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S W A N N, Judge:
1
Randy D. Lang, a nonmember of the State Bar of Arizona,
was enjoined from practicing law in Arizona based on evidence that he
repeatedly engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. We hold that a
person who presents himself as an attorney based in an Arizona office
engages in the unauthorized practice of law unless he has been admitted
to practice before the Arizona Supreme Court, even if he has been
admitted to practice in a tribal court within the boundaries of Arizona.
The supreme court rules that compel this conclusion violate neither the
First Amendment nor principles of tribal sovereignty. We further
conclude that the superior court properly granted the State Bar of
Arizonas motion for summary judgment, and that the injunction is
reasonable in its scope. We therefore affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
2
Lang holds a law degree and is admitted to practice law in
the San Carlos Apache Tribal Court. He has never been admitted to the
practice of law by the Arizona Supreme Court, and he is not a certified
legal document preparer under section 7-208 of the Arizona Code of
Judicial Administration.
3
From 2007 to 2009, the Bar, which is tasked under Ariz. R.
Sup. Ct. 32(a) with regulating and disciplining persons engaged in the
practice of law in Arizona, received a series of reports that Lang had
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Upon receiving each report,
the Bar notified Lang and demanded that he cease any activity defined as
the practice of law in Arizona. When Lang did not comply with these
demands, the Bar commenced an action against him in the superior court.
In its amended complaint, the Bar alleged five counts of unauthorized
practice of law and argued that an injunction was necessary to prevent
Lang from continuing his unlawful conduct. Lang answered and asserted
a counterclaim that was later dismissed for failure to prosecute.
COUNT 1
5
In September 2006, Lang entered an Attorney-Client
Agreement with T.M., a former professional boxer. The agreement was
printed on letterhead that showed Langs name, the name Integrated
Legal Services & Associates, an Arizona address not located on the San
Carlos Apache reservation, and Arizona fax and phone numbers,
including an Office number. The agreement provided that Attorney
Lang agrees to provide attorney services to Boxer [T.M.] as his personal
attorney and counselary on a worldwide basis on all matters concerning
Boxer [T.M.] and that Boxer [T.M.] acknowledges and understands that
Attorney Lang is engaged in international business and law and is a
licensed practicing attorney in various international for[u]ms, that
Attorney Lang is not licensed with any state Bar of the United States, and
that Attorney Lang practices in limited federal jurisdictions and may
appear in any state court proceedings with permission from the court.
Lang signed the contract as Attorney.
6
According to Lang, he then acted as scrivener for contracts
that T.M. entered with an athletic trainer and a Nevada-based
promotional company. In an e-mail to the promotional company, Lang
identified himself as T.M.s personal attorney, stated that he had
reviewed the Agreement with Mr. [T.M.] line by line, and requested
changes to the contract. Lang signed both the promotional contract and
the training contract as T.M.s attorney, the promotional contract
identified Langs Arizona address, and the training contract repeatedly
referred to Lang as Attorney Lang and provided that Lang would
represent T.M. in any disputes.
7
Lang also e-mailed and mailed a Nevada assistant attorney
general on T.M.s behalf. In the e-mail, Lang identified himself as T.M.s
COUNT 4
8
In March 2008, Lang met with S.J. in Arizona and agreed to
represent S.J., a Washington resident, in a federal employment law matter.
In connection with that representation, Lang drafted a notice of appeal in
which he identified himself as S.J.s Attorney, Personal Attorney, and
counsel, and indicated that he worked for I.L.S. & Associates in
Arizona. I.L.S. & Associates charged S.J. an initial consultation fee and a
flat-fee retainer for Legal Service.
9
Lang also wrote a settlement letter on S.J.s behalf in
connection with a dispute arising from a Washington real estate
transaction. The letter was addressed to a Washington attorney and was
printed on I.L.S. & Associates letterhead that identified Lang as
Attorney and gave Arizona contact information, including an Ofc.
phone number.
III.
COUNT 5
10
In July 2008, Lang entered an Attorney-Client Fee
Agreement with J.C., a California resident, by which DPL, Inc. agreed
to provide legal services. The agreement was prepared by Langs
assistant, who had also helped him to form an Arizona corporation named
Debt Protection, Inc. The agreement was printed on Debt Protection
Legal, Inc. letterhead that showed an Arizona address not on the
reservation, toll-free office phone and fax numbers, and an Arizona
mobile number for the Managing Attorney, who was identified in the
signature block as Lang.
11
In representing J.C., Lang wrote a letter to a California loan
consultant for the purpose of disputing debt attributed to J.C. The letter
was printed on Debt Protection Law, P.C. letterhead that showed a
California address, toll-free office phone and fax numbers, and an Arizona
4
15
The Arizona Constitution gives our supreme court exclusive
authority to regulate the practice of law in Arizona. In re Creasy, 198 Ariz.
539, 541, 6, 12 P.3d 214, 216 (2000). The supreme court has disciplinary
jurisdiction over individuals who are not members of the Arizona Bar but
are licensed to practice law in a different state or possession of the United
States and have engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in Arizona.
Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 31(a), 46(b), 46(f)(18), 75(a); Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 42, E.R.
5.5(g), 8.5(a). The Bar is authorized to investigate, prosecute, and obtain
enforceable judgments in the superior court against such individuals.
Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 75-80.
16
Lang contends that the superior court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction because he performed the acts at issue on behalf of clients
outside of Arizona or directed to third parties outside of Arizona. He also
contends that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking because his
representation of J.C. occurred during a period when Lang was living and
working in California on a temporary basis while periodically returning to
his family in Arizona. In short, Lang contends that he did not engage in
the practice of law in Arizona. We disagree. When a resident of
Arizona performs legal services while holding himself out to be an
Arizona attorney working from an Arizona office, he engages in the
practice of law in Arizona. See infra 20. That residents of other states
were affected by Langs representations and that other states also may
have jurisdiction over his conduct does not deprive Arizona of
jurisdiction. Cf. Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 42, E.R. 8.5(a) (A lawyer admitted to
practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this
jurisdiction, regardless of where the lawyers conduct occurs. A lawyer
not admitted in this jurisdiction is also subject to the disciplinary authority
of this jurisdiction if the lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal
services in this jurisdiction. A lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary
authority of both this jurisdiction and another jurisdiction for the same
conduct.).
II.
17
Lang next contends that summary judgment for the Bar was
inappropriate because genuine issues of material fact existed and because
federal law allows nonlawyers to engage in at least some of the activities
24
Lang finally contends that the injunction entered against him
is unconstitutionally overbroad. The injunction provides:
(A)
(B)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(D)
(E)
10
:MJT
12