G.R. No. 132524. December 29, 1998.

FEDERICO
C.
SUNTAY,
petitioner, vs. ISABEL
COJUANGCO-SUNTAY and
HON.
GREGORIO
S.
SAMPAGA, Presiding Judge, Branch 78, Regional Trial
Court, Malolos, Bulacan, respondents.
*

**

Appeals; Certiorari; Actions;When certiorari as a special civil

action can be availed of.Certiorari as a special civil action can be
availed of only if there is concurrence of the essential requisites, to
wit: (a) the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions
has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, and (b)
there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or
modifying the proceeding. There must be a capricious, arbitrary
and whimsical exercise of power for it to prosper.
Actions; Motions; The motion to dismiss may be filed within
the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint.Special
proceedings being one of the actions under the coverage of the
Rules on Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss filed thereunder
would fall under Section 1, Rule 16 thereof. Said rule provides that
the motion to dismiss may be filed within the time for but
before filing the answer to the complaint. Clearly, the motion
should have been filed on or before the filing of petitioners
opposition which is the counterpart of an answer in ordinary civil
actions.
Marriages; A void marriage is deemed never to have taken
place at all.The fundamental distinction between void and
voidable marriages is that a void marriage is deemed never to have
taken place at all. The effects of void marriages, with respect to
property relations of the spouses are provided for under Article 144
of the Civil Code. Children born of such marriages who are called
natural children by legal fiction have the same status, rights and
obligations as acknowledged natural children under Article 89
irrespective of whether or not the parties to the void marriage are
in good faith or in bad faith.

____________
*

**

SECOND DIVISION.
Should read Isabel Aguinaldo Cojuangco Suntay.

761

VOL. 300,
7
DECEMBER 29, 1998
61
Suntay vs. CojuangcoSuntay
Same; A voidable marriage is considered valid and produces
all its civil effects.A voidable marriage, is considered valid and
produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final judgment
of a competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the
annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had
never been entered into but the law makes express provisions to
prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out.
The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by
the second paragraph of Article 89. x x x Stated otherwise, the
annulment of the marriage by the court abolishes the legal
character of the society formed by the putative spouses, but it
cannot destroy the juridical consequences which the marital union
produced during its continuance.
Same; Words and Phrases;The terms annul and null and
void have different legal connotations and implications.Indeed,
the terms annul andnull and void have different legal
connotations and implications. Annul means to reduce to nothing;
annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to
abolish; to do away with whereas null and void is something that
does not exist from the beginning. A marriage that
is annulled presupposes that it subsists but later ceases to have
legal effect when it is terminated through a court action. But in
nullifying a marriage, the court simply declares a status or
condition which already exists from the very beginning.
Judgments; It is an elementary principle of procedure that the
resolution of the court in a given issue as embodied in the
1

dispositive part of a decision or order is the controlling factor as to

settlement of rights of the parties; Excepts.Parenthetically, it is
an elementary principle of procedure that the resolution of the
court in a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of a
decision or order is the controlling factor as to settlement of rights
of the parties and the questions presented, notwithstanding
statement in the body of the decision or order which may be
somewhat confusing, the same is not without a qualification. The
foregoing rule holds true only when the dispositive part of a final
decision or order is definite, clear and unequivocal and can be
wholly given effect without need of interpretation or construction
which usually is the case where the order or decision in question
is that of a court not of record which is not constitutionally
required to state the facts and the law on which the judgment is
based.
762

appointment as administratrix of her grandmothers estate

by virtue of her right of representation.
The suit stemmed from the following:
On July 9, 1958, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (son of
petitioner Federico Suntay) and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay
were married in the Portuguese Colony of Macao. Out of this
marriage, three children were born namely: Margarita
Guadalupe, Isabel Aguinaldo and Emilio Aguinaldo all
surnamed Cojuangco Suntay. After 4 years, the marriage
soured so that in 1962, Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay filed a
criminal case against her husband Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay.
In retaliation, Emilio Aguinaldo filed before the then Court of
First Instance (CFI) a complaint for legal separation against
his wife, charging her, among others, with infidelity and
praying for the custody and care of their children who were
living with their mother. The suit was docketed as Civil Case
Number Q-7180.
On October 3, 1967, the trial court rendered a decision the
dispositive portion of which reads:
1

762

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Suntay vs. Cojuangco-Suntay

___________

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Aquino and Ursua for petitioner.
Estelito P. Mendoza andOrlando A. Santiago for
private respondent.
MARTINEZ, J.:
Which should prevail
thefallo of a decision is
for certiorari under Rule
Suntay who opposes

between the ratio decidendi and

the primary issue in this petition
65 filed by petitioner Federico C.
respondent Isabels petition for

Allegedly for parricide.

Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, Branch 9, Quezon City.

Decision dated October 3, 1967 of the CFI of Rizal penned by Judge

Lourdes P. San Diego, p. 3; Annex A of Petition; Rollo, pp. 37-41.

763

VOL. 300, DECEMBER 763

29, 1998
Suntay vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
WHEREFORE,
the marriage
celebrated
between
Emilio
Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay on July 9, 1958 is
hereby declared null and void and of no effect as between the
parties. It being admitted by the parties and shown by the record
that the question of the case and custody of the three children have
2

been the subject of another case between the same parties in

another branch of this Court in Special Proceeding No. 6428, the
same cannot be litigated in this case.
With regard to counterclaim, in view of the manifestation of
counsel that the third party defendants are willing to pay
P50,000.00 for damages and that defendant is willing to accept the
offer instead of her original demand for P130,000.00, the defendant
is awarded said sum of P50,000.00 as her counterclaim and to pay
attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
4

As basis thereof, the CFI said:

From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was confined
in the Veterans Memorial Hospital. Although at the time of the
trial of parricide case (September 8, 1967) the patient was already
out of the hospital he continued to be under observation and
treatment.
It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the
plaintiffs mental aberration classified as schizophernia (sic) had
made themselves manifest even as early as 1955; that the disease
worsened with time, until 1965 when he was actually placed under
expert neuro-psychiatrist (sic) treatment; that even if the subject
has shown marked progress, the remains bereft of adequate
understanding of right and wrong.
There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties
was effected on July 9, 1958, years after plaintiffs mental illness
had set in. This fact would justify a declaration of nullity of the
marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 95. (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of the
following causes after (sic) existing at the time of the marriage:
x x x
xxx
xxx
___________
4

Ibid., pp. 3-5; Rollo, pp. 39-41.

764

764

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Suntay vs. Cojuangco-Suntay

(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after
coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife.

There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant

knew about the mental condition of plaintiff; and there is proof
that plaintiff continues to be without sound reason. The charges in
this very complaint add emphasis to the findings of the neuropsychiatrist handling the patient, that plaintiff really lives more in
fancy than in reality, a strong indication of schizophernia
(sic). (Emphasis supplied)
5

On June 1, 1979, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay predeceased his

mother, the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay. The latter
is respondent Isabels paternal grandmother. The decedent
died on June 4, 1990 without leaving a will.
Five years later or on October 26, 1995, respondent Isabel
Aguinaldo Cojuangco Suntay filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) a petition for issuance in her favor of Letters of
Administration of the Intestate Estate of her late
grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay which case was
docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. In her
petition, she alleged among others, that she is one of the
legitimate grandchildren of the decedent and prayed that she
be appointed as administratrix of the estate.
On December 15, 1995, petitioner filed an Opposition
claiming that he is the surviving spouse of the decedent, that
he has been managing the conjugal properties even while the
decedent has been alive and is better situated to protect the
integrity of the estate than the petitioner, that petitioner and
her family have been alienated from the decedent and the
Oppositor for more than thirty (30) years and thus, prayed
that Letters of Administration be issued instead to him.
6

settlement of estate of a deceased person; (b) the motion to

dismiss was timely filed; (c) the dispositive portion of the
decision declaring the marriage of respondent Isabels
parents null and void must be upheld; and (d) said decision
had long become final and had, in fact, been executed.
On the other hand, respondent Isabel asserts that
petitioners motion to dismiss was late having been filed after
the opposition was already filed in court, the counterpart of
an answer in an ordinary civil action and that petitioner in
his

___________
5

Ibid.

Annex I of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 111-119.

Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 78.

Annex I, Petition.

Annex J, Petition; Rollo, pp. 116-118.

765

VOL. 300, DECEMBER 765

29, 1998
Suntay vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
On September 22, 1997 or almost two years after filing an
opposition, petitioner moved to dismiss the special
proceeding case alleging in the main that respondent Isabel
should not be appointed as administratrix of the decedents
estate. In support thereof, petitioner argues that under
Article 992 of the Civil Code an illegitimate child has no right
to succeed by right of representation the legitimate relatives
of her father or mother. Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay,
respondent Isabels father predeceased his mother, the late
Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay and thus, opened succession by
representation. Petitioner contends that as a consequence of
the declaration by the then CFI of Rizal that the marriage of
respondent Isabels parents is null and void, the latter is an
illegitimate child, and has no right nor interest in the estate
of her paternal grandmotherthe decedent. On October 16,
1997, the trial court issued the assailed order denying
petitioners Motion to Dismiss. When his motion for
reconsideration was denied by the trial court in an order
dated January 9, 1998, petitioner, as mentioned above filed
this petition.
Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondent
court in denying his motion to dismiss as well as his motion
for reconsideration on the grounds that: (a) a motion to
dismiss is appropriate in a special proceeding for the
10

11

12

____________
10

Motion to Dismiss, Annex A of Petition; Rollo, pp. 31-36.

11

Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 78;

Annex D of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 60-61.

12

Order of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 78Annex H of the

Petition; Rollo, p. 110.

766

766

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Suntay vs. Cojuangco-Suntay

opposition likewise failed to specifically deny respondent

Isabels allegation that she is a legitimate child of Emilio
Aguinaldo Suntay, the decedents son. She further contends
that petitioner proceeds from a miscomprehension of the
judgment in Civil Case No. Q-7180 and the erroneous
premise that there is a conflict between the body of the
decision and its dispositive portion because in an action for
annulment of a marriage, the court either sustains the
validity of the marriage or nullifies it. It does not, after
hearing declare a marriage voidable otherwise, the court
will fail to decide and lastly, that the status of marriages
4

under Article 85 of the Civil Code before they are annulled is

voidable.
The petition must fail.
Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of only if
there is concurrence of the essential requisites, to wit: (a) the
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction,
and (b) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the
purpose of annulling or modifying the proceeding. There
must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of
power for it to prosper.
A reading of the assailed order, however, shows that the
respondent court did not abuse its discretion in denying
petitioners motion to dismiss, pertinent portions of which are
quoted hereunder, to wit:
13

14

The arguments of both parties judiciously and objectively

assessed and the pertinent laws applied, the Court finds that a
motion to dismiss at this juncture is inappropriate considering the
peculiar nature of this special proceeding as distinguished from an
ordinary civil action. At the outset, this proceeding was not
adversarial in nature and the petitioner was not called upon to
assert a cause of action against a particular defendant.
Furthermore, the State has a vital interest in the maintenance of
the proceedings, not only be-

cause of the taxes due it, but also because if no heirs qualify, the
State shall acquire the estate by escheat.
x x x
xxx
xxx
The court rules, for the purpose of establishing the personality
of the petitioner to file and maintain this special proceedings, that
in the case at bench, the body of the decision determines the
nature of the action which is for annulment, not declaration of
nullity.
The oppositors contention that the fallo of the questioned
decision (Annex AMotion) prevails over the body thereof is not
without any qualification. It holds true only when the dispositive
portion of a final decision is definite, clear and unequivocal and
can be wholly given effect without need of interpretation or
construction.
Where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the opinion or body of
the decision may be referred to for purposes of construing the
judgment (78 SCRA 541 citingMorelos v. Go Chin Ling; andHeirs
of Juan Presto v. Galang). The reason is that the dispositive
portion must find support from the decisions ratio decidendi.
Per decision of the Court of First Instance Branch IX of
Quezon City, marked as Annex A of oppositors motion, the
marriage of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel CojuangcoSuntay was annulled on the basis of Art. 85, par. 3 of the Civil
Code which refers to marriages which are considered voidable.
Petitioner being conceived and born of a voidable marriage before
the decree of annulment, she is considered legitimate (Art. 89, par.
2, Civil Code of the Phils.).
15

____________
13

Sempio v. Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA 617 (1996).

14

Zarate, Jr. v. Olegario, 263 SCRA 1(1996).

767

VOL. 300, DECEMBER 767

29, 1998
Suntay vs. Cojuangco-Suntay

The trial court correctly ruled that a motion to dismiss at

this juncture is inappropriate. The 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure governs the procedure to be observed in actions,
civil or criminal and special proceedings. The Rules do
not only apply to election cases, land registration, cadastral,
naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases
not therein provided for.
16

Special proceedings being one of the actions under the

coverage of the Rules on Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss
filed thereunder would fall under Section 1, Rule 16 thereof.
Said rule provides that the motion to dismiss may be filed
____________

Petitioner, however, strongly insists that the dispositive

portion of the CFI decision has categorically declared that
the marriage of respondent Isabels parents is null and void
and that the legal effect of such declaration is that the
marriage from its inception is void and the children born out
of said marriage are illegitimate. Such argument cannot be
sustained. Articles 80, 81, 82 and 83 of the New Civil Code
clas18

15

Annex D, Petition; Rollo, pp. 60-61.

16

Rules 1 & 3, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

768

___________

768

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Suntay vs. Cojuangco-Suntay

within the time for but beforefiling the answer to the

complaint. Clearly, the motion should have been filed on or
before the filing of petitioners opposition which is the
counterpart of an answer in ordinary civil actions.
Not only was petitioners motion to dismiss filed out of
time, it was filed almost two years after respondent Isabel
was already through with the presentation of her witnesses
and evidence and petitioner had presented two witnesses.
The filing of the motion to dismiss is not only improper but
also dilatory.
The respondent court, far from deviating or straying off
course from established jurisprudence on this matter, as
petitioner asserts, had in fact faithfully observed the law and
legal precedents in this case. In fact, the alleged conflict
between the body of the decision and the dispositive portion
thereof which created the ambiguity or uncertainty in the
decision of the CFI of Rizal is reconcilable. The legal basis for
setting aside the marriage of respondent Isabels parents is
clear under paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil Code,
the law in force prior to the enactment of the Family Code.
17

17

February 7, 1996.

18

Article 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
1. (1)Those contracted under the ages of sixteen and fourteen years by male and
female respectively, even with the consent of the parents;
2. (2)Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform
marriages;
3. (3)Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of
exceptional character;

769

VOL. 300, DECEMBER 769

29, 1998
Suntay vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
sify what marriages are void while Article 85 enumerates the
causes for which a marriage may be annulled.
19

_____________
1. (4)Bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 83, number 2;
2. (5)Incestuous marriages mentioned in Article 81;
3. (6)Those where one or both contracting parties have been found guilty of
killing of the spouse of either of them;

4. (7)Those between stepbrothers and stepsisters and other marriages specified

in Article 82. (n)

Article 84. No marriage license shall be issued to a widow till after three
hundred days following the death of her husband, unless in the meantime she
has given birth to a child. (n)

Article 81. Marriage between the following are incestuous and void from
their performance, whether the relationship between the parties be
legitimate or illegitimate:
1. (1)Between ascendants and descendants of any degree;
2. (2)Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood;
3. (3)Between collateral relatives by blood within the fourth degree. (28a)

Article 82. The following marriages shall also be void from the beginning:
1. (1)Between stepfathers and stepdaughters, and stepmothers and stepsons;
2. (2)Between the adopting father or mother and the adopted, between the
latter and the surviving spouse of the former, and between the former and
the surviving spouse of the latter;
3. (3)Between the legitimate children of the adopter and the adopted. (28a)

Article 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during

the lifetime of the first spouses of such person with any person other than

19

Article 85 of the New Civil Code reads:

770

770

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Suntay vs. Cojuangco-Suntay

The fundamental distinction between void and voidable

marriages is that a void marriage is deemed never to have
taken place at all. The effects of void marriages, with respect
to property relations of the spouses are provided for under
Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children born of such
marriages who are called natural children by legal fiction
have the same status, rights and obligations as
acknowledged natural children under Article 89 irrespective
of whether or not the parties to the void marriage are in good
faith or in bad faith.
20

_____________

such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at
1. (1)The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

the time of the marriage:

2. (2)The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of
the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the

1. (1)That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage

absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less

annulled was between the ages of sixteen and twenty years, if male,

than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by

or between the ages of fourteen and eighteen years, if female, and

the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or

the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parent,

if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The

guardian or person having authority over the party, unless after

marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared

attaining the ages of twenty or eighteen years, as the case may be,

null and void by a competent court. (29a)

such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together
as husband and wife;

2. (2)In a subsequent marriage under Article 83, Number 2, that the

former husband or wife believed to be dead was in fact living and
the marriage with such former husband or wife was then in force;
3. (3)That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after
coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband or
wife;
4. (4)That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless
such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting
the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as her husband or his
wife, as the case may be;
5. (5)That the consent of either party was obtained by force or
intimidation, unless the violence or threat having disappeared, such
party, afterwards freely cohabited with the other as her husband or
his wife, as the case may be;
6. (6)That either party was, at the time of marriage, physically
incapable of entering into the married state, and such incapacity
continues, and appears to be incurable.
20

thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as

acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural
children by legal fiction. (Emphasis supplied)
21

Stated otherwise, the annulment of the marriage by the

court abolishes the legal character of the society formed by
the putative spouses, but it cannot destroy the juridical
consequences which the marital union produced during its
continuance.
Indeed, the terms annuland null and void have
different legal connotations and implications. Annul means
to reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of
no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away with whereas null
and void is something that does not exist from the beginning.
A marriage that is annulledpresupposes that it subsists but
later ceases to have legal effect when it is terminated
through a court action. But in nullifying a marriage, the
court simply declares a status or condition which already
exists from the very beginning.
22

23

Article 89. Children conceived or born of marriages which are void from

the beginning shall have the same status, rights and

771

VOL. 300, DECEMBER 771

29, 1998
Suntay vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid
and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final
judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment.
Juridically, the annulment of a marriage dissolves the
special contract as if it had never been entered into but the
law makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the
marriage from being totally wiped out. The status of children
born in voidable marriages is governed by the second
paragraph of Article 89 which provides that:
Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of
annulment shall be considered legitimate; and children conceived

____________
obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are called natural
children by legal fiction.
xxx

xxx

xxx

21

See Tolentino, New Civil Code, Vol. 1, pp. 244-245.

22

Sy Loc Lieng, et al. v. Sy Quia, et al., 16 Phil. 137 (1910).

23

Nuguid v. Nuguid, 123 Phil. 1305 (1966).

772

772

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Suntay vs. Cojuangco-Suntay

There is likewise no merit in petitioners argument that it is

the dispositive portion of the decision which must control as
to whether or not the marriage of respondent Isabels parents
8

was void or voidable. Such argument springs from a

miscomprehension of the judgment in Civil Case No. Q7180 and the erroneous premise that there is a conflict
between the body of the decision and its dispositive portion.
Parenthetically, it is an elementary principle of procedure
that the resolution of the court in a given issue as embodied
in the dispositive part of a decision or order is the controlling
factor as to settlement of rights of the parties and the
questions presented, notwithstanding statement in the body
of the decision or order which may be somewhat
confusing, the same is not without a qualification. The
foregoing rule holds true only when the dispositive part of a
final decision or order is definite, clear and unequivocal and
can be wholly given effect without need of interpretation or
constructionwhich usually is the case where the order or
decision in question is that of a court not of record which is
not constitutionally required to state the facts and the law on
which the judgment is based.
Assuming that a doubt or uncertainty exists between the
dispositive portion and the body of the decision, effort must
be made to harmonize the whole body of the decision in order
to give effect to the intention, purpose and judgment of the
court. InRepublic v. de los Angeles the Court said:
24

25

26

Additionally, Article 10 of the Civil Code states that [i]n case of

doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed
that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail. This mandate of law, obviously cannot be any less binding
upon the courts in relation to its judgments.
____________
24

Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Calauag, 11 SCRA 333 (1964).

25

Board of Liquidators v. Ricma Trading Corporation, 29 SCRA

397(1969).
26

41 SCRA 422 (1971).

773

VOL. 300, DECEMBER 773

29, 1998
Suntay vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
x x x The judgment must be read in its entirety, and must be
construed as a whole so as to bring all of its parts into harmony as
far as this can be done by fair and reasonable interpretation and so
as to give effect to every word and part if possible, and to
effectuate the intention and purpose of the Court, consistent with
the provisions of the organic law. (49 C.J.S., pp. 863-864)
[Emphasis supplied]

Thus, a reading of the pertinent portions of the decision of

the CFI of Rizal quoted earlier shows that the marriage is
voidable:
It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs
mental aberration classified as schizophernia (sic) had made
themselves manifest even as early as 1955; that the disease
worsened with time, until 1965 when he was actually placed under
expert neuro-psychiatrict (sic) treatment; that even if the subject
has shown marked progress, he remains bereft of adequate
understanding of right and wrong.
There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties
was effected on July 9, 1958, years after plaintiffs mental illness
had set in. This fact would justify a declaration of nullity of the
marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 95 (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of the
following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party,
after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband
and wife;
xxx
xxx
xxx
There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage
defendant knew about the mental condition of plaintiff; and there
is proof that plaintiff continues to be without sound reason. The
9

charges in this very complaint add emphasis to the findings of the

neuro-psychiatrist handling the patient, that plaintiff really lives
more in fancy than in reality, a strong indication of schizophernia
(sic).
27

Inevitably, the decision of the CFI of Rizal declared null

and void the marriage of respondent Isabels parents based
on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil Code. The legal
consequences as to the rights of the children are therefore
governed by the first clause of the second paragraph of
Article 89. A contrary interpretation would be anathema to
the rule just abovementioned. Based on said provision the
children of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel CojuangcoSuntay who were conceived and born prior to the decree of
the trial court setting aside their marriage on October 3,
1967 are considered legitimate. For purposes of seeking
appointment as estate administratrix, the legitimate
grandchildren, including respondent Isabel, may invoke their
successional right of representation in the estate of their
grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay after their father,
Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, had predeceased their
grandmother. This is, however, without prejudice to a
determination by the courts of whether the Letters of
Administration may be granted to her. Neither does the
Court adjudge herein the successional rights of the
personalities involved over the decedents estate.
It would not therefore be amiss to reiterate at this point
what the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Ruiz Castro,
emphasized to all magistrates of all levels of the judicial
hierarchy that extreme degree of care should be exercised in
the formulation of the dispositive portion of a decision,
because it is this portion that is to be executed once the
decision becomes final. The adjudication of the rights and
obligations of the parties, and the dispositions made as well
as the directions and instructions given by the court in the

premises in conformity with the body of the decision, must all

be spelled out clearly, distinctly and unequivocally leaving
absolutely no room for dispute, debate or interpretation.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion, the
instant petition is DISMISSED.
28

____________
28

Padua v. Robles, 66 SCRA 485(1975).

775

VOL. 300, DECEMBER 775

29, 1998
Suntay vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman),Puno and Mendoza, JJ.,concur.
Petition dismissed.
Notes.Per current jurisprudence, a marriage though
void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any
party thereto can marry again; otherwise, the second
marriage will also be void. (Apiag vs. Cantero,268 SCRA
47 [1997])
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity. (Republic vs. Court of
Appeals, 268 SCRA 198[1997])
o0o

10

G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000.

ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of
the minors BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE
NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA
BAYADOG, respondent.
*

Civil Law; Family Code;Marriages; A valid marriage license is

a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the
absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to
Article 80 (3) in relation to Article 58.A valid marriage license is
a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the
absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to
Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58. The requirement and
issuance of marriage license is the States demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested. This
interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State
recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to
the family as a basic autonomous social institution. Specifically,
the Constitution considers marriage as an inviolable social
institution, and is the foundation of family life which shall be
protected by the State. This is why the Family Code considers
marriage as a special contract of permanent union and case law
considers it not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment.
Same; Same; Same; There are several instances recognized by
the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with.
There are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a
mar________________
*

FIRST DIVISION.

123

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14, 2000
Nial vs. Bayadog

1
23

riage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided

in Article 76, referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who
have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband
and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five
years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is required
in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame
and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation
of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every
applicants name for a marriage license. The publicity attending
the marriage license may discourage such persons from
legitimizing their status. To preserve peace in the family, avoid the
peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the
source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the
law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them
from that requirement.
Same; Same; Same; The five-year common-law cohabitation
period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of
marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage.Working on the assumption that Pepito
and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years
without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be
computed on the basis of a cohabitation as husband and wife
where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to
validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not
been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be
the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should
be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivitymeaning
no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and
continuitythat is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the
parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five
years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing
11

them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their
spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as
such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife is based on the approximation of the
requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any
excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use
the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nul124

1
24

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Nial vs. Bayadog

lify their marriage. There should be no exemption from

securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall
within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license
is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about
to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has
knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it
known to the local civil registrar.
Same; Same; Same; Any marriage subsequently contracted
during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void.
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present,
absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by the
same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage
subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse
shall be illegal and void, subject only to the exception in cases of
absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled.
The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the
contracting of two or more marriages and the having of
extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and
concubinage and adultery. The law sanctions monogamy.
Same; Same; Same; The subsistence of the marriage even
where there was actual severance of the filial companionship
between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse

with any third party as being one as husband and wife.Even

assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and
thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each
other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that
their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union
that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the
absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage
at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is
immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had
already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The
subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance
of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as
husband and wife.
Same; Same; Same; Void marriages can be questioned even
after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be
assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death
of either, in
125

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Nial vs. Bayadog

1
25

which case the parties and their offspring will be left: as if the
marriage had been perfectly valid.The Code is silent as to who
can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and
void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is
valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage
that is voidab initio is considered as having never to have taken
place and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally
ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the
other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed
collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can
be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be
questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
12

marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties

and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their
offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.
That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible,
unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the
parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper
interested party may attack a void marriage.
Same; Same; Same; No judicial decree is necessary in order to
establish the nullity of a marriage.Jurisprudence under the Civil
Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to
establish the nullity of a marriage. A void marriage does not
require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original
rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of
avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good
order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is
expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained
and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Other than for purposes of remarriage,no
judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity.Other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action
is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter,
the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to
the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any
issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final
judgment of decla126

1
26

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Nial vs. Bayadog

ration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than

to remarry. The clause on the basis of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code
connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for
purpose of remarriage.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court

of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Roldan R. Mangubat for petitioners.
Daryll A. Amante for private respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on
September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein
petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her
death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or
on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma
Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu
thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated
December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and were thus
exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19,
1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their fathers death,
petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage
was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed
under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the
second marriage would affect petitioners successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among
13

the persons who could file an action for annulment of

marriage under Article 47 of the Family Code.

7, of the 1997 Rules. However, upon motion of petitioners,

this Court
3

127

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2000
Nial vs. Bayadog

127

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of

Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after
finding that the Family Code is rather silent, obscure,
insufficient to resolve the following issues:
1. (1)Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against
defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of
marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with
her specially so when at the time of the filing of this
instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is already dead;
2. (2)Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs
deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio;
3. (3)Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the
validity of the second marriage after it was dissolved due
to their fathers death.
1

Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed
the action to declare null and void their fathers marriage to
respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47
of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the
persons who could initiate an action for annulment of
marriage. Hence, this petition for review with this Court
grounded on a pure question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance
with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
and because the verification failed to state the basis of
petitioners averment that the allegations in the petition are
true and correct. It was thus treated as an unsigned
pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule
2

________________
The dispositive portion of the Order dated March 27, 1998 issued by

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of Regional Trial Court (RTC)-Branch 59, Toledo

City, reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants motion to
dismiss is hereby granted and this instant case is hereby ordered dismissed
without costs. (p. 6; Rollo, p. 21).
2

Order, p. 4; Rollo, p. 19.

Minute Resolution dated July 13, 1998; Rollo, p. 39.

128

128

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Nial vs. Bayadog

reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for

review.
The two marriages involved herein having been
solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC),
the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil
Code which was the law in effect at the time of their
celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of
which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article
80(3) in relation to Article 58. The requirement and issuance
of marriage license is the States demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested. This
interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the
State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording
protection to the family as a basic
4

__________________

14

Minute Resolution dated October 7, 1998; Rollo, p. 50.

Tamano v. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584(1998).

Now Article 3, Family Code. Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized

unless all the requisites are complied with:

1. (1)Legal capacity of the contracting parties; their consent, freely
given;
2. (2)Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
3. (3)A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
7

marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and

exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before
the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in
such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation,
shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicants name for a marriage license.
The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage
such

Now Article 4, Family Code. Art. 80. The following marriages shall be
________________

void from the beginning:

xxx

xxx

xxx

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of

exceptional character.
xxx

xxx

10

Section 12, Article II, 1987 Constitution; Hernandez v. CA, G.R. No.

126010, December 8, 1999, 320 SCRA 76; See also Tuason v. CA, 256 SCRA
158 (1996).

xxx

Art. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in

11

Section 2, Article XV (The Family), 1987 Constitution.

Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under article 76, no marriage shall be

12

Article 1, Family Code provides: Marriage is a special contract of

solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of
the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides.
9

with law for the establishment of conjugal or family life. x x x.

13

Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97(1975).

Santos v. CA, 240 SCRA 20 at 35 (1995); 58 SCAD 17 (1995); 310 Phil.

21, 41 (1995).

129

VOL. 328, MARCH 14,

2000
Nial vs. Bayadog

permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance

129

14

Now Article 34, Family Code. Art. 76. No marriage license shall be

necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority
and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at

autonomous
social
institution. Specifically,
the
Constitution considers marriage as an inviolable social
institution, and is the foundation of family life which shall
be protected by the State. This is why the Family Code
considers marriage as a special contract of permanent
union and case law considers it not just an adventure but a
lifetime commitment.
However, there are several instances recognized by the
Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one
of which is that provided in Article 76, referring to the
10

11

12

13

14

least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall
state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law
to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the
marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the
ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no
legal impediment to the marriage.
130

130

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
15

Nial vs. Bayadog

persons from legitimizing their status. To preserve peace in
the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public
exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the
publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to
preserve their privacy and exempt them from that
requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners father
to respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage
license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating
that they have attained the age of majority, and, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, and that we now desire to marry each
other. The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to
what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76
of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year
period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a
marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both
parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire
five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation
wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively
with each other as husband and wife during the entire fiveyear continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal
impediment to their being lawfully married, which
impediment may have either disappeared or intervened
sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have
lived together as husband and wife for five years without the
benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed
on the basis of a cohabitation as husband and wife where
the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to
validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had
it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year
15

16

period should be the years immediately before the day of the

marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized
_______________
15

Report of the Code Commission, p. 80.

16

Rollo, p. 29.

131

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2000
Nial vs. Bayadog

131

by exclusivitymeaning no third party was involved at any

time within the 5 years and continuitythat is unbroken.
Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties
were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five
years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common law relationships and
placing them on the same footing with those who lived
faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special
relationship must be respected as such and its requirements
must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based
on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The
parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with
every single requirement and later use the same missing
element as a preconceived escape ground to nullify their
marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a
marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within
the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is
required in order to notify the public that two persons are
about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is
aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of
16

the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar. The
Civil Code provides:

Article 17 provides in part: x x x. This notice shall request all

persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to
advise the local civil registrar thereof. x x x.

considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and

adultery. The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents
marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each
other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to
their wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage was
dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only
about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that
Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter
both Pepito and respondent had started living with each
other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains
that their five-

_______________

_______________

17

Article 63: x x x. This notice shall request all persons having

knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local
civil registrar thereof. x x x.
Article 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to
the marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an
investigation, examining persons under oath. x x x

This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:

17

Articles 63 and 64, Civil Code;Articles 17 and 18, Family Code.

132

132

19

18

Article 83, Civil Code provides Any marriage subsequently contracted

by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Nial vs. Bayadog

person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless:
1. (1)the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

Article 18 reads in part: x x x.In case of any impediment known to

the local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note
down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the
application for a marriage license. x x x.

This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present,
absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages
by the same person during the same period. Thus, any
marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the
first spouse shall be illegal and void, subject only to the
exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage
was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code
complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or
more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are
18

2. (2)the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years . . .
Article 41 of the Family Codereads: A marriage contracted by any person
during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years . . .
19

Arts. 333 and 334, Revised Penal Code.

133

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Nial vs. Bayadog

133

year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation

contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect
union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only
17

by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a

subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting
with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with
each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from
his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even
where there was actual severance of the filial companionship
between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either
spouse with any third party as being one as husband and
wife.
Having determined that the second marriage involved in
this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement
of a marriage license, it is void ab initiobecause of the
absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the
personality to file a petition to declare their fathers marriage
void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judges ruling, Article 47 of the
Family Code cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions
20

_________________
20

Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the

following persons and within the periods indicated herein:

1. (1)For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose
parent or guardian did not give his or her consent, within five years
after attaining the age of twenty-one; or by the parent or guardian
or person having legal charge of the minor, at any time before such
party has reached the age of twenty-one;
2. (2)For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the sane
spouse, who had no knowledge of the others insanity; or by any
relative or guardian or person having legal charge of the insane, at
any time before the death of either party, or by the insane spouse
during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity;

3. (3)For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the injured

party, within five years after the discovery of the fraud;
134

134

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Nial vs. Bayadog

for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for

annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which
allows the sane spouse to file an annulment suit at any
time before the death of either party is inapplicable. Article
47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file
an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to
declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void
marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is
valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a
marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never
to have taken place and cannot be the source of rights. The
first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free
cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be
ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally
except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be
attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be
questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the
parties and not after death of either, in which case the
parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had
been perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for
nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where
the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage
can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a
void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except
those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged
21

22

18

spouses, regarding co-ownership (4) For causes mentioned in

number 4 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five
years from the time the force, intimidation or undue
influence disappeared or ceased; For causes mentioned in
numbers 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party, within
five years after the marriage.

decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to

make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance
be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order
of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is
expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be
ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction. Under ordinary circumstances, the
effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of
legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had
ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal
purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding
in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct
or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any
time, whether before or after the death of either or both the
husband and the wife, and upon mere proof
25

___________________
21

Suntay v. Cojuanco-Suntay, 300 SCRA 760 (1998); People v. Retirement

Board, 272 111. App. 59 cited in I Tolentino, Civil Code, 1990 ed., p. 271.
22

In re Conzas Estate, 176 111. 192; Miller v. Miller, 175 Cal. 797, 167

Pac. 394 cited in I Tolentino, Civil Code, 1990 ed., p. 271.

135

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Nial vs. Bayadog

135

or ownership through actual joint contribution, and its effect

on the children born to such void marriages as provided in
Article 50 in relation to Articles 43 and 44 as well as Articles
51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the
property regime governing voidable marriages is generally
conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its
annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the death of
petitioners father extinguished the alleged marital bond
between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous
and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a
marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should
be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if
it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished
nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial
decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage. A void marriage does not require a judicial

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23

24

23

Articles 148-149, Family Code; Article 144, Civil Code.

24

Odayat v. Amante, 77 SCRA 338(1977); Weigel v. Sempio-Dy, 143 SCRA

499 (1986); People v. Mendoza,95 Phil. 845 (1954); 50 O.G. (10) 4767 cited
in People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 (1957); 53 O.G. 3749.
25

35 Am. Jur. 219-220.

136

136

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Nial vs. Bayadog

of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be

disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts. It is
not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally
attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the
lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the
marriage cannot be impeached, and is made goodab
initio. But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides
26

19

that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a

previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into
a second marriage and such absolute nullity can be based
only on a final judgment to that effect. For the same reason,
the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. Corollarily, if
the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action
or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be
considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no
judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or
a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any
issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a
final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if
the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such
final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.
27

28

29

VOL. 328, MARCH 14,

137
2000
Heirs of Alberto Suguitan vs.
City of Mandaluyong
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch
59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.,Chairman), Puno andKapunan, JJ.,
concur.
Pardo, J., On official business abroad.
Petition granted, order reversed and set aside. Case
ordered reinstated.
Note.Per current jurisprudence, a marriage though
void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any
party thereto can marry again; otherwise, the second
marriage will also be void. (Apiag vs. Cantero,268 SCRA
47 [1997])
o0o

__________________
26

18 RCL 446-7; 35 Am Jur. 221.

27

Apiag v. Cantero, 335 Phil. 511(1997); 268 SCRA 47 (1997); Atienza v.

Judge Brillantes, Jr., 243 SCRA 32(1995); 60 SCAD 119; 312 Phil. 939(1995).
28

Domingo v. CA, 226 SCRA 572(1993).

29

Article 39, Family Code as amended by E.O. 209 and 227, s. 1987 and

further amended by R.A. No. 8533 dated February 23, 1998.

137

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