Luis Jacob Retanan

Philo 199

2012-07920

Prof. Tangco
Anarchist Democratic Peace

The 21st century international political landscape is increasingly becoming more volatile
and tense with the still unconcluded Syrian Civil War (2011-Present). This domestic political
turmoil has dragged the international community into a major international crisis. It is an
international crisis by the fact that it has become a threat to international peace as it intensifies
global terrorism of Islamic fundamentalists and the longstanding rivalry of United States and
Russia. But more importantly it is an international crisis as it puts into question whether
international democracy that is advocated under a liberal democratic world order installed by
the United States through the United Nations can actually exist and bring about international
peace. The international community of the United Nations faces not only a political crisis but
also an existential one.
On this paper, I will investigate the viability of international democracy of the
contemporary international political landscape as an effective mechanism of international peace,
and put forward the idea that the international democracy can only be such if it is brought about
not by a universalizing or hegemonic international order but contrary to the dominant
rationalist paradigm in the field of international relations by an anarchical international order.
In pursuit of that objective, this paper will investigate (1) the Democratic Peace Theory of
the liberal-rationalist school of international relations that has dominated the conception of the
interconnection between international democracy and international peace, and Immanuel Kants
Perpetual Peace, whose rationalist principles created the first liberal democratic theory of
international peace and formed the theoretical foundation of the Democratic Peace Theory, and
(2) the Anarchist International Theory developed by Zaheer Kazmi from Godwins skeptic
international thought that provides a positive conception of international anarchy and a critique
towards the moralizing rationalist Kantian international peace. From evaluating these two
theories in an approach of critical theory, this paper will attempt to develop an anarchist
democratic peace as an alternative to its traditional rationalist liberal conception and ultimately
to enable the international community to deal with its political and existential crises. Thus the

concept of democratic peace will have two conceptions in this paper, (a) Liberal Democratic
Peace, and (b) Anarchist Democratic Peace.
However before developing the arguments for an anarchist democratic peace, the scope
of the use of the two most important concepts that will be investigated in this paper democracy
and anarchy must be first determined.
As a whole the analysis of the paper will be limited to interstate relations under a
Westphalian paradigm that operates under the assumptions that (1) unit of analysis is ultimately
the sovereign state and, (2) international system is inherently anarchic; no overarching
international authority, and (3) the domestic-international divide. The concept of democracy,
beyond its traditional domestic character, has two primary conceptions; (a) intergovernmental
democracy democratic relations in the international arena can only be through the
preponderance of liberal democratic and decent non-liberal democratic states that respect
human rights and rule of law, (b) cosmopolitan democracy democratic relations in the
international arena ultimately rests on the individual through a global parliamentary assembly
thus puts forward a transnational conception of democracy and consequently dissolves the
international-domestic divide.1 Considering the limitation of the paper to the Westphalian
paradigm, the concept of international democracy that this paper will be focusing on is that of the
state-centric model of intergovernmental democracy.
On the other hand the concept of anarchy in this paper will be used both in descriptive
and prescriptive ways. International anarchy is traditionally used descriptively in the field of
international relations; it is a condition of the absence of a centralized authority in the
international sphere. However Kazmi (2012) transplanted the prescriptive notion of anarchy
anarchism from the domestic realm to the international thereby making anarchy a framework
for antihegemonic international relations. This is problematic due to the fact that anarchism is
traditionally conceived as a critique of state authority thereby to use anarchism in a state-centric
international realm is conceptually misleading. But Kazmi defended his transplantation by
pointing out that conceptually anarchism is ultimately an antiauthoritarian way of thinking a
critique of dominant political authority in general. This then implies that through analogical
reasoning international anarchy in its prescriptive sense is a critique of hegemony and
1 Kuyper, J. (2015, February 23). Global Democracy. Retrieved June 01, 2016, from
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/global-democracy/

consequently a prospective alternative model for international democracy that will be explored
by this paper in developing the anarchist democratic peace.
The transplantation of the prescriptive concepts of democracy and anarchy into the statecentric international realm analogically implies that the autonomous individual is now the
sovereign state in the international arena. I think this conceptual synonymity between autonomy
and sovereignty that is brought about by our analogical transplantation is valid because, even
though they are used in different levels, both concepts in their very essence are predicated upon
an antiauthoritarian thinking being an autonomous or sovereign entity is being in control of
itself. Thereby this paper will treat sovereign states as autonomous individuals interacting and
shaping the realm of the international. But by being so, the behavior sovereign state will then be
reflective of the behavior of an autonomous individual the question then is what behavior? The
two theories that I will be investigating, the Liberal Democratic Peace and the Anarchist
International Theory provide two contrasting views concerning the behavior of sovereign states
as independent individuals in an anarchic international sphere.
The liberal democratic peace is the conception of the contemporary empirical theory of
Democratic Peace that in its most general sense empirically verifies the importance of liberal
democracy in the establishment of international peace. Formulated by IR liberal scholars such as
Rudolph Rummel and Michael Doyle, its theoretical framework is based on the liberal
democratic ideology employed by Immanuel Kant in constructing his vision for a universal
world order in his essay the Perpetual Peace. 2 But ultimately these characteristics of liberal
democracy that puts primacy on the individual autonomy is inconceivable if it is not predicated
upon the fundamental Kantian moral principle that human beings are inherently rational
individuals that as individuals we do what is ought to be done by our own reason alone.3 What
is ought to be done by reason is what Kant calls as a categorical imperative, which follows the
criteria of universalizability and mutual respect for autonomy.4 Thus in the Kantian perspective
individual autonomy is ultimately tied with universal rational actions. It is from this moral
philosophy that Kant consequently based his international political thought, which in my view
also analogically treats state behavior as reflective of that of the individual. The general
2 Gobetti, Z. (2010). A Revision of the Theory of Democratic Peace. Retrieved April 12, 2016, from
http://home.hiroshima-u.ac.jp/heiwa/Pub/E23/02zenoGobettifinal.pdf
3 Jankowiak, T. (n.d.). Immanuel Kant: Moral Theory. Retrieved June 01, 2016, from
http://www.iep.utm.edu/kantview/#H5
4 Ibid 2

proposition of his perpetual peace thesis expressed in his three articles of perpetual peace is
that rational interactions between individuals will bring about a peaceful community of liberal
democratic states that will necessary reflect their rational mindset in international relations and
inevitably transform the inherently anarchic international system into a universal international
order through rational mechanisms of law and trade.5 It is this proposition that the contemporary
liberal democratic peace theory tries to support empirically as to prove the necessity of liberal
democracy for international democracy and peace.
As I have pointed out, the general proposition of the liberal democratic peace is that
liberal democracy is vital for the conception of international peace. But IR liberal scholars are
divided on the issues concerning the scope and causes of democratic peace due to the tensions on
Kants Perpetual Peace. This in my view caused by the Kants subtle conflation of the ideational
and structural aspects of liberal democracy that resulted to contradictions in his perpetual peace
thesis.
Danilovic and Clare (2007) identify two contrasting views liberal pacifism and separate
peace as a result of these tensions in Kants theory of peace.6 Liberal pacifism views that liberal
democratic states are inherently peaceful due to its representative political structure that enables
its rational citizens, who are ever mindful of the burdens of war, to have a say in foreign policy.7
This view stems from Kants first definitive article of peace. Rummel (1983) tried to provide an
empirical support for liberal pacifism but it was not widely accepted by other IR liberal scholars
since they deem that his five-year period of observation is too short to produce a credible
conclusion.8 On the other hand the separate peace views that liberal democracies are exclusively
peaceful only to their fellow liberal democratic states due to similarity of culture or worldview
that creates trust among them and distrust towards non-liberal states. 9 This view of exclusive
peace has no direct reference with Kants Perpetual Peace and it even goes contrary to the
inherent pacifist image of liberal democracies that Kant tries to put forward and to his notion of
human autonomy as a culture binds individuals to a certain way of thinking. Nonetheless, his
5 Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch. In P. Kleingeld (Ed.) & D. Colclasure (Trans.), Toward
Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace and History: Immanuel Kant (pp. 67-109). Yale University
Press.
6 Danilovic, V., & Clare, J. (2007). The Kantian Liberal Peace (Revisited). 400-402. Retrieved April 10, 2016, from
http://polsci.buffalo.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/51/2015/11/danilovicLiberalPeaceAJPS.pdf
7 Ibid 6
8 Ibid 2
9 Ibid 6

articles of peace bluntly express that international peace can and should only be if the
international order is governed under rational principles of liberal democratic states in other
words if all states behave in the same way. Thereby in my view he inevitably endorsed liberal
democracy as a political ideology, which consequently implies his goal of transforming the world
under that ideology. Doyle (1983) provided empirical support for the separate peace view by
investigating liberal democracies since their conception in the 18 th century.10 He concludes that
liberal democratic states tend to be more pacifistic with other such states not exactly because of
their political structure but the similarity of their political ideology, and tends to be more hostile
to non-liberal democratic states and active in spreading their rational worldview.11 This version
is the widely accepted conception of liberal democratic peace due to the fact that not only of the
quality and depth of its empirical analysis but ultimately international reality proves it so there
has been no major war between liberal democracies. Therefore the ideational interpretation of
Kants Perpetual Peace, in my view, proves to be more relevant as the contemporary international
reality reflects its prophetic ideological tone.
Given then that the liberal democratic peace is its very essence an enterprise of
universalizing a certain political ideology, I think it is still insufficient to say that similarity of
worldview alone is enough to bring about a universal international order. As pointed out by
Fontana (1993) in his neomarxist analysis of Machiavelli, the development of a common social
consciousness is made possible by constant public discourses under a hegemonic leadership that
transforms particularistic interests into a common vision.12 Thereby the universalization of liberal
democracy rests on the rational interactions of states under the hegemony of a powerful liberal
democratic state the vanguard of the cause. Furthermore as observed by Dawson (1996), the
hegemony of a liberal democratic state keeps the exclusive pacifism of liberal democracies in
check by compelling them to play within the rules of international law, secures a universal
international order from power politics, and promotes liberal democracy through imperialistic
means.13 This thought of liberal hegemony might seem to be already un-Kantian, but I would just
10 Doyle, M. (2006). Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs. In P. Kleingeld (Ed.) & D. Colclasure (Trans.),
Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace and History: Immanuel Kant (pp. 202-206, 224230). Yale University Press.
11 Ibid 5
12 Fontana, B. (1993). Machiavelli and the Democratic Philosopher. In Hegemony and Power: On the Relation
between Gramsci and Machiavelli (pp. 99-115). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
13 Dawson, P. (1996). Liberal Hegemony, Democratic Peace, and United States Strategy (Unpublished doctoral
dissertation). Naval War College.

like to point out that in his second article of peace Kant puts forward the idea that liberal
democracy can only spread if there is a powerful and enlightened liberal democratic state that
will lead and maintain the rational enterprise.14 The paradigmatic example is our current state of
affairs in the international sphere, where the hegemonic United States of America shapes the
world in accordance to its liberal democratic image.
But the very idea of liberal hegemony brings about a paradoxical condition; international
democracy can only be under universal rational rules facilitated by an imperialistic power. It is
therefore questionable whether the liberal theory of democratic peace actually establishes
democratic international relations that act as a mechanism of international peace. Its democratic
character is questionable in two levels: (1) empirical the presence of liberal hegemony, and (2)
theoretical universality of rationality. In my view, I think the liberal conception of democratic
peace is paradoxically authoritarian in character.
The presence of a hegemonic international power is arguably the most obvious reason to
question whether international democracy exists how can interstate relations be democratic in a
unipolar international condition? Defenders such as Dawson (1996) argues that liberal
democratic peace necessitates a liberal hegemony that promotes liberal democratic ideals, which
consequently makes the international sphere conducive to international democracy thus the
liberal hegemon is the guardian of universal rationality.15 With that defense, the authoritarian
actions of the liberal hegemon cannot be effectively used to argue against it. And even though
empirically it can be criticized through the limitations of hegemony and its inevitable predatory
transformation,16 defenders of liberal hegemony can easily shrug even use those criticisms to
further justify its necessity. It must be then dealt with in its very theoretical core, the presumption
of universal rationality and its interconnection with human autonomy.
The existence of universal rationality the right way of thinking regards individuals
and analogically states to be automatons to be slaves of reason in a billiard-ball model of the
international system and disregards their own way of life that reflects their own history,
14 For if fortune so determines that a powerful and enlightened people can constitute itself as a republic (which
according to its nature necessarily tends toward perpetual peace), then this republic provides a focus point for other
states, so that they might join this federative union and thereby secure the condition of peace among states in
accordance with the idea of international right and gradually extend this union further and further through several
such associations (PP 8:356)
15 Ibid 8
16 Hobson, J. (2003). Realism. In The State and International Relations (pp. 41-43). Cambridge University Press.

experience and sentiments, and their genuine emphatic connections with other states that were
formed through centuries of interactions and that has given rise to what Bull (1977) calls as the
anarchical international society. This interpretivist view of the English School, in my opinion,
echoes the anti-rationalist and post-positivist view of post-modernism. But before proceeding, it
must again emphasize that this paper treats by analogical reasoning a sovereign state as an
autonomous individual. I need to reemphasize this because in the 4 th Great Debate in IR, the
reflectivist camp, which is post-modernist, is critical of the state. This paper would just like to
investigate state-centric international relations in a post-modernist lens as if states are people due
to the antiauthoritarian theme of its concepts, which can prove useful in developing a
nonhegemonic conception of international order.
Post-modernism, a contemporary reactionary paradigm against rationalism/modernism,
take this plurality of ways of thinking and the narratives they entail as important things in
understanding the complexities of reality it is then a paradigm that denies the existence of a
universal concept of Truth.17 However the very definition of the paradigm is contested even
within its proponents due to the fact that they are uncomfortable with an objectifying framework;
nonetheless I would like to discuss some important concepts that its anti-rationalist proponents
developed that I think forms the relativistic characteristics of post-modernism: (1)
Schopenhauers concept of the Will he pointed out that reason is ultimately motivated by the
Will, characterized by instinctive irrational feelings, (2) Heideggers concept of horizons he
pointed out that each individual has his own perception of reality or point of reference, which has
been shaped by his social experiences, and (3) Husserls concept of intersubjectivity he pointed
out that the consciousness of an individual can transcend subjectivity through the conscious act
of empathy (putting ourselves into the other ones shoes) thereby form an intersubjective
understanding with other individuals.18
Analogically applying these post-modernist ideas to state behavior and interstate relations
implies that the fundamental liberal principle of universal rationality is nothing more but a
hegemonic enterprise to bind states into a singular worldview under a domineering state at the
expense of separating them from their own individual horizons and compromising genuine
17 Aylesworth, G. (2005, September 30). Postmodernism. Retrieved June 01, 2016, from
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/postmodernism/
18 Wicks, R. (2003, May 12). Arthur Schopenhauer. Retrieved June 01, 2016, from
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/schopenhauer/; Smith, J. (n.d.). Phenomenology. Retrieved June 01, 2016, from
http://www.iep.utm.edu/phenom/

emphatic connections with other states as an international society. As Habermas (1975) would
then criticize, liberal democracy does not bring about real democracy due to the fact that it
imposes the compliance to certain ahistorical universal principles that are not brought about by
the free activity of argumentation and deliberation, which is crucial in fusing different horizons
into a legitimate intersubjective consensus moreover as it is an intersubjective agreement it is
flexible for changes.19 Therefore liberal democratic peace because of its totalizing, insensitive,
and rigid character cannot and will not bring about international democracy but will inevitably
give rise to a hegemonic power in the effort of pursuing international peace but ends up
compromising the very autonomy of states.
So if a universalist international order cannot bring about international democracy
instrumental in establishing international peace, what international order can? As pointed out
earlier, there is no such thing as a universal rationality that binds human and analogically the
states autonomy into a single worldview instead there are multiplicity of horizons different
worldviews shaped by history and irrational sentiments. And as pointed out by Habermas, real
democracy can only be through intersubjective discursive argumentation as it enables each
individual to have a say based on what it wants to say.20 But at this point we are confronted with
an inconsistency. Although Habermas discourse theory, as shown earlier, is supportive of the
post-modernist theme of intersubjectivity is however it is based upon his theory of
communicative action, which is general a critique of post-modernist relativistic character.21 His
theory of communicative action only deflates our notion of rationality from being objective and
universal reality to being a cultural, legitimate and flexible standard but by the fact of being so
the standard of rationality is open to criticism and change, which then presupposes a standard
outside cultural boundaries that will act as a guideline of change. 22 Habermas reintroduces
Kantian universalism but in a way that is compatible with the idea of intersubjectivity but that I
think it is a slippery slope towards the totalizing consequences of universalism.
But I think the validity of the standard of rationality brought about by intersubjective
discourses ultimately lies on the conscious act of empathy the successful creation, change and
19 Bohman, J. (2005, March 08). Critical Theory. Retrieved June 01, 2016, from
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/critical-theory/#2.2
20 Ibid 14
21 Corradetti, C. (n.d.). The Frankfurt School and Critical Theory. Retrieved June 01, 2016, from
http://www.iep.utm.edu/frankfur/
22 Ibid 16

legitimization of social norms is ultimately based not on a meta rational framework but on
mutual understanding within the society itself and that is geared towards the common good.
Arguing from an existential point of view, self-reflection does not bring any result from looking
from a detach point of view but only through participating with others. However following
Schopenhauers idea, as empathy is a conscious act it is ultimately driven by irrational passions
and instincts. And Rousseaus anti-rationalist moral philosophy identifies the instinctive feeling
that motivates empathic reflection as the feeling of sympathy you can only be concern with
someone if you care for him.23 Attempts to nail down rationality to a certain universal standard,
according to him, can weaken the power of the feeling of sympathy thereby can pose negative
consequences to the society as a whole.24 Thus transplanting this idea to international relations,
the sentiment of sympathy among states is crucial in creating an emphatic international society
thereby bringing about a deliberative international democracy the only thing that can destroy it
is a universalizing standards of rationality through hegemony. This implies that the international
order, considering the importance of sympathy, should be not structured under a certain universal
dogma but rather in an anarchist political framework.
William Godwin, the father of anarchism, puts forward in his novel St. Leon a skeptic
international thought that puts primacy on sympathy instead of rationality.25 Godwin pointed out
that it is sympathy and not a meta-standard of rationality that binds people into a functional free
community. It is because the conception of a universal rationality, by the fact it tends to be
dogmatic and moralizing, compromises social utility (common good) by determining a certain
way of social relations thereby limiting possible actions that can pragmatically establish an
intersubjective common ground.26 Thus Godwin emphasized the necessity of an empathic mode
of social relations if the feeling of sympathy is to continue to be an agent of unity and openness.
That emphatic mode of social relations, as he pointed out, is reflected on the attitude of
politeness a manner of relating to others that aims to minimize conflicts by finding a common
ground through suspension of any presupposed judgments, especially negative conceptions. 27 Of
23 Rosen, M. (2004). Against Rationalism. 14-16. Retrieved June 1, 2016, from
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/michaelrosen/files/against_rationalism.pdf?m=1360039752
24 Ibid 18
25 Kazmi, Z. (2012). Polite Anarchy in International Relations Theory. New York: Palgrave Macmillian.
26 Ibid 20; Collings, D. (2003). The Romance of the Impossible: William Godwin in the Empty Place of Reason.
ELH, 30(3), 847-874. Retrieved from http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/michaelrosen/files/against_rationalism.pdf?
m=1360039752
27 Ibid 20

course it cannot work, if there is a dominating worldview or an intense enmity in the society.
Thereby politeness is ultimately dependent upon an anarchistic social milieu.28
Kazmi (2012) used Godwins skeptic international thought in developing his state-centric
anarchist international theory. In this theory, Kazmi combines the descriptive and prescriptive
usage of anarchy it is both a condition and a framework by forwarding the proposition that
the decentralized structure of international anarchy enables states to be autonomous and states
sustain international anarchy to preserve their liberty.29 He puts diplomacy as the key mechanism
in which states can realize and pursue their liberty because it is in diplomatic engagements that
states are able to participate in a discourse, exercise polite strategies and prevent any hegemonic
force. And for Kazmi, agreeing with Bull, these polite diplomatic engagements brings about and
maintains an anarchical international society that enables states to mitigate the negative
consequences of international anarchy such as mistrust without compromising their own
autonomy as sovereign states.30 However Kazmi is critical of the so-called new diplomacy
instigated by the liberal democratic worldview that obligates states to negotiate their disputes in
accordance to certain principles, although to be fair I think their structural-formalistic approach
does provide a clear cut solution yet by being so they are inflexible thus cannot provide a
solution to every international issue it prevents states from being creative in developing their
diplomatic strategies.31
Having now discussed the post-modernist critique of rationality and the anarchist
international theory that highlighted the general ideas concerning international relations, (1)
intersubjectivity, brought about by empathy, is the foundation of the real international democracy
as it brings about the practice of deliberative discourse that fuses different horizons into a
legitimate consensus in the international society, (2) empathy, being a conscious act, is driven by
the irrational feeling of sympathy that is only possible in a nonhegemonic social milieu, free
from any moralizing dogma, and (3) politeness being the mode of an emphatic social relations is
the behavior that primarily characterizes diplomatic engagements that entails intersubjective
discourse, which by its consensual nature, minimizes conflict and preserves international
anarchy. In my view, these three ideas put forward an anarchist conception of democratic peace.
28 Ibid 20
29 Ibid 20
30 Ibid 20
31 Ibid 20
10

International democracy can be a mechanism of international peace only in an anarchic

international order due to the fact that the kind of democracy of such international order is based
on an intersubjective, consensual and polite activity of diplomacy prevents states from being
disenfranchised and antagonistic, and encourages them in collectively participating in resolving
issues that face the international society. Thus in the anarchist democratic peace, is essentially a
bottom-top approach in bringing about international peace unlike the top-bottom approach of
liberal democratic peace.
However admittedly even though it is emancipating, this bottom-up approach of anarchist
democratic peace faces challenges that can compromise its emancipatory approach. Kazmi said
that even though the international system is inherently anarchic, states are not equal there are
strong and weak states due to power asymmetries. 32 Considering the prevalent realist paradigm in
IR, this brings about a problem regarding power politics since power asymmetries can
compromise the consensual nature of intersubjectivity thereby international democracy as states
are ultimately selfish and will grab any opportunity that can secure their survival and their own
interests.33
I think it is the realist paradigm that poses the strongest challenge to the very idea of
anarchist democratic peace because of its basic proposition that the inherent selfishness of states
drives them to dominate others it is arguably compatible with Schopenhauers Will but at the
same time challenges the very existence of Rousseaus sympathy. Nonetheless, in my view,
power politics is indeed from selfishness but selfishness is not an instinctive feeling but it is what
Rousseau called as amour-propre (vain selfishness) that is brought about by reason (a
universalizing worldview or a particular horizon), which compels us to compare and compete
with others in conformity with it it has a totalizing effect on us that consequently distorts our
inherent sympathy.34 Thus states as autonomous individuals engage in power politics not exactly
because they are meant to do so but because they have been totalized either by a hegemonic
worldview or by their very own horizons. Power politics comes about not because of there is no
such thing as sympathy but there is a lack of it due to the radicalizing effect of a certain dominant
worldview. Hence the realist challenge can be dealt with the reemphasis of sympathy through
minimization of radicalization.
32 Ibid 20
33 Heywood, A. (2011). Theories of Global Politics. In Global Politics (p. 54-61). 2011: Palgrave Macmillian.
34 Ibid 18
11

As I have pointed out earlier it is either from a hegemonic worldview or from the very
horizon of the state itself that radicalizes states. Totalization of a hegemonic worldview is easier
to make sense of, due to the fact that it is its defining characteristic from the very start that aims
to assimilate the world into one ideology but the radicalization of a particular horizon is unique
since it is not inherently radical they are merely the personal views of the state, it is untainted
of any hegemonic ambitions. In my view, considering an existentialist approach, the
radicalization of a particular horizon is a tragic outcome of the totalizing enterprise of hegemony
as such enterprise separates states from their own horizons that basically have always been their
identities. According to Vieira and Marder (2012) this existential separation brings about the
existential condition of worldlessness, as every meaning has been torn down, leaving victims
confused and disillusioned an existential crisis but nonetheless it provides the victims the
opportunity to create new meanings and right the injustices that the world has caused them. Yet it
would be dangerously nave to think that a disillusioned shaken victim of existential separation
would be benevolent in reasserting his new radicalized identity.35 As Schmid (2013) pointed out,
oppression and alienation can only lead to revenge and domination. 36 Therefore the radicalization
of a particular horizon ultimately becomes a dominating enterprise of hegemony. How can this
tragedy be prevented?
In my view the tragedy of radicalization can be dealt in two levels, (1) material material
powers of states must be checked through the realist diplomatic strategy of balance of power to
prevent any state in the anarchical international society to become dominant 37 in such a way that
the power configuration among states has become unipolar that enables the rise of single
hegemonic ideology; nonetheless at this level we only mitigate power politics, which means we
do not prevent the radicalization of states but only limit their capability to impose all-out their
radicalized worldviews through totalizing wars admittedly I think, it is only a band-aid solution
to the problem as balance of power can only goes so far in a world ridden by antagonism and
mistrust thus sooner or later it will collapse into a hegemonic order or into a dog eat dog world
(2) immaterial deradicalization, in my view, is a difficult and gradual process as the inherent
35 Vieira, P., & Marder, M. (2012). Chapter 4: Existential Utopia: Of the World, the Possible, the Finite. In
Existential Utopia: News Perspectives on Utopian Thought (pp. 35-50). Continuum International Publishing Group.
36 Schmid, A. (2013). Radicalisation, De -Radicalisation, Counter -Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and
Literature Review. 2. Retrieved April 23, 2016, from http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Schmid-RadicalisationDe-Radicalisation-Counter-Radicalisation-March-2013.pdf
37 Ibid 28

12

sympathy that has been suppressed by a dominating horizon cannot be fully emancipated in just
a day or a year; it is in fact uncertain even utopian considering the hate and the prejudices that
has been cultivated over time nevertheless what is certain is that the barriers of antagonism can
be neutralized because by the fact that, no matter how weak it is, there is still sympathy that can
be slowly channeled in forming emphatic connections through communicative discourses in the
form of polite diplomatic engagements thereby gradually strengthening sympathy that
consequently opens up more prospects for emphatic engagements.
In conclusion, the anarchist conception of democratic peace that I have developed from
the post-modernist critique of rationality and the anarchist international theory aims to show that
international peace is not about grand universal principles promoting democracy but it is about
constant open international communication, wherein states can express their own horizons as
autonomous individuals and can participate in the deliberation of crucial international issues as
part of the anarchical international society. This paper might be accused of being naively utopian
but nonetheless we cannot change the world for the better by just accepting the cruelty and flaws
of the present.
Works Cited
Aylesworth, G. (2005, September 30). Postmodernism. Retrieved June 01, 2016, from
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/postmodernism/
Bohman, J. (2005, March 08). Critical Theory. Retrieved June 01, 2016, from
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/critical-theory/#2.2
Collings, D. (2003). The Romance of the Impossible: William Godwin in the Empty Place of
Reason. ELH, 30(3), 847-874. Retrieved from
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/michaelrosen/files/against_rationalism.pdf?m=1360039752
Corradetti, C. (n.d.). The Frankfurt School and Critical Theory. Retrieved June 01, 2016, from
http://www.iep.utm.edu/frankfur/
Danilovic, V., & Clare, J. (2007). The Kantian Liberal Peace (Revisited). 400-402. Retrieved
April 10, 2016, from http://polsci.buffalo.edu/wpcontent/uploads/sites/51/2015/11/danilovicLiberalPeaceAJPS.pdf
Dawson, P. (1996). Liberal Hegemony, Democratic Peace, and United States Strategy
(Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Naval War College.

13

Doyle, M. (2006). Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs. In P. Kleingeld (Ed.) & D.
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