SIEGE OF EN GRAD 19:41-1944

I G F NING A 1941 19,44

900 Days of Terror

David M. Glantz

SPEllMOUNT

Staplehurst

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Dam:

A catalogue record (or this book is available from the Bntih lIhrnry

CONTENTS

opyrighr Q 2001 Brown Parrwork Lnnlr e d

15B. 1- 622 ·124·0

Key to map 6 Preface 7 Dramati Personae 8

Fir. t published In the UK III 2001 by pellmounr Limited

The Id Re r ry taplehurst

KenrT 120AZ

13 79 642

Chapter 1:

The City of Peter and Lenin 10 Chapter 2:

Target Leningrad 20 Chapter 3:

The Encirclern nt Struggle 42 Chapter 4:

Winter Agony 941-42 58

Tel: 01580893730 Fax: 01580 893731

E-mail: (.nquine@speltmounr.com Web ire: www.spellmounr.eorn

Editoria I a nd design:

Brown Parrworks Ltd 8 hapcl Pia e Rivington rrecr London

EC2A 3DQ

UK

Chapter 5:

False Dawn 82

All rights reserved, I U part of thi pubhcanon may be reprodu I'd rored in a retrieval y rem or rrnn mined in an form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopymg, recording, Of orherwi e, without prior permis ion in writing (rom pellmounr Limited, Publishers.

Primed in 'ingapOl"e

Chapter 6:

Fru trated Hopes 96 Chapter 7:

A City Besieged 1942-43 108 Chapter 8:

racking the Blockade 124 Chapter 9:

1944 - Liberation 150

dirors, Peter Derman, Anne ree Pi tu re resea reh: u a nnah jaye Design: \XlDA

Maps: Darren Awuah Production: Mart Weyland

Chapter 10:

Conclu ns 170

Cha pter ores 181 Appendices 199 Bibliography 221 Index 222

and heated periods of fighting during rhe long siege.

·or do histories. written from the German perspective adequately fill rhe gaps. Iesmerized by the imposing and seemingly unbroken mosaic of titanic battles of almost unprecedenred proportions that characterized combat on their Eastern Front, German participaars and historians scarcely had [he desire, rime Of capacity for detecting and noting the intricacies of ehe Red Army's military efforts .. Thi applied, in particular; to Red Army operations rhar failed, rhe category into which most of the missing 40 percenr of the war's forgotten battles fall.

Today, recent Russian archival releases finally permit us [Q begin correcting [he opera donal record of ehe Bartle for Leningrad and of the warin general. For the first time, we can compare rhe exrensive archival documentation of German army groups, armies and subordinate forces, which has long existed, with the new Russian documentation and, by doing so, begin to n.1I in the historical record.

By intent, rhis short volume is primarily a hisrory of military operations. Rather than replicating the already superb accounts written about the unparalleled human suffering engendered by the siege, it simply seeks to establish a ounderand more accurate description of the military operarions rhar provided es enrial contexr for all el e that occurred at Leningrad. Further; it represents a modest beg.inning in what will undoubtedly be a long process of restoring to public-view what actually occurred during the Leningraders' 900 days of unsurpas ed trial under fire. This and more definirive works will finally de justice to the suffering of rhe 1.6 to [\\'0 million soldiers and civilians who perished during the battle and siege, the 2.4 million soldier who became casualties, and the 1.6 million civilians who escaped or survived the siege.

KEY TO MAPS

PREFACE

Military units ~ types

Military movements

No chapter in the Soviet Union's long and gruesome Grear Patriotic War is fraught with greater drama, sacrifice and human suffering than the titanic struggle for rheciry of Leningrad. Born in war, an epduring crucible of revolution, and Russia's window on. [he West to bam tsar and commissar, Tsar Peter [he Grear' city has long symbolized to Russia's enemies the greamess and often ominous and rhrearening potential of the Russian Empire andc larer, the Bolshevik Soviet Union, It is no coincidence that when Adolf Hider chose the Soviet Union as. one of his priority r.argers in Germany's drive for Lebensraum (iiving space), Leningrad became a prime mrger of his ruthless ambition. It could not be otherwise, given the dry's momentous symbolic, strategic and ideological significance.

Thousands of bonks written in Russia and [he \Vest alike have recorded the dramatic course of the Bartle of Leningrad, relating the feats of rhe city's heroic military defenders and memorializing che monumental suffering of it population. A few, like Harrison E. alisbury's 900 Days and Dmitri Pavlov's Leningrad 194]; The Blockade have superbly captured the human anguish and agony associated wirh the siege's most famous military operations, and the tortured existence of Leningrad's population during rheir nearly three-year ordeal. Thousands of individual memoir, some .accurate and other apocryphal, embellish Salisbury's.account. While the Russian archives have yet to reveal the full extent of the population's suffering in terms of finite human. and material cosr, and may never do so in fujI measure, no doubt remains concerning the nature and magnitude of that suffering.

To this day howevee.a is the case with military operations in the Soviet Union' Great Patriotic War as a whole, the military dimension of the Bartle for Leningrad remains appaJlingly' obscure. Wbile Soviet military historians have produced tens of studies of the Battle for Leningrad and on many of irs component military operations, these accounts have ignored as much as 40 percent of rhe actual com bar. A product of political or military embarrassment, vanity, or rhe ovier Union's penchanr for secrecy in the interest of national security or preserving political and military reputations, these yawning gaps embrace some of the most desperate

infantry

oviet attack

armoured

I I .... Soviet retreat

more r ized in fa n try/ pa n ze rgrenadier

German arrack

II..... German retreat

Military units - size

xxxxx

D

xxxx

D

xxx

o

xx

D

x

D

General military symbols

army group/front

Soviet frontline

army

ovier defensive line

corp

German frondine

division

German defensive line

brigade

Geographical ymbol

-t---+-

Railway

Military unit colours

•

oviet

River

German

•

Urban area

o

Urban area

6

David M. Glanrz Carlisle, Pennsylvania

December 2000

Ku6l!" Marshal of Ihe Soviet Union G. I. - DeJMi1Y Peo~es' (cnunWr of Mell(e and Chiel. Roo Almy Moln Altimery DireClOror8 (1939-41). ComlTlllnder. Filly- 10Ulih AImy (AugwHeprember 1941)_ RelillYBd 01 oommond end DssigIlE1J to !he NXO (~ptemtlilr 1 W -Ajrfi119m (omlTlllnder, Fwrth Goollis Army (A/Jrll-Septllllltlilr 1943) oruJ !leplJi'j (hie!, NKO D~ec1cro18 for too Formation ond Ma~ning or the Soviet Army Uonuory 1944-Mcy 1m)'

Kurochkin, (~lonel-G1!neral p, A. - (ommoooer, Twentieth Army (Ju~AlIgust 1941) and Forry-Third AImy lAugusrI941). 5111vlco re~esentotive, orthwestem Front; Commander, NllfIhwesrem FroRt, rmd De~1y Commander, North· estem Front (Augtrs 1941-0dober 1942 ond lune-Novllllloor 1943). {ommondei, tleventh Army ( ovembel 1942-1.\oul1 1943) ondThir1y-fOUlth Army (Mmm-June 1943)_ Defllily Cnmmnnder, FilSt Ukroinim Front (December 1943-FeixuOfyI944) cnd ComlTlllnder, Se<ond Be~russkm Froot (Februory-Ajrfi119441 and SIx eth Armv (ApIiJ 1944-M1ly 1945). KIU.netso¥, Lieutenant·GenlTal A.. A.. - 1~d Se<retury, leninGrad Communist Porty RllIliollOl and Oty (OUII(~ (1938-4 S) and Memool, Balik fleal/Mlllry (ound (1938--~61. Northern/roil! Militory Council Oune-AugLlSl 19m, ll!llirllJIOd From Mi1iTOry Cm (September 1941---{lecembel 1942 000 Mmd11943--May 194 S), uoo ~CGrId S~ Army Mitrtory Coulltil (Oe<ember 1942--Mcrch 1943).

KuznolJoy, (olonel-Gtnerol f. I. - Commcrooe(, Balnc Special Mitrlary Dislrid and Northweslern front (Iune-lktober 1941). ComnnondeJ, Twenty·Fim Army ond (enllDl FlOnl, Chief of Sloff, Twe"ly'flghlh AJrrrt, Commonde, Fdry-fus! Arrrrt, De~ Commundei, Westem fronT, and Cornmaooer, SixltFilsl ny (Onober 1941-April 1942). (hie!, Genellli Sl1lfl Academy cnd Deputy (ommandel, Volkhov and Karelian hon~ (Apn1 1942-febtoory 1945). (ommer, Urol Mililllry Distrid (Febioory 1945-48). Lalaro¥, MailM'-Ge.,trall. G. - Commander, FffiyFifth Army

(Seprembef~cmmber 1941)_

Moslennlkov, Colollel-GentfOI I. I. - (NKVD officer). {omlTlllncer, Twenl'f'/linih Army (JU~f1(OI 1941), ThlrttNinth Army, Norlh (mro;uslI$ Fronfs Northern Group of f'OfCes, ond North CatK~ FIont (Oe<ember 1941-May 19431. D&)HJf1j ComlllOilder, Volkhov. Southwestsln !In~ Thirrl Ukroillion fronls (Moy-IIe<ember 1943). (ommander, Forry-Secooo Army (Ol1(or 1m-March 1944), Deputy Cammondar, LeningIM front lMnrdrApli119441, and Commoooer, Third Bollie Fronl (fIprII1944-4S)'

M&khhs, L Z. - (h ef, Red Army Main Polilicci Directorate orlCllle~ Peoples' (ommlssor 0 Defeoce (1941-42), Slrlvl:ari!pre5~n'otive, Volkhov Fronl (Jonuory 1942) and Crimeon Fron! (februlll'f-I~ 1942), Member. 6111 krrrt Military (ouocil, V~onezh Front MintolY Cooncil, VolkJi4l'l Front Mililmy Coontil, Brionsl: Front Militory Cntmcil. Seulild Bollie FronT Mililul'/ (olTfl(ll, Western From Mililory (OUIKil, Sel:ond Bel«lJSsion front Miitary Courd end fourth UklDiR~n Front Mililwy (ouncil (1942-44).

Mefelsko¥, Army Gtlleral K. A. - OepU!V Peoples' Commissor 01 Deleoce Uonuory-September 1941) and Sl11vka JepiBllmtolive, Nwthwestem and Korelion fronts lAu!lost-Se~18mber 19m. Arresled, impr&rlled, 001 exonerated (~p ember-&toOOt 1941). (ommoOOeI, Sever1lh Se~ore Army (October-November 1941), fourth Armv (Novsmtler-ll9lember 1941), and Volkfwv Front [December 1941-Moy 1942 and June 1942-fetlruory 1944). (ommondar, ThlrIy-ThirdArmv (May-June 1942), KmBtIJn flent (Februory--AugLlSlI94S), and Ffl5t FOi EOS1em Froot !August-Seprember 1945). Piadyshev, Ueilltnanl·Ganeral It P. - lst Deputy Cammonder. Northern Front Uune-Ju~ 1941) end (omnm!er. Logo Opellll1oool Group (6 July-August 1941). Arrested (23 July), senlenced 10 10 ytors' impmoIllltOOl, Dnd dled in prison in 194 3_ Reoobiilloled pesll1umomly in 196B_

Popov, lleuleflOnl·Gtnet-al M. M, - Commooder, orTnero 000 I.eJttlllllOO Fronts (June-Septembe! 1941) end SiX1V'ftfSl WId fortieth Armies (Novimoor )941-oauber 1942). Deputy (ommootier, ShJlin~,Dd and SouthwfBl~rn Fronts 000 CDnliTIIIOOet, Fifth Shock end filth lonk Armies (!ktobel 1942-klluorv 1943). Commaooer, MObi1eGroup Popov (Februruy-MllIrn 1943), R8Selve Front and Steppe MBitmy Distrkt (April-May 1943), BriorlSl: frool Uune-Odnbel 1943>. UM Bnltil: IlrnJ Second 8nflic fronts (Odober 1943-Ap.ri11944). Chief 01 Stefl, leningfM and Secood Bollie Fronts !AprtI1944-Ju~ 1945).

Roginsky, Uev.enant-Gtntral S. V. - Commander, 111111 (24111 Guords) Rifle Division,ond VI ond IV GuorU:rf1a CIlI]lS [December 194i-f®!uory 1942).Depury

Commander, rrlty-Ninrh, f~hlh and Sel:ond Sf10ck Armies (Febluory 1942-M1lICh 1943). Commander, Fdry-fwrtn Army IMarcn 1943-Decemoor 19«) 000 Sixty-~Yer1th Army [Februcry-Mcy 1945).

Roma.noysky, Uevtenant-General V. Z. - Commaooer, Arkhon~el'sk Mil' ary Oistria (1941-42) _ OeflIity CommanOOr ond Commander, rust Shock Almy (May-December 1942). COlllmander. Second Shod Army (December 1942--1le!smbel 1943) and DepiJ!V CllIIIITIIlOOer, fourth Ukrainian Frollf (Df(emberI943-March \944l. (ommaooe{, ForftSecond ArmV (Morch 1944), SixTy-Seventh Almy (Marm 194h\lorm 1945) arid NiMre~nth Army (Mor(n-May 1945).

SlKherHkoy, Major-General V, I, - (omroorn!er, l Rille Corps (J1II1e-September 1941 l. Commandel, Elghlh, fOlly-Second aoo Elevenlh nits and Depuf1j (ommandef,

TI enry-Third AImy (Sep emool1941-MOIch 1942). Cammande!, fourteenth Army (MOIch 1942-Mcy 1945).

Shevaldin, UevleHnt-G,"erai T. I. - (omroonder, Eightll Army lSeplember- ovembel 1941).

Slmonl~ Lieulenant-General N. P. - (omMel, 136til (631d Goords) Rifle DMsioo Uune 1941-\942), W!mD11lnder, XXX Goonls Rifla (DIjlS (1942-<ktober 19W, Thlrd Shod: Army ((klol1elI944-Mmc.h 1945), and Slxly-Seventh AImy (Maim-May 1945).

SOHMl1C1V; UtvlellOlll-GeMfal P; P. - Commander. EigJllh Army (Mnlm-lll1\B 1941), NQrtfrwestllln FIORt (JuIy-AugLlSl 194 \), ond Forty-Third Army

(Sep ember-{ktoOOr 19m Deputy (Mlmandar, Third Army (1942-1~ay 194 S). ~.olov. Ueutenan.-General G. G. - (NMI offi~~!). (ommnooer, Second Shock IIrmy [December 1941-Jonuary 1942),

St. Marthal of tbe Soviet Union I. V. - First Sooelltry, Commllllist Parly of rIleSovieI Union (1941-45), ChOKmon, SIDle Defeoce Comminee (GKO) [1941-4'1), (hoirman, 5trM:o VGK (194 H5}, Peelpies' (ommi5sor 01 DefelKe 11941-15), SupielTle lfigh ComlTlllndef, So'liel Armed Forces (1941-45), and Genermissirno (1945). SlarikD¥, Uellielant-General F. N. - Chirl, lrJ!Pl Opemlioool Groop's fmlem Seem.(J~ 1941), (ommoildet, TwenIy'Thid Army and SiIliM'IJ ~roOOtd Gc~ (December 1941-JOI1OOI)' 1942). IlejlJty (~, rrgf,1ll Army and VtiIkJKr.o llpaJotKml &rtlllJll1(Jlllo~1194Z) oncl Coomrdet, r':l~th Army ~ 1942-1OOv 19451. Svkhom6n, Uevlenan1-General A. V, - GrIel of Shlif, Nortfrwestem Front and Fi!ry-foun:ft Army (June 194 Honuory I 942). Commander, E~h th NITI)' Uanuory--April 1942) ond FHry-fOlIllhllrmy (Apr~ 1942-/.lmdlI943)_ Di!pU1y (ommoooel, Volkhov Fmnl. (March-Septembel 1943) alld (omm~r. Tenln Guards Army (September 194Hebluory 1944).151 Deputy Chief, fllll1Ze Academy (F~bruory I 94Hwlcy 1945). Svirida¥, Lieule ani-General V. P. - Chief of AlPliery, ~ortne!n front ond Chief of ArtiIleIy and Deputy (ommander, Leningrad fKll11 (Juriovemool 1941). (ommonrler, Filtyfilth Army (November 1941-1Jecember \ 943). Si~tv'Se'len1il Almv (fliKembel 1943-I~orch 19« l, cnd fOlly-Sel:ond AImy (MoJrn 194-4-Mcy 1945).

TImoshenko, Marshal of the Sovlel Union S. F. - People's Commlssm of Defeoce (May 194Q-June 1941) and DeJMi1Y Peo~es' Commm of Deleoca

(J ufr-Septemoor 1941). ComITlllOOer. Westem DiTection ond West~m Fronl (July-Septemoor 1941), Southwestern DirKlion and Sotrlllwesiern Front (Se~lember

) 941- llllle 194 2J. SToflllgroo Fron! [)uly-Dctobe! 1942), und Northwestem Froll1 (OctOOOI 1942-¥orth 1943). S/rMa repleser1totivs, L~ngllld and Volkoov Froots (MmCh-June 1943). North Coucmus .Fronr ond Blork Sec fleer (june-Navember 1943), Secmlll ond Third BoIMc fronl5 (Februory--June 19«). and Second, Third ond foorth Ukroinion fronl5 (Aug1I5l 1944-Moy 19451.

Tributs, Admiral V. F. - (ommonder, Balik Fleet (1939-47).

Vafuti .. Army Gueraf N. F. - lsi Deputy (hiel, Red Army General Staff (1941). (breI of Sfaff, orthwestern FIOOI (Jtm~US11941). De!MJ1y Chief, Red Almy GeneToi Stnfl (May- July 1942). CammondeT, V()I!I(Ilm frorri (JuIy-ik1obe! 1942 end M!tlclHklober 1943). Sou~lwestem Front (October 1942-Morch 1943)' and Filst Ukrainion Front (March 1943-lMlch 1944). Kiierl by portisons in March 1944.

Vlasov, UevtenGIII·Generol A.. A. - Commander, 99111 RifleDMsIon and IV Medlonized (or~ (June-July 1941), Thirty-Sev8I1rfr Army (JUly-Octobel 1941).000 Twentieth Army (OctobeJ I 941-Febroory 1942). Deputy Commander, Volkhov Flont (Februory-AprlII942) WId Commooder, Secand Shod: Army (April-Ju~ 1942). (a~tured by rhe Germans in July 1942.

Yoronov, Chief Marshal of Art.lery - Deputy Peoples' Commlssor of Defence (1941) and (hief, Red Army Main Dirl1(rOrDle lor Air Oe!en(e (1941). Chie! of ArlUlefy,

DRAMATIS PERSONAE

Sovln'

Aklmov, UeUlenant.oeneroi s. D. - DePbry Commander, Nonhweslern Froot (lunHugJJSl 1941), Ar-~ng Commander, V Airborne (orps (June- Ju~ 1941), and (ommaooer, Forty-Ejghrh Army tAII!1L1lt-1941l.

AnloTlluk, Ul!ul~nQnl·Geberal M. A. - (ommrmder, ForltEigh Ih Army (September 1941) end Silfieth Army (July 1942).

DukhanoY, Ueulenanl-G,neral M. P. - RiPe diYislon commander

(Sep emool-Dctoool 1941l, Chief of SloH, New Operorional Group «(ktotler 1941). ond Deputy Commandel ond Commander, ~eva Operatianol6roup (Ocrober 1941-Oclober 1942). (ommander, Silly-Seventh Army ((klebe, 1942-Oecembel 1943), 000 Deputy (omlOOndef, 8ghthArmv (March 1944-Mcy 1945).

Fediuninslr:y, (alonel-G1!neral L L - Coom:indet, ForttSeeml Army (September~ 1941), lenirljlrod Front (!)jober 1941), Fiftyfoortn kmy (Daober 1941-Aj:NJ1194 2). Dnd Fifth Army ~tober- 1942). Deputy (0IIIIIIIHkrt-. Vulhav froll! (October 1942-Moy 1 ~43) ttIllllriJrek Flonl (NiJy-J~ 1943). (ornlJlOll'Jes, Eleventh .limy (Jul)-DecerrhJ ! 94 3) and Se<:.oncI Shod Army (IlK. 194 3-NoJy 194 S). Galallln, Major·Genrrall. V. - (omrnonrJel, lwelfrh Army (Aug1lS1-Dclober \ 941 ) 000 Filry-Hinth Army (H!lV~mber 194 I-April 1942). OepIJly Commander, Westem Fran I (/;\oy-Au!lLllt19421 end Voronezh Front (4uguSI-SepllllllOOi )942). (ommander, fwenlyfourth AImy (!ktoberI942-ApriI1943), Sevenlieth Army (A~ril-Se~tKmber 1943), fourth Guards Army (SeptemOOI 1943-Jonuory 1944), Frfty-Third Almy (January-February 1944), and fourth Goords Army (Febluory-Novembel 1944). GGVIM'OV, Marshal of the ~viet Unlan L A. - Chief, Dzerzhinsky Arlillery A<odemy (Moy-Ju~ 1941), and Chief DI Amnery, 100 Westem Direction ond RfBIlM Fronl (Julv-Au!l!JS11941). Deputy COITllIHIl1d.sr, Mozboisk DEfence Une and Chief of Arlillety, Westem Flom (AlIlust---Oouber 1941). Commander, Hhh AImy (Ddober 1941-Apii1 1942), LenilM,l!ad Gloup 01 fOICBS (ApriHune 1942)' 000 Leningrad flonl (June 1942-Moy 1945).

GuseY, Colonel.General N. L - Commander, 25th COVlTiry OMsiDn (July 1941-Jo~uwy 19421. XIfi (ovcIry (orps (January-June 1942l, Fourth Army (June 1942~DVember 1943), nne! 'wen~eth, Forty-Seventh and fonyftghth Armies (Novemoor 194Hloy 1945),

lako¥lu, Ueulenmrl-General V. f. - Ch·ef of Reelr Serlires, Southwestem Front urld Deputy Ch et Red AImy Geflerol Stoff (June-Seplllllll1el 1941). Commandei, Fourlh Army (Seplember-N~ 1941) ond Fifry-Se<:onrl Army (Jonuory 1942-1uly 1943). Di!pU1y Comrronoor. Steppe Front lAngust-October 1943) and (ommondei. Belorussian and ShMopol Militory D~Trids (1943-46).

Ivano¥, Ueutenanl·Generai F. S. - 2nd Ile!lJIy Cornmondef, kiev Sil«ill Militcry ihtrk1 Uu-re19411. CommoOOer, Eighth Army (JlTIiIl-I\iIg!ls 1941), Forry-SeoondAmr( (.iu;jusl-Seplen1ber 1941) mel leningrad ~risoo ond intemol defence tSeptember-OerernbeJI941 ) _ qned to the lsringroo Fronl Miltnry (0lJ1ciI [1 5

December) end the NKO's /.loin Cadre Dirertorole 118 Joooory 1942). Arrested 011 22 moory 1942 and Imprisoned 00 B JOrMiry 1946. Freed 00 15.1onuary 1946 and IlItired in 1952, Khozin. Uevtllnant-Gelleral M. S. - Chlel of Rem Services. front of Reserve ArmieS and Deputy (hie!. Red Army Genellli Stofl (June-September 19m. Chief of Slttfl, Leningrad Fronl (Seprembel-Otrobe! 1941). Commander, Fifry-Foon:ft Alrrrt (September-October 1941l.lenmgloo F,ont (!klobe! 1941-June 1942), Thirty-lhlrd Army Uune-Oeclllllber 1942), Twentieth Army (Oeclllllbel I 942-Februol'l 1943), and Spedol Group Kholin (FebrUll/f--Mmch 1943). Deputy Commander, WllSl1lm Fiool [Mnr(h 1943-Mmm 194-4) and Com_Rr, Vot!Jll Miillltry Oistrid [Morch 194H~oy 19451. Klykov, Ueutenant-General N. It - Commander, Thirly-Ser:ooo Almy (Ju~gust 194 1 ), Fifty-Se<ond ArmV (r\ugll5! 194 I-JOnLI'Jry I 942), Dnd Sel:ond SIm Army (JonlJOlr-APril ond July-{le<embe! 1942), Deputy (omrnondei, Volkhov hORI IDocember 1942-June 1943). ~OVI Mlntmy District Uune 1943-June 1944l, end North (OOC!l5U'S M!litory D~rrtrr (1944-45).

Korovnikov, Ueu1eHllt-Generail. T. - Commonder, Northwestern Front Dpe!Olionot group mid Novgmod Army Group of FOIces operotional group Uune

1941- January 1942), Second Shockilrmy aperotionol group Uonuory-April194 2). und fihy-Ninth Army (April 1942-Muy- 1945).

8

Red Army and Deputy (omm~' of nefance (July 1941-Marth 1943). Sravka lepresetltolille. leningrad Front (DdoooI-Na ember 1941) and Commander, Roo Army orliOery (1943-46).

VlM'oshilov, Marshal of the Soviet Union K. L - Member, SlDte OefelKe Committee (6 KO) ond Smi'ko (1941-44), Cornmandet, NOIlhweslem Diredion Main Coll1l1lrllld (July-AllgllSt 194 I) and l!n~rod Fronr (Seplembel 1941). Stavka representalil'e, VolkOOv flont (Febroory-IAarch 1942), leningrad end Vothl1ov Fron~ (Docember 1942-lonoorv 1943), and Seporo!e [!!mini Army (OEKember 1943). Zil4ano¥, A. A. - Se<retalY, Communist Porty C~n1lol Committee ond lenirlgIoD • Reg1onol ond Qry Porty (ommiNoos (1934-.14). Pemoonent Advisoi, Sfmtka VGK (June: 1941). Member, Northwestern Direttloo Command MiliTary COUI\{U (June--August 1941), Lrmingrnd frool Mililnry Council (September 194Hu~ 1945), and rhe Red IIrmy'l Moin PolitioollJirectomte's MllitolYfolilkol Propogondo (oon(il

Zhuko¥, Manhal of the Soviet Union G. Il - Chief of StuR, Red ny, and Deputy PeIlPIes' Commi~ of Defence (Jonuory- June 1941). Member, Stovko VGK (1941-45). lsllltputy Peelp!es' Commissor of DelerKe and Supreme High (ommonder (Au!lw 1942-1945). Slrlvl:o VGK reptesenlldive, Soothwes1em Front UtJne 1941), (ommondei, RB5IJlVe front (July-September \9~ I 1, ~roo flon! (SeptDI-Dc10beI 1941),000 Western front (()dOber 1941-Augus1 1942). CommoOOer, Western DiJe<!oo Moin {OIIlIOOnd (Febluory-Moy 1942), 5tavka VliK IBptesentotive, !Reserve f IOnl (Odotlilr 19~ I), Westem clld Kalinin Fron~ (November-Oeoember19~2), Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts [lonuwy 1943), ond Norlfrwestetn Fronl (FeblUary-Mortn 1943). Srovht VGK reprasentotive, Voronel.h 000 Sle~ fronl5 {Apri11943l, North (000lS1lS front (April-Mcy 1943), Voronezh. Cenlro! ond Western fron~ (Moy--June 1943), Southwestern Fronr (June 1943)' Brionsk, Centro! and Weslem Fronrs Uune-Ju~ 1943), 000 Steppe and Voronezh Fronl5 (August-Septemool 19431_ SJuvlca VGK replfBllfltlllive, Centrol and VOionezh fronts (SeptemOOi-Oecember 1943) ~oo First ond Se<ond Ukrolnion Fronrs UonullIy-Morrnl944J. Commander, Fir5! UkroJlJlon From (Marm-Mcy 1944). 51avko VGK reprB5llntotive, fim ond Ser:ood Belorwlon end Fils! UkrotniGn Fron~ UullHlugus! 194~), Third Ukrolnion front (September 1944) and First 000 Secon~ BekmlSSiao end FilSl UkruiniGn fronl> (~!imber-No'illmbel 19441. (IJIIIroonder, FiB! Belorussion F lont (N(I1Iember 194 4-MOV 1945).

GIllMAN

B115ch, (olonel-Generof Emsl - (ommonder, Sixleenrh AImy (June 194 Hlctober 1943) and Army Group (anlTe (Odober 1943-Juoe \ 944).

Haidet, Colonel-General FrGllz - Chief, Arrrrt General Shlfl (OKH) 11941-Septlllllbe! 1942).

Hoep!!tf, ColOlltl·G.Mfal Erich - (omITIIlnde., fourth l'1lll1er Group (June 194T-Janucry 1942).

Keitel, Colonel-o&nerol Wilhelm - Olief, liem'ar Mned Fllrtes (OKW) (1941-45) Kuethler. Colonel-General Georg von - CommonrIef, Stlhteenrh Army (June-l.orI#y 1942) end (omroorrde1, Arrrr:i 5:CMJjt North (JQOOQry 194HeI:Koorv 19m leeb, Field Manhal Rifler yon - (omlTlmdel, Army GlOIJp Horth

[fune 1941-Junoory 1941)

Undllmann, (olon~l-General Gllorg - (ommornlei, L Almy [orps (June 194Honuory 1942) 000 Bghreenrhkmy (JORuoI'l1942---febroory 1944). ManSleill, rteld Marshal Erich von - ConmmrIer, lVI /kJlorized Corps (March-September 1941), EIeven1h Army (September 1941-December 1942), Army GrO!4l Don (DocIlfTlbet-1942-febiuory 1943). Army Group SooIb (FWrurny 1943-Mordr 1944). Modet neW Mar,hal Waller - Commandel, Ninll1 ny (June 1941-febluary 1944), ArITl)' Grwp Non:ft (Febnrory-Morth 1944), AImy Group Soutll ond orth Ukroine [Marm-June 1944), Army Group Cel\tre Uune-August 1944). Western TheQITe !kJgus! 1944-Aprtl1945). Klliad in ocIIon In ih.o Ruhl101lio~ in A{lriI1945.

Rernharclt, (olonel-General HilliS - Commander, XXXXI PMzer CorllS (june-{ktooorI9 41), ThirdP0I11~1 Group end ThiIdPonl+ll Army (iXlTlber 19~ J--AugLlSl 1944), Army Gloup (enhe (Aug1I5t 194 Honuwy 1945 J.

Schmidt, (ol_I.ollllrol RucIoH - (ornmnnder, XXXIX Molorized (or~ (/1Ill~November 1941), Secooo Army ond AImy 6rwp Sdllnidl (November 194Hanuwy 1942)' and Se<ond POAler/oJmy Uonuory 1942-July 1943). Zeitzler, CDlonel-Generai Kin - Chief of STaff, Army Group 0 (1941-42) and Chief, Almy Genela1 Stoft (OKH) (September 1942-lu~ 194-41.

9

CHAPTER 1:

T

TV

The city of Leningrad. formerly St. Petersburg. had played an important part in the success of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 and the subsequent triumph of the Communists in the Russian Civil War. As a cradle of sorsnevtsm. it was logical that the German Fascist dictator Adolf Hitler would designate the city a

main target in his plans for the invasion and conquest of the Soviet Union.

Adolf Hitler, azi dictator of Germany had good rea on for hOD ing Leningrad as a priority objective for Operation Barbarossa the codenarue for his June [941 invasios of rhe

ovier Union, From it foundin in 1703 a r.

Peter burg the cit)" hi tory reflc ted it rrategic importance a the northwestern gateway ro Russia an important poliriea] economic and culrural centre and the yrnbol of revolution.

Ti ar Peter the Great (1672-[72 -) founded St.

Petersburg Leningrad imperial ancestor; in 1703 during his Grear orthern '\' ar with Sweden' King

harle XlI. The city wa located on primordial Rus ian land adjacent ro the old Varangian trade routes [0 Byzantium land which had previou ly belon Ted to rhe feudal principalities of ovgorod and lzhor k. The land on which Peter built hi city"

LEFT: After the siege. As life slowly returns to normal, smool pllrtles such IlS Ihis one mn resume their ordiDIIlY round of visits to places of Inlerest. Bul although Ihe buildings, roads and pllfhways Irre clear, Ihe gordens and windows 51ill bear the

scars of 900 days under siege.

had become pan of Ru ia in 1478 along with [he remainder of lovgor d.

While rruggling to gain uprernacy in the Baltic region, on 11 October 1702 Peter's forces stormed the wed ish fort ar r ore org near the old Ru ian own of reshek ar the jun rion of the eva River a nd Lake Ladoga and renamed the fortress

Sblissel'burg ("key city'). The following year Peter' annie aprured the mall wedish fort at Nyen hanrz at the junction of the eva and Okhra River and renamed it St. Petersburg and, below it, built the Form: of I. Peter burg (later named Perropavlovsk Fortress) on Zaiachi Island. Peter also built a port, trading facilities and a pala e on Lake Berzovyi, Kron hlor (named Kron htadr after 1713) Fortre on Kotlin I land, and the Admiral Porrre on [he left bank of the r eva River between 1 03 and I 04.

Peter built rhe e facilitic and the ciry around [hem in a traregically vital eographical locarion ar rhe mauch of the 'eva River and on 42 islands in rhe river' delra.i The ory'. founding, \ hich ended a century-long rruggle for ac e t the Baltic ea,

II

TH' lEGE OF LENINGRAD 1941-1944

LIfT: The grand palace of (o1herine the Great, one of the most splendid in the world, was turned into a museum by the (ommunists. It contrasted sharply with the sprawling slums of leningrad, mosl notably the workers' DreDS 01 the Petro grad side and the Vyborg quarter.

TH

underscored Peter's intent to seize and maintain acce s to the Baltic ea a Russia's "Windov.' on rhe West". A( the same time, however rhe ciry's construction cook a terrible roll on it iniria I population. Ten of thousands of pea ant , forcibly recruited from a co Russia, p ri hed in epidemics during it can trucrion as they fe eri hi, carved [he ciry om of near-impenetrable mar hland.!

The con cious deci ion of Peter and man)' of hi imperial uccessors to make the ciry the eat of imperial power, complete ~ irh the trappings of a modern Western city, burnished Sr. Petersburg'S

traregic value and prestige. A crude backwater before Peter's lifetime, it later became a beautiful

hining city under Elizabeth and Catherine the Great. The rule of the rwo empre e repre enred [he spe tacular age of St. Peter burg the golden age of the nobility, and the legendar age of Russian opulence and glitter. The iry developed rapidly ac .0rdLng to a disrin t plan and erved as rite Ru ian Empire's capital from J712 to ] 28 and from 1 32 to 1918.J By the rnid-eigh reenth century, Peter and his imperial successors had transformed the city imo Russia's mosr irnporranr political adrnini rrative cultural and military centre and II main outpost on the country' northwestern border.

haracrerized by irs brilliant court, exten i e militar}, e tabli hrnent and bureaucra )'. and imposing

'J hile appreciating [he city'S political, economic and cultural ignificance, Hitler also correctly perceived t, Peter burg as a centre of revolution and [he birthplace of the hated Bolshevi m. The city wa rite focal point of revolution 011 several occa ions, in 1820, 1825, J 905-0 , in Februa ry, Augu rand October of 1918, and in 192 L. St. Petersburg' bourgeoi ie and, later, it proletariat, ind ed formed the anguard of Rus ian revolutionary movement from a early as 1 02 when the soldiers of the

cmcnov ky uard Regiment revolted again t rhe arbitrary p Ii ie f mperor Paul.

frer their expo ure to Western idea during the War of Liberation against apoleon, Ru sian guard officers founded the "Union of a I varian" and, la ter, the 'Union of WeI fa re", secrer revolution a ry political ocietics in St. Peter burg [hat sought to promote repre curative government and 31 0 liberate the serfs. The so-called Decernhrisr Movement, which harb ured anti-foreign overtones, led a revolt in (he city in December 1 2 - but was blood iI, uppre ed, Through ut the en uing century, demo rat and revoluti nary leader were to gravitate t \ ard r. Perersburg.> In 1.895, V. I. Lenin founded the' nion for the rruggle of the Working CIa "in r, Perer burg and began introducing larxi t ocialisrn to the city'S 'workers' movement. Subsequently, rhc ciry \WI the focal point of revolution in 1904-07,

hipbuilding and ordnance indu tries, t. Peter burg became Russia's most important political, administrative. cultural and military centre. It population gTC\ from 425,000 in 182~ to 1, "34,000 in 190 ~, a reflection of irs grm ing imporran e.

r. Peter burg developed symbolic ignificance and a my rique of irs own a a bulv ark of autocracy, nobiliry and. later: of [he bourgeoisie f r more than 200 year. It al a became a centre of Rus ian .cien e and ulrure and the focal point of progresive thought and ocial and revolutionary move-

ment , in part due to its proximity to the West and Wt tern idea. Understandably, creative tension exi ted between Peter's fledgling city and 1oscow, the capital of the ancient Muscovite rare and Tsar Ivan the Terrible' sear of power. hile Mo cow repre enred '" Id Mother Ru ia ' and Russia's

lavi heartland Sr. Perersburg ' tood for rhe turelary light of the We r again t the Byzantine dark of 1-.10 ow"," St. Petersburg' increa ed tatun: made it a focal point for barb international and internal struggles, As Russia's Baltic military outpost, it served asa base for Russian grou~d forces and the fledgling Baltic Fleet in the Great orthern \'(far (l 00-21) against Sweden. Two centurie later, during the rimean War (18 "3- -6) Kronshradt Forrre and the Baltic Fleer prevented an AngloFrench quadran from reaching t. Peter burg.

12

RIGHT: View of the waterfront of the Neva River at leningrad. During the siege the German luftwaffe frequently bombed supply barges sen I GeJOIS take Ladogll before Ihey reached the dty. Loaded wilh grail! and munitions, many foundered in storms on the lake, even before they ran

the Luftwaffe gaunt lei.

including the November 1904 Kron hradr Munny and the infarnou Bloody Sunday, which oc urred on 9J.muary 190-_

When \) orld War 1 began in ]914, the Tad r government renamed the city Pctrograd to eradicate irs German-a ociated pa r, By (917, however .. the rigours of war once again made the ciry the focal point of revolutionary activity that culminated in the revolution of February and October J 91 and the Bolshevik' eizure and consolidation of power. During the en uing Ru ian Civil Wa[ the city remained a Bo1 hevik trongpoinr a Lenin e rrended his control over the entire country. The Bolsheviks' military arm, [he Red Gua rd , defended the ciry during the de perare struggle with Germany in 1918 and alter World War [ had ended the new Red AnTI)' did the arne against counter-revolutionary (White) force during the Civil War.b

After me Sol heviks transferred the country' capiral rom Petrograd to I\ loscow for ecuriry rea-

ons rhe cit}' be arne a natural target for Wlliee forces. General N. Iudenich' White orrhw tern Army arrempted to eize Petrograd in the period from May [0 Augu t and in ctober and ovember 1919, in conjunction with \'(fhite armies advancing from the south and ea r bur failed on both occasions since rhe Red Army and Perrograd' worker haired each offen ive."

N

13

and General G. K. Zhukov, rhe Cni·ef of rhe Red Army General Staff. A variery of regionsl and local organs were directly responsible for the city's and region's defence. Adminisrra ri ve I y, these incl uded the Leningrad region (ublasl), di trier (railm) and city (gorod) council (sollely) and mayor. Politically, A. A. Zhdanov, talm' dose associate, a member of the Politburo and arguably Stalin' heir apparenr. served as Fir t Secretary ofthe Leningrad Communist Party. Zhdanov, together with A. A. Kuznetsov, the Secretary of rhe Leningrad Regional Part), Committee, headed a hierarchy of regional, district and ciry Parry comrninees, which effectively dominated all rnarrers, borh political and military, thar rook place in or affected Leningrad. As was the case in any coralirarian srrucrure, tight organization, strict centralization of authoriry and pervasive Party discipline allowed these Parry leaders to mobilize virtually all of the ciry's resources for <I given task, in [his case defence.

Milirarily, the People's Commissariat of Defence (Narodl1yi komissarriat oborun)' - lKO), closely supervised by Stalin and the Communist Party Politburo and Central Committee, formulated all Stare defence policy and approved general and pecific ~orcc readiness measures. The Red Army General Staff, headed by General G. K. Zhukov, drafted all rnobilizarion, deployment and war plans, but implemented them only with the TKO's approval and guidance. Finally, the Leningrad Military Disrricr was responsible for maintaining the readiness of district forces and fa lfilling the Genera I Staff pi a 115, but ani y when specifica lJ y ordered to do so by the IKO. The military district's executive organ was irs military council (vuetl1l)'; s 0 vet), a collective organization consisting of the military district commander, its member of the military council (commissar) andirs chief of sraff,

THE CITY OF PETER AND LE IN

Leningrad's revolutionary traditions continued in Bolshevik times when, in February and March 1921, the sailors of the Kronshradr Naval Base rose in revolt against the harshness of the new Communist regime. Although Red Army forces brutally suppressed the uprising, it prompted Lenin to introduce his mote moderate New Economic Policy in March 192P After Lenin's death, on 26 January 1924, the 2nd Congress of Soviets of the US R renamed the ciry Leningrad at the request of the city's workers.

In the 19305, Leningrad figured prominently in Stalin's consolidation of power. When S ... M. Kirov, the popular Leningrad Party secreraIY and an advocareof a moderate economic policy, emerged as a potential. rival, Stalin orchestrared his murder and used it to [usrify the subsequent purges." Later, many believed that Stalin's neglect and harsh rreatrnenr of the city during and after World War 11 reflected his hatred for Kirov and fear of [he city'S great influence.

The Defence of the City

leningrad's close association with rhe rnillrary continued during the initial period of World War n. In March 1939, in rhe wake of the infamous MolotovRibbenrrop Pact between Hider and Sralin, the Soviet Union provoked war with Finland, mainly to improve the defences along the Soviet Union's northwestern borders. Leningrad served as the command POSt and base of operarions for the Leningrad Military District, which conducted rhe short war, Ironically the Red Army's dismal performance in the war encouraged Hider to launch Operation Barbarossa. The German Hihrer chose Leningrad as a prime military objective because be believed the city's capture and, if necessary, its obliteration. was necessary ro destroy rhe Soviet stare and, with it the forces of international Bolshevism. 1-1 itler's Wehrmacht (German armed forces) was to inflict rhis ugly judgement on the city of Peter and Lenin.

Leningrad's long and illustrious military past and irs current political, economic, cultural and strategic significance made ir an appropriate target for Hider's wrath. Responsibility for defending the city of 2,544,000 souls and irs surrounding region (oblast) rested with the Soviet government's and Party's central, regional and local organs, and the Leningrad Milirary District. At national level, this meant I. V. Stalin, Chief of Srate and the Communist Parry First Secretary, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Tirnoshenko, People's Commissar 0 Defence;

ABOVE: A Finnish machine-gun team during the Winter War. The HI-coordinated Red .Army cGmpoignagaill511iny finland cosllhe Sovielsnearly 50,000 dead, In iBerlin, Ihe ineptitude, 01 the Sovielperiormance convinced Hiller and his seniorcommcmders IhallheSoViel Union would rapidly 5u~cumb 10 Ihe IBlitzkrieg.

The Leningrad Military District

By" definition, the Leningrad Military District (L ID) was the "premier operational-srreeegic territorial formation of the Soviet Union deployed at Leningrad and in the surrounding oblast" on me eve of war. A was the case wieh other military distriers when war. broke our the LM.D was [Q form the Red Army's orehern Front (a From \\I,lS roughly equivalent to a German army group], which was responsible for mobilizing and deploying forces and conducting military operations in accordance with the Genera! Sra f's plans and directives under srricr

IKO supervision.

The U,4D had a long history as one of the Red Army's premier military districts. Formed on 6 September 19] 8 as the Petrograd Military Disrricr, it being the first military district in the Red Army, it was renamed the LMD on 1 February 1924 when the cit)' itself W3 renamed. During the ensuing decades, the military district served as the rest-bed for many advanced military concepts, such as air and chemical operations, airborne, air assault, and air landing operation , and the rwin concepts of deep battle and deep operations. Its distinguished roster of commanders included such future luminariesas M N_ Tukhaebcvsky, the architect of deep operations, B_ M_ Shape hnikov, the father of the Red Army General Staff, . K. Timoshenko, the Commissar of Defence, and future From commanders K. A. Mererskov, M. P. Kirponis and jV!. i'vl. Popov.11J

The LMO planned, organized and conducted the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-40, but performed so

14

poorly that it was replaced by the orthwestern Front, which was able to bring the war to a more successful conel usion.U

Between rile end of rhe ovier-Fiunish \'(far and the SHirr of the German invasion 01' 22 June 1941, [he LMD was at rhe forefront of attempts to reform, reorganize and re-equip the Red Army .. During this period rhe L .ill formed new mechanized and aviation formations armed with new types of weaponry. It alsocreated rhe orrhern Air Defence (PVO) Zone and constructed fortifications along the Soviet Uni.OIl'S new borders. When war broke OUt in June, Lieutenant-General. M. M. Popov, who had been assigned command in January, commanded the milnary district Corps Commissar r , r . Klernenr'ev was hi commissar (member of [he Military Council], and Major-General D. H, ikishev was his Chief of Staff.

On the eve of wa r, the LMD encompassed the territory of Leningrad and Murrnansk regions and the Karclo-Finnish Republic (SSR). The district's military forccs included the Seventh, Fourteenth and Twenty-Third Armies, XIX, XLII and L Rifle Corps. I and V Mechanized Corp, I Fighter Aviation Corps, and II PVO Corps and VIl Fighrer Aviation Corps PVO (of [he Northern PVO Zone)

15

T

( ee A/Jplmdices). The 1 ~ rifle divi in, one rifle brigade, four tank and fWO mororiz d division and eight f(Jrtified region, formed the nu leu of the di trier' ground for e . The ground for e numbered 404,470 men supported by 9 I gun and mortars, I l-l57 tanks (1543 opcrarional) and 1336 combat aircrafr (1216 operational).'!

The oviet rare cf nee Plan (DP-194l)

ordered [he military district ro defend the stare borders with Finland from the r tic ea to the ul f of Finland, the eo to roni, and the naval ba con the Hango Penin ula on Finland's ourhern coast in cooperation with the Soviet lorthern and Baltic Fleet .11 in the north. rhe di trier' ourreenrh Army defended the approa h ro Murman k with it: III Rifle orps, two eparare rifle divi ion, one ortified region and ) Mechanized rps' 1 r Tank

Divi ion, The venth rmy def nded the ector

between Lake nega and Ladoga in enrral Karelia

wirh four rifle divi 'ion and one fortified region. Finally, (he T\ cnry-Third Army defended the

Karelian I rhrnu with the 1 r and Rifle and

Mechanized (ITp. and two fortified regions. Two rifle divi ions, one rifle brigade four fortified regi n and one rank and one m torized clivi ion of

I Me hanized Corp \ ere dire dy ubordinare t military di trier head uarrers.

n 'the eve of war, rhe j KO and rhe encral

taff relied n the Balri pe ial Military Di en r,

whi h was [0 f em the orthwe tern rom in

wa rri me, to defe nd rhc a pproache through rhe Balri republic toward Leningrad. The U1D wa re ponsible for defending against any inn! h advance along rhe Karelian Penin ula CO\ ards the

Ity. A it turned our. the! KO's assumption that rhe lorrhwe rem Fr or c uld contain any enemy ad ance along the border or along the ~ e rern Dvina River. and certainly weU hort of Leningrad, pro ed to b grossly incorrect. Thi ad reality virrually negated mu h of the value of the j !D's prewar military planning.

Air Defence Over the Cit

However given its \ ell-defined defensive rcspon ibilirie and the KO false as urnption , rhe L 10 paid lirrl attention to preparing ground d ·fen e along the ourhern approache to [he city. nl. on rhe rnorrung of 23 June, 24 hour after the German invasion had begun, did General Popov begin worr. ing about hi military di rri r' ourh rn fl nk.

n that day Popov di parched hi deputy, ieutenanr- .eneral K. P. Piadyshev, to inspect the ourhern appr ache [ the iry and re ommend ire for the erection of new, precautionary defen e

line . Even though Piadyshev recommended that (he Kingi epp-Luga-Lake Il'men line hould be on idered as the 10 ical I arion for a clcfen e line tit ab ence of re ources made it a mom i ue, rhar i , until the wor ening ituarion finally impelled Popov to take action.

The [K a igned re pon ibilit or providing a ir defence over the northern Soviet Union, including eningrad, to the orrhern Air Defence iproti-

uo-uozdu hnaia oborona - P ) Zone. The zon

con is ted of II PVO orps a nd the yborg,

Murmansk P kov, Lu a and Perrozavod k P Brigade Regions. n 22 June, II P orp and 11 righter ianon orp \ ere re 'pan ible for air defence in the Immediate vicinity of Leningrad- II P orp • command d by la] r- eneral M_ l. Pror verkin, which on isted of the 11 irh, 169th,

LEn; Georgi Zhukov, Olle of the greatest commanders of World War II, was dosely involved with tbe military effort to free leningrad. The hero of Ihe victory over the Japoness Army at KhalkhiJt~ol ill August 1939, Stafin appointed him commander af Leningro.d ill September 1941.

16

TH

Leningrad

ll\rmy Headquarters 2 Hermitage

3 AdmiralI)'

4 S Isaac call1edral

5 Main Post and Telegraph Oflir;e 6 N KVO Headquarters

7 Mam waler wor1<s

8 Smolny Institute

9 Kazan cathell ra I

10 Gos Inyi Ovor

11 ~oscow Radway Station 12 Electric Power Sta lion 13 MartJ Shipyards

14 Vitebsk Railroad Station 15 Bectric Pour Station

16 Sa Itic Ra i!way StaUon

17 Warsa Ra itway Statio n 18 Main Gas

.19 KirO'l flour Mill 20 roy \'Ior1<s

VYBORG SIDE

o

2

o

3

- ....

20

........ ----*

21 Badaevskil Food Warehouses '}J_ lenin ~aChlne BuIlding Plant 23 Elektrosi la Works

189rh, 19 Znd, 19th and - 1 r nti-a ircra fr Artillery Regiments, numbered 9 -0 anti-aircrafr gun, 230 anri-aircra Fe machine un, 300 earch-

lights, 360 aerial ob tach: balloon 02 0

(early warning) po r and eight radio-location ires. The Baltic Fleets PV divi ion with] 91 gUll wa also operationally ubordinare to n P orp . VIl Fighter viari n ~orp, commanded by olonel . P. DOl nil 0\', consi red of rhe -. rd and -4th Figh re r Aviation Divi ion (P 0) and wa equipped \ irh 300 fighrer aircraft.

11 PYQ Corps defended rhe iry with a erie of defence zone radiating from me iry's nrre. A ystern of ;:1Ir oh ervari n and early , arning po t

ABOVE: The dty of leningrpd in 1941, Ihe city Ihol Adolf Hiller wlOJted to erase from the face of the e.arth. The Badaevskii Food Warehouses were lllIIodg the fint siles to be destroyed by German bombs, whith added to the problems of feeding a city full of refugees and troops.

Vyborg Side

24 UtelJtYI Bndge

25 Finland Ral!Way Stauon 26 Milltal)' Medical Academy 27 Statin Works

Petrogtad Side

28 Peter and Paul Fortress 29 ZoolOgical Garden

30 Botanical Garden

Vasll'e\lSkll Island 31 IIa llic ShlP)'lIrd

32 Electric Power Station 33 Army Food S orage

THE

(VN ) \ a deployed 120-14okm (T- 7.~ mile) from the city, a zone of aviation cover formed by vn Fighter Aviation Corps defended a belt 20-60km (12.5-3 .5 miles) di tanr from the city, and ami-aircraft artillery defended a z ne 35km (21.8 mile I from the ciry's centre. All of the air defences wer

centralized under 11 P orps' control.

Though this defence wa impo ing on paper, it suffered from several major weaknes e the rno t seriou of which wa a horrage of airfield. Compounding rhi problem, once war began. rhe rapid German advance disrupted the VNO • early warning ystem, forcing rhe icy's defender co rely on unreliable radio location and visual ob ervarion. The ovier command tried ro olve this problem by mounting eight PV gun barrerie 011 barges in the Gulf f Finland to increa e the depth of the defence. Parry organization al 0 upplernentcd the PV effort by forming local air defence (MPVO) force con i tin of 10- 1 elf-defence group of 600-800 men and women each, totalling around 00,000 per on who were re p n ible for ob ervarion, security and defence 0 city blocks and orher importanr buildings.!+

ABOYl: Derelic' barges studt fo.s' in ke in pre-war Leningrad,

an image that amply conveys the sub'zero temperatures that grip the dty during the winler. Death from the told was common during the first wlnler of the siege, espedally oller (entrnl heating was (ut 0" in December 1941 due to fuel shortages.

The Red Banner Bald Fleer, who e long history dared back to its creation r Peter T in J 70 I wa re ponsible for defending the ovier naval bases ill the Baltic region and at enin cad and the Baltic coast again t naval, ail' and r und attack. It wa to do 0 in 10 e c operari n with Red rmy for e. operating in adjacent land theatre. Vice- dmiral V. F Tribut , who was promoted to full admiral in May 194 ~ commanded the fleer throughout the enri re \ ar.

On rhe eve of war, [he Baltic Fleet con isted of a

urface hip quadron,.1 light ship detachment. three submarine brigade two rorpedo boar brigade a wide array 0 cutters, air forces oasral defence region and se ror nd rear ervi e in tallations and fa iliri . The fleet's force \ re rationed at [be Tallin, Hango, Kronshtadr and Libau (neal· Riga) naval ba es. Its 225 combat ships

THEel

included two hattie hips, rwo crui er , 2 I destroyer leader and destroyers. 68 submarines, two cannon hip, even de [royer escort, fOUI armoured cutters, - - torpedo boar, 34 mine-. w cper , four mine and net layer , 34 submarine hunter and numerous coa ral cutters. The Baltic Fleer's air force numbered 682 aircraft ( 9 ~ erviceable), in luding 184 boml ers, "31 fighter and 167 reconnai ance air 'raft. The fie t' naval and coa ral artillery included 2189 gun and mortar. Irs total personnel strength was 119.64' men.

o ier a al orce

\) hile the bulk of the Baltic Fleer upporred the Baltic Military Di rrict from it ba se at Tallin and Libau, [he fleet s ba es ar Kron hradr and Hango supported [he LiVlD. Although it wa not full)' a rivated until Ocrol er 19 1, the Leningrad Military r aval Ba eat Kronshradr wa responsible for helping to defend the ea approache ro Leningrad and the city ir elf.11 The bases primary rni 1011 was to conduct counrer-barrery fire and to erve a a rran - shipment point for for e between Leningrad and the ranienbaum bridgehead.

The ovier Union obrained Tr naval base at Hango located on tht: nonhero shore of rhe Gulf of Finland a a re ulr of the ovier-Finni h War,lti The ba e' primary mi ion wa to defend the ea route TO Leningrad through the CuI of Finland and provide a fOOThold on the southern coast of

inland. n l1.1une the th icparatc Ri le Brigade, border guard engineer-con rrucri n unit, coa tal and anti-air raft artillery batteries, an aviation group, and a naval security detachment defended the base. The garri on' overall srrengrh was 2~,OOO men equipped with 95 37mm ro 30Smm guns 0 aircraft, seven cutrer-hunrer and 16 au, - iliary hip.

Iorth of Leningrad. the Ladoga 1 aval Flotilla defended Lake Ladoga itself. The flotilla was an 'operarional-racrical naval formation" which had been created on 25 October 1939, and \ as ubordinare ro rhe Baltic Fleer. lr mission wa to defend rhe shore and water of Lake Ladoga primarily wirh a mall force of surface ships. On rhe eve of war it con isted of a clivi ion of even training

hip, a divi ion of 35 training cutter and an artillery training battalion with three I02mlll and ei hi 6mm guns. On _5 June 1941, the Cornmis ariat of the avy ( M) reorganized the florilla into a division of cutters, mine- \ eeper ,

ccuriry curter cutter-mine-sweeper and coastal

boat and uuirs.!" sprain 2nd Rank

Zcrnlianichenko commanded rhe flotilla when the war began.

Thus, on the eve of war rhe LMD the Balric Fleet and other organizations which were tasked with rhe defen e of Leningrad were marginally

apable of doing 0 bur only again t a Finnish arrack through Karelia. talin and the General taff in Moscow believed the powerful Northwestern From could defend the approache co Leningrad along the nortbwe rern axi . H w ver, neither rh UvlD nor the Ios ow authorities anticipated how rapid and destructive the German Wc:hrmacht s advance would be once Operation Barbaross a wa under way, They would pay dearly for underesrimarin' the ituarion. Wirhin ju t days the deteriorating iruari n convened rheir mild on ern into near panic.

LEFT: Stalin wos determined Ihat Leningrad would nol lolIta tbe Germans, but his interferente in the organilatian of Ihe city's defence as the Germans approoched during Ihe autumn of 1941 hindered rather than helped those on the ground. He saw plots and treason everywhere, espedolly when his generals retreated.

19

GRA

CHAPTER 2:

Following the start of Operation Barbarossa, the codename for the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the Red Army suffered a number of crushing defeats along the Soviet frontier region. In the north, teeb's panzers were soon racing for Leningrad as the military and civilian leaders in the city desperately tried to organize their defences.

LE

I

Adolf Hider' plan for Operation Barbaro ,3, the conquest of the ovier Union, were contained in Directive .0 21 i sued on 18 December 1940, \ hicb de ignared Leningrad Mo cow and Kiev a rhe '\ ehrrna hr' three prime military objectives. Plan Barbaro a required three army group to atra k irnulraneousI)' to envelop trap and annihilate rhe bulk of the Red rmy in rhc frontier region, to "p event 01l1~ bat-capable enemy force from withdrawing inr

the va Ru ian interior" .rmy Group orrh and

entre were to make rhc main arrack along the Leningrad and Moscow axes nann of the Pripiar Marshes, while Army Group outh wa to attack along the Kiev axi outh of the Pripiar Mar he .

nee Army roup entre had de [rayed enemy

force' in Beloru ia, it wa to a i t rmy roup N rth in apruring cningrad and Kronsbradr. .. nly after ac ornpli hing chi priority mi ion," read the directive hould we initiate op ration to seize Moscow." I

Field Mar hal Ritter von Leeb' .rrny Group

orth wa to advance along rhe Leningrad axi ,

LEn: Leningrad as a garrison town was ln the forefront of the Red Army's mobilization plans. This Inf!lotry unit is boarding a train for the front, men in cattie-carsl tbeir artillery under tamauflage on flat cars. The rifle is tbe standard Red Army Masin-Nagant Model 1891 - a robust and effective weapon.

destroy Soviet forces in rhe Baltic: region and apcure Leningrad. Leeb' army group consisted 0 the Eighreenrh and Sixteenth Armies and the Fourth Panzer Group, a total of six army and tWO motorized corps ba ked up by three security divi ions and an arm. corp in army group reserve (se Appendices for organization];' olonel- en ral Erich Hoepner Fourth P nzer Group on i ring of Colonel-Generals Ian Reinhardt's and ri h von

Man rein' J and L I MOtorized orps, wa

to pearhead the army group's advance} ColonelGenerals Georg von ue hler' and Ern r Ell ch' Eighteenrh and Sixteenth Armies, each with three army corp, were to advance on the Rank and in the wake of the advancing panzer :~ Leeb retained XX1II Arm. Corp III rmy grQup re ervc and could, if need be, all on L Army orp deployed in his seer r a Army High ornrnand ( KH) re ervc. This cast of players \ auld initiate the tirani Battle for Leningrad.

Leeb's . Hong and experienced force faced Colonel-Ceneral F. 1. Kuznetsov'sBaltic pecial Military Di trier who e Eighth and Eleventh Armies and III and XU Mecbanized Corp defended rhe norrhv estern srrsregi axis, Powerful on paper Kuznersov' forces uffered from the arne debilitating deficien ie rhar plagued the entire Red Army on rhe eve of war: they were only partially reorganized, trained and re- quipped. Because ralin ord I'

21

GRAD 1941-1944

prevented him from mobilizing and defending. properly, within \ eek > Army Group North had cru hed hi defence and quickly turned rhe pproache to Leningrad into a war zone.

Leeb's forces advanced on 22 June. ripped apart partially manned So vier defences, and plunged deep uno ovier territory pre-empting oviet defence plan and genera ring chao in the Red rrny' ranks. Kuzner ov tried to implemenr hi defen e plan, but given the pre ipirous and violent errnan atta k, did so in wooden and haphazard fashion. After counrerattacklng in vain on 25 June hi Eighth and -levenrh rrnies withdrew in dis rder northward towards the orthern Dvina River. The newly formed oviet taulea (I Iigh ommand) hastily tried to esrabli h new defen e to the rear by ordering Kuznersov to defend along the Western Dvina River with hi haltered Eighth and Eleventh Armie and the fre h Twenty- evenrh and Twenn - econd

rmie and r rl Me hanized orp. However,

when the Twenty- evenrh Arm, failed to 0 cup}' it defence in time, on 26 June Mansrein's LVI Panzer

orp captured a bridgehead over the \1 estern Dvina River. Deprived of hi la [ de e ive barrier along rhe northwe tern a" i Kuznets withdrew hi Eighth rmy northwards toward Estonia and the Eleventh and Twenty-Seventh Annie ea tv ards, leaving the approache from P kov and 0 trov ro Leningrad unprotected. Fa ed with the imminent loss of the Dvina River line on 29 jun the taoka ordered Kuznetsov to defend along rhe former

ralln l.ine (from Pskov to Osrrov), bur Kuznetsov

GRAD

LEFT: With their equipment stowed away, these men

pose cheerfully for the comera on the steps of the troop train. It would not be long before the Iront was only a short ma.rch from their ba.rracks. It is unlikely that many of these men would have survived the first

clashes with the German invaders.

and the Baltic coa t and protected hi right f1':1I1k again r arrack £rom evel. Hour later: rhe OKH added the area between Velikie Luki and ak 11 men to Hoepner' objectives. but ordered him nor to ad van e further without pecial authorizarion.

Arm Group orth Advance

Hoepner' panzer group advan ed from the Dvina River on 2 uly, Reinhardt's X 'X I Motorized Corp captured 0 trov on 4 July and P kov on July, crushing Soviet defences along the Stalin Line and entering rhe Leningrad region (oblast). To the south Man rein' L I Motorized orr seized Rezekne on 3 July, but then became bogged do n for day trying ro traver e the nearby wamp prompting Hoepner CO transfer Mansrein' 3rd Motorized Divi ion to Reinhardt' orp. At the

arne time, Kuechler Eighteenth Army pread into Latvia pu rung ba k Ivanov' sever ly weakened Eighth Army and upporred Reinhardt panzer to the ourh, while Bu ch' Sixteenth Arm)' upported Man rein' armour and protected the army group's right flank. By 6 July the border barrie were 0 cr. Leeb' army group and Hoepner' panzer had preempred tauka mobilization and defence plan utterly defeated Kuzner ovs orrhwe tern Front, and advanced northea rwards through the Stalin

ine. Leeb' army group nov po ed a deadly rhreat

ro Popo' orrhernFronr and r the great city of

Leningrad it elf.

Popov and his military council were acutely aware 0 rhe new rhrear 0 much so (bar on 25 june tbey a ep cd General Piady hey' propo ed new defen line along the Luga River and appointed him to ornmand the, a yet, phantom de ence, Thi rhrear ws nor Popov's only worry, for enemy forces were threatening hi from from Karelia in [he north to the Baltic coast, where rhe Baltic Fleer wa withdrav in' to Tallin.

Le b. army group re urned it advance on 9 July. ~ hile Kuechler' ighreenth Army cleared Soviet force' from ou rland La tvia and Estonia, Reinhardt' XXXXf Motorized Corp pread northwards rom P kov and Man rein' L 1 M t rized

orp \I epr northea t\ ard t ward L kc ll'men wi til Bu h ' ixreenrh Army protecti ng its righ r flank. ince tile), hdievcd the Red Army was already de eared Hitler and Gener I Franz Halder, rhe

KH hief of taff decided to retain he Third

roup in Arm .roup entre, only relea -

ing it XXJX lotorizer] orps to rmy .roup

North Oil 12 August. Q

failed to do 0 in rime .. (The ralin Line was theline of fortification built along rhe 19"'9 ovier-Polish border. lt 10 r much of it uriliry after the border moved we t a a re lilt of the iovier inva ion of Poland in eprern e 1939. uppo eelly, rhe line \ as partially di mantled and cannibalized to build new fortification along the new border. However, the

oviets manned it with fortified regions and, in ome eeror - the ourhwe - the line retained orne de en ive value.)" Reinhardt' r Panzer

Corps seized eros ings over the '\ e tern Dina River from [he Eighth Army on .30 June \ hile

an rein' 1 Panzer rp e panded i bridge-

head at Daugavpil .

Faced with looming di a rer on ~O June the to Ilk a shuffled the Front's senior command cadre, replacing Kuzner ov with Lieutenant-General P. P.

obennik v, the . ighrh rm}' commander and

app inting Lieutenant- eneral F. '. Ivan v in

bennikov read. t rhe 'arne time it em

Lieutenant-General 1. F. Varutin, the Deputy Chief of rhe General raf], who had played a vital role in preparing pre-war ovier de ence plan to erve a

obennikov' hief of staff effective from 4 july, arurin's in rru tions were ro re eore order to the Front at all co r and actively re ist the German advance. Meanwhile, the OKH ordered Leeb to advance through Pskov to Leningrad and ake

adog ro inve t Lenin rad, Hoepner' Furth Panzer Group wa ro advance northerly or northea twardl from P kov, while Kuechler' and Busch's in fa nrry cleared oviet force from E tonia

The oviet defences rhey faced were haky [Q say the lea t, The Norrhwe tern From' Eighth Army defended ourhern ronia and it levenrh and Twenty- evenrh Armie \ ere wirhd a\ ing from \\I ha r rerna i ned of rhe tal i n Li n c. Th ou gh

obennikov' mission was ro prorccr the approaches ro Leningrad and Tallin a huge gap existed ill hi front and rno r f hi urvi ing divisi n numbered le s than 2000 men each. n 4 July Zhukov ordered Popov's Northern Front' ro irnmcdiarel occupy a defence line along rhe arva-Luga-Srarais RussaBorovichi front" ro hore up the defen e ouch 0 Leningrad, and to help beef lip his forces, a igned him the Ba lri leer on 28 J line and the Eighth Army on 14July.IO

Popov re "ponded to Zhukov' order on 6 July by forming and deploying the Luga Operational roup

BELOW: A feature of Soviet cities wos the puLli( oddress system, which rompensated lor the lack of privately owned radios. Ihls group, fnduding a sailor of the Baltic Fleet, lidens Intenlly 10 Molotav's speech announcing the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941.

2

railroad line from Avrovo to Ryharskoe on rhe eva River. None of these lines, hOWCIIN, was heavily fortified. On 29 june, the tauka approved PUPO\" requc r ro form people's militia divisions (dh'iziia narodnogo opolcbanii - DNO) to generate necessary defence forces. \,('irhin davs the NorrhernFronr began forming people's militia divisions and innnediarelv di parched rhcrn IO d1C from 0 [hey could man the incomplcre and fragile defence.

German Frontllnes

&-lO.AugtJ!:I 1941 ------- 10 SeplemMr 1941 12 November 1941

Suoyarvl '.

Hold Leningrad "at all COS[s"

All of rhi frenzied acriviry ro hore up Leningrad's defences n:fle..::tedand was, in nun, effected by Stalin's derermined efforts to rationalize Red Army command and control from 1\11,0 scow. Between 30 June and 10 july, he established (he Stare Defence Committee and, ultimately, the Stavh« of tile High Command ro centralize control of operations .. 14 Also on 10 July, Stalin ordered the People's

omrnis ariar of Defence (NKO) IO organize the Main Command of the L orrhwesrcrn Direction to coordinate the orrhern and Northw('srern Fronts' and rhe Northern and Baltic Fleets' operation. Stalin appointed Mar hal of the 'uviet Union K. E. Voroshilov as the lain Command's Commander; A. A. Zhdanov, Secreta ry of the Communist Parry's Central Committee and Leningrad Parry Chief, as Member of the Military Council [Comrni sar]; and Major-General 1. V. Znkharov as Chief of Staff.

Beset by Gt'rman offellsives from north and sourh, Voro~hilo\! reorganized command and control of the Main ornmand' forces ourhwcst of Leningrad on 13 July. He transferred the battered Eighth AJimy and the Eleventh Army's XXXXI Rifle orps frOm Northwestern ro Iurthern Front control to help block the German advance on Leningrad, the former [Q defend Estonia and the larrer to reinforce the LOG. The LOG was to defend the southwestern approaches to Leningrad on .3 300km (I 87-mile) front from

arva to Lake Il'rnen, The Norrhwesrern From's Eleventh Army newly formed Thirry-Fourrh Army and Twenty- evenrh Army were to defend the Novgorod, Sraraia Russa and Vel.ikie Luki axe .IS Voro hilov stiffened his soldiers' resolve by issuing Order r 0 3, dared 14 July, which demanded Red Army troop bold Leningrad "at all costs".

Hoepner' Fourth Panzer Group resumed irs advance from the Pskov and OS[fOV regions 011 10 July. Reinhardt's XXXXI Iororized Corps advanced towards Kingisepp with XXXVUl Army Corp of Kuechler's Eighteenth Arm}' in it wake. Thecorps' lsr and 6rh Panzer Divisions pursued the

90

(LOG) with General Piadyshev in command. II When irs initial force occupied the line on 9 July, the group consisted of XXXXI Rifle Corps with four fifle divisions, two separate rifle divisions, one rnounrain rifle brigade, three militia divisions and severo I era ining school units. Jl During the next week additional forces filtered into the line and backed up Piudyshcv' fragile force wirh X Mechanized Corps' 21st and 24th Tank Divisions in fronr reserve. The Northern Front' Rear Line Construction Directorate had begun building the l.uga Line OIl 29 june, after halting a 1.I fortific:ltion work at Leningrad.r! The lineitself extended from rhe Gulf of arva to Lake !I'men with a gap

ABOVE: German IIndSo'liel opera lions durin.g Ih.e WehrmathYs approach 10 Leningract J 0 July 10 30 Det{!mber J 941. Red Army aUempb 10 halt the Germans were heroic bul disastrous, as SO'liel uni1s were continually outflanked Qndsunoun.ded by a: rIIOre:organized and mobile enemy.

between uga and Krasnogvardeisk through .. vhich the orrhwesrern Front's force .could withdraw. Behind the firsf line and roughly 20-3Dkm ( [1.5-18. 7"~ mi lc .) from rile c i ry it el f was a second "outer circle" anchored on rhe Kra nogvardei k Forrified Region, extending from Percrgof through Kra nogvardeisk to Kolpino. A third line, which formed the city's inner defence, stretched along the

24

LOG's forces through Liady toward Luga and captured several mall bridgeheads aero s the Luga River on 13 Jul.}'. There, rhe panzcr corp" advance stalled for six days in the face of fanatical. resistance by the 2nd D '0 and two companies of rhe Leningrad Red Banner [nfnntry ichool which Popov hall hastily dispatched to that ector to stem the German tide. Reinhardt's panzers were wirhin striking dista nee - [ 10k In (68.7- mi le ) - of l.cni rrgrad, bur could only strike if lansrcin's powerful LVI Panzer Corp could provide a sistance.

The Front Begins (0 Crumble

While Reinhardt's forces were marching victoriously towards rhe Luga River, Mansrein's LVI Mororized Corps and the Eighteenth Army's I Army Corps advanced ccnfidentlv -easrwards towards

Iovgorod and Sraraia Russa. The 8[h Panzer Division, in LVI Motorized Corps' vanguard, made spectacular initial progress, penerraring 40km {IS miles) and reaching [he town of ol'tsy late 011 13 july. There, however the LOG's 177[11 Ilifle Divi ion and X Mechanized Corps, skillfully exploiting the difficult terrain, struck back at the 8th Panzer Division, isolating it from the 3rd Motorized Division to irs left and rhe SS Totenkop] Divi ion still lagging well ro jrs rear. Only day before, an angry Stalin had .scarhinglycriticized Voroshilov's conduct of the defence and ordered Varurin, rhe orrhwestern From's new chief of staff, to savage the exposed German panzer force. Varurin orche crated a two-pronged assault on Sol'( y from the north and east by two orrhwesrern From shock gTOUpS.I~ The surprise Soviet assault forced the B til Panzer Division to fighr a costly barrie of ertcirclemenr for four days. It also disrupted German offensive plans by forcing Hoepner TO divert forces from the Kingisepp and Luga axes ro rescue rhe 8rh Panzer Division at Sol'tsy.!"

Once the crisis at SO!'TS), was over, I Army Corps continued irs advance, capturing Shirnsk all 30 Jldy.18 The corps' determined advance forced the Eleventh Army' XXII Rifle Corps and rhe TwenrySeventh Army to break contact and withdraw [Q [he Staraia Rus a-Kholrn line. Busch's Sixteenth Army pursued, caprur ing Kholrn on 2 August and Staraia Russa on 6 August,establishing a conrinucus front from Lake i1'men to Ve!ikie Luki .. Varutin's counter-

troke ar Sol'{sy succeeded in delaying the German advance along the Lugs Line for about three week. While Soviet critiques of the so-called ol'tsy-Dno counrersrroke recognize its impact on rhe German

25

THE SIEGE OF LE

GRAD 1941-1944

TARGET LENlNGRAD

offen ive timetable they al 0 lamented the arracking forces' poar command, control and coordination that prevented rhe operation from accomplishing far mare.

After the Sol'rsy counrersrroke failed, the Staok» demanded Voroshilov strengthen Ius Luga defences. Voroshilov then assembled a new reserve for rhe Luga Linevconsisting of fQur rifle divisions and the lse Tank Division sent southwards from northern Karelia. Widun days, however, rhe Finnish advance in Karelia and the Eighteenth Army's arrack into Estonia forced him to divert the four rifle divisions, leaving only the l st Tank Division south of Krasnogvardeisk as a reserve.r? On 15 J u I y the St(lllka also ordered Voroshilov to simplify his command tructure by forming rnaller forces that his commanders could more effectively conrrol.w POPO\' did so on 23 July by relieving Piady hev and splitting his LOG inro the Kingisepp, Lugs and Eastern Sectors. each responsible for its own defence,!l At the same time, having determined that the Luga Line was wholly inadequate for defence, on 29 July Voro hilov ordered construction of rhe Krasnogvardeisk Fortified Region and subdivided it into the Krasnoe elo, Central and lut k-Kolpino sectors. General Zairsev, chlef of the Northern Front's engineers, was to construct the fortified region with a new rni Ii fa ry-civilia n pecia 1 Defence Works Commission, headed by A. r\. Kuznetsov, the Leningrad Partychief who was responsible for constructing all defensive works in and around Leningrad. However" even this effort wa inadequare since Voroshilov objected ro placing defences

RIGHT: As the Ihr&al of German airalladu ,be<ame a reality, anti-aimml artillery was positioned, 10 'protect the dty. The Cruiser AUr(lfll~ seen here, 115 a :polentsymbol of the October Revol'utian, WIIS II :p non tv targ el for the luftwaffe. A.s II resull, its mooring on, the NeYIl WIIS well defended.

so dose to the city and insisted rhe work be concentrated on the Luga Line. Dissatisfied with rhe defensive effort, Stalin summoned Voroshilov and Zhdanov to -loscow on 30 July, where he sharply criticized them for "lack of roughness" in conducting operations in the Northwestern Theatre.

Meanwhile, the Siauka vigorously strengthened the defences south of Leningrad. On 6 August, it deployed rhe Thirrv-Fourrh Army with five ri·f1e and rwo cavalry divisions, four artillery regiments and two armoured trains to rhe orrhwesrern From, with instructions rhar jt be employed as a single enriry rather Than be frittered away on peripheral operations.n The next day it dispatched the newly formed Forty-Eighth Army with four rifle and one tank division, one rifle brigade and a detachment of ships to operate on Lake lI'men .[0 the orrhwestern Front with orders thiuie protect the Northern Front's left flank north of Lake Il'merl.~3

During the second half of July, Hider and the OKH formulated their final plans for the assault on Leningrad. Fiihrer Directive 0 33 dated 19 July ordered German farces to "prevent rhe escape of large enemy forces inro the depths of rhe Russian territory and to annihilate them." A supplementary directive is ued on 23 July reiterated Hirler'sinrencion [a capture Leningrad before marching on Mo cow, and assigned the Third Panzer Group [Q Army Group North far the duration of the operation against leningrad.!4 Shorrly after an OKW communique (Solidermehilillg) expressed confidence that victory was at hand. Issued on 6 August, it lauded German achievements during the first six

weeks of war, noring that Army Group orrh had cleared almost the entire Baltic State, broken through the 'talin Line, and occupied jumping-off positions along the Lake ll'rnen-Narva line for the offensive on Leningrad, According to the cornrnuniqne, Army Group - arch had taken or de rroyed 35,000 prisoners, 355 tanks, 655 gun and 771 airera fr during th is period.

Futile Counterattacks

Given this optimism, on 8 August Hitler declared he would soon reinforce Army Group orrh with XXXIX Motorized Corps from Army Group Centre and with Vill Air Corps, and ordered Leeb "to initiate the offensive on Leningrad, encircle [he city, and link up with me Finnish Army." Leeb was to make his main arrack between the Narva River and Lake !J'men on 9 August with XXXXland LVI Motorized and XXXVU Army Corps, \, ... bile I and XXVlll Army Corps of Busch's Sixteenth Army wert' ro conduct a supporting arrack sourh of Lake U'men.H Leeb formed three groups to conduct the final offensive cowards Leningrad. The Northern Group, with XXXXl Motorized and xxxvm Army Corps, later reinforced by the 8rh Panzer Division, was [Q arrack towards Kingisepp and Leningrad from irs Luga River bridgeheads.s- The Luga Group,consisring of LVI Motorized Corps, with the Sch Panzer Division in reserve, was to arrack through Luga towards Leningrad. Finally, the Souehern Group, wirh I and XXVTII Army Corps, was to arrack the Soviet Forty-Eighth Army along me Shimsk-Novgorod-Chudovo axis. eo.envelop Leningrad from [he east and sever its communications with doscow,

While the bulk of his forces advanced on Leningrad, Loeb planned major operations on his flanks, On rhe left, five Eigbreeneh Army divisions were [0 advance on arva, and the Eighteenth Army's x,.'XXXll Army Corps was to dear Soviet forces from the Estonian coast and Tallin, On his righr, [he Sixteenrh Army was to advance eastwards on a broad front south of Lake Il'rnen, defeat the Soviet Eleventh, Thirty-Fourth, Twenty-Seventh and Twenty-Second A rrnies, capture Staraia Russs and Velrkie Luki and penetrate into the Valdai Hi!! to

ever the vital Mo cow-Leningrad railroad line)" Leeb and hi subordinate armies retained only three security division in reserve,

Expecting the renewed German onslaught, (JJ1 9 and 10 August the StOllka ordered Voroshilo\' and Vatutin to mount yet another counterstroke, This

16

ABOVE: The Soviet boltle.ship Maratu:n.der Luflwllife otlQck III Krollshla.dtnG'la'l base in September 1941. The aged warship, which hod shelled German Iroopsos t.hey opprollthed tenin.grod o.n.land, was finolly sunk. on 23 September by Junkers Ju88 aircraf!. Some 200 of her crew were killed or wounded.

time they were to employ rhe reinforcements provided to [hem by the Sttwka in a counrerstroke designed [Q destroy aU German forces in rhe Sol'rsy, Staraia Russa and Dna regions. Planned by Varutin, the so-en lIed Srara ia - Russa - Dna offensive opera [ion required the Northwestern Front's Forty-Eighth, Thirty-Fourth, Eleventh and Twenry-Sevenrh Armies to conduct concentric (macks on 12 August against rhe Sixteenth Army's X Arrny Corps, which occupied an e posed position at Sraraia Ru ssa. The pincer attack by the Forty- igbrh Army towards $himsk and Utorgosh west of Lake Il'rnen and by the Eleventh, Thirty-Fourth and Twenty-Seventh Armies south of the lake were designed to cut off and destroy the German X Corp and capture . ol'tsy and Dno,thereby disrupting the German advance on Leningrad.

Despite ca reful preparations, Va rutin '5 offensive achieved only fleeting success, primarily because the

TARGETL

ixreenth Army pre-empted and di rupred rhe Ferry-Eighth rrny's attack by advancing on Novgorocl on 10 August. Worse rrill for Vaturin, X

rmy orp attacked ea [ward from raraia

Ru a, t. ing down much of the Elcvenrh Army' force. De pite the unanticipated difficulties, the

hirty-Fourth rmy, the remainder of Eleventh

Army and the wenty- eve nth rmy attacked early on 12 Augu r. though the Twenry-i everuh rmy' advan e faltered again r German defences at Kholrn, [he Thirty- ourrh Army spearheaded by the 202nd and 163rd Motorized and 2 -th avalry Divi ions. Thrust westward 40kl11 (25 miles), reaching the Dno- raraia Ru sa railroad line early on 14 ugu r. The dramatic advan e enveloped X Army orp in raraia Russa, separated it from 0 Army orp on it right flank, and threatened the rear of (he errnan main panzer force that wa advancing on .ov orod,

De pite it all piciou beginning, however. rhe

evict COli mer rroke oon floundered, in pa rt becau c of the roadle s terrain and in part due to the now familiar command and control problems, While the Eleventh Army arracked X Army Corps ar

taraia Ru 53 and the Thirry-Fourth Army threarened it ornmunicarion to the outhwe r, on 14 Augu t Leeb diverted the Toteukopf lotorized Divi ion from the Novgorod axi to Dna with

delayed the German advance on Lenin fad and the fighting it elf rook a toll on German rrength; by crus time Army Group! orrh's loses rood at a rna sive 80,000 men.

Slaughter at Kingi epp

In a larger en e, the failed ovier counter rroke at

raraia Ru sa al 0 diverted forces from both rrny Group orrh and Cenrreawar from the vital Leningrad axi by prompting the OKH to eliminate the threat ourh of Lake ll'rnen, On 24 Augur t ( KH ordered Army Group orrh's Vl Mororized II and X Army orp and Army Group entre' L II Motorized Corp to advance duo ugh Demiaru k toward aldai again r rhe oviet levenrh, ThirtyFourth and Twenty-Seventh Armies eo support the offensive toward ovgorod. After rain delayed the arrack for everal day, LVTI Motorized alp 19th Panzer Divi ion finally attacked capturing Dernian k on 31 Augu L To [he south the corp , 20th Panzer Divi ion and Il Army Corp encir led a large ovier for e at Molvotit y appr a h d Ostashkov and 10 ed the gap berv een Army Group orrh and outh, The OKW claimed that me operation de rroyed the Eleventh, Thirty-Fourth and T wenry- even til Armies (18 divi ion in all) a nd captured or destroyed 320 ranks, 659 gun and killed or captured -3000 men during the monrh: and 117 tank, 334 gun and 3 ~ 000 men during the operation in the aldai Hills. After the operation ended OKH ordered [ I and LVII M rorized orp to join rrny Group entre' advance on j 10 0\.

While the aldai diversion wa tying do" n [he better pan of two panzer corp. Leeb' army group resumed it advance on Leningrad, achieving immediatc succcs despite it erback ar taraia Rus a. Reinhardt' XX)..'J(T Motorized Corp, upporred by XX 'VT!I Army orp began the a ault along the Kingi epp-Kra nogvardei k axi on ugu r in driving rain. I i objective was the open country

ourh of the 1a rva-Leningrad railroad whi h hi ho k group reinforced by rhe re erve rh Panzer and 3rd Motorized Divi ion, couJd use a a ba e to wheel eastward towards Leningrad. Two day later, I lan rein' L I Motorized Corp and vm Army Corp attacked along the Luga and [ lovgorod axes towards the southern and ourhea tern approach ro Leningrad.

XX I Motorized and xxxvm Army Corp'

1 t and 6th Panzer 36th Motorized, and L t infantry Division penetrated the 2nd DN ' and 90th Rifle Divi ion' defence alongrlw Luga River at

ABOVE: General Erich Hoepner ((entre), commander of the Fourth Panz.e.rGroup, watches the progress of his tanks during the opening phase of BarbllrossCl, the codenome for the German atlllck on the Soviet Union. The officer on the right is General Georg-Hans Reinhardt, commander of XXXXI Panzer Corps.

rder t block the .oviet ad ance. He chen [tan - fer red LVI Motorized Corp' headquarter and "rd Motorized Divi ion from the Luga e rot along with VUl if Corps ro counrerarra k against the Thirty-Fourth Army late the next day, The ounrerarrack was immediately successful. By 25 August LVI Mororized Corps bad driven [he Thirty-Fourrh and Eleventh Armies back ro [he Lovar River line

apturing 1 ,000 Russian and apruring or de rroying over 200 rank 300 gun and mortar 6 anti-air raft guns 700 other vehi les, and the fir r Kariu ha rocker launcher to fall inra r inro German hand.

Though aturin's countersrroke failed it did adversely effect the subsequent German advance on LeningTad)8 Fir r, the increa ed ovier resi ranee prompted the OKHro shift additional forces from Army Group Centre [0 Army roup North and ac elerare rran fer of X XIX Motorized Corps northwards from molen k ro reinfor e the drive on Leningrad. AI 0, the diver ion of l I Ilororized Corp r taraia Ru a eriou Iy weakened and

2

Kingisepp, Ivan v k and Bcl'shoi ab k on 11 August. However, [he three days of heavy fighting co r the attacker 1600 a ualries.> The Germans [hen comrnirred the th Pamer Divi ion (detached from Man rein' corp) which lunged forward and severed the Kingisepp-Krasnogvardeisk railroad line [he next day. XXI Motorized Corp then wheeled irs main force ea rward towards Kra nogvardeisk, while the ac ornpanying infantry launched a upporring attack we [\ ard [0\ ards Kin isepp. Voroshilov reinfor ed rile agglng defences in the Kingi epp se tor with rh 1 t Tank Divi i n and the I r .uard 0 1 on 9 ugu r, and (he 2 r Rifle Division on l ugu r, r rhe same time, Popov o cupied the Kra nogvardci k ortified Region with the 2nd and 3rd Guard D[05 on 17 Augu r and the 29 J tRifle Divi ion on 18 Augu r. and formed a

epsrate Aviation Croup to centralize control of hi Front' aircraft. The Kingiscpp Croup launched repeated ounreratta k between I' and I but rhey all failed. Beginning on 16 ugust Panzer orps' 6th, ] t and th Panzer Divi ion repeatedly a aulred oviet po man along the approaches to the Kra mogvardci k Fortified Re ion for six day, but failed to crack the Soviet defence. To the west, German Infantry occupied Kingi epp on 16 August, forcing the Eighth Army to withdraw it five rifle clivi. ion defending Kingi epp from the J arva region to the ea. tern bank of the Luga River on 21 ALIgu [. The Eighth rrny reponed 10 ing all of i regimental and battalion commander and their

taff in the vi iou fighting. r und Kingi cpp)O

Unending oviet Di a ter

However [he German failure to destroy the oviet forces at Narva and Kingi epp left a worn-down yet still sizeable force rhrearening the left flank of X XXI Mororized o.rp forces attacking Kra nogvardei k.31 onsequently, Leeb ordered the motorized corp [0 po pone temporarily it a aulr on Krasnogvardei k 0 that the Eighteenth Army' infantry could eliminare the threat and at the same time, rhreaten Kronshradr and Leningrad from the

ea. XXV1 and XXVlll Army Corp attacked between 22 and 2 - Augu [ and, by I eprernber, had forced the Eighrh Army' forces to withdrav into a tight bridgehead outh of Oranienbaum, which Soviet forces would retain unti I ] 944. During rhe period &om 21 Augu t [0 9 Seprernber, the Eighteenth Arm}' reponed it had captured 9 4 pri oner and de troyed r captured 60 tank and 77 gun .12

29

WhiJe rhe forces on Leeb's left flank smashed the

orrhern From's defences at Kingisepp and assaulted Krasnogvardcisk, Manstein's LVI Ilotorized Corps' 3rd Motorized Division and L Army Corps' 269[h and S Pol ice Divisions began their assault along the Luga axis on 10 August. Simultaneously, xxvm and I Army Corps anackcdalong rhe Novgorod axis on Manstcin' right Oank. The three corps ron: through the LOG's and Forty-Eighth Army's partially prepared defence forward of Luga and Novgorod, After the Jrcl Mororizcd Division was diverted to deal with the crisis at Sraraia Ru sa. L Army Corps' 269th lnfanrry Division, reinforced by the 8th Panzer Division, broke into the Luga defence line and outflanked lind captured l.uga on 24 August after two weeks of very heavy fighting. The hag of captured men and hardware reached a reponed 16,000 men,-I tanks, 171 artillery pieces and 1000 vehicles.

At the arne time, XXVlU and I Army Corp smashed the F eery- Eighth Army s defences a long the M shaga Rive r on lOA ugust a nd had ca prured

TARGET LENINGRAD

men, and 5043 rifles and 3 -1 artillery pieces remaining with which ro defend rhe southeastern approaches to l.eningrad.»

Faced with these disasters, on 23 August Voroshilov subordinated the FOrty-Eighth Army TO the Northern Front 0 that it could berrer coordinate its 9 . cnons with other forces dr::fending Leningrad, and ordered Akimov' withered army ro defend the Gruzino-Liuban sector protecting the main axis into Leningrad from the sourheasr, The same day, rhe Stavka split Popov's Northern From into the Leningrad Front under Popov's command and the Karelian Front under rhe command of LieutenantGeneral V. A. Frolov. The new Leningrad Front a sumed control of the Eighth, Twenty-Third and Forty-Eighth Armies, the Koper, outhern and Slursk-Kolpino Operational Groups, the Baltic Fleet, and Front air forces. The Karelian Front, which was re ponsible for operations north of Lake ladoga, controlled the Sevenrh and Fourteenth Armies and the orrhern Fb"r.

ABOVE: The Communisl Pllrly wilson .inle!l1111 port ollhe Red. ArmV lit 011 revels .. !:lere, Majof"'General A, L Bondlllev(rlghl) (onfers with Regimental CommIssarS. l. Alex.ondtov. The p(lliliclil affker~,plusall (t;lmmunist Party members,. if caplured by the Germans, were immedialelyexec;uled.

The Germans Close In

Voroshilov also arrempted ro tighten up the 1 orthwestern Command's organization for the defence of Leningrad by serring up a local council ro deal with rhe existing crisis. However, S[3I.in intervened, forcing him to create the larger and more forma I },Iiilirary Council for the Defence oE Leningrad under closer Staoha control. The new council's mission was [0 mobilize all the forces chat would be necessary for the city's defences .. Its mernbers, by implication, would be held responsible for failing to do so. Council members in·eluded Voroshilov, Zhdanov, his commissar, Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, the aval Commissar, and others. To ensure stricter Staoka control, DO 17 August me GKO abolished the orrhwesrern Direction High Command and merged its remnants inro the

eningrad From, which was Hill under Popov's command. In doing 50, rhe GKO assumed direct control over the Karelian, Leningrad and

Iorthwesrern Fronts' operations. This directive, which was unique in Soviet wartime command and conrro], effectively ended Voroshilov' and Zhdanov's sarrapy over military affairs at Leningrad. Voroshilov, who had displayed his military incompetence on far roo many occasions prior to and during the W'H, would nor feel [he directive's full effects umil almost two weeks later.

By late August German forces were pummelling Soviet defences at Krasnogvardeisk, only 40km (25

Shunsk by the 'l Zth, After repelling Forty-Eighth Army counterattacks against its left flank between 13 and "IS August, XXVITl Army Corps swung to the northeast, ourflanking the ha pless Soviet defenders of Luga from the cast. I Army Corps captured ovgorod on 16 August and raced northwards to capture Chudovo on 20 August, severing the Moscow-Leningrad railroad line and communicarion between the forty-Eighth Army and the remainder of the orrhwesrern Front, whose offensive at taraia Ru sa wa by this time falrering. In two week of fighting, )("XV[ll and I Army Corps had [liken 16,000 prisoner, destroyed or captured 74 tanks and 300 guns and reached the desolate rerrain along the Volkhov River. General Akirnov's Forty-Eighth Army was a wreck, with only 6235

]0

miles) southwest of Leningrad, ami had reached Chudovo, on rhe mam Leningrad-Moscow railroad line only 100km (62.5 miles) sourheasr of rhe city. Worse still, the Stavka feared [hat German forces ndvancingeasr of Leningrad might link up with Finnish forces and encircle the city. To protect against that evenrualiry, on 27 Augusr it began deploying fresh forces along and east of rhe Volkhov River. These included the newly formed FiftyFourth <1I1d Fifty-Second Armies and, later, the Fourth Army. which were responsible for protecting the Volkhov axis and preventing Getman forces from advancing TO Tikhvinand the Svir River and linking up with Finnish forces advancing eastwards through the Karelian Isthrnus.v Finally, on 5 September the GKO appointed Voroshilov to command the Leningrad Front with Popov as his Chief of Staff osren ibly to foster unity of command.

\Xlhil·e the StaIJka strove desperately fa shore up its defences south and east of Leningrad, Leeb prepared to resume his offensive, intending TO do so once the crisis at Sraraia Russa had passed and after General Rudolf Schmidt's xxxrx Motorized Corps had arrived from Arm}' Group Centre .. u In the meantime, between 24 and 26 August he concentrated the Sixteenth Army's rand XXVUl Army Corps and XXXIX MOTOrized Corps in the Chudovo and ovgorod region with orders [.Q penerrare into Leningrad from the SOUTheast along [he Leningrad-Moscow road.1& While Schmidt's 1110[ofizedccrps wasencircling Leningrad from the southeast, Hoepner's panzer group a nd Kuechler's Eighteenth Army were to arrack Leningrad from the south and the west. To the south. the remainder of Busch's Sixreenrh Army was to defend the army group's right flank along the Valdai l-]jlls and Volkhov River,

A Chaotic Defence

The Leningrad Front'S defences (IPPO ire the gathering German host were a shambles. The Eighth Army clung to defences west (If Leningrad and the LOG attempted to man the Krssnogvardeisk Fortified Region, even though most of its XXXXI Rifle Corps was half encircled between Luga and south of Krasnogvardeisk. To rhe east, rhe threadbare Forty-Eighth Army defended rhe 40km (25-milelsecror frol11 north of Chudovo, v vhile the Northwestern From's ha rily assembled Novgorod ArOlY Group AG) screened the Volkhov River north of ovgorod.!"

XXXIX Motorized Corps, flanked on [he left by xxvrn Corps' 1215[, 122ndal1d 96th Infantry

]'1'

GRAD 19-U-[944

GRAD

Divi ion, rna bed rhr ugh rhe F rry-Ei hrh

rrnv' defen es and captured Liuban on 2- Augu r.

F laving uncovered the outhea rem approaches ro Leningrad, chrnidr' orr fanned our in three directions rhe 18rh Motorized Divi ion northeastward towards Kirishi, rhe 11rh Panzer Division westwards towards Kolpino, an I rhe 20th Motorized Divi ion norrhwe rwards towards Volkhov, The next day a frantic Stallka allocated rhe Leningrad Front four day \ orrh of Leningrad's rank production, four aviation regiments and 10 march battalions with which [0 reinforce it defence. Popov tried to plug the yawning gap [hat now e i ted outhea t 0 Leningrad by reinforcing his . lue k-Kolpino Group with the 16 th Rifle Divi ion, \ hicb was transferred from north of Lake Ladoga and rhe 4th 0 0 [ran ferred from Kra nogvardei k. He also ordered the Group and Forty-Eighth Army "to or aruze a trong defence and conduct counterattack

Clo ing the Iron Ring

De pire Popov's bravado hmidt' 12[h Panzer and 20th ororized Di i ion, ollowed by [he 12] [, 96rJ1 and l21nd Infantry Divi ions, raced forward towards Tosno and Mga Station while the 18th ,1o[Qrized Division advanced OJ1 Kirishi. The 20tb Motorized Divi ion captured Tosno and rea bed [he eva River at Ivanov koe on 29

ugu r rhrearening to sever the la r Leningrad railroad line ro [he ea r and in the pro e plirring apart ovier force d fending ourheasr of

eningrad. With hi left flank 'pli[ a under, Popov in peer d the Kra nogvardci k Fortified Region and on ~ 1 ugl.lst requested and received tauk« permis ion to reorganize the region into two armies, rhe Fifty-Fifth to defend rhe western portion of rhe fortified region and the Forty- e ond Army to defend it ea rem portion.38

The reorganization implified command and control of for e defending the area ourh of Leningrad, and in a doing ignificamly influen ed [he our and outcome of the battle For the city. fter piercing [he Forry-Eighth Army' defence ea t of Leningrad,

HI Tmy orp: wheeled we rward toward

Leningrad proper. The corp.' three in fantry diviion wirh the J Zrh Panzer in upport, managed to drive the Fifry-Fifth Army back to the lzhora and

eva River, in heavy fighting between 0 Augu t and epternber, However, three day of Fierce fighting at lam-Izhora forced the errnan to hair their ad ance on 9 epternber,

To rh ea r, after emng hud \'0 and Liuban on 1 ugu r, the rwo motorized division of hrnidr'

XIX 1\ fororizcd Corp attacked norrheasrwards towards M nand rhe southern hore of Lake Ladoga and towards Kiri hi along he Volkhov River. They pummelled the weakened Forry-Eighth Arm}". forcing it to withdraw ru rhe Mga-Kirishi line, and captured Mga on 29 Augu r. Meanwhile, PUPO\' ordered the Forry-Eighth Army ro recapture Mga and counrerartnck on 6 prernber co drive the

ermans ourhwards.t? He reinfor ed rhe army with an NK D Rifle Division formed from Karelinn border guard which managed to recapture Mga from the 20th Motorized Di i. ion on 30 ugu r, and repelled evera I German a ault Oil Ivanov koe and rhe mouth of the Mga River on 31 Augu t.~1) Howe er; {he 20th Motorized Oivi ion recaptured M a on 3 L A ugu r, and after a week of heavy fightin during which the J Zrh Panzer Divi ion reinfor ed it on 7 eprember it finally cracked the Forry-Eighth Army's defence ourh of Lake Ladoga. The 20[h Motorized Divi ion then caprured il iavino after heavy ighring on eprember and oc upied hlis el'burg [he ne t day, The j\,T]( D Rifle Divi ion withdrew [0 the Neva River and the ] [ eparare Mountain Rifle Brigade [Q defences cast of iniavino. The OKW announced rriumphanrly in a communique that "the iron ring around Leningrad ha been cia ed" ignalling the beginning of [he Leningrad blockade.

ABOVE: As the Germans tighten.ed the noose around Leningrad, senior Wehrmacht officers sometimes made the trip 10 the fronlline 10 assess Ihe situation for themselves. Here, General Kruger and his adjutant survey the eHecf5 of a LuftwaHe air strike on a nearby village.

Fresh laughter for no Result

Whil the 10 of hli sel'burg wa di a troll enou h for Popov' Front a well a Leningrad' now be ieged population, rhe presen e of German forces within triking distance of Vulkhov and leningrad' cornmunicarions with Moscow and (he remainder of the ountrv only ervcd to wor en an already had ituarion. Forrunarely, Popov could 011 ole himself with two po irive dcveloprncnr . The arrival of mall rein for em nr enable the Neva p rational Gr up t hold firmly t it defence al ng the leva River , est of hlissel'burg. Farther east, Iar hal Kulik's new Fifty-Fourth Ann)" whi h the Stavka had just deployed forward to fill the gap between the Leningrad and orthwesrcrn Front now de .ended Volkhov and managed to halt the German advance ea. t of iniavino. However, an even greater ovier di a rrer had occurred ourh of Leningrad.

The G rman advance on Kras nogvardei k and the Forty-Eighth rrny' 10 of hudo 0 and Tosno severed the L G's communications and lines of

withdrawal r rad. The Group abandoned Luga on 20 u u t and attempted to wirbdraw ro Krasnogvardei k, bur wa encircled and for cd ro cur irs war our TO rhe norrh and ea t in mall parries. During their escape, the th Panzer, Police, 269rl1 and 96ch Infantry Divisions hounded rhe encircled force unmercifully by consrant converging arrack, infli ring esrirnared losse of roughly 30,000 men, tlO rank and 400 guns on the beleaguered ovier force.41

The capture of hli sel'burz on 9 September ave the German roral .onrro] over all 0 Lenin zrad's ground communication with the remainder of the country. Hen eforth, reo upply of the cit)' wa pos-

ible only via Lake Ladoga or by air. \ hile the e ha rsh realirie convinced the Stavka and the Leningrad Front that rhe Eight for leningrad wa fa t approaching it climax, rno t in the German leadership felt the climax had pas ed and the ity was their for the raking. n 5 eprernber Halder wrote in hi diary:" Leningrad: ur bjective ha

31

been achieved. '\ IiI] now become a subsidiary rhearre of operations. ~ iven these strategic perception , Hider decided to prevent unneces ary ca ualtie, avoiding an a sault Oil a city that wa: already dnorned. Enticed b)1 new opporrunirie in Army Gruup Centre' ector; he ordered Leeh ro en irde and tarve out Leningrad rather [han eize it by frontal a sault, Fuhrer Directive 0'" -, dated 6

eptember, ordered Army roup entre to eml ark on irs (0 CO\ adventure:

"The initial ucce e in operations again r enemy force located between he adjoining flank uf rrny Group outh and entre, combined with further succes e in the encirclement of enemy forces in rhe Leningrad region, ha ve created prerequisites for rhe conduct or a decisive operation against Army Group Timo henko, which is unsu • ccssfully conducting 0 fen ive operations in front of Army Group entre. I[ rnu r be destroyed deci iveIy before the on et of winter v irhin rhe limited rime indi ared in exi ring order."

The Finni h Dimen ion

Within the context of perarion Typhoon, Leeb' order were;

. To encircle enemy force operating in the Leningrad region ... in cooperation with Finn! h forces so rhat a con iderable number of rhe mobile and Fir t ir Fleer ormation, particularly VUI Air Corps, can be cran ferred to Army Group entre no

later [han 1 eprernber, "42

n 4 epternber, errnan force began hellin eningrad daily with 240mm guns from the region north a To no and. four day larer, German air-

rafr began pounding rhc city wirh daylight air raids. In respon e rhe taoko ordered rhe Leningrad Front to form [he Ladoga PVO (Air Defence) Brigade Region.

Finnish rrny operarion on the Karelian J thrnu and to rhe north further cornplicared the oviet defence of Leningrad. Irhough the Finns were tippo ed to help capture lenin rad, from 22 June to L 0 July they onducred only limired-objecrive perarion , and after 10 July they limited their operanon to the sector we of I ake nega and Ladoga again t the ioviet evenrh Ann}'. Beginning on 31 July, however, Finni h forces attacked the Leningrad Front's Twenty-Third Army defending rhe Karelian I rhmu , forcing the army to withdraw to new defen ive po irian a rride the isthrnu only 30km (Is.r mile I from Leningrad'. northern dcfen e . Although the Finn advanced no further, the m re

GRAD 1941-1944

LEFT: This hastily constructed defence line on the outskirts of Leningrad ii manned by infantrymen druwn from Ihe city's garrison. Movement is dearly 0 ri5ky business, liS Ihe men crouching Dnd scampering at Ihe back of the trench demanrlrole!

rhrear of, Finnish arrack adver ely affected the Leningrad From's defence in other eetors. For example, at a rime when Popov rna r needed re erves, Finnish operations for ed him to rran fer rhe 265th Rifle Divi ion, the Ferry-Eighth Army s re erve, and the 291 t Rifle Division from the Kra nag ardei k Fortified Region to bol rer the Twenty-Third Army' de ence against the Finn.

At the end of the first week of September, the ehrrnacht began operations (0 i olare and de troy Leningrad. A anti-climactic a it seemed t the German no Russian doubted the battle wa ar its climax.

Following Hider's directive Leeb formulated a plan [Q encircl Leningrad by ealing off all acces routes [0 ir from both east and west. Leeb' original plan called for Hoepner s panzer group to e rabli h a tight inner encirclement line around the city with Reinhardt's and Schmidt's XXXXI and XXXIX Motorized Corps, while Kuechler's Eighteenth Army formed a broader encirclement line extending from Kopor kii Bay to Lake Ladog:;l.~l However, Hitler's directive ordered Leeb to tran fer XXXXI LVI and L Il Mororiz d, plu IU Air rp to

rrny Group Centre, effecrive f S eprember, leaving the field marshal only XXXLX Motorized Corp and, a a later conce ion, the 8th Panzer Division. iven the e realitie Leeb decided to onducr a wider encirclement of [he city with XXXIX lororized Corps, leaving the Eighteenth Army the broad ector ourh and \ est of Leningrad. Before it

departed to Army Group entre, however Motorized Corps would spearhead the advance on Leningrad from the sourhwe r.

n 29 Augu t Leeb ordered his for es to condu t a • \ ide encirclement of Leningrad" by capturing bridgeheads over the Neva and rhe towns of Uritsk, Pulko 0 Pushkin (Der koe elo] Kolpino and Izhora, and e rablish a right ring around the city before rhe Fourth Panzer Group departed. Leeb

rganized his atra king for es into [\ v 0 group: the Krasnogvardei k and lut k-Kolpino Group. he former consisted of X XVIlT and L Army and XXXXI Motorized Corp , deployed with the Ise and 6th Panzer, and 36th Motorized Divi ion in the centre XXV1Il Army orps on the left, and the L Army Corps on rhe righr.+ The 8rh Panzer Division, \ hich wa refitting after uffering heavy 10 e the previou month, wa in re rve. Thi group v a to capture Krasnogvardei k, Krasnoe elo and Uritsk, reach the coast of the Gulf of Finland and i clare

o ier force we r f Leningrad from the city, The Jut k-Kolpino roup, under Hoepner' command and consisring of xxvm Army Corps and elements of the 12th Panzer Divi ion was to penetrate 0 ier defence along the lzhora River and aprure lutsk and KolpinoJs Farther east, x.xXLX Motorized Corp , 20th Motorized Divi ion and the 12th Panzer Divi i n' main force were ro widen the c rridor to

hli el'burg and Lake Ladoga, creen rbe eva

River on its left flank and drive ovier forces eastwards from iniavino.

34

ARGET LENINGRAD

oro hilov ighth Forry- econd and Fi ry-Fifrh

Annie defended the curhern approa hes to Leningrad. Lieutenant-General F. . lvanov' Forry-

e ond Army manned [he Krasnogvardeisk Fortified Region from Krasnce elo to Pu to hka with two divisions and one fortified region.~6 Major- en era I of Tank Forces L G. Lazarov' ifryFifth l'my defended the lur k-Kolpino Fortified Region from Pu roshka ro [he eva River with six di vi ion, one forti fied region and [\\'0 rank battalion Y Finally Major- encral . 1. hcherbakov s Eighth Army defended the coastal ector we t of the city with ix weak divisions, four of which were deployed along the main German attack axis.s

oro hilov retained the 10th and 16th Rifle Divisions, 5th 0 'O, the 8th Rifle and 1 t aval Lnfantry Brigade and the 48th Tank Battalion and rhe #OOth Rifle Regiment in re erve.-l9 n 11

eprember, the Leningrad From s strength wa 452 000 men about two-third of whom were deployed ourh of Lenin rad facing an equal number of German. Ea t of the Shli el burg corridor the 85,000-man Fifry-Fourrh Army was assembling ar olkhov, in [he rear of rhe decimated FortyEighth Army)!)

XXXXl Motorized and XXXVITI Army orp began their a sault towards Kra nogvardei k Kra noe cia and rir k earl}' on 9 eprernber, The

36th Mot rized Division qui kly penetrated rile 3rd D 0' defence and advanced 10km (6.25 mile ) before being haired by heavy artillery fire late ill the day. The day before the Lu [\\'affe had begun three days of heavy bombardment against the city to upplement the heavy shelling rhar had begun 011 I

eprember, The artillery fire' effecrivene however

wa limited ince it could nor hit the heart of the city. The Luftwaffe dropped 8000 incendiary bombs during the air trike au ing heavy damage and malt}' fires and de troying the Badacv kii Warehou es where rno r of Leningrad's foodsmff were STOred.

In re ponse. Voroshilov ordered Ivanov's Forry-

econd Army ro fire a tTong artillery COUlHerpreparation on 10 epternber and ounreratra k vigorou iy with the 3rd DNO. However, XXXX( Motorized Corps ommiered the lsr Panzer Divi ion to combat lare on 10 eprember, and it punched ir way through to the Krasncgvardeisk-Krasnoe elo road, forcing the 3rd DNO [0 withdraw northwards. It oon became dear, however. rhar reinforcements would be necessary [0 overcome (he

BELOW: The Imperial Russian Army had always prided itself

an the bravery and eHicien(y of Its artillery arm, and that tradition W05 maintained In tbe Red Army. These two howit18rs are preparing to fire in support of an armoured attack on the German besiegers.

Forty-Second Army' well-prepared defen es, ince the 6th Panzer Divi ion wa engaged in heavy fighting for Kra noe elo, l.eeb reinforced [he 1 [Panzer Division with a ingle tank barralion rather than the entire Bth Panzer Division.'! At the same irne, an increasingly desperate Vow bilov committed his last re erve into battle. De pire [he reinforcements, rhe 1 [ Panzer Division aptured Dudergov n 11

epternber and Kra noe elo on 11 eprember but was then haired at Pulkovo after rea hing Leningrad' outhwe rem uburbs.S The way wa now open for L Army Corp to exploit toward

lutsk and Pu hkin and link up with r- CVlIl Army orps, whi h was arrackin Pushkin from the ea r.

The fighting inten ified on l_eptcmb r when the Isr Panzer and 36th Motorized Divi ion outflanked the Forry- econd Army' defences at Krasnog ardei k, threatening rhe rear of the Fi fryFifth Army force defending lut k nd Kolpino.

nee again, however crrnan reinforcernen were OOt available since the th Panzer Divi ion wa still reorganizing and was unable to exploit the motorized corp' success. '\ or e till for Leeb the Fift. -

ifrh Army then halted XXV111 rrny orp'

advance on lur k.n (I r ult, Voroshilov tran - ferred the forces defending Kra nogvardeisk to Fifty-Fifth Army control and ordered Lazarov'

Leeb di patched the rh Panzer Divi ion to as i r

chmidr' orp and rhe fre h 254[h Infantry

Divi ion to the Eighteenth rrny co fill the gap once Reinhardt's orp had departed.» 11 13 epternber XXVlll Army Corp was to advan c westwards towards Pushkin, Slursk and Marino and rhe 6rl1 Panzer Division wa to arrack Pu Itkin from the west. After regrouping to permit the infantry to cat h up. the re t of Reinhardt' orp wa to pearhead one final attempt to breI" h Leningrad' defences south of rhe Pushkin-Petergof road with

XX HI Army Corp on irs lefr and L Army orp

on it right.

ABOVE; The conversion olthi~ dep(lrtmenl siore on the Stotlnevski Prospect inlo a defen5ive position demonstrates the architecture and layout of Leningrad: wide, straight avenues, tall, solidly budt buildings. These civilian labourers, including women, are working under the 5upervision of on army engineer section.

Stalin Reorganize the Defenc

'I irh the German non e around Leningrad tightening a di ali fied ralin made 'whole ale change to the Leningrad Front ommand trucrure, On 10

eprember he appointed rrny eneral G. K.

Zhukov [0 command the From in pla e of the haples Voro hilov, who e incompetence wa becoming mote evident each day .. talin wa particularly angry over oro hilov' failure ro inform him about the all of hli el'burg, a fa t whi h talin fir r read

about in a erman communique. ralin al 0 learned of [he Leningrad Military ouncil' decision to demoli h Leningrad's military installation in anticipation of me city' falJ ro the German. hile meeting with dmiral Kuzne ov, whom he had urnmoned ro Moscow to prepare preliminary in truetion for scuttling the Baltic Fleer, talin admitted:

"It i po ible that it (Leningrad) may have to be abandoned." Before Zhukov' deparrure ro

eningrad ralin informed him, "It i an aIm r

hope lc iruarion, By taking Leningrad and joining up with rhe Finn the German can trike Ioscow from the norrhea t and rhen the situation will become e ell more criri al. ' Handing Zhukov a slip of paper r. lin said "Give this to oro hilov." The paper read "Hand 0 er ommand of the From to Zhukov and fly back to Mo COl immediarely, "5'

ratio al 0 di banded rhe Leningrad From's Forty-Eighth Army, which the advan ing German

had already dernoli hed in any a e, and n 12

eprernber, a igned it orces to Kulik' new FiftyFourth rmy, then a embling at olkhov, talin ordered Kulik to restore the broken front sourh of Lake Ladoga, while rhe Fourth and Fifty-Second Armie defended the olkhov River line outhward r Lake Il'rnen. Zhukov cogerher with MajorGeneral L L Fediunin ky and I L . Khozin, au ted lieutenants from his Khaikhin-Gol days, arrived

arm}' to defend Pushkin Kra nogvsr dei k and Kolpino at ali co t, Lceb now faced a dilemma in parr caused by faulty command and control. The

ad Iacr wa that Hoepner could not c nrrol Kuechler's corp OIl the Ie , or chmidr' group on the right, nor: a it turned our, hi only re erve [he 8th Panzer Divi ion. Furthermore the attack \ a

not ynchronized ince rp , \ h:,h v a rill

truggling north of Luga, wa not ready in time.

Finally. Leeb trans erred the 254th Infanrry Divi ion, which should have reinforced Reinhardt' panzer corp to Kuechler.' uch di array wa eri-

u and could hav jeopardized the peration if the Ru ians rhernselve had not al 0 reached the end of their rerher, "14

Compounding Leeb's dilemma, the OKH~s 10 eprernber order transferring Reinhardt s XXXXl Motorized orp ro Army Group Centre "in good

ondirion" finally arrived. r rhe arne time

hmidr reported rhar the 0 ier Fifty-Fourth emy and a cavalry division threatened his right f1ank.S5

36

in Leningrad on 13 eprember and a surned command of the Leningrad From. He immediately appointed Khozin a hi chief of staff, e tablished 3 new headquarter at the amed moln: lnsrirure, and suspended the Military Council' plans to demolish Leningrad, even though the Stauka reiterated the in trucrions everal day later. The M ilirary

ouncil rhen ordered it for e "not a tep ba k" under penalty of being hoc. The ituation wa indeed dangerous by rhe rime Zhukov reached Leningrad: German force had captured Krasnoe

elo, broken into the Krasnogvardei k Fortified Region and advan .ed to rir k, le (han Iflkrn (6.25 mile) from Perergof and rrel'na on the 0:1 t.

outh of the iry they had reached the our kim of Pulkovo andPushkio only 12-18km ( .5-11.2" miles) from the city's our kin, and to [he ea [ they , ere rhreatening to capture Volkhov and link up with me Finn. Convinced [hat rhe grearesr threat existed in the Uritsk and Pulkovo se tor Zhukov reinforced these areas and ordered relenrle S counrerartack to blum the German advance.

De perare Counterattack

Leeb re urned hi adva n e on Urir k and Krasnogvardei k 0.11 13 epternber, the arne day rhar Zhukov arri ed in Leningrad. XXXXJ Motorized and XX VITI Army orps' 58th and 1 r Infantry, 1 t Panzer and 6th I{ororized Divi ion penetrated the Forry- econd rmy' defences north of Kra noe elo and approached Urirsk, cau ing a cri i in the Forty- e ond Army. Zhukov reinforced the Forty- econd Army with the IOrh and Llrh Rifle Di i in, which launched de - perate counrerarrack .59 The next day Zhukov issued new orders designed co regain the initiative. While the Fi ry-Fifth Arm)' wa stubbornly defending Pu hkin Kra nog ard i k and Kolpino, the from wa [0 mother the enemy with artillery and mortar fir and air aria k allowing no penetration of the defence .. ,. At the arne time, it ws 'to Form five rifle brigade and rwo rille clivi ion by 18

epternber and concentrate them in four defence line for rhe immediate defence of Leningrad." . lost importantly he ordered h herbakov' Eighth Army "to strike rhe enemy in the flank and rear" and Kulik' Fifty-Fourth Army "to Liberate the Mga and

hlis el'burg region." By (his rime XXI Iororized and xvm rmy Corp • fi e Eighth and L r Infantry, 1 t Panzer and 36th Motorized Divi ion had driven the Forry- econd .rrny's force to the outskirt of Urirsk only 4km (2.5

3

II

GRAD 1941-1944

GRAD

ABOVE: Adolf Hitler wa5 determined to eradicote leningrlld from the 10(8 of the earth. On 8 November 1941, as his forces tightened the noose around the city, he dedored: "Leningrlld's hands II e In the air. It faUs seener or later. No one can free it. No one can break the ring. I.eniDgrod is doomed to die of famine. n

mile ) from the coasr.w In de perarion Zhukov ba ked up Ivanov's army with the newly formed 21 t K D Rifle Division, the 6th DNO, two naval rifle brigades and PVQ troop, which, on 16

eprember occupied an arm}' econd echelon defence tine south of Leningrad from the Gulf of Finland [Q [he leva River.s' Zhukov himself forbade commanders from removing forces from this line wirhout his express permi sian, and talin reinforced Zhukov' prohibition by i uing a Ora oman order of hi own dealing mer iles Iy with "saboteur and German sympathizer ' who recreated without authorization.

Zhukov sent Fediunin ky to inve tigare the situation in the orry-Second Army, but when he arrived at army headquarters he found General Ivanov irting with hi head in hi bands unable to report where his troops were located. Major-

eneral l.arionov, Ivanov chief of raff reported that the Fort. -Second Army wa balding "literally by a mira Ie". Ivan v reque red penni ion co move hi headquarter to the rear, but Fediunin ky care-

gorically refu ed. ediunin ky rep ned to Zhuk v that morale in the Forty- econd, a well a the Eighth and Fifty-Fifth Annie \ a racking. Learning also chat Ivanov had relocated his headquarters to a safer position further behind the lines ill rhe basement of the Kirov factory, Zhukov ordered Fediuninsky to "Take over rhe Forry-

e ond Army - and quickly. "tl2

Zhukov' 14 eprember arrack order wa based on hi perc prion that the errnan pre rpitous advan e to Urir k had expo ed their left flank which wa pounding the Forty-Second Army, leavin if

ulnerable to a flank arrack. Hi inrenrion, therefore, was to catch the German orce advancing toward rit k between the hammer of [he Eighth Army and the anvil of the Ferry-Second Army.

h herbakov Eighth Army was to attack rewards Kra noe elo again e the German orce' left flank with five rifle division .6J hen hcherbakov demurred Jaiming that hi force wa to weak to launch rhe counterattack, Zhukov relieved him on the pot together with hi commi ar, I. F.

hukhno and appointed Lieutenanr-General T. I. 'hevalclil'i to command [he army.

'\1 hile heavy fi hriug raged along the rir k axi , Leeh began a two-pronged assaulr on rhe oviers' vital Kra nogvardeisk and Pushkin rrongpoinr. His intention wa to destroy rhe Fifry-Fifrh Army' main force in the Krasnogvardeisk lursk and Pushkin region by concentric arrack from east and west and rhen smash rhe Forty-Second Army' .1 eft flank and open rhe door [Q Leningrad. On 12

epternber 'XXI Motorized Corp 6th Panzer

Division and L Arm orps' Police and 169th

Infantry Divi ion attacked eastward rov ard Krasnogvardei k and Pu hkin. imultaaeou 1 , XXVIII Army orp' 96th and 121 t Infantry Division attacked westwards from the lzhora River [awards. III k and Pu hkin.6s The two attacking German force captured Krasnogvardeisk on 13 September bur then became bogged down for three day in fier e fighting for po session of the lur kKolpino Fortified Region. During the fighting, on 14 September oldier of the Police Divi ion reportedly found the dead bodies of General I ano , [he former Fcrry-! e and Army commander, and hi ommissar in a bunker (both were actually captured).

The ] t Panzer and Police Divi ions finally

captured Pu hkin late on J 7 September, and XXVIn Arm}' Corp captured lursk the following day, forcing the FUry-Fifth Army to withdraw [0 new

Zhukov Slows the Germans

However, the Germans foiled Zhukov' plan by preempting the Eighth Army's counterattack. On l6

epternber their X}"'XI ororized and X VIII rrn orps ~8rh Infantry and 1 r Panzer Divis ion reinforced by the l54[h Infantry Di i i 11 attacked and defeated [he Eighth rmy before ir had omplered it regrouping for it ounterarta k [0\ ard Kra noe cia. The three arrscking German divi ion had captured Uric k, Perergov and trel'na by nightfall, reaching the Gulf of finland and j olaring the Eighth Army in the 0- called Oranienbaurn Pocket, cutting it off from Leningrad proper. However, Fediunin ky's Forty-

e and em. \ as able to tabilize it defen es long the igo a izhnoe K irovo and Pulko 0 line, even though heavy- fighting raged in the se tor until 30 eprernber,

Undeterr d by the etback and whipped on by Zhukovj hcvaldin, the Eighth Army nev commander had completed regrouping his force on 18 September and now attacked towards Kra noe elo with four riHe divi ions the next day. xvru Army orp truck back on 20 eprember, halting the ighrh rrny and ending it reeling back to a new defence line where the from rabilized once and for alJ.&4

defences at Pulkovo, Bol' h e Kuz'rnino, ovaia and Purrolovo. In one final desperate lunge, rhe 1 t Panzer Divi ion reached Pulkovo crossroad and Aleksandrovka, the terminus of [he Leningrad southwest tram line only llkm (7.5 mile) from the city's centre, but failed ro seize Pulkovo Height. During the fighting Soviet troops drove into combat ranks that had ju t left the Kolpino rank fa tory a embly line. The determined German a ault ground to a halt on the blo dy southern lope of the Pulkovo Hci ht , even though [he fighting la red until 30 epternber, While the renaciou oviet defence of Pulkovo Heights convinced Leeb ro halt his advance the cheduled redeployment of X XXI Motorized Corp v .. hich he dreaded so much, wa the most important facror.M Alrhough me ground action waned the Luftwaffe commenced a rna ive and furious air offen ive against the Baltic Fleet and Kronshtadr from 21 to 23 eprember,

By [he end of eprernbcr, Leeb had indeed hemmed in Zhukov, force at Leningrad but n t a

Bnow: These warmly dad, apparently well-fed ladie5 ore taking tea in theit factary canteen. This pictr,rre is typitol of those taken to show the Soviet people that, olthough under blockade, life wen.t an. There even appellf5 10 be a "fanty pas fry" in the ba(kgroundl

38

39

ARGET LENINGRAD

rightly a he and the KH had \ i hed. Alrh ugh Germ. n f( rces h d dented ovret defences, Zhukov' dt:fen e in the iry's outhern uburbs and along the Neva River remained intact, and rhe Finns had yet [0 attack. Militarily, the "Miracle on the Neva" had occurred largely due to Zhukov's iron h nd and it was clear ro all [hat Leeb had lOST hi be r opporrunlr: to seize Leningrad. \! orsc rill, from Leeh' perspective Zhukov did nor rest on hi defen ive laurel. lnsread, no ooner had he nrained the errnan a aulr rhan he er about exa ting an e en greater roll n L nin rad' rorrnentor by conducting an offen ive of hi own. dding reel to Zhukov' intent rhe Staukn ordered Marshal Kulik' Fifry-Fourth Army, till operating under its direct conrrol, and Zhukov' ! eva perarional Group ( OG) to launch .onverging attacks toward iniavino and j lga in an effort ro raise rhe Leningrad blo kade.s"

Kulik army attacked on 10 epternber hut advanced only 6-10km (3.75-6.2 - mile) in 16 day of off-and-on heavy fighting during which both Zhukov an the tavka repeatedly a riga red Kulik for hi army' di mal performance.

Ulrirnarely, chrnidr' X IX Motorized orp

counrerarrn ked and forced Kulik force to withdraw from rhe Mga-Kirishi railroad line to defcn-

ive position eastward along the Na iia River.

Borh Zhukov and the Stauka were angered enough hy Kulik's failure [0 remove him rom command and replaced him with another 0 Zhukov' protI:ge , General Khozin.~~ While Kulik' ineptly led army faltered, the eva Operational Group' 115th Rifl Divi ion and 4th Naval Infantry Brigade

roo ed the eva River on 20 eprernber and eized a mall bridgehead in rhe Mo kov kaia Dubrovka region on rhe river' left bank, bur ac ompli hed little more. Although Zhukov o-called ir t _ inia vino offensive failed, ir did produ e orne po - itive re uln from rhe Soviets' perspective by forcing the German [0 transfer force ro the Leningrad region and by delaying somewhat the tran er of

xx:>..rrx Motorized orps southward (0 reinfor e rm}' Group enrre .. ~9

Afrer the fighting in ehe Leningrad region petered our in late eptember [he from rabilized temporarily. De pile the pectacular gains it had regi cered

ince it force era ed rhe Western Dvina River in early July Army Group orth had offered 60,000 10 ses.~O Howe er, Leningrad's badly organized, trained and equi ped defender 10 r far mare. The Northern Front reported 55,535 ca ualrie between 10 July and 2' ugu tour 0 153,000 men n aged and rhe Leningrad Fronr 116316 a ualrie from 23 August [0 30 epremb r our of 300,000 engaged. Finally, the Iorrhwe tern From ell ualry toll berween ] 0 July and 30 epternber added another 144,788 men our of 2 72,.oOOeng.aged. By any count rhe oppo ing forces were exhau red. I everthele a [hey licked their wound and counted their ca ualtie bam ides prepared ro re ume operation driven by the knowledze that Army Group orth had nor achi ved rhe obi ctive Hitler had a igned it in Plan Barbaro a. Inevitably, rhi fa r alone rneanr that the rruggl would have ro connnue.

aElOw: Troops of Leeb's Army Group North toke (over behind II panzer during the odvance towards Leningrad. At first, the speed of the Blitzkrieg swept all before it. Some Red Army mechanized units, for example, reported losses of up to 90 percent in manpower and vehides.

eeb Run Our of Momentum

Unfortunately for Lceb the re ourcc with which he would have ro continue the rruggle 011 0 dwindled. Beginning on 1 epternbcr, X XI LVl LVlI Motorized and III rr orp departed for Army Group entre ro take pan in Op rari n Typhoon."! Only chmidt' XXXIX Iororized orp (the L-th Panzer, and 1 rh and 20th Motorized Djvi ion ,) and, a a later conee ion, the 8th Panzer Divi ion remained to provide hi army group with armour support. -2 Lceb deployed [he 2 -4th Infantry Division from the Oranienbaum bridgehead [0 shore up rhc defences on XXXIX Motorized orps' left flank. Then, on 24 epternber, he reported candidly to KH that the ituation had "wor ened considerably" he could [10 longer continue offen-

ive operation toward eningrad and hi for e

had no other choice but to go on to the defen ive a declaration that Hitler could not ac epc-1

The Red Army' defence along the outhv estern appr osche [0 Leningrad lasted from 10 July [Q 30

eptember. Thereafter the from sourh of Leningrad stabilized and remained stable until January 1943.-4 During rhe 50 days of often-desperare and co dy defence, the Red Army di rupred Hider' plan [Q seize Leningrad by on enrri blow from rhe ourh and north. ombat readily inren ified a the Red

40

Arm)' increa ed it r i tan I' and began conducting counter troke of it own. s a re ulr, the tempo of the German advance decreased from a rare of advance of km ( .1 mile) per day in July, to 2.2km (1.7 miles) per day in Augu t, and L4km (.8 mile) per day in September. The Red Army improved it defensive force and techniques as [he offen ive developed largely bccau e it adopted extraordinary and ornerirnc even Draconian mobilization mea-

ures and committed virtually all of its manpower re erve to rnbar. Durin July and Augu r ir raj ed and fielded .vcn militia ri Ie divi ions and an. KVO Rifle Divi ion and wa reinforced by four rifle divisions dispar hed by [he Stallka.

The srrengrh and complexity of [he German offensive also increased as the offensive developed. In July, Army Group orth and its Finnish Allies arracked simultaneously along the Petroza vod k loners and Lenin zrsd axes. In rnid-Augu r the erman penerrared oviet defences along the Joygorod axi .ur off and isolated mu h of rile Eighth Army in E ronia, and area ked irnultaneau Iy along rhe Kra nogvardeisk and Karelian lsrhrnu axe .In late Augu r and early eptember German forces attacked simultaneously along the

J1.ga., Kra nogvardei. k and Karelian axes. During (hi period cbe Red Army experienced major difficulries in mounting large- cale counter troke even though if tried to do a at ol'r y and raraia Ru a. Intentionally or not, the e and other counter rroke achieved very little other than delaying the German advance. Even though the Red Arm}' managed to

halt the errnan [uggernaut on Leningrad'

doorstep and forced rhe Germans to abandon [heir attempts to capture the city by direct arrack at the end of eprember the dry remained in morral danger of being encircled and destroyed.

No doubt exi ted on either side regarding German inrentions. A German directive i ued on 22 eprember read:

"The Fuhrer ha decided ro erase the iry of Petersburg from the a e of rhe earth, I have no interest in the further e d renee of rhi large iry after [he defeat of ovier Ru sia ... We propo to blockade che city rightly and erase ir from the earth by means of artillery fire and continuou bombardment from rhe air."

Of did rhe German artillery and air bombardmenr dun began ill late ugust diminish. nd driven by ambition feu tration and sheer hatred, rider would force rmy roup tanh to make one last major effort to encircle Leningrad before the n et of winter.

41

CHAPTER 3:

ENC 5

H CL

L

As Army Group North neared Leningrad, it looked as though the city would fall into German hands. However, though the Red Army's Siniavino Offensive of October 1941 failed to stop the Germans. it did slow their advance. Then. the Tikhvin Counteroffensive of November and December t 941 saved the city from encirclement and brought an exhausted Army Group North to a standstill.

As rhe heal of ummer gave way [Q rhe hill of fall in northern Russia, for [he fir r rime in the \ ar German force in the Leningrad region fund them elves playing ccond fiddle to more mornentou developments el ewhere along the Eastern From. Hitler' Directive No 35 had abruptly shined the focn of Operation Barbaro a away from Leningrad and towards Moscow, and Leeb's September arrempt to encircle the city had failed. Hitler however had nor abandoned Leningrad a a target of hi wrath. 1n read, grudgingly admitting mar the ciry' conque r would be ar more difficult than originally intended, he turned to Mo cow a a far more lucrative and a hieveable goal leaving the task of en ircling eningrad to the bewildered Leeb,

Leeb had ro do 0 in dererioraring weather and without [he Fourth Panzer GtOUP, on which he was

LEFT: The PTRD 14.Smm antitank rifle used by the Red Army was of Gttle value when pitted agalnst th.e medium and beG'ly tanks of the Wehrmacht. However, in the hands at an expert, when used against salt-skinned vehicles this cumbersome, single-shot weapon (auld be deadly.

a cusrorned to rely. By early rober, Leeb' army group fielded 3 divi ion (including two panzer and two motorized) and even brigade along the northwestern axis half of which were deplo ed with the Eighteenth rm in the leningrad region. Having already informed Hitler that hi forc were in no tate to conduct major offensive operation, a debate en ued over what orr of limited offen ive

rrny Group larch could conduce before can elidating it po ition for the winter, Leeb ugge ted two options. He could either eliminate the oviet bridgehead at Oranienbaum or he could advance ea t and norrhea t from hudovo or Kiri hi CO Tikhvin or olkho to blo k the oviets remaining access route to Leningrad and perhaps link up with me Finn. Leeb ho e a lesser varianr of the latrer, specifically, a limited arrack with chmidr' XXXIX Iororized Corps reinforced by infantry northward from Kirishi to Volkhov ro dislodge and perhaps destroy the oviet Fi ry-Fourth Army. He proposed rhe offen i e hould begin 011 6 October.

Hider however rejected Leeb's proposal on [he grounds that hi attack would traver e poor terrain

43

THE S[EGE OF LEN! GRAD 1941-1944

rHE E 'Cm.CLEMENT TRUGGLE

unsuited fur armoured operations. Insrcad, he ordered Leeb to advance norrheasrwards from Chudovo to Tikh in and then northwestwards along the road and railroad to Volkluw ro encircle the Fifty-Fourth Army. This offensive projected German forces r'< .... ice as far as rhe operation propn ed h~· Leeb and required grearer forces than the field marshal possessed. Leeb reluctantly ordered Schmidt's XXXIX dororized Corps ro conduct the main attack from Chudovo to Tikhvin on 16 October; while infanrry conducted a secondary arrack northwards from Kirishi towards Volkhov. Ulrimarely the rwo forces were ro capture Volkhov and cur the remaining railroad line ro Lake Ladoga.

The Red Army Srrerched Thin

Stalin was 301'50 concerned about rhc siruarion on the northern flank, particularly as it related ro [he WehrmadlI's rhrusr rewards Moscow char began in early October His intent was to defend Leningrad, attack to raise rhe blockade of rhe city, prevent the Germans from transferring forces from Leningrad to the Moscow axis, and block any German attempt IO link Llp with rhe Finns and ompletely encircle Leningrad. Days a Frer the Germans began their advance all Moscow, on 5 crober Stalin recalled Zhukov to Moscow to take command of the crumbling Western and Re erve Front. Zhukov turned temporary command of the Leningrad Front over to his favourite, Fediuninsky, and flew co Moscow the following day. Several days later, Stalin dispatched Colonel-General . N. Voronov, a Deputy People's Commissar of Defence and Chief of Red Arm:- Air Defence (PVO) to rhe city as his represenrarive with ordersro prepare an operarlon to raise the blockade of the dry. The most important question confronring STalin Voronov and Fediuninsky, however, was whether The Leningrad Front, which had ju r survived the costly defence, was strong enough to rnounr a successful offen ive,

The Leningrad From's forces were i:n(_ieed stretched thin. The Twenry-Third Army defended Leningrad's northern and \ estern periphery only 30k rn (18.75 mi leg) (rom the city a nd the Eighth Army wa isolated in the coastal bridgehead ar Oranienbaum .. 1 The battle-weary Forty-Second and Fifry-Fifrh Armies occupied defences sourh of rhe city and the eva Operational roup was dug in along the Neva River to the east) East of rhe German corridor to Sh.lissel'burg, the Fifry-Fourrh Army, now under Leningrad From control was conducting desultory attacks towards 1I11:IVI110.

The Fourth and Fift},- econd Armies, till under Sf IIIka control; a nd che orrhwesrern From's Novgorod Army Group defended eastwards [0 the Volkho« River and southwards along the river's wesrern bank to Lake Il'rnen.

On 12 October the Stupka ordered Fediuninsky [Q conduct ~l two-pronged offensive operation beginning nn 2.0 October to crush German forces in rhe Shlissel'burg corridor and restore communications herween Leningrad and the Sevier rear, Lazarou's Fifty-Fifth rmy, organized into the socalled Eastern Sector Operational Group, was [Q conduct rhe western prong of rhe attack by assaulting across the Neva River, advancingrowards Siniavino, and linking up with the Fifry-Fourth Army advancing from the east. The leva Operational Group was to COnd\lCC a supporring arrack on rhe Fifry-Fifth Arm}"sleft fla.nk. Khozin's Fifty-Fourth Army was to arrack westwards from the t aziia River,capture iniavino, and link up wirh rhe Fifry-Fifth Army's Operational Group and Neva Operational Group. Once the link-up occurred the three forces were to destroy German forces in rhe Shlissel'burg corridor.

tanks (including 59 heavy KVs), 475 guns"including an ava ilable heavy artillery and Kariusha rocker launchers, and aircraft and artillery from the Baltic Fleet. The assaulting force faced 54,000 German soldiers occupying fortified positions in depth flanked by swampy terrain, supported by 4 '0 guns, but no- tanks.

Despite Fediuninsky's careful preparations, the Germans pre-empted his offensive by beginning rheir thrust towards Tikhvin on 16 Ocrober, Nevertheless, the Staoka insisted the Leningrad From's shock groups arrack as planned on 20 October. Although [he artacking forces achieved only meagre gains in three days of fighting, Stalin repearedly ordered Fediuninsky to complete the operation successfully regardless of the deteriorating situation along the Volkhov River. The only redeeming feature of the failed offensive was thar it tied fjye German divisions down in rhe Siniavino salient. On 23 OCto her; rhe Slauka's nerve fjnall~r

Leningrad

"-""

•

AR,;\W GRaUl' I'OR'l1·1

SOViet Ftontlin a-s

12 Nov 1941

!I·IS Dec 1941

The failed Tikbvio Offensive

The Eastern Sector Operational Group (E OG), which Fediuninsky formed from [he Fifty-Fifth Army and From reserves, consisted of five rifle divi-

ions, rwo tank brigades and one separate rank bartalion.s The group's mission was to assault across the eva River in [he Skm (3.1-mile) sector on rhe army's right flank, advance rewards Siniavino, and helpencircle and destroy [he German force b), the end of the second day of the operation. The eva Operational Group (NOG) was to defend the northern sector of it eva River defences with irs IS[ Rifle Division and l lrh Rifle Brigade, and arrack eastwards towards Siniavino from irs bridgehead across rhe Neva near Moskovskaia Dubrovka with its llSrh Rif!,c Division and 4th laval Infantry Brigade. Irs assault force was to support the 'SOG ill destroying German fortes in the corridor. The Fifty-Fourth Army was ro penetrate German defences between Worker's Secrlement : 0 8 and rhe Leningrad-Volkhov railroad with a force of three rifle divisions and rwo tank brigades, caprure Siniavino, link up with the ESOG and lOG,. and destroy German forces in the corridor+

Fediuninsky's arracking force totalled nine rifle divisions, one rifle brigade, (our tank brigades and one separate rank battalion with 70,.000 men, 97

. .. .. . ..

31 Dec 1941

44

OG

2D40Km

ABOV[:Red Army operationsllr·ou-nd Jikh.vincmd Siniavino belwHn Oclober cmd 'Oece.mber 1941, .A1though. the Soviet oHells~es were not su-nenlvl in themselves, they did bring Army Grou-p Non!!', advance 10 a halt, and thereby were inSlrumettlal in saving leningrad.

cracked, and iT ordered Khozin to dispatch 1:\\'0 rifle divisions (Q Tikhvin. Three days later, it assigned Fediuninsky command of the Fifry-Fourth Army and appointed Khozln a Leningrad From commander, ostensibly because The tarter outranked me former, bur more likely because Fediuninsky had developed a well-deserved repurarion as a fighrer - and a fighter was what was mOST needed along the Tikhvin axis. On 28 o crober, the Staulea finally ordered Fediuninsky's Fifty-Fourth Arm)' rccease irs offensive at Siniavino and, instead, divert forces to defend Volkhov,' By Then. rhe Stavka's optimism over prospects for raising the blockade of Leningrad had faded, replaced by a deep foreboding over the

45

GRAD 1941-1944

THE

prospect of the rota I i ola tion of the ciry. Tha r would certainly occur if the German were able to capture Tikhvin and olkhov,

he tavka concern were very real indeed.

Leeb' mi ion wa to exploit apparent oviet weakne s along the Volkhov River and Tikhvin axis and complete operations around Leningrad as quickly as possible to free up force to strengthen the offensive roward Moscow. He wa ro arrack through Tikhvin ro Lake Ladoga to sever Leningrad's last rail links to I loscow and completely encircle [he city. If uccessful, it was remotely po sible that German force could Link up with rhe elu ive Finns along rhe vir River. In either case, enin rad's fare \ ould then be ealed.

Leeb can entrared hi XXXIX Motorized and most of I Army Corps at Kirishi, Liuban and southward along the VoLkhuv River. chmidt' motorized corp wa to conduct the main attack from hudovo through Gruzino, Budogo hand ikhvin, to Lodeinoe Pol e on [he ir River with the '12th Pa mer, 20th Motorized a nd 21st and 126rh I nfanrry Division. On its left flank, the ] 1 rh Infantry Divi ion v a [Q advance from Kiri hi towards Volkhov. ~ rhe south, the 8th Panzer and I rh Motorized Divi ion were [0 arrack towards lalaia Vishera and Bologoe to link up with force operating

one corp artillery regiment, and one ponroon bridge battalion. all of which were under rrengrh.s Lieurenanr-General . K. Klykov ifry- e and Army defended me Okrn (50-mile) e tor along the Volkho River [Q 1-km (I -.6 mile) north of Novgorod wirh tWO undersrrength rifle divisions, four corp artillery regiments, and one ami-rank arriller regiment, but with no re erve. ~ Finally, the

G defended me 30km (18. r -mil ) e tor along the olkhov north of Lake Il'rnen with tWO rifle and one rank division, which had no eanks.s Since the bulk of [he Fifry- ourth Army was concentrated for the attack on Siniavino only five rifle di i ion one cavalry divi ion, one tank battalion five artillery regiment and one ami-rank regiment defended the 130km (81.2S.mile) ector oppo ire rhe German main arrack. This for e \ as wholly inadequate to deal with the German offensive.

Early on 16 October, German infantry of the 2J t and 116th Infantry Divi ions stormed aero the Volkhov River, folJowed later in the day hy the 12th Panzer and 20th Mororized Divi ion . The as atilting force penetrated [be Fourth ,rm)" fragile defen e in four day of hea y fighting in roadl terrain covered by "-4in (76-102mm) f now. The assault forced the Fourth Army' 188th and 26 eh Rifle Divi ions ro withdraw creating an immense

ABOVE: This artillery crew manhandles lis 76.2mm field gun into a newly finished position. Although this model 1902 weapon was obsolete by 1941, many were pressed Into service during the early months of tbe siege. The upper port of the shield has been lowered for eose of placement.

011 Army Group Centre's left flank which were ro arrack northwe t along the Mo cow-Leningrad railroad from alinin through y hii olochek to Bologoe. Even if [he offen ive failed to reach the vir River, ir would likely encircle and destroy the iftyFourth Army operating we r of the Volkhov River.

In mid-October the Leningrad Front' FiftyFourth Army the Fourth and Fifty- econd Armie under Stauha onrrol, and the I orthwe tern front's

a gored Army Group ( A ), defended the 200km (125-miJe) front from Lipka on Lake Ladoga ro Kiri hi and southward along the ea tern bank of the Volkhov River co Lake Il'men, Khozin' fifty-Fourth rmy defended the 3 km (21.8-mile)

ector from Lipka halfway to Kirishi and was preparing to attack toward iniavino, LieurenantGen ral V. F. Iakovlev's Fourth Army occupied hallower defences along the Okm (31.25-mile) from we t of Kirishi and southward along the olkhov River. Iii army can isted of three rifle divi ions one ca va I ry di vision, one sepa ra te tank barra I ion,

46

gap between the Fourth and Fifty-Second Armies which the defenders were unable to dose. From 21 to 23 October the arra king force fanned OUt, rhe 12tb Panzer and 10th M t rized Divi ion advanclug toward Budogo hand Tikhvin the l1s[ Infaurry Division toward Kirishi, and rhe ] 26rh Infantry Divi ion reward Bol' haia and Malaia

i hera. The advance, however, wa tediou ly low becau e the fe\ road were often impa ible and periodic tha ws turned the adjacent terrain into a [hick glue}' mass that everely inhibited movement and re- upply of the advan ing force. De pire rhe problem on 23 October the l Zrh Panzer and 20th Motorized Divi ion captured Budogosh on the Fourth Army left flank, bur me 28 -th and 3 J Irh Rifle Divisions on the Fourth Army's right flank halted the 11 rh Infanrr Division's attacks north of Kirishi rhc following da r : To the south. the 18rh Motorized and 126rb Infantry Divi ion forced [he Fifty- econd Army to abandon Bol'shaia ishera and withdraw southeast.

BELOW: The terrain around leningrad was not ideal country for onnoured operations, 115 tbis pair of BT· 7 Soviet Medium lonks demonstrates. (aught in the open, advancing along a narrow track, the Rus.sians fell victim to a heavy German artillery barrgge. The BT series was the forerunner of the legendary T·34.

4

ABOVE: I\s In London during the "SliIZ", so in leningrad barrage balloons were la form an Importanl part of Ihe

air defences of Ibe dly. These "oeroslols" are being guided into position by Iheir handlers outside the Drama Theatre on the Nevsky Prospect.

Given the obviou threat to Tikhvin the Staulea reinforced the Fourth and Pifry-Se ond Armies with

ix rille divi ion and one rank divi 1011, four of which it deployed along the approaches to Tikhvin and ordered [he annie [0 halt the German advance counrerarrack, and re tore the olkhov River defen es.? r the arne time, it ord red the FiftyFourth rmy ro continue it arrack at iniavino to [if' down German force. Once reinforced, Iakovlev' Fourth Army should have been capable of driving German forces back to the olkhov River. Hov ever hi defence continued to collapse because he committed hi re erves in pie meal fashion and without adequate preparation or command and control, For example, on 27 October the 191s[ Rifle Division and element of the 4rh Guard Rifle and 60[h Tank Divi ion ana ked rhe 12th Panzer Divi ion' VaJ1- guard near irornlia on the road to Tikhvin. The counterattack failed be au e it was poorly coordinared, although it did orce the 12d, Panzer Division

ro hair its advance and regroup. By this time, hrnidr' orp reported capturing 12 500 pri oner and seizing or de [raying 66 Ru ian gun .

Further ourh, the Fiiry- C ond Army now three divisions strong, delayed he German th Panzer and 18th Mororized Divi ions advance long enough ro 0 cupy ncv defen e at Malaia i hera."

o srrenuou wa the defence char. by 27 October; the German advance in this ecror ground ro a halt. At this juncture, increasing oviet resistance west of Tikhvin forced chrnidr to regroup rhe 8rh Panzer and 18th Motorized Divi ion from Malaia i hera to Sirornlia r r inforce hi main arta k. The following day he reinforced the 11 th Infantry Divi ion, \ ho e arrack north of Kiri hi had failed, with part of the 21 t Infantry, renamed the force Group VOIl Boeckmann, and ordered the new group to attack northwards towards Volkhov to prote t his main force's lefr flank.

With the pace of hi offens ive lowing on 16 October Leeb vi ired Hitler at hi ~ olf' Lair (WCJlfssc!Jal1ce) headquarter and reque ted that Army Group Centre upport hi offen i e by attacking from Kalinin through y hii 010 hek to Bologoe with it hird Panzer roup and part of the Ninrh Army. Although Leeb's reque t ecrned

reasonable at [he rime, violent Soviet counterattack at Kalinin oon made it impossible.'! In any case, Hitler, who e attention wa fi~ ed on Moscow, refu ed Leeb' reque t. However, he did agree to cancel plan for an attack [0 eliminate the Oranienbaum bridgehead. in so doing aving three of Leeb' divi ions. Before leaving Hider's headquarter Leeb expre sed doubts to Hider that his force could take Tikhvin, Hitler however, insi ted that the offen ive continue.

The Cold Begin to Bite

In late 0 rober; the tauka began planning and orche tratin a eries of counter troke it hoped would defea the Jerman offensive. On 30 October it ordered the Fourth Army to concentrate tWO shock group each of roughly rwo divi ion, south\) est of Tikh in with order to attack toward Budogo h and Gruzino on 1 1 overn er, de troy the German force advan ing on Tikhvin, and restore

oviet defences along the Volkhov River.ll The counterarta k began on 2 November but failed after four day of heavy fi hring.O Undeterred by the counterarta k and raking advantage of a fre h bla r of cold weather on 6 ovember that began freezing river and rreams in the region chrnidr's corp resumed it advance toward Tikhvin on 5 November. The l Zth Panzer Divi ion, now reinforced by (he Srh Panzer and l Srh Motorized Division brushed a ide the 191st Rifle Division and aprured Tikhvin during a snowstorm on 8 i overnber severing the last railroad line from Moscow to Lake Ladoga. In the proce ,thG. orp reported capturing 20 000 pri oner and eizing or de troying 96 tank. 179 guns, and an armoured train ince the beginning of rhe operation. H

De pite thi succe ,it was also increasingly clear chat hrnidr' forces had already" hot their bolt' . The prolonged advance had eriou Iy weakened his force the ravages of winter were taking their roll of German armoured vehicles, and Soviet re istance was riffening both north of Tikhvin and at l'vlalaia

ishera. Even before the German aptured

Tikhvin the temperature had fallen to a 10\ as-40 degree Fahrenheit and many soldier were fro rbirten or had simply frozen ro death. The 12th Panzer and 18th Motorized Divisions were hemmed in by menacing Russian rroop concentration around Tikhvin and were nor able to arrack northward. The rh Panzer, 20th Motorized and l26th Infantry Divi ions manned defence scattered through the 100km (62.- -mile) gap berween

Tikhvin and Malaia Vi hera and Ru sian forces were counrerarta king again r the l26th Infantry Divi ion at Malaia Vi hera. To the we r, roup von Boeckmann onrinued it advance alon the

olkhov axi , bur at a much lower pace, reaching within 14km (8.75 m.iles) of Volkhov be are it arrack became [Orally bogged down. l.eeb' entire offensive ground to a halt on I lovern er a if locked in plac by the extreme cold weather. Hi forces had neither eliminated [he oviet Fifty-Fourth Army nor reached the Finn ,and although they had taken Tikhvin and cur the 0 cow-Lado '3 railroad line, his force was now 0 ere 'tended and threatened from every direction. Wirh the temperature falling to -_0 degree Fahrenheit and the terrain covered by deep snow, the bitter cold caused more ca ua lrie than R us ian bullet.

Hitler, hov ever, perrnirred Leeb no respire.

Goaded on by the Fuhrer, he stoically reinforced Group von Bo ckrnann \ irh the 154[h Infamry

ivision and di patched the Gisr Infantry Division to Tikhvin to reinforce Schmidt' corps. He then altered hi plan by hitting hi empha i from ikh in to . olkhov, Hi revi ed plan alled for Boeckmann to capture olkhov with it minum plant and power ration and then [ovaia Ladoga on the ourhern hare of Lake Ladoga to cur off tran portation of upplie to Leningrad via Lake Ladoga and encircle and de troy the Fifty-Fourth Army. Boeckmann's force reinforced by the _~4th Infantry Divi ion, had been attacking along the Kirishi-Volkhov axi since 28 October, slowly driving the Fourth Army' four defending division northward toward Volkho .15 Boeckmann' group approached the outhern out kirts of olkhov on 8

Iovernbez driving a deep wedge between the ovier Fifty-Fourth and Fourth Armies. At this point Leeb di patched a [a k force from the 8th Panzer Divi ion to upporr Boeckmann' advan e. Howev r, a counterattack b. the LOth Rifle Divi ion rh, arted the

rh Panzer Divi ion's attempt ro outflank OVICt defence ea r of rhe rown.JG

he Panzer Gri d to a Halt

The appearance of Brh Panzer Divi ion forces at olkhov which threatened both Volkhov and the FiFty-Fourth Army's rear, forced the tallka to react.

n 9 November it appointed Army General K. A.

Merctskov, [u t released from KVO irnpri nrnent, to command the Fourth Army.!" At the arne time, it ordered the Leningrad From to hair the Fifty-Fourth Army' offensive against Siniavino and employ the

49

GRAD 1941-1944

THE E. CIRCLEMENT 'TR GGLE

LEFT: Red Army troops under artillery fire es they probe German positions on the Leningrad frontline. These troops are wearing the typiud R U 55 fan greal coal made of dark grey cloth, which was double-breasted with II fall collar and fly front. A.s (an be seen, much of the terrain around .he city was marshy, which hindered large-scale operations.

Leeb' offen ive along rhe Tikhvin and olkhov axe had become I gged down by mid-November In rhe face of inten ified ovier resistance, debilitating weather, and Leeb' force' heavy 10 e. Over the course of 30 day of heavy fighting, hi £ronr ea r of the Volkhov River had expanded from 70 to 350km (43.75 to lIS. 5 mile 1, hi force were exhau red, woefully overe rtended, and at [he end of their logi rical tether, and chrnidr' main force \\'3 half encircled in Tlkhvin, L eb only con alation, rhar hi force. held the 10 ow-lad ga and Tikhvin- olkho railroad lin in a rranglehold and by doing 0 po d a morral threat to Leningrad wa , however illusory, The reck le advance deep inro [he 0 iet rear area in the dead of winter created favourable condirion for a concerted ovier counteroffensive, a circumstance that the watchful ttwka decided to exploit to full advantage. De pitc the heavy fighting underway along the Moscow a i the correlation of force ea t of

eningrad had hifr d ignificanrly in the Red rmy's favour. Finally, rmy Group Centre' 1 ovember assault on Mo 0\ made ir essential that the Red

rmy g on rhe ff n ive in the Leningrad region. II did 0 after mid- ovcmber, by unleashing a eri of counterattacks and counrersrroke that grew inevitably inro a fully fledged counreroffen ive,

tavka' je rive

taoh« began orche trating it counrerarounrer rrokcs northea r of L eningrad, it n evera] priority objective . Fir r and forerno r, it oughr to save Leningrad by de rroying German force at Tikhvin and Volkhov and re taring communi ari n between Leningrad and J\l10 cow via thc Tikhvin-Volkhov railroad. ccond, it tried to rle down a many German force' a pos-

ible along the northwe tern axis in the intere t of it Mo cov defence.

In late overnber, the Leningrad Front Fifty·

fourth rrny and rhe Fourth and Fifty- econd Armies under 'ta~lka control faced a erman force of ] 0 infantry rwo motorized and rwo panzer divisions deployed between Lake Ladoga and Il'men,

be German force, \ bose division were at a bout 60 percent rrength, numbered roughly 120,000 men, LOO rank and assault gun, and 1000 guns and mortars. The Staoka was able to concentrate I rifle and two tank divi ions one cavalry division, three rifle and rwo rank brigade. and three tank and tWO ki battalion , organized into three annie and fielding 192 9 -0 men, again r the German. HO\ ever, while the oviers enjoyed a con iderable

bulk of Fediuninsky's army ro de 'troy German force in the olkhov region. Fediunin ky, in rum, requested [he tavha as ign the four rifle divi ion and one naval rifle brigade operating on the Fourth Army' right flank to his army, I The tauk« approved his reque [on 12 ovember, and ordered Fediunin ky to form a new shock group to defeat Boeckmann group's advance towards Volkhov, Fediuninskr's task became more challenging when, on 18 overnber, Leeb reinforced Boeckmann' group with a combat group from the l Zrh Panzer Divi ion.

Fediuninsky moved his army au .iliary command post to the Volkhov region, began as crnbling a shock

roup ourhwe r of Volkhov, and ordered rhc group to arrack B cckmarm's fore on 2 ovember, While Fediunin ky wa preparing hi ount r troke, howe er, Boeckmann's 254th Infantry Division attacked northwest towards oibokalo Station in the Fifty-Fourth rmy' rear along the harte r route to Lake Ladoga. Fediunin ky' 28 Sth Rifle Divi ion and 122nd Tank Brigades managed to hale the thrust in late November just hort of Voibokalo ration. This

cr the ttage for Fediuninsky' army to participate in the gen ral oviet Tikhvin counteroffer ive, which was already beginning to ripple aero the entire ront in the olkhov and ikhvin region .

uperioriry in manpower and guns, they were lightly inferior in armour.

oviet Dept yment

The Sfal'ka ordered the Fifty-Fourth, Fou rrh, and Fifty-Second Armies [Q defeat the oppo ing German force , drive them back to the olkhov River, and establish a bridgehead on its western bank b)' conducting concentri attack towards Kiri hi and Gruz.ino. Merer ko ' Fourth Army, ondu nng the main attack wa to en ir le errnan f re at Tikhvin e rploir through Budog h to the olkhov River, Link LIp with the Fifty-Fourth Army at Kiri hi and the fifty- e ond Army at iruzino, and capture bridgeheads over m'e river, Hi army faced tbe 12th Panzer, 18th and 20th Morcrizedcand 61srl nfantry Divisions, and one third of the 8th Panzer Division.

Merer kov divided bi army which con i ted of five rifle one rank and one cavalry divi ion one rifle and one rank brigade and three eparate rank ba rta lion , into orthern, ourhern and Ea tern

hock Group ea h \ ith a pecific mi j n.!" Th [orrhern Group wa to arrack German force ar Tikhvin from the north with one rifle division and one rank brigade, while the Eastern Group attacked Tikhvin from the ea [ with two cavalry divisions and a cornpo ice infantry and tank [orce.20 The Southern Group wa ro assault rhe Germans communication rome ourhwesr of Tikhvin with tWO reinforced rifle divi ion .21 Once it caprured Tikhvin, the orthern Group was to advance northwestward to air rhe Fifty-Fourth Army sana k on Boeckmann' orce ourh of olkhov while Meret kov' main force advanced ro .. ard Gruzino to link up with the Fifty-Fourth rrny s main force and envelop Boeckmann' forces from the outh,

Fediunin ky's Fifty-Fourth Army, which con i red of eight rifle divi ion, one tank division without tanks, two rifle and two tank brigade, and n 0 ki battalions, wa ro launch its main arta k we t of

olkhov and at oibokalo, link LIp with Fourth rmy ncar Kiri hi, and ncircle and de troy Boeckmann' force. Hi remaining force were to defend the rmy' right flank rewards iniavino and Lake Ladoga)l If ucce ful, the Fifty-Fourth and Fourth Armies' converging attacks would al 0 ever German withdrawal routes westward from Tikhvin. To the south, the four divisions of Klykov's Fifty-

econd Army and two divisions of rhe orrhwesrern front's 1 AG were [Q destroy German force in the Malaia i hera region advance to rhe Volkhov River, capture bridgehead

THE lEGE OF LENINGRAD 1941~t944

THE ENC1R:CLEMENT TRUGGLE

over [be river, and help cur German withdrawal routes from TikhYin.~~

Since the chaotic operational siruanon and a shortage of forces prevented the Stallka from iniriaring operations simultaneously in every sector, it began the attack piecemeal, bu i lding ie to the crescendo of a fu tl counteroffensive as the month progressed. The fiftySecond Army initiated the process, snacking along the Malaia Vishera axis on 12 j ovember, the Fourth Army unlea bed it attacks around Tikhvin on 19

Iovernber, and the Fifry-Fourth Army attacked west of Volkhov on 3 December.

Schmidt's Corps Buckles

As the Soviet attack began rippling aero s the front, Schmidt's motorized corps was ill-deployed to deal effectively with the expanding torrent of attacks. While his 12th Panzer and 18th Mororized Divisions were bottled up in Tikhvin proper, hls 8th Panzer, 20th MOtorized, and newly arrived Spanish 250th "Blue" Infantry Division dung precariously to a tring of srrongpoints along the corp' long right flank from Tikhvin southwest to Malaia Vishera. Throughout this period Leeb steadily withdrew his armour from Tikhvin reinforcing Group Boeckmann south of Volkhov with parts of the 8th Panzer Division and shoring up rhe vulnerable defences on his right flank. On 3 December Leeb subordinated Boeckmann's three divisions to I Army Corps headquarters, which he transferred from Leningrad, and reinforced the army corps with additional 8th Panzer. Division forces. By now, the infantry forces of Kuechler's Eighteenth Army were strung alit far to the west, manning an extended front from the Gulf of Finland to hlisscl'burg on Lake Ladoga and eastwards to the Volkhov-Tikhvin railroad. Busch' Sixteenth Army, also vastly overextended, defended the long front from Lake Il'men southwards to the Valdai Hill. Nor did the weather cooperate with Leeb's defence. As the temperatures dropped another 10degre~s, his men were

oon fighting in desperariona machine guns and artillery pieces jammed, and horses collapsed, freezing solid in a matter of minutes.

The Fifty-Second Army artacked early on 12 November, while Mererskov's forces were still S[IUggling to contain German forces in Tlkhvin. The army's four rifle divisions repeatedly assaulted the 126rh lnfamry Division's defence on a broad from north and south of Malaia Vishera for four days bur made no appreciable progress. Failing to concentrate his forces, instead Klykovemployed fruitless frontal

attacks with inadequate artillery support against poorly reconnoitered German strongpoints.2~ The OKJ-I responded to the attacks by transferring the 6·1 r and 22.3rd Infantry Divi ion from Arm.y Group Centre's reserve and France ro reinforce Malaia Vishera's defences and protect rhe right flank of its forces at Tikhvin. The I AG' initial: a. sault also faile(1 For the same reasons.

Urged on by the Stauka, Klykov regrouped his forces on 16 and I 7 j overnber and re umed bi attack overnight 011 17-18 Iovember, This time he infiltrated two detachmenr from rhe 259th and 11 l th Rifle Divisions into the Gernt2!lS' tear, and the two divisions SUCCI" sfully stormed and captured [be village the next morning, forcing the defending 126[11 Infantry Division to withdraw. Although Klykov's forces pursued rhe retreating Germans towards Bol'shaia Vishera the pursuit "vas roo low to prevent Leeb from reinforcing his forces ar Tlkhvin, then under assault by the Fourth Army's forces.with the 6] Sf Infanrry Division. WithiH days, Leeb also reinforced [he 126[.11 lnfantry Division with the 21Sth Infantry Division transferred from France.

perrrussron from [he OKH to withdraw ehrnidt's forces back to the Volkhov River. hortly after midnight on 7 December, Halder informed Leeb that Hider still insisted the original plan be ful filled. The next day, Leeb informed Hitler that his forces at Tikhvin wen: outnumbered by more than two ro one, adding rhat, if he did not agree to a withdrawal, they might be destroyed. By this time, the Red Army had already begun its massive Mo cow counteroffensive, Bowing to the inevitable, at 02:00 hours on 8 December, exactly am: month after the ] 2tn Panzer Division captured Tikhvin, Hitler consented to Leeb' request (hours before a distraught Leeb had already is ued the evacuation order).

On 9 December, rhe 12th Panzer and 18th Motorized Divisions began their painful withdrawal westwards from Tikhvin towards rhe Volkhov River over roads clogged with deep now" Leeb raced reinforcement to itornlia, Gruzino and Volkhov to support the withdrawal, which chmidr was suppo ed to complete by 22 December. B}' this rime, Schmidt' rwo panzer division numbered only 30 tanks apiece (full strength 160 ranks each). As they withdrew Meretskov's northern and eastern groups assaulted German rearguards and captured Tikhvin late in [he day. While the three German divisions withdrew in orderly fashion. the 61st

A Slow Advance

The three shock groups of Mererskovs Fourth Army attacked German forces defending the Tikhvin region on 19 November. Advancing through deep snow at an agonizingly slow pace against determined German resistance, Mererskov's northern group finally fought its way to the outskirts of Tikhvin on 7 December. By this time his eastern shock group had stalled locked in heavy combat west of the Tikhvinka River and along the TikhvinTal'rsy road with the 20th Motorized and 61st Infantry Divisions (the latrer had just arrived from Ma 13 ia Vishera], chm ide's l Zth Pa nzer and lSrh Motorized Divisions in Tikhvin were now enveloped from three ides and suffering heavy- ca ualtie fighting in the deep snow and bitter cold. The 18th Motorized Division alone lust 9000 men in the fierce fighting, leaving it with a combat rrength of 741 men. The 3rd Battalion of its 30th Panzergrenadier Regiment had already lost 250 men, most of whom had frozen [Q death, during rhe advance from Chudovo to Tikhvin .. Worse still, Mererskov's southern group had penetrated the 18th Motorized Division's defences to [he south and now threatened rhe Tikhvin group'scommunlcarions with the rear.

After withdrawing more troops from Schmidt's beleaguered forces at Tikhvin [0 defend their vital communications lines to [he rear, Leeb requested

Infantry Division's 1 ~1 r Regiment, supported by the 11th and 12th Companies of the 18th Motorized Division's 51st Panzergrenadier Regiment, attempted [Q block rhe pursuing Russians. During the heavy fighting, rhe regiment suffered heavy losses and rhe panzergrenadier companies were wiped our to rhe lasr man, On 10 December, . Iererskov's forces began their pursuit also hindered byrne heavy snow. To the south Krykov's Fifty-Second Army captured Bol'shaia Vishera on 16 December and pushed the rwo defending German division westwards to their new defences along the Volkhov River.1_(

Whi.!e one act of the Stavka's drama was playing Out around Tikhvin, another was developing in the Volkhov sector to the west. Fediuainsky's FinyFourth Army had halted I Army Corps' attacks south of Volkhovandar Voibokalo Station by 25 November. The next day Fediuninsky's initial shock group, made up of three divisions and a rifle brigade, attacked I Army Corps' Z'l sr infantry

IIEL.OW: A Red Army lank·huntIngunit marches ouf of the dty 10wIII'ds the 'ron I, Tllelong.-barrelled weapons are Deglaryev 14.Smm PTRDantila.n:k rifles. A large and cumber.some weapon, it weighed 16kg 13S.21bJand could penelrale 3Smm 11.38In} of lII'lIIourup 10 a rllDge of 100m (32811).

-J ~-

53

THE SIEGE OF LENt GRAD 1941-1944

THE E CiRCLEMENT STRUGGLE

Division sourh of Voikhov, driving it back several kilometres south of the rown by 29 November.n Several clays later, Khozin reinforced Fediuninsky's forces with the 80th Rifle Division and ordered him to form another shock group at Voibokalo Srarion by 1 December and srrike I Army Corps' left flank. The new shock group, consisting of four rifle divisions, one rifle brigade and OHe rank brigade, arracked on 3 December and drove the Germani Army Corps left flank southwards successively encircling and destroying several companies of (he 254m Infantry Division .. ~- The 115th and 198th Rifle Divisions, transferred from Leningrad, joined [he army's assault on 15 December and drove the Germans back to Olomny on 17 December, enveloping I Army Corps' lefr flank on the western bank of me Volkhov River.

At the same time, the northern group of Mererskov's Fourth Army penetrated German defences along the Tikhvin-Volkhov railroad, and reached the Lynka River southeast of Volkhov, enveloping 1 Army Corps' right flank and forcing the beleaguered corps to withdraw ourhwards towards Kirish i. 0 u ring its wi ehdrawa I, the Fi Fry-Fourth Army's tsr and 2nd Ski Battalions constantly

Zhdanov to Moscow to discuss how the offensive could best be expanded. The first order of business was to reorganize Red Army forces in the region into a proper Front structure capable of controlling multiple armies in a major new offensive push. When the conference ended on 11 December, [he Stavka formed the new Volkhov Front effective on 1 7 Decem ber wi th M ererskov as its comma nder and Srelmakh as its chief of st.aff. In addition to Mererskov's Fourth and Krykov's Fifty- econd Armies, the Stavka assigned rhe new From Lieurenanr-General G. G. Sokolov' Twenty-Sixth Army [designs red the Second hock in late December) and Major-General I. v.. Galan.in s Fifry-

inrh Army, both of which had been formed in the Stavka reserve.

The loscow meeting also produced an arnbirious new plan for an expanded offellsive to accomplish nothing less chan the complete lifting of the Leningrad blockade. The ] 7 December tavka directive stared:

"The Vo!khov From consisting of the Fourth, Fifry- [inrh, Second Shock and Fifty-Second Armies, will launch a general offensive to smash the enemy defending along the western bank of rhe

ABOVf:.Soviet Iroo,ps an.lhe Leningrad front mavelhrough the rubble of IJ destroyed vHloge. They are armed with the standard rine 01 the Red Army during Warld War II: the 1.62mmMoisin iNoganl Model 1891 /30 boll'1lction model. Somewhalardlai(, il was preferred 10 Ihe unreliable oulomoli( Tokorev SVHO,.

hara sed the Germans' flanks and rear. Although I Army Corps attempted to hold on to the critical Mga-Kirishi railroad line, the Fifty-Fourth Army s 3Ilth, 80th and 285th Rifle Divisions penetrated across the railroad forming a shallow salient in the German defences west of Kirishi .. The remainder of the Fifry-Fourrh Army struggled to expel German forces from Kirishi and the surrounding villages unril 28 December bur failed eo dislodge me defenders and suffered massive losses. During the fighring, Leeb reinforced the Kinshi srrongpoint with the 291 t and 269(11 Infantry Divisions transferred from Leningrad, rransforming it into the vital apex of the German defences along the Volkhov River:

While irs Tikhvincounreroffensive was reaching its climax, the Stauko reorganized its forces in the Volkhov region [Q facilitate furore operations. Two days after Tikhvin fell, Stalin summoned Mererskov, his chief of smff General Srelrnakh, Khoain and

54

Volkbov River, and reach the iuban and Cholovo Station front with your armies' main force by the end of ...... Subsequently, while attacking to the northwest, encircle the enemy defending around Leningrad, destroy and capture him in cooperation with the Leningrad Front, and if the enemy resists capture, destroy him ....

"The Stavka of the Supreme High Command I. Sralin, B. Shaposhnikov'

A companion directive sent to Khozin the same day ordered the Leningrad Front, "to help the Volkhov Front destroy the enemy defending around Leningrad and raise rhe Leningrad blockade by active operations with rhe Forty-Second, FiftyFifth, Eighth and Fifty-Fourth Armies, and the Coastal Operational Group.' In addition, the St(1vka ordered the I orrhwestern Front [0 conduct a major offensive to capture Demian k, ovgorod and Dna. The twin offensive.swere [0 begin soon

8UOW:The youthfulness of litis Red Army soldier ·01 the Leningrad Fronl is obvious. The young man is being welfomed btuk 10 'hisunil, hllv:ing;been wounded and treated .by Ihe slaff allhe aidposf in Ih.ebotkground.. The men CITe aU wearing Ib.e 1940 model winler fur hili.

55

THE lEGE OF LENINGRAD 1941-1944

, K1ve~ ...

---...-.

GULF o.F FINLAND

Flulkavo.

__ .

after Meretskov's forces reached the Volkhov River, The perilous situation at Leningrad, which was being subjected to near-constant artillery fire and was facing famine, and talin's desire to maintain the initiative, prompted him to demand that Meretskov begin his offensive with the force he had at hand.

The seamless expansion of [be Tikhvin counreroffensive into [he expanded Volkhov-Leni!lgrad offensive depended entirely on Mererskov's armies reaching and esrablishingadequare bridgeheads aero the Volkhov River. To Stalin's obvious disgust, Mererskov's armies in particular, Fediuninskys FiftyFourth, were roo slow. After Stalin sent them numerous, increasingly caustic, messages ordering them to accelerate [heir advance, the Fourth and Fifry-Second Armies finally reached rhe river near Kirishi, Gruzino and norm of Novgorod on 27 December eized bridgeheads, and began expanding [he bridgeheads against determined German resistance, However, despite Stalin' exhortation, Fediuninsky failed [Q capture Kid hi and Iakovlev could not seize Tigoda Station. By 30 December Mererskov's three armies had driven the two German corp back to positions from which they had begun their Tikhvin offensive on 16 October. Utterly exhausted and at the end of their supply lines, Meretskov's forces had no choice bur to dig in, forafy their po itions and go over to the

The Tikhvin counteroffensive wa rhl: Red Anny's firsr large-scale military success in the Great Parrioric \'(far. ln adduion mending Hider's dream of encircling Leningrad in 1941, rhecounreroffensive a sisted in the defeat of German forces at Mo cow and drove home to .errnan leaders the realization rhar rhis war would nor he easily won. The victnry, however. was difficult ro nchicve and proved costly. The Red Army employed about 280,000 troops in the Tikhvin defence, the Tikhvin counteroffensive, a nd the associated Siniav ino offensive. V hen the fighting ended, it had suffered more than 140,000 ca ualties, including 62,878 dead, captured or mis jllg.1~

The Germans also suffered heavy Ius es. Leeb committed more than 100,000 troops ill the advance [0 Tikhvin and Volkho\' and another 60,000 to the defence at iniavino, and suffered roughly 40,000 ca ualries, Despite his defeat, Leeb is ued a proclamation to his forces on Christmas Day proclaiming hi army group' victories:

"In the battles on and to the east of the Volkhu\' - as well as in [he withdrawal of [he from into a secure winter position behind the Volkbov - you have again met rhe highest requirernenrs of defensive power and of physical resiliency in fulfilling the mission. The enemy arrives at [he Volkhov empty handed.

0 40 80 Miles
..
h ~ 50Km
0 25
\
. LAKE lADOGA Nova/II. ladoga •

~ .

\ ,

i

ABOVE; leningrad's dl!lentes on 31 Oetembef 1941. Stren\lOV~ efforts hod been made by IheRed: Annyond the diy's population 10 stiffen the defences 0$ the Gerrnon~ gO'I nearer. Unfortunately, the city wa$Slill wilhinrange 01 German $iege ortIDery, whJmSiurled hi inmtl damage and loues,

defence. The grand new offen ive would nave to await the ew Year.

The Red Army's Tikhvin defence and counteroffensive were component part , of a far greater tracegic duel, \ hick wa occurring along the entire SovietGermall from, but particularly along the Moscow axis. Arm)' Grouponh's bold lunge towards Tikhvln ymbolized the optimism ehar gripped Hitler and the OKH when the}' launched perarion Typhoon in October 1 94 \. The ensuing defeats at both likhvin and Moscow were sober reminders that this optimism wa misplaced. In reality, rhe Red Army's victory at Tlkhvin represented the culmination of a process begun at ol'rsy in July and continued at Sraraia Russa and Luga in August and ar Leningrad in September .. Although costly in rerrns of lives, the St(llJka's insistence 011 an aerlve defence and merciless counrerarracks andcounrerstrokes fmally caught up with an exhausted Wehrmacnr in November and December. At rhe same rime, rhe Wehrmachr learned 1'0 its everlastingconsterrrarion, [hat warfare in Russia Wli far from the port it had been irr [he West.

56

.. mel' 12 june and up ro 20 December, Army Group .orth ha ... taken 438,950 prisoners and cap[tired or til;' rrroyed 3847 tanks <Inc! 4590 guns.

"Y'I;' reverently bow our heads to those who have given their lives, The Homeland thanks us for having protected it and count on u in the futme.

"We shall justify this trust. The New Year will find us ready to repel all enemy breakthrough ('Horts, unril rhc Fuhrer calls on \I again ro resume rhe arrack.">

Lceb's in pirational me sage belied the grim realirr rhar German forces had fall.cd toachieve the missions [hat Hider had a igned to them. Less Than two week later, Leeb's tired forces would have to respond to their commander' bold urnrnons when, on7 january, the Red Army assaulted their defences alung the Volkhm' River with renewed deterrninanon. Leeb's hristmas message was :-II Q his swan song. A the new Soviet offen ive began, he submitted his resignation [0 Hider. After five days of indecision, on 18 January Adolf Hitler replaced von Leeb with K uechler,

BELOW : One 01 Ihe mosl f am.olls images 0 II h e siege 0 I Leningrad: II Red Armysoldi er sl ares otlb e vicliln 5 of a Germ em artillery barrage, Ollce Hiller had decideda.gainsl 0' direci onoull against Ihe oty, the main German wellponsusedagainsl the ·defenders were bo.mbs IIlId millery shells - and sla:rvolion •.

;7

CHAPTER 4:

WI GO 19

~42

The iron grip that the Communist Party maintained over the population of Leningrad ensured that the city did not fall into the Germans' hands in late 1941 . Party functionaries organized civil defence teams, and the city's factories continued to produce war material. However, shortages, air attacks and shelling combined. to make life hell for the Inhabitants as the winter began.

The German in a ion srru.ck like a thunderbolt a it did \ ith the ovier Union a a .. hole catching government and p pularion alike by urpri c. The deva raring effects of me ehsna hr' rapid advan e di rupted defence and mobilization plan and quickly rran formed Leningrad into an active war zone. A the from collapsed the fir r order of busirre s wa defence and mobilization. A[ 05:00 hour: on 22 June, Major-General D. . iki hey, rhe Leningrad Iilirary Disrricr Chief of Staff ummoned hi arm. commander and implemented the di tri r' mobilization plan whi h by then eemed utterly irrelevant to the iruation. From this point forth mobilization and preparation of the city defence wa largely an ad hoc and increasingly frami affair.

The Leningrad Party organization, under Party chief A_ A. Zhdanov now began mobilization in

LIFT: Two dvU defence officials pofrollhe streets. Ess&nliaJ workers such as Ihese iometimes received on exira ralion allowance, as did the mainlen.ance gangs on the IIRoad 01 Ule". The armband denoles the woman's stotus.

accordance with the 29 June directives of the U R'

ouncil of People 'ommi ar and rhe Communi r Party) hese directives required the Part)' to upervi e preparation of the city's defence, mobilize industry, raise People's J lilitia forces. and form and field partisan force' in close cooperarion with the

orrhern from' Military Council, the Leningrad ciry Party Committee, and ciry's workers' council. The must urgent task was to organize Leningrad' military defences: fir t, the distant approache to the city and, later, around the city itself. To do 0 the authorities mobilized the city's population. On 27 June 1941 rhe Leningrad it}' Council' Executive Committee (lspolkom) ordered all able male between the age of 16 and 50 year and women berween 16 and 45 ro participate in the defen ive work being carried out.!

Those civilian formed work derails thar began constructing defence on Leningrad's southern ourskim and within [he icy itself in late July.] ubsequently an average of 125,000 Leningrader per day e pended a toral of 8,757,600 man-day working on defen ive belt and fortified region on

9

GRAD 1941-1944

ABOVE: The residential Narva district near the Gulf of Finland was directly In the path of the German assault. The (obbles from the rood have been used to build the barricade. The poster shows Lenin In defiant mode and prodaim.s:

"Death for death, blood lor blood".

(7.2ft) high and 3 .. irn (11.-Ft) deep ben een block (If hou e and individual buildings on the periphery and \ ithin ea h ector. For example, the Kirov ror built 17.2km (10.75 miles) of bar ric ad prate ted b. amitank dit hes around it ircurnference, ince ami-tank defences were particularly vital given the Germans' reliance on armour. construction for e arrernpred to ere r continuous ami-tank defence e heloned in depth along aJI dangerou tank approaches. For e 'ample; by 1 ovember [he Forty- econd rrny who c sector included the most dangerous tank axis, built 41 mutually upporting anti-tank region in addition to those already created on the edge of the city.1> Tbe anti-rank defence also included extensive network of ami-tank ob tacle and barrier that exploited unique terrain feature uch a nvers ravines, trearns and forested region and covered the e feature with over-watching fire. Where no u h natural ob tacles exi ted, engineer fjJJed in the gap with dragon s teem ob tacle , e carpment and annrank dirche .

Leningrad' defender al 0 had to counter the a hiliry of the Luftwaffe porenrialiy to pound the city into suhmi ion wirh air arrack. Aim ugh initially weak Leningrad's air defences (P 0) improved markedly during the fall. Initially, four organizations were

[he approache to the city during July Augu [and the first 10 day of eprern cr. Organized a factory reams and working under military upervi ion, the population huilt a raggering number of defensive works ranging from imple lit rrenche to 1.96- tonne (two-ton) reinforced concrete artillery posinons and anti-tank ob [a le .~ Despite accomplishing a prodigiou amounr of work, however, the effort was fraught with problems, particularly in July and Augu t, when the rapidly changing military sirnarion prevented ound planning and pre-empted much of the work done. Wor e rill, [he \ ork was poorly organized and [here was a chronic shortage of qualified upervi or and labour [0 perform the task. Since most weaponry and explosives were required at the front the defence were deficient in anti-rank and and-per onnel mines and other explo ive b racle . The defen ive on rructi n effort went on after the Front reached Leningrad, with an average of 4S 000 people per day pending 6, ~96,OOO man-days preparing the defen e berwecn 1 August and 31 December.

Defen i e work within the icy itself be an in Late August and accelerated n 2 epternber when German force reached the city's ourhern outskirts. The Leningrad F ron t orga nized a "sector de ence"

within the icy, whose outer forward edge extended along me city' ring railroad, and ubdividcd the defence into six ector cerre paneling to the city' ix districts (raiof1)~. Each ector con i ted of everal defensive po irian 1.2-2km (0. --1.1- mile 1 apart, and each defen ive po irian can i ted of eparare but mutually supporting battalion defensive region. The six sector encompassed a rota I of 99 barta lion regions. A defence taU formed from the ecretary of the district Parry organization the hairman of the eli tri t executive committee and repre enrative of 10 al NKVD and worker' organizations omrnanded ea hector. Lo 31 j\.llCVD and fire security for e ,ciry militia and workers' formation manned the defen-

ive region, but only a rhe combat ituarion required.

An elaborate. y [em of barricades and ami-tank defences formed rhe backbone of each e tor's defence. The defender erected barricades up [0 2.5m

60

responsible for air defence of rhe Leningrad region. II p 0 and 11 Fighter Aviation Corp defended Leningrad pI" aper; rhe Lad ga Brigade PV Region defended water route a ro the lake, and the vir Brigade PVO Region defended the railroad line from the depth of the country to Lake Ladoga. In an effort to improve air defence by centralizing it, in overnber

1941 the tare De.fence mrnirtee (GKO) reorga-

nized me oviet nion' arional ir Defence (PV

trail),), converting Il PVO orp into the Leningrad Corp' .pva Region. \'Vhile not affecting the Svir and Ladoga Brigade PV Region organization, if subordinated {he three regions to the Leningrad From rather {han [he ommander of P 0 trany. Thi facilitated concentration of air defence resource and fostcred better flJ"e coordination between PVO and air units, which was especially riti OIl for succes ful city defence. ub equendj air defence force operated independenrly only when protecting specific objective within their own zones of fire.

BElOW: Dreued for the (old weather in their podded lackets, Ihese civilians .Iabaor to complete a machine-gun position in a wooded oreo on the approache~ to Leningrad. Such civilian warkers were 0 ... ital pari of the city's defences, enabling soldiers to concentrate on the fighting.

61

THE SIEGE OF LE 1NGRAD 1941-1944

WINTER AGO

1941-42

pva fighter avianon concentrated on repelling German air attacks on the city as far forward as possible, and associated searchlight baneries supported the aircraft at night .. Anti-aircraft artillery regiments subordinate to the Leningrad Front's armies established anti-aircraft artillery fire zones on the city's outskirts and in the city itself, concentrated primarily along the western and southwestern approaches to rhe city. PVO also mounted anti-aircraft batteries on ships in the Gulf of Finland to strengthen and add depth to the western defence sector, and protected the approaches to the city itself with aero raric (barrage) balloons.

The city's defender also had to counter the threat of artillery fire, once German forces advanced to \vitnin artillery range of the city, br initiating extensive counrer-barrery programmes to halt or impede the destructive fire delivered against the city's P{lPUlation, factories and buildings. ill late September the Leningrad from developed a common artillery and air fire plan to deal with this threat. The plan allocared specific targets [0 the artillery and aircraft the most disrarn obviously TO aircraft. In October, the front also formed counrer-barrery artillery groups, each consisting of tWO ro three anri-aircrafr artillery battalions, These groups which included the ForrySecond and Fifty-Fifth Armies' anti-aircraft artillery

possible German air assanlts against rbe city fell ro the ground commanders of each defensive sector and special 3nri-deSallt detachments. Headed by a special three-man committee (troika) formed from representatives from militia, fire and Komsomol elements, these detachments included forces from each element.

Leningrad was in the greatest danger in September, when German forces approached the city's suburbs and Zhukov commanded the Leningrad from. During this period, the Stollka direcred Khozin, Zhukov's Chief of Staff, to prepare the city's bridges and factories for demolition and the city's defences for final German assault by 17 September. However, the failure of the German assault and Hider's decision to encircle the ciry ended the immediate crisis.

In response to GKO instructions to exploit "local resources for irs defence", from July through September military and Parry authorities instituted an ambitious and extensive mobilization programme to generate military manpO\ver, whose centrepiece was the formation of People's Militia inarodnne opolchanie) forces, primarily in divisional configuration, and armed workers' detachments .. The Party began forming the Leningrad People's Militia Army (Lellingradskoi armii narodnogo opoichaniia - LANO) on 30 June 1941, and the Front appointed General A. I. Subborin as irs commander; Originally,

ABOV[: T.hisphologrllph WII5 tllken in September 1941, whenlhe n.ovelly of bombing OJ sheUing Wll5 suth, thlll]1 wouldia1trlld II uowd of onlookers. The ipump is emptying themder so Ihalfhe WilIer mains <un be repaIred.

and all coastal and naval guns. were subordinate to the Irene's chief of artillery, When me threat became espcciallycrirical in the fall, [he Stavka sent ColonelGeneral of Artillery . N. Voronov to Leningrad [Q advise on the counrer-barterv struggle.

During the winter, when the surface of me Gulf of Finland and lakes and rivers in the Leningrad region froze, permitting possible German or Finnish attacks across their surfaces, coastal defence became a major concern. The Leningrad From addressed this threat by forming the Internal Defence of the City (VOG), formed around the nucleus of a rifle brigade.- This unit's mission was to organize continuous defences in Leningrad's western sector, prevent the enemy reaching the city from the Finnish Gulf, and ensure normal communications between Leningrad and forces isolated in the Oranienbaum bridgehead. During the same period, rhe Stavka rransferred the bulk of the Baltic Fleet's ships from Kronshtadr to Leningrad, strengthening Leningrad's defences but also necessiraring the reinforcement of Kronshtadt's ground defences with army troops ... The task of countering

62

Subborins army was to consist of J 5 division of the "besr workers, students and teachers" in Leningrad. The collap e of the Northwestern Front's defences in ea rI y J u I y, however, forced acceleration of rhe process, and LANG sent the first three divisions ro man the Luga Line by 7 July.

LA..'lO fielded it subordinate forces in three stages. from 4 to 18 Jul)', the army formed three divisions of people's militia divisions (dit'izij narodnogo opoldmniia - DNO), designated the 1st 2nd and 3ed DNOs with strengths of 12,102, 8721 and \0 094 men, respecrively.s During rhe same period, it formed ] 6 machine gun-artillery battalions and six deseroyer regiments wirha total of 16,800 men and 5000 men respectively, Since the first ,levy was dearly inadequate on 16 July the" orthwesrern Direcrion Command ordered five new divisions be formed between 18 July and 20 August. The 4th DNO was a light division formed from three destroyer regiments, and the l sr, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Guards D Os (GDl Os) were made up of men from fomu:r workers'

BELOW: Thi~ 10(111 Parly olfidal, Comrade Pristavko, i5 addre5sing II group of dVitillJls in Ibe "Red Comer" of fhe !lrell mllnagemenfoffi(e. Everyone looks heahhy I1Ild' well"led. II would seam thai blackoutreglllalions have .been relaxed

10 rlh eo c(a 51 enl

63

GRAD 1941~1944

volunteer detachment. The four uards DI

which numbered 10, • 11,4 9 1 ,334 and 924 men ea h, were at or above required establishment

rrengrh.? Finally, the orrhwe tern Direction

Command ordered rhe 6th and 7th ONOs be formed between 'I and 15 eprember, al 0 on the basis of existing workers' battalion. ince the fWO divisions numbered 8189 and 8454 men re pecrivcly, each wa roughly 2500 men belox srren tth. Thu , by 15

eprernber [he orthwe [em Dire tion Command

had fielded 10 0 divi ion and 16 cparate ma hine gun-artillery battalion with a total trengrh of 135,000 men.!v

Raw Courage Not Enough

Each 0 0 resembled a normal rifle division and was manned primarily by re ervi ts and other volunreers.!' However, [be di i ions enior command

adre of roughly 20 officer per divi ion were inc - perienced poorly [rained and unfamiliar with the employment of modern milirary equipment, while the divi ion ' mid- and low-level cadre were fanner

rgeant or from the rank. The 0 0 \ erc woefully hort of light and heavy machine guns and antirank and anti-aircraft artillery. To ompensare for the e grave. hortage the divi ions formed ami-rank de troyer groups of men armed with anti-rank grenade or anti-tank mine.

The orrhwestern Direction Command sent the DNO to the l.uga front from 10 (0 20 July, immediarely after their formaci nand without providing the officer or oldier with an)' refre her training. The result were predicrable. De pite the enthusiasm and ardour of officers and oldiers, the divisions had no

raying power 3Hd their troop died like flies, Since alJ of it division had been di patched to the from rhe Direction Command disbanded the Milicia Army at the end of September. Tho e DNO that survived ultimately provided the backb ne of the Forry-

econd and Fifty-Fifth Armies and the eva

Operational Group. In late eprernber the General

taff renumbered rhe seven urviving D '0 as regular Red Army rifle divi ion and di banded the 1 t D 0 and the 2nd and +rh GD , which had been annihilated in combat.'?

While the People's Militia wa forming, the Parry and industrial enterprises created armed workers' detachments and insritured military training for worker. Large factories such a the Kirov and Lenin Factorie formed worker detachment headed b. troikas, made up of the factory director. the local Parry e retary and the trade union chairman. About

WINTER AGO

1941-42

107,000 worker received military training during july and August, while on rhe job and [hen formed armed dera hmenrs on the ba i of one company per factory hop or section. In thi fashion, the Party organized L23 workers' detachment totalling 15,460 worker-soldiers by I l overnber, Since most of these detachments were ineffective, on 9 OCTober the authorities reorganized some of [he derachrnenr into rifle bartalions companie and platoons and later, five worker' brigades, and a igned ro them re ponsibilitie in the city' internal defence. These worker barralions erved a re ervoir for the formarion 0 D T 5 and later to repleni h the Leningrad From' line forces.n

t maintain them and conrr I their u e.16 Later the MPYO formed brigades to fight fires in faceosie and other installation, and self-defence group and fire teams to perform [he arne functions in horne and apartment blo k . More than 3500 of these groups were operating by early epternber manned by 270,000 men and women - 16,000 women were serving in the Frunze dlsrricr alone. Finally on 2 July the Council' E: ecurive ommirtee order d the entire able-bodied population in rhe cit. to receive MPVO training.

All of these mea ure paid off, particularly when the Luftwaffe began it inten e bombing campaign on rhe night of 6 epternber and cominued the bombing through 2 eprernber.!" During chi period the LufrwaHr conducted 11 day and 12 night air raid , 480 of the total 2712 German aircraft ucce fully penetrated the city' air defences. In addition ovier aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery shot down 1 2 of the aircraft, forcing the Luftwaffe to bomb from everincrca ing height and more often at ni ht. The

Women on [he Frontline

When the Germans intensified rheir air offensive again t the city in early 1942 and manpower hortage became critical military aurhoririe began employing many women, parri ula rly Komsomol member, in ombat a signmenr in addition to their more traditional roles. Ba ed on ,KO instruction , the Leningrad Fronr Military Council initially accepted 1000 women inro the PY .H The Leningrad Komsomol regional committee rai cd the fema le volunteers through pecia I co In m i ttee esta bIi rhed in each district and al 0 accepted olunreers from Among non-union youth. ThePVO command a signed women primarily [Q P 0 anti-aircraft artillery batteries, projector (searchlight) 'rations, balloon-ob racle sub-unit telephone and radio tations and aerial reconnais an e and radio location point and in tallations, n additional 1000 women had joined rhe ranks of the Leningrad PYO by 'lay 1942 alone,

One of the most ubiquitou task performed by Leningrad's popularion wa local air defence (ltlesl· naia !JrOfilJo'L10zdushnaw oborona - j\o1FVO) supervised by local authorities. Soon after rhe war began. the Party as igned rhe Leningrad Council (Sovel) of Worker' Depurie re pon ibility for organizing J! 1P O. In turn, on 27 June the ouncil' Executive

ommirree (Coris1JOlkol'l'I) ordered worker in all fa rode, installation, chool and universities, social organization and hou ing aurhoririe to organize round-the-clock MPVO sentry duty. Sentries were to .issueair raid warnings to the popularion, organize fire fighting and enforce blackout (light discipline) to protect against enemy air attack.'! MPYO per onnel also prepared specially equipped collective air-raid helrer and field air-raid helter rhroughour the cit)' and manned and provided permanent cadres

ABOVE: Soldiers and civilians queue at a newspaper kiosk an the leilliny Prospect. The faces of Ihe dvilians ore beginning 10 show signs of the strain and deprivation Ihal was 10 become mD.re cammon os the first winter drew on.

64

Luftwaffe conducted 108 air raids during the rest of the year and 1499 of it aircraft (79 percent) penetrated the city defence. The 3295 high-explo ive and 67,078 incendiary bomb these aircraft dropped caused 88 percent of the casualties Leningrad' population uffered from air attack throughout the war.

The German air bombardment decree ed harply between January and March 1942, when rhe arrack dwindled to individual ames by single aircraft. For example, 5 2 aircraft attacked the ciry in April. and only 95 made it rhrough rhe city's anti-aircraft defences. The Germans ceased rheir air arracks entirely in lay and did nor re ume them unril October. Thereafter German air activity wa light for the remainder of the year. The marked de rea e in German air activity the German air blo kade' 01- lapse, and a ociaced decrea e in ci ilian 10' e due to air arrack re ulred largely from the growing strength and resilience of Leningrad's PYO and the efforts of the u> O.

Before rhe war began, Leningrad was one of the most imporranr centre for weapon production in the Soviet Union. It remained 50 after the war began as rile State and Parry [a ked the city'S fa rorie , ith

upplying the Red Army with weapons, ammunition and other upplie and equipment, under the logan

65

THE SIEGE OF LENINGRAD 1941-1944

ABOVE: lihe hideous reality of Ii!e in a besieged dty.The removal of the dead from the streels of Leningrad was 10 becomes'l,1(h lin everyday BveM:tthat itexdled UltleoJ no lurio$i Iy. These ClI r:ps sSP Ta being remove dlrom Ihe V05$ltlllyaSquare ,near IheMas(ow Slolion.

"E verythi 11g for [he from". Immed iarely after war began, the governmem ordered the city's industries [0 shife [Q production of military products only, a process rhar took rwo to three months to complete. Factories such as Kirov, Frunze and Boi'sbeoik accelerared their production after 22 June, enlisting large numbers of women in their workforces,

Whil.e the factories' workload increased, working conditions deteriorated sharply as. the from neared the city. German artillery pounded Leningrad and irs factories 272 times from 4 Seprem ber to 31 December, firing more than J3,OOO shells into the dry, exaeerbating: rhe devastation produced by [he more than 70,000 aerial bombs already dropped there. Shelling sometimes Ia ted for more than 18 hours in a single day, reaching .3 crescendo on ] 5 September when it lasted 18 hour and 32 minutes and on 17 Seprern bee which endured one minute more. Another 2],000 artillery shells and more than 950 bombs Struck [he city in 1942. This prolonged enemy bombardment killed 5723 civilians and wounded 20,507 from September 1941 to the end of 1943.

Soviet heavy indu try was. the primary mrget for German artillery and aerial bombardment. Artillery fire struck [he E.leklrosiln Factory, located along the southern ring railroad, nine rimes from September

city. on 4 Ocrober rhe GKO ordered Zhdanov and Kuznersov ro evacuate key indusrrie and technical per onnel trom Leningrad [0 the Volga and Ural regions, The evacuation of heavy tank and armoured vehicle factories and man)' other plants with their qualified workers, which had already begun in August, accelerated in October when German Forces began operations to cur off the remaining communications routes east of the city and began bombarding these routes. The evacuation routes extended by rail co Lake Ladoga, by barge across the lake, and hy rail though Volkhov and Tikhvin ro Vologda and rhe depths of the country, By 31 August, 282 [rains had left Leningrad, bur the German capture of Mga complicared movement plans, forcing LieutenantGeneral of Technical Services V. A. Golovko,. who was in charge, to rely more heavily on barges to ferry rhe equipment across Lake Ladoga from Shlissel'hurg. The subsequent German caprure of Shlissel'burg closed the evacuation routes, leaving tons of industrial equipment rranded on rail sidings and roads from Leningrad to the lake. Ultimately rhe Kirov and Izhora rank factories relocated [Q Cheliabinsk and Sverdlovsk in the Ural region. At rhe same rime •. aircraft evacuated 10.500 of rhe IllOS[ qualified technical personnel. These factories and

through November ]941 and 73 of the 333 shells fired struck the .factory's buildings. Artillery hit the Kronshtadt Factory 114 times from 2.2 Seprern ber 1941 to 25 January 1942 and tbel42.0 shells killed 26 persons and wounded another 58. The artillery raids finally tapered off after July J 942 as a consequence of successful Red Army ground operations. Thereafter, a total of 15,462 artillery shells. hit the city during the first half of 1943 and 5535 during the last six months of the year. Despite me appalling working conditions, fa.ctory production remained substantial through 31 December 1941 and included 491 tanks (from the Kirov Factory), many of which rolled off the assembly line directly into the frontlines.!S In addition [Q supplying the orthern and Leningrad Froms' needs the factories produced 1000 guns and mortars and millions of shells far the defence of Moscow,

After the Germans captured Shlissel'burg in early epternber and began their ground blockade of the

66

WINTER AGO

1941~2

technicians soon resumed rheir production work in the new locations.

Despite severe shortages in personnel and supplies and constant enemy bombardment, rhe factories continued producing during [he evacuation by u ing locally availa ble resources, Beside rhe German' intense September hombardrnenr, the. most trying period For factories was from ~ lovernber 1941 to early 1941, when fuel and electricity shortage and per onnel losses due to famine forced many factories to cease production alrogerhec A[ the heighr of rhe famine, 50 to 60 percent of faeroe}' worker were absent from. work at any given time. This bad a devastating impact on the availability of ammunition ar the from. Even during this period, though Leningrad's factories continued supplying Red Army forces in other critical regions particularly rhe Moscow sector. On GKO instrucrions, in October and j_ ovember, Leningrad transported viral weapons and ammunition to Moscow via Lake Ladoga and by air. The Special orrhern

BELOW: AgriJly photomontage of Ihe NevskyPr05ped under nre.Civilians ~(ln be5een running along the pavement 0" the left QWClY from Ihee",plo~iCln farther down the rCiod. Th.elarpse5 on the righi, lI-1though dearly Qui 01 Hale, are ,erlainly reol.

67

THE SIEGE Of LENINGRAD 1941-1944

ter approaching, the food and fuel supplies. cut off, and inadequate reserves dwindling, the city's inhabitants raced a uoz·cn hell of starvation and disease while they fought for survival under enemy fire. I[ was indeed fortunate that the Wehrmadu faiJed ro draw the noose righr around Leningrad by severing all of the city's comrnunicarions lines easr of Lake Ladoga. This reality came back to haunt [he Germans and, in the end, saved the city and irs population from utter starvation and destruction. 10r did the Germans get dose enough to the CiTY to destroy it by artillery £ire. In addition, in early September Riehrofen's Vlll Air Corps (360 aircraft), which was scheduled for transfer to Army Group Centre in mid-September, attacked the Baltic Fleet, damaging the battleships Martlt and Oktiabrskaia Reoolursiia and (he cruisers Kirov and Maksill Gork.i. However, these attacks failed to achieve their goal of destroying the fleer before Richrofen's departure.

Aviation Group, which flew key Kirov and lzhora Factory technicians to the Ural, participated in rile airlift of cririca I su pplies to Ioscow,

Factory producrion improved ignificantly in the spring of 1942, when supplies transported across Lake Ladoga on the icc road perrnirred the resumpdon of some factory production and cicy transport. However, since sho rtages of rra i ned managers and workers still limited full production, the Parry and city government established technical schools and training programmes. Understandably, the authorities focused on restoring weapons and munitions production and the number of functioning weapons factories ro e [rom 50 in April [Q 57 in May and 75 in June, although most remained quite small. Arms production rose modestly from 1 January through 30 eprernber 1942, particularly of light weaponry and munitions.rs Thus, although arms production decreased drastically during rhe first 18 months of war, Leningrad's factories were able to satisfy the dry's basic defence needs despite experiencing the harshe t rigours of war, the blockade and famine.

The German blockade of Leningrad trapped more than three million souls in (be ciry, With win-

Bnow: Small workshop5 511(h 115 Ihis sprongiLrp 011 oyer the (ity •. This worker is repa:lringo PPSh subm.omme gun. The simple

con structioncm dro b II stness of many Soviet we opo ns made SQch workrelalively straightforward for the least skilled workers.

With the bulk of Leningrad's male population at or on their \"'3Y to [he from, thefirst crisis faced by the Leningrad Defence Council was ro look after the soldiers' families. To do so, me Council established spt"cial deparrmentsin regional, ciry and district execurive councils, which were responsible for the support and welfare of soldiers' families. These departments distributed benefits and pensions and determined and arrernpred to satisfy the families' legal benefits and material needs, a process that became quite difficult during [he winter famine . .!O Despite this special assisranee, the soldiers' families shared many of me blockade's hardships with the population as a whole.

Leningrad's population suffered immensely during the German blockade, particularly during the first winter when hortsges, f.amine and disease ravaged the city .. The blockade' most immediate impact was to reduce drastically the supply of food, ammunition, fuel fat and other materials necessary to sustain human life. Ellen though the GKO, the Party and city government were preoccupied with rhe desperate situation at rhe front. they mobilized all of rheciry's resources ro salle it and irs population. When the

68

\V1NTER AGONY 1941--42

AiSOVE:. The original caption 10 Ihls photograph read: "Ule in heroic Lenlngl'Gd~ Armament factories (onlln.ul 10 work during bombardments cmd aIr aJerls. This Is Is an va, who r,egular.ly fulfils 300 ,percent 01 her dallyquoll1." The cilyc,onlillued to be II malor armaments produ(erlhroughoQllhe war.

Germans first disrupted Leningrad s uppJy lines in early September, the dry's reserves were insufficient to meet the population's needs. Since bread and flour reserve totalled 34,381 tonnes (35,000 tons) on 26

eprember and daily requirements were at least 1081 tonnes (1101 rons) of flour, the city had iust over one moneh's supply of this staple remaining. Reserves of other foodstuffs were just as low. Thus rhe aurhorities' first priority was to ensure that some essential supplies reached rhe city,

The only routes by which supplies could reach the city were by water across Lake Ladoga and byair, The Lake Ladoga route relied on flimsy and slow barges and cutters to cross the lake around the dock, in stormy weather, and under constant German air attack. From ] October co 30· ovember these ships transported 44,204 ronnes (45,000 tons) of food

69

6098 tonne (6208 ron) uf ammunition 6 -10 tonnes (6638 tons] of fuel and lubricant, and 2321 tonne (1363 tons) of other cargo aero the lake. Thi totalled 5 .939 ronne (60,000 ron ) of upplies or 17 l wagonloads at a fare of 30 wagon per day. Aerial re- upply by 30 to -0 aircraft per day during the period 14-28 lovernbcr managed co transport 1179 tonne (1200 ron) of high-calorie food to the city. However, these deliverie fell ar hort of the city' requirements.

The e tabli hmenr of the blo kade on September and the de [ruction of the ciry Badaev kii food warehouse by German aerial bornbardment on 12 September, created a food supply

risis in the ciry, on equenrly, talin em D.

Pavlo a representative of A. Mikoian's Food Commissariat, to Leningrad with order to in tirure food fa rion i ng and conservari on systems. Pa vlov establish d and managed the food and fuel rationin y rem for two years in do e .ooperarion with the city adrninistrarion and Part)'. Pavlov' rarioning sr tern esrabli hed strict norm based on the military function or work status of each soldier

62.5 percent decrease for troops in rear ervice units and in ra llari n. On 20 lovember, me city required -0 I tonne (- LO ron ) of bread each day to

upp rt the population of 2.5 million oul.

To help make up for rhe bread hortage, the ci .• bakeries increased me bread's baked weighr compared with the amount of flour used by hilling rom hearth baking [0 form baking, whi h increased rhe bread' baked \ eight bv 6 percent. In addition, on 23 eprember me Leningrad From cea ed beer production and ordered all malr, barley oybeans and

ABOVE; On 20 August 1942, tragedy struck tbe Amelkin fomily - their o·partment was helrvily dlrmoged by enemy fire. The thickness of the wall must han absorbed much of the explosion os Ihe furniture and the family somovar are olmost undisturbed.

RIGHT: These three victims of the German bombing are starkly recorded by the Soyiet caplion as::

"S. It. Gorshkoy, nine years old, a pupil at the leninsky District School No 122; loya KhulikoYQ, factory worker, and construction worker AleI(andra Hlyino."

All died in their hospital beds.

and inhsbiranr in [he dry. For example, bread norms char had been e rablished even before his arrival, were to decrease five rimes between 2

eprernber and 20 I ovember.» The 10 Iovernber daily bread ration was a bare minimum 0 375 gram (L3.2 oun e ) for worker in priority hops, 2 ~O gram (8.8 ounces) for engineer and technical workers, and 125 grams (4.4 ounces) for employees dependent and children. Compared wirh 22 June 1941 (hi repre enred a 60 percent de rea e in the , orkers' bread ration norm nd a more than 80 percent decrea e in the employee' norm. The 20

overnber norm endured until 31 December.

During (he arne period, the bread norm for oldier decrea ed three time> on 2 October, and on 7 and 20 November. Thi repre ented a decrea e of 44.5 percent for frontline oldier who re eived 00 grams (17.6 ounce) each after 20 November. and a

70

bran reserve be senr to rhe bread factories to economize on the u e of flour. However, the measures only ca ed rather than lved the hortages. Therefore, n 24 eprernber the rant ordered bakerie to adulrerare rhe bread further (40 percent of the bread already consisted of such additive a malt, oatmeal and husks). Finally, a bread supplies conrinued to dwindle, in late overnber bakerie began adding edible cellula c ro the bread, which depending on the day, constituted between 20 and 50 percent of each loaf. This use of additive and decreasing norm c>.'1'cnded

THE lEGE OF LENINGRAD 1941-1944

me bread supply more man one and a half months, Bur it was still inadequate.

The early onset of an abnormally severe winter sharply curtailed navigation on Lake Ladoga in hue November 1941, and significantly worsened the supply siruarion in the dry and ar the from. More than 982 ronnes (1000 tons) of cargo daily was required JUSt [Q sustain the city's population and [he ice road, which was JUSt beginning to operate In mid-January, could not satisfy the e supply requirements. This forced the city authorities to search for new ways to increase the volume of cargo crossing Lake Ladoga and mobilize Leningrad's internal resources.

First, in late December the from released to the population 294 tonnes (300 tons] of food reserves stored at Kronshradt and on other islands. Ar rhe same time, soldiers assigned to the fleet, fares and the Fifry-Fourth Army reduced their rations voluntarily for the sake of the population. All the while, search parries scoured all buildings formerly used for food and bread Storage for foodrell1nants.

AE supplies dwindled and the Germans intensified their bombardrnenr of supply depots and the ice road, the dry's population began suffering from hunger and famine, casualties rose, and normal work became difficult and then impossible. As hunger spread, fuel supplies also fan our in January 1942, elecericiry became unavailable, the city's

"The grown-ups told me they did not know when rhe war would begin bur I could feel the sense of anticipation in every bone of my body. The radio was never turned off. The whole world W:.lS arwar. My father moved little Hags around a map of pain. There was fighting in nearby Finland. But then, one summer's day, rhe black, benr receiver of OUf streer rad io announced rha t the wa r had spilled over our borders. At first they tried ro save [he children.

"They knitted me a little shoulder bag. I had to leave alone, without my parents, v virh a rroop of other children carrying the ame little shoulder bags. ";; e assembled at the factory where my mother worked - and then we all returned home. The city was surrounded .. The evacuation had been cancelled. The siege had begun.

"Try gertiag dressed in a hurry when they wake you up every few hours of the night. You're only nine years old and you could ea ily sleep through any bomb raid or artillery barrage. Your mother is rushing you - 'Quickly! Quickly!' Bur your boots have so many eyelets it rakes an interminable time to lace [hem up - no, char's not righr, that's the wrong hole. Bur it's good enough. You pull on the econd boot

ABOVE: Throughoullheeailyyears of Ihe sieg.e, a vasl anay of small ships and barges wDsconstantiyemployed ferrying in munilions and foodstuffs. The retum jouTl1ey.s alten sow them conveyingnon-essel1tial workers, the o'id and the young to places a'grellter safety etsewhere in! l'he Soviet Union.

trams ceased operating, water supply was interrupted, ferry and boat rransporr ended, and all business activity ceased. The city's inhabitants had [0 obtain water from the icy Neva River, walk to work from one end of the city to the other or live in the factories, and operate machine cools by hand or by generator. Since the population had no choice but to use wood stoves to cook their food or heat their lodgings. numerous fires broke out, which were no les dangerou than the German bombardment and were difficult to fight because of the lack of water. The government established numerous fire commands to advise [he population on [he dangers and figh t fi res.

Lyudmils Anopova, bornin 193], lived through the iegeof Leningrad, Her father, Akindin Kadykov, was a writer who had completed a novel about Cossack life. The manuscript was lost during the blockade of the dry, and Kadykov himself died shortly after escaping from the besieged dry. Lyudmila' story is bur one of mOUSaLHis. of experiences from the ciry of leningrad during rhis terrible time:

n

WINTER AGOY 19011-42

without bothering .. You grab }'OUf bundle - th~H'S it, uff you go.

"The air-raid shelter is in the neighbouring bouse. The road is dark. You know it well, hut it's pockmarked with shell holes and your right foot gets caught in something, makes you stumble. You search for the light - there it i ! The helrer is welllit inside. There's still room to sit down. There are benches in rbe centre at me entrances.

"We waste no rime in taking our place and piling up our bundles, There is already a rumbling ound in rhe far distance. They are firing, me bombs are already dropping .. Bur it's not them I'm afraid of.l am hiding my right foot from rhe other people. I've JUSt noticed that I'm wearing my grandmother's boor, laced up by one eyelet, Has rio-one seen it yet? 1 am so clumsy, It's five sizes too big, How could Il10r have seen that - even half-asleep? How careless, what a muddlehead I am! I can't stand ir, I hare everyone

B ELO W: T TO dilia n alcelehratians sfillcurri ed o.n de spile I he silua lion .. Here, 'II y au n 9 gitlton~ iders whidide(orllt i en 10 moose from 'hose on oHer al this loy (Qunler. Despite being indoors, bath (ustamer and Qssistontllre dressed 10 keep worm as heoling WIlS (1I1efully (ontralled to SIIYe fuel.

73

RAD 1941-1944

"Dying Was Painful But [0 Terrible"

"In 'the morni ng,wc do nor ha ve rhe rrength to ger up, but my mother force us to climb ut four beds and then ro make them Lip. I d rhi n my knee. I have no need ro dre . \Vie lecp in our vercoars, J\ I)" parent have already decided ro leave rhe ciry, even though Ill}' facl,er has work. nee an engineer, he now work' as a van driver ar rhe bakery and unload rhe bread in a wheelbarrow at rhe bread hop. 'ly mother pu he me wheelbarrow rom behind and guard it at rhe arne time, earing char they will be robbed. Bur one day I found my elf pu hing the barrow in read of my mother. It wa rhe da, my family had de ided to leave - to rhe south, [0 rhe Don.

They baked [he bread in enorrnou oven. The ern [ urled over and fell off in crumb. TIle workers treated me [0 the crusts. I are and are and are. I didn 'r ave a ingle rumb rhar the bak ry chief ga e me. I don't rernernb r hov many ru t r ate in [hat day - pr bably a wh le loaf of them. By evening I was ull, That night I thought I \ a, dying hilt rny father didn't notice.

"He didn't I ok after me. I knew that I'd never ha e .u h a day again. Dying wa p inful but nor 0 terrible. B~' m rning, it had all pa ed - the pain, [he feeling of satiny. Bur me mel! of the bread ru t ha remained wirh me forever,

"On maps of [he Leningrad oblast, rhc Road of Lit a oro Lake Ladoga i cleael- marked.s n pril 4, 1942, \ e made our way along char road - [u t the Iour of u and a ew meagre po e ion. \; e wenr by car then by train to the Borisovsya Ridge, to rJ1C banks of rhe lake trewn with people and their lugga 'e. The lorrie arne up and the driver gave preferen e to tho e who had vodka on them - that erernal hard curren y. '\ te had nothing bur eau de

ologne, '\e were the la r to go. The wind \\"1I cruel and piercing. There were people and their po e ion bundled together in rhe back of rhe lorr .

.. he driver had nor lepr for three dar. Ju t a we \ ere approa hing the other bank, he fell asleep on [he wheel, era hed into a pine tree and threw the pa enger aero the ice. [y farher fell our of the lorr '. He died two monrhs later. My i ter and J be arne srphans."

- --- - - The Road or Ute lOules

o

IS

30 Miles

gel a lirrle millet, orne dry onion. now and again .l piece of frozen rnear, '\ e 'rand rher f r hour. '\'{' are frozen but we wait and u er in ilence."

:------_

--_

---

Malyi Islancl----- KO.bona

'-1 'BoI'st\o Island

Kloch'ia Islati'd Shlissal'butg : __ ,_....r-

) - -.._...--

• Toksovo

-----

OSlnovet$""~""""""V-a:ranovo.

I vaganova.j

Vsevolol<hskii . _

Kokkorevo .'

Gorod.okZ·

•

Slnlavlno

lam lZhora.·, IV:OOVSkOfl Krasnyi Bot ~\

LAKE LADOGA 0

25

SOKm

..... -- .....

.. ..

_" "

".. ...

,

,

\

\ \

\ \

.., \ -

Novala Ladoga-.:

I \ ,

\ I I

Staraia Ladoga •

who unn near me - all rho e people throwing

u h apparently indifferent glan e in my dire rion.

The 11- lear ounds, afe r la r. The dark road with it potholes. Autumn. tar. JUSt like in the wood, j\((y grandmother' boots lip and slide. There i a smell of burning in the air.

"During rhe day and night that follow d, all the PI' vision in the town \ ere burned - and with them all rra of rhe old life. Famine de ended upon Leningrad. And once: again there wa an evacuation - rhi time troop from the [r nrline and rhe out-

kir \ ere retreating [0 rhe centre of ehe iry under hea \'y fire.

" hat was rhe beginning of me worst winter in living memory. The father of 1l1)' be r friend was the fir t of my clo e a quaintan e to die. Hi coffin rood ill [heir be r r m and the dead man lay in ide, dre ed in hi e t clothes \ a hed and arefully ombed ready for rhe lasr journey. nd it wa terrible indeed. But it wasn't long before we ceased ro be afraid of dearh.

"They ur off rhe water upply, The Ne a wa dose b~" only 500 meter away. Bur how could we reach it? '\ e lowered ledge saucepan and milk churn from the fourrh floor.'\· e made our way slow-

ABOVl: The "Road of Ufen across Lake Ladoga saved Le.ningrad during the first winter of the siege, and thereafter tontinued 10 be an important winter supply route for the city. Uke Le.ningrad Itself it was under (onstant LuftwoHe threat, and so antl-oircraft positions were set up along its various rouln.

Iy to the "eva, cro the nowdrifr, and oop d up freezing water from the ice hal. n both ide lay the abandoned corp e 0 the dead. clothed, other Wt'("C covered in hrouds,

"The \ indows are boarded up with plywood.

It dark everywhere. The only warmth i in the kitchen br the iron ove, and a tiny wick i burning on the table. It' just a rwisred piece of cloth dipped in oil. We already take no notice of the hel] exploding around u . \ e no longer go dOV{l1 to the air-raid helrers. '\ e [u [ it together in the gloomy kitchen.

"I read [Q my elf all day. And such wonderful books! About uvorovl About rhe young princess ~ ho became arherine 11. I draw pi rure of lirtle houses, rree a wood. BU[ I'm hun r. every moment of the day. Provi ion are old on ration book. '\ e ha e to rand in a long queue at the h p on Kirovsky Prospect. For our six rarion books we

preading di eas e wa a natural outgrowth of rhe famine. TI,e percentage of rhe population ill with

4

scurvy and malnurrition (dysrrophia) in rea ed dr a - rically and rhe death [Oil ro. e cara rrophically, The same nurnl er of people peri hed in De ember 1941 rhar ha I died in all of J 40, and in january 1 42 J -OO~OOO uccurnbed to di ea e and famine daily. After rhe famine began in November the monthly dearh r II ro e from 10,000 in No ember [0 more than 0,000 in December and more [han LO 000 in januc ry, During rhe \ inter of 194L and 1942, the wnr t period of the iege \ hen curvy be rune ra111- pant, the aurhoririe I egan producing' itarnin from pi nc need Ie , man u facturing I 62 010 gallon (738 -00 litre) 0 pine extract in the fin half 0 I 4__ In addiri n, the populari n of Leningrad region provided fo d to rhe Leningrsder rhrough the porou blo(.:kade.ll The city' fuel upplies al a remained critically herr, largely due to the From' and nee!' requirement. e pite rri t rationing and conservation, all fuel upplie had be 11 e thau ted b.

BELOW: This female tralfi( oHicer i.s guarding the ehlronce to

tbe Leningrad Front and the beginning of tbe "Road of Ufe". The Gaz lorry is typkal of thousonds of such vehicles tbol made Ihe dangerous journey across the ice day after day.

\

the ice had thickened to l m 13.2h) and was covered by 3QOlllm (11.Sin) of snow cover, permirring almost unlimited usc. Thereafter, the roures were able to ~u~cain the weigh of almost any type of military vehicle up to and including heavy ](V tanks. Theengineers configured the icc road (0 accornmodaee aroundthe-clock, rwo-way traffic in an)' weather. When construction was completed. the roads extended a total of 1770kll1 (I L06 miles), 1650 of which had to be repeatedly cleared of snow.·!5 The Front also had to create and depio}" an elaborate network of road guides, communicarions points, road service commandant POStS, medical and rescue service points, feeding points, and combat security posts along [he routes to ensure the routes functioned rel.iably)~

Initially, however, the new ice road fell far short of satisfying Leningrad's needs and the Leningrad From's plan for supplying 1965 ron nes (lOaD tons) of supplies ro [he ciry per clay.!~ Worse still, a rha", .. that began on 30 November limited vehicular movement and reduced the shipment that day ro only 61 ronnes (62 IOn~). Even after the ice thickened, the supply effort was plagued by congenitally poor and ineffecrive organization, which reduced food, amrnunirion and fuel reserves to catastrophically low Ievels and threatened the survival of soldier and civilian alike In

WINTER AGO Y 1941-42

ABOVE: An es sen tial feature of I he "Road of Lif'e" was the Ihickl1ess 01 the ice. '['he ReA! Army's m.eteorological brallch performed a vilal, if unSl1l1g. servicelram isolU'ted slafians such aslhis ice-blodi hut dOlled anon leke Ladoga.

1 January 1942. The a urhoriries [hell collected firewood and pear from neighbouring districts, particularly (rom the dry's suburbs and [be norrheasr, where more than 3.5 million cubic meters of firewood were gathered in 1942.

Leningrad's sale ground supply route during the firsr harsh winter was [he so-called Ladoga ice road (Ladozhskaia ledouaia frassa), which crossed the surface of Lake Ladoga. This legendary road earned the well-deserved name, the "Road of Life" (Doroga ZhiZlli), because it "V3S critical to Leningrad's survival. The Stallka ordered construction of a uppJy rome across [he lake in early overnber even before [he lake froze,wllt:n it became obvious that the Leningrad From could nor raise the blockade. On 19

overnher the Leningrad Front ordered that a military vehicular road (VOfZllIlO-OII!Ol1lobil'lloia domga - BAD1, designated the IOlst BAD, be built from Kobona on ehe eastern bank of lake Ladoga aero s [he ice of Shlissel'burg Ba}' to Vaganovo 011 the lake's western bank. However, the German capture of

Tikhvin on 8 November forced construction of at far longer road, rhe 102nci BAD. which bypassed Tikhvin from the north.~l The ice road itself followed rhe shortest possible route - 28-32km (17.5-20 miles) - across the lake and was constructed in extremely difficult conditions. Units constructing the road had to contend with almost constant German arrillery fire and air bombardment, which required extensive use of camouflage and anri-aircraft defence .. The builders also had roconterrd with ever-changing ice conditions on the lake, frequent and numerous cracks and fissures in rhe ice, periodic thaws rhar effected [he ice's rhickness, and recurring storms.

Road exploirarion parties reconnoitred and marked routes across the lake in. mid-November and, afrer testing [he routes' viability, the first cargo reached Leningrad on 2.3 ovember.H Subsequently, harsh and ever-changing weather condirions continually battered the routes and limited their carrying capacity, requiring Front engineers to work constantly [0 repair, improve and expand [hem. Between 18 ami 28 November [be engineers managed ro build a second route extending 27km (16.8 miles) across the lake from Kokkorevo via Kloch'ia Island [0 Kobona. As [he ice thickened, the engineers also created multiple new routes [0 rhe norm. By the end of December

76

the city, Therefore, Parry leaders Zhdanov and Kuzncrsov rook personal charge of the supply effort, after which the siruarion slowly unproved. Daily supply shipments rose to 687 tonnes (700 tons) on 22 December and 786 ronnes (800 tons] on 23 December. for the first time exceeding Leningrad's dailyconsumprion rare, ince the city and its defending front and the fleer WCIC being fed "on wheels", the effort could not diminish, since even the slightest disruption in the flow .of supplies had immediate adverse consequences for the population and [be troops.

On 25 December the flow of supplies had improved enough that the from could increasethe daily bread ration by 100 grams (3.5 ounces) for workers and engineer and technical personnel and 75 grams (1.8 ounces) for employees, dependent and children However, the increased bread radon alone did notsatisfr the exhausted population' food needs, and they continued to endure incredible deprivation well into January 1942. Ln early

BELOW: TherieHeded light from the in' makes it difficult 10 idenllly the air aaO, b U I judging by the aLlmm ann III of !be !rOOps o.n tbe ice II is unliJlely Ihal they are German. The iloack ton:i&dby Ihe lorries was determined by the thickness U'llhe ice; their speed was ollen only the equivalent 01 walking pace.

7

January Leningrad's food reserves shrank to two days' su pply a nd fuel reserves to 213,J 63 [annes (217,000 rons}, well short of the required 1700 wagonloads per dayJ~

Given rhe catastrophic shorrages, the From accelerated work on the icc road, expanding its capacity and usage ro rwo or three convoys per day along multiple routes and increa ing the speed of convoy movement. As a result, deliveries doubled and by 18 january 1942 road trajfic finally fulfilled the From's norms, permitting it to incrca c daily rations and begin building up rescrvcs.r? The improved upply rran port prompted rhc from to double the population's and soldiers' daily bread ration on 24 January.JIl All categories of rations increased once again on 10 February, wirh ff'onrline soldiers receiving 800 grams (28.2 ounces) of bread daily and rear service troops 600 grams (21.J ounces). The effort to increase the quantity of ice routes a ndrheirca paci ryconri n ued unabated until rhe road was no longer needed. This required tremendous exerrions .. "Two convoys per driver per day" became a slogan that 261 drivers achieved in January and anorher 627 in March. During March, 355 drivers completed three rrips and 100 completed five, The supply flow across rhe lake increased

civilians received daily food rations comparable to those received ill' workers elsewhere In the country, and bread adulteration fdl to les than 1>,'Q percent during rhe f.ir t quarter of 1942. During the final three weeks rhe mad was functioning, it transported four and a half times as man~' supplies as it had in Nm'ember and December 194 L, including special high-calorie products)' Furthermore, the reserve ama sed during its operations were sufficient to feed the population from [he time the icc road melted and lake water transport resumed.

Be Ide vital ammunition food and fuel supplies, rhe ice road served as a means for evacuating civilians, key personnel and factories .. As soon as the ice road opened, rhe Leningrad From began .3 massive evacuation of [hose who were nor capable of working, in particular, women, children and [he disabled. The number evacuated rose from 11 296 persons in ja nua ry ro 117,"34 in February, 221,947 in March, and 163,392 in April. By April me rom I number of evacuees reached 514,069, an average rare of 5000-6000 persons per day. lndustrial evacuation also began in December. From December 1941 to April 1942, rhe Leningrad From ent 3677 railroad cars loaded with dlsmantled factory machine equipme nr, valuable culrural items and ca.rgo destined for

ABOVE: WIth weapons shorlages il was eS$enliollQ colletl ond. repair o.s mon.'fQrms o.s pos:slble. This squod has 1.1151 laken delivery 01 refurbish.ed! .Moisin Nogd1l1 rifles. The faca oflhe (ivilian. po.sser·byshows a dislinct preoccupation with 'mailers alher than. guns - ralian.s, maybe?

further in the second half of January 1942, with food ruffs making up 75 percent of rhecsrgo. At the same time, convoys began evacuating women, children, the ick and wounded, a well a valuable cargoc ftllm the city.

However the ice road's usefulness began decreasing rapidly after [he pring thaw et in. On 25 March the rhickne s of the ice began eroding, pools of water and numerous cracks began appearing on and in the ice, Rnd transport had to be curtailed. Buse could not use the road after 15 April and ranker [rucks after 19 April. The From ordered all movement across the ice halted, effective 12:00 hours on 21 April. Despite [he order, a 64,wnne (65-ron) shipment of spring onions made it ro Leningrad all 23-24 April. That, however, was the end. and all vehicular traffic stopped rhe next day.

The ice road contributed enormously to the city's defence and irs population's survival before the spring thaw ended irs usefulness, By February, Leningrad's

the "mainland", from Leningrad to Lake Ladoga's eastern snore. Abour 20 percent of these rran fers occurred along rhe ice road.

The Defence of [he Ice Road

Since the ice road operated under almost constant German air arrack, road security and defence were immensely important. The Leningrad from deployed rifle units and naval infantry brigades along the lake's coast to defend againsr German or Finnish diversionary attacks, and aircraft and ami-aircraft units to defend against air attacks. These forces defended rhe road's many routes road5 and railroads adjacent [Q rhe lake, and bases and warehouses on rile lake proper or on irs approaches. PVQ fielded 200 mid-calibre anti-aircraft gu.ns .. 50 sma ll-calibre gu ns, 100 anti-airera ft machine guns, and 100 search lights (Q defend againsrenemy aircraft. Forces from rhe Fifry-Fourth Army defended the lake's southern shore. and the 10th Rifle Division, 4th Naval Infanrry Brigade and

mow; When ships ·af IhBalll, Flee! were In dotk Iheir weaponry would be used 10 supplemenllhe maln onli-oinrotl defen(es. Sailors were also used in the frontline lighting alongside the Red Army. These sailors are weoTing thenq-vy isslJe black na~vol winter hal.

9

Twenty-Third Aml}' units, reinforced by armoured cutters and coastal artillery of rhe Baltic Fleer, defended the western shore. These forces organized observation poinrs, patrols, ourposrs and local securit), along the icc road and mined and deployed ski patrols along the approaches to rhe lake and icc road. German air attack on the road and associated installations inrcnsified throughout March 1942. and, on some days, Gerrna n a i rcra ft a rracked the road repeatedly around rhc dock. The Leningrad From PVO countered with all. means at it di posal, including the entire 13Th Fighter Aviation Regiment.

The Leningrad Fronr's Road-Commandant Service maintained and regulated traffic along the ice road. Initially, it established 2.0 trafficconrro] POStS, .3-400m (9S4-1312ft) apart, to controlrraffic, hut ultimately increased [he number of posts m 75 hy 1 january 1942.. A[ thar time. 350 traffic regulators conrrolled vehicle intervals, movement and dispersion, verified the thickness and condition of the ice, and deployed 1 -0-200 blackout lanterns along the routes to light the way. Later; when the weather became more settled and when high snow waUl> flanked tnt: road~. traffic concrol became easier, [he number of regulators. decreased, and poses were deploy-ed J-2.km (.62.-1.25 mile I apart. The regulator contributed significantly to rhe ice road's success, doing so while roscally with randing the extreme cold and German air attacks,

Hand in hand with the military defence of The city itself, me Parry and mi1itar~' leadership worked to establish a partisan movement in the German rear area, which ir hoped could disrupt German operations and logistics, and gather intelligence 011 enemy troop movements and inrention . Inirially, rhe suddenne s of the German offensive and Army Group North's rapid advance towards [he ciry paralyzed me ovier authoriries, leaving rhcm lirde time ro ponder partisan operafirms. However, the Germans' subsequently harsh rreatmcnr of the population and the huge number of Soviet soldiers bypassed in rhe German rear created partisan forces sponrancously. In time, [he Stat-ha and rhe From moved decisively IO create and expand a partisan movement, first, by exploiting underground Parry organizations in the German rear area and, later, by sending specially trained (earns and derachmenrs inro the .erman fear to organize partisan forces.

The Parti an I Hoft

Initially, from mid- to lare July rhc Norrhwesrern Direction .ommand and Leningrad Pany Committee mer with provisional partisan command and political cadres, formed initial partisan detach-

'\ INTER AGO 'Y 194J-42

rnenrs, and assigned rrusstnns ro partisan forces through rhe Norrhcrn and Nurrhwestern Fronrs' headquarters.u H} September 194 I, Parry and KOIIISOIIIO/ regional and district comrnirrec formed 227 partisan detachments and smaller diversionary groups composed of carefully selected volunteers eoralling roughly 9000 men. During August and Seprern ber the two Fran rs i nserred 67 dera,h rncnrs of the e (roratling 2B86 men) into the German rear area and disbanded rhe remaining derachrnents, using their personnel [0 man newly tormed destroyer derachrnenr and guards 0 0 divisions. The Leningrad Regional Parry Comrnhree established a troika beaded by G. Kh. Bumagin, a regional Party secretary, ro direct parrisan operations, and on 2 August rhe Leningrad Front appointed LieutenantColonel E. N. Arroshchenko [0 head an Operational Group ro direct the From' partisan det.achn_1cnts. Finally, on 27 cptember the Leningrad Front and Parry established a partisan headquarter headed hy M. N. Nikitin, [he secretary of rhe Regional Parr}, Cornrnirrec, ro control partisan aetions and ooordinarc [bern with Front operation.

Initially, Party members formed rhc nucleus of rhcse partisan detachrnenrs and diversionary groups and Part)' secretaries at each level directed both rhe partisan ururs and Parry underground groups operaring in terri rories under rhei r [urisd icrion, 11 By 22. October 1941, this increasingly elaborate parri an effort encompassed '8 di rricr Parry and 38 district Komsomol organizations cornpo ed of 125 Parry and 100 Komsomol groups and 84 partisan detachments numbering rrrore than 3000 men opera ring in rhe regrons we. .. t and sourhwe t of Leningrad. Although carcely operational and lacking even rudimentary

command and conrrol, these early partisan detachments initiated a serie of low-level sabotage and diversionary actions in jnne and july. ~

The 2nd Pam an Brigade

The must significant partisan action during this period took place in the southern portion of the Leningrad region. There, the 2nd Partisan Brigade, headed by

G. Vasilev, seized and held most of the Belebelkovskii, Ashevskii and Dedovichi regions. which became one of [he firsr SQ"Cd lied" Partisan krai". Ii TIle area. under the 2nd Brigade's control extended J 20km (7- miles) from north ro south and 90km (56.2 miles) from easr to west, encompassing the area bounded by Dna, Sraraia Russa, Bezhanirs and Kholm .. Throughout July and early August. the partisans successfully parried German attempts to penetrate and occup}" this region,

and, during October and l'\ overn her, the Parry reestablished village councils, rnanycollecrive farm~, 5} schools and numerous medical pomrs wrtlun the region. Although Army ,roup North organized severa.l punitive expeditions against the: Pa ITISnn kra) rn August and September; it .. LL~e of S~ units only inflamed patti an activit, and German force. were not ahle to re-establish control over the region.

In the final anal}' is, however, ar best, partisan activuies during the first few months of the war were crude, poorly organized, sporadic and, hence, only rna rgina II y efiecri ve, N evert hel fOSS. the I r I ci III ired actions and the German.' often arrogantand brutal re ponse towards the mhabirants paved rhe way for rhe emergence of an even more effective partisan movement in the furure.'~

\'Uhile fierce debate still ra~e over the nLrnlher~ of civilian who perished from famine or enemy fire during the first yea.1" of rhe Battle for Leningrad, no one call question the horror of rhe first terrible winter LInder [he blockade. The gruesome toll rose from ar least 10 • .000 dead in ovemher, to 50.000 in December, to in excess of 120,000 in January. Drnitriv Pavlov, who fed the Lenlngraders during the blockade, stare that 199.187 persons were officially reponed to have peri hed during [he winter. Although [he funeral Trust, which wa responsible for individual and 111.1SS burials, rnainrained no records for January and February it recorded 89,968 bodies buried in March 1942,102,497 in April, and 53,562 III May.The average of 4000-5000 bodies buried through autumn 1942 brought the total from February 194] [0 February 1942ro 460,.000 person. In additioM .. individual work (cams of civilians and soldiers estimated rhey transported 228,163 more bodies from morgues to cemeteries from December 1941 to December 1942.

When the winner evacuation via the Ladoga ice road ended in April 1942, Leningrad' population had f.1l1en from a bout 2,2. S 0,000 rn ill ion in December 1941 to anc rirnared 1,.1 00,000, a decline of ] ,'180,000. COil idcring the 440,000 per ons who were evacuated Juring the winter and rhe 120,000 soldiers sent to the from or evacunred in Mar and june, rheciey's civilian population suffered ar leasr 62.0,000 dead b}' 1 July 1942, nor counting the many who perished in the ciry's suburbs.

As far as military casualties were concerned, official ligures indicate that [he Red Army and Balric Fleet lost 344,92.6 personnel during the Leningrad strategic defensive operation from 10 July to 30 eprernber 1941. This included 2J4,078 dead and 130,.848 wounded or sick. The Fifty-Fourrh Separate Army lost

80

ABOVE: Another corpse is hauled awa.y lor disposal. Ollhe Ilrst winter ollhe sie!le,w:henslafValionkilledmcmy, one survivor wrole: "In the worst period ofrh.e sie!leLerungrad was in Ihe power of Ihe cionnibal·s, God alone knows what terrible things wenlon: behind t.he wells of apartments,"

54,979. including 22,211 dead and 32,768 wounded or ick in the Siniavino offensive' fO eprember-28 October}, Toral lo ses during the Tikhvin defence and offensive (L6 ctober-du December) were 89,490 including 40,667 dead and 48.823 wounded or sick. The Liuban offensive and subsequent encirclement (7 Ja nuary-I 0 July 1942) COSt rhe Red Army 403,118 casualties, including 149,838 dead and 253..280 wounded and sick. T11is grim toll in major operations .tlmountcd ro 825,513 casualties, including 426.i94 dead ;111£1 46 -," I 9 wou nded a nd sick. Losses: during other periods were likelr to have raised rhe military dearl, toll during the first year of rhc Reml" for Leningrad to in excess of 100,000 soldiers and [he overall military and ci v -ilian death roll to more rhan 1.1 million persons. Regardless of [he death roll, these figures accord the Barrie for Leningrad and irs associared winter blockade [he dubious honour of being me mOST terrible and costly siege in recorded history.

CHAPTER 5:

AS the Wehrmacht ground to a halt on the Eastern Front in December 194 f • the Stavka and Stalin thought that determined counterattacks could inflict a severe defeat on the Germans. In the Leningrad area the Red Army launched

its Liuban Offensive. but the German troops proved tenacious and tne Soviets had too few resources to achieve victory The threat to Leningrad continued.

he Red Army VI torte: ar Mosc w, Ro t v and Tikhvin in J) ember 1941 made it po.. ible for rhe Staoka to c. .pand It ongoing

operation in the. e region into a general winter offen ire en ornpas ing the entire evict-German frOI1C. Khl'),i n's Leningrad Fronr defended Leningrad and the Neva River line JUS! east of rhe city, and ~lt!rcrskov's Volkhov From manned 011- rinuou defen e from rhe ouchern hore of Lake Ladoga ro Kin. hi and ourhv ard along the

olkhov River to 1 ake Il'men. Merer~ko\' for'e were arrempring to expand rheir bridgehead we r of the Volk hov River bur gave up rhe eif rr on 3 january becau e of ,tiff errnan re i ranee.

To rhe ourh, the ;\'nrrhwe tern From defended between Lakes H'mcn and Selizharevo and w . preparing to arta k westwards along the raraia Ru a and elikie l.uki axe. Along the vital we rern axis, the Kalinin and '\ e rern Fr nt \ ere pre sing errnan rrny roup entre we rward {rom i\lo'cO\, rhrearcning t envel p the army group's Rank. In nurhern Ru ia, the bulk of the

Brian k, outhv e rem, Southern and au a u

From wert: on the defensive, rying down ub ranrral erman force and defending eva ropol and the Kerch perun ula,

EFT: Allhough obviously a posed shot, these Red Army soldiers lire properly equipped for the rigors of winler warfare in their comomloge dren. The leading man is holding II yrenode with

o metol hlmdle, dangerous in Sflb-z_ero temperatures (bare flesh could slick to i'I, Imd the popular PPSb "burp gun".

The taeka had ~ egun planning f r a fully fledged Wimer arnpaign in mid-December, during rhe mid r of it Tikhvin, Mo ow and Ro tov ounrer f en ives, n J 0 January 1942 it ordered rhe Red Army to commence a general offen ive to exploit it December successes. The tavka' aim W3S [0:

"Deny the erman- ascist forces a breathing

spell, drive (hem to the we t without a hair. and force [hem ro e 'pend their re erves before pring \ hen \ e will have lar e, fre h re erve and the German \ ill not have greater reserves, rhus pavin the way for the ornplete destruction of Hirlerir forces in 1942."

The primary objective of [he tauka was ro captun: rnolcn k and de troy German Arm}' Group

.enrre, imulrancou Iy, ir hoped to liberate the Donbas r 'gion and reate prerequisites for liheraring the rimca, and de ear German Arm' roup larch and ra i e rhe Leningrad blockade. ~ hile these objectives reflected ralin's political aims, rhey did not a ord wirh [he Red Army' real militar capahiliric . War c rill, a [hey mounted their expanded of en ives, talin and the tavka failed to concenrra te their orce deci ively along all)' Ingle a xt by di per ing their forces and arracking along every conceivable poinr,

On 17 December. the tavka ordered the

Leningr3d arid Volkh v From and the

orthwestern Fronr' right wing ro conduct the Leningrad-Novgorod 0 fen ive by launchin conentrie arta k on Arrnv r lip I orth, to defeat the

ABOVE: Marshal of the So vie I Union K.A. Meretskov (ommonded the Volkhov Fronl Qllhe beginning of 1942. Ordered by Stalin 10 launch an offensive to destroy the German Eighteenth Army, his fortes suffered II series of defeats, rul:minoting in the destruction of the Second Shock Army.

army group and raj e the Leningrad blockade. ithin the conrext f the larger offen ive rhe Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts were to conduct the Leningrad- olkhov offen ive to cut off and destroy ennan force in the Mga To no and l.iuban region and, by extension in the Shli sel'burg alienr by attacking ourhea rwards from Leningrad and northwe [ward from the olkhov River, To the ourh the [ orrhwe tern Front was to arra k to caprure Demian k and. raraia Russa e ploir r ward

ol'rsy and Dno, and Cut off German withdrawal route from ovgorod and Luga in coop .ration ~ ith the olkhov Front. in e Meret kov' olkhov Front was ro play rhe primary role in raising the Leningrad blockade, the tauha provided him wirh

ign ificanr rei n forcernents.

In early January the Werumacbr wa already facing increasingly powerful and violent Red [my a saulrs aero 5 rhe breadth of its sasrem Front

orne of which jeopardized large groups of irs force. Therefore Hitler and rhe OKH ordered the 'I ehrmachr to hold on to it position, re t nd replenish it for es, form new rraregic and operati nal re erves and prepare to re ume de i ive offen ive operations in the spring and urnrner of [94_. long rhe norrhwe tern axis, rrny roup j orth and the Finnish ourheastern Army were to blo kadc Leningrad, firmly d 'fend the olkhov River line, refir their orces, and prepare a new offen ive to capture Leningrad in the Slimmer. Axis force along the northwe [ern a·i numbered 26 infantry, two panzer tWO motorized, three ecurity divi Ion and two brigade, concentrated primarily

ourh and ea r of Leningrad, in the Kiri hi trongpoint, and 31 o along the Derniansk and raraia Ru sa axi .

Kuechler' Eighteenth Army with [ divi ion,

including the rh and 12th Panzer and 20rh

Iororized Divi ion • wa deployed along the from e trending from south of Oranienbaum and Leningrad proper to the hli scl'burg alient ourh of Lake Ladoga and outheasrward to the Volkhov River at Kiri hi. XX I and L Army Corps contained the oviets' Oranienbaurn brid ehead and defended south 0 Leningrad, the XXVIII Army Corp oc upied the viral hli sel burg aliem and

the ector to the ourhea t, and 1 Army and Q

Motorized orp defended the Kiri hi region, Bu ch' i teenth rruy, with It clivi ion including the I th Motorized, protected [he 350km (219- mile) front 'OUUl along the Volkhov River from the Kirishi re ion [0 Lake Il'rnen and ea rward through the Valdai Hills to Osrashkov, The army's

XX 1lI Army orp defended the olkhov River line X rmy orp, backed up by the LSrh Motorized Divi ion covered from raraia Ru a to Demian k, and TI rrny orp [he rcgi n from Dernian k to Osrn hkov,

created terrible fighting condition for the troop of both side.

• he Leningrad and Volkhov Frouts' Leningrad.

OlkJlOV offensive was only one parr of rhe centre. pie e of the taoka: '\ inter ampaign along rhe northwesrem axi .Bur at the ame rime, it wa only parr of a larger effort [0 liberate the entire region from Leningrad ourhwards to raraia Ru a an efforr rhar involved the orrhwe rem From a well

I

Plans for the Offen 1 e

Tb taulea a igned the leading role in rhe offen-

ive ro 1eret kov's olkho Front. Hi fre h econdhock and Fifty- Iinth Annie were to conduct hi main atta k we tward from the Volkhov

River to ever the l.eningrad-Dno and LeningradNovgorod railroad, and destroy German fore in rhe Liuban and hudovo region in cooperation with the Leningrad From's Fifty-Fourth Army arracking from rhe north. ub equenrly the three arrnie were to advance northwe tward to raj e the Leningrad blockade in cooperation with the Leningrad Front other arrnie . The Fifty- ccond A rmy, on Mererskov' left flank, wa to attack north of Novgorod and help the lorthwe tern Front's Eleventh Army de rroy the German Sixteenth Army' forces in the ovgorod, ol'tsy and Dno region . Merer kov' Fourth rrny, ea t of the 'hli el burg salient, wa to upport the rna in and econdary attack and protect heir flank', while the front -2 aircraft were to provide air

upporr.t

Khozin' Leningrad Front wa [Q p~netra[e German defences west of Kirishi and southeast of Leningrad with irs Fifry-Fourrh and Fifty-Fifth Armies apture Tosno encircle and destrov German forces at Mga and in the hlissel'burg

alienr and rai e the Leningrad blo kade, Hi Forty-Second Army and the Coastal and eva Operational Groups, which were blockaded in

ranienbaurn nd Leningrad were to UppOTt the offensive, and, subsequently, arrack to the south as soon as rhe Fifry-Fourrh eeond hock and fiftyNinth Arrnie rea hed the Leningrad-Dno railroad. The 34 - aircraft a igned to the Leningrad From rhe Baltic Fleet and P \ ere to protect

tavka Winter Plan

The [\ 0 German armies occupied strong and deep defence anchored on numerous rrongpoinrs along rhe front and to the rear. The most formidable

erongpoint were at at Ropsha, Krasnoe elo, lamIzhora, Mga, iniavino Liuban passkaia Poli r, Sraraia Ru a, Derniansk and Vamlino. The German po irion killfully integrated their defence with man}' terrain obstacles in the region, e pecially the multitude of river, lake and

\ amps, While the hard freeze of winter reduced the obstacle value of the e terrain features, it also

RIGHT: This OJ1i1lery officer is wearing the Red Army's standard winter camouflage geor of hood, smock and overalls. The entrance 10 the ballery office has been reinforced with generous layers of ice blocks, which improved 'he insulation and strengthened the buildin.g against counter·,battery fir·e,

4

Leningrad, Kronshradr, [he Tlkhvin-Leningrad Sf - tor and communications rome into Leningrad and upporr the ground offensive.r When the opel'arion began, Khozin' and Merer kov' Fronr commitred 325 00 troop to ombar and rein fore d them with upward of 100000 more during [he offen ive.

Kuro hkin' orthwestern From wa ro arra k

German forces at taraia Russa, Dernian k and Toroper simulraneou [y with rwo hock group. The first sho k group, the Eleventh Army deplored 011 th rom' right wing, wa to advan e through

raraia Ru a to Dno link lip with the Volkhov

Front' ifry- econd Army and de troy German

fore in the Novgorod rcgi n.

The ccond hock group, the Third and Fourth ho k rmi (formerly the ixrierh and T v enrycvenrh rmie) on the Front" left wing, was to advance through Toropets to Rudnia lind de tWI' crman force in rhe Rzhev and' iaz'rna regions i~

ooperarion \ ith the Kalinin and \1 c tern Fronrs.

The Thirty-Fourth Army deployed in the Front' centre, was to encircle and de troy German force in Demian k. A total of 89 a ircraft, many in disrepair, were to provide the Front with air upport. Initially Kurochkin committed 10-, 00 men to the

85

THE SIEGE Of L N GRAD 1941-1944

offen ive bur reinforced rhe operation with another 200 000 during it our e.

The tauha ordered me force participating in me offen ive to seize jumping-off po irion and complete the concenrrarion of rheir force by 26 December. However, neither the German nor the weather cooperated, forcing the tavk« to delay the main operation until 6 January. Meanwhile the Fifty-Fourth Army wa to begin its a sault west of Kiri hi. Because of rhc innumerable delays, the

tovka decided ro laun h it main offen ive in raggered a hion, with the Fifty- inrh, Fourth and Fifty- econd rrnie ana king n 6 january and the e ond hock joining the effort on 7 january. Even 0, the attacking force completed few of their offen ive preparations on time. leret kov did nor complete the concentration of hi infantry and armour uruil 7 and 8 January, his artillery until 12 January, and his rear erviee until \. ell after the operation began. Despite the e delay and rhe incomplete attack preparation ralin in isred Meret kov begin his a ault on 6 january as planned, before his force \ ere full on enrrared

ABOVE: Following the Germll1l failure 10 loke Moscow 01 the end of 1941, Siolin was (onvin(ed he (ould defeol the Wehrmo(ht 0ilaJon9 the fronl. But his armies lacked training, equipment and sound leadership, and soon ground to a holt despite the demands he mode upon their commanders.

the same period the lorrhwesrem From' armie bypassed and encircled crman forces in Dernian k and reached the e. tern out kir of taraia Ru a becoming engaged in prolonged and fruirle operation in both region . The Leningrad Front' FiftyFourth Army became locked in a fruitlc eruggle we T of Kiri hi, and the Front' arrnie .ourh and we r of Leningrad made no progre what oever, in parr becau e conditions within Leningrad made them too weak to do o.

Fediunin ky" Fifty-Fourth Army whi h initiated the offen ive by attacking German defence near Pogo e'e \ e r of Kiri hi on 4 and - January advanced ani)' 4- ikrn (2.5-3.1 mile) before German counterattacks threw the army's troops back to their jumping-off positions. Although the Fifty-Eourch Army's failure seemed insignificant, it set the pattern for what was to come and, wor e

till, prevented the army from upporting [he olkhov Front Oil e it began it offen ive. Ierer kov' and Khozin' force arra ked on 6 and

7 january a ralin demanded, but their initial assault wa aborted almost immediately after they had achieved only meagre gains. Galanin' Fifty[ inrh Army began Mererskov's main attack early on 6 January when irs lead divisions attempted to seize and expand the Fronr's bridgehead we t of rhe Volkbov River a that okolov' econd hock Army could exploit westv ards the next day, While a portion of Galanin' forces struggled we t of [he river Merer kov completed concentrating rhe remainder of the Fifty- inrh and rhe econd ho k Armies 011 rhe river sea rem bank. By [be d~. ' end Galanin' initial a ault expired amid the Germans' strong defence. Undeterred, Ieretskov committed [he remainder of [he Fifty- i nrh rrny and Sokolov's Second Shock Arm}' ro combat early on 7 january, bur only in piecemeal and uneocrdinared fashion. Reinforcing failure, [be haple for e immediately gor bogged down with heavy 10 e rhe Second ho k Arm)' alone losing more than 3000 men in rhe fir r three minute of it ill-fated assault. Driven n by ralin's ince ant rders, exhortation and threat, the two arrnie truggled for [\ .... 0 more day before the attack end d in utter exhau tion and confu ion.!

and without necessary artillery and Jogi tical lIPport. The re ulrs were predictable.

From it very beginning, the overly ambition offensive encountered recurring and in urmountable diffi ultie . Inevitably, the arrackin force uffered from acute and pcrsi tent ammunition and fuel hortage rhe unavailabiliry of re ervc ncces-

ary to exploit successes and congenitally poor command and control and coordination of force. Wor e till, as the offensive developed the three From \ axes of advance diverged harply in three directions and combat developed In three sectors,

eparared from one another in both pace and time.

The Volkhov Fronr's econd bock and Fifty- inth Armi advan ed into the Iroz n v ampy wa [eland outh of Liuban, where they fought in relative i alation berween january and June. uring

,

Stalin' Frustration

Nonplu ed by these failures talin ordered Mererskov to regroup his armies and re urne the offen ive in more oordinared fa hion on I January, thi time leading the a sault \ ith the full

86

econd hock Army. To en lire hi order were arried out to the letter, ralin dispatched L. Z. Mekhlis, Chief of the Red Army's Main Political Directorate and hi pecial emissary and per anal hatchet man, to upcrvi e Meretskov' arrack preparations. Uncharacteristically, 1ekhlis' fir [ action, the appointment of General Klykov, the experienced Fifry- econd rmy commander to replace the incompetent okolov as Second hock Army commander, was a positive srep.s However, the arrival of Mekhli did not bode well for the operation' uccess, Hi legendary vile temperament and military incompetence was only exceeded by his ruthless treatment of commanders and 01- diers alike. Here along the Volkhov, rhe dreaded Mekhlis would begin earning his well-deserved reputation as a harbinger of military disaster.

Red Army Failure

After regrouping and refre hing their force for everal day, Meret kov' econd hock Fifty- inch Fourth and Fifty- econd Armies and Khozin' Fifty-Fourth Army reo umed the offen ive early on 13 September rhi time alma t sirnultaneou Iy and preceded by proper artillery preparations. E en so, ammunition was till woefully inadequate to usrain the fresh attacks, In the econd Shock Army'

ector, the 90-minute artillery preparation and u bsequent ground a aulr hattered German defence at the [unction of xxx III Army orp 126[h and 215[h Infantry Divi i n producing panic in the former: which had onl recenely arrived from the WesL Tn hea . fighting from 13 [0 16 january the army's forces managed to car e small wedge in the German'defence we t of the Volkhov and Tigoda Rivers. They were nor able, however [Q capture key German strongpoinr on the rivers' western banks and penetrate deep into the Germa 11 defences, largely be all e Mererskov and hi army commander once again failed TO concentrate their

attacking forces. On the econd hock rrnj

flank the Fourth and Fifty- econd Armie al 0 failed co record any progre and wenr a er [0 [he defence on 14 and 15 January.

Fediunin ky' Fifty-Fourth Army also attacked early on ] 3 january with full kit, but Immediately encountered determined resistance by XXVIII Army Corp' 269tb, lnfanrry Division, reinforced by elernenrs of rhe 223rd and 291st Infantry and 12th Panzer Divisions. Although Fediuninsky' forces captured Pogo r'e on 17 January they failed to penetrate the erman defen es, reportedly

87

l.F_"'1N"GRAD FRO;",'

XXXX

.. 1 ,

,/

.. ," I

I ",

....

• CholovD Simlon

.. ..

-'

0 15 30 Miles

0 25 50Km XXXXX
Soviet Frontllnes VOL.l(}IOV
January 1942 xx FRO:"JT
---------- 15 Marth 1942 NOV.OROO
OG be au 1", de pite repeated taoka in trucrion ro du

0, Fediunin ky also failed ro on enrrare hi force and, in read, attacked in di persed fa hion across a JOkm (18.75-rnilel from. The failure, which the General raff also attributed to poor command and control, prompred ralin TO subdivide

diunin ky' army into rhe Fifty-Fourth and ighrh rrnie in late january to tighten command and onrrol. The new i hrh rm)' ornmanded by

LEFT: The Soviet Liubon offensive operation Gnd the encirclement ond destruction of the Soviet Second Shod!. Army, January-June 1942.

unchan red. Hi Fifty-Fourth Arm}' wa to advance sourhwesrwards from Pogosr'e, link up with rhe econ d . hock rmy at Liuban, arid de, troy errnan force' at Liuban, hudovo and Kirishi, However, neither army was to achieve a I)' ucce s.

n I January.rhe ame day that Fediuuinsky' force captured Pogo 'e, Klykov Se and Shock Army re urned its attack. Supported by more [han I -00 aircraft orries, the arm}' finally penetrated the erman first defen i e position on rhe left bank of rhe olkho River, advan ed 5-10km (3.12-6,2· mile) and reared condiri n rhar Merer ko deemed favourable for de eloping uccess, However, once again rhe arracking force failed [Q capture key German rrongpoinrs, the \ .... earher dererioratedvand rhe offensive faltered with heavy 10 e,$ On 21 January after a four-day hair ro regroup and receive reinforcernenrs, the

econd ho k Army resumed its struggle this time focusing on capturing [he German rrongpoinn of pa kaia Poli r, Mo tki Zernrirsy and Mia snoi Bor ar rhe ba e of the hallow penetration.

n rhe night of 2"124 January, I lerer kov inally convinced him elf that Klykov' force had bla 'ted a large enough hole through German defence ro commit his exploitation force. The next morning Major-General . L Gusev's XIJI Cavalry Corps, consi ring of rhe 1 rh and 87th avalry Divi ion and an attached rifle clivi ion from the Fifty- linth

rrny, lunged rhrough the narrow gap into the German rear. However, once Gu ev' cavalry and Klvkov' infantry made it through the gap, the German r XIX! Iororized and X X Jll Army

orp hurriedly a ernbled forces ro hold rhe flanks of rhe penetration and contain the exploiting ovier forces in The fare ted warnps south 0 Liuban, The Fifty- inrh and Fifty- econd Armies franrically struggled ro widen the narrow gap at the ba e of

econd hock rrny' penetration, but were unable ro capture the German srrongpoinr along the flank of rhe gap.

An Enticing Target

Merer ko' offen i e once again railed in late January this time with about 30,000 ovier troop lodged precariously in the ermans' rear area, From Mererskov' per pective, this force wa in an ideal position to perform it viral mi ion, bur only if he could reinforce it and ecure its suppl line. From rhe German per pecrive, although rhe large VIer force threarened the viability f [he wh le erman defence uth f Leningrad ir al 0 repre nred an

Major- eneral A. . ukhornlin, manned what had formerly een the Fifty-Fourrh rrny' right flank

outh of the Ladoga, ukhornlin' .. army, togerhcr wid\ the Fifty-Fourth Army on its left flank, was to sma h German defences in [he Lodva region, east of iniavino, and advance westwards to To no, \ here it wa ro link up with the Fifty-Fifth Army, who e force were [0 arrack To no from the north\ e r. The tauka left Fediunin ky rru 1 n

enricin t [arg r for de tru ri 11, bur only if they uld contain it and ver it logi rica I umbili al ord.

On 27 January, I lerer kov regrouped hi for I" and ordered rhcrn [0 aprure the key errnan srrongpoinr on the flank of [he gap and \ iden the penetration. Wi rh i n rh e penerrari on "sack", rhe

econd hock Arm was ro arrack the German rrongpoinr and capture Liuban in ooperarion \ irh an arm k from rhe north by Fediunin kr' Fifry- ourrh rmy. Klykov formed rhre operadonal roup in the ond ho k Army ro conduct rhe arrack. The ir r fWO ornrnanded by Major-

eneral L T. Koro nikov and olonel hil'tsov

were to seize the I .rrna n rrongpoinrs at pa kaia Polisr and Zerntitsy and then fan out westward into the German rear with the third operational group. imultam:ously"u ell" cavalry corp \ a to capture Liuban, \ hile Ieret kov' other armie attacked el ewhere a lone rhe front.

Agonizingly low Advance

However, on e a ·ain, the e and hock Arm '. a. ault on pa kaia P Ii r and Zemtit y failed.s

leverthele ,[he remainder of Klyko ' force penetrated between the rwo rrongpoinrs, advanced 75km (46.8 mile). and joined .usev cavalrv, More than 100 000 ovier troop were now in the German rear area, poi ed to advance on Liuban and hreatening the very ur ival of German force in the Liuban hudo 0 and Kirishi re ion. H wever, the army' failure to eize pa kaia Poli r and the difficultie it e perien ed in moving aero s terrain that \ a covered with frozen wamp and pear bog eriously hindered the ovier advance and perrnirted German forces to contain me thrust.

Kuechler did 0 by assigning Busch' ixreenth Arm)' the respon ibiliry for the outhern flank of the penetration and Lindemann' Eighteenth rmy the responsibility for the northern flank." The former' XXXVJll Army orp erected strong defence ourh of lia noi Bor and at Zamosh'e and me larter' I Army orp did the same at pa kaia Poli r, Mia noi Bor and ourh of Liuban. In early February, I Army orp cordoned of the alienr' northern face wirh it 22 - ch 212th 254rh, 61 r and 21 - th Infantry and Police Divi ions, and XXXVIIl Army Corp the outhem face with the 285th and 126th Infantry and 20th Motorized Divi ion.

In early February, the touk« dispan hed A. v_ Krulev, the Deputy People' ommissar of Defen e for Loci tic, ro the olkhov Front to help

89

ENINGRAD 1941-1944

Meter kov olve hi per isrcnt logi ri al problems. Meret kov then prepared a special a aulr group under the command of olonel . V. Roginsky can i ring of the 11th Rifle Divi ion and _2nd Tank Brigade, and ordered the group to attack the

German trongpoint at Liubino Pole and osrki

ourh of pa kaia Polisr, Roginsky' a ault group captured the rwo srrongpoint on 12 February, widening [he mouth of the penetration to 14km (S.T miles), and Meretskov threw fre h forces into the penetration with orders ro reinforce the advance on Liuban. On 19 February the econd

hock rmy' 327th, 46th Rifle and Orh Cavalry Divi ion, nd 39th and 42nd ki Battalion arra ked northwards toward Liuban, enveloping and capturing Krasnaia Gorka at rhe junction of the German 291 rand 254rh Infantry Divi ion' defen eo. Klykov then ordered the two divi ion to capture Liuban, which wa Ie than lOkm (6.25 miles) distant and his cavalry and ski force to cut the Leningrad-Liuban railroad ar Riabovo, 10km (6.25 mile) northwest of liuban.

The econd Shock Army' advance towards Liuban po cd a serial! danger to German defence by threatening ro separate 1 Army orp fr rn the re t of the Eighteenth Army, de troy it, and open

offen ive. With them wa Lieutenant-General A. A. la ov, who had re emir di ringui hed him elf a Twenrierh Army omrnander in the fightin \ e t of Moscow and who the tavka appointed a

Iererskov' deputy. On 28 Februa cy, the tal,k 1 ordered Voro hilov, Mererskov and Khozin to drafr a new plan to liquidate German force in the Liuban and Chudovo regions.

Once completed, Voro hilov' plan required the Second hock rmy TO attack norrhwc t toward Liuban wirh a h ck group of five rifle divi i n one cavalry divi ion and four rifle brigade, reinforced with rank and artillery. Th hock group was to CUt rhe Leningrad-Liuban railroad line, link up with rhe Fifty-Fourth Army, and encircle and destroy German forces in the Liuban and Chudovo region. Fediuninsky's Fifry-Fourrh Army, reinforced by rheresh I Guards Rifle Corps and

ukhomlin's Eiahth rl11)' were to attack Liuban from rhe north and we .

Ar the arne time the Fifry-Ninrh Army now commanded by Major-General I. T. Korovnikov, \ a to attack and de troy German force defending Chudovo, The bulk of the Leningrad Front aircraft were to trike German defence and their rear area installation prior to rhe attack, which wa to

ABOVE: A Soviet patrol cautiously approaches a wooded

area during the January offensive. Only the soldier at the bllck has attempted to camounage himself by whitening his helmet; the others stand out quite clellrly in their g.reat(oats. They have advanced past the remains of a German bomber.

the r ad to Leningrad. Hov ever I Army Corp , 291 r In fanrry Divi ion and Group Haenicke arta ked the flank of the mall penetration recaptured Kra naia Gorka on 27 February, and encircled the ovier 327th Rifle and 80rb Cavalry Divisions in Riabovo.s Alehough mo t of the encircled ovier force escaped, the German claimed 6000 Ru ian pri oners by 15 March.

By lace 'ebruary Meret ko ' force had utterly fail .d in their multiple attempt to de troy erman force in the Kiri hi Liuban and Chudovo region and to rai e the Leningrad blockade. They failed becau e they arta ked [he complex network of

errnan point frontally and in dispersed and uncoordinated fashion without adequate fire or logistical up port. Because of the From's repeated failures,

talin di pat hed larshal Voro hilov and GKO rnem er . Malenkov to Ierer kov' headquarters in mid-February to oversee planning for a renewed offen i e. ~ ith them \ as Lieutenant-General A. A.

90

commence irnulraneou Iy in all ector n 4 . larch. The combined force arracked a ordered early on 4 March, but on e again achieved only limited aain again t trong German re i ranee. After several day of intense fighting Fediunin ky' army finally managed to penetrate the German 269rh Infantry Divi ion' defences near Pogost'e on 1 - March and advanced 22km (J3.r mile) outhwards to within 10km (6.25 miles) of Liuban. However, quick reaction by the German 5th, 93rd 2j 7th and 21 r lnfanrry Divi i ns succe fully onrained Fediunin ky army on 31 March. The other

ovier assault al 0 failed utterly.

While Merec kov and Voro hilov were conducting their March offen ive, Army Group orth was preparing a counrersrroke of irs own. During a meeting hetween Hitler and Kuechler on 2 Mar h, Hider ordered his army group commander ro rnounr an operation between 7 and 12 March to close the penetration gap and encircle the ovier Liuban for e in conjuncrion with a counter rroke

Bnow: As a counter to the siege artillery deployed by the Wehrmamt, the Red Army employed units of heavy artillery such as this 203mm howilzer, which has just been lowed into pla(e. To the left of the picture is the crane lor .lifting the round.

91

f LENINGRAD 1941-1944

The objective of Kuc hler' arrack \ ere the [\VO narrow n w-packed oviet upply line, nl kname 1 'rike and Dora rhar ran through the .LOkm(6.25-milc·) wide orridor between the econd

hock rmy and the ovier frontlines along rhe Volkhov River. Hider gave Kuechler 5-10 days to plan the countersrroke whi h the OKH codenamed perarion Bea t of Prey (Ral{l~tif!r). If sue-

c ful, ir \ ould rh\ art rhe econd hock Army" atta k on Liuban and rorally encir Ie and de troy Klykov' i lared army. Although hi Army roup

orth I a ready to b gin the op ration on 9 March Kuechler had to delay the op ration for one day ince the Luftwaffe wa tied dov n in dealing with oviet attack on Kholrn.m

Operation Grind to a Halt

The Eighteenth Army began it ounrer [rake at o :30 hours 01:1 15 March when rwo ho k groups totalling five divi ion wirh rrong air upport arta ked from Spa kaia Poli rand Zernrit r at the ba of the Second ho k rrny' penetration rov ard Liubino Pole. The north rn sho k group, can i ring of I Army Corps Police 61 t and 121 r Infanrry Divisions, advanced 3km (1.8 miles) on the fir ( day of the attack, the' ourhern sho k group made up of XXX'VIH Army orps' - til and 126th Infantry Divi ion, advanced lkm (0.62 mile). fter two day of agonizingly low movernenr through boggy r rrain against heavj resistan e. the northern ho k group e ered route Erika on 1 March and the ourhern group ["QU[e, Dora, the following day. The two group linked up on 20 March, trapping the econd hock rmy in the half-frozen wa teland south of iuban. Even though ir uccessfu lly lammed the door hut on the econd hock Army, On 23 March rhe Eighteenth Army reported to OKH that it \ a becoming impo ible for the arm}' [0 keep the Ru ian from taking Liuban in e it lacked uffi-

ienr manpower to do o. Wor e rill for the Eighteenth rrny, the ovien po itioned [heir tanks a that they could rake route Erika with onstant fire revenring the German from apruring it and turning it into a bloody no man' land.

Mererskov answered the German eounrersrroke by counterarracking toward Liubino Pole with all of his re erve . By 27 March. the desperate and co rly a sault managed to carve out a narrow bur tenuou corridor ro rhe econd ho k rrny near the village of . ia noi Bar. Meanwhile, Kuechler relieved VIII Army orp ommandcr for

ailing co eize route Erika, and, over Kuechler' objection, Hitler demanded rhar the -Srh Infantry Di i ion commander al 0 be relieved. '\ irhin days, [he econd hock rrny at a recaptured rou e Dora and built a new supply road. However, in early April the rainy period (rasplilitsa) et in, the road became impassable for all but foot tralfic, and errnan fire paralyzed all movement along the 3-4km- (1. -2.S-mile-) wide corridor. Within day, both routes Erika and Dora were under water, the econd h ck rmy ran horr of ammunition fuel and food supplies and command, onrrol and communications wirhin the army be arne impo ible. These appalling condition paralyzed all opera dons and left [he Leningrad and Volkhov Fronrs no choice but to halt their offensive in late April, d i.g in and await more fa voura ble condirion to resume the offensive or to re cue the

econd bock Army.

Reorganization

Khozin then a ked talin ro enrralize control of all for e penning in rhe region under hi Leningrad Front. talin agreed de pice hapo hnikov objections, and on 23 April [he tavka ordered the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts be combined into a larger Leningrad From con i ring of a Leningrad

.roup of Force and a Volkhov Group of Force. The lavka appointed Lieutenanr-General L. . Govorov, the f rrner Fifth Arm. commander, to ornmand the Leningrad roup of orces, whi h con i ted of the Twenty- hird Forty-Second and ifry-Fifrh Armies and the oasral and eva Operational coups. Khozin retained command of the Leningrad From and aJ 0 ommanded the Volkhov Group of Forces which can i red of [he EighrJ1, Fifry-Fourth, Fourth,

econd hock, Fifry-Ninth and Fifry- econd Armies and IV and VI Guards Rifle and XIII Cavalry Corps. Meret kov became deputy commander 0 Zhukov's We tern Direction Command.

lrhough designed to streamline command and control of force in [he Leningrad and Liuban region l the new force can igurarion nly onfu ed matter more. Only days before, on 20 . pril with

ralin' permi ion Mere kov enr 'eoeral VIa OY, hi deputy into the pocket to a ume ornmand of [he eeond hock Army from the ailing General Klykov Vlasov's mission wa either to reinvigorate rhe econd Shock Army's offen ive Or extricate hi army from it peri lous position.

In four 1110mh of inten e fighring in heavy rerrain and enerally terrible weather condition, rhe

Volkhov From managed to penetrate German defence ir] err a full army inro rhe German rear area and threaten the German r Army orp \ 1[11 en ir lemenr, However killful and r olure German r i tan e and numerou problem with command and control, fire upp rt and I gi ric prevented oviet force from e cploiring til opporamity and al 0 jeopa rdized more [han 100,000 Second hock Army rroops in the warnp west of Mia noi Bor.

While the Leningrad-Volkhov offen ive failed to meet tavka expectation the I orthwe tern Front accompli hed can iderably more in its portion of the Leningrad- ovgorod offen ive. Even 0, Kurochkin' Front ell well short of a hie ing the arnbiriou mi ion the tavka a igned to it.

Lieurenanr-General V. 1. Iorozov's Eleventh Army began ir ad ance on 7 January along the raraia Russa axis on the From's right flank. Morozov' army penetrat d German defences and advan ed almost 60km ( . mile) in [\\'0 day 0 fighting reaching the ea rem out kirr of raraia Ru a.

rmy ski barrali n b. pa ed.erman rrongpoints, crossed frozen Lake n men north of the city and cur off the road leading from Staraia Russa to

hirnsk, while other army force dug in all along the Lovat River to the outh, Thereafrer; howe er the army' attack faltered badly against heavy German re i ranee,

Major-General I . E. Berzarin' Thirty-Fourth rmy attacked along the Demian k a ri on January, then penetrated errnan defence and

92

93

LEn: Th~ fuilure of the series of Red Army offensives in the Leningrad orea in early 1942 doomed the (ity's population 10 furlher privations. Enemy bombing and shelling.. (ombilled with power failures, ohen resulted in Ihe breakdown of essential services. Leningr'aden had 10 manage as best they (ould, whim induded queuing for waler, Il5 here.

THE 'IEGE OF LENINGRAD 1941-1944

A.BOVE: General Simoniak, a heroD' the siege, points towards Germon trenches during a tour of Ihe front. Popular among his men, Simoniak once argued with Zhukav for refusing to send an attack through a swamp, which would have resulted in slaughter. Zhukov was incensed, but Simoniak refused to back down.

Grand Strategy

lrhough the Leningrad- Iovgorod offen ivc failed spectacularly, it provided a model for future taulea offen ivc in the region, in particular Zhukov' Operation Polar tar the next winter.

As had been the ca c in the summer and the fall of '1941, Red Army military operations along the northwestern axes were clo ely related to those along other more critical axe. ln fact, rhe eningrad-Novgorod offen ive wa bur one segment of a far grander Stallko. scheme to defeat all three German army group, rai e the blockade of Leningrad, and re aprure man)' 10 t citie , in luding molen k, Briansk Orel Kur k Khar'kov and Dneproperrov k.

Ultimately, rhe Slauka's aim wa to drive German force back to the larva P kov, Vireb k and Gomel line and southwards along the Dnepr River to the Black ea. However, as rhe COUf e of operations indicated rhi aim dearly exceeded the Red Army' apabilities. During the inter Campaign, ralin and hi taoka di played a ongenital over-optirni m that would characterize their

advanced very slowly through heavy snow in tandem \ irh me Kalinin From' Third hock Army po irioned on his left flank. The Thirty-Fourth and Third ho k Armies [hen reached the atolino and

Iolvori ry region south of Demiansk enveloping the German II Army Corp in rbe town fr m the

outh. Halted by hea y German re i ance south of Demian k Kurochkin ordered hi force

to bypa German srrongpcirrt and ever their

communication.

By la ce Jan ua ry, KI.I roch k in' arm ies had almost completely encircled ll Army Corp in Derniansk leaving only the narrow Rarnushevo corridor connecting the beleaguered corp .., irh the German

ixteenth rrny' rnam for e at taraia Russa. By rhi time Red rmy fore had utterly demolished the i reenrh Army's front fr m raraia Ru a ro o ta hko , and all that rood between rhe Red Army and rnolensk wa a eric of unconnected

trongpcints northwest of the ciry. Kurochkin' forces threatened Demia.nsk and raraia Russia and the Kalinin From Third hock Army encircled German force in Kholrn.

Howe er the tlllJko realized that the fate of it Leningrad- ovgorod offen i e depended on it al iliry ro capture Demian k and taraia Rus a.

the Leningrad and Volkhov roms rai e the Leningrad blockade. Thi meant char Kuro hkin had to de troy II ArlllY Corps before it fortified it defence around Demian k and before the rasplIlitsa began. To a si r Kurochkin, the Staok« combined all force taking part in [he reduction of Demiansk, in luding rhe Kalinin From' Third Shock Army, the Thirty-fourth Army and I Guards Rifle orp under hi control.u Kurochkin' offensive, during \ hich he employed elire airborne force in a [oinc air-ground role, la red from 6 March until 9 April and ended in failure.

The German re i red skillfully and re- upplied their encircled forces by air.lj Worse till on 16 March Army Group orth assembled a force of five divisions under Group Scydlirz wirh orders to advance ea r from Staraia Russa and relieve rhe encircled II Army Corps. Group eydlirz attacked on 20 Mar h, linked up with [he Dernian k for e on 21 pril after week of prolonged fighting in quagmire conditions, and established a 4km (2. c, mile) corridor through Ramushcvo, linking n rmy

orp \ ith the ixteenth rrny main force.

Urged on by the taulca, Kuro hkin for e

attacked incessantly from 3 to 20 lay, attempting to clo e the corridor. but all of the arrack failed with hea \'y \0 e. The front In the orrhwesrern Front' ector finally rabilized along the Lovat River at the end of ay.14

cordingly on 26 January it rein for ed rhe Northwe tern Front with the First hock Army and rand II Guards Rifle orps and ordered Kurochkin to seize both cities. His Thirty-Fourth Arm}" and rhe two reinforcing rifle corps were [Q complete encirclement of the German orces in Demiansk, and rhe Fir r hock and Eleventh Armie were to advance CO\ ard 01'[ y and him k to cur the

ornmuni arion lines of the German force defending ovgorod and taraia Ru a. n 29 January, I and IT Guard Rifle orp attacked the Ramu hevo corridor from the north and the Tbirry-Fourth and Third hock Armies from rhe outh, After almo r a month of complex and bloody figbting the two force linked up near Zaluch'e on 26 February, encircling 70 000 German rroop in the Demian k Pocket.'!

With Demiansk encircled [he taoka ordered Kur hkin r cru h the encircled errnan force as qui kly a po ible and advance northv e t r help

94

strategic planning well into the future 0 the war.

nreali ric milirary obje rive , unwarranted ra h· ne s, and fru tration from not being able to a hie e them, generated much of rhe en uing arnage and damaged rhe ovier war effort by squandering precious human and material resource that more patient leader could have pur [0 better u e.

As u ual, the 10 e uffered by ovier force. were mas ive. The olkhov and Leningrad Front

uffered 30 36 a ualrie during [he ill-fated

operation, including 9 ,064 men killed aprured or mis ing. The orthwe rem From 10 t 245 -1] more ca ualries, including 88908 killed captured or mis ing, lone 0 [he Fronrs had accompli hed irs mission and the operation ended with the Second Shock Army isolated in the frozen swamps

ourheast of Leningrad. The only saving gra es were thar rhe offensive inflicted modest damage on German Army Group orrh and forced th OKH ro reinforce the eningrad and Demian k region ar the expen e of other ccrors on the Ea [ern From. Finally the cope inrensiry, duration and

o t of the C op rari n learly indicated that talin wi hed to raise the Leningrad blockade and was making every attempt to do $0.

efective Command and Control

The course and outcome of the offen ivc vividly

revealed the gro error that Khozin, eret ko

and their ubordinare ornmanders made when planning and ndu ring the offen ive. Lacking experience in conducting major offensive operations, they neglected to exploit their numerical superiority by concentrating their force a t decisive point although the order they received

ornewhar mitigated thei r guilt. In thi rega rd, ta lin ordered them to do on a smaller cale preci ely what he wa doing on a larger eale, A a re ulr, the arrnie often attacked one after the other in eparate ector, often regrouping for new attacks in sector v here previous attacks had already failed. Thr ughout rhe offen i e, command, control and communication often collapsed and the force had wholly inadequate fire and Logistical upport.

All in all it was a depressing beginning to the New Year, which, in turn, promised ill-consequences for the coming summer months. Most tragically of aLL, the offensive'S failure condemned Leningrad' civilian and defenders to the pecrre of unrequited famine, mi ery and death during (he winter and rhe pring that was to follow.

9-

CHAPTER 6:

D

The Stavka and Stalin were determined that Leningrad would be relieved, and in May-August 1942 launched fresh offensives to achieve this. But the Red Army discovered that enthusiasm and numbers coutd not compensate for poor planning and deficiencies in command. control and equipment. The Germans held. defeated the Red Army and then launched their own counterattack.

U HO

In late April 1942. the Red Army's winter offensive collap ed in utter exhaustion before ir was able ro fulfil [he am irious objective mat had been a igned [0 it by rhe tauka, Ne errhele s, the ma ive fen ive had aved Mo CO\, denied Hider hi Barbaro a objective , and inflicted an unpre edented defeat n the Wehrma hr. The Red Army multiple fensive left the Soviet-German front a crazy patchwork quilt of interlocking and often overlapping orce arrayed from the Leningrad region to the Black Sea.' The can igurarion of the front it elf, disfigured by numerous alient and large oviet forces lodged deep in rJ1C erman rear area, illu trated the unfini bed nature of the fir r i

month of operation. nder randa ly, neither

Hitler nor ralin could accept the winter de i i 0 a final, each viewin it a an aberration that auld b corrected in the urnmer, In sborr, both ide planned ro eize rhe rraregi initiative and complete the mission left unfulfilled during the fir r ix month of Waf.

LEFT: A Red Army Guardsman of the Leningrad Front poses with a SOmm marlar. The designation "Guards" was a collective title awarded to Sovielland, air and nllval units t'hol hod distinguished themselves in action. The Guards honorific was established in late 1941.

5

After considera hie deliberation, the tmrkl1 decided to conduct a strategic defence along the viral western axis in the umrner against an anti ipated new German offensive toward Moscow, while ondu ring spoilin f offen ive of their own in urhern Russia durin the pring. r rhe same rime, Hider ordered the '\ ehrma hr ro condu r perarion Blau, a major offen ive , Arm)' Group outh to onquer the Stalingrad and oil-rich aucasus regions. Fuhrer Directive 0 41 i sued on 5 April 1942, er rh parameters of the offensive which wa to begin in late JLUle:

"Initially, it i nece ary to concentrate all exi ting forces for the onduct of a main operarion in the outheru e tor of the front to destroy tnemy for e v e r of the Don River and, ub equenrly, capture the Caucasus oil re ions and rhe passes across the auca us Mountain ."

The directive al 0 provided Context and rationale for Army Group 1 arm' ummer perarions:

"\' e will. refrain from the final encirclement of Leningrad and the ca pru re of I ngel'1ll 8 rutland [Oranienhaum] until u h time a the ituation in [he enveloped area or rhe availability of orherwi e su fidem force permit."

Accordingly rrny Group North's inirial rni ion wa to improve ir po irion around Leningrad I

9

FR STRATED HOP

A80VE: These Guards infantry pidured In 1942 are manning a DT lank machine gun with a bipod atlothed. This wea:pon had a ~mall drum magazine that made for ease of reloading in the cramped (onditlons of the trenches. The stadt WitS (ollapsible.

liquidating Red Army bridgehead on the western bank of the Volkhov River. ub equently after the Wehrmacht offensive in outhern Ru sia began

ucces fuUy, [he OKH planned to reinforce Army Group lorci, so that it could launch it urnrner offen. ive, Kuechler's army group wa to apture Leningrad establish contact with the Finni h Army on the arelian Isthmus and seize ranienbaurn in a ordan e wirh Plan ordlicht, which rmy orrh had already prepared early rhe previau \ inter, fter eizing Leningrad and e tablishing coma t with the finn Army roup North's Eighreenth Army was to ever ovier rail communication between Mo cow and Murrnansk.

irnulraneously, the army group' ixrcenrh Army

was [Q attack southeasre 31'd from Dernian k in tandem with an attack by Army Group entre'

inth Army northward from Rzhcv, he rwin

a aulr were to en ircle and de troy ovier forces oc upying the large alient in the ta hkov Kholrn

'\ ith ornbar raging in ourhern Ru ia in May rhe t wk ordered the Leningrad From [0

rrengthen Leningrad' defence, onduct local operation to weaken German for e be ieging rhe city, and liberate rhe econd ho k Army from the German trap outh of Liuban, On 19 May Khozin rhe leningrad Front commander, propo ed to the Stauk 1 that hi Front rrack and de troy German force in the Nt a- iniavino alient to rai e the Lenin rad blo kad . TIle tavka approved hozin' plan and em him sub ranrial re erves with which [Q mount hi offen ive)

'\ hiie planning his nev offen sive at Leningrad, Khozin al a planned to free la ov' e ond hock Army from it near el,eirdemen[. However, before doing so he agreed with a Stollka reque t to dispatch rhe fre h V1 Guards Rifle Corp, which Merer kov had intended to employ ill the relief of the ecorrd Shock Army to reinforce the Northwe tern rom's operation at Derniansk. By rhi rime lasov beleaguered army had de reased 70 percent in trength and la ked rank artillery> ammunition and food.

everthele rhe taoka approved Khozin' plan for

the econd hock I11Y's breakout on 20 May. vlasov' army arrempred ro break out everal rimes over the next few days. bur rhe Eighteenth Army

and Toropet regions, which threatened rnolen k and Army Group entre' rear area.

1.11 accordan e with ralin' trarcgy the tauha

ondu ted it Khar kov and Crimean offen ives operarion in May. However, both offen ivc ended cara rrophically with the complete defeat and de rrucrion of both attacking force. German forces then captured eva ropol and the Kerch perrin ula advanced eastwards aero s the Northern Donees River" and initiated Operation Blau on 28 June, sharcering Red Army defence in ourhern Russia. The German vi tories at Kharkov, in the Crimea, and aero outhern Ru sia b tween May and July enabled the KH [ di parch ub tanrial re erves to the Leningrad region with whi h to mount Operation ordlicht. However, at the arne rime,

ovier operations around Lenin zrad and Derniansk between January and May ended German hopes of enveloping the city by an advance ncrthea rwards tram Demian k. Conversely, the failure of the Sevier Leningrad- ovgorod offen ive and the ucce sful German relief of Dernian k wor ened me ovier ituarion along rhe norrhwcsrern axi and encouraged Army Group Iorth to mount . eri u new opera-

ion in me region.

9

reinforced it ardon of troop around it and foiled all of rhe artempr . The econd ho k rmy and relief force from our ide the encirclement tried repeatedly to break OUt bur failed in heavy fighting that la red throughour early July.

in [he midst of these battles, 011 2.4 May Kuechler ordered Lindemann' Eighteenth Army to orchesrrare an offen ive ro rrap la OV'S army ornplerely a task Lindemann a igned to XVIII and r rmy Corps. frer a delay due to heavy rain, rhe l\ 0 corps began their joinr offen ive again r the ba e of the ccond Shock Army' packer on 30 May. De pire su fering heavy 10 e. xxxvru Corp continued it a sault into the night, linking up with J Army Corp' forces at 01 :30 hour on 31 May, and evering the vital route Erika.' The tWO corps establi hed a COntinuous front facing ea t at 12:00 hours on 31 lay and a froll[ facing we r later in rhe day. Finding them clve rorally trapped, the remnant. of la a . once proud arm. de perarely arternpred [ e ape by

Bnow: The donic image of the Red Army. The army did not generally use a knapsack or other specialized equipment, simply Ihe roRed grealcool and bread bag. The Maxim model 1910 machine gun, seen here with troop.s in Ihe Leningrad area, is being carried 10 ayold damaging the melal wheels on the rocks ..

99

TH

-»: ~
0 10 20 Miles If. LAKE LADOGA
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Shll$58I'lIW'g '\...-..,_)
0 5 10 Km \ ._,
Workers' Settlement 4 r JOrkers' Settlemll!nt 5 I I

NEVA pE.R.<~nONAL GR01.l1'

Jl-

Soviet Frontllnes

27 Iwgusl1942

• - • - - - - • 29 AlJgust 1942

2 Septem ber 1942

Wol'iters' Setuement 8

On 23 July, Hitler issued revised guidance for 'V ehrma br offen ive oper tion to be c ccured in late summer in his Fuhrer irecrive '0 45.6 The directive added yet another oflen ive option for Army Group orth, Operation Feuerzauber (Fire Magic) which required Kuechler' army group to

apture Leningrad by early eprember, To do so, Hider transferred General rich von Manstein's Eleventh Army headquarters \ ith five infanrry clivi-

ions northwar from the rirnea to reinforce the

Eighteenth Army and rhe heavy artillery already em ro the region. One \ eek later, the KH renamed Operation Feuerzauber Operation ordlidn." Hitler ordered Kuechler to conduct operation Moorbrtll1d and Bette/stab in ' horr order before embarking n

ordlicht and to complete them all by early epternber,

ince ondu ring aU of [he e operations was learIy beyond the army group' capability, Kuechler coo-

inced Hider and [he KH to delay Operation

Bette/stab until after me ucces ful ompletion of Operation ordlicht.S On 23 Augu [ he a igned Man tein respon ibiliry for conducting ordllcht and ordered him to execute it in any way fea ible with his fresh Elevenrh rmy as long a he linked up with the Finn and 'levelled Leningrad to [he ground". To en ure that hi order were carried our Hider ubordinared an rein' forces directly to the OKH rarher than Army Group orrh, The Finnish

rmy on th Karelian Isthmus v a ro a i r the operarion with artillery upporr and by conducting a feint north of eningrad.

MIIII

VoronOVQ ~

~

....

II

attacking ea [ward on 4 June. The erman

repelled the attack, which according to Wehrma hr report, were made by troops who were all "drunk". The next day erman forces also bear off a major arrack from the east.

After several telephone onver arion \ irh hi senior commanders, including Merer kov, on 8 June

ralin re-e rablished rh Volkhov Fronr under Mererskov' command ordered the larrer ro rescue hock Army, and ent Vasilev ky from the General raff ro assist hirn.! . talin then a igned Lieutenant- eneral L. ovoro to replace Khozin as Leningrad Front commander and rran ferred the latter to the '\ e tern From to ornrnand rhe ThirtyThird Army. Thereafter, in mid-June Mererskov made several attempt to free the Second hock Army but all failed. errnan force sub equenrly destroyed the encircled arm)' capturing a reponed 15,000 viet troop at the corridor' ea r en end in mid-June and another 33 000 by 28 JUDe. On 12 JuJy Vlasov him elf feU into erman hand. Official

oviet figure recorded 4 -] ca ualrie from 13 May [0 10 july, including 54,774 killed, captured or missing rna t uffercd by la ov's army.

~ ith Operation Blew well underv ay and apparently ucces ful the German began planning a new

ABOV~ This map illustrates the Soviet SIniovino offensive operotion between 19 August and 9 September 1942, and the German (ounlerstroke ot Siniovinobetween 2.0 September and 1 S October J 942_ The laHer ended Soviet hopes of relieving Leningrad in 1942.

offensi e in [he Lenin rrad region. On 30 june Kuechler briefed Hitler at the Fiihrer headquarters, detailing offensive oprion other [ban 1 ordlicht that hi army group was capable of undertaking. The e operation included tWO in [he Leningrad regicn.i The fir t, odenamed Operarion Moorbrand (Moor Fire) involved either capturing the Pogosr e salient, we t of Kiri hi which wa still held by the ovier Fifty-F urth

rmy, or [orally destroying the entire So ier force we r of d,e Volkhov River. The e and codenamed peration Bettelstab (Beggar' taff), called for the elimination of the Soviet bridgehead outh of

ranienbaum. Kue hler added detail to these propo ed operation when be returned [0 hi headquarter on 1 July, and ordered his raff to begin work on Moorbrand first an I rhen Bettelstab, In [he meantime, the OKH ordered it siege artillery batteries, named Dora Gamma and Karl, regrouped from eva ropol co Leningrad between 2 and 23 July 0 rhey ould air in [he reduction of the Kron hradr fortIe .

Red Army Local Offensive

fter the errnan de rroyed the econd ho k rmy in late June the tauha and Leningrad From anticipated renewed German offen ive operations in the Leningrad region orne time during mid- urnmer. In ea r.ly July Soviet intelligence reponed a build-up of German force in the iniavino and

hudovo regions possibly in preparation for a major advance on Volkhov. To fore tall the German offensive and pave the way for a larger offensive of its own, Govorov's Front mounted everal "local" offen ive in late July and ea rly Augu r againsr erman force south of Leningrad. The Forry- econd Army attacked in the Sraro-Panovo ector on 20 July and the Fifry-Fifrh Army attacked

in the Putrolovo and larn-Izhors ecrors three davs later, Alrhough ehe fighting wa costly and inconlu i e, ovorov did nor halt the Fifty-Fifth Arm ' operation until 4 August and the Forry- econd

100

Army' until 26 August. Although the [win offeni e achiev d very little, rhey did for e the German ighrcenrh Army ro hift u b ranrial or e [0 the threatened ectors."

German Defence at Siniavino

The growing fear of impending German offensive operations against Leningrad prompted rhe Stavka ro d rnand rhar ovorov' and Merer kov' Fronts

ondu t a larger- calc offen ive to pre-empt rhe po - ible German offen ive and, if pos ible, raise rhe erman bl kadc. The 1m,ka and two Front cho e

the German hli cl burg- inia ino-Mga alienr ouch of Lake Ladoga as their target. The offensive

plan required the Leningrad and olkhov From supported by the Baltic Fleet and Ladoga Flotilla, ro onducr concentric attack to defeat and de tro

errnan fore in tile alicnt and restore ground

ommunication with Leningrad. By doing so ucessfull , the lt1l.1ka hoped it could fore tall any

German offen ive farther ea t and draw errnan r er e awa {Tom the ralingrad region .

The ta k onfronting ovoro and Merersko was nor an easy one since Lindemann's Eighteenth

my had erected rrong and deep defence in and around irs iniavino "bottleneck". The bulk of [he army' force \ ere concentrated south of Leningrad and in the Mga- iniavino alienr.1O XX I Ann Corps 227rh and 223rd Infantry Divisions defended the ea rem flank of rhe salient oppo ire the Volkhov From' Eighth Army. It was flanked On the left by L Army Corps S Police Division deployed along [he

eva River opposite the eva Operational Group and on rhe righr by I Army Corp' 96th Infantry Divi ion. A econd German defence line wa anchored on the iniavino trongpoinr and a third line \ a locared orward of rhe Mga River with element of the 12rh Panzer and Sth Mountain Divisions po itioned nearby.

The erman defen e con i ted of a dense network of trongpoinr and centre of re i ranee protected by e rensive obstacle inrerconnecred by trenches, and prore ted by int docking artillery and mortar fields of fire. The mo t important German r£Ongpoints were at Worker errlement as 7, 8 and 4 and at the villages of Tortol va and Porech'e. Wor e still for the Soviets, on the eve of their offensive OKH alerted Kuechler ro in rea ed ovier arrack preparations and ordered him ro move the 170[h Infantry Divi ion one of the levenrh rrny' divi-

ion preparing for perarion ordlicbt north-

wards from Mga into the bottleneck. lr also gave

10]

FRU 'TRATED HOPE

Kuechler everal new Tiger tank char had been en route by train from P ko ,

Although at firsr sigbr the ovier offen ive plan

eemed imple and dire r, Govorov and Merer kov tried (Q eliminate the glaring deficiencic a evident in their early offensives. In the .erringrad Front's e - tor, Major- eneral V. P. viridov' Fifty-Fifth emy and the eva perarional Group were to attack [0\ ard To 110 and iniavino to link up with the Volkhov Front's force and destroy German force in the salient. Farther we r, Lieutenant-General L F.

ikolsev' Ferry-Second Army and other Fifty-Fifth

Army for e were to arra k toward rir k and

raro-Panovo [0 ric down German force .11 Meret kcv's ighrh Army, commanded by Major' General F. . Starikov, \ as to penetrate German defence we r of Gaitolovo ar rhe base of the salient, desrroj German force at iniavino, exploit toward Mga, and link up with ovorov's Fin -Fifth Army.l~ General Klykov's Second 'hock Ann}' just re-estabIi hed after irs predecessor' destruction at Liuban was in e ond echelon behind rarikov Eighth Army, I Klykov's army wa to de troy German force ar Mga, link up \ irh Leningrad Fr or force neal' Kra nyi Bor, and rhen exploit the offensive south .. vards towards Tosno, In addition Meretskov

movements by the appointed tirne.!" ·.incc only tWO rifle divi ions and one rifle brigade had reached Merer kov' reserve in olkhov when the offen ive began, both his fir [ and second echelons had ro defend (heir own flanks a they onducred the breakthrough and exploitation. Nevertheles ,when prepa· rations were cornplere, the ovier forces ournurnbercd the German or e by more rhan four to one. IS However, for rhe offen ive to succeed it had [Q develop qui kly, since the Germans had ix to seven clivi-

ion in operarional reserve which they could use [0 reinforce the rhrearened ector by the eighth or ninth dar of the operation.

ABOVE: A Red Army battery outside the Dty of Leningrad prepilres to lUlJnm a barrage against the enemy. Red Army doctrine laid great stress on tlfe use of mass barrages, which used up vast quantities of ammunition.

Heavy Losse for 0 Gains

The Fifty-Fifth Army attacked aero me Neva River on 19 ugust and eized a bridgehead near Ivanov koc, but the Police Divi ion onrained the

ovier attack. Although Govorov reinforced the bridgehead with portion of three more division the advance still stalled.r? With his preliminary operation to cro S rhe eva River proving unsucces ful Govorov postponed any further operations until Meretskov's forces had penetrated errnan de ence east of iniavino,

To rhe east, in the Volkhov From's sector

tarikov's Eighth Army attacked at 02: 1 0 hOUIS 011 2 Augu r, striking at the junction of the German 227th and 223rd Infantry Divi ion. The army' main hock group, con isting of the four division 0 Major-General Biakov's VT Guard Rifle Corp supported by one division on rhe right flank and rwo 011 the I. ft penetrated between [he 227th and 223rd Infanrr Divi ion, and captured Tonal vo, driving a 3km (1. -rnile) wedge into the -errnan defence on the first day of rhe operation. The attack caught rhe German by surpri e since oviet operation along the I eva had ju r failed. horrly before] 2:00 hours Lindemann reported to Kue hler that arta k were underway alan 1 the entire from north of the railroad, tha 20 enemy tanks had a hieved a mall penetrarion, but no discernable enemy main arrack was apparent. Ar tbi point, Kuechler' primary oncern \ a the fare of Operation ordlicht which a prolonged ovier offen ive might di rupr.

tarikov sho k group advanced lowly and painfully towards iniavino from 28 to 30 August again t trong German ounrerarrack, finally rea hing the ourhern approache to lniavino in the centre of hi arrack e ror on 3 t Augu r, At [hi pint the banks of the eva River were only 7km (4.3 miles) to his front, Wilile the shock group gnawed it

e tablished a rrong reserve 0 fi ve ri fle d i ision and aile rifle brigade and positioned it in the olkhov region in tarikov' deep rear.H . Ierer kov \ a to begin his offen ive on 28 Augu t. However, Govorov was [Q arrack to ecure bridgeheads over the Ieva River on 19 August and conduct his main offen ive on 2 August.

Unlike the a e in previous offen Ive I Ierer kov provided rarikov' army with ignif am armour and artillery upporr so [hat, at least in theory it could penetrate the entire depth of [he German defence and apture Siniavino.I! During the a ault, the Eighth rmy wa to depl y rrong creening forces along it flanks to prorecr the hock group' advance.ts eretskov's remaining armi deployed from Kiri hi to Lake H'men were TO conduct diver-

ionary arrack to tie down German fore .

lth ugh ovorov and Meretskov pent roughly o days regrouping and preparing their for e for the offensive, five rifle di i ion, four tank brigade, and many pecialized force failed to complete heir

[01

way through the German defence, it flanking divisions tried in vain ro expand the flank of the penetration.w The German de n e of it trongpoint on the hock group's flank, tied down 0 ier forces and weakened the strength of the main effort [awards Siniavino and Mga.

Fearing rhar rhe attacking ovicr were heading for the Neva River by way of iniavino on 2 Augu t Kuechler ordered hi -th Mountain and 28rh Jager Divi ions to move from their staging areas for Operation ordlicht ro Mga. Later in [be da)" Hider diverted the 3rd Mountain Divi ion, which 'VaS en route by ea from orway to Finland to Rcval, Estonia, and uechler brought up the] 2th Panzer Division to protect the eva River front and accelerated the 170th Infantry Divi ion' movement to Siniavino, hese force and parr of rhe 96th Infantry Divi ion a em bled near iniavino between 27 and 30 Augu t. Finally, Kue hler committed hi four Tiger tank to combar ourh of iniavinc Height on

Bnow: The order "mon the guns" tllkes on a new meaning as the all-female crew of this anti-oircroft gun et leningrad hurry to toke their positions! From the eorly doys of the siege, women had taken over many jobs to enoble the men to loin (ombal unit5. The gun is an 8Smm model dating from 1939.

103

29 August, bur tWO of the new rank broke down alma t immediately. The redeployment and ornrnirrnenr of the e force uccecdcd in slowing down the VoLkhov "rom's offen ive prompting Lindemann to report that the crisis had pa ed and the penetration had been contained.

By rhi rime, Merer kov had already begun Irirtering a\ 3)' his second e helon force and reserve to sustain the Eighth Army' advan e. He began committing his second e helon IV Guards Rifle

orp in upporr of Vl Guards Rifle orp prior ro O' Augu (..!I The 2 -9th Rifle Divi ion and a rank brigade \ enr inro a tion on 29 Augu [ and [he additional rifle brigade in piecemeal fashion beginning on 30 Augu r although it was too lare,

ince rhe h k group had already been everelv weakened. The ighth Arm}" h ck roup onrinlied snuggling for iniavino and the urrounding German rrongpoinrs on 31 Augu I. lthough reinforced, it main arrack finally faltered ourh of

iniavino on I and 2 • epternber in the face of countcrarta k by the 2 th jiigel' Divi ion and part of the I 70th Infantry Divi ion. n ir right flank, the 128rh Rifle Divi ion urrounded and then captured Worker's etriemenr No 8 ill orne brutal hand-to-

Wirh Mererskov's assault faJrt:ring, Covorov's FifTy-Fifth Army and the NC\'a perarional Group joined the a aulr on 3 eprember attacking a ro rhe 'eva River or from bridgehead on its ea tern bank. The Fifty-Fifth .rrny ana ked in [he lamlzhora ector with two divi ions, but its atta k failed. t the arne time, parr of the Pi rt, -Fifth Arm}' and the eva Operational Group arta ked n rth and outh of 10 kov kaia Dubro ka in an an rnpr to advance to Siniavino from the we [ and link lip wirh Mcrerskov' hock group. Two rifle divisions managed to orce the Neva River in the Annen koe and I r Village ector, and sma hed inro the German

Police Division' defence. Once again, however [he attack bogged dov 0 and (he tallka ordered rhe forces to withdraw to their iumping-offposirion on 12 eprember.ll

Hitler was "exa erared by the fact that rhe ovier a sault had tied up four of rhe di isions ear-

marked for perarion ordlicbt in the dga-

iniavino bottleneck withour any apprecia ble effect

OD the oviet o ffensi "e. oting rhese "atrocious

developments", he ordered Man rein and hi Eleventh Army t rake ommand in rh bottleneck r "re tore [he situation offen ively" to "report immediately failures on rhe parr of aay cornmander ". An

ABOVE: Infantry and a pair of T-34/76 tanks adYQII(e. More modem versions of the T-34, such OJ the T-34/8S (armed with an 8Smm gunl were supplied to other areas of the front, where lank-la-lank (om bat was a more dedsive factor on the battlefield. The 1-34/76 was adequate for Ihe Leningrad Front, where the scope for armoured action wa1 limited by the terrain.

hand fighting bur \ as halted on 3 eprernbcr after advancing only 2- ""km ( 1.2 ~ -1.8 miles). On irs left, the 11 rh Rifle Divi ion captured Mishina, but the 26th Rifle Divi ion failed to eize Voronovo, which was defended by the 223rd Infantry Divi ion and a ra k for e from the 12th Panzer Divi ion. Thu , de pire three days of heavy fighting against heavy re iran e on 3 . eprernber rhe Volkhov Front' econdary attack faltered with heavy 10 - c nly 2- krn (1.2 --1.8 mile ) into the German defence. B}' rhi rime, rarikov hock group, now reinforced by all of I Guard Rifle orp, was lodged in the woods sourhwesr of iniavino Height almo t l Okrn (6.25 miles) deep into the

erman defence and only km (3.12 mile) from the eva Ri er, An in rca ingly fru rrared Merer kov reinforced Srarikov' hock group \ irh the econd Shock Army s 191 r Rifle Division.

104

FR ;TRATEn HOPE

im.:reasillgly de perate Merer kov then cmmined the remainder of his econd hock Army into combat on 5 eprcmber, How ver, the army wa unable to make any further progre • and the errnan

X ! rrny orps' 121 r lnfanrrv. Jrh Iounrain, 28th Jager and 223rd lnfanrry Divisions contained the oviet arm ks in heavy fighting on 8 and 9 epremh r. Having halted the ovier advance on iuiavin , rein ord r d his 24th and 170[h Infantry and 12th Panzer Divi ion to arrack the

oviet penetration from the southeast on 10 eprember Thi arrack immediately collapsed when hi infantry ran into heavy artillery and mortar fire and hi rank stumbled into ovier rninefields, Man rein ancellcd rh attack the ne 'r day ordered his army to neutralize the ovier artillery and to prepare another ana k from both north and ourh. Meanwhile, from 4 to 20 eptember ounrerarracks by the 121 sr Infantry and -th Mountain Divisions

BELOW; The !Llmnst stoli( (andillon 01 the Leningrad Front made for an ideal sniping environment. The sergeant and corporal pidllred here are both armed with the Moisin Naganl Model 1891/30 with the PU sniper sight. hperls such as these would remoin in situ lor several days, wailing for the right target to present ilsell.

LO.-

FRUSTRATED HOPES

from [he north, [he 28th Jager from rhewesr, and the 170[h Infantry from the south, compressed the attacking Soviet forces back into a right salient southeast of Siniavino.

Aftcr heavy rains forced a three-day delay, on 2. i

eptember Manstein began a more carefully planned cou nter [Toke involving pi ncer,macks [0\·V3 rd s Gairolovo at the base of the Soviet's penetration from north a nd south. X X VII A rmy Corp , 12J Sf Infantry Division formed rhe northern prong of the pincer and XXX Army Corps' 24rh, 132nd and ! 70th Infantry Divi ions the southern prong, while the 3rd Mountain and 28th Jager Divi ions contained oviet forces in the penerrarion, Overcoming desperate Soviet resistance, the couneerattscking forces linked up near Gaieolovo 011 25 September, encircling the bulk of '\{eretskov's Eighth and Second Shock Armies .. However, before Mansrein could begin mopping-up operations, Covorov's forces attacked once again across the Neva River.

\'(lith Meretskov's shock group imperiled west of Gairolovo, [he Suwka immediately ordered Govorov ro mount a relief operation. At 03:00 hours on 26 September. [he Fifry-Pifth Army and rhe r eva Operational Group assaulted across Ole eva River

Covorov's assault delayed rhe German desrrucrion of MerCThkov' shock group in the Gaitolovo Pocket, but accomplishcd Tirtlc more)] In heavy fighting from 30 September to 15 October, Mansrein's force sysrematically reduced the encirclement, recaprured all previously 10 t srrongpoinrs, and restored the front. The German success, however, wa costly ince Wehrm3cht forces suffered 26.000 casualries.zs Worse still, the counrersrroke totally "burned our"

everal division earmarked for participation in Operation Nordlicht.

Belatedly, on 29 September, the Stauha ordered Meretskov to withdraw his forces from the Siniavino Pocket. Within days after the remnants of hi two armies escaped from encirclement, ou 1 October an undaunted Meretskov noted the continued German threat to Volkhov and requested permission to mounta new offen ive to reduce the threat. The Stovko refused categorically on 3 October; instead ordering him to establish new defences along [he Chernaia River and forbidding him Irom undertaking any new operarion until he gave his forces the rest the}' obviously required. Although the Siniavino offensive utterly destroyed any German hopes of conducting Operation No rdlicht and capturing Leningrad, the offensive rook a heavy toll on Red Army forces .. In addition ro losing me Second Shock Army for the second time in less than a year, the two Francs lost 113,674 men, including 40,085 dead, captured and missing, our of a roral of 190,000 commined to comba[.2..1 Combined with the almost 400 000 casualties me tWO Fronts suffered earlier in the year, both urgently needed a respite)~ •

ABOVE: This paTrol 01 sailors Is guarding Ihe Haa.nkopenlnsula. Alii hem en are wearing the 51 an dardR e d Navy un i lo.rm with tbe dlslinttive long cap bands. On tbe lell ls the petty oHicer commanding the group, wha is wearing a peaked cap.

against the 12th Panzer Division' defence at Annenskoe and the lst Village, The I eva Group's 70th and 86th Rifle Divisions and I l eh Separate Rifle Brigade managed to capture bridgeheads at Arbu1.ovo, Annen koe and Moskovskaia Dubrovka, into which they moved 28 guns, 281 mortars and 12 tanks. These forces conrinued wssaulring German defences until the end of September, but failed to expand the bridgeheads despite suffering heavy lose. Adding insult eo injury, 12th Panzer Division forces recaptured Arbuzovo and Annenskoe in counrerarracks on 29 September. After a further week of futile fighting, on 7 October Govorov ordered the Fifry-Fifrh Army ro abandon its bridgehead and withdraw back across the Neva. Although the 28th Jager Division recaptured most of the leva Operational Group's bridgehead ar Moskovskaia Dubrovka, a single company of the 70th Rifle Division, later reinforced by rhe 46th Rifle Division, retained a small foorhold over the river until January 1943.

ehrrnachr Reorganization

On 14 Oerober, the OKH ordered Army Group North ro go OIl me defence during the forthcoming wincer but left Operation Nordlicht as a future optionP Given the state of Mansrein's Eleventh Army, however, soon after Hitler postponed the operarion, instead ordering Mansrein to smash Sevier defences ar Leningrad by artillery fire. Mansrein remained custodian of a dormant front until 20 November, when he was summoned southto deal with [he growing crisis in the Sralingrad region.

As in previous periods the Red Army's operations around Leningrad bad a significant impact on operations elsewhere along the from in the summer of 1942. The most irnporranr impact was rhe rransfer of [he Eleventh Arm}' to the region, which deprived [be Wehrmadu of critically important reserves in southern Russia at a rime when they most needed

106

them. After [he Eleventh Army failed ro ca.prure Leningrad, [he OKH transferred its divisions [0 the south, bur they arrived [00 late to help prevem the disa rer that beset German forces in that region.

Reflections on the Offensive

Although most Soviet accounts ignore the 1942 Siniavino offensive or mention it only briefly in passing. the operation bad far greater significance than simply p. ja!I~ command cadre and staff with valuable experIence in conducting offensive operations .. More imporranrly, me operation underscored Stalin's preoccupation wicil the offense, even at a rime when the Red Army faced a major crisis in southern Russia. It also vividlyillustrated Stalin's conrinued determination ro raise the Leningrad blockade regardless of cost.

Finally operations in the SLUl1ITler and fall of 1942 brutally revealed how much more the Red Army command cadre and forces would have to learn if [hey ever hoped ro defeat German forces and raise [he Leningrad blockade. During this period the two Fronrs repeated many of the mistakes they had made in previous operations with the same adverse effecr, The catalogue of deficiencies was long and tOO familiar. First and foremost, Govornv and ;\I[eretskov fai.led to synchronize their offen ives, allowing the Germans to shift forces between rhrearened sectors and defeat the attacks in detail. Ineffective preliminary reconnaissance did not "reveal" the true nature of German defences, and thus largely negated the effectiveness of artillery preparations. During the offensive artillery was too decentralized to provide effective concentrated and flexible artillery support. Commanders (ail.ed to concentrate rheir forces properly before the offensive, til control and coerdinate infantry, tank and artillery force effectively before and during the offensive, and to manoeuvre their forces properly during the operations. Often, they cornrnirredrheir forces TO battle piecemeal and without adequate flank protection, failed to anticipate German counterattacks, and belatedly shifted Forces from secondary to main arrack sectors. Poor logistical support throughout the offensives made it difficult if nor impossible [Q sustain operations, and equally poor movement and engineer support led to excessive losses of ranks toenemy mines.

The twO Fronts would have IO address and solve these and other glaring problems before (hey could achieve any success in future offensives. They did nor have long to do so for in October 1942 Stalin was already planning for even larger-scale offensives in the Leningrad region.

107

CHAPTER 7:

IT

Having survived the terrible winter of 1941-42, the Leningrad authorities continued to strengthen the city's defensive network, while supply routes across Lake Ladoga became more organized, and tenuous ground communications were even established with the Soviet rear area. Throughout, German bombs and artillery shells continued to pound the city.

While the Red rrny fought to rai e the blo kade of Leningrad in 1942 and 194', rhe tavka exploited it c rperienee in orh r fr nt ector and progse ively strengthened and deepened the ciry' defences.' Ulrirnarcly, the de erice consisted of di tinct defensive belt echeloned in depth and equipped with numerou anti-rank ob racles integrated artillery positions, and a mature y tern of interlock ing antiaircraft po ition and arc of fire. The ba kbone of the de enee during the fir t half of 1942 wa a Ollr tinuou tren h ' tern, which onnecrcd eparare battalion defen ive region, fortified rrongpoints, and other le er defen ive lines inro a ingle ruurually upporring de en e network. The battalion defen ive region which consisted of riJle banalIOns, upporring weapon and a well-developed

L£FT: T-34 tanks rumble down a Leningud street on their iourney to the Iront following manufacture in the dty. Leningrad was on essential industrial centre, producing 10 percent 01 the entire Soviet industrial production during World War II. Its environs, for example, contained over SOO factories.

y tern bE rren he and ommunication rrenche formed rhe ta ri al foundation of ea h epa ra re lefen iv belt.

Throughout the r t of ] 942, the Leningrad From improved the defence's trengrb and re ilience, largely becau I" it organized the defensive work more effectively. Under its supervi ion, the ciry' civilian population constructed additional defen LVI" \ urk along Leningrad's southern ourhea tern and northern approaches which formed both main and econd defen ive belts and a eric of or-off po ition and fortified region in [he

wen y-Third Forty- econd and Fifry-Fi rh

Armies' and the eva perarional roup' defensive sector .2

The Leningrad From finally completed the entire system of conrinuou defen ivc belts around the city during the econd half of 1942. The heart of the system were three defensive belts around the cit}' proper and a erie of intermediate line and

tit-off po irian linking (he three belts, whi h were themselve equipped with exten ive engine r work. and fortification . By (hi rime. rhe From' force

109

TI-iE SlEGE OF LENINGRAD 1941-1944

counrer-bartecy fire against German artillery. This fire forced the Germans [0 move their artillery I 0-15kru (6.25-9 .. 3 m iles) back from the front and curtailed rhe frequent fire raids on the city. The Baltic Fleet and Ladoga Flotilla concen era red their fire against German forces, communication and

upply routes, and the HeN bad established complere superiority over the Gulf of Pinland by the end of 1942. The Ladoga Flotilla protected the supply routes aCIOS the lake to facilitate the build-up of supplies nece Sat}' for the city' survival during the winter.

Leningrad' a rmed workers' forces a Iso

increased in strength in ]942 as the number of worker' barralions ro e to 52 by the year's end manned by 26,897 personnel including more than 10,000 women. In early 1943, [he commander of the Internal Defence of the City (VOG) recommended that the Leningrad From improve the city's internal defence forces by forming 12 workers' battalions modelled on [he existing machine gunartillery units, and another 40 resembling Red Army automatic weapons battalions. Govorov approved of and implemented {he proposal. After the Red Army penetrated the German blockade in

RIGHT: A beautifully (omposedimoge, more SOli et lu.mierelhon wo.r, SirhoueUed against the night sky is the dome of $1. Isaac's (alhedral in 'Le nln grad. The weapo n. is the 4M, a special mounliri.g of 7.67mm Maxim machine guns, whiCh was Ihe mest (ommon elr def en ce piece in the leningrad areo~

A ClTY BE IEGED 1942-43

January 1943 and esrabllshed the narrow land corridor connecting Leningrad with the country as a whole, on 3 April the St(wka ordered the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts to dig III to defend the corridor and strengthen the city's defences.

The Leningrad From responded by converriug the Forty-Second Army's final defence lin", into a reinforced concrete defensive belr occupied by VOG forces. This measure convened a defence line that had consi ted of anti-rank obstacles and

a rmou red and wooden forti fica don in to a serie of perrna nenr forti fied region s. Govorov a Iso erected new forti fica rions a nd cut-off positions along rill: eastern bank of rhc eva River north of Goradok Nus 1 and 2. To the east, the Volkhov fronts also established continuous and deeply echeloned defences anchored all numerous strongpoinrs and obstacles, which extended to a depth of 80km (50 miles) on its right wing and 3S-S0km (21.8-31.2 miles) on irs left, This eliminated any possibility of

ABOVE: Pre~arln.g ane of the dlyJs orTillery pieces for a barroge againsl the Germans. The wea~on appears 10 be a 152mm Model 1937 gun-howitzer. Hovinga range of 17 .. 2km (10.75 miles), it had a nile of lire of up to four raunds per mingle. Many ollhese glllls had been losilo Iheenemy In 1941.

were able to occupy all three belts in depth." Forces from the defending armies' first and second echelons. and fortified regions occupied the first and second defensive belts, rhe Prout and army reserves occupied the [bird defensive belt and intermediate and cur-off positions, and NKVD troop manned position in [he city itself. Thi complete defence system permitted rhe armies [0 manoeuvre their forces and weaponry laterally and ill the depths, improved (he ammunition re-supply, and provided berter protection against German arrilleryand air attack. By the end of the year the From had sufficient resources co organize the entire defence on [he basi of field fortified regions (FFRs) whose arrached transport made them more mobile than earlier wartime fortified regions.

The artillery of the Leningrad Front, Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga Flotilla materially assisted the city's de fence by bei ng a hie to co nduct berter-orga nized

110

11 I

remove all vermin and garbage from street basernenrs home, building and waterway . During the mas ive lean-up operation, more rhan 00,000 people leaned I ,000 buildings, three million

quare meters (9.84 million quare feet) of treers, squares and a lleys, and removed about 982 3 J 8 ronnes (one million ron) of refu e and garbage.

During the pring of 1942 the ciry' cransporr

ystem once again began to operate, it population returned to work, and rhe authorities and public worked frantically to improve the city's stil! scarce food supplie . The tram, water upplv, anal and many facrorie began \ orking on I - . pril and rhe city government ordered the population to plant gardens wherever po ible. It e 'plaited every park and vacant area in the city to a sign plot of land to the population on whi h ro grow vegetables. Ultimately, more than 200 000 eningrader planted an area en ompa sing 2000 he tare.

Factories also began producrion albeit lowly, parri ularly rhose producing weaponry to which the overnrnent a igned priority in the allocation of critical resource. Weapon fa torie increa ed their production rom five machine gun, 649 submachine guns and about 70,000 hell and mines in pril 1941 to 150 machine gun 2875 subrnachine gun and more than [45,000 hells and mine in May. ince coal and other fuel \ ere rill in short uppJy, the faetorie and orher enrerpri c burnt only wood and peaL Once again, rhe city mobilized [he entire population and they gathered one million cubic rueter (9.84 million ubic feet) of fuel during the umm r. ince thi amount wa

till rorally insufficient, the aurhoritie ordered all buildings not suited or occupancy to be torn down for fuel.

CITY BESIEGED 1942-4

German force threatening either the corridor north of iniavino or the cit}' of Volkhov,

After weathering rhe terrible famine of winter 1941-42, the ciry's civilian and military leader hip worked frantically to eliminate the famine's effect and rescore as much normality [Q Leningrad as a dry under iege could expect. At the arne time, however they had [Q prepare ro defend me cit)' again t an expected German summer offen ive. This meant chat they had to alan e arefully the city' defensive requirements, particularly the soldier ' need, against the needs of the icy' hrunken surviving population.

The m t eriou problem facing Leningrad other chan the food upp!y was the pectre of epidemic produced by the city'S poor living condition and rhe pring [haw. The chaw, which relea ed bodies, garbage and debri from the grip of the winter ice, pr du ed irnmen e number f rodents and other vermin. The city managed to avoid major outbreak of disease throughout 1942 because the aurhoririe implemented a serie of stringent hygieni measures ro prevent ir. Between 2 1'.lar h and I - pri I 1942 the iry government and Parry lind actory cadres organized a public effort [Q

Food and uel upplie

In the fall of 1942 a the econd winter under lege approached, rbe ciry' entire population, together with soldier and sailor, helped preps re the city f r the orning winter. Every able-bodied man and woman repaired building and gathered foodstuff . including 74,656 ronnes (76000 ron ) of vegetable on. idera bly lightening rran port requirement aero Lake Ladoga in the urnmer and early fall. To help 01 e the fuel horrage, on 25 April 1942 the GKO ordered Red Arm engineers to Jay a welded fuel pipeline across Lake Ladoga. When it went into operarion on 18 June, the 35km- (21.8- mile-) long and 12m- (39.3-fee[-) deep pipeline carried 295 tonnes (300 tons) of fuel per .day to Leningrad. Finally in eprernber 1942, the cit began re eiving elcctri al power from [he power station at Volkhov [ran rnirted aero [he Jake by underwater cable.

While the population and military truggled to make L ningrad a afe and elf- ufficient as possible the Leningrad From and Ladoga Flotilla worked with equal determination during the ummer to expand rran port capacity into the city. On 9 April 1942 the GK approved a new transport plan chat e rablished daily target or hiprnenr of food, arnrnunirion, military equipment and fuel and lubricant into the city. and of evacuee and some cargoes out of [be ciry.! The Ladoga Military Flotilla wa responsible for organizing and managing thi rran pOrt effort. The Flotilla and Balri Fleer repaired hip during the winter, and Leningrad' shipbuilder built barge and both towed and self-propelled boats for u e on [he lake,

BELOW: German artiJleryrnen prepare one olthe!r pIeces to fire at leningrad in July 1943 (note mosquito nets draped over their headgear). As well as shells, the Germans dropped booby traps disgUised as thildren's toys on the city in IlII effort to break the morale of Ihe populaTion.

112

ABOVE: The desperation to survive during the blotkode led many people 10 thieve and, par1jeularly following a heavy air raid or period of shening, loaf. To prevent these situations gelling out of hand, yOUl1g m.ernbers of Ihe Porly, o.s above, were armed and given Ihe power 10 arrest suspeded looters.

and rhe flotilla requi irioned other boat from local fi hermen.r irnilar work went on ar docking facilities, whi h, ere greatly expanded.

Ia vigarion across [he lake began all 22 May \ hen the steamer Gidrotekbnik towed a tring of barges from Kobona ro 0 inovers, oon after other

hip began travelling rhe 150krn (9 . 5 miles) from 0 aia Ladoga to 0 inovers and the 29km (18 miles) from Kobona [0 Osinovers, The first Iul] convoy left ovaia Ladoga on 28 May. Fr rn May to 1 Decem er 1942, more than 200 hip transported a rota I of 76 - 0 l tonne (779,5 6 tons) of

argo acres the lake, half of which con tiruted foodstuffs and the remainder coal, lubricanr and military equipmenc.« The foodstuff primarily included f1 ur, grain, rna aroni, butter far, meat

ugar pre er e and chocolate. nee the Ladoga

route were operational, the evacuation of factory equipment and critical technical personnel

11

THE GE OF LENINGRAD 1941-19~4

in rea ed dramatically a , during the urnrner; the flotilla evacuated -39, -97 per onnel ;lnd 2 7711 tonne (292 900 tons) of factory equipment acres the lake. n ir return trip it rran ported 310 000 combat replacements to the Leningrad From, turning the ciry into an immense rnilitaryencampment, The e hipmenrs materially improved [he city's food upply avoided new famine in the winter of 1942 and 1943, and permitted indu try to re urne it operation.

in e Leningrad remained in the grip of a right i ge rhroughour 1942, til defen e of the upply line remained a critical requirement particularly

again t German air arrack. During the ummer, the German, in conjunction with rheir anricipared Operation ordlicht against the ciry, rried ro interdiet the flow of upplies inro the ciry by bombing ir pOrt facilities and viral supply route aero Lake Ladoga and rhe Gulf of Finland ben een Leningrad and ranienbaum.

The Germans began their air Cam aign on 4 April when they onducred heavy attack again t Baltic Fleer and Ladoga Flotilla ships. They repeated the attack on 24, 25 and 27 April in coniunction \ ith a heavy artillery bombardment of rhe city' port facilirie .. " The heaviest German air attack hov ever 0 urred in the early fall of 1942 when Hider ordered Man rein to pound the city into ubmi. ion. In eprember alone [man aircraft dropped 120 bomb. in everal raid on the Kob na region. Throughout the fall, the German conducted a total of 122 daylight and I - night raids involving between 80 and 1.30 aircraft each, and dropped a total of 6400 homb Oil the city. However, PVO anti-aircraft gunner and aircraft inflicted ill rea ingl. heavy aircraft 10 e on the Luftwaffe for ing ic to reduce ha rply the ize and number of it raid. In the end, the e raid had only a negligible effe [ on trail port and re- upply,

LEFT: Leningrad WDS an important (entre lor heavy indusITy. Here, la.thas are being loaded onlo larries far evacuation. The machinery is from Ihe Slanldlov Focilily, which was targeted by the Germans during the period 1941-43 due la the vi1a1 no lure of ils work.

BELOW: Straight from the paint shop to the frontline. A (olumn of SU·122 self·propened howitlers, produ(ed by the Kirovsky fadory in Leningrad, rons past a triumphal anh evoking memories of past Russian victories. Such symbolism became more politically a(ceptoble as Ihe war continued.

114

IS &ora.wDtl~. 4J1I~ .!!J

IIHUt'"., -_

I HHIJJUnu f:rrmrO (lPfiHTPt

It H. 3JIH4CSEPr .

WOCTAHOB 'I nn~M~R ~rMr11nHRR

ABOVE: This soldier is buying II ticket for ShoSlakovich's 71h Symphony. Such cultural even Is were very popular with the population, military and dvilian alike, throughout the 900 days of the siege, acting as II reminder of more peaceful times.

reducing arg hipment by nly 0.4 percent -

but at a co t of 160 aircraft lost by the German.

Lake Ladoga efences

Ground de 'eoce of Lake Ladoga'S southem bore and [he approache east and west of the lake remained viral ro rhe defence of the water routes rhroughour rnid-januar 1943 since the ermans' frontline tiU Iun to the lake's southern hare perilou ly clo e [0 the iry, brougham 1942, the Ladoga Flotilla manned the "Oreshek" Forrre oppo ire hli el'burg [0 defend the ourhwe tern

horc of the lake and maintained a naval garri on on u kho T land TO protect the lake' outhea r

hore. The Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts protected the ground approaches TO these routes, e pecialIy the critical road and rail network between 1 lovaia Ladoga and Volkhov. Largely due to thi effective de cnce, the Ladoga water route managed to function normally rhroughour 1942 de pire nearly Con tant navigational difficulrie cau ed by

115

THE SIEGE OF LENINGRAD 1941-J 944

A CITY BESIEGED 1942-43

storms, rough water and [he German atr and artillery action.

Frustrated bytheir inability to halt Or slow the steady flow of vital supplies aero the lake, on several occasions the Germans attempted direct action to closethe routes. For example, in April and May 1942 they convinced the Finn to deploy a small naval and amphibious force on the Jake.8 Soviet intelligence detected the presence of these ships and a landing force of 3000 men at and around the ports of Sorravala, Lakhdenpokh'Ia and Impilakhti the following month.Tn addition, the Germans deployed a detachment of landing barges to Keksholm in August, and began conducting reconnaissance and diversionary anions on [he lake in lare September, laying magnetic mines on the sea routes on 27 September and also cutting communications west of Sukho Island. Govorov responded by deploying a naval derachrnenr of 100 men and three lOOmm guns to occupy defences on Sukho Island. Thereafter, the Finns made rwo attempts ill October to land forces on Sukho Island bur both of these failedY

When winter began in late 1942, German force defending the Mga-Siniavino salient east of the city still held all land routes into the ci.ty in a stranglehold. Once again it seemed as if the Leningrader would have ro rely on the icc road, the "Rl).ad of

experienced with rhcexploirarion of the ice road. Fifth, rhe Red Army finally cracked the blockade in mid-January L943.

\Xlhen the lake tinnily did freeze, the Leningrad Fronr and Ladoga Flotilla exploited their experiences of the previous winter to improve the road and also began constructing railroad lines to upplemeur the existing road routes, whose use precluded painstaking and time-consuming transfer of cargoes from railcar to boats. Red Army engineer began building the railroad line simulraneou ly from east and west, and b)' mid-January had laid 15km (9.3 miles) of operational [rack across the western exrremiry of [he lake. However. after Red Army forces opened the land corridor to Leningrad in January 1943, theengineers haired construction of the lake route and instead moved the railroad to a land rOUIe Through [he corridor, even though the land corridor remained quire narrow and was subject [Q constant German artillery fue.1o Although the engineers abandoned the lake railroad, they continued (0 improve and expand the ice roads across the lake.

ABOV!: MaTines allhe Baltic. Fleet onpatroJ, The task of the Ileel was to support Leningrad with its sltipborne~ns and Ihe guns sited in hrnd batteries .. Its vessels were also tasked with guQJding again51a possible ,enemy umphibiouslanding fram Ihe Gulf af Finland.

The Ice Road

Despite the late freeze and the frequent thaws, the ice road finally opened for traffic on 19 December.

Life", as their li feli ne du ring the coming. wi.mer. Since few Leningraders had forgotten [he horrors of the previous winter's famine, they and the ciry authorities redoubled their efforts to avoid repeatmg the carasrrophe rhar had befallen them [he previous year. 'However, four, and ultimately five, factors combined to alleviate the situation.

First, and rragically, because of the previous year's death toll and rhe summer evacuations, the size of Leningrad' population was far mailer in November '1942 than if had been in November 1941. Leningrad now had only 700,000 civilian and aboue 420,000 soldier to feed. Second, rhe Leningraders amassed far greater food reserve in 1942 than had existed in 194.1. Third, rhe winter of 1942~3 was far less severe than the winter of 1941~2. The freeze arrived later in 1942 and as a result navigation and transport on the lake continued until 27 lovernber and, in some instances, until 7 January 1943 farther north all the lake where the ice formed later, Fourth, despite the later freeze, the aurhoriries were far more

116

The firsr convoy pa sed over it on 20 December, but the 160 trucks carried only 300kg (660Ib) of cargo each. ubsequenrly, larger column of several hundred trucks travelled the route on 27 December and 8 January, bur thereafter the convoys ended due to 'weak ice, I I The traffic re umed on J 2 January, but ended again on 30 Iarch when the Leningrad Front closed [he road because of another thaw. Over the course of the winter, rhe ice road was serviceable for only 101 days between 20 December and 30 March, and suitable for massive [ruck movement on only 97 days, During this period, [tucks transported 210,745 ronnes (214,539 tons) of cargo, predominantly food and ammunition, and more than 200,000 personnel and evacuees over che ice road. 12 Even after the railroad line through the Shlissel'burg corridor became operational, rhe ice road still functioned as a reliable communication route for the Leningrad Front. The Germanscontinued their air arracks on the ice road

,BHOW: Holding the sniper's rifle· is Captain Grigoriev, who has been IIWOTded the Order of the 'Patriotic WQJ {Setond (lass). GrigorievOlld his mellllJt bemg vjsiledbyParly members from th.e Oklober5ky dislrid on a morale-boosling. teur; Th.e shoulder boards were reintroduced into the Red Annyin 1943.

lH

THE SIEGE Of

A CITY BESIEGED 1942-43

'GRAD 1941-1944

terms of irs capacity, the rail line was far more irnporranr rhan [he water routes aero sLake Ladoga. Construction forces continued TO improve the rail passage as spring approached, opening a new fa j I roa d bridge ac ross the eva Ri ver OIl I 8 March, which perrnirred through traffic along [be entire rail lineY However, the incessant German artillery fire caused heavycasualries and consranrly forced the constructors to repair and restore the line. Consrrucrion rroops built a second railroad line parallel to the first in May 1943. This IBkm (t 1.1-mile) railroad line, which was closer to the

tEn: Shelling andbortlbing continued 10 cause ,hardship lor t,he pO,pulallon, aJldodded to Ihe general lerrar. The apartments aver Ihis boarded-up falld shopbove ',ake n. 0 dire d hit. The wagons drawn up, outside 119,. 2S I b October P fOS pe ct, ha,ve removed mu(b allhe debris.

lake, improved the efficiency, capacity and safety of rail transport through the hlissel'burg corridor.!'

The Germans did everything in their power to disrupt Of halt rail movement by conducting artillery fire and air strikes on the roadway, bridges and other rail insrallarions, Since the Germans believed rhar they could cur off supplies both to Leningrad and the Volkhov Front by destroying bridges across the Volkhov River, in May and June rhey mounted heavy air raids against these bridges, bue failed ro hinder significanrly the re-supply effort.16 Subsequently, the railroad lines through

LEFT.; Visibly shaken bul sliD olive, .Mrs KorohovlI, .sh.own here, s flUl ds beside her wretked apllrlmentloUllwing II Germlln ariiUery OO«lIg.e, Incredibly, given the damoge 10 f100f5 !ll1d willis, the wmilureseem s I oh live 5ur'lived inloo and inploce.

throughout the winter, even after the Red Army had recaptured the narrow land link into the ciry, but failed to hinder movement over the ice road.!' To the relief of the road's defenders, German artillery fire ended after the Red Army seized rhe land corridor to the city in January.

After Operation Spark in January 1943,. the Leningrad Front worked feverishlyro restore reliable ground cornmunicarions between Leningrad and rhe Soviet rear area. On 2"l January, railroad

and construction troops began building a railroad line along the southern shore of Lake Ladoga from Sblissel'burg to Poliana, The railroad bed, which ran through rough terrain only 6-8km (3.75-5 miles) from the frontlines near Siniavino, was constructed under constant artillery fire a nd air a track in severe wi nrer condi rions, Despi re rhe di fficul ties the 33km (20.6-mile) route opened on 6 February. Thereafter, the railroad and lake water routes supplied Leningrad's military andci.viIian needs. In

119

118

A OTY BE lEGED 1941-43

the corridor played an immense role supplying Leningrad's population and defenders. During me period from 6 February 1943 ro 6 March 1944, for example, 5334 cargo trains with 225,859 railroad cars traversed the land route to Leningrad,

With the new land route into Leningrad functioning effectively, re-supply of the city and defence of the supply lines became a far easier process during the spring and Slimmer of 1943. In addition, the nature of transported Cargo also changed considerably as the Leningrad From used the lake routes to transport primarily wood and wood products.!" The supply routes across Lake Ladoga gradually lose their military importance after September 1943, when the Leningrad Front transferred all berths, ports and cargo mean on the lake's eastern and western shores to civilian conrrol.rs Throughout the entire Leningrad blockade, the water routes across Lake Ladoga transported 2,234,477 ronnes (2,275,000 ton ) of ca rgo, including ] ,836,.935 ronnes ( 1,.870,000 tons) ()f cargo sent to the city.

Although the partisan movement in the Leningrad region grew significantly in 1942 and

reaching the city by circuitous route on 25 February. Partisan detachrnenrs also sent representatives and delegations to and from rhe dry to receive instructions and coordinate eheiraceions with rhe Leningrad From. Despite irs relative inactivity, the partisan movement and associated Parry underground structure grew rhroughout rhe winter. By April 1942, 50 new partisan detachments had formed and began operating in the Leningrad region, and the Parry formed and fielded numerous partisan cells throughout the region [Q establish an underground infrastructure, communications and liaison with partisan detachments.a-

ABOVE: A1wllysCI feature ollile In Russia, the denring of snow from the main roads had 10 be ta:med oul siege or no siege. Leningfaders ·of 01] ages were enlisted 10 carry oDllbis ne(e~~Qry work.

he Partisans

Partisan organization and operational effecriveness improved in the summer and (aU of 1942 prirnariIy because rhe Parry, GKO and Red Army exercised more effective centralized control over partisan organizations and operations. On 30 May 1.942. the Parry and GKO formed the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement to centralize State control over all partisan organization and detachment .. The new headquarters established an elaborate hierarchy of command and control organs extending. from Moscow through the Front to individual partisan headquarter in the German rear, and disparched Red Army and KVD officers to create new patti an forces and control all partisan operations, At Leningrad, Govorov established the leningrad Headquarters of the Partisan Movement in July 1942, which he tasked with centralizi ng a II planning for and control over partisan warfare in [he region. The plan created new partisan forces and diversionary groups ordered these forces [Q sabotage and destroy German garrisons, installadons and communications, and to attack German headquarters, supply depots, airfields and communications centres, and also established priority intelligence collection requirements in su.pport of Red Army ground combat operations.

The STrength and dynamism of partisan forces in the Leningrad region increased sharply in the summer of 1942. Throughout [he year the number of partisan brigades and the strength of partisan forces operating in the German rear grew from ["\"'0 partisan brigades and 30 weak detachments with 2000 fighters, to four brigades and numerous separate detachments with more than 3000 personneJ.2] Although these forces engaged primarily in sabotage and diversionary operations, their actions were bothersome enough to provoke an organized

1943 its military importance remained limited. On 1 January 1942, an estimated 1994 partisans were opera ring in the northwestern, we-stern and southern parts of the Leningrad region, most actively in the Parti an krai. Wbi.le these forces were loosely organized into the Leningrad, Valdai and Volkhov Operational Groups each consisting of separate detachments, the latter were weak and poorly arg,anized, and the heavy snow and extreme cold severely hindered their operarions.rs Therefore, the partisan headquarters pent the winter attempting to improve the organization, command and control, and firepower of partisan dctacbmcnts.lO During the winter; partisan operations were weak and episodic and only loosely coordinated with Front operations.n At the same time, however, partisans operating in a nd around the Partisan krai gathered and sent foodstuffs to Leningrad, the first delivery

120

German response in the form of formal anri-parrisan operations. In FUhrer Directive No 46 i sued on 18 August 1942, Hider declared: "The bandit monstrosity in [he East has assumed a no longer rclerable scope and threatens to become a erious danger to from supply and exploitation of the land." Hider assigned Heinrich Himmler, head of the SS the responsibility for tooting out partisan activiry charged the Chief of Staff of OKH with conducting ami-partisan warfare, and ordered rhe Replacement Army (each formarion ion rhe German Army had it own replacement unit) to be employed as anti-partisan forces when theycornpleted their training. Subsequently, the Germans mounted numerous operations against partisans, but particularly against the Partisan krai. ln about 30 days of auri-partisan operations, 6000 German troops turned the krai into a virtual desert_!4

The German punitive operation inflicted significant casualties on the partisans and forced the Partisan Movement to move its forces to safer locales out of harm's way)..\" However. che fury of the German operation produced a backlash by prompting. virtually all of the region's inhabitants to join the partisan movement. Despite destroying the Partisan krai, German losses to partisan activities continued to mount in 3 vicious circle that ultimately ignited revolt throughout the entire German rear area. Worse still for the Germans, the near constant heavy fighting in and around Leningrad and to the south around Derniansk forced Army Group Iorrh to reduce the size and number of its rear area security installations, which significantly improved partisan morale ..

Increasing Guerrilla Activity

The partisan movement in the Leningrad region increased from 2993 enrolled fighters on I January 1943 to 14,358 on 1 November. The scope of diversionary, reconna issance and underground activities also widened. By 1 January 1943,. the Leningrad Parry Regi.onal Commirtee had established Ll Inrer-regional underground Parry centres in major cities and towns throughout theregion.~6 Headed by a first secretary and fullstaff, each centre coordinated the activities of aJI partisan groups, detachments and underground organizations operacing in each region and consolidated these forces into larger and more effective formations. By I August 1943, five partisan brigades, a separare partisan regiment, and rens of derachrnenrs and groups operated throughout the Leningrad region.r Before

121

ABOVE: The ite on Lake ladogll had 10 be at least 200mm (7.87In) thick to support II loaded truck - a thidness of IOOmm (3.93in) was sulfident to support the weight of an unladen horse. Driving across the lake was always dangerous: many trucks and their drivers fell through the ice.

RIGHT: These cheerful Leningrad youngsters have managed til keep their spirits up. All have a malnourished look while the boy on the right, although well'provided with skis, does not seem parli(ularly well-dressed for the weather. The smoker in the middle seems very pleMed with his appetlle suppressanl!

the year send the number of brigade grew ro ] 0 with an eleventh formed in early January 1944,1 By ) December the e force en ompa ed 35000 a rive fighter and thou and f auxillaric . This expanded partisan and underground rrucrure organized 10 al government organ and conducted a propaganda war by pu bli hing underground new papers and pamphlet. All [he while. it intensi ied i[ reconnaissance and diver ionary operarions in support of Red Army military operation.

in mid-1943 parti an brigade and dera hrnenrs began conducting coordinated large- cale raid and attack on errnan line of communi arion and military in rallation . For example on 1 Augu [

ITY BESIEGED 1942-H

ABOVE: Allbaugh (ommunj(ations with the outside world had been establIshed by the end of 1943, the "Road of Life" was nat immediately redundant. With their transport parked carefully on Ihicker i(e, Ihis se(llon of Red Army engineers gingerly inspects a weak pOinl. Groups such as this worked around the dock and in all (onditions 10 maintain ice routes.

1943 parri an force began Operation Railroad War (Re/so!'(lia uoina) concerted arrack on German rail communications acres the entire Soviet-German from controlled by the Central taff of the Parri an Movement and rhe SUwka,l9 0 1I - cessful were these operations and 0 confident were the Leningrad parri an of imminent victory, rhar, in eprember. the partisan movement began peaking openf about the Red Army' forthcoming liberarion of rhe re ion and accelerated it activirie again t German rear area in ta llation . Parri an attacks then inten ified and, by October, the concerted arrack ignited a ull-scale popular upri ing in the entire region. The ferocity and cope of chi parti an revolt had a ingularly adver 'C effect on German control of the region, and ha rened Hitler' deci ion to permit the whole of Army Group! orth fir t to can truer and then to withdraw [0 rhe Panther Line.

121

Akhough the Germans had initially treated the partisans' actions with onrempt comparing their impact [Q mere discomfort produced by "Red lice under the German' hide" ultimately partisan warfare had an adverse impa r on their military operation , While the Germans ould and did di miss the hundred of parri-

an pinprick arra ks a inconsequential, the curnularive effect was debilitating: they tied down an everincreasing number of ennanecuriry troop at a rime when manpower wa becoming criri al at the front. They also gave the lie to the Germans' rated intent regarding (he future political, economic and social organization of captured territorie , and reno dered German propaganda utterly u eles .

However, the le tangible aspects of parti an warfare bad a more telling effect on [he German.

parri an operari n e panded in ope from

mere hara rncnr to oncerted attack that pr - duccd real pain they undermined the German' will for victory, By earl)' 1944, a rbe Red Army mounted its major a aulr that Ii berated the

eningrad region, [he parti an movement a umed proportion that accuratel reflected the immen e suffering of their countrymen who had been confined for three year in the hellish prison that wa the city of Leningrad.

123

CHAPTER 8:

KIN _OC A

The Stavka was determined to raise the Leningrad blockade in 1943. and thus launched a number of offensives between January and September. The Third, Fourth and Fifth Smlavlno Offensives, and Operation Polar Star, were bloody affairs. but by the end of 1943 the wenrrnacnr threat co Leningrad had been removed forever - Army Group North began its retreat west.

After its .success~.ul .cou.llter.offenSi\.,e. in the Sralingrad region in November and

December 1942, the Stavka exploited the Axis defeats by expanding its offensive operations to encompass virtually the entire Soviet-German front. Understandably, the St(wka included the Leningrad region in its offensive plans since the city's defender faced a second harsh winrer in blockade and aconrinued,if reduced, threat of German. attack. Therefore the St(1uka decided to conduct a major offen ive in the Leningrad region timed to correspond wid] me expanded Red Army offensive in southern Russia, Although it initial aim was to raise che Leningrad blockade, by February 1943 the Stauka also hoped ro defeat Army Group North decisively and drive irs forces frOr11 rbe entire Leningrad region. By this rime, the Leningrad offensi ve was. pa rr of a gra nder scheme ai rned at defeating all three German ann}' groups in tbe East and driving them back to arva, Virebsk, Kiev and the Dnepr River line, rhe same objectives me Red Army had failed to achieve in the wimer of 1941-42.

un: A Germgn nger heQY)'llInk in wooded: lemrin on Ihe Leningrad Fronl in the summer 011943. the mighty figer, armed with an 88mm gUll, wo~ nol 0 deti~ive hldor in the fightin.g in Ihetrees ond morshes. of n.orthemRu5itia·. ,]I wait 10 have more impact on the open steppes In the sl)ulh.

On ., january 1943, the Red Army's strategic situation in the Leningrad region was seriou bur no longer grave, Although the threat of a major offensive against the ciry had lessened, German forces still encircled the cit}' from three sides and Finnish forces rhrea rened it from the north. 1 Covorov's Len ingra d Fronr defended the isolated Oranienbaum bridgehead west of the city and the ciry's southern, southeastern and eastern approaches. The cit)' was still cut off from the resr of ,dle ovier Union, the Baltic Fleer was bottled up in the eastern Gulf of Finland, and German artillery ccnrinued to pound Leningrad, To the east, Meretskov's Volkhov from defended vital communications lines to Lake Ladoga's ea tern shore and the wide ector between akes Ladoga and ll'rnen.

The Leningrad From's Twenty-Third Army defended the northwestern approaches to the dty along the Karelian Isthmus against possible Finnish attack, and the Coastal Operation Group (COG - formerly rhe Eighth Army) defended rhe isolated Oranieubaum bridgehead west of the city.2 The COG's bridgehead protected rhe approaches to Kronshtadr withlong-range artillery and threatened the left flank of German forces sOUIh of Leningrad. The Internal Defences of the City (VaG) and the Balric fleer's Kronshradr aval Defensive Region protected the sea approaches to Leningrad, and rhe

125

THE IEGE OF LENINGRAD t941~1944

rhe Front reserve near Leningrad for employment on the Karelian Isthmus.!

The Leningrad From's air forces consisted of [he Thirteenth Air Army and Baltic Fleet aviation, which proreceed the Leningrad Fronr and naval base. The Thirreenrh Air Army, which had been formed in November 1942, consisted of three aviarion divisions, five separate aviation regiments and one mixed aviation regiment, which was still forming.s Ir had 150 combat aircraft at irs disposal, augmented by the 235 alrcrafr from the Baltic Fleet's three aviarion brigades. The Leningrad PVO Army and the Ladoga Division PVO Region defended Leningrad and irs environs against air arrack. The Leningrad PVO Army's vn Flghter Aviation Corps and amiaircraft artillery and machine-gun regiments fielded 550 and-aircraft guns and 150 heavy anti-aircrafr machine guns, supplemented by a further '180 andaircraft guns and 60 heavy and-aircraft machine guns assigned [Q [he Ladoga Division PVO Region." The Balric Fleer, still subordinate ro [he Leningrad From, consisted of the Kronshradr laval Base and adjacent forts, the Izhorsk and Osrrov Fortified Sectors, the Leningrad Naval Base, which repaired fleet ships, squadron ships and submarines based ar

CRACKING THE BLOCKADE

Kronshradt and Leningrad, the Ladoga Military Emilia, coastal defences, and aviation units. The Baltic Fleet prorecred rhe sea approaches to Leningrad and the viral Lake Ladoga supply routes."

Mererskov's Volkhov From defended the 300kl11 (187.5-mile) sector from Lake Ladoga [0 Lake Il'men. Srarikov's Eighth Army defended the 50kl11 (31.25-milel sector on the From's right flank from [he Novo Ladoga Canal [Q [he Kirov railroad and was backed up by Lieurenanr-General V. Z. Rornanovsky's Second Shock Army which was in second echelon preparing for offensive opera dons. ~ The Fifty-Fourth Fourth, Fifty-Ninth and FiftySecond A rmi eS,c:om rna nded res pecti lIely by Lieutenant-General A. V, Sukhornlin, MajorGeneral ,I. Gusev, Lieutenant-General l. T. Korovnikov and Lieutenant-General V. F. lakovlev, were deployed from the Kirov railroad south to Lake II' men.1O Meretskov retai ned one rifle di vi sian an d rwo sk i brigades in h is reserve .11 The Fourteenth Air Army, Formed in J~lly t 942, provided air support to the Volkhov Front with more than 200 aircraft organized into three aviation divisions and seven separate aviation regiments ..

A Fter the Wenrmacht's defeats in southern Russia, the OKH deferred further aetionin the Leningrad region until the situation stabilized in rhe south. In the meantime, it ordered Kuechler's army group to go on the defence, and weakened it considerably by rransferring the Eleventh Army to Army Group Centre in October. In addition, it transferred nine divisions from the Eighteenth Army to other Front

ABOVE: Finnish officers (in [ur (aps) during a visit 10 German milliary inSinUations south. 01 lake Ladoga. in 1943. Finland's participation lnlhe sleg.e 01 leningrad was a greal disappoinlmenllo Ihe Germans, who expeded their allies 10 display the same ideological (onvidio"s as themselves.

Kronshradr aval Defensive Region defended islands in the Gulf of Finland and maintained communications between these islands by rhe use of aircraft and aerosleighs,

Colonel-General I. 1, Maslennikov's ForrySecond and Lieutenant-General V. P. Sviridov's Fifty-Fifth Armies defended [he southern and southeastern approaches to the dry along a front extending from Urirsk on me Gul of Finland through Pushkin and Kolpino to the eva River.' Major-General M_ P. Dukhanov's Sixry-Sevenrh Army, which had been formed in October 1942 from the leva Operational Group, occupied a 55km(34 .. 3-mile) sector northwards along che

eva River [0 Shlissel'hurg on rhe From's left fla n k. Ir a lso defen ded Lake La doga 's western shore north of the Neva River's mourh.t Govorov retained rwo rifle divisions, two rifle and tWO rank brigades, one ski brigade and one fortified region in

RIGHT: German artillery In adion in January 1943. The gun is a 1 05mm leFHl8 standard field how.ilter, which wa 5 equivalent tot he British 2S-pounder. II was a

venatUe weapon~ca:pa.hle 01 firing aU types 01 praiOtlHe and even kl1 Delling Ollt la nks at short ranges.

126

sectors during October and November 1942. On 1 December, Lindemann' army consisted of 26 divisions deplored OIl a 450km (lSI-mile) fTom from the Baltic Sea to Lake Il'rnen oppo Ire the Red Army's Leningrad and Volkbov Fronts. evere force

horrages caused Lindemann to deploy virtuallyal] of his divisions ill a single line with each clivi ion defending roughly a 17k.m (I 0 .. 6-mile) front. Lindemann retained portions of rwo divisions in reserve at Mga and west of Krasnoe Selo.l:! The OKH tried to compensate for the shortages by sending Lindemann [he 10th Luftwaffe field Division, which 00 1 December, was en route from Kingisepp to Krasnogvardeisk, The Luftwaffe's First Air Fleet provided Lindemann's army with air support by conducting a limited number of reconnaissance and bam bing sorties a ga insr Len ingrad. 11

German Dispositions

The Eighteenth Army's L Army Corps defended the sector outh of Leningrad from the western edge of the Oranicnbaurn bridgehead [Q Pushkin with fOUI divisions, and, farther east, UV Army Corps deployed three divisions in the sector from Pushkin co Armcnskoe on the j eva River+' Three XXVI Army Corps divisions manned forrificarions from Annenskoe uo south of Voronovo in the critical Mga-Sinia vino salient south of Sblissel'burg, and six J Army Corps divisions defended from the south of Voronovo to the Volkhov River south of Kirishi.'! Finally, xxvrn Army Corps and XXXVJU Army Corps defended the front southwards along the

Il7

olkhov River to Lake Il'rnen with three divi ion 1'.1 h, and the 2 Srh ecuriry Divi ion prote red the army group's rear area a a whole. Iii

The errnan defence were strongest in the

hli cl'hurg-Siniavino bottleneck, where five c perienccd German division with 10000-12. 000 men each, manned rrongly ortified defence in the region' forested and swampy rerrain.!" The depth and width of the Neva River which, a partially frozen during the winter, and the nearly impassable fore ted and swampy terrain in rhe Mga-Siniavino

alient , hich was laced with m ny fortified tone villag facilitated German defence and maintenance of the blockade a a whole. Even in cady 1943, Hider considered the salient as a viral launching pad far future attacks again r the ice road and Leningrad Erom rhe ea t, and a vital link in the blockade ince ir blocked communications betv .... een the Leningrad and olkhov From. Therefore, the

ermans e tablished three trong defence line within the alient, ea h can isting of three trench line, and formed defensive region and larger cenrre of re istance anchored on uumerou orrified village .IS The e strong defence in rhe alient repre-

ented the' nut" rhar Soviet force had to crack if the)' were ro raise the blockade of Leningrad.

Govorov and Merer kov began planning the offensi e to raise the Leningrad blockade in late overnber and early December 1942 under the watchful eye of tavka repre enrarive Voroshilov JUSt a the Red Arm was beginning ro exploit it talingrad victory by onducting a major winter

fen ive in ourhern Ru ia, riginally, ovorov

propo ed tWO eparare offen ive , the fir r named the Uric k Operation, to penetrate the blo kade and re tore communication outh of Lake Ladoga, and the econd, rhe hlissel'burg Operation to re-esrablish communications ben een the Coastal Operational Group and rhe Forty- econd Army. In [he Uri, k offensive, the Leningrad From' Coa tal Operational Group and -orry- ecoud Army were to

ma herman defen e and re rore a onrinuous franc we t of the cit),.19 In [he hli el'burg offen-

ive, the leningrad Front' i try- eventh rrny and the olkhov Front' econd hock and Eighth Armies were to penetrate German defences east of rhe city and raise rhe leningrad blockade.w These Red Army operations were to be conducred succes-

ively - the hlissel'burg operation in the second half 0 December and the Uritsk operation in February 1943.21

o let track Plan

Go orov recommended that both Fronts arrack

imulraneously with powerful h k group to avoid any repetition of rhe problem experienced in Augu t 1942. He requested al 0 that the Slavka reinforce his Front with three to four rifle divisions and bring the Thirteenth Air rmy up to full

trengrb,!l The Stavka approved Govorov' plan on 2 December with only minor amendment ordered Govorov and Ieretsko ro omplete their planning b. 1 ecember, and as igned a codename, park, (Iskra) ro the offensive. It designated Romano ky'

LEFT: The luftwaffe did not have things ilil its own way in the skies over hnlngrad. This Tupol!! ... 58-7 medium bomber has just returned from a night raid. The 58-2 was reaching the end of its useful life by the mid-wllr years, but oir operatitlns against the Germans were very good 'Dr the dty's morale.

12

KING THE BLO KADE

RIGHT: Well-dressed for the biller (onditions, this Soviet Moxim gvn (feW prepares to fight off a German c.ounler· aflad!. on the Volkhov Front, The Maxim, IIllhough doling trom 1910, provided valuable service throughout the

war and served with other Soviel'spon5Oted armies during the second half of the twentieth cen1ury.

Second h k Army a the VoLkhov Front' ho k group and Dukhanov' ["'Y. evenrh Army a the Leningrad From' shock group and ordered Fediuninsky the depury From commander. to upervise Rornanov ky' operations and Govorov him el ro direct Dukhanov's operations. Finally, the tavka ordered Mar hal Voroshilov co coordinate the offensive as a whole a irs represenrarive, assigned [he rwo Front pecifi mi ion on 8 December and di - parched ignificanr reinforcement during the remainder of the monrh.21 Although the rwo Fronts managed to complete their offensive preparation by I January, i e ondition on the j eva for ed the .avka to agree with ovorov and po tpone the

offensive until 10-·12 January

According to the fina I Qffenive plan, the tWO shock group were to destroy Germa n force defending the Shli el'burg- iniavino alierrt and raise rhe Leningrad blockade. Therea fter; in ea rly February rhey were to arra k ourhward de rroy

erman force in the Mga region, and e tabli h a broad land orridor to Leningrad to r tore reliable ground omrnuni arion to the city.!4 Govorov

hock group Dukhanov ixry- eventh Army, \ 3

to penetrate German defence ill the 13km (8.1- mile) ector between Mo kovskaia Dubrovka and Shlissel burg defeat German forces in the western porrion of the alient and link up with the Volkhov From' ho k group to re tore ground communicadons \ lrh Leningrad.u ub equenrly, its for e \ ere to wheel outhv ards and occupy nev defen e along the Moika River north of Mga. Dukhano '

army con i red of eight rifle divi ions five rifle t\ 0

ki and three tank brigades, one fortified region, and an impo ing array of supporting force deployed in rwo e helen to rrengtben [he force of irs 3U3Ck.!1> The shock group was [Q arrack early on 12 Jan U3f)' and opera te round-the-clock 0 a to penetrate the blockade in three [Q four day.

Mererskov' hock group, Rornanov ky Second hock Army, v a to rna h German defence in the 12km (7.S-rnil) ector from Lipka to Gairolovo destroy German force in rhe eastern parr of the alient and link up with the Leningrad Front, ~ bile

defending aero the remainder of it £romP

ub equently, it orce were to dig in, protect the hli cl'burg axi and it left flank, and link up with the Leningrad From' 1 x cry-Seventh Army. Rornanov ky' army coni red of 11 rifle division, and one rifle, tWO ki and four (auk brigades deployed in two echelons with specific force a igned to caprur pe ific objecri es.2S rarikov' Eighth rrny, on Rornanov ky' left flank v a to penetrate -erman dcfen e from Gairolo 0 outh to [he railroad, advance we rward and ourhx e [ward, and e rabli h new defence in tandem with the Sixty- eventh Army rrorrhwe t of the town of Mga. Mererskov was also to begin his offen ive on 12 January-

On 27 December Voro hilov approved ovorov' and Meret kov' plan for cooperation which required [he Front' two hock groups to link up along a line pa ing through Worker' errlernenr l 0 2 and 6_2q Dukhanov and Roman v ky did

129

TH STEGE OF LENl GRA.D 1941-1944

most of [heir planning based on From warning orders even before receiving {he Front directive , and had submitted [heir plans ro Govorov and Meretskov by 1 January. Dukhanov ordered his

hock group ro cross the leva River' ice and pcnerrare enemy defences berween Moskov kaia Dubrovka and hlissel'burg .. It would then attack rewards iniavino, destroy .erman forces in Shlissel'burg and Siniavino, :lndcaprurc the Arbuzovo, Marker 22.4, Workers' Serrlernenr No 6, Siniavino, Workers' Scrrlernent No t, and Shlissel'burg srrongpoinrs. Sub equenrly, his shock group was to link up with the Volkhov From's shock group, restore 11 continuous front south of Lake Ladoga, and attack southeast to capture rhe

Ioika River line. Other 'ixty-Sevenrh Army forces defended (he eva River and rhe ice road across Lake Ladoga, and the Baltie Fleer provided rhe army with additional fire SUPPOfr.JI)

Romanovsky ordered hi shock group to penerrare German defence between Lipka and Gaitolovo, destroy German forces in the Lipka, Workers' erdemenr I 0 8, "Kruglaia" Grove and Gairelovo regions, and capmrc Workers' Serrlement No 1 and .5 and Siniavino, Subsequently, while protecting it left and right £lank, rhe shock group was to reach the Neva River and link up with rhe Leningrad Front's shock group.·ll On Romanovsky's left flank, Srarikov ordered his Eighrh Army to penetrate German defences in the Gairolovo and Mishino sector with two rifle divisions and one rifle brigadevand advance towards Mga to protect Rornanovsky's left flank.

To conduct so complex an offensive against enemy forces occupying strong defences in very difficult terra ina nd poor weather coud irions necessirated careful and effective command and conrrol and massive but thoroughlyintegrated and coordinated artillery, air, armour, engineer and logistical support.v This was parricnlarly true since previous offensives. had often illustrated what not to do. Both Govorav and Iererskov planned {Q provide massive .artiHery support to their shock grau.p. both before and during the offensive. GovorovCOl1- centrared I S73 guns and mortars in the SixtySeventh Army's sector alone formed numerous special-purpose artillery groups, and planned a lSO-minute artillery preparation before rhe assault.JJ Mererskov concentrated 2885 gun and mortars in his offensive sector, employed the same types of artillery groups as Govcrov, and planned an 80~minu[e preparation in the Second Shock

Army's secror and a IOOminme preparation in the Eighth Army's seCfor.l~

Major-General S. D. Rvbal'chenko's Thirteenth Air Army. reinforced by B'llric Fleer aircraft. the Leningrad PVO Army' VIl Fighter Aviation orps, and four mixed aviation dIvisions as igned to the armies, supported Govorov's offensive \ .... ith 4J4aircraft, predominantly fighters. \.1 Rybal'chenkoconcenrrared his air sonic during the preparation against targets in the forward edge and, later, against enemy reserves and artillery positions, while small groups of aircraft supported rhe advancing troops on an on-call ba is.1b Major-General I. P. Zhuravlev's Fourteenth Air Any,)', reinforced by U Fighter Aviation Corps, the 232nd Assault Aviarion Divi ion, and three mixed aviation regiments assigned to subordinate arrmes, supported Mererskov's offensive witb 395 aircraft, most of which were ground-attack rypes and fighrers.t" The greater proportion 0 assault aircraft permitted Zhuravlev' air army to provide more effective ground suPPOrt while striking enemy srrongpoints,

ngineer Support for the ASS3.Ult

Large tank forces could not operate in the broken, forested and swampy terrain around Leningrad, particularly in winter; and the short distances to the shock groups' objectives denied tank forces adequate room to manoeuvre. Therefore, both Fronrs assigned their shock groups tank brigades, regiment and battalions simply as infantry suppOrt unirs. Govorov assigned rhe Si,xry-Seventh Army three rank brigade and rwo separate tal1k bartalions totalling 222 tanks and 37 armoured cars, distributed equally between the first and econd echelons, with light tanks deployed forward to negotiate the Jeva River' icy surface.v Mcrerskov <lunched [OUI tank bngades, one rank regiment and four sepam re tank barta I ions - a rota I of 217 ranks - to the Second Shock Army, and one regimenr and rwo batrations with 92 tanks to rhe Eighth Army.19 In addi[jon, rhe 32nd and 44rh Aerosleigh Battalions, equipped with lightly armoured machine-gun aerosleigh , conducted reconnaissance and raids in the German rear.

Given the STrong German defences and difficult terrain, extensive engineer suppOrt was vital for the operation' succe s, particularly for the Sixty-Seventh Army, whi.ch had to assault across [he frozen surface of the eva River.~!l Govorov supported the SixtySeventh Army with 15 engineer-sapper; pontoon and other battalions, seven river-crossing parks, and

130

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camouflage (nu1SkirfJllka) and hydro-technical companies. Mererskov allocated rwo complete engineer-

apper brigades, one separate mine-sapper battalion, and one moeorlzed engineer battalion ro [be econd Shock Army, and an engineer-miner brigade and separare motorized engineer battalion to support the Eighth Army. Finally, for the first time in rhe war rhe two Fronts were able to provide their forces wirh adequate logistical support,. even though rhe blockade still adversely affected the Leningrad Front and the Volkhov From's supply lines were overexrended.u When rhe offensive began, for example, the Leningrad From's Sixry-Sevenrh Army had 22 days' supply of food and forage and three refills of fuel. The Volkhov From's Second Shock Army had 20 days' supply of food, 58 days' supply of forage and two to three refills of fuel per fighting vehicle ...

Throughout the preparalOry period, horh Fronts observed srrict security requirements, limiting the number of written planning documents, restricting daytime movement, and concealing all arrack preparations .. At rhe same rime, rheyconducred specialized training in combat technique unique [0 the

ABOVE: The SovielSiniavino oHen.sive operlilion 01 13--31 Ja:nuary 1943 - Operation S.park - a:nd Ihepenetration of lbe Leningrad blockode. Though, cu· ever, theprltein Soviet tlVes was high. the «adling of the blockad-ewas II luming ,point in the city'slortunes.

operation, such as rhe assault across the eva River's ice, and practice attacks aga insr specific objecrives, which encompassed nurnerou rehearsals and exercises in the rea r area conducted on detailed mock-ups of each objective, JUSt prior to the attack, rhey simulated attack preparations in other front sectors to prevent the Germans from determining the exact time and location of rhe offensive. On the eve of [he offensive, [he arrillery had occupied its forw.ard FirilJg positions by 5 January, rifle divisions had moved inro their jumping-off positions by 11 January, and fir: t echelon tanks had moved into rheirad vanced positions on 12 janua ry.

The Leningrad and Volkhov Fronrs' third Siniavino offensive cook place within the conrexr of rhe Red Army's expanding winter campaign in SOuthern Russia. Shortly before the offensive began

'131

rhe tauka em Zhukov to Leningrad to 0 rdinate the operation. Le man a rnonrh before, Zhukov had coordinated Operation Mars, the We tern and Kalinin Front' un ucce sful attempt to mash Army Group Centre' Rzhev alienr.42 Zhukov remained io eningrad between 12 and 24 january and, in February, after the operation was complete, he developed the plan for [he even more ambitiou Operation Polar rar. Thus while Operation park was underway the Red Army was conducting or preparing to onduct major offensive operation along (he entire front.4.1

The Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts' forces attacked irnultaneou ly early on 12 january after e tten ive air and artillery prepararion. ovorov began hi artillery preparation at 09:30 hours on 12 january, taking care to pearec!: the ice on the eva River' surfa e. At 11:4 - hour five minute before the artillery preparation ended with a Katiu ha barrage, the rna sed oviet infantry of Dukhanov'

ixty- cventh Army a aulred aero s rhe Neva River with rcmarkablj light casualties. The day was clear and the temperature at dawn was -23 degree Centigrade (-9 degrees Fahrenheit).

Led by pe ial a atilt group the 6[h 136rh and 268rh Rifle Divi ions co ed the river and pierced German defences between Mar'ino and orodok 0 1 as [he protective artillery fire slow-

I}. hifred into the depth .~~ lajor-General . P.

imoniak's 136[h RiA.e Division advanced due ease and Colonel . N. Bar hchev' 268rb Rifle Division began enveloping German defen e at Gorodok 0

LEFT: Another posed shot

of Red Army infantry undergoing training. the objective Is the ruined building. Advancing through knee-deep snow IIl1d supported by 5ubmochine gunners, the Dghtly equipped Iroops move caufIous'ly forward In preparation

lor the real thing later in

the year.

another 96rh Infantry Divi ion combat group [Q Workers' etrlernenr No 1-

After regrouping and r pleni hing it for I'" overnight, Dukhanov' forces re umed their offen-

ive along the entire fronc on 13 January after another short artillery preparation. Sirnoniak's 136rh Rifle Division, supported by rank from rhc 6J t Light Tank Brigade enveloped rhe 96rh Infantry Di ision' right flank, advanced 4km (2. - miles) eastward, and within 1. Skrn (.93 miles) 0 Worker' ettlernent No -, forming a deep wedge only 4- krn (2.5-3.1 miles) we r of the advancing econd hock Army. Simulraneou Iy, Trubachev's 86th Rifle Divi ion, following after the 136th, approached orkers'

ertlement a '\ and Preobrazhen koe Hill, the main German scrongpoinr protecting the outhern approache to Shli el burg, where heavy re istan c by [he 227rh Infantry Divi ion halted it advance. However, on Dukhanov' right flank, Borshchev' 268th Rifle Division failed to di lodge the German defender of Gorodok os I and 2 and, worse still, ar 16;15 hour the 96rh Infantry Divi ion upported by 15 tanks counterartacked, forcing Bor hchev's divi ion to withdrav 2km (1.25 mile) in near pani .

n Bor h hey' right flank near 0 kovskaia

Dubrovka, rhe 5th Mountain Divi ion a] 0 counter-

I and 2 from the northea t. By [he day's end the two divi ion had carved out a ikm- ( .1-mile-) wide and Jkm- (1.8-mile-) deep bridgehead between

hli sel'burg and Corodok No 1 at the bound ry of the defending 1 Orh and 227[h Lnfanrry Divi ions. At 18:00 hours sappers built bridge over the Neva River norm and south of 1\ ar'ino for rhc pa sage of the second echelon's heavy ranks. However, the division attacking on the shock group' flank a hieved far le s success. On the righr flank the 45th Guards Rifle Divi ion, which wa attacking through the 46rh Rifle Divi ion's forces already in the

loskovskaia Dubrovka bridgehead, captured the firsr trench line but was haired by errnan counterarracks. On rhe left the arrack by olonel . A. Trubachev' 6th Rifle Division faltered, forcing it to regroup in the 136[b Rifle Divi ion' ector later in the day.

Genera! Karl Hilpert, XXVI Army orp omrnander, who e force were defending the Shlissel'burg bottleneck, reacted quickly to the Soviet a ault, He immediately reinforced hi beleaguered 170th Infantry Division at Gorodok 0 2 with part of the 96th Infantry Divi ion from Mga, and di parched a combat group fr m [he neighbouring -th Mountain Infantry Divi ion to reinorcc hi defence ourh of loskovskaia Dubrovka,

t the arne time, the haken I Oth and 22 th Infantry Divi ion consolidated their defence west of Gorodok oland south of Workers' ertlernent 1 0 2 and 3 leaving a sizeable gap in bcrwe n \ hi h Hilpert tried [Q fill by ending

132

CRACKING

ana ked, for ing the 4 -[h Guard. Rifle Divi ion to withdraw several hundred meter. At nightfall, Dukhanov ordered hi econd echelon [0 go into action the ne t morning.

To rhe ea r, 1 leretskov began hi artillery and air preparation at 09:30 hour on 12 January while special group of niper picked off German offi ers and oldier and apper cut lane through [he German minefields, A captured sergeant from the 227th Infantry Division' 366th Infantry Regiment, de cribed [he ene:

'It was a nightmare. In the morning rhe Russians opened fire from guns of all calibre. The bells impacted preci ely where the bunker were located. Even before the Russians attacked many were killed and wounded. In the lOth Company Lieutenant Dehl rhe company commander, and his enior

ergeanr and sergeant were killed. The oldiers were

BELOW: The reallhing! Moving through the smoking remains of o recently liberated village, these Red Army infantrymen look os if they have seen hard fighting. The somewhat bulbousffgures they cui are auounted for by the layers of clothing worn beneoth their camouflage smocks, including steel helmets, podded iackets and trousers ..

133

over orne by pani . The Rus ian had hardly approached when rho' located in the trenche greered [hem with raised hand."

Rornanovskv' first-echelon rifle divi ion

assaulted at I I: I S hours ,1cr05 the entire e tor from ipka ro airol 1'0 and the a ault group on {he right flank of Srarikov' Eighth /'\ rmy joined the ana kat 11: - hour. Again t heavy resi ranee the assaulting infantry and in anrry upport tanks p nerrated rhc forward edge of rhe 22 7[h Infantry Divi ion' defen e and arracked the erman

srrongpoints at Lipka orkers' 'etdemenr No

and Kruglaia' co e. On rhe right flank, Major-

eneral F. I. Parkhorncnko 128th Rifle Di i ion penetrated German defences bur was haired south of Lipka by hea y fir from now-covered German bunker in a hilltop cemetery on the division' right f1ank.4$ In the entre olonel P. 1. Radygin' 172nd and olonel A. P. Barabo hkin 2 ~6th Rifle Division penerrated up to 2km (1.25 miles) north and outh of Worker' errlernenr No 8, but were halred by heavy German flanking fire rornrhe etdement and from "Kruglaia" Grove. With hi attack faltering. Romanov k received permission to commit Major-General M, .Ovchinnikov second echelon 18th Rifle Divi ion and 9 th Tank Brigade to combat early on 13 january to outflank Worker' ertlernent 0 8, and link up with [he

ixry- evenrh rmy."t. HO\ ever, heavy now and

strong winds caused the arrack ro abort.

On the left flank, Colonel I . A. Poliakov' 32 til Rifle Divi ion, upported by the 32nd Heavy Tank Regiment and-07rh Tank Battalion assaulted and

CR KING THE BLOCKADE

captured "Krugiaia' Grove on 12 January in heavy hand-to-hand fighting. However farther to the left, the attack by the econd hock Army' 376tl1 Rit1e Divi ion and rhe Eighth rrny' 80th and 26 -rh Rille Divi ions and 73nd Rifle Brigade aborred : her only minimal gain. The defending 1 r Infantry Division repelled repeated arta k all day on 12 January and all the morning of the 13 january, Meanwhile. Hilpert laun hed heavy counterattack TO recapture M Kruglaia" .rove and rrongpoint protecting rhc iniavirio-Gairolovo road. Mererskov

ounrered reinforcing the 376th Rifle Divi ion's advance on Siniavino with Major-General 1 . M. Zarnarov kv' I t RiOe Divi ion. A the battle raged on, deteriorating weather and rhe heavy forests hindered supporting artillery fire and severely curtailed air upporr.!"

By day end on 13 January Rornanov ky's

econd hock Army had pencrrared German

defence in two ector along [he IOkrn (6.25-mileJ front between Lipka and Gairolovo, Two of his divi-

ion had driven a 3km- (1.8-mil -) deep wedge inca the 22 th Infantry Divi ion' defence ouehea [ of Workers' errlernenr No 5, and [\\'0 other formed a smaller penetration ourh of Lipka. he acta kers had alrno t encircled Lipka and 'I orker: Settlement 1 0 ,caprured mo r 0 •• Kruglaio" Grove, and had almost rea bed ~ orkers' ertlernents as 4 and 5

\ here the 227th and 1 t Infantry Divi ions rruggled ro avoid ell irclemenr, Fa icd wirh rhis determined and dearly better-organized oviet offensive, Kuechler desperately oughr to defend the

hli sel'burg borrleneck and prevent the two attacking from from linking up. He ordered me 6Ist Infantry Divi ion at Kiri hi to reinforce .German defences at Worker' Settlement a 6 and Gorodok

oland 2 and element of the -til Mountain and Police Division to rein orce German defence at in and around Siniavino.

arly the next day, Colikov rdercd the i try-

evenrh Army to commit irs second echelon. link up with the olkhov Front and capture Gorodok 0 1 and 2. Dukhanov committed one riflt' divi ion and a rille and tank brigade [0 upport the 136th Rille Divi ion' attack in hi army's entre, and one riAe divi ion and two rifle brigades to reinforce the a sault 011 Gorodok 10 1 and 2.48 In ddirion Govorov cornrnireed a ki brigade from hi reserve to upport the 86th Rifle Division' assauk on hlissel'burg.w However rhi piecemeal commitment of the second echelon across so broad a from to reinforce already exhausted forces was a mistake that actually lowed the ixry- eventh Arm}' advance. ub equently beginning on 14 January Dukhanov's forces gnawed

BELOW: Soldiers of the Volkhov and leningrod Fronts meet near WorkerS"' Settlement No.5 on 18 January 1943. Though Leningrad was for from free, the linking up of the two fronts mode the fall of tbe city a remale possibility, alld brought ultimate Savlet victory II step doser.

U4

ABOVE: When the Leningrad and Volkhav Fronts linked lip it was naturally II time for celebration. The attention of Iheaffiter5 and men being congratulated by a senior alfi(er is, undmtandably, wandering to tables of foad and drink iu~t out of view!

their way through erman defence uffering heavy

losses a they did so.

III four day of bitter fighting irnoniak' 136tl1 Rifle Division, upporred )' the 61 t Tank Brigade, advanced up to 2. ikrn (] .56 mile ), reaching the western our kirts of Worker' ertlement 0 5 late on 1 January. To the ourh, Dukhanov force captured \Vorker' crrlernenr 0 3 011 17 January, but were unable to capture Workers' ettlernent No I and 2 despite improved air upporr.50 On Dukhanov left flank Trubachev's 6th Rifle Division finally termed Preobrazhenskoe Hill at 15:00 hour on 15 januar and in heavy fighting fought it way into tile outhern portion of hii el'burg proper at 12:00 hour [he next day. For the next [\",0 days the 86th Rifle Divi ion fought inten e treer barrie wirh reargua d force of the 22 th Infantry Division, which had just received order to withdraw.

Meanwhile, to the east Romanov ky force were advancing at a nail's pace in intense fighting

1 -

THE SIEGE OF LENINGRAD 1941-1944

la_rgely because both he and Meretskov replicated Govorov's mistake of committing their second-echelon and reserve forces in piecemeal fashion. II Despite rhis Ba ra boshkin 's 256th Rifle Division captured Podgornyi Station on 14 January and, wheeling irs from to me southwesr, attacked German defences at Siniavino. The next morning Radygin's 372nd Rifle Division captured Workers' Settlement 08, and rhe German defenders escaped west with heavy casualties. Radygin's forces pursued, reaching Workers' Settlement No I late on 17 January at the same time as the 18th Rifle Division fought its way into the outskirts of Workers' Settlement ! 0 5. By this rime, Govorov's and Merctskov's force were only 2km(L25 miles) apart threatening TO encircle German forces in the Shlissel'burg Pocket.

Both Kuechler IH army group and Lindemann at Eighteenth Army understood the perilou situation they faced late on 17 January. Clearly, one more determined Sov iet th rust wo u ld cut off a nd destroy German forces in the Shlissel'burg region. Therefore, with Kuechler's approval. Lindemann ordered these forces, now organized ineo Group Huhner, ro break our ourhwards rhrough [he narrow forested corridor north of Siniavino in con-

A:BOVE:Beoring pictures of Slatrnand .Molotoy and de,orated with congratula,lary wards uluUing the YQlaurof Ihpeople of Leningrad In the siruggle ogaln5llhe German Fascisls, the firstlrain pulls Inlo the Finland Slation in leningrad laUawing the b re akin gal the blo rkade.

junction with an attack by the SS Police Division against che Sixry-Seventh Army's right flank at Workers' Settlement No S.51 However, before the Germans could act, at 09:30 hours on 18 january lead elements of the Sixty-Seventh Army's 123rd Rifle Division and the Second Shock Army's 372nd Rifle Division linked up JUSt east of Workers' Settlement 0 I. Less than an hour later Simoniak's J36rh Rifle Division captured Workers' Serrlement No 5,. and 500.n aftermade contact with the Second

hock Army' 18th Rifle Division."

The struggle reached a crescendo as victorious Soviet forces tried [0 destroy German forces desperately [f)ling [Q escape from Shlissel'burg and Lipka. Truhachev's 86th Rifle Division captured Shlissel'burg at 14:00 hours on 18 January after intense street fighring and then et about liquidating German forces scattered in the forests south of Lake Ladoga. Ar the same rime, Rornanovsky's 128rh and 372nd Rifle Divisions captured Lipka and cleared German forces

L36

CRACKING THE BLOCKADE

from the forests northea t of Worker' Settlement No 1. Finding itself trapped between Dukhanov's and Romanovsky's forces, Group Hubner ran the gauntlet southwards past Workers' Serdemenr No Sand Podgomyi Station, reaching the relative safety of Siniavino on 19 and 20 january.

After linking up, Dukhanov and Rornanovsky wheeled their armies southwards eo capture Gorcdok Nos 1 and 2 and Siniavino, In turn, Lindemann reinforced his Slnlaviao defences with the S5 Police and 21st Infantry Divisions and, soon after, with the 11th Infantry Division and his defences at Gorodok os 1 and 2 with the 28th Jager Division. Spurred on by an impatienr Zhukov, beginning on 20 january the Sixty-Seventh and Second Shock Armies delivered arrackafter arrack against the German defences across a broad from from Gorodok ios 1 and 2 through Siniavino to Gonrovaia Lipka .. Dukbanov's army arracked east of Gorodok Nos I and 2 in an attempt to caprure

luseolovo, cut the road and railroad from Siniavino to Mga, and outflank Siniavino from the west, while other army forces attacked Gorodok 10 1 and Siniavino.n

Although the advance on Mustolovo failed, Dukhanov's forces attacking Siniavino managed [Q advance 2km (1.25 rnilesj against heavy resistance, severing the railroad line southeast of Gorodok 0 I and capturing Workers' Settlement 06 "vest of Siniavino, At the same time, Romarrovsky's forces drove a wedge into German defences south of Workers' Settlement No 7, bur were also unable to achieve a clean breakthrough. Govorcv's and Mererskov's offensive collapsed from utter exhaustion on 31 January, and the front finally stabilized north of Siniavino.

Victory Tinged with Disappointment Operation Spark was a clear Red Army victory. During the operation Soviet forces penetrated German defences to a depth of 15km (9.3 miles) in a period of seven days captured numerous German srrongpoinrs, and opened an 8-10km (5-...6.25-mHe) corridor between Leningrad and the rest of the counrry.JS The successful offensive aJ a vastly improved the Soviets' strategic siruario» along rhe northwestern strategic axis by eliminating the possibiliry or a German-Finnish link-up and improving cooperation between the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts. lost important to Leningraders themselves, [he victory opened supply links between Russia, the city and the city's defenders.v However, ro

Zhukov's consrernation, the elusive rarger of Siniavino and the adjacent Sinia vine Height remained in German hands.

Red Army Losses

If the third Siniavino offensive was a victory, it was a costly one .. The arracking Soviet force suffered 115.,082 casualties, including 33,940 ki.Hed,. capcured or missing and 81,.142 wounded, out of 302,800 rroops engaged. Several senior Sovierofficers were among rhe casualties including Meretskov's deputy, Fediuninsky, who was seriously wounded by mortar fire on 20 January, and Major-General N .. A. Bolotnikov, Mcretskov's Chjd of Armoured and Mechanized Force, who was killed by a. German air strike on 26 January. The Germans also suffered greatly admitting to ] 2,000 dead and many wounded, losses the Eighteenth Army could ill-afford.!"

General Zhukov, whom Stalin promoted to Marshal of the Soviet Union. on 'J january the same day [hat Govorov's forces captured Shlissel'burg, conducted the operation in characreri eically brutal fashion and suffered characteristically heavy losses. An exchange between Zhukov and General Simoniak, [he commander of the bay-Seventh Army's 136[h Rifle Division, vividly describes Zhukov's command style:

"Rows broke om among the oviet generals_ Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgi Zhukov, hero of the Barde of Moscow, hero of Stalingrad, had been sent in to 'coordinate' between the Volkhov Front and Moscow. He got 011 [he VC high-security line to General Simoniak of the 136[h Division. Why didn't Sirnoniak attack the Siniavino Heighrs? The [ azi positions there were holding up the Second Shock Army.

"For the same reason the Second Army doesn't attack them' Simoniak replied. 'The approach is through a marsh .. The losses would be great and rhe results small.'

'Trotskyite! Passive resister" shouted Zhukov. 'Who arc those cowards of yours? Wbo doesn't want to fight? Who needs to be ousted?'

Simoniak angrily replied that there were no cowards in the Sixty-Seventh Army.

'Wi e guy,' snapped Zhukov, 'I order you to rake the heights.'

'Comrade Iarshal,' Sirnoniak rejoined, 'My arm.y is under the command of the Leningrad Front commander, General Govorev, [ rake order from him:

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ABOVE: Manha] lbukov's plan for Operation Polar SIal, which aImed!!1 tbe complete destrudion of .Army Group Norlh Qnd the l1beralion of the entire Leningr'odregion. Massive in s(ole and s(ope, Zbukov Inlended 10 involve no less Ihon seven fronlS. H'ow,ever, mee pruiou5 offensives, the results wera disappointing and Army Grol/P North still exist eQ, but It had been. severely depleted in the lighting.

Zhukov hung up. Simoniak got no orders to arrack the in ia vine Heights." I~

Despite rhe high cosr of victory, rhe offensive did crack the Leningrad blockade, but only barely. The Sovierswere able ro restore ground communications with the ciry, but rhose communications lines

IJI!

HE BLOCKADE

remained tenuou at best and subject to errnan artillery interdiction. During the ensuing days rhe SOI'Iets huilr the Shlissel'burg-Poliany railroad, and on 6 February opened regular rail cornmunicarions between Leningrad and rhe rest of the Soviet Union. Despite the construction of the new railroad line, the corridor was only IOkm (6.25 miles) wide, It wassuhiecr to constant German artillery fire, and me German interdiction meant rhar its carrying capaciry remained low. Mga rarion, the most important point on the old main rail line from Leningrad ro Volkhll;', remained in enemy hands and heavy German uoop concentrations still posed a threat to the renuou corridor.

xpanding the Offen ive

Although the third iniavino offensive was a relatively small-scale component of the much vaster Sevier winter campaign, the operation had more than [ust ymholic significance. It marked the iirsr rime in the modern era I, hen major offensives from within and wirhouc raised the siege of a large ciry and port. Wh,l.( made it more impressive was rhe fact that the artacking forces had to assault wellprepared enemy defences on the far bank of an icecovered river 500-600m (1640-1 968fr) wide.

The rhird iniavino offensive served only as a prelude for an even more ambitious Red Army offensive in the Leningrad region. B~' early February 1943, rhe Red Army had smashed German Army Groups B and Don west and south of (he Don River. and Army Group A was in full retreat from the Caucasus region. The Stavea ... vas already planning to expand it winter offensive to mclude the region from Rzhev in the north to Khar'kov in the outh during February and March 1943 and, non, would plan an advance ro the Virebsk region and rhe Dnepr River from iomel to the Black ea. It was only reasonable that the tm,ka would include the Leningrad region in its plans.

At leningrad, the iniavino offensive created conditions that the Stooka considered conducive to the conduct of an even larger oFfen ive, The fighting around Siniavino had forced the German Eighteenth Army roeencenrrare its forces in rhae region and had wea kened it forces elsewhere. I~ \X'o!' e til I, !:he army was overextendet], it had had only two ecuriry divisions in reserve, and since its strongeST forces faced the Sixty- eventh and econd hock Armies, the flanks of the iniavino corridor appeared vulnerable.

After Govorov and Meretskov proposed an offensive IO cur off, encircle and destroy German forces in the Mga and rniavino region, Zhukov recommend-

A80VE:Norlhwestem front tllm.mondllt' Mlllshol filnoshenko. A [lIVoIrymonin fhe Tsarbtnmry, heioined the Red Army In 1917. A striddisaplmarion, he wa.slhe only line 01 the prewar marshals to ret rii1lhis $1ondinglhroughout the war -no doubt due 10 his IlIsi5felKe on iron disdpline, which i!nd'earedhim to Stalin.

ed that StOPka broaden the offensive to destroy Army Group Iorrh complerelyand liberare rhe entire Leningrad region,60 The tal;'.ka accepted Zhukov' proposal and designated rhe offensive, Operation Polar rar, According to rhe operational plan, rhe Norrhwesrern Front was to attack from rhe Demisnsk region through Dno and l.uga to Pskov and I arva on the Gulf of Finland. Simultaneously, the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts were to attack rhe Eighteenth Army around Leningrad and, ultimately, link up with the Northwestern Front'. forces ro encirde all'llostall of Army Group I orrh south of Leningrad. The tat,ka timedthe operation [Q coincide with a major offensive by rhe Kalinin, '\ estern, Briansk and Central Fronts rewards Smolensk, and by the Voronezh, ourhwesrem and ourhern Froors to the Onepr River line.

Operation Polar tar

The 1 orrhwesrern From, nov .. commanded by Marshal of the ovier Union S. K. Tirnoshenko, was to play me major role in Polar srar by destroying

139

30 wnb."" Once hi~ first echelon smashedGerman defences at Krasnyi gar, a mobile group consisting of a ski and tank brigade was [0 advance along rhe Okriabr railroad, capture Ul'ianovka Starion, and lead the advance on Tosno.s! Sviridov's force' faced L Army Corps' 250rh "Spanish Blue" Infanrry Divi ion and rhe 4th Police Division deployed in rhe 32km- (20-mile-) wide sector from Krasnyi Bor [I) the Neva River east of Kolpino. General ESTebanInfant..: . Spanish division had it reinforced regiment and tllt~e infantry battalions ~ 4500 men but no ranks - facing the Fifty-Fifth Army's main arrack.

Division's success. However; heavy resistance and an unexpected thaw, which prevented rhe ski brigades from operating off the road, hailed rhe mobile group arrack short of its objective. viridov's ranks and infantry got bogged down in hand-tohand fighting with Spanish defenders along the lzhora River and rhe narrow roads sou rh of K rasnyi Bor. During rhe larer srages of the operation, rhe Germans reinforced the paniards' defences with regimenralcombar groups from rhe 212rhand llSrh Infanrry Divisions transferred from Chudovo and Urirsk.

The [orces on Sviridov' left flank fared little better. The 43rd Rifle Division and 34th Ski. Brigade advanced 4km (2.S miles) in tWO days of heavy Fighting, driving the 5 Police Division's farces back towards the Tosno River. Once again, however, rhe

.errnans quickly reinforced their defences and stopped the Soviet advance: far hort of its objecr.ive558 Sviridov"s forces had advanced Skm (3.1 miles] on a fronr of 14km (8.7 miles] by 13 February, out could advance no more since his army had lost

CRACK] G THE SLOCKO

the German II Army Corps at Demiansk and advancing through raraia Ru a and Dno to Pskov and Narva. The Northwestern Front's lcfr wing, con isring of the Twenry-Sevenrh, Eleventh, ThirtyFourth, First Shock and Fifry-Third Armies, was ro make Timoshenko's main arrack through Sraraia Rus a reward Luga and Dna and destroy German force!. at Derniansk, Subsequently a pecial Operational Group made up of rhe First Tank and Sixty-Eighth Armies under Colonel-General M, -. Khozin's command, was to advance northwest, capture Pskov and I arva ,111d cur off and desrroy the German Eighteen.th Army in cooperation wirh the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts.61 The Northwestern Front was [Q begin its offensive on 15 February.

In the Leningrad region .. rhe Leningrad Front's Fifry-Fifth Army was ro attack southeastwards towards To 110, wheel eastwards across the Tosno River and link up with the Volkhov Front's FiftyFourth Army, advancing on Tosno from the northea r. The (win pincers would encircle all German forces in rhe Mga-iniavino region, widen the narrow corridor to Leningrad, and, ubsequendy, serve as a hammer to smash rhe bulk of Army Group

lorrh again t an anvil formed by the I orrhwestern From advancing in the SOllth.6Z While the Fifty-Fifth and Fifty-fourth Armies were conducting [heir piner manoeuvre towards Tosno, the Leningrad From's ixry-! evenrh and Volkhov From's Second hock Arrnie were to attack Gorodok Nos I and 2 and Siniavino and capture Mga and [he LeningradVolkhov railroad.

Before the operation began, the Slt1ukacransferredr.he econd hock Army and its sector north of iniavino to the Volkhov From [0 provide for a more unified command and control structure, The leningrad and Volkhov Fronrs were to begin their offensive on 8 february, one week before rhe

'ofchwestern From, ro draw Arm)' Group North's reserves northwards TO Leningrad and away from che orthwestern Front's main arrack sector, The fact that d,e Suwkt1 assigned Zhukov, Timoshcnko, Karukov and Tolbukhin to plan or participate in Operation Polar Scar was indicative of the irnporranee the Stavka attached ro the of'fensive.

Major-General V. P. viridov's Fifty-Fifth Army, which formed the Leningrad Front' arm of rbe pincer consisted of eight rifle divisions, rwo (ifle and two ski brigades, and one tank regimenr.e- viridov planned [Q lead the assault with three rit1e divisions and one ski brigade in the firstechclon upported by a rank regiment, a force numbering 33,000 men and

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The Volkhov Front's arm of the pincer, MajorGeneral A. V.. ukhomlin' Fifty-Fourth Army, consisted of 10 rifle divisions, three ri fle brigades and rwo rank brigades with a strength of mote than 70,000 men and 60 ranks_6~ Sukhomlin's forces were (Q assault a sector defended by XXVIII Arm}' Corps' 96rh Infantry Division, which wa flanked on the left by rhe 69th infantry Division and on the righr by the 132nd Infantry Division. General

oeldechen's 96th Infantry Divisron had been assigned rhis "quiet" ector after being decimated in theearlier fighting af Siniavino.

Although imposing on paper, rhe Sixry-Sevenrh and Second Shock Arrnie de ignatedto arrack at Gorodok TOS I and 2 and at iniavino were still woefully understrength after rhe January fighting. Rornanovsky's Second hock Army consisted of 12 understrength rifle divisio» , one rifle, one ki and fWO rank brigades, one rank regiment and four separate tank bartalions - roughly 60,000 men and 50 ranks. Dukhanov's Sixty- eventh Army consisted of six rifle divisionsceighr rifle, tWO ski and four tank brigades, two tank regiments, rwo separate tank barralions, and one fortified region - abour 40,000 men and 30 tanks in allF The German XXVI Army Corps (Group Hilpert) defended the Gorodok j 0 1 and 2 sal ien e with in. 28 th J tiger and 21 Sf I n fa ntry Divisions and the Siniavino region with the II rh and Gist Infantry Divisions, giving a combined strength of roughly 35,000 men.

S"i ridov's Fifty- Fifrh Arrnyartacked ell til' on 10 february after a two-hour artillery preparation. Carching the defenders by surprise, the 63rd Guards Rifle Division captured Krasnyi Bor at 12:00 hours, and the 45[h Guards RiFle Division captured Mishkino laser in the dar. arisfied by the 5km (3_1- mile) advance, Sviridov rhen committed hi mobile group into acrlon toexploir the 45th Guards Rifle

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an estimated 10,000 casualties and most of IUs tanks in rhe heavy fighting .. The Spanish 250rh Infantry Division's gallant defence cosr it 3200 casuakies.w

While Sviridov's forces were condncring their futile offensive ar Krasnyi Bor, the Fifty-Fourth Arm}' went inre acrion carlyon 10 February in the secror north of Smerdynia and the Tigoda River; aiming its thrust at the railroad line south of Tosno.

ukhornlin ulrirnerely attacked the 96th Infantry Division's defences with fou r ri fie divisions, th ree rifle brigades and one tank brigade.?" Despite employing rhis overwhelming force, in rhree days of heavy fighting his shock group penetrated only 4km (2..5 milesl into rhe German defence along a fronr of some 5km (3.1 miles). The Germans halted the assault by reinforcing rhe 96rh Infantry Division with regimental combat groups drawn from the 61 Sf Infa nrry Division ar iniavino, rhe I21 Sf Infantry and 217rh Infantry Divisions, transferred from the Volkhov River Front, and from the seljacent 132nd Infantry Division.

The Sixty-Seventh and Second . hock Armies joined the offensive early on 12 February, capiralizing on the fact that the Eighteenth Army had transferred forces from rhe Sinisvino region to reinforce the sectors already under assault, Dukhanov's shock group assaulted German defences at Gorodok Nos 1 and 2. at the same time as Rornanovsky's shock

141

RIGHT: An infantry Sllttlon probes (01l1l0051y forwlJrd. By 1943 the myth of German Invincibility had been shattered by tbe defea1s

01 Stallngrad and KUlsk.

As the Red Army prepwed

10 break the siege, patrols sueh as this gained valuable Inlelligence about tbe

German dispositions,

offensive preparation. Hm ever, deteriorating weather prevented his armie from concentrating in time, forcing Zhukov to delay the operation. 0

ooner had he authorized the delay than ovier intelligence derected rerman preparati 11 to abandon the Demian k alienr, Therefore Zhukov ordered Tirno henko to begin his offen ive prernarurcly with rhe forces he had at hand. The 0 fen ive rhus developed in pie emeal fashion wirh predictable re ulr .

The Ele enrh and Fifty-Third Arrnie as aulred the flank of the Rarnu hevo corridor on 1- February, while the Thirry-Fourrb Army began a erie of haras ing arrack 011 German positions

northeast of Dernian k. When the initial a aulr failed, on 2 ~ February Zhukov threw rhe T\ enrySeventh and Fir r Shock Armies inro ornbar rhe former [u r ourh of Sraraia Russa and [he latter ar [he ba e of the corridor. However, both armie ' attacks faltered against the rrong defence German

orce had erected to protect their withdrax al from the Dernian k alien(.-2 rged on by Zhukov the rwo annie tried to re urne their offen ives on 27 February but once again failed with heavj 10 e. Up er over the heavy ca ualrie and limited gains

talin halted the attack on 27 Februar and ordered Zhukov to orch trate a new offen ive in March. The defear cost Zhukov's and Timo henko's

group struck German defences ea r and we r of Siniavino .. In six days of heavy fighting Dukhanov' force managed to capture Gorodok 0 ] and 2 and advan ed everal kilometres ourhward IO rhe our kirr of Arbuzovo, Although rhej pinched off rhe mall errnan alienr pointing menacingly toward hlissel'burg, the forces were roo exhau Ted to accomplish more. To rhe ea t, however, Romanov ky' a sault on iniavino talrere immediately with heav 10 e. The ovier fourth Siniavino offensive ended with [he iniavino strongpoint till firmly in German hands.

The Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts' To no offensive failed for a variety of all too familiar rea on .~I In a dire rive the tauka i lied on 27 February, it noted: "The ba it horrcorning wa [he fact that the Sixry- evenrh and econd hock rmy operated separately ... They dispersed their force ... and ufIered unju tifiable casualrie ." In rea I icy, Govorov' and Merer kov's orce were 0 exhau ted by previous fighting rhar [hey lacked the trength and endurance necessary to fulfil the tt1vka's overly ambitious mission.

Despite rhe obviou failure of the econdary arrack to the north, Zhukov de ided to capitalize on their diversionary effect and unlea h the orrhwe tern Front' main arrack. Meanwhile Timo henko's armies were completing [heir final

forces 33 .66 ~ cas ua I r ies, i ndudi ng 1 0,0] 6 dea d, captured or mi ing.

Neither Zhukov nor the tal/kt1 however were read)' t abandon the offen ive enrirelv, 11 Zhukov recommendation, rhe tt1tlka ordered the Northwestern, Leningrad and Volkhov Front ro conduct a truncated version of peration Polar tar against the same objective as in the original operarion."! Thi rime, the offen i e \ 3 ro begin in raggered fa hion with the lorrhwe rern Front attacking 00 4 'larch and the Leningrad and Volkhov Front on 14 Mar h. Zhukov ubordinarcd the Thirty-Fourth Fift -Third, ixry-Eighrh rmies and Fir r Tank Army under Khozin' antral, and ordered [he Twenty- e enrh and Fir. r hock rrnie to capture tara ia Russa, If the latter two armies captured rhe [Own, Khozin's entire force wa: to e ploir toward P kov and at a. The tavka ordered (be Leningrad and olkho r nts t conduct a upporring attack it' the Len ingrad region this rime a hallower envelopment of German force located north of. Mga without a frontal a sult on

iniavino it elf.-4

Plan for the Attack

In the Leningrad region, the Leningrad Front's FifryFifth rmy and the Volkhov Front' Eighrh Army were to de troy errnan orce ar iniavino and Mga in onjuncrion \ ith Zhuko '

raraia Ru 3. while [he Fifry-Second

conduct a diver ionary arrack near ovgorod.

viridov Fifty-Fifth Army was [0 arrack from irs Krasnyi Bor salient with eight rifle clivi iQn and three rifle brigade, aprure Ul'iano ka, ever the

l'ianovka-Mga railroad, and link up with the Eighth Army. Srarikov' Eighth Army wa [0 arrack in the Voronovo-Lodva ector ea r of {go With 10 rifle clivi ion and our rifle bri ade , capture M a, and link up with the Fifty-Fifth Army ar Voirolo o. Thi rime the totally exhausted ixry- evcnth and

econd hock Arrnie which remained on rhc

defen ive opposite iniavino, were to join the arrack only if it uceeeded."!

he e ond attempt to onducr perarion Polar

car faltered from the very Start and, thereafter, developed piecemeal a a fru rrated tal1ka and Zhukov strained to milk some success from The efforr. The I orrhwe tern From's Twenty- evenrh and Fir t hock Armies attacked on - March (afrer a one-day delay) bur a hieved virtually nothing. Then In reaction to a uccessful German counteroffen ive in the Khar'kov region, on March the

[42

'tal1ka ordered Zhukov aJld Tirno henko to transfer the Fir t Tank rrny ourhwards to Kur k and limit Operation Polar tar to rhe capture of taraia Ru a and rhe elimination of the Mga alienr.~~ Tirnoshenko' armies a aulted German defence east of raraia Russa and south of Ramushevo on 14 M.lHCh, bur advanced everal kilometre only while uffering heavy 10 e ." Mer furth r intense bur furile fighting on 17 March the tavha ordered Zhukov to end the offen ive and fly to Kursk ro restore some order {Q rhe Red Army's deteriorating

iruarion in rhar region. Many of [he Northwestern Front' best forces oon ollowed Zhukov ourh. While the dramatic event were playing OUt in the [ orthwc tern From' ector, Govorov and Mcrerskov began their Mga offensive.

ru trarion II Along the Line Lieutenant-General V. F. Iakovlev Fifty- econd

rmy began diver ionar operation in the

ovgorod region earlv on 14 March, when hi 'mall army attacked aero the Volkhov River outh of ovgorod again r vm Army orp' 1 r LuftwaFfe Field Division." The fighting which lasted until 1 achieved it end since Lindemann reinforced the ovgorod sector with the 217rh and -8th Infantry Divisions from the Kirishi region and Dernian k. viridov's Fifty-Fiftb Army began i arrack south of Kra nyi Bor on 19 March after a two-day delay to complere irs offensive preparations. His fi rst echelon 268rh Rifle Division and 55th Rifle Brigade penetrated the SS Police Infantry Divi ion' defence and had advanced 3km (1. mile) by the da' end.'Y low ever, the Flander Legion and the 50 2nd H avy Tank Barralion ounterarracked and drove viridov' forces back to Theis jumping-off po ition .80

viridov tried in vain for eight day to rekindle hi offen ive, but failed. The bitter bur fruitle . fighting lasted until 1 April when the Stavka ordered Govorov' Fronr to abandon further offen ive operations. By this rime, both ides had suffered very heavy 10 e .81

rarikov' Eighth Army b g3l1 it <1 aulr ourh of

oronovo on 19 March after an artillery prepararion. Hi' army, \ hich con i red of nine rifle divisions fWO rifle and rwo eparate tank brigades and four separate rank regiment was opposed by rhe l sr 223rd and 69dl Infantry Divi ions of the . ighrecnrh Army' XXVI Army Corp v hi h occupied defence from Conrovaia Lipka north of the

Mga railroad, ro Pogo r'e.S! During the fir t three

1-11

day: of intense fighting rhe army fir t echelon divi ions penetrated 4krn (2.5 miles) along a 7km (4.3-mile) front at the junction of the defending Ist and 22 rd Infantry Divi ion. Advancinz in heavy ram, rarikov' mall mobile group reached the Mga-Kiri hi railroad before being halted by reinforcing German force .R> Lindemann reinforced the 69th Infantry Divi ion combat group from the 21st 61 t and 121st Infantry Divi ion. lthough

rhe reinforcements halted the ighrh rmy

advance, Zhukov in isted [hat Srarikov continue his attack throughou the remainder 0 March. On 1 April Zhukov ordered him to commit hi reserve 14th Rifle Division and 1 r eparare Rifle Brigade in upport of yer another a aulr by the 64th Guard

Rifle Divi ion on arbu el jusr ea [ of the 19aKirishi railroad. The German 121st Infantry Division repelled the assault inflicting heavy losses

n the arra kers. FinaUy on 2 April the tavka permirred [be Eighth Army ro halt its attacks and go over [Q the defence.

In part, [he Stauka ordered rhe tWO Fronts to end their Mga offensive because their forces failed to dent German defence outh of leningrad and in pa t becau c rh spring rasputttsa had begun. Actually however the Stavka halted the operation becau e Operation Polar tar which gave meaning and context to the offen ive at Leningrad, had failed. Further, c en the tavka ould no longer permit the irnmen e wa te of manpov er in COntinued futile offensives in the region. Hov ever, de pite irs failure the offensive onrribured ignificanrly to the Stal/ko's overa l! effort by end i ng, once and for

LEFT: Rell Army marines in a forward trench in the leningrad region. The man in the foreground is armed with the weapon thai was mod assotialed with the Red Army in World War II - the PPSh submachlne gun. The soldier "exlto him is armed with a Tokarev SVT-40 automatic rifle.

salient. During irs initial defence at Kursk and it counrcroffcn ivcs thereafter, ovier force, in the Leningrad region would remain n the defen , .onducring only limited offen ive to upporr rhe far larger Red Army operations [0 rhe ourh. Thu prior [0 the Bartle for Kursk, the Str1l'kt1 secretly rran ferred izcable force, including the N rrhwc tern From' Eleventh, Twenry- evenrh Fifty-Third and ixry-Ei hrh rmie outhward to the Kur k region, Deprived of much of their strength, the three ovier Fronts operating along the northwe tern axi temporarily de erred any offen ive operation and, in a harp departure from previou pra rice, re red and r fitted rh if for e throughout the spring and summer. (0

After Red Army forces had defeated rhe Germans at Kur k in early Ju Iy 1943, the tal/ka ordered offensive operations ro re ume along the northwe [em axi . This rime. however, ir aim were limited to attracting erman artenrion and forces away from more critical fronr se tors. By ea rly July, So iet intelligence indicated [hat the Leningrad From ournumbered erman for e by a fa WI' of two to on and rhe olkhov Front by a factor of L" to one, and German e tirnares confirmed chi ovict superiority.~- In the. tauka' judgement chi wa ufficienr force with which ro conduct a new offen rve,

all, an}' German thought about capturing Leningrad. [0 addition it pinned down 30 German divisions some of which could have helped the

KtJ stabilize the situation along the \ e tern and outhwestern a e .H4

fter be Red Army failed ro achieve [he objectives the lt1uka assigned [0 it in February and March a period of relative calm descended over the

oviet- errnan front v virh the spring rasputitsa halring all peration in it warcry grip. During the three-month 11IJI both Hider and Stalin planned feverishly to regain the trategic initiative in the

urnrner. Ultimately, Hitler decided ro conduct yet another ummer 0 fen ive thi time more limited in

cope and aim. He cho e a hi obie rive rhe Kursk "bulge , a large alienr jutting w rward bet" een German Ann}' Groups Centre and ouch, \ hich, to rhe Soviets ymbolized the ucces their force had achieved the previous winter and, to the German, represented an inviting target. By striking the Kursk

bulge" and de troying the large Red rmv forces in ide it Hider hoped to undo ome of the damage done [0 [he Wehrmacht during the pa t winter and re tore German fortunes in rhc Ea. t.

In [he ovier amp, ralin ought to e ploir the Red Army' \i inter victoric by condu ring a erie of massive DCW offensives in the summer to achieve the obiecrive the Red Army had failed to gain the previous winter. Based on earlier experience Stalin decided to blunt the Wehrmacht summer offensive before unlea hing the Red rrny on a major urnmer offen ive of its own.U The tavka decided ro begin with a premeditated defence of the Kursk

144

Immediately after rhe Barrie of Kur k, the Stavka ordered ovorov and Mcret kov [Q conducr a new offen iv to pin down and, if po sible, cru h [he . ighrcenrh rrny by an offensive again t German force ill the Mga and iniavino region. They were to do 0 by attacking the Mga salient from three

ide with their Fifty-Fifth i ry- evenrh and

Eighth Armies. Sviridov s Fifry-Fifrh rrnv was ro arrack aero the Neva River towards Mga in tandem wirb an a' 'salt by Dukhanov's ixry- eventh Army between the Neva and iniavinc, and an offen ive by rarikov' ighth rrny from rhe Gait lovo-Lod a ector toward, Mga. If ucces ful rhe offen ive,. uld capture Mga and iniavino, de troy the German VI rrny Corp, and er up rhe Eighteenth Army fur subsequent de trucrion.

Dukhanov' ixry- evenrh rmy wa to onduct

ovorov' main attack ea. t of the Neva River with the newly formed uard Rifle orp under [he command f eneral irnoniak, the former 136rh Rille Divi ion' cornmander.ss imoniak's

8ELOW: TIred German troops of Army Group North return from an engogemen1 with enemy troops. The soldier in the (entre of the photogroph is carrying a captured Soviel 7.62mm Degloryev DP machine gun, nicknamed the "record player" on account of its lorge drum magazine.

THE lEGE OF LENu'\lGRAO 1941-1944

ated into a lugfe r with advan e, mea ured in only ten of meters. he fierce fighrin , which III ted until 22 ugu t and ended wirh iniavino till in German hand • l;,HI ed heavy iovier a ualties and only minimal gains. Oukhanov failure also prompted Govorov to ell nee! vi ridov' u pporting arra k.

four rifle divi in, [\\'0 rank brigade and tWO rank regimen were to capture rbuzovo and advance on Mga from [he north. To the ea t, four divisions of Dukhanov' army were ro arrack in the iniavinoContovaia Lipka sector ro tie down German forces defending iniavlno.e? XXVI Army orps' 121sr, 23rd, 1 Irh and 290rh lnfanrry Divisions manned defence between Arbuzovo and Contovaia Lipka. This force of roughly ~.- 000 men faced a ovier for e in e, cess of 7 - 000 men and 120 tanks.

iridov' Fifry- ifth Arm)' wa to upport Dukhan v' advance with a smaller arrack of it own ourh of the . eva River, bur only if Dukhanov' assault succeeded.

Dukhanov' Plans

Ea r of Iga, tar ikov Eighth ArlllY was to condu [it main arra k in rhe Vorono 0 region to link up near Mga with the i ty- eventh and Fifrv-Fifrh

rrnie attacking from the north and we r, and a

upporting attack north of Pogo r'e [0 pr recr the main shock group's left flank.?" To penetrare the trong German defen e rarikov organized tWO hock group, ea h COl) i ring of four rifle diviion and upporring armour, to arrack north and outh of rhe M.ga railroad;" He ordered tWO rifle division and two rifle brigades ro conduct rhe

upporting arrack, while he defended his righr flank with one rifle division and retained a rifle clivi ion and rifle brigade in re erve.9! rarikov' northern hock group faced the bulk of rhe

errnan -th M unrain Di i ion d played astride the ga- olkho railroad line. and hi southern group faced the remainder of rh rh Mountain Divi ion and the 69(h Infantry Divi ion's left flank. The 13211d In fantry Divi ion fa ed hi uppaning arrack north of Pogo r'e. tarikov's reinarced arm. which fielded about 80 000 men up-

ported by more [han 250 tanks, had a two- to fivefold uperioriry over the defending iermans.O

icrory eerned certain.

Dukhanov' force began 22 July after a 90-minme imoniak' 63rd and 4 Sth

rh ir a aulr early n arrillery preparation. uardRi!1e Divi ion

pearheaded the a atilt on German defence at Arbuzovo, while the 43rd Rifle Division attacked west of Siniavino.vt Although the 63rd Guards Divi ion achieved it fir r day' objectives, XXVI Army Corps quickly reinforced it defence aero the entire iniavino front converting (he struggle inro \ har a ovier participant called "an uffensive on ur bellie ."9$ Dukhanov' a ault 0 n degener-

lu ive Goal

• two ighth \rmy ho k group launched ault again t errnan defence along [he r Iga- lkhov railroad north and outh of Voronovo at 06:"' 5 hour on 2.2 July. De pite ix day of preliminary artillery bombardment, hi a aulting troop captured the forward German trenches, bur then ran into stiff resistance and heavy a ir strikes that lowed their forward progres (Q a nail's pacc,~'6 With hi offen ive at a stand till, in late July

tarikov reinforced hi hock gl'oup with [\ 0 fre h clivi ion and withdrev [\ other for refirring.?" However, the reinf rcernents did not improve the iruarion. By thi rime, Lindemann had repla ed [he J 32nd Infantry Divi ion whi b had repelled all . ovier attacks in its sector with [he 121 ( Infantry Divi ion from the Arbuzovo ector, and enr til!' 132nd Infantry Division to reinforce the beleaguered

rh Mountain Division.

A it turned our, the reinforcement arrived just in time. On 9 Augu t, rarikov' a ault group detected what they thought wa a weak pot in the -th Mountain Division' defence around a mall bridgehead 011 the eastern bank of the "aziia River. T\ 0 day later rarikov reinforced the four division, already artackin rhe cri u ly weakened Srh Mountain Divi ion's bridgehead with two fresh rifle clivi ion and tWO tank regiment .98 lrhough his reinforced hock group almo t enveloped the defending Germans and the 256rh Rifle Division captured Porech'e, the arrack on e again tailed in L11e fa e of heavy German fire a rhe 132nd Divi ion join d the f hr. A fru rrared Mcrct kov then threw hi 13 r re erve , a rifle divi i nand eparare tank battalion inro the bloody melee in one final desperare atrempr to crack [he German defence .99 After repeated attacks that decimated both the attacking and defending forces, rarikov's offensive collapsed in utter exhaustion. His army had captured the Porech'e bridgehead which the Germans evacuated on the night 0 14/15 ugust bur it was still far from Mga.

Early on 16 ugu t the fre h 1 rand 2 -4th

Infantry Divi ion relieved the I artered 132nd,

which. in the word of one divi ion member, wa "reduced by ca ualrie and exhau ted to the point of incoherence, n A German pa rrici pam ca pru red the Ferocity of the barrie:

"During the cour c of rhi battle rhe enemy had thrust the c divi ions and armoured unit into rhe battle: 64th Rifle Divi i n, with parr of rhree regiment ;. 34th Rifle Divi ion, with two regiment ; 16-ch Rifle Divi ion, with two regiment·' til Rifle Divi ion, with rwo regiments: J 1 rh Rifle Division, with one regiment; 2 -6rh Rifle Divi ion, with one re aimenr: 503rd Armoured Battalion with 14 ranks; 35th Armoured Regiment, with 15 ranks, 50th Armoured Regiment. with I - ranks: and rh Independent Engineer Battalion.

"Twelve to fourteen enemy battalion \V re reported a de .irnared. Twenty-four rank were de rroyed, J 0 of which were kno ked our in 10 e combat \ ith light weapons. Tilt: Rus ian uffercd extremely high a sualries during the inren ive arrempts to break the defence line. With the withdrawal of our divi ion, the battle ourh of Lake Ladoga came to an end.'

The Leningrad and Volkhov Front' fifth offensive ar iniavino cerrainly burni hed iniavino repurarion a a raveyard for Red Army soldier . Of the 2 -3, 00 oldiers the two Front committed to

146

ABOVE: The growing strength ond confidence of the Red Army during 1943 is evident here. ThIs training shot

has T-34 tanks armed with 76mm gun5 transporting ond giving fire support to an Inlantry squod behind the lines of the Valkl10v Front.

barrie, 79 9 '7 becam a ualrie , includine 20 90 dead, captured and mi ing, ~ irh I se that hi h one might hay a urned the, taulea \ auld de i r

rom further offen ive ,at lea I' for a time. Thi \ a' nor to be the a e.

As, . drawn to the iniavino strongpoinr by orne perver e force the ca mage repea red it el f i J1 mid-September, when Govorov once again tried to expel German force from iniavino. On L-

eprembcr Dukhanov' ixr - evenrh Army

re umed it a aulr on erman defen e ea t and \ est of in13\'i110. II 11 Thi rime, the three divi ion of General imoniak' XX Rifle orp pummelled errnan defence at and we r of inia ino supported by three clivi ions artacking on their left flank, .and first one and then two division ana king toward Arbuzovo on (heir right f1ank.l01 Although thi offen ivc also failed, the a saulting force captured iniavino village and about half rhe adjacent height, bur at a !;O t of heavy 10 se 3 the German n c again huffled reserve ro tern rhe tide. The short but violent a aulr co t the arra kers another LO 000 ca ualrie .

H7

LEFT: These wounded Luftwaffe aimew are

shown shortly after their aircrah was shot down

over Leningrad during a bombing mission. The pilot has suffered burns 10 his hands and is being supported by on infantry NCO.

parion \V uld OJ ke fran rderly v irhdrav al we rwards. The me r imp rranr of rhe lin (stellulIg) were the Rollbahn stellung parallel ro and just ea t of the l.eningrad-I 10 cow railroad, and the Luga stellung along the Luga River and sourhea rward to Novgorod.I06 The e lines were anchored on fortified city rrongpoints u h a Narva Kra nogvardci k and Luga and mo r were fairly well developed by lare 1943.lo~

Army Group arm began planning for a wi hdrav al to the Panther Line in cprernb r under rhe

adena me perarion Blau. When impl rn nr d, the plan required force to withdraw uc e ively through the erie of intermediate lines. The most serious dilemma fa(;cd by the army group concerned the fate of the approximately 900,000 ivilians living in the area who the Red Army would undoubtedly on cript when it reached th region.

rtempr to move the population ba k to Germany in early crober produ ed " 0 rnu h on u ion, misery and ho rility that Kuechler ordered the rear area command to adopt les onerou methods. " Thereafter errnan force fcrcibl moved rhe male population (some 2 -0,000) ba k into Lithuania and Latvia until accommodation were no longer available. Initially, Army Group orth planned to complete the withdrawal in rage from midJanuary through the prmg of 1944. On 22 December however, Halder informed army commanders that Hitler would not implement Operation Blau unle a new oviet offen ive forced him to d o. Hitler believed the Red Army had lost 0 many men in the Ukraine rhar.ir ould ill-afford a major offensive elsev here.

The Red Army victory in Operation park wa more signifi ant than the modest rerritorial gain indicated. or since December 1941, when the Leningrad Front blunted the Germans' bold artempr to encircle Leningrad, did me tauka have a mu h to celebrate. he Red Army's wre ring of the narrow land orridor from [he ehrmacht' gra p in January ended more than 12 month of repeated ernbarra ing and often raggering defeat. park however wa al 0 feu rraringly incomplete becau e the vital iniavino trongpoinr wa still in errnan hands and the taok« knew mat as long a it was, neither Leningrad' defences nor irs supply lines would be entirely ecure. This alone turned the January truggle for iniavino into a prelude rather chan a po t ript. Pride a well a rrategi Impera-

tive ompeUed the fovka to order it for e t

eRA KING THE BLOCKADE

t this point, mercifully, a period of relative calm de ended over [he hom ourh of Leningrad. Kue hler used rhe re pite to prepare for what he wa errain would be yet another oviet on laught. Hi most serious problem \ a hi total lack of re serves neces ary to counter an y new vier rh rust. Therefore in late September, he and Lindemann reque ted and received Hitler' perrni sion to abandon the Kirishi salient to tree up four division for employment el e\ here.IOl The fOlir divisions began \ irhdrawing from the alient on 3 October back through successive defence line. lrhough

Ilerer kov' Fourth Army attempted to trap he errnan forces, the latter were able to e ape unharmed and then erect nev defence along the Tigoda Ri cr.IOl

The our e and ourcornc of rhe tauha'. summer and fall ampaign in the Leningrad region was indeed frustraring. While it operations made Leningrad more secure and ended any possibility of a future German offen ive in the region the repeated offen i es failed specra ularly and did nor appreciably widen the iniavino corridor. However, while the oviet casualty roll mounted to \ ell ove I" 000 men, German rrength wa al 0 seriously

eroding. While Army Group 1 orth erength fell from 760,000 in mid-July ro 601 000 men 011 14 rober 1943, during the arne period oviet rrength in rea ed from 734 000 men with 491 000 ill re erve [0 93,000 with 66 000 in re erve, '\ or e

till for Kuechler, beginning in early rober the sit-

uation [0 the ourh deteriorated forcing him to rran fer izeable forces from the Eighteenth Army at Leningrad to me Sixteenth Army in the Nevel region.IDoI 0 perilous wa Army Group orth's situation char, in early eprernber, the OKH ordered a nev defence line rhe so-called Panther Line be con-

eructed .r marva to rrov deep in Arm)' Group

1 orrh' rear. In addition Kue hler' army group be an building an elaborate 'y tern of intermediate po irian forward of the Panther Line in ca e it needed ro wirhdrav from the Leningrad region.

The Panther Line

The German began constructing the Panther Line, which extended from arva through P kov and o (fOV to the outh of level, on eptcmber..1os In addition, rrny roup orth onstrucred a cries of intermediate line forward of the Panther Line at varying di tance fr m the from, \ ho e pha ed 0 cu-

14

eize

lr wa , theref re inevitable that perarion Polar tar \ auld follow clo ely after perarion park.

Given th tauka' ambitious rrategic aim in the winter of 1942--43, Operation Polar Star repre ented a logical culmination to the series of Red Army offensives [hat spread from south to north across rhe entire ovier-Gerrnan front. Given [he Red Army' capabilities, however, Polar tar failed like rhe other offen. ive . It did 0 because ehe Red Army was nor yer apa le of winning uch vi torie errainly nor in the difficult terrain of rhe Leningrad region, where large tank force ould not be brought to bar. Thereafter a more sober and rea li - ric tauka chose when and \ here to fight more carefully, attacking only if victory seemed achievable. De pire thi greater prudence Siniavino remained its nerne i and even in [he summer, rhe talJka could not re 1ST it enticement.

A Hi h Price in Blood

Like previous operation, perarion park, P lar

tar and Fifth iniavino proved co d}' to man}' hundreds of thou and of Red Arm: oldiers who fought in [hem. The Leningrad, Volkhov and • orrhwe tern ront 1I fered more than one million casualties during 1943 including 255 44 killed, captured or rnissing.)(j~ German our e indicare that me Red Army lose 270,000 men in the fighting for inia ina alone. German force al 0 uffered grievou Iy in the hard-fought battles although rar le S 0 than the Red Army. Army Group orrh

rrengrh ell from 760000 men in July 1943 to 601,000 in October, in part clue to ca ualtie . The fighting in 1943 everely \ eakened virtually ever division in Arm}' Group Jorrh becau e, like the French Army at Verdun in 1916, every divi ion was blooded at or around iniavino,

After January] 943 rrny Group orth had no operariona I reserve, and a a result, had to rely on the wift manoeuvre of regimental- and battalion-

ized combat gr up t ntain Red Army offen-

I e .109 With rrengrh de rea ing and replacement dwindling it wa only a matter f rime before Army Group orth Quid 110 longer tern rhe tide.

Fina Ily Operation park and Polar tar clearly demonstrated the tallka' intent to achieve victory at Leningrad, a concern many histories of the war have ignored. At me arne time, the tWO operation indicated how di fficlIlr thi task would be. Armed with thi awarene when it formulated it traregic prioritie for 1944 the tavka would pia e the liberation of Leningrad at [he rap of irs Ii r.

149

CHAPTER 9:

944

10

1-

In January 1944. the Red Army launched its tenlngrad-Novgorod Olfens.ive.

Vast in scale, its end result was finally to liberate leningrad. But the successful ending of the siege was bought for a heavy price in terms of blood. for Army Group North still. had a lot of fight left and its untts, though outnumbered, conducted a skilful defence as they withdrew to the Baltic states.

By [he end of 1943 [he Red Army had seized the strategic initiative on . [he Sovier-German from. Ic had won the Bartle of Kursk, and irs forces had driven the Wehrmachr back to rhe Sozh and Dnepr Rivers in central and southern Russia, and were beginning operarions 1.11[0 Belorussia and the Ukraine. By rhis rime, Red Army forces had penetrared [be Panther Line, the vaunted German Eastern WaH,. at several location III rhe central and southern sectors of the front. Worse still for the Germans, the Red Army Air Force had complete air

uperioriry over the battlefield, the partisan movernenr was growing in the Wehrmach,'s rear, and Sovier industry was producing and equipping its forces with immense quantities of new tanks, a rti lle ry and aircraft of a 11 rype .

As the year ended, the $tovka planned to conduct a series of major strategic offen [yes aimed at clearing enemy forces from all Soviet territor}" and beginning rhe liberation of l azi-occupied Europe. These offensives, which had already begun in rhe mid-faD against German forces in Belorussia and Ukraine

LUT: 'Red Army soldiers sXO.mine II co·ptuTed trenrn af the German Panlher Une. This defensive lone skirted IheRlver Norvo, the books of La:ke (hud, lake Pskov, and Ihe lownsol Pskov Gnd O.strov. The Germa:nsgrandly titled it an impregJIable "'Northern Wall".

would grow to embrace all three strategic axes. The Soviets' two-fold military superiority over Axis forces seemed to guarantee success.' At the least Soviet superiority forced the Ger.mans to go over to the strategic defence in virtually every sector.

Along the northwestern axis by I January 1944, rhe Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts had restored comrnunicarions to Leningrad, removed any chance ofa German offen ive against the city, and created conditions suitable for the utter defeat of German Army Group North .. Kuechler's arm}' group still occupied defences close to ehe city, and was able TO strike at ir and jt commenicarions Iines with artillery and air strikes. However the deteriorating simarion elsewhere along irs Eastern From precluded the OKH from providing Kuechler with any reinforcements. Thus, the Stavka decided to liberate the city and all of the Leningrad region as its first order of business in 1944.

011 ] January, the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts, supported by rhe Baltic Fleer, faced Finnish forces north of Leningrad and German forces south or the city. Govorov's Twenty - Tbird Arm y defen ded against Finnish forces north of Leningrad, the Second Shock Army occupied [be Oranienbaum bridgehead, and me Ferry-Second and Sixry- eventh Armies defended the southern and southeastern approaches to Leningrad from [he Gulfof Finland to

151

tactically. ,\, orse [ill for Kuechler. his army group had few reserves." The Germans compen ared fur their numerical weakness by con [meting strong de renee organized in great depth back to the Panther Line. The weakest German defences werein rhc sector opposite the Oranienbaum bridgehead and rhe srrongesr 'were south and ea [of Leningrad .. ~ The Germans fortified virtually every town and village around rhe from and in rhc shallow depths, and formed multiple strongpoints into larger centres of resistance." Weather conditions in rhc winter of J 944, which were mild and subject ro frequent thaw, favoured defence. The icc cover on rivers and lakes could supporr Trucks and regimental artillery, but nor heavy weaponry or ranks, and the swamps were only partially I:rozcn and difficult to traverse,

1944 - llBERAllO I

GULF OF FINLAND

LAKE LA.DOGA

• SI! 1I:$$",l"burg

.... ,-~-

.~ ,Klngb'epp '" ..... -

New Offen ives

Based on intelligence reports, Kuechler concluded that any Red Army offen ive in early 1944 would be no larger than previous operation, and Lindemann declared his Eighteenth Arm}' could successfully (end off any ovier attack III B~~sed on [his assessment, Hider ordered Army Group North to hold firmly to irs poslrions at all costs. Despite this order, Kuechler secretly prepared plan to withdraw m December and establi hed new upply ba esin E ronia, In the meanrime, his force!. in the Leningrad area dug in, convinced they could hold on. On 10 January, the Eighteenrh Army commander, Lindemann, assessed rhe ovier bui Id- u ps i 11 the Ora Ilienba u m Pockets nd east of lovgorod as mode t, particularly in reserves. '\ ithour reserves. he claimed, [he arracks could not go deep and any assaults from Oranienbaum and at Novgorod would "very likely" be staggered.

RIGHI: A Genncm Pakallli· Ian k gvn (reW tranlkally prepare lheir weapon fo meel enemy tonks.ln general, the German~ in Ih.eno.rth were able 10 withdraw in order in the hl~e 01 R.u $sion oilensive5, os Sovietloclks were allen (nsdeond unimClginolive.the Wehrmo[hl retreat never become 0 'f'oul.

.' NovgQI'Od

o

30

o

'\ hile rhe G1;:rm3n command exuded confidence .. on geprember Gnvorov had already proposed a massive new oHensi.\'t' to the tallka that would utili t' hi:. aml Merer~ko\"s [roms. His plan required tilt' Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts roconducr rwo successive operations to capture Luga and encircle and destroy the Eighteenth Army. In the first offensi \ e, h i Forty- econd rm y 311cl casta I Operational Group ( G) would arrack ourhwards towards Kra not' Sell),. link up, and organize a conrinuou fronr south of leningrad. After capturing Kra noe elo, rhe ixry- evenrh Army would join the offensive andcapture Krasnog- v ardeisk, and [he Ferry-Second Army and COG would arrack towards Kingisepp .. Taken together. the tWO offensives were de igncd to expel German forces from rhe Leningrad region and cut off rhe Eighreenrh Army's withdrawa I route to the wesr. In rum ,. on J 4 eprernber, Mcrerskov recommended rhar his Volkhov Front arrack from che region north of Novgorod towards LUg::! to encircle and destroy the Eighreenrh Army's main force and prevent if from withdrawing we rwards rorhe Luga or Panther Line.

Driven on by fear rhar German forces would c cape desrrucrion by conducting a pre-emptive withdrawal, the Stallka approved Covorov's and Mercrskov's proposal on Il October wirh a renrarive attack date inearly January, and modestly reinforced their FrOIlrs.1I It ordered rhe Len ingrad Front to transfer its Second Shock Army to rhe Oranienbaurn bridgehead. and prepare TO conduce two rrongconcentric assaults from Leningrad and the Oranienbsurn bridgehead to encircle German forces in the Petergof and Srrel'na regions. The revised Staukl1 objective required the rwo fronrs TO

ABOVI~ Iheposition of German defensive lines and. strongpliinls in the lenin:glod areG in January 1944. Though Army Group Narth bod imae strenuous efforts 10 turn Ih.e area In.lo an impl'egnable fortress, il had neither the manpower nO.t the equipment to wltbstartdlhe Soviet offensive when it came.

First and Third Shock, Sixth Guards and Fifreenrh Air Armies opposire Army Group I orrh's ixreenrh Army.4 The ixrh Guards and Third huck Armies on Popov's left flank were pursuing German forces who were withdrawing northwards from Nevel to new defences west of ovosokol'niki, The three From fielded 822,000 troop, supported by rough. ly 35,.000 partisansoperaring in [he German tear. ~

Army Group North's Eighteenth and Sixteenth Annie defended the front from the Gu.lf of Finland

outhwards to [he evel region with 44 infarnry divisions (including one panzergrenadier] totalling roughly 500,000 rnen,s By concentrating it forces the Red Army could improve irs strategic uperioriryof less than tWO ro one [0 a more [ban four-fold superiority operationally and more [han eight-fold

ea e of Siniavino against the German Eighteenrh Army's left wing) lererskov' Eighth, Fifty-Fourth and Fi fry- inrh Armies faced the German Eighteenth Army's right wing from easr of Siniavino to Lake ll'men, and occupied an Ski'll (S-mile) bridgehead on [he western bank of [he Volkbov River 50km (31.2 miles) north of [ ovgorod.! To the oueh, Army General M. 1. Popov's Second Baltic

Front defended [he sector from Lake Il'men southwards TO JUSt north of level with its Twenry-Second,

152

RAD 1941-1944

destroy rhe Eighteenth Arm) sourh of Leningrad, raise rhc city's hlockade , and liherare the entire Leningrad regmn. I ninall y, they \\ ere to smash the Eighrcenrh Army's tlanks by sunultaneous attack sourhwesr of Leningrad and in the Novgorod region, and rhcn de~rr()y the entire army and reach rhe Lug,", River from Kingisepp to Luga. Subsequently, rhey were ro advance rowsrds ';uva and Pskov to Clear German forc·e~ from the Leningrad region, and then begin [iberating rhe Baltic region. Simulrancou [y, the ccorid Baltic Front was to arrack rhe Si rreenth Army's ri~l1( flank north of L eve! ro tie down the army' forces and prevent ir from reinforcing

.errnan forct: in the Leningrad region.

Operation Neva

Govorov began planning hi initial offensive, codenamed Operation Neva, on 6 October .. z His final concept required that the ccond Shock and ForrySecond Armies penCtraH' German defences in the eastern Hank of rhe Oranienbaum bridgehead and southwest of Leningrad Pulkovo, link up at Ropsha, and encircle and destroy German forces in the Krasnoe

do, Ropsha and Srrel'na regions. The Sixry- eventh Army was to til' down German forces outh and east of the city to prevent them [rom reinforcing rhe econd Shock and Forry- econd Army ectors, ubsequcndy .. rhc Second Shock and Furry- econd Armies were to attack ourhwesr towards Kingisepp

and south reward Kra nogvardeisk, while the ixrySeventh Army attacked through :vlg;l. and Ul'ianovka towards Krasnogvardcisk from the norrhea t. Covorov a igned mission TO the three armie participating in rhe Rop ha offen ive between 6 N"ll\'fmber and 23 December, To confu e the Cermans, the

econd Shock Army W3S to attack a da~ before the Forry- econd Army. I I

Govorov's fir~r shuck gruup wa the econd Shock Army, now cornmanded by the experienced Colonel-Ccnera] I, I. Fediuninsky, which consisted of two rifle corps, seven ri fle did ions, one rifle, {\VO na val infantry and one rank brigade, one fortified region, and three tank regimenr . Fediuninsky was to attack eastwards frum the Oranienbaurn bridgehead with his XXXXlll and XII Rifle Corp, capture Ropsha, link up with rhe Forry- ccond rrny, and help destroy German forces 111 the Kra nor 5clo ami Ropsha regions. ' 4 Befo re do i ng 5.0, howe ver, Govorov faced rhe daunting task of transferring the enrire Second hock Army into the Oranicnbaurn bridgehead. He accomplished this complex fa k between 5 November and 21 January 1944,1>

GOVOfUI"S second shock fo.r.;e;:, rhe Forty-Second Army. commanded hy the equally experienced Colonel-G ... neral l, I. :-'I,l~!r:nnikn\'. c{Jll~j\oreJ of three ritle corps, iO rifle divisions, one forrified region, TWO rank brigades and fi\'l~ rank regiments. His army' XXX Cuards, CIX and X Rifle Corp were III penetrate German defences and capture Kra nee do. Attacking trolll St:cunJ echelon, the army's XXIII RiH... .orps was to link up with rhe econd hock Army at Ropsha , and help destroy German forces in the region. An army mobile group consisting of rhe 1ST and 220[h Tank Brigade and rwo elfpropelled arrillery regirnenrs was to envelop Krasnoe Selo from [he south and spearhead his advance on rhe town of Ropsha.t«

Mererskov ordered his Fifty- linrh Army to conducr two urracks: a main arrack from irs bridgehead on the western bank of [he olkhov River, and a econdary arrack across Lake [l'mcn outh of Novgorod, The attacks were to converge west of Novgorod. encircle and destroy the German XXXVlll Army Corps, andcapwrc the city. Subsequently, rhe Fifty- inth Army wa to exploit westward and ourhwesrwards •. capture uga, and em off rhe withdrawal of German force in the Tosno and Chudovo regions. Simultaneously, the Eighth and Fifry-Fourrh rrnics were to artack towards Tosno, Liuban and hudovo [0 prevent the Germans from [ran fC'fring forces to 1 ovgcrod, and to encircle and destroy errnan forces in the Tosno and Chudovo regions.!"

VOlkh.ov

\.

\

LAKE LADOGA

..... "

GULF OF.F/NLAND

J lJ-NL'GK,\I}

. F1l0:".'

,up:nov rR~

ii

, S'IIl'ICK

Ii

111.\LTIC FRO'"

iii

.IRMY GROLl' :':U!tl1i

• :K.ozlovo

• Kholm

• :PuShkinskie ,Gory

j

30

eo Miles

The Fift - linth Army

Mererskov's large r army, Lieutenanr-General 1. T. Korovnikov's Fifty-Nimh Army, consisted of three rifle corps, nine rifle divisions, one ritle brigade, three rank brigades and four rank regiments .. His' I and I IV Rifle Corps were to penetrate XXXVIll Army Corps' defences 50km (~1.2 miles) north of Novgorod and ever German communications routes into Novgorod from the west. South of [he city, his Snurhern Operational Group, consisting of a reinforced rifle brigade, wa to cro s Lake Il'rnen (on the icc), link up with the main hock group we t of lnvgorud, and help capture [ ovgorod and de troy Germs n forces in the city. I ~ Sub eq uently, Korovnikov's army was to advance westwards ro Luga to as isr in thermal destruction of the Eighteenrh A fIll} .19

Finoll)", both GOVOf()V and Meretskov employed stringent operational security measures and decep[ion plans to confuse the German regarding rhe

50

100 Km.

Soviet Fron III nes

14 January 1944 15 Fenruil1'( 1'944 I Malth 1944

MOVE: The Soviet leningrad.-Novgorod strategic offensive operation of Janoary-March 1944 .. Vast in scale and intensity. it finally freed the tily of Leningrad and signalled the beginning 01 the Red Army's liberation ollbe Baltic Stales. The 900-day ordeal of Leningrad was over.

inregruted partisan operations in the offensive for the .f.i rsr ri me in rhe wa r, 111 Novem ber, [he Leningrad Headquarters of the Partisan Movement ordered its partisans to conduct major sabotage and diversionary operations in support of [he offen ive,

By the time rheir preparation were complete, borhronr commander had created overwhelming

uperiorjry over the opposing German by concentrating rheir forces." Govorov's forces outnumbered rhe Germans three-fold in infantry, four-fold in artillery and six-fold in rank and self-propelled

timing and location of [he offensive: ovorov by posturing to mount an offensive along rhe Kingisepp axis, and Meretskov by conducting a dcmonsrrarion near Mga and a fal e concenrrarion near Chudovo.>' In addition .. borh from' had fully

ISj

THE lEGE OF LENINGRAD 1941-1944

LEFT: The undulating emply landscape presents no visual problems lor these Soviet anli-Ionk gunners south of Leningrad. Tbe piece Ihey are serving is a captured German 75mm Pak anlHank gun. As tbe Red Army advanced It captured mucb artillery ammunition, which was tben used against its former owners,

1944 - LI£ERA110

gun . Merer kov' r well over three-fold in infantry and artillery and eleven-fold in tanks and elf-pr - pelled gun'. Their as awe force occupied their final jumping-of positions for [he arrack r\ a to three nights before the assault and pha ed their forces into attack positions the day and night before.

upporting tanks deployed fan ard during rhe artillery preparation.

De pite heavy snov ovier ni ht bombers

pounded German de en e on the night of 13/14 January, and at dawn Govorov artillery rained 104,000 hell on the 9[h and LOch Luftwaffe Field Di i ion' defence durin a 65-minure artillery preparation.s- At 10;00 hour the ma ed infantry of the 4 rh, 90th and 131 [Rifle Division leading XXXX1ll and CXXII Rifle Corps' as ault, lunged forward ineo rhe German defen ive po itions as Fediunin ky and Golikov ob erved the a sault from a ornmand post on Kolokol'nia Hill. The three arrackin divisions quickly over arne the errnans' fon ard defences and, by the day' end, had penecrated Jkrn (1. 7 mile) inro the hartered German forward defence along a 10km (6.2 -mile) front. Overnight the force advanced anorher 4km (2. r mile ). while the Forry- econd and ixry- evenrh Armies fired on enemy defences ouch and east of Leningrad, confusing [he Germans as [0 when and where the next assault would come.!] They received their answer at 11 :00 hour rhe next morning, when rhe econd hock and Forty-Second

rrme truck simulraneou ly after fresh and

inren e artillery preparation .

Early on 1 - January Fediunir ky' xxxxm and

XXll Rifle orp bartered whar remained of rhe ] Orh Luftwaffe Division's defence, defeating everal ill Panzer Corps' counreratta k and advan ing 6km (3. 5 mile) before being halted by heavy German fire west of Ropsha.> Less than 20km (12.5 miles) to the east Maslennikov' Forty- econd Army attacked German defences near Pulkovo at 11:00 hour after it artillery had poured more than 220000 hell into the enemy' defence, the artillery barrage hifted into the depth General

irnoniak' T Guard Rifle orp wept forward

into the G rman line. However, I and X Rifle Corp, on irnoniak's flank, oon encountered heavy re i ranee, and the fight degcneraeed Inrc a

lugfe r wirh attacking Soviet infantry gnawing their way through the dense German defence in succes-

ive a ault .15 irnoniak' corp had penetrated up to 4km (2. mile) along a Skrn (3.n-mile) front by the dar' end, bur could do no morc.16 Govorov' a aulr inren ified the next day, when Fe liunin ky' lead clivi ion penetrated the entire depth of the German main defensive belr and Ma lennikov's forces painfully advanced another 4km (2. - miles), primarily in the ector of irnoniak' corp.

Dis arisfied with his force' progre s Fediuninsky threw a mall mobile group, a reinforced tank brigade into combat early on 1 January wid) order to aprure and hold Rap ha.2" However, German counterattack haired rhe a aulr force when it wa only halfway to it obiecrive, Sirnulraneou I)" Maslennikov committed his econd

]'6

echelon rifle corp and mobile tank group r exploit

irnoniak u ce and capture Kra noe elo.28 The

mobile group \ enr into action at midd )' but the German, who dere ted its forward rnovernen counterattacked and forced it to withdraw to Pulkovo with heavy losses)Q Despite the setbacks, by the day's end only ISkm (11.25 miles) separated [he

econd bock and Forty- e and Armies' vanguards.

Fa ed with encir Iernenr, the German L26rh Infantry and 9rh Luftwa fe Field Divisions lung grirnl ' to a shrinking alienr north of Krasnoe 1"10 and prepared to withdraw their force to rhe ouch.

De pite the threatening iruation Lindemann rill exuded confidence on 16 January inforruing his army commanders that the Russian had committed all of their forces, and Kuechler [hat he could win the battle by taking ome risk in quiet ector .1lI11,e next day however. Kuechler informed OKH that [he

iruarion \ a det r iorating, and reque ted Hider' perrni ion to withdraw forces from rh M a alienr back [ the Rollbahn line r relea e fWO di i ion to counter the a ier a aults southwest of Leningrad.u

aying neither )'1" nor no Hider in read llgge red that Kuechler abandon the fron between Oranienbaum and Lel1ingrad.j2 Lindemann neverrhele ,tran ferred forces from Mga and Chudovo to reinforce hi defence ouehwesr of the ciry, but to no avaiJ.3J

~ hile Hitler, Kuechler and Lindemann were debating the Eighteenth Army's ate Fediunin ky and Maslennikov ertled [be is ue for ill rn by 001- mirring their e and e helen corp to ombar leaving the erman no other choice bur to withdrav their force ba k ro Kra noe cia. Fediunin ky'

RIGHT: Another dauie Russian Front image.

A ski patrol near Novgorad fakes up a defensive position. The men blend perfedly into their surroundings, the lur tops under their hoods

giving an odd shape to their heads. The man on the lelt

is using his ski-poles to steady his aim.

entire army urged forward on 1 January and captured Rap ha late the next day. Ar 21 :00 hour, Iii lead element linked up \ ich Ferry-Second Army forces JUSt ourh of rhe rown, and the next morning the armies' main forces mer all along the from. Jamming the door shut Oil German forces still locked in combat to rhe north. N Farther east, irnoniak's corps captured Krasnoe elo [are on 19 January. During [he night the army" mobile rank group arta ked wesrv ard from Kra noe elo with headlights blazing, demoralizing and defeating the erman force

withdrawing ourh from Perergof trel'na and

ritsk, linking up \ irh econd Shock Army force south of Ropsha, and encircling German force rill defending ro the north. However, ince the Soviet infantry had fallen well behind [he rank, many German troop \ ere able to successfully infiltrate southward through rile porous Soviet line on the night a 19/20 January, thereby escaping de rruction, Soviet force liquidated rho e who bad failed [0 do so on 20 Januar ,

Early on 1 January Lindemann finally informed Kuechler that hi from ourhv est of Leningrad and near ovgorod was ollap ing and, once again Kuechler ought but wa denied perrni sian to withdraw to [he Rollbahn line, When Krasnoe elo fell in the afternoon on hi own volition Kuechler decided to abandon me Mga line and so in armed OKH. Hider approved only after Zeirzler raid him that he had already giv n the order. However ir arne too late [Q ave the G rman defences. In ix day of heavy combat F diunin ky and Ma lennikov' armies had penetrated prepared errnan defenc , advanced 2 ikrn (]. mile) and linked up ar

LEFT: German troops observe a bu.rni'ng Soviet village as Ihey pull bac.k towards the Pan Iher Line in January 19 4 4. As it retreafell fbe Wehrmarnt destroyed anything thai could be of use 10 the advancing Red Army - and forciblyev!lcuClted lhe civilian iPopulalion ..

\Va teland at Novgorod

A frer midnight OIl i 9 January, Kuechler sought Hi tier's perm i sian to wi rhdra w what he termed "the five German battalions surrounded by eight ovier divisions" through the swamp west of lovgorod. Although he still srubbornly claimed that ovgorod was of "extraordinary symbolic significance", Hitler agreed to Kuechler's request, but insisred his force hold east of the RolJbahn Line. Fifreen minutes later he gave permission for that withdrawal as "Veil but tried to gain Kuechler's guarantee that he would hold 011 rorhe Rollbahn, On 20 january, Kuechler as es ed the situation and informed OKW that the tactical setbacks atovgorod and outhwe r of Leningrad had resulted from lack of reserves and al1 overextended fronr. Since [be arne conditions still existed, he requested thar rhe withdrawal ro [he Rollbahn become rhe firsrstep in a genera! withdrawal to rhe Panther LillI", as the three divisions released by [he withdrawal would soon be consumed in the fighting,

ln seven days of combat, Korovnikov's army had penerra red strong ene my defences. li bera ted

ovgorod, and advanced 20km (12.5 miles) westwards, widening its penerrarion to 50km (31.2 miles). \Vh.ile doing so, it bad destroyed or seriously damaged tWO German divisions, one regiment, four separate battalions and other smaller units, and capru red 3000 prisoners, i I The Germans, however, left

1944 - UBERATIO

Ropsha, restoring a continuous from and communications between the Leningrad from's disparate farces south and west of rhe ciry.15 In the process, they had destroyed rwo German divisions and damaged another five caprured more than 1000 prisoners, weakened the Eighteenrh Army, and facilitated future operations towards both Krasnogvardeisk and Kingisepp .. I~

'WIlile Fediullillsky's and Maslennikov's armies were demolishing German defences sourhwesr of Leningrad Korovnikov's Fifry- inrh Army, despite bad weather, unleashed its ass a ulrs against the Eighteenth Army's riglu flank in the Novgorod region. Alrer pulverizing German defences with 133,000 artillery shells, assaulr detachments from each of his army's first echelon rifle battalions began the ground assault. However, VI Rifle Corps' assault stalled after advancing lkm(.62 miles) into the Germans' first defensive position .. l~ Forrunately for Korovnikcv, [Q the south, xrv Rifle Corps' 378rb Rifle Division attached prematurely and without ordera.exploiring a German withdrawal during the artillery preparation and seizing a portion of [he enemy's defence)H South of ovgorod, MajorGeneral T. A. Sviklin's Southern Operational Group crossed the ice on Lake Il'rnen without an artillery preparation, urpri ed The German defender and captured a G x 4km (3.7 x 2.S-mile) bridgehead on the eastern shore of the lake. Fearing 10 s of communications between Shimsk and ovgorod, the German >-..'"Xxvm Army Corps sent in reinforcemenrs."

Korovnikov also reinforced his advancing forces on 'IS January.~!1 Once reinforced, VI Rifle Corps

along rhe only remaining road to the wesr, to occupy new defences positions at Barcrskii pcorecring Luga from the east.

Bad weather; the swampy and heavily wooded terrain, and a lack of transport slowed the Fifty-

inrh Army's advance." Assisted by sappers, the army's VI Rifle Corp struggled through the frozen swamps. fi.nally cutting the ovgorod-Baretskii railroad late on 19 January. Further south, the Southern Group bad cur the Shirnsk-Novgorod railroad the previous day, bur XIV Rifle Corps made little progress in irs attack on Novgorod from the north. While [he latter was preparing to storm Novgorod the next morning, the Germans began evacuating the city without interference.~8 At 09:30 hours on 20 January Soviet forces captured lovgorod without a fight, after rhe last Germans our had destroyed the bridge over rhe Volkhov River.49 The loss of

ovgorod was not, however, bloodless for the Germans, since VI Rifle Corps and the Southern Group's 372ml Rifle Division encircled and later destroyed some German forces west of the city_lO

advanced 7km (4.3 miles), encircled and defeated the 28th Jdger Division, and approached the ChudovoNovgorod railroad lare in rhe day.41 The next day rhe corps brushed aside a regiment of the 24th Infantry Division sent by XXXVITl Army Corps to hold the railroad, and together with XlV Rifl.e Corps, which had cut rhe Finn' Lug-l lovgorocl road, rore a gaping 20km (12.5-mile) hole in rhe Germans' main defence belr, Simulraneou lv, Merecskov applied increased pressure against the sagging German front by ordering Roginsky's Fi ry-Fourrh Army to join the assault out oJ the Volkhov River bridgehead. Although Roginsky' army had advanced only 5km (3.12 miles) by 20 January, his arrack prevented XXXVITI Army Corps from sending any forces to the ovgorod region .. H

South of ovgorod, Korovnikov reinforced his Fifty- inrh Army's Sourhern Operational Croup with rwo divisions. which broke out of their bridgebead and cut the himsk-Novgorod railroad west of Novgcrcd.r! faced wirh the possible encirclement uf his entire Novgorod force, Lindemann reinforced the force wirh, initially, four divisions, and later a cavalry regiment and another in fan try division+' Neverrhele 5, Korovnikov's arilly continued its low but inexora ble ad va nce.ertvelopi ng German forces in Novgorod from the north and south.n On 18 January, Korovnikovcommirted hi army's econd echelon to protect hisarmy's right flank and ro coop· erate with Fifty-Fourth Army forces in the destruction of German forces in the l.iuban and Chudovo regions.te Lindeman 11 quick Iy ordered h is XX X V III Army Corps [0 abandon lovgorod withdrawing

158

Novguroda virtual wasteland, destroying 2460 our of 2500 homes and most other insrallarions and churches. In addition, only 50 inhabiranrs remained in [he city itself; the remainder had been shipped back to Germany.

The tavka's Displeasure

Although Govorov' and Meretskov's Fronts bad resoundingly smashed both flanks of the Eighteenth Army and threatened it with a general offensive trom the Gulf of Finland to Lake ll'rnen, the Stavt:« was not pleased with their progress. It noted a host of shortcomings in the econd Shock Forty-Second and Fifry-Ninrh Armies' operations and demanded they be correcred,v However dissatisfied it was, the Sta.!!ka took solace in the fact that while the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts were savaging the Eighteenth Army, Kuechler faced a new crisis on his southern flank. In late December he bad ordered Busch's Sixteenth Army, then under attack north IJf Nevel, to begin withdrawing eo new defences west of Novosokol'niki .. General Popov's Second Baltic Front pur ued, reached the new German defence line on 7 January, and launched a fresh offensive with its Third Shock and Tenth Guards Armies nil 12 January, and the Twenty-Second Army two days larer, On 18 January, after days of confused and heavy fighting and several regroupings, [he TwentySecond Army captured a narrow eCTOr of [he Leningrad- level railroad line before going over [Q the defence on 20 January.

Although the Second Baleic From's offensive was not dramaricallyuccessful ir did tie down the Sixteenth Army and prevent it from reinforcing rhe Eighteenth Army. L1 fact, ir forced Kuechler ro send fWO security divisions and the bulk of one infantry division to assist [he ixteenrh Army. B\Vorse still, by seizing rbeovosokol'njki-Dno rail line, the Twenty-Second Army had severed we Germans' main lateral communications artery, endangering their forces in rhe ovosokol'niki and Sraraia Russa regions. Thi would become an imporranr factor in Kuechler's decision-making, as he soon faced new crises that threatened to unhinge both his Eighteenth and Sixteenth Armies' defences.

After completing Operation eva and the

ovgorod operations, Govorov and Mercrskov, with Stavka approval, planned to continue rhe offensive, This required that the Leningrad From capture Krasnogvardeisk and Tosno, and the Volkhov Front seize Chudovo to encircle and desrroy German forces in the Mga, Tosno and Liuban regions. If ucce sfu],

159

the joint operation would end (he leningrad blo kadc, defeat rhe ighteenth Army and lear German force from rhe northern half of the Leningrad oblast. Govorov ordered Maslennikov's Forry- econd Army to capture Krasnogvardeisk, Pushkin Iursk and Tosno to cut off German orces south and souraeasr of leningrad and Fediuninsky' e ond hock Army to arrack southward, co protect Iaslennikovs right flank. Mererskov planned to continue his offensive towards Luga, ut the Pu hkin-Dno and Krasnogvardeisk-Luga-P ko railroad and encircle and destroy German force in [he I Iga Liubao and

_hudovo regions in coop ration with Govorov' for e , He ordered Korovnikov' Fifty- inch Army [0 advance towards Luga and Oredezh, while protecting the Front's left flank, Hi Fifty-Fourth Army would capture Liuban and envelop [be German xxvm Army orps from rhe north. and five partisan regiments would support hi offen ive and a 51St in rhe capture of Oredezh, Baret kii, Urorgosh and Shimsk.

The two Fronts re umed their offensives on 21 January v irh [he econd ho k and Forry- econd Armie attacking reward Kra nogvardci k, and the fifty- inrh Army [0\ ard Luga. Wbile [he

ighreenth Army's l rmy Corp de perarely held all to iIS defences around Kra nogvardeisk late 011 2'1 January Kuechler flew [0 [he Fuhrer headquarters. Early the next morning he informed Hitler char Kra nogvardeisk would all un Ie he allowed him ro abandon Pushkin and lut k. Hirler categorically r j cted Kuechler's plea taring: "I am against all withdrawal. We will have ri e wherever ware.

LEft: Red Army troops warm themselves by a fire on their way wesl In January 1944. The German roadsign, bearing fhe old imperial title, obou1 to be engulf e dl n flames beoTS the nome of the <ity thaI the Wehrma(ht was never destined 10 lake.

There i n guarantee \ e will not b broken rhrough 00 rh Panther Line. If we go ba k voluntarily rhey [the Ru Ian J will get rh re with only half of hi force. He rnu r bleed himself white on rhe way. The barrie must be fought as far as possible from the German border." Kuechler countered rhat the army group would not even be able to hold on to the Panther Line if it wa too weak to do 0 when it got there, Hider, however, wa adamant, Blaming the

ap in the front on the 'g ri m of hi arm. group ommander and in iring ev ry quare yard of ground be sold at the highest po sible price in Ru ian bloo I, be demanded that the Rollbshn line be held and ent Kuechler on hi, way. reigned Kuechler withdrew hi force to the Rollbahn line ending part of two division to hore up hi

defences at Krasnogvardeisk.s- A concerned OKH al 0 em Kuechler the 12th Panzer Divi ion from Army roup entre and the -02nd Heavy Tank Battalion from the ixteenth rmy to employ at Kra no rvardeisk.

hile Hirler and Kuechler were meering ovier inrellizen e detected a erman withdrawal from Mga and iniavinu and immediately ordered

viridov' ixry-Sevenrh Army to pur ue and destroy German force' in the Mga region. Although [hey failed ro carch the withdrawing Germans, viridov's forces occupied Mga at 17:00 hours on 21 january." The following day Govorov ordered viridov's army to aprure Tosno and clear enem force' from their Rollbahn line, The next day Lindemann acknowled red the fact char the Rollbahn line" a , in facr

160

untenable by ordering hi trOOP to begin eva uaring Pushkin and lutsk and reponing to OKH that' ir could either ac epr hi de i ion or end a general to replace him . B, the rime the Eighteenth Army' forces had completed their withdrawal to the Rollbahn Line ourh of Mga. Soviet forces had already penetrated ir in everal place.

Tbe German witbdrax al from the Rollbahn line forced Go orov and ~I[ rerskov to alter their plan signifi andy for a general offensi e and pur uir along the entire front from the Gulf of Finland to Lake II m n. in e ir wa no longer leary f r the Forty- ccond rmy ro capture To no Govorov ordered Fediunin ky's econd Shock Army and Maslennikov' Forry- econ.d rmy (Q arrack toward Ki.ngi cpp and Bol' hoi ab k and reach the Luga River by 30 january, Meanwhile, viridov's

ixty- evenrh rmy wa to attack outhv ard and we t'\ ard to destroy errnan forces at Pu hkin and To no, keeping pac with the two arrnie 011 if right, If succe ful Govorov's offensive would orcc rhe Germans to withdraw ourhwards acres rhe fore red and warnpy terrain north of uga and walk

rraight into the gun of Mcret kov' forces. The tavka approved Govorov' plan on 22 January.

Merer kov' plan complemented Covorov's. He ordered Kerovnikov' Fifty- inth Army to capture Luga and tarikov' Eighth Army, up to now a igned only econdary missions, to capture To no and clear errnan forces from the remainder of the Rollbahn line. ub equenrly rarikov would rran fer hi f ret the Fifty-Fourth rmy and move with

RIGHT: Soviet sappers search for German mines in newly liberated Petergof, west of Lenin grCl~ in January 19 4 4. The lifting of the siege of Leningrad raised the morale of the whole Soviet people/ ond was also a great military victory for the Red Army.

hi headquarter to the From left flank to take onrrol of force atta king Luga, Finally, after capturing Liuban, Rogin ky' Fifty-Fourth Army wa to help capture Tosno and U haki and arrack outhwe twards in support of the Sixty-Seventh Army and

ourhea [ward toward Oredczh to strike the flank of German force withdrawing westward from Chudovo. he tavk« approved Mererskov plan on 22 January, and ordered him to capture Liu an no later chan 2"-24 January and Luga no later than 29- 0 January.

The econd hock rmy began its pur uit on 21 January against killful -erman rearguard arion. Because Fediuninsky wa unhappy with rhe pur uit since his subordinate commanders often conducted frontal anacks against German strongpoint and urrerly failed to employ manoeuvre, he issued a bli - rering series of rebukes to correct the error: and pur hi force on.5b Pia aued by the same problems rhar

dogged Fediunin k la.lennikov ordered hi

main force to a ault German defences around Krasnogvardeisk at 13:00 hours on 22 January aft r a 1· -minute artiller fire raid. ~ Hi In and VII Rifle Corp attacked Kra nogvardeisk proper and Rifle Corps advanced outheast to envelop Pu hkin and Slursk, Although by late on 23 January hi force had encircled the German defenders at Pu hkin and Slutsk from three ides they \ ere unable to dislodge German force from Kra nogvsrdeisk. Further ea r

viridov ixry- e enth Arm. captured ga, but

failed [0 capture Ul'ianovka To no and the Rollbahn line in between. A fru crated Govorov berated hi

161

THE StEGE OF LENI GRAD 1941-1944

Govorov realigned his forces .. , reinforcing Maslennikov's army with cvrn Rifl.e Corps from Fediuninsky' army and transferring Maslennikov's ex Rifle Corps [Q Sviridov's Sixry-Sevenrh Army .. OVNthe next [\'10 days Fediuninsky's right flank advanced up to 16km (10 miles), and his left flank captured Ellzavetino and Cut the KrasnogvardeiskKingisepp railroad.n After reaching the railroad, on 27 January he wheeled his army £0 the west and began pursuing the German XXVI Army Corps toward Kingisepp, Late that day he rransterred his CXX11 Rifle Corps to Maslennikov's army.

With his defences crumbling around him, Kuechler attended a Jational Socialist Leadership Conference at Konigsberg on 27 January. In between Hitler's speeches exhorting faith in the cause as a guarantee of ultimate victory, Kuechler reiterated [0 the Fuhrer the dire consequences tharwould roll ow if he was not allowed to conduct a genera! wiehdrawal, Hitler categorically prohibited al! voluntary withdrawals and reserved the decision to withdraw for himself. The next day, Kuechler told the attendees that his Eighteenth Army had lost 40,000 casualties and the troops had fought as hard as could be expected. Hitler replied (hat rhe srarernenr was "nor quite true". He had beard that the army group was not fighting everywhere witb as much dererminanon as it might. Kuechler returned to his headquarters a broken man. \lIbile knowing he should retreat, all he could talk about was showing more determination and attacking. With whar, though, nobody knew.

Given Kuechler' apparent paralysis, LieurenanrGeneral Eberhard Kinzel his chief of staff, took matters into his own hands and wid Lindemann's chief of staff that the rime bad come. An order [Q retreat must be issued, bur the army group was forbidden to do [hat. Therefore the army would have to act as if the order had been given, issuing irs own implementing orders orally rather than in writing. He. Kinzel, would see to it Chat the army was covered "in the General Staff channel". On 29 January, Kinzel prevailed on Kuechler IO at least report ro Hitler that the Eighteenth Arm)' was splir into three pans and could nor hold any k.ind of a from forward of the Luga River. Lindemann began withdrawing his main forces on the night of 27/28 January, leaving rearguards to prorect his movement)9

Fediuninsky's forces accelerated their pur uit on 27 January and reached the Luga River on 30 January, seizing small bridgeheads on the river's sourhern bank. At the same rime, Maslennikov' cxxm and eXVIl Rifle Corps pressed German

1944 -LlBERATIO

army and corps commanders for operating too slowly, exercising poor command and control and using unrealistic linear tactics.

Recriminations also resounded in German ranks as Kuechler accused Lindemann of submitting fa lse eseirnaees of Soviet reserves at the end of December, For his part, Lindemann admitted "mistakes had been made. Amidst this exchange, grim tidings overwhelmed borh commanders as news arrived that Soviet forces were on the outskirts of Krasnogvardeisk and had smashed through the bend of the Luga River southeast of Luga. Though Lindemann tried to parch up his front by throwing in rear-echelon troops by the day's end on 24 January he grudgingly admitted that his right flank had lost canmer wirh the Sixreenrh Army and that Krasnogvardeisk would fall within 24 hours. Kuechler asked for Hider's permission to withdraw at least to rhe Luga Line. but that night Zeltzler at OKW told Kuechler that Hitler's orders were to hold [he corner posts and make the trOOps fight [Q the lasr, Since there was nothing else to do for the time being, he advised the army groupcommand TO be "a little ruthless" for a willie.

Fediuninsky's forces continued their advance along the Krasnogvardeisk-Kinglsepp railroad on 24 January, but made only modest prog,ress against determined German resistance. On the same day

BllOW: E.ven with. the ground l~king less than sn.owtovered, these In IGlltrym.e n an s tiD wearing their filthy camouflage smocks. Given the en.vious glantes being cast by his comrade, the soldier on theleh may be drinking something imore polent than wa.ler [romhJs mess-tin!

ABOV,E: Marshal ollhe Soviel Union Leonid Govorov, wilD comm.Gllded the Leningrad Fronl at Ihe beginning of 1944. A very capable comman.der, he had led the Fifth Army during Zhukov's 1941 counleroHensive Glld look pa:rt in Ihe delence 01 Leningrad theremter.

forces back towards Krasnogvardeisk against dwindling resistance, and his ex Rifle Corps end 79Th Fortified Region captured Pusbkin and Slursk, Lindemann men began shifting forces westwards from Krasnogvardeisk [0 keep open his withdrawal routes to Kingisepp,

The Bartle for Krasnogvardeisk proper began early on 2S January when Masleunikov's forces attacked German defences afrer a lO-mlnure fire raid.60 His CV1U R:ifle Corps and 120dl Tank Brigade had advanced 5km (3.1 miles) by me day's end. curr.ing rherail line west of the town, but had encountered a German infantry barralion with 15 anti-tank guns and a company of Tiger tanks, which brought the advance to an abrupt halt. After regrouping, the force resumed rhe attack and fought it way into the town's northwestern ecnon JUSt as eXVll Rifle Corps' "[10th Rifle Division penetrated into the town's northeastern section. After an all-night bartie, [he l20th Rifle Division captured Krasnogvardeisk [he following morning. laslennikov's army pursued,

162

capturing the irnportanr German supply base at Volosovo and reaching the Luga River on 30 January, while Covorov once again shuffled his forces.61

While Fediuninsky and Maslennikov's armies were advancing to the Luga River, the Sixry-Sevenrh Army, on Govorov's left flank, advanced on Push kin, lutsk and Tosno against stubborn German opposition. Sviridov's CVIII Rifle Corps captured UI'ianovka late on 24 January and, after capturing Pushkin and Slursk, his CX Rifle Corps reached the lzhora River.H.owever, there viridov halted his advance temporarily, wasting anexcellenr opporrunity to encircle and destroy the. GeTman forces southeast of Slursk, As the Germans accelerated their withdrawal, the Sixry- eventh Army continued its advance capturing Tosno and the western sector of the once formidable Rollbahn line on 25-26 January. Late on 26 January Govorov once again scolded hisarmy commanders for their slow pursuit, regrouped h.is forces and issued new orders.62

Sviridov's revised orders required his SixtySeventh Army ro advance towards Siverskii and Luga, protect the Forty-Second Army's right flank, and help rhe Volkhov From destroy German forces ill the Liuban and Chudovo region to the southeast. Sviridov's ann)' resumed irs pursuit on 27 January, bur its eXVII Rifle Corps ran inro heavy resistance southeast of Krasnogvardeisk where L Army Corps and the 12th Panzer Division were protecting XXVI and XXVIII Army Corps' withdrawal from me Tosno and Liuban regions.61 Joined by CX Rifle Corps the fWO corps finally overcame the stiff German resistance and captured Siverskii late 00 30 January albeit with considerable difficulry . .64

Whi.le Govorov's armies were advancing towards Kingisepp and Luga Ieretskov's armies advanced on Luga £rom rhe east and northeast. Srarikov's Eighth Army began irs pursuitearly on 21 January linked up with the Sixty-Seventh Army at Mga, and approached [he Tosno and Ushaki sector of me Rollbahn line late on 24 January.6l That night, Srarikov turned his forces and sector over to the Filiry-.Founh Army and moved with his headquarter to the front's left wing, where he took control of forces on the Fifty-Ninth Army's left flank on 26 January. On Starikov's lefr flank, Roginsky's FiftyFourth Army advanced 25km (15.6 miles] in five days but was then halted by heavy German resisranee near Liuban along the RoHbahn line.66 On 25 January Meretskov assigned most of the Eighth Army's forces to the Fifty-Fourth Army, designating them the new cxrx Rifle Corps.

163

Rogin ky reinforced army re timed i advance during the night of _5/26 January captured To no and U haki and reached the railroad southeast of LiubanF The next day Lindemann withdrew the

pani h Legion from Liuban to Lugs and abandoned Liuban. \Virh the caprure of hudovo the ame day Ragin ky' forces controlled the entire length of the Okriabr railroad, the main link between Mo cow and Leningrad. Fearing en ir lernent after their 10 of Liuban and hudovo Ill Army orp accelerared it withdrawal toward Lu a with the Fifty-

Fourth my in pur uit.6

Failure Along the Luga Axi

Korovnikov' Fifty-Ninth Army po ed the greatest threat to xxvm and XXXVLlI Army Corp, bur only i hi army could reach Luga and cur off The rwo corp' withdrawal route After apturingovgorod and regrouping his army, Korovnikov re umed hi o fen ive on 21 January through difficult terrain that required ignificant engineer upport to urmounr.w Korovnikov' V[ Rifle orps area ked westward through Bater kii to Luga v irh Xll Rifle Corp on the right and XIV Rifle orp attacking ourhwesrward towards hirnsk on the left. VII Rifle Corps, in second echelon, was eo fill the gaps between VI and XTV Rifle Corps and e rploit to Peredol'skaia

ration on the Leningrad-Dna railroad line ourheast of Luga. Meretskov reminded Korovnikov that hi for e could Cut off and de troy German forces withdrawing from the OSDO Liuban hudovo and

ovgorod region if be ad all ed de i ively, Despir Merer ko optimi m, Korovnikov advance quickly got bogged dov n. lr did 0 becau e Kuechler under. rood the peril he faced, and quickly reinforced his defences at the junction of his Sixteenth and Eigbteenth Annie with combat group drawn from other army group ector,70

The advance by Korovnikov' VI Rifle orp and -9th Tank Brigade faltered badly on 24 January after only minimal ain .-. Wor c till, in read f committing his Ire h vn Rifle orp along the Barer kii axis Korovnikov ordered it to advance

ourhs ard rov ards him k and Peredol'skaia ration a decision that overe 'tended hi arm)' and ultimately resulted in failure along the Luga axis.

ubsequeutly, the Fi fry-Nimh rrny' advance

turned into a slugfesr in difficult terrain, as the troops waded forward in wai r-deep water with their upporting ranks and artillery lagging far behind. An increasingly disrrau hr Merecskov demanded that Korovnikov oncenrrate his force

and aprure Luga no later than _9- 0 January. However, de pice Mercr k ,," entreatie ,I Rifle orp made little progrc . in four dar of heavy fighting along the Barerskii-Luga railroad."l

Popov' Offensive

'\1 hile VI Rifle Corps advanced toward Luga at a11

agonizingly low pace Korovnikov' [J and Xl

Rifle orp made deceptively greater progre 011 the army' left flank. In a ra id cia h through rhe

\ amp, II Rifle orp and a ornpan ing 7th Guard Tank Brigade reached the out kin f Peredol' kaia rarion late on 27 January in cooperation with the irh Partisan Brigade. VII Rifle Corps also captured Medved from the th Jager Division curring The Luga- hirnsk road, and XlV Rifle Corps and rhe 16[h Tank Brigade cleared German forces from the western shore of Lake 11 men reaching the our kim of hirnsk late on 2 january" ince Meter kov had not anticipated advancing thi far

ourh he ordered the 1 -Oth orrified Region to defend rhar ector and Xl Rille Corp to rum northea r and reinforce [he attack on Luga. To re olve ommand and control difficulties, ere' kov ordered rarikov' Eighth Army to take control of forces on the Fifty- inth Anny' (and hi Front's) left f1ank?~ tarikov' new army included VII and

IV Rifle Corps, the 7th Guard, 122nd and 16rh Tank Brigade, and the 150th Fortified Region. This left Korovnikov's Fifry-Nimh Army with only VI and II Rifle orp and the 29th Tank Brigade with whi h to capture Barer kii and Lu a and Oredezh to the north.

Govorov ordered Korovnikov to continue his advance on Luga protected by a single rifle division on hi right fiank.-; At the arne time. Srarikov's Eighth Army on Korovnikov' left, wa to capture Peredol' kala tation Utorgo hand Pliu a, envelop Luga from the ourh and utheast and capture Luga in .cnjun ti n with the ifty- Jinth rmy.

Irhough the redeployment of hi Eighth rmy wa de igned co shorten [he Fifry- imh rmy' from significantly and ea e command and ontrol, it did nor do o. When Korovniko re urned hi advance on 17 januar hi VI Rifle Corp' arrack wiled along the railroad ea to Barerskii, while 11j Xll Rifle Corps fought irs way across the Luga River and advanced to within 1 krn (J 1.2 mile) of Oredezh on 30 January. However, the weakn of the 2nd Rifle Di i ion on it right flank and Korovnikov' la k 0

re erve permitted Ill Army Corp ro es ape

from the hudovo region.~6

ABOVE~ To the victors the spoils_ Following the fighling ond the speeth moking, these Soviet soldiers prep ore 10 eot ond drink from supplies "liberated" from the Germons.

Korovnikov' failure ro capture Luga meant that a succe sful advance on Lugs rested in the hand of

tarikov' Eighth Army. H we er before fulfilling the rnis ion a igned t him by derer kov, tarikov had to aprure Peredol' kaia ration whi h wa no mean ra k. Although hi VII Rifle Corp and the 5th Parti an Brigade had captured Peredol kala ration early on 27 January, thereafter the srarion changed hand three rimes in heavy fighcing as the Germans cornrnirred fre h re erves to the fight, forcing

rarikov to commit all 0 his reserve . - War e till the Fifty- inch Arm ' VI Rifle orp lagged far behind, for ing VU Rifle OIP [Q defend it right flank \ hile weakening ir fa ce artacking coward the we t. Alrhough VIJ Rifle orp managed to advance everal more kilometres we rward by 30 january and cut rhe Leningrad-Duo railroad, Srarikov's army failed ro accomplish irs rnis ion and Luga remained firmly in German hand. ince the Fifty-Ninth and -igj1thrmles low advance toward Luga threatened to di rupt it plan to cut off and d troy German f rce north and ea t of

uga the 'laIJka in i ted that Mcree k v ut [he

164

road and railroad south 0 Luga no later rhan 30-31 January, ending him rein orcernenrs." However Merer kov' force failed to do 0.,9

While Govorov and lererskov's force were plodding orward toward Kingisepp and Luga Popov' econd Balri Front planned to mount a new offen ive again t Army roup [orth ixteenth Army to support the offen ive to the north. After halting hi earlier offensive north and we t of

ovosokol'niki Popov regrouped his force and prepared a new offensive.so However, The ixteenrh Army dete ted the arrack preparations, withdrew from I ovosokol'niki on 30 January and occupied new defen e to the northwest. The Twenty- econd and Tenth Guard Annie pur ued, but halted in front of the new G rman defences. The econd Balrie From ina ti iry and feeble pur uit allowed [he ixreenrh Army to di par h reinforcement to the Eighreenth Arm>' right flank, which helped cop the Eighth and Fif . -Ninth Armies' advance on Luga. 1

In more than two weeks of heavy combat Govorov's and Merer kov's forces had penetrated German defence along [he entire rom from the GuJ of inland to Lake Il'men inflicting a major de ea r on rhe Eighteenth Army. While doing 0, their force drove German f fee DOkm (62.5 miles) outh and outhwc t of Leningrad and Okm (50

165

GRAD 1941-l944

miles) west from ovgorod, and cleared German force from the main railroad line between Moscow and Leningrad. How ver lererskov' forces had failed [Q capture uga by 30 January and 0 the Eighteenth rmy managed to withdraw it force relatively intact from Leningrad and the Iga Chudovo, Liuban and ovgorod region. 'ii hill' Kuechler ucceedcd in e rablishing a nev defence line protecting Luga and hi. viral withdrawal route to P ko the Red rmy had once and for all raised the blockade of Leningrad and put [he enrire Eighteenth Army in jeopardy.

Although the Batrle for Leningrad did nor formally end until 10 ugu t 1944 when Red Army forces dro e the la t xi forces &om every square metre of the leningrad region the battle was really over by 30 January 1944, when the German threat to Leningrad ended. Thereafter, it rook unril 1 March for rhe Red Arm to expel German forces from the outhern portion of the Leningrad region and until J 0 Augusr ro dri e Finnish force OUt of rhe northern Leningrad region.

Govorov and Merer kov's advance on arva

and Luga \ as slow and arduous and de pite their besr effort a badly haken Eighteenth (my managed (0 limp back to the Panther Line, where it haired the Red Army's advance. Early in the fighting, Hider replaced the haplcs Kuechler with hi favourite fighting general, Field Mar hal '\ alter Model and the latter attempted in vain to restore [he root near Luga by an artful ombinarion of stubborn defence and counterartack . While the

1944 - LIBERATIO

LEFT: As the Red Army pressed forward the Germon frontline broke. Among the Soviet troops inspecting the German d efen c e scan be seen several mountedflgures.

The Red Army made great use of mounted scouts ond did not disband its last cavalry units until the 19505.

On JO JW1C Govorov's Leningrad Front began the Vyborg operation to drive Finni h force from the Karelian Isthrnu . The Twenry-First, TwentyThird and later, Fifty- Iinth Armies srna hed Finni h defences recaptured the i thrnus, and seized Vyborg on 20 June, bur were rhen rebuffed in their attempt to peneuate deeper into Finland between 2"' June and 13 July.

irnulraneou Iy, the Karelian Front commanded by General Ierer kov who wa a igned command 0 rhe From after the Volkhov Front was disbanded in February 1944 conducted the virPetroza odsk offen ive operation de igned ro lear

inni h forces rom central Karelia. The operation by rhe evenrh eparare and Thirty-Second Armies which lasted until 9 August developed in two stage during which Red Army force liberated rhe terri ory between Lake nega and Ladoga westward to the 19 innish- ovier border. The Barrie for leningrad formally ended on JO Augu r [he day after the Red Army completed expelling all axis forces from every square metre of rhe

eningrad region.

The eningrad, olkhov and e ond Baltic

Front Leningrad- ovgorod offensive \I as irnmen ely significanr. irst and foremost, by liberating Leningrad it rai ed the oviet population' morale inspired the ovier Union' allies, and had a cru hing effe t on errnan morale. hill' represeming the fir r rage of the Red Army' winter offensive it rook place imultaneously \ ith and supported major Red Army offen ives into Beloru sia and the Ukraine. During the course of 45 day r:j1e three

heavy fighting delayed [he ovier advance and led to complex and heavy fighting the die wa cast and Model' ef orr failed. Covorov hifted the bulk of hi armie again t M del Eighteenth Army and forced it ro abandon Luga. However, y virtue of their strenuous actions, Model' force managed to hold on to Narva and extract hi bartered Eighreenrh Army afely back to the Panther Line by the end of ebruary by which time Popov econd Baltic Front had joined the oviet we t\ ard advance. Having cleared mo t of the ourhern Leningrad region 0 German, ovier forces attempted [Q penetrate rhe Panther Line bur failed. There the from rabilized until the summer.

Although the ovier Novgorod-Luga offen ive ended the German threat to Leningrad, Finnish orces still occupied positions only 30km 08.7 miles) from rhe city, whi h they had seized in me

urnrner of 1941. The Finni h Army remained in tho e positions for alma t three years [Q Hider's annoyance doing little or norhing to contribute to the barrie for Leningrad. However, their very presen e repre enred a threat, an embarrassment and a

on tanr reminder of the indignities the ovier Union had suffered in 1941. Therefore, after the ovier government failed to drive Finland from the war by diplomatic mean in rhe spring of 1944 in June the Red Arm did a militarily; On 10 June 1944, the Leningrad and Karelian Front conducted military operation to recapture their 10 r rerrirori , punish the Finns for allying with Germany, and drive finland from the war.

RIGHT: Killed In action.

A Red Army convoy drives pas t D German grave yard in Ropsha on the outskirts of Lenlngrad_ The small (hurch had been used by the Wehrma(ht as a place of worship during the y~rs of the siege.

166

fronts smashed deeply echeloned defences the enemy had erected over a period of rwo year , defeated Army Group 10m's Ei hreenth Army and raised the Leningrad blockade. By the end of February, Red Army forces had liberated all of Leningrad and parr of the Kalinin region and entered Soviet Estonia. in the pro e saving million of Soviet citizens from German lavery. The offen ive opened me Mo cowLeningrad railroad line gave the Baltic Fleer freedom of action and created prerequisites for driving Finland from rhe war.

The three Red Army Fronts inflicted evere lose on rhe German Eighteenth and Sixteenth Armies during the operation completely destroying three divisions and severely damaging '12 of the Eighteenth Army's divisions and five of the Sixteenth Army's.si However, it did so at a considerable cost in Red Army soldiers' lives. ut of a force of 22,000 troop omrnirred to battle the three Fronts suffered 313 9-3 ca ualries, including 6,686 dead captured or missing.S)

The Red Army performed several noteworthy feats in the operation. Initially, it ecreti transferred the entire Second hock Army and large amounts of artillery into the Oranienbaurn bridgehead. Then it conducted simultaneou offensives 200lan (12S miles) apart against the Eighteenth Army' flank weakening that arm ' defences at Leningrad proper. ~ hile it failed [Q de tro the Eighteenth Army, ultimately it dro e it forces back to . arva and [be Panther Line. The rv in offensives

panned a 400km (2S0-mlle) front and reached ro a depth of 300km (187.5 miles) in 47 days ar an

16

RAn J94 1-1944

~

~ % ~

Vuoks.almr

III

F!lkk~

98

110

GULF OF FINLAND

o

50 Miles

~--------~------~

25

o

40

80Km

Sovl et F.rontll nes

10 June 1944 11 June 1944 20 June 1944

15 July 1944

average advance rate of 6. ikrn (four mile) per day. Covorov and Meret kov employed ho k g.roup which concentrated on 10-12 per em of the from ro conduct their penetration oper rion , and u ed

econd echelon re erve and frequent regrouping ro u rain their offen ive into the operational depth _

de ignared to ondu [ main attack deployed in two e helens of rifle corp with exren ive artillery supporr. he e and hock and Forty- e and Armies employed ami-rank re elves, rank re erves and mobile ob fa Ie derachmenrs while the Ferry-Second Army u ed a SHang mobile rank group rogerher with a combined-arms re erve.B4 Within the annie, [he rifle corp arta ked in one, tWO or three echelon depending on the iruatlon and a a rule. rifle division formed in ingle echelon, along with a re erve co

i

Throughout the region, it became quire difficult to carry out amrnurutron and food re- upply and evacuate rhe wounded, While ar illery wa imrncn ely valuable when supporting penetration of trong German defences ami reducing rrongpoints, it proved less u eful during operation aero s difficult terrain because it u ual1y lagged

orne 20-l"km (12_ --1 -.6 mile) behind the advancing infantry. Bad weather condition and the shortage of bombers alsu limited aviation support, even though long-range aviation rook up

orne of the la k.

The Red Arm)' eneral raff later identified major deficien ie in the offen ives rhat hindered operation in the cliffi ulr terrain. Poor engineer reconnai ance and a horrage of engineer for es made manoeuvre difficult for rank and artillery and. at rime, even for infantry. ince it wa ofren easier to manoeuvre from depth [han laterally, rhe value of mobile dera hrnenr operating alan the ew existing road in rea ed

harply, The wampy and fore red road I even if frozen, al 0 inhibited rhe establi hmenr of effe rive c mrnuni arion . Bad terrain and rhe frequent di - per al afforce along separate axe made wire omrnunicarion impo ible and forced unir r rei}" on radio, which were often in short upply

J {any other deficiencies identified by the

eneral raff mirrored those apparent in previou operation. For example, intelligen e organ failed

to re onnoirre rhe terrain and erman d fence

adequately, and rhi had an adver e impa r of rhe effectivene of artillery preparari nand upporring barrage. omrnander tended to di p,!!r e their

LAKE LADOGA

• Tarplla

115

MUlilalovo -

115

TV

[j

II

Shlilillel'bur9·

ABOVE! TIle Soviet Vyhorg oReniive operation, I 0 Jun~ 1 S July 1944, Wllj Ih.e la1:t act in the siege 01 Leningrad drama. Compared 10 the lighting in the soulh againsl Army Group

North, the offensive aga:inst the tlnns was relatively straightftlfward and bloodless.

RIGHT: Soviet artillery

pounds Army Group North os il retreats through the Balti, states in mid-1944. The German.s managed to loll back 10 Riga, but by the end 01 Septemher 1944 Goyorov's leningrad Front had deared 011 German forces from E.slonla except the Bolti, Island.s.

generate the maximum 0 fensive momentum. Hov ever orne armies failed to ornmir their econd e bel n III timely or effe ive fa hi n, thereby weakening rhe force 0 rhe main arta k.Si In addition, army commander failed ro capitalize on their artillery, rank, engineer and aviation upparr, and neglected ro employ manoeuvre when arrem ring to capture rrongpoinr and fortified region. a result, rhe in anrry advan e through rhe wamp)' and forested terrain degenerated into progre i e gnawing through uc c. ive rm n defen line.

16

forces in an apparent artcmpr [0 arrack and win everywhere sirnultaneously, and often neglected ro concentrate uHicicnr force to achieve deci ive penctrari nand advance along main attack axe. During operation commanders exerci cd weak command and conrrol and either neglected entireIy or ineffectively conducted night operarions. '\ or e rill, both tank and artillery lagged behind, depriving the in -antr, of critica I a rriller and tank support when they most needed it. Finally, when it did occur, upply wa either late or inadequate forcing unit [0 operate without nece ary ammunition, fuel or food ruffs, he f raging rhar inevitably re ulred further redu ed the unit' combar effecri ene .

AU of the e problems slgnificanrly redu ed [he rare of advance and prevented rhe encir lemem and destruction of many otherwi e vulnerable German orce . Mo r imporrandy, raff at rhe From army and corp level la ked experience in the condu t of large- ale offen i e operation - and it h wed.

ne notable exception [0 chi rule wa rhe po irive role rhar the parri an played. Pam an brigade, regiment • dcra hrnent and mall gr up conducted reconnai ance and diver ionary work during the prcpararory period.

Despite these horrcornings, neither the evicts nor [he erman discounted the Red rrny' achievement . The Leningrad-I ovgorod ffen ivc wa it rna r ucce ful 0 en ive r dare. Its re ulr , the liberation f eningrad, ob iared rhe need for any more a' ault a • in r crrnan force in the whole of the

eningrad re ion.

169

CHAPTER 10:

c

SI

For three long years Leningrad had endured great hardships. Tens of thousands of men, women and children had been killed by enemy bombs and shells and starvation, while hundreds of thousands of Red Army troops had died trying to

liberate them. The failure of Army Group North to take the city stands as a lasting testament to the heroism and self-sacrifice of the Russian people.

he Battle for Leningrad justifiably cupi a legendary place in [he Red Arm truggle during it .rear Parri ric War, if 01), be .au e

[he city acknowledged as the birthplace of rhe Bolshevik Revolution, represented both a forrre of

ocialisrn and Ru sian national idenriry and a rna - sive example of heroism on an unprecedented cale, While the suffering and fare of Leningrader during me ciry's three-year siege had rremendou political importan e for irs military defender and the ovier people a a whole, its su cessful defence and ultimate liberation had an even greater impact on th country morale.

The Red Army de encc of Leningrad, i~ UllmerOU and ofren tragic attempts to rai e the icge, and its liberation 0 the city in early 1944 reflected and affected the oviet Union's wartime military traregy. During [he initial period of war in 194 I, the Red Army's orrhern (Leningrad) and I orchwe tern Fronrs and evenrh eparare rmy were the fir e Red Army force to bait the seemingly inexorable German Barbaro a tide. The Red Army onducted a renaciou though co r1y defence on rhe approaches to the city contained erman force ill the iry' sourhern suburb and though the iry wa nearly totally blockaded, thwarted German arcempr to complete the city'S encirclement from [he east. In

LEfT: A Soviet propaganda poster of Stalin in Leningrad. The Soviet dictator, who had made strenuous efforts to save the tity during the war, became jealous of its fome and .h.ose luminaries of the siege in the yean immediately afterwords. It is rumoured that he had a hand in the death of Zhdonav in Augu.st J 948.

overnher ] 941 the Red Army conducted it fir t successful count roffen ive of the war again r the '\ ehrrnachc at Tikhvin and Volkhov. In the proce , it exhau ted rmy Gr up orth, began bleeding it white, and forced the Germans to go on [be defence in the entire Leningrad region. This feat challenged enduring German mi conceptions about the morale fighting spirit and raying power of the Red Army and confounded Hitler' Operation Barbaros a.

The German' unexpected failure to capture Leningrad in epternber and October 194] bad farrea hing on equence . Fir t for [he first rime in

World ar Il at Leningrad the con epr 0

Blitzkrieg failed reinforcing what had begun to occur in July and Augu r at Smolensk and ami iparing \ hat would 0 ur at Moscow in December.

econd, Army Group orth's failure to capture Leningrad forced Hitler to alter his Barbarossa

trategy. Instead of eapruring Leningrad by a :wifr coup de main and then shifting forces to other axes, the desperate oviet defence of Leningrad between July and December forced the Wehrmacht to reinforce Army Group orth with 16 division and two

brigade including e en divisions from Arm

Group Centre. Thi weakened the main errnan drive on Mo cow, perhap fatally. During this mo t critical period of the war, 32 percent of the Wehrmacht' forces. operating north of the Pripiat Marshe , including alma r twO full panzer group, were tied down in combat along or adjacent [0 the northwestern axi .

Leningrad figured ignificantly in the tauka:

December 1941 ounreroffensive and [he Red

171

Liuban offensive rhe Volkhov Norrhwe tern and Leningrad Froncs' offensive at iniavino and Dernian k in rhe urnrner and fall of 1942 demon-

rrared continued Stauka re olve [0 rai e [he Leningrad blo kade. Although [he e offensi e al 0 failed they affected the \ ar in other more irnportam theatre by attracting large German forces away from outhern Ru ia and tying down German force in the Leningrad region. The threat of renewed Red Army offen 1\'C and Hitler's fixation on seizing Lenin' ciry compelled the Wehrmaht to dispatch its Eleventh Army ro the region in Augu r and eprcrnbcr at (he critical moment when the German were trying but failing to a hieve de i ive victory at ralingrad.

On e again, in early 194 rh taulca demon-

trared i concern for Leningrad and capitalized on the German defeat at talingrad by mounting Operation park to raise the blockade. Although the offensive fell far short of ovierexpectacions, i.t gave the lie to Gennan claims that leningrad wa in their pocket for the taking at any time and ended all German h pes of carving leningrad into ubmi ion. The partial penetration of the blo kade and the e rablishrnenr of ground omrnunicari n

with the it. dramatically improved the eningrad Front' military apabilities, and paved the way f r a erie of more powerful and ultimately more ucce Iul offel1 ive operation along the northwestern axis. The most ambitious of these offensive was Zhukovs Operation Polar Star, which for rhe fir r time ought CO implement a "larger elution to raising the Len ingrad iege by enveloping and defeating all of Arm}' Groul orth. nee it ab rted the operation al a yrnbolized the failure of the

tavka' entire grand de ign for a hieving vi tory in 1943. iII a larger en e, it also signalled the birth of a new, more ober appreciation on the parr of the tauka of whar would be required to achieve vi rory in the future.

In the summer and fall of 1943 while rnornearous events were unfolding at Kur k, Ore], Smolensk, Khar'ko and along rhe nepr Ri er, and, later. in ea tern Belorussia and rhe Ukraine, the

tavka reru ned [Q a " mailer olurion" of rhe pro - lem of rai ing the Leningrad blockade. During rhi period, it relied on a combination of major ovicr o fen ive el ewhere along rhe from and limitedobjective offen ive in the Leningrad region. WhiJe the Leningrad and Volkhov Front' arrempr to envelop and de rroy German forces in the ga,

ABOVE: Uke ten.s of thousands 01 others, these Red Army troops on patrol near Leningrad were determined thot the city would nol loll to the Nllzls, Their sacrifice was not a consequence of NKVD pressure or olher threats; rather, a love of Mother Russia, its people, culture and history.

Army fir r rraregi offen ive in the winter of 1941--42 during whi h rhe tal/ka allocated its new Volkhov Front and four fre h armie , including rhe Second Shock Arm)" to combat in the Leningrad region. It u ed the bulk of the e force to conducr the Liuban offensive the fir T large- ale offensive de igned to envelop German for e sourh of Leningrad and rai e the blockade by all advance we rward from [he olkho River. hile dem n-

rraring ir re olve ro rai e the blockade, the dramati bur tragic and co tly failure educated rhe tal/ka on how difficult operation in rhi region were and wou.ld continue [0 be,

In the slimmer of 1942, the tauka adopted a .. maller olurion" ro the problem of raising the Leningrad blockade by ana king to e tabli h a corridor to Leningrad throu h iniavino while disrra ring rhe German with offen ives near Dernian k. lthough maller ill ale than [he

1 2

iniavino and To no region and significantly widen rhe hlis el'burg corridor failed after only limited gain, they did ric down ignificanr German force and bled rm)' Group North white. The e fierce costly, bur largely ineffective offensives so weakened the German army group rhar by the fall of 1943 it wa clearly no longer capable of with tanding another major Red rrny offen ive,

Becau e it under rood how weak rrny Group

orrh wa and be au e the rai ing of the eningr d bl kade wa till a high-priority objective, the tat ka began irs 1 44 '\ inter ampaign in the Leningrad region before expandin it to the enrire ovierGerman from, In January, rhe Leningrad and Volkhov From joined later by the econd Baltic Front. began large-scale offen ive operations that ultimately endured through the summer, From mid-January through February, the Leningrad, Volkhov and

econd Bald From defeated Army Group orth, raised the Leningrad blockade and liberated [he

BELOW: The troops of Army Group North lought wilh tenacity and skill during the three-year siege, but the army group was gradually 5tripped of units to (ombol emergencies on other sectors of the front. This meant thlll it was increa5ingly unoble to lighten Ih.e blockode from early 1943 onwards ..

[73

ABOVE: Horse-drawn transport on the "Road af life". The ice route across Lake Ladoga, though IJnable to bring in all that the city required, and in range of German artillery and Luftwaffe airaaft, undoubtedly saved Leningrad from starving in the winter of 1941-42.

southern half of the Leningrad region. By doing 0, they paved the way for rhe liberation of the Baltic region and the defeat of ony Group entre in Beloru ia in the ummer of 1944. During the urnrner

ampaign the Leningrad and Karelian Front completed liberation of [he eningrad region by defeating Finni h force on the Karelian lsthmu and in ourhern Karelia, and forcing Finland to leave the war.

Throughout the wa r, operation in the Leningrad region tied down between 15 and 20 percent of all Axi force operating on the German Ea tern Front. At the arne time, Red Army forces operating along the north we rem axi also uHered roughly 12-15 percent of the army' \ artime asualries.

ltimarely, the Red Army de troyed or eriou Iy damaged -0 German and Finni h divi ions in the region. However, despite the heavy fighting for a variety of political, geographical and military reasons the tauka did not consider the northwestern theatre as the most viral strategic axi in the war. That honour belonged to (he vital western ( 0 CO\ - Iinsk- War a' -Berlin) and at times, the

ourhwestcrn (Kiev-Khar'kov- ralingrad) strategic a I where. like the German the tavka well understood that it had to a hieve victory if it was ro

Likcv i e rhe Red rrny's vicrory at eningrad in earl)" 1944 paved the way for 0 ier i tory in Beloru ia and rhe western Ukraine in rh ummer of 1944 by weakening the Wehrmacht overall and by releasing fresh. large reserves for employment along other critical axes. Mosr importanrly however. throughout rhe war Leningrad symbolized the

ovier Union' and Red Army's re iJien e, raying power and will to achieve ulrirnare vi rory.

prevail in the war, Tberefore, both the \i ehrrnachr and the Red Army can i reurly concentrated [heir most i mporran[ offensive and defensive efforts along these axe. However, [his shared appreciation al a made it impossible for either side to win along the we [ern axi unless they woo elsewhere. In

horr the German could n [ capture Mo cow in L941 1942 or 1943 unle and until they weakened ovier defence along [be Mo cow axi by operating ucce full, along other axe. onver ely. after

defeating rmy Group Centre at ' loscow in 1941 and 1942 and at Rzhev in late 1942, the Red Army appreciated rhar if could nor win along the western axi unle s it achieved victory el ewhere.

\'\lirhin thi COntext, the Red rmy' victory at Tikhvin conditioned it victory at Mo cow, and its partially u ce sful and failed offen ive in 1942 and 194 onrribured marginally ro rhe Red Army' victorie along the western and outhwe tern axe.

The Defence at Leningrad

The Battle for Leningrad made ignifi ant onrribu[ion, both po irive and negative, to the evolution of what the ovier and Russians term military art, which encornpa ses [he realms of military traregy operational art and tactic .. Despite defeat of catastrophic proportions, severe shortage of huma n and material re ource and appalling terrain and weather condition the tauka, Red Army fron and the Leningrader rhernselve organized rb uccessful defence of the city in the ummer, fall and winter of 1941. While conducting a stubborn, a t· I)' and often de perate defence along rhe approaches ro Leningrad the tauka also incorporated a degree of "offen ivene 'in it defence that rno t hisroria n have si nee overlooked.

The hort but exceedingly violent Red Army counter troke or anized by Varutin and Zhukov at Sol'rsy in JuJy at taraia Rus a in August and at Krasnoe elo and i [ga in August and eptember 1941 played an enormous role in the u es ful defence. The e ounrer rroke and other counterattack urpri ed the German seriou Iy di rupred their offen ive plan, and forced rhem to di per e their for e weaken their shock groups and ignificantly alter their attack axes, slowing their advance and winning rhe time necessary (0 erect stronger defences along key operational axes. As a result, the closer the German advanced reward Leningrad, the fiercer rhc re i lance became. Although German force ucceeded in reaching Lake Ladoga and in blo kading the city from the land they ould not capture it, Given time to mobilize, Leningrad' defender thwarted every German attempt to capture the city.

Leningrad' defences set new standard of sophi - tication for the defence of a modern major city. Operating skillfully under the mo r trying of circumstance the I lorthern and eningrad Front erected com pie and deeply echeloned defence along the mo t riti al outhern and outhwe tern approa he [0 the it}' rha inc rporared the entire

174

depth of the blockaded regi nand rhe iry i elf. For the first rime during the war. the defence can i ted of multiple fortified defen ive line, in orporating conrinuou tren h line, defensive region, po itions and line and ortified regions, which while durable, also permitted forces to manoeuvre. The defence incorporated trenches, Fortificarioru (pillboxes and bunker ), I' Ten ive obstacles overhead cover for trOOP and anti-artillery anti-tank and anti-air raft defen e in the ciry itself. Mo t imporrandy, for rhe fir r rim in the rwenrieth enrury, the defence of the iry worked. ubsequenrly the uccessful defence of Leningrad genera red practical experience that contributed to the defence of OTher cirie , su h a ralingrad, and the content of numerou Red Army directive, regulations and in trucrion on the defence of cities and defen e in genera I. he e techniques al 0 proved valuable to

he Red rm, when it conquered German-o cupied me uch a Poznan, Bre lau, Budape t and Berlin. or rhe first time in recent military history the Leningrad and olkhov Fronts solved the problem of defeating a large blockading force and rai ing a iege by operation from in ide and out ide the

be ieged ciry. De pin: the privation wrought by the

iege and the often har h weather condition, the Leningrad Front organized it own attack from wirhin the ciry and, ucce fully broke out, defeating a trong enemy grouping in the proce . it accompli hed this feat, however, only after repeated failure and with rhe vital a i ranee of the olkhov Front attacking from the out ide. Thi required close co rdinarion ben een (be tWO from attacking from within and from \ irhour, which they did nor achieve unril januarj 1943.

Example of Deep Echeloning

The Leningrad Front' Operation park in January 1943 which it condo ted across the ice of the I eva River again r well- prepared enemy defen es in winter co ditions, wa al 0 unique becau e it required

killfu] emplo menr and oordination of artillery and engineer ro cro the river ucce fully. Likewise, rhe Leningrad From s Operation eva (the Ropsha-Kra nee do offensive operarion) in January 1944 wa also unique in that the tWO force conducting the initial operarion were only 10-15km (6.25-9.3 mile) apart. Thi required deep echeloning to penetrate German defences and deaJ with enemy tactical and operational reserves. The offen-

ive killfully employed artillery upport and tailored as suit group to overcome enemy stron poinr .

I-

GRAD 1941-1944

However, these ucce sful operation were punctuated by a hOSI of major and minor offensive defeats, all characterized by similar mistakes and appallingly high Red Army losses. The Liuban disaster and me destruction of the Second Shock Army in July 1942 headed this undistinguished list of defeats, followed closely by rhe iniavino defeat of September 1942, when die new Second Shock Army once again perished. These and other defeats at

iniavino, Krasnyi Bor, Mga and Tosno in 1943 underscored how difficult it was for rhe Red Army to educate itself in the conduct of modern war, In these defeats, and even in other successful milirary operations, Red Army commanders often displayed ineptitude in reconnaissance, command and conrrol, combined-arms coordinarion and supporr, and the intricacies of sound logistical support. When they overcame these deficiencies rhey did so by a curiously Soviet combinarion of sheer force 0 will, callousness and cold brutality,

The Effect of Terrain

Admittedly, boththe Leningrad and Volkbov Proms conducted their operations in difficult terrain and equally difficult weather conditions. As rile German Army learned in 1941, even during Ole summer, [he forested, swampy and lake- and river-infested terrain severely inhibited military operations, In winter, when the temperarure often plummeted to -10 degrees Fahrenheit and periodic thaws puncruared periods of extreme frost, operations of any sort, and particularly offensive operations, became exceedingly difficult to conduct. This was particularly true when inexperienced commanders and forces operated wirhourcornmunicanons and adequate artillery and armour support against well-prepared and deep defence manned by the world's besr-rrained and most experienced Soldiers .. Even when adequately supported, the Red Army's offensive operations against strong German defences required artillery, infantry and tanks to manoeuvre constantly in often heavily restrictive terrain nndconduct river crossings over numerous major and minor rivers and streams.

Unlike in other theatres of war, rhe harsh terrain and weather conditions in the leningrad region inhibited manoeuvres by tanks and artillery and the movement of supporting forces and supplies of any sort, particularly 011 the offense, Thi meant that Red Army infantry had to perform the bulk of the defensive and offensive fighting" often in terrain that required them to operate in small groups separated from one another. In these conditions, artillery upport was c.ritical to

defen ivc and offensive success. Thu • the Leningrad Front used artillery [Q help defeat the German September assault on the city by firing irs artillery and employing aviation counter-preparation. Despite severe shortages of weaponry and ammunition, me artillery fire disorganized and weakened the German arrack sufficiently for infantry and tanks to hold out. Larer Red Army artillery played a viral role in penetradng the heavy German defences by softening up enemy defences prior [0 infanrry and tank assaults, in a direct fire mode to destroy specific German Strongpoints, and in a xounrer-benery role to counter German artillery.

Unlike other senors of [he from, where large tank forces proved decisive in achieving victory at Leningrad the Red Army had to operate and ulrimarely achieve victory without large-scale armour suppo.rt because the poor terrain, harsh weather conditions and limited road nerwork restricted the employment of tracked vehicles. Those small rank forces that operated in the region did so at considerable COSt. The two Pronrs employed separate tank brigades, regiments and battalions primarily in small groups [Q provide infantry suppOrt during penetration operations, or to suppor[ specific groups, such as advanced guards or forward detachmenrs during exploitation operations. In a few isolaced instances, tank forces formed rhe nucleu of mobile rank groups designated [Q complete penetrations or lead exploitations .. Additionally, for the first rime in the war, amphibious ranks participated in river-crossing operarions, for example, across [he I eva River in January 1943,

CO CLUSIONS

A80VE: To celebrale the end 01 Ihe three-yeOJ .siege, Lenmgraders decoroted their city as best they could, These wOlllen offite workers OJe putting up Soviet flags at Ihe enlrttn[e 10 their building.

he Question of Logi tics

Given the re mctive terrain, the absence of trafficable roads and the strong German defences, engineer and sapper forces played a vital role both in preparing defences and supporting offensive operations. On the offcnsivev engineers prepared roads and jumping-off positions, cleared mines and obstacles prior to and during penetration operations, supported river crossings, helped overcome strong German defences, and upported forces moving across difficult terrain. Often engineers were integrated into rifle regiments and divisions and specialpurpose task forces such as mobile rank groups and forward detachments.

The defence of Leningrad was the first instance when naval forces (Baltic Fleet and Ladoga Flotilla), aviation and air defence (PVO) forces were operationa II y su bordinaee to Front control .. Th i sperm i rted

the From commander to concentrate hi forces more effectively on the most important defensive and offensive missions. For example, the Staoka formed a special operational aviation group subordinate to the orthwestern Direction Command on 14 August 1941 and. two months Iarer, a similar group under the Leningrad Front. These groups, which centralized air forces under rhe Front commander and perrrurred him to employ them more effectively, erved as models for Red Army air armies fanned in 1942. Aviation in general, and long-range aviarion in particular; played an equally vital role in both defensive and offensive operations, even in times when aircraft were in short supply

Fin.ally, as is the case in any offensive or defensive military operation in allY war, logistics proved to be the single rno [ important constraint on achieving success in the defence and on the offens.ive. This was particularly true of the Leningrad Front, whose forces remained besieged and deprived of routine supplies in virtually every operation up to January

176

1944. To a lesser extent, me Volkhov Front faced the same problem given irs over-extended and often convoluted supply lines to Vologda, Moscow and the Soviet rear area. Rear-service forces also had [0 cope with the poor road nerwork and severe weather and terrain conditions. The most impressive logistical. feat during the Leningrad blockade was the construction and maintenance of rhe various ice roads across Lake Ladoga and between Leningrad, Kronshradt and the Oranienbaum bridgehead. At the same time, hundreds of logistical organizations at every level of command struggled to supply forces with the ammunition, fuel and food necessary to SUStain military operations. This was the case even after the blockade was lifted, since Red Army forces were advancing greer distances across regions torally laid co waste by the Germans.

Since the war's end, historians have tended' to crear military operations around leningrad as a sideshow to more momentous operations elsewhere along the Soviet-German front. They have focused primarily on the symbolic significance of the Leningrad defence and its population's brave and' stoic resistance. While these factors were important, so too were the military operations that took place in the region, even if many failed and they lacked

177

(he drama associated with more famous barril's in other front ecrors.

\ a the ca e \ ith the oviet Union a a \ hole the ommunisr Parry ruled supreme in aJI matter during the Leningrad blo kade. Part)' leaders uch a Zhdanov and Kuznersov and Party executive committees at the regional. district and city level, played a vital role in mobilizing the city' population and re ource for defence, organizing the defence it elf, and enforcing discipline, order and morale in the city and it defending forces. They did so while cia ely coordinaring with, and in some in ranees dominating military aurhoritie . It i no coincidence that the militarily incompetent Voroshilo pr ided over a many operation in the region and talin's cau tic henchman, Mckhli attended Meret kov during the failed Liuban offen ive,

In a ense, trier and at time, ruthless political

onrrol wa nece ary both to organize the city defen e 0 that ir auld urvive and to ounrer natural panic, defeati m and even instance of sabotage (hat characterized Leningrad's exi renee during the day when it wa mo [ imperiled. Mi1irarily, it wa al 0 required to ted rhe backbone of Leningrad' defender when they faced German at the it)' gate from late 1941 through 1942. The crude and ca llou ruth Ie snes 0 f Zhukov in eprember 0 incornprehen ible to We [ern ob erver in pea e or in war, takes on far rearer meanin when can idering the re ults of his actions. The old bard fact i that Leningrad wa aved in parr by his action, at a time when few even tal in, retained any hopes for

LEFT: .A.A. Zhdanov, head

of the lenJngrad Party Committee, flanked by Party and military officials, is seen here (ong:ratulating the 45th Order 01 lenin Rifle Divis'ion on receiving its Guards status. Such ceremonies were performed wilh lnneasing pomp as the war drew on and Russian pCl1riotism was enc.oufaged.

its salvation. On the other hand, there wa far les excuse for applying rhe arne rurhle methods in ] 942, '1943 and 1944 that had aved the city during the initial year of war. While the Liuban and

iniavino eli a ters in 1942 could be attributed £0 inexperience, the failure of the urnrner of 1943 could not. Ultimately, Govorov, ere kay and many of their army commander learned ho\ [0 operare effectively on rhc offen e. lnrere ringly enough, hov ever, they did nor do 0 in the summer un til rhei r of eusive aga in r rhe Fi n n in June 1944.

As many author have vividly pointed our Leningrad' population paid the greate [ pri e for the ciry' uc e fu] defence. They did so b. defending [he city a oldiers, air defender or auxiliarie , by manning rhe cit)" factories, and by simply surviving [he rigours of [be WOISt siege in recent hi tory.

Although Leningrader died by [he hundreds of thousand, rho e rhar remained continued at their posts until liberarion wa a ured, By virtue of [heir work, Leningrad's industry continued to produce and support rhe dry's defence throughout [he blockade. Their inten ive work in indu try and che upply effort created the re erve nece sary [0 nducr the january 1943 offensive and the sub equenr offensive rhar finally liberated the cit)' in J 944. After the blockade wa rai ed, indusrrial production incrca ed harply,

However, in human rerm the price f victory was appalling. Although it \ ill probably never be determined accurately, rbe COSt 111 civilian dead probably reached one million. While the

Extraordinary Commi sion for [he lnve rigaring of Nazi '\. ar Crime, which pre en ted it findings at the uremberg War rime trials after the \ ar' end, e timared that the blo kade produced 642,000 civilian dead, tlu figure repre ent rhe low end of [hi grue orne spe rrum, Recent e rimates place civilian 10 e at between 800,000 and one million. The 00000 figure iu: rapo eli Leningrad' prewar population of 2.5 million with it De ember 194 population of 600,000, and take into account (he one million evacuees and 100,000 Red Army coo-

criprs. The figure of one million include rhe roughly 642 000 ul wh died during the iege and another 400000 who peri hed or o then. .... i e disappeared during rhe evacuation.

The m i J i (a ry ca sua Ities were nearl y a staggering.

During the [\VO month of irs e·i renee, the Northern From 10 r 5.459 killed, caprured or mi ing and 62,905 \ ounded or irk for a total f 14 ,364 oldiers. It u essor, rhe Leningrad From, losr 467.,525 killed captured or mi sing and 1,2 ,3 wounded or ick for a total of 1,755,89 throughout four year of war. Two-third of these ca ualrie 0 urred during [he Bartle for Leningrad. The olkhov Front 10 r 298,62" killed, captured or mi ing. and 667,2'4 wounded or sick for a roral of

965,857 ca ua lries during its existence, Finally, in almost four years of war rhe Karelian Front suffered J J 0 4" - killed, aprured or mi ing and

09, 2 - wounded for 420260 total ca ualrie .

Fina II y, rhe Fourth. Fifty- econd and evenrh

eparare Armies lost roughly 56000 killed, caplured or III is i ng and 91,000 wounded or ick for a [Oral of 147,000 ca ualri over [he Course of their existence. By the war's end, by conservative official coum, [he fighring in rhe Leningrad region had co t the Red Army 1,017 81 killed, captured Or rnis - ing, and 2 418,185 wounded or sick for a [Oral los of 3 4 "706 oldier. Thi figure repre: enred just over 10 per enr of the Red rrny's 10 million wartime killed, captured or mi smg, more than 13 percent of i[ 18.2 million wounded or sick, and 12 percent of it. 28.2 millinn total casualrie .

Considering the norrhv estern strategic a is a a whole, one mu r al add the! orthwe tern, Baltic and econd Baltic Fronts' casualties. The

BElOW: Throughout the siege good relations between the cmned farces and the civilian population had beell encouraged. To this end, visiting 'he wounded was regarded by many as a serious duty. In this rase a young girl, dremd in her finest and taoking very heaJlhy, is delivering the posl 10 D. hospital ward.

THE SIEGE OF LENINGRAD 1941 1944

orthwesrern From 10 t 88 798 killed, caprured or mi ing 246,653 wounded or sick, for a [mal of 33- 4 -1 casualties between 1941 and 1943. In addition, from its formation in late 1943 to 1945, rhe Baltic From and its u e or, rh cond Baltic Front 10 t 39,5 9 killed, captured or mis ing and 152097 wounded or sick for a rota I of 2 - 127 casualti . When added to [he 10 e in the Battle for Leningrad, this re ulcs in 1,146,258 killed aprured or missing and 2,816925 wounded or sick, for a coral of 3,964 193 casualties suffered in fighting along the norrhwesrern strategic axi . The total represents 11.4 percent of rhe Red Army' total v arrime killed captilled or mi sing, 15.4 percent f it total wounded and sick, and 14 percent of i total wartime ca ualties. These percenrage reflect rhe relati e importance of the north v estern axi with re peer [0 the western, southwe rem and southern axe .

Thu , the number of soldiers and civilians who peri hed during the Battle for Leningrad amounted to the awesome [oral of between 1.6 and twO million soul. These figure a oelated witb the defence of a

ingle city are st." time greater [han [he United tale' total death roll during the entirery of World War 11.

In rhe broade r en e, the our e and outcome of the Bartle for Leningrad repre emed rhe entire Great

ABOVE: A child being evacuated from leningrad durIng the siege. Hiller had commented thol Ihe Slavs were "0 robbitlamlly who would never proceed beyond the family ossociotion if not for(ed to do 50 by a ruling don." But those ot leningrad 5UCC8SrluUy defied his so' tolled "moster race" for three years.

Patriotic War in microcosm. 111e fier e defence in mid-1941 rhe dramatic rebuff ro the errnans in lare 1941, me abortive attempt [Q penetrate the blockade in 1942, [he cracking of the blockade in 1943, and the unambiguous vicrorie of 1944 parallel the Red Army' fears elsewhere along the oviet-German front. However. while the turning point in the Red Army' fortunes on the ovier- Jerman from a a v hole 0 urred ben cell ralingrad in overnb 'f 194_ and Kursk in July 1943, that ruin in the north did nor 0 ur until January J 944. This was so becau e by ] 943 both id under rood mar rhe war would be won or lost along the western and southwestern axe.

Although rhe Barrie for Leningrad played a significant role in the war' ultimate outcome, irs role wa nor militarily decisive. In term of drama, symboli m and -heer human suffering hO\ ever, r.he Baule

or Leningrad ha no peer either in the Grear Patriotic War or in any other modern .. ar.

1 0

CHAPTER 1 NOTES

I Once fully d!l'lelope1l, me Cliy encompassed on oreD of 570 SQuers 'Ioo1enes (369 SQlRlle millIS), bofdaled on !he north by !he POIgolol'1l highlands, OIl me lOU1h by Illa PuI 01'1l, oudeJhol 000 lJgoI'o highlonGs, and on rOO emt by rOO KoJllI5bi highloods. I~ coosrol Cnmllle, chDlllnerized bv rmk! w!nte~ and fJequenl rhows. (Dnkam !Iw~y wffh Ihat or the ltilillim ~I Rlfilio. The cily's DiBrogB tempeJohJI8 ~ 7 9 degrea<i (0 ~ lmwmy ond 17.7 degrm in Ju~. The adjJKmlI New RiYal G generoily from I~ four mon 1M each VeGr.

2 !he cOIlSIlUction requl ed wooden pi as 00 driven inro the earTh 10 provide a firm Ioondalion.

3 $t. PetelYrurg remoined Illa Rlmian Emplle's copUol "om 1712, when Peter me Glenl moved hh (01111 ta IIrt ciiy, to 1728, when Ccthefine Ille Great';;cn 000 slKcessor, PeTir II, who dIsii ed lire ci1V.1M'Ied Ille fmpefiGl COUll bock to Masr.ow. AIlel Peter II's dwlh Q1 ege 1 S, h~ 1lJ((6lOI, Anne. IT'rO'IOO me oopital bock 10 51. Pelel5i1urg ml73t

4 Allhough 51. PetersbUlD often adipsed I.\os(ow, !he Jailer, whase papllla~an reached 306.000 in iS30 and 1,092,000 in 1905. grodool~ betome Russia's main cenfril of monufochJnng 000 trode. porHcolmfy 101 the rextile Industry, ond of intelleauol tlte, through Moscow Univriy.

5 These included V G. ~nnsky. N. G. OielllyW'lSky, N. A. Dobrolrubov and D. L PisDJ8'I.

II While IIrt old TIGris! Armv wos demobiliz~ in FeblUDry 1918 ond ilie Red Goord wos bellllJ lIonsf~ lmo 0 new Rod Amly, rOO iJt!lmollS odwncod on Pettogroo,. &lorussiu. the Ukmine Clltl OdemJ. The Ked Gooros' ond Red Army's fnillJl! 10 oolt lhe Germons forced Ill~ ROW BoIsIlevilljQ'1ammant 10 nego~olllihe Irealy of B r~I{jllmk. whiI h BSIDDtrShed !he Soviet Union's boidel olanq rhe Wl!SlBm boIdel 01 Pelrograd region.

7 A rotoJ of 110,000 Leninglllliers smed in the Red Army during the O'lil Wal. i\s a rasu1t, 05 Oecemoorl919 decree of Ihe 7th AlJ.Russilln (ongress 0 SovieTS OII'Orded!he I!ningrod proletario with the Ordel or lhe Red Booner.

8 Inhoomed Ollila lOth PuI1y (Ol1!lleSS, Ille Hew E<onomK PolICY (liEf) ~lied some PIMl e p!openy 10 ex~t in me IVfGlihJrol ond iIlllusmal aJeIlll'l.

9 Stu~ blmned KlrOl"s 1 Decembel 1934 mUlde! on a TIollkyite stud!Y1t end. bV ex:!nllSion, on TlDlsk~.

10 !he LeningJoo Mi ffaryllimi<t's (ommortders indllCled A. L Egorov (Apn1-5ejllemlJei 1921), V. M. Gittt~ tSeptemool 1921-Dctnoor 192 SJ. 8. M. Shoposh ' 01' (Ocrobel 192HAoy 1927 CInd SeplemlJei 1m-June 1937J,A.I. kork (Mcy J92HulJe 1931), M .. Mho<hevslty (Mov 1928-June 19311, L P. 8elov (lillie I 93Hep emll4lr 1935J, P. E. Dybenko (June 1937 -April 19381. Nt. S. Xilozin (April 1938-Jonuor( 19391. K. A. MilIetskoy (Jcnuol'( I 939-.1unOOl'f 1940), S. K.li~hel1 0

(Junl.lllry-JUIli 1940), M. P. Kirpanis (June 194(}.-lamJIlry 194]). UIId M. M. POpcl'l (Januory- JUlIII 19411. Muny of Ille~. rell Iiclim III Ille purges.

II The LMO ~eOOqlllJJter; directed opelolions dlJling the wer's fillt ~ from 30 November 1939 through 9 februul'( 1940, bEll sufIereQ Wloouassing 0010015 In aD seclol5. The NQ(lIlwestem Front, created on 7 JOflU!ll'j 194000 !he !me of ilia IMD, directed o~r(!1ions in 1M second phase hom 10 FebruolY uRnl lne Wlli'S end in Mm(h 1940. The CIf western Fronl WIIS dlswlved un 26 Mtllt:h 1940, wheo its 10r(8$ returned ro LMD ClHl!rol

12 The 1336 aircmfllnduded 394 bombers, 902 fijlleB and 40 reclll1lKlimlce oircrofl.

13 Subleqll€nilv, !he N~O 1000Qlllllled Ills lMO's h~um1M into the NoI1hem Front on 24 June 1941. und, in !urn. subdIVided Ills Narlheln Froot into Illa KwelhlP 000 Lellingroo f rool5 on 23 Augusr 1941 The Northern 000 Leningroo Fronts (ontinoorl to fufflll the le;ponsibm~a; 01 the d~frid military beOOQuerters. The NKO ref~roodllle Lenillgrod Mmhlry Oistrld on 15 July 1941 m !he NDltOOrn Front's loor seIVioo organ, ~oo the iJt!nellll Staff SIlbordinated rOO new mllililly dl!.triu ro he N orIhem Flon I on 25 Jtl~ 1941. The NKO finally disbal!ded !be LMO on 21 August 1941 tu ml OIIt !he leningloo Front's heodqunrlel!.

14 Subsequently, rile NKO reorgonizeiJ !he 2nd I'VO (CIJl5 Into !he Leni~lod riO (CIJl5 Re!jion In rmmber 1942 fo improve (OIHmDnd WId {Qn1roIlDteJ. it SUJIIllemented the Leningrad CDIJlS ReGion' 'Ih me lMlgo I'IJO B~ Region ond rcnsllJf1l1ed il inlllthe leningrud 1"10 Army, (ommonded by l.\cjor-Gen~ral 01 the (oosfol Sarvke G. S. lmhikhin, ill JOOl.lllry 1942.

I S The KtonslltOO! bose was foonded os rhe Pelrogrod NowIIIase ill Moillt 1919, bur was abolished after the Clvil War. On 6 flovember 1939, 0 SeMel Navol flarr (Voenny AlilIIkoi FIDI- VMFJ orner ~lUbI'tIhed e!me becrruse of lI1e OOrarioraHng inlllmotforud silUallon and UIed it os 0 bose IoJ the BoIIic fleer during the SOYieffinnish WOI. Altar !he war's end the VMf deocti'lll ad the !me on 5 July 1940, but reoctM!ted in ana oguin in OctobeJ 1941 os me Sal ( Reet's pnmory !me 101 me defence 01 Lenin!llud.

16 The OO'/IJllme's e~mrm{e doled bock 10 1809-1917. when me RlJSliDo Em~re cootm~ed ~aJ'1l0, The !me reve~eiJ ta AlIMroo ill 1917. In 11.m, rOO Arms fIIrned !he pOO ovar III lI1e Suviel Union in Alarch 1940 on the 00sG of 0 31).yoor lease Ilild me SovIet Union turned flmlD e for~Aed oovcl tme.

17 TIlll iIIlh'llG's romlOOnde~ were Co~tuin 7d Rank S. V. ZemrlOllkhenko (June-JiAy 1941). '{J(e-MrimI P. A. Tromm (July 19411, (OjIlrlin 1st Ronk Y. P. Bogolepov u~r 1941). Coptain lsi Ronk (Vi(BMmiHl! on 16 September) B. V. Khoroshkhin {ltugusHlctuberI941l, ood (op Illn lSi Ro lYke AdlniIIlI nom Jonooryl9441 V. S. Cherikov (Ck:tobe! 194H1owmberI944).

CHAPTER 2 NOTES

1 Th€ dile<livll's Hool obje<1ivti Wfl'I "Illa as!rrbf'~hllllmr o! 0 da!e~6 oonieJ ~irncl A>lolk Russi! oloog the G~rol ~ne of tire VoIgo fIIlIl MhongeJ'!k.," 8med upon ih ~ mi1ital'( pe~onmm and Ille Ih'esurned slate of Ille o~ Red Armv. German militory p!oollil5 osswned Ih.e Wahrmocht could ocoompi'1Sh this task ~thfn eight to 1 0 1I'1*1:s. So (ordidenl wQS i ar or 000ry, rho un II June 1941 he Iswed vel aooriler directive (No 32) ordering 60 d'lVisio~ be left on security duty In occupied Rossio ;c rho rho bul 01 the Welllmorhl could be d~ eisewheJe.

2 The lOIn rotlllled 20 fnmntry, rhree pc!JieJ and wee mororizoo d'rvisio~.

3 The lWIl mOI~ioo CDfjl5 consisted m Ille I Sf and 6th Punler and 36th Molo~led Divisions 000 !he 8th PunIer and 31d Motorizi!d OiYisiaflS. rBSpedively.

4 The f19hleen!b ArmV consisted of XXVI. XXXVI" tmd I Army (orps and the Sixteenth Amrt ronloined X, XXVIII ond It Almy Corp$.

181

5 ~V7rtefl.ov'S mibtwy dislric16elded 269,701 men, 7019 guns ond mortms, 1549 ranks (1274 opel1lTilmoD, o~d 1262 wmbur IliIcmfl (1018 OjIel1lliOOlll) on 22 June ]941.

6 Onte cr ~ugOVJlnS OR the OItincJ, HilleI orderedHoopnm'~ fourth Panle! IiltlUp ro odvance OIl !htrov, but VOR leeb ordered a 12-1tour deJcy to PE,mil the SiXieentb Army 'II tetth up w~h h5 OOVDrKmg ponle!;.

1 The Sflwka gave KuznelSO'I three rille (orps from SluVka reserve with which III do so.

8 North of lenifll)l(I((, the oJthem Front's 5el'enlh AArri (three rifle divisionsJ defended i±ls bo!de! nonh of Lah L~o, 000 Ihe Twenly·Ihird AImy, (omisfu1g oJ XIX aoo L Rilla Co;ps with four rille divisiollS, aod the I 98th Motoriled Division, defeooed from the Gull 01 flniood 10 west oJ LakeLndago.

9 To the nonh, the Finrush Army WllS to tlS5ou1l1.enillllrOO from the northwest hetween lokes Onego nrnj I.od~ ond oSlist AImy Gmup No,th In caprurilljj LenirnJroo.

10 The l~ Delence Urnas intended 0 be 0 lD-15km (615-9.3-milel-deep deleoce of barriers, minefralds and onrtll)1lk gullS Imhind the lvgo RiYel, l00hn (62 milesl south of Leninglad. AI the SlIme ~me, Popov hOO to defend me cil(s DOrThern o]llllOO<hes wilt! his Twenly-Third AImy nnd rhe opploocl15 in 0 lecr~aI Kore5a and Mu,monsi: In me 101 north with his Seven fb and Foorlwnlh Ar mles.

II 1M LOG consisted Initicily of rita 70th, 171 st, 177th cnd 19 I S! Rifle Divisions, tile lsi, 2nd and 3rd People's Mililio DMslons (DND), the 1st SepalDIe Mounhlin Rifle Bri9.ode, ond 5U~parlinQ or~ltry.

12 When the Urst 01 the lOG's Wmlons, the Imh RiRe, urriwd sooth of lugo on 4 Juty, IDaline IWS so in<omplere thot on ooddJonol 25,000 Iohouril; wele molMllze<!ro O<eelerote JI5 COIlstruclilln. The,eofier.OOdilio~ol forces ocrupied fue defencBli, wMe 1M fronlll1ched pelliOtJs~ ~orthword, lowuOOs ~. The 191 st Ri~ DMsioo occupled Iba Kingisepp s.ector, tile I , 1 fh ~iI1e Division, which hod been she ered in fighling east of N:ov, wil~rew III buck up Ihe 177th SCIIth of lugo, ami tOO 'GmDmirlg forCe! Jiftered inro ~~ berwaen 10 ond J 4 Ju~. As of 14 Ju~, tOO LOG (OI'6isree! 01 me 177th ond

I 9hrl!ifle O"Msions, XXXXI Rme Corps' 90!h, 111 th, I 18th ond 235th Rifle DiviSions. !he 1s1 /'\ounhlln Rifle BrigoiJe, the Ill, Zoo and 4th ONOs, Qn~ rh8 Lening.oo ·S.I~. XJrov' lnfontry and riflffilQ(hme gun school.

13 Tbs Rem Une Consllllctitm O·redorote (USTOR) VIm headed bv Mojor-Geoerol P. A. ZOiOOi, fopq(s ~pIIly {ommonder fOI Fortified Regiom, ond employe<! COfI5I!1K1ioo foIces and 30,000 cMlioll5 10 II'OIk rouilllme·dock on the rteW defences.

14 Slalin established !he Srote DBienta Comml1Tee (GKO), 0 virtual wor (Obirrel, on 30 June to coollol the Slota's mal101lelT1il1lt of the WOl mOle effettiYe~. Gn 10 Ju~ Slutll\ 'ellIllanized 1118 Sl!M;o (headquarters) of the MoUl (o~ (SilK), whkh hod heen Or[Jllniled on 24 June to rentrobe rila umllo1 at mmlory opero~DIl$, into lite 510rta 01 the H~h (OIMlOlll (SVK) with himself 05 its chairman. Lemr, an B August. SIoSn OS5IImed Ilie ~rie of Supreme H~h Command.er, and meretrite, the orgon was ~oown 05 the Shrlko of lite StJpreme High Command {SVb .

1 S On 1 0 July, !he LOG consisted of Ilie 191 sl ond 177tb RiflII DiviskIns, 100 1 sl Dnd 2nd DNIh, the hi Sap MOlllltDin Rifle Brigode, and XXXXI r& (orps (1111h, 90111, 235tb ond 1181n Rifkl D~), the 101181 [efi~ oost of luga.

1 6 VaMin's pkm (01 ed foIlhe N.mern F ronfs Eleventh Army to tllLlllterolllKk DIon!l the Sol'!sy-DOO axis with two shock grOOjl5 !be nO/mem groop's 21s1 Tonk O"MSiOO 011 Melhonized (O!p5 ond the 70th 000 231111 Rifle Divi~ of XVI Rifle (Olps were 10 nlflJd

rite 8th Panzer Division's exposed positions mound Sol'rsy nom the north. O/hellO<i's lones to Ihe weit cnd the IS! DIIO and lsllr\OUDlurn Rille Btigade defending aIoog Ihe HevgD OIl OXiS were III I1lpporl and 'einforce the normem group's asswlt. !be soo hem D'OOP, y,mth comlsted 01 :all Rille (orps' 18D1h, I 820d and I 93rd Rifle Dlmiom, was to oHock Sol'by nom !he east with the 183rd Rille DiYision; the Dille, two divisiorls wera 10 s~rkelhe 8th POOler Division's wmmunkoliDll$ routes to the southwest.

17 WhIle Ihe ~u!I: 01 Laab's army gloup WIlS OIIockrng tl)W!lilk lenll19rod. Elghleenth Army elements we;e cieaJiI1!l So ·81 forces 110m Ihe OJll1Y group's Ish!lan ,n EsIOl1ia and olong the BaltIC coesl to depr e lhe Soviets of YitollKMll and ai, oales in the region. BeTWeen II JU~!llI~ 2811ugust, the lighleenlll Army's XXVI 000 XXXXII Army Corps defealed the Soviet fighfh Amrt and ocrupiell lOIN, Parnu and ToHin. The SttMO ordwee! Tollin OYlKuoled on 26 August. AI 0 lGSI of heavy ioose:>, including rough~ 20,000 prisoners, the ~e delanle of Estonia lied dOW11 fou, ileulIOn aMsioIlS and mollJinolly weaken.d the GellOOn lugo IJl1d Novguroo groupings. Thel.r, in Septemhel and OttuOOr, Geiman forces seized Itt!i Moon hlonds ofllhe EslDruon (oosl while Annish falCes elJrninoled the SoviEt oovol bose III Hango.

18 Iha LOG's III DND and lsi SijIOllIte Mountain RrfIe Brigade defended the Sllimsk· Novgorocl tooS.

19 The rommund ool1S!el1ed tht 212nd Rifle DiI'isiM 10 the Seven h Army at PelrozovOOs , tht 2651h Rifle DMsiofl'D Iha T~TtTh fd Army on the KaJeflOn Isthrrrus. the 268th Rifle DMsion ID the Eighth t.imy i~ E,lonilr, ond IIill iSh! Rifle Division to !be

ng sepp de ensive sec_tDt

20 SluVko Leltar No 1, dated 15 July, to Ihe Nonhem Front oboillhOO Ifle (rife (olps lin within armies aild crealed smalle, o,mies, CO$1Ig 01 liYe to six oll'isions eDlh 101 eose 01 (ontlal.

21 !be KlngiSepp 5elhli, 1TlIlll8 ~p of Balrk Aeelloostol LIIl1h,th8 90lh and 191 sTRiffe DMslons, the 2ild DNO and 41h Lighr DNO, !he lenirrgllld lnfonfry School, the 14th A111iTank Brigode, Armouled Trorn No 60, uIlIlliJa 5 19th RVK Howitzet ArIiIlery Regiment, WIll respollSlDlo for de!tndrng the KiTIgiseptJ oxis. The 1.Jrga Sector had the missioo 01 prolecfing the Logo hlgflwoy axis with the 111 th, I 17th and mth Rille DiYisiorlS, the 2nd Tonk DMsion,Ihe 1 sf Rille R~lmonl, 3rd DNO, the 2601fr cnd 262nd Mexhine gurH\rliHery HMo lOllS, and the leningrod ArtiDery Sdool's Ri eiIIQ(!une Gun School and Bottnlron. Finol~,the £05 ern Sector, tOIl5i5ftng 01 Ihe lsI DNO. 1st Sep%la Moonrnin Rlfie B~de, oDd the 26151 and 263rd Moth,ne gurt-Arnllery 8rIlturKlllS, was 10 protet me Novgorod axis. Maiur_rol V. V.SEmostiko commanded tfm Kingisepp SeaOI and IAojor-G-enurals

~ . !slamn oM F. N. Staw«ov comm'mded lite lugo olll! Eastern Sec1ors, respe<tively.

Presr.rmob~, Genercl Pfodyshev wos orrested 101 dereliction of duty

221M 5/f11'ko 00d ulreody d~tched nine rifle ond IwO (lII'Qlry divisions to the onlrwestmn FTont bV eady August

23 Commanded Dot I.JtiIIleoon,-!ieneroi S. D. Aklmov. tha Forly-Eighlf1 AImy (onsisted 01 Ine lSI D 0, th8 70rf1, 128th!ll1d 137th Rifle Divisions, fbe 1st $epa rnB AllllJllrOln Rifle Brillode, GOO the 21 51 Tonk DiYBion.

24 FUilhrer DiratliYe No 34 of ao J~IV pr~ed awn more precise lnstroctiOllS regarding the coplHle 01 Lening,od.

25 The frghleen1ir AlITr{s XXXXII Army {Olps was 10 jam Ii1e odvonce afler iT hod mprured raltll1 and (umple ad opero6011S in EsIOl1i1l.

26 The 581h In aolly Division prolectOO lile NorIIrern GlOUp'S left fIon .

2

27 The S eenth Annv Cl)lllposed X. II, l and XXIII kmy Corps de~ IJOIln ru1b to sourh.

28 5oYle' uitiqlJes Cledillhe fo IUle to the difliorlt laTmin, poor (0IllI11(l00 000 (oolrol, fed of odeq~te onlH!~(lo!I ~PIOO,1Jl1d me qr.rlc roocllon of Almy G,oup North.

29 See LuiTidtuu monuswpl.

30 E,ickson, 189.

3 J Th510l(e induded the lemrronlS of e Eighth Army's 48111, 125th, 19111, 268111, l11hooo I 18th Rifie DIvisiOfl5 arn!lhe 1 sl avoilnfGnlry Brigode, cnd the Kingisepp OefellSll'e Se<IOI'S 2nd D D. 151 GlJOIds 0 0, and Ihe lSI Ton and 28hl Rille Divisions.

32 See LutlKOOu monU!Ulpl.

33 Erick5Oll,I B 7.

34 Thtr FIf1y-fourth fumy WIlS 10ITIled in iGte A.uglllt and OOJ~ September Und<.1 Morstrol G. I. Ku I • Unde! 51ovko (ontrol, iT was formed on the bose of XXXXIV iJ~a (orps mMl corrsmed of rfle 285th, 1861b, 310th and 314th Rifla Oivisiorrs, 27th (walry Oivision. l22nd Tan 81'11000, nnd 119th SePUlO'8 Tonk BolTolron_lts lTHSlIon was 10 deleoo along Ihe Voikhov lOver. The Fourth Army, lommanded by lIeutenant_roI V. F. 10 o'lfl.'Y, formed in lOla Septemboir under 5flwko (oonol. II (onsistee! 01 the 28Sth, 19200 and 3111t! rrDe DivisiollS and the 21th ((MIlry Division (the 185m rrfle and 21th (IlYrllry Divisions Illm the fl ty-fOOIrf1 Army). II deployed aloog me Val hov RiveJ in eody Octobef. Tbs f!ftt$e(O!ld Army, cOIlllIIOnded by UootenonHiene,a( N. K. KIy (1'/. ormed [n August

\ 94 I 011 the !me ol XXV Rifle (orps as a seporcrle OImy unciel SfrJvko (oonol. It consisted of the 276Th, 285fb, 288th, 292nd, 312th, 314111 and 3) 61ft Rifle DiYiIiollS and OC(iJ]Jled delerw olongthe V03:.hav River [If the eoo of Augusl.

3.5 XXXIX Motorized Corps (oOlisted af the 12th and 18th I'llUle, ond 2DIb Motl)llzed DivlsiollS.

36!bis thrust was to be supported by the fl~l Air Fie-e orn! VII COips.

37 The NAG coml5led of the remnunts 01 XVI Rifle Corps' 237th Rille Oivi5iljll1, the 151 MlIIJIIlllin ~ifle Brigode, and lite rresIr 305m Rifle llivlsion.

38 The mttFillh Amrt, unde, Mojor-Generol I. G. lruorev, WO'i 10 de end the western portion of the sector with the 1 68th, 7(llb, 90th and 237111 RiIlrr Divisions, Iba 4!h ONO, and the Slul5l{olpino Fooifled Region. The FOiltSecond Almy, uooe! lielllenonHir1florol F. S. IYmlov, was 10 defend Ibe 8CStem sector ond KrosnogVllrdeisk proper wilh thB ~nd and 3,d DNIh, the 291st RifloJ D"Nisilm, and Ihe Krosnogvnldersl Fortilie;ll1egion

39 Popov OIdeled the FQrty-f~hth fumy ta empllJy the reliNed 311th and 12Bth ~ifIa Division; (lnd 1 st SePOlote Mountain Rille Brigade in the IarlJf1 couRfeltll1ock.

40 The 122nd Infon ry Division oftempted to (lOSS !be Izhoro liver at Ivonavskoe.

41 The encilcled forles rnthrded the 111tb. 117m, 90th, 70th, 23Sth, 231th Rille DMsions, the ht ond 3ro DNO, and 1M 24th ion Divisioo.

42 The dirOOlVe weill on to slote: 'Fi!>! onci 100flmoll, howevel, it is n~ry to sIriva to encircle lIInmGlod com~ele~, 01 lerlst hom !he m. 00(, ff wrll1lhBf caMillon! pmnil, (onduCl 0 kTr9ffiule oir offeroive on leningrod. It is espedoDr importont to destroy tile WIlle! ~p~ ,r0ti0n5_ As soon os poslible, kmy Groop North's fOlC8 musl begm on offensive oorihWtlrds rn the ~wo River 5e(tlJ( to help the finrts ovelcome!he fortffkolions

olong !he old SoviEt'fmnislt border, ond Disc 10 shorten the frandin05 and deplive the enemy of tile olraily to usa the oil bases. fn roopel1l.liOll Wllh 1M Arms, prevent enemy !lOYal OI(es from e~itlllg XlollShtoot Into the Bolli< Sea (HUllQO and fbe Moonzumllslundsl by using mirte abstodes 000 orti~ fire,

• Alsa. isdote tha legilln of romhoillpelllliorrs ot lenil!!Jlllll from me seclal olong the Io-.ver reaches of 'he VolUm as soon as lones ~ry 10 perform this m'SSIOn become OVOllali1e. L"nk up With !be KmelJOR Army 011 me Sw rl'ler on~ whrm enemy forces have been destroyed in the lemngrod region .•

43 XXXXI Molorized (orps (Onsjsled of rf1e 1sr. 6th and Bth PORlel Gnd 36th Motoriloo IIivisions, end XXXIX Marorized COI)lS the 12th PonZflr, 0l1li 18th and 20th Motlllitad OiYisiollS. flghlaenth Army [Dn_ of XXVI, XXXVIII. l Dlld XXVIII Army (Olps.

44 XXXVIII AsmV (0fp5 cortshfed of tht J sl, SSIh, 19h and lalel 254th Infantry Divisions, and L Army CO!p5 me 5S PGUce a00269th I~fontry OiYisiDll$

45 XXVIII Army (Olps (OllSlSted of rhe 121st. 96rh and 122nd Inf~!dry DiYisioIls,

46 !be Forty-$e(and Amrt (OIlSis!oo of !he 2nd and 3m Guords DMOs, and e KrllSOOJVOldelsl: fortified Regloo.

41 !ba Hfrv-fifth Army consisTed of me 9Drh. 10m, 168rh Riffe DMs1ons, the 1$1 onrl4 til DNOs, the SIu~-KoIpirlo fortified RegiIln. and the 84th onrl86th Tun Botlulions.

48 The ElghlhArmy's 19151, 1181l!.llthond 281sllllile Oivisionsdefendlngoppasile XXXVIII Army (OIPS.

491n odcfilion, rhe 1551il Rifle and 151 MOO Rille Divisions defended the f evo trver front east of Iatin~rod.

50 The forty-fightb t.imy was d"lSbornIed on 14 September, and rr; furIes wele rronslerlecl o the Filttfourth Army.

5 I Th858 indl.illed the SOOth Rille Regiment IlIl 1 D September. !be 151 NllYrlllofonhy Brigade 00 12 Septemool, lind Ihe newly formed 5fh ON 0 1)11 the SlIme day.

52 The 2nd ON!) a00500th ~e Regiment delended DUlergov, the 3rd DNO and hr Nom Infonhy Brillode Kr!lSOOl! Selo, ond the Sib DNO Pr.rIkQ'lO.

S l The 1681b RiIIrI Division d.eFemled the feodorovskoe ~lIlr easl 01 Slurs!:...

S4 ~ lutt1ctKru roomooipt.

55 The !&ported ~esence of the 27m {lII'Qlry Oivfsion on 5drmidr'1 flank W1I5 irKonocl.

S 6 Whrm tile 8th Ponle! Olll'led rn XXXIX Corps lee daYllct9l, II WIn no 10Pger 1Ieeded.

5.7lndicoWe of his mood, Stalin hod sent a Iette, ra (!wrchiU on 3 SepTemQel describing the deteriOlofing ~MTion In fle lIkrcine end 01 Leningrod, Irrme~ thi olJsijnce of c se<ond Imm 000 la,ge-iCole malerial aid, ond desalbing ,he effect on Brilll'n of SaYler deleat. I n the iellef, Slortn svggelled that Chul(hifllend up 10 30 o'Msiorrs 10 M.Itor'Ije!'9: o,lin IllIn III help the Red Army. OllJnhiD noled Ihe iel1ei's 'uller unroollty' in 0 remalk III 15 Se~lembe!. See Lumtltcw droit.

S 8 !be Militmy (oo,d WlIS eniGrged on 17 Septembe by lIle addition of Admltoll. s. I~ ov, Chi~f 01 the MollT Naval 5ftJIf and 5hrlka ,ePf8Sellfalive.

183

THE IEGE OF LENINGRAD 1941-1944

S 9 !be: lrd Guards DNO's and 1st NavoI1nf(JII1ry Brigade defeOOed north of Krmnoe Selo; !be _ of SoIooIko ooJ Finsl:.oe KoiJnvo: dlo~ hams sevemI ~mes Iilring me IighlJi!l.

60 Urit;k W!IS defermd by !he Forty-Svtooo Army's 10th and 11!h R"dle OMsicos.

61 Tho new defence line extended hom lIgovo Ihrough MkIsoKombioot 0 ~ oe.

62fmksan, 192.

63 Sheherbokov was to II11IU his Qrto(k with the 19151 and 2Bls1 RIfJll DMslons, reillfoned by The 1 Oth and 11th Rille OMsioIlS, end lila remnonl5 01 !he Forrv-5emfld hmv's 3rd DNa. While doing so, he was III proled his elClended righl Honk by wilhdrowill!l the 5th ~OV(Illnfcnlry Brigode To new defences oloog me K!ll'!lShi River 000 raruin !he 125m ond 266th Rifle Divisions In r~fVe.

64 !he Bghth Amly's!ront finolly S obillzed along me No>yi PelelQllf. Jomuzi and fgnomlG Ilne.

65 SoYisI II(ra!lrl~ dalm 1001 inrelrlgelKe forowtJrned me leniogrud Fronr ond i~ ormy comfll(jnds olll1e impernlifljj olfod:, permll1illi them to deal ell&live~ wi!h b.

66 I'D .ovo Heighls were defe~ded bV me 5Th DNO, lhe 500lh R1fle Repnl onrl me 5th Seporole Machine-gun AIt11iery BrrttotlDll.

67 The NOG hOO heen orgonized on 2 September from me 46th Dnd 11 Sth Rille Divisions and the 4th Armouled Cor Regimen!. Kulik's Flftyfoorih hrrr'/ consisted of the 128th and 310111 Rille llMsions. the 21st Ten Division, and the lsi Mountain Rifle BrigIlrle hom the former Forty-figllth Army, reinfMed iI1lci B September by the 3rd ond 4th Goords ond

286111 ond 294th Rifle Divisions, ond me 16Th and I22nd Tonk Brigades_ lIS srrengID WtlS 85,000 men.

68 AiloolIgh courli1lllflialed 1111 his failuJe o~d redllCerJ 10 me ronk iiI mOialllenelol, ~Ter rile poI'dl(cl~ loy()1 lul lI'1lulti rerum 10 army command with predl(tably poor reStJlIi.

69 The Germ~ns lronsferred 1'11'0 pr!I1Khuts regimenlS 01 me 7m PlH1lchule DlYilloQ!Jom Germany, one in Miry regimenl hum Army Groop Cerdffi.lhe Sponish 2501h "11100" ~n, ond lhe 72nd Inluntry Divh10n lrom Weslern €UIllp8 10 lhe LeIlingIOO regien. In ocklllion, H Iorced lBeb 10 Imrrsff)l the 8th Panzel Division and port of !he 961h Infon!Jy Of/ilion from IOlIih of Lenlll!lrud to theS_no Wdor.

70 Soviet SOOI(8$ em thclleeb's forces fightill!l fm the coostel hrldgenool nnO the krosnogwnleisk ond SlursHoIpino For1i&d R~'ons suffered 41J.50 pelcenllosses (killed or lI'1lundedt

71 XXXIX Molorized (orps look with it tire 1st, 6111, 8th I'onzer and 361h Motorized DMsiam. To compell!1l e 101 this loss, !he OKH begon nons!enillg the 227th ond 212m Infonlry IlMllons from france to Army Group ~th,

72 The 6th Panzer Division depot ed tote on IS Seplembel, me lst Pamer Division on 19 SepTetTltIaJ. tire 361h Molorized DivlWl on 20 Sep ember, 000 !he rofllS heOOqumr~Js 00 20 September.

73 Erichoo, 195_

74 The ~onl nol1b of Leningmd olIO smbi1ized on Ihe KllIelron IsmfJM Dnd olDfljj tire Silr River.

CHAPTER 3 NOTES

I The Twenty-Third Army fielded the 43rd, 1231d, 142nd, 198!h, 265th and 29 1st ~e Divisions, e special NIND Rlfte B~e, !he 22nd F ooiMl! RI!IJ1oJl, 000 !he 4 a th and 1 06!h Separute TIIIlk IIoltalioflS. The Eighth Army rom!! ed of XVI Rifle Corps' 10th, J 1 th end 851h Ririe DivisIons. me 48th, 80th, 19lst and 28 hi Kiful Irl'lisiDns, the 2nd NllVcl InlrJntly Iki!lode, the 76th Separote llIMt1n Rille R~imen, me 2nd Sepurote Tunk R~imenl, cnd an ormoUted CDr 1rottu1i~n.

2 The fOlltSecood Army del_ rhe 17km (l0.6rie) SEdor from lJgovo to Pu <MI wiIh Iwo rifle d"M5ioos ., rl!S! ed1eloo 000 fufee rifle d'1'Iilioos and one novcIlnfonny end one IifIe ~ in second echelon, supported by the IIoftie Freel. The oony Cllmisied of tire 13 , 44th, 56th. 189th ond 21st NKVD Rifle!1il'islons, the 6!h trOO 7th NavoIlnlonrry 8rigodes, the 268m. 282nd aM 291 s1 Seporo!e Mocbine gllhWlery BoItollOllS, ond !be 51 sr Se9rJ1DIll Tenl:. 8aIiokoo, ond supportiflg lIIIilmy Dnd englOOlllS. The Frlty-fifth Army dclooded !be 30km 118.7 5-f111e) seder hom easl of NkO'lO 10 tile ew Rive! D l'ufrol4lvG with fW.l rifle ~ ill first echekHi end one iI second echelon, with c or1iOOl regloo (seven seplIme m1ill~ @In borrcfioosl cc~ rul-ofi posI1ions III !be 1811. The: fiftyfillh Army fielded the 70th, B6ih, 90th, 12Sth, 168!h ood 268!b Rifle DMIions, me 17m Rifle Dt;tioo's 55th Rifle Regimefil,lhe S!uW:·KoIpiIIo ForIified~, and the 84th ond 86m SeIN]Ill e Tallk Boltolions. The e'IO Opero1iorIll Group defended JlOf1hwDrds obng the NBYIl III ~b l!rlJga willllhe llSth ond NKVD RiflIIlhisklm, the 4th NmoJ InIrmtry Brigade, end rl'II hr, 4rh and Sm Desiroyer ond 1 07th Sowrate lonk !knIum.

3 The ESOG rrosisted of rile 265th, 86th, 20th, 19151 ond 177th Rifle Divisions, the 123rd end 124111 Tonk ~e!, lIle 1071h Seportlfe Tenk 8artutron, and StI~ng ortJ1lert.

4 Khozin's shod: grllUp (~ed 01 !be 3111 ond 4lh GuoIds and 310th Rifle Divisions, 16th end. 122nd Tcrn~ Br'rgorles, end IwlJ DrTlllery rejllmenb. XOOzin's 286th and 194th Rille DMsiorrs !UpJJC11ed the otlntk on the sh«k gtrlllp's Honks, end the I 28th Rifle DMsio~, lsr IlIounlatll Rifle 8Iigode ond 21s! Ton Division eitber conducted local nlfods or defended the remlilodel of the Olmy's sad~r.

.5 On the SIMa; Ci&fS, KMzin resumed the Sinirll'ino offensive on 2 Nll'I€mber. this time wim even stro~ fOKes, oot the offensive fOlled alter several dey; of heovy fighrfllg.

61he fourth Army illduded the 285tb, 31lth and 292nd Rille Divisions,lbe 27tb Covulry DMslen, and the 1 \ 9th SllpCrole fonk IIolfrrrton. One .rille regiment was In reserve.

7 The FilttSecond Army indooed the 2BBth and 267111 Rifle DiviliOO5, whIM 6000 men each defended 5eCIM of 46 om 34km (18.7 5 000 21.25 mles) respectively.

8 !he NAG cnmilled 01 the 305m and 180th Rilla and 43rd Tan Divisions.

9 In ccOOfrJ.mce with Stavta insTnxlicns, the FifrtF oorttr Army Ironsferred j~ 31 DIh 000 ~rh G\Jords Rifle DMsIoos 10 the foIIrtIr Army on 23 Ot:lober, At the some ~, the 5mvko lIKI'ied the lenb1!lloo Fronl's 191;1 ~lfI!l DlViIionto SitDmtlCl, 40km (25 miles) southwes1 of 1ik1w!n, cnd rite 44th 'e Divisloolo ruvin by u~ III occupy de el'l(es cJoll!llhe Sics' River, 20km (12.5 miles) 10 !he 191s1 f!l1e Division's relli. In oddilion.the SfMo sent me 92nd me and 60th lank Divisions to the TruMn regioo !Jorn its r~ on 30 October. Moonwhile, on 20 October, the Northwestem fronl reinlorced tOO Ft!ry·Se!ond Army with iI5 259th Rifle Oivisioo end 0 Kenusho OOl1ntJoo.

184

J 0 The Fifty-Second Almv now conslsled of the 288m, 2611ll and mrh Rifle DIVisions..

II The Germans oopllSfed KoIln!n on 17 October and seemed capable 01 oltotiing I1IHIhwest 010l1li the MQS(ow·hningrod ro~rood rtne. Howsl'et, th~ S/11'rko moon ed 0 mojor (oontel'!tro e, plunned ond led by VtJlU~n, ogalnsl GeTlTlCll forces defefiding Kolillin. The (oon~l'!Iroke, which was the IiJSI s~ revelS!) ruffered by Gerfll(jn forces in Oparooon Typhoon. olmDSl rBtoptured the cily and cerlDrIlly llfIIied WehmlO<hl hopes 01 odvondrtg northwestwords 10 StJppOrI Leeb of TIklMn.

12 The TWO formh Army shoe grooJlS coosis ed of me J 91 SI Rin. Divislon and one regimenT each IrCiill the 44th Rille and 60th Ton UMsioflS lit the Sitomtf(l region, ond me 4111 Guords Rifle Division IIfl1J two regimen ~ of me 60th lank Di'lision 25km (15.6 milesJ ro tire ~~Ih.

1 J This coonleraltDck wllS ~med to coincide wlth the lenirlgHId front's foiled (lftem~ to revive i~ offensive or Sinflrvino.

1 4 The Foorth Army's MOOqoorrm obanrloned i~ records 000 o~ o.f 1J; vehide:s In irs hos!e 0 escape Tikhvin.

I S The fOlJrth Army defended !he VulkOOv om with lis 285th, 311th ond 310th Riffe Divisions, ond pelfl of ilia mnd Rifle Division.

16 The 31 Oth frfle IlM!ion (oonlvrrrtlucked IIl'lj] lekme~ Stalion.

17 MeJelskov, who hod served as (hief of the Roo Army GeneIol Stoff befOie Jom.rory 1941, wos im~iscned 00 gl1landless dlllrges of treason.

18 Thesa wele me 285th, 31 ()fh, 31lln 000 292nd RiAe Dlvisions 000 me 6th Novo! Infantry 8rigode.

19 On I December Melelskov's FOU!1h Army consisled 01 the 4th &.irds, 44th, 6SIh. 92nd and 19ht Rifle DMsioIl$, rite 1sT Glen. ~~ lIrigode, the 27th Covolry Division, !he 60lh Tonk Division, me 46th Tonk BliIJode, ond the 119th, 120m end 128!h Seporote Tank BoItorKllll.

20 The Dlthern Groop consistoo ollwo regiments of !he 44tb Rille OMslon, the 1671h

RIlle Regiment,the 46th ~ Brigade, and the 159tn POI11OIlIl 8o!tcIioo. lhe Eostem Groop (1l11mned one _ot 01 the 44!h I!ifte Division, the 19Jsr and 27ih (ovrdry Divisklns, the 60111 TIlIlk llMsilr1's 1200 Regimen!, a!Il tire 12Bth Seporore look lIotlollDll.

21 1M Soutbem Group consisted of the 92~ and 4111 Guards Rifle nns and one regiment of the 292nd Rifle Divisioo.

22 On Illetemtler Femun' V's FiftyfOtlJm Army consIsled or the 3,d Goords, 80th, 128m, 28SIh, 286rh, 294!b, 310m and 311th Rifle Divisions, rite \SI MoI/l1TDi~ Rille and 6lh ovollnhmt'Y 8rigOOes. the 2 Is! Ta~ Division (witb flO !nohl, ilia 161h urrd 122m! lun~ Brigodes, aoo the I sf 000 200 Ski IklHortDRI.

23 On 1 Ile<entoor Krykov's fifly-Se<ooo Army consisted 01 the III th, 259th, 267lh end 288th Rifle O~. The NoY1lo~ Armv GroiJjl's 180th end 305!h Rille DiI'isions joined the Fifly-Setond .Army'! allllCk, looving me 3Td Tonk DiviIion, whJth lacked ronks ond was OOill!l C0lJll9rted Into !he 25th Rrfle OMsioo, III delllflli the res! of it> 5edor.

24 t:lYm/s oItocked with bis Iooi dM;ion; deployed (((lOS! e 481m (3D-rn'kl) fronl and rmrulted the stroogpiilr 01 NdtitJ V'1Iirero Wi My 1Wo-reglment! of the 25'1 Ri& rlMsm,

25 Tho wilhdro 'ng Germans hulted at on intermediate '~lI'1lmp" position til midDecembel, but falllrod to the V\ilhuv River by rilB monTh's e.nd.

26 The shock groop consisred of the 31d Guards, 31 O!h and 311 til Rifle DMs/ORS ond ilu! 16th Novullnfonlry BrigOOe.

27 The firs! mk group, [ormed on I lle<etTlber, (onwed of the 80!h, l) 1 th ond 28Sth Rille DMsiofl5, the 6th ovullnfCl11ry Brigade, and !he 122nd Tonk Brigade.

28 Aaonling to offldof ((((oonlS,1he frlty-fOlNth, FOUf1b olld Ftfry-5e(ond Armes suffefed 40,589 CllllJIIlfuK,lrl.ding 22,743 kiled, (Oprured {t rrHssing, in thelr nkJMn dclance!MIT of 135.700 rroop! er1QIJ.l8Il.1l1e IDvin cOUllleruHemiw em! the RlIIl Army aoolbe, 48,901 (QSlJQ1ties, rfICblifljjl7,924 killed, m~tursd [I mMing, out 01192,950 engoged.1n odctlOOtl, the filtvfllllllh Army ond New Operotioool Grotrp1osl54,979 men, inl:Uling 22,211 killed, (aptured 01 missing, out of 71.270 involved in the sideshow 01 Silio'lioo.

CHAPTER 4 NOTES

29 See luIlkhau dlaft

1 Zhdarlov was, l8l1uIIOIl!l{lm~, Sei:ratDry of rht; leningrad Regicnol ond ('rty fmly Comminees, Communist Porty Politburo member, StavtG odvisor, Member of the Sovier FIee!'s Mcin Mitr1Ury Council, Dnd peoonollTiend oj STalin.

2 The Older rBOO: "In IK(OIoonce with the 22 June 1941 crrIer of !be Plesid!um of the USSR'sSu~eme Soviel, '(OIKeming the Militory Situation', end on the oosls of me orders of me miutory outhorities, the becume (ommiltee oj the Leningrod at'{ (ounril of WOIXeIS' Depu 'es has decided:

I. Til enl"lSlthe II!M:SS 01 uble civifm of ooth sexes between me ~es 0116 and 50 fOI men und hetween rhe Dges of 16 ond 45 for wlllmn, exdoolng workers working In defence industries, In (dele.l wolk ..•

5. ro estaDlisIJ the following work rouflne fO! the ruHmml of work ~Iions:

D) NllItWOo'king wori-(!ljXlbIe civitlCns of both se~es - eight hoofS per &v-

b) Off'Ke work~I!OO WOIketS - three iIoors pel rIuy alter m

c) Students of funclioning edtK.olioooJ lnsdMions -illree hours per day alter doss.

3 Ultimately, Ihe poPlllcliOf1 helped blUe! !he I'skoy and OslTov Fortified Regions, the l.Lr!lo aefelKe LNre 000 associored CUf-,Qff posiTions 0 Kingi5epp,luga, 6otetskeill, Chudovo and iri!I1i, ond dffensive regions Doo lines closilr to leningrad oj Krusl1llgo1l1deisk, Urilsl:, M.ovo, Kolpino. and oIong the righr bonk of the , eva River.

4 For exo~, between 22 June and 13 Sep ember, frum os, 16,53 aoo 55, fotlmy No,S, ond the llarricady, Kirov, Ordzhenikidze and Wrorsk for:lones p!8pored 378 ormmrred ond reinforced coocrate gun--firing P001lS, 678 mochine-gun • l1li poims, and 24,046 rmfor(ed concrete Doli-Ionl:. pymmm in the lugo, Kingisepp. ~~rdeisl:; ond Sltmk·KoIpino Fomlied Regions ond The city of lenin1Jrnd- The Ilfficiol (ounl51a ed thol the populolion ooJ1i 591km (370 millIS) of open ontHonl dllmes, 459km (2S6 mlles) or e!l:Drpments and coonlef-6SCorpments, 48km (30 nu1es1 of onli-mn obsrucles, 134km (84 miles) 01 blockades, 24km 05 miles) 01 borrkorles, 667 aoli-rank h.hogs end rhevuu~, 329km (206 nules) 01 bwbed w~e enJongleml!llls, 11.500 5(lood loxhollll, 771km (482 mires) ohommunlrooollS trenches, 1527 she!~, 2072 (IlmIJIIlOO, ~r'IIJ1ion 000 meOOl ~nt;. cnd cboo! 4500 pilltroxes end SJnrJE ond large bunkers belween n June ond 31 December 1941.

185

GRAD 1941-1944

19 Productwn dunllg rbe 6m IliIle monllis of 194210 of 1935 roo O~, 1975 ~ moeNne glIRS, 21.000 wbfoochlne gUllS, I B7 ronks (repaired) ~nd 360 III1llS bepoired}. DUII~ ~ enhre year, ommunrlion ploduthon talclled 1,700, 000 ~~1lI1b and mlnes, 22,000 OOrnbs, and 1,260,000 hand glinodes.

8 G!oup Hoelle( e {oosisred otsrooll (umbel QTOUPS from Ibe 215m and 61slinfunllY OMlions.

S These Included the !IV, Moscow alld Volodmsk sartOIl (UISTrlcts) rn Ihe oor1l1 ond the

Pnmorski (coo~lnl), VyOOlg ond KIOSIlogvtlrm sectOIS in the south.

6 The Forly-Se<ood Alm(s onlHlll1k regiG~ 6alded 34 2 nnttlllll gUll'>, Including l1 guns par kiIomelle 0 ron!. II de~oyed SO ~l( ani of its onlHank guns in Ilsmtlin def~e bell, 20 p!l((enl in Ihe seron4l belt end 30 peKe"1 on !he city's oul5l:JII5.

7 Inlholly, rile ~06 (Qffiisled aI 0 rifIll bliQO!lE, sI:i detochme nl, fWD moe hinfl"jJll companies, eight 4Smm gill bo"el~, 1 8 SIl~ (Ke) boals, ond fourressml rompanies.

8 The hree divisions' roml mength of 30,917 111811 feft 2-3000 men mOil 01 SiDled leqUilemen~

9 The 2nd DNO WQS tKtuol~ 653 men obove ~ required strength. The 41h GlIIlfds ONO was lenom~ the 5th ONO 00 11 September.

10 By 30 September, 96,776 Leflllllraders hod ~okmfeered fer !he People's Mitrlill oIrmy, indllflng 20,647 Communisr POlly 000 13,457 Komsomol membe~, nrnl32,OOO WOOl6l1 for Qudiory servim,

11 A ONO consistoo of 111!~ lifle legrnen~, OI1e OrliUeIV regiment, 0 IsccnflllissmKe dehlcomeni, 0 commUnKOliollS (ompol1'(, 0 !OPpel bo11ulion or COITIplll1Y, a mm boiloBon, ond an OUIIl-IIIlllSport wmplll1V.

12 ThBS1I \'ere !he ISih (Sib 0"0), 44th (3rd lids. DN()), 56th (7 bONO), 80th (lst lids. 0 0)' 85th (2nd OHGI. aMIl Orb DNO), ond 1891h (6th DNO) RIffe Divisions.

13 In addition 10 mobiiZillg mifioo, worl:el5' de\o(hmen~ rod 1I'Offi1J1, m!illlry 000 Porty OIIJllIIS piO'IJded !he PIl~u1clion \Virll minimal mi~hlry Inlirrlng to Ifl{[BIlS6 rna (umbar leadiness of workm' fO!ffillH~ns, On 3 Moo 1942, the oty I'flIIy &re(]~ Illdered foclory dllll( 015 ond ~lIty ~elnfl8> to h!llp Ifflloool milrtoJy cOfnlTliSsOOO~ ImprQVll tmiveoo mllillllY homIng and strengthen leningr®'s defenCe>. WMe Party DlQDnizofioos WIDe responsible 01 meeHng the minlll1lll needs of nuOs and WllrUlS' and des1roclion dehlchmenls, IodOllIlS jlfll\'illed weapons, 8QUlpment.lII1ifurms and suppfies ta mobiliID.l unils from theit own inlellllll resources obove and bevood Ibe reqlluements 01 oocrnol produclion ~OIlS.

14 Too G~O issuoo inslnlcl1011 un the em~oymenT of women 00 23 liillllh und 13 iIpriI 1942.

I S An nu1m WEle p!ohibilEd on th~ sIlr;sl5 and iI1 bumdlngs, and ptote<hw tllYel5 mosked ~8SlII1)' rood oM rmlli!Jook.

16 For exom~e, the ~101lOll of OkOOh!sh1 dn1nd U!l mille 11m 4oo0m (13,123h) o ~il rrenches, preparoo 214 basemenJ bomb shelters, paimoo oboul one million ~ meters (3.28 mUm sqlrlJre leell of ellle (overs with super-phospliotes, and pelfarmed hundred! of other rash Vlithin the Iil5I 45 duys of WItt

17 During this period, 280 Gelman aircroh dlop~ 528 elplo>ive ond 135 m.em!"wry bombs aU! i~ six sepclrate all/aids on 19 Sep ember, und millS thrm 200 RXpIosM! b"mbs in !hlee Iiparora roitls Dn 27 Septembel.

18 ProoU1tion l!Dm 12 JUJIe 10 31 Oe<ernoor 1941 IIrl.rded rhousonds of martm; ond wbmo<hlne gtJIlS. thr~ milnoo shells onrl minij'j, 4(),OOO I1l\Iltip!e ((Kker Ioonchet rounds, more thon 42,000 oeriol bombs, g-reollj1Jtlnhlias 01 r' e ammunihOn, 49111lnks, oml 317 ollillery pie<es.

21 for example, the lood ~red 711lrn1lel (70 Ions) 011 25 0Wnher, 156.7 tonnes (154 IOnsl 00 tIKi 261h. 128 ;ormes n 26 tans) 00 the 27th, 200 lonlle5 (196 ions) on the 28th, and 130 onnes (128 ronsl on the 29th, which was insignificont compared wi1tl rIeeds.

20 Doong !he fits! wmleJ, spedDI depomnenl5 1IJjl~ 17,000 soidJ&I5' Iomilies with fuel. lI1OIlI!TQn 9000 fUITItras with 00lv flIollellil'j payments, more lOOn 10,000 persoos WIth !hoes and dolll~, DIMl· more thoo 10,000 fcmioos \\1m kvrrg quarrelS. In odd'®n, KoolscmoI 50011 brigodes ood the Red (rDS1IHDVided meUiwJ ond food osHrKB III manv lomies.

28 This rJmoll~trd to 998 IDrmes (980 toll» 01 HOUI, 2.910ilS of bruley, 830 toones

(8 I 5 roilS) of Wjbeons. II lonnes (11 lOllS) of mdt, 435 Tonnes (427.7 tons) of slub 101, wMl 1,1 fonnes (1.1 tonsl of brun. Ihe 1700 ~on loads of flJel WII~ eqIlMllent to 36 nDinkrcds aI hHil or 120 hoinOOds cI wood.

21 Specillcal~, !he oorms deallCJ5ed on 2 (100 7 Sep ambel, 1 Ochlber, oncl 13 aoo 20 NIlYQmoor. In decreasing order, lila norms oppl"ed to fIVe co *,18$ 0 people,lI1dllrllllg fianriJile sold'le~, rear Dreo flOOfIS, priGliry worKers, engll1eelS and edmi(w per~nel, aild employees, dfpende~~ ond children.

'29 By 10 JanoolY !he Lenil1grod frOIl! had amassed 1 ()-ll days' worth of flour, live 00ys' 01 grum, 9·10 d~' 01 OOI1el, IOIJI doYl' 01 lot, and 8 doys' 01 SllQDI in ciry WIIJehouses, at Ladogo S a on CI1 the Ioke's w!lSlBrn IIInk, ond en loute = 1M ice. A like quonhly amount wcs stDred 00 e lake's eastern bon nod 01 VOlbokolo alld lAI hore'lO on the loitmod t!1le 10 Vo~ hllY.

22 For nample, t~ in~abUOl1IS of lfle region's soothem ~n dlSfnd smtrggled 305 IOMes (30!l Tons) of foodsrufb Into r!le dry 110m 28-30 J 00l.1li1)', 000 Lemngradm IOCeWOO male IIwn 509 tom~ (5001011» cI breOO, menl ond other p!odud5 flOOl ocrupled regloos in Mat I 942- This wm pcw"ble 'oomUle rflels, 10 es 000 swamps, impenetmble mOSl Dr !he ~I, froze and CDUr~ be nove~ ID winteL

30 By this time. angineIm 000 lechr»cnl workm were roceM~ 400 IPDrm (14 OOf1(~)per day, arnpkryoas 300 grtmlS (l 0.5 OUlKesl. depmjenls onrl thildrefl 250 grams (8. 8 ~), mer:! in JlIioriI'r'!hops 575 groms [20.3 oonces) (up from 500), ~oolline forteS 600 groms (2U DImS) (up from Soo), ~ rem saMes IToops 400 gmms (14.1 OIIIKesJ.

31 The rooo CIlIIllId 367.608 toones (361.1 09 ~1 of CIlI]lO rIi.tq me wiuet, ilIbIing 267,142 hlones (262.419 lin) of loW. 8507 hm!s (8357 IIIG) 01 for~. 32,484 torn!s (31.910 Ilrns) 01 cmmuni!ion. 35,342 ~ [34,717 tin) cllueIlIld UWon~, 22,414 tcnoos m,8l81onsl 01 cool, 000 904 IOnI1eS (888 Ions) IX other cargo, In ~, 2036 tonnes (2000 mns) of heoIlftenlxrong li;!h calorie prOOIlcls such as chocola e lJl1d eggs roode it illtl Leningroo otlass the ice rood.

23 lhe Leningrad Fron appcinled Engineer 15 Ron V. G. Monokl1llY, the DeJlllIy Chief of the !ronl's AutomobilBiood Oepallment, as the 101 sl BAD's commands. The situolion WlJ5 extrerne~ PlIlCllIIOO5 bemuse me IaHrood (OnneCTing Kobono with Vologdo ond the Sowle' rnteriol WIJ) the 1osIIIY0Datlle raillO!J!s III tIKi r91l1, and ~ ron through Volkhov. then threatened by Germrm fOll65, and ])khyjn, w1rl(h German forces hod obeodv rGjJlUred, This farced rile Lenlnglod Fronl to build 000 emp~ the much IOIl!J6I 102nd BAD, whICh bvrmsed fIkh<.oin until SovIet forces (oild 1er:.lrjJtur9 the lawn. Th a I 02nd SAD, which w(lS commanded by Aloilx-l.iensml 01 tho 000 rtermosfer Serwe A. M, sru1ov, obsolbed rile

)() I sl BADon 7 Dl!(smOOr oitSJ the Roo NR1j' rllCl!jlTUIed liklMn. IMD history, 267,

32 Amoog the rlrsr por1i!on Iol(es formed Wire 13 prlIhWl detDlhmenls made up 0 sludenls and mty af the Lesgolt Insliluhl of Ph~ol Culture.

33 fBI ~m~e, me Glovsl: district helded thlee portlsoo dflllthmenlS, six diversioool)' glOOpl, and 11\'",01 underground Porty I1fDUIIS and too Luga district - 0 tuTOI Dr I 1 partison delvdllllenl> and umrsionwv groups. BV lhe end of 1941, aa reyiorml ond disllicl SB(lelIDl~, 29 mlRI5 of d~frJ(1 ond lily (ommiJrees, Md hundreds of atlw!llOOll off rem d'reeled me undelgtOlJnd effoo.

34 For exomple, the Lesgoit Ins lUte snrdeot pcltioon detlKhmenr blew up the lDillood bend on me Lugo-SiveIS ro Itood In J~V. In lote July and Augll'll, the 5th leningrad I'ornsnn Regimen deshoyed 40 TnKks and Ilghl vehrcles an me Pskov-lugo rood, blew up the N:.tII"Parkhav raurood line, damaged Lokar' SIDIion, ond ronduc.led numerous small ombusnes. Also in Ju~. the lenl~rad Un elSily and Art Institule StOOenl Oelocnmenl desiroyed the IOllrood bridge 0(1011 the Igol'nyi River 00 the ShopkHIMO lOod and oomoged severol rrcins, To the sourll, six dehlthmenls in !he Wgo di5lTkl destroyed SS'lerol lilirman ronks and oiItioit, 24 ammunilion lrucks, four molGrI:)'des, 36 flitycies, and seven bcirl!les, and desnoyed rile Geimen gorrilnn 01 Vo1os1roYO

35 A bm'llm OIl odm ",strohve sulKfNiswp under 0 IIlIOO (dJ;!n1I).

36 Sclviel 50IIlCes clolm thol, during this period, me pallisons kllied 11,493 Garmon smdklrs and officel5, captured five gillIS, 30 modlioo guns. 98 tanks om! OlmoUied (Drs, 1632 YlIhides, 316 motOlcycles, 71 airuafl, 661ocomoliYes, 807 wogons, pIotlo!ms olld railroad WIS, elyhl Wll!~houses, 320 bridges, ond el9il1 garrisons ond IteodqwrteIS, and (OpfiJled roony If(lsoners. It is I ke~ Ilrcl these ligures lelllOln apocryphal.

CHAPTER 5 NOTES

1 HQWeve~ the oircrofllemoined undm mTll'I (anlrof, ~nce the hoot's oil 510ft, whJ( h hod been (lBIlI8!l in Decemool 1941, locked !he metJns 10 connol !he okcooh.

24 MllfOI A. S. MGzlllJ€v's rood exploilution regiment begun lecannclning OM morking primary Qoo 01 emotive rooles DCI~ the j{e once Shhssel'buru Boy began fr~lrug over in mid-No embel. The firsrreconooissonu glOOp, COIISIS'1Ig 0 the 88rb Seporllle Bridge Conslruction 80 nilan, under Milirolj'"Teehnicion 1st Rank V. Sokolov, marked !he ~15 roule on 17 ood 18 ovembel, and the secood gloop uooel MOIOI Molhoev hlmsel reochoo koOOno the some dey. HOW~II, the grou~ determinoo that the 100mm (3.93io) of fee WIll 001 suffltientf.{ tk 10 5IJpport heovy 1IQ1lSPOIt, whitn required 0 minimum 01 200mm (7.87in): lilalelore, most 01 the SIJ~ tronspod; hod 10 \Wit fOl!he ke 0 thielan. Dllffn!j the deloy, light com tronsported 1118 RrtI OOIQOO5 ~r nour aoo~ the 10 e 110m Koilona on 19 tlOVernbel, with eoch (Ill carrying a modesllood oIrwo to fOOl socks of fioel. The nexr duy, M~JOr-Generol 01 the Quortenooster Sell'ke f. N. !.ogUnDV, the (hl~f 01 rile lBnirrqrod Front's rBlll services. IWice rroveiled ocross the Joke's lie hom D orel'1l 10 Kobono by rrght 'It Ide to tBsI the ice's!orxkmrying rapooly. The fi~T subsranhol .... hKUb (okimn (60 (olgo IHICks with 33.S tonnes [33 Ions] 01 floor) crossed the 10 eon 22 ovember dMplle a hoovy snowstorm. TrGVem~ Tn column rormation along DCks p!epared by hOlSe tronsport, e trutks reoched Leningrad lin 23 November. A second (olumn carrylng 19.3 tonnes (19 ons) rmed leningrad the nexl dey,

2 The 345 olluof1 included 82 born~, OOU of whim were older models, live IlSSOUIr ~ones und 258 I1gh SIS, The Leninglnd flonl oDDCIllHd 67 Hgolers to plOTed j1\ {OITImurucuoons Dnd 25 0 jlfOlec leningroo pioper. The lemoini~ 166 ftghtM, heR 01 which were in dlSla,OO~, were ro wppon the groooo mr(es.

3 SlIViel ofmullon (fif~1I8l no III dFYl'i rhol 100 ollorks faded oom tMlcouse 0 !he halce Gerroon resistance ond the front's toogenilol penchont for rfrssipo!ing its sIlenuth in ~uiriess ond rejlOli1ive assoults. on Gelmen sIlollllpolnfs.

4 SokDkN, 0 rormel NlMl ofliwi and dese IlSS«.!lTe 01 L.avrenfi Berio, rile h~d of liTe Smil N KlJO,Io1ked mUllO!y expenence ood WIIS woofuly un~t to plon, cooldioota or portl(ipIlte in such 0 com~e~ operation.

S Geoom15tu11 cri qOOl (ltoo JlOOf command, cormal and ctIOIdinolion and ferce rfrspeool lIS the rna or reasons the 0 ensrve !o~ed,

6 !he GanelOl Stull othibUloo tho lailures to week (DOpeIOnOO, IRcHecl1ve em~oymenl of lanks 000 or tdlerv, ond undll8 rerronn on c~ frooltJl u!1tKh.

25 This rfHluiroo deari~ nnd le-deoring ice hummocks and SI1owdrif~ [10m more thon 33,000 5110018 mehij'j (two so,UIIr8 miles) of roadwoy. DLmIIg this ~oces~, the IIOI1~s mOIl service IS\'I:Doo 824 kIn (S 15 m~es) 01 ke and snow 1WlIIs, d~red IlIOVI from 2200kIn

(\ 37S miles) 01 rood surilKe, and buill 260km (162 m~i1S) 01 delM wound inlerseC1lOO~ 000 dongelOOS sedoo

7 Kuechler os9g00d theSB IIlSPIlIlSl"blJities on 22 Joooor1, end lorc8s r!!nlolCed thail posit~ns on rM fianks 0 the p.enelnltion in eGdy February.

26 The toml1l\lnKolions nelWork olooe eXientloo 16Bkm (lOS rmles).

J86

9 By Ihls lime, Kur«lrkin', Northwestern Fron! hod IBIlefled the I\ISIsm wrts of SfaJDifl RlJS5IJ and IuJrl encircled the Gemmn 11 Army (tHpI in the Damfmsl:. I~n. (n mldJlion, 00 23 Februllry lJeIhlm hod DS!lgnoo the enfire rogloo north cnd SOIJlh of Ihe Soviel peoolmion III the Eighteenth Army. The new bounilol)' ootwO€fl the frghleenth ood Sixteenrll u(nlies Ion due W~ from loke lI·men.

10 During rhe Jom~cy oftensive, the Kortoin Fronl's rortes endlclad the oomon II Army (O!PI' tighl Honk in Knolm. Kuechler then sent XXXIX !.\ololizcd Corps 10 the legioo to moun I 0 relief operotion in !.\oleh.

11 Savi~t lOOlle~ clcim rhol mo Gerrnons Ios:r three dilli>iMs: 12,000 deed, 185 guns, 13 5 mOllo~, 29 tunks, 340 fIIO(hine guns, 415() submudr ill!! gun~ ofld lill8l, 320 rootorcydes. 560 bicycles, and 125 !IIP~ wngons dlllUlll the IIlIoment bonfe

12 The 5IDvKD olso reil1fol(oo lis fOKes Wllh ~ve orti1lecy ond Ihr~ mar1U1 reglmen~ in eGriV March and aR O'notion shock glOup ill mlrJ.Mmdl.

13 Soviet criliques (loorloo the iaUure 10 weo 011 ond artillery suppon and poor commend, control ond (ommunl((J6o~s. KUltJdi in p!sporad the IIRenSll'B too quICkly. in pori bemuse inleOtgence reported rhot the Garmon! were abouIm mount on effort III reUeve lbeil 0emi01lS !!Orrison

14 Soviet crillques biomed the Ilemionsi: foi1lll~ 01 iooxpl!rience in deslroying farge encircled Iol(es, porn command, CIlI1lToi 000 (OOldlllClioo, (ongenllDI undere:stimoriol1 of German (Qpobllities and intefloons, 000 a fa~ure to IoIIdy the jJmdioflS oofWeen coopero~ng forces

1 7

CHAPTER 6 NOTES

CHAPTER 7 NOTES

I Along the 1IO!ri1wes!ern axis, lhe leningrad Front's Second SOOt and filtyfourth Armies wrue ooep in rhe Ei~hleenlh Amr;'s real, 1M wele rharnsell'es enveloped from three sides by [;erman forces, The Norrhwes!em Fronl fOices llueelined the ft~nl::s ami rear of

Six eeplli Army fOlCes ocCllJlYing the Oemilmsl: ~~BJ11 ~ Romushevo cllIridor. Along Iho weslern Ilo\mc~) am, Soviet forces In 0 deep sousm IU"illQ weslwolm hom Os:IDSI1kov IOW1llm VelikJe Lu thleelifted Army Group (enne's forces in rhe R1~ 000 Vlaima crees wi1h enciniement, WI wele rhemselws "ueatened wim eoci/dement. In the 5lIulli, !he $ou1hwestem oml Soothem Fronls' fOlces ill rhe Botven 0'lIl selient soulli of KIiod:ov

llireo ened Getmnn Army Gioup South's delences D1 KiIorkov. In me Donbos ond on 1M (rimOOJ1 peninsula, the NQIlb (aucOSlJS Flonll1ileatened 10 lelleve Se'lUSlopui hom ia brklgehead on the Kerch peninsula.

2 The Stmia bad reinforced Khimn's Irool willr 25 MilleryillO(hine !!lfn oomnlOns, six antl'lllnk regimenl5, SOD Ireovy!lllll 1 000 1ig~1 mooline g1J1IS, 5Doo rubmodline QIIfIS, ond two tunk ~ wlrh 5D trmi.! each by 1 June.

3 XXXVIII AArrt ~' kIM WlI18 30 )lel«int Forces ~ ill the operutioo i:odOOed I Army (ClIps' 2S4il1, 611f, 12151 000 SS Me Infantry 1lMsioos, and XXXVIII Army Corps' SBth InfIlllITy 1iYision, the 2nd 55 lnJoolIy B/VIde and !he 20th Molorized DM!ilri.

4 Almy Geooral A. M. Vmila~. !he Deputy Chief D the Generul Sluff, ~ sam 10 IISSist /.Iererskov ill the ropocily (If 5rrMa representolive.

5 Kuechler abo ploposed TWO opemiiGns in tile south. Opelll1ion BroeckrmschJag invcm.oo 0 ilJint atlDd with Armv !i1~UP (en~e oyoirll the Sovirll !.OHent ill thl! German roor southwest 01 OsIoshkov, ond Operolian 5th~ngplhnte (Vine) 011 mIIlull 10 widen lhe north Hank 01 lhe Rom~ corridor to UemloflSl

6 Oirecnw No 45 orde.led Mny Group Sourh, new spUI inlO AmIy G!oops A ond 8. 10 coOOud Operotioo 8ioullSl:hweig 10 liquiOOte ~ed AArrt forces in the Qleat bend of the Coo RiI'81.

7 Operation NMflich,was codenomed Opelalian Georg wim'n me Eighleenth Army.

8 Ulhmote~, me OKH cClJlceried Opeiarion MOOIbrond Iorer In Ihe SIIIIlI1I6I because by then the ~toorion hod (OOllged subshmtioIly, Howivllr, Hider irrsisted tflol NanJIithr go aheod as s.c:hed~ed

9 These Ir,duded the 121 It end 61 It lufonlTy, 511i Mountain 1JMljoo, 000 jIClil of 12th Ponzel Oivision. Dulinq the 5lIIIIe period me ~Drthwes1em Frool {otMfucred nem {ollS!oo1

olfer6ive operufions D~Dinsl GeflDlln forCe! 01 Demicr and S!1IJa e RllSSO, both kI

elimino 8 the Gellnon lGlienl 000 reduce rhe chances 0 0 GeIJMn offensive 01 Looingmd. These operation~. wbkb took plu(e from 3-20 MiJy, 17-24 Ju~, I()-ZI Auyusl Dnd

1 5-16 Seplember. fui!ed 10 mee any p!ogress. bullied dclwn the SIXteenth Army and prevented II from toklng Dny oction to support fire E~hteenth Army 01 Leningrad.

I 0 The Eighteenth Army {onsisted of 21 infuntry divisions, one pallZel DMstOn (the 12th) and ooeil1fMh)'brigDdfJ.

1 2 !he Eillhltr I\rmy's !hod:: grfMIII consisted at VI Goords ~if1e (otJlS with llie 3ed, 19!h ond 24t1r Goold! Rille llivisIons ond lIIe 26Sth Rifle Division.

13 MajoI-Gerlellll N. A. Gagen's IV Goolds Rille (Cirps also reinforced Klyl:ov's nEW Qlmy.

14 The deeply echeloned formelian WII5 rlasigned hom 10 ov rcome !he hoovy GelIOOII defences quk~ and to Ml!Jin fue atlod into IhE depths,

4 The daily shipment !IJ(!)Il1S wele 2456 1OIlIl8S (2500 lOllS) 01 food, 305 tonnes (300 toIlS) 01 ommuni1ion, 102 lunnes (1 DO Ions) of miliiury equipmool, 102 tOMeS 000 tons) 01 ([Jol and fual 011. ond 3D5 lOOMS (300 101IS) ollubilmnlS 0 the city 0001 01 a 1Offl18'j (1000 tons) 01 COlgo oml3000 peoplE doily from rhe city 10 the Soviet rS1ll,

1 Thlllieneral Staff col acTed and (looivzw !he experiences from the defence 01 Ddes5ll, 5ewstopal and Stuhngloa aoo provided it to the len. from,

I S Thls SU)lpart indOOeilIwD tonk hligoOOs, fiI'e separote tunk lMlttelions, 12 OIhDery !IJld ni~ moll\1r leg.imen~. fOOl ~Iote looritu oollo~ons, thr~ M·13 Kaijillha regimenll and seven Mo30 koliusho OO"otlOll5.

2. 1m d~fencB:lIIlCIuded 1501m (937S milss) 01 ooli-lOnk ditches, Bfoorpml'nls Dnd cOlintemolJll118lll1, 2021m (] 26 ml~s) of oolDed wire entangiemenb, 7118 rifle: llJoon nenches, 62 7km (392 mflesl of com munkations lrenches, 140 plrHobrkuted Iron and leinfur(ed concrete wOlks, 4 B7 oJlllOOred firing points, 176 oocosemenls tOf tanks 000 hmk hrlle~, 1500 ontHon obstacles (P)'Iomlds), 1395 oorth 000 timber bunksr;, 809 imng patnls In buddlngs, and I OB9 command and ~eJVOlirm pasrs or bJindoges.

16 The 128111 Rifle OMsion wcs fo strain tire sIror:k groop's ri!Jht fim from WOf eJs' Selliemenl No ] III MD! mio Ilubro'lko, and !be 11th and 286m Rifle DMsions the right flon IrOlTI luryshkino 10 Klilsnyi Bol.

171he regroupil19 effort Involved rhe lTIDVemenl of 479 Irmns ond 153 !.U~~y (onvo~ belween 7 August 000 17 5ep em~. The deloy5 were doo to tile limited ropolily 01 ruilrood lines Into cOrKen!ro600 Oleos, poor command and conkol, and the slow reglouping llseff, when units hod to be moved to tire reur to refill belote going bed to tho hOOT.

3 For example, by Oclober!he FOIty-SecOlld ond frfly-f'rlth Armtes' defensive ~s sooth of lemng~ wele equ ~~ With 656 arn11ery and 2094 mochlntlJun bun er;,536 mortar frring pasi~ons, BOO anli-tunkrifle: firill!l pasitioos, 2000 bflndoges and bunl:ers, 600km (375 miles) of ooli-Ionk GAd anllinlookv Mlroclel. oml 350km (219 maIlS) 01 (Ommuniccllons hunches.

I 8 The ItJd'icIlI demity of the Volkhai FlDnr~ Ot11Jc1ng IlliellS was up 10 live rille oo"alollS, more than I 00 g~1IS coo mortalS ami nine lOOks per kiMJmtihe 0111001.

S Sh[pbuBoors construded 14 melDI borges, 31 rowed wooden beals and 11 B smell rnporily lGffiliopelled OOoIS fGl use on rhe loke, and fisherman ~ovided 17 selfillopelled boots ond four tawed boots,

19 T~ initiol al11KQng 100ce was tire 268th Rifle DMSlOll, and ~ wos ioler reinforced by elemellts 0 Ihe 43id, lOrh Gnd 136m ~ DNisions. Soviet crilique$ Indice e tOO! this and othel FiI1vflfth ArmV ollocks foiled ~ becollSe of poor (ommoml and conlro! cnd inadequale amery ond engineer wpporl.

20 !he 1281h R;Ae DMsion was on fire sIlock group's nght Ilonl and tile 11th cnd 286th Rille OMsions were 00 it'; le~,

liThe iargesl 01 these ~ips ml1led 32,576 loon~ (32,000 10m) 00 WIlD, In odrfdion 10 me loodstulk, 15.4 percent 01 the Cat§O was c(l(ll" 16} percent lubOOrnb onrl17 ,9 percent wSjlpenlj' ond other m~itory {alllO. Alsc indudOO weru 41 a 6 sheep em gooll, 7723 srool! (llII1e, 4388 harses, woOO and medklll supplles.

21 IV Guards Rille Corps [lllMled of llie 2591h Rifle Division and me 2200, 23rd, 32nd, 3M Slid, 137th OM 1401tr ~H1a ond 98th and 12200 Ton Br~es.

22 During Iile wilhdl1lWlllllle forCe! abondoned 011 of !bell eq~ipmenl. Soviet cntlqUIlS cridil the fui&Jre To POOl commaoo and con rnI and inodequo e me suppart.

7 For exomple, about 100 Gelmoo oiruoft slrud: rhe pori of KobornJ on 28 May, but ontiOK(rafi glrl1ners shol down an eshme!ed 19 BMll'rf mruoft.

23 Gov~ov's osscull 0(f(15S me Nevn Rivel fOKed MonstBln III mOVB the 28th JOgor llMsion irOlTI Sinirl'lioo 10 !he Neva FrGnt

8 This fGl[e (onsisled 01 Gur I orliJO lorpeOO bools, lour Ge!lll!ln culters, seVIn seD· propelled lIIIIlPhillious as~lt boots, 12 5e~'JIfopelled looding borges, ond one heodquorlelS, one medkol 000 fOlllllDn~t shJps.

24 Soviet source! optimistically estima ed 1001 lila GelmGlIS Jos1 60,000 men, 200 Ionks, 200 gUlIS, 400 ITIOlIuJS ond 730 mochiilllQulIS.

9 N:cOldi'lg to Soviet Q(counb, tOO Finns formed on IIIIlphibioos fOlle 01 23 ~IS and _n (uIIeIS ermed \lim 88.mm cOO 31mm Q!IIIIj 000 22mm O!JIornalk grm5 00 9 Dclobe!, ond prepared 10 mt tOO Illice on the isIarIl. H~81, Sovret oiJ(roh dis.c:ove,ed and beoWy oomoged the f1oli~ on 1 3 Octobel and tatted The iJOS1]JOOemen of the opero1ioo, The Fm • a oow Icrldlng attempt Irom SorI1MJlo OIl 22 t:krobe!, cooceaied by a stom1 on me lake. 1m agolll. two Soviet palTcI WI1eIS dGclWl!rlld the 100ce in time Olld the Sovie gmrisOI1 repeled the atnxk, sinking 17 fll1lli!h OOaIs, shooting down 14 enemy airmrft uOO mplllring 61 priSOOerS. This srooI victory ended 011 enemy altempl5 to operote 00 the Ie I,

:2 S The Germans est1mGled 1001 SovIet Ioss~ iodlKfed 36,000 dood, 12,370 prMOOS ond 244 desboyed or (ophrred tenis.

26 (andid SoWer of1er«!ion en_ c1trihIted !he fair-.e 01 the secood SinicMoo offemil'e 10 o WOOly Ii causes. ~ Mererskov's arelui preparations, (0RVJml ami con!rol, reconooissance, OOPCen_n 0Ill ~ o~ attocking fOlCes (an!iooed 10 be pooL l.Iere15k.ov and his srJxxdioote armywrnrrmleJl corrvnined their ser:orlCI echebns orlCI re5e!VllS 10 cOl11bcJl in piecemeol fasllion IJIKI offen Il1O lore ro make 0 difference. The uiIJlues creOcred these lobes 10 ineJrjlelierKoo cDllllOOlld mdres ood stofIs, partkulurly 01 !he plaruon tlnd COOJ!IIrry lawl, inJPOOI stoll procedures. On !he other hood, the mlilpls ooled !he ofIensMI'S positNs effecT 01 for~ rhe lienmm to CllOCeI rIB )timed offemil'B 10 COjlhrre

!he dly and r:fiveIi IIlICe5 !Tom Ihe south. The ofImWe cJso setkrI.t!Iv !!faded Geiman moogth, wee eoeO!heif defm:es, 000 ~ !he 'IoVf for 0 me soccass/ul offensiw in me rurure by rnportil'l,ll1lKeslIlIy eXperience 10 me Soviel command codres and staffs.

1 0 Engineers ceosed wolk 00 Itt~ ita rorlrood on 19 Jonoory.

11 Ihe Iwo /lOCk cGilJfIl!'l$ consisled 01300 GAZ,\A 1nJc.ks, eacn one ([Jlrying 0 Iood 01 I OOOkg moo~), and 143 liS-55 1nKks.

12 The kll1lll00nogE' In rhe wimer 01 1942-43 induded 113,825 lonnes (] 1l,aJ3 1005) 0 food, 5S,3331oonllS (54,355 rons) aI omffillllilion and IB,93B lonnes (18,603 10m) aI (oolln adrlilion, 12,368 horses, 1431 whides. 000 133.144 pelSllnnel reinfoKemenl5 ent!lled tne (Ity vio the rood, with 88,932 IMKlJ!!es from ~ dly.

27 OKH Opem~ons Orool No I.

188

13 The Germons condurted 140 air raids ond dropped more Ihan 260 bombs dunng llie Wllller.

14 The lOOogo worer ro~tes rook over tire IIOnsport msl:.s while the railroad was beillg lepa~ed.

1 5 AI MI, on rrol !rcllIpart along the two roilroom loel. ploce 01 nighl on !he basis m spedal plans IglOp!1ics) IOf ooo-wuy ond ~ movemenl. Bv the end of June, howev~r, an l1liltrolli< wos rU""lng two ways 01l1)[l$I coostanlty.

16 The G~I/Tllns employed es II1Qny as 100 bombers and 40 lighters a time againsl the bridges. Although flrey succeeded in deslro~1l!l one bridge 00 1 June, cortstnKtioo troo~ ond engine«s reploced Ihe deslroyed bridge with 0 wnodrrn hridge within fIVe days and 0 mGral bridge bV 19 June. German auCloft destroyed dre wood€n !Jridge ogoln on 19 llrl1B and lIIe melOl blldge on the 21st. However, ~ Merges w~e ogcin reOOih OIl 23 June onrl1 J~ rllSpe(1ive~.

17 The oirJll'(1lll1M of!Upplies IIIT1Iltmled to 524,779 laMes (515,500 OIlS), O'Ier hal of 'lI'i1idi W05 wood. Sh pmenls dUllng the sllfing aoo summer induded 79,51 5 laones (7B,1 09 tons) of wood, 53,8381oor1es (52,886 10111) of food, 4516 'onnes (4436 Ions) of Iuel, and 12,751tannes (12,532 !oo5J 01 cool sent into lening.oo, ond 42.032 1000es 141,300 OIlS) of cargo shipped out 0 Lenlnglod.

181he woter rolJfes reverted to (oofrcl 01 tOO NorthwestRIH Rivel F ~Iry m[e_

19 The lIlniRgror:l OpeIotiooo1 GrfMIII consisted of parli5Qn detuchments in !he losno and liubcn regIons orllODized infO two bonorlons c omll\llnc!ed by E. f. Twnla'lilll and K. I. VoIovkh The Vtlldoi Operuticrrull Group colliil1ed of poriisan ooflKhmen!; In Ihe 5rmllia Rus!.O, PohMk. Zoluch' 8 and MtrIwtitty 'egrom In the soollrwesrl!ln and southein rmes 01 leninilrod legion, and the thild operotionoi grOlip operoled ill the Vollhov Fronrs ser:tor,

20 In MDI(h, for exnm~e, il combined the leniI1lJlor:I and Volkhov Opelufionol Groups under A. A. &l18ev'S command 10 improve command and (onlrol. !he following month, il raorgalllzed rile Valdol Opeiolionol GrOllll's de!o<bmenl5 mlo the 3rd Pm" Brigade, commonded by A. y, Germorr, and me 4!hPartisoo IIlp. (OlIUI1lnried by A.. P. Luthln

21 for example, the 10S110 000' Uu'oon detochmenl1 ope!oted llQllinst [;ermon (ontmlllU{OliClllS Ines,lMJl wilh anIy nmiterl efferti'l&ness, d~ rhe Vo!kI1ov Flool's Liuban offe~e. Forther sooth, 1n Jonuary ond feblUllr~ Itr~ paJlisarrs OIOUoo &lev supported the ~ ol1lrwestem f rem's Demionsk oHellSM! by disluptillg IieImrur tommunkorions belWelln N:ov and tilov und GOOv ond rnglsepp, In OOJilion. portilGllS near ilmO'l, Ono, PCl~hov, ~rurin ond I!elebelkov 5IJl)pa41ed the orthweSlelfl fianfs oj)llroliolls around Demiamk and Kholm. l11ese portisons ochieved much success when they assiSted Red Atmy forces In the seizure of Xholm on I B JanuolY ond I~ copture ollllssid 00 5 Februa!y and Dedovkhi on 22 fetlruary. HoweYe!, In eo<h (ose GelllHJJl relief mrncks lonee! ilia partisans and Red Army forces 10 aoondon lire IOWIl5.

22 fill eXDm~,1he Party sent 25 ~ .parlisorr groups of 7-9 tne(leoch 10 Gdov, Psi:0'I, ~, ()redelh. 1'Iiuss, Sm.goI:llISIIIIflIk, kilgi5epp tiIIl ather regions. ThroogOOulIlls pedrx! 50viel recooIs inIIwIe lOOt ~n rxti:Ins Infilted 15,000 IosJes 00 Gemm froaps 000 des. 114 mil rind rood lxiJges, 26 WOIeIrcws, 69 tooks. 500 veItIes ood 13 amafr.

23100 2nd Pomsan Brigode operaled soorheosr 01 DIIO ond llie 31d P([ftlsan Brigade soo1I1 01 Poochkn ShI1ion. Delodllllenis commended by A. I. 10 UlIlO'I, h I. SixhulUV, L p, Durygin, O. A.. Shokhrinsl;v ond F. S. Moknlov Gnd teJ\S of oM!llionory glOUps operoled in

18~

TH

the lotesl5 east 01 MIN. DerarnmelilS led by B. M. Prokhorov, T. la. Pechotlllkov. S. A. Serlleev, G. F. Sol'shav, A.. A. lobellno, G I Bogdonov, ~ I SI ParTisan Bligode IJIld tillS of oilier delochmenl5 opemted IKlrth~ of Iirfoy Frncl~, 1fIo 41f1 Porrimn Rrrgode op!lrtlled in me 50IIthern ~( o! the oblmt.

24 The liermnn punilive exped'lTiGn, conli5riflg of 6!lOO rroo~ ~om the 218th Inf01l1ry Division, Ihe 4th Blocking ReglrTlllflt, .~runlV IIml5 arK! punilNB delOcnmenls, loOOuded lhe P[I(rikolron operahon IIIlighhng rool mred unhll 0 Seplembet. IluirllG Itti!. paiod, GeU11011 f~(6$ (apllJled i1l1oges in the Belehelk~ij, DeOO'licni ond Paddorsl: re1Jions, ~~ hOUleS, fulTllS DOd other buildings ond peBe<uled the Iocclll1hobifllnl5_

25 The 2M OM 3rd Brigades moved 10 Osllov, Slav ovi(hl ond NINorzheill , tilt 1s1 and 4m Brigades moved TO Gdov and Slonrsy, ond remoinlng derochmenls moved 10 NOvgOllld, 501'15'(, Utorgosh' ond Wgc reglDlIS

7b The r(!{liQRal ceones were 01 Osnov. I'sb~, Dna, Strug asnem.l:, Dedovic;hl, Gdo-I. Kinglsepp, luga, Oledezh, NoYgOloo 000 Mhov.

77 The 5!h PIliIMn 811gode. hooded bV X D. KOIits y, hoe formed In !he SlovkOYKhi regroo in lhe wmter 0.1 1942-43 Imm Ihe Shlraio RUSSII DOd ~dIi dehldlmant. It. O. Koooral'ev's 4rill'ol11llln Brigade wns 100rTIIlIl from lI1e 5111 Bngode rn ml!J.1943 hl

[oodue opemlilmsln Ihe southem ~rt of Let1~lDd r611lon. The 11 th rumson Bngodli, fll> commanded by A. P. lllChi~ and, Ictet, by . A. Bledn OV, combined the Oredezh. NOVgolOO, 8olOisk ond orller denxhmenlS opera 'fig 01 rhe jUIl(Tioo of me l.en!ngllld aoo Volkhov Froob.1hB 3rd 'A_ Y ~rrnDn' PllJIisnn BriQOOe «II1ti1lood 10 o~ate in Ihe [lslrov and Sash hm regIonS. ond Ila 2nd 'N. G Vosil'ev' Pllrlison 8rl!lode, commonded SlKces1ive~ by M. I. Tamokhin, A. N. M ov DOO N. I, Sinel'nikov, rede~~yed &om !he Novgolod III !he I'$kov rB!lion in summer 194 3.ln oddilion, 5e'/eml ~ote partison rfllliRlllnls and dehlchmenlS operoledtfuaugMul !he lejjlOO.

28 The 6th Por11slln BrigOOe, ~r V P. Ob'erlkov,lo!med In Sep~mber from the 2nd

Brigode and me 7th and Bth I'orlis1lll8ngodllS. under A V. Alekleev cnd L B. TsillChenko. formed In !he regions Ilfiminisrared bv the !'skov, Osnov, and Porkhov Party DiSllict (ommillees The 9 h PorbsmI BlJ9llde, commanded by N G. SveUov, fGlmad dmng Ihe fail In the Gdov, Siontsev, llody, Os'mlon and luge r~Ofl5. I. A. NOi1kov's IOlh Portlsan Srrgode formed In me Ono and SlrUgo ~IOM, and .l It. InglOen's 12111 Pomson Br!gorJe fOllned flom dehldlmeol5 in the KiIlllOOW regioo also in ~ a fall. Finoli't, me 13m PorliS!Jn Brigade, unoor A. V. lurl5ev. whicn WDS ttre'lml 10 101m, Illgonized on II Jonuory 1944 in me soorttem IlCIlion 01 Dedovkhl regtcn

Q(IOSS Ihe Ie e with cooslOl olhllery ooolile lodoga Military Flanlla's shijls, ond defended ovoia lndollO on me 1o e's eastern shore

9 The Eighth Arm( conSISted of e-ghr Idle dMIIOIlS, ooe rifle ~rgode, one ron legimeRl ond rwo separore ron oonolioll5; too Se<and Shock ArmV fielded TWO liRe djy~ns, !wo rifle brig., one 1lIIvul inlimhy brigooe, 1\'11) ten briiJUdel, fWl 5epaillle hmk oothlflllnl ortd 'i!JPIl'lI1I1IIl Mlilery

10 lbe Gpelolicnol delllily in e VolkOOv froot's Ei~hm and ~orol Shod Almies' ~0fS wos ooe _n Jl<lr 4km (2. S miles) oJ ~oot. The Eighth Army's o'Msioos numbeled hom 3800-9500 mCll (5400 00 oyeroye), ond die SKond Shoo. Alrrrt 6500-7000 men. The 1'110 armies fielded 1700 guns ond mortOIS. 130 Knhu~DI, ond ovel 100 tanks.

29 FOI elomple, ID the LEmngrad regiGn, the 3m Pmtrlun 8rigade condut:!ed IIIIllh~e ooocks 00 !he Psi;D'I'M.bov railroad fille on 21 August !hoI put the railroad oul nl rxtion fOl eignr dGyS. In Sep ember sevelol ~mS()o bngorJas (onducted Operorion lkII'shoi KOII{etl Ilorge (Ofl{oo) against the lugllM.~ milrood une. $(Mel sources claIm rhor portisnos IBed on esruTIOloo 17,000 Germon Iroopllrmn 1 January II1loll1Jn I Seplemblll 1943

and dastrOVed or domoged 0 ronsid&mblij omounl of Germon eqUipment Illdudillg 156

tlOms, 1331ocomolives, ond 1452 roil (ors, plotfu;ms 000 Wllter to~rs, 19 ro~ ond 151 (000 bridges, 12,020 'el~one lind alegroph Iin-es, 12 IOnks and 26 guns, 50 WIlfShouses, one 37 sroog garrisool Of sec.urily pests.

II MBretskov's 18S'el\'e induded Ihe 7 ht Rifle D;vmon and the 37m ortd 39m S . Brigades.

12 The 96111 Inmnhy ond 5th Mounloin Iliviskllls were in rmIlV qrgup l8S'eI'Ii,

13 The fil5l Au Arrrrt lornlooed 4700 bombing sorliBS o~r~51 LemlljJJOd wlm R~hl'; 01 rhree 10 llx ouuoIt ooch oolween I Ildobei and 31 Oe(emhe,.

30 rD! 81a., me 200 I'llrtI5Iln llllJooe mrded i'Iitmo S_ 011 the leningrod-fshw rmlrood lina, bloWing up 0 budge, dashOvmg a fioln 000 flee ng ScMat prilooBlS-1lf'W1lr, ond gog a reported 136 GennoI15.ln focT, in Saplvmbei the 77S porIlsan fightel5 01 the Sm Partisan BriQode lomen ed popdoJ upc1sings in manV villages, coovernng th~ rncJYemenl into 0 full revol in its opermioool 'egion. In Oaober me 00g0de Cllll ed die lovm of PIiusso mrJ

e muthern portion Df the ll9t IDlIf Bolaisk regMS, p!evenfing German occupying oulhoolies from ellher ge!herrrnJ the harvest orl8fllO'llng much of thi popuIolion to lorced Iobor.r (amps in GerlTGIl)' or ~ lerrilor!'. The 9111 POlIison 6ngode (reated simiInr contboos in the GOOv, ~ liody, 0s'1TlIII and Kingisepp regiom in eorIy 0cI000 by OiQlllluifig fJIlIismIls rn Urorgooh, PIiusso, luga, &loY, Sbltsev, Os'mrn, Liody, Volosovo am elsewhe!e inCoopelOOOn \'lim tile 11m 8r;p1e. Sooo !be Up!1silg SjIlood ro the Pekrrvels legfoo, wlrere lI1e 2nd olld 3rt! PoI1iloo BIigOOes were IltJflIQIirIg

14 L Almy (ClIps conslsred 0 Ibe 215111 ood 215m Inlcnhy, 9th luftwo e Fle~ ond 2nd 55 Divisions; lIV Armv (~conroined too 2501h Spanish 'BIoo', 55 Police ond 51h MiIIII1tuin Divisions.

1 S XXVI Atmv COlPS' 170!h 1nfu1111'1 Dll'Isior1 Q~d 0Ile rejjlmoor 0 the 227th InfonlrV Division defended alOl1g the Nevo River foeing west, ond the rell'lfJlnder ollhe 221lh, 1 st 000 mrd I nfl!llhy DNisioll! were deployad ~orn 5h6mrI' wry pasl VOroOOiU focin!loorth and east. I Aimy (GiPS Cl!nSISled allhe 69th, I 32nd. 6 hl. 11 tho m m and 21 SI InlMtry DIVisions.

CHAPTER B NOTES

16 XXVlllumy (OlpS COnsisl00 of the 24ril ond 121st Imonhy ond 28th Jliger Divisions, and XXXVIII Army (Olps the 254m and 2J2rh Inlonuy and lSI LufllWffe Field Divisions.

I The flOnliines were a llIore 4km (2_S miles) 500tn 01 !he city ond on~ 30km (18]5 mil~) to the oorlhwesl a~d sourITea>l.

2 The Twanry.Th!rd Army [oosi5!ed 01 frro rifle dMsions, 000 rffie ~iglJde, rwo fortified I~lons and one hlnk c.r~de; the (00$101 Opera liaool Gioup ~eldedlwo rille divisions, iwe rifle brlQOdes, IIW novoIlnflll1fi~ brlgOOllS, rwo sepomle mDc~ine gUll1lrh11ery bo"otlOll1 and one sepomtuoo bcllulioo.

3 The fOiItSlI(and Amry helded fIVe nfra tf~. 008 forldled regloo, one Illn brij1lde, and Ql1e separate lUll leglment; tire frltyflftb Army (OMlSted of fOUl rifle dlVl1ioos, OI1e fOilifled reglon ond ona tank brigade.

4 The SixfitSevenlh Almy conmted 01 three riDe dlons.ons, two rifle lIrlgodes, one skr bllgode, one fortified regIOn, IIW sepo!ote ron oolflllioP$ ond 5fJpporting artillery. The army's 46th Riffe DMslon del-ended PCIJogtVvbol~[D llubJovka sector and 0 small bndiJehtOO OCIOS!- the NOio Rivor Roor MoskomoPo Dubrov 0, and the 11 th RiRe Br~e was deployed frnm Vylxllgsklriu Oubrlllb 10 me !ioonibololta Rivat,4km (2.5 miles) sooth of SbWIKJI!I. The 1IlfIlY'1 16th fortified Region tlEfended the wli5tErn sIl~H!l 01 toke ~, rile 55th Rifl. Br'JOOB defended the ita rood along with 1M ~ Flofilill, and 0 smull gomsoo Il'IfJnned Oresh~ Forness aline moulh of the Neoro opposite Shlissd'!ug. Duklulllov rerolned the 4Sm ms ond 86th Rifle DMIIOIIS ond !he 35th Ski Bngode In armv (aserve. The Sixly-Severuh Almv's divWOI1S ronged in slengrh from

7-10,000 men!l\l{h ond Ihe bllgade~ from 3-5800 mon eoch, ond the Dlmy O'i 0 whole helded 850 gurrs ond morlllrs, 400 M-30 mulh¢e rocket Jounroers, ond slightly more thon 50 tonfs The army's opetDtiOllOI densilywos 12km (7.5 m~es) per delendmg dMsion.

11 The salient wos de ended by XXVI Army (0IpS' hr, 227th and 170111 In antry DMsIons. UV Almy (orps' S5 Panta Orvmn ood ~ of the Sth MounIDin Dpn, and Ihe Elghteenth Army's relel\'o 96th Infonhy !livision.

5 The 130m 000 2681b Rifle DivisiollS, lhe 6151 and 122nd Rine Brigade, lhe 34th Ski Br~cde,lI1e 13th FOl-fled R&giOO, ond the 6151 ond 122n~ Tunk Illl(lades CIl1IS\llUlOO GovQrov's reseM.

18 The Germms cGl'lSlllx1ed def~ regions ol WDIl:8I>' Sertlemenl) Nos I coo 2-

Slimel 'burg IIIIdSiniMoo_ Filla ~et1nlll o! ffi!i!lmKe iomlOO ot SI1MiI'iug. Gomdrlk 1 M:I 2. rIrOOlovo orKI AlVlemlr.oo roced !he 5U1't'i.evellih AIJrr.i. and IJOOIhe 01 L~ prooecled the rmIIood me 10 ~ 51 •. In 00dm00, SIX' od!iooooI (et1hllS of ~e 01 Up 0, WIlIkm Setm-nenl No 8, Gootowio lJpko, Toodow. Mmoo and PoOO' e faced the E~h!h Amly. Ady, the GemIons Iotmed deep de 8IlSM ~1iorls onchrred on W!XKI!I5' SertierneJll5 Nos 1 end 5 ond Sinlrl'oino In the deptlis, end 1IIJ118l00s OOdlriooal roor dfl!l!!'I<e lines

6 Leningrad Froor olr fORm indoded the 275111 Fighler, 276!h Bombei D~ m!h AAuuh AvlGrlon Oivrsions, the 196'" Dod 286m FIghter, 23rd Goolds ond 897ih Bomber, Dnd 13th Recannoissall<e Avk!rion RegimenlS, and me 121h Mixed Al'ialion RflIIimenl, which was 5hllfOlming_

19 If SllClessful. the Uritsl: offunsivs would hull ~ GenTJOl1 orfille'Y bombordment ul temngrod, resTore freedMI 01 moooewre between lemngroo ond Kronshtodllo the 801t~ Fleer's ~hlps, ond significan~y widen tho southern sector 01 rile lentngrod delefl(llS.

I rhe leningroo PVO Army fnduWl VII Fighrel Al'klnon (~ WIth 80 oJr(rcft operaHonal~ SIlbolml101e 10 the Thirteenth Au Army, six medlum DOd 01lEl srnaIkolilJJe onlkrircrolt orhUery regiments, and one hoovy molhiilEl1!Un oml1l~croIt Orli~el'llegfmenl.

20 The Sixty-Selrafl th Army WIl5 10 ~trQle Garmon dalen<8l. between GnrMbk 2 and 5111~sel'wrg ond ~mulhlneoosly olollQ tire shores of lIlke LOOogo. The Second ShQ(k 000 E~hm Nmies were hl penelJole GeIlOOR defet1ce5 iletween Luke lodoga ood Milllioo. The IIW sh«k groups wele 10 Unk up near SiniovllJo.

8 The &lIne Flilill pilrfurmed muitiplil missions. first, h jlevenled GeIlllOO force-; horn 18izin1l Ko~m IlJond and othel ilIttnds in me GuH 01 Fin~nd by on attock OC(O'I$ rhe ile ond 1lI0lected the sec afJ!l!mes to LeI1ingroo In cooperotion WIth the TwenltThird Arm(, the Coostcl Group ond lhe In emollle£ences of die (11'1. In oddltiCfl,lr prolicred 1he ICe roods across the Gulf of Finland, helped defern! luke lodoga's westem shore and the Ice rm

21 Alll10ugh me nan! stoffs plOl1ned bom 1ljletD00m rn deroil, mG ur 'mare 0 o(k dote depern!ed on ita crmd'rtrons 011 the New [!Wr und lIlks Lo&Jgu.

190

72 lin'l{llOV ra<ommended mol each sh« group COIISISI of seven 10 cight rifle dMsiORS, wilh fQUI dl'lisiof15 in fJTs1etheloo, !hree In ~ond echelon and ona in resaNe, and 00 ;opponed by suhstuntiol ron , ortillery ond engiQWIlo[(es.

73 Tile 510'11:0 leinlnrred GovorOl"S front with the 214m ~·IlMsiM, tt.e 10200, mrd, 138m, 251hh ond 14200 Rille ~, Ihe 7th Anlkrimrrft Amnery Division and three GOIIlSIeigh brrttnm.11 !lInllolaretsl:OI"s 00iI1!he 18111. 147m, 239m, 364th 000 379rh Rifle Oivisions ond the 531d EJ1jJiooer·Soppei B~ ~om //IO'i(ow, the 11th, 12th oro 13th SI:i HrigOOes from ~'li:, and fw oerosJelgll oolfllm. The NKO also pfD'IidOO the

IwIl fronls ....;1f1 new Eq\Iipmenl /le(.essury 10 loon sizecNe new orllilefy and OImOllled funes, 1hese incMled foor 1Ii1111eri d'Msiofls, 10 tnOfIOI regiments, 1\'11) ootiWCI1lit OI1i1!Ery rflliments 0IId one IOnk regiRlllnl1fl the Volkbov fronl aM one rulBlety dmsioo, OIle ortitery bngoda. three • regim001>, five guocls IOO!1ur OOltaliom. three mor1m regrments, one ton regfmerrl 000 fDIII 5ejlOrcIe tonk 00thlIi0ns lI1tbe !eringroo Front Ihase relnforcements looeosed !he VOlkhoi FIOII 's personlllll shengm by 22 peltenl, !JtrllS by 20 ~(enl and morrars by 30 perce"" crnrl !be tarungrod Floors parso~neI !nelllllh by 10 peltenl.

24 The ~r!!Ose Il!{ond stage mis;ion WG> 10 clem me iilov m~rl)Qd onD reoln tiIf Voruoovo. Voskresenskoo, Sijgolovo and VOilolOl'O Jrne by !he month's end.

25 Dukhon~'s sIlod:. group wos to olfll(k ato~ the Mm'IIlO'Siflia'lino axis ro destroy German sllOl1!lpoSlts on !he lefl bon~ of !he eva R'rrol, and copllnl! AIOOI01'O, WOI flS' Sslllem!inr 02 ortd SbI~I'oolg. Subsequently. Dukhonov WDS 10 commillus seconder:heJoo fortes and overcome lI1e German cenlle-; 01 resistcroce a1 Annenskoe.lAus1olovo, Worke!s' Settlement No 6, 5iniOl'ino aoo Wo~kers' Seffiemenls Nos S ond I.

26 The Sixty-Selrenm!llmy WO'i sullPOrted by 22 cmnery arm rnorIDf 1~lrn~nts, 1 S ~flgirle~r~per and pCIIltOOll butloliorrs, !lnd amer spaiiulized iJIlits.

77 Rommrc'lSl:.y's immeil'Jole mission was 10 destroy German lortS'S tn the lJpI:o, "Krug'oo' grove and Galtolovo regions wiftl his silang left fI1lnk ond cDplUfe 1M German s1rong~ints 01 Workers' Ss ements ~O'I 1 aod 5, and the cenne of reSiston(s or Slnlovioo 10 disorgtlnlze Ihe en~le Germon defence.

28 Two en!jllleer~ ~lIJode-;, 37 OI1IReI'f and IIlQIrol regrments and otfler specloRzed U1li15 SIIp~rred !he SoconcI Shock Army.

29 The completed plnn fOi (ooparolion was fill mOle d&ta~ed !han PUMOUS pions, inslnicling the IwIl shot grw~ 00 every IfSPi{t oIl11e opemlion ond es1obtlllrl~ g~ lOt lIV&ry rupee! ofltof! p.iarming.

30 TIre Silly-Seventh Army's 46th Rifle 01'111100, 55111 ~ifle ond 35th SkI BlIflOOIlS, 000 16th Fortified Region defended Itre W1lS em bank of the Nevu giver and the Ice rood ocr~ l.o e lndogn. The 80itk Fleelleiololced the SixttSwenril Army with 23 butteries of fi erl and romlilod CJr ftlcry. These Indvded 88 ~onge 130-356mm gullS from the Fleel noming grounds, four minesweeper squorhrrs ond three cunoon ships posiIioned on the lew RivOl

31 fhe Se(Ond silrxk Arrrrt'S nnd Rifle Sngtlde IVQ5 III praIser rhe loulhern snore of 1Il e I.rnIagu !.'I];I of Upko during the offensive.

32 The foci rtrrJl the sl10ck QrCMJll! wOle atIlKking rowarM one ilI1'O:lherllillllrrst 00ielrl'ffls oo~ 13-15 m (8.H3 m~es) cpor! mode COOIdinolion both es~ntilll cnd difficull

33 GoVDIOV coocennDred 144 guns Dod mortols per kilamehe 01 frOl1I in tile SW;Srrventh Atmv's senOI and reinfillced this fire with three goords mor1uJ re,jlments and 12 botlolions in thti pelll!tmiion 5IKh.lr to inaeose the ~re~lUlio,,'s effedivellllS5.ln 1ili1ion, he formed

191

Ionq-mngo Q(non and speriol desigootion groops ro deslroy enemy crlillel\' and enguge importont tol~f; in ihe dapih, and 0 gUllIds mortm groop to SIIPport Ihe socond e<bmn during il> commllmen1 IIllo the penelro1ion, fioollv, 10 Im""ave Moo 11'/ Wjl{lCI1, 6111'01(1'{ fDnnOO toUI11e1-mortor groops in eclcn cittJdmg diVisioo 10 rupplemem lIle fire of Infonhy rup~ grollJlS, GoVOl(l'{ initially employed simuftonoous borruge me to Q de~ih of I ~m (,61 miles), When the bollages endoo, orbllery Ired successive me coJltenhDlioM and iIlid down 0 delllll looe of Il001 plOle(1ive files 250m [820ft) hom the NIMl ~Ivel'! oonk to prolecl the odvandng Infllflll'1. Before and during tile ill anJl'f os50ult, roossed direct fua by 22 guns per !omelle of front would jlfllYem lIle Gennon, from desrroyfng the j{e (over ovelrOO NeY(] River, The frofi1 allocolellthrell MI (ombol bJds of ar~lIerv to the SillY" Sewnth AIIll'/ and rerained 15-5 Ioo~ oj frOnl and Olmy oopor>, and plcnMd III emplov 3.3-5 (lJIllbalioods during the penelrctlon 10 0 oopth of 51:m (3,1 miles), This luI ex(eedad the quonfilies of !lmmunition olkKoted 10 prlMQll'; offensives,

34 Mele~ (oncenhOled 180 gum ond morTa~ pel kilometre 0' hOnl, not induding !he IWO heavy btigodes and four gUOJds morrol bIlgodes, and c ocoted 2206 gUllS and mOlIms to S\I~rt the Sei.ond SIJock Armv. His ortillerj p!ePGro~en also rened 00 heavy drre<! us oloo!l the IOfW1lrd edge invoM~ 18 guns pel kilomehe of hent, The front suppl'e!l tile Sei.ond Shock Army wim bEtween 2-2.5 16 fiw CHt loads 01 ommurtilioo, ami orrleIBIl ollregimenlol ond a_nol artillery 10 be moonted on skis or sleighs and heavy machine guns on skis or snow mrB 10 Imp!(I'{e their mobility.

35 nIB nm eenm Air Army's 414 oimalt induded 52 bombm, 85 DSllluli p!ooas, 242 fightel5 ond 35 r~l(InllllissaOOl aoo othef type air«ofI,

36 In oddilion, tile ~hleG cOlI(enhoted 00 n~DWng oir IlJperiorily and piO¥iding olr {owr 101 rhe 1rOOjlS.

37 1M 395 nirach looiJded 35 00rnbers, 174 II5SOIJII ooaufi, 1631i~htijG und 23 re<ollll!liMnce oilcroh,

38 The I S2nd, 220m und 61s1 !lonl Tonk 8I1godes. 000 rtJa I 89th and 119th Separote Tonk 8atral'IOM svppOOed the Slxry.$eventh ilfmy.

39 The 16th, 981h, 12200, aIlil185!h Ton 8ngodes, the 32nd lioollis Ton Penatmlion Regiment, and the 50fh, 501 sl, S03rd,IInd S07th Sepalllra Ion and 32nd (fIId 441h A!losleigh SaITOllOm SU)IIlOOed the Second Shock Army_ The 15m Sepolote lonk Reglmem ami 107m end 502nd Tank Sa om !ilJPPIll1ed the f~hth Army, !he Sixly-SwEllth Army empkryBll ihe blJlk of ill hllll:5 on the shod group's left flonk to assisI in me ropll mplure 01 the SlninYino (enke of rMrOl1(e. The 37200, 256th omII91 $I RrIle Oivisions, whkh Wtl8 ollllcking in ttJa centre, hud no orlllClH suppcrt,

40 Laningllld Fronl engiRee.rS hod 10 ass~ in lI1e c_g on me N!lVD Riv~!, fJlepore movemetrl IOules in !he rood1elS lenoin, ond DI~Dnit8 jumJll~lillnd DSlllull posIlioltS. Prior to rile cliensmriley wiIlened IJI1d deepened exlSling IIE1l(hes and construdeiJ an eloboroTe ~lem of ditches 4-600m (1312-1968ft) Irom!he rivtl II! prolecT the mOVBm~nt of koops Irom the roillood \0 Tile jumpinQ'O~ posilions o!ong the ri'lIlI, They oM 00111 an extensm system 01 command Dnd DbstriOlion points, numercus (owted gun IUing pos1!!0I15, porliculoJiv for direct lire ovar Ihe fiver, and heD1irJg and res.! buD und cabins COveled wilh waTerproof (OlIVOS 101 entire platoons. While the army regrou~, tlley construe/ed up to SOkm (31.2 m~es) oj winler roods (two routes fIB! divilioq) and wI poths ihrougll the millefield!; using spedoIIy p!eprlled overhaod el~es. Duling the IlHurk, und Undel enBffiy Am, they bu~1 wooden Clossings over rile HI!'IlJ will1 0 mpocily of up 10 61 Itm~ (60 lOllS) so thai medium (fnd hecvv ronks coule! tum the river. !hek mosl impo~ont combat (oolliilutiOl1 wm Ihe employment oIosSIJuh ond destruction gtOLlp! especlol~ robed 10 dB5lroy spo<ifk Getman 5lTollOiJ'linl5, and Blllli1leel Dbshlde oot11lfKlns and miner bol1olJons to fortify occupied rmes ood protecllhe Honks.

41 The Leningrod Front snlllo(ked an udeqooTe dePOI system and was shorr of vehkulDI Tronsport, fU&l and madkol supplies,

S S ilIJring Iile offer1Sive Soviet IOlcas (Oplllled GEIJlI!IIl 5Irongpointl DI Shl.ssel'oorg, MoIIRO, ~pko, WDlke~' Serrlemonll 01 I, 2. 3, 4, S, 6, 7 ·one! B, 000 Podgoinyi Stumm.

CHAPTER OTES

42 Op6Jolion Man was !he third Rlhev-S),(1Hma ope •• !he fint operolfoo had mien ploce In Februory-Morcb 1942 as pn of lhe Red Army's Winrel offensm, ond!he second opemtion, which was a rullS5 lehlKlrsc! 101 Opellldoo Mars, Olwrred in AlIglIs! and Se~lembEl 1942. Allrill8e operclions soughl III de!rol ilfmv Group Cenhe, end all rillee foiled.

S 6 For ejr contriburions III !he victory, the GKO oworded the designolions of 63rd and 64m Guards to Gellelai Slmooiak's 136dl 000 Colonel PQ~nkov'~ 327th Rifle nivi5lORS, ond 30th GlIDlI!S 10 liwtenont{e!onel KIII1 .. ~~lskv's 6151 Tonk BrigoOO

43 oIJong the southern am, the Don fronl WIIS deshoyillll the Gelman SlxIh Army endrcled 01 Stalinglod, the Varonelh ond Soothweilem Front wele dliving Gelmen !!)fCBS weslwards hOIll he Don RivBf, ane! me SootheJo Frool wm odVC11UljJ 011 RoSloy. Along me southwestem axis, the BriollSk front wm prePGIIIl!l to sm e the Gennoo Second Army 0.1 VOionetn, nM along 1M weslem axis ril.e Koanln f root WIIS ooltling with Germon 101(.e5 near Vellkie Lliki. Alf of these operD1iom WWB DCCIIlling simultor.eoos~.

57 The Sovle~ dorm to hove liUed and wounded 19,000 Germcn salamIS, coprurod 1m ~ers, und deslroyed 272 guns, 1200 rrothlne gullS and more thun 300 morton during Opercrl'ion SpnIk.

58 HOlrison E. ScllsblllV, TIle 900 /Jays: TIle Siege of Leningrad (New YOlt Harper g Rtlw .. 1969), 548,

44 Hea;y snowfall 00g0n at mkldoy, IlmiHng air support III iUS! Q'let 1 00 serties on the ~m dll'f of Ihe oHM

59 For example, on 31 JonllOlY 1 943 on~ Iwo regiments of the Spanish 250m InlOllhy Division dEfended 1M secr~! fram PU5h 'n To I~ south of Lerungrod OjlpOsfte 1M lenill'lr~d froot's Flfry-fifth ilfmy, Al ihe same ~me, jus! the 69th, 13200 and B h! Infootry Divioom defaMed ihe 100 111" (621T1ile-/ wide secr~r opposite Ihe Volkhov Front's filJtFourth Army

4 S Scml crillques ooted thol tire 128m Rifle Division foiled tu III!IIlOOUVTe 1II0iIBr!y, eqilllJ! il; heavy wBopnnry, concentrale il; dlre(1 fires, or cooperllte lIIoperly With lIS suppOOing ronks.

60 The 5ruvko Bl'jlIInCOO the oflensi'le OOcOU'il! u lecogniled rhe diffil.uJ lilB Ini1llved In rnotrnting on offensive in !he irnmedlote Leningrad regioo

46 Ovdlinnikov's missitm W!IS to bypass Workers' Selflement NoB hom e SlluIh, ottocl; towom Wli!lm' SeHlemonr No 5, one! frn up with lI1e smy.Swenm Army.

61 Special Group Koolin, whose forcr;> olld (om_elS were OOr.:!picl.:ed by the 511lvko, cofJlisted of Ueuleoom-Genemf M. t. KlJrukJlv's fIIlW~ !OImed fim Tonk Armv 01.0 Ue~tenont~1l1 F. I, 10[00 "s new Sixtr£i!lhlh Army,

47 The Fourteenth Ail Army flaw S500u sorties 00 12 January but none OR lhe 13th.

4B (clonal A. P. IVIInov's 1 231d ~ifle Division, (1Iiooe1 P. I, Pll1(huk,'s 151l1li Too Brigllde, and lielJl8oont-{clonei F. F. Shlshov's 123rd Rifle ~Od8 supportod Ihe IS6th Rifle Oivision, Colonel V. P.lokUlovit:n's 13th RiHe Division, lieu engn {olone! A. V. 80du '5 102nd Rifle Brigade, ond lieutellOl1l{olonel Koshcllienko's 142nd NMI Rifle 8rigoo'e reinforcetl tile 26 8th Riffe Oivislon ot Gllrod<i NI15 1 0Il!J. 2.

62 In oddiliOl1, port of lI1e Frfryfourth Atmv WIIS 10 altock liuoon 10 bulh disfroct the Eighleenth AJmy ami fie down its forces.

63 The Flltyfilth Army tonsisted of ihe 45th ond63rd Goorrls, 43rd, 46111, 56th, 72od, 131 st ond 26 B th Mia DM5lom, the 56th and 250th Rifle, 341h ood 35th Ski, ond tile 222nd fonk Brigodes, und lhe 3 ht Ton Regimen •.

49 Ueurenonl{o1nnello, F. Polek!rin's 34 th Ski Brigade

SO The 123rd Rifu! B~e captured Work8rs' Settlement No 3, but the 268th ~Irw Division f~1ed ta cap re Sememenl Nos I ood 2. After four days of cambel, rhe mrd Rille Division IlJ1d 102nd RIfle 81J,lude (optured the woods east uf Gorodok Nu 2, but cooId uuomptlSh IlIlming more. The ThIrteenm Alr Mnv ReII' 919 oil ~ on 14 and 15 Jonoory lIS the wetllherlmJlloved morkoo~.

64 S'llridov de~yed the 45th ond 63rd Guurds ~nd 4300 Rifle DiYisiorrs, 34!h 5I:i

BrigOOe, ami 3 lsi Tonk Regimefll 1Il Arst e<hakln. •

65 !he moMe groop, (ommonrled by Mnjor-Generol I. M. lioboil>ev, consis1ed 0 me 35th Ski and 12200 lank Bngades

51 On Mereli:Q'I's orde3, ROITllRtlYSky committed Gen9lul Ovcrunn ov's I Bth end (olOllel V. N. f eOOrov's i 151 Rille Ol/rsions, suppo~ed by the 98th Tcrnk 8rigade, into (omool 01113 Jonoory, Colonel P. A. PlltJOpov's 191$1 Rifle 0Msi0n wenlllllo (ombet QlI!Ilnst Getman defeJKes north of "Kruglolu" glove on 14 JOlllJ(llY. RnoOy, Mojor-Generol P. N. Chemyshav's 239dl one! CokvmIl, B. Gliboy's 11th Rille Divisions, the 121h IJI1d 13th Ski 8~udDS, ond Ihe I 2200 Tank Brigode went illlu ucfu1 DI'flI the nelt three days.

66 The f'lfryfoortb Army comprised rhe IISlh, 166m, 177rb, 198ill, 281$1, 285m. 294m, 311th, 3l4th ond 37 Bth Rl~B Divisiol5, the 14th and 140ih Rifle Brigades, the 6th ~ovcJ Rifle Brigade, aM the mod and 12 4 t~ Tonk Brigades.

S 2 GroLrp Huhne!, dE ending from ShllSSel'oolg 16 north of Siniuviml, (_ted of the 18 moonl! of Ihe 22 7th, 6151 ond 5ft1 Moontoin Infantry 0iI'isi0ns_

67 On I Fehnllry 1943 rile Seumd SOOd Army comprised lI1e 64th Goords, 11th, 18th, 7151 128th, 147t~ 314th, 364!h, 316th and 379th Rifte Divisions, tha nnd ~ffle alld nrd N(I'{OI Rifle, and 16th ond9Bth lank 8ri1lool15, the 32nd IiuoHls Tonk Regiment, nnd the 501 51, SD3rd and S07th SaporDlll Tonk fklt11l~DIIS The SIxty-Nth Aimy comprised the 13th, 46m, 90th. 14200, 189ih ~ne! 2.?4rh Rifle DMsinns, rhe 11th, SSm, 561h, I01nd, l13rd, 138th, 14200 and l50th Rlfla ond lsi, 61s! .. 15200 omI2201l11onk Brigndas, ll1e 31st 000 46th Guards Toni: ~egimenls, the 86th and Seporofe Tan SathlllOllS, and !be 16th fonified R~ion,

53 The 136th Rifle DMsion', 269th Rifle R~'menI Un eli up wi1I1 the 18m Rifle DMlioo's 424ih Rille Regimenl otll:45 heurs SOIITn of l'lroers' Senlem~t No S.

54 1IrMrcro~'s 1420d O\W Infml!y and 138th Riflrl BrqxIes DIhrled lOW(Jds Sinill'iino, and his l02nd Rille and 2201h iouk 8riQOOes onrf mid Rifle DMsbi strudc Gorodok riD I.

68 ReffifolcemenlS iocJuderl the 14th Infonlry ffiviIion, porl1llRI 01 the 2nd SS MolllIil~d InfoolTy Brigode, the flallllms lEIiion, ond remnonts of tile 11111, 21st ond 227th Divisions, which hod been sevRrrillv dcmoged in me 6ghling 01 SWuviIlO,

192

69 The 2501h Oivriior!'s FWl!!r 80ltDOOD Iosl olmOS! 90 pelcen' of its strength.

70 Ihe 166 tho 198m, 31 t th o~ 378th R'me Divisions, !he 14th and 140!h Rifli BrijJories, the 6th NIMII Rdle BO!lCJde, 000 the 124th Tonk BrigOOe.

11 Soliet critiques aooited the defelll m the sTrong~ fortified enemy oolemes, foully re<onno~n(e, pool Soviel command IJI1d COOlie! ot on levels 01 commend, cMnsy employment of lonh Iwhidl invoriobly be<ume sePQlolod from the infantry), and inefledMI OIll11ery ruppml.

72 The liegmnlng of the GElIIllln withdrownl korn lI1e Demillmk sa~enl, ([]denmned ()peroJion Tsitin, began on 19 FeblOOry ond 10 a ~ d'iSlupred Zhu ny'S pions fOJ OpeIUllon Polllr 5tor.

73 By thil ffme GEiman fOices hud abandoned most 01 the ~mionsk ~lienJ.

14 The Slovko's decision was based 011 intelrrgaoor infOimofion rhut ihe Gelllllln r~hl8enll1 Armv W!IS ((fl)CenKori"G 5kGnilIOll!lS noo Siniovioo. wilh the intenlion of (oorludill!l bolh 0 Honk at1u< agoimt the Frfttfifth Armv 110m posillons at f>ushkin m1~ ogclnsl the SOOy-Seventh and Second Shock Army to resfOl"e the bIockode.

75 Voroshilav svpe!'li$OO opeloHoM in the Leningfod rogioR, wilkh wela suppo~ 10 achieve their objectives by 25 March.

76 The SllIvka wtrs reo(~fl{Ilo lhe (oonleroflensive by Monstein's Army GTOOp Sooth againsl ScJviet forces. in the Oonbos, KOOrlov and Be~OIod orem.

77 The Northwestern Fronrs Twenty-Swanm Army lISSIluhed German defences ensl of SrorallJ Russo, and the Eleventh, Thbty-fOll/th and Fffry.Third Armias atIoCled Gemwm deferK!!S SOIJIh of ROnWlBYO, The loiter group odvon(oo to Tils Red'Hl Rive, bEfore the cHua foiIM.

78 The Rftv-Second Army comprised the 6Sih, 215th, 2.29th ornl 311hb Rille DMslnns, the 38th Ski llIigode, the 34m olld 53rtl Aeroskigh 8ollollollS, ond the 16th for ed Region, but no 10/11:5. Mere ov reinlo!red!he olmy wi1I1rhe 2291h and 3101h R.ifle Divisions just ~ 10 !he ok

19 The 55 Police Oivision wos ruboidinore to UV Army (orps. II was reinlDl(ed by the Flanders Legion and ruppotfBll on rhe ~hl by the 241111nfcrnhy Oivl$!an and 011 . ~e left by rhe 250m Sponish DMsion.

80 The 50200 Heovy Tonk boIlnlion W[n equlppOO wim 88mm fkl guns ami severol Jiger 1IlJ11:s,

81 For example, rhe Flanders Logion coonled 0I1~ 45 SUI'IMI~ nut of its Wllli strength or 500 men.

82 Ston'l:av (onr:enkflled his 2861h, 256!h, 318111, 374th 000 26SIh R"rlls D'Msioos in fiJSt echelon, svpported by me 35th, 25th, 3Jrd n1lll50!h Ton Regiment!. The 239th, 64th Guards and 364th [rfle Divisions, ond tile 122nd and 185m Tank Brigades, were m setolld echelon, ond rhe 311nd RIlla DiI'ision ond sa th Rifle 8rigOOe were jn reserve. Geilerol Alwet;k(l'{ lIJjlpotfed SmrikQ'l's army with most 01 his hont's arliDe!V.

83 The molri e group, wflkh consisted of the Mth GlIDfds iIIe Divisien's 1915l6ucrds .Rifle Regimen I 000 a ooltlrlloo oftha mild lank Brigade, cui tlls railroad etJ>1 of TlK)'lhkioo Sto ·on. The bod woother pieVenTed Th~ Fourteenth Air Army Irom providing il wim oir support,

193

lEGE OF LENINGRAD 1941-1944

97 The 379th and 165m HIRe Divisions relnfOiced «lid the 18!h and 256!h Rifle Divisions wilhdiOW.

CHAPTER

84 HHIe! h<irbouTed some hopes of condut1injj new offensives In tbe lenL119rrnlleg on. bUl on~ if the WehllTMlchl achleved vidory at Kursk. The Getman deleot 01 Kursk ended Dfl'/ web hqle.

85 Onfe the ~ed J\Jm1 delenled !he Gelllllln offemN9, wlmh thf 51rMn (OIleaiy assumed would be 01 Krl. it plunned 10 IolJl1(h m~n~e affemiYes of 11> awn, ileginning lIQ(llo;1 the Ronks 01 Germen forces Illihe Kursk region and then eipOooll1g to encMljIIm !he til nre fronT.

86 GoYorov withdrew e Sixly-Seventh Almy's nne rifte alVisfGns, one mOl hrigode end !\Yo tonk regiments mto reserve fOl nm and refittill!l, aoo Merallkov withdrew fOUl rille divisions, !hree ton brigades GOO one lank regiment into front leseNe GOO OIdeIed i1> (omponent IlImies to fOim resBlYlI! 01 one or two divisions eo<h.

87 AaQldin~ 10 Fore~n Armies E~ (f/erode HeeIII Dsn eslifootas, 00 20 July Almv Group North numbered 760,000 met! QIlJGoized inlo 43 il1lootry divMns eM was apiMJ!8d by 734,000 _I ~oops, Ilctkoo up by 491,000 r8lllMits. l1la sume report lrJdh:otoo thai Almv Group North ilod~ 9 ionia onrl 4 OJ guns crnlroort0r5 lOOn!] 00 estimated 209 ~t ronks and 2793 guns and IIIO!tar5, bocked up by 843 IWlks ond 1800 (fU115 ond morturs in le5ervB.

88 Simonlck's corps riled of the 45m, 63rd and 65111 Guollk Rille Divisions, supported by !he 30th Guards and 220lh Tonk Brigades eM !he 3 Island 29111 Guord5 Tonk Regimenl5.

89 TIle 90th. 268m, 43rt1 ond 123rd ~ifki Divisioos, depqw flom wesllO oosJ, weJe TO cttocl: eas1 01 SiniIrIioo.

90 The 8,Jhth Mny'slmmed"Hlte misJ.ion was 10 pe11e~Dte German de!~tes and leoch the Toooiovo-Korbusel' line. Subseque~rfy, it W05 10 expion Ihe offensive TO tl11k up wilh Ihe Sixty-Sewnlh Army's Ioite:s al Mgo, while delothlng ot Ioost IWO rifle a~ and one tonk brig(lde to d.e S1nicNil1o ~om the jQ(fth.

91 The first shock group (onsistw ollhe 18th and 3781h Rille DMsiDn in thledmlon and Ihe 3791h nnd 239m ~ IlMsJons m second. all4l !he soutnem shock fjlDVP comprised

me 256m and 364m Rille llMsicns In fl~1 echelon cnd me 16SIb and 3]4111 Rille DivislCm in second. Storikov relnloned fIO\h first1l(heion division with 0 tDllk r9n@nl and assigned his 161h end 122nd Took Brignd~ 10 the l«ond edlI!lon with OI~ 10 exploit !he Dffensive. The Eighth Almy illduOOd me 32nd, S3rd, 35m and 50th GIJIlIlk 000 1SIh 000 18.51h Sepclafe Ton~ Reglmenls, but their precise suooralllO~on dllli~ the oHock reroolns obscure.

921ha 372m! Rille !lon dafnOOed the OImy's righl Honk, and the 265m ond 382nd Rifte Divisions ond hI and 22nd Riffe BrigOOes (Oool!( 00 the supporting uttod on the left. The 2861h Rifle ilMmn ond S81h Rille Brigodo were in reserve.

93 In his lOOin oltcck sector, Slan"kov's IQlca 01 olleosj 50,000 men ond over 150 lonI:s outnumbeloo the IiellOOn delendJJ~ by a 1m cI olmost fiw 10 0IIII ond fOl more in orl1lOlJf, but !he m1io wm (onsidamb~ 11& fovoorohIe in Ihe seroMrny 01T1Id:. sedOI.

94 The ThI~etI1th M Amr! flew 540 air WIlJlOl1 salles on lf1e 11m day of the opemlion.

95 Over tha course of seveal days, the GeIiOOIlS commiltoo, first, the S8th 000 Illen the 28th JIIgeI and I 26th Infonrry DivlsiMs vilh SUJlIlOfting onl:.s inTo comool near SiniJvino.

96 Worse mll,lI1IlIlY of SIIlrlknv's SIlpporfing InIlks gotllogged down in tbe rnot5hy Bltnln 01 woro blown up by ~nemy min~ o.nd ootf.lonl guns.

CHAPTER 9 NOTES

98 The 256m oM 374th Rille OMllORS cnd 3S!h and 30!h Goorm Ton R~lm8n~ reinforceil tne378m, 364th ood 165!h RIlle Dlmions oheody figh~ng In 1110 region.

I ,o\(c~rling to S&liel e~ftrootes, on I Jonoory 19H the German Alllled FOI(es numbeJed 10,680,000 men, 01 whidt seven miJIioo WEIS in the fiBld !olCas ond the r~nder in Ihe reserves. AI !his ~me, the German ground IOKes nvmheJed 4.399.000, ci whrch 2,740,000 {63 IIBrcsntl W1Irs deployed an Ihs Eoslem flOOr. oIlJ1lni7ed 1010 198 divillons 000 ~I liIlgodBt Gelman I&(Ofm rnditele lhur !he Germoo Asrrrr fiek!ed 2,498,000 men on the!as!em froot on 14 Octo!ler 1943,OI~jloo inlO 151 infuntrylll1rl26 ~nlet d'l'Iisions. In oddroon, the finns, Hungarians ond Romanians fielded onother 500,000 men, bringill!l the Axis hltollO 3,068,000 mell. These foKes foced 6,165,000 Soviet ~oo~.

99 The 311 th Ri& Div~ion and me S03)d Seporolo Tonk Sonorion.

100 I remoins UII(Iwr who omara!! GcYOlO'l to krunlh the Seplember aooult.

101 The 4Sm, b3rd and 64111 GOO/tis RIfle DI'Iisions CtlocKW SiRlovino with e 1201h, 124m and 196 h Rifle Divisian~ on the mh, alld tile I 23rd and, Icter, the 11th and 268111 Rifle Divisions on me right.

2 The 5e<ond Shock Amry lepieced tile (ooslDi Operalion GrOlJp in November 1943 ond thE frhyfrfttr Amly \'lOS obsolberl inlo the Sixty-Seventh Almy ro Iote DelemDer 19~3. Admiref TrilMJt!' B4lf~( Fleet {Admiral V. F. lribctsJ, still suboralM!ij to the lenln~'oo Fronl, WGS oosed at leningrad and Kronslltodl and wm d-afemfrng seo comm\lllkofun~ IJiltween Lenl~rod and me Olanlenboom bridge~.

102 XXVIII Army Corps· 12th lufIwoffe Aeld ITIVi;ioo Dnd 8151, 132m! ond 96th InfonlTy Divisions occupied me so!enl, whkh jutrnd 0111 ill !he northeast ololl!l the Volkhov River north of (hudovo.

103 The Foorth Almv w~ comlllllnded by lieuienr;mr·&mercl N. I. !Mev.

3 roo F nurll\ .!.rmy ood beiinoobondoo in November 10 Improve fronl command and (ooRol.

104 In iIs October evef aile •• the Soviel Kolin n flonl dsove a wedge between Koochler's Six eenih Almv and wrocen! Army GrOUp (enne.

4 When formed on the tlOSe of me formet Rriansk fronr, me 801m: fronr ocwpred 1M s!!<lor between the orthwestern and Fu.r Ilullk (former KaI"min) Flools. On 26 November rite SlDvko d"1Sbonded the OlmweslStn Franl and lMigned iIs sector ond the Firs Silo<k Almy'~ seclur to the Second Bailie Flenl.

1 05 The nor1hem ool! 0 !he line was mOfW on nohmll obstacles !lJtn os!he ONO Riwr ond 1.0 es CIMl ond N:ov. The!OlJlhern half jutted eos1W1l1(1s to prole<l the mojor rood ond roU cenITes at I'Skov and Ostrov. and lied in with AlIII'{ Group (entre's pallion 01 lhe tlll~ sooth of Nevel. When ocrupiOO me flne wDlIld sli~rten Amly Groop North'~ front by 25 percent.

S As of 14 ]anual'/, the Lenin~rod front's >lr!iflglh WIIS 417,600 men, the Vo hay Front 260,000, and the Se<ond I!oI1k front's fIlS! Shod. AIIII'{ 54,900 mefi, whkh, wrtb the Balik f~ers 89,600 mell, tololJeij snooo men avniloblo 10 ~Ifldpote 111 the frntlK:cming nperotion. In odtl1ion, obout 35,000 porliscll5 ofgonlle1J inlo 13 portMo brigades wele operallng in Army Group Norm's reor olea.

1 D6 Soufuwestwords from !be fron~ines, tlte most impodlJnt inlermediota positions WIlre the Mgo, Kussinkc, Rolibohn (mi~ood), 2nd Wok how, Oradesh, Ingerrmnnland and Luge positions.

6 Soum 0 Lanill!lroo, CoIoneHieRilroi Undenmn'$ E~hreeIlrh Army monned defeoces flom the Gull ~ Finfend to lo~e lI'men oppwite !he I!ningrod and Valkhov fronts. After losing seven infontry divisJons ro other se~ from Seplem!!er through Ilecemool, the Elghteenth Almv receivoo one dMSlOn (SS Pllnzerwenodiel DMsion NordlanrfJ and two b~es (SS PllIIlergrenoo!el Brigade edeJfund rmd The 100Q-m0n Spolli!b legion)_ 00 I Jonuary, by Sovf!ll es~rootas, the 0Im'f hod 14 infuntry, live Luitwaffe fie~ and ooe ~ll1etgrenodJt! divisions, one divisionm [omOOlglDllP, rmd !hres infunlTy 000 one ponzergretlOOiei Mple. In otfd1tion. the fllJh1eenth Almy flJll"ne1l two amllery groups, Ihe fin! FIOlth 01 Krosnoe Selo 10 bombard lenfll!lrociond the second north of Alga 10 !lombard So~t {OIIIITIUnicotions routes Illlo Leninlt!Od. Bv Soviet asimales, the E~hleenlh Arlll'{ still fielded 4950 guns and mortars, 100 tom and assaull guns and 200 oirmrlt of the Firs! Air Fleet. South of loke II'men, CoIooef.Geneml RusclJ's Sixleenth Anliy, {Qn~Nng of 18 infDllITy rfJlli5ioos, one luftwaffe field ortiWn. aile infantry brigode and (omposife Group Ekholm (17 baltolions) IrKed the Sec:ond 80ftic Fronl. Accordlll!l ta German records. 011 14 Octobel Almy GIOUp HOIlh's 44 divisium ([ndtrding forms in NOlihern finlond) w· a streng!h al 601,000 men, 146 mnks cnd 2389 glJns and mOilcrs flK~ on eslimoled 959,000 5o'IieitrOOjlS, 650 hlOb 000 3680 guns ond r00r1u~. Dill:ounlJll!I!he f«ces lfl nmli1ern f1nlrmd, me Elghleenm ruwI SlxIr!enrh Armies flelda!! rOl.l!l~ 500,000 men Irom the GlJH of F inkmd to north 01 NevellJ1l!1lnst oooul 800.000 Soviel lroop!.

107 The mostlmponom snon9poln~ WIlre Dr Gortschioo (KlDsoogvnrdeiskl, Tschudowo (Chudovo), CJW!lOlOO (Novgmodl, WRO, JllIOburg (Kill1liseppJ ruwI NolWo (Norvu). A SO.OOOmon mnslrudion f008. IrJcluding mOUS(lnd5 of ~ levioo from the cMfron populcfun, Improved commooicooons bock 10 Riga and 1MnsI:, 0011 6000 ~, BOO of 'lA1kh wele (onmte, ~ld 200m (125 miles) 01 bmbed wire, and dug 40km (25 m~esl of Iremha:l ond oolHrmk oops. (DIISlrrmln mOIeri1lfs: I~ in 01 0 mle of 100 )O~[lJI loods per day during NtlVBmbei anrl December.

I DB The Lenlllgrnd f/OOI suffered 390.194 (m "81, il1dOOillg as,745 med, ropturBii or missing; Ihe Vol hnv front 321,404 clISUOfli85, indootIlll77,904 dead. coplUfed Or missing; and rile or1hwestem Front 335,451 (osoolhes, ImllJding 98,798 ijled, coplUled or tMsing.

109 FOI exom~e, !he Sponisll250m Division Iosr 3200 men. 01 obool 30 pertem 0 lis slTet!~ ,in the FelitlJllry fighlillg and omer dlV1S1OOS llIffered equally heavy iossel.

7 Armv GrOUjl North defended lfI single echelon, with thrfB SMJoty divisfons and one Ira n ng division in reseM!, though occupied against the partisans. to oddiJio!l, the l~h!eenth Armv hod 000 fnlonlry d'lYision in reserve. rmd SiXTeenth Army hIJd r Ie!) infa~iry divmons in reseIVe.

194

a German defaMes 01 OlDni~obaum r.onslsted 01 0 lingle de ensive belt with two posi1ions IJTIIl few for1lfled ~POIR~, monnOO by one regiment of me 5S I'd~e llMlion, SS Panzer!lleooliJer Di'lilioo Nord/ond cnd roo 1 01b ond 91f1luilwolle Field DiviWfII The strongest &lunan defoot9S were opposite lhe lenlng.rad FIOI\t'~ FO)Iy-Sei:olid Armv ond !he Volkhov rron(s fiftt,' rlflh Army, where Ihe fortifi8ll mom defenswe belt was 4 -6km (2.5-3.7 miles) dee~ f)nd W05 ba(b~ up bV 0 ser:ond tleft8-12km (5-7.5 males) ro riIlI reor.

9 The slrooga<; (enhes of le5islnn<e ere ot Ilrtl5l, Smrl)-Panovo, Novofanovo, 8aI'shoi 8itto1Gvo, AleksondrOYko, Push in, Krosnoe SeIo, Hin 172.3 (VOIlln'io HiS), Mgu,

l'OOOOiaz'io. Iini, Iovskoe Monostety and NOVGoloo.

I 0 Ini1iIIl~, in Io~ 1943, Kuechmi (IJIl(AAjed that Ihe R.ed Amrt WIlS ~onning a Iolgl!"S(oie offenst;e around leningrad and NO'/9Ilrod Ie !lidrcle me Eighteen!h Army, ond dedded to foresra~ Iile offensive ond shOflen me from bv conducTing a jlJGnned wittmlnwol to tlla PaRihar Ur.e. HnwINer, by em!y JooUOJy rile lflreoloi 0 mujor affensive seamed 10 hove diminished SIlmewilol. While disllJlber! by lite n!Mor.ts Seviel bUjkkrp in the Orooienboum bridyeheOO, Army Group North messed tho the LenirMjrad Front was relyjng on )8pie[amanls from lemngroo's populoliOll, cnd the Red Arrrrt offensIVes at Webs!:; and furthet SOllth seemed 0 be drowill!l off reselVllS. Acconlingly, from 29 llecembeI 10 4 January, !he OKH lIOosferred three d'MsioaS hom ItHl Eighteenth 10 the Sixteenth Amly.

II SirKO the SIMa MIS torNluding ~TmultDllOOllS offensives in the leningroo ond Novgotoo regions cnd III &lolusslo and the Uk!Oine, arMlilioool roinfOlCMlenl5 were !£orce. Nevertlwless, if ossigned the VoIIthov FroollilifionoJ ~llnge ovluIion forcas and ooe sell1llopelled orliOery regimool, and the leninGrad Ftonr four seJl.propell~ IlItillerV le!lime~ls, ronk rllSillll'8S and one ossouh 'sngine8l-st1pper brigode.

I 2 There were two operolionol VQtion~: 'Nevo I' in the evenl 01 DlI eneIII'{ withdrawal and 'N6I'II 2'111 the evan 0 fuI~ Herlgoo peMtrolion was necemry. !he fronT begun planning for • NIMI 2' In November, clter transferring the Secoild Shock Alnry Imo the Omnieflbaum bridgeheod.

131ha Thirtll!l1th Ail Army, II Guonls Frgnrer Awmoo (1IIJlS (!'VOl o~d poll of the Balik fleet's J.iI fur<es w~re 10 provide llltilfery and material support.

1 4 If lI1e forttSe!ond Army's QSS!l~11 fcikrf, the Setond Shock Army'~ evlll RilkI COijlS 000 15211d TDnkBrigarIe WIlIII 10 attock fOWllrm Kr~ Selo cnd Doo'elllof f~ se<ond e{hekm. lltheormy Unked up SIl(ussful~ wi!h the forttSei:ond Army, IIsser:oncf echelon wm to OOvuIiU sourhWGltis in pursuiI and roplur8 ley German withdrOWClf roUles southwest of leningrad. 1001JUIlv, fedluorMk(s army WIlS 10 advarKe 17-2Um 110.6-13.1 miles) in 0 period 01 S-6 dcrfs.

I 5 liovoIov trollSfefled his Second Shock Almv from leningroo 10 !he OmnienbQum bridgeheorl usinq !lie Bolli< flee 10 tronspon the army via the ice loods over the GtJK of flnlond. The en~re p!OCI& took from 5 Nownbel 10 2' 10nool'/ ond wm s~1J undel Wrlf wnen lI1e offel1Sive began. BV rhol ~me, the honl hod rooverllhe Selool Shock Army ~1l!lIl8l5, live rille divisions (rile II m, 431d, 90th, 13151 ond 19 6th), 13 WGX orTUklly regiments, !wo tonk 000 one self-propelled ornllary regimen~, one tank bligooe, ond 700 wogons With cmmunifion ond other cargoes inlll tIw ~eheod. Ouri~ riIlI !lillie 1IBriOO, the honl riiglouped most 01 ils orhiltrv Irom Ihe AlgttStniovfno seclOI to me Oronianbaum bridgehead cnd the fOlty-Se<ond Army's sector.

16 f,lasIennl ov retolned IWO rifle d"IVlSlons in reserve. iflS pion requiIed the fortv-Sec:ooo Almy's 100(es 10 advan<e 2O-25km (12.5-15.6 rm1esJ, but sar 00 ~me "mils on it!

195

GRAD 1941-1944

HAPTERNOT

OOvOIlC8. Govotov ollocaled BO pel(enr of his froors or lel'(,lbe Bukic Fleel's novnl gum ond the bul of lIS SlJIljlOIling tl'Iiorion ro ll!jlpon the fol1't~ood oM 5«000 Shoe AmlliiS' oswtdl. WIuIe planrung 0 1 OO-minUle plepolo~oo to pre<ede the Ol!ll( , for de<epltle plJljKIS8!i he also ordeled th~ Sl~ty-Se'ienm AImy to candlXl O~ or1illerv pseporotiDn. A !Ornl of 653 oimllft nom !he lhlrtesnm Air Army provrrl€tJ IIIIllllljlOrt DgolnSt aR aI!imllterll~ 0 (iellllon ailcraft. A!. hlJd been Iile (ase in eodifl operuoons, Iorge~ due 10 Iil€ hewJ· Gerroon delellCes, dlfliOJIt tll'll1lin 000 problem oswdoted WI!b moving 1Oi[ill ormouled IOI{aI into rile lfjj1inglod leg~n, DlrtlOlIled ()jMllolions mrs limited priroori~ to infontrv SlJpport. His OrmoUl mBflgtn WDS SSO IOnks and seff?opeUe1l guns. Go'lOlo{s tlon also lelled IteoWy on engrnee~ 10 ovel{ome !be pGWerfu1lierman defences, the swmn:py forested ielml" ond the severe nlel eothel (ordlions.

1 7 II Gell11Cl1 fOf~ ~n 10 wilhdrllW 110m the 10sn0 and Chudoyo legiol1!i, me two ormles ~e (Ieel enemy fortes Irom the rodl(~d Irom TolOO 10 01UOO'l1l cnd eoou lO'Mlrrls LLJgll to em both the Lel1lngloo Flonl and the FifrtNin1h Iumy in the deshlKlioo ollbe Elgnreenil1 Army. MeralS ov OSligned sj)e£ilk mi1slom III hl5 mmies oolWBBn midOdobel and 31 De<ember.

18 The SIlu!hern O~rahonol SlOOP (onslsled o[ me 5 B m Rifle SrigDde, 299m Rifle Regiment, a 22S!h Rdle DMslon ski oottulion!lOO the 34th ond 44!h Aelcrsrelgh 8Qnolio~.

19 KOIDVIII WS IlfIIl'I hllllMmre 30km (] 8.75 miles) in 3-5 drJys ond ftllerute ovgoroo, while the depTh of lire !root's en~le o~oticn 'MlS 110-120m (&8.75-75 miles). MarelSkov also OSligneli 80 peltent 0 his ° . ery ond most of his OR OS38ts It! support !hi! fiflr lnth Army ond pkmned 10 precede his glOOM !I1SIIuJ) wiIb 0 I H)-minute al1iUery prepolalion. He SUPlJOfled his asseu1t wim 257 aircmh hom the Thil1elm!h Ai! Arll\'l ond 330 odiJitionol n~hl oomben hom foorlollgion~e [lVIIltiGn lOfIlS provided by the SlIM:a, ~ins! the looghly 1 03 GerJMI1 D~CJ[rfl thnt coold opemlB In hIS 5e(tOI. M~retskov's urmour, which IlllUlli1l231 IGnks ond 25 se~1llopeled gUlIS, performed the some lnlnnlly suflllO'1 function. While periOimirtg rile some rosks as 1M leningrod Fronl's engineers. rhtJse in the Vofkhov Flont 000 10 \lIejlOre nl/lllerDUS crossings 1l'III! the VolklloY and olher rivets, ond loke lI'men. for this remon, !.IBlsl; IIY OSsigned orIdiliorral rmglneeI forces 10 me f' inth Iumy.

20 The!iet111llllS IMPOnded !o the de<eplion by iTnnsierring the Panlergrelllllller Brigade I{etieffond IIlli1e legl()l1 !mill YugooJlJYIII_ SIl eHedM! wus !he dll(epMn thol eorell Red Army pe~nool batIeWd the assou1t woold occur In tho reglol1. The Germom clso rlijJrooped their lones prior to the offensive. The OK H tJIInsfelled !he 96!h ond 254 Ih Infwlrj DivisiMs !rom me flghreenrh AImy to Army Groop SoutIr. The Eighleeolll AImy shifted !he 6 ht Infunlry OMsion fiorn the Mgo regioo 10 lusl nolth 01 Krosnogvardelsk beginnillll 00 1 0 JaIlUlll)', ond too 55 fnnleJGHll1lldiel 8iigode Nededorni 10 posiriOIl5 opposite !he Se<oOO Shock Army's rrghl Han in Iesp!lRse to the SIlvill) oo:eprion plcn. 10 tile solllh, the Sixteenth AImy moved m leserve, the 290!h InIon rlj' Division, to rha Shimsk, utorqosh and So!'Isy legion. 10 bot. up German defences 01 ij junction of me Sixteenth ond Eighleenm Armies.

21 GovoIOV (ollCenllllled 72 per(enl of his Inlanlfy, 68 pel(ent 0 hl5 artillery and 011 of his oRks Dnd se~~ed quns irI the Second Shoe and f oily-Second Armies' sector, ued Mele~kov (Ofl(enliaTed 48 pette", of his infontr;, 55 pel{en) of his urtifle!'f, OhM$! oD 01 his K_as, ond 80 (IEItent Ilf his OIlllOOt in the Filr{'Ninth Army's sedol. Toctkd

loom hunon inuu !h.ilIUpillioIi tv by 0 ro.:lll( of 1\110 10 thlee.

22lbe 9th and 1 Olh luftwaffe DMslons belonged III III 55 POlIZel (1lijII,

23 The 12th Ton Brigode Dnd the 22m! ond 204th Tun Regiments supparted Fediuninsl:y's orlll( 'ng COllIS.

24 Thlee (OOSlrucl1Of1 ballOlions 000 a oolllllioo hom SS Panz81grenodiel Division mrfland (onduded the (ounlBJrIHDds.

4 S Atcording 10 Soviel (lilillues, poor Ulmy ond (Dqli (omroond and (0111101, hetNY Gelman forfifica OIlS, !he poe.' tenoin and a thew hindered the Filly-Ninth Army's odwlKe DOll pe!miHed the GellTlOllS 10 bring up hesh ~.

39 The (Of\lS sent !he 290ri11niOl1rry Division's S031d Woolly Regiment ond the (C'IIIIry R~'lMnl NOfdlo block the SIlYleT urlvuf1(e SOIJIb of NOvgOIOO, and the 241h Infunlfy DMslon (fllll11 MQII) ncrlh of Nll"Igurod.

7S The FIlII'I'5ec~nd Army foeed t ArmV (DIps' 126th, 17Dth cnd 215!h Infontry Div~ions

40 The leinlDlcements InchJded one rifle divisWn fl11m secood eche!oi1 ond Ofl Ol111OlJled ror bo"oOOn hom his reserve to develop success 50IJth 01 NO'IQOIOO. To tire nOilb, he (ommitted, RISI, the 16th Tonk BrigDrIs and 0 ~1lropeUed ol1i!e:ry regim~nt in Vi .R1fle [Olps' sector, 000 lhen tho 65th Rifle Division ond 29m TIlJ1k Brigorle ~om!tis s8Clfml· echekln (XII RiHe (Olps.

26 Sovia! crilw1U8! mm tOOl lila umited PlOGIMI by ooth QlllliEs wm due III poor (etO!lIlOlSSQ!)[B 000 (QIT1I1lIJnd 000 [0Il1r1li, p!JIicukulv in the Selood Shock IIrmy, the ioollllirv of hetNY weopons Ie eep up with the iIllrmtry, and on effediYe (OOnler-bormge by L Almy (DIjIS'!IIIiI~ !hat blun ed me Forry-Second ilrmy's ground O$SOU1t.lhus, the Second Shod:

Arm(s 204 Ih lonk Reg1ment los'II9 Ionks in enemy mineneJds, frve In enemy lrellChes lind fOOl took.s whBe aossing the Chemaio rIVer. !he FalT'f'Secooo AlITr{s 260li1 To Rejjment gal bowed dewll in an an1Hun ditch IlIIl subsequendy lost six KYs to !lennon mines.

41 The 61h and 291h Ton Brigodes cnd Vi R'dle Corps' 239th Rjfle DMsioo reached tire rood.

77 The mobikl gloup consisled 0 100 1 S2nd Ton BrigOOa wilb Q seffjJIopeHed Olfillery 1~.ilMnl, 0 nlKk'mool1led rifle balllllroo, 0 Ilgh orHUslj' balttJlion ond !hies sepper oolttJ~oos 011 ~lKks,

42 Rcgill5k{s missioo wm In ccp1uTe liuOOn, j!levent the Glinncns Irom leinforcing meil ffillences 01 NovgilfOO. and ~! !he fiflrHmIh Alm'l In !he deslnJr:lioo 01 tire Genna" XXVIII and XXXVlllloJrny (OllIS Ini~ony, RD',lrnsky olttJeked wi h6 801h RilItlllivisilm Dnd 00 Rifle (orps (the 281s1 cnd 28Sih Rifle Divisions), bot lu!Mquanlfy h~ 44th RilItl Uivision jcrned llie DSSl!LIlr early on 11 JalillOlY hV onaoong sootlr of tire Tlgoda R!vtr.

28 MosIennikov (omll1med his (XXIII RiAe (QlPS on xxx Goonh RiHe (orps' righl flank. The mobile on group. Ironed lIIOOnd ° nocleus al be hi Red Bonn!tlond 220lh Ton Brlgodes, as m eR'II!fop I(rasnoe Seta hDlll llie west.

43 The mill and 312nd R;& Divisions reinfDlced rhe Soumern Operolionol Groop

29 The mobile an OIOOP consisted 01 rhe two IOnk brigodes reinforced 1r1 two seff· plopeDed or1i1lely legimenl}, on onlffiiroull ur1ilrery legimenl, 00 ooli1ank artil1ery Do!tery aoo two sappel companies,

44 The ini~DlleinfO!(ell1enl; iocluded alemen1s (If the 24th cnd 21s1lnfon!Ty DMsions Rom /,\go, the 2501h InfGnlrj Division from SoI'I5y and me Brh JOgel Division. loler. lire SS (ovalI'( Reg!lllenl NOfd wen Into &1ioIl soolll 01110'190100 on 16 Jonuary 000 the 121s1 Mantry Division from losno norIh of ND'I!lOloo on 17 )orl\l\lry.

30 Undemann (ommil1eil his laslleserve, 1M 61srlnlanlly OMsion, in SIIp.ooo 01 the soottered 1 01h Luftwufle Diltion on 14 end 1 S Joooory Il1 on otrempf to ~w the 5«orrd ShOO: AImy's OOWJ1( a.

52 Among the most serioos of these delki<incies Vle/e pool e~~oi a~on of ffiOIJOeWl8 to bvim 01 envelop enemy slToog~inl;, lock of n~ht (omOOl, joorleqoote re(onooiSson(e oj Gelroon defelKes. and lne:ffedlva cummond cnd (oorral, ~r1i(uknfi ot Olmy ond (OIPS leveb,

31 The Rolibahn Une was forward 000 poruUel to me rllilrood and rood !rom leningmd 10 Chudcl1l.

46 lire committed lorces mduded CXII Rilkt Corps 000 mnd Tonk arigade.

32 Kuechler proresled loot 10 do so would permit me Sowers to uni e ll1eir foltes fOI an even monGel DSSOulr.

47 The front's S2nd Separo a Au 0 Regiment locked 46 percent of lis reQU ed trucks and the 11m R~iment 82.3 pelcent. The Iwo regimen!; were short 0 666 vehicles in all.

48 Soviet cri~ues fuulred me XIV Rifle Corps' rommoooel for IJOOlle( Isso!Ke.

33 lindemonn leWorced his defeoces oorttr 01 KlIllIlOe Selo wi IIOI1iorls aI his mth and 21 51 lnlool1'lDivilions hom I\Iol and dlOOow, end the SS NMiIood 000 11!h Infunfr; 1ivIIions.

49 XIV Rifte (Olps' 191sl and 225!h Rille Divis«Jns and VII Rilkt (orps' 382nd . e D'Mslon ro~tuled NOlgolod.

34 The Seoond Shock Army's (VIII Rille (GIllS I'IMIlmo 1X~0I1 eIlrlv on 18 Jonuory, ond 0011 Rifle (0IIfS (OptUled Ropsoo the nelf dey. The IoovoId elMJallIs of !he 168t!J Rifle DivlsiDn (CVlII Rifle Corps) tlIlked IJII with the 54th Engfneerlloltunon of the ForltSecond Army's InoMe group just SOl! of Ropsho lote on 19 January.

50 These indulled elements of Ihe 2Bth Jiigel 000 ht LtJltwulfe Field 1lMsl1ID5, two $I!pa!ale battnlions, and elemen~ of !he 55 Urwlry Regiment Nord

S 1 SIlviel SOIJICes re.oooed deshoyillll or (apturing 182 g\I~, 120 mOllOrs, 263 veflk:les, 21 tlocl~ and 28 101ehouses filled with SIIpptres.

35 Tha victOf'( also Imptoved hoot command and (onllOl, Icgis!icol suppoll rmrl rooooeUYle (o~bibl1es,

36 The LenillgJllli Flonl oIso lepal1i1l deshoylflG or rupTUring 265 gullS (85 1Iecvy), 159 I1IOr1015, 30 IOnks and 18 WIllehlM~ with ommunilion.

3 7 The otlDd:. slt!lled DetOOSO !he infOlll1'j !UIJIXI~ lunk; crrived late and IOOIIV fell vklim to ((aiers end swamps due It! IJOOI re(OIlOOi;selKe and engineer wOO.. N8'II!rlhelllSS, during the night SOfijlelS built a blidge cr;.r the VGlkhov Rivel co~ble 01 cOlrying tonks.

53 !he 29!lth In[onlly Ilimion.

54 The 227tft and perl 0 the 22S1h hJfontry ilMsions.

38 The Il!!rghbaunng 12S41h Regiment jorlled e ollock, ond the fOl(e GWlrome me 1m! 11'10 German tlenches and Sei7ed 0 !iIOOll bridgaheed over the PI!'ixI River oll.\oIavodskoe.

5S SIlviel trilillues faulted Sviridov's (XVIII Rifle (DIjIS for il} slow reodien, stufing thu its forward deflKhmenl OpelOled • slow~ ond indecisively".

196

56 A 29 lonrxrry bo!b reOO: 'You Revs DOllulfilled yoor mls5ion 01 the day on 23, I. 44. In illitE of my Dlrle~. lhe oI11r(s furrnolions (011 'nue to mark nrne in place belO!e the sevare~ dolliOged enemv fOlm. nei1he1 Mfurilrg tDSIIIIl!ies DOl hJl'ling obsel1Jre SIJ(ess. As belore, !he (Of\lS commanders ale dislllovf1'l\l s~WTlIlSS, we d'lIIIding combo! Well lv, and not direcJing the [G!JlS 10 empiDv ITIOnoetMe and decisive movill1!lfl1 mrwrllli. hplJiling 0IJl sIowooss, the enemv, woo ~ (0I1ning in smoll QI~, ~ wjitJljrowfng his main fOltes SOIJTtr cnd SOIJmwest flom KmYlfJgvmdem. oed EIiz.avefino.·

57 The GerlllOn L ilrmV (()I~S defended KrwIogvurGeisk 'II"" lis 11m and 1701h Infontr; Divislons ond remounts of the 126th, 6151, 21 5th and 125th Inmnlry DiVisions, and

f'ushkin cnd Siu wi the 215 and port of lAe 24!h Inlantr; DM5icrns. Heovy artillery

was positiooed sourheost of Krosnogvardelsk and rile 121h P!!Illel Division ond S02nd PoOlSI BolTnlion were heginning hJ (I)fl(enh1l!1l soud1 and seulhwesl of the tDWll.

511 :<XXXIII ood OX Rifle Corps were on Fediuninskv's lighillonk_ and 0011 ond (VIII ~fle Corps we!B on his Ie &m

59 Regiman~ and balllll'!Ilm ~h behillCl bonnilort- ond mmjlllllV sized rlKl!goorm rei~fof{ed bv ortillery and ton\:.s 10 COIlduct delaying OCtiOllS in villages and olong roods. The GermCIn; deslroyed or mined lIridges ond roods. The heaviesllesislonce was oIontl the mUrood tine o\VDrds lIIIi50jlJl on the ormy's left HllrIk.

60 Combol groups 10m the 126 ,225m, 9ib Luflwcffe Field. 11 th end 215th InfonTry IlMsiDllS defl!llded the opproo{hes to KrOlOOgvlJldelS

61 At 16:00 hours 01\ 26 Jonoorv. Govorov Il1lnsieued 0011 Rifle (Olps from Ihe Se<ond Shock Army to me forty-Second AImy cnd tlI1l fol1\'Secom Asmv's CXVlI R' e (oljlS Ie the Sixty-Sel'ell!h Army.

62 50vfel cri~Ques DO e thai $l1rldov's mmy 'fo~ed III fulfil rhe IIonl (OIIlmonder's demond to deslrov the Gelman f()l(es iQ the Pusbkln, Skrt*, UI1000vko ond Tosoo legions Dnd reach rhe Vvrtlso-Usino-Korpus Dne by 26 JOfRlllf'f becouse of wea command ond (oofrol.· GovoIOV then lronsfelled (XVII rifle Corps !rom the FO!Iy-Second 10 the Sixtt Sevenfu Armv oM wirhdlew me SIXJy-5eYenlir Army's CXVl Rifle (OllIS ond 13th RHte Urkioo into the front reserve,

63 SYinoov's ex and CXV111 Rifle COIPS (Oplll!ed meil desl!looled o~tives on 28 Januor; and. nfrer oong re~eved by the 14th FOI1ifted Region 00 29 JOrl\l\lry, rll'/elled 10 honl rEMrl8 in Pusi1kin.

64 SirKe ex ond CXV11 R'rfie (Olps hod on~ recendy been rnig~ed 10 t~ alITI'{, command and coolToI W05 pool. The e~,;enced 121h Panzer IlMsIon and remno~rs of llie mth,

I 26th and 11th Inhmrry Divisions defended hom sootbeost of Kram.rroldeis.k tD )iver>kii. II look duee days of heavy flghling to expel 100m from the town.

65 A sirrg!e Gsrroo~ d'Nisioo deloyed the army's mom Ioo:es for severo! rool5 obrg !he Mgo h Unkoown 10 the Eigh Army, ille experienced 221m lnfanlTV Division, whldl hod been defeOOing along the II9l RIVes, hod been konsT!fled 10 ~deisI:., Ieovitrg only the 212th Infantr; [i,tioo with 7750 men 10 delend me rotire sector. Slun'kov's IWO rifle ~ and single rifle !qode, II!JllIberirJ.llJ, 16 7 men, WIlle I.foUbie hJ lIWrcome !he GeI1llOl1 fo!{81 in 50 lormilahle a defoe.

66 The Frlty.foorlh Almy foced !he Germon XXII1I1 Armv (orps' III sl ond 21sllnlonlly Divisio~,!he Spanish Legion, ond combol graullS 110m the 55 Police and 12th and 13th Luftwufle Field O!visiollS. The (orps began withdrawing its leh Honk on !he nighl ol

20/21, sending rhe 55 Polka mYision sourhw!lrds la OJlll(lse!he fdl)'-Nlnrh Army, while lire 21 sllll!lInhy and 13th lrJftwcffe Ilivisioos (OI1~nued delendblg aloou rhe Volldrov River

J.97