I.

II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.

Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP

People v. Malmstedt
People v. Musa
Morfe v. Mutuc
Zalameda vs. People
Rodel Luz y Ong vs. People
Paderanga vs. Drilon
People vs. Andre Marti

Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP

[GR 64261, 26 December 1984] En Banc, Escolin
(J): 10 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: On 7 December 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz-Pao, Executive
Judge of the then CFI Rizal [Quezon City], issued 2 search warrants
where the premises at 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784
Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business
addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers,
respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines,
equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in
the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as
well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written
literature alleged to be in the possession and control of Jose Burgos,
Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized. A
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction was filed after 6 months
following the raid to question the validity of said search warrants, and
to enjoin the Judge Advocate General of the AFP, the city fiscal of
Quezon City, et.al. from using the articles seized as evidence in
Criminal Case Q- 022782 of the RTC Quezon City (People v. Burgos).
Issue: Whether allegations of possession and printing of subversive
materials may be the basis of the issuance of search warrants.
Held: Section 3 provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law,
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place

to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Probable cause

for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. In
mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined by the judge, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce;
the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the
complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of
a search warrant may be justified. Herein, a statement in the effect
that Burgos "is in possession or has in his control printing equipment
and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents
which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of
committing the offense of subversion punishable under PD 885, as
amended" is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the
requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would
justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation
cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant. Further,
when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper
publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive
materials, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must
contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged
subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere
generalization will not suffice.

People v. Malmstedt
[GR 91107, 19 June 1991]
En Banc, Padilla (J): 8 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines
for the 3rd time in December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the
country sometime in 1982 and 1985. In the evening of 7 May 1989,
Malmstedt left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning
of the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place
for 2 days. On 11 May 1989, Capt. Alen Vasco of NARCOM, stationed
at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint
at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of
checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to

establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent

reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting
marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was
received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning,
that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession
prohibited drugs. At about 1:30 pm, the bus where Malmstedt was
riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and
announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they
would conduct an inspection. During the inspection, CIC Galutan
noticed a bulge on Malmstedt's waist. Suspecting the bulge on
Malmstedt's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for Malmstedt's
passport and other identification papers. When Malmstedt failed to
comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was
bulging on his waist, which was a pouch bag. When Malmstedt
opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed 4 suspiciouslooking objects wrapped in brown packing tape, which turned out to
contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana, when opened. Malmstedt
stopped to get 2 travelling bags from the luggage carrier, each
containing a teddy bear, when he was invited outside the bus for
questioning. It was observed that there were also bulges inside the
teddy bears which did not feel like foam stuffing. Malmstedt was then
brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa for
further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened
the teddy bears and they were found to also contain hashish.
Representative samples were taken from the hashish found among
the personal effects of Malmstedt and the same were brought to the
PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis, which established the
objects examined as hashish. Malmstedt claimed that the hashish
was planted by the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the 2
travelling bags were not owned by him, but were merely entrusted to
him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further
claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the same bus
with him but because there were no more seats available in said bus,
they decided to take the next ride and asked Malmstedt to take
charge of the bags, and that they would meet each other at the
Dangwa Station. An information was filed against Malmstedt for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. During the arraignment,
Malmstedt entered a plea of "not guilty." After trial and on 12 October

1989, the trial court found Malmstedt guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for violation of Section 4, Article II of RA 6425 and sentenced him to
life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000. Malmstedt sought
reversal of the decision of the trial court.
Issue: Whether the personal effects of Malmstedt may be searched
without an issued warrant.
Held: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures. However, where the search is
made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search
warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace
officer or a private person under the following circumstances. Section
5 provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person (a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person
to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling
under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or
jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7." Herein, Malmstedt was caught in flagrante delicto, when
he was transporting prohibited drugs. Thus, the search made upon his
personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing
provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a
lawful arrest.

People v. Musa
[GR 96177, 27 January 1993]
Third Division, Romero (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 13 December 1989, the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) in
Zamboanga City conducted surveillance and test buy on a certain

Mari Musa of Suterville, Zamboanga City. Information received from

civilian informer was that this Mari Musa was engaged in selling
marijuana in said place. The Narcom agent (Sgt. Ani) was able to buy
one newspaper wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00, which was
turned over to the Narcom office. The next day, a buy-bust was
planned with Sgt. Ani being the poseur-buyer. NARCOM teams
proceeded to the target site in 2 civilian vehicles. Ani gave Musa the
P20.00 marked money. Musa returned to his house and gave Ani 2
newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. The signal to
apprehend Musa was given. The NARCOM team rushed to the location
of Ani, and a NARCOM officer (Sgt. Belarga) frisked Musa but did not
find the marked money. The money was given to Musas wife who was
able to slip away. Later, Belarga found a plastic bag containing dried
marijuana inside it somewhere in the kitchen. Musa was placed under
arrest and was brought to the NARCOM office. One newspaperwrapper marijuana and the plastic bag containing more marijuana
was sent to the PC Crime Laboratory, the test of which gave positive
results for the presence of marijuana. On the other hand, Mari Musa
alleged that the NARCOM agents, dressed in civilian clothes, got
inside his house without any search warrant, neither his permission to
enter the house. The NARCOM agents searched the house and
allegedly found a red plastic bag whose contents, Mari Musa said, he
did not know. He also did not know if the plastic bag belonged to his
brother, Faisal, who was living with him, or his father, who was living
in another house about ten arms-length away. Mari Musa was
handcuffed and was taken to the NARCOM office where he was joined
by his wife. Musa claimed that he was subjected to torture when he
refused to sign the document containing details of the investigation.
The next day, he was taken to the fiscals office to which he was
allegedly made to answer to a single question: that if he owned the
marijuana. He allegedly was not able to tell the fiscal that he had
been maltreated by the NARCOM agents because he was afraid he
might be maltreated in the fiscal's office. Mari Musa was brought to
the City Jail. Still, an information against Musa was filed on 15
December 1989. Upon his arraignment on 11 January 1990, Musa
pleaded not guilty. After trial and on 31 August 1990, the RTC
Zamboanga City (Branch XII) found him guilty of selling marijuana in

violation of Article II, Section 4 of RA 6425. Musa appealed to the

Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the contents of the red plastic bag found in the
kitchen may be admitted as evidence as evidence acquired incidental
to a lawful arrest.
Held: Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest authorizes the
arresting officer to make a search upon the person of the person
arrested. An officer making an arrest may take from the person
arrested and money or property found upon his person which was
used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or
which might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing
violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence in the trial
of the cause. Hence, in a buy-bust operation conducted to entrap a
drug-pusher, the law enforcement agents may seize the marked
money found on the person of the pusher immediately after the
arrest even without arrest and search warrants. The warrantless
search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may
extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises
or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the "plain
view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that
view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. When
the discovery of the evidence did not constitute a search, but where
the officer merely saw what was placed before him in full view, the
warrantless seizure of the object was legal on the basis of the "plain
view" doctrine and upheld the admissibility of said evidence. The
"plain view" doctrine, however, may not be used to launch unbridled
searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general
exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt.
The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is
not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. What the 'plain
view' cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them
had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he
came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification
whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search
incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being

present unconnected with a search directed against the accused

and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the
original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately
apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the
'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory
search from one object to another until something incriminating at
last emerges. The "plain view" doctrine neither justify the seizure of
the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not
apparent from the "plain view" of the object. Thus, the exclusion of
the plastic bag containing marijuana does not, however, diminish, in
any way, the damaging effect of the other pieces of evidence
presented by the prosecution to prove that the appellant sold
marijuana, in violation of Article II, Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972. By virtue of the testimonies of Sgt. Ani and T/Sgt.
Belarga and the two wrappings of marijuana sold by Musa to Sgt. Ani,
among other pieces of evidence, the guilt of Musa of the crime
charged has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Morfe v. Mutuc
22 SCRA 424, January 31, 1968
J. Fernando
Facts: Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019), provides that
every public officer, ...after his assumption to office and within the
month of January of every other year thereafter, as well as upon the
termination of his position, shall prepare and file with the head of the
office to which he belongs, a true detailed and sworn statement of
assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and
sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family
expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next
preceding calendar year...
Jesus Morfe, disputing that such requirement is violative of due
process as an oppressive exercise of police power and as an unlawful
invasion of the constitutional right to privacy, implicit in the ban
against unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the
prohibition against self-incrimination, filed a petition for declaratory
relief before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pangasinan. After the
submission of pleadings and stipulation of facts, the CFI found for

Morfe, affirming that the requirement of periodical submission of such

sworn statement of assets and liabilities exceeds the permissible limit
of the police power and is thus offensive to the due process clause
hence, Section 7 of R.A. 3019 is unconstitutional.
Aggrieved, Executive Secretary Amelito Mutuc appealed the
decision of the CFI before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not, the requirement of periodical submission of
the sworn statement of assets and liabilities, pursuant to R.A. 3019,
exceeds the permissible limit of the States police power and is thus
offensive to the due process clause?
Ruling: No. Nothing can be clearer than that R.A. 3019 was precisely
aimed at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official
corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public
service. It is intended to further promote morality in public
administration. A public office must indeed be a public trust. Nobody
can cavil at its objective; the goal to be pursued commands the
assent of all. The conditions then prevailing called for norms of such
character. The times demanded such a remedial device.
In the absence of a factual foundation, the presumption of a statutes
validity must prevail over mere pleadings and stipulation of facts
(Ermita-Malate Hotel, et. al. v. Mayor of Manila). While in the
attainment of attainment of such public good, no infringement of
constitutional rights is permissible, there must be a showing, clear,
categorical, and undeniable that what the Constitution condemns, the
statute allows.
While the soundness of the assertion that a public office is a public
trust and as such not amounting to property in its usual sense cannot
be denied, there can be no disputing the proposition that from the
standpoint of the security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution
the mantle of protection afforded by due process could rightfully be
invoked.

ZALAMEDA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

September 4, 2009
G.R. No. 183656
STATEMENT OF THE CASE: A petition for review on certiorari
involving the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
conviction of the RTC of Makati City against petitioner Zalameda.
FACTS OF THE CASE: The petitioner was charged and found guilty
of violating Sections 11 and 12 of R.A. 9165 (The Comprehensive
Drug Act of 2002).
On September 14, 2003, the desk officer of Precinct I of Makati City
received a phone call from a concerned citizen reporting an ongoing
pot session at Brgy. Tejeros, Makati City. Acting on the report, the
police operatives proceeded to the reported address. Upon reaching
their destination, the police officers found a house at about 3 x 6
meters. The door was slightly open. SPO2 de Guzman peeped inside
and saw petitioner Zalameda and his co- accused Villafor sniffing a
smoke. SPO2 signaled the rest of the police operatives and they
immediately rushed inside the house. Accused Villaflor was holding a
tooter at that point which he threw away. The Police officers then
frisked the two accused according to police procedures and was able
to recover the following:
-rectangular sachet containing white crystalline substance
-aluminum foils (confirmed later to have traces of shabu)
-pair of scissors
-disposable lighter
-a bag with plastic zipper
-an improvised tooter
Petitioner and co-accused were found guilty of the crime
charged before the RTC of Makati City.

On appeal, petitioner alleges that the confiscated items are

inadmissible as evidence against them as the arrest, search and
seizure were unlawful. The appellate court ruled against the
petitioner, hence this petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest, search and seizure were unlawful
and invalid.
RULING: The petition was denied for lack of merit. The conviction of
the appellate court was AFFIRMED with modification as to penalties.
RATIONALE/REASON: Paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113 is
commonly known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. For a warrantless
arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two
requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt
act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
After carefully evaluating the evidence in its totality, we hold that the
prosecution successfully established that the petitioner was arrested
in flagrante delicto.
At the place where the two accused were frisked and arrested, the
responding police officers verified from a slightly opened door and
saw the petitioner and Villaflor "sniffing smoke". As it turned out, the
petitioner indeed possessed a prohibited drug and, together with
Villaflor, was even using a prohibited drug and likewise illegally
possessed drug paraphernalia, contrary to law. When an accused is
caught in flagrante delicto, the police officers are not only authorized
but are duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant.
In the course of the arrest and in accordance with police procedures,
the petitioner and Villaflor were frisked, which search yielded the
prohibited drug in the petitioners possession. The police, aside from
seeing Villaflor throw away a tooter, also saw various drug
paraphernalia scattered on top of the petitioners bed. These
circumstances were sufficient to justify the warrantless search and
seizure that yielded one (1) heat-sealed plastic sachet of shabu. In
this regard, Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court states:

Section 13. Search Incident to Lawful Arrest. A person lawfully

arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an
offense without a search warrant.
The seizure of the various drug paraphernalia is likewise beyond
question. Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain
view" of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that
view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. This
doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification
for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular
area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent;
and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he
observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise
subject to seizure.
All the foregoing requirements for a lawful search and seizure are
present in this case. The police officers had prior justification to be at
the petitioners place as they were dispatched by their desk officer;
they arrested the petitioner and Villaflor as they had reason to
believe that they were illegally using and possessing a prohibited
drug and drug paraphernalia. The search of the petitioner incident to
his arrest yielded the confiscated crystalline substance which later
proved to be shabu. In the course of their lawful intrusion, they
inadvertently saw the various drug paraphernalia scattered on the
bed. As these items were plainly visible, the police officers were
justified in seizing them.

Salazar v. Achacoso (1990)

Petitioner: Hortencia Salazar
Respondent: Hon. Tomas Achacoso
Ponencia: Sarmiento, J.
DOCTRINE: The Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer
issue search or arrest warrants.
FACTS:

1.
Rosalie Tesoro charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar for illegal
recruitment
before
the
Philippine
Overseas
Employment
Administration (POEA).
2.
Rosalie claims that upon arriving from Japan, Hortencia took
her PECC Card on the premise that Hortencia would find her another
booking in Japan. 9 months passed and there is still no booking.
Rosalie transferred to another agency but Hortencia would not give
her the PECC Card.
3.
The POEA ordered Hortencia to appear before the POEA AntiIllegal Recruitment Unit. That same day, public respondent,
Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued a CLOSURE AND SEIZURE
ORDER against Hortencia, having ascertained that the petitioner had
no license to operate a recruitment agency.
4.
Subsequently, a POEA group, assisted by Mandaluyong
policemen and mediamen, proceeded to the residence of the
Hortencia to implement the Closure and Seizure Order. There it was
found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio.
5.
Inside the studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent
performers practicing a dance number and saw about twenty more
waiting outside. The team confiscated assorted costumes which were
duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs.
Flora Salazar.
6.
Because of this event, Hortencia filed a letter with the POEA
requesting that the personal properties seized at her residence be
immediately returned.
Petitioners basis:

She has not been given any prior notice or hearing, hence the
Closure and Seizure Order violated "due process of law" guaranteed
under Sec. 1, Art. III, of the Philippine Constitution.

POEAs actions violate Sec. 2, Art. III of the Philippine

Constitution which guarantees right of the people "to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose."

ISSUES: W/N the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or

the Secretary of Labor) may validly issue warrants of search and
seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code NO
PROVISION:
Article 38 of the Labor Code. Illegal recruitment.
xxx
The Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized
representatives shall have the power to cause the arrest and
detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after
investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to
national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of
job-seekers. The Secretary shall order the search of the office or
premises and seizure of documents, paraphernalia, properties and
other implements used in illegal recruitment activities and the closure
of companies, establishments and entities found to be engaged in the
recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having
been licensed or authorized to do so.
RULING + RATIO: NO.

We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge,

may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities
must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare
Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of
no force and effect.

For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the
following principles:
1.
Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only
judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search:
2.
The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and
undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of
Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of
deportation, for the purpose of deportation.

The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for

deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests)
can not be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under
the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts.
DISPOSITION: Petition is granted.

G. R. No. 197788. February 29, 2012

Rodel Luz y Ong, petitioner, vs. People of the
Philippines, respondent.
Facts: On March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 oclock in the morning, PO2
Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned as a traffic enforcer saw
the accused, who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive
and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without
a helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the accused for
violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers
to wear helmet while driving said motor vehicle, invited the accused
to come inside their sub-station since the place is almost in front of
the said sub-station. He was alerted of the accuseds uneasy
movement and thus asked to take out the contents of the pocket of
his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it; that the accused
obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket
which was a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three
(3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors
and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing the said container, he asked
the accused to open it; that after the accused opened the container,
he noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that upon
his instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the container
on the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two
(2) of which were empty while the other two (2) contained suspected
shabu.
Issue: Whether or not the roadside questioning of a motorist
detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop can be considered a formal
arrest.
Ruling: There was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged
down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and
solely for this reason, arrested. Arrest is the taking of a person into

custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the

commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the
person to be arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to the
custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of
actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a
formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an
intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that
there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief
and impression that submission is necessary. There being no valid
arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise
illegal. The following are the instances when a warrantless search is
allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii)
search of evidence in plain view; (iii) search of a moving vehicle;
(iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a stop
and frisk search; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances.
None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident
to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.

Paderanga vs. Drilon

GR 96080, 19 April 1991
En Banc, Regalado (J): 14 concur
Facts: On 16 October 1986, an information for multiple murder was
filed in the Regional Trial Court, Gingoog City, against Felipe Galarion,
Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter
Doe and Richard Doe, for the deaths on 1 May 1984 of Renato Bucag,
his wife Melchora Bucag, and their son Renato Bucag II. Venue was,
however, transferred to Cagayan de Oro City per Administrative
Matter 87- 2-244. Only Felipe Galarion was tried and found guilty as
charged. The rest of the accused remained at large. Felipe Galarion,
however, escaped from detention and has not been apprehended
since then. In an amended information filed on 6 October 1988,
Felizardo Roxas, alias "Ely Roxas," "Fely Roxas" and "Lolong Roxas,"
was included as a co-accused. Roxas retained Atty. Miguel P.
Paderanga as his counsel. As counsel for Roxas, Paderanga filed,
among others, an Omnibus Motion to dismiss, to Quash the Warrant
of Arrest and to Nullify the Arraignment on 14 October 1988. The trial
court in an order dated 9 January 1989, denied the omnibus motion
but directed the City Prosecutor "to conduct another preliminary

investigation or reinvestigation in order to grant the accused all the

opportunity to adduce whatever evidence he has in support of his
defense." In the course of the preliminary investigation, through a
signed affidavit, Felizardo Roxas implicated Atty. Paderanga in the
commission of the crime charged. The City Prosecutor of Cagayan de
Oro City inhibited himself from further conducting the preliminary
investigation against Paderanga at the instance of the latter's
counsel, per his resolution dated 7 July 1989. In his first indorsement
to the Department of Justice, dated 24 July 1989, said city prosecutor
requested the Department of Justice to designate a state prosecutor
to continue the preliminary investigation against Paderanga. In a
resolution dated 6 September 1989, the State Prosecutor Henrick F.
Gingoyon, who was designated to continue with the conduct of the
preliminary investigation against Paderanga, directed the amendment
of the previously amended information to include and implead
Paderanga as one of the accused therein. Paderanga moved for
reconsideration, contending that the preliminary investigation was
not yet completed when said resolution was promulgated, and that he
was deprived of his right to present a corresponding counter-affidavit
and additional evidence crucial to the determination of his alleged
"linkage" to the crime charged. The motion was, however, denied by
Gingoyon in his order dated 29 January 1990. From the aforesaid
resolution and order, Paderanga filed a Petition for Review with the
Department of Justice. Thereafter, he submitted a Supplemental
Petition with Memorandum, and then a Supplemental Memorandum
with Additional Exculpatory/Exonerating Evidence Annexed, attaching
thereto an affidavit of Roxas dated 20 June 1990 and purporting to be
a retraction of his affidavit of 30 March 1990 wherein he implicated
Paderanga. On 10 August 1990, the Department of Justice, through
Undersecretary Silvestre H. Bello III, issued Resolution 648 dismissing
the said petition for review. His motion for reconsideration having
been likewise denied, Paderanga then filed the petition for mandamus
and prohibition before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether there is no prima facie evidence, or probable cause,
or sufficient justification to hold Paderangato a tedious and prolonged
public trial.

Held: A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or

proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by
the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent
is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The quantum
of evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such
evidence sufficient to "engender a well-founded belief" as to the fact
of the commission of a crime and the respondent's probable guilt
thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties' evidence; it is for the presentation
of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that
an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof. Preliminary investigation is generally inquisitorial, and
it is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be
reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his
complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and
has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the
accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the person against
whom it is taken in jeopardy. The institution of a criminal action
depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He has the quasijudicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should
be filed in court. Hence, the general rule is that an injunction will not
be granted to restrain a criminal prosecution. The case of Brocka, et
al. vs. Enrile, et al. cites several exceptions to the rule, to wit: (a) To
afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
(b) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to
avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (c) When there is a
prejudicial question which is sub-judice; (d) When the acts of the
officer are without or in excess of authority; (e) Where the
prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (f) When
double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (g) Where the court has no
jurisdiction over the offense; (h) Where it is a case of persecution
rather than prosecution; (i) Where the charges are manifestly false
and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (j) When there is clearly
no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on
that ground has been denied. A careful analysis of the circumstances

obtaining in the present case, however, will readily show that the
same does not fall under any of the aforesaid exceptions.

People vs. Andre Marti

[GR 81561, 18 January 1991] Third Division, Bidin (J): 3
concur
Facts: On 14 August 1987, Andre Marti and his common-law wife,
Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the Manila Packing and Export
Forwarders in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying
with them 4 gift-wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and
no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. Marti informed Anita
Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich,
Switzerland. Marti filled up the contract necessary for the transaction,
writing therein his name, passport number, the date of shipment and
the name and address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ,
Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland." Anita Reyes did not inspect
the packages as Marti refused, who assured the former that the
packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts
to his friend in Zurich. In view of Marti's representation, the 4
packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box, with styrofoam placed at the bottom and on top of the packages, and sealed
with masking tape. Before delivery of Marti's box to the Bureau of
Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and
husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure,
opened the boxes for final inspection, where a peculiar odor emitted
therefrom. Job pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the
opening of one of the gloves, and took several grams of the contents
thereof. Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment
to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he
extracted from the cellophane wrapper. At the Narcotics Section of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the box containing Marti's
packages was opened, yielding dried marijuana leaves, or cake-like
(bricks) dried marijuana leaves. The NBI agents made an inventory
and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after signing
a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects. Thereupon, the
NBI agents tried to locate Marti but to no avail, inasmuch as the
latter's stated address was the Manila Central Post Office. Thereafter,
an Information was filed against Marti for violation of RA 6425,

otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. After trial, the Special
Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX) rendered
the decision, convicting Marti of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV
in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e)(i), Article 1 of
Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act. Marti appealed.
Issue: Whether an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of
the accused's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State.
Held: In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
The contraband herein, having come into possession of the
Government without the latter transgressing the accused's rights
against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent
reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the
prosecution of the offense charged. The mere presence of the NBI
agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a
warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely
to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search.

Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been

committed in aid thereof, is not search. Where the contraband
articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting
officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures
therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government
and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it
could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against
arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. If the
search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must
generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality.
However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the
proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private
purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police
authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot
be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law
enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by
private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged
unlawful intrusion by the government.