Term/Concept

Definition

war

an event involving the

organized use of military
force by at least 2 parties
that satisfies some
minimum threshold of
severity (1,000 deaths)

interstate war

war in which main

participants are states

civil war

war in which main

participants are within the
same state

Example/Significance

i.e. govt and a rebel group

theories/explanations for
war:
realist theories

emphasize wars as a result nothing to stop states

of international anarchy
from using force to get
(absence of central
their way
authority)
creates insecurity and
competition for power
theres a preventative
motive (fight to prevent
enemy from becoming
powerful)

misperceptions or
mistakes theories

conclude that wars occur

because decision makers
inaccurately estimate their
chances of winning or
amount of costs

serve the interests of

influential groups

wars are fought in spite of

costs because costs dont
fall on actors who call the
shots

people fall prey to wishful

thinking

root of all wars lies

conflict over things that
states value:
goods such as territory

might contribute to wealth of the state (contains nat

resources)
might cause conflict b/w 2 states if has military or
strategic value (i.e. Golan Heights)
might be valuable for ethnic, cultural, historical
reasons (i.e. India + Pakistan both claim region of
Kashmir)

policies

when one state enacts a

policy that benefits it but
harms interests of another

i.e. US saw Iraqs alleged

pursuit of weapons of mass
destruction as a threat

conflicts over regime type

using force to change

another countrys regime

i.e. US sought to prevent

est of communist regimes
during Cold War

crisis bargaining

bargaining interaction in
which at least one actor
threatens to use force in
the event that its demands
are not met

i.e. Bushs March 2003

ultimatum giving Hussein
48 hours to leave country
or face invasion

coercive diplomacy

the use of threats to

influence the outcome of a
bargaining interaction

territory = $100 mill

cost of war = $20 mill
value = $80 mill

a state will only accept a

bargain that gives it at least
as much as it can expect to
get from war ($80 mill)

because war is costly, a

settlement that all sides
prefer to war generally
exists

bargaining range

the set of deals that both

parties in a bargaining
interaction prefer to the
reversion
when reversion outcome
is war, the bargaining
range is the set of deals
that both sides prefer to
war

green area on Figure 3.2

an effort to change the

status quo through the
threat of force

intended to coerce target

state into making a
concession or changing
current policy
US demand that Afgan
hand over Bin Laden

bargaining and war:

compellence vs.
deterrence
compellence

deterrence

an effort to preserve the

status quo through the
threat of force

i.e. dont do X, or else

general deterrence:
dont attack me, or Ill
fight back
extended deterrence:
dont attack my ally X, or
else

a state confronted by
demands may mistakenly
yield too little or not at all

one state feels it can

achieve more through
fighting (Iraq) than the
other is willing to offer in
negotiations (Kuwait)

i.e. Kuwait failed to budge

under Husseins threats

a state may demand too

much (Iraq) under
mistaken belief that other
side will cave (Kuwait
backed by US)

even if there is a settlement due to incomplete info

both sides would prefer to
war, uncertainty about one
anothers willingness
prevents such settlements

incomplete info

a situation in which parties in a strategic interaction lack

info abt other parties interests and/or capabilities (# of
troops, # and quality of armaments, economic resources
to sustain war effort, quality of military leadership)

resolve

the willingness of an actor

to endure costs in order to
acquire some good

How much is it willing to

pay in blood and money?
hinges on variety of
political, ideological,
psychological factors

risk-return trade-off

in crisis bargaining, the

trade-off b/w trying to get a
better deal and trying to
avoid a war

i.e. Kuwait could have

given in to all Iraqs
demands and would have
avoided war

mistakes that occur when

states have poor and
incomplete info about
anothers willingness and
ability to wage war:

incentives to
misrepresent + the prob of
credibility:
credibility

believability
credible threat - a threat that the recipient believes will
be carried out
credible commitment - commitment that the recipient
believes will be honored

why credibility is hard to

receive:
carrying through on
threats is costly

even though states have

common interests in
avoiding war, each has
incentives to
misrepresent info to get
the best deal for himself

USs threat to Hussein

lacked credibility because
he though US would be
unwilling to bear costs of
war
some countries will
conceal info about true
strength
some states hide
weakest cards

i.e. US hid its left hoot

military plan from
Hussein

brinksmanship: The
Slippery Slope

a strategy in which
adversaries approach the
brink of war through
provocative actions in
hopes that the other will
lose its nerve first and
make concessions

separate genuinely
resolved opponents from
the bluffers

tying hands

making threats in ways

that would make backing
down difficult
by tying their hands they
are saying I cannot back
down; hence, my threat is
completely credible

i.e. Bush made clear,

public statements and
actions that Iraqs
invasion of Kuwait will
not stand that would be
embarrassing for him to
retreat from
generated audience
costs

audience costs

negative repercussions for

failing to follow through on
a threat or to honor a
commitment

i.e. US was skeptical of

Chinese threats to
intervene in Korean war
because of failure to carry
out threats to liberate
Taiwan

paying for power

taking costly steps to

increase capabilities (like
mobilizing large military
forces, increasing military
manpower, spending large
sums of money)

signals that it is an issue

the threatening state cares
about

mechanisms states use to

make threats credible:

ways in which inability to

make credible
commitments to a bargain
might undermine peaceful
settlements:

because states often have

an incentive to defect

1. bargaining over goods

that are a source of future
bargaining power

state is often reluctant to

render itself more
vulnerable to attack w/o
credible promises that the
other side will not exploit
that vulnerability in the
future

state might decide it

would rather fight today
then face a future in
which it is weaker
i.e. made it hard for N.
Korea to give up nuclear
programs peacefully
i.e. US was not credible
in keeping promise to
Libya to not press for
changes in Qaddafi
regime

2. if balance of military
capabilities is anticipated
to change b/c of factors
external to bargaining
process

makes states with

growing opponents rather
fight now than face worse
terms in the future (a.k.a.
fight a preventative war)

common sources of growth:

economic growth
development of new tech
(nukes)
i.e. growth of Germanys
economic power late
19th-early 20th centuries
increased its ability to
challenge neighbors

preventative war

a war fought with the

intention of preventing an
adversary from becoming
stronger in the future

arise b/c:
states whose power is
increasing cannot commit
not to exploit that power
in future bargaining
interactions
adversaries decide it is
better to gamble on war
today
i.e. US-Iraq war

3. first-strike advantages

situation that arises when

each state will try to beat
military tech, military
the other to the punch,
strategies, geography give creating a preemptive war
a significant advantage to
whichever state attacks first
in a war

preemptive war

a war fought with the

anticipation that an attack
by the other side is
imminent

preemption vs. prevention

preemption - response to both arise from difficulty

an imminent threat when
states have in making
there is already existing
credible commitments not
first-strike advantage
to use military power
prevention - response to i.e. Iraq war =
anticipated changes in
considered preemptive
distribution of power that i.e. Pearl Harbor =
might result in an
considered preventative
increased threat
sometime in the future

4. whether or not a good

can be divided
divisible goods

can be split into smaller

shares

i.e. 100 pennies

indivisible goods

goods that cannot be

divided without diminishing
its value

i.e. 1 hundred dollar bill

bargaining becomes all
or nothing
i.e. problem of dividing
city of Jerusalem so that
people of all faiths have
access to its holy sites

1. raising the costs of war

as war becomes less

attractive, states will be
more willing to make
compromises to avoid it

i.e. threat of nuke war

helped US and Soviet
diffuse many crisis
i.e. trade and financial
relations increase
economic costs of going
to war

2. increasing
transparency

can reduce dangers of

miscalculation

i.e. transparency of
military capabilities

3. providing outside
enforcement of
commitments

repeated
interaction/prospect of
future dealings can help
make promises credible
(fear of retaliation
tomorrow)
int orgs can monitor and
enforce agreements

i.e. US played a large role

in reassuring W. European
countries that they had little
to fear from W. Germany
after WWII

ways we can make war

less likely:

4. dividing apparently
indivisible goods

possible mechanisms:
joint or shared control
compensation on another issue (i.e. although a rare
painting cannot be divided, one party can compensate
the other)