Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
John Aceveda
2008-0032
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John Aceveda
2008-0032
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John Aceveda
2008-0032
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Gil Acosta
2008-0085
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Gil Acosta
2008-0085
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Jasper Agbay vs. Deputy Ombudsman for Military (G.R. No. 134503)
Facts:
On September 7, 1997 Jasper Agbay together with a Sherwin Jugalbot
were arrested and detained at the Liloan Police Station by herein private
respondent policemen. They were arrested for an alleged violation of R.A. 7160.
The following day a complaint for violation of said law was filed against the two
accused before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Metro Cebu by one
Gicarya for and behalf of her daughter Gayle.
On September 10, 1997 the petitioner argued to the Chief of Police that
they be released, considering that the latter had failed to deliver the detained
petitioner to the proper judicial authority within 36 hours from Sept. 7, 1997.
The Main argument of herein petitioners that they were not delivered to
the proper judicial authority, hence herein private respondent policemen were in
violation of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner contends that the act
of Gicarya in filing the complaint before the MCTC was for the purposes of P.I.
as the MCTC has no jurisdiction to try the case, thus not falling within the
requirements of Art. 25.
Isuue:
Wheter or not there was a violation of Art. 125 of the RPC?
Decision:
NO. The SC Held that upon filing of the Complaint to the MCTC, the intent
behind Art. 125 of the RPC is satisfied considering that by such act, the detained
person is informed of the crime imputed against him and, upon his application
with the court, he may be released on bail. Petitioner himself acknowledged this
power of the MCTC to order release when he applied for and was granted his
release upon posting bail. Thus, the very purpose underlying Art. 125 of the RPC
has been duly served with the MCTC. That the filing of the complaint with the
MCTC interrupted the period prescribed in said Article.
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Ranvylle Albano
2008-0052
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Ranvylle Albano
2008-0052
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because
appellant
and
his
companions,
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that prior to the buy-bust operation, the civilian informer had an agreement with
the petitioner to arrange a meeting with the prospective buyers. It was actually
the petitioner who planned and arranged said meeting and what the informer did
was only to convince the petitioner that there are prospective buyers. Clearly
therefore, prior to the buy-bust operation, the petitioner had already the intention
to sell fake US dollar notes and from that fact alone he cannot claim that he was
only instigated to commit the crime. The petitioner also failed to overcome the
legal presumption that public officers regularly perform their official duties.
Melencio S. Faustino
2008-0094
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In the instant case, It is quite obvious that the proper method for claiming
payment under the pakyaw contract was for Murillo to simply bill the town for so
many cubic meters of boulders which had been delivered and piled at the
municipal wharf. Instead he and Inocentes Amora, Jr. resorted to the payroll
system which is not only cumbersome but also involved falsification. The reason
could only be that they were ignorant and ill-advised as claimed.
From the foregoing coupled with the fact that the town of Guindulman
suffered no damage and even gained on the project (the cost of the boulders
actually delivered was P18,285.00 but Murillo was paid only P13,455.00) plus the
additional fact that the alleged complaining witness mentioned in the informations
suffered no damage whatsoever and were in fact awarded no indemnity, it is
obvious that the falsifications made by the petitioners were done in good faith.
The petition is hereby granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals which
adjudged the petitioners guilty of falsification is hereby reversed and the
petitioners are acquitted.
Melencio S. Faustino
2008-0094
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Melencio S. Faustino
2008-0094
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submitted by petitioner himself when the same was requested by the NBI for
examination. Clearly in possession of the falsified deed of sale was petitioner and
not Caridad Dorol who merely verified the questioned sale with the Provincial
Assessor's Office of Sorsogon. In other words, the petitioner was in possession
of the forged deed of sale which purports to sell the subject land from the private
complainant to him. Given this factual backdrop, the petitioner is presumed to be
the author of the forged deed of sale, despite the absence of any direct evidence
of his authorship of the forgery. Since the petitioner is the only person who stood
to benefit by the falsification of the document found in his possession, it is
presumed that he is the material author of the falsification. As it stands, therefore,
we are unable to discern any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of
Appeals.
Jaypee Garcia
2007-0280
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Jaypee Garcia
2007-0280
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Jaypee Garcia
2007-0280
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Later on, the petitioner withdrew such petition for naturalization for some
unknown reason.
After 2 years, a case was filed against him by his wife for perjury, stating that
during within the time the petitioner is asking for naturalization, he committed
acts of perjury by stating material facts which his wife said was all false.
Issue:
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Jm Sandino Imperial
2007-0297
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Shaun Jayoma
2005-0016
Decision:
It is opined that the respondent board can still utilize "attack against any
religion" as a ground allegedly because section 3 (c) of PD No. 1986 prohibits the
showing of motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials which are
contrary to law and Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal Code punishes
anyone who exhibits "shows which offend any race or religion." We respectfully
disagree for it is plain that the word "attack" is not synonymous with the word
"offend." Moreover, Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal Code should be
invoked to justify the subsequent punishment of a show which offends any
religion. It cannot be utilized to justify prior censorship of speech. It must be
emphasized that E.O. 876, the law prior to PD 1986, included "attack against any
religion" as a ground for censorship. The ground was not, however, carried over
by PD 1986. Its deletion is a decree to disuse it. There can be no other intent.
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Shaun Jayoma
2005-0016
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injunction, defendant pointed out that in that anti- smut campaign conducted on
December 1 and 3, 1983, the materials confiscated belonged to the magazine
stand owners and peddlers who voluntarily surrendered their reading materials,
and that the plaintiffs establishment was not raided.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial
court and, in effect, holding that the police officers could without any court
warrant or order seize and confiscate petitioner's magazines on the basis simply
of their determination that they are obscene?
Decision:
(PD No. 960 as amended by PD No. 969) Sec. 2. Disposition of the
Prohibited Articles. The disposition of the literature, films, prints, engravings,
sculptures, paintings, or other materials involved in the violation referred to in
Section 1 hereof (Art. 201), RPC as amended) shall be governed by the following
rules: (a) Upon conviction of the offender, to be forfeited in favor of the
Government to be destroyed. (b) Where the criminal case against any violator of
this decree results in an acquittal, the obscene/immoral literature, films, prints,
engravings, sculptures, paintings or other materials and articles involved in the
violation referred to in Section 1 (referring to Art. 201) hereof shall nevertheless
be forfeited in favor of the government to be destroyed, after forfeiture
proceedings conducted by the Chief of Constabulary. (c) The person aggrieved
by the forfeiture action of the Chief of Constabulary may, within fifteen (15) days
after his receipt of a copy of the decision, appeal the matter to the Secretary of
National Defense for review. The decision of the Secretary of National Defense
shall be final and unappealable.
The Court is not ruling out warrantless searches, as the Rules of Court
(1964 rev.) (the Rules then prevailing), provide: SEC. 12. Search without warrant
of person arrested. A person charged with an offense may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission
of the offense. But as the provision itself suggests, the search must have been an
incident to a lawful arrest, and the arrest must be on account of a crime
committed. Here, no party has been charged, nor are such charges being
readied against any party, under Article 201, as amended, of the Revised Penal
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Code. To say that the respondent Mayor could have validly ordered the raid (as a
result of an anti-smut campaign) without a lawful search warrant because, in his
opinion, "violation of penal laws" has been committed, is to make the respondent
Mayor judge, jury, and executioner rolled into one. And precisely, this is the very
complaint of the petitioner.
Shaun Jayoma
2005-0016
Issue:
Whether petitioners participate in the distribution and exhibition of
obscene materials?
Decision:
The Supreme Court emphasizes that mere possession of obscene
materials, without intention to sell, exhibit, or give them away, is not punishable
under Article 201, considering the purpose of the law is to prohibit the
dissemination of obscene materials to the public. The offense in any of the forms
under Article 201 is committed only when there is publicity. The law does not
require that a person be caught in the act of selling, giving away or exhibiting
obscene materials to be liable, for as long as the said materials are offered for
sale, displayed or exhibited to the public. In the present case, we find that
petitioners are engaged in selling and exhibiting obscene materials.
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unjust order or judgment. The last is punishable under Article 204 of the Revised
Penal Code as follows:
Art. 204. Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust judgment in a
case submitted to him for decision shall be punished by prision mayor and
perpetual disqualification.
Alvin Ocampo
2011-0386
Facts:
This is an administrative case initiated by the sworn affidavit-complaint of
Lucia F. Layola, dated 12 August 1997, charging Presiding Judge Basilio R.
Gabo, Jr. of Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan, with a
violation of Section 3 (e), R.A. 3019, for issuing an unjust interlocutory order, and
with gross ignorance of the law. Complainant sent the above-mentioned affidavitcomplaint to Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, BGen. Manuel B. Casaclang
(Ret.), of the Office of the Ombudsman who, in turn, indorsed the same to the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for appropriate action.
Respondent Judge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr. stands charged with a violation of
Section 3 (e), R.A. 3019, for issuing an unjust interlocutory order, and with gross
ignorance of the law. According to the complainant the respondent judge directed
that accused SPO2 German be held in the custody of his immediate superior, the
Chief of Police of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, an order sans any legal and factual basis,
instead of ordering the arrest of the said accused being indicted for murder, a
heinous and non-bailable crime. Thereafter, respondent judge denied the motion
for reconsideration interposed by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military
The Office of the Court Administrator, after thorough examination of the
evidence submitted before it, found that the charges for violation of Section 3 (e),
R.A. 3019 and of issuing an unjust interlocutory order, bereft of merit but
respondent judge was adjudged guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
As regards the charge of violating Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, the OCA stressed that the important element of the
offense, which is damage or injury to the complainant, or manifest partiality
shown to any party, is anemic of evidentiary support. There is no allegation of
any injury suffered by the complainant as a result of the conduct or actuation of
the respondent judge, nor was there any showing of undue benefit or advantage
given to the adverse party under the orders complained of.
With respect to the alleged rendering of an unjust interlocutory order, in
connection with the denial by respondent judge of the motion for reconsideration
of the order granting the petition of the Chief of Police, Sta. Maria Station to take
custody of accused SPO2 German, the OCA found such a charge to be
unfounded.
Knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order must have the elements:
1) that the offender is a judge; 2) that he performs any of the following acts: a) he
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However, the Supreme Court found Judge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr. guilty of
gross ignorance of the law.
Justiniano Quiza
2008-0290
Sevilla and a certain Mrs. Dimaano joined them in the canteen. They occupied
two squareshaped tables joined together. The petitioner sat at the head of the
table with Mrs. Mutia seated at her left, Mrs. Dimaano at her (the petitioner's)
right and Mrs. Sevilla at the right of Mrs. Dimaano. Member of the Philippine
Constabulary (PC) brought along a camera in order to take photographs of the
entrapment. The marked money was folded altogether.
After the money had been delivered and received, pictures were taken,
one of them depicting the accused held by member of the PC on the left hand
and another showing the accused also held on the left hand by one of the PC
men, and the complainant, Mrs. Mutia, drinking from a glass .
The petitioner was arrested by the soldiers despite her objections to the
entrapment. She denied having accepted the supposed bribe money.
The case was brought to the respondent court which ruled that the crime
committed by the petitioner was not Direct Bribery as defined in Article 210 of the
Revised Penal Code cited in the Information but Indirect Bribery as defined under
Article 211 of the same code.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was properly convicted of the crime of indirect
bribery?
Decision:
No. The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as defined in Article 211 of
the Revised Penal Code is that the public officer concerned must have accepted
the gift or material consideration. There must be a clear intention on the part of
the public officer to take the gift so offered and consider the same as his own
property from then on, such as putting away the gift for safekeeping or pocketing
the same. Mere physical receipt unaccompanied by any other sign, circumstance
or act to show such acceptance is not sufficient to lead the court to conclude that
the crime of indirect bribery has been committed.
An examination of the seven photographs that were allegedly taken
immediately after the passing of the money shows that the petitioner was
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Alexander Santos
2006-0205
Issue:
Whether or not complainants action constitute corruption of a public
official?
Decision:
Yes, the court agreeing with the trial court adopts the recommendation that
appropriate directive be issued to the City Prosecutor of Manila after preliminary
investigation to charge complainant Rina Chua and Atty. Victoriano R. Yabut, Jr.
with corruption of public official under Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code.
Renato Segubiense
2006-0040
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wherein petitioner was found to have an unsettled cash advance in the amount of
P18,000.00.
Petitioner admitted receiving the P18,000.00 cash advance intended to
purchase working tools for the "NALGO" project.
allegations that he misappropriated the said amount. He testified, too, that, the
purchase order (PO) for the said tools were already approved by the provincial
treasurer and the provincial auditor, the new administration decided to scrap the
proposed transaction. According to petitioner, following the assumption to office
of Governor Luisito Reyes, his office files containing the said PO and the
requisition paper were taken and his services terminated per Governor Reyes'
Memorandum No. 88-63 dated November 23, 1988. Said memorandum also
stated that "should you apply for the commutation/payment of your unused
leave/vacation and sick/credits, the same may be approved provided it is first
applied/charged
to
your
unliquidated
cash
advance
of P18,000.00."
Pressing the point, petitioner stated that he then applied for his terminal leave
and other benefits through the following summary of vouchers which he
personally prepared, but were then disapproved.
Despite his belief that he was then no longer obligated to liquidate his
P18,000.00 cash advance, petitioner nonetheless settled his account. Petitioner
brushed aside the charge of malversation and declared that he had already been
relieved of his accountabilities by the Commission on Audit. He, however,
admitted receiving from the provincial treasurer the two demand letters earlier
adverted to dated May 5, 1988 and May 26, 1988 requiring him to submit his
liquidation of the P18,000.00 cash advance on the dates respectively indicated
therein.
On June 30, 2000, the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision, finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of malversation of public
funds and sentencing him accordingly.
Issue:
Whether or not the alleged acts of the petitioner constitute the crime
charge?
Decision:
The elements essential for the conviction of an accused under the above
penal provision are; that the offender is a public officer; that he has the custody
or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; that the funds
or property are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and that he
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on January 27, 1995, that is, after almost seven (7) years from the last demand.
The return of the said amount cannot be considered a mitigating circumstance
analogous to voluntary surrender considering that it took petitioner almost seven
(7) years to return the amount.
In malversation of public funds, payment, indemnification, or
reimbursement of funds misappropriated, after the commission of the crime, does
not extinguish the criminal liability of the offender which, at most, can merely
affect the accused's civil liability thereunder and be considered a mitigating
circumstance being analogous to voluntary surrender.
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Renato Segubiense
2006-0040
(PNB)
but
were
subsequently
used
to
purchase
two
(2)
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On value date, per routing procedure, Credit Lyonnais (the second bank)
remitted Japanese Yen 1,143,316,130.00 to the Bank of Japan, Tokyo Branch.
Likewise, per routing procedure, UCPB T.M. Kalaw Branch was supposed to
have remitted on said value date the amount of US$7,740,799.80. UCPB T.M.
Kalaw, however, despite the fact that the PNB had already issued two (2)
managers/cashiers checks for such purpose, did not make the agreed
remittance to Credit Lyonnais, so Credit Lyonnais received no payment for the
funds it had remitted to the Bank of Japan, Tokyo. Both the State and the
accused have offered explanations for the failure of UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch to
remit the dollar equivalent of P183,805,291.25 to Credit Lyonnais. Both
explanations, naturally, were diametrically opposed.
The accused allegedly diverted the funds covered by the two PNB
Managers checks by falsifying a commercial document called an Application for
Cashiers Check (ACC) by inserting an account number (A/C #111-1212-04) of a
private individual after the name of the payee, UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch. It
claims that NPC did not authorize the insertion considering that the Payment
Instruction (PI) issued by NPC instructing PNB to prepare a Managers check to
be charged to NPCs savings account did not contain any account number.
Through the insertion, the accused allegedly succeeded in diverting the funds
from the UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch in favor of Raul Gutierrez, Raul Nicolas,
George Aonuevo and Mara Aonuevo.
On May 28, 2002, the Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision, finding the
accused Jaime B. Ochoa guilty of the crime of malversation of public funds thru
falsification of commercial documents. On the ground of reasonable doubt
accused Jose Ting Lan Uy, was acquitted. An alias warrant of arrest was issued
against Raul Gutierrez.
Issue:
Whether or not the herein accused is guilty of Malversation of Public
Funds thru Falsification of Commercial Documents?
Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled that to be found guilty of malversation, the
prosecution must prove the the offender is a public officer; that he has the
custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; that
the funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is
accountable; and that he has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has
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through
negligence
by
allowing
another
to
commit
such
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Renato Segubiense
2006-0040
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Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled that the petition lacks merit and guilty of te crime
charge. In affirming the courts below the Supreme Court pointed out the following
reasons, that the fact that Bas was given official designation during all the times
that she acted as collection officer, petitioner's liability is not, by that fact alone,
mitigated. Petitioner could still be held liable for the amount unremitted by Bas if
it can be shown that the latter was under her supervision. The questioned
amount on time because it is incumbent upon him to exercise the strictest
supervision on the person he designated, otherwise, he would suffer the
consequences of the acts of his designated employee through negligence. In
short, by failing to exercise strict supervision he could be liable for malversation
through negligence. The auditor thus committed no error when she charged to
petitioner's account the shortage in the collections actually done by Bas. The
failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property
with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall
be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to
personal use. The petitioner not only did omit to report the shortages of Bas to
the proper authority upon her discovery thereof; she even practically admitted to
having assisted Bas in covering up such shortages. Petitioner did not only lend
Bas those amounts given on November 7, 9, and 15, 1995. She admittedly
extended 'vales to her and to others, also out of public funds.
The grant of loans through the "vale" system is a clear case of an
accountable officer consenting to the improper or unauthorized use of public
funds by other persons, which is punishable by the law. To tolerate such practice
is to give a license to every disbursing officer to conduct a lending operation with
the use of public funds. The Supreme Court further ruled that the alleged
acquiescence of petitioner's superior, even if true, is not a valid defense. The fact
that petitioner did not personally use the missing funds is not a valid defense and
will not exculpate him from his criminal liability.
Facts:
gave
Php 3,000 cash financial assistance to the chairman and Php 1,000 to each
tanod in a certain barangay. When it was not justified as a lawful expense, the
latter refunded the amount from the City of Manila.
Respondent asserted that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the
case, but it is lodged in the COMELEC instead. He alse maintained his position
on the validity of the expenses made.
Issue:
Whether or not Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the case against respondent?
Decision:
It is well-settled that the Court will not ordinarily interfere with the
Ombudsmans determination of whether or not probable cause exists except
when it commits grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion exists
where a power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to
amount to evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by,
or in contemplation of law.
Along with Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, appellant was charged under
an Information, both public officers, being then the President and cashier,
respectively, of the Sulu State College, and as such by reason of their positions
and duties are accountable for public funds under their administration, while in
the performance of their functions, conspiring and confederating with Darkis, also
a public officer, being then the Administrative Officer V of the said school, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without lawful authority, apply
for the payment of wages of casuals, the amount of Php 40,000, which amount
was appropriated for the payment of the salary differentials of secondary school
teachers of the said school, to the damage and prejudice of public service.
Appellants co-accused, Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, were both
acquitted. Only appellant was found guilty and sentenced by the Sandiganbayan
in its decision. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan amended
appellants sentence by deleting the temporary special disqualification imposed
upon her.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty of technical malversation?
Decision:
The presumption of criminal intent will not automatically apply to all
charges of technical malversation because disbursement of public funds for
public use is per se not an unlawful act. Here, appellant cannot be said to have
committed an unlawful act when she paid the obligation of the Sulu State College
to its employees in the form of terminal leave benefits such employees were
entitled to under existing civil service laws.
There is no dispute that the money was spent for a public purpose
payment of the wages of laborers working on various projects in the municipality.
It is pertinent to note the high priority which laborers wages enjoy as claims
against the employers funds and resources.
Settled is the rule that conviction should rest on the strength of evidence
of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. Absent this required
quantum of evidence would mean exoneration for accused-appellant. The
Sandiganbayans improper reliance on Sec. 5(b) of Rule 131 does not save the
day for the prosecutions deficiency in proving the existence of criminal intent nor
could it ever tilt the scale from the constitutional presumption of innocence to that
of guilt.
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Issue:
Whether or not petitioner can be convicted of illegal use of public funds?
Decision:
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Lacsamana's testimony shows that the CRBI fund is a general fund, and
the utilization of this fund specifically for the concreting of the Barangay Jalung
Road was merely an internal arrangement between the Department of Public
Works and Highways and the barangay captain and was not particularly provided
for by law or ordinance. There is no dispute that the money was spent for a
public purposepayment of the wages of laborers working on various projects in
the municipality. It is pertinent to note the high priority which laborers' wages
enjoy as claims against the employers' funds and resources. In the absence of a
law or ordinance appropriating the CRBI fund for the concreting of the Barangay
Jalung Road, the petitioner cannot be declared guilty of the crime of illegal use of
public funds.
Eddie Tamondong
2009-0178
the accused claims, was able to get dressed and ran outside the house to avoid
his wrath.
Nevertheless, he was still found guilty by the RTC of parricide.
Issue:
Should Eduardo be granted the exceptional circumstance under Art. 247
of the RPC?
Decision:
In order to appreciate Art. 247 of the RPC, the accused must be able to
prove that:
lover;
the spouse and/or the lover; and 3) the accused never consented to the carnal
acts done by the spouse.
Unfortunately for Eduardo, he wasnt able to establish the existence of the
aforesaid circumstances. His version of how things went down were too full of
inconsistencies. First off, he stabbed his wife several times which is not
consistent with an accidental killing (because he claimed he was aiming for the
lover). Another was that he claimed that the paramour was able to GET
DRESSED while under attack. And another was that even his daughter testified
that she did not tell her father anything about her mothers residence or
whereabouts as even she did not know where her mother was staying.
So the guilty verdict is sustained.
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Eddie Tamondong
2009-0178
People v. Amamongpong
Facts:
Amamompong was charged with homicide for the killing of SPO1 Flores in
their house. The accused contends that not only was the killing done under
exceptional circumstances (Art. 247 of the RPC), but that he was also justified in
killing Flores under Art 11 of the RPC because his act was done in defense of the
honor of his wife.
Although a prosecution witness testified that he saw the accused actually
hold a scythe to hack Flores in the first floor of the house, the accused counters
that the incident took place in the bedroom located at the 2 nd floor of their
residence. And it was there that he saw Flores naked from the waist down
attempting to have sex with his wife. It was then that he pursued Flores with the
scythe and thereby wounding him. And when the victim tried to run, Flores also
drew his gun but the accused was quick to wrestle the gun away and use it
against Flores. The accused whereby emptied the bullets on the victim.
Another prosecution witness testified that although the accused claims this
all happened in the second floor, large quantities of blood was found in the first
floor and even on the stairs and that on the second floor, no apparent signs of
struggle can be seen as all the furniture and appliances were in order. And
except for the victims bloody carcass, nothing else seemed out of the ordinary.
But Amamompong was steadfast in his defense.
Issue:
Should the accused be afforded the benefit under Art. 11 as well as Art.
247 of the RPC?
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Decision:
No. Not only is the accused version of the events not credible, but the fact
that the accused claims BOTH Art 11 and 247 of the RPC is contradictory in
itself. One cannot claim that rage was brought upon when an accused sees his
wife engaged in sexual intercourse willingly with a lover, and at same time claim
that his acts were to defend the honor of his wife.
Add to this the testimony of the prosecution witness that he saw the
accused strike the victim with a scythe on the first floor, as well as the forensic
evidence pointing to the fact that the body of the victim could have been just
carried on the second floor to make it seem like the victim was attempting to
have intercourse, then the Court has no reason to reverse the finding of the trial
court that Art 11 and 247 of the RPC can not be appreciated in the case at bar.
Eddie Tamondong
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2009-0178
People v. Oyanib
Facts:
Michael Oyanib was charged with parricide and homicide for the killing of
his wife and her lover at Michaels wifes residence.
The following facts have been established:
That Michael and his wife Tita started living separately a year earlier.
Michael tried to win back Tita but the latter was openly flaunting his new lover
Jesus Esquirdo.
In one occasion, Micheal and Jesus almost came to blows when Michael
saw his wife and Jesus in a loving embrace at the plaza. After this incident, Jesus
and Tita were heard threatening Michael that they would kill him the next time
they see each other.
A day before the killings, One of Michael and Titas children was asked by
the school to call her parents for a meeting. But because Michael was
indisposed, he went to his wifes residence the next day to ask her if she could
come. But because of the threats of Jesus and his wife in the previous incident,
he brought with him a hunting knife.
Unfortunately, when the accused arrived at Titas house, he saw Tita and
Jesus having sex. Jesus launched at Michael but he (Mike) was able to draw his
knife and stab Jesus. Tita, meanwhile got a hold of a liquor bottle whereby she
attacked Michael. And so, Michael also stabbed Tita.
But the RTC still found Mike guilty.
Issue
Should the exempting circumstance under Art. 247 be applied under the
circumstances?
Decision:
In order for Art. 247 to apply, the accused or the defense must be able to
show the following elements: 1) he/she/ catches the other spouse by surprise
having sex with a lover;
72 | P a g e
The evidence show that all three elements are present in this case.
Michael was still married to Tita (albeit living separately), he caught his wife and
Jesus by surprise having sex, and Michael certainly did not approve of their
relationship, much less their carnal act.
The fact that Mike brought with him a hunting knife is consistent with his
excuse that he was fearful of an attack by either Jesus or Tita because of past
events.
So the decision of the RTC is modified. Mike is found guilty only under Art.
247 of the RPC.
Mark Vergara
2008-0323
run away. When they were not able to catch up with him, Rufino boarded and
drove the truck parked near the basketball court and continued chasing Joseph
until the truck ran over the latter, which caused his instantaneous death.
Appreciating the qualifying circumstance of use of motor vehicle, it
convicted Rufino of murder.
Issue:
Whether or not the use of a motor vehicle is a qualifying circumstance for
the crime of murder?
Decision:
The evidence shows that Rufino deliberately used his truck in pursuing
Joseph. Upon catching up with him, Rufino hit him with the truck, as a result of
which Joseph died instantly. It is therefore clear that the truck was the means
used by Rufino to perpetrate the killing of Joseph.
The case of People v. Muoz cited by Rufino finds no application to the
present case. In the said case, the police patrol jeep was merely used by the
accused therein in looking for the victim and in carrying the body of the victim to
the place where it was dumped. The accused therein shot the victim, which
caused the latters death. In the present case, the truck itself was used to kill the
victim by running over him.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, a person who kills another
by means of a motor vehicle is guilty of murder. Thus, the use of motor vehicle
qualifies the killing to murder. The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to
death.
In view of the absence of an aggravating circumstance and the presence
of one mitigating circumstance, reclusion perpetua, not death, should be the
penalty to be imposed on Rufino.
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Mark Vergara
2008-0323
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Andres and for two counts of frustrated murder for the injuries sustained by
Kenneth Andres and Kevin Valdez.
Issue:
Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of treachery is present for the
crime of murder?
Decision:
The fact that the appellant fired his gun from behind the victim does not by
itself amount to treachery. There is no evidence on record that the appellant
deliberately positioned himself behind the victim to gain advantage over him
when he fired the shot. On the contrary, the evidence before us reveals that the
position of the appellants car was not of his own doing but it became so when
Noel Andres overtook his car and cut off his path.
Appellant did not act belligerently towards Noel Andres even after the
latter cut off the appellants path. Andres stated in court that the appellant did not
alight from his car nor opened his window until he, Andres, tapped on it. For his
part Gonzalez categorically stated in court that he did not point his gun nor
threatened Andres during their short spat. Gonzalez, although he had his gun in
his car, did not react to Andres cursing until the latter was having an altercation
with the appellants son, Dino. Gonzalez claimed that he perceived that his son
was in imminent danger.
There is no indication that Gonzalez had any opportunity to see the
passengers when he fired the shot. The totality of the evidence on record fails to
support a conclusion that Gonzalez deliberately employed the mode of attack to
gain undue advantage over the intended nor the actual victim. Without any
decisive evidence to the contrary, treachery cannot be considered; thus the crime
committed is homicide.
As regards the injuries sustained by the two children we find that the crime
committed are two counts of slight physical injuries. The intent to kill determines
whether the crime committed is physical injuries or homicide and such intent is
made manifest by the acts of the accused which are undoubtedly intended to kill
the victim. In a case wherein the accused did not know that a person was hiding
behind a table who was hit by a stray bullet causing superficial injuries requiring
treatment for three days, the crime committed is slight physical injuries. In case of
doubt as to the homicidal intent of the accused, he should be convicted of the
lesser offense of physical injuries.
76 | P a g e
Mark Vergara
2008-0323
Republic Act No. 8294, which took effect on July 6, 1994. The pertinent
provision of the said law provides:
SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or
Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be
Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. The penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand
pesos (P15,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm,
such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of
firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be
used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, that no other
crime was committed.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm,
such use of an unlicensed firearm such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.
It is clear from the foregoing that where murder or homicide results from
the use of an unlicensed firearm, the crime is no longer qualified illegal
possession, but murder or homicide, as the case may be.
The crime of illegal possession of firearm, in its simple form, is committed
only where the unlicensed firearm is not used to commit any of the crimes of
murder, homicide, rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d'etat.
Otherwise, the use of unlicensed firearm would be treated either: (1) as an
essential ingredient in the crimes of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or
attempted coup d'etat; or (2) as an aggravating circumstance in murder or
homicide.
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Mark Vergara
2008-0323
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80 | P a g e
Mark Vergara
2008-0323
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half-hearted, if not totally unwilling, to perform their assigned duties for fear that
they would suffer the same fate as that of accused-appellant.
Mark Vergara
2008-0323
Facts:
Arnulfo Arnie Tuadles succumbed instantaneously to a single gunshot wound
right between the eyes, inflicted with deadly precision by the bullet of a .9mm caliber
Beretta pistol of appellant Antonio.
Prior to the shooting, appellant and the victim spent several hours having fun
playing "pusoy dos." The situation turned ugly, however, when Tuadles could not pay to
appellant Antonio his alleged winnings. An argument arose, with appellant Antonio and
Tuadles standing face to face three (3) feet away from each other.
According SG Bobis who witnessed the said crime; Tuadles and Antonio were
arguing. Antonio even called out: Sarge! Sarge! Sarge! Just before the shooting, Bobis
heard Antonio saying: Putang ina ka kasi.
Issue:
Whether or not the shooting was attended with the qualifying circumstance of
treachery for the crime of murder?
Decision:
If Antonio had consciously adopted means and methods to kill Tuadles, there
was no reason to call for a Sergeant (Sarge) or any eyewitness for that matter.
The aggravating circumstance of treachery is not present when decision to attack
was arrived at on the spur of the moment.
The trial court's ruling that the mere suddenness of an attack makes the killing a
murder because of treachery is not consistent with the decisions of this Court.
To the point is our ruling in the case of People v. Alacar, where we held that there
was no treachery where the attempt to kill resulted from a verbal altercation. More
recently, in People v. Salvador, we pronounced that:
There would be no treachery when the victim was placed on guard, such as
when a heated argument preceded the attack, or when the victim was standing face to
face with his assailants and the initial assault could not have been unforseen.
Antonio can only be convicted of the lesser crime of homicide under Article 249
of the Revised Penal code.
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Arlyn Barcelon
2006-0021
Not long after, Danilo, halfway on his first bottle, left to look for a place to
relieve himself. According to Edwin, he was only about three meters from Danilo
who was relieving himself when a short, dark bearded man walked past him,
approached Danilo and stabbed him at the side. Danilo retaliated by striking his
assailant with half- filled bottle of beer. Almost simultaneously, a group of men
numbering of seven (7), ganged up on Danilo and hit him with assorted weapons.
Edwin, who was petrified, could only watch helplessly as Danilo was being
mauled and overpowered by his assailants. Danilo fell to the ground and died
before he could be given medical attention.
Edwin Selda confirmed the identity of the suspect who was then in the
custody of the police. Thereat, he executed an affidavit and affirmed before the
police authorities, that the man under detention, Anecito Unlagada, was the same
man who stabbed his friend Danilo. The accused assails his conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in finding Unlagada guilty of murder
instead of tumultuous affray under Art. 251 of the Revised Penal Code?
Decision:
Basic is the rule that the defense of alibi should be rejected when the
identity of the accused has been sufficiently and positively established by an
eyewitness because alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification
.
A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several
persons who engage in a confused and tumultuous manner, in the course of
which a person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be
ascertained. The quarrel in the instant case is between a distinct group of
individuals , one of whom was sufficiently identified as the principal author of the
killing, as against a common, particular victim. It is not, as the defense suggests,
a tumultuous affray within the meaning of Art. 251 of The Revised Penal Code,
85 | P a g e
that is, a melee or free- for- all, where several persons not comprising definite or
identifiable groups attack one another in a confused and disorganized manner,
resulting in the death or injury of one or some of them.
Verily, the attack was qualified by treachery. The deceased was relieving
himself, fully unaware of any danger to his person when suddenly the accused
walked past witness Edwin Selda, approached the victim and stabbed him at the
side. There was hardly any risk at all to accused- appellant; the attack was
completely without warning, the victim was caught by surprise, and given no
chance to put up any defense.
Wherefore, the decision of conviction appealed from is affirmed.
Arlyn Barcelon
2006-0021
87 | P a g e
Decision:
For Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code to apply; it must be established
that: (1) there be several persons; (2) that they did not compose groups
organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other
reciprocally; (3) these several persons quarreled and assaulted one another in a
confused and tumultuous manner;(4) someone was killed in the course of the
affray; (5) it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and (6) that
the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used
violence be can be identified.
A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several
persons and they engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of
which some person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be
ascertained.
The quarrel in the instant case, if it can be called a quarrel, was between
one distinct group and one individual. Confusion may have occurred because of
the police dispersal of the rallyists, but this confusion subsided eventually after
the loyalists fled to Maria Orosa Street. It was only a while later after said
dispersal that one distinct group identified as loyalists picked on one defenseless
individual and attacked him repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches, kicks
and blows on him. There was no confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor
was there a reciprocal aggression at this stage of the incident.
As the lower courts found, the victims assailants were numerous by as
much as fifty in number and were armed with stones with which they hit the
victim. They took advantage of their superior strength and excessive force and
frustrated any attempt by Salcedo to escape and free himself. Salcedo pleaded
for mercy but they ignored his pleas until he finally lost unconsciousness. The
deliberate and prolonged use of superior strength on a defenseless victim
qualifies the killing of murder.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed and modified.
88 | P a g e
Arlyn Barcelon
2006-0021
fence for safety. Miguelito Donato was about two meters away from where
Ricardo stayed at the fence. Not for long, accused- appellant took his hand- gun
tucked in his waist and fired at the victim Miguelito Donato, hitting the latter at the
left breast. Ricardo Donato tried to help his fallen brother Miguelito but somebody
struck Ricardos head with an iron bar which knocked him out for about 3
minutes. When Ricardo regained consciousness, he hurried home and informed
his parents of what happened.
Their father immediately went to the crime scene and rushed Miguelito to
the Pio Duran Hospital where the latter died early in the morning of the next day.
Before Miguelito expired, Regarder Donato, the father, asked who shot him and
Miguelito replied that it was accused- appellant.
The autopsy report revealed that aside from gunshot, the body of
Miguelito bore lacerated wounds. That the wounds could have inflicted by more
than two persons.
The trial court ruled against the accused- appellant and was held guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder.
Issue:
Whether or not Maramara should be held liable for tumultuous affray
instead of murder?
Held:
There is no merit in the accused- appellants position that he should be
held liable only for death caused in a tumultuous affray under Article 251 of the
Revised Penal Code. It was in such situation that accused came at the scene
and joined the fray purportedly to pacify the protagonists when Miguelito attacked
him causing four (4) stab wounds in different parts of his body- two on the
stomach, one on the left nipple, and one on the left arm. Then accused- appellant
with his hand- gun shot Miguelito.
Assuming that a rumble or a free- for- all fight occurred at the benefit
dance, Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code cannot apply because prosecution
witness Ricardo and Regarder Donato positively identified accused- appellant as
Miguelitos killer.
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Jasmine Calaycay
2005-0049
Alfredo
Balinas and Rufo Alga were both armed with M14 armalite rifles, while petitioner
was armed with a caliber .45 pistol and accused Francisco Eraso was carrying
an M16 armalite rifle.
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naked. When he was about 5 meters away from the team, Balinas told Eraso to
wait, but before Balinas could beam his flash light, Eraso fired his M16 armalite
rifle at the approaching man. Thereafter, petitioner fired a single shot from his .
45 caliber pistol. Petitioner admitted that when he heard the rapid gun burst, he
did not turn to face the source thereof and instead fired his .45 caliber pistol in
front of him purposely to demoralize their enemy.
The victim turned out to be Silvestre "Butsoy" Balinas, the nephew of
Alfredo Balinas and not the cattle rustler the team were ordered to intercept.
Accused Eraso embraced Alfredo Balinas and told him that it was not
intentionally done and it was merely an accident. Silvestre Balinas died as a
result of the gunshot wounds he sustained.
Dr. Rhodora T. Antenor, who conducted the post-mortem examination on
the cadaver of Silvestre Balinas testified that the fatal wound that caused the
death of the victim was the one inflicted on the mid-inner thigh. The bullet pierced
through and injured the organs in the pelvic region where she found three
irregularly shaped metallic fragments. She added that the position of the victim at
that time of the shooting was higher than the assailant considering that the
trajectory of the bullets was upwards.
Upon examination by NBI Ballistician Elmer Nelson D. Piedad, the three
metallic fragments recovered from the fatal wound of the victim turned out to be
fragments of a 5.56 mm jacketed bullet. However, on cross-examination, he
declared that he is not sure whether the 2 other metallic fragments recovered
from the fatal wound of the victim are indeed parts of a copper jacket of a caliber
5.56 mm. jacketed bullet.
The trial court convicted petitioner and accused Eraso of the crime of
homicide which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Accused Eraso filed a Petition for Review but was denied by CA; on the
other hand petitioner, filed this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in finding the
petitioner guilty of homicide?
Decision:
The Court sustains the finding of the trial court that petitioner fired his .45
caliber pistol towards the victim. However, it appears that there is no evidence to
prove that petitioner had intent to kill the victim. The prosecution witnesses did
92 | P a g e
automatically drawn from the mere fact that the use of firearms is dangerous to
life.
required of the other elements of the crime. The inference of intent to kill should
not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove such intent
beyond reasonable doubt.
Absent an intent to kill in firing the gun towards the victim, petitioner
should be held liable for the crime of illegal discharge of firearm under Article 254
of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of this crime are: (1) that the offender
discharges a firearm against or at another person; and (2) that the offender has
no intention to kill that person
.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in affirming the conviction of
petitioner for the crime of homicide is set aside and petitioner is acquitted of the
crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt.
However, petitioner Geronimo Dado is guilty of the crime of illegal
discharge of firearm.
93 | P a g e
Heide Olarte-Congson
2007-0316
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No. Filomeno Salufrania should not be held guilty of the complex crime of
parricide with intentional abortion but of the complex crime of parricide
with unintentional abortion.
The elements of Unintentional Abortion are as follows:
1. That there is a pregnant woman.
2. That violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an
abortion.
3. That the violence is intentionally exerted.
4. That as a result of the violence the fetus dies, either in the womb or after
having been expelled therefrom.
It has been clearly established (a) that Marciana Abuyo was seven (7) to
eight (8) months pregnant when she was killed; (b) that violence was voluntarily
exerted upon her by her husband Filomeno; and (c) that, as a result of said
violence, Marciana Abuyo died together with the fetus in her womb. The abortion
was caused by the same violence that caused the death of the wife, Marciana
Abuyo, such violence being voluntarily exerted by Filomeno upon her. However,
the intent to cause the abortion has not been sufficiently established. Mere
boxing on the stomach, taken together with the immediate strangling of the victim
in a fight, is not sufficient proof to show intent to cause an abortion. In fact,
Filomeno must have merely intended to kill his wife but not necessarily to cause
an abortion.
95 | P a g e
Heide Olarte-Congson
2007-0316
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Ozelle Dedicatoria
2006-0406
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner should be convicted for the crime of slight
physical injury instead of homicide?
Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. It ruled that the only injury
attributable to Li is the contusion on the victims right arm that resulted from Li
striking Arugay with a baseball bat. In view of the victims supervening death from
injuries which cannot be attributed to Li beyond reasonable doubt, the effects of
the contusion caused by Li are not mortal or at least lie entirely in the realm of
speculation. When there is no evidence of actual incapacity of the offended party
for labor or of the required medical attendance, the offense is only slight physical
injuries.
What transpired during the dawn hours of was an artless, spontaneous
street fight devoid of any methodical plan for consummation. It arose not
because of any long-standing grudge or an appreciable vindication of honor, but
because the actors were too quick to offense and impervious to reason. Yet,
however senseless this lethal imbroglio is, a judicious examination of the
circumstances must be made to avoid leaps into hyperbole. Careful scrutiny of
the evidence reveals that the criminal culpability of Li in the death of Arugay was
not established beyond reasonable doubt. Unfortunately, the person who is
responsible for the death apparently remains at large.
98 | P a g e
incident which took place sometime 2002. On said day, while M was cleaning
their house, appellant suddenly grabbed her and pulled her towards the bed. He
took off her clothes, undressed himself and inserted his finger into her vagina.
Appellant denied the charges against him, he claimed that he treated M
like his own daughter. The trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape.
Issue:
Whether or not the insertion of the appellants fingers into the victims
vagina constituted the crime of rape trough sexual assault?
Whether or not relationship could be considered in the proper imposition
of penalty?
Decision:
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Case No. A-436 mentioned the victim as appellants stepdaughter and an 11-year
old minor. A stepdaughter is a daughter of ones spouse by previous marriage,
while a stepfather is the husband of ones mother by virtue of a marriage
subsequent to that of which the person spoken of is the offspring. In the instant
case, appellant and Ms mother were never married. Hence, appellant is not Ms
stepfather; vice-versa, M is not appellants stepdaughter.
Appellant is the
common law spouse of Ms mother. However, since the relationship was not
specifically pleaded in the information, it cannot be considered in the imposition
of the proper penalty.
100 | P a g e
labia. Even the briefest of contacts, without lacerations of the hymen, is deemed
to be rape.
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At around 2:00 a.m. of August 10, 1998, Ignacio and his wife were
awakened by the loud banging of corrugated GI sheet coming from the barracks
of his co-construction worker which was about 3 meters away. Ignacio and his
wife proceeded in haste to investigate but they were surprised and disarrayed to
see his co-worker, herein appellant, naked on top of their daughter, Irene, who
was also naked.
Irene testified that at around 10:00 p.m. of August 9, 1999, the appellant
summoned her to his barracks. Thinking he had the usual errand for her she
approached him.
wooden bed (papag). The appellant then took off her pants and panty, as well as
his clothes. He inserted his penis into her vagina. It was only at around 2:00
a.m. that she was able to finally kick the galvanized iron sheet that enclosed the
appellants barracks.
Appellant did not deny that he had several intercourse with Irene but
interposed sweetheart story.
Issue:
Whether or not force and intimidation are attendant in this case?
Decision:
Neither was intimidation employed against her. Even if she was pulled
down to the bed, she was not threatened with bodily or physical harm by a knife,
bolo or any object or instrument that the appellant could have employed so as to
create a real apprehension of dangerous consequences or serious bodily harm.
Irenes overall deportment during her ordeal defies comprehension and the
reasonable standard of human conduct when faced with a similar situation. It is
unnatural for an intended rape victim, as in the case at bar, not to make even a
feeble attempt to free herself despite a myriad of opportunities to do so. This
constrained us to entertain a reasonable doubt on the guilt of the appellant.
102 | P a g e
Maricris Ella
2007-0030
103 | P a g e
Henderson was dismissed from his classes and proceeded to the nearby house
of his tutor in Chinese language, Huang Lao Shih. Ed Henderson and his father,
Eddie Tan, had earlier agreed that after the tutorial classes ended at 7:00 p.m.,
Ed Henderson would phone his father, who would then fetch him from his
mentors house. The tutorial classes ended at 7:00 p.m., as scheduled, and Ed
Henderson then proceeded to the store near the gate of the school to have his
periodic test papers photocopied. He left the store and was on his way back to
the house of his tutor to wait for his father.
Suddenly, Ed Tampos, armed with a revolver, chased and overtook Ed
Henderson at the Royalty canteen near the school. Tampos ordered the boy to
proceed to a motorcyle parked nearby and warned the latter that if he refused, he
would be shot.
appellants Elvie Ejandra and Roel Revilla were waiting. Ejandra had no legs
(pilay), while Revilla had curly hair. There was no lamp post outside the school
premises but the lights inside the school were still on.
Ejandra covered Ed
Hendersons mouth with his hand, pointed his gun at the boy and warned the
latter not to shout. Revilla boarded the motorcycle and took the drivers seat.
Ejandra sat behind him, and Tampos sat behind Ejandra. Tampos ordered Ed
Henderson to board the motorcyle, or else, he would be shot. The boy was then
ordered to sit behind Tampos.
Ed was brought to a one-storey house with cemented flooring and whitecolored walls. Once inside, he saw a man who was drinking, who turned out to
be Antonio Huera, and a female, who turned out to be Magdalena Calunod. Ed
Henderson also saw a cell phone. The was ordered to write down his fathers
telephone number, as well as that of their house and their store. Ed Henderson
did as he was told, and wrote down the telephone number of his father, Eddie
Tan.
At 12:30 a.m., Eddie received a call through his home phone, informing
him that his son had been kidnapped. The caller demanded P10,000,000.00 for
the safe release of his son which was reduce to P5,000,000.00. Thereafter,
Eddie received several calls threatening him that if he refused to pay the ransom
they demanded, the kidnappers would cut Ed Hendersons ear and finger, and
thereafter kill the boy and dump his body in an isolated place. Eddie pleaded for
mercy but the caller would simply hang up the telephone.
At 10:00 a.m. the next day, July 4, 1997, another call from the kidnappers
came through, and Eddie reiterated that he could no longer raise any additional
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amount. The caller hung up, but called again and informed Eddie that the
kidnappers had agreed to accept a ransom of P548,000.00. At about noon, the
caller contacted Eddie and instructed him to place the money in a newspaper
and to bring the money to the parking lot in front of the Sto. Domingo Church in
Quezon City within ten minutes. The caller further instructed Eddie to open the
doors and windows of his car upon arriving at the designated spot. Eddie was
also told that a man would approach him and call him "Eddie."
Eddie did as he was told. Suddenly, a man approached him and called
him Eddie, so he immdiately he handed over the plastic bag which contained
the money. He asked her how his son was, she told him not to worry because
she would bring the boy home. Shortly after his arrival at their house, Eddie
received two telephone calls from a male and a female, respectively, who
informed him of his sons impending release.
Between 3:20 to 3:30 p.m. of July 4, 1997, Ed Henderson was told that he
would be brought back home. The boy then called up his mother and told her
that he would be back soon. Tampos and Calunod boarded Ed Henderson in a
taxi.
Calunod ordered the boy to pretend that she was his aunt.
The taxi
kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from
the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above105 | P a g e
mentioned were present in the commission of the offense. When the victim is
killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to
torture dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
For the accused to be convicted of kidnapping or serious illegal detention,
the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements
of the crime, namely, (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or
detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of h is liberty; (3) the act of
detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense
any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention
lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority;
(c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped and serious
illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if
the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom,
the duration of his detention is immaterial.
To warrant an imposition of the death penalty for the crime of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention for ransom, the prosecution must prove the following
beyond reasonable doubt: (a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the
victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and, (c)
motive of the accused, which is ransom for the victim or other person for the
release of the victim.
qualifying circumstance which may be proven by his words and overt acts before,
during and after the kidnapping and detention of the victim.
Neither actual
demand for nor actual payment of ransom is necessary for the crime to be
committed. Ransom as employed in the law is so used in its common or ordinary
sense; meaning, a sum of money or other thing of value, price, or consideration
paid or demanded for redemption of a kidnapped or detained person, a payment
that releases from captivity. It may include benefits not necessarily pecuniary
which may accrue to the kidnapper as a condition for the victims release.
In this case, the appellants not only demanded but also received ransom
for the release of the victim.
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Maricris Ella
2007-0030
Maganoy, Maguindanao, where a certain Salik Karem, Hadji Kutang Omar alias
Commander Palito, and Jumbrah Manap met them. Initially, the three demanded
P15,000,000 from Alexander Saldaa for his release which was subsequently
reduced to P12,000,000.00. They made Alexander write a letter to his wife to pay
the ransom. The letter was hand-carried by a certain Armand Jafar, alias Dante,
and two of the victims, Ervin Tormis and Victor Cinco, who both later managed to
escape. No ransom was obtained so Commander Palito and Jumbrah Manap
sent other persons and one of the victims, Americo Rejuso, Jr., to renegotiate
with Alexander's wife. No agreement was likewise reached.
Seven days later, Alexander Saldaa and Americo Rejuso, Jr., were
transferred to the town proper of Maganoy. Commander Palito, Jumbrah Manap,
Sacaria Alon alias Jack Moro, Ramon Pasawilan, guarded them. When the
kidnappers learned that the military was looking for Alexander, they returned to
the mountain hideout and stayed there for two weeks.
On September 24, 1996, Mayangkang released Alexander Saldaa to the
military in exchange for a relative who was caught delivering a ransom note to
Alexander's family.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused the guilt of the appellants has been proven by
credible evidence beyond reasonable doubt?
Decision:
The essence of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention as
defined and penalized in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is the actual
deprivation of the victim's liberty coupled with proof beyond reasonable doubt of
an intent of the accused to effect the same. It is thus essential that the following
be established by the prosecution: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he
kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of his
liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the
commission of the offense, any of the four circumstances enumerated in Article
267 be present. But if the kidnapping was done for the purpose of extorting
ransom, the fourth element is no longer necessary.
There is no mistaking the clear, overwhelming evidence that the
appellants abducted Alexander Saldaa and his companions at gunpoint and
deprived them of their freedom. That the appellants took shifts guarding the
victims until only Alexander was left to be guarded and in transferring Alexander
108 | P a g e
from one hideout to another to prevent him from being rescued by the military
establish that they acted in concert in executing their common criminal design.
Macapagal's participation is clearly evident from the records. Aside from
being one of Alexander's armed guards in Kabuntalan, and having been part of a
party which brought Alexander from the river hideout of Commander Kugta to
Mayangkang
Saguile's lair in
Talayan,
indirect
evidence
also
support
Alexander was in the custody of Mayangkang Saguile, not only was he made to
write more letters to his family, Mayangkang himself wrote ransom notes. In
those letters, Mayangkang even threatened to kill Alexander if the ransom was
not paid.
Maricris Ella
2007-0030
to flee. He was able to untie his legs and tackle the stairs towards the second
storey. He jumped out through the window but the noise he created caught the
attention of Castro. The latter fired his gun, hitting the fleeing victim and planting
a bullet in his buttocks. His plea for help alarmed some barangay officials who
immediately came to his rescue and brought him to the nearest hospital.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused can be held liable for the crime of kidnapping
even if detention was made to merely compel Saez to pay his debt?
Decision:
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Any private individual
who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his
liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death; (1) If the
kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days; (2) If it shall
have been committed simulating public authority; (3) If any serious physical
injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if
threats to kill him shall have been made; or (4) If the person kidnapped or
detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female
or a public officer. The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention
was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other
person, even if none of the circumstances abovementioned were present in the
commission of the offense. When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of
the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed."
The corpus delicti in the crime of kidnapping for ransom is the fact that an
individual has been in any manner deprived of his liberty for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person. Whether or not the ransom
is actually paid to or received by the perpetrators is of no moment.
In People vs. Salimbago, the Court stressed: "x x x No specific form of
ransom is required to consummate the felony of kidnapping for ransom so long
as it was intended as a bargaining chip in exchange for the victim's freedom. In
municipal criminal law, ransom refers to the money, price or consideration paid or
demanded for redemption of a captured person or persons, a payment that
111 | P a g e
releases from captivity. Neither actual demand for nor actual payment of ransom
is necessary for the crime to be committed."
Dionisio, plainly demonstrate their intent to likewise deprive Salvador and Antonio
of their liberty. The Court likewise added that the general rule is that evidence
is not admissible which shows or tends to show, that the accused in a criminal
case has committed a crime wholly independent of the offense for which he is on
trial. It is not competent to prove that he committed other crimes of a like nature
for the purpose of showing that he would be likely to commit the crime charged in
the indictment. Where a person is charged with the commission of a specific
crime, testimony may be received of other similar acts, committed at about the
same time, for the purpose only of establishing the criminal intent of the accused.
The Court found that both incidents of kidnapping were related in that proof of
one kidnapping tends to prove the other, thereby establishing the accuseds
intent to deprive the victims of their liberty.
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least one day, which act by itself constitutes slight illegal detention. Besides, the
trial court appreciated the act constituting slight illegal detention as a qualifying
circumstance, i.e., employing means to weaken the defense. While we find no
proof beyond reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction for murder, the records
indisputably prove culpability for slight illegal detention.
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find that the crime committed is slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the
Revised Penal Code.
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Maria Garalde
2008-0326
Aresola from their home in Caloocan and brought them in Tondo. Aresola went
home and Willy was left in Tondo. Accused-appellant was asking Erma for sums
of money which Erma refused to transmit.
March 27, 1997, accused-appellant informed Doroteo that Willy was
missing and that he was last seen playing inside her apartment. Erma returned
to the Philippines to look for her son. Erma found out that Willy was never
treated for any illness.
against her but the trial court found her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused the crime of
kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal
Code?
Decision:
No, the Court ruled that Kidnapping and failure to return a minor under
Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code has two essential elements, namely: (1)
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the offender is entrusted with the custody of a minor person; and (2) the offender
deliberately fails to restore the said minor to his parents or guardians. What is
actually being punished is not the kidnapping of the minor but rather the
deliberate failure of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents
or guardians. The word deliberate as used in Article 270 must imply something
more than mere negligence - it must be premeditated, headstrong, foolishly
daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong.
In the final analysis, the issue posed here is the credibility of witnesses.
As consistently ruled by the Court, we will not interfere with the judgment of the
trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses unless there appears on
record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been
overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted.
Factual
findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of witnesses, are accorded
great weight and respect. This is so because the trial court has the advantage of
observing the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or
falsehood. In the instant case, there is no reason for us to disregard the trial
courts finding that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are entitled to full
faith and credit.
Maria Garalde
119 | P a g e
2008-0326
Kagawad
Emerento took the baby and handed it to his wife. They looked for the mother of
the two children and when they found her, she confirmed that the baby was
indeed her daughter. The kagawad requested the hospital security guard to
blotter the incident.
beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article
270 of the Revised Penal Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in ruling that the accused-appellant,
Teresa Bernardo, is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping
and failure to return a minor under article 270 of the Revised Penal Code?
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Decision:
No, the Court ruled that a person whose only intention is to look for the
childs mother would generally return the child to the person who entrusted the
child to her. This did not happen in the present case. The only logical conclusion
we can derive from appellants actions is that her intention was really to kidnap
the child not to look for the childs mother.
The essential element of the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a
minor is that the offender is entrusted with the custody of the minor, but what is
actually being punished is not the kidnapping of the minor but rather the
deliberate failure of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents
or guardians. It has two essential elements, namely: (1) the offender is entrusted
with the custody of a minor person; and (2) the offender deliberately fails to
restore the said minor to his parents or guardians (People vs. Bondoc, 232 SCRA
478 [1997]). In People vs. Ty (263 SCRA 745 [1996]), we stated that the
essential element of the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor is that
the offender is entrusted with the custody of the minor, but what is actually being
punished is not the kidnapping of the minor but rather the deliberate failure of the
custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or guardians. Indeed,
the word deliberate as used in Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code must imply
something more than mere negligence it must be premeditated, headstrong,
foolishly daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong.
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Maria Garalde
2008-0326
122 | P a g e
Decision:
No, the Court ruled that before a conviction for kidnapping and failure to
return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code can be had, two
elements must concur, namely: (a) the offender has been entrusted with the
custody of the minor, and (b) the offender deliberately fails to restore said minor
to his parents or guardians. The essential element herein is that the offender is
entrusted with the custody of the minor but what is actually punishable is not the
kidnapping of the minor, as the title of the article seems to indicate, but rather the
deliberate failure or refusal of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to
his parents or guardians. Said failure or refusal, however, must not only be
deliberate but must also be persistent as to oblige the parents or the guardians of
the child to seek the aid of the courts in order to obtain custody.
Essentially, the word deliberate as used in the article must imply
something more than mere negligence; it must be premeditated, obstinate,
headstrong, foolishly daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong. In the case at
bar, it is evident that there was no deliberate refusal or failure on the part of the
accused-appellants to restore the custody of the complainant's child to her.
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Lourizza Genabe
2008-0154
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victim
constitutes
the
crime
of
attempted
rape?
Decision:
The Supreme Court held the acquittal of Chito from the crime of attempted
rape. There was no overt act of rape in this case. Overt act is some physical
activity or deed indicating the intention to commit a particular crime. It is more
than a mere planning or preparation. Considering the facts of the case, it cannot
be construed that the act of pressing chemical-soaked cloth on the face of Malou
constitutes an overt act of rape when there was no commencement of any act
indicating the intent to rape the victim.
The acts committed by Chito are not indicative of rape but rather of unjust
vexation under Article 287, second paragraph. Unjust vexation exists when an
act causes annoyance, irritation, torment, distress or disturbance to the mind of
the offended. Unjust vexation includes any conduct which would unjustly annoy
or
125 | P a g e
irritate
person.
Lourizza Genabe
2008-0154
Having
admitted that he ordered the cutting of electric, water and telephone lines without
the permit to relocate such, he caused the annoyance and vexation of Mildred
Ong. To add, the electric, water and telephone interruption happened during the
operation of the business.
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Kristine Gonzales
2008-0192
127 | P a g e
Issue:
Whether or not the essential elements of the crime of robbery with
homicide were proven by the prosecution?
Decision:
Yes, the essential elements of the crime of robbery with homicide was
proven by the prosecution. Add to that that the homicide was committed by
reason or on the occasion of the robbery, appellants are guilty of the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code.
The element of taking or asportation was completed when the apellants
took the personal property of spouses Hibaler. The wife Restituta testified that
after the incident, she made an inventory and found out that some of their
personal belongings were missing. It is of no moment that the property taken was
not disposed of in so far as the characterization of the crime as robbery is
concerned.
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Kristine Gonzales
2008-0192
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Kristine Gonzales
2008-0192
131 | P a g e
satisfactorily explain his possession. The accused knew exactly where he can
recover the stolen jewelries and was positively identified by witnesses.
Intent to gain is assumed in an information where it is alleged that there
was unlawful taking and appropriation by the offender of the properties stolen.
The jewelries recovered were pawned and sold by the accused and was
positively identified by the owner of the establishments.
Homicide may occur before or after robbery, what is important is there is
an intimate connection between the killing and the robbery.
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"personal property" in interpreting the theft provision of the penal code in United
States v. Carlos.
The only requirement for a personal property to be the object of theft
under the penal code is that it be capable of appropriation. It need not be capable
of "asportation," which is defined as "carrying away." Jurisprudence is settled that
to "take" under the theft provision of the penal code does not require asportation
or carrying away.
To appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing. The word
"take" in the Revised Penal Code includes any act intended to transfer
possession which, as held in the assailed Decision, may be committed through
the use of the offenders own hands, as well as any mechanical device, such as
an access device or card as in the instant case. This includes controlling the
destination of the property stolen to deprive the owner of the property, such as
the use of a meter tampering, as held in Natividad v. Court of Appeals,10 use of a
device to fraudulently obtain gas, as held in United States v. Tambunting, and the
use of a jumper to divert electricity, as held in the cases of United States v.
Genato, United States v. Carlos, and United States v. Menagas.
As illustrated in the above cases, appropriation of forces of nature which
are brought under control by science such as electrical energy can be achieved
by tampering with any apparatus used for generating or measuring such forces of
nature, wrongfully redirecting such forces of nature from such apparatus, or using
any device to fraudulently obtain such forces of nature. In the instant case,
petitioner was charged with engaging in International Simple Resale (ISR) or the
unauthorized routing and completing of international long distance calls using
lines, cables, antennae, and/or air wave frequency and connecting these calls
directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where destined.
The right of the ownership of electric current is secured by Articles 517
and 518 of the Penal Code; the application of these articles in cases of
subtraction of gas, a fluid used for lighting, and in some respects resembling
electricity, is confirmed by the rule laid down in the decisions of the supreme
court of Spain of January 20, 1887, and April 1, 1897, construing and enforcing
the provisions of articles 530 and 531 of the Penal Code of that country, articles
517 and 518 of the code in force in these islands.
135 | P a g e
The acts of "subtraction" include: (a) tampering with any wire, meter, or
other apparatus installed or used for generating, containing, conducting, or
measuring electricity, telegraph or telephone service; (b) tapping or otherwise
wrongfully deflecting or taking any electric current from such wire, meter, or other
apparatus; and (c) using or enjoying the benefits of any device by means of
which one may fraudulently obtain any current of electricity or any telegraph or
telephone service.
In the instant case, the act of conducting ISR operations by illegally connecting
various equipment or apparatus to private respondent PLDTs telephone system,
through which petitioner is able to resell or re-route international long distance
calls using respondent PLDTs facilities constitutes all three acts of subtraction
mentioned above.
The business of providing telecommunication or telephone service is
likewise personal property which can be the object of theft under Article 308 of
the Revised Penal Code. Business may be appropriated under Section 2 of Act
No. 3952 (Bulk Sales Law), hence, could be object of theft. Interest in business
was not specifically enumerated as personal property in the Civil Code in force at
the time the above decision was rendered. Yet, interest in business was declared
to be personal property since it is capable of appropriation and not included in
the enumeration of real properties. Article 414 of the Civil Code provides that all
things which are or may be the object of appropriation are considered either real
property or personal property. Business is likewise not enumerated as personal
property under the Civil Code. Just like interest in business, however, it may be
appropriated.
It was conceded that in making the international phone calls, the human
voice is converted into electrical impulses or electric current which are
transmitted to the party called. A telephone call, therefore, is electrical energy. It
was also held in the assailed Decision that intangible property such as electrical
energy is capable of appropriation because it may be taken and carried away.
Electricity is personal property under Article 416 (3) of the Civil Code, which
enumerates "forces of nature which are brought under control by science."
Indeed, while it may be conceded that "international long distance calls,"
the matter alleged to be stolen in the instant case, take the form of electrical
energy, it cannot be said that such international long distance calls were personal
136 | P a g e
properties belonging to PLDT since the latter could not have acquired ownership
over such calls. PLDT merely encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and
transmits said calls using its complex communications infrastructure and
facilities. PLDT not being the owner of said telephone calls, then it could not
validly claim that such telephone calls were taken without its consent. It is the
use of these communications facilities without the consent of PLDT that
constitutes the crime of theft, which is the unlawful taking of the telephone
services and business.
137 | P a g e
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Decision:
Although the information charged the petitioner with estafa, the crime
committed was theft. It is settled that what controls is not the designation of the
offense but the description thereof as alleged in the information. And as
described therein, the offense imputed to Santos contains all the essential
elements of theft, to wit: (1) that there be a taking of personal property; (2) that
said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain;
(4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the
taking be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against
persons or force upon things.
Theft should not be confused with estafa. According to Chief Justice
Ramon C. Aquino in his book on the Revised Penal Code, "The principal
distinction between the two crimes is that in theft the thing is taken while in estafa
the accused receives the property and converts it to his own use or benefit.
However, there may be theft even if the accused has possession of the property.
If he was entrusted only with the material or physical (natural) or de facto
possession of the thing, his misappropriation of the same constitutes theft, but if
he has the juridical possession of the thing, his conversion of the same
constitutes embezzlement or estafa."
The petitioner argues that there was no intent to gain at the time of the
taking of the vehicle and so no crime was committed. In U.S. v. De Vera, we held
that the subsequent appropriation by the accused of the thing earlier delivered to
him supplied the third element that made the crime theft instead of estafa.
Illustrating, the Court declared:
... let us suppose that A, a farmer in the Province of Bulacan, agrees to sell B a
certain quantity of rice at a certain price per picul. A ships several sacks of the
grain which B receives in his warehouse. If, prior to the measuring required
before the payment of the agreed price, B takes a certain quantity of rice from the
different sacks, there can be no doubt that he is guilty of the crime of theft. Now,
it may be asked: Did not B receive the sacks of rice shipped to him by A?-Yes.
And did A voluntarily deliver the sacks of rice which he owned by shipping them
to B?-Yes Was the taking of the rice by B from the different sacks done with A's
consent?- No.
141 | P a g e
This shows, to our mind, that the theory of the defense is untenable,
according to which, when the thing is received and then appropriated or
converted to one's own use without the consent of the owner, the crime
committed is not that of theft.
It was erroneous for the respondent court to hold the petitioner guilty of
qualified theft because the fact that the object of the crime was a car was not
alleged in the information as a qualifying circumstance. Santos would have had
reason to argue that he had not been properly informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, as qualified theft carries a higher penalty.
But although not pleaded and so not considered qualifying, the same
circumstance may be considered aggravating, having been proved at the trial.
Hence the imposable penalty for the theft, there being no other modifying
circumstances, should be in the maximum degree.
142 | P a g e
Cheryl Navarro
2007-0026
period,
the correct penalty is fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of
Cheryl Navarro
2007-0026
theft.
0It was alleged that on or about 16 November 1989, in the municipality of
Floridablanca, Pampanga, accused Asuncion Galang Roque, being employed as
teller of the Basa Air Base Savings and Loan Association Inc. (BABSLA) and as
such was authorized and reposed with the responsibility to receive and collect
capital contributions from its member/contributors of said corporation, and having
collected and received in her capacity as teller of the BABSLA the sum of PHP
10,000.00, said accused, with intent of gain, with grave abuse of confidence and
without the knowledge and consent of said corporation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the amount of
P10,000.00, by making it appear that a certain depositor by the name of Antonio
Salazar withdrew from his Savings Account, when in truth and in fact said
Antonio Salazar did not withdraw the said amount to the damage and prejudice
of BABSLA.
Issues:
Whether or not qualified theft may be committed when the personal property
is in the lawful possession of the accused prior to the commission of the alleged
felony?
Whether or not the elements of qualified theft were proven?
Decision:
When the defendant, with a grave abuse of confidence, removed the
money and appropriated it to his own use without the consent of the bank, there
was the taking or apoderamiento contemplated in the definition of the crime of
theft.
In the case of the United States vs. De Vera (43 Phil., 1000, 1003), Justice
Villamor enumerated the essential elements of the crime of theft, which are as
follows:
146 | P a g e
The specific qualifying circumstance in Article 310 of the RPC which the
information indicated was that the felony was committed with grave abuse of
confidence. Hence, to warrant a conviction, the prosecution should have also
proven the fact that it be done with grave abuse of confidence.
In the case at bar, regarding the first element, the taking of personal property,
the prosecution was not able to present direct evidence that petitioner took the
PHP 10,000 on November 16, 1989. The prosecution attempted to prove the
taking through circumstantial evidence. One of the pieces of evidence that the
prosecution adduced was the withdrawal slip for PHP 10,000 dated November
16, 1989.
Antonio Salazar disowned the signature on the withdrawal slip. However, he
also indicated that he did not know who made the withdrawal. Rosalina de Lazo
testified that the initial on the withdrawal slip, written after the figure 11-17-89,
was the customary signature of petitioner. She, however, did not intimate the
significance of petitioners initial on the withdrawal slip.
147 | P a g e
A careful inspection of all the withdrawal slips including the withdrawal slip
stated above shows that the date and the initial of petitioner were written across
the stamped word paid. This indicates that petitioners initial was placed in her
capacity as a teller which, therefore, only proves that this transaction passed
through her hands in such capacity. It does not in any manner show that
petitioner prepared the withdrawal slip or that the proceeds of the withdrawal
increased her patrimony.
The presumption that being in possession of said withdrawal slip before its
delivery to Reynaldo Manlulu, the accused is the one who prepared the said
withdrawal slip is without basis in law. The presumption under paragraph (j),
Section 3 of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent
wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things
which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by
him;
Thas always applied to a situation where property has been stolen and the
stolen property is found in the possession of the accused. In these cases the
possession of the accused gives rise to the presumption that the accused is the
taker of the stolen property.
In the case at bar, the withdrawal slip, is not stolen property.
The presumption used by the lower court and the one found in paragraph (j),
Section 3 of Rule 131 are different. The lower court presumed that the petitioner
was the maker of the withdrawal slip and not that the petitioner stole anything. It
is plain that there is no basis for the finding that the withdrawal slip was prepared
by the petitioner.
Another piece of evidence offered to prove petitioners taking is her
extrajudicial confession that she allegedly admitted taking money from the
accounts of several members of the BABSLA and the list of people from whose
accounts she took money.
However, it cannot be deduced from the alleged verbal confession of
petitioner that she was confessing a specific taking of P10,000 from the account
of Sgt. Salazar on November 16, 1989. And a perusal of the handwritten list
allegedly prepared by petitioner does not disclose any relation to the specific
taking alleged in the information. All that was written on the list, among other
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names and figures, was the name Salazar, Antonio and the number fifteen (15) to
the right of the name. The list does not mention the date on which the money
was taken. Neither does it disclose the precise amount that was taken.
The other pieces of evidence such as the Tellers Daily Report and Abstract of
Payment merely reveal that on 16 November 1989, a withdrawal was made on
the account of Sgt. Antonio Salazar and that this withdrawal passed through the
hands of petitioner in her capacity as a teller of the BABSLA. Again, they prove
neither that petitioner prepared the subject withdrawal slip nor that she took the
P10,000 on that date.
It is plain that the prosecution failed to prove by direct or sufficient circumstantial
evidence that there was a taking of personal property by petitioner.
149 | P a g e
Cheryl Navarro
2007-0026
Decision:
Appellant was convicted of qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), as amended for the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle.
However, Article 310 has been modified, with respect to certain vehicles,
by Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, otherwise known as "AN ACT
PREVENTING AND PENALIZING CARNAPPING.
The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the RPC
are:
1.that there be taking of personal property;
2.that said property belongs to another;
3.that the taking be done with intent to gain;
4.that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and,
5.that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things.
Theft is qualified when any of the following circumstances is present:
plantation;
the property stolen is fish taken from a fishpond or fishery; and
the property was taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon,
volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil
disturbance.
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended defines carnapping as the
taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the
latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by
using force upon things.
The elements of carnapping are thus:
(1) the taking of a motor vehicle which belongs to another;
(2) the taking is without the consent of the owner or by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons or by using force upon things; and
(3) the taking is done with intent to gain.
Carnapping is essentially the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle, the
concept of unlawful taking in theft, robbery and carnapping being the same.
The unlawful taking of motor vehicles is now covered by the anti-carnapping
law and not by the provisions on qualified theft or robbery.
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The anti-carnapping law is a special law, different from the crime of robbery
and theft included in the RPC. It particularly addresses the taking, with intent to
gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things.
But a careful comparison of this special law with the crimes of robbery and
theft readily reveals their common features and characteristics, to wit: unlawful
taking, intent to gain, and that personal property belonging to another is taken
without the latter's consent. However, the anti-carnapping law particularly deals
with the theft and robbery of motor vehicles. Hence a motor vehicle is said to
have been carnapped when it has been taken, with intent to gain, without the
owner's consent, whether the taking was done with or without the use of force
upon things.
Without the anti-carnapping law, such unlawful taking of a motor vehicle
would fall within the purview of either theft or robbery which was certainly the
case before the enactment of said statute.
While the anti-carnapping law penalizes the unlawful taking of motor vehicles,
it excepts from its coverage certain vehicles such as roadrollers, trolleys, streetsweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers, amphibian trucks and cranes if not used on
public highways, vehicles which run only on rails and tracks, and tractors, trailers
and tractor engines of all kinds and used exclusively for agricultural purposes. By
implication, the theft or robbery of the foregoing vehicles would be covered by
Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended and the provisions on
robbery, respectively.
Since appellant is being accused of the unlawful taking of a Daewoo sedan, it
is the anti-carnapping law and not the provisions of qualified theft which would
apply as the said motor vehicle does not fall within the exceptions mentioned in
the anti-carnapping law.
The designation in the information of the offense committed by appellant as
one for qualified theft notwithstanding, appellant may still be convicted of the
crime of carnapping.For while it is necessary that the statutory designation be
stated in the information, a mistake in the caption of an indictment in designating
the correct name of the offense is not a fatal defect as it is not the designation
that is controlling but the facts alleged in the information which determines the
real nature of the crime.
152 | P a g e
In the case at bar, the information alleges that appellant, with intent to gain,
took the taxi owned by Cipriano without the latters consent. Thus, the indictment
alleges every element of the crime of carnapping, and the prosecution proved the
same.
Appellants appeal is thus bereft of merit.
That appellant brought out the taxi on December 25, 1996 and did not return
it on the same day as he was supposed to is admitted.
Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the motor vehicle without
the consent of the owner, or by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons, or by using force upon things; it is deemed complete from the moment
the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to
dispose of the same.
While the nature of appellants possession of the taxi was initially lawful as he
was hired as a taxi driver and was entrusted possession thereof, his act of not
returning it to its owner, which is contrary to company practice and against the
owners consent transformed the character of the possession into an unlawful
one. Appellant himself admits that he was aware that his possession of the taxi
was no longer with Ciprianos consent as the latter was already demanding its
return.
Appellant assails the trial courts conclusion that there was intent to gain with
the mere taking of the taxi without the owners consent.
Appellants position does not persuade.
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the
unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important
consideration is the intent to gain. The term gain is not merely limited to
pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be
derived or expected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the
thing which was taken without the owners consent constitutes gain.
153 | P a g e
Christine Perez
2006-0104
154 | P a g e
Real Rights in Property. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Hence, this case.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-petitioner who claims to be owner of the land
in question could be held liable of usurpation of her own property?
Decision:
Contrary to petitioner's allegation, the decision rendered by the trial court
convicting her of the crime of usurpation of real property was not based on
"speculations, surmises and conjectures" but clearly on the evidence on record
and in accordance with the applicable law under Article 312 of Revised Penal
Code.
The requisites of usurpation are that the accused took possession of
another's real property or usurped real rights in another's property; that the
possession or usurpation was committed with violence or intimidation and that
the accused had animo lucrandi. In order to sustain a conviction for "usurpacion
de derecho reales," the proof must show that the real property occupied or
usurped belongs, not to the occupant or usurper, but to some third person, and
that the possession of the usurper was obtained by means of intimidation or
violence done to the person ousted of possession of the property.
In Castrodes vs. Cubelo, the Court stated that the elements of the offense
are (1) occupation of another's real property or usurpation of a real right
belonging to another person; (2) violence or intimidation should be employed in
possessing the real property or in usurping the real right, and (3) the accused
should be animated by the intent to gain. Petitioner failed to give any cogent
reason for this Court to deviate from this salutary principle.
155 | P a g e
Bernadette Remalla
2007-0392
156 | P a g e
on maturity, the checks were deposited, they were returned with the stamp
"Account Closed."
Hence, petitioner was indicted for Estafa. She was likewise indicted for 10
counts of violation of B.P. 22 before the RTC of Manila. RTC convicted petitioner
of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, the petition.
Issue:
Whether she could be convicted of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph
2(a) of the Revised Penal Code when she was, in the Information, charged of
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the same Code?
Held:
The appeal is impressed with merit.
Section 14(2) of Article III of the Constitution grants the accused the right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. This is to enable the
accused to adequately prepare for his defense. An accused cannot thus be
convicted of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or
information.
From the allegations in an information, the real nature of the crime
charged is determined. In the case at bar, the Information alleged that petitioner
issued the questioned checks knowing that she had no funds in the bank and
failing to fund them despite notice that they were dishonored. These allegations
clearly constitute a charge, not under paragraph 2(a) as the lower courts found
but, under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
Although the earlier quoted paragraph 2(a) and the immediately quoted
paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 have a common element false pretenses or
fraudulent acts the law treats Estafa under paragraph 2(d) by postdating a
check or issuing a bouncing check differently. Thus, under paragraph 2(d), failure
to fund the check despite notice of dishonor creates a prima facie presumption of
deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act, which is not an element of a
violation of paragraph 2(a).
157 | P a g e
158 | P a g e
Bernadette Remalla
2007-0392
demanded payment of the checks. Appellant failed to redeem or pay the amounts
of the checks despite several demands. Appellant admitted issuing the checks
but interposed the defense that she issued the checks as collateral and by way of
accommodation of the complainant who requested for the checks. The Regional
Trial Court found appellant guilty of violation of Article 315 (2)(d) of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC). The Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of conviction
rendered by the court a quo, with a slight modification as to the penalty imposed.
Hence, the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Anita Chua is guilty of Estafa under Article 315 (2)(d) of the
RPC?
Decision:
Article 315 (2)(d) of the RPC penalizes any person who defrauds another
by postdating a check or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the
offender has no funds in the bank or his funds deposited therein are not sufficient
to cover the amount of the check.
The elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the RPC, as
amended by RA 4885, are:
(1) that the offender postdated or issued a check in payment of an obligation
contracted at the time of the postdating or issuance;
(2) that the at the time of the issuance of the check, the offender had no funds in
the bank or the funds deposited were insufficient to cover the amount of the
check; and,
(3) that the payee has been defrauded.
All the elements of the crime of estafa under par. 2(d) of Art. 315, RPC are
present in this case. The evidence showed and petitioner Chua admitted issuing
the questioned checks in favor of private respondent in exchange for the
imported goods she obtained from the latter. It is likewise not disputed that the
checks she issued bounced or were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds
and/or because her bank account had already been closed by the bank due to
160 | P a g e
lack of funds. As a result, private respondent suffered damage. She had to close
down her business because she could not recoup her losses due to the huge
amount petitioner owed her.
Petitioners defense that she issued the unfunded checks as collateral or
security for the goods she got from private respondent was not worthy of
credence. the amounts of the checks issued by petitioner clearly showed that
they were intended as payments for the items she obtained from private
respondent. Private respondent would not have parted with her goods in
exchange for bum checks. It was likewise contrary to ordinary human experience
and to sound business practice for petitioner to issue so many unfunded checks
as
"collateral"
or
"by
way
of
accommodation."
As
an
experienced
businesswoman, petitioner could not have been so nave as not to know that she
could be held criminally liable for issuing unfunded checks.
Ergo, the petition is denied for lack of merit.
Bernadette Remalla
2007-0392
Then, in 1985, Ulysses took one Rosemarie Gelogo as his mistress and brought
her into the house. In time, improvements were made on the house and the
house was transformed into a 2-storey structure. After Ulyssess demise in
January of 1992, his mistress Rosemarie Gelogo offered to sell the 2-storey
house for P80,000.00 to herein petitioner Bienvenido Gonzaludo, a.k.a. Ben
Gonzaludo, who lives just nearby. Since the house was being sold for a cheap
price, petitioner convinced the spouses Gregg Canlas and Melba Canlas, to
whom he is related by affinity, to buy the same. Herein, petitioner introduced the
Canlases to Rosemarie Gelogo. In the Deed of Sale, Rosemarie Gelogo signed
as Rosemarie G. Villaflor and represented herself to be the lawful owner of the 2storey house. By virtue of the same deed, vendee Gregg Canlas acquired all of
Rosemaries rights and interest on the subject house.
Later, upon complaint of Ulyssess widow Anita Manlangit, an Information
dated May 31, 1994 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City
charging Rosemarie Gelogo, alias Rosemarie Villaflor, the spouses Gregg
Canlas and Melba Canlas and petitioner with the crime of Estafa thru
Falsification of Public Document. The trial court acquitted the Canlas spouses but
convicted petitioner of the crime charged. The appellate affirmed the trial courts
judgment of conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not Rosemarie Villaflor is guilty of the crime of Estafa thru
Falsification of Public Document as defined and punished under Paragraph 2(a),
Article 315, Revised Penal Code considering that the third element of the crime
of Estafa is not present?
Decision:
The petition is partly impressed with merit.
For an accused to be convicted of the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public document, all the elements of the two crimes of estafa and
falsification of public document must exist.
162 | P a g e
There is no question that the first, second and fourth elements are
present: there was false or fraudulent misrepresentation by Rosemarie Gelogo
when she used the fictitious surname "Villaflor"; the misrepresentation or false
pretense was made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud;
and private complainant Anita Manlangits right to the subject 2-storey house was
lost or at the very least prejudiced when Rosemarie sold it to the Canlases.
It is petitioners thesis, however, that there is here an absence of the third
element contending that private complainant Anita Manlangit, who was the
offended party in this case, was never induced to part with any money or
property by means of fraud, committed simultaneously with the false pretense or
fraudulent representation by Rosemarie. The Court find merit in petitioners
submission.
The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the settled principle that
the deceit, which must be prior to or simultaneously committed with the act of
defraudation, must be the efficient cause or primary consideration which induced
the offended party to part with his money or property and rule differently in the
present case.
While it may be said that there was fraud or deceit committed by
Rosemarie in this case, when she used the surname "Villaflor" to give her
semblance of authority to sell the subject 2-storey house, such fraud or deceit
was employed upon the Canlas spouses who were the ones who parted with
their money when they bought the house. However, the Information charging
Rosemarie of estafa in the present case, alleged damage or injury not upon the
Canlas spouses, but upon private complainant, Anita Manlangit. Since the deceit
or fraud was not the efficient cause and did not induce Anita Manlangit to part
with her property in this case, Rosemarie cannot be held liable for estafa. With all
the more reason must this be for herein petitioner.
The lack of criminal liability for estafa, however, will not necessarily
absolve petitioner from criminal liability arising from the charge of falsification of
public document under the same Information charging the complex crime of
estafa through falsification of public document.
It is settled doctrine that the conviction of an accused on one of the
offenses included in a complex crime charged, when properly established,
163 | P a g e
despite the failure of evidence to hold the accused of the other charge is legally
feasible. As correctly found by the trial court, petitioner conspired with Rosemarie
to falsify, that is, by making untruthful statement in the narration of facts in the
deed of sale, by declaring Rosemarie to be the owner of the house subject of
such sale and signing as "Rosemarie Villaflor" instead of her real name,
Rosemarie Gelogo, in order to sell the same to the Canlas spouses. It is
established by evidence beyond reasonable doubt that Rosemarie committed the
crime of falsification of public document. Likewise, proof beyond reasonable
doubt has been duly adduced to establish conspiracy between Rosemarie and
petitioner who is the brother-in-law of Melba Canlas, one of the buyers of the
house in this case.
Petitioner is acquitted of the complex crime of Estafa through Falsification
of Public Document, but found guilty of the crime of Falsification of Public
Document.
Michelle Ricaza
2008-0040
the petitioner. They were not informed that said van was damaged due to a
vehicular accident that occurred when Guinhawas driver, Leopoldo Olayan,
suffered a heart attack while traveling from Manila to Naga City On March 17,
1995 when said van was initially purchased by petitioner from Union Motors
Corporation in Paco, Manila.
A day after Spouses Silos purchase of the van, they heard a squeaking
sound which seemed to be coming from underneath the van. Believing that the
van merely needed grease, they stopped at a Shell gasoline station where it was
examined. The mechanic discovered that some parts underneath the van had
been welded. When they complained to Guinhawa, the latter told them that the
defects were mere factory defects. As the defects persisted, the spouses Silo
requested that Guinhawa change the van with two Charade-Daihatsu vehicles.
Guinhawa initially agreed to the couples proposal, but later changed his mind
and told them that he had to sell the van first. The spouses then brought the
vehicle to the Rx Auto Clinic in Naga City for examination. The mechanic
discovered that it was the left front stabilizer that was producing the annoying
sound, and that it had been repaired.
Josephine Silo filed a complaint for the rescission of the sale and the refund
of their money before the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). During the
confrontation between her and Guinhawa, Josephine learned that Guinhawa had
bought the van from UMC before it was sold to them, and after it was damaged in
the vehicular accident. Subsequently, the spouses Silo withdrew their complaint
from the DTI.
On February 14, 1996, Josephine Silo filed a criminal complaint for
violation of paragraph 1, Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code against
Guinhawa.
Issue:
Whether or not Jaime Guinhawa violated Article 318 of the RPC covering
other deceits?
Decision:
Yes, Jaime Guinhawa violated Article 318.
165 | P a g e
Petitioner insists that the private complainant merely assumed that the van
was brand new, and that he did not make any misrepresentation to that effect. He
avers that deceit cannot be committed by concealment, the absence of any
notice to the public that the van was not brand new does not amount to deceit.
The Supreme Court held that the petitioner cannot barefacedly claim that
he made no personal representation that the herein subject van was brand new
for the simple reason that nowhere in the records did he ever refute the
allegation in the complaint, which held him out as a dealer of brand new cars. It
has thus become admitted that the petitioner was dealing with brand new
vehicles a fact which, up to now, petitioner has not categorically denied.
Therefore, when private complainant went to petitioners showroom, the former
had every right to assume that she was being sold brand new vehicles there
being nothing to indicate otherwise. But as it turned out, not only did private
complainant get a defective and used van, the vehicle had also earlier figured in
a road accident when driven by no less than petitioners own driver.
It is true that mere silence is not in itself concealment. Concealment which
the law denounces as fraudulent implies a purpose or design to hide facts which
the other party sought to know. Failure to reveal a fact which the seller is, in good
faith, bound to disclose may generally be classified as a deceptive act due to its
inherent capacity to deceive. Suppression of a material fact which a party is
bound in good faith to disclose is equivalent to a false representation. Moreover,
a representation is not confined to words or positive assertions; it may consist as
well of deeds, acts or artifacts of a nature calculated to mislead another and thus
allow the fraud-feasor to obtain an undue advantage.
The petitioner knew that the van had figured in an accident, was damaged
and had to be repaired. Nevertheless, the van was placed in the showroom, thus
making it appear to the public that it was a brand new unit. The petitioner was
mandated to reveal the foregoing facts to the private complainant. But the
petitioner even obdurately declared when they testified in the court a quo that the
vehicle did not figure in an accident, nor had it been repaired; they maintained
that the van was brand new. Thus, the private complainant bought the van,
believing it was brand new.
166 | P a g e
Sheryll Tablico
2008-0341
Article 36 of the Family Code before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In
her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it
was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman
named Milagros Salting. Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for
concubinage under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner and
his paramour.
In order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion
to Defer Proceedings including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the
criminal case. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration
of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the
criminal case.
Issue:
Whether or not the pendency of the petition for the declaration of nullity of
petitioners marriage is a prejudicial question that should merit the suspension of
the criminal case for concubinage filed against him by his wife?
Decision:
No. The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's
marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to
be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the
latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that
the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.
So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner
need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce
evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a
final judgment declaring his marriage void.
With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the
charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to
state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the
beginning is not a defense.
168 | P a g e
Therefore, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same
must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there
is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents
and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not erred in affirming
the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency of a
civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a
criminal case for concubinage.
Sheryll Tablico
2008-0341
accused Eduardo Arroyo arrived at the Neris' condominium. Witness opened the
door for Arroyo who entered, he went down to and knocked at the master's
bedroom where accused Ruby Vera Neri and her companion Linda Sare were.
On accused Ruby Vera Neri's request, Linda Sare left the master's bedroom and
went upstairs to the sala leaving the two accused. About forty-five minutes later,
Arroyo Jr. came up and told Linda Sare that she could already come down. Three
of them, thereafter, went up to the sala then left the condominium.
Petitioner Arroyo filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of
Appeals' Decision. Petitioner Ruby Vera Neri also moved for reconsideration or a
new trial, contending that a pardon had been extended by her husband, private
complainant Dr. Jorge B. Neri, and that her husband had later on traded marriage
with another woman with whom he is presently co-habiting. Both motions were
denied by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not Dr. Neris alleged extra-marital affair precludes him from
filing the criminal complaint on the ground of pari delicto.
Decision:
The concept of pari delicto is not found in the Revised Penal Code, but
only in Article 1411 of the Civil Code. The Court notes that Article 1411 of the Civil
Code relates only to contracts with illegal consideration. The case at bar does not
involve any illegal contract which either of the contracting parties is now seeking
to enforce. In the Guinucud case, the Court found that the complaining husband,
by entering into an agreement with his wife that each of them were to live
separately and could marry other persons and by filing complaint only about a
year after discovering his wife's infidelity, had "consented to, and acquiesced in,
the adulterous relations existing between the accused, and he is therefore, not
authorized
by
law
to
institute
the
criminal
proceedings."
In
fine,
the Guinucud case refers not to the notion of pari delicto but to consent as a bar
to the institution of the criminal proceedings. In the present case, no such
acquiescence can be implied: the accused did not enter into any agreement with
170 | P a g e
Dr. Neri allowing each other to marry or cohabit with other persons and Dr. Neri
promptly filed his complaint after discovering the illicit affair.
It should also be noted that while Article 344 of the Revise Penal Code
provides that the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted without the offended
spouse's complaint, once the complaint has been filed, the control of the case
passes to the public prosecutor. Enforcement of our law on adultery is not
exclusively, nor even principally, a matter of vindication of the private honor of the
offended spouse; much less is it a matter merely of personal or social hypocrisy.
Such enforcement relates, more importantly, to protection of the basic social
institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation of which the State has
the strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the most fundamental
kind.
After his sexual advances, he would give them money from P5 to P10 and
threaten them again not to tell their mother about what happened or he would kill
them.
Fearing for their lives, the twins did not tell their mother about what
happened. It was only when their older sister, Rosalina, had told their mother
about it, based on the confession of accused-appellants granddaughter who saw
him rape Liza, had she learned of the incidents.
Wasting no time and propelled by her rage of what she had learned, their
mother filed four separate complaints for rape against accused-appellant. This
was after she had her twins physically examined by a doctor who, based on his
findings, confirmed that the twins were indeed sexually-abused.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of all the charges, sentenced
him with the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered him to pay each twin with
P100,000 as indemnity for moral damages.
On appeal, appellant, maintained and consistently argued that the
intercourse he had with twins were all consensual and that the complainants in
fact, would always visit him at his house asking for money and sexual
satisfaction. He further argued that if any, he would, be only held liable for simple
seduction.
Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellant may be held liable for the crime of rape
even if allegedly he did not employ force in order to have sexual intercourse with
the twins?
Whether or not he is liable for simple seduction?
Decision:
Yes. It is clear from the foregoing testimony that private complainants tried to
scream but the appellant prevented them by threatening to kill them. Also, after
each rape incident, private complainants were warned by the appellant not to tell
their mother what happened to them. It is settled that a rape victim is not required
172 | P a g e
to resist her attacker unto death. Force, as an element of rape, need not be
irresistible; it need only be present and so long as it brings about the desired
result, all considerations of whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the
point. Indeed, physical resistance need not be established in rape when, as in
this case, intimidation was used on the victim and she submitted to the rapists
lust for fear of her life or her personal safety. Jurisprudence holds that even
though a man lays no hand on a woman, yet, if by an array of physical forces, he
so overpowers her mind that she does not resist or she ceases resistance
through fear of greater harm, the consummation of unlawful intercourse by the
man is rape. Without question, the prosecution was able to prove that force or
intimidation was actually employed by the appellant on the two victims to satisfy
his lust.
No. Equally untenable is the argument of the appellant that, if he is at all liable
for anything, it should only be for simple seduction. Under Article 338 of the
Revised Penal Code, to constitute seduction, there must in all cases be some
deceitful promise or inducement. The woman should have yielded because of
this promise or inducement. In this case, the appellant claims that the acts of
sexual intercourse with the private complainants were in exchange for money. He
declared that, prior to every sexual intercourse with Liza and Anna, he would
promise them P20. However, aside from his bare testimony, the appellant
presented no proof that private complainants consent was secured by means of
such promise. As aptly opined by the trial court, the money given by the appellant
to private complainants was not intended to lure them to have sex with him.
Rather, it was for the purpose of buying their silence to ensure that nobody
discovered his dastardly acts. The evidence for the prosecution was more than
enough to show that the element of voluntariness on the part of private
complainants was totally absent. Liza and Annas respective testimonies
established that the appellant had sexual intercourse with them without their
consent and against their will. Considering that the victims accounts of what the
appellant did to them were absolutely credible and believable, the trial court
correctly convicted the appellant of several crimes of rape against the 12-yearold twins, Liza and Anna Paragas.
173 | P a g e
174 | P a g e
Based on the record, it was undisputed that prior to the said incident,
Fernando and Elaine were together. Earlier that day he accompanied her to her
Christmas party at her school in Manila Central University in the morning; went to
Luneta Park and took a stroll; thereafter went to Cubao and ate at a fastfood
restaurant; then she accompanied him to his school at Lyceum where he took his
examination; and then finally they went to Champion Lodge Inn where said
incident took place.
After said incident, Elaine told it to her mother who, without wasting time,
brought her to PC Crime Laboratory for a physical examination, the result of
which revealed that she had a fresh laceration on her hymen. Based on said
findings, a complaint was filed against Fernando.
After arraignment, Fernando pleaded not guilty. In the meantime during her
testimony before the court, Elaine admitted that she knew Fernando because
they were neighbors. She even admitted that they were sweethearts and that she
had given him her photo, at the back of which, she had her personal message for
him.
The trial court rendered a decision convicting accused of the offense
charged. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed decision and
imposed upon defendant the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The case was
brought to the Supreme court through an automatic review.
Issues:
Whether or not the trial court had proven the guilt of defendant for the crime
of rape beyond reasonable doubt?
Whether or not defendant may be held liable for the crime of simple
seduction?
Decision:
NO. The contradictions in the testimony of Elaine where she attempted to
prove that their coition was involuntary rather than fortify the case of the
prosecution, served to demolish the same.
175 | P a g e
Firstly, while Elaine claimed she was dragged to the hotel, her medical
examination did not reveal any contusions on her body showing use of any force
on her. Indeed, if she was under any compulsion, she could easily have escaped
during the many hours they were together going from one place to another, but
she did not. She was enjoying their tryst.
Secondly, if she was really drugged she should have been given at least a
blood and urine test to determine if there were any remaining chemicals in her
system. This was not done.
Thirdly, after the incident, Elaine was composed and was not disturbed at all.
She did not show any sign of having had a traumatic experience. It was only
when her mother scolded her that she contrived her story.
Fourthly, in one part of her Sagot Salaysay submitted to the fiscal's office, she
said she did not accept the invitation of appellant for them to go to the Luneta. In
another part thereof, she said she accepted the same. 6 In court, she said she
agreed to go to the Luneta and thereafter she said she was
forced.
She also stated in her Sagot Salaysay that she was only persuaded to give
appellant her photograph and appellant dictated what she wrote thereon. In court
she admitted she gave the photograph to appellant and that appellant did not ask
her to write the dedication thereon.
Verily, the foregoing circumstances effectively disprove the theory of force and
involuntariness in the sexual interlude of the two.
What is obvious and clear is that these two young lovers, carried by their
mutual desire for each other, in a moment of recklessness, slept together and
thus consummated the fruition of their brief love affair. Appellant cannot be held
liable for rape as there was none committed. It was a consensual affair.
NO. Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 338.
single or a widow of good reputation, over twelve but under eighteen years
of age, committed by means of deceit, shall be punished by arresto mayor.
All the elements of the offense are present.
176 | P a g e
Frankly
1.
2.
3.
4.
Appellant said he planned to marry Elaine and for this reason he successfully
persuaded her to give up her virginity. This is the deceit contemplated by law that
attended the commission of the offense.
Section 4, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 4.
177 | P a g e
178 | P a g e
179 | P a g e
Sometime in 1996, the lower court convicted the accused of the crime of
rape under Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659 and
sentenced the accused to Death Penalty which caused the automatic review by
the Supreme Court.
Issues:
Whether or not the trial court committed grave error when it convicted the
accused under a fatally defective complaint as it was Susans grandmother who
filed the same, when it should have been Marilyn (Susans mother), in
accordance with Sec. 5 of the Rules of Court?
Whether or not the death penalty should be imposed?
Decision:
Under Sec. 5, par. 3 of Rule 110, where the offended party is a minor, her
parents, grandparents, or guardian may file the complaint. The right to file the
action granted to parents, grandparents or guardian shall be exclusive of all other
persons and shall be exercised successively in the order herein provided.
However, with the advent of RA 8353, which reclassified rape as a crime against
person and no longer a private crime, for which reason, the complaint can now
be instituted by any person. It is also worthy to note that in the case of People vs.
Estrebella, it was held that any technical defect in a complaint for rape would be
remedied by testimony showing the consent and willingness of the family of the
complainant who cannot give her consent (due to minority or mental retardation,
for instance) to have the private offense publicly tried. In the case at bar, Marilyn
Deguino (complainants mother) herself requested Susans grandmother to take
care of the case.
The Supreme Court, however, held that the trial court erred in imposing
death penalty on accused-appellant. In view of RA 7659 (the Death Penalty Law)
applicability in the crime of rape, which imposes death penalty when the victim is
under 18 years of age and the offender is her parent, ascendant, step-parent.. it
is required that the prosecution proved with certainty the fact that the victim was
under 18 years of age when the rape was committed in order to justify the
imposition of death penalty. In the case at bar, the allegation in the complaint that
181 | P a g e
complainant is under 16 years of age when the crime was committed and that the
accused-appellant lack of denial in that regard is not sufficient to excuse the
prosecution of its burden to prove said qualifying circumstance by competent
evidence.
182 | P a g e
In 1996, Juvie-lyn, through her counsel, Atty. Balbin, and Assistant Chief
State Prosecutor Guiyab, Jr., filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a
Petition for Change of Venue to have the case transferred and tried by any of the
Regional Trial Courts in Metro Manila. The same has been approved on
September 20, 1997. On the other hand, during the pendency of the petition for
change of venue, Juvie-lyn, assisted by her parents and counsel, executed an
affidavit of desistance.
Meanwhile, in 1997, Atty. Casano on behalf of petitioners, moved to have
the petition for change of venue dismissed on the ground that it had become
moot in view of complainants affidavit of desistance.
Upon arraignment on November 07 1997, petitioners both pleaded not
guilty to the charge. From November 10, 1997 to December 10, 1997,
petitioners filed five Urgent Motion to Admit to Bail to which the respondent judge
did not act on.
Accused were sentenced to suffer the indivisible penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua for having been found guilty of the crime of rape.
Issue:
Whether or not the affidavit of desistance filed by the offended party
extinguished the criminal liability of the accused?
Decision:
An affidavit of desistance by itself, even when construed as a pardon in
the so-called "private crimes," is not a ground for the dismissal of the criminal
case once the action has been instituted. The affidavit, nevertheless, may, as so
earlier intimated, possibly constitute evidence whose weight or probative value,
like any other piece of evidence, would be up to the court for proper evaluation.
Paragraph 3 of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code prohibits a
prosecution for seduction, abduction, rape, or acts of lasciviousness, except
upon a complaint made by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or
guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the
above-named persons, as the case may be. It does not prohibit the continuance
of a prosecution if the offended party pardons the offender after the case has
been instituted, nor does it order the dismissal of said case.
183 | P a g e
Eileen S. Tan
2007-0027
185 | P a g e
Eileen S. Tan
2007-0027
186 | P a g e
On 7 July 1993, the third molestation occurred when Messeah and her
brother Metheor were again left home with Jessie. Armed with a knife, Jessie
forced Messeah to sit on a chair. He took off her shorts and underwear and
spread her legs. He inserted and rubbed his penis between her thighs until it
touched her vagina.
Another similar incident happened on 17 October 1993. While, Messeah
was changing her clothes, Jessie entered the room and inserted his smallest
finger into her vagina. He then removed his pants and briefs and went on top of
her but his penis was not able to touch her vagina because Messeah cried for
help and Metheor came and told Jessie to get away.
After Messeahs parents learned about their daughters ordeal they
decided to file complaints against him for one (1) count of consummated rape
and three (3) counts of acts of lasciviousness. RTC rendered decision holding
Jessie liable for statutory rape and 3 counts of acts of lasciviousness.
Isue:
Whether or not Jessie should be held liable for acts of lasciviousness and
statutory rape?
Decision:
The trial court was correct in finding accused-appellant guilty of three (3)
counts of acts of lasciviousness. However, RTC erred in sentencing him guilty
for statutory rape because he should only be convicted for acts of lasciviousness.
While Jessie succeeded in touching her genitalia with his private parts there was
no indication that it successfully penetrated at least the labia of the victim.
We recall that during the first incident of 27 April 1993, accused-appellant
tried forcing his penis into her vagina, but when he failed in his first attempt, he
inserted it into her anus instead. This could have been attempted rape, or even
consummated rape but the Complaint filed was only for acts of lasciviousness.
By then he must have realized that it was difficult to penetrate his victims sex
187 | P a g e
organ. Touching of the female organ will result in consummated rape if the
penis slid into or touched either labia of the pudendum. Anything short of that will
only result in either attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness.
Eileen S. Tan
2007-0027
Decision:
Yes. The trial court correctly convicted petitioner of acts of lasciviousness.
Andrea told the court that petitioners penis was never inserted in her vagina, nor
was there even a touching of her external organ by petitioners penis. There
could, therefore, be no rape.
Andrea Ortega recounted the event while she was on witness stand and
was given full credence by the trial court. The lewd design of petitioner is evident
and, although the information filed was for the crime of rape, he can be convicted
of acts of lasciviousness because the latter is necessarily included in rape.
189 | P a g e
190 | P a g e
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of rape or quite possibly,
the crime of qualified seduction, taking into account the inconsistencies of the
victims statement?
Decision:
No. SC acquitted the accused, both on the crime of rape and qualified
seduction.
The inconsistencies on victims testimony for evidence cannot be
dismissed as trivial. Trial courts must keep in mind that the prosecution must be
able to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence beyond a
reasonable doubt to justify the conviction of the accused. The prosecution must
stand or fall on its own evidence; it cannot draw strength from the weakness of
the evidence for the defense. As SC has said:
Rape is a very emotional word, and the natural human reactions
to it are categorical: admiration and sympathy for the courageous
female publicly seeking retribution for her outrageous violation, and
condemnation of the rapist. However, being interpreters of the law and
dispensers of justice, judges must look at a rape charge without those
proclivities, and deal with it with extreme caution and circumspection.
Judges must free themselves of the natural tendency to be
overprotective of every woman decrying her having been sexually
abused, and demanding punishment for the abuser. While they ought
to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation the rape victim goes
through as she demands justice, judges should equally bear in mind
that their responsibility is to render justice based on the law.
The prosecutions evidence is not only shot through with inconsistencies
and contradictions, it is also improbable. If complainant had been raped on
November 1, 1991, the Court cannot understand why she went with her father to
Tarlac on November 2 and stayed there with him until November 14, 1991. She
was supposed to have gone through a harrowing experience at the hands of her
father but the following day and for thirteen more days after that she stayed with
him. It is true the medico-legal examination conducted on November 17, 1991
showed that she was no longer a virgin and that she had had recent sexual
192 | P a g e
intercourse. But the fact that she had voluntarily gone with her father to Tarlac
suggests that the crime was not rape but, quite possibly qualified seduction,
considering the age of complainant (14 at the time of the crime). This is
especially true because she said she had been given money by her father
everytime they had an intercourse.
The fact that she could describe the lurid details of the sexual act shows
that it was not an ordeal that she went through but a consensual act. One
subjected to sexual torture can hardly be expected to see what was being done
to her. What is clear from complainants testimony is that although accusedappellant had had sexual intercourse with her, it was not done by force or
intimidation. Nor was the rape made possible because of accused-appellants
moral ascendancy over her, for the fact is that accused-appellant was not living
with them, having separated from complainants mother in 1986.
Considering the allegations in the complaint that the rape in this case was
committed by means of force, violence and intimidation, accused-appellant
cannot possibly be convicted of qualified seduction without offense to the
constitutional rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the
accusation against him. That charge does not include qualified seduction. Neither
can qualified seduction include rape.
193 | P a g e
194 | P a g e
Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape or quite possibly, of the crime
of qualified seduction?
Decision:
SC acquitted the accused for the crime of rape but charged him of the
crime of qualified seduction, the elements of which were included in the facts
alleged in the Information.
Viewed from human observation and experience not even a confirmed sex
maniac would dare do his thing before the eyes of strangers, how much more for
a healthy husband before the eyes of his very wife? Then, again, testimony that
her sister before whose very eyes the alleged raping incident took place did not
lift a finger to her, mocks at human sensibility. In the natural course of things, this
piece of evidence is repugnant to common experience and observation in that
the natural reaction wife would be that of righteous indignation rather than
passive [acquiescence] and the natural response of a sister would be to protect
the virtue of a younger sister from abuse of her husband.
Our criminal law is not susceptible to such a reproach, it being clear from
the information that the elements of the crime of qualified seduction were
included in the facts alleged. He cannot be heard to complain thereafter that he is
entitled to complete acquittal. As a matter of fact, in his defense, rightfully given
credence by us, he did admit his having taken advantage of an inexperienced
adolescent, the younger sister of his wife, to whom he ought to have been bound
by the closest ties of affinity, considering also, as testified to by him, how close
she felt towards him.
In the case of People v. Fontanilla, it is said that when the offender is a
public officer, a priest or minister, a servant, domestic, tutor, teacher, or under
any title is in charge of the education or keeping of the offended woman, as in the
present case, the act is punishable although fraud or deceit may not have been
used or, if employed, has not been proved. The seduction of a virgin over twelve
and under eighteen years of age, committed by any of the persons enumerated
in art. 337 is constitutive of the crime of qualified seduction, even though no
deceit intervenes or even when such carnal knowledge were voluntary on the
part of the virgin, because in such a case, the law takes for granted the existence
of the deceit as an integral element of the said crime and punishes it with greater
severity than it does the simple seduction, taking into account the abuse of
195 | P a g e
196 | P a g e
Katherine Yarte
2011-0296
Since the amicable settlement was not realized, Akiao forcibly relocated Lenie
to Cabalantian, Kataotao, Bukidnon, where the latter was successfully rescued on
15 May 1997.
An Information for Forcible Abduction with Rape was filed against the
accused. After several warrants of arrest and attempts to arrest him, he was finally
arrested at Arakan, Cotabato.
The accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. During the trial,
accused tried to prove that he and Lenie had actually been living together under
Manobo rites in the house of her father after he has given the family, the dowry. The
accused allegedly delivered the horse to the father, but was again refused when the
latter increased the number of horses from one to two. The accused concluded that
because he failed to deliver two wild horses, the instant case was filed against him.
The trial court rejected the defenses of the accused and convicted him of
forcible abduction with rape. The accused appealed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Between the accused and the victim, whose version is more credible, more
plausible and more trustworthy considering the circumstances surrounding the
commission of the crime charged?
Decision:
All the elements of forcible abduction were proved in this case. The victim
who is a young girl was taken against her will as shown by the fact that at knifepoint, she was dragged and taken by accused-appellant to a place far from her
abode. At her tender age, she could not be expected to physically resist considering
the fact that even her companion, Jessica, had to run home to escape accusedappellants wrath as he brandished a haunting knife.
The evidence likewise shows that the taking of the young victim against her
will was done con miras deshonestas or in furtherance of lewd and unchaste
designs. The word lewd is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lascivious,
lecherous. It signifies that form of immorality which has relation to moral impurity; or
that which is carried on in a wanton manner. Such lewd designs were established by
the prurient and lustful acts which accused-appellant displayed towards the victim
after she was abducted. This element may also be inferred from the fact that while
Lenie was then a naive twelve (12)-year old, accused-appellant was thirty-six (36)
years old and although unmarried was much wiser in the ways of the world than she
198 | P a g e
Given the straightforward and candid testimony of Lenie and her father
Palmones as well as the absence of any motive to testify falsely against accusedappellant, the logical conclusion is that there was no improper motive on their part,
and their respective testimonies as to facts proving forcible abduction are worthy of
full faith and credit
Accused-appellant would however insist that he and Lenie had been
engaged under Manobo rituals to marry each other and that her companionship
was willful and voluntary. Proof of this, he said, was the alleged dowry of one (1)
horse, two (2) pigs, ten (10) sacks of palay, and P2,000.00, with two (2) wild
horses forthcoming, he had given her father in exchange for her hand in
marriage. In moving from one place to another to look for the horses which the
old man Palmones had demanded, it was allegedly only his intention to realize
his matrimonial aspiration with Lenie.
The testimony of the victim negated this contrived posture of accusedappellant which in reality is simply a variation of the sweetheart defense. If they
were, surely, Lenie would not have jeopardized their relationship by accusing him
of having held her against her will and molesting her and, on top of it all, by filing
a criminal charge against him. If it had been so, Lenie could have easily told her
father after the latter had successfully traced their whereabouts that nothing
untoward had happened between her and the accused. Her normal reaction
would have been to cover-up for the man she supposedly loved and with whom
she had a passionate affair. But, on the contrary, Lenie lost no time in
denouncing accused-appellant and exposing to her family and the authorities the
disgrace that had befallen her. If they had indeed been lovers, Lenie's father
would not have shown so much concern for her welfare and safety by searching
for the couple for four (4) months, desperately wanting to rescue her from
captivity and seeking the intervention of the datus in resolving the matter.
Under the circumstances, the criminal liability of accused-appellant is only for
forcible abduction under Art. 342 of The Revised Penal Code. The sexual abuse
which accused-appellant forced upon Lenie constitutes the lewd design inherent in
forcible abduction and is thus absorbed therein. The indecent molestation cannot
form the other half of a complex crime since the record does not show that
the principal purpose of the accused was to commit any of the crimes against
chastity and that her abduction would only be a necessary means to commit the
same. Surely it would not have been the case that accused-appellant
would touch Lenie only once during her four (4)-month captivity, as she herself
admitted, if his chief or primordial intention had been to lay with her. Instead, what
199 | P a g e
we discern from the evidence is that the intent to seduce the girl forms part and
parcel of her forcible abduction and shares equal importance with the other element
of the crime which was to remove the victim from her home or from whatever familiar
place she may be and to take her to some other. Stated otherwise, the intention of
accused-appellant as the evidence shows was not only to seduce the victim but also
to separate her from her family, especially from her father Palmones, clearly tell-tale
signs of forcible abduction
200 | P a g e
Katherine Yarte
2011-0296
accused-appellant could not have been apparent to her at that time. Physical
resistance need not be demonstrated to show that the taking was against her
will. The employment of deception suffices to constitute the forcible taking,
especially since the victim is an unsuspecting young girl. Considering that it was
raining, going to the hut was not unusual to Magdalena, as probably the purpose
was to seek shelter. Barrio girls are particularly prone to deception. It is the
taking advantage of their innocence that makes them easy culprits of deceiving
minds. Finally, the evidence shows that the taking of the young victim against
her will was effected in furtherance of lewd and unchaste designs. Such lewd
designs in forcible abduction is established by the actual rape of the victim
In the case at bar, Magdalena testified in open court that accused-appellant
inserted his penis into her private parts. The fact of sexual intercourse is
corroborated by the medical findings wherein it was found that the victim suffered
from complete hymenal laceration. Whether or not she consented to the sexual
contact is immaterial considering that at the time thereof, she was below twelve
years of age. Sex with a girl below twelve years, regardless of whether she
consented thereto or not, constitutes statutory rape.
The findings of facts of the trial court, when supported by evidence on
record, are binding on this Court. No significant facts or circumstances were
shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which, if considered, might
substantially affect the outcome of this case. Consequently, the trial courts
conclusions and assessments on the credibility of witness must be accorded
respect on appeal
The imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua, for the crime of forcible
abduction with rape committed in 1993, was correct. No qualifying or
aggravating circumstance was proven in this case and there was none alleged in
the information.
However, the trial court erred in failing to award civil indemnity to the
victim. Whenever the crime of rape is committed, a civil indemnity is awarded to
the victim without necessity of proof or pleading, and the same is automatically
granted together with moral damages, generally in the amount of P50,000.00
each. In this connection, the prayer of the Solicitor General that the civil
indemnity be increased to P75,000.00 cannot be granted, the same being
contrary to jurisprudence In cases where the death penalty cannot be imposed,
the civil indemnity is reduced from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00
Katherine Yarte
2011-0296
202 | P a g e
Nilda brought her to the police where Judeliza reported her ordeal.
After the initial police investigation, Judeliza was brought to Masbate Provincial
Hospital, where she was confined for four days. The medico-legal officer
examined her.
An information for forcible abduction with rape was filed. The accused
pleaded not guilty. During the trial, accused admitted having sexual relations
with Judeliza, but insisted that it was consensual. He claimed that they were
lovers and had been engaging in sexual intimacies for three months before
running away. He explained that they had gone to Masbate after Judeliza had
revealed to him that she was not really her father's daughter. They then lived
together as husband and wife. He admitted having boxed and kicked her but
claimed that he got mad at her after she confided that she really was his niece,
contrary to what she earlier told him. He likewise admitted having pinched the
203 | P a g e
victim's vagina, but only to punish her for deceiving him about their kinship. He
claimed the instant case was filed against him because of the maltreatment she
received. Pedsc
The trial court found appellant's version of the incident preposterous and
his defense untenable.
reasonable doubt of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape under
Article 48 in relation to Article[s] 335 and 342 of the Revised Penal Code and is
meted the extreme penalty of death.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court gravely err in its evaluation of the honesty of
private complainant, in effect giving full weight and credence to the evidence of the
prosecution than that of the defense?
Whether or not the trial court gravely err in finding the accused appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged?
Decision:
There is no no reason to overturn the trial court's detailed evaluation of the
evidence for both the prosecution and the defense. Complainant Judeliza's
testimony was given in a straightforward, clear, and convincing manner, which
remained consistent even under cross-examination. The trial court found her
testimony believable and convincing, while appellant's version of events incredible
and outrageous. Moreover, as testified by the medico-legal officer, he found that her
body bore evidences of physical and sexual assault. Appellant's bare denial could
not prevail over said positive evidence
Appellant next insists that the intercourse between him and Judeliza was
consensual, since they were sweethearts. A "sweetheart defense" should be
substantiated by some documentary and/or other evidence of the relationship .In this
case, there is no showing of mementos, love letters, notes, pictures, or any concrete
proof of a romantic nature. Besides, as observed by the trial judge, it is contrary to
human experience that a naive rural lass like Judeliza, barely nineteen years old,
would willingly consent to be her uncle's paramour. Nor, would he if he were indeed
her sweetheart maltreat her repeatedly for no justifiable cause, without over-straining
our credulity
The elements of forcible abduction are: (1) that the person abducted is
any woman, regardless of age, civil status, or reputation; (2) that the abduction is
against her will; and (3) that the abduction is with lewd designs. The
204 | P a g e
prosecution's evidence clearly shows that the victim was forcibly taken at
knifepoint from Borbon, Cebu by appellant and through threats and intimidation
brought to various towns in Masbate, where he passed her off as his "wife". That
appellant was moved by lewd designs was shown in regard to rape by his having
carnal knowledge of private complainant, against her will, on July 4, 1994 at
Cagba, Tugbo, Masbate. While it may appear at first blush that forcible
abduction, as defined and penalized by Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code
was also committed, we are not totally disposed to convict appellant for the
complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. When a complex crime under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is charged, such as forcible abduction with
rape, it is axiomatic that the prosecution must allege and prove the presence of
all the elements of forcible abduction, as well as all the elements of the crime of
rape. When appellant, using a blade, forcibly took away complainant for the
purpose of sexually assaulting her, as in fact he did rape her, the rape may then
absorb forcible abduction. Hence, the crime committed by appellant is simple
rape only.
The imposable penalty for rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, is reclusion perpetua. But where the rape
is committed with the use of deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
imposable penalty ranges from reclusion perpetua to death. The use of the
bladed weapon already qualified the rape. Under Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code, the crucial factor in determining whether appellant should be meted the
death penalty is the presence of an aggravating circumstance which attended the
commission of the crime. A perusal of the record shows that none of the
aggravating circumstances enumerated in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code
was alleged and proven by the prosecution. Where there is no aggravating
circumstance proved in the commission of the offense, the lesser penalty shall be
applied.
In sentencing appellant to death, the trial court noted that the victim was
his niece, a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree. Section 11 (1)
of R.A. No. 7659 imposes the death penalty when the rape victim is under 18
years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the commonlaw spouse of the parent of the victim. However, R.A. No. 7659 cannot be made
to apply in the instant case for two reasons: First, at the time the rape was
committed, private complainant was already more than eighteen years of age.
Second, the information did not allege that offender and offended party were
relatives within the third degree of consanguinity. We have held that the seven
205 | P a g e
circumstances in R.A. No. 7659 which warrant the automatic imposition of the
death penalty partake of the nature of qualifying circumstances and as such
should be alleged in the information to be appreciated as such. In view of the
failure of the information to comply with this requirement, said degree of relation
could not be taken into account in considering the penalty to be imposed. For
these reasons, the sentence on appellant should only be reclusion perpetua
Jm Sandino Imperial
2007-0297
Jm Sandino Imperial
2007-0297
Abunado v. People
Facts:
Salvador Abunado married Narcisa Arceno on September 18, 1967.
Salvador later contracted a second marriage with Zenaida Binas.
On May 18, 1995, a case for bigamy was filed by Narcisa against Salvador and
Zenaida.
On May 18, 2001, the Trial Court of San Mateo Rizal convicted Salvador
of the crime of bigamy.
207 | P a g e
Jm Sandino Imperial
2007-0297
Cacho v. People
Facts:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete married on August 30, 1990.
On August 19, 1991, a decree of divorce by Ontario Court was granted
unto them.
On October 4, 2992, Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago.
On September 321, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicail declaration
of nullity of marriage in the trial court of Bohol, on the ground that no marriage
ceremony actually took place.
208 | P a g e
On October 19, 1993, appelant was charged with bigamy filed by the City
Prosecutor of Tagbilaran, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
On August 5, 1996, the Regional Trial Court of Bohol convicted Lucio
Morigo of the crime of bigamy.
Petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals and the same affirmed
the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner committed bigamy?
Decision:
No, the first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must
have been legally married.
The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential
element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense
cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of.
No marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage
contract on their own.
Under the aforementioned circumstance, the Court held that petitioner has
not committed bigamy.
209 | P a g e
Alvin Ocampo
2011-0386
the
above-named
accused
CRISTENELLI
210 | P a g e
NILA
DUN,
BUKOD
PA
SA
211 | P a g e
Petitioner and Tugas appealed to the CA. The appellate court, in its
Decision dated September 3, 2002, affirmed the conviction of petitioner, but
acquitted Tugas on account of non-participation in the publication of the libelous
article.
The CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit in
the Resolution dated March 24, 2003. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
Whether or not Tugas and Fermin can be held liable for liable?
Decision:
The Supreme Court noted that, in the first issue, the CA erred in
acquitting Tugas. It said that Tugas cannot feign lack of participation in the
publication of the questioned article as was evident from his and petitioners Joint
Counter-Affidavit and as gleaned from his testimony before the trial court, to wit:
WITNESS:
and
sworn
in
before
ATTY. ALENTAJAN:
That is all for the witness, your Honor.
212 | P a g e
the
City
COURT:
A:
COURT:
A:
In U.S. v. Taylor, the accused was indicted under Section 6 of Act No. 277
which provides that: Every author, editor or proprietor of any book, newspaper, or
serial publication is chargeable with the publication of any words contained in any
part of said book or number of each newspaper or serial as fully as if he were the
author of the same. However, proof adduced during the trial showed that
accused was the manager of the publication without the corresponding evidence
that, as such, he was directly responsible for the writing, editing, or publishing of
the matter contained in the said libelous article.
In People v. Topacio and Santiago, reference was made to the Spanish
text of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code which includes the verb publicar.
Thus, it was held that Article 360 includes not only the author or the person who
causes the libelous matter to be published, but also the person who prints or
publishes it.
Based on these cases, therefore, proof of knowledge of and participation
in the publication of the offending article is not required, if the accused has been
specifically identified as author, editor, or proprietor or printer/publisher of the
publication, as petitioner and Tugas are in this case.
Tugas testimony, in fact, confirms his actual participation in the
preparation and publication of the controversial article and his approval thereof
213 | P a g e
as it was written. Moreover, his alibi, which was considered meritorious by the
CA, that he was confined at the Mother of Perpetual Help Clinic in Angeles City,
is unavailing, in view of the testimony of his attending physician that Tugas
medical condition did not prevent him from performing his work.
However, the Supreme Court cannot reverse the findings of acquittal by
the appellate court in view of the principle of double jeopardy. As the wordings of
the Supreme Court, But, of course, we cannot reinstate the ruling of the trial
court convicting Bogs Tugas because with his acquittal by the CA, we would run
afoul of his constitutional right against double jeopardy.
As regards to the second issue, petitioner Fermin argues that the subject
article in the June 14, 1995 issue of Gossip Tabloid is not libelous, is covered by
the mantle of press freedom, and is merely in the nature of a fair and honest
comment. The Supreme Court disagrees on her arguments by analyzing the
libelous articles, to wit:
The banner headlines of the offending article read:
KUNG TOTOONG NAKATAKAS NA SI ANNABELLE
RAMA,
IMPOSIBLENG
SA
STATES
SIYA
NAGPUNTA!
MAS MALAKING HALAGA ANG NADISPALKO NILA
SA STATES, MAY MGA NAIWAN DING ASUNTO
DUN SI ANNABELLE!
On the first page of the same issue of Gossip Tabloid, written in smaller
but bold letters, are:
HINDI SIYA MAKAKAPUNTA SA AMERIKA DAHIL
NAPAKARAMI RIN NIYANG ASUNTONG INIWAN
DUN NOON PA, NAKAPAG-ABROAD MAN SIYA, E,
PIHADONG HINDI SIYA SA AMERIKA NAGTULOY,
SA AMERIKA PA KAYA SIYA MAGTATAGO, E, ILANG
TAON NA RIN SIYANG INAABANGAN DUN NG NGA
KABABAYAN NATING NILOKO NIYA, IN ONE WAY
OR ANOTHER?... NAAALALA PA BA NINYO YUNG
MGA MAMAHALING KALDERO NA IBINEBENTA
NILA
214 | P a g e
NOON
SA
AMERIKA,
DUN
SILA
NAGKAPROBLEMA,
MILYON-MILYON
ANG
215 | P a g e
Alvin Ocampo
2011-0386
BAWAL
DUMAAN
ANG
SUSPETSOSA
BASTOS
AT
216 | P a g e
Rodelito proceeded with his errand and, upon reaching home, related
what he saw to his father.
Again, feeling that he was the maniac and dog thief being referred to,
Cerelito lost no time in filing a complaint with the Baguio City Police (BCP).
Pictures were then taken of the aforesaid writing on the wall. Eventually, the
Office of the City Prosecutor in Baguio, finding, following an investigation,
probable cause for libel against Dolores, filed the corresponding information
giving rise to Criminal Case No. 8804-R.
Evidently apprised by the police of the complaint thus filed by Cerelito,
Dolores, in the morning of March 15, 1991, went to the BCP sub-station to deliver
her 3-page letter-answer written in yellow pad and addressed to the station subcommander.
At around 12:20 p.m. of the same day, March 15, 1991, Dolores handed to
and instructed Evelyn Arcartado, Cerelito's sister, to deliver an unsealed white,
long, ordinary envelope to Fe Alejandro, Cerelito's wife.Since Fe was out of the
house at that time, Evelyn gave the unsealed envelope to Cerelito, who
immediately read the three (3) separate letters contained in the envelope. Evelyn
followed suit afterwards. Fe read the contents of the envelope upon reaching
home late in the afternoon of March 15, 1991.
The first letter, unsigned and undated and written on yellow pad, was
addressed to spouses Cerelito and Fe Alejandro. Quoted, in part, in the
information in Criminal Case No. 8806-R, this unsigned letter reads:
If your husband can't show any proof of his makating dila
then comply & if your husband can't understand this simple
English dahil mangmang, dayukdok na galing sa isang kahig
isang tukang pamilya at walang pinagaralan, illiterate, mal
educado kaya bastos eh huag na niya kaming idamay sa
kaniyang katangahan na alam na trabaho eh humawak ng
grasa sa Saudi.Kaya iyong pambabastos mo at pagdudumi
niya sa pangalan naming at higit pa siyang marumi at putang
ina rin niya.Galing siya sa p ng baboy at hindi sa p ng
tao.Huag niyang ikumpara ang pinangalingan niya sa
pinangalingan
namin.Siya
ang
magnanakaw
at
na
bantay
salakay.In
simple
tagalog
the
originator
of
the
libel
is
not
responsible
for
the
Alvin Ocampo
2011-0386
letter was open, not contained in an envelope, and Atty. Pieraz wife put it on her
husband's desk. On that same day, Atty. Pieraz came upon the letter and made
out its content. It reads:
DON HERMOGENES RODRIGUEZ Y REYES ESTATE
Office of the Asst. Court Administrator
No. 1063 Kamias St., Bgy. Manggahan, PasigCity,
Metro Manila
August 18, 1995
ATTY. JOSE J. PIERAZ
Counsel for Benjamin A. Monroy
#8 Quirino St., Life Homes Subdivision
Rosario , PasigCity, Metro Manila
Subject:
Anent your letter dated August 18, 1995
addressed to one Mrs. Teresita Quingco
Atty. Pieraz:
This has reference to your lousy but inutile threatening letter
dated August 18, 1995, addressed to our client; using
carabao English.
May we remind you that any attempt on your part to continue
harassing the person of Mrs. Teresita Quingco of No. 1582
Mngo St., Bgy. Manggahan, PasigCity, Metro Manila--undersigned
much
to
his
regrets
shall
be
Rodriguez Y. Reyes.
Copy furnished:
All concerned.
Reacting to the insulting words used by Buatis, Jr., particularly: 'Satan,
senile, stupid, [E]nglish carabao, Atty. Pieraz filed a complaint for libel against
accused-appellant. Subject letter and its contents came to the knowledge not
only of his wife but of his children as well and they all chided him telling him:
'Ginagawa ka lang gago dito.
The defense forwarded by accused-appellant Buatis, Jr. was denial.
According to him, it was at the behest of the president of the organization
'Nagkakaisang Samahan Ng Mga Taga Manggahan or NASATAMA, and of a
member, Teresita Quingco, that he had dictated to one of his secretaries, a
comment to the letter of private-complainant in the second week of August 1995.
Initially during his testimony, Buatis, Jr. could not recall whether he had
signed that letter-comment or if it was even addressed to Atty. Pieraz. Neither
could he remember if he had made and sent another letter, this time dated
August 24, 1995, to Atty. Pieraz. Confronted in court with the counter-affidavit
which he filed before the Pasig City Prosecutor's Office, however, Buatis, Jr.
could not deny its contents, among which was his admission that indeed, he had
sent subject letter of August 18 and the letter dated August 24, 1995 to Atty.
Pieraz.
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision dated April 30,
1997 finding petitioner guilty of the crime of libel.
Subsequently, petitioner appealed the RTC's decision to the CA which, in
its Decision dated January 18, 2000, affirmed in its entirety the decision of the
trial court.
The CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in a Resolution
dated March 13, 2000.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty of libel?
Decision:
The Supreme Court denied the petition.
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel as a public and
malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any
223 | P a g e
225 | P a g e
Justiniano Quiza
2008-0290
226 | P a g e
227 | P a g e
Justiniano Quiza
2008-0290
228 | P a g e
Justiniano Quiza
2008-0290
embarrassed. At that time, Atty. Escolango was a candidate for vice mayor of
Morong, Bataan in the elections of May 8, 1995.
Issue:
Whether petitioner is guilty of slight or serious oral defamation?
Decision:
Petitioner is guilty of slight oral defamation.
In resolving the issue, we are guided by a doctrine of ancient
respectability that defamatory words will fall under one or the other, depending
not only upon their sense, grammatical significance, and accepted ordinary
meaning judging them separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the
case, antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender,
which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time.
Unquestionably, the words uttered were defamatory.
Considering,
however, the factual backdrop of the case, the oral defamation was only slight.
The parties were also neighbors; that petitioner was drunk at the time he uttered
the defamatory words; and the fact that petitioners anger was instigated by what
229 | P a g e
Atty. Escolango did when petitioners father died. In which case, the oral
defamation was not of serious or insulting nature.
Alexander Santos
2006-0205
230 | P a g e
Issue:
Whether or not the charge of the charge for violation of Article 365 of the
RPC "absorbs" the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942?
Decision:
The petition has no merit, The Court had continuously ruled that a single
act or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated
provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one
offense. The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person
shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for "the same offense.
In P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), the additional element to be
established is the dumping of mine tailings into the Makulapnit River and the
entire Boac River System without prior permit from the authorities concerned.
In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must be proved is
the existence of actual pollution. The gravamen is the pollution itself.
In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be
established is the willful violation and gross neglect on the part of the accused to
abide by the terms and conditions of the Environmental Compliance Certificate.
On the other hand, the additional element that must be established in Art.
365 of the Revised Penal Code is the lack of necessary or adequate precaution,
negligence, recklessness and imprudence on the part of the accused to prevent
damage to property. This element is not required under the previous laws.
The claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs"
the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942 must fail, suffice it to
say that a mala in se felony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage
to Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD
1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the former a felony is criminal intent
(dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the special laws
enacting them.
231 | P a g e
Alexander Santos
2006-0205
232 | P a g e
Decision:
Yes, Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code states that reckless
imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an
act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act,
taking into consideration (1) his employment or occupation; (2) his degree of
intelligence; (3) his physical condition; and (4) other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.
Petitioner herein is a professional driver who has been in the employ of
the bus company for 18 years and has undergone training courses and
seminars to improve his skills as a driver. He is expected to be well aware of his
responsibilities to his passengers. Not only must he make sure that they reach
their destinations on time, he must also ensure their safety while they are
boarding, during the entire trip, and upon disembarking from the vehicle.
Having failed to exercise due diligence that resulted in the tragic incident,
petitioners liability for the death of passenger Lourdes Mangruban, as found by
the lower courts, must be sustained.
No, The records show that petitioner stated under oath that he alighted
from the bus and saw that several people were assisting the injured party and
corroborated by other witnesses.
The assistance required by Article 365, Revised Penal Code, is one which
may be in the hands of the offender to give. We must therefore take into
consideration the type and degree of assistance that the offender, at the time and
place of the incident, is capable of giving.
Under the circumstances of this case, the petitioner is not a hit-and-run
driver. He exerted efforts to see to it that the victim had been attended to. There
were several people assisting the victim, including his co-employees working for
the bus company. The injured party was carried from the terminal, to a vehicle,
then to the hospital. Before petitioner was given clearance by the dispatcher to
leave, an hour later, he was assured that the victim was brought already to the
hospital. We note that petitioner had a bus full of passengers requiring also his
233 | P a g e
attention. He could only do so much, so that the burden of helping the injured
party was shared by the bus company personnel and other good Samaritans.
Alexander Santos
2006-0205
234 | P a g e
Decision:
No, from the convergence of circumstances, the court held that the tragic
event was more a product of reckless imprudence than of a malicious intent on
accused part. The conclusion of the trial court and the OSG the accused
intentionally rammed and hit the jogging trainees was premised on the
assumption that despite the first bumping thuds, he continued to accelerate his
vehicle instead of applying his brakes, as shown by the absence of brake marks
or skid marks along the traffic scene. For its part, the defense attributed the
continuous movement of accused vehicle to the confluence that the Isuzu Elf
truck, a huge vehicle, was moving fast that even if the brakes were applied the
truck would have still proceeded further on account of its momentum, albeit at a
reduced speed, and would have stopped only after a certain distance.
It is a well-entrenched rule that if the inculpatory facts are capable of two
or more explanations one consistent with the innocence or lesser degree of
liability of the accused, and the other consistent with his guilt or graver
responsibility the Court should adopt the explanation which is more favorable to
the accused.
The court is convinced that the incident, tragic though it was in light of the
number of persons killed and seriously injured, was an accident and not an
intentional felony.
Although proof of motive is not indispensable to a conviction especially
where the assailant is positively identified, such proof is, nonetheless, important
in determining which of two conflicting theories of the incident is more likely to be
true.
The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act
whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this:
Could a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is
attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of
the course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain
from that course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results,
and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm,
followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this prevision, is always
necessary before negligence can be held to exist.
235 | P a g e
GLENN showed an inexcusable lack of precaution and liable under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code.
Considering that the incident was not a product of a malicious intent but
rather the result of a single act of reckless driving, accused should be held guilty
of the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with
serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime
shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Since
No, The slight physical injuries caused by the accused to the ten other
victims through reckless imprudence, would, had they been intentional, have
constituted light felonies. Being light felonies, which are not covered by Article 48,
they should be treated and punished as separate offenses. Separate
informations should have, therefore, been filed.
However, It must be noted that only one information (for multiple murder,
multiple frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder) was filed with the trial
court. However, nothing appears in the record that GLENN objected to the
multiplicity of the information in a motion to quash before his arraignment. Hence,
he is deemed to have waived such defect.
Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, when two or more
offenses are charged in a single complaint or information and the accused fails to
object to it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many offenses as
are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each of them.
236 | P a g e
Arlyn Barcelon
2006-0021
237 | P a g e
Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any
person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly
record such communication by means of tape recorder. The law makes no
distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to
be a party other than or different from those involved in the private
communication. The statutes intent is to penalize all persons unauthorized to
make such recordings is underscored by the use of a qualifier any.
Consequently, as respondent CA correctly concluded, even a person (privy) to a
communication who records his private conversation with another without the
knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator under this provision of R.A. No
4200.
The nature of the conversation is immaterial to a violation of the statute.
The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information.
What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or
recording private communications by means of devices enumerated therein.
Mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an
offense under Sec. 1 of R.A. 4200.
Petitioners contention that the phrase private communication in Sec.1 of
R.A. 4200 does not include private conversations narrows the ordinary meaning
of the word communication to a point of absurdity.
The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable facts
and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity,
and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized recording of private
communications with the use of tape- recorders as among the acts punishable.
Petition is hereby denied.
238 | P a g e
Arlyn Barcelon
2006-0021
239 | P a g e
240 | P a g e
violence occurred involving petitioner Navarro and Lingan, with the latter getting
the worst of it.
Wherefore, the decision of the CA is affirmed.
Arlyn Barcelon
2006-0021
241 | P a g e
243 | P a g e
Tablico, Sheryll G.
2008-0341
245 | P a g e
Tablico, Sheryll G.
2008-0341
247 | P a g e
Tablico, Sheryll G.
2008-0341
248 | P a g e
amended by Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7659, the Death Penalty Law, which
took effect on 31 December 1993.
In Section 2 of R. A. 6536 as amended, defines the crime of carnapping as
the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the
latters consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by
using force upon things. It becomes qualified when in the course of the
commission or on occasion of the carnapping, the owner, driver or occupant of
the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped. When the carnapping is qualified, the
penalty imposable is reclusion perpetua to death. In the case at bar, all the
elements were duly proven by the prosecution. Based on the testimony of
Sanchez, accused-appellant and his companions shot the driver of the tricycle,
abandoned him and took possession of the vehicle. The testimony of Sanchez
that the driver was unknown to the group clearly establishes the fact that the
motive of accused-appellant was to steal the tricycle and that the killing of the
driver was incidental thereto.
249 | P a g e
Ozelle Dedicatoria
2006-0406
Probation Law
Domingo Lagrosa and Osias Baguin v. People (G.R. No. 152044)
Facts:
The Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City rendered a decision against
the petitioners Lagrosa and Baguin for violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705, as
amended (The Revised Forestry Code), for having in their possession forest
products without the requisite permits. They were sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision
mayor, as maximum. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the decision was
denied by the trial court.
Thereafter, they appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. However,
the appellate court affirmed the conviction of the petitioners, with the modification
as to the penalty imposed, which was reduced to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correccional, as
minimum, to one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty one (21) days of Prision
Correccional, as maximum. Said decision became final and executory.
Petitioners filed an Application for Probation with the trial court but it was denied.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals but it the latter only affirmed the
decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners should be allowed to apply for probation
even if they had already appealed the decision of the trial court?
Decision:
250 | P a g e
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. It held that probation may be
granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An
application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the
application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. Under Section 9 (a)
of the Probation Law, offenders who are sentenced to serve a maximum term of
imprisonment of more than six years are disqualified from seeking probation.
In the case at bar, upon interposing an appeal petitioners should be precluded
from seeking probation. By perfecting their appeal, petitioners ipso facto
relinquished the alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law, the purpose
of which is simply to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an
accused who, although already eligible, does not at once apply for probation, but
did so only after failing in his appeal.
251 | P a g e
Ozelle Dedicatoria
2006-0406
1976, as amended), which in part provides that the filing of an application for
probation is deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. Thus, there was no more
opportunity for petitioner to exercise her right to appeal, the judgment having
become final by the filing of an application for probation.
253 | P a g e
Ozelle Dedicatoria
2006-0406
Alejandra Pablo v. Hon. Silverio Castillo and People (G.R. No. 125108)
Facts:
Information was filed before the RTC of Dagupan against petitioner Pablo
charging her with a violation for BP 22 (Bouncing Check Law) for issuing and
delivering various checks to Nelson Mandap in partial payment of a loan she
obtained from the latter. When Mandap draw those checks from the bank, it was
dishonored upon presentment for payment because the current account of the
petitioner had been closed. The trial court rendered its judgment convicting
petitioner for the crime charged, sentencing her to pay a fine and to serve a
prison term of 30 days.
Thereafter, petitioner applied for probation. Her application was given due
course and was given a favorable evaluation upon recommendation of the local
probation office. However, such recommendation was overruled by the National
Probation Office and denied petitioners application on the ground that she is
disqualified under Section 9 ( c ) of the Probation Law: c) those who have
previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by
imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or fine of not less than
two hundred pesos. Respondent judge denied petitioners application for
probation. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence,
this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion
in denying petitioners application for probation on the ground of disqualification
from probation under Section 9 of P.D. 968?
Decision:
254 | P a g e
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. It held that Section 9 paragraph
(c) is in clear and plain language, to the effect that a person, who was previously
convicted by final judgment of an offense punishable by imprisonment of not less
than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than two hundred pesos, is
disqualified from applying for probation. This provision of law is definitive and
unqualified. There is nothing in Section 9, paragraph (c) which qualifies "previous
conviction" as referring to a conviction for a crime which is entirely different from
that for which the offender is applying for probation or a crime which arose out of
a single act or transaction as petitioner would have the court to understand. As
held in Rura vs. Lopea, the word previous" refers to conviction, and not to
commission of a crime.
It is well-settled that the probation law is not a penal statute; and therefore,
the principle of liberal interpretation is inapplicable. And when the meaning is
clearly discernible from the language of the statute, there is no room for
construction or interpretation.
255 | P a g e
Anti-Fencing Law
Fransisco v. People (GR No. 146584)
Facts:
The private complainant in this case, Jovita Rodriquez, was the wife of the
former mayor of Rodriguez Rizal and was engaged in business as a general
contractor. She and her husband own pieces of jewelry which they kept inside a
locked cabinet in a locked room in their main house. Aside from her family, she
also had under her employ one Macario Linghon and the latters sister, Pacita,
who was their household helper charged with sweeping and cleaning the room
periodically. Pacita later on left her employ.
Sometime on August 1992, she was surprised to discover that the box
where the jewelries were kept inside the cabinet were empty. There appears no
indication however that the lock of the cabinet was broken. Among the pieces of
jewelry missing were one heart-shaped diamond ring worth P100,000; one white
gold bracelet with diamond stones worth P150,000; and a pair of diamond heartshaped earrings worth P400,000.
Believing that Pacita, her previous helper, had taken said jewelries, she
filed a complaint for theft against her and her mother Adoracion. When the latter
was invited to the police station, she admitted selling one pair of heart-shaped
earrings with diamond, one white gold bracelet, one heart-shaped diamond ring,
and one ring with big and small stones to petitioner whom she identified as
Mang Erning. The amount she obtained from said sale, was, according to her,
intended for her fathers operation and for food.
To confirm her admission, she accompanied the policemen to said Mang
Erning, who refused to cooperate with them at first when Pacita identified him as
the one who purchased the stolen jewelries. Despite his refusal, however, Jovita
filed a complaint for violation of PD 1612 or Anti-Fencing Law, against him. To
strengthen her accusations against petitioner, she obtained the written testimony
of the policemen involved in the case and also convinced Macario to testify
against him as Macario had once sold jewelries to him.
256 | P a g e
In the meantime, the trial court found Pacita and her mother guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of theft and PD 1612 respectively.
Subsequently, the trial court also rendered judgment in the case of petitioner and
found him also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating PD 1612.
Wasting no time, petitioner appealed the adverse decision to the Court of
Appeals alleging that the lower court erred in not finding that the testimony of
prosecution witnesses are all hearsay evidence and that because of said failure,
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt was not sufficiently established. The court of
Appeals however affirmed the trial courts decision. Hence the present appeal to
the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the conviction of Pacita in the crime of theft is sufficient to
establish petitioners conviction for violation of PD 1612?
Whether or not the prosecution based on the pieces of evidence presented
was able to prove petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
Decision:
No. We agree with the trial and appellate courts that the prosecution
mustered the requisite quantum of evidence, on the basis of the testimony of
Jovita, that Pacita stole the subject jewelry from the locked cabinet in the main
house of her then employer. Jovita testified on her ownership of the jewelry and
the loss thereof, and narrated that Pacita had access to the cabinet containing
the pieces of jewelry.
We, however, agree with the petitioner that the decision of the RTC of Rizal,
Branch 76, in Criminal Case No. 2005 convicting Pacita of theft does not
constitute proof against him in this case, that Pacita had, indeed, stolen the
jewelry. There is no showing that the said decision in Criminal Case No. 2005
was already final and executory when the trial court rendered its decision in the
instant case.
No. The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime
of robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or
accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in
257 | P a g e
any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused
knew or should have shown that the said article, item, object or anything of value
has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and, (4)
there is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.
Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a prima facie
presumption of fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of any good,
article, item, object or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or
theft, and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property.33 The
stolen property subject of the charge is not indispensable to prove fencing. It is
merely corroborative of the testimonies and other evidence adduced by the
prosecution to prove the crime of fencing.
On the second element of the crime, the trial and appellate courts held that
the prosecution proved the same beyond reasonable doubt based on the
testimony of Jovita during the trial in Criminal Cases Nos. 1992 and 2005; that
Pacita had confessed to Jovita that she sold some of the jewelry to the petitioner;
the joint affidavit of PO1 Roldan, Jr. and SPO1 Peralta on their investigation of
the complaint of Jovita; the testimony of PO1 Roldan, Jr. relating to said
investigation; the RTC decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 1992 and 2005; the
testimonies of Pacita and her brother Macario during the preliminary investigation
of Criminal Case No. 92-13841 before the MTC of Meycauayan as shown by the
transcripts of the stenographic notes taken during the proceedings; the
supplemental sworn statement of Pacita on August 23, 1992 in Camp Crame,
Quezon City, and, the testimony of Macario before the trial court.
First. Jovitas testimony in Criminal Cases Nos. 1992 and 2005, that Pacita
had confessed to her that she had sold four pieces of jewelry to the petitioner, is
inadmissible in evidence against the latter to prove the truth of the said
admission. It bears stressing that the petitioner was not a party in the said
criminal cases. The well-entrenched rule is that only parties to a case are bound
by a judgment of the trial court. Strangers to a case are not bound by the
judgment of said case.34 Jovita did not reiterate her testimony in the said
criminal cases during the trial in the court a quo. The prosecution did not present
Pacita as witness therein to testify on the admission she purportedly made to
Jovita; hence, the petitioner was not able to cross-examine Pacita. The rule is
that the acts or declarations of a person are not admissible in evidence against a
third party.
258 | P a g e
259 | P a g e
fix the value of the property at P5.00, conformably to our ruling in People v.
Dator.
No. Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 is the act of any
person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive,
possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in
any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows,
or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime
of robbery or theft.
The law on fencing does not require the accused to have participated in
the criminal design to commit, or to have been in any wise involved in the
commission of, the crime of robbery or theft.
Before the enactment of P. D. No. 1612 in 1979, the fence could only be
prosecuted as an accessory after the fact of robbery or theft, as the term is
defined in Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty was light as it
was two (2) degrees lower than that prescribed for the principal.
P. D. No. 1612 was enacted to impose heavy penalties on persons who
profit by the effects of the crimes of robbery and theft. Evidently, the accessory
in the crimes of robbery and theft could be prosecuted as such under the
Revised Penal Code or under P.D. No. 1612. However, in the latter case, the
accused ceases to be a mere accessory but becomes a principal in the crime of
fencing. Otherwise stated, the crimes of robbery and theft, on the one hand, and
fencing, on the other, are separate and distinct offenses. The State may thus
choose to prosecute him either under the Revised Penal Code or P. D. No. 1612,
although the preference for the latter would seem inevitable considering that
fencing is malum prohibitum, and P. D. No. 1612 creates a presumption of
fencing[9] and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property.
In Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People of the Philippines, we set out the essential
elements of the crime of fencing as follows:
1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission
of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps,
acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner
deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been
derived from the proceeds of the said crime;
262 | P a g e
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item,
object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft; and
4. There is on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for
another.
Consequently, the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused by
establishing the existence of all the elements of the crime charged.
Short of evidence establishing beyond reasonable doubt the existence of
the essential elements of fencing, there can be no conviction for such offense. It
is an ancient principle of our penal system that no one shall be found guilty of
crime except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt (Perez vs. Sandiganbayan,
180 SCRA 9).
In this case, what was the evidence of the commission of theft
independently of fencing?
Complainant Rosita Lim testified that she lost certain items and Manuelito
Mendez confessed that he stole those items and sold them to the accused.
However, Rosita Lim never reported the theft or even loss to the police. She
admitted that after Manuelito Mendez, her former employee, confessed to the
unlawful taking of the items, she forgave him, and did not prosecute him. Theft is
a public crime.
reported no loss, we cannot hold for certain that there was committed a crime of
theft. Thus, the first element of the crime of fencing is absent, that is, a crime of
robbery or theft has been committed.
There was no sufficient proof of the unlawful taking of anothers property.
True, witness Mendez admitted in an extra-judicial confession that he sold the
boat parts he had pilfered from complainant to petitioner. However, an admission
or confession acknowledging guilt of an offense may be given in evidence only
against the person admitting or confessing. Even on this, if given extra-judicially,
the confessant must have the assistance of counsel; otherwise, the admission
would be inadmissible in evidence against the person so admitting. Here, the
extra-judicial confession of witness Mendez was not given with the assistance of
counsel, hence, inadmissible against the witness.
263 | P a g e
264 | P a g e
Gil Acosta
2008-0085
266 | P a g e
Gil Acosta
2008-0085
267 | P a g e
Facts:
Petitioner herein was the Assistant Regional Director of DSWD in Region
2. On July 1989 DSWD Region 2 embarked on a project involving the
procurement of 19 typewriter. Respondent herein served as the chairman of the
Procurement Board in relation to the abovementioned project. The Board
prepared the Requisition for Equipment and Supplies (RES) for 19 typewriters,
and then after submitted to Regional Director Arafiles for approval which she
approved. From the 4 bidders it was San Sebastian Marketing represented by
Jessie Callangan, won the bid. After San Sebastian completed its delivery of the
19 machines, supply officer Rogelio Hipolito also a member of the abovementioned board inspected and tested the typewriters and certified that the
machines are in compliance with the specifications given by them.
However, upon pos-audit it was discovered that all the 19 typewriters were
not brand new but merely rebuilt and reconditioned and thus failing to comply
with the specification requirements. The petitioner together with Director Arafiles,
Callangan and Hipolito were charged for violation of section 3 ( e ) of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. The sandiganbayan adjudged herein petitioner
as guilty of the charge hence this petition to the Supreme Court.
Petitioners main contentions are that the elements of conspiracy were not
established beyond reasonable ground and that there is no sufficient evidence to
prove the alleged crime.
Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner herein is guilty of the charge?
Decision:
Yes. Petitioners contention is untenable first on the issue of conspiracy,
the reliance of petitioner to the ARIAS Doctrine must be answered in the
negative. Petitioners contention that all heads of offices have to rely to a
reasonable extent on their subordinate and on the good faith of those who
prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations When however, that
infraction consists in the reliance in good faith, albeit misplaced, by a head of
office on a subordinate upon whom the primary responsibility rests, absent a
268 | P a g e
clear sense of conspiracy, the Arias doctrine must be held to prevail. Petitioner
cannot seek refuge in the cases of Magsuci and Arias when she relied on the
recommendations of her subordinates. Petitioner is an Assistant Regional
Director, not the head of office or the final approving authority whom the Arias
doctrine is applicable.
In relation to the second issue of sufficiency of evidence, the Supreme
Court elucidated the main elements of the crime provided for in sec. 3 R.A. NO.
3019 corrupt practices of officers, these are 1. The accused are public officers or
private persons charged in conspiracy with them 2. Said public officers commit
the prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties as in relation to
their public position. 3. They caused undue injury to any party, whether the
government or a private party 4. Such injury is caused by giving unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and 5. The public officers have
acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
These requisites being attendant in this case, the SC held that indeed Petitioner
is guilty with the crime.
Gil Acosta
2008-0085
269 | P a g e
Facts:
Petitioner herein Arturo Mejorda is a public officer, connected with the
Office of the Highway District Engineer of Pasig. His position in said office was a
right of way agent of which his main duty was to negotiate property owners
affected by highway constructions for the purpose of compensating them for
damages incurred by said owners
Sometime in Oct. or Nov. of 1977, Mejorada approached herein private
respondents and informed them that he could work out their claims for the value
of their lots and improvements affected by the widening of a certain highway in
Pasig oh which their properties would be damaged in a certain way. Mejorada
required said owners to sign blank copies of Sworn Statement on the Correct and
Fair Market Value of the Real Properties and Agreement to Demolish. Remove,
and Reconstruct improvements. However Mejorada for his part made it appear
that the value of the respective properties were much higher than the actual price
claimed by the owners. Furthermore Mejorada , in relation to the improvements
made it appear that the declarations of Property are not really intended for the
claimants as they were registered in the names of other persons.
On the date on which the claims were to be encashed by herein private
respondents, Mejorada accompanied them and personally assisted in the
process of signing and encashing the checks. Right after the claimants received
the cash, accused Mejorada accompanied them to his car were they were
divested of the cash and was given only the sum of P1,000.00 , stating to them
that there were many who would share in said amounts. All the claimants were
helpless to complaint because they were afraid o0f the accused and his armed
companions. Thus the complainants filed a case against herein Petitioner
Mejorada for violation of Section 3 ( e ) of R.A. 3019 the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act
For his defense the main contention of the accused is that the element of
damage to the parties must have caused by the public officer in the discharge of
his official functions, in as much as when the damage to the complainants, he
was no longer discharging his official duties, therefore he is not liable for the
charge. Furthermore it was also the argument of the petitioner herein that the
evidence adduced by the prosecution is not the violation of R.A. 3019 but that of
robbery.
270 | P a g e
Issue:
Whether or not Mejorada could be prosecuted of the crime punishable
under Section 3 ( e ) of R.A. 3019?
Decision:
Yes. The SC Held that the first argument of the petitioner as stated above
is devoid of merit. It was clearly established that the petitioner took advantage of
his position as right of way agent by making the claimants sign the
aforementioned agreements to demolish and sworn statements which contained
falsified
evident bad faith on the part of Mejorada when he inflated the values of the true
claims and when he divested the claimants of a large share of the amounts due
them.
The SC also answered the second argument of herein petitioner in the
negative. The High Court stated that it was duly proven that through badfaith,
petitioner cased damage to the claimants and the Government. The Manner by
which the petitioner divested the private individuals of the compensation they
received was part of the scheme which commenced when the petitioner
approached the claimants and informed them that he could work out their claims
for payment of the values of their lots and improvements affected by the widening
of the highway. The evidence clearly establish a violation of Section 3 ( e ) of
R.A. 3019
Lourizza Genabe
2008-0154
271 | P a g e
Robbery
Law.
He
appealed
the
decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Pascual is guilty of the violation of the Anti-Highway
Robbery Law?
Decision:
The court ruled that Pasual is liable for the crime of robbery with homicide
and not of the violation of P.D. 532. For a person to be convicted for highway
robbery, it is required that there must be an organization of a group of persons for
the purpose of committing indiscriminate robbery. In the present case, no proof
was shown that a group was organized by Pascual and Bonglay to commit the
robbery. P.D. 532 punishes the commission of robbery of persons who travel
from one place to another, disturbing peace. In this case, there was a single act
of robbery and homicide committed by the accused.
Lourizza Genabe
2008-0154
272 | P a g e
of
Highway
Robbery
with
homicide
and
Reanzares
appealed.
Issue:
Whether
or
not
the
accused
is
liable
for
highway
robbery?
Decision:
The court held that the accused is not liable for highway robbery but of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide. For conviction under P.D. 532
to prosper, proof that several accused organized for the purpose of committing
indiscriminate robbery must be established. There was no proof, in this case,
showing that there was organization by several persons to commit this purpose.
There was only the establishment of a single act of robbery which is not
contemplated under the law.
Lourizza Genabe
2008-0154
273 | P a g e
announced the hold-up. The four armed men proceeded to seize the passengers
of their money and belongings. A passenger, who happened to be a policeman,
was shot by one of the accused and, as a consequence, died.
The Trial Court found the accused guilty of violation of P.D. 532 and of
homicide. It was appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused are guilty of violation of the Anti-Highway
Robbery Law?
Decision:
The Court ruled that accused are guilty of highway robbery/brigandage
under Section 2(e) of P.D. 532. As defined by law, brigandage is the taking of the
property of another using violence against or intimidation of persons or other
unlawful means. It is committed by any person against another on any Philippine
Highway. It must also be directed against any prospective victims and not only
against specific victims. In this case, the elements of highway robbery were
proven and present thus the accused are guilty of violation of P.D. 532.
Christine Perez
2006-0104
274 | P a g e
275 | P a g e
Christine Perez
2006-0104
276 | P a g e
Christine Perez
2006-0104
278 | P a g e
279 | P a g e
Under the facts and circumstances obtaining in this case, we find that
appellants explanation of how she came into possession of the package without
knowing that it contained shabu is credible and sufficient to rebut the prima
facie presumption of animus possidendi.
Heide Olarte-Congson
2007-0316
280 | P a g e
Mission Orders do not constitute the license required by law for these were not
issued by the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit, who is the one authorized by
law to issue the required license. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that
Saycos reliance in good faith on the said documents is not a valid defense in the
crime of illegal possession of firearms.
RTC affirmed the conviction but lowered the penalty imposed. CA likewise
denied Saycos petition for review as well as its Motion for Reconsideration,
hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order constitute
sufficient authority to possess and carry firearms and ammunitions required by
PD 1866 as amended by RA 8294.
Decision:
No, they are not, for it is a settled jurisprudence that a memorandum
receipt and mission order cannot take the place of a duly issued firearms license
and an accused who relies on said documents cannot invoke good faith as a
defense against a prosecution for illegal possession of firearms as this is a
malum prohibitum.
The corpus delicti in the crime of illegal possession of firearms is the
accused's lack of license or permit to possess or carry the firearm, as possession
itself is not prohibited by law. To establish the corpus delicti, the prosecution has
281 | P a g e
the burden of proving that the firearm exists and that the accused who owned or
possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess or
carry the same.
Sayco, a mere confidential civilian agent (as defined under Section 6(a) of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866) is not authorized to
receive
the
subject
government-owned
firearm
and
ammunitions.
The
Heide Olarte-Congson
2007-0316
The accused
committed the crime by lobbing a hand grenade over the roof of the house of the
Agbanlogs that eventually exploded, killing Robert Agbanlog and injuring 6
282 | P a g e
others. After trial, the court a quo convicted Comadre et al. of the complex crime
of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder sentencing them to suffer the penalty
of death, hence this automatic review.
When the killing is perpetrated with treachery and by means of explosives,
the latter shall be considered as a qualifying circumstance. Not only does
jurisprudence support this view but also, since the use of explosives is the
principal mode of attack, reason dictates that this attendant circumstance should
qualify the offense instead of treachery, which will then be relegated merely as a
generic aggravating circumstance.
Incidentally, with the enactment on June 6, 1997 of Republic Act No.
8294 which also considers the use of explosives as an aggravating
circumstance, there is a need to make the necessary clarification insofar as the
legal implications of the said amendatory law vis--vis the qualifying
circumstance of by means of explosion under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code are concerned. Corollary thereto is the issue of which law should be
applied in the instant case. R.A. 8294 was enacted, to lower their penalties (as
conspicuously reflected in the reduction of the corresponding penalties for illegal
possession of firearms, or ammunitions and other related crimes under the
amendatory law including the penalties for unlawful possession of explosives) in
order to rationalize them into more acceptable and realistic levels, and this is
therefore favorable to the accused. Specifically, when the illegally possessed
explosives are used to commit any of the crimes under the Revised Penal Code,
which result in the death of a person, the penalty is no longer death, unlike in
P.D. No. 1866, but it shall be considered only as an aggravating circumstance.
Congress likewise clearly intended RA No. 8294 to consider as aggravating
circumstance, instead of a separate offense, illegal possession of firearms and
explosives when such possession is used to commit other crimes under the
Revised Penal Code. It must be made clear, however, that RA No. 8294 did not
amend the definition of murder under Article 248, but merely made the use of
explosives an aggravating circumstance when resorted to in committing any of
the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code. The legislative purpose is to do
away with the use of explosives as a separate crime and to make such use
merely an aggravating circumstance in the commission of any crime already
defined in the Revised Penal Code. Thus, RA No. 8294 merely added the use of
unlicensed explosives as one of the aggravating circumstances specified in
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Like the aggravating circumstance of
explosion in paragraph 12, evident premeditation in paragraph 13, or
283 | P a g e
emphasizes is the acts lack of authority. What is per se aggravating is the use of
unlawfully manufactured or possessed explosives. The mere use of
explosives is not.
284 | P a g e
Heide Olarte-Congson
2007-0316
285 | P a g e
the Informations for murder and frustrated murder, which is necessary under our
present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Moreover, even if alleged, the
286 | P a g e
Jasmine Calaycay
2005-0049
Decision:
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime
of robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or
accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in
any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused
knew or should have shown that the said article, item, object or anything of value
has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and, (4)
there is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.
In the absence of direct evidence that the accused had knowledge that the
jewelry was stolen, the prosecution is burdened to prove facts and circumstances
from which it can be concluded that the accused should have known that the
property sold to him were stolen. This requirement serves two basic purposes:
(a) to prove one of the elements of the crime of fencing; and, (b) to enable the
trial court to determine the imposable penalty for the crime, since the penalty
depends on the value of the property.
Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a prima facie
presumption of fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of any good,
article, item, object or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or
theft, and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property. The
stolen property subject of the charge is not indispensable to prove fencing. It is
merely corroborative of the testimonies and other evidence adduced by the
prosecution to prove the crime of fencing.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in affirming the Decision of the trial
court is reversed and set aside. The petitioner is acquitted of the crime of
violating P.D. No. 1612 for the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
289 | P a g e
290 | P a g e
of issue he does not have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such checks in full upon its presentation is a state of the mind.
However, Section 2 of B.P. 22 provides that if the prosecution proves that the
making, drawing and issuing of a check, payment of which is refused by the
drawee bank because of insufficiency of funds or credit with the said bank within
90 days from the date of the check, such shall be prima facie evidence of the
second element of the crime. The drawee or maker of the check may overcome
the prima facie evidence, either by paying the amount of the check, or by making
arrangements for its payment in full within five banking days after receipt of
notice that such check was not paid by the drawee bank.
The ruling of the Court in Lao v. Court of Appeals is applicable in this case.
In acquitting the petitioner therein, the Court explained that this statute actually
offers the violator a compromise by allowing him to perform some act, which
operates to preempt the criminal action, and if he opts to perform it the action is
abated. In this light, the full payment of the amount appearing in the check
within five banking days from notice of dishonor is a complete defense. The
absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity
to preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly
enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually served on the petitioner.
The
petitioner has a right to demand and the basic postulates of fairness require that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford her
the opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P. 22.
Moreover, the notice of dishonor must be in writing; a verbal notice is not
enough. This is because while Section 2 of B.P. 22 does not state that the notice
of dishonor be in writing, taken in conjunction, however, with Section 3 of the law,
i.e., that where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee bank,
such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal, a
mere oral notice or demand to pay would appear to be insufficient for conviction
under the law. The Court is convinced that both the spirit and letter of the
Bouncing Checks Law would require for the act to be punished thereunder not
only that the accused issued a check that is dishonored, but that likewise the
accused has actually been notified in writing of the fact of dishonor.
The
consistent rule is that penal statutes have to be construed strictly against the
State and liberally in favor of the accused.
Thus, if the drawer or maker is an officer of a corporation, the notice of
dishonor to the said corporation is not notice to the employee or officer who drew
or issued the check for and in its behalf. The Court explained in Lao v. Court of
291 | P a g e
Appeals, that there was no obligation to forward the notice addressed to it to the
employee concerned, especially because the corporation itself incurs no criminal
liability under BP 22 for the issuance of a bouncing check. Responsibility under
B.P. 22 is personal to the accused; hence, personal knowledge of the notice of
dishonor is necessary. Consequently, constructive notice to the corporation is
not enough to satisfy due process. Moreover, it is the petitioner, as an officer of
the corporation, who is the latters agent for purposes of receiving notices and
other documents, and not the other way around. It is but axiomatic that notice to
the corporation, which has a personality distinct and separate from the petitioner,
does not constitute notice to the latter.
In this case, the prosecution failed to present any employee of the PT&T
to prove that the telegrams from the offended party were in fact transmitted to
INSURECO and that the latter received the same. Furthermore, there is no
evidence on record that the petitioner ever received the said telegrams from
INSURECO, or that separate copies thereof were transmitted to and received by
the petitioner. In fine, the respondent failed to prove the second element of the
crime. Hence, the petitioner should be acquitted of the crimes charged.
292 | P a g e
48
monthly
installments.
defects.
Decision:
Under the provisions of the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. No. 22), an
offense is committed when the following elements are present:
(1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for
value
293 | P a g e
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
(4) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency
of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
In this case, the Court found that although the first element of the offense
exists, the other elements have not been established beyond reasonable doubt.
To begin with, the second element involves knowledge on the part of the
issuer at the time of the check's issuance that he did not have enough funds or
credit in the bank for payment thereof upon its presentment. B.P. No. 22 creates
a presumption juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists when the
first and third elements of the offense are present. But such evidence may be
rebutted. If not rebutted or contradicted, it will suffice to sustain a judgment in
favor of the issue, which it supports. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, such
knowledge of the insufficiency of petitioner's funds "is legally presumed from the
dishonor of his checks for insufficiency of funds." But such presumption cannot
hold if there is evidence to the contrary. In this case, we find that the other party
has presented evidence to contradict said presumption. Hence, the prosecution
is duty bound to prove every element of the offense charged, and not merely rely
on a rebuttable presumption.
Admittedly, what are involved here are postdated checks. Postdating simply
means that on the date indicated on its face, the check would be properly funded,
not that the checks should be deemed as issued only then. The checks in this
case were issued at the time of the signing of the Contract to Sell in August 1989.
But we find from the records no showing that the time said checks were issued,
petitioner had knowledge that his deposit or credit in the bank would be
insufficient to cover them when presented for encashment. On the contrary, there
is testimony by petitioner that at the time of presentation of the checks, he had
P150,000.00 cash or credit with Citibank.
To rely on the presumption created by B.P. No. 22 as the prosecution did in
this case, would be to misconstrue the import of requirements for conviction
under the law. It must be stressed that every element of the offense must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt, never presumed. Furthermore, penal statutes
are strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.
Under the Bouncing Checks Law, the punishable act must come clearly within
both the spirit and letter of the statute.
294 | P a g e
issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank x x
x which check is subsequently dishonored x x x shall be punished by
imprisonment.
B.P. 22 does not appear to concern itself with what might actually be
envisioned by the parties, its primordial intention being to instead ensure the
stability and commercial value of checks as being virtual substitutes for currency.
It is a policy that can be easily eroded if one has yet to determine the reason for
which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, before
an appropriate application of the legislative enactment can be made
It is not required much less indispensable, for the prosecution to present
the drawee banks representative as a witness to testify on the dishonor of the
checks because of insufficiency of funds. The prosecution may present, as it did
in this case, only complainant as a witness to prove all the elements of the
offense charged. She is competent and qualified witness to testify that she
deposited the checks to her account in a bank; that she subsequently received
from the bank the checks returned unpaid with a notation drawn against
insufficient funds stamped or written on the dorsal side of the checks
themselves, or in a notice attached to the dishonored checks duly given to the
complainant, and that petitioner failed to pay complainant the value of the checks
or make arrangements for their payment in full within five (5) banking days after
receiving notice that such checks had not been paid by the drawee bank.
296 | P a g e
Winny Mahor
2008-0306
Winny Mahor
2008-0306
Facts:
Appellant Domingo Temporal, Pedro, Valdez, and Rivera went to the
house of Spouses Valentin and Clara Gabertan, armed with a piece of bamboo,
2x2 piece of wood, ipil-ipil posts and bolo, They assaulted and clubbed Valentin
with their weapons, weakening and injuring him. Eventually they stole from the
Gabertan spouses cash in the amount of P5,350.00, 1 ladies gold Seiko watch, 9
turkeys, and 2 chickens. Thereafter, while Rivera guarded Valentin, the four
accused took turns in raping Carla outside the house where she was forcibly laid
on the cogon grass. RTC found appellant guilty of robbery with multiple rape.
Issue:
Whether accused is guilty of robbery with multiple accounts of rape or just
robbery with rape under Article 294(b)?
Decision:
The RTC erred in ruling that the accused is guilty of robbery with multiple
rapes. He should have been convicted of the crime under Art. 294(b) that is
robbery with rape.
In the special complex crime of robbery with rape, the true intent of the
accused must first be determined, because their intent determines the offense
they committed. To sustain a conviction for robbery with rape, it is imperative that
the robbery itself must be conclusively established. To support a conviction
therefor, proof of the rape alone is not sufficient. Robbery with rape occurs when
the following elements are present: (1) personal property is taken with violence or
intimidation against persons, (2) the property taken belongs to another, (3) the
taking is done with animo lucrandi, and (4) the robbery is accompanied by rape.
In the case at bar, all the foregoing elements are present. The
contemporaneous acts of appellant and his co-accused stress the fact that they
were initially motivated by animus lucrandi. They first demanded guns, moneys
and animals from Valentin Gabertan. Apparently, it was only when they entered
the house and saw his wife when they thought of raping her. The prosecution
likewise established that appellant and his co-accused took chickens, a watch
and money from complainants through violence.
298 | P a g e
Winny Mahor
2008-0306
Luis Celestino
2006-0354
300 | P a g e
Luis Celestino
2006-0354
Luis Celestino
2006-0354
301 | P a g e
302 | P a g e