Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18209
June 30, 1966
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee,
vs.
VENANCIO SULLANO, defendant and appellant.
M. M. Magsalin as counsel de officio for defendant and appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff and appellee.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is an appeal direct to Us from the Court of First Instance of Iloilo's decision
finding the accused guilty of estafaand condemning him to suffer an indeterminate
sentence of not less than two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor and not
more than one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional, to indemnify the
offended party (ACCFA) in the amount of P5,070.38, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of non-payment, and to pay the costs.1wph1.t
On February 29, 1956, the Santa Barbara Farmers Cooperative Marketing
Association was formally organized. Among the officers elected therein was
Venancio Sullano, herein appellant, as Secretary-Treasurer. The Articles of
Incorporation and the By-Laws of the Santa Barbara FACOMA were registered on
May 11, 1956 in the Securities and Exchange Commission. Also on that date said
FACOMA affiliated with the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing
Administration (ACCFA)
About ten months after or specifically on March 20, 1957, Restituto Danque, an
ACCFA auditing examiner, was directed, by Special Order No. 462 of the ACCFA
Assistant Administrator, to proceed to the Santa Barbara FACOMA and audit its
books of accounts. The result of said audit, as set forth in Restituto Danque's audit
report (Exhs. B, B-1, B-2 and B-3), was a finding that Secretary-Treasurer Sullano
had a shortage, in his cash account, of P5,005.47 as of April 25, 1957.
Subsequently, the Santa Barbara FACOMA's board of directors was informed of said
discrepancy, at a meeting called for that purpose. Sullano admitted he might be
short, but not in the big amount of P5,005.47 (Tsn., Perez, p. 12). As a result,
Secretary-Treasurer Sullano was suspended effective May 31, 1957.
Sullano, in his letter dated June 13, 1957, requested t general re-audit "to clarify the
real situation" (Exh. D-1). On the other hand, a letter dated June 18, 1957 from
ACCFAs General Counsel, on behalf of its Administrator, addressed to Sullano,
stated:
The audit report on your Facoma as of March 31, 1957 shows that you had a cash
shortage of P5,005.47 as of said date. The report also discloses that you promised
to make good said shortage. If you have not done so, please do so within seven (7)
days from receipt hereof, failing which, we will be compelled to bring the matter to
the court.
Also explain within three (3) days from receipt hereof why you should not be
suspended and removed from office in view of your shortage discovered. (Exh. Q)
Sullano further wrote the ACCFA District Director at Iloilo City on June 30, 1957, thus
(Exh. R):
Upon inquiring from the Central Office regarding my case, I was informed that it was
already forwarded to the Provincial Office. By this information, I believed it was
already in your table awaiting for action.

In this connection, I humbly request for an extension of a considerable time, to raise

the necessary amount to cover the real shortage after request for further
verification is conducted.
Personally, I would like to employ all possible means to settle this case extrajudicially.
I hope for your kind consideration.
On July 15, 1957, the ACCFA Administrator, by telegram (Exh. C), ordered its
Auditing Team Leader in Iloilo to send Restituto Danque to re-audit the books of
accounts of the Santa Barbara FACOMA. In a letter of the same date (Exh. D), the
Assistant Administrator sent to the aforesaid Auditing Team Leader, Sullano's letter
of June 13, 1957 requesting a re-audit, with instructions that it be used as guide in
said re-audit. It was further stated by him that documents not previously presented
should be taken into consideration if proved to be valid.
Restituto Danque, therefore, made a re-audit of the Santa Barbara FACOMA's books
on accounts. Specifically, he made a re-audit of the FACOMA's of accounts from
February, 1956 (date of organization) to December 31, 1956 and a cash audit from
April 1, 1957 to May 31, 1957. The result was a finding of cash shortage in Sullano's
cash accountability in the amount of P5,070.98. (See Audit Report dated October 9,
1957 [Exh. E] and statement of cash accountability [Exh. E-1])
For the ACCFA Acting Provincial Director, the ACCFA District Legal Officer wrote
Sullano on November 21, 1957. Said the letter:
As a result of the re-audit of the Sta. Barbara Facoma for the period ending May 31,
1957, the date when your suspension as Secretary-Treasurer of the Sta. Barbara
Facoma became effective, you had been found short of Five Thousand Seventy
Pesos and 98/100 (P5,070.98) incurred during your incumbency as such SecretaryTreasurer of the Sta. Barbara Facoma, for which, demand is hereby made that you
account for and make good said shortage within ten (10) days from date hereof,
otherwise, much to our regret, drastic court action will be brought against you. (Exh.
S)
After Sullano failed to pay the afore-stated sum, a criminal complaint for estafa was
filed against him in the Justice of the Peace Court of Santa Barbara, Iloilo.
Subsequently, on June 9, 1959, an information for estafa was filed against Sullano in
the Court of First Instance of Iloilo.
Sullano pleaded not guilty. At the trial, the prosecution adduced testimonial and
documentary evidence in support of the charge. For his defense, the accused
presented no witness, but his counsel submitted as documentary evidence the
annotations signed by Alfredo Sonalan appearing at the back of three official
receipts1 issued by the municipal treasurer of Santa Barbara, Iloilo. Apparently it
was sought to be proved thereby that Alfredo Sonalan manager of the Santa
Barbara FACOMA was the one who withdrew and received the sums of P1,225 (Exh.
E), P400 (Exh. 2) and P375 (Exh. 3), covered by said receipts, which consisted of
funds of the FACOMA deposited with the municipal treasurer of Santa Barbara, Iloilo.
We surmise that the defense intended thereby to show that Sonalan not Sullano, is
responsible for the cash shortage to the extent of said amounts.
As adverted to above, the trial court rendered, on February 17, 1961, a judgment of
conviction. And the accused perfected an appeal therefrom to this Court.
Appellant states in his brief that he thereunder discusses questions of facts as well
as of law and, hence, asks for certification of his appeal to the Court of Appeals.
Although the Solicitor General states in appellee's brief that he is agreeable to said
certification, we are of the view that the request ought not be granted. For one

thing, in his notice of appeal filed in the court below, appellant expressly specified
that he was appealing the case to the Supreme Court. And it is the rule that an
appellant who takes his appeal to the Supreme Court is deemed to have waived his
right to dispute any finding of fact made by the trial court. 2
And, for another, the principal arguments raised by appellant in his brief are
actually in the nature of questions of law, which we now proceed to discuss.
It is first contended by appellant that the court a quo erred in holding that the funds
involved in the cash shortage are ACCFA funds. There is no dispute that the Santa
Barbara FACOMA affiliated with the ACCFA on May 11, 1956. There is also no dispute
that prior to said date, or on February 24 and 27, 1956, funds of the proposed
FACOMA i.e., the P1,225, the P400 and the P375 appearing under Exhibits 1, 2
and 3, respectively were deposited with the municipal treasurer of Santa Barbara,
Iloilo. And that said deposited funds were included by Restituto Danque in his audit
and re-audit. Said funds were in fact included in his computation of Sullano's cash
shortage. Appellant would argue, from these undisputed facts, that said funds
having been received before the Santa Barbara FACOMA affiliated with ACCFA, the
same can not be considered as ACCFA funds.
Appellant forgets that prior to May 11, 1956 the Santa Barbara FACOMA had yet no
legal personality and existence. For equally unquestioned is the fact that it was only
on said date, also, that its Article of Incorporation was registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (Exh. F). And to form a cooperative marketing
association such as the Santa Barbara FACOMA herein adoption and
registration of Articles of Incorporation, in the manner provided by the Corporation
Law, is required (Sec. 3, Public Act 3425). For this reason, prior to May 11, 1956,
funds of the proposed FACOMA were deposited "for safe-keeping" (See Exhs. 1, 2
and 3) with the municipal treasurer. From the foregoing it is clear that, since the
Santa Barbara FACOMA affiliated with the ACCFA on the same day that it acquired
legal existence, there was no error in considering, for purposes of this estafa case,
the afore-stated so-called FACOMA funds as ACCFA funds.
Neither is there necessity, as appellant would further urge, to pinpoint the items
misappropriated or the specific time the same were misappropriated. It suffices that
the accused was shown, beyond reasonable doubt, to be short in his cash
accountability, as of May 31, 1957, in the total amount of P5,070.98. Since, upon
demand for the same, he could neither account for it nor cover the shortage, there
is evidence that he misappropriated said amount. Failure to account upon demand,
for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation
(Tubb vs. People, L-9811, April 22, 1957; 53 O.G. 6096).
The second assignment of error in appellant's brief is on the finding that he
admitted having misappropriated funds in his custody. It is averred that the
statements of the appellant thereon were conditional, that is, that he "might" be
short, and, "if so he was willing to make up for the same. As rightly observed by the
Solicitor General, however, this point is inconsequential. For even totally apart from
any finding of admission on appellant's part that he misappropriated the funds in his
custody, the prosecution's evidence, as discussed above, has established such
misappropriation.
In his third and last assignment of error, appellant would again refer to the deposits
of P1,225 (Exh. 1), P400 (Exh. 2) and of P375 (Exh. 3) made on February 24, and 27,
1956 with the municipal treasurer.
The receipt and withdrawal of said deposits by the accused himself are clearly
admitted. For in the official municipal voucher (Exh. W), said accused signed a

certification to the effect that he received said amounts from the municipal
treasurer of Santa Barbara, Iloilo, on May 29, 1956. It is true that there were
certifications signed by Alfredo Sonalan at the reverse side of the official receipts for
said deposits, stating that Sonalan received them from said municipal treasurer. It
must be remembered, however, that Sonalan was the one who made these
deposits, prior to the establishment of the Santa Barbara FACOMA. For which reason
it is not surprising that, regardless of who actuallywithdrew said amount, Sonalan
was likewise made to acknowledge said withdrawal. At the time said deposits were
withdrawn, on May 29, 1956, the Santa Barbara FACOMA was already legally
existing. Sullano, being then its Secretary-Treasurer, is without doubt the one who
actually received, for keeping in his custody, the said funds. Standing unrebutted to
this effect is the testimony of Simplicio Aranda, a clerk in the Provincial Auditor's
Office of Iloilo, stating that said deposits were in fact withdrawn by Sullano and not
by Sonalan (Tsn., Gavan, pp. 83, 85).
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs
against the appellant. So ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24796
June 28, 1968
DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, FOREST STATION WARDEN, DISTRICT 13, BUREAU
OF FORESTRY, BOARD OF DIRECTORS, NATIONAL WATERWORKS AND
SEWERAGE AUTHORITY 1 and CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. EMMANUEL M. MUOZ, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, Branch I, the SHERIFF OF THE PROVINCE of BULACAN, and
PINAGCAMALIGAN INDO-AGRO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
INC.,respondents.
----------------------------G.R. No. L-25459
June 28, 1968
PINAGCAMALIGAN INDO-AGRO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. MACARIO PERALTA, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of National
Defense;
HON. ENETERIO DE JESUS, in his capacity as Undersecretary of National
Defense;
GENERAL RIGOBERTO ATIENZA, in his capacity as the Chief of Staff; 2
Armed Forces of the Philippines,
COLONEL MANUEL V. REYES, in his capacity as the Judge Advocate General,
Armed Forces of the Philippines;
and the TASK FORCES COMMANDER, Task Force Preserve (Tabak Division),
1st Infantry Division, Fort Magsaysay, Nueva Ecija, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner Director of Forestry, et al.
Gualberto Cruz for respondent Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Two original actions involving divers legal questions are now before this Court.

In the first, L-24796, the corresponding government officials seek

on certiorari and prohibition to annul the order and writ of execution issued by
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in its Civil Case 3035-M allowing
Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc. (Piadeco, for short) to haul
its logs in the area hereinafter to be mentioned.
In the second, L-25459, it was Piadeco's turn to ask on prohibition and injunction
for a ruling that respondent government officials are "without authority and
jurisdiction to stop logging operations, construction of the roads, cutting, gathering
and removing of timber and other forest products" from said corporation's private
woodland area.
Because of their interrelation, the two case are here jointly considered.
The following undisputed facts control:
Piadeco claims to be the owner of Some 72,000 hectares of land 3 located in the
municipalities of Angat, Norzagaray and San Jose del Monte, province of Bulacan,
and in Antipolo and Montalban, province of Rizal. Piadeco's evidence of ownership
consists of Titulo de Propiedad No. 4136, dated April 25, 1894,4 and a deed of
absolute sale of July 12, 1962, in its favor. Piadeco applied for registration
as private woodland some 10,000 hectares of this land. The Bureau of Forestry, on
December 4, 1963, issued in Piadeco's name Certificate of Private Woodland
Registration No. PWR 2065-New, covering but a portion of the land an aggregate
area of 4,400 hectares and an average stand of 87.20 cubic meters, situated in the
municipalities of Angat, Norzagaray, and San Jose del Monte, all of the province of
Bulacan, and Montalban, in Rizal. It was to expire on December 31, 1964. By virtue
of the registration certificate, Piadeco conducted logging operations..
The controversy in the these cases began on April 11, 1964, when Acting Director of
Forestry Apolonio F. Rivera issued an order cancelling PWR No. 2065-New. He
required Piadeco to surrender the original certificate to him. Ground for this
cancellation was that Piadeco had violated forestry rules and regulations for cutting
trees within the Angat and Marikina Watershed Reservations, expressly excluded
from the said certificate.5
On April 14, 1964, Forest Station Warden Reinaldo B. Marquez, District 13, Bureau of
Forestry, wrote Piadeco requesting the latter to desist, effective the same day, April
14, 1964, from conducting its logging operation inside or outside the area covered
by PWR 2065-New, and to refrain from removing logs already cut unless they have
been scaled and properly invoiced by forestry officers.
Previously, on April 10, 1964, Nawasa's board of directors advised Piadeco, by letter,
of the revocation of the 1964 grant to Piadeco, of a right of way from a barrio in
Bosoboso, Antipolo, to Montalban, Rizal, as an access road to its logging concession
under PWR 2061.
Offshot of the foregoing is Piadeco's petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction, lodged on April 17, 1964 with the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan.6 This petition was directed against the Director of Forestry, Forest Station
Warden Marquez and Nawasa, essentially upon the averment that their acts
heretofore narrated were "all precipitate, arbitrary, whimsical and capricious." On
the same day, April 17, 1964, Judge Emmanuel M. Muoz of the Bulacan court
directed the government authorities to show cause why preliminary injunction
should not issue.
On May 4, 1964, over the Director of Forestry's opposition, the judge ordered the
issuance upon a P10,000-bond of a writ of preliminary injunction restraining
the Director of Forestry, the Forest Station Warden and Nawasa from carrying out

and executing the April 10, 1964 revocation by Nawasa of Piadeco's right of way,
the April 11, 1964 order of the Director of Forestry, and the April 14, 1964 directive
of the Forest Station Warden, heretofore mentioned.
On May 5, 1964, Piadeco moved to declare the forestry officials in default for failure
to answer its petition on time.
On May 6, 1964, unaware of Piadeco's May 5 motion, the forestry officials, upon a
motion dated April 29, 1964, asked the Bulacan court to dismiss Piadeco's petition
upon the averments that said court had no jurisdiction over their persons or the
subject matter of the petition, and that administrative remedies have not yet been
exhausted by Piadeco. On the same date, too, but in a separate motion, said
forestry official asked for a reconsideration of the lower court's order granting
preliminary injunction, bottomed upon their charge that the illegal cutting of trees
by Piadeco inside the Angat and Marikina Watershed Reservations which are the
main source of water supply of the City of Manila and its surrounding towns and
cities poses a grave danger of causing them to dry up to the prejudice and
irreparable injury of the inhabitants thereof. Piadeco file written opposition on May
13, 1964.
On May 14, 1964, acting on the aforesaid motion for reconsideration and opposition
thereto, the judge below ruled that although Piadeco is entitled to injunction, the
continuance thereof would cause great damage to the government, while Piadeco
can be fully compensated for any damages Piadeco may suffer because of the
dissolution thereof. That bond, however, was not filed by the forestry officials.
On July 13, 1964, upon Piadeco's May 5 motion earlier adverted to, the forestry
officials were declared in default.
On July 24, 1964, said forestry officials filed a verified motion to set aside the
default order and to admit their answer thereto attached. They pleaded excusable
neglect and/or oversight of the clerk of the records of the Records section of the
Bureau of Forestry.
On July 29, 1964, the court shunted aside the foregoing motion for the reason that
their six days' delay was not excusable and their answer was prepared only after
three days from their receipt of the order of default. A motion for reconsideration
registered by the forestry officials on August 12, 1964 was unavailing. The court
below struck down that motion on September 4, 1964.
Thus it is, that Piadeco submitted evidence ex parte to the court below against the
Director of Forestry and the Forest Station Warden.
Piadeco had, in the meantime, entered into an amicable settlement with Nawasa
whereby Piadeco's case against Nawasa was withdrawn, the right of way granted by
Nawasa to Piadeco remaining revoked and cancelled; and Nawasa's counterclaim
against Piadeco was also withdrawn in consideration of P1,651.59 paid by Piadeco
to Nawasa, representing the former's liabilities to the latter.
On December 29, 1964, the court below rendered judgment. It approved Piadeco's
compromise agreement with Nawasa. It held that Piadeco was the owner of the land
in question; that its operation was not in violation of forestry rules and regulations;
that aside from its regulation certificate, Piadeco was permitted by Nawasa thru the
latter's Resolution 1050, Section of 1963, to conduct selective logging within the
Angat-Marikina Watershed upon payment of P2.00 for every cubic meter of timber
classified in the first group and P1.75 belonging to the second group; that similar
permits were issued to other individuals by the Director of Forestry with the
acquiescence of Nawasa; that Piadeco's logging under Resolution 1050 aforesaid
could not be contrary to forestry rules and regulations; and that, upon the doctrine

laid down in Santiago vs. Basilan Lumber Co., L-15532, October 31, 1963, even if
Piadeco's private woodland was unregistered, it still retains its inherent "rights of
ownership, among which are (its) rights to the fruits of the land and to exclude any
persons from the enjoyment and disposal thereof", its only liability being the
payment of surcharges on the timber severed from the land. Thereupon, the court
reinstated the writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued and made it permanent,
with costs..
Meanwhile, on December 28, 1964, one day before the rendition of the judgment
just mentioned, Piadeco applied for the renewal of its Certificate of Private
Woodland Registration PWR 2065-New, which would expire on the last day of that
month. On January 12, 1965, in reply thereto, Assistant Director of Forestry J. L.
Utleg denied the renewal requested. He informed Piadeco that its Titulo de
Propiedad 4136 was not registerable under Forestry Administrative Order No. 12-2
which took effect on January 1, 1963. The expiration of its registration certificate
and the non-renewal thereof notwithstanding, Piadeco continued logging operations.
It was about this time that illegal logging was denounced by some members of
Congress thereby attracting national attention. This led to a directive by the
President of the Philippines on March 8, 1965 to stop all illegal logging operations.
Complying therewith, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources wrote the
Secretary of National Defense with the request that units of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines be detailed at the areas involved, deputizing them agents of the Bureau
of Forestry to assist in the enforcement of forest laws, rules and regulations, and the
protection of the forests. The Secretary of National Defense, in turn, direct the Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces to implement the request. And, the Chief of Staff
dispatched at ask force of the army into the Angat area, which impounded and
seized all logs cut by Piadeco and other loggers which were purportedly conducting
illegal operations.
On May 11, 1965, Piadeco sought from the Bulacan court an ex parte writ of
execution of the December 29, 1964 decision. That decision had by then become
final for failure of the forestry officials to appeal therefrom. Piadeco prayed that it
be not molested in its logging operations including the hauling of about 600 pieces
(unscaled) and 1,000 pieces of mixed (scaled and unscaled) timber from the log
ponds.
On May 12, 1965, the Bulacan court presided over temporarily by Judge Ricardo C.
Puno set Piadeco's motion for execution for hearing on May 27, 1965. Before the
day of the hearing arrived, however, Piadeco withdrew its ex parte motion for
execution with the manifestation that it would look for a more expeditious way or a
more appropriate remedy to enable it to haul the logs before the rains set in. But on
May 27, 1965, Piadeco refiled its motion for execution with Judge Muoz, who had
meanwhile resumed his duties.
On June 1, 1965, Judge Muoz granted Piadeco's motion. In line therewith, on June
3, 1965, the corresponding writ of execution was issued, directing a special sheriff
to make effective and execute the aforesaid lower court's decision of December 29,
1964.
Execution notwithstanding, the forestry officials still refused to permit Piadeco to
haul its logs. Because of this, on June 11, 1965, Piadeco asked the court below to
declare the forestry officials and those acting under them in contempt. On June 30,
1965, the forestry officials opposed. They averred that Piadeco's registration
certificate already expired on December 31, 1964; that despite this expiration,
Piadeco continued illegal logging operations, which resulted in the seizure of its

logs: that after December 31, 1964, the December 29, 1964 decision of the court
below became functus officio and could no longer be executed. Piadeco's rejoinder
of July 1, 1965 was that its registration certificate is not expirable and that it is not a
license.
On July 8, 1965, the judge came out with an order declaring that notwithstanding
"the expiration of petitioner's [Piadeco's] license (?) on December 31, 1964, their
said property remains registered with the Bureau of Forestry subject only to
renewal, in which case it can still pursue its logging operations, conditioned upon
the payment by it of forest charges." The judge took into consideration a certificate
issued on May 4, 1965 by Assistant Director of Forestry J. L. Utleg, as officer-incharge, that "all the timber cut ... during the lifetime" of the registration certificate
"may be transported by" Piadeco "provided they are properly documented." Finding
that Piadeco "complied with all the requirements of the Bureau of Forestry and the
Bureau of Internal Revenue as regards the proper documentation of the logs in
question," the judge thereupon directed the forestry officials "and all members of
the Armed Forces stationed along the way" to allow Piadeco "to haul its logs which
have already been properly documented."
This precipitated the filing on July 28, 1965 by the Director of Forestry, the Forest
Station Warden, the Armed Forces Chief of Staff 7 of an original petition with this
Court (L-24796, now at bar) for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
to annul the June 1,1965 order of execution, the June 3, 1965 writ of execution and
the July 8, 1965 order allowing Piadeco to haul its logs. Named respondents were
Piacedo, Judge Emmanuel M. Muoz of the Bulacan court, and the Provincial Sheriff
of Bulacan..
On July 30, 1965, this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction, as prayed for by
the aforenamed government officials. On August 3, 1965, Piadeco sought the
dissolution thereof for the reason, amongst others, that Mr. J. L. Utleg, Assistant
Director of Forestry and Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Forestry, was already
agreeable mentioned, as per his letter of June 7, 1965 to Piadeco informing the
latter that the writ of execution was being referred to the Forest Station Warden for
compliance. On August 9, 1965, the Solicitor General blocked Piadeco's motion to
dissolve, with an allegation, amongst others, that the June 7, 1965 letter just
mentioned was deemed recalled when the Director Forestry realizing that the
said writ would allow Piadeco to continue logging after the expiration and nonrenewal of its certificate in a public forest area or in an area excluded from the
expired permit did not give effect to the said letter.
On August 18, 1965, manifestation was made by the Solicitor General to this Court
thru a motion dated August 17, 1965, that the logs seized and imposed by the
armed forces were being exposed to the elements; that the rainy season having set
in, there was grave danger that the said logs might deteriorate and become
useless. He thus prayed that the forestry officials be authorized to turn the logs over
to the engineer corps of the Armed Forces for the construction of prefabricated
schoolhouses pursuant to General Circular V-337, series of 1961, of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. On August 31, 1965, Piadeco objected upon the ground that the
said logs are still its private property; and that there is no law empowering the State
to seize, confiscate and turn over the cut logs to the Armed Forces.
On September 29, 1965, Piadeco, in turn, petitioned for preliminary injunction and
moved again to dissolve this Court's writ of preliminary injunction of July 30, 1965. It
called attention to the fact that the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the court
below on May 4, 1964 in Civil Case 3035-M is still enforceable and has not yet been

dissolved because the forestry officials have not filed their P10,000.00-bond as
required by the trial court in its order of May 14, 1964.
On October 8, 1965, this Court denied the two motions of Piadeco, declared that the
writ of preliminary injunction it issued stands enforced and is effective until
otherwise lifted, and authorized the Solicitor General to effect the removal of all the
logs subject of his motion of August 17, 1965 from the log ponds but only for the
purpose of turning them over to the Armed Forces for safekeeping and custody
pending final resolution of the case.
On October 14, 1965, Piadeco traversed the averments of the forestry officials'
petition before this Court, thru an answer dated October 12, admission of which was
however denied for being late. The case was submitted without further memoranda.
Meanwhile, a companion case (L-25459, also at bar)emerged from subsequent
events hereunder related.
On October 20, 1965, pending this Court's resolution of the foregoing petition of the
forestry officials (L-24796), Piadeco wrote the Director of Forestry with a request to
grant it "AUTHORITY to cut, gather and remove timber" from its alleged private
woodland. At the same time, it advised the Director of Forestry that "in the absence
of such authority or permit", it "shall cut, gather and remove timber from the said
area subject to the payment of regular forest charge and 300% surcharge for
unlawful cutting in accordance with the penal provisions" of Section 266 of the Tax
Code.
On November 4, 1965, Acting Director J. L. Utleg replied. He told Piadeco that
"pending meticulous study" of its application for renewal of PWR 2065-New, his
"[o]ffice is not now in a position to grant" the desired authority and "will consider
any cutting, gathering and removal of timber" from the land "to be illegal, hence,
subject to the provisions of Section 266 of the National Internal Revenue Code."
Obviously taking the foregoing letter as a case, Piadeco, on December 6, 1965,
advised the Director that immediately upon receipt of said letter, it (Piadeco)
resumed logging operations within its private woodland area in the municipality of
Montalban, Rizal, "thereby subjecting all timber cut therefrom to the payment of
300% penalty, plus regular forest charges." Piadeco also requested the Director to
inform the Task Force Commander that it "can be allowed to continue its logging
operation within their private woodland" subject to Section 266 of the Tax Code.
So, on December 7, 1965, Acting Director J. L. Utleg notified the Task Force
Commander, through the Undersecretary of National Defense, that Piadeco "can
conduct logging operations within its private woodland, as it is a constitutional right
on its part to use and enjoy its own property and the fruits thereof" but that
whatever timber cut therefrom "should be subject to the payment not only of the
regular charges but also of the surcharges imposed by Section 166" of the Tax Code.
This notwithstanding, the army authorities refused to heed Utleg's December 7,
1965 letter and stood pat on its posture not to allow Piadeco to conduct logging
operations.
Hence, it was Piadeco's turn to come to this Court on December 22, 1965 on an
original petition for injunction and prohibition (L-25459 aforesaid) against
respondents Secretary of National Defense, the Undersecretary of National Defense,
the Chief of Staff, the Judge Advocate General and the Task Force Commander (Task
Force Preserve, Tabak Division). Specifically, Piadeco charges as follows: On
December 17, 1965, army men [Capt. Zamuco, Lt. Oresque, Sgts. Albino, Gutierrez,
Ramirez, and Sawada, and Cpl. Manlapus], boisterously, unlawfully, wilfully, and
feloniously entered upon orders of a certain Major Elfano Piadeco's land at

Barrio Anginan, Montalban, Rizal, outside the watershed reservations. They made a
portion of the land their private quarters. They prevented Piadeco's officers (a) from
continuing its logging operations, especially the construction of the road inside the
land; (b) from cutting, gathering and removing timber and other forest products
therefrom; and (c)from living and moving in freedom and engaging in the pursuit of
happiness on said land. Piadeco asks principally that respondent officials be
declared "without authority and jurisdiction to stop logging operations, construction
of the roads, cutting, gathering and removing of timber and other forest products
from the Private Woodland area" of the former.
There was a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction which this
Court, however, denied on December 31, 1965, and upon reconsideration, on
February 1, 1966.
After respondents' answer, and hearing on oral arguments, the case was submitted
for decision.
1. Basic to an intelligent appraisal of the rights of Piadeco, who comes to us as an
alleged private wood landowner, is the all-important question: Is Piadeco's title
registrable with the Bureau of Forestry?
The pertinent statutory provision is Section 1829 of the Revised Administrative
Code, viz:
SEC. 1829. Registration of title to private forest land. Every private owner of land
containing timber, firewood and other minor forest products shall register his title to
the same with the Director of Forestry. A list of such owners, with a statement of the
boundaries of their property, shall be furnished by said Director to the Collector of
Internal Revenue, and the same shall be supplemented from time to time as
occasion may require.
Upon application of the Director of Forestry the fiscal of the province in which any
such land lies shall render assistance in the examination of the title thereof with a
view to its registration in the Bureau of Forestry.
Ampliatory thereof is Section 7, Forestry Administrative Order 12-1 of July 1, 1941,
as amended by Forestry Administrative Order 12-2, which took effect on January 1,
1963. It reads:
7. Titles that may be registered. Only the following titles covering lands
containing timber, firewood and other minor forest products may be registered
under and pursuant to Section 1829 of the Revised Administrative Code;
(a) Administrative titles granted by the present Government, such as homestead
patent, free patent, and sales patent; and
(b) Judicial titles, such as Torrens Title obtained under the Land Registration Act (Act
496, as amended) or under the Cadastral Act (Act No. 2259, as amended).
The amendment of Forestry Administrative Order 12-1 by Forestry Administrative
Order 12-2 consisted in theomission of one paragraph, paragraph (c), which
particularized as one of the titles registrable pursuant to Section 1829 of the
Revised Administrative Code, "[t]itles granted by the Spanish sovereignty in the
islands and duly recognized as valid titles under the existing laws."
Piadeco's position is that such amendment contravenes said Section 1829, which
does not specify the titles that are registrable thereunder; and that it is
diametrically opposed to the Opinion of the Attorney General of October 15, 1919,
which ruled that a royal title "issued in September, 1896, and inscribed in the
Registry of Property within a year after its issuance is valid, and therefore its owner
is entitled to the benefits" of Section 1829 aforesaid. Also cited are the Opinion of
the Secretary of the Interior of November 7, 1916, stating that registration under

Section 1829 is not subject to change and revocation unless title is established in a
different person by judicial declaration; the Opinion of the Director of Forestry of
January 8, 1925, which recognized as registrable, titles "such aninformacion
posesoria ..., composicion con el estado and purchase under the Spanish
sovereignty" amongst others; and the Opinion of the Collector of Internal Revenue
of February 6, 1926, declaring imperfect titles within the purview of Section 45(a) of
Act 2874, as also registrable.
True it is that the law, Section 1829, does not describe with particularity titles that
may be registered with the Bureau of Forestry. Concededly, too, administrative
authorities in the past considered as registrable, titles issued during the Spanish
regime. In fact, as late as 1962, Forestry Administrative Order 12-1 was still in force,
authorizing registration of such Spanish titles. But when Forestry Administrative
Order 12-2 came into effect on January 1, 1963, that order should be deemed to
have repealed all such previous administrative determinations.
There should be no question now that Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 has the
force and effect of law. It was promulgated pursuant to law. Section 1817, Revised
Administrative Code, empowers the Bureau of Forestry, with the approval of the
department head, to issue regulations "deemed expedient or necessary to secure
the protection and conservation of the public forests in such manner as to insure a
continued supply of valuable timber and other forest products for the future, and
regulating the use and occupancy of the forests and forest reserves, to the same
end." Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 was recommended by the Director of
Forestry, and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. It is
no less a valid law. It is an administrative regulation germane to the objects and
purposes of the law. A rule shaped out by jurisprudence is that when Congress
authorized the promulgation of administrative rules and regulations to implement a
given legislation, "[a]ll that is required is that the regulation should be germane to
the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with
it, but conform to the standards that the law prescribes." 8 In Geukeko vs. Araneta,
102 Phil. 706, 712, we pronounced that the necessity for vesting administrative
authorities with power to make rules and regulations for various and varying details
of management has been recognized and upheld by the courts.
And we are certainly totally unprepared to jettison Forestry Administrative Order 122 as illegal and unreasonable.
Spanish titles are quite dissimilar to administrative and judicial titles under the
present system. Although evidences of ownership, these Spanish titles may be lost
thru prescription. They are, therefore, neither indefeasible nor imprescriptible. The
law in this jurisdiction, both under the present sovereignty and the previous Spanish
regime is that ordinary prescription of ten years may take place against a title
recorded in the Registry of Property "in virtue of another title also recorded," 9 and
extra-ordinary prescription of thirty years will run, even "without need of title or of
good faith."10 For possession for along period fixed by law, the "unquestionable
foundation of the prescription of ownership ... weakens and destroys the force and
value of the best possible title to the thing possessed by one who is not the owner
thereof."11 The exception, of course, is the Torrens title, expressly recognized to be
indefeasible and impresciptible.12
And more. If a Spanish title covering forest land is found to be invalid, that land is
public forest land, is part of the public domain, and cannot be appropriated. 13 Before
private interests have intervened, the government may decide for itself what
portions of the public domain shall be set aside and reserved as forest

land.14 Possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership.15
In this case, it is undisputed that Picadeco's title which it sought to register was
issued by the Spanish sovereignty Titulo de Propiedad No. 4136, dated April 25 or
29, 1894. It is unmistakably not one of those enumerated in Section 7 aforesaid. It
should not have been allowed registration in the first place. Obviously, registration
thereof can never be renewed.
2. Piadeco is nonetheless insistent in its plea that it can still cut, gather, and remove
timber from its alleged private woodland, upon payment of forest charges and
surcharges.
The purposes of registration, as succinctly stated in Section 6, Forestry
Administrative Order 12-1 dated July 1, 1941, are:
6. Objects of registration (a) to exempt the owners of private woodlands from the
payment of forest products gathered therefrom for commercial or industrial
purposes.
(b) To regulate the transportation of forest products gathered or collected therefrom
and to avoid fraud which may be committed in connection with utilization of such
forest products with respect to their origin.
(c) To determine the legality of private claims for the protection of the interest of the
owners as well as of the Government, and to exclude all land claimed under valid
titles from the mass of the public forest in order to facilitate the protection,
administration, and supervision of the latter.
The foregoing has in part gained judicial approval in Santiago vs. Basilan Lumber
Company, L-15532, October 31, 1963, where we pronounced: "Obviously, the
purpose of the registration required in Section 1829 of the Administrative Code is to
exempt the titled owner of the land from the payment of forestry charges as
provided for under Section 266 of the National Internal Revenue Code." 16 And
Section 266 of the Tax Code, therein mentioned, provides in full:
SEC. 266. Charges collectible on forest products cut, gathered and removed from
unregistered private lands. The charges above prescribed shall be collected on all
forest products cut, gathered and removed from any private land the title to which
is not registered with the Director of Forestry as required by the Forest
Law:Provided, however, That in the absence of such registration, the owner who
desires to cut, gather and remove timber and other forest products from such land
shall secure a license from the Director of Forestry in accordance with the Forest
Law and regulations. The cutting, and the removing of timber and other forest
products from said private lands without license shall be considered as unlawful
cutting, gathering and removing of forest products from public forest and shall be
subject to the charges prescribed in such cases in this Chapter. (As amended by
Rep. Act No. 173, approved June 20, 1947.) 17
Following this provision in the Tax Code is Section 267, which in part provides:
SEC. 267. Surcharges for illegal cutting and removal of forest products or for
delinquency. Where forest products are unlawfully cut or gathered in any public
forest without license or, if under license, in violation of the terms thereof, the
charges on such products shall be increased by three hundred per centum....
To recapitulate, registration of titles by the owners of private woodlands with the
Bureau of Forestry results in an exemption "from the payment of forest products
gathered therefrom for commercial or industrial purposes." If an owner fails to so
register, he is obliged to pay forest charges, as prescribed in Sections 264 and 265
of the Tax Code, because "he still retain(s) his rights of ownership, among which are

his rights to the fruits of the land and to exclude any person from the enjoyment
and disposal thereof (Art. 429, New Civil Code)." 18 However, as provided in Section
266 above-quoted, if an owner does not register his title, but he desires to cut,
gather and remove timber and other forest products from his land, he may "secure
a license from the Director of Forestry in accordance with the Forest Law and
regulations." If he does not, under the same Section 266, his cutting, gathering and
removing of timber and other forest products "shall be considered as unlawful
cutting, gathering and removing of forest products from public forests and shall be
subject to the charges prescribed in such cases." And this would bring into play
Section 267, where, as heretofore quoted, the charges on forest products
"unlawfully cut and gathered in any public forest without license, or, if under
license, in violation of the terms thereof ... shall be increased by three hundred per
centum."
But it should be stressed that all of the situations herein mentioned refer specifically
to owners of private woodlands. The position Piadeco has taken is a jump ahead of
where it should be. We are not ready to grant the assumption that Piadeco owns the
forest land it seeks to register. Such unwillingness can come from even a superficial
assessment of Piadeco's pretensions of ownership based on the Titulo de
Propiedad in question.
Neither said Titulo, nor a copy thereof, was presented in the two proceedings before
us. What we have is merely a description thereof, viz:
TITULO DE PROPIEDAD NUMERO 4136
DATED APRIL 25, 1894, ISSUED BY
GOBIERNO CIVIL DE LA PROVINCIA
DE BULACAN
Titulo de Propiedad Numero 4136, in the name of Dn. Mariano San Pedro y Esteban,
dated April 25, 1894, being a gratuitous composicion title, grated to Dn. Mariano
San Pedroy Esteban, by the Spanish Government in the Philippines, pursuant to
Resolution dated April 14, 1894, of the Board of Land Adjustment of the (Spanish)
Administration Civil de Filipinas, as authorized under Royal Decree of May 14, 1867
and August 31, 1888, and signed by Dn. Alejandro Garcia, El Jefede la Provincia de
Bulacan and Dn. Mariano Lopez Delgado El Secretario de la Junta, with the Seal of
the Spanish Government in the Philippines attached thereto and to said Titulo de
Propiedad Numero 4136, is affixed a "Sello 10aA*s 1894 y 95 de Peso" documentary
stamp bearing Serial Number NO. 292-404 inscribed in the Office of the Registry of
Property of Bulacan, on pages 127 and 129 of Book I, for Norzagaray, as Tax
Declaration (Fincas) Nos. 57 and 58, Inscripcion No. 1, on July 16, 1894 (or within
one (1) year from April 25, 1894, pursuant to Royal Decree of January 12, 1863), the
inscription of the said TITULO DE PROPIEDAD NUMERO 4136 of Dn. Mariano San
Pedro y Esteban, having been accomplished by the Office of the Land Registry of
Bulacan, on the said date of July 16, 1894, by the then Registrar of Bulacan, Dn.
Miguel de Lizan, as follows:
Ynscrito el titulo que precede, a los folios ciento veinti-sietey ciento veintinueve del
Tomo primero de Norzagaray, fincas numeros cincuenta y siete y cincuenta y ocho
inscripcion numero uno, Bulacan, diez y seis de julio de mil ocho cientos noventa y
cuatro (Fdo.) MIGUEL DE LIZAN.
Two (2) vast parcels of land (agricultural and mountainous lands), together with the
improvements thereon, including all the trees in the mountains, all mineral deposits
or resources ( pertenecia minera), including lime, gravel and lumber for ship
building, located in the Provinces of Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon and Quezon City, and

bounded, on the North, by Sierra Madre Mountains and Rio Grande (Laog to
Kinabayunan); on the East, by Maputi, Umiray and Caliwatcanan (Ibona Estate and
Public Land); on the South by Susong Dalaga and Cupang (Hegmatangan to
Pinugay) and on the West, by Pugad-Lawin and Sapang-Alat (Pinugay, Public Land,
Bignay, Lauan to Laog).
The various types of titles granted by the Spanish crown, it will be remembered,
were: (1) the "titulo real" or royal grant; (2) the "concession especial" or special
grant; (3) the "composicion con el estado" title or adjustment title; (4) the "titulo de
compra" or title by purchase; and (5) the "informacion posesoria" or possessory
information title, which could become a "titulo gratuito" or a gratuitous title. 19
Piadeco's Titulo appears to be an adjustment title. Piadeco asserts in its answer in L2479620 that it is a "titulo de composicion con el estado" 21 or a "composicion" with
the State.22 The given description of Titulo de Propiedad No. 4136 above-quoted
calls it a "gratuitous composition title."
Title by "composicion con el estado" was granted by the Direccion General de
Administracion Civil, pursuant to the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880, or by the Chief
of the Province by delegation, pursuant to the Royal Decree of August 31, 1888, or
under the Royal Decree of February 13,1894, otherwise known as the Maura Law.
The theory behind this title is that all lands belong to the State. Applicants to be
entitled to adjustment must possess the lands sought to be acquired for a number
of years.23 These titles, as the "titulo real", altho evidences of ownership, may be
lost by prescription.24
Piadeco's Titulo de Propiedad 4136, as heretofore described, was signed, pursuant
to the Royal Decrees of May 14, 1867 and August 31, 1888, by Dn. Alejandro
Garcia, el Jefe de la Provincial de Bulacan, and Dn. Mariano Lopez Delgado, el
Secretario de la Junta, purportedly with the Seal of the Spanish Government in the
Philippines.
The main difficulty here lies with the requirements, then obtaining, for the issuance
of Spanish adjustment titles.
The Royal Decree of August 31, 1888 under which Piadeco's title was issued
classified public lands subject to adjustment into two groups:
First. Those bounded at any point thereof by other lands belonging to the State, and
those which, though entirely encircled by private lands, had a total area of more
than 30 hectares.
Second. Those with an area of less than 30 hectares and entirely bounded by
private lands.
By this royal decree, adjustment of the lands of the first group just mentioned
continued to be heard and determined by the general directorate of civil
administration with the intervention of the Inspector General of Forests; adjustment
of lands of the second group were heard and determined by "a provincial board for
the adjustment of lands "headed by a Civil or Military-Civil Governor as president.
When the provincial board approves the adjustment, "the chief of the province, in
his capacity as deputy of the General Directorate of Civil Administration, shall issue
the corresponding title."25
The property here involved unquestionably belongs to the first group. That is
because the area thereof is more than 30 hectares (72,000 or 74,000 hectares);
and, going by the descripcion of its boundaries, the property is bounded by public
land. In particular, the description is that it is "bounded, on the North, by Sierra
Madre Mountains and Rio Grande (Laog to Kinabayunan); on the East, by Maputi,
Umiray and Caliwatcanan (Ibona Estate and Public Land); on the South by Susong

Dalaga and Cupang (Hegmatangan to Pinugay) and on the West, by Pugad-Lawin

and Sapang-Alat (Pinugay, Public Land, Bignay, Lauanto Laog)."26
As stated, the title were was "signed by Dn. Alejandro Garcia, El Jefe de la Provincia
de Bulacan, and by Dn. Mariano Lopez Delgado, El Secretario de la Junta, with the
Seal of the Spanish Government in the Philippines attached thereto."
Piadeco now claims before this Court that its title "appears to be issued by (on its
face) the DIRECTOR GENERAL DE ADMINISTRACION DE FILIPINAS"; that the title is in
printed form, with the dry seal in the form of a mountain, bearing the inscription,
"Office of the Inspector General of Forests in the Philippine Islands Adjustment of
Lands" and the rubric of the said Inspector General of Forests and is serially
numbered, pursuant to the Circular dated February 14, 1894 of the General
Directorate of Civil Administration. In the same breath, however, Piadeco avers that
the title was approved by the Chief of the Province of Bulacan as Deputy of the
General Directorate of Civil Administration and the said Chief issued Titulo 4136
pursuant to the Royal Decree of August 31, 1888. 27 Theseaverments, we must say,
merely emphasize the necessity of adducing evidence to prove the validity of
Piadeco's title, which should be done in appropriate land registration
proceedings. Ramirez vs. Director of Lands, 60 Phil. 114, 123, struck down a similar
title covering land which it thereupon declared public forest land, upon grounds,
amongst others, that the title was not issued by the proper authority. On this
ground, this Court there specifically declared
Judging from the area of the land28 in question and that of the two-third portions
from which it has been segregated, upon the supposition that the three-third
portions above-mentioned constitute the whole tract of land which had originally
passed from Tomas Ilao, it is obvious that the same belonged to the first group, as
defined in the aforesaid Royal Decree, on the ground that the area thereof greatly
exceeded thirty hectares and was not entirely bounded by private lands.
Notwithstanding such facts, the title Exhibit D-2 was not issued by the General
Directorate of Civil Administration with the intervention of the Inspector General of
Forests, but merely by the provincial board, in open violation of the laws and
regulations relative thereto.29
But an important moiety here is the deeply disturbing intertwine of two undisputed
facts. First. The title embraces land "located in the Provinces of Bulacan, Rizal,
Quezon, and Quezon City." Second. The title was signed only by the provincial
officials of Bulacan, and inscribed only in the Land Registry of Bulacan. Why? The
situation, indeed, cries desperately for a plausible answer.
To be underscored at this point is the well-embedded principle that private
ownership of land must be proved not only through the genuineness of title but also
with a clear identity of the land claimed.30 This Court ruled in a case involving a
Spanish title acquired by purchase that the land must be concretely measured per
hectare or per quion, not in mass (cuerpos ciertos),31 That fact that the Royal
Decree of August 31, 1888 used 30 hectares as a basis for classifying lands strongly
suggests that the land applied for must be measured per hectare.
Here, no definite are seems to have been mentioned in the title. In Piadeco's
"Rejoinder to Opposition" dated April 28, 1964 filed in Civil Case 3035-M, it specified
the area covered by its Titulo de Propiedad as 74,000 hectares.32 In its "Opposition"
of May 13, 1964 in the same case, it described the land as containing 72,000
hectares.33 Which is which? This but accentuates the nebulous identity of Piadeco's
land. Piadeco's ownership thereof then equally suffers from vagueness, fatal at least
in these proceedings.

Piadeco asserts that Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, the original owner
appearing on the title, acquired his rights over the property by prescription under
Articles 4 and 5 of the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880, 34 the basic decree that
authorized adjustment of lands. By this decree, applications for adjustment
showing the location, boundaries and area of land applied for were to be filed
with the Direccion General de Administracion Civil, which then ordered
the classification and survey of the land with the assistance of the interested party
or his legal representative.35
The Royal Decree of June 5, 1880 also fixed the period for filing applications for
adjustment at one year from the date of the publication of the decree in the Gaceta
de Manila on September 10, 1880, extended for another year by the Royal Order of
July 15, 1881.36 If Don Mariano sought adjustment within the time prescribed, as he
should have, then, seriously to be considered here are the Royal Orders of
November 25, 1880 and of October 26, 1881, which limited adjustment to 1,000
hectares of arid lands, 500 hectares of land with trees and 100 hectares of irrigable
lands.37 And, at the risk of repetition, it should be stated again that
Piadeco's Titulo is held out to embrace 72,000 or 74,000 hectares of lands.
But if more were needed, we have the Maura Law (Royal Decree of February 13,
1894), published in the Gaceta de Manila on April 17, 1894.38 That decree required a
second petition for adjustment within six months from publication, for those who
had not yet secured their titles at the time of the publication of the law. 39 Said law
also abolished the provincial boards for the adjustment of lands established by
Royal Decree of December 26, 1884, and confirmed by Royal Decree of August 31,
1888, which boards were directed to deliver to their successors, the provincial
boards established by Decree on Municipal Organization issued on May 19, 1893, all
records and documents which they may hold in their possession. 40
Doubt on Piadeco's title here supervenes when we come to consider that that title
was either dated April 29 or April 25, 1894, twelve or eight days after the
publication of the Maura Law.
Let us now take a look, as near as the record allows, at how Piadeco exactly
acquired its rights under the Titulo. The original owner appearing thereon was Don
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. From Piadeco's explanation not its evidence 41 we
cull the following: On December 3,1894, Don Mariano mortgaged the land
under pacto de retro, redeemable within 10 years, for P8,000.00 to one Don Ignacio
Conrado. This transaction was said to have been registered or inscribed on
December 4, 1894. Don Mariano failed to redeem within the stipulated period. When
Don Ignacio died, his daughter, Maria Socorro Conrado, his only her, adjudicated the
land to herself. At about the same time, Piadeco was organized. Its certificate of
registration was issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission on June 27,
1932. Later, Maria Socorro, heir of Don Ignacio, became a shareholder of Piadeco
when she conveyed the land to Piadeco's treasurer and an incorporator, Trinidad B.
Estrada, in consideration of a certain amount of Piadeco shares. Thereafter, Trinidad
B. Estrada assigned the land to Piadeco. Then came to the scene a certain Fabian
Castillo, appearing as sole heir of Don Mariano, the original owner of the land.
Castillo also executed an affidavit of adjudication to himself over the same land, and
then sold the same to Piadeco. Consideration therefor was paid partially by Piadeco,
pending the registration of the land under Act 496.
The question may well be asked: Why was full payment of the consideration to
Fabian Castillo made to depend on the registration of the land under the Torrens
system, if Piadeco was sure of the validity of Titulo de Propiedad4136? This, and

other factors herein pointed out, cast great clouds of doubt that hang most
conspicuously over Piadeco's title.
The standing presumption, we must not forget, is that land pertains to the State,
and any person seeking to establish ownership over land must conclusively show
that he is the owner. 42 And his presumption clings with greater force here where "a
portion" of the land Piadeco claims is, as Piadeco itself admits, directly affected by
Proclamation No. 71 dated March 10, 1927 of the then Governor-General Leonard
Wood of the Philippines, which reserved for watershed purposes an area of
62,309.0952 hectares of land located in Montalban, Province of Rizal, in San Jose del
Monte, Norzagaray, Angat, San Rafael, and San Miguel, Province of Bulacan, in
Pearanda, Province of Nueva Ecija, and in Infanta, Province of Tayabas (now
Quezon),subject to "private rights if any there be." Private rights must then have to
be proved. It will be remembered that, by Article VIII of the Treaty of Paris of
December 10,1898, property of the public domain was relinquished and ceded by
the Kingdom of Spain to the United States of America, which, of course, transferred
the same to the present Republic.
Assertion has likewise been made that Piadeco's title has already been judicially
recognized in the judgment rendered in Civil Case 3035-M, the case below, at least
insofar as the portion of the land that lies in Bulacan is concerned. This is less than
persuasive. Piadeco's title was not directly in issue in the court below. A reading of
the decision thereof suggests that said title was not submitted therein. The judge
did not even examine that title. According to the decision, Piadeco's ownership was
gleaned merely from the registration certificate which stated that a copy of
Piadeco's land title, including the corresponding plan, was submitted to the Director
of Forestry. A mere statement by the judge below that Piadeco appears to be the
owner of the land cannot wipe out the objectionable features of its title.
From all the foregoing, our conclusion is that we cannot give prima facie value to
Piadeco's title. We cannot thus truly state that Piadeco is a private woodland owner
for purpose of these proceedings. This all the more strengthens our view that
Piadeco needs to acquire an indefeasible title to be entitled to registration under
Section 1829 of the Revised Administrative Code.
3. Even on the assumption that Piadeco's alleged title is registrable, said
corporation cannot complain against the cancellation thereof by the Director of
Forestry on April 11, 1964. Why?
When the Director of Forestry cancelled Piadeco's registration certificate, he only
performed his duty as he saw fit. By Forestry Administrative Order 12-2, "[t]he
Director of Forestry may cancel a certificate of registration for any violation of the
provision of this Order or of the forest and internal revenue laws and regulations or
of the terms and conditions embodied in the certificate, or when found that the area
is no longer covered with forest, or upon failure of the landowner thereof, or of his
representatives, to obey, follow or implement instructions of the said Director of
Forestry."43 To him, a condition expressly written into the registration certificate was
being violated. Piadeco was found to be cutting trees within the Angat and Marikina
Watershed Reservations in direct contravention of a specific prohibition in the
certificate. And this, upon the basis of positive and actual findings of qualified and
competent forestry officers.
Quite revealing is Piadeco's admission 44 before the court below that "it made
cuttings on that portion of its own private land within the Angat and Marikina
Watershed Reservation where it was constructing its access road to the area
covered by P.W.P. No. 2065 to the construction of which no objection was interposed

by ... Nawasa as per its resolution No. 126, Series of 1964." 45 Deducible from the
foregoing is that Piadeco was cutting within the watershed reservations outside the
area covered by its registration certificate, altho within the land it claims in private
ownership, which is now disputed.
Piadeco's registration certificate should remain cancelled. It could be stricken down
anytime. It is a nullity. And, notwithstanding the fact that said registration certificate
had expired and was not renewed, Piadeco had the temerity to continue operations.
Correctly, there was necessity for freezing forthwith Piadeco's illegal acts. 46
4. True it is that the judgment below virtually reinstated Piadeco's registration
certificate. However, as shall be discussed later on in this opinion, that judgment
has now no legal effect. For, said certificate, by its very terms, expired on December
31, 1964. Piadeco cannot be heard to protest further.
But Piadeco still insists that it objected to the expiry date of the registration
certificate, when it was issued that certificate. Granting the truth of this averment,
Piadeco nonetheless accepted the certificate, did not follow up its objection to its
logical conclusion, sat supinely until the certificate was cancelled; only then did it
renew the bid that its registration certificate is non-expirable.
At all events, Piadeco's submission is inaccurate. Forestry Administrative Order 122, promulgated pursuant to law, amended Section 11 of Forestry Administrative
Order 12-1, the pertinent part of which reads:
(b) Duration of the certificate. The certificate of registration issued under this
Order shall be made to expire on the last day of the 12th month from the date of its
issuance.
This regulation is not without rational basis. This Court had occasion to say
once47 that: "Land may be classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by reason of
the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified as agricultural land tomorrow.
And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable
minerals, land classified as agricultural today may be differently classified
tomorrow." Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 verily declares that certificates "are
renewable for as long as there are substantial amounts of forestry in the area, upon
filing of the necessary application therefor" and that those "cancelled for causes
may be renewed upon submission of application for registration by the owner and if
the cause of cancellation is explained satisfactorily." 48 If only for purposes of
effective regulation, annual registration of private woodlands cannot be successfully
assailed.
5. We cannot place our stamp of approval on Piadeco's claim that it should be
permitted to remove from the premises those logs that have already been cut
before December 31, 1964, the expiry date of its registration certificate. We have
already said that its registration certificate is a nullity. Even if it is not, the facts and
the law will not support its plea.
It is not altogether clear whether the 600 pieces of unscaled and the 1,000 pieces of
mixed (scaled and unscaled)timber sought to be hauled by Piadeco, were cut before
December 31, 1964. Piadeco could present only one auxiliary invoice thereon, which
but covers 256 logs and that very invoice stated that those logs were "cut or
ordered cut" in the area covered by P.W.R. No. 2065-New, "after its expiration on
Dec. 31, 1964."49
Worse, a factual assumption that the logs were cut before that date, is meaningless
in law. A contrary view would easily lend itself to misuse and mischief. For, loopholes
could then be bored through which an unscrupulous logger may crawl. Such that a
holder of a registration certificate could be at complete liberty to just cut and cut

during the lifetime of that certificate and leave the hauling for later, as he pleases,
even long after expiry thereof. This, we must say, should not be allowed to pass.
6. Absent a valid registration certificate under Section 1829 of the Revised
Administrative Code, or a license to cut, gather and remove timber, and more
important, credible evidence of private ownership over the forestry land in question,
Piadeco's logging operations logically descend to the level of unlawful cutting from
public forests.
Seizure made by the government authorities here of logs illegally cut cannot be
branded as illegal. It was but in obedience to Bureau of Internal Revenue General
Circular No. V-337 of May 24, 1961, which prescribed rules on the disposition of
illegally cut logs, pursuant to a directive from the Office of the President to the
Secretary of Finance on March 22, 1961. Section 3 of Circular V-337 declares as
follows:
3. Logs illegally cut from public forests, such as timberlands, forest reserves other
than national parks, 50communal forests and communal pastures shall be subject
to seizure and delivered to the nearest Bureau of Internal Revenue Officer who in
turn shall deliver them to the duly authorized representative of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines for use in the manufacture of prefabricated school houses. The
illegal cutter shall not be allowed to pay the forest charges and surcharges and
other fees on the logs cut. However, if such forest charges and fees have already
been paid, the same shall be retained by the Bureau of Internal Revenue Officer
concerned as part of the collection for forest charges, but shall not be the basis for
the release of such logs. On the other hand, such payment shall be used as
evidence should the illegal cutter be prosecuted in court for the violation of the
corresponding forest laws.51
Could this Court then justifiably order the delivery to Piadeco of the logs impounded
right there on the land? The answer must certainly have to be in the negative; a
contrary posture is tantamount to abetting a wrong. The logs belong to the State.
They are not Piadeco's. Piadeco cannot later on come back to claim them by curing
defects in the proof of its ownership over the land. It has submitted the controversy
over the logs for decision to this Court. Any ruling thereon should bind Piadeco. It
cannot be overturned by fresh convincing proof of ownership, which it should have
offered in the first place.
We hold that government seizure of Piadeco's logs here complained of is valid.
7. The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy
that should be followed with respect to forest lands. Many have written much, and
many more have spoken, and quite often, about the pressing need for forest
preservation, conservation, protection, development and reforestation. Not without
justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment of any country's natural
resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green
cover on our lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects of serious
proportions. Without the trees, watersheds try up; rivers and lakes which they
supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear. Denuded areas become
dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the
rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With erosion
come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property crops,
livestock, houses and highways not to mention precious human lives. Indeed, the
foregoing observations should be written down in a lumberman's decalogue.
Because of the importance of forests to the nation, the State's police power has
been wielded to regulate the use and occupancy of forests and forest reserves.

To be sure, the validity of the exercise of police power in the name of the general
welfare cannot be seriously attacked. Our Government has definite instructions from
the Constitution's preamble to "promote the general welfare." Jurisprudence has
time and again upheld the police power over individual rights, because of the
general welfare. Five decades ago, Mr. Justice Malcolm made it clear that the "right
of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the
common good" and that the "liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest
of public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper
scope of the police power."52 Mr. Justice Laurel, about twenty years later, affirmed
the precept when he declared that "the state in order to promote the general
welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations" and that"[p]ersons and property may be subjected to all kinds of
restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and
prosperity of the state."53 Recently, we quoted from a leading American
case,54 which pronounced that "neither property rights nor contract rights are
absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to
the detriment of his fellow, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm,"
and that, therefore, "[e]qually fundamental with the private right is that of the
public to regulate in the common interest. 55
These precepts more than suffice to sustain the validity of the government's action
with respect to Piadeco's logging operations.
8. We come to consider the effects of the judgment in Civil Case 3035-M, where the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan adjudged Piadeco's operation not to be in violation
of forestry rules and regulations and made permanent the writ of preliminary
injunction issued against the defaulting forestry authorities, upon Piadeco's exparte evidence. That judgment, it should be remembered, is sought to be executed
by Piadeco and the execution proceedings in that case are not before this Court on
review.
Said judgment enjoined the forestry officials from carrying out and executing the
order of April 11, 1964 and the implementing letter of April 14, 1964, cancelling
Piadeco's registration certificate, PWR 2065-New. But when execution was ordered
on June 1, 1965, and the writ of execution issued on June 3, 1965, and when the
court ordered on July 8, 1965 that Piadeco be allowed to haul its logs, the
registration certificate had already expired on December 31, 1964. It is, therefore,
not inappropriate for us to say that judgment had already become functus
officio56 and can no longer be executed.
The over-all position we have here taken should dispose of all other issues raised by
the parties; hence, unnecessary is a discussion thereof.
For the reasons given
The petition for certiorari and prohibition in L-24796 is hereby granted; the June 1,
1965 order of execution, the June 3, 1965 writ of execution issued pursuant thereto,
and the July 8, 1965 order, allowing respondent Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro
Development Corporation, Inc. to haul its logs, all of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan in Civil Case 3035-M, are hereby declared null and void; the writ of
preliminary injunction issued herein is hereby made permanent; and the Chief of the
Engineer Corps, Armed Forces of the Philippines, who was permitted by this Court
on October 8, 1965 to retain for safekeeping and custody the logs previously seized
by the State from the log ponds of respondent Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro
Development Corporation, Inc., is now given authority to use the same for the
manufacture of prefabricated school houses; and

The petition of Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc. for

injunction and prohibition in L-25459 is hereby denied.
Costs in both cases against Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation,
Inc. So ordered.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23769 April 29, 1968
REGINA ANTONIO, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs. PELAGIO BARROGA, ET
AL.,Defendants-Appellees.
Raymundo Meris-Morales for plaintiffs-appellants.
Morante, Baago and Valencia for defendant-appellee Pelagio Barroga.
Office of the Solicitor General for defendant-appellee Director of Lands.
DIZON, J.:chanrobles virtual law library
Appeal interposed by Regina Antonio and others from order of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. U-553 dismissing their complaint filed
against Pelagio Barroga, the Director of Lands and
others.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Appellants' action was for the annulment of Free Patent No. 26383 and the
corresponding original certificate of title No. 2799 both issued in the names of
Pelagio and Marcelo Barroga. Their complaint substantially alleged that they were
the children of the deceased Jorge Antonio who, during his lifetime, was the
absolute owner of a parcel of land located in Barrio Nancamaliran, Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, with an area of approximately 27,646 square meters and described in
said pleading; that the defendants applied with the Bureau of Lands for a free
patent in connection with said parcel of land, alleging that it was public land
although they knew that it was the private property of Jorge Antonio; that
subsequently, the free patent and certificate of title already mentioned were issued
in the names of said defendants, who on March 26, 1961 mortgaged and/or sold the
property to the defendants Francisca Bautista and Inocencio Salvador, for which
reason the latter two were impleaded as
defendants.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Within the reglementary period appellees filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
upon the ground that appellants' cause of action had already prescribed. Appellants
filed a written opposition thereto and on May 28, 1962 the lower court denied the
motion because the grounds relied upon had to be established by evidence. In view
of this, appellees filed their answer alleging therein that the late Eusebio Rellera,
their predecessor in interest, was the absolute owner of the land described in the
complaint as evidenced by Titulo Real No. 12479 issued by the Chief of the Province
of Pangasinan on July 22, 1894, and that Rellera's legal heirs had sold the same to
Pelagio Barroga, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale appearing as Registry
No. 175, p. 99, series of 1933 of an unnamed notary
public.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On July 15, 1963, appellants filed an amended complaint - which was admitted by
the lower court - to implead the Director of Lands as defendant. Within the
reglementary period or more specifically on August 9 of the same year, the new
defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that it stated no
cause of action and on the further ground that any cause of action in favor of the
plaintiffs was already barred.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Appellants opposed the motion to dismiss alleging that the other defendants had
admitted in their answer that their predecessor in interest, Eusebio Rellera, was the

absolute owner of the land in question, his title thereto being evidenced by Titulo
Real No. 12479 and that they acquired the property from Rellera's legal heirs. From
this they concluded that the land was private property and that therefore the free
patent and original certificate of title issued in favor of the Barrogas were void
because the Director of Lands had no right to dispose of private
property.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Upon the issues thus arising from the motion to dismiss and the opposition thereto,
the lower court ruled that the first was well founded and dismissed the
complaint.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Appellants now raise in effect the same issues, namely: that the Barrogas are
concluded by their admission that the land in question was private property; that,
consequently, it was not within the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of it
in favor of any party, and that, as a result, the free patent and the original
certificate of title mentioned heretofore issued in the name of the Barrogas were
void and must be ordered cancelled.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
We find no merit in appellants' contention.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
It is not disputed that appellee Pelagio Barroga applied for a free patent over the
land subject matter of the present case after he had purchased it from the heirs of
Eusebio Rellera, and that, as a result of the proceedings had in relation to his
application, Free Patent No. 26383 was issued in his name. Subsequently this was
cancelled to be substituted by original certificate of title No. 2799 likewise issued in
his name, and now partially cancelled by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 39487
issued in the name of Francisca Bautista, duly approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
It is true that by filing the application for a free patent Barroga impliedly admitted
either the invalidity or insufficiency of Titulo Real No. 12479 issued in the name of
his predecessor in interest on July 22, 1894, but neither the allegation made in his
answer that his aforesaid predecessor in interest was the absolute owner of the
property covered by said Titulo Real nor his implied admission of the latter's
invalidity or insufficiency are grounds for the annulment of the free patent and
original certificate of title in question. Evidently, it was Barroga's privilege to rely or
not to rely upon his claim of private ownership in favor of his predecessor in interest
and of whatever the latter's Titulo Real was worth. He decided not to rely upon them
and to consider instead that the property covered by the Titulo Real was still part of
the public domain. Acting accordingly he applied for a free patent and was
successful. It must be borne in mind that the Titulo Real was not an indefeasible title
and that its holder still had to prove that he had possessed the and covered by it
without interruption during a period of ten years by virtue of a good title and in
good faith (Royal Decree of June 25, 1880). We may well presume that Barroga felt
that he had no sufficient evidence to prove this, for which reason he decided to
acquire the land as part of the public domain.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
Having arrived at this conclusion, We are constrained to agree with the trial court
that because the record shows that the complaint was filed many years after the
free patent and certificate of title it sought to annul had become final and
indefeasible, the facts set forth in said pleading do not constitute a cause of action
in favor of appellants.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 75042 November 29, 1988
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF LUCENA,
represented by Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez, and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH LIII, LUCENA CITY, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Gilbert D. Camaligan for private respondent.
BIDIN, J.:
This is an appeal from the 1) decision * of the FIRST CIVIL CASES DIVISION of the
then Intermediate Appellate Court dated May 13, 1986, in AC G.R. No. 01410
entitled the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF Lucena, represented by Msgr. Jose T.
Sanchez, applicant-appellee vs. Republic of the Philippines, et al., Oppositorsappellants, affirming the decision ** of the then Court of FIRST INSTANCE of Quezon,
9th Judicial District, Branch 1, dated November 4, 1980 in Land Registration Case
No. N-1106 entitled the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP of Lucena, represented by Msgr.
Jose T. Sanchez, applicant vs. the Director of Lands and the Director, Bureau of
Forest Development, oppositors, ordering the registration of title to the parcel of
land designated, as lots 1, 2 and 3 of plan PSD-65686 and its technical descriptions,
and the parcel of land described in plan PSU-112592 and its technical description,
together with whatever improvements existing thereon, in the name of the ROMAN
CATHOLIC BISHOP of Lucena and 2) its resolution Dated June 19,1986, denying
appellant's "Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit."
The factual background of the case as found by the Intermediate Appellate Court
are as follows:
On February 2, 1979, the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP of Lucena, represented by Msgr.
Jose T. Sanchez, filed an application for confirmation of title to four (4) parcels of
land. Three of said parcels, denominated as Lots 1, 2 and 3, respectively, of plan
PSU-65686 are situated in Barrio Masin, Municipality of Candelaria, Quezon
Province. The fourth parcels under plan PSU-112592 is located in Barrio Bucal
(Taguan), same municipality and province. As basis for the application, the applicant
claimed title to the various properties through either purchase or donation dating as
far back as 1928.
The legal requirements of publication and posting were duly complied with, as was
the service of copies of notice of initial hearing on the proper government officials.
In behalf of the Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau of Forest
Development, the Solicitor General filed an Opposition on April 20, 1979, alleging
therein among others, that the applicant did not have an imperfect title or title in
fee simple to the parcel of land being applied for.
At the initial hearing held on November 13, 1979, only the Provincial Fiscal in
representation of the Solicitor General appeared to interpose personal objection to
the application. Hence, an Order of General Default against the whole world was

issued by the Court a quo except for the Director of Lands and the Director of the
Bureau of Forest Development.
The preliminaries dispensed with, the applicant then introduced its proofs in support
of the petition, summed up by the lower court as follows:
With respect to Lots 1, 2, and 3, plan PSU-65686.
Lots 1, 2 and 3 of plan PSU-65686 respectively containing an area of 18,977, 6,910
and 16,221 square meters, are adjoining lots & are situated in the Barrio of Masin,
Municipality of Candelaria, Province of Quezon (formerly Tayabas) (Exhibits F, F-1, F2 and F-3). Said lots were surveyed for the Roman Catholic Church on November 3,
1928 (Exhibit P-5) and the survey plan approved on October 20, 1929 (Exhibit F-6).
Lot 1 was acquired by the Roman Catholic Church thru Rev. Father Raymundo
Esquenet by purchase from the spouses Atanacio Yranso and Maria Coronado on
October 20, 1928 (Exhibits G, G-1), portion of Lot 2 also by purchase thru Rev.
Father Raymundo Esquenet from the spouses Benito Maramot and Venancia
Descaller on May 22, 1969 (Exhibits M, N-1), while the remaining portion of Lot 2
and Lot 3 were already owned and possessed by the Roman Catholic Church even
prior to the survey of the said three lots in 1928.
Records of burial of the Roman Catholic Church of Candelaria, Quezon showed that
even as early as November 1918, Lot 3 has already been utilized by the Roman
Catholic Church as its cemetery in Candelaria, Quezon (Exhibit N, N-1 to N-5).<re||
an1w>
These three lots presently constituted the Roman Catholic Church cemetery in
Candelaria, Quezon.
Lots 1, 2 and 3 are declared for taxation purposes in the name of the Roman
Catholic Church under Tax Declaration Nos. 22-19-02-079, 22-19-02-077 and 22-1902-082 as 'cemetery site' (Exhibit S, V and T).
With respect to the parcel of land described in plan PSU-112592:
This parcel of land situated in the barrio of Bucal (Taguan), Municipality of
Candelaria, Province of Quezon (formerly Tayabas) and more particularly described
in plan PSU-1 12592 and its technical description with an area of 3,221 square
meters (Exhibit 1) was formerly owned and possessed by the spouses Paulo G.
Macasaet, and Gabriela V. de Macasaet. Said spouses, on February 26, 1941,
donated this lot to the Roman Catholic Church represented by Reverend Father
Raymundo Esquenet (Exhibit J, J-1 to J-4). It was surveyed for the Roman Catholic
Church on Aug. 16, 1940 as church site and the corresponding survey plan
approved on Jan. 15, 1941 (Exhibits I-1, I-2, 1-3).
Previously erected on this Lot was an old chapel which was demolished and new
chapel now stands in its place on the same site.
For his part, the Fiscal in a Manifestation dated July 22, 1980, said 'the State will not
adduce evidence in support of its opposition and will submit the instant case for
decision.'
Evaluating the applicant's submitted proofs, the court a quo concluded, on the basis
of acquisitive prescription at the very least, that the former had adequately shown
title to the parcels of land being claimed.
Since the acquisition of these four (4) lots by the applicant, it has been in
continuous possession and enjoyment thereof, and such possession, together with
its predecessors-in interest, covering a period of more than 52 years (at least from
the date of the survey in 1928) with respect to lots 1 and 2, about 62 years with
respect to lot 3, all of plan PSU- 65686; and more than 39 years with respect to the
fourth parcel described in plan PSU-112592 (at least from the date of the survey in

1940) have been open, public, continuous, peaceful, adverse against the whole
world, and in the concept of owner.
Accordingly, the court ordered the registration of the four parcels together with the
improvements thereon "in the name of the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF LUCENA,
INC., a religious corporation sole duly registered and existing under the laws of the
Republic of the Philippines."
Against this decision, the Solicitor General filed a Motion for reconsideration on the
following grounds:
1. Article XIV, Section 11 of the New Constitution(1973) disqualifies a private
corporation from acquiring alienable lands for the public domain.
2. In the case at bar the application was filed after the effectivity on the New
Constitution on January 17, 1973.
which was denied by the lower court for lack of merit.
Still insisting of the alleged unconstitutionality of the registration (a point which,
incidentally, the appellant never raised in the lower court prior to its Motion for
Reconsideration), the Republic elevated this appeal. (Rollo, pp. 25-28)
On May 13, 1986, the first Civil Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court
rendered its Decision the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the judgment a quo to be supported by law and the evidence
on record, the same is hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo p. 30)
A reconsideration of the aforequoted Decision was sought by Appellant Republic of
the Philippines, but for lack of merit, its motion for reconsideration was denied on
June 19, 1986, by Resolution of the First Civil Case Division, Intermediate Appellate
Court which resolution reads in full:
Considering appellant Republic of the Philippines "Motion for reconsideration" filed
on June 4, 1986; the Court RESOLVED to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for
lack of merit, grounds raised therein having all been considered in the decision.
(Rollo, p. 31)
Hence, this petition.
The following are the assigned errors raised by the petitioner in its petition:
1. The decision and the resolution in question are contrary to law and decisions of
this honorable Court in Meralco vs. Castro-Bartolome and Republic, 114 SCRA 799
(prom. June 29,1982); Republic vs. Judge Villanueva and Iglesia ni Cristo, 114 SCRA
875, June 29, 1982); and Republic vs. Judge Gonong and Iglesia ni Cristo, 118 SCRA
729-733 (November 25,1982); Director of Lands vs. Hermanos y Hermanas, Inc. 141
SCRA 21-25 (Jan. 7,1986).
2. The lands applied for registration were the subject of a previous registration case
where a decree of registration was already issued.
3. Respondent corporation failed to establish the indentity of the lands applied for.
(Rollo, pp. 14-15)
The issue raised in this case involves the question of whether the Roman Catholic
Bishop of Lucena, as a corporation sole is qualified to apply for confirmation of its
title to the four (4) parcels of land subject of this case.
Corollary thereto is the question of whether or not a corporation sole should be
treated as an ordinary private corporation, for purpose of the application of Art. XIV,
Sec. 11 of the 1973 Constitution.
Article XIV, Sec. 11 of the 1973 Constitution, in part provides:

Sec. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the
public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; nor
may any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares....
Sec. 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose
titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of a Certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to
wit:
(a) ...
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessor-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
(c) ...
In its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner contends that the Roman Catholic
Bishop of Lucena (private respondent herein) which is admittedly a corporation sole
is disqualified to own and register its title over the parcels of land involved herein.
(Rollo, p. 41)
In its petition it likewise argued that being a juridical entity, private respondent
cannot avail of the benefits of Sec. 48(b) of the public land law which applies to
FILIPINO citizens or NATURAL persons. On the other hand, private respondent in its
MEMORANDUM espoused the contrary view.
There is no merit in this petition.
The parties herein do not dispute that since the acquisition of the four (4) lots by
the applicant, it has been in continuous possession and enjoyment thereof, and
such possession, together with its predecessors-in-interest, covering a period of
more than 52 years (at least from the date of survey in 1928) with respect to lots 1
and 2, about 62 years with respect to lot 3, all of plan PSU-65686; and more than 39
years with respect to the fourth parcel described in plan PSU-11 2592 (at least from
the date of the survey in 1940) have been open, public, continuous, peaceful,
adverse against the whole world, and in the concept of owner.
Being disputed before this Court is the matter of the applicability of Art. XIV Sec. 11
of the 1973 Constitution to the case at bar.
Petitioner argues that considering such constitutional prohibition, private
respondent is disqualified to own and register its title to the lots in question.
Further, it argues that since the application for registration was filed only on
February 2, 1979, long after the 1973 Constitution took effect on January 17, 1973,
the application for registration and confirmation of title is ineffectual because at the
time it was filed, private corporation had been declared ineligible to acquire
alienable lands of the public domain pursuant to Art. XIV, Sec. 11 of the said
constitution. (Rollo, p. 41)
The questioned posed before this Court has been settled in the case of DIRECTOR
OF LANDS vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (146 SCRA 509 [1986]) which reversed
the ruling first enunciated in the 1982 case of Manila Electric Co. vs. CASTRO

BARTOLOME, (114 SCRA 789 [1982]) imposing the constitutional ban on public land
acquisition by private corporations which ruling was declared emphatically as res
judicata on January 7, 1986 inDirector of Lands vs. Hermanos y Hermanas de Sta.
Cruz de Mayo, Inc., (141 SCRA 21 [1986]).<re||an1w> In said case, (Director of
Lands v. IAC, supra), this Court stated that a determination of the character of the
lands at the time of institution of the registration proceedings must be made. If they
were then still part of the public domain, it must be answered in the negative.
If, on the other hand, they were already private lands, the constitutional prohibition
against their acquisition by private corporation or association obviously does not
apply. In affirming the Decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court in said case, this
Court adopted the vigorous dissent of the then Justice, later Chief Justice Claudio
Teehankee, tracing the line of cases beginning with CARINO, 1 in 1909, thru
SUSI, 2 in 1925, down to HERICO, 3 in 1980, which developed, affirmed and
reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable
public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the
land, upon completion of the requisite periodipso jure and without the need of
judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes' private property.
(DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. IAC, supra, p. 518).
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering
possession of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by
statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the state than the dictim of the
statute itself; 4 that the possessor "... shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to
a certificate of title ..." No proof being admissable to overcome a conclusive
presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a
formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of
the required character and length of time, and registration thereunder would not
confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not
ORIGINALLY convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a
conversion already effected by operation of law from the moment the required
period of possession became complete. As was so well put in Carino, "... There are
indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that,
for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof,
wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already
conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. (DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. IAC, supra,
p. 520).
The open, continuous and exclusive possession of the four lots by private
respondent can clearly be gleaned from the following facts on record: Lot 1 and
portion of Lot 2 was acquired by purchase in 1928 and 1929, respectively. The
remaining portion of lots 2 and 3 was already owned and possessed by private
respondent even prior to the survey of said lots in 1928. In fact, records of burial of
the Roman Catholic Church of Candelaria, Quezon showed that as early as 1919, Lot
3 has already been utilized by the Roman Catholic Church as its cemetery. That at
present, said three lots are utilized as the Roman Catholic Church of Candelaria,
Quezon. That said lots are declared for taxation purposes in the name of the Roman
Catholic Church. The fourth parcel of land was acquired by donation in 1941 and
same lot is utilized as church site.
It must be emphasized that the Court is not here saying that a corporation sole
should be treated like an ordinary private corporation.

In Roman Catholic Apostolic Administration of Davao, Inc. vs. Land Registration

Commission, et al. (L-8451, December 20,1957,102 Phil. 596). We articulated:
In solving the problem thus submitted to our consideration, We can say the
following: A corporation sole is a special form of corporation usually associated with
the clergy. Conceived and introduced into the common law by sheer necessity, this
legal creation which was referred to as "that unhappy freak of English Law" was
designed to facilitate the exercise of the functions of ownership carried on by the
clerics for and on behalf of the church which was regarded as the property owner
(See 1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 682-683).
A corporation sole consists of one person only, and his successors (who will always
be one at a time), in some particular station, who are incorporated by law in order
to give them some legal capacities and advantages, particulary that of perpetuity,
which in their natural persons they could not have had. In this sense, the King is a
sole corporation; so is a bishop, or deans distinct from their several chapters (Reid
vs. Barry, 93 fla. 849, 112 So. 846).
Pertinent to this case is the provision of Sec. 113 Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 which
reads as follows:
Sec. 113. Acquisition and alienation of property. Any corporation sole may
purchase and hold real estate and personal property for its church, charitable,
benevolent or educational purposes, and may receive bequests or gifts for such
purposes. Such corporation may mortgage or sell real property held by it upon
obtaining an order for that purpose from the Court of First Instance of the province
where the property is situated; but before the order is issued, proof must be made
to the satisfaction of the Court that notice of the application for leave to mortgage
or sell has been given by publication or otherwise in such manner and for such time
as said court may have directed, and that it is to the interest of the corporation that
leave to mortgage or sell should be granted. The application for leave to mortgage
or sell must be made by petition, duly verified by the chief archbishop, bishop,
priest, minister, rabbi or presiding elder acting as corporation sole, and may be
opposed by any member of the religious denomination, sect or church represented
by the corporation sole: Provided, That in cases where the rules, regulations and
discipline of the religious denomination, sect or church religious society or order
concerned represented by such corporation sole regulate the method of acquiring,
holding, selling and mortgaging real estate and personal property, such rules,
regulations and discipline shall control and the intervention of the courts shall not
be necessary.
There is no doubt that a corporation sole by the nature of its Incorporation is vested
with the right to purchase and hold real estate and personal property. It need not
therefore be treated as an ordinary private corporation because whether or not it be
so treated as such, the Constitutional provision involved will, nevertheless, be not
applicable.
In the light of the facts obtaining in this case and the ruling of this Court in Director
of Lands vs. IAC, (supra, 513), the lands subject of this petition were already private
property at the time the application for confirmation of title was filed in 1979. There
is therefore no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the appellate court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit and the appealed decision
and Resolution of the Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68741 January 28, 1988
NATIONAL GRAINS AUTHORITY, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MELECIO MAGCAMIT, NENA COSICO and
EMELITA MAGCAMIT,defendants-appellants.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate
Court * (now Court of Appeals) dated January 31, 1984, reversing the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City, 8th Judicial District, Branch III,
and of the resolution dated August 28, 1984 denying the motion for reconsideration
filed thereof.
The undisputed facts of this case as found by the Trial Court and the Intermediate
Appellate Court are as follows:
On December 2,1971, the spouses Paulino Vivas and Engracia Lizards, as owners of
a parcel of land situated in Bo. San Francisco, Victoria, Laguna, comprising more or
less 105,710 square meters, sold for P30,000.00 said property in favor of spouses
Melencio Magcamit and Nena Cosico, and Amelita Magcamit (herein private
respondents) as evidenced by "Kasulatan Ng Bilihang Mabiling Muli." This sale with
right to repurchase was recorded in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna on
December 6,1971 under Act No. 3344. On January 31,1972 the sale was made
absolute by the spouses Vivas and Lizardo in favor of the private respondents for
the sum of P90,000.00; P50,000.00 of which was paid upon the execution of the
instrument, entitled "Kasulatan Ng Bilihan Tuluyan," after being credited with the
P30,000.00 consideration of the "Kasulatan Ng Mabibiling Muli," and the balance of
P40,000.00 was to be paid the moment that the certificate of title is issued. From
the execution of said Kasulatan, private respondent have remained in peaceful,
adverse and open possession of subject property.
On February 26, 1975, an Original Certificate of Title No. T-1728 covering the
property in question was issued to and in the name of the spouses Vivas and
Lizardo without the knowledge of the private respondents and on April 30, 1975,
said Spouses executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Irenea Ramirez
authorizing the latter to mortgage the property with the petitioner, National Grains
Authority.
On May 2, 1974, the counsel for the petitioner wrote the Provincial Sheriff in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna, requesting for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage executed
by Irenea Ramirez on May 18, 1975, covering, among others, the property involved
in this case covered by OCT No. T-1728, for unpaid indebtedness in the amount of
P63,948.80 in favor of the petitioner.
On May 31, 1974, the Provincial Sheriff caused the issuance of the notice of sale of
the property in question, scheduling the public auction sale on June 28, 1974. The
petitioner was the highest and successful bidder so that a Certificate of Sale was
issued in its favor on the same date by the Provincial Sheriff.
On July 10, 1974, the petitioner in its capacity as attorney-in-fact of the mortgagor
sold the subject real property in favor of itself. By virtue of the deed of absolute
sale, TCT No. T-75171 of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Laguna was

issued in the name of the petitioner on July 16, 1974. It was only in July 1974, that
private respondents learned that a title in the name of the Vivas spouses had been
issued covering the property in question and that the same property had been
mortgaged in favor of the petitioner. Private respondent Nena Magcamit offered to
pay the petitioner NGA the amount of P40,000.00 which is the balance of the
amount due the Vivas spouses under the terms of the absolute deed of sale but the
petitioner refused to accept the payment. On July 31, 1974, counsel for private
respondents made a formal demand on the spouses Vivas and Lizardo to comply
with their obligation under the terms of the absolute deed of sale; and soon after
reiterated to the NGA, the offer to pay the balance of P40,000.00 due under the
absolute deed of sale. On August 13, 1974 petitioner in its reply informed counsel of
private respondents that petitioner is now the owner of the property in question and
has no intention of disposing of the same.
The private respondents, who as previously stated, are in possession of subject
property were asked by petitioner to vacate it but the former refused. Petitioner
filed a suit for ejectment against private respondents in the Municipal Court of
Victoria, Laguna, but the case was dismissed.
On June 4, 1975, private respondents filed a complaint before the then Court of First
Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City, Branch III, San Pablo City, against the
petitioner and the spouses Vivas and Lizardo, praying, among others, that they be
declared the owners of the property in question and entitled to continue in
possession of the same, and if the petitioner is declared the owner of the said
property, then, to order it to reconvey or transfer the ownership to them under such
terms and conditions as the court may find just, fair and equitable under the
premises. (Record on Appeal, pp. 2-11).
In its answer to the complaint, the petitioner (defendant therein) maintained that it
was never a privy to any transaction between the private respondents (plaintiffs
therein) and the spouses Paulino Vivas and Engracia Lizardo that it is a purchaser in
good faith and for value of the property formerly covered by OCT No. 1728; and that
the title is now indefeasible, hence, private respondents' cause of action has'
already prescribed. (Record on Appeal, pp. 16-22).
After due hearing, the trial court ** rendered its decision on March 17, 1981, in favor
of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of said judgment reading as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) declaring defendant National Grains Authority the lawful owner of the property
in question by virtue of its indefeasible title to the same;
(2) ordering plaintiffs to turn over possession of the land to defendant National
Grains Authority;
(3) ordering defendants-spouses Paulino Vivas and Engracia Lizardo to pay plaintiffs
the sum of P56,000.00 representing the amount paid pursuant to the Kasulatan Ng
Bilihang Tuluyan marked Exhibit "3", with legal interest thereon from January 31,
1972 until the amount is paid, to pay an additional amount of P5,000.00 for and as
attorney's fees, an additional amount of Pl0,000.00 as moral damages, another
amount of P5,000.00 by way of exemplary damages and to pay the costs of this
suit. (Rollo, P. 35).
The private respondents interposed an appeal from the decision of the trial court to
the Intermediate Appellate Court.
After proper proceedings, the appellate court rendered its decision on January 31,
1984, reversing and setting aside the decision of the trial court as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby reversed and set aside and
another one is rendered ordering the National Grains Authority to execute a deed of
reconveyance sufficient in law for purposes of registration and cancellation of
transfer Certificate of Title No. T-75171 and the issuance of another title in the
names of plaintiff-appellants, and ordering defendants-appellees Paulino Vivas and
Engracia Lizardo to pay the National Grains Authority the sum of P78,375.00 (Exh.
3) within thirty (30) days from the receipts of the writ of execution. No damages and
costs. (Rollo, p. 19).
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision but the same
was denied. (Rollo, p. 26).
Hence, this petition.
In the resolution of May 20, 1985, the petition was given due course and the parties
were required to submit simultaneous memoranda (Rollo, p. 128). The
memorandum for the petitioner was filed on July 3, 1985 (Rollo, p. 129) while the
memorandum for the private respondents was filed on August 26, 1985 1 Rollo p.
192).
The main issue in this case is whether or not violation of the terms of the agreement
between the spouses Vivas and Lizardo, the sellers, and private respondents, the
buyers, to deliver the certificate of title to the latter, upon its issuance, constitutes a
breach of trust sufficient to defeat the title and right acquired by petitioner NGA, an
innocent purchaser for value.
It is undisputed that: (1) there are two deeds of sale of the same land in favor of
private respondents, namely: (a) the conditional sale with right to repurchase or the
'Kasulatan Ng Bilihang Mabibiling Muli" which was registered under Act 3344 and (b)
the deed of absolute sale or "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan" which was not
registered; (2) the condition that the Certificate of Title will be delivered to the
buyers upon its issuance and upon payment of the balance of P40,000.00 is
contained in the deed of absolute sale; and (3) the land in question at the time of
the execution of both sales was not yet covered by the Torrens System of
registration.
It is axiomatic, that while the registration of the conditional sale with right of
repurchase may be binding on third persons, it is by provision of law "understood to
be without prejudice to third party who has better right" (Section 194 of the
Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344). In this case, it will be noted that
the third party NGA, is a registered owner under the Torrens System and has
obviously a better right than private respondents and that the deed of absolute sale
with the suspensive condition is not registered and is necessarily binding only on
the spouses Vivas and Lizardo and private respondents.
In their complaint at the Regional Trial Court, private respondents prayed among
others, for two alternative reliefs, such as: (a) to be declared the owners of the
property in question or (b) to order the declared owner to reconvey or transfer the
ownership of the property in their favor.
Private respondents claim a better right to the property in question by virtue of the
Conditional Sale, later changed to a deed of Absolute Sale which although
unregistered under the Torrens System allegedly transferred to them the ownership
and the possession of the property in question. In fact, they argue that they have
been and are still in possession of the same openly, continuously, publicly under a
claim of ownership adverse to all other claims since the purchase on December 2,
1971 (Rollo, p. 165). It is stressed that not until the month of July, 1974 did the

plaintiff learn that a title had been issued covering the property in question (Rollo,
p. 15).
Time and time again, this Court has ruled that the proceedings for the registration
of title to land under the Torrens System is an action in rem not in personam, hence,
personal notice to all claimants of the res is not necessary in order that the court
may have jurisdiction to deal with and dispose of the res. Neither may lack of such
personal notice vitiate or invalidate the decree or title issued in a registration
proceeding, for the State, as sovereign over the land situated within it, may provide
for the adjudication of title in a proceeding in rem or one in the nature of or akin a
to proceeding in rem which shall be binding upon all persons, known or unknown
(Moscoso vs. Court of appeals, 128 SCRA 719 [1984], citing: City of Manila vs. Lack,
et al., 19 Phil. 324, 337; Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. 31; Director of Lands vs. Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 41 Phil. 120; Aguilar vs. Caogdan, 105 Phil. 661). It is
thus evident that respondents' right over the property was barred by res
judicata when the decree of registration was issued to spouses Vivas and Lizards. It
does not matter that they may have had some right even the right of ownership,
BEFORE the grant of the Torrens Title.
Thus, under Section 44 of P.D. 1529, every registered owner receiving a certificate
of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of
registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold the
same free from all encumbrances except those noted on the certificate and any of
the encumbrances which may be subsisting, and enumerated in the law. Under said
provision, claims and liens of whatever character, except those mentioned by law as
existing, against the land prior to the issuance of certificate of title, are cut off by
such certificate if not noted thereon, and the certificate so issued binds the whole
world, including the government (Aldecoa and Co. vs. Warner Barns & Co., 30 Phil.
209 [1915]; Snyder vs. Fiscal of Cebu and Avila, 42 Phil. 766 [1922]). Under said
ruling, if the purchaser is the only party who appears in the deeds and the
registration of titles in the property registry, no one except such purchaser may be
deemed by law to be the owner of the properties in question (Ibid). Moreover, no
title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession (Umbay vs. Alecha, 135 SCRA 427
[1985]).
It does not appear that private respondents' claim falls under any of the exceptions
provided for under Section 44 of P.D. 1529 which can be enforced against petitioner
herein.
Thus, it has been invariably restated by this Court, that "The real purpose of the
Torrens System is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any question as to its
legality. "Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity
of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the "mirador su casato," avoid the
possibility of losing his land." "An indirect or collateral attack on a Torrens Title is not
allowed (Dominga vs. Santos, 55 Phil. 361; Singian vs. Manila Railroad, 62 Phil.
467)."
The only exception to this rule is where a person obtains a certificate of title to a
land belonging to another and he has full knowledge of the rights of the true owner.
He is then considered as guilty of fraud and he may be compelled to transfer the
land to the defrauded owner so long as the property has not passed to the hands of
an innocent purchaser for value (Angeles vs. Sania, 66 Phil. 444 [1938], emphasis
supplied).

It will be noted that the spouses Vivas and Lizardo never committed any fraud in
procuring the registration of the property in question. On the contrary, their
application for registration which resulted in the issuance of OCT No. 1728 was with
complete knowledge and implied authority of private respondents who retained a
portion of the consideration until the issuance to said spouses of a certificate of title
applied for under the Torrens Act and the corresponding delivery of said title to
them. The question therefore, is not about the validity of OCT No. 1728 but in the
breach of contract between private respondents and the Vivas spouses. Petitioner
NGA was never a privy to this transaction. Neither was it shown that it had any
knowledge at the time of the execution of the mortgage, of the existence of the
suspensive condition in the deed of absolute sale much less of its violation. Nothing
appeared to excite suspicion. The Special Power of Attorney was regular on its face;
the OCT was in the name of the mortgagor and the NGA was the highest bidder in
the public auction. Unquestionably, therefore, the NGA is an innocent purchaser for
value, first as an innocent mortgagee under Section 32 of P.D. 1529 and later as
innocent purchaser for value in the public auction sale.
Private respondents claim that NGA did not even field any representative to the land
which was not even in the possession of the supposed mortgagors, nor present any
witness to prove its allegations in the ANSWER nor submit its DEED OF MORTGAGE
to show its being a mortgages in good faith and for value (Rollo, p. 110).
Such contention is, however, untenable. Well settled is the rule that all persons
dealing with property covered by a torrens certificate of title are not required to go
beyond what appears on the face of the title. When there is nothing on the
certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or
any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore further than
what the torrens title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or
inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto (Centeno vs. Court of
Appeals, 139 SCRA 545 [1985]).
More specifically, the Court has ruled that a bank is not required before accepting a
mortgage to make an investigation of the title of the property being given as
security (Phil. National Cooperative Bank vs. Carandang Villalon, 139 SCRA 570
[1985]), and where innocent third persons like mortgagee relying on the certificate
of title acquire rights over the property, their rights cannot be disregarded (Duran
vs. IAC, 138 SCRA 489 [1985]).
Under the circumstances, the Regional Trial Court could not have erred in ruling that
plaintiffs (private respondents herein) complaint insofar as it prays that they be
declared owners of the land in question can not prosper in view of the doctrine of
indefeasibility of title under the Torrens System, because it is an established
principle that a petition for review of the decree of registration will not prosper even
if filed within one year from the entry of the decree if the title has passed into the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value (Pres. Decree No. 1529, Sec. 32). The
setting aside of the decree of registration issued in land registration proceedings is
operative only between the parties to the fraud and the parties defrauded and their
privies, but not against acquirers in good faith and for value and the successors in
interest of the latter; as to them the decree shall remain in full force and effect
forever (Domingo vs. The Mayon Realty Corp. et al., 102 Phil. 32 [19571). Assuming,
therefore, that there was fraud committed by the sellers against the buyers in the
instant case, petitioner NGA who was not privy therein cannot be made to suffer the
consequences thereof As correctly declared by the trial court, the National Grains

Authority is the lawful owner of the property in question by virtue of its indefeasible
title.
As to private respondents' alternative prayer that the declared owner be ordered to
reconvey or transfer the ownership of the property in their favor, it is clear that
there is absolutely no reason why petitioner, an innocent purchaser for value,
should reconvey the land to the private respondents.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and the decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City,
now Regional Trial Court, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-3595
May 22, 1950
ANG LAM, petitioner,
vs.
POTENCIANO ROSILLOSA and VICENTE SANTIAGO, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Quezon,respondents.
Reyes and Matias for petitioner.
Manuel R. Trias for respondents.
OZAETA, J.:
This is petition for certiorari to annul an order of the respondent judge, denying the
petitioner's motion to set aside a judgment in civil case No. 4820 of the Court of
First Instance of Quezon Province, entitled "Potenciano Rosillosa vs. Maximo Alpay
and Eugenia "Peregrina," on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant Eugenia Peregrina, and to declare said judgment null and void.
The herein respondent, Potenciano Rosillosa, was the owner of a parcel of land,
planted to coconuts, containing an area of 145,957 square meters, and located in
the municipality of Unisan, Province of Quezon, which parcel of land he had
acquired by homestead and for which he had obtained homestead title No. 3201,
patent No. 18102, issued January 30, 1932. On May 22, 1944, he sold said parcel of
land to Maximo Alpay for P10,000. In the month of July, 1944, Maximo Alpay in turn
sold said parcel of land to Eugenia Peregrina for the sum of P25,000 and transfer
certificate of title No. 19539 was duly issued in her name on July 29, 1944.
On or about October 22, 1947, Potenciano Rosillosa instituted said civil case No.
4820 in the Court of First Instance of Quezon against Maximo Alpay and Eugenia
Peregrina to redeem the said property under the provisions of the Public Land Act.
The complaint was amended on October 21, 1948. In the meantime the plaintiff
asked for the dismissal of the case against the defendant Maximo Alpay on the
ground that the latter had ceased to have any interest in the property sought to be
redeemed.
On December 4, 1948, upon petition of the plaintiff Potenciano Rosillosa, who
alleged that the defendant Eugenia Peregrina could not found and served with
summons at her known address, the respondent judge ordered that said defendant
be served with summons by publication in The Manila Chronicle. Thereafter said
defendant, having failed to appear within the period fixed in the summons, was
declared in default; and the court, after hearing the evidence for the plaintiff,
rendered a decision on April 2, 1949, ordering the defendant Eugenia Peregrina to
execute a deed of resale of the land in question in favor of the plaintiff Potenciano

Rosillosa upon payment to her of the sum P50, which the court found as the
equivalent in Philippines currency of the original price of P10,000 in Japanese
military notes (which the original buyer Maximo Alpay had paid to the said plaintiff)
at the rate of P1, Philippine currency, for every P200 of Japanese fiat money.
It turned out, however, that the defendant Eugenia Peregrina had died in the City of
Manila as early as April 1, 1945, that is to say, several years before said civil case
No. 4820 was commenced. On September 22, 1949, the present petitioner Ang
Lam, who alleged under oath that on September 21, 1949, he was appointed by the
Court of first Instance of Manila administrator of the estate of the deceased Eugenia
Peregrina, filed a petition in said civil case No. 4820, praying that the judgment
theretofore rendered therein be set aside on the ground that the ground that the
court had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the deceased defendant
Eugenia Peregrina. That petition was denied by the respondent judge on the
grounds (1) that plaintiff's action was by its nature one in rem; (2) that the
petitioner Ang Lam is the surviving husband of the defendant Eugenia Peregrina and
had the administration of the land in litigation; and (3) that the decision of the court
was handed down on April 2, 1949, whereas the petition to set it aside was
presented only on September 26, 1949, that is to say, after the lapse (sc.) of the
periods mentioned in section 3 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.
We are of the opinion and so hold that the judgment in question is null and void of
jurisdiction over person of the defendant. At the time the action was commenced
said defendant had long passed to another world. Hence the publication of the
summons against her was absolutely vain and no validity whatsoever.
The attempt of the respondent judge to hold the said summons by publication
binding upon the petitioner Ang Lam on the theory that the action was one in
rem and that said petitioner is the surviving husband of the defendant and is the
administrator of the property in question, is, in our opinion, untenable. An action to
redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real property is not an action in
rem or an action against the whole world, like a land registration proceeding or the
probate of a will; it is an action in personam, so much so that a judgment therein is
binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given an
opportunity to be heard. (See Patriarca vs. Orate, 7 Phil., 390, 393-393.)
"Actions in personam and actions in rem differ in that the former are directed
against specific and seek personal judgments, while the latter are directed against
the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto
as against the whole world." (1 C.J.S., 1148.)
An action to recover a parcel of land is a real action, but it is an action in personam,
for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible
thing. An action for resolution of a contract of sale of real property is an action in
personam (Sandejas vs. Robles, 46 Off, Gaz., [Supp. to No. 1], 203 1). if, on the other
hand, the object is to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an
objection of any sort against the right sought to be established, and if any one in
the world has a right to be heard on an allegation of facts which, if true, shows an
inconsistent interest, the proceeding is in rem (Grey Alba vs. Cruz, 17 Phil., 49, 62).
For instance, an application in rem, for the judgment which may be rendered therein
is binding upon the whole world (Reyes vs. Razon, 38 Phil., 480, 482). The probate
of a will is a proceeding in rem, because the order of probate is effective against all
persons wherever residing (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil., 156). (See Moran, Rules
of Court, 2d Ed., Vol. 1, p. 9.)

With regard to the other reason adduced by the respondent judge, that the petition
to set aside the judgment was presented after the lapse of the six months, period
provided in Rule 38, we think said rule is not applicable. 2 That rule provides for relief
from a judgment, order or other proceeding taken against a party to the case, who
"by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, has been unjustly deprived of
a hearing therein, or has been prevented from taking an appeal." The petitioner
herein was not a party to the original case, and he did not seek relief from the
judgment upon any of the grounds mentioned in section 1 of Rule 38, but sought
the annulment of said judgment for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, who had long been deceased before the action was commenced. A
judgment rendered by a court which had not acquired jurisdiction either over the
subject matter or over the person of the defendant, is void. A void judgment may be
assailed or impugned at any time either directly or collaterally, by means of a
petition filed in the same case or by means of a separate action, or by resisting such
judgment in any action or proceeding wherein it is invoked.
The order of the respondent judge of November 18, 1949, is set aside and the
decision rendered in civil case No. 4820 on April 2, 1949, is declared null and void,
with costs against the respondent Potenciano Rosillosa.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 123361. March 3, 1997]
TEOFILO CACHO, petitioner-appellant, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION and THE CITY OF
ILIGAN, respondents-appellees.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
The late Doa Demetria Cacho applied for the registration of two parcels of land
situated in what was then Lanao, Moro Province. Both parcels were within the limits
of Military Reservation No. 43, known as "Camp Overton".
The petitions were docketed as GLRO Record No. 6908 & 6909 and were jointly tried
and decided by Judge Jesse Jorge on December 10, 1912.
In the said decision, which was affirmed in toto by this Court in Cacho vs.
Government of the United States (28 Phil. 616 [1914]) the trial court made the
following pronouncements:
Re: Case No. 6908
The parcel object of Case No. 6908 is small. It was purchased by the applicant, Doa
Demetria Cacho y Soriano from Gabriel Salzos. The title of Gabriel Salzos is founded
on a deed of sale in his favor, executed and signed by a Moro woman named
Alanga, who acted for her husband, a Moro named Dorondon. It appears that the
husband of Alanga, Datto Dorondon is alive yet and before admitting this parcel to
registration, it is ordered that a deed from Dorondon be presented, renouncing all
his rights in the small parcel of land object of Case No. 6908. It is further ordered
that the applicant present the corresponding deed from Datto Dorondon on or
before March 30, 1913.
Re: Case No. 6909
The parcel of land claimed by the applicant in Case No. 6909 is the larger of two
parcels and contains 37.87 hectares or more than 90 acres. This was purchased by
the applicant from the Moro Datto Bunglay.
Datto Bunglay claims to have acquired part of it by inheritance from his uncle Datto
Anandog who died without issue and the balance by his own possession and
cultivation.

A tract of land 37 hectares in area, is larger than is cultivated by the Christian

Filipinos. In the Zamboanga cadastral case of thousands of parcels now on trial
before this court, the average size of the parcels is not above 3 or 4 hectares, and
the court doubts very much if a Moro with all his family could cultivate as extensive
a parcel of land as the one in question.
The court therefore finds that the applicant Doa Demetria Cacho is owner of the
portion of land occupied and planted by the deceased Datto Anandog in the
southern part of the large parcel object of expediente No. 6909 only; and her
application as to all the rest of the land solicited in said case is denied.
On the 8th day of December, the court was at Camp Overton and had another
ocular inspection for the purpose of fixing the limits of the part cultivated by Datto
Anandog. The court set stakes marking the N.E., S.E., & N.W. corners of the land
found to have been cultivated by Anandog.
And it is ordered that the new survey be made in accordance with the points
mentioned. It is further ordered that one half of the costs of the new survey be paid
by the applicant and the other half by the Government of the United States.
Re: Cases 6908 & 6909
Final decision in these cases is reserved until the presentation of the said deed and
the new plan.
On June 29, 1978, Teofilo Cacho, herein petitioner, as the son and sole heir of the
late Doa Demetria Cacho, filed a petition for reconstitution of two original
certificates of title under Republic Act 26, and docketed under the original GLRO
Record No. 6908 and 6909.
The petition was opposed by herein respondents Republic of the Philippines,
National Steel Corporation (NSC), and the City of Iligan.
Acting on the motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence filed by the Republic
and the NSC, the lower court dismissed the petition because it found the evidence
inadequate to show the prior existence of the titles sought to be restored. The same
order stated further that the proper remedy was for the reconstitution of decrees
since it is undisputed that in Cases No. 6908 and 6909, Decrees No. 10364 and
18969, respectively, were already issued. The same trial court specifically found
that since the decrees had, in fact, been issued, the judgment of this Court in
Cachovs. U.S., supra, although by itself expressly dependent upon some conditions,
must have indisputably become final.
Thus, petitioner filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file and to admit
amended petition, but this was denied. Petitioner elevated the matter to this Court
(docketed as Teofilo Cacho vs. Hon. Manindiara P. Mangotara, G.R. No. 85495) but
we resolved to remand the case to the lower court, ordering the latter to accept the
amended petition and to hear it as one for re-issuance of decrees under the
following guidelines:
Considering the doctrines in Sta. Ana vs. Menla, 1 SCRA 1297 (1961) and Heirs of
Cristobal Marcos vs. de Banuvar, 25 SCRA 315 (1968), and the lower court findings
that the decrees had in fact been issued, the omnibus motion should have been
heard as a motion to re-issue the decrees in order to have a basis for the issuance
of the titles and the respondents being heard in their opposition.
Considering the foregoing, we resolve to order the lower court to accept the
amended petition subject to the private respondents being given the opportunity to
answer and to present their defenses. The evidence already on record shall be
allowed to stand but opportunity to controvert existing evidence shall be given the
parties.

(p. 59, Rollo.)

Thus, the lower court accepted the amended petition and heard it as one for reissuance of the decrees.
In their "Consolidated Answer and/or Opposition" to the amended petition,
respondents Republic of the Philippines and NSC raised the defenses that the
petition suffered from jurisdictional infirmities; that petitioner was not the real party
in interest; that petitioner was guilty of laches; that Demetria Cacho was not the
registered owner of the subject parcels of land; that no decrees covering the
properties were ever issued in the name of Demetria Cacho; and that the issuance
of the decrees was dubious and irregular.
On June 9, 1993, the lower court (RTC-City of Iligan, Branch 1) rendered its decision
decreeing the reconstitution and re-issuance of Decrees No. 10364 and 18969. The
pertinent portion of the said decision reads:
The third issue is whether sufficient legal and factual basis exist for the issuance of
the subject decrees.
This Court has already ruled that Decrees Nos. 10364 and 18959 were issued in
these LRC Cases Nos. 6908 and 6909, respectively, and that the issuance of the
decrees presupposed a prior judgment that had already become final. Oppositors
never disputed the cited pronouncements and therefore these should now be
considered final and conclusive
In fine, the Land Registration Commission (now) National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration (NALTDRA), through its then Acting Commissioner
Santiago M. Kapunan, its Deputy Clerk of Court III, the Head Geodetic Engineer, and
the Chief of Registration, all certified that according to the Record Book of Decrees
for Ordinary Land Registration Case, Decree No. 18969 was issued in GLRO Record
No. 6909 and Decree No. 10364 was issued in GLRO Record No. 6908. (Exhibits "C",
"D", "E" and "M").
In the manifestation submitted by the then Acting LRC Commissioner Santiago
Kapunan in compliance with an order of this Court, confirmed that the proceedings
undertaken by the LRC in the original petition for reconstitution have been regularly
and properly done based on existing records; that Decrees 10364 and 18969 have
been issued and recorded in LRC's Record Book of Decrees; that the plan and
technical description of the lots involved were found to be correct, approved by the
LRC and transmitted to this Court, (Exh. "M").
On Record also is the decision in the Military Reservation Nos. 43 and 63 in which
this Court affirmed the issuance of Decrees Nos. 10364 and 18969 in the name of
Demetria Cacho.
Moreover, the testimony by way of deposition of one Ricardo A. Arandilla, Deputy
Clerk of Court of the LRC which identified and validated the report of the LRC to this
Court on the present petition, (Exh. "M"), shows that the decrees registry of the LRC
had recorded the fact and date of issuance of Decrees No. 10364 and 18969 in
GLRO Rec. No. 6908 and 6909 and the approval of the plans and corresponding
technical descriptions of the lots involved in the aforesaid record numbers and
decrees (Exh. "T").
It is worthy to note that on cross-examination by Oppositors' counsel, Arandilla
produced for scrutiny the LRC Registry Book of Ordinary Registration Cases, which
contained therein the entries showing that Decree No. 10364 was issued on May 9,
1913 in Case No. 6908 and Decree No. 18969 was issued on July 7, 1915 in Case No.
6909. (Exhs. "T", "P" and "19").

From the foregoing environmental facts, the Court finds that the existence of the
decrees have been established sufficiently and indubitably by the evidence
submitted by the petitioner, and therefore, said amended petition has to be
granted.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. The amended petition is hereby granted and approved. Declaring Decrees No.
10364 and No. 18969 as reconstituted.
2. Ordering the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration
(NALTDRA), (formerly Land Registration Commission) to reissue Decrees No. 19364
and No. 16869 existing at the LRC Registry Book of Ordinary Registration Cases in
the name of Demetria Cacho upon payment by the petitioner of the required legal
fees.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 62-65, Rollo.)
From the aforesaid decision, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Republic of the Philippines and the National Steel Corporation in their joint brief
assigned the following errors:
The lower court erred in granting appellee Teofilo Cacho's amended petition for
reconstitution of decrees of registration purportedly issued in LRC Record Nos. 6908
and 6909. Notwithstanding that
I. The petition suffers from fatal jurisdictional infirmities;
II. The Supreme Court declared in Cacho v. Government of the United States, 28
Phil. 616, that final decision in LRC Cases 6908 and 6909 had been reserved
pending compliance by the applicant therein of certain conditions albeit, as of Date,
No competent evidence exists showing compliance with the imposed conditions
and/or the rendition of a "final judgment" and/or the issuance of decrees pursuant
thereto;
III.The petition is barred by laches; and
IV.The petition is being prosecuted by a fictitious person and/or a party who does
not have a lawful interest in the case.
(pp. 16-17, Rollo.)
Respondent City of Iligan, for its part, argued that the trial court erred:
1. In giving due course to "Teofilo Cacho's" petition for reconstitution of titles when
the same is already barred by laches.
2. In granting the amended petition for reconstitution when there is no proof that
Teofilo Cacho actually exists and is a real party in interest.
3. In granting the amended petition for reconstitution even in the absence of
sufficient proof to the effect that land registration Decree Nos. 10364 & 18969 were
indeed issued to Demetria Cacho.
4. In reopening the case despite the finality of the order dated 16 April 1979
dismissing the original petition for reconstitution of title.
5. In giving title to petitioner over a parcel of land already owned by appellant City
of Iligan pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 469 (dated 4 October 1965)
which ownership was affirmed by the Supreme Court on 26 February 1988 [City of
Iligan versus Director of Lands, et al., 158 SCRA 158].
(pp. 17-18, Rollo.)
The Court of Appeals sustained the validity of the proceedings below and brushed
aside respondents' claim of jurisdictional infirmities. It also acknowledged the
issuance and existence of the registration decrees in favor of Demetria Cacho, to
wit:

As to the second issue, we can not do otherwise but hold that Decree Nos. 10364
and 18969 were issued in GLRO Record No. 6908 and GLRO Record No. 6909, on
May 9, 1913 and July 8, 1915, respectively, according to the Record Book of Decrees
for Ordinary Land Registration Case. Then Acting Commissioner of the Land
Registration Commission Santiago M. Kapunan (now Justice of the Supreme Court),
submitted a Manifestation, dated November 2, 1978, in compliance with an order at
the lower court, confirming that the plan and technical description of the land
involving both Lots 1 and 2 were correct, that said lots are decreed properties, and
that all the proceedings undertaken by the LRC were regularly done based on
existing records.
(pp. 49-50, Rollo.)
This notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court
and dismissed the petition for re-issuance of Decrees No. 10364 and 18969, with
prejudice, for the following reasons:
First. The decision of the Supreme Court in Cacho vs. Government of the United
States on December 10, 1914, now appearing in 28 Phil. 617, regarding GLRO
Record Nos. 6908 and 6909, denied in part and granted in part the application for
adjudication and registration of the two parcels of land of Demetria Cacho,
appellee's predecessor-in-interest. Final decision on the cases was reserved pending
compliance with conditions set forth therein.
1.) Re: Case 6908, "x x x before admitting this parcel to registration, it is ordered
that a deed from Dorondon . . . be presented, renouncing all his rights in the small
parcel of land object of Case No. 6908" (28 Phil. 629).
2.) Re: Case No. 6909, "the parcel of land claimed by the applicant in Case No. 6909
is the larger of two parcels and contains 37.87 hectares . . . (28 Phil. 619). The court
therefore finds that the applicant Doa Demetria Cacho is owner of the portion of
land occupied and planted by the deceased Datto Anandog in the southern part of
the large parcel object of expediente No. 6909 only; and her application as to all the
rest of the land solicited in said case is denied." (28 Phil. 629) On the 8th day of
December, the court was at Camp Overton and had another ocular inspection for
the purpose of fixing the limits of the part cultivated by Datto Anandog . . . with
previous notice to the applicant and her husband and representative Seor Vidal.
Having arrived late, Seor Vidal did not assist in the ocular inspection . . . But the
court, nevertheless, set stakes marking the N.E., S.E., and N.W. corners of the land
found to have been cultivated by the deceased Anandog" (28 Phil. 630); "And it is
ordered that the new survey be made in accordance with the points mentioned . . ."
(28 Phil. 630).
The Court notes that the plan and technical description referred to in the
Manifestation dated November 2, 1978 of the Acting Commissioner of the Land
Registration Commission and the plan submitted by Demetria Cacho in Case No.
6909 are the same as to the area, which is 37.87 hectares, and as to the date of
approval, which is November 15, 1910. Since the Supreme Court decision in Cacho
vs. US "ordered that the new survey be made in accordance with the points
mentioned"; that applicant Demetria Cacho is owner only of the portion of land
occupied and planted by the deceased Datto Anandog; and that her application as
to all the rest of the land solicited in case No. 6909 is denied, it follows that the new
survey, if it was made, must have a smaller area and a later date of approval.
As it is, although there is proof that Decree No. 18969 was issued in GLRO No. 6909,
re-issuance of the decree cannot be made in the absence of the "new survey" on

which to base the area and technical description of the parcel of land in Case No.
6909.
Second. While a person may not acquire title to registered property through
continuous adverse possession, in derogation of the title of the original registered
owner, the heir of the latter, however, may lose his right to recover back the
possession of such property and the title thereto, by reason of laches.
According to appellee, appellants failed to prove:
a. any conduct on their part that would have impelled appellee to act earlier;
b. that they were misled by appellee's inaction into believing that appellee would
not assert the right on which he bases his suit;
c. the nature of extent of injury or prejudice that would accrue to them in the event
that relief is accorded to the appellee or that the suit is not held barred; and
d. that their claims fall within the metes and bounds of the property covered by the
decree.
The above need not be proven by appellants. Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands
of whatever classification belong to the state.
The rule applies even to privately owned unregistered lands which, unless the
contrary is shown, are presumed to be public lands, under the principle that all
"lands belong to the Crown which have not been granted by (the King), or in his
name, or by the kings who preceded him.
Finally, petitioner failed to establish his identity and existence and that he is a real
party interest. To qualify a person to be a real party in interest in whose name an
action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real owner of the right
sought to be enforced.
(pp. 50-53, Rollo.)
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied, he filed the present
petition because allegedly, the Court of Appeals decided questions of substance in a
way not in accord with the law and applicable decisions of this Court:
First: Respondent Court of Appeals erroneously embarked upon a reopening of
Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969 issued on May 9, 1913 and July 8, 1915, respectively,
when it required proof of compliance with conditions for their issuance. These
conditions are conclusively presumed to have been complied with before the
original decrees were issued and can no longer be inquired into.
Second: Respondent Court of Appeals contravened settled and standing doctrines
pronounced in Sta. Ana v. Menla, 1 SCRA 1297 and Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. de
Banuvar, 25 SCRA 315, when it applied laches as a bar to the reissuance of decrees.
Third: Respondent Court of Appeals ignored standing decisions of this Honorable
Court when it applied laches despite the total absence of proof to establish the
requisite elements for its application.
Fourth: Respondent Court of Appeals erroneously applied the "Regalian doctrine" to
dispense with proof of the essential elements of laches.
Fifth: Respondent Court of Appeals abjured the judicial responsibility to uphold the
stability and integrity of the Torrens system.
Sixth: Respondent Court of Appeals ignored uncontroverted proof on the identity
and existence of petitioner and allowed itself to be swayed by wild and gratuitous
allusions to the contrary.
(pp. 21-22, Rollo.)
The petition having been given due course and the parties having filed their
respective memoranda, we shall now resolve the case.
We vote to grant the petition.

A land registration proceeding is "in rem," and, therefore, the decree of registration
is binding upon and conclusive against all persons including the Government and its
branches, irrespective of whether or not they were personally notified of the filing of
the application for registration or have appeared and filed an answer to said
application, because all persons are considered as notified by the publication
required by law.
Furthermore, a decree of registration that has become final shall be deemed
conclusive not only on the questions actually contested and determined but also
upon all matters that might be litigated or decided in the land registration
proceedings. With the certification duly issued by the then Land Registration
Commission, now National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration
(NALTDRA), through then Acting Commissioner Santiago M. Kapunan (now a
distinguished member of this Court), its Deputy Clerk of Court III, the Head Geodetic
Engineer, and the Chief of Registration, the lower court and the Court of Appeals
correctly found there is no doubt that decrees of registration had in fact been issued
in the case at bench. It is likewise beyond dispute that such decrees attained finality
upon the lapse of one year from entry thereof. To allow the final decrees to once
again be subject to the conditions set forth in the 1914 case of Cacho vs. U.S. would
be tantamount to setting aside the decrees which cannot be reopened after the
lapse of one year from the entry thereof (Lapore vs. Pascual, 107 Phil. 695 [1960]).
Such action would definitely run counter to the very purpose of the Torrens System.
Moreover, to sustain the Court of Appeals ruling as regards requiring petitioners to
fulfill the conditions set forth in Cacho vs. U.S. would constitute a derogation of the
doctrine of res judicata. Significantly, the issuance of the subject decrees
presupposes a prior final judgment because the issuance of such decrees is a mere
ministerial act on part of the Land Registration Commission (now the NALTDRA),
upon presentation of a final judgment. It is also worth noting that the judgment in
Cacho vs. U.S. could not have acquired finality without the prior fulfillment of the
conditions in GLRO Record No. 6908, the presentation of the corresponding deed of
sale from Datto Dorondon on or before March 30, 1913 (upon which Decree No.
10364 was issued on May 9, 1913); and in GLRO Record No. 6909, the presentation
of a new survey per decision of Judge Jorge on December 10, 1912 and affirmed by
this Court on December 10, 1914 (upon which Decree No. 18969 was issued on July
8, 1915).
Requiring the submission of a new plan as a condition for the re-issuance of the
decree would render the finality attained by the Cacho vs. U.S. case nugatory, thus,
violating the fundamental rule regarding res judicata. It must be stressed that the
judgment and the resulting decree are res judicata, and these are binding upon the
whole world, the proceedings being in the nature of proceedings in rem. Besides,
such a requirement is an impermissible assault upon the integrity and stability of
the Torrens System of registration because it also effectively renders the decree
inconclusive.
As to the issue of laches, suffice it to state that the settled doctrine in this
jurisdiction is that laches cannot bar the issuance of a decree. The reason therefor
may be gleaned from Sta. Ana vs. Menla (1 SCRA 1294 [1961]):
. . . This provision of the Rules (Sec. 6, Rule 39) refers to civil actions and is not
applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so
because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is
secured against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within
a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable

against the losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status,
condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership of a parcel of land
is sought to be established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by
judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary,
except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the
winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
. . . There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court may
order or issue a decree. The reason is . . . that the judgment is merely declaratory in
character and does not need to be asserted or enforced against the adverse party.
Furthermore, the issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of
the Land Registration Commission ...
(p. 1297-1298)
Thus, it was held in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. de Banuver (25 SCRA 316 [1968])
that a final decision in land registration cases can neither be rendered inefficacious
by the statute of limitations nor by laches. This was reiterated in Vda. De
Barroga vs. Albano (157 SCRA 131 [1988]).
Finally, anent the issue of identity and existence of petitioner and his being a real
party in interest, records show that petitioner has sufficiently established his
existence and identity as well as his legal interest.
By an Affidavit of Adjudication as sole heir of Demetria Cacho, the property in
question were adjudicated in favor of petitioner under Doc. 1355, Page 128, Series
of 1985 of the Consulate General of the Philippines in Chicago. The fact of
adjudication of the estate of Demetria Cacho was published in the Times Journal.
Petitioner also appeared personally before Vice Consul Stephen V. David of the
Philippine Consulate General of the Republic of the Philippines in Chicago and
executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Atty. Godofredo Cabildo to
represent him in this case.
The execution of public documents, as in the case of the Affidavit of Adjudication, is
entitled to a presumption of regularity and proof is required to assail and controvert
the same. Thus, the burden of proof rests upon him who alleges the contrary and
respondents cannot shift the burden to petitioner by merely casting doubt as to his
existence and his identity without presenting preponderant evidence to controvert
such presumption. With more reason shall the same rule apply in the case of the
Special Power of Attorney duly sworn before the Philippine Consulate General of the
Republic of the Philippines in Chicago, the act of the administering oath being of
itself a performance of duty by a public official.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The decision of Branch I of the Regional Trial Court of the Twelfth Judicial Region
stationed at the City of Iligan, in its LRC Case No. CLR (GLRO) Record Nos. 6908 and
6909 dated June 9, 1993, is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
No special pronouncement is made as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 80687 April 10, 1989
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, petitioner,
vs.

HONORABLE MARIANO M. UMALI, in his capacity as Presiding Judge,

Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 23, Trece Martires City,
REMEDIOS MICLAT, JUAN C. PULIDO, ROSALINA NAVAL, and the REGISTER
OF DEEDS OF CAVITE, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner seeks reversion of a parcel of land on the ground that the original
sale thereof from the government was tainted with fraud because based on a
forgery and therefore void ab initio. The present holders of the property claiming to
be innocent purchasers for value and not privy to the alleged forgery, contend that
the action cannot lie against them.
The land in question is situated in Tanza, Cavite, and consists of 78,865 square
meters. 1 It was originally purchased on installment from the government on July 1,
1910 by Florentina Bobadilla, who allegedly transferred her rights thereto in favor of
Martina, Tomasa, Gregorio and Julio, all surnamed Cenizal, in 1922. 2 Tomasa and
Julio assigned their shares to Martina, Maria and Gregorio. 3 In 1971 these three
assignees purportedly signed a joint affidavit which was filed with the Bureau of
Lands to support their claim that they were entitled to the issuance of a certificate
of title over the said land on which they said they had already made full
payment. 4 On the basis of this affidavit, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources executed Deed No. V-10910 (Sale Certificate No. 1280) on September 10,
1971, in favor of the said affiants. 5Subsequently, on October 13, 1971, TCT No.
55044 (replacing Bobadilla's OCT No. 180) was issued by the register of deeds of
Cavite in favor of Maria Cenizal, Gregorio Cenizal, and (in lieu of Martina Cenizal)
Rosalina Naval, Luz Naval, and Enrique Naval. 6
When the complaint for reversion was filed on October 10, 1985, the registered
owners of the land, following several transfers, were Remedios Miclat under TCT No.
80392, Juan C. Pulido under TCT No. 80393, and Rosalina, Luz and Enrique Naval
under TCT No. 80394. 7 They were named as defendants and asked to return the
property to the State on the aforestated grounds of forgery and fraud. The plaintiff
claimed that Gregorio Cenizal having died on February 25, 1943, and Maria Cenizal
on January 8, 1959, they could not have signed the joint affidavit dated August 9,
1971, on which Deed No. V-10910 (Sale Certificate No. 1280) was based. 8
In their answer, Pulido and the Navals denied any participation in the joint affidavit
and said they had all acquired the property in good faith and for value. By way of
affirmative defenses, they invoked estoppel, laches, prescription andres
judicata. 9 For her part, Miclat moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that the
government had no cause of action against her because there was no allegation
that she had violated the plaintiff's right, that the government was not the real
party-in-interest because the subject land was already covered by the Torrens
system, and that in any event the action was barred by prescription or laches. 10
The respondent court, in its order dated October 2, 1987, granted the motion. 11 The
petitioner, contesting this order, now insists that it has a valid cause of action and
that it is not barred by either prescription or res judicata.
The Court will observe at the outset that the joint affidavit is indeed a forgery. Apart
from the fact that two of the supposed affiants were already dead at the time they
were supposed to have signed the sworn statement, even the most cursory
examination of the document will show that the three signatures affixed thereto
were written by one and the same hand. 12 There is no doubt about it. It is indeed
difficult to understand how such an obvious forgery could have deceived the people

in the Bureau of Lands who processed the papers of this case and made possible
the fraudulent transfer of the land.
But given such deception, would the sale itself be considered null and void from the
start, as the petitioner insists, so as to make all titles derived therefrom also
ineffectual ab initio?
We agree with the contention that there is no allegation in the complaint 13 filed by
the petitioner that any one of the defendants was privy to the forged joint affidavit
or that they had acquired the subject land in bad faith. Their status as innocent
transferees for value was never questioned in that pleading. Not having been
disproved, that status now accords to them the protection of the Torrens System
and renders the titles obtained by them thereunder indefeasible and conclusive.
The rule will not change despite the flaw in TCT No. 55044.
Section 39 of the Land Registration Act clearly provided:
Sec. 39. Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of
registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a
certificate of title for value in good faith shall hold the same free of all encumbrance
except those noted on said certificate.
The rulings on this provision are indeed as numerous as they are consistent:
Thus, under Section 44 of P.D. 1529 (then Sec. 39 of the Land Reg. Act), every
registered owner receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of
registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a certificate
of title for value and in good faith, shall hold the same free from all encumbrances
except those noted on the certificate and any of the encumbrances which may be
subsisting, and enumerated in the law. Under said provision, claims and liens of
whatever character, except those mentioned by law as existing against the land
prior to the issuance of certificate of title, are cut off by such certificate if not noted
thereon, and the certificate so issued binds the whole world, including the
government. 14
xxx xxx xxx
A holder in bad faith is not entitled to the protection of Sec. 39 of the Land
Registration Act. 15
xxx xxx xxx
The real purpose of the Torrens System of land registration is to quiet title to land;
to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which
were noted at the time of registration in the certificate, or which may arise
subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once the
title was registered, the owner might rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in
the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the
possibility of losing his land. 16
The decision in Piero v. Director of Lands 17 is not applicable to the present
proceeding because the lands involved in that case had not yet passed to the hands
of an innocent purchaser for value. They were still held by the Pineros. The action
for reversion was filed by the government against them as the original transferees
of the properties in question. They were the direct grantees of the free patents
issued by the government pursuant to which the corresponding certificates of title
were issued under the Torrens system. The fraud alleged by the government as a
ground for the reversion sought was imputable directly to the Pineros, who could not
plead the status of innocent purchasers for value.
The difference between them and the private respondents is that the latter acquired
the land in question not by direct grant but in fact after several transfers following

the original sale thereof to Bobadilla in 1910. The presumption is that they are
innocent transferees for value in the absence of evidence to the contrary. The
petitioner contends that it was Pedro Miclat who caused the falsification of the joint
affidavit, but that is a bare and hardly persuasive allegation, and indeed, even if
true, would still not prove any collusion between him and the private respondents.
The mere fact that Remedios Miclat was the daughter and heiress of Miclat, without
more, would not necessarily visit upon her the alleged sins of her father.
The Solicitor General also argues that Remedios is an extension of the juridical
personality of her father and so cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser for value
because she is charged with knowledge of her father's deceit. Such conclusion has
no basis in fact or law. Moreover, there is evidence that Remedios did not merely
inherit the land but actually purchased it for valuable consideration and without
knowledge of its original defect. The agreement to subdivide, 18 which she
presented to show that she had acquired the land for valuable confederation, is
more acceptable than the conjectures of the petitioner. It is also consonant with the
presumption of good faith.
The land being now registered under the Torrens system in the names of the private
respondents, the government has no more control or jurisdiction over it. It is no
longer part of the public domain or, as the Solicitor General contends as if it
made any difference of the Friar Lands. The subject property ceased to be public
land when OCT No. 180 was issued to Florentina Bobadilla in 1910 or at the latest
from the date it was sold to the Cenizals in 1971 upon full payment of the purchase
price. As private registered land, it is governed by the provisions of the Land
Registration Act, now denominated the Property Registration Decree, which applies
even to the government.
The pertinent provision of the Land Registration Act was Section 122, which read as
follows:
Sec. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the
Government of the United States or to the Government of the Philippine Islands are
alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations, the
same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act and shall become
registered lands. 19
This should be related to Section 12 of the Friar Lands Act, providing thus:
Sec. 12. . . . upon the payment of the final installment together with all accrued
interest, the Government will convey to such settler and occupant the said land so
held by him by proper instrument of conveyance, which shall be issued and become
effective in the manner provided in section one hundred and twenty-two (Sec. 122)
of the Land Registration Act.
The petitioner claims that it is not barred by the statute of limitations because the
original transfer of the land was null and void ab initio and did not give rise to any
legal right. The land therefore continued to be part of the public domain and the
action for this reversion could be filed at any time. The answer to that is the
statement made by the Court in Heirs of Tanak Pangawaran Patiwayan
v. Martinez 20 that "even if respondent Tagwalan eventually is proven to have
procured the patent and the original certificate of title by means of fraud, the land
would not revert back to the State," precisely because it has become private land.
Moreover, the petitioner errs in arguing that the original transfer was null and
void ab initio, for the fact is that it is not so. It was only voidable. The land remained
private as long as the title thereto had not been voided, but it is too late to do that
now. As the Court has held in Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals. 21

A certificate of title fraudulently secured is not null and void ab initio, unless the
fraud consisted in misrepresenting that the land is part of the public domain,
although it is not. In such case the nullity arises, not from the fraud or deceit, but
from the fact that the land is not under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands.
Inasmuch as the land involved in the present case does not belong to such
category, OCT No. 282-A would be merely voidable or reviewable (Vda. de Cuaycong
vs. Vda. de Sengbengco, 110 Phil. 113): (1) upon proof of actual fraud; (2) although
valid and effective, until annulled or reviewed in a direct proceeding therefor
(Legarda vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590), not collaterally (Sorongon vs. Makalintal, 80 Phil.
259, 262; Director of Lands vs. Gan Tan, 89 Phil. 184; Henderson vs. Garrido, 90
Phil. 624,630; Samonte vs. Sambilon, 107 Phil. 198,200); (3) within the statutory
period therefor (Sec. 38, Act 496; Velasco vs. Gochuico 33 Phil. 363; Delos Reyes vs.
Paterno, 34 Phil. 420; Snyder vs. Provincial Fiscal, 42 Phil. 761, 764; Reyes vs.
Borbon, 50 Phil. 791; Clemente vs. Lukban, 53 Phil. 931; Sugayan vs. Solis, 56 Phil.
276, 279; Heirs of Lichauco vs. Director of Lands, 70 Phil. 69); (4) after which, the
title would be conclusive against the whole world, including the Government
(Legarda vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 596; Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883; J. M.
Tuason vs. Santiago, 99 Phil. 615).
And as we declared in Municipality of Hagonoy vs. Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources: 22
. . . Once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued,
the land ceases to be part of public domain and becomes private property over
which the director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction. A public land patent,
when registered in the corresponding Register of Deeds, is a veritable Torrens Title,
and becomes as indefeasible as Torrens Title upon the expiration of one (1) year
from the date of issuance thereof. Said title is, like one issued pursuant to a judicial
decree, subject to review within one (1) year from the date of the issuance of the
patent. Beyond said period, the action for the annulment of the certificate of title
issued upon the land grant can no longer be entertained. (Emphasis supplied).
It is worth observing here that in two earlier cases, the private respondents were
challenged by the heirs of Matilde Cenizal Arguson but both were dismissed and the
titles of the registered owners were confirmed by the trial court. 23This decision was
later sustained by this Court. 24 While this is not to say that the present petition is
barred by res judicata,as the government was not a party in these cases, it does
suggest that the issue it wants to rake up now has long been settled. It should not
be the subject of further judicial inquiry, especially at this late hour. Litigation must
stop at some point instead of dragging on interminably.
The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the
most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their
indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a
person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the seller's title thereto is
valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was
ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if this
were permitted, public confidence in the system would be eroded and land
transactions would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily
conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence would be
that land conflicts could be even more numerous and complex than they are now
and possibly also more abrasive if not even violent. The government, recognizing
the worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to accept the validity

of titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied. As
in this case.
We find that the private respondents are transferees in good faith and for value of
the subject property and that the original acquisition thereof, although fraudulent,
did not affect their own titles. These are valid against the whole world, including the
government.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is
so ordered.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 102858. July 28, 1997]
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL,
ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all surnamed ABISTADO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land
registration case mandatory or directory?
Statement of the Case
The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to
cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the
application. But the Solicitor General disagreed and thus filed this petition to set
aside the Decision[1] promulgated on July 3, 1991 and the subsequent
Resolution[2] promulgated on November 19, 1991 by Respondent Court of
Appeals[3] in CA-G.R. CV No. 23719. The dispositive portion of the challenged
Decision reads:[4]
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of dismissal appealed from is
hereby set aside, and a new one entered confirming the registration and title of
applicant, Teodoro Abistado, Filipino, a resident of Barangay 7, Poblacion Mamburao,
Occidental Mindoro, now deceased and substituted by Margarita, Marissa, Maribel,
Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado, represented by their aunt, Miss Josefa
Abistado, Filipinos, residents of Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to the
parcel of land covered under MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D located in Poblacion Mamburao,
Occidental Mindoro.
The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and private oppositor are
hereby dismissed for want of evidence.
Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the corresponding taxes due on
this land, let an order for the issuance of a decree be issued."
The Facts
On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for
original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1529.[5] The application was docketed as Land Registration Case
(LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao,
Occidental Mindoro.[6] However, during the pendency of his petition, applicant
died. Hence, his heirs -- Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all
surnamed Abistado -- represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was appointed
their guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants.
The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition
for want of jurisdiction.However, it found that the applicants through their
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful
possession of the subject land since 1938.

In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned: [7]

"x x x. However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the provisions
of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529, requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of Initial
Hearing (Exh. `E') in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Exhibit `E'
was only published in the Official Gazette (Exhibits `F' and `G'). Consequently, the
Court is of the well considered view that it has not legally acquired jurisdiction over
the instant application for want of compliance with the mandatory provision
requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general
circulation."
The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982, which in
its pertinent portion provides:[8]
It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23 [of PD 1529]
has a two-fold purpose; the first, which is mentioned in the provision of the
aforequoted provision refers to publication in the Official Gazette, and is
jurisdictional; while the second, which is mentioned in the opening clause of the
same paragraph, refers to publication not only in the Official Gazette but also in a
newspaper of general circulation, and is procedural. Neither one nor the other is
dispensable. As to the first, publication in the Official Gazette is indispensably
necessary because without it, the court would be powerless to assume jurisdiction
over a particular land registration case. As to the second, publication of the notice
of initial hearing also in a newspaper of general circulation is indispensably
necessary as a requirement of procedural due process; otherwise, any decision that
the court may promulgate in the case would be legally infirm.
Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which, as
earlier explained, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the
registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA
Resolution dated November 19, 1991.
The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this
recourse to us. This Court notes that the petitioners counsel anchored his petition
on Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy should be based on Rule 45 because he is
appealing a final disposition of the Court of Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his
petition as one for review under Rule 45, and not for certiorari under Rule 65. [9]
The Issue
Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion[10] in holding
x x x that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case No. 86 need
not be published in a newspaper of general circulation, and in not dismissing LRC
Case No. 86 for want of such publication.
Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial hearing
shall be published both in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general
circulation. According to petitioner, publication in the Official Gazette is necessary to
confer jurisdiction upon the trial court, and xxx in xxx a newspaper of general
circulation to comply with the notice requirement of due process. [11]
Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply with the
requirement of publication in a newspaper of general circulation is a mere
procedural defect. They add that publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to
confer jurisdiction.[12]
In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent Court of Appeals ruled: [13]

x x x although the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette and in a

newspaper of general circulation is couched in mandatory terms, it cannot be
gainsaid that the law also mandates with equal force that publication in the Official
Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.
Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded the opportunity
to explain matters fully and present their side. Thus, it justified its disposition in this
wise:[14]
x x x We do not see how the lack of compliance with the required procedure
prejudiced them in any way. Moreover, the other requirements of: publication in the
Official Gazette, personal notice by mailing, and posting at the site and other
conspicuous places, were complied with and these are sufficient to notify any party
who is minded to make any objection of the application for registration.
The Courts Ruling
We find for petitioner.
Newspaper Publication Mandatory
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring
publication of the notice of initial hearing reads as follows:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. -- The court shall, within five
days from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the
initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety
days from the date of the order.
The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land
registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
1. By publication. -Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the
Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be
published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official
Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.Said notice shall be
addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved
including the adjoining owners so far as known, and `to all whom it may
concern.' Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a
certain date and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be
granted.
xxx xxx xxx
Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that
publication in the Official Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land
registration court. However, the question boils down to whether, absent any
publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land registration court can
validly confirm and register the title of private respondents.
We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the demands of
statutory construction and the due process rationale behind the publication
requirement.
The law used the term shall in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner
of Land Registration upon the latters receipt of the court order setting the time for
initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the
mandatory character of a statute.[15] While concededly such literal mandate is not an
absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its
context in the entire provision, we hold that in the present case the term must be
understood in its normal mandatory meaning. In Republic vs. Marasigan,[16] the

Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held that Section 23 of PD 1529
requires notice of the initial hearing by means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3)
posting, all of which must be complied with. If the intention of the law were
otherwise, said section would not have stressed in detail the requirements of
mailing of notices to all persons named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the
Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of the land.Indeed, if
mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of reasoning, publication in a
newspaper of general circulation is likewise imperative since the law included such
requirement in its detailed provision.
It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem.[17] Being in
rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as
against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the
property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This
being so, the process must strictly be complied with. Otherwise, persons who may
be interested or whose rights may be adversely affected would be barred from
contesting an application which they had no knowledge of. As has been ruled, a
party as an owner seeking the inscription of realty in the land registration court
must prove by satisfactory and conclusive evidence not only his ownership thereof
but the identity of the same, for he is in the same situation as one who institutes an
action for recovery of realty.[18] He must prove his title against the whole world. This
task, which rests upon the applicant, can best be achieved when all persons
concerned -- nay, the whole world -- who have rights to or interests in the subject
property are notified and effectively invited to come to court and show cause why
the application should not be granted.The elementary norms of due process require
that before the claimed property is taken from concerned parties and registered in
the name of the applicant, said parties must be given notice and opportunity to
oppose.
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be
deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the
Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been
complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that
the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is
oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein may
not reach the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not
be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real
estate. In sum, the all-encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the
consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of
disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory
construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting.
Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of
the law. Private respondents did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would
not have mattered because the statute itself allows no excuses.Ineludibly, this Court
has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law is
unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that
where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for
interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application.
[19]
There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private
respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future,
after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application of private respondent for land
registration is DISMISSED without prejudice. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-26127 June 28, 1974
(Civil Case No. 3621)
VICTOR BENIN, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
MARIANO SEVERO TUASON y DE LA PAZ, ET AL., defendants. J. M. TUASON
& CO., INC., defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-26128 June 28, 1974
(Civil Case No. 3622)
JUAN ALCANTARA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
MARIANO SEVERO TUASON y DE LA PAZ, ET AL., defendants. J.M. TUASON
& CO., INC., defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-26129 June 28, 1974
(Civil Case No. 3623)
DIEGO PILI, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
MARIANO SEVERO TUASON y DE LA PAZ, ET AL., defendants. J.M. TUASON
& CO., INC., defendant-appellant.
Jose Palarca Law Offices for plaintiffs-appellees.
Manuel O. Chan & Rodolfo M. Caluag for defendant-appellant.
ZALDIVAR, J.:p
Appeal from the decision, dated January 18, 1965, of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, the Hon. Judge Eulogio Mencias, presiding in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622, and
3623. 1
On May 19, 1955 three sets of plaintiffs filed three separate complaints containing
substantially the same allegations. 2
In Civil Case No. 3621, the plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and
possessors of the three parcels of agricultural lands, described in paragraph V of the
complaint, located in the barrio of La Loma (now barrio of San Jose) in the
municipality (now city) of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an aggregate area of
approximately 278,928 square meters; that they inherited said parcels of land from
their ancestor Sixto Benin, who in turn inherited the same from his father, Eugenio
Benin; that they and their predecessors in interest had possessed these three
parcels of land openly, adversely, and peacefully, cultivated the same and
exclusively enjoyed the fruits harvested therefrom; that Eugenio Benin, plaintiff's
grandfather, had said parcels of land surveyed on March 4 and 6, 1894, that during
the cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands of the lands in Barrio San Jose in 1933
Sixto Benin and herein plaintiffs claim the ownership over said parcels of land; that
they declared said lands for taxation purposes in 1940 under Tax Declaration No.
2429; that after the outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and

subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other places, after having
secured the permission of the plaintiffs, constructed their houses thereon and paid
monthly rentals to plaintiffs.
In Civil Case No. 3622 the plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and
possessors of two parcels of agricultural land, described in paragraph V of the
complaint, located in the Barrio of La Loma (now Barrio San Jose) in the municipality
of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an aggregate area of approximately 148,118
square meters; that these parcels of land were inherited by them from their
deceased father Bonoso Alcantara, who in turn inherited the same from his father,
Juan Alcantara; that plaintiffs Juan Alcantara and Jose Alcantara were the children of
Bonoso Alcantara; that these two brothers inherited the land from their father, and
they and their predecessors in interest had been in open, adverse and continuous
possession of the same, planting therein palay and other agricultural products and
exclusively enjoying said products; that on March 28, 1894 plaintiffs' grandfather,
Juan Alcantara, had said lands surveyed; that during the cadastral survey by the
Bureau of Lands of the lands in Barrio San Jose in 1933 Bonoso Alcantara and the
plaintiffs filed and registered their claims of ownership over said lands; that
plaintiffs had said lands declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No.
2390, of Quezon City; that after the outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in
1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other places, after
having secured permission from plaintiffs, settled and constructed their houses on
said lands and plaintiffs collected monthly rentals from them.
In Civil Case No. 3623, plaintiffs alleged that they are the owners and possessors of
a parcel of agricultural land located in the Barrio of La Loma (now San Jose),
municipality of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an area of approximately 62,481
square meters; that this parcel of land was inherited by plaintiffs from their ancestor
Candido Pili who in turn inherited the same from his parents; that Candido Pili and
his predecessors in interest owned, possessed, occupied and cultivated the said
parcel of land from time immemorial; that upon the death of Candido Pili his
children Luisa Pili, Pascual Pili, Diego Pili and Manuel Pili succeeded to the ownership
and possession and cultivation of said land; that plaintiffs and their predecessors in
interest, as owners and possessors of said land, had openly, adversely and
continuously cultivated the land, planting thereon palay and other agricultural
products and enjoying exclusively the products harvested therefrom; that during his
lifetime, Candido Pili ordered the survey of said land sometime on March 11, 1894,
and when the cadastral survey of said land was conducted by the Bureau of Lands
in 1933 Candido Pili and plaintiffs filed and registered their claim of ownership over
the said parcel of land; that plaintiffs had the land declared for taxation purposes
under Tax Declaration No. 2597, Quezon City, Philippines; that after the outbreak of
the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees
from Manila and other places, after securing permission from plaintiffs, settled and
constructed their houses in said land and plaintiffs collected monthly rentals from
their lessees or tenants.
The plaintiffs in these three civil cases uniformly alleged, in their respective
complaint, that sometime in the year 1951 while they were enjoying the peaceful
possession of their lands, the defendants, particularly the defendant J.M. Tuason and
Co. Inc., through their agents and representatives, with the aid of armed men, by
force and intimidation, using bulldozers and other demolishing equipment, illegally
entered and started defacing, demolishing and destroying the dwellings and
constructions of plaintiffs' lessees, as well as the improvements consisting of rice

paddies (pilapiles), bamboos and fruit trees, and permanent improvements such as
old roads, old bridges and other permanent landmarks within and outside the lands
in question, disregarding the objections of plaintiffs, and as a result plaintiffs were
deprived of the rentals received from their lessees; that plaintiffs made inquiries
regarding the probable claim of defendants, and in 1953 they discovered for the
first time that their lands, as described in their respective complaint, had either
been fraudulently or erroneously included, by direct or constructive fraud, in what
appears as Parcel No. 1 (known as Santa Mesa Estate) in Original Certificate of Title
No. 735 of the Land Records of the province of Rizal in the names of the original
applicants for registration, now defendants, Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz,
Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion
Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz.
The plaintiffs in each of the three complaints also alleged that the registered owners
mentioned in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 had applied for the registration of
two parcels of land (known as the Santa Mesa Estate and the Diliman Estate),
located in the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte, province of Rizal,
of which parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) contained an area of 8,798,617 square
meters; that the registration proceedings were docketed as LRC No. 7681 of the
Court of Land Registration; that the application for registration in LRC No. 7681,
containing the boundaries, technical descriptions and areas of parcel No. 1 (Santa
Mesa Estate) and parcel No. 2 (Diliman Estate) was published in the Official Gazette;
that before the decision was handed down in LRC No. 7681, the area, boundaries
and technical descriptions of parcel No. 1 were altered and amended; that the
amendments and alterations, which were made after the publication of the original
application, were never published; that on March 7, 1914 a decision was rendered in
LRC No. 7681 based on the amended plan; that pursuant to the decision of March 7,
1914 a decree of registration was issued on July 6, 1914, known as Decree No.
17431, decreeing the registration in the names of the applicants of the two parcels
of land (Santa Mesa Estate and Diliman Estate); that the decision dated March 7,
1914 in LRC No. 7681 is null and void because the Land Registration Court had no
jurisdiction to render the decision for lack of publication; that Decree No. 17431
issued pursuant to the decision of March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is likewise null and
void from the beginning, because it was issued pursuant to a void decision and
because the boundaries, technical descriptions and areas appearing in the decree
are different and not identical with the boundaries, technical descriptions and areas
in the application for registration as published in the Official Gazette; that the area
of parcel No. 1 as mentioned in Decree No. 17431 is bigger than the area of parcel
No. 1 appearing in the application for registration as published in the Official
Gazette; that Original Certificate of Title No. 735, referring to parcel 1 (Santa Mesa
Estate), is also null and void from the beginning because it was issued pursuant to a
void decree of registration; that the area, boundaries and technical description of
Parcel No. 1 appearing in Decree of Registration No. 17431 and in the Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 are different from the area, boundaries and technical
description appearing in the application for registration as published in the Official
Gazette; that the plaintiffs had not been notified of the proceedings in LRC No. 7681
although the applicants knew, or could have known, by the exercise of necessary
diligence, the names and addresses of the plaintiffs and their predecessors in
interest who were then, and up to the time the complaints were filed, in possession
and were cultivating the lands described in paragraph V of their respective
complaint; and that during, before, and even after the issuance of Original

Certificate of Title No. 735 the defendants had tacitly recognized the ownership of
the plaintiffs over their respective lands because said defendants had never
disturbed the possession and cultivation of the lands by the plaintiffs until the year
1951; and that all transfer certificates of title issued subsequently, based on
Original Certificate of Title No. 735, are also null and void. 3
The plaintiffs in each of the three cases prayed the court: (1) to declare them
owners and entitled to the possession of the parcel, or parcels, of land described in
their respective complaint, as the case may be; (2) to revoke the decision of the
Court of Land Registration, dated March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681, and to declare
Decree No. 17431, dated July 6, 1914 null and void from the beginning with respect
to Parcel No. 1(Santa Mesa Estate) in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 which
include the lands of the plaintiffs; (3) to declare Original Certificate of Title No. 735,
particularly as it refers to Parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) also null and void; (4) to
declare null and void all transfer certificates of titles issued by the Register of Deeds
of Rizal and of Quezon City subsequent to, and based on, Original Certificate of Title
No. 735; (5) to order the defendants, in the event Original Certificate of Title No.
735 is declared valid, to reconvey and transfer title over the land described in their
respective complaint in favor of the plaintiffs in each case, as the case may be; (6)
to order the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the market value of the lands in
question in case of defendants' inability to reconvey the same; (7) to order the
defendants to pay damages to the plaintiffs; (8) to issue a writ of preliminary
injunction against the defendants, their lawyers, their agents and representatives
from disturbing the ownership and possession of the plaintiffs during the pendency
of these cases.
The plaintiffs, in the three cases, were allowed by the trial court to litigate as
paupers.
Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was actually served with summons. The other
defendants were ordered summoned by publication in accordance with Sections 16
and 17 of the Rules of Court. Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. appeared. The
other defendants were all declared in default.
On June 23, 1955 defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss in each
of the three cases. This motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court on July 20,
1955.
On July 18, 1955 the trial court issued an order granting the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for by the plaintiffs in their complaints. The preliminary injunction,
however, was lifted by order of the trial court on October 3, 1955, upon the posting
by defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. of bonds in the total amount of P14,000.00
pursuant to the order of the court of September 26, 1955.
On August 11, 1955 defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed in the three cases a
motion for reconsideration of the order of July 20, 1955 denying the motion to
dismiss. This motion for reconsideration was denied by order of the court of
September 26, 1955.
On November 29, 1955 defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed an answer in each of
the three cases. In its answer, this defendant, among others, specifically denied
plaintiffs' claim of ownership of the lands involved in each case. The answer
contains special and affirmative defenses, to wit: (1) that the plaintiffs' cause of
action is barred by prior judgment and res judicata in view of the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal in its Civil Case No. Q-156 which was subsequently
elevated to the Supreme Court as G.R. No. L-4998, in which latter case the Supreme
Court affirmed in toto the order of the lower court dismissing the case; (2) that the

complaints failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the
defendants; (3) that the plaintiffs' action, assuming that their complaints state
sufficient cause of action, had prescribed either under Act No. 496 or under statutes
governing prescription of action; (4) that defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. is a buyer
in good faith and for valuable consideration of the parcels of land involved in the
three cases; (5) that the registration proceedings had in LRC No. 7681 instituted by
the defendant's predecessors in interest was in accordance with law, and the
requirements for a valid registration of title were complied with. By way of
counterclaim the defendant prayed that the plaintiffs be ordered to pay damages as
therein specified.
The plaintiffs, amended their complaints in the three cases, by including additional
parties as plaintiffs, and the amended complaints were admitted by the trial court.
The defendant, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., filed a manifestation that it was reproducing
and realleging its answers to the original complaints as its answers to the amended
complaints in view of the fact that the amendments to the complaints consist
merely in the inclusion of additional indispensable as well as necessary partiesplaintiffs. 4
On June 7, 1962, after the plaintiffs had presented their evidence, defendant J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. presented a motion to dismiss the cases upon grounds that (1)
the actions were barred by the statute of limitations; (2) that the actions barred by a
prior judgment; and (3) that plaintiffs had not presented any evidence to prove their
claim of ownership. The defendant later filed a motion to withdraw the third ground
of its motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss,
as well as to the motion of defendant to withdraw its third ground to dismiss. The
trial court, in an order dated December 3, 1962, granted defendant's motion to
withdraw the third ground of its motion to dismiss but denied the motion to
dismiss. 5
After trial, on January 18, 1965, the lower court rendered a decision for the three
cases, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants as follows:
A Declaring that the decision, the decree and the title issued in LRC No. 7681, are
null and void, ab initio, and of no effect whatsoever;
B Declaring that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 found on page 136 Vol. A-7 of
the Registration Book of Rizal is null and void from the very beginning (and) of no
effect whatsoever;
C Declaring that all Transfer Certificates of Title emanating or allegedly derived
from Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Province of Rizal are likewise null and
void;
D Declaring that the plaintiff in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 are the
owners and entitled to the possession of the parcels of land claimed and described
in paragraph V of their respective complaints;
E Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming under them to vacate and
restore to the plaintiffs the possesion of the parcels of land described in paragraph
V of the complaint in Civil Case No. 3621 and indicated as Parcel A, Parcel B and
Parcel C, in SWO-40187 (Exh. "UU" and Exh. "VV");
F Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming under them to vacate and
restore to the plaintiffs the possession of the parcels of land described in paragraph
V of the complaint in Civil Case No. 3623 and indicated as Parcel D and Parcel F, in
SWO-40187 (Exh. "UU" and Exh. 'VV");

G Ordering the Defendants and all persons claiming under them to vacate and
restore to the plaintiffs the possession of the parcels of land described in paragraph
V of the complaint in Civil Case No. 3623 and indicated in Parcel E, in SWO-491187
(Exh. "UU and Exh. "VV");
H Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621 the sum of
P600.00 a month as actual damages for uncollected rentals from 1951 until such
possession is restored to them;
I Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623 the sum of
P600.00 a month, as actual damages for uncollected rentals from 1951 until such
possession is restored to them;.
J Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623 the sum of
P150.00 a month as actual damages for uncollected rentals from 1951 until such
possession is restored to them; .
K Ordering the defendants to pay the costs; .
L The defendants' counterclaim is hereby declared dismissed for lack of merit." 6
A motion for new trial was filed by defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. on January 30,
1965. However, before the motion for new trial was resolved by the court, said
defendant, on February 11, 1965, filed a notice of appeal to this Court and an
appeal bond, and on February 12, 1965 he filed the record on appeal. 7 The record
on appeal, after it had been corrected and amended, as ordered and/or authorized
by the trial court, was approved on September 29, 1965. 8
Appellant J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc., in this appeal, contends that the trial court
committed the following errors:
I. The lower court erred in holding that the Land Registration Court in GLRO No.
7681 lacked or was without jurisdiction to issue decree No. 17431 for the alleged
reason that:
(1) The amendment to the original plan was not published;
(2) The description of Parcel 1 in the decree is not identical with the description of
Parcel 1 as applied for and as published in the Official Gazette;
(3) Parcel 1 as decreed is bigger in area than Parcel 1 as applied for;
(4) A. Bonifacio Road is the only boundary on the West of Parcel 1.
II. The trial court erred in finding that the transcription of the decree No. 17431 was
not in accordance with the law and that, therefore, said OCT 735 was a complete
nullity and the land remains unregistered.
III. The trial court erred in taking cognizance of these cases despite its lack of
jurisdiction to hear and decide the same.
IV. The trial court erred in not dismissing these cases on the grounds of prescription
and laches, and in denying the motions to dismiss filed on said grounds.
V. The trial court erred in not dismissing these cases on the ground of res
judicata and in denying the motion to dismiss filed on said ground.
VI. The trial court erred in declaring null and void all certificates of title emanating
from OCT 735.
VII. The trial court erred in holding that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. is not a purchaser in
good faith and for value.
VIII. The trial court erred in awarding ownership of the lands claimed by, and in
awarding damages to, the appellees.
IX. The trial court erred in denying and in dismissing appellant's counterclaim and in
sentencing appellant to pay the costs of these suits.
As stated by the trial court in its decision, "These cases involve the validity of the
decision and the decree issued in LRC No. 7681 resulting in the issuance of Title No.

735, and the ownership and possession of several parcels of land, claimed by the
plaintiffs in their respective complaints...."
The lower court, summarizing its findings, among others, concluded that: (1) the
decision and the decree in LRC No. 7681 are null and void ab initio, having been
rendered without jurisdiction; (2) Original Certificate of Title No. 735 issued pursuant
to the decree in LRC No. 7681 is null and void, having been issued pursuant to a
void degree; (3) Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is null and void because the No.
17431 in LRC No. 7681, assuming the degree to be valid, had not been inscribed in
accordance with the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496; (4) all Transfer Certificates
of Title allegedly emanating and derived from the void Original Certificate of Title
No. 735 are likewise null and void; and (5) the plaintiffs in these three civil are the
owners and entitled to the possession of the parcels of land described in their
respective complaints.
We have carefully examined and studied the voluminous records, and the numerous
documentary evidence, of these three cases, and We find that the conclusions of
the trial court are not supported by the evidence and the applicable decisions of this
Court.
The Original Certificate of Title No. 735 that had been declared null and void ab
initio by the trial court covers two big parcels of land, mentioned in said title as
Parcel 1, having an area of 8,778,644.10 square meters more or less, known as the
Santa Mesa Estate; and Parcel 2, having an area of 15,961,246 square meters more
or less, known as the Diliman Estate. The three parcels of land involved in Civil Case
No. 3621, having an aggregate area of 278,853 square meters, more or less; the
two parcels of land involved in Civil Case No. 3622 having an aggregate area of
154,119.7 square meters, more or less; and the one parcel of land involved in Civil
Case No. 3623, having an area of 62,481 square meters, more or less, are all
included in the area of Parcel 1. 9 The trial court, in its decision, states that the
identity of the parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs is not disputed and that both
the plaintiffs and the defendant admit that the parcels of land litigated are found
within the boundaries of the present Sta. Mesa Heights Subdivision (Parcel 1)
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. 10 It is shown in the survey plans,
presented by both the plaintiffs and the defendant, that the six parcels of lands
involved in these three cases are located at the northwestern portion of Parcel 1.
(Exhs. UU, VV; and Exh. 29).
The records show, and it is established by the evidence, that sometime in 1911
Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose
Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto
Tuason y de la Paz, filed with the Court of Land Registration an application for the
registration of their title over two parcels of land, designated in the survey plans
accompanying the application as Parcel 1 with an area of 8,798,617 square meters,
and Parcel 2 with an area of 16,254,037 square meters. The application was
docketed as LRC No. 7681. There was another application covering three other
parcels of land, docketed as LRC No. 7680. The application in LRC No. 7681 was set
for hearing on November 20, 1911 (Exh. X). The application and the notice of
hearing, containing the technical descriptions of the two parcels of land applied for,
were published in the issue of the Official Gazette of October 25, 1911 (Exh. YY). On
November 20, 1911 the Court of Land Registration issued an order of general
default against the whole world except the Insular Government, the Director of
Lands and the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte (Exh. 28). On
December 23, 1911 the court issued an order authorizing the amendment of the

plan in LRC No. 7681 (Exh. 23). November 11, 1913 the applicants and the
Government entered into an agreement whereby the Government agreed to
withdraw its opposition to the application for registration of title over the portion
known as Hacienda Diliman (Parcel 2) on condition that the roads existing on said
tract of land be allowed to remain, and it was further agreed "that the issuance, of
the title to applicants shall be made subject to all the exceptions established by
Section 39 of Act 496 as amended by Section 1 of Act 2011" (Exh. 21). On
December 29, 1913 the Court of Land Registration rendered a decision (Exh. 24) in
both LRC No. 7680 and LRC No. 7681 which, among others, stated that during the
registration proceedings the plans accompanying the two applications were
amended in order to exclude certain areas that were the subject of opposition, that
the order of general default was confirmed, that the Chief of the Surveyor's Division
of the Court of Land Registration was ordered to submit a report as to whether or
not the new (amended) plans had included lands which were not by the original
plans, and whether or not the new plans had excluded the lands that had already
been covered by the decree in LRC No. 3563. The decision further stated that in the
event that the new plans did not include new parcels of land and that the lands that
were the subject of the proceedings in LRC No. 3563 had been excluded, an
additional decision would be made decreeing the adjudication and registration of
the lands that were the subject of the registration proceedings in favor of the
applicants, as follows: To Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, two sixths (2/6)
undivided portion to Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6) undivided
portion; to Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6) undivided portion; to
Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6)undivided portion; and to
Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6) undivided portion.
In compliance with the order contained in the decision of December 29, 1913, the
Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration, on January 24, 1914,
submitted a report (Exh. 22) to the court which, among others, stated that the new
plan of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681 did not include any land that had not been
previously included in the original plan.
On March 7, 1914 the Court of Land Registration rendered a supplemental decision
declaring that, on the basis of the decision of December 29, 1913 and of the report
of the Surveyor of Court of Land Registration, the applicants Mariano Severo Tuason
y de la Paz and others were the owners of the land applied for, as described in the
amended plan, in the proportion mentioned in the decision, and ordering that the
land applied for be registered in the names of the applicants and that a decree of
registration be issued in accordance with the decision and the amended plan. On
March 27, 1914 the Chief of the Survey Division addressed a communication to the
registration court, in connection with LRC No. 7681, suggesting that the decision of
the court of March 7, 1914 be modified such that the decree of registration be
based upon the original plan as published and not upon the amended plan (Exh. Z3). The Court of Land Registration did not follow the recommendation of the Chief of
the Survey Division. On July 6, 1914 Decree of Registration No. 17431 was issued by
the Chief of the General Land Registration Office pursuant to the decision of the
Court of Land Registration of March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681. The decree contains
the technical description of the two parcels of land in accordance with the plan as
amended. It appears in the decree that Parcel 1 has an area of 8,798,644.10 square
meters, more or less, or an increase of 27.10 square meters over the area of
8,798,617 square meters that was stated in the application for registration and in
the notice of hearing which were published in the Official Gazette of October 25,

1911; and that Parcel 2 has an area of 15,961,246 square meters, more or less, or a
decrease of 292,791 square meters from the area of 16,254,037 square meters that
was stated in the application and in the notice of hearing that were published in the
Official Gazette (Exhs. 25 and YY). All in all, there is a decrease of 292,763.90
square meters in the aggregate area of the two parcels of land sought to be
registered.
Subsequently, on July 8, 1914, the Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal issued
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 in the names of the applicants, Mariano Severo
Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz,
Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz
(Exh. 30).
1. We shall now deal with the first error assigned by the appellant.
The lower court declared Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void ab
initio because, according to said court, that title was based on Decree of
Registration No. 17431 in LRC No. 7681 that was null and void, said decree having
been issued pursuant to a decision of the Court of Land Registration in LRC No. 7681
which had no jurisdiction to render said decision.
As We have adverted to, Original Certificate of Title No. 735 covers two big parcels
of land: Parcel 1, known as the Santa Mesa Estate, and Parcel 2, known as the
Diliman Estate. The records show that these two parcels of land had been
subdivided into numerous lots, and most of those lots had sold to numerous parties
Parcel 1 having been converted into a subdivision known as the Santa Mesa
Heights Subdivision, and the lots had been sold to private individual and entities,
such that in that subdivision now are located the National Orthopedic Hospital, the
station of Pangasinan Transportation Co. (Pantranco), Sto. Domingo Church, Lourdes
Church and others. Necessarily, as a result of the sales of the lots into which Parcel
1 was subdivided, transfer certificates of title were issued to the purchasers of the
lots, and these transfer certificates of title were based upon transfer certificates of
title that emanated from Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The trial court declared
null and void all transfer certificates of title emanating, or derived, from Original
Certificate of No. 735.
The decision of the trial court declaring null and void ab initio Original Certificate of
Title No. 735 would invalidate the title over the entire area included in Parcel 1
which admittedly includes the six parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs-and also
the title over the entire area included in Parcel 2. Let it be noted that Parcel 1 has an
area of 8,798,644.10 square meters, more or less, and Parcel 2 has an area of
15,961,246 square meters, more or less; while the six parcels of land claimed by the
plaintiffs have an aggregate area of only 495,453.7 square meters, more or less. In
other words, the area of the six parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs is only a
little over two per cent (2%) of the aggregate area of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2. But the
decision of the trial court nullified Original Certificate of Title No. 785, without any
qualification.
The trial court held that the Court of Land Registration had no jurisdiction to render
the decision in LRC No. 7681 because during the registration proceedings, after the
original application and notice of hearing had been duly published, the plan of
Parcel 1 was amended and no publication regarding the amended plan was made.
The trial court pointed out that the area and the description of Parcel 1 in Decree of
Registration No. 17431 are not identical with the area and description of Parcel 1
applied for and published in the Official Gazette. The trial court stressed on the
point that publication is one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court to

hear and decide an application for registration and to order the issuance of a decree
of registration, as provided in Act 496 (Land Registration Act).
We believe that the lower court erred when it held that the Land Registration Court
was without jurisdiction to render the decision in LRC No. 7681. Under Section 23 of
Act 496, the registration court may allow, or order, an amendment of the
application for registration when it appears to the court that the amendment is
necessary and proper. Under Section 24 of the same act the court may at any time
order an application to be amended by striking out one or more parcels or by
severance of the application. The amendment may be made in the application or in
the survey plan, or in both, since the application and the survey plan go together. If
the amendment consists in the inclusion in the application for registration of an area
or parcel of land not previously included in the original application, as published, a
new publication of the amended application must be made. The purpose of the new
publication is to give notice to all persons concerned regarding the amended
application. Without a new publication the registration court can not acquire
jurisdiction over the area or parcel of land that is added to the area covered by the
original application, and the decision of the registration court would be a nullity
insofar as the decision concerns the newly included land. 11 The reason is because
without a new publication, the law is infringed with respect to the publicity that is
required in registration proceedings, and third parties who have not had the
opportunity to present their claim might be prejudiced in their rights because of
failure of notice. 12 But if the amendment consists in the exclusion of a portion of the
area covered by the original application and the original plan as previously
published, a new publication is not necessary. 13 In the latter case, the jurisdiction of
the court over the remaining area is not affected by the failure of a new
publication. 14
In the case at bar We find that the original plan covering Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 that
accompanied the application for registration in LRC No. 7681 was amended in order
to exclude certain areas that were the subject of opposition, or which were the
subject of another registration case; and the Chief of the Survey Division of the
Court of Land Registration was ordered to determine whether the amended plan
included lands or areas not included in the original plan. In compliance with the
order of the registration court said Chief of the Survey Division informed the court
that no new parcels were included in the new (or amended) plan. Thus, in the
decision of the Court of Land Registration in LRC Nos. 7680 and 7681, dated
December 29, 1913 (Exh. 24), We read the following:
Despues de las notificaciones y avisos de las dos solicitudes en ambos
expedientes, se enmendaronlos planos unidos a los mismos para excluir ciertas
porciones que habian sido objeto de oposicion.
xxx xxx xxx
POR TANTO, ratificando como por la presente se ratifica la declaracion de rebeldia
general, se ordena:
"1.o Que el Jefe de la Division de Agrimensores de este Tribunal terreno que no haya
sido comprendido en los planos originales ...." 15
On January 24, 1914, the Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land
Registration made a report to the court (Exh. 22), from which the report We read the
following:.
Cumpliendo lo mandado por el Tribunal en el No. 1 de la parte dispositiva de su
Decision de fecha 29 de Diciembre proximo pasado, el que suscribe, despues de un

detenido estudio de los planos unidos a los Expedientes arriba citados, tiene el
honor de informar:
1.o Que los nuevos planos presentados por los solicitantes corresponden a las
parcelas 1.a 2.a, y 3.a, del Expedients No. 7680 y a la 1.a parcela del No. 7681, que
son las mismas a que se refiere el plano Exhibito A del No. 7680.
xxx xxx xxx
4. Que los nuevos planos presentados de las parcelas 1.a, 2.a y 3.a del Expediente
7680, y de la 1.a del 7681 no incluyen terreno alguno que no haya sido
comprendido en los planos originales. 16
And so, in the supplemental decision of the Court of Land Registration in LRC No.
7681, dated March 7, 1914 (Exh. 24-A), the report of the Chief of the Survey
Division was taken into consideration and the court ordered the registration of the
lands applied for by the applicants as described in the amended plan ("como esta
descrito en el plano enmendado"). It is thus shown that the amended plan in LRC
No. 7681 did not cover parcels, or areas, that were not previously included in the
original plan which accompanied the application that had been published in the
Official Gazette. There was, therefore, no necessity for a new publication of the
amended plan in order to vest the Court of Land Registration with jurisdiction to
hear and decide the application for registration in LRC No. 7681 and to order the
issuance of Decree of Registration No. 17431 upon which Original Certificate of Title
No. 735 was based.
Way back in 1933, this Court had occasion to rule on the validity of the very same
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 which the trial court had declared null and void
in the three cases now before this Court. In the case of the Bank of the Philippine
Islands vs. Acua (59 Phil. 183) the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735
was assailed by the appellants (Pascual Acua and others) precisely upon the
ground that during the registration proceedings, which brought about the issuance
of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, the original plan of the applicants was
ordered amended, and no new publication was made of the amended plan and so it
was urged that the registration court did not have jurisdiction to order the issuance
of the decree of registration in favor of the applicants. The action in this case was
instituted by the Bank of the Philippine Islands as receiver of the Tuason Entail for
the purpose, among others, of recovering from Pascual Acua and others certain
lands included in the Santa Mesa and Diliman hacienda located in the barrios of
Bagobantay and Diliman, in the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte
Province of Rizal. Upon hearing, the Court of First Instance of Rizal declared that
none of the defendants owned any part of the land in controversy. On appeal, this
Court observed that the character in which the plaintiff sued was not open to
question, and the material facts were as follows: The heirs of the Tuason estate,
referred to as the Tuason Entail, held a Torrens title to a tract of land with an area of
about 1,600 hectares located in the province of Rizal. This property was then
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3792 issued in lieu of older certificates
dating from July 8, 1914. This Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3792 emanated from
Or Certificate of Title No. 735. 17The appellants precisely sought to nullify the title of
the heirs of the Tuason estate, which emanated from Original Certificate of Title No.
735, upon the ground, as now urged by the appellees in the three cases at bar, that
during the registration proceedings the original plan of the lands known as the Sta.
Mesa and Diliman was amended, and no publication was made of the amended
plan. Regarding the question of the non-publication of the amended plan, this Court
said:

Among the arguments made by the appellants of the Bagobantay group, it is

alleged that the Torrens title relied by the plaintiff is void, and in support of this
contention it stated that, during the course of the registration proceedings, an order
was made by the court for the amendment of the applicants and that this order was
not followed by new publication, wherefore, it is supposed the court was without
jurisdiction to decree the title to the applicants. In this connection reliance is placed
upon the doctrine stated in the Philippine Manufacturing Co. vs. Imperial (49 Phil.
122). But the brief for the appellants fails to call attention to the fact that the rule
stated in the case cited has reference to an amendment of the plan by
which additional land, different from that included in the original survey is intended
to be brought within the process of registration. In the case before us, the order
referred to was for the exclusion of certain portions of the land covered by the
original survey, and the doctrine of the case cited cannot apply. Apart from this it
does not appear that the portion intended to be excluded comprehended any part of
the land which had been usurped. 18
The appellees, however, asserts that the case of the Bank of the Philippine Islands
vs. Acua, supra, is not applicable to the three cases now before this Court because
what was involved in said case was Parcel 2 of Original Certificate of Title No. 735,
and not Parcel 1 which is the land involved in these cases. This assertion of the
appellees is not correct. The decision in that case states that the action was
instituted by the Bank of the Philippine Islands, as receiver of the Tuason Entail, for
the purpose, among others, of recovering from Pascual Acua and others "certain
lands contained in the Sta. Mesa and Diliman Hacienda located in the barrios of
Bagobantay and Diliman in the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del
Monte." 19 But what matters is the doctrine that was laid down by this Court in that
case that is: that when the original survey plan is amended, after the publication of
the application in order to include land not previously included in the original
survey, a new publication of the amended plan is necessary in order to confer
jurisdiction upon the registration court to order the registration of the land that is
added to what was included in the original survey plan. The ruling of this Court in
the Bank of the Philippine Islands case has a decisive application in the three cases
now before this Court.
The trial court laid stress on the point that publication of the amended plan of Parcel
1 should have been made because it appears in the Decree of Registration No.
17431, and as reproduced in Original Certificate of Title No. 735, that the area of
said parcel is "bigger" than the area stated in the application as published in the
Official Gazette; and, also, that the boundaries of Parcel 1 stated in the decree are
not identical with the boundaries stated in the application as published in the
Official Gazette. We paid particular attention on this point of the lower court's
decision, and our impression is that the trial court had exploited certain minor
discrepancies between the description of Parcel 1 in the decree of registration and
its description in the original application, in order to bolster its ruling that "to render
a decision on the amended plan, boundary descriptions, and additional lands
comprised within Parcel 1 in Decree No. 17431, a republication of such amended
plan, boundary description, technical description and additional areas is necessary
to confer jurisdiction upon the Court." 20
Oddly enough, when the lower court said that the area of Parcel 1 in the decree of
registration is bigger than the area of Parcel 1 in the application as published, it did
not mention the fact that the difference in area is only 27.10 square meters. We
believe that this difference of 27.10 square meters is too minimal to be of decisive

consequence in the determination of the validity of Original Certificate of Title No.

735. It was error on the part of the lower court to lay stress on this circumstance
and made it a basis for ruling that because in the amended plan there is this
increase in area as compared to the area appearing in the application as published,
the Land Registration Court did not have jurisdiction to render the decision
decreeing the registration of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681. The Chief of the Survey
Division of the Court of Land Registration, in his report to the court of January 24,
1914 (Exh. 22), stated that the new plan of Parcel 1 did not include any land that
was not included in the original plan. That report was made precisely in compliance
with the order of the registration court, in the decision of December 29, 1913 in LRC
No. 7681, to inform the court "si los nuevos planos incluyen o no terreno que no
haya sido comprendido en los planos originales". That report was submitted by the
Chief Surveyor "despues de un detenido estudio de los planos unidos a los
expedientes". Under the foregoing circumstances, our inference is that the area of
27.10 square meters was already included in the original plan, and that the
computation of the area in the original survey must have been inaccurate; and the
error was corrected in the recomputation of the area when the amended plan was
prepared. We made a careful study and comparison of the technical description of
Parcel 1 appearing in the application as published, and the technical description
appearing in Decree of Registration No. 17431 (Exhs. 19, 19-A and Z-6), and We
accept the explanation of counsel for the appellant that this seeming increase of
27.10 square meters had been brought about "by the fact that when the
amendment of the plan was made, the distances and bearings in a few points along
the southwestern boundary (Please see Exh. 19) were brought to the nearest
millimeter and to the nearest second respectively; whereas, the computation of the
survey in the original plan was to the nearest decimeter and to the nearest minute
only". 21 We believe that this very slight increase of 27.10 square meters would not
justify the conclusion of the lower court that "the amended plan ... included
additional lands which were not originally included in Parcel 1 as published in the
Official Gazette." It being undisputed that Parcel 1 has an area of more than
8,798,600 square meters (or 879.86 hectares), We believe that this difference of
27.10 square meters, between the computation of the area when the original plan
was made and the computation of the area when the amended plan was prepared,
can not be considered substantial as would affect the identity of Parcel 1.
Moreover, no evidence was presented to identify this area of 27.10 square meters,
nor to show its location, in relation to the entire area of Parcel 1. The appellees did
not even attempt to show that this excess area of 27.10 square meters is included
within the parcels that they are claiming. We cannot, therefore; consider this area of
27.10 square meters as an area that was separate and distinct from, and was added
to, the land that was covered by the original survey plan, such that the publication
of the amended plan would be necessary in order that the registration court could
acquire jurisdiction over that area. As We have pointed out, this increase of 27.10
square meters was simply the result of the recomputation of the area when the
original plan was amended. There is no showing that the recomputation is incorrect.
Neither is there a showing that this small area of 27.10 square meters belongs to
any person and that person had been deprived of his property, or had failed to
claim that particular area because of the non-publication of the amended plan. On
the other hand, there is the report of the Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of
Land Registration (Exh. 22) stating that the amended plan of Parcel 1 in LRC No.
7681 did not include any land which was not included in the original plan.

It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that only in cases where the original survey
plan is amended during the registration proceedings by the addition of lands not
previously included in the original plan should publication be made in order to
confer jurisdiction on the court to order the registration of the area that was added
after the publication of the original plan. 22
The settled rule, further, is that once the registration court had acquired jurisdiction
over a certain parcel, or parcels, of land in the registration proceedings in virtue of
the publication of the application, that jurisdiction attaches to the land or lands
mentioned and described in the application. If it is later shown that the decree of
registration had included land or lands not included in the original application as
published, then the registration proceedings and the decree of registration must be
declared null and void in so far but only in so far as the land not included in the
publication is concerned. This is so, because the court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the land not included in the publication-the publication being the basis: of the
jurisdiction of the court. But the proceedings and the decree of registration, relating
to the lands that were included in the publication, are valid. Thus, if it is shown that
a certificate of title had been issued covering lands where the registration court had
no jurisdiction, the certificate of title is null and void insofar as it concerns the land
or lands over which the registration court had not acquired jurisdiction. 23
And so in the three cases now before this Court, even granting that the registration
court had no jurisdiction over the increased area of 27.10 square meters (as alleged
by appellees), the most that the lower court could have done was to nullify the
decree and the certificate of title insofar as that area of 27.10 square meters is
concerned, if that area can be identified. But, certainly, the lower court could not
declare, and should not have declared, null and void the whole proceedings in LRC
No. 7681; and, certainly, the lower court erred in declaring null and void ab
initio Original Certificate of Title 735 which covers not only the supposed excess
area of 27.10 square meters but also the remaining area of 8,798,617 square
meters of Parcel 1 and the entire area of 15,961,246 square meters of Parcel 2. The
trial court, in its decision, declared Original Certificate of Title No. 735 "null and void
from the very beginning and of no effect whatsoever", without any qualification.
This declaration by the lower court, if sanctioned by this Court and given effect,
would nullify the title that covers two big parcels of land (Parcels 1 and 2) that have
a total area of 24,759,890.10 square meters, or almost 2,476 hectares. And not only
that. The trial court declared null and void all transfer certificates of title that are
derived, or that emanated, from Original Certificate of Title No. 735, regardless of
whether those transfer certificates of title are the results of transactions done in
good faith and for value by the holder of those transfer certificates of title.
It must be noted that the appellees in the present cases claim six parcels that have
an area of some 495,453.7 square meters (about 49.5 hectares), whereas the
combined area of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 is 24,759,890.10 square meters (about
2,476 hectares). It must also be noted that both Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 have been
subdivided into numerous lots (Exhs. 14 and 14-B) which have already been
acquired by numerous persons and/or entities that are now holding certificates of
title which can be traced back to Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The decision of
the lower court, however, would render useless Original Certificate of Title No. 735
and all transfer certificates of title emanating, or derived, therefrom. The decision of
the lower court would certainly prejudice the rights of the persons, both natural and
juridical, who had acquired portions of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2, relying on the doctrine
of the indefeasibility of Torrens title. The decision of the lower court would, indeed,

prejudice the rights of persons who are not parties in the present cases. And this is
so, because the trial court, in its decision, did not adhere to the applicable decisions
of this Court in resolving the pertinent issues in these cases.
Another reason mentioned by the lower court to support its ruling that Decree of
Registration No. 17431 is null and void is that the description of Parcel 1 in the
decree of registration is different from the description of the same parcel in the
notice of hearing of the original application for registration as published in the
Official Gazette. The different description that appears in the decree of registration,
according to the lower court, is an amendment to the Original survey plan that
accompanied the application and the amended survey plan should have been
republished; and because there was no such republication the registration court was
without jurisdiction to issue the decree of registration. The lower court also
committed an error in making this ruling. We find that the lower court incorrectly
laid stress on differences in the names of the owners, and on differences in the
designations, of the lands that adjoin Parcel 1 along its southwestern boundary. We
find, however, that these differences are well explained in the record.
In the notice of hearing in LRC No. 7681 (Exhibits YY and YY-2) the boundaries of
Parcel 1 are stated as follows:
Bounded on the N. by property of Rosario Negrao and others (Maysilo Estate); E. by
the San Juan River; SW. by Parcel 3, properties of Benito Legarda, Hospital de San
Juan de Dios, by Parcel 2, Santa Clara Monastery, by Parcel 1; and W. by a road,
Cementerio del Norte and the Roman Catholic Church.
As described in Decree of Registration No. 17431 (Exh. 25), the boundaries of Parcel
1 are as follows:
PARCEL 1. Bounded on the N. by property of Rosario Negrao y Escobar, et al.,
(Maysilo Estate): On the E. by San Juan River; on the SW. by properties of Mariano
Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., Benito Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de Dios and
C.W. Rosenstock & Co.; and on the W. by a road, Cementerio del Norte and property
of the Roman Catholic Church ...
It will thus be noted that the boundaries of Parcel 1 on the northern, eastern, and
western sides, as they appear in the notice of hearing that was published and in
Decree of Registration No. 17431, are the same. It is in the southwestern boundary
where there appear some differences in the names of the owners, or in the
designations, of the adjoining lands. Thus, in the published notice of hearing, it
appears that the names of the owners, or the designations, of the lands that bound
Parcel 1 (of LRC No. 7681) on the Southwest are parcel 3, properties of Benito
Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de Dios, parcel 2, Monasterio de Santa Clara and
parcel 1; while in the decree of registration it appears that the lands that bound
Parcel 1 (of LRC No. 7681) on the Southwest are the properties of Mariano Severo
Tuason y de la Paz, et al., Benito Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de Dios and C.W.
Rosenstock & Co. Upon a careful examination of the records, We find that the lands
that adjoin Parcel 1 at its southwestern boundary, as indicated in the notice of
hearing that was published in the Official Gazette, are the same lands that are
indicated in the decree of registration as the lands that adjoin Parcel 1 at its
southwestern boundary. There is simply a change in the names of the owners or in
the designations, of the lands. We find that parcels 3, 2 and 1, appearing as the
boundary lands on the southwestern side of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681, as published,
are in fact parcels of land that are owned, and had been applied for registration, by
Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al. in LRC No. 7680. This LRC No. 7680 was
heard and decided jointly with LRC No. 7681 by the Land Registration Court (Exh.

24). These parcels 3, 2 and 1 of LRC No. 7680, being lands owned by Mariano
Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., it may as well be stated in the decree of
registration that those lands on the southwestern side of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681
are the properties of Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., instead of
designating them as parcel 3, parcel 2, and parcel 1 (of LRC 1680). And so, what
appears in Decree of Registration No. 17431 as the properties of Mariano Severo
Tuason y de la Paz, et al., at the southwestern side of Parcel 1 are no other than
those very parcels 3, 2 and 1 that appear in the notice of hearing as the lands that
bound Parcel 1 on the southwest.
In the description of Parcel 1 as published, it appears that one of the boundaries on
the southwestern side is Santa Clara Monastery, while in the decree of registration
the words "Santa Clara Monastery" do not appear but, instead, are replaced by the
words "C. W. Rosenstock & Co." It will be remembered that during the registration
proceedings the plan of Parcel 1 was ordered amended, and the surveyor, who
prepared the amended plan must have found that what used to be the property of
the Santa Clara Monastery at the time of the original Survey was already the
property of C. W. Rosenstock & Co. when the amended plan was prepared. This can
simply mean that there was a change of ownership from Santa Clara Monastery to
C.W. Rosenstock & Co. It must be considered that the original survey took place
from December, 1910 to June, 1911 (Exhibits 18 and 19), while the registration case
was decided on March 7, 1914.
Under Section 40 of Act 496, the decree of registration "shall contain a description
of the land as finally determined by the court." Evidently, the Court of Land
Registration acted in consonance with this provision of the law when, in its decision
in LRC 7681, it took into consideration the actual description of Parcel 1 as shown in
the amended survey plan, and when it disregarded the recommendation of the
Chief of the Survey Division, dated March 27, 1914, that the decision of the court of
March 7, 1914 "be based upon the original plans, as published, and not upon the
amended plan." It may well be said that Decree of Registration N. 17431 simply
contains the correct area of Parcel 1 and the correct names of the owners of the
lands that bound Parcel 1 in LRC No. 1681 as of the time when the decision of the
land registration court was rendered.
In this connection, the following pronouncement of this Court in the case
of Domingo vs. Ongsiako, 55 Phil. 361, 373-4, is pertinent:
We may further observe that underlying the contention of the plaintiffs is the idea
that errors in the plans nullify the decrees of registration. This is erroneous. It is the
land and not the plan which is registered. Prior to the enactment of Act No. 1875,
practically all plans for land registration were defective especially in regard to errors
of closures and areas, but so far no such errors have been permitted to affect the
validity of the decrees. If the boundaries of the land registered can be determined,
the technical description in the certificate of title may be corrected without
cancelling the decree. Such corrections have been made in this case by approved
surveys which embrace all of the land here in question. To nullify and cancel final
decrees merely by reason of faulty technical descriptions would lead to chaos.
We have taken note of the fact that the six parcels of land that are claimed by the
plaintiffs in the three cases now before this Court are on the northwestern portion of
Parcel 1 (parcels labelled A, B, C, D, E and F, in Exh. UU; and Exhs. 17, 29 and 29-B).
They are far from the southwestern boundary. The circumstance, therefore,
regarding the dissimilarity in the names of the owners, or the designations, of the
lands that adjoin the southwestern side of Parcel 1 is of no moment insofar as the

lots claimed by appellees are concerned. What matters is that the lots claimed by
the appellees are included in Parcel 1 of LRC No. 1681 and are located at the
northwestern portion of said Parcel 1. Indeed, it was error on the part of the lower
court to make as one of the bases in declaring Decree of Registration No. 17431 and
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void and of no effect whatsoever the
aforestated dissimilarities in the names of the owners, or in the designations, of the
lands on the southwestern side of Parcel 1, because those dissimilarities are well
explained in the records of these cases.
The lower court committed still another error when it made the finding that the only
boundary of Parcel 1 on the western side is "A. Bonifacio road" and then declared
that the lands situated west of the A. Bonifacio road were never the subject of the
registration proceedings in LRC No. 7681. The lower court declared the lands west of
A. Bonifacio road as unregistered lands and awarded the ownership of those lands
to the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621 and 3622 (appellees in G.R. Nos. L-26127
and L-26128). This finding of the lower court is contrary to the evidence presented
by the parties in these cases. Both the appellees and the appellant submitted as
their evidence the notice of hearing of the application as published in the Official
Gazette (Exhibit X, YY and YY-2; and Exhibit 26) and the decree of registration No.
17431 (Exhibit Y, and Exh. 25) wherein are clearly stated that the boundaries of
Parcel 1 on the West are: (1) a road, (2) Cementerio del Norte and (3) Roman
Catholic Church (Exhs. Z-6, UU, and Exhs. 6, 18, 19 and 20). But the lower court
considered the A. Bonifacio road as the only boundary on the West, and ignored the
two other boundaries on the West that are mentioned both in the notice of hearing
as published and in the decree of registration. The sketches and the survey plans,
forming part of the evidence on record, show that the road, labelled as "A.
Bonifacio", goes alongside the western boundary of Parcel 1 (separating Parcel 1
and the Cementerio del Norte), until it reaches a point where it traverses the
northwestern portion of Parcel 1, such that from the point where it enters the area
of Parcel 1 what is left as the boundaries on the western side are the Cementerio del
Norte and the Roman Catholic Church (Exhibits UU, VV, 17, 19 and 29). Ignoring the
existence of the Cementerio del Norte and the Roman Catholic Church as the other
boundaries of Parcel 1 on the West, the lower court declared that the lands west of
the A. Bonifacio road, which form part of the lands that are claimed by the plaintiffs
in Civil Cases Nos. 3621 and 3622, are outside the boundary of Parcel 1 on the west
and that those particular areas had remained as unregistered lands and are not
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. This finding of the lower court is
contrary to the very admission of the appellees in these three cases that all the
lands (six parcels in all) that they claim are included in the area of Parcel 1
mentioned in Original Certificate of Title No. 735. In paragraph XIV of the original, as
well as in the amended complaint, in each of these three cases, the plaintiffs
alleged that the lands that they claim "had either been fraudulently or erroneously
included ... in Parcel 1 (known as Santa Mesa Estate) of the Original Certificate of
Title No. 735 of the Land Records of the Province of Rizal." 24 In their appeal brief,
the appellees categorically stated that "Both the appellees and the appellant admit
that these parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs in these three (3) civil cases are
located within Parcel 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 735". 25 In the pre-trial order of the lower court of December 18, 1957, it was
stated that the parcels of land litigated in these are portions of the lands covered by
OCT No. 735. 26 The lower court itself, at the earlier part of its decision, stated that
"both the plaintiffs and the defendants admit that the parcels of land litigated in

Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 are found within the boundaries of the
present Santa Mesa Heights Subdivision covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
735" 27 The appellees in these two cases had never asserted that part of the lands
that they claim are outside the boundaries of Parcel 1, nor did they assert that part
of the lands that they claim have remained unregistered and not covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The lower court had made a finding not only
contrary to the evidence of the appellees but even more than what the appellees
asked when it said in its decision that the western boundary of Parcel 1 is only the
A. Bonifacio road and that the lands claimed by the appellees west of this road had
never been registered. This Court certainly can not give its approval to the findings
and rulings of the lower court that are patently erroneous.
2. The lower court also erred when it declared Original Certificate of Title No. 735
null and void upon the ground that the decree of registration was not transcribed in
the Registration Book in accordance with the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496. In
its decision, the lower court said:
During the trial, the Book of Original Certificate of Title was brought to the Court.
The Court had occasion to see and examine the `ENTRY' made in the Registration
Book. The Court found that the Face of the Title which, under ordinary
circumstances, should be Page 1 is found as Page 2. The sheet containing the
technical description which should be page 2 is Page 1. The FACE of the Title, which
should have been Page 1, contained the last portion of the description of the land
described in the decree. The sheet containing the bulk of the description of the
lands decreed should have been Page 2. The so-called Original Certificate of Title
No. 735 found on Page 138, Book A-7 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal is, therefore,
null and void because the provisions of Section 41 of the Land Registration Law
have not been complied with. Said Section requires that the entry in the
Registration Book must be a transcription of the Decree and the paging should
consist of a leaf or leaves in consecutive order .... 28
The pertinent provisions of Section 41 of Act 496 reads, as follows:
SEC. 41. Immediately after final decision by the court directing the registration of
any property, the clerk shall send a certified copy of such decision to the Chief of
the General Land Registration Office, who shall prepare the decree in accordance
with section forty of Act numbered four hundred and ninety-six, and he shall forward
a certified copy of said decree to the register of deeds of the province or city in
which the property is situated. The register of deeds shall transcribe the decree in a
book to be called the "Registration Book" in which a leaf, or leaves in consecutive
order, shall be devoted exclusively to each title. The entry made by the register of
deeds in this book in each case shall be the original certificate of title, and shall be
signed by him and sealed with the seal of his office....
The pertinent provisions of Section 40 of Act 496 reads, as follows:
SEC. 40. Every decree of registration shall bear the day of the year, hour, and
minute of its entry, and shall be signed by the clerk. It shall state whether the owner
is married or unmarried, and if married, the name of the husband or wife. If the
owner is under disability, it shall state the nature of the disability, and if a minor,
shall state his age. It shall contain a description of the land as finally determined by
the court , . . The decree shall be stated in a convenient form for transcription upon
the certificates of title hereinafter mentioned.
Section 29 of Act 496 provides that as soon as the decree of title has been
registered in the office of the register of deeds, as provided in Section forty-one, the
property included in said decree shall become registered land under the Act. Section

42 of Act 496 provides that the certificate shall take effect upon the date of the
transcription of the decree.
This Court has held that as defined in Section 41 of Act 496, the certificate of title is
the transcript of the decree of registration made by the register of deeds in the
registry. 29
The appellant presented as evidence a photostat of Original Certificate of Title No.
735, as found in the Registration Book in the office of the register of deeds of Rizal
(Exhibit 50). 30 We have examined this document very carefully, and We find that it
is a copy of the original that satisfies all the requirements of a valid Torrens title as
provided for in Sections 40 and 41 of Act 496.
On the face, or on the first page, of this title, there is the certification of the Chief of
the Land Registration Office that the decree of registration was registered in Manila
on July 6, 1914 at 7:41 a.m.; and the certification of the Register of Deeds of Rizal
that the decree was received for transcription in his office on July 8, 1914 at 3:30
P.M. It is also stated on the face of this title that it was entered pursuant to Decree
No. 17431 of the Court of Land Registration, dated at Manila on the 7th day of
March 1914, in Case No. 7681 of said court. The names of the declared owners,
their civil status, their spouses if married, and their respective interest or share in
the lands covered by the title are stated on the face of this title. We have noted that
the technical descriptions of the lands (Parcels 1 and 2) covered by the title are
copied on the sheets constituting the title. We have compared the technical
descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 as they appear on this photostat of Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 (Exhibit 50) with the technical descriptions of these lands
as they appear in the decree of registration (Exhibit Y for the plaintiffs, and Exhibit
25 for the defendant), and We find that the technical descriptions appearing on the
title are the complete and faithful reproduction, or transcription, of the technical
descriptions appearing in the decree of registration.
We have noted what the lower court found, that the technical descriptions of Parcels
1 and 2 do not begin on the face, or on the first page, of this title, as a technical
description is ordinarily copied on the certificate of title. What appears on the face
of this title is the last part of the technical description of Parcel 2. The technical
descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 begin on the second page and end on the first page.
This circumstance, that is, that the technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 do not
begin on the face, or on the first page, of the title, is the basis of the lower court in
ruling that the decree of registration was not transcribed in the registration book in
accordance with Section 41 of Act 496, and so Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is
null and void. We have noted, however, that in its decision the lower court made no
mention that in the transcription of the decree in the registration book any of the
data that is required in Section 40 of Act 496 to be included had been omitted. We
have also noted and this fact is undenied that the technical descriptions of
Parcels 1 and 2 as they appear in Decree of Registration No. 17431 are fully and
faithfully transcribed on the photostat of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 (Exhibit
50). There is no showing that the manner of transcribing the decree, as it appears
on that photostat, was done for a fraudulent purpose, or was done in order to
mislead. Considering that the decree of registration is fully transcribed in the
Registration Book, and also as copied in Original Certificate of Title No. 735, the
circumstance that the beginning of the technical descriptions is not found on the
face, or on the first page, of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is not a ground to
nullify the said certificate of title. We agree with the lower court that the
transcription of the technical descriptions should begin, or should have been

started, on the face, or on the first page, of the title. We hold, however, that the fact
that this was not so done in the case of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 should
not be taken as a factor in determining the validity of Original Certificate of Title No.
735. This defect in the manner of transcribing the technical descriptions should be
considered as a formal, and not a substantial, defect. What matters is that the
original certificate of title contains the full transcription of the decree of registration,
and that the required data provided for in Section 40 of Act 496 are stated in the
original certificate of title. The lower court made a literal construction of the
provisions of Section 41 of Act 496 and strictly applied its construction in the
determination of the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. We believe that
the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496 should be interpreted liberally, in keeping
with Section 123 of said Act which provides that "This Act shall be construed
liberally so far as may be necessary for the purpose of effecting its general intent."
If We adopt a literal construction of the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496, as was
done by the lower court, such that the defect in the manner or form of transcribing
the decree in the registration book would render null and void the original certificate
of title, then it can happen that the validity or the invalidity of a certificate of title
would depend on the register of deeds, or on the personnel in the office of the
register of deeds. The register of deeds, or an employee in his office, can wittingly
or unwittingly render useless a decree of registration regularly issued pursuant to a
decision of a registration court and thus nullify by the error that he commits in the
transcription of the decree in the Registration Book an original certificate of title
that has been existing for years. This strict interpretation or construction of Section
41 of Act 496 would certainly not promote the purpose of the Land Registration Law
(Act 496), which generally are to ascertain once and for all the absolute title over a
given landed property 31; to make, so far as it is possible, a certificate of title issued
by the court to the owner of the land absolute proof of such title 32; to quiet title to
land and to put a stop forever to any question of legality of title 33; and to decree
that land title shall be final, irrevocable and
indisputable. 34
We, therefore, hold that the formal defect in the transcription of Decree of
Registration No. 17431 in the Registration Book did not render null and void Original
Certificate of Title No. 735. Consequently, We declare that the two parcels of land
(Parcel 1 which includes the lands claimed by the appellees, and Parcel 2) covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 are properly registered under the Torrens
System of registration.
3. The principal issue that has to be resolved in the present appeal is whether or not
the lower court had correctly declared that "Original Certificate of Title No. 735 ... is
null and void from the very beginning and of no effect whatsoever. 35
In the preceding discussions, We have held that the lower court erred when it
declared null and void Original Certificate of Title No. 735. We have found that the
registration proceedings that brought about the decree of registration upon which
was based the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 were in accordance
with the provisions of Act 496, as amended. We have held that the Land
Registration Court that ordered the issuance of the decree of registration had
jurisdiction to hear and decide the application for registration filed by Mariano
Severo, Teresa Eriberta, Juan Jose, Demetrio Asuncion, and Augusto Huberto, all
surnamed Tuason y de la Paz. The records show that the notice of hearing of the
application, which embodied the technical descriptions of the two parcels of land
(Parcel 1, known as the Sta. Mesa Estate, and Parcel 2, known as the Diliman

Estate), was duly published as required by law. The records show that the hearing
on the application was regularly held, and that the registration court had seen to it
that no land which was not included in the original survey plan and not covered by
the original application was made the subject of the registration proceedings. We
have found that the decree of registration was properly issued by the Land
Registration Office pursuant to the decision of the Land Registration Court, and that
said decree of registration was fully transcribed in the Registration Book in the office
of the Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal. We have found also that the six
parcels of land that are claimed by the appellees. in the three cases now before Us
are all included in Parcel 1 that is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735.
In view of Our findings and conclusion that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was
issued in accordance with the provisions of Act 496, and that the six parcels of land
that are claimed by the appellees in the present cases are covered by said
certificate of title, what is left for this Court to decide is whether or not the
appellees still have any legal right over the six parcels of land that they claim.
Let it be noted that, as maintained by counsel for the appellees, the action of the
appellees is principally to recover the ownership and possession of the six parcels of
land mentioned and described in their complaints. The appellees would accomplish
their objective through alternative ways: (1) secure the nullification of the decision
of the Land Registration Court in LRC No. 6781, the nullification of the Decree of
Registration No. 17431 and the nullification of Original Certificate of Title No. 735;
(2) if they fail in their efforts to secure the desired nullifications, with Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 being considered valid and effective, they seek the
reconveyance to them by the defendants named in their complaints, including
herein appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., of the six parcels of land that they claim;
and (3) if they cannot secure a reconveyance, they seek to secure payment to them
by the defendants named in their complaints of the actual value of the six parcels of
land that they claim.
It appears to Us that the appellees are not sure of their stand, or have not adopted
a definite stand, in asserting the rights that they claim.
It is the settled rule that a party seeking the reconveyance to him of his land that he
claims had been wrongly registered in the name of another person must recognize
the validity of the certificate of title of the latter. It is also the rule that a
reconveyance may only take place if the land that is claimed to be wrongly
registered is still registered in the name of the person who procured the wrongful
registration. No action for reconveyance can take place as against a third party who
had acquired title over the registered property in good faith and for value. And if no
reconveyance can be made, the value of the property registered may be demanded
only from the person (or persons) who procured the wrongful registration in his
name. 36
The lower court accepted, and sustained, the assertion of the appellees that the
proceedings in LRC No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration were null and void
and that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is null and void ab initioand of no effect.
The trial court even went to the extent of declaring that some of the parcels of land
claimed by the appellees in Civil Cases Nos. 3621 and 3622 (now G.R. Nos. L-26127
and L-26128 before this Court) were not covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
735. The lower court forthwith declared the appellees the owners of the parcels of
land claimed by them, as described in their complaints. Strangely enough, the lower
court, upon declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void, did not make
any statement, or observation, regarding the status or situation of the remaining

lands (Parcels 1 and 2) covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 after
adjudicating to the appellees the six parcels of land claimed by them in their
complaints.
In the present appeal counsel for the appellees had maintained, and has
endeavored to show, that the lower court was correct in annulling Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 and in adjudicating in favor of the appellees the
ownership and possession of the six parcels of land claimed by them in their
complaints.
But, as hereinbefore held by Us, the lower court erred in declaring Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 void and of no effect. We have held that Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued as a result of the registration proceedings in
LRC No, 7681 which was regular and that said certificate of title is valid and
effective. The proceedings in LRC 7681 being in rem, the decree of registration
issued pursuant to the decision rendered in said registration case bound the lands
covered by the decree and quieted title thereto, and is conclusive upon and against
all persons, including the government and all the branches thereof, whether
mentioned by name in the application, notice or citation, or included in the general
inscription "To whom it may concern", and such decree will not be opened by reason
of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by
any proceedings in any court for reversing judgment or decree. Such decree may
only be reopened if any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein
by decree of registration obtained by fraud would file in the competent court of first
instance a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree, provided no
innocent purchaser for value had acquired an interest on the land, and upon the
expiration of said period of one year, the decree, or the certificate of title issued
pursuant to the decree, is incontrovertible (See. 38, Act 496). In the case now
before Us, the Decree of Registration No. 17431 in LRC 7681 was entered on July 8,
1914. It is undisputed that no person had filed any petition for review of the decree
of registration in LRC 7681 within the period of one year from July 8, 1914. That
decree of registration, and Original Certificate of Title No. 735 issued pursuant
thereto, therefore, had been incontrovertible since July 9, 1915.
Moreover, innocent purchases for value had acquired interest in the lands covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. 37
The Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued on July 8, 1914 in the names of
the original an applicants for registration, namely, Mariano Tuason y de la Paz,
Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion
Tuason y de la Paz and Augusta Huberto Tuason y de la Paz. Herein appellant J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. is not one of those who were registered as the original owners
mentioned in Original Certificate of Title No. 735. When the original complaints were
filed in these three cases in the Court of First Instance of Rizal the parties named
defendants in each of the three cases were Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz,
Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion
Tuason y de la Paz, Augusta Huberto Tuason y de la Paz, the heirs of each one of
these defendants (without naming them), and J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Of all the
defendants named in the three complaints only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
appeared and filed its answer to the complaints. All the other defendants did not
appear, and so they were all declared in default. 38 It had to happen that way
because as of the time when the three complaints were filed on May 19, 1955 the
ownership of Parcel 1 that was originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No.

735 had already passed to defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. In fact this defendant
had caused Parcel 1 to be subdivided and had sold the subdivision lots.
The records show that Parcel 1 in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was part of the
properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason (Tuason Entail) which became involved in a
litigation in the Court of First Instance of Manila. 39 During the pendency of the case
the properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason were administered by the Bank of the
Philippine Islands as the judicial receiver. In the order of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, dated May 5, 1938, in Civil Case No. 24803, the Bank of the Philippine
Islands, as receiver, was authorized, directed and ordered to execute, upon
payment to it of the sum of P763,925.75, a deed of transfer and assignment in favor
of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. of the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 31997, which was originally Parcel 1 included in Original Certificate of Title No.
735 (Exh. 13-B). On June 13, 1938 the receiver Bank of the Philippine Islands
executed the deed of transfer and assignment (Exh. 13-A). Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 34853 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal was forthwith issued in the name of
the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. (Exhs. 12-b and 36). The deed of transfer and
assignment was approved by the court in an order dated June 17, 1938. This
conveyance to the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. took place at a time when the Supreme
Court had already decided the case of Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acua (59
Phil. 183) wherein this Court upheld the validity of Original Certificate of Title No.
735 and also the validity of the transfer certificate of title emanating therefrom. 40
The circumstances attending the acquisition by the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. of the
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31997 which was formerly Parcel
1 covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 clearly indicate that said
corporation acquired its title in a regular transaction as purchaser in good faith and
for value. On June 15, 1938 the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. in turn sold the same
property to J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 35073 was
issued in the name of the latter (Exhs. 12-c and 37).
The lower court declared that herein appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was a
purchaser in bad faith. We do not find any evidence in the record that would sustain
such a finding of the lower court. One reason given by the lower court in declaring
appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. a purchaser in bad faith is the fact that the
incorporators of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. and the incorporators of J. M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. were practically the same persons belonging to the same Tuason family. We
do not see anything wrong if some incorporators of the Heirs of D. Tuason Inc. are
also incorporators of the J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. During these days when businesses
are promoted, operated, and managed, through corporate entities, it is not
surprising to see two or more corporations organized by the same persons or group
of persons with different purposes, for different lines of business and with distinct or
separate assets and interests. Besides, as has been shown, the Heirs of D. Tuason,
Inc. acquired the land (Parcel 1 in Original Certificate of Title No. 735) from the Bank
of the Philippine Islands, the receiver of the properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason, in
a sale that was authorized, and subsequently approved, by the court. The Heirs of
D. Tuason, Inc. paid the sum of P763,950.80 for the property. Certainly if the Heirs of
D. Tuason, Inc. had acquired the land originally covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 735 in a transaction that was authorized by the court, for a valuable
consideration, thereby acquiring a good title over the property as a purchaser in
good faith and for value, the title that it transferred to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. when
it sold same property to the latter was also a good title, and J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
was also a purchaser in good faith and for value even if it appears that the

incorporators of the two corporations belong to the same Tuason family. The records
of these cases are bereft of any evidence which would indicate that the sale of
Parcel 1 in question by the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was
fraudulent.
Another reason given by the lower court in declaring appellant J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. a buyer in bad faith is that when said appellant bought Parcel 1 originally
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 it was aware of the fact that the
appellees or their predecessors in interest were in possession of, and were
cultivating, the six parcels of land that they now claim in these cases. The
conclusion of the lower court is too strained. It should be remembered that the
registered property bought by J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had an area of some 879
hectares. It could happen that certain relatives or ancestors of appellees had been
squatting on some portions of the land and claimed certain areas as their own, to
the extent of having the areas claimed by them declared for taxation purposes in
their names. Thus the appellees presented in evidence tax declarations that appear
to have taken effect as of 1941. We have noted, however, that at the back of those
tax declarations are written the words "This parcel is a duplicate of the land under
Tax No. 764-J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc." (Exhs. E-Alcantara, F-Alcantara, FF-1-Benin, GGBenin, HH-Benin, BBB-Pili, and BBB-1-Pili). 41 These annotations simply reveal that
when the predecessors of the appellees had those tax declarations made to cover
the lands that they claim, those lands were already included in the tax declaration
of appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had been
exercising, and asserting, its proprietary rights over the lands in question after it
bought the same from the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. 42 This is borne by the statement
in the order, dated September 26, 1955, issued by Judge Juan P. Enriquez who at the
time was presiding the branch of the Court of First Instance of Rizal where these
three were pending, as follows:
3. It having been shown that J. M. Tuason & Co. had title covering the land in
question which they are subdividing into small lots for sale and in view of the
observation under paragraph 2 hereof the Court finds that there is no justifiable
reason to maintain the writ of preliminary injunction that has been issued. This is
particularly true in Civil Case No. 2622, defendants having secured a final judgment
against plaintiffs Juan Alcantara and Jose Alcantara for ejectment before the
Municipal court of Quezon City; and such injunction would annul the order of the
execution issued by the Quezon City courts. It should be noted that the herein
plaintiffs at the beginning pleaded to the Court that the area on which their
respective houses stand be not touched and their possession thereof be respected
by defendant J. M. & Co. In other words, each plaintiff is merely asking for about 250
square meters each which represents the land on which the house stands and their
immediate yard, and not the whole land covered by these three or 68 hectares. On
the other hand, the Court requires J. M. Tuason & Co. to put up a bond of P2,000 in
favor of each of the defendant (sic) to answer for whatever damages he may suffer
by reason of the continuance during the action of the acts complained
of. 43
Besides, the possession by the appellees, either by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest, if there was such possession at all, would be unavailing
against title holder of a Torrens certificate of title covering the parcels Of lands now
in question. From July 8, 1914 when Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued, no
possession by any person of any portion of the lands covered by said original
certificate of title, or covered by a subsequent transfer certificate of title derived

from said original certificate of title, could defeat the title of the registered owner of
the lands covered by the certificate of title. In this connection, let it be noted that
appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. became the registered owner of Parcel 1, which
was originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735, only on June 15, 1938,
or almost 24 years after Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued.
It can well be said that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had relied on the title of the Heirs of
D. Tuason, Inc. when it bought the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No.34853, and the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. likewise had relied on the title of the
Mayorasgo Tuason (Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al.) when it bought the
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31997 from the judicial receiver,
duly authorized and approved by the court. We, therefore, can not agree with the
lower court when it declared appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. a purchaser on bad
faith.
The evidence shows that appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had converted the land
originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735, including the six parcels
claimed by appellees into a subdivision, and numerous persons and entities had
purchased the subdivision lots, and the purchasers in turn were issued transfer
certificates of title covering the lots that they bought, based on the transfer
certificate of title in the name of J. M Tuason & Co., Inc. The buyers of the lots relied
upon the certificate of title in the name of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and because they
paid for the lots they certainly are purchasers in good faith and for value. The
purchasers of these lots have built thereon residential houses, office buildings,
shops, hospital, even churches. But the lower court, disregarding these
circumstances, declared null and void all transfer certificates of title that emanated,
or that were derived, from Original Certificate of Title No. 735. This is a grave error
committed by the lower court. And the error is compounded when the lower court
ordered appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and all those claiming under said
appellant, to vacate and restore to the appellees the possession of the parcels of
lands that are claimed by them in the present cases. The possessors of the lots
comprised within the six parcels of land in question, and who hold certificates of
title covering the lots that they bought, are not parties in the present cases, and yet
the decision of the lower court would annul their titles and compel them to give up
the possession of their properties. To give effect to the decision of the lower court is
to deprive persons of their property without due process of law. 44 The decision of
the lower court would set at naught the settled doctrine that the holder of a
certificate of title who acquired the property covered by the title in good faith and
for value can rest assured that his title is perfect and incontrovertible. 45
In view of the foregoing discussions, it is obvious that the action of the appellees in
the three cases now before this Court must fail..
It has been shown that appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had acquired a valid title
over the land which includes the six parcels that are claimed by the appellees. The
fact, that the predecessors in interest of the appellees or any person, for that
matter had not filed a petition for the review of the decree of registration in LRC
No. 7681 within a period of one year from July 8, 1914 when the decree of
registration was issued, is a circumstance that had forever foreclosed any
proceeding for the review of said decree. As We have adverted to, that decree of
registration had become incontrovertible. An action, similar to one brought by the
appellees in each of the present cases, which attack collaterally the said decree of
registration cannot be entertained. 46 Neither may the action of the appellees for
reconveyance of the lands in question be entertained because such action had

already prescribed, barred by laches, considering that Original Certificate of Title

No. 735 had been issued way back in 1914 and the complaint in the present cases
were filed only on May 19, 1955, or after a lapse of some 41 years. Moreover, as of
the time when these complaints were filed the six parcels of land claimed by the
appellees are no longer covered by the certificate of title in the names of the
persons who procured the original registration of those lands. The title to Parcel 1,
which includes the six parcels of land claimed by the appellees, had passed to the
hands parties who were innocent purchase for value. This Parcel 1 which was one of
the two parcels originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735, was
subsequently covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31997. As has been shown,
this Parcel 1 was part of the properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason and it was
conveyed by order of the court in Civil Case No. 24803 of the Court of First Instance
of Manila to the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc., and the latter in turn conveyed the same to
J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34853 in the name of the
Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. was cancelled and transfer Certificate of Title No. 35073 was
issued in the name of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. It has also been shown that J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. had converted Parcel 1 to a subdivision. Numerous persons and
entities bought those subdivision lots, and to those buyers were issued transfer
certificates of title covering the lots that they acquired. It is very clear, therefore,
that an action for reconveyance cannot prosper against appellant J. M. Tuason & Co.,
much less against the registered owners of the lots that form parts of the six parcels
of land that are claimed by the appellees. 47
Neither may the appellees have a cause of Action for damages against appellant J.
M. Tuason & Co., Inc., considering that said appellant is not one of the original
registered owners that procured the registration of the land. There is no evidence
that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had anything to do with the registration proceedings
which brought about the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 even
supposing that the registration was procured fraudulently.
4. Numerous cases have been decided by this Court, dealing on questions regarding
the validity and ineffectiveness of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The rulings of
this Court in those cases are necessarily relevant to, and of decisive bearing in, the
resolution of the issues involved in the three cases now at bar.
(a) We have earlier cited the case of the Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acua (59
Phil., 183), where the jurisdiction of the Court of Land Registration that issued the
decree which was the basis of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was questioned,
and this Court upheld the jurisdiction of the registration court and categorically
pronounced the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735.
(b) There is the case of Jose Alcantara, et al., versus Mariano Tuason y de la Paz, et
al. (G.R. No. L-4998, Mar. 13, 1953, 92 Phil. 796), where this Court declared that
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is incontrovertible and is conclusive against all
persons claiming, either by themselves or by their predecessors in interest, rights
over the lands covered by said certificate of title.
We find that the Alcantara case is intimately related to the three cases at bar, and
the rulings of this Court in that former case are of decisive application to these
three cases.
On August 29, 1950 a complaint was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
(Quezon City Branch) by Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin, Pascual Pili, Alejandro de Dios,
Tomas Bagagonio, Quintina Sandoval, and Tomasa Lazaro against Mariano Tuason y
de la Paz, Heirs of Mariano Tuason, J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and Gregorio Araneta,
Inc. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-156. It will be noted that three of

the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-156, namely, Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin, and
Pascual Pili, are among the original plaintiffs in the three cases now before this
Court; Elias Benin, in Civil Case No. 3621; Jose Alcantara, in Civil Case No. 3622; and
Pascual Pili, in Civil Case No. 3623. Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili, as
plaintiffs in that Civil Case No. Q-156 claimed that they were the lawful owners of
six (of the ten) parcels of land described in paragraph 2 of their complaint Jose
Alcantara claiming two parcels, Elias Benin claiming three parcels, and Pascual Pili
claiming one parcel. Substantially, it is alleged in the complaint 48 that each plaintiff,
by himself and by his predecessors in interest, as lawful owner, had been in the
actual, open and continuous possession of his own respective parcel, or parcels, of
land from time immemorial until January 1950 when the defendants by force and by
the use of armed men started to convert their lands into a subdivision; that on July
8, 1914 the defendants had obtained Original Certificate of Title No. 735 over a
parcel of land which included the lands possessed by them (plaintiffs) and which
they and their ancestors had been enjoying as owners, for more than thirty years
before the issuance of the title; that the silence and inaction of the defendants since
the date of their original certificate of title showed that said certificate of title did
not express the status of the their claim to the said parcels, that plaintiffs were not
given formal notice by the defendants of the registration of the lands, such that
defendants' certificate of title No. 735 was not in accordance with law, and that
defendants did not have proper title for registration to the parcels of land owned by
the plaintiffs, as described in the complaint; and that because the certificate of title
issued by the register of deeds was still in the names of the defendants, successors
in interest of the Tuasons y de la Paz, and has not passed to innocent parties for
valuable consideration, the conveyance of the same to the plaintiffs was in order.
The plaintiffs prayed that therein defendants be ordered to execute deeds of
conveyance of the parcels of land described in their complaint in favor of the
plaintiffs, that the defendants' certificate of title be cancelled and the corresponding
certificate be ordered issued in the names of the plaintiffs. We quote from the
decision:
The material allegations of the complaint are: that plaintiffs are owners of the
parcels of land set forth in their complaint, which parcels are situated along
Bonifacio street, barrio of San Jose, Quezon City, and that they have been in actual,
open, and continuous possession and enjoyment thereof without molestation from
defendants from time immemorial to the present; that on July 8, 1914, defendants
obtained a certificate of title (No. 735) over a parcel of land, which included the
lands by plaintiffs, and which they and their ancestors had been enjoying as owners
more than 30 years before the issuance of said title; that on June 23, 1950,
defendants caused the removal of two houses of plaintiffs on the land; and that
defendants did not file any action against plaintiffs before the inclusion of the lands
in their title, in violation of the "due process of law" clause of the Constitution. There
are other allegations which really are arguments of legal discussion, thus: that
defendants could not acquire title by the registration proceedings against the lawful
holder, especially without formal notice, because registration is to confirm title, not
to acquire it; that the silence of the defendants since the issuance of their title
shows that this does not express the lawful status of their claim, etc. The
defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it states no of action
and that, if it does, the same is barred by the statute of limitations. The court
sustained this motion on the second ground. Subsequently, plaintiffs filed an
amended complaint with the same substantial allegations, but with new ones, i.e.,

that it was in January, 1950, that they learned that their lands were included in the
registration proceedings which culminated in the issuance of defendants' title; that
defendants never claimed ownership to the lands, but directly or indirectly allowed
plaintiffs to continue exercising their rights of ownership over the same. This
amended complaint was denied admission, and the motion for the reconsideration
of the order of dismiss was also denied. Hence the appeal.
In affirming the order of the lower court dismissing the complaint, this Court held:
Without considering whether the trial court's refusal to admit the amended
complaint is erroneous or not we are constrained to hold that the dismissal of the
action, even with the amended complaint is a basis thereof, is correct. From the
allegations of both the original and amended complaints, it appears that the
defendants are holders of a certificate of title issued on July 8, 1914 as a
consequence of registration proceedings. There is no allegation in both original and
amended complaints that the plaintiffs were not notified, or were not aware, of the
registration proceedings. It is presumed, therefore, that as occupants proper notices
thereof were served on them and that they were aware of said proceedings. If this is
so, then the plaintiffs, who were, or whose predecessors in interest were, on the
land during the registration proceedings, were bound by said proceedings. The
latter are in rem and bind the whole world, whether served with notice personally or
not. (Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil., 49). And the decree of registration, in
pursuance of which defendants' title was issued, binds the land and quiets title
thereto, and is conclusive against the plaintiffs. (Section 38, Land Registration Act).
The supposed right of plaintiffs by reason of their alleged continued possession for
thirty years was, therefore, destroyed fully and completely by the registration
proceedings, and their supposed ignorance of the inclusion of the lands can not
exclude them from the effects of the registration proceedings, and the supposed
conduct of defendants in allowing plaintiffs to continue on the land after registration
can not serve as basis of any title or right thereto, because acts of a possessory
character by tolerance of an owner does not constitute possession (Article 1942,
Spanish Civil Code), and because no title to registered land in derogation to that of
the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession
(Section 46, Land Registration Act).
Thus, in the Alcantara case, as in the Bank of the Philippine Island vs. Acua case,
supra, this Court upheld the validity of the registration proceedings which
culminated in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. This Court
declared that "the decree of registration, in pursuance of which defendants' title
was issued, binds the land and quiets title thereto and is conclusive against the
plaintiffs." In other words, in virtue of that decision, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q156, among them Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili, and their successorsin-interest, could no longer question the validity of Original Certificate of Title No.
735, nor claim any right of ownership over any portion of the land that is covered by
said certificate of title.
But Elias Benin, Jose Alcantara, and Pascual Pili again came to court to claim
ownership over portions of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735.
On May 19, 1955 Elias Benin, joined by his brother Victor Benin and his sister Marta
Benin, filed Civil Case No. 3621; Jose Alcantara joined by his brother Juan Alcantara,
filed Civil Case No. 3622; and Pascual Pili, joined by his sister Luisa Pili, filed Civil
Case No. 3623. These are the three cases which originated in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch) which are now before this Court on appeal.

In the earlier part of this decision, We have pointed out that the complaints in these
three cases had been amended so as to include as parties plaintiffs all the heirs of
the persons who were alleged to be the owners of the parcels of land claimed by the
plaintiffs in each case. Thus, the complaint in Civil Case No. 3621 was amended to
include all the heirs of Sixto Benin, the alleged owner of the three parcels of land
described in the complaint and the common predecessor in interest of all the
plaintiffs in the case. The complaint in Civil Case No. 3622 was amended to include
all the heirs of Bonoso Alcantara, the alleged owner of the two parcels of land
described in the complaint and the common predecessor in interest of all the
plaintiffs in the case. The complaint in Civil Case No. 3623 was amended to include
all the heirs of Candido Pili, the alleged owner of the one parcel of land described in
the complaint and the common predecessor in interest of all the plaintiffs in the
case.
In those three cases, in the court below, herein appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
(defendant therein) filed a motion to dismiss upon the principal ground "that the
cause of action (assuming there is one) is barred by prior judgment, or by the
statute of limitation". In its motion to dismiss J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. contended that
the decision of the Supreme Court in the Alcantara case is a bar to the action of the
plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 of the Court of the First Instance
of Rizal. The lower court, however, denied the motion to dismiss. In its answer to
the complaint in each of these three cases, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. set up as
affirmative defenses the very grounds of its motion to dismiss. After the plaintiffs
had closed their direct evidence, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed another motion to
dismiss upon the ground that the action was barred by the statute of limitations and
by a prior judgment, and that the plaintiffs had not presented evidence to prove
their claim of ownership. This second motion to dismiss was also denied by the
lower court. 49
In its decision, which is now on appeal before this Court, the lower court held that
the decision in the Alcantara case was not a bar to the action in these three cases,
ruling that there is no identity, of the parties, of the subject matter, and of the
cause of action, between Civil Case No. Q-156, on the one hand, and Civil Cases
Nos. 3621, 3622, and 3623, on the other.
It is now contended by appellant J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc., in the present appeal, that
"the trial court erred in not dismissing these cases on the ground of res judicata and
in denying the motion to dismiss filed on said ground." 50
Does the judgment in the aforementioned Alcantara case operate as a bar to the
action of the appellees in the three cases at bar?
In order that the rule of res judicata may apply, the following requisites must be
present: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a
court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties; (c) it must be a
judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the first and the second
actions, identity of parties, of subject-matter, and of cause of action (San Diego vs.
Cardona, 70 Phil. 281-283).
We find that the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998) is a final
judgment on the merits that was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and over the parties. The only requisite for res judicata which we
have to determine is whether between Civil Case Q-156 (G.R. No. 4998), on the one
hand, and Civil Cases Nos. 8621, 3622 and 3623 (G.R. Nos. L-26127, 26128 and
26129), on the other, there is identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of
action.

In our examination of the records and the evidence, We find that there is identity of
subject matter. In the lower court's pretrial order dated December 18, 1957, which
was based on the agreement of the parties, it is stated
That the parcels of land in litigation in Case No. Q-156 are substantially identical to
the same parcels of land litigated in them cases Nos. 3621, 8622 and
3623. 51
We also find that there is identity of cause of action. It is apparent, upon reading the
original complaint (Exhibit 1) in Civil Case Q-156 and the decision in the Alcantara
case (G.R. No. L-4998), that the cause of action in Civil Case Q-156 was based on
the alleged fact that the defendants had dispossessed and deprived the plaintiff
therein of the parcels of land described in the complaint, which were claimed by the
plaintiffs as their own and of which they had been in actual, open and continuous
possession from time immemorial, and that said lands were wrongly included in
Certificate of Title No. 735 that was obtained by the defendants. In the three cases
at bar, plaintiffs (now appellees) also complain of having been dispossessed and
deprived by the defendants of the parcels of land of which they were absolute
owners and possessors, by themselves and through their predecessors in interest,
since time immemorial and that their said lands wrongly included in Parcel 1 of
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 that was obtained by the defendants. In Civil
Case No. Q-156, on the one hand, and in the three cases now at bar, on the other,
the plaintiffs therein seek the nullification of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, and
the reconveyance to them of the parcels of land that they claim as theirs. 52 It
appears clear to Us that in Civil Case No. Q-156 and in the three cases at bar, the
object or purpose of the plaintiffs is to recover the ownership and possession of the
same parcels of land.
As far as the parties are concerned, We find that there is no exact identity of parties
between Civil Case No. Q-156, on the one hand, and Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622
and 3623, on the other. It appears that of the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621,
3622 and 3623 only Elias Benin, Jose Alcantara and Pascual Pili were plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. Q-156. In Civil Case No. Q-156, the defendants were Mariano Tuason y
de la Paz, Heirs of Mariano Tuason, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and Gregorio Araneta,
Inc., while in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 the defendants were Mariano
Severo, Teresa Eriberta, Juan Jose, Demetrio Asuncion, Augusta Huberto, all
surnamed Tuason y de la Paz (the persons appearing as registered owners in
Original Certificate of Title No. 735), their heirs, and J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. We
find that the natural persons surnamed Tuason, and the heirs, refer to the persons
who belong to the Tuason family that secured the registration of Parcel 1 in Original
Certificate of Title No. 735. The defendant Gregorio Araneta Inc. in Civil Case No. Q156 is the administrator of the Tuason properties. So, the parties defendants in all
these cases are practically the same. We find, however, that in Civil Case No. Q-156
as well as in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, it was the defendant J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. that actually controverted the claims of the plaintiffs.
After a careful study, We are of the considered view that the judgment in the
Alcantara case is a bar to the action of the plaintiffs who are the heirs of Elias Benin
in Civil Case No. 3621 (G.R. No. 26127), of plaintiff Jose Alcantara in Civil Case No.
3622 (G.R. No. 26128), and of plaintiff Pascual Pili in Civil Case No. 3623 (G. R. No.
26129) under the doctrine of res adjudicata. We are likewise of the considered view
that the decision in the Alcantara case would serve to rule out the action of the
other plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 under the doctrine of stare
decisis.

In Civil Case No. 3621 the original plaintiffs were Victor Benin, Marta Benin, and
Elias Benin--two brothers and a sister. In the amended complaint it was alleged that
these three original plaintiffs had another brother, and another sister, namely
Esteban Benin and Felipa Benin. But because all the five Benin brothers and sisters
died, they were all substituted by their heirs, such that as of the time when Civil
Case No. 3621 was decided the plaintiffs were: (1) the heirs of Victor Benin; (2) the
heirs of Marta Benin; (3) the heirs of Elias Benin; (4) the heirs of Esteban Benin, and
(5) the heirs of Felipa Benin.
In Civil Case No. 3622 the original plaintiffs were Juan Alcantara and Jose Alcantara.
Juan Alcantara died, and he was substituted by his heirs, such that as of the time
Civil Case No. 3622 was decided the plaintiffs were: (1) the heirs of Juan Alcantara,
and (2) Jose A. Alcantara.
In Civil Case No. 3623 the original plaintiffs were Pascual Pili and Luisa Pili. In the
amended complaint, it was alleged that Luisa Pili and Pascual Pili had two brothers
who were already dead, namely, Diego Pili and Manuel Pili, so they were substituted
by their heirs. Luisa Pili died, and she was substituted by her heirs, such that as of
the time Civil Case No. 3623 was decided, the plaintiffs were: (1) the heirs of Diego
Pili; (2) the heirs of Manuel Pili; (3) the heirs of Luisa Pili, and (4) Pascual Pili.
It would thus appear that of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621 Elias Benin is the
only one who was a plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-156; of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
3622 Jose E. Alcantara, who is still living, is the only one who was a plaintiff in Civil
Case No. Q-156; of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623 Pascual Pili, who is still living,
is the only one who was a plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-156.
It being Our finding that the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998the Alcantara case) is a final judgment on the merits that was rendered by a court
that had jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties, and that there is
identity of subject matter and cause of action between Civil Case No. Q-156, on the
one hand, and Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622, and 3623, on the other; and it
appearing that Elias Benin is a party-plaintiff both in Civil Case Q-156 and Civil Case
No. 3621; that Jose Alcantara is a party-plaintiff in both Civil Case No. Q-156 and
Civil Case No. 3622; that Pascual Pili is a party-plaintiff in both Civil Case No. Q-156
and Civil Case No. 3623; and that the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-156 and in Civil
Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 are practically the same persons and/or entities,
We hold that the doctrine of bar by a previous judgment or res adjudicata squarely
applies to Elias Benin, or to his heirs and successors in interest in Civil Case No.
3621; to Jose Alcantara and his heirs or successors in interest in Civil Case No. 3622;
and to Pascual Pili and his heirs or successors in interest in Civil Case No. 3623. 53
We now consider the case of the other plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and
3623.
It will be noted that in Civil Case No. 3621 the plaintiffs base their claim of
ownership of the three parcels of land described in the complaint on their being
heirs or successors in interest of Sixto Benin who died in 1936. In Civil Case No.
3622 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership over the two parcels of land
described in their complaint on their being the heirs and successors in interest
of Bonoso Alcantara who died in 1934. In Civil Case No. 3623 the plaintiffs base
their claim of ownership of the one parcel of land described in their complaint on
their being the heirs and successors in interest of Candido Pili who died in 1931.
When Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili, alleged in their complaint in Civil
Case No. Q-156 (which was filed in 1950) that they were the owners of the parcels
of land specified in their complaint, having inherited the same from their ancestors

and had been in possession of the same from time immemorial, each was claiming
a right as an heir of Bonoso Alcantara, Sixto Benin, and Candido Pili, respectively.
Similarly, in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, the source of the rights claimed
by the plaintiffs Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili and all the other
plaintiffs were their respective ancestor, or predecessor in interest, namely Bonoso
Alcantara, Sixto Benin and Candido Pili, as the case may be.
Inasmuch as Sixto Benin died in 1936, Bonoso Alcantara died in 1934, and Candido
Pili died in 1931, it is obvious that during all the time when the registration
proceedings in LRC No. 7681 were taking place before the Court of Land
Registration, which culminated in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735
on July 8, 1914, Sixto Benin, Bonoso Alcantara and Candido Pili were living. The
records show that no one of these three persons, or their representative, had filed
any opposition to the application for registration in said LRC 7681, nor did any one
of them, or their representative, file any petition for review of the decree of
registration No. 17431 that was issued in said LRC No. 7681.
It is Our view, therefore, that the decision of this Court, in G.R. No. L-4998, which
affirmed the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing the complaint of
Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili (along with four other plaintiffs) in Civil
Case No. Q-156 should apply not only against the heirs, of Elias Benin, against Jose
Alcantara, and against Pascual Pili, as plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and
3623, respectively, but also against all the other plaintiffs in those cases. We find
that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621 do not claim a right which is different from
that claimed by Elias Benin in Civil Case No. Q-156. Likewise, the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 3622 do not claim a right different from that claimed by Jose Alcantara in
Civil Case No Q-156. And, also, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623 do not claim a
right different from that claimed by Pascual Pili in Civil Case No. Q-156. They all
claim the same right, based on the alleged ownership of their respective common
predecessor in interest in Civil Case No. 3621 the common predecessor in
interest being Sixto Benin; in Civil Case No. 3622 the common predecessor in
interest being Bonoso Alcantara; and in Civil Case No. 3623 the common
predecessor in interest being Candido Pili. In Civil Case No. Q-156 Elias Benin based
his claim of ownership upon the ownership of his predecessor in interest who
necessarily must be Sixto Benin; Jose Alcantara, upon the ownership of his
predecessor in interest who necessarily must be Bonoso Alcantara; and Pascual Pili,
upon the ownership of his predecessor in interest who necessarily must be Candido
Pili. It follows, therefore, that the decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-4998 (Civil Case
No. Q-156), which held untenable the cause of action of the successors in interest,
of Sixto Benin, of Bonoso Alcantara and of Candido Pili, to recover the ownership
and possession of any land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735, would
also foreclose a similar cause of action of all other persons who claim to be
successors in interest of Sixto Benin, of Bonoso Alcantara and of Candido Pili over
any land covered by said certificate of title. As We have adverted to, Sixto Benin
died in 1936, Bonoso Alcantara died in 1934, and Candido Pili died in 1931. These
three predecessors in interest of the appellees died long after the issuance of
Original Certificate of Title No. 735, which took place on July 8, 1914.
And so, even if there are plaintiffs (now appellees) in these three cases who are not
privies to plaintiffs Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin, and Pascual Pili in Civil Case No. Q156 (G.R. No. L-4998 the Alcantara case) and were not parties in that case, still
the ruling of this Court in that former case, to the effect that therein plaintiffs or
their predecessors in interest were bound by the proceedings in the registration

court which culminated in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, holds
and applies to those plaintiffs in these three cases, because the claim of ownership
of these plaintiffs is based on the same predecessors in interest of plaintiffs Jose
Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili in said Civil Case No. Q-156. 54 It may well be
said that the interests of the appellees in G.R. No. L-26127 (Civil Case No. 3621)
who claim rights as heirs or successors in interest of Sixto Benin were represented
by Elias Benin in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998); the appellees in G.R. No.
26128 (Civil Case No. 3622) who claim rights as heirs or successors in interest of
Bonoso Alcantara were represented by Jose Alcantara in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R.
No. L-4998); the appellees in G.R. No. 26129 (Civil Case No. 3623) who claim rights
as heirs or successors in interest of Candido Pili were represented by Pascual Pili in
Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998).
(c) In the case of Albina Santiago, et al. vs. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. (G.R. No. L-14223,
November 23, 1960) 55, where Original Certificate of Title No. 735, was also in
question, this Court ruled on issues akin to the issues involved in the three cases
now at bar. Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Court of
First Instance of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-2918, against J. M.
Tuason & Co. Inc. alleging, substantially, that their ancestor, Inocencio Santiago,
was the owner of a parcel of land, evidenced by a document (attached to their
complaint as Annex A) issued by the Spanish government on May 12, 1848 56; that
Inocencio Santiago had since then been in possession of the aforesaid land as
owner, publicly, continuously and adversely until his death, when his two children,
Isaias and Albina, succeeded and continued to own and possess said land pro
indiviso in the same character as that of their predecessor that upon the death of
Isaias Santiago his one-half share of the land was inherited by his eleven children
who, together with their aunt Albina, continued to own and possess the land in the
same character as that of their predecessors; that Albina and her co-plaintiffs came
to know that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had previously filed in the Court of First Instance
of Quezon City Civil Case No. Q-27 for "quieting of title and recovery of possession"
against five of the children of Isaias Santiago involving the parcel of land of which
they were co-owners; that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had claimed that parcel to be part
of the land covered by its Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119; that the judgment in
Civil. Case No. Q-27, in which they (Albina Santiago, et al.) were never impleaded as
parties, had already become
final 57; that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had executed the judgment against them,
excluding and rusting them from the enjoyment and possession of the land. Albina
and her co-plaintiffs also alleged that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 (37679) of
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., as well as Original Certificate of Title No. 735 from which the
former was derived, did not include the parcel claimed by them; that even granting
that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 included the parcel claimed by them the
inclusion of that parcel in the certificate of title of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was done
through fraud because they, nor their predecessors, were not actually notified of the
registration proceedings. As ground for cancellation of the certificate of title of J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs further alleged that the
technical description in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 had been falsified to
include areas never brought within the jurisdiction of the Land Registration Court,
since they were areas not included in the application and publication in the
registration proceedings; that long before the predecessors of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
applied for, and secured, registration of the land which included their parcel of land
they had already acquired ownership thereof not only by the document, Annex A of

their complaint, but also by acquisitive prescription. Albina Santiago and her coplaintiffs prayed, that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. be ordered to desist from enforcing
Civil Case No. Q-27 against them; that a resurvey be ordered to determine whether
or not Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 (37679) included the land described in
their complaint; that a reconveyance to them be ordered of whatever portion of the
land claimed by them may be found included in transfer Certificate of Title No. 119;
that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 and Original Certificate of Title No. 735 be
ordered cancelled and substituted with a new certificate of title embracing only
those lands included in the application, publication and/or decree in LRC No. 7681 of
the Court of Land Registration.
Upon motion of defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City dismissed the complaint of Albina Santiago, et al., upon the grounds
that there was no cause of action, that the case was barred by a prior judgment in
Civil Case No. Q-27 which was affirmed by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-5079,
and that the action of the plaintiffs, if they had any, had prescribed.
This Court affirmed the order of the lower court dismissing the complaint of Albina
Santiago and her co-plaintiffs. 58Regarding the contention of Albina Santiago and her
co-plaintiffs that the judgment in the previous case (Civil Case No. Q-27, affirmed in
G.R. No. L-5079) would not operate as res judicata against them because they were
not parties in that suit, and that they did not derive their title from the defendants
in the previous suit, this Court held:
We agree with appellants that the decision in the preceding suit to quiet title,
prosecuted by the appellee Tuason & Co. against other heirs of Ynocencio Santiago
(99 Phil., 615; 50 Off. Gaz. 11, 5727), can not constitute res judicata against these
appellants who were not parties to that suit and do not derive their title from the
defendants in the previous litigation (Rule 39, sec. 44 (b). There is authority for the
proposition that a judgment may be made binding in a subsequent litigation upon
one who, although not a formal party to a previous suit, has actually conducted or
controlled the action or defense therein (65 ALR 1134), or who was adequately
represented in such previous litigation; but no clear proof of the existence of such
exceptional circumstance is before us in the present case. On the other hand, the
rule is that co-owners are not privies inter se in relation to the property owned in
common.
xxx xxx xxx
But granting that the plaintiffs-appellants herein are not privies of the defendants
Santiago in the former litigation over this same property (S.C.G.R. No.
L-5079), still the pronouncement of this Court, made in the former case, to the
effect that the Spanish document (Annex A) issued in favor of Ynocencio Santiago
(ancestor of appellants herein) was neither a titulo de informacion posesoria nor a
title by composicion con el estado, and, therefore, vested no ownership over the
land therein described in favor of Ynocencio Santiago, holds and applies to herein
appellants, since the quality or the legal effect of the document does not depend
upon the person who invoke it.
If the late Ynocencio Santiago did not become the owner of the disputed property by
virtue of the document Annex A, then appellants herein, as heirs of Ynocencio have
not acquired such ownership either. It follows that the first and second causes of
action of their complaint, predicated as they are on the assumption that such
ownership and its consequential rights resulted from Annex A, must necessarily fail.
Not being owners, they can complain of no invasion of dominical rights.

It will thus be noted that in the aforementioned decision in the Santiago case, even
if Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs were not considered privies to the
defendants in Civil Case No. Q-27, and even if they were not parties in that previous
case, this Court nevertheless applied to them the judgment (G. R. No. L-5079) in
that previous case where it was pronounced that the document, Annex A of the
complaint of Albina Santiago, et al., was neither a titulo de informacion
posesoria nor a title by composision con el estado, and it did not establish the right
of ownership of their predecessor in interest, Inocencio Santiago, Albina Santiago
and her co-plaintiffs had based their claim of ownership on that document (Annex
A). 59 This Court held in that previous case that the document was unavailing
against Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and against
Original Certificate of Title No. 735.
And so, following the logic of this Court in its decision in the Santiago case, in the
three cases at bar We hold that even if the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621, except
the heirs of Elias Benin, are not privies to Elias Benin and were not parties in Civil
Case No. Q-156; even if the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3622, except Jose Alcantara,
are not privies to Jose Alcantara and were not parties in Civil Case No. Q-156; and
even if the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623, except Pascual Pili, are not privies to
Pascual Pili and were not parties in Civil Case No. Q156, still the pronouncement of
this Court in the judgment in that previous case (G.R. No. L-4998), to the effect that
the plaintiffs in that case and their predecessors in interest were bound by the
registration proceedings which culminated in the issuance of Original Certificate of
Title No. 735, holds and applies to all the plaintiffs (now appellees) in these three
cases. In that judgment this Court ruled out, or did not sustain, the rights claimed
by the predecessors in interest of herein appellees over the land covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 735. These appellees, therefore, have not succeeded to any
right that can derrogate the validity and conclusiveness of Original Certificate of
Title No. 735, and of the certificates of title that are derived from said original
certificate of title.
Coming back to the Santiago case, as regards the contention of Albina Santiago and
her co-plaintiffs that the registration proceedings which resulted in the issuance of
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 were irregular and fraudulent, this Court held:
(T)he mere fact that appellants herein were not personally notified of the
registration proceedings that resulted in a decree of registration of title in favor of
the Tuasons in 1914 does not constitute in itself a case of fraud that would
invalidate the decree. The registration proceedings, as proceedings in rem, operate
as against the whole world and the decree issued therein is conclusive adjudication
of the ownership of the lands registered, not only against those parties who
appeared in such proceedings but also against parties who were summoned by
publication but did not appear. The registration by the appellee's predecessors-ininterest freed the lands from claims and liens of whatever character that existed
against the lands prior to the issuance of the certificates of title, except those noted
in the certificate and legal encumbrances saved by law (Yumol vs. Rivera and Dizon,
64 Phil. 13, 17 and cases cited therein). In addition, there being no allegation that
the registered owners procured the non-appearance of appellants at the registration
proceedings, and very much more than one year having elapsed from the issuance
of the decree of registration in 1914, neither revocation of such decree nor a decree
of reconveyance are obtainable any more.
Regarding the claim of Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs that they had acquired
title by prescription over the parcel of land claimed by them, this Court held:

It follows also that the allegation of prescriptive title in favor of plaintiffs does not
suffice to establish a cause of action. If such prescription was completed before the
registration of the land in favor of the Tuasons, the resulting prescriptive title was
cut off and extinguished by the decree of registration. If, on the contrary, the
prescription was either begun or completed after the decree of registration, it
conferred no title because, by express provision of law, prescription cannot operate
against the registered owner (Act 496, section 46).
Thus, in this Santiago case, as in the Alcantara case, this Court declared conclusive
and indefeasible Original Certificate of Title No. 735 which was issued as a result of
the registration proceedings in L.R.C. No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration.
There are many other cases where this Court has made a similar pronouncement
regarding Original Certificate of Title No. 735. 60
In view of the findings, and the rulings, that We have hereinbefore made, it follows
that, as contended by the appellant, the lower court also erred when it declared the
appellees the owners of the lands claimed by them and in awarding damages to
them, in these three cases. 61
We consider it unnecessary to rule on the counterclaim of appellant J.M. Tuason &
Co., Inc., for damages and attorneys fees against the appellees 62, considering, as
the records show, that the appellees are persons who are not in a position to pay
damages in any form. 63 We believe that the appellees had filed their complaints in
the honest, but mistaken, belief that they have a good cause of action against the
appellant corporation and not because they meant to embarrass or humiliate the
persons who are identified or connected with the appellant.
WHEREFORE, the joint decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City
Branch) in Civil Cages Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, appealed from, is reversed and
set aside. The bond filed by appellant in the three cases in the court below for the
lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction is ordered cancelled. No pronouncement
as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-32621
July 29, 1987
ASSOCIATION OF BAPTISTS FOR WORLD EVANGELISM, INC., petitioner,
vs.
FIRST BAPTIST CHURCH and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
Review on certiorari of the Resolution* of the respondent Court of Appeals, dated 17
August 1970, issued in G.R. No. 37022-R, entitled: "Association of Baptists for World
Evangelism, Inc., petitioner-appellee versus First Baptists Church, respondentappellant," which dismissed petitioner's application for cancellation of a notice of
adverse claim.
The facts of the case which led to the filing of this petition are as follows:
On 30 September 1963, the parties entered into an agreement, denominated
"Contract of Purchase and Sale" wherein the petitioner agreed to sell to the
respondent a parcel of land, together with the building and improvement thereon,
with an area of 735 Sq. meters, located at the corner of Leon Guinto and Padre
Faura Streets, Manila, and covered by TCT No. 62203 of the Register of Deeds of
Manila, for the amount of P293,506.25, payable in three (3) installments, as follows:

1. The First installment shall be paid by the VENDEE to the VENDOR on or before
September 30, 1963 amounting to P29,350.62,
2. The Second Installment which shall be the sum of P66,038.90, shall be paid by
the VENDEE to the VENDOR on or before September 30, 1964.
3. The last and final installment which shall be the sum of P198,116.72, less the
P25,000.00 deduction allowed by the VENDOR, shall be paid by the VENDEE to the
VENDOR on or before September 30, 1965.
The parties further agreed that:
All the foregoing payments shall be made by the VENDEE to the VENDOR's duly
authorized Resident Agent and attorney-in-fact in Manila, Philippines.
It is hereby expressly understood and agreed that immediately upon the execution
of this document and thereafter for a period of five (5) consecutive years so long as
this agreement is in force and effect, the VENDEE shall have the right to occupy and
use the property for church purposes but for no other purpose whatsoever.
Should the VENDEE fail to pay any or all the installments when due, this agreement
shall automatically be considered as rescinded and without force and effect and the
VENDEE shall, without further demand from the VENDOR peacefully return
possession of the property to the VENDOR; provided, however, that any installment
which the VENDEE may have already paid to the VENDOR shall be returned by the
VENDOR to the VENDEE.1avvphi1
Upon final and complete payment of the stipulated purchase price the VENDOR
shall immediately execute and deliver to the VENDEE a final and absolute Deed of
Sale of the Property free and clear of all liens and encumbrances. 1
The first installment of the purchase price was duly paid and the respondent took
possession of the property. However, when the second installment became due on
30 September 1964, the petitioner, upon request of the respondent, extended the
period of its payment to 30 October 1964. For this purpose, the parties executed a
document entitled: "Supplement to the Contract of Purchase and Sale of September
30, 1963" with the stipulation that "all the provisions of the original contract of
purchase and sale of 30 September 1963 shall remain in full force and effect, except
as modified and supplemented."2 The respondent, however, failed to pay the second
installment when it became due. Neither did it return the possession of the property
to the petitioner.
But, on 8 March 1965, the respondent caused to be recorded in the Office of tile
Register of Deeds of Manila a Notice of Adverse Claim on TCT No. 62203. 3 Upon
learning of the burden constituted on its certificate of title, the petitioner, on 6 June
1965, filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Manila for the cancellation of
the said notice of adverse claim, on the ground that when said notice of adverse
claim was filed, the respondent had already lost its right to or interest in the
property, in view of the automatic rescission of the contract caused by the
respondent's failure to pay the second installment of the purchase price on 30
October 1964, as agreed upon, so that the notice of adverse claim is invalid and
should be cancelled.4
The respondent filed its opposition to the petition for cancellation of notice of
adverse claim5 and the case was then set for hearing. At the hearing on 14 August
1965, the petitioner presented its evidence consisting of the Contract of Purchase
and Sale, the Supplement thereto, and the Notice of Adverse Claim. The
respondent, upon the other hand, did not submit any evidence. The court then
declared the case submi tted " however, in an Order issued on the same day, the
court suspended the resolution of the petition to cancel the notice of adverse claim

"until after fifteen (15) days from today during which time counsel for respondent
should file civil action in order to thresh out the question involved in ordinary suit. If
after the lapse of said period no civil action is filed, this Court will be constrained to
act on same."6
The respondent failed to initiate the civil suit, as ordered, so that the petitioner, on
8 September 1965, filed a motion to give due course to its petition to cancel notice
of adverse claim.7 The motion was set for hearing on 11 September 1965 and, on
said date, the respondent manifested in court that it was the prevailing opinion
among its members that to file a suit against the petitioner would be "unscriptural"
and that they intend to do so only as a last recourse when it becomes absolutely
necessary that it be done.8
On 15 September 1965, the lower court issued an order directing the cancellation of
the notice of adverse claim on TCT No. 62203 on the grounds that the basis of said
notice of adverse claim was no longer in force and effect inasmuch as the same was
automatically rescinded upon the failure of the respondent to pay the second
installment when it became due, and for failure of the respondent to file the civil
action, as required by the court.9
The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order claiming, for the first
time, that the trial court had no jurisdiction in that, as a land registration court, it
cannot pass upon the issue of whether or not the contract of purchase and sale has
been rescinded or rendered without force and effect, 10 but the trial court denied said
motion.11
Whereupon the respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 25 May 1970, the
appellate court rendered judgment affirming the order of the lower court. 12 This
decision, however, was set aside by the appellate court in its Resolution dated 17
August 1970 on the ground that the lower court, sitting as a land registration court,
had no jurisdiction to resolve the issues presented which should be litigated in a
regular court. Accordingly, the respondent appellate court ordered the dismissal of
the petition to cancel notice of adverse claim. 13 Hence, the present recourse.
The issue raised is whether the Court of First Instance, now the Regional Trial Court,
acting as a land registration court, has jurisdiction to cancel an adverse claim based
on a contract to sell or promise to sell which can no longer be enforced because of
non-payment of the agreed purchase price.
This issue had been raised in view of the findings of the respondent Court of
Appeals that the court a quo, sitting as a land registration court, has limited
jurisdiction and has no authority to resolve controversial issues which should be
litigated before a court of general jurisdiction. Under existing laws, however, this
concept no longer holds. Regional Trial Courts now have exclusive jurisdiction, not
only over applications for original registration of title to lands, including
improvements and interests therein, but also over petitions filed after original
registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon
such applications or petitions. Section 2 of PD 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree, provides, as follows:
SEC. 2. Nature of registration proceedings: jurisdiction of courts. Judicial
proceedings for the registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall be in rem
and shall be based on the generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens
system.
Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for
original registration of title to lands, including improvements and interests therein,
and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and

determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. The court
through its clerk of court shall furnish the Land Registration Commission with two
certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or issued in
applications or petitions for land registration, with the exception of sten ographic
notes, within five days from the filing or issuance thereof.
But, even under Act 496, the Land Registration Act, the court of first instance,
sitting as a land registration court, has the authority to conduct a hearing, receive
evidence, and decide controversial matters with a view to determining whether or
not the filed notice of adverse clam is valid. Section 110 of Act 496 provides:
SEC. 110. Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the
registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if
no other provision is made in this Act for registering the same, make a statement in
writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom
acquired, and a reference to the volume and page of the certificate of title of the
registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is
claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant's
residence, and designate a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This
statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim, and the court, upon
a petition of any party in interest, shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of
the validity of such adverse claim and shag enter such decree therein as justice and
equity may require. If the claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration shall be
cancelled. If, iii any case the court after notice and hearing shall find that a claim
thus registered was frivolous or vexatious, it may tax the adverse claimant double
or treble costs in its discretion.
At any rate, it appears that the disputed "Contract of Purchase and Sale" entered
into by and between the parties on 30 September 1963 had already been rescinded
so that there is no more basis for the continued annotation of the notice of adverse
claim on the petitioner's TCT No. 62203. Records show that the herein petitioner had
filed an action against the respondent for the rescission of said contract of purchase
and sale on 1 August 1967 before the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed
therein as Civil Case no. 70298, and after trial, the said contract was ordered
rescinded for reasons therein stated. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, docketed
therein as CA-G.R. No. 42467-R, the judgment was affirmed. The respondent then
appealed to this Court, docketed as G.R. No. L-35008; again, its petition was denied
on 15 May 1972, "for being factual (insufficient showing that the findings of fact are
unsupported by substantial evidence) and for lack of merit." The judgment became
final and executory on 14 August 1972.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the respondent Court, dated 17 August 1970, is
hereby set aside. The notice of adverse claim annotated on petitioner's TCT No.
62203 by virtue of the "Contract of Purchase and Sale" entered into by and between
the parties on 30 September 1963 is hereby ordered cancelled. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 81401 May 18, 1990

VIRGINIA FRANCO VDA. DE ARCEO, CARMELITA ARCEO, ZENAIDA ARCEO,

ROMEO ARCEO, RODOLFO ARCEO and MANUEL ARCEO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Former 16th Division), PEDRO M. ARCEO,
SOTERA ARCEO, LORENZO ARCEO, and ANTONIO ARCEO, respondents.
Ricardo S. Inton and Jose F. Tiburcio for petitioners.
Hermin E. Arceo for private respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The Court grants this petition on a successful demonstration of error committed by
the Court of Appeals. 1
It appears that the spouses Abdon Arceo and Escolastica Geronimo were the owners
of four parcels of unregistered land (six were involved but only four were disputed)
located in Pulilan, Bulacan, identified as lots nos. 2582, 2595, 3054, and 8131.
Escolastica died on September 16, 1942 while Abdon passed away in 1953. They
had one son, Esteban, who died on September 2, 1941. Esteban had five children,
Jose, Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera. Jose married Virginia Franco, with whom
he fathered six children, Carmelita, Zenaida, Rodolfo, Manuel, Cesar, and
Romeo. 2 Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera are the private respondents herein
while Jose's widow, Virginia (Jose died on March 8, 1970), and their children are the
petitioners.
It also appears that on October (or September) 27, 1941, the Arceos executed a
deed of donation inter vivos, marked as Exhibit "J", in which the spouses bestowed
the properties in favor of Jose. 3 Since 1942, Jose had been paying taxes
thereon. 4 In 1949, he took personal possession thereof, worked thereon, and
claimed them as owner thereof 5
It furthermore appears that on August 2, 1950, the spouses executed another deed
of donation inter vivos, marked as exhibit "T" disposing of the properties further in
favor of Jose. 6
On October 3 (or 30), 1941, the Arceos supposedly signed a deed of
donation mortis causa, marked as exhibit "1" revoking exhibit "J" and giving away
the properties in question in favor of all his grandchildren including Jose. It seems
however that it was notarized only on November 3, 1944, after Escolastica had died.
On January 12, 1972, Virginia, together with her children, filed with the cadastral
court 7 an application for registration in their names of lots Nos. 2582, 2595, 3054,
and 8131 on the strength of exhibits "J" and "T". Pedro, Antonio, Lorenzo, and Sotera
opposed the application on the basis of exhibit "1". Pedro and Lorenzo specifically
contested the application on lots Nos. 3054 and 8131 on claims that each of them
were entitled to one-third thereof. 8
The cadastral court rejected all three documents and distributed the properties
according to the law on intestate succession. 9
Virginia and her children shortly went to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
decision of the cadastral court and dismissed the appeal.
On February 15, 1988, Virginia, et al. petitioned this Court.
The petitioners argue that the cadastral court was bereft of the power to determine
conflicting claims of ownership, and that its authority was solely to confirm an
existing title, and that anyway, all the lots should have been awarded to them by
virtue of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession since 1941 (1942,
when Jose took possession of the parcels) or otherwise, by acquisitive

prescription. 10 They also assert that exhibits "J" and "T" had validly transferred the
subject lands to them.
In their comment, Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera contend that the cadastral
court had the jurisdiction to decide questions of ownership of property; that the
issue of prescription was never ventilated below; and that exhibit "J" had been
validly rescinded by exhibit "1".
The parties do not quarrel over the genuineness of all three exhibits but rather, over
the dates thereof. Pedro, et al. alleged that exhibit "J" was executed on September
27, 1941, and not October 27, 1941, and that exhibit "l", the instrument that
revoked it, came later, or on October 3, 1941. Virginia et al. maintain on the other
hand that exhibit "J' was actually made on October 27, 1941, twenty-four days after
the execution of exhibit "1", and that assuming exhibit "1" came earlier, it was
notarized, and took effect, only on November 3, 1944, after the death of
Escolastica, one of the donors.
Although the parties wrangle over dates, the Court observes that there is no real
question of fact to be resolved in this case. The important question, so we find, is,
based on existing facts, legal in character: Who has the right over lots Nos. 2582,
2595, 3054, and 8131?
As we indicated, we find merit in this petition.
The first question must, however, be resolved against the petitioners. We have held
that under Section 2 of the Property Registration Decree, the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court, sitting as a land registration court, is no longer as
circumscribed as it was under Act No. 496, the former land registration law. 11 We
said that the Decree "has eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction
vested in the regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the
former law when acting merely as a cadastral court." The amendment was "aimed
at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change has simplified registration proceedings
by conferring upon the required trial courts the authority to act not only on
applications for 'original registration' 'but also 'over all petitions filed after original
registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising from
such applications or petitions.'" 12 At any rate, we have also stated that the limited
jurisdiction rule governing land registration courts is subject to recognized
exceptions, to wit, (1) where the parties mutually agreed or have acquiesced in
submitting controversial issues for determination; (2) where they have been given
full opportunity to present their evidence; and (3) where the court has considered
the evidence already of record and is convinced that the same is sufficient for
rendering a decision upon such controversial issues. 13 By the same token, it has
been held that the rule is not, in reality, one of jurisdiction, but rather, of mere
procedure, which may be waived. 14 It is not amiss to state likewise that where the
issue, say, of ownership, is ineluctably tied up with the question of right of
registration, the cadastral court commits no error in assuming jurisdiction over it,
as, for instance, in this case, where both parties rely on their respective exhibits to
defeat one another's claims over the parcels sought to be registered, in which case,
registration would not be possible or would be unduly prolonged unless the court
first decided it.
The next question refers to acquisitive prescription. In support of their claims,
Virginia, et al. cite four events: (1) In 1941, Jose entered upon the properties and
until his death in 1970, worked thereon; (2) Upon his death, they, Virginia, et al.,
divided the same by virtue of an extrajudicial partition; (3) Ever since, Jose had paid
taxes thereon until he died; (4) Pedro, et al., have not lifted a finger to oust him,

Jose, in possession, or otherwise, to impugn his right. Virginia, et al. now say that
barring the above exhibits, they have anyway acquired the parcels by prescription.
We also regret that one can not agree with this proposition. The petitioners suppose
that the parcels ' had come under the category of a co-ownership, following the
death of their grandparents, but in that case, it has been held that in order for
prescription to set in, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is a clear
showing that the claimant has repudiated the co-ownership; (2) he has made known
to the rest of the co-owners that he is assuming exclusive ownership over the
property; (3) there is clear and convincing evidence thereof; and (4) his possession
is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious. 15
The evidence for Virginia et al. do not persuade us that they (through Jose) have
acquired the lots by lapse of time. The fact that in 1941, Jose wrested possession
thereof, so we hold, does not amount to adverse possession because as a co-owner,
he had the right of enjoyment, and his use thereof can not by itself prejudice the
right of his fellow co-owners. The fact that he paid taxes thereon is not controlling
either because payment of real estate taxes does not necessarily confer title upon a
claimant. 16 The fact finally that Virginia, et al. had sought to extrajudicially divide
the property is nothing conclusive because there is no showing that they, Virginia,
et al. had made this known to Pedro, et al. Under these circumstances, we can not
validly say that the lands had devolved on Virginia., et al., by way of prescription.
We are granting the petition nonetheless on the finding that the lots had been
conferred to Jose by a valid donationinter vivos, that is, exhibit "J".
Other than the claims by Pedro, et al., that exhibit "J" had been revoked by exhibit
"1", exhibit "J" appears to have been executed in compliance with legal
requirements, i.e., as to form and acceptance. 17 It is true that the cadastral court
was supposed to have attributed fraud on the part of Jose in making Abdon sign the
exhibit, 18 (according to Pedro, Abdon affixed his signature thereon upon "the belief
that it was a deed of sale of the land purchased from one Marciano Santos" 19) but
as found by the Court of Appeals, It is a theory that "must be received with a 'grain
of salt', 20 because, for one thing, Jose is dead, and for another, the petitioners have
adduced evidence that exhibit "J" was genuine. We are bound by the factual finding
of the Appellate Court and as we averred, we are disposing of this question on pure
questions of law.
As to exhibit "T", the finding of the Court of Appeals that it was defective is just as
controlling on this Court, that is, that "it was signed by Abdon Arceo after the death
of his wife on September 16, 1942 and does not contain the acceptance ... by Jose
Arceo." 21
We can not say that exhibit "1" had validly revoked exhibit "J". The weight of
authority is that a valid donation, once accepted, becomes
irrevocable, 22 except on account of officiousness, 23 failure by the donee to comply
with charges imposed in the donation,24 or by reason of ingratitude. 25 There is
simply no proof that Abdon when he executed exhibit "1", was in possession of a
legal ground for annulment.
We can not thus accept the Court of Appeals' holding that exhibit "1" had
"neutralized the force and effect" 26 of exhibit "J".
It is therefore this Court's ruling that the disposition under exhibit "J" in favor of Jose
(whose rights were transmitted to Virginia, et al.) should be respected.
We find no need in settling the issue of true dates of the parties' exhibits, because
first, it is an issue of fact and second, because whatever their true dates, there is no
obstacle to the validity of the claims of Virginia, et al.

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The court a quo is ORDERED
to distribute the properties covered by the donation inter vivos, dated October (or
September) 27, 1941, exhibit "J", according to the terms and conditions set forth
therein, and in the proportions indicated thereby. No costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 133465. September 25, 2000]
AMELITA DOLFO, petitioner, vs. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE
PROVINCE OF CAVITE, TRECE MARTIRES CITY, THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, CESAR E. CASAL, RUSTICO
A. CASAL, ERNESTO A. CASAL, RODOLFO A. CASAL, ALFREDO A. CASAL, JR.,
EMMANUEL A. B. CASAL, RAFAEL S. CASAL, JR., C. JOSEFINA S. CASAL,
CELEDONIA S. CASAL, WILHELMINA S. CASAL, MELANIO MEDINA, ADELAIDA
MEDINA, AURORA MEDINA, C. P. G. AGRICOM CORPORATION and HEIRS OF
DAMIAN ERMITANIO and CELEDONIA MARTINEZ, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the Sixteenth Division of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41896 entitled, "Amelita Dolfo v. Hon. Novato
T. Cajigal, et al." Said decision upheld the orders dated May 7, 1996 and August 22,
1996 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite, in LRC Case Nos. B-8914 and B-90-6 denying petitioner's motion for leave to intervene and/or admit
complaint in intervention as well as her motion for reconsideration. The petition
likewise assails the appellate court's resolution denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration and the trial court's joint decision recognizing the rights of private
respondents over a parcel of land located in Barangay Lantic, Carmona, Cavite
which is the subject of the abovesaid LRC Cases.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On March 5, 1996, petitioner and Yangtze Properties, Inc. (Yangtze) filed a motion for
leave to file and/or admit complaint-in-intervention in LRC Cases Nos. B-94-60, B-8914 and B-90-6 pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Bacoor,
Cavite. The first case is for reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title No. 362
purportedly covering the subject real property, while the last two were cases for
registration of title. Petitioner alleged that she is the registered owner of the real
property subject of the said LRC Cases as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-320601 issued in her name by the Register of Deeds of Trece Martires
City. Yangtze, petitioner's co-movant, had earlier entered into a Contract to Sell with
petitioner over the said property. [2] In its order dated May 7, 1996, the trial court
denied the aforementioned motion on the grounds that: 1) it is a procedural error to
file a complaint for intervention in cases involving original application for land
registration, the proceedings therein being in rem; and 2) there had already been an
order of general default entered by the court against those who failed to oppose the
applications. The trial court noted petitioner's failure to exercise any act of dominion
over the subject property consistent with her allegation of ownership. [3] On May 15,
1996, petitioner and Yangtze filed a motion for reconsideration of the May 7, 1996
order. The trial court, treating the motion as a motion to lift the order of general
default, denied the same in its order dated August 22, 1996. The trial court gave
greater weight to the report of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) that
petitioner's certificate of title was issued without any legal basis and the report of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that the signature of Antonia Cabuco, the

Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite signatory on the certificate, was a

forgery. This is notwithstanding the documents proffered by petitioner allegedly
showing the genuineness of the signature of Antonia Cabuco on the certificate of
title. The trial court opined that petitioner's title over the subject property was of
doubtful nature and that allowing her to intervene in the LRC cases would unduly
delay the proceedings.[4]
Meanwhile, on August 1, 1996, Atty. Artemio Caa, in his capacity as Acting Register
of Deeds of the Province of Cavite, filed a complaint for the annulment of
petitioner's certificate of title before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Bacoor,
Cavite.[5] The matter remains pending in that court.
On the other hand, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite rendered a
joint decision recognizing and confirming the rights of private respondents over the
litigated property and ordered the issuance of a Decree of Registration in their favor.
[6]

Later, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a petition

for certiorari and mandamus to annul and set aside the above orders of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite. Petitioner also prayed that the latter
be compelled to give due course to her motion for leave to intervene and/or admit
complaint-in-intervention. The petition was later amended to include the LRA as
party respondent.[7]
On October 20, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision denying the
petition due course, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and is DISMISSED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.[8]
The Court of Appeals likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in its
resolution dated April 21, 1998.[9]
Petitioner now contends that:
I. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
PROPER REMEDY IN THE LAND REGISTRATION CASES IS AN OPPOSITION TO THE
APPLICATION OF THE APPLICANTS, AND NOT A MOTION TO INTERVENE IN THE
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT.
II. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ADMITTING PETITIONER'S
MOTION FOR INTERVENTION ON THE BASIS OF PETITIONER'S POSSESSION OF HER
INDEFEASIBLE TITLE OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES.
III. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING
THE TITLE OF THE PETITIONER, TCT NO. T-320601, OVER THE PROPERTIES IN
QUESTION DESPITE PETITIONER'S OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE
GENUINENESS AND DUE EXECUTION OF HER TITLE, AND DESPITE ITS EXPRESS AND
CATEGORICAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE FACT THAT PETITIONER INDEED
PRESENTED NUMEROUS DOCUMENTS TO PROVE THE AUTHENTICITY OF HER TITLE.
We find petitioner's contentions unmeritorious.
First. The provisions of 14 and 25 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree)
show that the applicant and the oppositor are the only parties in cases of original
applications for land registration, unlike in ordinary civil actions where parties may
include the plaintiff, the defendant, third party complainants, cross-claimants, and
intervenors.
It is now settled that a motion to intervene in a land registration case cannot be
allowed. A party wishing to be heard should ask for the lifting of the order of general

default, and then if lifted, file an opposition to the application for registration. This is
so because proceedings in land registration are in rem and not in personam, the
sole object being the registration applied for, not the determination of any right
connected with the registration.[10]
Second. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals made a factual finding that
petitioner's title to the land is of doubtful authenticity.
Having jurisdiction only to resolve questions of law, this Court is bound by the
factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. [11] Even if intervention is
allowed in cases of original registration of title, petitioner cannot rely on her
certificate of title in view of the evidence respecting its genuineness. As correctly
held by the Court of Appeals:
Moreover, even if intervention is proper, petitioner's reliance on her title is
infirm. While she presented numerous documents to prove its authenticity,
however, they have been disputed by Benjamin Flestado, Chief of the Inspection
and Investigation Division of the Land Registration Authority (LRA), in his Report
showing that her T.C.T. No. T-320601 was issued without legal basis and that no
document was on file with the Primary Entry Book of the Registry of Deeds of Trece
Martires City to support the issuance thereof. This Report concludes that petitioner's
T.C.T. No. T-320601 is spurious. Such finding is reinforced by the NBI Report dated
June 20, 1996 showing that the signature of Register of Deeds Antonia Cabuco
appearing on petitioner's title is a forgery.Consequently, Atty. Artemio Cana, Acting
Register of Deeds of Cavite, filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
89 at Bacoor for annulment of petitioner's title.[12]
The rule that a title issued under the Torrens System is presumed valid and, hence,
is the best proof of ownership of a piece of land does not apply where the certificate
itself is faulty as to its purported origin.[13]
In this case, petitioner anchors her arguments on the premise that her title to the
subject property is indefeasible because of the presumption that her certificate of
title is authentic. However, this presumption is overcome by the evidence
presented, consisting of the LRA report dated May 24, 1996 [14] that TCT No. T320601 was issued without legal basis and the NBI report dated June 20,
1996[15] that the signature of Antonia Cabuco was a forgery. Although petitioner
submitted documents purporting to show the genuineness of Antonia Cabuco's
signature, she has not refuted the findings contained in the LRA report that her
certificate of title has no legal basis. Thus, in its report, the LRA stated:
Verification conducted in the Registry of Deeds of Cavite Province on 21 May 1996
disclosed that there is no document on file in the registry vault to support the
issuance of TCT No.T-320601 in favor of Amelita Dolfo. Even the Primary Entry Book
for Act 496 under the date 18 November 1991 does not indicate that a document
was presented for registration in favor of Amelita Dolfo affecting TCT No. 11520
which resulted in the issuance of TCT No. T-320601. Instead, page 232 of the
Primary Entry Book, Volume 47 (Annex "B") shows that under the date - 18
November 1991 there appears no document entered therein at 11:05 a.m. in favor
of Amelita Dolfo or in her behalf affecting the parcel of land described in TCT No. T320601.
This Investigator also failed to locate despite the thorough search of the vault
clerks, TCT No. 11520 the supposed title from whence the subject TCT No. T-320601
was derived. What are filed in the title volume are certificates of titles, including TCT
No. T-11519 and TCT No. T-11521 both issued by RD Cuevas on 5 November 1964 at
9:00 a.m. (see Annexes "C" & "C-1"). In other words, TCT No. 11520 was supposed

to have been issued by RD Cuevas in November 1964. In the absence of the title, it
cannot however be determined if TCT No. T-11520 covers the same parcel of land in
the subject title of Amelita Dolfo.
Records of this Authority show that Judicial Forms 109 and 109-D (CB printed) with
Serial No. 2061717 were requisitioned by and issued to Cavite Registry of Deeds
on 21 October 1991. There appears no report of consumption pertaining to those
title-forms was submitted by the Cavite Registry of Deeds (see Annexes "D" to "D5").
On the other hand, records of the Cavite Registry of Deeds show that Judicial Forms
109-109-D with Serial No. 2061717 were consumed and used for a certificate and of
title, TCT No. 322182, in favor of Manuel dela Cruz and not for issuance of TCT No. T320601 in favor of Amelita Dolfo. This is confirmed by the Certification of Deputy
Register of Deeds, dated 21 May 1996 (Annex "E"), which attests:
This is to certify that as per records on file in the issuance book dated October 25,
1991, Judicial Form 109-109-D with Serial No. 2061717 was issued to Manuel dela
Cruz with corresponding TCT No. 322182 and not TCT No. T-320601 in favor of
Amelita Dolfo.
It is, however, also unfortunate that TCT No. 322182 (with Serial No. 2061717) and
the certificate of title with Serial No. 2061716 are not also filed in the corresponding
title (book) volume. What are filed therein are certificates of title, including TCT No.
T-322180 (with Serial No. 2061715) and TCT No. T-322183 (with Serial No. 2061718)
both issued by RD Cabuco on 8 August 1993 and 25 October 1991, respectively (see
Annexes "F" & "F-1").
The Issuance Book of title-forms on file in the Cavite RD, particularly page 134
(Annex "G"), also confirms that Judicial Form 2061717 was issued or released for
TCT No. 322182 and not for TCT No. T-320601.
Furthermore, registry records show, particularly the same Issuance Book of titleforms, page 88 (Annex "H"), that the Judicial Forms 109 and 109-D used for the
genuine TCT No. 320601 were with Serial No. 2037534 (erroneously typed in the
certification as 2037519); and that the said TCT No. 320601 was issued in the name
of Molino Homes and not in favor of Amelita Dolfo. This is confirmed by the
Certification of DRD Diosdado A. Concepcion, dated 21 May 1996, which states
(Annex "H-1"):
This is to certify that as per records on file in this registry, dated October 8, 1991
Judicial Form 109-109-D with Serial Number 2037519 TCT No. 320601 Book No.
1701 Page 101 issued in the name of Molino Homes and was received by Amania
Jimenez.
When interviewed, DRD Concepcion disclosed to this Investigator that the supposed
original of TCT No. T-320601 in the name of Amelita Dolfo is detached from the title
volume. He could not tell where it is now, not even the vault clerks of the
registry.However, Atty. Concepcion surmised that the same is in the
possession/custody of Ms. Melany Victoria, OIC Deputy Registry of Deeds. Atty.
Concepcion furnished this Investigator a certified copy (of a xerox copy in his file) of
the subject TCT No. T-320601 (see Annex "I"). He further intimated that based on his
own personal verification he believes that the supposed title in the name of Amelita
Dolfo is of doubtful authenticity. In fact, Atty. Concepcion further averred, that
former Register of Deeds Antonia Cabuco disowned the signature above the
typewritten name "Antonia B. Cabuco, Register of Deeds" in the subject TCT No.T320601.[16]

In an effort to remove any doubt on the veracity of her certificate of title, petitioner
questioned the credibility of Atty. Artemio Caa who filed an action for annulment of
her title. However, her evidence to prove the genuineness of her certificate of title
was the letter of the LRA Administrator, Reynaldo Maulit, who, in declaring the
existence of TCT No. T-320601 in the vaults of the Register of Deeds of the Province
of Cavite, referred to the letter-report of the same Atty. Artemio Caa dated April 30,
1996.[17]
Thus, petitioner cannot invoke the indefeasibility of her certificate of title. It bears
emphasis that the Torrens system does not create or vest title but only confirms and
records one already existing and vested.[18] Thus, while it may be true, as petitioner
argues, that a land registration court has no jurisdiction over parcels of land already
covered by a certificate of title, it is equally true that this rule applies only where
there exists no serious controversy as to the authenticity of the certificate.
Fourth. Indeed, to allow petitioner to intervene in the LRC cases would not avoid
multiplicity of suits in view of the case for annulment and cancellation of TCT No. T320601 now pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Bacoor, Cavite. It is
premature for petitioner to intervene in the LRC cases because her certificate of
title, supposedly her best proof of ownership over the property described therein, is
questionable. Besides, inasmuch as the authenticity of her certificate of title is also
being questioned in the LRC cases, the evidence that she will present to the prove
the contrary would be the same evidence she will present in the case for annulment
of title. At this point, where there is already a decree of registration issued in favor
of private respondents, it is moot and academic to allow petitioner to participate in
the LRC cases for the purpose of preventing possible double titling of property. As
the trial court correctly stated, petitioner is not left without remedy even if she was
not allowed to intervene. If it is shown that her certificate of title is genuine and that
she is the true owner of the litigated property, the proceedings in the land
registration cases would then be null and void because the trial court has no
jurisdiction on the matter. Otherwise, she could sue for damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision and the resolution of the
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17610
April 22, 1963
JESUS R. FRANCO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MONTE DE PIEDAD AND SAVINGS BANK, defendant-appellee.
Gatdula and Vidanes for plaintiffs-appellants.
Narciso Pimentel for defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (in its Civil Case No. Q5009) granting appellee's motion to dismiss.
The antecedent facts appear in a resolution issued on 13 January 1960 by the Court
of First Instance of Quezon City in Case G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 3563:
On October 30, 1953, the spouses Jesus R. Franco and Natividad C. Torres,
oppositors in this case, obtained from the petitioner Monte de Piedad & Savings
Bank, a loan in the amount of P15,000.00 secured by four (4) parcels of land, three

of which are located in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 11918 and 19919 of the Land records of Quezon City, and
another parcel of land located at Cavite City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-3330 of the land records of Cavite City. From the date of the granting of the
mortgage loan, the oppositors-borrower did not pay one single amortization. In view
of this and after several demands, notice of foreclosure was given the mortgagors
and published in the newspapers. However, upon request of mortgagor Jesus R.
Franco, it was agreed to suspend the foreclosure proceedings and in view thereof,
he offered to cede his mortgaged properties in payment of the mortgage obligation,
which at the time reached the amount of P20,242.07. In the deed of assignment,
the mortgagors were granted the right to redeem the properties within one (1) year,
from July 13, 1956. The period of redemption would have expired on June 13,
1957, 1 but before that time specifically on June 5, 1957, the mortgagor Jesus R.
Franco, redeemed the property situated at Cavite City upon payment of P10,000.00
for which a deed of partial redemption was executed. It was agreed, however, that
the period of redemption as regards the other property would in no way be affected.
Upon request of mortgagor Jesus Franco in writing on July 8, 1957 the mortgagors
were granted an extension of six (6) months from and after July 8, 1957 within
which to exercise their right of redemption with respect to the remaining parcels of
land in Quezon City, said extension to expire on January 13, 1958. On January 13,
1958 the mortgagor Jesus Franco again requested for a further extension of one (1)
month to redeem his properties, which was granted by the petitioner on condition
that such extension would be the last,the same to expire on February 13, 1958.
Fifteen days thereafter or on February 28, 1959, mortgagor Franco again asked for
another extension of onemonth. Because from the very beginning his account has
been handled veryunsatisfactorily, the petitioner denied his request for further
extension.
In view of the repeated failures of the assignors (spouses Franco) to redeemthe
properties, the Monte de Piedad finally petitioned the Court of QuezonCity, in the
G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 3563 case, to declare the ownership of the assigned properties
consolidated in it; to order the cancellation of thetitles in the name of the spouses;
and the issuance of new certificates in the name of Monte. The spouses Franco
opposed the petition on the ground that their deed of cession or assignment was
valid as a pactum commissorium; butthe court overruled their objection, and
ordered their certificates cancelledand the issuance of new ones in the name of
Monte de Piedad.
The foregoing order was not appealed and ultimately became final. But beforeit did
so, on 10 February 1960, spouses Franco instituted the present caseby a complaint
alleging substantially the loan, the mortgage, and the cession(assignment), with
right to repurchase previously narrated; that it was the intention of the parties, at
least the plaintiffs were made to understand,that the said deed of assignment was
only an extension or continuation of themortgage of the above-mentioned
properties; that on 5 July 1957, the property at Caridad, Cavite City, was redeemed
by plaintiffs for P10,000, sothe property was released by defendant in their favor,
thus reducing the indebtedness by P10,000; that shortly thereafter, plaintiffs made
attemptsto pay the balance of the mortgage indebtedness, and secure the release
ofthe remaining mortgaged properties at San Francisco del Monte, but
defendantconsidered itself the owner of said properties, and would only
considerselling the properties not less than P20,000, although ther indebtedness
wasreduced by payment of P10,000; and that the properties in San Francisco del

Monte are valued at approximately P25,000, and its improvements, consisting ofa
two-story house of strong materials, one kiosk, and one shed, is valued
atapproximately P35,000, or a total of P60,000. Plaintiffs prayed forjudgment
declaring the deed of assignment in fact not a deed of assignment ofproperties with
the right to repurchase, but an equitable mortgage, and thatthe same be foreclosed
in the manner provided by law, with costs, and furtherrelief, just and equitable.
On March 6, 1960, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
inconsistent theories that the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment,the
same cause of action having been finally decided between the same partiesin Land
Registration Case No. 3563 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, where
plaintiffs' opposition to the consolidation of title of defendant to the disputed land
was overruled, and that the complaint states no cause ofaction because it is an
action for declaratory relief under Rule 66, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, and no
such actions will prosper after thesubject contract or statute has been breached
(Sec. 2, Rule 66).
Ten days later, plaintiffs opposed this action on the ground that the courtos first
instance, acting as a land registration court, because of its limited jurisdiction, could
not have passed upon the issues of the presentaction for reformation; and that to
determine the sufficiency of a cause ofaction, the facts alleged must be deemed
admitted true, in view of the motion to dismiss.
On 29 July 1960, the lower court dismissed the complaint in an order findingthe
present action to be one of the declaratory relief and barred by res judicata.
From this order of the lower court, plaintiffs appealed on questions of law, on the
following points: (1) That the present action is not one for declaratory relief, but of
reformation, because it prays that the deed ofassignment be declared an equitable
mortgage, and when so declared, that thesame should be foreclosed in accordance
with law, which prayer calls forperformance or positive action from defendant; (2)
that in opposing thepetition of the defendant in the former case (No. 3563), wherein
the consolidation of plaintiffs' certificates of title in defendant's nameswas asked,
plaintiff's ground was that the deed of assignment was in thenature of pactum
commissorium, and henceunenforceable, and that before theorder of the lower
court granting the consolidation became final plaintiffs filed this action for
reformation because this issue (of reformation) was not,and could not be, raised in
resisting the petition of defendant for consolidation of plaintiffs' certificates of title
in the court's limited jurisdiction acting as a land registration court.
The decisive question is whether this action is barred by the previousadjudication
had in G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 3563. We find no reversible error inthe holding of the court
below that it is. The rule in this jurisdiction isthat a prior decision is conclusive in a
second suit between the same parties,on the same subject-matter, and on the same
cause of action, not only as towhat was expressly adjudged in the first suit but also
as to all matter and defenses that could have been properly set up in the prior
action. That thereis identity of parties and subject-matter in the present litigation
and in theG.L.R.O. case is not disputed; and there is also identity of causes of
action,since in both suits the issue is wheather the deed of assignment was in
reality an equitable mortgage merely, the Monte de Piedad would not have been
entitled to have certificates of title transferred to its name. This claim,therefore,
could have been properly interposed in the former case of consolidation of
ownership; and not having been set up there, it is now barred.
Appellant Franco argue that they could not have raised the issue in the G.L.R.O.
case, because a Land Registration Court has no power to decidecases involving

issues properly litigable in ordinary civil actions. Suchis the general rule; but
because in this jurisdiction it is the courts offirst instance that also function as
courts of land registration, ourjurisprudence recognizes exceptions to the rule
above-stated, where theparties have acquiesced in submitting the issues for
determination in theregistration proceedings, and they are given full opportunity to
presenttheir respective sides and submit their evidence (Aglipay vs. De los
Reyes,G.R. No. L-12776, 23, March 1960, and case cited). The appellants
hereinattacked the sufficiency of the deed of assignment to vest title in theMonte de
Piedad, and voluntarily submitted that issue to the Registrationcourt for decision in
the preceding case; they must, therefore, be concluded by its judgment, which has
concededly become final.
Moreover, the defense that the deed of assignment was intended to be a second
mortgage to secure the same loan is absurd on its face, considering that theMonte
de Piedad already held a prior mortgage, and that the appellants hadfailed to pay a
single amortization thereunder. What would have been the useof suspending
foreclosure of the existing mortgage just to procure anothermortgage on the very
same property as security for the same loan?
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of the dismissal is herebyaffirmed.
Costs against appellants.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-33850 January 22, 1976
DEMETRIO MANALO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. HERMINIO C. MARIANO, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, SEVERINO, INOCENCIO, PRISCILLA, TEODORA, ELENA and
LOPEZ all surnamed MANALO, respondents.
Alejandro A. Marquez for petitioner.
Casiano G. Atuel Jr. for respondents.
AQUINO, J.
The question in these special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition is whether
Pasig Branch X of the Court of First Instance of Rizal can entertain an action for the
annulment of a partition agreement on the ground of fraud although its validity had
already been upheld by Branch VIII of the same court in a land registration case.
The factual background of that question, as shown in the expedientes of Land
Registration Case No. N-6347, LRC Record No. N-35459 and Civil Case No. 13708 of
the lower court, is as follows:
Pedro Manalo was the owner of a parcel of land located at Barrio Ususan, Pateros,
near Taguig, Rizal. After his death in 1901, the land was inherited by his daughter,
Teodora Manalo. When Teodora died, the land was inherited by her son, Francisco
Ymzon. Ymzon donated the land to his first cousins, the brothers, Demetrio Manalo
and Mamerto Manalo. On April 30, 1952 they partitioned into two equal parts the
said land which had an area of one thousand four hundred seventy-four (1,474)
square meters and which was covered by Tax Declaration No. 6746 in the name of
Teodora Manalo (Exh. J, Reparticion Extrajudicial). Mamerto died in 1956. His onehalf share of the said land was inherited by his son, Severino Manalo.

On August 4, 1960 Demetrio Manalo, and his nephew, Severino (the son of Mamerto
Manalo) executed a "Kasulatan ng Hatian ng Lupa" (Exh. 6 or K) before the same
notary who had notarized the 1952 extrajudicial partition (Exh. J). The "Kasulatan"
referred to three parcels of land covered by Tax Declarations Nos. 1249, 856 and
1368 in the name of Mamerto Manalo with areas of 768, 4,706 and 1,286 square
meters, respectively. It was recited in that document that Demetrio Manalo and
Severino were the owners ("tunay at ganap na mayari lamang") of the said three
parcels of land. In the partition Demetrio was given (a) the parcel with an area of
1,286 square meters and (b) 2,094 square meters out of the parcel with an area of
4,706 square meters. On the other hand, the parcel with an area of 768 square
meters and the remainder of 2,612 square meters (out of the 4,706 square meters)
were allocated to Severino Manalo.
As stipulated in that document and in conformity with Act No. 3344 amending
section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code regarding the registry for
unregistered lands, the said document was recorded in the Registry of Deeds of
Rizal on August 25, 1960 (Entry No. 17079, Page 193, Volume 85, File No. 17079;
Exh. K-1).
On March 6, 1968 Demetrio Manalo filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal an
application for the registration of the lands which he had acquired under the 1952
and 1960 partitions already mentioned and which are now Identified as Lots 1, 2, 3,
4 and 5 of the Plan Psu-191273 with a total area of four thousand forty-five (4,045)
square meters (LRC Case No. N6347). That case was assigned to Pasig Branch VIII.
Severino Manalo opposed the application. He averred that his signature to the
"Kasulatan ng Hatian ng Lupa" dated August 4, 1960 was fraudulently secured by
Demetrio Manalo. He filed a counter-petition for the registration in his name of Lots
1 to 5. 1
At the inception of the hearing, Severino Manalo withdrew his opposition to the
registration of Lots 4 and 5. He confined his opposition to Lots 1, 2, 3. And after the
hearing, the lower court (Branch VIII) overruled Severino Manalo's opposition and
decreed the registration of the five lots in the name f Demetrio Manalo. In its
decision dated October 9, 1970 it found that the partition dated August 5, 1960 was
valid. Severino Manalo did not testify on the alleged fraud. It was his son, Inocencio,
who testified that Severino Manalo was defrauded. the lower court did not give any
credence to Inocencio's testimony. (Its findings on the validity of the partition
agreement are quoted in the
footnote.) 2
Severino Manalo was not able to perfect an appeal from that decision. It became
final and executory. the lower court in its order of October 2, 1971 directed and
issuance of the corresponding decree.
On July 31, 1970, or before the termination of the land registration case, the
children of Severino Manalo, named Inocencio, Priscilla, Teodora, Elena and Lope
(without joining their father, Severino) filed ill the lower court a "petition" for the
annulment of the aforementioned "Kasulatan ng Hatian sa Lupa" on the ground that
their father, who had an inadequate education, had signed it because of the false
and fraudulent representation of Demetrio Manalo that he (Demetrio) was an heir of
Mamerto Manalo, the father of Severino. That case was assigned to Branch X (Civil
Case No. 13708).
Demetrio Manalo filed a motion to dismiss the "petition" on the grounds (1) that the
action is between members of the same family and no earnest efforts towards a
compromise had been made before the action was filed; (2) that the plaintiffs have

no legal capacity to sue; (3) that the action is barred by the prior judgment in the
land registration case, and (4) that the action is barred by prescription.
The lower court in its orders of March 10 and July 17, 1971 denied the motion to
dismiss. It ruled that the decision in the land registration case did not constitute res
judicata as to the validity of the "Kasulatan" in question because Severino Manalo
did not testify in the land registration case regarding its execution and, moreover,
the lower court, as a land registration court with limited jurisdiction, allegedly could
not resolve that issue.
On August 5, 1971 Demetrio Manalo filed the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition. The issue is whether the action for the annulment of the partition
agreement is barred by res judicata. 3
We hold that such an action is barred by the prior judgment in the land registration
case. The decision in a land registration proceeding, which is a proceeding in rem "is
conclusive upon the title" to the land and is binding on the whole world (Sec. 49[a],
Rule 39, Rules of Court).
In the instant case, the decision in Land Registration Case No. N-6347 may also be
regarded as a judgment in personam against Severino Manalo. He was the oppositor
in that case. He presented evidence in support of his opposition particularly with
reference to the supposed nullity of the 1960 partition agreement. He asked that
the contested lots be registered in his name. The lower court ruled against his
contentions and sustained the application of Demetrio Manalo.
The lower court's decision is conclusive against Severino Manalo. It has all the
elements of res judicata vis-a-vis Civil Case No. 13708: (a) a final judgment, (b) a
court with jurisdiction over the res and the parties, (c) a judgment on the merits,
and (d) Identity of parties, subject-matter and cause of action.
Severino Manalo's contention that the lower court, as a land registration court, had
no jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the 1960 partition agreement is not welltaken. The Court of First Instance is a court of "general original jurisdiction"
"invested with power to take cognizance of all kinds of cases": civil cases, criminal
cases, special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty
and insolvency cases (Sec. 39, Judiciary law; De Paula vs. Escay 97 Phil. 617, 619).
Whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Court of First Instance in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court
(probate, land registration, etc.) is in reality not a jurisdictional question. It is in
essence a procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may be waived"
(Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227, 232; Cf. Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484 re
jurisdiction over the issue).
Thus, although a probate court may not decide a question of title, yet if the parties
submit that question to the probate court and the interests of third parties are not
impaired, the probate court may have jurisdiction to decide that issue (Pascual vs.
Pascual, 73 Phil. 56).
Generally, an issue properly litigable in an ordinary civil action under the general
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance should not be resolved in a land
registration proceeding. But since in this jurisdiction the Court of First Instance also
functions as a land registration court, if the parties acquiesced in submitting that
issue for determination in the land registration proceeding and they were given full
opportunity to present their respective sides and their evidence, the land
registration court would have jurisdiction to pass upon that issue (Franco vs. Monte
de Piedad and Savings Bank, L-17610, April 22, 1963, 7 SCRA 660; City of Manila vs.
Tarlac Development Corporation, etc., L-24557, 24 SCRA 467, 3 cases).

In this case, Severino Manalo himself invoked the court's jurisdiction by praying that
the deed of partition be "declared null and void" and that the disputed lands be
registered in his name. He and Demetrio Manalo in effect agreed to submit the issue
for adjudication by the lower court, sitting as a land registration court. That was
merely a matter of practice or procedure. It did not mean that the parties asked the
lower court to exercise a jurisdiction which it did not possess.
In such a situation, the rule is that a party cannot invoke the court's jurisdiction to
secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 86 ALR 79; Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy, L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29, 3536).
Respondent Manalo's other contention is that the fact that the plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 13708, who are Severino Manalo's children, were not parties in Land
Registration Case No. N6347, and that the said case is not a land registration case
precludes the application of res judicata. That is a flimsy contention. Severino
Manalo's children, as his compulsory heirs, could bring the action in Civil case No.
13708 only in behalf of Severino Manalo who is still alive and who is the real party in
interest. The truth is that the cause of action pertains to him and not to his children.
The compulsory heirs may bring an action to impugn a "simulated alienation of
property with intent to deprive" them "of their legitime" (Art. 221[4], Civil Code;
Concepcion vs. Sta. Ana, 87 Phil. 787 793). That is not the situation in Civil Case No.
13708. There, it was Severino Manalo who was supposed to have been defrauded.
As he is still alive, he should have brought the action to annul the contract wherein
he was allegedly defrauded.
So, the fact that Civil Case No. 13708 is an action to annul the partition agreement
and that Severino Manalo's children are the plaintiffs therein would not prevent the
application of res judicata. That case and the land registration case involve one and
the same subject matter, namely, Lots 1, 2 and 3, Plan Psu-191273. "A party
cannot, by varying his form of action or adopting a different method of representing
his case, escape the effects ofres judicata" (Rasay-Lahoz vs. Leonor, L-27388, March
23, 1971, 38 SCRA 47).
Moreover, the action to annul the 1960 partition agreement would be an
unwarranted collateral attack on the judgment in the land registration case which
was rendered by another branch of the lower court. Such an action would reopen
the issue as to the validity of the partition agreement, an issue which was already
resolved and set at rest in the land registration case. The rule of non quieta
movere applies. (See Dulap vs. Court of Appeals, L-28306, December 18, 1971, 42
SCRA 537).
Demetrio Manalo called the lower court's attention to the decision in the land
registration case. It should have taken judicial notice of that case (Figueras vs.
Serrano, 52 Phil. 28). If should have known that the issue raised in Civil Case No.
13708, which is the validity of the partition agreement, had already been
adjudicated by another branch of the same court in Land Registration Case No.
6347 and, therefore, it would be highly improper to re-litigate the same issue. When
there is an intimate connection between two cases, and the parties and subjectmatter of the controversy are the same and the issue raised in the latter case was
determined in the previous case, the principle of the res judicata is applicable
(Martinez vs. Notor, 85 Phil. 62; Vda. de Ursua vs. Pelayo, 107 Phil. 622).
Since public and private interests demand that litigation should cease, the tendency
is to broaden, rather than restrict, the application of res judicata (Paz vs. Inandan 75
Phil. 608).

The jurisdiction to annul a judgment of a branch of the Court of First Instance

belongs solely to that branch. Another branch, even if it belongs to the same judicial
district, that attempts to annul the judgment of another branch, exceeds its
jurisdiction or acts with grave abuse of discretion. certiorari and prohibition would
lie to prevent one branch of a Court of First Instance from nullifying the prior
judgment rendered by a coequal and coordinate branch. (J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs.
Torres, L-24717, December 4, 1967, 21 SCRA 1169, 1172).
Generally, certiorari is not available to annul an order denying a motion to dismiss
issued by a Court of First Instance within its jurisdiction. Appeal in due time is the
remedy to review the validity of that order. But, where, as in this case, a patent
grave abuse of discretion was committed in not dismissing a complaint on the
ground of prior judgment (cosa juzgada)or where "the broader interests of justice or
public policy require an exception" and the petitioner's contention appears to be
clearly tenable, the writ of certiorari may be granted to set aside an interlocutory
order (Manila Electric Co. and Sheriff of Quezon City vs. Hon. Enriquez, etc. and
Espinosa, 110 Phil. 499; Pachoco vs. Tumangday and Fernandez, etc., 108 Phil. 238;
Sanchez vs. Zosa, L-27043, November 23, 1975).
WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of March 10 and July 17, 1971 are set aside. It
is directed to dismiss Civil Case No. 13708. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 120435. December 22, 1997]
ESTATE OF THE LATE MERCEDES JACOB represented by MERCEDITA JACOB,
DONATO JACOB JR., ERENEO JACOB and LILIAN JACOB QUINTO, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES RAMON R. TUGBANG and VIRGINIA S.
TUGBANG, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY and CITY TREASURER OF
QUEZON CITY, respondents.
[G.R. No. 120974. December 22, 1997]
CITY TREASURER OF QUEZON CITY, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
BERNARDITA C. TOLENTINO., respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
These two (2) petitions are heard jointly by the Court for the reason that they
involve a common issue of jurisdiction over the nature of the action.
G.R. No. 120435
Petitioners allege that in 1981 Mercedes Jacob, registered owner of the land subject
matter hereof and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 39178, left for the
United States. Before she did, she asked her son-in-law Luciano Quinto Jr. to pay the
real estate taxes on her property. However, Luciano Jr. was not allowed to pay by
the City Treasurer's Office as he had no written authorization from her. Luciano Jr.
and his wife Lilian Jacob Quinto attempted several times to pay but they were as
many times refused.
In 1984 respondent City Treasurer of Quezon City sent a notice to Mercedes Jacob
through her daughter Lilian Jacob Quinto that her real estate taxes on the property
were delinquent. Lilian was also informed that the land was already sold at public
auction on 24 August 1983 to private respondent Virginia Tugbang for P6,800.00 to
satisfy the tax delinquency of the land.
Mercedes Jacob came to know of the sale on 6 September 1983 when she received
from respondent City Treasurer a Notice of Sale of Real Property addressed to her

husband. Members of Mercedes' family tried to redeem the property from Virginia
Tugbang but she evaded them until the Final Bill of Sale was issued to her.
On 30 September 1985 Virginia filed a petition for the cancellation of TCT No. 39178
and the issuance of a new certificate of title in her name alleging in par. 4 of her
petition that x x x (On) August 27, 1985, the period of redemption on the sold property having
already expired and the registered owner-delinquent taxpayer, Mercedes Jacob, and
any other interested party, did not, within the said period, take any step to redeem
the property and pursue any lawful remedy to impeach the proceedings or to
enforce any lien or claim thereon, thereby allowing the sale to become final and
absolute, [1]
thereby disregarding and frustrating the efforts of the Jacobs to redeem the
property after depositing P2,000.00 with the City Treasurer as redemption price. On
3 March 1989 TCT No. 39178 was canceled and TCT No. 81860 was issued in the
name of Virginia Tugbang.
On 17 May 1993 petitioners Mercedita Jacob, Donato Jacob, Jr., Ereneo Jacob and
Lilian Jacob-Quinto, heirs of the late Mercedes Jacob, filed a complaint with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against respondent spouses Ramon R. Tugbang
and Virginia S. Tugbang, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-93-15976, for annulment or
cancellation of the auction sale, the final bill of sale, TCT No. 81860, and for
redemption of the property plus damages. However, the trial court dismissed the
petition purportedly for lack of jurisdiction as the petition was deemed to be x x x in reality a petition to annul and set aside the Decision rendered on March 13,
1994 by the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 106, canceling petitioner
Mercedes Jacob's TCT No. 39178 x x x x consolidating title to the property covered
thereby in herein private respondent Virginia S. Tugbang, and ordering the issuance
of a new title in her favor. [2]
On 12 October 1994 petitioners filed with us a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which we certified on 9 November 1994 to the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court however dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Thus
this petition for reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals and for judgment
directing the RTC - Br. 82, Quezon City, to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. Q93-15976.
The petition must be granted. It is axiomatic that the averments of the complaint
determine the nature of the action, hence, the jurisdiction of the
courts. This is because the complaint must contain a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action and specify the relief
sought. [3]
A cursory examination of the petition readily shows that it is an action for
reconveyance. The petition states that "petitioners are not after the annulment of
the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 106. The remedy of
petitioners under the law is an action for reconveyance the jurisdiction of which is
vested in the Regional Trial Court." [4] In Sevilla v. De los Angeles [5] reconveyance
was allowed where the procurement of a transfer certificate of title was made under
circumstances of constructive trust based on fraudulent representations. In the
instant case the complaint alleges that respondent Virginia Tugbang procured a
transfer certificate of title upon her fraudulent representation in her petition for
cancellation of title. This way of acquiring title creates what is called "constructive
trust" in favor of the defrauded party and grants to the latter a right to the
reconveyance of the property. Thus it has been held that if a person obtains legal

title to property by fraud or concealment courts will impress upon the title a socalled "constructive trust" in favor of the defrauded party. The use of the word
"trust" in this sense is not technically accurate but as courts are agreed in
administering the same remedy in a certain class
of frauds as are administered infraudulent breaches of trusts, and as courts and the
profession have concurred in calling such frauds constructive trusts, there can be no
misapprehension in continuing the same phraseology, while a change might lead to
confusion and misunderstanding. [6]
In Alzua v. Johnson [7] we declared that under our system of pleading it is the duty of
the courts to grant the relief to which the parties are shown to be entitled by the
allegations in their pleadings and the facts proved at the trial, and the mere fact
that they themselves misconstrued the legal effect of the facts thus alleged and
proved will not prevent the court from placing the just construction thereon and
adjudicating the issue accordingly.
As the petition makes out a case for reconveyance and not a mere annulment of an
RTC judgment as viewed under par. (2), Sec. 9, BP Blg. 129, jurisdiction over the
case is clearly vested in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City as provided in par.
(2), Sec. 19, BP Blg. 129 Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction: x x x x (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry
into andunlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is
conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts x x x x
Moreover, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the petition as it may be
considered only as a continuation of the original proceeding for cancellation of title
which in view of its non-litigious character is summary in nature.Furthermore, under
Sec. 2 of PD 1529 otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court sitting as a land registration court is no longer
as circumscribed as it was under the former Land Registration Act (Act 496), so that
now a Regional Trial Court, like the RTC of Quezon City which issued a new title to
respondent Virginia Tugbang in lieu of the old one, has the authority to act not only
on applications for original registration but also over all petitions filed after original
registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising from
such applications or petitions. [8]
As to whether such an action should be granted requires further evidence culled
from a full-blown trial; hence, Civil Case No. Q-93-15976 previously dismissed by the
trial court should be reinstated so that the parties may be able to present their
evidence.
G.R. No. 120974
Alberto Sta. Maria owned a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 68818 which he sold
in 1964 to Teresa L. Valencia who, as a consequence, had the title canceled and TCT
No. 79818 issued in her name. She however failed to have the tax declaration
transferred in her name. Thus she paid the real estate taxes from 1964 to 1978 in
the name of its previous owner Alberto Sta. Maria.
On 20 December 1973 Valencia entered into a contract of sale of the property on
installment with a mortgage in favor of respondent Bernardita
C. Tolentino. However, from 1979 to 1983 Valencia failed to pay the real estate
taxesdue on the land. As a result, notices of tax delinquency and intent to sell the
property [9] were sent to Alberto Sta.

Maria's address which was simply stated as "Olongapo, Zambales." The notices
were then returned to petitioner City Treasurer of Quezon City for a "better
complete address." [10]
In the auction sale on 29 February 1984 the spouses Romeo and Verna Chua bought
the land in question, which was already covered by TCT No. 79818 in the name of
Teresa L. Valencia. On 5 March 1984 a certificate of sale was issued to the Chua
spouses but it showed on its face that the land was still covered by TCT No. 68818
and not TCT No. 79818. Apparently, the Office of the City Treasurer was unaware
that TCT No. 68818 had already been canceled by TCT No. 79818. However, in the
Final Bill of Sale issued to the Chua spouses on 15 May 1985 TCT No. 79818 still
appeared in the name of Alberto Sta. Maria, the former owner, [11] so that the
vendee spouses lost no time in filing a petition with the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City for the cancellation of TCT No. 79818 and the issuance of a new title
in their name. On 4 February 1987 the court granted their petition and TCT No.
357727 was issued in the name of the spouses Romeo and Verna Chua.
In the meantime, on 2 February 1987, respondent Bernardita C. Tolentino paid in full
the purchase price of the property so that Teresa L. Valencia executed a
deed of absolute sale in her favor. On 2 August 1988, in view of the fire that gutted
the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, Tolentino filed a petition for
reconstitution of TCT No. 79818.
Sometime in April 1989, as purchasers of the property in the auction sale, the Chuas
demanded delivery of possession from Bernardita C. Tolentino and Teresa L.
Valencia. As a consequence, Tolentino sued for annulment of the auction sale in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Finding the action to be well taken, the trial
court granted the petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed the court a
quo. Hence this petition for review on certiorari by the City Treasurer of Quezon City
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner City Treasurer cites Galutira v. Ramones, [12] a decision of the Court of
Appeals, in support of his position that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the
case as it is one for annulment and cancellation of TCT No. 357727 which is vested
in the Court of Appeals pursuant to par. (2), Sec. 9, BP Blg. 129. [13] In Galutira it was
held that "in the law of pleading, courts are called upon to pierce the form and go
into the substance, not to be misled by a false or wrong name given to a pleading
because the title thereof is not controlling and the court should be guided by its
averments x x x x" Apparently the ruling is contrary to petitioner's very own
position. While the complaint of Bernardita C. Tolentino is captioned as one for
annulment of auction sale with damages, it is not an action for annulment of
judgment which should be filed with the Court of Appeals. In fact, from the
allegations in the complaint it can be gathered that a reconveyance was intended
by Tolentino, in which case, jurisdiction is vested in the trial court.
Under Sec. 55 of the Land Regitration Act, as amended by Sec. 53 of PD No.
1529, [14] an original owner of registered land may seek the annulment of the
transfer thereof on the ground of fraud and the proper remedy is
reconveyance. However, such remedy is without prejudice to the rights of an
innocent purchaser for value holding a certificate of title.
As regards the propriety of the nullification of the auction sale in the instant case,
which still remains unresolved, petitioner submits that he had done everything
incumbent upon him to do in proceeding with the auction sale. Besides, not only
was original vendee Valencia remiss in her obligation to secure a new tax
declaration in her name but she likewise failed to pay the real property taxes for

1979 to 1983. Therefore, petitioner City Treasurer of Quezon City reiterates, the
validity of the auction sale should instead be sustained conformably with Estella
v. Court of Appeals. [15]
Section 73 of PD No. 464 provides Sec. 73. Advertisement of sale of real property at public auction. - After the
expiration of the year for which the tax is due, the provincial or city treasurer shall
advertise the sale at public auction of the entire delinquent real property, except
real property mentioned in subsection (a) of Section forty hereof, to satisfy all the
taxes and penalties due and the costs of sale. Such advertisement shall be made by
posting a notice for three consecutive weeks at the main entrance of the provincial
building and of all municipal buildings in the province, or at the main entrance of
the city or municipal hall in the case of cities, and in a public and conspicuous place
in (the) barrio or district wherein the property is situated, in English, Spanish and
the local dialect commonly used, and by announcement for at least three market
days at the market by the crier, and, in the discretion of the provincial or city
treasurer, by publication once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation published in the province or city.
The notice, publication, and announcement by crier shall state the amount of the
taxes, penalties and costs of sale; the date, hour, and place of sale, the name of the
taxpayer against whom the tax was assessed; and the kind or nature of property
and, if land, its approximate area, lot number, and location stating the street
and block number, district or barrio, municipality and the province or city where the
property to be sold is situated (italics supplied).
Copy of the notice shall forthwith be sent either by registered mail or by messenger,
or through the barrio captain, to the delinquenttaxpayer, at his address as shown in
the tax rolls or property tax record cards of the municipality or city where
the property is located, or at his residence, if known to said treasurer or barrio
captain; Provided, however, that a return of the proof of service under oath shall be
filed by the person making the service with the provincial or city treasurer
concerned (italics supplied).
There is no dispute that the requirements of law as regards posting of the notice,
publication and announcement by crier have been complied with. [16] The
controversy lies in the failure of petitioner City Treasurer to notify effectively the
delinquent taxpayer who at the time of the auction sale was Teresa L. Valencia.
Apparently, petitioner proceeded on the wrong premise that the property was still
owned by the former registered owner, Alberto Sta. Maria, who sold the property to
Valencia in 1964. In fact, at the time of the auction sale, the property was already
covered by a conditional sale on installment in favor of respondent Bernardita C.
Tolentino. Plainly, at the time of the auction sale, Alberto Sta. Maria who appeared
to have been notified of the auction sale was no longer the registered owner, much
less the delinquent taxpayer.
In ascertaining the identity of the delinquent taxpayer, for purposes of notifying him
of his tax delinquency and the prospect of a distraint and auction of his delinquent
property, petitioner City Treasurer should not have simply relied
onthe tax declaration. The property being covered by the Torrens system, it would
have been more prudent for him, which was not difficult to do, to verify from the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City where the property is situated and as
to who the registered owner was at the time the auction sale was to take place, to
determine who the real delinquent taxpayer was within the purview of the third
paragraph of Sec. 73. For one who is no longer the lawful owner of the land cannot

be considered the "present registered owner" because, apparently, he has already

lost interest in the property, hence is not expected to defend the property from the
sale at auction. The purpose of PD No. 464 is to collecttaxes from
the delinquent taxpayer and, logically, one who is no longer the owner of the
property cannot be considered the delinquent taxpayer.
While we understand the earnestness and initiative of local
governments to collect taxes, the same must be collected from the rightful debtors
and not from those who may only appear to be the registered owners in the official
files. Certainly, properties change hands as fast as their owners can, and to deprive
the present owners of their properties by notifying only the previous owners who no
longer have any interest in them will amount not only to inequity and injustice but
even to a violation of their constitutional rights to property and due process. This
interpretation as well as its ratiocination was explained as early as 1946 in Cabrera
v. The Provincial Treasurer of Tayabas [17] where the parties therein seemed to be in
the same predicament as the parties herein.
In Cabrera the notice of auction sale was sent to the declared owner but was
returned "unclaimed." Nevertheless, the auction sale proceeded and the property
was sold to the highest bidder. It turned out that the property had been
previously conveyed by the declared owner to another who, upon learning of the
sale, filed a complaint attacking the validity of the auction sale for lack of notice to
the registered owner, and that although the land remained in the assessment books
in the name of her transferor, she had become its registered owner several years
prior to the auction sale. We resolved the controversy in this manner x x x x The appellee was admittedly not notified of the auction sale, and this also
vitiates the proceeding. She is the registeredowner of the land and, since
1934, has become liable for the taxes thereon. For all purposes, she is the
delinquent taxpayer 'againstwhom the taxes were assessed' referred to in
Section 34 of the Commonwealth Act No. 470. It cannot be Nemesio Cabrera
(declared owner) for the latter's obligation to pay taxes ended where the appellee's
liability began (underscoring supplied).
x x x x The sale in favor of the appellant (purchaser at auction sale) cannot bind the
appellee, since the land purportedly conveyed was owned by Nemesio Cabrera, not
by the appellee; and at the time of sale, Nemesio Cabrera had no interest
whatsoever in the land in question that could have passed to the appellant.
The appellee may be criticized for her failure to have the land transferred to her
name in the assessment record. The circumstance, nevertheless, cannot supplant
the absence of notice. Of course, it is the duty of any person acquiring at the time
real property to prepare and submit a tax declaration within sixty days
(Commonwealth Act No. 470, section 12), but it is no less true that when the owner
refuses or fail to make the required declaration, the provincial assessor should
himself declare the property in the name ofthe defaulting owner (Commonwealth
Act No. 470, Sec. 14). In this case, there is absolutely no showing that the appellee
haddeliberately failed to make the declaration to defraud the tax officials; and it
may be remarked that there can be no reason why her Torren title, which binds the
whole world, cannot at least charge the Government which had issued it, with notice
thereof x x x x
Forty years later, in Serfino v. Court of Appeals, [18] we reiterated
the Cabrera doctrine and nullified the auction sale because x x x x the prescribed procedure in auction sales of property for tax delinquency
being in derogation of property rights should be followed punctiliously. Strict

adherence to the statutes governing tax sales is imperative not only for the
protection of the taxpayers, but also to allay any possible suspicion of collusion
between the buyer and the public officials called upon to enforce such laws.Notice
of sale to the delinquent landowners and to the public in general is an essential and
indispensable requirement of law, the non-fulfillment of which vitiates the sale x x x
x A purchaser of real estate at the tax sale obtains only such title as that held by
the taxpayer, the principle of caveat emptor applies. Where land is sold for
delinquency taxes under the provisions of the ProvincialAssessment Law, rights of
registered but undeclared owners of the land are not affected by the proceedings
and the sale conveys only such interest as the person who has declared the
property for taxation has therein.
The principle in Cabrera, reiterated in Serfino, should be, as it still is, considered
valid doctrine today, despiteEstella which petitioner invokes as the latest rule on the
matter. Quite significantly, Estella did not make any reference to
the Cabrera and Serfino cases, much less did it pass upon, reverse or modify them;
instead, the Court simply declared Under the particular circumstances of the case, we hold that the City Treasurer had
done everything that was legally incumbent upon him. Not only did he send the
pertinent notices to the declared owner, he also caused the mandatory publication
of the notice of public auction in two (2) newspapers of general circulation pursuant
to Section 65 of PD No. 464. The notices were understandably mailed to Concepcion
because as far as the City Treasurer was concerned, she was still the 'declared
owner' since the assessment of the property in question was still in her name. It
should be recalled that while petitioners had promptly secured anew
transfer certificate of title in their name after the 1970 acquisition, they neglected
to effect the necessary change in the tax declaration as then required by (Sec. 12
of Commonwealth Act No. 470 Assessment Law) and later by P.D. No. 464 x x x
x (italicssupplied).
All told, if it were really true that petitioners were never given the opportunity to
protect their rights, they had only themselves to blame for the catastrophe that
befell them. Not having been apprised
by petitioners of a change in ownership of the subject property, the government
was never placed in a position to give them that opportunity (italics supplied).
In Estella we relied on our ruling in Paguio v. Ruiz [19] where we emphasized the
requirement of declaration by the owner under Sec. 2484 of the Revised
Administrative Code [20]x x x x the duty of each person acquiring real estate in the city to make a new
declaration thereof with the advertence that failure to do so shall make the
assessment in the name of the previous owner valid and binding on all persons
interested, and for all purposes, as though the same had been assessed in the
name of its actual owner (italics supplied).
When the property was sold by Sta. Maria to Valencia in 1964 the law applicable
was RA No. 537 [21] which provided for the same requirement under its Sec.
48. [22] However, the law in force at the time of the auction sale on 29 February 1984
was already PD No. 464 [23] which did not contain the aforecited phrase. The new
law, Sec. 11 of PD No. 464, merely states Any person who shall transfer real property to another shall notify the assessor of
the province or city wherein the property is situated within sixty (60) days from the
date of such transfer. The notification shall include the particulars of the transfer,

the description of the property alienated and the name and address of the
transferee.
The fact that the pertinent phrase, "'failure to do so shall make the assessment in
the name of the previous owner valid and binding on all persons interested, and for
all purposes, as though the same had been assessed in the name of its actual
owner," found in both RA No. 537 and RA No. 409 was not incorporated in PD No.
464 implies that the assessment of the subject property in 1983 in the name of Sta.
Maria would not bind, much less adversely affect, Valencia. This, in spite of the nondeclaration by Valencia of the property in her name as required by the law, for there
is no longer any statutory waiver of the right to contest assessment by the actual
owner due to mere non-declaration.We can infer from the omission that the
assessment in the name of the previous owner is no longer deemed an assessment
in the name of the actual owner.
It is therefore clear that the delinquent taxpayer referred to under Sec. 72 of PD No.
464 is the actual owner of the property at the time of the delinquency and mere
compliance by the provincial or city treasurer with Sec. 65 of the decree is no longer
enough. [24] The notification to the right person, i.e., the real owner, is an essential
and indispensable requirement of the law, non-compliance with which renders the
auction sale void.
The registered owner need not be entirely blamed for her failure to transfer the tax
declaration in her name. Section 7 of PD No. 464 directs the assessor, in case the
owner fails to make a return, to list the real estate for taxation and charge the tax
against the true owner if known, and if unknown, then as against the unknown
owner. In this way, a change of ownership may be ascertained. Along the same line
did we rule in Cabrera.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 120435 is GRANTED. The decision and
resolution of respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint of petitioners by the RTC-Br. 82, Quezon City, are SET ASIDE and Civil
Case No. Q-93-15976 is REINSTATED. The trial court is directed to hear and decide
this case with deliberate dispatch.
The petition in G.R. No. 120974, on the other hand, is DENIED. The decision and
resolution of respondent Court of Appeals affirming with modification that of the
trial court are AFFIRMED. The public auction sale conducted on 29 February 1984 is
declared VOID for lack of notice to the registered owner Teresa L. Valencia. Transfer
Certificate Title No. 357727 and Tax Declaration No. B-091-01469 in the name of the
spouses Romeo and Verna Chua are ANNULLED. The Register of Deeds of Quezon
City is ordered to cancel TCT No. 357727 and issue in lieu thereof a new one in the
name of respondent Bernardita C. Tolentino. Petitioner City Treasurer of Quezon City
is ordered to cancel likewise Tax Declaration No. B-091-01469 and issue in lieu
thereof a new tax declaration in the name of respondent Bernardita C.
Tolentino. The award of attorney's fees is deleted.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-67451 September 28, 1987
REALTY SALES ENTERPRISE, INC. and MACONDRAY FARMS, INC., petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Special Third Civil Cases Division), HON.

RIZALINA BONIFACIO VERA, as Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal,

Branch XXIII, MORRIS G. CARPO, QUEZON CITY DEVELOPMENT AND
FINANCING CORPORATION, and COMMISSIONER OF LAND
REGISTRATION,respondents.
CORTES, J.:
The litigation over the ownership of the parcels of land which are the subject of this
petition started in 1927 when an application for their registration under the Torrens
System was first filed. In the present petition for review Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc.
(hereafter referred to as Realty) and Macondray Farms, Inc. (hereafter referred to as
Macondray) seek a reversal of the Resolution of May 2, 1984 of the Intermediate
Appellate Court, and an affirmance of the Court of Appeals Decision of December
29, 1982.
Two (2) adjacent parcels of land located in Almanza, Las Pias, Metro Manila, having
an aggregate area of 373,868 sq. m., situated in the vicinity of the Ayala Alabang
Project and BF Homes Paraaque are covered by three (3) distinct sets of Torrens
titles to wit:
1) TCT No. 20408 issued on May 29, 1975 in the name of Realty Sales Enterprise,
Inc., which was derived from OCT No. 1609, issued on May 21, 1958, pursuant to
Decree No. N-63394 in LRC Cases Nos. 657, 758 and 976, GLRO Record Nos. N29882, N-33721 and N-43516, respectively.
2) TCT No. 303961 issued on October 13, 1970 in the name of Morris G. Carpo,
which was derived from OCT No. 8629, issued on October 13, 1970 pursuant to
decree No. N-131349 in LRC Case No. N-11-M (N-6217), GLRO Record No. N-32166.
3) TCTs Nos. 333982 and 333985, issued on July 27, 1971 in the name of Quezon
City Development and Financing Corporation, derived from OCT No. 8931 which was
issued on July 27, 1971 pursuant to LRC Case No. P-206 GLRO Record No. N-31777.
On December 29, 1977, Morris Carpo filed a complaint with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIII, presided over by Judge Rizalina Bonifacio Vera
(hereafter referred to as Vera Court), for "declaration of nullity of Decree No. N63394 and TCT No. 20408." Named defendants were Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc.,
Macondray Farms, Inc. and the Commissioner of Land Registration. Subsequently,
however, Carpo withdrew his complaint as against the last named defendant, and
the answer filed on behalf of said government official was ordered stricken off the
record. The complaint alleged that TCT No. 20408 as well as OCT No. 1609 from
which it was derived, is a nullity as the CFI of Rizal, Branch VI, then presided over by
Judge Andres Reyes (hereafter referred to as the Reyes Court) which issued the
order dated May 21, 1958 directing the issuance of a decree of registration, was not
sitting as a land registration court, but as a court of ordinary jurisdiction. It was
further alleged that the original records of LRC Case No. 657, GLRO Record No.
29882 which was the basis for the issuance of said order of May 21, 1958, were lost
and/or destroyed during World War II and were still pending reconstitution; hence,
the Reyes Court had no authority to order the issuance of a certificate of title.
Realty and Macondray alleged in their answer that the Reyes Court was acting as a
court of land registration and in issuing the order of May 21, 1958, was actually
performing a purely ministerial duty for the registration court in Case No. 657, GLRO
Record No. 29882 (and the two other cases, Cases Nos. 758 and 976, with which
said case had been jointly tried and decided) which on August 19, 1935 had
rendered a decision adjudicating the two (2) lots in question to Estanislao Mayuga
(father of Dominador Mayuga, predecessor-in-interest of Realty and Macondray),

which decision was upheld by the Court of Appeals. It was alleged that it is the title
of Carpo which is null and void, having been issued over a parcel of land previously
registered under the Torrens System in favor of another.
With leave of court, Realty and Macondray filed a third-party complaint against the
Quezon City Development and Financing Corporation (hereafter referred to as
QCDFC) and the Commissioner of Land Registration alleging that TCTs Nos. 333982
and 333985 in the name of QCDFC also covered the same parcels of land subject of
the dispute between Carpo and the two corporations, Realty and Macondray. They
thus prayed that Decree No. N-135938 issued on July 22, 1971, OCT No. 8931 issued
on July 27, 1971, as well as TCTs Nos. 333982 and 333985 derived from OCT No.
8931 be declared null and void.
In its answer to the third-party complaint, QCDFC asserted the validity of its own
title alleging that it is the title in the name of Realty which is null and void. QCDFC
also filed a fourth-party complaint against Carmelino Alvendia, Esperanza Alvendia,
Felicisimo Alvendia, Josefina Alvendia, Jacinto G. Miranda, Rosa G. Miranda, Isabel G.
Miranda, and Feliciano G. Miranda, alleging that it bought said parcels of land from
them. It prayed that in the event of an unfavorable judgment against it, fourth-party
defendants be ordered to reimburse the purchase price which the corporation paid
to them. However, QCDFC failed to prosecute its case, and the fourth-party
complaint was dismissed for lack of interest.
After hearing, the Vera Court rendered judgment on January 20, 1981, sustaining
the title of Morris G. Carpo to the two (2) lots in question and declaring the titles of
Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. and QCDFC null and void.
On March 20, 1981, Realty filed a Petition for certiorari with this Court docketed as
G.R. No. L-56471 questioning the decision of the lower court. It also asked that it be
allowed to appear directly to this Court as it was raising only questions of law. After
respondents filed their comments to said petition, this Court passed a resolution
dated October 19, 1981 referring the case to the Court of Appeals "in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction for proper determination on the merits of the appeal."
In its decision dated December 29, 1982, the Court of Appeals, through its Ninth
Division, with Justice Patajo asponente, concurred in by Justices Gopengco and
Kapunan, set aside the decision of the trial court and rendered a new one upholding
the validity of the title in the name of Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. and declaring null
and void the titles in the name of Carpo and QCDFC.
Carpo filed a motion for reconsideration with the appellate court. In the meantime,
by virtue and pursuant to Batas Pambansa Bldg. 129, or the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980, the Court of Appeals was reorganized into the Intermediate Appellate
Court (IAC). As a consequence, there was a re-raffling of cases and the case was
assigned to the Second Special Cases Division which, however, returned the records
of the case for another re-raffling to the Civil Cases Divisions as it deemed itself
without authority to act on a civil case in view of the allocation of cases to the
different divisions of the IAC under Section 8 of BP 129. The case was then assigned
to the Third Civil Cases Division, composed of Justices de la Fuente, Coquia, Zosa
and Bartolome.
Justices Coquia and Bartolome inhibited themselves, and Justices Camilon and Bidin
were assigned to the Third Civil Cases Division.
On May 2, 1984, the IAC, through its Special Third Civil Cases Division, with Justice
Zosa as ponente; concurred in by Justices Camilon and Bidin, promulgated its
Resolution granting Carpo's motion for reconsideration, reversing and setting aside

the decision of December 29, 1982, and affirming the decision of the trial court.
Hence, this petition docketed as G.R. No. 67451.
Petitioners assign the following errors:
I
The SPECIAL THIRD CIVIL CASES DIVISION of the Intermediate Appellate Court (for
brevity, referred to herein as SPECIAL DIVISION) which promulgated the disputed
RESOLUTION of May 2, 1984 had no legal standing under the provisions of Batas
Pambansa Bldg. 129 and, as such, not vested with jurisdiction and adjudicatory
power to pronounce any decision of final resolution for the Court.
II
On the assumption that the SPECIAL DIVISION is legally vested with jurisdiction and
adjudicatory powers under the provisions of BP 129, it decided questions of
substance contrary to law and the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court
because:
(a) The SPECIAL DIVISION'S Resolution of May 2, 1984 amounted to a denial to the
Petitioners of their right to appeal and judicial review over fundamental issues of
law duly raised by them in their Petition for Review on certiorari (G.R. No. 56471), as
authorized by the Constitution (Art. X, sec. 5 (2) (e), the provisions of the Judiciary
Act of 1948 and Rule 42, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court; and
(b) By its RESOLUTION of May 2, 1984, it ruled that the decision of the Court of
Appeals could not have gained the nature of a proper and valid judgment as the
latter had no power to pass upon the appealed judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (the Vera Court), as appeal and not certiorari was the proper
remedy;
Furthermore, the said SPECIAL DIVISION grossly departed from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings by giving a perverted and obviously unjustified
and illogical interpretation of the RESOLUTION of July 25, 1983, of the Ninth Division
of the Court of Appeals, holding and declaring that "it has in effect erased or
cancelled the validity of (the DECISION of December 29, 1982), when the said
RESOLUTION merely "RESOLVED to return the records of the case ... for re-raffling
and reassignment ... in view of the allocation of cases to the different Divisions of
the Intermediate Appellate Court under Section 8 of BP 129.
III
The SPECIAL DIVISION by confirming the appealed judgment of the lower court in
effect sanctioned the contemptible disregard of law and jurisprudence committed
by Judge Vera, which call for an exercise of the power of supervision;
IV
The SPECIAL DIVISION did state in its RESOLUTION of May 2, 1984 a deliberate
falsehood, namely, that Morris G. Carpo is a purchaser in good faith and for value
when there is absolutely no evidence, whether written or testimonial, that was
presented by Carpo, or by anyone else that he was, in fact, a purchaser for value
and in good faith a material matter which was neither alleged nor referred to in
the complaint and in all the pleadings, nor covered by any of the exhibits presented
by all of the parties herein and solely on the bases of which the case at bar was
submitted by the parties for consideration and decision.
1. To support their contention that the Special Third Civil Cases Division of the
Intermediate Appellate Court which promulgated the Resolution of May 2, 1984 had
no legal standing under the provisions of BP 129 and, as such, not vested with
jurisdiction and adjudicatory power, petitioners cite Sections 4 and 8 of BP 129, to
wit:

Sec. 4. Exercise of powers and functions.The Intermediate Appellate Court shall

exercise its powers, functions and duties, through ten (10) divisions, each composed
of five members. The Court may sit en banc only for the purpose of exercise
administrative, ceremonial or other non-adjudicatory functions.
Sec. 8. Grouping of Divisions.Of the ten (10) divisions, of the Court, four (4)
divisions, to be known as Civil case Divisions, shall take cognizance of appeals in
civil cases originating from the Regional Trial Court; two (2) divisions, to be known
as Criminal Cases Divisions, of appeals in cases originating from the Regional Trial
Courts; and four (4) divisions, to be known as Special Cases Divisions, of original
actions or petitions, petitions for review, and appeals in all other cases, including
those from administrative agencies, except as provided in Section 9 hereof.
Except with respect to the Presiding Appellate Justice, the appointment of a member
of the court should specifically indicate whether it is for the Civil Cases Divisions,
the Criminal Cases Divisions, or the Special Cases Divisions of the Court. No
member of the Court appointed to any of the three classes of conclusions shall be
assigned to any of the other classes of division except when authorized by the
Supreme Court, upon recommendation of the Intermediate Appellate Court en
banc, if the exigencies of the service so require. . . . (emphasis supplied)
As officially constituted, the Third Civil Cases Division was composed of Justice B.S.
de la Fuente, as Chairman, Justices Jorge Coquia, Mariano Zosa, and Flores
Bartolome, as Members. In view, however, of the voluntary inhibition of Justices
Coquia and Bartolome from taking part in the case, Justices Bidin and Camilon were
reassigned to the Third Civil Cases Division to form the Special Third Civil Cases
Division.
Petitioners argue that the so-called Special Third Civil Cases Division, not being one
of the ten (10) Divisions of the Court duly vested with jurisdiction, had no
adjudicatory powers. It is also alleged that the reassignment of Justices Bidin and
Camilon is violative of the injunction against appointment of an appellate Justice to
a class of divisions other than that to which he is appointed. (Petition, pp. 21-26.)
This contention has no merit. A reading of the law will readily show that what BP
129 prohibits is appointment from one class of divisions to another class. For
instance, a Justice appointed to the Criminal Cases Divisions cannot be assigned to
the Civil Cases Divisions.
Justice Bidin was reassigned from the Fourth Civil Cases Division, while Justice
Camilon was reassigned from the Second Civil Cases Division. The two therefore
come from the same class of divisions to which they were appointed.
Thus, the reassignment of Justices Bidin and Camilon to form the Special Third Civil
Cases Division in view of the voluntary inhibition of two (2) "regular" members, is
still within legal bounds. Otherwise, a situation would have arisen where a regular
division could not decide a particular case because some members thereof inhibited
themselves from participating in said case.
2. The second assigned error involves a determination of the correctness of the
ruling of the IAC that the CA Decision of December 29, 1982 could not have gained
the nature of a proper and valid judgment (since appeal and not certiorari was the
proper remedy) and that the Resolution of July 25, 1983 had in effect erased or
cancelled the validity of said Decision.
The IAC said in its Resolution of May 2,1984:
Said resolution of July 25, 1983, to Our view, was effectively an acknowledgment by
the Division that promulgated it that the earlier Decision dated December 29, 1983
rendered in a Special Civil Action case for certiorari, CA-G.R. No. SP-13530, was not

appropriate and beyond the authority of the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals
to promulgate. The said Resolution was actually a statement that the Ninth Division
of the Court of Appeals had over-stepped its bounds by reviewing in certiorari
proceedings a decision in a purely civil case that should have passed through the
processes of an ordinary appeal. We are not aware of any legal doctrine that
permits an appellate court to treat a petition for review on certiorari upon purely
questions of law, such as that filed by petitioners herein, as an ordinary appeal.
Neither can we find any legal basis or justification for the election by the appellate
court of the essential requisites then prescribed for the validity of an appeal, such
as the submission of a formal notice of appeal, an appeal bond and approved record
on appeal. Without any of these mandatory requisites, the appeal could not have
been deemed perfected and ought to have been dismissed outright.
The Court does not agree.
There are two modes by which cases decided by the then Courts of First Instance in
their original jurisdiction may be reviewed: (1) an ordinary appeal either to the
Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals, or (2) an appeal on certiorari to the
Supreme Court. To the latter category belong cases in which only errors or questions
of law are involved. Each of these modes have different procedural requirements.
As stated earlier, Realty originally filed a Petition for certiorari with this Court
docketed as G.R. No. L-56471 questioning the decision of the Vera Court, and asking
that it be allowed to appeal directly to this Court as it was raising only questions of
law. However, this Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals "in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction for proper determination on the merits of the appeal."
It may thus be observed that even this Court treated the petition first filed as an
appeal, and not as a special civil action for certiorari. After as, a petition for review
by certiorari is also a form of appeal. (People v. Resuello L-30165, August 22, 1969,
69 SCRA 35).
This mode of appeal under Rule 42 is in the form and procedure outlined in Rule 45
which, unlike ordinary appeals, does not require a notice of appeal, an appeal bond
and a record on appeal.
Thus it was error for the IAC to hold that the Decision of the Vera Court "cannot be
passed upon anymore in the Court of Appeals decision because appeal and not
certiorari was the proper remedy." Precisely, petitioners brought the case to this
Court on appeal, albeit by way of certiorari.
Respondent Carpo cited authorities holding that certiorari is not a substitute for
appeal. Those cases are not in point. They refer to the special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65, and not to appeal by way of certiorari under Rule 45.
Similarly, the IAC Special Civil Cases Division erred in interpreting the Resolution
dated July 25, 1983 of the SecondSpecial Cases Division (to which the case was
assigned after the reorganization under BP 129) as having "erased or cancellation"
the validity of the Decision of the Ninth Division. A perusal of said Resolution shows
that it merely made clarification about the nature of the case and why it should be
reassigned to the Civil Cases Division of the IAC. There was not the slightest
implication that it "erased or cancelled" the validity of the Decision of the Ninth
Division.
Even the IAC Special Third Civil Cases Division impliedly admitted the validity of the
Decision of the Ninth Division when it granted Carpo's motion for reconsideration. It
would have been incongruous to grant a motion to reconsider a decision, reverse
and set it aside, if in the first place it did not have any validity. It would have been
necessary only to decide its invalidity.

3. In the third assigned error, Petitioners contend that the Vera Court, and the IAC
Special Third Civil Cases Division, erred in upholding the validity of the title in the
name of Carpo and declaring null and void the titles in the names of Realty and of
QCDFC.
The basis of the complaint fired by Carpo, which was the same basis for the of the
Vera Court and the IAC Special Division, is that the Reyes Court had no authority to
issue the order of May 21, 1958 directing the issuance of a decree of registration in
favor of Mayuga, predecessor-in-interest of Realty, as it was not sitting as a land
registration court and also because the original records of LRC Case No. 657, Record
No. N-29882 were lost and/or destroyed during World War II and were still pending
reconstitution.
Under Act No. 496, Land Registration Act, (1902) as amended by Act No. 2347
(1914), jurisdiction over all applications for registration of title to and was conferred
upon the Courts of First Instance of the respective provinces in which the land
sought to be registered is situated.
Jurisdiction over land registration cases, as in ordinary actions, is acquired upon the
filing in court of the application for registration, and is retained up to the end of the
litigation. The issuance of a decree of registration is but a step in the entire land
registration process; and as such, does not constitute a separate proceeding.
In the case at bar, it appears that it was Estanislao Mayuga, father of Dominador
Mayuga, predecessor-in-interest of Realty, who originally filed on June 24, 1927 a
registration proceeding docketed as LRC Case No. 657, GLRO Record No. N-29882 in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal to confirm his title over parcels of land described
as Lots 1, 2 and 3, Plan Psu-47035. (Lots 2 and 3 the subject of the instant litigation
among Carpo, RRealty and QCDFC.) Case No. 657 was jointly tried with two other
cases, LRC Case No. 976, GLRO Record No. 43516 filed by Eduardo Guico and LRC
Case No. 758, GLRO Record No. 33721 filed by Florentino Baltazar, as the three
cases involved Identical parcels of land, and Identical applicants/oppositors.
On August 19, 1935 the CFI-Rizal acting as a land registration court issued a
consolidated decision on the three cases, the dispositive portion of which reads:
En meritos de to do lo expuesto, se ordena el registro de los lotes, 1, 2 y 3 del plans
PSU-47035 a nombre de Estanislao Mayuga, desist oposicion de Florentino Baltazar
y Eduardo Guico con respects a dichos lotes....
On appeal, the above decision of the CFI was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its
decision dated November 17, 1939. the dispositive portion of which reads:
Por todas last consideraciones expuestas confirmamos la decision apelada en
cuanto adjudica a Estanislao Mayuga los lotes, 1, 2 y 3 de such piano y que
equivalent a lost lotes, 4, 5 y 6 del plano de Baltazar y 4 y 5 del plans de Guico.
xxx xxx xxx
Guico filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court, but the petition was
dismissed and the Court of Appeals decision was affirmed (See Guico v. San
Pedro, 72 Phil. 415 [1941]).
Before he could secure a decree of registration in his name, Estanislao died.
On May 13, 1958 Dominador Mayuga, son of Estanislao, filed a petition with the
Reyes Court docketed as Case No. 2689 alleging that he was the only heir of the
deceased Estanislao Mayuga and praying for the issuance of a decree of registration
over the property adjudicated in favor of Estanislao. At this point, it cannot be
overemphasized that the petition filed by Dominador is NOT a distinct and separate
proceeding from, but a continuation of, the original land registration proceedings
initiated by Estanislao Mayuga, Florentino Baltazar and Eduardo Guico. In the same

vein, the Reyes Court, as Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, was
continuing in the exercise of jurisdiction over the case, which jurisdiction was vested
in the CFI-Rizal upon filing of the original applications.
On May 21, 1958 the Reyes Court issued an order granting the petition of
Dominador Mayuga and directing the Commissioner of Land Registration to issue a
decree of registration over Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Plan Psu-47035, substituting therein as
registered owner Dominador Mayuga in liue of Estanislao.
Respondent Carpo, however, contends, that since the records of LRC Case No. 657
were not properly reconstituted, then there was no pending land registration case.
And since the Reyes Court was acting without a pending case, it was acting without
jurisdiction. (Respondent Carpo's Memorandum, pp, 2-8.)
He cites the case of Villegas v. Fernando (L-27347, April 29, 1969, 27 SCRA 1119)
where this Court said that upon failure to reconstitute pursuant to law, "the parties
are deemed to have waived the effects of the decision rendered in their favor and
their only alternative is to file an action anew for the registration in their names of
the lots in question," citing the case of Ambat v. Director of Lands, (92) Phil. 567
[1953]) and other cases. The basis of said ruling is Section 29 of Act No. 3110, an
Act to provide an adequate procedure for the reconstitution of the records of
pending judicial proceedings and books, documents, and files of the office of the
register of deeds, destroyed by fire or other public calamities, and for other
purposes.
However, the Ambat case, in so far as it ruled on the effect of failure to reconstitute
records on the status of the case in its entirety, was modified in the case of Nacua
v. de Beltran, (93) Phil. 595 [1953]). where this Court said:
(W)e are inclined to modify the ruling (in the Ambat case) in the sense that Section
29 of Act No. 3110 should be applied only where the records in the Court of First
Instance as well as in the appellate court were destroyed or lost and were not
reconstituted, but not where the records of the Court of First Instance are intact and
complete, and only the records in the appellate court were lost or destroyed, and
were not reconstituted. One reason for this view is that section 29 of Act 3110 is
found among the sections and provisions dealing with the reconstitution of records
in the Court of First Instance in pending civil cases, special proceedings, cadastral
cases and criminal cases. A study of Act (No.) 3110 ... who show that there are
separate procedures for the reconstitution of records in the Justice of the Peace
Courts, from Sec. 48 to Sec. 53; for the reconstitution of records in the Supreme
Court, now including the Court of Appeals, from Sec. 54 to Sec. 74; for the
reconstitution of records in the office of the Register of Deeds, from Sec. 75 to Sec.
90 and for the reconstitution of destroyed records in the Courts of First Instance,
from Sec. 1 to Sec. 47, under which sections, Sec. 29 is obviously comprehended.
The whole theory of reconstitution is to reproduce or replace records lost or
destroyed so that said records may be complete and court proceedings may
continue from the point or stage where said proceedings stopped due to the loss of
the records. The law contemplates different stages for purposes of reconstitution. . .
.
. . . (S)ection 4 covers the stage were a civil case was pending trial in the Court of
First Instance at the time the record was destroyed or lost; section 6 evidently refers
to the stage where the case had been tried and decided but was still pending in the
Court of First Instance at the time the record was destroyed or lost; section 6 covers
the stage where the case was pending in the Supreme Court (or Court of Appeals) at
the time the record was destroyed or lost. *

If the records up to a certain point or stage are lost and they are not reconstituted,
the parties and the court should go back to the next preceding age where records
are available, but not beyond that; otherwise to ignore and go beyond the stage
next preceding would be voiding and unnecessarily ignoring proceedings which are
duly recorded and documented, to the great prejudice not only of the parties and
their witnesses, but also of the court which must again perforce admit pleadings,
rule upon them and then try the case and decide it anew,-all of these, when the
records up to said point or stage are intact and complete, and uncontroverted.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . (T)o require the parties to file their action anew and incur the expenses and
(suffer) the annoyance and vexation incident to the filing of pleadings and the
conduct of hearings, aside from the possibility that some of the witnesses may have
died or left the jurisdiction, and also to require the court to again rule on the
pleadings and hear the witnesses and then decide the case, when an along and all
the time the record of the former pleadings of the trial and evidence and decision
are there and are not disputed, all this would appear to be not exactly logical or
reasonable, or fair and just to the parties, including the trial court which has not
committed any negligence or fault at all.
The ruling in Nacua is more in keeping with the spirit and intention of the
reconstitution law. As stated therein, "Act 3110 was not promulgated to penalize
people for failure to observe or invoke its provisions. It contains no penal sanction. It
was enacted rather to aid and benefit litigants, so that when court records are
destroyed at any stage of judicial proceedings, instead of instituting a new case and
starting all over again, they may reconstitute the records lost and continue the
case. If they fail to ask for reconstitution, the worst that can happen to them is that
they lose the advantages provided by the reconstitution law" (e.g. having the case
at the stage when the records were destroyed).
Applying the doctrine in the Nacua decision to LRC Case No. 657, the parties thereto
did not have to commence a new action but only had to go back to the preceding
stage where records are available. The land registration case itself re. mained
pending and the Court of First Instance of Rizal continued to have jurisdiction over
it.
The records were destroyed at that stage of the case when an that remained to be
done was the ministerial duty of the Land Registration Office to issue a decree of
registration (which would be the basis for the issuance of an Original Certificate of
Title) to implement a judgment which had become final (See Government v. Abural,
39 Phil. 996 [1919] at 1002; Sta. Ana v. Menla, 111 Phil. 947 [1961], 1 SCRA 1294;
Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. De Banuvar, 134 Phil. 257 [1968], 26 SCRA 316). There
are however authentic copies of the decisions of the CFI and the Court of Appeals
adjudicating Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Plan Psu-47035 to Estanislao Mayuga. Moreover,
there is an official report of the decision of this Court affirming both the CFI and the
CA decisions. A final order of adjudication forms the basis for the issuance of a
decree of registration.
Considering that the Reyes court was actually in the exercise of its jurisdiction as a
land registration court when it issued the order directing the issuance of a decree of
registration, "substituting therein as registered owner Dominador Mayuga, in hue of
the original adjudicates, Estanislao Mayuga, based on the affidavit of selfadjudication, subject to the provisions of Sec. 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court,"
which order is in consonance with the ruling of this Court in the Guico decision, and
the decisions of the CFI-Rizal and the CA dated August 19, 1935 and November 17,

1939, respectively, We uphold the validity of said order and rule that Judge Vera was
without jurisdiction to set it aside.
4. In upholding the title of Carpo as against those of Realty and QCDFC, the Special
Division also relied on Carpo's being an innocent purchaser for value.
Whether or not Carpo is an innocent purchaser for value was never raised as an
issue in the trial court. A perusal of the records of the case reveals that no factual
basis exists to support such a conclusion. Even Carpo himself cites no factual proof
of his being an innocent purchaser for value. He merely relies on the presumption of
good faith under Article 527 of the Civil Code.
It is settled that one is considered an innocent purchaser for value only if, relying on
the certificate of title, he bought the property from the registered owner, "without
notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays
a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has
notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property." (Cui v.
Henson, 51 Phil. 606 [1928], Fule v. De Legare, 117 Phil. 367 [1963], 7 SCRA 351.)
He is not required to explore farther than what the Torrens title upon its face
indicates. (Fule v. De Legare supra.)
Carpo bought the disputed property from the Baltazars, the original registered
owners, by virtue of a deed executed before Iluminada Figueroa, Notary Public of
Manila dated October 9, 1970. However, it was only later, on October 13, 1970, that
the decree of registration in favor of the Baltazars was transcribed in the
Registration Book for the Province of Rizal and that an Original Certificate of Title
was issued. It was on the same day, October 13, 1970, that the deed evidencing the
sale between the Baltazars and Carpo was inscribed in the Registry of Property, and
the Original Certificate of Title was cancelled as Transfer Certificate of Title No.
303961 in the name of Carpo was issued. (Exhibit 12, Rollo pp. 270-273.)
Thus, at the time of sale there was as yet no Torrens title which Carpo could have
relied upon so that he may qualify as an innocent purchaser for value. Not being a
purchaser for value and in good faith, he is in no better position than his
predecessors-in-interest.
The Baltazars, predecessors-in-interest of Carpo are heirs of Florentino Baltazar, an
oppositor in the original application filed by Estanislao Mayuga in 1927. As stated
earlier, the CFI-Rizal confirmed the title of Estanislao to Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Plan Psu47035 "desestimando oposicion de Florentino Baltazar . . . con respeto a dichos
lotes . . ." As such successors of Florentino, they could not pretend ignorance of the
land registration proceedings over the disputed parcels of land earlier initiated by
Eduardo Guico, Florentino Baltazar and Estanislao Mayuga, as when as the decisions
rendered therein.
Moreover, it is not disputed that the title in the name of Dominador Mayuga, from
whom Realty derived its title, was issued in 1958, or twelve years before the
issuance of the title in the name of the Baltazars in 1970.
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that "(t)he general rule is that in the case of two
certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails .
. . . In successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect
of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior
certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold
under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or
indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in
respect thereof . . . ." (Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 [1915] at 595596; Garcia V. CA, Nos. L-48971 and 49011, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 380.)

TCT No. 20408 derived from OCT 1609, is therefore superior to TCT No. 303961
derived from OCT 8629.
5. For its part, respondent Quezon City Development and Financing Corporation
(QCDFC) alleges that it has been improperly impleaded as thirty-party defendant
inasmuch as Realty's alleged cause of action against it is neither for contribution,
indemnity, subrogation or any other relief in respect of Carpo's claim against Realty.
It likewise alleges that Realty had no cause of action against it since the third party
complaint did not allege that QCDFC violated any legal right of Realty, QCDFC also
assails the Vera Court decision in that it declares QCDFC directly liable to Carpo and
not to Realty.
In the first place, QCDFC did not appeal from the decision of the Vera Court, nor
from the decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 29, 1982, nor from the
resolution of the IAC Special Third Civil Cases Division dated May 2, 1984 all of
which voided QCDFCs title to the disputed property. Hence, said decisions/resolution
have become final and executory as regards QCDFC.
Moreover, even as this Court agrees with QCDFC that the third-party complaint filed
against it by Realty was procedurally defective in that the relief being sought by the
latter from the former is not in respect of Carpo's claim, policy considerations and
the factual circumstances of the case compel this Court now to rule as well on
QCDFC's claim to the disputed property. ** To rule on QCDFC's claim now is to avoid
multiplicity of suits and to put to rest these conflicting claims over the property.
After an, QCDFC was afforded fun opportunity, and exercised its right, to prove its
claim over the land. It presented documentary as well as testimonial evidence. It
was even permitted to file a fourth-party complaint which, however, was dismissed
since it failed to prosecute its case.
QCDFC derived its title from Carmelino Alvendia et. al., the original registered
owners. Original Certificate of Title No. 8931 in the name of Spouses Carmelino
Alvendia, et. al. was issued on July 27, 1971, or thirteen (13) years after the
issuance of Mayuga's title in 1958.
Since Realty is claiming under TCT No. 1609 which was issued earlier than OCT No.
8931 from which QCDFC's title was derived, Realty's title must prevail over that of
QCDFC.
6. During the pendency of this case, Petitioners filed a manifestation alleging that
the case at bar is closely connected with G.R. No. L-469953, Jose N. Mayuga et.
al. v. The Court of Appeals, Macondray Farms, Inc., Realty Sales Enterprise, inc., et.
al. and moved for consolidation of the two cases involving as they do the same
property. By Resolution of August 29, 1984, this Court denied the motion for
consolidation.
In this connection, it must be emphasized that the action filed by Carpo against
Realty is in the nature of an action to remove clouds from title to real property. By
asserting its own title to the property in question and asking that Carpo's title be
declared null and void instead, and by filing the third-party complaint against
QCDFC, Realty was similarly asking the court to remove clouds from its own title.
Actions of such nature are governed by Articles 476 to 481, Quieting of Title, Civil
Code (Republic Act No. 386), and Rule 64, Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies,
Rules of Court.
Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor are they, strictly speaking, in
personam, but being against the person in respect of the res, these proceedings are
characterized as quasi in rem. (McDaniel v. McElvy, 108 So. 820 [1926].) The

judgment in such proceedings is conclusive only between the parties. (Sandejas v.

Robles, 81 Phil. 421 [1948]).
The ruling in this case is therefore without any prejudice to this Court's final
determination of G.R. No. L-46953.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of May 2,1984 of the Intermediate Appellate Court and
the Decision of January 20, 1981 of the CFI-Rizal Branch XXIII, are SET ASIDE and
the Decision of December 29, 1982 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18884
May 29, 1963
J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., represented by its Managing Partner,
the Gregorio Araneta, Inc., plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANNY VIBAT, defendant-appellant.
Araneta and Araneta for plaintiff-appellee.
Manuel B. Ruiz for defendant-appellant.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from an order denying a petition for relief from judgment.
On January 7, 1959, a plenary action (publiciana) for ejectment and collection of
rentals was filed by plaintiff J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal against appellant Vibat on the basis of plaintiff's registered title to a parcel of
land known as the Santa Mesa Heights Subdivision situated at Quezon City covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1267 (37686-Rizal).
The complaint avers that on or about June, 1950 the defendant, without and against
plaintiff's consent, through force, strategy, and stealth, unlawfully entered into the
possession of a portion of 500 square meters, more or less, within said parcel of
land of the plaintiff situated at Bo. North Tatalon, Quezon City, and constructed his
house thereon; and that as a consequence of the acts of usurpation committed by
the defendant the plaintiff suffered damages at the rate of P150 monthly
representing the fair rental value of its premises, and prayed that defendant be
adjudged to be without any valid right of possession and title in plaintiff's premises;
that defendant and all persons claiming under him be ordered to vacate the same
and remove his house and other construction thereon, and to pay P150 a month
from the date of usurpation until restoration of possession, with costs.
Summons appears served on April 13, 1959 upon the defendant, through one
Candido Calon.
The Court of First Instance of Rizal, on May 16, 1959, declared defendant in default
for failure to file any responsive pleading within the reglementary period, and as a
consequence, plaintiff was allowed to present his evidence in support of the
complaint. Thereafter, upon presentation of plaintiff's evidence, finding the
allegations of the complaint sufficiently established, the court rendered judgment,
on June 3, 1959, in favor of plaintiff.
On June 23, 1959, defendant (now appellant) filed a petition for relief from this
judgment of the trial court, alleging that his failure to file a responsive pleading was
due to no fault, or negligence of his; that Candido Calon, the person who, according
to the Sheriff's return, received the copy of the summons and a copy of the
complaint, was not, and never has been, residing at 39 B.M.A, Avenue, Tatalon,

Quezon City, herein defendant's residence; that Calon was only a visitor who
happened to be in the yard of his residence when the Deputy Sheriff persuaded him
to receive said summons; that defendant Danny Vibat and his family were in
Calamba, Laguna, on April 13, 1959 when said summons was received by Candido
Calon, and that it was only several days after their arrival on May 10, 1959 that
Calon delivered to him the copy of the summons with a copy of the complaint; that
it was only on June 5, 1959 that he learned that he was declared in default; and that
he has good and valid defenses to the plaintiff's complaint if given a chance to be
heard. Sworn affidavits of the defendant and Calon were attached to this petition,
which prayed that the order of default be set aside, and that defendant be allowed
to file a responsive pleading to the complaint.
Plaintiff, opposing this pleading, alleged that defendant's petition is not sufficient in
form to justify the issuance of an order requiring to answer because he relied only
upon an alleged purchase of the property in question from one E. Alquiros as his
defense, whereas plaintiff is indubitably the registered owner of the property in
question by virtue of a Torrens title issued in its name; that even assuming the truth
of defendant's allegations that he purchased the property in question from E.
Alquiros, such fact could not offset plaintiff's right to recover possession of the
property as it is the registered and indefeasible owner thereof, and that the
affidavits executed by defendant and Calon are purely self-serving, and should not
be countenanced by this Court; And prayed for the summary dismissal of the
petition.
On the date requested by defendant-petitioner for hearing, the court dictated an
order in open court denying the petition, "for the same has failed to comply with
mandatory requirements laid down by the provisions of Rule 38 of the Rules of
Court." Thereafter, the defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified
the case to this Court on the ground that only questions of law are involved.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1wph1.t
We find no error in the denial of the petition for relief, because the record shows
that appellant did not act with due diligence, and that he has no meritorious
defense.
Even granting that Candido Calon was not qualified to accept service of summons,
the fact is admitted by him and by the appellant (in their affidavits in support of the
motion for relief) that Calon did turn over the summons to this appellant only
"several days" after May 10, 1959. Had appellant Vibat acted with due diligence,
and made prompt inquiries, he would have discovered that he had been declared in
default on May 16, 1959, and could have asked for its lifting well before the
rendition of the judgment on the merits on June 3, 1959.
As to the alleged defense that appellant Vibat had bought the land occupied by him
from Eustaquio Alquiros. who, in turn, purchased it from Juliana (Juana) de la Cruz,
the same plainly can not hold against the Torrens title admittedly issued in favor of
plaintiff J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., since the Torrens title concludes all controversy over
ownership of the land covered by the final decree of registration, nor can title by
adverse possession be acquired against the registered owner (Act 496, section 46).
Appellant's remedy, if any, would only lie against his immediate vendor, on the
latter's warranty against eviction.

WHEREFORE, the denial of the petition for relief is hereby affirmed, with costs
against appellant Danny Vibat.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-40399 February 6, 1990
MARCELINO C. AGNE, FELIX ORIANE, AGATON TAGANAS, HILARIO
ESCORPIZO, ISABELO MAURICIO, HEIRS OF ROMAN DAMASO, NAMELY:
JORGE DAMASO and ALEJANDRO DAMASO, HEIRS OF FRANCISCO RAMOS,
NAMELY: ENCARNACION R. LEANO and DOMINGA R. MEDRANO, HEIRS OF
SABINA GELACIO AGAPITO, NAMELY: SERAPIO AGAPITO, and NICOLASA
AGAPITO, FELISA DICCION AGNE, ESTANISLAO GOROSPE, LIBRADO BADUA,
NICOLAS VILLANUEVA, HEIRS OF CARLOS PALADO, NAMELY: FORTUNATA
PALADO and ISABELITA PALADO, PRIMITIVO TAGANAS, PANFILO SOINGCO,
BERNARDO PALATTAO, MARCELINO S. SANTOS and PAULINO D. AGNE JR.
(Minor), represented by his mother FELISA DICCION AGNE, petitioners,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, PRESENTACION AGPOON GASCON, JOAQUIN
GASCON and HON. ROSALIO C. SEGUNDO, Presiding Judge, Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V, respondents.
G.R. No. L-72255 February 6,1990
MARCELINO C. AGNE, FELIX ORIANE, AGATON TAGANAS (deceased),
represented by FLORENTINO C. TAGANAS, FELISA DICCION AGNE, HILARIO
ESCORPIZO, NICOLAS VILLANUEVA, ISABELO MAURICIO, ESTANISLAO
GOROSPE (deceased), represented by ELIZABETH G. BADUA and SILVINA G.
VALERIO, LIBRADO BADUA, JOSE ALSISTO, SERAPIO AGAPITO, NICOLASA
AGAPITO, JORGE DAMASO, ALEJANDRO DAMASO, ENCARNACION RAMOS,
DOMINGA RAMOS and CARLOS PALADO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, PRESENTACION AGPOON GASCON
and JOAQUIN GASCON,respondents.
Espiritu Taganas for petitioners.
Adriatico T. Bruno for private respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Before us are two separate petitions for review on certiorari of the order of the
defunct Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V, in Civil Case No. 2649,
entitled "Marcelino Agne et al. vs. The Director of Lands, et al.," dismissing the
complaint filed by herein petitioners in said case; 1 and the decision of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. CV No. 60388-R, entitled "Presentacion
Agpoon Gascon vs. Marcelino C. Agne et al.," promulgated on January 30, 1985,
affirming in toto the decision of the trial court in favor of herein private
respondents 2 which cases are docketed herein as G.R. No. L-40399 and G.R. No.
72255, respectively.
These two petitions, arising from the same facts and involving the same parties and
common questions of law, were ordered consolidated in our resolution of August 9,
1989.

As found by respondent court and disclosed by the records, the land subject matter
of this case was originally covered by Free Patent No. 23263 issued on April 17,
1937 in the name of Herminigildo Agpoon. On May 21, 1937, pursuant to the said
patent, the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan issued to said Herminigildo Agpoon
Original Certificate of Title No. 2370. 3 Presentacion Agpoon Gascon inherited the
said parcel of land upon the death of her father, Herminigildo, and was issued
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 32209 on April 6,1960. Respondent Presentacion
declared the said land for taxation purposes in her name under Tax Declaration No.
11506 and taxes were paid thereon in her name. 4
On April 13, 1971, private respondent spouses filed Civil Case No. U-2286 in the
then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for recovery of possession and damages
against petitioners. Their complaint states that they are the registered owners
under the aforesaid Transfer Certificate of Title No. 32209 of the parcel of land
situated in Barrio Bantog, Asingan, Pangasinan which is now in the possession of
petitioners; that during the Japanese occupation, petitioners, taking advantage of
the abnormal conditions then obtaining, took possession of said land by means of
fraud, stealth, strategy and intimidation; that private respondents repeatedly
demanded the surrender of the physical possession of said property but the latter
refused. 5
Petitioners, in answer to said complaint, alleged that the land in question was
formerly a part of the river bed of the Agno-Chico River; that in the year 1920, a big
flood occurred which caused the said river to change its course and abandon its
original bed; that by virtue of the provisions of Article 370 of the Spanish Civil Code
which was then the law in force, petitioners, by operation of law, became the
owners by accession or accretion of the respective aliquot parts of said river bed
bordering their properties; that since 1920, they and their predecessors in interest
occupied and exercised dominion openly and adversely over said portion of the
abandoned river bed in question abutting their respective riparian lands
continuously up to the present to the exclusion of all other persons, particularly
Herminigildo Agpoon; that they have introduced improvements thereon by
constructing irrigation canals and planting trees and agricultural crops thereon 6 and
converted the land into a productive area.
In their joint stipulation of facts, the parties agreed as follows:
1. That the parties admit the identity and area of the land in question, which forms
part of the river bed of the Agno-Chico River, and further admit that the said river
bed was abandoned as a result of a flood in 1920 and opened a new bed. The
location and course of the aforesaid abandoned river bed as well as the relative
position of the lands bordering the same can be gleaned from Cadastral Survey Plan
of Asingan, Pangasinan, Street No. 49 thereof, as approved by the Director of Lands
on October 12, 1912, a photostat copy of which is hereto attached and made an
integral part hereof a Annex "A".
2. That the parties admit that the defendants are the riparian owners of the area in
question and further admit that the defendants are in possession thereof but that
each of them is in possession only of an aliquot part of the said area proportionate
to the length of their respective lands. (As amended).
3. That the parties likewise admit that a Free Patent No. 23263 in the name of
Herminigildo Agpoon covering the area in question was issued on April 17, 1937 and
that they admit O.C.T. No. 2370 of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan covering the
same parcel of land was issued to the same Herminigildo Agpoon on May 21, 1937,
a photostat copy of said O.C.T. is hereto attached as Annex "B".

4. That the parties admit that the property in controversy is now covered by T.C.T.
No. 32209 in the name of Presentacion Agpoon Gascon and by Tax Declaration No.
11506 in the name of said Presentacion Agpoon Gascon, a photostat reproduction of
said T.C.T. No. and Tax Declaration are hereto attached and marked as Annexes "C"
and "F", respectively. 7
On March 6, 1974, while the above-mentioned case was still pending, petitioners
filed a complaint against the respondents Director of Lands and spouses Agpoon
with the former Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for annulment of title,
reconveyance of and/or action to clear title to a parcel of land, which action was
docketed as Civil Case No. U-2649. Petitioners alleged in their said complaint that
the land in question, which was formerly a portion of the bed of Agno-Chico river
which was abandoned as a result of the big flood in 1920, belongs to them pursuant
to the provision of Article 370 of the old Civil Code; that it was only on April 13,
1971, when respondent spouses filed a complaint against them, that they found out
that the said land was granted by the Government to Herminigildo Agpoon under
Free Patent No. 23263, pursuant to which Original Certificate of Title No. 2370 was
issued in the latter's name; and that the said patent and subsequent titles issued
pursuant thereto are null and void since the said land, an abandoned river bed, is of
private ownership and, therefore, cannot be the subject of a public land grant. 8
On June 21, 1974, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. U-2286, the
dispositive part of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court renders judgment:
1. Ordering the defendants to surrender to the plaintiffs the physical possession of
the land in question described in paragraph 3 of the amended complaint;
2. Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff the produce of
the land in question in the total sum of P5,000.00 per year from the date of the
filing of the present action at the rate of 6% interest per annum until fully paid;
3. Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally the amount of P800.00
representing attorney's fees;
4. And to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 9
Not satisfied with said decision, petitioners appealed to respondent court. As earlier
stated, on January 30, 1985 the former Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed in
toto in AC-G.R. CV No. 60388-R the said decision of the court a quo, 10 and with the
denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration, 11 the case came up to us as G.R.
No. 72255.
On June 24, 1974, the aforesaid Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, acting on the
motion to dismiss filed by respondents Director of Lands and spouses Agpoon,
issued an order dismissing Civil Case No. U-2649 for annulment of title by
merely citing the statement in the case of Antonio, et al. vs. Barroga, et al. 12 that
an action to annul a free patent many years after it had become final and
indefeasible states no cause of action . 13 Petitioners' motion for the reconsideration
of said order was denied on September 11, 1974, 14 hence the recourse to us in G.R.
No. L-40399.
In these petitions, petitioners raise the following issues:
1. Whether or not the lower court is justified in dismissing the complaint by simply
invoking the ruling in the aforestated case of Antonio although the facts and
circumstances set forth in the complaint show that the land in question was private
land under Article 370 of the old Civil Code and that the subsequent derivative
certificates of title in question were null and void ab initio because the said land was

not within the authority of the government to dispose of in favor of any party and
must be ordered annulled, cancelled or rescinded; 15
2. Whether or not the trial court and the former Intermediate Appellate Court were
justified in not basing their judgments on the judicial admissions of private
respondents in the stipulation of facts of the parties, since such admissions have
the legal force and effect of precluding private respondents from disputing such
admission;
3. Whether or not respondent court can presume that private respondents or their
predecessor had prior possession of the land in dispute in the light of provisions of
law which oblige them to prove such possession, as well as the stipulated facts and
other facts and circumstances on record showing that private respondents or their
predecessor were not in actual occupancy of the said land, and without appreciating
the evidence put up by petitioners to prove their prior possession thereof;
4. Whether or not respondent court was justified in its application of Section 41 of
the Code of Civil Procedure in favor of private respondents, although the private
respondents did not invoke said law in this case and did not adduce any evidence or
proof that all the essential requisites of acquisitive prescription under the said law
were present in their favor;
5. Whether or not the Government had the right to convey by way of free patent to
any party the land in dispute which belonged to the riparian owners as decreed by
Article 370 of the old Civil Code, the law then in force, and despite the fact that the
patentee herein never occupied the said land during the period prescribed by Act
No. 2874; and
6. Whether or not private respondents are guilty of laches for not having attempted
to file suit to recover the land in dispute during an interval of 50 or 30 years. 16
The issues and arguments raised by the proponents in these petitions are well
taken.
We agree with petitioners that the lower court erred in ordering the dismissal of Civil
Case No. U-2649. The aforesaid case of Antonio relied upon by the lower court in its
dismissal order is not controlling. In that case, the complaint was dismissed for
failure to state a cause of action, not only because of the delay in the filing of the
complaint but specifically since the ground relied upon by the plaintiff therein, that
is, that the land was previously covered by a titulo real, even if true, would not
warrant the annulment of the free patent and the subsequent original certificate of
title issued to defendant. Thus:
It is true that by filing the application for a free patent Barroga impliedly admitted
either the invalidity or insufficiency of Titulo Real No. 12479 issued in the name of
his predecessor in interest on July 22, 1894, but neither the allegation made in his
answer that his aforesaid predecessor in interest was the absolute owner of the
property covered by said Titulo Real nor his implied admission of the latter's
invalidity or insufficiency are grounds for the annulment of the free patent and
original certificate of title in question. Evidently, it was Barroga's privilege to rely or
not to rely upon his claim of private ownership in favor of his predecessor in interest
and of whatever the latter's Titulo Real was worth. He decided not to rely upon them
and to consider that the property covered by the Titulo Real was still part of the
public domain. Acting accordingly he applied for a free patent and was successful. It
must be borne in mind that the Titulo Real was not an indefeasible title and that its
holder still had to prove that he had possessed the land covered by it without
interruption during a period of ten years by virtue of a good title and in good faith
(Royal Decree of June 25,1880). We may well presume that Barroga felt that he had

no sufficient evidence to prove this, for which reason he decided to acquire the land
as part of the public domain.
In the case at bar, the facts alleged in the complaint, which are deemed
hypothetically admitted upon the filing of the motion to dismiss, constitute a
sufficient cause of action against private respondents. Petitioners in their complaint
in Civil Case No. U-2649 alleged, among others, that the disputed area was formerly
an abandoned river bed formed due to natural causes in 1920; that the riparian
owners of the lands abutting said abandoned river bed were the plaintiffs and/or
their predecessors in interest; that since then and up to the present, they have been
occupying and cultivating aliquot portions of the said land proportionate to the
respective lengths of their riparian lands; that they are the real and lawful owners of
the said land as decreed by Article 370 of the old Civil Code, the law then in force;
that since the said area was a private land, the same could not have been the
subject matter of an application for free patent; and that all these facts were known
to the private respondents and their predecessor in interest.
If the said averments are true, and the factual recitals thereon have been admitted
in the stipulation of facts hereinbefore quoted, then the land in question was and is
of private ownership and, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of the Director of Lands.
The free patent and subsequent title issued pursuant thereto are null and void. The
indefeasibility and imprescriptibility of a Torrens title issued pursuant to a patent
may be invoked only when the land involved originally formed part of the public
domain. If it was a private land, the patent and certificate of title issued upon the
patent are a nullity. 17
The rule on the incontrovertibility of a certificate of title upon the expiration of one
year, after the entry of the decree, pursuant to the provisions of the Land
Registration Act, does not apply where an action for the cancellation of a patent and
a certificate of title issued pursuant thereto is instituted on the ground that they are
null and void because the Bureau of Lands had no jurisdiction to issue them at all,
the land in question having been withdrawn from the public domain prior to the
subsequent award of the patent and the grant of a certificate of title to another
person. Such an action is different from a review of the decree of title on the ground
of fraud. 18
Although a period of one year has already expired from the time a certificate of title
was issued pursuant to a public grant, said title does not become incontrovertible
but is null and void if the property covered thereby is originally of private
ownership, and an action to annul the same does not prescribe. 19 Moreover, since
herein petitioners are in possession of the land in dispute, an action to quiet title is
imprescriptible. 20 Their action for reconveyance which, in effect, seeks to quiet title
to property in one's possession is imprescriptible. Their undisturbed possession for a
number of years gave them a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to
determine the nature of the adverse claims of a third party and the effect on her
title. 21 As held in Caragay-Layno vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 22 an adverse claimant
of a registered land, undisturbed in his possession thereof for a period of more than
fifty years and not knowing that the land he actually occupied had been registered
in the name of another, is not precluded from filing an action for reconveyance
which, in effect, seeks to quiet title to property as against the registered owner who
was relying upon a Torrens title which could have been fraudulently acquired. To
such adverse claimant, the remedy of an action to quiet title is imprescriptible. In
actions for reconveyance of property predicated on the fact that the conveyance

complained of was void ab initio, a claim of prescription of the action would be

unavailing. 23
The resolution of the other assigned errors hinges on the issue of who, as between
the riparian owner presently in possession and the registered owner by virtue of a
free patent, has a better right over the abandoned river bed in dispute.
We rule in favor of petitioners.
The claim of ownership of herein petitioners is based on the old Civil Code, the law
then in force, which provides:
The beds of rivers which remain abandoned because the course of the water has
naturally changed belong to the owners of the riparian lands throughout their
respective lengths. If the abandoned bed divided estates belonging to different
owners, the new dividing line shall run at equal distance therefrom. 24
It is thus clear under this provision that once the river bed has been abandoned, the
riparian owners become the owners of the abandoned bed to the extent provided by
this article. The acquisition of ownership is automatic. 25There need be no act on the
part of the riparian owners to subject the accession to their ownership, as it is
subject theretoipso jure from the moment the mode of acquisition becomes evident,
without the need of any formal act of acquisition. 26Such abandoned river bed had
fallen to the private ownership of the owner of the riparian land even without any
formal act of his will and any unauthorized occupant thereof will be considered as a
trespasser. The right in re to the principal is likewise a right in re to the accessory,
as it is a mode of acquisition provided by law, as the result of the right of accretion.
Since the accessory follows the nature of the principal, there need not be any
tendency to the thing or manifestation of the purpose to subject it to our ownership,
as it is subject thereto ipso jure from the moment the mode of acquisition becomes
evident. 27
The right of the owner of land to additions thereto by accretion has been said to rest
in the law of nature, and to be analogous to the right of the owner of a tree to its
fruits, and the owner of flocks and herds to their natural increase. 28 Petitioners
herein became owners of aliquot portions of said abandoned river bed as early as
1920, when the Agno River changed its course, without the necessity of any action
or exercise of possession on their part, it being an admitted fact that the land in
dispute, prior to its registration, was an abandoned bed of the Agno River and that
petitioners are the riparian owners of the lands adjoining the said bed.
The failure of herein petitioners to register the accretion in their names and declare
it for purposes of taxation did not divest it of its character as a private property.
Although we take cognizance of the rule that an accretion to registered land is not
automatically registered and therefore not entitled or subject to the protection of
imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens system. 29 The
said rule is not applicable to this case since the title claimed by private respondents
is not based on acquisitive prescription but is anchored on a public grant from the
Government, which presupposes that it was inceptively a public land. Ownership
over the accession is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered
land is a concern of the Land Registration Act.
Under the provisions of Act No. 2874 pursuant to which the title of private
respondents' predecessor in interest was issued, the President of the Philippines or
his alter ego, the Director of Lands, has no authority to grant a free patent for land
that has ceased to be a public land and has passed to private ownership, and a title
so issued is null and void. 30 The nullity arises, not from the fraud or deceit, but from
the fact that the land is not under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. 31 The

jurisdiction of the Director of Lands is limited only to public lands and does not
cover lands privately owned. 32 The purpose of the Legislature in adopting the
former Public Land Act, Act No. 2874, was and is to limit its application to lands of
the public domain, and lands held in private ownership are not included therein and
are not affected in any manner whatsoever thereby. Land held in freehold or fee
title, or of private ownership, constitute no part of the public domain and cannot
possibly come within the purview of said Act No. 2874, inasmuch as the "subject" of
such freehold or private land is not embraced in any manner in the title of the
Act 33 and the same are excluded from the provisions or text thereof.
We reiterate that private ownership of land is not affected by the issuance of a free
patent over the same land because the Public Land Act applies only to lands of the
public domain. 34 Only public land may be disposed of by the Director of
Lands. 35 Since as early as 1920, the land in dispute was already under the private
ownership of herein petitioners and no longer a part of the lands of the public
domain, the same could not have been the subject matter of a free patent. The
patentee and his successors in interest acquired no right or title to the said land.
Necessarily, Free Patent No. 23263 issued to Herminigildo Agpoon is null and void
and the subsequent titles issued pursuant thereto cannot become final and
indefeasible. Hence, we ruled in Director of Lands vs. Sisican, et al. 36 that if at the
time the free patents were issued in 1953 the land covered therein were already
private property of another and, therefore, not part of the disposable land of the
public domain, then applicants patentees acquired no right or title to the land.
Now, a certificate of title fraudulently secured is null and void ab initio if the fraud
consisted in misrepresenting that the land is part of the public domain, although it is
not. As earlier stated, the nullity arises, not from the fraud or deceit but, from the
fact that the land is not under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. 37 Being null
and void, the free patent granted and the subsequent titles produce no legal effects
whatsoever. Quod nullum est, nullum producit effectum. 38
A free patent which purports to convey land to which the Government did not have
any title at the time of its issuance does not vest any title in the patentee as against
the true owner. 39 The Court has previously held that the Land Registration Act and
the Cadastral Act do not give anybody who resorts to the provisions thereof a better
title than what he really and lawfully has.
. . . The Land Registration Act as well as the Cadastral Act protects only the holders
of a title in good faith and does not permit its provisions to be used as a shield for
the commission of fraud, or that one should enrich himself at the expense of
another (Gustilo vs. Maravilla, 48 Phil. 838). The above-stated Acts do not give
anybody, who resorts to the provisions thereof, a better title than he really and
lawfully has. If he happened to obtain it by mistake or to secure, to the prejudice of
his neighbor, more land than he really owns, with or without bad faith on his part,
the certificate of title, which may have been issued to him under the circumstances,
may and should be cancelled or corrected (Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil.,
590). . . . 40
We have, therefore, to arrive at the unavoidable conclusion that the title of herein
petitioners over the land in dispute is superior to the title of the registered owner
which is a total nullity. The long and continued possession of petitioners under a
valid claim of title cannot be defeated by the claim of a registered owner whose title
is defective from the beginning.
The quality of conclusiveness of a Torrens title is not available for use to perpetrate
fraud and chicanery. To paraphrase from Angeles vs. Samia, supra, the Land

Registration Act does not create or vest title. It only confirms and records title
already existing and vested. It does not protect a usurper from the true owner. It
cannot be a shield for the commission of fraud. It does not permit one to enrich
himself at the expense of another. Stated elsewise, the Torrens system was not
established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land. It is intended
merely to confirm and register the title which one may already have on the land.
Where the applicant possesses no title or ownership over the parcel of land, he
cannot acquire one under the Torrens system of registration. 41 Resort to the
provisions of the Land Registration Act does not give one a better title than he really
and lawfully has. 42 Registration does not vest title. It is not a mode of acquiring
property. It is merely evidence of such title over a particular property. It does not
give the holder any better title than what he actually has, especially if the
registration was done in bad faith. The effect is that it is as if no registration was
made at all. 43
Moreover, the failure of herein private respondents to assert their claim over the
disputed property for almost thirty 30 years constitute laches 44 and bars an action
to recover the same. 45 The registered owners' right to recover possession of the
property and title thereto from petitioners has, by long inaction or inexcusable
neglect, been converted into a stale demand. 46
Considering that petitioners were well within their rights in taking possession of the
lot in question, the findings of respondent court that herein petitioners took
advantage of the infirmities and weakness of the preceding claimant, Herminigildo
Agpoon, in taking possession of said land during the Japanese occupation is neither
tenable in law nor sustained by preponderant evidence in fact.
Where the evidence show that the plaintiff is the true owner of the land subject of
the free patent and title granted to another and that the defendant and his
predecessor in interest were never in possession thereof, the Court, in the exercise
of its equity jurisdiction and without ordering the cancellation of said title issued
upon the patent, may direct the defendant registered owner to reconvey the
property to the plaintiff. 47 Further, if the determinative facts are before the Court
and it is in a position to finally resolve the dispute, the expeditious administration of
justice will be subserved by such a resolution and thereby obviate the needless
protracted proceedings consequent to the remand of the case of the trial
court. 48 On these considerations, as well as the fact that these cases have been
pending for a long period of time, we see no need for remanding Civil Case No. 2649
for further proceedings, and we hold that the facts and the ends of justice in this
case require the reconveyance by private respondents to petitioners of the disputed
lot.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of respondent court in its AC-G.R. CV No. 60388R and the questioned order of dismissal of the trial court in its Civil Case No. 2649
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and judgment is hereby rendered ORDERING
private respondents to reconvey the aforesaid parcel of land to petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127797. January 31, 2000]
ALEJANDRO MILLENA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FELISA
JACOB, represented herein by her attorney-in-fact JAIME
LLAGUNO, respondents.
DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:
This case involves a 3,934-square meter parcel of land in far-flung Bgy. Balinad,
Daraga, Albay. It was originally a part of Lot 1874, a 14,284-square meter land that
was subject of a cadastral proceeding during the 1920s before the Court of First
Instance of Albay. Among the claimants in the cadastral case were Gregoria Listana
and her sister-in-law Potenciana Maramba, together with the latters seven (7)
children, namely, Felix, Marcela, Ruperta, Emeteria, Florencio, Gaspar and
Nicomedes, all surnamed Listana.
On 17 August 1926 the claimants reached a compromise agreement to divide Lot
1874 among themselves. Approximately one-fourth (1/4) of the lot went to Gregoria
Listana while the remaining three-fourths (3/4) portion, to Potenciana Maramba and
her seven (7) children.[1] The compromise agreement was submitted to the cadastral
court on 17 August 1926 and on even date adjudication was rendered in accordance
with the terms of the agreement.[2] Thus the northern portion of Lot 1874 with an
area of approximately 3,934 square meters was awarded to Gregoria Listana.
Gregoria Listana was at that time seriously ill of tuberculosis. To her death was
inevitable. Gregoria executed on 9 October 1926 a power of attorney in favor of her
cousin Antonio Lipato which authorized the attorney-in-fact to sell the portion of Lot
1874 belonging to his principal. Conformably with Gregoria's instruction, the
proceeds of the sale would be used for her interment.
On 23 October 1926 Antonio Lipato in his capacity as attorney-in-fact sold the
portion of Gregoria Listana to Gaudencio Jacob. Incidentally, Gregoria died on the
same day the land was sold. Thereafter Gaudencio entered the portion of Lot 1874
that was sold to him and started harvesting the coconuts found therein. When
Potenciana Maramba learned about Gaudencio's entering the land and harvesting
the coconuts she confronted him. But Gaudencio explained that he had every right
to do whatever he pleased with the land since he had lawfully bought it from
Gregoria Listana.
Potenciana Maramba filed an ejectment case against Gaudencio Jacob before the
Justice of the Peace in Legazpi, Albay. However, on 31 December 1926 the court
ruled that Gaudencio entered the land in question without force and intimidation
since he had with him a document of sale over the land which authorized him to
take possession thereof.[3] Thus, the Justice of the Peace dismissed the case.
After the dismissal of the case, Gaudencio Jacob continued with his possession of
the one-fourth (1/4) portion of Lot 1874. His continuous, actual and peaceful
possession lasted for almost forty (40) years until 4 April 1966, when he and his
children executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of his deceased wife
Brigida Jacob. The extrajudicial settlement adjudicated to respondent Felisa Jacob,
daughter of Gaudencio Jacob, the 3,934-square meter portion of Lot 1874.
[4]
Thereafter, respondent Felisa Jacob had the land annually declared as her
property and paid the corresponding real property taxes.
However, sometime in November 1981 respondent Felisa Jacob discovered that
Florencio Listana, son of Potenciana Maramba, acquired from the Bureau of Lands in
Legazpi City Free Patent Certificate of Title No. VH-23536 dated 28 August 1980
covering the entire 14,284-square meter area of Lot 1874 which included the
portion adjudicated to Felisa Jacob in 1966.[5]
On 6 November 1981 respondent Felisa Jacob immediately filed a protest before the
Bureau of Lands in Legazpi City alleging that she was the absolute owner of a onefourth (1/4) portion of Lot 1874 having acquired it through an extrajudicial partition
in 1966, and that through misrepresentation and deceit Florencio Listana was able

to secure title for the whole of Lot 1874. Felisa Jacob prayed that an investigation be
conducted and that the Free Patent issued in the name of Florencio Listana covering
Lot 1874 be annulled and set aside.
After the death of Florencio Listana and notwithstanding the protest filed by Felisa
Jacob, the heirs of Florencio Listana sold the entire Lot 1874 including the portion
sold by Gregoria Listana to Gaudencio Jacob to petitioner Alejandro Millena on 30
September 1986 for P6,000.00. Alejandro Millena, a nephew of Florencio Listana and
grandson of Potenciana Maramba, was eventually issued Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-71657 covering the whole of Lot 1874.
Thus on 17 March 1992 respondent Felisa Jacob through her attorney-in-fact Jaime
Llaguno filed a complaint against petitioner Alejandro Millena for annulment of title
with preliminary injunction and damages before the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi
City which she subsequently amended on 19 March 1992 by including a claim for
reconveyance with preliminary injunction and damages. She prayed for judgment
(a) declaring her the lawful and absolute owner of the one-fourth (1/4) northern
portion of Lot 1874; (b) ordering Alejandro Millena to reconvey the aforesaid portion
of Lot 1874 to her; (c) enjoining the construction of a house on said lot by Alejandro
Millena and, after trial, making the injunction permanent; and, (d) ordering
Alejandro Millena to pay damages in the amount of P50,000.00.
On 3 October 1994 Judge Wenceslao R. Villanueva Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of
Legazpi City, Br. 3, rendered a decision ordering petitioner Alejandro Millena to
reconvey by proper document the portion of 3,934 square meters in question from
Lot 1874 to respondent Felisa Jacob and awarded to her P10,000.00 for attorneys
fees.
Petitioner Alejandro Millena appealed to the Court of Appeals which on 12 August
1996 affirmed the trial court but deleted the award of P10,000.00 for attorneys fees.
[6]
After the appellate court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, he filed
with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
Petitioner raises the following issues: (a) whether prescription has now barred the
action for reconveyance; (b) whether the documents and pieces of evidence used
by respondent Court of Appeals as basis in its assailed Decision were duly
authenticated and proved by private respondent, Felisa Jacob; and, (c) whether
respondent appellate court correctly affirmed the order of reconveyance by the trial
court.
We resolve.
First. An action for reconveyance can indeed be barred by prescription. When an
action for reconveyance is based on fraud, it must be filed within four (4) years from
discovery of the fraud, and such discovery is deemed to have taken place from the
issuance of the original certificate of title.[7] On the other hand, an action for
reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years
from the date of the issuance of the original certificate of title or transfer certificate
of title. For the rule is that the registration of an instrument in the Office of the
Register of Deeds constitutes constructive notice to the whole world and therefore
the discovery of the fraud is deemed to have taken place at the time of registration.
[8]

In his petition Alejandro Millena argues that both the Regional Trial Court and the
Court of Appeals failed to pass upon the issue of prescription. According to him, the
issue of prescription is pivotal considering that title to the property was procured in
1980 while the action for reconveyance was filed only in 1992. This interim period,

he submits, had a span of more than twelve (12) years; thus, the action for
reconveyance had clearly prescribed.
But, nonetheless, it must be stressed that prescription cannot be invoked in an
action for reconveyance when the plaintiff is in possession of the land to be
reconveyed.[9] In view of this, can it be said that Felisa Jacob was in possession of
the contested portion of Lot 1874? Article 523 of the Civil Code states that
possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. In order to possess,
one must first have control of the thing and, second, a deliberate intention to
possess it. These are the elements of possession.
The records of the case show that respondent Felisa Jacob had exercised dominion
over the contested parcel of land. Immediately after acquiring the property through
an extrajudicial settlement in 1966, she instructed her nephew Jaime Llaguno to
continue working as caretaker of the land. Felisa made improvements on the land
and paid its property taxes. In fact the municipal treasurer of Daraga, Albay, issued
a certification dated 10 March 1992 that respondent Felisa Jacob was the declared
owner of Lot 1874-P - the litigated portion - and that she had been paying its real
property taxes since 1967.[10]
Apparently Felisa Jacob met the requisite elements of possession. She exercised
control over the parcel of land in litigation through her caretaker, her nephew, Jaime
Llaguno. Moreover, her declaration that the land was her property and the payment
of real property taxes manifested clearly that she was in possession of the land.
Consequently, petitioner may not validly invoke prescription as defense against
respondent Feliza Jacob.
Second. Petitioner Alejandro Millena questioned the very existence and authenticity
of several documents which according to him the Court of Appeals used as basis for
its assailed Decision. These documents were (a) the compromise agreement dated
17 August 1926 between Gregoria Listana and Potenciana Maramba over Lot 1874;
(b) the Justice of the Peace decision dated 31 December 1926 dismissing the
ejectment suit filed by Potenciana Maramba against Gaudencio Jacob; (c) the power
of attorney executed by Gregoria Listana authorizing her cousin Antonio Lipato to
sell her one-fourth portion of Lot 1874; and, (d) the deed of sale executed by
Antonio Lipato in favor of Gaudencio Jacob.
Alejandro Millena assailed the authenticity and even the existence of the decision of
the Justice of the Peace of Legazpi dated 31 December 1926 in which the court
dismissed the suit filed by Potenciana Maramba against Gaudencio Jacob,
predecessor-in-interest of Felisa Jacob. The court decided in favor of Gaudencio
Jacob and held that he had the right to possess the contested one-fourth (1/4)
portion of Lot 1874.
Likewise, Alejandro Millena questioned the genuineness of the compromise
agreement dated 17 August 1926 among the claimants of Lot 1874. Petitioner
Millena averred that the alleged compromise agreement did not bear the signatures
of the contracting parties except for the thumb mark of Gregoria Listana from whom
Gaudencio Jacob bought the property.
As to the special power of attorney and the deed of sale, Alejandro Millena insisted
that respondent Felisa Jacob never proved the existence of these documents. Thus,
according to petitioner, the Court of Appeals erred in assuming their existence and
using them to support its assailed Decision.
Questions of authenticity of documents being one of fact, this Court will not
ordinarily disturb the conclusions of the Court of Appeals on this matter. [11] However

for the sake of substantial justice we shall thoroughly discuss the points raised by
petitioner.
The focal issue that needs to be answered and which would ultimately resolve the
other issues raised by petitioner is the genuineness of the decision of the Justice of
the Peace dated 31 December 1926. Being a public document the decision is
admissible in evidence without further proof of its due execution or genuineness.
Such decision may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record or by his deputy. [12]
We have examined the copy of the decision and found it to be genuine. [13] The
decision, which was penned in Spanish, was duly signed by Justice of the Peace
Manuel M. Calleja. It also bore the seal of the court and an attestation that such was
a true copy.[14]Moreover, petitioner Alejandro Millena failed to adduce any evidence
demonstrating the spurious character of the decision.
Having resolved the issue of genuineness, it can therefore be said that the facts
enumerated by the Justice of the Peace in its decision are likewise correct. This is
because a judgment is conclusive as to the facts admitted by the pleadings or
assumed by the decision, where they were essential to the judgment, and were
such that the judgment could not legally have been rendered without them. [15] The
Justice of the Peace found that [Plaintiff Potenciana Maramba and Gregoria Listana x x x were co-owners [of Lot
1874]. The land [subject matter of this suit for unlawful detainer] was claimed by
one and the other, finally they arrived at a compromise agreement whereby
Potenciana Maramba ceded to Gregoria Listana one-fourth (1/4) portion of the land
referred to. This compromise agreement was submitted to the Cadastral Court x x x
and an adjudication was rendered in accordance with the tenor of the compromise
agreement x x x x [T]he land was surveyed and x x x the northern portion
equivalent to one-fourth part was delivered to Gregoria Listana. The latter was
seriously sick of tuberculosis. And foreseeing that someday she would die x x x she
executed a power-of-attorney (Exh "1") in favor of her cousin Antonio Lipato in order
that in case of her death he would sell the land and the proceeds thereof be paid for
the expenses of her interment x x x x In fact on October 23, 1926 on which date
Gregoria Listana died, Antonio Lipato executed a document of sale over the land in
favor of defendant herein [Gaudencio Jacob]. [16]
The foregoing pronouncements of the Justice of the Peace confirmed the existence
of the compromise agreement, the power of attorney and the deed of sale. And
since no appeal was made, the 31 December 1926 decision of the Justice of the
Peace had long become final and the findings of fact therein conclusive.
Third. The basic rule is that after the lapse of one (1) year from entry, a decree of
registration is no longer open for review or attack, even though the issuance thereof
may have been attended by fraud and that the title may be inherently defective.
The law nevertheless safeguards the rightful partys or the aggrieved partys interest
in the titled land from fraud and improper technicalities by allowing such party to
bring an action for reconveyance to him of whatever he has been deprived as long
as the property has not been transferred or conveyed to an innocent purchaser for
value. The action, while respecting the decree as incontrovertible, seeks to transfer
or reconvey the land from the registered owner to the rightful owner.
In an action for reconveyance the issue involved is one of ownership, and for this
purpose, evidence of title may be introduced. In fact, respondent Felisa Jacob had
submitted evidence showing a strong claim of ownership over the contested parcel
of land. She testified before the trial court that she had been in actual possession of

the land since 1966. Moreover, proof was adduced showing that her predecessor-ininterest, her father Gaudencio Jacob, had lawfully possessed the property from
1926. She likewise offered as evidence a certification from the municipal treasurer
that she had been declaring the land as her property for tax purposes since 1967.
The evidence on record without doubt tilts in favor of respondent Felisa Jacob.
Although petitioner Alejandro Millena holds a certificate of title covering the
contested parcel of land, such possession of a certificate of title alone does not
necessarily make the holder thereof the true owner of all the property described
therein. Land registration proceedings cannot be made a shield for fraud or for
enriching a person at the expense of another. The inclusion of an area in a
certificate of title which the registered owner or successful applicant has placed no
claim on and has never asserted any right of ownership thereof is void and of no
effect.[17] Thus, the incorporation of the 3,934-square meter northern portion of Lot
1874 in the Free Patent Certificate Title issued to Florencio Listana on 28 August
1980 was clearly erroneous and irregular.
Petitioner also avers that he is an innocent purchaser for value and that an action
for reconveyance cannot prosper against him. He argues that the finding of
respondent appellate court of bad faith was not supported by evidence. A purchaser
in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice that some other
person has a right to, or interest in, such property at the time of such purchase, or
before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property.
Good faith, or the lack of it, is in the final analysis a question of intention; but in
ascertaining the intention by which one is actuated on a given occasion, we are
necessarily controlled by the evidence as to the conduct and outward acts by which
alone the inward motive may, with safety, be determined. Truly, good faith is not a
visible, tangible fact that can be seen or touched, but rather a state or condition of
mind which can only be judged by actual or fancied tokens or signs. Otherwise
stated, good faith is the opposite of fraud and it refers to the state of mind which is
manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. [18]
Certain pieces of evidence when put together would prove that petitioner Alejandro
Millena had actual knowledge of facts that would have made an ordinary prudent
purchaser of land go beyond what appears on the face of the certificate of title and
inquire into its genuineness. The first evidence to be considered is the 3 October
1994 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City wherein it ruled
[D]uring the ocular inspection conducted by this court, it was noted that only a
portion of the defendants [Alejandro Millenas] kitchen encroached a small portion of
the lot in question and his house merely occupied an abandoned road adjoining the
lot in question which cast doubt to the defendants claim of possession and
ownership of the property in question. [19]
Prescinding from this pronouncement we can conclude that petitioner Alejandro
Millena lived right beside the contested portion of Lot 1874. And since he himself
insisted that his house was constructed in 1980, [20] it would have been difficult, if
not impossible, for him not to have noticed Felisa Jacobs nephew and caretaker
Jaime Llaguno planting and harvesting crops in the disputed land.
In fact Bgy. Secretary Lucio Londonio, who is also a brother-in-law of petitioner
Alejandro Millena, testified in court that he has been living near the contested
parcel of land for thirty-seven (37) years. Londonio told the court that the land was
originally owned by Gaudencio Jacob and that ownership hereof was later
transferred to Felisa Jacob. He further testified that he would often see Jaime

Llaguno, the caretaker of the land, planting banana and coconut trees on the land.
[21]

We are hard-pressed to believe the claim of petitioner that he purchased Lot 1874 in
good faith. Having lived adjacent to the contested lot six (6) years prior to his
purchase of Lot 1874 in 1986, petitioner Alejandro Millena would have seen and
noticed the crops and fruit trees planted by Jaime Llaguno on the land. Thus,
contrary to his asseverations, petitioner was not a purchaser in good faith since
there were circumstances sufficient to arouse his curiosity and prod him to inquire
into the real status of his sellers title.
Finally, a perusal of the records reveals that petitioner Alejandro Millena prior to his
purchase of the land in 1986 had knowledge of the protest filed by Feliza Jacob
before the Bureau of Lands against Florencio Listana in 1981. This he admitted
during his cross-examination on 7 February 1994 Atty. Ludovico:
......Are you aware of the protest that was filed by Felisa Jacob x x x before the
Bureau of Lands at Legazpi City in connection with Lot No. 1874, the lot in question?
Alejandro Millena: Yes, sir.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 12 August 1996 as well as its Resolution of 6 December 1996 denying
petitioner Alejandro Millena's motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED.
Consequently, petitioner is ORDERED to reconvey within thirty (30) days from the
finality of this Decision that northern portion in question of Lot 1874 consisting of
3,934 square meters as shown in the location map (Exhs. "L" and "L-1") in favor of
private respondent Felisa Jacob, represented herein by her attorney-in-fact Jaime
Llaguno, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 114243. February 23, 2000]
SPS. ISAGANI MIRANDA and MIGUELA JOGUILON, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, LUCILA L. VDA. DE JAVA (Deceased) Substituted by the Heirs
ESTELLA JAVA BACALLA, Assisted by her husband APOLONIO BACALLA and
JAIME JAVA, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated February 28,
1994 in CA-G.R. CV No. 20546, which reversed and set aside the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4, in Civil Case No. 112765. The decretal
portion of the assailed decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 63117 is hereby declared NULL and VOID. The
execution, sales and subsequent transfers of the Thames jeep and Lot 8015 are
ANNULLED. Defendant-appellees Spouses Miranda are hereby ordered to execute a
Deed of Reconveyance over Lot 8015 in favor of plaintiff-appellants.
"No pronouncement as to costs.
"SO ORDERED."[2]
The facts as supported by the records are as follows:
On October 27, 1965, Luneta Motor Company (hereinafter LMC) filed suit against the
spouses Lucila and Pablo D. Java, et al., with the former Court of First Instance (CFI)
of Manila, which docketed the same as Civil Case No. 63117. LMC sought to recover

one "Thames" jeep and the sum of P9, 403.00, plus interest and attorneys fees from
defendants.
On March 11, 1966, LMC moved to declare the Java spouses in default for failure to
file their answer within the reglementary period, notwithstanding notice. The trial
court granted the motion.
On November 9, 1966, the CFI disposed of the case as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the
defendant, ordering the latter to pay plaintiff the amount of P8,354.00, the sum
total of the balances on the defendants promissory notes, plus interest thereon at
the rate of 12% per annum from April 7, 1966, until fully paid, plus the sum of
P1,000.00 as and for attorneys fees, and the costs of this action.
"The case against John Doe is hereby dismissed.
"SO ORDERED."[3]
Pursuant to the writ of execution, the City Sheriff of Cebu City sold the vehicle at
public auction to one Jose Angulo.[4]Also subsequently sold at public auction to LMC,
was a parcel of land described as Lot 8015 of the Cadastral Survey of Cebu, and
owned by the Javas.[5] LMC then sold Lot 8015 to petitioners.
On December 19, 1977, Lucila vda. de Java and her daughter Estela Java, filed Civil
Case No. 112765 to nullify the judgment in Civil Case No. 63117, as well as the
execution sales and subsequent transfers, with the then CFI of Manila. Among those
named as defendants were the petitioners herein; and the spouses Ernesto Elizondo
and Angeles Java Elizondo, the son-in-law and daughter of Lucila vda. de Java.
On July 19, 1987, Lucila vda. de Java died and was substituted by her heirs.
On November 11, 1988, the trial court decided the case as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, let this case be, as it is hereby dismissed
without pronouncement as to costs for lack of jurisdiction. The Writ of Preliminary
Injunction issued by this Court is ordered lifted. The counterclaim of defendants
Mirandas, being without merit under the circumstance(s), is likewise ordered
dismissed.
"SO ORDERED."[6]
Private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which, as earlier noted,
reversed the lower court.
Hence, the instant case relying on the following grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE TRIAL COURT NEVER
ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER LUCILA L. JAVA AND HER HUSBAND SINCE THERE
WAS NO PROPER SERVICE OF SUMMONS.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE JUDGMENT IN CIVIL CASE
NO. 63117 ENTITLED LUNETA MOTOR COMPANY V. LUCILA JAVA, ET AL., HAD LONG
BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING AS NULL AND VOID THE JUDGMENT
RENDERED IN CIVIL CASE NO. 63117 AND ORDERING PETITIONERS TO EXECUTE A
DEED OF RECONVEYANCE OVER LOT NO. 8015 IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS. [7]
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals committed
reversible error in annulling the judgment in Civil Case No. 63117 for want of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.
In declaring the judgment in Civil Case No. 63117 null and void, the appellate court
found from the Sheriffs Return of Service, [8] that summons was served on the

spouses Java by substituted service without effort at personal service. The court a
quo held that the said service was invalid and the lower court never acquired
jurisdiction over the persons of defendants (private respondents herein) in Civil
Case No. 63117, thus, the execution sale of the "Thames" vehicle, as well as the
sale of Lot 8015 to LMC, and the subsequent sale by the latter to petitioners were
null and void.
Petitioners contend that the decision of the Court of Appeals that service of
summons was invalid is contradicted by the trial court and is not supported by the
evidence. Besides, the judgment had already become final since there were no
grounds to annul it.
On the question of the validity of service of summons, pertinent is Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court, particularly Sections 7 and 8 which respectively provide:
Sec. 7. Personal service of summons. The summons shall be served by handing a
copy thereof to the defendant in person, or if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it
to him.[9]
Sec. 8. Substituted service: If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable
time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving
copies of the summons in the defendants dwelling house or residence with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein; or (b) by leaving the
copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some competent
person in charge thereof.[10]
Service of summons upon the defendant is essential for the court to acquire
jurisdiction over his person.[11] The modes of service should be strictly followed in
order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the person. [12] Thus, it is only
when a defendant cannot be served personally "within a reasonable time" that
substituted service may be made.[13]
In the instant case, the Sheriffs Return of Service reads:
"Respectfully returned to the Clerk of Court, Court of First Instance, Manila, the
herein summons of the above-entitled case, copy of which and a copy of the
complaint were served on December 9, 1965 at 11:00 oclock in the morning by
substituted service (stress supplied) through Ernesto Elizondo, son-in-law of
defendants Lucila Java and Pablo Java and living together with them." [14]
Even the briefest perusal of the aforementioned Return clearly shows no reason why
personal service could not be made. Impossibility of prompt, personal service
should be shown by stating in the proof of service that efforts were made to find the
defendant personally and that said efforts failed, hence the resort to substituted
service.[15] Here, no such explanation was made. Failure to faithfully, strictly, and
fully comply with the requirements of substituted service renders said service
ineffective.[16]
Petitioners point to the deposition of Ernesto Elizondo to support their argument
that there was valid service of summons.[17] Ernesto Elizondo emphatically testified
under oath, however, that at the time he allegedly signed for the summons, he was
not living in the same house as his parents-in-law, "although I am living within the
compound of my father-in-law."[18] Rule 14, Section 8 of the Rules of Court
specifically provides that substituted service must be effected by "(a) leaving copies
of the summons at the defendants dwelling house or residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein." Since Ernesto Elizondo admitted
that he was not living with the spouses Java, the requirement that the summons be
left with a person of suitable age residing in the same dwelling house or residence
as the defendant, for substituted service to be valid, has not been complied with.

For want of proper service of summons upon defendants, the trial court in Civil Case
No. 63117 never acquired jurisdiction over the former and hence, could not render
valid judgment over their persons. Hence, the execution sales of the "Thames"
vehicle and Lot 8015, pursuant to said void judgment, are void ab initio. A final
judgment may be annulled upon either of two grounds: (1) extrinsic fraud, and (2)
lack of jurisdiction.[19] In the present case, the trial court did not have jurisdiction. No
reversible error was thus committed by the Court of Appeals in annulling the
judgment in Civil Case No. 63117 for absence of jurisdiction on the part of the court
which rendered the same.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 28, 1994 in CA-G.R. CV No. 20546
is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 95608. January 21, 1997]
SPOUSES IGNACIO PALOMO and TRINIDAD PASCUAL, and CARMEN PALOMO
VDA. DE BUENAVENTURA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, FAUSTINO J. PERFECTO,
RAFFY SANTILLAN, BOY ARIADO, LORENZO BROCALES, SALVADOR DOE, and
other DOES, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
The issue in the case at bar pertains to ownership of 15 parcels of land in Tiwi,
Albay which form part of the "Tiwi Hot Spring National Park." The facts of the case
are as follows.
On June 13, 1913, then Governor General of the Philippine Islands, William Cameron
Forbes issued Executive Order No. 40 which reserved for provincial park purposes
some 440,530 square meters of land situated in Barrio Naga, Municipality of Tiwi,
Province of Albay pursuant to the provisions of Act 648 of the Philippine
Commission.[1]
Subsequently, the then Court of First Instance of Albay, 15th Judicial District, United
States of America, ordered the registration of 15 parcels of land covered by
Executive Order No. 40 in the name of Diego Palomo on December 9,
1916; [2] December 28, 1916;[3] and January 17, 1917.[4] Diego Palomo donated these
parcels of land consisting of 74,872 square meters which were allegedly covered by
Original Certificates of Title Nos. 513, 169, 176 and 173 [5] to his heirs, herein
petitioners, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo two months before his death in April 1937.
[6]

Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost during the Japanese
occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with the Court of First
Instance of Albay on May 30, 1950.[7] The Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 sometime in October 1953. [8]
On July 10, 1954 President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47
converting the area embraced by Executive Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot Spring
National Park," under the control, management, protection and administration of the
defunct Commission of Parks and Wildlife, now a division of the Bureau of Forest
Development. The area was never released as alienable and disposable portion of
the public domain and, therefore, is neither susceptible to disposition under the
provisions of the Public Land Law (CA 141) nor registrable under the Land
Registration Act (Act No. 496).

The Palomos, however, continued in possession of the property, paid real estate
taxes thereon[9] and introduced improvements by planting rice,
bananas, pandan and coconuts. On April 8, 1971, petitioner Carmen vda. de
Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad Pascual mortgaged the
parcels of land covered by TCT 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 to guarantee a loan
of P200,000 from the Bank of the Philippine Islands.
In May 7, 1974 petitioner Carmen vda. de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio
Palomo and Trinidad Pascual filed Civil Case No. T-143 before the then Court of First
Instance of Albay for Injunction with damages against private respondents Faustino
J. Perfecto, Raffy Santillan, Boy Ariado, Lorenzo Brocales, Salvador Doe and other
Does who are all employees of the Bureau of Forest Development who entered the
land covered by TCT No. 3913 and/or TCT 3914 and cut down bamboos thereat,
totally leveling no less than 4 groves worth not less than P2,000.00.
On October 11, 1974, the Republic of the Philippines filed Civil Case No. T-176 for
annulment and cancellation of Certificates of Title involving the 15 parcels of land
registered in the name of the petitioners and subject of Civil Case T-143. Impleaded
with the petitioners as defendants were the Bank of the Philippine Islands, Legazpi
Branch and the Register of Deeds of Albay.
The case against the Bank of Philippine Islands was dismissed because the loan
of P200,000 with the Bank was already paid and the mortgage in its favor cancelled.
A joint trial of Civil Case T-143 and T-176 was conducted upon agreement of the
parties and on July 31, 1986, the trial court rendered the following decision:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
IN CIVIL CASE No. T-143, in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs,
dismissing the complaint for injunction and damages, as it is hereby DISMISSED.
Costs against the plaintiffs.
In CIVIL CASE No. T-176, in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants:
(1) Declaring null and void and no force and effect the Order dated September 14,
1953, as well as the Original Certificate of Titles Nos. 153, [10] 169, 173 and 176 and
Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos. 3911, T-3912, T-3913, and T-3914, all of the
Register of Deeds of Albay and all transactions based on said titles.
(2) Forfeiting in favor of the plaintiff Government any and all improvements on the
lands in question that are found therein and introduced by the defendants;
(3) Declaring Lot Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12, Plan II-9299 and Lots 1,
21,[11] 3 and 4 of Plan II-9205 as part of the Tiwi Hot Spring National Park;
(4) and Finally, the Register of Deeds of Albay is hereby ordered to cancel the
alleged Original Certificates of Titles Nos. 513, 169, 173 and 176, Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-3911, T-3912, T-3913 and T-3914.
Costs against the defendants.
So Ordered."[12]
The court a quo in ruling for the Republic found no sufficient proof that the Palomos
have established property rights over the parcels of land in question before the
Treaty of Paris which ended the Spanish-American War at the end of the century.
The court further stated that assuming that the decrees of the Court of First
Instance of Albay were really issued, the Palomos obtained no right at all over the
Properties because these were issued only when Executive Order No. 40 was
already in force. At this point, we take note that although the Geodetic Engineer of
the Bureau of Lands appointed as one of the Commissioners in the relocation survey
of the properties stated in his reamended report that of the 3,384 square meters
covered by Lot 2, Plan II-9205, only 1,976 square meters fall within the reservation

area,[13] the RTC ordered TCT 3913 covering the entire Lot 21 (sic) Plan II-9205
cancelled.
The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the findings
of the lower Court; hence this petition raising the following issues:
1. The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in
affirming in toto the decision of the lower court.
2. The declaration of nullity of the original certificates of title and subsequent
transfer certificates of titles of the petitioners over the properties in question is
contrary to law and jurisprudence on the matter.
3. The forfeiture of all improvements introduced by the petitioners in the premises
in favor of the government is against our existing law and jurisprudence.
The issues raised essentially boil down to whether or not the alleged original
certificate of titles issued pursuant to the order of the Court of First Instance in
1916-1917 and the subsequent TCTs issued in 1953 pursuant to the petition for
reconstitution are valid.
Petitioners contend that the Treaty of Paris which ended the Spanish-American War
at the end of the 19th century recognized the property rights of Spanish and Filipino
citizens and the American government had no inherent power to confiscate
properties of private citizens and declare them part of any kind of government
reservation. They allege that their predecessors in interest have been in open,
adverse and continuous possession of the subject lands for 20-50 years prior to
their registration in 1916-1917. Hence, the reservation of the lands for provincial
purposes in 1913 by then Governor-general Forbes was tantamount to deprivation
of private property without due process of law.
In support of their claim, the petitioners presented copies of a number of decisions
of the Court of First Instance of Albay, 15th Judicial District of the United States of
America which state that the predecessors in interest of the petitioners' father
Diego Palomo, were in continuous, open and adverse possession of the lands from
20 to 50 years at the time of their registration in 1916.
We are not convinced.
The Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown by discovery and conquest in the 16th
century. Before the Treaty of Paris in April 11, 1899, our lands, whether agricultural,
mineral or forest were under the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish
Crown. Hence, private ownership of land could only be acquired through royal
concessions which were documented in various forms, such as (1) Titulo Real or
Royal Grant," (2) Concession Especial or Special Grant, (3) Titulo de Compra or Title
by Purchase and (4) Informacion Posesoria or Possessory Information title obtained
under the Spanish Mortgage Law or under the Royal Decree of January 26, 1889.
Unfortunately, no proof was presented that the petitioners' predecessors in interest
derived title from an old Spanish grant. Petitioners placed much reliance upon the
declarations in Expediente No. 5, G.L.R.O. Record Decision No. 9820, dated January
17, 1917; Expediente No. 6, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9821, dated December 28, 1916;
Expediente No. 7, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9822, dated December 9, 1916; Expediente
No. 8, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9823, dated December 28, 1916 and Expediente No. 10,
G.L.R.O. Record No. 9868, dated December 9, 1916 of the Court of First Instance of
Albay, 15th Judicial District of the United States of America presided by Judge Isidro
Paredes that their predecessors in interest were in open, adverse and continuous
possession of the subject lands for 20-50 years. [14] The aforesaid "decisions" of the
Court of First Instance, however, were not signed by the judge but were merely

certified copies of notification to Diego Palomo bearing the signature of the clerk of
court.
Moreover, despite claims by the petitioners that their predecessors in interest were
in open , adverse and continuous possession of the lands for 20 to 50 years prior to
their registration in 1916-1917, the lands were surveyed only in December 1913,
the very same year they were acquired by Diego Palomo. Curiously, in February
1913 or 10 months before the lands were surveyed for Diego Palomo, the
government had already surveyed the area in preparation for its reservation for
provincial park purposes. If the petitioners' predecessors in interest were indeed in
possession of the lands for a number of years prior to their registration in 19161917, they would have undoubtedly known about the inclusion of these properties
in the reservation in 1913. It certainly is a trifle late at this point to argue that the
government had no right to include these properties in the reservation when the
question should have been raised 83 years ago.
As regards the petitioners' contention that inasmuch as they obtained the titles
without government opposition, the government is now estopped from questioning
the validity of the certificates of title which were granted. As correctly pointed out
by the respondent Court of Appeals, the principle of estoppel does not operate
against the Government for the act of its agents. [15]
Assuming that the decrees of the Court of First Instance were really issued, the
lands are still not capable of appropriation. The adverse possession which may be
the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to
alienable lands of the public domain.
There is no question that the lands in the case at bar were not alienable lands of the
public domain. As testified by the District Forester, records in the Bureau of Forestry
show that the subject lands were never declared as alienable and disposable and
subject to private alienation prior to 1913 up to the present. [16] Moreover, as part of
the reservation for provincial park purposes, they form part of the forest zone.
It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be
owned by private persons. It is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter
how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, [17] unless such lands are
reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.
Neither do the tax receipts which were presented in evidence prove ownership of
the parcels of land inasmuch as the weight of authority is that tax declarations are
not conclusive proof of ownership in land registration cases. [18]
Having disposed of the issue of ownership, we now come to the matter regarding
the forfeiture of improvements introduced on the subject lands. It bears emphasis
that Executive Order No. 40 was already in force at the time the lands in question
were surveyed for Diego Palomo. Petitioners also apparently knew that the subject
lands were covered under the reservation when they filed a petition for
reconstitution of the lost original certificates of title inasmuch as the blueprint of
Survey Work Order Number 21781 of Plan II-9299 approved by the Chief of the Land
Registration Office Enrique Altavas in 1953 as a true and correct copy of the Original
Plan No. II-9299 filed in the Bureau of Lands dated September 11, 1948 [19] contains
the following note, "in conflict with provincial reservation." [20] In any case,
petitioners are presumed to know the law and the failure of the government to
oppose the registration of the lands in question is no justification for the petitioners
to plead good faith in introducing improvements on the lots.
Finally, since 1,976 square meters of the 3,384 square meters covered by TCT 3913
fall within the reservation, TCT 3913 should be annulled only with respect to the

aforesaid area. Inasmuch as the bamboo groves leveled in TCT 3913 and subject of
Civil Case T-143,[21] were within the perimeter of the national park, [22] no
pronouncement as to damages is in order.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification that TCT 3913 be annulled with respect to the 1,976 square meter area
falling within the reservation zone.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 120066 September 9, 1999
OCTABELA ALBA Vda. De RAZ, Spouses MANUEL and SUSANA BRAULIO,
RODOLFO, LOURDES and BEATRIZ all surnamed ALBA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE LACHICA, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is an appeal by certiorari from a decision rendered by the Court of
Appeals dated August 18, 1992 affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch I, in Land Registration Case No. K-101, LRC Record No.
K. 15104, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. The parcel of land described in Plan Psu-161277 and the improvements thereon
situated in the Poblacion of the Municipality of Banga, Province of Aklan, Philippines,
with an area of 4,845 square meters is brought under the operation of the property
registration decree (PD No. 1529) and the title thereto is registered and confirmed in
the name of applicant Jose Lachica, married to Adela Raz of Kalibo, Aklan,
Philippines;
2. A ten (10) meter road width along the national road mentioned in the application
be segregated for future road widening program upon payment of just
compensation to be annotated at the back of the title;
3. For lack of merit, the opposition filed by the spouses Manuel and Susana Braulio,
Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz, Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba and Beatriz Alba are hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 1
The factual antecedents of the case as summed by the trial court and adopted by
the Court of Appeals are as follows:
Applicant Jose Lachica filed this application for title to land on April 28, 1958 with
the claim that the land applied for was purchased by him and his wife, Adela Raz
from, from one Eulalio Raz. The documents attached to the application are:
technical description, surveyor's certificate, certification by the chief deputy
assessor of Aklan and the blue print of Psu-161277.
The initial hearing was scheduled for October 31, 1958 and the certificate of
publication in the Official Gazette was issued on September 23, 1958. The
certification of posting of the notice of initial hearing was issued on October 13,
1958.

The land applied for is residential, situated in the Poblacion of Banga, Aklan, with an
area of 4,845 square meters, bounded on the northeast by the property of the
Municipality of Banga (Sketch, Exh. "F").
The initial hearing was held on October 31, 1958. An order of general default was
issued but those who presented their opposition, namely, Octabela Alba Vda. De
Raz, Manuel and Susana Braulio, Jose Rago, representing Apolonia Rebeco, the
Director of Lands and the Municipality of Banga represented by the Provincial Fiscal,
were given thirty (30) days to file their written opposition.
Manuel C. Braulio and Susana P. Braulio filed their opposition on October 31, 1958.
They opposed the registration of the southeastern portion of the 240 square meters
of the land applied for alleging that they are the owners in fee simple and
possessors of said portion and all the improvements thereon for not less than 70
years together with their predecessor-in-interest deriving their title by purchase
from the original owners. They prayed for the Court to declare them the true and
absolute owners of the disputed portion of the same in their names.
On October 31, 1958, Octabela Vda. de Raz filed her opposition.
Jose Rago filed his opposition on November 29, 1958 as the duly constituted
attorney-in-fact of Apolonia Rebeco although no special power of attorney was
attached. He opposed the registration of the northeastern portion of the land
applied for, with an area of 43.83 square meters. He alleged that his principal is the
owner by right of succession and is in the possession of said portion with all its
improvements for more than 80 years together with his predecessor-in-interest,
continuously, peacefully and openly under claim of ownership. He prayed that his
principal be declared the true and absolute owner of the disputed portion of 43.83
square meters.
On March 22, 1966, the Court issued an Order allowing the applicant to hire another
surveyor to segregate the non-controversial portion of the land applied for and to
notify the oppositors and their counsels.
On January 12, 1970, a motion to lift the order of general default and to admit the
attached opposition of Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba and Beatriz Alba, as well as a
motion to admit the attached amended petition of Octabela Vda. de Raz were filed.
The Court in its order dated March 21, 1970 admitted said opposition and set aside
the order of default.
In their opposition, Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba, represented by their attorney-in-fact,
Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz, alleged that they are the co-owners of a portion of the
land applied for with an area of 2,262 square meters bounded on the north by
Januario Masigon, Nicolas Realtor, Agustina Rebeldia and Apolonia Rebeco, on the
south by Eulalio Raz and on the west by the public market of Banga. They claimed
to have inherited the above-mentioned portion from their late father, Eufrosino M.
Alba, who purchased the same from Dionisia Regado in 1918. Hence, they have
been in possession continuously, openly and peacefully under claim of ownership of
the above-mentioned portion for not less 70 years. They prayed that the disputed
portion of 2,262 square meters be registered as their pro-indiviso property.
In her amended opposition, Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz opposed the registration of
the southeastern portion of the land applied for with an area of 331.44 square
meters. She claimed to have been in peaceful, continuous and open possession
together with her deceased husband, Eulalio Raz, under claim of ownership of the
above-mentioned portion for not less than 70 years, by purchase from its owners.
She likewise opposed the registration of the western portion of the land applied for,
with an area of 676 square meters, having purchased the same from its original

owners on (sic) her predecessor-in-interest has been open, peaceful and continuous
under claim of ownership for a period of not less than 70 years. She prayed that the
portion of 331.44 square meters be registered in her name and that of the heirs of
Eulalio Raz, pro indiviso., and the other portion of 676 square meters be registered
solely in her name.
On February 25, 1970, the applicant Dr. Jose Lachica filed his consolidated
opposition and reply to the motion to lift order of default stating that there is no
reason to do so under the Rules of Court, and that the opposition of Rodolfo Alba,
Lourdes Alba and Beatriz Alba, as well as the amended opposition of Octabela Alba
Vda. de Raz are without merit in law and in fact.
On March 21, 1970, the motion to lift the order of general default was granted and
the opposition of Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba and Beatriz Alba, as well as the
opposition of Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz were all admitted.
In the hearing of March 3, 1972, applicant offered for admission exhibits "A" to "I"
and the testimonies of Pedro Ruiz (April 20, 1971), Jose Rago (Oct. 23, 1970) and Dr.
Jose Lachica (July 16, 1971; Feb. 10, 1972). The Court admitted the same.
On March 13, 1974, the Court issued an order appointing Engr. Angeles Relor to act
as Commissioner and delimit the portions claimed by the three sets of oppositors
and submit an amended approved plan together with the technical description for
each portion.
The Commissioner's report and sketch was submitted on December 4, 1974. The
applicant filed his opposition to the Commissioner's report on December 12, 1974.
The Court in its order of December 13, 1974 required the Commissioner to submit
an amended report and amended sketch.
The Commissioner's corrected report and sketch was submitted on February 24,
1975 which the Court approved on February 25, 1975 there being no objection from
the parties.
On March 15, 1977, the Court issued an order whereby the testimony of oppositor
Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz was stricken off the record for her failure to appear in the
scheduled hearing on March 15, 1977.
Again, in its order dated May 27, 1977 the testimony of Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz
was stricken off record because the latter was bedridden and can not possibly
appear for cross-examination.
Oppositor Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz substituted by her heirs filed a formal offer of
exhibits on August 24, 1988. Applicant filed his comments thereto on August 29,
1988. The Court admitted said exhibits and the testimony of their witness on March
1, 1989.
In this application for title to land filed by applicant Jose Lachica, four oppositions
were filed by the following:
1. Jose Rago, in representation of Apolonia Rebeco;
2. Manuel C. Braulio and Susana Braulio;
3. Rodolfo, Lourdes and Beatriz, all surnamed Alba, represented by Octabela Alba
Vda. de Raz; and
4. Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz.
In the hearing of October 23, 1970, counsel for oppositor Jose Rago manifested that
he would file a motion for withdrawal of opposition and Jose Rago himself declared
his conformity (Tsn, Oct. 23, 1970, p. 5). Although no formal motion to withdraw was
actually filed, oppositor Rago has not presented evidence on his behalf; hence, his
opposition must be disregarded.

As regards oppositor Manuel C. Braulio ans Susana Braulio, a deed of sale

supposedly executed by Susana Braulio and Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz in 1956 was
identified by Felimon Raz, a witness for the oppositors (Tsn, Sept. 29, 1977, pp. 3 to
4). However, said deed cannot be found in the records. Even so, the Braulios have
not presented evidence to show that by the time this application was filed, they and
their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open, public, peaceful and
continuous possession of the land claimed, in concept of owner, for at least 10
years sufficient to acquire title thereto (Arts. 1117, 1118, 1134, Civil Code of the
Philippines). As such, the opposition of Manuel C. Braulio and Susana Braulio must
be dismissed. 2
On the basis of the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the
applicant and the oppositor Raz, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of the
applicant as stated at the outset. In dismissing the claim of the remaining
oppositors Rodolfo, Lourdes and Beatriz, all surnamed Alba, represented by
Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz and Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz herself, the trial court in
sum noted that said oppositors have never offered any explanation as to the nonpayment of realty taxes for the disputed portions of the subject property from 1941
to 1958 while the respondent/applicant continuously paid taxes under Tax
Declaration No. 14181 covering said property from 1945-1958 when the case was
filed per certification issued by the Municipal Treasurer's Office of Banga. 3 In
rendering judgment in favor of respondent/applicant, the trial court stressed that
while it is true that tax receipts and declarations of ownership for tax purposes are
not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they become strong evidence of
ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual
possession.
Dissatisfied, petitioners interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals which affirmed
the decision of the trial court.
Unfazed, petitioners now come to this Court arguing that
1. The Civil law provisions on prescription are inapplicable.
2. The applicable law is Section 48 [a] of the Public Land Law or Act 141, as
amended.
3. Private respondent has not acquired ownership in fee simple, much less has he
met the conditions for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48 [a] of
Act 141, as amended, except perhaps for a 620 square meter portion of the land
applied for because:
3.1. There is absolutely no proof of the alleged sales made by Raz and Alba.
3.2. There is absolutely no reliable proof of the alleged theft of the deeds of sale.
3.3. The identity of the land has not been established.
3.4. The Court of Appeals misapplied the basic rules governing the introduction of
secondary evidence.
3.5. The applicant/respondent's Tax Declaration No. 14181 is a "doctored" tax
declaration.
3.6. Applicant/respondent's tax declarations have no probative value.
3.7. Applicant/respondent has not satisfied the required quantum of evidence in
land registration cases.
3.8. Petitioners-oppositors have proven their right over the subject property.
In rendering judgment in favor of private respondent, the Court of Appeals
reasoned, inter alia, as follows:
On the basis of the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the
applicant, the trial court did not err in confirming that the applicant is the absolute

owner in fee simple of the property subject of the application for registration
entitling him to register the same in his name under the operation of PD 1529.
It is of no moment that the applicant failed to produce the originals of those other
deeds/documents of conveyances, for he was able to present sufficient substantial
secondary evidence, in accordance with the requirements of Section 4, Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules of Court, now Section 5, same Rule of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, and the doctrines in point.
Thus, Government vs. Martinez, 44 Phil. 817, explained that when the original
writing is not available for one reason or another which is the best or primary
evidence, to prove its contents is the testimony of some one who has read or known
about it. Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 73 SCRA 148, laid out the foundation before
secondary evidence is introduced, that the due execution, delivery and reason for
non-production of the original writing must first be produced. Raylago vs. Jarabe, 22
SCRA 1247, ruled that it is not necessary to prove the loss of the original document
beyond all possibility of mistake. A reasonable probability of its loss is sufficient and
this may be shown by a bonafide (sic) and diligent search, fruitlessly made, for it in
places where it is likely to be found. After proving the due execution and delivery of
the document, together with the fact that the same has been lost or destroyed, its
contents may be proved, among others, by the recollection of witnesses. AndBeall
vs. Dearing, 7 ala. 126; and Bogardas vs. Trinity Church, 4 Sandf. Ch. (Nn.y.) 639,
are of the view that that where the lost documents are more than thirty (30) years
old and would thus prove themselves if produced, secondary evidence of their
contents is admissible without proof of their execution.
In the case at bar, petitioner acquired the property in 1940-1941. He presented the
Deed (Exh. G) executed by the vendor Faustino Martirez. While he failed to present
the other deeds of sale covering the other portions of the property, he has
sufficiently established that they were notarized documents and were taken by his
mother-in-law sometime in 1956. He reported the loss to the authorities and even
filed a case of theft. He further exerted efforts and made a diligent search of those
documents from the notary public but in vain. He presented the clerk of the
Municipal Treasurer's Office of Banga, who testified having seen those deeds as they
were presented to him by the applicant and which were used as basis for the
preparation and issuance of Tax Declaration No. 14181 in the name of the tax
declarant. Tax Declaration No. 14181 (Exh. H) was presented in Court, proving that
the land was declared for tax purposes in the name of the applicant and his wife.
The applicant has been paying the realty tax covering the property since 1945 and
beyond 1958, when the application for registration was filed in court, per
certification of the Municipal Treasurer of Banga (Exh. 1).
In resume, We find and so hold as did the trial court that Dr. Jose Lachica is the
absolute owner in fee simple of the land described in his application for its original
registration in his name. The land contains an area of 4,845 square meters, more or
less, situated in Banga, Aklan, and
Bounded on the NE., along line 1-2, by property of Apolonia Rimate; on the SE.,
along line 2-3, by National road; on the SW., along line 3-4, by property of the Mpl.
Government of Banga (Public Market); and on the NW., along line 4-1, by property of
the Municipal Government of Banga (Public Market). Beginning at a point marked 1
on plan, being N. 45 deg. 02' E., 423.38 m. from B.L.L.M. 1, Mp. of Banga, Aklan;
thence, S. 33 deg. 46' E., 87.66 m. to point "2"
thence, S. 56 deg. 42' W., 63.81 m. to point "3"
thence, N. 37 deg. 22' W., 59.26 m. to point "4"

thence, N. 33 deg. 42' E., 73.08 m. to the point of

beginning, . . . All points referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked on the
ground by P.L.S. Cyl. Conc. Mons. Bearings true date of the survey, January 25,
1957, and that of the approval, October 3, 1957.
The applicant has been in public, open, continuous and adverse possession of the
property since 1940-41 up to the present to the exclusion of all, and thereby also
acquired the property by acquisitive prescription, in accordance with Sections 40
and 43 of Act 190, otherwise known as the "Code of Civil Procedure", having been in
actual and adverse possession under claim of ownership for over ten (10) years,
and thus in whatever way his occupancy might have commenced or continued
under a claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claimants,
resulted in the acquisition of title to the land by acquisitive prescription (Vda. de
Delima vs. Tio, 32 SCRA 516).
Indeed, to borrow the apt words of the ponente in the Delima case, such proof of
ownership of, and the adverse, continuous possession of the applicant since 1940,
strongly ". . . militate against any judicial cognizance of a matter that could have
been withheld in its ken," hence, whatever right oppositors may have had over the
property or any portion thereof was thereby also lost through extinctive prescription
in favor of the applicant who had been in actual, open, adverse and continuous
possession of the land applied for in the concept of owner for over 10 years when
the application for registration was filed in court. 4
It is a fundamental and settled rule that findings of fact by the trial court and the
Court of Appeals are final, binding or conclusive on the parties and upon this
Court, 5 which will not be reviewed 6 or disturbed on appeal unless these findings
are not supported by evidence 7 or unless strong and cogent reasons dictate
otherwise. 8
More explicitly, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, which are as a general
rule deemed conclusive, may be reviewed by this Court in the following instances:
1.] When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are
contradictory; 9
2.] When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures; 10
3.] When the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is
manifestly mistaken, absurd 11 or impossible;
4.] Where there is a grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of
facts; 12
5.] When the appellate court in making its findings went beyond the issues of the
case, and such findings are contrary to the submission of both appellant and
appellee;
6.] When the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of
facts; 13
7.] When the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties which, if property considered, would justify a different
conclusion; 14
8.] When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;
9.] When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; and
10.] When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence
of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record. 15

The primordial issue to be resolved is whether or not the private

respondent/applicant is entitled to the confirmation of his ownership in fee simple
for the 4, 845 square meter parcel of land he applied for.
In sum, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals adjudicated confirmed private
respondent/applicant's title to the land on the basis of the findings that: 1.] the
private respondent/applicant purchased the land from Faustino Martirez; 2.] the
subject land is covered by Tax Declaration No. 14181; 3.] the private
respondent/applicant has paid the realty taxes on the land from 1945 up to the
filing of his application in 1958; 4.] the private respondent/applicant has been in
actual, open and continuous possession of the subject land in the concept of owner
since 1945, and 5.] the private respondent/applicant has acquired the land by
prescription.
As stated earlier, a review of the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals is not a
function that this Court normally undertakes 6 unless the appellate court's findings
are palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or unless the judgment itself is
based on a misapprehension of facts. 17 A thorough review of the record convinces
this Court that the general rule with regard to the conclusiveness of the trial court's
and appellate tribunal's factual findings should not be applied because there are
material circumstances which, when properly considered, would have altered the
result of the case.
First, a circumspect scrutiny of the evidence extant on record reveals that with the
exception of 620 square meters, there has been no satisfactory showing of how
private respondent/applicant acquired the remainder of the subject land.
As can be gathered from the discussion of the appellate court, as well as the
arguments proffered by private respondent, he acquired the land in question from
three (3) sources, namely: a.] A Deed of Sale dated August 13, 1941 allegedly
executed by Faustino Martirez covering 840 square meters; b] 300 square meters
allegedly purchased from private respondent's father-in-law Eulalio Raz, and c.]
3,725 square meters private respondent allegedly bought in 1940 from Eugrocino
Alba.
The sale involving the first parcel of land covering 840 square meters, was not
questioned by petitioners as its technical description delineated in the Escritura De
Venta Absoluta dated August 13, 1941, 18 to wit:
Un terreno solar residencia antes palayero regado, actuado en el casco central del
municipio de Banga, Capiz. Sin ninguna mejora, de una extension superficial de
ochocientos cuarenta metros cuadrados (840 mts. cds.) 6 sean cuarenta metros de
frente por otros veinte y unmetrode fondo, cuyos linderos por el Norte con
propiedad de Eufrosino Alba y con Eulalio Raz; por Este con Eulalio Raz y con la
carretera provincial de Kalibo a Banga; por Sur con la misma carretera provincial y
con terreno del municipio para mercado; y por al Oeste con al terreno del mercado
municipal de Banga y con propiedad de Eufrosino Alba y al terreno tienes sus
mojones de cemento en todos sus cuatro cantos de linderia y sin otro limite visible
de linderia mas que dichos mojones y esta amillarado a mi nombre en una sola hoja
declaratoria de propiedad Tax No. 12374 en la Oficina del Tasador Provincial de
Capiz, cuyo valor amilarado actual es veinte pesos (P20.00) . . .
leaves no room for doubt as to its identity, total area of 840 square meters as well
as its dimensions of 40 meters in front and 21 meters at the base. How this parcel
was further reduced to 620 square meters is explained by the fact that the
Municipal Government of Banga appropriated 220 square meters thereof for the
Banga Public Market Road.

What, however, is seriously contested are the alleged purchases of the other two
parcels from Eulalio Raz measuring 300 square meters and from Eufrocino Alba
measuring 3,725 square meters owing to the questionable circumstances
surrounding their acquisition.
The records disclose that the subject land was originally owned by Dionisia Regado
under Tax Declaration No. 802. 19 The records further reveal that Dionisia Regado
sold: [1.] 1,850 square meters of the land to the Municipality of Banga evidenced by
a Spanish document denominated as a deed of sale dated April 29, 1914; 20 [2.]
1,320 square meters to Eulalio Raz evidenced by a document entitled Escritura de
Venta Absoluta dated September 6, 1918, 21 and [3.] 2,938 square meters to
Eufrocino Alba evidenced by a deed of conveyance dated September 6, 1918
written in Spanish. 22
Faustino Martirez acquired a portion of 840 square meters from Eulalio Raz on
January 15, 1933. 23 Raz retained 480 square meters, however, he and his wife
Octabela Alba conveyed a 240 square meter portion thereof to Susana Braulio on
November 5, 1956. 24 Subsequently on May 29, 1969, the heirs of Eufrocino Alba
sold a 676 square meter portion of the parcel purchased by Eufrocino to Octabela
Alba Vda. de Raz. 25 The deed of conveyance was duly registered with the Registry
of Deeds of Aklan pursuant to Act No. 334 on June 17, 1969 26 and is covered by Tax
Declaration No. 332 in the name of Eulalio Raz, her husband. 27
Other than the foregoing transactions involving the subject land which are borne out
by the documentary evidence on record, private respondent/applicant did not
produce the alleged deeds of conveyances evidencing the purported transfers made
by Eulalio Raz and Eufrocino Alba in his favor. Instead he relied chiefly on secondary
evidence to prove the existence thereof which was sustained by both the trial and
the appellate courts. Such reliance on secondary evidence vis-a-vis the peculiar
facts prevailing in this case rests on infirm legal bases much more so in the face of
the overwhelming documentary evidence of petitioners arrayed against it because

. . . [a] contract of sale of realty cannot be proven by means of witnesses, but must
necessarily be evidenced by a written instrument, duly subscribed by the party
charged, or by his agent, or by secondary evidence of their contents. No other
evidence, therefore, can be received except the documentary evidence referred to,
in so far as regards such contracts, and these are valueless as evidence unless they
are drawn up in writing in the manner aforesaid. 28
An applicant for registration of land, if he relies on a document evidencing his title
thereto, must prove not only the genuineness of his title but the identity of the land
therein referred to. The document in such a case is either a basis of his claim for
registration or not at all. If, as in this case, he only claims a portion of what is
included in his title, he must clearly prove that the property sought to be registered
is included in that title. 29
Second, there are glaring variances in the identities and technical descriptions of
the land applied for by private respondent/applicant and the land he purportedly
purchased from Eufrocino Alba.
Private respondent/applicant alleged that he purchased the remainder of the subject
land measuring 3,725 square meters from Eufrocino Alba sometime in 1940
averring that this parcel is listed as Item No. 5 of his Exhibit "I" which is
denominated as an "Inventory And Appraisal Of The Properties Of The Spouses
Adela Raz De Lachica (Deceased) and Dr. Jose Lachica." Item

No. 5 30 of the said inventory described the parcel of land mentioned therein as
follows:
5. Una parcela de terreno cocal secano, amillarado en nombre de Eufrocino Alba
bajo el Tax No. 12792 por valor de P390.00, situado en el municipio de Banga,
Capiz, que linda el Norte con Lorenzo Retiro, y Silverio Relis; al Este con la carretera
provincial Banga-Libacao; al sur con Bienvenido M. Alba y al Oeste con Cirilo rala y
Adela Raz; con una extension aproximada de una (1) hectarea (20) areas y (35)
centiareas poco mas o menos. (Note: Said property was purchased by the spouses
Jose Lachica and Adela Raz Lachica from Eufrocino M. Alba in the amount of P500.00
as evidenced by a Escritura de Compraventa executed on November 25, 1940, at
Himamaylan, Negros Occidental and notarized by Atty. Conrado Gensiano, as Reg.
Not. 122, Pag. 67, Libro VIII, Serie 1940).
On the other hand, the land applied for is described technically per Psu 161277 as

A parcel of land (as shown on Plan Psu-161277), situated in Poblacion, Municipality

of Banga, Province of Aklan. Bounded on the NE., along line 1-2, by property of
Apolonia Rimate; on the SE., along line 2-3, by National Road; on the SW., along line
3-4, by property of the Mpl. Government of Banga (Public Market); and on the NW.,
along line 4-1, by property of the Municipal Government of Banga (Public Market).
Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan, being N. 45 deg. 02' E., 423.38 m. from
B.L.L.M. 1, Mp. of Banga, Aklan;
thence S. 33 deg. 46' E. 87.66 m. to point "2"
thence S. 56 deg. 42" W., 63.81 m. to point "3"
thence N. 37 deg. 22' W., 59.26 m. to point "4"
thence N. 33 deg. 42' E., 73.08 m. to the point of
beginning, containing an area of FOUR THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND FORTY
FIVE (4,845) SQUARE METERS. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and
are marked on the ground by P.L.S. Cyl. Conc. Mons. Bearings true date of survey,
January 25, 1957, and that of the approval, October 3, 1957. 31
It will be readily noted vis-a-vis the foregoing that: a.] the land applied for is covered
by Tax Declaration No. 14181 while the parcel allegedly purchased from Eufrocino
Alba is covered by Tax Declaration No. 15792; b.] the land applied for is palayero
whereas the land allegedly acquired from Eufrocino Alba is cocal secano. Palay is
unhusked rice, 32 thus, the term palayero refers to land devoted to the planting
rice; cocal, on the other hand, means coconut tree
plantation 33 while secano denotes unwatered land or a dry sand bank; 34 c.] the
land applied for has an area of 4,845 square meters whereas the land supposedly
sold by Eufrocino Alba measures 12,035 square meters; d.] the land applied for is
bounded on the NE by the Banga Public Market, on the SE by Apolinia Rimate, on
the SW by the Banga-Kalibo National Road; and on the NW by the Banga Public
market whereas the land allegedly obtained from Eufrocino Alba is bounded on the
N by Ernesto Retino and Silverio Relis, on the E by the Banga-Libaco Carreta
Provincial, on the S by Bienvenido Alba and on the W by the Cirilo Rala and Adela
Raz. It needs be stressed in this regard that a person who claims that he has better
right to real property must prove not only his ownership of the same but also must
satisfactorily prove the identity thereof.35
Third, both trial and appellate courts placed undue reliance on Tax Declaration No.
14181 considering that there is no satisfactory explanation of how the area of land
covered by Tax Declaration No. 14181 geometrically ballooned from a modest 620
square meter lot to a huge parcel measuring 4,845 square meters.

As pointed out by petitioners, Tax Declaration No. 14181 was preceded by 1954 Tax
Declaration No. 13578 in the name of private respondent/applicant and his spouse
which shows that the land declared therein for taxation purposes covers an area of
620 square meters. Tax Declaration No. 13578 was preceded by 1953 Tax
Declaration No. 13040 in the name of Adela Raz, private respondent's wife. The land
declared for taxation purposes therein also has an area of 620 square meters. Tax
Declaration No. 134040 was preceded by 1947 Tax Declaration No. 6528 in the
name of private respondent's wife, Adela Raz. The land declared therein for taxation
purposes likewise measures 620 square meters.
It appears that the quantum leap from 620 square meters in 1947 to 4,845 square
meters in 1956 came about on account of an affidavit dated November 17, 1956
wherein private respondent/applicant requested 36 the Municipal Assessor of Banga
to issue a revised tax declaration covering 4,845 square meters on the bare claim
that "the area has been decreased" to only 620 square meters. The timing of the
revision and its proximity to the date of filing of the application can not but
engender serious doubts on the application more so considering that prior thereto
realty tax payments covering the period 1945 to 1956 covered an area measuring
620 square meters and private respondent/applicant is banking on said payments to
claim possession and ownership over the same period for an infinitely larger area of
4,845 square meters.
A tax declaration, by itself, is not conclusive evidence of ownership. 37 Tax
declarations for a certain number of years, although constituting proof of claim of
title to land, 38 is not incontrovertible evidence of ownership unless they are
supported by other effective proof. 39 It was, thus, held in one case 40 that where
realty taxes covering thirty-one (31) years were paid only a few months prior to the
filing of an application, such payment does not constitute sufficient proof that the
applicant had a bona fide claim of ownership prior to the filing of the application.
Still in another case, 41 the claim that the applicant had been incontinuous and
uninterrupted possession of the disputed land was not given credence because it
was negated by the fact that he declared the land for taxation purposes in October
1959 when he filed his application for registration although he could have done so
in 1937 when he allegedly purchased the land. A belated declaration is,
furthermore, indicative that the applicant had no real claim of ownership over the
subject land prior to the declaration 42 and where there are serious discrepancies in
the tax declarations as in this case, registration must be denied. 43 If at all, the
foregoing facts only serves to underscore private respondent/applicant's crafty
attempt to cloak with judicial color his underhanded scheme to seize the adjoining
parcels of land and to enrich himself at the expense of its rightful owners.
Fourth, the lower court's reliance on prescription is not well-taken given the peculiar
facts prevailing in this case.
The law in force at the time an action accrues is what governs the proceeding
consistent with the fundamental dictum that laws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is proved. 44 Basic is the rule that no statute, decree, ordinance,
rule, regulation or policy shall be given retrospective effect unless explicitly stated
so. 45 Along the same vein, a court's jurisdiction depends on the law existing at the
time an action is filed 46 and a law continues to be in force with regard to all rights
which accrued prior to the amendment thereof. 47
In this case, the controlling statute when the private respondent/applicant filed his
application for registration on April 28, 1958 is Section 48 of Commonwealth Act
141, as amended by RA Nos. 1942 and 6236, 48 which states that:

Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose
titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claim
and issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States
have applied for the purchase, composition or other form of grant of lands of the
public domain under the laws and royal decrees then in force and have instituted
and prosecuted the proceedings in connection therewith, but have with or without
default upon their part, or for any other cause, not received title therefor, if such
applicants or grantees and their heirs have occupied and cultivated said lands
continuously since the filing of their applications. 49
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership, for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. 50
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture,
whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30
years shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof. 51
A circumspect scrutiny of the assailed Decision readily shows that in the affirming
the ruling of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the provisions of Section
19 of Act 496 52 in relation to the Civil Code's provision's on prescription on the
assumption that the subject land is private land. Therein lies the flaw in the
appellate court's postulate. The application for registration of private respondent is
for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title considering that the land is presumed
under the Regalian Doctrine to be part of the public domain.
Public lands are broadly classified into 1.] Alienable or disposable lands; and, 2.]
Inalienable or non-disposable public lands. Non-disposable public lands or those not
susceptible of private appropriation include a.] Timber lands; and, b.] Mineral
lands. 53 For purposes of administration and disposition, the lands of the public
domain classified as "disposable" or "alienable" are further sub-classified into a.]
Agricultural; b.] Residential, commercial, industrial or for similar productive
purposes; c.] Educational, charitable or other similar purposes, and d.] Reservations
for town sites and for public and quasi-public purposes. 54
From the foregoing classifications, public agricultural land may be defined as those
alienable portions of the public domain which are neither timber nor mineral lands.
Thus the term includes residential, commercial and industrial lands for the reason
that these lands are neither timber nor mineral lands. 55
On the other hand, Section 19 of Act No. 496, as amended, permits the registration
of private lands claimed to be owned by the applicant in fee simple which refer to:
1.] Lands acquired by various types of titles from the government during the
Spanish Regime by way of grants by the Spanish crown namely the: a.] Titulo real or
royal grant; b.] Concession especial or special grant; c] Composicion con el
estado title or adjustment title; d.] Titulo de compra or title by purchase and;

e.] Informacion posesoria or possessory information title, which could become

a Titulo gratuito or a gratuitous title; 56
2.] Lands that are claimed to be owned by accession, i.e. accretion, avulsion,
formation of islands, abandoned river beds, as provided for in Articles 457, 461 and
464 of the Civil Code; and
3.] Lands which have been acquired in any other manner provided by law.
Suffice it to state that the land sought to be registered by private respondent hardly
falls under any of the latter classifications of land referred to by Act No. 496, as
amended. Given the foregoing facts, prescription in the manner invoked by both
courts can not be pleaded to bolster private respondent/applicant's claim because

. . . [N]o public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express
or implied from the government; it is indispensable that there be a showing of title
from the state . . . . 57
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, the possession of public agricultural land, however, long the period may
have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor. 58 The reason, to
reiterate our ruling, is because the statute of limitations with regard to public
agricultural land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove
possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required
number of years to constitute a grant from the State. 59
Fifth, even assuming ex gratia argumenti that prescription can be applied in the
manner invoked by the trial court and the appellate court, it must be pointed out
that
. . . [W]hile Art. 1134 of the Civil Code provides that "(o)wnership and other real
rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through
possession of ten years," this provision of law must be read in conjunction with Art.
1117 of the same Code. This article states that ". . . (o)rdinary acquisitive
prescription of things requires possession in good faith and with just title for the
time fixed by law." Hence, a prescriptive title to real estate is not acquired by mere
possession thereof under claim of ownership for a period of ten years unless such
possession was acquired con justo titulo y buena fe (with color of title and good
faith). 60 The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the
person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit
his ownership. 61 For purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse
claimant came into possession of the property through one of the recognized modes
of acquisition of ownership or other real rights but the grantor was not the owner or
could not transmit any
right. 62
It can not be said that private respondent's possession was con justo titulo y buena
fe. On the contrary, private respondent/applicant's act of appropriating for himself
the entire area of 4,845 square meters to the exclusion of petitioners who have
been occupying portions of the disputed land constituted acts of deprivation
tantamount to bad faith. Indeed this Court has ruled that the
. . . [c]oncealment and misrepresentation in the application that no other persons
had any claim or interest in the said land, constitute specific allegations of extrinsic
fraud supported by competent proof. Failure and intentional omission of the
applicants to disclose the fact of actual physical possession by another person
constitutes an allegation of actual fraud. 63 Likewise, it is fraud to knowingly omit or
conceal a fact, upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third person. 64

Suffice it to state in this regard that to allow private respondent/applicant to benefit

from his own wrong would run counter to the maxim ex dolo malo non oritur actio
no man can be allowed to found a claim upon his own wrongdoing. 65
It need not be overemphasized that extraordinary acquisitive prescription can not
similarly vest ownership over the property upon private respondent/applicant
because Article 1137 of the Civil Code states in no uncertain terms that
Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through
uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of good
faith.
Needless to state, private respondent/applicant's possession of thirteen (13) years
falls way below the thirty-year requirement mandated by Article 1137.
Sixth, petitioners/oppositors have, in stark contrast to the secondary proof of
private respondent, adduced overwhelming evidence to prove their ownership of
the portions they claim in the subject land. The evidence on record clearly points to
the fact that private respondent/applicant's right, if at all, is confined to only 620
square meters or what has been left of the 840 square meters he purchased from
Faustino Martirez after 220 square meters thereof were appropriated by the
Municipality of Banga for the Public Market Road. 66
The records further bear out that the original owner of the whole area was one
Dionisia Regado who executed three (3) deeds of sale covering certain portions of
the disputed lands, namely: 1.] the Deed of Sale dated April 29, 1914 covering
1,850 square meters executed in favor of the Municipality of Banga; 67 2.] the Deed
of Sale dated July 10, 1915 covering 1,320 square meters executed in favor of
Eulalio Raz; 68 and, 3.] the Deed of Sale dated September 6, 1918 covering the
balance with an area of 2,938 square meters in favor of Eufrocino Alba. 69
Faustino Martirez acquired only an 840 square meter portion of the land by
purchase Eulalio Raz on January 15, 1933 as confirmed in paragraph 2 of
theEscritura De Venta Absoluta executed by him on August 13, 1941. 70 After selling
840 square meters to Faustino Martirez, Eulalio Raz retained 480 square meters to
Susana Braulio 71 leaving a balance of 240 square meters which remained
undiposed.
On May 29, 1969, Virginia Alba, Inocentes Alba and Estrella Alba, children of the
deceased Eufrocino Alba, sold a 676 square meter portion of the 2,938 square
meter lot purchased by their father from Dionisia Regado to petitioner/oppositor
Octabela alba Vda. De Raz. 72 This Deeds was duly registered with the Registry of
Deeds of Aklan in accordance with Act No. 3344 on June 17, 1969. 73 The land is
covered by Tax Declaration No. 332 in the name of Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz's
husband. 74
Petitioner/oppositor Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz's ownership of the remaining 240
square meter portion which she and her husband Eulalio Raz bought from Dionisia
Regado 75 and the 676 square meter portion which they bought from the heirs of
Eufrocino Alba 76 is fully substantiated by documentary proof. 77 Rodolfo Alba,
Lourdes Alba and Beatriz Alba's ownership of a portion measuring 1,335 square
meters 78 and another portion measuring 2,262 square meters 79 is likewise backed
by documentary evidence. Susana Braulio's ownership of a 240 square meter
portion 80 which she acquired from Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz on November 11,
1956 81 is also documented, her predecessor-in-interest having acquired the same
from Dionisia Regado on September 6, 1918. 82
The foregoing only serves to underscore the paucity of the proof of private
respondent/applicant to support his claim of ownership over the entire 4,845 square

meter area. He has not adduced evidence to show how and when he was able to
acquire, with the exception of 840 square meters further reduced to 620 square
meters on account of 220 square meters appropriated for the market road, the
bigger area of 3, 755 square meters from anybody let alone the ancestral owner,
Dionisia Regado.
His claim is anchored mainly on Revised Tax Declaration No. 14181 which he was
able to procure from the Municipal Assessor of Banga in 1956 on the basis of a selfserving affidavit which proffered the lame excuse that there was error in the
statement of the area of the land which he claimed to be 4,845 square meters
instead of 620 square meters which was the area reflected in earlier tax
declarations namely, 1954 Tax Declaration No. 13578; 1953 Tax Declaration No.
13043; and 1947 Tax Declaration No. 6528.
Be that as it may, the Court has reservations on the propriety of adjudicating to
petitioners the contested portions of the subject land, in view of their failure to
present the technical descriptions of these areas. Furthermore, there is no sufficient
evidence showing that petitioners have been in open, adverse, exclusive, peaceful
and continuous possession thereof in the concept of owner, considering that the
testimony of Octabela Alba vda. De Raz was stricken off the record.
WHEREFORE, based on foregoing premises, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 1 dated August 18, 1992 in Land Registration Case No. K101, LRC Record No. K-15104 is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1.] The 620 square meter portion on which private respondent Jose N. Lachica's
house is situated, clearly delineating its metes and bounds, is hereby ORDERED
segregated from the parcel of land described in Psu-161277 situated in the
Poblacion of the Municipality of Banga, Province of Aklan, Philippines with an area of
4,484 square meters, to be registered and confirmed in the name of private
respondent;
2.] A ten (10) meter road width along the National road mentioned in the application
be segregated for future road widening programs upon the payment of just
compensation to be annotated at the back of the title.
3.] Insofar as the ownership of the remainder of the subject land is concerned, the
case is hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for the reception of further
evidence for the petitioners to establish the other requisites for the confirmation of
title and registration in their names of the areas they respectively claim.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127296. January 22, 1998]
EDUBIGIS GORDULA, CELSO V. FERNANDEZ, JR., CELSO A. FERNANDEZ,
NORA ELLEN ESTRELLADO, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, J.F.
FESTEJO AND CO., INC. AND REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
LAGUNA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (represented by the National Power
Corporation), respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Before us is a petition to affirm the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27,
Sta. Cruz, Laguna, which was reversed by the respondent Court of Appeals in its
Decision[1] dated June 20, 1996 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 45466.Petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration was denied by respondent court on November 15, 1996.[2]

The facts show that on June 26, 1969, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 573[3]withdrawing from sale and settlement and setting aside as
permanent forest reserves, subject to private rights, certain parcels of the public
domain denominated as follows:
Parcel No. 1 - Magat River Forest Reserve
Parcel No. 2 - Chico River Forest Reserve
Parcel No. 3 - Abulug River Forest Reserve
Parcel No. 4 - Penaranda River Forest Reserve
Parcel No. 5 - Angat River-Bustos Dam Forest Reserve
Parcel No. 6 - Ambayawan River Forest Reserve
Parcel No. 7 - Umiray River Forest Reserve
Parcel No. 8 - Kaliwa River Forest Reserve
Parcel No. 9 - Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve
Parcel No. 10 - Barit River-Lake Buhi Forest Reserve
Parcel No. 11 - Jalaur River Forest Reserve
They were primarily for use as watershed area. Their development was to be
undertaken by the Bureau of Forestry, with the cooperation of, among other
government agencies, the National Power Corporation (Napocor).
Located in Talaongan, Cavinti, Laguna with an area of Twenty Nine Thousand Seven
Hundred Seven (29,707) square meters, and bearing the following boundaries:
North - National Power Corporation
South - Road and Baldomero Halili
West - National Power Corporation
East - National Power Corporation
the parcel of land subject of the case at bar is, by petitioners' explicit admission,
[4]
within Parcel No. 9, the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve.
More than three years after the land was segregated as part of the Caliraya-Lumot
River Forest Reserve, or on January 9, 1973, petitioner Edubigis Gordula, a native of
Cavinti, Laguna, filed with the Bureau of Lands, an Application [5] for a Free Patent
over the land. Manuel Fernandez and several others also filed free patent
applications covering other parcels of land in the area.
On February 5, 1973, petitioner Gordula declared the land for taxation purposes in
his name as shown in Tax Declaration No. 0429.
The Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands referred the free patent applications of
petitioner Gordula, Fernandez, and several others to Mr. Ravanal Ravanzo, then the
General Manager of the Napocor. Mr. Ravanzo responded through the following
letter:
"October 24, 1973
The Director
Regional Lands Office No. IV
757 Gen. Solano St.
San Miguel, Manila
S i r:
This refers to the Free Patent Application[s] of Manuel Fernandez, et al., of Barrio
Talaongan, Cavinti, Laguna, which were referred to this Office for clearance it having
been found that they are within the Caliraya-Lumot Watershed Reservation under
Proclamation No. 573 dated June 26, 1969.
Investigation conducted by this Office reveals that applicants have sufficient ground
to establish `priority rights' over the areas claimed and that agricultural
improvements introduced thereon are not detrimental to the watershed.

In view thereof, this Office interpose[s] no objection to the application by the

applicants contained in your letter dated October 2, 1973.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) R.R. RAVANZO
General Manager"
On December 10, 1973, petitioner Gordula had the land surveyed; Survey Plan No.
F(IV-5) 949-D under his name was approved by the Regional Director of the Bureau
of Lands. Thereafter, Mr. Amundo Munda, a Land Inspector of the Bureau of Lands,
conducted the requisite investigations.
On January 17, 1974, petitioner Gordula's Application for Free Patent was
approved. Free Patent No. 693 was issued in his name.
On January 30, 1974, the Register of Deeds of Laguna issued, on the basis of Free
Patent No. 693, Original Certificate of Title No. P-1405 in the name of petitioner
Gordula.
He declared the land anew for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration NO.
6498. He paid its real estate taxes from 1975 to 1979.
In the meantime, respondent Republic, through the Napocor, contracted the Certeza
Surveying Company to surveythe area constituting the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest
Reserve. The survey plans were approved by the Regional Director of the Bureau of
Lands on October 27, 1975.
The said survey plans, as well as the Cadastral Map of Talaongan and the Geological
Plan of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, show that petitioner Gordula's land
is located in the saddle area of the watershed recreation for the hydro-electric
reservoir.
On January 22, 1979, petitioner Gordula sold the land to petitioner Celso V.
Fernandez, Jr. for six thousand pesos (P6,000.00). The Register of Deeds of Laguna
cancelled Original Certificate of Title No. P-1405 and issued, in lieu thereof, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-85445 in the name of petitioner Fernandez, Jr. The latter
declared the land for taxation purposes in his name.
On March 12, 1979, Fernandez, Jr. executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the land in
favor of petitioner Celso A. Fernandez for six thousand five hundred pesos
(P6,500.00). Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-85445 was cancelled and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 85594 was issued on March 21, 1979 in the name of
petitioner Fernandez.
As approved by the Bureau of Lands in Psd-Plan 04-014230, petitioner Fernandez
subdivided the land into nine (9) lots. On August 16, 1985, the Register of Deeds of
Laguna issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 102492 to 102500 in his name
covering the nine (9) subdivision lots.
On August 29, 1985, he sold the lots to petitioner Nora Ellen Estrellado for twenty
one thousand pesos (P21,000.00). Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 102492 to
102500 were cancelled, and in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T103404 to T-103412 were issued to petitioner Estrellado.
On October 17, 1986, petitioner Estrellado mortgaged to petitioner Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP) four [6] (4) of the (9) lots. Another lot, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 103408, was sold to petitioner J.F. Festejo Company,
Inc. to whom was issued, in lieu of the former, Transfer Certificate of Title No.
106495.
On July 16, 1987, former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No.
224[7] vesting in the Napocor "complete jurisdiction, control and regulation" over the
"Caliraya-Lumot Watershed Reservation as covered by Proclamation No. 573".

On July 26, 1987, Mr. Antonio Aquino, Jr., the Civil Security Officer of the Cavinti
reservoir complex, sent a Memorandum to the President of the Napocor informing
him of the fences and roads being constructed in the saddle area, more particularly,
in the lots sold by petitioner Fernandez to petitioner Estrellado.
On July 28, 1987, Mr. A. Coronado, the Manager of the Cavinti reservoir complex,
asked petitioner Fernandez to remove all the improvements made in the Estrellado
lots. In reply, petitioner Fernandez claimed that the roads being constructed would
not adversely affect the reservoir area in case of heavy floods because the
Estrellado lots were elevated at a height of around fifty (50) feet.
In view of petitioner Fernandez's refusal, the Napocor assigned two (2) security
guards over the lot. The guards ordered the construction workers to leave their
posts and barred their return without permission from the Napocor.
On October 18, 1987, petitioner Fernandez, as attorney-in-fact and counsel of
petitioner Estrellado, wrote to the President of the Napocor threatening to file a
multi-million damage suit if the guards were not removed within fifteen (15) days.
On November 18, 1987, respondent Republic, through the Napocor, filed against
petitioners a Complaint for Annulment of Free Patent and Cancellation of Titles and
Reversion with Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the RTC of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. [8] On
January 29, 1988, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon a bond
of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00).
On December 28, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of
petitioners. The dispositive portion of its decision states:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and against
plaintiff:
(1) Dismissing plaintiff's complaint and dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction
issued in this case;
(2) Ordering National Power Corporation to pay defendant Celso A.
Fernandez P300,000.00 as actual damages andP30,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
With costs against the plaintiff.
SO ORDERED."[9]
Respondent Republic, through the Napocor, elevated the case to the respondent
Court of Appeals.
On June 20, 1996, the respondent Court of Appeals ruled against petitioners. It
held, inter alia, viz:
"The kernel and primal issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not Free
Patent No. IV-5(693) and Original Certificate of Title No. P-1405 and all derivative
titles thereafter issued to the Appellees x x x are null and void. The Appellant avers
that the parcel of land covered by the aforesaid Free Patent issued to Gordula is a
portion of the vast track of land reserved by former President Marcos as permanent
forest under Proclamation No. 573 dated June 26, 196[9] x x x and hence, nondisposable and inalienable, pursuant to Section 88 in relation to Section 83 of
Commonwealth Act [No.] 141, as amended. In contrast, the Court a quo dismissed
Appellant's complaint, in the light of the exclusionary clause in Proclamation No.
573 x x x that the setting up of the permanent forest reserves over the CalirayaLumot Watershed area was `subject to private rights' if there be any and the letterclearance of the then General Manager of [Napocor] x x x dated October 24, 1973,
interposing no objection to the Application for a free patent of Manuel Fernandez, et
al.
xxx

We are convinced, beyond cavil, that the parcel of land subject of the Free Patent
issued to Gordula on January 17, 1974 and covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. P-1405 issued on January 30, 1974 x x x as the two (2) parcels of land
purportedly purchased by the [Republic] from Perez and Glorioso in 1941, were
public disposable and alienable lands before the issuance, by the former President,
of Proclamation No. 573, on June 26, 196[9]. x x x The property was, however, later
reserved, under Proclamation No. 573, as a permanent forest, on June 26,
196[9]. Since then, the property became non-disposable and inalienable public land.
xxx
xxx
At the time Gordula filed his application for a Free Patent, on January 9, 1973, the
parcel of land x x x was already reserved as a permanent forest under Proclamation
No. 573. Since the property was already a forest reservation as of June 26, 196[9],
the same could no longer be disposed of or alienated in favor of private individuals
x x x.
xxx
We do not agree with Appellees' and the Court a quo's pose that Gordula's property
was exempt from the application of Proclamation No. 573 because, by express
provision thereof, the reservation was `subject to private rights, if there be any' x x
x.
Appellees failed to adduce proof that, as of June 26, 196[9], Gordula had acquired
ownership or title to the aforesaid property either by deed or by any other mode of
acquisition from the State by operation of law for that matter such as for instance,
alienable public land held by a possessor personally, or through his predecessors-ininterest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed period of thirty (30)
years, is converted into private property by mere lapse of period ipso jure x x x. In
the present recourse, Gordula, as of 196[9], had been in possession of the property
for only [twenty-five (25) years] years since 1944 when he commenced, as can be
gleaned from his application x x x for a free patent, possession of the property. The
period of Gordula's occupancy after 196[9] should not be tacked to the period from
1944 because by then the property was not susceptible of occupancy, disposition,
conveyance or alienation. x x x
xxx
The Appellees cannot find refuge in the letter of the then General Manager of
[Napocor], Ravanal Ravanzo, on October 24, 1973 x x x.
In the first place, Ravanzo made no explicit and unequivocal statement, in said
letter, that Gordula had priority rights to the property. What he merely declared was
that `applicants have sufficient ground to establish priority rights over the areas
claimed x x x'. Even if it may be conceded, for the nonce, that indeed, Ravanzo
declared that Gordula had priority rights over the property claimed by him, such a
declaration is irrefragably erroneous. Munda and the Director of Lands erred in
recommending the approval of Gordula's application in the same manner that the
then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources erred in issuing the patent to
Gordula. But then, well-settled is the doctrine, enunciated by the Supreme Court, in
a catena of cases, that the State cannot be bound and estopped by the errors or
mistakes of its agents or officials x x x.
The General Manager of the Appellant is not vested with authority to allow the
occupancy or acquisition, by private individuals, of such properties, whether still
needed by the Appellant or not, reserved by the President of the Philippines for

permanent forests. Only the President or [the] Congress, by statutory fiat, can
revert the property to the disposable or alienable portion of the public domain.
Anent Appellees' plea that they are buyers of the property in good faith, they must
harken to the Decision of the Supreme Court in Republic of the Philippines vs. Court
of Appeals, et al., 148 SCRA 480 that:
`x x x even assuming that the transferees are innocent purchasers for value, their
titles to said lands derived from the titles of private respondents which were not
validly issued as they cover lands still a part of the public domain, may be
cancelled.' x x x
We do not agree with Appellees' claim that Appellant's suit was barred by
prescription and by the purported indefeasibility of their title. Prescription, basically,
does not run against the State. The right of the State for the reversion of unlawfully
acquired property is not barred by prescription nor by the perceived indefeasibility
of Appellees' title for that matter. x x x"[10]
Thus states the dispositive portion of the decision of respondent appellate court:
"IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the assailed Decision is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Another Decision is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Free Patent No. IV-5-693 and Original Certificate of Title No. P1405 issued under
the name of Edubigis Gordula and all derivative titles issued to the Appellees are
hereby declared null and void;
2. The parcel of land covered by said titles is hereby declared reverted to the
Government under the jurisdiction, control and supervision of the [Napocor] under
Executive Order No. 224 of former President Corazon C. Aquino;
3. The Appellees and all those acting for and in their behalf are hereby prohibited
from intruding into and disturbing the Appellant of its possession and dominion of
the subject property; [and]
4. Appellees' counterclaims are DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED."[11]
Hence, this petition anchored on the following grounds:
"FIRST
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE SUBJECT LAND IS WITHIN THE LANDS BOUGHT BY
THE NPC EITHER FROM GERONIMO PEREZ ON MARCH 10, 1941 AND/OR FROM
CELERINO GLORIOSO ON SEPTEMBER 26, 1941;
SECOND
ON [sic] THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF PAGE 19 UP TO PAGE 23, LAST PAGE OF THE
DECISION, THE RESPONDENT COURT WENT BEYOND THE ISSUES OF THE CASE
WHICH RESULTED [IN THE] REVERSAL OF THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT X X
X;
THIRD
THE FACTUAL FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE IN
CONFLICT WITH THE FINDINGS OF THE RESPONDENT COURT CONCERNING THE
ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER EDUBIGIS GORDULA HAD ACQUIRED
`PRIVATE RIGHTS' ON THE SUBJECT LAND, WHICH IS AN EXCEPTION UNDER
PROCLAMATION NO. 573. HENCE, THIS CASE IS A QUESTION OF FACTS AND OF LAW.
X X X;
FOURTH
THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT THE SUBJECT LAND IS WITHIN THE AREA OF
PROCLAMATION NO. 573.HOWEVER THE RESPONDENT [COURT] GRAVELY ERRED
TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT WENT TO THE EXTENT OF

DISCUSSING ON [sic] THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND INVESTIGATION RELATIVE TO THE

ISSUANCE OF THE TITLE TO PETITIONER EDUBIGIS GORDULA AND AFTERWARD
DECLARED THAT GORDULA WHO HAS A TITLE ON THE SUBJECT LAND HAS NOT
ACQUIRED `PRIVATE RIGHTS' ON THE LAND DESPITE OF [sic] THE FACT THAT SAID
RESPONDENT COURT IS ALREADY PRECLUDED FROM DISCUSSING THE FACTS
RELATIVE ON [sic] THE ISSUANCE OF THE TITLE BY AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT
OF THE PHILIPPINES, MORE SO ITS FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION IS [sic] AGAINST
THE LAW, JUSTICE AND EQUITY. THIS IS AGAINST THE RULING IN ESPINOSA VS.
MAKALINTAL, 79 PHIL. 134 and ORTUA VS. SINGSON ENCARNACION, 5[9] PHIL. 440;
and
FIFTH
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THEN GENERAL
MANAGER RAVANZO OF NPC AND UNDERSECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE BY
AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES ERRED IN ISSUING THE PATENT
TO PETITIONER GORDULA. THIS IS AGAINST THE RULING IN ESPINOSA VS.
MAKALINTAL, 79 PHIL. 134 and ORTUA VS. SINGSON ENCARNACION, 5[9] PHIL.
440."[12]
We affirm the Court of Appeals.
We start with the proposition that the sovereign people, represented by their
lawfully constituted government, have untrammeled dominion over the forests on
their native soil. Forest lands, being the self-replenishing, versatile and all-important
natural resource that they are, need to be reserved and saved to promote the
people's welfare. By their very nature[13] or by executive or statutory fiat, they are
outside the commerce of man, unsusceptible of private appropriation in any form,
[14]
and inconvertible into any character less than of inalienable public domain,
regardless of their actual state, for as long as the reservation subsists and is not
revoked by a subsequent valid declassification. [15]
"Once again, we reiterate the rule enunciated by this Court in Director of Forestry
vs. Muoz and consistently adhered to in a long line of cases the more recent of
which is Republic vs. Court Appeals, that forest lands or forest reserves are
incapable of private appropriation, and possession thereof, however long, cannot
convert them into private properties.This ruling is premised on the Regalian doctrine
enshrined not only in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution but also in the 1987
Constitution."[16]
Petitioners do not contest the nature of the land in the case at bar. It is admitted
that it lies in the heart of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, which
Proclamation No. 573 classified as inalienable and indisposable. Its control was
vested in the NAPOCOR under E.O. No. 224.
Petitioners, however, contend that Proclamation No. 573 itself recognizes private
rights of landowners prior to the reservation. They claim to have established their
private rights to the subject land.
We do not agree. No public land can be acquired by private persons without any
grant, express or implied from the government; it is indispensable that there be a
showing of a title from the state.[17] The facts show that petitioner Gordula, did not
acquire title to the subject land prior to its reservation under Proclamation No.
573. He filed his application for free patent only in January, 1973, more than three
(3) years after the issuance of Proclamation No. 573 in June, 1969. At that time, the
land, as part of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, was no longer open to
private ownership as it has been classified as public forest reserve for the public
good.

Nonetheless, petitioners insist that the term, "private rights", in Proclamation No.
573, should not be interpreted as requiring a title. They opine that it suffices if the
claimant "had occupied and cultivated the property for so many number of years,
declared the land for taxation purposes, [paid] the corresponding real estate taxes
[which are] accepted by the government, and [his] occupancy and possession [is]
continuous, open and unmolested and recognized by the government".
[18]
Prescinding from this premise, petitioners urge that the 25-year possession by
petitioner Gordula from 1944 to 1969, albeit five (5) years short of the 30-year
possession required under Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, as amended, is
enough to vest upon petitioner Gordula the "private rights" recognized and
respected in Proclamation No. 573.
The case law does not support this submission. In Director of Lands v. Reyes,[19] we
held that a settler claiming the protection of "private rights" to exclude his land
from a military or forest reservation must show "x x x by clear and convincing
evidence that the property in question was acquired by [any] x x x means for the
acquisition of public lands".
In fine, one claiming "private rights" must prove that he has complied with C. A. No.
141, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, which prescribes the
substantive as well as the procedural requirements for acquisition of public
lands. This law requires at least thirty (30) years of open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition, immediately preceding the filing of the
application for free patent. The rationale for the 30-year period lies in the
presumption that the land applied for pertains to the State, and that the occupants
and/or possessors claim an interest therein only by virtue of their imperfect title or
continuous, open and notorious possession. [20]
Indeed, the possession of public agricultural land, however long the period may
have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor. [21] The reason, to
reiterate our ruling, is because the statute of limitations with regard to public
agricultural land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove
possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required
number of years to constitute a grant from the State. [22]
In the case at bar, petitioners have failed to comply with the mandatory 30-year
period of possession. Their 25-year possession of the land prior to its reservation as
part of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve cannot be considered compliance
with C. A. No. 141, as amended. The Court has no authority to lower this
requirement for it cannot amend the law.
Next, petitioners contend that their "private rights" have been recognized by the
government itself. They point to (1) the letter dated October 24, 1973 of then
NAPOCOR General Manager, Ravanal Ravanzo, (2) the action of the Bureau of Lands
which after investigation, declared him qualified to acquire the land; and (3) the
Free Patent issued on January 17, 1974 by the Undersecretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, by authority of the President of the Philippines. Petitioners urge
that the findings and conclusions of the aforementioned government agencies
and/or officers are conclusive and binding upon the courts, as held in the cases of
Ortua v. Singson Encarnacion[23] and Espinosa v. Makalintal.[24]
The submissions are unconvincing.
In the first place, there is nothing in Espinosa v. Makalintal that is relevant to
petitioners' claims. On the other hand, our ruling in Ortua v. Singson Encarnacion
that "a decision rendered by the Director of Lands and approved by the Secretary of

Agriculture and Commerce, upon a question of fact is conclusive and not subject to
be reviewed by the courts," [25] was made subject to the categorical caveat "in the
absence of a showing that such decision was rendered in consequence of fraud,
imposition, or mistake".[26]
Undoubtedly, then General Manager Ravanzo erred in holding that petitioner
Gordula "ha[d] sufficient ground to establish `priority rights' over the areas
claimed". This error mothered the subsequent error of the Bureau of Lands which
culminated in the erroneous grant of a free patent on January 17, 1974. The
perpetration of these errors does not have the effect of converting a forest reserve
into public alienable land. It is well-settled that forest land is incapable of
registration, and its inclusion in a title nullifies that title. [27] To be sure, the defense
of indefeasibility of a certificate of title issued pursuant to a free patent does not lie
against the state in an action for reversion of the land covered thereby when such
land is a part of a public forest or of a forest reservation, the patent covering forest
land being void ab initio.[28] Nor can the mistake or error of its officials or agents in
this regard be invoked against the government. [29] Finally, the conversion of a forest
reserve into public alienable land, requires no less than a categorical act of
declassification by the President, upon the recommendation of the proper
department head who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain
into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands. [30] There is none such in this
case.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is HEREBY DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 116111. January 21, 1999]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (Represented by the Acting Commissioner
of Land Registration),petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, Spouses
CATALINO SANTOS and THELMA BARRERO SANTOS, ST. JUDES
ENTERPRISES, INC., Spouses DOMINGO CALAGUIAN and FELICIDAD
CALAGUIAN, VIRGINIA DE LA FUENTE and LUCY MADAYA, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is the immunity of the government from laches and estoppel absolute? May it still
recover the ownership of lots sold in good faith by a private developer to innocent
purchasers for value. Notwithstanding its approval of the subdivision plan and its
issuance of separate individual certificates of title thereto?
The Case

These are the main questions raised in the Petition for Review before us, seeking to
set aside the November 29, 1993 Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals[2] in CA-GR CV
No. 34647. The assailed Decision affirmed the ruling[3] of the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City, Branch 125, in Civil Case No. C-111708, which dismissed petitioners
Complaint for the cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) to several lots in
Caloocan City, issued in the name of private respondents.
In a Resolution[4] dated July 7, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied the Republics
motion for reconsideration.
The Facts

The facts of the case are not disputed. The trial courts summary, which was
adopted by the Court of Appeals, is reproduced below:
Defendant St. Judes Enterprises, Inc. is the registered owner of a parcel of land
known as Lot 865-B-1 of the subdivision plan (LRC) PSD-52368, being a portion of

Lot 865-B located in Caloocan City containing an area of 40,623 square meters. For
Lot 865-B-1 defendant St. Judes Enterprises, Inc. was issued TCT No. 22660 on July
25, 1966.
Sometime in March 1966 defendant St Judes Enterprises, Inc. subdivided Lot No.
865-B-1 under subdivision plan (LRC) PSD-55643 and as a result thereof the Register
of Deeds of Caloocan City cancelled TCT No. 22660 and in lieu thereof issued
Certificates of Title Nos. 23967 up to 24068 inclusive, all in the name of defendants
St. Judes Enterprises, Inc. The subdivision of lot 865-B-1 [which was] covered [by]
TCT No. 22660 was later found to have expanded and enlarged from its original area
of 40,523 square meters to 42,044 square meters or an increase of 1,421 square
meters. This expansion or increase in area was confirmed by the land Registration
Commission [to have been made] on the northern portion of Lot 865-B-1.
Subsequently, defendant St. Judes Enterprises, Inc. sold the lots covered by TCT
Nos. 24013 and 24014 to defendant Sps. Catalino Santos and Thelma Barreto
Santos[;] TCT No. 24019 to defendant Sps. Domingo Calaguian and Felicidad de
Jesus[;] TCT No. 24022 to defendant Virginia dela Fuente[;] and TCT No. 2402[3] to
defendant Lucy Madaya. Accordingly, these titles were cancelled and said
defendants were issued the following: TCT No. C-43319 issued in the name of Sps.
Santos containing an area of 344 square meters[;] TCT No. 55513 issued in the
name of defendants Sps. Calaguian containing an area of 344 square meters[;] TCT
No. 13309 issued in the name of Sps. Santos[;] TCT No. 24069 issued in the name of
Virginia dela Fuente containing an area of 350 square meters[;] and TCT No. C46648 issued in the name of defendant Lucy Mandaya with an area of 350 square
meters."[5]
"[On January 29, 1985, then Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed] an action
seeking xxx the annulment and cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT)
Nos. 24015, 24017, 24018, 24020, 24021, 24024, 24025 and 24068 issued in the
name of defendant St. Jude's Enterprises, Inc.[;] Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
13309 and C-43319 both registered in the name of Sps. Catalino Santos and Thelma
B. Santos[;] TCT No. 55513 registered in the name of Sps. Domingo Calaguian and
Felicidad de Jesus[;] TCT No. 24069 registered in the name of Virginia dela Fuente[;]
and TCT No. C-46648 registered in the name of Lucy Mandaya, principally on the
ground that said Certificates of Title were issued on the strength of [a] null and void
subdivision plan (LRC) PSD-55643 which expanded the original area of TCT No.
22660 in the name of St. Jude's Enterprises, Inc. from 40,623 square meters to
42,044 square meters upon its subdivision
"Defendants Virginia dela Fuente and Lucy Mandaya were declared in default for
failure to file their respective answer within the reglementary period.
"Defendants Sps. Catalino Santos and Thelma Barreto Santos, St. Jude's Enterprises,
Inc. and Sps. Domingo Calaguian and Felicidad Calaguian filed separate answers to
the complaint. Defendants Sps. Domingo Calaguian and Sps. Catalino Santos
interposed defenses, among others, that they acquired the lots in question in good
faith from their former owner, defendant St. Jude's Enterprises, Inc. and for value
and that the titles issued to the said defendants were rendered incontrovetible,
conclusive and indefeasible after one year from the date of the issuance of the titles
by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City.
"On the other hand, defendant St. Jude's Enterprises, Inc. Interposed defenses,
among others, that the cause of action of plaintiff is barred by prior judgment; that
the subdivision plan submitted having been approved by the LRC, the government
is now in estoppel to question the approved subdivision plan; and the plaintiff's

allegation that the area of the subdivision increased by 1,421 square meters
is without any basis in fact and in law." [6]
Ruling of the Trial Court

On April 30, 1991, the trial court dismissed the Complaint. [7] While the plaintiff
sufficiently proved the enlargement or expansion of the area of the disputed
property, it presented no proof that Respondent St. Jude Enterprises, Inc. (St. Jude)
had committed fraud when it submitted the subdivision plan to the Land
Registration Commission (LRC) for approval. Because the plan was presumed to
have been subjected to investigation, study and verification by the LRC, there was
no one to blame for the increase in the area but the plaintiff[,] for having allowed
and approved the subdivision plan. Thus, the court concluded, the government was
already in estoppel to question the approved subdivision plan.
The trial court also took into account the absence of complaints from adjoining
owners whose supposed lots [were] encroached upon by the defendants, as well as
the fact that an adjoining owner had categorically stated that there was no such
encroachment.Finding that Spouses Santos, Spouses Calaguian, Dela Fuente and
Madaya had brought their respective lots from St. Jude for value and in good faith,
the court held that their titles could no longer be questioned, because under the
Torrens system, such titles had become absolute and irrevocable. As regards the
Republics allegation that it had filed the case to protect the integrity of the said
system, the court said:
xxx [S]ustaining the position taken by the government would certainly lead to
disastrous consequences. Buyers in good faith would lose their titles. Adjoining
owners who were deprived of a portion of their lot would be forced to accept the
portion of the property allegedly encroached upon. Actions for recovery will be filed
right and left[;] thus instead of preserving the integrity of the Torrens System it
would certainly cause chaos rather than stability. Finally, if only to strengthen the
Torrens System and in the interest of justice, the boundaries of the affected
properties of the defendants should not be disturbed and the status quo should be
maintained.[8]
The solicitor general appealed the trial courts Decision to the Court of Appeals.
Ruling of the Appellate Court

Citing several cases[9] upholding the indefeasibility of titles issued under the Torrens
system, the appellate court affirmed the trial court. It berated petitioner for bringing
the suit only after nineteen (19) years had passed since the issuance of St. Judes
title and the approval of the subdivision plan. The pertinent portion of the assailed
Decision reads:[10]
xxx Rather than make the Torrens system reliable and stable, [its] act of filing the
instant suit rocks the system, as it gives the impression to Torrens title holders, like
appellees, that their titles to properties can be questioned by the same authority
who had approved the same even after a long period of time. In that case, no
Torrens title holder shall be at peace with the ownership and possession of his land,
for the Commission of land Registration can question his title any time it makes a
finding unfavorable to said Torrens title holder.
Undaunted, petitioner seeks a review by this Court. [11]
The Issues

In this petition, the Republic raises the following issues for our resolution: [12]
1. Whether or not the government is estopped from questioning the approved
subdivision plan which expanded the areas covered by the transfer certificates of
title in question;

2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it did not consider the Torrens
System as merely a means of registering title to land;
3. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it failed to consider that
petitioners complaint before the lower court was filed to preserve the integrity of
the Torrens System.
We shall discuss the second and third questions together. Hence, the issues shall be
(1) the applicability of estoppel against the State and (2) the Torrens system.
The Courts Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

First Issue: Estoppel Against the Government

The general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or error
of its officials or agents.[13] However, like all general rules, this is also subject to
exceptions, viz.:[14]
Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except in
rate and unusual circumstances, and may not be invoked where they would operate
to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. They
must be applied with circumspection and should be applied only in those special
cases where the interests of justice clearly require it.Nevertheless, the government
must not be allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must
not play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations x x x, the
doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well as
against private individuals.
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,[15] the government, in its effort to recover ill-gotten
wealth, tried to skirt the application of estoppel against it by invoking a specific
constitutional provision.[16] The Court countered:[17]
We agree with the statement that the State is immune from estoppel, but this
concept is understood to refer to acts and mistakes of its officials especially those
which are irregular (Sharp International Marketing vs. Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA
299; 306 [1991];Republic v. Aquino, 120 SCRA 186 [1983]), which peculiar
circumstances are absent in the case at bar. Although the States right of action to
recover ill-gotten wealth is not vulnerable to estoppel[;] it is non sequitur to suggest
that a contract, freely and in good faith executed between the parties thereto is
susceptible to disturbance ad infinitum. A different interpretation will lead to the
absurd scenario of permitting a party to unilaterally jettison a compromise
agreement which is supposed to have the authority of res judicata (Article 2037,
New Civil Code), and like any other contract, has the force of law between parties
thereto (Article 1159, New Civil Code; Hernaez vs. Kao, 17 SCRA 296 [1966]; 6
Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, 7th ed., 1987, p. 711; 3 Aquino, Civil Code, 1990 ed., p.
463). xxx.
The Court further declared that (t)he real office of the equitable norm of estoppel is
limited to supply[ing] deficiency in the law, but it should not supplant positive law.
[18]

In the case at bar, for nearly twenty years (starting from the issuance of St.
Judes titles in 1966 up to the filing of the Complaint in 1985), petitioner failed to
correct and recover the alleged increase in the land area of St. Jude. Its prolonged
inaction strongly militates against its cause, as it is tantamount to laches, which
means the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to
do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it
is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a

presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined
to assert it.[19]
The Court notes private respondents argument that, prior to the subdivision, the
surveyors erred in the original survey of the whole tract of land covered by TCT No.
22660. So that less then the actual land area was indicated on the title. Otherwise,
the adjoining owners would have complained upon the partition of the land in
accordance with the LRC-approved subdivision plan. As it is, Florencio Quintos, the
owner of the 9,146 square-meter Quintos Village adjoining the northern portion of
St. Judes property (the portion allegedly expanded), even attested on August 16,
1973 that there [was] no overlapping of boundaries as per my approved plan (LRC)
PSD 147766 dated September 8, 1971.[20] None of the other neighboring owners
ever complained against St. Jude or the purchasers of its property. It is clear,
therefore, that there was no actual damage to third persons caused by the resurvey
and the subdivision.
Significantly, the other private respondents -- Spouses Santos, Spouses Calaguian,
Dela Fuente and Madaya -- bought such expanded lots in good faith, relying on the
clean certificates of St. Jude, which had no notice of any flaw in them either. It is
only fair and reasonable to apply the equitable principle of estoppel by laches
against the government to avoid an injustice [21] to the innocent purchasers for value.
Likewise time-settled is the doctrine that where innocent third persons, relying on
the correctness of the certificate of title, acquire rights over the property, courts
cannot disregard such rights and order the cancellation of the certificate. Such
cancellation would impair public confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone
dealing with property registered under the Torrens system would have to inquire in
every instance whether the title has been regularly issued or not. This would be
contrary to the very purpose of the law, which is to stabilize land titles. Verily, all
persons dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefor, and the law or the courts do not oblige them to go
behind the certificate in order to investigate again the true condition of the
property. They are only charged with notice of the liens and encumbrances on the
property that are noted on the certificate.[22]
When private respondents-purchasers bought their lots from St. Jude, they did not
have to go behind the titles thereto to verify their contents or search for hidden
defects or inchoate rights that could defeat their rights to said lots. Although they
were bound by liens and encumbrances annotated on the titles, private
respondents-purchasers could not have had notice of defects that only an inquiry
beyond the face of the titles could have satisfied. [23] The rationale for this
presumption has been stated thus: [24]
The main purpose of the Torrens System is to avoid possible conflicts of title to real
estate and to facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the public the right to
rely upon the face of a Torrens Certificate of Title and to dispense with the need of
inquiring further, except when the party concerned had actual knowledge of facts
and circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to make such
further inquiry (Pascua v. Capuyoc, 77 SCRA 78). Thus, where innocent third persons
relying on the correctness of the certificate thus issued, acquire rights over the
property, the court cannot disregard such rights (Director of Land v. Abache, et al.,
73 Phil. 606).
In another case,[25] this Court further said:
The Torrens System was adopted in this country because it was believed to be most
effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their

indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a

person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the sellers title thereto is
valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was
ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if this
were permitted, public confidence in the system would be eroded and land
transactions would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily
conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence would be
that land conflicts could be even more abrasive, if not even violent. The
Government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens System, should be the
first to accept the validity of titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down
by the law are satisfied. [Italics supplied.]
Petitioner never presented proof that the private respondents who had bought their
lots from St. Jude were buyers in bad faith.Consequently, their claim of good faith
prevails. A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the property of
another without notice that some other person has a right to or an interest in such
property; and who pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such
purchase or before he or she has notice of the claims or interest of some other
person.[26] Good faith is the honest intention to abstain from taking any
unconscientious advantage of another.[27]
Furthermore, it should be stressed that the total area of forty thousand six hundred
twenty-three (40,623) square meters indicated on St. Judes original title (TCT No.
22660) was not an exact area. Such figure was followed by the phrase more or
less.This plainly means that the land area indicated was not precise. Atty. Antonio H.
Noblejas, who became the counsel of St. Jude subsequent to his tenure as Land
Registration Commissioner, offers a sensible explanation. In his letter[28] to the LRC
dated November 8, 1982, he gave the following information:
a. Records show that our client owned a large tract of land situated in an area
cutting the boundary of Quezon City and Caloocan City, then known as Lot 865-B,
Psd-60608, and described in T.C.T. No. 100412, containing an area of 96,931 sq.
meters, more or less.
b. It will be noted that on the northern portion of this Lot 865-B, Psd-60608, is xxx
Lot 865-A, Psd-60608, which means that at a previous point of time, these 2 lots
composed one whole tract of land.
c. On December 23, 1965, Lot 865-B, Psd-60608, was subdivided into 2 lots,
denominated as Lot 865-B-1, with an area of 40,622 sq. meters, more or less, on the
Caloocan side, and Lot 865-B-2, with an area of 56,308 sq. meters, more or less, on
the Quezon City side, under Plan (LRC) Psd-52368.
d. On March 1-10, 1966, Lot 865-B-1, Psd-52368, then covered by T.C.T. No. N22660, was subdivided into residential lots underPlan (LRC) Psd-55643, with a total
area of 42,044 sq. meters, more or less.
e. It will be noted that Lot 865-B, Psd-60608, covered by T.C.T. No. 100412,
contained an area of 96,931 sq. meters, more or less, but when subdivided under
Plan (LRC) Psd-52368, into 2 lots, its total area shrank by 1 sq. meter, to wit:
Lot 865-B-1, Psd-52368 = 40,622 sq. meters
Lot 865-B-2, Psd-52368 = 56,308
96,930 sq. meters.
f. There is no allegation whatever in the Perez report that there was error in laying
out the metes and bounds of Lot 865-B-1 in Plan (LRC) Psd-55643, as specified in
the Technical Description of the said lot set forth in T.C.T. No. N-22660 covering the
same. There is likewise no allegation, on the contrary there is confirmation from the

boundary owner on the northern side, Mr. Florencio Quintos, that there is no
overlapping of boundaries on the northern side of Lot 865-B-1, Psd-55643.
g. We respectfully submit that the area of 42, 044 sq. meters stated in Plan (LRC)
Psd-55643 as the size of Lot 865-B-a, is the more accurate area, confirmed by the
Perez report as per surveyor[]s findings on the ground, which
rectifies previous surveryors error incomputing its area as 40,622 sq. meters in Plan
(LRC) Psd-52368, which is about 3.5% tolerable error (1,422 divided by 40,622 = .
035).
[h.] It is well settled that in the identification of a parcel of land covered by
certificate of title, what is controlling are the metes and bounds as set forth in its
Technical Description and not the area stated therein, which is merely an
approximation as indicated in the more or less phrase placed after the number of
square meters.
i. There is thus no unauthorized expansion of the survey occasioned by the
subdivision of Lot 865-B-1 under Plan (LRC) Psd-55643; consequently, LRC Circular
No. 167, Series of 1967, finds no application thereto, as to bar the processing and
registration in due course of transactions involving the subdivision lots of our client,
subject hereof. This is apart from the fact that LRC Circular No. 167 has not been
implemented by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City or any proper government
authority since its issuance in 1967, and that, in the interest of justice and equity,
its restrictive and oppressive effect on transactions over certificates of titles of
subdivisions that allegedly expanded on re-surveys, cannot be allowed to continue
indefinitely. (Italics supplied.)
The discrepancy in the figures could have been caused by the inadvertence or the
negligence of the surveyors. There is no proof, though, that the land area indicated
was intentionally and fraudulently increased. The property originally registered was
the same property that was subdivided. It is well-settled that what defines a piece
of titled property is not the numerical date indicated as the area of the land, but the
boundaries or metes and bounds of the property specified in its technical
description as enclosing it and showing its limits. [29]
Petitioner miserably failed to prove any fraud, either on the part of Private
Respondent St. Jude or on the part of land registration officials who had approved
the subdivision plan and issued the questioned TCTs. Other than its peremptory
statement in the Complaint that the expansion of the area was motivated by bad
faith with intent to defraud, to the damage and prejudice of the government and of
public interests, petitioner did not allege specifically how fraud was perpetrated to
cause an increase in the actual land size indicated. Nor was any evidence proffered
to substantiate the allegation. That the land registration authorities supposedly
erred or committed an irregularity was merely a conclusion drawn from the table
survey showing that the aggregate area of the subdivision lots exceeded the area
indicated on the title of the property before its subdivision. Fraud cannot be
presumed, and the failure of petitioner to prove it defeats it own cause.
Second Issue: The Torrens System

True, the Torrens system is not a means of acquiring titles to lands; it is merely a
system of registration of titles to lands.[30]Consequently, land erroneously included
in a Torrens certificate of title is not necessarily acquired by the holder of such
certificate.[31]
But in the interest of justice and equity, neither may the titleholder be made to bear
the unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the States agents, in the
absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third

persons. First,the real purpose of the Torrens system is to quite title to land to put a
stop forever to any question as to the legality of the title,except claims that were
noted in the certificate at the time of the registration or that may arise subsequent
thereto.[32] Second, as we discussed earlier, estoppel by laches now bars petitioner
from questioning private respondents titles to the subdivision lots. Third, it was
never proven that Private Respondent St. Jude was a party to the fraud that led to
the increase in the area of the property after its subdivision. Finally, because
petitioner even failed to give sufficient proof of any error that might have been
committed by its agent who had surveyed the property, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of their functions must be respected.Otherwise, the
integrity of the Torrens system, which petitioner purportedly aims to protect by filing
this case, shall forever be sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of land
registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly performed their
duties.[33]
We cannot, therefore, adhere to the petitioners submission that, in filing this suit, it
seeks to preserve the integrity of the Torrens system. To the contrary, it is rather
evident from our foregoing discussion that petitioners action derogates the very
integrity of the system. Time and again, we have said that a Torrens certificate is
evidence of an indefeasible title to property in favor of the person whose name
appears thereon.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 106593. November 16, 1999]
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE MAURO T.
ALLARDE, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 123,
Kalookan City and SPOUSES RUFINO AND JUANITA MATEO, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court assailing the Order,[1] dated April 8, 1992, of Branch 123 of the Regional Trial
Court of Kalookan City,[2] in Civil Case No. C-15325, which granted the motion of the
herein private respondents for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, and
the Order[3] of August 4, 1992, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The facts that matter may be culled as follows:
Lots 836 and 839, registered in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, and
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title No. 34624 and No. 34627, respectively,
were acquired by the Republic on April 2, 1938 from Philippine Trust Company.
[4]
Said lots form part of the Tala Estate in Bagong Silang, Kalookan City, which, on
April 26, 1971, was reserved by Proclamation No. 843 for, among others, the
housing programs of the National Housing Authority.
According to private respondent Rufino Mateo, he had lived in the disputed lots
since his birth in 1928. In 1959, he started farming and working on a six-hectare
portion of said lots, after the death of his father who had cultivated a thirteenhectare portion of the same lots.[5]
On September 1, 1983, the National Housing Authority notified the respondent
spouses of the scheduled development of the Tala Estate including the lots in

question, warning them that it would not be responsible for any damage which may
be caused to the crops planted on the said lots. [6]
In 1989, private respondent Rufino Mateo filed with the Department of Agrarian
Reform a petition for the award to them of subject disputed lots under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).[7]
In January 1992, in pursuance of the implementation of Proclamation No. 843,
petitioner caused the bulldozing of the ricefields of private respondents, damaging
the dikes and irrigations thereon, in the process.
On March 18, 1992, the respondent spouses, relying on their claim that subject lots
are agricultural land within the coverage of the CARP, [8] brought before the
respondent Regional Trial Court a complaint for damages with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction, to enjoin the petitioner from bulldozing further and making
constructions on the lots under controversy. Petitioner traversed such complaint,
contending that the said lots which were previously reserved by Proclamation No.
843 for housing and resettlement purposes, are not covered by the CARP as they
are not agricultural lands within the definition and contemplation of Section 3 (c) of
R. A. No. 6657.[9]
On April 8, 1992, the respondent Court issued its assailed Order granting private
respondents prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction; opining and ruling thus:
"x x x
The Court, after considering the testimony of herein plaintiff Rufino Mateo as well
as the Agrarian Reform Officer, Danilo San Gil, that the herein plaintiffs have been
occupying the subject property and actual tillers/farmers of the land owned by the
government and registered in the name of, and administered by, the NHA, the land
being an agricultural land and is, therefore, covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian
reform Program (CARP), is of the opinion that in order to maintain the status quo of
the subject property that the aforesaid prayer for the issuance of the said writ
should be, as it is hereby, GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, upon the filing by the herein plaintiffs of a bond, in the amount
of P5,000.00 duly approved by this Court, let a writ of preliminary injunction be
immediately issued restraining the defendants herein from bulldozing and making
any constructions on the land farmed and tilled by plaintiffs located in Phase IX,
Bagong Silang, Kalookan City, designated as lot 836 of the Tala Estate and of
dispossessing them of said land, or until further orders by this Court.
SO ORDERED[10]
Dissatisfied therewith, the petitioner presented a Motion for Reconsideration,
pointing out that the preliminary injunction thus issued is a blatant violation of P.D.
No. 1818, which proscribes the issuance of injunctive writs against the execution or
implementation of government infrastructure projects. But on August 4, 1992, the
said motion was denied by respondent Courts second Order under attack.
Undaunted, petitioner found its way to this Court via the Petition under
consideration, theorizing that:
I.
RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION IN RENDERING HIS ORDER OF APRIL 8, 1992 GRANTING
RESPONDENTS SPOUSES APPLICATION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUCNTION AND ISSUING
THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION DATED APRIL 15, 1992, BECAUSE HE HAD
NO JURISDICTION TO ISSUE IT AND THEY ARE NOT ENTITLED TO IT.
II

RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF

JURISDICTION IN RENDERING HIS ORDER OF AUGUST 4, 1992 DENYING PETITIONERS
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND ADDENDUM THERETO ON THE FINDING THAT
THE GROUNDS RAISED THEREIN ARE EVIDENCIARY IN NATURE, DESPITE THE FACT
THAT THEY ARE ALL SETTLED LEGAL QUESTIONS.[11]
As a rule, direct recourse to this Court is not allowed unless there are special or
important grounds for the issuance of extra-ordinary writs. [12] In the case of Garcia
vs. Burgos,[13] where pure questions of law were raised, this Court, mindful of P.D.
No. 1818, entertained a direct invocation of its jurisdiction to issue extraordinary
writs, realizing the serious consequences of delay in essential government projects.
[14]
So also, in Republic vs. Silverio,[15] a similar case involving government
infrastructure projects, the Court Took cognizance of an original action
for Certiorari against a Regional Trial Court.
In light of the foregoing, the Court believes, and so holds, that the present case
merits consideration by the Court. To the end that the prosecution and progress of
government projects vital to the national economy be not disrupted or hampered,
this Court should pass upon and resolve the questions of law raised by the
petitioner.
The pivotal issues for resolution here are: 1) Whether or not the Compressive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) covers government lands reserved for specific public
purposes prior to the effectivity of said law; and 2) Whether or not housing, plants
and resettlements are "infrastructure projects" within the contemplation of P.D. No.
1818.
The petition is impressed with merit.
In Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. Department of Agrarian Reform, [16] the Court succinctly
held that lands reserved for, or converted to, non-agricultural uses by government
agencies other than the Department of Agrarian Reform, prior to the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL), are not considered and treated as agricultural lands and therefore, outside
the ambit of said law,[17] on the basis of the following disquisition:
"x x x Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall 'cover, regardless of
tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural
lands.' As to what constitutes 'agricultural land,' it is referred to as 'lands devoted to
agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land. The deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission confirm this limitation. 'Agricultural lands' are only those lands which
are 'arable and suitable agricultural lands' and 'do not include commercial,
industrial and residential lands'
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo
Hills Subdivision cannot in any language be considered as 'agricultural lands.' These
lots were intended for residential use. They ceased to be agricultural lands upon
approval of their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. x x x"[18]
Thus, since as early as April 26, 1971, the Tala Estate (including the disputed lots)
was reserved, inter alia, under Presidential Proclamation No. 843, for the housing
program of the National Housing Authority, the same has been categorized as not
being devoted to the agricultural activity contemplated by Section 3 (c) of R.A. No.
6657,[19] and is, therefore, outside the coverage of the CARL. Verily, the assailed
Orders of the respondent Court declaring the lots under controversy as "agricultural
land" and restraining the petitioner from involving the same in its housing project
thereon, are evidently bereft of any sustainable basis.

Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1818, provides:

SECTION 1. No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction in any
case, dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure project, or a mining,
fishery, forest or other natural resource development project of the government, or
any public utility operated by the government, including among others public
utilities for the transport of the goods or commodities, stevedoring and arrastre
contracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity or government official from
proceeding with, or continuing the execution or implementation of any such project,
or the operation of such public utility, or pursuing any lawful activity necessary for
such execution, implementation or operation (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the aforecited provision of law in point prohibits the Courts of the land from
issuing injunctive writs against the implementation or execution of government
infrastructure projects.[20]
Untenable is private respondents contention that the housing and resettlement
projects at stake are not infrastructure projects within the purview of Presidential
Decree No. 1818.[21]
As regards the definition of infrastructure projects, the Court stressed in Republic of
the Philippines vs. Salvador Silverio and Big Bertha Construction: [22]
The term infrastructure projects means construction, improvement and
rehabilitation of roads, and bridges, railways, airports, seaports, communication
facilities, irrigation, flood control and drainage, water supply and sewage systems,
shore protection, power facilities, national buildings, school buildings, hospital
buildings, and other related construction projects that form part of the
government capital investment.[23]
Applying the principle ejusdem generis, the Court is of the view, and so holds, that
the government projects involved (2) For the various plants and installations of the
National Housing Corporation, for its future expansion and for its staff and pilot
housing development,[24] and (5) For housing, resettlement sites and other uses
necessary and related to an integrated social and economic development of the
entire estate and environs, x x x.[25] are infrastructure projects. The various plants
and installations, staff and pilot housing development projects, and resettlement
sites related to an integrated social and economic development of the entire estate
are construction projects forming part of the government capital investment,
undertaken in compliance with the mandate of the Constitution for the state to
embark upon a continuing program of urban land reform and housing envisioned to
provide at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to the unprivileged and
homeless in urban centers and resettlement areas. [26]
The questioned Orders of respondent Court (which is bound to follow P.D. No.1818),
[27]
enjoining or preventing the implementation of subject housing and resettlement
projects under the administration of the National Housing Authority, are repugnant
to Presidential Decree No. 1818. Well-settled to the point of being elementary is the
doctrine that before a writ of preliminary injunction may issue, there must be a clear
showing by the complaint of a right to be protected and that the acts against which
the writ is to be directed infringe such right. [28] Here, it is decisively clear that the
private respondents have no right to the relief sought for.
Premises studiedly viewed in proper perspective, the Court is of the irresistible
finding and conclusion that the respondent Court gravely abused its discretion in
issuing the challenged Orders in Civil Case No. C-15325.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the Orders, dated April 8, 1992 and August
4, 1992, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, in Civil Case No.
C-15325 are hereby SET ASIDE; and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by
virtue thereof DISSOLVED. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-31303-04 May 31, 1978
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ALFREDO V. DE OCAMPO, and OSCAR
ANGLO, respondents.
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio and Assistant Solicitor General Dominador L.
Quiroz for petitioner.
Eusebio V. Navarro, Eugenio G. Gemarino and Eusebio P. Navarro for respondent
Alfredo V. de Ocampo.
Vicente F. Delfin and V. del Rosario & Associates for respondent Oscar Anglo.
SANTOS, J.:
An appeal by certiorari filed on December 5, 1969 by petitioner, Republic of the
Philippines (Republic, for short), from the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
August 21, 1969 1 dismissing petitioner's appeal in CA-G. R. Nos. 40683-84-R, as
well as from the resolution of the said Court dated November 14, 1969 2 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof
The relevant and essential factual and procedural antecedents follow. Both
Republic and respondents Alfredo V. de Ocampo and Oscar Anglo claim ownership
over the same lots, i.e,, Nos. 817 and 2509 of the Sagay-Escalante Cadastre, Negros
Occidental, subject matter of this litigation. The basis of Republic's claim is that said
lots were bequeathed to the Bureau of Education (now Bureau of Public Schools) on
September 21, 1926 by the late Esteban Jalandoni through his will. 3 Republic
further alleged that the said parcels of land were already registered under the
Torrens System "before 1919 in a cadastral case in the name of Meerkamp and
Company" in whose favor Original Certificate of Title (OCT, for short) No. 370 was
issued, that said company sold the lots to Esteban Jalandoni who was issued
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT, for short) No. 1251: that TCT No. 6014 was issued
to the Bureau of Education when the subject property was bequeathed to it; and
that as a matter of fact, a sugar quota (Plantation Audit No. 24-10) was issued for
the lots under the name of the Bureau of Education. 4 The lots have a total area of
289.47 hectares. 5
Respondent de Ocampo, upon the other hand, predicates his claim on an application
for registration of the same Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 in Land Registration Case No. N4, LRC Rec. No. N-19196, wherein a decree of registration No. 105538 was issued
over the lots, followed by the issuance in his name of OCT No. 576, on October 1,
1965. 6 He averred that the lots were unregistered lands belonging to and
possessed by him, by virtue of a donation dated November 10, 1911 from one Luis
Mosquera. 7

Respondent Anglo intervened in the case on February 21, 1966, having allegedly
bought the same lots from respondent de Ocampo on January 6, 1966. TCT No.
42217 was issued to him (Anglo) on January 12, 1966. 8
Procedurally, the records show that the Bureau of Public Schools, then represented
by the Provincial Fiscal of Negros Occidental initiated on December 24, 1958, a
forcible entry and detainer case against de Ocampo over Lots Nos. 817 and 2509.
On appeal, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental dismissed the complaint
(Civil Case No. 5353). 9
Then on June 29, 1960, de Ocampo filed an application for registration of the same
two parcels of land in Land Registration Case No. N-4 LRC Rec. No. N-19196,
entitled "Alfredo V. de Ocampo, Applicant, v. Republic of the Philippines,
Oppositor Republic filed its opposition; in due time. 10
On May 2, 1961, Republic, represented by the Solicitor General, filed a complaint
against de Ocampo with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (Branch VII)
for the recovery of possession of the subject lots, with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, docketed therein as Civil Case No, 264
(6154), entitled"Republic of the Philippines v. Alfredo v. de Ocampo,
Defendant, " 11 De Ocampo averred in his answer that the properties alleged to
have been donated by Esteban Jalandoni to the then Bureau of Education were
different from the properties involved in this case, the former being titled lands (TCT
No. 1251) containing two million nine hundred and twelve thousand four hundred
and seventy four square meters (2,912,474), while Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 applied
for by de Ocampo and which Republic sought to recover were unregistered lands,
and that granting, without admitting, that they are the same lands, the court no
longer had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action since the issue of
possession over said lots was already decided by the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental. 12
On May 26, 1961, a preliminary hearing was held before Branch IV of the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental where the land registration case was pending,
but inasmuch as the issues involved in both Civil Case No. 264 (6154) for recovery
of possession and the land registration case were Identical, the parties agreed to a
joint trial, this time before Branch VI I, Judge Jose D. Divinagracia, presiding, where
the civil case was pending. 13
After a joint trial of the above-mentioned two (2) cases, the Court of First Instance
rendered judgment on August 3, 1965, dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No.
264 (6154) and adjudging the registration of the subject two lots in the name of the
then applicant de Ocampo. On October 1, 1966, OCT No. 576 was issued in his
name. 14
It is admitted by Republic that it received a copy of the decision on August 13,
1965 15 but no appeal was taken therefrom. However, Republic later filed with the
trial court on December 28, 1965, a "Petition for Relief from Judgment with
Preliminary Injunction Pending Proceeding 16 (petition, for short) praying, among
other things, that de Ocampo be restrained from enforcing the decision dated 3
August 1965, and that after the hearing, an order be issued declaring the decision
to be not yet final add executory, and granting Republic the right to file a motion for
reconsideration and/or appeal within the period granted, to commence upon receipt
of the order.
The petition alleged inter alia that the Republic's failure to appeal was due to
accident, mistake and/or excusable negligence, specifically, stating that its docket
clerk, Cesar Salud, merely committed excusable negligence when he inadvertently

attached the copy of the decision to the file of another case; that it was only on
November 5, 1965, that Cesar Salud found the copy of the same; and that petitioner
has a substantial cause of action in Civil Case No. 264 (6154) and a good and
substantial defense in Land Registration Case No. N-4 Rec. No. N-19196.
An opposition to the petition was filed by respondent de Ocampo on February 5,
1966 17 on the ground that the same was filed beyond the reglementary period. The
petition was, however, given due course on January 11, 1966. 18 On February 21,
1966, respondent Oscar Anglo filed a motion for intervention alleging that he
bought the subject two (2) Lots Nos. 817 and 1509 from respondent de Ocampo on
January 6, 1966 and that TCT No. 42217 of the Register of Deeds for Negros
Occidental was issued to him (Anglo) on January 12, 1966. 19 He also filed an answer
in opposition to Republic's petition for relief from judgment 20 on the grounds,
among others, that the decree of registration and certificate of title had already
been issued and that a writ of preliminary injunction will not lie to restrain
enforcement of the decision of the trial court.
On June 6, 1966, after respondents filed their respective memoranda, the trial court
dismissed the Republic's petition for lack of competent proof, pursuant to Section 6,
Rule 38, of the Rules of Court which the court said required a hearing. 21
On July 25, 1966, petitioner Republic filed a motion for reconsideration of the
aforesaid order dismissing its petition;22 and on August 4, 1966, it filed a
manifestation averring additional grounds in support of the motion for
reconsideration. 23Respondent Anglo and de Ocampo opposed the same. 24
On September 28, 1966, Republic filed an "Amended Petition for Relief from
Judgment and/or Review of Decree with Preliminary Injunction 25 (Amended Petition,
for short). In specific regard to the petition for review of the decree, Republic
contended, inter alia, that actual fraud had been perpetrated by respondent de
Ocampo in securing the lower court's decision ordering the registration of the lots in
his name, as well as the issuance of the decree of registration and the
corresponding certificate of title, on the grounds which, briefly restated. advert to
respondent de Ocampo's alleged misrepresentations that the two parcels of land
applied for by him in the land registration case were "different from the two parcels
of land of the same lot numbers, technical descriptions and areas belonging to the
Government, knowing such allegations to be false, the truth of the matter being
that said parcels of land are the same property owned by the Government"; 26 that
there was previous registration of the same parcels of land, Lots Nos. 817 and 2509,
under the Torrens System in favor of Meerkamp and Company which later sold the
same to Jalandoni who, in turn, gave the lots to the Bureau of Education as a legacy
and that the Court of First Instance no longer had jurisdiction to decree again the
registration of Lots Nos. 817 and 2509, in favor of respondent de Ocampo, in view of
the earlier registration of the same lands in favor of Meerkamp and Company.
Additionally, Republic claimed that its counsel was not given notice of de Ocampo's
motion and the corresponding order dated September 16, 1965, for the issuance of
the decree of registration and the issuance of the decree itself by the Land
Registration Commission, in violation of its constitutional rights to due
process", 27 that it has also been "in continuous peaceful, adverse, open and public
owner and possessor, in good faith and with just title" of the lots "deriving the fruits
and products of said properties and appropriating them to the purpose and
purposes they were intended for"; 28that they were in fact declared for tax
purposes; 29 that on April 11, 1927, the lands were leased for ten (10) years but the
lease was amended several times to extend the same; 30 that on September 17,

1964, Republic's counsel filed a "Petition for an Order to Produce the Original
Documentary Exhibits and Submit Same to the NBI for Examination, 31 Which
petition was communicated to de Ocampo's lawyers, Atty. Gemarino and
Garingalao, earlier on September 7, 1964; that they did not object or state that the
originals were burned or lost; that it was only on September 28, 1964 that de
Ocampo's lawyers revealed for the first time in their "Manifestation and Reply" that
the purported originals were burned in the house of Atty. Gemarino on May 16,
1963; 32 and that the "supposed originals were fake and their alleged burning was
false and these pretenses were intentionally resorted to only to evade the
examination of the spurious documents by the NBI and as camouflage to hide their
fraudulent character. 33
On October 4, 1966, the trial court set, aside its order of June 6, 1966, dismissing
the petition for relief, 34 having found Republic's motion for reconsideration wellfounded, and scheduled December 1 and 2, 1966, for Republic's witnesses to
testify, and likewise gave respondents, a chance to oppose the amended petition.
Respondents and Republic filed their opposition 35 and reply; 36 respectively.
Republic alleged in the said reply that "(T)he lands in question and their incomes
are used exclusively for a public purpose: public education. 37
In a subsequent hearing on June 6, 1967, the trial court ordered Republic to present
its evidence in the absence of respondents, who objected thereto for lack of
jurisdiction, the parcels of land having been already registered in the name of
respondent de Ocampo and in fact transferred to an alleged buyer in good faith, the
other private respondent, Anglo.
On August 30, 1967, the trial court rendered its decision on the Amended
Petition 38 against Republic, upon resolution of what it considered the "decisive"
issue, i.e., that the allegations in the said petition did not constitute actual and
extrinsic fraud which is the only ground available to review or reopen a decree in
cadastral cases pursuant to Section 38 of Act 496. 39
On the other issues, the trial court found that it was through mistake, accident and
excusable negligence that the decision of August 3, 1965 was not brought to the
attention of Solicitor Emerito Salva "as it was inadvertently clipped to the record of
another case". 40 However, while the petition for relief itself another case was filed
within the reglementary period prescribed in Section 3, Rule 38, of the Rules of
Court 41 the remedy of relief from judgment was no longer available since the
decree, and later the title, were already issued in the name of respondent de
Ocampo. 42 It also held that the amended petition was still legally available as it was
filed within one (1) year after the issuance of the decree, pursuant to Section 38 of
Act No. 496, "in case of actual fraud" and that it had jurisdiction to entertain the
amended petition and to receive evidence in support thereof, 43 but it had to deny
the relief prayed for on grounds already adverted to. In regard to respondent
Anglo's claim that the petition for review was no longer tenable as against him
because he was a purchaser in good faith, the trial court ruled that competent
evidence to that effect should be submitted considering, among other things, that
the case was pending when he acquired his interest. 44 Finally, it held that the fact
that the Republic was not notified of the motion and the corresponding issuance of
the decree and title was immaterial since petitions for issuance of decrees in
cadastral cases are analogous to petitions for execution in ordinary cases and
parties are not entitled to notice thereof as a matter of right. 45 Thus
In the light of the decision of this Court dated August 3. 1965, Section 39 of Act No.
496 and the authorities cited ... this court is persuaded to conclude as it hereby

holds, that the evidence adduced by the petitioner in this incident does not
establish actual and constructive fraud which is the only kind of fraud that is
considered a legal ground to review, reopen or set aside the decree which has
already been issued in the name of Alfredo V. de Ocampo.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition for Relief from Judgment and/or Review of
Decree is hereby dismissed without pronouncement as to costs. 46
From the said decision, Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals, docketed therein
as CA-G.R. Nos. 4083-84-R. Private respondents de Ocampo and Anglo moved to
dismiss the appeal which was opposed by petitioner, Republic. 47 A supplemental
motion to the same effect was later filed by respondent de Ocampo for failure of the
record on appeal to show on its face that it was filed on time, 48 followed by an ex
parte motion to consider the Solicitor General to have waived his right to oppose
the said supplemental motion to dismiss and that the case be submitted for
resolution. 49 A new party, Salvacion Maraon, sought to intervene in the case and
also filed a motion to dismiss the appeal before respondent appellate court.
In its minute resolution of August 21, 1969, 50 the Court of Appeals resolved
(1) To DISMISS ... the appeal ... for failure of the record on appeal to show on its face
that the record on appeal was filed within the period fixed by the Rules (Secs. 3 & 6,
Rule 41, Sec. 1[a] & [b), Rule 50, Rules of Court), it appearing that appellant's
motion for extension of 20 days from October 14, 1967 to file the record on appeal
was never granted by the lower court (there being no showing to that effect in the
record on appeal); and even if there was such an order granting it, the extension
asked for would have expired on November 3, 1967 and, therefore, the record on
appeal filed on November 9,1967 was filed six days late ...; and
(2) to DENY the motion to intervene of intervenor Salvacion Maranon following the
doctrine enunciated in Hant, et al. vs. O'Leary, et al., page 993. At any rate, the
purpose of intervening; which is to join the appellees in their motion to dismiss the
appeal of the appellant, has already been served by the dismissal of the instant
appeal.
On September 11, 1969, Republic filed a motion for reconsideration 51 but on
November 14, 1969, the Court of Appeals
RESOLVED TO DENY the said motion for reconsideration. Killings in the pertinent
cases are equally applicable to the Republic of the Philippines where the latter is the
appellant that recourse to 'the original records is immaterial because it is what
appears in the record on appeal that is essential. 52
Hence, this appeal by certiorari on the following assignment of errors, i.e., that the
Court of Appeals erred in not holding that (1) prescription, the statute of
limitations and laches do not lie against the Republic, as a sovereign state, and that,
it is not bound or prejudiced by the faults or mistakes of its officers and employees,
(2) the dismissal of Republic's appeal is not in accordance with the liberal
construction of the Rules of Court and the promotion of its object to assist the
parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of actions and
proceedings; (3) the trial court has no jurisdiction to entertain the application for
land registration of Alfredo V. de Ocampo on the ground that Lots Nos. 817 and
2509 were already registered under the Torrens System before 1919; (4) the
dismissal of Republic's appeal placed technicality over, substance; and (5) the
dismissal of Republic's appeal will abet and promote land grabbing. 53
Private respondents in turn stress in their respective briefs, inter alia, (1) that
Republic shed its immunity and sovereignty and assumed the garb of an ordinary
private litigant when it initiated an action for forcible entry and detainer case over

Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 against respondent de Ocampo. filed I s opposition in the
land registration case, and instituted Civil Case No. 264 (6154); 54 (2) that Republic
should comply with the mandatory and jurisdictional requirements of the rules on
perfection of appeals, citing cases; 55 that there cannot be one set of Rules for
ordinary private litigants, and another set for the State otherwise the set-up will
result in the denial of due process and equal protection of law to private litigants as
well as chaos in the administration of justice; 56 and (4) that public policy and sound
practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should
become final at some definite date fixed by the, law. 57
The threshold and, in the ultimate analysis, the decisive issue raised by this petition
is whether the dismissal by respondent. Court of Appeals of Republic's appeal from
the decision of the trial court denying its Amended Petition, is not proper and should
be set aside as contended by Republic, or correct and should be maintained, as
argued by respondents. The issue framed in the context of the suit's true
significance to the parties involved in this protracted proceeding and in the light of
the value the protagonists attach to the outcome of the litigation may be stated
thus-Should the government, represented by petitioner Republic not be permitted
by respondent Court of Appeals to show that it stands Lo lose thru fraudulent
machinations close to three hundred (300) hectares of prime sugar land to the
private respondents who have allegedly secured their titles to these holdings long
after the same parcels of land were already titled in the name of the original owner,
Meerkamp and Company and, therefore, the trial court's action in directing the
issuance of the title in the name of respondent de Ocampo is null and void ab
initioand of no legal effect, simply because petitioner Republic failed to show in its
record on appeal that it was perfected on time and that it actually filed its record on
appeal six (6) days late?
Respondent Court of Appeals, in a very simplistic approach, which disregards the
substantive merits of the appeal dismissed, the same on the grounds that the
record on appeal did not show on its face that it was perfected on time, and,
additionally, that even if it were to be assumed that the motion for extension of 20
days to file the record on appeal was indeed granted, the appeal was still not
perfected on time because the record on appeal was filed November 9, six (6) days
after November 3, 1967, when petitioner's requested extension expired.
If respondents' line of reasoning were to be upheld, the dismissal of the appeal may
be sustained. For, as stated, in its notice of appeal filed on October 12, 1967,
petitioner Republic received a copy of the decision of the trial court on September
14, 1967. 58 Therefore, it had until October 14, 1967 within which to file its record
on appeal. The record on appeal does not show that the extension prayed for was
granted, but the lower court in its order of December 4, 1967 approved the same,
as there was no opposition to its approval. There is also no mention in the order
approving the record on appeal as to whether or not it was filed on time. The record
on appeal is, however, dated November 9,1967. Assuming then that this was also
the actual filing date, and on the further assumption that the 20day extension was
impliedly granted with its approval, it was still filed six (6) days late, after the
requested extension expired on November 3, 1967. 59 And, as to the legal ground
for the dismissal on the foregoing bases, this Court has repeatedly construed
Section 6, Rule 41, of the Rules of Court 60 as mandatory and jurisdictional in nature,
non-compliance with which justifies the dismissal of the appeal. 61
However, a consideration in depth of the unique and peculiar facts attendant to this
case and the procedural and substantive implications of the dismissal of the appeal

now sought to be reviewed and reconsidered; and a due and proper regard to the
merits of the case rather than a fascile reliance on procedural rules, compel this
Court to reverse and set aside the dismissal of Republic's appeal by respondent
Court of Appeals for the following reasons,viz: (1) Should Republic prove that the
subject Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 were registered in favor of Meerkamp and Company
before 1919, the trial court's decision decreeing again the same lots in the name of
respondent de Ocampo in 1965 is null and void ab initio for lack of jurisdiction and a
fatal infirmity necessarily attaches to the said decision; (2) There are strong and
substantial allegations of fraudulent misrepresentations and machinations
employed by respondent de Ocampo in securing his title Relevant to this is The
express finding of the trial court that The Petition for Relief was filed within the
reglementary period prescribed in Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, and the
Amended Petition was filed within one year from issuance of the decree. If the
appeal is dismissed without considering its merits, the above periods will resumed
to run and will lapse, and the reliefs sought herein will be forever foreclosed to
Republic; (3) Assuming that respondents can invoke, the material data rule, and/or
the fact that Republic's appeal was filed out of time because the record On appeal
was submitted to the Court six (6) days beyond the requested extension of 20 days,
it always in the power of this Court to suspend its rules or to except certain cases
therefrom whenever courtervailing considerations so warrant; and (4) This Court, is
not powerless to prevent gross miscarriage of Justice, which would follow if
Republic's appeal is dismissed since it stands to lose close to 300 hectares of
prime sugar land already titled in its name and devoted to educational purposes
if it is true that the land registration court was without jurisdiction to issue a Second
decree of registration in favor of respondent de Ocampo and, if it is also true that
fraudulent misrepresentations and machinations attended respondent de Ocampo's
application for registration and likewise prevented Republic from exposing the fake
exhibits, on the basis of which he secured his title. 62
1. Specifically both Republic and respondents claim ownership over the same Lots
Nos. 811 and 2509, hence, this controversy. If Republic's contentions are true that
the said lots had been registered twice, with OCT No. 370 issued in favor of
Meerkamp and Company before 1919 and another, OCT No. 576, issued in the name
of respondent de Ocampo in 1965 or some forty-six (46) years later then the
decision of the trial court, sitting as land registration court, is null and void ab
initio and suffers from a fatal infirmity, which is also a ground for the review of a
decree of registration. provided no innocent purchaser for value will be
prejudiced. 63
It is very significant in this connection that respondent de Ocampo admitted the
donation of Jalandoni in favor of the Bureau of Education, but averred that the lots
so donated were titled (TCT No. 1251), 64 while Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 applied for
by him in the land registration case were "unregistered. 65 Yet, both parties claim to
be the owners of the same Lots Nos. 817 and 2509. Respondent de Ocampo also
gave the area of the lots covered by TCT No. 1251, in the name of Jalandoni, as two
million nine hundred and twelve thousand four hundred and seventy four
(2,912,474) square meters, or 291 hectares plus. 66 Coincidentally, Lots Nos. 817
and 2509 claimed by Republic have a total area of 289.47 hectares, 67 or only about
two (2) hectares less. These factors, brought to light by respondent de Ocampo
himself, cannot simply be ignored in reaching the conclusion that the disputed
resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals be reversed.

It is also important to advert to the documentary exhibits adduced by Republic in

the hearing of the Amended Petition below, one of which was a certification dated
November 8, 1952 signed by the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental, stating
that on May 13, 1919, there was registered a sale executed by Meerkamp and
Company in favor of Esteban Jalandoni and as a result OCT No, 370 in the name of
the Company was cancelled and TCT No. 1251 was issued to Jalandoni; that TCT No.
1251 was later cancelled by virtue of the will of Jalandoni leaving the parcel of land
to the then Bureau of Education; that TCT No. 6014 was correspondingly issued to
the Bureau of Education; and that lease contracts were annotated in TCT No. 6014
in favor of Francisco Copper, executed by the Division Superintendent of
Schools. 68 However, the above certification does not mention the lot numbers, and
no certificates of title were exhibited in court, the incumbent Register of Deeds
having declared that the titles could not be found in his office. 69
The trial court also made the express finding that the alleged deed of donation by
Luis Mosquera in favor of respondent de Ocampo, dated November 10, 1911,
acknowledged before one Notary Public John Boardman does not appear in his
notarial book which is on file in the Bureau of Record Management, Manila, from
October 16, 191 1 to May, 1913. 70
The Provincial Assessor of Negros Occidental likewise issued a certification, dated
November 29, 1966, stating that Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 were never declared in the
name of Mosquera. 71 His later certification states that the said lots were assessed
in the name of the Bureau of Education, and that the technical descriptions in the
Bureau of Lands records show that the same lots were in the name of Meerkamp
and Company. 72
Authorities are in agreement that a land registration court is without jurisdiction to
decree again the registration of land already registered in an earlier registration
case, and that the second decree entered for the same land is null and void. 73 If
there is no valid and final judgment by the land registration court to speak of, then
the filing of an admittedly late appeal from the decision denying the Amended
Petition would be immaterial and of no moment, in so far as these proceedings are
concerned in view of the congenitally fatal infirmity that attaches to the main
decision. decreeing for the second time the registration of the same Lots Nos. 817
and 2509 in favor of respondent de Ocampo, despite an earlier registration in the
name of Meerkamp and Company. Jurisprudence holds that the appellant's failure to
perfect an appeal on time, "although ordinarily decisive, carries no persuasive
force" and may be completely disregarded if the trial court acted without
jurisdiction. 74 As held in United States v. Jayme, 75 lack of jurisdiction. la jurisdiction
over the subject matter is fatal and may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.
Jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; it is
given only by law, and in the manner prescribed by law and an objection on the lack
of such jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties. The infirmity cannot be cured
by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent, 76 or by win of the parties. 77
In the interest of justice, which is the paramount consideration in all litigations, and
especially considering the cloud surrounding the decision of the land registration
court, as aforesaid, the more judicious course to follow is for respondent Court of
Appeals to entertain Republic's appeal, not to dismiss it, so that if it finds the same
to be meritorious, and the decision appealed from is reversed, the correct Identity of
the lots that were donated to the then Bureau of Education (admitted by respondent
de Ocampo), as well as those parcels of land applied for by said respondent in the
land registration case, may already be ascertained once and for all, in the trial court

below, and in this same proceeding, without Republic having to resort to relitigation
to prove its claim. Further proceedings will not prejudice respondents. On the
contrary, the cloud over their titles, OCT No. 576 and TCT No. 42217. issued in favor
of respondents de Ocampo and Anglo, respectively, will be removed if Republic's
claim is not true.
2. There is a serious charge, which is also crucial to the issue between the parties,
that respondent de Ocampo used fraudulent misrepresentations and machinations
in securing his title, Firstly, there was the averment in his Answer in Civil case No,
264 (6154) for recovery of possession of the subject lots by Republic, which case
was jointly tried with the land registration case,, that the properties alleged to have
been donated by Jalandoni to the then Bureau of Education were "different" from
Lots Nos. 817 and 2509, applied for by him, the Jalandoni holdings being "titled"
lands, while Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 were "unregistered" lands. The then applicant
de Ocampo even cited TCT No. 1251 of the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental
as the title covering the lots in the name of Jalandoni, further stating that the lands
donated by him to the Bureau of Education had an area of 2,912,474 square
meters, 78 or 291 hectares plus. Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 have a total area of 289.47
hectares 79 or a difference of only 2 hectares, more or less. The coincidence in area
is highly significant since both claim to be the owners of the same lots. Secondly,
certain documents which were presented as exhibits by respondent de Ocampo, on
the basis of which he secured OCT 576 in his name, were withdrawn from the files of
the trial court, and, thereafter were allegedly lost by fire. As a result, Republic's
pending motion to have the said exhibits produced for examination of their
genuineness by the NBI could not be made. Unless successfully traversed, the
inference is strong that respondents did not want a full disclosure of the true nature
of the same by the NBI and that the truth had been suppressed. The inference is
also buttressed by the Republic's claim that despite their counsel's knowledge of
Republic's intention to file the said motion which was orally communicated to them
earlier, the alleged loss was not revealed to Republic's counsel. 80
If the charge is true, there is the element of wilfull intent to deprive Republic of just
rights which constitutes the essential characteristics of actual as distinguished
from legal fraud. 81 As Justice Fernando stressed, "Nicolas v. Director of
Lands 82 should erase any doubt as to the extreme judicial displeasure at this
species of fraud of an applicant seeking to include as a part of the property to which
title is sought land actually in possession of another. 83 This is very relevant in view
of the denial of the Amended Petition which was premised on the conclusion that
allegations in the said petition did not constitute actual and extrinsic fraud and
which, according to the trial court, is "the only ground" available to review or reopen
the decree. Of related significance is the express finding of the trial court that the
original Petition for Relief was filed within the reglementary period pursuant to
Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, and the Amended Petition was filed within
one year from issuance of the decree. For, if the appeal is dismissed
notwithstanding allegations of fraud which appear to be supported by the evidence
adduced during the hearing of the Amended Petition below the appealed decision
will become final and executory, and the aforesaid periods will lapse, foreclosing
forever to Republic the reliefs prayed for in the Amended Petition. Although Republic
may seek to recover the lots in a different action that may still be legally available
to it after the appeal is dismissed, that recourse will involve not only a re- litigation
and, therefore. multiplicity of suits, but will also entail the risk that subject lots may
be disposed of to innocent purchasers for value to put them beyond recovery. As it

is, the other respondent, Anglo, has already intervened. alleging that he bought the
same lots from respondent de Ocampo on January 6, 1966, and that TCT No. 42217
was in fact issued to him. 84 A new party, Salvacion Maraon, also sought to
intervene in the case and filed in respondent Court of Appeals a motion to dismiss
Republic's appeal before the said Court. 85
Finally, We held in Reyes, et al. v. Borbon, et al. 86 "(W)hen the attention of the Court
of Land Registration is called to the fact that the same land has been registered in
the name of two different persons, it is the duty of said court to order an
investigation of that fact and that should be done even without requiring the parties
to show that a fraud has been committed in during the double registration. When it
is established that the same has been registered in the name of two different
person the titile should remain in the name of the person securing the first
registration." This Court further held that " (T)he very purpose of the Torrens System
would be destroyed if the same land may be subsequently brought under a second
action for registration. 87
3. The foregoing overriding considerations then the alleged lack of jurisdiction
and the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations and machinations, which, buttressed
by strong evidence, can nullity the second registration and/or set aside OCT No. 576
issued to respondent de Ocampo taken in relation with the procedural and
substantive implications which could and would arise if the appeal were dismissed,
namely, the risk that the holdings may be transacted to third parties and the fact
that Republic's action to recover tile holdings would give rise to multiplicity of suits
compel Us to conclude that the only recourse in the interest of just and
expeditious proceedings. considering that these have been pending for close to
twenty (20) years now is to suspend Our rules and/or to except this case from
their operation. For when the operation of the Rules of will lead to an injustice We
have, in justifiable instances, resorted to this extraordinary remedy to prevent
it. 88 The Rules have been drafted with the primary objective of enhancing fair trials
and expediting justice. 89 As a corollary, if their application and operation tend to
subvert and defeat instead of promote and enhance it, their suspension is justified.
In the words of Justice Antonio P. Barredo in his concurring opinion in Estrada v. Sto.
Domingo, "(T)his Court, through the revered and eminent Mr. Justice Abad Santos,
found occasion in the case of C Viuda de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, to lay down for
recognition in this jurisdiction the sound rule in the administration of justice holding
that 'it is always in the power of the court (Supreme Court) to suspend its own rules
or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice
required it ... 90
Exceptions to the operation of the mandatory and jurisdictional character of the
rules on perfection of appeals are to be noted in Sarmiento v. Salud, et
al., 91 penned by Justice J.B. Reyes, Dequito v. Lopez 92 and Carillo v. Allied Workers
Association of the Philippines 93 both written for the Court by Justice E. M. Fernando,
decided years after the Revised Rules of Court took effect in January, 1964. In the
Sarmiento case, the late appeal was allowed on the ground of laches on the part of
the appellees, the filing of the motion to dismiss having taken place six (6) years
after the brief for appellees was filed, and after the case was submitted for decision.
This, according to the Court, "constitutes a unique instance of laches without
comparable precedent in the records of the Court. 94 The Dequito and Carillo cases,
upon the other hand, took into account the fact that labor cases were involved.
Justice Fernando expressly noted in the Dequito case that "in the light of the
constitutional as well as codal and statutory mandates, there being an explicit

command of protection to labor as well as the promotion of social justice," 95 the

motion to dismiss the late appeal which was "filed much too late" hardly deserved
sympathy or consideration. 96 In the Carillo case, no question whatsoever as to the
late appeal was raised, hence, "it would seem that whatever right to contest the
jurisdiction could have been availed of is by now no longer in
existence. 97Continuing, Justice Fernando stated that "Social justice would be a
meaningless term if in a situation like the present, an element of rigidity would be
affixed to procedural precepts and made to recover the matter. Flexibility should not
be ruled out. Precisely, what is sought to be accomplished by such a fundamental
principle expressly so declared by the Constitution is the effectiveness of the
community's effort to assist the economically underprivileged." The responsibility to
protect labor is incumbent "not only on the legislative and executive branches but
also on the judiciary, to translate this pledge into a living reality. 98
While the above exceptions are predicated on different grounds, they nevertheless
support the view that the rigid adherence to the rules on perfection of appeals may
and should be relaxed where compelling reasons so warrant. The grounds invoked in
this case not only lack of jurisdiction but gross injustice itself more than justify
the exception considering further that the delay in the perfection of the appeal
involved six (6) days only.
4. Finally, enshrined in our legal and judicial annals is the maximum Chat no person
should enrich himself at the expense or prejudice of others. 99 Courts should not be
used as instruments Lo disregard this elemental and basic norm which is the
essence of justice and fair play. The whole trust of our laws on civil relations enjoins
all those who come before the courts of justice to observe true faith and candor in
their dealings with one another the government included. 100 The commendable
and determined efforts on the part of the citizenry to fashion a New Society rid of
graft, corruption and the persistent malaise of land grabbing, will be set back, if the
subject lots consisting of close to 300 hectares which are devoted to educational
purposes have indeed been wrongfully titled to respondent de Ocampo, Happily,
We can at this stage still prevent this, if true, by setting aside the dismissal of
Republic's appeal and according the parties the opportunity in this proceeding, and
without further need to re-litigate, to terminate this litigation, which has been
pending for close to twenty (20) long years in fairness to both parties.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated August 21,
1969, dismissing the appeal, as well as its resolution of November 14, 1969,
denying petitioner Republic's motion for reconsideration in CA G.R. Nos. 40683-84
are hereby SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the said Court to give due course to
and consider on its merits Republic's appeal. No costs.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18339
June 29, 1962
GODOFREDO NAVERA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PERFECTO QUICHO ETC., ET AL., respondents.
Bienvenido M. Llaneta for petitioner.
Wilfredo A. Matias for respondents.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

On January 24, 1961, the municipality of Ligao filed with the Court of First Instance
of Albay a petition under Section 112 of Act No. 496, as amended, for the correction
of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9304 issued in the name of Godofredo Navera,
covering Lot No. 2793-A, on the ground that a portion of 123 sq. m. was erroneously
included in said title during the cadastral survey of Ligao.
Navera filed a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the relief which petitioner
seeks to obtain cannot be granted under Section 112 of Act 496 because the same
would involve the opening of the original decree of registration. He contends that,
under said section, the court can only authorize an alteration which may not impair
the rights recorded in the decree, or one which will not prejudice such rights, or one
which is consented to by all parties concerned, or can authorize the correction of
any error or mistake which would not involve the reopening of the original decree of
registration. Here the petition will have such effect, for it will involve the correction
of the technical description of the land covered by the certificate of title in question,
segregating therefrom the portion alleged to have been erroneously included, which
eventually will cause the amendment of the original decree of registration. This
cannot be done at this stage after the lapse of 23 years from the issuance of the
certificate of title.
After hearing both parties, the court a quo issued an order denying the motion to
dismiss and requiring Navera to answer the petition within the reglementary period.
After his motion for reconsideration was denied, Navera filed the present petition for
certiorari disputing the jurisdiction of the court a quo.
It is alleged by the municipality of Ligao that in the course of the construction or
repair of Natera street of said municipality it was ascertained by a duly licensed
surveyor that Lot No. 2793-A of the cadastral survey of Ligao has encroached upon
said street by depriving the street of an area amounting to 123 sq. m. which was
erroneously included in Lot No. 2793-A now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-9304 issued in the name of Godofredo Navera. Hence, the municipality prays
for the correction of such error in the technical description of the lot, as well as in
the certificate of title, with a view to excluding therefrom, the portion of 123 sq. m.
erroneously included therein.
The court a quo, over the objection of Navera, granted the petition even if the same
was filed under Section 112 of Act No. 496. The court predicates its ruling upon the
following rationale:
It is a rule of law that lands brought under the operation of the Torrens System are
deemed relieved from all claims and encumbrances not appearing on the title.
However, the law excepts certain rights and liabilities from the rule, and there are
certain burdens on the lands registered which continue to exist and remain in force,
although not noted on the title, by express provisions of Section 39 of Act No. 496,
as amended. Among the burdens on the land registered which continue to exist,
pursuant to said Section 39, is "any public highway, way, private way established by
law, or any Government irrigation canal or lateral thereof, where the certificate of
title does not state that the boundaries of such highway, way, or irrigation canal or
lateral thereof, have been determined." The principle involved here is that, if a
person obtains a title under the Torrens System which includes by mistake or
oversight a land which cannot be registered, he does not by virtue of such
certificate alone become the owner of the land illegally included therein. In the case
of Ledesma vs. Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil., 769, the Supreme Court laid down the
doctrine that "the inclusion of public highways in the certificate of title under the

Torrens System does not thereby give to the holder of such certificate said public
highways."
Petitioner Navera does not agree with this ruling, invoking in his favor what we
stated in a recent case to the effect that, "the law authorizes only alterations which
do not impair rights recorded in the decree, or alterations which, if they do not
prejudice such rights, are consented to by all parties concerned, or alterations to
correct obvious mistakes, without opening the original decree of registration"
(Director of Lands v. Register of Deeds, G.R. No. L-4463, promulgated March 31,
1953). Navera contends that the purpose of the instant petition is not merely to
correct a clerical error but to reopen the original decree of registration which was
issued in 1937, and this is so because the petition seeks to direct the register of
deeds to make the necessary correction in the technical description in order that
the portion erroneously included may be returned to the municipality of Ligao. In
effect, therefore, the petition does not seek merely the correction of a mistake or
error but the return or reconveyance of a portion of a registered property to
respondent. This cannot be done without opening the original decree of registration.
The theory entertained by the court a quo that if the portion to be segregated
was really erroneously included in the title issued to petitioner because it is part of
the Natera street which belongs to the municipality of Ligao that portion may be
excluded under Section 112 of Act 496 because under the law 1 any public highway,
even if not noted on a title, is deemed excluded therefrom as a legal lien or
encumbrance, is in our opinion correct. This is upon the principle that a person who
obtains a title which includes by mistake a land which cannot legally be registered
does not by virtue of such inclusion become the owner of the land erroneously
included therein.2 But this theory onlyholds true if there is no dispute that the
portion to be excluded is really part of a public highway. This principle onlyapplies if
there is unanimity as to the issue of fact involved.1wph1.t
Here said unanimity is lacking. The claim of the municipality that an error has been
committed in the survey of the lot recorded in respondent's name by including a
portion of the Natera street is not agreed to by petitioner. In fact, he claims that is a
question of fact that needs to be proven because it is controversial. There being
dissension as to an important question of fact, the petition cannot be granted under
Section 112 of Act No. 496.
We are of the opinion that the lower court did not err in finding that it lacks
jurisdiction to entertain the present petition for the simple reason that it involves as
controversial issue which takes this case out of the scope of Section 112 of Act No.
496. While this section, among other things, authorizes a person in interest to ask
the court for any erasure, alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title "upon the
ground that registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent,
expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased", and apparently the petition
comes under its scope, such relief can only be granted if there is unanimity among
the parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party
in interest; otherwise the case becomes controversial and should be threshed out in
an ordinary case or in the case where the incident properly belongs. . . . (Tangunan
et al. v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-5545, December 29, 1953; See
also Jimenez v. De Castro, 40 O.G. No. 3, 1st Supp. p. 80; Government of the
Philippines v. Jalandoni, 44 O.G. 1837)
WHEREFORE, petition is granted. The order of respondent court dated March 8,
1961, as well as its order dated March 25, 1961, are hereby set aside. No costs.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-21024
July 28, 1969
CENON MATEO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. FLORENCIO MORENO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF PUBLIC
WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS,defendant-appellee.
Antonio M. Albano and C.S. de Guzman for petitioner-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for defendant-appellee.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This case, elevated to the Court of Appeals by the petitioner for review of the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing his petition for injunction,
was subsequently Certified to us under Section 31 of Republic Act No. 296.
Sometime in 1959 a number of residents of Guiguinto, Bulacan, sent a lettercomplaint to the Highway District Engineer of that province asking that the Sapang
Cabay, a public navigable stream, which had been blocked by means of dikes and
dams and converted into fishponds, be ordered reopened and restored to its original
condition. The letter was referred to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, who caused an investigation to be conducted pursuant to Republic
Act No. 2056. Acting on the report which the investigator submitted to him, the
Secretary rendered his decision on August 10, 1959, finding that the Sapang Cabay
was a public navigable stream and ordering Cenon Mateo, the herein petitionerappellant, who had in the meantime acquired the property inside which the said
creek is situated, to remove the dikes and dams therein constructed within thirty
days from notice; otherwise they would be removed at his expense. Mateo moved to
reconsider but was turned down, whereupon he filed the basic petition to restrain
the respondent Secretary from enforcing his decision. The petition, as already
stated, was dismissed by the Court a quo. The certification of the appeal to us was
upon motion of both parties in view of the constitutional question involved.
Five errors are ascribed to the decision of dismissal, to wit: (1) in not holding that
the respondent Secretary had no jurisdiction to conduct the investigation (of the
original complaint) and order the removal of the dikes and dams constructed in the
fishponds of the appellant; (2) in not holding that Republic Act No. 2056 is
unconstitutional because it unduly delegates judicial power to the Secretary and
unlawfully deprives the appellant and others similarly situated of their property
without due process of law; (3) granting that Republic Act No. 2056 is constitutional,
in not holding that it is inapplicable to the instant case; (4) in finding that the
Sapang Cabay is a public navigable waterway belonging to the public domain; (5) in
disregarding and failing to give legal effect to the Torrens Certificate of title of the
appellant covering the property in question; and (6) in not issuing the writ of
injunction prayed for.
The first two errors assigned are interrelated. They pose the argument that when
the question at issue is whether or not a certain body of water is private property or
constitutes a navigable stream or river of the public domain, the same is essentially
judicial and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications to inquire into and decide; and that insofar as Republic Act No.
2056 purports to confer that power upon him it does so in violation of the
Constitution.

The constitutionality of the aforesaid statute has been upheld by this Court
in Lovina vs. Moreno, G.R. No. L-17821, November 29, 1963, shortly before the
present appeal was submitted for decision. That case held, furthermore, that the
absence of any mention of a navigable stream within a property covered by a
certificate of title does not preclude a subsequent investigation and determination
of its existence nor make it private property of the title holder; that the findings of
fact made by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications should be
respected in the absence of illegality, error of law, fraud or imposition, as long as
such findings are supported by substantial evidence; and that the ownership of a
navigable stream or of the bed thereof is not subject to acquisitive prescription.
In the memorandum filed by the petitioner-appellant after Lovina vs. Moreno was
decided, he submits that all but one of the issues he raised have been settled by
that decision, and that the only issue which remains is the applicability of Republic
Act No. 2056 in the instant case. He concedes the authority of the Secretary to
decide, after hearing, whether or not a river or creek is navigable and therefore
belongs to the public domain; whether or not the dikes and dams complained
against encroach upon or obstruct such navigable river or creek, or communal
fishing grounds; and whether or not the dikes and dams constitute public nuisance
or prohibited constructions. The plea, however, is that in the light of the facts
established at the investigation ordered by the respondent Secretary his conclusion
that Sapang Cabay is a public navigable creek constitutes a grave abuse of
discretion.
We see nothing in the argument which would justify a departure in the present case
from the "substantial-evidence" rule as a limitation upon the scope of judicial review
in administrative cases. Substantial evidence, it has been held, "is more than a
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion." 1
Under this rule the courts are not supposed to reassess the evidence, determine its
preponderance on either side, and substitute its own findings for those of the
administrative agency. All that the court does is to inquire from the record if the
findings are based on substantial evidence. If so, the findings are deemed
conclusive.
In the present case the evidence in support of the respondent Secretary's decision
is more than merely substantial. The testimony of several witnesses is correctly
summarized in the brief submitted by the Solicitor General, as follows:
Ocular inspection of the entire length of the creek up to Guiguinto, shows that
portions of the creek are closed by dikes (pp. 85, 92, 93 Exh. 1, Def.), that traces of
the path of the Cabay Creek within petitioner-appellant's fishpond are still visible by
the nature of the mud; that a man-made canal detours the creek from its original
path (Ibid., 89); that the widest portion of the creek is from 70 to 75 meters wide
(Ibid., 97); that Juan Bernardo, 79 years old in 1959, and resident of Guiguinto from
birth, testified (that) as a result of the closing of said creek for fishpond purposes, it
deprived the public the use of the same for fishing, gathering fruits and fuel, and
that surrounding areas are overflooded during heavy rain as water from creek could
not be drained to the river (Ibid., 95-96, 98); that in 1917, he complained to the
Chief of Police, Demetrio Bernardo, against the construction of dikes across said
Cabay Creek (Ibid., 98); that he used to go fishing on said creek before its closure
(Ibid., 98); that they usually rode on boats in entering the creek (Ibid., 98-99); that
Jose Mojica, 70 years old in 1959, and a resident of Guiguinto, testified that Petra
Gatmaitan was the second claimant to said creek, the first being Venancio

Gatmaitan; that the same was sold to Modesto Pascual, then to Encarnacion Jacobo
and lastly to present petitioner-appellant (Ibid., 107); that petitioner-appellant used
a bulldozer to elevate the dikes crossing the creek which encloses the fishpond
(Ibid, 108); that they used to fish on said creek before its closure, gather nipa palms
and fuel, and catch shrimps (Ibid., 109); that they used bancas along the creek
before its closure, particularly when carrying rice seedlings to distant ricefields for
planting purposes (Ibid., 111); that during the flood season the creek is waistdeep
and even more, and surrounding ricelands are overflooded (Ibid., 111); that Isidra
de la Cruz, 65 years old in 1959, and a resident of Guiguinto, testified that she
drafted a resolution complaining against the issuance of title covering said creek
(Ibid., 117-118); that Agripino de la Cruz testified that the creek is public property
across which a tall dike was constructed (Ibid., 118-120); that the surrounding
ricelands are flooded during heavy rains because the man-made canal is not
sufficient to contain the volume of water coming from the creek (Ibid., 121); that he
knew that Guiguinto folks made use of fishtraps for catching fish therefrom (Ibid.,
122); that in his children days, he used to see bancas going thru the creek; that
although before its closure overflooding did not usually occur even after continuous
heavy rains, things have changed now and overflooding occurs frequently (Ibid.,
123-124); that Julian Manicad, 70 years old in 1959, declared that before its closure,
people fished there, gathered fuel and nipa palms, but it is different now, and the
surrounding areas are easily flooded whenever there is heavy rain (Ibid., 143); that
the people of Guiguinto once complained to the authorities about said closure (Ibid.,
144); that before its closure, he and his brother-in-law used to go fishing there,
riding on a banca (Ibid., 159-160); that Pedro Dionisio, 64 years in 1959, declared
that before its closure, they used to fish, gather firewood and nipa palms on said
creek; that its closure has caused the flooding of surrounding areas, thereby
resulting in poor rice harvests (Ibid., 152-154); that ocular inspection further
showed that there is a man-made canal about 5 feet deep and between 4 to 8 wide
which diverts the water from the main path of Cabay Creek as said canal is within
the fishpond; that the canal ends at Guiguinto River (Ibid., 185-186); that portions of
Cabay Creek is within respondent-appellant's fishpond and the water therein is deep
enough for bancas to sail over it (Ibid., 190-191).
The documentary evidence shows that as long ago as 1941 there were already
complaints against the closure of the Sapang Cabay by the petitioner-appellant's
predecessor-in-interest, Modesto Pascual; that the municipal council of Guiguinto
passed a resolution on November 22 of the same year, requesting the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications to order the removal of the obstruction; that the
administrative proceedings for that purpose were interrupted by the war, but
reopened in 1948, and again in 1952, pursuant to similar resolutions of the same
municipal council; and that in 1954 the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications rendered a decision ordering Encarnacion Jacobo, who was then
the owner from whom the petitioner-appellant subsequently bought the property, to
remove the dikes she had constructed. It is true that Encarnacion Jacobo was able to
get her free patent application approved in 1953 and to secure the corresponding
certificate of title, but said title did not change the public character of the Sapang
Cabay, the same being covered by one of the exceptions mentioned in Section 39 of
Act No. 496. 2
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.1wph1.t

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20950
May 31, 1965
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
AYALA Y CIA. and/or HACIENDA CALATAGAN, ET AL., defendants-appellants;
MIGUEL TOLENTINO, ET AL., intervenors-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
Jalandoni and Jamir for defendants-appellants.
Miguel Tolentino in his own behalf and for other intervenors-appellants.
BARRERA, J.:
In an amended complaint dated May 12, 1960 filed in the Court of First Instance of
Batangas (Civil Case No. 373) against Ayala Y Cia., Alfonso Zobel, Antonio Dizon.
Lucia Dizon, Ruben Dizon, Adelaida D. Reyes, Consolacion D. Degollacion, Artemio
Dizon and Zenaida Dizon, the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines sought the
annulment of titles allegedly obtained by the defendant over portions of the
territorial waters of the public domain. It was alleged that the defendant company
caused the survey and preparation of a composite plan of Hacienda Calatagan,
increasing its area from 9,652.583 hectares (as evidenced by TCT No. 722) to
12,000 hectares, by taking or including therein lands of public dominion. Thus,
plaintiff also prayed for recovery of possession of such areas in excess of those
covered by TCT No. 722, and for which fishpond permits were already issued in
favor of bona fide applicants; for damages in the sum of P500,000.00, and for a
restraining order to enjoin defendants from exercising further acts of ownership.
Miguel Tolentino and 22 others alleged holders of fishpond permits issued by the
Bureau of Fisheries over the areas supposedly outside the boundaries of Hacienda
Calatagan, were allowed to intervene in the case and make demand for recovery of
possession of said areas, and claim for damages for the deprivation of possession
thereof allegedly by the illegal acts of defendants.
Defendants, while admitting that there really existed a difference between the area
(of the Hacienda) as appearing in TCT No. 722 and the plan prepared by the
commissioned private surveyor for the company, contend that the excess (of area)
was insignificant in nature and attributable to the inaccuracy of the magnetic survey
that was used in the preparation of the plan upon which OCT No. 20 (and later, TCT
No. 722) was based.
After trial, during which the parties presented documentary and testimonial
evidence, the court rendered judgment annulling TCT No. T-9550 of the Register of
Deeds of Batangas issued to defendants Dizons covering Lots 360, 362, 363 and
182, as well as other subdivision titles issued to Ayala y Cia. and/or Hacienda de
Calatagan over the areas outside its private property covered by TCT No. 722, and
ordering defendants Dizons to vacate Lot No. 360 in favor of intervenor Miguel
Tolentino, and all the defendants to pay said intervenor, jointly and severally,
compensatory damages in the sum of P3,000.00 a year per hectare of Lot 360, until
he is placed in possession thereof. Defendants were also restrained from exercising
acts of ownership over said Lots 360, 362, 363, and 182 of Psd-40891. This ruling
was based upon the finding that the disputed areas form part of the navigable
water, or are portions of the sea, beach and foreshores of the bay. However as the
intervenors, other than Miguel Tolentino, failed to establish with particularity the lots

allegedly covered by their respecting permits or to name the present possessors or

occupants thereof, and as Ayala y Cia., Alfonso Zobel, and the Dizons were the only
ones impleaded as parties defendants, the judgment was made effective exclusively
against them. Thus Lot No. 360, included in TCT No. T-9550 in the name of the
Dizons, and proved by intervenor Miguel Tolentino to be the portion covered by the
fishpond permit issued to him, was ordered by the court delivered to said
intervenor. As a consequence of this decision, a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, to place the plaintiff and intervenor in possession of the disputed
properties, was issued by the court. However, by order of May 3, 1961, the same
was set aside on the ground that in the issuance thereof, the defendants were not
given their day in court. The motion for reconsideration of this order was denied on
October 5, 1962, for the reason, among others, that as, defendants have always
been in possession of the areas in question, to order delivery of such possession to
the other parties at this stage of the proceeding will result in injuries and promote
confusion. Both parties appealed directly to this Court: the plaintiff and intervenors
claiming that the court erred in not awarding damages to the plaintiff State; in
holding that the areas claimed by the intervenors other than Miguel Tolentino were
not duly identified; and in suspending the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
which had been executed and served by the Provincial Sheriff. Defendants, on the
other hand, claim that the trial court was in error in finding that Lots 360, 362, 363,
and 182 of Psd-40891 are outside the boundaries of Hacienda Calatagan, as
delimited in TCT No. 722, and in ordering for their reversion to the public dominion;
and in ordering the latter to deliver possession of Lot 360 to intervenor Miguel
Tolentino; in ordering defendants to pay said intervenor compensatory damages,
and in not declaring the defendants Dizons entitled to reimbursement of all
necessary expenses made on the properties in question.
We have gone over the evidence presented in this case and found no reason to
disturb the factual findings of the trial court. It has been established that certain
areas originally portions of the navigable water or of the foreshores of the bay were
converted into fishponds or sold by defendant company to third persons. There is
also no controversy as to the fact that the said defendant was able to effect these
sales after it has obtained a certificate of title (TCT No. 722) and prepared a
"composite plan" wherein the aforesaid foreshore areas appeared to be parts of
Hacienda Calatagan. Defendants-appellants do not deny that there is an excess in
area between those delimited as boundaries of the hacienda in TCT No. 722 and the
plan prepared by its surveyor. This, however, was justified by claiming that it could
have been caused by the system (magnetic survey) used in the preparation of the
original titles, and, anyway, the excess in area (536 hectares, according to
defendants) is within the allowable margin given to a magnetic survey.
But even assuming for the sake of argument that this contention is correct, the fact
remains that the areas in dispute (those covered by permits issued by the Bureau of
Fisheries) were found to be portions of the foreshore, beach, or of the navigable
water itself. And, it is an elementary principle of law that said areas not being
capable of registration, their inclusion in a certificate of title does not convert the
same into properties of private ownership or confer title on the registrant. 1 In the
present case, as the lots covered by TCT No. T-9550 issued in the names of
defendants Dizons (and which were purchased by the latter from defendants Ayala y
Cia., and/or Alfonso Zobel) were found to be portions of the foreshore or of the
territorial waters, the lower court committed no error in rendering judgment against

said defendants and ordering the reversion of said properties to the public
dominion.
However, as we have ruled in the Case of Dizon, et al. v. Rodriguez, etc., et
al., 2 there being no showing that defendant Dizon are not purchasers in good faith
and for value, they have a right to retention of the property until they are
reimbursed of the necessary expenses made on the land. which must properly be
established and determined. It also follows that as such possessors in good faith the
defendants Dizons cannot also be held liable for damages allegedly suffered by
other parties on account of their possession of the property.1wph1.t
In view of the foregoing, the revocation of the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction previously issued by the lower court, and the suspension of the delivery
of possession of the properties to plaintiff and intervenor Tolentino, were in order.
WHEREFORE, thus modified, the decision of the lower court appealed from is hereby
affirmed. No costs. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Makalintal and Bengzon, J.P.
JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Dizon, Regala and Zaldivar, JJ., took no part.
Footnotes
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-34463 September 27, 1977
ROSALINA TONGSON, applicant-appellee,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, ET AL., oppositors-appellants, MACARIO BERMEJO,
ETC., oppositor.
Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro
and Solicitor Alicia V. Sempio for appellants.
Rafael B. Silva for applicant-appellee.
Victor A. Arches for oppositor Macario Bermejo.
FERNANDO, J.:
The sole appellant in this application for registration of title for Lot 855 of the
cadastral survey of Pilar is the Director of Forestry, one of the oppositors. It smiled
the lower court decision in favor of another oppositor, Macario Bermejo. 1 The
question raised is one of law, whether or not a parcel of land, in the possession of
the predecessors- in-interest and the oppositor Bermejo as far back as 1905,
asserted to have originally been mangrove swamps, thereafter converted into a
fishpond, may still be considered as part of the timber domain which is not
disposable. As the sole issue is one of law, the Court of Appeals, where the matter
was first elevated, certified the case to this Tribunal. the decision must be affirmed,
the facts as found by the lower court being entitled to respect. As noted in the
decision: "After examining very closely the testimonial and documentary evidence
presented by Macario Bermejo in his capacity as judicial administrator of the estate
of the late Santiago M. Bermejo, the Court arrives at the conclusions that the claims
of possession and ownership of the heirs of said Santiago M. Bermejo are clearly
supported by the evidence." 2

The facts as found by the lower court follow: "The testimonial evidence shows that
as early as the year 1905 the parcel of land which later became Lot 855 of the
cadastral survey of Pilar, was under the exclusive possession of Francisco Boria who
cut trees therefrom and converted them into firewood. He also established a salt
factory and that he sold the firewood and the salt without having been disturbed by
anybody. After the death of Francisco. Boria, his son Arturo Borja took possession of
the land, continued to cut trees and converted them into firewood without giving
share of the products to anybody, up to the year 1910. On May 1, 1917 Antero Borja
sold the land to Deogracias Gayacao as evidenced by a private document over
thirty years of age, marked Exhibit '15-A-Bermejo.' The English translation is marked
Exhibit '15-A-Bermejo Deogracias Gayacao took possession of the land and made
use of the trees and the improvements therein. On January 4, 1940, Deogracias
Gayacao sold five parcels of land to Santiago M. Bermejo and one of the parcels
known as parcel No. 4 is cadastral Lot No. 855. The sale is evidenced by the notarial
instrument marked Exhibit '14- Bermejo.' During his lifetime, Santiago M. Bermejo
possessed said parcel of land, cut trees for the firewood purposes and also had a
salt factory. Upon the death of Santiago M. Bermejo in 1951, his children took
possession of this parcel of land and when Macario Bermejo was appointed judicial
administrator by the Court of First Instance of Capiz, in Special Proceedings No.
V689, this lot appeared in the Revised Inventory of the estate of the late Santiago
M. Bermejo (Exhibit '13-Bermejo'). Paragraph 21 of said Inventory (Exhibit '13-ABermejo') is Lot 855. During his lifetime, Santiago M. Bermejo declared this land for
taxation purposes as shown by tax declaration No. 10190, Exhibits '19-Bermejo,'
'20-Bermejo', '21-Bermejo,' '23-Bermejo,' and '25-Bermejo.' During the cadastral
survey of the land in the municipality of Pilar, Santiago M. Bermejo claimed Lot 855,
and presented a cadastral survey of the land in the municipality of Pilar, Santiago M.
Bermejo claimed Lot 855, and presented a cadastral answer, a copy of which is
marked Exhibit '29-Bermejo.' This cadastral answer was subscribed on March 6,
1951. 3 It was stated further: "At present Lot 855 is a completed and producing
fishpond. When Macario Bermejo took possession of the land in 1953 he converted
it into a fishpond and started to construct fishpond dikes. However, due to lack of
funds, the construction of the fishpond was not completed. On May 30, 1956,
Macario Bermejo, in his capacity as administrator of the estate of the late Santiago
M. Bermejo, leased the land to Leopoldo L. Somes with the approval of the Court of
First Instance of Capiz. Said lease contract is marked Exhibit Bermejo At present
Leopoldo L. Somes is in actual possession of Lot 855 by virtue of said lease contract
(Exhibit Bermejo) ... The possession of Francisco Borja Antero Borja, Deogracias
Gayacao, and Santiago Bermejo was peaceful, continuous, open, and adverse under
claim of ownership. The possession of the children of the late Santiago M. Bermejo,
represented by judicial administrator Macario Bermejo, started after the death of
Santiago Bermejo on April 1951. Nobody molested them. Consequently, the
possession of the heirs of Santiago M. Bermejo together with that of their
predecessors-in-interest was likewise peaceful, continuous, open, adverse and in
concept of owners for a period of not less than fifty years." 4
As set forth at the outset, the appeal lacks merit, and the affirmance of the decision
is called for.
1. It is admitted in the brief of appellant Director of Forestry that the lower court, in
its decision, relied on Montano v. Insular Government, 5 Jocson v. Director of
Forestry 6 and Garchitorena Vda. de Contrera v. Obias. 7 It is contended, however,
that after the Administrative Code of 1917 took effect, mangrove swamps were

included in the category of public forest. 8 The Administrative Code became

effective on October 1, 1917. Jocson v. Director of Forestry was decided in 1919.
This Court, in the opinion of Justice Moir was quite categorical: "In the case of Mapa
v. Insular Government ..., this court said that the phrase 'agricultural lands' as used
in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timberor
mineral lands. Whatever may have been the meaning of the term 'forestry' under
the Spanish law, the Act of Congress of July Ist 1902, classifies the public lands in
the Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural lands, and all public lands
that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands,
whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglare, fisheries or ordinary farm lands.
The definition of forestry as including manglares found in the Administrative Code of
1917 cannot affect rights which vested prior to its enactment," 9 What is even more
persuasive as to the correctness of the decision reached by the lower court is that in
the Garchitorena decision, this Court, through Justice Ostrand who was famed for his
authoritative opinions on public land controversies, promulgated in 1933, more than
fifteen years after the effectivity of the revised Administrative Code, was equally
explicit: 'The opposition rests mainly upon the proposition that in the land covered
by the application there are mangrove lands as shown in this opponent's Exhibit 1,
but we think this opposition of the Director of Forestry is untenable, inasmuch as it
has been definitely decided that mangrove lands are not forests lands in the sense
in which this phrase is used in the Act of Congress ... 10 It could be said, therefore,
that even on the assumptions that the parcel of land in question could be
characterized as mangrove swamps, the conclusion reached by the lower court is
not without support in the applicable authorities.
2. ctually, it cannot be said with certainty that there was a finding in the appealed
decision that to the disputed lot was originally mangrove swamps. As stated therein:
"Mangrove swamsp where only trees of mangrove species grow, where the trees are
small and sparse fit only for firewood purposes and the trees growing are not of
commercial value as lumber, do not convert the land into public land. Such lands
are not forest in character. They do not form part of the public domain." 11 Based on
such a finding which must be accorded due weight and is control the sole question
raised on appeal is one of law, the decision arrived at by the lower court is not open
to any valid objection.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of April 5, 1962 is affirmed. No costs.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-56077 February 28, 1985
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES PRUDENCIO MAXINO and TARCIANA
MORALES, PEDRO GONZALES, ROGELIO AQUINO, Minor represented by his
father, Manuel Aquino, and ALEJANDRO, SOCORRO, MERCEDES, CONCHITA,
REMEDIOS and FLORA, all surnamed CONSOLACION, respondents.
Silvestre Loreria, Jr. for respondent spouses Prudencio Maxino and Tarciana Morales.
AQUINO, J.:

This case is about the validity of the registration of 885 hectares of public forestal
land located in Mulanay, Quezon.
In Land Registration Case No. 81-G of the Court of First Instance at Gumaca,
Quezon, Judge Vicente del Rosario on March 21, 1961 rendered a decision, ordering
the registration of said land, Lot 1, allegedly located at Barrio Cambuga (Anonang),
Mulanay, in the names of the spouses Prudencio Maxino and Tarciana Morales, less
200 hectares which should be registered in the names of the Heirs of Lorenzo
Consolacion (72, Record on Appeal). The decision became final and executory. A
decree and an original certificate of title were issued.
More than eight years later, or on June 20, 1969, the Republic of the Philippines filed
with the Gumaca court an amended petition to annul the decision, decree and title
on the ground that they are void because the land in question was still a part of
the unclassified public forest. Moreover, the possessory information title relied upon
by the Maxino spouses covered only 29 hectares of land and not 885 hectares. The
petition was verified by the Acting Director of Forestry.
The Maxinos opposed the petition. After a hearing on the merits, Judge Agana
denied the petition in his order of September 8, 1970. That order was served upon
the assistant provincial fiscal on September 16, 1970 and on the special counsel,
Jaime Dispo of the Bureau of Forestry, on November 26, 1970.
A copy of the order was transmitted by the fiscal to the Solicitor General's Office
only on September 2, 1971 or nearly one year from the issuance of the order.
Twenty-two days thereafter or on September 24 the Solicitor General appealed from
that order and filed a motion for extension of time within which to submit a record
on appeal. The appeal was given due course.
In its decision dated October 24, 1980 the Appellate Court through Justices
Asuncion, Porfirio V. Sison and Sundiam dismissed the petition because the 1970
order had allegedly long become final and unappealable. The Solicitor General
appealed to this Court.
That is the issue to be resolved first: whether the appeal of the State from the trial
court's 1970 order of denial was seasonably made. The Appellate Court held that
the service of the order on Dispo, as special attorney, was binding on the Solicitor
General's Office. Consequently, the record on appeal, which was filed after thirty
days from the service of the order upon Dispo, was filed out of time.
We hold that the reglementary thirty-day period for appeal should be reckoned from
the time the Solicitor General's Office was apprised of the 1970 order of denial and
not from the time the special counsel or the fiscal was served with that order. These
representatives of the Solicitor General had no power to decide whether an appeal
should be made. They should have referred the matter to the Solicitor General.
In the designation of Dispo as special counsel by Solicitor General Barredo,
approved by Secretary of Justice Teehankee, it was specified that he should consult
the Solicitor General on all questions, legal and factual, regarding the case. The
question of whether an appeal should be made could only be decided by the
Solicitor General's Office.
The 1969 petition to annul the decision, decree and titles was filed by Solicitor
General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor
Alicia Sempio-Diy. Consequently, the Solicitor General's Office should be served with
the final order disposing of the petition and should not be bound by the service on
his surrogates, the special counsel and the fiscal (Republic vs. Polo, L-49247, March
13, 1979, 89 SCRA 33; Republic vs. Mendoza, L-49891, October 31, 1983, 125 SCRA
539).

The fact that after the record on appeal was filed on time, the Solicitor General's
Office was late in filing the amendments to it is of no moment. In exceptional cases,
like the instant case, the interest of justice may warrant waiver of the rules
(Republic vs. Court of Appeals, L-31303-04, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 453).
In this case, where it is contended that the registration is void allegedly because
public forestal land was registered and the State sought to declare the decision
void, the Government should not be estopped by the mistakes or errors of its agents
(Gov't. of the U. S. vs. Judge of 1st Inst. of Pampanga, 50 Phil. 975, 980; Bachrach
Motor Co. vs. Unson, 50 Phil. 981, 990; Go Tian An vs. Republic, 124 Phil. 472, 475;
Republic vs. Aquino, L-33983, January 27, 1983, 120 SCRA 186, 191-192).
Now, as to the merits of the case. It is incontestable that Lot 1, the 885-hectare area
registered by the Maxinos, is within the public forest, not alienable and disposable
nor susceptible of private appropriation. Its inclusion in the public forest was
certified by Director of Forestry Florencio Tamesis on July 6, 1940, as per Land
Classification Map No. 1386, Tayabas Project No. 16-E of Mulanay, Exhibit CAnnulment, and as shown in the report and testimony of Lorenzo R. Tria, a forest
station warden (Exh. B-Annulment; 7, 10-15 tsn March 5, 1970). Tria recommended
that the title of the Maxino spouses be annulled (Exh. B-Annulment).
The certification was reiterated by the Director of Forestry on May 20, 1948 as per
Land Classification Map No. 1516, No. 16-E of Mulanay, Quezon, Exhibit 1-A-Director
of Forestry, and as shown in paragraph 6 of the report of Forester Emerson B.
Abraham who recommended that the opposition to the registration entered by the
Director be sustained (Exh. 1-Director of Forestry; Exh. Q, Report of Land
Investigator Serapion Bauzon).
The basis of the claim of the Maxinos is a Spanish title, Exhibit G, a gratuitous
composition title or adjustment title issued on July 30, 1888 to Prudencio
Tesalona pursuant to the Royal Decree of December 26, 1884 for 29 hectares
of pasture land (pasto de animales) allegedly bounded by the Yamay and
Campalacio Creeks. *
There is a monstrous and bewildering discrepancy between the area of 29
hectares and the actual area of the land bounded by the Yamay and Campalacio
Creeks which is 970 hectares as surveyed in 1959 (Exh. D). We have no hesitation
in saying that the composition title erred in stating the boundaries. The trial court
grievously erred in applying to this case the rule that the area comprised in the
boundaries should prevail over that stated in the moniments of title.
Tria averred in his report and testimony that the Yamay and Campalacio Creeks
mentioned in the composition title really refer to the Banguian and Mamba creeks.
This would mean that the actual area claimed by Maxino was only 371 hectares, not
970 (Exh. B-Annulment; 27-30 tsn March 5, 1970).
That would also explain why in the document, Exhibit H, presented by the Maxinos,
mention is made of "paligawang 'Manba' ".
The unreliability or dubiousness of the composition title is evident from the sale
executed by the heirs of Prudencio Tesalona in favor of Tarciana Morales-Maxino
(Exh. F).
Prudencio Tesalona died in 1905. He was survived by his two children Maria and
Lucila. On September 24, 1935 the two heirs, without executing an extrajudicial
settlement of Prudencio's estate and adjudicating the said 29-hectare land to
themselves, executed an " absolute sale" of the land in favor of Tarciana MoralesMaxino (Exh. F), the wife of applicant Prudencio Maxino who was Maria's son and
the grandson of Prudencio Tesalona.

That curious document is not a sale at all. It is a "quit-claim". It is stated therein that
in consideration of P200 the Tesalona sisters "releases and forever quitclaim unto
the said Vendee" the 29-hectare land described in the composition title (Exh. F).
As an indication that the Tesalona "vendors" were not certain that their title was
good, it was stipulated as an "express condition" that the said vendors had no
obligation of warranty for "the premises hereby sold by them, the Vendee hereby
expressly releasing the Vendor(s) from all duty of defending the Vendee against all
persons now claiming, or who may hereafter claim, to have a better right and
title thereto, and assuming all the risk of eviction by superior title" (Exh. F).
It was further stipulated "that in the event that any third person shall succeed in
establishing right or title to said premises or to any portion thereof superior to that
of the grantor and in lawfully dispossessing the Vendee therefrom the Vendee shall
not be entitled to reimbursement from the Vendor of the sum of TWO HUNDRED
PESOS which constitutes the consideration for these presents, or of any part
thereof, or to damages" (Exh. F).
The Maxinos contend that Tesalona's gratuitous adjustment or composition title (as
distinguished from an onerousadjustment title) should prevail in determining the
Identity of the disputed land. This assertion is untenable in the light of the notorious
discrepancy between the area of 29 hectares stated in the title and the 970
hectares now claimed as the real area (885 hectares for Lot 1 and 84 hectares for
Lot 2 which is not involved in this case).
The most that can be said for Tesalona is that his gratuitous adjustment title
granted him possessory rights over pasture land with an area of 29 hectares but not
ownership over 970 hectares of grazing land. As to the requirements for an
adjustment proceeding under the Royal Decree of December 26, 1884, where the
area in hectares, not the boundaries, is important, see Ventura, Land Registration
and Mortgages, pp. 1719.
The Maxinos have the burden of proving that the title justified the considerable
increase in area. They have not shown that a title for 29 hectares could be a valid
title for 970 hectares. The boundaries and areas stated in Tesalona's tax
declarations reveal that a different land was covered thereby. The title states that
the 29-hectare land was located in Barrio Yamay. In his tax declarations it is stated
that the land was located in Barrio Cambuga, now Anonang.
His 1906 tax declaration is for a parcel of land whose boundaries are not the Yamay
and Campalacio Creeks but it was bounded by the Yamay Creek and the lands of
Maximo Tesalona, Emiterio Tesalona and Felix Aguilles, with an area of 120
hectares (Exh. I). On the other hand, his 1919 and 1921 tax declarations are for
land with the same boundaries but with an area of 36 hectares only (Exh. I-2 and I3).
The 1948, 1958 and 1961 tax declarations use the boundaries Campalacio and
Yamay Creeks but the area of the pasture land is 100 hectares only, a far cry from
the 970 hectares as surveyed (Exh. I-4, I-5 and I-6).
It is axiomatic that public forestal land is not registerable. Its inclusion in a title,
whether the title be issued during the Spanish regime or under the Torrens system,
nullifies the title (Director of Lands vs. Reyes, L-27594 and Alinsunurin vs. Director
of Lands, L-28144, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 177, 194-5; Director of Lands vs.
Salazar, G. R. No. 50340, December 26, 1984).
Possession of public forestal lands, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership (Director of Forestry vs. Munoz, L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183,
1199; Director of Lands vs. Salazar, supra).

The oral evidence does not bolster the case at all for the applicants. Applicant
Prudencio Maxino testified that the lot he was seeking to register has an area of
more than seventy hectares (8 tsn Jan. 11, 1961). He purchased the lot from his
aunt and mother, as shown in the deed of September 24, 1935, Exhibit F (9).
He testified that the Mamba Creek is also known as Yamay Creek (13). The land was
grazing or pasture land (15). Thirty-one squatters occupied the land (5 tsn March 6,
1961). He did not know that the land had an area of 29 hectares in 1935 when he
bought it (6). He came to know the area of the land when it was surveyed. He was
not present when it was surveyed (6).
Another witness, Fortunato Naadiego, 76, testified that the land was possessed
during the Spanish regime by his stepfather, Pedro Tesalona, the owner,
not Prudencio Tesalona, the holder of the adjustment title (11).
Spanish titles are not indefeasible (Director of Forestry vs. Munoz, supra, p. 1198).
The instant case bears similarities to Ramirez and Bayot de Ramirez vs. Director of
Lands, 60 Phil. 114, where an adjustment title issued in 1896 was held to be void
because it was fraudulent and it covered public forestal land not subject to
registration. As to void composition or patent issued in 1898, see Testagorda vs.
Commanding General, 6 Phil. 573.
Incidentally, it may be mentioned that Presidential Decree No. 892 effective
February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence in land
registration proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the order of Judge Agana, the decision of the Appellate Court and the
decision of Judge Del Rosario dated March 21, 1961 are reversed and set aside. The
application for registration of Lot 1, Psu-175880 is dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-52518 August 13, 1991
INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER COMPANY OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., respondentsappellants.
Taada, Vivo & Tan for petitioner-appellee.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:p
From an adverse decision of the then Court of First Instance (now RTC) Laguna
dated 3 June 1968 in a special civil action for declaratory relief with injunction, Civil
Case No. SC-650 entitled International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the
Philippines vs. University of the Philippines and Jose Campos, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of petitioner and against
the respondents:
(a) Declaring that Rep. Act No. 3990 does not empower the University of the
Philippines, in lieu of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of Forestry, to
scale, measure and seal the timber cut by the petitioner within the tract of land

referred to in said Act, and collect the corresponding forest charges prescribed by
the National Internal Revenue Code therefor; and
(b) Dismissing the respondents' counterclaim.
respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was docketed as C.A.G.R. No. 49409-R.
After the parties filed their respective Briefs in 1971, the Court of Appeals (Sixth
Division) promulgated on 28 December 1979 a resolution elevating the case to this
Court as the "entire case hinges on the interpretation and construction of Republic
Act 3990 as it applies to a set of facts which are not disputed by the parties and
therefore, is a legal question. 1
Civil Case No. SC-650 was filed by petitioner Hardwood before the trial court on 28
June 1966. 2 Petitioner seeks therein a declaration that respondent University of the
Philippines (hereafter referred to as UP) does not have the right to supervise and
regulate the cutting and removal of timber and other forest products, to scale,
measure and seal the timber cut and/or to collect forest charges, reforestation fees
and royalties from petitioner and/or impose any other duty or burden upon the
latter in that portion of its concession, covered by License Agreement No. 27-A
issued on 1 February 1963, ceded in full ownership to the UP by Republic Act No.
3990; asks that respondents be enjoined from committing the acts complained of
and prays that respondents be required to pay petitioner the sum of P100,000.00 as
damages and costs of the suit.
Its motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue having been unfavorably
acted upon, and pursuant to the order of the trial court of 26 August 1967,
respondents filed their Answer on 13 September 1987, 3 wherein they interpose the
affirmative defenses of, among others, improper venue and that the petition states
no cause of action; they further set up a counterclaim for the payment of it by
petitioner of forest charges on the forest products cut and felled within the area
ceded to UP under R.A. No. 3990 from 18 June 1964, with surcharges and interests
as provided in the National Internal Revenue Code.
Petitioner filed a Reply and Answer to Counterclaim. 4
On 18 October 1967, the parties submitted a Joint Stipulation of Facts and Joint
Submission of the Case for Judgment, 5 which reads as follows:
COME NOW the parties in the above entitled case by the undersigned counsel, and
respectfully submit the following JOINT STIPULATION OF FACTS AND JOINT
SUBMISSION OF THE CASE FOR JUDGMENT, without prejudice to the presentation of
evidence by either party:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Plaintiff is, among others, engaged in the manufacture, processing and
exportation of plywood and was, for said purpose, granted by the Government an
exclusive license for a period of 25 years expiring on February 1, 1985, to cut,
collect and remove timber from that portion of timber land located in the
Municipalities of Infanta, Mauban and Sampaloc Province of Quezon and in the
Municipalities of Siniloan, Pangil, Paete, Cavite and Calauan, Province of Laguna
under License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) issued and promulgated by the
Government through the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on January
11, 1960. ... ;
3. That aforementioned Timber License No. 27-A (Amendment) is a renewal of the
Timber License Agreement No. 27-A previously granted by the Government to the
plaintiff on June 4, 1953 to February 1, 1963. ... ;

4. Plaintiff, since June 4, 1953, continuously up to the present, has been in peaceful
possession of said timber concession and had been felling cutting and removing
timber therefrom pursuant to the aforementioned Timber License Agreement No.
27-A (Amendment) of January 11, 1960;
5. Plaintiff, on the strength of the License Agreement executed by the Government
on June 4,1953 (License Agreement No. 27-A) and of the License Agreement No. 27A (Amendment) of January 11, 1960, has constructed roads and other
improvements and installations of the aforementioned area subject to the grant and
purchased equipment in implementation of the conditions contained in the
aforementioned License Agreement and has in connection therewith spent more
than P7,000,000.00 as follows: ... ;
6. Sometime on September 25, 1961, during the effectivity of License Agreement
No. 27-A (Amendment) of January 11, 1960, the President of the Philippines issued
Executive Proclamation No. 791 which reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
RESERVING FOR THE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE, UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES,
AS EXPERIMENT STATION FOR THE PROPOSED DAIRY RESEARCH AND TRAINING
INSTITUTE AND FOR AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION STUDIES OF THIS
COLLEGE A CERTAIN PARCEL OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, SITUATED PARTLY IN
THE MUNICIPALITIES OF PAETE AND PAKIL ,PROVINCE OF LAGUNA, AND PARTLY IN
THE MUNICIPALITY OF INFANTA, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, ISLAND OF LUZON.
Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
and pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I, Carlos P. Garcia, President of
the Philippines, do hereby withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve for the
College of Agriculture, University of the Philippines, as experiment station for the
proposed Dairy Research and production studies of this College, a certain parcel of
land of the Public domain situated partly in the municipalities of Paete and Pakil
province of Laguna, and partly in the municipality of Infants, Province of Quezon,
Island of Luzon, subject to private rights, if any there be, and to the condition that
the disposition of timber and other forest products found therein shall be subject to
the forestry laws and regulations, which parcel of land is more particularly described
as follows, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the
Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila this 25th day of September, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and sixty-one, and of the Independence of the Philippines, the
sixteenth.
(SGD.) CARLOS P. GARCIA President of the Philippines
xxx xxx xxx
7. That on or about June 18, 1964, during the effectivity of the aforementioned
License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of July 11, 1960, Republic Act No. 3990
was enacted by the Congress of the Philippines and approved by the President of
the Philippines, which Republic Act provides as follows:
AN ACT TO ESTABLISH A CENTRAL EXPERIMENT STATION FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF
THE PHILIPPINES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. There is hereby established a central experiment station for the use of
the University of the Philippines in connection with its research and extension

functions, particularly by the College of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine

and College of Arts and Sciences.
SEC. 2. For this purpose, the parcel of the public domain consisting of three
thousand hectares, more or less, located in the Municipality of Paete, Province of
Laguna, the precise boundaries of which are stated in Executive Proclamation 791,
Series of 1961, is hereby ceded and transferred in full ownership to the University of
the Philippines, subject to any existing concessions, if any.
SEC. 3. All operations and activities carried on in the central experiment station
shall be exempt from taxation, local or general, any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, and any incidental receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to
the general fund of the University of the Philippines.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. Approved, June 18, 1964.
8. That on the strength of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3990, and prior to the
institution of the present suit, defendants have demanded, verbally as well as in
writing to plaintiff-.
(a) That the forest charges due and payable by plaintiff under the License
Agreement 27-A (Amendment) referred to in paragraph 2 hereof be paid to the
University of the Philippines, instead of the Bureau of Internal Revenue; and
(b) That the selling of any timber felled or cut by plaintiff within the boundaries of
the Central Experiment Station as defined in Republic Act No. 3990 be performed by
personnel of the University of the Philippines.
9. That the position of the plaintiff oil the demand of the defendants was fully
discussed in the letter dated April 29, 1966 of plaintiffs lawyer addressed to the
President of the University of the Philippines, copy of which is hereto attached as
Annex "A" hereof.
10. That in line with its position as stated in paragraph thereof, plaintiff has refused
to allow entry to personnel of the University of the Philippines to the Central
Experiment Station area assigned thereto for the purpose of supervising the felling
cutting and removal of timber therein and scaling any such timber cut and felled
prior to removal
11. That in view of the stand taken by plaintiff and in Relation to the implemetation
of Republic Act No. 3990 the defendant Business Executive sent the letter quoted
below to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue:
xxx xxx xxx
February 8, 1966
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Manila
Re: Forest Charges of U.P. Paete Land Grant
Dear Sir:
Under Republic Act 3990 approved in June, 1964 a parcel of forest land
approximately 3,500 hectares in area was ceded in full ownership by the
government to the University of the Philippines. This area is known as Paete Land
Grant, the title to which is presently issued in the name of the University of the
Philippines. The law transferring the ownership to the University of the Philippines
gives the university full rights of dominion and ownership, subject to the existing
concession of International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the Philippines.
Under the terms of this law all forest charges due from the concessionaire should
now be paid to the University of the Philippines. The purpose of giving this land
grant to the University is to enable us to generate income out of the land grant and

establish a research and experimental station for the Colleges of Agriculture,

Forestry, Arts and Sciences and Veterinary Medicine.
I would like, therefore, to inform you and to secure your approval of the following
matters:
1. All forest charges paid by Interwood to the District Forester of Laguna from June,
1964 up to the present should be remitted in favor of the University of the
Philippines pines;
2. All forest charges presently due from Interwood shall hereafter be paid to the
University of the Philippines and lastly
3. Hereafter the University of the Philippines shall receive all forest charges and
royalties due from any logging concession at the land grant.
May we request that proper instructions be issued by the district Forester of Laguna
about this matter. Thank you.
Very truly yours,
Sgd.) JOSE C. CAMPOS JR.
Business Executive
12. That in reply to the above letter of defendant Business Executive dated February
8, 1966, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued the following letter-ruling
dated March 11, 1966:
xxx xxx xxx
March 11, 1966
U.P. Paete Land Grant
University of the Philippines
Diliman, Quezon City
Attn: Jose C. Campos, Jr.
Business Executive
Gentlemen:
This has reference to your letter dated February 8, 1966 stating as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
In reply thereto, I have the honor to inform you as follows:
In accordance with Section 266 of the Tax Code as amplified by Section 15(a) of
Revenue Regulations No. 85, the Forest Products Regulations, forest products, cut,
gathered and removed from registered private woodlands are not subject to forest
charges, but they must be invoiced when removed to another municipality or for
commercial purposes in the manner prescribed by the regulations. As the Paete
Land Grant was ceded by law to the U.P. in full private ownership and as the grant is
manifestly to be considered registered, no forest charges are actually due and
payable on the timber cut and removed therefrom. The forest charges purportedly
to be paid by any concessionaire under any licensing agreement entered or to be
entered into by the U.P. are, therefore, to be considered not as the charges
contemplated by the National Internal Revenue Code but as part of the royalties
payable by the concessionaires for the exploitation of the timber resources of the
land grant.
Accordingly, you queries are answered viz:
1. The University may directly collect the supposed forest charges payable by
concessionaires of the land grant.
2. The forest charges paid by International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the
Philippines may be refunded provided that a formal claim for the refund thereof is
made within two years from the date of payment. The proper claimant shall be
International Hardwood and not the University.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) MISAEL P. VERA
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
13. That subsequently, defendant Business Executive sent the letter quoted below
to the District Forester of the province of Laguna una dated April 18, 1 966:
April 18, 1966
The District Forester
Bureau of Forestry
Sta. Cruz, Laguna
Dear Sir:
Enclosed is a copy of a letter to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue concerning
the right of the University of the Philippines to collect forest charges from the
existing logging concessionaire at the Laguna Land Grant (formerly Paete Land
Grant). This tract of forest land containing some 3,500 hectares was ceded to the
University of the Philippines in full ownership by Republic Act No. 3990, approved in
June, 1964. In view thereof, the University of the Philippines requested that its
authority over said land be recognized and that the existing concessionaire,
International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the Philippines, in turn pay its
forest charges directly to the University instead of to the national government.
Please take note of page "2" of the enclosed letter of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue on the official ruling of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to the following
points raised by the University:
1. That the University of the Philippines may now directly collect forest charges from
INTERWOOD, the existing logging concessionaire.
2. That forest charges paid by INTERWOOD to the Bureau of Forestry from June,
1964 up to April, 1966 shall be refunded to the University of the Philippines. In this
manner, INTERWOOD is requested to file a claim for the refund in the amount
heretofore paid by it to be remitted to the University of the Philippines.
On the basis of this letter to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, it is understood
that forest charges on timber cut from the Laguna Land Grant as scaled by scalers
of the University of the Philippines shall now be paid directly to the University of the
Philippines. In another ruling by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the
University, particularly the Laguna Land Grant, is exempted from all kinds of
Internal Revenue taxes.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) Jose C. Campos, Jr.
Business Executive
14. That the above quoted letter of defendant Business Executive dated April 18,
1966 was duly endorsed by the District Forester of the province of Laguna to the
Director of Forestry.
15. That on or about June 7, 19667 the Assistant Director of Forestry addressed to
plaintiff the letter dated June 7, 1966, which states as follows:
Sirs:
This is in connection with your request for this Office to comment on your reply to
the letter of Mr. Jose C. Campos, Jr. of the University of the Philippines.
In your reply to the letter of Mr. Campos, it is stated that the University of the
Philippines is claiming the right:
(a) To scale, measure and seal the timber cut inside the area covered by the U.P.
Land Grant at Paete, Laguna;
(b) To collect the corresponding forest charges;

(c) To collect royalties aside from the forest charges; and

(d) To exercise in effect all the authority vested by law upon the Bureau of Forestry
in the cutting, removal and disposition of the timber from said area, and the
authority of the Bureau of Internal Revenue respecting the measurement and
scaling of the logs and the collection of the corresponding forest charges and other
fees in connection therewith.
This office is in full accord with your arguments against the claim of the University
of the Philippines to have acquired the above rights. We believe that the right
vested the INTERWOOD by virtue of number License Agreement No. 27-A
(Amendment) to utilize the timber inside subject area is still binding and should
therefore, be respected. It is on the basis of this acknowledgment that we sent your
client our letter of November 4,1965 requesting him to comment on the application
of the State University for a Special Timber License over the said area.
16. That acting on the endorsement referred to in paragraph l4, the Director of
Bureau of Forestry issued the letter ruling quoted below, dated June 30,1966:
xxx xxx xxx
June 30, 1966
District Forester
Sta. Cruz, Laguna
(Thru the Regional Director of Forestry, Manila)
Sir:
This concerns your inquiry contained in the 3rd paragraph of your letter dated April
26, 1966, designated as above, as to whether or not you shall turn over the scaling
work for logs cut from the area of the International Hardwood & Veneer Company of
the Philippines in the Pacto Land Grant to Scalers of the University of the
Philippines.
In view of the ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that the Paete Land
Grant, which embraces the area of the International Hardwood & Veneer Company
of the Philippines, is considered a registered private woodland of the University of
the Philippines and therefore no forest charges are actually due and payable on the
timber cut and removed therefrom, and in view further of the ruling of said
Commissioner that the forest charges purportedly to be paid by any concessionaire
under any licensing agreement entered or to be entered into by the U.P. are to be
considered not as the charged contemplated by the National Internal Revenue Code
but as part of the royalties payable by the concessionaires for the exploitation of the
timber resources of the land grant, you may turn over the scaling work therein to
the scalers of the U.P.
However, you should guard against the use of such licensing agreements entered or
to be entered into by the U.P. as a means of smuggling forest products from the
neighboring public forests.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) ANTONIO A. QUEJADA
xxx xxx xxx
On the basis of the above JOINT STIPULATION OF FACTS, the pleadings filed in the
case, and whatever additional evidence may be presented by the parties, the
parties hereto, through counsel, jointly move and pray of this Honorable Court that
judgment be rendered granting full and appropriate relief, on the following issues:
1. Whether plaintiff, as of the date of present case was filed, should pay forest
charges due and payable under its timber License Agreement No. 27-A

(Amendment) as set forth in paragraph 2 hereof', to the Bureau of Internal Revenue,

or to the University of the Philippines; and
2. In the event that it be found by this Honorable Court that said forest charges are
to be paid to the University of the Philippines, whether or not the University of the
Philippines is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the
logging, telling and removal of timber within the Central Experiment Station area as
described in Republic Act No. 3990, and to scale the timber thus felled and cut.
Manila for Laguna, September 29,1967.
Upon the foregoing Stipulation of Facts, the trial court rendered its judgment on 3
June 1968 in favor of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which is quoted at the
beginning of this decision. In deciding the case against UP, it held:
... the court finds that the respondents' demand on the petitioner has no legal basis.
In the first place, the cession in full ownership of the tract of land referred to in the
Act was expressly made 'subject to any existing concessions.' Inasmuch as at the
time of the enactment of the Act, the petitioner's timber concession over the tract
of land was existing and would continue to exist until February 1, 1985, the
University of the Philippines will acquire full ownership' and exclusive jurisdiction to
control and administer the property only after February 1, 1985. The cession of the
property to the University of the Philippines is akin to the donation of a parcel of
land, subject to usufruct. The donee acquires full ownership thereof only upon the
termination of the usufruct. At the time of the donation, all what the donee acquires
is the 'naked' ownership of the property donated. In the second place, the
respondents' demand cannot be valid unless the provisions of Sees. 262 to 276 of
the National Internal Revenue Code regarding the measuring of timber cut from the
forest and the collection of the prescribed forest charges by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and Bureau of Forestry are first amended. In their arguments, the
respondents tried to stretch the scope of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3990 in
order to include therein such amendment of the provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code and Revised Administrative Code, but they failed to convince the
Court, not only because of the first reason above stated, but also because it clearly
appears that such amendment is not intended in Republic Act No. 3990, which does
not contain even a remote allusion thereto in its title or a general amendatory
provision at the end. In the third place, under Republic Act No. 3990, the University
of the Philippines cannot legally use the tract of land ceded to it for purposes other
than those therein expressly provided, namely, 'for the use of the University of the
Philippines in connection with its research and extension functions, particularly by
the College of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine and College of Arts and
Sciences.' Hence, upon the expiration of the petitioner's timber concession, the
University of the Philippines cannot even legally renew it or grant timber concession
over the whole tract of land or over portions thereof to other private individuals and
exercise the functions of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of Forestry by
scaling and measuring the timber cut within the area and collecting from them the
forest charges prescribed by the National Internal Revenue Code.
Respondents claim in their Brief that the trial court erred:
I
... WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF WITH
INJUNCTION INSPITE OF ITS INHERENT JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS THAT SHOULD
WARRANT A DISMISSAL.
II

... WHEN IT DECLARED THAT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3990 DOES NOT EMPOWER THE
RESPONDENT UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, IN LIEU OF THE BUREAU OF
INTERNAL REVENUE AND BUREAU OF FORESTRY, TO SCALE, MEASURE AND SEAL
THE TIMBER CUT BY THE PETITIONER WITHIN THE TRACT OF LAND REFERRED TO IN
SAID ACT, AND COLLECT THE CORRESPONDING FOREST CHARGES PRESCRIBED BY
THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE.
1. The first assigned error is without merit. In the Joint Stipulation of Facts, the
parties jointly move and pray that the trial court render judgment granting full and
appropriate remedy on the following issues:
l. Whether plaintiff, as of the date of present case was filed, should pay forest
charges due and payable under its Timber License Agreement No. 27-A
(Amendment) as set forth in paragraph 2 hereof, to the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
or to the University of the Philippines; and
2. In the event that it be found by this Honorable Court that said forest charges are
to be paid to the University of the Philippines, whether or not the University of the
Philippines is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the
logging, felling and removal of timber within the Central Experiment Station area as
described in Republic Act No. 3990, and to scale the timber thus felled
These issues bring the matter within the scope of an action for declaratory relief
under Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court and render meaningless the appeal to
the rule laid down in Sarmiento, et al. vs. Caparas, et al. 6 that declaratory relief
cannot be joined by injunction, because herein petitioner, for all legal intents and
purposes, abandoned it by its failure to raise it in the Stipulation of Facts. Thus,
what attains is an amendment to both pleadings (the complaint and the answer),
which is authorized by Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. Said section
pertinently provides:
SEC. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. When
issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the
parties, they shall be treated in all respect, as if they had been raised in the
pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to
conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any
party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to so amend does not affect the
result of the trial by these issues. ...
The stipulation of facts and the agreement as to the issues unquestionably satisfy
the requisites for declaratory relief. (a) there must be a justiciable controversy; (b)
the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the
party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and
(d) the issue invoked must be ape for judicial determination. 7
There is a justiciable controversy where there is an actual controversy, or
the ripening seeds of one exists between the parties, all of whom are sui juris and
before the court, and that the declaration sought will help in ending the controversy.
A doubt becomes a justiciable controversy when it is translated into a claim of right
which is actually contested. 8
2. On the second assigned error, respondents assert that: (a) Under R.A. No. 3990,
the Republic of the Philippines may effect collection of forest charges through the
University of the Philippines because the License Agreement does not expressly
provide that the forest charges shall be paid to the Bureau of Internal Revenue; in
the absence of a specific contractual provision limiting it to a particular agency in
collecting forest charges owing to it, the Republic may effect such collection through
another agency. (b) Having been vested with administrative jurisdiction over and

being the owner of the tract of land in question, the UP acquired full control and
benefit of the timber and other resources within the area. Timber areas within the
ceded property but outside the concession of petitioner can be fully exploited by UP.
However, in respect to timber areas within the ceded property but covered by the
concession of petitioner, only forest charges (or more appropriately, royalties) may
be enjoyed by UP until the expiration of petitioner's license. To deny it such charges
would render its "full ownership" empty and futile. (c) The UP is clearly entitled to
the income derived from the tract of land ceded to it, for Section 3 of R.A. No. 3990
expressly provides:
All operations and activities carried on in the central experiment station shall be
exempt from taxation, local or general, any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, and any incidental receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to
the general fund of the University of the Philippines. (emphasis supplied for
emphasis).
(d) As provided by R.A. No. 3990, the UP is duty bound to operate and maintain a
central experiment station; since this law does not provide for appropriations for
such purpose, it is clearly the legislative intention that the establishment and
maintenance thereof must be financed by the earnings or income from the area,
which can only come from the timber and the royalties or charges payable
therefrom. This is in accordance with the general principle that a grant of authority
or jurisdiction extends to all incidents that may arise in connection with the matter
over which jurisdiction is exercised. (e) Supervision of the License Agreement in
favor of petitioner by UP was intended by R.A. No. 3990. (f) Finally, the two
government agencies affected by R.A. No. 3990 have issued specific rulings
recognizing the authority of UP to collect royalties or charges and to supervise
petitioner's logging operations.
Petitioner refutes the foregoing arguments of respondents by asserting that: (a) The
UP has not been granted by R.A. No. 3990 the authority to collect forest charges or
the authority to supervise the operation by the petitioner of the timber concession
affected by said Act.
The rule is well-settled that legislative grants must be construed strictly in favor of
the public and most strongly against the grantee, and nothing will be included in the
grant except that which is granted expressly or by clear implication. Under Section
262 of the Tax Code, as amended, the duties incident to the measuring of forest
products and the collection of the charges thereon shall be discharged by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue under the regulations of the Department of Finance. The
reforestation fee shall be collected by the Bureau of Forestry. 9 The supervision and
regulation of the use of forest products and of the cutting and removal of forest
products are vested upon the Bureau of Forestry. 10 R.A. No. 3990 does not
expressly, or even impliedly, grant the UP any authority to collect from the holders
of timber concessions on the area ceded to it forest charges due and payable to the
Government under the Tax Code, or to enforce its provisions relating to charges on
forest products or to supervise the operations of the concessions by the holders
thereof; (b) The cession in full ownership of the land in question was expressly
made "subject to any concession, if any", and that petitioner's concession would
continue until 1 February 1985; the UP then would acquire full ownership and
exclusive jurisdiction to control and administer the property only after 1 February
1985. The position of UP is akin to that of a donee of a parcel of land subject to
usufruct. (c) The rulings of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Acting
Director of the Bureau of Forestry are patently incorrect; moreover, said agencies do

not have the power to interpret the law, which is primarily a function of the
judiciary. (d) Finally, it has acquired a vested right to operate the timber concession
under the supervision and control of the Bureau of Forestry.
There is merit in the second assigned error.
Under Proclamation No. 791, dated 25 September 1961, a parcel of land of the
public domain described therein, with an area of 3,500 hectares, which is the very
parcel of land subject of R.A. No. 3990, was withdrawn from sale or settlement and
was reserved for the College of Agriculture of the UP as experiment station for the
proposed Dairy Research and Training Institute and for research and production
studies of said college, subject however to private rights, if any, and to the
condition that the disposition of timber and other forest products found thereon
shall be subject to forestry laws and regulations.
The above reservation is within the area covered by petitioner's timber license.
Pursuant, however, to R.A. No. 3990 which establishes a central experiment station
for the use of the UP in connection with its research and extension functions,
particularly by the College of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine and College
of Arts and Sciences, the above "reserved" area was "ceded and transferred in full
ownership to the University of the Philippines subject to any existing concessions, if
any."
When it ceded and transferred the property to UP, the Republic of the Philippines
completely removed it from the public domain and, more specifically, in respect to
the areas covered by the timber license of petitioner, removed and segregated it
from a public forest; it divested itself of its rights and title thereto and relinquished
and conveyed the same to the UP; and made the latter the absolute owner thereof,
subject only to the existing concession. That the law intended a transfer of the
absolute ownership is unequivocally evidenced by its use of the word "full" to
describe it. Full means entire, complete, or possessing all particulars, or not wanting
in any essential quality. 11 The proviso regarding existing concessions refers to the
timber license of petitioner. All that it means, however, is that the right of petitioner
as a timber licensee must not be affected, impaired or diminished; it must be
respected. But, insofar as the Republic of the Philippines is concerned, all its rights
as grantor of the license were effectively assigned, ceded and conveyed to UP as a
consequence of the above transfer of full ownership. This is further home out by
Section 3 of R.A. No. 3990 which provides, inter alia, that "any incidental receipts or
income therefrom shall pertain to the general fund of the University of the
Philippines. Having been effectively segregated and removed from the public
domain or from a public forest and, in effect, converted into a registered private
woodland, the authority and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry over it were
likewise terminated. This is obvious from the fact that the condition in Proclamation
No. 971 to the effect that the disposition of timber shall be subject to forestry laws
and regulations is not reproduced iii R.A. No. 3990. The latter does not likewise
provide that it is subject to the conditions set forth in the proclamation. An owner
has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing without other limitations than those
established by law. 12 The right to enjoy includes the jus utendi or the right to
receive from the thing what it produces, and the jus abutendi or the right to
consume the thing by its use. 13 As provided for in Article 441 of the Civil Code, to
the owner belongs the natural fruits, the industrial fruits and the civil fruits. There
are, however, exceptions to this rules, as where the property is subject to a
usufruct, in which case the usufructuary gets the fruits. 14 In the instant case, that
exception is made for the petitioner as licensee or grantee of the concession, which

has been given the license to cut, collect, and remove timber from the area ceded
and transferred to UP until I February 1985. However, it has the correlative duty and
obligation to pay the forest charges, or royalties, to the new owner, the UP, at the
same rate as provided for in the Agreement. The charges should not be paid
anymore to the Republic of the Philippines through the Bureau of Internal Revenue
because of the very nature of the transfer as aforestated. Consequently, even the
Bureau of Internal Revenue automatically lost its authority and jurisdiction to
measure the timber cut from the subject area and to collect forestry charges and
other fees due thereon.
The foregoing disposes of the contention of petitioner that R.A. No. 3990 does not
grant the UP the authority to collect forest charges and to supervise the operations
of its concession insofar as the property of the UP within it is concerned. Its
argument that it has acquired vested rights to operate its concession under the
supervision and control of the Bureau of Forestry is preposterous. The grantor,
Republic of the Philippines, was by no means bound under the License to
perpetuate the Bureau as its agent. Neither is there force to its contention that
legislative grants must be construed strictly in favor of the public and most strongly
against the grantee. The grant under R.A. No. 3990 is transfer of absolute, full and
entire ownership which leaves no room for a strict interpretation against the
grantee, the UP. The reservation therein made is in favor of the private party
pursuant to the license, which is nevertheless protected. It is the concession in favor
of the petitioner which should, on the contrary, be bound by the rule.
It follows then that respondent UP is entitled to supervise, through its duly
appointed personnel, the logging, felling and removal of timber within the area
covered by R.A. No. 3990.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the
decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. C-650, rendered on 3 June 1968;
DECLARING that forest charges due from and payable by petitioner for timber cut
pursuant to its License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) within the area ceded
and transferred to the University of the Philippine pursuant to R.A. No. 3990 shall be
paid to the University of the Philippines; DECLARING that the University of the
Philippines is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the
logging, felling and removal of timber within the aforesaid area covered by R.A. No.
3990.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 135527. October 19, 2000]
Spouses GEMINIANO and AMPARO DE OCAMPO and Spouses PEDRO and
CRISANTA SANTOS, petitioners, vs. FEDERICO ARLOS, MARY ARLOS,
TEOFILO OJERIO and BELLA OJERIO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Under the Public Land Act as amended, only titles to alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain may be judicially confirmed. Unless a public land is reclassified
and declared as such, occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how
long ago, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights. A suit for the reversion of
such property to the State may be instituted only by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG).
The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the August 28, 1998
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 52048, the decretal portion
of which reads as follows:[2]
ACCORDINGLY, for want of merit, the appeal is DENIED and the challenged Decision
dated 26 November 1993 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Balanga, Bataan,
is AFFIRMED. No costs.
The affirmed Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled on the following: (1)
Land Registration Case No. N-340, filed in 1977 for confirmation of respondents title
to three parcels of land; and (2) Civil Case No. 4739, filed in 1981 for cancellation of
petitioners Sales Patents and Transfer Certificates of Title covering two of the said
lots. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads: [4]
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered:
I. In Civil Case No. 4739 1. Ordering the cancellation of Sales Patent Nos. 5387 and 5388 as well as Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. T-43298 and T-44205 in the names of [herein
petitioner-]spouses Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo de Ocampo and x x x Pedro
Santos and Crisanta Santos.
2. Taking judicial cognizance of the decision in Civil Case No. 3769, which ordered
the cancellation of Free Patent Nos. 522697 and 502977 as well as Original
Certificate of Title Nos. 296 and 297, which decision has already become final and
executory;
3. Ordering [Petitioners] Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo de Ocampo and x x
x Pedro Santos and Crisanta Santos to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs
attorneys fees in the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) and the costs of suit.
II. In Land Registration Case No. N-340 1. Confirming [herein respondents] title [to] the land subject of registration and
ordering the registration thereof in the names of [Respondent] Teofilo D. Ojerio, of
legal age, Filipino, married to Bella V. Ojerio and a resident of Cabcaben, Mariveles,
Bataan - share; and Cecilia P. Arlos, Jose P. Arlos, Gloria P. Arlos, Luisito P. Arlos, all of
legal age, Filipinos, single and residents of 500-A, Fifth Avenue corner Baltazar
Street, Grace Park, Caloocan City, Metro Manila, and Alberto U. Arlos, minor, Filipino,
and a resident of 500-A, Fifth Avenue corner Baltazar Street, Grace Park, Caloocan
City, Metro Manila - share; and
2. As soon as this decision becomes final and executory, let an order for the
issuance of the corresponding decrees be issued.
SO ORDERED.
The Facts

The undisputed facts are quoted by the CA from the RTC judgment, as follows: [5]
On 14 April 1977, Federico S. Arlos and Teofilo D. Ojerio filed an application for
registration, docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-340, wherein they seek
judicial confirmation of their titles [to] three parcels of land, namely: (1) a parcel of
land covered by SGS 4140 [PLAN] with an area of 226,105 square meters; (2) a
parcel of land identified as Lot 1, SGS 41241 [PLAN] with an area of 111,333 square
meters; and (3) a parcel of land identified as Lot 2, SGS 4141 [PLAN] with an area of
63,811 square meters, all located at Cabcaben, Mariveles, Bataan, and having a
total area of 401,159 square meters or 40.1159 hectares.
Spouses Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo De Ocampo and spouses Pedro Santos
and Crisanta Santos opposed the application for registration, alleging that they are
the co-owners of Lots 1 and 2 of Plan SGS 3062, situated at Cabcaben, Mariveles,
Bataan, and their ownership is evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-

43298 and T-44205, and that they became owners of said lots by purchase from the
government through sales patents.
The Republic of the Philippines also opposed the application, contending that
neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interests have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in
question for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the application;
and that the parcels of land applied for are portions of the public domain belonging
to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.
Spouses Placido Manalo and Rufina Enriquez and spouses Armando Manalo and
Jovita Baron also opposed the application for registration.
Almost four years after the filing of the land registration case or, to be exact, on 20
February 1981, applicant Arlos and his spouse, Mary Alcantara Arlos, and applicant
Ojerio and his spouse Bella V. Ojerio, filed Civil Case No. 4739, seeking to cancel; (1)
the free patent title of defendants-spouses Placido Manalo and Rufina Enriquez, that
is, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 296-Bataan, covering Lot, 1, Plan F-(III-4)
508-D with an area of 155,772 square meters, and Lot 2, same plan, containing an
area of 43,089 square meters, or a total area of 198,861 square meters or 19.8861
hectares; (2) the free patent title of defendants Armando Manalo and Jovito Baron,
that is, OCT No. 297-Bataan, covering Lot, 1, F-(III-4) 510-D with an area of 72,065
square meters or 7.2065 hectares; and (3) the sales patent title of defendantsspouses Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo de Ocampo and defendants-spouses
Pedro Santos and Crisanta Santos, that is, Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-44205Bataan with an area of 225,011 square meters or 22.5011 hectares, and T-43298Bataan with an area of 111,333 square meters or 11.1333 hectares.
In the Order dated 31 July 1991 of the RTC, Branch 1, Balanga, Bataan, Civil Case
No. 4739 which was then assigned to said Branch was ordered consolidated with the
land registration cases assigned to Branch 2.
Of relevance to this case on appeal is the Decision of the Supreme Court dated 26
April 1989 in G.R. 64753 involving Civil Case No. 3769 entitled Spouses de Ocampo
et al. v. Manalo, et al. which annulled the free patent titles of the spouses Manalo
and declared as valid the sales patent title issued in favor of the spouses De
Ocampo and spouses Santos involving the same properties subject of this appeal.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Affirming the factual findings of the trial court, the CA ruled that petitioners had
failed to comply with the Public Land Act, which required sales patent applicants to
be the actual occupants and cultivators of the land. It held that the testimonies of
petitioners, which were incongruous with reality, bolstered the finding that [they
had] never occupied, cultivated or made improvements on the property. It
explained:
On the basis of its own findings, the trial court, after evaluating the evidence
presented, concluded that [herein respondents] and their predecessors-in-interest
were in actual possession of the subject lands in 1947 and continuously up to the
present. In contrast, the checkered testimonies of [petitioners] reveal that they
have never been in possession of the lands. And because of the absence of the
actual occupancy on their part, the sales patents and titles issued in their favor are
null and void citing therein the ruling inRepublic v. Mina (114 SCRA 946) that the
alleged misrepresentation of the applicant that he had been occupying and
cultivating the land are sufficient grounds to nullify the patent and title under
Section 9 of the Public Land Laws.

On this particular note, we find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial
court. x x x.[6]
Debunking petitioners reliance on Manalo v. IAC and de Ocampo,[7] the CA
ratiocinated as follows:
[Herein respondents] do not challenge the Decision of the High Court dated 26 April
1989 in GR No. 64753 which annulled the free patent titles of defendants-appellants
Manalos and granted the issuance of sales patent titles of [Petitioners] De Ocampos
and Santoses.
What is being disputed is that the issuance of the sales patents of the subject
property in favor of the Santoses and the De Ocampos was allegedly tainted by
fraud and misrepresentation on their part by misrepresenting themselves to be
actual occupants of the subject properties when in fact the subject properties were
being actually occupied by the [respondents] since 1947 way back when the land
still formed part of the military reservation and further on when it was declared to
be public agricultural land. x x x.[8]
Hence, this Petition.[9]
The Issues

In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration:
[10]

I
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in disregarding the
Decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 64753 entitled, Placido Manalo, et al. vs.
Spouses Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo de Ocampo, et al., wherein the validity
and legality of petitioners TCT No. T-44205 and TCT No. T-43298 [pertaining to] the
land in dispute were upheld.
II
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in ordering the cancellation
of petitioners Sales Patent as well as TCT Nos. T-43298 and T-44205 considering that
private respondents are not the proper party to institute the action for annulment of
petitioners titles [to] the lots.
III
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in ruling that petitioners
committed an act of misrepresentation in their Application for Sales Patent.
IV
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in ordering petitioners to
pay private respondents the amount ofP50,000.00 representing attorneys fees.
In short, petitioners ask this Court to determine the propriety of (1) the registration
of respondents title under the Public Land Act and (2) the cancellation of petitioners
Sales Patents and Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs).
The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

First Issue:Registration of Respondents Title

Respondents application for registration of title to the three parcels of land that
were once part of the public domain is governed by the Public Land Act, [11] the
pertinent portion of which reads:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of
the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxxxxxxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter.
xxxxxxxxx
Respondents claim that they purchased the subject lots in 1967 from Bernardo and
Arsenio Obdin,[12] who in turn had been in possession of the property since
1947. Hence, when the former filed their application for registration in 1977, they
and their predecessors-in-interest had been occupying and cultivating, in the
concept of owners, the said parcels of land for at least 30 years, as required by the
Public Land Act.
We are not convinced. First, a title may be judicially confirmed under Section 48 of
the Public Land Act only if it pertains to alienable lands of the public domain.
[13]
Unless such assets are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable,
occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long cannot ripen into
ownership and be registered as a title. Verily, Presidential Decree No.
1073[14] clarified Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act by specifically declaring that
the latter applied only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. [15]
In the present case, the disputed land which was formerly a part of a US military
reservation that had been turned over to the Philippine government in 1965, was
declared disposable and alienable only in 1971. In Manalo v. IAC and de Ocampo,
[16]
a suit involving the same parcel of land and instituted by herein petitioners
against other claimants, the Court held:
As correctly pointed out by the appellate court in its questioned decision:
x x x. It is not correct to say that when the U.S. Military Reservation in Bataan, of
which the land in question forms part, was turned over to the Philippine
government, the same automatically became a disposable land of the public
domain. The ownership and control over said reservation was transferred to the
Philippine government, but its nature as a military reservation remained
unchanged. Said parcels of land became a disposable land of public domain only on
May 19, 1971, per certification of the Bureau of Forestry (Project No. 4-A, C-C. Map
No 26-40). Its disposition only by sale was duly authorized pursuant to the
provisions of Republic Act No. 274. If the land in question became immediately
disposable upon its turn over to the Philippine government in 1965, then why, it
may be asked, was it certified disposable only in 1971. This Court is of the
conclusion that this land above referred to continued to be a military reservation
land while in the custody of the Philippine government until it was certified
alienable in 1971. (Emphasis supplied.)
Second, respondents and their predecessors-in-interest could not have occupied the
subject property from 1947 until 1971 when the land was declared alienable and
disposable, because it was a military reservation at the time.Hence, it was not
subject to occupation, entry or settlement. This is clear from Sections 83 and 88 of
the Public Land Act, which provide as follows:
SEC. 83. Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce,
the President may designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public

domain as reservations for the use of the Commonwealth of the Philippines or of

any of its branches, or of the inhabitants thereof, in accordance with regulations
prescribed for this purpose, or for quasi-public uses or purposes when the public
interest requires it, including reservations for highways, rights of way for railroads,
hydraulic power sites, irrigation systems, communal pastures or leguas comunales,
public parks, public quarries, public fishponds, working-men's village and other
improvements for the public benefit.
SEC. 88. The tract or tracts of land reserved under the provisions of section eightythree shall be non-alienable and shall not be subject to occupation, entry, sale,
lease, or other disposition until again declared under the provision of this Act or by
proclamation of the President. (Emphasis supplied.)
Verily, in Manalo, the Court debunked therein petitioners similar argument that they
had been occupying the property since 1944. It ruled in this wise:
The big tract of land in Mariveles, Bataan to which the parcels of land involved in
the case belong was formerly a portion of the US Military Reservation in Mariveles,
Bataan which was turned over to the Philippine Government only on December 22,
1965 (Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals et al., No. L-39473, April 30,
1979, 89 SCRA 648). Under the situation, the Court seriously doubts whether
Placido Mapa and their predecessors-in-interest could have been in possession of
the land since 1944 as they claimed:
Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on
them can be acquired (Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.,
No. 14912, September 30, 1976, 73 SCRA 146).
We reiterate that the land was declared alienable only in 1971; hence, respondents
have not satisfied the thirty-year requirement under the Public Land Act. Moreover,
they could not have occupied the property for thirty years, because it formed part of
a military reservation. Clearly then, their application for the registration of their
titles was erroneously granted by the appellate and the trial courts.
Second Issue: Cancellation of Petitioners Titles

Petitioners claim that their titles can no longer be challenged, because it is a rule
that the Torrens Title issued on the basis of a free patent becomes indefeasible as
one which was judicially secured upon registration upon expiration of one year from
date of issuance of patent.[17]
Petitioners further contend that the action for the cancellation of their Sales Patents
and TCTs should have been initiated by the solicitor general, not by herein
respondents, pursuant to Section 101 of the Public Land Act, which we quote:
SEC. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public
domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the
officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines.
Respondents argue, however, that the present proceedings are not for reversion,
but for reconveyance. Hence, they have the personality to file the present suit.
We are not persuaded by respondents argument. In an action for reconveyance, the
decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the
transfer of the property, in this case the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another persons name, to its rightful owner or to one with
a better right. That is what reconveyance is all about.[18]
Reconveyance, however, is not available to respondents, because they have not
shown a title better than that of petitioners. As earlier shown, the former have not
proven any title that may be judicially confirmed.

Moreover, respondents invocation of Heirs of Nagano v. CA[19] must be rejected. In

that case, the Court noted that the allegations in the Complaint, which were
deemed admitted for the purpose of resolving the Motion to Dismiss, were an
assertion that the lot is private land, or that even assuming it was part of the public
domain, private respondents had already acquired imperfect title thereto under
Section 48 (b) of CA No. 141 x x x. Hence, the Court ruled that respondents, not the
OSG, were the proper parties to file the suit.
In the present case, we reiterate that respondents failed to show entitlement to the
land. They have not established that they are the rightful owners of the property; or
at least, that they, not petitioners, have a better right thereto.
Respondents vigorously contend that the Sales Patents were fraudulently obtained
by petitioners, who have allegedly failed to prove the requisite actual occupation of
the land in question. The former cite several portions of the transcript of
stenographic notes, showing that the latter have not actually occupied or cultivated
the property.
The Court, however, finds that a ruling on the veracity of these factual averments
would be improper in this Decision. If petitioners Sales Patents and TCTs were in fact
fraudulently obtained, the suit to recover the disputed property should be filed by
the State through the Office of the Solicitor General. Since petitioners titles
originated from a grant by the government, their cancellation is a matter between
the grantor and the grantee.[20] At the risk of being repetitive, we stress that
respondents have no personality to recover the property, because they have not
shown that they are the rightful owners thereof.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decisions of the Court of
Appeals and the Regional Trial Court are REVERSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General for a
possible review, in its sound discretion, of the issuance of the Sales Patents and
Certificates of Titles in the name of herein petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 103882. November 25, 1998]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS AND REPUBLIC REAL ESTATE
CORPORATION, respondents. CULTURAL CENTER OF THE
PHILIPPINES, intervenor.
[G.R. No. 105276. November 25, 1998]
PASAY CITY AND REPUBLIC REAL ESTATE CORPORATION, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
At bar are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Here, the Court is confronted with a case commenced before
the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal in Pasay City, in
1961, more than 3 decades back, that has spanned six administrations of the
Republic and outlasted the tenure of ten (10) Chief Justices of the Supreme Court.
In G.R. No. 103882, the Republic of the Philippines, as petitioner, assails the
Decision, dated January 29, 1992 and Amended Decision, dated April 28, 1992, of
the Court of Appeals[1], which affirmed with modification the Decision of the former
Court of First Instance of Rizal (Branch 7, Pasay City) in Civil Case No. 2229-P,

entitled Republic of the Philippines versus Pasay City and Republic Real Estate
Corporation.
The facts that matter are, as follows:
Republic Act No. 1899 (RA 1899), which was approved on June 22, 1957, authorized
the reclamation of foreshore lands by chartered cities and municipalities. Section I
of said law, reads:
SECTION 1. Authority is hereby granted to all municipalities and chartered cities to
undertake and carry out at their own expense the reclamation by dredging, filling,
or other means, of any foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish, provide,
construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities as
such municipalities and chartered cities may determine in consultation with the
Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
On May 6, 1958, invoking the aforecited provision of RA 1899, the Pasay City
Council passed Ordinance No. 121, for the reclamation of Three
Hundred (300) hectares of foreshore lands in Pasay City, empowering the City Mayor
to award and enter into reclamation contracts, and prescribing terms and conditions
therefor. The said Ordinance was amended on April 21, 1959 by Ordinance No. 158,
which authorized the Republic Real Estate Corporation (RREC) to reclaim foreshore
lands of Pasay City under certain terms and conditions.
On April 24, 1959, Pasay City and RREC entered into an Agreement [2] for the
reclamation of the foreshore lands in Pasay City.
On December 19, 1961, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a
Complaint[3] for Recovery of Possession and Damages with Writ of Preliminary
Preventive Injunction and Mandatory Injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 2229-P
before the former Court of First Instance of Rizal, (Branch 7, Pasay City).
On March 5, 1962, the Republic of the Philippines filed an Amended
Complaint[4] questioning subject Agreement between Pasay City and RREC (Exhibit
P) on the grounds that the subject-matter of such Agreement is outside the
commerce of man, that its terms and conditions are violative of RA 1899, and that
the said Agreement was executed without any public bidding.
The Answers[5] of RREC and Pasay City, dated March 10 and March 14, 1962,
respectively, averred that the subject-matter of said Agreement is within the
commerce of man, that the phrase foreshore lands within the contemplation of RA
1899 has a broader meaning than the cited definition of the term in the Words and
Phrases and in the Websters Third New International Dictionary and the plans and
specifications of the reclamation involved were approved by the authorities
concerned.
On April 26,1962, Judge Angel H. Mojica, (now deceased) of the former Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Branch 7, Pasay City) issued an Order[6] the dispositive portion of
which was to the following effect:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby orders the defendants, their agents, and all persons
claiming under them, to refrain from further reclaiming or committing acts of
dispossession or dispoilation over any area within the Manila Bay or the Manila Bay
Beach Resort, until further orders of the court.
On the following day, the same trial court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction[7] which enjoined the defendants, RREC and Pasay City, their agents, and
all persons claiming under them from further reclaiming or committing acts of
dispossession.
Thereafter, a Motion to Intervene[8], dated June 27, 1962, was filed by Jose L.
Bautista, Emiliano Custodio, Renato Custodio, Roger de la Rosa, Belen Gonzales,

Norma Martinez, Emilia E. Paez, Ambrosio R. Parreno, Antolin M. Oreta, Sixto L.

Orosa, Pablo S. Sarmiento, Jesus Yujuico, Zamora Enterprises, Inc., Industrial and
Commercial Factors, Inc., Metropolitan Distributors of the Philippines, and Bayview
Hotel, Inc. stating inter alia that they were buyers of lots in the Manila Bay area
being reclaimed by RREC, whose rights would be affected by whatever decision to
be rendered in the case. The Motion was granted by the trial court and the Answer
attached thereto admitted.[9]
The defendants and the intervenors then moved to dismiss [10] the Complaint of the
Republic, placing reliance on Section 3 of Republic Act No. 5187, which reads:
Sec. 3. Miscellaneous Projects
xxx
m. For the construction of seawall and limited access highway from the south
boundary of the City of Manila to Cavite City, to the south, and from the north
boundary of the City of Manila to the municipality of Mariveles, province of Bataan,
to the north, including the reclamation of the foreshore and submerged areas:
Provided, That priority in the construction of such seawalls, highway and attendant
reclamation works shall be given to any corporation and/or corporations that may
offer to undertake at its own expense such projects, in which case the President of
the Philippines may, after competitive bidding, award contracts for the construction
of such projects, with the winning bidder shouldering all costs thereof, the same to
be paid in terms of percentage fee of the contractor which shall not exceed fifty
percent of the area reclaimed by the contractor and shall represent full
compensation for the purpose, the provisions of the Public Land Law concerning
disposition of reclaimed and foreshore lands to the contrary
notwithstanding: Provided, finally, that the foregoing provisions and those of other
laws, executive orders, rules and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding,
existing rights, projects and/or contracts of city or municipal governments for the
reclamation of foreshore and submerged lands shall berespected. x x
x. (underscoring ours)
Since the aforecited law provides that existing contracts shall be respected,
movants contended that the issues raised by the pleadings have become moot,
academic and of no further validity or effect.
Meanwhile, the Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc. (PLCU) moved to intervene[11],
alleging as legal interest in the matter in litigation the avowed purpose of the
organization for the promotion of good government in Pasay City. In its Order of June
10, 1969, the lower court of origin allowed the said intervention [12].
On March 24, 1972, the trial court of origin came out with a Decision, disposing,
thus:
WHEREFORE, after carefully considering (1) the original complaint, (2) the first
Amended Complaint, (3) the Answer of Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation
to the first Amended Complaint, (4) the Answer of Defendant Pasay City to the first
Amended Complaint, (5) the Second Amended Complaint, (6) the Answer of
Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation to the Second Amended Complaint, (7)
the Answer of Defendant Pasay City to the Second Amended Complaint, (8) the
Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction of Plaintiff, (9) the Memorandum
In Support of the Opposition to the Issuance of Preliminary Injunction of Defendant
Pasay City and Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation, (10) the Answer in
Intervention of Intervenors Bautista, et. al., (11) Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion to
Intervene, (12) the Reply to Opposition to Motion to Intervene of Intervenors
Bautista, et. al. , (13) the Stipulation of Facts by all the parties, (14) the Motion for

Leave to Intervene of Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc., (15) the
Opposition to Motion For Leave to Intervene of Intervenors Bautista, et. al., (16) the
Reply of Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc., (17) the Supplement to
Opposition to Motion to Intervene of Defendant Pasay City and Republic Real Estate
Corporation, (18) the Complaint in Intervention of Intervenor Pasay Law and
Conscience Union, Inc., (19) the Answer of Defendant Republic Real Estate
Corporation, (20) the Answer of Intervenor Jose L. Bautista, et. al., to Complaint in
Intervention, (21) the Motion to Dismiss of Defendant Republic Real Estate
Corporation, and Intervenors Bautista, et. al., (22) the Opposition of Plaintiff to said
Motion to Dismiss, (23) the Opposition of Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience
Union, Inc., (24) the Memorandum of the Defendant Republic Real Estate
Corporation, (25) the Memorandum for the Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience
Union, Inc., (26) the Manifestation of Plaintiff filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General, and all the documentary evidence by the parties to wit: (a) Plaintiffs
Exhibits A to YYY-4, (b) Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporations Exhibits 1RREC to 40-a and (c) Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Incs., Exhibits APLACU to C-PLACU, the Court hereby:
(1) Denies the Motion to Dismiss filed on January 10, 1968, by Defendant Republic
Real Estate Corporation and Intervenors Bautista, et. al., as it is the finding of this
Court that Republic Act No. 5187 was not passed by Congress to cure any defect in
the ordinance and agreement in question and that the passage of said Republic Act
No. 5187 did not make the legal issues raised in the pleadings moot, academic and
of no further validity or effect; and
(2) Renders judgment:
(a) dismissing the Plaintiffs Complaint;
(b) Dismissing the Complaint in Intervention of Intervenor Pasay Law and
Conscience Union, Inc.,
(c)Enjoining Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation and Defendant Pasay City
to have all the plans and specifications in the reclamation approved by the Director
of Public Works and to have all the contracts and sub-contracts for said reclamation
awarded by means of, and only after, public bidding; and
(d) Lifting the preliminary Injunction issued by the Court on April 26, 1962, as soon
as Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation and Defendant Pasay City shall have
submitted the corresponding plans and specifications to the Director of Public
Works, and shall have obtained approval thereof, and as soon as the corresponding
public bidding for the award to the contractor and sub-contractor that will
undertake the reclamation project shall have been effected.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. (See Court of Appeals Decision dated January 28, 1992; pp. 6-8)
Dissatisfied with the said judgment, the Republic appealed therefrom to the Court of
Appeals. However, on January 11, 1973, before the appeal could be resolved,
Presidential Decree No. 3-A issued, amending Presidential Decree No. 3, thus:
SECTION 1. Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 3, dated September 26, 1972, is
hereby amended by the addition of the following paragraphs:
The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the reclamation of areas
under water, whether foreshore or inland, shall be limited to the National
Government or any person authorized by it under a proper contract.
All reclamations made in violation of this provision shall be forfeited to the State
without need of judicial action.

Contracts for reclamation still legally existing or whose validity has been accepted
by the National Government shall be taken over by the National Government on the
basis of quantum meruit, for proper prosecution of the project involved by
administration.
On November 20, 1973, the Republic and the Construction Development
Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) signed a Contract[13] for the Manila-Cavite
Coastal Road Project (Phases I and II) which contract included the reclamation and
development of areas covered by the Agreement between Pasay City and
RREC. Then, there was issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 which transferred to the
Public Estate Authority (PEA) the rights and obligations of the Republic of the
Philippines under the contract between the Republic and CDCP.
Attempts to settle amicably the dispute between representatives of the Republic, on
the one hand, and those of Pasay City and RREC, on the other, did not work out. The
parties involved failed to hammer out a compromise.
On January 28, 1992, the Court of Appeals came out with a Decision [14] dismissing
the appeal of the Republic and holding, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
modifications:
1. The requirement by the trial court on public bidding and the submission of RRECs
plans and specification to the Department of Public Works and Highways in order
that RREC may continue the implementation of the reclamation work is deleted for
being moot and academic;
2. Ordering the plaintiff-appellant to turn over to Pasay City the ownership and
possession over all vacant spaces in the twenty-one hectare area already reclaimed
by Pasay City and RREC at the time it took over the same. Areas thereat over which
permanent structures has (sic) been introduced shall, including the structures,
remain in the possession of the present possessor, subject to any negotiation
between Pasay City and the said present possessor, as regards the continued
possession and ownership of the latter area.
3. Sustaining RRECs irrevocable option to purchase sixty (60%) percent of the
Twenty-One (21) hectares of land already reclaimed by it, to be exercised within
one (1) year from the finality of this decision, at the same terms and condition
embodied in the Pasay City-RREC reclamation contract, and enjoining appellee
Pasay City to respect RRECs option.
SO ORDERED.
On February 14, 1992, Pasay City and RREC presented a Motion for Reconsideration
of such Decision of the Court of Appeals, contending, among others, that RREC had
actually reclaimed Fifty-Five (55) hectares, and not only Twenty-one (21)hectares,
and the respondent Court of Appeals erred in not awarding damages to them,
movants.
On April 28, 1992, the Court of Appeals acted favorably on the said Motion for
Reconsideration, by amending the dispositive portion of its judgment of January 28,
1992, to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the dispositive portion of our Decision dated January 28, 1992 is
hereby AMENDED to read as follows:
1. The requirement by the trial court on public bidding and the submission of the
RRECs plans and specification to the Department of Public Works and Highways in
order that RREC may continue the implementation of the reclamation work is
deleted for being moot and academic.

2. Ordering plaintiff-appellant to turn over to Pasay City the ownership and

possession of the above enumerated lots (1 to 9).
3. Sustaining RRECs irrevocable option to purchase sixty (60%) percent of the land
referred to in No. 2 of this dispositive portion, to be exercised within one (1) year
from the finality of this Decision, at the same terms and condition embodied in the
Pasay City-RREC reclamation contract, and enjoining Pasay City to respect RRECs
irrevocable option.
SO ORDERED.
From the Decision and Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals aforementioned,
the Republic of the Philippines, as well as Pasay City and RREC, have come to this
Court to seek relief, albeit with different prayers.
On September 10, 1997, the Court commissioned the former thirteenth Division of
Court of Appeals to hear and receive evidence on the controversy. The
corresponding Commissioners Report, dated November 25, 1997, was submitted
and now forms part of the records.
On October 11, 1997, the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) filed a Petition in
Intervention, theorizing that it has a direct interest in the case being the owner of
subject nine (9) lots titled in its (CCP) name, which the respondent Court of Appeals
ordered to be turned over to Pasay City. The CCP, as such intervenor, was allowed to
present its evidence, as it did, before the Court of Appeals, which evidence has
been considered in the formulation of this disposition.
In G.R. No. 103882, the Republic of the Philippines theorizes, by way of assignment
of errors, that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF PASAY CITY
ORDINANCE NO. 158 DATED APRIL 21, 1959 AND THE RECLAMATION CONTRACT
ENTERED INTO BETWEEN PASAY CITY AND RREC;
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT RREC HAD RECLAIMED 55
HECTARES AND IN ORDERING THE TURN-OVER TO PASAY CITY OF THE OWNERSHIP
AND POSSESSION OF NINE (9) LOTS TITLED IN THE NAME OF CCP.
In G.R. No. 105276, the petitioners, Pasay City and RREC, contend, that::
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 3-A
UNCONSTITUTIONAL;
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT AWARDING DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF PASAY
CITY AND RREC.
Let us first tackle the issues posed in G.R. No. 103882.
On the first question regarding the validity of Pasay City Ordinance No. 158 dated
April 21, 1959 and the Agreement dated April 24, 1959 between Pasay City and
RREC, we rule in the negative.
Section 1 of RA 1899, reads:
SECTION 1. Authority is hereby granted to all municipalities and chartered cities to
undertake and carry out at their own expense the reclamation by dredging, filling,
or other means, of any foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish, provide,
construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities as
such municipalities and chartered cities may determine in consultation with the
Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.

It is the submission of the petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, that there are no
foreshore lands along the seaside of Pasay City [15]; that what Pasay City has are
submerged or offshore areas outside the commerce of man which could not be a
proper subject matter of the Agreement between Pasay City and RREC in question
as the area affected is within the National Park, known as Manila Bay Beach Resort,
established under Proclamation No. 41, dated July 5, 1954, pursuant to Act No.
3915, of which area it(Republic) has been in open, continuous and peaceful
possession since time immemorial.
Petitioner faults the respondent court for unduly expanding what may be considered
foreshore land through the following disquisition:
The former Secretary of Justice Alejo Mabanag, in response to a request for an
opinion from the then Secretary of Public Works and Communications as to whether
the term foreshore areas as used in Section I of the immediately aforequoted law is
that defined in Websters Dictionary and the Law of Waters so as to make any
dredging or filling beyond its prescribed limit illegal, opined:
According to the basic letter of the Director of Public Works, the law of Waters
speaks of shore and defines it thus: that space movement of the tide. Its interior or
terrestrial limit in the line reached by highest equinoctial tides.
Websters definition of foreshore reads as follows:
That part of the shore between high water and low-water marks usually fixed at the
line to which the ordinary means tide flows: also, by extension, the beach, the shore
near the waters edge.
If we were to be strictly literal the term foreshore or foreshore lands should be
confined to but a portion of the shore, in itself a very limited area. (p. 6,
Intervenors-appellees brief).
Bearing in mind the (Websters and Law of Waters) definitions of shore and of
foreshore lands, one is struck with the apparent inconsistency between the areas
thus described and the purpose to which that area, when reclaimed under the
provision of Republic Act No. 1899, shall be devoted. Section I (of said Law)
authorizes the construction thereat of adequate docking and harbor facilities. This
purpose is repeated in Sections 3 and 4 of the Act.
And yet, it is well known fact that foreshore lands normally extend only from 10 to
20 meters along the coast. Not very much more if at all. In fact, certain parts in
Manila bordering on Manila Bay, has no foreshore to speak of since the sea washes
the sea wall.
It does not seem logical, then, that Congress had in mind. Websters limited concept
of foreshore when it enacted Republic Act No. 1899, unless it intends that the
wharves, piers, docks, etc. should be constructed parallel to the shore, which is
impractical.
Since it is to be presumed that Congress could not have intended to enact an
ineffectual measure not one that would lead to absurd consequences, it would
seem that it used foreshore in a sense wider in scope that that defined by Webster.
xxx
To said opinion on the interpretation of the R.A. 1899, plaintiff-appellant could not
offer any refutation or contrary opinion. Neither can we. In fact, the above
construction is consistent with the rule on context in statutory construction which
provides that in construing a statute, the same must be construed as a whole. The
particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and
isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a

harmonious whole (see Araneta vs. Concepcion, 99 Phil. 709). There are two
reasons for this. Firstly, the force and significance of particular expressions will
largely depend upon the connection in which they are found and their relation to
the general subject-matter of the law. The legislature must be understood to have
expressed its whole mind on the special object to which the legislative act is
directed but the vehicle for the expressions of that meaning is the statute,
considered as one entire and continuous act, and not as an agglomeration of
unrelated clauses . Each clause or provision will be illuminated by those which are
cognate to it and by the general tenor of the whole statute and thus obscurities and
ambiguities may often be cleared up by the most direct and natural
means. Secondly, effect must be given, if it is possible, to every word and clause of
the statute, so that nothing shall be left devoid of meaning or destitute of force. To
this end, each provision of the statute should be read in the light of the whole. For
the general meaning of the legislature, as gathered from the entire act, may often
prevail over the construction which would appear to be the most natural and
obvious on the face of a particular clause. It is by this means that contradiction and
repugnance between the different parts of the statute may be avoided. (See Black,
Interpretation of Laws, 2nd Ed., pp. 317-319).
Resorting to extrinsic aids, the Explanatory Note to House Bill No. 3630, which was
subsequently enacted as Republic Act No. 1899, reads:
In order to develop and expand the Maritime Commerce of the Philippines, it is
necessary that harbor facilities be correspondingly improved, and, where necessary,
expanded and developed. The national government is not in a financial position to
handle all this work. On the other hand, with a greater autonomy, many chartered
cities and provinces are financially able to have credit position which will allow
them to undertake these projects. Some cities, such as the City of Bacolod under
R.A. 161, has been authorized to reclaim foreshore lands bordering it.
Other cities and provinces have continuously been requesting for authority to
reclaim foreshore lands on the basis of the Bacolod City pattern, and to undertake
work to establish, construct on the reclaimed area and maintain such port facilities
as may be necessary. In order not to unduly delay the undertaking of these
projects, and inorder to obviate the passage of individual pieces of legislation for
every chartered city and province, it is hereby recommended that the
accompanying bill be approved. It covers Authority for All chartered cities and
provinces to undertake this work. x x x (underscoring supplied)
Utilizing the above explanatory note in interpreting and construing the provisions of
R.A. 1899, then Secretary of Justice Mabanag opined:
It is clear that the Bacolod City pattern was the basis of the enactment of the
aforementioned bill of general application. This so-called Bacolod City pattern
appears to be composed of 3 parts, namely: Republic Act No. 161, which grants
authority to Bacolod City to undertake or carry out ... the reclamation ... of any [sic]
carry out the reclamation project conformably with Republic Act No. 161; and
Republic Act No. 1132 authorizing Bacolod City to contract indebtedness or to issue
bonds in the amount not exceeding six million pesos to finance the reclamation of
land in said city.
Republic Act No. 161 did not in itself specify the precise space therein referred to as
foreshore lands, but it provided that docking and harbor facilities should be erected
on the reclaimed portions thereof, while not conclusive would indicate that
Congress used the word foreshore in its broadest sense. Significantly, the plan of
reclamation of foreshore drawn up by the Bureau of Public Works maps out an area

of approximately 1,600,000 square meters, the boundaries of which clearly extend

way beyond Websters limited concept of the term foreshore.As a contemporaneous
construction by that branch of the Government empowered to oversee at least, the
conduct of the work, such an interpretation deserves great weight. Finally, Congress
in enacting Republic Act No. 1132 (supplement to RA 161), tacitly confirmed and
approved the Bureaus interpretation of the term foreshore when instead of taking
the occasion to correct the Bureau of over extending its plan, it authorized the city
of Bacolod to raise the full estimated cost of reclaiming the total area covered by
the plan. The explanatory note to House Bill No. 1249 which became Republic Act
No. 1132 states among the things:
The Bureau of Public Works already prepared a plan for the reclamation of about
1,600,000 square meters of land at an estimated costs of about P6,000,000.00. The
project is self-supporting because the proceeds from the sales or leases of lands so
reclaimed will be more than sufficient to cover the cost of the project.
Consequently, when Congress passed Republic Act No. 1899 in order to facilitate
the reclamation by local governments of foreshore lands on the basis of the Bacolod
City pattern and in order to obviate the passage of individual pieces of legislation
for every chartered city and provinces requesting authority to undertake such
projects, the lawmaking body could not have had in mind the limited area described
by Webster as foreshore lands. x x x.
If it was really the intention of Congress to limit the area to the strict literal meaning
of foreshore lands which may be reclaimed by chartered cities and municipalities,
Congress would have excluded the cities of Manila, Iloilo, Cebu, Zamboanga and
Davao from the operation of RA 1899 as suggested by Senator Cuenco during the
deliberation of the bill considering that these cities do not have foreshore lands in
the strict meaning of the term. Yet, Congress did not approve the proposed
amendment of Senator Cuenco, implying therefore, that Congress intended not to
limit the area that may be reclaimed to the strict definition of foreshore lands.
The opinion of the then Secretary of Justice Mabanag, who was at that time the
chief law officer and legal adviser of the government and whose office is required
by law to issue opinions for the guidance of the various departments of the
government, there being then no judicial interpretation to the contrary, is entitled to
respect (see Bengzon vs. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor, 68 Phil. 912).
We are not unmindful of the Supreme Court Resolution dated February 3, 1965 in
Ponce vs. Gomez (L-21870) and Ponce vs. City of Cebu (L-2266 , by a unanimous
vote of six (6) justices (the other five (5) members deemed it unnecessary to
express their view because in their opinion the questions raised were not properly
brought before the court), which in essence applied the strict dictionary meaning of
foreshore lands as used in RA 1899 in the case of the city of Cebu. But this was
promulgated long after the then Secretary of Justice Mabanag rendered the above
opinion on November 16, 1959 and long after RREC has started the subject
reclamation project.
Furthermore, as held by the lower court, Congress, after the Supreme Court issued
the aforementioned Resolution, enacted RA 5187. In Sec. 3 (m) of said law,
Congress appropriated money for the construction of the seawall and limited access
highway from the South boundary of the city of Manila to Cavite City, to the South,
and from the North boundary of the city of Manila to the municipality of Mariveles,
province of Bataan, to the North (including the reclamation of foreshore and
submerged areas ... provided ... that ... existing projects and/or contracts of city or
municipal governments for the reclamation of foreshore and submerged lands shall

be respected... This is a clear manifestation that Congress in enacting RA 1899, did

not intend to limit the interpretation of the term foreshore land to its dictionary
meaning.
It is presumed that the legislature was acquainted with and had in mind the judicial
construction given to a former statute on the subject, and that the statute on the
subject, and that the statute was enacted having in mind the judicial construction
that the prior enactment had received , or in the light of such existing judicial
decisions as have direct bearing upon it (see 50 Am. Jur., Sec. 321, pp. 312-313).
But notwithstanding said interpretation by the Supreme Court of RA 1899 in the
Ponce cases, Congress enacted a law covering the same areas previously embraced
in a RA 1899 (as mentioned earlier, cities without foreshore lands which were
sought to be excluded from the operation of RA 1899 were not excluded), providing
that respect be given the reclamation of not only foreshore lands but also of
submerged lands signifying its non-conformity to the judicial construction given to
RA 1899. If Congress was in accord with the interpretation and construction made
by the Supreme Court on RA 1899, it would have mentioned reclamation of
foreshore lands only in RA 5187, but Congress included submerged lands in order to
clarify the intention on the grant of authority to cities and municipalities in the
reclamation of lands bordering them as provided in RA 1899. It is, therefore, our
opinion that it is actually the intention of Congress in RA 1899 not to limit the
authority granted to cities and municipalities to reclaim foreshore lands in its strict
dictionary meaning but rather in its wider scope as to include submerged lands.
The Petition is impressed with merit.
To begin with, erroneous and unsustainable is the opinion of respondent court that
under RA 1899, the term foreshore lands includes submerged areas. As can be
gleaned from its disquisition and rationalization aforequoted, the respondent court
unduly stretched and broadened the meaning of foreshore lands, beyond the
intentment of the law, and against the recognized legal connotation of foreshore
lands. Well entrenched, to the point of being elementary, is the rule that when the
law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or
construction, but only for application. [16] So also, resort to extrinsic aids, like the
records of the constitutional convention, is unwarranted, the language of the law
being plain and unambiguous. [17]Then, too, opinions of the Secretary of Justice are
unavailing to supplant or rectify any mistake or omission in the law. [18] To repeat, the
term foreshore lands refers to:
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is
alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. (Words and Phrases,
Foreshore)
A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part of a
seashore between the low-water line usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide
terrace and the upper limit of wave wash at high tide usually marked by a beach
scarp or berm. (Websters Third New International Dictionary)
The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we
cannot broaden its meaning, much less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention
of Congress were to include submerged areas, it should have provided
expressly. That Congress did not so provide could only signify the exclusion of
submerged areas from the term foreshore lands.
Neither is there any valid ground to disregard the Resolution of this Court dated
February 3, 1965 in Ponce v. Gomez (L-21870) and Ponce v. City of Cebu (L-

22669) despite the enactment of Republic Act No. 5187 (RA 5187), the relevant
portion of which, reads:
Sec. 3. Miscellaneous Projects
xxx
m. For the construction of seawall and limited access highway from the south
boundary of the City of Manila to Cavite City, to the south, and from the north
boundary of the City of Manila to the municipality of Mariveles, province of Bataan,
to the north, including the reclamation of the foreshore and submerged areas:
Provided, That priority in the construction of such seawalls, highway and attendant
reclamation works shall be given to any corporation and/or corporations that may
offer to undertake at its own expense such projects, in which case the President of
the Philippines may, after competitive bidding, award contracts for the construction
of such projects, with the winning bidder shouldering all costs thereof, the same to
be paid in terms of percentage fee of the contractor which shall not exceed fifty
percent of the area reclaimed by the contractor and shall represent full
compensation for the purpose, the provisions of the Public Land Law concerning
disposition of reclaimed and foreshore lands to the contrary
notwithstanding: Provided, finally, that the foregoing provisions and those of other
laws, executive orders, rules and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding,
existing rights, projects and/or contracts of city or municipal governments for the
reclamation of foreshore and submerged lands shall be respected. x x x.
There is nothing in the foregoing provision of RA 5187 which can be interpreted to
broaden the scope of foreshore lands. The said law is not amendatory to RA 1899. It
is an Appropriations Act, entitled AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR PUBLIC
WORKS, SYNCHRONIZING THE SAME WITH PREVIOUS PUBLIC WORKS
APPROPRIATIONS.
All things viewed in proper perspective, we reiterate what was said in Ponce v.
Gomez (L-21870) and Ponce v. City of Cebu (L-22669) that the term foreshore refers
to that part of the land adjacent to the sea which is alternately covered and left dry
by the ordinary flow of the tides. As opined by this Court in said cases:
WHEREAS, six (6) members of the Court (Justices Bautista Angelo, Concepcion,
Reyes, Barrera, Dizon and Jose P. Bengzon) opine that said city ordinance and
contracts are ultra vires and hence, null and void, insofar as the remaining 60% of
the area aforementioned, because the term foreshore lands as used in Republic Act
No. 1899 should be understood in the sense attached thereto by common
parlance; (underscoring ours)
The aforesaid ruling was applied by then Secretary of Justice Claudio Teehankee, in
his opinion dated December 22, 1966, in a case with analogous facts as the present
one, to wit:
December 22, 1966
The Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources
Diliman, Quezon City
Sir:
xxx
I. Facts 1. On January 19, 1961, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 1899, the
Municipality of Navotas enacted Ordinance No. 1 authorizing the Municipal Mayor to
enter into a reclamation contract with Mr. Chuanico.

2. On March 15, 1961, a reclamation contract was concluded between the

Municipality of Navotas, represented by the Municipal Mayor, and Mr. Chuanico in
accordance with the above ordinance. Thereunder, Mr. Chuanico shall be the
attorney-in-fact of the Municipality in prosecuting the reclamation project and shall
advance the money needed therefor; that the actual expenses incurred shall be
deemed a loan to the Municipality; that Mr. Chuanico shall have the irrevocable
option to buy 70% of the reclaimed area at P7.00 per square meter; that he shall
have the full and irrevocable powers to do any and all things necessary and proper
in and about the premises, including the power to hire necessary personnel for the
prosecution of the work, purchase materials and supplies, and purchase or lease
construction machineries and equipment, but any and all contracts to be concluded
by him in behalf of the Municipality shall be submitted to public bidding.
xxx
3. On March 16, 1961, the Municipal Council of Navotas passed Resolution No. 22
approving and ratifying the contract.
xxx
III. Comments 1. The above reclamation contract was concluded on the basis of Navotas
Ordinance No. 1 which, in turn, had been enacted avowedly pursuant to Republic
Act No. 1899. This being so, the contract, in order to be valid, must conform to the
provisions of the said law.
By authorizing local governments to execute by administration any reclamation
work, (Republic Act No. 1899 impliedly forbids the execution of said
project by contract. Thus, in the case of Ponce et al. vs. Gomez (February 3, 1966),
five justices of the Supreme Court voted to annul the contract between Cebu
Development Corporation and Cebu City for the reclamation of foreshore lands
because the provisions of said ... contract are not ... in accordance with the
provisions of Republic Act No. 1899, as against one Justice who opined that the
contract substantially complied with the provisions of the said law. (Five Justices
expressed no opinion on this point.)
Inasmuch as the Navotas reclamation contract is substantially similar to the Cebu
reclamation contract, it is believed that the former is likewise fatally defective.
2. The Navotas reclamation project envisages the construction of a channel along
the Manila Bay periphery of that town and the reclamation of approximately 650
hectares of land from said channel to a seaward distance of one kilometer. In the
basic letter it is stated that practically, all the 650 hectares of lands proposed to be
reclaimed under the agreement do not constitute foreshore lands and that the
greater portion of the area . . . is in fact navigable and presently being used as a
fishing harbor by deep-sea fishing operators as well as a fishing ground of
sustenance fisherman. Assuming the correctness of these averments, the Navotas
reclamation contract evidently transcends the authority granted under Republic Act
No. 1899, which empowers the local governments to reclaim nothing more than
foreshore lands, i.e., that part of the land adjacent to the sea which is alternately
covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of the tides. (26 C.J. 890.) It was for this
reason that in the cited case Ponce case, the Supreme Court, by a vote of 6-0 with
five Justices abstaining, declared ultra vires and void the contractual stipulation for
the reclamation of submerged lands off Cebu City, and permanently enjoined its
execution under Republic Act No. 1899.
xxx

In accordance with the foregoing, I have the honor to submit the view that the
Navotas reclamation contract is not binding and should be disregarded for noncompliance with law.
Very truly yours,
(SGD) CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE
Secretary of Justice
The said opinion of Justice Secretary Teehankee who became Associate Justice, and
later Chief Justice, of this Court, did, in our considered view, supersede the earlier
opinion of former Justice Secretary Alejo Mabanag, aforestated, as the cases, in
connection with which subject opinions were sought, were with similar facts. The
said Teehankee opinion accords with RA 1899.
It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as
amended by Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement under attack, have been found
to be outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899, and therefore ultra vires and
null and void.
What is worse, the same Agreement was vitiated by the glaring absence of a public
bidding.
Obviously, there is a complete dearth of evidence to prove that RREC had really
reclaimed 55 hectares. The letter of Minister Baltazar Aquino relied upon by RREC is
no proof at all that RREC had reclaimed 55 hectares. Said letter was just referring to
a tentative schedule of work to be done by RREC, even as it required RREC to
submit the pertinent papers to show its supposed accomplishment, to secure
approval by the Ministry of Public Works and Highways to the reclamation plan, and
to submit to a public bidding all contracts and sub-contracts for subject reclamation
project but RREC never complied with such requirements and
conditions sine qua non.
No contracts or sub-contracts or agreements, plans, designs, and/or specifications
of the reclamation project were presented to reflect any accomplishment. Not even
any statement or itemization of works accomplished by contractors or
subcontractors or vouchers and other relevant papers were introduced to describe
the extent of RRECs accomplishment. Neither was the requisite certification from
the City Engineer concerned that portions of the reclamation project not less than
50 hectares in area shall have been accomplished or completed obtained and
presented by RREC.
As a matter of fact, no witness ever testified on any reclamation work done by
RREC, and extent thereof, as of April 26, 1962.Not a single contractor, subcontractor, engineer, surveyor, or any other witness involved in the alleged
reclamation work of RREC testified on the 55 hectares supposedly reclaimed by
RREC. What work was done, who did the work, where was it commenced, and when
was it completed, was never brought to light by any witness before the
court. Certainly, onus probandi was on RREC and Pasay City to show and point out
the as yet unidentified 55 hectares they allegedly reclaimed. But this burden of
proof RREC and Pasay City miserably failed to discharge.
So also, in the decision of the Pasay Court of First Instance dismissing the complaint
of plaintiff-appellant, now petitioner Republic of the Philippines, the lifting of the writ
of Preliminary Injunction issued on April 26, 1962 would become effective only as
soon as Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation and Defendant Pasay City shall
have submitted the corresponding plans and specifications to the Director of Public
Works, and shall have obtained approval thereof, and as soon as corresponding
public bidding for the award to the contractor and sub-contractor that will undertake

the reclamation project shall have been effected.(Rollo, pp. 127-129, G.R. No.
103882)
From the records on hand, it is abundantly clear that RREC and Pasay City never
complied with such prerequisites for the lifting of the writ of Preliminary
Injunction. Consequently, RREC had no authority to resume its reclamation work
which was stopped by said writ of preliminary injunction issued on April 26, 1962.
From the Contract for Dredging Work, dated November 26, 1960, marked Exhibit 21A for RREC before the lower court, and Exhibit EE for CCP before the Court of
Appeals, it can be deduced that only on November 26, 1960 did RREC contract out
the dredging work to C and A Construction Company, Inc., for the reclamation of the
55 hectares initially programmed to be reclaimed by it. But, as stated by RREC itself
in the position paper filed with this Court on July 15, 1997, with reference to CDCPs
reclamation work, mobilization of the reclamation team would take one year before
a reclamation work could actually begin.Therefore, the reclamation work undertaken
by RREC could not have started before November 26, 1961.
Considering that on April 26, 1962 RREC was enjoined from proceeding any further
with its reclamation work, it had barely five (5) months, from November, 1961 to
April, 1962, to work on subject reclamation project. It was thus physically impossible
for RREC to reclaim 55 hectares, with the stipulated specifications and elevation, in
such a brief span of time. In the report of RREC(Exhibit DD for CCP), it was conceded
that due to the writ of preliminary injunction issued on April 26, 1962, C and A
Construction Co., Inc. had suspended its dredging operation since May, 1962.
The graphical report on the Pasay Reclamation project, as of April 30, 1962,
attached to the Progress Report marked Exhibit DD, is a schematic representation of
the work accomplishment referred to in such Progress Report, indicating the various
elevations of the land surface it embraced, ranging from 0.00 meters to the highest
elevation of 2.5 meters above MLLW. Such portrayal of work accomplished is crucial
in our determination of whether or not RREC had actually reclaimed any land as
under its Contract for Dredging Work with C and A Construction
Company (Exhibit EE), the required final elevation for a completely reclaimed land
was 3.5 meters above MLLW, as explicitly provided in said Contract for Dredging
Work. So, the irresistible conclusion is - when the work on subject RREC-Pasay City
reclamation project stopped in April, 1962 in compliance with the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the trial court of origin, no portion of the reclamation project
worked on by RREC had reached the stipulated elevation of 3.5 meters above
MLLW. The entire area it worked on was only at sea level or 0.00 meter above
MLLW.In short, RREC had not yet reclaimed any area when the writ of preliminary
injunction issued in April 1962.
On this point, the testimonies of Architect Ruben M. Protacio, Architect and
Managing partner of Leandro V. Locsin and partners, Architect and City Planner
Manuel T. Maoza, Jr. of Planning Resources and Operation System, Inc., Rose D. Cruz,
Executive Assistant, Office of the President, from 1966 to 1970, and Dr. Lucrecia
Kasilag, National Artist and member of CCP Advisory Committee, come to the
fore. These credible, impartial and knowledgeable witnesses recounted on the
witness stand that when the construction of the Main Building of the Cultural Center
of the Philippines (CCP) began in 1966, the only surface land available was the site
for the said building (TSN, Sept. 29, 1997, pages 8, 14 and 50), what could be seen
in front of and behind it was all water (TSN, Sept. 29, 1997, pages 127-128). When
the CCP Main Building was being constructed, from 1966 to 1969, theland above
sea level thereat was only where the CCP Main Building was erected and the rest of

the surroundings were all under water, particularly the back portion fronting the
bay. (TSN, Sept. 13, 1997, pp. 181, 182, 185, 186, 188). Dr. Lucrecia R. Kasilag
stressed that on April 16, 1966, during the ground breaking for the CCP Main
Building, it was water all around (TSN, Sept. 30, 1997, pp. 320, 324, 325).
There was indeed no legal and factual basis for the Court of Appeals to order and
declare that the requirement by the trial court on public bidding and the submission
of RRECs plans and specification to the Department of Public Works and Highways in
order that RREC may continue the implementation of the reclamation work is
deleted for being moot and academic. Said requirement has never become moot
and academic. It has remained indispensable, as ever, and non-compliance
therewith restrained RREC from lawfully resuming the reclamation work under
controversy, notwithstanding the rendition below of the decision in its favor.
Verily, contrary to what the Court of Appeals found, RREC had not reclaimed any
area with the prescribed elevation of 3.5 meters above MLLW, so much so that in
1978, it (RREC) opted to file with the former Ministry of Public Highways, a claim for
compensation of P30,396,878.20, for reclamation work allegedly done before the
CDCP started working on the reclamation of the CCP grounds. On September 7,
1979, RREC asked the Solicitor General to settle its subject claim for
compensation at the same amount of P30,396,878.20. But on June 10, 1981, guided
by the cost data, work volume accomplished and other relevant information
gathered by the former Ministry of Public Highways, the Solicitor General informed
RREC that the value of what it had accomplished, based on 1962 price levels, was
only P8,344,741.29, and the expenses for mobilization of equipment amounted
to P2,581,330.00. The aforesaid evaluation made by the government, through the
then Minister of Public Highways, is factual and realistic, so much so that on June
25, 1981, RREC, in its reply letter to the Solicitor General, stated:
We regret that we are not agreeable to the amount of P10,926,071.29, based on
1962 cost data, etc., as compensation based on quantum meruit. The least we
would consider is the amount of P10.926,071.29 plus interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from 1962 to the time of payment. We feel that 6% is very much less than
the accepted rate of inflation that has supervened since 1962 to the present, and
even less than the present legal rate of 12% per annum. [19]
Undoubtedly, what RREC claimed for was payment for what it had done, and for the
dredge fill of 1,558,395 cubic meters it used, on subject reclamation project.
Respondent Court likewise erred in ordering the turn-over to Pasay City of the
following titled lots, to wit:
LOT NO. BUILDING AREA OCT/TCT
42 Gloria Maris 9,516 sq.m. OCT 159 in the Restaurant name of GSIS
3 Asean Garden 76,299 sq.m. OCT 10251 in the
name of CCP
12 Folk Arts Theater 1.7503 sq.m. TCT 18627 in the
and PICC parking name of CCP
space
22 landscaped with 132,924 sq.m. TCT 75676 in the
sculpture of Asean name of CCP
Artists-site of
Boom na Boom

23 open space, back 34,346 sq.m. TCT 75677 in the

of Philcite name of CCP
24 Parking space for 10,352 sq.m. TCT 75678 in the
Star City, CCP, name of CCP
Philcite
25 open space, 11,323 sq.m. TCT 75679 in the
occupied by Star name of CCP
City
28 open space, 27,689 sq.m. TCT 75684 in the
beside PICC name of CCP
29 open space, 106,067 sq.m. TCT 75681 in the
leased by El name of CCP
Shaddai
We discern no factual basis nor any legal justification therefor. In the first place, in
their answer to the Complaint and Amended Complaint below, RREC and Pasay City
never prayed for the transfer to Pasay City of subject lots, title to which had long
become indefeasible in favor of the rightful title holders, CCP and GSIS, respectively.
The annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the certificates of title covering the said
lots is of no moment. It did not vest in Pasay City and RREC any real right superior
to the absolute ownership thereover of CCP and GSIS. Besides, the nature of
theaction did not really warrant the issuance of a notice of lis pendens.
Section 14 of Rule 13, Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, reads:
Sec. 14. Notice of lis pendens. - In an action affecting the title or the right of
possession of real property, the plaintiff and the defendant, when affirmative relief
is claimed in his answer, may record in the office of the registry of deeds of the
province in which the property is situated a notice of the pendency of the
action. Said notice shall contain the names of the parties and the object of the
action or defense, and a description of the property in that province affected
thereby. Only from the time of filing such notice for record shall a purchaser, or
encumbrancer of the property affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive
notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency against the parties
designated by their real names.
The notice of lis pendens herein above mentioned may be cancelled only upon
order of the court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of
molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the
party who caused it to be recorded.
Under the aforecited provision of law in point, a notice of lis pendens is necessary
when the action is for recovery of possession or ownership of a parcel of land. In the
present litigation, RREC and Pasay City, as defendants in the main case, did not
counterclaim for the turnover to Pasay City of the titled lots aforementioned.
What is more, a torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue of validity of
a torrens title, whether fraudulently issued or not, may be posed only in an action
brought to impugn or annul it. (Halili vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 257
SCRA 174; Cimafranca vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 147 SCRA
611.) Unmistakable, and cannot be ignored, is the germane provision of Section 48

of P.D. 1529, that a certificate of title can never be the subject of a collateral
attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding
instituted in accordance with law.
Although Pasay City and RREC did not succeed in their undertaking to reclaim any
area within subject reclamation project, it appearing that something compensable
was accomplished by them, following the applicable provision of law and hearkening
to the dictates of equity, that no one, not even the government, shall unjustly
enrich oneself/itself at the expense of another [20], we believe; and so hold, that
Pasay City and RREC should be paid for the said actual work done and dredge-fill
poured in, worthP10,926,071.29, as verified by the former Ministry of Public
Highways, and as claimed by RREC itself in its aforequoted letter dated June 25,
1981.
It is fervently hoped that long after the end of our sojourn in this valley of tears, the
court, for its herein historic disposition, will be exalted by the future generations of
Filipinos, for the preservation of the national patrimony and promotion of our
cultural heritage. As writer Channing rightly puts it: Whatever expands the
affections, or enlarges the sphere of our sympathies - Whatever makes us feel our
relation to the universe and all that it inherits in time and in eternity, and to the
great and beneficent cause of all, must unquestionably refine our nature, and
elevate us in the scale of being.
WHEREFORE:
In G.R. No. 103882, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision, dated January 28, 1992,
and Amended Decision, dated April 28, 1992, of the Court of Appeals, are both SET
ASIDE; and Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, dated May 6, 1958, and Ordinance No.
158, dated April 21, 1959, as well as the Reclamation Agreements entered into by
Pasay City and Republic Real Estate Corporation(RREC) as authorized by said city
ordinances, are declared NULL and VOID for being ultra vires, and contrary to Rep.
Act 1899.
The writ of preliminary injunction issued on April 26, 1962 by the trial court a quo in
Civil Case No. 2229-P is made permanent, and the notice of lis pendens issued by
the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 51349 ordered CANCELLED. The Register of
Deeds of Pasay City is directed to take note of and annotate on the certificates of
title involved, the cancellation of subject notice of lis pendens.
The petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, is hereby ordered to pay Pasay City and
Republic Real Estate Corporation the sum of TEN MILLION NINE HUNDRED TWENTYSIX THOUSAND SEVENTY-ONE AND TWENTY-NINE
CENTAVOS(P10,926,071.29) PESOS, plus interest thereon of six (6%) percent per
annum from May 1, 1962 until full payment, which amount shall be divided by Pasay
City and RREC, share and share alike.
In G.R. No. 105276, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 133250
July 9, 2002
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
vs.

PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION, respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
This is an original Petition for Mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction and a temporary restraining order. The petition seeks to compel the
Public Estates Authority ("PEA" for brevity) to disclose all facts on PEA's then ongoing renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation
("AMARI" for brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. The petition further seeks to
enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with AMARI involving such reclamation.
The Facts
On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public
Highways, signed a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of
the Philippines ("CDCP" for brevity) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas
of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of Phases I and II of the
Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in
consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land.
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree
No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore
and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any
and all kinds of lands."1 On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential
Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and
offshore of the Manila Bay"2 under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation
Project (MCCRRP).
On December 29, 1981, then President Marcos issued a memorandum directing PEA
to amend its contract with CDCP, so that "[A]ll future works in MCCRRP x x x shall
be funded and owned by PEA." Accordingly, PEA and CDCP executed a
Memorandum of Agreement dated December 29, 1981, which stated:
"(i) CDCP shall undertake all reclamation, construction, and such other works in the
MCCRRP as may be agreed upon by the parties, to be paid according to progress of
works on a unit price/lump sum basis for items of work to be agreed upon, subject
to price escalation, retention and other terms and conditions provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 1594. All the financing required for such works shall be
provided by PEA.
xxx
(iii) x x x CDCP shall give up all its development rights and hereby agrees to cede
and transfer in favor of PEA, all of the rights, title, interest and participation of CDCP
in and to all the areas of land reclaimed by CDCP in the MCCRRP as of December 30,
1981 which have not yet been sold, transferred or otherwise disposed of by CDCP as
of said date, which areas consist of approximately Ninety-Nine Thousand Four
Hundred Seventy Three (99,473) square meters in the Financial Center Area
covered by land pledge No. 5 and approximately Three Million Three Hundred Eighty
Two Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (3,382,888) square meters of reclaimed
areas at varying elevations above Mean Low Water Level located outside the
Financial Center Area and the First Neighborhood Unit." 3
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No.
3517, granting and transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the
Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a total
area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four
(1,915,894) square meters." Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds
of the Municipality of Paraaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309,

7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as
the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road, Paraaque City. The Freedom Islands have a total land area of One Million Five
Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Four Hundred and Forty One (1,578,441) square
meters or 157.841 hectares.
On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement ("JVA" for brevity)
with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA also
required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas
surrounding these islands to complete the configuration in the Master Development
Plan of the Southern Reclamation Project-MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into the
JVA through negotiation without public bidding. 4 On April 28, 1995, the Board of
Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA. 5 On June 8, 1995,
then President Fidel V. Ramos, through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres,
approved the JVA.6
On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege
speech in the Senate and denounced the JVA as the "grandmother of all scams." As
a result, the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises,
and the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,
conducted a joint investigation. The Senate Committees reported the results of their
investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated September 16,
1997.7 Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks
to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the
government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate
these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void,
and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential
Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the
legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report No. 560. The members of the
Legal Task Force were the Secretary of Justice, 8 the Chief Presidential Legal
Counsel,9 and the Government Corporate Counsel.10 The Legal Task Force upheld the
legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions reached by the Senate Committees. 11
On April 4 and 5, 1998, the Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today published reports
that there were on-going renegotiations between PEA and AMARI under an order
issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos. According to these reports, PEA Director
Nestor Kalaw, PEA Chairman Arsenio Yulo and retired Navy Officer Sergio Cruz
composed the negotiating panel of PEA.
On April 13, 1998, Antonio M. Zulueta filed before the Court a Petition for Prohibition
with Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 132994 seeking to nullify the JVA. The Court
dismissed the petition "for unwarranted disregard of judicial hierarchy, without
prejudice to the refiling of the case before the proper court." 12
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a taxpayer,
filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner contends the
government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed
lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any
renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of
the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern. Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a
blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale

of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations. Finally, petitioner

asserts that he seeks to enjoin the loss of billions of pesos in properties of the State
that are of public dominion.
After several motions for extension of time,13 PEA and AMARI filed their Comments
on October 19, 1998 and June 25, 1998, respectively. Meanwhile, on December 28,
1998, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion: (a) to require PEA to submit the terms of
the renegotiated PEA-AMARI contract; (b) for issuance of a temporary restraining
order; and (c) to set the case for hearing on oral argument. Petitioner filed a
Reiterative Motion for Issuance of a TRO dated May 26, 1999, which the Court
denied in a Resolution dated June 22, 1999.
In a Resolution dated March 23, 1999, the Court gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to file their respective memoranda.
On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement
("Amended JVA," for brevity). On May 28, 1999, the Office of the President under the
administration of then President Joseph E. Estrada approved the Amended JVA.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner
now prays that on "constitutional and statutory grounds the renegotiated contract
be declared null and void."14
The Issues
The issues raised by petitioner, PEA15 and AMARI16 are as follows:
I. WHETHER THE PRINCIPAL RELIEFS PRAYED FOR IN THE PETITION ARE MOOT AND
ACADEMIC BECAUSE OF SUBSEQUENT EVENTS;
II. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR FAILING TO OBSERVE THE
PRINCIPLE GOVERNING THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS;
III. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR NON-EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES;
IV. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS LOCUS STANDI TO BRING THIS SUIT;
V. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INFORMATION INCLUDES OFFICIAL
INFORMATION ON ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE A FINAL AGREEMENT;
VI. WHETHER THE STIPULATIONS IN THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT
FOR THE TRANSFER TO AMARI OF CERTAIN LANDS, RECLAIMED AND STILL TO BE
RECLAIMED, VIOLATE THE 1987 CONSTITUTION; AND
VII. WHETHER THE COURT IS THE PROPER FORUM FOR RAISING THE ISSUE OF
WHETHER THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT IS GROSSLY
DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT.
The Court's Ruling
First issue: whether the principal reliefs prayed for in the petition are
moot and academic because of subsequent events.
The petition prays that PEA publicly disclose the "terms and conditions of the ongoing negotiations for a new agreement." The petition also prays that the Court
enjoin PEA from "privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing any new
agreement with AMARI."
PEA and AMARI claim the petition is now moot and academic because AMARI
furnished petitioner on June 21, 1999 a copy of the signed Amended JVA containing
the terms and conditions agreed upon in the renegotiations. Thus, PEA has satisfied
petitioner's prayer for a public disclosure of the renegotiations. Likewise, petitioner's
prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA is now moot because PEA and
AMARI have already signed the Amended JVA on March 30, 1999. Moreover, the
Office of the President has approved the Amended JVA on May 28, 1999.

Petitioner counters that PEA and AMARI cannot avoid the constitutional issue by
simply fast-tracking the signing and approval of the Amended JVA before the Court
could act on the issue. Presidential approval does not resolve the constitutional
issue or remove it from the ambit of judicial review.
We rule that the signing of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and its approval by
the President cannot operate to moot the petition and divest the Court of its
jurisdiction. PEA and AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA. The prayer to
enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily
includes preventing its implementation if in the meantime PEA and AMARI have
signed one in violation of the Constitution. Petitioner's principal basis in assailing
the renegotiation of the JVA is its violation of Section 3, Article XII of the
Constitution, which prohibits the government from alienating lands of the public
domain to private corporations. If the Amended JVA indeed violates the Constitution,
it is the duty of the Court to enjoin its implementation, and if already implemented,
to annul the effects of such unconstitutional contract.
The Amended JVA is not an ordinary commercial contract but one which seeks
to transfer title and ownership to 367.5 hectares of reclaimed lands and
submerged areas of Manila Bay to a single private corporation. It now
becomes more compelling for the Court to resolve the issue to insure the
government itself does not violate a provision of the Constitution intended to
safeguard the national patrimony. Supervening events, whether intended or
accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave
violation of the Constitution. In the instant case, if the Amended JVA runs counter to
the Constitution, the Court can still prevent the transfer of title and ownership of
alienable lands of the public domain in the name of AMARI. Even in cases where
supervening events had made the cases moot, the Court did not hesitate to resolve
the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide
the bench, bar, and the public. 17
Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression. All previous decisions of the
Court involving Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, or its counterpart
provision in the 1973 Constitution,18 covered agricultural lands sold to private
corporations which acquired the lands from private parties. The transferors of the
private corporations claimed or could claim the right to judicial confirmation of
their imperfect titles19 under Title II of Commonwealth Act. 141 ("CA No. 141" for
brevity). In the instant case, AMARI seeks to acquire from PEA, a public corporation,
reclaimed lands and submerged areas for non-agricultural purposes
by purchase under PD No. 1084 (charter of PEA) and Title III of CA No. 141.
Certain undertakings by AMARI under the Amended JVA constitute the consideration
for the purchase. Neither AMARI nor PEA can claim judicial confirmation of their
titles because the lands covered by the Amended JVA are newly reclaimed or still to
be reclaimed. Judicial confirmation of imperfect title requires open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain for at
least thirty years since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Besides, the deadline for filing
applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect title expired on December 31,
1987.20
Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised in this
petition because of the possible transfer at any time by PEA to AMARI of title and
ownership to portions of the reclaimed lands. Under the Amended JVA, PEA is
obligated to transfer to AMARI the latter's seventy percent proportionate share in
the reclaimed areas as the reclamation progresses. The Amended JVA even allows

AMARI to mortgage at any time the entire reclaimed area to raise financing for the
reclamation project.21
Second issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for failing to observe
the principle governing the hierarchy of courts.
PEA and AMARI claim petitioner ignored the judicial hierarchy by seeking relief
directly from the Court. The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to
cases involving factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot
entertain cases involving factual issues. The instant case, however, raises
constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the public. 22 The Court can
resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to the case. Also, the
instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under the original jurisdiction of
the Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. We resolve to exercise
primary jurisdiction over the instant case.
Third issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
PEA faults petitioner for seeking judicial intervention in compelling PEA to disclose
publicly certain information without first asking PEA the needed information. PEA
claims petitioner's direct resort to the Court violates the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. It also violates the rule that mandamus may issue only if
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
PEA distinguishes the instant case from Taada v. Tuvera 23 where the Court granted
the petition for mandamus even if the petitioners there did not initially demand
from the Office of the President the publication of the presidential decrees. PEA
points out that in Taada, the Executive Department had an affirmative
statutory duty under Article 2 of the Civil Code24 and Section 1 of Commonwealth
Act No. 63825 to publish the presidential decrees. There was, therefore, no need for
the petitioners in Taada to make an initial demand from the Office of the President.
In the instant case, PEA claims it has no affirmative statutory duty to disclose
publicly information about its renegotiation of the JVA. Thus, PEA asserts that the
Court must apply the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies to the
instant case in view of the failure of petitioner here to demand initially from PEA the
needed information.
The original JVA sought to dispose to AMARI public lands held by PEA, a government
corporation. Under Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code, 26 the disposition of
government lands to private parties requires public bidding. PEA was under a
positive legal duty to disclose to the public the terms and conditions for
the sale of its lands. The law obligated PEA to make this public disclosure even
without demand from petitioner or from anyone. PEA failed to make this public
disclosure because the original JVA, like the Amended JVA, was the result of
a negotiated contract, not of a public bidding. Considering that PEA had an
affirmative statutory duty to make the public disclosure, and was even in breach of
this legal duty, petitioner had the right to seek direct judicial intervention.
Moreover, and this alone is determinative of this issue, the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is a purely legal or
constitutional question.27 The principal issue in the instant case is the capacity of
AMARI to acquire lands held by PEA in view of the constitutional ban prohibiting the
alienation of lands of the public domain to private corporations. We rule that the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply in the instant
case.
Fourth issue: whether petitioner has locus standi to bring this suit

PEA argues that petitioner has no standing to institute mandamus proceedings to

enforce his constitutional right to information without a showing that PEA refused to
perform an affirmative duty imposed on PEA by the Constitution. PEA also claims
that petitioner has not shown that he will suffer any concrete injury because of the
signing or implementation of the Amended JVA. Thus, there is no actual controversy
requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review.
The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks
to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties. There are two constitutional
issues involved here. First is the right of citizens to information on matters of public
concern. Second is the application of a constitutional provision intended to insure
the equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino
citizens. The thrust of the first issue is to compel PEA to disclose publicly
information on the sale of government lands worth billions of pesos, information
which the Constitution and statutory law mandate PEA to disclose. The thrust of the
second issue is to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable
lands of the public domain in violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA to comply
with a constitutional duty to the nation.
Moreover, the petition raises matters of transcendental importance to the public.
In Chavez v. PCGG,28 the Court upheld the right of a citizen to bring a taxpayer's
suit on matters of transcendental importance to the public, thus "Besides, petitioner emphasizes, the matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth of
the Marcoses is an issue of 'transcendental importance to the public.' He asserts
that ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning
the validity of acts or orders of government agencies or instrumentalities, if the
issues raised are of 'paramount public interest,' and if they 'immediately affect the
social, economic and moral well being of the people.'
Moreover, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal
interest, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, such as in this
case. He invokes several decisions of this Court which have set aside the procedural
matter of locus standi, when the subject of the case involved public interest.
xxx
In Taada v. Tuvera, the Court asserted that when the issue concerns a public right
and the object of mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of a public duty, the
people are regarded as the real parties in interest; and because it is sufficient that
petitioner is a citizen and as such is interested in the execution of the laws, he need
not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result of the action. In the
aforesaid case, the petitioners sought to enforce their right to be informed on
matters of public concern, a right then recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution, in connection with the rule that laws in order to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively
promulgated. In ruling for the petitioners' legal standing, the Court declared that the
right they sought to be enforced 'is a public right recognized by no less than the
fundamental law of the land.'
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, while reiterating Taada, further declared that
'when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the
requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that petitioner is a
citizen and, therefore, part of the general 'public' which possesses the right.'
Further, in Albano v. Reyes, we said that while expenditure of public funds may not
have been involved under the questioned contract for the development,
management and operation of the Manila International Container Terminal, 'public

interest [was] definitely involved considering the important role [of the subject
contract] . . . in the economic development of the country and the magnitude of the
financial consideration involved.' We concluded that, as a consequence, the
disclosure provision in the Constitution would constitute sufficient authority for
upholding the petitioner's standing.
Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information
and access to official records, documents and papers a right guaranteed under
Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner, a former solicitor general, is
a Filipino citizen. Because of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by
decisional law to sustain petitioner's legal standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a
public right (2) espoused by a Filipino citizen, we rule that the petition at bar should
be allowed."
We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the
enforcement of constitutional rights - to information and to the equitable diffusion of
natural resources - matters of transcendental public importance, the petitioner has
the requisite locus standi.
Fifth issue: whether the constitutional right to information includes
official information on on-going negotiations before a final agreement.
Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the people's right to information on
matters of public concern in this manner:
"Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded
the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." (Emphasis
supplied)
The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest
reinforces the people's right to information on matters of public concern. This State
policy is expressed in Section 28, Article II of the Constitution, thus:
"Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest." (Emphasis supplied)
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policymaking and in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people
sufficient information to exercise effectively other constitutional rights. These twin
provisions are essential to the exercise of freedom of expression. If the government
does not disclose its official acts, transactions and decisions to citizens, whatever
citizens say, even if expressed without any restraint, will be speculative and amount
to nothing. These twin provisions are also essential to hold public officials "at all
times x x x accountable to the people," 29 for unless citizens have the proper
information, they cannot hold public officials accountable for anything. Armed with
the right information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the
formulation of government policies and their effective implementation. An informed
citizenry is essential to the existence and proper functioning of any democracy. As
explained by the Court in Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.30
"An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or
process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the
interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to
the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will.
Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is

informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants
in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating
thereto can such bear fruit."
PEA asserts, citing Chavez v. PCGG,31 that in cases of on-going negotiations the
right to information is limited to "definite propositions of the government." PEA
maintains the right does not include access to "intra-agency or inter-agency
recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions
are still in the process of being formulated or are in the 'exploratory stage'."
Also, AMARI contends that petitioner cannot invoke the right at the pre-decisional
stage or before the closing of the transaction. To support its contention, AMARI cites
the following discussion in the 1986 Constitutional Commission:
"Mr. Suarez. And when we say 'transactions' which should be distinguished from
contracts, agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the
steps leading to the consummation of the contract, or does he refer to the contract
itself?
Mr. Ople: The 'transactions' used here, I suppose is generic and therefore,
it can cover both steps leading to a contract and already a consummated
contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.
Mr. Suarez: This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the
consummation of the transaction.
Mr. Ople: Yes, subject only to reasonable safeguards on the national
interest.
Mr. Suarez: Thank you."32 (Emphasis supplied)
AMARI argues there must first be a consummated contract before petitioner can
invoke the right. Requiring government officials to reveal their deliberations at the
pre-decisional stage will degrade the quality of decision-making in government
agencies. Government officials will hesitate to express their real sentiments during
deliberations if there is immediate public dissemination of their discussions, putting
them under all kinds of pressure before they decide.
We must first distinguish between information the law on public bidding requires
PEA to disclose publicly, and information the constitutional right to information
requires PEA to release to the public. Before the consummation of the contract, PEA
must, on its own and without demand from anyone, disclose to the public matters
relating to the disposition of its property. These include the size, location, technical
description and nature of the property being disposed of, the terms and conditions
of the disposition, the parties qualified to bid, the minimum price and similar
information. PEA must prepare all these data and disclose them to the public at the
start of the disposition process, long before the consummation of the contract,
because the Government Auditing Code requires public bidding. If PEA fails to
make this disclosure, any citizen can demand from PEA this information at any time
during the bidding process.
Information, however, on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals
being undertaken by the bidding or review committee is not immediately accessible
under the right to information. While the evaluation or review is still on-going, there
are no "official acts, transactions, or decisions" on the bids or proposals. However,
once the committee makes its official recommendation, there arises a "definite
proposition" on the part of the government. From this moment, the public's right
to information attaches, and any citizen can access all the non-proprietary
information leading to such definite proposition. In Chavez v. PCGG,33 the Court
ruled as follows:

"Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is

incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government
representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed
settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of
ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions
of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency
recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions
are still in the process of being formulated or are in the "exploratory" stage. There is
need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in
general, as discussed earlier such as on matters involving national security,
diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified information."
(Emphasis supplied)
Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission understood that the right to information "contemplates inclusion of
negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction."Certainly, a
consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to
information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is
consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to
expose its defects.1wphi1.nt
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the
contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal,
becomes a fait accompli. This negates the State policy of full transparency on
matters of public concern, a situation which the framers of the Constitution could
not have intended. Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from participating
in the public discussion of any proposed contract, effectively truncating a basic
right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. We can allow neither an emasculation of a
constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of its avowed "policy of full disclosure
of all its transactions involving public interest."
The right covers three categories of information which are "matters of public
concern," namely: (1) official records; (2) documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions and decisions; and (3) government research data used in
formulating policies. The first category refers to any document that is part of the
public records in the custody of government agencies or officials. The second
category refers to documents and papers recording, evidencing, establishing,
confirming, supporting, justifying or explaining official acts, transactions or decisions
of government agencies or officials. The third category refers to research data,
whether raw, collated or processed, owned by the government and used in
formulating government policies.
The information that petitioner may access on the renegotiation of the JVA includes
evaluation reports, recommendations, legal and expert opinions, minutes of
meetings, terms of reference and other documents attached to such reports or
minutes, all relating to the JVA. However, the right to information does not compel
PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like relating to the renegotiation
of the JVA.34 The right only affords access to records, documents and papers, which
means the opportunity to inspect and copy them. One who exercises the right must
copy the records, documents and papers at his expense. The exercise of the right is
also subject to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of the public records
and to minimize disruption to government operations, like rules specifying when
and how to conduct the inspection and copying. 35

The right to information, however, does not extend to matters recognized as

privileged information under the separation of powers. 36 The right does not also
apply to information on military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting
national security, and information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement
agencies before the prosecution of the accused, which courts have long recognized
as confidential.37 The right may also be subject to other limitations that Congress
may impose by law.
There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged
information rooted in the separation of powers. The information does not cover
Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door
Cabinet meetings which, like internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and other
collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either house of Congress, 38 are
recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open by a coequal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and
assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is
essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to
exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. 39 This is not the situation in the
instant case.
We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official
information on on-going negotiationsbefore a final contract. The information,
however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not
cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic
secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order. 40 Congress
has also prescribed other limitations on the right to information in several
legislations.41
Sixth issue: whether stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to
AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution.
The Regalian Doctrine
The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in
the Regalian doctrine which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the
public domain. Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all
"lands, territories and possessions" in the Philippines passed to the Spanish
Crown.42 The King, as the sovereign ruler and representative of the people, acquired
and owned all lands and territories in the Philippines except those he disposed of by
grant or sale to private individuals.
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine substituting,
however, the State, in lieu of the King, as the owner of all lands and waters of the
public domain. The Regalian doctrine is the foundation of the time-honored principle
of land ownership that "all lands that were not acquired from the Government,
either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain." 43 Article 339 of the
Civil Code of 1889, which is now Article 420 of the Civil Code of 1950, incorporated
the Regalian doctrine.
Ownership and Disposition of Reclaimed Lands
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 was the first statutory law governing the
ownership and disposition of reclaimed lands in the Philippines. On May 18, 1907,
the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which provided for the lease, but
not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and
individuals. Later, on November 29, 1919, the Philippine Legislature approved Act
No. 2874, the Public Land Act, which authorized the lease, but not the sale, of
reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and individuals. On

November 7, 1936, the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, also
known as the Public Land Act, whichauthorized the lease, but not the sale, of
reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and individuals. CA No.
141 continues to this day as the general law governing the classification and
disposition of lands of the public domain.
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 and the Civil Code of 1889
Under the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, the shores, bays, coves, inlets and all
waters within the maritime zone of the Spanish territory belonged to the public
domain for public use.44 The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 allowed the reclamation
of the sea under Article 5, which provided as follows:
"Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by
the State, or by the provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper permission,
shall become the property of the party constructing such works, unless otherwise
provided by the terms of the grant of authority."
Under the Spanish Law of Waters, land reclaimed from the sea belonged to the
party undertaking the reclamation, provided the government issued the necessary
permit and did not reserve ownership of the reclaimed land to the State.
Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public dominion as follows:
"Art. 339. Property of public dominion is
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a
similar character;
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general public
use, is employed in some public service, or in the development of the national
wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works for the defense of the territory,
and mines, until granted to private individuals."
Property devoted to public use referred to property open for use by the public. In
contrast, property devoted to public service referred to property used for some
specific public service and open only to those authorized to use the property.
Property of public dominion referred not only to property devoted to public use, but
also to property not so used but employed to develop the national wealth. This
class of property constituted property of public dominion although employed for
some economic or commercial activity to increase the national wealth.
Article 341 of the Civil Code of 1889 governed the re-classification of property of
public dominion into private property, to wit:
"Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no longer devoted to public use or to
the defense of the territory, shall become a part of the private property of the
State."
This provision, however, was not self-executing. The legislature, or the executive
department pursuant to law, must declare the property no longer needed for public
use or territorial defense before the government could lease or alienate the
property to private parties.45
Act No. 1654 of the Philippine Commission
On May 8, 1907, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which regulated
the lease of reclaimed and foreshore lands. The salient provisions of this law were
as follows:
"Section 1. The control and disposition of the foreshore as defined in existing
law, and the title to all Government or public lands made or reclaimed by
the Government by dredging or filling or otherwise throughout the Philippine
Islands, shall be retained by the Government without prejudice to vested rights

and without prejudice to rights conceded to the City of Manila in the Luneta
Extension.
Section 2. (a) The Secretary of the Interior shall cause all Government or public
lands made or reclaimed by the Government by dredging or filling or otherwise to
be divided into lots or blocks, with the necessary streets and alleyways located
thereon, and shall cause plats and plans of such surveys to be prepared and filed
with the Bureau of Lands.
(b) Upon completion of such plats and plans the Governor-General shall give
notice to the public that such parts of the lands so made or reclaimed as
are not needed for public purposes will be leased for commercial and
business purposes, x x x.
xxx
(e) The leases above provided for shall be disposed of to the highest and
best bidder therefore, subject to such regulations and safeguards as the GovernorGeneral may by executive order prescribe." (Emphasis supplied)
Act No. 1654 mandated that the government should retain title to all lands
reclaimed by the government. The Act also vested in the government control
and disposition of foreshore lands. Private parties could lease lands reclaimed by
the government only if these lands were no longer needed for public purpose. Act
No. 1654 mandatedpublic bidding in the lease of government reclaimed lands. Act
No. 1654 made government reclaimed lands sui generis in that unlike other public
lands which the government could sell to private parties, these reclaimed lands
were available only for lease to private parties.
Act No. 1654, however, did not repeal Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866. Act No. 1654 did not prohibit private parties from reclaiming parts of the sea
under Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters. Lands reclaimed from the sea by
private parties with government permission remained private lands.
Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature
On November 29, 1919, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2874, the Public
Land Act.46 The salient provisions of Act No. 2874, on reclaimed lands, were as
follows:
"Sec. 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the
lands of the public domain into
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands, x x x.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the government and disposition of alienable or
disposable public lands, the Governor-General, upon recommendation by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time
declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act."
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession
which have been officially delimited or classified x x x.
xxx
Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor
mineral land, shall be classified as suitable for residential purposes or for
commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other than
agricultural purposes, and shall be open to disposition or concession, shall be
disposed of under the provisions of this chapter, and not otherwise.
Sec. 56. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:

(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other

means;
(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks
of navigable lakes or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
x x x.
Sec. 58. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-six
shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise, as
soon as the Governor-General, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall declare that the same are not
necessary for the public service and are open to disposition under this
chapter. The lands included in class (d) may be disposed of by sale or lease
under the provisions of this Act." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 6 of Act No. 2874 authorized the Governor-General to "classify lands of the
public domain into x x x alienable or disposable" 47 lands. Section 7 of the Act
empowered the Governor-General to "declare what lands are open to disposition or
concession." Section 8 of the Act limited alienable or disposable lands only to those
lands which have been "officially delimited and classified."
Section 56 of Act No. 2874 stated that lands "disposable under this title 48 shall be
classified" as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands, as well as other
lands. All these lands, however, must be suitable for residential, commercial,
industrial or other productive non-agricultural purposes. These provisions vested
upon the Governor-General the power to classify inalienable lands of the public
domain into disposable lands of the public domain. These provisions also
empowered the Governor-General to classify further such disposable lands of the
public domain into government reclaimed, foreshore or marshy lands of the public
domain, as well as other non-agricultural lands.
Section 58 of Act No. 2874 categorically mandated that disposable lands of the
public domain classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
lands "shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not
otherwise." The Governor-General, before allowing the lease of these lands to
private parties, must formally declare that the lands were "not necessary for the
public service." Act No. 2874 reiterated the State policy to lease and not to sell
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the public domain, a policy
first enunciated in 1907 in Act No. 1654. Government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain that the government could not sell to private parties.
The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government reclaimed, foreshore
and marshy public lands for non-agricultural purposes retain their inherent potential
as areas for public service. This is the reason the government prohibited the sale,
and only allowed the lease, of these lands to private parties. The State always
reserved these lands for some future public service.
Act No. 2874 did not authorize the reclassification of government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy lands into other non-agricultural lands under Section 56 (d).
Lands falling under Section 56 (d) were the only lands for non-agricultural purposes
the government could sell to private parties. Thus, under Act No. 2874, the
government could not sell government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands to
private parties, unless the legislature passed a law allowing their sale.49

Act No. 2874 did not prohibit private parties from reclaiming parts of the sea
pursuant to Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Lands reclaimed from
the sea by private parties with government permission remained private lands.
Dispositions under the 1935 Constitution
On May 14, 1935, the 1935 Constitution took effect upon its ratification by the
Filipino people. The 1935 Constitution, in adopting the Regalian doctrine, declared in
Section 1, Article XIII, that
"Section 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and
other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines
or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is
owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at
the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this
Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural
land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the
exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be
granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five
years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial
uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may
be the measure and limit of the grant." (Emphasis supplied)
The 1935 Constitution barred the alienation of all natural resources except public
agricultural lands, which were the only natural resources the State could alienate.
Thus, foreshore lands, considered part of the State's natural resources, became
inalienable by constitutional fiat, available only for lease for 25 years, renewable for
another 25 years. The government could alienate foreshore lands only after these
lands were reclaimed and classified as alienable agricultural lands of the public
domain. Government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain, being
neither timber nor mineral lands, fell under the classification of public agricultural
lands.50 However, government reclaimed and marshy lands, although subject to
classification as disposable public agricultural lands, could only be leased and not
sold to private parties because of Act No. 2874.
The prohibition on private parties from acquiring ownership of government
reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain was only a statutory prohibition
and the legislature could therefore remove such prohibition. The 1935 Constitution
did not prohibit individuals and corporations from acquiring government reclaimed
and marshy lands of the public domain that were classified as agricultural lands
under existing public land laws. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution
provided as follows:
"Section 2. No private corporation or association may acquire, lease, or
hold public agricultural lands in excess of one thousand and twenty four
hectares, nor may any individual acquire such lands by purchase in excess
of one hundred and forty hectares, or by lease in excess of one thousand
and twenty-four hectares, or by homestead in excess of twenty-four hectares.
Lands adapted to grazing, not exceeding two thousand hectares, may be leased to
an individual, private corporation, or association." (Emphasis supplied)
Still, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the legislature did not repeal
Section 58 of Act No. 2874 to open for sale to private parties government reclaimed
and marshy lands of the public domain. On the contrary, the legislature continued

the long established State policy of retaining for the government title and ownership
of government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain.
Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the Philippine National Assembly
On November 7, 1936, the National Assembly approved Commonwealth Act No.
141, also known as the Public Land Act, which compiled the then existing laws on
lands of the public domain. CA No. 141, as amended, remains to this day
the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of
the public domain other than timber and mineral lands. 51
Section 6 of CA No. 141 empowers the President to classify lands of the public
domain into "alienable or disposable"52 lands of the public domain, which prior to
such classification are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Section 7 of
CA No. 141 authorizes the President to "declare what lands are open to disposition
or concession." Section 8 of CA No. 141 states that the government can declare
open for disposition or concession only lands that are "officially delimited and
classified." Sections 6, 7 and 8 of CA No. 141 read as follows:
"Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of
the public domain into
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in like manner transfer such lands from one class to
another,53 for the purpose of their administration and disposition.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or
disposable public lands, the President, upon recommendation by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time declare
what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act.
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession
which have been officially delimited and classified and, when practicable,
surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public uses,
nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become private property,
nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any
other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated,
have ceased to be so. x x x."
Thus, before the government could alienate or dispose of lands of the public
domain, the President must first officially classify these lands as alienable or
disposable, and then declare them open to disposition or concession. There must be
no law reserving these lands for public or quasi-public uses.
The salient provisions of CA No. 141, on government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy lands of the public domain, are as follows:
"Sec. 58. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber
nor mineral land, is intended to be used for residential purposes or for
commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other than
agricultural, and is open to disposition or concession, shall be disposed of
under the provisions of this chapter and not otherwise.
Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other
means;
(b) Foreshore;

(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks
of navigable lakes or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
Sec. 60. Any tract of land comprised under this title may be leased or sold, as the
case may be, to any person, corporation, or association authorized to purchase or
lease public lands for agricultural purposes. x x x.
Sec. 61. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-nine
shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise, as
soon as the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture, shall declare that the same are not necessary for the public
service and are open to disposition under this chapter. The lands included in
class (d) may be disposed of by sale or lease under the provisions of this
Act." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 61 of CA No. 141 readopted, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution,
Section 58 of Act No. 2874 prohibiting the sale of government reclaimed, foreshore
and marshy disposable lands of the public domain. All these lands are intended for
residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural purposes. As before,
Section 61 allowed only the lease of such lands to private parties. The government
could sell to private parties only lands falling under Section 59 (d) of CA No. 141, or
those lands for non-agricultural purposes not classified as government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy disposable lands of the public domain. Foreshore lands,
however, became inalienable under the 1935 Constitution which only allowed the
lease of these lands to qualified private parties.
Section 58 of CA No. 141 expressly states that disposable lands of the public
domain intended for residential, commercial, industrial or other productive purposes
other than agricultural "shall be disposed of under the provisions of this
chapter and not otherwise." Under Section 10 of CA No. 141, the term
"disposition" includes lease of the land. Any disposition of government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy disposable lands for non-agricultural purposes must comply
with Chapter IX, Title III of CA No. 141,54 unless a subsequent law amended or
repealed these provisions.
In his concurring opinion in the landmark case of Republic Real Estate
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,55Justice Reynato S. Puno summarized succinctly
the law on this matter, as follows:
"Foreshore lands are lands of public dominion intended for public use. So too are
lands reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other means. Act 1654
mandated that the control and disposition of the foreshore and lands under water
remained in the national government. Said law allowed only the 'leasing' of
reclaimed land. The Public Land Acts of 1919 and 1936 also declared that the
foreshore and lands reclaimed by the government were to be "disposed of to private
parties by lease only and not otherwise." Before leasing, however, the GovernorGeneral, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, had first to determine that the land reclaimed was not necessary for the
public service. This requisite must have been met before the land could be disposed
of. But even then, the foreshore and lands under water were not to be
alienated and sold to private parties. The disposition of the reclaimed land
was only by lease. The land remained property of the State." (Emphasis
supplied)
As observed by Justice Puno in his concurring opinion, "Commonwealth Act No. 141
has remained in effect at present."

The State policy prohibiting the sale to private parties of government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain, first implemented in
1907 was thus reaffirmed in CA No. 141 after the 1935 Constitution took effect. The
prohibition on the sale of foreshore lands, however, became a constitutional edict
under the 1935 Constitution. Foreshore lands became inalienable as natural
resources of the State, unless reclaimed by the government and classified as
agricultural lands of the public domain, in which case they would fall under the
classification of government reclaimed lands.
After the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, government reclaimed and marshy
disposable lands of the public domain continued to be only leased and not sold to
private parties.56 These lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain the government could not sell to private
parties.
Since then and until now, the only way the government can sell to private parties
government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public domain is for the
legislature to pass a law authorizing such sale. CA No. 141 does not authorize the
President to reclassify government reclaimed and marshy lands into other nonagricultural lands under Section 59 (d). Lands classified under Section 59 (d) are the
only alienable or disposable lands for non-agricultural purposes that the
government could sell to private parties.
Moreover, Section 60 of CA No. 141 expressly requires congressional authority
before lands under Section 59 that the government previously transferred to
government units or entities could be sold to private parties. Section 60 of CA No.
141 declares that
"Sec. 60. x x x The area so leased or sold shall be such as shall, in the judgment of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, be reasonably necessary for the
purposes for which such sale or lease is requested, and shall not exceed one
hundred and forty-four hectares: Provided, however, That this limitation shall not
apply to grants, donations, or transfers made to a province, municipality or branch
or subdivision of the Government for the purposes deemed by said entities
conducive to the public interest; but the land so granted, donated, or
transferred to a province, municipality or branch or subdivision of the
Government shall not be alienated, encumbered, or otherwise disposed of
in a manner affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress: x x x."
(Emphasis supplied)
The congressional authority required in Section 60 of CA No. 141 mirrors the
legislative authority required in Section 56 of Act No. 2874.
One reason for the congressional authority is that Section 60 of CA No. 141
exempted government units and entities from the maximum area of public lands
that could be acquired from the State. These government units and entities should
not just turn around and sell these lands to private parties in violation of
constitutional or statutory limitations. Otherwise, the transfer of lands for nonagricultural purposes to government units and entities could be used to circumvent
constitutional limitations on ownership of alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. In the same manner, such transfers could also be used to evade the
statutory prohibition in CA No. 141 on the sale of government reclaimed and marshy
lands of the public domain to private parties. Section 60 of CA No. 141 constitutes
by operation of law a lien on these lands. 57

In case of sale or lease of disposable lands of the public domain falling under
Section 59 of CA No. 141, Sections 63 and 67 require a public bidding. Sections 63
and 67 of CA No. 141 provide as follows:
"Sec. 63. Whenever it is decided that lands covered by this chapter are not needed
for public purposes, the Director of Lands shall ask the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce (now the Secretary of Natural Resources) for authority to dispose of the
same. Upon receipt of such authority, the Director of Lands shall give notice by
public advertisement in the same manner as in the case of leases or sales of
agricultural public land, x x x.
Sec. 67. The lease or sale shall be made by oral bidding; and adjudication
shall be made to the highest bidder. x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, CA No. 141 mandates the Government to put to public auction all leases or
sales of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. 58
Like Act No. 1654 and Act No. 2874 before it, CA No. 141 did not repeal Section 5 of
the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Private parties could still reclaim portions of the
sea with government permission. However, the reclaimed land could become
private land only if classified as alienable agricultural land of the public
domain open to disposition under CA No. 141. The 1935 Constitution prohibited the
alienation of all natural resources except public agricultural lands.
The Civil Code of 1950
The Civil Code of 1950 readopted substantially the definition of property of public
dominion found in the Civil Code of 1889. Articles 420 and 422 of the Civil Code of
1950 state that
"Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar
character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended
for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
x x x.
Art. 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for
public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State."
Again, the government must formally declare that the property of public dominion is
no longer needed for public use or public service, before the same could be
classified as patrimonial property of the State. 59 In the case of government
reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain, the declaration of their being
disposable, as well as the manner of their disposition, is governed by the applicable
provisions of CA No. 141.
Like the Civil Code of 1889, the Civil Code of 1950 included as property of public
dominion those properties of the State which, without being for public use, are
intended for public service or the "development of the national wealth." Thus,
government reclaimed and marshy lands of the State, even if not employed for
public use or public service, if developed to enhance the national wealth, are
classified as property of public dominion.
Dispositions under the 1973 Constitution
The 1973 Constitution, which took effect on January 17, 1973, likewise adopted the
Regalian doctrine. Section 8, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution stated that
"Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of

agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands

of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no
license, concession, or lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, or
utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except as to
water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which cases, beneficial use may be the measure
and the limit of the grant." (Emphasis supplied)
The 1973 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all natural resources with the
exception of "agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement
lands of the public domain." In contrast, the 1935 Constitution barred the alienation
of all natural resources except "public agricultural lands." However, the term "public
agricultural lands" in the 1935 Constitution encompassed industrial, commercial,
residential and resettlement lands of the public domain. 60 If the land of public
domain were neither timber nor mineral land, it would fall under the classification of
agricultural land of the public domain. Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions,
therefore, prohibited the alienation of all natural resources except
agricultural lands of the public domain.
The 1973 Constitution, however, limited the alienation of lands of the public domain
to individuals who were citizens of the Philippines. Private corporations, even if
wholly owned by Philippine citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire alienable
lands of the public domain unlike in the 1935 Constitution. Section 11, Article XIV of
the 1973 Constitution declared that
"Sec. 11. The Batasang Pambansa, taking into account conservation, ecological, and
development requirements of the natural resources, shall determine by law the size
of land of the public domain which may be developed, held or acquired by, or leased
to, any qualified individual, corporation, or association, and the conditions
therefor. No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of
the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area
nor may any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares or
acquire by purchase, homestead or grant, in excess of twenty-four hectares. No
private corporation or association may hold by lease, concession, license or permit,
timber or forest lands and other timber or forest resources in excess of one hundred
thousand hectares. However, such area may be increased by the Batasang
Pambansa upon recommendation of the National Economic and Development
Authority." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations could hold alienable lands
of the public domain only through lease. Only individuals could now acquire
alienable lands of the public domain, and private corporations became
absolutely barred from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain. The constitutional ban extended to all kinds of alienable lands of the
public domain, while the statutory ban under CA No. 141 applied only to
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain.
PD No. 1084 Creating the Public Estates Authority
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree
No. 1084 creating PEA, a wholly government owned and controlled corporation with
a special charter. Sections 4 and 8 of PD No. 1084, vests PEA with the following
purposes and powers:
"Sec. 4. Purpose. The Authority is hereby created for the following purposes:

(a) To reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas, by

dredging, filling or other means, or to acquire reclaimed land;
(b) To develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and
sell any and all kinds of lands, buildings, estates and other forms of real
property, owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the government;
(c) To provide for, operate or administer such service as may be necessary for the
efficient, economical and beneficial utilization of the above properties.
Sec. 5. Powers and functions of the Authority. The Authority shall, in carrying out the
purposes for which it is created, have the following powers and functions:
(a)To prescribe its by-laws.
xxx
(i) To hold lands of the public domain in excess of the area permitted to private
corporations by statute.
(j) To reclaim lands and to construct work across, or otherwise, any stream,
watercourse, canal, ditch, flume x x x.
xxx
(o) To perform such acts and exercise such functions as may be necessary for the
attainment of the purposes and objectives herein specified." (Emphasis supplied)
PD No. 1084 authorizes PEA to reclaim both foreshore and submerged areas of the
public domain. Foreshore areas are those covered and uncovered by the ebb and
flow of the tide.61 Submerged areas are those permanently under water regardless
of the ebb and flow of the tide.62 Foreshore and submerged areas indisputably
belong to the public domain63 and are inalienable unless reclaimed, classified as
alienable lands open to disposition, and further declared no longer needed for public
service.
The ban in the 1973 Constitution on private corporations from acquiring alienable
lands of the public domain did not apply to PEA since it was then, and until today, a
fully owned government corporation. The constitutional ban applied then, as it still
applies now, only to "private corporations and associations." PD No. 1084 expressly
empowers PEA "to hold lands of the public domain" even "in excess of the area
permitted to private corporations by statute." Thus, PEA can hold title to
private lands, as well as title to lands of the public domain.
In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the
public domain, there must be legislative authority empowering PEA to sell these
lands. This legislative authority is necessary in view of Section 60 of CA No.141,
which states
"Sec. 60. x x x; but the land so granted, donated or transferred to a province,
municipality, or branch or subdivision of the Government shall not be alienated,
encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when
authorized by Congress; x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Without such legislative authority, PEA could not sell but only lease its reclaimed
foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain. Nevertheless, any
legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its reclaimed alienable lands of the public
domain would be subject to the constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring alienable lands of the public domain. Hence, such legislative authority
could only benefit private individuals.
Dispositions under the 1987 Constitution
The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions before it, has adopted
the Regalian doctrine. The 1987 Constitution declares that all natural resources are
"owned by the State," and except for alienable agricultural lands of the public

domain, natural resources cannot be alienated. Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution state that
"Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall
be under the full control and supervision of the State. x x x.
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain
may be further classified by law according to the uses which they may be
devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the
Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more
than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development,
and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine,
by law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed,
held, or leased and the conditions therefor." (Emphasis supplied)
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning
private corporations fromacquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private
corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease. As
in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the general law governing the lease to private
corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public
domain is still CA No. 141.
The Rationale behind the Constitutional Ban
The rationale behind the constitutional ban on corporations from acquiring, except
through lease, alienable lands of the public domain is not well understood. During
the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the commissioners probed
the rationale behind this ban, thus:
"FR. BERNAS: Mr. Vice-President, my questions have reference to page 3, line 5
which says:
`No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease, not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.'
If we recall, this provision did not exist under the 1935 Constitution, but this was
introduced in the 1973 Constitution. In effect, it prohibits private corporations from
acquiring alienable public lands. But it has not been very clear in
jurisprudence what the reason for this is. In some of the cases decided in 1982
and 1983, it was indicated that the purpose of this is to prevent large
landholdings. Is that the intent of this provision?
MR. VILLEGAS: I think that is the spirit of the provision.
FR. BERNAS: In existing decisions involving the Iglesia ni Cristo, there were
instances where the Iglesia ni Cristo was not allowed to acquire a mere 313-square
meter land where a chapel stood because the Supreme Court said it would be in
violation of this." (Emphasis supplied)

In Ayog v. Cusi,64 the Court explained the rationale behind this constitutional ban in
this way:
"Indeed, one purpose of the constitutional prohibition against purchases of public
agricultural lands by private corporations is to equitably diffuse land ownership or to
encourage 'owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm' and to prevent
a recurrence of cases like the instant case. Huge landholdings by corporations or
private persons had spawned social unrest."
However, if the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings, the
Constitution could have simply limited the size of alienable lands of the public
domain that corporations could acquire. The Constitution could have followed the
limitations on individuals, who could acquire not more than 24 hectares of alienable
lands of the public domain under the 1973 Constitution, and not more than 12
hectares under the 1987 Constitution.
If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size farms, placing the
land in the name of a corporation would be more effective in preventing the breakup of farmlands. If the farmland is registered in the name of a corporation, upon the
death of the owner, his heirs would inherit shares in the corporation instead of
subdivided parcels of the farmland. This would prevent the continuing break-up of
farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from one generation to the next.
In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limitation on
individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable lands of the
public domain. Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the
maximum area of alienable lands of the public domain could easily set up
corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could own as
many corporations as his means would allow him. An individual could even hide his
ownership of a corporation by putting his nominees as stockholders of the
corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the constitutional
limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the public domain.
The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer
ownership of only a limited area of alienable land of the public domain to a qualified
individual. This constitutional intent is safeguarded by the provision prohibiting
corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain, since the vehicle
to circumvent the constitutional intent is removed. The available alienable public
lands are gradually decreasing in the face of an ever-growing population. The most
effective way to insure faithful adherence to this constitutional intent is to grant or
sell alienable lands of the public domain only to individuals. This, it would seem, is
the practical benefit arising from the constitutional ban.
The Amended Joint Venture Agreement
The subject matter of the Amended JVA, as stated in its second Whereas clause,
consists of three properties, namely:
1. "[T]hree partially reclaimed and substantially eroded islands along Emilio
Aguinaldo Boulevard in Paranaque and Las Pinas, Metro Manila, with a combined
titled area of 1,578,441 square meters;"
2. "[A]nother area of 2,421,559 square meters contiguous to the three islands;" and
3. "[A]t AMARI's option as approved by PEA, an additional 350 hectares more or less
to regularize the configuration of the reclaimed area." 65
PEA confirms that the Amended JVA involves "the development of the Freedom
Islands and further reclamation of about 250 hectares x x x," plus an option
"granted to AMARI to subsequently reclaim another 350 hectares x x x." 66

In short, the Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157.84
hectares of the 750-hectare reclamation project have been reclaimed, and
the rest of the 592.15 hectares are still submerged areas forming part of
Manila Bay.
Under the Amended JVA, AMARI will reimburse PEA the sum of P1,894,129,200.00
for PEA's "actual cost" in partially reclaiming the Freedom Islands. AMARI will also
complete, at its own expense, the reclamation of the Freedom Islands. AMARI will
further shoulder all the reclamation costs of all the other areas, totaling 592.15
hectares, still to be reclaimed. AMARI and PEA will share, in the proportion of 70
percent and 30 percent, respectively, the total net usable area which is defined in
the Amended JVA as the total reclaimed area less 30 percent earmarked for
common areas. Title to AMARI's share in the net usable area, totaling 367.5
hectares, will be issued in the name of AMARI. Section 5.2 (c) of the Amended JVA
provides that
"x x x, PEA shall have the duty to execute without delay the necessary deed of
transfer or conveyance of the title pertaining to AMARI's Land share based on the
Land Allocation Plan. PEA, when requested in writing by AMARI, shall then
cause the issuance and delivery of the proper certificates of title covering
AMARI's Land Share in the name of AMARI, x x x; provided, that if more than
seventy percent (70%) of the titled area at any given time pertains to AMARI, PEA
shall deliver to AMARI only seventy percent (70%) of the titles pertaining to AMARI,
until such time when a corresponding proportionate area of additional land
pertaining to PEA has been titled." (Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably, under the Amended JVA AMARI will acquire and own a
maximum of 367.5 hectares of reclaimed land which will be titled in its
name.
To implement the Amended JVA, PEA delegated to the unincorporated PEA-AMARI
joint venture PEA's statutory authority, rights and privileges to reclaim foreshore
and submerged areas in Manila Bay. Section 3.2.a of the Amended JVA states that
"PEA hereby contributes to the joint venture its rights and privileges to perform
Rawland Reclamation and Horizontal Development as well as own the Reclamation
Area, thereby granting the Joint Venture the full and exclusive right, authority and
privilege to undertake the Project in accordance with the Master Development Plan."
The Amended JVA is the product of a renegotiation of the original JVA dated April 25,
1995 and its supplemental agreement dated August 9, 1995.
The Threshold Issue
The threshold issue is whether AMARI, a private corporation, can acquire and own
under the Amended JVA 367.5 hectares of reclaimed foreshore and submerged
areas in Manila Bay in view of Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which state that:
"Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated. x x x.
xxx
Section 3. x x x Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural
lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable
lands of the public domain except by lease, x x x."(Emphasis supplied)
Classification of Reclaimed Foreshore and Submerged Areas

PEA readily concedes that lands reclaimed from foreshore or submerged areas of
Manila Bay are alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. In its
Memorandum,67 PEA admits that
"Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are classified
as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain:
'Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other means;
x x x.'" (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Legal Task Force68 constituted under Presidential Administrative Order
No. 365 admitted in its Report and Recommendation to then President Fidel V.
Ramos, "[R]eclaimed lands are classified as alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain."69 The Legal Task Force concluded that
"D. Conclusion
Reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain. However, by statutory authority,
the rights of ownership and disposition over reclaimed lands have been transferred
to PEA, by virtue of which PEA, as owner, may validly convey the same to any
qualified person without violating the Constitution or any statute.
The constitutional provision prohibiting private corporations from holding public
land, except by lease (Sec. 3, Art. XVII,70 1987 Constitution), does not apply to
reclaimed lands whose ownership has passed on to PEA by statutory grant."
Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and submerged
areas of Manila Bay are part of the "lands of the public domain, waters x x x and
other natural resources" and consequently "owned by the State." As such, foreshore
and submerged areas "shall not be alienated," unless they are classified as
"agricultural lands" of the public domain. The mere reclamation of these areas by
PEA does not convert these inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a law or presidential
proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable
and open to disposition or concession. Moreover, these reclaimed lands cannot be
classified as alienable or disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or
quasi-public use.71
Section 8 of CA No. 141 provides that "only those lands shall be declared open to
disposition or concession which have been officially delimited and
classified."72 The President has the authority to classify inalienable lands of the
public domain into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, pursuant to
Section 6 of CA No. 141. In Laurel vs. Garcia, 73 the Executive Department attempted
to sell the Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan, which was acquired by the Philippine
Government for use as the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy. Although the
Chancery had transferred to another location thirteen years earlier, the Court still
ruled that, under Article 42274 of the Civil Code, a property of public dominion
retains such character until formally declared otherwise. The Court ruled that
"The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual
Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such
conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen
and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]. A property continues to be
part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or
ownership 'until there is a formal declaration on the part of the
government to withdraw it from being such' (Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108
Phil. 335 [1960]." (Emphasis supplied)

PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977, authorized the issuance of special land
patents for lands reclaimed by PEA from the foreshore or submerged areas of Manila
Bay. On January 19, 1988 then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent
No. 3517 in the name of PEA for the 157.84 hectares comprising the partially
reclaimed Freedom Islands. Subsequently, on April 9, 1999 the Register of Deeds of
the Municipality of Paranaque issued TCT Nos. 7309, 7311 and 7312 in the name of
PEA pursuant to Section 103 of PD No. 1529 authorizing the issuance of certificates
of title corresponding to land patents. To this day, these certificates of title are still
in the name of PEA.
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special patent
covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying
the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. PD No.
1085 and President Aquino's issuance of a land patent also constitute a declaration
that the Freedom Islands are no longer needed for public service. The Freedom
Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, open
to disposition or concession to qualified parties.
At the time then President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, PEA had already
reclaimed the Freedom Islands although subsequently there were partial erosions on
some areas. The government had also completed the necessary surveys on these
islands. Thus, the Freedom Islands were no longer part of Manila Bay but part of the
land mass. Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the
public domain into "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks."
Being neither timber, mineral, nor national park lands, the reclaimed Freedom
Islands necessarily fall under the classification of agricultural lands of the public
domain. Under the 1987 Constitution, agricultural lands of the public domain are the
only natural resources that the State may alienate to qualified private parties. All
other natural resources, such as the seas or bays, are "waters x x x owned by the
State" forming part of the public domain, and are inalienable pursuant to Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
AMARI claims that the Freedom Islands are private lands because CDCP, then a
private corporation, reclaimed the islands under a contract dated November 20,
1973 with the Commissioner of Public Highways. AMARI, citing Article 5 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, argues that "if the ownership of reclaimed lands
may be given to the party constructing the works, then it cannot be said that
reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain which the State may not
alienate."75 Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters reads as follows:
"Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by
the State, or by the provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper permission,
shall become the property of the party constructing such works, unless otherwise
provided by the terms of the grant of authority." (Emphasis supplied)
Under Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, private parties could reclaim
from the sea only with "proper permission" from the State. Private parties could own
the reclaimed land only if not "otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of
authority." This clearly meant that no one could reclaim from the sea without
permission from the State because the sea is property of public dominion. It also
meant that the State could grant or withhold ownership of the reclaimed land
because any reclaimed land, like the sea from which it emerged, belonged to the
State. Thus, a private person reclaiming from the sea without permission from the
State could not acquire ownership of the reclaimed land which would remain
property of public dominion like the sea it replaced. 76 Article 5 of the Spanish Law of

Waters of 1866 adopted the time-honored principle of land ownership that "all lands
that were not acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong
to the public domain."77
Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters must be read together with laws
subsequently enacted on the disposition of public lands. In particular, CA No. 141
requires that lands of the public domain must first be classified as alienable or
disposable before the government can alienate them. These lands must not be
reserved for public or quasi-public purposes. 78 Moreover, the contract between
CDCP and the government was executed after the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution which barred private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain. This contract could not have converted the Freedom
Islands into private lands of a private corporation.
Presidential Decree No. 3-A, issued on January 11, 1973, revoked all laws
authorizing the reclamation of areas under water and revested solely in the National
Government the power to reclaim lands. Section 1 of PD No. 3-A declared that
"The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the reclamation
of areas under water, whether foreshore or inland, shall be limited to the
National Government or any person authorized by it under a proper
contract. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x."
PD No. 3-A repealed Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 because
reclamation of areas under water could now be undertaken only by the National
Government or by a person contracted by the National Government. Private parties
may reclaim from the sea only under a contract with the National Government, and
no longer by grant or permission as provided in Section 5 of the Spanish Law of
Waters of 1866.
Executive Order No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979, designated PEA as the
National Government's implementing arm to undertake "all reclamation projects of
the government," which "shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper
contract executed by it with any person or entity." Under such contract, a
private party receives compensation for reclamation services rendered to PEA.
Payment to the contractor may be in cash, or in kind consisting of portions of the
reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring alienable lands of the public domain. The reclaimed land can be used as
payment in kind only if the reclaimed land is first classified as alienable or
disposable land open to disposition, and then declared no longer needed for public
service.
The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but also an additional
592.15 hectares which are still submerged and forming part of Manila Bay. There is
no legislative or Presidential act classifying these submerged areas as
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain open to disposition.
These submerged areas are not covered by any patent or certificate of title. There
can be no dispute that these submerged areas form part of the public domain, and
in their present state are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Until
reclaimed from the sea, these submerged areas are, under the Constitution, "waters
x x x owned by the State," forming part of the public domain and consequently
inalienable. Only when actually reclaimed from the sea can these submerged areas
be classified as public agricultural lands, which under the Constitution are the only
natural resources that the State may alienate. Once reclaimed and transformed into
public agricultural lands, the government may then officially classify these lands as

alienable or disposable lands open to disposition. Thereafter, the government may

declare these lands no longer needed for public service. Only then can these
reclaimed lands be considered alienable or disposable lands of the public domain
and within the commerce of man.
The classification of PEA's reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands into alienable
or disposable lands open to disposition is necessary because PEA is tasked under its
charter to undertake public services that require the use of lands of the public
domain. Under Section 5 of PD No. 1084, the functions of PEA include the following:
"[T]o own or operate railroads, tramways and other kinds of land transportation, x x
x; [T]o construct, maintain and operate such systems of sanitary sewers as may be
necessary; [T]o construct, maintain and operate such storm drains as may be
necessary." PEA is empowered to issue "rules and regulations as may be necessary
for the proper use by private parties of any or all of the highways, roads,
utilities, buildings and/or any of its properties and to impose or collect fees or
tolls for their use." Thus, part of the reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands held
by the PEA would actually be needed for public use or service since many of the
functions imposed on PEA by its charter constitute essential public services.
Moreover, Section 1 of Executive Order No. 525 provides that PEA "shall be primarily
responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for
and on behalf of the National Government." The same section also states that "[A]ll
reclamation projects shall be approved by the President upon recommendation of
the PEA, and shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper contract executed
by it with any person or entity; x x x." Thus, under EO No. 525, in relation to PD No.
3-A and PD No.1084, PEA became the primary implementing agency of the National
Government to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands of the public domain. EO No.
525 recognized PEA as the government entity "to undertake the reclamation of
lands and ensure their maximum utilization inpromoting public welfare and
interests."79 Since large portions of these reclaimed lands would obviously be
needed for public service, there must be a formal declaration segregating reclaimed
lands no longer needed for public service from those still needed for public
service.1wphi1.nt
Section 3 of EO No. 525, by declaring that all lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong
to or be owned by the PEA," could not automatically operate to classify inalienable
lands into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Otherwise, reclaimed
foreshore and submerged lands of the public domain would automatically become
alienable once reclaimed by PEA, whether or not classified as alienable or
disposable.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987, a later law than either PD No. 1084 or EO
No. 525, vests in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR" for
brevity) the following powers and functions:
"Sec. 4. Powers and Functions. The Department shall:
(1) x x x
xxx
(4) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and
disposable public lands, mineral resources and, in the process of exercising such
control, impose appropriate taxes, fees, charges, rentals and any such form of levy
and collect such revenues for the exploration, development, utilization or gathering
of such resources;
xxx

(14) Promulgate rules, regulations and guidelines on the issuance of

licenses, permits, concessions, lease agreements and such other
privileges concerning the development, exploration and utilization of the
country's marine, freshwater, and brackish water and over all aquatic
resources of the country and shall continue to oversee, supervise and
police our natural resources; cancel or cause to cancel such privileges upon
failure, non-compliance or violations of any regulation, order, and for all other
causes which are in furtherance of the conservation of natural resources and
supportive of the national interest;
(15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of
all lands of the public domain and serve as the sole agency responsible for
classification, sub-classification, surveying and titling of lands in consultation with
appropriate agencies."80 (Emphasis supplied)
As manager, conservator and overseer of the natural resources of the State, DENR
exercises "supervision and control over alienable and disposable public lands."
DENR also exercises "exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of
all lands of the public domain." Thus, DENR decides whether areas under water, like
foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay, should be reclaimed or not. This
means that PEA needs authorization from DENR before PEA can undertake
reclamation projects in Manila Bay, or in any part of the country.
DENR also exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the disposition of all lands of the
public domain. Hence, DENR decides whether reclaimed lands of PEA should be
classified as alienable under Sections 6 81 and 782 of CA No. 141. Once DENR decides
that the reclaimed lands should be so classified, it then recommends to the
President the issuance of a proclamation classifying the lands as alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain open to disposition. We note that then DENR
Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. countersigned Special Patent No. 3517 in
compliance with the Revised Administrative Code and Sections 6 and 7 of CA No.
141.
In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas under
water, while PEA is vested with the power to undertake the physical reclamation of
areas under water, whether directly or through private contractors. DENR is also
empowered to classify lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable lands
subject to the approval of the President. On the other hand, PEA is tasked to
develop, sell or lease the reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain.
Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged
areas does not make the reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the mere transfer by the
National Government of lands of the public domain to PEA does not make the lands
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of
PEA.
Absent two official acts a classification that these lands are alienable or disposable
and open to disposition and a declaration that these lands are not needed for public
service, lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands of the public domain. Only
such an official classification and formal declaration can convert reclaimed lands
into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, open to disposition under
the Constitution, Title I and Title III 83 of CA No. 141 and other applicable laws.84
PEA's Authority to Sell Reclaimed Lands
PEA, like the Legal Task Force, argues that as alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain, the reclaimed lands shall be disposed of in accordance with CA No.

141, the Public Land Act. PEA, citing Section 60 of CA No. 141, admits that
reclaimed lands transferred to a branch or subdivision of the government "shall not
be alienated, encumbered, or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its
title, except when authorized by Congress: x x x."85 (Emphasis by PEA)
In Laurel vs. Garcia,86 the Court cited Section 48 of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1987, which states that
"Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property of the
Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall
be executed in behalf of the government by the following: x x x."
Thus, the Court concluded that a law is needed to convey any real property
belonging to the Government. The Court declared that "It is not for the President to convey real property of the government on his or her
own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a
law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence."
(Emphasis supplied)
PEA contends that PD No. 1085 and EO No. 525 constitute the legislative authority
allowing PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977,
provides that
"The land reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore area of Manila
Bay pursuant to the contract for the reclamation and construction of the ManilaCavite Coastal Road Project between the Republic of the Philippines and the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines dated November 20,
1973 and/or any other contract or reclamation covering the same area is hereby
transferred, conveyed and assigned to the ownership and administration
of the Public Estates Authority established pursuant to PD No. 1084; Provided,
however, That the rights and interests of the Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines pursuant to the aforesaid contract shall be recognized
and respected.
Henceforth, the Public Estates Authority shall exercise the rights and assume the
obligations of the Republic of the Philippines (Department of Public Highways)
arising from, or incident to, the aforesaid contract between the Republic of the
Philippines and the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines.
In consideration of the foregoing transfer and assignment, the Public Estates
Authority shall issue in favor of the Republic of the Philippines the corresponding
shares of stock in said entity with an issued value of said shares of stock (which)
shall be deemed fully paid and non-assessable.
The Secretary of Public Highways and the General Manager of the Public Estates
Authority shall execute such contracts or agreements, including appropriate
agreements with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines,
as may be necessary to implement the above.
Special land patent/patents shall be issued by the Secretary of Natural
Resources in favor of the Public Estates Authority without prejudice to the
subsequent transfer to the contractor or his assignees of such portion or
portions of the land reclaimed or to be reclaimed as provided for in the
above-mentioned contract. On the basis of such patents, the Land
Registration Commission shall issue the corresponding certificate of title."
(Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Section 3 of EO No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979, provides
that -

"Sec. 3. All lands reclaimed by PEA shall belong to or be owned by the

PEA which shall be responsible for its administration, development, utilization or
disposition in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084. Any
and all income that the PEA may derive from the sale, lease or use of reclaimed
lands shall be used in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1084."
There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to sell
its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085 merely transferred "ownership and administration"
of lands reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No. 525 declared that lands
reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be owned by PEA." EO No. 525 expressly states
that PEA should dispose of its reclaimed lands "in accordance with the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1084," the charter of PEA.
PEA's charter, however, expressly tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire,
administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of
lands x x x owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the
government."87(Emphasis supplied) There is, therefore, legislative authority
granted to PEA to sell its lands, whether patrimonial or alienable lands of
the public domain. PEA may sell to private parties its patrimonial propertiesin
accordance with the PEA charter free from constitutional limitations. The
constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the
public domain does not apply to the sale of PEA's patrimonial lands.
PEA may also sell its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to
private individuals since, with the legislative authority, there is no longer any
statutory prohibition against such sales and the constitutional ban does not apply to
individuals. PEA, however, cannot sell any of its alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain to private corporations since Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution expressly prohibits such sales. The legislative authority benefits only
individuals. Private corporations remain barred from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain, including government reclaimed lands.
The provision in PD No. 1085 stating that portions of the reclaimed lands could be
transferred by PEA to the "contractor or his assignees" (Emphasis supplied) would
not apply to private corporations but only to individuals because of the
constitutional ban. Otherwise, the provisions of PD No. 1085 would violate both the
1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
The requirement of public auction in the sale of reclaimed lands
Assuming the reclaimed lands of PEA are classified as alienable or disposable lands
open to disposition, and further declared no longer needed for public service, PEA
would have to conduct a public bidding in selling or leasing these lands. PEA must
observe the provisions of Sections 63 and 67 of CA No. 141 requiring public auction,
in the absence of a law exempting PEA from holding a public auction. 88 Special
Patent No. 3517 expressly states that the patent is issued by authority of the
Constitution and PD No. 1084, "supplemented by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended." This is an acknowledgment that the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to
the disposition of reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain unless otherwise
provided by law. Executive Order No. 654,89 which authorizes PEA "to determine the
kind and manner of payment for the transfer" of its assets and properties, does not
exempt PEA from the requirement of public auction. EO No. 654 merely authorizes
PEA to decide the mode of payment, whether in kind and in installment, but does
not authorize PEA to dispense with public auction.

Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government

Auditing Code, the government is required to sell valuable government property
through public bidding. Section 79 of PD No. 1445 mandates that
"Section 79. When government property has become unserviceable for any
cause, or is no longer needed, it shall, upon application of the officer accountable
therefor, be inspected by the head of the agency or his duly authorized
representative in the presence of the auditor concerned and, if found to be
valueless or unsaleable, it may be destroyed in their presence. If found to be
valuable, it may be sold at public auction to the highest bidder under the
supervision of the proper committee on award or similar body in the presence of the
auditor concerned or other authorized representative of the Commission, after
advertising by printed notice in the Official Gazette, or for not less than
three consecutive days in any newspaper of general circulation, or where
the value of the property does not warrant the expense of publication, by notices
posted for a like period in at least three public places in the locality where the
property is to be sold. In the event that the public auction fails, the property
may be sold at a private sale at such price as may be fixed by the same
committee or body concerned and approved by the Commission."
It is only when the public auction fails that a negotiated sale is allowed, in which
case the Commission on Audit must approve the selling price. 90 The Commission on
Audit implements Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code through Circular No.
89-29691 dated January 27, 1989. This circular emphasizes that government assets
must be disposed of only through public auction, and a negotiated sale can be
resorted to only in case of "failure of public auction."
At the public auction sale, only Philippine citizens are qualified to bid for PEA's
reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain. Private
corporations are barred from bidding at the auction sale of any kind of alienable
land of the public domain.
PEA originally scheduled a public bidding for the Freedom Islands on December 10,
1991. PEA imposed a condition that the winning bidder should reclaim another 250
hectares of submerged areas to regularize the shape of the Freedom Islands, under
a 60-40 sharing of the additional reclaimed areas in favor of the winning bidder. 92 No
one, however, submitted a bid. On December 23, 1994, the Government Corporate
Counsel advised PEA it could sell the Freedom Islands through negotiation, without
need of another public bidding, because of the failure of the public bidding on
December 10, 1991.93
However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the Freedom Islands
and the additional 250 hectares still to be reclaimed, it also granted an option to
AMARI to reclaim another 350 hectares. The original JVA, a negotiated contract,
enlarged the reclamation area to 750 hectares.94 The failure of public bidding on
December 10, 1991, involving only 407.84 hectares, 95 is not a valid justification for
a negotiated sale of 750 hectares, almost double the area publicly auctioned.
Besides, the failure of public bidding happened on December 10, 1991, more than
three years before the signing of the original JVA on April 25, 1995. The economic
situation in the country had greatly improved during the intervening period.
Reclamation under the BOT Law and the Local Government Code
The constitutional prohibition in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is
absolute and clear: "Private corporations or associations may not hold such
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, x x x." Even Republic Act No.
6957 ("BOT Law," for brevity), cited by PEA and AMARI as legislative authority to sell

reclaimed lands to private parties, recognizes the constitutional ban. Section 6 of RA

No. 6957 states
"Sec. 6. Repayment Scheme. - For the financing, construction, operation and
maintenance of any infrastructure projects undertaken through the build-operateand-transfer arrangement or any of its variations pursuant to the provisions of this
Act, the project proponent x x x may likewise be repaid in the form of a share in the
revenue of the project or other non-monetary payments, such as, but not limited to,
the grant of a portion or percentage of the reclaimed land, subject to the
constitutional requirements with respect to the ownership of the land: x x
x." (Emphasis supplied)
A private corporation, even one that undertakes the physical reclamation of a
government BOT project, cannot acquire reclaimed alienable lands of the public
domain in view of the constitutional ban.
Section 302 of the Local Government Code, also mentioned by PEA and AMARI,
authorizes local governments in land reclamation projects to pay the contractor or
developer in kind consisting of a percentage of the reclaimed land, to wit:
"Section 302. Financing, Construction, Maintenance, Operation, and Management of
Infrastructure Projects by the Private Sector. x x x
xxx
In case of land reclamation or construction of industrial estates, the repayment plan
may consist of the grant of a portion or percentage of the reclaimed land or the
industrial estate constructed."
Although Section 302 of the Local Government Code does not contain a proviso
similar to that of the BOT Law, the constitutional restrictions on land ownership
automatically apply even though not expressly mentioned in the Local Government
Code.
Thus, under either the BOT Law or the Local Government Code, the contractor or
developer, if a corporate entity, can only be paid with leaseholds on portions of the
reclaimed land. If the contractor or developer is an individual, portions of the
reclaimed land, not exceeding 12 hectares96 of non-agricultural lands, may be
conveyed to him in ownership in view of the legislative authority allowing such
conveyance. This is the only way these provisions of the BOT Law and the Local
Government Code can avoid a direct collision with Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
Registration of lands of the public domain
Finally, PEA theorizes that the "act of conveying the ownership of the reclaimed
lands to public respondent PEA transformed such lands of the public domain to
private lands." This theory is echoed by AMARI which maintains that the "issuance
of the special patent leading to the eventual issuance of title takes the subject land
away from the land of public domain and converts the property into patrimonial or
private property." In short, PEA and AMARI contend that with the issuance of Special
Patent No. 3517 and the corresponding certificates of titles, the 157.84 hectares
comprising the Freedom Islands have become private lands of PEA. In support of
their theory, PEA and AMARI cite the following rulings of the Court:
1. Sumail v. Judge of CFI of Cotabato,97 where the Court held
"Once the patent was granted and the corresponding certificate of title was issued,
the land ceased to be part of the public domain and became private property over
which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction."
2. Lee Hong Hok v. David,98 where the Court declared -

"After the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title
based on a public land patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes under
the operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all the safeguards provided
therein."3. Heirs of Gregorio Tengco v. Heirs of Jose Aliwalas,99 where the Court ruled
"While the Director of Lands has the power to review homestead patents, he may do
so only so long as the land remains part of the public domain and continues to be
under his exclusive control; but once the patent is registered and a certificate of
title is issued, the land ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private
property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction."
4. Manalo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,100 where the Court held
"When the lots in dispute were certified as disposable on May 19, 1971, and free
patents were issued covering the same in favor of the private respondents, the said
lots ceased to be part of the public domain and, therefore, the Director of Lands lost
jurisdiction over the same."
5.Republic v. Court of Appeals,101 where the Court stated
"Proclamation No. 350, dated October 9, 1956, of President Magsaysay legally
effected a land grant to the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services,
Department of Health, of the whole lot, validly sufficient for initial registration under
the Land Registration Act. Such land grant is constitutive of a 'fee simple' title or
absolute title in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical Center. Thus, Section 122 of
the Act, which governs the registration of grants or patents involving public lands,
provides that 'Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the
Government of the United States or to the Government of the Philippines are
alienated, granted or conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations, the
same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act (Land Registration
Act, Act 496) and shall become registered lands.'"
The first four cases cited involve petitions to cancel the land patents and the
corresponding certificates of titlesissued to private parties. These four cases
uniformly hold that the Director of Lands has no jurisdiction over private lands or
that upon issuance of the certificate of title the land automatically comes under the
Torrens System. The fifth case cited involves the registration under the Torrens
System of a 12.8-hectare public land granted by the National Government to
Mindanao Medical Center, a government unit under the Department of Health. The
National Government transferred the 12.8-hectare public land to serve as the site
for the hospital buildings and other facilities of Mindanao Medical Center, which
performed a public service. The Court affirmed the registration of the 12.8-hectare
public land in the name of Mindanao Medical Center under Section 122 of Act No.
496. This fifth case is an example of a public land being registered under Act No.
496 without the land losing its character as a property of public dominion.
In the instant case, the only patent and certificates of title issued are those in the
name of PEA, a wholly government owned corporation performing public as well as
proprietary functions. No patent or certificate of title has been issued to any private
party. No one is asking the Director of Lands to cancel PEA's patent or certificates of
title. In fact, the thrust of the instant petition is that PEA's certificates of title should
remain with PEA, and the land covered by these certificates, being alienable lands
of the public domain, should not be sold to a private corporation.
Registration of land under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 does not vest in the registrant
private or public ownership of the land. Registration is not a mode of acquiring
ownership but is merely evidence of ownership previously conferred by any of the

recognized modes of acquiring ownership. Registration does not give the registrant
a better right than what the registrant had prior to the registration. 102 The
registration of lands of the public domain under the Torrens system, by itself, cannot
convert public lands into private lands. 103
Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the certificate
of title the alienable land of the public domain automatically becomes private land
cannot apply to government units and entities like PEA. The transfer of the Freedom
Islands to PEA was made subject to the provisions of CA No. 141 as expressly stated
in Special Patent No. 3517 issued by then President Aquino, to wit:
"NOW, THEREFORE, KNOW YE, that by authority of the Constitution of the
Philippines and in conformity with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084,
supplemented by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, there are hereby
granted and conveyed unto the Public Estates Authority the aforesaid tracts of land
containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred
ninety four (1,915,894) square meters; the technical description of which are hereto
attached and made an integral part hereof." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the Freedom Islands on matters not
covered by PD No. 1084. Section 60 of CA No. 141 prohibits, "except when
authorized by Congress," the sale of alienable lands of the public domain that are
transferred to government units or entities. Section 60 of CA No. 141 constitutes,
under Section 44 of PD No. 1529, a "statutory lien affecting title" of the registered
land even if not annotated on the certificate of title. 104Alienable lands of the public
domain held by government entities under Section 60 of CA No. 141 remain public
lands because they cannot be alienated or encumbered unless Congress passes a
law authorizing their disposition. Congress, however, cannot authorize the sale to
private corporations of reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain because of
the constitutional ban. Only individuals can benefit from such law.
The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with Section 60
of CA No. 141 does not automatically convert alienable lands of the public domain
into private or patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of the public domain must be
transferred to qualified private parties, or to government entities not tasked to
dispose of public lands, before these lands can become private or patrimonial lands.
Otherwise, the constitutional ban will become illusory if Congress can declare lands
of the public domain as private or patrimonial lands in the hands of a government
agency tasked to dispose of public lands. This will allow private corporations to
acquire directly from government agencies limitless areas of lands which, prior to
such law, are concededly public lands.
Under EO No. 525, PEA became the central implementing agency of the National
Government to reclaim foreshore and submerged areas of the public domain. Thus,
EO No. 525 declares that
"EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 525
Designating the Public Estates Authority as the Agency Primarily Responsible for all
Reclamation Projects
Whereas, there are several reclamation projects which are ongoing or being
proposed to be undertaken in various parts of the country which need to be
evaluated for consistency with national programs;
Whereas, there is a need to give further institutional support to the Government's
declared policy to provide for a coordinated, economical and efficient reclamation of
lands;

Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 3-A requires that all reclamation of areas shall be
limited to the National Government or any person authorized by it under proper
contract;
Whereas, a central authority is needed to act on behalf of the National
Government which shall ensure a coordinated and integrated approach in
the reclamation of lands;
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1084 creates the Public Estates
Authority as a government corporation to undertake reclamation of lands
and ensure their maximum utilization in promoting public welfare and
interests; and
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1416 provides the President with continuing
authority to reorganize the national government including the transfer, abolition, or
merger of functions and offices.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue
of the powers vested in me by the Constitution and pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 1416, do hereby order and direct the following:
Section 1. The Public Estates Authority (PEA) shall be primarily responsible
for integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for
and on behalf of the National Government. All reclamation projects shall be
approved by the President upon recommendation of the PEA, and shall be
undertaken by the PEA or through a proper contract executed by it with any person
or entity; Provided, that, reclamation projects of any national government agency or
entity authorized under its charter shall be undertaken in consultation with the PEA
upon approval of the President.
x x x ."
As the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects
nationwide, with authority to sell reclaimed lands, PEA took the place of DENR as
the government agency charged with leasing or selling reclaimed lands of the public
domain. The reclaimed lands being leased or sold by PEA are not private lands, in
the same manner that DENR, when it disposes of other alienable lands, does not
dispose of private lands but alienable lands of the public domain. Only when
qualified private parties acquire these lands will the lands become private lands. In
the hands of the government agency tasked and authorized to dispose of
alienable of disposable lands of the public domain, these lands are still
public, not private lands.
Furthermore, PEA's charter expressly states that PEA "shall hold lands of the
public domain" as well as "any and all kinds of lands." PEA can hold both lands of
the public domain and private lands. Thus, the mere fact that alienable lands of the
public domain like the Freedom Islands are transferred to PEA and issued land
patents or certificates of title in PEA's name does not automatically make such lands
private.
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA
as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. PEA will
simply turn around, as PEA has now done under the Amended JVA, and
transfer several hundreds of hectares of these reclaimed and still to be reclaimed
lands to a single private corporation in only one transaction. This scheme will
effectively nullify the constitutional ban in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which was intended to diffuse equitably the ownership of alienable
lands of the public domain among Filipinos, now numbering over 80 million strong.

This scheme, if allowed, can even be applied to alienable agricultural lands of the
public domain since PEA can "acquire x x x any and all kinds of lands." This will
open the floodgates to corporations and even individuals acquiring hundreds of
hectares of alienable lands of the public domain under the guise that in the hands of
PEA these lands are private lands. This will result in corporations amassing huge
landholdings never before seen in this country - creating the very evil that the
constitutional ban was designed to prevent. This will completely reverse the clear
direction of constitutional development in this country. The 1935 Constitution
allowed private corporations to acquire not more than 1,024 hectares of public
lands.105 The 1973 Constitution prohibited private corporations from acquiring any
kind of public land, and the 1987 Constitution has unequivocally reiterated this
prohibition.
The contention of PEA and AMARI that public lands, once registered under Act No.
496 or PD No. 1529, automatically become private lands is contrary to existing laws.
Several laws authorize lands of the public domain to be registered under the Torrens
System or Act No. 496, now PD No. 1529, without losing their character as public
lands. Section 122 of Act No. 496, and Section 103 of PD No. 1529, respectively,
provide as follows:
Act No. 496
"Sec. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the x x x
Government of the Philippine Islands are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons
or the public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under
the operation of this Act and shall become registered lands."
PD No. 1529
"Sec. 103. Certificate of Title to Patents. Whenever public land is by the Government
alienated, granted or conveyed to any person, the same shall be brought forthwith
under the operation of this Decree." (Emphasis supplied)
Based on its legislative history, the phrase "conveyed to any person" in Section 103
of PD No. 1529 includes conveyances of public lands to public corporations.
Alienable lands of the public domain "granted, donated, or transferred to a province,
municipality, or branch or subdivision of the Government," as provided in Section 60
of CA No. 141, may be registered under the Torrens System pursuant to Section 103
of PD No. 1529. Such registration, however, is expressly subject to the condition in
Section 60 of CA No. 141 that the land "shall not be alienated, encumbered or
otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when authorized
by Congress." This provision refers to government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy lands of the public domain that have been titled but still cannot be
alienated or encumbered unless expressly authorized by Congress. The need for
legislative authority prevents the registered land of the public domain from
becoming private land that can be disposed of to qualified private parties.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 also recognizes that lands of the public
domain may be registered under the Torrens System. Section 48, Chapter 12, Book I
of the Code states
"Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property of the
Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be
executed in behalf of the government by the following:
(1) x x x
(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, but titled in
the name of any political subdivision or of any corporate agency or

instrumentality, by the executive head of the agency or instrumentality."

(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, private property purchased by the National Government for expansion of a
public wharf may be titled in the name of a government corporation regulating port
operations in the country. Private property purchased by the National Government
for expansion of an airport may also be titled in the name of the government
agency tasked to administer the airport. Private property donated to a municipality
for use as a town plaza or public school site may likewise be titled in the name of
the municipality.106 All these properties become properties of the public domain, and
if already registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529, remain registered land.
There is no requirement or provision in any existing law for the de-registration of
land from the Torrens System.
Private lands taken by the Government for public use under its power of eminent
domain become unquestionably part of the public domain. Nevertheless, Section 85
of PD No. 1529 authorizes the Register of Deeds to issue in the name of the National
Government new certificates of title covering such expropriated lands. Section 85 of
PD No. 1529 states
"Sec. 85. Land taken by eminent domain. Whenever any registered land, or interest
therein, is expropriated or taken by eminent domain, the National Government,
province, city or municipality, or any other agency or instrumentality exercising
such right shall file for registration in the proper Registry a certified copy of the
judgment which shall state definitely by an adequate description, the particular
property or interest expropriated, the number of the certificate of title, and the
nature of the public use. A memorandum of the right or interest taken shall be made
on each certificate of title by the Register of Deeds, and where the fee simple is
taken, a new certificate shall be issued in favor of the National
Government, province, city, municipality, or any other agency or
instrumentality exercising such right for the land so taken. The legal expenses
incident to the memorandum of registration or issuance of a new certificate of title
shall be for the account of the authority taking the land or interest therein."
(Emphasis supplied)
Consequently, lands registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 are not
exclusively private or patrimonial lands. Lands of the public domain may also be
registered pursuant to existing laws.
AMARI makes a parting shot that the Amended JVA is not a sale to AMARI of the
Freedom Islands or of the lands to be reclaimed from submerged areas of Manila
Bay. In the words of AMARI, the Amended JVA "is not a sale but a joint venture with a
stipulation for reimbursement of the original cost incurred by PEA for the earlier
reclamation and construction works performed by the CDCP under its 1973 contract
with the Republic." Whether the Amended JVA is a sale or a joint venture, the fact
remains that the Amended JVA requires PEA to "cause the issuance and delivery of
the certificates of title conveying AMARI's Land Share in the name of AMARI." 107
This stipulation still contravenes Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that private corporations "shall not hold such alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease." The transfer of title and ownership to AMARI clearly
means that AMARI will "hold" the reclaimed lands other than by lease. The transfer
of title and ownership is a "disposition" of the reclaimed lands, a transaction
considered a sale or alienation under CA No. 141, 108 the Government Auditing
Code,109 and Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

The Regalian doctrine is deeply implanted in our legal system. Foreshore and
submerged areas form part of the public domain and are inalienable. Lands
reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas also form part of the public domain
and are also inalienable, unless converted pursuant to law into alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain. Historically, lands reclaimed by the
government are sui generis, not available for sale to private parties unlike other
alienable public lands. Reclaimed lands retain their inherent potential as areas for
public use or public service. Alienable lands of the public domain, increasingly
becoming scarce natural resources, are to be distributed equitably among our evergrowing population. To insure such equitable distribution, the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions have barred private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain. Those who attempt to dispose of inalienable natural
resources of the State, or seek to circumvent the constitutional ban on alienation of
lands of the public domain to private corporations, do so at their own risk.
We can now summarize our conclusions as follows:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now
covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the
public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell
or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these
lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987
Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open
to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government
can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these
submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the
public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In
their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and
outside the commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation,
ownership of 77.34 hectares110of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156
hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the
alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify
the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer
needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the
public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.
Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. Under Article 1409112 of the Civil Code, contracts whose "object or
purpose is contrary to law," or whose "object is outside the commerce of men," are
"inexistent and void from the beginning." The Court must perform its duty to defend
and uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and
void ab initio.

Seventh issue: whether the Court is the proper forum to raise the issue of
whether the Amended JVA is grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no necessity to
rule on this last issue. Besides, the Court is not a trier of facts, and this last issue
involves a determination of factual matters.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari
Coastal Bay Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from
implementing the Amended Joint Venture Agreement which is hereby
declared NULL and VOID ab initio.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD

DIVISION

MANOTOK REALTY, INC. and

MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 123346

- versus CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION,
Respondent.
x----------------------------------------------------x
ARANETA INSTITUTE OF
AGRICULTURE, INC.,
Petitioner,
- versus HEIRS OF JOSE B. DIMSON,
represented by his Compulsory Heirs:
His surviving spouse, ROQUETA R.
DIMSON and their children, NORMA
and CELSO TIRADO, ALSON and
VIRGINIA DIMSON, LINDA and CARLOS
LAGMAN, LERMA and RENE POLICAR,
and ESPERANZA R. DIMSON;
REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF MALABON,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 134385

x-----------------------------------------------------x

STO. NINO KAPITBAHAYAN

ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Petitioner,

- versus -

CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION,
Respondent.

G.R. No. 148767

Present:
PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES, and
GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated:
November 29, 2005
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us for resolution are three petitions for review on certiorari: [1]
1. G.R. No. 123346
The petition in this case was filed by Manotok Realty, Inc. and Manotok Estate
Corporation against CLT Realty Development Corporation assailing the
Decision[2] dated September 28, 1995 and Resolution dated January 8, 1996 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45255;
2. G.R. No. 134385
The petition was filed by Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Inc. against Jose B. Dimson
(now deceased), represented by his surviving spouse and children, and the Registry
of Deeds of Malabon, challenging the Joint Decision [3] dated May 30, 1997 and
Resolution dated July 16, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41883 and
CA-G.R. SP No. 34819; and
3. G.R. No. 148767
The petition here was filed by Sto. Nio Kapitbahayan Association, Inc. against CLT
Realty Development Corporation questioning the Decision [4] of the Court of Appeals
dated March 23, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 52549.
On March 6, 2002, these petitions were consolidated [5] as the issue involved is the
validity of the parties titles over portions of land known as the Maysilo
Estate located at Caloocan City and Malabon, Metro Manila, covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City. It is
this same OCT No. 994 from which the titles of the parties were purportedly
derived.
We shall state the antecedents of these cases separately considering their peculiar
circumstances.
1. G.R. No. 123346
(Manotok Realty, Inc. and Manotok Estate Corporation, petitioners, vs. CLT
Realty Development Corporation, respondents)
On August 10, 1992, CLT Realty Development Corporation (CLT Realty) filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 129, Caloocan City a complaint for annulment
of Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT), recovery of possession, and damages
against Manotok Realty, Inc. and Manotok Estate Corporation (Manotok
Corporations) and the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City, docketed as Civil Case
No. C-15539.
The complaint alleges inter alia that CLT Realty (plaintiff) is the registered owner
of Lot 26 of theMaysilo Estate located in Caloocan City, covered by TCT No. T177013 of the Registry of Deeds of said city; that this TCT was originally derived
from OCT No. 994; that on December 10, 1988, CLT Realty acquired Lot 26 from its
former registered owner, Estelita I. Hipolito, by virtue of a Deed of Sale with Real
Estate Mortgage; that she, in turn, purchased the same lot from Jose B. Dimson;
that Manotok Corporations (defendants) illegally took possession of 20 parcels of
land (covered by 20 separate titles[6]) within said Lot 26 owned by CLT Realty; that
based on the technical descriptions of Manotok Corporations titles, their
property overlap or embrace Lot 26 of CLT Realty; and that the titles of Manotok
Corporations constitute a cloud of doubt over the title of CLT Realty. The latter thus
prays that the 20 titles of Manotok Corporations be cancelled for being void; and
that Manotok Corporations be ordered to vacate the disputed portions of Lot 26 and
turn over possession thereof to CLT Realty, and to pay damages.

In their answer with counterclaim, Manotok Corporations denied the material

allegations of the complaint, alleging that Jose B. Dimsons title (TCT No. R-15166)
was irregularly issued, hence void; and that consequently, the titles of Estelita
Hipolito (TCT No. R-17994) and CLT Realty (TCT No. 177013) derived therefrom are
likewise void. By way of affirmative defense, Manotok Corporations assert ownership
of the parcel of land being claimed by CLT Realty, alleging that they acquired the
same from the awardees or vendees of the National Housing Authority.
During the pre-trial conference, the trial court, upon agreement of the parties,
approved the creation of a commission composed of three commissioners tasked to
resolve the conflict in their respective titles. On July 2, 1993, the trial court issued
an Order[7] defining the issues to be resolved by the commissioners, thus:
1. Whether or not the property covered by the Transfer Certificates of Title of
defendants (Manotok Realty, Inc. and Manotok Estate Corporation) pertain to or
involved Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo Estate presently titled in the name of the plaintiff
(CLT Realty Development Corporation); and
2. Whether or not the property covered by the title of the plaintiff and the property
covered by the titles of the defendants overlap. [8]
The commissioners chosen were Engr. Avelino L. San Buenaventura (nominated by
CLT Realty), Engr. Teodoro I. Victorino (nominated by Manotok Corporations), and
Engr. Ernesto S. Erive (chosen by the two commissioners and the
parties). Significantly, Engr. Ernesto Erive is the Chief of the Surveys
Division, Land Management Bureau, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), Quezon City.[9] On July 2, 1993, the three took their
oaths of office in open court.
On October 8, 1993, Ernesto Erive and Avelino San Buenaventura submitted an
exhaustive Joint Final Report[10] (Majority Report) with the following conclusion:
h. Based on the foregoing, it is the conclusion of the undersigned Commissioners
that defendants (Manotok Realty, Inc. and Manotok Estate Corporation) titles
overlap portions of plaintiffs (CLT Realty Development Corporation) title, which
overlapping is due to the irregular and questionable issuance of TCT Nos. 4211 (also
of TCT No. 4210), 5261, 35486, 1368 to 1374. The inherent technical defects on TCT
No. 4211 (from where defendants derive their titles) and TCT No. 4210 which were
exhaustively elucidated above, point to the fact that there was no approved
subdivision of Lot 26 which served as legal basis for the regular issuance of TCT
Nos. 4210 and 4211. Thus, as between plaintiffs title, which was derived from
regularly issued titles, and defendants titles, which were derived from irregularly
issued titles, plaintiffs title which pertains to the entire Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate
should prevail over defendants titles.
On the other hand, Teodoro Victoriano submitted his Individual Final
Report[11] (Minority Report) dated October 23, 1993 with the following findings:
f. That viewed in the light of the foregoing considerations, there is no question that
the different parcels of land which are covered by defendants transfer certificates of
title in question are parts of Lot 26 of then Maysilo Estate;
g. That on the basis of the technical descriptions appearing on the certificates of
titles of the defendants, it is ascertained that the parcels of land covered therein
overlap portions of the parcel of land which is covered by the plaintiffs certificate of
title.

The trial court then scheduled the hearing of the two Reports. CLT Realty filed its
objections to the Minority Report. For its part, Manotok Corporations submitted their
comment/objections to the Majority Report.
On February 8, 1994, the trial court issued an Order directing the parties to file their
respective memoranda to enable this court to adopt wholly or partially the
memorandum for either as the judgment herein, x x x.[12]
On April 6, 1994, Manotok Corporations submitted their Memorandum praying that
the trial court approve the Minority Report and render judgment in their favor.
CLT Realty likewise filed its Memorandum on April 15, 1994 praying that the Majority
Report be approved in toto, and that judgment be rendered pursuant thereto.
In its Order of April 22, 1994, the trial court considered the case submitted for
decision.[13]
On May 10, 1994, the trial court rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff
(CLT Realty) and against defendants (Manotok Corporations) as follows:
1. Ordering the annulment and cancellation of defendants Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 4210 and 4211 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City which encroach
on plaintiffs 201,288 square meters of Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo Estate, Caloocan
City;
2. Ordering defendants to vacate said 201,288 square meters of Lot No. 26
registered in the name of plaintiff;
3. Ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff the sum of P201,288.00
annually from March 15, 1989, as reasonable compensation for defendants
occupancy and use of the 201,288 square meters involved in this case until the area
is vacated;
4. Ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs counsel (Villaraza &
Cruz Law Office) the sum of P50,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
5. Ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay the costs of suit.
Defendants Counterclaim is dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
The findings of fact and conclusions contained in the Majority Report, which the trial
court adopted in its Decision, are quoted as follows:
7. That the following facts were established by the undersigned Commissioners:
a. Records show that Maysilo Estate was surveyed under Plan No. Psu-2345 on
September 8 to 27, October 4 to 21 and November 17 to 18, 1991;
b. That on the basis of the Decision rendered on December 3, 1912 by Hon.
Norberto Romualdez in Land Registration Case No. 4429 pursuant to which
the Decree No. 36455 was issued and the approved plan Psu2345, the Maysilo Estate was registered under Republic Act No. 496 and Original
Certificate of Title No. 994, OCT-994, was issued by the Registry of Deeds of
Rizal, covering 34 parcels of land, Lots 1 to 6, 7-A, 8 to 15, 17 to 22, 23-A, 24, 25-A,
25-D and 26 to 33, all of Psu-2345.
c. The original copy of OCT-994 in its original form although dilapidated is on file at
the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City;
d. That according to the documents submitted by the plaintiff, TCT-177013 in the
name of plaintiffCLT Realty Development Corporation specifically describes the
parcel of land covered by its title asLot 26, Maysilo Estate. TCT-177013 was a
transfer from TCT-R-17994 registered in the name ofEstelita Hipolito which in
turn is a transfer from TCT-R-15166 registered in the name of Jose B.

Dimsonwhich also is a transfer from OCT-994. TCT-R-17994 and TCT-R-15166 also

specifically describe the parcel of land covered by the titles as Lot 26, Maysilo
Estate;
e. That defendant Manotok Realty Inc.s properties are covered by TCT Nos. 7528,
7762, 8012, 9866, C-17272, 21107, 21485, 26405, 26406, 26407, 33904, 34255, C35267, 41956, 53268, 55896, T-1214528, 163902 and 165119, while defendant
Manotok Estate Corporations property is covered by TCT No. T-232568, all of the
Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City.
f. That on the basis of the technical descriptions on the titles of defendants, the
parcels of land covered therein overlap portions of the parcel of land covered by
plaintiffs title;
g. That according to the documents of defendants, Lot 26 was apparently
subdivided which led to the issuance of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 4210 and
4211 which were registered on September 9, 1918 in the names of Messrs.
Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano Leuterio. All of defendants titles are derived from TCT
No. 4211.
h. The original copy of OCT-994 does not contain the pages where Lot 26 and some
other lots are supposedly inscribed;
i. TCT No. 4211 was later cancelled by TCT No. 5261 in the name of Francisco J.
Gonzales which was later cancelled by TCT No. 35486 in the names of Jose Leon
Gonzales, Consuelo Susana Gonzales, Juana Francisca Gonzales, Maria Clara
Gonzales, Francisco Felipe Gonzales and Concepcion Maria Gonzales;
j. Upon examination of the original copy of OCT-994, it can be seen that the
technical descriptions of the lots and the certificate itself are entirely
written in the English language. On the other hand, it was noticed that the
technical descriptions on TCT Nos. 4211 (as well as TCT No. 4210) 5261
and 35486 are inscribed in the Spanish language in these certificates;
k. The dates of the original survey of the mother title OCT-994 (September
8-27, October 4-21 and November 17-18, 1911) are not indicated on TCT
Nos. 4211 (also on TCT No. 4210), 5261 and 35486. Rather, an entirely
different date, December 22, 1917, is indicated at the end of the Spanish
technical descriptions on TCT No. 4211 (also on TCT No. 4210), 5261 and
35486;
l. The parcel of land covered by the successive titles TCT Nos. 4211, 5261
and 35486 is not identified by a lot number. There is no reference or
mention of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate in the technical description of said
titles.
m. That there is no subdivision survey plan number indicated on TCT No.
4211 (also on TCT No. 4210), 5261 and 35486 covering the purported
subdivision of Lot 26. Upon verification with the Bureau of Lands or in the
Land Registration Authority, which are the official depositories of all
approved survey plans, no survey plan covering said subdivision could be
found;
n. The three (3) separate lots covered by TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211 which
allegedly were the result of the subdivision of Lot 26 were not designated
or identified as Lot 26-A, Lot 26-B and Lot 26-C to conform with existing
practice;
o. That it appears that the parcel of land covered by the successive titles TCT No.
4211, then 5261 and lastly 35486 was again subdivided under Plan Psu-21154. The
alleged subdivision plan Psd-21154 had seven (7) resultant lots which are issued

individuals certificates, TCT Nos. 1368 thru 1374, six of which are in the names of
each of the six children of Francisco J. Gonzales;
p. Plan Psd-21154 appears to have been prepared on September 15, 21, 29
and October 5-6, 1946 according to the technical descriptions appearing
on TCT Nos. 1368 thru 1374;
q. TCT Nos. 1368 thru 1374 are written in the English language and the
technical descriptions of the lots covered therein indicate the original
survey of the mother title as September 8-27, October 4-21 and November
17-18, 1911 which dates are not found in the mother title TCT No. 35486
or the antecedent titles TCT No. 5261 and 4211;
r. It appears that these seven (7) properties covered by TCT Nos. 1368 thru 1374
were later expropriated by the Republic of the Philippines through the Peoples
Homesite and Housing Corporation (now the National Housing Authority) after which
they were consolidated and subdivided into 77 lots under (LRC) Pcs-1828 for resale
to tenants. Manotok Realty, Inc. appears to be one of the original vendees of said
lots having acquired Lot 11-B covered by TCT No. 34255. It appears that some of the
tenants later sold their lots to various vendees some of whom are the defendants,
Manotok Realty, Inc. and Manotok Estate Corporation;
s. That Psd-21154, the plan which allegedly subdivided the lot covered by
TCT No. 35486 (formerly covered by TCT No. 4211, then TCT No. 5261),
could not be traced at the official depository of plans which is the Bureau
of Lands. According to the EDPS Listings of the Records Management
Division of the Lands Management Bureau (formerly the Bureau of Lands),
there is no record of the alleged plan Psd-21154. Accordingly, said EDPS
listings indicate those survey plans which were salvaged after the fire that
gutted the Philippines from the Japanese forces. It appears, however, from
TCT Nos. 1368 thru 1374 that psd-21154 was done after the war on
September 15, 21, 29 and October 5-6, 1946;
t. Upon examination of the technical descriptions inscribed on TCT Nos.
1368 thru 1374, it was noticed that the tie lines deviated from the mother
lots tie point which is Bureau of Lands Location Monument No. 1, Caloocan
City. Instead different location monuments of adjoining Piedad Estate were
used. The tie point used in TCT No. 1368 is B.M. 10, Piedad Estate while
TCT Nos. 1369 and 1370 used B.M. No. 9, Piedad Estate; and TCT Nos.
1371, 1372, 1373 and 1374 used B.M. No. 7, Piedad Estate. The changing
of the tie points resulted in the shifting of the position of the seven (7)
lots do not fall exactly inside the boundary of the mother lot. The same is
true when the lots described on the titles of the defendants are plotted on
the basis of their technical descriptions inscribed on said titles.
8. In the light of the foregoing facts, the undersigned Commissioners have
come to the following conclusions:
a. There are inherent technical infirmities or defects on the face of TCT
Nos. 4211 (also on TCT No. 4210), 5261 and 35486. The fact that the
technical descriptions in TCT Nos. 4211, 5261 and 35486 are written in
Spanish while those on the alleged mother title, OCT-994, were already in
English is abnormal and contrary to the usual practice in the issuance of
titles. If OCT-994 is the mother title of TCT Nos. 4211, 5261 and 35486,
then said titles should also be written in English because OCT-994 is
already in English. It is possible that an ascendant title be written in

Spanish and the descendant title in English, the language now officially
used, but the reverse is highly improbable and irregular.
b. Also, the fact that the original survey dates of OCT-994 (September 827, October 4-21 and November 17-18, 1911) are not indicated on the
technical descriptions on TCT Nos. 4211, 5261 and 35486 but an entirely
different date, December 22, 1917, is instead indicated likewise leads to
the conclusion that TCT Nos. 4211, 5261 and 35486 could not have been
derived from OCT-994. It is the established procedure to always indicate in
the certificate of title, whether original or transfer certificates, the date of
the original survey of the mother title together with the succeeding date
of subdivision or consolidation. Thus, the absence of the original survey
dates of OCT-994 on TCT Nos. 4211, 5261 and 35486 is the original survey
date of the mother title, then OCT-994 is not the mother title of TCT Nos.
4211, 5261 and 35486 not only because the original survey dates are
different but because the date of original survey is always earlier than the
date of the issuance of the original title. OCT-994 was issued on May 3,
1917 and this is much ahead of the date of survey indicated on TCT Nos.
4210 and 4211 which is December 22, 1917;
c. Granting that the date December 22, 1917 is the date of a subdivision
survey leading to the issuance of TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211, there are,
however, no indications on the face of the titles themselves which show
that a verified and approved subdivision of Lot 26 took place. In subdividing
a lot, the resulting parcels are always designated by the lot number of the
subdivided lot followed by letters of the alphabet starting from the letter A to
designate the first resultant lot, etc., for example, if Lot 26 is subdivided into three
(3) lots, these lots will be referred to as Lot 26-A, Lot 26-N and Lot 26-C followed by
a survey number such as Psd-_____ or (LRC) Psd-_____. However, the lots on TCT
Nos. 4210 and 4211 do not contain such descriptions. In fact, the parcels
of land covered by TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211 are not even described by lot
number and this is again technically irregular and defective because the
designation of lots by Lot Number was already a practice at that time as
exemplified by the technical descriptions of some sub-lots covered by OCT994, i.e., 23-A, 25-A, 25-D, etc.;
d. That TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211 which allegedly was the result of a
subdivision of Lot 26 should not have been issued without a subdivision
plan approved by the Director of Lands or the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office. Republic Act No. 496 which took effect on November 6,
1902, particularly Section 58 thereof, provided that the Registry of Deeds
shall not enter the transfer certificate to the grantee until a plan of such
land showing all the portions or lots into which it has been subdivided,
and the technical description of each portion or lot, have been verified and
approved by the Director of Lands and as corroborated by Section 44,
Paragraph 2, and that the plan has been approved by the Chief of the
General Land Registration Office, or by the Director of Lands as provided
in Section fifty-eight of this Act, the Registry of Deeds may issue new
certificates of title for any lot in accordance with said subdivision plan;
e. The absence of a lot number and survey plan number in the technical
description inscribed on TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211 and the absence of a
subdivision survey plan for Lot 26 at the records of the Bureau of Lands or
the Land Registration Authority leads to the conclusion that there was no

verified and approved subdivision survey plan of Lot 26 which is a

compulsory requirement needed in the issuance of said titles;
f. Similarly, the absence of plan Psd-21154 from the files of the Bureau of
Lands, the official depository of survey plans, is another indication that
the titles covered by TCT Nos. 1368 thru 1374 which were derived from
TCT No. 4211 are again doubtful and questionable;
g. Moreover, the changing of the tie points in the technical descriptions on TCT Nos.
1368 thru 1374 from that of the mother lots tie point which is BLLM No. 1, Caloocan
City to different location monuments of adjoining Piedad Estate which resulted in
the shifting of the position of the seven (7) lots in relation to the mother lot defeats
the very purpose of tie points and tie lines since the accepted practice is to adopt
the mother lots tie point in order to fix the location of the parcels of land being
surveyed on the earths surface.[14]
Manotok Corporations then interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. For its
part, CLT Realty filed a motion to amend/correct the dispositive portion of the above
Decision alleging that TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211 mentioned therein are mistakenly
referred to as the titles of Manotok Corporations; and that to conform to the body of
the Decision, the correct numbers of the titles ordered to be cancelled should be
indicated. In its Order dated May 30, 1994, the trial court granted the motion, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Amend/Correct Judgment dated
May 23, 1994 filed by counsel for plaintiff is granted. Accordingly, the first
paragraph of the dispositive portion of the Decision of this Court dated May 10,
1994 is amended as follows:
xxx
1. Ordering the annulment and cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
7528, 7762, 8012, 9866, C-17272, 21107, 21485, 26405, 26406, 26407, 33904,
34255, C-35267, 41956, 53268, 55897, T-121428, 163902 and 165119 in the name
of defendant Manotok Realty, Inc. and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-232568 in
the name of defendant Manotok Estate Corporation of the Registry of Deeds of
Caloocan City which encroach on plaintiffs 201,288 square meters of Lot No. 26 of
the Maysilo Estate, Caloocan City.
x x x.
SO ORDERED.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated September 28, 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No.
45255, affirmed the Decision of the trial court, except as to the award of damages
which was ordered deleted, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the
Decision dated May 10, 1994, as corrected by the Order dated May 30, 1994,
rendered by the trial court, with the modification that the award of damages in favor
of plaintiff-appellee is hereby DELETED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Manotok Corporations motion for reconsideration was denied by the Appellate Court
in its Resolution dated January 8, 1996.
Hence, the present petition of Manotok Corporations. They allege in essence that
the Court of Appeals erred:
1. In upholding the trial courts Decision which decided the case on the basis of the
Commissioners Report; and
2. In giving imprimatur to the trial courts Decision even though the latter overlooked
relevant facts recited in the Minority Report of Commissioner Victorino and in the
comment of petitioners on the Majority Report of Commissioners San Buenaventura
and Erive, detailing the legal and factual basis which positively support the validity
of petitioners title and ownership of the disputed parcels of land.
2.

G.R. No. 134385

(Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Inc., petitioner, vs. Heirs of Jose B. Dimson,

represented by his compulsory heirs: his surviving spouse, Roqueta R.
Dimson and their children, Norma and Celso Tirado, Alson and Virginia
Dimson, Linda and Carlos Lagman, Lerma and Rene Policar, and Esperanza
R. Dimson; and Registry of Deeds of Malabon, respondents)
Records show that on December 18, 1979, Jose B. Dimson filed with the then
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 33, Caloocan City a complaint for recovery of
possession and damages against Araneta Institute of Agriculture,
Inc. (Araneta Institute), docketed as Civil Case No. C-8050. Dimson alleged in his
amended complaint that he is the absolute owner of a parcel of land located at
Barrio Potrero, Malabon, Metro Manila with an area of 50 hectares of the Maysilo
Estate, covered by TCT No. R-15169 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City;
that he discovered that his land has been illegally occupied by Araneta Institute;
that the latter has no legal and valid title to the land; and that Araneta Institute
refused to vacate the land and remove its improvements thereon despite his
repeated demands.
In its answer, Araneta Institute admitted occupying the disputed land by
constructing some buildings thereon and subdividing portions thereof, claiming that
it is the absolute owner
of the land by virtue of TCT No. 737[15] and TCT No. 13574.[16] It further alleged that
Dimsons title of the subject land is void, hence, his complaint has no cause of
action.
On May 28, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision [17] in favor of Dimson, thus:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff Jose B. Dimson and against defendant Araneta Institute of Agriculture,
ordering
1) defendant Araneta Institute of Agriculture and all those claiming rights and
authority under the said defendant Araneta, to vacate the parcel of land covered by
plaintiff Dimsons title TCT No. R-15169 of the Registry of Deeds of Metro Manila,
District III, Caloocan City, with a land area of 500,000 square meters, more or less;

to remove all the improvements thereon; and to return full possession thereof to the
said plaintiff Dimson.
2) defendant Araneta Institute of Agriculture to pay plaintiff Dimson the amount
of P20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees; and
3) defendant Araneta Institute of Agriculture to pay costs.
Defendant Aranetas counterclaim is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
All other counterclaim against plaintiff Dimson are, likewise, hereby dismissed for
lack of merit.
All claims of all the intervenors claiming rights against the title of plaintiff Dimson
TCT R-15169 are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
This is without prejudice on the part of the intervenors Heirs of Pascual David,
Florentina David and Crisanta Santos to file the proper case against the proper
party/parties in the proper forum, if they so desire.
The claim of Virgilio L. Enriquez as co-plaintiff in the instant case is dismissed for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[18]
Araneta Institute interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 41883.
On May 30, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision affirming
the Decision of the trial court in favor of Dimson.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, in CA-G.R. CV No. 41883 (Civil Case No. C-8050
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 122, Caloocan City), with MODIFICATION deleting
the award for attorneys fees, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED, with costs
against defendant-appellant. CA-G.R. SP No. 34819 is DENIED DUE COURSE and
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
In its Decision, the Appellate Court ruled that the title of Araneta Institute to the
disputed land is a nullity, holding that:
We now proceed to CA-G.R. CV No. 41883.
In its first assignment of error, defendant-appellant (Araneta Institute of Agriculture,
Inc.) contends that the trial court erred in giving more weight to plaintiffs transfer
certificate of title over the land in question notwithstanding the highly dubious
circumstances in which it was procured.
This validity of plaintiff-appellees (Jose B. Dimson) title is actually the meat of the
controversy.
It was in the pursuit of this objective to nullify plaintiff-appellees title that CA-G.R.
SP No. 34819 was belatedly filed on August 10, 1994, long after plaintiff-appellees
TCT No. R-15169 was issued on June 8, 1978.
Unfortunately for defendant-appellant, in the light of applicable law and
jurisprudence, plaintiff-appellees title must be sustained.
Plaintiff-appellees TCT No. R-15169 covers Lot 25- A-2 with an area of 500,000
square meters. This was derived from OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917. TCT
No. R-15169 was obtained by plaintiff-appellee Jose B. Dimson simultaneously with
other titles, viz: TCT Nos. 15166, 15167, and 15168 by virtue of the Decision dated
October 13, 1977 and Order dated October 18, 1977, in Special Proceedings No. C732. The Order dated October 18, 1977 directed the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan
City to issue in the name of Jose B. Dimson separate transfer certificate of titles for

the lot covered by plan (LRC) SWO-5268 and for the lots covered by the plans,
Exhibits H, I and J.
Upon the other hand, defendant-appellant Araneta Institute of Agricultures TCT No.
13574 was derived from TCT No. 26539, while TCT No. 7784 (now TCT No. 21343)
was derived from TCT No. 26538. TCT No. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 were both
issued in the name of Jose Rato. TCT No. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 both show
Decree No. 4429 and Record No. 4429.
Decree No. 4429 was issued by the Court of First Instance of Isabela. On the other
hand, Record No. 4429 was issued for ordinary Land Registration Case on March 31,
1911 in CLR No. 5898, Laguna (Exhs. 8, 8-A Rivera). The trial court ruled defendantappellant Araneta Institute of Agricultures TCT No. 13574 spurious because this title
refers to a property in the Province of Isabela (RTC Decision, p. 19).
Another point, Aranetas TCT No. 13574 (Exh. 6) and 21343 are both derived
from OCT No. 994registered on May 3, 1917, which was declared null and void by
the Supreme Court in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. Court of
Appeals, 215 SCRA 783 (1992). The Supreme Court ruled: Where two certificates of
title purport to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails x x x. Since the
land in question has already been registered under OCT No. 994 dated April 19,
1917, thesubsequent registration of the same land on May 3, 1919 is null and void.
In sum, the foregoing discussions unmistakably show two independent reasons why
the title of defendant-appellant Araneta Institute of Agriculture is a nullity, to wit:
the factual finding that the property in Isabela, and the decision of the Supreme
Court in the MWSS case.[19]
Araneta Institute then filed the present petition, ascribing to the Court of Appeals a
long list of factual errors which may be stated substantially as follows:
In CA-G.R. CV No. 41883
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the evidence presented by
petitioner Araneta Institute clearly establish the fact that it has the better right of
possession over the subject property than respondent Jose B. Dimson.
A.)
There is only one Original Certificate of Title No. 994 covering the
Maysilo Estate issued on May 3, 1917 pursuant to the Decree No. 36455 issued by
the Court of Land Registration on April 17, 1917.
B.)
Certifications of responsible government officials tasked to
preserve the integrity of the Torrens System categorically confirm and certify that
there is only one OCT 994 issued on May 3, 1917.
C.)
The Government in the exercise of its governmental function of
preserving the integrity of the torrens system initiated a fact-finding inquiry to
determine the circumstances surrounding the issuance of OCT No. 994 and its
derivative titles.
D.)
The Government fact-finding committee correctly found and
concluded that there is only one OCT No. 994 issued on May 3, 1917.
E.)
The Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights and the
Senate Committee on Urban Planning, Housing and Resettlement conducted an
Investigation and concluded that there is only one OCT 994 that was issued on May
3, 1917.
F.)
The certifications issued by the government officials, notably from
the Land Registration Authority, the Department of Justice Committee Report and

the Senate Committees Joint Report are all newly-discovered evidence that would
warrant the holding of a new trial.[20]
3.
G.R. No. 148767
(Sto. Nino Kapitbahayan Association, Inc., petitioner, vs. CLT Realty
Development Corporation, respondent)
CLT Realty is the registered owner of a parcel of land known as Lot 26 of the
Maysilo Estate in Caloocan City, covered by TCT No. T-177013.[21] It acquired the
property on December 10, 1998 from the former registered owner Estelita I. Hipolito
under TCT No. R-17994, who in turn, acquired it from Jose B. Dimson.
On the other hand, Sto. Nio Kapitbahayan Association, Inc. (Sto. Nio Association),
petitioner, is the registered owner of two parcels of land likewise located in
Caloocan City, covered by TCT Nos. T-158373 and T-158374. By virtue of these
titles, Sto. Nio Association occupied and claimed ownership over a portion of Lot 26.
Thus, on July 9, 1992, CLT Realty filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121,
Caloocan City a complaint for annulment of titles [22] and recovery of possession with
damages against Sto. Nio Association, docketed as Civil Case No. C-15491. In its
complaint, CLT Realty alleged that based on the technical descriptions on the titles
of Sto. Nio Association, an overlapping exists between their respective titles; and
that the titles of Sto. Nio Association are void as they are derived from TCT No.
4211,[23] a forged and fictitious title.
In its answer, Sto. Nio Association denied the material allegations of the complaint
and asserted that its members have been in possession of the disputed lots prior to
1987. The area had been identified by the government as slum and blighted.
At the pre-trial conference, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts, thus:
(1) Both parties admit that the defendant (Sto. Nio Association) is presently
occupying the property covered by TCT Nos. 158373 and 158374 located at Barrio
Baesa, Caloocan City; and
(2)
Both parties admit that the plaintiff (CLT) is also the registered owner of
the same properties being occupied by the defendant and covered by TCT No.
177013 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City.
Resolving the issue of whose title to the disputed land is valid, the trial court, on
September 28, 1995, rendered a Decision in favor of Sto. Nio Association and
ordered the cancellation of TCT No. T-177013 in the name of CLT Realty.
However, upon motion for reconsideration by CLT Realty, the trial court, in
its Amended Decision dated February 12, 1996, granted the motion, rendered
judgment in favor of CLT Realty, and ordered the cancellation of TCT Nos. T-158373
and T-158374, both in the name of Sto. Nio Association, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby
GRANTED and judgment is accordingly rendered in favor of the plaintiff CLT REALTY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and against the defendant STO. NIO KAPITBAHAYAN
ASSOCIATION, INC., ordering the cancellation of TCT Nos. T-158373 and T-158374,
both in the name of the defendant. The defendants counterclaim is hereby
dismissed for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[24]

The Amended Decision is anchored on the trial courts finding that, based on the
evidence, there was fraud in the issuance of TCT No. 4211 from which Sto. Nio
Associations titles were derived. The irregularities which attended such issuance
were discussed lengthily by the court a quo as follows:
The court finds the motion meritorious.
The conflict stems from the fact that the plaintiffs and defendants titles overlap
each other, hence, a determination of the respective origins of such titles is of
utmost importance.
TCT No. T-177013 in the name of the plaintiff was derived from R-17994 T-89 in the
name of Estelita Hipolito which title can trace its origin from OCT 994. The
boundaries of OCT 994 known as Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo Estate are the same as
that of the plaintiffs titles.
On the other hand, TCT Nos. T-158373 and T-158374, both in the name of the
defendants, are the latest in a series of titles which descend from TCT No. 4211. A
trace of the history of TCT No. 4211 reveals that it was succeeded by TCT No. 5261
which was in turn succeeded by TCT No. 35486. TCT No. 35486 was allegedly
subdivided into seven lots covered by TCT Nos. 1368 to 1374. One or two of these
subdivided lots were the predecessors of the defendants titles.
It behooves this court to address the issue of whether or not TCT No. 4211
from which the defendants titles were originally derived can validly trace
its origin from OCT 994.
There is pervasive evidence that TCT No. 4211 could not have been a true
derivative of OCT No. 994.
Firstly, the survey dates indicated in OCT No. 994 are September 8-27,
October 8-21 and November 17-18, all in the year 1911. On the other
hand, these dates of original survey are conspicuously missing in TCT No.
4211 contrary to established procedure that the original survey dates of
the mother title should be indicated in succeeding titles. Instead, an
examination of TCT No. 4211 reveals a different date on its face. This date,
December 22, 1971, could not be an original survey date because it differs
from those indicated in the mother title. Of equal importance is the fact
that the date of original survey always comes earlier than the date of the
issuance of the mother title. Since OCT No. 994 was issued on April 19,
1917, it is highly irregular that the original survey was made only several
months later or only on December 22, 1917.
Neither is the Court inclined to consider this date as the date a subdivision survey
was made. The regular procedure is to identify the subdivided lots by their
respective survey or lot numbers, on the contrary, no such lot number is found in
TCT No. 4211, pointing to the inevitable conclusion that OCT No. 994 was never
validly subdivided into smaller lots, of which one of them is covered by TCT No.
4211.
Secondly, the assertion that TCT Nos. 1368 to 1374 which preceded the
defendants titles were issued pursuant to subdivision plan PSD 21154 is
not supported by the evidence. The Land Management Bureau which
handles survey plans has no records of the said PSD 21154. The Registry

of Deeds of Rizal has a copy of the plan but the court finds such
possession questionable since the Land Registration Authority which
supervises the Registry of Deeds does not have a copy of the same. The
court therefore believes that the issuance of TCT Nos. 1368 to 1374 is
attended by a serious irregularity which cannot be ignored as it affects the
very validity of the alleged subdivisions of the land covered by TCT No.
35486.
Thirdly, the language of the technical descriptions of the land covered by
OCT No. 994 is already in English, while its alleged derivative titles TCT
Nos. 4211, 5261 and 35486 are still in Spanish. This is in direct violation of
the practice that the language used in the mother title is adopted by all its
derivative titles. The reversion to Spanish in the derivative titles is highly
intriguing and casts a cloud of doubt to the genuineness of such titles.
Fourthly, the tie points used in the mother lot were not adopted by the
alleged derivative titles particularly TCT Nos. 1368 to 1374, the immediate
predecessors of the defendants titles. The pivotal role of tie points cannot be
brushed aside as a change thereof could result to the shifting of positions of the
derivative lots in relation to the mother lot. Consequently, overlapping could take
place as in fact it did when the defendants titles overlapped that of CLT at the
northwestern portion of the latters property.
Fifthly, the results of laboratory analysis conducted by a Forensic Chemist
of the NBI revealed that TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211 were estimated to be
fifty (50) years old as of March 1993 when the examination was
conducted. Hence, the documents could have been prepared only in 1940
and not in 1918 as appearing on the face of TCT No. 4211.
Based on the foregoing patent irregularities, the court finds the
attendance of fraud in the issuance of TCT No. 4211 and all its derivative
titles which preceded the defendants titles. Evidently, TCT No. 4211
cannot be validly traced from OCT No. 994. Being void ab initio, it did not
give rise to any transmissible rights with respect to the land purportedly
invalid, and resultantly, the defendants, being the holders of the latest
derivatives, cannot assert any right of ownership over the lands in
question. The void ab initio land titles issued cannot ripen into private
ownership. (Republic vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 90)
xxx
The courts findings are consistent with a ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR No.
45255 entitled CLT Realty Development Corp. vs. Manotok Realty, Inc., et al.
promulgated on September 28, 1995, affirming the decision of the mother branch of
this court ordering the cancellation of TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211 which encroached on
a specific area of Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo Estate, Caloocan City. This court is also
aware that on January 8, 1996, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for
Reconsideration of the defendants in the aforementioned case for lack of merit.
[25]
(underscoring supplied)
The above Amended Decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its Decision
dated May 23, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 52549, thus:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the appealed Decision, We AFFIRM the
same. Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[26]

Hence, the present petition based on the following assigned errors:

1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE
AMENDED DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO.
2. THE JUDGMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS PREMISED ON THE
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS OF THE COURT A QUO.
3. ASSUMING ARGUENDO, WITHOUT NECESSARILY ADMITTING THAT THE
ARGUMENTS OF APPELLANT ARE UNAVAILING, THERE ARE SUPERVENING FACTS AND
EVENTS, SHOULD THIS HONORABLE COURT CONSIDER THE SAME, THAT WOULD
WARRANT THE REVERSAL OF THE CHALLENGED DECISION AND WILL IMPEL A
DIFFERENT CONCLUSION.[27]
In sum, the three instant petitions assail the validity of: (1) TCT No. R-15169 of the
Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City in the name of Jose B. Dimson, covering Lot
25-A-2 of the Maysilo Estate;[28] and (2) TCT No. T-177013 of the same Registry
of Deeds in the name of CLT Development Corporation, covering Lot 26, also of
the Maysilo Estate.[29]
In the meantime, petitioners Manotok filed with this Court two separate
Manifestations stating that a (1) Report of the Fact-Finding Committee dated August
28, 1997 composed of the Department of Justice (DOJ), Land Registration Authority
and the Office of the Solicitor General, and (2) Senate Committee Report No. 1031
dated May 25, 1998 were issued by the DOJ and the Senate. Both reports conclude
that there is only one OCT No. 994 issued, transcribed and registered on May 3,
1917.
The respondents in these cases vehemently opposed the said Manifestations
alleging, among others, that the same are nothing but a crude attempt to
circumvent and ignore time-honored judicial procedures and sabotage the orderly
administration of justice by using alleged findings in the alleged reports prepared by
the DOJ and the Senate Committee that were never presented before the trial
courts to obtain a reversal of the questioned Decisions. At the very least, said
procedure is highly irregular, improper and contrary to the dictates of due process.
[30]

Summary of the Contentions of the Parties

I.
G.R.
No. 123346
Petitioners Manotok Corporations mainly contend that the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the lower courts Decision which was rendered without conducting trial for
the reception of evidence. It merely relied on the technical report of the
commissioners appointed by the court based on the parties nomination. They
(petitioners) were thus denied due process as they were not able to present
evidence in a full-blown trial.
Respondent CLT Realty, on the other hand, maintains that the factual findings of the
commissioners are supported by evidence. The contending parties were accorded
due process because they submitted their respective evidence to the

commissioners in the course of the proceedings. The same evidence became the
basis of their Majority and Minority Reports. The two Reports were later heard and
passed upon by the trial court.
Respondent CLT Realty adds that the Decision of the trial court, upheld by the Court
of Appeals, complies with the requirement of Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution since it clearly and distinctly expresses the facts and the law upon
which it is based.
II. G.R. 134385
Petitioner Araneta Institute basically submits that the case of MWSS vs. CA[31] cited
in the Decision dated May 30, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is inapplicable to the
present case. In that case, it upheld TCT No. 15167 of Dimson derived from OCT 994
issued and registered earlier, or on April 19, 1917. Whereas, the MWSS title was
derived from OCT 994 issued and registered later, or on May 3, 1917. The Appellate
Court erred when it relied on MWSS vs. CA.[32]
On the other hand, respondents heirs of Dimson counter that the validity of
Dimsons title, TCT No. 15167, has been upheld by this Court in MWSS case.
III. G.R. No. 148767
Like petitioner Araneta Institute in G.R. No. 134385 and petitioners Manotok
Corporations in G.R. No. 123346, petitioner Sto. Nio Association contends that there
are supervening facts and events that transpired after the trial court rendered its
Amended Decision that if considered will result in a different conclusion. These are
the two Reports of the DOJ and Senate Fact-Finding Committees that there is only
one OCT No. 994 issued on May 3, 1917. Thus, with a new trial, and with the
presentation of these Reports as evidence, it could be shown that the titles of Jose
Dimson and CLT Realty are void.
Ruling of the Court
The present petitions must fail.
At the outset, it bears stressing that under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, our jurisdiction over cases brought to us from the Court of
Appeals is limited to reviewing and correcting errors of law committed by said
court. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Thus, it is not our function to
reviewfactual issues and examine, evaluate or weigh the probative value of the
evidence presented by the parties. [33]We are not bound to analyze and weigh all
over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below. [34]
Here, the paramount question being raised in the three petitions is whether TCT
No. 15169 issued in the name of Jose B. Dimson and TCT No. 177013 issued in
the name of CLT are valid. Undoubtedly, such issue is a pure question of fact a
matter beyond our power to determine. Where, as here, the findings of fact of
the trial courts are affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the same are
accorded the highest degree of respect and, generally, will not be
disturbed on appeal. Such findings are binding and conclusive on this
Court.[35]
Be that as it may, to reinforce our conclusion, we shall still proceed to discuss why
the present petitions have no merit.

As regards G.R. No. 123346 (Manotok Corporations vs. CLT Realty, involving
Lot 26), the trial court acted properly when it adopted the Majority Report of the
commissioners as part and parcel of its Decision. That is allowed in Section 11, Rule
32 of the Revised Rules of Court (now the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended), quoted below:
SEC. 11. Hearing upon report. Upon the expiration of the period of ten (10) days
referred to in the preceding section, the report shall be set for hearing, after which
the court shall render judgment by adopting, modifying, or rejecting the report in
whole or in part or it may receive further evidence or may recommit it with
instructions. (underscoring supplied)
The case of overlapping of titles necessitates the assistance of experts in the field of
geodetic engineering. The very reason why commissioners were appointed by the
trial court, upon agreement of the parties, was precisely to make an evaluation and
analysis of the titles in conflict with each other. Given their background, expertise
and experience, these commissioners are in a better position to determine which of
the titles is valid. Thus, the trial court may rely on their findings and conclusions.
It bears stressing that the parties opted to submit the case for decision on the
bases, among others, of their respective objections/comments on the
commissioners reports.
Thus, petitioners Manotok Corporations, under the doctrine of estoppel, cannot now
be permitted to assail the Decision of the trial court which turned out to be adverse
to them and insist that it should have conducted further reception of evidence
before rendering its judgment on the case.
We note further that while petitioners assail the trial courts Decision as being
premature, however, they also assert that the said court should have adopted the
Minority Report which is favorable to them. Certainly, we cannot countenance their
act of adopting inconsistent postures as this is a mockery of justice.
We noted in the beginning of this Decision that the issue in all these three (3) cases
involves the validity of the parties overlapping titles. The titles of the respondents in
these cases were derived from OCT No. 994 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan
City registered on April 19, 1917. The validity of such mother title has already
been upheld by this Court in G.R. No. 103558, MWSS vs. Court of Appeals, et
al. dated November 17, 1992[36] earlier cited in the assailed Decisions. Significantly,
the ruling in MWSS was reiterated in G.R. No. 96259, Heirs of Luis J. Gonzaga vs.
Court of Appeals dated September 3, 1996.[37]
We cannot delve anymore into the correctness of the Decision of this Court
in MWSS. The said Decision, confirming the validity of OCT No. 994 issued on April
19, 1917 from which the titles of the respondents in the cases at bar were derived,
has long become final and executory. Nothing is more settled in law than that once
a judgment attains finality it becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer
be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether
the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest
court of the land.[38]
The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of
public policy and sound practice, and that, at the risk of occasional errors, the
judgments or orders of courts must become final at some definite time fixed by law;
otherwise, there would be no end to litigations, thus setting to naught the main role

of courts of justice which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the
maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with finality. [39]
Just as the losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period,
the winning party likewise has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
resolution of his case. We held that "a final judgment vests in the prevailing
party a right recognized and protected by law under the due process
clause of the Constitution. . . . A final judgment is a vested interest which
it is right and equitable that the government should recognize and
protect, and of which the individual could not be deprived arbitrarily
without injustice."[40] In the present cases, the winning parties, respondents
herein, must not be deprived of the fruits of a final verdict.
Finally, we cannot consider the alleged newly-discovered evidence consisting of the
DOJ and Senate Fact-Finding Committee Reports invoked by petitioners herein.
Certainly, such committee reports cannot override the Decisions of the trial courts
and the Court of Appeals upholding the validity of respondents titles in these cases.
The said Decisions were rendered after the opposing parties have been accorded
due process. It bears stressing that the courts have the constitutional duty to
adjudicate legal disputes properly brought before them. The DOJ and Senate, or any
other agencies of the Government for that matter, have clearly distinguishable roles
from that of the Judiciary. Just as overlapping of titles of lands is abhorred, so is the
overlapping of findings of facts among the different branches and agencies of the
Government. This we unmistakably stressed in Agan, Jr., et al. vs. Philippine
International Air Terminals Co., Inc., et al,[41] thus:
Finally, the respondent Congressmen assert that at least two (2) committee reports
by the House of Representatives found the PIATCO contracts valid and contend that
this Court, by taking cognizance of the cases at bar, reviewed an action of a coequal body. They insist that the Court must respect the findings of the said
committees of the House of Representatives. With due respect, we cannot
subscribe to their submission. There is a fundamental difference between
a case in court and an investigation of a congressional committee. The
purpose of a judicial proceeding is to settle the dispute in controversy by
adjudicating the legal rights and obligations of the parties to the case. On
the other hand, a congressional investigation is conducted in aid of
legislation (Arnault vs. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950). Its aim is to
assist and recommend to the legislature a possible action that the body may take
with regard to a particular issue, specifically as to whether or not to enact a new law
or amend an existing one. Consequently, this Court cannot treat the findings
in a congressional committee report as binding because the facts elicited
in congressional hearings are not subject to the rigors of the Rules of
Court on admissibility of evidence. The Court in assuming jurisdiction over the
petitions at bar simply performed its constitutional duty as the arbiter of legal
disputes properly brought before it, especially in this instance when public interest
requires nothing less. (Underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED and the assailed Decisions and
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against
petitioners.
FIRST DIVISION

THE PHILIPPINE COTTON G.R. No. 130389

CORPORATION,
Petitioner-Appellant,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
LEONARDO- DE CASTRO, JJ.
NARAINDAS GAGOOMAL and
ENGRACIO ANG,
Respondents-Appellees,
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, Promulgated:
Intervenor-Appellee. February 11, 2008
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) promulgated on August 29, 1997 in CA-G.R. CV No. 50332.
The facts of record would indicate that Pacific Mills, Inc. (Pacific Mills) originally
owned five parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos.
136640, 136441, 222370 and 134249. These properties were subsequently
purchased by respondents on an installment basis from Pacific Mills on July 19,
1979.[3]
On June 23, 1983, petitioner filed a collection case against Pacific Mills before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Branch 162 on the ground of alleged failure to
fulfill its obligation under a contract of loan. After hearing, the trial court issued a
writ of preliminary attachment in favor of petitioner. Thereafter, on August 17, 1983,
the writ of preliminary attachment was annotated on TCT Nos. 136640, 136441,
222370 and 134249.
On December 27, 1985, the RTC of Pasig rendered a decision ordering Pacific Mills to
pay its obligation under the loan agreement plus interest, penalty charges,
attorneys fees and costs of suit. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial
court. Not satisfied with the judgment of the appellate court, Pacific Mills filed a
petition for review before this Court.
During the pendency of the appeal or on June 11, 1988, the Quezon City Hall was
razed by fire thereby destroying the records of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City,
including the TCTs of Pacific Mills.

Sometime in 1992, Pacific Mills filed a petition for reconstitution of the burned TCTs
through administrative reconstitution, in accordance with Republic Act No. 6732.
[4]
On March 23, 1992, the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City issued to Pacific Mills
the reconstituted TCTs, namely: No. RT-55702 (for TCT No. 136640), No. RT-55704
(for TCT No. 134249), No. RT-55703 (for TCT No. 136441) and No. RT-55705 (for TCT
No. 222370). However, the aforesaid alleged annotations of the preliminary
attachment in favor of petitioner were not incorporated in the reconstituted TCTs,
but annotated therein was the sale made by Pacific Mills to respondents and their
payment in full. On even date, the reconstituted TCTs were cancelled in favor of the
respondents. Respondents were given the following clean TCT Nos. 56683[5] (for RT55703), 56684[6] (for RT-55702), 56685[7] (for RT-55704) and 56686[8] (for RT-55705).
On February 8, 1993, petitioner wrote the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City
requesting for the annotation of the notice of levy, and, subsequently, the
annotation of a favorable decision of this Court rendered on August 3, 1992, on the
new TCTs issued to respondents.
On February 10, 1993, Samuel C. Cleofe, the Quezon City Register of Deeds,
informed respondents that the letter-request for re-annotation of notice of levy had
been entered in the Primary Entry Book 574/Volume 24, and asked them to
surrender their owners duplicate copies of TCT Nos. 56683 to 56686. [9]
Immediately upon receipt of the said letter, respondents verified the original copies
of titles in the possession of the Registry of Deeds and discovered that the following
annotations were included at the back of the titles: Request for Re-Annotation of
Notice of Levy and Letter Request for Annotation of Entry of Judgment of Supreme
Court.
Thereafter, respondents filed on March 3, 1993, a Petition for the Cancellation of
Annotations in Land Titles before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 100, docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-6056(93). Later on, petitioner was impleaded as an additional
respondent, while China Banking Corporation filed a complaint-in-intervention for
being a mortgagee of the real properties, together with all the improvements
thereon.
On March 29, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondents. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises above considered, there being no justification for the
Quezon City Register of Deeds in making the annotation on petitioners original TCT
Nos. 56683 (RT-55703), 56684 (RT-55702), 56685 (RT-55748) and 56686 (RT-55705),
said respondent is hereby ordered to DELETE therefrom the said annotation request
for annotation and the annotated Supreme Court decision against the Pacific Mills,
Inc. and to desist from its request for petitioners to submit their owners duplicate of
titles to annotate such request of the Philippine Cotton Corporation.
There being no justiciable issue in the complaint-in-intervention, let the annotations
of a mortgage executed by petitioners on December 18, 1992 in favor of intervenor
China Banking Corporation remain on petitioners subject TCTs.

SO ORDERED.[10]
The trial court ratiocinated that:
Under the circumstances, respondent [the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City] should
and could have properly refused such request instead of immediately annotating it.
In the same light, The Register of Deeds may likewise properly refuse registration of
an order attachment when it appears that the title involved is not in the name of the
defendant and there is no evidence submitted to indicate that the said defendant
has any present or future interest in the property covered by the titles. (Gotauco vs.
Register of Deeds of Tayabas, 59 Phil. 756, 1934 and Geonanga vs. Hodges, 55 O.G.
p. 2891, April 21, 1958). (Underscoring Supplied) [11]
Unsatisfied with the outcome of the case, petitioner filed a notice of appeal before
the CA, contending that:
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY HAS THE AUTHORITY TO RE-ANNOTATE
THE NOTICE OF LEVY AND TO ANNOTATE THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT OF THE
SUPREME COURT ON TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF TITLE NOS. 56683, 56684, 56685
AND 56686, ALL ISSUED IN THE NAME OF THE PETITIONERS-APPELLEES AS A RESULT
OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE RECONSTITUTION OF TITLES.[12]
In its August 29, 1997 decision, the appellate court dismissed the appeal because
the issue raised by the petitioner was a pure question of law, over which the CA had
no jurisdiction.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner presents the following assignment of errors:
FIRST ERROR
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT SUSTAINING THE AUTHORITY OF THE QUEZON
CITYREGISTER OF DEEDS TO VALIDLY RE-ANNOTATE THE INCUMBRANCE/LIENS AND
ANNOTATE THE SUPREME COURT DECISION ON THE ADMINISTRATIVELY
RECONSTITUTED TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF TITLES (TCTs) IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONER-APPELLANT.
SECOND ERROR
THE LOWER COURT, IN CONSEQUENCE THEREOF, LIKEWISE ERRED IN ORDERING
THE QUEZON CITY REGISTER OF DEEDS TO DELETE THE ANNOTATION THAT READS:
REQUEST FOR ANNOTATION AND THE ANNOTATED SUPREME COURT DECISION
AGAINST PACIFIC MILLS, INC., FROM PETITIONERS ORIGINAL TCT NOS. 96683 [sic]
(RT-55703), 56684 (RT-55702), 56685 (RT-55748) AND 56686 (RT-55705) AND TO
DESIST FROM REQUESTING RESPONDENTS/APPELLEES TO SUBMIT THEIR OWNERS
DUPLICATE OF TITLES FOR ANNOTATION OF PETITIONER PHILIPPINE COTTON
CORPORATIONS REQUEST.[13]

Petitioner asserts that a cursory reading of Section 71 of Presidential Decree No.

1529 shows that it is the ministerial duty of the Register of Deeds, in the matter of
an attachment or other liens in the nature of involuntary dealing in registered land,
to send notice by mail to a registered owner requesting him to produce his duplicate
certificate so that a memorandum of attachment or other lien may be made
thereon. This provision, according to petitioner, actually applies whenever a writ of
attachment has been issued by a court of competent jurisdiction after hearing on
the issuance of the said writ. The notice of attachment not having been dissolved, it
was ministerial on the part of the Register of Deeds to record the notice on the TCTs
he issued.
Petitioner would persuade this Court that it is the ministerial duty of the Register of
Deeds to record any encumbrance or lien on respondents existing TCTs. It cites, as
proof of its supposition, Sections 10 and 71 of the Property Registration Decree (P.D.
No. 1529), which are quoted as follows:
Section 10. General functions of Registers of Deeds. The office of the Register of
Deeds constitutes a public repository of records of instruments affecting registered
or unregistered lands and chattel mortgages in the province or city wherein such
office is situated.
It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument
presented for registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with
all the requisites for registration. He shall see to it that said instrument bears the
proper documentary and science stamps and that the same are properly cancelled.
If the instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and
inform the presentor of such denial in writing, stating the ground or reason therefor,
and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117
of this Decree.
xxx
Section 71. Surrender of certificate in involuntary dealings. If an attachment or
other lien in the nature of involuntary dealing in registered land is registered, and
the duplicate certificate is not presented at the time of registration, the Register of
Deeds, shall, within thirty-six hours thereafter, send notice by mail to the registered
owner, stating that such paper has been registered, and requesting him to send or
produce his duplicate certificate so that a memorandum of the attachment or other
lien may be made thereon. If the owner neglects or refuses to comply within a
reasonable time, the Register of Deeds shall report the matter to the court, and it
shall, after notice, enter an order to the owner to produce his certificate at a time
and place named therein, and may enforce the order by suitable process.
(Underscoring supplied)
The Court is not in accord with the stance of petitioner. Section 10 of P.D. No. 1529
merely involves the general functions of the Register of Deeds, while Section 71
thereof relates to an attachment or lien in a registered land in which the duplicate
certificate was not presented at the time of the registration of the said lien
or attachment.

A special law specifically deals with the procedure for the reconstitution
of Torrens certificates of title lost or destroyed. Under Section 4 of Act No. 26: [14]
Liens and other encumbrances affecting a destroyed or lost certificate of title shall
be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be
available, in the following order:
(a)
Annotations or memoranda appearing on the owners, co-owners,
mortgagees or lessees duplicate;
(b)
Registered documents on file in the registry of deeds, or authenticated
copies thereof showing that the originals thereof had been registered; and
(c)
Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is
sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the liens or encumbrances affecting
the property covered by the lost or destroyed certificate of title. (Underscoring
supplied)
Furthermore, Sections 8 and 11 of the same Act provide for the procedure for the
notation of an interest that did not appear in the reconstituted certificate of title,
mandating that a petition be filed before a court of competent jurisdiction:
Section 8. Any person whose right or interest was duly noted in the original of a
certificate of title, at the time it was lost or destroyed, but does not appear so
noted on the reconstituted certificate of title, which is subject to the reservation
provided in the preceding section, may, while such reservation subsists, file a
petition with the proper Court of First Instance for the annotation of such right or
interest on said reconstituted certificate of title, and the court, after notice and
hearing, shall determine the merits of the petition and render such judgment as
justice and equity may require. The petition shall state the number of the
reconstituted certificate of title and the nature, as well as a description, of the right
or interest claimed. (Underscoring supplied)
xxx
Section 11. Petitions for reconstitution of registered interests, liens and other
encumbrances, based on sources enumerated in sections 4(b) and/or 4(c) of this
Act, shall be filed, by the interested party, with the proper Court of First
Instance. The petition shall be accompanied with the necessary documents and
shall state, among other things, the number of the certificate of title and the nature
as well as a description of the interest, lien or encumbrance which is to be
reconstituted, and the court, after publication, in the manner stated in section nine
of this Act, and hearing shall determine the merits of the petition and render such
judgment as justice and equity may require. (Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, therefore, it is not the ministerial function of the Register of Deeds to record
a right or an interest that was not duly noted in the reconstituted certificate of title.
As a matter of fact, this task is not even within the ambit of the Register of Deeds

job as the responsibility is lodged by law to the proper courts. The foregoing quoted
provisions of the law leave no question nor any doubt that it is indeed the duty of
the trial court to determine the merits of the petition and render judgment as justice
and equity may require.
This conclusion is bolstered by Chapter X,[15] Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529, which
provides:
Sec. 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. No erasure, alteration, or
amendment shall be made upon the registration book after the entry of a
certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation of the
same by the Register of Deeds, except by order of the proper Court of
First Instance. A registered owner or other person having an interest in
registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register of Deeds with the
approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition
to the court upon the ground that the registered interests of any
description, whether vested, contingent, expectant inchoate appearing on
the certificate, have terminated and ceased; or that new interest not
appearing upon the certificate have arisen or been created; or that an
omission or error was made in entering the certificate or any
memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate certificate; or that the name of
any person on the certificate has been changed; or that the registered owner has
married, or, if registered as married, that the marriage has been terminated and no
right or interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected, or that a corporation
which owned registered land and has been dissolved has not yet conveyed the
same within three years after its dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground;
and the court may hear and determine the petition after notice to all
parties in interest, and may order the entry or cancellation of a new
certificate, the entry or cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate, or
grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring security or bond if
necessary, as it may consider proper: Provided, however, That this section shall not
be construed to give the court authority to reopen the judgment or decree of
registration, and that nothing shall be done or ordered by the court which
shall impair the title or other interest of a purchaser holding a certificate
for value and in good faith, or his heirs and assigns, without his or their written
consent. Where the owners duplicate certificate is not presented, a similar petition
may be filed as provided in the preceding section,
All petitions or motions filed under this section as well as under any other provision
of this Decree after original registration shall be filed and entitled in the original
case in which the decree or registration was entered. (Underscoring supplied)
The courts intervention in the amendment of the registration book after the entry of
a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon is categorically stated in the
Property Registration Decree and cannot be denied by the mere allegations of
petitioner. Hence, the contentions that the Register of Deeds may validly reannotate the incumbrance/liens and annotate the Supreme Court decision on the
administratively reconstituted transfer certificates of titles (TCTs) have no basis in
law and jurisprudence.

Petitioner further submits that the issuance of the TCTs to respondents is

fraudulent. It suggests that under Sections 69 and 73 of P.D. No. 1529, any person
whose interest does not appear on a reconstituted title may file a request directly
with the Register of Deeds.
As correctly observed by respondents, P.D. No. 1529 principally pertains to the
registration of property, while R.A. No. 26 is a special law on the procedure for the
reconstitution of Torrens certificates of title that were lost or destroyed. Specifically,
Section 69[16] of P.D. No. 1529 refers to an attachment that arose after the issuance
of a certificate of title; while Section 71[17] of the same law pertains to the
registration of the order of a court of an attachment that was continued, reduced,
dissolved or otherwise affected by a judgment of the court. Undoubtedly, the
foregoing provisions find no application in the present case since petitioner insists
that its interest was annotated prior to the reconstitution of the disputed
certificates of title.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 50332, dated August 29, 1997, and the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, in Civil Case No. Q-6056(93), [18] are
hereby AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC
THE SECRETARY OF THE G.R. No. 167707
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
REGIONAL EXECUTIVE Present:
DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI,
REGIONAL TECHNICAL PUNO, C.J.,
DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, QUISUMBING,
LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
REGION VI PROVINCIAL CARPIO,
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, CORONA,*
AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS, CARPIO MORALES,
DIRECTOR OF LAND AZCUNA,
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, TINGA,
DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM CHICO-NAZARIO,
SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF VELASCO, JR.,
PHILIPPINE TOURISM NACHURA,**
AUTHORITY, REYES,
Petitioners, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and

BRION, JJ.
- versus MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD
TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and
ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and Promulgated:
in behalf of all those similarly situated,
Respondents. October 8, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x
DR. ORLANDO SACAY and G.R. No. 173775
WILFREDO GELITO, joined by
THE LANDOWNERS OF
BORACAY SIMILARLY
SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST,
ANNEX A OF THIS PETITION,
Petitioners,
- versus THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
REGIONAL TECHNICAL
DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS
MANAGEMENT BUREAU,
REGION VI, PROVINCIAL
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO,
AKLAN,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants
of Boracay Island to secure titles over their occupied lands.
There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for
review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that[2] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for
declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al.and ordered

the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a petition
for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064 [3] issued by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into reserved forest and
agricultural land.
The Antecedents
G.R. No. 167707
Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white sand
beaches and warm crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist
destination. The island is also home to 12,003 inhabitants [4] who live in the boneshaped islands three barangays.[5]
On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay
Island,[6] which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named
persons.[7]
On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation
No. 1801[8] declaringBoracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in
the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration
of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the
issuance of PTA Circular 3-82[9] dated September 3, 1982, to implement
Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from
filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for
titling purposes, respondents-claimants
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a
petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801
and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their
occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessorsin-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They
declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them. [10]
Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing
Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was
classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section
48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act,
they had the right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial
confirmation of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition
for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified
land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as public

forest, which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code, [11] as amended.
The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801
and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title
was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. SinceBoracay Island had not been
classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen
into ownership.
During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the following
facts: (1) respondents-claimants were presently in possession of parcels of land in
Boracay Island; (2) these parcels of land were planted with coconut trees and other
natural growing trees; (3) the coconut trees had heights of more or less twenty (20)
meters and were planted more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4) respondentsclaimants declared the land they were occupying for tax purposes. [12]
The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal:
whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to the
titling of the lands in Boracay. They decided to forego with the trial and to submit
the case for resolution upon submission of their respective memoranda. [13]
The RTC took judicial notice[14] that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island, more
particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots
were involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed before the RTC ofKalibo, Aklan.
[15]
The titles were issued on
August 7, 1933.[16]
RTC and CA Dispositions
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants,
with a fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that Proclamation No.
1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to the petitioners and those
similarly situated to acquire title to their lands in Boracay, in accordance with the
applicable laws and in the manner prescribed therein; and to have their lands
surveyed and approved by respondent Regional Technical Director of Lands as the
approved survey does not in itself constitute a title to the land.
SO ORDERED.[17]
The RTC upheld respondents-claimants right to have their occupied lands titled in
their name. It ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82
mentioned that lands in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the subject of
disposition.[18] The Circular itself recognized private ownership of lands. [19] The trial
court cited Sections 87[20] and 53[21] of the Public Land Act as basis for
acknowledging private ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those forested
areas in public lands were declared as part of the forest reserve. [22]

The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. [23] The Republic then
appealed to the CA.
On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us
DENYING the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision of the lower
court.[24]
The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration
that the lands they occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.
Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied. [25] Hence, the
present petition under Rule 45.
G.R. No. 173775
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064[26] classifying Boracay Island into
four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six
hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable
and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone
on each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and
which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay, [27] Wilfredo Gelito,
[28]
and other landowners[29] in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for
prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. [30] They
allege that the Proclamation infringed on their prior vested rights over portions of
Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay
since time immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in developing their
lands and building internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots. [31]
Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation
reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor
timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of
1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act.[32] Thus, their possession
in the concept of owner for the required period entitled them to judicial confirmation
of imperfect title.
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a
vested right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified
public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the
claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the courts,
which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and

disposable lands. There is a need for a positive government act in order to release
the lots for disposition.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions as
they principally involve the same issues on the land classification of Boracay Island.
[33]

Issues
G.R. No. 167707
The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular
No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for respondents, and all those similarly situated, to
acquire title to their occupied lands in BoracayIsland.[34]

G.R. No. 173775

Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:
I.
AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT OF
OWNER OVER THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL OR
AT THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR
DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM
PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED BY LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL
CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a,
PD 705?
II.
HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP OVER THEIR OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF
IMPERFECT TITLE?
III.
IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC6, CA 141 [AN] INDISPENSABLE PREREQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN TITLE UNDER THETORRENS SYSTEM?
IV.
IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF THE
PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR
LANDS IN BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY TOSEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC.
4(a) OF RA 6657.
V.

CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE SURVEY AND TO

APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF
THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN BORACAY?[35] (Underscoring supplied)
In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in
G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to
secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay.The twin petitions pertain to
their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141, as
amended. They do not involve their right to secure title under other pertinent laws.
Our Ruling
Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive
to reclassify lands of the public domain
Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 1902 [36] in relation to Act
No. 926, later amended and/or superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141; [37] (b)
Proclamation No. 1801[38] issued by then President Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No.
1064[39] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed to determine
their rights to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under these laws and
executive acts.
But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to
reclassify lands of the public domain.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest
or timber.[40]Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following divisions:
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or
forest and grazing lands, and such other classes as may be provided by law,
[41]
giving the government great leeway for classification. [42] Then the 1987
Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition:
national parks.[43] Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated.[44] Prior to
Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly
and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the
State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and
charged with the conservation of such patrimony. [45] The doctrine has been
consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions. [46]
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State.[47] Thus, all lands that have not been acquired
from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of
the inalienable public domain.[48] Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if
lands of the public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The
government, as the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the
persona in law to determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as
well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding the

placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary
acts of ownership.[49]
Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish
conquest of thePhilippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in
the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown. [50] The Regalian doctrine was first
introduced in the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,
which laid the foundation that all lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. [51]
The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of
1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles
and deeds as well as possessory claims.[52]
The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law[53] partly amended the Spanish
Mortgage Law and theLaws of the Indies. It established possessory information as
the method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under certain conditions
which were set forth in said decree.[54] Under Section 393 of the Maura Law,
aninformacion posesoria or possessory information title,[55] when duly inscribed in
the Registry of Property, is converted into a title of ownership only after the lapse of
twenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession which must be actual, public, and
adverse,[56] from the date of its inscription.[57] However, possessory information title
had to be perfected one year after the promulgation of the Maura Law, or until April
17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to the State. [58]
In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be
founded on royal concessions which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or
royal grant; (2) concesion especial or special grant; (3)composicion con el estado or
adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title by purchase; and (5) informacion
posesoria or possessory information title.[59]
The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines under
American rule was embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.[60] By this law, lands of
the public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into three (3) grand
divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest lands. [61] The act
provided for, among others, the disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute
grant (freehold system) and by lease (leasehold system). [62] It also provided the
definition by exclusion of agricultural public lands. [63]Interpreting the meaning of
agricultural lands under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court declared in Mapa v.
Insular Government:[64]
x x x In other words, that the phrase agricultural land as used in Act No. 926
means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or
mineral lands. x x x[65] (Emphasis Ours)
On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Act. The act established a system of registration by
which recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is
known as the Torrens system.[66]

Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 926,
which was the first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead system and
made provisions for judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and
for the sale or lease of public lands. It permitted corporations regardless of the
nationality of persons owning the controlling stock to lease or purchase lands of the
public domain.[67]Under the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10) years
preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. [68]
On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise
known as the second Public Land Act. This new, more comprehensive law limited
the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other
countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial confirmation of title,
possession and occupation en concepto dueo since time immemorial, or since July
26, 1894, was required.[69]
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874
on December 1, 1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the
existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the
public domain other than timber and mineral lands, [70] and privately owned lands
which reverted to the State.[71]
Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since time immemorial or
since July 26, 1894. However, this provision was superseded by Republic Act (RA)
No. 1942,[72] which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. The provision was last amended by PD No. 1073,
[73]
which now provides for possession and occupation of the land applied
for since June 12, 1945, or earlier.[74]
The issuance of PD No. 892[75] on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish
titles as evidence in land registration proceedings. [76] Under the decree, all holders
of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act No.
496 within six (6) months from the effectivity of the decree on February 16,
1976. Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered lands[77] shall be governed by
Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.
On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529, known
as the Property Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the various laws
relative to registration of property.[78] It governs registration of lands under
the Torrens system as well as unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages. [79]
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In
keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again
emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government,such as an
official proclamation,[80] declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes.[81] In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or
disposable lands only to those lands which have been officially delimited and
classified.[82]

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands
of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming
ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable.[83] To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or
disposable.[84] There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain
as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act
of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute.[85] The applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number
of years is alienable and disposable.[86]
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action,
report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of
evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private
claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and
disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot
accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open
to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot
be assumed. They call for proof.[87]
Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or
portions of it, agricultural lands. Private claimants posit that Boracay was
already an agricultural land pursuant to the old cases Ankron v. Government of the
Philippine Islands (1919)[88] and De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government (1909).
[89]
These cases were decided under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
Act No. 926. There is a statement in these old cases that in the absence of evidence
to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary
is shown.[90]
Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These cases did
not have the effect of converting the whole of Boracay Island or portions of it into
agricultural lands. It should be stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No.
926 merely provided the manner through which land registration courts would
classify lands of the public domain. Whether the land would be classified as timber,
mineral, or agricultural depended on proof presented in each case.
Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the
Philippines had no power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber,
and agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to make corresponding
classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so,
depending upon the preponderance of the evidence. [91] This was the Courts ruling
in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De
Palanca v. Republic,[92] in which it stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:
x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be formally
released by an act of the Executive before it can be deemed open to private

ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of Lands andAnkron v. Government

of the Philippine Islands.
xxxx
Petitioners reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government is
misplaced. These cases were decided under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first
Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926,
under which there was no legal provision vesting in the Chief Executive or President
of the Philippines the power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral,
timber and agricultural so that the courts then were free to make corresponding
classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so,
depending upon the preponderance of the evidence. [93]
To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was then
necessary to devise a presumption on land classification. Thus evolved the dictum
in Ankron that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is
shown.[94]

But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an

argument that all lands of the public domain had been automatically reclassified as
disposable and alienable agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination did the
presumption convert all lands of the public domain into agricultural lands.
If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No.
926 would have automatically made all lands in the Philippines, except those
already classified as timber or mineral land, alienable and disposable lands. That
would take these lands out of State ownership and worse, would be utterly
inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine.
The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land registration cases
brought under the provisions of Act No. 926, or more specifically those cases
dealing with judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The
presumption applies to an applicant for judicial or administrative conformation of
imperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to landowners, such as
private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail themselves of
the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their land remained unclassified and, by
virtue of the Regalian doctrine, continued to be owned by the State.
In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute. Land
classification was, in the end, dependent on proof. If there was proof that the land
was better suited for non-agricultural uses, the courts could adjudge it as a mineral
or timber land despite the presumption. In Ankron, this Court stated:
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General admitted
in effect that whether the particular land in question belongs to one class or another
is a question of fact. The mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has

mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the
other, mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent and present or future
value of the forestry and of the minerals.While, as we have just said, many
definitions have been given for agriculture, forestry, and mineral lands, and that in
each case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe to say that in order to be
forestry or mineral land the proof must show that it is more valuable for the forestry
or the mineral which it contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No.
1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists some trees upon the land or that
it bears some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by
reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified as agricultural land
tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth of timber or the discovery
of valuable minerals, lands classified as agricultural today may be differently
classified tomorrow. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that
particular case, having regard for its present or future value for one or the
other purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter of
public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are
agricultural lands that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the
contrary is shown.Whatever the land involved in a particular land
registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter
of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other is a question of
fact to be settled by the proof in each particular case. The fact that the land
is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to decide whether it
is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or the other
of said classes of land. The Government, in the first instance, under the provisions
of Act No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land
shall be considered forestry land, unless private interests have intervened before
such reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the land is agricultural,
forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests have intervened,
the Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself
what portions of the public domain shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or
mineral land. (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs. Director of
Forestry, supra)[95] (Emphasis ours)
Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands from
the facts of each case, except those that have already became private lands. [96] Act
No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave
the Executive Department, through the President, the exclusive prerogative to
classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest. 96a
Since then, courts no longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to
determine the classification of lands of the public domain. [97]
Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their title in
1933,[98] did not present a justiciable case for determination by the land registration
court of the propertys land classification.Simply put, there was no opportunity for
the courts then to resolve if the land the Boracay occupants are now claiming were
agricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874 in 1919,
without an application for judicial confirmation having been filed by private
claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no longer authorized to

determine the propertys land classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank
on Act No. 926.
We note that the RTC decision[99] in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v. Register
of Deeds of Manila,[100] which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the
Executive with the sole power to classify lands of the public domain was already in
effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular Government,[101] De Aldecoa v.
The Insular Government,[102] and Ankron v. Government of the PhilippineIslands.[103]
Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally different
issue. The pertinent issue in Krivenko was whether residential lots were included in
the general classification of agricultural lands; and if so, whether an alien could
acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled that as an alien, Krivenko was prohibited
by the 1935 Constitution[104] from acquiring agricultural land, which included
residential lots. Here, the issue is whether unclassified lands of the public domain
are automatically deemed agricultural.
Notably, the definition of agricultural public lands mentioned in Krivenko relied on
the old cases decided prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874,
including Ankron and De Aldecoa.[105] As We have already stated, those cases cannot
apply here, since they were decided when the Executive did not have the authority
to classify lands as agricultural, timber, or mineral.
Private claimants continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create
a presumption that the land is alienable. Private claimants also contend that
their continued possession of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of
ten (10) years under Act No. 926[106] ipso facto converted the island into private
ownership.Hence, they may apply for a title in their name.
A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of
Appeals.[107] Collado,citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,107-a ruled:
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of
the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public
domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and
leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the
terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in
the Islands. It also provided for the issuance of patents to certain native settlers
upon public lands, for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for
the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of
Spanish concessions and grants in theIslands. In short, the Public Land Act operated
on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the
government; and that the governments title to public land sprung from the Treaty
of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. The
term public land referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained
in the government and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement,
and excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands.

Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill
of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private
individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are
alienable and disposable.[108] (Emphasis Ours)
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No.
1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No.
705. The DENR[109] and the National Mapping and Resource Information
Authority[110] certify that BoracayIsland is an unclassified land of the public domain.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the
public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as
a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present
system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest
purpose and which are not. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including
those in Boracay Island, areipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705,
however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No. 705
may seem to be out of touch with the present realities in the island. Boracay, no
doubt, has been partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the way for commercial
developments. As a premier tourist destination for local and foreign tourists,
Boracay appears more of a commercial island resort, rather than a forest land.
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach
resorts on the island;[111] that the island has already been stripped of its forest
cover; or that the implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the islands
tourism industry, do not negate its character as public forest.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the
Constitution[112] classifying lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral lands, and national parks, do not necessarily refer to large tracts of
wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes.
[113]
The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry [114] is particularly
instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or
planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have to
be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove
trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be
classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or
status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks
like. Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
[115]
(Emphasis supplied)

There is a big difference between forest as defined in a dictionary and forest or

timber land as a classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our
statutes. One is descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal
status, a classification for legal purposes.[116] At any rate, the Court is tasked to
determine thelegal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical
layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts,
restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has not been automatically
converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.
Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The proclamation did not convert
Boracay into an agricultural land. However, private claimants argue that
Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos in 1978 entitles them to
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The Proclamation classified Boracay, among
other islands, as a tourist zone. Private claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the
island is susceptible of private ownership.
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of Boracay
into an agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular which
made Boracay Island an agricultural land.The reference in Circular No. 3-82 to
private lands[117] and areas declared as alienable and disposable [118]does not by itself
classify the entire island as agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes reference
not only to private lands and areas but also to public forested lands. Rule VIII,
Section 3 provides:
No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from
the PTA. All forested areas inpublic lands are declared forest
reserves. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely
recognizes that the island can be classified by the Executive department pursuant
to its powers under CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the then
Bureau of Forest Developments authority to declare areas in the island as alienable
and disposable when it provides:
Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of
Forest Development.
Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to
classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos
intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he
would have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in
Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind the
declaration of Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves and peninsulas in
the Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine reserve to be administered by
the PTA to ensure the concentrated efforts of the public and private sectors in the
development of the areas tourism potential with due regard for ecological balance
in the marine environment.Simply put, the proclamation is aimed at administering

the islands for tourism and ecological purposes. It does not address the areas
alienability.[119]
More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island, but sixtyfour (64) other islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune
and Verde Islands in Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and
Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and surrounding areas in
Palawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a
few. If the designation ofBoracay Island as tourist zone makes it alienable and
disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas mentioned would
likewise be declared wide open for private disposition. That could not have been,
and is clearly beyond, the intent of the proclamation.
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of
Boracay as alienable and opened the same to private ownership. Sections 6
and 7 of CA No. 141[120] provide that it is only the President, upon the
recommendation of the proper department head, who has the authority to classify
the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral
lands.[121]
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely
exercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of the public domain,
presumably subject to existing vested rights. Classification of public lands is the
exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office of the
President.Courts have no authority to do so. [122] Absent such classification, the land
remains unclassified until released and rendered open to disposition. [123]
Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land
and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise provides for a
15-meter buffer zone on each side of the center line of roads and trails, which are
reserved for right of way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest
land protection purposes.
Contrary to private claimants argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular,
much less unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay Island made by the
President through Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to make such
classification, subject to existing vested rights.
Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law. Private claimants further assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates
the provision of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657
barring conversion of public forests into agricultural lands. They claim that since
Boracay is a public forest under PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no longer convert
it into an agricultural land without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657,
thus:
SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover,
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private
agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229,
including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.

More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for
agriculture. Noreclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall
be undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account
ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law,
the specific limits of the public domain.
That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not bar
the Executive from later converting it into agricultural land. Boracay Island still
remained an unclassified land of the public domain despite PD No. 705.
In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v. Republic,
[124]
the Court stated that unclassified lands are public forests.
While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically
state that the islands are public forests, the fact that they were
unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the absence of the classification
as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified land until released and
rendered open to disposition.[125](Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a reclassification of land. If
the land had never been previously classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can
be no prohibited reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with the opinion
of the Department of Justice[126] on this point:
Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in Section 4(a) is
the word reclassification.Where there has been no previous classification of public
forest [referring, we repeat, to the mass of the public domain which has not been
the subject of the present system of classification for purposes of determining
which are needed for forest purposes and which are not] into permanent forest or
forest reserves or some other forest uses under the Revised Forestry Code, there
can be no reclassification of forest lands to speak of within the meaning of Section
4(a).
Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the
reclassification of forest lands to agricultural lands without a prior law delimiting the
limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot, apply to those lands of the public
domain, denominated as public forest under the Revised Forestry Code, which have
not been previously determined, or classified, as needed for forest purposes in
accordance with the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code. [127]
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over
the occupied lands under the said law. There are two requisites for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land
by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of

ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of
the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. [128]
As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did
not convert portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The island remained
an unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is
considered State property.
Private claimants bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the
Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of
the absence of the second element of alienable and disposable land. Their
entitlement to a government grant under our present Public Land Act presupposes
that the land possessed and applied for is already alienable and disposable. This is
clear from the wording of the law itself.[129] Where the land is not alienable and
disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or
possessory rights.[130]
Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were classified as
agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first element of open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay since June
12, 1945.
We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory relief
that private claimants complied with the requisite period of possession.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the
first element of possession. We note that the earliest of the tax declarations in the
name of private claimants were issued in 1993.Being of recent dates, the tax
declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court that the period of possession
and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.
Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in
possession of the island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in
developing the island into a tourist spot. They say their continued possession and
investments give them a vested right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by
Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not
automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to
apply for a title to the land they are presently occupying. This Court is
constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the evidence presented and the
laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible
to apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay
even with their continued possession and considerable investment in the island.
One Last Note
The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the development
of Boracay Island, making it a by-word in the local and international tourism

industry. The Court also notes that for a number of years, thousands of people have
called the island their home. While the Court commiserates with private claimants
plight, We are bound to apply the law strictly and judiciously. This is the law and it
should prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang dapat umiral.
All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible
to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No.
141, as amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster from the residential,
commercial, and other areas they possess now classified as agricultural.Neither will
this mean the loss of their substantial investments on their occupied alienable
lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of
improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For
another, they may look into other modes of applying for original registration of title,
such as by homestead[131] or sales patent,[132] subject to the conditions imposed by
law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire
title to their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the
present land laws. There is one such bill[133] now pending in the House of
Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill will become a law is for Congress
to decide.
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary to
open up the island to private ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to
appease some sectors which view the classification of the island partially into a
forest reserve as absurd. That the island is no longer overrun by trees, however,
does not becloud the vision to protect its remaining forest cover and to strike a
healthy balance between progress and ecology. Ecological conservation is as
important as economic progress.
To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nations survival. Their promotion
and protection are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and activists. These are
needs that become more urgent as destruction of our environment gets prevalent
and difficult to control. As aptly observed by Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968
inDirector of Forestry v. Munoz:[134]
The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy
that should be followed with respect to forest lands. Many have written much, and
many more have spoken, and quite often, about the pressing need for forest
preservation, conservation, protection, development and reforestation. Not without
justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment of any country's natural
resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green
cover on our lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects of serious
proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which they
supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear. Denuded areas become
dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the
rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With erosion
come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property crops,

livestock, houses, and highways not to mention precious human lives. Indeed, the
foregoing observations should be written down in a lumbermans decalogue. [135]
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court of
Appeals Decision inCA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
SEVERINO M. MANOTOK IV, FROILAN
M. MANOTOK, FERNANDO M.
MANOTOK III, MA. MAMERTA M.
MANOTOK, PATRICIA L. TIONGSON,
PACITA L. GO, ROBERTO LAPERAL III,
MICHAEL MARSHALL V. MANOTOK,
MARYANN MANOTOK, FELISA MYLENE
V. MANOTOK, IGNACIO V. MANOTOK,
JR., MILAGROS V. MANOTOK,
SEVERINO MANOTOK III, ROSA
R. MANOTOK, MIGUEL A.B. SISON,
GEORGE
M.BOCANEGRA, MA. CRISTINA E.
SISON, PHILIPP L. MANOTOK, JOSE
CLEMENTE L. MANOTOK, RAMON
SEVERINO L. MANOTOK, THELMA R.
MANOTOK, JOSE MARIA MANOTOK,
JESUS JUDE MANOTOK, JR. and MA.
THERESA L. MANOTOK,
represented by their Attorneyin-fact, Rosa R. Manotok,
Petitioners,

G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605

Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.

- versus HEIRS OF HOMER L.

Promulgated:
BARQUE,represented by TERESITA
BARQUE HERNANDEZ,
August 24, 2010
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

In our Resolution[1] promulgated on December 18, 2008, we set aside the

Decision[2] dated December 12, 2005 rendered by the First Division; recalled the
Entry of Judgment recorded on May 2, 2006; reversed and set aside the Amended
Decisions dated November 7, 2003 and March 12, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 66700
and 66642, respectively; and remanded to the Court of Appeals (CA) for further
proceedings these cases which shall be raffled immediately.
The CA was specifically directed to receive evidence with primary focus on whether
the Manotoks can trace their claim of title to a valid alienation by the Government
of Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate, which was a Friar Land. On that evidence, this
Court may ultimately decide whether annulment of the Manotok title is warranted,
similar to the annulment of the Cebu Country Club title in Alonso v. Cebu Country
Club, Inc.[3] The Barques and Manahans were likewise allowed to present evidence
on their respective claims which may have an impact on the correct determination
of the status of the Manotok title. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) was directed to secure all the relevant records from the Land
Management Bureau (LMB) and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR). If the final evidence on record definitively reveals the proper
claimant to the subject property, the Court would take such fact into consideration
as it adjudicates final relief.[4]
After concluding the proceedings in which all the parties participated and presented
testimonial and documentary evidence, as well as memoranda setting forth their
respective arguments, the CAs Special Former First Division rendered a
Commissioners Report[5] consisting of 219 pages on April 12, 2010. Upon receipt of
the sealed Report submitted to this Court, the parties were no longer furnished
copies thereof in order not to delay the promulgation of the Courts action and the
adjudication of these cases, and pursuant to our power under Section 6, Rule 135 of
the Rules of Court to adopt any suitable process or mode of proceeding which
appears conformable to the spirit of the Rules to carry into effect all auxiliary
processes and other means necessary to carry our jurisdiction into effect. [6]
The evidence adduced by the parties before the CA, which are exhaustively
discussed in the Commissioners Report, including the judicial affidavits and
testimonies presented during the hearings conducted by the CAs Special Former
Special Former First Division, are herein summarized. But first, a brief restatement
of the antecedents set forth in our Resolution.
Antecedents
Lot No. 823 is a part of the Piedad Estate, Quezon City, a Friar Land acquired by the
Philippine Government from the Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company,
Ltd., La Sociedad Agricola de Ultramar, the British-Manila Estate Company, Ltd., and
the Recoleto Order of the Philippine Islands on December 23, 1903, as indicated
in Act No. 1120 (Friar Lands Act) enacted on April 26, 1904. The Piedad Estate has
been titled in the name of the Government under Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. 614 and was placed under the administration of the Director of Lands. [7]
Controversy arising from conflicting claims over Lot 823 began to surface after a fire
gutted portions of the Quezon City Hall on June 11, 1988 which destroyed records

stored in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. That fire has attained
notoriety due to the numerous certificates of title on file with that office, which were
destroyed as a consequence. The resulting effects of that blaze on specific property
registration controversies have been dealt with by the Court in a number of cases
since then. The present petitions are perhaps the most heated, if not the most
contentious of those cases thus far.[8]
Sometime in 1990, a petition for administrative reconstitution [9] of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 372302 in the name of the Manotoks covering Lot No.
823 with an area of 342,945 square meters was filed by the Manotoks with the Land
Registration Authority (LRA) which granted the same, resulting in the issuance of
TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in 1991. In 1996, eight (8) years after the fire which
razed the Quezon City Hallbuilding, the Barques filed a petition with the LRA for
administrative reconstitution of the original of TCT No. 210177 in the name of
Homer Barque and covering Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate, Quezon City, alleged to be
among those titles destroyed in the fire. In support of their petition, the Barques
submitted copies of the alleged owners duplicate of TCT No. 210177, real estate tax
receipts, tax declarations and a Plan Fls 3168-D covering the property. [10]
Learning of the Barques petition, the Manotoks filed their opposition thereto,
alleging that TCT No. 210177 was spurious. Although both titles of the Manotoks
and the Barques refer to land belonging to Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate situated
in the then Municipality of Caloocan, Province of Rizal, TCT No. 210177 actually
involves two (2) parcels with an aggregate area of 342,945 square meters, while
TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) pertains only to a single parcel of land, with a similar
area of 342,945 square meters.[11]
On June 30, 1997, Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos, the reconstituting officer, denied
Barques petition declaring that Lot No. 823 is already registered in the name of the
Manotoks and covered by TCT No. 372302 which was reconstituted under Adm.
Reconstitution No. Q-213 dated February 1, 1991, and that the submitted plan Fls
3168-D is a spurious document as categorically declared by Engr. Privadi J.G. Dalire,
Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division of the LMB. The Barques motion for reconsideration
having been denied, they appealed to the LRA. [12]
The LRA reversed the ruling of Atty. Bustos and declared that the Manotok title was
fraudulently reconstituted. It ordered that reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 in the
name of Homer L. Barque shall be given due course after cancellation of TCT No. RT22481 (372302) in the name of the Manotoks upon order of a competent court of
jurisdiction. The LRA denied the Manotoks motion for reconsideration and the
Barques prayer for immediate reconstitution. Both the Manotoks and the Barques
appealed the LRA decision to the CA.[13]
In the petition for review filed by the Barques (CA-G.R. SP No. 66700), Felicitas
Manahan filed a motion to intervene and sought the dismissal of the cases in CAG.R. SP No. 66700 and CA-G.R. SP No. 66642 as she claimed ownership of the
subject property.[14]
By Decision of September 13, 2002, the CAs Second Division denied the petition in
CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 and affirmed the LRA Resolution. Subsequently, in an
Amended Decision[15] dated November 7, 2003, the Special Division of Five of the

Former Second Division reconsidered its Decision dated September 13, 2002 and
directed the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel TCT No. RT-22481 (372302)
in the name of the Manotoks and to reconstitute the Barques valid, genuine and
existing TCT No. 210177. The Manotoks filed a motion for reconsideration but this
was denied.[16]
As to Manotoks petition (CA-G.R. SP No. 66642), the CAs Third Division rendered a
Decision[17] on October 29, 2003 which affirmed the resolution of the LRA. The
Barques filed a motion for reconsideration. As what happened in CA-G.R. SP No.
66700, the CAs Third Division granted the Barques motion for reconsideration and
on February 24, 2004, promulgated its Amended Decision wherein it reconsidered
the decision datedOctober 29, 2003, and ordered the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City to cancel TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in the name of the Manotoks and the LRA
to reconstitute the Barques TCT No. 210177.[18]
Aggrieved by the outcome of the two (2) cases in the CA, the Manotoks filed the
present separate petitions (G.R. Nos. 162605 and 162335) which were ordered
consolidated on August 2, 2004. On December 12, 2005, this Courts First Division
rendered its Decision affirming the two (2) decisions of the CA. The Manotoks filed a
motion for reconsideration, which the Courts First Division denied in a Resolution
dated April 19, 2006.Thereafter, the Manotoks filed a Motion for Leave to File a
Second Motion for Reconsideration, with their Motion for Reconsideration
attached. The Court denied the same in a Resolution dated June 19, 2006 and
eventually entry of judgment was made in the Book of Entries of Judgment on May
2, 2006. In the meantime, the Barques filed multiple motions with the First Division
for execution of the judgment, while the Manotoks filed an Urgent Motion to Refer
Motion for Possession to the Supreme Court En Banc (with prayer to set motion for
oral arguments). In a Resolution dated July 19, 2006, the Special First Division
referred these cases to the Court en banc, and on July 26, 2006, the Court en
banc promulgated a Resolution accepting the cases. [19]
On September 7, 2006, Felicitas Manahan and Rosendo Manahan filed a motion to
intervene, to which was attached their petition in intervention. They alleged that
their predecessor-in-interest, Valentin Manahan, was issued Sale Certificate No. 511
covering Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate and attached to their petition the findings
of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that the documents of the Manotoks
were not as old as they were purported to be. Consequently, the Director of the
Legal Division of the LMB recommended to the Director of the LMB that steps be
taken in the proper court for the cancellation of TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) and all
its derivative titles so that the land covered may be reverted to the State. In
compliance with the directive of this Court, the OSG filed its Comment and oral
arguments were held on July 24, 2007. Thereafter, the Court required the parties,
the intervenors and the Solicitor General to submit their respective memoranda.
As already mentioned, the December 12, 2005 Decision of the Courts First Division
was set aside, entry of judgment recalled and the CAs Amended Decisions in CAG.R. SP Nos. 66642 and 66700 were reversed and set aside, pursuant to our
Resolution promulgated on December 18, 2008 wherein we ordered the remand of
the cases to the CA for further proceedings.
Evidence Submitted to the CA

A. OSG
Engr. Judith Poblete, Records Custodian of DENR-NCR, brought the original copy
of the Lot Description of Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate, a certified copy of which
was marked as Exhibit 28-OSG [DENR]. She also identified Land Use Map (1978),
Exhibit 32-OSG [DENR], showing the location of Lot No. 823 of Piedad Estate at
Matandang Balara, Quezon City.[20]
Engr. Evelyn G. Celzo, Geodetic Engineer III of the Technical Services Section of
DENR-NCR, identified her signature in Technical Descriptions (Lot No. 823, Piedad
Estate) marked as Exhibit 29-OSG [DENR], [21] which is on file at the Technical
Services Section. She explained that there is no discrepancy because the lot
description 64.45 appearing in Exhibit 28-OSG should read 644.5 (as reflected in
Exhibit 29-OSG [DENR]) and they used this computation as otherwise the polygon
will not close. Sketch/Special Plans (Exhibits 30 and 31-OSG [DENR]) were prepared
for Felicitas Manahan after she had purchased Lot No. 823 of Piedad Estate. As land
investigator, she made a thorough research of the property and she was able to see
only the sale certificate of the Manahans (Exhibit 2-OSG [LMB]) but not those of the
Manotoks and the Barques. She admitted that she does not have the record of the
field notes of the survey conducted in 1907. [22]
Atty. Fe T. Tuanda, Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Records Management Division
(RMD), LMB, testified that she was designated OIC on January 13, 2009. She
identified the following documents on file at their office, certified copies of
previously certified copies which were marked as OSG exhibits: (a) Survey Card for
BL Survey No. Fls-3164 in the name of Valentin Manahan (Exh. 1-OSG [LMB]); (b)
Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 511 dated June 24, 1939 in the name of Valentin
Manahan, assignor, and Hilaria de Guzman, assignee (Exh. 2-OSG [LMB]); (c) Deed
of Absolute Sale dated August 23, 1974 executed by Hilaria de Guzman in favor of
Felicitas Manahan covering Lot 823, Fls-3164, Piedad Estate (Exh. 3-OSG [LMB]); (d)
Technical Description of Lot No. 823, Piedad Estate dated May 27, 1983 (Exh. 4-OSG
[LMB]); (e) Investigation Report on Lot No. 823, Piedad Estate dated July 5, 1989
prepared by Evelyn C. dela Rosa, Land Investigator, North CENRO (Exh. 5-OSG
[LMB]); (f) Petition for cancellation/reversion of TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in the
name of Severino Manotok, et al. dated November 25, 1998 filed by Felicitas
Manahan before the OSG (Exh. 6-OSG [LMB]); (g) Letter dated December 3, 1998 of
Assistant Solicitor General Cecilio O. Estoesta referring the petition filed by Felicitas
Manahan to the LMB for investigation and/or appropriate action (Exh. 7-OSG [LMB]);
(h) LMB Special Order No. 98-135 dated December 18, 1998 designating
investigators for the petition filed by Felicitas Manahan (Exh. 8-OSG [LMB]); (i)
1st Indorsement dated February 23, 1999 and 2 nd Indorsement dated March 26, 1999
issued by DENR Lands Sector Regional Technical Director Mamerto L. Infante
forwarding documents pertaining to Lot No. 823, Fls-3164, Piedad Estate, Quezon
City to the Director of LMB (Exhs. 9 and 10-OSG [LMB]); (j) Chemistry Report No. C99-152 dated June 10, 1999 issued by the NBI Forensic Chemistry Division (Exh. 11OSG [LMB]); (k) Office Memorandum dated October 2000 from LMB Land
Administration and Utilization Division Chief Arthus T. Tenazas forwarding records of
Lot No. 823, Piedad Estate to the LMB-RMD for numbering and notarization of the
Deed of Conveyance (Exh. 12-OSG [LMB]); (l) Memorandum dated April 17, 2000

issued by the Chief of the Legal Division of the LMB to the OIC- Director of the LMB
regarding the petition filed by Felicitas Manahan (Exh. 13-OSG [LMB]); (m)
Memorandum dated July 6, 2000 issued by the DENR Undersecretary for Legal
Affairs to the Director of the LMB on the issue of whether a Deed of Conveyance
may be issued to Felicitas Manahan by virtue of Sale Certificate No. 511 covering
Lot No. 823 of Piedad Estate (Exh. 14-OSG [LMB]); (n) Order dated October 16, 2000
issued by the LMB transferring Sale Certificate No. 511 in the name of Valentin
Manahan and ordering the issuance of Deed of Conveyance in favor of Felicitas
Manahan (Exh. 15-OSG [LMB]); (o) Deed No. V-200022 dated October 30, 2000
issued by the LMB and signed by the OIC Director of Lands Management, in favor of
Felicitas Manahan covering Lot No. 823 of Piedad Estate (Exh. 16-OSG [LMB]); (p)
Letter dated November 24, 2004 from LRA Deputy Administrator Ofelia E. AbuegSta. Maria addressed to then DENR Secretary Michael T. Defensor referring to the
latter Deed No. V-200022 for verification as to its authenticity (Exh. 17-OSG [LMB]);
(q) Letter dated January 3, 2005 of DENR Secretary Defensor addressed to LRA
Deputy Administrator Abueg-Sta. Maria acknowledging receipt of the latters letter
dated November 24, 2004 (Exh. 18-OSG [LMB]); (r) Memorandum dated January 3,
2005 from DENR Secretary Defensor to the Director of LMB requiring the latter to
take immediate appropriate action on the letter dated November 24, 2004 of LRA
Deputy Administrator Abueg-Sta. Maria (Exh. 19-OSG [LMB]); (s) Office
Memorandum dated January 19, 2005 from LMB OIC Assistant Director Alberto R.
Ricalde to the LMB-RMD referring to the latter the Memorandum dated January 3,
2005 issued by DENR Secretary Defensor (Exh. 20-OSG [LMB]); (t) Memorandum
dated January 20, 2005 from LMB-RMD OIC Leonido V. Bordeos to LMB OIC Assistant
Director Ricalde stating the results of their records verification conducted pursuant
to Office Memorandum dated January 19, 2005 (Exh. 21-OSG [LMB]); (u) Letter
dated January 21, 2005 from LMB Director Concordio D. Zuiga addressed to LRA
Deputy Administrator Abueg-Sta. Maria indicating the results of their records
verification on Deed No. V-200022 (Exh. 22-OSG [LMB]); (v) Inventory of
Claims/Conflicts Cases involving the Piedad Estate (Exh. 23-OSG [LMB]); (w)
Memorandum dated November 23, 2007 from LMB Land Administration and
Utilization Division, Friar Lands Unit Chief Ariel F. Reyes to LMB Legal Division OIC
Manuel B. Tacorda providing a history of OCT No. 614, Piedad Estate, as well as its
metes and bounds (Exh. 24-OSG [LMB]); (x) Memorandum dated November 9, 2007
from DENR Undersecretary for Administration, Finance and Legal Atty. Mary Ann
Lucille L. Sering addressed to the Regional Executive Director and Regional
Technical Director for Lands of the DENR-NCR, the Director and Handling Officer of
the LMB, the Executive Director of Land Administration and Management Project,
calling for a conference regarding the launching of a project called Operation 614
(Exh. 25-OSG [LMB]); (y) Memorandum dated November 26, 2007 from Legal
Division OIC Tacorda to the LMB Director regarding the conference for the launching
of Operation 614 (Exh. 26-OSG [LMB]); and (z) Memorandum dated November 28,
2007 from LMB OIC Director Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. to the DENR Secretary regarding
the launching of Operation 614 (Exh. 27-OSG [LMB]). [23]
On cross-examination, Atty. Tuanda said that while all documents received by the
RMD are stamped received, there were no such stamp mark on Exhibits 1-OSG, 2OSG, 3-OSG, 9-OSG, 10-OSG, 13-OSG, 14-OSG, 19-OSG and 25-OSG; Exh. 17-OSG
had stamp received by the Office of the Assistant Director of LMB. When asked why

the pagination in Exh. 13-OSG is not consecutive, Atty. Tuanda said she was not the
one (1) who placed the page numbers on the documents. [24]
Engr. Ludivina L. Aromin, Chief of the Technical Services Section, DENR-NCR,
identified the Sketch/Special Plans prepared for the Manahans for reference
purposes (Exhs. 30 and 31-OSG [DENR][25]), based on the technical description of Lot
No. 823 taken from results of the original survey conducted in 1907.These were
signed by Engr. Ignacio R. Almira, Jr., Chief of Surveys Division, and noted by Atty.
Crisalde Barcelo, Regional Technical Director of DENR-NCR. She had verified the
metes and bounds of Lot No. 823, explaining that if the distance used between
points 2 and 3 is 64.45, and not 644.5, the area of Lot No. 823 would not be
342,945 square meters and the Special Plans would not have been approved by the
LMB. She clarified that the sale certificate in the name of Valentin Manahan she was
referring to is actually the Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 511 (Exh. 2-OSG). [26]
On November 17, 2009, the OSG submitted the following certified true copies of
documents contained in Volume 2 of the records pertaining to Lot No. 823, Piedad
Estate, on file with the LMB: (a) Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 1054 dated
March 11, 1919 executed by Regina Geronima and Zacarias Modesto, assignors, and
Felicisimo Villanueva as assignee (Exh. 33-OSG [LMB]); (b) Assignment of Sale
Certificate No. 1054 dated May 4, 1923 executed by M. Teodoro and Severino
Manotok as assignors, and Severino Manotok as assignee (Exh. 34-OSG [LMB]); (c)
Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 651 dated April 19, 1930 executed by Ambrosio
Berones as assignor, and Andres C. Berones as assignee (Exh. 35-OSG [LMB]); and
(d) Sale Certificate No. 651 issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands in
favor of Ambrosio Berones (Exh. 36-OSG [LMB]).[27]
Recalled to the witness stand, Atty. Tuanda testified that the allegation of the
Manotoks in their Tender of Excluded Evidence With Proffer of Proof that she
suppressed the release of LMB records to Luisa Padora is misleading, as she was
merely complying with DENR Administrative Order No. 97-24 dated July 30, 1997 on
the release and disclosure of information. As ordered by the court on July 28, 2009,
she allowed the Manotoks to photocopy all the records pertaining to Lot No.
823. She asserted that Volume 2 of the records of Lot No. 823 is not missing, as in
fact she produced it in court. Volume 2 contained the following documents: (a)
Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 651 dated April 19, 1930 covering Lot 823 of the
Piedad Estate executed by Ambrosio Berones as assignor, in favor of Andres C.
Berones as assignee; (b) Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 1054 dated March 11,
1919 executed by Regina Geronimo and Zacarias Modesto; (c) Assignment of Sale
Certificate No. 1054 dated May 4, 1923 executed by Teodoro and Severino Manotok
covering Lot No. 823; and the NBI Chemistry Report (Exh. 11-OSG [LMB]). [28]
On cross-examination, Atty. Tuanda said that she assumed office only on January 16,
2009. Volume 2 contains only four (4) thin documents and she personally
supervised its pagination; she cannot answer for the pagination of Volumes 1, 3 and
4. She cannot recall if there are other papers in the RMD involving Lot No. 823,
there is no indication when the documents in Volume 2 were received for filing but
their index cards will show those dates.The documents in Volume 2 were borrowed
by the NBI and were inadvertently inserted in Volume 1 when it was returned by the
NBI. She cannot remember if there was a Deed of Conveyance either in favor of the

Manotoks or the Barques. They have in their records not the Sale Certificate No. 511
dated June 24, 1939 but only the Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 511. [29]
Nemesio Antaran, Assistant Chief of the RMD, and concurrently Chief of the
General Public Land Records Section, LMB, brought to the court original copy of
Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 511 dated June 24, 1939 in the name of Valentin
Manahan, assignor, and Hilaria de Guzman, assignee (Exh. 2-OSG [LMB]). [30] On
cross-examination, he said that such document was included in the Indorsement
dated February 23, 1999 signed by Mamerto L. Infante, Regional Technical Director,
Lands Sector, DENR-NCR. He cannot ascertain when Exh. 2-OSG was filed or
received by the DENR. He saw in the record sale certificate in the name of the
Manotoks but did not see sale Certificate No. V-321 and Deed of Conveyance No.
4562 in the name of the Barques. Exhibits I to VI, X to XXII are faithful reproduction
of the originals on file with the RMD, but he is not sure whether their Exhibits VII,
XXVI to XXXIV are on file with the RMD.[31] On re-direct examination, he said that the
Indorsement dated February 23, 1999 (Exh. 9-OSG [LMB]) was addressed to the
Director, LMB and not to the OSG. He further explained that the DENR-NCR has
documents pertaining to Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate because the application to
purchase friar land begins with or emanates from the NCR office. After the
requirements are completed, these applications are forwarded to the Office of the
Director, LMB for processing.[32]
The OSG formally offered Exhibits 1-OSG [LMB] to 27-OSG [LMB], and 28-OSG
[DENR] to 32-OSG-DENR.
B. Manotoks
Jose Marie P. Bernabe, a geodetic engineer who had worked in both public and
private sectors and was hired as consultant in cases involving disputed lots,
examined the survey plans and titles covering Lot No. 823 of the Piedad
Estate. Using coordinate geometry and/or computer aided design, he plotted the
technical descriptions of Lot No. 823 based on the technical descriptions appearing
in OCT No. 614, Manotoks TCT No. RT-22481 and Barques TCT No. 210177. He found
that although both titles indicate that Lot No. 823 was originally registered under
OCT No. 614, they contain significantly different technical descriptions of the same
property. The Manotoks title indicates an unsubdivided Lot No. 823 with the
following boundaries: on the East by Payatas Estate, on the Southeast by the Tuazon
Estate, and on the West by Lots 824-A, 818-A and 818-C. On the other hand, the
Barques title describes Lot 823 as subdivided into Lots 823-A and 823-B bounded on
the Northeast and Southeast by the property of Diez Francisco, on the Southwest by
Lot 824, and on the Northwest by Lot 826. However, the southeast and northeast
boundaries of Lot No. 823 as indicated in the Barques title are not mentioned in OCT
No. 614. Using Google Earth, Lot 826 is actually located far north of Lot 823 based
on the Lot Description Sheet (Exh. 43[33]) certified correct and reconstructed on
December 17, 1979 by the Director of Lands. Lot 818 is the correct lot to the west of
Lot 823 together with Lot 824, as shown in the various approved survey plans in the
area (such as Psd-16296, Psd-16489, Psd-6737, Psd-22842 and Psd-291211), but as
shown in the Barques title, Lots 824 and 826 are cited as adjacent lots to the west
of Lot 823. He found some unusual irregularities in the Barques Subdivision Plan Fls3168-D dated June 21, 1940 (Exh. 45[34]), prepared for Emiliano Setosta. When he

compared Subdivision Plan Fls-3004-D dated February 16, 1941, the lot he surveyed
covering Lot 290-B which is a portion of Lot 290 of the Piedad Estate covered by TCT
No. RT-120665, he noticed that Fls-3168-D dated June 21, 1940 is more than six (6)
months ahead of the date of survey on February 16, 1941 for Fls-3004-D. It is highly
irregular that a survey executed at a later date would have a lower plan number
since the plan numbers are issued consecutively by the Bureau of Lands. He
likewise found that the errors and discrepancies pertaining to Fls-3168-D show that
the regular procedures and requirements for preparing subdivision plans were not
followed.[35]
Engr. Bernabe pointed out that his examination of Survey Plan for Lot 824-A done in
1947 (Exh. 46[36]) showed that to the east of Lot 824-A is undivided Lot 823 (Exh. 46A[37]); the Survey Plan for Lot 822-A (Exh. 47[38]), which is located north of Lot 823,
prepared in 1991 and approved in 1992, shows that Lot 823 is anundivided piece of
property (Exh. 47-A[39]); and Survey Plan for Lot 818-A-New (Exh. 48 [40]) shows Lots
818-New-A, 818-New-B and 818-C the western boundaries of Lot 823, which is
consistent with the description in Manotoks title. Thus, based on the totality of the
documents he examined, Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate is an undivided piece of land
with an area of 342,945 square meters, bounded on the East by Payatas Estate, on
the Southeast by the Tuazon Estate and on the West by Lots 824-A, 818-A and 818C, consistent with the technical descriptions appearing in the nine (9) certificates of
title of the Manotoks. Based on his research, and as shown in the Report signed by
Engr. Privadi Dalire, Chief of Geodetic Surveys Division, LMB (Exh. 49 [41]) and the
latters Affidavit dated November 18, 2006 (Exh. 50[42]), no record of Subdivision Plan
Fls-3168-D exists in the LMB and LMS-DENR-NCR, and the machine copy of Fls-3168D purportedly issued by the LMS-DENR-NCR is spurious and did not emanate from
LMB.[43]
Luisa Padora, employed as legal assistant in the various corporations of the
Manotoks whose responsibilities include securing, preparing and safekeeping of all
documents such as titles, conveyances, tax declarations, tax payment receipts, etc.
pertaining to the properties of the Manotoks, identified the documents marked as
Exhibits 1 to 13, 26 to 27-EEEEEEE.[44]
Milagros Manotok-Dormido declared that Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate where she
also resides was acquired by their grandfather Severino Manotok from the
Government. They have since built several houses and structures on the property
where they live up to the present. The property was fenced with concrete walls to
secure it from outsiders and bar the entry of trespassers. As a result of the lengthy
ownership of the Manotoks and their occupancy, Lot 823 became publicly known
and referred to as the Manotok Compound. Severino Manotok bought Lot 823 in the
1920s and obtained a transfer certificate of title under a direct transfer from the
Government; they have declared it for real property tax purposes and religiously
paid the taxes since 1933.Tracing the acquisition of ownership by the Manotoks of
Lot 823, the witness said she has in her possession copies of the following
documents:
1. OCT No. 614 issued on March 12, 1912 in the name of Gobierno de las Islas
Filipinas covering the Piedad Estate, including Lot 823 (Exh. 9);

2. Sale Certificate No. 1054 dated March 10, 1919 issued by the Bureau of Lands to
Regina Geronimo, Zacarias Modesto and Felicisimo Villanueva covering Lot 823
(Exh. 10);
3. Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 1054 dated March 11, 1919 entered into
between Regina Geronimo, Zacarias Modesto and Felicisimo Villanueva as assignors,
and Zacarias Modesto as assignee, covering Lot 823 (Exh. 11);
4. Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 1054 dated June 7, 1920 entered into between
Zacarias Modesto as assignor, and M. Teodoro and Severino Manotok as assignees,
covering Lot 823 (Exh. 12);
5. Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 1054 dated May 4, 1923 entered into between
M. Teodoro and Severino Manotok as assignors, and Severino Manotok as assignee,
covering Lot 823 (Exh. 13);
6. Relocation Plan No. FLR67-D for Lot 823 as surveyed for Severino Manotok
on April 18, 1928 by Deputy Public Land Surveyor A. Manahan and approved by the
Bureau of Lands on August 27, 1928 (Exh. 20);
7. Description of Relocation Plan for Lot 823 prepared by Deputy Public Land
Surveyor A. Manahan for Severino Manotok with accompanying receipt (Exhs. 21
and 21-A);
8. TCT No. 22813 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Rizal indicating Lot
823, its area and boundaries, the lower half of this document is torn (Exh. 8);
9. Deed of Donation dated August 23, 1946 executed by Severino Manotok in favor
of his children (Purificacion, Elisa, Rosa, Perpetua, Filomena, Severino, Jr., Jesus and
Rahula Ignacio) and grandsons Severino III and Fausto, Jr., covering Lot 823 (Exh. 7A);
10. Page of the Notarial Register of Notary Public Angel del Rosario for the year
1946 issued by the National Archives reflecting the Deed of Donation executed by
Severino Manotok (Exh. 7-B);
11. TCT No. 534 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Rizal issued
on September 4, 1946 in the name of the Manotok children and grandchildren (Exh.
7);
12. Deed of Assignment dated August 25, 1950 executed by the Manotok children
and grandchildren in favor of Manotok Realty, Inc. (Exh. 6-A);
13. TCT No. 13900 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City issued on August 31,
1950 in the name of Manotok Realty, Inc. (Exh. 6);
14. Unilateral Deed of Conveyance dated January 31, 1974 executed by Manotok
Realty, Inc. in favor of the Manotok children and grandchildren, covering Lot 823
(Exh. 5-A);

15. TCT No. 198833 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City issued on May 27,
1974 in the name of the Manotoks (Exh. 5);
16. Deeds of Absolute Sale separately executed on May 8, 1976 by Purificacion
Laperal Rosa R. Manotok, Perpetua M. Bocanegra, Severino Manotok, Jr. and Jesus R.
Manotok (Exhs. 4-A to 4-E);
17. TCT No. 221559 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City issued on August 9,
1976 in the name of the Manotoks (Exh. 4);
18. Deed of Sale executed by Perpetua M. Bocanegra in 1984 covering the
remaining 1/2 of her 1/9 undivided interest in Lot 823 in favor of her son George M.
Bocanegra;
19. TCT No. 330376 issued in the name of the Manotok children and grandchildren
in 1984 as a result of the Deed of Sale executed by Perpetua M. Bocanegra,
covering Lot 823;
20. Unilateral Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 22, 1986 executed by Ignacio
R. Manotok covering his 1/9 undivided interest in Lot No. 823 in favor of his children
Michael Marshall, Mary Ann, Felisa Mylene, Ignacio, Jr. and Milagros (Exh. 3-A);
21. TCT No. 354241 issued in the name of the Manotok children and grandchildren
as a result of the Unilateral Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 22,
1986 executed by Ignacio R. Manotok, covering Lot No. 823;
22. Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 8, 1987 executed by Fausto Manotok
covering his 1/18 undivided interest in Lot No. 823 in favor of his children (Exh. 2-A);
23. TCT No. 372302 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City issued on October 17,
1987 in the name of the Manotok children and grandchildren as a result of the
October 8, 1987 Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Fausto Manotok (Exh. 2);
24. TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City issued in
the name of the Manotok children and grandchildren in 1991 upon their application
for reconstitution of TCT No. 372302 after the same was destroyed by a fire that
razed the Quezon City Registry of Deeds office on June 11, 1988 (Exh. 1).

Milagros Manotok-Dormido also identified those documentary exhibits attached to

their pre-trial brief, several declarations of Real Property covering Lot No. 823 (Exhs.
26 to 26-N), numerous Real Property Tax Bills and Real Property Tax Receipts from
1933 to the present (Exhs. 27 to 27-EEEEEEE, 27-YYYYYY), photographs of the
perimeter walls surrounding Lot No. 823 (Exhs. 35-A to 35-UUU), photographs of the
houses and structures built by the Manotoks on the property over the years (Exhs.
35 to 35-YY), some letters from government offices recognizing their grandfather as
the owner of the property (Exhs. 15, 16, 17, 18 and 25), and Metro Manila Street
Map (2003 ed.) identifying Lot No. 823 as Manotoc Compound (Exh. 34). She had

secured a copy ofDeed of Conveyance No. 29204 dated December 7, 1932 (Exh. 51A[45]) from the National Archives of thePhilippines. [46]
On cross-examination, the witness declared that she is testifying in lieu of Rosa
Manotok; her affidavit is the same as the affidavit of Rosa Manotok, the daughter of
Severino Manotok. She asserted that Severino Manotok acquired Lot No. 823 of the
Piedad Estate by direct transfer from the Government. After the Bureau of Lands
issued the Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 1054 on June 7, 1920, her grandfather
Severino Manotok fully paid the installments and was able to obtain a title (TCT No.
22183) after a deed of conveyance was issued onDecember 7, 1932. Sale
Certificate No. 1054 was not annotated on OCT No. 614. Relocation Plan of Lot No.
823 (Exh. 21) indicated its location at Barrio
Payong, Municipality of Caloocan, Province of Rizal. The changes of location of the
property in the tax declarations and tax receipts from Barrio Payong, then to Barrio
Culiat, and later to Barangay Matandang Balara was caused by the City Assessor
(the Manotok Compound and Barrio Culiat are two [2] distinct locations). [47] As a
layman, she considered as sales certificate the Assignment of Sale Certificate No.
1054. They asked for a certified true copy of Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 from
the National Archives; she believes that it is an internal document of the Bureau of
Lands. Despite a diligent search, they were not able to secure a copy of Deed of
Conveyance No. 29204 from the Bureau of Lands, LMB, LRA and the Registry of
Deeds offices of Quezon City, Caloocan and Rizal. When confronted with TCT No.
22813 supposedly dated August 1928 while the Deed of Conveyance was issued
later in 1932, the witness said that the title must have been issued in 1933. The
Manahans never demanded from the Manotoks nor sued the latter for the return
of Lot 283, Piedad Estate which they were also claiming. [48]
When asked who is the registered owner under TCT No. 22813, Milagros Manotok
Dormido said she cannot answer it because said document they recovered is
truncated and cut under. But the Manotoks were the recognized owners under TCT
No. 22813 by the Provincial Assessor. As to the notation cancelled by TCT No. 634
she said that she has not seen that title; it could be a human error somewhere in
that document. She also had no knowledge that TCT No. 634 covers a lot
in Cavite with an area of about 500 square meters registered in the name of
Mamahay Development Corporation.[49]
Susana M. Cuilao, longtime employee of the Manotoks, testified that she assisted
Elisa R. Manotok in filling the application for reconstitution of TCT No. 372302
covering Lot No. 823 after it was destroyed in a fire which razed the Quezon City
Registry of Deeds on June 11, 1988. She identified the documents they submitted in
their application. After several follow-ups, in February 1991, Elisa R. Manotok
received a copy of the Order datedFebruary 1, 1991 (Exh. 36) signed by the
Reconstituting Officer Benjamin Bustos granting her application for reconstitution. In
December 1993, she received original duplicate copy of TCT No. RT-22481 (372302)
from theQuezon City Registry of Deeds.[50]
One (1) of the rebuttal witnesses for the Manotoks, Luisa Padora, in her Judicial
Affidavit dated December 9, 2009, obtained from the National Archives certifications
(signed by an archivist) stating that said office has nocopy on its file of the
following: Sale Certificate No. 511 executed by Valentin Manahan in favor of Hilaria
de Guzman (Exh. 28[51]); the Deed of Absolute Sale between Hilaria de Guzman

Manahan and Felicitas B. Manahan (Exh. 29[52]) supposedly notarized by Santiago R.

Reyes on August 23, 1974 (Exh. 119[53]) as Doc. No. 1515, Page 98, Book No. VI,
series of 1974 entered in the notarial register is a Memorandum of Agreement,
Promissory Note and Payment Receipt executed by Reynaldo Cornejo on August 23,
1974; and the Deed of Absolute Sale between Emiliano Setosta and Homer K.
Barque (Exh. 30[54]) as certified true copies of pages 84 and 85 (Exhs. 120 and
121[55]) of the notarial register of Atty. Eliseo Razon shows that neither Document
Nos. 415 nor 416 was the supposed Deed of Sale dated September 24, 1975
between Emiliano Setosta and Homer K. Barque but a Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by Magdalena Reyes and a Special Power of Attorney executed by Victorio
Savellano, respectively.[56]
Luisa Padora further declared that sometime in 1999, she located two (2) old
documents, among others, at the Manotoks warehouse in the compound: a 1929
certified copy of Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 1054 dated May 4, 1923 (Exh.
13-A[57]) between M. Teodoro and Severino Manotok (assignors) and Severino
Manotok (assignee) covering Lot No. 823, which was certified by the Chief Clerk of
the Bureau of Lands, and the original Official Receipt dated February 20, 1929 (Exh.
14[58]) issued by the Government of the Philippines Islands for the cost of the
certified copy of the Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 1054. With respect to the
documents relating to Lot No. 823 which were in the LMB, Luisa Padora stated that
she brought the letter-request (Exh. 122 [59]) dated July 9, 2009 requesting for copies
of all LMB documents pertaining to Lot No. 823. When she went to the Friar Lands
Division of the LMB, and went through the folders marked Volumes I, III and IV, she
noticed that there was no Volume II, and that out of the 1000 pages of available
records of Lot No. 823, only 416 pages were released to her upon orders from the
OIC of the RMD, Atty. Tuanda. Atty. Tuanda released all the withheld
documents (only 416 pages out of 1000 pages of available records of Lot No.
823) only after she was ordered by the Court to provide the Manotoks with copies of
the documents. She noticed there was no Volume II. The LMB released some of the
requested documents after her first affidavit was submitted before the court onJuly
20, 2009.[60]
As to the statement of Atty. Tuanda during the November 10, 2009 hearing that
Volume II of the records of Lot No. 823 was not missing and is available, Luisa
Padora stated that she received a letter-reply dated October 15, 2007 addressed to
the Manotoks (Exh. 117[61]) from Mr. Rainier D. Balbuena, OIC of the RMD, which
states that out of all the records pertaining to Lot 823, Piedad Estate, only Volumes
I, III and IV were officially returned/received by the RMD on October 5, 2006 and that
Volume II was not returned to the RMD. As additional proof, she presented LMB
Office Memorandum (Exh. 118[62]) dated September 19, 2007 which contains a note
at the bottom left hand corner which states Volume II not yet returned as of this
writing (charged to Office of the Asst. Director and recd by Charie Sale on 12.21.00).
[63]

Dr. Mely F. Sorra, Document Examiner V and presently the Chief of Questioned
Documents Division, Philippine National Police (PNP), testified that the LMB
submitted for examination on December 1, 2009 three (3) questioned documents:
Q-1 - Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 1054 dated March 11, 1919 executed by
Regina Geronimo, Modesto Zacarias and Felicisimo Villanueva; Q-2 - Assignment of

Sale Certificate No. 1054 dated May 4, 1923; and Q-3 Assignment of Sale Certificate
No. 511 dated June 24, 1939 (transmittal lettermarked as Exh. 139 signed by Atty.
Fe. T. Tuanda, OIC, RMD). Her laboratory report (Exh. 138[64]) contains the findings of
the microscopic, ultraviolet (UV) transmitted light and physical examinations, and
photographic procedure she performed on the questioned documents. She also
went to the National Archives for comparison of the appearance of documents dated
1919, 1923 and 1932 with Q-1, Q-2 and Q-3. She found the three (3) documents
authentic being old and because of their discoloration and tattered condition, but
she admitted that she cannot tell the age of said documents, nor the age of the
paper used. She merely determined the age through the browning and
discoloration, tears or tattered condition of the paper. In this case, she concluded
that the documents were old because they are attested/notarized and because of
their physical appearance, such as the ink used in the signatures was already fading
and had evaporated/oxidized. Because of age, the ink of the signatures appearing
on the documents had evaporated and the color is brownish; the particular ink
which evaporates refers to a fountain pen ink. The entries that were in ballpoint pen
ink were the written entries on the stamp pad bearing the words Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Land Management Bureau-RMD Manila. When
the documents were subjected under ultraviolet light examination, they gave a dull
fluorescence reaction as opposed to a very bright fluorescence reaction of a new
coupon bond.[65]
On cross-examination, Dr. Sorra said that at the National Archives she saw the
duplicates of the originals of documents Q-1 and Q-2 and had examined and
photographed them; they appeared newer than those copies submitted by the LMB
because of good storage. She did not examine contemporaneous documents in the
records of the LMB because she believes that the National Archives is the repository
of all the documents in the Philippines and because the three (3) questioned
documents came from the LMB, and she presumed that the record-keeping facilities
at the LMB are not as good as that of the National Archives based on the difference
in the appearance of the documents from these offices. However, she was not able
to see how the documents are being stored at the LMB as she was not able to visit
said office. Based on her findings, the questioned documents are old; she had seen
documents dated 1919 and 1923 on file with the National Archives. Documents Q-1
and Q-2 were from 1919 based on their copies at the National Archives and her
examination thereof. She explained that her conclusion that the document is
authentic does not mean that the signatures are also authentic because she had no
basis for comparison, and that she would not be able to determine the age of a
document when there was an artificial aging. [66]
Dr. Sorra admitted that she did not conduct a chemical examination of the
questioned documents because the PNP Crime Laboratory has no scientific
equipment for chemical analysis, and that she did not refer the said documents to
the Chemistry Division of the PNP because the carbon dating equipment is with the
Department of Science and Technology (DOST); she also did not refer the
documents to the DOST. She agreed that the best and more accurate way of
determining the age of a paper or a document is through carbon dating, and
explained that through microscopic and physical examination she will be able to tell
whether the document is old but not its exact age. [67]

In her Rebuttal Judicial Affidavit, [68] Milagros Manotok-Dormido declared that the
completion of Severino Manotoks installment payments was evidenced by official
receipts (Exhs. 112-115[69]) and acknowledged by the Deed of Conveyance No.
29204 (Exh. 51-A) validly certified by the National Archives (Exhs. 84 and 85 [70]),
which also certified page 97 of the Notarial Register for the year 1932 that on
December 20, 1932, Jose P. Dans appeared and acknowledged the due execution of
this Deed of Conveyance (Exh. 83[71]). Said Deed of Conveyance is genuine as
shown by the certified copies of Deeds of Conveyance issued on the same date and
which contain deed numbers immediately preceding and succeeding the Deed of
Conveyance No. 29204 (Exhs. 86-98[72]). On January 29, 1946 (August 23, 1946[73]),
Severino Manotok executed a Deed of Donation conveying Lot No. 823 covered by
TCT No. 22813 to his children and grandchildren. The Manotoks ownership of the
property is further evidenced by tax declarations in the name of Severino Manotok
and later his children and grandchildren as co-owners (Exhs. 25 to 27-YYYYYY), tax
payment receipts, building permits secured by Elisa Manotok for the construction of
buildings and structures on the land (Exhs. 64 to 78 [74]), and succeeding transfer
certificates of titles.[75]
With respect to the claim of the Barques, the witness presented the following
documents: (a) Certification issued on February 10, 2009 by the National Archives
stating that it has no copy on file of the Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly executed
between Emiliano Setosta and Homer K. Barque ratified on September 24, 1975
before Notary Public Eliseo A. Razon (Exh. 80[76]); (b) Property Identification issued
by the Quezon City Assessors Office showing that Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate
remains unsubdivided (Exh. 79[77]); (c) Letter dated August 7, 2007 addressed to
Engr. Privadi J.G. Dalire (former Chief of Geodetic Surveys Division) from Chief of
Geodetic Surveys Division, Engr. Bienvenido F. Cruz, attesting that Fls-3168-D is not
recorded in the Inventory Book of Fls Plans (Exh. 99 [78]), also shown by a certified
copy of page 351 of the Inventory Book of Plans (Exh. 82 [79]) ; and (d) Letter dated
August 6, 2009 from the Quezon City Assistant Assessor confirming that Property
Index No. 21-22020 which was submitted by the Barques marked as Exh. 35, does
not pertain to Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate but to a property located at Miller St. cor.
Don Vicente St., Filinvest II Subdivision, Bagong Silangan, Quezon City (Exh. 100 [80]).
[81]

As to the claim of Manahans, the witness submitted the following documents: (a)
the same Letter from the Quezon City Assistant Assessor, it was confirmed that Tax
Declaration No. C-138-06951, submitted by the Manahans as Exh.1, does not
pertain to Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate but to a property located at Don Wilfredo
St., Don Enrique Subdivision, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City (Exh. 100 [82]); (b)
Certifications from the National Archives that it has no copy on file of Sale
Certificate No. 511, Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 511 and Deed of Sale
between Hilaria de Guzman-Manahan and Felicitas Manahan (Exhs. 28[83], 104 and
105[84]); (c) Certification dated October 14, 2009 issued by Jose M.B. Cabatu, Chief,
Reconstitution Division-LRA, stating that an administrative petition for reconstitution
of the purported original of TCT No. 250215 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City
was filed by a certain Felicitas Manahan and transmitted to the LRA on or about
January 7, 1998 but the petition and other documents transmitted therewith could
not be located, and that it has no record of any order directing the reconstitution of
said title (Exh. 106[85]); (d) Certificates of Death issued by the Parish of Our Lady of
Mt. Carmel in Malolos City, Bulacan stating that Valentin Manahan died on

September 21, 1931, thus refuting the claim that Valentin Manahan caused the
property survey of Lot No. 823, the preparation and approval of survey plan Fls3164 and executed the Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 511 in favor of Hilaria de
Guzman on June 24, 1939 (Exhs. 102, 61, 62[86]); (e) Negative Certification of Death
issued by the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Malolos stating that the records of
deaths during the period January 1931 to December 1931 were all destroyed by
natural cause and for that reason it cannot issue a true transcription from the
Register of Deaths relative to Valentin Manahan who is alleged to have died on
September 21, 1931 in Malolos City (Exh. 103 [87]); (e) Documents obtained from the
Parish of Our Lady of Mt. Carmel, the Office of the Civil Registrar of Malolos City and
the National Statistics Office (NSO), and also Liber Defunctorum 5-Entry No. 10,
showing that Rosendo Manahan died on July 30, 1963 at the age of 20, thus refuting
the claim of Rosendo Manahan that he is the son of Lucio Manahan and Hilaria de
Guzman-Manahan (Exhs. 107, 108, 109 and 57 [88]).[89]
Milagros Manotok-Dormido further declared that the building permits applied for by
her aunt refer to the houses appearing in the photographs attached to her Judicial
Affidavit. Based on the index cards (Exhs. 64 to 69 [90]), the location of the properties
described therein is Capitol Golf Club, Capitol; at that time, the location of the
property subject of the building permits in Exhs. 67, 68 and 69 is Capitol Golf Club,
Capitol. They did not apply to build residences inside a golf club and there is no golf
course inside the Manotok Compound.[91] She went to Malolos about four (4) times
to confirm the story of the Manahans. At the Parish of Our Lady of Mt. Carmel, the
custodian of the records, Teodora Dinio, referred her to a man she knew as Mang
Atoy who showed her the Book of Deads. She borrowed three (3) books and
returned them right away after xeroxing. She asked Mang Atoywhere the Catholic
cemetery is and he pointed to the back of the church. There she saw (for a brief
time) the tombstone of Lucio Manahan; she did not see that of Valentin
Manahan. When asked why she did not go to the LMB or other government office
instead of the National Archives to secure a certification in the records concerning
Sale Certificate No. 511, the witness said it was because that was a notarized
document. The certifications she obtained were not signed by the Executive Director
but only by an archivist who was authorized to sign in behalf of Dr. Teresita Ignacio,
Chief of the Archives Collection and Access Division. As to the lack of signature of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in the certified copy of Deed of
Conveyance No. 29204 from the National Archives, she asserted that it is still a
complete document being just a copy of the duplicate original, which must have
been signed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources; she was sure of
this, as in fact they were issued TCT No. 22813 dated 1933 (not August 1928 as
erroneously reflected in the title because the Deed of Conveyance was issued in
1932 and her grandfather was notified by the Provincial Assessor of Rizal that he
can start paying his tax on August 9, 1933). [92]
The Manotoks also presented as witness Msgr. Angelito Santiago, Parish Priest of
Our Lady of Mt. Carmel in Barasoain, Malolos, Bulacan. Said witness testified that
based on their record book, Hilaria de Guzman who was living in Bulihan was the
wife of Lucio Manahan who died on August 19, 1955, while in Book 7, Hilaria de
Guzman who died on June 19, 1989 was living in San Gabriel and the husband was
Jose Cruz; Hilaria de Guzman appearing in Book 7 is different from Hilaria de
Guzman found in Book 5. He further declared that the Certificate of Death of

Valentin Manahan married to Francisca Lucas (Exh. 61 [93]) does not cover the death
of Valentin Manahan married to Placida Figueroa. He could not explain why Folio
Nos. 145, 146, 148, 149 are intact while page or Folio 147 of Book 4 covering the
record of deaths in the month of February 1955 is missing. [94]
Other documentary evidence formally offered by the Manotoks are the following: (a)
Exh. 7[95] - a photocopy of TCT No. 534 covering Lot No. 823, Piedad Estate in the
name of the Manotok children, which is offered to prove that said title is a transfer
from TCT No. 22813 which was cancelled by TCT No. 534; (b) Exh. 19 [96] -certified
copy of a Certification dated November 18, 1950 issued by Register of Deeds for
Pasig Gregorio Velazquez that the original of TCT No. 534 issued in the name of
Purificacion Manotok, et al. was forwarded to the Register of Deeds for Quezon
City; (c) Exh. 119[97] - certified copy of page 98 of the Notarial Register of Atty.
Santiago Reyes which shows that document no. 1515 is a Memorandum of
Agreement-Promissory Note & Payment Receipt executed by one (1) Mr. Cornejo
on August 23, 1974, and not the alleged Deed of Sale between Hilaria de Guzman
and Felicitas Manahan; (d) Exh. 120[98] - certified copy of page 84 of the Notarial
Register of Atty. Eliseo Razon for 1975 which shows that doc. no. 415 is not the
supposed Deed of Sale datedSeptember 24, 1975 between Homer Barque and
Emiliano Setosta, but a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Magdalena Reyes; (e)
Exh. 121[99] - certified copy of page 85 of the Notarial Register of Atty. Eliseo Razon
for 1975 which shows that doc. no. 416 is not the supposed Deed of Sale
dated September 24, 1975 between Homer Barque and Emiliano Setosta, but a
Special Power of Attorney executed by Victorino Savellano.
As part of their rebuttal evidence, the Manotoks also formally offered the following:
Exh. 142 - Certified copy issued by the National Archives of Assignment of Sale
Certificate No. 1054 dated March 11, 1919 between Zacarias Modesto, Regina
Geronimo and Felicisimo Villanueva (assignors) and Zacarias Modesto (assignee),
covering Lot 823 of Piedad Estate [100]; Exh. 143 Certified copy issued by the National
Archives of Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 1054 dated June 7, 1920 between
Zacarias Modesto (assignor) and M. Teodoro and Severino Manotok
(assignees) covering Lot 823 of Piedad Estate [101]; and Exh. 144 - Certified copy
issued by the National Archives of Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 1054 dated
May 4, 1923 between M. Teodoro and Severino Manotok (assignors) and Severino
Manotok (assignee), covering Lot 823 of Piedad Estate. [102]
C. Barques
Teresita Barque-Hernandez identified and affirmed the contents of her Judicial
Affidavit declaring that she caused the filing of an application for administrative
reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 before the LRA because the original copy thereof
was among those titles destroyed in a fire which struck the Quezon City Hall in
1988.As proof that her father Homer Barque owned Lot No. 823 of the Piedad
Estate, she presented copies of various Tax Declarations from 1986 up to 1996 and
Plan of Lots 823-A and 823-B, Fls-3168-D dated April 24, 1998. Her father acquired
the property from Emiliano P. Setosta pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale
dated September 24, 1975 (Exh. 14[103]). Emiliano P. Setosta was issued TCT No.
13900 but despite diligent efforts she could no longer locate it. She was able to

obtain the following documents from the LRA and Bureau of Lands: (a) Certified true
copy of the approved Subdivision Plan of Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate for Emiliano
Setosta dated June 21, 1940, containing an area of 342,945 square meters (Exh.
3[104]); (b) Certified true copy of the File Copy from the Bureau of Lands of said
Subdivision Plan now bearing the typewritten notation VALIDATION DENR A.O. No.
49 1991 (Exh. 4[105]); (c) Certification dated April 11, 1996 from the LRA issued by
Felino M. Cortez, Chief, Ordinary and Cadastral Decree Division stating that as per
Record Book of Decrees for Ordinary Land Registration Cases, (OLD) CLR Record No.
5975, Rizal was issued Decree No. 6667 on March 8, 1912, which appears in TCT No.
210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque, Sr. (Exh. 5 [106]); (d) Certified true copy of
the survey plan (microfilm enlargement of Fls-3168-D with the signatures of Privadi
J.G. Dalire and Carmelito Soriano, which she got from the Bureau of Lands (Exh.
6[107]); (e) Certified photocopy of BL From 31-10 showing the technical descriptions
of Lots 822, 823, 824 and 826 (Exh. 7[108]); and (f) BL Form No. 28-37-R dated 11-894 which shows the lot boundaries, also obtained from the Bureau of Lands (Exh.
12[109]).[110]
On cross-examination, the witness said that she is engaged in selling subdivision
lots and many attempted to sellLot 823 but nobody buys it. Emiliano Setosta was
introduced to her by her father in 1974 or 1975 when she was in her 30s. Her father
did not discuss with the family his transaction with Emiliano Setosta and she
learned about it when her father was sick and dying in 1989. When asked why it
was only in 1989 that she discovered that her father purchased thirty four (34)
hectares of land from Emiliano Setosta, she answered it was wayback in 1985.Asked
again as to when she learned for the first time of the purchase of the subject lot by
her father, she replied that it was sometime in 1989 after the fire which gutted the
Register of Deeds in 1988. In 1985, when her mother was sick of cervical cancer,
her father borrowed money from her Lola Felisa to purchase the subject lot. When
asked about such money borrowed by her father in 1985, she said that her father
bought the property in 1975 and the money borrowed by her father was used for
the hospitalization of her mother. Her father left the title of the subject lot to
her Lola Felisa before his death in 1991. After her fathers death, her sister found a
tax declaration covering Lot 823 which was burned by her sister along with other
belongings of their father. In filing a petition for administrative reconstitution, she
applied for the issuance of a tax declaration; the tax declaration she secured was
new and the property undeclared. When asked why, she said that the lawyer of her
father who is 89 years old told them how to do it because we do not have tax
declaration. When asked again why the property is undeclared, she replied that the
OIC of the Assessors Office in the person of Mr. Viloria told her that the tax
declaration of her father was lost because of saksak-bunot. In the early part of
1999, a certain Atty. Quilala of the Register of Deeds told her that another person
filed a petition for reconstitution; he gave her copies of a tax declaration and title in
the name of Felicitas Manahan married to Rosendo Manahan. [111]
As for the title of the Manotoks, nobody told her about it when she was securing a
new tax declaration. Before 1979, she had visited the property which had no fence
then. She was not actually interested, she just went there for a visit with her friends
to boast that her father bought something that is big. She only learned there was
somebody occupying their land after she had paid the taxes and submitted
documents which were transmitted to the LRA; it was the reconstituting officer who

told her that the title has been reconstituted already. She had not seen before any
structure inside the property. The reconstituting officer made it hard for her to have
administrative reconstitution of her title, verifying if she had an approved plan. She
admitted that as shown in the Deed of Conveyance No. 4562 dated May 4,
1937 (Exh. 1[112]), the lot was paid in Japanese war notes despite the fact that the
war started only on December 8, 1941. She was not able to bring with her the
original copy of TCT No. 210177 because it was mortgaged on June 15, 2007 and
the same is in the possession of Cedric Lee (president of Isumo Corporation) from
whom she received P10,000,000.00; Mr. Cedric Lee will buy the property. Her sister
was to be operated at that time and she was forced to borrow money. Mr. Lee
wanted to be ahead of Ayala, Megaworld, and others, in offering to buy the
property. She admitted that they never tried to occupy Lot No. 823 after learning
that her father owned it in 1985. They were then employed and had a bus line
(Mariposa Express); her father bought other properties but she was not privy to
this. Exhibits 34, 35, 35-A and 35-B[113] pertaining to the claim of Manahans were
given to him not by Atty. Quilala but by Atty. Bragado. She never saw the title of
Emiliano Setosta as her father transferred immediately the title in his name (TCT No.
210177).[114]
As to the Sale Certificate and Deed of Conveyance in the name of Emiliano Setosta,
she did not yet know its number or date when she asked for a copy in the LMB (she
went there accompanied by Castor Viernes), they just located it. After two (2) days
she returned and the person in-charge gave her a certified xerox copy of Deed of
Conveyance No. 4562 and Sale Certificate No. V-321 (Exh. 1), which documents
were later authenticated by the LMB. The caption of this document dated May 4,
1937 reads: Republic of the Philippines, Department of Agriculture and Commerce,
Office of the Secretary: she agrees though that the Republic of the Philippines was
not yet established at the time the document was executed. It also mentioned the
Civil Code of the Philippinesand the purchase price being fully paid with Japanese
war notes in July 1942. Together with Engr. Castor Viernes, she got a Certification
dated June 8, 2009 from Mr. Ignacio R. Almira which states that his office has
available record of Deed of Conveyance No. 4562 (Exh. 1 [115]) and Sale Certificate
No. V-321 (Exh. 2[116]).She also secured the Certification dated April 13, 2009 issued
by Ignacio R. Almira, stating that according to our Registry Book upon verification
that Lot No. 823, Piedad Estate under Sales Certificate No. 511 in favor of Valentin
Manahan as assignor and Hilaria de Guzman Manahan had no available record in
this Office (Exh. 30[117]). She later clarified that Ignacio R. Almira is not the custodian
of the records of the LMB but Chief of the Regional Surveys Division certifying
documents with the DENR; neither is Ignacio R. Almira the custodian of the records
of the DENR.[118]
Engr. Castor C. Viernes, a former employee of the Bureau of Lands (1961-1972),
identified in court the following documents he obtained through his research: (a)
Certification dated June 19, 2007 issued by Rainier D. Balbuena, OIC, RMD, LMB,
Binondo, Manila stating that according to verification of their records, EDPs Listing
has available record with Fls-3168-D, Lot 823, xerox copy of which is herewith
attached, situated in Caloocan, Rizal (now Quezon City), in the name of Survey
Claimant Emiliano Setosta (Exh. 10[119]); (b)Certification dated June 19, 2007 issued
by LMB-RMD OIC Rainier D. Balbuena stating that according to verification of their
records, the office has no available record of F-30510 and F-87330, situated in

Piedad Estate, Rizal, in the name of M. Teodoro as Assignor, and Severino Manotok
as Assignee, as per attached xerox copies of the Assignment of Sale Certificate No.
1054, according to the general index card (Exh. 24 [120]); (c) Certification issued by
Ernesto S. Erive, Chief, Surveys Division, DENR-NCR stating that plan Flr-67-D is not
among those existing records on file in the Technical Records and Statistics Section
of this Office. However, further verification should be made from Land Management
Bureau, Binondo, Manila (Exh. 26[121]); (d) Letter dated January 10, 2003 from
Bienvenido F. Cruz, OIC, Geodetic Surveys Division, LMB, stating that Flr-67-D is not
listed in the EDP listing (Exh. 27[122]); (e) Plan of Lot 823, Piedad Estate prepared by
Geodetic Engineer Teresita D. Sontillanosa on April 23, 1998 (Exh. 28 [123]); (f) TCT
No. RT-22481 (372302) in the name of Severino Manotok IV, et al. indicating Payatas
Estate as a boundary in the survey made in 1912 when Payatas Estate did not exist
until 1923 (Exh. 29[124]); (g) Certification dated April 13, 2009 issued by Ignacio R.
Almira, Chief, Regional Director Surveys Division, confirming the absence of any
record in the DENR of Sale Certificate No. 511 issued to Valentin Manahan (Exh.
30[125]); (h) Certification dated August 27, 2002 issued by Bienvenido F. Cruz, OIC,
Geodetic Surveys Division, LMB stating that Fls-3164 is not listed in the EDP Listing
(Exh. 31[126]); (i) Letter dated March 12, 2003 from Atty. Crizaldy M. Barcelo,
Assistant Regional Executive Director for Technical Services, DENR-NCR stating that
their office has no record on file of Sale Certificate No. 511 in the name of Valentin
Manahan and Sale Certificate No. 1054 in the name of Modesto Zacarias, Regina
Geronimo and Felicisimo Villanueva, covering Lot 823, Piedad Estate, and
advising Mr. Viernes to make a similar request with the LMB which has jurisdiction
over friar lands (Exh. 32[127]); (j) Copy of TCT No. 250215 in the name of Felicitas
Manahan, married to Rosendo Manahan issued on May 25, 1979 covering Lot 823,
Piedad Estate with an area of 342,945 square meters given to Felicitas Manahan by
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City (Exh. 34 [128]); (k) Tax Declaration No. D-13807070 in the name of Felicitas Manahan indicating that Lot 823, Piedad Estate is
situated at Old Balara, Holy Spirit/Capitol, Quezon City for the year 1996, with tax
receipt and certification (Exhs. 35, 35-A and 35-B[129]); (l) Letter dated February 21,
2003 from Emelyne Villanueva-Talabis, Special Assistant to the LMB Director
informing Mr. Viernes that his letter requesting for a certified copy of Sales
Certificate Nos. 511 and 1054 was forwarded to the RMD on February 21, 2003
(Exh. 36[130]); and (m) Letter dated February 27, 2003 from Leonardo V. Bordeos, OIC
of LMB-RMD informing Mr. Viernes that the latters request cannot be granted
because the said records are still not in the custody of this Division and suggesting
that a similar request be made with the DENR-NCR (Exh. 37 [131]).[132]
Engr. Viernes asserted that the subject property is not bounded by the Payatas
Estate considering that when the Piedad Estate was surveyed in 1907, the Payatas
Estate was not yet existing because it was surveyed only in 1923. The computation
made by Engr. Barikwa (sic) and report made by Engr. Evelyn Celzo, and also the
plotting of Marco Castro seems to be erroneous. The other parties claimed that the
property described in TCT No. 210177 (Barques title) is not located in Quezon
City allegedly because when plotted to its tie line it appears to be 5,637.50 meters
away from Lot 823. In the submitted title of the Barques, Lot 823-A of Fls-3168-D as
described in the title is not readable; it seems to be 9,000 kilometers and not 4,000
kilometers. That is why when they plotted the tie line of Lot 823-A using the 9,786.6
meters from monument 16, it falls away from the map of Quezon City, something
like more than five (5) kilometers away from the plotting using the tie line of the

original Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate of 4,097.4 meters from monument 16. The
witness said he showed his computation to his officemate, Geodetic Engineer
Teresita Sontillanosa who agreed with his computation. He identified Comparative
Report on TCT No. RT-22481 and TCT No. 210177 (Exh. 41), the Sketch Plans for Lots
823-A and 823-B (Exhs. 39 and 41[133]).[134]
Engr. Viernes denied that he was employed by the Barques for a fee. It was Mr.
Gregorio Que, a friend of Mrs. Hernandez, the son of his client Mr. Domingo Que,
who asked him to help verify the authenticity of the Barques title. He obtained
copies of TCT No. 250215 and tax declaration of the Manahans from Engr. Mariano
Flotildes. As to the Barques Exh. 1, he denied having a hand in securing said
document but admitted he was with Teresita B. Hernandez when it was handed to
her. Mrs. Hernandez presented a document to Mrs. Teresita J. Reyes for
authentication, but he did not see the latter sign the certification because he was at
the ground floor of the LMB talking to a friend; the document was already signed
when it was handed to Mrs. Hernandez. He also did not see Ignacio R. Almira sign
the Certification dated June 8, 2009 (Exh. 2). When he was still in the Bureau of
Lands from 1961 to 1972, he was holding the position of Computer II in-charge of
the verification of cadastral survey returns; he was not then involved in the actual
survey of lots because he was a Civil Engineer and not a Geodetic Engineer. He
admitted that he was not able to conduct an actual survey of Lots 823-A and 823-B
of the Piedad Estate.[135]
The Barques presented as witnesses in rebuttal Engr. Castor Viernes, Teresita
Barque-Hernandez, Dante M. Villoria and Engr. Mariano Flotildes.
Engr. Viernes declared that Mrs. Hernandez had told him that it appeared during her
cross-examination in court that the alleged Deed of Conveyance No. 4562 is
spurious. A copy of said deed of conveyance (Exh. 44) was given to him by the LMB
sometime in March 1997 which he in turn submitted to Mr. Que. Mr. Que had asked
him to verify Lot 823 because Mrs. Teresita Barque Hernandez wanted to borrow
money from him on the title of said lot. When asked why he did not include Deed of
Conveyance No. 4562 among the fourteen (14) documents he found pertaining to
the property of Homer L. Barque, Sr. despite his earlier testimony that he got a copy
thereof from the LMB on March 14, 1997, Engr. Viernes explained that the Deed of
Conveyance was not among those he would be testifying and was not mentioned in
the previous affidavit that he had signed. When asked why Deed of Conveyance No.
4562 marked as Exh. 1 is dated January 25, 1938 while the Deed of Conveyance No.
4562 marked as Exh. 44 is dated May 4, 1937, he answered that he does not know;
neither was he aware that the name and address mentioned in the two (2)
documents are also different (in Exh. 44 it is Emiliano T. Setosta who was resident of
2800 Santolan St., Sampaloc, while in Exh. 1 it stated that Jose Setosta who was
named therein was a resident of Bustillos, Sampaloc. Mrs. Hernandez was claiming
the lot which she said is located in Culiat, but based on the maps it is situated in
Matandang Balara. If the name of the place where the property is located is
incorrect, the technical description should be corrected to conform to the lots actual
location.[136]
Teresita Barque-Hernandez testified that she did some research on the alleged
practice among employees of the Bureau of Lands of issuing fake documents and

was dismayed to discover that Atty. Fe T. Tuanda, a high-ranking official of the LMB,
was suspended from the practice of law, and her credibility is in question after
having been charged with violation of B.P. Blg. 22. She described the practice
of saksak-bunot wherein documents are inserted in the records of the LMB, and
people submit documents from their own personal file after which they would ask
for certification or a certified copy thereof. She admitted that Exh. 1 which was
presented by her lawyer was a falsified document, and that she was fooled by
somebody from the Bureau. However, she was sure of the authenticity of Exh. 44,
[137]
as it came from Mr. Que. When confronted with Exh. 44 which stated that the
price of Lot 823 was P2,850.45 but only 50% thereof was paid allegedly by Emiliano
Setosta, she lamented that she was not yet born at the time of the transaction
January 25, 1938 and did not know what really happened. She denied asking for reauthentication after the conduct of her cross-examination which tended to show
that her Exh. 1 was a forgery and after Teresita Reyes testified that the latters
signatures thereon were forged. She affirmed that she went to Mr. Que in the early
part of 1997 to borrow money in order to redeem the property covered by TCT No.
210177, which was mortgaged by her father to the sister of her lola in 1985. She
received a total of P2,000,000.00 from Mr. Que; thereafter, she went to another
lender, Mr. Jesus Lim, from whom she secured a loan of the same amount. She paid
the loan to Mr. Lim with the proceeds of yet another loan from Mr. Cedric Lee.[138]
Dante M. Villoria, retired City Assessor of Quezon City, declared in his Judicial
Affidavit that Lot 823 is located in Barangay Matandang Balara, which has existed
as a separate barangay from Barangay Culiat even before they were transferred
from Caloocan City to Quezon City in 1939.[139] He testified that it is the technical
description of the property that determines its identity, regardless of the name of its
location. He was shown Tax Declaration No. 06895 in the name of the Barques (Exh.
123[140]-Manotoks) which contains a memo on the lower left hand portion which
reads this property appear[s] to duplicate the property of Manotok Realty, Inc.,
declared under [Tax Declaration Number] D-067-02136 with area of 342,945
sq.m./P.I. No. 21-4202, and was asked if that meant that the tax declaration in the
name of Manotok Realty Inc. existed before the tax declaration in favor of the
Barques. Upon the objection of his counsel, the witness vacillated and said he is not
certain as he has to see first the tax declaration of the Manotoks to determine which
came ahead. However, he affirmed that if such memo is written on a tax
declaration, it means that the information stated in the memo was already available
on the date of the tax declaration. As to the statement on the reverse side of Exh.
124[141]-Manotoks on the portion indicating the tax declaration cancelled there is an
entry new (undeclared), witness explained that it means that there was no tax
declaration for the same property in the name of the Barques prior to the said tax
declaration. He then clarified by saying that while there is an existing tax
declaration, they still issued another tax declaration because the documents
presented as basis therefor were legal and binding. He admitted that their office will
issue several tax declarations covering the same property even with the knowledge
that the tax declaration can be used as evidence for ownership because the main
concern is to collect more taxes.[142]
Engr. Mariano Flotildes declared in his Judicial Affidavit that Rosendo Manahan
engaged his services in 1998 and gave him a relocation plan, photocopy of TCT No.
250215 in the name of Felicitas Manahan, field notes cover of the survey returns,

complete lot survey data, traverse computation and azimuth computation.After

signing the relocation plan in March 1998, Mr. Manahan submitted the Relocation
Survey and the related documents to DENR-NCR, Surveys Division. Thereafter,
Relocation Survey Number Rel-00-000822 was issued in favor of Felicitas Manahan.
[143]
He testified that he was commissioned by Rosendo Manahan sometime in 1998
to conduct a relocation survey of a property owned by his wife, Felicitas Manahan,
covered by TCT No. 250215. His findings coincided with the technical description of
said title, duly certified by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, which was shown
to him together with the full print survey returns, tax declaration, field notes cover
(Exh. 45[144]), plot data computation, traverse computation (Exh. 47 [145]) and azimuth
computation (Exh. 48[146]) and the plan itself. However, the relocation plan for the
Manahans was not approved by the Bureau of Lands. It was Rosendo Manahan who
gave him a copy of TCT No. 250215 (Exh. 34), from which was derived the
information found in the plot data of Lot No. 823 (Exh. 46 [147]); these were not based
on documents from the Bureau of Lands.[148]
Other documentary evidence formally offered by the Barques are the following: Exh.
8 Certified copy of Logbook Entries of Destroyed and Salvaged Documents in the
fire which razed the office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on June 11, 1988;
[149]
Exh. 9 Certified Copy of the Bureau of Lands Computer Printout of the List of
Locator Cards by Box Number as of February 4, 1982 to prove that Fls-3168-D has
been duly entered in the microfilm records of the Bureau of Lands and assigned with
Accession No. 410436 appearing on page 79, Preliminary Report No. 1, List of
Locator Cards by Box Number, as of February 4, 1984, copy of EDP Listing certified
by Teresita J. Reyes, OIC, LMB-RMD;[150] Exh. 11 Certified Xerox Copy of the Tax Map
of Quezon City dated April 21, 1998 issued by the Tax Mapping Division, City
Assessors Office, Quezon City to prove the veracity of the subdivision of Lot No. 823
Piedad Estate into Lots No. 823-A and 823-B;[151] Exh. 13 Certification dated 27
September 1996 issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City attesting that
based on the List of Salvaged Titles prepared by the Land Registration Authority,
TCT No. 210177 was not included as among those saved from the fire of June 11,
1988;[152] Exh. 15 Acknowledgment Receipt dated September 24, 1975 issued by
Emiliano Setosta, confirming the payment given to him by Homer L. Barque, Sr. in
the amount of P350,000.00 for the purchase of Lots 823-A and 823-B, located in
Matandang Balara, Quezon City;[153]Exh. 16 Certification dated August 13,
1997 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila stating that an instrument
entitled Deed of Absolute Sale between Emiliano P. Setosta (vendor) and Homer L.
Barque, Sr. (vendee) was notarized by Atty. Eliseo Razon on September 24,
1975 and entered in his Notarial Register, under Doc. 416, Page No. 85, Book No.
VIII, Series of 1975;[154] Exh. 18 Certified True Copy of the Owners Duplicate Copy of
TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque, Sr.; [155] Exhs. 19 to 19-H - Tax
Declaration Nos. 06893 (1996) and 06892 (1987) in the name of Homer L. Barque,
Sr. m/to Matilde Reyes and Real Property Tax Bills/Receipts; [156] Exh. 20 - Certification
issued by Nestor D. Karim, Kagawad/Official-On-Duty of Bgy. Culiat, Area XII, District
II, Quezon City, attesting that there is no Payong Street or place in the barangay;
[157]
Exh. 21 - Letter dated April 14, 1998 from Dante M. Villoria, Assistant City
Assessor of Quezon City addressed to the Law Division, LRA affirming that [a]s per
our record, there is no Barrio Payong inQuezon City; [158] Exh. 22 - Certification dated
August 10, 2007 issued by the City Assessor, Quezon City stating that there is no
Barangay or Barrio Payong in Quezon City as per office record; [159] Exhs. 23 to 23-L

-Barangay Profile of Matandang Balara, District III, Area 15 as of May 2000 (NSO)
issued by the Office of the City Mayor, Quezon City, which shows that Bgy.
Matandang Balara was created on May 10, 1962 pursuant to Ordinance No. 5068
and describes the barangays boundaries, and thus prove that TCT No. RT-22481
(372302) in the name of Severino Manotok IV, et al. and Sales Certificate No. 511 in
the name of Felicitas Manahan are fake and spurious; [160] Exh. 25 Certification dated
July 19, 2007 issued by Rainier D. Balbuena, OIC of LMB-RMD stating that according
to their records, there is no available record of a Deed of Sale No. 1054 allegedly in
the name of M. Teodoro and/or Severino Manotok covering the property situated in
Piedad Estate, Caloocan, Rizal;[161] Exh. 32 - Letter dated March 12, 2003 from Atty.
Crizaldy M. Barcelo, Assistant Regional Executive Director for Technical Services,
DENR-NCR stating that they have no record on file of Sale Certificate No. 511 in the
name of Valentin Manahan and Sale Certificate No. 1054 in the name of Modesto
Zacarias, Regina Geronimo and Felicisimo Villanueva covering Lot 823 of the Piedad
Estate;[162] Exh. 33 Copy of Sale Certificate/Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 511 in
the name of Valentin Manahan (assignor) and Hilaria de Guzman (assignee), with
same date as Sale Certificate No. 511 - June 24, 1939 showing the Department of
the Interior, Bureau of Lands when in fact the Department of the Interior was
abolished pursuant to Act No. 2666 on November 18, 1916 and its transfer and
functions were transferred to the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources
(DANR), and in 1932 another reorganization act was passed providing, among
others, for renaming of the DANR to Department of Agriculture and Commerce
(DAC);[163] Exh. 33-A - Deed of Conveyance in the name of Felicitas Manahan,
married to Rosendo Manahan purportedly issued on December 3, 2000 by the
Director of Lands, Office of the Secretary, DANR despite the fact that said
department was renamed Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) pursuant to Executive Order No. 192 issued on June 10, 1987; [164] Exh. 37
Certified true copy of the Property Identification Map of Barangay Matandang Balara
issued by the City Assessor of Quezon City to prove that the records of the Bureau
of Lands conform to and confirm the metes and bounds contained in the full
technical description of Lot 823, Piedad Estate embodied in TCT No. 13900 in the
name of Emiliano Setosta and TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque, Sr.,
and which also shows Lots 823-A and 823-B subdivided lots; [165] Exh. 38
- Certification dated May 12, 1998 issued by Ernesto S. Erive, Chief, Surveys
Division, DENR-NCR for the Regional Technical Director, with approval recommended
by Veronica S. Ardina Remolar, Chief, Technical Records and Statistics Section,
stating that plan Psu-32606, as surveyed for the Payatas Estate IMP Co., situated in
Montalban and San Mateo, Rizal, with an area of 36,512.952 sq.m. and originally
approved on Jan. 12, 1923 is among those existing reconstructed records on file in
the Technical Records and Statistics Section of this Office, to prove that the Payatas
Estate could have been claimed by the Manotoks as a boundary of Lot 823, Piedad
Estate since Payatas Estate was created only on June 12, 1923; [166] Exh. 42 Certification dated August 24, 2007 issued by Gregorio Faraon of the RTC of Manila
stating that the document entitled Deed of Absolute Sale executed between
Emiliano P. Setosta (vendor) and Homer L. Barque, Sr. (vendee) exists in the notarial
files and was among the documents notarized, reported and submitted by Atty.
Eliseo A. Razon, in his notarial book for the month of September 1975, under Doc.
No. 416, Page No. 85, Book No. VII, series of 1975; [167] Exh. 43 - Certification dated
March 14, 1997 issued by Amando Bangayan stating that the only available record
on file in this Office is the Deed of Conveyance/Sales Certificate issued to Emiliano

Setosta covering Lot No. 823, Piedad Estate, Caloocan, Rizal [168] with attached copy
of Deed of Conveyance No. 4562 dated January 25, 1938 (Exh. 44); Exh. 49
Certification dated November 23, 2009 issued by Atty. Ma. Cristina B. Layusa,
Deputy Clerk of Court & Bar Confidant, Supreme Court, stating that Atty. Fe T.
Tuanda has been suspended from the practice of law as imposed in a Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated 17 October 1988 in CA-G.R. Cr # 05093;[169] and Exh. 51
Certified Microfilm Copy of the Articles of Incorporation of Manotok Realty, Inc.
issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) showing its date of
incorporation as of September 11, 1950, which was after the issuance of TCT No.
13900 in the name of said corporation on August 31, 1950.[170]
Exhibits 1 (certified copy of Deed of Conveyance Record No. 4562 with Sale
Certificate No. V-321 in the name of Emiliano Setosta, and 2 (Certification
dated June 8, 2009 issued by Ignacio R. Almira, Chief, Regional Surveys Division,
DENR), marked during the pre-trial were not formally offered by the Barques.
C. Manahans
Rosendo Manahan declared in his Judicial Affidavit that Lot 823 of the Piedad
Estate belongs to his wife by virtue of Deed of Conveyance No. V-2000-22
dated October 30, 2000 issued to her by the LMB. However, his wife has no
certificate of title because the LRA Administrator declared that her deed of
conveyance is non-registrable at this time because there are two (2) other claimants
to the lot - Severino Manotok IV, et al. and the Heirs of Homer L. Barque, Sr. Thus,
his wife filed a petition for mandamus with the CA to compel the LRA to allow the
registration of Deed of Conveyance No. V-2000-22 and issuance of the
corresponding title in the name of Felicitas Manahan. However, the CA denied the
petition, and they filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court where the case
is still pending. He had assisted his wife in working for the issuance of a certificate
of title and did a lot of record searching. The Manotoks have no valid claim
over Lot 823 as their documents have been found to be spurious and not authentic
by the NBI and LMB. As to the Barques who claimed that their plan has accession
number, the witness asserted that Accession No. 410436 is in the name of Nicolas
Apo, et al. as shown in Exh. XXXII.[171] Moreover, the technical description of the lot
being claimed by the Barques when verified and plotted by DENR-NCR, LRA and
private surveyor Jose R. Baricua, is outside Quezon City and 5.8 kilometers away
from Lot 823 as shown in Exhs. XXVIII, XXIX, XXX and XXXI. [172]
Rosendo Manahan testified that the documents relied upon by the Manotoks were
submitted for verification by the LMB to the NBI and found to be fake and
spurious. A very thorough search of documents covering Lot 823 by the LMB and
DENR yielded only documents in the name of the Manahans but no genuine
document in the name of the Manotoks. The claim of the Barques that they
own Lot 823 is likewise false considering that the files of the LMB and DENR do not
have Sale Certificate No. V-321 and Deed of Conveyance No. 4562. The technical
description of the lot claimed by the Barques, when plotted by the private
prosecutor Jose Baricua and the DENR-NCR as well as LRA, showed that it is
outside Quezon City and 5.8 kilometers away from Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate
(Exhs. XXVIII, XXIX, XXX and XXXI[173]). The Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 of the

Manotoks had no signature of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, and he

had not seen any copy thereof in the records of the LMB. [174]
On cross-examination, Rosendo Manahan testified that his father Lucio Manahan
and mother Hilaria de Guzman were born in Malolos, Bulacan; he was also born and
lived there almost his life. In 1945 or 1946 when he was about seven (7) years old,
his grandfather Valentin Manahan brought him to Lot 823. His grandfather died in
1948, his grandmother died later at the age of 93. His wife Felicitas bought Lot 823
for P350,000.00 because his other siblings had no money to buy the property. He
met Evelyn Celzo when he accompanied his wife to the regional Office; they had no
intervention in the preparation of her report. He cannot recall if Evelyn Celzo asked
his wife about Valentin Manahans application and assignment of Lot 823, nor of the
death of Lucio Manahan, Felicitas told Celzo that Hilaria de Guzman went to the
property but she was denied entry by heavily armed men. When he was about eight
(8) years old, his father would take him from Malolos to Quezon City to see Lot823,
and his parents took over Lot 823 when his grandparents Valentin Manahan and
Placida Figueroa after 1939 went back to Malolos, specifically Barrio Pulilan. [175]
Rosendo Manahan asserted that Sale Certificate No. 511 (Exh. XXXVII [176]) was
issued as early as 1913; he had verified its existence in the records of the
LMB. However, he had sent letters - the last being in 1998 - asking for a
certification, to no avail; despite a thorough search for the document in the LMB and
DENR, it could not be found. He did not think of obtaining copy of the document
from the National Archives because as far as his laymans understanding, the main
purpose of the National Archives is to keep and preserve documents of historical
and cultural value. Sometime in 1974, he obtained a xerox copy of Sale Certificate
No. 511 from his mother in Malolos and furnished the LMB with a copy thereof as
reference. When he verified with the LMB in 1997, he actually saw an assignment of
sale certificate, not the sale certificate itself. He had knowledge of the tax
declarations that his wife filed for Lot 823 in 1997. The tax declarations submitted
by the Barques caught them by surprise; these were not the same as those filed by
his wife but he did not bother about it as they were spurious. He and his wife
secured tax declarations in 1997 upon the advice of people who were helping them
pursue their case with the LMB. His wife secured a special plan, not a relocation
plan but he could not recall who prepared it. [177]
On redirect examination, the witness declared that he is claiming Lot 823, Piedad
Estate, as described in the technical description, regardless of what the place it is
located is called. Based on his study, Culiat was just a part of Matandang Balara
before it was split into several barangays. He denied having filed a reconstitution
proceeding; it was the Manotoks who filed for administrative reconstitution of their
alleged title. When she read the report of Evelyn dela Rosa Celzo, he noticed in the
penultimate paragraph stating Documentary evidence hereto attached:
[1] Sale Certificate No. 511, and so he tried to get a copy from the LMB but they
could not show him any sale certificate, what they showed him was an assignment
of sale certificate. He also tried to ask a copy of Fls-3164 but they only showed him
the index card. When he learned about the 2nd Indorsement dated March 26 from
Mamerto L. Infante, Regional Technical Director, Land Sector of DENR-NCR (Exh.
XIV[178]), stating that a photocopy of the sale certificate was transmitted to the LMB,
he was able to get a photocopy of Sale Certificate No. 511 and also Index card of
Fls-3164. He discovered later that there was no more original or certified copy of

Sale Certificate No. 511 with the LMB. As to TCT No. 250215 in the name of Felicitas
Manahan, married to Rosendo Manahan, Tax Declaration of Real Property No. D-13807070, and tax Bill Receipt No. 183999 which were secured by the Barques, the
witness denied having anything to do with those documents. [179]
Felicitas B. Manahan declared in her Judicial Affidavit that her grandfather-in-law
Valentin Manahan occupied and cultivated Lot 823, and had it surveyed
on November 16, 1938. On December 13, 1939, survey plan Fls-3164 prepared in
his name was approved by the Director of Lands. Valentin Manahans application to
purchase Lot 823 was approved and after paying in full the purchase price
of P2,140.00, he was issued Sale Certificate No. 511. Valentin Manahan assigned his
rights over Lot 823 to his daughter-in-law Hilaria de Guzman, wife of his son Lucio
Manahan and mother of her husband Rosendo Manahan (Exh. III [180]). With the aid of
caretakers, Hilaria de Guzman and Lucio Manahan occupied Lot 823. However, in
the middle of 1950s, a group of armed men ousted Hilaria de Guzmans caretaker on
the lot. To protect her rights, Hilaria de Guzman declared the property for taxation
purposes under TD No. 17624 effective 1959 and TD No. 1751 effective
1965.On August 23, 1974, Hilaria de Guzman sold her rights to Lot 823 in her favor,
under Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. X) believing that she could take effective
measures in recovering the property. She then paid the real property tax and after
making follow-up with the LMB and Malacaang thru then First Lady Imelda Marcos
and LRA, Deed of Conveyance No. V-200022 was issued in her name by the LMB
on October 30, 2000 (Exh. IV[181]). Deed of Conveyance No. V-200022 was forwarded
to the Register of Deeds of Quezon City for registration and issuance of the
corresponding title (Exh. XX[182]), letter of the LMB Director to the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City), but in a Consulta, the LRA Administrator declared that it is not
registerable because of the existence of the titles of the Manotoks and the
Barques. Hence, she filed a petition for mandamus, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
99177, to compel the LRA to allow the registration of Deed of Conveyance No. V200022.However, the CA denied her petition, prompting her to file a petition for
review with the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 184748) where the case is pending for
decision. The documents on which the Manotoks base their claim is false and untrue
because after conducting a chemistry test on those documents submitted by the
LMB, the NBI concluded that they were not old as they purport to be (Exh.
XXV[183]). The LMB, as repository of all records of all friar lands, conducted a
thorough search of its files for documents covering Lot 823, but it found only
documents issued to the Manahans and no genuine document covering Lot 823 in
the name of Severino Manotok or his alleged predecessors-in-interest. The DENR
likewise conducted an investigation confirming the findings of the LMB embodied in
its report (Exh. XVI[184]) that the documents of the Manotoks were spurious.The lot
being claimed by the Barques, on the other hand, based on their technical
description, as plotted by private surveyor Jose Baricua and the DENR-NCR as well
as LRA, is outside Quezon City and 5.8 kilometers away from Lot 823 of the Piedad
Estate (Exhs. XXVIII, XXIX, XXX and XXXI).[185]
Felicitas Manahan identified the following documents in court: (a) Letter dated July
10, 2009 of Teresita J. Reyes stating that Deed of Conveyance No. V-4562 was
issued on June 28, 1955 in favor of PAULINO DIGALBAL covering a parcel of land
situated in Naic, Cavite identified as Lot No. 1540-N, Naic Friar Land Estate
containing an area of 1.1396 hectares, and that the same was transmitted to the

Register of Deeds of Cavite on July 13, 1955 and that further verification disclosed
that this Office has no record/copy of the alleged Deed of Conveyance No. 4562
(Sale Certificate No. V-321) purportedly issued in the name of EMILIANO
SETOSTA supposedly covering a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 823, Piedad Friar
Land Estate, situated in Quezon City (Exh. XXXVIII[186]); (b) Letter dated August 27,
2009 of Atty. Fe T. Tuanda, OIC Chief, LMB-RMD stating that this Office has no record
of the alleged Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 purportedly issued onDecember 7,
1932 supposedly covering a parcel of land situated in Caloocan, Rizal, now Quezon
City, identified as Lot No. 823, Piedad Friar Lands Estate (Exh. XXXIX [187]); and (c)
xerox copy of Sale Certificate No. 511 dated June 24, 1913 (Exh. XXXVII[188]) which
was given to her by her mother-in-law when the latter signed the deed of sale. The
witness explained that they did not attach a copy of Sale Certificate No. 511
because the CA ordered that only certified copies are to be attached to the pre-trial
brief, and also said that she tried to secure a certified copy of Sale Certificate No.
511 but the LMB and DENR could not give her the same. [189]
On cross-examination, Felicitas Manahan testified that her mother-in-law was living
in Malolos, Bulacan but occupied Lot 823 in 1939 by hiring caretakers to till the
land. After the assignment of Lot 823 from Valentin Manahan to Hilaria de Guzman,
her father-in-law Lucio Manahan frequently visited Lot 823 to oversee the
caretakers. Since 1976, she and her husband resided in Manila where they rented a
house. In 1974, Hilaria de Guzman told her she wanted to sell Lot 823 and after
Hilaria had signed the deed of sale and was paid in cashP350,000.00, she obtained
from Hilaria the sale certificate, assignment of sale certificate and a sketch
plan.However, when she visited the land in 1981, she was told by an elderly man
not to return and aspire to recover the land because it belonged to Imee
Manotok. When she went there in 1979, the property was not fenced and it seemed
to her there were no occupants. She met Evelyn dela Rosa in March 1979 and again
in the year 2000 at the DENR. Evelyn dela Rosa asked questions about the property
and her grandfatherin-law Valentin Manahan.Despite having seen Lot 823 vacant in
1979, 1981 and in 1989, she and her husband continued to live in Levytown. She
had seen the original copy of Sale Certificate No. 511 mentioned in the
1st Indorsement datedFebruary 23, 1999 of Mamerto L. Infante, Regional Technical
Director of DENR-NCRs Lands Sector (Exh. XIII[190]). She gave the owners duplicate
copy of Sale Certificate No. 511 which she got from Hilaria to DENR-NCR Director
Pelayo in March 1989 without asking for a receipt. Director Pelayo, however, lost
it. The witness clarified that the original copy of Sale Certificate No. 511 mentioned
in Exh. XIII refers to theassignment of sale certificate. When Atty. Rogelio Mandar
accompanied her for a site inspection of Lot 823 in 1997 or 1998, she saw men with
firearms. On that occasion, she tagged along Policeman Fernandez from Paraaque
as bodyguard because she knew of the presence of armed men in the
property. However, she did not report the matter to the Quezon City Police. [191]
Atty. Roseller S. de la Pea, former Undersecretary for Legal Affairs of DENR and
now Dean of the College of Law of Polytechnic University of the Philippines, declared
in his Judicial Affidavit that in June 2000, he received a query from LMB Director
Ernesto D. Adobo, Jr. on whether a deed of conveyance for Lot 823 of the Piedad
Estate may be issued to Felicitas B. Manahan by virtue of Sale Certificate No. 511
issued to Valentin Manahan. In response to this query, he issued a Memorandum
dated July 6, 2000 (Exh. XVII[192]) recommending the issuance of a deed of

conveyance to Felicitas Manahan, as per verification with the LMB and the DENRNCR, except for the subsisting records of Sale Certificate No. 511 in the name of
Valentin Manahan, there is no record in said offices to show that the Manotoks filed
an application for the property; there was no such sale certificate issued in the
name of the Manotoks. Sale Certificate No. V-321 and Deed of Conveyance No. 4562
are also not found in the records of the LMB and DENR. He affirmed the comments
and recommendations contained in Exh. XVII. In accordance with his
recommendation, the LMB issued to Felicitas B. Manahan Deed of Conveyance No.
V-200022 on October 30, 2000. The signing of deed of conveyance had been
delegated effective 1997 to the Director of the LMB by means of General
Memorandum Order No. 1, Series of 1997 issued by the DENR Secretary. A bona
fide settler can acquire a friar land only through conveyance by the LMB which is
the agency authorized under Act 1120 to administer and dispose friar lands. [193]
Atty. Rogelio Mandar, Chief of the Claims and Conflicts Section, Legal Division,
LMB, declared that he, together with Atty. Manuel B. Tacorda, Assistant Chief, Legal
Division of LMB, were authorized by the LMB Director under Special Order No. 98135 dated December 18, 1998 to conduct an investigation regarding Lot 823 of the
Piedad Estate. It appears that on November 25, 1998, Felicitas Manahan filed a
petition with the OSG for the cancellation/reversion proceedings against TCT No. RT22481 (372302) issued in the name of Severino Manotok IV, et al., which was
referred by the OSG to the LMB for investigation and/or appropriate action. Thus,
they collated all the pertinent available records and referred these to the NBI
on April 21, 1999 for determination of the age of the documents; they also
scheduled an ocular inspection of the land on July 15, 1999and set the petition for
hearing on December 13, 1999. The documents sent to the NBI were the following:
(1) Sale Certificate No. 1054 in the name of Regina Geronimo, Modesto Zacarias and
Felicisimo Villanueva (Exh. 10-Manotoks); (2) Assignment of Sale Certificate No.
1054 dated March 11, 1919 (Exh. 11-Manotoks); (3) Assignment of Sale Certificate
No. 1054 dated June 7, 1920 (Exh. 12-Manotoks); (4) Assignment of Sale Certificate
No. 1054 dated May 4, 1923 (Exh. 13-Manotoks); (5) Sale Certificate No. 651 in the
name of Ambrosio Berones; (6) Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 651 dated April
19, 1930 in favor of Andres Berones who is the alleged predecessor-in-interest of
Severino Manotok; and (7) Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 511 dated June 24,
1939 in the name of Valentin Manahan, the predecessor-in-interest of Felicitas
Manahan (Exh. III-Manahans). The NBI submitted its Chemistry Report No. C-99-152
(Exh. XXV-Manahans) dated June 10, 1999 stating that the first six documents could
not be as old as it [sic] purports to be, while the seventh document, the Assignment
of Sale Certificate No. 511 dated June 24, 1939 showed natural aging and
discoloration of paper; it also exhibited a water mark which is distinct under
transmitted light; the adhesive tapes were attached along creases and tears, and
the paper did not exhibit the characteristics which were observed on the questioned
documents.[194]
Atty. Mandar further declared that they were not able to conduct the ocular
inspection of Lot 823 because armed men prevented them. There was a hearing
held wherein the Manahans and the Manotoks agreed to submit the case for
resolution on the basis of memoranda with supporting documents. Thus, a written
report was submitted to the Legal Division Chief Atty. Alberto R. Recalde which
served as the basis of the latters Memorandum dated April 17, 2000 (Exh. XVI[195]),

who held that TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) has no legal and factual basis, and
therefore void ab initio; that records pertaining to Sale Certificate No. 511 in the
name of Valentin Manahan Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 511 dated June 24,
1939 had been authenticated by both the report of investigation of Land
Investigator Evelyn dela Rosa and NBI Chemistry Report No. C-99-152; and that Sale
Certificate No. 651 in the name of Ambrosio Berones is unauthenticated. Their
recommendation that steps be taken in the proper court for the cancellation of the
Manotoks title was approved by the LMB Director and sent to the DENR. LMB OICDirector Ernesto D. Adobo, Jr. then issued an Order dated October 16, 2000(Exh.
XVIII[196]) which was forwarded to the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
on December 13, 2000 for registration and issuance of corresponding title. [197]
Evelyn G. Celzo, nee Evelyn C. dela Rosa, Land Investigator/Geodetic Engineer of
DENR-NCR declared that she conducted an investigation of Lot 823, Piedad Estate,
pursuant to Travel Order dated May 15, 1989 issued by North CENRO, Quezon
City. She conducted an ocular inspection of the land and interviewed witnesses. She
prepared a written Investigation Report dated July 5, 1989 (Exh. XV[198]). She
confirmed the truth of her findings contained in said report. She made a very
thorough search of the records of LMB Central Office but found no sale certificate
covering Lot 823 other than that issued to Valentin Manahan. Lot 823 is covered by
Fls-3164 in the name of Valentin Manahan. She categorically stated that there was
no Sale Certificate No. 1054, Deed of Conveyance (Sale Certificate No. V-321) in the
name of Emiliano Setosta and Fls-3168-D in the name of Emiliano Setosta existing
in the records of the LMB Central Office.[199]
On cross-examination, Evelyn Celzo testified that she is not acquainted with Hilaria
de Guzman but she knew her to be one (1) of the heirs of Lot 823, a property she
owned and given by Valentin Manahan. During her investigation, she met and talked
to Rosendo and Felicitas Manahan in her office. Mrs. Manahan did not supply all the
information contained in her report. The information that Lot 823 was an agricultural
land when Valentin Manahan took possession thereof as a farmer in 1908 came
from the people she personally interviewed in the adjoining lots; she did not record
the names of the persons she interviewed. However, she had no more notes of the
interview she conducted. She had not referred the results of her interview nor the
statements in her report to Felicitas. She admitted that she did not see the
application for the purchase of the land stated in her report nor the Sale Certificate
issued to Valentin Manahan; she also could not recall the name of the record officer
whom she asked about the application of Valentin Manahan. After the assignment of
the sale certificate, Hilaria de Guzman and her husband Lucio Manahan were not
able to enter Lot 823 because they were prevented by some people. Neighbors told
her that Hilaria only visited the land. There was an old man in his 60s, whose name
she cannot remember, told her that Lucio and Hilaria lived in Malolos, Bulacan. As to
the requirements of an investigation report, these are provided in the Surveying
Manual. She maintained that if one (1) already has a sale certificate given by the
government, no other individual can claim that property. A report from the field to
determine the location of the land is required for the issuance of a deed of
conveyance. As to Valentin Manahans survey plan, Fls-3164, it was approved
on December 13, 1939, after which he applied for the purchase of Lot823. After
paying the sum of P2,140.00, Valentin Manahan was issued a sale certificate. She
did not conduct another survey of Lot 823 because she is an investigator. Lot 823

was not fenced in 1989; she in fact walked around the property consisting of about
thirty four (34) hectares. She cannot anymore remember the number of persons she
had interviewed. She pointed out that the technical description appearing in TCT No.
250215 dated May 25, 1979 (Exh. 34-Barques) in the name of Felicitas Manahan
married to Rosendo Manahan, is different from the technical description of Lot 823
appearing on Manahans Exhibit VII[200] (Technical Descriptions of Lot 823). In their
conversation, Felicitas Manahan never told her that she had a transfer certificate of
title overLot 823 as early as 1979.[201]
On redirect examination, Evelyn Celzo corrected a typographical error in the last
paragraph of her report, in which the word no should be inserted between the words
since and deed to read: In this regard, since no deed of conveyance has been issued
to the above applicant, it is hereby recommended that appropriate action be
issued. She also identified her signature and the signature of Engr. Ludivina Aromin
appearing on the sketch plan (Exh. XL[202]) showing that the land claimed by the
Barques is 5639.59 meters from the lot claimed by the Manahans based on the tie
line; the tie line of Lot 823 of the Manahans is only 4,097.40, while the tie line of the
Barques is 9,736.60.[203]
When confronted with the discrepancy in her computation based on the tie lines of
Lot 823-A and Lot 823-B appearing on the technical description on TCT No. 210177,
Evelyn Celzo said that they have copies of titles in their office and she could not
make a decision whether it is the same title being shown to her by counsel (Atty.
Carao, Jr.). Responding to clarificatory questions from the court, Evelyn Celzo
admitted that she was not able to obtain information as to whether there are other
claimants over Lot 823 aside from the Manahans and her investigation report was
based on her ocular inspection of Lot 823 and research at the LMB. From her
research in the LMB, she was not able to obtain information on whether or not there
are other claimants of Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate.[204]
Teresita J. Reyes, who retired on July 14, 2009, was formerly OIC-Assistant Chief,
RMD, LMB declared in her Judicial Affidavit that Exh. 1 of the Barques is not in the
records of the LMB and that no Deed of Conveyance No. V-4562 and Sale Certificate
No. V-321 issued to Emiliano Setosta mentioned in Exh. 1 is on file in the records of
the LMB. These documents were instead issued to Paulino Bagalbal covering a
parcel of land with an area of 1.1396 hectares, identified as Lot No. 1540-N of the
Naic Friar Land Estate, located at Naic,Cavite, and forwarded to the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Naic, Cavite, for registration and issuance of title. Her signature
on the document (Deed of Conveyance No. 4562 in the name of Emiliano Setosta
coveringLot 823) is a forgery. She identified her signature on the letter dated July
10, 2009 (Exh. XXXVIII[205]) addressed to Felicitas Manahan and confirmed the truth
of its contents.[206]
On cross-examination, Teresita Reyes testified that a party requesting for a certified
true copy of the records in the LMB had to file a written request which will be
forwarded to the unit concerned and then to the Division. With respect to the
records pertaining to friar lands, the sales registry books were decentralized to the
regional offices of the bureau pursuant to Executive Order No. 292 issued in
1987. She did not know for sure what records were decentralized because she was
assigned to the RMD only in 1997. She had been requested to authenticate or

certify copies of records of Lot 823, Piedad Estate. However, she categorically
denied that the signatures appearing on the certifications/authentications of
documents presented by the Barques (Exhs. 9, 10 and 25 [207]), were her
signature. The signature appearing in her affidavit is her genuine signature. The
sales registry books in the regional office are copies of appropriate pages of the
sales registry books in the main RMD.It is a very big and heavy book and is turned
over to the regional offices. The RMD-LMB has an inventory of deeded books or lots
subject of deeds of conveyance. As for sales registry book, they no longer have it at
the RMD. Sales registry books contain the names of the claimants, the respective lot
numbers and area, but the sale certificate itself would still be with the RMD in the
file folders of particular lot number. Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate had several folders
in the RMD. They also have a logbook listing the lots. If there is already a deed of
conveyance, the records would be in a folder. These deeds of conveyance are not
bound separately but are inside the folder of the particular lot number. [208]
Atty. Romeo C. Dela Cruz, counsel for the Manahans, testified in court and
identified the letter datedJuly 4, 2009 (Exh. XXXV[209]) of Ignacio R. Almira Jr.
addressed to him informing that the signatures appearing in Exh. 2 (Certification
dated June 8, 2009 attesting that Deed of Conveyance record No. 4562 and Sale
Certificate No. V-321 covering Lot 823 in the name of Emiliano Setosta has available
record in this office) and Exh. 30 (Certification dated April 13, 2009 attesting that
Sale Certificate No. 511 in favor of Valentin Manahan (assignor) and Hilaria de
Guzman (assignee) had no available record in this office) of the Barques are not his
signatures.[210]
Aida R. Viloria-Magsipoc, NBI Forensic Chemist III, testified that the documents
examined were submitted to the Forensic Chemistry Division from the LMB by
Evelyn Celzo and the requesting party was Atty. Manuel Tacorda, Assistant Chief,
Legal Division, LMB. She explained her findings in Chemistry Report No. C-99-152
(Exh. XXV[211]) on the following specimen documents: (1) Sale Certificate No. 1054 in
the name of Regina Geronimo, Modesto Zacarias and Felicisimo Villanueva (Exh.
XXV-A, front[212] and Exh. XXV-B,[213] back); (2) Assignment of Sale Certificate No.
1054 dated March 11, 1919 (Exh. XXV-F,[214] front and Exh. XXV-G,[215] back); (3)
Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 1054 dated June 7, 1920 (Exh. XXV-J,[216]front and
Exh. XXV-K,[217] back); (4) Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 1054 dated May 4,
1923 (Exh. XXV-N,[218] front and Exh. XXV-O,[219] back); (5) Sale Certificate No. 651 in
the name of Ambrosio Berones (Exh. XXV-R,[220] front and Exh. XXV-S,[221] back); and
(6) Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 651 dated April 19, 1930 (Exh. XXV-T,[222] front
and Exh. XXV-U,[223] back). The seventh document (Assignment of Sale Certificate
No. 511 dated June 24, 1939) was used as the standard (Exh. XXV-V, [224] front and
Exh. XXV-W,[225] back).[226]
Explaining the word examinations in her report, the witness said that first, they did
an ocular examination.Visualization includes photography, viewing the documents
under direct light, under UV light, under infrared (IR) light using the stereoscope;
and then chemical examinations to determine the kind of paper or reaction of the
paper, and the reaction of the ink strokes that are on the questioned documents. A
stereoscope enables one (1) to view the whole sheet of paper by just tilting the
mouse (macro viewing), whereas for the microscope, you could view just a very
small portion. After examination over UV, IR and direct light examinations, chemical

examination is done on a paper wherein punch holes are taken from the pieces or
sides of the document. Only these physical and chemical examinations were done
on the questioned documents.[227]
The following photographs taken of the questioned documents were also presented:
Exh. XXV-C,[228]the front close-up of the tear on top of the page of Sale Certificate
No. 1054; Exh. XXV-D,[229] front close-up of uneven browning and discoloration of
paper (Sale Certificate No. 1054); Exh. XXV-E, [230] front page browning and
discoloration of tears and creases along the edges of document (Sale Certificate No.
1054); Exh. XXV-F,[231] front of the Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 1054
dated March 11, 1919; Exh. XXV-G,[232]back portion of Assignment of Sale Certificate
dated March 11, 1919; Exh. XXV-H[233], showing the staple wire marks that are clear
and firm (Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 1054 dated March 11, 1919); Exh. XXVI,[234] showing the aniline (violet) stamp pad ink entries that are clear and distinct
(Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 1054 dated March 11, 1919); Exh. XXV-L,
[235]
showing the aniline (violet) stamp pad ink entries that are clear and distinct with
handwritten entries and signatures in blue, blue-black, black ballpoint pen
ink and sign pen ink (Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 1054 dated June 7,
1920); Exh. XXV-M,[236] showing the aniline (violet) stamp pad ink entries that are
clear and distinct with handwritten entries and signatures in black ballpoint pen ink,
sign pen ink (Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 1054 dated June 7, 1920); Exh. XXVP,[237] showing the adhesive tape used to hold tears or cuts, uneven brown
discoloration (Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 1054 dated May 4, 1923); Exh.
XXV-Q,[238] showing the sharply cut line along letter/s and a distinct scratch/tear
along the loop of the signature (Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 1054 dated May
4, 1923); Exh. XXV-X,[239] showing close-up portions of Assignment of Sale Certificate
No. 511 dated June 24, 1939; Exh. XXV-Y,[240] standard brown even discoloration of
Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 511 datedJune 24, 1939; Exh. XXV-Z, [241] standard
brown even discoloration of Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 511 dated June 24,
1939; Exh. XXV-AA,[242] water mark on Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 511
dated June 24, 1939; and Exh. XXV-BB,[243] water mark on Assignment of Sale
Certificate No. 511 dated June 24, 1939.
On the particular findings in her report, [244] the witness testified that printed entries
on all the documents showed similarities but differ in font size. The font size would
indicate if there were insertions or corrections that have been made on the
typewritten entries on the document. Next, the typescript entries are
clear/distinct/uniform especially on specimens 5 (Sale Certificate No. 651
dated January 8, 1913) and 6 (Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 651 dated April 19,
1930), which indicates that both documents could have been done at the same
time. Finding No. 3 states that Folds on specimens 1 to 4 are irregular and
inconsistent while on specimen 5 and 6 folds across show whiteness in color
indicating that they are recent. The irregular folds on the first four (4) documents
would indicate that these documents could not be that old. Finding No. 5 states that
Adhesive tapes used to hold tear/s or cut/s are placed on areas even without
apparent tear but only a fold or a crease, from which it can be concluded that the
tape was just placed over to show that the document is old, even if it is not
so. Finding No. 6 refers to punch holes and staple wire marks are clean and firm
which could be attributed to its being recent, which are found in Exhs. XXV-C, XXVH, XXV-U, XXV-T, XXV-S and XXV-R. If the documents were bound by staple wires,
they could have aged and there should already be iron residue that adhered to the

paper. On Finding No. 7, it states that Aniline (violet) stamp pad ink entries are
clear/distinct with handwritten entries in Blue/ Blue-Black BALLPOINT PEN INK and
SIGN PEN INK. Age of BALLPOINT PEN INK could not be determined. The witness
pointed out that ball point pen inks were commercially manufactured after World
War II, around 1945. In 1919, 1920, 1923 and 1930, there were no ball point pens
yet at the time. This fact indicates the documents could have been executed after
1945. Finding No. 8 states that The notarial dry seal of the notary public is clear and
firm on specimen 2, 5 and 6, which pertains to Assignment of Sale Certificate No.
1054 dated March 11, 1919, Sale Certificate No. 651 in the name of Ambrosio
Berones and Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 651. Under Finding No. 9, it was
observed that [T]he browning and discoloration of the documents are uneven and
whitening are very prominent even on its sides/areas which are supposedly exposed
during storage. This is notably shown on the close-up photo of Exh. XXV-C wherein
the edge, the uppermost edge of the document is very very white and clear, and
even on the tear that was allegedly torn because of age, it is even clearer than in
the inner portion of the document. Uneven discoloration from the edges to the
center of the document would indicate that they are not as old as they purport to
be; hence they are spurious. Finding No. 10 refers to specimen 2 (Assignment of
Sale Certificate No. 1054 dated March 11, 1919) and specimen 3 (Assignment of
Sale Certificate No. 1054 dated June 7, 1920) A signature of an assignor/assignee on
specimen number 2 showed a sharply cut line along the letter/s and distinct
scratch/tear appear along the loop of the signature of one (1) witness on specimen
3 with an adhesive attached to make it firm. The witness noted there are cuts along
the line of the ink entries of the signature (Exhs. XXV-I, XXV-J), which are mechanical
in nature; a sharp instrument was used to cut a portion of the ink in the signature,
to make an impression that the document has aged already. Finding No. 11 states
that [I]nsect bites/tears are superficial in nature especially on specimen 5 (Sale
Certificate No. 651 in the name of Ambrosio Berones) and 6 (Assignment of Sale
Certificate No. 651 dated April 19, 1930). The witness explained that as paper ages,
even in storages, its edges would have insects or mites, insect bites or cuts; in this
case, those appear to have been artificially placed on the edges. Finally, on Finding
No. 12, it was noted that [A]ttached/adhering torn sheet/s at the center/topmost
portion/back of specimen 2 and on the upper left hand corner of specimen 3 are
lighter in color than the document itself. Again, an indication that the documents
are not as old as they purport to be and therefore spurious. [245]
In contrast, the standard document (Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 511 dated
June 24, 1939) was found to have showed natural aging and discoloration of paper;
it also exhibited a water mark which is distinct under transmitted light; the adhesive
tapes were attached along creases and tears; and the paper did not exhibit the
characteristics which were observed on the questioned documents. The witness
thus concluded that Exh. XXV-V and XXV-W is authentic and as old as the date
indicated therein. The witness denied having been influenced by anybody in arriving
at these findings.[246]
On cross-examination, Ms. Viloria-Magsipoc admitted that while she had attended a
training course for questioned documents, she has not done any work under the
Questioned Documents Division. This case was assigned to her by the Chief of the
Forensic Chemistry Division and it took her about thirty (30) working days to finish
the work. Regarding handwritten entries in ballpoint pen ink, she had read an article

in the New Encyclopedia Britannica stating that ballpoint pens came in the late
19th century, and that commercial models appeared in 1895. There is no known
method in chemistry to determine the age of ballpen writing. Paper chromatography
and thin layer chromatography methods were used only in determining whether the
ink was ballpen ink, fountain pen, sign pen and other ink entries. The LMB chose
specimen No. 7 (Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 511 dated June 24, 1939) as the
reference standard, while specimens 1 to 6 are the questioned documents. She did
a comparative analysis of papers and went to the National Library to look at
documents which are 5 to 10 years prior to a particular date and 5 to 10 years after
said date.[247]
The witness declared that when she went to the National Archives, she did not see a
copy of the following documents: Sale Certificate No. 1054; Assignment of Sale
Certificate No. 1054 dated March 11, 1919; Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 1054
dated June 7, 1920; Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 1054 dated May 4, 1923;
Sale Certificate No. 651 in the name of Ambrosio Berones; and Assignment of Sale
Certificate No. 651 dated April 19, 1930. Chromatologic analysis was used in this
case to determine whether the entries in the questioned documents were written in
ballpoint pen ink. She opined that it was possible that tears and creases along the
edges of the subject documents are mechanical in nature. As to punch holes and
staple wires, these are used to determine the characteristic of paper so that if the
marks and holes are clean and clear, they were made recently, regardless of
whether the paper is old or new. The marks of staple wire or puncher on a recent
document are different from those on an old document. A recently stapled or
punched paper has a very, very firm impression while an old document would have
some tear or a reaction of the mechanical impression, or the hair fiber would be
flaky already because of the brittleness of the paper. However, the preservation of
paper may be affected by storage conditions and a very old paper can be wellpreserved, such that even if created in 1911, it could survive without any insect
bites. As to the quality of the impression made by dry seals, it depends on the
quality of the seals, the force exerted on the seal lever when the seal is being
pressed on paper, and the quality of the paper itself. The discoloration of documents
is caused by the reaction of paper to air, as well as to dust and exposure to strong
light. It is possible that the torn portions of the document, which were lighter in
color than the document itself, were separated or folded in such a way that they
were less exposed than the rest of the documents before they were reattached. Specimen No. 7 does not bear any stamp mark of the LMB-RMD. [248]
On redirect examination, Ms. Viloria-Magsipoc pointed out that ball point pens were
commercially used in the Philippines in 1953; sign pens came later in the early 60s.
She had used paper and thin layer chromatography of the questioned documents in
determining the ink entries. Ink strokes are taken from the handwritten entries and
they are spotted on a chromatographic plate both in paper and thin layer of silica
gel. It is allowed to be diluted to a solvent system and the results would be a
chromatogram that would indicate what dyes or what kind of ink is on the ink stroke
that is being analyzed. After the chemical examination, she found that the
handwritten entries in the questioned documents were all in ballpoint pen ink and
sign pen ink. Ballpoint pens and sign pens were not yet commercially used at the
time the documents were supposedly executed. She affirmed the findings contained
in her Chemistry Report No. C-99-152 (Exh. XXV) and also her conclusion that the

questioned documents were not as old as they purport to be. No water marks were
found on the documents presented by the Manotoks which she had examined. [249]
Responding to clarificatory questions from the court, the witness declared that
water marks on documents would indicate the possible manufacturing date of the
paper. Water mark that is on the manufacturer of the paper is different from the
water mark being placed on those government paper for official use only. In
determining the possible age of the paper, she had used both physical and chemical
examination. Because of their characteristics, she was able to conclude that the
questioned documents are of recent paper and they could not have possibly been
executed on the dates indicated. As to carbon dating, the witness declared that the
NBI does not have carbon dating. Recent document means 10 years or less. As to
type of paper, she said that bond paper was used in the questioned documents; she
does not know the exact date when bond paper was introduced in thePhilippines. [250]
As sur-rebuttal evidence, the Manahans presented the affidavit/deposition of
Rosendo Manahan, Atty. Richie Q. Caranto, Jacinto Ramos de Guzman and Felix S.
Javier.
Rosendo Manahan in his Judicial Affidavit dated January 5, 2010, declared that the
statement made by Milagros Manotok-Dormido in her Rebuttal Judicial Affidavit that
Valentin Manahan could not have caused the survey of Lot 823 in 1938 and
executed the Deed of Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 511 in favor of Hilaria de
Guzman on June 24, 1939 because Valentin Manahan died on September 21, 1931
is not correct. He asserted that Valentin Manahan died on February 5, 1955 as
shown by the Certification dated December 11, 2009 issued by the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Malolos City, Bulacan (Exh. XLIV [251]). On the certificates of death
submitted by Milagros Manotok-Dormido, he explained that the Valentin Manahan
mentioned in those documents is not the same Valentin Manahan who was his
grandfather, but just a namesake. His grandfather Valentin Manahan was born
on May 21, 1890 whose parents were Luis Manahan and Rita Giron. These facts are
shown by the certified Partida de Bautismo issued by Rev. Fr. Arsenio C. Reyes,
Parish Priest of the Barasoain Parish dated June 24, 1949 (Exh. XLV).[252] Valentin
Manahans residence at the time he died was Bulihan, Malolos, Bulacan. He was
married to Placida Figueroa as shown by the certified Partida de Bautismo of his son
Lucio Manahan issued on November 5, 1945 by the Parish Priest of the Iglesia
Catolica Apostolica Romana in Barasoain, Malolos, Bulacan (Exh. XLVI[253]). The
Valentin Manahan subject of the Certificates of Death (Exhs. 61 and 102) was
married to Francisca Lucas and was residing at Guinhawa, Malolos, Bulacan at the
time of his death as shown in Manotoks Exhs. 61/102. [254]
Rosendo Manahan said that he tried to get a certificate of death from the Parish of
Our Lady of Mt. Carmel but half-page of pages 147 and 148, Book IV of their Liber
Defunctorum in which the death of his grandfather is supposedly entered/recorded,
were torn off and missing after Milagros Manotok-Dormido borrowed it. This was the
information relayed to him by the custodian of the parish records, Felix Javier. Felix
Javier told him he was surprised when Milagros, who borrowed the book as she
wanted to photocopy some pages thereof, returned it with the half of pages 147 and
148 already missing. The missing pages cover deaths during the period January 26
to February 16, 1955, as evident in the remaining half-pages 147 and 148 (Exhs.

XLVII, XLVII-A and XLVII-B[255]). He also went to the Roman Catholic Cemetery of
Malolos City to look at the tombstone (lapida) of his grandfather Valentin Manahan
and see the date of his death inscribed thereon.However, the tombstone was freshly
vandalized; the date of his death and middle initial of his wife Placida Figueroa
Manahan were chiselled off, which he had photographed (Exhs. XLII and XLIII [256]). It
was Milagros Manotok-Dormido and her brother who went to Felix Javier, the parish
records custodian, and Emilio V. Pangindian, Jr. the sepulturero of the Roman
Catholic Cemetery of Malolos City and inquired about the tomb of the Manahan
family. Emilio V. Pangindian, Jr. executed an Affidavit (Exh. XLVIII [257]) in support of
this fact.As to the certificate of death (Exhs. 108 and 109) showing that he died on
July 30, 1963 at age 20, he declared that it was a mistake since it was his brother
Clodualdo de Guzman who died on July 30, 1963 at age 20 but his uncle, Jacinto de
Guzman, erred in reporting the matter to the Local Civil Registrar as shown by his
Affidavit (Exh. XLIX[258]). To prove that he is still alive, he submitted copies of his
Philippine passport issued to him on December 12, 2006 (Exh. L [259]), US Visa issued
to him on February 20, 2007 (Exh. LI[260]), BIR Tax Identification Card (Exh. LII [261]),
Drivers License issued by the Land Transportation Office to expire onMarch 1,
2011 (Exh. LIII[262]), and Firearm License Card issued on April 2, 2009 by the PNP
Firearm Explosives Unit (Exh. LIV[263]).[264]
Rosendo Manahan further declared that the claim of Milagros Manotok-Dormido that
she was able to obtain a copy of Sale Certificate No. 1054 from the LMB is
contradicted by the testimonies of former DENR Undersecretary Roseller dela Pea,
Evelyn dela Rosa Celzo and Atty. Fe T. Tuanda. As to Deed of Conveyance No. 4562
(Exh. 44-Barques), it is a spurious document like Deed of Conveyance No. 4562
marked as Exh. 1 in the Barques Pre-Trial Brief, for the simple reason that the
documents have the same number but different dates and varying details issued by
the Bureau of Lands for the same lot and in favor of the same party (Emiliano
Setosta). Upon verification with LMB, said office replied to her wife that they do not
have Exh. 44 on their files and that Deed of Conveyance No. 4562 was issued to
Paulino Bigalbal on June 28, 1955 covering a 1.1396-hectare land identified as Lot
No. 1540-N of the Naic Friar Land Estate (Exhs. LV and LVI[265]). He denied having
commissioned Engr. Mariano V. Flotildes (rebuttal witness of the Barques) to
conduct a relocation survey for him and his wife. Contrary to the assertions of
Milagros Manotok-Dormido, his wife has not secured a tax declaration and title
over Lot 823 nor filed a petition for reconstitution of title. [266]
Jacinto Ramos de Guzman identified Rosendo Manahan as his nephew during the
taking of deposition and his Judicial Affidavit dated December 14, 2009 wherein he
declared that Hilaria de Guzman who is now deceased, is his sister and the wife of
Lucio Manahan who is also now deceased. His sister is not married to Jose
Cruz. Rosendo Manahan who is still alive is the son of his sister Hilaria de Guzman
and Lucio Manahan. The children of his sister other than Maria are, namely:
Clodualdo, Flaviana and Leonarda (all deceased). Rosendo Manahan is married to
Felicitas B. Manahan. He explained the mistake in the Certificate of Death (Exh 56Manotoks) saying he was dizzy for lack of sleep attending to the wake of Clodualdo
and he was confused about the names of his nephews that he committed an honest
mistake in reporting that Rosendo de Guzman died onJuly 30, 1963 instead of
Clodualdo.[267] On cross-examination, he said that Clodualdo had been ill for more or

less one (1) year (tuberculosis) and he took care of him before his death. Clodualdo
was buried the following day after his death. [268]
Atty. Richie Q. Caranto, in his Judicial Affidavit declared that at about 2:15 in the
afternoon ofDecember 10, 2009, he stepped out of the hearing room to call their
office messenger. A few minutes later, Atty. Roberto San Juan, counsel of the
Manotoks, came out and the latter did not notice him because his view was blocked
by the Court Security. He then overheard Atty. San Juan who called a person whose
name sounded like Din. Atty. San Juan and the person he called talked about
documents; Atty. San Juan told Din that the findings should be that the writings in
the documents were written in fountain pen ink and not ballpoint pen ink. Atty.San
Juan told Din not to make a categorical statement in the report but just state therein
that ballpoint pen was already existing for commercial use as early as 1895. When
Atty. San Juan saw him, he noticed that he toned down his voice and told Din to
state his findings and recommendations in the report. He was five (5) meters away
from Atty. San Juan during the incident and thereafter, he went inside the hearing
room and relayed what he heard to Solicitor Omar Diaz who was sitting in the last
row near the door.[269]
Felix S. Javier, undersecretary of Parish of Our Lady of Mt. Carmel residing
at Barasoain Church, Malolos, Bulacan, identified Milagros Manotok-Dormido during
the taking of the deposition. He also identified two (2) pictures shown to him by Mr.
Manahan taken of the tombstone that was vandalized (Exhs. XLII and XLIII). He
admitted that he has no knowledge as to whether it is the same Valentin who died
in 1931; that is recorded in the books of the parish. [270]
Other documents formally offered by the Manahans are the following: Exh. I
Certified copy of the Petition dated November 25, 1998 for the cancellation of
Manotoks TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) filed by Felicitas B. Manahan with the OSG;
[271]
Exh. II Certified photocopy of the letter dated December 3, 1998 of Cecilio O.
Estoesta, Assistant Solicitor General, to the Director of LMB referring the petition
filed by Felicitas Manahan for investigation, report and recommendation; [272] Exh. V
- Letter dated January 21, 2005 of Concordia D. Zuiga, Director, LMB to LRA Deputy
Administrator Ofelia E. Abueg-Sta. Maria attesting to the authenticity of Deed of
Conveyance No. V-200022 covering Lot 823 issued in favor of Felicitas Manahan on
October 30, 2000, and further stating that [t]he subject deed of conveyance does
not contain the signature of then DENR Secretary Antonio Cerilles, because during
the incumbency of Director Ernesto Adobo, Jr., the Director of Lands was the one (1)
approving the issuance of deed of conveyance over friar lands pursuant to General
Memorandum Order No. 1, series of 1977;[273] Exh. IX Certified photocopy of the
original of Real Property Tax Bill Receipt No. G-No. 712650 issued to Felicitas
Manahan in 1989 by the Office of the Treasurer of Quezon City for payment of
property tax covering Lot 823 for the year 1990-1991;[274] Exh. XII Certified
photocopy of letter-reply dated November 16, 1998 of Director Manuel D. Gerochi,
LMB, to Felicitas Manahan stating that per verification of their records, Lot 823 of
Piedad Estate is not available in their file but which verification must not be
construed as a confirmation that the said lot is still vacant or open for
disposition/sale to any person as title thereto might have already been obtained and
further advising that a verification be made to the DENR-CENR Office and to the
Register of Deeds concerned to avoid any confusion as to the present status of the

said lot;[275] Exh. XIII Certified copy of 1st Indorsement dated February 23, 1999 from
Mamerto L. Infante, Regional Technical Director, Lands Sector, DENR-NCR forwarding
to the LMB Director the only available records in our office of Lot 823, Fls-3164,
Piedad Estate;[276] Exh. XIV Certified photocopy of the 2nd Indorsement dated March
26, 1999 from Mamerto L. Infante, Regional Technical Director, Lands Sector, DENRNCR to the Director of LMB transmitting additional documents in connection with
the investigation by Engr. Evelyn Celzo of Lot 823, Piedad Estate; [277] Exh. XX
Certified photocopy of the letter dated December 13, 2000 of Ernesto D. Adobo, Jr.,
OIC-Director, LMB to the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, forwarding Deed of
Conveyance No. V-200022 in the name of Felicitas Manahan for registration and
issuance of certificate of title to Felicitas Manahan covering Lot 823 of Piedad
Estate;[278] Exh. XXII Certified true copy of truncated TCT No. 22813 issued by the
Register of Deeds, Province of Rizal with notation Cancelled See TCT No. 634;
[279]
Exh. XXIII Certified true copy of TCT No. 634 dated September 17, 1946 which is
offered to prove that TCT No. 634 is in the name of Enrique Miguel, married to
Rosario Tech and covers a land in Pasig with an area of 428 square meters [280]; Exh.
XXIV - Original of Certification dated January 10, 2000 issued by Atty. Roberto B.
Salcedo, Deputy Register of Deeds of Rizal stating that after a thorough verification
from the files of this office, it appears that the document/s leading to the issuance
of TCT No. 22813, Book T-92 (Pre-War Title)can no longer be found from the files of
this office as of this date;[281] Exh. XXX photocopy of 1st Indorsement dated August
23, 2006 of Marco A. Castro, Acting Chief, LRA Land Projection Section referring to
the Chief, Legal Division, LRA, Deed of Conveyance No. V-200022 of Felicitas
Manahan and TCT No. 210177, and stating that the deed of conveyance is covered
by Consulta No. 2282, and that when said Deed of Conveyance was plotted in our
Municipal Index Map thru its tie line, was found to be previously plotted under TCT
No. 372302, while TCT No. 210177 when plotted thru its tie line falls outside Quezon
City;[282] Exh. XXXII -photocopy of the Bureau of Lands transmittal of Survey Records
(decentralizing of records) showing that Accession No. 410436 which the Barques
claimed as the accession number of their Fls-3168-D is in the name of Nicolas Apo,
et al.;[283] Exh. XXXIII Original of the letter dated October 3, 2005 of DENR-NCR OIC
Regional Technical Director, Land Management Services informing that copy
of approved Fls-3168-D is not on file in the Technical Records Section, Land
Management Services, DENR-NCR, and what is on file is only aphotocopy of Plan Fls3168-D covering Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate which is not a duly certified one (1);
[284]
Exh. XXXV Letter dated July 4, 2009 of Ignacio R. Almira, Jr., Chief, Regional
Surveys Division stating that the Certifications dated June 8, 2009 and April 13,
2009 stating that DENR-NCR has available record of Deed of Conveyance Record No.
4562 and Sale Certificate No. V-321 and no available record of Sale Certificate No.
511 in the name of Valentin Manahan (assignor) and Hilaria de Guzman (assignee)
were not issued by the LMB and the signatures appearing thereon are not the
signatures of Ignacio R. Almira, Jr.;[285] Exh. XXXVI Letter dated June 22, 2009 of Engr.
Fernando R. Verbo, OIC-Chief, Geodetic Survey Division, LMB, to Atty. Manuel
Abrogar, stating that Fls-3168-D is not listed in the EDP listing; [286] and Exh. XXXVII Photocopy of Sale Certificate No. 511 dated June 24, 1913 offered as secondary
evidence to prove that Valentin Manahan was issued Sale Certificate No. 511
covering Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate on June 24, 1913.[287]
CA Findings

Examining the entire evidence on record, the CA found that none of the parties were
able to prove a valid alienation of Lot 823 of Piedad Estate from the government in
accordance with the provisions of Act No. 1120otherwise known as the Friar Lands
Act. Notably lacking in the deed of conveyance of the Manotoks is the approval of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce as required by Section 18 of the said
law. Upon close scrutiny, the factual allegations and voluminous documentary
exhibits relating to the purchase of Lot 823 by the predecessors-in-interest of the
claimants revealed badges of fraud and irregularity.
Manotoks Claim
In our Resolution promulgated on December 18, 2008, the Court already made
initial observations when we re-evaluated the points raised against the Manotok
title and found these to be serious enough, thus:
...The apparent flaws in the Manotoks claim are considerable and disturbing
enough. The Court, as the ultimate citadel of justice and legitimacy, is a guardian of
the integrity of the land registration system of thePhilippines. We will be derelict in
our duty if we remain silent on the apparent defects of the Manotok title, reflective
as they are of a scourge this Court is dedicated to eliminate.
Many of these flaws have especially emerged through the petition-for-intervention
of Felicitas and Rosendo Manahan, whom we have allowed to intervene in these
cases. The Manahans had filed a petition with the OSG seeking that it initiate
cancellation/reversion proceedings against the Manotok title. That petition was
referred by the OSG to the LMB of the DENR, which duly investigated the claim of
the Manahans. The Chief of the Legal Division of the LMB recommended that the
appropriate proceedings be taken in the proper court for the cancellation of the
Manotok title, through a Memorandum dated 17 April 2000.
Around the same time, the LMB referred to the DENR Undersecretary for Legal
Affairs Roseller S. dela Pea a query on whether a deed of conveyance could be
issued to Felicitas Manahan. The DENR Undersecretary, in answering that query
through a Memorandum dated 6 July 2000, pointed out that the titles of the
Manotoks could not have been derived from OCT No. 614, the mother title
of Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate. The chain of transfers leading from OCT No. 614
to the Manotok title was a TCT No. 22813, purportedly issued by the Office of the
Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal. The copy of said TCT No. 22813
submitted to the Court is truncated in the upper half, to the point that it is
not visually discernible what year the same was issued.More crucially, a
certification was issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal dated 7 January
2000 stating thus:
After a thorough verification from the files of this Office, it appears that the
documents leading to the issuance of TCT No. 22813, Blk. T-92 cannot be found
from the files of this Office.

These findings were twice verified with due diligence and reconfirmed by the DENR,
according to Undersecretary Dela Pea.
The DENR also requested the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) in conducting the said investigation. The NBI examined various sales
certificates and assignment of sales certificates in the names of the purported
predecessors-in-interest of the Manotoks Regina Geronimo, Modesto Zacarias, and
Felicisimo Villanueva certificates that were all dated prior to 1930. In its Chemistry
Report No. C-99-152 dated 10 June 1999, the Forensic Chemistry Division of the NBI
concluded that the said documents could not be as old as it (sic) purports to be.
xxxx
Also on record is an Investigation Report on Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate dated 5
July 1989, authored by Evelyn C. dela Rosa, Land Investigator of the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), NCR-North Sector and
addressed to the CENRO Officer, North CENRO. It was narrated therein that Lot No.
823 had actually been in the possession of a Valentin Manahan beginning in
1908. In 1939, Valentin Manahan applied for the purchase of the land, and he was
issued Sales Certificate No. 511. The Investigation Report stated:
Records show that the Sale Certificate No. 511 covering Lot 823, Piedad Estate, was
issued to Valentin Manahan as purchaser and transferred to Hilaria de Guzman
Manahan as (Assignee) and sold to Felicitas Manahan by way of Deed of Absolute
Sale dated August 23, 1974. Based on my research at the Land Management
Bureau (LMB), Central Office, it appears that original claimant of lot 823 was
Valentin Manahan.
All told, these apparent problems with the Manotoks claim dissuade us from being
simply content in reflexively dismissing the administrative petition for reconstitution
filed by the Barques. Indeed, we have to take further action.[288]
But since the Court recognized there was yet no sufficient evidence to warrant the
annulment of the Manotok title, the case had to be remanded to the CA for further
reception of evidence for the Manotoks, as well as the Barques and Manahans, to
prove a valid acquisition from the Government of Lot No. 823.
Evaluating the documentary and testimonial evidence adduced by the Manotoks,
the CA concluded that they still failed to establish a valid claim over Lot 823. It cited
the finding of the NBI Forensic Chemistry Division that the result of the chemical
analysis of the documents of Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 1054 dated March
11, 1919, June 7, 1920, May 4, 1923 and April 19, 1930 executed by the original
claimants of Lot 823 in favor of Severino Manotok showed they were not really as
old as they purport to be considering that (1) the handwritten entries were found to
be made in ballpoint pen and sign pen inks, which were not yet commercially
available in the Philippines until 1953 and 1965; and (2) the physical signs in the
paper itself such as the uneven discoloration, artificial tears on the edges to make
the document appear much older, and other tell-tale marks on the punch and staple
wire holes. To contradict the findings of NBI Chemist Magsipoc, the Manotoks

presented Dr. Sorra of the PNP Crime Laboratory who testified that she examined
the questioned documents of the Manotoks and found them to be genuine and
authentic. The CA, however, found Dr. Sorras opinion of less probative value as it
was based merely on the physical appearance of the questioned documents, and
she did not subject these to chemical analysis or other more reliable procedures. [289]
The most fatal defect stressed by the CA in its Commissioners Report is the lack of
signature of the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands (now Director of Lands) on Sale
Certificate No. 1054 and approval by the Secretary of Interior/Agriculture and
Commerce on the Manotoks Sale Certificate No. 1054 and Deed of Conveyance No.
29204, as required under Act No. 1120. For being null and void ab initio, Sale
Certificate No. 1054 cannot thus be the source of any legal right over Lot 823 and
no valid transfer or assignment could have been made by the original claimants in
favor of Severino Manotok. The CA found that the Manotoks documentary evidence
even showed a discrepancy since the Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 1054
marked as Exhs. 11, 12 and 13 showed a signature at the dorsal portion above the
printed words Director of Lands, but such signature is absent in the supposedly
certified true copies obtained from the National Archives (Supplemental offer of
Rebuttal Evidence, Exhs. 142, 143 and 144). [290] As to Manotoks longtime possession
evidenced by tax declarations, tax receipts and buildings constructed on the land as
early as 1933, the CA considered these immaterial, the property being friar land
which forms part of the States patrimonial property.
Barques Claim
With the admission made by Teresita Barque-Hernandez that their Exh.
1[291] (certified true copy of Deed of Conveyance Record No. 4562 with Sale
Certificate No. V-321) is a fake and spurious document, no legal right was acquired
over Lot 823 by their predecessor-in-interest Emiliano Setosta who allegedly sold
the lot to her father, Homer L. Barque. The CA noted that on its face, this document
dated May 6, 1937 is spurious considering that while its heading indicated Republic
of the Philippines Department of Agriculture and Commerce and the consideration
for the conveyance in Japanese war notes, it is of judicial notice that the Republic of
the Philippines was established only on July 4, 1946, and the identified owner of
Piedad Estate should be Gobierno de las Islas Filipinas as stated in OCT No.
614. Moreover, Teresita J. Reyes, whose name appears in Exh. 1 as the officer who
certified and verified the documents in the records of the LMB, denied that the
signature appearing above her printed name was her signature. [292]
The Barques themselves realized their mistake in presenting Exh.1 and so they
submitted another document, a photocopy of Deed of Conveyance No. 4562 dated
January 25, 1938 (Exh. 44) with accompanying Certification dated 14 March 1997
(Exh. 43) of Amando V. Bangayan, Chief, LMB-RMD stating that the only available
record on file with their office is the said Deed of Conveyance No. 4562 issued to
Emiliano Setosta covering Lot 823 of Piedad Estate, Caloocan, Rizal. [293] The CA,
however, gave scant weight to the aforesaid documents, particularly as the Deed of
Conveyance No. 4562 lacks the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, thus:
...The veracity of the certification is seriously contradicted by the reply letter of Atty.
Fe Tuanda (Exhibit LVI, Manahans) to the letter of Felicitas B. Manahan (Exhibit LV,

Manahans). In her reply, Atty. Fe Tuanda, OIC, Records Management Division, LMB
categorically declared that xxx please be informed that according to our
verification, this Office has no record/copy of the alleged Deed of Conveyance No.
4562 purportedly issued in the name of EMILIANO P. SETOSTA supposedly covering a
parcel of land identified as Lot No. 823, Piedad Estate, Quezon City. Atty. Fe Tuanda
further declared that (F)urther verification of our records shows that the Deed of
Conveyance No. V-4562 was issued on June 28, 1955 in favor of PAULINO BIGALBAL
covering a parcel of land situated in Naic, Cavite identified as Lot No. 1540-N, Naic
Friar Land Estate containing an area of 1.1396 hectares, and the same was
transmitted to the Register of Deeds of Cavite on July 13, 1955. In his Judicial
Affidavit dated July 17, 2009, former DENR Undersecretary Roseller de la Pea
declared that Deed of Conveyance Record No. 4562 and Sales Certificate No. V-321
are not in the records of the LMB and DENR. Also, DENR-NCR Land Investigator
Evelyn G. Celzo, declared in her Judicial Affidavit dated July 15, 2009, that she made
a thorough research in the files of the Central Office of the LMB but did not find
Sales Certificate No. V-321 and a Deed of Conveyance in the name of Emiliano
Setosta. With the foregoing evidence seriously controverting the veracity of Exhibit
43, the BARQUES should have presented Amando Bangayan as a witness in Court to
confirm the veracity of her certification. The accuracy of the certification should be
confirmed by Amando Bangayan on the witness stand wherein the other parties
would be given the opportunity to cross-examine him on the veracity of his
certification.Also, it must be pointed out that the attachment to Exhibit 43 marked
and offered as Exhibit 44 is a mere photocopy of the so-called DEED No. 4562 which
has no probative value. The Barques has not accounted for the original copy for them
to be allowed to present a photocopy as secondary evidence. Curiously, Exhibit 44
refers to a photocopy of DEED NO. 4562 which also appeared as Deed No. 4562 in the
left upper portion of the spurious document pre-marked as Exhibit 1 for the Barques
and offered as Exhibit XLI for the Manahans. At any rate, even if Exhibit 44 will be
considered as a secondary evidence, the same is null and void ab initio for the same
lacks the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce as explicitly
required by law.[294] (Italics supplied.)
Aside from the absence of a valid deed of conveyance and/or sale certificate in the
name of the Barques predecessor-in-interest, Emiliano Setosta, the basis for the
issuance of TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque is further put seriously
in doubt in view of the Barques failure to prove the existence of Subdivision Plan Fls3168-D duly authenticated by the Geodetic Surveys Division, LMB National Office.
TCT No. 210177, purportedly a transfer from TCT No. 13900 [295] -- which title until
now the Barques said they could no longer find a copy despite diligent search -- is
itself questionable, considering that TCT No. 13900 was not issued in the name of
Emiliano Setosta but Manotok Realty, Inc.[296] We recall that the evidence of the
Barques in support of their claim over Lot 823 was found by this Court to be
exceedingly weak, but which nonetheless was erroneously accorded credence by
the First Division in its December 12, 2005 Decision. We quote from our Resolution
dated December 18, 2008:
The Barque title, or TCT No. 210177, under which the Barques assert title to Lot 823
of the Piedad Estate, states that it was transferred from TCT No. 13900. The Barques
assert that they bought the subject property from a certain Setosta. Thus, it could
be deduced that TCT No. 13900 should have been registered under the name of
Setosta. However, it was not. TCT No. 13900 was registered under the name of

Manotok Realty, Inc. This detracts from the Barques claim that the Manotoks do not
have title to the property, as in fact the Barque title was a transfer from a title
registered under the name of the Manotoks. The Barques have failed to explain the
anomaly.
The Barques hinge their claim on a purported subdivision plan, FLS-3168-D, made in
favor of Setosta.However, based on the records, it appears that there is a conflict as
to its actual existence in the files of the government. Revelatory is the exchange of
correspondence between the LMB and the LRA. The LMB did not have any copy of
FLS-3168-D in the EDP listing, nor did the LMB have a record of the plan. However, a
microfilm copy of FLS-3168-D was on file in the Technical Records and Statistical
Section of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources National Capital
Region (DENR-NCR). The copy with the Technical Records and Statistical Section,
which bore the stamp of the LMB, was denied by the LMB as having emanated from
its office.
Further, the letter dated 2 January 1997 from the LMB stated that the copy of FLS3168-D as verified from its microfilm file was the same as the copy sent by the
Technical Records and Statistics Section of the National Capital Region Lands
Management Sector. The LMB, however, denied issuing such letter and stated that it
was a forged document. To amplify the forged nature of the document, the LMB sent
a detailed explanation to prove that it did not come from its office. In a letter to the
administrator of the LRA, the hearing officer concluded that it is evident that there is
an attempt to mislead us into favorable action by submitting forged documents,
hence it is recommended that this case [be] referred to the PARAC for investigation
and filing of charges against perpetrators as envisioned by this office under your
administration.
There are significant differences between the technical description of Lot 823 of the
Piedad Estate as stated in FLS-3168-D, the subdivision plan relied on by the
Barques, and the technical description provided by the DENR.
xxxx
The Barques offered no credible explanation for the discrepancy... They also do not
contradict the finding of the National Archives that there is no copy in its files of the
deed of sale allegedly executed between Setosta and Barque.
Lastly, in the 1st Indorsement issued by the Land Projection Section of the LRA
dated 23 August 2006, that Section stated that upon examination it was found out
that the land as described in the Barque title when plotted thru its tie line falls
outside Quezon City. This is material, since Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate is within the
boundaries of Quezon City. A similar finding was made by the Land Management
Bureau (LMB). It attested that the line or directional azimuth of Lot No. 823 per the
Barque title locates it at 5,889 meters away from point 1 of Lot No. 823 of the
Piedad Estate.
These discrepancies highlight the error of the LRA and the Court of Appeals in
acknowledging the right of the Barques to seek reconstitution of their purported
Barque title. Even assuming that the petition for reconstitution should not have

been dismissed due to the Manotok title, it is apparent that the Barques claim of
ownership is exceedingly weak.[297]
The Barques Exh. 6, Fls-3168-D dated June 21, 1940, contained a certification
dated September 23, 1996prepared by Romy A. Felipe that it is allegedly the
Microfilm enlargement of Fls-3168-D with the signatures of Privadi J.G. Dalire and
Carmelito Soriano.[298] However, Engr. Dalire, who served as Chief of the Geodetic
Surveys Division of the LMB, DENR from 1988 to 1998, had earlier prepared a
Report[299] and also executed an Affidavit dated November 18, 2006 [300] setting forth
the exchange of correspondence with the LRA relative to Fls-3168-D, and attesting
that after having scrutinized all records while he was still Chief of the Geodetic
Surveys Division, he found that no such Fls-3168-D exists. The pertinent portions of
Engr. Dalires affidavit stated:
xxxx
Sometime in October 1996, when I was still Chief of the Geodetic Surveys Division
of the LMB, I received a letter requesting a certified true copy of Subdivision Plan
Fls-3168-D (Fls-3168-D) in connection with the examination/verification of a petition
for administrative reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 allegedly registered in the name
of Homer L. Barque, Sr.
The letter came from Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos, who was then the Reconstituting
Officer and Chief of the Reconstitution Division of the Land Registration Authority
(LRA).
A copy of Atty. Bustoss October 29, 2006 letter is attached as Annex A.
2. In my reply, I informed Atty. Bustos that the LMB has no record of Fls-3168-D.
A copy of my November 7, 1996 reply-letter is attached as Annex B.
Atty. Bustos later wrote me again, seeking clarification as to why the Land
Management Services, DENR-National Capital Region (LMS-DENR-NCR) apparently
had a microfilm copy of Fls-3168-D while the LMB does not have a record of the
same.
Atty. Bustos letter (dated December 2, 1996) is attached as Annex C.
I then wrote the Regional Technical Director of the LMS-DENR-NCR , stating that the
LMB had no record of Fls-3168-D and requesting a copy of the alleged Fls-3168-D on
file with the LMS-DENR-NCR for LMBs evaluation.
A copy of my letter (dated December 5, 1996) to the LMS-DENR-NCR is attached as
Annex D.
3. LMS-DENR-NCR did not respond to my letter, Annex D, so I wrote them again
on January 5, 1997repeating my request for a copy of their alleged Fls-3168-D.
A copy of the letter dated January 5, 1997 is attached as Annex E.

4. On January 31, 1997, I wrote the LRA Administrator stating that despite repeated
requests, LMS-DENR-NCR had not furnished the LMB a copy of Fls-3168-D which had
been alleged to be in their files.
In the same letter, I advised the LRA Administrator that, based on the LMBs
examination of the machine copy of Fls-3168-D (which was attached to Atty. Bustos
letter of December 2, 1996), it is certain that the source of the copy [of Fls-3168-D]
is a spurious plan which may have been inserted in the file[s]. I also stated that until
this writing, NCR [referring to LMS-DENR-NCR] has not sent to us the copy [of Fls3168-D] for authentication as required by DENR Administrative Order. I likewise
confirmed that the copy of Fls-3168-D, which I received from Atty. Bustos, did not
emanate from the LMB for the following reasons:
a. Our inventory of approved plans enrolled in our file, our Microfilm Computer list of
plans available for decentralization all show that we do not have this plan Fls-3168D, logically we cannot issue any copy.
b. The copy of the plan Fls-3168-D shows visible signs that it is a spurious copy.
1) The certification (rubber stamp) serves a two piece stamp. The certification and
the signing official are separate. Ours is one-piece.
2) The alignment of: Lands, GEODETIC, this, Privadi, and Chief in the syndicates (sic)
stamp differ from our stamp. Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division is our stamp, their
(sic) is Survey without the s plural.
3) We do not stamp the plan twice as the syndicate did on the copy.
4) The size of the lettering in the rubber stamp Not for Registration/Titling For
Reference Only is smaller than our stamp. It is also incomplete as an (sic) Stamp, in
addition to the above is of ____________.
5) The copy bears forged initials of my section officer and myself. I sign completely
certification.
6) The name of the claimant is very visible to have been tampered in the master
copy.
7) Again, it is certified that this Bureau does not have copy of Fls-3168-D.
A copy of my letter dated January 31, 1997 is attached as Annex F.
5. On February 13, 1997, I received a letter from Atty. Bustos, requesting that I
authenticate an enclosed letter dated January 2, 1997, purporting to have been
written by me to him.
The January 2, 1997 letter states that LMS-DENR-NCR has forwarded a copy of Fls3168-D to the LMB and that this copy is identical with that contained in the LMBs
microfilm records.

Copies of Atty. Bustos letter dated January 28, 1997 and my alleged letter of January
2, 1997 are attached as Annexes G and H, respectively.
I replied to Atty. Bustos, reiterating that Fls-3168-D does not exist in the files of
LMB. I also stressed that the letter dated January 2, 1997, which I allegedly wrote, is
a forged document. I stated that LMS-DENR-NCR had not forwarded any copy of Fls3168-D to the LMB.
A copy of my letter (dated February 13, 1997) is attached as Annex I.
6. On February 19, 1997, I again wrote Atty. Bustos, reiterating that I did not prepare
or issue the letter datedJanuary 2, 1997. I also explained that the copy of Fls-3168D, which was attached to Atty. Bustos December 2, 1996letter, did not emanate
from the LMB for the following reasons:
1) We have no copy of Fls-3168-D on file so how can we issue a copy of plan that is
non-existing?
2) The copy of plan bears two Certifications at the top and at lower half. This is not
our practice;
3) The rubber-stamp shows there are two pieces; one for the certification and
another for the signing official.We use one piece rubber stamp. The alignment of the
letters/words of one rubber stamp is different from this marking on this spurious
plan;
4) The plan shows only initial. I sign in full copies of plans with the initials of my
action officers and their codings below my signature. These are not present in the
spurious copy of plan;
5) The letter size of the rubber stamp NOT FOR REGISTRATION/TITLING, FOR
REFERENCE ONLY is smaller than our rubber stamp;
6) The spurious copy of plan you furnished us does not carry our rubber stamp
GOVERNMENT PROPERTY NOT TO BE SOLD: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY OF
___________________ This is stamped on all microfilm copies we issue because all
microfilm copies are for official use only of our LMS. We have shown you our rubber
stamps to prove that the copy of Fls-3168-D in your possession is a spurious plan.
A copy of my February 19, 1997 letter to Atty. Bustos is attached as Annex J.
7. I hereby affirm under oath that I did not prepare, write, sign and/or send
the January 2, 1997 letter to Atty. Bustos. The signature appearing in that letter is
not my signature. I also confirm that the LMB did not, and until now does not, have
any copy of Fls-3168-D, and that any representation purporting to produce a copy of
it from the LMB files is false.
8. The LMBs Geodetic Surveys Division is the depositary of vital records containing
information on survey plans. These records consist of, inter alia, (1) the Logbooks

for Psu, Psd, Fls, and survey plans containing the survey number, the location, the
surveyor, the condition of all plans salvaged after World War II; (2) the Locator Card
prepared for each plan contained in the Logbooks (The Locator Card indicates the
location of the land, the Survey Number and the Accession Number. The Accession
Number stamped on the Locator Card is also stamped on the survey plan before
microfilming so that authentic microfilm copies of plans should indicate an
Accession Number); (3) the Microfilms of microfilmed survey plans; and (4) the EDP
Listing of plans which were salvaged, inventoried, accession numbered and
microfilmed (The EDP listing was made before the decentralization of the survey
plans to the various offices of the LMS. Hence, if a particular survey plan is not
included in the EDP Listing, it simply means that no such plan was
decentralized/forwarded to the LMS.)
9. All these records, which I have thoroughly scrutinized while I was Chief of the
Geodetic Surveys Division, revealed that no such Fls-3168-D exists. The Logbook of
Fls surveys, more specifically page 351 thereof (attached as Annex K), shows that
the portion for Fls-3168-D was left blank. This simply means no Fls-3168-D was
salvaged, inventoried and microfilmed by the LMB after World War
II. Consequently, no such Fls-3168-D could have been decentralized/forwarded by
the LMB to LMS-DENR-NCR and therefore, it is impossible for LMS-DENR-NCR to
have a microfilmed copy thereof. Moreover, the deck of Locator Cards does not
contain a Locator Card pertaining to Fls-3168-D. Again, this shows that Fls-3168-D
was not salvaged after World War II. It should be emphasized that the Locator Card
indicates the Accession Number for a particular survey plan so that without the
Locator Card, the roll of microfilm containing the survey plan cannot be located.
10. Previously, I prepared a report which discusses in greater detail why the LMB
and the LMS-DENR-NCR did not have, and until now could not have, any genuine
microfilm copy or any other genuine copy of Fls-3168-D. A copy of this report is
attached as Annex L and forms an integral part of this affidavit. I hereby confirm the
truthfulness of the contents of the report.
x x x x[301]
As pointed out by Engr. Dalire, the forwarding of the copy of Fls-3168-D to their
office for validation is mandatory under DENR Administrative Order No. 49, series of
1991, and for the repeated failure of LMS-DENR-NCR to comply with the request of
Engr. Dalire to forward to the Geodetic Surveys Division their purported copy of Fls3168-D, the inescapable conclusion is that said plan is spurious and void. [302]
To cure this anomaly, the Barques presented before the CA another purported copy
of Fls-3168-D containing an alleged certification of more recent date (Exhs. 3 and
4[303]). But still, the CA found no probative value in their additional evidence, further
noting that the Barques, since their filing of a petition for administrative
reconstitution on October 22, 1996, have failed to submit an authenticated and
validated copy of Fls-3168-D.
Also, in a desperate attempt to cure the absence of a certified true copy of
Subdivision Plan Fls-3168-D validated by the Chief of the Geodetic Surveys Division,
the BARQUES offered as their Exhibits 3 and 4 an alleged copy of Subdivision Plan
Fls-3168-D covering Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate, allegedly surveyed on June 21,

1940 by Deputy Public Land Surveyor Tomas Colmenar and approved on January 30,
1941 by the Director of Lands Jose P. Dans, purportedly authenticated on June 8,
2009 by Ignacio G. Almira, Chief, Regional Surveys Division. A visual comparison of
Exhibits 3 and 4 will readily show that both are reproduction of the same
Subdivision Plan.Although, it appears to be an exact reproduction of the same
Subdivision Plan, nonetheless, it is perplexing to note the existence of different
notations on the same Subdivision Plan.
In Exhibit 4, below the stamp FOR OFFICIAL USE, marked as Exhibit 4-A, is the
date June 8, 2009 and the VALIDATION DENR A.O. NO. 49. 1991 and above the
signature over the same Ignacio G. Almira is the notation which reads:
This print copy of FLS-3168-D is cross-checked with other records and the microfilm
of the original and it is found the same.
Exhibit 3, on the other hand, below the stamp FOR OFFICIAL USE, marked as Exhibit
3-A is the CERTIFICATION which reads:
This is to certify that this is a true and correct reproduction of plan Fls-3168-D(W P),
Claimant: Emiliano Setosta
Location: Caloocan City
Area/Nos.: 342945 sq.m.
Requested by: Castor Viernes
Address: 55 Quirino Hi Way Talipapa, Novaliches, Q. City
Purpose: Reference
Date issued: 10-13-98
O.R.# 6437394-A
(Sgd.)
Prepared by: Norma C. trs
(Sgd.)
MAMERTO L. INFANTE
OIC, Regional Technical Director
Under it, marked as Exhibit 3-B. are the following notations, AUTHENTICATE June 8,
2009:
Sir:
According to the verification of FLS-3168-D, situated in Caloocan City dated October
13, 1998.Has available record and files, to National Capital Region. Signing (sic) of
Engr. Mamerto L. Infante
(Sgd.)
IGNACIO G. ALMIRA
Chief, Regional Surveys Division

The mere existence of different notations on the same Subdivision Plan creates
serious doubt on the existence and veracity of the said Subdivision Plan. On record,
from the testimonies of Teresita Barque Hernandez and Engr. Castor Viernes, no
explanation was offered in their Judicial Affidavits and when they testified in Court
on the above divergent notations on the same Subdivision Plan. As such, without an
acceptable explanation, the only logical conclusion is that the different notations on
the same Subdivision Plan was a result of tampering of documents. This is so
because common experience will tell us that if one and the same document is
reproduced several times, even a million times, it would still reflect or replicate the
same notations. Certainly, the tampering of documents not only affect the probative
value thereof, but also subject the malefactor to criminal liability.
x x x x[304]
The CA observed that the Barques should have presented Mamerto L. Infante and
Ignacio G. Almira to identify their signatures on Exhs. 3 and 4. Such failure on their
part to present said witnesses, according to the appellate court, could be considered
eloquent evidence of the absence of Fls-3168-D in the name of Emiliano Setosta
duly approved by the Director of Lands and authenticated by the Chief of the
Geodetic Surveys Division of the LMB.Lastly, the CA cited the following letter-reply
dated 03 October 2005 of Samson G. De Leon, OIC Regional Technical Director, LMSDENR-NCR addressed to Felicitas B. Manahan (Exh. XXXIII), categorically denying
that a copy of approved plan Fls-3168-D exists in their files, thus:
This pertains to your letter dated 22 September 2005 requesting for a duly certified
copy of the original approved plan Fls-3168-D which, as per letter dated 08 August
2005 of the Regional Technical Director for Land Management Services, Atty.
Crizaldy M. Barcelo was verified to be on file in the Technical Records Section, Land
Management Sector of the DENR-National Capital Region.
In connection thereto, may we inform you that, contrary to the claim of Atty.
Crizaldy M. Barcelo in his letter of 08 August 2005, copy of approved plan Fls-3168D is not on-file in Technical Records Section, Land Management Services, DENRNCR. At present, what is on file is ONLY a PHOTOCOPY of Plan Fls-3168-D
covering Lot823, Piedad Estate which is not a duly certified one.
In addition, Lot 823, Piedad Estate is covered by approved plans Sp-00-000360 and
Sp-00-000779 are likewise on-file in the Technical Records Section, Land Surveys
Division, certified on 28 November 2000 by then Chief, Regional Surveys Division
and on 04 June 2005 by then Regional Technical Director for Lands Management
Services, NCR, Atty. Crizaldy M. Barcelo, respectively. Further, verification
revealed that there is no record of receipt of the original copy of plan Fls3168-D. In view thereof, we regret to inform you that your request cannot be
granted.
x x x x[305] (Emphasis supplied.)
The Barques claim being anchored on a spurious, fake and non-existent sale
certificate or deed of conveyance, the CA concluded that no valid transfer or
assignment can be used by them as basis for the reconstitution of title over the
subject lot. And in the absence of a duly approved subdivision plan, the Barques
title, TCT No. 210177, is also null and void.

Manahans Claim
From the existing records in the DENR and LMB, it appears that the original
claimant/applicant over Lot 823 of Piedad Estate was Valentin Manahan who
supposedly had the lot surveyed on November 10, 1938, with the plan designated
as Fls-3164 approved by the Director of Lands on December 13, 1939, and Sale
Certificate No. 511 in the name of Valentin Manahan subsequently issued. However,
the CA seriously doubted the existence of Sale Certificate No. 511, as well as the
veracity of their claim of actual possession before armed men allegedly barred their
caretakers from the premises in the 1950s, thus:
...There is no competent evidence showing that Felicitas Manahan and/or her
predecessor-in-interest have ever been in actual possession of the subject lot. The
Investigation Report of Land Investigator Evelyn de la Rosa (Evelyn G. Celzo) that
Valentin Manahan, as a farmer, took possession of the subject lot in 1908 is not
supported by credible evidence. Evelyn de la Rosa conducted the ocular inspection
only on May 15, 1989 and her Investigation Report dated July 5, 1989 (Exhibit XV,
Manahan) did not mention nor identify the person who allegedly gave her the above
information when she conducted an ocular inspection of the subject lot. A closer
examination of her Investigation Report narrating specific events in 1948 like the
lingering illness of Lucio Manahan who died in 1955 and the alleged reports of
caretakers of heavily armed men taking the subject lot by force are tell-tale
evidence of a scripted report of Land Investigator Evelyn de la Rosa. Indubitably, the
Investigation Report is dovetailed to portray actual possession of the predecessorin-interest of Felicitas Manahan. It is no coincidence that the Investigation Report is
practically a replica or summation of Felicitas Manahans allegations embodied in her
petition (Exhibit 1, Manahans, Rollo, pp. 991-995) for cancellation/reversion of TCT
No. RT-22481 in the name of Severino Manotok she filed before the OSG and
forwarded to the LMB.
xxxx
...the claim of actual possession in 1908 up to about 1948 when allegedly armed
men forcibly wrested possession from the caretakers of Lucio Manahan is negated
by the absence of tax declarations and receipts showing that the MANAHANS who
claimed to be owners of the subject lot declared the subject lot for taxation and paid
the real property tax during the said period. One who claim to be the owner of a
parcel of land should declare it and pay the corresponding real property
tax. Possession of a tax declaration and payment of real property tax will certainly
bolster the claim of possession and ownership over a parcel of land. No evidence
was even formally offered by the MANAHANS showing that they declared the
subject lot for taxation purposes in 1948. The only documentary evidence offered
by the MANAHANS is Real Property Tax Bill Receipt No. 712650 (Exhibit IX,
Manahans) showing payment of real property tax only for the taxable year 19901991 in the sum of P102,319.22. On the other hand, Severino Manotok declared the
subject lot for taxation, as shown in various tax declarations (Exhibits 26-A to 26-N,
Manotoks), the earliest of which was dated July 28, 1933 per Tax Declaration No.
12265 (Exhibit 26, Manotoks) and paid the real property tax as evidenced by tax bill
receipts (Exhibits 27 to 27-KKKKKKK, Manotoks). Thirdly, the Court entertains
serious doubt on the existence of Sale Certificate No. 511 allegedly issued to

Valentin Manahan after paying the purchase price of P2,140.00 stated in the
Investigation Report of Evelyn de la Rosa. Although, Sale Certificate No. 511 was
mentioned as one of the documents attached to the Investigation Report,
nonetheless, no certified copy of Sale Certificate No. 511 issued to Valentin
Manahan was presented and formally offered as evidence in Court. As a matter of
fact, Sale Certificate No. 511 was not among the documents secured from the LMB
and DENR by the OSG and formally offered as evidence in Court. Also, Rosendo
Manahan declared in Court that he tried on several occasions, after reading the
Investigation Report, to secure a certified true copy of Sale Certificate No. 511, but
despite a thorough search for the said document, no original or certified true copy is
on file in the records of the LMB and DENR (TSN, November 19, 2009, pp. 2526). Sans a copy of Sale Certificate No. 511 in the files of the LMB and DENR, it is
quite perplexing to note where and how Hilaria de Guzman secured a photocopy of
Sale Certificate No. 511 dated June 24, 1913 (Exhibit XXXVII, Manahans). No
explanation was offered by Felicitas Manahan and Rosendo Manahan when they
testified in Court. Therefore, We cannot accord probative value on the said
photocopy of Sale Certificate No. 511 dated June 24, 1913 as secondary evidence
for the simple reason that it is of questionable existence and of dubious origin.
[306]
(Italics supplied.)
The CA thus assailed the adoption by Attys. Rogelio Mandar and Manuel Tacorda of
the unsubstantiated findings of Evelyn dela Rosa regarding the claim of the
Manahans in their Memorandum dated April 3, 2000 [307] addressed to the Chief of
the Legal Division Alberto R. Recalde, who in turn adopted the same unsupported
findings in his Memorandum dated April 17, 2000 [308] addressed to the LMB OICDirector. On the basis of Memorandum dated July 6, 2000[309] issued by then DENR
Undersecretary Roseller de la Pea, who also relied on the Investigation Report of
Evelyn dela Rosa, LMB OIC-Director Ernesto Adobo, Jr. issued an Order
dated October 16, 2000[310] for the issuance of Deed of Conveyance No. V-200022
dated October 30, 2000 in favor of Felicitas Manahan.[311]
As to the Deed of Conveyance No. V-200022 dated October 30, 2000, the CA held
that its validity cannot be sustained considering that it lacked the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources) and was signed only by LMB OIC-Director Ernesto Adobo, Jr. In
any event, according to the appellate court, Sale Certificate No. 511 in the name of
Valentin Manahan would be considered stale at the time of issuance of Deed of
Conveyance No. V-200022 as more than eighty six (86) years had passed from the
execution of Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 511 dated June 24, 1939.Clearly,
OIC-Director Ernesto Adobo, Jr. committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing said
deed of conveyance.
As to DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 issued by then Secretary Michael T.
Defensor, the CA ruled that the Manahans, just like the Manotoks, may not invoke it
to cure the lack of approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce in their
respective sale certificate/deed of conveyance, the same being inconsistent with Act
No. 1120.
The Courts Ruling

The core issue presented is whether the absence of approval of the Secretary of the
Interior/Agriculture and Natural Resources in Sale Certificate No. 1054 and Deed of
Conveyance No. 29204 warrants the annulment of the Manotok title.
From the proceedings in the CA, it was established that while records of the DENRLMB indicate the original claimant/applicant of Lot 823 as a certain Valentin
Manahan, only the Manotoks were able to produce a sale certificate in the name of
their predecessors-in-interest, certified by the LMB Records Management Division
(Exh. 10). In addition, the Manotoks submitted photocopies of original documents
entitled Assignment of Sale Certificate dated March 11, 1919, June 7, 1920 and May
4, 1923 (Exhs. 11, 12 and 13). On the other hand, only two (2) of these documents
were submitted by the OSG certified as available in the files of LMB:Assignment of
Sale Certificate dated March 11, 1919 and May 4, 1923 (Exhs. 33 and 34-OSG-LMB).
Sale Certificate No. 1054 dated March 10, 1919 (Exh. 10) was not signed by the
Director of Lands nor approved by the Secretary of the Interior. Exhibits 33 and 34OSG-LMB contained only the signature of the Director of Lands. The Manotoks
belatedly secured from the National Archives a certified copy of Deed of
Conveyance No. 29204 dated December 7, 1932 (Exh. 51-A) which likewise lacks
the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as it was signed
only by the Director of Lands.
Section 18 of Act No. 1120 provides:
SECTION 18. No lease or sale made by Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands under the
provisions of this Act shall be valid until approved by the Secretary of the
Interior. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from the foregoing provision that the sale of friar lands shall be valid only
if approved by the Secretary of the Interior (later the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce). In Solid State Multi-Products Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[312] this
Court categorically declared that the approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce is indispensable for the validity of the sale of friar lands. This was
reiterated in Liao v. Court of Appeals,[313] where sales certificates issued by the
Director of Lands in 1913 were held to be void in the absence of approval by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
In their Memorandum, the Manotoks pointed out that their photocopy of the original
Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 (Exh. 51-A), sourced from the National Archives,
shows on the second page a poorly imprinted typewritten name over the words
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, which name is illegible, and above it
an even more poorly imprinted impression of what may be a stamp of the
Secretarys approval.Considering that the particular copy of said deed of conveyance
on which the transfer certificate of title was issued by the Register of Deeds in the
name of the buyer Severino Manotok is required by law to be filed with and retained
in the custody of the Register of Deeds in accordance with Sec. 56 of Act No. 496
and Sec. 56 of P.D. No. 1529, the Manotoks contend that we can assume that the
Manotok deed of conveyance was in fact approved by the Department Secretary
because the register of deeds did issue TCT No. 22813 in the name of the buyer
Severino Manotok. It is also argued that since the Bureau of Lands was required by
law to transmit the deed of conveyance directly to the Register of Deeds, said office

is legally presumed to have observed the laws requirements for issuing that
deed. The presumption of regularity therefore stands as uncontradicted proof, in
this case, that all...requirements for the issuance of that deed of conveyance had
been obeyed. In any event, the Manotoks assert that even if we were to ignore the
presumption of validity in the performance of official duty, Department
Memorandum Order No. 16-05 issued on October 27, 2005 by then DENR Secretary
Michael T. Defensor, supplies the omission of approval by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources in deeds of conveyances over friar lands.
These arguments fail.
Applying the rule laid down in Solid State Multi-Products Corporation v. Court of
Appeals and Liao v. Court of Appeals, we held in Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc.,
[314]
that the absence of approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce in
the sale certificate and assignment of sale certificate made the sale null and void
ab initio. Necessarily, there can be no valid titles issued on the basis of such sale or
assignment. The Manotoks reliance on the presumption of regularity in the
statutorily prescribed transmittal by the Bureau of Lands to the Register of Deeds of
their deed of conveyance is untenable. In our Resolution[315] denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners in Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc., we
underscored the mandatoryrequirement in Section 18, as follows:
Section 18 of Act No. 1120 or the Friar Lands Act unequivocally provides: No lease
or sale made by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands (now the Director of Lands)
under the provisions of this Act shall be valid until approved by the Secretary of the
Interior (now, the Secretary of Natural Resources). Thus, petitioners claim of
ownership must fail in the absence of positive evidence showing the approval of the
Secretary of Interior. Approval of the Secretary of the Interior cannot simply
be presumed or inferred from certain acts since the law is explicit in its
mandate. This is the settled rule as enunciated in Solid State Multi-Products
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals and reiterated in Liao vs. Court of
Appeals. Petitioners have not offered any cogent reason that would justify a
deviation from this rule.
x x x x[316]
DENR Memorandum Order No. 16,[317] invoked by both the Manotoks and the
Manahans, states:
WHEREAS, it appears that there are uncertainties in the title of the land disposed of
by the Government under Act 1120 or the Friar Lands Act due to the lack of the
signature of the Secretary on the Deeds of Conveyance;
WHEREAS, said Deeds of Conveyance were only issued by the then Bureau of Lands
(now the Land Management Bureau) after full payment had been made by the
applicants thereon subject to the approval of the Secretary of the then Department
of Interior, then Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and presently the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, in accordance with Act 1120;

WHEREAS, some of these Deeds of Conveyance on record in the field offices of the
Department and the Land Management Bureau do not bear the signature of the
Secretary despite full payment by the friar land applicant as can be gleaned in the
Friar Lands Registry Book;
WHEREAS, it is only a ministerial duty on the part of the Secretary to sign the Deed
of Conveyance once the applicant had already made full payment on the purchase
price of the land;
WHEREFORE, for and in consideration of the above premises, and in order to
remove all clouds of doubt regarding the validity of these instruments, it is hereby
declared that all Deeds of Conveyance that do not bear the signature of
the Secretary are deemed signed or otherwise ratified by this
Memorandum Order, provided, however, that full payment of the purchase price
of the land and compliance with all the other requirements for the issuance of the
Deed of Conveyance under Act 1120 have been accomplished by the applicant;
This Memorandum Order, however, does not modify, alter or otherwise affect any
subsequent assignments, transfers and/or transactions made by the applicant or his
successors-in-interest or any rights arising therefrom after the issuance of a Transfer
Certificate of Title by the concerned Registry of Deeds.
The CA opined that the Manotoks cannot benefit from the above department
issuance because it makes reference only to those deeds of conveyance on file with
the records of the DENR field offices. The Manotoks copy of the alleged Deed of
Conveyance No. 29204 issued in 1932, was sourced from the National
Archives.Apparently, for the Manotoks, Memorandum Order No. 16 provides the
remedy for an inequitable situation where a deed of conveyance unsigned by the
Department Secretary could defeat their right to the subject lotafter having fully
paid for it. They point out that the Friar Lands Act itself states that the Government
ceases reservation of its title once the buyer had fully paid the price.
The first paragraph of Section 15 states:
SECTION 15. The Government hereby reserves the title to each and every parcel of
land sold under the provisions of this Act until the full payment of all
installments or purchase money and interest by the purchaser has been
made, and any sale or encumbrance made by him shall be invalid as against the
Government of the Philippine Islands and shall be in all respects subordinate to its
prior claim.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Indeed, in the early case of Director of Lands v. Rizal,[318] this Court ruled that in the
sale of friar lands under Act No. 1120, the purchaser, even before the payment of
the full price and before the execution of the final deed of conveyance is considered
by the law as the actual owner of the lot purchased, under obligation to pay in full
the purchase price, the role or position of the Government being that of a mere lien
holder or mortgagee. Subsequently, in Pugeda v. Trias,[319] we declared that the
conveyance executed in favor of a buyer or purchaser, or the so-called certificate
of sale, is a conveyance of the ownership of the property, subject only to the
resolutory condition that the sale may be cancelled if the price agreed upon is not
paid for in full.

In Dela Torre v. Court of Appeals,[320] we held:

This is well-supported in jurisprudence, which has consistently held that under Act
No. 1120, the equitable and beneficial title to the land passes to the
purchaser the moment the first installment is paid and acertificate of sale
is issued. Furthermore, when the purchaser finally pays the final installment on the
purchase price and is given a deed of conveyance and a certificate of title, the title,
at least in equity, retroacts to the time he first occupied the land, paid the first
installment and was issued the corresponding certificate of sale.
All told, notwithstanding the failure of the government to issue the proper
instrument of conveyance in favor of Mamerto or his heirs, the latter still
acquired ownership over the subject land.[321] (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, it is the execution of the contract to sell and delivery of the certificate of
sale that vests title and ownership to the purchaser of friar land. [322] Such certificate
of sale must, of course, be signed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, as evident from Sections 11, 12 and the second paragraph of Section 15,
in relation to Section 18, of Act No. 1120:
SECTION 11. Should any person who is the actual and bona fide settler upon, and
occupant of, any portion of said lands at the time the same is conveyed to the
Government of the Philippine Islands desire to purchase the land so occupied by
him, he shall be entitled to do so at the actual cost thereof to the Government, and
shall be granted fifteen years from the date of the purchase in which to pay for the
same in equal annual installments, should he so desire paying interest at the rate of
four per centum per annum on all deferred payments.
The terms of purchase shall be agreed upon between the purchaser and
the Director of Lands, subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources.
SECTION 12. ...When the cost thereof shall have been thus ascertained, the Chief of
the Bureau of Public Lands shall give the said settler and occupant a certificate
which shall set forth in detail that the Government has agreed to sell to
such settler and occupant the amount of land so held by him, at the price
so fixed, payable as provided in this Act. . .and that upon the payment of the
final installment together with all accrued interest the Government will convey to
such settler and occupant the said land so held by him by proper instrument of
conveyance, which shall be issued and become effective in the manner provided in
section one hundred and twenty-two of the Land Registration Act.
SECTION 15.
The right of possession and purchase acquired by certificates of sale signed
under the provisions hereof by purchasers of friar lands, pending final payment
and the issuance of title, shall be considered as personal property for the purposes
of serving as security for mortgages, and shall be considered as such in judicial
proceedings relative to such security. (Emphasis supplied.)

In the light of the foregoing, we hold that the Manotoks could not have acquired
ownership of the subject lot as they had no valid certificate of sale issued to them
by the Government in the first place. Sale Certificate No. 1054 dated March 10,
1919 (Exh. 10) purportedly on file with the DENR-LMB, conspicuously lacks the
signature of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. In fact, Exh. 10 was not included among those official documents
submitted by the OSG to the CA. We underscore anew that friar lands can be
alienated only upon proper compliance with the requirements of Sections 11, 12
and 18 of Act No. 1120. It was thus primordial for the Manotoks to prove their
acquisition of its title by clear and convincing evidence. [323] This they failed to
do. Accordingly, this Court has no alternative but to declare the Manotok title null
and void ab initio, and Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate as still part of the Governments
patrimonial property, as recommended by the CA.
The decades-long occupation by the Manotoks of Lot 823, their payment of real
property taxes and construction of buildings, are of no moment. It must be noted
that the Manotoks miserably failed to prove the existence of the title allegedly
issued in the name of Severino Mantotok after the latter had paid in full the
purchase price. The Manotoks did not offer any explanation as to why the only copy
of TCT No. 22813 was torn in half and no record of documents leading to its
issuance can be found in the registry of deeds. As to the certification issued by the
Register of Deeds of Caloocan, it simply described the copy presented (Exh. 5-A) as
DILAPIDATED without stating if the original copy of TCT No. 22813 actually existed in
their records, nor any information on the year of issuance and name of registered
owner. While TCT No. 22813 was mentioned in certain documents such as the deed
of donation executed in 1946 by Severino Manotok in favor of his children and the
first tax declaration (Exh. 26), these do not stand as secondary evidence of an
alleged transfer from OCT No. 614. This hiatus in the evidence of the Manotoks
further cast doubts on the veracity of their claim.
As we stressed in Alonso:
Neither may the rewards of prescription be successfully invoked by respondent, as it
is an iron-clad dictum that prescription can never lie against the Government. Since
respondent failed to present the paper trail of the propertys conversion to private
property, the lengthy possession and occupation of the disputed land by respondent
cannot be counted in its favor, as the subject property being a friar land, remained
part of the patrimonial property of the Government. Possession of patrimonial
property of the Government, whether spanning decades or centuries, can
not ipso facto ripen into ownership. Moreover, the rule that statutes of
limitation do not run against the State, unless therein expressly provided, is founded
on the the great principle of public policy, applicable to all governments alike, which
forbids that the public interests should be prejudiced by the negligence of the
officers or agents to whose care they are confided. [324] (Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the claim of the Manahans, we concur with the finding of the CA that
no copy of the alleged Sale Certificate No. 511can be found in the records of either
the DENR-NCR, LMB or National Archives. Although the OSG submitted a certified
copy of Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 511 allegedly executed by Valentin
Manahan in favor of Hilaria de Guzman, there is no competent evidence to show

that the claimant Valentin Manahan or his successors-in-interest actually

occupied Lot 823, declared the land for tax purposes, or paid the taxes due thereon.
Even assuming arguendo the existence and validity of the alleged Sale Certificate
No. 511 and Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 511 presented by the Manahans, the
CA correctly observed that the claim had become stale after the lapse of eighty six
(86) years from the date of its alleged issuance. As this Court held in Liao v. Court of
Appeals, the certificates of sale x x x became stale after ten (10) years from its
issuance and hence can not be the source documents for issuance of title more than
seventy (70) years later.[325]
Considering that
provisions of Act
the CA declaring
Piedad Estate as

none of the parties has established a valid acquisition under the

No. 1120, as amended, we therefore adopt the recommendation of
the Manotok title as null and void ab initio, and Lot 823 of the
still part of the patrimonial property of the Government.

WHEREFORE, the petitions filed by the Manotoks under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended, as well as the petition-in-intervention of the
Manahans, are DENIED. The petition for reconstitution of title filed by the Barques
is likewise DENIED. TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in the name of Severino Manotok
IV, et al., TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque and Deed of Conveyance
No. V-200022 issued to Felicitas B. Manahan, are all hereby declared NULL and
VOID. The Register of Deeds of Caloocan City and/or Quezon City are hereby
ordered to CANCEL the said titles. The Court hereby DECLARES that Lot823 of the
Piedad Estate, Quezon City, legally belongs to the NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, without prejudice to the institution of REVERSION
proceedings by the State through the Office of the Solicitor General.
With costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.