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Is there a successful Frankfurt-style argument against the Principle of
Alternative Possibilities?
I will show that there is a successful Frankfurt-style argument against the principle
of alternative possibilities (PAP). PAP states that "a person is morally responsible for
what he has done only if he could have done otherwise" (Frankfurt, 1969; 829). To
show that PAP is mistaken, the focus will be on direct moral responsibility. This is a
matter of the freedom a person has when choosing whether they should perform an
action. This freedom is not possible if that person is indirectly morally responsible.
For example, Zoe can choose to pour a drink on the floor and therefore is directly
morally responsible for making a mess. However, Zoe does not choose to drop that
drink when someone knocked it out of her hand and therefore is indirectly morally
responsible for making a mess. Moreover, people who are coerced, hypnotized,
and/or forced to perform actions are also instances of the latter sense; that agent is
indirectly morally responsible because they did not perform that action freely, and
could not have voluntarily chosen to do otherwise. Since direct moral responsibility
are my concerns, I shall omit direct when talking about moral responsibility.
Consequently, I will argue that a person's choice of alternative possibilities are not
necessary for them to be held morally responsible. In section one, I shall outline a
Frankfurt-style argument against PAP. Henry Frankfurt (1969) originally devised this
argument to show that agents could not have alternative possibilities and still be
morally responsible for an action. Next, section two presents Widerker's dilemma to
Frankfurt-style arguments. This dilemma defends PAP by stating that in Frankfurtstyle arguments either (1) the event that occurs prior to a person deciding on
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whether to perform an action causally determines that person's action, or (2) it does
not. Lastly, section three will demonstrate that Widerker's defense of PAP fails. This
will be done by presenting a sophisticated Frankfurt-style argument that retorts
horn (2) of the dilemma.
1
I shall elucidate the aim of Frankfurt-style arguments prior to describing a case that
is in the style of Frankfurt's original argument. In his article Alternate Possibilities
and Moral Responsibility (1969), Frankfurt presents a counterexample to PAP. PAP is
used to argue for the incompatibilist position in the free will debate. This position
maintains that free will and moral responsibility are not compatible with
determinism. Determinism proposes that every event is causally determined, if
determinism is true then agents cannot avoid the performance of their actions. As a
result, incompatibilists argue that if agents do not have alternative possibilities
regarding their actions, then agents have no freedom over their actions and
therefore should not be held morally responsible for them. Since we want to hold
people accountable for their actions, incompatibilists conclude that determinism is
false and that agents must have alternative possibilities to be held morally
responsible. Frankfurt's counterexample to PAP, and hence incompatibilists, argues
that that "there may be circumstances that make it impossible for a person to avoid
performing some action without those circumstances in any way bringing it about
that he performs that action" (1969; 837). What this states is that an agent's ability
to do otherwise, is not required for them to be held morally responsible (Frankfurt,
1969; 836). Hence, contra to the aim of the incompatibilist, PAP is false because
agents can be morally responsible for performing an action and not have an
alternative possibility other than to perform that action.
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I shall now describe a case in the style of Frankfurt's argument (1969; 835-836). I
shall call this an Original Frankfurt-Style Argument (OFSA). Alice is deciding whether
she should kill her brother in law, Bob, after he catches her being unfaithful to her
husband (Bob's brother). Unbeknownst to Alice, Carl also wants Alice to kill Bob.
Carl possesses powers of telepathy and mind control, and hence can make Alice
decide that she should kill Bob if Alice does not decide so. Through his powers of
telepathy, if Carl reads Alice's mind and sees a certain event prior to her decision of
deciding to kill Bob (for example Alice's worrying), then Carl will not evoke his
psychic powers as this event indicates that she will perform that action. Conversely,
if Carl sees that Alice does not exhibit this prior event of worry, that brings around
Alice's decision to kill Bob, then Carl will use his powers of mind control and change
Alice's mental state so that she decides to kill Bob. As things happen, Alice freely
makes the choice to kill Bob, so Carl does not evoke his psychic powers, and Alice
voluntarily kills Bob.
Prima facie, OFSA demonstrates two things. Firstly, Alice is morally responsible for
killing Bob because her decision was not influenced by Carl's presence, which
ultimately means that she decided and acted freely in the process of deciding to kill
Bob and actually doing it. Secondly, it demonstrates that she is not free to do
otherwise. This is so because there is a mechanism, namely Carl and his psychic
powers, which ensure that she performs the action of killing Bob. This mechanism's
presence in OFSA gives the agent no alternative possibility because it depends upon
whether that agent does or does not exhibit a certain event prior to the decision of
whether to perform an action or not. Thus, it seems valid that OFSA refutes PAP
because it describes a scenario where an agent is morally responsible for an action,
and has no alternative possibilities.
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2
Having presented OFSA, I shall consider Widerker's objection to it. As stated
previously, Frankfurt views that the error of PAP lies in the fact that "there may be
circumstances that make it impossible for a person to avoid performing some action
without those circumstances in any way bringing it about that he performs that
action" (1969; 837). Widerker dubs this fact as an IRR situation (1995; 247). Hence,
for a Frankfurt-style argument to disprove PAP it must describe an IRR situation; a
circumstance where an agent is morally responsible for an action, and has no
alternative possibility other than to perform said action. Widerker states that whilst
IRR situations falsify PAP, he argues that Frankfurt-style arguments, like OFSA, are
not IRR situations (1995; 251). Widerker's claim that OFSA does not provide an IRR
situation sets up his dilemma defense of PAP. Focusing on the relation between the
prior event that occurs in Alice before she decides, and the event of Alice actually
deciding to murder Bob, Widerker asserts that in OFSA either (1) the prior event in
Alice's brain indicates a determined state of affairs that Alice will later decide to kill
Bob, or (2) it is not (1995; 251). I shall now elucidate each of the horns of Widerker's
dilemma and show how he concludes that OFSA does not refute PAP.
Horn (1) of the dilemma proposes that OFSA assumes a causally determined
situation. If this is the assumption, then OFSA describes a case where an agent's
decision (Alice's choice to kill Bob) is a necessary consequence of an event prior to
that decision. What this states is that regardless as to whether Alice's choice was
made freely or was forced upon her, because the mechanism (Carl and his psychic
powers) ensure that a certain action is performed (Alice killing Bob), that action is
determined. This is problematic for those refuting PAP. If an agent's choice was
causally determined, and hence they could not have done otherwise, then the PAP
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defender could respond to OFSA claiming that the counterexample begs the
question against incompatibilists. In other words, because incompatibilists claim
that people are only morally responsible for actions if they are not determined, and
hence have alternative possibilities, they will say that Alice is not morally
responsible for killing Bob because the events that led to that action were
determined. PAP defenders conclude that OFSA does not refute PAP because it does
not give an IRR situation; whilst the OFSA provides a case where an agent has no
alternative possibilities, if incompatibilism is true then that agent is not morally
responsible, because they had no freedom over their action.
Horn (2) suggests that OFSA describes a situation where the agent's decision is not
determined by an event prior to their decision (Widerker, 1995; 250). If events are
not causally determined then what entails is that agents in these described
scenarios will have alternative possibilities. This is problematic because for OFSA to
refute PAP it must describe a situation where an agent is morally responsible and
does not have alternative possibilities. Carl and his psychic powers will only
eliminate Alice's alternative possibilities, and hence ensure that Alice kills Bob, if
Alice either exhibits or does not exhibit the prior event of worrying. Therefore, the
mechanism (Carl and his psychic powers) is dependent on this prior event.
However, if OFSA is a situation that is not determined, then the prior event may
only indicate that an action might be performed; if Carl reads Alice's mind and see
that she is worrying this prior event of worry does not determine that she actually
decide to kill bob; Alice may worry and decide to not kill him. Moreover, Alice may
worry and in fact decide to kill Bob, but because the events in the described
scenario are not determined it follows that Alice had alternative possibilities

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available to her. Therefore, if OFSA is not determined then it does not disprove PAP
because it does not give an IRR situation; the agent has alternative possibilities.
Having giving Widerker's dilemma and showing that OFSA does not show PAP to fail,
I shall develop OFSA so that the situation presented is one that does not presuppose
determinism, and hence will overcome horn (2) of Widerker's objection.
3
For this development to successfully respond to the dilemma defense, the described
situation must involve a mechanism that is not dependent upon a prior event. To
develop OFSA so that it overcomes horn (2) I shall follow Mele and Robb's article
Rescuing Frankfurt-style Cases (1998; 101-105). In this Sophisticated Frankfurt-Style
Argument (SFSA), the described situation will involve an indeterministic sequence of
events that results in an agent's performance of an action, and a determined
sequence of events that also results in that agent's performance of said action.
Here, the deterministic sequence is the mechanism that ensures that the agent
performs the specified action. The sequence will cause the action only if the
indeterministic sequence does not result in the action (Mele and Robb, 1998; 102). I
shall now present the SFSA, which follows Mele and Robb's response to Widerker. In
Alice's choice of whether she should or shouldn't kill Bob, she engages in a decision
making process. This decision making process is indeterministic and will result in
either her choice to kill Bob, or not kill Bob. Unbeknownst to Alice, Carl used his
psychic powers to initiate a deterministic sequence in her. This sequence forces
Alice to decide to kill Bob and perform that action. This deterministic sequence does
not consider any prior event that Alice may exhibit, Carl simply evokes his psychic
powers of mind control and not his powers of telepathy. Thus, when Alice kills Bob,
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Carl will believe that her action was a result of his psychic powers. It is important to
note that Alice is completely unaware that Carl initiated this deterministic sequence
in her, thus it does not influence her indeterministic decision making process. As
things happen, Alice's indeterministic process resulted in her freely deciding that
she should kill Bob, and Carl's deterministic psychic powers played no role in that
result.
SFSA overcomes horn (2) of the dilemma defense because Carl evoking his psychic
powers and initiating the deterministic does not depend upon a prior event; Carl
evokes his powers regardless as whether Alice does or does not decide to kill Bob,
this ensures that Alice has no alternative possibilities. Moreover, SFSA gives a
situation where an agent's decision is not causally determined; whilst the
deterministic process ensures that the action of Alice killing Bob occurs, it does not
influence Alice's indeterministic process of deciding to perform that action. Alice
freely chooses to kill Bob, and is morally responsible, because Alice is unaware of
Carl's presence and hence is not influenced by him. Therefore, SFSA describes a
scenario where an agent is morally responsible and could not have done otherwise,
and hence PAP fails since SFSA gives an IRR situation.
Widerker could respond saying that SFSA does not refute PAP because it does not
present an IRR situation (2006; 55). Widerker argues that there are two problems
with SFSA. Firstly, Widerker questions how it is the indeterministic sequence causes
Alice to kill Bob and not the deterministic sequence (2006; 55). This is problematic
because if the deterministic sequence decides Alice's action then Alice did not
cause the decision, and therefore Alice isn't morally responsible for killing Bob
because she did not have control over that action. The second problem is that if we
assume that the deterministic sequence is pre-empt, it is possible that Alice could
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decide not to kill Bob and hence the deterministic sequence will not ensure that
Alice kills Bob (2006; 55). In their awareness of these two problems, Mele and Robb
develop SFSA further to respond to Widerker's objection (1998; 104-105). I shall
apply their development to SFSA; suppose that Alice's brain has two different
decision nodes; the firing of N1 represents that Alice decided to kill Bob; the firing of
N2 represents Alice did not decide to kill Bob. These nodes fire when either the
deterministic and indeterminist sequence occur and hit a decision node Alice's
brain. Alice acts in a certain way if a node fires. Depending on what node is fired
and by what sequence will determine whether the deterministic or indeterministic
sequence caused Alice to decide to kill Bob. If both sequences hit N1 at the same
time, Alice's indeterministic sequence fires N1 because the indeterministic
sequence would preempt the deterministic sequence. The deterministic sequence
would make Alice decide to kill Bob, if the deterministic sequence fires N1 and the
indeterministic sequence fires N2. The deterministic sequence would prevail
because this will ensure that Alice kills Bob. The fact that sequences are pre-empted
and prevail get around the two problems.
Widerker could respond to this development saying that PAP is still not refuted
because it does not present an IRR situation. Widerker would claim that the
deterministic sequence makes it impossible for Alice to avoid deciding to kill Bob,
and hence he the developed case still begs the question against incompatibilists. If
Alice's indeterministic process did not result in her decided to kill Bob then the
deterministic process will force her to do this, because she is unaware that she is
being forced, Incompatibilists will claim that PAP is not refuted because Alice is not
morally responsible since she did not choose to perform that action. Thus PAP
remains valid.
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There is general consensus that "no non-question begging example [of Frankfurtstyle arguments] can be constructed that does not involve at least some alternative
possibilities"(Capes, 2010; 63). Due to this, attention is turned to whether the
remaining alternatives are morally significant enough to transforms agents from
being not morally responsible to being morally responsible, here the alternative
"grounds" the agent (Capes, 2010; 63). Drawing on Pereboom's ideas(2000; 128130) I shall evaluate the developed SFSA to see whether the alternative possibilities
are morally significant enough so that Alice can be deemed morally responsible.
Consider that Alice is a free agent and the only way that she would decide to not kill
Bob will be due to moral reasons; because she is adamant that she wants and is
going to kill Bob, the moral reasons that it is wrong to kill someone will have to
occur in her with enough force to make her not decide on performing that action.
This moral reason does not causally determine whether Alice will decide to kill Bob
or not, and the second horn is of the dilemma defense is resisted. Alice must be
willing to consider the moral reason as to why she should not kill Bob, This process
is indeterministic since it could either result in the decision or her killing bob or not
killing Bob; there is an alternative possibility that she could at the last minute
decide to not kill Bob if there is enough force from these moral reasons. Hence this
is the moral responsibility that incompatibilists care about; Alice must be freely
decide whether or not she should consider these moral reasons, and ultimately
decide whether act on them (and not kill Bob), or act against them(and kill him). To
ensure that Alice does kill Bob, the deterministic sequence of Carl using his psychic
powers is initiated regardless as to whether Alice exhibits a prior event, Carl just
evokes his powers of telepathy (which are blocked off from Alice's consciousness),
hence Alice has no alternative possibilities. In this case, if Alice considers the moral
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reasons to not kill Bob and decides against them, then she will kill Bob and be
morally responsible for that action because whilst Carl's presence made her not
able to do otherwise it did not affect her decision. Conversely, if Alice considered
the moral reasons to not kill Bob and decided that they had enough force to cause
her to not kill him, then the mechanism will force her to do so. The fact that Alice is
even having to consider the moral reasons of the alternative possibility (not having
to kill Bob) grounds her in being morally responsible for that action even if she did
not choose to perform it. This is because she is freely deciding whether or not to
perform am action that is obviously morally wrong. Therefore, this developed and
evaluated SFSA gives an IRR situation; Alice freely decides to perform an action,
making her morally responsible, any alternative possibilities that are forceful moral
reasons in the described scenario ground her to be morally responsible even if she
did not choose to perform that action, however there will not be alternative
possibilities due to a deterministic mechanism.
Having presented a sophisticated Frankfurt-style argument that overcomes horn (2)
of the dilemma defense objection, and is developed such that it is an indeterministic
IRR situation, which accommodates for the moral responsibility that are the
concerns of incompatibilists, I conclude that PAP is false.
Word Count
3059
Bibliography
Capes, J., 2010., 'The W-Defense'. Philosophical Studies, 150, pp. 61-77.

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Frankfurt, H., 1969. 'Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility'. The Journal of
Philosophy, 66(23), pp. 829-839.
Mele, A & Robb, D., 1998. Rescuing Frankfurt-style Cases. The Philosophical
Review, 107, pp. 97-112.
Pereboom, D., 2000. 'Alternative Possibilities and Causal Histories'. Philosophical
Perspectives, 14, pp. 119-137.
Widerker, D., 1995. 'Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of
Alternative Possibilities'. The Philosophical Review, 104(2), pp. 247-261.
Widerker, D., 2006. Blameworthiness and Frankfurts Argument Against the
Principle of Alternative Possibilities, in D. Widerker & M. McKenna (eds), Moral
Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative
Possibilities. England: Ashgate, pp. 53-73.

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