
material thing already perceivedand

Phantasm

of

The

some

imagination*
longeractually

of the
no

'

est similitude rei parPhantasma

present (Psych.,55, 93).
ticularis (Sum. Theol.,I, q. 84, a. 7, ad 2).
Phantasma
per
I
dist. 3, q. 4,
actum
Sent.,
(In
imaginations repraesentatur
'

'

'

3).

a.

Phenomenalism

The
supportingand

stance

theory that there is no such thing as sub

distinct from
phenomena perceivedin

things,and that all that is real is the existence of

transitoryappearances (Gen.Met., 83 ; Crit.,42).
external

Phenomenon

comparativelymodern
accidental

ism, denoting the

manifests
it

aspect under
'

'

itself and

word

appears

to the

one

these

arisingfrom ideal
which

who

substance

knowledge of

has

(Crit.,
42).

ancient classification of the sciences,

for its formal object the properties
of
material things and, in general,any kind of movement
A.,
(Intro
Gen.
mobili
est
de corpore
Met., 1).
9;
Physicus

Physics
the

According

science

which

to the

has

'

'

...

(In I Post. Anal, 1. 14).

According to the modern
science which

has

to matter

common

the
classification,

for its formal

experimental

object the superficial

properties

(Cos.,3).

A system which does not explicitly

Positivism
:
deny the existence
of supersensuous
but
waives
the questionof
reality, on principle
its existence and limits the field of knowledge to sensible pheno
facts that are simultaneous
95 ;
successive (Psych.,
or
or
mena,

Crit.,28,38).
the constituent notes of
thing is intrinsically
possible
do not involve a contradiction.
A thing is extrinsically
of it can be made actual by
possiblewhen the intrinsic possibility
virtue of some
other existingbeing capable of making it exist
Possibile dicitur dupliciter
:
(Gen.Met, 18 ; Nat. Theol, 18).
ad
modo
modo
alio
uno
aliquam potentiam
per respectum
absolute
terminorum
(Sum.
propter ipsam habitudinem

Possible
which

'

'

Theol, I, q. 25, a. 3).

Potentiality : Perfectibility,
by some
capacityfor being perfected
form (seeformal cause
Gen.
is con
It
Mel, 114, 117, 118).
;

sequently a relative imperfection. Purus

(Sum. Theol, I, q.
aliquidde potentialitate
'

actus

'

Power

Oftentimes

3,

a.

non

habet

2).

with

potentiality
potency ;
(q.v.},
est
Potentia
passiveor receptive
principassiva
power.
ab
alio
(Sum. Theol, I, q. 25, a. i).
pium patiendi

and

synonymous

is

'

'

(PAn operativepower or power

action, and
synonymous

of

of action is
with

an

immediate

principle

faculty (Gen. Met., 118).

GLOSSARY
'

521

activa est principiumagendi in aliud (Sum. Theol, I.

be active or passiveaccording as the
q. 25, a. i). This may
intrinsic complement
facultyhas need or not of receivingsome
into exercise (Gen.Met., 117 ; Cos., 68).
before it can come
Potentia

'

Predicables

in which

The ways

the

predicatecan

be attached

to

subject(Log.,16).

the

Predicaments

Synonymous

Predicate

with

Synonymous

That

with

categories
(q.v.).

attribute

(q.v.).

in virtue of which

something exists or is done or

it is called logical
In the last sense
is known.
; in the
principle
Met.,
two
former, ontological
165; Log., 51).
principle(Gen.
aliquid est, fit, vel cognoscitur
Principium est id quo
(ARISTOTLE,Metaph., IV, c. i).
In general,
the absence
in a subject of a perfection
Privation
:
Privatio
which should naturallybelong to it (Gen. Met., 75).
est negatio debiti inesse alicui subjecto'. In cosmology, the

Principle

'

'

'

determinate

of the

absence

naturallyreceive (Cos.,74).
absentia formae

Property

An

with

up

est nata

quae
accident which

'

accidens sic dictum

Proposition
.

Quiddity

'

nihil aliud

matter
est

can

quam

(Coel,1, 1. 6).

is necessarily
and

bound
invariably

The

That

thing-is,TO
Met., 15)

TI.

verbal

which
arrt

de essentia rei sed ex principiis

essenessentiam
et
unde
medium
est inter

(Sum. Theol.,I, q. 77,

est
Propositio
:

'Privatio
inesse

primary

of which the substance

by means
the
five predicables
(Log.,
(Cos.,52). One of

'

29)

which

substance, and

its nature
displays
16). Proprium non est
tialibus specieicausatur,

'

form

expressionof

oratio enuntiativa
answers

synonym

the

for

a.

i, ad

5).

;
Log.,
judgment(q.v.

'.

questionQuid
essence

est ? what

(Psvch., 89

-a

Gen.

Ouia illud per quod res constituitur in propriogenere

vel specieest quod significamus
per definitionem indicantcm quid
in nomen
essentiae a philosophis
est res, inde est quod nomen
'

(De Ente et Ess., c. i).

The theory of knowledge accordingto which the object
Realism
:
of something extramental.
of knowledge is real, in the sense
realism the external object is justas i
According to exaggerated
mutatur
quidditatis

'

all the notes of abstraction, uni

in the act of knowledge (History,
Idealism). According to moderate realism

in our
mind, with
represented
etc., that it assumes
versality,

Platonic
the object in the real world is the correlative of the objec
the i
knowledge, but the modes in which it appears before
4
the work of the act of knowledge itself(Crit.,
are

52, 56;

see

and denotes
for intelligence
faculty,
synonym
knowing facultyas proceedingby a discursive ( ) proces"=
of knowledge, that which the mind
As an
object"
thing and which is the foundation of its properties

Reason

here

As

with the nature

of the thing (Nat. Theol.,62).

GLOSSARY

522
In

logic,that

which

the question,Why?
truth known
(Introd.,
rationis intelliguntur,
primo

corresponds

explainssome

what

thing,
165). 'Ex nomine
cognoscitivavirtus. Alio

Gen. Met.,

5;

quaedam

dicitur

cum

modo

poniturpro

fecisti. Tertio modo

ratione hoc

qua

ratio

to

or

occurrence

aliquidsimplex a
naturam
pertinens (Comment, in
c.7.1-5).
act by which the reason
Reasoning : A logical
'

hominis

terms

of

to

if

see

46

dicitur
.

dicitur ratio
lib. de div. nom.,

sicut

abstractum

multis

ut

causa

the two
compares
middle
term
the same

judgment not yet evident with

objectivelythe one includes or excludes the other (Log.,
a

f.). See discursive.

Reduplicative : Laying stress upon an idea. The reduplicative

is usuallyexpressed by such phrases as
such ', inas
as
sense
much
as
', formally ', qua
(Log.,38 d). Id quod in aliqua
illud
e
st
propositione
reduplicatur
per quod praedicatum convenit subjecto (In III Sent.,dist. i, q. i, a. 3).
'

'

'

'

'

'

'

Reflection

deliberate

turning back of the mind either to the

object of a previousthought or to the act of thought itself.
(Psych.,144, 2). In the first case it may be called oncological
and in the latter psychological
or objective
reflection,
or subjective.
Sunt duo modi
reflexionis animae, quarum
altera cognoscitse
et quae a parte sua
a
sunt, altera vero
parte objecti
quae sunt
sui (De Princ. Indiv.}.
:

'

'

Reflex
to

In

reflex movement
physiology,
peripheralstimulation, without
:

conscious
In

effort

in response
intervention
of any

is that made
the

(Psych.,74).

psychology,reflex knowledge

is that

which

is obtained

the intellect,
making it to
has already been an objectof thought, or

the influence of the free-will on

through
again upon

think

to bend

Relation

back

what

upon

think of its

itself and

act ;

own

see

reflection.

In

distinct
general,a connexion between two or more
realities or concepts (Gen. Met., 108). 'Ratio
things,whether
propria relationis non
accipitursecundum
comparationem ad
:

illud in quo

est sed

comparationem ad aliquidextra

secundum

'

(Sum. Theol.,I, q. 28, a. 2).

A relation may be real or logical
accordingas it follows from the
from the knowledge that
or
very nature of the things connected
form of them
Sicut
we
realis relatio consistit
(Gen.Met., 109).
'

in ordine

rei ad
'

tellectuum

Met.,

Relativism

; see
:

absolute,that

ita relatio rationis consistit in ordine

in-

(De Potent.,q. 7, a. u).

Relative : Unable
connexion
with
108

rem,

The

either to
some

exist

other

or

to

of except in
is its correlative (Gen.

be conceived

being, which

absolute).
theory which

is,any immutable

denies that
and

necessary

we

can

truth.

perceivethe

GLOSSARY

524

is a movement
of the locomotive organs
Spontaneous movement
(Psych.,74).
sensuous
appetition
by some
Proprio
motu
et sponte agunt, ita quod a nullo exteriori moventur
(In III Nic. Eth., 1. 4).
'

determined

'

of which
Subject : In logic,that of the two terms in a proposition
the predicationis made
(Log.,13). Dicitur subjectum, de quo
alia praedicantur (In VII Metaph., 1. 2).
which
determinations
In metaphysics, that
to
accidental
substance.
convenit
for
Soli substantiae
belong ; synonym
proprieratio subject! (In I Post. Anal., 1. 34).
In psychology and criteriology,
a
being capable of knowledge
and appetition
and consequently
capable of enteringinto relation
called objects
with things which, by way
of distinction,are
(Gen.Met., 114, note).
'

'

'

'

Subjective

In

psychology and

pertainingto
criteriology,

the

subjectthinking.
In

subject of accidental deter

minations, i.e. to substance
(Gen. Met., 114, note). 'Soli
substantiae convenit proprieratio subject! (In I Post. Anal.,

metaphysics,pertainingto

the

'

1- 34)Subsistence

for substance
virtue of which

Formerly synonym

perfectionin

that

to

express
sufficient alike for existence and
Substance
in

not

That

which

something

'.

else

(q.v.).Now
a

thing

used
is self-

action.

has the

of its

reason

in
reality
'Ens

(Gen. Met., 84, 85).

itself and

in se, per

se

it was
emphasize the trait of existence-in-self,
subsistentia
called
Secundum
:
quod per se existit
formerly
in alio vocatur
et non
subsistentia
(Sum. Theol.,I, q. 29, a. 2).
To express its role of servingas a support of accidents,which it
stans

To

'

'

underlies

it is
(sub-stat),

supponitur accidentibus

called

dicitur

substance

'

:
'

substantia

Secundum

quod

(Sum. Theol., I,

q. 29, a. 2).
First or individual substance

is that which has the firstclaim to

it contains within itself the
called substance, inasmuch
as
of its realityand, as such, is, from the logicalpoint of
reason
the subject of predication,
view, in ultimate analysis
and, from the

be

ontological
pointof view, the real support of all that makes up the
of
Dicitur substantia ipsum subjectum
a
being
thing (Log.,14)
in
ultimum
quod non praedicaturde alio et hoc est particulare
substantiae
(De Pot.,q. 9, a. i).
genere
'

'

Second

namely,

substance
as

the

is substance

essence
genericor specific

for accidental
first substance

but
predications,

(Gen. Met.,

et

86

considered

or

concrete

an

serves

abstract
as

way,

subject

itself be predicated of a
may
in
which alone it has reality
subject,

Log.,15).

et maxime
principaliter

in

; it

'

prima est quae proprie

Hujusmodi enim secundum

Substantia

dicitur.

GLOSSARY
se

omnibus

aliis substant, sc.

Substantiae

tibus.

525

speciebuset generibuset acciden-

secundae

id est genera et species

sub
accidentibus et hoc etiam non
stant solum
habent nisi ratione
primarum (In VII Metaph., 2 et sq.). Substantia secunda
naturam
absolutam
significat
generissecundum
se
; prima vero
substantia
individualiter
ut
significat
subsistentem
earn
(De
vero

'

'

'

Pot.,q. 9,

6).
completeor incompleteaccordingas

2, ad

a.

Substance
in itself to

is

exist

it is sufficient

of another
sub
requiresthe concurrence
stantial element similarly
incomplete (Gen. Met., 117, note ; see
informingform, separatedform}. A completesubstance which
results from

compound ;
Suppositum

the union of two

and is opposed to

Same

Syllogism

The

process ;

or

as

incomplete substances
simplesubstance.

is termed

hypostasis.

complete, typical expressionof

reasoning

reasoning.

see

of the mind
to have
Synteresis : A natural facility
knowledge of moral first principles
(Ethics,44)
.

an
'

habitual

Synderesis

dicitur lex intellectus nostri,in quantum

est habitus continens
praecepta legisnaturalis quae sunt prima operum humanorum

'

(Sum. Theol.,I-II, q. 94, a. i, ad 2).

Synthesis : A mental gatheringtogetheror union into one whole
of elements
notes
which
or
by a previousanalysishave been
considered separately(Log.,10 e).
As a logical
or
is to proceedfrom principles,
method, synthesis
axioms, in order to deduce consequences or conclusion (Log.,85).
A
:
Synthetic judgment
judgment in which the union of the
called by
and subjectdepends upon experience.It was
predicate
the Schoolmen
in
matter
a
(Log.,31, 33).
judgment
contingent
The Kantian
a priori
judgment is a judgment of the
synthetic
in which the necessary
ideal order (i.e.
independentof experience)
connexion
of predicateand
subject does not follow from the
with that
the predicate
of what
represents
necessary connexion
which the subjectrepresents,
but is merely the inevitable resi
the laws

of

Teleology

understanding(Log.,33

our

The

study of the final cause

Crit.,39)

(Gen.Met., 156 f.).

theologyor the study of positively

immaterial
being (Gen. Met., 1, 3). 'Dicitur scientia divin
na
n
sive theologiain quantum substantias quae nunquam
esse
possunt,sicut Deus et intellectuals substantiae, consu
(In Metaph., Prolog.).

Theodicy

Synonym

for natural

used in the
Sometimes
God in permittingevil.

sense

of

vindication of the jus

to designate the in
used to-day sometimes
tellectual concept, sometimes
the work of the mind by whi
to expre
sense,
elaborated : sometimes
in a more
particular

Thought

word

GLOSSARY

526
concept

the intellect

as

Transcendence

ing to

the work

or

eminently.
metaphysical property

or

such, and

being as

See

Transcendental

work of the senses

the combined
of this productionitself(Psych.,
148)

productof

the

the
and

attribute

An

belong

therefore verified in all beings(Gen.Met.,

37).

philosophythat knowledge is called transcendental

which surpasses sense-experience.
Transformation
For completeor substantial transformation,see
:
In modern

corruption.
The truth of a being is the conformityof this being actually
:
considered
with its nature
as
alreadysupposed to be known
est in
Denominantur
a veritate quae
verae
res
(Gen.Met., 60)
aliud
nihil
est
intellectui
adaequata, vel
ipsa re (quae
quam
intellectum sibi adaequans)sicut a forma inhaerente, sicut cibus

Truth

'

denominatur

truth
4). Oncological
between
a thing presented to

Ver., q.
nature

i, a.

previouslyknown

'

dicitur
sanus
(De
qua
of
is the relation of identity

qualitatesua,

sanus

there

ideal type
Veritas est adaequatiovel conformi-

'

mind

the

and

an

5 ; Gen. Met., 61). Logicaltruth is

rei et intellectus (Crit.,
that attributed to knowledge ; it is the qualityof a judgment in
which the connexion
between
subject and predicateis in con
'

tas

formitywith

fact

(Crit.,
6)
accident in virtue of which
a
:
localizing
body
takes possession
of a definite place(Cos.,139).
intellect. More
or
Understanding : Synonym for intelligence
and in connexion
with the Scholastic theory of the idea,
precisely
be defined as the passivepower
t may
which, on receivingthe
conceptualdeterminant produced by the active intellect,accom
intellectus
the act of knowledge. Called by the Schoolmen
plishes
and also passive,
as
possibilis,
opposed to the active intellect or
Intellectus possibilis
of
abstraction
96, 103, 104)
(Psych.,
power
est in quo possint
fieri (De III Anima, 1. 10)
omnia intelligilia
Ubication

The

'

'

Unity
'

The state of a being which

nihil aliud significat
quam

Unum

I, q.

II,

Universal

is undivided
ens

indivisum

(Gen.Met., 41).
'

(Sum. Theol.,

i).

a.

: Capableof being referred

indefinite number
of concrete

attributed in the

same
way
92
Log.,
subjects(Psych., ;
9 ; see abstraction). Hoc
enim dicitur universale quod natum
est multis inesse et de pluribus
praedicari(In VII Metaph.,1. 13).

to

an

or

'

'

Universals
ndividual

concepts considered in their relation to the

44 ; History,
thingsof which they are predicated
(Crit.,

Universal

51).
Univocal
to
'

Terms

things which

are

verifythe

Quidquid dicitur

unam

rationem

univocal when
they are applied
essential
definition
same
(Log.,26).
pluribusunivoce dicitur de eis secundum

said to be

de

'

communem

(Sum. Theol.,I, q. 68, a.

4,

obj.3).

GLOSSARY

Virtually
of

The

its

virtue

Moral

God

from

electionem,

i,

q.

perfection

Voluntary

of

the

volition

sit

2).

note).

is

will

The

of

facit

qui
'

its

rectam

IV

(In

due

Sent.,

not

the

cum

word

voluntarii

aliqua
is

is

to-day

the

an

in

under

same

(Sum.

the

as

volition,

no

its

on

principium

quod

wider

the

intellectual

by

requiritur

also

will

influence

any

'

agent

f.).

of

act

finis

the

the

not

presented

has

cognitione
used

is

of

object

volition

the

rationem

Ad

It

which

volitum,

of

action

the

137

64,

less

used

which

by

(Psych.,
to

sometimes

as

or,

faculties

knowledge.
or

or

intra

natural

exercise

loquendo

proprie

something

constitutes

whether

realization.

normal

received
the

to

habitus

appetitive

other

intellectual

'

either

added

the

Omnis

rational

the

which

and

knowledge

a.

virtus

towards

of

influence

actus

of

That

matter

'

"

of

himself

object

make

to

46).

dici

act

accurately,
moves

soul

is

which

i).

a.

An

6,

the

disposition,

acquired,

(Ethics,

potest

14,

Volition

64,

contains

cause

habitual

an

rational

the

easier

activity

is

personally

or

of

powers

q.

effect.

Virtue

dist.

which

in

manner

527

Theol.,
sense

I-II,

(Psych.,

INDEX
A

judgments, i
29, 184.

POSTERIORI

PRIORI,

373, ii 161 ; demonstrations,

Abelard, ii 386.

Abiogenesis,
Absolute

i 177.

relative, i 504.
Absolute, the, ii 116 ; and morality,
ii 256 ; and rights,
ii 266 ; in Fichte's
ii
326, 464 ; Schelling,326,
system,
466; Hegel, 32 7, 467 (seePantheism,
and

Monism)
Abstract

idea, ii 153.

Abstraction, faculty peculiar to man,

i 4, 281 ; stages of, 9, 39 ; mean
ing, 4, 5, 240 1, 296, 379, ii 141,
153,

172-

The
and
Academies,
Old, Middle
New, i 26, ii 350, 361.
Accident, i 102, 487 f. ; ontological,
82, 492 ; and
substance,
480 ;

logical,ii 146
Actio

f.

passio,i

et

(see Properties).
503,

ii 147,

537,

in distans, i 131,

133,

135,

Actual

and

transitive,
creative, 538; of

potential, i 420. 506 f.,

meaning of actus
potentia ', 514 ; relations of,

and
'

508, 531.
Purus,

'

'

ii 36, 355

517,

Adamson,

ii

484.

Ampere, i 25 ; ii 472.
Analogy, analogical idea, ii 154
ii 154, 156
predication, i 239,

of Bath, ii 386.
extra
activity of God,

ii 362.
Aenesidemus,
Aesthetics, i 564 f. ;
the

aesthetic

transcendental
459

ii 91,

school,
of

aesthetic

Schiller, 462

Albert

the
of

f.

morality,

and

450

Kant,

induction, ii 186.

ii 161.
i 26, 49 ; ii 348.
of Miletus, i 26,

Anaxagoras,

of

Andronicus
Animal

(see

Miletus, i 49, ii 345.

ii 362.

Sensitive

life);

auto

ii 435.

Besate, ii 383.
St., of Canterbury,

of

Anselm

Anselm,
ii 29,

77 n.,

383

28,

f.

St., of Florence, ii 416.

and
Apperception, transcendental
empirical (see Kant).
Appetition, i 218 f ; and the good,
463 ; and free-will,ii 225.
Apprehension, i 36, 260, ii 141 f.
ii 364.
Apuleius of Madaura,
Arabian
(se"
philosophy, ii 391
Avicenna
and
Averroes).

i
.,

of Pitane, i 26, ii 361.

ii

483.
Aristotle, passim',
Ardigo,
i

n.,

26, 71, 172

translations, i

477.

i,

life

works

and

f.,ii 352 f.,381

28, 33, ii 381

philosophy, i 17, 21, ii 353 f.

physics, i 100, ii 355 ; logic, i
principles,i 6 ; causes
353 ; on
i n,
f., ii
355 ;. hylo527
morphism, i 71 f.,506 f., ii 354
on

Great, i 28, ii 403.

Saxony,

49,

of Rhodes,

Arcesilaus

aesthetic

idealism, 465.
Affinity,i 56, 108.
Agnosticism, i 2, 251, 413, ii i6f
Agricola, Rudolph, ii 421.
Ailly, Peter d', ii 415, 416.
ii 428.
Alamanni,
Alan
of Lille, ii 388.
Albert

113

ii 415, 422.

chemical
528

;
;

Analysis, ii 142, 193 f.,202.

Analytic and synthetic propositions,

Adelard

455,

Alkindi, ii 392.
Allen, Grant, ii 483.
of Bene, ii 389.
Amalric
Ambrose,
St., ii 370.
ii 366.
Ammonius,

Antoninus,
i 513,

(see God).

569

Aphrodisias, ii 362, 421

of Hales, i 28, 72, ii 401.
Alfarabi, ii 392.

matism,

f. ; double

Actus

Ad

of

Alexander

Alexander

ii 345Anaximenes

143,

ii83.
Action, immanent
1169, 533, 537;
God, ii 113.
511
and

of Clairvaux
Alcher
ii 388.
Alcuin, ii 380.
Alembert, d', ii 447.
Alexander
Achillinus, ii 421.

Anaximander

354Actio

Albinus, ii 364.

compound,

105

INDEX
Aristotle.

Being

Continued.

"

f"' liomoeo

',

merles

ii

348 ; Pure
God's
ii
knowledge,
Actuality, 355 ;
ii 94 ; theory of knowledge, ii 357 ;
immortality, ii 357 ; the categories,

ii 145, 354 ; time, i 145 ; the moods

of the syllogism,ii 1 74 ; enthymeme,
ii 1 86 ; epicheirema, ii 1 79 n. ; ethics,

slavery,ii 274.
morality, i 569.
of
Association
images,
ii 357
and

476

29,

210-213,

ii

441,

443,

f.
ii 20,

Atheism,

being

449.

Athenagoras, i 27.
Atomic
weights, i 55, 107.
Atomicity, i 56, 109.
Greek, ii 348 (see Mechan
Atomism,
ism and
Dynamic atomism)
Attribute
(see Predicate, Property).
Augustine, St., i 27, ii 370 f. ; God's
existence, ii 32, 55, 87, 94 n.,
.

and

logicalbeing,i 35,
171 ; being and

ii 137;

living,i
non-being, 448 ;

immaterial, 419;
limitation

beings

of, ii

443-

Bernouilli, ii 201 n.
Beneke, ii 471.
i 29, ii 267, 445,
Bentham,
477, 478.
Berengarius of Tours, ii 385.

Bergson, i 30, ii 15, 485.

Berkeley, i 29, 247, 365,

ii 442.
of Chartres, ii 386.
of Tours, ii 386.

Bernard
Bernard

i 288

Bernheim,

n.

Bernier

of Nivelles, ii 410.
Bessarion, ii 421.

Augustinianism,ii
Authority,

Biran,

and

395.
i 21, 23 n., 31, ii 390 ;
i 399, ii 187 ; civil,
certitude

Averroes, i 71, 94, ii 392.

ii 409, 416, 421.
Averroism,

Avicebron, ii 392, 407.

Avicenna, i 71, ii 94, 392-

Ballanche,

to soul, i 314;
reincarnation, i 325 ;
resurrection, i 326.
Boethius, i 312, 431, ii 86, 381, 382..
Boethius
the Dacian, ii 410.

Bonnetty,
Bonum
i

n.,

232,

394

n.,

ii 33,

ii 474.

utile, delectabile, honestum,

264, ii

Bossuet,

ii 474.

i 145

445.

Bonald, de, i 22, 30, 363, ii 22, 473.

St., i 28, 72, ii 33, 83,
Bonaventure,
86, 217, 401 f.
Charles, ii 447.
Bonnet,

213.

ii 30,

33,

102

n.,

103,

128,

435-

Bouillier,ii 484.
Boutroux,

Baflez, i 28, 72, ii 427.

Bartholomew

of Messina,

Bradley,

ii 393,

484.
ii 417.
Thomas,
f.,204, 301 ; Plate, 335.

Bridges, ii 483.

ii 468.

Baumgarten,

i 30, ii 484.
ii

Bradwardine,
Brain, i 181

Basil, St., i 27.

Bate, Henry, ii 412.
ii 450,

451

Beesley,ii 483.
Being, i 413 f. ; meanings,
as
object of knowledge,
of, 520

causes

Moralists, ii 444.
Broussais, ii 471.
Peter, ii 442.
Brown,
ii 477.
Thomas,
Brown,
Brucker, ii 452 n.
i 29,
Giordano,
Bruno,
British

Baumker, ii 482.
Bautain, i 30, ii 474.
Bayle, Pierre, ii 448.
Beatitude, ii 210 i., 219, 245.
Beaunis, i 288 n.
Beautiful,the, analysis and definition
of, i 564 f.
Bede, Venerable, ii 379-

kinds

relation

Jacob, ii 425.
Bolingbroke, Lord, ii

480.

Bauer,

de, ii 472.

Bohme,

ii 467.
BAADER,
von,
i 29, 50, ii 434.
Francis,
Bacon,
Bacon, Roger, ii 411 f.
Baer, von, ii 478.
Bain, i 212, ii 478.
Baldwin, Mark, ii 482.
Balfour, Arthur, ii 483.

Balmes,

Maine

Body, human,

origin,i 319

ii 336.

and

Bichat, ii 471.
Billot,i 487.
Billuart, ii 61, 63.

131-

possible, 422

receptivity and
48 ; contingent

God's
existence, ii 43 ;
and
existence in God,
ii
God's
self-subsistence, ii 61.
transcendental
attributes, i

essence

75 ;

251.

Associationism,

Continued.

"

real

63

Art

217,

529

of,

439
239
5- j

f. ;
f. ;
f- ;

436.
Buchez, ii 471.
Biichner, i 115, ii 483.
ii 344.
Buddhism,
Buffon, ii 447, 478Buhle, ii 462.
Buridan, John, ii 415-

ii 114,

423,

INDEX

530

Byzantine philosophy, i
393,

Cleanthes, ii 359.
of Alexandria, i 27, ii 370.
Clement
Clerselier,Claude, ii 435.
Clichtove, Josse, ii 427.
Clifford,\V. K., ii 484.

ii 445.

Burke, Edmund,
Butler, ii 444.

ii 391,

27,

4J3-

Cognition (seeKnowledge).

ii 471.

CABANIS,

Cajetan, i 28, 72,

184, 427.
in,
Campanella, i 29,

Cohen, i 30.

ii 70, 83,

487,

431,

i 28, ii

Coimbra,

Coleridge,ii 460

ii 423.

428.
n.

Cano, Melchor, ii 427.

Collectivism, ii 287 f.

Capitalism, ii 302 f
Capreolus, i 72, ii 416.

Combination

(seeCompound)
(see Senses).

ii 423.

Carlyle,ii

460 n.
of Cyrene,

sensibles,i 194, 203.

ii 284 f.
Communism,

Casuistry, ii 261.
Categorematic terms, ii 156.
Categories,ontological,i 492, ii 354 ;
ii 145 ; Kantian, i 378,ii 456.
logical,
Causality, principle of, i 375, 540
(see Cause).
Cause, general meaning, i 10, 525 ;
classification

com
of, n,
535;
parison between, 552 f ; effects of,
.

540 ;

principle of causality, 375,

efficient,i 13, 533 ; principal
instrumental,

f., 535 ;
257
and
14, 551 f ; cause
condition, 533 ; and occasion, 534 ;
accidental
and
effects, 546 ; and

exemplary,

occasionalism,
539,
303,
actio fitin passo ', 536 ;

ii

435 ;

'

an

argu
existence, ii 40 f. ;

for God's

ment

and

i 6,

final, 13, 73,

77, 541 f. (see Purpose) ; formal,
527!. ; material, 12, 527 f.
n,
Cell, the, i 166, 176 f. ; Plates, 331 f.
reason,

10

Celsus, ii 364.

Certitude, i 349 f., 363 f. ; kinds of,

i 385, 402 ; historical, i 399 ; of
faith, i 400.
Chance, i 550.
Change, i 16, 65, 73, 98, 506 f., 523,
for
God's
an
argument
527 ;
existence, ii 35 f.
Charcot, i 289, 337.
Charron, ii 426.
Chemical, facts and
theories, i 52,
55I-,

22,

towards

ii 445.

science,

23, 32.

Church, Fathers
369 f.
Cicero, ii 362.
Clarke, Samuel,

substance

and

unity,

and

accident,

4 53 ;

entitative,

i 52,

chemical,

Compound,

; real,
existence,

and

57,

103,

no.

Comprehension of ideas, i 5, ii
the syllogism,ii 172.
and
Comte,
Auguste, i 2, 29, 409,
ii 474

'

477

.,

of the

law

149

413,
three

stages ',ii 16 f.,474.

Concept, general meaning, i 260,
and
ii 143
f. ;
comprehension
extension, i 5 n., ii 149 ; opposition
between
concepts, ii 150.
Conception, physiological, i 177 ;
i 260, ii 141.
Conceptualism, i 379.
intellectual

Condillac, i
Condition

251,

29,

ii

446.

(seeCause).

Condorcet, i 29, ii 471.

Confucius, ii 344.

Congreve,

ii

Connotation
Conscience,

483.
(see Comprehension).
ii

259

f. ;

and

God's

existence, ii 56 ; obligation of an
ii
262 ;
erroneous
conscience,
liberty of, ii 278, 337 ; and synteresis,ii 239, 259.
Consciousness, i 189 f. ; and person

ality,
strable

313,

269.
Conservation,
Content

ii

142

truths, i 388

;
;

indemon

free-will,i

ii 121.

of ideas, ii 149, 152.

Contingent things

as

argument

for

existence, ii 43 f., 51 f. ;
contingent judgment, ii 159, 162 n.
i 458.
Continuum,

107.

attitude

490
86.

of, i 450

essence

God's

of,
Cherbury, Lord Herbert
China, philosophy of, ii 344,
Chrysippus, ii 359.
Church,

of

435,

Cassiodorus, ii 381.

and

kinds

Composition,
438 f. ; of

i 361.

Caro, i 29, ii 484.

Carus, ii 483.

557;

sense

Common

Cardanus,
Carneades

Common

of

the, i 27,

ii 445.

33,

ii

Contract-Theory of Right, ii 328 f.

Contradiction, principle of, i 475.
Contradictory ideas, ii 151 ; pro
positions,ii 167.
Contrary ideas, ii 152 ; propositions,
167.
of propositions,ii 166.
Conversion

INDEX

532

ii 116, 364, 384 (see

Emanationism,
Pantheism, Monism).
Embryology, i 166 f., 318.
Emerson, ii 484.
i 220
ii
Emotions,
f., 278 f., 291,
f. ; and
of the will,
freedom
225
f.

225

Empedocles, i 26, 49, ii 347.

Empiricism, i 251, ii428f.
Encyclopedia, the French,
End

of

f ;

ii 214

man,

morality, ii 231 ;
God's
glory,ii 254
tvepytia,i 307,

420,

ii 447.
of
basis

Extension
of

fa",

455Faith and

science, i 22 f., 32 ; certi

the
of, 400 ; and
super
traditionalist
natural, 327 ; the
truth, ii
theory, 363 ; twofold
tude

(seePurpose).
n, (seeHylo-

509

morphism)
Energism, theory of, i 54 n., 127 f.
English philosophy, i 29, ii 434, 439 f

410,

476 f.
Enneads,
Ens

.,

(see Being).

^reA^xetct, i 307,
ii 354. 356.

Enthemyme,
Envieu, Fabre

402,

509

n.,

513

n.,

ii 179, 186.
d', ii 474.
ii 179.

Epicheirema,
Epicurus, i 26,

50,

115,

166.

Erasmus, ii 426.
Ercole, d', ii 480.
Eric of Auxerre, ii 383.
Eriugena, John Scotus, ii 384.
Essence,

Fichte, i

463

76, 78 f., 421 f. ; and

substance, 483 ; and
ii 63 ;
meta
existence, i 435,
of God, ii 60, 147
physical essence

species,148

Evolution,

moral
2,

234,

f ;

Fischer, Kuno,
;

ii 229 f
506, ii 371,
principles of
.

and
the
478
morality, ii 235, 241 f., 333 f.
(seeChange).
Example, as a probable argument,
.

ii

86.

Existence,
420,

434

ii 371.

i 40, 420 ; and

essence,
ii 63 ; and
f
individual
.,

substance, i 486 (see Being),

333,

462,

ii

436

and

482.

Fonseca, i 72, ii 428.

Forces, 94 f., 514
(see Faculties);

dynamism,
Form

and

i 127,

134.
i

matter,

12

substantial

f ; classification of,
.,
77 ; the soul the form of the human
'
corporeitatis',
body, 307 ; forma

form

310,
Formal

76 f

99

408 (seeHylomorphism)
object,i 9, 238, ii 136.

ii

Fontenelle, ii 447.
Fouillee, i 30, ii 484.
Francis

of

Mayron, ii 415.
Sylvestris,i 28,

ii 427.
of Vittoria, ii 427.
Franciscan
Order, i 28, ii 394, 396,
Francis

Francis

401,

402, 407,

412, 427.

411,

Sebastian, ii 425.

Franck,

Fredegis, ii 382.
Free

action, i 265 f.

Freedom

Exemplarism,

329,

f.

and
infinite, i
indefinite,456.

essential

good,

Finite

definition, 192.
Eternity, definition, ii 86 ; of the
world, ii 42 ; of God, ii 86.
Ethics, 119, 20, ii 209.
Eucken, i 3, ii 484.
Eustachius, ii 364.
Everett, ii 484.
and
Evidence, immediate
mediate,
i 349, 386 f.,391 f.,ii 170.
Evil, i 470, ii 129, 372 ; moral
evil,
i 274 ; and
divine
Providence, ii
; and

ii 326,

29,

Sylvestris)

(seeTraditionalism).
Finality,i 114 (seePurpose).

and

220

n.,

Fichte, the Younger, ii 468.

ii 451.

and

i 190

Fideism

nature

n.

ii 444.
Ferguson, Adam,
ii
Ferrari,
483.
Ferrariensis
(seeFrancis
Feuerbach, ii 462, 468.

ii 360 f.
.

Eschenburg,

486

tone,
tive); feeling-

Equipollence, ii 166 n.
Equivalence of propositions,ii

ii

Fatalism, ii 255 (seeDeterminism).

Fathers, philosophy of the, i 27, ii
369.
Feeling, i 221, 278 (see Life, sensi
Fenelon, ii 435.
Fere, i 199.

Epistemology (see Criteriology)

128

442.

Fallacies, logical,ii 187 f.

Family, rightsof the, ii 316 f.

Farges,
the, of Plotinus, ii 364

rationis

genus

category, ii 147, 354.

ii 427.
STAPULENSIS,
Faculties, i 238 f., 259, 278, 291 i.,
classification
n.
of, 498 f. ;
;
509
modern
division, i 219,
tripartite
278, ii 451 ; in Kant's
system, ii

end,

supreme

; extension

FABER

the

(seeQuantity)
concepts, i 5, ii 149.

(seeLiberty).

Free-will, i 265 f.,285, 289, ii 224 f. ;

matter
for action of,i 27 1 ; and faith,
i 400

ii 105

and

;
;

and

God's

foreknowledge,

God's

sovereignty,

INDEX
Free-will.

Continued.

"

moral
evil, 130 ; and
4 ; and
moral
obligation, 239 ; influences
12

225.

upon,
French

philosophy,

ii

29,

432,

f.

446 f., 471

ii

Galileo, i 72, ii 428.

and

corruptio (see Change).

150-2.

Gerbert, ii 382.
Gerbert, ii 474.
German

i 29,

ii 449

f.,

ii 393.

Salomon,

Ben

ii 8 ;

ontological argu
46 f. ; unicity of,

ii 29,
88 f. ; God's

ment,
53,

metaphysical
i 68

definition,

no

105

will

and
in

of

man,

plicit

108
f. ;
203

and

the

the

end

ii 216, 232
of
God,
knowledge

and

moral

and

God's

i 325,

sanctions, 245

other

im219

Kant

existence, ii 10, 457;

the Absolute
of Fichte, ii 464 ; in
ii
Plotinus'
system,
364 ; tra
ditionalist

views,

363,

ii

32 ;

ontologist views, i 253, ii 24 ;

the
Divine
Right of monarchs,
ii 328 ; and State authority, ii 336.
'

'

Happiness,

n.

493 f.

ii 216

Harper, i 407
Harris, ii 484.

ii

483.

f., 245.

n.

Hartley, David,
Von,

Hartmann,

ii 442.
i 29,

ii 255,

470,

484.
ii

Haureau,

Hauy.

482.

i 25 n., 61.

Hearing,

free-will,

human

God,

perfections of, in
end
of philosophy,
|

im86 ;
and

conservation, i 234, 316, ii 113 f. ;

God's
knowledge, ii 93 f. ; fore

knowledge
i

ii

immensity,

f ;

infinity,72
j 79 f- ; omnipresence, 81 ;
;
mutability, 84 ;
eternity,
activity of, 91 f. ; creation
;

394,

Harrison, ii 483.
ii

f. ;
f. ;

ii 59
of, ii 61

nature,

essence

simplicity,65

417.

ii 451, 463.
Hamilton, Sir W., ii 476.
Hamy, 1319-

f. ;

29

ii

Hamann,

262,
254,
of,
; notion
of, ii 7 f ; and

existence

proofs, ii

ii 468

i 115, 234,
Hallucination, i 285.

cognoscibility of,
truth, i 348
; and

n.,

i 275,

HABITS,
Haeckel,

de

Giles of Rome,
ii 406, 407, 416.
Gioberti, i 30, 253, ii 24, 474, 480.
Gnosticism, i 27, ii 370.
ii

f.

(Hugo de Groot), ii 424.

(Egidius of Medonta), ii

Guido

Gunther, i 304

la Porree, ii 387, 390.

Giles of Lessines, ii 406.

ii

ii 345

400.

Gerson, Levi Ben, ii 413.

Geulincx, ii 435, 439.

God,

moral
evil, ii
ii 254 ; the

Gunclissalinus, Dominicus,

Gerson, ii 416.

Gilbert

duty,

Grosseteste, ii 394, 401.

f.

Gerson

and

transcendenta'

philosophy, i 26,

Grotius

philosophy,

461

f. ;

ii 71 ;
and
;

Gregory XVI, i 22.

Gregory the Great, ii 379.
Gregory of Nazianzus, ii 370.
Gregory of Nyssa, ii 370.
Gregory Palamas, ii 413.
Gregory of Rimini, ii 416.

ii 442.

species,ii

468

Green, T. H., ii 484.

i 316.
Generationism,
Gentile, ii 484.
Genus

Goschel, ii 468.
Greek

Gassendi, i 50, ii 422.

et

being,

end, ii 2*54
supreme
;
degrees of
moral
goodness, ii 255 ; Platonic
'
Idea of the Good
',ii 350.
Gorgias, i 26, ii 348.

364.

Gay, John,

and

229

Gall, ii 471.
Gallon, Francis, i 248.
ii 473.
Gamier,
Gases, kinetic theory of, i 63.

Generatio

Godfrey of Fontaines, ii 406.

Goethe, ii 453, 465.
i 219;
Good,
analysis of. i 463.
ii 212;
kinds
of, i 263, ii 213;
good,

Fries, ii 470.
GALEN,

533

i 192.

Heart, i 225.
ii 233
Hedonism,

f.,266.
ii
266,
467 f. ; and
Hegel,
ii
S
tate,
326,
333.
Spirit-

the

i 29,

Hell, ii 245 f.
ii 19.
Helmholtz,
Helvetius, ii 191, 449.
Henry of Brabant, ii 394.
Henry of Ghent, i 28, 72, ii 406. 407.
Heraclitus, i 26, 49. 524. " 346 fHerbart, i 280, ii 462, 469, 470.
Herbert

of

Cherbury,

Lord

Cherbury).
ii 452, 463,
Heredity, i 177.

Herder,

478.

Hermes,

ii 394ii 468 n.

Hermes

Trismegistus,ii 364.

Herman,

(see

INDEX

534
of

Herve

Nedellec, ii 415.
ii 435.

Heydanus,
Historical

certitude, i 399.
ii 440

Hobbes,

; i 29, ii 231,

266,

233,

Holbach,
Home,
Huet,

ii

482,

i 249.
possibilis,

i 250,

256 f

Intentio, ii 138 n.
Intuition, i 253.
i 27.
of Seville, ii 379.

Isidore

n.

431

d', ii 447, 449.

Henry,

JACOBI, i 365, ii 451, 463.

Jamblichus, ii 366.

ii 445.

ii 435.

of St. -Victor, ii 387, 390,

Hulst, d', ii 33.
ii 420, 484.
Humanism,
ii 442 ; i 29, 365, ii 413.
Hume,
Hutcheson, ii 444.

Hugh

Huxley, i 234,
Hylomorphism,
3"7.

agens,

Intellectus

Irenaeus,

328, 444.

Hoffding,

Intellectus

ii 233,
i

anet, Paul,
oachim
ohn

478, 479, 483.

47,

71

n.,

f.,

73

528, ii 354.

507.

Hypnotism, i 228.
Hypostasis, i 484.
Hypothesis, ii 198, 201.
Hypothetical necessity, i 246,

372,

"ii159, 173.

Hypothetical

syllogism,

ii 180.

i 280, ii 236,
ii 252, 254,
Floris, ii 389.

William,

ames,

391.

de

VI

i 29,

Cantacuzenus,

485.
484.

ii 413.

John Chrysostom, St., i 27.

Scotus
John Duns
(see Scotus).
of
(de Genundo,
John
Jandun
Ganduno), ii 417.
John of Mirecourt, ii 417.
John Philoponus, ii 366.
John de la Rochelle, ii 401.
John of Salisbury, ii 387.
i 28, 72, 432
John of St. Thomas,
433

de

n.,

ii 427.
Scotus
Eriugena
n.,

(seeScotus)
John
Jouffroy, i 29, ii 55, 473.
Jouvencel, de, i 115.
of Hegel, 467.
Joyce, ii 161 n.
Idea, simplicity and
universality, Judgment, i 36, 347, ii 142, 157 f. ;,
i 4, 246 f ; and image, 248 n. ; as
i 371,
in necessary
matter,
375,
ii 159 ; objectivity of judgments,
habit, 260 ; innate, 253, 255, ii 350,
i 362 f. ; and free-will, i 265 f., ii
443 (see Concepts, Knowledge).
Identity, i 449 ; logical, ii 150 ;
judgments, ii 236 f.,
224 ; moral
i
principle of, 387.
(see Proposition).
244, 260;
Ideology,i 17.
Justin, St., i 27.
Ignoratio elenchi, ii 190.
ii 348 ;
life and works, i 29, ii 454 f. ;
and
KANT,
Image, i 188, 211,
influence
on
thought, i 243, 247.
English literature, ii
Imagination, 1189, 21 if.,243, 248, 256.
460 n. ; analytic judgments, ii^
Immanent
action, i 170, 537.
synthetic a priorijudgments,
455
i
f.
i
161, 455;
Immortality,
369, 373 f-,.ii
321
351,
ii 455 ;
forms
of
intuition,
Impenetrability,i 93.
pure
transcendental
aesthetic, 455 ; tran
Imperative, categorical, i 366, ii
scendental
analytic, 456 ; tran
248, 249, 457.
scendental
Independent morality, ii 256.
apperception of the ego,
Indifferent
moral
'real'
acts, ii 233, 253.
456;
logic, i 343, ii 139;
i 377 f., 381 f. ;
Individuation, i 428 f.
phenomenalism,
Induction, i 37, 395 f., ii 198 f. ;
categories, i 378, ii 456 ; con
methods
the
and
of, ii 199 ;
ception of relation, i 502, a priori
relations, ii 456 ; space and time,
syllogism,200 ; Socratic induction,
ii 349 ; fallacies
i 26
of
in
ii 455 ; the
i 382,
categorical
n.,
duction, ii 1 88.
imperative ; i 366, ii 248, 249,
IDEALISM, of Plato, i 253, ii 350 ; of
Fichte, ii 463 ; of Schelling.465 ;

"

Inertia, i 92, 123, 127.

Infinite, i 436 ; and indefinite, 456
the

Infinite, ii 69, 72 f.

Inheritance, right of, ii 314.

Instinct, i 190, 214-217.
Intellect,i 238 f. ; and will, 219
and

man's

highest good,

and
knowledge
f. ; and
ii 241
260

of the
moral

(seeKnowledge).

moral

of the
Practical
autonomy
moral
i 366, ii 248 ; and
per
duty, ii 238, 247 f. ; human
sonalityand rights,ii 265, 266, 267 ;
457

Reason,

belief, ii 276 ; im
ii 16, 458 ; the
of God, ii 10, 46, 457 ; on
existence
the
State, ii 330, 333 ; influence,
i 409, 413, 481, ii 28, 461 f.,484 ;

necessity

f.

ii 217

;
;

order,
ii
conduct,

material

neo-

of

being,

Kantianism,! 30, 365, ii 483.

INDEX
a
category, ii 147, 354.
Kepler, i 25 n., 72, ii 428.
Kilwardby, Robert, ii 402, 406.
Kinetic
theory of gases, i 63 f.
Kleutgen, ii 83, 119, 486 n.
Knowledge, stages of, i 6 ; spon
8 ;
sensuous
taneous,
cognition,
187 f. 195 ; intellectual : material
formal
and
object, 238 f. ; from

sense-data

and
uni
yet abstract
f. ; the
of uniact
versal, 240
versalization, ii 172 ; Scholastic

theory,

i 17,

f. ;

249

cognitional

determinant,
f., 252 f.,
195,
249
active
f. ;
256
intellect, 250,
criterion
of
truth, 363 f. ; ob
jectivity of
369 ;
judgments,
Thomistic
the
realism,
379 ;
categories, ii 146 ; scientific sysii 191
f. ;
attain
temization,
of scientific

ment

knowledge, 204 ;
spiritualityof the soul, i
man's
296 ;
knowledge
highest
exercise, ii 217 ; man's
knowledge
and

the

of

self, i

ii

ii

261

f. ;
f ; and

93
His

of

God's
'

God,

scientia

media

foreknowledge

of

knowledge

ii

352

of

Historical

ii

', 97 ;
human
theories

Platonism,

262,

knowledge,

free-acts, 105.

i 253,

Augustine, ii 371 ;
Descartes, i 255, ii 433 ; ontologism,
i 253,
441 ;
idealism

ii 24 ; Hobbes,
i 374,
Kant,
ii

Krause,

St.

440 ; Locke,
ii 161, 455 ;

Lange,

Lao-Tse,

276,

298,

ii 56,

of

moral

law,

30, ii 484.

n.,

sis),ii

364

implies

ideas, i 282.

ii 344.

ii 436

29,

f. ;

dynamism, i 131 ; monadism,

ii
438 ; theory of perception, ii 438,
ii 451 ;
extrinsic
finality,i 541 ;
pre-established harmony ', i 303,
ii 438 ; determinism,
i 273 ; emo
'

tion, i

280

God's

31 ; and
essence,
i 481, 516.

ii 61

existence, ii
; substance,

Leo

XIII, i 30, 31, 72, 272, ii 335

486.
Lepidi, ii 33, 486 n.
Le Roy, ii 15, 22, 26 f.,485.
Leroy- Beau lieu,ii 285, 296.

n.,

Lessing, ii 452.
Lessius, ii

101.

Leucippus, i 26, 115, ii 348.

Levy-Bruhl, ii 236, 482.
Liard, i 30.
Liberatore, i 72, 304, ii 252, 486.
i 272,

Liberty, meaning,

275

re

spect of, ii 272 ; of opinion, 275

of conscience, 278, 337.
Liebault, i 288 n.
ii

i 30,

Liebmann,

484.

n.

general,

165

animal.

179 f. ; rational, 237 f. ; originof

human
life,immediate,
176, 316,
remote, 233 f. ; present life,ii 220,
ii 245 ; respect of
244 ; after-life,

life,ii 271

f.

Lilienfeld, ii 333.

Lipps, ii 481.
Lipsius, Justus (Joest Lips),ii
Littre, i 29, ii 233,
Localization

of

413.

422.

475.

sensations, i

201

f.,

204.

John, ii 441 ; i 29, 251, 304,

ii 442, 449, 454Logic, i 16, 18, 19, 35, 36, 11 135 f.,
ii 139 ; symbolic.
139 ; real, i 343,
Locke,

ii48i.
Lombroso,

ii 225.

Laplace, ii 478.

Lorenzelli, ii 486

Lassalle,ii 304.
Lavoisier,i 25 n., 49, 276, ii 428.
Law, physical, i 397, 545, ii 200 ;
natural
law, meaning and charac
ter of, ii 263 f
268 ; origin of
ii 449 ;
rights,ii 265 ; Rousseau,
positive law, ii 264, 268 ; moral

Lotze,

.,

244

427.

Lee, Vernon, ii 480.

Leibniz, life,i 25 n.,

human

280, ii 483.

f. ;

236
ii

characteristics of, ii 250 ; eternal

law, ii 237.
Lazarus, ii 470.
Lefevre, Jacques (Faber Stapulen-

Life, in

Language, origin of,

universal

sanction

466.

ii 8.
i 116

Continued.

law,

Liegeois,i 288

Lacordaire, ii 474.
Ladd, ii 484.
Lafitte, ii 475.
Lalo, ii 480.
Lamarck, i 215, ii 478.
La Mennais, de, i 22, 30, 363, ii 474.
La
Mettrie, de, ii 447, 449.

Lang,

Law."

of Fichte, 463.

LAAS, ii 483.
basis
the
of ownership, ii
Labour,
282 ; labour-value, ii 298, 306.

Lachelier,i

535

ii

n.

484.

i 3, 31, ii 435.
Lucretius, ii 360 f.
Lugo, de, i 400, ii 271.

Louvain,

Lully, Raymond,
ii 425.
Lyell, ii 47*"-

Luther,

487-

ii 412.

536

INDEX
ii 423.

MACCHIAVELLI,
Mach, i 139.

Mackintosh,

Sir

J.,ii 476

Mill, J. S., ii 477 f., i 29, 251, 413 ;

on
free-will,i 267 f. ; on the syl
logism, i 392 ; inductive
methods,
ii 199 ; originof rights,ii 267.
Mitchell, ii482.
Mivart, St. George, ii 480.
Moleschott, ii 483.
Molina, ii 101, 125.
Monism, i 141, 234, 305, ii 114, n6f.,
463, 468, 475
344,
(see Emanationism, Pantheism).

n.

i 286.

Madness,

Magic, ii 423.
Magnen, i 50.
Maher, i 256 n.
Maimon,
Salomon, ii 463.
Moses
Maimonides,
(seeMoses).
Maisonabe, ii 299.
Maistre, Jos: de, ii 474.
i 253, 303, 516, 539,
Malebranche,

ii

Mandeville, ii 445.
ii 482.
Mandonnet,
Manegold of Lautenbach, ii 385.
ii 114.
Manicheism,
Mansel, ii 476.
Mansion, Paul, i 25 n.
Marriage, ii 316 f ; perpetuity

122

Marsilius

ii 299,

sanction

439, 471.
and

ii 402.

Aquasparta,
364.

ii

Mechanical

facts, i 63.
i 249
f., 116,

Mechanism,
mechanical

conception
of

545,

verse,

applied

to

Melchior

Cano,

Memory,

i 190,

215

ii 235

as

neo-

i 54 n., 137.
de', ii 421.

389.

407

Michael

i 27.
of Morbaix,

Mill, James, ii 477.

ii 409.

569

'

'

pendent
'

an

'

'

'

argument

for

God's

existence,

ii 56.
Sense
Moral

',ii 241, 444.

More, Bl., Thomas, ii 424.
Morselli, ii 483.
Moses
Maimonides, ii 392.
Mosso, i 199.
i 53, 55 f ; local motion,
Movement,
f.
55 f-,65
; the Aristotelian
sense,
i 65, 145 f., 408, 506, 509 f., 523,
ii 35 (see Change) ; proof of the
existence
of God
from, ii 35 f. ;
vital, i 169 ; reflex, automatic,

425,

i 226.
ii 147.

436.

NANCY

i 289.
SCHOOL,
i
ii
484.
Natorp, 30,

f., 519

f.,

325, ii 344.
ii
f.
Method,
196
doubt,
; methodic
i 354 ; St. Thomas's
method, i 34.

Methodius,

253

Multitude, i 85 n., 448, 455.

Muscular
sensation, i 185, 187.
Mysticism, ii 364, 390, 402, 416, 418,

Mendelssohn, ii 451.
Mercier, Cardinal, ii 487.
Merit, ii 251.
Merseune, ii 435.
21,

spontaneous,

ii 425.
ii 427.

Metaphysics, i 17,
ii 4, 137, 482.
Metempsychosis, i

society,

acts, 233,

aesthetics,
'

Miiller, Max,

217,

of

525 ;
of the uni

instinct,

morality,

mechanism,
Medici, Cosmo
Meier, ii 451.
Melanchthon,

and

'

inde
organic morality ', 242 ;
secular
;'
morality, 256
or
lay
morality, 257 ; moral
law
obligation, ii 238 ; moral
as

(see Hylomorphism),

Mathematics, 117, 19 f.,85, 408

methods
of, ii 202.
of

basis

as

'

'

Maximus,

of

source

instinct
moral
moral
or
sense
',
ii 241, 444 ; Hobbes
and utilitarian
ism, ii 233,
234, 440 ; sociological
and
pragmatist morality, ii 236 ;

306.
f.,90 f.

335,

the

as

indifferent

'

In Plato, ii 351 ;
74, 528.
Aristotle, 73 f.
Materia
secunda, ii 528.
Materialism, i 115, 234,
251,
300,

Matthew

of, 244

morality

i 12,

ii 114,

'

336

300,

prima

n.,

of,

of

i 53, 55

121

of, i 172, 310.

law, ii 236 f ; sources
of, 232

rights, 268

Mass,

n.,

Montpellier, school

Ficino, ii 421.

Marx,

ii 421.
ii 69
n.,

n.,

Moral

Inghen, ii 415.
Marston, Roger, ii 411, 412.
Martianus
Capella, ii 381.
Martineau, James, ii 480.

Materia

i 32

124 n., 127 n., 129.

Montaigne, i 354 n., ii 231, 426.
ii 474.
Montalembert,
Montesquieu, i 29, ii 331.

321.
Marsilio

Monopsychism,
Monsabre,

435, 439-

law, teleologicalconception
of, i 545 ; three meanings of, 548;
of, ii
necessity of, 548 ; character
of
263, 268 ; as the foundation
Rousseau's
theory
Society, 335 ;
of Right, 331 ; Grotius, 424.
Naturalism, of Aristotle, i 525 ; of
the Renaissance, ii 422.

Natural

INDEX
meaning of, i 483, 544,

Nature,

being

as

good,

i 219

nature,

'

466

'

the

523 ;
f ., ii 49 ;

557

movement

stability in,
nature,

ii 212

the

and

and

order

of

mechanical

and

teleological
explanations, i

114

f., 541

73,

f., 545.

Necessity and will, i 264 (see Deter

minism) ;
hypothetic necessity,
'

in

', i 371,

matter

necessary

ii

Nervous

ii 372.

theory

New

i 25 n., 29,

92,

the

241.
Oriental philosophy,
ii 343,

Origen, i

State,

428, 455.
ii393.

Nicholas

413.
of Autrecourt, ii 417.
Cabasilas, ii 413.

Nicholas

of Cusa,

Nicholas

391.

27, 317, ii 370.

i 39, 141, ii 370.

Otto

of

Freising,ii 387.

Ownership,
titles

to

theories
:

of, ii 279

occupancy,

307,

ii

418.

(Niphus), ii

i 277,

ii 129.

Paralogism,

421.

Nirvana, ii 344.
Nominalism, i 251, 379, ii 283.
i 378, ii 456.
Noumenon,
Novalis, ii 465.
i 85 n., 456.
Number,
ii 364.
Numenius,

ii 188.

Parker, Samuel, ii 443.

Parmenides, i 26, 524, ii 347.
Pascal, i 366, ii 28, 55, 435, 436.
Passio, i 492, 500, 503, 537, ii 147,
354-

Passion, i 220

OBJECT, i 4, 38, 187, 508 n., ii 142

material, formal, i 9, 238, ii 136

object of

;
;

i 191.
Objectivityof sensations, i 202 ; of
judgments, 362 f. ; of concepts,
proper

sense,

f-

Obversion,

Ockham,

ii 166
William

Ockhamist

of, ii 413, 415, 417.

school, ii 415,

Paulsen, ii 484.
Peano, ii 482.

Peccham,

John,
i

Percept,
Perception, i

405, 406.

f.,175 f.,207 f.

188

f. ;

kinds

of, 563,

perfection and
existence, 46 f. ; perfection

9 ;

God's

427.

417,

ii

ii 402,

211.

562
grades

Perfection,

n.

(seeEmotion)
178, ii 21.

n., 279

i 25 n.,
Patrizzi, ii 423.

Pasteur,

of

Occasion, i 534.
Occasionalism, i 303, 539, ii 435.

69, 72 ; of man,
217 f.
i
26,
the,
71, ii 361.
Peripatetics,

Occupancy, ii 307.

Perry, ii 485.
Persecution, ii 278

Occultism, ii 423.
Odo
of Tournai, ii 382.
Oken, ii 465, 466.
Olivi, Peter John, ii 402.
Onto logical argument,
the, ii
46 f.

of God,

29

f.,

Opinion, libertyof, ii 275.

Opposition, of concepts, ii 150 ; of
propositions,167, 168.
Order, meaning and kinds, i 557 f. ;
dynamic and static, ii 150 ; and
perfection, i 562 ; and
beauty,
;

and

final cause,

intelligent
purpose

114 f., 173 ;

God's
and

existence, ii 49 f., 123 ;

order, ii 136.
Organic life, i 165 f., 22g f.

n.

484 ; false theories

dual, 313 ;
personality,313;
basis of rights,ii 335.
i 312,

Person,

Ontologism,i 30, 253, 368, ii 24, 474.

Ontology (see Metaphysics), i 18.

and

f. ;
pre

Palmieri, ii 120 n.
Pantheism, ii 114, 116, 343, 364, 389 ;
of
Scotus
Eriugena, 384 ; Gior
dano
Bohme,
Bruno, 114, 423;
Spinoza, 114, 436; Hegel,
425;
326.
Paracelsus, ii 423.
Paradox, ii 191.

Nicole, ii 435.
Nietzsche, ii 485.

564

ii

Ostwald,
Oswald, James, ii 444.
Otloh
of St. Emmeram,
ii 385.

PAIN,

ii

Nicephorus Blemmides,
Nicephorus Gregoras, ii

377

of

333,

3H-

system, i 181 f.
Philosophy ',ii 26, 40.

Newton,

Nifo

Organism,

scription,
308, will,3 1 1, inheritance,

159-

Nemesius,
'

537

logical

of
the

ii 255.
Pessimism,
i 28, 33, ii 39"Lombard,
Peter of Maricourt, ii 412.
Peter of Poitiers, ii 39"de la Ram6e
(Petrus.Ramus),
Peter
Peter

ii 421.
of Tarantaise, ii 402.
ii 19"Petitio principii,
Aureolus, ii 414.
Petrus
Peter

Petrus

Hispanus,

Phantasm,

i 243,

Phenomenalism,
ii

ii

408.

257.
i 2, 303,

482.

i 378, ii 45"Phenomenon,
Philo, i 27, ii 364.

378, 478.

538

INDEX

the

of, i i f., 4 ; and

particular sciences, 7, 20, 31

the

name,

Philosophy,

'

n.

first

philosophy

;
'

of

Aristotle, 407 ; definition

of,
8 f., 14 f. ; divisions
of, 15 f.,
20
method
of, ii 202 ;
n., 408 ;
and
theology, i 21 f.,ii 376 ; and
truths ',
two
authority,i 31 ; the
'

ii 409,
of, ii

442

utilityof the

341

Greek

f. ;

f. ;

369

history
philosophy, i

Patristic, i 27, ii
Oriental, ii 343,
391 ;

26, ii 345

i 94

Power,

scope

i 27, ii 364, 391 ; Byzan

i
tine, 27, ii 391, 393, 413 ; Ara
bian, i 27, 71, ii 391 f. ; Scholastic,

f., 496 f. (see Faculties,

Actual).
Pragmatism,

ii 236, 485.
Predicables, ii 147.
Predicaments, ii 146.
Predicate, ii 145.
Premotion, physical,ii 127
Prescription,ii 308 f.

Priestley,Joseph, ii 442.

Primary

matter,

74, 528, ii 73 f.

i 12,

(see Hylomorphism)
Principle; general meaning,
.

i 6, 10,
and

Jewish,

473.

regulativeprinciples,i 387, ii 173

three
first principles,i 387, 473
moral
first principle,ii 242.

27,

ii

i 30,

31,

375

485

27"
5".
72,
i 29, ii 431

f. ;
f ;
.

Scholastic,
Renaissance, i

neo-

ii 419
f ;
Modern,
f. ; English, i 29, ii
.

i
f., 476 f. ; German,
ii
f.
i
f.,
French,
461
29,
;
449
29,
ii 432,
446 f., 471 f ; contem
434,

439

ii 481 f

porary,
'

4 ;

ancient
60

theories, i 49 ; atomists,
Aristotle, 71, 73 f.,409, ii 355.

Physiocrats, ii 333.
Physiology, i 181 f.
d'Abano, ii 417.
Place, i i5of ; as a predicament, ii 147.
Plato, life and works, i 26, ii 350 ;
theory of idea, i 253, ii 350 f. ;
ultra-realism, ii 48, ii 350 ; phy
sics,ii 351 ; on the soul, i 304, 314,
the State, ii 351 ;
317, ii 352 ; on
on
God, ii 351 ; ethics, ii 352 ;
influence, i 359 ii 364 f., 381,
421 ; neo-Platonism, ii 364 f.
Pleasure, i 277 f. ; as the end of life,
ii 233 f ; aesthetic
pleasure,i 565.
Pietro

Pletho

(Georgios Gemistos), ii 421.

Plotinus, i 27, ii 364.

Plutarch
of Cheronea, ii 363.
Poincare, H., ii 22, i 54 n.
Poiret, ii 436.
Poisson, ii 210
n.

Polysyllogism, ii 179.
Polytheism, ii 88.
Pomponazzi, ii 421.
Porphyry, i 27, ii 364, 366, 381, 382 ;
logicaltree, ii 150.
Port
Royal logicians,ii 196 n., 435.
Positivism, i 2, 251, 395, ii 16, 233,
483 ; refutation, i 244, 251, 372 ;
in France, ii 472, 474 ; in England,
477and
Possibility,extrinsic
intrinsic,
i 422, ii 32 ; St. Augustine, ii 32 ;
and

God, ii 97.

ii 186

Proper, object,i

57,
i

191

82

;
;

f.

idea, ii 153.
f., ii 147, 148

f ; and
induc
tion, 396, ii 198 ; transcendental
properties,i 443 i.

diversity of,

'

formative

Privation, ii 151.
Probabilism, ii 261.
Probable
arguments,
Proclus, ii 366.
Proof, i 37, ii 183.

Properties,i

Physical facts, i 60 f., 113.

Physical influx
theory, i 304.
of, i 16, 19, ii
Physics, scope

ii iQi

553.

120

Property (see Ownership).

Proposition, the, ii 157 f. ; import,
ii 162 ;
quantity, 163 ; quality,
164 ; form, 161 ; modality, 164,
169 n. ; subordination, 168
(see
Judgment)
Protagoras, i 26, ii 348.
Providence, ii 121
f., 238 f., 252 ;
and
eternal
punishment, 247.
ii 385.
Pseudo-Bede,
Pseudo-Dionysius, i 27, ii 62, 372 f.,
.

38i.

Psychology, i 18, 161, ii 481.

Psycho-physical parallelism,i
ii487.
Pufiendorf, ii 230.
eternal, ii 245
Punishment,

305,

f.

Purpose, meaning, i 13, 542 ; and

the
good, 263 f., 271, ii 212 ;
extrinsic
intrinsic
and
finality,
i

541

and

i 557
manifest

order,

561
intelligence,

and

in the

universe, 73,

114 f., 541 f., 571;

ii
of God,
proof of the existence
ii
God's
in
creation,
49 ;
purpose
122

and

morality,

ii 236

f. ;

in

Kant, ii 459.

Pyrrho, the Sceptic,i 26,

Pythagoras, i 26, ii 345.

ii 361.

QUALITY, analysisof, i 492 ; divisions

of, 493 ; primary and secondary,
sensa
ii 434,
441 ; quality of
tions, i 191 f ; as a predicament, ii
146.
.

INDEX

540
ii

Secretan,

Soul.

484.

Self-defence, ii 270.

of, 205

nature

certitude, 397

and

sentient

317

f. ;
f ;
.

f., 330

nature
f.

n.

of the

subject, 229
Sensationalism
(see Sensism).
Senses, i 184 f. ; external
senses,
190 f. ; organs,
184 ; nature, 206
internal
mon

189, 208 f. ; com

189, 209 ; common

sensibles, 194,

;
veracity of"
284 f.
Sensism, i 247, 251, 365 ; in France,
ii 446, 471 ; Hobbes,
440.
Sensitive
life, i 179
f., 233 ; the
subject of, 206 ; first principle of,
229 f ; and intellective life,284 f ;
and
moral
free-will, ii 225 ; and

397

; and

203

reason,

duty,

241.

Sentiment,
of

religionof, ii

28 ;

sentiment,

241

moral

losophy, ii 451.
ii 486 n.
Sertillanges,
Sextus
Empiricus, ii 362.
Shadworth
Hodgson, ii 484.
Shaftesbury, ii 444.
Sidgwick, Henry, ii 482.
Siger of Brabant, ii 406, 410.
Siger of Courtrai, ii 409.
Sight, i 191.
Silvester Maurus,
ii 428.
Simon, Jules,ii 473.
Simplicity,notion of, i 454 ;
soul, i 299

ideas, i

of

God,

ii 65

theory
phi
;

the
of

f. ;

ii 445.

theory, ii 281, 328

(see Collectivism).

f.

Socrates, i 26, ii 349.

i

348.

established

291

ii 479

f.; i

29,

Leibniz's

harmony,
303 ;
casionalism, 303 ; origin of,

145,

294, 366, 481, ii 18,

233 f ., 483 ; criterion of truth, i 366 ;
theory of social organism, 267, 333.
Spinoza, ii 436 f. ; i 29, 305, ii 114 ;

214, 234,

213,

and
substance, i 482, 516.
Spirit(seeSoul).
Spontaneous, appetition, i 219
movement,
227 ; generation,i
of, ii 325-338 ;
State, theories
creation
of
rights, 266 ;
atheistic
State ', 448.

f. ;
177.
and
'

Statistics,use of, ii 201.

Steinthal, ii 470.
Stephen, Sir Leslie, ii 482.
Stewart, Dugald, ii 444, 476.
Stoic school, i 26, ii 359, 422.
Strato, ii 361.
Suarez, i 28, 72, ii 83, 86, 1 19 f 250
faith, i 400.
427 ; on
Subaltern

its

and
477

ii 150,

genera,

the

n.,

151.

form,

preoc

233,

12,

511
;

173 ; substantial
and
properties,

quantity, 87

and

accident,
first substance,
414 f.,

determinations,

f.,487

f. ;
;

second

erroneous

172 f. ;
material

substance,

views, i 480 ;
body and soul,

spiritual,
428 ; its
496 ; cognoscibility,261 ;
powers,
as
object of metaphysics, 418,
519 ; called nature, 483, 544 ; and
295

Sorbonne, the, ii 393

Sorites, ii 179.
de, i 28, 72.
Soto, Dominicus
f. ;
rational,
Soul, sentient, i 230
238 f., 294 f. ; and body, 300 f.,
know
; our
305 f., 314 f., ii 221
ledge of, 261 ; organ of, 301 ; and
faculties,

God, ii 95.

Spencer, Herbert,

307

ii

perception of,
prioriform, 382.
ii 348 ; biological,

Species, atomic,
i 233 f.,ii 148 n. ; chemical, i 59 ;
logical,i 40, ii 148 f. ; human
species: origin,1234 f. ; unity, 319.
Species expressa, sensibilis, i 195,
205 ; intelligibilis,
195, 252 f. ; in

426
482, ii 146
organic, i

287.

Sophism, ii 188.
Sophists, the, i 26,

f. ;

150
an

419,

Solger,ii 466.
Somnabulism,

stantial

Contract

Socialism

not

change, 98,
82 f., 496 f

n.

29,

i 86,

202

Subject, logical,ii 144.

Subjectivism, i 277 ; of Berkeley, ii
of post-Kantian
idealists,461.
442;
sub
Substance, i 13, 478 f. ; and

Simplicius,ii 366, 391.

Sin, i 274, ii 232, 246.
Slavery, ii 273, 294.
Sleep, i 285, 287.

Social

Space,

.,

of

4.

Smedt, de, i 24
Smith, Adam, i

325-

senses,

sense,

spirituality of, 295 f.,

simplicity of, 299 ; im
mortality of, 309, 321 f.,and super
natural
a
destiny, i 324 ; not
485 ; metempsychosis, i
person,
f. ;

316

ii 129, 132, 273, 362.

Sensation, i 181 f. ; quantity, 197
quality,191 f. ; localization,201

Seneca,

general

Conti nued.

"

f. ;

purpose,

and

individuation,

561.

Suffering,ii 129.
Suggestion, i 287,
Suicide, i 275;

Sully,James,

'

290.

cosmic

suicide ',ii256.

i 305.

Sulzer, ii 451.
Summum
Bonum,

ii 71.

INDEX
ii 222,

Supernaturallife,i 327,
Suppositum, i 484.
ii

Suso, Bl., Henry,

Tongiorgi, i

245.

418.
logicalbasis of,
figures and
;

moods,
174 ; rules of, 174 f. ; and
truth, ii 177, 182 ; kinds of, 178 f.
and
induction, 200.
Sylvester of Ferrara, i 72.
Syncategorematic terms, ii 156.

i 29, 213,
Taparelli,ii 252,
Taste, i 194.

Tracy, Destutt

i 262, ii n.
Transcendence,
i
f. ;
Transcendentals,
443
generic notions, ii 153.
i 234 f.
of the soul, i 325.
i 87, 489.
Transubstantiation,

ii 475.

n.,

ii

137
i 346,
Three
terion

ii 414.

f.

ii 451.
Thales
of Miletus, i 26, 49, ii 345.
Theism, ii 425 ; 448.

Tetens,

Theodicy,
Theodoric
Theodoric

Theology
between,
'

the

Theodicy)

on

the

unity, i 532 ; on
(seeSoul) ; on time, i 145
f. ;

life, 170

i 431

on

logic,ii

139,
the

induction, 396 ; on
of God, ii 35 f. ; attitude

persecution,ii
Thomasius,
Thomists

individuation,

on

140 ; on
existence
towards

n.

279

ii 452.
and
free-will,ii 126.

Thompson, W., i
Thought, i 4, 301
ality,i 296.
Thought-reading,
Tiberghien, ii 78,

177.
;

matter,

pound,

proof of spiritu

pound,
;

174
of

81

of

species,i

human

dental.

'"

*"

455predfcamental,

numerical, 458; form, tl

principleof unity, 532.

i

the,

Universal,
f

tran"

319;

unity, 446, 455

452

ii 150;

382 f-

"

moderate
terminism,
281

com

living being. 119.

of

scendental

779

primary

chemical

fof sentient bcin-. ^9

and soul, 244, 30.: f., h 221

'"

and

f. ;

24"
reahsm-

4-

"
5"

realism, 38?- nominalwn.

4M
the

order

254.
of

P^uUar*"
syllogism

11

of, ii 49

rights, 266

J. S. Mill, 477-

M7-

Toland, John,

143.

211.

ii 452 n.
Tiedemann,
Time, i 86, 145 f. ; not an a priori
form, i 382 ; as a predicament, ii

Tindal, Matthew,

354-

of composition.
104;
substantial com
of

57,

453

449

of

75 ;

Universe,
i

"

Understanding, i 260, ii
Unicity, i 449Unity, i 85, 132, 446;

body

principle of

the soul
on

ii 474.

i 253,

synthesis, ii 403, i 30 ;
and
form, i 73 f ; form,

matter

483-

479

Ulrici,ii 468.

of

Thomas,
St., of Aquin, passim, life
and
works, i 28, 34 f.,ii 403 ; on
philosophy, i 8, 15 n., 30 f. ; the
Thomistic

n.

Ubicatio, i 151, 153Ubiquity of God, ii 81.

Ulric of Strasburg, ii 404.

theory
80, 442
(see

376

', ii

truths

two

i 29.
ii 341

Ubi, category of, i 150.

of Chartres, ii 386.
of Freiburg, ii 410.
and
philosophy, relations

f.,ii

Turgot,
Turner,

UBAGHS,

ii 366.
i 17, ii 3 f.

i 21

logical,
;
460 ; transcendental, 461 f. ;
Primary Truths, 357 ; cri
of, 363 f. ; in the judgment,
logical and

onto

Tyndall, John, ii
Tyrannio, ii 362.

Tertullian, i 27.

Themistius,

of, 346. 459,

idea

f. ;

346

ii 168 ;
346, 362 f. ; in propositions,
in the syllogism,177 ; capacity of
i 371, 386 ; as
to know,
the mind
twofold, ii 410, 442.

406.

154

Truth,

486.

logical,ii

and

Transmigration

Telesio, ii 422.

Terms,

22,

i 316, ii 371.

Traducianism,

Tauler, ii 418.
Teleology (see Purpose).
Telepathy, i 290.

Terminism,

f., ii

363

Transformism,

248

ii

i 30,

473-

202.

197,

231,

Templier, Stephen,
ii 462.
Tenemann,

de, ii 471.

Traditionalism,

259.
193,

TAINE,

357.

Torricelli,ii 428.
Touch, i 194.

Syllogism, ii 170 f. ;
182
ii 171,
i 391,

Synteresis,ii 240,
Synthesis, ii 143,

541

ii 445.

ii 445.

Vaihinger.

30.

Bentham,

445

',

INDEX

542

Valency,
Valla,

56,

ii

Lorenzo,
i

Vasquez,
ii

Vera,

ii

72,

452

185,

Will

Vitalism,

ii

319.
ii

240.
i

moderate,

gerated,

172,

f.

172
of

310;

Vogt,

ii
ii

Volkelt,

ii

Volney,

de,

of

Champeaux,

William

of

Conches,

de

la

de

Moerbeke,

William

of

ii

29,

WAGNER,

ii

469

Wakefulness,

Walter

Ward,
Weber's

A.
of

ii

R.,

ii

James,

Law,

Van,
i

55,

59,

Weisse,

ii

Whole,

metaphysical

485.

ii

Fichte,

407,

29,

460

463.

450.

ii

aeterno,

ii

42

49.

ii

305,

ii

n.

ab

558,

30,

ii

ZELLER,

198.

64,

417.

481.

26.

386.

484.

ii

352
77

n.

107,

127,

194.

and

logical,

ii

482
359

n.,

Zeno

of

Citium,

Zeno

of

Elea,

Zigliara,

ii

Zimara,

ii

62

Zwingli,

; i 26

n.,

ii
ii

376

n.,

425.

50

n.,

ii

486

470.

n.

ii

26,

26,

421.

Zimmermann,
ii

XENOPHANES,
ii

394.

482.

ii

ii

415,

285.

467.

150.

Wilbois,

478.

Mortagne,

Weddingen,
Weight,

of,

33,

413,

411.

of,

Wundt,

n.

state

Wallace,

ii

creation

order

406.
i

Christian,

World,

448.

387.

386,

386.

ii

of

Wordsworth,

471.

ii

Ockham,

ii

Wolff,

ii

f.

108

401.

ii

Mare,

ii

Witelo,

480.

Voltaire,

William

Wissenschaftslehre
263

ii

311.
ii

Auvergne,

Windelband,

219,

God,

ii

testament,
of

William

f.

acts,

happi

Free-will).

and

William

483.

Volition,

in

will

its

supreme

exag

421.

of

man's
217

faculties,

other

and

Telesio,

422.

Viv6s,

ii

William

422.

f.

knowledge

and

(see

190.

da,

i 292,

Virtue,

389

428.

n.

f.

291

83,

i 263

the,

ness,

ii

Leonardo

Virchow,

ii

ii

circle,

Vinci,

420.

480.

Vicious

Vico,

Will,

109.

359.

347.
n.

n.,

ii

349

n.,

APPENDIX

TO

THE

OF
BY

PROF.

The Manual

M.

ALFRED

NYS

RAHILLY,

here translated

stereotyped. Some

COSMOLOGY

footnotes

M.A., B.Sc.

written in 1905 and

added
late as
as

was

presumably

1913 (e.g.,
and
M.
few
inserted
a
the
54,
were
translators
Nys),
139, by
pp.
by
(e-g-"
circumstances
it
PP- 75. 85). Owing to the present abnormal
became
a
fter
the
of
the
impossible,
inception
translation,to com
municate
freelywith M. Nys. The section on Cosmology appears,
revision which
therefore, without
scientific research
recent
any
it
is
Of
in an elemen
moot
a
whether
might suggest.
course
point
tary text -book such as the present it is desirable to introduce a
discussion of the latest, and
conclusions of
perhaps disputable,
were

on

science.

It is

certain,however,

consulted,
directly

perhaps
seemed

would

immediate

volume.

the

the

author

of M.

views

only

in the

had

Cosmologie.

of his statements

some

In

change

to withhold

has

been

has
been

delayed

until

possible.Unfortu

(translatedbelow)
beginningof the War
and revised edition of his larger
N eo-Scolastique
Revue
of the

Mercier.
a

not

and

briefest form

in the

press
last

the

Nys

essential

been

decision justified
by the
of
first
the
edition
English
"

present volume

letter to Cardinal

short

of the

exhaustion

expressionof the
nately they appear
a

of the War

end

issue of the

The

an

in

modified

of his arguments.
as
no
some
necessitated,the translators decided

recast
to be

almost

the author, could he have

But

until
publication

the

have

that

new

number

At

the

(May, 1914),he publishedan article on the Constitution of Matter

',but deferred to a subsequent issue
according to Modern
Physicists
the consideration
of its philosophical
implications.Under these
'

circumstances
a

note

Dr.

to the

Nys

is in

the

section
no

edition be called
his section and

translators have
on

asked

Cosmology.

the

It must

be

understood

for this note, and, should

responsible
for,it is to be hoped that he will be able
way
thus

render

this note

to add

presentwriter

that

another
to revise

unnecessary.

standpointthe outstanding feature of

philosophical
science is its advocacy of mechanism, the theory
physico-chemical
needed to
factors alone are
that (as M. Nys puts it, p. 53) two
local
and communicated
mass
homogeneous
explain the world
From

the

'

"

[543]

APPENDIX
motion

'. The

motions,

no

THE

TO

is to be reduced

world

longer of

M.

NYS

and
spatialconfigurations

to

of atoms,

different kinds

hundred

OF

COSMOLOGY

but

of

set of similar
identical electrons and perhaps of another
absolutely
later form of
of
this
Against
(nuclei positive
electricity).
of their force,and
mechanism
the arguments of M. Nys lose none
is
It
at
the
well,
outset, to assert
only requirerefurbishing.
the theory adopted by the majority
that in combating
explicitly
of modern
scientists ', Scholastic philosophymakes
no
attempt to
is quite
difficulties.
to
facts
Perfect
to
facts
shirk
or
loyalty
deny

entities

'

compatible with the denial that current scientificconstructions are

of reality.This
is perhaps most
an
adequate representation
evident in the case
of biology,wherein the facts of heredity,
on
far
and
consciousness
have
outrun
such-like
togeny,regeneration,
all scientific syntheses. But even
in the inorganicrealm, where
(at
held rigidsway, science
least until lately)the classical mechanics
has progressed onlv by adopting a deliberate,partialand
one
It may
be good science, but it sometimes
results in
sided survey.
bad

philosophy.

In connexion

with

it will suffice to consider

research

recent

the theories of molecular

briefly
latter problem has attracted more

the

atomic

and

very

here

Though

structure.

attention,the former question

(thestructure of the molecule)is of equal philosophical

importance.
A good deal of unnecessary
scepticismhas been exhibited with
reference

to

Most

molecules.

hold that the substantial

with
that

form of
But

arbitrarypiece.

any

the form

older

of the

is associated with

to
seemed
co-extensive

Schoolmen

inorganicbody was
view has long since prevailed
definite quantum, greater amounts

an

the
a

being merely congeriesof these substantial entities or molecules 1.

of matter is nowadays not a theory,
Indeed, the coarse-grainedness
but a fact, for science has made
us
acquaintedwith the
of apparentlyhomogeneous
micro -structure
bodies, such
and

metals.

Molecular

motion, too, is

now

familiar

complex
as

phenomenon

in

evaporation,in gaseous pressure, in diffusion which occurs

at the interface of two
movement
metals, in the Brownian
agitationof

grainsin
microscopic

which
liquid),

the

wood

even

(the

Belgian Pere

first to explaincorrectly.The brilliant

additional
M.
in
researches
of
this latter domain
Perrin
an
are
confirmation of the kinetic theory of gases.
this theory and
From
about
that
analogous considerations it was estimated
250 million

Carbonelle, S.J.,was

molecules

placed in

individual

molecule

of

the

For

parte

the

'Tota

forma

'

forma

naturalis

dentia

'

(In

over

an

Hence

inch.

the

to be for ever
seem
beyond our powers
the last few years, however, it has been found
individual
molecule
effects of an
directly

instance, St. Thomas

(In IV Sent., d.

eius

stretch

would

Within

perception.
possibleto make

would

row

q. 3, a.
requirit determinatam

quae
I Physic., 1.

10,

9).

[544]

substantialis

3).

'

In

corpore

quantitatem

ligniest

in

qualibet

naturali

invenitur

sicut

alia

et

acci-

APPENDIX

TO
Thus

2.
appreciable

'

THE

the
'

COSMOLOGY

problem
of the

OF

of the

M.

existence

NYS

realityof
been finally

or

(the
now
relegatedto the general epistemological
questionof reality.
Since the time of Dalton and Berzelius there is a specialnotation
for molecules ; that of common
salt,for instance,is denoted by
the
of
the
two symbols for sodium
NaCl ; i.e.,
and
juxtaposition
molecules

chlorine

into

atoms

salt

which

may

ancients)has

be

decomposed.

inevitablyand

This notation
molecule of salt is
and a chlorine atom.

that

This idea

a
suggests
deliberately
of
sodium
a
spatialjuxtaposition
is further impressedby the constitutional

duced

Frankland

merely the

carbon

by
compounds

and

Kekule

led to the

(about 1852).

idea that

the

formulae

The

different

intro
of
the
study
in the

atoms

attraction of each

mutual

by
kept
by
Van't Hoff and
by a linkagefrom atom to atom.
introduced the idea that the intra-molecular
Le Bel (1874) finally
be regarded as three-dimensional,
must
of the atoms
configuration
and not merely in a plane; the molecule of marsh-gas (CHJ, for
instance,consists of a carbon atom at the centre of a regulartetra
molecule

together,not

were

all the others, but

vertices are four hydrogen atoms.

hedron at whose
conclusions of chemists, reinforced by more
These unanimous
to be the
would
seem
recent discoveries to be mentioned
presently,
final coup de grace to the Scholastic notions of substantial changes
and
forms ; for all chemical processes are thereby resolved into

indeed,
entities. It is possible,
spatialregroupingof pre-existent
reference
kinetic
;
to maintain that chemical formulae have merely a
sub
of
a
behaviour
future
and
the
i.e.,
they indicate
past history
Thus
stance without throwing any lighton its static constitution.
formula

the

NaCl

would

simply mean

and

that sodium

chloride

can

of
recovered from it ; just as a sum
from it,
and again withdrawn
be depositedin a bank
i money
can
identical
I without necessarily
implyingthe continual existence of the
coins in the bank.
Still,it is very difficultto escape the conclusion
How, for
exist in the molecule.
do somehow
that the atoms

i form

salt and

can

again

be

right-or left-handed deviation

explainthe optical
exerted bv
of a transmitted light-ray)
(ofthe planeof polarization
!
geometrical
corresponding
a
substances, unless we assume
many
of the molecule
iright-or
in the configuration
left-handedness
Furthermore, the recent experimentsof Laue, W. L. Bragg
W. H. Bragg show
acts on X-rays as a solid dii
that a crystal
planesof atoms
gratingowing to the existence of sets of parallel
instance,can

we

'

"

The

effect of

single alpha particle(chargedhelium

has

molecule

been

substance)
high velocity from a radioactive
by the bombardrn
:
(i) in Crookes' spinthariscope,
being indicated by a
each
of
the
particle
sulphide screen
impact
and
Gei"
by Rutherford
splash ; (2) in an apparatus devised
the jerk
indicated
by
Wherein the entrance
of a singleparticleis
^rometer; (3) in C. T. R. Wilson's photographs of the path of a si

iwith

projected

made

-three ways

the
:he

flyingparticleionisingthe gas
centre
of a visible globule of

-molecules
water.

[545]

in its

path so

that

each

APPENDIX

TO

THE

crystal.Hence it
structure
crystalline

would

the

COSMOLOGY
appear

that

OF
each

M.

NYS
of

atom

component

separatespatialexistence.
On the other hand, this account
fails utterly
to explainthe real
is
in
chemical
It
true that
which
in
a sense
occur
changes
processes.
sodium added to oxygen givessoda, or that water subtracted from
alcohol leaves ether.
But surelythe addition precedesbut does not
a

has

follows the chemical

for
example, to tell us
quiteridiculous,
that common
metal plus a yellowpoisonousgas,
salt is a silvery
of one
each of carbon,
that
acid
the
is
atom
sum
or
prussic
merely
constitute the chemical

union

disruption.It would

be

believe that
the
theine is explained
the fact that they consist of the same
elements only arranged in
old objection of Aristotle is still
different pattern ? The

nitrogen. Can

and

hydrogen

difference in the

by
a

; the subtraction

any

of
properties

man

sane

strychnineand

pertinent :
s

'

When

the

components

(piKpa)and

are

divided

into

intimately
juxtaposed
is there then compositionat
distinguishable,
Since

as

so

to

small particles
be sensiblyin
all

or

not

?
.

is not the same

a compound
as
aggregate (o-vvfleo-is)
but different,clearlywe
cannot
(fu'fts),
say that things are
when
remain
unchanged in small particles.
compounded
they
to the senses
would things then be com
Only relatively
.

an

pounded

the

same

thing would

be

compound

to

weak-

'.
sightedperson but not so to a lynx-eyed man
Elsewhere
he gives the essentials of his own
solution, in ter
be applied
to modern
chemistry 4 :
minology which can easily
A compound which is existentially
and
like a syllable
one,
For a syllableis not
not like a heap, has Being as a whole.
is
B and A),
the
its
letters
constituent
not
as
same
(BA
merely
After dissolution,in
neither is flesh simply fire and earth.
'

whole
or
flesh)no longer exists,but the
(syllable
constituents (letters
or fire and
earth)stillexist. The syllable

fact, the

then

is

something ;

not

consonant
merely the letters,

plusvowel,

but also something more

(eVe/aoV
n). And flesh is not merely
fire and earth or warm
and cold ; it is something else besides.
itselfbe a constituent element
cannot
Now this something more
For if it were
an
element, the
or
composed of such elements.
then
Flesh
be
would
would
same
composed
difficulty
crop up.
of three (fire
and earth and this other)instead of two ; and we
This
should stillhave to search for the somethingbeyond.
.

is the substantial form

ground of being '.

of each compound,
(ovo-t'a)

its

primary

the argument of Scholastic Cosmology,the

this is precisely
Now
fulladmission of all chemical analysesand the assertion of something
constellation of
else. If it be true that the molecule is a spatial
diverse atoms, we cannot indeed follow Aristotle and the Schoolmen
1
4

gen. et corruptione,i. 10, 327 b, 33

Metaphysica, vii: 17, 1041 b, n ff.

De

[546}

ff.

APPENDIX

ejectedfrom

After

the

COSMOLOGY

OF

M.

NYS

and

along the earth's mag

moving in spirals
molecule
ion is one
which
or
charged
electrically
gained an electron ; an electric current is a stream

the sun,

netic lines. An
has either lost or
of electrons.

THE

TO

findingof

the

in
X-rays (originating

vacuum-tube

the most
a swarm
moving electrons is suddenlystopped),
The rays which at
sensational discoveryis that of radioactivity.

of

where

expenditureof electrical energy we can excite in a vacuum-tube

are
spontaneouslyemitted by the radio -elements. Radium, for
of
instance,givesoff three kinds of rays : (i)alpharays, consisting
the

charged helium

molecules

(or atoms) moving with the enormous

of 12,000 miles a second ; (2)beta rays, which are electrons
velocity
shot out with even
are
greater speeds; (3) gamma
rays, which
probablyX-rays caused by the startingof the beta-electrons. The
of radioactivity
lies in the fact that it is the first
specialsignificance
of the

recorded instance, not so much

death and
birth of elements.
of radium
the transformation

Apart

helium

into

chemical

representedas a commonplace
subsequentexploitsof niton and
These

and

similar

phenomena

transmutation,
from

its

unique

and

niton

equation; and

so

of the
features 8

as

might be
might the

its congeners.
have led to the conclusion

(i)that

all atoms

contain electrons,some
of which may be lost without any
of
and
alteration
chemical identity
(2)that, at least in the case of
;
the radioactive elements, there is another
set of electrons the loss

into different elements.

More recent re
and
outer
distinction
inner
this
between
justified
electrons. The presentview of tl*e atom, which, of course, is vague
be summarized
and tentative,may
as follows.
Chieflyas a deduc
tion from the scatteringof high-speedparticles
in their transit

of which
searches

them

changes

have

through matter, Sir

Rutherford

has supposed that the atom

nucleus wherein most of the mass
possesses a concentrated positive
resides. Furthermore, there is evidence that the nuclear charge
E.

changes by unity in passingfrom

element to the next ; so

in order of atomic weight,these
elements are numbered
atomic numbers
will actuallyexpress the nuclear charge. Thus
and
is
in
fundamental
there
the atom
a
quantitywhich is more
varies more
regularlythan the atomic weights. A similar simple
of the
other properties
relation has been found to connect
some

that

one

if the

'

'

elements ; for instance,the frequencyof the characteristic X-rays

of an element is proportional
to the square of its atomic number.
Hence there are atomic properties
connected in a very simplemanner

change is absolutely independent of the

than
is more
associated
; (2) The
energy
chemical
times greater than that accompanying any known
change ;
of monoof change follows the exponential law characteristic
rate
show
that of
reactions
The
of
radium
does
not
(4)
;
spectrum

Briefly,these are
physical and chemical
8

million

(3) The
molecular

(i)

The

environment

helium.

[548]

APPENDIX

TO

THE

COSMOLOGY

OF

M.

NYS

with the nuclear charge, and presumably due to inner electrons ".
such as gravitation
and radioactivity,
There are other properties,
uninfluenced by chemical or physical
agencies ; and these, too, must
But
most
be mainly ascribed to the nucleus.
of the ordinary
of the elements change rhythmically
properties
physico-chemical
with the atomic

number

proceed along the

carried unchanged by
we

would
properties

or

weight,i.e.,wax

list of elements

and,

or

wane

as
periodically

they are not

compounds. These

moreover,

into its chemical

the atom

seem,

therefore, to be associated with the

outer

conceptionof the atomic system be

layer of electrons.
with different atomic
correct, it might be possiblefor elements
is actually
and
this
claimed to
weights to be chemicallyidentical ;
If this

of the newly discovered elements.

be true of some
The actual calculation of the distribution of the electrons in the
when
the conditions
is an extremelydifficult problem
even
atom
its solution cannot
be effected by the
are
simplified
artificially
real intra-atomic
world would
classical laws of dynamics. The
to be far more
seem
complicatedthan even our intricate model of a
"

Thus no theory
to suppose.
to explainthe series-laws of
of the atom
lines is not the only clear
spectra. This complexityof the spectral
indication of atomic complexity; the very law of transformation
miniature

system would lead us

has
yet been devised

solar

of radioactive substances is a vivid proof. On the average a certain

of radium in every
atom
about one
of the atoms
small proportion
This
rate is affected
break
second.
billion
ten thousand
up every
neither by external conditions nor by the past historyof the atoms.
of radium, half of it will dis
be the age of a mass
Thus whatever
which escapes destruction has
appear in 2,000 years ; every atom
must
We
of surviving for the next 2,000 years.
chance
even
an
is itself a world subject to chance, i,e.,
conclude that the atom
variable factors,so that when
of irregularly
contains a vast number
to be realized in this
certain condition or coincidence chances
a
"

"

infra-world
the
A

Sir
mass

out
an

The

cataclysmoccurs.
is

atom

is the world

atom.
large-scale

a
universe
few final remarks

may

be

made

concerningthe electron itself.

is about
its mass
1/1800 of the

that
has shown
J. J. Thomson
As
far back as 1881 he had pointed
of a hydrogen atom.
that a moving electrified body possesses, in virtue of its charge,
a
liquidhas
additional mass
; just as a body moving through

inertia. Moreover, this electrical mass

of
the mass
showed
Kaufmann
as
the velocity,
mass
the
that
concluded
been
it
has
Hence
increase.
actual
in origin10. The
is
electromagnetic
increased

an

writ small

entirely

increases

with

electron to
an
of an electron
of
implications

and
of positively
negativelyelectrified
consist
itself must
nucleus
c
how
to see
a
ready-made helium atom
it is hard
bodies, for otherwise
radium.
be ejected from
"
no
if it had
mass
have
no
w
would
electron
that an
In the sense
a:
that
mass,
remembered
be
It
must
i.e.,if it ceased to be an electron.
associated with a body.
science, is merely a certain coefficient or number
"

The

[549]

APPENDIX
this statement
to be derived

If the

is

little

which
vicious

or

M.

OF
mass

it must
electromagnetically,
"

of

ordinarymatter

be

nothing

NYS
is

associated
is

yet

as

with
known.

circle in the current

theory. The
know) is explained
(perhapsthe onlykind we really

there

inertia of matter
due

COSMOLOGY

very obscure.

are

of
positiveelectricity

Moreover,

THE

TO

electromagneticenergy of moving electric charges ;

this, according to Maxwell's theory, is the kinetic energy of

as

and

the

to

which

aether"

started

we

To

istherefore endowed

with

inertia which

that
precisely

by repudiating.

the
philosopher

importantresult of this analysisof

is the fact of multiplicity
and complexity. It
molecule and atom
is only
above that the need for a real synthesis
has been shown
increased.
the
of
Once
realize
this
we
thereby
synthetic
necessity
factor and its perfectcompatibility
with a spatially
heterogeneous
the actual details
complex whether organism, molecule or atom
of secondaryphilosophical
are
importance. In the present state
of science it is certainly
advisable to keep an open mind concerning
be
their validity and
The
interpretations.
philosophermust
the

most

"

content
worse

behind the man

of science, for
lag somewhat
dangers than that of not being up-to-date.

there

to

are

views of Dr. Nys is taken from

recent letter addressed to Cardinal Mercier.
As to the application
to
of this scientific theory [ofelectrons]

followingexpressionof

The

"

the

'

in

cosmology,here
'

(i) The

'

(2) Anyway,

few words

is my

opinion:

theory is a generallysuccessful attempt at

but
as
synthesis,
yet it raises serious difficulties. Hence it is
premature to wish to base upon it a cosmologicalconceptionof
matter
or to employ it as a conclusive argument
againstan adverse
philosophical
theory.
with

electronic

this scientific

Scholastic

the

evitable dualism,

admit,

as

nucleus
Thus

and

there

theory.

In

synthesiscan

easilybe

effect it results

in

real and

substances.
of primordial
plurality
the
chemical
elements
of
atom,
primordial
a

negativeelectrons,both linked
are

two

to the

reconciled
in

Physicists
positive

central nucleus.
described

electrical elements
but mutuallyirreducible.
(electricity),

constituents,two

Now it is
world
for
Thomist
the
formation
of
the
conceive
to
a
justas easy
dualism as to do so in terms of the
startingfrom a simpleprimitive
bodies
admitted by chemists.
eightyor a hundred simple
actually
to one,
reduced
were
(3) Even if the two kinds of electricity
in
of the
the diversity
the
the
Scholastic sense
of
chemical species,
the

by

same

name

'

word, could stillbe maintained

that the
transformed
us

'

(4)

same

matter,

show
and polymerisation
allotropy

subjected to different influences,can

into different species.

Finally,as is admitted by numerous
[550]

writers,it

is

by

be

no