MARAMBA v.

LOZANO
G.R. No. L-21533
June 29, 1967
Facts:
On November 3, 1948, the plaintiff filed an action against the defendant Nieves de
Lozano and her husband Pascual Lozano for the collection of a sum of money. After trial,
the court a quo on June 23, 1959 rendered its decision, the dispositive part of which is as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby renders judgment, sentencing the defendants herein,
Nieves de Lozano and Pascual Lozano, to pay unto the herein plaintiff, Hermogenes
Maramba, the total sum of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos and Seven Centavos
(P3,500.07), with legal interest thereon from date of the filing of the instant complaint
until fully paid.
Not satisfied with the judgment, the defendants interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals but the appeal was dismissed on March 30, 1960 for failure of the defendants to
file their brief on time. After the record the case was remanded to the court a quo, a writ
of execution was issued, and on August 18, 1960 levy was made upon a parcel of land
covered by transfer certificate title No. 8192 of Pangasinan in the name of Nieves de
Lozano. The notice of sale at public auction was published in accordance with law and
scheduled for September 16, 1960.
On that date, however, defendant Nieves de Lozano made a partial satisfaction of the
judgment in the amount P2,000.00, and requested for an adjournment of the sale to
October 26, 1960. On October 17, 1960, she filed amended motion, dated October 14,
alleging that on November 11, 1952, during the pendency of the case, defendant Pascual
Lozano died and that the property levied upon was her paraphernal property, and praying
that her liability be fixed at one-half () of the amount awarded in the judgment and that
pending the resolution of the issue an order be issued restraining the Sheriff from
carrying out the auction sale scheduled on October 26, 1960. On that date the sale
proceeded anyway, and the property of Nieves de Lozano which has been levied upon
was sold to the judgment creditor, as the highest bidder, for the amount of P4,175.12, the
balance of the judgment debt.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the decision of the lower court dated June 23, 1959 could still be
questioned;
(2) Whether or not the judgment was joint; and
(3) Whether or not the judgment debt could be satisfied from the proceeds of the
properties sold at public auction.

Ruling:
(1) NO. It would entail a substantial amendment of the decision of June 23, 1959, which
has long become final and in fact partially executed. A decision which has become final
and executory can no longer be amended or corrected by the court except for clerical
errors or mistakes, and however erroneous it may be, cannot be disobeyed; otherwise
litigations would be endless and no questions could be considered finally settled. The
amendment sought by appellee involves not merely clerical errors but the very substance
of the controversy. And it cannot be accomplished by the issuance of a "nunc pro tunc"
order such as that sought in this case. The purpose of an "nunc pro tunc" is to make a
present record of an which the court made at a previous term, but which not then
recorded. It can only be made when the ordered has previously been made, but by
inadvertence not been entered.
Now then, it is clear that the decision of June 23, 1959 does not specify the extent of the
liability of each defendant. The rule is that when the judgment does not order the
defendants to pay jointly and severally their liability is merely joint, and none of them
may be compelled to satisfy the judgment in full. This is in harmony with Articles 1137
and 1138 of the Civil Code.
(2) YES. The rule is that when the judgment does not order the defendants to pay jointly
and severally their liability is merely joint, and none of them may be compelled to satisfy
the judgment in full. This is in harmony with Articles 1137 and 1138 of the Civil Code.
(3) NO. The presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code to property acquired during
the marriage. But in the instant case there is no showing as to when the property in
question was acquired and hence the fact that the title is in the wife's name alone is
determinative. Furthermore, appellant himself admits in his brief that the property in
question is paraphernal.
Appellant next points out that even if the land levied upon were originally paraphernal, it
became conjugal property by virtue of the construction of a house thereon at the expense
of the common fund, pursuant to Article 158 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code. However, it
has been by this Court that the construction of a house at conjugal expense on the
exclusive property of one of the spouses does not automatically make it conjugal. It is
true that meantime the conjugal partnership may use both in the land and the building, but
it does so not as owner but in the exercise of the right of usufruct.

MAGALLON v, MONTEJO
G.R. No. 73733
December 16, 1986
Facts:
The petition before this Court sinks the annulment of a writ of execution issued by the
respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 727 of her court (RTC Davao del Sur). Said case was
instituted by the plaintiffs (private respondents herein) against Martin Lacerna to compel
partition of parcel of land located in Barrio Kasuga Municipality of Magsaysay, Davao
del Sur, to which said defendant had perfected a claim by homestead. The plaintiffs,
claiming to be the common children of Martin Lacerna and his wife, Eustaquia Pichan,
who died in 1953, asserted a right to one-half of the land as their mother's share in her
conjugal partnership with Martin. While said defendant denied having contracted
marriage with Eustaquia Pichan although he admitted living with her without benefit
of marriage until she allegedly abandoned him as well as paternity of two of the
plaintiffs who, he claimed, were fathered by other men, the Trial Court gave his denials
no credence. Said Court, on the basis of the evidence presented to it, found that Martin
had in fact been married to Eustaquia, and that the plaintiffs were his children with her.
The Trial Court further found that Martin had begun working the homestead, and his right
to a patent to the land accrued, during his coverture with Eustaquia. On the basis of these
findings, the plaintiffs were declared entitled to the half of the land claimed by them.
Issue:
Whether or not a wife, not a party to an action is bound by a judgment therein for or
against her husband with respect to community or homestead property or property held as
an estate in entirety.
Ruling:
Community property. It has been held that a judgment against the husband in an action
involving community property, is conclusive on the wife even if she is not a party, but it
has also been held that a judgment against either husband or wife with respect to
community property in an action to which the other spouse is not a party does not prevent
the other spouse from subsequently having his or her day in court, although, of course, a
judgment against both husband and wife is binding on both.
In the particular circumstances obtaining here, the Court can as it does in good
conscience and without doing violence to doctrine, adopt the affirmative view and hold
the petitioner bound by the judgment against Martin Lacerna, despite her not having in
fact been impleaded in the action against the latter. This ruling presumes that petitioner is,
as she claims, the legal wife of Lacerna though, as observed by the Intermediate
Appellate Court, no marriage contract was presented by Lacerna to prove his marriage to
the petitioner either before or after the death of Eustaquia Pichan. Indeed, it is clear that
the petitioner cannot assert any claim to the land other than by virtue of her supposed
marriage to Lacerna. As a mere mistress, she cannot pretend to any right thereto.
But whether the petitioner is a lawful wife or a mere "live-in" partner, the Court simply

cannot believe that she never became aware of the litigation concerning the land until
presented with the writ of execution. What is far more probable and credible is that she
has known of the lawsuit since 1956 when Martin Lacerna "married" her.
From the averments of the petition, it is evident that the petitioner relies mainly, if not
solely, on the fact that the certificate of title to the land carries her name as the "wife" of
the owner named therein, Martin Lacerna. As already observed, such entry on the
certificate of title has been established by evidence no longer disputable as resulting from
a mistake if, indeed, it was not procured through fraud. Moreover, on the authority of
Litam vs. Rivera 17 and Stuart vs. Yatco, 18 the phrase "married to Epifania Magallon
written after the name of Martin Lacerna in said certificate of title is merely descriptive
of the civil status of Martin Lacerna, the registered owner, and does not necessarily prove
that the land is "conjugal" property of Lacerna and petitioner hereyn. Neither can
petitioner invoke the presumption established in Article 160 of the Civil Code that
property acquired during the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership, there being no
proof of her alleged marriage to Martin Lacerna except that which arises by implication
from the aforestated entry in the certificate of title and for the far more compelling reason
that the homestead claim on the land was shown to have been perfected during Martin
Lacerna's marriage to Eustaquia Pichan, mother of the private respondents. The ruling in
Maramba vs. Lozano 19 that the presumption does not operate where there is no showing
as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired applies with even greater force
here.

IN RE: ESTATE OF NARCISO PADILLA

G.R. No. L-48137

October 4, 1943
Facts:
This case is an incident of the settlement of the testate estate of the late Narciso A.
Padilla. In order that his property may be divided according to his last will and testament,
it is necessary first to liquidate the conjugal partnership. It was in connection with such
liquidation that the widow, Concepcion Paterno Vda. de Padilla, commenced the instant
proceedings by filing a petition wherein she prayed, inter alia, that her paraphernal
property be segregated from the inventoried estate and delivered to her together with the
corresponding reimbursements and indemnities; that she be given one-half of the
conjugal partnership property; and that her usufructuary right over one-half of the portion
pertaining to the heir instituted in the will be recognized. The Court of First Instance of
Manila rendered judgment declaring certain pieces of real estate and jewelry as well as
certain sums of money to be paraphernal, and ordering the same to be delivered to the
widow (appellee herein).
Issues:
(1) Whether or not what appears in the Torrens Title is conclusive and incontestable.
(2) Whether or not the ownership of the land is retained by the wife.
(3) Whether or not the value of the paraphernal buildings which were demolished to
make possible the construction of new ones, at the expense of the conjugal partnership,
should be reimbursed to the wife.
Ruling:
(1) NO. There is nothing sacrosanct and definitive in the certificate of title when the
conjugal partnership is liquidated. The true and real owner may be shown whether it
be the husband, or the wife, or both. Thus, in Flores vs. Flores, 48 Phil. 288, this Court
held that property acquired during the marriage but registered in the husband's name still
belonged to the conjugal partnership. A similar ruling was announced when the real estate
was registered in the wife's name. An exception should in no wise be made when the
property is registered in the names of both spouses. In such instances, the property may
be shown to be really of either spouse, though recorded in the names of both. The
underlying reason is the same in all cases, which is the confidential relation between
husband and wife. Because of the feelings of trust existing between the spouses,
certificates of title are often secured in the name of both, or of either, regardless of the
true ownership of the property, and regardless of the source of the purchase money. It is
thus but fair that on liquidation of the partnership, the trust should be recognized and
enforced, so that the real ownership of the property may be established. The principle that
a trustee who takes a Torrens title in his name cannot repudiate the trust by relying on the
registration, is one of the well-known limitations upon the finality of a decree of title.
(See Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil., 343).
(2) YES. The ownership of the land is retained by the wife until she is paid the value of
the lot, as a result of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. The mere construction of
a building from common funds does not automatically convey the ownership of the wife's

land to the conjugal partnership. Such a mode of using the land, namely, by erecting a
building thereon, is simply an exercise of the right of usufruct pertaining to the conjugal
partnership over the wife's land. In consequence of this usufructuary right, the conjugal
partnership is not bound to pay any rent during the occupation of the wife's land because
if the lot were leased to a third person, instead of being occupied by the new construction
from partnership funds, the rent from the third person would belong to the conjugal
partnership. Therefore, before payment of the value of the land is made from the common
funds, inasmuch as the owner of the land is the wife, all the increase or decrease in its
value must be for her benefit or loss. And when may she demand payment? Not until the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership because up to that time, it is neither necessary nor
appropriate to transfer to the partnership the dominion over the land, which is lawfully
held in usufruct by the conjugal partnership during the marriage.
(3) YES. Such tearing down of buildings was done with regard to the Arquiza, Juan Luna
and Martin Ocampo properties. Appellant maintains that it is doubtful if these buildings
had any value at the time they were destroyed, and that there is no evidence that the
conjugal partnership realized any benefit therefrom. However, we are certain these old
buildings had some value, though small, and it will be the duty of the commissioners
mentioned in the judgment appealed from, to assess that value. We entertain no manner of
doubt that the conjugal partnership derived a positive advantage from the demolition,
which made it possible to erect new constructions for the partnership. It is but just,
therefore, that the value of the old buildings at the time they were torn down should be
paid to the wife.

Wong vs. IAC

GR No. 70082
August 19, 1991
Facts:
Romario Henson married Katrina on January 1964. They had 3 children however, even
during the early years of their marriage, the spouses had been most of the time living
separately. During the marriage or on about January 1971, the husband bought a parcel
of land in Angeles from his father using the money borrowed from an officemate.
Sometime in June 1972, Katrina entered an agreement with Anita Chan where the latter
consigned the former pieces of jewelry valued at P321,830.95. Katrina failed to return
the same within the 20 day period thus Anita demanded payment of their value. Katrina
issued in September 1972, check of P55,000 which was dishonored due to lack of funds.
The spouses Anita Chan and Ricky Wong filed action for collection of the sum of money
against Katrina and her husband Romarico. The reply with counterclaim filed was only
in behalf of Katrina. Trial court ruled in favor of the Wongs then a writ of execution was
thereafter issued upon the 4 lots in Angeles City all in the name of Romarico Henson
married to Katrina Henson. 2 of the lots were sold at public auction to Juanito Santos and
the other two with Leonardo Joson. A month before such redemption, Romarico filed an
action for annulment of the decision including the writ and levy of execution.
Issue:
Whether or not debt of the wife without the knowledge of the husband can be satisfied
through the conjugal property.
Ruling:
No. The spouses had in fact been separated when the wife entered into the business deal
with Anita. The husband had nothing to do with the business transactions of Katrina nor
authorized her to enter into such. The properties in Angeles were acquired during the
marriage with unclear proof where the husband obtained the money to repay the loan.
Hence, it is presumed to belong in the conjugal partnership in the absence of proof that
they are exclusive property of the husband and even though they had been living
separately. A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things
necessary for support of the family. The writ of execution cannot be issued against
Romarico and the execution of judgments extends only over properties belonging to the
judgment debtor. The conjugal properties cannot answer for Katrinas obligations as she
exclusively incurred the latter without the consent of her husband nor they did redound to
the benefit of the family. There was also no evidence submitted that the administration of
the partnership had been transferred to Katrina by Romarico before said obligations were
incurred. In as much as the decision was void only in so far as Romarico and the
conjugal properties concerned, Spouses Wong may still execute the debt against Katrina,
personally and exclusively.