James Hughes

The Cypriot Labyrinth

The communal fighting which broke out between Greek and Turkish Cypriots
on December 21st, 1963, seems, at the moment of writing, to have reached a
stalemate. Of the 104,000 Turks, some 60,000 are crowded, either into their own
quarter of Nicosia, or in the strip of land running northwards towards the
Kyrenia range where the Turkish Army Contingent is dug in. Elsewhere there
are similarly embattled concentrations; the result of evacuations (not always
voluntary) of Turkish Cypriots in vulnerable areas, carried out in the January
lull in hostilities. In other towns like Limassol, the Turkish minorities grimly
sit it out, dependent for their safety on the patrolling UN Force and, more importantly, on a certain Greek reluctance to recommence battle with their exfriends and neighbours. The United Nations Force (UNFICYP) has had some
success in dismantling strongpoints, reopening communications, and preventing outbreaks of violence. Its individual members have shown, with one or two
exceptions, a commendable restraint in the face of golden opportunities for gunrunning. Yet the political outlook is almost as gloomy as ever. So many conflicting interests are involved that a solution satisfactory to all parties can be
ruled out. But it is clear that any effort to resolve the present impasse which
does not take into account the sequence of events which led up to it must be
rejected, or, worse, create conditions for yet another crisis in a year or twos
time. It is the purpose of this article to put the situation into some kind of
historical perspective.
41

Historical backdrop

There is a widely held belief, which has formed the basis for many
solutions of the Cyprus crisis, that Greek and Turkish Cypriots have
been at loggerheads ever since the Turks moved into the island, 350
years ago. In fact, the extreme smallness of the country (about half the
size of Wales) precludes such hostility unless there is a geographical
division of the communities. Of this not only has there been no sign
(until, that is, the 1964 evacuations) but a review of the population distribution will show that the opposite is the case. There are 121 townships and villages inhabited by Turkish Cypriots, and these are scattered all over the island, without any significant concentration of population. There are, or rather were, 114 towns and villages inhabited by
both Greeks and Turks engaged in identical occupations and, in many
cases, inextricably inter-mingled. In some villages the proportion of
Greeks to Turks is far greater than their overall majority of 80 per cent.
There is only one all-Turkish town, Lefka, where a small Greek
minority lived until the inter-communal rioting of 1958. There are
even cases of miscegenation, rare indeed between Christians and
Moslems. It seems, then, that on the social plane there was no segregation of the two races. Of course, religion and divergent ethnic
aspirations prevented assimilation, as it has in the case of the Turkish
community in Rhodes and of the Syrian Maronite, Armenian and
Latin minorities in Cyprus; but in practical affairs it is hard to find
instances of friction before 1955. Whenever the Greek Cypriots have
called on the British Government to allow them union with Greece
(Enosis), an event which has taken placesometimes with violence
on a number of occasions during the last 60 years, there have been
counter-petitions from the Turkish Cypriot leadership calling for a
retention of the status quo or a return of the island to Turkey; but the
general response of the Turkish Cypriot people has been conspicuously
passive. In 1931 there was widespread pro-Enosis rioting, in the course
of which Government House was burned down, but this inflammatory
action led to little anti-Greek activity from the Turkish Cypriots. It
seems likely that, had Cyprus been handed over to Greece then,
Turkish Cypriots would have viewed the situation with the same
equanimity shown by other Turkish communities in Greece, such as
those in Western Thrace and Rhodes.
Politics of Grivas

The hardening of feeling between the two communities may be dated

to 1955, when Eoka began its anti-British Campaign. The leader of
this organization, Colonel George Grivas, was a Cypriot who, like
many others, had chosen to make a career for himself in his mother
country. He showed himself to be a resourceful soldier who played an
important part in the Greek Resistance. After the War he organized a
terrorist group (the Khi) notorious for its hunting down and suppression of Left-wing elements in Greece. Makarios proposed that
Grivas should lead a terrorist operation against the British because,
first, he was a Cypriot and keenly interested in Cypriot affairs, and
secondly because he was experienced in this kind of warfare. It should
be emphasized that Makarios did not share the Colonels political
42

sympathies. Grivas, on the other hand, wished not only to liberate

Cyprus from Britain but also to purge it of Communism. Akel, the
Communist party in Cyprus, under its leaders Papaioannou and
Zhiartides commanded the support of labour unions numbering about
40,000 men; it also controlled the mayoralties of Limassol, Famagusta
and Larnaca. Its popular support was based mainly on gratitude for the
excellent welfare services provided by Akel.
Grivas used Eoka fighters to attack prominent leftists as well as to dislodge the British. In January 1958 two trade unionists were killed,
and there were many other instances of beatings and victimization
which brought Greek Cyprus near to civil war. Makarios (who was not
allowed to set foot in Cyprus at this time) secretly criticized this policy,
but was unable openly to attack Grivas, for the latter was his instrument in the battle against the Britishthe man who could instil a
sense of discipline into courageous but unmilitary bands and thereby
bring about Makarios real aim: self-determination. Grivas and
Makarios were not joined in a political but a military alliance. This is
clear, I think, from the speed with which, once independence was
achieved, Makarios neutralized Grivas as a political force in Cyprus.
During the Emergency, however, Akel was forced to submerge its
political detestation of Eoka in support for the aim, fervently shared by
all Greek Cypriots, of self-determination.
Turkish perspectives

The Turks, it goes without saying, were opposed to union with Greece.
As fellow-subjects under British rule, their standing vis--vis the Greek
community was assured; and it was to them that the British turned. As
the Greek police became more and more reluctant to act against what
was now understood as a movement of national liberation, Turkish
auxiliaries were increasingly appointed to take their places. Early in
1956 a Turkish policeman was shot in Paphos. Immediately, bands of
Turkish Cypriots stormed through Nicosia, burning and looting. The
Nicosia Commissioner ordered an enquiry into the disturbances and
announced that he was considering the imposition of a fine on the
Turks, but in fact no more was heard of the matter. From then on
anti-Greek disturbances, treated with leniency by the British authorities, continued to break out until, in June and July 1958, full-scale
inter-communal battles took place at Nicosia in which over a hundred
people were killed.
It is misleading, however, to treat these anti-Greek outbursts in Cyprus
as the spontaneous reaction of Turkish Cypriots against Eoka. They
must be seen in close conjunction with, almost as part of, the foreign
policy of the Menderes government in Turkey. In the late summer of
1955 a conference was called between Britain, Greece and Turkey to
discuss the Cyprus problem. On the day that Britain announced her
proposalsSeptember 6thviolent rioting broke out in Istanbul and
Ankara. The nature of this riot is remarkable for three reasons: first, its
extreme violence, millions of pounds worth of damage was done and
hundreds of dwellings gutted. Secondly, the high degree of organization shown by the rioters, who went through the city systematically
43

destroying non-Turkish property, and who were equipped with lists

of targets to be attacked. Thirdly, the fact that Armenian and Jewish
property suffered along with Greek, while the police stood by making
no effort to interfere. These three factors, taken together, suggest that
the riot was about a great deal more than concern at either Greek
Cypriot demands for Enosis or Eoka violence, which at that time was
comparatively trivial. The real cause is to be found in the state of
Turkey herself.
Turkey was then, and still is, in a state of potential revolution. In the
Eastern provinces an unofficial war was being carried on against the
Kurdish minority. On the Anatolian plateau and elsewhere the bulk of
the rural population lived at or below subsistence level. The government was corrupt and repressive, and the country depended for its
financial existence on large and frequent grants from the USA, in return
for which it allowed rockets and early warning systems to be sited on
its territory. Xenophobia has often been used by incompetent governments as an outlet for unrest due to unsatisfactory conditions at home.
Menderes apologized to Greece for the Istanbul-Ankara riots, and put
the blame on communist elements, but by then the damage had been
done and the attention of the Turkish people was firmly fixed on the
plight of their fellow countrymen in Cyprus rather than on their own.
Makarios

However much Menderes may have been responsible for mobilizing

anti-Greek opinion among both Turks and Turkish Cypriots, the press
in Britain has consistently singled out Makarios as the evil genius
behind Cyprus disturbances. It is, therefore, necessary to make some
assessment of the aims and personality of the present President of
Cyprus. Ignoring the more hysterical attacks on him, he is generally
found to be guilty on three counts. First, his association with Eoka.
Many people of liberal views find it hard to forgive him for not only
refusing to denounce, but actually supporting, a terrorist group
responsible for the shooting of a number of unarmed civilians, some of
them in the back. Second, his readiness to participate in political intrigue, and his subordination of pastoral duties to the activities of leader
of a political party; in particular his habit during the Emergency of
making polemical speeches from the pulpit. Third, his high-handed
treatment of the Turkish Cypriot minority both during and after the
Emergency. His failure to consult Turkish interests is usually said to be
the prime cause of the present situation.
Those who accuse him of dishonesty in his dealings with the British and
his support for Grivas actions have lost sight of the fact that, from a
Cypriot point of viewindeed, from any objectively anti-colonialist
point of viewthe British were a hostile occupying force whose
announced aim was to maintain their own control over the island.
Grivas men were national heroes, and if Makarios had denounced them,
as he was frequently urged to do, he would have been a traitor to his
own cause. It is naive to expect him to have acted otherwise during this
period.
44

Those who maintain that a priest should not be concerned with political
activities either forget or are unaware of the special role of the clergy in
Greek and Greek Cypriot affairs. The Greek Orthodox church has
always been intensely nationalist, and was both the inspiration and the
effective instrument for the expulsion of the Turks. In Cyprus the
Archbishop is also the Ethnarch and political leader of his community.
Under the Turkish occupation the Church administered the island as a
sort of Khedivate, in the course of which it amassed considerable wealth
and property. Today Kykko Monastery is one of the largest single
landowners in the country, and much of its property is in areas ready for
development, e.g. in the suburbs of Nicosia. The material power of the
Church naturally augments the spiritual authority of its leader, whose
benevolent paternalism is taken for granted in many parts of the island.
It was thus as temporal rather than spiritual leaders (though spiritual as
well, since Enosis was regarded as a holy cause) that successive Archbishops had for 50 years brought the question of Enosis to the attention of the British Government. Makarios would be breaking with
tradition and his own obligations if he were not deeply involved in the
political affairs of the island.
The third charge against Makarios, that he has discriminated against
the Turks, is a more complicated subject and will be treated at greater
length below. There is perhaps some truth in the charge that he did not
make sufficient efforts to conciliate Turkish Cypriots during the
5559 Emergency. But it must be remembered, first, that at that time
any concession to the Turks, who were vociferously opposed to Enosis,
implied a betrayal of the cause of Grivas and his men; secondly, that
the British, by removing him from the island in 1956, prevented him
from building up any personal contact with the Turkish Cypriot
leaders; and thirdly, relations between him and the Turkish vicepresident, Dr Kutchuk, were initially very promising.
On the subject of Enosis Makarios position has always been a difficult
one. In many ways Union with Greece already exists. Greek Cypriots
go to Athens University as a matter of course; there is no university in
Cyprus. They have the same opportunities as other Greeks to make
their careers in Greece, and they have often done so with success. For
instance, the film director Michael Cacoyannis is a Cypriot. Intellectually and culturally there is no division, though the Athenian Greek
sometimes displays a cosmopolitan loftiness towards what he regards as
the provincial ways of the Cypriots. Such is the attachment between the
two countries that even Akel was obliged to support Enosis at a time
when the Karamanlis government was persecuting Communism in
Greece.
On the other hand, there are serious objections to Enosis, quite apart
from the problem of the Turkish minority. First, Cyprus has a far
higher per capita income than Greece. As a province of that country it is
very probable that her prosperity would decrease. Secondly, the civil
administration and judiciary, modelled on the British, is sophisticated
and considerably more efficient than that of the Greeks. This would
presumably have to be dismantled in the event of Enosis. Thirdly, the
45

political structure in Cyprus would not be easily assimilated. The

Greek Cypriot politicians, and Makarios himself, are unlikely to relish
the prospect of handing over their independence, even to Greece. But
the problem is more complicated than that. In the course of the past
four years, Cyprus has established herself as an articulate and thoughtful member of the non-aligned world. Her absorption by a Nato
country, and the subsequent commitment to Western policies, would
not be well-received by the Left in Cyprus, which constitutes a large
proportion of the country.
Makarios has, of course, always been aware of these facts. His first task
after the signing of the London-Zurich agreements in February 1959
was to tackle his own Grivas-inspired Right wing, which insisted that
the struggle was not over until Enosis had been achieved. He included
in his government a number of ex-Eoka activists, the most prominent
of whom was Polykarpos Yorgadjis, who was to become Minister of
the Interior, Yorgadjis, an ex-clerk, was one of the heroes of the Eoka
resistance. By bringing him into the Government Makarios hoped to
harness a force which might otherwise have been used to subvert the
State. Yorgadjis has in general supported the Makarios line of Cypriot
independence and non-alignment, but has on occasion made speeches
of a militantly pro-Enosis nature. If there is a Rightist coup in Cyprus, it
will be because Yorgadjis has decided to break with Makarios and throw
in his paramilitary forces on the side of the Enosists.
Another step which Makarios took against the Right in 1959 was to
reveal a conspiracy against him organized by Papaphotis, a prominent
Eokist, and the Bishop of Kyrenia (whom he had previously superseded in the post of Archbishop). Whether or not this plot was a
fabrication, its revelation succeeded in rallying public opinion behind
Makarios and against the extreme Right. Finally, in October, he had a
meeting in Rhodes with Grivas, who had complained furiously over
the Zurich sell-out. This meeting ended in the capitulation of the
General. Makarios was free temporarily, to carry out his policy of
making Cyprus autonomous.
After the Zurich Agreement

Cyprus did not become formally independent until August 16th, 1960,
as a result of protracted and, as it turned out, quite unnecessary haggling
by Amery over the precise acreage of the British sovereign bases.
Makarios had already been returned as president after the election of
December 13th, polling two thirds of the votes cast. His opponent was
John Clerides, a political liberal who founded the Cyprus Democratic
Union and based his opposition to Makarios on the complaint that the
latter had not consulted the Cypriot people after the London-Zurich
agreements. After some hesitation Akel gave its support to Clerides.
The size of Makarios majority, though less impressive in the urban
vote, reflected the confidence of the Greek Cypriots; and Kutchuk,
speaking on behalf of the Turkish community, expressed his approval
of the result.

46

The Archbishop had already dealt with the right wing Enosists. By
1960 he was the undisputed leader of the Greek community, for Akel,
having tested its strength in the Presidential elections and found it
wanting, was content to make an electoral pact with him and to give
general support to his policies. Moreover, there were in Makarios
Patriotic Front Party acceptable socialist thinkers, such as Vassos
Lyssarides. Lyssarides was one of the few Left wingers in the Eoka
organization, and after Independence took a lead in developing the
islands relations with Afro-Asian countries. Makarios now commanded
the allegiance of both Right and Left elements in the Greek Cypriot
community; he must therefore be held accountable if blame for the
inter-communal fighting rests on the Greeks.
Makarios never made any secret of his dissatisfaction with the LondonZurich agreement, which he regarded as a basis for a final settlement
rather than a perfected document. Few would disagree with him in his
insistence that the only chance of making the country economically,
rather than politically, independent lay in a centralized Government
and a determined drive to increase material production; and this implied amendment of the more separatist clauses in the Constitution. In
his eagerness to press on with the organization of the new republic,
however, Makarios too often tended to dismiss Turkish objections as
irrelevant. The fact that they often were irrelevant does not excuse the
Archibishops psychological error in overlooking the sensibilities of a
materially reduced but intensely proud minority. Too often Kutchuk
had reason to complain that he had not been consulted in some important matter (e.g. the decision to send a delegation to the Afro-Asian
Conference in Belgrade) or that his veto was being limited to unimportant affairs. Similarly, Turkish intransigence in the House of
Representatives, their vetoing of unexceptionable legislation, may be
interpreted not as an effort to undermine the economy (though that was
the effect it had) but as a symbolic assertion of the rights given them
under an international agreement. For in some respects the Turkish
Cypriots were weaker than their 18 per cent minority suggests.
Traditionally uncommercial, the able and intelligent of their community
gravitated towards the professions rather than business. This is perhaps due to their long period of overlordship in Cyprus, when their
wealth was derived from a serf-based economy. As a result, the economic scene in Cyprus is dominated by the Greeks, while the tiny
Armenian community, comprising 1 per cent of the population, contributes almost as much to National Income as the Turks. Attempts to
interest the Turkish Cypriot community in ways of increasing their
wealth, e.g. a joint mining corporation, have not succeeded. But this
economic weakness has the effect of making the Turkish Cypriots
particularly jealous of their constitutional privileges, and anxious that
their poverty should not relegate them to the status of second-class
citizens. It is difficult to see how Makarios could have developed his
country along modern economic lines and at the same time sustained
the confidence of this proud but unproductive minority, who were
unable to find sufficient qualified men to fill the posts allotted to them
by the ministers of Britain, Greece and Turkey. But one feels that,
whatever the provocation, he should have treated these last rags of
departed grandeur with more respect.
47

Economic situation

In the economic sector the new presidents legacy was not particularly
enviable.
Cyprus is a very small country, less than half the size of Wales,
with a population of about 540,000. 360,000 Cypriots live in the rural
areas, and over half the national income is derived from agriculture;
exports include carobs, citrus fruits and potatoes. Others are employed
in various light industries, tobacco factories, canneries, etc. There were
possibilities for tourism, and a fair amount of trade accrued from the
islands position as a half-way-station between the Mediterranean and
the Near East.
In April 1961, Makarios announced a five-year plan based on the report
of a UN economic mission. It aimed at increasing the Gross National
Product from 78m in 1960 to 108m in 1966, and per capita income
from 139 to 175, a 4 per cent growth rate. The programme was
ambitious but not impossible of execution. In the agricultural sector,
production and marketing co-operatives were set up, low-interest
loans advanced to farmers, while the Government planned to invest
14m in the erection of dams and other irrigation projects. 3m was to
be spent on developing tourist amenities and building hotels; and in
fact there was a gratifying increase in the number of visitors each year
until 1964. A system of cheap loans was designed to expand the light
industries, and legislation for a development bank was drafted. Special
tax concessions were prepared, as in Ireland, to attract foreign investment; 11m was set aside for the development and improvement of
the harbours; hundreds of miles of roads were metalled, and internalexternal telecommunications brought to a reasonable level of efficiency.
Britain agreed to provide a grant of 12m over the first five years, and
a further 2,340,000 for specific projects. The USA and West Germany
agreed to provide financial and advisory aid, and there were numerous
private donations, the most spectacular of which was the 7m assets of
the Greek industrialist Athanassiades. Makarios hoped to raise half his
Government investment of 62m from outside help and the remainder
by means of customs duties, income tax, state loans, etc.
The plan was approved by the House of Representatives, a body consisting of 35 Greeks and 15 Turks. Makarios had previously made an
electoral pact with Akel, as a result of which the latter held five seats
unopposed. Clerides Democratic Union had boycotted the election,
but liberal and left-wing opinion was quite strongly represented in the
Presidents Patriotic Front Party, which held the remaining 30 seats.
Glafkos, Clerides son and a well-known liberal, was leader of the
House and Makarios deputy; and another prominent member was
Lyssarides who organised the Afro-Asian Solidarity conference in
Nicosia in 1963. The right was in disarray after the political collapse of
Grivas, who had been outmanoeuvred by Makarios at Rhodes, and
whose increasingly erratic outbursts were now largely ignored. On the
Greek side, then, members of differing views were prepared to unite
to make Cyprus economically and politically viable.
48

Denktash and Kutchuk

A similar degree of co-operation was not forthcoming from the Turks.

All 15 seats were held by Kutchuks United Front Party, whose first
and, it seemed, only interest was to prevent any measure which might
conceivably encroach on the rights granted to their community under
the London-Zurich agreements. Kutchuk was fundamentally a moderate. In July 1959, he said that he had full confidence in the future of the
Republic as long as Archbishop Makarios is in office and there is no
outside interference. Unfortunately, the actual leader of the Turkish
Cypriots was not Kutchuk (there has never been any secret about this)
but Rauf Denktash, head of the Turkish Communal chamber. The
latter is one of the most important, and perhaps one of the most
destructive, figures in the brief history of Cyprus. He is regarded by
many Greek Cypriots as the ablest lawyer on the island, and, though he
lacked the popular authority of Kutchuk, he surpassed him in
political acumen and uncompromising toughness at the negotiating
table. Denktash refused ministerial office in the new government, preferring to remain leader of the Turkish Communal Chamber and head
of the Turkish delegation of the joint constitutional committee. In the
former capacity he was in a position to instruct and advise the Turkish
community with an authority independent of, and virtually equal to,
Kutchuks own; in the second, he was able to insist on and strengthen
those clauses in the constitution which most tended towards separation
of the two communities.
Denktash was the guardian of the Turkish rights set out in the ZurichLondon agreement; and many of the provisions in that constitution, if
not the constitution as a whole, are strongly separatist in flavour.
Measures concerned with taxation or financial legislation require a
majority of Turkish votes before they can become law. The vicepresident (constitutionally always a Turk) has powers of veto in
foreign affairs, defence and security measures. 30 per cent of all posts in
the Government service, and 40 per cent in the army and police, are
reserved for Turks. The five main towns on the islands, whose populations range from 50,000 to 100,000, are managed by separate Greek and
Turkish municipal authorities. Under the Treaty of Guarantee, any of
the three guaranteeing powers (Britain, Greece and Turkey) has the
right to intervene unilaterally in order to preserve the treaty.
The object of these clauses was, of course, to protect the Turkish
minority from any brutal discrimination, and in view of the preceding
years some safeguards were obviously necessary. But successful management of the country required, from the Turkish side, a responsible
and co-operative use of its constitutional privileges. It is clear that this
was not regarded as a priority by the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot
United Front.
This party was opposed in the 1960 election by a group led by Ahmet
Gurkan, editor of the Turkish Cypriot newspaper Cumhuriet, and
Ayhan Hikmet, a lawyer. They supported Kutchuk in essentials but
objected to what they called the dictatorial tendencies of his party.
Although unrepresented in the House this group maintained an
49

independent, though generally quiescent, attitude until April 24th,

1962. On that date Gurkan and Hikmet were assassinated by gunmen.
The latters brother claimed that they were murdered because Ayhan
and his friend stood for the idea of brotherly co-operation between the
two communities. After that there was no opposition to the United
Front party. However, outside Nicosia relations between Greek and
Turkish Cypriots were much more cordial. The Turkish leaders of
Famagusta and Limassol, Djemil and Sami, encouraged a positive
approach towards community problems with the result that, as late as
March 1964, after over a hundred people had been killed in the suburbs
of Nicosia, Greek and Turkish dockers were still working together at
the port of Famagusta.
Constitutional deadlock

In the House of Representatives, however, the Turkish Cypriots were

not prepared to use their powers constructively. In March 1961, they
voted out a bill prolonging certain taxation, including import duties.
Again, in December a new income tax bill was drafted, giving relief to
low-income groups, increasing rates on incomes over 3,000, and
allowing exemptions for foreign firms investing in the island. The
Turkish recommendation that this measure should become law only on
condition that it be renewed annually was rejected by the Greeks on
the grounds that it was an integral part of the five-year plan. It should
be emphasized that neither bill could have done any damage to the
Turkish community. On the contrary, the new income tax would have
benefited them since the large majority of Turks belonged to low income groups. However, the effect on the countrys economy was
serious, since Denktash officially advised Turkish importers and
businessmen to refuse to pay the revenue departments, whom Makarios
had instructed to collect their taxes and dues normally. Early in 1963
the Constitutional Court increased the confusion by ruling that, although the taxes could be imposed, no legal machinery existed for their
collection.
Other disputes interfered with the smooth administration of the
country. The Zurich provision for the administration of the five towns
by separate Greek and Turkish municipal authorities was supposed to
be reviewed six months after Independence, but no agreement could be
found between the Turks, who wished the two communities to be
separately managed, and the Greeks, who wanted integration. Such a
system clearly encouraged separatist tendencies, but the main objection
to it was economic. In a town the size of Paphos (population 9,000)
two separate and weakly co-ordinated bodies of local government led
to much duplication and inefficiency. It was proposed that these be replaced by unified municipalities with a guaranteed proportion of
Turkish representatives and finance adequate for their needs. This suggestion was regarded by the Turkish leadership as an attack on the
communitys independent status, and consequently rejected. Finally,
in January 1963, Makarios brought in improvement boards which replaced and effectually unified the municipalities.
Further inter-communal disagreements included the formation of the
50

Cypriot National Army, where the Turks insisted on separation up to

company level, and the implementation of the Zurich proposals on the
Civil Service, where the Turks were unable to supply sufficient qualified
men to fill the 30 per cent quota allotted to them. On April 9th 1963,
Makarios made a speech in which he claimed that the blocking of
taxation laws had created great difficulties, that the separate municipalities system was wastefully expensive, and that Turkish obstruction
of legislation for a development bank had caused real damage.
There is much substance in these complaints. The Turkish insistence on
the letter of the Constitution, and their refusal to consider any alteration
to it was harming the administrative and economical viability of the
country. On the other hand, it might be argued that the Turks were not
so much creating an atmosphere of hostility as reacting to one which
already existed. After all, a year before Independence inter-communal
fighting had broken out in Larnaca and the suburbs of Nicosia; 55
Turks and 60 Greeks were killed. Throughout the Emergency there
were bombings and race-inspired destruction of property. 22 Turkish
policemen had been killed by Eoka terrorists. Against such a background of ill-feeling, the slightest effort to readjust the London-Zurich
constitution was likely to be misinterpreted. Naturally, with a country
whose total population was no more than that of a fair-sized industrial
town, a high degree of centralized control was necessary to ensure that
her rather meagre assets were used to maximum effect; but remarkable
tact, more perhaps than the Greeks were capable of, was required to do
so without alienating an already suspicious Turkish minority.
End of co-operation

The honeymoon between Kutchuk and Makarios (a direct result of the

latters firm handling of Grivas after the Emergency) came to an end in
October 1959. On that date the British mine-sweeper, H.M.S. Burmaston, intercepted the motor-boat Deniz, registered at Izmir and
carrying a large consignment of arms. There were many other reports
of gun-running by both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, but a joint appeal
by Makarios and Kutchuk that all arms be handed in by November 5th
met with a poor response. Naturally, there were men and organizations
on both sides who were anxious to insure themselves against any
further outbreak of hostilities. On the Greek side there were Eoka
zealots who went up into the Troodos mountains to practise military
manoeuvres; ex-Eoka war-lords like Nikos Sampson (the proprietor of
a popular right wing newspaper) who still commanded a residue of the
allegiance which had been theirs during the Emergency; and an underground committee, set up in 1961 when it became clear that the
Turkish Cypriots were receiving arms on a considerable scale, which
had paramilitary status and drew many of its members from those
Cypriots who had fought in the Second World War. The leader of this
organization was Polykarpos Yorgadjis, Minister of the Interior.
Details of the military organization of the Turkish Cypriot Underground, TMT, are more obscure. It is known to have been in fairly close
touch with Turkey and, it is rumoured, actually led by a Turkish
National during the December fighting. This is understandable in view
51

of the fact that the Turkish Cypriot leadership has always looked for
guidance to Turkey, whose policy towards Cyprus remained much the
same in spite of the fall of the Menderes rgime.
The point is, however, that these armed groups existed as an insurance
rather than a proof of aggressive intention. Had the Greeks been more
tactful in their presentation of the need for reform; and had the Turks
been less obstructivist in their insistence on the Constitution as it stood,
the guns would still have been kept under the beds and the young men
would still have practised weapon-training in the mountains, but there
the matter would have rested. It is unnecessary to posit an innate
temperamental incompatibility in order to account for inter-communal
violence between Greeks and Turks in Cyprus.
The chain of responsibility for the present situation in Cyprus is a long
one. Makarios action on December 5th, 1963 was the immediate
cause of the fighting. He was wrong to push through his constitutional
reforms, however necessary, without considering Turkish Cypriot
sensibilities. The Turkish Cypriot leadership was wrong to force him
to this by subordinating every political issue to their sectional interests.
Their chauvinism, however, was culpably encouraged by the Turkish
Government in order to project internal dissatisfaction on to a foreign
situation. Turkeys activities since December 1963, culminating with
the August 1964 strafing of Greek Cypriot villages, have been increasingly hard to defend. (A look at the Turkish Cypriot casualty
figures since the fighting started makes nonsense of their claims of
genocide.) But Turkey would not have acted in this way unless she
had been confident of the USA, which supports a repressive administration for military and ideological reasons. Finally, much of the blame
lies with Britain who, first, created the conditions for inter-communal
enmity by her disastrous repression during the 195559 Emergency;
and secondly, in January 1964, attemptedin conjunction with
Americato impose a solution on Makarios within a Nato context
when the latter wished to lay the problem before the UN immediately.
Now the matter is in the hands of the UN. It is likely that the principles
of majority rule, as set out in the Charter, will be upheld eventually.
The Greek Cypriots have made proposals for the Turkish minority: a
general amnesty; proportional representation in the Government; an
office of Turkish Affairs to handle the educational and cultural matters
of the community; adequate safeguards, such as unilateral right of
appeal to an independent judicial authority. It is just possible that the
two communities will be able to return to the amicable relations which
they enjoyed ten years ago. That depends on how soon a settlement can
be reached.

52