Constitutional Law Case Digest Matrix Set 2 – Stef Macapagal

EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS

Title Facts Issue/s Ruling Doctrine/s

Mirasol v. DPWH In 1957, RA 2000 (Limited W/N Administrative Order 1 is NO. It is neither warranted nor Classification by itself is not
GR No. 158793 Highways Act) was enacted. unconstitutional for violating the reasonable to say that the only prohibited. It can only be assailed
8 June 2006 Subsequently, DPWH equal protection clause. justifiable classification among if it is deemed invidious, that is,
Carpio, J. Administrative Order 1 modes of transport is the if it is not based on substantial
(prohibiting motorcycles on motorized against the non- differences.
limited access highways), motorized. Not all motorized
DPWH Department Order 74 vehicles are created equal. Real A police power measure may be
(declaring certain portions of the and substantial differences exist assailed upon proof that it unduly
NLEX and SLEX as limited between a motorcycle and other violates constitutional limitations
access facilities), and DPWH forms of transport sufficient to like due process and equal
Department Order 215 (declaring justify its classification among protection of the law.
Coastal Road as a limited access those prohibited from plying the
facility) were issued. tollways. The most obvious and
troubling difference would be
James Mirasol, Richard that a two-wheeled vehicle is less
Santiago, and the Luzon stable and more easily
Motorcyclists Federation, Inc. overturned than a four-wheeled
sought to have the DPWH vehicle. Public interest and
issuances invalidated for safety require the imposition of
violating RA 2000. certain restrictions on tollways
Consequently, the Toll that do not apply to ordinary
Regulatory Board issued roads. As a special kind of road,
Department Order 123, which it is but reasonable that not all
allowed motorcycles with engine forms of transport could use it.
displacements of 400cc inside
limited access facilities.

The trial court dismissed the

petition but declared DO 123
invalid.
Parreño v. Commission on Audit Salvador Parreño served in the
GR No. 162224 AFP for 32 years before his
7 June 2007 retirement, after which he
Carpio, J. received pension payments.
Parreño then migrated to Hawaii
and became a naturalized
American citizen. The AFP
subsequently stopped Parreño’s
pension, in accordance with
Section 27 of PD 1638 which
W/N Section 27 of PD 1638 NO. Petitioner’s loss of Filipino
discriminates against AFP citizenship constitutes a protection of the laws is not
retirees who have changed their substantial distinction that
nationality. distinguishes him from other
retirees who retain their Filipino
citizenship. A retiree who had
lost his Filipino citizenship
already renounced his allegiance
to the state. Thus, he may no
longer be compelled by the state
to render compulsory military
The constitutional right to equal
absolute but is subject to
reasonable classification. To be
reasonable, the classification
(a) Must be based on
substantial distinctions
which make real
differences;
(b) Must be germane to the
purpose of the law;

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 Constitutional Law Case Digest Matrix Set 2 – Stef Macapagal
provides that a retiree who loses
his Filipino citizenship shall
have his retirement benefits
terminated.
Parreño requested for
reconsideration but the Judge
Advocate General of the AFP
denied his petition. Thus, he filed
a claim before the COA for the
continuance of his monthly
pension.
The COA denied Parreño’s claim
for lack of jurisdiction, and
advised Parreño to file the case
in the proper court.
PHILRECA v. DILG Secretary With the passage of PD 269,
GR No. 143076 electric cooperatives were
10 June 2003 decreed to be permanently
Puno, J. exempted from income taxes,
and exempted from paying
national or local government
taxes until it has become
completely free of indebtedness
incurred by borrowing.
From 1971 to 1978, the
Philippine government and the
electric cooperatives entered into
6 loan agreements with USAID
to finance their electrification
projects. These obligations still
exist.
However, the petitioners contend
that their tax exemptions were
invalidly withdrawn by the
passage of the Local Government
Code. They assail Sections 193
and 234 for giving different tax
treatments on electric
cooperatives registered under PD
269 and those registered under
RA 6938, thereby violating the
W/N the difference in treatment
of electric cooperatives
registered under PD 269 and
those registered under RA 6938
constitute a violation of the equal
protection clause.
service when the need arises,
which the state may require of
not only its private citizens, but
also citizens who have retired
from military service.
NO.
First, substantial distinctions
exist between cooperatives under
PD 269 and cooperatives under
RA 6938. Cooperatives under
RA 6938 are funded by capital
contributions by members and
are envisioned to be self-
sufficient and independent
organizations with minimal
government intervention or
regulation. In contrast,
cooperatives under PD 269 are
government-funded, and are
largely controlled by the
National Electrification
Administration to ensure that the
loans granted to them would be
repaid to the government.
Second, the classification of tax-
exempt entities in the LGC is
germane to the purpose of the
law. The limited and restrictive
nature of the tax exemption
privileges under the LGC is
consistent with the State policy
to ensure autonomy of LGUs and
the objective of the LGC to grant
(c) Must not be limited to
existing conditions
only; and
(d) Must apply equally to
each member of the
class.
If the groupings are characterized
by substantial distinctions that
make real differences, one class
may be treated and regulated
differently from another.
The equal protection clause
under the Constitution means that
“no person or class of persons
shall be deprived of the same
protection of laws which is
enjoyed by other persons or other
classes in the same place and in
like circumstances. Thus, the
guaranty of the equal protection
of the laws is not violated by a
law based on reasonable
classification.
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 Constitutional Law Case Digest Matrix Set 2 – Stef Macapagal
equal protection clause.
People v. Lacson In 1999, Judge Agnir
GR No. 149453 provisionally dismissed 11
7 October 2003 murder cases against Panfilo
Callejo, Sr., J. Lacson. In 2000, the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure
took effect, Section 8, Rule 117
of which prescribes a time-bar
rule of 2 years for the revival of
the prosecution of cases which
were provisionally dismissed.
In 2001, the case against Lacson
was revived. Lacson invoked
Section 8, Rule 117 of the
RRCP, stating that the rule
should also apply retroactively
on the basis of being favorable to
the accused. Lacson contended
that if the rule would only be
applied prospectively, the
petitioners would be given more
than 2 years from the dismissal
of the case to revive the criminal
cases, thus violating his right to
genuine and meaningful
autonomy to enable LGUs to
attain their fullest development.
The obvious intention of the law
is to broaden the tax base of
LGUs to assure them of
substantial sources of revenue.
Finally, Sections 193 and 234 of
the LGC permit reasonable
classification as these
exemptions are not limited to
existing conditions and apply
equally to all members of the
same class. Exemptions from
local taxation, including real
property tax, are granted to all
cooperatives covered by RA
6938 and such exemptions exist
for as long as the LGC and the
provisions therein on local
taxation remain good law.
W/N the non-retroactive NO. The institution and The State is entitled to due
application of the new time-bar prosecution of criminal cases are process in criminal cases as
rule would violate the accused’s governed by existing rules and much as the accused.
right to equal protection of the not by rules yet to exist. It would
law. be the apex of injustice to hold
that Section 8 had a platonic or
ideal existence before it was
approved by the Court. As a
matter of fact, it would be a
denial of the State’s right to due
process and a travesty of justice
for the Court to apply the new
rule retroactively in the present
case as Lacson insists,
considering that the criminal
cases were provisionally
dismissed by Judge Agnir in
1999 before the new rule took
effect in 2000. A retroactive
application of the time-bar will
result in absurd, unjust and
oppressive consequences to the
State and to the victims of crimes
and their heirs.
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 Constitutional Law Case Digest Matrix Set 2 – Stef Macapagal
due process and equal protection
of the law.
Beltran v. Secretary of Health RA 7719 (National Blood
GR Nos. 133640, 133661, and Services Act) was enacted in
139147 1994, seeking to provide an
25 November 2005 adequate supply of safe blood by
Azcuna, J. promoting voluntary blood
donation and by regulating blood
banks in the country. Section 7
thereof provided for the phase-
out of all commercial blood
banks within 2 years after its
effectivity.
The Act was passed after studies
showed that blood transfusions
could lead to transmission of
diseases, and that blood sold by
persons to commercial blood
banks are three times more likely
to have blood transfusion
transmissible diseases than those
donated to the Philippine
National Red Cross.
Prior to the expiration of the
commercial blood banks’
licenses, they filed a petition
assailing the constitutionality and
validity of RA 7719 and its
Implementing Rules and
Regulations, for discriminating
against free standing blood banks
in a manner which is not
germane to the purpose of the
law.
W/N RA 7719 violates the equal
protection clause.
W/N Section 7 of RA 7719
constitutes unlawful deprivation
of personal liberty and property.
NO. Class legislation, discriminating
One, RA 7719 is based on against some and favoring others
substantial distinctions. is prohibited; but classification
Nonprofit blood banks operate on a reasonable basis and not
for purely humanitarian reasons made arbitrarily or capriciously
and as a medical service, and is permitted.
encourage voluntary blood
donation. On the other hand,
commercial blood banks are
motivated by profit and treat
blood as a sale of commodity.
Two, the classification and the
consequent phase-out of blood
banks is germane to the purpose
of the law, which is to provide
the nation with an adequate
supply of safe blood by
promoting voluntary blood
donation and treating blood
transfusion as a humanitarian or
medical service rather than a
commodity. This necessarily
involves the phase-out of
commercial blood banks based
on the fact that they operate as a
business enterprise, and they
source their blood supply from
paid blood donors who are
considered unsafe.
Three, the Legislature intended
for the general application of the
law. Its enactment was not solely
to address the peculiar
circumstances of the situation
nor was it intended to apply only
to existing conditions.
Four, the law applies equally to
all commercial blood banks
without exception.
NO. In serving the interest of the
public, and to give meaning to
the purpose of the law, the
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 Constitutional Law Case Digest Matrix Set 2 – Stef Macapagal
Dycaico v. Social Security Bonifacio Dycaico was a
System member of the SSS, with his
GR No. 161357 common-law wife Elena and
30 November 2005 their eight children named in his
Callejo, Sr., J. data record as beneficiaries. In
1989, Bonifacio was considered
retired and began receiving his
monthly pension from the SSS.
He married Elena on the same
year that he passed away.
Shortly after Bonifacio’s death,
Elena filed with the SSS an
application for survivor’s
pension. However, the same was
denied on the ground that under
Section 12-B(d) of RA 8282
(Social Security Law), she could
not be considered Bonifacio’s
primary beneficiary became they
were not married “at the time of
his retirement.”
Elena brought her case to the
Social Security Commission,
which still denied her claim.
W/N the proviso “as of the date
of his retirement” in Section 12-
B(d) of RA 8282 violates the
equal protection and due process
clauses of the Constitution.
Legislature deemed it necessary
to phase-out commercial blood
banks. This action may seriously
affect the owners and operators,
as well as the employees, of
commercial blood banks but
their interests must give way to
serve a higher end for the interest
of the public.
YES. The classification violates Generally, a statute based on
the equal protection clause reasonable classification does not
because: (1) it is not germane to violate the constitutional
the purpose of the law. guaranty of the equal protection
Classifying dependent spouses clause of the law.
with respect to their entitlement
based on whether the marriage Irrebuttable presumptions have
was contracted before or after the long been disfavored under the
retirement of the other spouse, due process clause, as they could
regardless of the duration of the presume facts which are not
said marriage, bears no relation necessarily or universally true.
to the achievement of the police
objective of the law, which is to
“provide meaningful protection
to members and their
beneficiaries against the hazard
of disability, sickness, maternity,
old age, death, and other
contingencies resulting in loss of
income or financial burden.” (2)
it is not based on real and
substantial distinctions. It is
arbitrary and discriminatory. It
unfairly lumps marriages
contracted after the member’s
retirement as sham relationships
or were contracted solely for the
purpose of acquiring benefits
accruing upon the death of the
other spouse.
The proviso also violates the due
process clause as it outrightly
deprives the surviving spouses
whose respective marriages to
the retired SSS members were
contracted after the latter’s
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 Constitutional Law Case Digest Matrix Set 2 – Stef Macapagal
Coconut Oil Refiners v. Torres In 1992, RA 7227 was passed for
GR No. 132527 the conversion of the Clark and
29 July 2005 Subic military reservations into
Azcuna, J. special economic zones. In 1993,
the Bases Convertion
Development Authority passed a
resolution allowing the tax and
duty-free sale at retail of
consumer goods imported via
Clark for consumption outside
the Clark Special Economic
Zone. Subsequently, several
Executive Orders allowed the
bringing out of purchased tax-
free items from the Subic Special
Economic and Free Port Zone. It
prescribed a $100 monthly limit
to those who live within the
SSEFPZ but outside the Secured
Area, and $200 yearly limit to
those who live outside the
SSEFPZ.
Petitioners assail the $100
monthly and $200 yearly tax-free
privileges.
W/N EO 97-A (which prescribes
the tax-free privileges) violates
the equal protection clause.
retirement of their survivor’s
benefits. There is outright
confiscation of benefits due such
surviving spouses without giving
them an opportunity to be heard.
The proviso creates the
presumption that marriages
contracted after the members’
retirement date were entered into
for the purpose of securing
benefits under RA 8282. This
presumption is conclusive
because the said surviving
spouses are not afforded any
opportunity to disprove the
presence of the illicit purpose,
thereby also depriving them the
opportunity to be heard.
NO. Substantial distinctions lie The guaranty of the equal
between the establishments protection of the laws is not
inside and outside the zone, violated by a legislation based on
justifying the difference in their a reasonable classification.
treatment. Enterprises outside the
SEZ maintain their businesses
within the Philippine territory,
while SEZ enterprises operate
within a separate customs
territory. To grant the same tax
incentives given to enterprises
within the zones to businesses
operating outside the zones
would clearly defeat the statute’s
intent to carve a territory out of
the military reservations in Subic
Bay where free flow of goods
and capital is maintained; thus,
the classification is germane to
the purpose of the law. The
classification moreover, is not
limited to existing conditions
when the law was promulgated,
but to future conditions as well,
inasmuch as the law envisioned
the former military reservation to
ultimately develop into a self-
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 Constitutional Law Case Digest Matrix Set 2 – Stef Macapagal
Villareña v. Commission on Atty. Rudy Villareña was
Audit assigned as Auditor of Marikina
GR Nos. 145383-84 by the Commission on Audit
6 August 2003 from 1994 to 1997. Ordinances
Azcuna, J. passed by Marikina entitled him
to receive special allowances and
benefits, which were later
discovered by a Special Audit
Team constituted by COA. It
was then declared that these were
received in violation of Section
18 of RA 6758, which prohibited
payment of additional
compensation to COA personnel
by government units to which
they were assigned.
Atty. Villareña was then found
guilty by the COA for neglect of
duty, simple misconduct, and
violation of reasonable office
rules and regulations. Atty.
Villareña appealed, stating that
he was among the “other national
government officials” which
were entitled to whatever
additional allowances and
benefits the City of Marikina
gave to such officials according
to the LGC. He then contended
that to discriminate COA
personnel from other national
W/N Section 18 of RA 6758
violates the equal protection
clause.
sustaining investment center.
Finally, the classification applies
equally to all retailers found
within the secured area. The
individuals and businesses within
the secured area, being in like
circumstances or contributing
directly to the achievement to the
end purpose of the law, are not
categorized further. They are all
similarly treated, both in
privileges granted and in
obligations required.
NO. There are valid reasons to The equal protection clause does
treat COA officials differently not preclude classification of
from other national government individuals who may be accorded
officials. The primary function of different treatment under the law
an auditor is to prevent irregular, as long as the classification is
unnecessary, excessive or reasonable and not arbitrary.
extravagant expenditures of
government funds. To be able to
properly perform their
constitutional mandate, COA
officials need to be insulated
from unwarranted influences, so
that they can act with
independence and integrity. The
prohibition under Section 18 of
Act 6758 was designed precisely
to serve this purpose.
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 Constitutional Law Case Digest Matrix Set 2 – Stef Macapagal
government officials would
constitute a violation of the equal
protection of the laws.
People v. Mijano Accused Jimmy Mijano was
GR No. 129112 convicted by the lower court of
23 July 1999 the crime of rape of five-year-old
Per Curiam Hazel Ramirez, for which the
penalty of death was given.
Mijano assails the death penalty
for being violative of the equal
protection clause, stating that it
only punishes people like him
who are uneducated and jobless.
W/N the death penalty violates
the equal protection clause.
NO. The death penalty makes no
distinction. It applies to all
persons and to all classes of
persons—rich or poor, educated
or uneducated, religious or non-
religious. No particular person or
classes of persons are identified
by the law against whom the
death penalty shall be
exclusively imposed.
Obiter: Compassion for the poor
is an imperative of every human
but only when the recipient is not
a rascal claiming an undeserved
privilege.
The equality the Constitution
guarantees is legal equality, or as
it is usually put, the equality of
all persons before the law. Under
this guarantee, each individual is
dealt with as an equal person in
the law, which does not treat the
person differently of who he is or
what he is or what he possesses.