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Facts:
- Petitioner is the CEO of Boracay West Cove.
- January 7, 2010, While they were already operating in the said area, the
company applied for a zoning compliance with the municipality and was
approved and issued in favor of Boracay West Cove. It sought for a building
permit of a 3 storey hotel located within the Forest land Use Agreement
(FlagT) with the municipality issued in favor of the Company
- The Municipal Zoning Administrator denied the petition for application on the
grounds that it was within the no building zone per municipal ordinance
2000-131:
o SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Ordinance, the
following words, terms and phrases shall mean as follows:
xxxx
(b) No Build Zone the space twenty-five (25) meters from the edge of
the mean high water mark measured inland;
xxxx
SECTION 3. No building or structure of any kind whether temporary or
permanent shall be allowed to be set up, erected or constructed on the
beaches around the Island of Boracay and in its offshore waters. During
the conduct of special activities or special events, the Sangguniang
Bayan may, through a Resolution, authorize the Office of the Mayor to
issue Special Permits for construction of temporary structures on the
beach for the duration of the special activity as embodied in the
Resolution.
- Petitioner appealed but no action was taken by the respondent Mayor. A
notice of assessment was sent to petitioner asking for the payment of tax
liabilities and later, However, the Municipal treasurer refused to accept
tendered payment and a cease and desist order was issued by the
municipality, a subsequent EO was issued ordering the building to be
demolished.
- Petitioner filed for injunctive relief with the CA
o He argued that judicial proceedings should first be conducted before
the respondent mayor could order the demolition of the companys
establishment; that Boracay West Cove was granted a FLAgT by the
DENR,
- Respondents: respondents contended that the FLAgT does not excuse the
company from complying with the Ordinance and Presidential Decree No.
1096 (PD 1096), otherwise known as the National Building Code of the
Philippines. Respondents also argued that the demolition needed no court
order because the municipal mayor has the express power under the Local
Government Code (LGC) to order the removal of illegally constructed
buildings.
- CA: the CA dismissed the petition solely on procedural ground, i.e., the
special writ of certiorari can only be directed against a tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions and since the issuance of
EO 10 was done in the exercise of executive functions, and not of judicial or
quasi-judicial functions, certiorari will not lie. Instead, the proper remedy for
the petitioner, according to the CA, is to file a petition for declaratory relief
with the Regional Trial Court.
Issue:
- Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the respondent mayor was
performing neither a judicial nor quasi-judicial function when he ordered the
closure and demolition of Boracay West Coves hotel;
- Whether or not petitioners right to due process was violated when the
respondent mayor ordered the closure and demolition of Boracay West Coves
hotel without first conducting judicial proceedings
- Whether or not petitioners rights under the FLAgT prevail over the municipal
ordinance providing for a no-build zone;
Held:
Petition denied.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. The
Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 120042 dated
August 13,
2013 and February 3, 2014, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED.
Ratio:
- Certiorari, not declaratory relief, is the proper remedy
- the LGC, which authorizes city and municipal governments, acting through
their local chief executives, to issue demolition orders. Under existing laws,
the office of the mayor is given powers not only relative to its function as the
executive official of the town; it has also been endowed with authority to hear
issues involving property rights of individuals and to come out with an
effective order or resolution thereon
- The Court ruled that the property involved cannot be classified as a nuisance
per se which can therefore be summarily abated. Here, it is merely the hotels
particular incident, its location and not its inherent qualities that rendered it a
nuisance. Otherwise stated, had it not been constructed in the no build zone,
Boracay West Cove could have secured the necessary permits without issue.
As such, even if the hotel is not a nuisance per se, it is still a nuisance per
accidens
-
Issue:
- Whether or not the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement is void ab initio for
contracting obligations that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with
universally recognized principles of international law.
Held:
- No
- WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack
of merit. No costs.
Ratio:
- The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the
necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long
usage. From the earliest days of our history, we have entered executive
agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations,
most favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright
protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims.
The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts.
- Executive agreements may be validly entered into without such concurrence.
As the President wields vast powers and influence, her conduct in the
external affairs of the nation is, as Bayan would put it, executive altogether.
The right of the President to enter into or ratify binding executive agreements
has been confirmed by long practice.
- The Agreement does not contravene or undermine, nor does it differ from,
the Rome Statute. Far from going against each other, one complements the
other. As a matter of fact, the principle of complementarity underpins the
creation of the ICC. According to Art. 1 of the Statute, the jurisdiction of the
Sec. 140 states, among other things, that a province may levy an
amusement tax to be collected from the proprietors, lessees, or operators of
theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other places of
amusement at a rate of not more than thirty percent (30%) of the gross
receipts from admission fees. By operation of said Sec. 151, extending to
them the authority of provinces and municipalities to levy certain taxes, fees,
and charges, cities, such as respondent city government,may therefore
validly levy amusement taxes subject to the parameters set forth under the
law.
-
The then Sec. 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (AO 07) or the Rules of
Procedure of the OMB, in turn, stated:
Sec. 7. Finality of decision. Where the respondent is absolved of the charge,
and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to
one month salary, the decision shall be final and unappealable. In all other
cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of ten (10) days
from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration
or petition for certiorari, shall have been filed by him as prescribed in Section
27 of RA 6770.
Then came AO 17 dated September 15, 2003 further amending Sec. 7 of Rule
III. Thus, the section now provides:
Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. Where the respondent is
absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed
is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a
fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory,
and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the
Court of Appeals x x x.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the
penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he
shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be
paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason
of the suspension or removal. (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly then, as early as August 17, 2000, when AO 14A was issued, the
OMBimposed penalties in administrative disciplinary cases were already
immediately executory notwithstanding an appeal timely filed. In this case, it
must be noted that the complaint dated July 28, 2003 was filed on August 20,
2003 or after the AO 14A has come into effect. Thus, no error can be
attributed to the CA when it ruled that the penalties imposed by the
Ombudsman against petitioners are immediately executory. Immediate
execution argues against the outlandish notion that the Ombudsman can only
recommend disciplinary sanctions.
b. Dishonesty
Dishonesty, as juridically understood, implies the disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty or
probity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to
defraud, deceive or betray.42 It is a malevolent act that puts serious doubt
upon ones ability to perform duties with the integrity and uprightness
demanded of a public officer or employee
The failure to file a truthful SALN puts in doubts the integrity of the officer
and would normally amount to dishonesty. It should be emphasized, however,
that mere misdeclaration in the SALN does not automatically amount to such
an offense. Dishonesty requires malicious intent to conceal the truth or to
make false statements; otherwise, the government employee may only liable
for negligence, not for dishonesty. In addition, only when the accumulated
wealth becomes manifestly disproportionate to the income of the public
officer/employee and income from other sources, and the public
officer/employee fails to properly account or explain these sources of income
and acquisitions, does he or she become susceptible to dishonesty
In the case at bar, the required evidence sufficient to justify holding petitioner
Aguilar administratively liable has been, to us, as to the CA, satisfied. Not
only did she fail to declare in her SALN the residential lot located at
Panicuason, Naga City, she likewise failed to satisfactorily explain her
beneficial ownership of the Antel Seaview Towers fourbedroom condominium
unit and her use of the two BMWs registered in the name of different
corporations, which, as the records show, are both based in Olongapo City.