USCA1 Opinion

January 18, 1995

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________

No. 94-1543
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
v.
MONTERREY, INC.,
Defendants, Appellants.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Raymond L. Acosta, U.S. District Judge]
___________________
____________________
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge,
___________
Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
____________________
and Boudin, Circuit Judges.
______________
____________________

John M. Garcia with whom Garcia & Fernandez was on brief

_______________
___________________
appellants.
David A. Felt, Counsel, with whom Colleen B. Bombardier, Sen
_____________
______________________
Counsel, Ann S. Duross, Assistant General Counsel, Federal Depo
______________
Insurance Corporation, and Gustavo A. Gelpi and Feldstein, Gelp
_________________
________________
Gotay were on brief for appellee.
_____
____________________
____________________

Per Curiam.
__________

Having heard oral

argument, and read

the parties' briefs and the record, we affirm the judgment of

the district court.

We see no need to

add substantially to

the rationale in the district court's opinion and order.

Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Monterrey, Inc.,
___________________________
_______________

See
___

847 F. Supp.

997 (D.P.R. 1994).

While,

on appeal,

appellants

still

contest

and

struggle

to overcome the burden of D'Oench, Duhme & Co. Inc.

_________________________

v. FDIC, 315 U.S.

____

447 (1942), the district court's

of that issue is plainly correct.

931 F.2d

1 91st Cir. 1991).

appellants'

arguments

consideration to

based

Monterrey.

analysis

See also FDIC v. Caporale,

________ ____
________

We find nothing
on

the

convincing in

purported

Monterrey was

lack

of

not incorporated

at the relevant time, and lack of consideration is unavailing

for other reasons set out by appellee.
Nor,

viewing the summary

light most favorable to plaintiff,

could overcome
partnership.
supposedly

judgment materials

in a

do we find anything

that

the presumption of liability

of the conjugal

Mr. Pou's alleged reservations

on this score,

made verbally to agents of the failed bank, could

not accomplish this for present purposes.

not sign the
the

note, the conjugal

partnership was liable

debts and obligations of either

partner,

Mrs.

Pou stood

proceeds

to reduce

of its members.

to benefit

her husband's

-2-

While Mrs. Pou did

from

use of

debt unless

it

for

As one
the loan
could be

demonstrated, for some reason,

beyond the

joint and

several liability of

Evidence showing this is

637

F.

Santana,
_______

Supp. 358

lacking.

(D.P.R.

16 Official

that that particular debt was

the partnership.

See FDIC v.
___ ____

Perez Perez,
___________

1986); WRC Properties, Inc. v.

______________________

Translations of

the Supreme

Court of

P.R. 160 (1985).

Nor
although

is there reason to

treat the Mi Tacita stock,

registered to Mr. Pou, as beyond the purview of the

conjugal partnership.
should be deemed

No reason is suggested that the stock

to belong

than forming part of

to Mr.

Pou exclusively,

the pool of assets within

partnership and belonging to both spouses.

rather

the conjugal

If so, the use of

loan proceeds to pay Mi Tacita's debt and to whatever extent,

enhance the value of its

stock, benefited both partners, not

just Mr. Pou alone.

We

have considered appellants' other arguments and

are satisfied that the judgment below was correctly rendered.

Affirmed.
________

Costs for appellee.

-3-