Civil Law Review I Case Digests

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)
Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
CASE DIGEST
IN
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
Prof. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
SUBMITTED BY:
IV - LLB-4402

SURNAME
1ABRINA
2AQUILINO
3BACARRA
4BAET
5BANOCAG
6BARIA
7BERMUDO
8BUESER, AM
9BUESER, JM
10CARLOS
11DAVID
12DAYA
13DE GUZMAN
14DISTURA
15GARCIA
16GENUINO
17GEREMIA
18GONZAGA
19GONZALES
20GUILLERMO
21GUTIERREZ
22LAYSON
23MALABANAN
24MARTINEZ
25MENDOZA
26MOLINA
27NEPOMUCENO
28PATAUEG
29PIO
30RADOVAN
31RODRIGUEZ
32RONQUILLO
33SACRAMENTO
34SITJAR
35TELOG
36TOLENTINO
37TORRES
38YAMAT
CASES ASSIGNED for DIGEST

TANADA V. TUVERA to VAN DORN V. ROMILLO
QUITA V. CA to LLORENTE V. CA
VELAYO V. SHELL CO. PHILS to RCPI V. CA
MERALCO V. CA to REYES V. LIM
NDC V. MADRIGAL to SPS. PAHANG V. METROBANK
ABACAN V. NUI to REPUBLIC V. CA
SILVERIO V. REPUBLIC to REPUBLIC V. ORBECIDO
ATENZA V. BRILLANTES to CHING MING TSOI V. CA
REPUBLIC V. MOLINA to FERRARIS V. FERRARIS
ZAMORA V. ZAMORA to CALISTERIO V. CALISTERIO
REPUBLIC V. NOLASCO to JIMENEZ V. REPUBLIC
OCAMPO V. FLORENCIANO to PELAYO V. LAURON
ILUSORIO V. ILUSORIO to ESTONINA V. CA
AYALA INVESTMENT V. CA to RELUCIO V. LOPEZ
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS BANK V. DAILO to SAGUID V. REY
HONTIVEROS V. RTC, BR.25 ILOILO to PATRICIO V. DARIO III
ANDAL V. MACARAIG to CABATANIA V. REGODOS
SAYSON V. CA to AGUSTIN V. PROLLAMANTE
IN RE CHANGE OF NAME OF JULIAN LIN to TAMARGO V. CA
LAHOM V. SIBULO to SANTOS V. CA
PEREZ V. CA to ATOK V. IAC
REPUBLIC V. GUZMAN to EVADEL REALTY V. SORIANO
NAZARENO V. CA to HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO V. CA
SERASPI V. CA to DBP V. CA
VILLANUEVA V. CA to REPUBLIC V. SILIM
QUILALA V. ALCANTARA to DIONISIO V. ORTIZ
ROMAN CATHOLIC V. CA to CITY OF ANGELES
REPUBLIC V. CA to DKC HOLDINGS V. CA
ARUEGO V. CA to BUGNAO V. UBAG
BAGTAS V. PAGUIO to NERA V. RIMANDI
CANEDA V. CA to AZNAR V. GARCIA
UNSON V. ABELLA to CANIZA V. CA
PECSON V. CORONEL to ROSALES V. ROSALES
FRANCISCO V. ALFONSO to DE PAPA V. CAMACHO
LLORENTE V. RODRIGUEZ to DIAZ V. IAC
DELA PUERTA V. CA to SARITA V. CANDIA
ABLLENA DE BACAYO V. BORROMEO to SANCHEZ V. CA
NAZARENO V. CA to BICARME V. CA

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I.
PRELIMINARY TITLE--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------4
II.
HUMAN RELATIONS--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15
III.
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 29
IV.
CIVIL PERSONALITY--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 35
V.
CITIZENSHIP-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 36
VI.
MARRIAGE---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 39
VII.
VOID MARRIAGES------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 51
VIII.
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 53
IX.
VOIDABLE MARRIAGES---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 73
X.
LEGAL SEPARATION-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 77
XI.
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS

BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 82
XII.
PROPERTY RELATIONS---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 85
XIII.
THE FAMILY AS AN INSTITUTION--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 108
XIV.
PATERNITY AND FILIATIOIN---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 116
XV.
ADOPTION----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 136
XVI.
PARENTAL AUTHORITY----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 143
XVII.
CASES IN PROPERTY-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 152
XVIII.
CASES IN SUCCESSION----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 193

1) TAADA VS. TUVERA

G.R. No. L-63915. April 24, 1985
Doctrine:
The publication of presidential issuances "of a public
nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement
of due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be
officially and specifically informed of its contents.
Facts:
The petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel
respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause
the publication in the Official Gazette various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementation and administrative orders.
The respondents contend that the publication in the
Official Gazette is not a requirement for the
effectivity of the laws where the laws provide for their
own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since
the presidential issuances in question contain
special provisions as to the date that they are to take
effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not
indispensable for their effectivity based on Article 2
of the Civil Code.
The interpretation of the respondent is in accord with
the Courts construction of said article. In a long line
of decisions, the Court has ruled that publication in
the Official Gazette is necessary in cases where the
legislation itself does not provide for an effectivity
date - for the date of publication is material in
determining its date of effectivity which is the 15 th
day following its publication - but not when the law
itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Issue:
Whether there is still a need for publication of the
presidential decrees with specified dates of
effectivity.
Held:
Yes, there is still a need for publication. Article 2
does not preclude the requirement of publication in
the Officila Gazette, even if the law itself provides for
the date of its effectivity. Section 1 of CA 638
provides that: Section 1. There shall be published in
the Official Gazette [1] all important legislative acts
and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress
of the Philippines; [2] all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except

such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions
or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said
courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4]
such documents or classes of documents as may be
required so to be published by law; and [5] such
documents or classes of documents as the
President of the Philippines shall determine from
time to time to have general applicability and legal
effect, or which he may authorize so to be published.
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to
give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non
excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish
or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of
a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not
even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth
Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the
Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein
imposes upon respondent officials an imperative
duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional
right of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern is to be given substance and reality.
The law itself makes a list of what should be
published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our
mind, leaves respondents with no discretion
whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded
from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a
public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees
that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their
violation or otherwise impose a burden or the
people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall
within this category. Other presidential issuances
which apply only to particular persons or class of
persons such as administrative and executive orders
need not be published on the assumption that they
have been circularized to all concerned.
It is needless to add that the publication of
presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of

general applicability" is a requirement of due
process. It is a rule of law that before a person may
be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential
issuances of general application, which have not
been published, shall have no force and effect.
2) TAADA VS. TUVERA
G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986
Facts:
1. In the first Tanada case the petitioners were
invoking due process in demanding the disclosure of
a number of presidential decrees which they claimed
had not been published as required by law, which is
Art. 2 of the Civil Code. The government argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not
so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the
decrees themselves declared that they were to
become effective immediately upon their approval. In
the decision of the case on April 24, 1985, the Court
affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of
these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents
to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general
application, and unless so published, they shall have
no binding force and effect.
2.
Petitioners
are
now
moving
for
a
reconsideration/clarification of the aforementioned
decision.
Issue: 1. Whether or not the clause UNLESS IT IS
OTHERWISE PROVIDED solely refers to the
fifteen-day period and not to the requirement of
publication.
2. Whether or not the word LAWS refer to all laws
or only to those of general application.
3. Where should publication of said laws be made?
Held:
1. The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers
to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective immediately
upon approval, or on any other date, without its

previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the
legislature may in its discretion provide that the
usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or
extended. An example, as pointed out by the present
Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the
original decision, is the Civil Code which did not
become effective after fifteen days from its
publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after
such publication." The general rule did not apply
because it was "otherwise provided. "
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause
publication may be dispensed with altogether. The
reason is that such omission would offend due
process insofar as it would deny the public
knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern
the legislature could validly provide that a law be
effective
immediately
upon
its
approval
notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an
unreasonably short period after publication), it is not
unlikely that persons not aware of it would be
prejudiced as a result and they would be so not
because of a failure to comply with but simply
because they did not know of its existence.
It must be noted at this point the conclusive
presumption that every person knows the law, which
of course presupposes that the law has been
published if the presumption is to have any legal
justification at all. It is no less important to remember
that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the
right of the people to information on matters of public
concern," and this certainly applies to, among
others, and indeed especially, the legislative
enactments of the government.
2. The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not
only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking all laws relate to the people in general
albeit there are some that do not apply to them
directly.
Thus, all statutes, including those of local application
and private laws, shall be published as a condition
for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days
after publication unless a different effectivity date is
fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are:
a. Presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are
validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution;

b. Administrative rules and regulations, if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation;
c. Charter of a city;
procedure. Consequently, we have no

choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the
Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in
the Official Gazett and not elsewhere, as a
requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from
such publication or after a different period provided
by the legislature.
d. Circulars issued by the Monetary Board if

meant to fill in the details of the Central Bank Act
which that body is supposed to enforce.
However, no publication is required for the following:
a. Interpretative regulations and those
merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the
public;
b. Letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties;
c. Municipal ordinances, which are covered
by the Local Government Code.
3. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at
all since its purpose is to inform the public of the
contents of the laws, and publication is to be made
in the Official Gazette as decided upon in the first
Tanada case, however, the Court made this
pronouncement:
There is much to be said of the view that the
publication need not be made in the Official Gazette,
considering its erratic releases and limited
readership. Undoubtedly,
newspapers
of
general circulation could better perform the function
of communicating, the laws to the people as such
periodicals are more easily available, have a wider
readership, and come out regularly. The
trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is not
the one required or authorized by existing law. As far
as we know, no amendment has been made of
Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has
not pointed to such a law, and we have no
information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has
not yet been published.
At any rate, the Court is not called upon to
rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify
it if we find it impractical. That is not our function.
That function belongs to the
legislature. Our task
is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived
and approved by the political departments of the
government in accordance with the prescribed
3) PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT and

SERVICES CORPORATION v THE HON.
SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT,
VIVENCIO DE MESA, RODRIGO MIKIN and
CEDRIC LEYSON
G.R. No. 103144. April 4, 2001
Doctrine:
All statutes, including those of local application and
private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed
by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and
executive orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever the same
are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present,
directly conferred by the Constitution: Administrative
rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal
in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication required of the socalled letter of instructions issued by the
performance of their duties
Facts:
Petitioner Philsa International Placement and
Services Corporation is a domestic corporation
engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas
employment. Sometime in January 1985, private
respondents, who were recruited by petitioner for
employment in Saudi Arabia, were required to pay
placement fees in the amount of P5,000.00 for
private respondent Rodrigo L. Mikin and P6,500.00
each for private respondents Vivencio A. de Mesa
and Cedric P. Leyson.
After the execution of their respective work
contracts, private respondents left for Saudi Arabia
on January 29, 1985. They then began work for Al-

Hejailan Consultants A/E, the foreign principal of
petitioner.
While in Saudi Arabia, private respondents were
allegedly made to sign a second contract on
February 4, 1985 which changed some of the
provisions of their original contract resulting in the
reduction of some of their benefits and privileges. On
April 1, 1985, their foreign employer allegedly forced
them to sign a third contract which increased their
work hours from 48 hours to 60 hours a week
without any corresponding increase in their basic
monthly salary. When they refused to sign this third
contract, the services of private respondents were
terminated by Al-Hejailan and they were repatriated
to the Philippines.
Upon their arrival in the Philippines, private
respondents demanded from petitioner Philsa the
return of their placement fees and for the payment of
their salaries for the unexpired portion of their
contract. When petitioner refused, they filed a case
before the POEA against petitioner Philsa and its
foreign principal, Al-Hejailan.
Several hearings were conducted before the POEA
Hearing Officer. On the aspects of the case involving
money claims arising from the employer-employee
relations and illegal dismissal, the POEA rendered a
decision dated August 31, 1988, ordering
respondent PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT
AND
SERVICE
CORPORATION
to
pay
complainants, jointly and severally with its principal
Al Hejailan. Almost simultaneous with the
promulgation of August 31, 1988 decision of the
POEA on private respondents money claim, POEA
issued separate Order dated August 29, 1988
resolving the recruitment violation aspect of private
respondents complaint. In this order, POEA found
petitioner liable for three (3) counts of illegal
exaction, two (2) counts of contract substitution and
one count of withholding or unlawful deduction from
salaries of workers.
From the said Order, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was subsequently denied.
After the denial of its motion for reconsideration,
petitioner appealed to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment. However, public respondent Secretary
of Labor and Employment affirmed en toto the
assailed Order. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but this was likewise denied.
Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari.
Petitioner insists, however, that it cannot be held
liable for illegal exaction as POEA Memorandum
Circular No. 11, Series of 1983, which enumerated
the allowable fees which may be collected from
applicants, is void for lack of publication.
Issue: Whether or not POEA Memorandum Circular

No. 11 Series of 1983 is void for lack of publication?
Held: Yes, the said memorandum circular is void for
lack of publication.
In Taada vs. Tuvera, the Court held, as follows:
"We hold therefore that all statutes, including those
of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which
shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and
executive orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever the same
are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present,
directly conferred by the Constitution: Administrative
rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal
in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication required of the socalled letter of instructions issued by the
performance of their duties."
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983
must likewise be declared ineffective as the same
was never published or filed with the National
Administrative Register. POEA Memorandum Order
No. 2, Series of 1983 provides for the applicable
schedule of placement and documentation fees for
private employment agencies or authority holders.
Under the said Order, the maximum amount which
may be collected from prospective Filipino overseas
workers is P2,500.00. The said circular was
apparently issued in compliance with the provisions
of Article 32 of the Labor Code.
It is thus clear that the administrative circular under
consideration is one of those issuances which
should be published for its effectivity, since its
purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law
pursuant to a valid delegation. Considering that
POEA Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983
has not as yet been published or filed with the
National Administrative Register, the same is
ineffective and may not be enforced.
The Office of the Solicitor General argues however
that the imposition of administrative sanctions on
petitioner was based not on the questioned
administrative circular but on Article 32 and Article
34 (a) 28 of the Labor Code.
The argument is not meritorious. The said articles of
the Labor Code were never cited, much less

discussed, in the body of the questioned Orders of
the POEA and Secretary of Labor and Employment.
In fact, the said Orders were consistent in
mentioning
that
petitioner's
violation
of
Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 was the
basis for the imposition of administrative sanctions
against petitioner. Furthermore, even assuming that
petitioner was held liable under the said provisions
of the Labor Code, Articles 32 and 34 (a) of the
Labor Code presupposes the promulgation of a valid
schedule of fees by the Department of Labor and
Employment. Considering that, as, previously
discussed, Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of
1983 embodying such a schedule of fees never took
effect, there is thus no basis for the imposition of the
administrative sanctions against petitioner
The Office of the Solicitor General likewise argues
that the questioned administrative circular is not
among those requiring publication contemplated by
Taada vs. Tuvera as it is addressed only to a
specific group of persons and not to the general
public.
Again, there is no merit in this argument. The fact
that the said circular is addressed only to a specified
group, namely private employment agencies or
authority holders, does not take it away from the
ambit of our ruling in Taada vs. Tuvera. In the case
of Phil. Association of Service Exporters vs. Torres,
the administrative circulars questioned therein were
addressed to an even smaller group, namely
Philippine and Hong Kong agencies engaged in the
recruitment of workers for Hong Kong, and still the
Court ruled therein that, for lack of proper
publication, the said circulars may not be enforced or
implemented.
Our pronouncement in Taada vs. Tuvera is clear
and categorical. Administrative rules and regulations
must be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation. The only exceptions are interpretative
regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those
so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules and
performance of their duties. Administrative Circular
No. 2, Series of 1983 has not been shown to fall
under any of these exceptions.
4) Unciano Paramedical College c CA
G.R. No. 100335, April 7, 1993
Doctrine:
Settled is the rule that when a doctrine of this Court
is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new
doctrine is applied prospectively, and should not

apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and
acted on the faith thereof Thus, the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction was issued by the
trial court with grave abuse of discretion.
Facts:
On April 16, 1990, private respondents Elena
Villegas and Ted Magallanes, thru their mothers,
Victoria
Villegas
and
Jacinta
Magallanes,
respectively, filed before the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, a
petition for injunction and damages with prayer for a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against
petitioners Unciano Paramedical College, Inc.,
Mirando C. Unciano, Sr., Dominador Santos, Editha
Mora, Dr. Evelyn Moral and Laureana Vitug, they
alleged therein that:
1.
On July 1989, the above-named
students initiated a petition proposing to
the school authorities the organization of
a student council in the school. They
solicited support of their petition from
the studentry by asking the students to
endorse the same with their signatures.
They were able to get at least 180
signatures.
2.
On August 18, 1989, the students were
summoned to the Office of Dr. Moral and
were admonished not to proceed with
the proposal because, according to her,
the school does not allow and had never
allowed such an organization.
3.
On October 28, 1989, in compliance
with an announcement to see the Dean
of Nursing, the above-named students
met with Dean Vitug and Dr. Moral who
informed them that they would be barred
from enrollment for the second semester
because the school does not allow their
students to put up a student council. Dr.
Moral advised them to get their
Honorable Dismissal.
4.
On November 6, 1989, the students
again approached Dr. Moral who
informed them that they were no longer
allowed to enroll because they are
allegedly members of the National
Union of Students of the Philippines
(NUSP) and the League of Filipino
Students (LFS), officers of the student
organization they organized, and,
moreover 'drug addicts.' The students
asked for proof of these accusations but
were not given any.

5.
6.
On 29 November 1989, the students

were informed that the President had
unilaterally refused to allow them to
enroll and it was up to their parents to
request or appeal to the school officials
to change their decision. Mrs. Victoria
Villegas and Mrs. Jacinta Magallanes
wrote to the school officials to request
that their children be allowed to enroll .
Dr. Moral informed them that the Board
of Trustees will have to decide on these
requests.
On 11 December 1989, the students
were informed that the Board of
Trustees had refused to grant the
parents' request."
The trial court issued a temporary restraining order

effective May 17, 1990, enjoining petitioner school
from not enrolling private respondents in its College
of Nursing and setting the hearing for the issuance
of the writ of preliminary injunction on June 4, 1990.
Petitioners filed an opposition but the RTC still
ordered the school to allow the students to enroll.
The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the RTC
and based its the ruling in the recent case of Ariel
Non, et al. vs. Hon. Sancho Dames II, , May 20,
1990, the Supreme Court, abandoned and overruled
its decision in Alcuaz and declared thus:
The contract between the school and the student is
not an ordinary contract. It is imbued with public
interest, considering the high priority given by the
Constitution to education and the grant to the State
of supervisory and regulatory powers over all
educational institutions. When a student registers in
a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the
entire school year
'Every student has the right to enroll in any school,
college or university upon meeting its specific
requirement and reasonable regulation: Provided,
that except in the case of academic delinquency and
violation of disciplinary regulation, the student is
presumed to be qualified for enrollment for the entire
period he is expected to his complete his course
without prejudice to his right to transfer.'
Hence the instant appeal.
Issue: If the Ariel Non Doctrine should be applied
retroactively to govern and invalidate the legal
effects of the incidents that took place prior to its
adoption and which incidents were proper and valid
under the ALCUAZ doctrine prevailing at the time
said incident took place.
Held: No, the Non doctrine should not be applied to

the instant case. Under the then prevailing Alcuaz
doctrine which was promulgated on May 2, 1988, the
contract between them and private respondents was
validly terminated upon the end of the first semester
of school year 1989-1990.
Although said doctrine was later abandoned in Non,
et al. v. Dames II, et al., supra, this case was
promulgated much later, or on May 20, 1990, when
the termination of the contract between them had
long become fait accompli. Settled is the rule that
when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a
different view is adopted, the new doctrine is applied
prospectively, and should not apply to parties who
relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith
thereof. Thus, the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction was issued by the trial court with grave
abuse of discretion.
The ruling in the Non case should not be given a
retroactive effect to cases that arose before its
promulgation on May 20, 1990, as in this case,
which was filed on April 16, 1990. If it were
otherwise, it would result in oppression to petitioners
and other schools similarly situated who relied on
the ruling in the Alcuaz case, promulgated on May 2,
1988, which recognized the termination of contract
theory.
The contract between the parties was validly
terminated upon the end of the first semester of
school year 1989-1990, or in October, 1989. This is
the status quo. The trial court gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction which ordered petitioners to
allow private respondents "to enroll for the first
semester of school year 1990-1190." 16 Guided by
the Capitol case, certainly, this writ will not restore
the status quo but will go a step backward, then
restore the condition preceding the status quo.
Private respondents do not possess any clear legal
right to re-enroll, corollarily, petitioners are not
obliged legally to re-admit them.
5) Cui v Arellano University
G.R. No. L-15127; May 30, 1961
Facts:
Plaintiff enrolled in the College of Law of the
defendant university from the school year 19481949. He finished his law studies in the defendant
university up to and including the first semester of
the fourth year. During all the time he was studying
law in the defendant university, he was awarded
scholarship grants, for scholastic merit, so that his
semestral tuition fees were returned to him after the

end of each semester and when his scholarship
grants were awarded to him. The whole amount of
tuition fees paid by plaintiff to defendant and
refunded to him by the latter from the first semester
up to and including the first semester of his last year
in the college of law or the fourth year, is in total of
P1,033.87. However, before defendant awarded to
plaintiff the scholarship grants as above stated, he
was made to sign the following contract covenant
and agreement which provides that in consideration
of the scholarship granted to him by the University,
he waives his right to transfer to another school
without having refunded to the University
(defendant) the equivalent of his scholarship cash.
For the last semester of his law studies,
plaintiff enrolled in the college of law of the Abad
Santos University and graduated therefrom. After
graduating in law he applied to take the bar
examination. Plaintiff then petitioned the defendant
university to issue to him the needed transcripts.
However, the defendant refused until after he had
paid back the P1,033 87 which defendant refunded
to him as above stated. As he could not take the bar
examination without those transcripts, plaintiff paid
to defendant the said sum under protest. This is the
sum which plaintiff seeks to recover from defendant
in this case.
Issue: Whether or not the said provision of the
contract is valid.
Held: No, the stipulation in question is contrary to
public policy and, hence, null and void.
The
practice of awarding scholarships to attract students
and keep them in school is not a good custom nor
has it received some kind of social and practical
confirmation except in some private institutions as in
Arellano University. The University of the Philippines
which implements Section 5 of Article XIV of the
Constitution with reference to the giving of free
scholarships to gifted children, does not require
scholars to reimburse the corresponding value of the
scholarships if they transfer to other schools. The
same goes for leading colleges and universities of
the United States after which our educational
practices or policies are patterned. In these
institutions scholarships are granted not to attract
and to keep brilliant students in school for their
propaganda mine but to reward merit or help gifted
students in whom society has an established interest
or a first lien.
55 SCRA 607
Facts:
On September 5, 1964, the accused was found to be
in possession of a revolver without the requisite
license or permit. He claimed to be entitled to
exoneration because, although he had no license or
permit, he had appointments as Secret Agent from
the Provincial Governor of Batangas and as
Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial
Commander, and the said appointments expressly
carried with them the authority to possess and carry
the said firearm. The accused further contended that
in view of his appointments, he was entitled to
acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Courts
decisions in People vs. Macarandang and in People
vs. Lucero.
The trial court found the accused criminally liable for
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition on the
ground that the rulings in Macarandang* and in
Lucero* were reversed and abandoned in People vs.
Mapa**.
The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the appellant should be
acquitted on the basis of the Supreme Courts
rulings in the cases of Macarandang and of Lucero.
Held: The appellant was acquitted.
Decisions of the Supreme Court, although in
themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of
what the law means; this is the reason why Article 8
of the New Civil Code provides that, Judicial
decisions applying and interpreting the laws or the
constitution shall form part of the legal system. The
interpretation upon a law by the Supreme Court
constitutes in a way a part of the law as of the date
the law was originally passed, since the courts
construction
merely
establishes
the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus
construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule
supported by numerous authorities is a restatement
of the legal maxim legis interpretatio legis vim
obtinetthe interpretation placed upon the written
law by a competent court has the force of law. The
doctrine laid down in Lucero and in Macarandang
was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law of
the land, at the time appellant was found in
possession of the firearm and when he was
arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine
was overruled in Mapa case in 1967,but when a
doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a
different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be
applied prospectively, and should not apply to
6) People vs Jabinal
10

parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted
on the faith thereof.
Considering that the appellant possessed a firearm
pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in
Macarandang and in Lucero, under which no
criminal liability would attach to his possession of
said firearm, the appellant should be absolved. The
appellant may not be punished for an act which at
the time it was done was held not to be punishable.
below denied the motion to dismiss since the

property involved is located in the Philippines so that
the Divorce Decree had no bearing in this case. The
denial is now the subject of this certiorari
proceeding.
*The accused were acquitted for through their

appointment as confidential/secret agent they were
deemed to be peace officers. Peace officers had
the privilege of carrying firearms without license.
**Mapa was convicted although he was a
secret/confidential agent. The court ruled that thelaw
did not explicitly provide that secret/confidential
agents are among those who are exempted from
acquiring a license to carry a firearm.
Held: It is true that owing to the nationality principle

embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public police
and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national
law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage.
7) Van Dorn vs. Romillio

139 SCRA 139
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private

respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner.
He would have no standing to sue in the case below
as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision
of his own country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does
not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his
right over the alleged conjugal property.
Doctrine:
It is true that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public police
and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national
law
Facts:
Petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private
respondent is a citizen of the United States. They
were married in Hongkong in 1972. After the
marriage, they established their residence in the
Philippines. They begot two children born on April 4,
1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively. The
parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in
1982 and petitioner has re-married also in Nevada,
this time to Theodore Van Dorn. In 1983, private
respondent filed suit against petitioner alleging the
petitioners business in Ermita (the Galeon Shop) is
a conjugal property of the parties and prayed that
private respondent be declared with right to manage
said property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the
petition on the ground that the cause of action is
barred by previous judgement in the divorce
proceedings before the Nevada Court. The Court
Issue: Whether the foreign divorce on the parties

has affected the alleged conjugal property in the
Philippines?
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under

our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married
to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil
Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent.
The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs
with possible rights to conjugal property. She should
not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served.
8) QUITA vs. CA
G.R. No. 124862, December 22, 1998
Facts: Fe Quita and Arturo Padlan, both Filipinos,
were married in the Philippines on May 18, 1941, but
not blessed with any children. Fe sued Arturo for
divorce in San Francisco, USA, submitting as
evidence their agreement to live separately from
11

each other and a settlement of their conjugal
properties. A decree of divorce was granted on July
23, 1954. After 3 weeks, Fe married Felix Tupaz in
San Francisco, but eventually ended into a divorce.
For the third time, she married again in USA.
April 16, 1972, Arturo died leaving no will. August 31,
1972, Lino Javier Inciong filed with RTC QC a
petition for issuance of letters of administration
concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the
Philippine Trust Company. Blandina Dandan,
surviving spouse of Arturo, and their children
opposed the petition.
Later, Ruperto Padlan,
claiming to be the sole surviving brother of deceased
Arturo, intervened. October, 7, 1987, Fe moved fot
the immediate declaration of heirs of deceased
Arturo and distribution of his estate.
The trial court disregarded the divorce between Fe
and Arturo, and expressed the view that their
marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972.
Issues: Whether or not Blandinas marriage to Arturo
was void ab initio.
Whether or not Fe can be declared the primary
beneficiary of Arturos estate.
Held: No, Blandinas marriage to Arturo was valid,
thus, Fe cannot be declared a beneficiary to Arturos
estate.
At the time Fe obtained a divorce decree against
Arturo in San Francisco, she was already an alien
and no longer a Filipino citizen. Hence, the divorce
decree is valid in the Philippines, since it is
considered valid in Fes national law, which is the
USA law.
9) CATALAN vs. BRAGANZA
G.R. No. 167109, February 6, 2007
Facts:
Felicitas Catalan married Orando on June 4, 1950.
They migrated to USA and became naturalized
citizens thereof. On April 1988, they divorced.
June 16, 1988, Orlando married Merope in
Pangasinan. Later, Felicitas filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage with RTC Dagupan
against Orlando and Merope, contending that
Merope has a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio
Bristol. RTC ruled in favor of Felicitas.
Issue: Whether Felicitas has the personality to file a
petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage of
Orlando on the ground of bigamy.
Held: There is no specific provision as to who can

file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage under
the New Civil Code, which is the law governing at
the time of marriage between Orlando and Merope,
nor even in the Family Code. however, only a party
who can demonstrate proper interest can file the
same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest and must be based on a cause
of action.
In the instant case, Felicitas personality to file the
petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be
ascertained due to the absence of the divorce
decree and the foreign law allowing it. Thus, the
case is remanded to trial court for reception of
additional evidence necessary.
10) SAN LUIS vs. SAN LUIS

G.R. No. 133743, February 6, 2007
Facts:
The case involves the settlement of Felicisimos
estate. During his lifetime, he contracted 3
marriages. First was with Virginia, who predeceased
him. On May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee
Corwin, but ended to a divorce, when Merry filed a
divorce complaint in Hawaii and was granted. On
June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married Felicidad.
Felicisimo died on December 18, 1992. Felicidad
sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
assets and settlement of Felicisimos estate. She
filed with RTC Makati a petition for letters of
administration.
Rodolfo, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first
marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of
improper venue and failure to state a cause of
action, alleging that the petition should have been
filed in the Province of Laguna where Felicisimos
place of residence prior to his death, and that
Felicidad has no legal personality to file the petition
because she was only a mistress.
Issue: Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his
alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the
Civil Code, considering that Felicidads marriage to
Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or
before the effectivity of the Family Code.
12

Held: The divorce decree allegedly obtained by
Merry which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal
personality to file the present petition as the
surviving spouse of Felicisimo. But there is
insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the
divorce decree obtained by Merry, as well as the
marriage of Felicidad and Felicisimo under the laws
of USA.
Presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient, proof of its authenticity and due
execution must also be presented. Under Sections
24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may
be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a
copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
With regard to Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo
solemnized in California USA, she only submitted
photocopies of the Marriated Certificate and the
annotated text of the Family Law Act of California.
The Court, however, cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.
Therefore, this case was remanded to the trial court
for further reception of evidence on the divorce
decree obtained by Merry and the marriage of
Felicidad and Felicisimo.
11) AZNAR VS. GARCIA
7 SCRA 95
Facts:
CIF of Davao directed the executor to reimburse
Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid
by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy,
and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the
residue of the property to be enjoyed during her
lifetime, and in case of death without issue, of said
residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C
Borton, etc, in accordance with the provisions of the
will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. Helen
Christensen Garcia filed an opposition, as it deprives
her of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child,
she having been declared by the Court as one. The
court ruled that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen
of the United States of America and of the State of
California at the time of his death and he was
domiciled in the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not the Philippine Law shall

govern the administration of the will of Edward
Christensen.
Held: The Court ruled that the Philippine Law shall
govern the testamentary disposition of Edward
Christensen.
Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that the national
law shall govern intestate and testamentary
successions. National law refers to the private law of
the state of which the decedent is a citizen, in the
case at bar, the private law of the State of California.
Article 94 of the Civil Code of State of California
refers back the case, when a decedent is not
domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the
Philippines in the case at bar.
12) BELLIS vs. BELLIS
20 SCRA 358
Facts:
Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas,
United States. He had 5 legitimate children with his
first wife, 3 legitimate children with hi second wife,
and had 3 illegitimate children. On August 5, 1952,
Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines. July 8,
1958, Amos died.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions
to the project of partition on the ground that they
were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate
children of Amos Bellis, and therefore, compulsory
heirs of the deceased. Under the Laws of Texas,
there are no forced heirs of legitimes.
Issue: Which law must apply Texas Law or
Philippine Law?
Held: The decedents national law, which is the
Texas law, governs the order of succession, the
amount of successional rights, the intrinsic validity of
the provisions of the will and the capacity to
succeed.
It is not disputed that the decedent was both a
national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time
of his death.
A provision in a foreigners will to the effect that his
properties shall be distributed in accordance with
Philippine Law and not with his national law cannot
be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 16
of the Civil Code states said national law should
govern.
Since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will
and the amount of successional rights are to be
13

determined under Texas Law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos
Bellis.
13) TESTATE ESTATE OF BOHANAN
BOHANAN
G.R. No. L-12105, January 30, 1960
vs.
Facts:
On April 24, 1950, admitting to probate C. O.
Bohanans last will and testament, executed on April
23, 1944 in Manila, CFI found that the testator was
born in Nebraska and a citizen of California, but
temporarily stayed in the Philippines for a long
period of time. At the time of his death, he was a
citizen of the United States and of the State of
Nevada, and his will was executed in accordance
with the laws of the state of Nevada. Out of his total
estate of P211,639.33 in cash, the testator gave his
grandson P90,819.67 and of all shares of stock of
several mining companies and to his brother and
sister the same amount. To his children, he gave a
legacy of only P6,000 each. Magdalena, his wife,
and her 2 children opposed the validity of the
testamentary provisions contending that the will
deprived them of their legitime.
Magdalena alleged that the trial court erred in
recognizing the Reno divorce secured by the testator
from his Filipino wife Magdalena, and that divorce
should be declared a nullity in this jurisdiction.
According to the laws of the State of Nevada, no
right to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced
wife. The divorce was granted to the testator on May
20, 1922.
Issue: Whether Philippine laws or the law of the
State of Nevada should apply.
Held: The testator died in 1944, thus, the old Civil
Code governs. The old Civil Code provides that
successional rights to personal property are to be
earned by the national law of the person whose
succession is in question.
The foreign law, specifically Section 9905, compiled
Newada Laws, was introduced as evidence. That
law can be taken judicial notice by the Court, without
proof of such law having been offered at the hearing
of the project of partition.
According to Article 10 of the Old Civil Code, the
validity of testamentary dispositions are governed by
the national law of the testator, and it has been
decided without dispute that the national law of the
testator is that of the State of Nevada, which allows
a testator to dispose of all his property according to

his will.
14) LLORENTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G. R. No. 124371, November 23, 2000
Facts:
Lorenzo (enlisted serviceman of the US Navy from
March 10, 1927 Septermber 30, 1957) and Paula
were married on February 22, 1937. Before the
outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo went back to
the US while Paula stayed in the conjugal home at
Camarines Sur. On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo
was naturalized as an American citizen. He visited
the Philippines and discovered that his wife, Paula
was pregnant and was living in with his brother
Ceferino.
On November 1, 1951, Lorenzo filed for divorce with
the Superior Court of the State of California and was
granted.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia in
Manila and begot 3 children. On March 13, 1981,
Lorenzo executed a notarized Last Will and
Testament. On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed a
petition with the RTC for the probate and allowance
of his last will and testament, moving that Alicia be
appointed as Special Administratrix of his estate, but
was denied because Lorenzo was still alive. On
January 24, 1984, trial court admitted the will to
probate. On June 11, 1985, Lorenzo died. On
September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court
a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzos
estate in her favor, contending that she was
Lorenzos surviving spouse and that the
testamentary provisions in Lorenzos will encroached
on her legitime and share in the conjugal property.
Issue: Whether or not Paula is entitled to inherit from
Lorenzos estate.
Held: Foreign law should apply. Lorenzos divorce
decree with Paula is recognized as valid.
Foreign laws must be alleged and proved. Our
courts do not take judicial notice of them.
The fact is Lorenzo became an American citizen
long before and at the time of 1) his divorce from
Paula; 2) marriage to Alicia; 3) execution of his will;
and 4) death. Issues arising from these incidents are
governed by foreign law.
Both RTC and CA decisions in hastily applying
Philippine law are erroneous. Heres why:
1) Aliens may obtain divorces abroad provided
they are valid according to their national law.
In this case, LORENZOs divorce from
14

PAULA was valid and recognized in this
jurisdiction as a matter of comity.
2) LORENZOs will is valid. Article 17 The
forms and solemnities of contracts, wills,
and other public instruments shall be
governed by the laws of the country in which
they are executed. In this case, whether the
will was executed in accordance with the
formalities required is answered by referring
to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly
probated. The trial court should not that
Congress did not intend to extend the same
succession (system of legitime) to foreign
nationals.
15

II. HUMAN RELATIONS
15) ALFREDO M. VELAYO vs. SHELL
G.R. No. L-7817, October 31, 1956.
FACTS
CALI, a domestic airline corporation, met with its
creditors to inform them that the corporation was on
the verge of insolvency and had to stop operations.
To ensure payment of their claims against CALI, the
creditors agreed that it would be advantageous not
to present suits against CALI but to strive for a fair
pro-rata division of its assets, although CALI
announced that in case of non-agreement of the
creditors on a pro-rata division of the assets, it would
file insolvency proceedings. Right after the meeting,
defendant Shell Philippines, one of CALIs creditors
who was present in the meeting and who agreed to
the pro-rata division, assigned its credit to its sister
company, Shell USA. Shell USA then filed with a
California court an action for collection of the
assigned credit and applied for a writ of attachment
against CALIs Douglas C-54 plane which was in
California. Prior to the meeting with creditors, CALI
had already offered the plane to Shell Philippine but
the offer was rejected. Velayo, as assignee of the
other creditors of CALI, filed this action for damages
against defendant Shell Philippines. He claims that
that fraudulent assignment of Shell Philippines
credit to Shall USA prejudiced the other creditors
and was contrary to the agreed pro-rata division of
assets.
ISSUE: WON Shell Philippines, taking advantage
of its knowledge of the existence of CALI's
airplane in the US, acted in bad faith in assigning
its credit to its sister company effectively
defeating the agreed pro-rata division of assets
among the creditors of CALI.
HELD: PROVISIONS ON HUMAN RELATIONS
INTENDED AS CATCH-ALL PROVISIONS FOR
ANY WRONG FOR WHICH NO SPECIFIC
REMEDY IS PROVIDED FOR BY LAW.
Defendant schemed and effected the transfer to its
sister corporation in the United States, where CALI's
plane C- 54 was. By that swift and unsuspected
operation efficaciously disposed of said insolvent's
property depriving the latter and the Assignee that
was latter appointed, of the opportunity to recover
said plane.
Chapter 2 of the PRELIMINARY TITLE of the Civil

Code, dealing on Human Relations, provides the
following:
"Art 19. Any person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performances of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty
and good faith".
It maybe said that this article only contains a mere
declaration of principles and while such statement
may be is essentially correct, yet We find that such
declaration is implemented by Article 21 and
sequence of the same Chapter which prescribe the
following:
"Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage".
Another rule is expressed in Article 24 which
compels the return of a thing acquired 'without just
or legal grounds'. This provision embodies the
doctrine that no person should unjustly enrich
himself at the expense of another, which has been
one of the mainstays of every legal system for
centuries. It is most needful that this ancient
principle be clearly and specifically consecrated in
the Civil Code to the end that in cases not foreseen
by the lawmaker, no one may unjustly benefit himself
to the prejudice of another. Now, if Article 23 of the
Civil Code goes as far as to provide that:
"Even if an act or event causing damage to another's
property was not due to the fault or negligence of the
defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if
through the act or event he was benefited." with
much more reason the Defendant should be liable
for indemnity for acts it committed in bad faith and
with betrayal of confidence.
Arnel P. Bacarra
16) Albenson Enterprises Corporation vs. CA
G.R. No. 88694, January 11, 1993
FACTS:
Petitioner Albenson Enterprises delivered to
Guaranteed Industries, located at 3267 V. Mapa St.
Sta.Mesa, Manila, mild steel plates. As part
payment, Albenson was given a check drawn
against the account of E.L. Woodworks. However,
when the check was presented for payment, it was
16

dishonored because of lack of funds. This led
Albenson to trace the origin. This led them to a
certain Eugenio Baltao. They made afterwards an
extrajudicial demand to private respondent Baltao.
But he denied that he signed on the check because
Guaranteed Industries was already inexistent. This
led Albenson to file a criminal complaint for violation
of BP 22. However, it was later found out that his
namesake, Eugenio Baltao III, his son, was the one
who manages E.L. Woodworks located on the
ground floor of the Baltao Building. Nevertheless,
Assistant Fiscal Sumaway filed the information. But
Provincial Fiscal Castro instructed the trial fiscal to
dismiss the information. Because of the unjust filing
of the criminal complaint, Baltao filed a complaint for
damages against Albenson Enterprises. The trial
court ruled in favor of Baltao. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the criminal
complaint by Albenson Enterprises constituted
an abuse of right?
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.
Under Article 19 of the Civil Code, the following are
the requisites for abuse of right: (1) There is a legal
right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3)
for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other
provisions of law which do not especially provide for
their own sanction. Article 21 deals with acts contra
bonus mores, and has the following elements: 1)
There is an act which is legal; 2) but which is
contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or
public policy; 3) and it is done with intent to injure. A
closer look at the said articles and it can be revealed
that Articles 19 and 21 share a common element:
that the act is intentional. Article 20, however, does
not distinguish. It is dependent on the circumstances
of the case. By applying these to the case at hand, it
cannot be said that Albenson Enterprises was
abusing the rights of Baltao. The trial court and the
appellate court made a mistake of lumping the three
articles and used them as bases for the award of
damages in a civil complaint filed against the
petitioners. Albenson was prompted by its natural
instinct and right to file a criminal complaint because
it was not able to collect the payment of the mild
steel plates it had delivered. It had every right to
exhaust all legal remedies to collect its unpaid credit.
Arnel P. Bacarra
17) GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND

CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R No. 81262, August 25, 1983
RADIO
FACTS:
Private respondent Tobias was employed by Globe
Mackay in a dual capacity as a purchasing agent
and administrative assistant. Petitioner discovered
fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions
for which it lost several thousands of pesos. Tobias
was implicated as the number one suspect. Police
investigations were conducted as a result of said
anomaly.
The police reports exculpated Tobias from any
participation in the offense. Unsatisfied, petitioner
still hired private investigators. Pending the
investigation of the private detectives, petitioner filed
a complaint for estafa against Tobias.
Later, Tobias was terminated. Hence, he filed an
action for illegal dismissal. While his case awaits
resolution, he sought employment with RETELCO.
However, petitioner, without being asked by
RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that
Tobias was dismissed due to dishonesty.
Thus, Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored
on alleged unlawful, malicious and abusive acts of
petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should
indemnify private respondent for damages.
HELD: Article 19 of the Civil Code known to contain
what is commonly referred to as the principle of
abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must
be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights
but also in the performance of one's duties. These
standards are the following: to act with justice; to
give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and
good faith. Violation of Article 19 can result to right to
damages pursuant to Article 21 or Article 22.
This article was adopted to remedy the countless
gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of
moral wrongs helpless, even though they have
actually suffered material and moral injury.
In the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not
violate any provision of law since they were merely
exercising their legal right to dismiss private
respondent.
17

Nevertheless, the Court, after examining the record
and circumstances of the case ruled that petitioners
have indeed abused the right that they invoke,
causing damage to private respondent.
Notwithstanding the fact that it was private
respondent Tobias who reported the possible
existence of anomalous transactions, petitioner
Hendry showed belligerence and told plaintiff that he
was the number one suspect and to take a one week
vacation leave, not to communicate with the office,
to leave his table drawers open, and to leave his
keys to petitioner Hendry. The high-handed
treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was
certainly uncalled for. And this reprehensible attitude
of petitioners was to continue when private
respondent returned to work after his one week
forced leave. Upon reporting for work, Tobias was
confronted by Hendry who said. "Tobby, you are the
crook and swindler in this company."
The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern
of harassment during the investigations of Tobias
transgress the standards of human conduct set forth
in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has already
ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an
employee should not be confused with the manner in
which the right is exercised and the effects flowing
therefrom.
Therefore, petitioners are liable for damages.
Arnel P. Bacarra
18) BARONS MARKETING VS. CA
G.R. No. 126486, February 9, 1998
FACTS
Private respondent Phelps Dodge, Phil. Appointed
petitioner Barons Marketing Corp as one of its
dealers of electrical wires and cables. As such,
petitioner was given by private respondent 60 days
credit for its purchases reckoned from the date of
delivery. During the period December 1986 to
August 1987, defendant purchased on credit from
plaintiff various electrical wires and cables in the
total amount of P4,102,438.3. Of this amount,
P300,000 was paid leaving a balance of
P3,802,748.2.
Respondent wrote petitioner
demanding payment of its unpaid obligation. In
response, petitioner requests to pay the amount in
monthly installments of P500,000 plus 1% interest.
Said offer was rejected by respondent. Thereafter,
private respondent filed a complaint before the Pasig
RTC against petitioner for recovery of P3,802,748.2,
including interest with 25% attorneys fees,

exemplary damages of P100,000 and cost of
litigation. In its answer, petitioner admitted the
purchase made but disputed the amount. Petitioner
likewise interposed a counterclaim on the ground of
abuse of rights since it suffered injury to its
reputation.
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of
private respondent, which decision was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent is
guilty of abuse of rights or whether private
respondent intended to prejudice or injure
petitioner when it rejected petitioners offer and
filed the action for collection.
HELD: No. It is an elementary rule in jurisdiction
that good faith is presumed and that the burden of
proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging the
same. In the case at bar, petitioner has failed to
prove bad faith on the part of private respondent.
Private respondent was driven by legitimate reasons
for rejecting petitioners offer and instituting the
action for collection before the trial court. As pointed
out by private respondent. The corporation had its
own cash position to protect in order to pay its own
obligations. Clearly, this would be inimical to the
interests of any enterprise, especially profit-oriented
one like private respondent. It is plain to see that
this is a case of an exercise of rights, not an abuse
thereof. As such, private respondent has not acted
in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy as to violate Article 21 of the Civil Code.
Arnel P. Bacarra
19) MWSS vs. Act Theater
G.R. No. 147076, June 17, 2004
FACTS:
On September 22, 1988, four employees of the
respondent Act Theater, Inc., namely, Rodolfo
Tabian, Armando Aguilar, Arnel Concha and Modesto
Ruales, were apprehended by members of the
Quezon City police force for allegedly tampering a
water meter in violation of P.D. No. 401, as amended
by B.P. Blg. 876. On account of the incident, the
respondents water service connection was cut off.
Consequently, the respondent filed a complaint for
injunction with damages against the petitioner
MWSS.
18

In the civil case, the respondent alleged in its
complaint filed with the court a quo that the petitioner
acted arbitrarily, whimsically and capriciously, in
cutting off the respondents water service connection
without prior notice. Due to lack of water, the health
and sanitation, not only of the respondents patrons
but in the surrounding premises as well, were
adversely affected. The respondent prayed that the
petitioner be directed to pay damages.
The petitioner insists that in cutting off the
respondents water service connection, the petitioner
merely exercised its proprietary right under Article
429 of the Civil Code, which provides that the owner
or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to
exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal
thereof.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner validly
exercised its right under Article 429 of the Civil
Code.
HELD: No, the petitioner did not validly exercise its
right under Article 429 of the Civil Code. A right is a
power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed under a
constitution, statute or decisional law, or recognized
as a result of long usage, constitutive of a legally
enforceable claim of one person against the other.
Concededly, the petitioner, as the owner of the utility
providing water supply to certain consumers
including the respondent, had the right to exclude
any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof.
However, the exercise of rights is not without
limitations. Having the right should not be confused
with the manner by which such right is to be
exercised. When a right is exercised in a manner,
which discards these norms resulting in damage to
another, a legal wrong is committed for which actor
can be held accountable. In this case, the petitioner
failed to act with justice and give the respondent
what is due to it when the petitioner
unceremoniously cut off the respondents water
service connection.
Arnel P. Bacarra
20) Carpio vs. Valmonte
G.R. No. 151866, September 9, 2004
FACTS:
Respondent Leonora Valmonte is a wedding
coordinator. Michelle del Rosario and Jon Sierra
engaged her services for their church wedding. At
about 4:30 p.m. on that day, Valmonte went to the
Manila Hotel where the bride and her family were
billeted. When she arrived, several persons were

already there. Among those present was petitioner
Soledad Carpio, an aunt of the bride who was
preparing to dress up for the occasion.
After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the
suite. She proceeded to the Maynila Restaurant
where the reception was to be held. She paid the
suppliers, gave the meal allowance to the band, and
went back to the suite. Upon entering the suite,
Valmonte noticed the people staring at her. It was at
this juncture that petitioner allegedly uttered the
following words to Valmonte: "Ikaw lang ang
lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala mong bag?
Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang and lumabas ng
kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha." Petitioner then ordered
one of the ladies to search Valmontes bag. It turned
out that after Valmonte left the room to attend to her
duties, petitioner discovered that the pieces of
jewelry which she placed inside the comfort room in
a paper bag were lost.
The bags and personal belongings of all the people
inside the room were searched. Valmonte was
allegedly bodily searched, interrogated and trailed by
a security guard throughout the evening. Later,
police officers arrived and interviewed all persons
who had access to the suite and fingerprinted them
including Valmonte. During all the time Valmonte
was being interrogated by the police officers,
petitioner kept on saying the words "Siya lang ang
lumabas ng kwarto." Valmontes car which was
parked at the hotel premises was also searched but
the search yielded nothing.
After a futile attempt for a formal apology, Valmonte
filed a suit for damages against Carpio.
The trial court rendered dismissed Valmontes
complaint for damages. It ruled that when petitioner
sought investigation for the loss of her jewelry, she
was merely exercising her right and if damage
results from a person exercising his legal right, it is
damnum absque injuria.
The CA reversed, holding that petitioners verbal
assault upon Valmonte was done with malice and in
bad faith since it was made in the presence of many
people without any solid proof except petitioners
suspicion. Such unfounded accusation entitles
Valmonte to an award of moral damages for she was
publicly
humiliated,
deeply
insulted,
and
embarrassed.
ISSUE:
Should
Valmonte
be
entitled
to
19

Damages?
HELD: Yes. The victim of a wrongful act or omission,
whether done willfully or negligently, is not left
without any remedy or recourse to obtain relief for
the damage or injury he sustained. Incorporated into
our civil law are not only principles of equity but also
universal moral precepts which are designed to
indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain
of good conscience and which are meant to serve as
guides for human conduct. First of these
fundamental precepts is the principle commonly
known as "abuse of rights" under Article 19 of the
Civil Code. It provides that "Every person must, in
the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due
and observe honesty and good faith." One is not
allowed to exercise his right in a manner which
would cause unnecessary prejudice to another or if
he would thereby offend morals or good customs.
In the case at bar, petitioners verbal reproach
against respondent was certainly uncalled for
considering that by her own account nobody knew
that she brought such kind and amount of jewelry
inside the paper bag. This being the case, she had
no right to attack respondent with her innuendos
which were not merely inquisitive but outrightly
accusatory. By openly accusing respondent as the
only person who went out of the room before the
loss of the jewelry in the presence of all the guests
therein, and ordering that she be immediately bodily
searched, petitioner virtually branded respondent as
the thief. True, petitioner had the right to ascertain
the identity of the malefactor, but to malign
respondent without an iota of proof that she was the
one who actually stole the jewelry is an act which, by
any standard or principle of law is impermissible.
Petitioner had willfully caused injury to respondent in
a manner which is contrary to morals and good
customs. Her firmness and resolve to find her
missing jewelry cannot justify her acts toward
respondent. She did not act with justice and good
faith for apparently, she had no other purpose in
mind but to prejudice respondent. Certainly,
petitioner transgressed the provisions of Article 19 in
relation to Article 21 for which she should be held
accountable.
Arnel P. Bacarra
21) RCPI VS CA
G.R No. L-44748, August 29, 1986
FACTS:
Plaintiff-respondent Loreto Dionela alleges that the
defamatory words on the telegram sent to him not
only wounded his feelings but also caused him
undue embarrassment and affected adversely his
business as well because other people have come
to know of said defamatory words. Defendantcorporation as a defense, alleges that the additional
words in Tagalog was a private joke between the
sending and receiving operators and that they were
not addressed to or intended for plaintiff and
therefore did not form part of the telegram and that
the Tagalog words are not defamatory. The telegram
sent through its facilities was received in its station
at Legaspi City. Nobody other than the operator
manned the teletype machine which automatically
receives telegrams being transmitted. The said
telegram was detached from the machine and
placed inside a sealed envelope and delivered to
plaintiff, obviously as is. The additional words in
Tagalog were never noticed and were included in the
telegram when delivered.
The trial court ruled that in favor of the plaintiff
holding that the liability of petitioner-companyemployer is predicated on Articles 19 and 20 of the
Civil Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision, upon appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner-companyemployer is liable for damages under Articles 19
and 20 of the Civil Code.
HELD: Yes. The cause of action of the private
respondent is based on Arts. 19 and 20 of the New
Civil Code. As well as on respondent's breach of
contract thru the negligence of its own employees.
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the
business of receiving and transmitting messages.
Every time a person transmits a message through
the facilities of the petitioner, a contract is entered
into. Upon receipt of the rate or fee fixed, the
petitioner undertakes to transmit the message
accurately. There is no question that in the case at
bar, libelous matters were included in the message
transmitted, without the consent or knowledge of the
sender. There is a clear case of breach of contract
by the petitioner in adding extraneous and libelous
matters in the message sent to the private
respondent. As a corporation, the petitioner can act
only through its employees. Hence the acts of its
employees in receiving and transmitting messages
are the acts of the petitioner.
20

To hold that the petitioner is not liable directly for the
acts of its employees in the pursuit of petitioner's
business is to deprive the general public availing of
the services of the petitioner of an effective and
adequate remedy. In most cases, negligence must
be proved in order that plaintiff may recover.
However, since negligence may be hard to
substantiate in some cases, we may apply the
doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR (the thing speaks
for itself), by considering the presence of facts or
circumstances surrounding the injury.
The decision is affirmed.
22) MERALCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-39019, January 22, 1988
FACTS:
Petitioner Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a
public utility corporation providing electric power for
the consumption of the general public in Metro
Manila. Petitioner Pedro Yambao is a bill collector of
MERALCO.
Private respondents Isaac Chaves and Juana O.
Chaves, husband and wife, filed the complaint for
damages, together with their children, Isaac Chaves
Jr. and Rosendo Chaves. Isaac Sr. And Isaac Jr. and
Rosendo were members of the Philippine Bar; Isaac
Sr. And Isaac Jr. were practicing lawyers and
Rosendo was a legal officer at the Agricultural
Productivity Commission. Juana O. Chaves was a
public school teacher.
Private respondents became the customer of
petitioner MERALCO in the year 1953. At or about
the end of March, 1965, petitioner Yambao went to
the residence of private respondents and presented
two overdue bills, one for January 11 to February 9,
1965, for the sum of P7.90, and the other for
February 9 to March 10, 1965, for the sum of P7.20.
On April 2, 1965, Isaac Chaves went to the main
office of petitioner but paid only one bill, for January
11 to February 9, 1965, leaving the other bill unpaid.
Thereafter, on April 21, 1965, petitioner caused the
electric service in private respondents residence to
be discontinued and the power line cut off. On the
following day, Rosendo went to petitioners main
office and paid the unpaid bill. The power line was
restored at about 7:00 pm on the same day.
Private respondents filed an action for recovery of
damages for embarrassment, humiliation, wounded
feelings and hurt pride by reason of the
disconnection of their electric service by the
petitioner.
The CFI ordered rendered decision in favor of

private respondent, ordering petitioner to pay private
respondent moral damages, exemplary damages
and attorneys fees.
The Court of Appeal, affirmed in toto the trial courts
decision. Respondent Court stressed the importance
and necessity of 48 hour advance written notification
before the disconnection of service may be effected.
ISSUE: Whether advance written notification
before the disconnection of service may be
effected?
RULING: Yes. Petitioner being a public Utility having
monopoly of the supply of electrical power in Metro
Manila and some nearby municipalities. Being such,
the State may regulate the conditions under which
the manner by which a public utility such as
MERALCO may effect a disconnection of service to
delinquent customer. Among others, a prior written
notice to the customer is required before
disconnection of service. Failure to give such prior
notice amounts to a tort.
23) CUSTUDIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 116100. February 9, 1996.
FACTS:
Herein private respondents owned a parcel of land
wherein a two-storey apartment building was
constituted therein, for this, tenants then were
occupying the latter building. Such property was
surrounded by other immovables (houses) owned by
herein petitioners, Custidio and Santos. Before
reaching the property of the private respondents
from the P. Burgos St. there were two passage ways
in between the said other immovable, but however,
they were only narrow paths.
After sometimes, the petitioners constructed adobe
fence in the first passageway making it narrower in
width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by
defendants Santoses along their property which is
also along the first passageway. Defendant Morato
constructed her adobe fence and even extended
said fence in such a way that the entire passageway
was enclosed. As a result, the tenants left the
apartment because there was no longer a
permanent access -ingress and engress to the
public street.
The private respondents filed an action for the grant
of an easement of right of way. The trial court
ordered the petitioner to give plaintiff permanent
access ingress and egress, to the public street
and that in turn, the private respondent will pay a
21

sum of Php 8000 to the petitioner as an indemnity
for the permanent use of the passageway. On
appeal by the private respondent to the CA, the
latter Court affirmed the decision of the lower court
as to give a right of way to the private respondents
and awarded the latter actual, moral and exemplary
damages. For this, petitioner appealed to the SC
questioning the award of damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award of damages is
proper?
RULING: No. A reading of the decision of the Court
of Appeals will show that the award of damages was
based solely on the fact that the original plaintiff,
Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of
unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the
leased premises by reason of the closure of the
passageway. However, the mere fact that the plaintiff
suffered losses does not give rise to a right to
recover damages. To warrant the recovery of
damages, there must be both a right of action for a
legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage
resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without
damage, or damage without wrong, does not
constitute a cause of action, since damages are
merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury
caused by a breach or wrong. There is a material
distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the
illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss,
hurt, or harm which results from the injury, and
damages are the recompense or compensation
awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can
be damage without injury in those instances in which
the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a
legal duty. These situations are often called damnum
absque injuria. In order that a plaintiff may maintain
an action for the injuries of which he complains, he
must establish that such injuries resulted from a
breach of duty which the defendant owed to the
plaintiff a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and
legal responsibility by the person causing it.
In the case at bar, although there was damage, there
was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of private
respondents, petitioners could not be said to have
violated the principle of abuse of right. In order that
the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21
of the Civil Code can be applied, it is essential that
the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant
should have acted in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts
should be willful; and (3) There was damage or
injury to the plaintiff. The act of petitioners in
constructing a fence within their lot is a valid
exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy. The law

recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and
dispose of a thing, without other limitations than
those established by law. It is within the right of
petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their
property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that
(e)very owner may enclose or fence his land or
tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead
hedges, or by any other means without detriment to
servitudes constituted thereon.
At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot
was not subject to any servitudes. There was no
easement of way existing in favor of private
respondents, either by law or by contract. The fact
that private respondents had no existing right over
the said passageway is confirmed by the very
decision of the trial court granting a compulsory right
of way in their favor after payment of just
compensation. It was only that decision which gave
private respondents the right to use the said
passageway after payment of the compensation and
imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners not to
interfere in the exercise of said right.
24) GASHEM vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 97336. February 19, 1993.
FACTS:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the
assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial
court a complaint for damages against the petitioner
for the alleged violation of their agreement to get
married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is 22
years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good
moral character and reputation duly respected in her
community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an
Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments,
Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student
taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern
Colleges in Dagupan City; that the plaintiff is an
employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette, Fernandez
Avenue, Dagupan City and that the parties
happened to know each other when the Manager of
the Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johnny Rabino
introduced the defendant to the plaintiff; the latter
courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted
his love on the condition that they would get married;
they therefore agreed to get married after the end of
the school semester, which was in October of that
year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's
parents in Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure
their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20
August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with
him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin
22

before she began living with him; as a result of this
live-in relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but
defendant gave her some medicine to abort the
foetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with defendant
and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her
until he told her that he could not do so because he
was already married to a girl in Bacolod City. Private
respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the
petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not
less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual
expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and
costs, and granting her such other relief and
remedies as may be just and equitable.
In his Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner claimed
that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be
married with the private respondent; he neither
sought the consent and approval of her parents nor
forced her to live in his apartment; he did not
maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his
place because he discovered that she had deceived
him by stealing his money and passport.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying
Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered a decision
favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was
thus ordered to pay the latter damages and
attorney's fees.
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings
and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private
respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not
a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who
readily submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner,
through machinations, deceit and false pretenses,
promised to marry private respondent, (d) because
of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed
herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that
deceitful promise, private respondent and her
parents in accordance with Filipino customs and
traditions made some preparations for the
wedding that was to be held at the end of October
1987 by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting
friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f)
petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and
(g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and
who has abused Philippine hospitality, have
offended our sense of morality, good customs,
culture and traditions.
The CA affirmed in toto the trial court's ruling.
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the
instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil
Code applies to the case at bar.
RULING: It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21
is not applicable because he had not committed any
moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or

public policy; he has not professed love or proposed
marriage to the private respondent; and he has
never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for
liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and
culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a
foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino
customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian
Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and
Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had
made a promise to marry, the subsequent failure to
fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of
his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the
Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to
take four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis
thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not
possess good moral character. Moreover, his
controversial "common law wife" is now his legal
wife as their marriage had been solemnized in civil
ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his
unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent,
petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be
pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the private
respondent should also be faulted for consenting to
an illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates
that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he
had professed his love to the private respondent and
had also promised to marry her, such acts would not
be actionable in view of the special circumstances of
the case. The mere breach of promise is not
actionable.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to
marry per se is not an actionable wrong. Congress
deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil
Code the provisions that would have made it so. The
reason therefor is set forth in the report of the
Senate Committee on the Proposed Civil Code, from
which We quote:
"The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That
breach of promise to marry is not actionable has
been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs.
Syquia. The history of breach of promise suits in the
United States and in England has shown that no
other action lends itself more readily to abuse by
designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this
experience which has led to the abolition of rights of
action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of
the American states .."
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a
provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand
the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction
by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to specifically enumerate and
punish in the statute books.
23

Article 2176, of the Civil Code, which defines a
quasi-delict thus:
"Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter." is
limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes
the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict,
known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana,
is a civil law concept while torts is an AngloAmerican or common law concept. Torts is much
broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not
only negligence, but intentional criminal acts as well
such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and
deceit.
In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system
envisioned by the Commission responsible for
drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and
malicious acts with certain exceptions, are to be
governed by the Revised Penal Code while
negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In between these
opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the
absence of Article 21, would have been beyond
redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even
postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of
the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the
scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become
much more supple and adaptable than the AngloAmerican law on torts.
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article
21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a
man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate
cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and
his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter
becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself
unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in
reality, no intention of marrying her and that the
promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive
device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to
obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the
award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not
because of such promise to marry but because of
the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to
her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It
is essential, however, that such injury should have
been committed in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it
was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry
plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and
womanhood to him and to live with him on the
honest and sincere belief that he would keep said

promise, and it was likewise these fraud and
deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's
parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed marriage." In short,
the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the
cherished possession of every single Filipina, not
because of lust but because of moral seduction
the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its
example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not
be held liable for criminal seduction punished under
either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal
Code because the private respondent was above
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
seduction.
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's
alternative proposition to the effect that granting, for
argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the
private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at
fault. According to him, both parties are in pari
delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil
Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs.
Marcos, the private respondent cannot recover
damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as
far as stating that if the private respondent had
"sustained any injury or damage in their relationship,
it is primarily because of her own doing."
These statements reveal the true character and
motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a
condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the
private respondent on account of the latter's ignoble
birth, inferior educational background, poverty and,
as perceived by him, dishonorable employment.
Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not
at all moved by good faith and an honest motive.
Marrying with a woman so circumstanced could not
have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his
profession of love and promise to marry were empty
words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile
and deceive the poor woman into believing that
indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his
life partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he
wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed
that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of
marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease
and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's
concept of morality and so brazenly defied the
traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It
can even be said that the petitioner committed such
deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of
the Civil Code which directs every person to act with
justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty
and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his obligations.
24

No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of
our laws, customs and traditions. The pari delicto
rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the
private respondent may not have been impelled by
the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to
the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but
because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent
that she had qualms of conscience about the entire
episode for as soon as she found out that the
petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she
left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the
petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a
similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal
fault." At most, it could be conceded that she is
merely in delicto.
We should stress, however, that while We find for
the private respondent, let it not be said that this
Court condones the deplorable behavior of her
parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together
in the same room in their house after giving approval
to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to
protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon
them the higher values of morality and dignity.
District, the intended demolition did not take place

following talks between petitioner Rellosa and
counsel who pleaded that the demolition be
suspended since the order sought to be
implemented was not yet final and executory. On 11
December 1989, respondents filed their appeal
contesting the order of the Office of the Building
Official. On 12 December 1989, petitioners once
again hired workers and proceeded with the
demolition of respondents' houses.
Respondents filed Civil Case before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, praying that petitioners be
ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages, as
well as attorneys fees, for the untimely demolition of
the houses.
The RTC dismissed the complaint of respondents
and instead ordered them to pay petitioners moral
damages.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
trial court and ordered petitioners to pay
respondents of moral damages, exemplary damages
and Attorney's fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a premature
demolition
25) RELLOSA vs. PELLOSIS

G.R. No. 138964 August 9, 2001.
FACTS:
Respondents were lessees of a parcel of land,
owned by one Marta Reyes, located at Malate,
Manila. Respondents had built their houses on the
land which, over the years, underwent continuous
improvements. After the demise of Marta, the land
was inherited by her son Victor Reyes. Sometime in
1986, Victor informed respondents that, for being
lessees of the land for more than twenty (20) years,
they would have a right of first refusal to buy the
land. Sometime in the early part of 1989, without the
knowledge of respondents, the land occupied by
them was sold to petitioner Cynthia Ortega who was
able to ultimately secure title to the property in her
name.
On 31 May 1989, respondents filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila a suit for the
"Declaration of Nullity of the Sale," made in favor of
petitioner Cynthia Ortega predicated upon their right
of first refusal.
The Office of the Building Official issued a resolution
ordering the demolition of the houses of
respondents. The following day Cynthia Ortega,
together with her father and co-petitioner, Vicente
Rellosa, hired workers to commence the demolition
of respondents' houses. Due to the timely
intervention of a mobile unit of the Western Police
RULING: The Court upheld the decision of the Court

of Appeals that there was a premature demolition.
Hence, the petitioners should pay damages to the
lessees.
A right is a power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed
under a constitution, statute or decisional law, or
recognized as a result of long usage, constitutive of
a legally enforceable claim of one person against
another.
The exercise of these rights is not without limitations.
The abuse of rights rule established in Article 19 of
the Civil Code requires every person to act with
justice, to give everyone his due; and to observe
honesty and good faith. When a right is exercised in
a manner which discards these norms resulting in
damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for
which the actor can be held accountable.
At the time petitioners implemented the order of
demolition, barely five days after respondents
received a copy thereof, the same was not yet final
and executory. The law provided for a fifteen-day
appeal period in favor of a party aggrieved by an
adverse ruling of the Office of the Building Official
but by the precipitate action of petitioners in
demolishing the houses of respondents (prior to the
expiration of the period to appeal), the latter were
effectively deprived of this recourse. The fact that
the order of demolition was later affirmed by the
Department of Public Works and Highways was of
25

no moment. The action of petitioners up to the point
where they were able to secure an order of
demolition was not condemnable but implementing
the order unmindful of the right of respondents to
contest the ruling was a different matter and could
only be held utterly indefensible.
Digested by: Baet, Mark
This prompted PHIBRO to file an action for damages

with application for injunction against NAPOCOR
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, Makati City.
In its complaint, PHIBRO alleged that NAPOCOR's
act of disqualifying it in the October 1987 bidding
and in all subsequent biddings was tainted with
malice and bad faith.
26) NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION

PHILIPP BROTHERS OCEANIC, INC.
G.R. No. 126204, November 20, 2001
vs.
ISSUE: Whether or not NAPOCOR abused its right

or acted unjustly in disqualifying PHIBRO from the
public bidding.
FACTS:
On May 14, 1987, the National Power Corporation
(NAPOCOR) issued invitations to bid for the supply
and delivery of 120,000 metric tons of imported coal
for its Batangas Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant in
Calaca, Batangas. The Philipp Brothers Oceanic,
Inc. (PHIBRO) prequalified and was allowed to
participate as one of the bidders. After the public
bidding was conducted, PHIBRO's bid was
accepted. NAPOCOR's acceptance was conveyed
in a letter dated July 8, 1987, which was received by
PHIBRO on July 15, 1987.
On July 10, 1987, PHIBRO sent word to NAPOCOR
that industrial disputes might soon plague Australia,
the shipment's point of origin, which could seriously
hamper PHIBRO's ability to supply the needed coal.
From July 23 to July 31, 1987, PHIBRO again
apprised NAPOCOR of the situation in Australia,
particularly informing the latter that the ship owners
therein are not willing to load cargo unless a "strikefree" clause is incorporated in the charter party or
the contract of carriage. In order to hasten the
transfer of coal, PHIBRO proposed to NAPOCOR
that they equally share the burden of a "strike-free"
clause. NAPOCOR refused.
On August 6, 1987, PHIBRO received from
NAPOCOR a confirmed and workable letter of credit.
Instead of delivering the coal on or before the
thirtieth day after receipt of the Letter of Credit, as
agreed upon by the parties in the July contract,
PHIBRO effected its first shipment only on
November 17, 1987.
Consequently, in October 1987, NAPOCOR once
more advertised for the delivery of coal to its Calaca
thermal plant. PHIBRO participated anew in this
subsequent bidding. On November 24, 1987,
NAPOCOR disapproved PHIBRO's application for
pre-qualification to bid for not meeting the minimum
requirements. Upon further inquiry, PHIBRO found
that the real reason for the disapproval was its
purported failure to satisfy NAPOCOR's demand for
damages due to the delay in the delivery of the first
coal shipment.
RULING: No. NAPOCOR was not bound under any

contract to approve PHIBRO's pre-qualification
requirements. In fact, NAPOCOR had expressly
reserved its right to reject bids as provided in its
Instruction to Bidders found in the "Post-Qualification
Documents/Specifications for the Supply and
Delivery of Coal for the Batangas Coal-Fired
Thermal Power Plant I.
27) FRENZEL vs. CATITO
G.R. No. 143958, July 11, 2003
FACTS:
Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen
of German descent who was married to Teresita
Santos, a Filipino citizen. He works as a pilot for
New Guinea Airlines. On the other hand, private
respondent Ederlina P. Catito was married to Klaus
Muller, a German national. She worked as a
masseuse in the Kings Cross nightclub in Sydney,
Australia. The two met when Alfred went on a
vacation in Sydney. They met again and this time,
Alfred was able to convince Ederlina to stop working
and to go back to the Philippines. When she
returned to the Philippines, she was given money by
Alfred to put up a beauty salon. Later on, he also
gave money to her to be able to purchase a house
and lot in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City.
But since he was aware that aliens were prohibited
to purchase lands, he agreed to have Ederlina as
the sole vendee. Later also, they opened two bank
accounts with the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation in Kowloon, Hong Kong. Also, there
were subsequent purchases of other real and
personal properties. These were made on the
anticipation on the part of Alfred that he and Ederlina
will get married soon. However, this failed to
materialize because of the fact that Ederlina was still
married to Klaus. Ederlina failed to secure a divorce
from Klaus. This exasperated Alfred and eventually
their relationship started to fade. Later on, Alfred
filed a complaint before the RTC of Davao City for
26

recovery of real and personal properties. He
demanded from Ederlina that she return all the
money that were used to purchase the properties
and also the properties which were bought,
especially the house and lot and three other lots.
However, the complaint of Alfred was dismissed by
the RTC. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the RTC in toto.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alfred is entitled to
recover the said properties?
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.
The contention of petitioner Frenzel that to bar him
from recovering the properties would be in violation
of Article 22 of the Civil Code on unjust enrichment
did not hold water. It must be remembered that a
contract which violates the Constitution and the laws
is void and vests no rights and creates no
obligations. It does not produce any legal effect. His
reliance on Article 22 is misplaced because in this
case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or
the parties are in pari delicto. This is founded on the
general principles of public policy. It must be
remembered that Alfred knew all along that he was
disqualified from purchasing lands. His contention
that he entered into the transaction because he was
expecting that he and Ederlina will get married in the
future is not a valid one. He also knew that he
cannot get married to Ederlina because he still had a
valid existing marriage with Teresita Santos.
28) REYES vs. LIM
G.R. No. 134241, August 11, 2003
FACTS:
Petitoner Reyes and private respondent Lim entered
into a Contract to sell a parcel of land located in F.B.
Harrison, St. The parties stipulated that Lim shall
pay a down payment of P10 Million of the P28
Million purchase price. On one hand, Reyes shall
ensure that the lessee of the property, Harrison
Lumber, shall have vacated the lot upon payment of
the balance.
The day to consummate the contract arrived
however Harrison Lumber has still not vacated the
land. Worse, Lim found out that Reyes had already
sold the lot to Line One Food Corporation.
Aggrieved, Lim filed an action for specific
performance and nullification of the subsequent
contract of sale plus damages. The trial court and
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Lim.
Hence, the present petition. Reyes primarily
contends that the CA erred in affirming the RTC
Decision when it was based on equity. Petitioner

argues that it is Rule 57 to 61 of the Rules on Civil
Procedure which should be applied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of
petitioner is tenable.
RULING: According to the Supreme Court, the case
involves an issue left unanswerable due to silence or
insufficiency of the law and the rules of court. At this
instance, Article 9 of the Civil Code expressly
mandates the Court to make a ruling despite the
silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law. This
calls for equity which fills open spaces in the law.
Before rescission of the contract can be had, the
parties must be restored to their status quo ante.
This was ordered by the Court.
To rule otherwise would improve Reyes to the
detriment of Lim contrary to Article 22 of the Civil
Code which provides that no person shall unjustly
enrich himself at the expense of another. Article 22
applies to substantive as well as procedural
remedies.
Therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed.
29) NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY vs.
MADRIGAL WAN HAI LINES CORPORATION
G.R. No. 148332, September 30, 2003
FACTS:
The National Development Company, petitioner, is a
government-owned and controlled corporation.
petitioners Board of Directors approved the
privatization plan of the NSCP. In May 1993, the
Board offered for sale to the public its one hundred
percent (100%) stock ownership in NSCP as well as
its three (3) ocean-going vessels (M/V National
Honor, M/V National Pride and M/V National
Dignity).
Consequently, petitioner released to the public an
Information
Package
containing
NSCPs
background, assets, operational and financial status.
During the public bidding the lone bidder was herein
respondent, Madrigal Wan Hai Lines Corporation, a
domestic private corporation. Mr. Willie J. Uy,
respondents Consultant, submitted a bid of $15
million through the Proposal Letter Form.
The respondents bid was rejected by petitioner and
the Commission on Audit.
But since there was no other bidder, petitioner
entered into a negotiated sale with respondent. After
several negotiations, respondent increased its offer
to $18.5 million which was accepted by petitioner.
27

Accordingly, petitioner issued a Notice of Award to
respondent of the sale of the NSCP shares and
vessels for $18.5 million.petitioner and respondent
executed the corresponding Contract of Sale, and
the latter acquired NSCP, its assets, personnel,
records and its three (3) vessels.
After a while, respondent was surprised to receive
from the US Department of Treasury, Internal
Revenue Service (US IRS), a Notice of Final
Assessment against NSCP for deficiency taxes on
gross transportation income derived from US
sources for the years ending 1990, 1991 and 1992.
Anxious that the delay in the payment of the
deficiency taxes may hamper its shipping operations
overseas, assumed and paid petitioners tax
liabilities, including the tax due for the year
1993.Eventually, respondent demanded from
petitioner reimbursement for the amounts it paid to
the US IRS. But petitioner refused despite repeated
demands.
Hence, respondent filed with the
Regional Trial Court complaint against petitioner for
reimbursement and damages
the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondent
and against petitioner. The trial court found, among
others, that even before the sale, petitioner knew
that NSCP had tax liabilities with the US IRS, yet it
did not inform respondent about it.
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision affirming the trial courts judgment with
modification. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is legally bound to
reimburse respondent for the amounts it paid
corresponding to the formers tax liabilities to the US
IRS.
HELD:
The case at bar calls to mind the principle of unjust
enrichment Nemo cum alterius detrimento
locupletari potest. No person shall be allowed to
enrich himself unjustly at the expense of others.
This principle of equity has been enshrined in our
Civil Code, Article 22 of which provides:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act or
performance by another or by any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at
the expense of the latter without just or legal ground,
shall return the same to him.
Justice and equity thus oblige that petitioner be held
liable for NSCPs tax liabilities and reimburse
respondent for the amounts it paid. It would be
unjust enrichment on the part of petitioner to be
relieved of that obligation.
DIGEST BY: JIHAN A.M. BANOCAG

30) ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES,
ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY
BEDENIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984
FACTS:
That on or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00
o'clock in the morning, in the municipality of Jose
Panganiban, province of Camarines Norte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above- named accused, Roy
Padilla, Filomeno Galdones, Pepito Bedenia, Yolly
Rico, David Bermundo, Villanoac, Roberto Rosales,
Villania, Romeo Garrido, Jose Ortega, Jr., Ricardo
Celestino, Realingo alias Kamlon, John Doe alias
Tato, and Fourteen Richard Does, by confederating
and mutually helping one another, and acting without
any authority of law, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously, by means of threats,
force and violence prevent Antonio Vergara and his
family to close their stall located at the Public
Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte, and by subsequently forcibly
opening the door of said stall and thereafter brutally
demolishing and destroying said stall and the
furnitures therein by axes and other massive
instruments, and carrying away the goods, wares
and merchandise, to the damage and prejudice of
the said Antonio Vergara and his family in the
amount of P30,000.00 in concept of actual or
compensatory and moral damages, and further the
sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
That in committing the offense, the accused took
advantage of their public positions: Roy Padilla,
being the incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest
of the accused being policemen, except Ricardo
Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte, and that it was committed with
evident premeditation.
The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte,
rendered a decision finding the accused guilty.
The petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction
to the Court of Appeals. the Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower court decision but with
modification
hence this petition.
ISSUE: whether or not the respondent court
committed a reversible error in requiring the
petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants
after acquitting them from the criminal charge.
28

HELD:
The extinction of the civil action by reason of
acquittal in the criminal case refers exclusively to
civil liability ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code. (Elcano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 98;
Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472). In other words, the
civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal
of the accused is the civil liability arising from the act
as a crime.
Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds
from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil might arise did not exist. In other
cases, the person entitled to the civil action may
institute it in the Jurisdiction and in the manner
provided by law against the person who may be
liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or
indemnity for the damage suffered.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of
the accused for damages only when it includes a
declaration that the facts from which the civil might
arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not
extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil.
286) as only preponderance of evidence is required
in civil cases; where the court expressly declares
that the liability of the accused is not criminal but
only civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558;
People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the
felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief
committed by certain relatives who thereby incur
only civil liability (See Art. 332, Revised Penal
Code); and, where the civil liability does not arise
from or is not based upon the criminal act of which
the accused was acquitted (Castro v. Collector of
Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado,
Remedial Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623).
Article 29 of the Civil Code also provides that:
When the accused in a criminal prosecution is
acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for
damages for the same act or omission may be
instituted.
Such
action
requires
only
a
preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the
defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a
bond to answer for damages in case the complaint
should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is
based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so
declare. In the absence of any declaration to that
effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision
whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision
in the rendition of a judgment of acquittal and a
judgment awarding damages in the same criminal
action. The two can stand side by side. A judgment

of acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal
liability. It does not, however, extinguish the civil
liability unless there is clear showing that the act
from which civil liability might arise did not exist.
A separate civil action may be warranted where
additional facts have to be established or more
evidence must be adduced or where the criminal
case has been fully terminated and a separate
complaint would be just as efficacious or even more
expedient than a timely remand to the trial court
where the criminal action was decided for further
hearings on the civil aspects of the case. The
offended party may, of course, choose to file a
separate action. These do not exist in this case.
Considering moreover the delays suffered by the
case in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it
would be unjust to the complainants in this case to
require at this time a separate civil action to be filed.
With this in mind, we therefore hold that the
respondent Court of Appeals did not err in awarding
damages despite a judgment of acquittal.
WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the decision of
the respondent Court of Appeals and dismiss the
petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
29

III. PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
31) DONATO VS. LUNA
160 SCRA 441
FACTS:
Paz Abayan filed an information for Bigamy against
petitioner Leonilo Donato. She also filed with the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court a civil action
for declaration of nullity of marriage to petitioner
because of a prior marriage of petitioner. In his
answer petitioner claimed that his 2nd marriage was
void because it was solemnized without a valid
marriage license and that violence, intimation and
undue influence were employed by Paz to obtain his
consent.
Prior to the date set for the trial of the criminal case,
petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings
of the case because the civil action raises a
prejudicial question which must first be determined
before the criminal case can proceed.
ISSUE:
Does a criminal case for bigamy suspend the civil
case of annulment of marriage on the ground that
the latter constitutes a prejudicial question?
HELD:
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain
in the case at bar. I must be noted that the issue
before the JDRC touching upon the nullity of the
second marriage is not determinative of petitioner
Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy.
Furthermore, it was petitioner's 2nd wife, the herein
private respondent Paz Abayan who filed the
complaint for annulment of the 2nd marriage on the
ground that her consent was obtained through
deceit.
He who contracts a 2nd marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of first marriage assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
32) RICARDO QUIAMBAO vs. HON. ADRIANO
OSORIO
G.R. No. L-48157, March 16, 1988
FACTS:
In a complaint for forcible entry filed by herein
private respondents Zenaida Gaza Buensucero,
Justina Gaza Bernardo and Felipe Gaza against
herein petitioner Ricardo Quiambao before the then
Municipal Court of Malabon, Rizal,it was alleged that
private respondents were the legitimate possessors
of a 30,835 sq. m. lot known as Lot No. 4, Block 12,
Bca 2039 of the Longos Estate situated at Barrio

Longos, Malabon Rizal, by virtue of the Agreement
to Sell No. 3482 executed in their favor by the former
Land Tenure Administration ; that under cover of
darkness, petitioner surreptitiously and by force,
intimidation, strategy and stealth, entered into a 400
sq. m. portion thereof, placed bamboo posts "staka"
over said portion and thereafter began the
construction of a house thereon;
After hearing, the municipal court denied the motion
to dismiss. It ruled that inasmuch as the issue
involved in the case was the recovery of physical
possession, the court had jurisdiction to try and hear
the case.
Dissatisfied with this ruling, petitioner filed before the
then Court of First Instance of Rizal, a petition for
certiorari with injunction against public respondent
Judge and private respondents, praying for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction ordering
respondent judge to suspend the hearing in the
ejectment case until after the resolution of said
petition
Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the
petition, maintaining that the administrative case did
not constitute a prejudicial question as it involved the
question of ownership, unlike the ejectment case
which involved merely the question of possession.
Meanwhile, the Land Authority filed an Urgent
Motion for Leave to Intervene in Civil Case No. C1576 alleging the pendency of an administrative
case between the same parties on the same subject
matter and praying that the petition for certiorari be
granted, the ejectment complaint be dismissed and
the Office of the Land Authority be allowed to decide
the matter exclusively.
ISSUE:
whether or not the administrative case between the
private parties involving the lot subject matter of the
ejectment case constitutes a prejudicial question
which would operate as a bar to said ejectment
case.
HELD:
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that
which arises in a case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case
and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal.The doctrine of prejudicial question comes
into play generally in a situation where civil and
criminal actions are pending and the issues involved
in both cases are similar or so closely related that an
issue must be pre-emptively resolved in the civil
case before the criminal action can proceed. Thus,
the existence of a prejudicial question in a civil case
30

is alleged in the criminal case to cause the
suspension of the latter pending final determination
of the former.
The essential elements of a prejudicial question as
provided under Section 5, Rule 111 of the Revised
Rules of Court are: [a] the civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue in the
criminal action; and [b] the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
The actions involved in the case at bar being
respectively civil and administrative in character, it is
obvious that technically, there is no prejudicial
question to speak of. Equally apparent, however, is
the intimate correlation between said two [2]
proceedings, stemming from the fact that the right of
private respondents to eject petitioner from the
disputed portion depends primarily on the resolution
of the pending administrative case. For while it may
be true that private respondents had prior
possession of the lot in question, at the time of the
institution of the ejectment case, such right of
possession had been terminated, or at the very
least, suspended by the cancellation by the Land
Authority of the Agreement to Sell executed in their
favor. Whether or not private respondents can
continue to exercise their right of possession is but a
necessary, logical consequence of the issue
involved in the pending administrative case assailing
the validity of the cancellation of the Agreement to
Sell and the subsequent award of the disputed
portion to petitioner. If the cancellation of the
Agreement to Sell and the subsequent award to
petitioner are voided, then private respondents
would have every right to eject petitioner from the
disputed area. Otherwise, private respondent's light
of possession is lost and so would their right to eject
petitioner from said portion.
Faced with these distinct possibilities, the more
prudent course for the trial court to have taken is to
hold the ejectment proceedings in abeyance until
after a determination of the administrative case.
Indeed, logic and pragmatism, if not jurisprudence,
dictate such move. To allow the parties to undergo
trial notwithstanding the possibility of petitioner's
right of possession being upheld in the pending
administrative case is to needlessly require not only
the parties but the court as well to expend time,
effort and money in what may turn out to be a sheer
exercise in futility. Thus, 1 Am Jur 2d tells us:
The court in which an action is pending may, in the
exercise of a sound discretion, upon proper
application for a stay of that action, hold the action in
abeyance to abide the outcome of another pending
in another court, especially where the parties and
the issues are the same, for there is power inherent

in every court to control the disposition of causes on
its dockets with economy of time and effort for itself,
for counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights parties
to the second action cannot be properly determined
until the questions raised in the first action are
settled the second action should be stayed.
While this rule is properly applicable to instances
involving two [2] court actions, the existence in the
instant case of the same considerations of Identity of
parties and issues, economy of time and effort for
the court, the counsels and the parties as well as the
need to resolve the parties' right of possession
before the ejectment case may be properly
determined, justifies the rule's analogous application
to the case at bar.
If a pending civil case may be considered to be in
the nature of a prejudicial question to an
administrative case, We see no reason why the
reverse may not be so considered in the proper
case, such as in the petition at bar.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED. Civil Case No. 2526 of the then
Municipal Court of Malabon, Rizal is hereby ordered
DISMISSED. No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
33) ISABELO APA, MANUEL APA and LEONILO
JACALAN vs. HON. RUMOLDO R. FERNANDEZ,
HON. CELSO V. ESPINOSA, and SPS.
FELIXBERTO TIGOL, JR. and ROSITA TAGHOY
TIGOL
G.R. No. 112381 March 20, 1995
FACTS:
the above-named accused [herein petitioners
Isabelo Apa, Manuel Apa and Dionisio Jacalan],
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with
one another, without the knowledge and consent of
the owner, ROSITA TIGOL, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take advantage of
the absence or tolerance of the said owner by
occupying or possessing a portion of her real
property, Lot No. 3635-B. whereon they constructed
their respective residential houses against the will of
Rosita Tigol, which acts of the said accused have
deprived the latter of the use of a portion of her land,
to her damage and prejudice because despite
repeated demands the said accused failed and
refused, as they still fail and refuse to vacate the
premises above-mentioned.
Petitioners moved for the suspension of their
arraignment on the ground that there was a
31

prejudicial question pending resolution in another
case being tried in Branch 27 of the same court. The
case, docketed as Civil Case No. 2247-L and
entitled "Anselmo Taghoy and Vicente Apa versus
Felixberto Tigol, Jr. and Rosita T. Tigol, et al.,"
concerns the ownership of Lot No. 3635-B. 1 In that
case, petitioners seek a declaration of the nullity of
TCT No. 13250 of Rosita T. Tigol and the partition of
the lot in question among them and private
respondent Rosita T. Tigol as heirs of Filomeno and
Rita Taghoy. The case had been filed in 1990 by
petitioners, three years before May 27, 1993 when
the criminal case for squatting was filed against
them.
the trial court denied the petitioners' motion and
proceeded with their arraignment. Petitioners,
therefore, had to enter their plea (not guilty) to the
charge.
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but their
motion was denied by the court in its order dated
September 21, 1993. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
whether the question of ownership of Lot No. 3635B, which was pending, in Civil Case No. 2247-L, is a
prejudicial question justifying suspension of the
proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners.
HELD:
We hold that it is.
A prejudicial question is a question which is based
on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that its resolution is
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. To justify suspension of the criminal action,
it must appear not only that the civil case involves
facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution is based but also that the
decision of the issue or issues raised in the civil case
would be decisive of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. 2 Rule 111, 5 provides:
Sec. 6. Elements of prejudicial question. The two
(2) essential elements of a prejudicial questions are:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal
action; and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
In the criminal case, the question is whether
petitioners occupied a piece of land not belonging to
them but to private respondent and against the
latter's will. As already noted, the information alleges
that "without the knowledge and consent of the
owner, ROSITA TIGOL" petitioners occupied or took
possession of a portion of "her property" by building
their houses thereon and "deprived [her] of the use

of portion of her land to her damage and prejudice.
Now the ownership of the land in question, known as
Lot 3635-B of the Opon cadastre covered by TCT
No. 13250, is the issue in Civil Case 2247-L now
pending in Branch 27 of the RTC at Lapulapu City.
The resolution, therefore, of this question would
necessarily be determinative of petitioners criminal
liability for squatting.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and
respondent judge is ordered to SUSPEND the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 012489 until the
question of ownership in Civil Case No. 2247-L has
been resolved with finality and thereafter proceed
with the trial of the criminal case if the civil case is
decided
and
terminated
adversely against
petitioners. Otherwise he should dismiss the criminal
case.
SO ORDERED.
34) BELTRAN VS. PEOPLE
334 SCRA 106
FACTS:
Petitioner Maynardo Beltran and Charmaiene Felix
were married on June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate
Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City.
After 24 years of marriage and four children,
petitioner filed, in the RTC of Quezon City, Br. 87, a
petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code. In her Answer to said petition,
petitioners wife alleged that it was petitioner who
abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a
certain woman named Milagros Salting. She then
filed a criminal case for concubinage against
petitioner and his paramour before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Makati, Br. 61. Petitioner, in order to
forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed
a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the
Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal
case. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil
case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a
prejudicial question to the determination of the
criminal case. Judge Alden Cervantes denied the
motion, so was with a Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner then went to the RTC of Makati, on
certiorari , questioning the Orders issued by Judge
Cervantes. The RTC denied the petition also a
Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
32

Does the declaration of nullity of marriage a
prejudicial question in a criminal case for
concubinage?
HELD:
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial
question is to avoid conflicting decisions. It has two
(2) essential elements: a) the civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the criminal action; and b) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed.
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of
petitioners marriage is not a prejudicial question to
the concubinage case. For a civil case to be
considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to
cause the suspension of the latter pending the final
determination of the civil case, it must appear not
only that the said civil case involves the same facts
upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.
In DOMINGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS ( 226 SCRA
572) , the SC ruled that the import of Article 40 of the
Family Code is that for purposes of remarriage, the
only legally acceptable bases for declaring a
previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void,
whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage,
other evidence is acceptable.
So, that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like
the herein petitioner need not present a final
judgment declaring his marriage void for he can
adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of
his marriage other than proof of a final judgment
declaring his marriage void for he can adduce
evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his
marriage other than proof of a final judgment
declaring his marriage void.
With regard to petitioners argument that he could be
acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his
marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state
that even a subsequent pronouncement that his
marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense.
Analogous to this case is that of LANDICHO VS.
RELOVA ( 22 SCRA 731), cited in DONATO VS.
LUNA (160 SCRA 441), where the SC held that: xxx
Assuming that the first marriage was null and void
on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would
not be material to the outcome of the criminal case.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to
judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of the competent courts
and only when the nullity of the marriage is so

declared can it be held as void, and so long as there
is no such declaration the presumption is that the
marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.
Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that
parties to the marriage should not be permitted to
judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of the competent courts
and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there
is no such declaration the presumption is that the
marriage exists for all intents and purposes.
Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his
wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not
erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency of a
civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a
prejudicial question in a criminal case of
concubinage
35) SPOUSES ANTONIO S. PAHANG and LOLITA
T. PAHANG vs. HON. AUGUSTINE A. VESTIL,
Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court- Branch
56, Mandaue City, DEPUTY SHERIFF, Regional
Trial Court-Branch 56 and METROPOLITAN
BANK and TRUST COMPANY
G.R. No. 148595, July 12, 2004
FACTS:
the petitioners, Spouses Antonio and Lolita Pahang,
received a short-term loan of one million five
hundred thousand pesos (P1,500,000.00) from the
respondent Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company.
The loan was covered by Non-Negotiable
Promissory Note and was, likewise, secured by a
real estate mortgage on a parcel of land covered .
As the petitioners failed to pay the loan, the interest
and the penalties due thereon, the respondent
foreclosed the real estate mortgage extrajudicially.
As a consequence, the mortgaged property was sold
at public auction to the respondent bank as the
highest bidder. A certificate of sale was executed by
Ex-Officio Sheriff in favor of the respondent and was
registered with the Register of Deeds.
the respondent wrote the petitioners that the oneyear redemption period of the property would expire
on January 27, 1999. Instead of redeeming the
property, the petitioners filed, a complaint for
33

annulment of extrajudicial sale against the
respondent bank and the Sheriff.
After the expiration of the one-year redemption
period, the respondent consolidated its ownership
over the foreclosed property. Consequently, TCT No.
44668 was issued by the Register of Deeds in its
name. On July 23, 1999, the respondent filed a
Petition for Writ of Possession.
ISSUE:
whether or not the complaint of the petitioners in
Civil Case No. MAN-3454 for annulment of
extrajudicial sale is a prejudicial question to the
petition of the respondent bank for the issuance of a
writ of possession in LRC Case No.
HELD:
The contentions of the petitioners have no merit.
A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. It generally comes into
play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal
action are both pending and there exists in the
former an issue that must be preemptively resolved
before the criminal action may proceed, because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is
resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of
the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial
question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.
In the present case, the complaint of the petitioners
for Annulment of Extrajudicial Sale is a civil action
and the respondents petition for the issuance of a
writ of possession of Lot No. 3-A, Block 1, Psd-07021410, TCT No. 44668 is but an incident in the land
registration case and, therefore, no prejudicial
question can arise from the existence of the two
actions.
It bears stressing that the proceedings in a petition
and/or motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession, after the lapse of the statutory period for
redemption, is summary in nature.The trial court is
mandated to issue a writ of possession upon a
finding of the lapse of the statutory period for
redemption without the redemptioner having
redeemed the property. It cannot be validly argued
that the trial court abused its discretion when it
merely complied with its ministerial duty to issue the
said writ of possession.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
DENIED DUE COURSE. The assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Cost against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
36) ABACAN vs. NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY,

INC
G.R. No. 140777. April 8, 2005
FACTS:
Two opposing factions within respondent
Northwestern University, Inc. (NUI), the Castro and
the Nicolas factions, seek control as the legitimate
board thereof. These two factions are parties to
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Case
No. 12-96-5469, which is an action filed by the
Nicolas faction to nullify the election of the directors
of NUI belonging to the Castro faction and SEC
Case No. 12-96-5511 which is a counter-suit initiated
by the Castro faction seeking the nullification of
several board resolutions passed by the Nicolas
faction.
On December 19, 1996, SEC Hearing
Officer Rolando G. Andaya, Jr., issued an Order
authorizing the Castro faction and the Metropolitan
Bank Laoag City branch to withdraw the amount of
P2.5M from the account of NUI with said bank.
Metrobank thru Petitioner Abacan, complied and
released P1.4 M in favor of the Castro faction. The
Nicolas faction then initiated a criminal complaint
for estafa against the Castro faction as well as the
petitioners herein who are officers of Metrobank,
however the criminal case was later dismissed
insofar as petitioners are concerned.
Nicolas faction filed a suit for damages
against Castro faction and petitioner on the ground
that the corporate funds of NUI deposited with said
bank in the sum of P1.4 M was withdrawn without
the knowledge, consent or approval of NUI to the
grave and serious damage and prejudice of the
latter.
Marieta Y. Palanca filed a motion to dismiss
alleging that SEC Case No. 12-96-5469 must take
precedence over the civil case since it is a logical
antecedent to the issue of standing in said case.
Petitioners then prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint in Civil Case No. 11296-14 against them,
or in the alternative, to hold in abeyance the
proceedings therein until after the final determination
of SEC Case No. 12-96-5469. However, NUI avers
that the rule on prejudicial question finds no
application between the civil complaint below and
the case before the SEC as the rule presupposes
the pendency of a civil action and a criminal action;
and even assuming arguendo that the issues
pending before the SEC bear a similarity to the
cause of action below, the complaint of NUI can
stand and proceed separately from the SEC case
34

inasmuch as there is no identity in the reliefs prayed
for.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is prejudicial question
in this case.
RULING:
Yes. Considering the rationale behind the
principle of prejudicial question, being to avoid two
conflicting decisions, prudence dictates that we
apply the principle underlying the doctrine to the
case at bar.
A prejudicial question is that which arises in
a case, the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.
The prejudicial question must be determinative of
the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try
and resolve it must be lodged in another court or
tribunal.
In the case at bar, the question of which
between the Castro and the Nicolas factions are the
de jure board of directors of NUI is lodged before the
SEC. The complaint before the RTC of Laoag
meanwhile alleges that petitioners, together with
their co-defendants, comprised of the Castro
faction, wrongfully withdrew the amount of P1.4 M
from the account of NUI with Metrobank. Moreover,
whether or not Roy Nicolas of the Nicolas faction is
a duly elected member of the Board of NUI and thus
with capacity to institute the herein complaint in
behalf of the NUI depends on the findings of the
SEC in the case pending before it. It would finally
determine whether Castro, et al. legally withdrew the
subject amount from the bank and whether Nicolas
lawfully initiated the complaint in behalf of herein
respondent NUI. It is petitioners claim, and we
agree, that the presence or absence of their liability
for allowing the withdrawal of P1.4 M from the
account of NUI with Metrobank in favor of the
Castro faction is reliant on the findings of the SEC
as to which of the two factions is the de jure board.
Since the determination of the SEC as to which of
the two factions is the de jure board of NUI is crucial
to the resolution of the case before the RTC. Hence,
the trial court should suspend its proceedings until
the SEC comes out with its findings.
35

IV. CIVIL PERSONALITY
37) Antonio Gelus v. Court of Appeals
No. L-16439. July 20, 1961
Doctrine: Since an action for pecuniary damages on
account of personal injury or death pertains primarily
to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action
for such damages could be instituted on behalf of
the unborn child on account of the injuries it
received, no such right of action could deliberately
accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause
of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child,
the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death,
since no transmission to anyone can take place from
one that lacked of juridical personality under Article
40 of the Civil Code, which expressly limits such
provisional personality by imposing the condition that
the child should be subsequently alive.
Reyes, JBL, J.
FACTS: Nita Villanueva came to know the petitioner,
a physician, for the first time in 1948 through her
aunt Paula Yambot. The said physician made three
abortions on Villanueva on the following
circumstances: (1) In 1950, when she became
pregnant by her present husband, Oscar Lazo,
before they were legally married, and she deisred to
conceal her pregnancy from her parents; (2) after
their marriage, her second pregnancy proved to be
inconvenient as she was then working for the
COMELEC; and lastly (3) on February 21, 1955
she was aborted of a 2-month old fetus for the
amount of P50.00.
Upon knowing of the last abortion, Lazo filed
a complaint for damages against Geluz, claiming
that he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the
abortion.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Lazo
and against Geluz, ordering the latter to pay
P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 attorney's fees and
the costs of the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
sustained the award.
ISSUE: W/N the award of damages was proper.
HELD: NO. the Court of Appeals and the trial court
predicated the award of damages in the sum of
P3,000.06 upon the provisions of the initial
paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. This the Court believes to be error, for
the said article, in fixing a minimum award of
P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover
the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed

with personality; being incapable of having rights
and obligations.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on
account of personal injury or death pertains primarily
to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action
for such damages could be instituted on behalf of
the unborn child on account of the injuries it
received, no such right of action could deliberately
accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause
of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child,
the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death,
since no transmission to anyone can take place from
one that lacked of juridical personality under Article
40 of the Civil Code, which expressly limits such
provisional personality by imposing the condition that
the child should be subsequently alive.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
have not found any basis for an award of moral
damages, evidently because of Lazos indifference
to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by
the petitioner herein, clearly indicates that he was
unconcerned with the frustration of his parental
hopes and affections. The lower court expressly
found, and the majority opinion of the Court of
Appeals did not contradict it, that the appellee Lazo
was aware of the second abortion; and the
probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the
first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the
event, he appeared to have taken no steps to
investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and
secure the punishment of the responsible
practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion,
the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in
the administrative and criminal cases against the
appellant. His only concern appears to have been
directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money
payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 damages
and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim
that, under the circumstances of record, was clearly
exaggerated.
It is unquestionable that the appellant's act
in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife, without
medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and
morally reprehensible act, that can not be too
severely condemned; and the consent of the woman
or that of her husband does not excuse it. But the
immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an
award of damage that, under the circumstances on
record, have no factual or legal basis.
36

V. CITIZENSHIP
38) Mercado vs. Manzano
G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999
Doctrine:
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance.
The former arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of two or
more states, a person is simultaneously considered
a national by the said states. Dual allegiance, on the
other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to
two or more states. While dual citizenship is
involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an
individuals volition.
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private
respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates
for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11,
1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza
III.
The proclamation of private respondent was
suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril
who alleged that private respondent was not a
citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and
ordered the cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy of private respondent on the ground that
he is a dual citizen and, under 40(d) of the Local
Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are
disqualified from running for any elective position.
The respondent admitted that he is registered as a
foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien
Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged
that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in
1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He
was born in the United States, San Francisco,
California, on September 14, 1955, and is
considered an American citizen under US Laws. But
notwithstanding his registration as an American
citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
It would appear that respondent Manzano is both a
Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he holds
dual citizenship.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Private Respondent Manzano is
disqualified from the position for which he filed his
certificate of candidacy.
HELD: NO.
He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by
operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his

father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his
birth. At the age of six (6), his parents brought him
to the Philippines using an American passport as
travel document. His parents also registered him as
an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration.
He was issued an alien certificate of registration.
This, however, did not result in the loss of his
Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce
Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of
allegiance to the United States.
It is an undisputed fact that when respondent
attained the age of majority, he registered himself as
a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and
1998, which effectively renounced his US citizenship
under American law. Under Philippine law, he no
longer had U.S. citizenship.
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance.
The former arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of two or
more states, a person is simultaneously considered
a national by the said states. Dual allegiance, on the
other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to
two or more states. While dual citizenship is
involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an
individuals volition.
The phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160,
40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be
understood as referring to dual allegiance.
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do
not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with
dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to
strict process with respect to the termination of their
status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should
suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to
terminate their status as persons with dual
citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of
different states.
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to
renounce his American citizenship, effectively
removing any disqualification he might have as a
dual citizen.
By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is
a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident
or immigrant of another country; that he will defend
and support the Constitution of the Philippines and
bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he
does so without mental reservation, private
respondent has, as far as the laws of this country
are concerned, effectively repudiated his American
citizenship and anything which he may have said
before as a dual citizen.Petition dismissed
37

39) Republic v. Chule Lim
G.R. NO. 153883, January 13, 2004
Facts:
Chule Lim claimes that she was born on October 29,
1954 in Buru-an, Iligan City. Her birth was registered
in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte but the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Kauswagan transferred her record
of birth to Iligan City. She alleged that both her
Kauswagan and Iligan City records of birth have four
erroneous entries, and prays that they be corrected.
During the hearing, respondent testified thus:
First, she claims that her surname "Yu" was
misspelled as "Yo". She has been using "Yu" in all
her school records and in her marriage certificate. 2
She presented a clearance from the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI)3 to further show the
consistency in her use of the surname "Yu".
Second, she claims that her fathers name in her
birth record was written as "Yo Diu To (Co Tian)"
when it should have been "Yu Dio To (Co Tian)."
Third, her nationality was entered as Chinese when
it should have been Filipino considering that her
father and mother never got married. Only her
deceased father was Chinese, while her mother is
Filipina. She claims that her being a registered voter
attests to the fact that she is a Filipino citizen.
Finally, it was erroneously indicated in her birth
certificate that she was a legitimate child when she
should have been described as illegitimate
considering that her parents were never married.
Placida Anto, respondents mother, testified that she
is a Filipino citizen as her parents were both Filipinos
from Camiguin. She added that she and her
daughters father were never married because the
latter had a prior subsisting marriage contracted in
China.
In this connection, respondent presented a
certification attested by officials of the local civil
registries of Iligan City and Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte that there is no record of marriage between
Placida Anto and Yu Dio To from 1948 to the
present.
The Republic, through the City Prosecutor of Iligan
City, did not present any evidence although it
actively participated in the proceedings by attending
hearings and cross-examining respondent and her
witnesses.
On February 22, 2000, the trial court granted
respondents petition and rendered judgment.
Issue: whether or not lims citizenship should be
changed from Chinese to Filipino?
Held: YES. To digress, it is just as well that the

Republic did not cite as error respondents recourse
to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court to effect what
indisputably are substantial corrections and changes
in entries in the civil register. To clarify, Rule 108 of
the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure
for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry. The proceedings under said rule may either
be summary or adversary in nature. If the correction
sought to be made in the civil register is clerical,
then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the
rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or
nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and
the procedure to be adopted is adversary. This is our
ruling in Republic v. Valencia7 where we held that
even substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected and the true facts established under Rule
108 provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail
themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.
An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one
where the trial court has conducted proceedings
where all relevant facts have been fully and properly
developed, where opposing counsel have been
given opportunity to demolish the opposite partys
case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly
weighed and considered.8
As likewise observed by the Court of Appeals, we
take it that the Republics failure to cite this error
amounts to a recognition that this case properly falls
under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court
considering that the proceeding can be appropriately
classified as adversarial.
Instead, in its first assignment of error, the Republic
avers that respondent did not comply with the
constitutional requirement of electing Filipino
citizenship when she reached the age of majority. It
cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution,
which provides that the citizenship of a legitimate
child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father
followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon
reaching the age of majority, the child elected
Philippine citizenship.9 Likewise, the Republic
invokes the provision in Section 1 of Commonwealth
Act No. 625, that legitimate children born of Filipino
mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by
expressing such intention "in a statement to be
signed and sworn to by the party concerned before
any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall
be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party
shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the
oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the
Government of the Philippines."10
Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory
requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply
only to legitimate children. These do not apply in the
38

case of respondent who was concededly an
illegitimate child, considering that her Chinese father
and Filipino mother were never married. As such,
she was not required to comply with said
constitutional and statutory requirements to become
a Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a
Filipino mother, respondent automatically became a
Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino
since birth without having to elect Filipino citizenship
when she reached the age of majority.
In Ching, Re: Application for Admission to the Bar,11
citing In re Florencio Mallare,12 we held:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a
Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no other
act would be necessary to confer on him all the
rights and privileges attached to Philippine
citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332;
Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands,
42 Phil. 543; Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12,
1952; Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16,
1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954).
Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous
belief that he is a non-Filipino divest him of the
citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully
entitled.13
This notwithstanding, the records show that
respondent elected Filipino citizenship when she
reached the age of majority. She registered as a
voter in Misamis Oriental when she was 18 years
old.14 The exercise of the right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitute a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.15
In its second assignment of error, the Republic
assails the Court of Appeals decision in allowing
respondent to use her fathers surname despite its
finding that she is illegitimate.
The Republics submission is misleading. The Court
of Appeals did not allow respondent to use her
fathers surname. What it did allow was the
correction of her fathers misspelled surname which
she has been using ever since she can remember.
In this regard, respondent does not need a court
pronouncement for her to use her fathers surname.
Court of Appeals is was correct when it held:
Firstly, Petitioner-appellee is now 47 years old. To
bar her at this time from using her fathers surname
which she has used for four decades without any
known objection from anybody, would only sow
confusion. Concededly, one of the reasons allowed
for changing ones name or surname is to avoid
confusion.
Secondly, under Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act No.
142, the law regulating the use of aliases, a person
is allowed to use a name "by which he has been
known since childhood."
While judicial authority is required for a change of

name or surname,18 there is no such requirement for
the continued use of a surname which a person has
already been using since childhood.19
The doctrine that disallows such change of name as
would give the false impression of family relationship
remains valid but only to the extent that the
proposed change of name would in great probability
cause prejudice or future mischief to the family
whose surname it is that is involved or to the
community in general.20 In this case, the Republic
has not shown that the Yu family in China would
probably be prejudiced or be the object of future
mischief. In respondents case, the change in the
surname that she has been using for 40 years would
even avoid confusion to her community in general.
39

VI. MARRIAGE
40) Balogbog vs. CA
G.R. No. 83598 March 7, 1997
FACTS:
Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the
children of Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal
who died intestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively.
They had an older brother, Gavino, but he died in
1935, predeceasing their parents. In 1968, private
respondents Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog
brought an action for partition and accounting
against petitioners, claiming that they were the
legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and
that, as such, they were entitled to the one-third
share of Gavino in the estate of their grandparents.
In their answer, petitioners denied knowing private
respondents. They alleged that their brother Gavino
died single and without issue in their parents
residence at Asturias, Cebu.
the alleged marriage.

Nonetheless, evidence
consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held
competent to prove the marriage. Indeed, although
a marriage contract is considered primary evidence
of marriage, the failure to present it is not proof that
no marriage took place. Other evidence may be
presented to prove marriage.
Here, private
respondents proved, through testimonial evidence,
that Gavino and Catalina were married in 1929; that
they had three children, one of whom died in infancy;
that their marriage subsisted until 1935 when Gavino
died; and that their children, private respondents,
were recognized by Gavinos family and by the
public as the legitimate children of Gavino.
To support their claim, the petitioners obtained a

certificate from the Local Civil Registrar of Asturias
to the effect that that office did not have a record of
the names of Gavino and Catalina. The certificate
was prepared by Assistant Municipal Treasurer Juan
Maranga, who testified that there was no record of
the marriage of Gavino and Catalina in the Book of
Marriages.
On the other hand, the private
respondents presented several pieces of testimonial
evidence to bolster their claim.
Neither is there merit in the argument of the

petitioners that the existence of the marriage cannot
be presumed because there was no evidence
showing in particular that Gavino and Catalina, in the
presence of two witnesses, declared that they were
taking each other as husband and wife. An
exchange of vows can be presumed to have been
made from the testimonies of the witnesses who
state that a wedding took place, since the very
purpose for having a wedding is to exchange vows
of marital commitment. It would indeed be unusual
to have a wedding without an exchange of vows and
quite unnatural for people not to notice its absence.
The law favors the validity of marriage, because the
State is interested in the preservation of the family
and the sanctity of the family is a matter of
constitutional concern.
ISSUE:
Whose claim, as supported by their respective
pieces of evidence, will prevail?
41) VDA. De Jacob V. CA

312 SCRA 772
HELD:
The claim of the private respondents will prevail.
Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a
man and a woman conducting themselves as
husband and wife are legally married.
This
presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to
the contrary. In this case, petitioners claim that the
pieces of evidence presented by private respondents
was belied by the production of the Book of
Marriages by the assistant municipal treasurer of
Asturias. Petitioners argue that this book does not
contain any entry pertaining to the alleged marriage
of private respondents parents. This contention has
no merit. In Pugeda v. Trias, the defendants, who
questioned the marriage of the plaintiffs, produced a
photostatic copy of the record of marriages of the
Municipality of Rosario, Cavite for the month of
January, 1916, to show that there was no record of
FACTS:
Plaintiff-appellant [petitioner herein] claimed to be
the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E.
Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for
the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a
reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself
and the deceased.
Defendant-appellee on the other hand, claimed to be
the legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In support of his
claim, he presented an Order dated 18 July 1961
issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI,
Camarines Sur, granting the petition for adoption
filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil.
During the proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased Alfredo in Case No. T-46
(entitled "Tomasa vda. de Jacob v. Jose Centenera,
et al) herein defendant-appellee Pedro sought to
intervene therein claiming his share of the
40

deceaseds estate as Alfredo's adopted son and as
his sole surviving heir. Pedro questioned the validity
of the marriage between appellant Tomasa and his
adoptive father Alfredo.
Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for
Intervention and filed a complaint for injunction with
damages (Civil Case No. T-83) questioning
appellee's claim as the legal heir of Alfredo.
appellant claims that the marriage between her and
Alfredo was solemnized by one Msgr. Florencio C.
Yllana, CBCP, Intramuros, Manila sometime in 1975.
She could not however present the original copy of
the Marriage Contract stating that the original
document was lost when Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave
it to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration. In lieu of the
original, Tomasa presented as secondary evidence a
reconstructed Marriage Contract issued in 1978. No
copy of the Marriage Contract was sent to the local
civil registrar by the solemnizing officer thus giving
the implication that there was no copy of the
marriage contract sent to, nor a record existing in the
civil registry of Manila;
In signing the Marriage Contract, the late Alfredo
Jacob merely placed his "thumbmark" on said
contract purportedly on 16 September 1975 (date of
the marriage). However, on a Sworn Affidavit
executed between appellant Tomasa and Alfredo a
day before the alleged date of marriage or on 15
September 1975 attesting that both of them lived
together as husband and wife for five (5) years,
Alfredo [af]fixed his customary signature. Thus the
trial court concluded that the "thumbmark" was
logically "not genuine". In other words, not of Alfredo
Jacobs;
Issue: Whether the marriage between the plaintiffappellant and deceased Alfredo Jacob was valid?
Held:
Doctrinally, a void marriage may be subjected to
collateral attack, while a voidable one may be
assailed only in a direct proceeding. 8 Aware of this
fundamental
distinction,
Respondent
Pilapil
contends that the marriage between Dr. Alfredo
Jacob and petitioner was void ab initio, because
there was neither a marriage license nor a marriage
ceremony.9 We cannot sustain this contention.
To start with, Respondent Pedro Pilapil argues that
the marriage was void because the parties had no
marriage license. This argument is misplaced,
because it has been established that Dr. Jacob and
petitioner lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years.10 An affidavit to this effect was
executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner.11 Clearly then,
the marriage was exceptional in character and did
not require a marriage license under Article 76 of the

Civil Code.12 The Civil Code governs this case,
because the questioned marriage and the assailed
adoption took place prior the effectivity of the Family
Code.
"It is settled that if the original writing has been lost
or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, upon
proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or
unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy
or a recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by recollection of witnesses." 13 Upon a
showing that the document was duly executed and
subsequently lost, without any bad faith on the part
of the offeror, secondary evidence may be adduced
to prove its contents.14
The trial court and the Court of Appeals committed
reversible error when they (1) excluded the
testimonies of petitioner, Adela Pilapil and Msgr.
Florencio Yllana and (2) disregarded the following:
(a) photographs of the wedding ceremony; (b)
documentary evidence, such as the letter of
Monsignor Yllana stating that he had solemnized the
marriage between Dr. Jacob and petitioner, informed
the Archbishop of Manila that the wedding had not
been recorded in the Book of Marriages, and at the
same time requested the list of parties to the
marriage; (c) the subsequent authorization issued by
the Archbishop through his vicar general and
chancellor, Msgr. Benjamin L. Marino ordaining
that the union between Dr. Jacob and petitioner be
reflected through a corresponding entry in the Book
of Marriages; and (d) the Affidavit of Monsignor
Yllana stating the circumstances of the loss of the
marriage certificate.
It should be stressed that the due execution and the
loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the
conditio sine qua non for the introduction of
secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by
the very evidence they have disregarded. They have
thus confused the evidence to show due execution
and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In
Hernaez v. Mcgrath,15 the Court clarified this
misconception thus:
. . . [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in
holding that parol evidence of the execution of the
instrument was barred. The court confounded the
execution and the contents of the document. It is the
contents, . . . which may not be prove[n] by
secondary evidence when the instrument itself is
accessible. Proofs of the execution are not
dependent on the existence or non-existence of the
document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs
precede proofs of the contents: due execution,
besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for
the introduction of secondary evidence of the
41

contents.
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried
to justify its stand on this issue by relying on Lim
Tanhu v. Ramolete.16 But even there, we said that
"marriage may be prove[n] by other competent
evidence."17
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven
by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer,
by witnesses who saw and recognized the
signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom
the parties have previously narrated the execution
thereof.18 The Court has also held that "[t]he loss
may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact
of its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in the
judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the
place or places where the document or papers of
similar character are usually kept by the person in
whose custody the document lost was, and has
been unable to find it; or who has made any other
investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court
that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost." 19
In the present case, due execution was established
by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present
during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner
herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss
was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the
officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as well as by
petitioner's own declaration in court. These are
relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since
the due execution and the loss of the marriage
contract were clearly shown by the evidence
presented, secondary evidence testimonial and
documentary may be admitted to prove the fact of
marriage.
The trial court pointed out that on the face of the
reconstructed marriage contract were certain
irregularities suggesting that it had fraudulently been
obtained.20 Even if we were to agree with the trial
court and to disregard the reconstructed marriage
contract, we must emphasize that this certificate is
not the only proof of the union between Dr. Jacob
and petitioner.
Respondent Pedro Pilapil misplaces emphasis on
the absence of an entry pertaining to 1975 in the
Books of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar of
Manila and in the National Census and Statistics
Office (NCSO).26 He finds it quite "bizarre" for
petitioner to have waited three years before
registering their marriage.27 On both counts, he
proceeds from the wrong premise. In the first place,
failure to send a copy of a marriage certificate for
record purposes does not invalidate the marriage. 28
In the second place, it was not the petitioners duty
to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the civil
registrar. Instead, this charge fell upon the
solemnizing officer.29
The basis of human society throughout the civilized
world is . . . of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction
is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an
institution in the maintenance of which the public is
deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment
of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony.
Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony
are presumed, in the absence of any
counterpresumption or evidence special to the case,
to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the
common order of society, and if the parties were not
what they thus hold themselves out as being, they
would be living in the constant violation of decency
and of law. A presumption established by our Code
of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage." Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume
marriage.
This jurisprudential attitude31 towards marriage is
based on the prima facie presumption that a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.32 Given the undisputed, even accepted, 33
fact that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as
husband and wife,34 we find that the presumption of
marriage was not rebutted in this case.
42) Republic Of The Philippines v. CA
G.R. No. 92326 January 24, 1992
Facts:
On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed
a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then six (6) years
old and who had been living with her family since he
was four (4) months old, before the Regional Trial
Court of Legaspi City.
The petition for adoption was filed by private
respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles on February 2, 1988,
when the law applicable was Presidential Decree
No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code. Under
said code, a petition for adoption may be filed by
either of the spouses or by both of them. However,
after the trial court rendered its decision and while
the case was pending on appeal in the Court of
Appeals, Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code,
took effect on August 3, 1988. Under the said new
law, joint adoption by husband and wife is
mandatory.
Petitioner contends that the petition for adoption
should be dismissed outright for it was filed solely by
private respondent without joining her husband, in
violation of Article 185 of the Family Code which
42

requires joint adoption by the spouses. It argues that
the Family Code must be applied retroactively to the
petition filed by Mrs. Bobiles, as the latter did not
acquire a vested right to adopt Jason Condat by the
mere filing of her petition for adoption.
Issues:
1.)
Can the Family Code be applied
retroactively to the petition for adoption filed by
Zenaida C. Bobiles and;
2.)
Granting that the FC should be applied
retroactively should the adoption in favor of private
respondent only, her husband not being a petitioner.
Held:
1.)Article 246 of the Family Code provides for
retroactive effect of appropriate relevant provisions
thereof, subject to the qualification that such
retrospective application will not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws.
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and
extent does not depend upon events foreign to the
will of the holder. The term expresses the concept of
present fixed interest which in right reason and
natural justice should be protected against arbitrary
State action, or an innately just and imperative right
which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent
and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny.
Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title
to the enforcement of a demand, but also an
exemption from new obligations created after the
right has vested.
Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private
respondent had the right to file a petition for adoption
by herself, without joining her husband therein.
When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition, she was
exercising her explicit and unconditional right under
said law. Upon her filing thereof, her right to file such
petition alone and to have the same proceed to final
adjudication, in accordance with the law in force at
the time, was already vested and cannot be
prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new
law.
When private respondent filed her petition in Special
Proceeding No. 1386, the trial court acquired
jurisdiction thereover in accordance with the
governing law. Jurisdiction being a matter of
substantive law, the established rule is that the
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute
in force at the time of the commencement of the
action. We do not find in the present case such facts
as would constitute it as an exception to the rule.
2.)Petitioner argues that, even assuming that the

Family Code should not apply retroactively, the
Court of Appeals should have modified the trial
court's decision by granting the adoption in favor of
private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles only, her
husband not being a petitioner. We do not consider
this as a tenable position and, accordingly, reject the
same.
Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of
the petitioners in the petition for adoption filed by his
wife, his affidavit of consent, attached to the petition
as Annex "B" and expressly made an integral part
thereof, shows that he himself actually joined his
wife in adopting the child. The pertinent parts of his
written consent and the foregoing declarations, and
his subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court,
are sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Under the
circumstances then obtaining, and by reason of his
foreign residence, he must have yielded to the legal
advice that an affidavit of consent on his part
sufficed to make him a party to the petition. This is
evident from the text of his affidavit. Punctiliousness
in language and pedantry in the formal requirements
should yield to and be eschewed in the higher
considerations of substantial justice. The future of an
innocent child must not be compromised by arbitrary
insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules on
the form of pleadings.
43) SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 174689, October 22 2009
FACTS
Petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a
petition for the change of his first name and sex in
his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. The petition impleaded the civil registrar of
Manila as respondent. Petitioner alleged in his
petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the
spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino
Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as
"Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of
live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as
"male." He further alleged that he is a male
transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels,
thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always
identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling
trapped in a mans body, he consulted several
doctors in the United States. He underwent
psychological examination, hormone treatment and
breast augmentation. His attempts to transform
himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27,
2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery
in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined
43

by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and
reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who
issued a medical certificate attesting that he
(petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was
in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to
have his name in his birth certificate changed from
"Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male"
to "female." On the scheduled initial hearing,
jurisdictional requirements were established. No
opposition to the petition was made. During trial,
petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr.
Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fianc, Richard P.
Edel, as witnesses. On June 4, 2003, the trial court
rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Its relevant
portions read: Petitioner filed the present petition not
to evade any law or judgment or any infraction
thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the
purpose of making his birth records compatible with
his present sex. Firstly, the court is of the opinion
that granting the petition would be more in
consonance with the principles of justice and equity.
With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has
always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now
possesses the physique of a female. Petitioners
misfortune to be trapped in a mans body is not his
own doing and should not be in any way taken
against him. Likewise, the court believes that no
harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody
or the community in granting the petition. On the
contrary, granting the petition would bring the muchawaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and
her [fianc] and the realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any
cause or ground to deny the present petition despite
due notice and publication thereof. Even the State,
through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any
opposition.
ISSUE
Whether or not sex reassignment is a ground for
change of entry in the birth certificate?
HELD
No, there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment and its effect. The sex of a person is
determined at birth, visually done by the birth
attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining
the genitals of the infant Civil Register Law (Act
3753). If the determination of a persons sex made at
the time of his or her birth is not attendant by error,
the same is immutable and may not be changed by
reason of a sex reassignment surgery.
44) SY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent contracted marriage on
November 15, 1973. both were then 22 years old.
Their union was blessed with two children.
Respondent left their conjugal dwelling, since the
they lived separately.
Petitioner filed a petition for legal separation.
Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal
partnership of gains and approving a regime of
separation of properties based on the Memorandum
of Agreement executed by the spouse. The trial
court granted custody of the children to Filipina.
Petitioner filed a criminal action for attempted
parricide against her husband, which RTC convicted
him for lesser offense of slight physical injuries.
Petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of
absolute nullity of her marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. RTC denied. CA affirmed.
The petitioner for the first time on appeal, the issue
with regard to the absence of marriage license.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is valid?
HELD: No. The marriage is not valid on the ground
that there is no marriage license.
Although, the petitioner raises the issue for the first
time on appeal the issue on lack of marriage license.
The petitioner states that though she did not
categorically state her petition for annulment of
marriage before the trial court that the inconguinoty
in the dates of the marriage license and the
celebration of the marriage itself would lead to the
conclusion that her marriage to respondent was void
from the beginning, she pointed out that these
critical dates were contained in the documents she
submitted before the Court.
The marriage license was issued one year after the
ceremony took place. Hence the marriage was
celebrated without the marriage license.
Petition granted.
45) SEVILLA vs. CARDENAS
G.R. No. 167684. July 31, 2006.
FACTS:
Herein petitioner, Jaime Sevilla and respondent
Carmelita Cardenas were allegedly married without
a valid marriage license. The former contended that
44

his marriage with the latter was contracted through
machinations, duress and intimidation employed
upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's
father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines. That they never applied or
obtained a marriage license for their supposed
marriage, thus no marriage license was presented to
the solemnizing officer. In support for his contention,
petitioner further argued that although marriage
license no. 2770792 allegedly issued in San Juan,
Rizal on May 19, 1969 was indicated in the marriage
contract, the same was fictitious for he never applied
for any marriage license, Upon verifications made by
him through his lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Abola, with the
Civil Registry of San Juan, a Certification was issued
by Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr., Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan, that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was
ever issued by said office."
claim that all efforts to locate the logbook or prove

the material contents therein, had been exerted.
However, Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of

the Local Registry of San Juan, identified the
Certificates issued by Rafael Aliscad, Jr., the Local
Civil Registrar, and testified that their office failed to
locate the book wherein marriage license no.
2770792 may have been registered.
FACTS:
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar P. Mallion
filed a petition with the RTC, Branch 29, of San
Pablo City seeking a declaration of nullity of his
marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara under
Article 36 of the Family Code, citing respondent's
alleged psychological incapacity. After trial on the
merits, the RTC denied the petition in a decision
dated November 11, 1997 upon the finding that
petitioner "failed to adduce preponderant evidence
to warrant the grant of the relief he is seeking." The
appeal filed with the Court of Appeals was likewise
dismissed for failure of petitioner to pay the docket
and other lawful fees within the reglementary period.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage is void for lack of a valid
marriage license?
HELD: No. It has been held by the Court that the
certificates issued by the Local Civil Registrar were
not sufficient as to invalidate the marriage license
no. 2770792 which had been secured by the parties.
It could be easily implied from the said statement
that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar could not
exert its best efforts to locate and determine the
existence of Marriage License No. 2770792 due to
its "loaded work and that they failed to locate the
book in which the marriage license was entered.
Likewise, both certifications failed to state with
absolute certainty whether or not such license was
issued.
This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the
representative from the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who
stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to the
fact that the person in charge of the said logbook
had already retired. Further, the testimony of the
said person was not presented in evidence. It does
not appear on record that the former custodian of the
logbook was deceased or missing, or that his
testimony could not be secured. This belies the
It is required that the custodian of the document is

authorize to certify that despite diligent search, a
particular document does not exist in his office or
that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to
be found in a register. As custodians of public
documents, civil registrars are public officers
charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a
register book where they are required to enter all
applications for marriage licenses, including the
names of the applicants, the date the marriage
license was issued and such other relevant data.
46) MALLION vs. EDITHA ALCANTARA
G.R. No. 141528. October 31, 2006
After the decision in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95

attained finality, petitioner filed on July 12, 1999
another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
with the RTC of San Pablo City, this time alleging
that his marriage with respondent was null and void
due to the fact that it was celebrated without a valid
marriage license. For her part, respondent filed an
answer with a motion to dismiss, praying for the
dismissal of the petition on the ground of res judicata
and forum shopping.
In an order dated October 8, 1999, the RTC granted
respondent's motion to dismiss. Petitioner's motion
for reconsideration was also denied.
Petitioner argues that while the relief prayed for in
the two cases was the same, that is, the declaration
of nullity of his marriage to respondent, the cause of
action in the earlier case was distinct and separate
from the cause of action in the present case
because the operative facts upon which they were
45

based as well as the evidence required to sustain
either were different. Because there is no identity as
to the cause of action, petitioner claims that res
judicata does not lie to bar the second petition. In
this connection, petitioner maintains that there was
no violation of the rule on forum shopping or of the
rule which proscribes the splitting of a cause of
action.
On the other hand, respondent, in her comment
counters that while the present suit is anchored on a
different ground, it still involves
the same issue raised in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95,
that is, the validity of petitioner and respondent's
marriage, and prays for the same remedy, that is,
the declaration of nullity of their marriage.
Respondent thus contends that petitioner violated
the rule on forum shopping. Moreover, respondent
asserts that petitioner violated the rule on multiplicity
of suits as the ground he cites in this petition could
have been raised during the trial in Civil Case No.
SP 4341-95.
ISSUE:
The issue before this Court is one of first impression.
Should the matter of the invalidity of a marriage due
to the absence of an essential requisite prescribed
by Article 4 of the Family Code be raised in the same
proceeding where the marriage is being impugned
on the ground of a party's psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code?
HELD: Petitioner insists that because the action for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity and the action for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
absence of marriage license constitute separate
causes of action, the present case would not fall
under the prohibition against splitting a single cause
of action nor would it be barred by the principle of
res judicata.
The contention is untenable. Res judicata is defined
as "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon
or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. It
also refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree
on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies
in all later suits on points and matters determined in
the former suit."
This doctrine is a rule which pervades every wellregulated system of jurisprudence and is founded
upon the following precepts of common law, namely:
(1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the
interest of the State that there should be an end to
litigation, and (2) the hardship on the individual that

he should be vexed twice for the same cause. A
contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and
quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer
the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part
of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility
and happiness.
Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence
of the following requisites: (1) the former judgment is
final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a
judgment or an order on the merits; and (4) there is
between the first and the second actions
identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of
action.
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the first
three requisites. What is in issue is the presence of
the fourth requisite. In this regard, the test to
determine whether the causes of action are identical
is to ascertain whether the same evidence will
sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity
in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two
actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain
both, the two actions are considered the same, and
a judgment in the first case is a bar to the
subsequent action.
Based on this test, petitioner would contend that the
two petitions brought by him seeking the declaration
of nullity of his marriage are anchored on separate
causes of action for the evidence necessary to
sustain the first petition which was anchored on the
alleged psychological incapacity of respondent is
different from the evidence necessary to sustain the
present petition which is anchored on the purported
absence of a marriage license.
Petitioner, however, forgets that he is simply
invoking different grounds for the same cause of
action. By definition, a cause of action is the act or
omission by which a party violates the right of
another. In both petitions, petitioner has the same
cause the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
respondent. What differs is the ground upon which
the cause of action is predicated. These grounds
cited by petitioner essentially split the various
aspects of the pivotal issue that holds the key to the
resolution of this controversy, that is, the actual
status of petitioner and respondent's marriage.
Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the
claim that the marriage is null and void because no
valid celebration of the same took place due to the
46

alleged lack of a marriage license. In Civil Case No.
SP 4341-95, however, petitioner impliedly conceded
that the marriage had been solemnized and
celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner is now
bound by this admission. The alleged absence of a
marriage license which petitioner raises now could
have been presented and heard in the earlier case.
Suffice it to state that parties are bound not only as
regards every matter offered and received to sustain
or defeat their claims or demand but as to any other
admissible matter which might have been offered for
that purpose and of all other matters that could have
been adjudged in that case.
It must be emphasized that a party cannot evade or
avoid the application of res judicata by simply
varying the form of his action or adopting a different
method of presenting his case. It bears stressing
that a party cannot divide the grounds for recovery.
A plaintiff is mandated to place in issue in his
pleading, all the issues existing when the suit began.
A lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal. The plaintiff is
bound to set forth in his first action every ground for
relief which he claims to exist and upon which he
relied, and cannot be permitted to rely upon them by
piecemeal in successive action to recover for the
same wrong or injury.
47) NAVARRO vs. DOMAGTOY
A.M. No. MTJ-96-108. July 19, 1996
FACTS:
The complainant in this administrative case is the
Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo
G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to
two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal
Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy,
which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as
well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge
solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A.
Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge
that the groom is merely separated from his first
wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage
ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and
Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's
jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge
holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao
del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the
respondent judge's residence in the municipality of
Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional

area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos,
located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the
municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
Respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of
having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar
Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife,
and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied
on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge
of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr.
Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other
for almost seven years. With respect to the second
charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the
marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did
not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code
which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the
court's jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof applies
to the case in question.
The marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan
and Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's civil status is
"separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding
ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. He
presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A.
Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and
sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla,
MTC of Basey, Samar. In their affidavit, the affiants
stated that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been
civilly married to Ida D. Pearanda in September
1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and
having borne five children, Ida Pearanda left the
conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she
has not returned nor been heard of for almost seven
years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that
she is already dead.
ISSUE:
1.Whether or not the joint affidavit is sufficient proof
of the wife's presumptive death?
2.Whether or not the respondent judge erred when
he solemnized the marriage outside his court's
jurisdiction?
HELD:
1. The Supreme Court ruled that the joint affidavit is
insufficient proof to declare wife's presumptive
death.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides that
for the purpose of contracting the subsequent
marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of
47

presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.
Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse was already dead, a
summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death is necessary in order to contract
a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement
which has been precisely incorporated into the
Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages
where it is not proven that the previous marriage has
been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or
presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent
provisions of law.
Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary
proceeding for the declaration of his first wife's
presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration,
he remains married to Ida Pearanda. Whether
wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the
part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint
affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or
ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and
therefore void, marriage.
2. The Supreme Court ruled that Judge Domagtoy
erred when he soemnized the marriage outside his
court's jurisdiction. According to article 8 of the
Familiy Code The marriage shall be solemnized
publicly in the chambers the judge or in open court,
in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the
consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case
may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of
marriages contracted on the point of death or in
remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this
Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing
officer in writing in which case the marriage may be
solemnized at a house or place designated by them
in a sworn statement to that effect.
There is no proof that either Sumaylo or del Rosario
was at the point of death or in the remote place.
Moreover, the written request presented addressed
to the respondent judge was made by only one
party, Gemma del Rosario.
One of the formal requisites of marriage is the
"authority of the solemnizing officer." Article 8, which
is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of
the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify
the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in
the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith
will not invalidate the marriage.
Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions,

may officiate in weddings only within said areas and
not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage
outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite, which while it may
not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject
the officiating official to administrative liability.
Respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the
municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was
not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in
the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
The Supreme Court finds respondent to have acted
in gross ignorance of the law. The legal principles
applicable in the cases brought to our attention are
elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to
conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is
due to a lack of comprehension of the law. Judge
Domagtoy is SUSPENDED for a period of 6 months.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn
Borga is considered bigamous and void, there being
a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and
Ida Pearanda.
48) BESO vs. DAGUMAN
A.M. No. 99-1211, January 28, 2000
FACTS:
On August 28, 1997, the marriage between Zenaida
Beso and Bernardito Yman was solemnized by
Judge Juan Daguman at J.P.R. Subdivision in
Calbayog City, Samar. After the wedding, Yman
abandoned Petitioner. Thereafter, Petitioner found
that her marriage was not registered at the Civil
Registry. She then filed an administrative complaint
against the Respondent charging him with Neglect of
Duty and Abuse of Authority for solemnizing
marriage outside of his jurisdiction and of negligence
in not retaining a copy and not registering the
marriage contract with the office of the Local
Registrar.
In his Comment, Respondent averred that the civil
marriage had to be solemnized outside his territory
because on that date respondent was physically
indisposed and unable to report to his station in Sta.
Margarita and that Beso and Yman unexpectedly
came to his house urgently requesting the
celebration of their marriage rites since the
complainant, who is an overseas worker, would be
out of the country for a long period and their
marriage license would lapse before she could
48

return to the Philippines. He further averred that after
handling to Yman the first copy of the marriage
certificate, he left the three remaining copies on top
of the desk in his private office intending later to
register the duplicate and triplicate copies and to
keep the fourth in his office but said copies were
lost; that he diligently searched for them and even
subpoenad Yman to further inquire but was told that
Complainant put the copies of the marriage
certificate in her bag during the wedding party and
that Complainant already left for abroad.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is guilty of Neglect of
Duty and Abuse of Authority?
HELD:
Yes. As presiding judge of the MCTC Sta. Margarita
Tarangnan-Pagsanjan, Samar, his authority to
solemnize marriage is only limited to those
municipalities under his jurisdiction. Considering that
respondents Judge's jurisdiction covers the
municipality of Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan,
Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to
solemnize a marriage in the City of Calbayog. As
provided by Article 8 of the Family Code, wherein a
marriage may be solemnized by a judge outside his
chamber[s] or at a place other than his sala, to wit:
(1) when either or both of the contracting parties is at
the point of death;(2) when the residence of either
party is located in a remote place; (3) where both of
the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing
in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a
house or place designated by them in a sworn
statement
to
that
effect.
The
foregoing
circumstances are unavailing in the instant case.
Moreover, as solemnizing officer, respondent Judge
neglected his duty when he failed to register the
marriage. Such duty is entrusted upon him pursuant
to Article 23 of the Family Code requiring the same
not later than fifteen days after the marriage. The
records show that the loss was occasioned by
carelessness on respondent Judge's part. Hence,
Respondent is guilty of neglect of duty and abuse of
authority.
49) REPUBLIC vs. IYOY

G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005
FACTS:
Private respondent Crasus Iyoy filed a complaint for

declaration of nullity of marriage due to
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code, in relation with Articles 68, 70, and 72,
with Fely Ada Rosal. According to him, they got
married in 1961. The marriage produced five
children. But the marriage faded because Fely was a
nagger, extravagant and hot-tempered. In 1984, Fely
left for the United States. Barely a year after she left,
Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he
sign the divorce papers. But he ignored the request
Sometime in 1985, he was informed that Fely had
already married an American. In 1987, she came
back to the Philippines with her American family. In
1990, she came back to attend the wedding of their
eldest son, but in the invitations, she used the
surname of her American husband. She returned in
1992 for the operation of their fourth child. In her
Answer to the Complaint, she asserted that she was
already an American citizen in 1988, that she was no
longer hot-tempered, nagger and extravagant and
that the only reason she went to the United States
was that their income was not enough to sustain
their family, that it was Crasus who was irresponsible
and in fact living with another woman who bore her a
child. She also denied that she sent a letter
requesting him to sign the divorce papers. After
hearing both sides, the RTC rendered a decision
declaring the marriage null and void ab initio under
Article 36 of the Family Code. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court
but this time it had added a ratiocination, stating that
Article 26, 2nd paragraph of the Family Code is
applicable also to this case.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there was psychological incapacity
on the part of Fely?
2. Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code is applicable?
HELD
1. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Article
36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to
take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. It
was held in previous rulings that irreconcilable
differences, conflicting personalities, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion,
and abandonment, by themselves, also do not
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under
the said Article.
49

2. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The
second paragraph of Article 26 is not applicable. As
plainly worded, the provision refers to a special
situation wherein a foreigner divorces his or her
Filipino spouse. However, in this case, it cannot be
applied because of the simple fact that at the time
Fely secured a divorce decree, she was still a
Filipino. Fely admitted in her Answer filed before the
RTC that she married her American spouse in 1985
but she also admitted that she became and
American citizen only in 1988. Thus, she was still a
Filipino citizen and Article 15 of the Civil Code
applies, she was still bound by Philippine laws on
family rights and duties, status, condition and legal
capacity, even though she was already living abroad.
50) REPUBLIC vs. ORBECIDO III
GR No. 154380 October 5, 2005
FACTS:
In 1981, Cipriano Orbecido and Lady Myros
Villanueva were married in Ozamis City. Their
marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter,
Krsitoffer and Kimberly. In 1986, Lady Myros left for
the US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few
years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had
been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son
that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then
married an American, Innocent Stanley. Thereafter,
Cipriano filed with the trial court a petition for
authority to remarry invoking paragraph 2 of Article
26 of the Family Code. Finding merit on the petition,
the court granted the same. The Republic, through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the Republic contends that Par. 2 of
Art. 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the
instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed
marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a
Filipino and an alien.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent can remarry pursuant to
Article 26 of the Family Code?
HELD:
The Supreme Court was unanimous in holding that
par. 2, Art. 26 of the Family Code should be
interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been
divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign

citizenship and remarried, also to remarry.
The twin elements of Par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family
Code are as follows: (1) there is a valid marriage
that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner and (2) a valid divorce is obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship
at the time of the celebration of marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry. In this case, when Lady Myros was
naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a
valid marriage that has been celebrated between her
and Cipriano. Subsequently, the wife obtained a
divorce capacitating him to remarry. Clearly, the twin
requisites are both present in the case. Thus,
Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be
allowed to remarry.
However, for respondents plea to prosper, he must
prove that his wife was naturalized as an American
citizen and must show sufficient proof of the divorce
decree. Cipriano failed to do this so the petition of
the Republic was granted.
51) Atienza vs. Brillantes
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, 29 March 1995
Quiason, J.:
FACTS: A complaint file by complainant Lupo A.
Atienza (Atienza) for gross immorality and
appearance of impropriety against respondent Judge
Francisco Brillantes, Jr. (Brillantes).
Atienza has two children with Yolanda De
Castrp (De Castro). There was a time when
Atienza chanced upon Brillantes sleeping on his
bedroom and was later on informed by their
houseboy that Brillantes is cohabiting wioth De
Castro.
Atienza claims that Brillantes was married to
Zenaida Ongkiko (Ongkiko) whom the latter has
five children.
Brillantes denied having married Ongkiko,
because it was celebrated without a marriage
license, the same incident also happened on their
second marriage. Brillantes was thereafter
abandoned by Ongkiko seventeen years ago.
Brillantes claims that when he married De
Castro in Los Angeles, California, he believed in
good faith and for all legal purposes that he was
50

single because his marriage with Ongkiko was
celebrated without a license.
ISSUE: Wether a judicial declaration that the
previous marriage was void is under Article 40 of the
Family Code required before entering into a second
marriage.
RULING: YES, respondent argues that the provision
of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to
him considering that his first marriage took place in
1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the
Philippines, while the second marriage took place in
1991 and governed by the Family Code.
Article 40 of the Family Code is
applicable to marriages entered into after the
effectively of the Family Code on 3 August 1988
regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides,
under Article 256 of the Family Code, said article is
given retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other Laws. This
is particularly true with Article 40 of the Family Code,
which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not
shown any vested right that was impaired by the
application of Article of the Family Code in this case.
>Digest by: Allan Matthew G. Bueser
52) Borja-Manzano vs. Sanchez
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329, 8 March 2001
cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must

apply:
1.) The man and woman have been
living together as husband and
wife for at least five years before
the marriage;
2.) The parties must have no legal
impediment to marry each other;
3.) The fact of absence of legal
impediment between the parties
must be present at the time of
marriage;
4.) The parties must execute an
affidavit stating that they lived
together for at least five years
and
are
without
legal
impediment to marry each other.
5.) The solemnizing officer must
execute a sworn statement that
he
had
ascertained
the
qualifications of the parties and
that he had found no legal
impediment to their marriage.
Not all this requirement are present in the
case at bar. It is significant to note that in their
separate affidavits executed on 22nd of March 1993
and sworn to before respondent Judge himself.
David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly
stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also in
their marriage contract, it was indicated that both
were separated.
Digest by: Allan Matthew G. Bueser
David, Jr. C,.J.:

FACTS: Complainant-petitioner Herminia BorjaManzano (Herminia) was the lawful wife of the late
David Manzano being married on 21 May 1966. On
22nd of March 1993, her husband contracted another
marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before
respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez (Judge
Sanchez). That Judge Sanchez should have known
that the marriage was a bigamous one as the
marriage clearly stated that both contracting parties
were Separate.
Judge Sanchez claims innocence as to the
fact of the previous marriage, and solemnized their
marriage in accordance with Article 34 of the Family
Code.
ISSUE: Whether Judge Sanchez should be held
liable.
RULING: YES, for Article 31 of the Family Code to
apply the provision on legal ratification of marital
51

VII. VOID MARRIAGES
53) Suntay vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
G.R. No. 132524, 29 December 1998
Martinez, J:
FACTS: Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio), son of
petitioner Federico Suntay (Federico), was married
to Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay (Isabel:) their marriage
was celebrated in the Portuguese Colony of Macao.
Subsequently it was declared as void ab initio or null
and void.
The basis of the Court of First Instance for
such a ruling was that Emilio suffers from a mental
aberration known as schizophrenia.
Emilio predeceased his mother, decedent
Cristina
Aguinaldo
Suntay.
Isabel,
herein
respondent, the daughter of Emilio and Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay, filed before the Regional Trial
Court a petition for letters of administration of the
intestate estate of her late grandmother Cristina
Aguinaldo Suntay.
Petitioner Federico moved to dismiss the
case on the ground of Article 922 of the Civil Code
an illegitimate child has no right to succeed by right
of representation the legitimate relatives of her father
or mother. Federico contends that Emilio Aguinaldo
Suntay, respondent Isabels father predeceased his
mother, the late Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. It opened
a path to succession by representation, as a
consequence of declaration by the Court of First
Instance that the marriage of respondent Isabels
parents is null and void. Making Isabel an illegitimate
child and has no right nor interest in the estate of her
paternal grandmother the decedent.
ISSUE: Whether Isabel Aguinaldo CojuangcoSuntay is a legitimate child despite the declaration
that her parents marriage was void ab initio denying
her succession right from her grandmother.
RULING: YES. the marriage of Emilio Suntay and
Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay was annulled on the basis
of Article 85 par. 3 of the Civil Code which refers to
marriages which are considered voidable. Being
conceived and born of a voidable marriage before
the decree of annulment, she is considered
legitimate.
The status of children born in voidable
marriages is governed by the second paragraph of
Article 89 which provides that:
Children conceived of voidable marriages before

the decree of annulment shall be considered as
legitimate
The annulment of the marriage by the court
abolishes the legal character of the society formed
by the putative spouses, but It cannot destroy
consequences which marital union produced during
its continuance.
54) Nial vs. Bayadaog
G.R. No. 133778, 14 March 2000
Ynares Santiago, J.:
FACTS: Pepito Nial (Pepito) and Teodulfa
Bellones was married on September 26, 1974
whereby petitioners Babyline, Ingrid, Archie and
Pepito Jr., a;; surnamed Nial were born. Pepito shot
Teodulfa resulting to the latters death. One year and
eight months after the incident Pepito and Norma
Bayadog, herein respondent (Bayadog) got
married without any marriage license. Pepito and
Bayadog executed an affidavit dated December 11,
1986 state that they had lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years thus exempting them
from securing a marriage license. Pepito died in a
car accident. Thereafter petitioners question the
validity of the subsequent marriage of Pepito and
Bayadog due to the absence of a marriage license
as it was void.
ISSUE: Whether the cohabitation of Pepito and
Bayadog is that one in contemplation of the law.
RULING: No, the five year period should be the
years immediately before the day of the marriage
and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity-meaning no third part
was involved at any time within the five years and
continuity that is unbroken.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and
respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they
have lived with each other as husband and wife for
at least five years prior to this wedding day. From the
time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time
of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty
months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and
respondent had started living with each other the
fact remains that their five year period of
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated
by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union
52

that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect
only by the absence of a marriage contract. Pepito
had a subsisting marriage at the time when he
started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial
that when they lived with each other, Pepito had
already been separated in fact from his lawful
spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even
where there was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make
any cohabitation by either spouse with any third
party as being as husband and wife.
55) Ty vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 127406, 27 November 2000
Quisumbing, J.:
FACTS: Private Respondent Edgardo M. Reyes
married in a civil ceremony Anna Maria Regina
Villanueva thereafter a church wedding was
celebrated. The marriage was subsequently
declared null and void ab initio for lack of marriage
license and lack of consent of the parties.
Even before the decree was issued
nullifying the marriage, private respondent Edgardo
M. Reyes married Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on 4
April 1979. The decree of nullity of his marriage to
Anna Maira was rendered only on 4 August 1980,
while his civil marriage to petitioner Ofelia P. Ty took
place on 4 April 1979.
ISSUE: Whether the decree of nullity of the first
marriage is required before a subsequent marriage
can be entered into validity.
RULING: YES, a declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause
of action or a ground for defense. (Art. 39 of the
Family Code). Where the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contacting a second marriage, the sole
basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage
to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment
declaring previous marriage void.
In the present case, the second
marriage of private respondent was entered into
1979, before Wiegel, at that time the prevailing rules
was found In Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first
marriage of private respondent being void for lack of
license and consent, there was no need for judicial
declaration of its nullity before he could contract a
second marriage. In this case, therefore, we
conclude that private respondents second marriage

to petitioner was valid.
56) Terre vs. Terre
A.M. No 2349, 3 July 1992
Per Curiam
FACTS: Complaint Dorothy B. Terre met respondent
Atty. Jordan Terre for the first time in 1979 as fourth
year high school classmates; Dorothy was then
married to Merillo Bercellina. Dorothy and Atty.
Jordan went to manila to pursue their education of
personal choosing. Atty. Jordan took up law at
Lyceum Univsersity, still courting Dorothy on the
process this time with more persistence. Jordan
explained to Dorothy that their marriage is void ab
initio due to the reason that Dorothy and Merlito
were first cousins, convince by his explanation and
having secured a favorable advice from her mother
and ex in-laws, Dorothy agreed to marry Atty.
Jordan. In their marriage license Atty. Jordan wrote
single as her status explaining that since her
marriage was void ab initio, no need to go to court
for a declaration. Later on Dorothy found out that
Atty. Jordan was already married to one Helina
Malicdem.
When Atty. Jordan prior marriage
with Dorothy was subsisting, no judicial declaration
was obtained as to nullity of or any judicial
declaration obtained as to nullity of such prior
marriage of respondent with complainant.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Jordan Terre should be liable
for gross immorality.
RULING: Yes, respondent Terre, being a lawyer,
knew or should have known that such an agreement
ran counter to the prevailing case law of the court
which holds that for purposes of determining
whether a person is legally free to contract a second
marriage, a judicial declaration that the first a
marriage was null and void ab initio is essential.
Even if we are to assume , arguendo merely, that
Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith,
the same result will follow. For if we are to hold
Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first marriage
to complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid,
with the result that his second marriage to Helina
Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous and
criminal in character.
53

VIII. PSCYHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
57) Santos vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995
En Banc:
FACTS: Petitioner Leouel Santos (Leouel), a first
lieutenant in the Philippine Army, and private
respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos (Julia)
were married. The ecstasy did not last long because
of the frequent interference of Julias parents into the
young spouses family affairs.
Julia left for United States of America to work as a
Nurse despite Leouels pleas to dissuade her. Seven
months after her departure, Julia called up Leoule
for the first time by long distance telephone. She
promised to return home upon the expiration of her
contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel
got a chance to visit the United States during a
training program under the auspices of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, he desperately tried to
locate Julia but his efforts were in vain.
Having failed, Leouel filed with the Regional Trial
Court a complaint for Voiding of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether Leouels petition to declare their
marriage with Julia void ab initio under Article 36 of
the Family Code will prosper.
RULING: No, Article 36 of the Family Code cannot
be taken and construed independently of, but must
stand in conjunction with, existing precept un our law
on marriage. Thus correlated, psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed
by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality
disorder clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psycholigic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. The law does not evidently envision,
upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to
have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion
is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which
considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be

legitimate.
The factual setting in the case at bench, in
no measure at all, can come close to the standards
required to decree nullity of marriage. Undeniably
and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even
desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably,
neither law nor society itself can always provide all
the specific answers to every individual problem.
58) Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 119190, 16 January 1997
Torres, Jr.:
FACTS: Petitioner Chi Ming Tsos (Petitioner) and
private respondent Gina Lao-Tsoi (Respondent)
were married at the Manila Cathedral. They went
and proceeded to the house of petitioners mother
and slept together on the same room in the first night
of their married life. Instead of enjoying the night of
their marriage, petitioner just went to bed and slept
on his side then turned his back and went to sleep.
There was no sexual intercourse between them
during the first night. The same thing happened on
the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a
private place where they can enjoy together during
their first week as husband and wife, they went to
Baguio City. But, they did so together with her
mother, uncle, his mother and his nephew. They
were all invited to join them. There was no sexual
intercourse between them, since petitioner avoided
her by taking a long walk during siesta time or just
by sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living
room. Respondent claims that she never seen her
husbands private parts.
They submitted themselves to medical
examinations, respondent was found to be healthy
and still a virgin but petitioner was told to return but
never did. It was found that petitioner is capable of
having sexual intercourse with a woman.
Respondent claims that petitioner is
impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show
his penis.
ISSUE: Whether their marriage can be declared as
null and void ab initio due to psychological
incapacity.
RULING: Yes, one of the essential marital
obligations under the Family Code is to procreate
54

children based on the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is
the basic end of marriage. Constant non-fulfillment
of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligations is
equivalent to incapacity.
It is sexual intimacy which brings spouses
wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift
and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a
function which enlivens the hope of procreation and
ensures the continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy
between petitioner and private respondent. That is
a shared feeling which between husband and wife
must be experienced not only by having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of
spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way
process. An expressive interest in each others
feelings at a time is needed by the other can go
along way in deepening the marital relationship.
Marriage is definitely not for children but for two
consenting adults who view the relationship with
love, amor gignit amore, respect, sacrifice and a
continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of
its value as a sublime social institution.
59) REPUBLIC VS. CA and MOLINA
GR No. 108763. February 13, 1997
FACTS: Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo
Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to
a son a year after. Reynaldo showed signs of
immaturity and irresponsibility on the early stages
of the marriage, observed from his tendency to
spend time with his friends and squandering his
money with them, from his dependency from his
parents, and his dishonesty on matters involving his
finances.
Thereafter, Reynaldo was relieved of his job
in 1986. Roridel became the sole breadwinner of the
family. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job
in Manila and proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo
left her and their child a week later. The couple are
separated-in-fact for more than three years.
On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified
petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of
her own testimony, that of two of her friends, a social
worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General
Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not
present any evidence as he appeared only during

the pre-trial conference.
On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered
judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor
General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court
of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto
the RTCs decision. Hence, the present recourse.
ISSUE:
Whether
opposing
or
conflicting
personalities should be construed as psychological
incapacity
HELD: In Santos v. Court of Appeals, where
psychological incapacity should refer to no less than
a mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at the
time the marriage is celebrated, and that there is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. Psychological
incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability. In the present case,
there is no clear showing to us that the psychological
defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be
more of a difficulty, if not outright refusal or
neglect in the performance of some marital
obligations. Mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity.
The Court, in this case, promulgated the
guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code, removing any visages
of it being the most liberal divorce procedure in the
world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the
plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological
incapacity must be medically or clinically identified,
alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by
expert, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) The
incapacity must be proven existing at the time of the
celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be
clinically or medically permanent or incurable; (5)
such illness must be grave enough; (6) the essential
marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68
to 71 of the Family Code as regards husband and
wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as
regards parents and their children; (7) interpretation
made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order
the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as
counsels for the State.
The Supreme Court granted the petition,
and reversed and set aside the assailed decision;
concluding that the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to
55

Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
60) BARCELONA vs. CA & TADEO R. BENGZON
G.R. No. 130087. September 24, 2003
FACS: On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo
filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against
petitioner petitioner Diana before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 87. On 9 May 1995,
respondent Tadeo filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition
which the trial court granted.
On 21 July 1995, respondent Tadeo filed anew a
Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner
Diana. Petitioner Diana filed a Motion to Dismiss the
second petition on two grounds. First, the second
petition fails to state a cause of action. Second, it
violates Supreme Court Administrative Circular No.
04-94 on forum shopping. Respondent Tadeo
opposed the Motion to which petitioner Diana filed
Additional Arguments in Support of the Motion.
The trial court issued on 18 September 1996
an Order deferring resolution of the Motion until the
parties ventilate their arguments in a hearing.
Petitioner
Diana
filed
a
motion
for
reconsideration. However, the trial court issued on
second order denying the motion.
Petitioner Diana filed a Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court of
Appeals assailing the trial courts first order deferring
action on the Motion and the second order denying
the motion for reconsideration on 14 February 1997.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and
denied the motion for reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals agreed with petitioner
Diana that the trial court in its first order erred in
deferring action on the Motion until after a hearing
on whether the complaint states a cause of action.
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals pointed out that
the trial courts second order corrected the situation
since in denying the motion for reconsideration, the
trial court in effect denied the Motion. The appellate
court agreed with the trial court that the allegations
in the second petition state a cause of action
sufficient to sustain a valid judgment if proven to be
true. The Court of Appeals also held that there was
no violation of Circular No. 04-94. To determine the
existence of forum shopping, the elements of litis
pendentia must exist or a final judgment in one case
must amount to res judicata in the other. In this
case, there is no litis pendentia because respondent
Tadeo had caused the dismissal without prejudice of
the first petition before filing the second petition.
Neither is there res judicata because there is no final
decision on the merits.
ISSUE: Whether the allegations of the second

petition for annulment of marriage sufficiently state a
cause of action.
HELD: The petition has no merit. Petitioner Dianas
contention that the second petition fails to state a
cause of action is untenable.
We find the second petition sufficiently
alleges a cause of action. The petition sought the
declaration of nullity of the marriage based on Article
36 of the Family Code. The petition alleged that
respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana were legally
married at the Holy Cross Parish after a whirlwind
courtship as shown by the marriage contract
attached to the petition. The couple established
their residence in Quezon City. The union begot five
children, Ana Maria, born on 8 November 1964;
Isabel, born on 28 October 1968; Ernesto Tadeo,
born on 31 March 1970; Regina Rachelle born on 7
March 1974; and Cristina Maria born in February
1978. The petition further alleged that petitioner
Diana was psychologically incapacitated at the time
of the celebration of their marriage to comply with
the essential obligations of marriage and such
incapacity subsists up to the present time.
Petitioner Diana argues that the second
petition falls short of the guidelines set forth in
Santos and Molina. Specifically, she contends that
the second petition is defective because it fails to
allege the root cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity. The second petition also fails to state
that the alleged psychological incapacity existed
from the celebration of the marriage and that it is
permanent or incurable. Further, the second petition
is devoid of any reference of the grave nature of the
illness to bring about the disability of the petitioner to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Lastly, the second petition did not even state the
marital obligations which petitioner Diana allegedly
failed to comply due to psychological incapacity.
The complete facts should allege the
physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative
of psychological incapacity at the time of the
celebration of the marriage but expert opinion
need not be alleged.
Procedural rules apply to actions pending
and unresolved at the time of their passage. The
obvious effect of the new Rules providing that
expert opinion need not be alleged in the petition
is that there is also no need to allege the root cause
of the psychological incapacity. Only experts in the
fields of neurological and behavioral sciences are
competent to determine the root cause of
56

psychological incapacity. Since the new Rules do not
require the petition to allege expert opinion on the
psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also
no need to allege in the petition the root cause of the
psychological incapacity.
The second petition states a cause of action
since it states the legal right of respondent Tadeo,
the correlative obligation of petitioner Diana, and the
act or omission of petitioner Diana in violation of the
legal right.
61) MARCOS vs. MARCOS
G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000
FACTS: Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the
Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on,
he was transferred to the Presidential Security
Command in Malacaang during the Marcos
Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other
hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the
Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa
Revolution, both of them sought a discharge from
the military service.
They first met sometime in 1980 when both
of them were assigned at the Malacaang Palace,
she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a
Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos.
Through telephone conversations, they became
acquainted and eventually became sweethearts.
After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they
resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss,
Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired
from the Bliss Development Corporation when she
was still single.
After the downfall of President Marcos, he
left the military service in 1987 and then engaged in
different business ventures that did not however
prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for
work so that their children would see him, instead of
her, as the head of the family and a good provider.
Due to his failure to engage in any gainful
employment, they would often quarrel and as a
consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would
even force her to have sex with him despite her
weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on
their children for a slight mistake and was so severe
in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several
times during their cohabitation, he would leave their
house. In 1992, they were already living separately.
All the while, she was engrossed in the
business of selling "magic uling" and chickens.
When she was discharged from the military service,
she concentrated on her business. Then, she
became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and
construction company, NS Ness Trading and

Construction Development Corporation.
On October 16, 1994 the spouses had a
bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately,
she did not want him to stay in their house anymore.
On that day, when she saw him in their house, she
was so angry that she lambasted him. He then
turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and
even on her mother who came to her aid. The
following day, October 17, 1994, she and their
children left the house and sought refuge in her
sister's house.
On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself
[to] medical examination at the Mandaluyong
Medical Center where her injuries were diagnosed
as contusions. Sometime in August 1995, she
together with her two sisters and driver, went to him
at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their
missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad.
After knowing the reason for their unexpected
presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even
beat her driver.
At the time of the filing of this case, she and
their children were renting a house in Camella,
Paraaque, while the appellant was residing at the
Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
In the case study conducted by Social
Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their
father as cruel and physically abusive to them. The
appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad
A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation while
the appellant on the other hand, did not.
The court a quo found the appellant to be
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations mainly because of his failure to find work
to support his family and his violent attitude towards
appellee and their children.
CA reversed the RTC and held that
psychological incapacity had not been established
by the totality of the evidence presented on the basis
that there is no evidence at all that would show that
the appellant was suffering from an incapacity which
was psychological or mental - not physical to the
extent that he could not have known the obligations
he was assuming: that the incapacity was grave, had
preceded the marriage and was incurable."
Hence, this Petition.
ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the Honorable Court of
Appeals could set aside the findings by the Regional
Trial Court of psychological incapacity of a
respondent in a Petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage simply because the respondent did not
subject himself to psychological evaluation.
57

2) Whether or not the totality of evidence presented
and the demeanor of all the witnesses should be the
basis of the determination of the merits of the
Petition.
HELD: 1)The guidelines incorporate the three basic
requirements earlier mandated by the Court in
Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The
foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician
examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be
"medically or clinically identified." What is important
is the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the party's psychological condition. For
indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.
2) We rule in the negative. Although this Court is
sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to
provide material support to the family and may have
resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the
totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of
psychological incapacity on his part. There is
absolutely no showing that his "defects" were
already present at the inception of the marriage or
that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be
attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was
not gainfully employed for a period of more than six
years. It was during this period that he became
intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral
support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was
traced only to said period and not to the inception of
the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence
showing that his condition is incurable, especially
now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is
not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration
of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
one is about to assume. These marital obligations
are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221
and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal
separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted
in psychological incapacity but on physical violence,
moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction,

drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like. At best, the evidence
presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for
legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a
convenient divorce law, this Court laid down the
procedural requirements for its invocation in Molina.
Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the
dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to
show that the alleged psychological incapacity is
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability; and for her failure to observe the
guidelines outlined in Molina.
62) REPUBLIC vs. LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO
G.R. No. 149498. May 20, 2004
FACTS: On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita filed a
complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to
her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national,
on the ground of psychological incapacity.
In October 1986, she and Toshio started a
common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived
in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio
went back to Japan and stayed there for half of
1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their
child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were
married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the Municipal
Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to
respondent,
Toshio
was
psychologically
incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities,
which incapacity became manifest only after the
marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio
returned to Japan and promised to return by
Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family.
After sending money to respondent for two months,
Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote
him several times but he never responded.
Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her
friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did
not bother to see her and their child.
The summons issued to Toshio remained
unserved because he was no longer residing at his
given address. Because Toshio failed to file a
responsive pleading after the lapse of 60 days from
publication, respondent filed a motion dated
November 5, 1996 to refer the case to the
prosecutor for investigation. The trial court granted
the motion on November 7, 1996.
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando
I. Gonzales filed a report finding that no collusion
58

existed between the parties. On February 13, 1997,
the trial court granted respondents motion to
present her evidence ex parte. She then testified on
how Toshio abandoned his family. She thereafter
offered documentary evidence to support her
testimony.
The trial court rendered a decision declaring
the marriage between petitioner Lolita and Toshio
null and void on the basis of the records that
respondent spouses failed to fulfill his obligations as
husband of the petitioner and father to his daughter.
Respondent
remained
irresponsible
and
unconcerned over the needs and welfare of his
family.
The Office of the Solicitor General,
representing herein petitioner Republic of the
Philippines, appealed to the Court of Appeals but the
same was denied.
The appellate court thus concluded that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital obligations to his family, and to
"observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support" pursuant to Article
68 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The
appellate court emphasized that this case could not
be equated with Republic vs. Court of Appeals and
Molina and Santos vs. Court of Appeals. In those
cases, the spouses were Filipinos while this case
involved a "mixed marriage," the husband being a
Japanese national. Hence, this petition,
ISSUE: Whether or not the mere abandonment by
Toshio of his family and his insensitivity to them
constitute psychological incapacity.
HELD: We rule in favor of petitioner.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987
Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as
the basic autonomous social institution and marriage
as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.
What is important is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the partys
psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to.
We find that the totality of evidence
presented fell short of proving that Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital
responsibilities. Toshios act of abandonment was
doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged
nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological
illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio

abandoned his family, no other evidence was
presented showing that his behavior was caused by
a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there
was no need for an actual medical examination, it
would have greatly helped respondents case had
she presented evidence that medically or clinically
identified his illness. This could have been done
through an expert witness. This respondent did not
do.
We must remember that abandonment is
also a ground for legal separation. There was no
showing that the case at bar was not just an
instance of abandonment in the context of legal
separation. We cannot presume psychological
defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his
family immediately after the celebration of the
marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to
prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility
and duty as a married person; it is essential that he
must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to
some psychological, not physical, illness. There was
no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in
the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates a
person from accepting and complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
According to the appellate court, the
requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply
here because the present case involves a "mixed
marriage," the husband being a Japanese national.
We disagree. In proving psychological
incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien
spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient
in the application of the rules merely because the
spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated
happens to be a foreign national. The medical and
clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity
were formulated on the basis of studies of human
behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for
determining psychological incapacity should apply to
any person regardless of nationality.
63) DEDEL vs. DEDEL
G.R. No. 151867. January 29, 2004
FACTS: Petitioner David met respondent Sharon
while he was working in the advertising business of
his father. Eventually, their relationship resulted in
the exchange of marital vows before the City Court
of Pasay on September 28, 1966 and followed by
civil marriage in a church wedding on May 20, 1967.
The union produced four children. The conjugal
59

partnership, nonetheless, acquired neither property
nor debt.
Petitioner avers that during the marriage,
Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and
immature wife and mother. She had extra-marital
affairs with several men: a dentist in the AFP; a
Lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command
and later a Jordanian national.
Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila
Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a
clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite
the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit
relationship with the Jordanian national named
Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with whom
she had two children. When Mustafa Ibrahim left the
country, Sharon returned to petitioner bringing along
her two children by Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her
back and even considered the two illegitimate
children as his own. Thereafter, on December 9,
1995, Sharon abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in
Jordan with their two children. Since then, Sharon
would only return to the country on special
occasions.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition seeking
the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity, as defined in
Article 36 of the Family Code, before the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 149. Summons was effected by
publication in the Pilipino Star Ngayon, a newspaper
of general circulation in the country considering that
Sharon did not reside and could not be found in the
Philippines.
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan,
who testified that she conducted a psychological
evaluation of petitioner and found him to be
conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist
who wants all tasks and projects completed up to the
final detail and who exerts his best in whatever he
does.
On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that
Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality
Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity;
that she committed several indiscretions and had no
capacity for remorse, even bringing with her the two
children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner.
Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the
marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and
abandonment of her family are indications of AntiSocial
Personality
Disorder
amounting
to
psychological incapacity to perform the essential
obligations of marriage.
The trial court declared the marriage
between the spouses Dedel null and void on the
ground of psychological incapacity on the part of
respondent. Respondent Republic of the Philippines,
through the Solicitor General, appealed alleging that

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A
DECISION WITHOUT A CERTIFICATION HAVING
BEEN ISSUED BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AS
REQUIRED IN THE MOLINA CASE.
The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside
the judgment of the trial court and ordered dismissal
of the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage.Petitioners motion for reconsideration was
denied in a Resolution dated January 8, 2002.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the totality of the evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated
HELD: No. The petition is DENIED.
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at
the inception of marriage, like the state of a party
being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract
voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the
marriage, they become mere grounds for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
These provisions, however, do not necessarily
preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the
degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential
parameters are established, every circumstance that
may have some bearing on the degree, extent and
other conditions of that incapacity must, in every
case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that
no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is
peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinion
of psychiatrists, psychologists and persons with
expertise in psychological disciplines might be
helpful or even desirable.
Respondents sexual infidelity can hardly
qualify as being mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that she could not have known the obligations
she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given a valid assumption thereof. It appears that
respondents promiscuity did not exist prior to or at
the inception of the marriage. What is, in fact,
disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at
its celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and
which produced four children.
Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and
abandonment do not by themselves constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of
60

the Family Code. Neither could her emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with
psychological incapacity. It must be shown that
these acts are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make respondent completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of the
marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity
or sexual promiscuity.
64) CARATING-SIAYNGCO vs. SIAYNGCO
G.R. NO. 158896. October 27, 2004
FACTS: Petitioner Juanita and respondent Manuel
were married at civil rites on 27 June 1973 and
before the Catholic Church on August 11 1973. After
discovering that they could not have a child of their
own, the couple decided to adopt a baby boy in
1977, who they named Jeremy.
On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four
(24) years of married life together, respondent
Manuel filed for the declaration of its nullity on the
ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner
Juanita. He alleged that all throughout their
marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering
and selfish attitude towards him.
In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that
respondent Manuel is still living with her at their
conjugal home in Malolos, Bulacan; that he invented
malicious stories against her so that he could be free
to marry his paramour. The trial court denied
respondent Manuels petition for declaration of nullity
of his marriage to petitioner Juanita.
The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC
decision, relying mainly on the psychiatric evaluation
of Dr. Garcia finding both Manuel and Juanita
psychologically incapacitated. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity against petitioner Juanita
and/or respondent Manuel.
HELD: The petition for review is hereby granted.
The presumption is always in favor of the
validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio. In the case at bar, respondent Manuel
failed to prove that his wifes lack of respect for him,
her jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her
outbursts and her controlling nature, and her inability
to endear herself to his parents are grave
psychological maladies that paralyze her from
complying with the essential obligations of marriage.
Neither is there any showing that these defects

were already present at the inception of the marriage
or that they are incurable. In fact, the psychiatrist
reported that petitioner was psychologically
capacitated to comply with the basic and essential
The Court of Appeals committed reversible
error in holding that respondent Manuel is
psychologically incapacitated. The psychological
report of Dr. Garcia, which is respondent Manuels
own evidence, contains candid admissions of
petitioner Juanita, the person in the best position to
gauge whether or not her husband fulfilled the
essential marital obligations of marriage.
Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not
constitute psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown
that respondent Manuels unfaithfulness is a
manifestation of a disordered personality, which
makes him completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of the marital state and not
merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of his
own flesh and blood. In herein case, respondent
Manuel has admitted that: "I had [extra-marital]
affairs because I wanted to have a child at that
particular point
The psychological report of respondent
Manuels witness, Dr. Garcia, showed that the root
cause of petitioner Juanitas behavior is traceable
not from the inception of their marriage as required
by law but from her experiences during the
marriage, e.g., her in-laws disapproval of her as
they wanted their son to enter the priesthood, her
husbands philandering, admitted no less by him,
and her inability to conceive. Thus, from the totality
of the evidence adduced by both parties, we have
been allowed a window into the Siayngcoss life and
have perceived therefrom a simple case of a married
couple drifting apart, becoming strangers to each
other, with the husband consequently falling out of
love and wanting a way out.
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not
a null and void marriage. Mere showing of
irreconcilable
differences
and
conflicting
personalities in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity.
65) VILLALON VS. MA. CORAZON VILLALON
G.R. No. 167206. November 18, 2005
FACTS: Petitioner was married to respondent for 18
years. Petitioner filed a petition for annulment of his
marriage to respondent, citing psychological
incapacity on his part as a ground. Petitioner alleged
61

the psychological disorder as that of Narcissistic
Histrionic Personality Disorder with Cassanova
Complex.
On July 12, 1996, petitioner Jaime filed a
petition for the annulment of his marriage to
respondent Ma. Corazon before the RTC of Pasig
City on the ground of petitioners psychological
incapacity which he claimed existed even prior to his
marriage.
According to petitioner, the manifestations of
his psychological incapacity were: (a) his chronic
refusal to maintain harmonious family relations and
his lack of interest in having a normal married life;
(b) his immaturity and irresponsibility in refusing to
accept the essential obligations of marriage as
husband to his wife; (c) his desire for other women
and a life unchained from any spousal obligation;
and (d) his false assumption of the fundamental
obligations of companionship and consortium
towards respondent. Petitioner thus prayed that his
marriage to respondent be declared null and void ab
initio.
Respondent filed an answer denying
petitioners allegations. She asserted that her 18year marriage to petitioner has been fruitful and
characterized by joy, contentment and hopes for
more growth in their relationship and that their
marital squabbles were normal based on community
standards. Petitioners success in his professional
life aided him in performing his role as husband,
father, and provider. Respondent claimed that
petitioners commitment to his paternal and marital
responsibilities was beyond reproach.
On October 7, 1996, the trial court directed
the prosecutor to conduct an investigation on
whether there was collusion between the parties. As
a result of the report, there was no collusion. The
OSG opposed to the petition. Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued.
Petitioner testified that he met respondent
sometime in the early seventies when he applied for
a job at Metrobank, where respondent was
employed as a foreign exchange trader. They began
dating in 1975 and had a romantic relationship soon
thereafter. After going steady for about two years,
petitioner and respondent were married at the San
Pancracio Chapel in Paco, Manila on April 22, 1978.
In the middle of 1993, petitioner decided to separate
from respondent because their marriage reached a
point where there was no longer any communication
between them and their relationship became devoid
of love, affection, support and respect due to his
constant urge to see other women. Moreover, their
relationship tended to be one-sided since
respondent was unresponsive and hardly ever

showed her love, needs, wants and emotions.
Petitioner admitted that on certain occasions
before his marriage, he had two girlfriends at the
same time. He also saw other women even when
he became engaged to and, later on, married
respondent. Respondent learned of his affairs but
reacted in a subdued manner. Petitioner surmised
that it was respondents nature to be silent and
withdrawn.
In January 1994, petitioner left the conjugal
abode and moved into an apartment located five to
ten minutes away. Before he left, he and his wife
spoke to their three children who, at that time, were
14, 8, and 6 years old, respectively. Petitioner
consulted a child psychologist before talking to his
children. He considered himself as a good and
loving father and described his relationship with the
children as great. Despite the separation, petitioner
would regularly visit his children who stayed with him
on alternate weekends, voluntarily gave monthly
support to the children and paid for their tuition fees
and also shouldered the childrens medical
expenses as well as the maintenance and
miscellaneous fees for the conjugal abode.
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad Dayan, a
clinical psychologist, to testify on his alleged
psychological disorder of Narcissistic Histrionic
Personality Disorder with Casanova Complex. Dr.
Dayan submitted a psychological report on both
petitioner and respondent based on clinical
interviews and psychological tests.
Respondent testified that she first learned of
her husbands infidelity in 1980. She discovered that
he was having an affair with one of her friends who
worked as a trader in her husbands company. The
affair was cut short when the woman left for the
United States to work. Eventually, she and petitioner
were able to rebuild their relationship and overcome
the crisis.
When asked about the womanizing ways of
her husband, respondent averred that she did not
know whether her husbands acts could be deemed
womanizing since there were only two instances of
infidelity which occurred 13 years apart. She also
theorized that petitioner wanted to have their
marriage annulled so he could marry her old friend.
She stated that she has not closed her doors to
petitioner but the latter would have to give up his
extra-marital relationship.
To controvert the findings of petitioners
expert witness, respondent presented a psychiatrist,
Dr. Cecilia Villegas, who testified that Dr. Dayans
findings were incomplete because a team
approach was necessary in evaluating an
62

individuals personality. An evaluation of ones
psychological capacity requires the expertise of a
psychiatrist and social worker.
The trial court declared the marriage
between petitioner and respondent null and void on
the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of
petitioner. Thereafter. The respondent and the OSG
seasonably filed an appeal from the decision of the
trial court.
The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision
reversed and set aside the trial courts decision.
Contrary to the trial courts findings, the appellate
court held that petitioner failed to prove the juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability of his alleged
psychological
incapacity.
Petitioners
sexual
infidelity was made to appear as symptomatic of a
grave psychological disorder when, in reality, the
same merely resulted from a general dissatisfaction
with the marriage.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
of the appellate courts decision but it was denied.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was indeed
psychologically incapacitated to render his marital
obligations
HELD: The petition has no merit.
The totality of the evidence in this case does
not support a finding that petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations.
The illness must be shown as downright incapacity
or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will.
Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient
proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological
incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of
unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make petitioner completely unable
to discharge the essential obligations of marriage
Petitioner failed to establish the incurability
and gravity of his alleged psychological disorder. He
simply fall out of love and has consequently refused
to stay married to her. Refusal to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage is not psychological
incapacity within the meaning of law.
FACTS: On February 20, 2001, the RTC of Pasig

City, Branch 151 rendered a Decision denying the
petition for declaration of nullity of petitioners
marriage with Brix Ferraris. The trial court noted that
suffering from epilepsy does not amount to
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil
Code and the evidence on record were insufficient to
prove
infidelity.
Petitioners
motion
for
reconsideration was denied in an Order dated April
20, 2001 where the trial court reiterated that there
was no evidence that respondent is mentally or
physically ill to such an extent that he could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed in toto the judgment of the trial court
on the basis that the evidence on record did not
convincingly establish that respondent was suffering
from psychological incapacity or that his defects
were incurable and already present at the inception
of the marriage. The Court of Appeals also found
that Dr. Dayans testimony failed to establish the
substance of respondents psychological incapacity;
that she failed to explain how she arrived at the
conclusion that the respondent has a mixed
personality disorder; that she failed to clearly
demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening
disabling factor or an adverse integral element in
respondents character that effectively incapacitated
him from accepting and complying with the essential
marital obligations.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was
denied for lack of merit; thus, she filed a petition for
review on certiorari with this Court.
Petitioner filed the instant motion for
reconsideration. The Court required respondent Brix
Ferraris to file comment but failed to comply; thus,
he is deemed to have waived the opportunity to file
comment. Further, the Court directed the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on
petitioners motion for reconsideration which it
complied on March 2, 2006.
After considering the arguments of both the
petitioner and the OSG, the Court resolves to deny
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not Brix is psychologically
incapacitated as to render his marriage with Amy
void.
66) A. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS

FERRARIS
G.R. No. 162368 July 17, 2006
VS. BRIX
HELD: No. The Court found Brixs alleged mixed

personality disorder, the"leaving-the-ho use" attitude
whenever he and Amy quarreled, the violent
tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual
63

infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and
his preference to spend more time with his band
mates than his family, are not rooted on some
debilitating psychological condition but a mere
refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
A mere showing of irreconcilable differences
and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute
psychological incapacity; it is not enough to prove
that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities
and duties as married persons; it is essential that
they must be shown to be incapable of doing so due
to some psychological, not physical, illness.
The intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to
the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.
67) ZAMORA VS. CA and Norma ZAMORA
G.R. NO. 141917. February 7, 2007
Facts:
Bernardino Zamora and Norma Zamora were
married on June 4, 1970. Their union was not
blessed of a child. Two years after, Norma left the
country and went to the US to work as a nurse. After
two years she did come back in the Philippines and
thereafter she made periodic visits until she was
already a US citizen.
Bernardino filed a complaint for declaration of nullity
of marriage anchored on the alleged psychological
incapacity of Norma. To support his position, he
alleged that his wife was horrified by the mere
thought of having children as evidenced by the fact
that she had not borne him a child. Furthermore, he
also alleged that she abandoned him by living in the
US and that throughout their marriage they live
together for not more than three years. He alleged
that Art.36 of the Family Code provides that the
marriage contracted by any party who at that time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the marital obligations of the marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization and
that one of the essential marital obligations is to
procreate children through sexual cooperation which
is the basic end of marriage.
On the other hand, Norma denied that she refused
to have a child. She portrayed herself as one who
loves children as she is a nurse by profession and
that she would from time to time borrow her

husbands niece and nephews to care for them.
Issue:
Whether or not Norma was suffering from
psychological incapacity, hence their marriage be
declared void?
Held:
No. Norma was not psychologically incapacitated.
Under the law, the facts alleged in the petition and
the evidence presented, considered totality, should
be sufficient to convince the court of the
psychological incapacity of the party concerned.
In the case at bar the petition filed by Bernardino
was not sufficient as to substantiate his allegations
that Norma is psychologically incapacitated. His
allegations relating to her refusal to cohabit with him
and to bear a child was strongly disputed, as the
records undeniably bear out. Furthermore, the acts
and behavior of Norma that Bernardino cited
occurred during the marriage, and there is no proof
that the former exhibited a similar predilection even
before or the inception of the marriage.
68) DOMINGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 104818. September 17, 1993
FACTS:
Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition on May 29,
1991 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and
Separation of Property" against Roberto Domingo.
The petition alleged among others that: they were
married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth
Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract
Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License issued
at Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a
previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on
April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still
existing; she came to know of the prior marriage only
sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued
them for bigamy; from January 23, 1979 up to the
present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia and
she used to come to the Philippines only when she
would avail of the one-month annual vacation leave
granted by her foreign employer; since 1983 up to
the present, he has been unemployed and
completely dependent upon her for support and
subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she
purchased real and personal properties with a total
amount of approximately P350,000.00, which are
64

under the possession and administration of Roberto;
sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month
vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with
another woman; she further discovered that he had
been disposing of some of her properties without her
knowledge or consent; she confronted him about this
and thereafter appointed her brother Moises R.
Avera as her attorney-in-fact to take care of her
properties; he failed and refused to turn over the
possession and administration of said properties to
her brother/attorney-in-fact. The petition prayed that
a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from
exercising any act of administration and ownership
over said properties; their marriage be declared null
and void and of no force and effect; and Delia
Soledad be declared the sole and exclusive owner of
all properties acquired at the time of their void
marriage and such properties be placed under the
proper management and administration of the
attorney-in-fact.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a
void marriage is necessary. If in the affirmative,
whether the same should be filed only for purposes
of remarriage.
HELD:
Yes, a judicial declaration of a void marriage is
necessary and it can be filed even if not for the
purpose of remarriage.
Under the law, parties to a marriage should not be
allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if
such be the fact but must first secure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they
can be allowed to marry again.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
"ART. 40.The absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void." (n).
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the
significant clause denotes that such final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void need not be
obtained only for purposes of remarriage.
Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances
where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage for purposes other than
remarriage, such as in case of an action for
liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of
property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as
an action for the custody and support of their

common children and the delivery of the latter's
presumptive legitimes.
Therefore, in the instance where a party who has
previously contracted a marriage which remains
subsisting desires to enter into another marriage
which is legally unassailable, he is required by law to
prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity.
But this he may do on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
69) BELTRAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000
Facts:
Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were
married on June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate
Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City.
They were blessed with four children. After 24 years
of marriage, Beltran filed a petition for nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code before the RTC
of Quezon City.
Charmaine Felix answer she alleged that it was
Meyanard who abandoned the conjugal home and
lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting.
Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint
for concubinage against Meynard and his paramour
before the City Prosecutor's Office of Makati who, in
a Resolution found probable cause and ordered the
filing of an Information against them. The case,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 236176, was filed
before the MTC of Makati City.
On March 20, 1998, Meynard filed a Motion to Defer
Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant
of Arrest in the criminal case. He argued that the
pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of
his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the
determination of the criminal case.
Issue:
Whether or not the pending case involving a
declaration of nullity of marriage based on article 36
is a prejudicial question to a criminal action of
concubinage involving identical parties.
Held: No. It is not a prejudicial question.
Under the law, the pendency of the case for
declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a
prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a
civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal
65

action as to cause the suspension of the latter
pending the final determination of the civil case, it
must appear not only that the said civil case involves
the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based, but also that in the resolution of the
issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined.
In the case at bar, the parties to the marriage should
not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity,
for the same must be submitted to the judgment of
the competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and
so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore,
he who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy."
Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his
wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
concubinage.
70) MARBELA-BOBIS vs. ISAGANI BOBIS
G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000
FACTS:
On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first
marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Without
said marriage having been annulled, nullified or
terminated, the same respondent contracted a
second marriage with petitioner Imelda MarbellaBobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third
marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez.
Based on petitioner's complaint-affidavit, an
information for bigamy was filed against respondent
on February 25, 1998, which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. Q98-75611 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 226, Quezon City. Sometime
thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the
judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first
marriage on the ground that it was celebrated
without a marriage license. Respondent then filed a
motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal
case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for
nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question
to the criminal case. The trial judge granted the
motion to suspend the criminal case in an Order
dated December 29, 1998.
ISSUE:
Whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for

declaration of nullity of a previous marriage
constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case
for bigamy.
HELD:
No, it is not a prejudicial question.
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, which was
effective at the time of celebration of the second
marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of
nullity of a previous marriage before a party may
remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not
for the parties, particularly the accused, to determine
the validity or invalidity of the marriage. Whether or
not the first marriage was void for lack of a license is
a matter of defense because there is still no judicial
declaration of its nullity at the time the second
marriage was contracted. It should be remembered
that bigamy can successfully be prosecuted
provided all its elements concur, two of which are a
previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which
would have been valid had it not been for the
existence at the material time of the first marriage.
Therefore, Isagani cannot be permitted to use his
own malfeasance to defeat the criminal action
against him. The court should then immediately
proceed with the criminal case without waiting for the
result of the civil case.
71) MERCADO vs. CONSUELO TAN
G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000
FACTS:
Ma. Consuelo Tan and Vincent Mercado were
married in 1991. However, at the time of the
marriage of Tan with Mercado, the latter was actually
a married man, having been in lawful wedlock with
Ma. Thelma Oliva on 1976. In the first marriage he
have two children and in the second marriage he
has one child.
On October 5, 1992, a complaint for bigamy was
filed by Tan against Mercado. A month later, a
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was
filed by Mercado against Oliva. On May 6, 1993, the
trial court declared the marriage of Mercado and
Oliva as void ab initio. Nevertheless, the lower court
found accused Mercado guilty of the crime of bigamy
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower
court by stating that accused Mercado failed to
comply with Article 40 of the Family Code.
66

ISSUE:
Whether or not accused Mercado is guilty of bigamy
despite of his having obtained a judicial declaration
of nullity of marriage?
RULING:
Yes, Mercado is guilty of bigamy.
Under Article 40 of the Family Code and the rulings
enunciated in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy and Domingo
vs. Court of Appeals which expressly state that in
order to re-marry, one must first obtain a judicial
declaration of nullity of the previous marriage.
In the case at bar, accused Mercado failed to comply
with the requirement because he married Tan
without first securing a judicial declaration of his
marriage with Oliva. He only filed for such a month
after he was charge with the crime of bigamy.
Therefore, the crime of bigamy was already
consummated when he contracted a second
marriage while the first was still subsisting. The
subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the
first marriage was immaterial.
72) MORIGO V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 145226, February 6, 2004
Facts:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates
four years.. After the school year 1977-1978 they
lost contact with each other. Yet, after some time,
when Lucia was in Singapore she sent a letter to
Lucio, their friendship was rekindled. They became
sweethearts and on 1986 Lucia returned to the
Philippines. On 1990 they eventually got married.
After their marriage celebration, Lucia once again
left for Canada. After a year, Lucia filed with the
Ontario Court a petition for divorce against Lucio
which was granted on January 17, 1992.
In October of the same year, Lucio married Maria
Lumbago. Thereafter, he filed a petition for nullity of
his marriage to Lucia on the ground that no marriage
ceremony actually took place. In 1993, an
Information for Bigamy was filed against Lucio. He
moved for the suspension of the arraignment
alleging that the civil case for judicial nullification of
his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question
in the bigamy case. His motion was denied.
and on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the

conviction of Bigamy. It ruled that what is sought to
be punished by Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code is the act of contracting a second marriage
before the first marriage had been dissolved.
Issue:
Whether or not Lucio is guilty of bigamy by
contracting a marriage with Maria, considering that
there was no marriage ceremony took place with his
marriage with Lucia.
Held:
No, he is not guilty.
Under the law, the first element of Bigamy is that the
offender has been legally married and under the
principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared
void ab initio, the two were never married "from the
beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears
no legal effect.
In the case at bar, no marriage ceremony at all was
performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer.
Lucio and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage
contract on their own. The mere private act of
signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a
valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial
declaration of nullity. Legally speaking, Lucio was
never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first
marriage to speak of.
Therefore, Lucio is acquitted by the Supreme Court
from the charge of Bigamy because Lucio was not
married to Lucia at the time he contracted his
marriage with Maria,
73) CALISTERIO vs. MARIETTA CALISTERIO
G.R. No. 136467, April 6, 2000
Facts:
On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate,
leaving several parcels of land with an estimated
value of P604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by his
wife, Marietta Calisterio. Teodorico was the second
husband of Marietta who had previously been
married to James William Bounds. James Bounds
disappeared without a trace on 11 February 1947.
Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven years
later, or on 08 May 1958, without Marietta having
priorly secured a court declaration that James was
presumptively dead.
Subsequently, Lucio was convicted by the Trial Court
67

On 09 October 1992, Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a
surviving sister of Teodorico, filed with the Regional
Trial Court a petition entitled, "In the Matter of
Intestate Estate of the Deceased Teodorico
Calisterio y Cacabelos, Antonia Armas claiming to
be the sole surviving heir of Teodorico Calisterio,
and that the marriage between the latter and
Marietta Espinosa Calisterio being allegedly
bigamous and thereby null and void. Marietta
opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her first
marriage with James Bounds had been dissolved
due to the latter's absence, his whereabouts being
unknown, for more than eleven years before she
contracted her second marriage with Teodorico.
Contending to be the surviving spouse of Teodorico,
she sought priority in the administration of the estate
of the decedent.
On 17 January 1996, the lower court handed down
its decision in favor of petitioner Antonia and
declared the latter as the sole heir of the estate of
Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos. Respondent
Marietta appealed the decision of the trial court to
the Court of Appeals which ruled in her favor.
Issue:
Whether or not the second marriage, having been
contracted during the regime of the Civil Code,
should be deemed valid notwithstanding the
absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive
death of James Bounds.
Held:
The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and
Marietta was solemnized on 08 May 1958. The law
in force at that time was the Civil Code, not the
Family Code which took effect only on 03 August
1988. Article 256 of the Family Code itself limited its
retroactive governance only to cases where it
thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws.
Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant
controversy is Article 83 (2) of the New Civil Code
which provides: Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently
contracted by any person during the lifetime of the
first spouse of such person with any person other
than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from
its performance, unless: (2) The first spouse had
been absent for seven consecutive years at the time
of the second marriage without the spouse present
having news of the absentee being alive, or if the
absentee, though he has been absent for less than
seven years, is generally considered as dead and
believed to be so by the spouse present at the time
of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the

absentee is presumed dead according to articles
390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be
valid in any of the three cases until declared null and
void by a competent court.
Under the foregoing provisions a judicial declaration
of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary
as long as the prescribed period of absence is met.
It is equally noteworthy that the marriage in these
exceptional cases are, by the explicit mandate of
Article 83, to be deemed valid "until declared null
and void by a competent court." It follows that the
burden of proof would be, in these cases, on the
party assailing the second marriage.
Therefore, it remained undisputed that Mariettas
first husband, James Bounds, had been absent or
had disappeared for more than eleven years before
she entered into a second marriage in 1958 with the
deceased Theodorico Calisterio. This second
marriage, having been contracted during the regime
of the civil code should thus be deemed valid.
74) REPUBLIC vs. NOLASCO
220 SCRA 21
FACTS:
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco
filed before the RTC of Antique a petition for the
declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet
Monica Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family
Code. The petition prayed that respondent's wife be
declared presumptively dead or, in the alternative,
that the marriage be declared null and void. The
Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition
through the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who
had been deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in
the instant case. The Republic argued, first, that
Nolasco did not possess a "well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead," 2 and second,
Nolasco's attempt to have his marriage annulled in
the same proceeding was a "cunning attempt" to
circumvent the law on marriage. During trial,
respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman
and that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a
British subject, in a bar in England during one of his
ship's port calls. From that chance meeting onwards,
Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent on his
ship for six (6) months until they returned to
respondent's hometown of San Jose, Antique after
his seaman's contract expired. Respondent married
Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique, in
Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in
the Cathedral of San Jose.
68

Respondent further testified that after the marriage
celebration, he obtained another employment
contract as a seaman and left his wife with his
parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in January
1983, while working overseas, respondent received
a letter from his mother informing him that Janet
Monica had given birth to his son. The same letter
informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique.
Respondent claimed he then immediately asked
permission to leave his ship to return home. He
arrived in Antique in November 1983. Respondent
further testified that his efforts to look for her himself
whenever his ship docked in England proved
fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had
sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road,
Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar
where he and Janet Monica first met, were all
returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired
from among friends but they too had no news of
Janet Monica. On cross-examination, respondent
stated that he had lived with and later married Janet
Monica Parker despite his lack of knowledge as to
her family background. He insisted that his wife
continued to refuse to give him such information
even after they were married. He also testified that
he did not report the matter of Janet Monica's
disappearance to the Philippine government
authorities.
Respondent presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as
his witness. She testified that her daughter-in-law
Janet Monica had expressed a desire to return to
England even before she had given birth to Gerry
Nolasco. When asked why her daughter-in-law might
have wished to leave Antique, respondent's mother
replied that Janet Monica never got used to the rural
way of life in San Jose, Antique. Alicia Nolasco also
said that she had tried to dissuade Janet Monica
from leaving as she had given birth to her son just
fifteen days before, but when she (Alicia) failed to do
so, she gave Janet Monica P22,000.00 for her
expenses before she left for England. She further
claimed that she had no information as to the
missing person's present whereabouts.The trial
court granted Nolasco's petition declaring Janet
Monica Parker Nolasco as presumptively dead,
without prejudice to her reappearance. The Republic
appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the
trial court erred in declaring Janet Monica Parker
presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco
had failed to show that there existed a well founded
belief for such declaration.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision. Hence this Petition for Review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief
that his wife is already dead.
HELD:
Four (4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive
death under Article 41 of the Family Code:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing
for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance
occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Article
391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded
belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary
proceeding
for
the
declaration
of
presumptive death of the absentee.
The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to
conduct a search for his missing wife with such
diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief"
that she is dead.
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the
investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in
his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's
whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a
reasonable or well-founded belief that she was
already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique
after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of
seeking the help of local authorities or of the British
Embassy, he secured another seaman's contract
and went to London, a vast city of many millions of
inhabitants, to look for her there. In Respondent's
testimony, however, showed that he confused
London for Liverpool and this casts doubt on his
supposed efforts to locate his wife in England. The
Court of Appeal's justification of the mistake, to wit:
Well, while the cognoscente would readily know the
geographical difference between London and
Liverpool, for a humble seaman like Gregorio the
two places could mean one place in England, the
port where his ship docked and where he found
Janet. Our own provincial folks, every time they
leave home to visit relatives in Pasay City, Kalookan
City, or Paraaque, would announce to friends and
relatives, "We're going to Manila." This apparent
error in naming of places of destination does not
appear to be fatal. Is not well taken. There is no
analogy between Manila and its neighboring cities,
69

on one hand, and London and Liverpool, on the
other, which, as pointed out by the Solicitor-General,
are around three hundred fifty (350) kilometers
apart. We do not consider that walking into a major
city like Liverpool or London with a simple hope of
somehow bumping into one particular person there
which is in effect what Nolasco says he did can
be regarded as a reasonably diligent search.
The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet
Monica declined to give any information as to her
personal background even after she had married
respondent 17 too convenient an excuse to justify his
failure to locate her. The same can be said of the
loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his
wife which respondent claims were all returned to
him. Respondent said he had lost these returned
letters, under unspecified circumstances. Neither
can this Court give much credence to respondent's
bare assertion that he had inquired from their friends
of her whereabouts, considering that respondent did
not identify those friends in his testimony. The Court
of Appeals ruled that since the prosecutor failed to
rebut this evidence during trial, it is good evidence.
But this kind of evidence cannot, by its nature, be
rebutted. In any case, admissibility is not
synonymous with credibility. As noted before, there
are serious doubts to respondent's credibility.
Moreover, even if admitted as evidence, said
testimony merely tended to show that the missing
spouse had chosen not to communicate with their
common acquaintances, and not that she was dead.
Respondent testified that immediately after receiving
his mother's letter sometime in January 1983, he cut
short his employment contract to return to San Jose,
Antique. However, he did not explain the delay of
nine (9) months from January 1983, when he
allegedly asked leave from his captain, to November
1983 when be finally reached San Jose.
Respondent, moreover, claimed he married Janet
Monica Parker without inquiring about her parents
and their place of residence. 19 Also, respondent
failed to explain why he did not even try to get the
help of the police or other authorities in London and
Liverpool in his effort to find his wife. The
circumstances of Janet Monica's departure and
respondent's subsequent behavior make it very
difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet
Monica was dead a well-founded one.
The spouses should not be allowed, by the simple
expedient of agreeing that one of them leave the
conjugal abode and never to return again, to
circumvent the policy of the laws on marriage. The
Court notes that respondent even tried to have his

marriage annulled before the trial court in the same
proceeding.
While the Court understands the need of
respondent's young son, Gerry Nolasco, for
maternal care, still the requirements of the law must
prevail. Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear
requirements of the law, his petition for a judicial
declaration of presumptive death must be denied. In
fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the
well-founded belief required by law that his absent
wife was already dead that would sustain the
issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica
Parker presumptively dead.
74) REPUBLIC VS. LORINO
G.R. No. 160258 January 19, 2005
FACTS:
Respondent Gloria Bermudez-Lorino filed, On
August 14, 2000, nine (9) years after she left her
husband, a verified petition with the RTC under the
rules on Summary Judicial Proceedings in the
Family Law provided for in the Family Code, for a
Court declaration that her husband is judicially
presumed dead for the purpose of remarriage. She
alleged that: A) she and FRANCISCO LORINO, JR.
were married on June 12, 1987 and begot three (3)
children. B) Before they got married she was
unaware that her husband was a habitual drinker,
possessed with violent character/attitude, and had
the propensity to go out with friends to the extent of
being unable to engage in any gainful work. C)
Because of her husbands violent character, Gloria
found it safer to leave him behind and decided to go
back to her parents together with her three (3)
children. D) From the time of her physical separation
from her husband in 1991, Gloria has not heard of
him at all. She had absolutely no communications
with him, or with any of his relatives. She believes
that he is already dead and is now seeking through
this petition for a Court declaration that her husband
is judicially presumed dead for the purpose of
remarriage. On August 28, 2000, the RTC issued an
order directing, the publication of the petition in a
newspaper of general circulation. On September 16,
2000, the order for hearing was published in a
newspaper of general circulation in this province
once a week for three consecutive weeks and be
posted in the bulletin boards of the Hall of Justice
and the Municipal Hall, San Mateo, Rizal. Finding
the said petition to be sufficient in form and
substance, the same is hereby set for hearing before
70

the Court on September 18, 2000. The trial court
ruled declaring the presumptive death/absence of
Francisco Lorino, Jr. pursuant to Art. 41 of the New
Family Code but subject to all restrictions and
conditions provided therein. The judgment being
immediately final and executory under the provisions
of Article 247 of the Family Code, thus: Art. 247. The
judgment of the court shall be immediately final and
executory, Despite the decision of the trial court
having become final, the Office of the Solicitor
General, nevertheless filed a Notice of Appeal. The
RTC had the records elevated to the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals, treating the case as
an ordinary appealed case under Rule 41 of the
Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, denied the
Republics appeal and accordingly affirmed the
appealed decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals duly acquired
jurisdiction over the appeal on a final and executory
judgment of the Regonal Trial Court.
HELD:
No. In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the
Family Code, there is no reglementary period within
which to perfect an appeal, precisely because
judgments rendered thereunder, by express
provision of Section 247, Family Code, are
"immediately final and executory". It was erroneous,
therefore, on the part of the RTC to give due course
to the Republics appeal and order the transmittal of
the entire records of the case to the Court of
Appeals. An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction
to review a judgment which, by express provision of
law, is immediately final and executory. The right to
appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due
process, for it is merely a statutory privilege." Since,
by express mandate of Article 247 of the Family
Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial
proceedings in Family Law are "immediately final
and executory", the right to appeal was not granted
to any of the parties therein. The Republic of the
Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for
declaration of presumptive death, should not be
treated differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC
decision of November 7, 2001. Nothing is more
settled in law than that when a judgment becomes
final and executory it becomes immutable and
unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in
any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law, and whether made by the
highest court of the But, if only to set the records
straight and for the future guidance of the bench and
the bar, let it be stated that the RTCs decision dated

November 7, 2001, was immediately final and
executory upon notice to the parties. It was
erroneous for the OSG to file a notice of appeal, and
for the RTC to give due course thereto. The Court of
Appeals acquired no jurisdiction over the case, and
should have dismissed the appeal outright on that
ground.
76) TY VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 127406. November 27, 2000
FACTS:
As shown in the records of the case, private
respondent married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in
a civil ceremony on March 29, 1977, in Manila.
Then they had a church wedding on August 27,
1977. However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared
their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of a
valid marriage license. The church wedding on
August 27, 1977, was also declared null and void ab
initio for lack of consent of the parties.
Even before the decree was issued nullifying his
marriage to Anna Maria, private respondent wed
Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in
ceremonies officiated by the judge of the City Court
of Pasay. On April 4, 1982, they also had a church
wedding in Makati, Metro Manila.
Private respondent filed a petition, which alleged that
his marriage with petitioner was void for lack of
marriage license and his marriage with Anne Maria
was still subsisting.
ISSUE:
Whether or not nullity of first marriage is required
before obtaining 2nd marriage.
HELD:
In Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986), the Court held that
there is a need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a
void marriage. In Wiegel, Lilia married Maxion in
1972. In 1978, she married another man, Wiegel.
Wiegel filed a petition with the Juvenile Domestic
Relations Court to declare his marriage to Lilia as
void on the ground of her previous valid marriage.
The Court, expressly relying on Consuegra,
concluded that:
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence
about the existing prior marriage of her first husband
at the time they married each other, for then such a
marriage though void still needs according to this
Court a judicial declaration (citing Consuegra) of
such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she
71

would still be regarded as a married woman at the
time she contracted her marriage with respondent
Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the marriage of
petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID
under the law.
At any rate, the confusion under the Civil Code was
put to rest under the Family Code. Our rulings in
Gomez, Consuegra, and Wiegel were eventually
embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code. Article 40
of said Code expressly required a judicial declaration
of nullity of marriage
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.
In Terre v. Terre (1992) the Court, applying Gomez,
Consuegra and Wiegel, categorically stated that a
judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is
necessary. Thus, we disbarred a lawyer for
contracting a bigamous marriage during the
subsistence of his first marriage. He claimed that his
first marriage in 1977 was void since his first wife
was already married in 1968. We held that Atty.
Terre should have known that the prevailing case
law is that for purposes of determining whether a
person is legally free to contract a second marriage,
a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null
and void ab initio is essential.
In the present case, the second marriage of private
respondent was entered into in 1979, before
Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in
Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of
private respondent being void for lack of license and
consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of
its nullity before he could contract a second
marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that
private respondents second marriage to petitioner is
valid.
77) CARINO vs. CARINO
351 SCRA 131
FACTS:
SPO4 Santiago S. Carino contracted two
marriages during his lifetime, the first was on June
20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao, with whom
he had two children, and the second was on
November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee and
had no children at all in their 10 years of
cohabitation. On November 23, 1992, SPO4
Santiago Carino passed away in the care of Susan
Yee who paid the medical and burial expenses. Both
petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary
benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the
deceased from various government agencies,

petitioner was able to collect a total of P146,000.00
and respondent has collected P21,000.00
On December 14, 1993, respondent filed the
instant case for the collection of money against
petitioner to return to respondent at least one half of
the money she has collected from the government
agencies. Petitioner failed to file her answer and was
declared in default. Respondent then admitted that
her marriage with the deceased took place during
the subsistence of, and without the judicial
declaration of nullity of the 1st marriage. She also
claimed that she was not aware that the deceased
has a previous marriage and only found out when
petitioner introduced herself as the wife. To bolster
her action for collection of money, respondent
contended that the marriage of petitioner with the
deceased is void ab initio because the same was
solemnized without the required marriage license. In
support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the
marriage certificate of the deceased and the
petitioner which bears no marriage license number,
and 2) a certification dated March 9, 1994, from the
Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.
RTC ruled in favor of respondent. And on
appeal, CA affirmed the decision of the lower court in
toto. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the two marriages contracted
by the deceased are valid
HELD:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of
a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for the
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole
basis acceptable by law, for said projected marriage
to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void. However, for
purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
In the case at bar, there is no question that
the marriage of petitioner and deceased does not fall
within the marriages exempt from the marriage
license requirement. A marriage license, therefore,
was indispensible to the validity of their marriage.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the
marriage of petitioner and deceased has been
sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of
petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and
that they secured the valid marriage license.
72

It does not follow from the foregoing
disposition , however, that since the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab
initio, the death benefits under the scrutiny would
now be awarded to respondent. Accordingly, the
declaration in the instant case of nullity of the
previous marriage of the deceased and the petitioner
does not validate the second marriage of the
deceased with respondent. The fact remains that
their marriage was solemnize without first obtaining
a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner
and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of
respondent and the deceased is likewise, void ab
initio. As to the death benefits that the deceased
obtained from the government agencies, it should be
given to his legal heirs as it was declared an
intestate succession. The children from the first
marriage shall be the ones obtaining the said
benefits.
73

IX. VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
78) ANAYA vs. PALAROAN
36 SCRA 97
FACTS:
Plaintiff Aurora and defendant Fernando were
married on 4 December 1953; that defendant
Fernando filed an action for annulment of the
marriage on 7 January 1954 on the ground that his
consent was obtained through force and intimidation;
that judgment was rendered therein on 23
September 1959 dismissing the complaint of
Fernando, upholding the validity of the marriage and
granting Aurora's counterclaim; that (per paragraph
IV) while the amount of the counterclaim was being
negotiated "to settle the judgment," Fernando had
divulged to Aurora that several months prior to their
marriage he had pre-marital relationship with a close
relative of his; and that "the non-divulgement to her
of the aforementioned pre-marital secret on the part
of defendant that definitely wrecked their marriage,
which apparently doomed to fail even before it had
hardly commenced ... frank disclosure of which,
certitude precisely precluded her, the Plaintiff herein
from going thru the marriage that was solemnized
between them constituted 'FRAUD', in obtaining her
consent, within the contemplation of No. 4 of Article
85 of the Civil Code" (sic) (Record on Appeal, page
3). She prayed for the annulment of the marriage
and for moral damages.
Failing in its attempt to have the parties
reconciled, the court set the case for trial on 26
August 1966 but it was postponed. Thereafter, while
reviewing the expendiente, the court realized that
Aurora's allegation of the fraud was legally
insufficient to invalidate her marriage. The court
dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her
husband of his pre-marital relationship with another
woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.
HELD:
We must agree with the lower court that it is not. For
fraud as a vice of consent in marriage, which may be
a cause for its annulment, comes under Article 85,
No. 4, of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the
following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by
fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely

cohabited with the other as her husband or his wife,
as the case may be;
This fraud, as vice of consent, is limited exclusively
by law to those kinds or species of fraud enumerated
in Article 86, as follows:
ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall
constitute fraud referred to in number 4 of the
preceding article:
(1) Misrepresentati
on as to the
identity of one
of
the
contracting
parties;
(2) Non-disclosure
of the previous
conviction
of
the other party
of
a
crime
involving moral
turpitude, and
the
penalty
imposed
was
imprisonment
for two years or
more;
(3) Concealment
by the wife of
the fact that at
the time of the
marriage, she
was pregnant
by a man other
than
her
husband.
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character,
rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud
as will give grounds for action for the annulment of
marriage.
The intention of Congress to confine the
circumstances that can constitute fraud as ground
for annulment of marriage to the foregoing three
cases may be deduced from the fact that, of all the
causes of nullity enumerated in Article 85, fraud is
the only one given special treatment in a subsequent
article within the chapter on void and voidable
marriages. If its intention were otherwise, Congress
would have stopped at Article 85, for, anyway, fraud
in general is already mentioned therein as a cause
for annulment. But Article 86 was also enacted,
expressly and specifically dealing with "fraud
referred to in number 4 of the preceding article," and
proceeds by enumerating the specific frauds
(misrepresentation as to identity, non-disclosure of a
74

previous conviction, and concealment of pregnancy),
making it clear that Congress intended to exclude all
other frauds or deceits. To stress further such
intention, the enumeration of the specific frauds was
followed
by
the
interdiction:
"No
other
misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank,
fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will
give grounds for action for the annulment of
marriage."
Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital
relationship with another woman is not one of the
enumerated circumstances that would constitute a
ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by
the last paragraph of the article, providing that "no
other misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity"
shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage.
While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of
premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby
cheated into giving her consent to the marriage,
nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief
after her consent was solemnly given, for upon
marriage she entered into an institution in which
society, and not herself alone, is interested. The
lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's duty is to
give effect to the same, whether it agrees with the
rule or not.
On the merits of this second fraud charge, it
is enough to point out that any secret intention on
the husband's part not to perform his marital duties
must have been discovered by the wife soon after
the marriage: hence her action for annulment based
on that fraud should have been brought within four
years after the marriage. Since appellant's wedding
was celebrated in December of 1953, and this
ground was only pleaded in 1966, it must be
declared already barred.
79) AQUINO vs. DELIZO
109 Phil. 21
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari to review a
decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal which dismissed
petitioner's complaint for annulment of his marriage
with respondent Conchita Delizo.
The dismissed complaint, which was filed on
September 6, 1955, was based on the ground of
fraud, it being alleged, among other things, that
respondent, at the date of her marriage to petitioner
Aquino, on December 27, 1954, concealed from the
latter that fact that she was pregnant by another
man, and sometime in April, 1955, or about four
months after their marriage, gave birth to a child. In
her answer, defendant claimed that the child was

conceived out of lawful wedlock between her and the
plaintiff.
At the trial, the attorney's for both parties appeared
and the court a quo ordered Assistant Provincial
Fiscal Jose Goco to represent the State in the
proceedings to prevent collusion. Only the plaintiff
however, testified and the only documentary
evidence presented was the marriage contract
between the parties. Defendant neither appeared
nor presented any evidence despite the reservation
made by her counsel that he would present evidence
on a later date.
On June 16, 1956, the trial court, noting that no birth
certificate was presented to show that the child was
born within 180 days after the marriage between the
parties, and holding that concealment of pregnancy
as alleged by the plaintiff does not constitute such
fraud that would annul a marriage, dismissed the
complaint. Through a verified "petition to reopen for
reception of additional evidence", plaintiff tried to
present the certificates of birth and delivery of the
child born of the defendant on April 26, 1955, which
documents, according to him, he had failed to
secure earlier and produce before the trial court thru
excusable negligence. The petition, however, was
denied.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court held
that there has been excusable neglect in plaintiff's
inability to present the proof of the child's birth,
through her birth certificate, and for that reason the
court a quo erred in denying the motion for reception
of additional evidence. On the theory, however, that
it was not impossible for plaintiff and defendant to
have had sexual intercourse during their
engagement so that the child could be their own,
and finding unbelievable plaintiff's claim that he did
not notice or even suspect that defendant was
pregnant when he married her, the appellate court,
nevertheless, affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint.
Plaintiff filed a motion praying that the decision be
reconsidered, or, if such reconsideration be denied,
that the case be remanded to the lower court for new
trial.
The Court of Appeals denied the motion. From that
order, the plaintiff brought the case to this Court thru
the present petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the concealment by the wife
of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband
constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of
marriage.
75

HELD:
The court held that the dismissal of plaintiff's
complaint cannot be sustained.
Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife
of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband
constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of
marriage. The defendant wife was alleged to be only
more than four months pregnant at the time of her
marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are not
prepared to say that her pregnancy was readily
apparent, especially since she was "naturally plump"
or fat as alleged by plaintiff. According to medical
authorities, even on the 5th month of pregnancy, the
enlargement of a woman's abdomen is still below
the umbilicus, that is to say, the enlargement is
limited to the lower part of the abdomen so that it is
hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be attributed
only to fat formation on the lower part of the
abdomen. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy
that the enlargement of the woman's abdomen
reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the
roundness of the abdomen more general and
apparent. If, as claimed by plaintiff, defendant is
"naturally plump", he could hardly be expected to
know, merely by looking, whether or not she was
pregnant at the time of their marriage more so
because she must have attempted to conceal the
true state of affairs. Even physicians and surgeons,
with the aid of the woman herself who shows and
gives her subjective and objective symptoms, can
only claim positive diagnosis of pregnancy in 33% at
five months. and 50% at six months.
The appellate court also said that it was not
impossible for plaintiff and defendant to have had
sexual intercourse before they got married and
therefore the child could be their own. This
statement, however, is purely conjectural and finds
no support or justification in the record.
Upon the other hand, the evidence sought to be
introduced at the new trial, taken together with what
has already been adduced would, in our opinion, be
sufficient to sustain the fraud alleged by plaintiff. The
Court of Appeals should, therefore, not have denied
the motion praying for new trial simply because
defendant failed to file her answer thereto. Such
failure of the defendant cannot be taken as evidence
of collusion, especially since a provincial fiscal has
been ordered to represent the Government precisely
to prevent such collusion. As to the veracity of the
contents of the motion and its annexes, the same
can best be determined only after hearing evidence.
In the circumstance, we think that justice would be
better served if a new trial were ordered.
80) JIMENEZ vs. REPUBLIC

109 PHIL 273
FACTS:
The plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays for a decree
annulling his marriage to the defendant Remedios
Cazares contracted on 3 August 1950 before a judge
of the municipal court of Zamboanga City, upon the
ground that the office of her genitals or vagina was
to small to allow the penetration of a male organ or
penis for copulation; that the condition of her genitals
as described above existed at the time of marriage
and continues to exist; and that for that reason he
left the conjugal home two nights and one day after
they had been married. The wife was summoned
and served a copy of the complaint. She did not file
an answer. On 29 September 1956, pursuant to the
provisions of article 88 of the Civil Code, the Court
directed the city attorney of Zamboanga to inquire
whether there was a collusion, to intervene for the
State to see that the evidence for the plaintiff is not a
frame-up, concocted or fabricated. On 17 December
1956 the Court entered an order requiring the
defendant to submit to a physical examination by a
competent lady physician to determine her physical
capacity for copulation and to submit, within ten days
from receipt of the order, a medical certificate on the
result thereof. On 14 March 1957 the defendant was
granted additional five days from notice to comply
with the order of 17 December 1956 with warning
that her failure to undergo medical examination and
submit the required doctor's certificate would be
deemed lack of interest on her part in the case and
that judgment upon the evidence presented by her
husband would be rendered.
After hearing, at which the defendant was not
present, on 11 April 1957 the Court entered a decree
annulling the marriage between the plaintiff and the
defendant. The city attorney filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decree thus entered, upon the
ground, among others, that the defendant's
impotency has not been satisfactorily established as
required by law; that she had not been physically
examined because she had refused to be examined;
that instead of annulling the marriage the Court
should have punished her for contempt of court and
compelled her to undergo a physical examination
and submit a medical certificate; and that the decree
sought to be reconsidered would open the door to
married couples, who want to end their marriage to
collude or connive with each other by just alleging
impotency of one of them. He prayed that the
complaint be dismissed or that the wife be subjected
76

to a physical examination. Pending resolution of his
motion, the city attorney timely appealed from the
decree. On 13 May 1957 the motion for
reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage in question
may be annulled on the strength only of the lone
testimony of the husband who claimed and testified
that his wife was and is impotent.
HELD:
The law specifically enumerates the legal
grounds, that must be proved to exist by indubitable
evidence, to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the
annulment of the marriage in question was decreed
upon the sole testimony of the husband who was
expected to give testimony tending or aiming at
securing the annulment of his marriage he sought
and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent
cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily
established, because from the commencement of
the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had
abstained from taking part therein. Although her
refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court
show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude
the presumption arising out of the suppression of
evidence could not arise or be inferred because
women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and
shy and would not submit to a physical examination
unless compelled to by competent authority. This the
Court may do without doing violence to and
infringing in this case is not self-incrimination. She is
not charged with any offense. She is not being
compelled to be a witness against herself.
"Impotency being an abnormal condition should not
be presumed. The presumption is in favor of
potency." The lone testimony of the husband that his
wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is
insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound
them together as husband and wife.
The decree appealed from is set aside and the case
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings
in accordance with this decision, without
pronouncement as to costs.
77

X. LEGAL SEPARATION
81) DE OCAMPO vs. FLORENCIANO
G.R. No. L-13553, February 23, 1960
FACTS:
In 1938, Jose and Serafina were married
and lived together as husband and wife. They were
blessed of several children who are now living with
plaintiff. In March, 1951, Jose discovered on several
occasions that Serafina was maintaining illicit
relations with Jose Arcalas. For this reason, Jose
sent his wife Serafina to Manila in June 1951 to
study beauty culture, where she stayed for a year.
However, Jose discovered that his wife, while in
Manila was going out with several other men, aside
from Jose Arcalas. After Serafina finished her study
in 1952, she and her husband lived separately. On
June 18, 1955, Jose surprised his wife in the act of
having illicit relations with another man by the name
of Nelson Orzame. Jose signified his intention of
filing a petition for legal separation, to which Serafina
agreed provided she is will not be charged with
adultery. On July 5, 1955, a petition for legal
separation was filed by Jose in conformity with the
condition requested by Serafina.
The Court of Appeals found that in the night
of June 18, 1955, the husband upon discovering the
illicit happening has expressed his wish to file a
petition for legal separation and defendant readily
agreed to such filing. And when she was questioned
by the Fiscal upon orders of the court, she reiterated
her conformity to the legal separation even as she
admitted having had sexual relations with one
Nelson Orzame. Interpreting these facts virtually to
mean a confession of judgment the Appellate Court
declared that under Art. 101, legal separation could
not be decreed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the
committed a reversible error.
appellate
court
RULING:
Yes. As we understand the article, it does
not exclude, as evidence, any admission or
confession made by the defendant outside of the
court. It merely prohibits a decree of separation upon
a confession of judgment. Confession of judgment
usually happens when the defendant appears in
court and confesses the right of plaintiff to judgment
or files a pleading expressly agreeing to the plaintiff's
demand.
Yet, even supposing that the above
statement of defendant constituted practically a
confession of judgment, inasmuch as there is
evidence of the adultery independently of such

statement, the decree may and should be granted,
since it would not be based on her confession, but
upon evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the
law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively or
mainly on defendant's confession. If a confession
defeats the action ipso facto, any defendant who
opposes the separation will immediately confess
judgment, purposely to prevent it.
The mere circumstance that defendants told
the Fiscal that she "like also" to be legally separated
from her husband, is no obstacle to the successful
prosecution of the action. When she refused to
answer the complaint, she indicated her willingness
to be separated. Yet, the law does not order the
dismissal. Allowing the proceeding to continue, it
takes precautions against collusion, which implies
more than consent or lack of opposition to the
agreement.
82) BROWN vs. JUANITA YAMBAO
G.R. No. L-10699, October 18, 1957
FACTS:
William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First
Instance of Manila to obtain legal separation from his
lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He alleged under oath
that while interned by the Japanese invaders, from
1942 to 1945, at the University of Sto. Tomas
internment camp, his wife engaged in adulterous
relations with one Carlos Field of whom she begot a
baby girl that Brown learned of his wifes misconduct
only in 1945, upon his release from internment; that
thereafter the spouse lived separately and later
executed a document liquidating their conjugal
partnership and assigning certain properties to the
erring wife as her share. The complaint prayed for
confirmation of the liquidation agreement; for
custody of the children issued of the marriage; that
the defendant be declared disqualified to succeed
the plaintiff; and for their remedy as might be just
and equitable. Upon petition of the plaintiff, the court
subsequently declared the wife in default, for failure
to answer in due time, despite service of summons;
and directed the City Fiscal or his representatives to
investigate, in accordance with Article 101 of the
Civil Code, whether or not a collusion exists between
the parties and to report to this Court the result of his
investigation within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
copy of this order. The City Fiscal or his
representative is also directed to intervene in the
case in behalf of the State.
As ordered, Assistant City Fiscal Rafael Jose
appeared at the trial, and cross-examined plaintiff
78

Brown. His questions (strenuously objected to by
Brown's counsel) elicited the fact that after liberation,
Brown had lived maritally with another woman and
had begotten children by her. Thereafter, the court
rendered judgment denying the legal separation
asked, on the ground that, while the wife's adultery
was established, Brown had incurred in a
misconduct of similar nature that barred his right of
action under Article 100 of the new Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in permitting the
Assistant Fiscal Rafel Jose of Manila to act as
counsel for the defendant, who defaulted.
RULING:
NO. Appellant Brown argues that in cross-examining
him with regard to his marital relation with Lilia Deito,
who was not his wife, the Assistant Fiscal acted as
counsel for the defaulting wife, "when the power of
the prosecuting officer is limited to finding out
whether or not there is collusion, and if there is no
collusion, which is the fact in the case at bar, to
intervene for the state which is not the fact in the
instant case, the truth of the matter being that he
intervened for Juanita Yambao, the defendantappellee, who is private citizen and who is far from
being the state.
The court below also found, and correctly held that
the appellant's action was already barred, because
Brown did not petition for legal separation
proceedings until ten years after he learned of his
wife's adultery, which was upon his release from
internment in 1945. Under Article 102 of the new
Civil Code, action for legal separation can not be
filed except within one (1) year from and after the
plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within
five years from and after the date when such cause
occurred. Appellant's brief does not even contest the
correctness of such findings and conclusion.
It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription
as a defense. Nevertheless, the courts can take
cognizance thereof, because actions seeking a
decree of legal separation, or annulment of
marriage, involve public interest and it is the policy of
our law that no such decree be issued if any legal
obstacles thereto appear upon the record.
83) LERMA vs. CA

G.R. No. L-33352 December 20, 1974
FACTS:
Petitioner Lerma and respondent Diaz are husband
and wife. Petitioner filed a complaint for adultery
against the respondent and a certain Teodoro
Ramirez. Respondent a complaint against the
petitioner for legal separation and/or separation of
properties, custody of their children and support,
with an urgent petition for support pendente lite for
her and their youngest son, Gregory, who was then
and until now is in her custody. The respondent's
complaint for legal separation is based on two
grounds: concubinage and attempt against her
life.The petitioner filed his opposition to the
respondent's application for support pendente lite,
setting up as defense te adultery charge he had filed
against the respondent.Judge Luciano of CFI of
Rizal granted the respondent's application for
support pendente lite to the following effect: (1) the
respondent was declared entitled to support
pendente lite from the date of the filing of the
complaint; and (2) the amount of such monthly
support was reduced from P2,250.00 to P1,820.00.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals and
requested for prohibition and preliminary injunction
to annul the aforementioned orders. Court of
Appeals gave due course to the petition and issued
a writ of preliminary injunction to stop Judge Luciano
from enforcing said orders. Moreover, on opposition
of the respondent , the Court of Appeals dismissed
such petition of the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not adultery is a good defense against
the respondent's claim for support pendente lite.
RULING:
Yes. The probable failure of the respondent's suit for
legal separation can be foreseen since she is not an
innocent spouse, having been convicted of adultery
by the Court of First Instance. It is true that the
judgment of conviction is on appeal in the Court of
Appeals, but the same undoubtedly satisfies the
standard of provisional showing set by the aforesaid
Rule. If legal separation cannot be claimed by the
guilty spouse in the first place, the fact that an action
for that purpose is filed anyway should not be
permitted to be used as a means to obtain support
pendente lite, which, without such action, would be
denied on the strength of the decisions of this Court
recognizing adultery as a good defense. Otherwise,
as pointed out by the petitioner, all that an erring
spouse has to do to circumvent such defense would
79

be to file a suit for legal separation no matter how
groundless.
The right to separate support or maintenance, even
from the conjugal partnership property, presupposes
the existence of a justifiable cause for the spouse
claiming such right to live separately. This is implicit
in Article 104 of the Civil Code, which states that
after the filing of the petition for legal separation the
spouses shall be entitled to live separately from
each other. A petition in bad faith, such as that filed
by one who is himself or herself guilty of an act
which constitutes a ground for legal separation at the
instance of the other spouse, cannot be considered
as within the intendment of the law granting separate
support. In fact under Article 303 of the same Code
the obligation to give support shall cease "when the
recipient, be he a forced heir or not, has committed
some act which gives rise to disinheritance;" and
under Article 921 one of the causes for disinheriting
a spouse is "when the spouse has given cause for
legal separation." The loss of the substantive right to
support in such a situation is incompatible with any
claim for support pendente lite.
84) BUGAYONG vs. GINEZ
G.R. No. L-10033, December 28, 1956
FACTS:
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United
States Navy, was married to defendant Leonila
Ginez on August 27, 1949, at Asingan, Pangasinan,
while on leave. Immediately after their marriage, the
couple lived with their sisters who later moved to
Sampaloc, Manila. After some time, or about July,
1951, Leonila Ginez left the dwelling of her sister-inlaw and informed her husband by letter that she had
gone to reside with her mother in Asingan,
Pangasinan, from which place she later moved to
Dagupan City to study in a local college there.
As early as July, 1951, Benjamin Bugayong began
receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco and some
from anonymous writers informing him of alleged
acts of infidelity of his wife which he did not even
care to mention. In August, 1952, plaintiff went to
Asingan, Pangasinan, and sought for his wife whom
he met in the house of one Mrs. Malalang,
defendant's godmother. She came along with him
and both proceeded to the house of Pedro
Bugayong, a cousin of the plaintiff-husband, where
they stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1 day as
husband and wife. Then they repaired to the
plaintiff's house and again passed the night therein
as husband and wife. On the second day, Benjamin
Bugayong tried to verify from his wife the truth of the
information he received that she had committed

adultery but Leonila, instead of answering his query,
merely packed up and left, which he took as a
confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on her.
After that and despite such belief, plaintiff exerted
efforts to locate her and failing to find her, he went to
Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, "to soothe his wounded
feelings".
On November 18, 1952, Benjamin Bugayong filed in
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a
complaint for legal separation against his wife. The
motion to dismiss was answered by plaintiff and the
Court, considering only the second ground of the
motion to dismiss i. e., condonation, ordered the
dismissal of the action.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is condonation on the
part of the husband with respect to the legal
separation case on account of adultery of the wife.
RULING:
Yes. The Court considered plaintiff's line of conduct
under the assumption that he really believed his wife
guilty of adultery. What did he do in such state of
mind. In August, 1952, he went to Pangasinan and
looked for his wife and after finding her they lived
together as husband and wife for 2 nights and 1 day,
after which he says that he tried to verify from her
the truth of the news he had about her infidelity, but
failed to attain his purpose because his wife, instead
of answering his query on the matter, preferred to
desert him, probably enraged for being subjected to
such humiliation. And yet he tried to locate her,
though in vain.
A detailed examination of the testimony of the
plaintiff-husband, especially those portions quoted
above, clearly shows that there was a condonation
on the part of the husband for the supposed "acts of
rank infidelity amounting to adultery" committed by
defendant-wife. Admitting for the sake of argument
that the infidelities amounting to adultery were
committed by the defendant, a reconciliation was
effected between her and the plaintiff. The act of the
latter in persuading her to come along with him, and
the fact that she went with him and consented to be
brought to the house of his cousin Pedro Bugayong
and together they slept there as husband and wife
for one day and one night, and the further fact that in
the second night they again slept together in their
house likewise as husband and wife all these
facts have no other meaning in the opinion of this
court than that a reconciliation between them was
effected and that there was a condonation of the
wife by the husband. The reconciliation occurred
almost ten months after he came to know of the acts
80

of infidelity amounting to adultery.
There is no merit in the contention of appellant that
the lower court erred in entertaining condonation as
a ground for dismissal inasmuch as same was not
raised in the answer or in a motion to dismiss,
because in the second ground of the motion to
dismiss.
85) LAPERAL vs. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. L- 18008. October 30, 1962
FACTS:
After several years of marriage with Enrique Sta.
Maria, a decree of legal separation was granted by
the court. On the other hand, Elisea Laperal has also
ceased to live with him. A special procedure for
change of name and /or permission to resume the
maiden name of herein petitioner Elisea Laperal,
was filed. The petition was opposed on the ground
that the same violates the provisions of Art. 372 of
the New Civil Code. The court however granted the
petition on the ground that her continued use of her
married name will give rise to confusion in her affairs
and in the eventual liquidation of their conjugal
assets. The State appealed.
That in view of the fact that she has been legally
separated from Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria and has
likewise ceased to live with him for many years, it is
desirable that she be allowed to change her name
and/or be permitted to resume using her maiden
name to ELISEA LAPERAL. In its decision of
October 31, 1960, the court denied the petition for
the reason that Article 372 of the Civil Code requires
the wife, even after she is decreed legally separated
from her husband, to continue using the name and
surname she employed before the legal separation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for the change of name
should be granted.
RULING:
No, Art. 372 of New Civil Code is written in a
language that is mandatory, that the wife, even after
the legal separation has been decreed should
continue using her name and surname employed
before legal separation. This is so because her
married status is unaffected by the separation, there
being no severance of the vinculum. It seems to be
the policy of the law that the wife should continue to
use the name indicative of her unchanged status for
the benefit of all concerned.
The Supreme Court decided that from the petition
quoted in full at the beginning of these opinion, the
only reason relied upon for the change of name is

the fact that petitioner is legally separated from her
husband and has, in fact, ceased to live with him for
many years. It is doubtful, to say the least, whether
Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general,
may prevail over the specific provisions of Article
372 of the New Civil Code with regards to married
women legally separated from their husbands. Even,
however, applying Rule 103 to this case, the fact of
legal separation alone which is the only basis for the
petition at bar is, in the opinion of the Court, not a
sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of
herein petitioner, for to hold otherwise would be to
provide an easy circumvention of the mandatory
provisions of Article 372.
86) ONG vs. LUCITA G. ONG
G.R. No. 153206, October 23, 2006
FACTS:
Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong (William)
and Lucita G. Ong (Lucita) were married on July 13,
1975 at the San Agustin Church in Manila. They
have three children: Kingston, Charleston, and
Princeton who are now all of the age of majority. In
1996, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation
alleging that her life with William was marked by
physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly
abusive conduct.
Lucita claimed that she and William quarreled almost
every day, with physical violence being inflicted upon
her; William would shout invectives at her like
"putang ina mo", "gago", "tanga", and he would slap
her, kick her, pull her hair, bang her head against
concrete wall and throw at her whatever he could
reach with his hand; the causes of these fights were
petty things regarding their children or their
business.William would also scold and beat the
children at different parts of their bodies using the
buckle of his belt; whenever she tried to stop William
from hitting the children, he would turn his ire on her
and box her
In 1995, after she protested with Williams decision
to allow their eldest son Kingston to go to Bacolod,
William slapped her and said, "it is none of your
business". In the same year, she asked William to
bring Kingston back from Bacolod; a violent quarrel
ensued and William hit her on her head, left cheek,
eye, stomach, and arms; when William hit her on the
stomach and she bent down because of the pain, he
hit her on the head then pointed a gun at her and
asked her to leave the house; she then went to her
sisters house in Binondo where she was fetched by
her other siblings and brought to their parents house
81

in Dagupan; the following day, she went to her
parents doctor, Dr. Vicente Elinzano for treatment of
her injuries.
William for his part denied that he ever inflicted
physical harm on his wife, used insulting language
against her, or whipped the children with the buckle
of his belt. RTC rendered its Decision decreeing
legal separation. It found that "it is indubitable that
plaintiff (Lucita) and defendant (William) had their
frequent quarrels and misunderstanding which made
both of their lives miserable and hellish. This is even
admitted by the defendant when he said that there
was no day that he did not quarrel with his wife.
Defendant had regarded the plaintiff negligent in the
performance of her wifely duties and had blamed her
for not reporting to him about the wrongdoings of
their children." The CA found that the testimonies for
Lucita were straightforward and credible and the
ground for legal separation. William filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the CA.
William to smash the plate with steak and hit

Charleston, then slapped Lucita and shouted at her
"putang ina mo, gago, wala kang pakialam,
tarantado" when she sided with Charleston.
William also posits that the real motive of Lucita in
filing the case for legal separation is in order for her
side of the family to gain control of the conjugal
properties; that Lucita was willing to destroy his
reputation by filing the legal separation case just so
her parents and her siblings could control the
properties he worked hard for. The Court finds such
reasoning hard to believe. The claim of William that
a decree of legal separation would taint his
reputation and label him as a wife-beater and childabuser also does not elicit sympathy from this Court.
If there would be such a smear on his reputation
then it would not be because of Lucitas decision to
seek relief from the courts, but because he gave
Lucita reason to go to court in the first place.
ISSUE:
Whether a decree of legal separation should not be
granted following Art. 56(4) of the FC which provides
that legal separation shall be denied when both
parties have given ground for legal separation.
HELD:
A decree of legal separation should be granted in
this case. The abandonment referred to by the
Family Code is abandonment without justifiable
cause for more than one year. As it was established
that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct,
such
does
not
constitute
abandonment
contemplated by the said provision. As correctly
observed by the trial court, William himself admitted
that there was no day that he did not quarrel with his
wife, which made his life miserable, and he blames
her for being negligent of her wifely duties and for
not reporting to him the wrongdoings of their
children.
Lucita and her sister, Linda Lim, also gave numerous
accounts of the instances when William displayed
violent temper against Lucita and their children; such
as: when William threw a steel chair at Lucita threw
chairs at their children slapped Lucita and utter
insulting words at her use the buckle of the belt in
whipping the children; pinned Lucita against the wall
with his strong arms almost strangling her, and
smashed the flower vase and brick rocks and
moldings leaving the bedroom in disarray shouted at
Lucita and threw a directory at her, in front of Linda
and the employees of their business, because he
could not find a draft letter on his table got mad at
Charleston for cooking steak with vetchin prompting
82

XI.
RIGHTS
AND OBLIGATIONS
HUSBAND AND WIFE
BETWEEN
87) ARROYO vs. DE ARROYO

G.R. No. L-17014, August 11, 1921
FACTS:
In 1910 Mariano and Dolores married each other
and lived together as husband and wife. In 1920
Dolores went away and left their common home with
the intention of living separately from her husband
Mariano. After failing to convince and induce Dolores
to come back and resume her marital obligations,
Mariano filed an action to compel her to live with
him. Dolores answered by claiming that her husband
was very cruel and in turn prayed for a decree of
separation. The trial judge, upon consideration of the
evidence before him, reached the conclusion that
the husband was more to blame than his wife and
that his continued ill-treatment of her furnished
sufficient justification for her abandonment of the
conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of
marital relations with him.
The Court has carefully examined and weighed
every line of the proof, and is of the opinion that the
conclusion stated is wholly untenable. The evidence
shows that the wife is afflicted with a disposition of
jealousy towards her husband in an aggravated
degree; and to his cause are chiefly traceable
without a doubt the many miseries that have
attended their married life. During the trial it was
found out that the husband was not cruel to the wife.
Furthermore, it was the wife who was excessively
jealous without any proof of infidelity of the husband.
Therefore the wife is morally and legally obligated to
live with her husband.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the wife can be ordered by the court
to live with her husband and failure of which will
constitute contempt of court?
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court in this case is unable to
hold that Mariano B. Arroyo is entitled to the
unconditional and absolute order for the return of the
wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the
petitory part of the complaint though he is, without
doubt, entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife
has presented herself without sufficient cause and
that it is her duty to return. Moreover, upon
examination of the authorities the court ruled that it
is convinced that it is not within the province of the
courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the
spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights
to, the other. Of course where the property rights of

one of the pair are invalid, an action for restitution of
such rights can be maintained. But we are
disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order,
enforcible by process of contempt, may be entered
to compel the restitution of the purely personal rights
of consortium.
At best such an order can be effective for no
other purpose than to compel the spouses to live
under the same roof; and the experience of these
countries where the court of justice have assumed to
compel the cohabitation of married people shows
that the policy of the practice is extremely
questionable
Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from, in
respect both to the original complaint and the crossbill, it is declared that Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo
has absented herself from the marital home without
sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is her
duty to returnNo. The court ruled in the negative.
The authorities are convinced that it is not within the
province of the court to compel the wife to live with
her husband because such obligation is purely
personal in nature. However the court can declare
her to be absent from the marital home without
sufficient cause. She is further admonished that it is
her duty to return.
88) PELAYO vs. MARCELO LAURON
G.R. No. L-4089, January 12, 1909
FACTS:
Arturo Pelayo, a physician, filed a complaint against
Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella setting forth that
on or about the 13th of October of said year, at night,
the plaintiff was called to the house of the
defendants, situated in San Nicolas, and that upon
arrival he was requested by them to render medical
assistance to their daughter-in-law who was about to
give birth to a child; that therefore, and after
consultation with the attending physician, Dr.
Escao, it was found necessary, on account of the
difficult birth, to remove the fetus by means of
forceps which operation was performed by the
plaintiff, who also had to remove the afterbirth, in
which services he was occupied until the following
morning, and that afterwards, on the same day, he
visited the patient several times; that the just and
equitable value of the services rendered by him was
P500, which the defendants refuse to pay without
alleging any good reason therefor; that.
In answer to the complaint counsel for the
defendants denied all of the allegation therein
contained and alleged as a special defense, that
83

their daughter-in-law had died in consequence of the
said childbirth, and that when she was alive she
lived with her husband independently and in a
separate house without any relation whatever with
them, and that, if on the day when she gave birth
she was in the house of the defendants, her stay
their was accidental and due to fortuitous
circumstances
ISSUE:
Whether or not father and mother-in-law
may be compelled to pay the fees concerning the
services performed with the daughter-in-law.
RULING:
No. In the face of the above legal precepts it is
unquestionable that the person bound to pay the
fees due to the plaintiff for the professional services
that he rendered to the daughter-in-law of the
defendants during her childbirth, is the husband of
the patient and not her father and mother- in-law, the
defendants herein. Father and mother-in-law are
strangers with respect to the obligation that devolves
upon the husband to provide support, among which
is the furnishing of medical assistance to his wife at
the time of her confinement; and, on the other hand,
it does not appear that a contract existed between
the defendants and the plaintiff physician, for which
reason it is obvious that the former can not be
compelled to pay fees which they are under no
liability to pay because it does not appear that they
consented to bind themselves.
The foregoing suffices to demonstrate that the first
and second errors assigned to the judgment below
are unfounded, because, if the plaintiff has no right
of action against the defendants, it is needless to
declare whether or not the use of forceps is a
surgical operation. From the foregoing it may readily
be understood that it was improper to have brought
an action against the defendants simply because
they were the parties who called the plaintiff and
requested him to assist the patient during her difficult
confinement, and also, possibly, because they were
her father and mother-in-law and the sickness
occurred in their house. The defendants were not,
nor are they now, under any obligation by virtue of
any legal provision, to pay the fees claimed, nor in
consequence of any contract entered into between
them and the plaintiff from which such obligation
might have arisen.
89) ILUSORIO V. ILUSORIO

GRN 139789, May 12, 2000
FACTS: Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio.
Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age
possessed of extensive property valued at millions of
pesos. For many years, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio
was Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio
Country Club.
On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano
Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived together for
a period of thirty (30) years. In 1972, they separated
from bed and board . Potenciano lived at Urdaneta
Condominium, Ayala Ave., Makati City when he was
in Manila and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country
Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other
hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City.
Out of their marriage, the spouses had six (6)
children.
On December 30, 1997, upon Potenciano's arrival
from the United States, he stayed with Erlinda for
about five (5) months in Antipolo City. The children,
Sylvia and Erlinda, alleged that during this time, their
mother gave Potenciano an overdose of
an
antidepressant drug prescribed by his doctor. As a
consequence, Potenciano's health deteriorated.
On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the RTC
Antipolo City a petition for guardianship over the
person and property of Potenciano Ilusorio due to
the latter's advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight
and impaired judgment.
On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate
meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano Ilusorio did not
return to Antipolo City and instead lived at Cleveland
Condominium, Makati.
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the CA a
petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of
lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that
respondents refused petitioner's demands to see
and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano
from returning to Antipolo City.
CA granted visitation rights in favor of
Erlinda though she did not pray for such and the
administration of the Cleveland Condominium
ISSUE: May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to
compel her husband to live with her in conjugal
bliss?
HELD: The answer is no. Marital rights including
coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be
enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention or by which the rightful
84

custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled
thereto.
"Habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person
detaining another, commanding him to produce the
body of the prisoner at a designated time and place,
with the day and cause of his capture and detention,
to do, submit to, and receive whatsoever the court or
judge awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf.
The evidence shows that there was no actual and
effective detention or deprivation of lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio's liberty that would justify the
issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano
Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under
medication does not necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated.
After due hearing, the Court of Appeals
concluded that there was no unlawful restraint on his
liberty. Likewise, Potenciano Ilusorio did not request
the administrator of the Cleveland Condominium and
not to allow his wife and other children from seeing
or visiting him. He made it clear that he did not
object to seeing them.
Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed
with the capacity to make choices. In this case, the
crucial choices revolve on his residence and the
people he opts to see or live with. The choices he
made may not appeal to some of his family
members but these are choices which exclusively
belong to Potenciano. He made it clear before the
Court of Appeals that he was not prevented from
leaving his house or seeing people.
With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of
choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of
visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise,
we will deprive him of his right to privacy. Needless
to say, this will run against his fundamental
constitutional right.
In case the husband refuses to see his wife for
private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without
threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his
right.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to
compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture
cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of
habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other
mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial
authority and is best left to the man and woman's
free choice.
85

XII. PROPERTY RELATIONS
90) MOISES JOCSON V. C.A
170 SCRA 333
FACTS: Emilio Jocson during his lifetime sold
parcels of land to his daughter Agustina. One said
parcels of land bears and entry in the TCT Emilio
Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete. These parcels
of land are claimed by one of the surviving heirs of
Emilio to have been sold fictitiously and without any
or insufficient consideration. Futhermore he claimed
that when his father sold one of the land, it was still
part of the conjugal property of their parents which
has not been liquidated.
Agustina on the otherhand claim that the sale was
with sufficient consideration and rebutted the
allegation that she has no source of income by
alleging she is engaged in playa buying business.
This was not controverted by Moises.
ISSUE: Will the presumption that a property is
conjugal arise based on the entry in the registry
which states that the owner is Married to thereby
making it conjugal.
HELD; In order for the presumption to apply, it must
first be proven that the property was acquired during
the marriage. The description married to does not
vest title but merely serves to describe the civil
status. Registration does not vest ownership but
merely confirms one already vested. The allegation
that the sale is fictitious due to insufficient
consideration must be proven by the one who allege
the same. In this case Moises failed to prove this
fact which likewise fails to overcome the
presumption that a sale is with sufficient
consideration.
91) TODA JR V. ROSEMARIE TUASON-TODA
153 SCRA 713
FACTS: Benigno Toda, Jr and Rose Marie TuasonToda were married on June 9, 1951 and were
blessed with two children. Individual differences and
the alleged infidelity of Benigno, however, marred
the conjugal union thereby prompting Rose Marie to
file on December 18, 1979 in the CFI of Rizal, a
petition for termination of conjugal partnership for
alleged mismanagement and dissipation of conjugal
funds against Benigno.
In order not to lengthen the proceedings, the parties
entered into a compromise agreement. However
said agreement caused further litigation due to the

question on its effectivity. This is material to
determine when and how much certain shares of
stock is payable.
ISSUE: When is the effectivity of a compromise
agreement entered into by the husband and wife? Is
it when the court approves of the same or when the
spouses signed it?
HELD: The compromise agreement separating their
properties is given effect only upon the approval of
the court. Under Article 190 of the Civil Code, "(i)n
the absence of an express declaration in the
marriage settlements, the separation of property
between spouses during the marriage shall not take
place save in virtue of a judicial order." Hence, the
separation of property is not effected by the mere
execution of the contract or agreement of the
parties, but by the decree of the court approving the
same. It, therefore, becomes effective on y upon
judicial approval, without which it is void.
Furthermore, Article 192 of said Code explicitly
provides that the conjugal partnership is dissolved
only upon the issuance of a decree of separation of
property
92) WONG V. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT and ROMARICO HENSON
200 SCRA 792
FACTS: Romarico Henson married Katrina Pineda
on January 6, 1964. They have three children but
even during the early years of their marriage,
Romarico and Katrina had been most of the time
living separately. The former stayed in Angeles City
while the latter lived in Manila. During the marriage
or on January 6, 1971, Romarico bought a 1,787
square-meter parcel of land in Angeles City for
P11,492 from his father, Dr. Celestino L. Henson
with money borrowed from an officemate.
Meanwhile, in Hongkong sometime in June 1972,
Katrina entered into an agreement with Anita Chan
whereby the latter consigned to Katrina pieces of
jewelry for sale valued at 199,895 Hongkong dollars
or P321,830.95. 4 When Katrina failed to return the
pieces of jewelry within the 20-day period agreed
upon, Anita Chan demanded payment of their value.
Thereafter Anita and her husband filed an action for
collection of sum of money. After trial, the court
promulgated a decision in favor of the Wongs. It
ordered Katrina and Romarico Henson to pay the
Wongs.
86

A writ of execution was thereafter issued. Levied
upon were four lots in Angeles City all in the name of
Romarico Henson ... married to Katrina Henson.
ISSUE: WON the judgment of execution extends to
the properties owned by the husband
HELD: The Court disagrees with the CA that the said
properties are exclusively owned by Romarico.
Having been acquired during the marriage, they are
still presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership
even though Romarico and Katrina had been living
separately.
The presumption of the conjugal nature of the
properties subsists in the absence of clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome
said presumption or to prove that Romarico
exclusively owns the properties. While there is proof
that Romarico acquired the properties with money
he had borrowed from an officemate, it is unclear
where he obtained the money to repay the loan. If he
paid it out of his salaries, then the money is part of
the conjugal assets and not exclusively his. Proof on
this matter is of paramount importance considering
that in the determination of the nature of a property
acquired by a person during covertrue, the
controlling factor is the source of the money utilized
in the purchase.
The
conjugal
nature
of
the
properties
notwithstanding, Katrina's indebtedness may not be
paid for with them her obligation not having been
shown by the petitioners to be one of the charges
against the conjugal partnership. In addition to the
fact that her rights over the properties are merely
inchoate prior to the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, the consent of her husband and her
authority to incur such indebtedness had not been
alleged in the complaint and proven at the trial.
Furthermore, under the Civil Code (before the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988), a
wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when
she purchases things necessary for the support of
the family or when she borrows money for the
purpose of purchasing things necessary for the
support of the family if the husband fails to deliver
the proper sum; 32 when the administration of the
conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the
courts 33 or by the husband 34 and when the wife
gives moderate donations for charity. 35 Having failed
to establish that any of these circumstances
occurred, the Wongs may not bind the conjugal
assets to answer for Katrina's personal obligation to
them.
93) BELCODERO V. CA
227 SCRA 303
FACTS: Alayo D. Bosing, married Juliana Oday on
27 July 1927, with whom he had three children. In
1946, he left the conjugal home, and he started to
live instead with Josefa Rivera with whom he later
begot one child, named Josephine Bosing, now
Josephine Belcodero.
On 23 August 1949, Alayo purchased a parcel of
land on installment basis from the Magdalena
Estate, Inc. In the deed, he indicated his civil status
as, "married to Josefa R. Bosing," the common-law
wife. In a letter which he addressed to Magdalena
Estate, Inc., he authorized the latter to transfer the
lot in the name of his "wife Josefa R. Bosing." The
final deed of sale was executed by Magdalena
Estate, Inc. A few days later, or on 09 November
1959, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 48790 was
issued in the name of "Josefa R. Bosing, . . . married
to Alayo Bosing, . . ."
On 06 June 1958, Alayo married Josefa while his
prior marriage with Juliana was still subsisting.
Alayo died on 11 March 1967. About three years
later, or on September 1970, Josefa and Josephine
executed a document of extrajudicial partition and
sale of the lot in question, which was there described
as "conjugal property" of Josefa and deceased
Alayo. In this deed, Josefa's supposed one-half (1/2)
interest as surviving spouse of Alayo, as well as her
one-fourth (1/4) interest as heir, was conveyed to
Josephine for a P10,000.00 consideration, thereby
completing for herself, along with her one-fourth
(1/4) interest as the surviving child of Alayo, a full
"ownership" of the property. A new TCT No. 198840
was issued on June 1974 in the name of Josephine.
On October 1980, Juliana (deceased Alayo's real
widow) and her three legitimate children filed with
the court a quo an action for reconveyance of the
property. TC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.
CA affirmed.
ISSUE: WON THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION
BELONGS EXCLUSIVELY TO THE PETITIONERS.
HELD: It cannot be seriously contended that, simply
because the Property was titled in the name of
Josefa at Alayo's request, she should thereby be
deemed to be its owner. The property
unquestionably was acquired by Alayo. Alayo's letter,
dated 06 October 1959, to Magdalena Estate, Inc.,
merely authorized the latter to have the title to the
property transferred to her name. More importantly,
she implicitly recognized Alayo's ownership when,
87

three years after the death of Alayo, she and
Josephine executed the deed of extrajudicial
partition and sale in which she asserted a one-half
(1/2) interest .
The property remained as belonging to the conjugal
partnership of Alayo and his legitimate wife Juliana.
Under both the new Civil Code (Article 160) and the
old Civil Code (Article 1407), "all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife." This
presumption has not been convincingly rebutted.
As regards the property relation between
common-law spouses, Article 144 of the Civil Code
merely codified the law established through judicial
precedents under the old code. In both regimes, the
co-ownership rule had more than once been
repudiated when either or both spouses suffered
from an impediment to marry.
The present
provisions under Article 147 and Article 148 of the
Family Code did not much deviate from the old rules;
in any case, its provisions cannot apply to this case
without interdicting prior vested rights (Article 256,
Family Code).
It was at the time that 'the adjudication of ownership
was made following Alayo's demise (not when Alayo
merely allowed the property to be titled in Josefa's
name which clearly was not intended to be
adversarial to Alayo's interest), that a constructive
trust was deemed to have been created by operation
of law under the provisions of Article 1456 of the
Civil Code.
Article 1456. If the property is acquired through
mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force
of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for
the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes. AFFIREMED.
94) VALDEZ V. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY and CONSUELO M.
GOMEZ-VALDEZ
260 SCRA 221
FACTS: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were
married in January 1971 and had five children. In a
petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdez sought the
declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family code. After the hearing the
parties following the joinder of issues, the trial court,
in its decision of 29 July 1994, granted the petition,
declaring among others that (1) the marriage of
petitioner Antonio Valdez and respondent Consuelo
Gomez-Valdez null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code on the ground of their mutual
psychological incapacity to comply with their

essential marital obligations; and (2) the petitioner
and the respondent are directed to start proceedings
on the liquidation of their common properties as
defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to
comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51, and 52
of the same code, within thirty (30) days from notice
of this decision.
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that
portion of the decision directing compliance with
Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She
asserted that the Family Code contained no
provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of
common property in "unions without marriage." In an
order, the TC made the following clarification:
Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the
Family Code explicitly provides that the property
acquired by both parties during their union, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to
have been obtained through the joint efforts of the
parties and will be owned by them in equal shares,
plaintiff and defendant will own their "family home"
and all their properties for that matter in equal
shares. In the liquidation and partition of properties
owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant, the
provisions on ownership found in the Civil Code shall
apply.
The TC said that considering that this Court has
already declared the marriage between petitioner
and respondent as null and void ab initio, pursuant
to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner and
respondent shall be governed by the rules on coownership.
In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that
Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code should be
held controlling.
ISSUE: WON Article 147 of the Family Code apply to
cases where the parties are psychologically
incapacitated.
HELD: The trial court correctly applied the law. In a
void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article
147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the
Family Code. Article 147 provides:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages
and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares
and the property acquired by both of them through
their work or industry shall be governed by the rules
on co-ownership
88

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties
acquired while they lived together shall be presumed
to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal
shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did
not participate in the acquisition by the other party of
any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof in the former's efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
and of the household.
Under this property regime, property acquired by
both spouses through their work and industry shall
be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership.
Any property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall be considered as
having contributed thereto jointly if said party's
"efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of
gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are
not included in the co-ownership.
Thus, petitioner and private respondent own the
"family home" and all their common property in equal
shares, as well as in concluding that, in the
liquidation and partition of the property owned in
common by them, the provisions on co-ownership
under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in
relation to Articles 102 and 129, of the Family Code,
should aptly prevail. AFFIRMED.
95) ESTONINA V. COURT OF APPEALS
266 SCRA 627
FACTS: The controversy involves Lot C situated in
Barrio Santisima Cruz, Sta. Cruz, Laguna with an
area of 273 square meters. The said parcel of land
was in the name of Santiago Garcia who died on
October 2, 1967. Some six years after Santiago
Garcia's death, or on March 10, 1973, the then CFI
of Manila issued an order granting Trinidad
Estonina's application for a writ of preliminary
attachment. Consequently, a notice of attachment
was inscribed in favor of Trinidad Estonina covering
all the rights, title, interest, and participation that
Consuelo Garcia, the widow of Santiago Garcia,
may have in and to the parcel of land covered by the
said title.
On August 14, 1977, the children of Santiago Garcia
with his first wife, Adela Isoreta, namely Ofelia,
Remedios, Elvira and Castor all surnamed Garcia,
executed a deed selling, transferring and conveying
unto the spouses Celso Atayan and Nilda Hicban
their "title, rights, interest and participation which is
four tenths (4/10) pro indiviso share" in the said

parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-82229. About a
year after, Santiago Garcia's second wife and widow,
Consuelo Garcia and their children, Virgilio, Marilou
and Lolita, all surnamed Garcia, followed suit and
also sold to the spouses Atayan, their four-tenths
(4/10) pro indidviso share in the same parcel of land.
On February 22, 1980, Estrella R. Garcia, the widow
of Santiago Garcia, Jr. (Santiago Garcia's son from
his first marriage), and their children, Roderick,
Elizabeth, Dorothy and Erlinda, likewise sold to the
spouses Atayan, their one-tenth (1/10) pro indiviso
share in the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T82229.
Subsequent to a favorable decision obtained by
Trinidad Estonina against Consuelo Garcia,
execution pending appeal was made on the parcel of
land formerly covered by TCT No. T-82229 on July
20, 1979. The said parcel of land was sold at a
public auction where Trinidad Estonina was the
highest bidder. Consuelo Garcia appealed the
decision in Civil Case before the IAC which,
however, ruled in favor of Trinidad Estonina. Upon
the finality of the said decision, TCT No. T-82229
was cancelled by the Register of Deeds of Laguna
and in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-99961 was issued in
favor of "Trinidad Estonina married to Paulino
Estonina".
On July 25, 1985, the spouses Atayan filed a
complaint for annulment of sheriff's sale and transfer
certificate of title with damages before Branch 28 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz,
Laguna, impleading as defendants therein the
spouses Trinidad and Paulino Estonina , Nicanor E.
Silvano, Reynaldo G. Javier, Edmund R. Solidum,
the Register of Deeds of Laguna, and the heirs of
Santiago Garcia who sold to the spouses Atayan
their pro indiviso shares in the parcel of land covered
by TCT No. T-82229.
RTC:dismissed the complaint. It found the lot
covered by TCT No. T-82229, was acquired during
the marriage of Santiago Garcia and Consuelo
Gaza, and is presumed to be conjugal in nature.
Upon the death of Santiago Garcia on October 2,
1967, his conjugal share of one-half (l/2) of the said
parcel of land was transmitted to his heirs by
intestate succession. By the law on intestate
succession, his nine children, five by his first wife
and four out of the subsequent marriage, and
Consuelo Garcia, his second wife and widow,
inherited the same at one-tenth (1/10) each pro
indiviso. The remaining one-half (1/2) pertained to
the conjugal share of Consuelo Garcia. Thus,
inasmuch as Consuelo Garcia inherited one-tenth
(1/10) of her husband's conjugal share in the said
89

property and is the owner of one-half (1/2) thereof as
her conjugal share, she owns a total of 55% (or 1/10
plus 1/2) of the said parcel of land. What could be
attached by the spouses Estonina and later levied
on execution and sold at public auction was only
Consuelo Garcia's rights and interests which is fifty
five per cent (55%) of the property.
CA: the parcel of land in question was not the
conjugal property of Santiago and Consuelo Garcia,
but was the former's exclusive property. It was
therefore the entire property that formed part of
Santiago Garcia's estate upon his death. When
Santiago Garcia died, his nine children and
Consuelo Garcia inherited the said property each to
the extent of one-tenth (1/10) pro indiviso share.
Hence, it was only Consuelo Garcia's one-tenth(l/l0)
pro indiviso share in the parcel of land in question
which could be validly attached, levied and sold in
execution to satisfy the judgment against her and in
favor of Trinidad Estonina in Civil Case No. 88430.
ISSUE: WON the land is a conjugal property of
Santiago and Consuelo
HELD: The property involved in this dispute is
indeed the exclusive property of the deceased
Santiago Garcia. It has been repeatedly held that the
presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code that
all property of the marriage belong to the conjugal
partnership applies only when there is proof that the
property was acquired during the marriage.
Otherwise stated, proof of acquisition during the
marriage is a condition sine qua non for the
operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership. In the case at bench, the petitioners
have been unable to present any proof that the
property in question was acquired during the
marriage of Santiago and Consuelo. They anchor
their claim solely on the fact that when the title over
the land in question was issued, Santiago was
already married to Consuelo as evidenced by the
registration in the name of "Santiago Garcia married
to Consuelo Gaza". This, according to the spouses
Estonina, suffices to establish the conjugal nature of
the property.
In the case of Jocson v. Court of Appeals
The fact that the properties were registered in the
name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra
Poblete" is no proof that the properties were
acquired during the spouses' coverture. Acquisition
of title and registration thereof are two different acts.
It is well settled that registration does not confer title
but merely confirms one already erdsting. The words
"married to" preceding "Alejandra Poblete" are
merely descriptive of the civil status of Emilio
Jocson. In other words, the import from the

certificates of title is that Emilio Jocson is the owner
of the properties, the same having been registered in
his name alone, and that he is married to Alejandra
Poblete.
Being the exclusive property of Santiago
Garcia, it was the entire parcel of land in question
that formed part of his estate and which passed to
his ten heirs by compulsory succession upon his
death. And as correctly held by the Court of Appeals,
what could therefore be attached and sold at public
auction in Civil Case No. 88430 was only the onetenth (1/10) pro indiviso share of Consuelo Garcia in
the said parcel of land. The sale at public auction of
the disputed property in its entirety by the Sheriff in
favor of Trinidad Estonina over and above the onetenth (1/10) share of Consuelo Garcia is null and
void, belonging as it does to the other heirs of
Santiago Garcia and later to the spouses Atayan.
Anent the contention that the spouses Atayan are
guilty of laches, suffice it to state that this residual
argument deserves scant consideration. Being
strangers to Civil Case No. 88430 where the writ of
execution over the land in question was issued, they
cannot be faulted for filing the "proper action" only in
1985 or six (6) years after the levy on execution.
Besides, it was only in 1984 that the Court of
Appeals rendered a decision finally cancelling the
title of their predecessors-in-interest and issuing
another one in favor of Trinidad Estonina. The action
filed by the spouses Atayan seeking the annulment
of the sheriffs sale and the transfer certificate of title
with damages immediately thereafter or on July 25,
1985 cannot be considered as undue delay nor does
it imply a lack of interest to enforce their claim over
the disputed property.
96) AYALA INVESTMENT VS. CA & SPS. SHING
GR NO. 118305, FEBRUARY 12, 1998
DOCTRINE: If the money or services are given to
another person or entity, and the husband acted only
as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by
itself, alone be categorized as falling within the
context of "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." The contract of loan or services is
clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not
for the surety or his family.
FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a
P50,300,000 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment
and Development Corporation (AIDC). As added
security for the credit line extended to PBM,
90

respondent Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice President
of PBM, executed security agreements, making
himself jointly and severally answerable with PBM's
indebtedness to AIDC.
PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, AIDC filed a case
for sum of money against PBM and respondenthusband Alfredo Ching with the CFI of Pasig.
After trial, the court rendered judgment ordering
PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching to
jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount
of P50,300,000 with interests.
Upon motion of AIDC, the lower court issued a writ
of execution pending appeal. Upon AIDC's putting
up of an P8,000,000 bond, a writ of execution was
issued. Thereafter, petitioner Abelardo Magsajo, Sr.,
Deputy Sheriff of Pasig, caused the issuance and
service upon respondents-spouses of a notice of
sheriff sale on 3 of their conjugal properties.
Petitioner Magsajo then scheduled the auction sale
of the properties levied.
Private respondents filed a case of injunction against
petitioners to enjoin the auction sale alleging that
petitioners cannot enforce the judgment against the
conjugal partnership levied on the ground that,
among others, the subject loan did not redound to
the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. The
lower court issued a temporary restraining order.
AIDC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals, questioning the order of the lower court
enjoining the sale. Court of Appeals issued a
Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the lower
court from enforcing its Order, thus paving the way
for the scheduled auction sale of respondentsspouses conjugal properties.
The auction sale took place. AIDC being the only
bidder, was issued a Certificate of Sale. Upon
expiration of the redemption period, petitioner sheriff
issued the final deed of sale which was registered.
AIDC filed a motion to dismiss the petition for
injunction filed before the CFI of Pasig on the ground
that the same had become moot and academic with
the consummation of the sale. Respondents filed
their opposition to the motion arguing, among others,
that where a third party who claim is ownership of
the property attached or levied upon, a different legal
situation is presented; and that in this case, 2 of the
real properties are actually in the name of
Encarnacion Ching, a non-party to the civil case.
RTC: the conjugal partnership of gains of
respondents-spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion
Ching is not liable for the payment of the debts
secured by respondent-husband Alfredo Ching.
Thus, the sale on execution null and void.
CA: Affirmed decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
WON a surety agreement entered into by the
husband in favor of his employer is within the
contemplation of Art. 161 of the Civil Code and
considered for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership?
HELD:
No. The surety agreement entered into by the
husband in favor of his employer is not considered
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
We do not agree with petitioners that there is a
difference between the terms "redounded to the
benefit of" or "benefited from" on the one hand; and
"for the benefit of" on the other. They mean one and
the same thing. Art. 161 (1) of the Civil Code and Art.
121 (2) of the Family Code are similarly worded, i.e.,
both use the term "for the benefit of." On the other
hand, Art. 122 of the Family Code provides that "The
payment of personal debts by the husband or the
wife before or during the marriage shall not be
charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar
as they redounded to the benefit of the family." As
can be seen, the terms are used interchangeably.
From the jurisprudential rulings of this Court, we can
derive the following conclusions:
(A) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in
the contract, i.e., he directly received the money and
services to be used in or for his own business or his
own profession, that contract falls within the term . . .
. obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be proved.
It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent
at the time of the signing of the contract. From the
very nature of the contract of loan or services, the
family stands to benefit from the loan facility or
services to be rendered to the business or
profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the
end, his business or profession fails or does not
succeed. Simply stated, where the husband
contracts obligations on behalf of the family
business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that
such obligation will redound to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.
(B) On the other hand, if the money or services are
given to another person or entity, and the husband
acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract
cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling
within the context of "obligations for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership." The contract of loan or
services is clearly for the benefit of the principal
debtor and not for the surety or his family. No
presumption can be inferred that, when a husband
enters into a contract of surety or accommodation
agreement, it is "for the benefit of the conjugal
91

partnership." Proof must be presented to establish
benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.
The provisions of the Family Code is applicable in
this case. These provisions highlight the underlying
concern of the law for the conservation of the
conjugal partnership; for the husband's duty to
protect and safeguard, if not augment, not to
dissipate it.
This is the underlying reason why the Family Code
clarifies that the obligations entered into by one of
the spouses must be those that redounded to the
benefit of the family and that the measure of the
partnership's liability is to "the extent that the family
is benefited."
Here, the property in dispute also involves the family
home. The loan is a corporate loan not a personal
one. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise
of an industry or profession nor an act of
administration for the benefit of the family.
97) GUIANG VS. CA AND GILDA COPUZ
G.R. No. 125172, June 26, 1998
DOCTRINE: The sale of a conjugal property
requires the consent of both the husband and the
wife. The absence of the consent of one renders the
sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it
merely voidable. Only in the latter case can
ratification cure the defect.
FACTS:
Private respondent Gilda Corpuz and Judie Corpuz
are legally married spouses. They have three
children, namely: Junie (18 years old), Harriet (17),
and Jodie (15). The couple bought a 421 sq. meter
lot in Koronadal, South Cotabato from Manuel
Callejo through a conditional deed of sale. The
consideration was payable in installment. In 1988,
the couple sold one-half portion of their Lot to
petitioner-spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang.
Since then, Guiang occupied the one-half portion
and built their house thereon. They are thus
adjoining neighbors of the Corpuzes.
Gilda Corpuz left for Manila to look for work abroad.
Unfortunately, she became a victim of an
unscrupulous illegal recruiter. She was not able to go
abroad. She stayed for sometime in Manila.
After his wife's departure for Manila, Judie Corpuz
seldom went home to the conjugal dwelling. He
stayed most of the time at his place of work. Harriet
Corpuz learned that her father intended to sell the
remaining one-half portion including their house to
Guiangs. She wrote a letter to her mother. Gilda
Corpuz replied that she was objecting to the sale.
Harriet, however, did not inform her father about this;

but instead gave the letter to Luzviminda Guiang so
that she would advise her father.
However, in the absence of his wife Gilda, Judie
Corpuz pushed through the sale. He sold to
Luzviminda Guiang thru a "Deed of Transfer of
Rights" remaining one-half portion of their lot and the
house.
Gilda returned home. She found her children staying
with other households. Only Junie was staying in
their house. Harriet and Joji were with Mr. Panes.
Gilda gathered her children together and stayed at
their house. Her husband was nowhere to be found.
She was informed by her children that their father
had a wife already.
For staying in their house sold by her husband,
spouses Guiang complained before the Barangay
authorities for trespassing. The parties thereat
signed a document for amicable settlement stating
that Gilda Corpuz and her three children must leave
voluntarily the house without any charge.
Thereafter, Gilda approached the Barangay Captain
for the annulment of the settlement. Annulment not
having been made, they stayed put in her house and
lot. Spouses Guiang filed a motion for execution of
the amicable settlement with the MTC.
However, Private Respondent Gilda Corpuz filed a
Complaint against her husband Judie Corpuz and
Petitioner-Spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang.
The said Complaint sought the declaration of a Deed
of Transfer of Right, which involved the conjugal
property, null and void. The trial court ruled in favor
of private respondent. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: WON the assailed Deed of Transfer of
Rights was validly executed.
HELD: NO
Petitioners insist that the questioned Deed was
validly executed by the parties in good faith and for
valuable consideration. The absence of private
respondent's consent merely rendered the Deed
voidable under Article 1390 of the Civil Code. The
provision in par. 2, refers to contracts visited by vices
of consent, i.e., contracts which were entered into by
a person whose consent was obtained and vitiated
through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue
influence or fraud. In this instance, private
respondent's consent to the contract of sale of their
conjugal property was totally inexistent or absent.
The contract falls within the ambit of Article 124 of
the Family Code, which provides that "...In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition
or encumbrance shall be void..."
Furthermore, it must be noted that the fraud and the
92

intimidation referred to by petitioners were
perpetrated in the execution of the document
embodying the amicable settlement. Gilda Corpuz
alleged during trial that barangay authorities made
her sign said document through misrepresentation
and coercion. In any event, its execution does not
alter the void character of the deed of sale between
the husband and the petitioners-spouses. The fact
remains that such contract was entered into without
the wife's consent.
In sum, the nullity of the contract of sale is premised
on the absence of private respondent's consent. To
constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code requires
the concurrence of the following elements: cause,
object, and consent, the last element being
indubitably absent in the case at bar.
Doctrinally, a void contract cannot be ratified. By
Art.1390 of the Civil Code, the Deed to Transfer of
Rights cannot be ratified, even by an amicable
settlement.
Neither can the amicable settlement be considered a
continuing offer that was accepted and perfected by
the parties, following the last sentence of Article 124.
The order of the pertinent events is clear: after the
sale, petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing
against private respondent, after which the barangay
authorities secured an "amicable settlement" and
petitioners filed before the MTC a motion for its
execution. The settlement, however, does not
mention a continuing offer to sell the property or an
acceptance of such a continuing offer. Its tenor was
to the effect that private respondent would vacate
the property. By no stretch of the imagination, can
the Court interpret this document as the acceptance
mentioned in Article 124.
Petition denied.
98) FERRER VS. FERRER
G.R. No. 166496, November 9, 2006
It is the owner-spouse who has the obligation to
reimburse the conjugal partnership or the spouse
who expended the acts or efforts, as the case may
be.
FACTS:
In her Complaint for payment of conjugal
improvements, sum of money, and accounting with
prayer for injunction and damages, petitioner alleged
that she is the widow of Alfredo Ferrer (Alfredo), halfbrother of respondents Manuel M. Ferrer (Manuel)
and Ismael M. Ferrer (Ismael).
Before her marriage to Alfredo, the latter acquired a

piece of lot. He applied for a loan with the Social
Security System (SSS) to build improvements
thereon, including a residential house and a twodoor apartment building. It was during their
marriage that payment of the loan was made using
the couples conjugal funds. From their conjugal
funds, petitioner posited, they constructed a
warehouse on the lot. Moreover, petitioner averred
that respondent Manuel occupied one door of the
apartment building, as well as the warehouse;
however, in September 1991, he stopped paying
rentals thereon, alleging that he had acquired
ownership over the property by virtue of a Deed of
Sale executed by Alfredo in favor of respondents,
Manuel and Ismael and their spouses.
It is petitioners contention that when her husband
was already bedridden, respondents Ismael and
Flora Ferrer made him sign a document, purported
to be his last will and testament. The document,
however, was a Deed of Sale covering Alfredos lot
and the improvements thereon.
Learning of this development, Alfredo filed with the
RTC a Complaint for Annulment of the said sale
against respondents.
The RTC dismissed the
same. The RTC found that the terms and conditions
of the Deed of Sale are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, and public policy, and should be
complied with by the parties in good faith, there
being no compelling reason under the law to do
otherwise. The dismissal was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals.
Further, in support of her Complaint, petitioner
alluded to a portion of the Decision of the RTC,
which stated, that in determining which property is
the principal and which is the accessory, the
property of greater value shall be considered the
principal. In this case, the lot is the principal and the
improvements the accessories. Since Article 120 of
the Family Code provides the rule that the ownership
of accessory follows the ownership of the principal,
then the subject lot with all its improvements became
an exclusive and capital property of Alfredo with an
obligation to reimburse the conjugal partnership of
the cost of improvements at the time of liquidation of
[the] conjugal partnership. Clearly, Alfredo has all
the rights to sell the subject property by himself
without need of Josefas consent.
According to petitioner, the ruling of the RTC shows
that, when Alfredo died she had the right to be
reimbursed for the cost of the improvements on
Alfredos lot. Hence, one-half thereof should be
reimbursed and paid by respondents as they are
now the registered owners of Alfredos lot. She
averred that respondents cannot claim lack of
93

knowledge about the fact that the improvements
were constructed using conjugal funds as they had
occupied one of the apartment buildings on Alfredos
lot, and even paid rentals to petitioner.
For their part, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss,
contending that petitioner had no cause of action
against them, and that the cause of action was
barred by prior judgment.
RTC rendered an Order, denying the Motion to
Dismiss. According to the RTC, no pronouncement
as to the improvements constructed on Alfredos lot
has been made and the payment of petitioners
share in the conjugal partnership constitutes a
separate cause of action. A subsequent Order was
issued by the RTC, denying respondents Motion for
Reconsideration.
Aggrieved, respondents elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals by way of a Petition for Certiorari,
alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the RTC in denying the
dismissal.
Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting the
Petition. It held that petitioners Complaint failed to
state a cause of action. The appellate court
rationalized as follows:
[W]e believe that the instant complaint is not the
proper action for the respondent to enforce her right
of reimbursement of the cost of the improvement[s]
on the subject property. As correctly pointed out by
the petitioners, the same should be made and
directed in the settlement of estate of her deceased
husband Alfredo Ferrer pursuant to Article 129 of the
Family Code. Such being the case, it appears that
the complaint herein fails to state a cause of action
against the petitioners, the latter not being the
proper parties against whom the subject action for
reimbursement must be directed to. xxx Albeit the
respondent herein has the legal right to be
reimbursed of the cost of the improvements of the
subject property, it is not the petitioners but the
estate of her deceased husband which has the
obligation to pay the same. The complaint herein is
therefore dismissible for failure to state a cause of
action against the petitioners. Needless to say, the
respondent is not without any further recourse as
she may file her claim against the estate of her
deceased husband.
In light of the foregoing, we find that the public
respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying the petitioners motion to dismiss for failure
to state a cause of action.
Aggrieved,
petitioner
filed
a
Motion
for
Reconsideration thereon. Court of Appeals rendered
a Resolution denying the motion.
Hence, the present recourse.
ISSUE:
Whether or not he Court of Appeals erred in
dismissing petitioners Complaint for failure to state
a cause of action.
HELD:
NO.After a reading of the allegations contained in
petitioners Complaint, we are convinced that the
same failed to state a cause of action.
According to petitioner, while the RTC recognized
that the improvements constructed on Alfredos lots
were deemed as Alfredos exclusive and capital
property, the court also held that petitioner, as
Alfredos spouse, has the right to claim
reimbursement from the estate of Alfredo. It is
argued by petitioner that her husband had no other
property, and his only property had been sold to the
respondents; hence, she has the legal right to claim
for reimbursement from the respondents who are
now the owners of the lot and the improvements
thereon. In fine, petitioner asseverates that the
Complaint cannot be dismissed on the ground of
failure to state a cause of action because the
respondents have the correlative obligation to pay
the value of the improvements.
Petitioner was not able to show that there is an
obligation on the part of the respondents to respect
or not to violate her right. While we could concede
that Civil Case No. 61327 made a reference to the
right of the spouse as contemplated in Article 120 of
the Family Code to be reimbursed for the cost of the
improvements, the obligation to reimburse rests on
the spouse upon whom ownership of the entire
property is vested. There is no obligation on the part
of the purchaser of the property, in case the property
is sold by the owner-spouse.
Indeed, Article 120 provides the solution in
determining the ownership of the improvements that
are made on the separate property of the spouses at
the expense of the partnership or through the acts or
efforts of either or both spouses. Thus, when the
cost of the improvement and any resulting increase
in value are more than the value of the property at
the time of the improvement, the entire property of
one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal
partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of
the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the
improvement; otherwise, said property shall be
retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise
subject to reimbursement of the cost of the
improvement. The subject property was precisely
declared as the exclusive property of Alfredo on the
basis of Article 120 of the Family Code.
94

What is incontrovertible is that the respondents,
despite the allegations contained in the Complaint
that they are the buyers of the subject premises, are
not petitioners spouse nor can they ever be deemed
as the owner-spouse upon whom the obligation to
reimburse petitioner for her costs rested. It is the
owner-spouse who has the obligation to reimburse
the conjugal partnership or the spouse who
expended the acts or efforts, as the case may be.
Otherwise stated, respondents do not have the
obligation to respect petitioners right to be
reimbursed.
It can be said, thus, that respondents act of
acquiring the subject property by sale was not in
violation of petitioners rights. The same can also be
said of the respondents objection to reimburse
petitioner. Simply, no correlative obligation exists on
the part of the respondents to reimburse the
petitioner. Corollary thereto, neither can it be said
that their refusal to reimburse constituted a violation
of petitioners rights. As has been shown in the
foregoing, no obligation by the respondents under
the law exists. Petitioners Complaint failed to state
a cause of action against the respondents, and for
this reason, the Court of Appeals was not in error in
dismissing the same.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
99) DOCENA VS. HON. RICARDO LAPESURA
GR NO. 140153, MARCH 28, 2001
FACTS:
On June 1, 1977, private respondent,
Casiano Hombria filed a Complaint for the recovery
of a parcel of land against lessees, petitionerspouses Docena. The petitioners clamed ownership
of the land based on occupation since time
immemorial. A certain Guillermo Abuda intervened in
the case. In a decision dated November 24, 1989,
the trial court ruled in favor of petitioners and the
intervenor Abuda. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed the judgment of the trial court and ordered
the petitioners to vacate the land they have leased
from plaintiff-appellant.
On May 22, 19995, Hombria filed a Motion
for Execution of the above decision which has
already become final and executory. The above
motion was granted by judge Lapesura and a Writ of
Execution was issued therefore. An alias Writ of
Demolition was then filed by the Sheriff.
A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was
filed by the petitioners eith the Court of Appeals,
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court judge in issuing the orders and the sheriff
in issuing the Alias Writ of Demolition. CA dismissed

the petition on the grounds that the petition was filed
beyond the 60-day period provided under Section 4
of Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure as amended by Bar Matter No. 803 and
that the certification of non-forum shopping attached
thereto was signed by the husband alone. the The
Motion for reconsideration was also denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
dismissing the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
HELD: YES.
Under the New Civil Code, the husband is
the administrator of the conjugal partnership. In fact,
he is the sole administrator, and the wife is not
entitled as a matter of right to join him in this
endeavor. The husband may defend the conjugal
partnership in a suit or action without being joined by
the wife. Corollarily, the husband alone may execute
the necessary certificate of non-forum shopping to
accompany the pleading. The husband as the
statutory administrator of the conjugal property could
have filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition
alone, without the concurrence of the wife. If suits to
defend an interest in the conjugal prperties may be
filed by the husband alone, with more reason, he
may sign the certficate of non-forum shopping to be
attched to the petition.
Under the Family Code, the administration
of the conjugal property belongs to the husband and
the wife jointly. However, an act of alienation or
encumbrance where the consent of both spouses is
required, joint management or administration does
not require that the husband and wife always act
together. Each spouse may validly exercise full
power of management alone, subject to the
intervention of the court in proper cases as provided
under Article 124 of the Family Code. It is believed
taht even under the provisions of the Family Code,
the husband alone could have filed the petition for
certiorari and prohibition to contests the writs of
demolition issued against the conjugal property with
the Court of Appeals without being joined by his wife.
The signing of the attached certificate of non-forum
shopping only by the husband is not a fatal defect.
100) MANALO VS. CAMAISA

GR No. 147978, January 23, 2002
FACTS:
Thelma A. Jader-Manalo was interested in buying
95

the two properties of Spouses Camaisa. So she
negotiated for the purchase through a real estate
broker, Mr. Proceso Ereno. She made a definite offer
to buy the properties to respondent Edilberto
Camaisa with the knowledge and conformity of his
wife, respondent Norma Camaisa in the presence of
the real estate broker.
After Edilberto signed the contracts, Manalo
delivered to him two checks as down payments. The
contracts were given to Edilberto for the formal
affixing of his wife's signature. However, the
following day, petitioner received a call from
respondent Norma, requesting a meeting to clarify
some provisions of the contracts. To accommodate
her queries, petitioner, accompanied by her lawyer,
met with Edilberto and Norma and the real estate
broker at Cafe Rizal in Makati. During the meeting,
handwritten notations were made on the contracts to
sell, so they arranged to incorporate the notations
and to meet again for the formal signing of the
contracts.
When petitioner met again with respondent spouses
and the real estate broker at Edilberto's office for the
formal affixing of Norma's signature, she was
surprised when respondent spouses informed her
that they were backing out of the agreement
because they needed "spot cash" for the full amount
of the consideration. Petitioner reminded respondent
spouses that the contracts to sell had already been
duly perfected and Norma's refusal to sign the same
would unduly prejudice petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the husband may validly
dispose of a conjugal property of the without the
wifes written consent.
HELD: NO.
The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal
property by the husband as administrator in
appropriate cases requires the written consent of the
wife, otherwise, the disposition is void. Thus, Article
124 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse
to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which
must be availed of within five years from the date of
the contract implementing such decision.
The properties subject of the contracts in this case
were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be
effective, the consent of both husband and wife must
concur.
Even granting that respondent Norma actively

participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject
properties, which she denied, her written consent to
the sale is required by law for its validity.
Significantly, petitioner herself admits that Norma
refused to sign the contracts to sell. Respondent
Norma may have been aware of the negotiations for
the sale of their conjugal properties. However, being
merely aware of a transaction is not consent.
101) CARLOS VS. ABELARDO
GR NO. 146504, April 9, 2002
DOCTRINE:
The loan is the liability of the conjugal partnership
FACTS:
In October 1989, respondent and his wife Maria
Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached him and
requested him to advance the amount of
US$25,000.00 (P625, 000. 00) for the purchase of a
house and lot. To enable and assist the spouses
conduct their married life independently and on their
own, petitioner, in October 31, 1989, issued a check
in the name of a certain Pura Vallejo, seller of the
property, who acknowledged receipt thereof.
When petitioner inquired from the spouses in July
1991 as to the status of the amount he loaned to
them, the latter acknowledged their obligation but
pleaded that they were not yet in a position to make
a definite settlement of the same. Thereafter,
respondent expressed violent resistance to
petitioners inquiries on the amount to the extent of
making various death threats against petitioner.
Despite formal demand for the payment of the said
loan, spouses were unable to pay their obligation.
Hence, this prompted petitioner to institute a
collection suit against respondent and his wife. As
they were separated in fact for more than a year
prior to the filing of the complaint, respondent and
his wife filed separate answers. Maria Theresa
Carlos-Abelardo admitted securing a loan together
with her husband, from petitioner. She claimed,
however, that said loan was payable on a staggered
basis so she was surprised when petitioner
demanded immediate payment of the full amount.
In his separate Answer, respondent admitted
receiving the amount of US$25,000.00 but claimed
that the said US$25,000.00 was never intended as
loan of defendant. It was his share of income on
contracts obtained by defendant.
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RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner. CA reversed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the loan is chargeable to the
conjugal partnership.
HELD:
Yes. The loan is the liability of the conjugal
partnership pursuant to Article 121 of the Family
Code:
Article 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable
for:
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the
marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by
both spouses or by one of them with the consent of
the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either
spouse without the consent of the other to the extent
that the family may have been benefited; If the
conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the
foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily
liable for the unpaid balance with their separate
properties.
While respondent did not and refused to sign the
acknowledgment executed and signed by his wife,
undoubtedly, the loan redounded to the benefit of the
family because it was used to purchase the house
and lot which became the conjugal home of
respondent and his family. Hence, notwithstanding
the alleged lack of consent of respondent, under Art.
21 of the Family Code, he shall be solidarily liable for
such loan together with his wife.
Early in time, it must be noted that payment of
personal debts contracted by the husband or the
wife before or during the marriage shall not be
charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar
as they redounded to the benefit of the family. The
defendants never denied that the check of
US$25,000.00 was used to purchase the subject
house and lot. They do not deny that the same
served as their conjugal home, thus benefiting the
family.
On the same principle, acknowledgment of the loan
made by the defendant-wife binds the conjugal
partnership since its proceeds redounded to the
benefit of the family. Hence, defendant-husband and
defendant-wife are jointly and severally liable in the
payment of the loan.
102) RELUCIO VS. ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ

G.R. NO. 138497 January 16, 2002
FACTS:
Angelina Mejia Lopez filed a petition for
"APPOINTMENT AS SOLE ADMINISTRATIX OF
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF PROPERTIES,
FORFEITURE, ETC.," against defendant Alberto
Lopez and petitioner Imelda Relucio. Angelina
alleged that sometime in 1968, defendant Lopez,
who is legally married to her, abandoned the latter
and their four legitimate children; that he arrogated
unto himself full and exclusive control and
administration of the conjugal properties, that
defendant Lopez maintained an illicit relationship
and cohabited with petitioner since 1976. It was
further alleged that defendant Lopez and petitioner
Relucio, during their period of cohabitation have
amassed
a fortune
consisting mainly of
stockholdings in Lopez-owned or controlled
corporations, residential, agricultural, commercial
lots, houses, apartments and buildings, cars and
other motor vehicles, bank accounts and jewelry.
These properties, which are in the names of
defendant Lopez and petitioner Relucio singly or
jointly or their dummies and proxies, have been
acquired principally if not solely through the actual
contribution of money, property and industry of
defendant Lopez with minimal, if not nil, actual
contribution from petitioner Relucio. On December 8,
1993, a Motion to Dismiss the Petition was filed by
herein petitioner on the ground that private
respondent has no cause of action against her.An
Order dated February 10, 1994 was issued by herein
respondent Judge denying petitioner Relucio's
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that she is
impleaded as a necessary or indispensable party
because some of the subject properties are
registered in her name and defendant Lopez, or
solely in her name. Petitioner filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari assailing the trial
court's denial of her motion to dismiss. The Court of
Appeals promulgated a decision denying the
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent's petition for
appointment as sole administratrix of the conjugal
property, accounting, etc. against her husband
Alberto J. Lopez established a cause of action
against petitioner.
HELD:: No. The complaint is by an aggrieved wife
against her husband. Nowhere in the allegations
97

does it appear that relief is sought against petitioner.
Respondent's causes of action were all against her
husband. The first cause of action is for judicial
appointment of respondent as administratrix of the
conjugal partnership or absolute community property
arising from her marriage to Alberto J. Lopez.
Petitioner is a complete stranger to this cause of
action. Article 128 of the Family Code refers only to
spouses, to wit: "If a spouse without just cause
abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her
obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may
petition the court for receivership, for judicial
separation of property, or for authority to be the sole
administrator of the conjugal partnership property
xxx". The administration of the property of the
marriage is entirely between them, to the exclusion
of all other persons. Respondent alleges that Alberto
J. Lopez is her husband. Therefore, her first cause
of action is against Alberto J. Lopez. There is no
right-duty relation between petitioner and respondent
that can possibly support a cause of action. The
second cause of action is for an accounting "by
respondent husband." The accounting of conjugal
partnership arises from or is an incident of marriage.
Petitioner has nothing to do with the marriage
between respondent Alberto J. Lopez. Hence, no
cause of action can exist against petitioner on this
ground. Respondent's alternative cause of action is
for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez' share in the coowned property "acquired during his illicit
relationship and cohabitation with [petitioner]" and
for the "dissolution of the conjugal partnership of
gains between him [Alberto J. Lopez] and the
[respondent]." The third cause of action is essentially
for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez' share in property
co-owned by him and petitioner. It does not involve
the issue of validity of the co-ownership between
Alberto J. Lopez and petitioner. The issue is whether
there is basis in law to forfeit Alberto J. Lopez' share,
if any there be, in property co-owned by him with
petitioner. Respondent's asserted right to forfeit
extends to Alberto J. Lopez' share alone. Failure of
Alberto J. Lopez to surrender such share, assuming
the trial court finds in respondent's favor, results in a
breach of an obligation to respondent and gives rise
to a cause of action. Such cause of action, however,
pertains to Alberto J. Lopez, not petitioner. The
respondent also sought support. Support cannot be
compelled from a stranger. The action in Special
Proceedings M-3630 is, to use respondent Angelina
M. Lopez' own words, one by "an aggrieved wife
against her husband."
103) Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank vs.

Miguela C. Dailo
G.R. No. 153802, March 11, 2005
Facts
During their marriage, respondents Miguela C. Dailo
and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. purchased a house and lot
with the Deed of Absolute Sale executed only in
favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee.
Without the knowledge and consent of respondent
Miguela Dailo, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Lilibeth
Gesmundo, authorizing her to obtain a loan from
petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to
be secured by the spouses Dailos house and lot.
Gesmundo was able to obtain a loan from petitioner
and as security executed a Real Estate Mortgage on
the subject property in favor of petitioner.
Upon maturity, the loan remained unpaid and as a
result, petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings on the mortgaged property.
After the death of her husband, during one of her
visits to the subject property, respondent learned
that petitioner had already employed a certain
Roldan Brion to clean its premises and that her car,
a Ford sedan, was razed because Brion allowed a
boy to play with fire within the premises.
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage
constituted on the subject property, which was
conjugal in nature, respondent instituted a case
for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of
Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed
of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction and Damages against petitioner. In the
latters Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed
for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that
the property in question was the exclusive property
of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered
a Decision in favor of the respondent, and upon
elevation, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
courts finding in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that
the subject property was conjugal in nature. Hence,
the appellate court declared as void the mortgage on
the subject property because it was constituted
without the knowledge and consent of respondent, in
accordance with Article 124 of the Family Code.
With respect to the damage to respondents car, the
appellate court found petitioner to be liable because
it is responsible for the consequences of the acts or
omissions of the person it hired to accomplish the
assigned task. All told, the appellate court affirmed
the trial courts Decision, but deleted the award for
damages and attorneys fees for lack of basis.
98

As a response to above decision, petitioner filed a
petition for review on certiorari assailing
the Decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed
with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court. Petitioner argues that although Article 124 of
the Family Code requires the consent of the other
spouse to the mortgage of conjugal properties, the
framers of the law could not have intended to curtail
the right of a spouse from exercising full ownership
over the portion of the conjugal property pertaining
to him under the concept of co-ownership. Thus,
petitioner would like the Court to uphold the validity
of the mortgage to the extent of the late Marcelino
Dailo, Jr.s share in the conjugal partnership. In
addition, petitioner imposes the liability for the
payment of the principal obligation obtained by the
late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. on the conjugal partnership
to the extent that it redounded to the benefit of the
family.
Issues
1. Whether or not the mortgage constituted by
the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. on the subject
property as co-owner thereof is valid as to
his undivided share.
2. Whether or not the conjugal partnership is
liable for the payment of the loan obtained
by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. the same
having redounded to the benefit of the
family.
Held
On the first issue, the Court cited the case, Guiang
v. Court of Appeals, where it was held that the sale
of a conjugal property requires the consent of both
the husband and wife and the same principle shall
squarely applies to the instant case.
Respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were
married on August 8, 1967. In the absence of a
marriage settlement, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains
governed the property relations between respondent
and her late husband. With the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4
on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family Code
was made applicable to conjugal partnership of
gains already established before its effectivity unless
vested rights have already been acquired under the
Civil Code or other laws.
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the
property relations of respondent and the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. even in a suppletory manner.
The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a
special type of partnership, where the husband and
wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products,
fruits and income from their separate properties and

those acquired by either or both spouses through
their efforts or by chance. Unlike the absolute
community of property wherein the rules on coownership apply in a suppletory manner, the
conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules
on contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict
with what is expressly determined in the chapter (on
conjugal partnership of gains) or by the spouses in
their marriage settlements. Thus, the property
relations of respondent and her late husband shall
be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal
Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and,
suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the
Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former prevails
because the Civil Code provisions on partnership
apply only when the Family Code is silent on the
matter.
The basic and established fact is that during his
lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of his
wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estate
mortgage on the subject property, which formed part
of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of
Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of
(court) authority or written consent of the other
spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the
conjugal property shall be void.
The aforequoted provision does not qualify with
respect to the share of the spouse who makes the
disposition or encumbrance in the same manner that
the rule on co-ownership under Article 493 of the
Civil Code does. Where the law does not distinguish,
courts should not distinguish. Thus, both the trial
court and the appellate court are correct in declaring
the nullity of the real estate mortgage on the subject
property for lack of respondents consent.
On the second issue, the Court cited that under
Article 121 of the Family Code, The conjugal
partnership shall be liable for: . . . (3) Debts and
obligations contracted by either spouse without the
consent of the other to the extent that the family may
have been benefited; . . . . For the subject property
to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. must have redounded to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. There must be
the requisite showing then of some advantage which
clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses.
Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond
for a liability that should appertain to the husband
alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective
of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for
the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies
with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Ei
99

incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who
asserts, not he who denies, must prove).
Petitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan
obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to finance
the construction of housing units without a doubt
redounded to the benefit of his family, without
adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this
Court. Other than petitioners bare allegation, there
is nothing from the records of the case to compel a
finding that, indeed, the loan obtained by the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded to the benefit of the
family. Consequently, the conjugal partnership
cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal
obligation.
104) In Re: Petition For Separation Of Property
Elena Buenaventura Muller vs. Helmut Muller
G.R. No. 149615, August 29, 2006
Facts
Petitioner
Elena
Buenaventura
Muller
and
respondent Helmut Muller were married in Germany.
The couple resided in Germany at a house owned
by respondents parents but decided to move and
reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By
this time, respondent had inherited the house in
Germany from his parents which he sold and used
the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in
Antipolo Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and the
construction
of
a
house
amounting
to
P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered
in the name of petitioner.
Due to incompatibilities, respondent filed a
petition for separation of properties before the
Regional Trial Court.
The trial court rendered a decision which terminated
the regime of absolute community of property
between the petitioner and respondent. It also
decreed the separation of properties between them
and ordered the equal partition of personal
properties located within the country, excluding
those acquired by gratuitous title during the
marriage. With regard to the Antipolo property, the
court held that it was acquired using paraphernal
funds of the respondent. However, it ruled that
respondent cannot recover his funds because the
property was purchased in violation of Section 7,
Article XII of the Constitution.
However, pursuant to Article 92 of the Family Code,
properties acquired by gratuitous title by either
spouse during the marriage shall be excluded from
the community property. The real property, therefore,
inherited by respondent-petitioner in Germany is
excluded from the absolute community of property of
the herein spouses. Necessarily, the proceeds of the

sale of said real property as well as the personal
properties purchased thereby, belong exclusively to
the respondent-petitioner. However, the part of that
inheritance used by the respondent-petitioner for
acquiring the house and lot in this country cannot be
recovered by the respondent-petitioner, its
acquisition being a violation of Section 7, Article XII
of the Constitution which provides that "save in
cases of hereditary succession, no private lands
shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain." The law
will leave the parties in the situation where they are
in without prejudice to a voluntary partition by the
parties of the said real property.
Hence, as regards the property situated in Antipolo
and the improvements thereon, the Court shall not
make any pronouncement on constitutional grounds.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which
rendered the assailed decision modifying the trial
courts Decision. It held that respondent merely
prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of the
Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer of
ownership to him. It also considered petitioners
ownership over the property in trust for the
respondent. As regards the house, the Court of
Appeals ruled that there is nothing in the
Constitution which prohibits respondent from
acquiring the same.
Issue
Whether or not the respondent is entitled to
reimbursement of the amount used to purchase the
land as well as the costs for the construction of the
house.
Held
The Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that an implied trust was created and
resulted by operation of law in view of petitioners
marriage to respondent. Save for the exception
provided in cases of hereditary succession,
respondents disqualification from owning lands in
the Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in
trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is
made in violation of an existing statute and in
evasion of its express provision, no trust can result
in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. To hold
otherwise would allow circumvention of the
constitutional prohibition.
Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court
of law but also a court of equity is likewise
misplaced. He who seeks equity must do equity,
and he who comes into equity must come with clean
100

hands. Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot
seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it
is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the
property despite the constitutional prohibition.
Further, the distinction made between transfer of
ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futile
exercise
on
respondents part.
To allow
reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to
enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not allowed
to own.
In view of the foregoing, the Court ordered the
Decision of the Court of Appeals to be REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court terminating the regime of absolute community
between the petitioner and respondent, decreeing a
separation of property between them and ordering
the partition of the personal properties located in the
Philippines equally, is REINSTATED.
105) Agapay vs. Palang
276 SCRA 341
Facts
Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage with
private respondent Carlina (or Cornelia) Vallesterol
in 1949. A few months after the wedding, he left to
work in Hawaii. The trial court found evidence that
as early as 1957, Miguel had attempted to divorce
Carlina in Hawaii.
On July 15, 1973, the then sixty-three-year-old
Miguel contracted his second marriage with
nineteen-year-old
Erlinda
Agapay,
herein
petitioner. Two months earlier, on May 17, 1973,
Miguel and Erlinda, as evidenced by the Deed of
Sale, jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land
located in Pangasinan. Consequently, a Transfer
Certificate of Title covering said rice land was issued
in their names.
A house and lot in Pangasinan was likewise
purchased on September 23, 1975, allegedly by
Erlinda as the sole vendee. A Transfer Certificate of
Title covering said property was later issued in her
name.
On October 30, 1975, Miguel and Cornelia Palang
executed a Deed of Donation as a form of
compromise agreement to settle and end a case
filed by the latter. The parties therein agreed to
donate their conjugal property consisting of six
parcels of land to their only child, Herminia Palang.
Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son,
Kristopher A. Palang. In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda
were convicted of Concubinage upon Carlinas
complaint and two years later, Miguel died.
On July 11, 1981, Carlina Palang and her daughter

Herminia Palang de la Cruz, herein private
respondents, instituted an action for recovery of
ownership and possession with damages against
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court. Private
respondents sought to get back the riceland and the
house and lot allegedly purchased by Miguel during
his cohabitation with petitioner.
Petitioner, as defendant below, contended that while
the riceland is registered in their names (Miguel and
Erlinda), she had already given her half of the
property to their son Kristopher Palang. She added
that the house and lot is her sole property, having
bought the same with her own money. Erlinda
added that Carlina is precluded from claiming
aforesaid properties since the latter had already
donated their conjugal estate to Herminia.
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered its
decision dismissing the complaint after declaring that
there was little evidence to prove that the subject
properties pertained to the conjugal property of
Carlina and Miguel Palang.
On appeal, respondent court reversed the trial
courts decision. The Court of Appeals declared the
plaintiffs-appellants as the owners of the riceland
and the house and lot allegedly purchased by Miguel
during his cohabitation with defendant appellee.
Issue
Whether or not petitioner can be considered as the
rightful co-owner of the riceland and the house and
lot.
Held
The Court held that under Article 148 of the Family
Code, providing for cases of cohabitation when a
man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry
each other live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage, only the properties acquired
by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. It must be stressed that
actual contribution is required by this provision. If
the actual contribution of the party is not proved,
there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of
equal shares.
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her
testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy
and sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to
persuade the Court that she actually contributed
money to buy the subject riceland. Worth noting is
the fact that on the date of conveyance, May 17,
1973, petitioner was only around twenty years of age
101

and Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a
pensioner of the U.S. Government. Considering her
youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973
she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the
purchase price of subject property, there being no
proof of the same.
Petitioner again claims that the riceland was bought
two months before Miguel and Erlinda actually
cohabited. In the nature of an afterthought, said
added assertion was intended to exclude their case
from the operation of Article 148 of the Family
Code. Proof of the precise date when they
commenced their adulterous cohabitation not having
been adduced, the Court cannot state definitively
that the riceland was purchased even before they
started living together. In any case, even assuming
that the subject property was bought before
cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership would still
apply and proof of actual contribution would still be
essential. Since petitioner failed to prove that she
contributed money to the purchase price of the
riceland, the Court finds no basis to justify her coownership
with
Miguel
over
the
same. Consequently, the riceland should revert to
the conjugal partnership property of the deceased
Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang.
With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly
bought the same for P20,000.00 on when she was
only 22 years old. The testimony of the notary public
who prepared the deed of conveyance for the
property reveals the falsehood of this claim. Atty.
Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel Palang
provided the money for the purchase price and
directed that Erlindas name alone be placed as the
vendee.
The transaction was properly a donation made by
Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void
and inexistent by express provision of law because it
was made between persons guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation, under
Article 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of
the Family Code expressly provides that the
prohibition against donations between spouses now
applies to donations between persons living together
as husband and wife without a valid marriage.
106) Tumlos vs. Fernandez

330 SCRA 718
Facts
Herein respondents were the plaintiffs in an action

for ejectment filed before the MTC of Valenzuela
against herein Petitioner Guillerma Tumlos, Toto
Tumlos, and Gina Tumlos. In their complaint, the
said spouses alleged that they are the absolute
owners of an apartment building located at ARTE
SUBDIVISION III; that through tolerance they had
allowed the defendants-private respondents to
occupy the apartment building for the last seven (7)
years without the payment of any rent; that it was
agreed upon that after a few months, defendant
Guillerma Tumlos will pay P1,600.00 a month while
the other defendants promised to pay P1,000.00 a
month, both as rental, which agreement was not
complied with by the said defendants; that they have
demanded several times for the defendants to
vacate the premises, as they are in need of the
property for the construction of a new building; and
that they have also demanded payment of
P84,000.00 from Toto and Gina Tumlos representing
rentals for seven (7) years and payment of
P143,600.00 from Guillerma Tumlos as unpaid
rentals for seven (7) years, but the said demands
went unheeded.
Petitioner Guillerma Tumlos was the only one who
filed an answer to the complaint. She averred therein
that the Fernandez spouses had no cause of action
against her, since she is a co-owner of the subject
premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein
it was stated that she is a co-vendee of the property
in question together with Respondent Mario
Fernandez. Thus, she asked for the dismissal of the
complaint.
After an unfruitful preliminary conference, the MTC
required the parties to submit their affidavits and
other evidence on the factual issues defined in their
pleadings within ten (10) days from receipt of such
order and thereafter promulgated its judgment.
Upon appeal to the RTC, petitioner and the two
other defendants alleged in their memorandum on
appeal that Respondent Mario Fernandez and
Petitioner Guillerma had an amorous relationship,
and that they acquired the property in question as
their love nest. It was further alleged that they lived
together in the said apartment building with their two
(2) children for around ten (10) years, and that
Guillerma administered the property by collecting
rentals from the lessees of the other apartments,
until she discovered that Respondent Mario
deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage.
In the same memorandum, petitioner and the two
other defendants further averred that it was only
recently that Toto Tumlos was temporarily
accommodated in one of the rooms of the subject
premises while Gina Tumlos acted as a nanny for
102

the children. In short, their presence there was only
transient and they were not tenants of the
Fernandez spouses.
The RTC subsequently rendered a decision affirming
in toto the judgment of the MTC.
The petitioner and the two other defendants filed a
motion for reconsideration, alleging that the decision
of affirmance by the RTC was constitutionally flawed
for failing to point out distinctly and clearly the
findings of facts and law on which it was based vis-vis the statements of issues they have raised in
their memorandum on appeal. They also averred
that the Contract to Sell presented by the plaintiffs
which named the buyer as Mario P. Fernandez, of
legal age, married to Lourdes P. Fernandez, should
not be given credence as it was falsified to appear
that way. According to them, the Contract to Sell
originally named Guillerma Fernandez as the
spouse of Respondent Mario. As found by the RTC
in its judgment, a new Contract to Sell was issued by
the sellers naming the respondents as the buyers
after the latter presented their marriage contract and
requested a change in the name of the vendee-wife.
Such facts necessitate the conclusion that Guillerma
was really a co-owner thereof, and that the
respondents manipulated the evidence in order to
deprive her of her rights to enjoy and use the
property as recognized by law.
The RTC subsequently ruled that the Contract to
Sell submitted by the Fernandez spouses appeared
not to be authentic, as there was an alteration in the
name of the wife of Respondent Mario Fernandez.
Hence, the contract presented by the respondents
cannot be given any weight. The court further ruled
that Guillerma and Respondent Mario acquired the
property during their cohabitation as husband and
wife, although without the benefit of marriage. From
such findings, the court concluded that Petitioner
Guillerma Tumlos was a co-owner of the subject
property and could not be ejected therefrom.
The CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The CA
ruled that from the inception of the instant case, the
only defense presented by private respondent
Guillerma is her right as a co-owner of the subject
property, which was not satisfactorily proven by
Guillerma. It was only on appeal that Guillerma
alleged that she cohabited with the petitionerhusband without the benefit of marriage, and that
she bore him two (2) children. Attached to her
memorandum on appeal are the birth certificates of
the said children. Such contentions and documents
should not have been considered by the RTC, as
they were not presented in her affidavit/position
paper before the MTC. Even if the said allegations
and documents could be considered, the claim of co-
ownership must still fail as Respondent Mario

Fernandez is validly married to Respondent Lourdes
Fernandez as per Marriage Contract. Guillerma and
Mario are not capacitated to marry each other. Thus,
the property relations governing their supposed
cohabitation is that found in Article 148 of the Family
Code. It is clear that actual contribution is required
by this provision. Hence, if actual contribution of the
party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership
and no presumption of equal shares.
In the instant case, no proof of actual contribution by
Guillerma Tumlos in the purchase of the subject
property was presented. Her only evidence was her
being named in the Contract to Sell as the wife of
Respondent Mario Fernandez. Since she failed to
prove that she contributed money to the purchase
price of the subject apartment building, the Court
finds no basis to justify her co-ownership with
Respondent Mario. The said property is thus
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership
property of Mario and Lourdes Fernandez, it being
acquired during the subsistence of their marriage
and there being no other proof to the contrary.
The RTC also found that Respondent Mario has two
(2) children with Guillerma who are in her custody,
and that to eject them from the apartment building
would be to run counter with the obligation of the
former to give support to his minor illegitimate
children, which indispensably includes dwelling.
Such finding has no leg to stand on, it being based
on evidence presented for the first time on appeal.
Even assuming arguendo that the said evidence was
validly presented, the RTC failed to consider that the
need for support cannot be presumed. Article 203 of
the Family Code expressly provides that the
obligation to give support shall be demandable from
the time the person who has a right to receive the
same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be
paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial
demand.
Issues
1. Whether or not the petitioner is a co-owner
of the property pursuant to Article 148 of the
Family Code.
2. Whether or not the petitioners claim for
support bar the subject ejectment suit.
Held
On the first issue, the Court held that it cannot
accept petitioners submission that she is a coowner of the disputed property pursuant to Article
144 of the Civil Code. As correctly held by the CA,
the applicable law is not Article 144 of the Civil
Code, but Article 148 of the Family Code. Under
103

Article 148 of the Family Code, a man and a woman,
who are not legally capacitated to marry each other,
but who nonetheless live together conjugally, may be
deemed co-owners of a property acquired during the
cohabitation only upon proof that each made an
actual contribution to its acquisition. Hence, mere
cohabitation without proof of contribution will not
result in a co-ownership.
Article 144 of the Civil Code applies only to a
relationship between a man and a woman, who are
not incapacitated to marry each other, or to one in
which the marriage of the parties is void from the
beginning. It does not apply to a cohabitation that
amounts to adultery or concubinage, for it would be
absurd to create a co-ownership where there exists
a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community
between the man and his lawful wife.
Based on evidence presented by respondents, as
well as those submitted by petitioner herself before
the RTC, it is clear that Mario Fernandez was
incapacitated to marry petitioner because he was
legally married to Lourdes Fernandez. It is also clear
that, as readily admitted by petitioner, she cohabited
with Mario in a state of concubinage. Therefore,
Article 144 of the Civil Code is inapplicable.
In this case, petitioner fails to present any evidence
that she had made an actual contribution to
purchase the subject property. Likewise, her claim of
having administered the property during the
cohabitation is unsubstantiated and in any event,
this fact by itself does not justify her claim, for
nothing in Article 148 of the Family Code provides
that the administration of the property amounts to a
contribution in its acquisition. Clearly, there is no
basis for petitioners claim of co-ownership. The
property in question belongs to the conjugal
partnership of respondents. Hence, the MTC and the
CA were correct in ordering the ejectment of
petitioner from the premises.
On the second issue, the Court disagree with the
petitioner that the childrens right to support, which
necessarily includes shelter, prevails over the right of
respondents to eject her. The Court emphasized
that the case at bar is an ejectment suit whereby
respondents seek to exercise their possessory right
over their property. It is summary in character and
deals solely with the issue of possession of the
property in dispute and it has been shown that they
have a better right to possess it than does the
petitioner, whose right to possess is based merely
on their tolerance. Further, Article 298 of the Civil
Code expressly provides that the obligation to give
support shall be demandable from the time the
person who has a right to receive the same need it
for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from
the date of judicial and extrajudicial demand. In this

case, none was made.
107) Eustaquio Mallilin vs. Ma. Elvira Castillo
333 SCRA 628
Facts
On February 24, 1993, petitioner Eustaquio Mallilin,
Jr. filed a complaint for "Partition and/or Payment of
Co-Ownership Share, Accounting and Damages"
against respondent Ma. Elvira Castillo. The
complaint alleged that petitioner and respondent,
both married and with children, but separated from
their respective spouses, cohabited after a brief
courtship sometime in 1979 while their respective
marriages still subsisted. During their union, they set
up the Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation,
with petitioner as president and chairman of the
board of directors, and respondent as vice-president
and treasurer. The business flourished and petitioner
and respondent acquired real and personal
properties which were registered solely in
respondent's name. In 1992, due to irreconcilable
differences, the couple separated. Petitioner
demanded from respondent his share in the subject
properties, but respondent refused alleging that said
properties had been registered solely in her name.
In her Amended Answer, respondent admitted that
she engaged in the customs brokerage business
with petitioner but alleged that the Superfreight
Customs Brokerage Corporation was organized with
other individuals and duly registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission in 1987. She
denied that she and petitioner lived as husband and
wife because the fact was that they were still legally
married to their respective spouses. She claimed to
be the exclusive owner of all real personal properties
involved in petitioner's action for partition on the
ground that they were acquired entirely out of her
own money and registered solely in her name.
On November 25, 1994, respondent filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment, in accordance with Rule 34
of the Rules of Court. She contended that summary
judgment was proper, because the issues raised in
the pleadings were sham and not genuine.
The respondent contended that even if she and
petitioner actually cohabited, petitioner could not
validly claim a part of the subject real and personal
properties because Art. 144 of the Civil Code, which
provides that the rules on co-ownership shall govern
the properties acquired by a man and a woman
living together as husband and wife but not married,
or under a marriage which is void ab initio, applies
only if the parties are not in any way incapacitated to
104

contract marriage. In the parties' case, their union
suffered the legal impediment of a prior subsisting
marriage. Thus, the question of fact being raised by
petitioner, i.e., whether they lived together as
husband and wife, was irrelevant as no coownership could exist between them.
Further,
respondent maintained that petitioner cannot be
considered an unregistered co-owner of the subject
properties on the ground that, since titles to the land
are solely in her name, to grant petitioner's prayer
would be to allow a collateral attack on the validity of
such titles.
Petitioner opposed respondent's Motion for
Summary Judgment. 8 He contended that the case
presented genuine factual issues and that Art. 144 of
the Civil Code had been repealed by the Family
Code which now allows, under Art. 148, a limited coownership even though a man and a woman living
together are not capacitated to marry each other.
Petitioner also asserted that an implied trust was
constituted when he and respondent agreed to
register the properties solely in the latter's name
although the same were acquired out of the profits
made from their brokerage business. Petitioner
invoked Articles 1452 and 1453 of the Civil Code.
On January 30, 1995, the trial court rendered its
decision granting respondent's motion for summary
judgment. It ruled that an examination of the
pleadings shows that the issues involved were
purely legal. The trial court also sustained
respondent's contention that petitioner's action for
partition amounted to a collateral attack on the
validity of the certificates of title covering the subject
properties. It held that even if the parties really had
cohabited, the action for partition could not be
allowed because an action for partition among coowners ceases to be so and becomes one for title if
the defendant, as in the present case, alleges
exclusive ownership of the properties in question.
For these reasons, the trial court dismissed Case.
On appeals, the Court of Appeals, ordered the case
remanded to the court of origin for trial on the merits.
It cited the decision in Roque v. Intermediate
Appellate Court to the effect that an action for
partition is at once an action for declaration of coownership and for segregation and conveyance of a
determinate portion of the properties involved. If the
defendant asserts exclusive title over the property,
the action for partition should not be dismissed.
Rather, the court should resolve the case and if the
plaintiff is unable to sustain his claimed status as a
co-owner, the court should dismiss the action, not
because the wrong remedy was availed of, but
because no basis exists for requiring the defendant
to submit to partition. Resolving the issue whether
petitioner's action for partition was a collateral attack

on the validity of the certificates of title, the Court of
Appeals held that since petitioner sought to compel
respondent to execute documents necessary to
effect transfer of what he claimed was his share,
petitioner was not actually attacking the validity of
the titles but in fact, recognized their validity. Finally,
the appellate court upheld petitioner's position that
Art. 144 of the Civil Code had been repealed by Art.
148 of the Family Code.
Respondent moved for reconsideration of the
decision of Court of Appeals. Subsequently, the
Court of Appeals granted respondent's motion and
reversed its previous decision.
Issue
Whether or not the fact that the petitioner and
respondent indeed cohabited is material to
determine co-ownership of properties between the
parties.
Held
The Court held that although Art. 144 of the Civil
Code, applies only to cases in which a man and a
woman live together as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage provided they are not
incapacitated or are without impediment to marry
each other, or in which the marriage is void ab initio,
provided it is not bigamous, therefore, does not
cover parties living in an adulterous relationship. Art.
148 of the Family Code, however, provides for a
limited co-ownership in cases where the parties in
union are incapacitated to marry each other.
It was error for the trial court to rule that, because
the parties in this case were not capacitated to marry
each other at the time that they were alleged to have
been living together, they could not have owned
properties in common. The Family Code, in addition
to providing that a co-ownership exists between a
man and a woman who live together as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage, likewise
provides that, if the parties are incapacitated to
marry each other, properties acquired by them
through their joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their contributions which, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be
equal. There is thus co-ownership even though the
couples are not capacitated to marry each other.
In this case, there may be a co-ownership between
the parties. Consequently, whether petitioner and
respondent cohabited and whether the properties
involved in the case are part of the alleged coownership, are genuine and material. All but one of
the properties involved were alleged to have been
105

acquired after the Family Code took effect on August
3, 1988. With respect to the property acquired before
the Family Code took effect if it is shown that it was
really acquired under the regime of the Civil Code,
then it should be excluded.
108) Elna Mercado-Fehr vs. Bruno Fehr
G.R. No. 152716, OCTOBER 23, 2003
Facts
This case arose from a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity to comply with the essential marital
obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code filed
by petitioner Elna Mercado-Fehr against respondent
Bruno Fehr before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
in March 1997.
After due proceedings, the trial court declared the
marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab
initio under Article 36 of the Family Code and
ordered the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
of property. Custody over the two minor children
was awarded to petitioner.
After a careful scrutiny of the inventory of properties
submitted by both parties, the Court finds the
following properties to be excluded from the conjugal
properties:
a) The Bacolod property, considering that the same
is owned by petitioners parents; and
b) Suite 204 of the LCG Condominium, considering
that the same was purchased on installment basis
by respondent with his exclusive funds prior to his
marriage, as evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated
July 26, 1983.
In view of the above decision, Suite 204, LCG
Condominium was declared the EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTY of respondent. Accordingly, petitioner
was directed to transfer ownership of Suite 204 in
the name of respondent.
The Petitioner and Respondent are further enjoined
to jointly support their minor children, Michael and
Patrick Fehr, for their education, uniforms, food and
medical expenses.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said
Order with respect to the adjudication of Suite 204,
LCG Condominium and the support of the children.
Petitioner alleged that Suite 204 was purchased on
installment basis at the time when petitioner and
respondent were living exclusively with each other
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage,
hence the rules on co-ownership should apply in
accordance with Article 147 of the Family Code.
Resolving said motion, the trial court held that since
the marriage between petitioner and respondent was
declared void ab intio, the rules on co-ownership

should apply in the liquidation and partition of the
properties they own in common pursuant to Article
147 of the Family Code. The court, however,
affirmed its previous ruling that Suite 204 of LCG
Condominium was acquired prior to the couples
cohabitation and therefore pertained solely to
respondent.
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal questioning the
order of the trial court but subsequently withdrew the
notice and instead filed a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals,
questioning the findings of the trial court.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for
certiorari for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration of said Decision, which was also
denied by the appellate court.
Issue
Whether or not Suite 204 of LCG Condominium
should be governed by the rules on co-ownership
and what rules should be applied in the settlement of
the common properties?
Held
It appears from the facts, as found by the trial court,
that in March 1983, after two years of long-distance
courtship, petitioner left Cebu City and moved in with
respondent in the latters residence in Metro Manila.
Their relations bore fruit and their first child, Michael
Bruno Fehr, was born on December 3, 1983. The
couple got married on March 14, 1985. In the
meantime, they purchased on installment a
condominium unit, Suite 204, at LCG Condominium,
as evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated July 26,
1983 executed by respondent as the buyer and J.V.
Santos Commercial Corporation as the seller.
Petitioner also signed the contract as witness, using
the name "Elna Mercado Fehr". Upon completion of
payment, the title to the condominium unit was
issued in the name of petitioner.
In light of these facts, the Court gave more credence
to petitioners submission that Suite 204 was
acquired
during
the
parties
cohabitation.
Accordingly, under Article 147 of the Family Code,
said property should be governed by the rules on coownership. Article 147 applies to unions of parties
who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void, as in the case at bar.
This provision creates a co-ownership with respect
to the properties they acquire during their
cohabitation.
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a
man and a woman, suffering no legal impediment to
marry each other, so exclusively live together as
106

husband and wife under a void marriage or without
the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the
provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to
the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage,
i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen
years or upwards not under any of the impediments
mentioned in Article 37 and 38" of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by
both spouses through their work and industry shall
be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership.
Any property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall still be considered as
having contributed thereto jointly if said partys
"efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family household."
Thus, for Article 147 to operate, the man and the
woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each
other; (2) live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the
benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. All these
elements are present in the case at bar. It has not
been shown that petitioner and respondent suffered
any impediment to marry each other. They lived
exclusively with each other as husband and wife
when petitioner moved in with respondent in his
residence and were later united in marriage. Their
marriage, however, was found to be void under
Article 36 of the Family Code because of
respondents psychological incapacity to comply with
essential marital obligations.
The disputed property, Suite 204 of LCG
Condominium, was purchased on installment basis
on July 26, 1983, at the time when petitioner and
respondent were already living together. Hence, it
should be considered as common property of
petitioner and respondent. Further, the Court held
that the property regime of the parties should be
divided in accordance with the law on co-ownership.
109) Saguid vs. Rey
G.R. No. 150611.JUNE 10, 2003
Facts
Gina S. Rey was married, but separated de
facto from her husband, when she met petitioner
Jacinto Saguid sometime in July 1987. After a brief
courtship, the two decided to cohabit as husband
and wife in a house built on a lot owned by Jacintos
father. Jacinto made a living as the patron of their
fishing vessel Saguid Brothers. Gina, on the other
hand, worked as a fish dealer, but decided to work
as an entertainer in Japan from 1992 to 1994. In

1996, the couple decided to separate.
On January 9, 1997, private respondent filed a
complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal
Property
with
Receivership
against
the
petitioner. She alleged that from her salary as
entertainer in Japan, she was able to contribute
P70,000.00 in the completion of their unfinished
house. Also, from her own earnings as an
entertainer and fish dealer, she was able to acquire
and accumulate appliances, pieces of furniture and
household effects, with a total value of
P111,375.00. She prayed that she be declared the
sole owner of these personal properties and that the
amount of P70,000.00, representing her contribution
to the construction of their house, be reimbursed to
her.
Private respondent stated that she had a total of
P35,465.00 share in the joint account deposit which
she and the petitioner maintained. Gina declared
that said deposits were spent for the purchase of
construction materials, appliances and other
personal properties.
Petitioner, on the other hand, claimed that the
expenses for the construction of their house were
defrayed solely from his income. He averred that
private respondents meager income as fish dealer
rendered her unable to contribute in the construction
of said house. Petitioner further contended that
Gina did not work continuously in Japan from 1992
to 1994. When their house was repaired and
improved
sometime
in
1995-1996,
private
respondent did not share in the expenses because
her earnings as entertainer were spent on the daily
needs and business of her parents. Petitioner
further claimed that his savings from his income in
the fishing business were the ones used in
purchasing the disputed personal properties.
The respondent was allowed to present evidence ex
parte after the trial court declared the petitioner as in
default for failure to file a pre-trial brief. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Subsequently, a decision was rendered in favor of
the private respondent.
On appeal, said decision was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals except for the award for moral damages.
Issue
What provision of the Family Code shall governed
the property regime of the petitioner and private
respondent?
Held
The Court held that the property regime of Jacinto
and Gina, who was validly married to another man at
107

the time of her cohabitation with the former, should
be governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, as it
applies to adulterous relationships and under this
regime, proof of actual contribution is required.
In the case at bar, although the adulterous
cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1987,
which is before the date of the effectivity of the
Family Code, Article 148 still applies because this
provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus
in Article 144 of the Civil Code. Before Article 148 of
the Family Code was enacted, there was no
provision governing property relations of couples
living in a state of adultery or concubinage. Hence,
even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the
property occurred before the Family Code took
effect, Article 148 governs.
In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the
house
and
personal
properties
of
the
parties. Private respondent alleged in her complaint
that she contributed P70,000.00 for the completion
of their house. However, nowhere in her testimony
did she specify the extent of her contribution. What
appears in the record are receipts in her name for
the purchase of construction materials in the total
amount of P11,413.00.
On the other hand, both parties claim that the money
used to purchase the disputed personal properties
came partly from their joint account. While there is
no question that both parties contributed in their joint
account deposit, there is, however, no sufficient
proof of the exact amount of their respective shares
therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code,
in the absence of proof of extent of the parties
respective contribution, their share shall be
presumed to be equal. Here, the disputed personal
properties were valued at P111,375.00, the
existence and value of which were not questioned by
the petitioner. Hence, their share therein is
equivalent to one-half, which is P 55,687.50 each.
On the basis of the evidence established, the extent
of private respondents co-ownership over the
disputed house is only up to the amount of
P11,413.00, her proven contribution in the
construction thereof. While for the personal
properties, her participation should be limited only to
the amount of P55,687.50.
108

XIII. THE FAMILY AS AN INSTITUTION
110) Hontiveros vs. RTC Br. 25, Iloilo City &
Spouses Gregorio Hontiveros & Teodora Ayson
G.R.No. 125465, June 29, 1999
Facts:
Spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a
complaint for damages against private respondents
Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson before the
RTC Iloilo City.
Petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a
land located at the town of Jamindan, Province of
Capiz, as shown by OCT No. 0-2124, issued
pursuant to the decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court which modified decision of CFI
Capiz, in a land registration case filed by private
respondent Gregorio Hontivero. Also, that they were
deprived of income from the land as a result of the
filing of the land registration case. The income
consisted of rentals from tenants of the land in the
amount of P66,000.00 per year from 1968 to 1987,
and P595,000.00 per year thereafter; and that
private respondents filed the land registration case
and withheld possession of the land from petitioners
in bad faith.
Private respondents denied that they were married
and alleged that private respondent Hontiveros was
a widower while private respondent Ayson was
single. They denied that they had deprived
petitioners of possession of and income from the
land. They alleged that possession of the property
in question had already been transferred to
petitioners on August 7, 1985, by virtue of a writ of
possession, dated July 18, 1985, issued by the clerk
of court of the RTC Capiz, Mambusao, the return
thereof having been received by petitioners counsel.
Since then, petitioners have been directly receiving
rentals from the tenants of the land. The complaint
failed to state a cause of action since it did not allege
that earnest efforts towards a compromise had been
made,
considering
that
petitioner
Augusto
Hontiveros and private respondent Gregorio
Hontiveros are brothers. The decision of the IAC in
Land Registration Case was null and void since it
was based upon a ground which was not passed
upon by the trial court. That petitioners claim for
damages was barred by prescription with respect to
claims before 1984; that there were no rentals due
since private respondent Hontiveros was a
possessor in good faith and for value; and that
private respondent Ayson had nothing to do with the
case as she was not married to private respondent
Gregorio Hontiveros and did not have any

proprietary interest in the subject property. Private
respondents prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint and for an order against petitioners to pay
damages to private respondents by way of
counterclaim, as well as reconveyance of the subject
land to private respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC palpably erred in
dismissing the complaint on the ground that it
does not allege under oath that earnest efforts
toward a compromise were made prior to filing
as required by Art. 151 of FC.
Held:
No. This rule shall not apply to cases which may not
be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.
Moreover, as petitioners contend, Art. 151 of the
Family Code does not apply in this case since the
suit is not exclusively among family members.
Petitioners claim that whenever a stranger is a party
in a case involving family members, the requisite
showing of earnest efforts to compromise is no
longer mandatory. They argue that since private
respondent Ayson is admittedly a stranger to the
Hontiveros family, the case is not covered by the
requirements of Art. 151 of the Family Code.
We agree with petitioners. The inclusion of private
respondent Ayson as defendant and petitioner Maria
Hontiveros as plaintiff takes the case out of the
ambit of Art. 151 of the Family Code. Under this
provision, the phrase members of the same family
refers to the husband and wife, parents and children,
ascendants and descendants, and brothers and
sisters, whether full or half-blood.
In Gayon v. Gayon, the enumeration of brothers and
sisters as members of the same family does not
comprehend sisters-in-law. In that case, then Chief
Justice Concepcion emphasized that sisters-in-law
(hence, also brothers-in-law) are not listed under
Art. 217 of the New Civil Code as members of the
same family. Since Art. 150 of the Family Code
repeats essentially the same enumeration of
members of the family, we find no reason to alter
existing jurisprudence on the mater. Consequently,
the court a quo erred in ruling that petitioner
Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of private
respondent Hernando, was required to exert earnest
efforts towards a compromise before filing the
present suit.
Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are
not given any legal effect in this jurisdiction.
Consequently, private respondent Ayson, who is
described in the complaint as the spouse of
109

respondent Hontiveros, and petitioner Maria
Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of
petitioner Augusto Hontiveros, are considered
strangers to the Hontiveros family, for purposes of
Art. 151.
Petitioners finally question the constitutionality of Art.
151 of the Family Code on the ground that it in effect
amends the Rules of Court. This, according to them,
cannot be done since the Constitution reserves in
favor of the Supreme Court the power to promulgate
rules of pleadings and procedure. Considering the
conclusion we have reached in this case, however, it
is unnecessary for present purposes to pass upon
this question.
Courts do not pass upon
constitutional questions unless they are the very lis
mota of the case.
111) Guerrero vs. RTC Ilocos Norte, Judge Luis
Bello & Pedro Hernando
G.R. No. 109068 January 10, 1994
Facts:
Filed by petitioner as an accion publicana against
private respondent, this case assumed another
dimension when it was dismissed by respondent
Judge on the ground that the parties being brotherin-law the complaint should have alleged that
earnest efforts were first exerted towards a
compromise.
Admittedly, the complaint does not allege that the
parties exerted earnest efforts towards a
compromise and that the same failed. However,
private respondent Pedro G. Hernando apparently
overlooked this alleged defect since he did not file
any motion to dismiss nor attack the complaint on
this ground in his answer. It was only at the pre-trial
conference, that the relationship of petitioner
Gaudencio Guerrero and Hernando was noted by
respondent Judge Luis B. Bello, Jr.
Guerrero claims that since brothers by affinity are
not members of the same family, he was not
required to exert efforts towards a compromise.
Issue:
Whether brothers by affinity are considered
members of the same family contemplated in Art.
217, par. (4), and Art. 222 of the New Civil Code,
as well as under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the
Rules of Court requiring earnest efforts towards
a compromise before a suit between them may
be instituted and maintained.
Held:
No. The reason for the requirement that earnest
efforts at compromise be first exerted before a
complaint is given due course is because it is
difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic
spectacle than a litigation between members of the
same family. It is necessary that every effort should
be made toward a compromise before a litigation is
allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is
known that a lawsuit between close relatives
generates deeper bitterness than between
strangers. A litigation in a family is to be lamented
far more than a lawsuit between strangers .
In Gayon v. Gayon, the enumeration of brothers and
sisters as members of the same family does not
comprehend sisters-in-law. The attempt to
compromise as well as inability to succeed is a
condition precedent to the the filing of a suit between
members of the same family.
Since Art. 150 of the Family Code repeats
essentially the same enumeration of "members of
the family", we find no reason to alter existing
jurisprudence on the matter. Consequently, the court
a quo erred in ruling that petitioner Guerrero, being a
brother-in-law of private respondent Hernando, was
required to exert earnest efforts towards a
compromise before filing the present suit.
Also, Guerreros wife has no actual interest and
participation in the land subject of the suit, which the
petitioner bought, before he married his wife.
112) Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. vs. Hon.
Edmundo Acua, RTC Judge Caloocan City and
Alberto Moreno
G.R. no. 154132 August 31, 2006
Facts:
Alberto Moreno filed with the RTC of Caloocan City
a complaint against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank,
his wife Remedios, the spouses Felipe and Maria
Owe and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for
cancellation of mortgage.
Respondent Moreno
contends that he did not secure any loan from
petitioner, nor did he sign or execute any contract of
mortgage in its favor; that his wife, acting in
conspiracy with Hiyas and the spouses Owe, who
were the ones that benefited from the loan, made it
appear that he signed the contract of mortgage; that
he could not have executed the said contract
because he was working abroad.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss because private
respondent failed to comply with Article 151 of the
110

Family wherein it is provided that no suit between
members of the same family shall prosper unless it
should appear from the verified complaint or petition
that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been
made, but that the same have failed.
Petitioner
contends that since the complaint does not contain
any fact or averment that earnest efforts toward a
compromise had been made prior to its institution,
then the complaint should be dismissed for lack of
cause of action.
made to depend on the way the latter would settle

their differences among themselves. 22 x x x.
Hence, once a stranger becomes a party to a suit
involving members of the same family, the law no
longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest
efforts be made towards a compromise before the
action can prosper.
Petition is Dismissed.
FAMILY HOME
RTC denied the motion to dismiss, it held that

earnest efforts towards a compromise is not required
before the filing of the instant case considering that
the above-entitled case involves parties who are
strangers to the family.
Issue:
Whether or not lack of earnest efforts toward a
compromise is not a ground for a motion to
dismiss in suits between husband and wife when
other parties who are strangers to the family are
involved in the suit.
Held:
Yes. The Code Commission that drafted Article 222
of the Civil Code from which Article 151 of the Family
Code was taken explains: it is difficult to imagine a
sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation
between members of the same family. It is
necessary that every effort should be made toward a
compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed
hate and passion in the family. It is known that a
lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper
bitterness than between strangers.
In Magbaleta vs. Gonong, the case involved brothers
and a stranger to the family, the alleged owner of the
subject property. The Court, taking into consideration
the explanation made by the Code Commission in its
report, ruled that: These consideration s do not
however weigh enough to make it imperative that
such efforts to compromise should be a jurisdictional
pre-requisite for the maintenance of an action
whenever a stranger to the family is a party thereto,
whether as a necessary or indispensable one. It is
not always that one who is alien to the family would
be willing to suffer the inconvenience of; much less,
relish the delay and the complications that wrangling
between or among relatives more often than not
entail.
Besides, it is neither practical nor fair that
the determination of the rights of a stranger to the
family who just happened to have innocently
acquired some kind of interest in any right or
property disputed among its members should be
113) Modequillo vs. Breva

G.R. No. 86355 May 31, 1990
Facts:
In 1988, a judgment was rendered by the Court of
Appeals in "Francisco Salinas, et al. vs. Jose
Modequillo, et al. finding the defendants-appellees
Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay jointly and
severally liable to plaintiffs-appellants
as
compensation for the death of Audie Salinas for
hospitalization expenses of Renato Culan- Culan.
The said judgment having become final and
executory, a writ of execution was issued by the
RTC Davao City to satisfy the said judgment on the
goods and chattels of the defendants Jose
Modequillo and Benito Malubay at Malalag, Davao
del Sur.
The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land
located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur
containing an area of 600 square meters with a
market value of P34,550.00 and assessed value of
P7,570.00 per Tax Declaration No. 87008-01359,
registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in the
office of the Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur;
and a parcel of agricultural land located at
Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao del Sur
containing an area of 3 hectares with a market value
of P24,130.00 and assessed value of P9,650.00 per
Tax Declaration No. 87-08-01848 registered in the
name of Jose Modequillo in the office of the
Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur.
A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of
execution was filed by defendant Jose Modequillo
alleging that the residential land located at Poblacion
Malalag is where the family home is built since 1969
prior to the commencement of this case and as such
is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
under Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code
except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof,
and that the judgment debt sought to be enforced
against the family home of defendant is not one of
those enumerated under Article 155 of the Family
Code. As to the agricultural land although it is
111

declared in the name of defendant it is alleged to be
still part of the public land and the transfer in his
favor by the original possessor and applicant who
was a member of a cultural minority was not
approved by the proper government agency. An
opposition thereto was filed by the plaintiffs.
Issue:
Whether or not a final judgment of the Court of
Appeals in an action for damages may be
satisfied by way of execution of a family home
constituted under the Family Code.
Held:
Yes. Under the Family Code, a family home is
deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time
it is occupied as a family residence. There is no
need to constitute the same judicially or
extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the
family actually resides in the premises, it is,
therefore, a family home as contemplated by law.
Thus, the creditors should take the necessary
precautions to protect their interest before extending
credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns
the home.
Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment except:
(1) For non-payment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the
family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises
before or after such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects,
builders, material men and others who have
rendered service or furnished material for the
construction of the building.
The exemption provided as aforestated is effective
from the time of the constitution of the family home
as such, and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries
actually resides therein.
In the present case, the residential house and lot of
petitioner was not constituted as a family home
whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil
Code. It became a family home by operation of law
only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is
deemed constituted as a family home upon the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not
August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila
Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap
year).
The contention of petitioner that it should be
considered a family home from the time it was
occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not
well- taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it
is provided that "the provisions of this Chapter shall
also govern existing family residences insofar as

said provisions are applicable." It does not mean
that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a
retroactive effect such that all existing family
residences are deemed to have been constituted as
family homes at the time of their occupation prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt
from execution for the payment of obligations
incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code.
Article 162 simply means that all existing family
residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family
Code, are considered family homes and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a
family home under the Family Code. Article 162
does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title
V have a retroactive effect.
Is the family home of petitioner exempt from
execution of the money judgment aforecited? No.
The debt or liability which was the basis of the
judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the
vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the
money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by
the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both
preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the
exemptions from execution provided in the Family
Code.
As to the agricultural land subject of the execution,
the trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made
by the sheriff shall be on whatever rights the
petitioner may have on the land.
114) Manacop vs. CA and F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC.,
G.R. No. 104875 November 13, 1992
Facts:
Owing to the failure to pay the sub-contract
cost pursuant to a deed of assignment signed
between petitioner's corporation and private
respondent herein, the latter filed on July 3, 1989, a
complaint for a sum of money, with a prayer for
preliminary attachment, against the former. As a
consequence of the order on July 28, 1989, the
corresponding writ for the provisional remedy was
issued on August 11, 1989 which triggered the
attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City owned
by Manacop Construction President Florante F.
Manacop, herein petitioner.
The petitioner insists that the attached
property is a family home, having been occupied by
him and his family since 1972, and is therefore
exempt from attachment.
112

RTC held that the subject property is not
exempt from attachment.
Issue:
Whether or not the property of Florante Manacop
is exempt from attachment.
Held:
No. The debt or liability which was the basis of the
judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the
vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the
money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by
the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both
preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the
exemptions from execution provided in the Family
Code.
The contention of petitioner that it should be
considered a family home from the time it was
occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not
well-taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it
is provided that "the provisions of this Chapter shall
also govern existing family residences insofar as
said provisions are applicable." It does not mean
that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a
retroactive effect such that all existing family
residences are deemed to have been constituted as
family homes at the time of their occupation prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt
from execution for the payment of obligations
incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code.
Article 162 simply means that all existing family
residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family
Code, are considered family homes and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a
family home under the Family Code. Article 162
does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title
V have a retroactive effect.
115) Manacop vs. CA and E & L MERCANTILE
INC.
227 SCRA 57
Facts:
On March 10, 1972, Petitioner Florante F. Manacop
and his wife Eulaceli purchased a 446-square-meter
residential lot with a bungalow, in consideration of
P75,000.00.
The
property
is
located
at
Commonwealth Village, Commonwealth Avenue,
Quezon City.
Private Respondent E & L Mercantile, Inc. filed a
complaint against petitioner and F.F. Manacop
Construction Co., Inc. before the RTC Pasig to

collect an indebtedness of P3,359,218.45. Instead
of filing an answer, petitioner and his company
entered into a compromise agreement with private
respondent.
On July 15, 1986, E & L Mercantile filed a motion for
execution which the lower court. However,
execution of the judgment was delayed. Eventually,
the sheriff levied on several vehicles and other
personal properties of petitioner.
In partial
satisfaction of the judgment debt, these chattels
were sold at public auction for which certificates of
sale were correspondingly issued by the sheriff.
Petitioner and his company filed a motion to quash
the alias writs of execution and to stop the sheriff
from continuing to enforce them on the ground that
the judgment was not yet executory.
Private respondent opposed the motion alleging that
the property covered by TCT No. 174180 could not
be considered a family home on the grounds that
petitioner was already living abroad and that the
property, having been acquired in 1972, should have
been judicially constituted as a family home to
exempt it from execution.
RTC ruled in favor of private respondent. It held that
petitioners residence was not exempt from
execution as it was not duly constituted as a family
home, pursuant to the Civil Code.
CA affirmed.
Issue: May a writ of execution of a final and
executory judgment issued before the effectivity of
the Family Code be executed on a house and lot
constituted as a family home under the provision of
said Code?
HELD
Yes. [The Court of Appeals committed no reversible
error. On the contrary, its Decision and Resolution
are supported by law and applicable jurisprudence.]
Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in
holding that his residence was not exempt from
execution in view of his failure to show that the
property involved has been duly constituted as a
family home in accordance with law. He asserts
that the Family Code and Modequillo require simply
the occupancy of the property by the petitioner,
without need for its judicial or extrajudicial
constitution as a family home.
Petitioner is only partly correct. True, under the
Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988,
the subject property became his family home under
the simplified process embodied in Article 153 of
113

said Code. However, Modequillo explicitly ruled that
said provision of the Family Code does not have
retroactive effect. In other words, prior to August 3,
1988, the procedure mandated by the Civil Code
had to be followed for a family home to be
constituted as such. There being absolutely no
proof that the subject property was judicially or
extrajudicially constituted as a family home, it follows
that the laws protective mantle cannot be availed of
by petitioner. Since the debt involved herein was
incurred and the assailed orders of the trial court
issued prior to August 3, 1988, the petitioner cannot
be shielded by the benevolent provisions of the
Family Code.
Petitioner contends that he should be deemed
residing in the family home because his stay in the
United States is merely temporary. He asserts that
the person staying in the house is his overseer and
that whenever his wife visited this country, she
stayed in the family home. This contention lacks
merit.
The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the
family home either by the owner thereof or by any of
its beneficiaries must be actual. That which is
actual is something real, or actually existing, as
opposed to something merely possible, or to
something which is presumptive or constructive.
Actual occupancy, however, need not be by the
owner of the house specifically. Rather, the property
may be occupied by the beneficiaries enumerated
by Article 154 of the Family Code.
116) Versola vs. Ong
G.R. No. 164740 July 31, 2006
Facts:
Private respondent Dr. Victoria T. Ong Oh granted a
loan to a certain Dolores Ledesma in the amount of
P1M. As a security for said loan, Ledesma issued to
private respondent a check for the same amount
dated 10 February 1993 and promised to execute a
deed of real estate mortgage over her house and lot
located at Tandang Sora, Quezon City which did not
materialize.
Subsequently, Ledesma sold the said house and lot
to petitioners for P2.5M. Petitioners paid Ledesma
P1M as downpayment, with the remaining balance
of P1.5M to be paid in monthly installments of
P75,000. Petitioners, however, were only able to
pay the amount of P50,000.00 to Ledesma. To raise
the full amount that Ledesma demanded, petitioners
applied for a loan with Asiatrust Bank, Inc. (Asiatrust)
in the amount of P2M. In the course of the
application for said loan, petitioners, private

respondent, and Ledesma convened with Asiatrust
to arrive at a scheme to settle the obligation of
Ledesma to private respondent and the obligation of
petitioners to Ledesma.
In keeping with the foregoing agreement, private
respondent granted Ledesma an additional loan of
P450,000.00. Ledesma, in turn, executed a Deed of
Sale transferring the title of the subject property to
petitioners. Private respondent then delivered the
title of the said property to Asiatrust. The Deed of
Sale was registered and the title in the name of
Ledesma was cancelled and a new one was issued
in the names of petitioners. Thereafter, Asiatrust
approved the loan application of petitioners.
However, when Asiatrust tried to register the Real
Estate Mortgage covering the subject property
executed in its favor by petitioners, it discovered a
notice of levy on execution was annotated on the
title in connection with Ledesma's obligation to a
certain Miladay's Jewels, Inc., in the amount of
P214,284.00.
Because
of
this
annotated
encumbrance, Asiatrust did not register said Real
Estate Mortgage and refused to release the P2M
loan of petitioners. When private respondent
presented Ledesma's check for payment, the same
was dishonored for the reason that the account was
already closed. Subsequently, when private
respondent presented for payment the check issued
by petitioners, the said check was likewise
dishonored because there was a stop payment
order. With the dishonor of the checks and with
Asiatrust's refusal to release the P2M loan of
petitioners, private respondent came away emptyhanded as she did not receive payment for the
P1.5M loan she granted to Ledesma that was
assumed by petitioners. As a result, private
respondent filed a Complaint for Sum of Money
against Ledesma, petitioners, and Asiatrust.
RTC ruled in favor of Dr. Victoria T. Ong Oh. CA
affirmed withmodification.
Private respondent filed a Motion for Execution with
the RTC. The property in the name of Spouses
Versola were subsequently levied upon. On 5
August 2002, private respondent filed with the trial
court an Ex-parte Motion for Issuance of
Confirmation of Judicial Sale of Real Property of
Sps. Eduardo and Elsa Versola. Petitioners opposed
the said motion on the following grounds: (1) the
property sold at the public auction is the family home
of petitioners which is exempt from execution
pursuant to Article 155 of the Family Code; and (2)
114

no application was made by private respondent for
the determination of the value of their family home to
be subjected to execution, as required under Article
160 of the Family Code.
Petitioners maintain that said objection to the sale
was based on the fact that there was no order or
clearance from the trial court for the sheriff to
proceed with the auction sale, in clear violation of
Article 160 of the Family Code, which requires an
application by the creditor and a determination of the
actual value of the family home by the court ordering
the sale of property under execution.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners timely raised and proved
that their property is exempt from execution.
Held:
No. Article 153 of the Family Code provides:
The family home is deemed constituted on a house
and lot from the time it is occupied as the family
residence. From the time of its constitution and so
long as its beneficiaries resides therein, the family
home continues to be such and is exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment except as
hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value
allowed by law.
Under the cited provision, a family home is deemed
constituted on a house and lot from the time it is
occupied as a family residence; there is no need to
constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially.
The settled rule is that the right to exemption or
forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is a
personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor
and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff,
but by the debtor himself before the sale of the
property at public auction. It is not sufficient that the
person claiming exemption merely alleges that such
property is a family home. This claim for exemption
must be set up and proved to the Sheriff. Failure to
do so would estop the party from later claiming the
exception.
In the instant case, it was only after almost two years
from the time of the execution sale and after the
"Sheriff's Final Deed of Sale" was issued did
petitioners rigorously claim in their Opposition to
private respondent's Ex-parte Motion for Issuance of
Confirmation of Judicial Sale of Real Property of
Sps. Eduardo and Elsa Versola that the property in
question is exempt from execution. Even then, there
was no showing that petitioners adduced evidence
to prove that it is indeed a family home.
117) Patricio vs. Marcelino G. Dario III and CA

G.R. No. 170829 November 20, 2006
Facts:
On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate.
He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G.
Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario
and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III.
Among the properties he left was a parcel of land
with a residential house and a pre-school building.
On August 10, 1987, petitioner, Marcelino Marc and
private respondent, extrajudicially settled the estate
of Marcelino V. Dario. Thereafter, petitioner and
Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent
of their intention to partition the subject property and
terminate the co-ownership. Private respondent
refused to partition the property hence petitioner and
Marcelino Marc instituted an action for partition.
The RTC ordered the partition and the sale of the
property by public auction. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the complaint for partition filed by
petitioner and Marcelino Marc for lack of merit. It
held that the family home should continue despite
the death of one or both spouses as long as there is
a minor beneficiary thereof. The heirs could not
partition the property unless the court found
compelling reasons to rule otherwise. The appellate
court also held that the minor son of private
respondent, who is a grandson of spouses Marcelino
V. Dario and Perla G. Patricio, was a minor
beneficiary of the family home.
Issue:
Whether Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, the minor
son of private respondent, can be considered as a
beneficiary under Article 154 of the Family Code.
Held:
No. Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who
are the beneficiaries of a family home: (1) The
husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is
the head of a family; and (2) Their parents,
ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters,
whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate,
who are living in the family home and who depend
upon the head of the family for legal support.
To be a beneficiary of the family home, three
requisites must concur: (1) they must be among the
relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family
Code; (2) they live in the family home; and (3) they
are dependent for legal support upon the head of the
family.
115

As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family
home are: (1) The husband and wife, or an
unmarried person who is the head of a family; and
(2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants,
brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be
legitimate or illegitimate. The term descendants
contemplates all descendants of the person or
persons who constituted the family home without
distinction; hence, it must necessarily include the
grandchildren and great grandchildren of the
spouses who constitute a family home. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos. Where the
law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.
Thus, private respondents minor son, who is also
the grandchild of deceased Marcelino V. Dario
satisfies the first requisite.
As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must
be actually living in the family home to avail of the
benefits derived from Art. 159. Marcelino Lorenzo R.
Dario IV, also known as Ino, the son of private
respondent and grandson of the decedent Marcelino
V. Dario, has been living in the family home since
1994, or within 10 years from the death of the
decedent, hence, he satisfies the second requisite.
However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo
R. Dario IV cannot demand support from his paternal
grandmother if he has parents who are capable of
supporting him. The liability for legal support falls
primarily on Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IVs
parents, especially his father, herein private
respondent who is the head of his immediate family.
The law first imposes the obligation of legal support
upon the shoulders of the parents, especially the
father, and only in their default is the obligation
imposed on the grandparents.
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal
support not from his grandmother, but from his
father. Thus, despite residing in the family home
and his being a descendant of Marcelino V. Dario,
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot be considered
as beneficiary contemplated under Article 154
because he did not fulfill the third requisite of being
dependent on his grandmother for legal support. It
is his father whom he is dependent on legal support,
and who must now establish his own family home
separate and distinct from that of his parents, being
of legal age.
116

XIV. PATERNITY AND FILIATION
118) Andal vs. Macaraig
G.R. No. L-2474 May 30, 1951
FACTS:
Emiliano Andal was the owner of the parcel of land
in question having acquired it from his mother
Eduvigis Macaraig by virtue of a donation propter
nuptias executed by the latter in favor of the former
on the occasion of his marriage to Maria Dueas.
Emiliano Andal had been in possession of the land
from 1938 up to 1942, when Eduvigis Macaraig,
taking advantage of the abnormal situation then
prevailing, entered the land in question. Emiliano
Andal became sick of tuberculosis in January 1941.
Sometime thereafter, his brother, Felix, went to live
in his house to help him work his farm. His sickness
became worse that on or about September 10, 1942,
he became so weak that he could hardly move and
get up from his bed. On September 10, 1942, Maria
Duenas, his wife, eloped with Felix, and both went to
live in the house of Maria's father, until the middle of
1943. Since May, 1942, Felix and Maria had sexual
intercourse and treated each other as husband and
wife. On January 1, 1943, Emiliano died without the
presence of his wife, who did not even attend his
funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria Dueas gave birth
to a boy, who was given the name of Mariano Andal.
If the son born to the couple is deemed legitimate,
then he is entitled to inherit the land in question. If
otherwise, then the land should revert back to
Eduvigis Macaraig as the next of kin entitled to
succeed him under the law. The lower court
rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the child born by Maria is considered
as the legitimate son of Emiliano.
HELD:
Yes. Article 108 of the Civil Code provides that
children born after the one hundred and eighty days
next following that of the celebration of marriage or
within the three hundred days next following its
dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be
presumed to be legitimate. This presumption may be
rebutted only by proof that it was physically
impossible for the husband to have had access to
his wife during the first one hundred and twenty days
of the three hundred next preceding the birth of the
child. Impossibility of access by husband to wife
would include (1) absence during the initial period of
conception, (2) impotence which is patent,
continuing and incurable, and (3) imprisonment,
unless it can be shown that cohabitation took place

through corrupt violation of prison regulations. Since
the boy was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano
Andal died on January 1, 1943, that boy is presumed
to be the legitimate son of Emiliano and his wife, he
having been born within three hundred (300) days
following the dissolution of the marriage. There was
no evidence presented that Emiliano Andal was
absent during the initial period of conception,
especially during the period comprised between
August 21, 1942 and September 10, 1942, which is
included in the 120 days of the 300 next preceding
the birth of the child Mariano Andal. On the contrary,
there is enough evidence to show that during that
initial period, Emiliano Andal and his wife were still
living under the marital roof, or at least had access
one to the other. Even if Felix, the brother, was living
in the same house, and he and the wife were
indulging in illicit intercourse since May, 1942, that
does not preclude cohabitation between Emiliano
and his wife. Also, even though Emiliano was
already suffering from tuberculosis and his condition
then was so serious that he could hardly move and
get up from bed does not show that this does not
prevent carnal intercourse. He was not impotent.
The fact that Maria Dueas has committed adultery
can not also overcome this presumption. Therefore,
presumption of legitimacy under the Civil Code in
favor of the child has not been overcome.
Renren Geremia
119) Teofista Babiera vs. Presentacion B. Catotal
G.R. No. 138493 June 15, 2000
FACTS:
Presentacion B. Catotal filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Lanao del Node, Branch II, Iligan City, a
petition for the cancellation of the entry of birth of
Teofista Babiera in the Civil Registry of Iligan City.
The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No.
3046. From the petition filed, Presentacion asserted
that she is the only surviving child of the late
spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa,
who died on May 26, 1996 and July 6, 1990
respectively. On September 20, 1996 a baby girl was
delivered by "hilot" in the house of spouses Eugenio
and Hermogena Babiera and without the knowledge
of said spouses, Flora Guinto, the mother of the
child and a housemaid of spouses Eugenio and
Hermogena
Babiera,
caused
the
registration/recording of the facts of birth of her child,
by simulating that she was the child of the spouses
Eugenio, then 65 years old and Hermogena, then 54
117

years old, and made Hermogena Babiera appear as
the mother by forging her signature. Petitioner, then
15 years old, saw with her own eyes and personally
witnessed Flora Guinto give birth to Teofista Guinto,
in their house, assisted by "hilot". The birth
certificate of Teofista Guinto is void ab initio, as it
was totally a simulated birth, signature of informant
forged, and it contained false entries, to wit: a) The
child is made to appear as the legitimate child of the
late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena
Cariosa, when she is not; b) The signature of
Hermogena Cariosa, the mother, is falsified/forged.
She was not the informant; c) The family name
Babiera is false and unlawful and her correct family
name is Guinto, her mother being single; d) Her real
mother was Flora Guinto and her status, an
illegitimate child. The natural father, the carpenter,
did not sign it. Also, the respondent Teofista
Barbiera's birth certificate is void ab initio, and it is
patently a simulation of birth, since it is clinically and
medically impossible for the supposed parents to
bear a child in 1956 because: a) Hermogena
Cariosa Babiera, was already 54 years old; b)
Hermogena's last child birth was in the year 1941,
the year petitioner was born; c) Eugenio was already
65 years old, that the void and simulated birth
certificate of Teofista Guinto would affect the
hereditary rights of petitioner who inherited the
estate. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner
therein. Teofista averred "that she was always
known as Teofista Babiera and not Teofista Guinto
and that plaintiff is not the only surviving child of the
late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena C.
Babiera, for the truth of the matter is that they are
sisters of the full-blood. The Court of Appeals held
that the evidence adduced during trial proved that
petitioner was not the biological child of Hermogena
Babiera. It also ruled that no evidence was
presented to show that Hermogena became
pregnant in 1959. It further observed that she was
already 54 years old at the time, and that her last
pregnancy had occurred way back in 1941. The CA
noted that the supposed birth took place at home,
notwithstanding the advanced age of Hermogena
and its concomitant medical complications.
Moreover, petitioner's Birth Certificate was not
signed by the local civil registrar, and the signature
therein, which was purported to be that of
Hermogena, was different from her other signatures.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Teofista is the legitimate child of
spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa.
HELD:
No. Article 171 of the Family Code states that, the

child's filiation can be impugned only by the father
or, in special circumstances, his heirs. Respondent
has the requisite standing to initiate the present
action. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
provides that a real party in interest is one "who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
The interest of respondent in the civil status of
petitioner stems from an action for partition which
the latter filed against the former. The case
concerned the properties inherited by respondent
from her parents. Moreover, Article 171 of the Family
Code is not applicable to the present case. A close
reading of this provision shows that it applies to
instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy
of his wife's child. The provision, however,
presupposes that the child was the undisputed
offspring of the mother. The present case alleges
and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to
petitioner. In other words, the prayer herein is not to
declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of
Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not
the latter's child at all. Verily, the present action does
not impugn petitioner's filiation to Spouses Eugenio
and Hermogena Babiera, because there is no blood
relation to impugn in the first place. Also, the
prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of the
Family Code does not apply. Verily, the action to
nullify the Birth Certificate does not prescribe,
because it was allegedly void ab initio. A birth
certificate may be ordered cancelled upon adequate
proof that it is fictitious. Thus, void is a certificate
which shows that the mother was already fifty-four
years old at the time of the child's birth and which
was signed neither by the civil registrar nor by the
supposed mother. Because her inheritance rights
are adversely affected, the legitimate child of such
mother is a proper party in the proceedings for the
cancellation of the said certificate.
Renren Geremia
120) Marissa Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 105625 January 24, 1994
FACTS:
The facts show that the spouses Vicente Benitez
and Isabel Chipongian owned various properties
especially in Laguna. Isabel died on April 25, 1982.
Vicente followed her in the grave on November 13,
1989. He died intestate.The fight for administration
of Vicente's estate ensued. On September 24, 1990,
private respondents Victoria Benitez-Lirio and
118

Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Vicente's sister and nephew,
respectively) instituted Sp. Proc. No. 797 (90) before
the RTC of San Pablo City, 4th Judicial Region, Br.
30. They prayed for the issuance of letters of
administration of Vicente's estate in favor of private
respondent Aguilar. They alleged, that the decedent
is survived by no other heirs or relatives either any
ascendants or descendants, whether legitimate,
illegitimate or legally adopted. Also, despite claims or
representation to the contrary, petitioners can well
and truly establish, given the chance to do so, that
said decedent and his spouse Isabel Chipongian
who pre-deceased him, and whose estate had
earlier been settled extra-judicial, were without issue
and/or without descendants whatsoever, and that
one Marissa Benitez-Badua who was raised and
cared by them since childhood is, in fact, not related
to them by blood, nor legally adopted, and is
therefore not a legal heir. Petitioner opposed the
petition and alleged that she is the sole heir of the
deceased Vicente Benitez and capable of
administering his estate. The parties further
exchanged reply and rejoinder to buttress their legal
postures. Petitioner tried to prove that she is the only
legitimate child of the spouses Vicente Benitez and
Isabel Chipongian. She submitted documentary
evidence, among others: (1) her Certificate of Live
Birth; (2) Baptismal Certificate; (3) Income Tax
Returns and Information Sheet for Membership with
the GSIS of the late Vicente naming her as his
daughter; and (4) School Records. She also testified
that the said spouses reared and continuously
treated her as their legitimate daughter. On the other
hand, private respondents tried to prove, mostly thru
testimonial evidence, that the said spouses failed to
beget a child during their marriage and that the late
Isabel, then thirty six (36) years of age, was even
referred to Dr. Constantino Manahan, a noted
obstetrician-gynecologist, for treatment. The trial
court decided in favor of the petitioner. However, the
Court of Appeals, reversed the said decision of the
trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is the legitimate
child and thus the surviving heir of the spouses
Benitez.
HELD:
No. A careful reading of Articles 164, 166, 170 and
171 of the Family Code will show that they do not
contemplate a situation, like in the instant case,
where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature
or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these
articles govern a situation where a husband (or his
heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, it

is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of
said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible
for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife
within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that
for biological or other scientific reasons, the child
could not have been his child; (3) that in case of
children conceived through artificial insemination,
the written authorization or ratification by either
parent was obtained through mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles
170 and 171 speak of the prescriptive period within
which the husband or any of his heirs should file the
action impugning the legitimacy of said child.
Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when
it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench
for it is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente
are contending that petitioner is not his child by
Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that
petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel.
Factual finding of the appellate court that petitioner
was not the biological child or child of nature of the
spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian is
meritorious. There was strong and convincing
evidence that Isabel Chipongian never became
pregnant and, therefore, never delivered a child.
Renren Geremia
121) Jao vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-49162 July 28, 1987
FACTS:
Petitioner, assisted by her mother, filed a
case for recognition and support against Perico Jao.
The latter denied paternity thus the parties agreed to
a blood grouping test conducted by the National
Bureau of Investigation. The result indicated that the
petitioner could not have been the offspring of the
latter and her mother, Arlene. The lower court found
the test conclusive however, upon a second motion
for reconsideration the trial resulted on the
declaration of the petitioner being the child of Perico
and is entitled to support. The latter questioned said
decision to the Court of Appeals where it reversed
said decision of the lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the results of the blood
grouping test are admissible and conclusive to prove
non-paternity.
HELD:
119

Yes. The use of blood typing in cases of
disputed percentage has already become an
important legal procedure. There is now almost
universal scientific agreement that blood grouping
tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although
inconclusive to paternity. This is because the fact
that the blood type of a child is a possible product of
the mother and alleged father does not conclusively
prove that the child is born by such parents. On the
other hand, if the blood type of the child is not a
possible blood type when the blood of the mother
and that of the alleged father are cross-matched,
then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged
father.
Renren Geremia
122) Artemio G. Ilano vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 104376 February 23, 1994
FACTS:
Leoncia first met petitioner Artemio G. Ilano while
she was working as secretary to Atty. Mariano C.
Virata. Petitioner was one of the clients of Atty.
Virata. On several occasions, she and petitioner took
lunch together. Sometime in 1957, Leoncia, then
managing a business of her own as Namarco
distributor, met petitioner again who was engaged in
the
same
business
and
they
renewed
acquaintances. Since then, he would give her his
unsold allocation of goods. Later, he courted her
more than four years. Their relationship became
intimate and with his promise of marriage, they
eloped to Guagua, Pampanga in April, 1962. They
stayed at La Mesa Apartment, located behind the
Filipinas Telephone Company branch office, of which
he is the president and general manager. He came
home to her three or four times a week. The
apartment was procured by Melencio Reyes, Officerin-Charge of the Filipinas Telephone Company
branch office. He also took care of the marketing
and paid rentals, lights and water bills. Unable to
speak the local dialect, Leoncia was provided also
by Melencio with a maid by the name of Nena.
Petitioner used to give her P700.00 a month for their
expenses at home. In June, 1962, Leoncia, who was
conceiving at that time, was fetched by petitioner
and they transferred to San Juan St., Pasay City. In
October, 1962, she delivered a still-born female child
at the Manila Sanitarium. The death certificate was
signed by petitioner. Thereafter, while they were
living at Highway 54, Makati, private respondent
Merceditas S. Ilano was born on December 30, 1963
also at the Manila Sanitarium. Her birth was
recorded as Merceditas de los Santos Ilano, child of

Leoncia Aguinaldo de los Santos and Artemio Geluz
Ilano. Leoncia submitted receipts issued by the
Manila Sanitarium to show that she was confined
there from December 30, 1963 until January 2, 1964
under the name of Mrs. Leoncia Ilano. The support
by petitioner for Leoncia and Merceditas was
sometimes in the form of cash personally delivered
by him, thru Melencio, thru Elynia (niece of Leoncia)
or thru Merceditas herself. Sometimes in the form of
a check like Manila Banking Corporation Check No.
81532, the signature appearing thereon having been
identified by Leoncia as that of petitioner because he
often gives her checks which he issues at home and
saw him sign the checks. During the time that
petitioner and Leoncia were living as husband and
wife, he showed concern as the father of Merceditas.
When Merceditas was in Grade I at the St. Joseph
Parochial School, he signed her Report Card for the
fourth and fifth grading periods as her parent. Those
signatures were both identified by Leoncia and
Merceditas because he signed them in their
residence in their presence and of Elynia. Since
Merceditas started to have discernment, he was
already the one whom she recognized as her Daddy.
He treated her as a father would to his child. He
would bring home candies, toys, and anything a
child enjoys. He would take her for a drive, eat at
restaurants, and even cuddle her to sleep. In May,
1963, Ruth Elynia Mabanglo, niece of Leoncia, lived
with Leoncia and petitioner. She accompanied her
aunt when she started having labor pains in the
morning of December 30, 1963. Petitioner arrived
after five o'clock in the afternoon. When the nurse
came to inquire about the child, Leoncia was still
unconscious so it was from petitioner that the nurse
sought the information. Inasmuch as it was already
past seven o'clock in the evening, the nurse
promised to return the following morning for his
signature. However, he left an instruction to give
birth certificate to Leoncia for her signature, as he
was leaving early the following morning. Prior to the
birth of Merceditas, Elynia used to accompany her
aunt and sometimes with petitioner in his car to the
Manila Sanitarium for prenatal check-up. At times,
she used to go to his office at 615 Sales St., Sta.
Cruz, Manila, upon his instructions to get money as
support and sometimes he would send notes of
explanation if he cannot come which she in turn
gave to her aunt. They stayed at 112 Arellano St.,
then Sta. Cruz, Manila in 1966 before they finally
transferred to Gagalangin in 1967. Petitioner lived
with them up to June, 1971 when he stopped coming
home.
ISSUE:
120

Whether or not Merceditas is the child of
Artemio and is entitled to support.
HELD:
Yes. Under the then prevailing provisions of the Civil
Code, illegitimate children or those who are
conceived and born out of wedlock were generally
classified into two groups: (1) Natural, whether
actual or by fiction, were those born outside of lawful
wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of
the child, were not disqualified by any impediment to
marry each other and (2) Spurious, whether
incestuous, were disqualified to marry each other on
account of certain legal impediments. Since
petitioner had a subsisting marriage to another at the
time Merceditas was conceived, she is a spurious
child. In this regard, Article 287 of the Civil Code
provides that illegitimate children other than natural
in accordance with Article 269 and other than natural
children by legal fiction are entitled to support and
such successional rights as are granted in the Civil
Code. The Civil Code has given these rights to them
because the transgressions of social conventions
committed by the parents should not be visited upon
them. They were born with a social handicap and the
law should help them to surmount the disadvantages
facing them through the misdeeds of their parents.
However, before Article 287 can be availed of, there
must first be a recognition of paternity either
voluntarily or by court action. The Court finds that
there is sufficient evidence of recognition on the part
of petitioner. The evidences submitted like the
signature in the report cards, testimonies, and other
pieces of evidence shows that petitioner indeed
recognized Merceditas as his child and thus entitles
her to support.
Renren Geremia
123) Corito Ocampo Tayag vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 95229 June 9, 1992
FACTS:
Private respondent is the mother and legal guardian
of her minor son, Chad Cuyugan, by the father of the
petitioner, the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo. Petitioner
is the known administratrix of the real and personal
properties left by her deceased father, said Atty.
Ocampo, who died intestate in Angeles City on
September 28, 1983. Private respondent has been
estranged from her husband, Jose Cuyugan, for
several years now and during which time, she and
Atty. Ricardo Ocampo had illicit amorous relationship
with each other that, as a consequence thereof, they
begot a child who was christened Chad Cuyugan in

accordance with the ardent desire and behest of
said Atty. Ocampo. Chad, the son of private
respondent by the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, who
was born in Angeles City on October 5, 1980 had
been sired, showered with exceptional affection,
fervent love and care by his putative father for being
his only son as can be gleaned from indubitable
letters and documents of the late Atty. Ocampo to
herein private respondent. The minor, Chad D.
Cuyugan, although illegitimate is nevertheless
entitled to a share in the intestate estate left by his
deceased father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo as one of the
surviving heirs. The deceased Atty. Ricardo
Ocampo, at the time of his death was the owner of
real and personal property, located in Baguio City,
Angeles City and in the Province of Pampanga with
approximate value of several millions of pesos. The
estate of the late Atty. Ocampo has not as yet been
inventoried by the petitioner and the inheritance of
the surviving heirs including that of said Chad has
not likewise been ascertained. The only known
surviving heirs of the deceased Atty. Ricardo
Ocampo are his children, namely: Corito O. Tayag,
Rivina O. Tayag, Evita O. Florendo, Felina Ocampo,
and said minor Chad, for and in whose behalf this
instant complaint is filed. Private respondent has no
means of livelihood and she only depends on the
charity of friends and relatives for the sustenance of
her son, Chad, such that it is urgent, necessary and
imperative that said child be extended financial
support from the estate of his putative father, Atty.
Ricardo Ocampo. Several demands, verbal and
written, have been made for petitioner to grant
Chad's lawful inheritance, but despite said demands,
the latter failed and refused and still fails and refuses
to satisfy the claim for inheritance against the estate
of the late Atty. Ocampo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Chad is entitled to inherit
from Atty. Ocampos estate as his illegitimate child.
HELD:
Yes. Although petitioner contends that the complaint
filed by herein private respondent merely alleges
that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate child
of the deceased and is actually a claim for
inheritance, from the allegations therein the same
may be considered as one to compel recognition.
Further that the two causes of action, one to compel
recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may
be joined in one complaint is not new in our
jurisprudence. Also, the action has not yet
121

prescribed. The applicable law is Article 285 of the
Civil Code which states that the action for the
recognition of natural children may be brought only
during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except
in the following cases: (1) If the father or mother died
during the minority of the child, in which case the
latter may file the action before the expiration of four
years from the attainment of his majority. The Court
holds that the right of action of the minor child has
been vested by the filing of the complaint in court
under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code. We herein adopt our
ruling in the recent case of Republic of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al. where we
held that the fact of filing of the petition already
vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have
the same proceed to final adjudication in accordance
with the law in force at the time, and such right can
no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the
enactment of a new law.
Renren Geremia
124) John Paul E. Fernandez, et al., vs. Court of
Appeals
G.R. No. 108366 February 16, 1994
FACTS:
Violeta P. Esguerra, single, is the mother and
guardian ad litem of the two petitioners, Claro
Antonio Fernandez and John Paul Fernandez, met
sometime in 1983, at the Meralco Compound tennis
courts. A Meralco employee and a tennis enthusiast,
Carlito used to spend his week-ends regularly at
said courts, where Violeta's father served as tennis
instructor. Violeta pointed to Carlito as the father of
her two sons. She claimed that they started their
illicit sexual relationship six (6) months after their first
meeting. The tryst resulted in the birth of petitioner
Claro Antonio on March 1, 1984, and of petitioner
John Paul on not know that Carlito was married until
the birth of her two children. She averred they were
married in civil rites in October, 1983. In March,
1985, however, she discovered that the marriage
license which they used was spurious. Petitioners
presented the following documentary evidence: their
certificates of live birth, identifying respondent Carlito
as their father; the baptismal certificate of petitioner
Claro which also states that his father is respondent
Carlito; photographs of Carlito taken during the
baptism of petitioner Claro; and pictures of
respondent Carlito and Claro taken at the home of
Violeta Esguerra. In defense, respondent Carlito
denied Violeta's allegations that he sired the two
petitioners. He averred he only served as one of the

sponsors in the baptism of petitioner Claro. This
claim was corroborated by the testimony of Rodante
Pagtakhan, an officemate of respondent Carlito who
also stood as a sponsor of petitioner Claro during his
baptism.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Claro Antonio and John Paul
are children of Carlito and are entitled for support.
HELD:
No. The rule is well-settled that findings of
facts of the Court of Appeals may be reviewed by
this court only under exceptional circumstances.
One such situation is when the findings of the
appellate court clash with those of the trial court as
in the case at bench. It behooves us therefore to
exercise our extraordinary power, and settle the
issue of whether the ruling of the appellate court that
private respondent is not the father of the petitioners
is substantiated by the evidence on record. The
evidence offered by the petitioners is insufficient to
prove their filiation. Petitioners cannot rely on the
photographs showing the presence of the private
respondent in the baptism of petitioner Claro. These
photographs are far from proofs that private
respondent is the father of petitioner Claro. As
explained by the private respondent, he was in the
baptism as one of the sponsors of petitioner Claro.
The pictures taken in the house of Violeta showing
private respondent showering affection to Claro fall
short of the evidence required to prove paternity.
The baptismal certificates of petitioner Claro naming
private respondent as his father has scant
evidentiary value. There is no showing that private
respondent participated in its preparation. The
certificates of live birth of the petitioners identifying
private respondent as their father are not also
competent evidence on the issue of their paternity.
Again, the records do no show that private
respondent had a hand in the preparation of said
certificates. Also, there is no proof that Father
Fernandez is a close friend of Violeta Esguerra and
the private respondent which should render
unquestionable his identification of the private
respondent during petitioner Claro's baptism. In the
absence of this proof, we are not prepared to
concede that Father Fernandez who officiates
numerous baptismal ceremonies day in and day out
can remember the parents of the children he has
baptized.
Renren Geremia
125) Camelo Cabatania vs. Court of Appeals
122

G.R. No. 124814 October 21, 2004
FACTS:
Florencias version was that she was the mother of
private respondent who was born on September 9,
1982 and that she was the one supporting the child.
She recounted that after her husband left her in the
early part of 1981, she went to Escalante, Negros
Occidental to look for work and was eventually hired
as petitioners household help. It was while working
there as a maid that, on January 2, 1982, petitioner
brought her to Bacolod City where they checked in
at the Visayan Motel and had sexual intercourse.
Petitioner promised to support her if she got
pregnant. Florencia claimed she discovered she was
carrying petitioners child 27 days after their sexual
encounter. The sexual intercourse was repeated in
March 1982 in San Carlos City. Later, on suspicion
that Florencia was pregnant, petitioners wife sent
her home. But petitioner instead brought her to
Singcang, Bacolod City where he rented a house for
her. On September 9, 1982, assisted by a hilot in her
aunts house in Tiglawigan, Cadiz City, she gave
birth to her child, private respondent Camelo
Regodos.
Petitioner Camelo Cabatanias version was that he
was a sugar planter and a businessman. Sometime
in December, 1981, he hired Florencia as a servant
at home. During the course of her employment, she
would often go home to her husband in the
afternoon and return to work the following morning.
This displeased petitioners wife, hence she was told
to look for another job. In the meantime, Florencia
asked permission from petitioner to go home and
spend New Years Eve in Cadiz City. Petitioner met
her on board the Ceres bus bound for San Carlos
City and invited her to dinner. While they were
eating, she confided that she was hard up and
petitioner offered to lend her save money. Later, they
spent the night in San Carlos City and had sexual
intercourse. While doing it, he felt something jerking
and when he asked her about it, she told him she
was pregnant with the child of her husband. They
went home the following day. In March 1982,
Florencia, then already working in another
household, went to petitioners house hoping to be
re-employed as a servant there. Since petitioners
wife was in need of one, she was re-hired. However
petitioners wife noticed that her stomach was
bulging and inquired about the father of the unborn
child. She told petitioners wife that the baby was by
her husband. Because of her condition, she was
again told to go home and they did not see each
other anymore. Petitioner was therefore surprised
when summons was served on him by Florencias
counsel. She was demanding support for private

respondent Camelo Regodos. Petitioner refused,
denying the alleged paternity. He insisted she was
already pregnant when they had sex. He denied
going to Bacolod City with her and checking in at the
Visayan Motel. He vehemently denied having sex
with her on January 2, 1982 and renting a house for
her in Singcang, Bacolod City.
The trial court gave probative weight to the
testimony of Florencia despite its discovery that she
misrepresented herself as a widow when, in reality,
her husband was alive. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Camelo should be entitled to
support as Camelo Cabatanias child.
HELD:
No. Clearly, this petition calls for a review of the
factual findings of the two lower courts. As a general
rule, factual issues are not within the province of this
Court. Factual findings of the trial court, when
adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals,
become final and conclusive and may not be
reviewed on appeal. However, the Court is
convinced that this case falls within one of the
exceptions. Time and again, this Court has ruled that
a high standard of proof is required to establish
paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and
support may create an unwholesome situation or
may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the
parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or
filiation is established by clear and convincing
evidence. The applicable provisions of the law are
Articles 172 and 175 of the Civil Code which states
that: the filiation of legitimate children is established
by any of the following: (1) The record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of
the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall
be proved by: (1) The open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2)
Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws; Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children. Private respondents
copy of his birth and baptismal certificates, the
preparation of which was without the knowledge or
consent of petitioner. A certificate of live birth
purportedly identifying the putative father is not
123

competent evidence of paternity when there is no
showing that the putative father had a hand in the
preparation of said certificate. The local civil registrar
has no authority to record the paternity of an
illegitimate child on the information of a third person.
Also, while a baptismal certificate may be
considered a public document, it can only serve as
evidence of the administration of the sacrament on
the date specified but not the veracity of the entries
with respect to the childs paternity. Thus, certificates
issued by the local civil registrar and baptismal
certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as
proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted
indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the
same. Private respondent failed to present sufficient
proof of voluntary recognition. On the other hand,
the fact that Florencias husband is living and there
is a valid subsisting marriage between them gives
rise to the presumption that a child born within that
marriage is legitimate even though the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as an adulteress. The presumption
of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration
in the statute but is based on the broad principles of
natural justice and the supposed virtue of the
mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy
to protect innocent offspring from the odium of
illegitimacy. In this age of genetic profiling and
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely
subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity
of features will not suffice as evidence to prove
paternity and filiation before the courts of law.
Renren Geremia
126) SAYSON VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. Nos. 89224-25, January 23, 1992
Cruz, J.:
FACTS: Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five
children namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa,
Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died in 1952 and
Rafaela in 1976.
One of their children, Teodoro married to
Isabel died on 1972. The wife of Teodoro, Isabel
then after died in 1981. The properties of the couple
Teodoro and Isabel were left with private
respondents Delia, Edmundo and Doribel, who were
their children.
On April 25, 1983, Maurico, Rosario,
Basilisa, Remedios and Juana (mother of Isabel)
filed for partition of the estate of Teodoro and Isabel,
which was opposed by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel,

who claimed successional rights to the estate.
Likewise, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own
complaint for the partition of Eleno and Rafaelas
estate through representation.
Both cases were decided in favor of the
private respondents. Judge Rafael declared that
Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted
children of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by virtue of
the decree of adoption. Doribel was their legitimate
daughter as evidenced by her birth certificate.
Consequently, the three children were entitled to
inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of
representation. On the other case, Judge Saez
held that being the legitimate heirs of Teodoro and
Isabel as established by the aforementioned
evidence, the same excluded the plaintiffs from
sharing in their estate.
The Court of Appeals modified the decision
in that Delia and Edmundo Sayson are disqualified
from inheriting from the estate of the deceased
spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, but affirmed all
other respects. Hence, this petition for review by
certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondents are
entitled to inherit from their parents and their
grandparents.
HELD: A challenge to the validity of the adoption
cannot be made collaterally in an action for partition
but in a direct proceeding frontally addressing the
issue.
On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, the
findings of the trial courts as affirmed by the
respondent court must be sustained. Doribel's birth
certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one
of the prescribed means of recognition under Article
265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family
Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the
birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence of
filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence.
However, such evidence is lacking in the case at bar.
Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and
Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the
exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the
deceased couple, conformably to the following
Article 979 of the Civil Code:
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants
succeed the parents and other ascendants, without
124

distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should
come from different marriages.
An adopted child succeeds to the property of the
adopting parents in the same manner as a legitimate
child.
The philosophy underlying this article is that
a person's love descends first to his children and
grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and
thereafter spreads among his collateral relatives. It is
also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring
properties is to leave them eventually to his children
as a token of his love for them and as a provision for
their continued care even after he is gone from this
earth.
There is no question that as the legitimate
daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of
Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent
her deceased father in the distribution of the
intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article
981, quoted above, she is entitled to the share her
father would have directly inherited had he survived,
which shall be equal to the shares of her
grandparents' other children.
But a different conclusion must be reached in
the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the
grandparents were total strangers. While it is true
that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a
legitimate child and have the same right as the latter,
these rights do not include the right of
representation. The relationship created by the
adoption is between only the adopting parents and
the adopted child and does not extend to the blood
relatives of either party.
127) LIYAO vs. TANHOTI-LIYAO
378 SCRA 563
FACTS: This is a petition for compulsory recognition
of William Liyao Jr. as the illegitimate (spurious)
child of the late Willima Liyao against Juanita
Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L.
Tan and Linda Christina Liyao (children and wife of
William).
According to Corazon G. Garcia, William
Liyao Jr.s mother and representative, she was
married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo
for more than ten (10) years and cohabited with late
William Liyao from 1965 to the time of Williams
untimely demise on December 2, 1975. They lived
together with the knowledge of William Liyaos
legitimate children, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda

Christina Liyao-Ortiga, who were both employed at
the Far East Realty Investment, Inc. of which
Corazon and William were the vice president and
president, respectively. On June 9, 1975, Corazon
gave birth to William Liyao Jr. (Billy). Since then, he
had been in continuous possession and enjoyment
of the status of a recognized and/or acknowledged
child of William Liyao by the latters direct and overt
acts which among others, the payment of medical
and hospital expenses, food and clothing and
bringing him to vacations and various social
gatherings as evidenced by the pictures taken on the
said occasions.
On the other hand, according to Linda
Christina Liyao-Ortiga, her parents, William Liyao
and Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, were legally married.
She grew up and lived with her parents at San
Lorenzo Village , Makati until she got married. Her
parents were not separated legally or in fact and that
there was no reason why any of her parents would
institute legal separation proceedings in court. Her
father came home regularly even during out of town
to change cloths until he suffered from two strokes
before the fatal attack which led to his death on
December 2, 1975. She further testified that she
knew Corazon Garcia is still married to Ramon Yulo
and was not legally separated from her husband and
the records from Local Civil Registrar do not indicate
that the couple obtained any annulment of their
marriage. Tita Rose Liyao-Tan testimony was similar
to Ms. Linda that their parents were legally married
and had never been separated. They resided at San
Lorenzo Village until the time of their fathers death.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of
the William, Jr. and Corazon. However, the Court of
Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court and
ruled in favor of Juanita, Pearl and Linda.
Issue: Whether or not William, Jr. is entitled to
inherit.
Held: The Court sustained the decision of the Court
of Appeals stating that the fact that Corazon had
been living separately from Ramon at the time
petitioner was conceived and born has no bearing to
the legitimacy of the child. While the physical
impossibility for the husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds in
impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears
emphasis that the grounds for impugning the
legitimacy of the child mentioned in Art. 255 of the
Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband or in
125

proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth
under Art. 262 of the Civil Code. It is therefore clear
that the present petition initiated by petitioner, to
compel recognition by respondents of petitioner
William Liyao Jr., as the illegitimate son of late
William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a
child born within a valid marriage is presumed
legitimate even though the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress. The Court cannot allow
petitioner to maintain his present petition and
subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the
husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs could
impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and
subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot
choose his own filiation. If the husband presumed to
be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the
child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the
latter cannot choose to be the child of his mothers
alleged paramour.
128) DE JESUS vs. ESTATE OF DIZON
366 SCRA 499
Vitug, J.:
FACTS: Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de
Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It was during
this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie
Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners, were born.
In a notarized document, dated 07 June
1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and
Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children
by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died
intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind
considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in
various corporations and some real property. It was
on the strength of his notarized acknowledgement
that petitioners filed a complaint for "Partition with
Inventory and Accounting" of the Dizon estate with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Respondents, the surviving spouse and
legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon,
including the corporations of which the deceased
was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case,
arguing that the complaint, even while denominated
as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for
altering the status of petitioners from being the
legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus
and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate
children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan
Dizon.
The trial court denied, due to lack of merit.

However. the appellate court upheld the decision of
the lower court and ordered the case to be
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
The Trial Court decreed that the declaration of
heirship could only be made in a special proceeding
inasmuch as petitioners were seeking the
establishment of a status or right.
In the instant petition for review on certiorari,
the petitioners maintain that their recognition as
being illegitimate children of the decedent, embodied
in an authentic writing, is in itself sufficient to
establish their status as such and does not require a
separate action for judicial approval.
ISSUE: Whether an action for partition is proper to
ascertain the question of paternity & filiation or
whether it should be taken in an independent suit.
HELD: The filiation of illegitimate children, like
legitimate children, is established by (1) the record
of birth appearing the civil register or a final
judgement; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation
in a public document or a private handwritten and
signed by the parent concerned. In the absence
thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and
continuos possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws. The due recognition of an
illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court or record, or in any
authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act
of acknowledgement of the child, and no further
court action is required. In fact, any writing is
treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition;
it is in itself voluntary recognition that does not
require
a
separate
action
for
judicial
approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition
is predicted on other evidence merely tending to
prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth,
a will, a statement before a court or record or an
authentic writing, judicial action within the
applicable statue of limitations is essential in
order to establish the child's acknowledgement.
Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their
illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon,
petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate
status as being children of Danilo de Jesus and
Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly
done because the law itself establishes the
legitimacy of children conceived or born during the
marriage of the parents. The presumption of
legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in
126

wedlock, and only the father, or in exceptional
instances the latter's heirs, can contest in an
appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born
to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy
of a child has been successfully impugned that
the paternity of the husband can be rejected.
The rule that the written acknowledgement
made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes
petitioners' alleged illegitimate filiation to the
decedent cannot be validly invoked to be of any
relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e whether
petitioners are indeed the acknowledge illegitimate
offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly
adjudicated without an action having been first
instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the
children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de
Jesus born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is
strongly settled that the paramount declaration of
legitimacy
by
law
cannot
be
attacked
collaterally, one that can only be repudiated or
contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that
purpose. Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock
shall be considered legitimate although the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as having been an adulteress.
129) LABAGALA vs. SANTIAGO
G.R. No. 132305; December 4, 2001
Quisumbing, J.:
FACTS: Jose T. Santiago owned a parcel of land
located in Sta. Cruz, Manila . Alleging that Jose had
fraudulently registered it in his name alone, his
sisters Nicolasa and Amanda (now respondents
herein) sued Jose for recovery of 2/3 share of the
property.
The trial court in that case decided in favor of
the sisters, recognizing their right of ownership over
portions of the property. The Register of Deeds of
Manila was required to include the names of
Nicolasa and Amanda in the certificate of title to said
property.
Jose died intestate. The respondents filed a
complaint for recovery of title, ownership, and
possession against herein petitioner, Ida C.
Labagala, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
to recover from her the 1/3 portion of said property
pertaining to Jose but which came into petitioner's
sole possession upon Jose's death.
Respondents alleged that Jose's share in the
property belongs to them by operation of law,
because they are the only legal heirs of their brother,

who died intestate and without issue. They claimed
that the purported sale of the property made by their
brother to petitioner sometime in March 1979 was
executed through petitioner's machinations and with
malicious intent, to enable her to secure the
corresponding transfer certificate of title (TCT No.
172334) in petitioner's name alone.
Respondents insisted that the deed of sale
was a forgery .The deed showed that Jose affixed
his thumbmark thereon but respondents averred
that, having been able to graduate from college,
Jose never put his thumb mark on documents he
executed but always signed his name in full.
On the other hand, petitioner claimed that
her true name is not Ida C. Labagala as claimed by
respondent but Ida C. Santiago. She claimed not to
know any person by the name of Ida C. Labagala.
She claimed to be the daughter of Jose and thus
entitled to his share in the subject property. She
maintained that she had always stayed on the
property, ever since she was a child. She argued
that the purported sale of the property was in fact a
donation to her, and that nothing could have
precluded Jose from putting his thumbmark on the
deed of sale instead of his signature. She pointed
out that during his lifetime, Jose never
acknowledged respondents' claim over the property
such that respondents had to sue to claim portions
thereof. She lamented that respondents had to
disclaim her in their desire to obtain ownership of the
whole property.
Trial court ruled in favor of petitioner which
was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUES: (1) whether or not respondents may
impugn petitioner's filiation in this action for recovery
of title and possession; and (2) whether or not
petitioner is entitled to Jose's 1/3 portion of the
property he co-owned with respondents, through
succession, sale, or donation.
HELD: Petitioner's reliance on Article 263 of the Civil
Code is misplaced. This article should be read in
conjunction with the other articles in the same
chapter on paternity and filiation in the Civil Code. A
careful reading of said chapter would reveal that it
contemplates situations where a doubt exists that a
child is indeed a man's child by his wife, and the
husband (or, in proper cases, his heirs) denies the
child's filiation. It does not refer to situations where a
child is alleged not to be the child at all of a
particular couple.
Article 263 refers to an action to impugn
the legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove that a
127

person is not a man's child by his wife. However, the
present case is not one impugning petitioner's
legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely
that petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but
that she is not a child of Jose at all. Moreover, the
present action is one for recovery of title and
possession, and thus outside the scope of Article
263 on prescriptive periods.
Petitioner's reliance on Sayson is likewise
improper. The factual milieu present in Sayson does
not obtain in the instant case. What was being
challenged by petitioners in Sayson was (1) the
validity of the adoption of Delia and Edmundo by the
deceased Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and (2) the
legitimate status of Doribel Sayson. While asserting
that Delia and Edmundo could not have been validly
adopted since Doribel had already been born to the
Sayson couple at the time, petitioners at the same
time made the conflicting claim that Doribel was not
the child of the couple. The Court ruled in that case
that it was too late to question the decree of
adoption that became final years before. Besides,
such a challenge to the validity of the adoption
cannot be made collaterally but in a direct
proceeding.
Petitioner, who claims to be Ida Santiago,
has the same birthdate as Ida Labagala. The
similarity is too uncanny to be a mere coincidence.
During her testimony before the trial court,
petitioner denied knowing Cornelia Cabrigas, who
was listed as the mother in the birth certificate of Ida
Labagala. In her petition before this Court, however,
she stated that Cornelia is the sister of her mother,
Esperanza. It appears that petitioner made
conflicting statements that affect her credibility and
could cast along shadow of doubt on her claims of
filiation.
Thus, we are constrained to agree with the
factual finding of the Court of Appeals that petitioner
is in reality the child of Leon Labagala and Cornelia
Cabrigas, and contrary to her averment, not of Jose
Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. Not being a child
of Jose, it follows that petitioner can not inherit from
him through intestate succession. It now remains to
be seen whether the property in dispute was validly
transferred to petitioner through sale or donation.
Jose did not have the right to transfer
ownership of the entire property to petitioner since
2/3 thereof belonged to his sisters. Petitioner could
not have given her consent to the contract, being a
minor at the time. Consent of the contracting parties
is among the essential requisites of a contract,
including one of sale, absent which there can be no
valid contract. Moreover, petitioner admittedly did not
pay any centavo for the property, which makes the

sale void. Article 1471 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1471. If the price is simulated, the sale is void,
but the act may be shown to have been in reality a
donation, or some other act or contract.
Neither may the purported deed of sale be a valid
deed of donation.
130) ESTATE OF LOCSIN vs. JUAN C. LOCSIN
G.R. No. 146737, December 10, 2001
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.:
FACTS: Eleven months after Juan "Jhonny" Locsin,
Sr. died intestate on December 11, 1990, respondent
Juan E. Locsin, Jr. filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Iloilo City , a "Petition for Letters of Administration"
praying that he be appointed Administrator of the
Intestate Estate of the deceased. He alleged that he
is an acknowledged natural child. The trial court
issued an order setting the petition for hearing which
order was duly published, thereby giving notice to all
persons who may have opposition to the said
petition.
Before the scheduled hearing, the heirs of
Jose Locsin, Jr., the heirs of Maria Locsin, Manuel
Locsin and Ester Jarantilla, claiming to be the lawful
heirs of the deceased, filed an opposition. They
averred that respondent is not a child or an
acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C.
Locsin, who during his lifetime, never affixed "Sr." in
his name.
On January 5, 1993, another opposition to
the petition was filed by Lucy Salinop (sole heir of
the late Maria Locsin Vda. De Araneta, sister of the
deceased), Manuel Locsin and the successors of the
late Lourdes C. Locsin alleging that respondent's
claim as a natural child is barred by prescription or
the statute of limitations.
The Intestate Estate of the late Jose Locsin,
Jr. (brother of the deceased) also entered its
appearance in the estate proceedings, joining the
earlier oppositors. This was followed by an
appearance and opposition of Ester Locsin Jarantilla
(another sister of Juan C. Locsin), likewise stating
that there is no filial relationship between herein
respondent and the deceased.
To support his claim that he is an
acknowledged natural child of the deceased,
respondent submitted a machine copy of his
Certificate of Live Birth found in the bound volume of
birth records in the Office of the Local Clerk
Registrar of Iloilo City which contains the information
that respondent's father is Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and
128

that he was the informant of the facts stated therein,
as evidenced by his signatures. To prove the
existence and authenticity of Certificate of Live Birth,
respondent presented the Local Civil Registrar of
Iloilo City. Respondent also offered in evidence a
photograph showing him and his mother, Amparo
Escamilla, in front of a coffin bearing Juan C.
Locsin's dead body. The photograph, respondent
claims, shows that he and his mother have been
recognized as family members of the deceased.
Petitioners claimed that Certificate of Live
Birth is spurious. They submitted a certified true
copy of Certificate of Live Birth found in the Civil
Registrar General, Metro Manila indicating that the
birth of respondent was reported by his mother,
Amparo Escamilla, and that the same does not
contain the signature of the late Juan C. Locsin.
They observed as anomalous the fact that while
respondent was born on October 22, 1956 and his
birth was recorded on January 30, 1957, however,
his Certificate of Live Birth was recorded on
a December 1, 1958 revised form.
The trial court found that the Certificate of
Live Birth and the photograph are sufficient proofs of
respondent's illegitimate filiation. The Court of
Appeals affirmed in toto the order of the trial court.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, while
respondent filed a motion for execution pending
appeal. Both motions were denied by the Appellate
Court.
ISSUE: Which of the two documents Certificate of
Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and Certificate of
Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "8") is genuine.
HELD: Exhibit 8 for the petitioners.
With respect to Local Civil Registries, access
thereto by interested parties is obviously easier.
Thus, in proving the authenticity of Exhibit "D," more
convincing evidence than those considered by the
trial court should have been presented by
respondent.
The event about which she testified on
March 7, 1994 was the record of respondent's birth
which took place on October 22, 1956, on 37 or 38
years ago. The Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City at
that time was Emilio G. Tomesa. Necessarily,
Vencer's knowledge of respondent's birth record
allegedly made and entered in the Local Civil
Registry in January, 1957 was based merely on her
general impressions of the existing records in that
Office.
When entries in the Certificate of Live Birth

recorded in the Local Civil Registry vary from those
appearing in the copy transmitted to the Civil
Registry General, pursuant to the Civil Registry Law,
the variance has to be clarified in more persuasive
and rational manner. In this regard, we find Vencer's
explanation not convincing.
Respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No.
477 (Exhibit "D") was recorded in a December 1,
1958 revised form. Asked how a 1958 form could be
used in 1957 when respondent's birth was recorded,
Vencer answered that "x x x during that time, maybe
the forms in 1956 were already exhausted so the
former Civil Registrar had requested for a new form
and they sent us the 1958 Revised Form." The
answer is a "maybe", a mere supposition of an
event. It does not satisfactorily explain how
a Revised Form dated December 1, 1958 could
have been used on January 30, 1957 or almost (2)
years earlier.
Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8" of the
petitioners found in the Civil Registrar General in
Metro Manila is on Municipal Form No 102, revised
in July, 1956. We find no irregularity here. Indeed, it
is logical to assume that the 1956 forms would
continue to be used several years thereafter. But for
a 1958 form to be used in 1957 is unlikely.
There are other indications of irregularity
relative to Exhibit "D." The back cover of the 1957
bound volume in the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo is
torn. Exhibit "D" is merely pasted with the bound
volume, not sewn like the other entries.
The documents bound into one volume are
original copies. Exhibit "D" is a carbon copy of the
alleged original and sticks out like a sore thumb
because the entries therein are typewritten, while the
records of all other certificates are handwritten.
Unlike the contents of those other certificates,
Exhibit "D" does not indicate important particulars,
such as the alleged father's religion, race,
occupation, address and business. The space which
calls for an entry of the legitimacy of the child is
blank. On the back page of Exhibit "D", there is a
purported signature of the alleged father, but the
blanks calling for the date and other details of his
Residence Certificate were not filled up.
When asked to explain the torn back cover of
the bound volume, Vencer had no answer except to
129

state, "I am not aware of this because I am not a
bookbinder."
The records of the instant case adequately
support a finding that Exhibit "8" for the petitioners,
not respondent's Exhibit "D", should have been
given more faith and credence by the courts below.
In this connection, we echo this Court's
pronouncement
in Roces
vs.
Local
Civil
Registrar that:
"Section 5 of Act No. 3753 and Article 280 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines . . . explicitly prohibit,
not only the naming of the father of the child born out
of wedlock, when the birth certificate, or the
recognition, is not filed or made by him, but also, the
statement of any information or circumstances by
which he could be identified. Accordingly, the Local
Civil Registrar had no authority to make or record
the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the
information of a third person and the certificate of
birth of an illegitimate child, when signed only by the
mother of the latter, is incompetent evidence of
fathership of said child."
The Roces ruling regarding illegitimate
filiation is further elucidated in Fernandez vs. Court
of Appeals where this Court said that "a birth
certificate not signed by the alleged father (who had
no hand in its preparation) is not competent
evidence of paternity."
A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence
prescribed by both the Civil Code and Article 172 of
the Family Code for purposes of recognition and
filiation. However, birth certificate offers only prima
facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by
contrary evidence. Its evidentiary worth cannot be
sustained where there exists strong, complete and
conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. In this case,
respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477
entered in the records of the Local Civil Registry
(from which Exhibit "D" was machine copied) has all
the badges of nullity. Without doubt, the authentic
copy on file in that office was removed and
substituted with a falsified Certificate of Live Birth.
131) EDGARDO TIJING & BIENVENIDA TIJING
vs. COURT OF APPEALS
(G.R. No. 125901; March 8, 2001)
Quisumbing, J.:
FACTS: Petitioners are husband and wife. They
have six children. The youngest is Edgardo Tijing,
Jr., who was born on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of
midwife and registered nurse Lourdes Vasquez in
Sta. Ana, Manila . Petitioner Bienvenida served as
the laundrywoman of private respondent Angelita

Diamante, then a resident of Tondo, Manila .
According to Bienvenida in August 1989,
Angelita went to her house to fetch her for an urgent
laundry job. Since Bienvenida was on her way to do
some marketing, she asked Angelita to wait until she
returned. She also left her four-month old son,
Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita as she
usually let Angelita take care of the child while
Bienvenida was doing laundry.
Upon her return, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr.,
were gone. Bienvenida forthwith proceeded to
Angelita's house in Tondo, Manila , but did not find
them there. Angelita's maid told Bienvenida that her
employer went out for a stroll and told Bienvenida to
come back later. She returned to Angelita's house
after three days, only to discover that Angelita had
moved to another place. Bienvenida then
complained to her barangay chairman and also to
the police who seemed unmoved by her pleas for
assistance.
Four years later or in October 1993,
Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of
Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common-law husband of
Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state in
Hagonoy, Bulacan.
Bienvenida lost no time in going to Hagonoy,
Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo,
Jr., for the first time after four years. She claims that
the boy, who was pointed out to her by Benjamin
Lopez, a brother of the late Tomas Lopez, was
already named John Thomas Lopez. She avers that
Angelita refused to return to her the boy despite her
demand to do so.
Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition
for habeas corpus with the trial court in order to
recover their son. Petitioners presented two
witnesses. The 1st, witness is Vasquez who testified
that she assisted in the delivery of one Edgardo
Tijing, Jr. on April 27, 1989 at her clinic. The 2nd,
Benjamin Lopez who declared that his brother
admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only
an adopted son and that he and Angelita were not
blessed with children.
For her part, Angelita claimed that she is the
natural mother of the child. She asserts that at age
42, she gave birth to John Thomas Lopez on April
27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife Zosima Panganiban
in Singalong, Manila . She added, though, that she
has two other children with her real husband, Angel
Sanchez. She said the birth of John Thomas was
130

registered by her common-law husband, Tomas
Lopez, with the local civil registrar of Manila on
August 4, 1989.
On March 10, 1995, the trial court concluded
that since Angelita and her common-law husband
could not have children, the alleged birth of John
Thomas Lopez is an impossibility. The trial court also
held that the minor and Bienvenida showed strong
facial similarity. Accordingly, it ruled that Edgardo
Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the
same person who is the natural child of petitioners.
The sheriff implemented the order of the trial
court by taking custody of the minor. In his report,
the sheriff stated that Angelita peacefully
surrendered the minor and he turned over the
custody of said child to petitioner Edgardo Tijing.
The Court of Appeals reversed and
expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas
corpus. In its view, the evidence adduced by
Bienvenida was not sufficient to establish that she
was the mother of the minor. It ruled that the lower
court erred in declaring that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and
John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not habeas corpus is the
proper remedy?
(2) Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John
Thomas Lopez are one and the same person and is
the son of petitioners?
HELD: The writ of habeas corpus extends to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention by which
any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled thereto. Thus, it is the proper legal
remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a
minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a
third person of his own free will. It may even be said
that in custody cases involving minors, the question
of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the
underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as
a remedy. Rather, it is prosecuted for the purpose of
determining the right of custody over a child. It must
be stressed too that in habeas corpusproceedings,
the question of identity is relevant and material,
subject to the usual presumptions including those as
to identity of the person.
A close scrutiny of the records of this case
reveals that the evidence presented by Bienvenida is
sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is
actually her missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr.
First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer

bear children. From her very lips, she admitted that
after the birth of her second child, she underwent
ligation at the Martinez Hospital in 1970, before she
lived with Tomas Lopez without the benefit of
marriage in 1974. Second, there is strong evidence
which directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no longer
capable of siring a son. Benjamin Lopez declared in
court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile because of
the accident and that Tomas admitted to him that
John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son.
Moreover, Tomas Lopez and his legal wife, Maria
Rapatan Lopez, had no children after almost fifteen
years together. Though Tomas Lopez had lived with
private respondent for fourteen years, they also bore
no offspring. Third, we find unusual the fact that the
birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was filed by
Tomas Lopez instead of the midwife. Under the law,
the attending physician or midwife in attendance at
birth should cause the registration of such birth. Only
in default of the physician or midwife, can the parent
register the birth of his child. Fourth, the trial court
observed several times that when the child and
Bienvenida were both in court, the two had strong
similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head
shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his
alleged parent is competent and material evidence
to establish parentage. Needless to stress, the trial
court's conclusion should be given high respect, it
having had the opportunity to observe the physical
appearances of the minor and petitioner concerned.
Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in
Bienvenida's giving birth to Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at her
clinic. Unlike private respondent, she presented
clinical records consisting of a log book, discharge
order and the signatures of petitioners.
All these considered, we are constrained to
rule that subject minor is indeed the son of
petitioners. The writ of habeas corpus is proper to
regain custody of said child.
132) AGUSTIN vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND
PROLLAMANTE
G.R. No. 162571. June 15, 2005
Corona, J.:
FACTS: Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin
Prollamante sued Martins alleged biological father,
petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and
support pendente lite before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City . In their complaint,
respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in 1992,
after which they entered into an intimate relationship.
131

Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th
birthday on November 10, 1999. Despite Arnels
insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and
gave birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin, on
August 11, 2000 at the Capitol Medical Hospital in
Quezon City . The babys birth certificate was
purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel
shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but
later refused Fes repeated requests for Martins
support despite his adequate financial capacity and
even suggested to have the child committed for
adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the
child.
Arnel denied having sired Martin because his
affair and intimacy with Fe had allegedly ended in
1998, long before Martins conception. He claimed
that Fe had at least one other secret lover. Arnel
admitted that their relationship started in 1993 but
"he never really fell in love with (Fe) not only
because (she) had at least one secret lover, a
certain Jun, but also because she proved to be
scheming and overly demanding and possessive.
Unable to bear the prospect of losing his wife and
children, Arnel terminated the affair although he still
treated her as a friend such as by referring potential
customers to the car aircon repair shop" where she
worked. Later on, Arnel found out that Fe had
another erstwhile secret lover. In May 2000, Arnel
and his entire family went to the United States for a
vacation. Upon their return in June 2000, Arnel
learned that Fe was telling people that he had
impregnated her. Arnel refused to acknowledge the
child as his because their "last intimacy was
sometime in 1998." Exasperated, Fe started calling
Arnels wife and family. On January 19, 2001, Fe
followed Arnel to the Capitol Hills Golf and Country
Club parking lot to demand that he acknowledge
Martin as his child. According to Arnel, he could not
get through Fe and the discussion became so
heated that he had no "alternative but to move on
but without bumping or hitting any part of her
body." Finally, Arnel claimed that the signature and
the community tax certificate (CTC) attributed to him
in the acknowledgment of Martins birth certificate
were falsified. The CTC erroneously reflected his
marital status as single when he was actually
married and that his birth year was 1965 when it
should have been 1964.
Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an
order directing all the parties to submit themselves to
DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the
Rules of Court. Arnel opposed said motion by
invoking his constitutional right against self-
incrimination. He also moved to dismiss the

complaint for lack of cause of action, considering
that his signature on the birth certificate was a
forgery and that, under the law, an illegitimate child
is not entitled to support if not recognized by the
putative father. He attached the certification of the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory that his
signature in the birth certificate was forged.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss
the complaint and ordered the parties to submit
themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense
of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court.
ISSUES: (1) whether a complaint for support can be
converted to a petition for recognition and (2)
whether DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a
proceeding for support without violating petitioners
constitutional right to privacy and right against selfincrimination.
HELD: The assailed resolution and order did not
convert the action for support into one for recognition
but merely allowed the respondents to prove their
cause of action against petitioner who had been
denying the authenticity of the documentary
evidence of acknowledgement. But even if the
assailed resolution and order effectively integrated
an action to compel recognition with an action for
support, such was valid and in accordance with
jurisprudence. In Tayag v. Court of Appeals,20 we
allowed the integration of an action to compel
recognition with an action to claim ones inheritance:
In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be
entitled to support and successional rights from the
putative or presumed parent, must prove his filiation
to the latter. We also said that it is necessary to
allege in the complaint that the putative father had
acknowledged and recognized the illegitimate child
because such acknowledgment is essential to and is
the basis of the right to inherit. There being no
allegation of such acknowledgment, the action
becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be
brought after the death of the putative father. The
ratio decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the
absence of a cause of action for failure of the
petitioner to allege the fact of acknowledgment in the
complaint, but the prescription of the action.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case
at bar, although petitioner contends that the
complaint filed by herein private respondent merely
alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an
illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a
claim for inheritance, from the allegations therein the
132

same may be considered as one to compel
recognition. Further, that the two causes of action,
one to compel recognition and the other to claim
inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not
new in our jurisprudence.
Although the instant case deals with support
rather than inheritance, as in Tayag, the basis or
rationale for integrating them remains the same.
Whether or not respondent Martin is entitled to
support depends completely on the determination of
filiation. A separate action will only result in a
multiplicity of suits, given how intimately related the
main issues in both cases are. To paraphrase Tayag,
the declaration of filiation is entirely appropriate to
these proceedings.
On the second issue, petitioner posits that
DNA is not recognized by this Court as a conclusive
means of proving paternity. He also contends that
compulsory testing violates his right to privacy and
right against self-incrimination as guaranteed under
the 1987 Constitution. These contentions have no
merit.
The kernel of the right is not against all
compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The
right against self-incrimination is simply against the
legal process of extracting from the lips of the
accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply
where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an
incrimination but as part of object evidence.
Over the years, we have expressly excluded
several kinds of object evidence taken from the
person of the accused from the realm of selfincrimination. These include photographs,28 hair,29
and other bodily substances.30We have also
declared as constitutional several procedures
performed on the accused such as pregnancy tests
for women accused of adultery,31 expulsion of
morphine from ones mouth32 and the tracing of
ones foot to determine its identity with bloody
footprints.33 In Jimenez v. Caizares,34 we even
authorized the examination of a womans genitalia,
in an action for annulment filed by her husband, to
verify his claim that she was impotent, her orifice
being too small for his penis. Some of these
procedures were, to be sure, rather invasive and
involuntary, but all of them were constitutionally
sound. DNA testing and its results, per our ruling in
Yatar,35 are now similarly acceptable.
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore
that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions
into individual privacy. The right is not intended to
stifle scientific and technological advancements that

enhance public service and the common good...
Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by
proper safeguards that enhance public service and
the common good.
133) In re: Petition for Change of Name of Julian
Lim
G.R. No. 159966 March 30, 2005
Facts:
On 22 September 2002, petitioner Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented by his
mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition for change
of name and/or cancellation of entry in the Civil
Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Petitioner
sought to drop his middle name and have his
registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang to Julian Lin Wang.
The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to
stay in Singapore for a long time because they will
let him study there together with his sister named
Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in Singapore.
Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden
surname of the mother are not carried in a persons
name, they anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang will be discriminated against because of his
current registered name which carries a middle
name. Julian and his sister might also be asking
whether they are brother and sister since they have
different surnames. Carulasan sounds funny in
Singapores Mandarin language since they do not
have the letter R but if there is, they pronounce it
as L. It is for these reasons that the name of Julian
Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed to
Julian Lin Wang.
The RTC rendered a decision denying the petition.
The trial court found that the reason given for the
change of name sought in the petitionthat is, that
petitioner Julian may be discriminated against when
studies in Singapore because of his middle name
did not fall within the grounds recognized by law.
The trial court ruled that the change sought is merely
for the convenience of the child. Since the State has
an interest in the name of a person, names cannot
be changed to suit the convenience of the bearers.
Under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate
children have the right to bear the surnames of the
father and the mother, and there is no reason why
this right should now be taken from petitioner Julian,
considering that he is still a minor. The trial court
added that when petitioner Julian reaches the age of
133

majority, he could then decide whether he will
change his name by dropping his middle name.
Issue: Whether or not dropping the middle name of
a minor child is contrary to Article 174 of the Family
Code
Held: The touchstone for the grant of a change of
name is that there be proper and reasonable cause
for which the change is sought. To justify a request
for change of name, petitioner must show not only
some proper or compelling reason therefore but also
that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and
official name. Among the grounds for change of
name which have been held valid are: (a) when the
name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change
results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;
(c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when
one has continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of
alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a
Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in
good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f)
when the surname causes embarrassment and there
is no showing that the desired change of name was
for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name
would prejudice public interest.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced
by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is
convenience. However, how such change of name
would make his integration into Singaporean society
easier and convenient is not clearly established.
That the continued use of his middle name would
cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute
proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his
registered complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering
the nebulous foundation on which his petition for
change of name is based, it is best that the matter of
change of his name be left to his judgment and
discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As
he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and
appreciate the value of the change of his name and
granting of the same at this point may just prejudice
him in his rights under our laws.
134) Briones vs. Miguel

G.R. No. 156343 October 18, 2004
Facts:
Petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas
Corpus against respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel
and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of
his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda. Later,
petitioner filed an Amended Petition to include Loreta
P. Miguel, the mother of the minor, as one of the
respondents.
The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin
Pineda is his illegitimate son with respondent Loreta
P. Miguel.
The petitioner further alleges that he caused the
minor child to be brought to the Philippines so that
he could take care of him and send him to school.
That respondents Maricel P. Miguel and Francisca P.
Miguel came to the house of the petitioner in
Caloocan City on the pretext that they were visiting
the minor child and requested that they be allowed
to bring the said child for recreation at the SM
Department store. They promised him that they will
bring him back in the afternoon, to which the
petitioner agreed. However, the respondents did not
bring him back as promised by them. The petitioner
went several times to respondent Maricel P. Miguel
at Tanza, Tuguegarao City but he was informed that
the child is with the latters mother at Batal Heights,
Santiago City. When he went there, respondent
Francisca P. Miguel told him that Michael Kevin
Pineda is with her daughter at Tuguegarao City.
He sought the assistance of the police and the
Department of Social Welfare to locate his son and
to bring him back to him, but all his efforts were
futile. Hence, he was constrained to file a Petition for
Habeas Corpus.
The petitioner prays that the custody of his son
Michael Kevin Pineda be given to him as his
biological father and as he has demonstrated his
capability to support and educate him.
The respondents filed their Comment, in their
Comment, the respondent Loreta P. Miguel denies
the allegation of the petitioner that he was the one
who brought their child to the Philippines and stated
that she was the one who brought him here pursuant
to their agreement. She likewise denies petitioners
allegation that respondents Maricel P. Miguel and
Francisca P. Miguel were the ones who took the
child from the petitioner or the latters parents. She
averred that she was the one who took Michael
Kevin Pineda from the petitioner when she returned
to the Philippines and that the latter readily agreed
and consented.
Respondent Loreta P. Miguel alleges that the
petitioner was deported from Japan under the
assumed name of Renato Juanzon when he was
found to have violated or committed an infraction of
134

the laws of Japan. She further stated that since the
time the petitioner arrived in the Philippines, he has
not been gainfully employed. The custody of the
child was entrusted to petitioners parents while they
were both working in Japan. She added that even
before the custody of the child was given to the
petitioners parents, she has already been living
separately from the petitioner in Japan because the
latter was allegedly maintaining an illicit affair with
another woman until his deportation.
Respondent Loreta P. Miguel prays that the custody
of her minor child be given to her and invokes Article
213, Paragraph 2 of the Family Code and Article 363
of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Issue:
Who Should Have Custody of the Child?
Held: Under the Family Code there are only two
classes of children -- legitimate (and those who, like
the legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate
children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and
born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless
the law itself gives them legitimate status.
Obviously, Michael is a natural ("illegitimate," under
the Family Code) child, as there is nothing in the
records showing that his parents were suffering from
a legal impediment to marry at the time of his birth.
Both acknowledge that Michael is their son. As
earlier explained and pursuant to Article 176,
parental authority over him resides in his mother,
Respondent Loreta, notwithstanding his fathers
recognition of him.
There is thus no question that Respondent Loreta,
being the mother of and having sole parental
authority over the minor, is entitled to have custody
of him. She has the right to keep him in her
company. She cannot be deprived of that right, and
she may not even renounce or transfer it "except in
the cases authorized by law.
Article 213 of the Family Code that, generally, no
child under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother, except when the court finds cause
to order otherwise.
Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the
mothers unfitness to exercise sole parental
authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental
authority and the award of custody to someone else.
In the past, the following grounds have been
considered ample justification to deprive a mother of
custody and parental authority: neglect or
abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the
child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable
disease.
135) de Santos vs. Hon. Angeles and Conchita

Talag de Santos
G.R. No. 105619 December 12, 1995
Facts:
On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos
married Sofia Bona, which union was blessed with a
daughter, herein petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos.
After some time, their relationship became strained
to the breaking point. Thereafter, Antonio fell in love
with a fellow doctor, Conchita Talag, private
respondent herein. Antonio sought a formal
dissolution of his first marriage by obtaining a
divorce decree from a Nevada court in 1949.
Aware that said decree was a worthless scrap of
paper in our jurisdiction which then, as now, did not
recognize divorces, Antonio proceeded to Tokyo,
Japan in 1951 to marry private respondent, with
whom he had been cohabiting since his de facto
separation from Sofia. This union produced eleven
children. On March 30, 1967, Sofia died in
Guatemala. Less than a month later, on April 23,
1967, Antonio and private respondent contracted a
marriage in Tagaytay City celebrated under
Philippine laws. On March 8, 1981, Antonio died
intestate leaving properties with an estimated value
of P15,000,000.00.
On May 15, 1981, private respondent went to court
asking for the issuance of letters of administration in
her favor in connection with the settlement of her
late husband's estate. She alleged, among other
things, that the decedent was survived by twelve
legitimate heirs, namely, herself, their ten surviving
children, and petitioner. There being no opposition,
her petition was granted.
After six years of protracted intestate proceedings,
however, petitioner decided to intervene. Thus, in a
motion she filed she argued that private
respondent's children were illegitimate. This was
challenged by private respondent although the latter
admitted during the hearing that all her children were
born prior to Sofia's death in 1967.
After approval of private respondent's account of her
administration, the court a quo passed upon
petitioner's motion. The court declared private
respondent's ten children legitimated and instituted
and declared them, along with petitioner and private
respondent, as the heirs of Antonio de Santos.
Petitioner sought a reconsideration of said order but
this was denied. Hence, she filed the instant petition
for certiorari on June 16, 1992, contending that since
135

only natural children can be legitimized, the trial
court mistakenly declared as legitimated her half
brothers and sisters.
Issue:
Can natural children by legal fiction be
legitimized?
Held:
Article 269 of the Civil Code expressly
states:
Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated.
Children born outside wedlock of parents who, at the
time of the conception of the former, were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry each other,
are natural.
In other words, a child's parents should not have
been disqualified to marry each other at the time of
conception for him to qualify as a "natural child."
In the case at bench, there is no question that all the
children born to private respondent and deceased
Antonio de Santos were conceived and born when
the latter's valid marriage to petitioner's mother was
still subsisting. That private respondent and the
decedent were married abroad after the latter
obtained in Nevada, U.S.A. a decree of divorce from
his legitimate wife does not change this fact, for a
divorce granted abroad was not recognized in this
jurisdiction at the time. Evidently, the decedent was
aware of this fact, which is why he had to have the
marriage solemnized in Tokyo, outside of the
Philippines. It may be added here that he was
likewise aware of the nullity of the Tokyo marriage
for after his legitimate, though estranged wife died,
he hastily contracted another marriage with private
respondent, this time here in Tagaytay.
136

XV. ADOPTION
136) Republic vs CA and Zenaida Bobiles
G.R. No. 92326 January 24, 1992
Facts:
On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza
Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then
six (6) years old and who had been living with her
family since he was four (4) months old, before the
Regional Trial Court.
The trial court rendered the minor child,
JASON CONDAT, be freed from all legal obligations
of obedience and maintenance with respect to his
natural parents, and be, to all intents and purposes,
the child of the spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida
Bobiles, and the surname of the child be changed to
"Bobiles" which is the surname of the petitioner.
The petition for adoption was filed by private
respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles on February 2, 1988,
when the law applicable was Presidential Decree
No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code. Under
said code, a petition for adoption may be filed by
either of the spouses or by both of them. However,
after the trial court rendered its decision and while
the case was pending on appeal in the Court of
Appeals, Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code,
took effect on August 3, 1988. Under the said new
law, joint adoption by husband and wife is
mandatory.
On the foregoing consideration, petitioner contends
that the petition for adoption should be dismissed
outright for it was filed solely by private respondent
without joining her husband, in violation of Article
185 of the Family Code which requires joint adoption
by the spouses. It argues that the Family Code must
be applied retroactively to the petition filed by Mrs.
Bobiles, as the latter did not acquire a vested right to
adopt Jason Condat by the mere filing of her petition
for adoption.
Issue: Can the Family Code be applied
retroactively to the petition for adoption filed by
Zenaida Bobiles and granting that the Family Code
should not apply retroactively, should the CA have
modified the trial courts decision by granting the
adoption in favor of private respondent only, her
husband not being a petitioner?
Held:
Article 246 of the Family Code provides for
retroactive effect of appropriate relevant provisions
thereof, subject to the qualification that such
retrospective application will not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws.
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and
extent does not depend upon events foreign to the
will of the holder. Vested rights include not only legal
or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand,
but also an exemption from new obligations created
after the right has vested.
Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private
respondent had the right to file a petition for adoption
by herself, without joining her husband therein.
When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition, she was
exercising her explicit and unconditional right under
said law. Upon her filing thereof, her right to file such
petition alone and to have the same proceed to final
adjudication, in accordance with the law in force at
the time, was already vested and cannot be
prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new
law.
When private respondent filed her petition in Special
Proceeding, the trial court acquired jurisdiction there
over in accordance with the governing law.
Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the
established rule is that the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action.
Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named
as one of the petitioners in the petition for adoption
filed by his wife, his affidavit of consent attached to
the petition and expressly made an integral part
thereof, shows that he himself actually joined his
wife in adopting the child. Those declarations, and
his subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court,
are sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Under the
circumstances then obtaining, and by reason of his
foreign residence, he must have yielded to the legal
advice that an affidavit of consent on his part
sufficed to make him a party to the petition. This is
evident from the text of his affidavit. Punctiliousness
in language and pedantry in the formal requirements
should yield to and be eschewed in the higher
considerations of substantial justice. The future of an
innocent child must not be compromised by arbitrary
insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules on
the form of pleadings.
137

137) Cang vs. CA
G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998
Facts:
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie
Clavano who were married on January 27, 1973,
begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3,
1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977, and
Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981.
During the early years of their marriage, the Cang
couple's relationship was undisturbed. However,
Anna Marie learned of her husband's alleged
extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of
the Clavanos. Upon learning of her husband's
alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for
legal separation with alimony pendente lite with the
then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court which
rendered
a
decision
approving
the
joint
manifestation of the Cang spouses providing that
they agreed to live separately and apart or from bed
and board.
Petitioner then left for the United States where he
sought a divorce from Anna Marie before the Second
Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. Said
court issued the divorce decree that also granted
sole custody of the three minor children to Anna
Marie, reserving rights of visitation at all reasonable
times and places to petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner
took an American wife and thus became a
naturalized American citizen. In 1986, he divorced
his American wife and never remarried.
While in the United States, petitioner worked in
Tablante Medical Clinic earning P18,000.00 to
P20,000.00 a month a portion of which was remitted
to the Philippines for his children's expenses and
another, deposited in the bank in the name of his
children.
Meanwhile, on September 25, 1987, private
respondents Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara
Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sisterin-law of Anna Marie, filed Special Proceedings for
the adoption of the three minor Cang children before
the Regional Trial Court. The petition bears the
signature of then 14-year-old Keith signifying
consent to his adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed an
affidavit of consent alleging that her husband had
"evaded his legal obligation to support his children;
that her brothers and sisters including Ronald V.
Clavano, had been helping her in taking care of the
children; that because she would be going to the
United States to attend to a family business, leaving
the children would be a problem and would naturally
hamper her job-seeking venture abroad; and that her
husband had long forfeited his parental rights over

the children.
Upon learning of the petitioner for adoption,
petitioner immediately returned to the Philippines
and filed an opposition thereto, alleging that,
although private respondents Ronald and Maria
Clara Clavano were financially capable of supporting
the children while his finances were "too meager"
compared to theirs, he could not "in conscience,
allow anybody to strip him of his parental authority
over his beloved children."
Pending resolution of the petition for adoption,
petitioner moved to reacquire custody over his
children alleging that Anna Marie had transferred to
the United States thereby leaving custody of their
children to private respondents. The Regional Trial
Court issued an order finding that Anna Marie had, in
effect, relinquished custody over the children and,
therefore, such custody should be transferred to the
father. The court then directed the Clavanos to
deliver custody over the minors to petitioner.
Issue:
Can minor children be legally adopted
without the written consent of a natural parent on the
ground that the latter has abandoned them?
Held:
It is evident that notwithstanding the amendments to
the law, the written consent of the natural parent to
the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity.
The written consent of the natural parent is
indispensable for the validity of the decree of
adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written
consent can be dispensed with if the parent has
abandoned the child or that such parent is insane or
hopelessly intemperate. The court may acquire
jurisdiction over the case even without the written
consent of the parents or one of the parents
provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts
sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance
therewith.
However, in cases where the father opposes the
adoption primarily because his consent thereto was
not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned
his
child
becomes
a
proper
issue
for
determination.The issue of abandonment by the
oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issue that
an adoption court must first confront. Only upon
failure of the oppositor natural father to prove to the
satisfaction of the court that he did not abandon his
child may the petition for adoption be considered on
its merits. In its ordinary sense, the word abandon
means to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce
138

utterly. In reference to abandonment of a child by his
parent, the act of abandonment imports any
conduct of the parent which evinces a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish
all parental claims to the child. It means neglect or
refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of
care and support which parents owe their children.
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioners
conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to forego
all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims
over his children as to constitute abandonment.
Physical estrangement alone, without financial and
moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment.
While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as
he was then in the United States, he was not remiss
in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and
support for his children. He maintained regular
communication with his wife and children through
letters and telephone. He used to send packages by
mail and catered to their whims.
Wherefore, the questioned Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals, as well as the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, are SET ASIDE
thereby denying the petition for adoption of Keith,
Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang,
by the spouse respondents Ronald and Maria Clara
Clavano.
138) In the matter of the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus of a minor Angelie Anne
Cervantes, Nelson Cervantes and Zenaida
Cervantes vs. Gina Carreon Fajardo and
Conrado Fajardo
G.R. No. 79955 January 27, 1989
Facts:
This is a petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus
filed with this Court over the person of the minor
Angelie Anne Cervantes.
The minor was born on 14 February 1987 to
respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon,
who are common-law husband and wife.
Respondents offered the child for adoption to Gina
Carreon's sister and brother-in-law, the herein
petitioners Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson
Cervantes, spouses, who took care and custody of
the child when she was barely two (2) weeks old. An
Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child by
herein petitioners, was also executed by respondent
Gina Carreon
The appropriate petition for adoption was
filed by petitioners over the child before the Regional
Trial Court and rendered a decision granting the

petition. The child was then known as Angelie Anne
Fajardo. The court ordered that the child be freed
from parental authority of her natural parents as well
as from legal obligation and maintenance to them
and that from now on shall be, for all legal intents
and purposes, known as Angelie Anne Cervantes, a
child of petitioners and capable of inheriting their
estate .
Thereafter, adoptive parents, Nelson and Zenaida
Cervantes, received a letter from the respondents
demanding to be paid the amount of P150,000.00,
otherwise, they would get back their child.
Petitioners refused to accede to the demand.
As a result, while petitioners were out at work, the
respondent Gina Carreon took the child from her
yaya at the petitioners' residence on the pretext that
she was instructed to do so by her mother.
Respondent Gina Carreon brought the child to her
house. Petitioners thereupon demanded the return
of the child, but Gina Carreon refused, saying that
she had no desire to give up her child for adoption
and that the affidavit of consent to the adoption she
had executed was not fully explained to her. She
sent word to the petitioners that she will, however,
return the child to the petitioners if she were paid the
amount of P150,000.00.
Issue:
Who has the right to the custody of Angelie
Ann Cervantes?
Held:
In all cases involving the custody, care,
education and property of children, the latter's
welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother
shall be separated from a child under five (5) years
of age, will not apply where the Court finds
compelling reasons to rule otherwise.
In all
controversies regarding the custody of minors, the
foremost consideration is the moral, physical and
social welfare of the child concerned, taking into
account the resources and moral as well as social
standing of the contending parents. Never has this
Court deviated from this criterion.
It is undisputed that respondent Conrado Fajardo is
legally married to a woman other than respondent
Gina Carreon, and his relationship with the latter is a
common-law husband and wife relationship. His
open cohabitation with co-respondent Gina Carreon
will not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere
139

where she can grow and develop into an upright and
moral-minded person. Besides, respondent Gina
Carreon had previously given birth to another child
by another married man with whom she lived for
almost three years but who eventually left her and
vanished. For a minor (like Angelie Anne C.
Cervantes) to grow up with a sister whose father is
not her true father, could also affect the moral
outlook and values of said minor. Upon the other
hand, petitioners who are legally married appear to
be morally, physically, financially, and socially
capable of supporting the minor and giving her a
future better than what the natural mother who is not
only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with
a married man, can most likely give her.
spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a

petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in
Special Proceedings before the then Court of First
Instance. This petition for adoption was grunted on,
18 November 1982, that is, after Adelberto had shot
and killed Jennifer.
Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by

petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of
respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect,
among others, of dissolving the authority vested in
natural parents over the adopted child, except where
the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural
parent of the adopted, in which case, parental
authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly
by both spouses. The adopting parents have the
right to the care and custody of the adopted child
and exercise parental authority and responsibility
over him.
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since

Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his
natural parents, parental authority had not ceased
nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting
of a petition for adoption.
The custody and care of the minor Angelie Anne

Cervantes are hereby granted to petitioners to whom
they properly belong, and respondents are ordered
(if they still have not) to deliver said minor to the
petitioners immediately upon notice hereof.
139) Macario Tamargo, Celso Tamargo and
Aurelia Tamargo vs. CA and Hon. Rubio and
Victor Bunduc and Clara Bunduc
G.R. No.85044 June 3, 1992
Facts:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc,
then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer
Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which
resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint
for damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court
by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting
parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia
Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against
respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc,
Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living
at the time of the tragic incident.
Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc,

Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of the
foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they,
but rather the adopting parents, namely the spouses
Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable
parties to the action since parental authority had
shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the
successful petition for adoption was filed.
The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint,

ruling that respondent natural parents of Adelberto
indeed were not indispensable parties to the action.
Petitioners, then went to the Court of Appeals on a
petition for mandamus and certiorari questioning the
trial court's Decision. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioners had lost
their right to appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not Adelbertos natural parents
are indispensable parties to the action?
Held: This principle of parental liability is a species
of what is frequently designated as vicarious liability,
or the doctrine of "imputed negligence, where a
person is not only liable for torts committed by
himself, but also for torts committed by others with
whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he
is responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a
natural or logical consequence of the duties and
responsibilities of parents their parental authority
which includes the instructing, controlling and
disciplining of the child.
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts
of their minor children living with them, may be seen
to be based upon the parental authority vested by
the Civil Code upon such parents. The civil law
assumes that when an unemancipated child living
with its parents commits a tortious acts, the parents
140

were negligent in the performance of their legal and
natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in
their custody and control. Parental liability is, in other
words, anchored upon parental authority coupled
with presumed parental dereliction in the discharge
of the duties accompanying such authority. The
parental dereliction is, of course, only presumed and
the presumption can be overtuned under Article
2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the parents had
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by
Adelberto with an air rifle occured when parental
authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc
spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto.
It would thus follow that the natural parents who had
then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the
indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
The basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor
child is the relationship existing between the parents
and the minor child living with them and over whom,
the law presumes, the parents exercise supervision
and control.
We do not consider that retroactive effect may be
giver to the decree of adoption so as to impose a
liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time
when adopting parents had no actual or physically
custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect
may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition
for adoption where such is essential to permit the
accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the
adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold
that parental authority had been retroactively lodged
in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with
liability for a tortious act that they could not have
foreseen and which they could not have prevented
(since they were at the time in the United States and
had no physical custody over the child Adelberto)
would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result,
moreover, would be inconsistent with the
philosophical and policy basis underlying the
doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no
presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the
adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have
arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their
control at the time the tort was committed.
140) LAHOM vs. SIBULO
G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003

Facts:
Spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita
Lahom filed in 1971 a petition to adopt Melvin
Sibulo, Isabelita Lahom`s nephew. The petition was
granted in 1972. Hence, the Civil Registrar of Naga
City changed the name "Jose Melvin Sibulo" to
"Jose Melvin Lahom."
However, in 1999, the petitioner filed a petition to
rescind the adoption on the ground of the continuous
refusal of the respondent to change his surname
from Sibulo to Lahom and for his indifference
towards the petitioner by failing to visit her in Naga.
In 1998, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also known
as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect which
deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind
a decree of adoption.
Issue: Whether or not the adoption of respondent
may still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter.
Held: The new law withdrew the right of an adopter
to rescind the adoption decree and gave to the
adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties
created by adoption.
It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552
that herein petitioner filed an action to revoke the
decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the
new law, had already abrogated and repealed the
right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the
Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption.
Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the
Court should now hold that the action for rescission
of the adoption decree, having been initiated by
petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force,
no longer could be pursued.
Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute,
an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the
five-year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of
Court and that the adopter would lose the right to
revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that
period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive
period is a condition that could not fulfill the
requirements of a vested right entitled to protection.
It must also be acknowledged that a person has no
vested right in statutory privileges. While adoption
has often been referred to in the context of a "right,"
the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or
fundamental but rather a right merely created by
statute. It is a privilege that is governed by the
141

state's determination on what it may deem to be for
the best interest and welfare of the child.
when she is subsequently adopted by her natural

father.
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn

from an adopter a consequential right to rescind the
adoption decree even in cases where the adoption
might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it remains,
nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply
the law. Dura lex sed lex would be the hackneyed
truism that those caught in the law have to live with.
It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while
barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can
always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of
certain benefits otherwise accruing to an
undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds
recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an
adopted child his legitime and, by a will and
testament, may freely exclude him from having a
share in the disposable portion of his estate.
Held: We find merit in the petition.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a

quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.
141) IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF
STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
G.R. No. 148311 March 31, 2005
Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law

For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is
the designation by which he is known and called in
the community in which he lives and is best known.
It is defined as the word or combination of words by
which a person is distinguished from other
individuals and, also, as the label or appellation
which he bears for the convenience of the world at
large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing
with him. It is both of personal as well as public
interest that every person must have a name.
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the
given or proper name and (2) the surname or
family name. The given or proper name is that
which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism,
to distinguish him from other individuals. The
surname or family name is that which identifies the
family to which he belongs and is continued from
parent to child. The given name may be freely
selected by the parents for the child, but the
surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.
Facts:
Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt
his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia alleging that Stephanie has been using her
mother's middle name and surname and that he is
now a widower and qualified to be her adopting
parent. He prayed that Stephanie's middle name
Astorga be changed to 'Garcia, her mother's
surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed
to Catindig, his surname
.
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of Middle Name '
The trial court granted the adoption and ruled that

the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY
CATINDIG.
The middle name or the mother's surname is only

considered in Article 375(1), quoted above, in case
there is identity of names and surnames between
ascendants and descendants, in which case, the
middle name or the mother's surname shall be
added.
The petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or

reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be
allowed to use the surname of her natural mother
(GARCIA) as her middle name but was denied by
the trial court ruling
that there is no law or
jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the
surname of his biological mother as his middle
name.
Issue: Whether or not an illegitimate child may use
the surname of her mother as her middle name
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no

law regulating the use of a middle name. Even
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as 'An Act
Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname
Of Their Father, is silent as to what middle name a
child may use.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what

middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365 of
the Civil Code merely provides that 'an adopted
child shall bear the surname of the adopter. Also,
Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the
legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the
matter, thus:
"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be
deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters
142

and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and
obligations arising from the relationship of parent
and child, including the right of the adopted to use
the surname of the adopters;
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:

In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of
laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail.
The Underlying Intent of Adoption Is In Favor of

the Adopted Child '
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an

illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like
Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother's
surname, we find no reason why she should not be
allowed to do so.
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is

deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter for all
intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the
Family Code and Section 17 Article V of RA 8552.
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her
adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to
all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child
without discrimination of any kind, including the
right to bear the surname of her father and her
mother, as discussed above.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The

assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in the sense
that Stephanie should be allowed to use her
mother's surname 'GARCIA as her middle name.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties,

Stephanie's continued use of her mother's surname
(Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her
maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3)
of the Family Code and Section 18, Article V of RA
8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee
remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent.
Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her
hereditary rights from her natural mother in the
future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her
mother are living together in the house built by
petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose,
Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their
needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her
mother and father. She calls them 'Mama and Papa.
Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to
allow Stephanie to use her mother's surname as her
middle name will not only sustain her continued
loving relationship with her mother but will also
eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of Adoption Statutes In
Favor Of Adoption
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being
humane and salutary, should be liberally construed
to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption.
The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of
primary and paramount consideration, hence, every
reasonable intendment should be sustained to
promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.
143

XVI. PARENTAL AUTHORITY
142) DAVID vs. CA
G.R. No. 111180 November 16, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as
secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a
businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is
a married man and the father of four children, all
grown-up. After a while, the relationship between
petitioner and private respondent developed into an
intimate one, as a result of which a son, Christopher
J., was born on March 9, 1985 to them. Christopher
J. was followed by two more children, both girls,
namely Christine and Cathy Mae.
The relationship became known to private
respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher J. to
Villar's house in Angeles City and introduced him to
Villar's legal wife. After this, the children of Daisie
were freely brought by Villar to his house as they
were eventually accepted by his legal family. In the
summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow
Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with his
family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip,
Villar refused to give back the child. Villar said he
had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family
Academy for the next school year. Hence, Daisie
filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of
Christopher J.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the
petitioner ruling that the custody of the child shall be
given to the mother and directing respondent to give
a temporary support of P 3,000.00 a month. The
Court of Appeals reversed the RTC`s judgment
holding that habeas corpus case was not the proper
remedy in that the latter contemplate a situation
where the parents are married to each other but are
separated. Moreover, it ruled that in an adulterous
relationship, the question of custody shall be brought
in a case singularly filed for the purpose and that the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the other
minor children. It ruled that it is for the best interest
of Christopher J. That he should temporarily remain
under the custody of respondent until the issue on
custody and support shall have been determined in
a proper case. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the custody of the child shall be
given to the child.
Held: Rule 102, 1 of the Rules of Court provides

that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention by which
any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled thereto."
It is indeed true, as the Court of Appeals observed,
that the determination of the right to the custody of
minor children is relevant in cases where the
parents, who are married to each other, are for some
reason separated from each other. It does not follow,
however, that it cannot arise in any other situation.
In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate
child since at the time of his conception, his father,
private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to
another woman other than the child's mother. As
such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code,
Christopher J. is under the parental authority of his
mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a
consequence of such authority, is entitled to have
custody of him. Since, admittedly, petitioner has
been deprived of her rightful custody of her child by
private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the
writ of habeas corpus.
The fact that private respondent has recognized the
minor child may be a ground for ordering him to give
support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of
the child. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no
child under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise."
Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off a
reason for depriving petitioner of the custody of her
children, especially considering that she has been
able to rear and support them on her own since they
were born. Petitioner is a market vendor earning
from P2,000 to P3,000 per month in 1993 when the
RTC decision was rendered. She augments her
income by working as secretary at the Computer
System Specialist, Inc. earning a monthly income of
P4,500.00. She has an arrangement with her
employer so that she can personally attend to her
children. She works up to 8:00 o'clock in the evening
to make up for time lost during the day. That she
receives help from her parents and sister for the
support of the three children is not a point against
her. Cooperation, compassion, love and concern for
every member of the family are characteristics of the
close family ties that bind the Filipino family and
have made it what it is.
Although the question of support is proper in a
proceeding for that purpose, the grant of support in
144

this case is justified by the fact that private
respondent has expressed willingness to support the
minor child. The order for payment of allowance
need not be conditioned on the grant to him of
custody of the child.
In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out,
Christopher J., being less than seven years of age at
least at the time the case was decided by the RTC,
cannot be taken from the mother's custody. Even
now that the child is over seven years of age, the
mother's custody over him will have to be upheld
because
the
child
categorically
expressed
preference to live with his mother. Under Art. 213 of
the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice of
the child over seven years of age, unless the parent
chosen is unfit" and here it has not been shown that
the mother is in any way unfit to have custody of her
child. Indeed, if private respondent loves his child,
he should not condition the grant of support for him
on the award of his custody to him (private
respondent).
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals
is REVERSED and private respondent is ORDERED
to deliver the minor Christopher J. T. David to the
custody of his mother, the herein petitioner, and to
give him temporary support in the amount of
P3,000.00, pending the fixing of the amount of
support in an appropriate action.
143) Libi vs IAC
G.R. No. 70890 September 18, 1992
Facts:
Respondent spouses are the legitimate
parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who was an 18-yearold first year commerce student of the University of
San Carlos, Cebu City while petitioners are the
parents of Wendell Libi who was then a minor
between 18 and 19 years of age living with his
parents.
Julie Anne Goting and Wendell Libi were
sweethearts until after two years when Julie Ann
broke up with Wendell after she supposedly found
him to be sadistic and irresponsible. During the first
and second weeks of their break up, Wendell kept
pestering Julie Ann with demands of reconciliation
but the latter persited with her refusal prompting the
former to resort to threats against her. Hence, Julie
Anne stayed at the house of her bestfriend to avoid
Wendell. Julie Ann and Wendell died each from a
single gunshot wound inflicted with the sme firearm,
a revolver licensed in the name of petitioner

Cresencio Libi which was recovered from the scene
of the crime inside the residence of private
respondents.
Private respondent submitted that Wendell
caused their daughter`s death by shooting her with
the firearm and then turning the gun on himself to
commit suicide. Petitioner`s, however contended
that an unknown third person, whom Wendell may
have displeased or antagonized by reason of his
work as narcotics informer must have caused their
death.
Julie Ann`s parents filed a case to recover civil
damages arising from the vicarious liability of
Wendell`s parents under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners are liable
vicarious liability.
for
Held: In imposing sanctions for the so-called

vicarious liability of petitioners, respondent court
cites Fuella cs Callado, et al. Which supposedly
holds that the subsidiary liability of parents for
damages caused by their minor children imposed
by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers
obligation arising from both quasi-delicts and
criminal offenses, followed by an extended
quotation ostensibly from teh same case explaining
why under Article 2180 of the Civil Code and Article
101 of the Revised Penal Code parents should
assume subsidiary liability for the damage cause by
their minor children. Now, we do not have any
objection to the doctrinal rule holding the parents
liable, but the categorization of their liability being
subsidiary, and not primary, in nature requires a hard
second look considering previous decisions of this
court on the matter which warrant comparative
analysis. Our concern stems from our readings that
if the liability of the parents for crimes or quasidelict of their minors is subsidiary, then the parents
can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on
the defense that they acted with diligence of a good
father of the family to prevent damages. On the
other hand, if such liability imputed to the parents is
considered direct and primary, that diligence could
constitute a valid and substantial defense.
We believe that the civil liability of the parents for
quasi-delicts of their minor children is primary and
not subsidiary. In fact, if we apply Article 2180 of the
Civil Code which provides for solidary liability of joint
tortfeasors, the persons responsible for the act or
omission , in this case the minor and the father , in
145

cas of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
solidary liable.
that she spent a lot of money on long distance

telephone calls to keep in constant touch with her
children.
Under the foregoing rule, we hereby rule that the

parents are and should be held primarily liable for
the civil liability arising from criminal offenses
committed by theri minor children under their legal
authority or control, or who live in their company,
unless it is proven that the former acted with the
diligence of a good father of the family to prevent
such damages.
Reynaldo brought his children home to the

Philippines, but because his assignment in
Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back
by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his
children with his sister, co-petitioner Guillerma Layug
and her family.
In the case at bar, whether the death of hapless Julie

Ann Gotiong was caused by a felony or a quasidelict committed by Wendel Libi, respondent court
did not err in holding petitioner liable for damages
arising therefrom. Subject to the preceding
modifications of the premises relied upon by it
therefor and on the bases of the legal imperatives
herein explained, we conjoin with its findings that
said petitioners failed to duly exercise the requisite
diligentissimi patris familias to prevent such
damages.
Teresita claims that she did not immediately follow

her children because Reynaldo filed a criminal case
for bigamy against her and she was afraid of being
arrested. Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to
the Philippines and filed the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain
custody over the children.
The RTC dismissed the petition for habeas corpus
suspendeding Teresita's parental authority over
Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to
have sole parental authority over them but with
rights of visitation. The Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court's decision. Hence, this petition.
144) Espiritu vs.CA

G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the

custody of the two children.
Facts:
Held: In ascertaining the welfare and best interests

of the child, courts are mandated by the Family
Code to take into account all relevant
considerations. If a child is under seven years of
age, the law presumes that the mother is the best
custodian. The presumption is strong but it is not
conclusive. It can be overcome by "compelling
reasons". If a child is over seven, his choice is
paramount but, again, the court is not bound by that
choice. In its discretion, the court may find the
chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other
parent, or even to a third party as it deems fit under
the circumstances.
In the present case, both Rosalind and Reginald are
now over seven years of age. Rosalind celebrated
her seventh birthday on August 16, 1993 while
Reginald reached the same age on January 12,
1995. Both are studying in reputable schools and
appear to be fairly intelligent children, quite capable
of thoughtfully determining the parent with whom
they would want to live. Once the choice has been
made, the burden returns to the court to investigate
if the parent thus chosen is unfit to assume parental
authority and custodial responsibility.
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent

Teresita Masauding first met sometime in 1976 in
Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed by the
National Steel Corporation and Teresita was
employed as a nurse in a local hospital. In 1977,
Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as a
nurse. She was able to acquire immigrant status
sometime later. In 1984, Reynaldo was sent by his
employer, the National Steel Corporation, to
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and
Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a
common law relationship of husband and wife.
Subsequently, Rosalind Therese was born. While
they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines,
Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their
return to the U.S.A., Reginald Vince was born.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they
decided to separate sometime in 1990. Teresita
blamed Reynaldo for the break-up, stating he was
always nagging her about money matters. Reynaldo,
on the other hand, contended that Teresita was a
spendthrift, buying expensive jewelry and antique
furniture instead of attending to household
expenses. Teresita left Reynaldo and the children
and went back to California. She claims, however,
We are inclined to sustain the findings and

conclusions of the regional trial court because it
146

gave greater attention to the choice of Rosalind and
considered in detail all the relevant factors bearing
on the issue of custody.
When she was a little over 5 years old, Rosalind was
referred to a child psychologist, Rita Flores
Macabulos, to determine the effects of uprooting her
from the Assumption College where she was
studying. Four different tests were administered. The
results of the tests are quite revealing. The
responses of Rosalind about her mother were very
negative causing the psychologist to delve deeper
into the child's anxiety. Among the things revealed by
Rosalind was an incident where she saw her mother
hugging and kissing a "bad" man who lived in their
house and worked for her father. Rosalind refused to
talk to her mother even on the telephone. She
tended to be emotionally emblazed because of
constant fears that she may have to leave school
and her aunt's family to go back to the United States
to live with her mother.
At about the same time, a social welfare case study
was conducted for the purpose of securing the travel
clearance required before minors may go abroad.
Social Welfare Officer Emma D. Estrada Lopez,
stated that the child Rosalind refused to go back to
the United States and be reunited with her mother.
She felt unloved and uncared for. Rosalind was
more attached to her Yaya who did everything for
her and Reginald. The child was found suffering
from emotional shock caused by her mother's
infidelity.
Respondent Teresita, for her part, argues that the 7year age reference in the law applies to the date
when the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is filed,
not to the date when a decision is rendered. This
argument is flawed. Considerations involving the
choice made by a child must be ascertained at the
time that either parent is given custody over the
child. The matter of custody is not permanent and
unalterable.
Then too, it must be noted that both Rosalind and
Reginald are now over 7 years of age. They
understand the difference between right and wrong,
ethical behavior and deviant immorality. Their best
interests would be better served in an environment
characterized by emotional stability and a certain
degree of material sufficiency. There is nothing in the
records to show that Reynaldo is an "unfit" person
under Article 213 of the Family Code.
Teresita does not deny that she was legally married
to Roberto Lustado on December 17, 1984 in
California. Less than a year later, she had already
driven across the continental United States to

commence living with another man, petitioner
Reynaldo, in Pittsburgh. The two were married on
October 7, 1987. Of course, to dilute this
disadvantage on her part, this matter of her having
contracted a bigamous marriage later with Reynaldo,
Teresita tried to picture Reynaldo as a rapist,
alleging further that she told Reynaldo about her
marriage to Lustado on the occasion when she was
raped by Reynaldo. Expectedly, Judge Harriet
Demetriou of the Pasig RTC lent no weight to such
tale. And even if this story were given credence, it
adds to and not subtracts from the conviction of this
Court about Teresita's values. Rape is an insidious
crime against privacy.
The argument that moral laxity or the habit of flirting
from one man to another does not fall under
"compelling reasons" is neither meritorious nor
applicable in this case. Not only are the children over
seven years old and their clear choice is the father,
but the illicit or immoral activities of the mother had
already caused emotional disturbances, personality
conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values, at
least in Rosalind. This is not to mention her
conviction for the crime of bigamy, which from the
records appears to have become final.
The law is more than satisfied by the judgment of the
trial court. The children are now both over seven
years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they
prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all
indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting
the two requirements found in the first paragraph of
Article 213 of the Family Code. The presumption
under the second paragraph of said article no longer
applies as the children are over seven years.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and
set aside, and the decision of Branch 96 of the
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial
Region stationed in Quezon City and presided over
by the Honorable Lucas P. Bersamin in its Civil Case
No. Q-92-14206 awarding custody of the minors
Rosalind and Reginald Espiritu to their father,
Reynaldo Espiritu, is reinstated. No special
pronouncement is made as to costs.
145) SANTOS vs. CA

G.R. No. 113054 March 16, 1995
Facts:
147

Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army
lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession,
were married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget
only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. From the time the
boy was released from the hospital until sometime
thereafter, he had been in the care and custody of
his maternal grandparents, private respondents
Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
Petitioner and wife Julia agreed to place Leouel Jr. in
the temporary custody of the latter's parents, the
respondent spouses Bedia. The latter alleged that
they paid for all the hospital bills, as well as the
subsequent support of the boy because petitioner
could not afford to do so. Julia Bedia-Santos left for
the U.S.A. in 1988 to work. Petitioner alleged that he
is not aware of her whereabouts and his efforts to
locate her in the United States proved futile. PR`s
claim that although abroad, their daughter Julia had
been sending financial support to them for her son.
PR`s contended that petitioner abducted the boy
when petitioner along with his two brothers visited
the Bedia household, where three-year old Leouel
Jr. was staying.
The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care,
Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos
Jr., before the RTC which was granted on the same
day and was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not the custody of minor Leouel Santos,
Jr. shall be awarded to the petitioner.
Held: The father and mother, being the natural
guardians of unemancipated children, are dutybound and entitled to keep them in their custody and
company.The child's welfare is always the
paramount consideration in all questions concerning
his care and custody.
The law vests on the father and mother joint parental
authority over the persons of their common children.
In case of absence or death of either parent, the
parent present shall continue exercising parental
authority. Only in case of the parents' death,
absence or unsuitability may substitute parental
authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent.
The situation obtaining in the case at bench is one
where the mother of the minor Santos, Jr., is working
in the United States while the father, petitioner
Santos, Sr., is present. Not only are they physically
apart but are also emotionally separated. There has
been no decree of legal separation and petitioner's
attempt to obtain an annulment of the marriage on

the ground of psychological incapacity of his wife
has failed.
Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court
and the appellate court to award custody of his
minor son to his parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses
on the ground that under Art. 214 of the Family
Code, substitute parental authority of the
grandparents is proper only when both parents are
dead, absent or unsuitable. Petitioner's unfitness,
according to him, has not been successfully shown
by private respondents.
We find the aforementioned considerations
insufficient to defeat petitioner's parental authority
and the concomitant right to have custody over the
minor Leouel Santos, Jr., particularly since he has
not been shown to be an unsuitable and unfit parent.
Private respondents' demonstrated love and
affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate
father is still preferred over the grandparents. The
latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly
because there is no proof that at the present time,
petitioner is in no position to support the boy. The
fact that he was unable to provide financial support
for his minor son from birth up to over three years
when he took the boy from his in-laws without
permission, should not be sufficient reason to strip
him of his permanent right to the child's custody.
While petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable
and merits only the severest criticism, it cannot be
construed as abandonment. His appeal of the
unfavorable decision against him and his efforts to
keep his only child in his custody may be regarded
as serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To
award him custody would help enhance the bond
between parent and son. It would also give the
father a chance to prove his love for his son and for
the son to experience the warmth and support which
a father can give.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated
April 30, 1992 as well as its Resolution dated
November 13, 1992 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Custody over the minor Leouel Santos
Jr. is awarded to his legitimate father, herein
petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr.
146) NERISSA Z. PEREZ vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS (Ninth Division) and RAY C. PEREZ
255 SCRA 661
ROMERO, J.
148

FACTS:
Private respondent Ray Perez is a doctor of
medicine practicing in Cebu while petitioner Nerissa,
his wife is a registered nurse. They were married on
December 6, 1986. After six miscarriages, two
operations and a high-risk pregnancy, petitioner
finally gave birth to Ray II in New York on July 20,
1992. Petitioner who began work in the US in
October 1988, used part of her earnings to build a
model house in Mandaue City, Cebu. She also
sought medical attention for her successive
miscarriages in New York. In February 1992,
petitioner became a resident alien. Private
respondent stayed with her in the US twice and took
care of her when she became pregnant. Unlike his
wife, however, he had only a tourist visa and was not
employed. In January 1993, the couple and their
baby arrived in Cebu. After a few weeks, only
Nerissa returned to the US. When Nerissa came
home a few days before Ray IIs first birthday, the
couple was no longer on good terms. Petitioner did
not want to live near her in-laws and rely solely on
her husbands meager income of P 5,000.00. She
longed to be with her only child but her husband was
keeping him away from her. On the other hand, Ray
wanted to stay here , where he could raise his son
even as he practiced his profession. Petitioner was
forced to move to her parents home in Mandaue.
Nerissa filed a petition for Habeas Corpus asking
respondent to surrender the custody of their son to
her.
The court a quo issued an Order awarding custody
of the one year old child to his mother, citing
paragraph 2, of Art. 213 of the Family Code which
provides that no child under seven years of age shall
be separated from the mother, unless the Court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise. On appeal,
the CA reversed the trial courts order and awarded
custody of the boy to his father. Holding that granting
custody to the boys father would be for the
childs best interest and welfare.
ISSUE:
As between father and mother, who should have
rightful custody of a child who bears in his person
both their genes?
HELD:
When the parents of the child are separated, Article
213 of the Family Code is the applicable law.
Since the Code does not qualify the word
separation to mean legal separation decreed by a
court, couples who are separated in fact, such
petitioner and private respondent, are covered within

its terms.
The Revised Rules of Court also contains a similar
provision . Rule 99, Section 6 (Adoption and
Custody of Minors). The provisions of law mandate
that a child under 7 years of age shall not be
separated from his mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise. The use of
the word shall in Article 213 of the Family Code
and Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of
Court connotes a mandatory character.
The general rule that a child under 7 years of age
shall not be separated from his mother finds its
raison d' etre in the basic need of a child for his
mothers loving care. Only the most compelling
reasons shall justify the courts awarding the custody
of such a child to someone other than his mother,
such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental
authority. In the past the following grounds have
been considered ample justification to deprive a
mother of custody and parental authority: neglect,
abandonment, unemployment and immorality,
habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment
of the child, insanity and being sick with a
communicable disease. It has long been settled that
in custody cases, the foremost consideration is
always the welfare and best interest of the child.
(Gutierrez, Alvin F.)
147) VANCIL vs. HELEN G. BELMES

G.R. No. 132223
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
FACTS:
Bonifacia Vancil is the mom of Reeder C. Vancil, a
US Navy serviceman who died in US in 1986.
Reeder had a common-law wife, Helen Belmes, with
whom he had two kids, Valerie & Vincent. Bonifacia
instituted guardianship proceedings over person &
properties of Valerie (6 yrs old) & Vincent (2 yrs old).
Estate consists of proceeds from their dads pension
benefits worth P100k. RTC Cebu appointed
Bonifacia as legal & judicial guardian.
Natural mother Helen opposed claiming she already
filed a similar petition for guardianship. She later on
filed a motion for Removal of Guardian
&Appointment of New One claiming that shes the
natural mom in actual custody of & exercising
parental authority over children. She further asserted
that Bonifacia was a resident of Colorado, USA &
that shes a naturalized US citizen. Regional Trial
Court rejected & denied motion.
149

The Court of Appeals reversed. FC 225: parents,
father or in his absence, mother are considered
as natural guardian of minor children. Revised ROC
Rule 93 Sec. 7 confirms designation of parents
as ipso facto guardian of their minor kids w/o need of
court appointment & such can only be transferred to
another person for a good reason. CA found no
reason why biological mom should be deprived of
her legal right. Affirming RTC would abdicate &
violate the very basic fundamental tenets in civil law
& the constitution on family solidarity.
Bonifacia
claims that she should be appointed as the guardian
based on the
undisputed proof that Helens livein partner has raped Valerie seven times while under
Helens custody.
VITUG, CONCURRING: Law & jurisprudence

recognizes deep ties that bind parent & child.
Parents are placed 1st in rank in matters of parental
authority. Childs legitimacy doesnt affect the order
of priority in exercise of parental authority. FC176
states that illegitimate child shall be under parental
authority of mom who should be entitled for the
childs custody.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Bonifacia should be appointed as the
guardian
FACTS:
In February 1995, defendant-appellant St Marys
Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment
drive for the SY 1995-96.Part of the campaign was
the visitation of schools from where prospective
enrollees were studying. A student of that school and
part of the campaign, Sherwin Carpitanos along
w/other high school students were riding in a
Mitsubishi jeep driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year
old student of the same school. En route to Larayan
Elem School, it was alleged that minor James drove
the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the
jeep turned turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a
result of the injuries he sustained from the accident.
The Regional Trial Court held St Marys liable for
indemnification for loss of Sherwins life, actual
damages for burial and so-related expenses,
attorneys fees and moral damages. The Court of
Appeals affirmed decision but absolved from any
liability the driver-minor James and jeeps owner
Vivencio Villanueva. St. Marys appealed. The Court
of Appeals reduced actual damages to PhP25K but
affirmed the rest of its previous decision. School filed
Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. Hence,
this appeal.
HELD:
No. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The case is
moot. Valerie since already turned 18 on Sept. 2,
1998. Only thing in dispute is guardianship of
Vincent. Art. 211 (FC): Father & mother shall jointly
exercise parental authority over their common
children. Fathers decision shall prevail in cases of
disagreement unless theres a judicial order to the
contrary. Thus, Helen, being the natural mom of
Vincent has the natural & legal right to his custody.
Such right is inherent & not created by
state/decision of courts but derives from nature of
parental relationship (Sagala-Eslao vs. CA). Art. 214
(FC) allows substitute parental authority of surviving
grandparent only in case of death, absence or
unsuitability of parents. Helen is very much alive &
has continuously exercised parental authority over
Vincent. Helens unfitness was only asserted Valerie
& since shes already of major age, such cannot be
appreciated anymore. Even if Helen were unfit,
Bonifacia still wont qualify considering that shes a
US citizen & resident. She wont be able to perform
the responsibilities &obligations required of a
guardian. Most probably shell just delegate those
duties to another person who might not be qualified.
Shes been out of the country since 1987 and
considering that shes old & was previously
convicted of libel, its not likely that shell come back
here to fulfill her duties. Besides, only2 yrs are left
for her to exercise guardianship over child. True that
law does not require courts to only appoint residents
as guardians but court should not appoint guardians
who are not within our courts jurisdiction for it will be
difficult to protect the wards in such instances.
148) ST. MARYS ACADEMY vs.

CARPITANOS
G.R. No. 143363
PARDO, J.
WILLIAM
ISSUES:
1.
holding St. Marys liable for said death
2.
affirming the award of moral damages against the
school
HELD:1. Yes.CA held school liable under Arts 218 &
219 FC, pointing out that petitioner was negligent in
allowing a minor to drive in the campaign to visit
public schools to solicit enrollment. School was also
liable in not having a teacher accompany the minor
150

students in the jeep. However, for petitioner to be
liable, it must be shown that the act or omission
considered as negligent was the proximate cause of
the injury caused because the negligence, must
have a causal connection to the accident.
But respondent-spouses Daniel and Villanueva
admitted that the immediate cause of the accident
was not the negligence of the school or the reckless
driving of James Daniel II, but the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep. This was confirmed
by the testimony of the traffic investigator who
instituted a report of the accident. Hence, reliance on
Art 219 FC that those given the authority and
responsibility under Art 218 shall be principally and
solidarily liable for damages caused by acts
oromissions of the unemancipated minor was
unfounded. Liability, whether caused by the
negligence of the minor-driver or mechanical
detachment of the jeeps steering wheel guide, must
be pinned on the minors parents primarily. The
negligence of St Marys was only a remote cause of
the
accident, an event that the school had no control
over.
2. Yes. Incidentally, there was no question that the
registered owner of the vehicle was respondent
Villanueva for he even admitted this fact. The Court
has held that the registered owner of any vehicle,
even if not used for public service, would primarily
be responsible to the public or to 3rd persons for
injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being
driven on the highways or streets. It is not the
schools but the registered owned of the vehicle who
shall be held responsible for damages for the death
of Sherwin Carpitanos. Judgment reversed. Case
remanded to TC for determination of liability of
defendants excluding St Marys.
149) LACSON vs. LACSON
G.R. No. 150644
GARCIA, J.:
FACTS:
The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa
Daban Lacson are legitimate daughters of petitioner
Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson.
Maowee was born on December 4, 1974, while
Maonaa, a little less than a year later. Not long after
the birth of Maonaa, petitioner left the conjugal home
in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and
children to seek, apparently for financial reason,
shelter somewhere else. For a month, they stayed
with Leas mother-in-law, Alicia Lacson, then with her

(Leas) mother and then with her brother Noel
Daban. After some time, they rented an apartment
only to return later to the house of Leas mother. As
the trial court aptly observed, the sisters and their
mother, from 1976 to 1994, or for a period of
eighteen (18) years, shuttled from one dwelling
place to another not their own. It appears that from
the start of their estrangement, Lea did not badger
her husband Edward for support, relying initially on
his commitment memorialized in a note dated
December 10, 1975 to give support to his daughters.
As things turned out, however, Edward reneged on
his promise of support, despite Leas efforts towards
having him fulfill the same. Lea would admit, though,
that Edward occasionally gave their children meager
amounts for school expenses. Through the years
and up to the middle part of 1992, Edwards mother,
Alicia Lacson, also gave small amounts to help in
the schooling of Maowee and Maonaa, both of
whom eventually took up nursing at St. Pauls
College in Iloilo City. In the early part of 1995 when
Lea, in behalf of her two daughters, filed a complaint
against Edward for support before the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33, Maowee was about to
graduate.
In that complaint dated January 30, 1995, as
amended, docketed as Civil Case No. 22185,
Maowee and Maonaa, thru their mother, averred that
their father Edward, despite being gainfully
employed and owning several pieces of valuable
lands, has not provided them support since 1976.
They also alleged that, owing to years of Edwards
failure and neglect, their mother had, from time to
time, borrowed money from her brother Noel Daban.
As she would later testify, Lea had received from
Noel, by way of a loan, as much as P400,000.00
to P600,000.00. As applied for and after due
hearing, the trial court granted the sisters Maowee
and Maonaa support pendente lite at P12,000.00 per
month, subject to the schedule of payment and other
conditions set forth in the courts corresponding
order of May 13, 1996. Following trial, the RTC
rendered on June 26, 1997 judgment finding for the
plaintiff sisters, as represented by their mother. In
that judgment, the trial court, following an elaborate
formula set forth therein, ordered their defendant
father Edward to pay them a specific sum which
represented 216 months, or 18 years, of support in
arrears.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in the
grant of support in arrears from 1976 to 1994
151

HELD:
The Court finds no adequate reason to disturb the
factual determination of the CA confirmatory of that
of the trial court respecting the demand Lea made
on the petitioner to secure support for the
respondents. As a matter of long and sound
appellate practice, factual findings of the CA are
accorded respect, if not finality, save for the most
compelling and cogent reasons. Not one of the wellrecognized exceptions to this rule on conclusiveness
of factual findings appear to obtain in this case.
Accordingly, the Court cannot grant the petitioners
plea for a review of the CAs findings bearing on the
actuality that, as basis for an award of support in
arrears, an extrajudicial demand for support had
been made on the petitioner as evidenced by the
December 10, 1975 note adverted to. Lest it be
overlooked, the jurisdiction of the Court in a petition
for review, as here, is generally limited to correction
of errors of law. Complementing that postulate is the
rule that the Court is not bound to analyze and weigh
all over again the evidence already considered in the
proceedings below, except when, as earlier
indicated, compelling reasons demand a review of
the factual conclusions drawn from such evidence.
152

CASES IN PROERTY
150) LEUNG YEE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. FRANK
L. STRONG MACHINERY COMPANY and J. G.
WILLIAMSON, defendants-appellees
G.R. No. L-11658
CARSON, J.
FACTS:
The "Compaia Agricola Filipina" bought ricecleaning machinery from the machinery company,
and executed a chattel mortgage thereon to secure
payment of the purchase price. It included in the
mortgage deed the building of strong materials in
which the machinery was installed, without any
reference to the land on which it stood. The
indebtedness secured by this instrument not having
been paid when it fell due, the mortgaged property
was sold by the sheriff, in pursuance of the terms of
the mortgage instrument, and was bought in by the
machinery company. The mortgage was registered
in the chattel mortgage registry, and the sale of the
property to the machinery company in satisfaction of
the mortgage was annotated in the same registry on
29 December 1913. On 14 January 1914, the
"Compaia Agricola Filipina" executed a deed of
sale of the land upon which the building stood to the
machinery company, but this deed of sale, although
executed in a public document, was not registered
and made no reference to the building erected on
the land and would appear to have been executed
for the purpose of curing any defects which might be
found to exist in the machinery company's title to the
building under the sheriff's certificate of sale. The
machinery company went into possession of the
building at or about the time when this sale took
place, that is to say, the month of December 1913,
and it has continued in possession ever since. At or
about the time when the chattel mortgage was
executed in favor of the machinery company, the
"Compaia Agricola Filipina" executed another
mortgage to Leung Yee upon the building, separate
and apart from the land on which it stood, to secure
payment of the balance of its indebtedness to Leung
Yee under a contract for the construction of the
building. Upon the failure of the mortgagor to pay the
amount of the indebtedness secured by the
mortgage, Leung Yee secured judgment for that
amount, levied execution upon the building, bought it
in at the sheriff's sale on or about the 18 December
1914, and had the sheriff's certificate of sale duly
registered in the land registry of the Province of
Cavite. At the time when the execution was levied
upon the building, the machinery company, which
was in possession, filed with the sheriff a sworn
statement setting up its claim of title and demanding

the release of the property from the levy. The Court
gave judgment in favor of the machinery company,
relying upon Article 1473 and the fact that the
company had its title to the building registered prior
to the date of the registry of plaintiffs certificate.
Hence, the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiff to recover possession of
the building from the machinery company
HELD:
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment with costs
against the appellant. Building separate from land
does not affect character as real property; Registry
of chattel mortgage does not affect character of the
building and the machineries installed therein. The
Chattel Mortgage Law contemplates and makes
provision for mortgages of personal property; and
the sole purpose and object of the chattel mortgage
registry is to provide for the registry of "Chattel
mortgages," mortgages of personal property
executed in the manner and form prescribed in the
statute. The building of strong materials in which the
machinery was installed was real property, and the
mere fact that the parties seem to have dealt with it
separate and apart from the land on which it stood in
no wise changed its character as real property. It
follows that neither the original registry in the chattel
mortgage registry of the instrument purporting to be
a chattel mortgage of the building and the machinery
installed therein, nor the annotation in that registry of
the sale of the mortgaged property, had any effect
whatever so far as the building was concerned.
Possession before sheriffs sale, not Article 1473 (on
good faith), controlling as to ownership of property.
The ruling cannot be sustained on the ground of
Article 1473, second paragraph, but on the ground
that the agreed statement of facts discloses that
neither the purchase of the building by plaintiff nor
his inscription of the sheriff's certificate of sale in his
favor was made in good faith, and that the
machinery company must be held to be the owner of
the property under the third paragraph of the above
cited article of the code, it appearing that the
company first took possession of the property; and
further, that the building and the land were sold to
the machinery company long prior to the date of the
sheriff's sale to the plaintiff. (Gutierrez, Alvin F.)
153

151)
DEVELOPMENT
BANK
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT
OF
APPEALS, MYLO O. QUINTO and JESUSA
CHRISTINE S. CHUPUICO, respondent.
G.R. No. 109946
BELLOSILLO, J.
virtue of the foreclosure and subsequent sale at

public auction. Resultantly, the trial court declared
the following as null and void. Petitioner then
appealed to the Court of Appeals which likewise
ruled in favor of respondents, hence the instant
petition.
FACTS:
Development Bank of the Philippines filed this
petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision
of the Court of Appeals holding that the mortgages in
favor of the bank were void and ineffectual because
when constituted the mortgagors, who were merely
applicants for free patent of the property mortgaged,
were not the owners thereof in fee simple and
therefore could not validly encumber the same.
Petitioner granted a loan of P94,000.00 to the
spouses Santiago Olidiana and Oliva Olidiana. To
secure the loan the Olidiana spouses executed a
real estate mortgage on several properties. At the
time of the mortgage the property was still the
subject of a Free Patent application filed by the
Olidianas with the Bureau of Lands but registered
under their name in the Office of the Municipal
Assessor of Molave for taxation purposes.The
Olidiana spouses filed with the Bureau of Lands
a Request for Amendment of their Free Patent
applications over several parcels of land including
Lot No. 2029 (PIs-61). In this request they
renounced, relinquished and waived all their rights
and interests over Lot No. 2029 (Pls-61) in favor of
Jesusa Christine Chupuico and Mylo O. Quinto,
respondents herein. This second mortgage also
included Lot No. 2029 (Pls-61) as security for the
Olidiana spouses financial obligation with petitioner.
Thereafter, for failure of Santiago and Oliva Olidiana
to comply with the terms and conditions of their
promissory notes and mortgage contracts, petitioner
extrajudicially foreclosed all their mortgaged
properties. However, when petitioner tried to register
the sale and the affidavit of consolidation and to
have the tax declaration transferred in its name it
was discovered that Lot No. 2029 had already been
divided and covered in the name of Jesusa Christine
Chupuico, while the other half known as Lot 2029-B
was covered by the same in the name of Mylo 0.
Quinto. Since there was no showing that the sales
application was approved before the property was
mortgaged, the trial court concluded that the
Olidiana spouses were not yet its owners in fee
simple when they mortgaged the property. The lower
court also said that with the subsequent issuance of
the Free Patent by the Bureau of Lands for the
respondents. Therefore petitioner could not have
acquired a valid title over the subject property by
ISSUE:
Whether the land in dispute could have been validly
mortgaged while still the subject of a Free Patent
Application with the government
HELD:
Petitioner bank did not acquire valid title over the
land in dispute because it was public land when
mortgaged to the bank. The Court cannot accept
petitioners contention that the lot in dispute was no
longer public land when mortgaged to it since the
Olidiana spouses had been in open, continuous,
adverse and public possession thereof for more than
thirty (30) years. Meanwhile the government still
remained the owner thereof, as in fact the
application could still be canceled and the land
awarded to another applicant should it be shown that
the legal requirements had not been complied with.
What divests the government of title to the land is
the issuance of the sales patent and its subsequent
registration with the Register of Deeds. It is the
registration and issuance of the certificate of title that
segregate public lands from the mass of public
domain and convert it into private property. Since the
disputed lot in the case before us was still the
subject of a Free Patent Application when
mortgaged to petitioner and no patent was granted
to the Olidiana spouses. Thus, since the disputed
property was not owned by the Olidiana spouses
when they mortgaged it to petitioner, the contracts of
mortgage and all their subsequent legal
consequences as regards the subject lot are null and
void. It is essential requisite for the validity of a
mortgage that the mortgagor be the absolute owner
of a property mortgaged, and it appearing that the
mortgage was constituted before the issuance of the
patent to the mortgagor, the mortgage in question
must of necessity be void and ineffective. For the
law explicitly requires an imperative for the validity of
a mortgage that the mortgagor be the absolute
owner of what is mortgaged.
154

152) ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY,
INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and
LIWAN CONSI, respondents.
G.R. No. 88883
PARAS, J.
FACTS:
Fredia Mineral claim of about nine (9) hectares
situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet, was located
sometime between December 25, 1930 and
December 31, 1930, a period of six (6) days, by A.I.
Reynolds in accordance with the provisions of the
Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, better known as the
Philippine Bill of 1902, in a so-called Declaration of
Location. The said Declaration of Location of mineral
claim was duly recorded in the Office of the Mining
Recorder sometime on January 2, 1931. Fredia
mineral claim, together with other mineral claims,
was sold by A.I. Reynolds to Big Wedge Mining
Company, the earlier corporate name of Atok Big
Wedge Mining Company, Inc. in a Deed of Sale
executed on November 2, 1931. Since then
petitioner Atok has been in continuous and exclusive
ownership and possession of said claim up to the
present. Atok has paid the realty taxes and
occupation fees for the Fredia mineral claim. The
Fredia mineral claim together with other mineral
claims owned by Atok has been declared under Tax
Declaration No. 9535 and that in view of Presidential
Decree No. 1214 an application for lease was filed
by Atok covering the Fredia mineral claim.
On the other hand, private respondent Liwan Consi
has a lot below the land of a certain Mr. Acay at
Tuding Slide, Itogon, Benguet. He constructed a
house thereon sometime in 1964. The lot is covered
by Tax Declaration No. 9462. When he first
constructed his house below the lot of Mr. Acay he
was told that it was not necessary for him to obtain a
building permit as it was only a nipa hut. And no one
prohibited him from entering the land so he was
constructing a house thereon. It was only in January
1984 when private respondent Consi repaired the
said house that people came to take pictures and
told him that the lot belongs to Atok. Private
respondent Consi has been paying taxes on said
land which his father before him had occupied. On
January 1984, the security guards of Atok informed
Feliciano Reyes, Security Officer of Atok, that a
construction was being undertaken at the area of the
Fredia mineral claim by private respondent Liwan
Consi. Feliciano Reyes instructed the cashier to go
and take pictures of the construction. Feliciano
Reyes himself and other security guards went to the
place of the construction to verify and then to the
police to report the matter. On March 1, 1984, Atok
filed a complaint for forcible entry and detainer

against Liwan Consi. On January 29, 1987, after due
hearing, the Municipal Trial Court of Itogon. This
case against Liwan Consi is hereby ordered
dismissed. Petitioner ATOK appealed the decision to
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio and
Benguet. the Court of Appeals denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner ATOK. Hence, the
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an individual's long term occupation
of land of the public domain vests him with such
rights over the same as to defeat the rights of the
owner of that claim
HELD:
It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had
secured a patent for as held in the Gold Creek
Mining Corporation case, for all physical purposes of
ownership, the owner is not required to secure a
patent as long as he complies with the provisions of
the mining laws; his possessory right, for all practical
purposes of ownership, is as good as though
secured by patent.
In the case at bar, the evidence on record pointed
that the petitioner Atok has faithfully complied with all
the requirements of the law regarding the
maintenance of the said Fredia Mineral Claim. The
perfection of the mining claim converted the property
to mineral land and under the laws then in force
removed it from the public domain. By such act, the
locators acquired exclusive rights over the land,
against even the government, without need of any
further act such as the purchase of the land or the
obtention of a patent over it. As the land had become
the private property of the locators, they had the
right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet
and Atok. With this ruling enunciated by the Court, it
can further be declared and held that petitioner Atok
has the exclusive right to the property in question.
153) Republic vs. De Guzman, et.al.
326 SCRA 574
FACTS:
Conflicting applications for confirmation of
imperfect title was filed by Norma Almanzor against
respondents over lands located in Silang, Cavite.
It is undisputed that the lands were released as
agricultural land on 1965 and that the Petition for
155

Confirmation of Imperfect Title was filed by the
respondents on 1991.
Petitioner then filed an action for Quieting of Title

and Damages against herein respondent.
The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents.

The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner.
The CA affirmed such ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents have
overthrown the presumption that the lands are part
of the public domain?
HELD:
The petition for confirmation of imperfect title
was filed four (4) years short of the required thirty
(30) year period possession requirement under PD
29 and RA 6940.
The respondents period of occupancy over the
subject land 26 years at the time of the filing of the
petition, four (4) years short of the required 30-year
period possession requirement under the law.
Prior to its declaration as alienable land in 1965, any
occupation or possession thereon cannot be
considered in the counting of the 30-year possession
requirement.
The rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do
not apply unless and until the land classified as
forest land is released in an official proclamation to
that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain.
154) Isaguirre vs. De Lara
332 SCRA 803
The CA reversed the same. It ruled that the

transaction that was entered into was an equitable
mortgage and not a sale thus, the petitioners OCT is
void.
Respondents motion for execution was granted by
the trial court and was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to
retain possession of the property until payment of
the loan and the value of the necessary and useful
improvements made upon such property.
HELD:
As the sole owner, the respondent has the
right to enjoy her property without any other
limitations than those established by law.
As a general rule, the mortgagor retains possession
of the mortgaged property. A mortgage is merely a
lien.
Possession is an essential attribute of ownership. It
would be redundant for the respondent to go back to
court to establish her right to possess the property.
155) Geminiano et. al. vs. CA
259 SCRA 344
FACTS:
FACTS:
Alejandro De Lara was the original
applicant-claimant
for
Miscellaneous
Sales
Application on 1942. He was succeeded by his wife,
respondent Felicitas De Lara upon his death.
The subject lot was originally owned by

petitioners mother Paulina. An unfinished bungalow
was constructed on the lot by the petitioners. The
said bungalow was sold by petitioners to respondent
in 1978.
On said land stood a 2-story commercial and

residential apartment in the name of private
respondents sons.
Meanwhile, a contract of lease over the lot was

earlier entered into by the petitioners mother in favor
of the respondents for a period of 7 years.
Sometime on 1960, a Deed of Sale and Special

Cessation of Rights and Interests was executed in
favor of the petitioner, Cornelio. Subsequently, an
OCT was executed in his name.
Petitioners, after having the lot registered in their

names, filed a case for unlawful detainer and
damages against the respondents.
Meanwhile, an OCT was issued to the respondent

anent the sales application.
The lower court ruled in favor of the respondents. On

appeal, the RTC reversed the same and ordered the
156

petitioners to reimburse the respondents for the
value of the house and the improvements.
land was done in bad faith by the builder of the

encroaching structures.
The CA affirmed the RTC.
It is presumed that possession continues to be

enjoyed in the same character in which it was
acquired, until the contrary is proved.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents were
builders in good faith or mere lessees.
HELD:
Being mere lessees, the respondents knew
that their occupation of the premises would continue
only for the life of the lease. Thus, they cannot be
considered as possessors or builders in good faith.
Article 448 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 546
of the Civil Code applies only to possessors in good
faith. It does not apply where ones only interest is
that of a lessee under a rental contract; otherwise, it
would always be in the power of the tenant to
improve his landlord out of his property.
156) Tecnogas vs. CA
G.R. No. 108894, February 10, 1997
FACTS:
Plaintiff is a domestic corporation and a
registered owner of the subject land located in San
Dionisio, Paranaque. It purchased the subject land
from Pariz Industries, Inc. in 1970 with the buildings,
improvements and the wall existing thereon.
Dedendant Eduardo Uy was the registered owner of
the land adjoining petitioners land.
Tecnogas offered to buy from Uy the portion of the
latters land occupied by the portion of its buildings
and wall. Uy refused.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiff is considered a
builder in bad faith because he is presumed to know
the metes and bounds of his property as described
in the Certificate of Title.
HELD:
The plaintiff purchased the land with the
structures already in existence.
Article 527, Civil Code presumes good faith since no
proof exists to show that the encroachment over a
narrow, needle-shaped portion of the respondents
Thus, plaintiff is deemed to have stepped into the

shoes of the seller in regard to all rights of ownership
over the land sold, including the right to compel the
defendant to exercise either of the options under Art.
448, Civil Code.
Plaintiff must also pay rent for the property occupied
by its building but only up to the date the respondent
serves notice of its option upon plaintiff and the trial
court if such option is for the respondent to
appropriate the encroaching structure.
157) Pleasantville Dvt. Corp. vs. CA
253 SCRA 10
FACTS:
Robillo purchased from petitioner Lot 9 in
Pleasantville Subdivision, Bacolod City. In 1975,
respondent Jardinico bought the rights from Robillo.
At that time, Lot 9 was vacant.
Meanwhile, on 1974, respondent Wilson
Kee bought on installment Lot 8 of said subdivision
from CTTEI (exclusive real agent of petitioner).
Said agent, through one of its employees,
accompanied Kees wife to inspect lot 8.
Unfortunately, the parcel of land pointed to was Lot
9.
Kee then constructed improvements on said
property. Jardinico then filed an ejectment case
against Kee.
ISSUE: Whether or not a lot buyer who constructs
improvements on the wrong property erroneously
delivered by the owners agent, a builder in good
faith?
HELD:
Kee was in good faith. At the time he built
improvements of Lot 9, Kee believed that said lot
was what he bought from petitioner. The rights of
Kee and Jardinico vis--vis each other, as builder in
good faith and owner in good faith respectively are
regulated by law (448, 546, 548, Civil Code).
157

158) Benitez vs. CA
266 SCRA 242
A complaint for accion reinvindicatoria was filed by

respondents against petitioner.
FACTS:
The trial court, by way of a summary judgment, ruled

in favor of respondents.
Sometime on 1986, petitioners purchased a

lot from Cavite Development Bank. Subsequently,
the respondents bought the same.
Respondents then bought another property adjacent
to that of petitioners land. Thereafter, the former
then filed a case against the latter for ejectment
upon discovery of the former that the latters house
encroached on the formers land.
MeTC ruled in favor of the respondents. The RTC
and CA affirmed the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue regarding

petitioners good faith or bad faith as a builder
should have been peremptorily disposed of by the
trial court.
HELD:
The petitioner admitted in its Amended
Answer that the lot in dispute is covered by the TCT
of respondents.
With this admission, petitioner can no longer claim
that it was a builder in good faith.
ISSUE:
Whether or not possession of a lot
encroached upon by a part of anothers house be
recovered in an action for ejectment.
HELD:
Moreover petitioner, as a real estate developer is

presumed to be experienced in business and ought
to have sufficient technical expertise to correctly
determine the metes and bounds of the land it
acquires.
Yes, within 1 year from last demand.

That petitioners occupied the land prior to
respondents purchase thereof does not negate the
latters case for ejectment.
Prior physical possession is not required.
Possession can be acquired by material occupation,
by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of
ones will or by the proper acts and legal formalities
established for acquiring such right.
159) Evadel Realty vs. Soriano
April 20, 2001
FACTS:
Respondent-spouses as sellers, entered into
a Contract to Sell with petitioner as buyer over a
parcel of land which is part of a huge tract of land
known as the Imus Estate.
Upon payment of the first installment, the petitioners
introduced improvements thereon and fenced off the
property with concrete walls.
Thereafter, the respondents discovered that the area
fenced off by the petitioners exceeded the area
subject of the contract by 2,450 square meters.
160) NAZARENO et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

257 SCRA 589
FACTS:
A parcel of land is situated in Telegrapo, Puntod,
Cagayan de Oro City. It was formed as a result of
sawdust dumped into the dried-up Balacanas Creek
and along the banks of the Cagayan river by Sun
Valley Lumber Co. Private respondents Jose
Salasanan and Reo Rabaya leased the subject lots
on which their houses stood from Petitioner Antonio
Nazareno. For refusal to pay rentals, respondents
were ejected.
Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the
Bureau of Lands of the survey plan to perfect his title
over the accretion area being claimed by him.
However, it was protested by private respondents.
The petitioners claim that the subject land is private
land being an accretion to his titled property,
applying Article 457 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 457 of The Civil Code applies.
HELD:
No. The following requites should all concur in order
for accretion to apply as a mode of acquiring
property under Article 457 of the Civil Code: (1) that
158

the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of
the waters of the river (or sea); and
(3) that the land where accretion takes place is
adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea coast).
Petitioners admit that the accretion was formed by
the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling
materials on portions of the Balacanas Creek and
the Cagayan River bounding their land. It cannot be
claimed, therefore, that the accumulation of such
boulders, soil and other filling materials was gradual
and imperceptible, resulting from the action of the
waters or the current of the Balacanas Creek and
the Cagayan River. Absence of the first and second
requisites, they cannot claim the rights of a riparian
owner.
Article 457 excludes all deposits caused by human
intervention. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of
nature. When a land was not formed solely by the
natural effect of the water current of the river
bordering said land but as a consequence of the
direct and deliberate intervention of man, it manmade accretion and, as such, part of the public
domain.
161) NAVARRO vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT AND HEIRS OF SINFOROSO PASCUAL
G.R. No. 68166. February 12, 1997
FACTS:
Petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest,
Emiliano
Navarro, filed a fishpond application with the Bureau
of Fisheries covering twenty five (25) hectares of
foreshore land in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. The
Director of Fisheries, gave due course to his
application but only to the extent of seven (7)
hectares of the property as may be certified by the
Bureau of Forestry as suitable for fishpond
purposes.
Bay. He was a lessee and in possession of a part of

the subject property by virtue of a fishpond permit
issued by the Bureau of Fisheries and confirmed by
the Office of the President and also that he had
already converted the area covered by the lease into
a fishpond.
ISSUE:
Is land be considered as foreshore land?
HELD:
Yes. The third requisite of accretion is absent in the
case at bar. It states that alluvium must be deposited
on the portion of claimant's land which is adjacent to
the river bank.
Here private respondents' own land lies between the
Talisay and Bulacan Rivers; in front of their land on
the northern side lies the disputed land where before
1948, there lay the Manila Bay. If the accretion were
to be attributed to the action of either or both of the
Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, the alluvium should
have been deposited on either or both of the eastern
and western boundaries of private respondents' own
tract of land, not on the northern portion thereof
which is adjacent to the Manila Bay.
The disputed land is an accretion not on a river bank
but on a sea bank, or on what used to be the
foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined private
respondents own tract of land on the northern side.
Hence, the land which is adjacent to the property
belonging to Pascual cannot be considered an
accretion caused by the action of the two rivers.
162) ROBLES et al vs. CA
328 SCRA 97
Sometime in the early part of 1960, Sinforoso

Pascual filed an application to register and confirm
his title to a parcel of land, situated in Sibocon,
Balanga, Bataan. Pascual claimed that this land is
an accretion to his property, situated in Barrio Puerto
Rivas, Balanga, Bataan. Sinforoso Pascual claimed
the accretion as the riparian owner.
FACTS:
Leon Robles primitively owned a land which he
occupied the same openly and adversely as early as
1916 and paid its taxes. When Leon died his son
Silvino Robles inherited land, took possession and
paid taxes. Upon Silvinos death, his widow Maria de
la Cruz and his children inherited the property, took
adverse possession and paid taxes. However, the
task of cultivating the land was assigned to Lucio
Robles. Plaintiffs entrusted the payment of the land
taxes to their co-heir and half-brother, Hilario Robles.
Emiliano Navarro filed an opposition to Pascual's

application. Navarro claimed that the land sought to
be registered has always been part of the public
domain, it being a part of the foreshore of Manila
In 1962, the tax declaration in Silvinos name was

canceled and transferred Hilario Robles and his wife.
In 1966, Andrea Robles secured a loan from the
Cardona Rural Bank, Inc., using the tax declaration
159

as security. When the mortgage debt was unpaid, it
was auctioned for sale and Rural Bank was the
highest bidder. Consequently the spouses Robles
failed to redeem property. Thus, title was transferred
in the name of Rural Bank. Then Rural Bank sold the
same to the Spouses Vergel Santos and Ruth
Santos.
In 1987, plaintiff discovered the mortgage and
attempted to redeem the property, but was
unsuccessful. The spouses Santos also took
possession of the property and secured a free patent
in their names. Hence a petition for quieting of title to
the land was filed.
ISSUE:
Will the petition prosper?
HELD:
Yes. Hilario mortgaged the disputed property to the
Rural Bank of Cardona in his capacity as a mere coowner thereof. The said transaction did not divest
the plaintiff of title to the property at the time of the
institution of the complaint for quieting of title.
An action to quiet title is a remedy for the removal of
any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the title to real
property. It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant
to have a legal or an equitable title to or interest in
the real property which is the subject matter of the
action. Also, the deed, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding that is being alleged as a cloud on
plaintiffs title must be shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy.
Also, there is an irregularity when the tax declaration
of Silvino was cancelled since there was no
instrument or deed of conveyance evidencing its
transfer to Hilario Robles.
163) De Aviles vs. CA
264 SCRA 473
FACTS:
Eduardo Aviles was in actual possession of the
afore-described property since 1957. In fact he
mortgaged the same with the Rural Bank and
Philippine National Bank. When the property was
inspected by a bank representative, Eduardo Aviles,
in the presence of the boundary owners, namely,
defendant Camilo Aviles, Anastacio Aviles and
Juana and Apolonio Joaquin, pointed to the
inspector the existing earthen dikes as the boundary
limits of the property and nobody objected. When the

real estate mortgage was foreclosed, the property
was sold at public auction but this was redeemed by
plaintiffs' mother and the land was subsequently
transferred and declared in her name.
On March 23, 1983, defendant Camilo Aviles
asserted a color of title over the northern portion of
the property with an area of approximately 1,200
square meters by constructing a bamboo fence
(thereon) and moving the earthen dikes, thereby
molesting and disturbing the peaceful possession of
the plaintiffs over said portion.
ISSUE:
Will the remedy of quieting of title apply for settling a
boundary dispute?
HELD:
No. Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the
removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty
with respect to title to real property. To avail of the
remedy of quieting of title, a plaintiff must show that
there is an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance
or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud,
doubt, question or shadow upon the owner's title to
or interest in real property.
However, the Agreement of Partition executed by
private respondent and his brothers (including the
petitioners' father and predecessor-in-interest), in
which their respective shares in the inherited
property were agreed upon, and the Deed of Sale
evidencing the redemption by petitioner Anastacia
Vda. de Aviles of the subject property in a
foreclosure sale are in no way documents that
constitute a cloud or cast a doubt upon the title of
petitioners. In fact, the uncertainty arises from the
parties' failure to situate and fix the boundary
between their respective properties.
The construction of the bamboo fence enclosing the
disputed property and the moving of earthen dikes
are not the "clouds" or "doubts" which can be
removed in an action for quieting of title. An action to
quiet title or to remove cloud may not be brought for
the purpose of settling a boundary dispute.
164) DEL CAMPO vs. CA
160

351 SCRA 1
FACTS:
Salome, Consorcia, Alfredo, Maria, Rosalia, Jose,
Quirico and Julita, all surnamed Bornales, were the
original co-owners of 27, 170 sq. m. lot known as Lot
162 under OCT No. 18047. The lot was divided in
aliquot shares among the eight co-owners.
Salome sold part of her 4/16 share in Lot 162 to
Soledad Daynolo. Thereafter, Soledad Daynolo
immediately took possession of the land and built a
house thereon. A few years later, Soledad and her
husband, Simplicio Distajo, mortgaged the subject
portion of Lot 162 as security for a debt to Jose
Regalado, Sr. Then three of the eight co-owners of
Lot 162, specifically, Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo,
sold 24,993 square meters of said lot to Jose
Regalado, Sr.
Simplicio Distajo, heir of Soledad Daynolo who had
since died, paid the mortgage debt and redeemed
the mortgaged portion of Lot 162 from Jose
Regalado, Sr. The latter, in turn, executed a Deed of
Discharge of Mortgage in favor of Soledad's heirs,
namely: Simplicio Distajo, Rafael Distajo and
Teresita Distajo-Regalado. On same date, the said
heirs sold the redeemed portion of Lot 162 for
P1,500.00 to herein petitioners, the spouses Manuel
Del Campo and Salvacion Quiachon.
ISSUE:
Is the sale by a co-owner of a physical portion of an
undivided property held in common be valid?
HELD:
Yes. Salome's right to sell part of her undivided
interest in the co-owned property is absolute in
accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a coowner has full ownership of his pro-indiviso share
and has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it,
and substitute another person in its enjoyment.
Since Salome's clear intention was to sell merely
part of her aliquot share in Lot 162, in our view no
valid objection can be made against it and the sale
can be given effect to the full extent.
Even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his,
the sale will affect only his own share but not those
of the other co-owners who did not consent to the
sale. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his
undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one
co-owner will only transfer the rights of said coowner to the buyer, thereby making the buyer a coowner of the property.
In this case, Regalado merely became a new coowner of Lot 162 to the extent of the shares which
Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could validly convey.
Soledad retained her rights as co-owner and could
validly transfer her share to petitioners in 1951. The
logical effect of the second disposition is to
substitute petitioners in the rights of Soledad as coowner of the land. Needless to say, these rights are
preserved notwithstanding the issuance of TCT No.
14566 in Regalado's name in 1977.
165) Rodil Enterprises vs. CA
G.R. No. 129609; November 29, 2001
FACTS:
Petitioner Rodil Enterprises Inc. is the lessee of the
Ides O'Racca Building since 1959. It was a "former
alien property" over which the Republic of the
Philippines acquired ownership by virtue of RA 477.
In 1972, the lease contract between RODIL and the
REPUBLIC was renewed for another 15 years. In
1980, RODIL entered into a sublease contract with
respondents Carmen Bondoc, et al. members of the
Ides O'Racca Building Tenants Association Inc.
(ASSOCIATION). In 1982, authorization of the sale
of "former alien properties" classified as commercial
and industrial, and the O'RACCA building was
classified as commercial property. In 1987,RODIL
offered to purchase the subject property. In 1997,
ASSOCIATION also offered to lease the same
building.
In May 18, 1992, RODIL signed a renewal contract
which would extend the lease for 10 years from 1
September 1987. A supplement to the renewal
contract was subsequently entered into on May 25,
1992 where rentals on the previous lease contract
were increased. In September 1992: spouses
Saturnino Alvarez and Epifania Alvarez, sublessees
of RODIL, filed with the Office of the President a
letter-appeal assailing the authority of Factoran to
enter into the renewal contract of May 18, 1992 with
RODIL, and claiming the right to purchase the
subject property. ASSOCIATION instituted another
Civil Case praying for the setting aside of the
renewal contract of 18 May 1992 as well as the
supplementary contract of May 25, 1992. Finally in
1993, RODIL filed an action for unlawful detainer
against Divisoria Footwear (private respondents)
and a similar action against Chua Huay Soon (also
private respondents).
161

The lower court dismissed the action filed by the
ASSOCIATION. The Office of the President then
denied the letter-appeal of the spouses Alvarez but
nullified the renewal contract of 18 May 1992 and
the supplementary contract of 25 May 1992.
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila upheld RODIL's
right to eject respondents Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto,
Divisoria Footwear and Chua Huay Soon. The RTC
affirmed MTC decision. However the appellate court
declared the renewal contract between RODIL and
the REPUBLIC null and void.
Unfortunately for respondents, the REPUBLIC chose

to alienate the subject premises to RODIL by virtue
of a contract of lease entered into on 18 May 1992.
Resultantly, petitioner had the right to file the action
for unlawful detainer against respondents as one
from whom possession of property has been
unlawfully withheld.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Republic being the owner has
freedom to dispose of a thing.
FACTS:
The land in question was originally owned by
Adriano Soriano, upon his death, it passed on to his
heirs who leased the same to the spouse De Vera
for a period of 15 years. Roman Soriano as one of
the children of Adriano Soriano, acts as the
caretaker. The property was subdivided into two lots,
lot 1 was sold to respondent spouses Abalos. As a
co-owner of lot 2, Roman ownes , the of which
was also sold to the spouses Abalos. He was ousted
as caretaker of the land.
HELD:
Yes. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of
a thing, without other limitations than those
established by law. Every owner has the freedom of
disposition over his property. It is an attribute of
ownership, and this rule has no exception. The
REPUBLIC being the owner of the disputed property
enjoys the prerogative to enter into a lease contract
with RODIL in the exercise of its jus disponendi.
Hence, as lessor, the REPUBLIC has the right to
eject usurpers of the leased property where the
factual elements required for relief in an action for
unlawful detainer are present.
The contracts of 18 May 1992 and 25 May 1992 are
valid. CA invalidated the contracts because they
were supposedly executed in violation of a
temporary restraining order issued by the RTC. CA
however failed to note that the order restrains the
REPUBLIC from awarding the lease contract only as
regards respondent ASSOCIATION but not petitioner
RODIL.
In an action for unlawful detainer the plaintiff need
not have been in prior physical possession.
Respondents have admitted that they have not
entered into any lease contract with the REPUBLIC
and that their continued occupation of the subject
property was merely by virtue of acquiescence. The
records clearly show this to be the case. The
REPUBLIC merely issued a "temporary occupancy
permit" which was not even in the name of the
respondents Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria
Footwear or Chua but of respondent ASSOCIATION.
Since the occupation of respondents was merely
tolerated by the REPUBLIC, the right of possession
of the latter remained uninterrupted. It could
therefore alienate the same to anyone it chose.
166) Heirs of Roman Soriano V. CA

G.R. No. 128177; August 15, 2001
Roman Soriano filed a case for reinstatement and

reliquidation. The agrarian court authorized the
ejectment, but on appeal the CA reversed.
Subsequently the parties entered into an agreement
allowing Roman to sublease the property. The
spouses Abalos filed an application for registration of
the title of lot 1 and the of lot 2, which was
granted. The petitioner filed with DARAB for
Security of Tenure with prayer for preliminary
injunction.
The lower court ruled that the spouses Abalos are
the real owner of the land. They filed an application
for the writ of execution of the decision, and to oust
Roman Soriano and the sub-lessee. However there
was a pending case with DARAB.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the winning party in the land
registration case can effectively oust the possessor
whose security of tenure rights are still pending with
DARAB.
HELD:
No. The prevailing party in land registration case
cannot be placed in possession of the area while it is
occupied by the one claiming to be an agricultural
tenant, pending declaration that the latters
occupation was lawful. Judgement of ownership
does not include possession as a necessary
162

incident. Possession and ownership are distinct legal
concepts.
There is ownership when a thing pertaining to one
person is completely subjected to his will in a
manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the
right of others. Ownership confers certain rights to
the owner, among which are the rights to enjoy the
thing owned and the right to exclude other person
from possession. While possession is the holding of
the thing or enjoyment of a right. A person may be
declared owner but may not be entitled to
possession. It may be in the hand if another as a
lessee or a tenant.
167) SERASPI vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. 135602 April 28, 2000
FACTS:
The lots in question were originally owned by
Marcelino Recasa and are both situated in Barangay
Lapnag, Banga, Aklan. When Marcelino died in
1943, and in 1948 his intestate estate was
partitioned into three parts to his corresponding heirs
in his Three (3) marriages during his lifetime.
In the same year, Patronicio Recasa (the
representing the heirs first marriage) sold their share
to Dominador Recasa (representing heirs in the
second marriage). In 1950, Dominador sold their
share to Quirico and Purificacion Seraspi.
In 1958, the Seraspis acquired a loan from Kalibo
Rural Bank, Inc. (KRBI) the subject land being the
security, however, they failed to pay the loan and the
property was foreclosed and sold to the highest
bidder KRBI, and subsequently sold the same to
Manuel Rata (brother-in-law of Quirico Seraspi) who
allowed Quirico to administer the same.
In 1974, private respondent Simeon Recasa
(Marcelinos heir by his third marriage) took
advantage of the fact that Quirico was paralyzed due
to a stroke, forcibly entered the lands in question
and took possession thereof.
In 1983 the Seraspis were able to purchase the
lands from Manuel Rata and thereafter filed a case
against Simeon Recasa for recovery of possession
of the lands.
RTC ruled in favor of Seraspi, but CA
reversed on appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the there was
prescription in favor of Simeon Recasa?
HELD:
acquisitive
No, there was no acquisitive prescription

Acquisitive prescription of dominion and
other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. In
the case at bar, respondent claim ordinary
prescription through adverse possession of the
property for more than Ten (10) years under Art.
1134 of the Civil Code.
However, for purposes of prescription, respondent
was not able to prove his just title or good faith
required by acquisitive prescription, as he did not
acquire possession of the property through the
modes recognized by the Civil Code for acquisition
of ownership or other real rights, namely:
1.
Occupation
2.
Intellectual creation
3.
Law
4.
Donation
5.
Succession
6.
Tradition in consequence of certain
contracts
7.
Prescription
Also, under Article 714, the ownership of a piece of
land cannot be acquired by occupation, nor can
respondent claim that he acquired his right through
succession because he was an heir to the original
owner, remember that the property was validly
partitioned and the subject lots are not part of those
which he inherited, and lastly, he cannot be
considered in good faith as he entered the property
without the knowledge and permission of the original
owner, thus making him a mere usurper.
When the property belonging to another is unlawfully
taken by another, the former has the right of action
against the latter fir the recovery of the property and
such right may be transferred by the sale or
assignment of the property and the transferee can
maintain such action against the wrongdoer.
*1974-1983 in only 9 years.
168) CATAPUSAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. 109262 November 21, 1996
FACTS:
Bonifacio Catapusan was first married to Narcissa
Tanjuatco, the only surviving heir of Dominga
Piguing, their (4) children are the private respondent
in the case at bar. Narcissa died in 1910, Bonifacio
got married for the second time, and the children in
the second marriage are the petitioners in this case.
Bonifacio died in 1940. Thereafter in 1974,
petitioners filed an action for partition of the lot in
question located in Wawa, Tanay, Rizal. Petitioners
163

claim that the Wawa Lot is the property of their
father (Bonifacio) therefore it is co-owned by the
heirs of the first and the second marriage. As proof
of their claim, they have presented tax declarations
of the four (4) adjacent land owners stating in such
document that the owner of the subject lot is
Bonifacio Catapusan. Witnesses were also
presented and testified that they saw Bonifacio
working on the lot.
Respondent on the other hand, argues that
the Wawa lot was originally owned by Dominga
Piguing and inherited by Narcissa Tanjuatco as her
paraphernal property; hence petitioners have no
right over the lot. As evidence, theyve presented tax
declarations in their names and also alleged that
they have been in open, continuous and
uninterrupted possession of the said lot for more
than 50 years.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondents
declaring them as owner of the property, and such
decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
except for Attorneys fees.
ISSUE:
Whether Bonifacio is the owner of the lot?
HELD:
No, He is not an owner.
The tax declarations of neighbors stating
that Bonifacio is the owner of the lot is not
conclusive, so as the testimonies of the neighbors
that they saw him working on the lot. As oppose to
the tax declarations of the respondents showing they
own the land.
Possession be mere tolerance cannot ripen into
ownership even if such possession have been for a
long period of time. Also, the declaration of
ownership made by the RTC in favor of respondents
is proper because ownership must be decided first
before partition may be granted.
169) VERDAD vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. 109972 April 29, 1996
FACTS:
Macaria Atega was married twice during her lifetime,
first with Angel Burdeos, and second with Canuto
Rosales. She owned a land in Butuan City about 248
sq. m., Macaria died in 1956.
The petitioner is the Zosima Verdad, who
purchased the lot in question for P23,000.00 from
heirs of Macarias son (Ramon Burdeos) in 1982.
When Socorro (wife of the deceased David Rosales
who died some time after his mother Macaria died)
found out in March 30, 1987 that the lot was sold to
Verdad, she sought intervention of the Lupong
Tagapamayapa for redemption, her tender of
P23,000.00 was refused because the current value
of the property is higher.
October 16, 1987, no settlement was
reached, thus a case was filed by Socorro (private
respondent) for Legal Redemption with Preliminary
Injunction, which the RTC denied stating that
redemption period already lapse.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, it
reversed the RTC and declared that Socorro has the
right to redeem the property.
ISSUE:
Whether Socorro Cordero Vda. De Rosales
is capacitated to redeem the property even if she is
only related by affinity to Macaria Atega and not an
heir?
HELD:
Yes, Socorro is capacitated to make the
redemption.
Even if she is not an heir to Macaria, she is
an heir to David Rosales who inherited a share of his
mothers estate.
Article 995 of the Civil Code, in the absence
of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and
illegitimate and their descendants, whether
legitimate of illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall
inherit, without prejudice to the rights of brothers and
sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any,
under article 1001.
The right to redeem spawned from the nondisclosure of the sale to all co-owners when the sale
is in favor of a third person. In fact, written notice is
required under Article 1623, and the redemption
period is 30 days from receipt of such notice.
In the case at bar, no notice was given,
hence, the 30 day period stared from the time of
discovery of the sale on March 30, 1987, and stayed
by the proceedings in the Punong Tagapamayapa.
There was clear intent to redeem at that
time but the offer was rejected by Verdad.
170) TABUSO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. 108558 June 21, 2001
FACTS:
The lot in question is an unregistered parcel
of land in Antipolo, Naval, Leyte with an area of
3,267 square meters, which latter turned out to be in
fact 11,927 square meters.
164

A case was initiated to declare ownership of
the land in question. Herein petitioners claim
ownership of the land through succession from
Ignacio Montes and presented tax declarations from
1944 1947 in the name of Ignacio Montes, but
were only paid in 1981. Plaintiff Andrea Tabuso claim
to be a successor in interest of Andrea Elaba
(daughter of Maria Montes [Maria is the Sister of
Ignacio Montes]). Also, there is a house built on the
lot by Marcelo Tabuso (father of Andrea Tabuso).
Private respondent however, alleged that the
land was originally owned by Maria Montes, but she
donated it to Isabel Elaba as supported by a
document executed on September 24, 1923,
thereafter Isabel sold the lot to Esteban Abad in
1948. Various tax declarations were also presented
by respondent showing that from 1948 1982 tax
has been paid on the lot by respondents
predecessors in interest mainly by Esteban Abad.
Also, part of the lot is being rented by one Valentin
Poblete from Menesio Abad (heir of Esteban) as
evidenced by a lease contract.
During trial, petitioners also presented as
witness the counsel of defendant, Atty. Jose
Gonzales, who testified that he owns a lot adjacent
to the land in question and that he have personal
knowledge that the land in question had been in the
possession of the heirs of Esteban Abad.
RTC ruled that owner of the property is the
respondents, which was upheld by the CA on
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA was correct in declaring
respondents as owner of the land in question?
HELD:
Yes, Court of Appeals was correct.
The totality of evidence presented leans
heavily in favor of herein private respondents. They
have been able to adduce evidence which support
their claim that they have been in open, continuous,
and uninterrupted possession for more than 60
years. Also, in view of the size of the land which is
11,927 square meters, it is unbelievable for an
alleged owner such as Tabuso to build only a
barong-barong (small house) in the lot, which was
latter shown to be allowed by mere tolerance by a
letter addressed to plaintiff asking them to vacate the
property within 3 months time.
Also, petitioners are bound by the testimony
of Atty. Gonzales even if he is counsel for the private
respondent because he was presented by the
plaintiff themselves as hostile witness.
Petitioners possesses the land as mere

holders, distinguished from possession in the
concept of an owner, being a mere holder
acknowledges another superior right over the
property he possess.
*Petitioners also raised an issue regarding
the adjudication of 11,927 square meters to private
respondent when the tax declarations only state
3,267 square meters. This is untenable, because
what defines a piece of land is not the numerical
data indicated as its area, but the boundaries or
metes and bounds specified in its description as
enclosing the land indicating its limits.
171) DIZON vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. 116854 November 19, 1996
FACTS:
Aida Dizon mortgaged the subject lot to Monte de
Piedad Bank on October 23, 1980 and failed to pay
the loan obligation, hence the house and lot
mortgage was thereafter foreclosed. The bank told
Dizon that she can repurchase the property, having
no means to pay the amount at the moment, she
asked Elizabeth Santiago to repurchase the property
in the amount of P550,000.00 on May 28, 1987. The
TCT of Dizon was cancelled and a new one was
issued in favor of Santiago in view of the Deed of
Absolute Sale signed by Dizon in Favor of Santiago,
also, an Option to Buy Back was signed by the
same parties giving Dizon the option to buy back the
said property from Santiago within a period of Three
(3) months, with the stipulation that if Dizon failed to
used the option within the agreed period, Dizon shall
vacate the property in favor of Santiago.
The period lapse without Dizon exercising
her option to buy, thereafter, Santiago asked Dizon
to vacate the premises. Dizon refused, which
prompted Santiago to file an Ejectment case before
the MTC. After trial, MTC ordered Dizon to vacate
the property. RTC reversed and ordered the
cancellation of the TCT in favor of Dizon. CA
affirmed on appeal, but reversed itself upon MR of
Santiago.
ISSUE:
Whether Dizon is entitled to possession of
the subject property?
HELD:
No, Dizon is not entitled to possession.
The title of the property held by the private
respondent is enough proof to hold them as the
165

rightful possessor upon default of Dizon to exercise
her right to redeem the property. Also, the stipulation
that Dizon, upon failure to buy back the property
within the specified period, shall vacate the property
is a binding agreement, thus, Santiago is already
entitled to possession after the lapse of the said
period.
This is ofcourse without prejudice to Dizons
right to file another action to determine the
ownership of the property, which she interposed as a
defense alleging that the sale was an equitable
mortgage. The RTC made an error in ordering the
cancellation of the TCT because Ejectment cases
only dwell on the rightful possession and does not
determine ownership with finality.
172) CEQUENA vs. BOLANTE
G.R. 137944 April 6, 2000
FACTS:
The land subject of the dispute has an area of 1,728
square meters and situated in barangay Bangad,
Binangonan, Province of Rizal. Respondent
Honorata Mendoza Bolante is the only daughter of
Sinforoso Mendoza, while petitioner Cequena is the
daughter of Margarito Mendoza. Sinforoso and
Margarito are brothers.
The subject lot was declared for tax purposes by
Sinforoso since 1926. When he died in 1930, his
wife and daughter continuously possessed the land,
and when respondent was of age in 1948, she paid
the taxes for the lot from 1932-1948. Margarito
acquired joint possession from 1952, and by a virtue
of an affidavit signed allegedly by respondents
mother, transferred tax declaration in the name of
Margarito Mendoza starting 1954, who thereafter
cultivated part of the land with his heirs from 19531985 until they were ousted by respondents.
The dispute over who has a better right of
possession was raised in the trial court, which
decided in favor of the petitioners. The Court of
Appeals reversed the said decision and declared the
respondents as lawful owner and possessor.
ISSUE:
Whether respondents are the lawful owner
and possessor of the land in question?
HELD:
Yes, respondent is the lawful owner and
possessor of the land.
By acquisitive prescription of the property
under Article 1134 of the New Civil Code, ownership
and other real rights over immovable property may
be acquired by ordinary prescription through

possession of Ten (10) years. In the case at bar,
respondent acquired their rights over the property
through tax declaration of Sinforoso, when he died in
1930 respondents continued to possess the property
and paid taxes from 1932-1948 in the concept of an
owner. Such possession was not disturbed until
1952 when Margarito took joint possession of the
land, however, the possession of respondent which
is public, peaceful, and uninterrupted already
ripened to ownership.
*The affidavit that allowed the transfer of tax
declaration from Sinforoso to Margarito was doubtful
to say the lease, because one of the alleged
signatories is the respondent mother of Honorata
who testified that she was illiterate and could not
have signed the document.
*Possession of petitioners cannot ripen into
ownership because such possession was not
exclusive as they possess the property at the same
time respondent are also living therein from 19521985. 1985 respondent ousted petitioner from the
property.
173)
DEVELOPMENT
BANK
OF
PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. 129471 April 28, 2000
THE
FACTS:
The land in dispute has an area of 19.4 hectares
located in San Miguel, Province of Bohol whose
original ownership rest with Ulpiano Mumar as
evidenced by Tax Declaration since 1917.
In 1950, Mumar sold the subject property
Carlos Cajes (herein private respondent) who was
issued tax declaration in the same year. He occupied
and cultivated the land, planting cassava and
camote in certain portions of the land.
In 1969, unknown to private respondent,
Jose Alvarez was able to register a parcel of land
with an area of 1,512,468 square meters and OCT
#546 was issued in the same year in his name. In
1972 Alvarez sold the property to spouses Beduya to
whom TCT #10101 was issued, the former and the
latter never occupied the said lot the property
included in it the 19.4 hectares owned by Cajes.
In the same year, 1972, spouse Beduya
acquired a loan from DBP and mortgage the the land
under TCT #10101 for P526,000.00, and in 1978 it
was again mortgage for another loan in the amount
of P1,430,000.00 in favor of the petitioner (DBP), no
ocular inspection of the land was made.
166

In 1978 private respondent applied for loan
from DBP mortgaging the 19.4 hectares giving as
evidence of ownership tax declarations and a
certification of the Clerk of Court of the Court of First
Instance of Bohol that no civil, land registration or
cadastral case has been filed or instituted before the
court affecting the validity of the Tax Declaration on
the 19.4 hectare land. Private respondent approved
the loan, however after releasing the money
petitioner found out that the land mortgaged by
private respondent was included in the land covered
by TCT #10101, hence, petitioner immediately
cancelled the loan and demanded immediate
payment. Private respondent repaid the loan.
Spouses Beduya failed to pay their loan and
the land in TCT #10101 was forclosed. In 1985
during the foreclosure sale, DBP was the highest
bidder, and as spouses Beduya failed to redeem the
property, petitioner consolidated its ownership.
In 1986, petitioner found out that Cajes is
occupying a part of the land in TCT #10101, DBP
demanded that Cajes vacate the property but private
respondent refused, hence, DBP filed a case for
Recovery of Possession against him. RTC ruled in
favor of DBP, but the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision declaring Cajes the lawful owner of the 19.4
hectares included in TCT #10101.
respondent when he raised the counterclaim of

ownership plus damages, was in fact a direct attack
on the title.
DBP cannot be considered a mortgagor in
good faith because being a bank, it is required to
exercise due diligence in its dealings as such are
impress with public concern. It appears from the
facts that it did not conduct inspection of the property
of spouses Beduya when they applied for loan. Also,
even when it has knowledge since 1978 that the
private respondent has a claim in the land covered
by TCT #10101, it still bought the land in question in
the foreclosure sale in 1985 ignoring the fact that
would normally raise suspicion because private
respondent is occupying a part of the said lot.
174) VILLANUEVA VS CA
G.R. No. 108921 April 12, 2000
HELD:
FACTS:
Petitioners are the legitimate children of Leon
Villanueva, Concepcion Macahilas vda. de
Villanueva is his widow. Leon was one of eight (8)
children of Felipe Villanueva, predecessor-in-interest
of the parties in the present case.Private
respondents are related by blood to the petitioners
as descendants of Felipe.
.
The remaining undivided portion of the land
was held in trust by Leon for his co-heirs. During
Leon's lifetime, his co-heirs made several
seasonable and lawful demands upon him to
subdivide and partition the property, but for one
reason or another, no subdivision took place.
Yes, Court of Appeals is correct.

Acquisitive prescription already vested in
Carlos Cajes ownership of the 19.4 hectares of land
he was paying tax on since he has been in open
public, peaceful, uninterrupted, and adverse
possession of the said property in the concept of an
owner since 1950. Ordinary prescription requires
only such possession for Ten (10) years. Thus, in
1969, when the spouses Beduya were able to
register their land under TCT #10101, the private
respondent Cajes already acquired ownership over
the 19.4 hectares he acquired from Mumar who
have been in possession as an owner since 1917.
Surely, private respondents possession together with
Mumars possession and occupation of the 19.4
hectares is more than Thirty (30) years required
under Act no. 496.
Although the initial case is recovery of
possession of real property, and collateral attack is
not allowed in to defeat the indefeasibility of a
Torrens Title, the counter claim of the private
After the death of Leon in August 1972, private

respondents discovered that the shares of four of the
heirs of Felipe, namely, Simplicio, Nicolasa, Fausta
and Maria Baltazar, spouse of Benito, was
purchased by Leon as evidenced by a Deed of Sale
executed on August 25, 1946 but registered only in
1971.
Leon sometime in July 1970, executed a sale and
partition of the property in favor of his own children,
herein petitioners. By virtue of such Deed of
Partition, private respondents had succeeded in
obtaining Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. C256. On April 25, 1975, petitioners managed to
secure separate and independent titles over their
pro-indiviso shares in their respective names.
Private respondents then filed a case for partition
with annulment of documents and reconveyance
with the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Private
respondents contended that the sale in favor of Leon
was fraudulently obtained through m the Regional
ISSUE:
Whether the CA was correct in adjudicating
that the 19.4 hectares included in TCT #10101 is
owned by private respondent Carlos Cajes?
167

Trial Court of Kalibo rendered its decision in Civil
Case No. 2389, declaring "the defendants the legal
owners of the property in question through
machinations and false pretenses. On appeal The
CA Reversed the Trial courts ruling.
registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of

the certificate of title of the property. Here the
questioned Deed of Sale was registered only in
1971. Private respondents filed their complaint in
1975, hence well within the prescriptive period.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellate court erred in failing to
declare action by the private respondents to recover
the property in question barred by laches, estoppel,
prescription.
We held that a land registration case is an action in

rem binding upon the whole world, and considering
that the private respondents failed to object to the
registration of the realty in question, then res
judicata had set in. True, but notwithstanding the
binding effect of the land registration case upon the
private respondents, the latter are not deprived of a
remedy. While a review of the decree of registration
is no longer available after the expiration of the oneyear period from entry thereof, an equitable remedy
is still available. Those wrongfully deprived of their
property may initiate an action for reconveyance of
the properly.
RULING:
Laches is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting the
presumption that the party entitled to assert it has
either abandoned or declined to assert it. Its
essential elements are: (1) conduct on the part of the
defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving
rise to the situation complained of; (2) delay in
asserting complainant's right after he had knowledge
of the defendant's conduct and after he has an
opportunity to sue; (3) lack of knowledge or notice
on the part of the defendant that the complainant
would assert the right on which he bases his suit;
and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the
event relief is accorded to the complainant.
At the time of signing of the Deed of Sale of August
26, 1948, private respondents , Ramon and Rosa
were minors. They could not be faulted for their
failure to file a case to recover their inheritance from
their uncle Leon, since up to the age of majority, they
believed and considered Leon their co-heir and
administrator. It was only in 1975, not in 1948, that
they became aware of the actionable betrayal by
their uncle. Upon learning of their uncle's actions,
they filed an action for recovery.
They did not sleep on their rights, contrary to
petitioners' assertion. Under the circumstances of
the instant case, we do not think that respondent
appellate court erred in considering private
respondents' action. The action was not too late.
Furthermore, when Felipe Villanueva died, an
implied trust was created by operation of law
between Felipe's children and Leon, their uncle, as
far as the 1/6 share of Felipe. Leon's fraudulent
titling of Felipe's 1/6 share was a betrayal of that
implied trust
Neither is the action barred by prescription, we held
that an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land
based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in
10 years, the point of reference being the date of
175) Eduardo Fontanilla vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 119341, November 29, 1999
FACTS:
Spouses Crisanto and Feliciana Duaman were
awarded a homestead patent over a parcel of land.
Upon their death, private respondent Luis Duaman,
one of their children, inherited a four-hectare portion
of the homestead. On 21 July 1976, in order to
expedite the loan application of his two (2) sons,
Ernesto and Elpidio Duaman, with the Development
Bank of the Philippines, private respondent
transferred to them the ownership of his share in the
homestead.
On 8 August 1985, in view of the imminence of
foreclosure of the said lot by the bank, Ernesto and
Elpidio sold the two-hectare portion thereof to
Eduardo Fontanilla, Sr. for P30,000.00. The vendee
named in the deed of sale was Ellen M.T.
Fontanilla. . Sometime later, private respondent
informed Eduardo Fontanilla of his desire to
repurchase the subject lot.
Private respondent filed a case with the RTC of
Cauayan Isabela against petitioners for the
"Repurchase of the Homestead. Upon motion filed
by petitioners, the lower court dismissed private
respondent's complaint for failure to state a cause of
action
On appeal, the CA reversed the order of the trial
court.The CA held that private respondent could still
exercise the right to repurchase under Section 119
of the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141,
168

as amended) despite the fact that it was not him but
his sons who conveyed the subject lot to petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether private respondent, not being the vendor in
the sale of the subject lot to petitioners, could no
longer exercise his right to repurchase under Section
119 of the Public Land Act against petitioners.
RULING:
Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under
the free patent or homestead provisions, when
proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the
applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of
five years from the date of conveyance.
(Commonwealth Act 141)
these homestead laws were designed to distribute
disposable agricultural lots of the " State to landdestitute citizens for their home and cultivation." 2
Further, the plain intent of Section 119 is "to give the
homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve
for himself and his family the land that the State had
gratuitously given to him as a reward for his labor in
cleaning and cultivating it.
Petitioners argue that private respondent could no
longer avail himself of the right to repurchase under
Section 119 because he was not the vendor of the
subject lot. Only the vendor allegedly has the right to
repurchase.
Petitioners claim is without merit,
Our pronouncement in Madarcos that only the
vendor has the right to repurchase was taken out of
context by petitioners. Said pronouncement may not
be sweepingly applied in this case because of a
significant factual difference between the two cases.
In Madarcos, we ruled that Cantain (petition herein)
cannot repurchase the share of Francisca, his coheir, because the homestead had already been
partitioned and distributed among them as heirs. In
other words, in that case, we held that Catain could
not avail himself of the right granted under Section
119 because he was not entitled to repurchase the
share of his co-heir in the homestead. Upon the
other hand, in this case, private respondent is
precisely seeking to repurchase from petitioners his
own share in the homestead that he inherited from
his parents.
There is nothing in Section 119 which provides that
the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs" must be the
conveyor of the homestead before any of them can
exercise the right to repurchase. Rather, what said
law plainly provides is that the "applicant, his widow,
or legal heirs" shall be entitled to repurchase the
homestead within (5) years from the date of
conveyance. In this case, there is no dispute that
private respondent is the legal heir of spouses

Crisanto and Feliciana Duaman, the homesteaders.
Since the transfer of the subject lot by private
respondent to his sons does not fall within the
purview of Section 119, it necessarily follows that the
five-year period to repurchase cannot be reckoned
from the date of said conveyance. Rather, the date
of conveyance for the purpose of counting the fiveyear period to repurchase under Section 119 is that
alienation made to a third party outside of the family
circle which in this case was the conveyance of the
subject lot to petitioners on 8 August 1985.
Accordingly, private respondent's complaint for the
repurchase of the subject lot, which was filed on 20
June 1989, was not time-barred as not more than
five (5) years had lapsed since the date of its
conveyance to petitioners.
176) Quimen Vs. CA and Yolanda Oliveros
G.R. No. 112331, May 29, 1996
Facts:
Petitioner Anastacia Quimen together with
her brothers Sotero, Sulpicio, Antonio and sister
Rufina inherited a piece of property situated in
Pandi, Bulacan. They agreed to subdivide the
property equally among themselves, as they did,
with the shares of Anastacia, Sotero, Sulpicio and
Rufina abutting the municipal road.
In February 1982 Yolanda purchased a part of the lot
from her uncle Antonio through her aunt Anastacia
who was then acting as his administratrix. According
to Yolanda, when petitioner offered her the property
for sale she was hesitant to buy as it had no access
to a public road. But Anastacia prevailed upon her to
buy the lot with the assurance that she would give
her a right of way on her adjoining property for
P200.00 per square meter.
Thereafter, Yolanda constructed a house on the lot
she bought using as her passageway to the public
highway a portion of Anastacia's property. But when
Yolanda finally offered to pay for the use of the
pathway Anastacia refused to accept the payment.
In fact she was thereafter barred by Anastacia from
passing through her property. In February 1986
Yolanda purchased the other lot of Antonio Quimen,
located directly behind the property of her parents
who provided her a pathway Although the pathway
leads to the municipal road it is not adequate for
ingress and egress. The municipal road cannot be
reached with facility because the store itself
obstructs the path so that one has to pass through
the back entrance and the facade of the store to
169

reach the road.
On 29 December 1987 Yolanda filed an action with
the trial court praying for a right of way through
Anastacia's property. The trial court dismissed the
complaint for lack of cause of action.
On appeal by respondent Yolanda, the Court of
Appeals reversed the lower court and held that she
was entitled to a right of way on petitioner's property
ISSUE:
Whether Yolanda is entitled to a right of way on her
property
RULING:
YES, she is entitled. Yolanda sufficiently established
the presence of the ff:
1. her estate (dominant estate) is surrounded
by other immovable without an adequate
outlet to public highway;
2. she is willing to pay the proper indemnity;
3. the isolation was not due to the acts of
Yolanda; and
4. the right of way being claimed is at a point
least prejudicial to the servient estate.
The criterion of least prejudicial to the servient estate
must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance.
Where the easement may be established on any of
several tenements surrounding the dominant estate,
the one where the way is shortest and will cause the
least damage should be chosen. However, if these
2 circumstances do not concur, the way which will
cause the least damage should be used even if it will
not be the shortest. In this case, Anastacias
property is least prejudicial since it will not entail the
demolition of a sari-sari store which is made of
strong materials.
As between a right of way that would demolish a
store of strong materials to provide egress to a
public highway, and another right of way which
although longer will require an avocado tree to be
cut down, the second alternative should be
preferred.
177) Valley Land Resources vs Valley Golf Club
G.R. No. 126584. November 15, 2001
Facts:
Victoria Valley Blvd is composed of road lots which
connects Ortigas Avenue and Sumulong Highway.
Half of the Boulevard is made up of road lots owned
by defendant-appellant Valley Golf. The other half is

supposed to be owned by Hacienda Benito with
whom Valley Golf entered into an agreement,
whereby it was agreed that Hacienda Benito and
Valley Golf will own jointly Victoria Valley Blvd, one
of the provisions provide that the right of way shall
be owned and maintained jointly by Hacienda Benito
and Valley Golf.
Thereafter, Hacienda Benito transferred ownership
and all its rights and interests over the road lots
covering half of the Victoria Valley Blvd. to herein
plaintiff-appellee Valley Land by virtue of a Mutual
Agreement Valley Golf treated and recognized Valley
Land as its alleged new co-owner over Victoria
Valley Blvd., sharing half of all the proceeds of the
grant of right of way over the boulevard.
However, in a subsequent review of the agreement
between Valley Golf and Hacienda Benito, Valley
Golf discovered that there is actually no existing coownership between them over Victoria Valley Blvd.
Valley Golf retained exclusive ownership over the
road lots forming part of Victoria Valley Blvd.
notwithstanding their agreement, and that the other
half of the boulevard is no longer under the name of
either Hacienda Benito or Valley Land as the same
has been disposed of already and is registered in
favor of the Active Realty & Dev't. Corp.
Based on said discovery, Valley Golf sought to
recover the sum of money which it allegedly remitted
by mistake to Valley Land which represents the
supposed share of the latter in the grant of right of
way. Valley Land in turn sought the cancellation of
Valley Golf s titles over the road lots forming half of
Victoria Valley Blvd. The cases were filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo and consolidated
therein. In due time, the assailed decision was
rendered and brought to this Court on appeal by
Valley Golf
ISSUE: Whether Valley Golf is the sole owner of
the subject road lots, or Valley Land is a co-owner
thereof
RULING: Valley Golf is the sole owner of the road
lots.
The TCTs which are the subject of the road right of
way and all the rest of the other certificates of title
covering the road lots are solely in the name of
Valley Golf. Consequently, there can be no question
that Valley Golf is the owner of the road lots. As
such owner, Valley Golf has the right to enjoy and
170

dispose of the same without any limitations other
than those established by law.
However, Valley Golf made the mistake of sharing
the proceeds of the right of way with Valley Land.
Considering that when the said amount was given to
Valley Land, it did not have the right to receive the
amount as Valley Golf delivered it under the
mistaken belief that Valley Land was a co-owner of
the lands, thus Valley Land was under obligation to
return the amount of P1,585,962.96.
178) Cabatingan vs heirs of Corazon Cabatingan
G.R. No. 131953. June 5, 2002
FACTS:
On February 17, 1992, Conchita Cabatingan
executed in favor of her brother, petitioner Nicolas
Cabatingan, a "Deed of Conditional of Donation Inter
Vivos for House and Lot" covering () portion of the
former's house and lot located at Liloan, Cebu. Four
(4) other deeds of donation were subsequently
executed by Conchita Cabatingan on January 14,
1995, bestowing upon: (a) petitioner Estela C.
Maglasang, two (2) parcels of land - one located in
Cogon, Cebu and the other, a portion of a parcel of
land in Masbate. (b) petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, a
portion of a parcel of land located in Masbate (and
(c) petitioner Merly S. Cabatingan, a portion of the
Masbate property These deeds of donation contain
similar provisions:
"That for and in consideration of the love and
affection of the DONOR for the DONEE, x x x the
DONOR transfers, conveys, by way of donation,
unto the DONEE the above property, to become
effective upon the death of the DONOR xxx
Upon learning of the existence of these donations,
respondents filed with the RTC an action for
Annulment And Declaration of Nullity of Deed of
Donations and Accounting. Respondents allege that
petitioners, through their sinister machinations and
strategies and taking advantage of Conchita
Cabatingan's fragile condition, caused the execution
of the deeds of donation, and, that the documents
are void for failing to comply with the provisions of
the Civil Code regarding formalities of wills and
testaments, considering that these are donations
mortis causa. Respondents prayed that they be
declared as co-owners of the properties in equal
shares, together with Nicolas Cabatingan.
RTC rendered a partial judgment in favor of
respondents by declaring the 4 Deeds of Donation
as null and void for being a Donation Mortis Causa

and for failure to comply with formal and solemn
requisite under Art. 806 of the New Civil Code;
declaring respondents as co-owners of the
properties of Conchita
ISSUE: Whether or not the donations are mortis
causa or inter vivos
RULING: The Donations in this case are Mortis
Causa.
In a Donation Mortis Causa, "the right of disposition
is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still
alive." In determining whether a donation is one of
mortis causa, the following characteristics must be
taken into account:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee
before the death of the transferor; transferor retains
ownership (full or naked) and control of the property
while alive;
(2) Before his death, the transfer should be
revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum;
(3) The transfer should be void if the transferor
should survive the transferee.
In the present case, the nature of the donations as
mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the
donations do not contain any clear provision that
intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners prior
to Cabatingan's death. It establishes the donor's
intention to transfer the ownership and possession of
the donated property to the donee only after the
former's death. The phrase "to become effective
upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other
interpretation but that Cabatingan did not intend to
transfer the ownership of the properties to petitioners
during her lifetime. Petitioners themselves expressly
confirmed the donations as mortis causa in the
following Acceptance and Attestation clauses,
uniformly found in the subject deeds of donation,
"That the DONEE does hereby accept the foregoing
donation mortis causa.
179) GONZALES vs. CA
G.R. No. 110335. June 18, 2001
FACTS:
The deceased spouses Ignacio Gonzales
and Marina Gonzales were the registered owners of
two parcels of agricultural Land situated at Barrio
Fortaleza, Cabanatuan City, Herein petitioners are
the successors-in-interest or the children and
grandchildren of said Gonzales spouses. On the
171

other hand, private respondents are the farmers and
tenants of said spouses who have been cultivating
the parcels of land even before World War II either
personally or through their predecessors-in-interest.
On May 7, 1969, Marina Gonzales died intestate and
appointed as administratrix of her estate was
petitioner Lilia Gonzales. Prior to the partition of said
estate, Ignacio Gonzales executed a Deed of
Donation on July 12, 1972 conveying his share of
the property.
When Presidential Decree No. 27 (P.D. No. 27) took
effect on October 21, 1972, the landholdings of the
spouses Gonzales were placed under Operation
Land Transfer by virtue of said decree, and private
respondents
were
accordingly
issued
the
corresponding Certificates of Land Transfer and
Emancipation Patents. On March 5, 1974, the
administratrix Lilia Gonzales filed an application for
retention with the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform,
requesting that their property be excluded from the
coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) resolution dated February
23, 1983 recommending that the land subject of the
deed of donation, or Lot No. 551-C, be exempt from
Operation Land Transfer.
ISSUE:Whether the property subject of the deed of
donation which was not registered when P.D. No. 27
took effect, should be excluded from the Operation
Land Transfer.
RULING: No. Article 749 of the Civil Code provides
that "in order that the donation of an immovable may
be valid, it must be made in a public document,
specifying therein the property donated and the
value of the charges which the donee must satisfy."
Article 709 of the same Code explicitly states that
"the titles of ownership, or other rights over
immovable property, which are not duly inscribed or
annotated in the Registry of property shall not
prejudice third persons. From the foregoing
provisions, it may be inferred that as between the
parties to a donation of an immovable property, all
that is required is for said donation to be contained
in a public document. Registration is not necessary
for it to be considered valid and effective. However,
in order to bind third persons, the donation must be
registered in the Registry of Property (now Registry
of Land Titles and Deeds). Although the nonregistration of a deed of donation shall not affect its
validity, the necessity of registration comes into play
when the rights of third persons are affected, as in
the case at bar.
It is undisputed in this case that the donation

executed by Ignacio Gonzales in favor of his
grandchildren, although in writing and duly notarized,
has not been registered in accordance with law. For
this reason, it shall not be binding upon private
respondents who did not participate in said deed or
had no actual knowledge thereof. Hence, while the
deed of donation is valid between the donor and the
donees, such deed, however, did not bind the
tenants-farmers who were not parties to the
donation. From the foregoing, the ineluctable
conclusion drawn is that the unregistered deed of
donation cannot operate to exclude the subject land
from the coverage of the Operation Land Transfer of
P.D. No. 27, which took effect on October 21, 1972.
To rule otherwise would render ineffectual the rights
and interests that the tenants-farmers immediately
acquired upon the promulgation of P.D. No. 27.
180) Republic vs. Leon Silim
G.R. No. 140487. April 2, 2001
FACTS:
On 17 December 1971, respondents, the Spouses
Leon Silim and Ildefonsa Mangubat, donated a
5,600 square meter parcel of land in favor of the
Bureau of Public Schools, Municipality of Malangas,
Zamboanga del Sur (BPS). In the Deed of Donation,
respondents imposed the condition that the said
property should "be used exclusively and forever for
school purposes only."1 This donation was accepted
by Gregorio Buendia, the District Supervisor of BPS,
through an Affidavit of Acceptance and Confirmation
of Donation.
Through a fund raising campaign spearheaded by
the Parent-Teachers Association of Barangay
Kauswagan, a school building was constructed on
the donated land. However, the Bagong Lipunan
school building that was supposed to be allocated
for the donated parcel of land in Barangay
Kauswagan could not be released since the
government required that it be built upon a one (1)
hectare parcel of land. To remedy this predicament,
Assistant School Division Superintendent of the
Province of Zamboanga del Sur, Sabdani Hadjirol,
authorized District Supervisor Buendia to officially
transact for the exchange of the one-half (1/2)
hectare old school site of Kauswagan Elementary
School to a new and suitable location which would fit
the specifications of the government. Pursuant to
this, District Supervisor Buendia and Teresita Palma
entered into a Deed of Exchange whereby the
donated lot was exchanged with the bigger lot
owned by the latter..
172

When respondent Leon Silim saw, to his surprise,
that Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma was constructing a
house on the donated land, he asked the latter why
he was building a house on the property he donated
to BPS. Vice Mayor Wilfredo Palma replied that he is
already the owner of the said property. Respondent
Leon Silim endeavored to stop the construction of
the house on the donated property but Vice-Mayor
Wilfredo Palma advised him to just file a case in
court.
On February 10, 1982, respondents filed a
Complaint for Revocation and Cancellation of
Conditional Donation, Annulment of Deed of
Exchange and Recovery of Possession and
Ownership of Real Property with damages against
Vice Mayor Wilfredo Palma before the RTC of
Pagadian City which dismissed the complaint for
lack of merit.
Not satisfied with the decision of the trial court,
respondents appealed in which the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the trial court and declared
the donation null and void on the grounds that the
donation was not properly accepted and the
condition imposed on the donation was violated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation is valid.
HELD: Donations, according to its purpose or
cause, may be categorized as: (1) pure or simple;
(2) remuneratory or compensatory; (3) conditional or
modal; and (4) onerous. An onerous donation is that
which imposes upon the donee a reciprocal
obligation or, to be more precise, this is the kind of
donation made for a valuable consideration, the cost
of which is equal to or more than the thing donated.
Unlike the other forms of donation, the validity of and
the rights and obligations of the parties involved in
an onerous donation are completely governed not by
the law on donations but by the law on contracts
(Article 733 Civil Code). The donation involved in
the present controversy is one which is onerous
since there is a burden imposed upon the donee to
build a school on the donated property.
In accordance to Art. 745 & 749, there was a valid
acceptance of the donation in this case. The written
acceptance of the donation having been considered
by the trial court in arriving at its decision, there is
the presumption that this exhibit was properly
offered and admitted by the court. Also, a school
building was immediately constructed after the
donation was executed. Silim had knowledge of the
existence of the school building put up on the lot.
The condition for the donation in this case was not

violated when the lot donated was exchanged with
another one. The purpose for the donation remains
the same - for the establishment of a school. The
exclusivity of the purpose was not altered or
affected. In fact, the exchange of the lot for a much
bigger one was in furtherance and enhancement of
the purpose of the donation. The acquisition of the
bigger lot paved the way for the release of funds for
the construction of Bagong Lipunan School Bldg
which could not be accommodated by the limited
area of the donated lot.
181) QUILALA V. ALCANTARA
G.R. No. 13268, December 3, 2001
FACTS: On February 20, 1981, Catalina Quilala
executed a "Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos"
in favor of Violeta Quilala over a parcel of land
located in Sta. Cruz, Manila.
The "Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos"
consists of two pages. The first page contains the
deed of donation itself, and is signed on the bottom
portion by Catalina Quilala as donor, Violeta Quilala
as donee, and two instrumental witnesses. The
second page contains the Acknowledgment, which
states merely that Catalina Quilala personally
appeared
before
the
notary
public
and
acknowledged that the donation was her free and
voluntary act and deed. There appear on the lefthand margin of the second page the signatures of
Catalina Quilala and one of the witnesses, and on
the right-hand margin the signatures of Violeta
Quilala and the other witness.
On November 7, 1983, Catalina Quilala died. Violeta
Quilala likewise died on May 22, 1984. Petitioner
Ricky Quilala alleges that he is the surviving son of
Violeta Quilala..
Meanwhile, respondents Gliceria Alcantara, Leonora
Alcantara, Ines Reyes and Juan Reyes, claiming to
be Catalina's only surviving relatives within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity, executed a deed
of extrajudicial settlement of estate, dividing and
adjudicating unto themselves the subject property.
The trial court found that the deed of donation,
although signed by both Catalina and Violeta, was
acknowledged before a notary public only by the
donor, Catalina. Consequently, there was no
acceptance by Violeta of the donation in a public
instrument, thus rendering the donation null and
void. Furthermore, the trial court held that nowhere
in Catalina's SSS records does it appear that Violeta
was Catalina's daughter. Rather, Violeta was
referred to therein as an adopted child, but there
173

was no positive evidence that the adoption was
legal. On the other hand, the trial court found that
respondents were first cousins of Catalina Quilala.
However, since it appeared that Catalina died
leaving a will, the trial court ruled that respondents'
deed of extrajudicial settlement cannot be
registered.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision affirming with modification the decision of
the trial court by dismissing the complaint for lack of
cause of action without prejudice to the filing of
probate proceedings of Catalina's alleged last will
and testament.
ISSUE: validity of the donation executed by Catalina
in favor of Violeta
HELD: Article 749 of the Civil Code, the donation of
an immovable must be made in a public instrument
in order to be valid, specifying therein the property
donated and the value of the charges which the
donee must satisfy. As a mode of acquiring
ownership, donation results in an effective transfer of
title over the property from the donor to the
donee,and is perfected from the moment the donor
knows of the acceptance by the donee, provided the
donee is not disqualified or prohibited by law from
accepting the donation. Once the donation is
accepted, it is generally considered irrevocable, and
the donee becomes the absolute owner of the
property. The acceptance, to be valid, must be made
during the lifetime of both the donor and the donee.It
may be made in the same deed or in a separate
public document, and the donor must know the
acceptance by the donee.
In the case at bar, the deed of donation contained
the number of the certificate of title as well as the
technical description of the real property donated. It
stipulated that the donation was made for and in
consideration of the "love and affection which the
DONEE inspires in the DONOR, and as an act of
liberality and generosity."
Below the terms and stipulations of the donation, the
donor, donee and their witnesses affixed their
signature. However, the Acknowledgment appearing
on the second page mentioned only the donor,
Catalina Quilala.
The second page of the deed of donation, on which
the Acknowledgment appears, was signed by the
donor and one witness on the left-hand margin, and
by the donee and the other witness on the right hand
margin. Surely, the requirement that the contracting
parties and their witnesses should sign on the lefthand margin of the instrument is not absolute. The
intendment of the law merely is to ensure that each
and every page of the instrument is authenticated by

the parties. The requirement is designed to avoid the
falsification of the contract after the same has
already been duly executed by the parties. Simply
put, the specification of the location of the signature
is merely directory. The fact that one of the parties
signs on the wrong side of the page does not
invalidate the document. The purpose of
authenticating the page is served, and the
requirement in the above-quoted provision is
deemed substantially complied with.
In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by
the donee before the notary public does not also
render the donation null and void. The instrument
should be treated in its entirety. It cannot be
considered a private document in part and a public
document in another part. The fact that it was
acknowledged before a notary public converts the
deed of donation in its entirety a public instrument.
The fact that the donee was not mentioned by the
notary public in the acknowledgment is of no
moment. To be sure, it is the conveyance that should
be acknowledged as a free and voluntary act. In any
event, the donee signed on the second page, which
contains the Acknowledgment only. Her acceptance,
which is explicitly set forth on the first page of the
notarized deed of donation, was made in a public
instrument.
182)
SPOUSES
STA.
MARIA
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 127549, January 28, 1998
V.
FACTS: Spouses Arsenio and Roslynn Fajardo are

the registered owners of a piece of land, Lot No.
124, located at Paco, Obando, Bulacan. They
acquired said lot under a Deed of Absolute Sale
dated February 6, 1992 executed by the vendors
Pedro M. Sanchez, et al.
Plaintiff's aforesaid Lot 124 is surrounded by a
fishpond on the northeast portion thereof; by Lot
126, owned by Florentino Cruz, on the southeast
portion; by Lot 6-a and a portion of Lot 6-b, owned
respectively by Spouses Cesar and Raquel Sta.
Maria and Florcerfida Sta. Maria, on the southwest;
and by Lot 122, owned by the Jacinto family, on the
northwest.
On February 17, 1992, Respondent spouses Fajardo
filed a complaint against petitioner Cesar and
Raquel Sta. Maria or Florcerfida Sta. Maria for the
establishment of an easement of right of way.
Respondents alleged that their lot, Lot 124, is
surrounded by properties belonging to other
persons, including those of the petitioners; that since
174

respondents
have no adequate outlet to the
provincial road, an easement of a right of way
passing through either of the alternative petitioners
properties which are directly abutting the provincial
road would be respondents only convenient, direct
and shortest access to and from the provincial road;
that respondents predecessors-in-interest have been
passing through the properties of petitioners going to
and from their lot; that petitioners' mother even
promised respondents' predecessors-in-interest to
grant the latter an easement of right of way as she
acknowledged the absence of an access from their
property to the road; and that alternative petitioners,
despite respondents request for a right of way and
referral of the dispute to the barangay officials,
refused to grant them an easement. Thus,
respondents prayed that an easement of right of way
on the lots of defendants be established in their
favor.
Defendants, instead of filing an answer, filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the lower court
has no jurisdiction to hear the case since plaintiffs
failed to refer the matter to the barangay lupon. The
lower court, however, in its Order dated May 18,
1992, denied said motion on the premise that there
was substantial compliance with the law.
The trial court found that based on the Ocular
Inspection Report there was no other way through
which the private respondents could establish a right
of way in order to reach the provincial road except
by traversing directly the property of the petitioners.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that
the private respondents had sufficiently established
the existence of the four requisites for compulsory
easement of right of way on petitioners' property, to
wit: (1) private respondents' property was, as
revealed by the Ocular inspection Report,
surrounded by other immovables owned by different
individuals and was without an adequate outlet to a
public highway; (2) the isolation of private
respondents' property was not due to their own acts,
as it was already surrounded by other immovables
when they purchased it; (3) petitioners' property
would provide the shortest way from private
respondents' property to the provincial road, and this
way would cause the least prejudice because no
significant structure would be injured thereby; and
(4) the private respondents were willing to pay the
corresponding damages provided for by law if the
right of way would be granted.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT A COMPULSORY
RIGHT OF WAY CAN BE GRANTED TO PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS
HELD: In the instant case, the Court of Appeals

have correctly found the existence of the requisites.
Private respondents' property is landlocked by
neighboring estates belonging to different owners.
The petitioners try to convince the Court that there
are two other existing passage ways over the
property of Cruz and over that of Jacinto, as well as
a "daang tao," for private respondents' use. But the
examination of the records yields otherwise. Said
lots of Cruz and Jacinto do not have existing
passage ways for the private respondents to use.
Moreover, the Ocular Inspection Report reveals that
the suggested alternative ways through Cruz's or
Jacinto's properties are longer and "circuitous" than
that through petitioners' property. This is also clear
from the Sketch Plan submitted by the private
respondents wherein it is readily seen that the lots of
Cruz and Jacinto are only adjacent to that of private
respondents unlike that of petitioners which is
directly in front of private respondents' property in
relation to the public highway.
Under Article 650 of the Civil Code, the easement of
right of way shall be established at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest. Where there are several tenements
surrounding the dominant estate, and the easement
may be established on any of them, the one where
the way is shortest and will cause the least damage
should be chosen.The conditions of "least damage"
and "shortest distance" are both established in one
tenement petitioners' property.
As to the "daang tao" at the back of private
respondents' property, it must be stressed that under
Article 651 the width of the easement of right of way
shall be that which is sufficient for the needs of the
dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed
from time to time. Therefore, the needs of the
dominant estate determine the width of the
easement.The needs of private respondents'
property could hardly be served by this "daang tao"
located at the back and which is bordered by a
fishpond.
183) CRISTOBAL V. COURT OF APPEALS

291 SCRA 122
175

FACTS: Petitioners own a house and lot situated at
Visayas Avenue Extension, Quezon City, where they
have been residing from 1961 to the present.
Respondent Cesar Ledesma, Inc., on the other
hand, is the owner of a subdivision at Barrio Culiat
along Visayas Avenue which once included the
disputed residential lots, Lot 1 and Lot 2, located
adjacent to petitioners' property. Lots 1 and 2 were
originally part of a private road known as Road Lot 2
owned exclusively by Cesar Ledesma, Inc.
Petitioners were using Road Lot 2 in going to and
from the nearest public road. When Visayas Avenue
became operational as a national road in 1979,
Cesar Ledesma, Inc., filed a petition before the RTC
of Quezon City to be allowed to convert Road Lot 2
into residential lots. The petition was granted, hence,
Road Lot 2 was converted into residential lots
designated as lot 1 and lot 2. Subsequently, Cesar
Ledesma , Inc., sold both lots to Macario Pacione. In
turn, Macario Pacione conveyed the lots to his son
and dauhter-in-law, respondent spouses Jesus and
Lerma Pacione.
When the Pacione spouses, who intended to build a
house on Lot 1, Visited the property in 1987, they
found out that the lot was occupied by a squatter
named Juanita Geronimo and a portion was being
used a passageway by petitioners to and from
Visayas Avenue. Accordingly, the spouses
complained about the intrusion into their property to
the Barangay Office. When the parties failed to
arrive at an amicable settlement, the spouses
started enclosing Lot 1 with a concrete fence.
Petitioners prostested the enclosure alleging that
their property was bounded on all sides by
residential houses belonging to different owners and
had no adequate outlet and inlet to Visayas Avenue
except through the property of the Paciones. As their
protests went unheeded, petitioners instituted an
action for easement of right of way.
At the instance of the parties, the trial court ordered
an ocular inspection of the property.
The trial court dismissed the complaint holding that
one essential requisite of a legal easement of right of
way was not proved, i.e., the absence of an
alternative adequate way or outlet to a public
highway, in this case, Visayas Avenue.
On 16 January 1996 the Court of Appeals rendered
its assailed decision affirming the findings of the trial
court.
ISSUE: whether or not petitioners are entitled to a
compulsory easement of
right of way
HELD: To be entitled to a compulsory easement of
right of way, the preconditions provided under Arts.
649 and 650 of the Civil Code must be established.
These are: (1) that the dominant estate is

surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) that proper
indemnity has been paid; (3) that the isolation was
not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant
estate; (4) that the right of way claimed is at a point
least prejudicial to the servient estate and, in so far
as consistent with this rule, where the distance from
the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest.The burden of proving the existence of
these prerequisites lies on the owner of the
dominant estate.
In the present case, the first element is
clearly absent. As found by the trial court and the
Court of Appeals, an outlet already exist, which is a
path walk located at the left side of petitioners'
property and which is connected to a private road
about five hundred (500) meters long. The private
road, in turn, leads to Ma. Elena Street which is
about 2.5 meters wide and, finally, to Visayas
Avenue. This outlet was determined by the court a
quo to be sufficient for the needs of the dominants
estate, hence petitioners have no cause to complain
that they have no adequate outlet to Visayas
Avenue.
Further, no evidence was adduced by petitioners to
prove that the easement they seek to impose on
private respondents' property is to be established at
a point least prejudicial to the servient estate. For
emphasis, Lot 1 is only 164 square meters and an
improvident imposition of the easement on the lot
may unjustly deprive private respondents of the
optimum use and enjoyment of their property,
considering that its already small area will be
reduced further by the easement. Worse, it may
even render the property useless for the purpose for
which private respondents purchased the same.
It must also be stressed that, by its very nature, and
when considered with reference to the obligations
imposed on the servient estate, an easement
involves an abnormal restriction on the property
rights of the servient owner and is regarded as a
charge or encumbrance on the servient estate.
Thus, it is incumbent upon the owner of the
dominant estate to establish by clear and convincing
evidence the presence of all the preconditions
before his claim for easement of right of way be
granted. Petitioners miserably failed in this regard.
On the question of adequacy of the existing
outlet, petitioners allege that the path walk is much
longer, circuitous and inconvenient, as from Visayas
Avenue one has to pass by Ma. Elena St., turn right
to a private road, then enter, then vacant lot, and
turn right again to exit from the vacant lot until one
reaches petitioners' property.
176

We find petitioners' concept of what is "adequate
outlet" a complete disregard of the well-entrenched
doctrine that in order to justify the imposition of an
easement of right of way there must be a real, not
ficititious or artificial, necessity for it. Mere
convenience for the dominant estate is not what is
required by law as the basis for setting up a
compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity,
if it can be satisfied without imposing the easement,
the same should not be imposed
Admittedly, the proposed right of way over
private respondents' property is the most
convenient, being the shorter and the more direct
route to Visayas Avenue. However, it is not enough
that the easement be where the way is shortest. It is
more improtant that it be where it will cause the least
prejudice to the servient estate. As discussed
elsewhere,
petitioners
failed
to
sufficiently
demonstrate that the proposed right of way shall be
at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
184)
CAMARINES
NORTE
ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE, INC. (CANORECO) V. COURT OF
APPEALS
345 SCRA 85
FACTS: On May 18, 1989, Conrad L. Leviste filed
with the RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte, a complaint
for collection of a sum of money and foreclosure of
mortgage against Philippine Smelter Corporation
(PSC).
For failure to file an answer to the complaint, the trial
court declared PSC in default and allowed plaintiff
Leviste to present evidence ex-parte.
On November 23, 1989, the trial court rendered a
decision in favor of plaintiff.
When the decision became final and executory, the
trial court issued a writ of execution and respondent
sheriff Eduardo R. Moreno levied upon two (2)
parcels of land issued by the Registrar of Deeds in
the name of PSC. On April 24, 1990, the parcels of
land were sold at public auction in favor of Vines
Realty Corporation. On April 25, 1990, the Clerk of
Court, as ex-officio Provincial Sheriff, issued a
Certificate of Sale which Judge Luis D. Dictado, in
his capacity as executive judge, approved.
On June 23, 1992, Vines Realty moved for the
issuance of a writ of possession over said property.
On June 25, 1992, the trial court granted the motion.
On August 7, 1992, copy of the writ of possession
was served on petitioner as owner of the power lines
standing on certain portions of the subject property.
Later, on August 12, 1992, Vines Realty filed an
amended motion for an order of demolition and

removal of improvements on the subject land.
Among the improvements for removal were the
power lines and electric posts belonging to
petitioner.
Petitioner opposed the motion on the ground that
petitioner was not a party to the case and therefore
not bound by the judgment of the trial court and that
it had subsisting right-of-way agreements over said
property.
The trial court proceeded with the hearing despite
the fact that petitioner had no counsel present. Thus,
only Vines Realty presented its evidence.
On the same date, November 27, 1992, the trial
court ordered the issuance of a writ of demolition.
On December 7, 1992, petitioner filed with the Court
of Appeals a petition for prohibition with restraining
order and preliminary injunction and the same was
granted.
On December 11, 1992, the trial court issued
another order directing the National Power
Corporation sub-unit in Camarines Norte to shut off
the power lines .
On the same day, December 11, 1992, respondent
Vines Realty cut down petitioners electric posts
professedly using a chainsaw and resulting in a loud
blast affecting the area.
Even the members of the Sangguniang Bayan at
San Jose appealed to respondent Sheriff to desist
from proceeding with the demolition due to a
restraining order but to no avail.
On January 26, 1993, the trial court issued an alias
writ of demolition
The sheriff, at the request of Vines Realty
demolished the remaining electric posts resulting in
the cutting off of power supply to various business
establishments and barangays.
Meantime, on January 19, 1993, the Court of
Appeals, promulgated a decision dismissing the
petition for lack of merit.
Meanwhile, in response to the publics urgent basic
need, petitioner re-constructed its power lines along
the provincial road leading to the Port of Osmea
upon authority of DPWH.
On April 23, 1993, however, petitioner received a
letter dated April 10, 1993, stating that Vines Realty
was the owner of the roadside and that petitioner
could not construct power lines therein without its
permission. Petitioner promptly replied that the
power lines were constructed within the right of way
of the provincial road leading to the port of Osmea
as granted by the District Engineer of DPWH.
177

ISSUE: whether petitioner is entitled to retain
possession of the power lines located in the land
sold at public auction as a result of extra-judicial
foreclosure of mortgage
HELD: The most basic tenet of due process is the
right to be heard. A court denies a party due process
if it renders its orders without giving such party an
opportunity to present its evidence. This Court finds
that petitioner was denied due process. Petitioner
could have negated private respondents claims by
showing the absence of legal or factual basis
therefor if only the trial court in the exercise of justice
and equity reset the hearing instead of proceeding
with the trial and issuing an order of demolition on
the same day.
The trial court failed to appreciate the nature
of electric cooperatives as public utilities.
The acquisition of an easement of a right-ofway falls within the purview of the power of eminent
domain. Such conclusion finds support in easements
of right-of-way where the Supreme Court sustained
the award of just compensation for private property
condemned for public use.
However, a simple right-of-way easement
transmits no rights, except the easement. Vines
Realty retains full ownership and it is not totally
deprived of the use of the land. It can continue doing
what it wants to do with the land, except those that
would result in contact with the wires.
The acquisition of this easement, nevertheless, is
not gratis. Considering the nature and effect of the
installation power lines, the limitations on the use of
the land for an indefinite period deprives private
respondents of its ordinary use. For these reasons,
Vines Realty is entitled to payment of just
compensation, which must be neither more nor less
than the money equivalent of the property.
Just compensation has been understood to be the
just and complete equivalent of the loss, which the
owner of the res expropriated has to suffer by
reason of the expropriation. The value of the land
and its character at the time it was taken by the
Government are the criteria for determining just
compensation. No matter how commendable
petitioners purpose is, it is just and equitable that
Vines Realty be compensated the fair and full
equivalent for the taking of its property, which is the
measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would
accrue to the expropriating entity.
185) VILLANUEVA V. VELASCO
346 SCRA 99
FACTS: Petitioner Bryan Villanueva is the registered

owner of the parcel of land in Quezon City. He
bought it from Pacific Banking Corporation, the
mortgagee of said property. The bank had acquired
it from the spouses Maximo and Justina Gabriel at a
public auction on March 19, 1983. When petitioner
bought the parcel of land there was a small house
on its southeastern portion. It occupied one meter of
the two-meter wide easement of right of way the
Gabriel spouses granted to the Espinolas,
predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, in a
Contract of Easement of Right of Way.
Unknown to petitioner, even before he
bought the land, the Gabriels had constructed the
aforementioned small house that encroached upon
the two-meter easement. Petitioner was also
unaware that private respondents, Julio Sebastian
and Shirley Lorilla, had filed on May 8, 1991 for
easement, damages and with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order
against the spouses Gabriel. As successors-ininterest, Sebastian and Lorilla wanted to enforce the
contract of easement.
On May 15, 1991, the trial court issued a
temporary restraining order. On August 13, 1991, it
issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
ordering the Gabriels to provide the right of way and
to demolish the small house encroaching on the
easement. On August 15, 1991, the Gabriels filed a
motion for reconsideration which was also denied.
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and
upheld the RTCs issuances. The decision became
final and executory on July 31, 1992.
On January 5, 1995, Judge Tirso Velasco of
the RTC in Quezon City issued an Alias Writ of
Demolition. On June 20, 1995, the sheriff tried to
demolish the small house pursuant to the writ.
Petitioner, thereafter, filed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals asserting that
the existence of the easement of right of way was
not annotated in his title and that he was not a party
to the Civil Case. The Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition for lack of merit and denied the
reconsideration.
ISSUE: whether the easement on the property binds
petitioner
HELD: The subject easement (right of way)
originally was voluntarily constituted by agreement
between the Gabriels and the Espinolas. But as
correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the
easement in the instant petition is both (1) an
easement by grant or a voluntary easement, and (2)
178

an easement by necessity or a legal easement. A
legal easement is one mandated by law, constituted
for public use or for private interest, and becomes a
continuing property right. As a compulsory
easement, it is inseparable from the estate to which
it belongs, as provided for in said Article 617 of the
Civil Code.
The essential requisites for an easement to be
compulsory are: (1) the dominant estate is
surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper
indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not
due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate;
(4) the right of way claimed is at a point least
prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the
extent consistent with the foregoing rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest. The trial court and the
Court of Appeals have declared the existence of said
easement (right of way). This finding of fact of both
courts below is conclusive on this Court, hence there
is no need to further review, but only to re-affirm, this
finding. The small house occupying one meter of the
two-meter wide easement obstructs the entry of
private respondents cement mixer and motor
vehicle. One meter is insufficient for the needs of
private respondents. It is well-settled that the needs
of the dominant estate determine the width of the
easement. Conformably then, petitioner ought to
demolish whatever edifice obstructs the easement in
view of the needs of private respondents estate.
Petitioners second proposition, that he is not bound
by the contract of easement because the same was
not annotated in the title and that a notice of lis
pendens of the complaint to enforce the easement
was not recorded with the Register of Deeds, is
obviously unmeritorious. As already explained, it is in
the nature of legal easement that the servient estate
(of petitioner) is legally bound to provide the
dominant estate (of private respondents in this case)
ingress from and egress to the public highway.
Petitioners last argument that he was not a party to
Civil Case and that he had not been given his day in
court, is also without merit under Rule 39, Sec. 47,
of the Revised Rules of Court.
Simply stated, a decision in a case is
conclusive and binding upon the parties to said case
and those who are their successor in interest by title
after said case has been commenced or filed in
court. In this case, private respondents, Julio
Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla, initiated Civil Case on
May 8, 1991, against the original owners, the
spouses Maximo and Justina Gabriel. Title in the
name of petitioner was entered in the Register of
Deeds on March 24, 1995, after he bought the
property from the bank which had acquired it from

the Gabriels. Hence, the decision in Civil Case
binds petitioner. For, although not a party to the suit,
he is a successor-in-interest by title subsequent to
the commencement of the action in court.
186) COSTABELLA CORPORATION V. CA
193 SCRA 332
FACTS: petitioner owns the real estate properties
situated at Sitio Buyong, Maribago, Lapu-Lapu City,
on which it had constructed a resort and hotel. The
private respondents, on the other hand, are the
owners of adjoining properties.
Before the petitioner began the construction of its
beach hotel, the private respondents, in going to and
from their respective properties and the provincial
road, passed through a passageway which traversed
the petitioner's property. In 1981, the petitioner
closed the aforementioned passageway when it
began the construction of its hotel, but nonetheless
opened another route across its property through
which the private respondents, as in the past, were
allowed to pass. Sometime in August, 1982, when it
undertook the construction of the second phase of
its beach hotel, the petitioner fenced its property
thus closing even the alternative passageway and
preventing the private respondents from traversing
any part of it.
As a direct consequence of these closures, an action
for injunction with damages was filed against the
petitioner by the private respondents on September
2, 1982. In their complaint, the private respondents
assailed the petitioner's closure of the original
passageway which they (private respondents)
claimed to be an "ancient road right of way" that had
been existing before World War II and since then
had been used by them, the community, and the
general public, either as pedestrians or by means of
vehicles, in going to and coming from Lapu-Lapu
City and other parts of the country. The private
respondents averred that by closing the alleged road
right of way in question, the petitioner had deprived
them access to their properties and caused them
damages.
In the same complainant, the private respondents
likewise alleged that the petitioner had constructed a
dike on the beach fronting the latter's property
without the necessary permit, obstructing the
passage of the residents and local fishermen, and
trapping debris and flotsam on the beach. They also
claimed that the debris and flotsam that had
accumulated prevented them from using their
properties for the purpose for which they had
179

acquired them. The complaint this prayed for the trial
court to order the re-opening of the original
passageway across the petitioner's property as well
as the destruction of the dike.
In its answer, the petitioner denied the existence of
an ancient road through its property and counteraverred, among others, that it and its predecessorsin-interest had permitted the temporary, intermittent,
and gratuitous use of, or passage through, its
property by the private respondents and others by
mere tolerance and purely as an act of
neighborliness. At any rate, the petitioner alleged,
the private respondents were not entirely dependent
on the subject passageway as they (private
respondents) had another existing and adequate
access to the public road through other properties.
With respect to the dike it allegedly constructed, the
petitioner stated that what it built was a breakwater
on the foreshore land fronting its property and not a
dike as claimed by the private respondents.
Moreover, contrary to the private respondents'
accusation, the said construction had benefitted the
community especially the fishermen who used the
same as mooring for their boats during low tide. The
quantity of flotsam and debris which had formed on
the private respondents' beach front on the other
hand were but the natural and unavoidable
accumulations on beaches by the action of the tides
and movement of the waves of the sea.
After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision on
March 15, 1984 finding that the private respondents
had acquired a vested right over the passageway in
controversy based on its long existence and its
continued use and enjoyment not only by the private
respondents, but also by the community at large.
The petitioner in so closing the said passageway,
had accordingly violated the private respondents'
vested right.
The respondent Appellate Court held as without
basis the trial court's finding that the private
respondents had acquired a vested right over the
passageway in question by virtue of prescription.
The appellate court pointed out that an easement of
right of way is a discontinuous one which, under
Article 622 of the New Civil Code, may only be
acquired by virtue of a title and not by prescription.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of
respondent appellate court is grossly erroneous
not in accord with the provisions of Articles 649
650 of the Civil Code on easements and
prevailing jurisprudence on the matter
the
and
and
the
HELD: The petition is meritorious.

It is already well-established that an easement of
right of way, as is involved here, is discontinuous

and as such can not be acquired by prescription.
Insofar therefore as the appellate court adhered to
the foregoing precepts, it stood correct.
Unfortunately,
after
making
the
correct
pronouncement, the respondent Appellate Court did
not order the reversal of the trial court's decision and
the dismissal of the complaint after holding that no
easement had been validly constituted over the
petitioner's property. Instead, the Appellate Court
went on to commit a reversible error by considering
the passageway in issue as a compulsory easement
which the private respondents, as owners of the
"dominant" estate, may demand from the petitioner
the latter being the owner of the "servient" estate.
Based on Article 649 and 650 of the Civil Code,
Based on the foregoing, the owner of the dominant
estate may validly claim a compulsory right of way
only after he has established the existence of four
requisites, to wit: (1) the (dominant) estate is
surrounded by other immovables and is without
adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) after
payment of the proper indemnity; (3) the isolation
was not due to the proprietor's own acts; and (4) the
right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to
the servient estate. Additionally, the burden of
proving the existence of the foregoing pre-requisites
lies on the owner of the dominant estate.
Here, there is absent any showing that the private
respondents had established the existence of the
four requisites mandated by law. For one, they failed
to prove that there is no adequate outlet from their
respective properties to a public highway. On the
contrary, as alleged by the petitioner in its answer to
the complaint, and confirmed by the appellate court,
"there is another outlet for the plaintiffs (private
respondents) to the main road." Thus, the
respondent Court of Appeals likewise admitted that
"legally the old road could be closed." Yet, it ordered
the re- opening of the old passageway on the ground
that "the existing outlet (the other outlet) is
inconvenient to the plaintiff." On this score, it is
apparent that the Court of Appeals lost sight of the
fact that the convenience of the dominant estate has
never been the gauge for the grant of compulsory
right of way. To be sure, the true standard for the
grant of the legal right is "adequacy." Hence, when
there is already an existing adequate outlet from the
dominant estate to a public highway, even if the said
outlet, for one reason or another, be inconvenient,
the need to open up another servitude is entirely
unjustified. For to justify the imposition of an
easement or right of way, "there must be a real, not
a fictitious or artificial necessity for it."
Further, the private respondents failed to indicate in
180

their complaint or even to manifest during the trial of
the case that they were willing to indemnify fully the
petitioner for the right of way to be established over
its property. Neither have the private respondents
been able to show that the isolation of their property
was not due to their personal or their predecessorsin-interest's own acts. Finally, the private
respondents failed to allege, much more introduce
any evidence, that the passageway they seek to be
re-opened is at a point least prejudicial to the
petitioner. Considering that the petitioner operates a
hotel and beach resort in its property, it must
undeniably maintain a strict standard of security
within its premises. Otherwise, the convenience,
privacy, and safety of its clients and patrons would
be compromised. That indubitably will doom the
petitioner's business. It is therefore of great
importance that the claimed light of way over the
petitioner's property be located at a point least
prejudicial to its business.
As also earlier indicated, there must be a real
necessity therefor, and not mere convenience for the
dominant estate. Hence, if there is an existing outlet,
otherwise adequate, to the highway, the "dominant"
estate can not demand a right of way, although the
same may not be convenient. Of course, the
question of when a particular passage may be said
to be "adequate" depends on the circumstances of
each case.
The isolation of the dominant estate is also
dependent on the particular need of the dominant
owner, and the estate itself need not be totally
landlocked. What is important to consider is whether
or not a right of way is necessary to fill a reasonable
need
therefor
by
the
owner
But while a right of way is legally
demandable, the owner of the dominant estate is not
at liberty to impose one based on arbitrary choice.
Under Article 650 of the Code, it shall be established
upon two criteria: (1) at the point least prejudicial to
the servient state; and (2) where the distance to a
public highway may be the shortest. "The court,"
says Tolentino, "is not bound to establish what is the
shortest; a longer way may be established to avoid
injury to the servient tenement, such as when there
are constuctions or walls which can be avoided by a
roundabout way, or to secure the interest of the
dominant owner, such as when the shortest distance
would place the way on a dangerous decline."
187) ENCARNACION V. CA
195 SCRA 74
FACTS: Petitioner Tomas Encarnacion and private

respondent Heirs of the late Aniceta Magsino Viuda
de Sagun are the owners of two adjacent estates
situated in Buco, Talisay, Batangas. Petitioner owns
the dominant estate. Private respondents co-own the
405-square-meter servient estate which is bounded
on the North by the National Highway, on the South
by Tomas Encarnacion, on the East by Mamerto
Magsino and on the West by Felipe de Sagun. In
other words, the servient estate stands between the
dominant estate and the national road.
Prior to 1960, when the servient estate was not yet
enclosed with a concrete fence, persons going to the
national highway just crossed the servient estate at
no particular point. However, in 1960 when private
respondents constructed a fence around the servient
estate to provide access to the highway. One-half
meter width of the path was taken from the servient
estate and the other one-half meter portion was
taken from another lot owned by Mamerto Magsino.
No compensation was asked and non was given for
the portions constituting the pathway.
It was also about that time that petitioner started his
plant nursery business on his land where he also
had his abode. He would use said pathway as
passage to the highway for his family and for his
customers.
Petitioner's plant nursery business through sheer
hard work flourished and with that, it became more
and more difficult for petitioner to haul the plants and
garden soil to and from the nursery and the highway
with the use of pushcarts. In January, 1984,
petitioner was able to buy an owner-type jeep which
he could use for transporting his plants. However,
that jeep could not pass through the roadpath and so
he approached the servient estate owners and
requested that they sell to him one and one-half (1
1/2) meters of their property to be added to the
existing pathway so as to allow passage for his
jeepney. To his utter consternation, his request was
turned down by the two widows and further attempts
at negotiation proved futile.
Petitioner then instituted an action seeking the
issuance of a writ of easement of a right of way over
an additional width of at least two (2) meters over
the De Saguns' 405-square-meter parcel of land.
During the trial, the attention of the lower court was
called to the existence of another exit to the
highway, only eighty (80) meters away from the
dominant estate. On December 2, 1985, the lower
court rendered judgment dismissing petitioner's
complaint.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court on January 28, 1987 and
rejected petitioner's claim for an additional
181

easement. The Appellate Court took into
consideration the presence of a dried river bed only
eighty (80) meters away from the dominant estate
and conjectured that petitioner might have actually
driven his jeep through the river bed in order to get
to the highway, and that the only reason why he
wanted a wider easement through the De Sagun's
estate was that it was more convenient for his
business and family needs
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has sufficiently
established his claim for an additional easement of
right of way
HELD: While there is a dried river bed less than 100
meters from the dominant tenement, that access is
grossly inadequate. Generally, the right of way may
be demanded: (1) when there is absolutely no
access to a public highway, and (2) when, even if
there is one, it is difficult or dangerous to use or is
grossly insufficient. In the present case, the river bed
route is traversed by a semi-concrete bridge and
there is no ingress nor egress from the highway. For
the jeep to reach the level of the highway, it must
literally jump four (4) to five (5) meters up. Moreover,
during the rainy season, the river bed is impassable
due to the floods. Thus, it can only be used at
certain times of the year. With the inherent
disadvantages of the river bed which make passage
difficult, if not impossible, it is if there were no outlet
at all.
Where a private property has no access to a public
road, it has the right of easement over adjacent
servient estates as a matter of law.
Article 651 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)he
width of the easement of right of way shall be that
which is sufficient for the needs of the dominant
estate, and may accordingly be changed from time
to time." This is taken to mean that under the law, it
is the needs of the dominant property which
ultimately determine the width of the passage. And
these needs may vary from time to time. When
petitioner started out as a plant nursery operator, he
and his family could easily make do with a few
pushcarts to tow the plants to the national highway.
But the business grew and with it the need for the
use of modern means of conveyance or transport.
Manual hauling of plants and garden soil and use of
pushcarts have become extremely cumbersome and
physically taxing. To force petitioner to leave his
jeepney in the highway, exposed to the elements
and to the risk of theft simply because it could not
pass through the improvised pathway, is sheer
pigheadedness on the part of the servient estate and
can only be counter-productive for all the people
concerned. Petitioner should not be denied a

passageway wide enough to accomodate his
jeepney since that is a reasonable and necessary
aspect of the plant nursery business.
The Court is aware that an additional one and onehalf (1 1/2) meters in the width of the pathway will
reduce the servient estate . But petitioner has
expressed willingness to exchange an equivalent
portion of his land to compensate private
respondents for their loss. Perhaps, it would be well
for respondents to take the offer of petitioner
seriously. But unless and until that option is
considered, the law decrees that petitioner must
indemnify the owners of the servient estate including
Mamerto Magsino from whose adjoining lot 1/2
meter was taken to constitute the original path
several years ago.
188) DIONISIO V. ORTIZ
204 SCRA 745
FACTS: The petitioners are co-owners of lots
contiguous to each other situated in the Sitio of
Kangkong, District of Balintawak, Quezon City.
The private respondents are also co-owners of lots
which are adjacent to the lots owned by the
petitioners. Lot 272-B was later subdivided into two
lots where Lot 272-A was assigned to Chua Lee and
Chua Bun Tong pursuant to a memorandum
agreement executed by and between them. They
are also owners of another lot at the upper portion of
Lot 272-B .
By virtue of an agreement entered intobetween the
owners of the contiguous lots and the members of
the Quezon City Industrial Estates Association
(QCIEA), a right of way was granted over Howmart
Road which is a private road traversing the
contiguous lots owned by the petitioners, among
others, in favor of the QCIEA members. In return for
its use, QCIEA paid compensation to the petitioners
for this right of way. The private respondents are
bona fide members of the QCIEA.
In order to have access to Howmart Road, there is a
gate in private respondents' 914 sq. m. lot fronting
Howmart Road and another gate in Lot 272-A. As a
result of the subdivision of Lot 272, the private
respondents opened a new gate in Lot 272-B also
fronting Howmart Road which is now the gate in
question.
On October 5, 1989, under the instructions of
Maxima Dionisio, certain persons commenced the
digging of holes in a parallel line and afterwards put
up steel posts in front of the newly constructed gate
of private respondents amidst the latter's
182

protestations.The petitioners claim that the
surreptitiously constructed gate opened directly into
the house of Maxima Dionisio, exposing them to air
and noise pollution arising from the respondents'
delivery trucks and service vehicles.
On November 7, 1989, the private respondents
instituted a civil action for damages against the
petitioners. The complaint sought the immediate
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction ordering
the petitioner to remove the barricade erected by
them in front of the iron gate. The same was
granted.
Fifteen days later, the petitioners removed the
barricade in front of the gate of the private
respondents.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the
ground that the issue has already become moot and
academic since the petitioners have already
complied with the Order of the lower court.
ISSUE: whether or not the private respondents have
an easement of right of way over Howmart Road
HELD: The private respondents' claim that they
have every right to use Howmart Road as
passageway to EDSA by reason of the fact that
public respondents are bonafide members of the
QCIEA which has a standing oral contract of
easement of right of way with the petitioners. The
contract is still subsisting even after its alleged
expiration in December, 1988 as evidenced by the
two (2) letters signed by Maxima Dionisio and Atty.
In such a case, it is alleged that the petitioners did
not have the right to put the barricade in question in
front of the private respondents' gate and stop them
from using said gate as passageway to Howmart
Road.
There is no question that a right of way was granted
in favor of the private respondents over Howmart
Road but the records disclose that such right of way
expired in December, 1988. The continued use of
the easement enjoyed by QCIEAincluding the
private respondents is by the mere tolerance of the
owners pending the renegotiation of the terms and
conditions of said right of way. This is precisely
shown by the two letters to the QCIEA requesting for
an increase in compensation for the use of Howmart
Road. Absent an agreement of the parties as to the
consideration, among others, no contract of
easement of right of way has been validly entered
into by the petitioners and QCIEA. Thus, the private
respondents' claim of an easement of right of way
over Howmart Road has no legal or factual basis.
Not having any right, the private respondents are not
entitled to the injunctive relief granted by the lower
court.
The Court has held in several cases that in order to
be entitled to an injunctive writ, one must show an
unquestionable right over the premises and that
such right has been violated.
In the case at bar, the private respondents have not
shown that there is an urgent and paramount
necessity for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injuction.
The records show that there are two (2) gates
through which the private respondents may pass to
have direct access to EDSA: (1) the northern gate
which opens directly to EDSA; and (2) the southern
gate along Howmart Road. The records also
disclose that the petitioners and the other lot owners
previously prohibited and prevented members of
QCIEA from opening new gates. The claim that they
were forced to open a new gate by reason of the
subdivision of Lot 272 where a wall was constructed
between these 2 lots is untenable. The private
respondents can not assert a right of way when by
their own or voluntary act, they themselves have
caused the isolation of their property from the
access road.
The fact that the barricade constructed by the
petitioners was already removed upon the issuance
of the questioned preliminary injunction does not
make the petition moot and academic as ruled by
the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals has the
power to recallor lift the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction so issued if it finds that the
party is not so entitled. But as earlier found, the
private respondents are not entitled to the injunctive
relief considering that they have no clear right over
Howmart Road.
189) ROMAN CATHOLIC vs. CA
198 SCRA 300
FACTS:
Private respondents as plaintiffs, filed a complaint for
nullification of deed of donation, rescission of
contract and reconveyance of real property with
damages against petitioners Florencio and Soledad
C. Ignao and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus,
Cavite, together with the Roman Catholic Archbishop
of Manila, before the Regional Trial Court. Private
respondents alleged that on August 23, 1930,
spouses Eusebio de Castro and Martina Rieta, now
both deceased, executed a deed of donation in favor
of therein defendant Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila covering a certain parcel of land, Lot No.
626located at Kawit, Cavite. Said lot consists of an
area of 964 square meters. The deed of donation
183

allegedly provides that the donee shall not dispose
or sell the property within a period of one hundred
years from the execution of the deed of donation,
otherwise such would render ipso facto null and void
the deed of donation and the property would revert
back to the estate of the donors.
It is further alleged that on or about June 30, 1980,
and while still within the prohibitive period to dispose
of the property, petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of
Imus, executed a deed of absolute sale of the
property n in favor of petitioners Florencio and
Soledad C. Ignao for P114,000. 00. A Transfer
Certificate of Title was issued by the Register of
Deeds of Cavite on November 15, 1980 in the name
of said petitioner spouses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cause of action had
already prescribed.
HELD:
No. Article 764 of the Civil Code provides
that "The donation shall be revoked at the instance
of the donor, when the donee fails to comply with
any of the conditions which the former imposed upon
the latter," and that "this action shall prescribe after
four years from the non-compliance with the
condition, may be transmitted to the heirs of the
donor, and may be exercised against the donee's
heirs.
Although it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil
Code an action for the revocation of a donation must
be brought within four years from the noncompliance of the conditions of the donation, the
same is not applicable in the case at bar. The deed
of donation involved herein expressly provides for
automatic reversion of the property donated in case
of violation of the condition therein, hence a judicial
declaration revoking the same is not necessary.
When a deed of donation, as in this case, expressly
provides for automatic revocation and reversion of
the property donated, the rules on contract and the
general rules on prescription should apply, and not
Article 764 of the Civil Code. Since Article 1306 of
said Code authorizes the parties to a contract to
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy, we are of the
opinion that, at the very least, that stipulation of the
parties providing for automatic revocation of the
deed of donation, without prior judicial action for that
purpose, is valid subject to the determination of the
propriety of the rescission sought. Where such
propriety is sustained, the decision of the court will
be merely declaratory of the revocation, but it is not
in itself the revocatory act.

190) REPUBLIC v. DAVID REY GUZMAN
326 SCRA 90
FACTS:
David Rey Guzman, a natural-born
American citizen, is the son of Simeon Guzman, a
naturalized American citizen, and Helen Meyers
Guzman, an American citizen. In 1968 Simeon died.
He left to his sole heirs Helen and David an estate
consisting of several parcels of land located in
Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan.
Thereafter, Helen and David executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Simeon
Guzman dividing and adjudicating to themselves all
the property. The document of extrajudicial
settlement was registered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds. The the parcels of land were
accordingly registered in the name of Helen Meyers
Guzman and David Rey Guzman in undivided equal
shares. Later, Helen executed a Quitclaim Deed
assigning, transferring and conveying to David her
undivided 1/2 interest. Since the document appeared
not to have been registered, Helen executed another
document, a Deed of Quitclaim, confirming the
earlier deed of quitclaim as well as modifying the
document to encompass all her other property in the
Philippines. A signed letter was sent to the Office of
the Solicitor General together with documents
showing that David's ownership of the 1/2 of the
estate of Simeon Guzman was defective. On the
basis thereof, the Government filed a Petition for
Escheat praying that 1/2 of David's interest in the
subject parcels of land be forfeited in its favor. David
prayed that said petition be dismissed. The trial court
dismissed the petition holding that the two deeds of
quitclaim executed by Helen had no legal force and
effect and that the ownership of the properties
remained with her. The Government appealed. The
appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial
court.
ISSUE :
Whether or not David, being an American
citizen could validly acquire 1/2 interest in each of
the subject parcels of land by way of the two deeds
of quitclaim as they are in reality donations inter
vivos.
RULING:
Yes. There are three (3) essential elements
of a donation: (a) the reduction of the patrimony of
184

the donor; (b) the increase in the patrimony of the
donee; and, (c) the intent to do an act of liberality or
animus donandi. When applied to a donation of an
immovable property, the law further requires that the
donation be made in a public document and that
there should be an acceptance thereof made in the
same deed of donation or in a separate public
document. In cases where the acceptance is made
in a separate instrument, it is mandated that the
donor should be notified thereof in an authentic form,
to be noted in both instruments. Not all the elements
of a donation of an immovable property are present
in the instant case. The transfer of the property by
virtue of the Deed of Quitclaim executed by Helen
resulted in the reduction of her patrimony as donor
and the consequent increase in the patrimony of
David as donee. However, Helen's intention to
perform an act of liberality in favor of David was not
sufficiently established. However, the inexistence of
a donation does not render the repudiation made by
Helen in favor of David valid. There is no valid
repudiation of inheritance as Helen had already
accepted her share of the inheritance when she and
David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement.
By virtue of such extrajudicial settlement the parcels
of land were registered in their name in undivided
equal share and for eleven (11) years they
possessed the lands in the concept of owner.
Nevertheless, the nullity of the repudiation does not
ipso facto operate to convert the parcels of land into
res nullius to be escheated in favor of the
Government. The repudiation being of no effect
whatsoever the parcels of land should revert to their
private owner, Helen, who, although being an
American citizen, is qualified by hereditary
succession to own the property subject of the
litigation.
191) GESTOPA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
342 SCRA 105
Spouses Diego and Catalina Danlag were
the owners of six parcels of unregistered land. They
executed three deeds of donation mortis causa, in
favor of the Private Respondent Mercedes. All deeds
contained the reservation of the rights of the donors
(1) to amend, cancel or revoke the donation during
their lifetime, and (2) to sell, mortgage, or encumber
the properties donated during the donors' lifetime, if
deemed necessary.
Later, Diego Danlag, with the consent of his
wife, executed a deed of donation inter vivos
covering the aforementioned parcels of land plus two
other parcels, again in favor of private respondent.
This deed of donation contained two conditions, first,
that the Danlag spouses shall continue to enjoy the

fruits of the land during their lifetime, and second,
that the donee can not sell or dispose of the land
during the lifetime of the spouses, without their prior
consent and approval. Mercedes caused the transfer
of the parcels' tax declaration to her name and paid
the taxes thereon.
However, spouses Danlag later sold parcels 3 and 4
to herein petitioners, spouses Gestopa. They also
executed a deed of revocation recovering the 6
parcels of land subject of the deed of donation inter
vivos. Consequently, private respondent filed with
the RTC a petition for quieting of title over the above
parcels of land against the Gestopas and the
Danlags. She alleged that she was an illegitimate
daughter of Diego Danlag; that she lived and
rendered incalculable beneficial services to Diego
and his mother, Maura Danlag, when the latter was
still alive. In recognition of the services she
rendered, Diego executed a Deed of Donation
conveying to her the six parcels of land. She
accepted the donation in the same instrument,
openly and publicly exercised rights of ownership
over the donated properties, and caused the transfer
of the tax declarations to her name. However,
through machination, intimidation and undue
influence, Diego persuaded the husband of
Mercedes, Eulalio Pilapil, to buy two of the six
parcels covered by the deed of donation. Said
donation inter vivos was coupled with conditions
and, according to Mercedes, since its perfection, she
had complied with all of them; that she had not been
guilty of any act of ingratitude; and that respondent
Diego had no legal basis in revoking the subject
donation and then in selling the two parcels of land
to the Gestopas. However, petitioners averred that
the deed of donation dated January 16, 1973 was
null and void because it was obtained by the private
respondent through machination and undue
influence. RTC ruled that the both the donations
mortis causa and inter vivos as revoked, and
therefore have no legal effect. The trial court also
declared the spouses Danlag as the absolute
owners of the disputed lands. However, CA reversed
the decision of the RTC upon appeal.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the donation in this case is
inter vivos or mortis causa to determine whether the
donor intended to transfer the ownership over the
properties upon the execution of the deed.
Whether or not the revocation is valid
HELD:
185

On the first issue, the court held that the
donation was inter vivos and that the donor intended
to transfer the ownership of the properties. First,
Diego Danlag donated the properties in
consideration of love and affection for the donee..
Second, the reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates
that the donor intended to transfer the naked
ownership over the properties. As correctly posed by
the Court of Appeals, what was the need for such
reservation if the donor and his spouse remained the
owners of the properties? Third, the donor reserved
sufficient properties for his maintenance in
accordance with his standing in society, indicating
that the donor intended to part with the six parcels of
land. Lastly, the donee accepted the donation. A
limitation on the right to sell during the donors life
implied that ownership had passed to the donees
and donation was already effective during the
donors lifetime.
No.
A valid donation, once accepted,
becomes irrevocable, except on account of
officiousness, failure by the donee to comply with the
charges imposed in the donation, or ingratitude. The
donor-spouses did not invoke any of these reasons
in the deed of revocation.
192) NOCEDA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
313 SCRA 504
FACTS:
On June 1, 1981, plaintiff Aurora Directo,
defendant Rodolfo Noceda, and Maria Arbizo, the
daughter, grandson, and widow, respectively, of the
late Celestino Arbizo, extrajudicially settled a parcel
of land, Lot 1121, located at Bitaog, San Isidro,
Cabangan, Zambales, which was said to have an
area of 66,530 square meters. Directos share was
11,426 square meters, Noceda got 13,294 square
meters, and the remaining 41,810 square meters
went to Maria Arbizo. On the same date, Directo
donated 625 square meters of her share to Noceda,
who is also her nephew. However, on August 17,
1981, another extrajudicial settlement-partition of Lot
1121 was executed by plaintiff Directo, Noceda, and
Maria Arbizo. Three fifths of the said land went to
Maria Arbizo while Directo and Noceda got only onefifth each. In said extrajudicial settlement-partition
as well as in the Tax Declaration 16-0032 over Lot
1121 in the name of the late Celestino Arbizo, the
said parcel of land was said to have an area of only
29,845 square meters.
Noceda later constructed his house on the
land donated to him by Directo. Directo, on the other
hand, fenced the portion allotted to her in the
extrajudicial settlement, excluding the donated

portion, and constructed thereon three huts.
However said fence was later removed by Noceda,
occupied the three huts and fenced the entire land of
Directo without her consent. Directo demanded that
Noceda vacate her land, but the latter refused. Thus,
Directo filed the a complaint for the recovery of
possession and ownership and rescission/annulment
of donation.
During the trial, the lower court ordered
that a relocation survey of Lot 1121 be
conducted. The engineer found that the area of Lot
1121 stated in the extrajudicial settlement-partition
was smaller than the actual area of said lot which is
127,298 square meters. He further subdivided Lot
1121, excluding the portions occupied by third
persons, known as Lot 8, the salvage zone and the
road lot, on the basis of the actual occupancy of Lot
1121 by the heirs of the late Celestino Arbizo and the
extrajudicial settlement-partition.
The portion
denominated as Lot A, with an area of 12,957
square meters was the share of defendant Noceda;
Lot C, with the same area as that of Lot A, was the
share of plaintiff Directo, a portion of which was
donated to defendant Noceda; and Lot B, with an
area of 38,872 square meters, went to Maria Arbizo.
The trial court declared valid the extrajudicial partition and further held that the deed of
donation revoked. It further ordered the defendant
to vacate and reconvey that donated portion to the
plaintiff, and to remove the house built inside the
donated portion at the his expense or pay a monthly
rental of P300.00. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court.
ISSUES:
Whether or not said lot should be partitioned
in accordance with the extra-judicial settlement
revoking the deed of donation
HELD:
The Supreme Court sees no cogent reason
to disturb the findings of the respondent Court as
follows: The discrepancies between the extrajudicial
settlements executed by plaintiff Directo, defendant
Noceda and Maria Arbizo on June 1, 1981 and
August 17, 1981 only meant that the latter was
intended to supersede the former. The signature of
defendant Noceda in the extrajudicial settlement of
August 17, 1981 would show his conformity to the
new apportionment of Lot 1121 among the heirs of
the late Celestino Arbizo. The fact that defendant
Noceda occupied the portion allotted to him in the
extrajudicial settlement, as well as the donated
186

portion of the share of plaintiff Directo, presupposes
his knowledge of the extent of boundaries of the
portion of Lot 1121 allotted to him. Moreover, the
statement in the extrajudicial settlement of August
17, 1981 with respect to the area of Lot 1121, which
was 29,845 square meters, is not conclusive
because it was found out, after the relocation survey
was conducted on Lot 1121, that the parties therein
occupied an area larger than what they were
supposed to possess per the extrajudicial
settlement- partition of August 17, 1981. Although in
the extrajudicial settlement dated August 17, 1981
the heirs of Celestino Arbizo partitioned only a
29,845 square meter lot to conform with the area
declared under tax declaration 16-0032 yet the heirs
were each actually occupying a bigger portion the
total area of which exceeded 29,845 square meters.
This was confirmed by Geodetic Engineer Quejada
in his report. The survey conducted on Lot 1121 was
only a confirmation of the actual areas being
occupied by the heirs taking into account the
percentage proportion adjudicated to each heir on
the basis of their August 17, 1981 extrajudicial
settlement.
As to the second issue, the court holds
proper the judgment of respondent CA. Article 769
of the New Civil Code states that: The action
granted to the donor by reason of ingratitude cannot
be renounced in advance. This action prescribes
within one year to be counted from the time the
donor had knowledge of the fact and it was possible
for him to bring the action. As expressly stated, the
donor must file the action to revoke his donation
within one year from the time he had knowledge of
the ingratitude of the donee. Also, it must be shown
that it was possible for the donor to institute the said
action within the same period. The concurrence of
these two requisites must be shown by defendant
Noceda in order to bar the present action.
Defendant Noceda failed to do so. He reckoned the
one year prescriptive period from the occurrence of
the usurpation of the property of plaintiff Directo in
the first week of September, 1985, and not from the
time the latter had the knowledge of the usurpation.
Moreover, defendant Noceda failed to prove that at
the time plaintiff Directo acquired knowledge of his
usurpation, it was possible for plaintiff Directo to
institute an action for revocation of her donation.The
action to revoke by reason of ingratitude prescribes
within one (1) year to be counted from the time (a)
the donor had knowledge of the fact; (b) provided
that it was possible for him to bring the action. It is
incumbent upon petitioner to show proof of the
concurrence of these two conditions in order that the
one (1) year period for bringing the action be
considered to have already prescribed. No

competent proof was adduced by petitioner to prove
his allegation. In Civil Cases, the party having the
burden of proof must establish his case by
preponderance of evidence. He who alleges a fact
has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is
not evidence.Factual findings of the Court of
Appeals, supported by substantial evidence on
record are final and conclusive on the parties and
carry even more weight when the Court of Appeals
affirms the factual findings of the trial court; for it is
not the function of this Court to re-examine all over
again the oral and documentary evidence submitted
by the parties unless the findings of fact of the Court
of Appeals are not supported by the evidence on
record or the judgment is based on the
misapprehension of facts. The jurisdiction of this
court is thus limited to reviewing errors of law unless
there is a showing that the findings complained of
are totally devoid of support in the record or that they
are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious
abuse of discretion. We find no such showing in this
case.
193) ELOY IMPERIAL vs. COURT OF APPEALS
316 SCRA 393
FACTS:
Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner
of a parcel of land also known as Lot 45 of the
Cadastral Survey of Albay, which he later sold for
P1.00 to his acknowledged natural son, petitioner
herein, who then acquired title over the land and
proceeded to subdivide it into several lots. Petitioner
and private respondents admit that despite the
contracts designation as one of Absolute Sale, it
was in fact a donation. Two years after the donation,
Leoncio filed a complaint for annulment of the said
deed, on the ground that he was deceived by
petitioner into signing the said document. The
dispute, however, was resolved through a
compromise agreement, which provides that: (1)
Leoncio recognized the legality and validity of the
rights of petitioner to the land donated; and (2)
petitioner agreed to sell a designated 1,000-square
meter portion of the donated land, and to deposit the
proceeds thereof in a bank, for the convenient
disposal of Leoncio. In case of Leoncios death, it
was also agreed that the balance of the deposit will
be withdrawn by petitioner to defray burial costs.
In the meantime, Leoncio died, leaving only
two heirs, herein petitioner, and an adopted son,
Victor Imperial. Victor substituted for Leoncio in the
case, and moved for execution of judgment, which
187

was granted by the court. Fifteen years thereafter,
Victor died single and without issue, survived only by
his natural father, Ricardo Villalon, who was a lessee
of a portion of the disputed land. Four years hence,
Ricardo died, leaving as his only heirs his two
children, Cesar and Teresa Villalon.
Five years thereafter, Cesar and Teresa filed
a complaint for annulment of the donation. Petitioner
moved to dismiss on the ground of res judicata, by
virtue of the compromise judgment, which was
granted by the trial court. The Court of Appeals
however, reversed the trial courts order and
remanded the case for further proceedings.
Consequently, Cesar and Teresa filed an amended
complaint in the same case, for Annulment of
Documents, Reconveyance and Recovery of
Possession, seeking the nullification of the Deed of
Absolute Sale affecting the above property, on
grounds of fraud, deceit and inofficiousness. In the
amended complaint, it was alleged that petitioner
caused Leoncio to execute the donation by taking
undue advantage of the latters physical weakness
and mental unfitness, and that the conveyance of
said property in favor of petitioner impaired the
legitime of Victor Imperial, their natural brother and
predecessor-in-interest.
RTC held that it is a donation, and is hereby
reduced proportionately insofar as it affected the
legitime of the late Victor Imperial, which share is
inherited by the plaintiffs herein, to the extent that
plaintiffs are ordered to be given by defendant a
portion of 10,940 square meters thereof.
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the private respondents had a right
to question the donation and;
Whether or not the donation was inofficious and
should be reduced.
HELD:
The court held yes. Article 772 of the Civil
Code provides that: Only those who at the time of
the donors death have a right to the legitime and
their heirs and successors in interest may ask for the
reduction of inofficious donations. As argued by
petitioner, when Leoncio died, it was only Victor who
was entitled to question the donation. However,
instead of filing an action to contest the donation,
Victor asked to be substituted as plaintiff and even
moved for execution of the compromise judgment
therein. No renunciation of legitime may be
presumed from the foregoing acts. It must be
remembered that at the time of the substitution, the
judgment approving the compromise agreement has
already been rendered. Victor merely participated in

the execution of the compromise judgment. He was
not a party to the compromise agreement. More
importantly, our law on succession does not
countenance tacit repudiation of inheritance.
Rather, it requires an express act on the part of the
heir. Thus, under Article 1051 of Civil Code: The
repudiation of an inheritance shall be made in a
public or authentic instrument, or by petition
presented to the court having jurisdiction over the
testamentary or intestate proceedings. Thus, when
Victor substituted Leoncio upon the latters death,
his act of moving for execution of the compromise
judgment cannot be considered an act of
renunciation of his legitime. He was, therefore, not
precluded or estopped from subsequently seeking
the reduction of the donation, under Article 772. Nor
are Victors heirs, upon his death, precluded from
doing so, as their right to do so is expressly
recognized under Article 772, and also in Article
1053: If the heir should die without having accepted
or repudiated the inheritance, his right shall be
transmitted to his heirs.
As to the second issue, the court also rules
in the affirmative. The donation is inofficious
because Leoncio had no other property at the time
of his death, the RTC computed the legitime of
Victor based on the area of the donated property.
Hence, in its dispositive portion, it awarded a portion
of the property to private respondents as Victors
legitime. This was upheld by the Court of Appeals.
Our rules of succession require that before any
conclusion as to the legal share due to a compulsory
heir may be reached, the following steps must be
taken: (1) the net estate of the decedent must be
ascertained, by deducting all the payable obligations
and charges from the value of the property owned by
the deceased at the time of his death; (2) the value
of all donations subject to collation would be added
to it. Having ascertained this action as one for
reduction of an inofficious donation, we cannot
sustain the holding of both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals that the applicable prescriptive
period is thirty years, under Article 1141 of the Civil
Code. The sense of both courts that this case is a
real action over an immovable allots undue
credence to private respondents description of their
complaint, as one for Annulment of Documents,
Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession of
Property, which suggests the action to be, in part, a
real action enforced by those with claim of title over
the disputed land. Unfortunately for private
respondents, a claim for legitime does not amount to
a claim of title. The rationale for this is that the
donation is a real alienation which conveys
188

ownership upon its acceptance, hence, any increase
in value or any deterioration or loss thereof is for the
account of the heir or donee.
What, then, is the prescriptive period for an action
for reduction of an inofficious donation? The Civil
Code specifies the following instances of reduction
or revocation of donations: (1) four years, in cases of
subsequent birth, appearance, recognition or
adoption of a child; (2) four years, for noncompliance with conditions of the donation; and (3)
at any time during the lifetime of the donor and his
relatives entitled to support, for failure of the donor to
reserve property for his or their support.
Interestingly, donations as in the instant case, the
reduction of which hinges upon the allegation of
impairment of legitime, are not controlled by a
particular prescriptive period, for which reason we
must resort to the ordinary rules of prescription.
Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions upon an
obligation created by law must be brought within ten
years from the time the right of action accrues.
Thus, the ten-year prescriptive period applies to the
obligation to reduce inofficious donations, required
under Article 771 of the Civil Code, to the extent that
they impair the legitime of compulsory heirs. From
when shall the ten-year period be reckoned? The
case of Mateo vs. Lagua, 29 SCRA 864, which
involved the reduction for inofficiousness of a
donation propter nuptias, recognized that the cause
of action to enforce a legitime accrues upon the
death of the donor-decedent. Clearly so, since it is
only then that the net estate may be ascertained and
on which basis, the legitimes may be determined. It
took private respondents 24 years since the death of
Leoncio to initiate this case. The action, therefore,
has long prescribed.
194) EDUARTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS
253 SCRA 391
FACTS:
Pedro Calapine was the registered owner of
a parcel of land located in San Cristobal, San Pablo
City, with an area of 12,199 square meters. He later
executed a deed of donation inter vivos, ceding onehalf portion thereof to his niece Helen S. Doria.
Later, another deed identically entitled was
purportedly executed by Calapine ceding unto Helen
S. Doria the whole of the parcel of land. Doria then
donated a portion of the parcel of land to the
Calauan Christian Reformed Church, Inc., on the
basis of which said transfer certificate of title was
cancelled and TCT No. T-24444 was issued in its
name covering 157 square meters and TCT No. T-
24445, in the name of Helen S. Doria covering the

remaining portion of 12,042 square meters.
Doria then sold, transferred and conveyed
unto the spouses Romulo and Sally Eduarte the
parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-24445, save
the portion of 700 square meters on which her house
was erected.
Claiming that his signature to the deed of
donation was a forgery and that, she was unworthy
of his liberality, Calapine brought suit against Doria,
the Calauan Christian Reformed Church, Inc. and
the spouses Eduarte and asked to revoke the
donation made in favor of Doria to declare null and
to void the deeds of donation and sale that she had
executed in favor of the Calauan Christian Reformed
Church, Inc. and the spouses. The trial court granted
held in favor of Calapine. Spouses Eduarte
appealed, which as dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deeds of donation should
be revoked.
HELD:
Anent the revocation of the first deed of
donation, petitioners submit that paragraph (1) of
Article 765 of the Civil Code does not apply in this
case because the acts of ingratitude referred to
therein pertain to offenses committed by the donee
against the person or property of the donor.
Petitioners argue that as the offense imputed to
herein donee Helen Doria - falsification of a public
document - is neither a crime against the person nor
property of the donor but is a crime against public
interest under the Revised Penal Code, the same is
not a ground for revocation.
In support of this contention, petitioners cite
the following portions found in Tolentinos
Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code:
Offense against Donor - x x x. The crimes
against the person of the donor would include not
only homicide and physical injuries, but also illegal
detention, threats and coercion; and those against
honor include offenses against chastity and those
against the property, include robbery, theft,
usurpation, swindling, arson, damages, etc. (5
Manresa 175-176).
This assertion, however, deserves scant
consideration. The full text of the very same
commentary cited by petitioners belies their claim
that falsification of the deed of donation is not an act
of ingratitude, to wit:
Offense Against Donor. All crimes which
offend the donor show ingratitude and are causes
for revocation. There is no doubt, therefore, that the
189

donee who commits adultery with the wife of the
donor, gives cause for revocation by reason of
ingratitude. The crimes against the person of the
donor would include not only homicide and physical
injuries, but also illegal detention, threats, and
coercion; those against honor include offenses
against chastity; and those against the property,
include robbery, theft, usurpation, swindling, arson,
damages, etc. [Manresa 175-176]. (Italics supplied).
Obviously, the first sentence was deleted by
petitioners because it totally controverts their
contention. As noted in the aforecited opinion all
crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude and
are causes for revocation. Petitioners attempt to
categorize the offenses according to their
classification under the Revised Penal Code is
therefore unwarranted considering that illegal
detention, threats and coercion are considered as
crimes against the person of the donor despite the
fact that they are classified as crimes against
personal liberty and security under the Revised
Penal Code.
Petitioners also impute grave error to
respondent Court of Appeals in finding that the
second deed of donation dated July 26, 1984 was
falsified. Petitioners deplore the fact that more
credence was given to the testimony of the NBI
handwriting expert who found Pedro Calapines
signature in the second deed of donation to be a
forgery despite the existence of controverting
testimony by PC-INP Crime Laboratory (PCCL)
Chief Document Examiner which petitioners
adduced as evidence on their part.
We are not persuaded. Respondent Court of
Appeals and the trial court cannot be faulted for
giving more weight and credence to the testimony of
the NBI handwriting expert considering that the
examination of the said witness proved to be
complete, thorough and scientific.
195) CITY OF ANGELES vs. CA
G.R. No. 97882. August 28, 1996
FACTS:
In an Amended Deed of Donation, private
respondent donated to the City of Angeles 51
parcels of land. Said deed provides that the
properties donated shall be devoted and utilized
solely for the site of the Angeles City Sports Center.
Petitioners then started the construction of a drug
rehabilitation center on a portion of the donated land.
Upon learning thereof, private respondent protested
such action for being violative of the terms and
conditions of the amended deed and prejudicial to its
interest and to those of its clients and residents.

Private respondent also offered another site for the
rehabilitation center. However, petitioners ignored
the protest, maintaining that the construction was not
violative of the terms of the donation. The alternative
site was rejected because, according to petitioners,
the site was too isolated and had no electric and
water facilities.
Consequently, private respondent filed a
complaint, alleging breach of the conditions imposed
in the amended deed of donation and seeking the
revocation of the same. The trial court issued a
temporary restraining order to enjoin the petitioners
from further proceeding with the construction of the
center. The RTC further ordered that the defendants
perpetually cease and desist from constructing a
Drug Rehabilitation Center or any other building or
improvement on the Donated Land. It also declared
the amended Deed of Donation revoked and
rescinded and ordered defendants to peacefully
vacate and return the Donated Land to plaintiff.
Petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal.
However, while the appeal was pending, petitioners
inaugurated the Drug Rehabilitation Center. The
respondent Court rendered the assailed Decision
affirming the ruling of the trial court. Subsequently,
the petitioners motion for reconsideration was also
denied for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether a donor of open spaces in a
residential subdivision can validly impose conditions
on the said donation; whether the city government
as donee can build and operate a drug rehabilitation
center on the donated land intended for open space;
and whether the said donation may be validly
rescinded by the donor.
HELD:
The general law on donations does not
prohibit the imposition of conditions on a donation so
long as the conditions are not illegal or impossible.
In regard to donations of open spaces, P.D. 1216
itself requires among other things that the
recreational areas to be donated be based, as
aforementioned, on a percentage (3.5%, 7%, or 9%)
of the total area of the subdivision depending on
whether the subdivision is low-, medium-, or highdensity. It further declares that such open space
devoted to parks, playgrounds and recreational
areas are non-alienable public land and nonbuildable. However, there is no prohibition in either
P.D. 957 or P.D. 1216 against imposing conditions
on such donation. We hold that any condition may
be imposed in the donation, so long as the same is
190

not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy. The contention of petitioners
that the donation should be unconditional because it
is mandatory has no basis in law. P.D. 1216 does not
provide that the donation of the open space for parks
and playgrounds should be unconditional. To rule
that it should be so is tantamount to unlawfully
expanding the provisions of the decree. Private
respondents contention that the construction of said
drug rehabilitation center is violative of the Amended
Deed of Donation. Therefore, under Article 764 of
the New Civil Code and stipulation no. 8 of the
amended deed, private respondent is empowered to
revoke the donation when the donee has failed to
comply with any of the conditions imposed in the
deed. We disagree. Article 1412 of the Civil Code
which provides that: If the act in which the unlawful
or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a
criminal offense, the following rules shall be
observed: (1) When the fault is on the part of both
contracting parties, neither may recover what he has
given by virtue of the contract, or demand the
performance of the others undertaking; comes into
play here. Both petitioners and private respondents
are in violation of P.D. 957 as amended, for donating
and accepting a donation of open space less than
that required by law, and for agreeing to build and
operate a sports complex on the non-buildable open
space so donated; and petitioners, for constructing a
drug rehabilitation center on the same non-buildable
area. Inasmuch as the construction and operation of
the drug rehabilitation center has been established
to be contrary to law, the said center should be
removed or demolished. After due consideration of
the circumstances, we believe that the fairest and
most equitable solution is to have the City of
Angeles, donee of the subject open space and,
ostensibly, the main beneficiary of the construction
and operation of the proposed drug rehabilitation
center, undertake the demolition and removal of said
center, and if feasible, recover the cost thereof from
the city officials concerned.
Property:Action for Cancellation of Title
196)
REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
represented by the DIRECTOR OF LAND,
petitioner,
vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF IRENE
BULLUNGAN, represented by her husband
DOMINGO PAGGAO and THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF ISABELA, respondents.
G.R. No. 104296, March 29, 1996
MENDOZA, J.:
Note: This is a petition for review of the decision of
the CA reversing the decision of the RTC of
Cauayan, Isabela declaring Free Patent No. V79740 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-8817 in
the name of Irene Bullungan null and void so far as
the portion of Lot No. 1, Psu-150801 involved in this
case is concerned.
FACTS:
Irene Bullungan (now deceased) applied for a
FREE PATENT covering lots situated in Angadanan,
Isabela. The lots included a portion of lot (Lot No. 1,
Psu-150801 between Lot No. 763 and Lot No. 764)
which Vicente Carabbacan claimed. (Vicente
Carabbacan in this case is the present possessor
and cultivator of the land in dispute).
BASIS FOR HER APPLICATION OF FEE PATENT
(w/c is false): In her application however, Irene
Bullungan stated that the land applied for by her was
not claimed or occupied by any other person and
that it was public land which had been continuously
occupied and cultivated by her since 1925.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS DECISION: Upon
certification of Assistant Public Land that Irene
Bullungan had been in actual, continuous open,
notorious, exclusive and adverse possession of the
land since 1925, the Director of Lands approved
Bullungan's application for free patent and an OCT
was issued in her name.
STEPS TAKEN BY THE OPPOSITOR
THE PROTEST: Alleging that a portion of Lot No. 1,
Psu-150801 (lot in dispute) covered by the free
patent issued to Irene Bullungan overlapped the lot
between Lot No. 763 and Lot No. 764, which he was
occupying, Vicente Carrabacan, (the actual
possessor of the land) filed a protest to the Director
of Lands on 1961. The latter only ordered an
investigation on 1982.
ACTION
FOR
RECONVEYANCE
(1st)
&
CANCELLATION OF FEE PATENT: Vicente
Carabbacan also brought an action for the
reconveyance of the portion of the lot in dispute and
the cancellation of free patent against Irene
Bullungan before the CFI on 1961.
DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION BY THE COURT: but
this was dismissed by the court without prejudice.
191

The heirs of Irene Bullungan in turn sought to
RECOVER POSSESSION OF THE LAND in an
action filed in CFI on 1972.
issued in the name of Irene Bullungan became

incontrovertible and indefeasible upon the lapse of
one year from the issuance of the free patent.
2nd ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE: On the other

hand, refusing to give up his claim, Vicente
Carabbacan filed again a case for reconveyance on
1972. The cases were thereafter tried jointly.
CFIs DECISION: The court rendered a decision,
DISMISSING the complaint of Vicente Carabbacan
and ordering him to vacate the land and upheld the
ownership of Irene Bullungan. Carabbacan, who
had been in possession of the land in question, was
finally ousted on December 10, 1981.
RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION: Meanwhile, in
the investigation conducted by the Director of lands,
it was found out that Vicente Carabbacan had been
in actual cultivation of the land since 1947, having
acquired the same from Tomas Tarayao. The land
investigator stated that due to a big flood which
occurred in December 1947, the Cagayan River
changed its course by moving north-east,
resulting in the emergence of a piece of land,
which is the subject of this dispute. Carrabacan
took possession of the land and cultivated it. He
was in the continuous, peaceful, open and adverse
occupation and cultivation of the land from
December 1947 until 1981 when he was ejected by
virtue of the decision in Civil Case.
PETITIONER-REPUBLIC
ARGUMENT:
The
Republic controverts the ruling of the Court of
Appeals. It contends that the doctrine of
indefeasibility of Torrens Titles does not bar the filing
of an action for cancellation of title and reversion of
land even if more than one year has elapsed from
the issuance of the free patent in case of fraud in
obtaining patents.
THE PETITIONER: In view of the investigation, the

Republic, as represented by the Solicitor General,
filed a COMPLAINT FOR THE CANCELLATION OF
FREE PATENT issued in favor of Irene Bullungan on
the ground of fraud and misrepresentation.
RTC: Complaint for Cancellation of Free Patent was
GRANTED, thus the court ruled in favor of petitioner,
Republic and justified the reversion of the land in
question as an assertion of a governmental right. It
declared that the Free Patent was null and void
insofar as the portion of Lot subject to dispute.
BASIS: The lower court found that Irene Bullungan
made misrepresentations by claiming in her
application for a free patent that she was in
possession of the disputed portion of Lot No. 1, Psu150801, when in fact Vicente Carabbacan was
occupying and cultivating the land.
CA: GRANTED the appeal of private respondent,
thus REVERSING the lower courts decision.
BASIS: on the ground that, after the lapse of one
year from the date of issuance of the patent, the
State could no longer bring an action for reversion.
The appellate court held that the certificate of title
ISSUE:
Whether or not doctrine of indefeasibility of
Torrens Title bars the filing of an action for
cancellation of title, on the ground of fraud, if more
than one year has elapsed from the issuance of the
free patent.
HELD:
NO. The SC agreed as to the argument of
petitioner-Republic.
To begin with, there is no question that Free
Patent No. 79740 and Original Certificate of Title P8817 were obtained through fraud. The trial court
found that Irene Bullungan falsely stated in her
application for a free patent that Lot No. 1, Psu150801 was not claimed or occupied by any other
person. The trial court found that a portion of the lot
in question had been in the possession and
cultivation of Vicente Carabbacan since December
1947. Indeed private respondents admit that before
Irene Bullungan filed her application for a free
patent, she had filed a complaint for forcible entry
against Vicente Carrabacan. The complaint, which
was filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Angadanan, Isabela, was dismissed precisely
because the court found that Carabbacan had been
in possession of the land long before it was sold to
Irene Bullungan by Leonida Tarayao.
The Court of Appeals did not disturb the trial court's
finding in this case that Irene Bullungan committed
fraud and misrepresentation. Its decision rests solely
on the ground that after the lapse of one year from
the date of issuance of a free patent an action for the
cancellation of patent and title on ground of fraud
and misrepresentation can no longer be maintained.
GENERAL RULE: It is settled that once a patent is
registered under Act No. 496 (now P.D. No. 1529)
and the corresponding certificate of title is issued,
the land ceases to be part of the public domain and
192

becomes private property over which the Director
of Lands will no longer have either control or
jurisdiction. The Torrens Title issued on the basis of
a free patent or homestead patent becomes as
indefeasible as one which was judicially secured
upon the expiration of one year from date of
issuance of patent as provided in P.D. No. 1529.
EXCEPTION: However, as held in Director of
Lands v. De Luna, even after the lapse of one year,
the State may still bring an action for the reversion to
the public domain of lands which have been
fraudulently granted to private individuals. This has
been the consistent ruling of this Court.
FRAUD & MISREPRESENTATION: In the case at
bar, the failure of Irene Bullungan to disclose that
Vicente Carrabacan was in possession of the portion
of land in dispute constitutes fraud and
misrepresentation and is a ground for annulling her
title. Where public land is acquired by an applicant
through fraud and misrepresentation the State may
institute reversion proceedings even after the
lapse of the one-year period.
Public policy demands that one who obtains title to a
public land through fraud should not be allowed to
benefit therefrom. Vicente Carabbacan had been in
possession of the land even. before Irene Bullungan
bought the possessory rights to the land. It was
therefore a misrepresentation for her to state in her
application for a free patent that she had been in
possession of the lot in question when the fact is that
Carabbacan had been there ahead of her.
Pataueg, Nick Jr. y Alversado
193

CASES IN SUCCESSION
197) MARIA USON, plaintiff-appellee, vs.MARIA
DEL ROSARIO, CONCEPCION NEBREDA,
CONRADO NEBREDA, DOMINADOR NEBREDA,
AND FAUSTINO NEBREDA, Jr., defendantsappellants.
G.R. No. L-4963, January 29, 1953
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Note: This is an ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF THE
OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION of five (5) parcels
of land situated in the Municipality of Labrador,
Province of Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against
Maria del Rosario and her four children named
Concepcion, Conrado, Dominador, and Faustino,
surnamed Nebreda, who are all of minor age, before
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.
FACTS:
Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino
Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands
involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no
other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However,
plaintiff-lawful wife claims that when Faustino
Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria
del Rosario took possession illegally of said lands
thus depriving her of their possession and
enjoyment.
DEED OF SEPARATION: Defendants in their
answer set up as special defense that on February
21, 1931, Maria Uson and her husband, the late
Faustino Nebreda, executed a public document
whereby they agreed to separate as husband and
wife and, in consideration of their separation, Maria
Uson was given a parcel of land by way of alimony
and in return she renounced her right to inherit any
other property that may be left by her husband upon
his death. (waiver of future inheritance)
RTC: Trial court rendered decision ruling in favor of
the lawful wife and ordering the defendants
(common-law-wife & kids) to restore to the plaintiff
the ownership and possession of the lands in
dispute.
DEFENDANTs ARGUMENT: In its appeal to the SC,
defendant claimed that plaintiff has already
relinquished her rights when she expressly
renounced any future property she was to inherit
from her husband. It was also claimed that the
provisions of the New Civil Code, giving status and
rights to natural children, should be given a
retroactive effect so that the illegitimate children of
Del Rosario will be entitled to the inheritance.
ISSUE 1:
May Maria Unson validly renounce her future
inheritance?
HELD 1:
NO. There is no dispute that Maria Uson,
plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful wife of Faustino
Nebreda, former owner of the five parcels of lands
litigated in the present case. There is likewise no
dispute that Maria del Rosario, one of the
defendants-appellants, was merely a common-law
wife of the late Faustino Nebreda with whom she
had four illegitimate children, her now codefendants. It likewise appears that Faustino
Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the effectivity of
the new Civil Code. With this background, it is
evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945
the five parcels of land he was seized of at the time
passed from the moment of his death to his only
heir, his widow Maria Uson.
Applying Article 657 of the old Civil Code,
Court ruled that the property belongs to the heirs at
the moment of the death of the ancestor as
completely as if the ancestor had executed and
delivered to them a deed for the same before his
death. The right of ownership of Maria Uson over the
lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the
death of her late husband and this is so because of
the imperative provision of the law which commands
that the rights to succession are transmitted from the
moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code).
The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson
had relinquished her right over the lands in question
because she expressly renounced to inherit any
future property that her husband may acquire and
leave upon his death in the deed of separation they
had entered into on February 21, 1931 cannot be
entertained for the simple reason that future
inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor
can it be renounced. The decision appealed from is
affirmed.
ISSUE 2:
Whether or not the illegitimate children of del
Rosario are entitled to the inheritance.
HELD 2:
NO.
Defendants contend that, while it is true that the
four minor defendants are illegitimate children of the
late Faustino Nebreda and under the old Civil Code
are not entitled to any successional rights, however,
under the new Civil Code which became in force in
June, 1950, they are given the status and rights of
194

natural children and are entitled to the successional
rights which the law accords to the latter (article
2264 and article 287, new Civil Code), and because
these successional rights were declared for the first
time in the new code, they shall be given retroactive
effect even though the event which gave rise to them
may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article
2253, new Civil Code). There is no merit in this claim
PRINCIPLE OF NON-IMPAIRMENT OF VESTED
RIGHT AS AN EXCEPTION: Article 2253 above
referred to provides indeed that rights which are
declared for the first time shall have retroactive
effect even though the event which gave rise to them
may have occurred under the former legislation,
BUT this is so only when the new rights do not
prejudice any vested or acquired right of the
same origin. Thus, said article provides that "if a
right should be declared for the first time in this
Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the
act or event which gives rise thereto may have been
done or may have occurred under the prior
legislation, provided said new right does not
prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of
the same origin." As already stated in the early part
of this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson
over the lands in question became vested in 1945
upon the death of her late husband and this is so
because of the imperative provision of the law which
commands that the rights to succession are
transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657,
old Civil Code). The new right recognized by the new
Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the
deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the
impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over
the lands in dispute.
VOID DONATION: As regards the claim that Maria
Uson, while her deceased husband was lying in
state, in a gesture of pity or compassion, agreed to
assign the lands in question to the minor children for
the reason that they were acquired while the
deceased was living with their mother and Maria
Uson wanted to assuage somewhat the wrong she
has done to them, this much can be said; apart from
the fact that this claim is disputed, we are of the
opinion that said assignment, if any, partakes of the
nature of a DONATION OF REAL PROPERTY,
inasmuch as it involves no material consideration,
and in order that it may be valid it shall be made in a
public document and must be accepted either in the
same document or in a separate one (Article 633,
old Civil Code). Inasmuch as this essential formality
has not been followed, it results that the alleged
assignment or donation has no valid effect.

Succession
Ownership
as
Mode
of
Transferring
198) ROMULO A. CORONEL, ALARICO A.

CORONEL,
ANNETTE
A.
CORONEL,
ANNABELLE C. GONZALES (for herself and on
behalf of Florida C. Tupper, as attorney-in-fact),
CIELITO A. CORONEL, FLORAIDA A. ALMONTE,
and CATALINA BALAIS MABANAG, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, CONCEPCION D.
ALCARAZ, and RAMONA PATRICIA ALCARAZ,
assisted by GLORIA F. NOEL as attorney-in-fact,
respondents.
G.R. No. 103577. October 7, 1996
MELO, J.:
Note: The petition before us has its roots in a
COMPLAINT FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE to
compel herein petitioners (except the last named,
Catalina Balais Mabanag) to consummate the sale
of a parcel of land with its improvements located
along Roosevelt Avenue in Quezon City entered into
by the parties sometime in January 1985 for the
price of P1,240,000.00.
FACTS:
1st CONTRACT OF ABSOLUTE SALE: Peitioner,
Romulo Coronel, et. al. being the sons and
daughters of the decedent Constancio P. Coronel
(hereinafter referred to as Coronels) executed a
document entitled Receipt of Down Payment in
favor of plaintiff Ramona Patricia Alcaraz. The
document provided that for the total amount of
P1,240,000.00, wherein a downpayment of
P50,000.00 was initially paid, the Coronels bind
themselves to effect the transfer in their names the
certificate of title of the house and lot they inherited
from their father. They also promised that upon the
transfer of the TCT in their names, they will
immediately execute the deed of absolute sale of
the property, and the other party Ramona will pay
the balance of P1,190,000.00.
(Note: The agreement could not have been a
contract to sell because the sellers herein made no
express reservation of ownership or title to the
subject parcel of land. Furthermore, the
circumstance which prevented the parties from
entering into an absolute contract of sale pertained
to the sellers themselves (the certificate of title was
195

not in their names) and not the full payment of the
purchase price. Under the established facts and
circumstances of the case, the Court may safely
presume that, had the certificate of title been in the
names of petitioners-sellers at that time, there would
have been no reason why an absolute contract of
sale could not have been executed and
consummated right there and then).
succession are transmitted from the moment of

death of the decedent.
MOOTNESS OF THE ISSUE: Be it also noted that
petitioners claim that succession may not be
declared unless the creditors have been paid is
rendered moot by the fact that they were able to
effect the transfer of the title to the property from the
decedents name to their names.
2nd CONTRACT OF ABSOLUTE SALE/DOUBLE

SALE: The Coronels however, upon having the
property registered in their name, sold it to Catalina
Mabanag for a higher price (P1,580,000.00), and
cancelled and rescinded the contract with Ramona
by depositing the amount of down payment to a
bank, in trust for Ramona.
ESTOPPEL: Aside from this, petitioners are

precluded from raising their supposed lack of
capacity to enter into an agreement at that time and
they cannot be allowed to now take a posture
contrary to that which they took when they entered
into the agreement with private respondent Ramona
P. Alcaraz. The Civil Code expressly states that: Art.
1431. Through estoppel an admission or
representation is rendered conclusive upon the
person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved
as against the person relying thereon. Having
represented themselves as the true owners of
the subject property at the time of sale,
petitioners CANNOT claim now that they were
not yet the absolute owners thereof at that time.
THE COMPLAINT FILED: A complaint for specific

performance was filed by the Concepcions against
the Coronels.
RTC: The RTC ruled in favor of respondents
Conceptions. Judgment for specific performance is
hereby rendered ordering defendant-Coronels to
execute in favor of plaintiffs a deed of absolute sale
covering that parcel of land
CA: Affirmed the same.
The petitioners claim that there could been no
perfected contract on January 19, 1985 because
they were then not yet the absolute owners of the
inherited property.
ISSUE 1:
Whether or not petitioners were already the
owners of the inherited property when they executed
the contract with respondents.
HELD 1:
Yes. Article 774 of the Civil Code defines
Succession as a mode of transferring ownership as
follows:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition
by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations
to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person
are transmitted through his death to another or
others by his will or by operation of law.
Petitioners-sellers in the case at bar being the
sons and daughters of the decedent Constancio P.
Coronel are compulsory heirs who were called to
succession by operation of law. Thus, at the point
their father drew his last breath, petitioners stepped
into his shoes insofar as the subject property is
concerned, such that any rights or obligations
pertaining thereto became binding and enforceable
upon them. It is expressly provided that rights to the
The sale of the subject parcel of land between

petitioners and Ramona P. Alcaraz, is deemed
perfected.
PEITIONERs
ARGUMENT:
Petitioners
also
contend that although there was in fact a perfected
contract of sale between them and Ramona P.
Alcaraz, the latter breached her reciprocal
obligation when she rendered impossible the
consummation thereof by going to the United States
of America, without leaving her address, telephone
number, and Special Power of Attorney for which
reason, so petitioners conclude, they were correct in
unilaterally rescinding the contract of sale.
ISSUE 2:
Whether or not peitioner-seller is correct in
unilaterraly rescinding the contract of sale between
the latter and Ramona Alcaraz, the buyer.
HELD 2:
We do not agree with petitioners that there was a
valid rescission of the contract of sale in the instant
case. We note that these supposed grounds for
petitioners' rescission, are mere allegations found
only in their responsive pleadings, which by express
provision of the rules, are deemed controverted even
if no reply is filed by the plaintiffs (Sec. 11, Rule 6,
Revised Rules of Court). The records are absolutely
bereft of any supporting evidence to substantiate
196

petitioners' allegations. We have stressed time and
again that allegations must be proven by sufficient
evidence (Ng Cho Cio vs. Ng Diong, 110 Phil. 882
[1961]; Recaro vs. Embisan, 2 SCRA 598 [1961].
Mere allegation is not an evidence (Lagasca vs. De
Vera, 79 Phil. 376 [1947]).
Even assuming arguendo that Ramona P.
Alcaraz was in the United States of America on
February 6, 1985, we cannot justify petitioner-sellers'
act of unilaterally and extradicially rescinding the
contract of sale, there being no express stipulation
authorizing the sellers to extarjudicially rescind the
contract of sale. (cf. Dignos vs. CA, 158 SCRA 375
[1988]; Taguba vs. Vda. de Leon, 132 SCRA 722
[1984])
Moreover, petitioners are estopped from raising
the alleged absence of Ramona P. Alcaraz because
although the evidence on record shows that the sale
was in the name of Ramona P. Alcaraz as the buyer,
the sellers had been dealing with Concepcion D.
Alcaraz, Ramona's mother, who had acted for and in
behalf of her daughter, if not also in her own behalf.
Indeed, the down payment was made by
Concepcion D. Alcaraz with her own personal check
for and in behalf of Ramona P. Alcaraz. There is no
evidence showing that petitioners ever questioned
Concepcion's authority to represent Ramona P.
Alcaraz when they accepted her personal check.
Neither did they raise any objection as regards
payment being effected by a third person.
Accordingly, as far as petitioners are concerned, the
physical absence of Ramona P. Alcaraz is not a
ground to rescind the contract of sale.
ISSUE 3:
Between the Alcaraz and Catalina Mabanag,
who between them is the owner of the property
subject to dispute?
HELD 3:
It belongs to Alcaraz.
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been
sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken
possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property.
Should if be immovable property, the ownership shall
belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith
first recorded it in Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall
pertain to the person who in good faith was first in
the possession; and, in the absence thereof to the
person who presents the oldest title, provided there

is good faith.
The record of the case shows that the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated April 25, 1985 as proof of the
second contract of sale was registered with the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City giving rise to the
issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of
Catalina B. Mabanag on June 5, 1985. Thus, the
second paragraph of Article 1544 shall apply.
The above-cited provision on double sale
presumes title or ownership to pass to the first buyer,
the exceptions being: (a) when the second buyer, in
good faith, registers the sale ahead of the first buyer,
and (b) should there be no inscription by either of the
two buyers, when the second buyer, in good faith,
acquires possession of the property ahead of the
first buyer. Unless, the second buyer satisfies these
requirements, title or ownership will not transfer to
him to the prejudice of the first buyer.
In his commentaries on the Civil Code, an accepted
authority on the subject, now a distinguished
member of the Court, Justice Jose C. Vitug,
explains:
The governing principle is prius tempore, potior jure
(first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge by the first
buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first
buyer's rights except when the second buyer first
registers in good faith the second sale (Olivares vs.
Gonzales, 159 SCRA 33). Conversely, knowledge
gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats
his rights even if he is first to register, since
knowledge taints his registration with bad faith (see
also Astorga vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 58530,
26 December 1984). In Cruz vs. Cabana (G.R. No.
56232, 22 June 1984, 129 SCRA 656), it has held
that it is essential, to merit the protection of Art.
1544, second paragraph, that the second realty
buyer must act in good faith in registering his deed
of sale (citing Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals, 69
SCRA 99, Crisostomo vs. CA, G.R. No. 95843, 02
September
1992).
(J. Vitug Compendium of Civil Law and
Jurisprudence, 1993 Edition, p. 604).
In a case of double sale, what finds relevance
and materiality is not whether or not the second
buyer was a buyer in good faith but whether or not
said second buyer registers such second sale in
good faith, that is, without knowledge of any defect
in the title of the property sold.
As clearly borne out by the evidence in this
197

case, petitioner Mabanag could not have in good
faith, registered the sale entered into on February
18, 1985 because as early as February 22, 1985, a
notice of lis pendens had been annotated on the
transfer certificate of title in the names of petitioners,
whereas petitioner Mabanag registered the said sale
sometime in April, 1985. At the time of registration,
therefore, petitioner Mabanag knew that the same
property had already been previously sold to private
respondents, or, at least, she was charged with
knowledge that a previous buyer is claiming title to
the same property. Petitioner Mabanag cannot close
her eyes to the defect in petitioners' title to the
property at the time of the registration of the
property.
If a vendee in a double sale registers that sale
after he has acquired knowledge that there was a
previous sale of the same property to a third party or
that another person claims said property in a
pervious sale, the registration will constitute a
registration in bad faith and will not confer upon him
any right. (Salvoro vs. Tanega, 87 SCRA 349 [1978];
citing Palarca vs. Director of Land, 43 Phil. 146;
Cagaoan vs. Cagaoan, 43 Phil. 554; Fernandez vs.
Mercader, 43 Phil. 581.)
Thus, the sale of the subject parcel of land
between petitioners and Ramona P. Alcaraz,
perfected on February 6, 1985, prior to that between
petitioners and Catalina B. Mabanag on February
18, 1985, was correctly upheld by both the courts
below.
199) ISIDORO M. MERCADO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LEON C. VIARDO and PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF
NUEVA ECIJA, defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-14127, August 21, 1962
FACTS:
The spouses Bartolome Driz and Pilar Belmonte
were defendants in a case where a writ of execution
was issued and levied upon rights and interests the
spouses have over a disputed land.
copy of the certificate of title was likewise issued to

him.
On 28 December 1945 the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija, in Land Registration Case acting upon
a verified petition of Leon C. Viardo, ordered the
Registrar of Deeds in and for Nueva Ecija, to cancel
Original Certificate of Title and to issue another in
lieu thereof in the name of and in the proportion as
follows: LEONOR BELMONTE share; FELISA
BELMONTE, share; PILAR BELMONTE, /8
share; LEON C. VIARDO, /8 share; and INES DE
GUZMAN, share
Spouses Driz and Belmonte filed an action in the
CFI against the buyer-Viardo for reconveyance of
the said land.
CFI (now RTC): The court dismissed, including the
counterclaim of Viardo. Defendant is the legal owner
of the land in question and the right of redemption of
the plaintiff of said land had already elapsed.
Not satisfied with the judgment dismissing his
counter-claim, the defendant Leon C. Viardo
appealed to the Court of Appeals.
CA: Pending appeal with the Court of Appeals,
Bartolome Driz died. His children of age substituted
him in the appeal.
The judgment of the CA, granting the prayer of
Viardo, eventually became final and executory. The
CFI issued a writ of execution. Prior to the CA ruling,
Belmonte sold her interest in the land to Isidoro
Mercado. Mercado then filed a third-party complaint
against Belmonte. Viardo then sued Belmonte. CFI
ruled that the heirs of Bartolome could not be held
liable personally for judgment rendered against
them. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of Bartolome Driz can
be held personally liable for the judgment rendered
against their father?
HELD:
By virtue of the writ of execution as above

mentioned, the sheriff sold at public acution of the
lots subject of controversy. This was was bought by
Leon Viardo being the highest bidder.. The spouses
failed to redeem the property within the statutory
period of one year from the date of sale. A final bill of
sale was issued to buyer Viardo, and a co-owner's
NO. The only ground of appellant for this

contention is that the present owners of these lots
are the children of the spouses Pilar Belmonte and
Bartolome Driz, the plaintiffs in civil case No. 161,
and that, upon the death of Bartolome Driz during
the pendency of the appeal in civil case No. 161,
these children were substituted as parties. This
assignment of error is without merit.
198

The substitution of parties was made obviously
because the children of Bartolome Driz are his legal
heirs and therefore could properly represent and
protect whatever interest he had in the case on
appeal. But such a substitution did not and cannot
have the effect of making these substituted parties
personally liable for whatever judgment might be
rendered on the appeal against their deceased
father.
Article 774 of the Civil Code provides: Succession
is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the
property, rights and obligations to the extent of the
value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted
through his death to another or others either by his
will or by operation of law.
Moreover, it appears from the evidence that
Bartolome Driz was only a formal party to civil case
No. 161, the real party in interest being his wife Pilar
Belmonte. The subject matter in litigation was Pilar
Belmonte's interest in the parcel of land described in
original certificate of title No. 3484, which appears to
be paraphernal property.
The trial court, therefore, correctly ruled that the
remedy of Leon C. Viardo, the creditor was to
proceed against the estate of Bartolome Driz.
Judgment MODIFIED.
200) Intestate of the late AGUSTIN MONTILLA,
SR.; PEDRO LITONJUA, a movant-appellant,
vs.
AGUSTIN B. MONTILLA, JR., administratorappellee;
CLAUDIO MONTILLA, oppositor-appellee.
G.R. No. L-4170, January 31, 1952
PARAS, C.J.:
FACTS:
In a Civil Case rendered by the CFI of Negros
Occidental, Pedro L. Litonjua obtained a judgment
against Claudio Montilla for the payment of the sum
of P4,000 with legal interest, plus costs amounting to
P39.00 In due time, a writ of execution was issued,
but no property of Claudio Montilla was found which
could be levied upon.
In order to satisfy the said judgment Pedro L.
Litonjua filed in special Proceeding of the CFI of
Negros Occidental, Intestate Estate of Agustin
Montilla, Sr., deceased, a motion praying that the
interest, property and participation of Claudio
Montilla, one of the heirs of Agustin Montilla, Sr., in

the latter's intestate estate be sold and out of the
proceed the judgment debt of Claudio Montilla in
favor of Pedro L. Litonjua be paid. This motion was
opposed by Claudio Montilla and by Agustin Montilla,
Jr., administrator of the intestate estate
CFI : issued an order denying the motion. Hence,
this appeal to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Litonjua, as a creditor, may go
after the interest of Montilla Jr. in the intestate Estate
of Agustin Montilla Sr.
HELD:
NO. The creditors of the heirs of a deceased
person is entitled to collect his claim out of the
property which pertains by inheritance to said heirs,
ONLY AFTER all debts of the testate or intestate
succession have been paid and when the net assets
that are divisible among the heirs known. The debts
of the deceased must first be paid before his heirs
can inherit.
A person who is not a creditor of a deceased, testate
or intestate, has NO RIGHT to intervene either in the
proceedings brought in connection with the estate or
in the settlement of the succession.
An execution cannot legally be levied upon the
property of an intestate succession to pay the debts
of the widow and heirs of the deceased, until the
credits held against the latter at the time of his death
shall have been paid can the remaining property that
pertains to the said debtors heirs can be attached.
201) SOCORRO LEDESMA and ANA QUITCO
LEDESMA,
plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
CONCHITA MCLACHLIN, ET AL., defendantsappellants.
G.R. No. L-44837, November 23, 1938
VILLA-REAL, J.:
Note: This case is an appeal taken by the
defendants Conchita McLachlin, Lorenzo Quitco, Jr.,
Sabina Quitco, Rafael Quitco and Marcela Quitco,
from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Occidental Negros, making the heirs of their
deceased father solidary liable as to the
199

indebtedness incurred by their deceased father
instituted by the plaintiff-creditor in the Intestate
Estate of Eusebio, their grandfather and not in the
Intestate Estate of Quitco, their father.
FACTS:
Defendants in this case are the heirs of their
deceased debtor-father Lorenzo M. Quitco.
COMMON LAW RELATIONSHIP: In the year 1916,
the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma lived maritally with
Lorenzo M. Quitco, while the latter was still single, of
which relation, lasting until the year 1921, was born
a daughter who is the other plaintiff Ana Quitco
Ledesma. In 1921, it seems hat the relation between
Socorro Ledesma and Lorenzo M. Quitco came to
an end.
Lorenzo M. Quitco executed a deed acknowledging
the plaintiff Ana Quitco Ledesma as his natural
daughter.
THE DEBT: On January 21, 1922, Lorenzo issued in
favor of the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma a promissory
note for or on behalf of his indebtedness amounting
to 2,000 w/c is to be paid on installment.
THE MARRIAGE TO ANOTHER: Subsequently,
Lorenzo married Conchita McLachlin. They had four
(4) children, who are the other defendants.
DEATH: On March 9, 1930, Lorenzo M. Quitco died
predeceasing his father, but, still later, that is, on
December 15, 1932, his father Eusebio Quitco also
died, and as the latter left real and personal
properties upon his death.
Administration proceedings of said properties were
instituted in this court, the said case being known as
the "Intestate of the deceased Eusebio Quitco," civil
case No. 6153 of this court.
In order to satisfy the remaining value of the PN,
Socorro went after the Intestate Estate of Eusebio
Quitco, to claim the indebtedness of his debtordeceased son Lorenzo.
ISSUE 1:
Whether or not the action for the recovery of the
sum of P1,500, representing the last installment of
the promisorry note has already prescribed.
HELD 1:
YES. According to the promissory note
executed by the deceased Lorenzo M. Quitco, on
January 21, 1922, the last installment of P1,500

should be paid two years from the date of the
execution of said promissory note, that is, on
January 21, 1924. The complaint in the present case
was filed on June 26, 1934, that is, more than ten
years after the expiration of the said period. The fact
that the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma filed her claim, on
August 26, 1933, with the committee on claims and
appraisal appointed in the intestate of Eusebio
Quitco, does not suspend the running of the
prescriptive period of the judicial action for the
recovery of said debt, because the claim for the
unpaid balance of the amount of the promissory note
should not have been presented in the intestate of
Eusebio Quitco, the said deceased not being the
one who executed the same, but in the intestate of
Lorenzo M. Quitco, which should have been
instituted by the said Socorro Ledesma as provided
in section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
authorizing a creditor to institute said case through
the appointment of an administrator for the purpose
of collecting his credit. More than ten years having
thus elapsed from the expiration of the period for the
payment of said debt of P1,500, the action for its
recovery has prescribed under section 43, No. 1, of
the Code of Civil Procedure.
ISSUE 2:
Whether or not the properties inherited by the
defendants from their deceased grandfather by
representation are subject to the payment of debts
and obligations of their deceased father, who died
without leaving any property
HELD 2:
NO. The claim for the unpaid balance of the
amount of the PN should have been presented in the
intestate of Lorenzo and not in the intestate of
Eusebio, the formers father.
RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION: While it is true that
under the provisions of articles 924 to 927 of the
Civil Code, a children presents his father or mother
who died before him in the properties of his
grandfather or grandmother, this right of
representation does not make the said child
answerable for the obligations contracted by his
deceased father or mother, because, as may be
seen from the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure referring to partition of inheritances, the
inheritance is received with the benefit of inventory,
that is to say, the heirs only answer with the
properties received from their predecessor. The
herein defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco, in
200

representation of their father Lorenzo M. Quitco, are
not bound to pay the indebtedness of their said
father from whom they did NOT inherit anything.
The appealed judgment is reversed, and the
DEFENDANTS ARE ABSOLVED from the
complaint, with the costs to the appellees
202) DKC HOLDINGS CORPORATION,petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICTOR U. BARTOLOME
and REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR METRO MANILA,
DISTRICT III, respondents.
G.R. No. 118248, April 5, 2000
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Note: This is a petition for review on certiorari
seeking the reversal Decision of the CA entitled
"DKC Holdings Corporation vs. Victor U. Bartolome,
et al.", affirming in toto the Decision of the RTC of
Valenzuela, which dismissed Civil Case No. 3337-V90 and ordered petitioner to pay P30,000.00 as
attorney's fees.
FACTS:
THE LOT IN DISPUTE: The subject of the
controversy is a 14,021 square meter parcel of land
located in Malinta, Valenzuela, Metro Manila which
was originally owned by private respondent Victor U.
Bartolome's
deceased
mother,
Encarnacion
Bartolome, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. B37615 of the Register of Deeds of Metro Manila,
District III. This lot was in front of one of the textile
plants of petitioner and, as such, was seen by the
latter as a potential warehouse site.
Self-Adjudication over all the properties of

Encarnacion, including the subject lot. Accordingly,
respondent Register of Deeds cancelled Transfer
Certificate of Title No. B-37615 and issued Transfer
Certificate of Title No. V-14249 in the name of
Victor Bartolome.
2nd REFUSAL TO ACCEPT PAYMENT: On March
14, 1990, petitioner served upon Victor, via
registered mail, notice that it was exercising its
option to lease the property, tendering the amount of
P15,000.00 as rent for the month of March. Again,
Victor refused to accept the tendered rental fee and
to surrender possession of the property to petitioner.
DKC deposited its payments at China Bank. DKC
filed
a
COMPLAINT
FOR
SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE AND DAMAGES against Victor,
praying among others the surrender and delivery of
possession of the subject land in accordance with
the Contract terms.
RTC: dismissed the complaint filed by DKC, thus
ruling in favor of Victor Bartolome.
CA: affirmed in toto.
BASIS OF RTC & CA: Victor is not a party thereto
to the contract entered into between his deceased
mother and plaintiff.
ISSUE 1:
Whether or not the Contract of Lease with
Option to Buy entered into by the late Encarnacion
Bartolome with petitioner was terminated upon her
death or whether it binds her sole heir, Victor, even
after her demise. Stated differently, whether or not
Contract of Lease with Option to Buy entered into by
the late Encarnacion Bartolome with petitioner is
transmissible to his sole heir.
THE CONTRACT: DKC entered into a CONTRACT

OF LEASE W/ OPTION TO BUY with Encarnacion
Bartolome (plaintiff deceased mother). DKC was
given the option to a.) lease or b.) lease with
purchase the subject land w/c must be exercised
within a period of two (2) years counted from the
signing of the contract.
HELD 1:
1st REFUSAL TO ACCEPT PAYMENT: DKC

regularly paid its dues to Encarnacion until her
death.
DKC coursed its payment to Victor
Bartolome, the sole heir of Encarnacion. Victor
refused to accept these payments.
In the present case, there is neither contractual

stipulation nor legal provision making the rights and
obligations under the Contract intransmissible. More
importantly, the nature of the rights and obligations
therein are, by their nature, transmissible.
THE TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP OVER THE

LOT: Meanwhile, Victor executed an Affidavit of
The nature of intransmissible rights as explained

by Arturo Tolentino, an eminent civilist, is as follows:
YES. General Rule: Heirs are bound by

contracts entered into by their predecessors-ininterest except when the rights and obligations
arising therefrom are not transmissible by (1) their
nature, (2) stipulation or (3) provision of law. (Art
1311 CC)
201

Among contracts which are intransmissible are those
which are purely personal, either by provision of law,
such as in cases of partnerships and agency, or by
the very nature of the obligations arising therefrom,
such as those requiring special personal
qualifications of the obligor. It may also be stated
that contracts for the payment of money debts are
not transmitted to the heirs of a party, but constitute
a charge against his estate. Thus, where the client in
a contract for professional services of a lawyer died,
leaving minor heirs, and the lawyer, instead of
presenting his claim for professional services under
the contract to the probate court, substituted the
minors as parties for his client, it was held that the
contract could not be enforced against the minors;
the lawyer was limited to a recovery on the basis of
quantum meruit.
Victor cannot insist that he is not a party to the

Contract because of the clear provision of Art 1311.
Being an heir of Encarnacion, there is PRIVITY OF
INTEREST between him and his deceases mother.
He only succeeds to what rights his mother had and
what is valid and binding against her is also valid
and binding as against him.
In American jurisprudence, "(W)here acts stipulated

in a contract require the exercise of special
knowledge, genius, skill, taste, ability, experience,
judgment, discretion, integrity, or other personal
qualification of one or both parties, the agreement is
of a personal nature, and terminates on the death of
the party who is required to render such service."
TEST:It has also been held that a good measure for

determining whether a contract terminates upon the
death of one of the parties is whether it is of such a
character that it may be performed by the
promissor's personal representative. Contracts to
perform personal acts which cannot be as well
performed by others are discharged by the death of
the promissor. Conversely, where the service or act
is of such a character that it may as well be
performed by another, or where the contract, by its
terms, shows that performance by others was
contemplated, death does not terminate the contract
or excuse nonperformance.
NO PERSONAL ACT: In the case at bar, there is no
personal act required from the late Encarnacion
Bartolome. Rather, the obligation of Encarnacion in
the contract to deliver possession of the subject
property to petitioner upon the exercise by the latter
of its option to lease the same may very well be
performed by her heir Victor.
ISSUE 2:
Whether or not Victor Bartolome as sole heir is
not a party to the contract executed by his deceased
mother. The property subject of the contract was
inherited by Victor.
The subject matter of the Contract is lease, which is

a property right. Hence, the death of a party DOES
NOT excuse non-performance of a contract which
involves a property right, and the rights and
obligations thereunder pass to the personal
representatives of the deceased. Non-performance
is NOT excused by the death of the party when the
other party has a property interest in the subject
matter of the contract.
203) ARUEGO VS CA
254 SCRA 711
FACTS:
Jose Aruego Sr. had an amorous relationship with
Luz Fabian, out of which was born Antonia and
Evelyn Aruego.
A Complaint for Compulsory Recognition and
Enforcement of Successional Rights was filed by the
two children, represented by their mother, Fabian.
Said complaint prayed for the following:
a.
That Antonia and Evelyn be declared the
illegitimate children of the deceased Jose;
b.
That petitioners be compelled to recognize
and acknowledge them as the compulsory heirs of
the deceased Jose;
c.
That their share and participation in the
estate of Jose be determined and ordered delivered
to them.
The main basis of the action for compulsory
recognition is their alleged open and continuous
possession of the status of illegitimate children.
RTC declared Antonia as illegitimate daughter of
Jose but not as to Evelyn. It ordered petitioners to
recognize Antonia and to deliver to the latter her
share in the estate of Jose.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration
alleging loss of jurisdiction on the part of the trial
court by virtue of the advent of the Family Code.
Said motion was denied. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
HELD 2:
202

WON the application of the Family Code will
prejudice or impair any vested right of Antonia such
that it should not be given retroactive effect.
HELD:
YES. The action brought by Antonia for compulsory
recognition and enforcement of successional rights
which was filed before the advent of the Family
Code must be governed by Art 285 of the Civil Code
and NOT by Art 175, par.2 of the Family Code.
The Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect
as its application will prejudice the vested right of
Antonia. The right was vested to her by the fact that
she filed her action under the Civil Code.
The action was not yet barred, notwithstanding the
fact that it was brought when the putative father was
already deceased, since Antonia was then still a
minor when it was filed an exception to the general
rule under Art 285 of the Civil Code.
204) LORENZO VS POSADAS
64 PHIL 353
Doctrine:
A transmission by inheritance is taxable at the time
of the predecessor's death, notwithstanding the
postponement of the actual possession or enjoyment
of the estate by the beneficiary, and the tax
measured by the value of the property transmitted at
that time regardless of its appreciation or
depreciation.
Facts:
It appears that on May 27, 1922, one Thomas
Hanley died in Zamboanga, Zamboanga, leaving a
will and considerable amount of real and personal
properties. On june 14, 1922, proceedings for the
probate of his will and the settlement and distribution
of his estate were begun in the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga. The will was admitted to
probate.
The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
considered it proper for the best interests of the
estate to appoint a trustee to administer the real
properties which, under the will, were to pass to
Matthew Hanley ten years after the two executors
named in the will, was, on March 8, 1924, appointed
trustee. Moore took his oath of office and gave bond
on March 10, 1924. He acted as trustee until
February 29, 1932, when he resigned and the
plaintiff herein was appointed in his stead. During
the incumbency of the plaintiff as trustee, Defendant
Collector of Internal Revenue assessed against the
estate of Hanley an inheritance tax together with the
penalties for delinquency in payment. Lorenzo paid
the amount under protest. CIR overruled the said

protest and refused to refund the same.
CFI held that the real property of Thomas Hanley,
passed to his instituted heir, Matthew Hanley, from
the moment of death of the former, and that from
that time, the latter became the owner thereof.
Issue:
Whether an heir succeeds immediately to all of the
property of his or her deceased ancestor?
Held:
It is well-settled that inheritance taxation is governed
by the statute in force at the time of the death of the
decedent. The taxpayer can not foresee and ought
not to be required to guess the outcome of pending
measures. The SC hold that a transmission by
inheritance is taxable at the time of the
predecessor's
death,
notwithstanding
the
postponement of the actual possession or enjoyment
of the estate by the beneficiary, and the tax
measured by the value of the property transmitted at
that time regardless of its appreciation or
depreciation. The mere fact that the estate of the
deceased was placed in trust did not remove it from
the operation of our inheritance tax laws or exempt it
from the payment of the inheritance tax. The
corresponding inheritance tax should have been
paid to escape the penalties of the laws. This is so
for the reason already stated that the delivery of the
estate to the trustee was in esse delivery of the
same estate to the cestui que trust, the beneficiary in
this case. A trustee is but an instrument or agent for
the cestui que trust. When Moore accepted the trust
and took possesson of the trust estate he thereby
admitted that the estate belonged not to him but to
his cestui que trust.
205) CASTAEDA vs. ALEMANY

3 PHIL 426
Issue:
Whether or not the will of Doa Juana Moreno was
duly signed by herself in the presence of three
witnesses, who signed it as witnesses in the
presence of the testratrix and of each other. It was
therefore executed in conformity with law.
Held:
There is nothing in the language of section 618 of
the Code of Civil Procedure which supports the
claim of the appellants that the will must be written
by the testator himself or by someone else in his
presence and under his express direction. That
section requires (1) that the will be in writing and (2)
203

either that the testator sign it himself or, if he does
sign it, that it be signed by some one in his presence
and by his express direction. Who does the
mechanical work of writing the will is a matter of
indifference. The fact, therefore, that in this case the
will was typewritten in the office of the lawyer for the
testratrix is of no consequence. The English text of
section 618 is very plain. The mistakes in translation
found in the first Spanish edition of the code have
been corrected in the second.
(2) To establish conclusively as against everyone,
and once for all, the facts that a will was executed
with the formalities required by law and that the
testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only
purpose of the proceedings under the new code for
the probate of a will. (Sec. 625.) The judgment in
such proceedings determines and can determine
nothing more. In them the court has no power to
pass upon the validity of any provisions made in the
will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain
legacy is void and another one valid. It could not in
this case make any decision upon the question
whether the testratrix had the power to appoint by
will a guardian for the property of her children by her
first husband, or whether the person so appointed
was or was not a suitable person to discharge such
trust.
All such questions must be decided in some other
proceeding. The grounds on which a will may be
disallowed are stated the section 634. Unless one of
those grounds appears the will must be allowed.
They all have to do with the personal condition of the
testator at the time of its execution and the
formalities connected therewith. It follows that
neither this court nor the court below has any
jurisdiction in his proceedings to pass upon the
questions raised by the appellants by the
assignment of error relating to the appointment of a
guardian for the children of the deceased.
It is claimed by the appellants that there was no
testimony in the court below to show that the will
executed by the deceased was the same will
presented to the court and concerning which this
hearing was had. It is true that the evidence does
not show that the document in court was presented
to the witnesses and identified by them, as should
have been done. But we think that we are justified in
saying that it was assumed by all the parties during
the trial in the court below that the will about which
the witnesses were testifying was the document then
in court. No suggestion of any kind was then made
by the counsel for the appellants that it was not the
same instrument. In the last question put to the
witness Gonzales the phrase "this will" is used by
the counsel for the appellants. In their argument in
that court, found on page 15 of the record, they treat

the testimony of the witnesses as referring to the will
probate they were then opposing.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed,
eliminating therefrom, however, the clause "el cual
debera ejecutarse fiel y exactamente en todas sus
partes." The costs of this instance will be charged
against the appellants.
206) IN RE WILL OF RIOSA
39 PHIL 23
FACTS:
Jose Riosa died on April 17, 1917. He left a will
made in the month of January, 1908, in which he
disposed of an estate valued at more than P35,000.
The will was duly executed in accordance with the
law then in force, namely, section 618 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. The will was not executed in
accordance with Act No. 2645, amendatory of said
section 618, prescribing certain additional formalities
for the signing and attestation of wills, in force on
and after July 1, 1916. In other words, the will was in
writing, signed by the testator, and attested and
subscribed by three credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of each other; but was
not signed by the testator and the witnesses on the
left margin of each and every page, nor did the
attestation state these facts. The new law, therefore,
went into effect after the making of the will and
before the death of the testator, without the testator
having left a will that conforms to the new
requirements.
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure
reads:
No will, except as provided in the preceding
section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or
personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be
in writing and signed by the testator, or by the
testator's name written by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction, and attested
and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses
in the presence of the testator and of each other.
The attestation shall state the fact that the testator
signed the will, or caused it to be signed by some
other person, at his express direction, in the
presence of three witnesses, and that they attested
and subscribed it in his presence and in the
presence of each other. But the absence of such
form of attestation shall not render the will invalid if it
is proven that the will was in fact signed and attested
as in this section provided.
204

Act No. 2645 has amended section 618 of the
Code of Civil Procedure so as to make said section
read as follows:
SEC. 618. Requisites of will. No will, except
as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid
to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or
affect the same, unless it be written in the language
or dialect known by the testator and signed by him,
or by the testator's name written by some other
person in his presence, and by his express direction,
and attested and subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator
and of each other. The testator or the person
requested by him to write his name and the
instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as
aforesaid, each, and every page thereof, on the left
margin, and said pages shall be numbered
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of
each sheet. The attestation shall state the number of
sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written,
and the fact that the testator signed the will and
every page thereof, or caused some other person to
write his name, under his express direction, in the
presence of three witnesses, and the latter
witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof
in the presence of the testator and of each other.
The Court of First Instance for the province of Albay
rendered its decision on December 29, 1917
disallowing the will of Jose Riosa.
ISSUE:
The issue which this appeal presents is
whether in the Philippine Islands the law existing on
the date of the execution of a will, or the law existing
at the death of the testator, controls.
RULING:
The rule prevailing in many other jurisdictions
is that the validity of the execution of a will must be
tested by the statutes in force at the time of its
execution and that statutes subsequently enacted
have no retrospective effect. This doctrine is
believed to be supported by the weight of authority. It
was the old English view; in Downs (or Downing) vs.
Townsend (Ambler, 280), Lord Hardwicke is reported
to have said that "the general rule as to testaments
is, that the time of the testament, and not the
testator's death, is regarded." It is also the modern
view, including among other decisions one of the
Supreme Court of Vermont from which State many
of the sections of the Code if Civil Procedure of the
Philippine Islands relating to wills are taken.
(Giddings vs. Turgeon [1886], 58 Vt., 103.)
Of the numerous decisions of divergent

tendencies, the opinion by the learned Justice
Sharswood (Taylor vs. Mitchell [1868], 57 Pa. St.,
209) is regarded to be the best considered. In this
opinion is found the following:
Retrospective laws generally if not universally
work injustice, and ought to be so construed only
when the mandate of the legislature is imperative.
When a testator makes a will, formally executed
according to the requirements of the law existing at
the time of its execution, it would unjustly disappoint
his lawful right of disposition to apply to it a rule
subsequently enacted, though before his death.
It is, of course, a general rule of statutory
construction, as this court has said, that "all statutes
are to be construed as having only a prospective
operation unless the purpose and intention of the
Legislature to give them a retrospective effect is
expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the
language used. In every case of doubt, the doubt
must be resolved against the restrospective effect."
(Montilla vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos [1913],
24 Phil., 220. See also Chew Heong vs. U.S. [1884],
112 U.S., 536; U.S. vs American Sugar Ref. Co.
[1906], 202 U.S., 563.) Statute law, as found in the
Civil Code, is corroborative; article 3 thereof
provides that "laws shall not have a retroactive
effect, unless therein otherwise prescribed." The
language of Act No. 2645 gives no indication of
retrospective effect. Such, likewise, has been the
uniform tendency of the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands on cases having special
application to testamentary succession. (Abello vs.
Kock de Monaterio [1904], 3 Phil., 558; Timbol vs.
Manalo [1906], 6 Phil., 254; Bona vs. Briones, supra;
In the Matter of the Probation of the Will of Bibiana
Diquia [1918], R. G. No. 13176, 1 concerning the
language of the Will. See also section 617, Code of
Civil Procedure.)
The strongest argument against our accepting
the first two rules comes out of section 634 of the
Code of Civil Procedure which, in negative terms,
provides that a will shall be disallowed in either of
five cases, the first being "if not executed and
attested as in this Act provided." Act No. 2645 has,
of course, become part and parcel of the Code of
Civil Procedure. The will in question is admittedly not
executed and attested as provided by the Code of
Civil Procedure as amended. Nevertheless, it is
proper to observe that the general principle in the
law of wills inserts itself even within the provisions of
said section 634. Our statute announces a positive
rule for the transference of property which must be
complied with as completed act at the time of the
execution, so far as the act of the testator is
205

concerned, as to all testaments made subsequent to
the enactment of Act No. 2645, but is not effective as
to testaments made antecedent to that date.
To answer the question with which we began
this decision, we adopt as our own the second rule,
particularly as established by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania. The will of Jose Riosa is valid.
The order of the Court of First Instance for the
Province of Albay of December 29, 1917, disallowing
the will of Jose Riosa, is reversed, and the record
shall be returned to the lower court with direction to
admit the said will to probate, without special
findings as to costs. So ordered.
was already in force, which Code permitted the

execution of holographic wills, under a liberal view,
and to carry out the intention of the testator which
according to the trial court is the controlling factor
and may override any defect in form, said trial court
admitted to probate the subject document, as the
Last Will and Testament of Father Sancho Abadia.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of the Civil
Code allowing holographic wills should be applied.
HELD:
207) ENRIQUEZ VS ABADIA

95 SCRA 627
FACTS:
On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho
Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed a
document purporting to be his Last Will and
Testament. He died on January 14, 1943 and left
properties estimated at P8,000 in value. On October
2, 1946, one Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees,
filed a petition for its probate in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews, who
would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no
will, filed opposition.
During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses,
the other two being dead, testified without
contradiction that in his presence and in the
presence of his co-witnesses, Father Sancho wrote
out in longhand the subject document in Spanish
which the testator spoke and understood; that he
(testator) signed on the left hand margin of the front
page of each of the three folios or sheets of which
the document is composed, and numbered the same
with Arabic numerals, and finally signed his name at
the end of his writing at the last page, all this, in the
presence of the three attesting witnesses after telling
that it was his last will and that the said three
witnesses signed their names on the last page after
the attestation clause in his presence and in the
presence of each other. The oppositors did not
submit any evidence.
The learned trial court found and declared the
subject document to be a holographic will; that it was
in the handwriting of the testator and that although at
the time it was executed and at the time of the
testator's death, holographic wills were not permitted
by law still, because at the time of the hearing and
when the case was to be decided the new Civil Code
No. The new Civil Code (Republic Act No.

386) under article 810 thereof provides that a person
may execute a holographic will which must be
entirely written, dated and signed by the testator
himself and need not be witnessed. It is a fact,
however, that at the time the subject document was
executed in 1923 and at the time that Father Abadia
died in 1943, holographic wills were not permitted,
and the law at the time imposed certain
requirements for the execution of wills, such as
numbering correlatively each page (not folio or
sheet) in letters and signing on the left hand margin
by the testator and by the three attesting witnesses,
requirements which were not complied with in the
subject document because the back pages of the
first two folios of the will were not signed by any one,
not even by the testator and were not numbered,
and as to the three front pages, they were signed
only by the testator.
But Article 795 of this same new Civil Code
expressly provides: "The validity of a will as to its
form depends upon the observance of the law in
force at the time it is made." The above provision is
but an expression or statement of the weight of
authority to the affect that the validity of a will is to be
judged not by the law enforce at the time of the
testator's death or at the time the supposed will is
presented in court for probate or when the petition is
decided by the court but at the time the instrument
was executed. One reason in support of the rule is
that although the will operates upon and after the
death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about
the disposition of his estate among his heirs and
among the legatees is given solemn expression at
the time the will is executed, and in reality, the
legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act.
From the day of the death of the testator, if he leaves
a will, the title of the legatees and devisees under it
becomes a vested right, protected under the due
206

process clause of the constitution against a
subsequent change in the statute adding new legal
requirements of execution of wills which would
invalidate such a will. By parity of reasoning, when
one executes a will which is invalid for failure to
observe and follow the legal requirements at the
time of its execution then upon his death he should
be regarded and declared as having died intestate,
and his heirs will then inherit by intestate
succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal
requirements or which dispenses with such
requirements as to execution should be allowed to
validate a defective will and thereby divest the heirs
of their vested rights in the estate by intestate
succession. The general rule is that the Legislature
cannot validate void wills.
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is
reversed, and the subject document is denied
probate.
208) Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN
MICIANO, administrator vs. ANDRE BRIMO
50 PHIL 867
FACTS:
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a
scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the
brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court,
however, approved it.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that
the partition in question puts into effect the
provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in
accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality,
for which reason they are void as being in violation
or article 10 of the Civil Code.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that
said testamentary dispositions are not in accordance
with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not
present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws
are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on
such laws, they are presumed to be the same as
those of the Philippines.
There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that
the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was
violated in the testamentary dispositions in question
which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must
be complied with and executed. lawphil.net
As to the exclusion of the herein appellant as a
legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons
designated as such in will, it must be taken into
consideration that such exclusion is based on the
last part of the second clause of the will, which
says: that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen,
this citizenship having been conferred upon me by

conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality
and, on the other hand, having resided for a
considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands
where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property
that I now possess, it is my wish that the distribution
of my property and everything in connection with
this, my will, be made and disposed of in accordance
with the laws in force in the Philippine islands,
requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish,
otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever
disposition found in this will favorable to the person
or persons who fail to comply with this request.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional,
and the condition is that the instituted legatees must
respect the testator's will to distribute his property,
not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but
in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the condition imposed by the
decedent in his will is void being contrary to law.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the said condition is
void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the Civil
Code provides that Impossible conditions and
those contrary to law or good morals shall be
considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice
the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even
should the testator otherwise provide.
Moreover, the said condition is contrary to law
because it expressly ignores the testator's national
law when, according to article 10 of the civil Code
above quoted, such national law of the testator is the
one to govern his testamentary dispositions.
Therefore, the condition, in the light of the legal
provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and
the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional
and consequently valid and effective even as to the
herein oppositor.
The second clause of the will regarding the law
which shall govern it, and to the condition imposed
upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to
law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified
and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be
made in such a manner as to include the herein
appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees.
209) BELLIS vs BELLIS

20 SCRA 358
207

FACTS: Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen
of the State of Texas and of the United States." By
his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he
had five legitimate children: Edward, George, (who
pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry, Alexander and
Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet
Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate
children: Edwin, Walter and Dorothy and finally, he
had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in
which he directed that after all taxes, obligations,
and expenses of administration are paid for, his
distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the
following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his
first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his
three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00
each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been
satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven
surviving children by his first and second wives in
equal shares. 1wph1.t
Subsequently, died a resident of San Antonio, Texas,
U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court
of First Instance
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor
of the will, paid all the bequests therein including the
amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock
to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate
children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis, and pursuant to the "Twelfth"
clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament
divided the residuary estate into seven equal
portions for the benefit of the testator's seven
legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed
their respective oppositions to the project of partition
on the ground that they were deprived of their
legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore,
compulsory heirs of the deceased.
The lower court, issued an order overruling the
oppositions and approving the executor's final
account, report and administration and project of
partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it
applied the national law of the decedent, which in
this case is Texas law, which did not provide for
legitimes.
Issue: WON the national law of Amos Bellis should
apply in the said partition.
Held: YES.
In the present case, it is not disputed that the
decedent was both a national of Texas and a
domicile thereof at the time of his death. So that

even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule
providing that the domiciliary system (law of the
domicile) should govern, the same would not result
in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but
would still refer to Texas law. Rather, they argue that
their case falls under the circumstances mentioned
in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to
Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code,
render applicable the national law of the decedent, in
intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to
four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the
amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic
validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the
capacity to succeed.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17,
paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil
Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. It is evident
that whatever public policy or good customs may be
involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has
not intended to extend the same to the succession of
foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to
leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights,
to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions
must prevail over general ones.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis,
was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that
under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or
legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of
the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under
Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be
applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby
affirmed in toto.
210) Bugnao v. Ubag
14 PHIL 163
FACTS:
The last will and testament of Domingo Ubag was
admitted for probate. It was signed by him in the
presence of three subscribing and attesting
witnesses and appears upon its face to have been
duly executed in accordance with the provisions of
the Code of Civil Procedure on the making of wills.
208

The instrument was propounded by his widow
Catalina Bugnao who is the sole beneficiary.
The order admitting the will was appealed by the
appellants who are brothers and sisters of the
deceased and would be entitled to share in the
distribution of his estate, if probate were denied, as it
appears that the deceased left no heirs in the direct
ascending or descending line. They contend that
Ubag was not of sound mind and memory, and was
physically and mentally incapable of making a will.
The appellants pointed out that one of the attesting
witnesses stated that the decease sat up in bed and
signed his name to the will, and that after its
execution food was given him by his wife; while the
other testified that he was assisted into a sitting
position, and was given something to eat before he
signed his name.
Appellants also contended that the decedent was
physically incapacitated to make the will because he
was then suffering from an advanced stage of
tuberculosis, such that he was too weak to stand or
even sit up unaided, and that he could not speak
when he had asthma attacks.
Of the four witnesses appellant presented who tried
to prove that the attesting witnesses were not
present during the signing of the will by the
decedent, two of the witnesses stand to inherit from
the decedent if the will were denied probate. These
two witnesses, on direct cross-examination, later
admitted that they were not even in the house of the
decedent at the time of the execution of the will. The
attesting witnesses, on the other hand, testified on
the due execution and testamentary capacity of the
decedent.
Appellants, who are siblings of the decedent, also
claimed that the will was obtained by fraud
considering that they were excluded therefrom.
ISSUE:
Whether the evidence of the appellants is sufficient
to prove that the testator lacked testamentary
capacity at the time of the execution of the will or
that he was induced by fraud in making the same
HELD:
That the testator was mentally capable of making the
will is in our opinion fully established by the
testimony of the subscribing witnesses who swore
positively that, at the time of its execution, he was of
sound mind and memory. It is true that their
testimony discloses the fact that he was at that time
extremely ill, in an advanced stage of tuberculosis
complicated with severe intermittent attacks of
asthma; that he was too sick to rise unaided from his
bed; that he needed assistance even to rise himself
to a sitting position; and that during the paroxysms of

asthma to which he was subject he could not speak;
but all this evidence of physical weakness in no wise
establishes his mental incapacity or a lack of
testamentary capacity, and indeed the evidence of
the subscribing witnesses as to the aid furnished
them by the testator in preparing the will, and his
clear recollection of the boundaries and physical
description of the various parcels of land set out
therein, taken together with the fact that he was able
to give to the person who wrote the will clear and
explicit instructions as to his desires touching the
disposition of his property, is strong evidence of his
testamentary capacity.
Counsel for appellant suggests that the fact that the
alleged will leaves all the property of the testator to
his widow, and wholly fails to make any provision for
his brothers or sisters, indicates a lack of
testamentary capacity and undue influence; and
because of the inherent improbability that a man
would make so unnatural and unreasonable a will,
they contend that this fact indirectly corroborates
their contention that the deceased never did in fact
execute the will. But when it is considered that the
deceased at the time of his death had no heirs in the
ascending or descending line; that a bitter family
quarrel had long separated him from his brothers
and sisters, who declined to have any relations with
the testator because he and his wife were adherents
of the Aglipayano Church; and that this quarrel was
so bitter that none of his brothers or sisters, although
some of them lived in the vicinity, were present at
the time of his death or attended his funeral; we
think the fact that the deceased desired to leave and
did leave all of his property to his widow and made
no provision for his brothers and sisters, who
themselves were grown men and women, by no
means tends to disclose either an unsound mind or
the presence of undue influence on the part of his
wife, or in any wise corroborates contestants'
allegation that the will never was executed.
For the purposes of this decision it is not necessary
for us to attempt to lay down a definition of
testamentary capacity which will cover all possible
cases which may present themselves, because, as
will be seen from what has already been said, the
testator was, at the time of making the instrument
under consideration, endowed with all the elements
of mental capacity set out in the following definition
of testamentary capacity which has been frequently
announced in courts of last resort in England and the
United States; and while is some cases
testamentary capacity has been held to exist in the
absence of proof of some of these elements, there
can be no question that, in the absence of proof of
209

very exceptional circumstances, proof of the
existence of all these elements in sufficient to
establish the existence of testamentary capacity.
Testamentary capacity is the capacity to
comprehend the nature of the transaction which the
testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the
property to be disposed of and the person who
would naturally be supposed to have claims upon
the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which
the instrument will distribute his property among the
objects of his bounty.
The order probating the will affirmed.
211) JULIANA BAGTAS, plaintiffs-appellee, vs.

ISIDRO PAGUIO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
22 PHIL 227
FACTS:
The testator,Pioquinto Paguio, for some 14 or 15
years prior to the time of his death suffered from a
paralysis of the left side of his body; that a few years
prior to his death his hearing became impaired and
that he lost the power of speech. Owing to the
paralysis of certain muscles his head fell to one side,
and saliva ran from his mouth. He retained the use
of his right hand, however, and was able to write
fairly well. Through the medium of signs he was able
to indicate his wishes to his wife and to other
members
of
his
family.
At the time of the execution of his will, four
testamentary witnesses were present: Agustin
Paguio, Anacleto Paguio, and Pedro Paguio, and
attorney, Seor Marco, and one Florentino
Ramos.The testator, wrote out on pieces of paper
notes and items relating to the disposition of his
property, and these notes were in turn delivered to
Seor Marco, who transcribed them and put them in
form. The witnesses testify that the pieces of paper
upon which the notes were written are delivered to
attorney by the testator; that the attorney read them
to the testator asking if they were his testamentary
dispositions; that the testator assented each time
with an affirmative movement of his head; that after
the will as a whole had been thus written by the
attorney, it was read in a loud voice in the presence
of the testator and the witnesses; that Seor Marco
gave the document to the testator; that the latter,
after looking over it, signed it in the presence of the
four subscribing witnesses; and that they in turn
signed it in the presence of the testator and each
other.
The executrix and widow of the decedent, Juliana

Bagtas, filed a petition to probate the will of Paguio.It
was opposed by Isidro Paguio, son of the deceased
and several grandchildren by a former marriage, the
latter being the children of a deceased daughter.
Their opposition is based on the ground that the will
was not executed according to the formalities and
requirements of the law, and further that the testator
was not in the full of enjoyment and use of his
mental faculties to execute a valid will. CFI Bulacan
admits the will to probate. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: DID THE TESTATOR POSSESS THE
REQUIRED MENTAL SOUNDNESS TO VALIDLY
EXECUTE A WILL?
HELD: CFI AFFIRMED
Upon this point considerable evidence was adduced
at the trial. One of the attesting witnesses testified
that at the time of the execution of the will the
testator was in his right mind, and that although he
was seriously ill, he indicated by movements of his
head what his wishes were. Another of the attesting
witnesses stated that he was not able to say whether
decedent had the full use of his mental faculties or
not, because he had been ill for some years, and
that he (the witnesses) was not a physician. The
other subscribing witness, Pedro Paguio, testified in
the lower court as a witness for the opponents. He
was unable to state whether or not the will was the
wish of the testator. The only reasons he gave for his
statement were the infirmity and advanced age of
the testator and the fact that he was unable to
speak. The witness stated that the testator signed
the will, and he verified his own signature as a
subscribing
witness.
Florentino Ramos, although not an attesting witness,
stated that he was present when the will was
executed and his testimony was cumulative in
corroboration of the manner in which the will was
executed and as to the fact that the testator signed
the will. This witness also stated that he had
frequently transacted matters of business for the
decedent and had written letters and made
inventories of his property at his request, and that
immediately before and after the execution of the will
he had performed offices of his character. He stated
that the decedent was able to communicate his
thoughts by writing. The testimony of this witness
clearly indicates the presence of mental capacity on
the part of the testator. Among other witnesses for
the opponents were two physician, Doctor Basa and
Doctor Viado. Doctor Basa testified that he had
attended the testator some four or five years prior to
210

his death and that the latter had suffered from a
cerebral congestion from which the paralysis
resulted. The following question was propounded to
Doctor
Basa:
Q. Referring to mental condition in which you found
him the last time you attended him, do you think he
was
in
his
right
mind?
A. I can not say exactly whether he was in his right
mind, but I noted some mental disorder, because
when I spoke to him he did not answer me.
Doctor Basa testified at more length, but the
substance of his testimony is that the testator had
suffered a paralysis and that he had noticed some
mental disorder. He does not say that the testator
was not in his right mind at the time of the execution
of the will, nor does he give it at his opinion that he
was without the necessary mental capacity to make
a valid will. He did not state in what way this mental
disorder had manifested itself other than that he had
noticed that the testator did not reply to him on one
occasion
when
he
visited
him.
Doctor Viado, the other physician, have never seen
the testator, but his answer was in reply to a
hypothetical question as to what be the mental
condition of a person who was 79 years old and who
had suffered from a malady such as the testator was
supposed to have had according to the testimony of
Doctor Basa, whose testimony Doctor Viado had
heard. He replied and discussed at some length the
symptoms and consequences of the decease from
which the testator had suffered; he read in support of
his statements from a work by a German Physician,
Dr. Herman Eichost. In answer, however, to a direct
question, he stated that he would be unable to certify
to the mental condition of a person who was
suffering
from
such
a
disease.
We do not think that the testimony of these two
physicians in any way strengthens the contention of
the appellants. Their testimony only confirms the fact
that the testator had been for a number of years
prior to his death afflicted with paralysis, in
consequence of which his physician and mental
strength was greatly impaired. Neither of them
attempted to state what was the mental condition of
the testator at the time he executed the will in
question. There can be no doubt that the testator's
infirmities were of a very serious character, and it is
quite evident that his mind was not as active as it
had been in the earlier years of his life. However, we
cannot include from this that he wanting in the
necessary mental capacity to dispose of his property

by
will.
The courts have been called upon frequently to
nullify wills executed under such circumstances, but
the weight of the authority is in support if the
principle that it is only when those seeking to
overthrow the will have clearly established the
charge of mental incapacity that the courts will
intervene to set aside a testamentary document of
this character.In this jurisdiction the presumption of
law is in favor of the mental capacity of the testator
and the burden is upon the contestants of the will to
prove the lack of testamentary capacity. The rule of
law relating to the presumption of mental soundness
is well established, and the testator in the case at
bar never having been adjudged insane by a court of
competent jurisdiction, this presumption continues,
and it is therefore incumbent upon the opponents to
overcome this legal presumption by proper
evidence. This we think they have failed to do. There
are many cases and authorities which we might cite
to show that the courts have repeatedly held that
mere weakness of mind and body, induced by age
and disease do not render a person incapable of
making a will. The law does not require that a person
shall continue in the full enjoyment and use of his
pristine physical and mental powers in order to
execute a valid will
In the above case the will was sustained. In the case
at bar we might draw the same contrast as was
pictured by the court in the case just quoted. The
striking change in the physical and mental vigor of
the testator during the last years of his life may have
led some of those who knew him in his earlier days
to entertain doubts as to his mental capacity to make
a will, yet we think that the statements of the
witnesses to the execution of the will and statements
of the conduct of the testator at that time all indicate
that he unquestionably had mental capacity and that
he exercised it on this occasion. At the time of the
execution of the will it does not appear that his
conduct was irrational in any particular. He seems to
have comprehended clearly what the nature of the
business was in which he was engaged. The
evidence show that the writing and execution of the
will occupied a period several hours and that the
testator was present during all this time, taking an
active part in all the proceedings. Again, the will in
the case at bar is perfectly reasonable and its
dispositions are those of a rational person.
211

212) TRINIDAD NEYRA, plaintiff-appellant, vs.

ENCARNACION NEYRA, defendant-appellee
76 PHIL 333
FACTS:
Severo Nayra died leaving certain properties and
two children, by his first marriage, named
Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra, and other
children by his second marriage; That after the death
of Severo Neyra, the two sisters, Encarnacion Neyra
and Trinidad Neyra, had serious misunderstandings,
in connection with the properties left by their
deceased father.Trinidad Neyra filed a complaint
against her sister, Encarnacion Neyra, in CFI Manila,
for the recovery of of a property left by their
deceased father, and demanding at the same time
of the rents collected on the said property by the
defendant Encarnacion Neyra. CFI decided in favour
of Trinidad but at the same time ordered her to pay
Encarnacion the sum of P727.77, plus interests, by
virtue of said counterclaims.Trinidad Neyra appealed
from the said decision, to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, dismissed the appeal on a
decision dated November 10, 1942, by virtue of said
agreement or compromise, Atty. Lucio Javillonar,
claiming to represent Encarnacion Neyra, who had
died since November 4, 1942, and other relatives of
hers, The heirs of the deceased filed a motion for
reconsideration,
claiming
that
the
alleged
compromise or agreement, dated November 3,
1942, could not have been understood by
Encarnacion Neyra, as she was already then at the
threshold of death, and that as a matter of fact she
died the following day; and that if it had been signed
at all by said Encarnacion Neyra, her thumbmark
appearing on said document must have been affixed
thereto by Trinidad Neyra's attorney, against
Encarnacion's will.
Pending the appeal before CA, Encarnacion became
seriously ill and was advised by her religious adviser,
Fr. Garcia to reconcile with her sister. Trinidad was
invited to her sisters home and they reconciled
while Encarnacion was lying in bed. In the course of
their conversation which they also talked about the
properties left by their father and their litigations
which had reached the Court of Appeals, and they
agreed to have the latter dismissed, on the condition
that the property involved therein should be given
exclusively to Trinidad Neyra, that the latter should
waive her share in the rents of said property
collected by Encarnacion, and the Trinidad had no
more indebtedness to Encarnacion. Attorney Panis
prepared said document of compromise as well as
the new will and testament, naming Trinidad Neyra
and Eustaquio Mendoza beneficiaries therein,

pursuant to Encarnacion's express instructions, and
the two documents were prepared, in duplicate, and
were ready for signature, since the morning of
November 3, 1942; that in the afternoon of that day,
of compromise and last will and testament to
Encarnacion Neyra, slowly and in a loud voice, in the
presence of Father Teodoro Garcia, Dr. Moises B.
Abad, Dr. Eladio Aldecoa, Trinidad Neyra, and
others, after which he asked her if their terms were
in accordance with her wishes, or if she wanted any
change made in said documents; that Encarnacion
Neyra did not suggest any change, and asked for
the pad and the two documents, and, with the help
of a son of Trinidad, placed her thumbmark at the
foot of each one of the two documents, in duplicate,
on her bed in the sala, in the presence of attesting
witnesses, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio R.
Aldecoa and Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, after which
said witnesses signed at the foot of the will, in the
presence of Encarnacion Neyra, and of each other.
The agreement was also signed by Trinidad Neyra,
as party, and by Dr. M. B. Abad and Eustaquio
Mendoza, a protege, as witnesses.
Teodora Neyra, Presentacion Blanco and Ceferina
de la Cruz argue, that when the thumbmark of
Encarnacion Neyra was affixed to the agreement in
question, dated November 3, 1942, she was
sleeping on her bed in the sala; and that the
attesting witnesses were not present, as they were
in the caida.
ISSUES:
1.
WHETHER ENCARNACION WAS OF
SOUND MIND WHEN SHE SIGNED HER WILL
AND THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
2.
WHETHER THE WITNESSES WERE
PRESENT IN THE SIGNING OF THE WILL
HELD: PETITION DENIED, CA AFFIRMED
1.It has been conclusively shown that Encarnacion
Neyra died on November 4, 1942, due to a heart
attack, at the age of 48, after an illness of about two
(2) years. Presentacion Blanco, in the course of her
cross-examination, frankly admitted that, in the
morning and also at about 6 o'clock in he afternoon
of November 3, 1942, Encarnacion Neyra talked to
her that they understood each other clearly, thus
showing that the testatrix was really of sound mind,
at the time of signing and execution of the
agreement and will in question.
It may, therefore, be reasonably concluded that the
mental faculties of persons suffering from Addison's
disease, like the testatrix in this case, remain
212

unimpaired, partly due to the fact that, on account of
the sleep they enjoy, they necessarily receive the
benefit of physical and mental rest. And that like
patients suffering from tuberculosis, insomnia or
diabetes, they preserve their mental faculties until
the moments of their death.
Judging by the authorities above cited, the logical
conclusion is that Encarnacion Neyra was of sound
mind and possessed the necessary testamentary
and mental capacity, at the time of the execution of
the agreement and will, dated November 3, 1942.
2.The contention that the attesting witnesses were
not present, at the time Encarnacion Neyra
thumbmarked the agreement and will in question, on
her bed, in the sala of the house, as they were
allegedly in the caida, is untenable. It has been fully
shown that said witnesses were present, at the time
of the signing and execution of the agreement and
will in question, in the sala, where the testatrix was
lying on her bed. The true test is not whether they
actually saw each other at the time of the signing of
the documents, but whether they might have seen
each other sign, had they chosen to do so; and the
attesting witnesses actually saw it all in this case.
And the thumbmark placed by the testatrix on the
agreement and will in question is equivalent to her
signature.
213) In re estate of Piraso, deceased. SIXTO

ACOP, petitioner-appellant,
vs. SALMING PIRASO, ET AL., opponentsappellees.
52 PHIL 660
FACTS:
The proponent Acop appeals the judgment of the
CFI Benguet, denying the probate of last will and
testament of the deceased Piraso. The will was
written in English; that Piraso knew how to speak the
Ilocano dialect, although imperfectly, and could
make himself understood in that dialect, and the
court is of the opinion that his will should have been
written in that dialect.
ISSUE: WAS THE WILL VALIDLY EXECUTED?
HELD: CFI AFFIRMED
Section 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure, strictly
provides that:
"No will, except as provides in the preceding section"
(as to wills executed by a Spaniard or a resident of
the Philippine Islands, before the present Code of
Civil Procedure went into effect), "shall be valid to
pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or
affect the same, unless it be written in the language
or dialect known by the testator,"

Nor can the presumption in favor of the will
established by this court in Abangan vs. Abangan
(40 Phil., 476), to the effect that the testator is
presumed to know the dialect of the locality where
he resides, unless there is proof to the contrary,
even he invoked in support of the probate of said
document as a will, because, in the instant case, not
only is it not proven that English is the language of
the City of Baguio where the deceased Piraso lived
and where the will was drawn, but that the record
contains positive proof that said Piraso knew no
other language than the Igorrote dialect, with a
smattering of Ilocano; that is, he did not know the
English language in which then will is written. So that
even if such a presumption could have been raised
in this case it would have been wholly contradicted
and destroyed.
Such a result based upon solidly established facts
would be the same whether or not it be technically
held that said will, in order to be valid, must be
written in the Ilocano dialect; whether or not the
Igorrote or Inibaloi dialect is a cultivated language
and used as a means of communication in writing,
and whether or not the testator Piraso knew the
Ilocano dialect well enough to understand a will
written in said dialect. The fact is, we repeat, that it is
quite certain that the instrument Exhibit A was written
in English which the supposed testator Piraso did
not know, and this is sufficient to invalidate said will
according to the clear and positive provisions of the
law, and inevitably prevents its probate.
214) GERMAN JABONETA, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
RICARDO
GUSTILO,
ET
AL., defendantsappellees.
5 PHIL 541
FACTS:
Macario Jaboneta executed under the following
circumstances the document in question, which has
been presented for probate as his will:
Being in the house of Arcadio Jarandilla, in Jaro, in
this province, he ordered that the document in
question be written, and calling Julio Javellana,
Aniceto Jalbuena, and Isabelo Jena as witnesses,
executed the said document as his will. They were
all together, and were in the room where Jaboneta
was, and were present when he signed the
document, Isabelo Jena signing afterwards as a
witness, at his request, and in his presence and in
the presence of the other two witnesses. Aniceto
Jalbuena then signed as a witness in the presence
of the testator, and in the presence of the other two
213

persons who signed as witnesses. At that moment
Isabelo Jena, being in a hurry to leave, took his hat
and left the room. As he was leaving the house Julio
Javellana took the pen in his hand and put himself in
position to sign the will as a witness, but did not sign
in the presence of Isabelo Jena; but nevertheless,
after Jena had left the room the said Julio Javellana
signed as a witness in the presence of the testator
and of the witness Aniceto Jalbuena.
The last will and testament of Macario Jaboneta,
deceased, was denied probate because the lower
court was of the opinion from the evidence adduced
at the hearing that Julio Javellana, one of the
witnesses, did not attach his signature thereto in the
presence of Isabelo Jena, another of the witnesses,
as required by the provisions of section 618 of the
Code of Civil Procedure..
ISSUE: EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL WITH
RESPECT TO THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT
OF WITNESSES SIGNING THE WILL IN THE
PRESENCE OF EACH OTHER
HELD: TRIAL COURT REVERSED
We can not agree with so much of the above finding
of facts as holds that the signature of Javellana was
not signed in the presence of Jena, in compliance
with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. The fact that Jena was still in the
room when he saw Javellana moving his hand and
pen in the act of affixing his signature to the will,
taken together with the testimony of the remaining
witnesses which shows that Javellana did in fact
there and then sign his name to the will, convinces
us that the signature was affixed in the presence of
Jena. The fact that he was in the act of leaving, and
that his back was turned while a portion of the name
of the witness was being written, is of no importance.
He, with the other witnesses and the testator, had
assembled for the purpose of executing the
testament, and were together in the same room for
that purpose, and at the moment when the witness
Javellana signed the document he was actually and
physically present and in such position with relation
to Javellana that he could see everything which took
place by merely casting his eyes in the proper
direction, and without any physical obstruction to
prevent his doing so, therefore we are of opinion that
the document was in fact signed before he finally left
the room.
The purpose of a statutory requirement that the
witness sign in the presence of the testator is said to
be that the testator may have ocular evidence of the
identity of the instrument subscribed by the witness
and himself, and the generally accepted tests of
presence are vision and mental apprehension. (See

Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, vol. 30, p. 599, and cases
there cited.)
In the matter of Bedell (2 Connoly (N.Y.), 328) it was
held that it is sufficient if the witnesses are together
for the purpose of witnessing the execution of the
will, and in a position to actually see the testator
write, if they choose to do so; and there are many
cases which lay down the rule that the true test of
vision is not whether the testator actually saw the
witness sign, but whether he might have seen him
sign, considering his mental and physical condition
and position at the time of the subscription.
(Spoonemore vs. Cables, 66 Mo., 579.)
215) EUTIQUIA AVERA, petitioner-appellee, vs.
MARINO GARCIA, and JUAN RODRIGUEZ, as
guardian of the minors Cesar Garcia and Jose
Garcia,objectors-appellants
42 PHIL 45
FACTS:
Eutiquia Avera instituted the probate of the will of
one Esteban Garcia; contest was made by Marino
Garcia and Juan Rodriguez, the latter in the capacity
of guardian for the minors Jose Garcia and Cesar
Garcia. The proponent of the will introduced one of
the three attesting witnesses who testified that the
will was executed with all necessary external
formalities, and that the testator was at the time in
full possession of disposing faculties. Upon the latter
point the witness was corroborated by the person
who wrote the will at the request of the testator. Two
of the attesting witnesses were not introduced, nor
was their absence accounted for by the proponent of
the will. The attorney for the opposition introduced a
single witness whose testimony tended to show in a
vague and indecisive manner that at the time the will
was made the testator was so debilitated as to be
unable to comprehend what he was about.
The trial judge found that the testator at the time of
the making of the will was of sound mind and
disposing memory and that the will had been
properly executed. He accordingly admitted the will
to probate.Hence this appeal
ISSUES:
1. whether a will can be admitted to probate,
where opposition is made, upon the proof of
a single attesting witness, without producing
or accounting for the absence of the other
two;
2. whether the will in question is rendered
invalid by reason of the fact that the
214

signature of the testator and of the three
attesting witnesses are written on the right
margin of each page of the will instead of
the left margin.
HELD: lower court affirmed
1. While it is undoubtedly true that an
uncontested will bay be proved by the
testimony of only one of the three attesting
witnesses,
nevertheless
in
Cabang vs. Delfinado (34 Phil., 291), this
court
declared
after
an
elaborate
examination of the American and English
authorities that when a contest is instituted,
all of the attesting witnesses must be
examined, if alive and within reach of the
process of the court.
In the present case no explanation was made at the
trial as to why all three of the attesting witnesses
were not produced, but the probable reason is found
in the fact that, although the petition for the probate
of this will had been pending from December 21,
1917, until the date set for the hearing, which was
April 5, 1919, no formal contest was entered until the
very day set for the hearing; and it is probable that
the attorney for the proponent, believing in good faith
the probate would not be contested, repaired to the
court with only one of the three attesting witnesses
at hand, and upon finding that the will was
contested, incautiously permitted the case to go to
proof without asking for a postponement of the trial
in order that he might produce all the attesting
witnesses.Although this circumstance may explain
why the three witnesses were not produced, it does
not in itself supply any basis for changing the rule
expounded in the case above referred to; and were it
not for a fact now to be mentioned, this court would
probably be compelled to reverse this case on the
ground that the execution of the will had not been
proved by a sufficient number of attesting witnesses.
2. We are of the opinion that the will in
question is valid. It is true that the statute
says that the testator and the instrumental
witnesses shall sign their names on the left
margin of each and every page; and it is
undeniable that the general doctrine is to the
effect that all statutory requirements as to
the execution of wills must be fully complied
with. So far as concerns the authentication
of the will, and of every part thereof, it can
make no possible difference whether the
names appear on the left or no the right
margin, provided they are on one or the
other.
The controlling considerations on the point now
before us were well stated In Re will of Abangan (40

Phil., 476, 479), where the court, speaking through
Mr. Justice Avancea, in a case where the
signatures were placed at the bottom of the page
and not in the margin, said:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the
execution of wills is to close the door against bad
faith and fraud, to avoid substitution o will and
testaments and to guarantee their truth and
authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject
should be interpreted in such a way as to attain
these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also
one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the
object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise
of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation
already given assures such ends, any other
interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but
demands more requisites entirely unnecessary,
useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must
be disregarded.
In the case before us, where ingenuity could not
suggest any possible prejudice to any person, as
attendant upon the actual deviation from the letter of
the law, such deviation must be considered too trivial
to invalidate the instrument.
216) IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE
OF
THE
LATE
JOSEFA
VILLACORTE.
CELSO
ICASIANO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
NATIVIDAD
ICASIANO
and
ENRIQUE
ICASIANO, oppositors-appellants.
11 SCRA 423
FACTS:
A special proceeding was commenced on October 2,
1958 for the allowance and admission to probate of
the original will of Josefa Villacorte, deceased, and
for the appointment of petitioner Celso Icasiano as
executor thereof. Natividad Icasiano, a daughter of
the testatrix, filed her opposition. Enrique Icasiano, a
son of the testatrix, also filed a manifestation
adopting as his own Natividad's opposition to the
probate of the alleged will. Proponent subsequently
filed a motion for the admission of an amended and
supplemental petition, alleging that the decedent left
a will executed in duplicate with all the legal
requirements, and that he was, on that date,
submitting the signed duplicate , which he allegedly
found only on or about May 26, 1959. oppositors
Natividad Icasiano de Gomez and Enrique Icasiano
filed their joint opposition to the admission of the
amended and supplemental petition, but by order,
the court admitted said petition.
The evidence presented for the petitioner is to the
215

effect that Josefa Villacorte died in the City of Manila
on September 12, 1958; that on June 2, 1956, the
late Josefa Villacorte executed a last will and
testament in duplicate at the house of her daughter
Mrs. Felisa Icasiano at Pedro Guevara Street,
Manila, published before and attested by three
instrumental witnesses, namely: attorneys Justo P.
Torres, Jr. and Jose V. Natividad, and Mr. Vinicio B.
Diy; that the will was acknowledged by the testatrix
and by the said three instrumental witnesses on the
same date before attorney Jose Oyengco Ong,
Notary Public in and for the City of Manila; and that
the will was actually prepared by attorney Fermin
Samson, who was also present during the execution
and signing of the decedent's last will and testament,
together with former Governor Emilio Rustia of
Bulacan, Judge Ramon Icasiano and a little girl. Of
the said three instrumental witnesses to the
execution of the decedent's last will and testament,
attorneys Torres and Natividad were in the
Philippines at the time of the hearing, and both
testified as to the due execution and authenticity of
the said will. So did the Notary Public before whom
the will was acknowledged by the testatrix and
attesting witnesses, and also attorneys Fermin
Samson, who actually prepared the document. The
latter also testified upon cross examination that he
prepared one original and two copies of Josefa
Villacorte last will and testament at his house in
Baliuag, Bulacan, but he brought only one original
and one signed copy to Manila, retaining one
unsigned copy in Bulacan.
Witness Natividad who testified on his failure to sign
page three (3) of the original, admits that he may
have lifted two pages instead of one when he signed
the same, but affirmed that page three (3) was
signed in his presence.
The court issued the order admitting the will and its
duplicate to probate. From this order, the oppositors
appealed directly to this Court
before whom the testament was ratified by testatrix

and all three witnesses. The law should not be so
strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the
testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single
witness over whose conduct she had no control,
where the purpose of the law to guarantee the
identity of the testament and its component pages is
sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate
deviation existed, and the evidence on record attests
to the full observance of the statutory requisites.
Otherwise, as stated in Vda. de Gil. vs. Murciano, 49
Off.
Gaz.
1459,
at
1479
(decision
on
reconsideration) "witnesses may sabotage the will
by muddling or bungling it or the attestation clause".
That the failure of witness Natividad to sign page
three (3) was entirely through pure oversight is
shown by his own testimony as well as by the
duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete
set of signatures in every page. The text of the
attestation clause and the acknowledgment before
the Notary Public likewise evidence that no one was
aware of the defect at the time.
This would not be the first time that this Court
departs from a strict and literal application of the
statutory requirements, where the purposes of the
law are otherwise satisfied. Thus, despite the literal
tenor of the law, this Court has held that a testament,
with the only page signed at its foot by testator and
witnesses, but not in the left margin, could
nevertheless be probated (Abangan vs. Abangan, 41
Phil. 476); and that despite the requirement for the
correlative lettering of the pages of a will, the failure
to make the first page either by letters or numbers is
not a fatal defect (Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429).
These precedents exemplify the Court's policy to
require satisfaction of the legal requirements in order
to guard against fraud and bid faith but without
undue or unnecessary curtailment of the
testamentary privilege.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE WILL IS VALID IN THE

ABSENCE OF A WITNESS SIGNATURE IN ONE
PAGE
217) Testate estate of the late VICENTE CAGRO.

JESUSA
CAGRO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
PELAGIO
CAGRO,
ET
AL., oppositorsappellants.
92 PHIL 1033
HELD: CFI AFFIRMED

On the question of law, we hold that the inadvertent
failure of one witness to affix his signature to one
page of a testament, due to the simultaneous lifting
of two pages in the course of signing, is not per se
sufficient to justify denial of probate. Impossibility of
substitution of this page is assured not only the fact
that the testatrix and two other witnesses did sign
the defective page, but also by its bearing the
coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public
FACTS:
This is an appeal interposed by the oppositors from
a decision of the Court of First Instance of Samar,
admitting to probate the will allegedly executed by
Vicente Cagro who died in Laoangan, Pambujan,
Samar, on February 14, 1949.
The main objection insisted upon by the appellant in
that the will is fatally defective, because its
216

attestation clause is not signed by the attesting
witnesses. The signatures of the three witnesses to
the will do not appear at the bottom of the attestation
clause, although the page containing the same is
signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin.
The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures
of the three witnesses on the left-hand margin
conform substantially to the law and may be deemed
as their signatures to the attestation clause.
ISSUE: WHETHER THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL
COMPLIANCE
WHEN
THE
WITNESSES
SIGNATURES APPEAR ON THE LEFT MARGINS
BUT NOT IN THE ATTESTATION CLAUSE
HELD: CFI REVERSED
We are of the opinion that the position taken by the
appellant is correct. The attestation clause is 'a
memorandum of the facts attending the execution of
the will' required by law to be made by the attesting
witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their
signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be
considered as an act of the witnesses, since the
omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof
negatives their participation.
The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures
of the three witnesses on the left-hand margin
conform substantially to the law and may be deemed
as their signatures to the attestation clause. This is
untenable, because said signatures are in
compliance with the legal mandate that the will be
signed on the left-hand margin of all its pages. If an
attestation clause not signed by the three witnesses
at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it
would be easy to add such clause to a will on a
subsequent occasion and in the absence of the
testator and any or all of the witnesses
218)
BEATRIZ
NERA,
ET AL., plaintiffsappellees, vs. NARCISA RIMANDO, defendantappellant..
18 PHIL 450
FACTS:
The lower court admitted the instrument propounded
therein as the last will and testament of the
deceased, Pedro Rimando.The defendant appeals
the decision, contending that it one of the witnesses
was not present during the signing of the will by the
testator and of the other subscribing witnesses. one
of the witnesses was the outside some 8 or 10 feet
away, in a small room connected by a doorway from
where the will was signed ,across which was hung a
curtain which made it impossible for one in the
outside room to see the testator and the other

subscribing witnesses in the act of attaching their
signatures to the instrument.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE WILL WAS VALIDLY
EXECUTED EVEN IF ONE OF THE WITNESSES
WAS IN ANOTHER ROOM DURING THE SIGNING
OF THE WILL
HELD: LOWER COURT AFFIRMED
In the case just cited, on which the trial court relied,
we held that:
The true test of presence of the testator and the
witnesses in the execution of a will is not whether
they actually saw each other sign, but whether they
might have been seen each other sign, had they
chosen to do so, considering their mental and
physical condition and position with relation to each
other at the moment of inscription of each signature.
But it is especially to be noted that the position of the
parties with relation to each other at the moment of
the subscription of each signature, must be such that
they may see each other sign if they choose to do
so. This, of course, does not mean that the testator
and the subscribing witnesses may be held to have
executed the instrument in the presence of each
other if it appears that they would not have been
able to see each other sign at that moment, without
changing their relative positions or existing
conditions. The trial courts decision merely laid
down the doctrine that the question whether the
testator and the subscribing witnesses to an alleged
will sign the instrument in the presence of each other
does not depend upon proof of the fact that their
eyes were actually cast upon the paper at the
moment of its subscription by each of them, but that
at that moment existing conditions and their position
with relation to each other were such that by merely
casting the eyes in the proper direction they could
have seen each other sign. To extend the doctrine
further would open the door to the possibility of all
manner of fraud, substitution, and the like, and
would defeat the purpose for which this particular
condition is prescribed in the code as one of the
requisites in the execution of a will.
219) CANEDA VS CA
222 SCRA 781
FACTS: Testator Mateo Caballero is a widower
without any children. He executed a will in the
presence of three witnesses. He was assisted by his
lawyer and a notary public in the preparation of his
will. Under the said will, the testator disposed of his
217

properties to persons without blood relation to the
testator. The testator himself submitted the will to the
probate court but the testator passed away even
before his petition could be heard.
The petitioners, who claimed to be the nephews and
nieces of the testator, filed for the settlement of the
intestate estate of Mateo. The probate proceedings
and special proceedings filed were consolidated.
Petitioners opposed the allowance of the will of
Mateo on the ground that on the date stated in the
will, the testator was already of poor health and
could not have executed the will. They likewise
questioned the genuineness of the signature of the
testator in the said will.
The probate court allowed the will. On appeal, the
petitioners contended that the Attestation Clause
was fatally defective for failing to state that the
testator signed in the presence of the witnesses and
the witnesses signed in the presence of the testator
and of one another.
Court of Appeals, nevertheless affirmed the probate
courts decision and held that there was substantial
compliance with Art. 805.
ISSUE: Whether or not the attestation clause
contained in the last will complies with the
requirements of Art. 805 and 809?
HELD: In the case of ordinary or notarial wills, the
attestation clause need not be written in a language
or dialect known to the testator since it does not form
part of the disposition. The language used in the
attestation clause likewise need not even be known
to the attesting witnesses. The last paragraph of Art.
805 merely requires that, in such a case, the
Attestation Clause shall be interpreted to said
witnesses.
An Attestation Clause refers to that part of an
ordinary will whereby the attesting witnesses certify
that the instrument has been executed before them
and to the manner of the execution of the same. It is
a separate memorandum of the facts surrounding
the conduct of execution of the same.
Paragraph 3 of Art. 805 requires three things to be
stated in the Attestation Clause, the lack of which
would result in the invalidity of the will:
a) The number of pages
b) That the testator signed or
expressly caused another to
sign, the will and every page

thereof in the presence of the
attesting witnesses and
c) That the attesting witnesses
witnessed the signing by the
testator of the will and all of its
pages, and that said witnesses
also signed the will and every
page thereof in the presence of
the testator and of one another.
The purpose of the law is to safeguard against any
interpolation or omission of some of its pages,
whereas the subscription of the signatures of the
testator and the attesting witnesses is made for the
purpose of authentication and identification, and thus
indicates that the will is the very instrument executed
by the testator and attested to by the witnesses. By
attesting and subscribing to the will. The witnesses
thereby declare that due execution of the will as
embodied in the Attestation Clause. The Attestation
Clause provides strong legal guaranties for the due
execution of a will and to ensure the authenticity
thereof. It needs to be signed only by the witnesses
and not the testator, absence of the signature of the
former invalidates the will.
In the case at bar, the will was comprised of three
pages, all numbered correlatively, with the left
margin of each page bearing the respective
signatures of the testator and the three attesting
witnesses. The testamentary dispositions were
expresses in Cebuano- Visayan dialect and were
signed at the foot by the testator. The Attestation
Clause was recite in English and is likewise signed
at the end of three attesting witnesses.
What is fairly apparent upon a careful reading of the
Attestation Clause herein is the fact that while it
recites that the testator indeed signed the will and all
its pages in the presence of three attesting
witnesses and stated as well the number of pages
that were used, the same does not expressly state
therein the circumstance that said witnesses
subscribed their respective signatures to the will in
the presence of the testator and of each other. What
is clearly lacking is the statement that the witnesses
signed the will and every page thereof in the
presence of the testator and of one another. The
absence of that statement is a fatal defect which
must necessarily result in the disallowance of the
will.
As to the substantial compliance rule under Art. 809,
while it may be true that the Attestation Clause is
indeed subscribed at the end thereof and at the left
margin of each page by the three attesting
218

witnesses, it certainly cannot be conclusively
inferred therefrom that the said witnesses affixed
their respective signatures in the presence of the
testator and of each other, since the presence of
such signatures only establishes the fact that it was
indeed signed, but it does not prove that the
attesting witnesses did subscribe to the will in the
presence of the testator and of one another.
The execution of a will is supposed to be one act so
that where the testator and the witnesses sign on
various days or occasions and in various
combinations, the will cannot be stamped with the
imprimatur of effectivity. In a situation like in the
case at bar, the defects is not only in the form or
language of the Attestation Clause but the total
absence of a specific element requires by Art. 805.
In order that Art. 809 can apply, the defects must be
remedied by intrinsic evidenced supplied by the will
itself. In the case at bar, proof of the acts requires to
have been performed by the attesting witnesses san
be supplied only by extrinsic evidence thereof.
Reversal of the judgment rendered by the CA.
220) AZNAR VS GARCIA
7 SCRA95
FACTS: Aznar (executor) filed a petition to probate
the will of the deceased Edward Christensen giving
to Helen Christensen 3, 600 pesos while Lucy all the
remainder of his property which was opposed by
Helen because it deprives her legitime as an
acknowledged natural children hence she is entitled
to of the estate but CFI opposes the final
accounting of the executor.
ISSUE:WON Helen is entitled
estate?
to share of the
HELD: Remand the case to Philippine court for

partition be made as the Philippine law on
succession provides. The citizenship of the
deceases was never lost by his stay in the
Philippines, hence the meaning of national law in Art
16 is the conflict of law rules in California. However,
ART 946 of California Civil Code authorizes the
return of the question to the law of the testators
domicile, The Philippines. Therefore, the Philippine
court should not refer back it to California.
Court of domicile is bound to apply its own law as
directed in conflict of law rule of decedent state.
221) CRUZ VS VILLASOR

54 SCRA 31
FACTS: Respondent Manuel Lugay filed a petition
for probate of the will of Valente Cruz with the CFI
which was opposed by the petitioner, Agapita Cruz
on the ground that the one of the three witnesses is
at the same time the Notary Public before whom the
will was supposed to have been acknowledged.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will was executed in
accordance with Art. 805 and 806?
HELD:The notary public before whom the will was
acknowledged cannot be considered as the third
instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge
before himself his having signed the will. To
acknowledge before means to avow or to own as
genuine, to assent and before means in front or
preceding in space or ahead of. Consequently, if the
third witness were the notary public himself, he
would have to avow assent, or admit his having
signed the will in front of himself.
The function of a notary public is, among others, to
guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements.
That function would be defeated if the notary public
were one of the attesting or instrumental witnesses.
For them he would be interested in sustaining the
validity of the will as it directly involves himself and
the validity of his own act. It would place him in an
inconsistent position and the very purpose of the
acknowledgement, which is to minimize fraud would
be thwarted.
To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or
one of the attesting and acknowledging witnesses,
would have the effect of having only two attesting
witnesses to the will which would be in contravention
of the provisions of Art. 805 requiring at least three
credible witnesses to act as such and of Art 806
which requires that the testator and the required
number of witnesses must appear before the notary
public to acknowledge the will. The result woukd be,
as has been said, that only 2 witnesses appeared
before the notary public for that purpose.
222) KALAW VS RELOVA
132 SCRA 237
FACTS: The private respondent, who claims to be
the sole heir of his sister who is Natividad Kalaw,
219

filed for a petition to admit to probate the holographic
will of his sister. In such will, private respondent
Gregorio was named as the sole heir of all the
properties left behind by the testatrix and was also
named as the executor of the will.
The petition was opposed by Rosa, the sister of the
testatrix, who claims to have been originally
instituted as the sole heir. She alleged that the
holographic will contained alterations, corrections
and insertions without the proper authentication by
the full signature of the testatrix as requires by Art
The court denied the petition. Rosa filed a Petition
for Review on Certiorari.
private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam Arong,

Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand. Fe Sand, Lisa
Sand and Dr. Jose Ajero Sr and their children.
Petitioner filed for the allowance of decedent
holographic will contending that the latter was of
sound mind and not acting under duress. Private
Respondent opposed it that the testament body and
signature was not decedents handwriting and such
properties, the decedent is not the sole owner. RTC
admitted the will while CA reversed it that the will
fails to meet the requirements for its validity under
Art 813 and 814 because the dispositions were
either unsigned and undated or signed but not dated
and erasure had not been authenticated by
decedent.
ISSUE: WON the will is valid?
ISSUE: whether or not the original unaltered text

after subsequent alterations and insertions were
voided by the Trial Court for lack of authentication by
the full signature of the testatrix, should be probated
or not, with her as sole heir.
Held: No. ordinarily, when a number of erasures,
correction made by the testator on a holographic will
not be noted under his signature, hence the will is
not invalidated as a whole but as most only as
respects the particular words erased or corrected.
However in this case, the holographic will in dispute
had only one substantial provision, which was
altered by substituting the original heir with another,
but which alteration did not carry the requisite of full
authentication by the full signature of the testator,
the effect must be that the entire Will is voided or
revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains
in the Will after that which could remain valid. To
state that the will as first written should be given
efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind
of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither
be given effect because she failed to authenticate it
in the manner required by law by affixing her full
signature- the intention of the testator could not be
ascertained. However, there is clear showing of the
testators intention to revoke the institution of Rosa
as her sole heir.
Thus, the petition is hereby dismissed and the
decision of the respondent judge is affirmed.
223) AJERO VS CA
236 SCRA 488
FACTS: Late Anne Sand left a will and named as
devisees the petitioner, Roberto and Thelma Ajero,
HELD: Yes. Art 839, in a petition to admit a

holographic will to probate, the only issues to be
resolved are:
(1) whether the instrument submitted is the
decedents will
(2) whether said will was executed in accordance
with formalities prescribed by law
(3) whether the decedent had the necessary
testamentary capacity at the time the will was
executed and
(4) whether the execution of the will and its signing
were voluntary acts of the decedent
Art. 813 of the new Civil Code shows that its
requirement affects the validity of the dispositions
contained in the holographic will, but not its probate.
If the testator fails to sign and date some of the
dispositions, the result is that these dispositions
cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does
not render the whole testament void.
In the case at bar, unless, the unauthenticated
alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on
the date of the holographic will or on testators
signature, their presence does not invalidate the will
itself. The lack of authentication will only result in
disallowance of such changes.
In addition to, courts in probate are limited to pass
only upon the extrinsic validity of the will. However,
exception, Courts are not powerless to do what the
situation constrains them to do and pass upon
certain provisions of the will that Cabadbaran
property is in the name of her late father John Sand
which Dr Ajero question her conveyance.
220

224) LABRADOR VS CA
184 SCRA 170
FACTS: Testator Melencio died and left a parcel of
land and his children as heirs. He allegedly executed
a holographic will. The holographic will was
submitted for probate by petitioner Sagrado, the
devisee of the parcel of the land.
Jesus and Gaudencio opposed the probate of the
will on the ground that the will has been extinguished
or revoked by implications of law, when the testator,
before his death, sold the parcel of land to the
oppositors. The said transaction was evidenced by
the new TCT issued in the name of the oppositors
and the Deed of Sale executed by the testator.
Meanwhile, Jesus sold the parcel of land to a 3 rd
person, Sagrado sought to have the Deed of Sale
annulled on the ground that it was fictitious.
LC allowed the probate of the will and declared null
and void the Deed of Sale. CA reversed the
judgment and disallowed the probate of the will on
the ground that it was undated.
ISSUE: WON the alleged holographic will is dated?
HELD: The Holographic is dated. It appears that the
date when the testator made the will was stated in
the body of the complaint, on the 2nd page of the will
and this is the day in which we agreed that
we are making the partitioning and assigning the
respective assignment of the said fish pond, and this
being in the month of March, 17 th day, in the year
1968, and this decision and or instruction of mine is
the matter to be followed, and the one who made
this writing is no other that MELECIO LABRADOR,
their father.
The law does not specify a particular location where
the date should be placed in the will. The only
requirements are that the date be in the will itself
and executed in the hand of the testator. These
requirements are present in the subject will.
Each executed a will also in New York, containing

provisions on presumption of survivorship (in the
event that it is not known which one of the spouses
died first, the husband shall be presumed to have
predeceased his wife).
To wit: If my wife, EVELYN PEREZ-CUNANAN, and
I shall die under such circumstances that there is not
sufficient evidence to determine the order of our
deaths, then it shall be presumed that I predeceased
her, and my estate shall be administered and
distributed, in all respects, in accordance with such
presumption.
Four days later, on August 27, Dr. Evelyn P.
Cunanan executed her own last will and testament
containing the same provisions as that of the will of
her husband.
To wit: If my husband, JOSE F. CUNANAN, and I
shall die under such circumstances that there is not
sufficient evidence to determine the order of our
deaths, then it shall be presumed that he
predeceased me, and my estate shall be
administered and distributed in all respects, in
accordance with such presumption.
Later, the entire family perished in a fire that gutted
their home. Thus, Rafael, who was named trustee in
Joses will, filed for separate probate proceedings of
the
wills.
Later, Evelyns mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition
for reprobate in Bulacan. Rafael opposed, arguing
that Salud was not an heir according to New York
law. He contended that since the wills were executed
in New York, New York law should govern. He further
argued that, by New York law, he and his brothers
and sisters were Joses heirs and as such entitled to
notice of the reprobate proceedings, which Salud
failed
to
give.
For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of her
daughter, Evelyn, and that the two wills were in
accordance with New York law. But before she could
present evidence to prove the law of New York, the
reprobate court already issued an order, disallowing
the
wills.
225) PEREZ VS TOLETE

232 SCRA 722
ISSUE: Whether or not the reprobate of the wills

should
be
allowed
FACTS: Dr. Jose Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn PerezCunanan are husband and wife, who became
American citizens and residents of New York, U.S.A,
with their children, Jocelynm18; Jacqueline,16; and
Josephine,14.
HELD: The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses,

who were American citizens, will only be effective in
this country upon compliance with the following
provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
221

Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces
effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities
prescribed by the law of the place in which he
resides, or according to the formalities observed in
his country, or in conformity with those which this
Code
prescribes.
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the
formalities prescribed by New York laws or by
Philippine
laws
is
imperative.
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or
allowance of wills which have been probated outside
of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due
execution of the will in accordance with the foreign
laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign
country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has
been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the
fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and
(5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and
allowance of wills. Except for the first and last
requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed
evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign
laws upon which the probate in the foreign country is
based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot
take
judicial
notice
of
them.
This petition cannot be completely resolved without
touching on a very glaring fact - petitioner has
always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn
Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider
herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she
noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the
proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she
only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a
judge whose order is being assailed is merely a
nominal or formal party.
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the
reprobate of a will shall "cause notice thereof to be
given as in case of an original will presented for
allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27,
Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will
probated abroad should be treated as if it were an
"original will" or a will that is presented for probate
for the first time. Accordingly, compliance with
Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require
publication and notice by mail or personally to the
"known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator
resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he
is
not
the
petitioner,
are
required.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan,

contrary to petitioner's claim, are entitled to notices
of the time and place for proving the wills. Under
Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court,
the "court shall also cause copies of the notice of the
time and place fixed for proving the will to be
addressed to the designated or other known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator, . . . "
WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE.
Respondent Judge shall allow petitioner reasonable
time within which to submit evidence needed for the
joint probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses
and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose
F. Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all
pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings.
226) TESTATE ESTATE OF BOHANAN

106 PHIL. 997
FACTS: C.O. Bohanan was born in Nebraska and
therefore a citizen of that state. Notwithstanding his
long residence in the Philippines, he continued and
remained to be a citizen of the United States and of
the state of his pertinent residence to spend the rest
of his days in that state. His permanent residence or
domicile in the United States depended upon his
personal intent or desire, and he selected Nevada as
his homicide and therefore at the time of his death,
he was a citizen of that state.
The oppositors, Magadalena C. Bohanan and her
two children, question the validity of the
executor/testator C.O. Bohanans last will and
testament, claiming that they have been deprived of
the legitimate that the laws of the form concede to
them.
Another, is the claim of the testator's children,
Edward and Mary Lydia Bohanan, who had received
legacies in the amount of PHP 6, 000 each only,
and, therefore, have not been given their shares in
the estate which, in accordance with the laws,
should be two- thirds of the estate left by the
testator.
ISSUE: WON the testamentary dispositions of the
testator is valid: as to Magdalena Bohanan and
second to his children?
HELD: The first issue refers to the share that the
wife of the testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan, should
be entitled to receive. The will has not given her any
share in the estate left by the testator. It is argued
that it was error for the trial court to have recognized
the Reno divorce secured by the testator from his
222

Filipino wife Magdalena C. Bohanan, and that said
divorce should be declared a nullity in this
jurisdiction. The court refused to recognize the claim
of the widow on the ground that the laws of Nevada,
of which the deceased was a citizen, allow him to
dispose of all of his properties without requiring him
to leave any portion of his estate to his former (or
divorced) wife. No right to share in the inheritance in
favor of a divorced wife exists in the State of
Nevada, thus the oppositor can no longer claim
portion of the estate left by the testator.
With regards the second issue, the old Civil Code,
which is applicable to this case because the testator
died in 1944, expressly provides that successional
rights to personal property are to be earned by the
national law of the person whose succession is in
question, thus the two-third rule is not enforceable.
Wherefore, the court finds that the testator, C.O
Bohanan was at the time of his death a citizen of the
United States and declares that his will and
testament is fully in accordance with the laws of the
State of Nevada and admits the same to probate.
The validity of Testamentary dispositions are to be
governed by the national law of the testator and as it
has been decided and it is not disputed that the
national law of the testator is that State of Nevada,
which allows the testator to dipose his properties
according to his will, like in the case at bar.
Thus the order of the court approving the project
partition made in accordance to testamentary
provisions must be affirmed.
227) Testate Estate of Maloto
158 SCRA 451
FACTS:
Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and
nephews, the petitioners believing that no last wiil
and testament was left they iniateda an intestate
proceeding for the settlement of their aunt's estate.
While the case was still in progress, the parties
executed an agreement of extrajudicial settlement of
Adriana's estate. The agreement provided for the
division of the estate into four equal parts among the
parties. They
then presented the extrajudicial
settlement agreement to the trial court for approval.
Three years later, Atty. Sulpicio Palma discovered a
document
entitled
"KATAPUSAN
NGA
PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento)," dated January
3,1940, and purporting to be the last will and
testament of Adriana. It
Significantly, the appellate court while finding as
inconclusive the matter on whether or not the
document or papers allegedly burned by the

househelp of Adriana, Guadalupe Maloto Vda. de
Coral, upon instructions of the testatrix, was indeed
the will, contradicted itself and found that the will had
been revoked. The respondent court stated that the
presence of animus revocandi in the destruction of
the will had, nevertheless, been sufficiently proven.
The appellate court based its finding on the facts
that the document was not in the two safes in
Adriana's residence, by the testatrix going to the
residence of Atty. Hervas to retrieve a copy of the
will left in the latter's possession, and, her seeking
the services of Atty. Palma in order to have a new
will drawn up.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will was revoked by Adriana.
HELD:
It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will,
like burning in this case, does not per se constitute
an effective revocation, unless the destruction is
coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the
testator. It is not imperative that the physical
destruction be done by the testator himself. It may
be performed by another person but under the
express direction and in the presence of the testator.
Of course, it goes without saying that the document
destroyed must be the will itself.
In this case, while animus revocandi or the intention
to revoke, may be conceded, for that is a state of
mind, yet that requisite alone would not suffice.
"Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary
elements for the effective revocation of a last will
and testament. The intention to revoke must be
accompanied by the overt physical act of burning,
tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out
by the testator or by another person in his presence
and under his express direction. There is paucity of
evidence to show compliance with these
requirements. For one, the document or papers
burned by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not
satisfactorily established to be a will at all, much less
the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning
was not proven to have been done under the
express direction of Adriana. And then, the burning
was not in her presence. Both witnesses, Guadalupe
and Eladio, were one in stating that they were the
only ones present at the place where the stove
(presumably in the kitchen) was located in which the
papers proffered as a will were burned. Nowhere in
the records before us does it appear that the two
witnesses, Guadalupe Vda. de Corral and Eladio
Itchon, both illiterates, were unequivocably positive
that the document burned was indeed Adriana's will.
223

Guadalupe, we think, believed that the papers she
destroyed was the will only because, according to
her, Adriana told her so. Eladio, on the other hand,
obtained his information that the burned document
was the will because Guadalupe told him so, thus,
his testimony on this point is double hearsay.
228) Molo vs. Molo
90 PHIL 37
FACTS:
The deceased died leaving no forced heir in the
descending or ascending line, however he was
survived by his weife and and his nieces and
nephews who were the legitimate children of his
deceased brother, during his lifetime he executed
two wills, one executed at 1918 and the subsequent
one in 1939. The latter will contains a clause which
revokes the will in 1918. The said will containing the
clause revoking the previous will, however, was
disallowed.
ISSUE:
Whether the previous will was annulled even if the
subsequent will, with revoking clause, was
disallowed.
HELD:
A subsequent will containing a clause revoking a
previous will, having been disallowed for the reason
that it was not executed in conformity with the
provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure as to making of wills, cannot produce the
effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as
said revocatory clause is void
Execution of Wills
229) Tolentino v Francisco
57 PHIL 749
FACTS:
Gregorio Tolentino had been married to Benita
Francisco, but she predeceased him years ago. The
pair had no children with a number of his wifes kin
as survivors. However, strained relations, resulting
from grave disagreements, developed between
Tolentino and the Francisco relations and he
determined to make a new will in which, apart from
certain legacies in favor of a few individuals, the bulk
of his estate, worth probably about P150,000, should
be given to Adelaida Tolentino de Concepcion, as his

universal heir.
To this end, Tolentino went to the office of Eduardo
Gutierrez Repide, an attorney and informed him that
he wanted to make a new will and desired Repide to
draft it for him. After the necessary preliminary
inquiries had been made, the attorney suggested to
him to bring a copy of the will previously made which
was reduced to itsproper form. As the instrument
was taking shape Tolentino stated that he wanted
the will to be signed in Repide's office, with the latter
as one of the attesting witnesses. For the other two
witnesses Tolentino requested that two attorneys
attached to the office, namely, Leoncio B. Monzon
and Ramon L. Sunico, should serve.
When the instrument had been reduced to proper
form, changes were made by Tolentino with regards
to the attesting witnesses. Pursuant to these
instructions Repide made the desired changes in the
will and just before twelve o'clock noon of the next
day Tolentino returned to Repide's office and
received from him the criminal document with a
carbon copy thereof. Repide advised the testator
that the copy should be executed with the same
formality as the original in order that the intention of
the testator should not be frustrated by the possible
loss or destruction of the original.lawphil.netIt is a
custom in the office of Repide not to number the
consecutive pages of a will, on the typewriting
machine, the duty of numbering the pages being left
to the testator himself.
Tolentino thereupon drew two documents from his
pocket saving that it was his last will and testament,
done in duplicate, and he proceeded to read the
original to the witnesses. After this had been
completed, Legarda himself took the will in hand and
read it himself. He then returned it to Tolentino, who
thereupon proceeded, with pen and ink, to number
the pages of the will thus, "Pagina Primera", "Pagina
Segunda", etc. He then paged the duplicate copy of
the will in the same way. He next proceeded to sign
the original will and each of its pages by writing his
name "G. Tolentino" in the proper places. Following
this, each of the three witnesses signed their own
respective names at the end of the will, at the end of
the attesting clause, and in the left margin of each
page of the instrument. During this ceremony all of
the persons concerned in the act of attestation were
present together, and all fully advertent to the
solemnity that engaged their attention.
After preliminary explanations had been made,
Tolentino requested Repide to keep the will
overnight in his safe, In this connection the testator
stated that he did not wish to take the will to his
home, as he knew that his relatives were watching
224

him and would take advantage of any carelessness
on his part to pry into his papers.
On the morning of November 9, 1930, Gregorio
Tolentino was found dead in his bed, having
perished by the hands of an assassin.
ISSUE:
Whether the will was executed and attested in the
manner required by law
HELD:
The peculiarity of this case is that, upon the trial of
this proceeding for the probate of the will of the
decedent, two of the attesting witnesses, Jose
Syyap and Vergel de Dios, repudiated their
participation in the execution of the will at the time
and place stated; and while admitting the
genuineness of their signatures to the will, pretended
that they had severally signed the instrument, at the
request of the testator, at different places. Thus
Syyap, testifying as a witness, claimed that the
testator brought the will to Syyap's house on the
afternoon of October 21 a time, be it remembered,
when the will had not yet left the hands of the
draftsman and upon learning that Syyap could not
be present at the time and place then being
arranged for the execution of the will, he requested
Syyap, as a mere matter of complaisance, to sign
the will then, which Syyap did. Vergel de Dios has
another story to tell of isolated action, claiming that
he signed the will in the evening of October 22 at the
Hospital of San Juan de Dios in Intramuros.
We are unable to give any credence to the testimony
of these two witnesses on this point, the same being
an evident fabrication designed for the purpose of
defeating the will. In the first place, the affirmative
proof showing that the will was properly executed is
adequate, consistent, and convincing, consisting of
the testimony of the third attesting witness, Vicente
Legarda, corroborated by Miguel Legarda and
Urbana Rivera, two disinterested individuals,
employees of La Previsora Filipina, who were
present in Legarda's office when the will was
executed and who lent a discerning attention to what
was being done. In the second place, each of the
seven signatures affixed to his will by Syyap appear
to the natural eye to have been made by using the
same pen and ink that was used by Legarda in
signing the will. The same is also probably true of
the seven signatures made by Vergel de Dios. This
could hardly have happened if the signatures of
Syyap and Vergel de Dios had been affixed, as they
now pretend, at different times and places. In the
third place, Both Syyap and Vergel de Dios are
impeached by proof of contradictory statements
made by them on different occasions prior to their
appearance as witnesses in this case. In this

connection we note that, after the murder of
Gregorio Tolentino, and while the police authorities
were investigating his death, Nemesio Alferez, a
detective, sent for Syyap and questioned him
concerning his relations with the deceased. Upon
this occasion Syyap stated that Gregorio Tolentino
had lately made a will, that it had been executed at
the office of La Previsora Filipina under the
circumstances already stated, and that he himself
had served as one of the attesting witnesses.
These circumstances and other incidents revealed in
the proof leave no room for doubt in our mind that
Syyap and Vergel de Dios have entered into a
conspiracy between themselves, and in concert with
the opponents, to defeat the will of Gregorio
Tolentino although they are well aware that said will
was in all respects properly executed; and the trial
court, in our opinion, committed no error in admitting
the will to probate.
When a will is contested it is the duty of the
proponent to call all of the attesting witnesses, if
available but the validity of the will in no wise
depends upon the united support of the will by all of
those witnesses. A will may be admitted to probate
notwithstanding the fact that one or more of the
subscribing witnesses do not unite with the other, or
others, in proving all the facts upon which the validity
of the will rests. (Fernandez vs. Tantoco, 49 Phil.,
380.) It is sufficient if the court is satisfied from all
the proof that the will was executed and attested in
the manner required by law. In this case we feel well
assured that the contested will was properly
executed and the order admitting to it probate was
entirely proper.
SUCCESSION Probate of Wills
230) Mercado vs. Santos
57 Phil. 749
FACTS:
Petitioner Mercado applied for the probate of the will
of his deceased wife. There was no opposition to it.
The court then admitted the will to probate. After
more than a year, the relatives of his wife filed a
complaint against Mercado on the ground of
falsifaction or forgery of the will probated. A motion
to quash was filed by Mercado stating that the will
has already been admitted to probate. It is therefore
conclusively presumed to be genuine.
RTC: For respondent. Motion denied.
CA: Affirms RTC.
225

ISSUE:
Whether the will is can be presumed to be genuine?
HELD: Yes, it is.
A criminal action for falsification of will, will not lie
after its admission to probate. This is the effect of
the probate of a will.
The probate of a will in this jurisdiction is a
proceeding in rem. The provision of notice by
publication as a prerequisite to the allowance of a
will is constructive notice to the whole world, and
when probate is granted, the judgment of the court is
binding upon everybody, even against the State.
The probate of a will by the probate court having
jurisdiction thereof is considered as conclusive as to
its due execution and validity, and is also conclusive
that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at
the time when he executed the will, and was not
acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue
influence, and that the will is genuine and not a
forgery.
The will in question having been probated by a
competent court, the law will not admit any proof to
overthrow the legal presumption that it is not a
forgery.
A criminal action will not lie against a forger of a will
which had been duly admitted to probate by a court
of competent jurisdiction in view of the provisions of
sections 306, 333, and 625 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
231) Testate Estate of Biascan vs. Biascan
347 SCRA 621
FACTS:
In 1975, respondent Rosalina Biascon filed a petition
for her appointment as the administratrix of the
intestate estate of Florencio Biascan and Timotea
Zulueta. The court issued an order appointing her as
the regular administrator. Maria Biascon was the
legal wife of Florencio and filed an opposition to the
appointment. On April 2, 1981, the court issued an
order resolving that Maria as legal wife, and
Rosalina and her brother as the natural children of
Florencio, are the legal heirs of the deceased and
upheld the appointment of Rosalina as the
administratrix. On June 6, 1981 or 58 days after the
receipt of the Order, Maria filed her MFR. On
November 15, 1981, the fourth floor of the City Hall
of Manila was completely gutted by fire. The records
of the settlement proceedings were among those
lost in the fire. Thus, on January 2, 1985, private
respondent filed a Petition for Reconstitution of the
said records. Due to the delay caused by the fire and
the reconstitution of the records, it was only on April

30, 1985 that the RTC issued an Order denying
Marias June 6, 1981 MFR. Sometime thereafter,
Maria died and her lawyer Atty. Lopez was appointed
as interim special administrator. Notice of this April
30, 1985 Order allegedly came to the attention of
Marias lawyer only on August 21, 1996. Her lawyers
thereafter filed a Notice of Appeal and Record of
Appeal on September 20, 1996. The TC issued an
order denying the appeal on the ground that it was
filed out of time. A petition for certiorari was filed with
the CA which was likewise denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the appeal was filed on time?
HELD:
No, it was not.
Section 1. Rule 109 of the RROC enumerates the
orders and judgments in special proceedings which
may be the subject of an appeal. An appeal is
allowed in these cases as these orders, decrees or
judgments issued by a court in a special proceeding
constitute a final determination of the rights of the
parties so appealing. The ruling of the TC that Maria,
Rosalina and her brother were entitled to participate
in the settlement proceedings falls squarely under
paragraph b of section 1, Rule 109 as the proper
subject of appeal. By so ruling, the TC has
effectively determined that the three persons are the
lawful heirs of the deceased. As such, the same may
be the proper subject of an appeal.
Similarly, the ruling of the TC denying Marias motion
to set aside the order appointing Rosalina as the
regular administratrix of the estate of Florencio
Biascan is likewise a proper subject of appeal. The
order of the TC appointing a regular administrator of
a deceased persons estate is a final determination
of the rights of the parties thereunder and is thus
appealable. This is in contrast with an order
appointing a special administrator which is appointed
only for a limited time and for a specific purpose.
Because of the temporary character and special
character of this appointment, the Rules deem it not
advisable for any party to appeal from said
temporary appointment.
It is thus clear that the Order dated April 2, 1981 may
be the proper subject of an appeal in a special
proceeding. In special proceedings, the period of
appeal from any decision or final order rendered
therein is thirty days. The appeal period may only be
interrupted by the filing of a motion for a new trial or
reconsideration. Once the appeal period expires
without an appeal or a MFR or new trial being
perfected, the decision or order becomes final.
226

Considering that this was only on June 6, 1981 or a
full 58 days after the receipt of the order that the
MFR was filed, it is clear that the same was filed out
of time. There was no more appeal period to
interrupt as the Order had already become final.
It is well settled that judgments or orders become
final and executory by operation of law and not by
judicial declaration. Thus, finality of a judgment
becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary
period of appeal if no appeal is perfected or MFR or
new trial is filed. The TC need not even pronounce
the finality of the order as the same becomes final by
operation of law. Being final and executory, the TC
can no longer alter, modify or reverse the questioned
order. The subsequent filing of the MFR cannot
disturb the finality of the judgment order.
The Order of the trial court denying petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration of the April 2, 1981 Order
was issued on April 30, 1985. Allegedly, petitioner
was only made aware of this April 30, 1985 Order on
August 21, 1996 when it inquired from the trial court
about the status of the case. Giving petitioner the
benefit of the doubt that it had indeed received
notice of the order denying its motion for
reconsideration on August 21, 1996, it follows that
petitioner only had until the following day or on
August 22, 1996 within which to perfect the appeal.
At this point, we note with disapproval petitioners
attempt to pass off its Notice of Appeal as having
been filed on August 22, 1996. In all its pleadings
before this Court and the Court of Appeals, petitioner
insists that its Notice of Appeal was filed the day
after it secured the August 21, 1996 Certification
from the trial court. While the Notice of Appeal was
ostensibly dated August 22, 1996, it is clear from the
stamp of the trial court that the same was received
only on September 20, 1996. Moreover, in the Order
dated October 22, 1996 of the trial court denying
petitioners appeal, the court clearly stated that the
Notice of Appeal with accompanying Record on
Appeal was filed on September 20, 1996.
Considering that it is clear from the records that
petitioners notice of appeal was filed on September
20, 1996, the same was clearly filed out of time as it
only had until August 22, 1996 within which to file the
said pleading.
232) Nuguid vs. Nuguid,
17 SCRA 449
FACTS:
Rosario Nuguid died and was survived by her
parents, brothers and sisters. Petitioner Remedios,
her sister, filed for the probate of her holographic will
a year after her death. Remedios was instituted as

the universal heir in the said will. The parents
opposed this, claiming that they were preterited by
the institution of Remedios as the sole heir thereby
invalidating the will. The trial court declared the will
to be a complete nullity and therefore creating an
intestacy of the estate of Rosario.
ISSUE:
Whether the parents were preterited creating
intestacy of Rosarios estate?
HELD:
Yes, they were.
In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the courts
area of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and
resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will; the due
execution thereof; the testatrixs testamentary
capacity; and the compliance with the requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law. In the case at bar
however, a peculiar situation exists. The parties
shunned aside the question of whether or not the will
should be allowed probate. They questioned the
intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this comes only
after the court has declared that the will has been
duly authenticated. But if the case were to be
remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be
gained. In the event of probate or if the court rejects
the will, the probability exists that the case will come
up once again before the court on the same issue of
the instrinsic validity of or nullity of the will. The
result would be a waste of time, effort, expense, plus
added anxiety. These practical considerations
induce the SC to meet head-on the issue of the
nullity of the provisions of the will in question, there
being a justiciable controversy.
The deceased left no descendants, legitimate or
illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct
ascending line, her parents. Her will does not
explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their
names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled
ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the
said forced heirs suffer from preterition. There is no
other provision in the will except the institution of
Remedios as the universal heir. Such institution by
itself is null and void and, intestate succession
ensues. The disputed order declares the will in
question a complete nullity. Article 854 of the Civil
Code in turn merely nullifies the institution of the
heir. The will however, provides for the institution of
the petitioner as the universal heir and nothing more.
The result is the same. The entire will is null.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testators
will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either
because they are not mentioned therein or though
227

mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor
are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance in turn is
a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory
heir of his share in the legitime for a cause
authorized by law. The effects flowing from
preterition are totally different form those of
disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 shall
annul the institution of an heir. This annulment is in
toto, unless in the will there are, in addition,
testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or
legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article
918, such disinheritance shall also annul the
institution of the heirs but only insofar as it may
prejudice the person disinherited, which last phrase
was omitted in the case of preterition. In
disinheritance, the nullity is limited to that portion of
the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been
illegally deprived.
233) Caniza vs. CA
268 SCRA 641
FACTS:
Caniza was 94 years old and was declared
incompetent because of her advanced years. She
was represented in this case by Evangelista, her
guardian. Caniza previously allowed the spouses
and their relatives to occupy the house without
paying any rent out of the goodness of her heart.
However, she needed money for her support,
maintenance and medical treatment. A demand by
Evangelista was made on the Estradas to vacate
the house but refused contending that they would
inherit the house as stated in Canizas holographic
will. Evangelista then moved to eject the spouses
from the premises. The MetTC ruled in favor of
Caniza which was reversed by the RTC on the
ground that the "action by which the issue of
defendants' possession should be resolved is accion
publiciana, the obtaining factual and legal situation **
demanding adjudication by such plenary action for
recovery of possession cognizable in the first
instance by the Regional Trial Court." This was
affirmed by the CA. Caniza died during the
pendency of the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the Estradas may rightfully claim the
property through the holographic will?
HELD:
No, they cannot.
It is settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, it
suffices to allege that the defendant is unlawfully
withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed

sufficient, and a complaint for unlawful detainer is
sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of
possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful
without necessarily employing the terminology of the
law. The only issue that could legitimately be raised
under the circumstances was that involving the
Estradas possession by tolerance, i.e., possession
de facto, not de jure. It is therefore incorrect to
postulate that the proper remedy for Caiza is not
ejectment but accion publiciana, a plenary action in
the RTC or an action that is one for recovery of the
right to possession de jure.
The Estradas possession of the house stemmed
from the owners express permission. That
permission was subsequently withdrawn by the
owner, as was her right; and it is immaterial that the
withdrawal was made through her judicial guardian,
the latter being indisputably clothed with authority to
do so. Nor is it of any consequence that Caniza
executed a will bequeathing the disputed property to
the Estradas, that circumstance did not give them
the right to stay on the premises after demand to
vacate on the theory that they might in the future
become owners thereof. The Estradas right of
ownership being at best inchoate, no transfer of
ownership being possible unless and until the will is
duly probated. Prior to the probate of the will, any
assertion of possession by them would be premature
and inefficacious.
A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to
the testator's death, it may be changed or revoked;
and until admitted to probate, it has no effect
whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder,
the law being quite explicit: "No will shall pass either
real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court." An
owner's intention to confer title in the future to
persons possessing property by his tolerance, is not
inconsistent with the former's taking back
possession in the meantime for any reason deemed
sufficient. And that in this case there was sufficient
cause for the owner's resumption of possession is
apparent: she needed to generate income from the
house on account of the physical infirmities afflicting
her, arising from her extreme age.
While it is indeed well-established rule that the
relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily
terminated by the death of either the guardian or the
ward, the rule affords no advantage to the Estradas.
Amparo Evangelista, as niece of Carmen Caiza, is
one of the latter's only two (2) surviving heirs, the
other being Caiza's nephew, Ramon C. Nevado.
On their motion and by Resolution of this Court of
June 20, 1994, they were in fact substituted as
228

parties in the appeal at bar in place of the deceased,
in accordance with Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed
to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring
the appointment of an executor or administrator and
the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the
minor heirs. To be sure, an ejectment case survives
the death of a party. Caiza's demise did not
extinguish the desahucio suit instituted by her
through her guardian. That action, not being a purely
personal one, survived her death; her heirs have
taken her place and now represent her interests in
the appeal at bar.
234) PECSON VS. AGUSTIN CORONEL
G.R. No. L-20374, 11 October 1923
FACTS:
Decedent Dolores Coronel died testate and without
issue. She appointed as sole heir her nephew,
Lorenzo Pecson, wife of her niece Angela Coronel,
for the services he rendered for the decedent. He
was also appointed as executor thereof, and in his
absence, decedents grandson Vincent Pecson. As
she cannot read and write, he asked Vicente
Francisco to write the will and sign it in her behalf. In
the attestation clause, it stated that the will was
signed by each of (them) us signed these presents
in the presence of others and of the testatrix...
Decedents relatives opposed the probate of the will,
contending that the will could not be valid because
first, it is not natural in our culture to exclude a
persons blood relatives from her vast estate and
hence at most, the decedent merely intended to
appoint Lorenzo as executor; and second, that the
attestation clause failed to comply with the
provisions of Section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the relatives exclusion in the
will amounts to preterition?
2.
Whether or not the defect in the attestation
clause invalidates the will?
RULINGS:
First issue: Relatives Exclusion from the Will
Their exclusion in the will does not amount to
preterition. The liberty to dispose of ones estate by
will when there are no forced heirs is rendered
sacred by the Civil Code in force in the Philippines
since 1889 which provides: Any person who has no
forced heirs may dispose by will all of his property or
any part of it in favour of any person qualified to
acquire it. The preference given to Lorenzo is not

purely arbitrary, nor a caprice or whim of the moment
as there was sufficient proof that Lorenzo indeed
rendered services for the decedent even prior to
1914, and was the decedents administrator and
manager of her affairs in the last years of her life.
Second issue: Defect in the Attestation Clause
Section 618 of the Civil Code of Procedure provides
that: The attestation shall state the number of sheets
or pages used, uponwhich the will is written, and the
fact that the testator signed the will in each and
every page thereof, or caused some other person to
write his name, under his express direction, in the
presence of three witnesses, and the latter
witnessed and signed the will and all the pages
thereof in the presence of the testator and of each
other. However, the attestation clause of the
decedents will stated that it was signed in the
presence of others. In resolving the same, the
Court relied on in its decision in In Re Will of
Abangan whereby it ruled that the object of
solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to
close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid
substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee
their truth and authenticity. Hence, the laws on this
subject should be interpreted in such a way as to
attain these primordial ends. However, one must not
lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the
law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to
make a will. So when an interpretation already given
assures such ends, any other interpretation
whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more
requisite entirely unnecessary, useless and
frustrative of the testators will, must be disregarded.
The phrase is then construed to mean as of the
other and is a mere grammatical error. Grammatical
or clerical errors are not usually considered of vital
importance when the intention is manifest in the will.
235) ACAIN VS. IAC
G.R. No. 72706, 27 October 1987
FACTS:
Nemesio Acain died testate, leaving the
following as heirs: his wife Rosa Diongson Vda. de
Acain, his legally adopted daughter Virginia
Fernandez, and his nephews and nieces from his
brother Segundo Acain. In his will, he bequeathed all
of his property to Segundo, and in case the latter
predecease him, all his property will pass on to
Segundos children. As Segundo predeceased
Nemesio, the formers children moved for the
probate of the will. Nemesios widow and daughter
filed a motion to dismiss, contending that they were
229

preterited. The trial court denied their motion. On
appeal, the IAC reversed and ordered the trial court
to dismiss the probate of the will.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rosa and Virginia had been
preterited?
RULING:
Yes. Article 854 of the Civil Code provides
that: The preterition or omission of one, some, or all
of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether
living at the time of execution of the will or born after
the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of
the heir; but the devisese and legacies shall be valid
insofar as they are not inofficious. If the omitted
compulsory heir should die before the testator, the
institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the
right of representation.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testators
will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either
because they are not mentioned therein , or even
though mentioned, they are neither instituted as
heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Preterition
annuls the institution of an heir and annulment
throws open to intestate succession the entire
inheritance, except those legacies and devices,
unless it impairs the legitime of the heirs.
In the case of Rosa, preterition shall not
apply as she does not ascend nor descend from the
testator, although she is a compulsory heir. There is
no preterition because she is not in the direct line.
However, in the case of Virginia, preterition applies
because as a legal adoptee, she is vested with the
same rights and duties as that of a legitimate child of
the adopter and makes the adoptee the legal heir of
the adopter.
The universal institution of the petitioner and
his siblings to the entire inheritance of the testator
results in totally abrogating the will because the
nullification of such institution of universal heirswithout any other testamentary disposition in the willamounts to a declaration that nothing at all was
written.
236) NERI VS. AKUTIN
G.R. No. L-47799, 13 June 1941
FACTS:
Agripino Neri died on 12 December 1931
leaving 6 children from his first wife, and 5 children
from his second wife Ignacia Akutin. In his will, he
stated that his children by the first marriage shall
have no longer any participation in his estate as they
had already received their corresponding shares

during his lifetime. However, during the hearing for
declaration of heirs, the court found that contrary to
what Agripino declared in his will, that all his children
by the first and second marriages are intestate heirs
of the deceased without prejudice to one-half of the
improvements introduced in the properties during the
existence of the last conjugal partnership which
should belong to Ignacia Akutin. The Court of
Appeals modified the decision and ruled that the will
was valid with respect to the two-thirds part which
the testator can freely dispose of.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the omission of the children
by the first wife annuls the institution of the children
by the second wife as sole heirs of the testator?
RULING:
Yes. Preterition consists in the omission in
the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of
them, either because they are not mentioned
therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. In
this case, while the children of the first marriage
were mentioned in the will, they were not accorded
any share in the hereditary property, without
expressly being disinherited. The omission of a
forced heir or anyone of them, whether voluntary or
involuntary, is a preterition if the purpose to disinherit
is not expressly made or is not at least manifest.
Except as to legacies and devises which shall
remain valid insofar as they are not officious,
preterition avoids the institution of heirs and gives
rise to intestate succession. The will in this case,
there being no legacies or devises, is void.
237) VIADO NON VS. CA
G.R. No. 137287, 15 February 2000
FACTS:
Spouses Julian and Virginia Viado owned,
among others, a house and lot pertained to as the
Isarog property. Virginia died on 20 October 1982,
followed by Julian 3 years later. Left as heirs were
their children namely: Rebecca Viado Non, Delia
Viado, Nilo Viado, and Leah Viado Jacobs. Both Nilo
and Leah died on 22 April 1987. Nilo left as heirs his
wife Alicia and their 2 children.
The children of spouses Viado lived in the
Isarog property together with Nilos widow and
children. However, a dispute arose when Rebecca
Viado Non asked that the property be divided
equally between the 2 families to make room for
230

their growing children. Nilos wife and children
claimed absolute ownership over the property
evidence by a deed of donation executed by Julian
in favour of Nilo, covering his conjugal share, and
a deed of extrajudicial partition settlement in which
Julian, Leah, and Rebecca waived in favour of Nilo
all their interests and rights over their share of the
property inherited from Virginia. Both documents
were registered 5 years after its execution, and a
new TCT is issued by the Register of Deeds in Nilos
favor.
Petitioner Rebecca contends that Delia
Viado, their retardate sister, was not part of the
extrajudicial settlement, and hence amounts to
preterition which should invalidate the settlement.
Both the trial court and CA ruled in favor of Nilos
wife and children. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Delias exclusion from the
extrajudicial settlement amounts to preterition?
RULING:
Yes. However, in the absence of bad faith
and fraud, Article 1104 of the Civil Code must apply
which, in essence, provides that where the
preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the
partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited heir
shall be paid the value of the share pertaining to her.
238) PEREZ VS. GARCHITORENA
G.R. No. L-31703, 13 February 1930
FACTS:
Ana Maria Alcantara died testate. The
pertinent provisions of her will are as follows:
NINTH. Being single and without forced heir, to show
my gratitude to my niece-in-law, Carmen
Garchitorena, of age, married to my nephew,
Joaquin Perez Alcantara xxx as my sole and
universal heiress to the remainder of my estate xxx
TENTH. Should my heiress Carmen Garchitorena
dies, I order that my whole estate shall passu
unimpaired to her surviving children; and should any
of these die, his share shall serve to increase the
portions of his surviving brothers (and sisters) by
accretion, xxx the estate shall never pass out of the
hands of my heiress or her children insofar as it is
legally permissible.
Among Ana Marias properties is a deposit
amounting to Php 21,428.23 with La Urbana.
Mariano Garchitorena held a judgment for Php 7,
872.23 against Joaquin, Carmens husband. He
attached the La Urbana deposit to satisfy his claims.
Carmen secured an injunction restraining the

execution.
Garchitorena contends that the same can be
levied because Carmen is a universal heiress.
Carmen contends that the deposit belongs to
Carmens children as fideicommissary heirs of Ana
Maria.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the instant case is a
fideicommissary substitution?
RULING: Yes. Manresa provides 3 requisites for
fideicommissary:
1.
First heir called primarily to the enjoyment of
the estate;
2.
An obligation clearly imposed upon him to
preserve and transmit to a 3rd person the whole or a
part of the estate;
3.
Second heir.
Applying the foregoing to the case, Carmen was
called to the enjoyment of the estate according to
the 9th clause of the will. Clause 10th which provides
that the whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her
(Carmens) surviving children, thus, instead of
leaving Carmen at liberty to dispose of the estate by
will, or by living the law to take its course in case she
dies intestate, the said clause not only disposes of
the estate in favour of the disposition thereof in case
she should die after the testatrix. The children of
Carmen are referred to as second heirs. Hence, the
deposit does not belong to Carmen as her absolute
property, but also to her children, from the moment
of death of Ana Maria. It cannot be attached by
Mariano.
239) RABADILLA VS. CA
G.R. No. 113725, 29 June 2000
FACTS:
Alejandra Belleza executed a Codicil making Jorge
Rabadilla as her heir. The Codicil provides that she
is bequeathing No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre
and that should Dr. Rabadilla predecease her, the lot
will go to his wife and children. She also stated that it
shall be Dr. Rabadillas obligation to deliver in favour
of Marlina Coscolluela 75 piculs of Export sugar and
35 piculs of domestic sugar, until Marlinas death. In
case of Dr. Rabadillas death, his heir shall fulfil such
obligation. In the event that Dr. Rabadilla or his heirs
shall later sell, lease, mortgage the Lot, the buyer,
lessee, mortgagee, shall also have the obligation to
respect and deliver to Marlina yearly 100 piculs of
sugar ever December.
231

Dr. Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived
by his wife and children. His son Johnny is herein
petitioner. Marlina then filed a complaint against the
heirs of Dr. Rabadilla for the enforcement of the
Codicil. The parties came up with a Memorandum of
Agreement whch was, however, not complied with
by the heirs. The RTC dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whehter or not Dr. Rabadillas institution in
the Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution?
RULING:
Yes. Article 882 of the New Civil Code
provides that the statement of the object of the
institution or the application of the property left by
the testator, or the charge imposed on him, shall not
be considered as a condition unless it appears that
such was his intention. That which has been left in
this manner may be claimed at once provided that
the instituted heir or his heirs give security for
compliance with the wishes of the testator and for
the return of anything he or they may receive,
together with its fruits and interests, if he or they
should disregard this obligation. Article 883 provides
that when without the fault of the heir, an institution
referred to in the preceding article cannot take effect
in the exact manner stated by the testator, it shall be
complied with in a manner most analogous to and in
conformity with his wishes.
The institution of an heir in the manner
prescribed in article 882 is known as an institucion
sub modo or modal substitution. In a modal
substitution, the testator states:
1.
The object of the institution;
2.
Purpose or application o the property left by
the testator;
3.
Charge imposed by the testator upon the
heir.
A mode imposes an obligation upon the heir or
legatee but it does not affect the efficscy of his rights
to the succession. In a conditional testamentary
disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled
in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the
testator. The condition suspends but not obligate;
and the mode obligates but does not suspend.
In this case, Alejandra intended Dr. Rabadilla to
inherit the property. She likewise imposed an
obligation on him and to his heirs to deliver 100
piculs of sugar to Marlina. However, Alejandra did
not make Dr. Rabadillas inheritance and effectivity
of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the
performance of the said obligation. Should the
obligation be not complied with, the property shall be
turned over to Alejandras near descendants. The
institution of Dr. Rabadilla is evidently modal in

nature because it imposes a charge upon the
instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy
of such institution. Since testamentary dispositions
are generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed
upon the heirs should not be considered a condition
unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that such
was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt,
the institution should be considered as modal
institution.
240) MORENTE VS. DE LA SANTA
G.R. No. L-3891, 19 December 1907
FACTS:
Consuelo Morente died testate. In her will,
her husbnd Gumersindo de la Santa was made sole
heir, subject to the condition that he shall not
remarry, remain to live with her brothers, and that
should he have children with anyone, the 2/3 of the
estate shall remain for her brother Vicente, or the
latters children, and the remaining 1/3 is subject to
Gumersindos disposal.
Gumersindo married again 4 months after
his wifes death. Consuelos sister asked for the
annulment of the legacy in the will on the ground of
remarriage. She contends that the mere act off
remarriage of Gumersindo strips him off of his rights
acquired from the will.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Consulelos intention that
Gumersindos remarriage would forfeit the legacy?
RULING:
No. Article 790 of the Civil Code provides
that testamentary provisions may be made
confidential and Article 798 provides that a
prohibition against another marriage may in certain
cases be validly imposed upon the widow or
widower.
In this case, there was nothing in the will
which would mean that it was Consuelos intention
that Gumersindos remarriage would strip him of his
rights from the legacy. There is no express condition
attached to that legacy in references to the 2 nd
marriage, as the will simply said he will not marry
again. No condition was attached in case of noncompliance.
241) ROSALES VS. ROSALES
No L-40789, 27 February 1987
232

FACTS:
Petra Rosales died intestate, leaving as
heirs her husband Fortunato and their 2 children.
Carterio Rosales, also a child of Spouses Rosales,
predeceased her, and left as heirs his son
Macikequerox and widow Irenea. The estimated
gross value of Petras estate was about Php 30,
000.00.
Magna Rosales Acebes, her daughter, filed
for intestate proceedings and was later on appointed
as administratrix. The court then declared the
following as Petras legal heirs, and their respective
shares:
1.
Fortunato Rosales (husband) ;
2.
Magna Rosales Acebes (daughter) ;
3.
Macikequerox Rosales (grandson) ;
4.
Antonio Rosales (son) .
Irena appealed, contending that as the surviving
spouse of Carterio, she is compulsory heir of Petra
together with her son. The court denied her plea.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a widow (surviving spouse)
is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law?
RULING:
No. Intestate heirs/ legal heirs are divided
into two: those who inherit in their own right (as in
the order of intestate succession provided for in the
Civil Code), and those who inherit by right of
representation as provided in Article 981 of the Civil
Code.
There is nothing in the Civil Code which
states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate
heir of her mother-in-law. The provisions of the Code
which relates to intestate succession (Articles 978 to
1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the
intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the
final intestate heir.
Article 887, from which Irenea bases her
claim refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in
which case the surviving spouse is a compulsory
heir. It does not apply to the estate of the parent-inlaw. The surviving spouse is considered as a 3 rd
person as regards the estate of the parent-in-law.
The estate in this case is that of Petra
Rosales, the mother-in-law of Irenea. It is from
Petras estate that Macikequerox draws a share of
the inheritance by right of representation as provided
in Article 981. Article 971 explicitly declares that
Macikequerox is called to succession by law
because of his blood relationship. He does not
succeed his father Carterio who predeceased his
grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom his
father would have succeeded. Irenea cannot assert

the same right of representation as she has no
filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.
242) FRANCISCO vs. FRANCISCO-ALFONSO

G.R. No. 138774. March 8, 2001
FACTS:
Respondent Aida Francisco-Alfonso (hereafter Aida)
is the only daughter of spouses Gregorio Francisco
and Cirila de la Cruz, who are now both deceased.
Petitioners, on the other hand, are daughters of the
late Gregorio Francisco with his common law wife
Julia Mendoza, with whom he begot seven (7)
children. Gregorio Francisco (hereafter Gregorio)
owned two parcels of residential land, situated in
Barangay Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan, covered by
TCT Nos. T-32740 and T-117160. When Gregorio
was confined in a hospital in 1990, he confided to his
daughter Aida that the certificates of title of his
property were in the possession of Regina Francisco
and Zenaida Pascual.
After Gregorio died on July 20, 1990, Aida inquired
about the certificates of title from her half sisters.
They informed her that Gregorio had sold the land to
them on August 15, 1983. After verification, Aida
learned that there was indeed a deed of absolute
sale in favor of Regina Francisco and Zenaida
Pascual. Thus, on August 15, 1983, Gregorio
executed a Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan,
whereby for P25,000.00, he sold the two parcels of
land to Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. By
virtue of the sale, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan
issued TCT No. T-59.585 to Regina Francisco and
TCT T-59.586 to Zenaida Pascual.
On April 1, 1991, Aida filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Bulacan a complaint against petitioners for
annulment of sale with damages. She alleged that
the signature of her late father, Gregorio Francisco,
on the Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan dated August
15, 1983, was a forgery.
In their joint answer to the complaint, petitioners
denied the alleged forgery or simulation of the deed
of sale. After due proceedings, on July 21, 1994, the
trial court rendered a decision dismissing the
complaint. The Court of Appeals Reversed the
decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
May a legitimate daughter be deprived of her share
in the estate of her deceased father by a simulated
contract transferring the property of her father to his
illegitimate children?
233

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that the kasulatan was
simulated. There was no consideration for the
contract of sale. Felicitas de la Cruz, a family friend
of the Franciscos, testified that Zenaida Pascual and
Regina Francisco did not have any source of
income in 1983, when they bought the property, until
the time when Felicitas testified in 1991.
As proof of income, however, Zenaida Pascual
testified that she was engaged in operating a
canteen, working as cashier in Mayon Night Club as
well as buying and selling RTW (Ready to Wear)
items in August of 1983 and prior thereto. Zenaida
alleged that she paid her father the amount of
P10,000.00. She did not withdraw money from her
bank account at the Rural Bank of Meycauayan,
Bulacan, to pay for the property. She had personal
savings other than those deposited in the bank. Her
gross earnings from the RTW for three years was
P9,000.00, and she earned P50.00 a night at the
club.
Regina Francisco, on the other hand, was a market
vendor, selling nilugaw, earning a net income of
P300.00 a day in 1983. She bought the property
from the deceased for P15,000.00. She had no other
source of income.The testimonies of petitioners were
incredible considering their inconsistent statements
as to whether there was consideration for the sale
and also as to whether the property was bought
below or above its supposed market value. They
could not even present a single witness to the
kasulatan that would prove receipt of the purchase
price. Since there was no cause or consideration for
the sale, the same was a simulation and hence, null
and void.
Even if the kasulatan was not simulated, it still
violated the Civil Code provisions insofar as the
transaction affected respondents legitime. The sale
was executed in 1983, when the applicable law was
the Civil Code, not the Family Code. Obviously, the
sale was Gregorios way to transfer the property to
his illegitimate daughters at the expense of his
legitimate daughter. The sale was executed to
prevent respondent Alfonso from claiming her
legitime and rightful share in said property. Before
his death, Gregorio had a change of heart and
informed his daughter about the titles to the property.
According to Article 888, Civil Code:
The legitime of legitimate children and descendants
consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the
father and of the mother.
The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half
subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of
the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided.
Gregorio Francisco did not own any other property.

If indeed the parcels of land involved were the only
property left by their father, the sale in fact would
deprive respondent of her share in her fathers
estate. By law, she is entitled to half of the estate of
her father as his only legitimate child. The legal heirs
of the late Gregorio Francisco must be determined in
proper testate or intestate proceedings for
settlement of the estate. His compulsory heir can
not be deprived of her share in the estate save by
disinheritance as prescribed by law.
243) NIEVA vs. ALCALA

G.R. No. L-13386 October 27, 1920
FACTS:
Juliana Nieva, the alleged natural
mother of the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva, married
Francisco Deocampo. Of said marriage Alfeo
Deocampo was born. Juliana Nieva died intestate on
April 19, 1889, and her said son, Alfeo Deocampo,
inherited from her, ab intestate, the parcels of land
described in Paragraphs V and X of the complaint.
Alfeo Deocampo died intestate and without
issue on July 7, 1890. Thereupon the two parcels of
land above-mentioned passed to his father,
Francisco Deocampo, by intestate succession.
Thereafter Francisco Deocampo married the herein
defendant Manuela Alcala, of which marriage was
born Jose Deocampo, the other defendant herein.
Francisco Deocampo died on August 15,
1914, whereupon his widow and son, the defendants
herein, took possession of the parcels of land in
question, under the claim that the said son, the
defendant Jose Deocampo (a minor) had inherited
the same, ab intestate, from his deceased father.
On September 30, 1915, the plaintiff herein,
claiming to be an acknowledged natural daughter of
the said Juliana Nieva, instituted the present action
for purposes of recovering from the defendants the
parcels of land in question, particularly described in
Paragraphs V and X of the complaint, invoking the
provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiff is an
acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased
Juliana Nieva and if an illegitimate relative within the
third degree is entitled to the reserva troncal
provided for by article 811 of the Civil Code.
HELD:
The lower court held that, even granting, without
234

deciding, that the plaintiff was an acknowledged
natural daughter of Juliana Nieva, she was not
entitled to the property here in question because, in
its opinion, an illegitimate relative has no right to the
reserva troncal under the provisions of article 811 of
the Civil Code and which reads as follows:
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant
any property acquired by the latter gratuitously from
some other ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is
obliged to reserve such of the property as he may
have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of
relatives within the third degree belonging to the line
from which such property came.
SC held that the object is to protect the patrimony of
the legitimate family, following the precedents of the
foral law. And it could not be otherwise. Article 943
denies to legitimate parents the right to succeed the
natural child and viceversa, from which it must be
deduced that natural parents neither have the right
to inhering from legitimate ones; the law in the article
cited established a barrier between the two families;
properties of the legitimate family shall never pass
by operation of law to the natural family. (Ibid. pp.
251-252.)
Article 943, above referred to provides as follows:
A natural or legitimated child has no right to
succeed ab intestate the legitimate children and
relatives of the father or mother who has
acknowledged it; nor shall such children or relatives
so inherit from the natural or legitimated child.
To hold that the appellant is entitled to the
property left by her natural brother, Alfeo Deocampo,
by operation of law, would be a fragrant violate of the
express provision of the foregoing article (943).
For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
lower court is hereby affirmed, without any finding as
to costs. So ordered.
244) SOLIVIO vs. CA
G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990
FACTS:
This case involves the estate of the late novelist,
Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of the first post-war
Filipino novel "Without Seeing the Dawn," who died
a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants,
brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only
surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt,
petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister
of his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the private
respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister
of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr. He
was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten
(10) months after his marriage in December, 1916 to
Salustia Solivio and four months before Esteban, Jr.

was born.
Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal
properties (various parcels of land in Calinog, Iloilo
covered by 24 titles) which she had inherited from
her mother, Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's first
wife (p. 325, Record), but no conjugal property was
acquired during her short-lived marriage to Esteban,
Sr.
On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her
properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr., including a
house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where she, her
son, and her sister lived. In due time, the titles of all
these properties were transferred in the name of
Esteban, Jr.
During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than
once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia and some
close friends his plan to place his estate in a
foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but
deserving students obtain a college education.
Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack on February
26,1977 without having set up the foundation.
Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and
Celedonia talked about what to do with Esteban's
properties. Celedonia told Concordia about
Esteban's desire to place his estate in a foundation
to be named after his mother, from whom his
properties came, for the purpose of helping indigent
students in their schooling. Concordia agreed to
carry out the plan of the deceased.
Celedonia
was
appointed
as
the
administratix of the estate and later on the court
adjudicated her as the sole heir of the estate of
Esteban Javallana Jr. and proceeded to set up the
"SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE JAVELLANA
FOUNDATION"
Four months later, or on August 7, 1978, Concordia
Javellana
Villanueva
filed
a
motion
for
reconsideration of the court's order declaring
Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because
she too was an heir of the deceased. On September
3, 1984, the said trial court rendered judgment in
Civil Case No. 13207, in favor of Concordia
Javellana-Villanueva.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property of the deceased was
subject to reserve troncal.
HELD:
The Court finds no merit in the petitioner's argument
that the estate of the deceased was subject to
reserva troncal and that it pertains to her as his only
relative within the third degree on his mother's side.
The reserva troncal provision of the Civil Code is
235

found in Article 891 which reads as follows:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his
descendant any property which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant,
or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of
law for the benefit of relatives who are within the
third degree and who belong to the line from which
said property came.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor
(reservista)the ascendant who inherits by
operation of law property from his descendants.
2. The persons for whom the property is reserved
are the reservees (reservatarios)relatives within
the third degree counted from the descendant
(propositus), and belonging to the line from which
the property came.
3. The propositusthe descendant who received by
gratuitous title and died without issue, making his
other ascendant inherit by operation of law. (p. 692,
Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.)
Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban
Javellana, Jr., is not reservable property, for
Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the
descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from
whom he inherited the properties in question.
Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to
a reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio,
who is his relative within the third degree on his
mother's side. The reserva troncal applies to
properties inherited by an ascendant from a
descendant who inherited it from another ascendant
or 9 brother or sister. It does not apply to property
inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the
reverse of the situation covered by Article 891. Since
the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without
descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children,
surviving spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews or
nieces, what should apply in the distribution of his
estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code
which provide:
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate
of the deceased in accordance with the following
articles.
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor
sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, the other
collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or
preference among them by reason of relationship by
the whole blood.
However, It is true that by the agreement, she did
not waive her inheritance in favor of Celedonia, but
she did agree to place all of Esteban's estate in the

"Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation, and
therefore, Concordia is obligated to honor her
commitment as Celedonia has honored hers.
The petition for review was granted. The decision of
the trial court and the Court of Appeals were SET
ASIDE. Concordia J. Villanueva is declared an heir
of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. entitled to one-half
of his estate. However, comformably with the
agreement between her and her co-heir, Celedonia
Solivio, the entire estate of the deceased should be
conveyed to the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javallana
Foundation," of which both the petitioner and the
private respondent shall be trustees, and each shall
be entitled to nominate an equal number of trustees
to constitute the Board of Trustees of the Foundation
which shall administer the same for the purposes set
forth in its charter.
245) SUMAYA vs. IAC
G.R. No. 68843-44 September 2, 1991
FACTS:
Raul Balantakbo inherited from two (2) different
ascendants the two (2) sets of properties subject of
this case: 1) A one-third (1/3) interest, pro-indiviso in
a parcel of land situated in Dita, Lilio (Liliw) Laguna
from his father Jose, Sr., who died on January 28,
1945; and 2) A one-seventh (1/7) interest proindiviso in ten (10) parcels of registered lands from
his maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista, who died
on November 3, 1950.
On June 13, 1952, Raul died intestate, single,
without any issue, and leaving only his mother,
Consuelo Joaquin Vda. de Balantakbo, as his sole
surviving heir to the real properties abovementioned. On November 3, 1952, Consuelo
adjudicated unto herself the above described
properties in an Affidavit entitled "Caudal
Herederario del finado Raul Balantakbo."
Consuelo then sold some properties to Mariquita H.
Sumaya and Villa Honorio Development Corporation
which the latter in turn transferred and assigned all
its rights to the properties in favor of Laguna AgroIndustrial Coconut Cooperative.
On June 3, 1968, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de
Balantakbo died. On March 4, 1970, Amadeo,
Sancho, Donato, Luis, and Erasto, all surnamed
Balantakbo, brothers in full blood of Raul Balantakbo
and Luisa, Jose and Dolores, also all surnamed
Balantakbo, surviving children of deceased Jose
Balantakbo, Jr., another brother of the first named
Balantakbos, filed the above mentioned civil cases
to recover the properties described in the respective
236

complaints which they claimed were subject to a
reserva troncal in their favor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the properties sold were
subject to a reserva troncal and if it is necessary to
reserve and annotate the same.
HELD:
The trial court rendered a decision in favor
of the Balantakbos and the Coust of Appeals
affirmed said decision.
The SC Held that consistent with the rule in reserva
viudal where the person obliged to reserve (the
widowed spouse) had the obligation to annotate in
the Registry of Property the reservable character of
the property, in reserva troncal, the reservor (the
ascendant who inherited from a descendant property
which the latter inherited from another descendant)
has the duty to reserve and therefore, the duty to
annotate also.
The jurisprudential rule requiring annotation in the
Registry of Property of the right reserved in real
property subject of reserva viudal insofar as it is
applied to reserva troncal stays despite the abolition
of reserva viudal in the New Civil Code. This rule is
consistent with the rule provided in the second
paragraph of Section 51 of P.D. 1529, which
provides that: "The act of registration shall be the
operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as
third persons are concerned . . ." (emphasis
supplied)
The properties involved in this case are already
covered by a Torrens title and unless the registration
of the limitation is effected (either actual or
constructive), no third persons shall be prejudiced
thereby.
The respondent appellate court did not err in finding
that the cause of action of the private respondents
did not prescribe yet. The cause of action of the
reservees did not commence upon the death of the
propositus Raul Balantakbo on June 13, 1952 but
upon the death of the reservor Consuelo Vda. de
Balantakbo on June 3, 1968. Relatives within the
third degree in whose favor the right (or property) is
reserved have no title of ownership or of fee simple
over the reserved property during the lifetime of the
reservor. Only when the reservor should die before
the reservees will the latter acquire the reserved
property, thus creating a fee simple, and only then
will they take their place in the succession of the
descendant of whom they are relatives within the
third degree (See Velayo Bernardo v. Siojo, G.R. No.
36078, March 11, 1933, 58 Phil. 89). The reserva is
extinguished upon the death of the reservor, as it
then becomes a right of full ownership on the part of

the reservatarios, who can bring a reivindicatory suit
therefor. Nonetheless, this right if not exercised
within the time for recovery may prescribe in ten (10)
years under the old Code of Civil Procedure (see
Carillo v. De Paz, G.R. No. L-22601, October 28,
1966, 18 SCRA 467, 473) or in thirty years under
Article 1141 of the New Civil Code. The actions for
recovery of the reserved property was brought by
herein private respondents on March 4, 1970 or less
than two (2) years from the death of the reservor.
Therefore, private respondents' cause of action has
not prescribed yet.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The
questioned decision of the Intermediate Appellate
Court is AFFIRMED, except for the modification on
the necessity to annotate the reversable character of
a property subject of reserva troncal.
246) RIOSA vs. ROCHA
G.R. No. L-23770, February 18, 1926
FACTS:
Maria Corral was united in marriage with the
deceased Mariano Riosa, it being her first and only
marriage and during which time she bore him three
children named Santiago, Jose and Severina. The
latter died during infancy and the other two survived
their father, Mariano Riosa. Santiago Riosa, now
deceased, married Francisca Villanueva, who bore
him two children named Magin and Consolacion
Riosa. Jose Riosa, also deceased, married
Marcelina Casas and they had one child who died
before the father, the latter therefore leaving no
issue. Mariano Riosa left a will dividing his property
between his two children, Santiago and Jose Riosa,
giving the latter the eleven parcels of land described
in the complaint. Upon the death of Jose Riosa he
left a will in which he named his wife, Marcelina
Casas, as his only heir.
On May 16, 1917, the will of Jose Riosa was
filed for probate. Notwithstanding the fact that
Marcelina Casas was the only heir named in the will,
on account of the preterition of Maria Corral who,
being the mother of Jose Riosa, was his legitimate
heir, I Marcelina Casas and Maria Corral, on the
same date of the filing of the will for probate, entered
into a contract by which they divided between
themselves the property left by Jose Riosa, the
eleven parcels of land described in the complaint
being assigned to Maria Corral.
Maria Coral then sold some parcels of land
to Marcelina Casas and the latter to Pablo Rocha.
However some of the parcels of land were returned
237

by Pablo to Marcelina alleging that the said parcels
of land were erroneously transferred by Maria to
Marcelina.
An action was brought by Magin Riosa, for
whom the property should have been reserved,
against Maria Corral, whose duty it was to reserve it,
and against Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha as
purchasers of parcels 10 and 11. The complaint
prays that the property therein described be
declared reservable property and that the plaintiffs
Jose and Consolacion Riosa be declared reservees;
that this reservation be noted in the registry of
deeds; that the sale of parcels 10 and 11 to
Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha be declared valid
only in so far as it saves the right of reservation in
favor of the plaintiff Magin Riosa and of the
defendant Consolacion Riosa, and that this right of
reservation be also noted on the deeds of sale
executed in favor of Marcelina Casas and Pablo
Rocha;
ISSUE:
Whether or not the parcels of land subject to
reserva troncal necessitates the recording of which
in the registry of deeds.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that Marcelina
Casas, as well as Pablo Rocha, Knew of the
reservable character of the property when they
bought it. They had knowledge of the provisions of
the last will and testament of Mariano Riosa by virtue
of which these parcels were transferred to Jose
Riosa. Pablo Rocha was one of the legatees in the
will. Marcelina Casas was the one who entered into
the contract of partition with Maria Corral, whereby
these parcels were adjudicated to the latter, as a
legitimate heir of Jose Riosa. Pablo Rocha was the
very person who drafted the contracts of sale of
these parcels of land by Maria Corral to Marcelina
Casas and by the latter to himself. These facts,
together with the relationship existing between Maria
Corral and Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha, the
former a daughter-in-law and the latter a nephew of
Maria Corral, amply support the conclusion that both
of them knew that these parcels of land had been
inherited by Maria Corral, as her legitime from her
son Jose Riosa who had inherited them, by will, from
his father Mariano Riosa, and were reservable
property. Wherefore, the duty of Maria Corral of
recording the reservable character of lots 10 and 11
has been transferred to Pablo Rocha and the
reservees have an action against him to compel him
to comply with this obligation. The judgment
appealed from is modified and Pablo Rocha is
ordered to record in the registry of deeds the

reservable character of parcels 10 11, the subject of
this complaint.
247) DE PAPA vs. CAMACHO
G.R. No. L-28032 September 24, 1986
FACTS:
Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and
the plaintiffs, Francisco Tioco de Papa, Manuel Tioco
and Nicolas Tioco, are legitimate relatives, plaintiffs
being said defendant's grandaunt and granduncles
and having a common ancestor the late Balbino
Tioco (who had a sister by the name of Romana
Tioco), father of plaintiffs and great grandfather of
defendant.
Toribia Tioco died intestate in l9l5, survived by her
husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate
children, Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon (mother
of defendant Dalisay D, Tongko-Camacho) and
leaving the four (4) parcels of land as the inheritance
of her said two children in equal pro-indiviso shares.
Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by his
legitimate children by his wife Marciana Felix
(among them plaintiffs) and legitimate grandchildren
Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon. In the partition of
his estate, three (3) parcels of land now covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 16545 and 16554
of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, were adjudicated
as the inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco, but as
she had predeceased her father, Balbino Tioco, the
said three (3) parcels of land devolved upon her two
legitimate children Faustino Dizon and Trinidad
Dizon in equal
Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and without
issue, leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share in
the seven (7) parcels of land above-mentioned to his
father, Eustacio Dizon, as his sole intestate heir, who
received the said property subject to a reserva
troncal which was subsequently annotated on the
Transfer Certificates of Title.
Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her rights
and interests in the parcels of land abovementioned
were inherited by her only legitimate child, defendant
Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho, subject to the
usufructuary right of her surviving husband,
defendant Primo Tongko.
Eustacio Dizon died intestate, survived his only
legitimate descendant, defendant Dalisay D. TongkoCamacho.
Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now owns
one-half (1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels of land
abovementioned as her inheritance from her mother,
Trinidad Dizon-Tongko.
Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims,
upon legal advice, the other half of the said seven
238

(7) parcels of land abovementioned by virtue of the
reserva troncal imposed thereon upon the death of
Faustino Dizon and under the laws on intestate
succession; but the plaintiffs, also upon legal advice,
oppose her said claim because they claim threefourths (3/4) of the one-half pro-indiviso interest in
said parcel of land, which interest was inherited by
Eustacio Dizon from Faustino Dizon, or three-eights
(3/8) of the said parcels of land, by virtue of their
being also third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not all relatives of the praepositus within
the third degree in the appropriate line succeed
without distinction to the reservable property upon
the death of the reservista, or, as asserted by the
defendant-appellant, the rights of said relatives are
subject to, and should be determined by, the rules
on intestate succession.
HELD:
The Supreme Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Padura vs. Baldovino,,
declared the principles of intestacy to be controlling,
Reversion of the reservable property being governed
by the rules on intestate succession, the plaintiffsappellees must be held without any right thereto
because, as aunt and uncles, respectively, of
Faustino Dizon (the praepositus), they are excluded
from the succession by his niece, the defendantappellant, although they are related to him within the
same degree as the latter. The court, therefore, held,
and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a
decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab
intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the
decedent survive and are willing and qualified to
succeed.
Had the reversionary property passed
directly from the praepositus, there is no doubt that
the plaintiffs-appellees would have been excluded by
the defendant-appellant under the rules of intestate
succession. There is no reason why a different result
should obtain simply because "the transmission of
the property was delayed by the interregnum of the
reserva;" 6 i.e., the property took a "detour" through
an ascendant-thereby giving rise to the reservation
before its transmission to the reservatario.
Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings
already cited, the defendant-appellant Dalisay
Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the
reversionary property to the exclusion of the
plaintiffs-appellees.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower
Court is reversed and set aside and the complaint is
dismissed.
248) LLorente vs. Rodriguez, et. Al.

G.R. NO. L-3339, MARCH 26, 1908
FACTS:
Martina Avalle, widow of Llorente, had
during her marriage four legitimate children named
Jacinta, Julio, Martin, and Francisco, all with the
surname of Llorente y Avalle. In the will executed by
her on the 31st of December, 1900, she instituted as
her sole and general heirs her three first-named
children, Jacinta, Julio, and Martin, and the children
of the late Francisco, named Soledad and Adela
Llorente.
Jacinta died prior to the testatrix, on the 11th
of August, 1901, leaving several legitimate children
with the surname of Rodriguez y Llorente, and
besides them, a natural daughter named Rosa
Llorente.
The said Rosa Llorente, the natural
daughter of Jacinta Llorente, wanted to become a
party in the proceedings for the probate of the will of
Martina Avalle, but the legitimate children of the said
Jacinta Llorente objected thereto on the ground that
they were the sole and exclusive heirs of their
mother, the late Jacinta Llorente, and that the
plaintiff, Rosa Llorente, absolutely cannot be a party
thereto.
The Court of First Instance of Cebu, where
the will was admitted for probate, held that Rosa
Llorente had no right whatever to the inheritance of
the late Martina Avalle, and denied her all right to
intervene in the proceedings regarding the estate of
the said deceased.
ISSUE: Whether or not the hereditary portion which
Martina Avalle left in her will to her legitimate
daughter Jacinta Llorente, and which the latter had
not been able to possess because of her death
before that of the testatrix, should also pass to her
natural daughter, Rosa Llorente, the same as to her
legitimate children.
HELD: No. From the fact that a natural son has the
right to inherit from the father or mother who
acknowledged him, conjointly with the other
legitimate children of either of them, it does not
follow that he has the right to represent either of
them in the succession to their legitimate
239

ascendants; his right is direct and immediate in
relation to the father or mother who acknowledged
him, but it cannot be indirect by representing them in
the succession to their ascendants to whom he is
not related in any manner, because he does not
appear among the legitimate family of which said
ascendants are the head.
legitimate child of the deceased Teresa Pecson.

Teresa was a daughter of the testator; that the said
granddaughter, Rosario Mediavillo y Pecson, was
disinherited by her grandfather, the testator
Florencio Pecson, according to clause 3 of the will,
because she failed to show him due respect and on
a certain occasion raised her hand against him.
If Jacinta Llorente had survived her mother,

Martina Avalle, she would have inherited from her,
and in what she inherited from her mother, her
natural daughter, Rosa Llorente would have
participated, in conjunction with her legitimate
children, from the day in which the succession
became operative, because she would then appear
by virtue of her own right to inherit from her mother
the legal quota that pertained to her; but, not
because she has said right, would she also be
entitled to that of representation, inasmuch as there
is no legal provision establishing such a doctrine;
that Rosa Llorente might and should inherit from her
natural mother is one thing, and that she should
have the right to inherit from her who would be
called her natural grandmother, representing her
natural mother, is quite another thing. The latter right
is not recognized by the law in force.
On his will, Florencio Pecson state that he

disinherited Rosario Mediavillo "because she was
grossly disrespectful to me and because on one
occasion, when it was I do not remember, she raised
her hand against me. Therefore it is my will that she,
the said Rosario Mediavillo, shall have no share in
my property."
Therefore, the judgment appealed from is

hereby affirmed.
249) FILOMENA PECSON, as administratix of the

last will and testament of Florencio Pecson, et al.
vs. ROSARIO MEDIAVILLO
28 PHIL. 81
FACTS:
Some time prior to the 17th day of September, 1910,
the last will and testament of Florencio Pecson was
presented to the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Albay for probate.
Mr. Tomas Lorayes, an attorney at law, opposed the
legislation of the will on the ground that it had not
been authorized nor signed by the deceased.
However, after hearing the respective parties, the
court found that the will had been signed and
executed in accordance with the provisions of law.
On the 18th day of September, 1910, the said Tomas
Lorayes, representing Basiliso Mediavillo and
Rosario Mediavillo, presented a motion alleging that
Rosario Mediavillo is and Joaquin Mediavillo was a
ISSUES: Whether or not the court may inquire into

the cause of the disinheritance and decide whether
there is a ground for such disinheritance.
Whether or not Basiliso Mediavillo, the father of
Joaquin Mediavillo, is the latters heir by
representation.
HELD: Yes, the Civil Code (art. 848) provides that
disinheritance shall only take place for one of the
causes expressly fixed by law. In accordance with
the provisions of that article (848) we find that
articles 756 and 853 provide the cases or causes for
disinheritance; or, in other words, the cases or
causes in which the ancestors may by will disinherit
their heirs.
Article 849 of the Civil Code provides that the
disinheritance can only be effected by the testament,
in which shall be mentioned the legal grounds or
causes for such disinheritance. If it is true that heirs
can be disinherited only by will, and for causes
mentioned in the Civil Code, it would seen to follow
that the courts might properly inquire whether the
disinheritance has been made properly and for the
causes provided for by law.
The right of the courts to inquire into the causes and
whether there was sufficient cause for the
disinheritance or not, seems to be supported by
express provisions of the Civil Code. Article 850
provides that "the proof of the truthfulness of the
reason for disinheritance shall be established by the
heirs of the testator, should the disinherited person
deny it." It would appear then that if the person
disinherited should deny the truthfulness of the
cause of disinheritance, he might be permitted to
240

support his allegation by proof. The right of the court
to inquire whether or not the disinheritance was
made for just cause is also sustained by the
provisions of article 851, which in part provides
that:Disinheritance made without statement of the
reason, or for a cause the truth of which, if
contradicted, should not be proven . . . shall annul
the designation of heirship, in so far as it prejudices
the person disinherited.
With reference to the second assignment of error,
The Supreme Court held that the right of
representation shall always take place in the direct
descending line, but never in the ascending. In
collateral lines, it shall take place only in favor of the
children of brothers or sisters, whether they be of the
whole or half blood.
It will be remembered that the whole argument of the
appellants with reference to the first assignment of
error was that Rosario Mediavillo had been
disinherited and the court evidently believed that
there were no "legitimate children, descendants of
the deceased, surviving," and that therefore the
father or mother of said legitimate children would
inherit as ascendants. Inasmuch, however, as there
was a descendant in the direct line, surviving, the
inheritance could not ascend, and for the reason the
lower court committed an error in declaring that
Basiliso Mediavillo was entitled to inherit that share
of the estate that would have belonged to Joaquin
Mediavillo, had he been living.
Therefore, and for all the foregoing, that part of the
judgment of the lower court nullifying and setting
aside paragraph 3 of the will is hereby affirmed, and
that art of said judgment which decrees to Basiliso
Mediavillo one-half of the estate of Florencio
Pecson, belonging to Teresa Pecson and which
would have been given to Joaquin Mediavillo, had
he been surviving, is hereby revoked.
The latter died in 1969 without her estate being

settled. Alejandro died thereafter. Sometime in
1977, after Alejandros death, petitioner, who claims
to have taken care of Alejandro before he died, filed
a special proceeding for the probate of the latters
last will and testament. In 1981, the court issued an
order admitting Alejandros will to probate. Private
respondents did not appeal from said order. In 1983,
they filed a Motion To Declare The Will Intrinsically
Void. The trial court granted the motion and issued
an order, declaring Lourdes Legaspi not the wife of
the late Alejandro Dorotheo, the provisions of the
last will and testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as
intrinsically void, and declaring the oppositors
Vicente Dorotheo, Jose Dorotheo and Nilda
Dorotheo Quintana as the only heirs of the late
spouses Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes,
whose respective estates shall be liquidated and
distributed according to the laws on intestacy upon
payment of estate and other taxes due to the
government.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing
that she is entitled to some compensation since she
took care of Alejandro prior to his death although she
admitted that they were not married to each other.
Upon denial of her motion for reconsideration,
petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the
same was dismissed for failure to file appellants
brief within the extended period granted. This
dismissal became final and executory on February 3,
1989 and a corresponding entry of judgment was
forthwith issued by the Court of Appeals on May 16,
1989.
Petitioner assails the Order of the Court of
Appeals upholding the validity of the January 30,
1986 Order which declared the intrinsic invalidity of
Alejandros will that was earlier admitted to probate.
Issue: May a last will and testament admitted to
probate but declared intrinsically void in an order
that has become final and executory still be given
effect?
And without any findings as to costs, it is hereby

ordered that the cause be remanded to the lower
court.
Held: The petition is without merit.
250) DOROTHEO vs CA
320 SCRA 12
whether the will submitted is indeed, the

decedents last will and testament;
FACTS:
compliance with the prescribed formalities for

the execution of wills;
Private respondents were the legitimate

children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes.
It should be noted that probate proceedings

deals generally with the extrinsic validity of the will
sought to be probated, particularly on three aspects:
the testamentary capacity of the testator;
241

and the due execution of the last will and
testament.
Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a
determination of whether the testator was of sound
and disposing mind at the time of its execution, that
he had freely executed the will and was not acting
under duress, fraud, menace or undue influence and
that the will is genuine and not a forgery, that he was
of the proper testamentary age and that he is a
person not expressly prohibited by law from making
a will.
The intrinsic validity is another matter and
questions regarding the same may still be raised
even after the will has been authenticated. Thus, it
does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid
last will and testament is always intrinsically valid.
Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator
provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the
lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance
according to the laws on succession,i[13] the unlawful
provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given
effect. This is specially so when the courts had
already determined in a final and executory decision
that the will is intrinsically void. Such determination
having attained that character of finality is binding on
this Court which will no longer be disturbed. Not that
this Court finds the will to be intrinsically valid, but
that a final and executory decision of which the party
had the opportunity to challenge before the higher
tribunals must stand and should no longer be
reevaluated.
Failure to avail of the remedies
provided by law constitutes waiver. And if the party
does not avail of other remedies despite its belief
that it was aggrieved by a decision or court action,
then it is deemed to have fully agreed and is
satisfied with the decision or order
Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the
declaration of the intrinsic invalidity of the will, as she
precisely appealed from an unfavorable order
therefrom. Although the final and executory Order of
January 30, 1986 wherein private respondents were
declared as the only heirs do not bind those who are
not parties thereto such as the alleged illegitimate
son of the testator, the same constitutes res judicata
with respect to those who were parties to the
probate proceedings. Petitioner cannot again raise
those matters anew for relitigation otherwise that
would amount to forum-shopping. It is clear from the
executory order that the estates of Alejandro and his
spouse should be distributed according to the laws
of intestate succession.
No intestate distribution of the estate can be
done until and unless the will had failed to pass both
its extrinsic and intrinsic validity. If the will is

extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy apply
regardless of the intrinsic validity thereof. If it is
extrinsically valid, the next test is to determine its
intrinsic validity that is whether the provisions of
the will are valid according to the laws of succession.
In this case, the court had ruled that the will of
Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic
provisions thereof were void. Thus, the rules of
intestacy apply as correctly held by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the
decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
251) URIARTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
BENEDICTO ESTRADA
284 SCRA 511
FACTS:
Agatonica Arreza is the offspring of Pedro Arreza
and Ursula Tubil. The Private respondent Benedicto
Estrada is the son of Agatonica. Upon the death of
Pedro Arreza, Ursula married Juan Arnaldo by whom
she had another daughter, the decedent Justa.
Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is thus the
nephew of Justa by her half sister Agatonica.
Domingo Arnaldo is the brother of Juan Arnaldo.
Domingo and his wife Catalina Azarcon had a
daughter, Primitiva Arnaldo. Primitiva then married
Conrado Uriarte who had children, one of whom was
Pascasio Uriarte. The widow and daughters of
Pascasio are the petitioners in his case. Petitioners
are thus grandchildren, the relatives within the fifth
degree of consanguinity, of Justa by her cousin
Primitiva Arnaldo Uriarte.
The other petitioners are the children of Primitiva
and those of her brother Gregorio. The children of
Primitiva by Conrado Uriarte, aside from Pascasio,
are Josefina, Gaudencio, Simplicio, Domingo and
Virgilio, all surnamed Uriarte. The children of
Gregorio Arnaldo, Primitiva's brother, by Julieta
Ilogon, are Jorencio, Enecia, Nicolas, Lupecino and
Felisa. These other petitioners are
thus
grandchildren and relatives within the fifth degree of
consanguinity of Justa by her cousins Gregorio
Arnaldo and Primitiva Arnaldo.
Private respondent Benedicto Estrada brought this
case in the Regional Trial Court for the partition of
the land left by Justa Arnaldo-Sering. The land,
consisting of 2.7 hectares, had been acquired by
Justa as follows: 0.5 hectare by inheritance from her
parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, and 2.2
hectares by purchase. Private respondent claimed
to be the sole surviving heir of Justa, on the ground
242

that the latter died without issue. He complained that
Pascasio Uriarte who, he claimed, worked the land
as Justa's tenant, refused to give him (private
respondent) his share of the harvest. He contended
that Pascasio had no right to the entire land of Justa
but could claim only one-half of the 0.5 hectare land
which Justa had inherited from her parents Juan
Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil.
Pascasio died during the pendency of the case and
was substituted by his heirs. In their answer, the
heirs denied they were mere tenants of Justa but
the latter's heirs entitled to her entire land.
They claimed that the entire land, subject of the
case, was originally owned by Ambrocio Arnaldo,
their great granduncle. It was allegedly bequeathed
to Domingo and Juan Arnaldo, Ambrocio's nephews,
in a holographic will executed by Ambrocio in 1908.
Domingo was to receive two-thirds of the land and
Juan, one-third. The heirs claimed that the land had
always been in their possession and that in her
lifetime Justa never asserted exclusive right over the
property but only received her share of the harvest
from it. They alleged that private respondent did not
have any right to the property because he was not
an heir of Ambrocio Arnaldo, the original owner of
the property.
properties were left in the possession of Delia,

Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who
claim to be their children.
On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and
Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's
mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting
of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson.
The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and
Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional rights to
the disputed estate as the decedent's lawful
descendants.
Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own
complaint, this time for the accounting and partition
of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson,
against the couple's four surviving children. The
complainants asserted the defense, that Delia and
Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel
was the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel.
As such, they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share
in his parents' estate by right of representation.
ISSUE: Whether the adopted children of Teodoro
(Delia and Edmundo) are entitled to inherit Teodoros
share by right of representation?
HELD: YES. Petitioners misappreciate the

relationship between Justa and private respondent.
As already stated, private respondent is the son of
Justa's half-sister Agatonica. He is therefore Justa's
nephew. A nephew is considered a collateral relative
who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or
spouse survive the decedent.
That private
respondent is only a half-blood relative is immaterial.
This alone does not disqualify him from being his
aunt's heir. As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed
out, "The determination of whether the relationship is
of the full or half blood is important only to determine
the extent of the share of the survivors.
HELD:NO! There is no question that as the

legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the
granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a
right to represent her deceased father in the
distribution of the intestate estate of her
grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted above, she
is entitled to the share her father would have directly
inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to
the shares of her grandparents' other children.
But a different conclusion must be reached in the
case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the
grandparents were total strangers. While it is true
that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a
legitimate child and have the same right as the latter,
these rights do not include the right of
representation. The relationship created by the
adoption is between only the adopting parents and
the adopted child and does not extend to the blood
relatives of either party.
252) SAYSON vs. COURT OF APPEALS

205 SCRA 321
253) Bagunu vs. Piedad

G.R. No. L-66574 June 17, 1987
FACTS:
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children,
namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and
Teodoro. Eleno died on 1952, and Rafaela on 1976.
Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on
1972. His wife died nine years later, on, 1981. Their
Doctrine: The rule on proximity is a concept that

favors the relatives nearest in degree to the
decedent and excludes the more distant ones except
when and to the extent that the right of
representation can apply. By right of representation,
a more distant blood relative of a decedent is, by
ISSUE:
Whether a nephew is considered a
collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant,
ascendant or spouse survive the decedent
243

operation of law, "raised to the same place and
degree" of relationship as that of a closer blood
relative of the same decedent. In the direct line, right
of representation is proper only in the descending,
never in the ascending, line. In the collateral line, the
right of representation may only take place in favor
of the children of brothers or sisters of the decedent
when such children survive with their uncles or
aunts.
The right of representation does not apply to "other
collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to
which group both petitioner and respondent belong)
who are sixth in the order of preference following,
firstly, the legitimate children and descendants,
secondly, the legitimate parents and ascendants,
thirdly, the illegitimate children and descendants,
fourthly, the surviving spouse, and fifthly, the
brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, fourth
decedent. Among collateral relatives, except only in
the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent
concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of
proximity, expressed in Article 962, aforequoted, of
the Code, is an absolute rule. In determining the
degree of relationship of the collateral relatives to
the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives
direction.
Facts:
On 28 August 1995, herein petitioner Ofelia
Hernando Bagunu moved to intervene in Special
Proceedings No. 3652, entitled "In the matter of the
Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Augusto H.
Piedad," pending before the Regional Trial Court
("RTC"), Branch 117, of Pasay City. Asserting
entitlement to a share of the estate of the late
Augusto H. Piedad, petitioner assailed the finality of
the order of the trial court awarding the entire estate
to respondent Pastora Piedad contending that the
proceedings were tainted with procedural infirmities,
including an incomplete publications of the notice of
hearing, lack of personal notice to the heirs and
creditors, and irregularity in the disbursements of
allowances and withdrawals by the administrator of
the estate.
Issue: WON petitioner, a collateral relative of the fifth
civil degree, can inherit alongside respondent, a
collateral relative of the third civil degree? Elsewise
stated does the rule of proximity in intestate
succession find application among collateral
relatives?
Held:No. Augusto H. Piedad died without any direct
descendants or ascendants. Respondent is the
maternal aunt of the decedent, a third-degree
relative of the decedent, while petitioner is the

daughter of a first cousin of the deceased, or a fifthdegree relative of the decedent. The right of
representation does not apply to "others collateral
relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to which group
both petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth
in the order of preference following, firstly, the
legitimate children and descendants, secondly, the
legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly, the
illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the
surviving spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and
sisters/nephews and nieces, fourth decedent.
Among collateral relatives, except only in the case of
nephews and nieces of the decedent concurring with
their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed
in Article 962, aforequoted, of the Code, is an
absolute rule. In determining the degree of
relationship of the collateral relatives to the
decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives
direction. Respondent, being a relative within the
third civil degree, of the late Augusto H. Piedad
excludes petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree,
from succeeding an intestato to the estate of the
decedent.
254) DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO,
petitioners,
and
FELIXBERTA
PACURSA
guardian of FEDERICO SANTERO, et al., vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA
PAMUTI JARDIN, respondents
182 SCRA 427
FACTS: ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all surnamed
SANTERO, FACTS: Private respondent filed a
Petition dated January 23, 1976 with the CFI of
Cavite in a special proceeding "In The Matter of the
Intestate Estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero," praying among other things, that the
corresponding letters of Administration be issued in
her favor and that she be appointed as special
Administratrix of the properties of the deceased
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa's mother
Juliana were the only legitimate children of the
spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion.
Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union
were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died
during infancy. Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is
the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of
Pablo Santero. Pablo Santero was the only
legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
244

Pascual Santero died in 1970, while Pablo Santero
died in 1973 and Simona Santero died in 1976.
Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived
by his mother Simona Santero and his six minor
natural children to wit: four minor children with
Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta
Pacursa.
In 1976, the court declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as
the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero.
Before the trial court, there were 4 interrelated cases
filed to wit: Petition for the Letters of Administration
of the intestate Estate of Pablo Santero; Petition for
the Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate
of Pascual Santero; Petition for Guardianship over
the properties of an incompetent Person, Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero; and Petition for Settlement
of the Intestate Estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero.
Felisa Jardin upon her Motion to Intervene was
allowed to intervene in the intestate estates of Pablo
Santero and Pascual Santero by Order of the Court
in 1977. Petitioner Anselma Diaz, as guardian of her
minor children, filed her "Opposition and Motion to
Exclude Felisa Pamuti from further taking part or
intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate
of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the
intestate estate of Pascual Santero and Pablo
Santero. Felixberta Pacursa guardian for her minor
children.
In 1980, the court issued an order excluding Felisa
Jardin "from further taking part or intervening in the
settlement of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate estates
of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero and declared
her to be, not an heir of the deceased Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero."
Felisa Jardin filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and
it was denied by the trial court. On appeal, the
Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the decision
of the trial court and declaring the Felisa Jardin as
the sole heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and
ordering oppositors-appellees not to interfere in the
proceeding for the declaration of heirship in the
estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners as illegitimate children
of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of their
father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of

Simona Pamuti Vda, de Santero.
HELD: NO. Since the hereditary conflict refers
solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero, who is the legitimate mother of Pablo
Santero, the applicable law is the provision of Art.
992 of the Civil Code which reads as follows:
ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit
ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives
of his father or mother; nor shall such children or
relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child. (943a)
Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an
illegitimate child. On the other hand, the oppositors
(petitioners herein) are the illegitimate children of
Pablo Santero.
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier
or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate
child and the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother of said legitimate child. They may
have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized
by law for the purposes of Art. 992, Between the
legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is
presumed to be an intervening antagonism and
incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully
looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family
is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter
considers the privileged condition of the former, and
the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the
former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing
but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a
blemish broken in life; the law does no more than
recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of
resentment. Thus, petitioners herein cannot
represent their father Pablo Santero in the
succession of the letter to the intestate estate of his
legitimate mother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero,
because of the barrier provided for under Art. 992 of
the New Civil Code.
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil
Code that the phrase "legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative"
includes all the kindred of the person spoken of.
The record shows that from the commencement of
this case the only parties who claimed to be the
legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor
245

natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.
Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions
of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate
Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa
Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the
intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero.
255) WENCESLA CACHO, petitioner-appellee, vs.

JOHN G. UDAN, and RUSTICO G. UDAN,
oppositors-appellants.
G.R. No. L-19996
April 30, 1965
will be excluded by the illegitimate son, Francisco

Udan, as sole intestate heir, by operation of law.
The death of Francisco two years after his mother's
demise does not improve the situation of appellants.
The rights acquired by the former are only
transmitted by his death to his own heirs at law not
to the appellants, who are legitimate brothers of his
mother, for the reason that, as correctly decided by
the court below, the legitimate relatives of the mother
cannot succeed her illegitimate child. This is clear
from Article 992 of the Civil Code.
The legitimate relatives of the mother cannot
succeed her illegitimate child. This is clear from
Article 992 of the Civil Code.
REYES, J.B.L., J.
David T. Tolentino
FACTS:
John, Rustico and Silvina are siblings. Silvina G.
Udan died leaving a purported will naming her
illegitimate son, Francisco G. Udan, and one
Wencesla Cacho, as her sole heirs, share and share
alike. During the probate of the will, opposition was
made by her two brothers on the ground that the will
was not attested and executed as required by law,
that the testatrix was incapacitated to execute it; and
that it was procured by fraud or undue influence.
Francisco died pending the probate. The RTC
denied the oppositions filed by the two brothers.
Hence, this appeal
ISSUE:
WON oppositor brothers, John and Rustico Udan,
may claim to be heirs intestate of their legitimate
sister, the late Silvina Udan.
HELD:
The Court ruled that the court below correctly held
that they were not, for at the time of her death
Silvina's illegitimate son, Francisco Udan, was her
heir intestate, to the exclusion of her brothers under
Articles 988 and 1003 of the governing Civil Code of
the Philippines in force at the time of the death of the
testatrix
It decreed that collateral relatives of one who died
intestate inherit only in the absence of descendants,
ascendants, and illegitimate children. Albeit the
brothers and sisters can concur with the widow or
widower under Article 1101, they do, not concur, but
are excluded by the surviving children, legitimate or
illegitimate (Art. 1003). The trial court committed no
error in holding that John and Rustico Udan had no
standing to oppose the probate of the will. For if the
will is ultimately probated John and Rustico are
excluded by its terms from participation in the estate;
and if probate be denied, both oppositors-appellants
256) ISABEL DE LA PUERTA, petitioner, vs. THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
CARMELITA DE LA PUERTA, respondents.
G.R. No. 77867 February 6, 1990
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:
The testator, Dominga Revuelta died on July 3,
1966, at the age of 92, leaving her properties to her
three surviving children, Alfredo, Vicente and Isabel.
Isabel was given the free portion in addition to her
legitime and was appointed executrix of the will.
Vicente and Alfredo opposed the petition for the
probate of the will filed by Isabel. The two claimed
that their mother was already senile at the time of
the execution of the will and did not fully
comprehend its meaning, that the properties listed in
the inventory of her estate belonged to them
exclusively.
Alfredo subsequently died, leaving Vicente the lone
oppositor. Vicente de la Puerta filed with the CFI of
Quezon, a petition to adopt Carmelita de la Puerta,
which was thereafter granted. Isabel appealed the
said decision to the CA. Vicente died during the
pendency of the appeal, prompting her to move for
the dismissal of the case. Carmelita filed a motion
for the payment to her of a monthly allowance as the
acknowledged natural child of Vicente de la Puerta.
The said motion was granted by the probate court
granted the motion, declaring that Carmelita was a
natural child of Vicente de la Puerta and was entitled
to the amounts claimed for her support. CA affirmed
this order of the lower court. Hence, this petition
wherein the petitioner's main argument is that
Carmelita was not the natural child of Vicente de la
Puerta, who was married to Genoveva de la Puerta
in 1938 and remained his wife until his death in
246

1978. Carmelita's real parents are Juanito Austrial
and Gloria Jordan.
ISSUE:
WON respondent Carmelita de la Puerta, can claim
successional rights to the estate of her alleged
grandmother.
HELD:
The Court held that Vicente de la Puerta did not
predecease his mother and Carmelita is a spurious
child. It is settled that in testamentary succession,
the right of representation can take place only in the
following cases: first, when the person represented
dies before the testator; second, when the person
represented is incapable of succeeding the testator;
and third, when the person represented is
disinherited by the testator. In all of these cases,
since there is a vacancy in the inheritance, the law
calls the children or descendants of thefiliation of
private respondent Carmelita de la Puerta, who
claims successional rights to the estate of her
alleged grandmother. person represented to
succeed by right of representation.
The law is clear that there is representation only
when relatives of a deceased person try to succeed
him in his rights which he would have had if still
living.
Not having predeceased Dominga Revuelta, her son
Vicente had the right to inherit from her directly or in
his own right. No right of representation was
involved, nor could it be invoked by Carmelita upon
her father's death, which came after his own
mother's death. It would have been different if
Vicente was already dead when Dominga Revuelta
died. Carmelita could then have inherited from her in
representation of her father Vicente, assuming the
private respondent was a lawful heir. As a spurious
child of Vicente, Carmelita is barred from inheriting
from Dominga because of Article 992 of the Civil
Code, which lays down the barrier between the
legitimate and illegitimate families. This article
provides quite clearly:
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit
ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives
of his father or mother; nor shall such children or
relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child.
Even as an adopted child, Carmelita would still be
barred from inheriting from Dominga Revuelta for
there would be no natural kindred ties between them
and consequently, no legal ties to bind them either.
Carmelita, as the spurious daughter of Vicente de la
Puerta, has successional rights to the intestate
estate of her father but not to the estate of Dominga
Revuelta. Her claims for support and inheritance

should therefore be filed in the proceedings for the
settlement of her own father's estate and cannot be
considered in the probate of Dominga Revuelta's
will.
David T. Tolentino
257) BENIGNO MANUEL, LIBERATO MANUEL,
LORENZO
MANUEL,
PLACIDA
MANUEL,
MADRONA MANUEL, ESPERANZA MANUEL,
AGAPITA MANUEL, BASILISA MANUEL, EMILIA
MANUEL and NUMERIANA MANUEL, petitioners,
vs. HON. NICODEMO T. FERRER, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 37,
Lingayen, Pangasinan, MODESTA BALTAZAR
and ESTANISLAOA MANUEL, respondents.
G.R. No. 117246 August 21, 1995
VITUG, J.:
FACTS:
The property involved in this petition for review on
certiorari is the inheritance left by an illegitimate child
who died intestate without any surviving descendant
or ascendant.
Petitioners, the legitimate children of spouses
Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling, filed this suit.
During his marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had an
extra-marital affair with Ursula Bautista. From this
relationship, a child named Juan Manuel was born.
Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married
Esperanza Gamba. In consideration of the marriage,
a donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land, with
an area of 2,700 sqm was executed in favor of Juan
Manuel by Laurenciana Manuel. Two other parcels
of land, were later bought by Juan and registered in
his name. The couple were not blessed with a child
that is why they took private respondent Modesta
Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so raised her as
their own "daughter." On June 3, 1980, Juan Manuel
executed in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of
Sale Con Pacto de Retro over a one-half (1/2)
portion of his land. Juan Manuel died intestate on
February 21, 1990. Two years later, Esperanza
Gamba also passed away. A month after the death
of Esperanza, Modesta executed an Affidavit of SelfAdjudication claiming for herself the three parcels of
land.
Following the registration of the document of
adjudication with the Office of the Register of Deeds,
the three titles in the name of Juan Manuel were
canceled and new titles, were issued in the name of
Modesta Manuel-Baltazar. Modesta executed in
favor of her co-respondent Estanislaoa Manuel a
247

Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim over the
unredeemed one-half (1/2) portion of the land that
was sold to the latter by Juan Manuel under the
1980 Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro. The
petitioners filed a complaint filed before the RTC
Lingayen, Pangasinan, seeking the declaration of
nullity of the aforesaid instruments. The trial court
dismissed the complaint holding that petitioners, not
being heirs ab intestato of their illegitimate brother
Juan Manuel, were not the real parties-in-interest to
institute the suit. The motion for reconsideration
filed by the petitioners was denied by the trial court.
Hence, this Petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioners are entitled to inherit in the
intestate estate of their illegitimate brother, Juan
Manuel.
RULING:
The Court ruled that the petitioners are not entitled
to inherit from the intestate estate of their illegitimate
brother, Juan Manuel under ARTICLE 992, an
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato
from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother; nor shall such children or relative
inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
The principle of absolute separation between the
legitimate family and the illegitimate family wherein
such doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in the
collateral line between legitimate relatives, on the
one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other hand,
although it does not totally disavow such succession
in the direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the
presumed will of the decedent, it has no application,
however, on testamentary dispositions.
A barrier dividing members of the illegitimate family
from members of the legitimate family wherein the
legitimate brothers and sisters as well as the
children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such
brothers and sisters, cannot inherit from the
illegitimate child.
Admittedly in her answer, Modesta is not an intestate
heir of Juan Manuel. A ward, without the benefit of
formal/judicial adoption, is neither a compulsory nor
a legal heir. Nevertheless, the complaint of
petitioners seeking the nullity of the Affidavit of SelfAdjudication executed by Modesta, the three TCT's
issued to her favor, as well as the Deed of
Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of Estanislaoa
Manuel, was properly dismissed by the trial court.
David T. Tolentino
258) OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S.

PASCUAL, petitioners,
vs. ESPERANZA C.
PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL,
JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C. PASCUALBAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, WENCESLAO
C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF
ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL,
ISOCELES
PASCUAL,
LEIDA
PASCUALMARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER, NONA
PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL,
GERANAIA
PASCUAL-DUBERT,
and
THE
HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S.
PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, Metro Manila,
respondents.
G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992
PARAS, J.:
Facts:
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed
Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of
the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood
brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual.
Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12,
1973 without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged
natural, adopted or spurious children.
Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of
the late Don Andres Pascual, filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), a Special Proceeding for
administration of the intestate estate of her late
husband. On October 16, 1985, all the heirs entered
into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over the
vehement objections of the herein petitioners Olivia
S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual
The Compromise Agreement had been entered into
despite the Manifestation/Motion of the petitioners
Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, manifesting
their hereditary rights in the intestate estate of Don
Andres Pascual, their uncle. On September 30,
1987, petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate
Hereditary Rights and the Memorandum in Support
of Motion to reiterate Hereditary Rights.
Both the RTC and CA dismissed the submitted
Motions as well as Motions for reconsideration
reiterating the hereditary rights of Olivia and Hermes
Pascual.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
WON Article 992 excludes recognized natural
children from the inheritance of the deceased.
Ruling:
The Court dismissed the instant petition for lack of
merit and affirmed the assailed decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals. It cited the previous
248

decided case of Diaz v. IAC, where such Court ruled
that Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier
or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate
child and the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother of said legitimate child. They may
have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized
by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the
legitimate family and illegitimate family there is
presumed to be an intervening antagonism and
incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully
looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family
is in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the latter
considers the privileged condition of the former, and
the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the
former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing
but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a
blemish broken in life; the law does no more than
recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of
resentment.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are
his illegitimate children.
Applying the doctrine, respondent IAC did not err in
holding that petitioners herein cannot represent their
father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter
to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres
Pascual, full blood brother of their father.
David T. Tolentino
259) MANUEL SARITA, ET AL., plaintiffsappellants, vs. ANDRES CANDIA, defendantappellee.
G.R. No. L-7768
November 14, 1912
ARELLANO, C.J.:
FACTS:
Spouses Apolinario Cedenio and Roberta Montesa
are allegedly the owners of a parcel of land
apparently of an area of 2 cavanes of corn upon
which they had planted fruit trees. Respondent
Candia claims ownership over the land having
purchased the same from Villarosa, the vendee of
Apolinario. Petitioners claim on the other hand, that
as nieces and nephews,they are the collateral heirs
of Apolinario, through the latters brothers and
sisters. Sarita, however, is the grandnephew of
Apolinario.
The RTC absolved the defendant from the
complainant, on the grounds that, with regard to the
animals and real property sued for, there was no
proof whatever that they were in possession of the
spouses at the time of their death, and, with respect
to the land: (1) That the defendant was the
possessor in good faith continuously and was

presumed to hold under just title so long as the
contrary should not be proved; and (2) that neither
the plaintiffs nor their alleged predecessors in
interest made demand for it during the period of
twenty-six years, since the ownership thereof was
conveyed by Isidario or Apolinario Cedeo to Juan
Basa Villarosa, on the 24th of June, 1881, it being
that during this very long period of time they did not
obtain possession of the property.
Hence, the judgment having been appealed through
a bill exceptions.
ISSUE:
WON grandnephews have a right of representation
over the estate of the deceased.
HELD:
The Court ruled that the right of representation is
limited to nephews and nieces who are children of
brothers and sisters of decedent. The plaintiff Sarita
who joins as the representative of his grandfather in
a complaint with others, who are brothers and
nephews of the predecessor in interest, lacks such
right of representation, for it belongs in the collateral
line only to the nephews and not to the
grandnephews. Hence, sister and nephews of the
deceased having appeared to claim the inheritance,
they, as the nearest of kin, exclude a remote relative
like a grandnephew.
David T. Tolentino
260) CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R.
DEZOLLER, petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS
and TEODORA DOMINGO, respondents.
G.R. No. 121027 July 31, 1997
REGALADO, J.:
FACTS:
This case involves an action for reconveyance filed
by herein petitioners against herein private
respondent before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 98, docketed as the aforesaid
Civil Case No. Q-88-1054, over a parcel of land with
a house and apartment thereon located at San
Francisco del Monte, Quezon City and which was
originally owned by the spouses Martin Guerrero
and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.
Petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are the
niece and nephew, respectively, of the deceased
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero who is the sister of
petitioner's father, Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora
249

Dezoller Guerrero died on March 5, 1983 without
any ascendant or descendant, and was survived
only by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein
petitioners. Petitioners' father, Hermogenes, died on
October 3, 1973, hence they seek to inherit from
Teodora
Dezoller
Guerrero
by
right
of
representation.
Records revealed that upon the death of Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse, Martin,
executed an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement
adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, the
land in dispute which is covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 66886, as a consequence of
which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 358074 was
issued in the name of Martin Guerrero. Martin
Guerrero then sold the lot to herein private
respondent Teodora Domingo and thereafter,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012 was issued
in the latter's name.
After Martin Guerreros death, Petitioners filed an
action for reconveyance claiming that they are
entitled to inherit one-half of the property in question
by right of representation.
Both the RTC and CA granted the demurrer to
evidence and dismissed the complaint for
reconveyance and declared that the documentary
evidence presented by herein petitioners, such as
the baptismal certificates, family picture, and joint
affidavits are all inadmissible and insufficient to
prove and establish filiation.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
WON petitioners failed to meet the quantum of proof
required by Article 172 of the Family Code to
establish legitimacy and filiation
HELD:
The Court ruled for the petitioners and reversed and
set aside the questioned judgment of respondent
Court of Appeals. Petitioners and Private
Respondent were declared co-owners of the subject
property with an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and
three-fourths (3/4) share therein, respectively.
The Court considered two points:
First is the issue on petitioner's legitimacy.
The documentary evidence adduced by petitioners,
taken separately and independently of each other,
are not per se sufficient proof of legitimacy nor even
of pedigree. It seems that the lower courts have
regrettably overlooked the universally recognized
presumption on legitimacy. There is no presumption
of the law more firmly established and founded on
sounder morality and more convincing reason than
the presumption that children born in wedlock are
legitimate. And well settled is the rule that the issue

of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.
The issue, therefore, as to whether petitioners are
the legitimate children of Hermogenes Dezoller
cannot be properly controverted in the present action
for reconveyance. This is aside, of course, from the
further consideration that private respondent is not
the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of herein
petitioners. The presumption consequently continues
to operate in favor of petitioners unless and until it is
rebutted.
Indubitably, when private respondent opted not to
present countervailing evidence to overcome the
presumption, by merely filing a demurrer to evidence
instead, she in effect impliedly admitted the truth of
such fact. Indeed, she overlooked or disregarded the
evidential rule that presumptions like judicial notice
and admissions, relieve the proponent from
presenting evidence on the facts he alleged and
such facts are thereby considered as duly proved.
Second is the question regarding their filiation
with Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.
The Court is sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that
the present case is one instance where the general
requirement on evidence aliunde may be relaxed.
Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the estate
of the declarant herself. Conformably, the
declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that
petitioner Corazon is her niece, is admissible and
constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship,
notwithstanding the fact that there was no other
preliminary evidence thereof, the reason being such
declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the
necessity of receiving such evidence to avoid a
failure of justice. More importantly, there is in the
present case an absolute failure by all and sundry to
refute that declaration made by the decedent.
From the foregoing disquisitions, it may thus be
safely concluded, on the sole basis of the decedent's
declaration and without need for further proof
thereof, that petitioners are the niece and nephew of
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.
Applying the general rule in the present case would
nonetheless produce the same result. For while the
documentary evidence submitted by petitioners do
not strictly conform to the rules on their admissibility,
we are however of the considered opinion that the
same may be admitted by reason of private
respondent's failure to interpose any timely objection
thereto at the time they were being offered in
evidence.
David T. Tolentino
261) ZOSIMA VERDAD vs. CA
G.R. No. 109972 April 29, 1996
VITUG, J.:
250

FACTS:
Petitioner Zosima Verdad is the purchaser of a 248square meter residential lot at Magallanes Street,
now Marcos M. Calo St., Butuan City. Private
respondent Socorro Cordero Vda. de Rosales,
seeks to exercise a right of legal redemption over
the subject property and traces her title to the late
Macaria Atega, her mother-in-law, who died intestate
on 08 March 1956.
During her lifetime, Macaria contracted two
marriages: the first with Angel Burdeos and the
second, following the latter's death, with Canuto
Rosales. At the time of her own death, Macaria was
survived by her son Ramon A. Burdeos and her
grandchild (by her daughter Felicidad A. Burdeos)
Estela Lozada of the first marriage and her children
of the second marriage, namely, David Rosales,
Justo Rosales, Romulo Rosales, and Aurora
Rosales (notice that other respondents in this case
are the children from the 2 nd marriage). Socorro is
the wife of David Rosales who sometime after the
death of Macaria, died intestate without issue.
It was discovered that the heirs of Ramon Buderos
sold the lot in question to petitioner in an instrument
dated 14, June 1982 (for P55,460) and another
instrument on 14 Nov 1982 (this time a duly
notarized deed of sale for P23,000), which sale was
later discovered by respondent Socorro on 30 Mar
1987. Settlement was attempted at the Failure of
settlement at the Lupong Tagapamayapa prompted
the Respondent to initiated a case for the "Legal
Redemption with Preliminary Injunction" before the
Regional Trial Court of Butuan City.
RTC decided that the private respondents' right to
redeem the property had already lapsed. On appeal
by respondents, Court of Appeals reversed the lower
courts decision declaring plaintiff-appellant, Socorro
C. Rosales, entitled to redeem the inheritance rights
(Art. 1088, NCC) or pro indiviso share (Art. 1620,
NCC) of the Heirs of Ramon Burdeos, Sr. in Lot 529,
Ts-65 of the Butuan Cadastre, within the remaining
ELEVEN (11) DAYS from finality hereon, unless
written notice of the sale and its terms are received
in the interim, under the same terms and conditions
appearing under Exhibit "J" and after returning the
purchase price of P23,000.00 within the foregoing
period.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON respondents may initiate redemption
proceedings over the lot, her not being a legal coheir, as well as the timeliness of that the said case
was instituted.
HELD:
The Court denied the petition. On the contention of
petitioner as to the capacity of Socorro to initiate the
redemption proceedings, the Court ruled that
Respondent possess the capacity to ask for a
redemption. It is true that Socorro, a daughter-in-law
(or, for that matter, a mere relative by affinity), is not
an intestate heir of her parents-in-law; however,
Socorro's right to the property is not because she
rightfully can claim heirship in Macaria's estate but
that she is a legal heir of her husband, David
Rosales, part of whose estate is a share in his
mother's inheritance.
David Rosales, incontrovertibly, survived his
mother's death. When Macaria died on 08 March
1956 her estate passed on to her surviving children,
among them David Rosales, who thereupon became
co-owners of the property. When David Rosales
himself later died, his own estate, which included
his undivided interest over the property inherited
from Macaria, passed on to his widow Socorro and
her co-heirs pursuant to the law on succession(Art
995 and 1001). Socorro and herein private
respondents, along with the co-heirs of David
Rosales, thereupon became co-owners of the
property that originally descended from Macaria.
As to the timeliness of the filing of the petition, the
Court ruled that such was exercised on time.
Concededly, no written notice of the sale was given
by the Burdeos heirs (vendors) to the coowners required under Article 1623 of the Civil Code.
Hence, the thirty-day period of redemption had yet to
commence when private respondent Rosales sought
to exercise the right of redemption on 31 March
1987, a day after she discovered the sale from the
Office of the City Treasurer of Butuan City, or when
the case was initiated, on 16 October 1987, before
the trial court. The written notice of sale is
mandatory. This Court has long established the rule
that notwithstanding actual knowledge of a coowner, the latter is still entitled to a written notice
from the selling co-owner in order to remove all
uncertainties about the sale, its terms and
conditions, as well as its efficacy and status.
David T. Tolentino
262)
FILOMENA
ABELLANA
DE
BACAYO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.GAUDENCIA
FERRARIS DE BORROMEO, CATALINA FERARIS
251

DE
VILLEGAS,
JUANITO
FERRARIS
and
CONCHITA
FERRARIS, oppositors-appellees.
G.R. No. L-19382
August 31, 1965
FACTS:
Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until
1937 when she transferred to Intramuros, Manila.
She
was
known
to
have
resided
in
Manilacontinuously until 1944. More than ten (10)
years having elapsed since the last time she was
known to be alive, she was declared presumptively
dead for purposes of opening her succession and
distributing her estate among her heirs.
Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City. The
deceased Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct
descendant, ascendant, or spouse, but was survived
only by collateral relatives, namely, Filomena
Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of
decedent's father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by
Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all
surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who
were the children of Melodia's only brother of full
blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-deceased her (the
decedent).
The trial court ruled that the appellees, as children of
the only predeceased brother of the decedent, are
nearer in degree than the appellant since nieces and
nephews succeed by right of representation.
ISSUE:
Who amongst the claimants are entitled to the
inheritance?
HELD:
We agree with appellants that as an aunt of the
deceased she is as far distant as the nephews from
the decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral
line to which both kinds of relatives belong degrees
are counted by first ascending to the common
ancestor and then descending to the heir. Appellant
is likewise right in her contention that nephews and
nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation
(i.e., per stripes) unless concurring with brothers or
sisters of the deceased.
Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held
that, in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces of
the de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and
uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession.
Under Article 1009, the absence of brothers, sisters,
nephews and nieces of the decedent is a
precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins,
etc.) being called to the succession.
Brothers and sisters and nephews and nieces
inherited ab intestato ahead of the surviving spouse,
while other collaterals succeeded only after the

widower or widow. The present Civil Code of the
Philippines merely placed the spouse on a par with
the nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters of
the deceased, but without altering the preferred
position of the latter vis-a-vis the other collaterals.
Therefore, a decedent's uncles and aunts may not
succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and
nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and
qualified to succeed.
263) BICOMONG vs. ALMANZA
G.R. No. L-37365 Nov. 29, 1977
Facts:
Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas
having three children: Perpetua, Igmedia and
Ignacio. When Sisenda died, Simeon married
Silvestra producing two children: Felipa and Maura.
The subject matter of the complaint concerns the
one-half undivided share of Maura Bagsic in the 5
parcels of land which she inherited from her
deceased mother, Silvestra Glorioso.
Three sets of plaintiffs filed the complaint, namely:
(a) the Bicomongs, children of Perpetua Bagsic; (b)
the Tolentinos, children of Igmedia Bagsic; and (c)
Francisco Bagsic, daughter of Ignacio Bagsic, in the
CFI of Laguna and San Pablo City against the
defendants Geronimo Almanza and Engracio
Menese for the recovery of their lawful shares in the
properties left by Maura Bagsic.
After the death of Maura Bagsic, properties passed
on to Cristela Almanza who took charge of the
administration of the same. Thereupon, the plaintiffs
approached her and requested for the partition of
their aunt's properties. However, they were prevailed
upon by Cristeta Almanza not to divide the
properties yet as the expenses for the last illness
and burial of Maura Bagsic had not yet been paid.
Having agreed to defer the partition of the same, the
plaintiffs brought out the subject again sometime in
1959 only. This time Cristeta Almanza acceded to
the request as the debts, accordingly, had already
been paid. Unfortunately, she died without the
division of the properties having been effected,
thereby leaving the possession and administration of
the same to the defendants.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of
plaintiffs. The respondents have the right to inherit
from Maura by right of representation.
The appellate court certified the case to the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
252

Whether the nephews and nieces from the brothers
and sisters whether full or half blood has the right to
inherit
Held:
Yes. The nephews and nieces from the brothers and
sisters whether full or half blood has the right to
inherit.
In the absence of defendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, Art. 1003
of the NCC provides that collateral relatives shall
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. It
appearing that Maura Bagsic died intestate without
an issue, and her husband and all her ascendants
had died ahead of her, she is succeeded by the
surviving collateral relatives, namely the daughter of
her sister of full blood and the ten (10) children of
her brother and two (2) sisters of half blood in
accordance with the provision of Art. 975 of the
NCC.
Under the same provision, Art. 975, which makes no
qualification as to whether the nephews or nieces
are on the maternal or paternal line and without
preference as to whether their relationship to the
deceased is by whole or half blood, the sole niece of
whole blood of the deceased does not exclude the
ten nephews and n of half blood. The only difference
in their right of succession is provided in Art. 1008,
NCC in relation to Art. 1006 of the NCC, which
provisions, in effect, entitle the sole niece of full
blood to a share double that of the nephews and
nieces of half blood.
264) CITY OF MANILA VS. ARCHBISHOP
G.R. No. L-10033 / August 30, 1917
FACTS: In 1668, Ana Sarmiento resided with her
husband in the City of Manila. She owned properties
consisted of five parcels of land in Malate and Paco.
She made a will and later on added a codicil to said
will. The will contained provisions for the
establishment of a "Capellania de Misas"; that the
first chaplain of said capellania should be her
nephew Pedro del Castillo; that said will contained a
provision for the administration of said property in
relation with the said "Capellania de Misas"
succeeding
administration
should
continue
perpetually. In 1672, Ana Sarmiento died. For more
than two hundred years, respondent Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila, through his various agencies,
has administered said property.
Petitioner city of Manila filed an action before the
CFI to have declared escheated to the city of Manila
the mentioned property. The theory of the petitioner
is that one Ana Sarmiento was the owner of said

property and died in the year 1668 without leaving
"her or person entitled to the same." However, the
respondent opposed alleging that it has rightfully and
legally succeeded to the possession and
administration of the property in accordance with the
terms and provisions of the will of Ana Sarmiento.
The trial court denied the petition.
ISSUE: Whether the property can be escheated in
favor of City of Manila.
HELD: No
Section 750 of Act No. 190 provides when property
may be declared escheated. It provides, "when a
person dies intestate, seized of real or personal
property . . . leaving no heir or person by law entitled
to the same," that then and in that case such
property under the procedure provided for by
sections 751 and 752, may de declared escheated.
The proof shows that Ana Sarmiento did not die
intestate. She left a will. The will provides for the
administration of said property by her nephew as
well as for the subsequent administration of the
same. She did not die without an heir nor without
persons entitled to administer her estate. It further
shows that she did not die without leaving a person
by law entitled to inherit her property. Therefore, the
property in question cannot be declared escheated.
The will clearly, definitely and unequivocally defines
and designates what disposition shall be made of
the property in question. The heir mentioned in said
will evidently accepted its terms and permitted the
property to be administered in accordance therewith.
And, so far as the record shows, it is still being
administered in accordance with the terms of said
will for the benefit of the real beneficiary as was
intended by the original owner.
265) TORRES vs. LOPEZ
G.R. No. L-25966
November 1, 1926
FACTS:
Tomas Rodriguez, had been judicially declared
incapable of taking care of himself and had been
placed under the care of his cousin Vicente F.
Lopez, as guardian. The will instituted as universal
heirs of all his property his daughter Luz Lopez de
Bueno and cousin Lopez. Lopez died 4 days from
the time the will was made and the testator died
about a month thereafter. The time the will was
made Lopez had not presented his final accounts as
guardian, and no such accounts had been presented
by him at the time of his death.
253

Margarita Lopez was a cousin and nearest relative
of the decedent, filed a case claiming half of the
estate of Tomas by intestate succession as next of
kin and nearest heir. Luz, on the other hand, claims
the same by accretion and in the character of
universal heir under the will of Tomas. Appellant
contends that there has supervened a partial
intestacy with respect to the half of the estate which
was intended for Vicente F. Lopez and that this half
has descended to the appellant.
The trial court ruled in favor of Luz.
ISSUE:
Whether or not one-half of the estate of Tomas
Rodriquez should go to Margarita Lopez being the
next of kin and nearest heir of Vicente Lopez or to
his daughter by accretion?
HELD:
Article 753 of the Civil Code which in effect declares
that, with certain exceptions in favor of near
relatives, no testamentary provision shall be valid
when made by a ward in favor of his guardian before
the final accounts of the latter have been approved.
This provision is of undoubted application to the
situation before the court and the provision made in
the will of Tomas Rodriguez in favor of Vicente F.
Lopez was not any general incapacity on his part,
but a special incapacity due to the accidental relation
of guardian and ward existing between the parties.
Accretion takes place in a testamentary success
when two or more persons are called to the same
inheritance or the same portion thereof without
special designation of shares and secondly, when
one of the persons so called dies before the testator
or renounces the inheritance or is disqualified to
receive it. In the case before us we have a will
calling Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter, Luz Lopez
de Bueno, to the same inheritance without special
designation of shares. In addition to this, one of the
persons named as heir has predeceased the
testator, this person being also disqualified to
receive the estate even if he had been alive at the
time of the testator's death by reason of his being
then the legal guardian of the testator with accounts
unsettled, does not make a case for intestate
succession as to his part of the estate. This article
(982) is the exact application to the case and its
effect is to give to the survivor, Luz Lopez de Bueno,
not only the undivided half which she would have
received in conjunction with her father if he had been
alive and qualified to take, but also the half which
pertained to him. There was no error whatever,
therefore in the order of the trial court declaring Luz
Lopez de Bueno entitled to the whole estate.
266) NEPOMUCENO vs. IAC

139 SCRA 206
FACTS:
On July 16, 1974, Martin Jugo died and left a will. In
the said will, the testator named and appointed
herein petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno as his sole
and only executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in
the Will that the testator was legally married to a
certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two
legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since
1952, he had been estranged from his lawfully
wedded wife and had been living with petitioner as
husband and wife. The estate was devised to his
legal heirs, except the free portion which was
devised to petitioner. Petitioner filed a petition for the
probate of the will but was denied by the court on the
opposition of the legal heirs on the ground that
petitioner admitted her living in concubinage with the
testator, thus, she is wanting in integrity and letters
testamentary should not be issued to her.
The Court of Appeals declared the will to be valid
except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null
and void, Petitioner contends that the lower court
has no jurisdiction in passing upon the question of
the intrinsic validity of the will.
ISSUE: Whether or not the probate court may pass
upon the provisions of the will.
HELD: NO.
The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction
when after declaring the will to be validly drawn, it
went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will
and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null
and void.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the
courts area of inquiry is limited to an examination
and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. The
rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given
exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not
powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do
and pass upon certain provisions of the will. The fact
that the probate court declared a devise made in a
will null and void will be sustained where no useful
purpose will be served by requiring the filing of a
separate civil action and restricting the court only to
the issue of extrinsic validity of the will. There is no
useful purpose that would be served if we remand
the nullified provision to the proper court in a
separate action for that purpose simply because, in
254

the probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily
look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.
subject to the final decision in a separate action to

resolve title.
The prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is

against the making of a donation between persons
who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is the
donation which becomes void. The giver cannot give
even assuming that the recipient may receive. The
very wordings of the will invalidate the legacy
because the testator admitted he was disposing the
properties to a person with whom he had been living
in concubinage.
Probate court erred in assuming in its implementing

order that the probate order adjudged the issues of
ownership. In case of death of one of the spouses,
their respective rights must be liquidated and the
debts paid in the succession proceedings for the
deceased spouse. Certiorari is proper where probate
court issued erroneous implementing orders of its
probate order. Legacy made in a will cannot be
distributed without a prior liquidation of the
decedents estate and payment of debts and taxes.
A legacy is not a debt of the estate for which a writ of
execution may issue. An order of execution that
varies the terms of a final order can be questioned in
a certiorari proceeding.
267) PASTOR vs. CA

122 SCRA 885
FACTS:
Alvaro Pastor, Sr. (PASTOR, SR.), a Spanish
subject, died in Cebu City on June 5, 1966, survived
by his Spanish wife Sofia Bossio (who also died),
their two legitimate children Alvaro Pastor, Jr.
(PASTOR, JR.) and Sofia Pastor de Midgely
(SOFIA), and an illegitimate child, not natural, by the
name of Lewellyn Barlito Quemada (QUEMADA).
QUEMADA filed a petition for the probate and
allowance of an alleged holographic will of PASTOR,
SR., which contained a legacy in favor of Quenada
consisting of 30% of Pastor Sr.s 42% share in the
operation of Atlas Mining.
PASTOR, JR. and his wife claimed to be the owners
thereof in their own rights, and not by inheritance
Thus, Quemada appointed as special administrator
filed for reconveyance of said claims of alleged
properties including the subject of legacy.
ISSUE:
Whether the probate order resolved with finality the
questions of ownership.
Whether the probate ordere resolved the intrinsic
validity of the will.
HELD:
In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the
issue by and large is restricted to the extrinsic
validity of the will, As a rule, the question of
ownership is an extraneous matter which the
Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for
the purpose of determining whether a certain
property should or should not be included in the
inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court
may pass upon the title thereto, but such
determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is
268) SANCHEZ vs. CA

G.R. No. 108947 September 29, 1997
FACTS:
Private respondent Rosalia S. Lugod is the only child
of spouses Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca
while Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn L. Ranises and
Roberto S. Lugod are the legitimate children of
Rosalia. Petitioners Rolando, Florida Mierly, Alfredo
and Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez, are the
illegitimate children of Juan C. Sanchez. Rosalia
filed a petition for letters of administration over the
estate of her mother following her death and the
estate of her father, Juan, who was at the time in a
state of senility. But before the administration
proceedings could formally be terminated and
closed, Juan died. Such that petitioners as heirs of
Juan, filed a petition for letters of administration over
the intestate estate of Juan, which petition was
opposed by Rosalia. Thereafter, Rosalia and
petitioners executed a Compromise Agreement
wherein they agreed to divide the properties
enumerated therein of the late Juan Sanchez.
Petitioners filed a Motion to require administratrix,
Rosalia, to deliver deficiency of 24 hectares and/or
to set aside compromise agreement. Private
respondent Rosalia and petitioners entered into and
executed a memorandum of agreement which
modified the compromise agreement. Nine years
later, petitioners filed a motion to require Rosalia to
submit a new inventory and to render an accounting
over properties not included in the compromise
agreement. They likewise filed a motion to defer the
approval of the compromise agreement, in which
they prayed for the annulment of the compromise
agreement on the ground of fraud.
255

The trial court declared the compromise agreement
void and unenforceable, the same not having been
approved by the intestate court and that the same
having been seasonably repudiated by petitioners on
the ground of fraud. The Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court and declared the modified compromise
agreement valid and binding. Petitioners contend
that, because the compromise agreement was
executed during the pendency of the probate
proceedings, judicial approval is necessary to
shroud it with validity.
Issue: Whether or not the compromise agreement
entered by the parties during the pendency of
probate proceedings is valid and binding.
Held: Yes. Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a
compromise agreement as "a contract whereby the
parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a
litigation or put an end to one already commenced."
Being a consensual contract, it is perfected upon the
meeting of the minds of the parties. Judicial approval
is not required for its perfection. Petitioners'
argument that the compromise was not valid for lack
of judicial approval is not novel; the same was raised
in Mayuga vs. Court of Appeals, where the Court
ruled: It is alleged that the lack of judicial approval is
fatal to the compromise. A compromise is a
consensual contract. As such, it is perfected upon
the meeting of the minds of the parties to the
contract. And from that moment not only does it
become binding upon the parties, it also has upon
them the effect and authority of res judicata (Civil
Code, Art. 2037), even if not judicially approved . In
the case before us, it is ineludible that the parties
knowingly and freely entered into a valid
compromise agreement. Adequately assisted by
their respective counsels, they each negotiated its
terms and provisions for four months; in fact, said
agreement was executed only after the fourth draft.
As noted by the trial court itself, the first and second
drafts were prepared successively in July, 1969; the
third draft on September 25, 1969; and the fourth
draft, which was finally signed by the parties on
October 30, 1969, followed. Since this compromise
agreement was the result of a long drawn out
process, with all the parties ably striving to protect
their respective interests and to come out with the
best they could, there can be no doubt that the
parties entered into it freely and voluntarily.
Accordingly, they should be bound thereby. To be
valid, it is merely required under the law to be based
on real claims and actually agreed upon in good faith
by the parties thereto. Indeed, compromise is a form
of amicable settlement that is not only allowed but
also encouraged in civil cases. Article 2029 of the

Civil Code mandates that a "court shall endeavor to
persuade the litigants in a civil case to agree upon
some fair compromise."In opposing the validity and
enforcement of the compromise agreement,
petitioners harp on the minority of Florida Mierly,
Alfredo and Myna. Citing Article 2032 of the Civil
Code, they contend that the court's approval is
necessary in compromises entered into by guardians
and parents in behalf of their wards or children.
However, we observe that although denominated a
compromise agreement, the document in this case is
essentially a deed of partition, pursuant to Article
1082 of the Civil Code which provides that "[e]very
act which is intended to put an end to indivision
among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed
to be a partition, although it should purport to be a
sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other
transaction."For a partition to be valid, Section 1,
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, requires the
concurrence of the following conditions: (1) the
decedent left no will; (2) the decedent left no debts,
or if there were debts left, all had been paid; (3) the
heirs and liquidators are all of age, or if they are
minors, the latter are represented by their judicial
guardian or legal representatives; and (4) the
partition was made by means of a public instrument
or affidavit duly filed with the Register of Deeds. We
find that all the foregoing requisites are present in
this case. We therefore affirm the validity of the
parties' compromise agreement/partition in this case.
269) NAZARENO VS. CA
343 SCRA 637
FACTS
Maximinoo Nazareno Sr. and Aurea Poblete were
husband and wife. Aurea died on April 15, 1970 ,
while Maximo Sr. died on December 18, 1980 . They
were survived by their children, Natividad, Romeo,
Jose, Pacifico and Maximinoo Jr. Maximinoo Jr. and
Natividad are petitioners in this case, while Romeo
and his wife are respondents.
Deceased spouses Nazareno acquired properties in
Quezon City and in Cavite . It is the ownership of
some of these properties that is in question in this
case.
It appears that after the death of Maximino Sr.
Romeo filed an intestate case in the CFI of Cavite.
Romeo was appointed administrator of his fathers
estate. In the course of the proceedings, Romeo
discovered that his parents executed several deeds
256

of sale conveying a number of real properties in
favor of his sister, Natividad. This involved 6 lots in
QC one of which is a lot occupied by Romeo and his
wife. This lot was later sold by Natividad to Maximino
Jr.
Romeo filed on behalf of the estate of Maximino Sr.,
a case for annulment of sale with damages against
Natividad and Maximino Jr. on the ground that both
sales were void for lack of consideration. Trial Court
rendered judgement declaring the nullity of the deed
of sale. CA modified RTC, ordered lots cancelled
and restored to the estate of Maximino Sr.
ISSUE: Whether upon death of the deceased
spouses their estate alone can seek the annulment
of said sale? Whether the sale is valid?
HELD
The petition is without merit.
The fact that other properties had allegedly been
sold by the spouses Maximino Sr. and Aurea does
not necessarily show that the deed of sale made in
favor of Natividad is valid.
The trial court and CA found that the Nazareno
spouses transferred their properties to their children
by fictitious sales in order to avoid payment of
inheritance taxes. It was also found out that
Natividad had no means to pay for the six lots
subject of the deed of sale.
The estate of Maximino alone cannot contest the
validity of the deed of sale because the estate of
Aurea has not been settled. CA decision affirmed.
270) ZARAGOZA VS. CA
341 SCRA 309
FACTS
Flavio Zaragoza Cano was a registered owner of
certain parcels of land situated at the municipalities
of Cabatuan, New Lucena and Sta. Barbara, Iloilo .
He had four children, Gloria, Zacariaz, Florentina
and Alberta . On Decemeber 1964 he died without a
will.
Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan filed a complaint against
Florentino for delivery of her inheritance share,
consisting of lots 943 and 871 and for payment of
damages. She claims that, his father in his lifetime
partitioned the said properties among his children.
The shares of her brothers and sisters were given to
them in advance by way of deed of sale, but without

valid consideration. Her share, lots 943 and 871
were not conveyed then. She averred that because
of her marriage, she became an American citizen
and was prohibited to acquire lands in the
Philippines except by hereditary succession.
Petitioners denied that there was partition of the
estate of their father during his lifetime. The trial
court ruled and ordered adjudication lot 871 to the
plaintiff Alberta , the claim for lot 943 is dismissed.
Ca reversed RTC in so far as lot 943 is concerned,
ordered Alberta as owner of lot 943.
ISSUE: 1. Whether the partition inter vivos by Flavio
Zaragoza of his properties which includes lot 871
and 943 valid?
2. Whether the validity of the sale and
consequently, the TCT over lot 943 registered in the
name of Petitioners Florentina be a valid subject
matter of the entire proceeding for the delivery of the
inheritance share.
HELD
This court affirms the decision of CA, lots 871 and
943 were inheritance shares of respondent, based
on documentary evidence and testimonial evidence.
Partition during the lifetime of Flavio zaragoza is
valid. It is basic in the law of succession that a
partition inter vivos may be done for as long as
legitimes are not prejudiced. Article 1080 of the Civil
Code is clear, the petition, must be dismissed
without prejudice to the institution of a new
proceeding were all the indispensable parties are
present for the rightful determination of their
respective legitime.
Second Issue. Petition is a collateral attack. It is not
allowed by Sec 48 of PD 1529. The certificate, in
absence of fraud, is eveidence of title and shows
exactly the real interest of the owner. The title once
registered. Should not be thereafter impugned,
altered or changed except in direct proceeding
permitted by law.
271) MENDOZA VS CA
199 SCRA 778
FACTS
Petitioner Mendoza I et al instituted before CFI of
Bulacan an action for reconveyance of real property
against private respondents spouses Samonte.
Petitioners are legitimate children of deceased
Mendoza , Trinidad , their mother sold a parcel of
257

land to respondents spouses Samonte. Petitioners
aver that they are entitled to legal redemption.
According to the plaintiff, the sale of the disputed
property in favor of the defendants was null and void
on the ground that, as a mere co-owner of an
undivided estate, Trinidad Mendoza had no right to
divide the estate into parts and then convey a part
thereof by metes and bounds to a third person, since
there had never been any partition, judicial or extra
judicial, of the estate among the heirs of their late
father, Arcadio.
Private Respondents alleged that they are the

successors and descendants of the eight children of
the late Crisanta and that they had been residing in
the concept of owner since the time of their parents
and grandparents. They claim that the deed of
absolute sale was simulated and fraudulent. Thus
files with RTC a complaint seeking to declare the
subject document null and void.
MTCC favored Aznar. RTC ordered demolition. CA
reversed and set aside RTC and declared Private
Respondents as the rightful possessors.
The trial court dismissed the the petitioners

complaint. CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether the extrajudicial partition with deed

of absolute sale is valid.
ISSUE: Whether the deed of sale is void? Whether

petitioners can still exercise the right of legal
redemption?
HELD:
Private respondents claim that not all the known
heirs participated in the extrajudicial partition, and
that two persons who participated and were made
parties thereto were not the heirs of Crisanta.
HELD:
Petitioner Trinidad is not entitled to one-half (1/2) of
said lot but only to the share of one legitimate child
or 1 and 1/3 rights and interest, citing article 996 of
the Civil Code.
The deed of sale is void insofar as it affects the
rights and interests of other petitioners because
petitioner Trinidad can only sell her 1 1/3 rights and
interest over the said lot and no more than that.
Corollary, the remaining petitioners can still exercise
the right of legal redemption, conformably with
Article 1620 of the civil code.
272) AZNAR BROTHERS REALT CO. VS CA
327 SCRA 359
FACTS
Lot no. 4399 containing an area of 34,325 square
meters located at Brgy. Mactan, Lapu Lapu City was
acquired By Aznar from the heirs of Crisanta
Maloloy-on by virtue of an extrajudicial Partition of
real estate with deed of absolute sale.
This claim even if true would not warrant rescission

of the deed. Article 1104 of the Civil Code as to
parties who were allegedly not heirs, article 1105 is
in point.
Extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute sale is a
notarized document. As such, it has in its favor the
presumption of regularity and it carries the
evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to
its due execution. It is admissible in evidence without
further proof of authenticity. Decision of RTC
reinstated.
273) RALLA VS. UNTALAN
L-63253-54 APRIL 27 1989
FACTS
Rosendo Ralla, a widower, filed a petition for the
probate of his will in the RTC of Albay. In his will he
left his entire estate to his son, Pablo (herein
petitioner substituted by heirs), leaving nothing to his
other son, Pedro.
Private respondents were allegedly allowed to

occupy portions of lot 4399 provided that they leave
the land in the event that the company would use the
property for its purpose. Later, Aznar entered into a
joint venture with Sta. Lucia Realty for development
of the subject lot into a multi-million peso housing
subdivision and beach resort.
At the same time, Pedro filed an action for the

partition of the estate of their mother, Paz. With this
case, the brothers agreed to amicably compromise
via project partition, whereby sixty-three parcels of
land, apparently forming the estate of their deceased
mother was divided between them.
When demands to vacate failed, Aznar filed with

MTCC a case for unlawful detainer and damages.
In the course of the proceeding for the probate of

Rosendo, Pablo filed a motion to dismiss the petition
258

for probate on the ground that he was no longer
interested in the allowance of the will of his late
father for its probate would no longer be beneficial to
him. This motion was denied, it was also denied at
the CA. In its decision the CA said, indeed the
petitioner stood to gain if the testate proceedings
were to be dismissed because then he would not be
compelled to submit for inclusion in the inventory of
the estate of Rosendo comprising 149 parcels of
land from which he alone had been collecting rentals
and receiving income, to the exclusion and
prejudiced of hi s brother who was being deprived of
his successional rights. Consequently, the court
declared Pedro and Pablo the only heirs of Rosendo
who should share equally upon the division of the
latters estate and thereupon converted the testate
proceedings into one of intestacy.
After eleven years, one Joaquin Chancoco brother in
law of Pablo filed a petition for the probate of the
same will of Rosendo on the ground that the
decedent owed him P5000. The petition for probate
was granted. Teodorico Almine, son-in-law of Pablo
was appointed special administrator, over and above
the objections of the heirs of Pedro. In taking
possession, Teoderico also took possession of the
63 parcels of land subject of the partition earlier.
Judge Untalan orderd that the 63 parcels of land
should be included in the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of Rosendo and thereafter
proceed as probate proceedings. After 2 years,
Judge Untalan reconsidered his order and held that
the project partition is respected and upheld.
Petitioners filed an MR but was denied hence the
instant case.
ISSUE: Whether the partition should be regarded or
respected in view with the probate proccedings of
the estate of Rosendo
HELD:
Verily, the rule that there can be no valid partition
among the heirs till after the will has been probated.
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to
be partitioned are the same properties embraced in
the will. Thus this rule invoked, is inapplicable in the
instant case where there are two separate cases
each involving the estate of two different person
comprising dissimilar properties.
The project partition is valid and binding upon the
brothers as well as upon their heirs especially as this
was accompanied by delivery of possession to them
of their respective shares. They are duty bound to

respect the division agreed upon by them and
embodied in the document of partition.
Thus the petitioner could no longer question the
exclusion of the lands subject of the partition from
the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
Rosendo. Petition dismissed.
274) FELIX BALANAY, Jr. vs. Martinez
L-39247 June 27, 1975
FACTS
Leodegaria Julian died in Davao City , she was
survived by her husband Felix Balanay Sr. and by
their 6 children, Felix Jr., Avelina, Beatriz, Carolina
Delia and Emilia.
Felix Jr. filed in the lower court a petition for the
probate of his mothers notarial will. In the said will, it
was declared that, 1.) She was the owner of the
southern half of the nine conjugal lots, 2.) That it was
her desire that her properties should not be divided
among her heirs during her husbands lifetime. She
devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they
were all owned by her. She disposed of in the will
her husbands one half share of the conjugal assets.
Feliz Sr. and Avelina opposed the probate on the
ground of lack of testamentary capacity, undue
influence preterition of the husband and alleged
improper partitioned of the conjugal estate. They
claim that Felix Jr. should collate certain properties
which he had received from the testatrix. Felix Jr. in
his reply attatched an affidavit signed by Feliz Sr
waiving and renouncing hereditary rigts in the estate
of his wife in favor of their children. Avelina
contended that the affidavit was void. Lower court
denied and gave effect to the affidavit and
conformity of Felix Sr.
In the meantime, A lawyer Montana appeared
claiming to be a lawyer of Felix Jr, he filed a motion
to withdraw the probate and to proceed by intestae
estae proceeding. The lower court adopted the view
of Atty , Montana that the will was void. So, it
dismissed the petition for probate and converted the
testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding.
ISSUE: Whether the probate court erred in passing
upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on
its allowance or formal validity, and declaring it void.
HELD
259

We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual
provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality,
and because of the motion to withdraw the petition
for probate. The trial court acted correctly in passing
upon the wills intrinsic validity even before its formal
validity had been established. But the probate court
erred in declaring the will was void and in converting
the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding
notwithstanding the fact that in its order it gave effect
to the surviving husbands conformity to the will and
to his renunciation of his hereditary rights which
presumably included in one-half share of the
conjugal estate.
The rule is that the invalidity of one of several
dispositions contained in a will does not result in the
invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be
presumed that the testator would not have made
such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition
had not been made. (Art.792 CC) Where some
valid parts will be upheld if they can be separated
from the invalid without defeating the intention of the
testator or interfering with the general testamentary
scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries.
The provision of the will of the testatrix should not be
divided among her heirs during her husbands
lifetime but should be kept intact and that the
legitimes should be paid in cash is contrary to article
Felix Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights
and his one-half share of the conjugal partnership
(Art. 179 and Art 1041 CC) but insofar as said
renunciation partakes of a donation of his hereditary
rights and his one-half share in the conjugal estate
(1061 CC) it should be subject to the limitations
prescribed in Articles 750 and 752 of the CC. A
portion of the estate should be adjudicated to the
widower for his support and maintenance or at least
his legitime should be respected.
In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix
and her husband intended to partition the conjugal
estate in the manner set forth in paragraph V of her
will. It is true that she could dispose of by will only
her half of the conjugal estate but since the
husband, after the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, had assented to her testamentary
partition of the conjugal estate, such partition has
become valid assuming that the will may be
probated.
In the instant case, the preterited heir was the
husband, the surviving spouse. His preteritiion did
not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his

conformity to his wifes will and renounced his
hereditary rights.
Hearing for the petition for probate affirmed.
275) Amorante Plan vs. IAC
L-65656 February 28,1985
FACTS
In the intestate proceeding for the settlement of
Regino Bautistas estate, his widow filed a motion
dated December 9, 1964 for authority to sell to Plan
the two lots and theater for not less than P140,000.
The purpose was to pay the debts amounting to
P117,220. The motion was set for hearing. It was
indicated that the children were notified through one
child Milagros Bautista.
Judge Jimenez of the probate court granted the
authority to sell to Plan the entire estate of the
deceased for not less than P140,000 so as to pay
the obligations of the estate, appearing that all heirs
have conformed thereto.
On that day, Florencia and Plan executed a deed of
sale with assumption of mortgage obligations for the
two lots. A motion to approve the sale was filed.
Judge signed the original deed of sale under the
word approved to indicate that the sale was okayed
by probate court.
Sixteen days after the sale an opposition to the
agreement of absolute sale was filed by Federico
Bautista child of the deceased. Federicos counsel
did not file any objection to the project of partition as
per order by the Judge. The reason is not hard to
surmise. The estate sought to be partitioned had
already been sold to Plan.
Federico contended that because there was no
compliance with Section 7 Rule 89 of the Rules of
Court the sale was void. Instead of asking the court
to act on his petition for relief from the orders
authorizing and approving the sale, Federico filed a
separate action against Plan to nullify the sale.
Judge dismissed the action. He ruled that the nullity
of the sael as to Federicos 1/16 share should be
resolved in the intestae proceeding. He filed three
times same action, all have been dismissed.
260

Ca ruled in favor of Federico, it declared void the
agreement to sell based on article 1088 of the Civil
Code.
ISSUE: Whether Federico could nullify in a separate
action, instead of an intestate proceeding his fathers
estate, the sale of two conjugal lots made by his
mother, with authorization and approval of the
probate court.
HELD
We hold that the appellate court erred in ordering
Plan to reconvey the disputed property to Federico.
Said judgment is bereft of factual and legal basis.
Federico did not pray for reconveyance he prayed
for receivership for nullification of the agreement to
sell and the sale itself. Article 1088 of the Civil Code
does not justify legal redemption in this case
because it refers to the sale of hereditary rights, and
not to specific properties, for the payment of the
debts of the decedents estate as to which there is
no legal redemption.
In the instant case we agree with the decision of the
Judges that Federicos remedy is in the intestate
proceeding where his petition for relief has been
pending for nearly twenty years.
276) Maria Bicarme vs. CA and Cristina Bicarme
L-51914 June 6, 1990
FACTS
Maria Bicarme and Cristina Bicarme are the only
surviving co-heirs and co-owners and entitled in
equal shares over the parcel of lands (cornland and
Riceland) in litigation. Spouses Bicarme died
intestate and were survived by children, Maria and
Victoria (mother of Cristina). Cristina instituted this
action for partition, because her aunt, Maria refused
to share with her the yearly fruits of the disputed
parcels of lan. Maria howeve, maintains that she
acquired these two parcels of land from deceased
spouses Bidaya and since then until the present,
had been in open, public, peaceful and contionous,
adverse possession and enjoyment in the concept of
absolute owner. Maria further claims that Cristina
never shared or contributed to the payment of taxes
of said two parcels of land.
The trial court stated that the provision in the deed of

sale (Maria subscribed that the property is inherited
from her father) was in the nature of trust provision
in favor of Cristina as co-owner and co-heir.
ISSUE:
Who has ownership rights over the litigated parcels
of land
HELD: We agree with the trial court. By admitting
that the cornland is inherited property, Maria in effect
recognized Critinas rights thereto as a co-owner coheir.
Having established that Critinas co-ownership
rights, maria nonetheless insists that Cristinas rights
are barred by prescription under secs 40 and 42 of
act 190 / art 1116 of the Civil Code where the
longest period of both acquisitive and extinctive
prescription is ten years. In the present case,
Cristina, it is alleged, asserted her claims 34 yers
after her right of action accrued. On Marias claims
of acquisitive prescription, the trial court held that
Maria was a trustee with respect to Cristinas share.
As such, prescription, as a mode of acquiring title,
could not apply.
An action for partition implies that the thing is still
owned in common. If a co-owner holds the property
in exclusive adverse possession as owner, asserting
the property in exclusive dominion for a required
period, he can acquire sole title to it as against coheirs or co-owners. The imprescriptibly of an action
for partition cannot thus be invoked when one of the
co-owners has possessed the property as exclusive
owner, and for a period sufficient to acquire it by
prescription. From the moment one of the
co0owners claims that he is absolute owner and
denies other any question involve is no longer of
partition but of ownership.
Acquisitive prescription cannot apply in this case.
A mere silent possession by a co-owner, his receipt
of rents fruits or profit from the property cannot serve
as proof of exclusive ownership, it is not borne out of
clear and complete evidence that he exercise acts of
possession which unequivocally constitute an ouster
of the other co-owners. Cristinas rights to partition
will therefore prosper.
i
261

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CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan

Prof. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

CASES ASSIGNED for DIGEST

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS

THE FAMILY AS AN INSTITUTION--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 108

PATERNITY AND FILIATIOIN---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 116

PARENTAL AUTHORITY----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 143

CASES IN PROPERTY-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 152

CASES IN SUCCESSION----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 193

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

1) TAADA VS. TUVERA

administrative orders and proclamations, except

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

upon approval, or on any other date, without its

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

procedure. Consequently, we have no

d. Circulars issued by the Monetary Board if

3) PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT and

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

Issue: Whether or not POEA Memorandum Circular

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

doctrine is applied prospectively, and should not

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

On 29 November 1989, the students

The trial court issued a temporary restraining order

Held: No, the Non doctrine should not be applied to

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

below denied the motion to dismiss since the

*The accused were acquitted for through their

Held: It is true that owing to the nationality principle

7) Van Dorn vs. Romillio

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private

Issue: Whether the foreign divorce on the parties

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

Held: There is no specific provision as to who can

10) SAN LUIS vs. SAN LUIS

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

Issue: Whether or not the Philippine Law shall

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

a testator to dispose of all his property according to

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

Chapter 2 of the PRELIMINARY TITLE of the Civil

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

17) GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

including interest with 25% attorneys fees,

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

billeted. When she arrived, several persons were

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

The CFI ordered rendered decision in favor of

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

to morals, good customs or public policy. The law

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)

honest and sincere belief that he would keep said

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I - LLB4402(2010-2011)