Enrile vs Salazar

G.R. No. 92163

June 5, 1990

Facts:

In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was
arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of
Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941.

The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of
prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand
R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the
spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with
murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup
attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990.

Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila,
without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest
warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in
Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern
Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.

On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for
habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990),
alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights.

Issue:

(a) Whether the petitioner has committed complex crimes (delito compleio) arising from an
offense being a necessary means for committing another, which is referred to in the second
clause of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code?

Held:

There is one other reason and a fundamental one at that why Article 48 of the Penal Code cannot
be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes
were punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the following penalties would be
imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000
and prision mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances
present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder,
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying circumstances
present. In other words, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could
not be imposed upon him. However, under Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to
him, even in the absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed
in conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.

The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the
statute books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be
complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed
as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed
charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple
rebellion.

Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's
reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary
corollary that the information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of
simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct
proposition. But the question remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition
for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating
its denial? The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the
petitioner's right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction
to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke
that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by
reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the
trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not
without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.

The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the
questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and
Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled
to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners
being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered remanded to
the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed
by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this Court
shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.

DONATO VS. LUNA, 160 SCRA 441

FACTS:
Paz Abayan filed an information for Bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donato. She also filed
with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court a civil action for declaration of nullity of
marriage to petitioner because of a prior marriage of petitioner. In his answer petitioner
claimed that his 2nd marriage was void because is was solemnized without a valid marriage
license and that violence, intimation and undue influence were employed by Paz to obtain his
consent.
Prior to the date set for the trial of the criminal case, petitioner filed a motion to suspend the
proceedings of the case because the civil action raises a prejudicial question which must first be
determined before the criminal case can proceed.

ISSUE:
Does a criminal case for bigamy suspend the civil case of annulment of marriage on the ground
that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question?

HELD:
[i]The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. I must be noted that the
issue before the JDRC touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of
petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioner's
2nd wife, the herein private respondent Paz Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of the
2nd marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit.

He who contracts a 2nd marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy

CRIMINAL LAW (highway robbery)

http://www.scribd.com/doc/19099539/Pangandaman-vs-Casar-Case-Digest

http://www.scribd.com/doc/15819957/Crimpro-Doctrines

G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995

HUBERT J. P. WEBB, petitioner
VS.
HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque, Branch 258, HONORABLE ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 259, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ZENON
L. DE GUIYAB, JOVENCITO ZUÑO, LEONARDO GUIYAB, JR., ROBERTO
LAO, PABLO FORMARAN, and NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
and HONORABLE AMELITA G. TOLENTINO, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Parañaque, Branch 274, respondents
LAURO VIZCONDE, intervenor
FACTS:
On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of
Justice a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J.
Lejano and six (6) other persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N.
Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in
their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30,
1991.
Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant
Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary investigation.
ARGUMENTS:
Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They assail the credibility of
Jessica Alfaro as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to the inconsistencies between
her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sworn statements. They criticize the procedure
followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged
inconsistencies.
Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later, respondent Judge
Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting the required
preliminary examination.
Petitioners complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and
violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They also assail the prejudicial publicity
that attended their preliminary investigation.
ISSUES:
 1. Whether or not the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding
that there is probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape and homicide
2. Whether or not respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their
discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing
warrants of arrest against them
3. Whether or not the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due
process during their preliminary investigation
4. Whether or not the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it
failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the information as an accused.
HELD:
1. NO.
2. NO.
3. NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all the
opportunities to be heard.
4. NO.
REASONS:
1. The Court ruled that the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
found probable causeagainst the petitioners. A probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and was
committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable
doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.
2. The Court ruled that respondent judges did not gravely abuse their discretion. In
arrest cases, there must be a probable cause that a crime has been committed and
that the person to be arrested committed it. Section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides
that “upon filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the
accused. Clearly the, our laws repudiate the submission of petitioners that respondent
judges should have conducted “searching examination of witnesses” before issuing
warrants of arrest against them.
3. The DOJ Panel precisely ed the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf
and for the panel tostudy the evidence submitted more fully.
4. Petitioner’s argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the
decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of the courts and
beyond executive and legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes
appertains to the executive department ofgovernment whose principal power and
responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of
this power is the right to prosecute their violators (See R.A. No. 6981and section 9 of
Rule 119 for legal basis).
With regard to the inconsistencies of the sworn statements of Jessica Alfaro, the Court
believes that these have been sufficiently explained and there is no showing that the
inconsistencies were deliberately made to distort the truth.
With regard to the petitioners’ complaint about the prejudicial publicity that attended their
preliminary investigation, the Court finds nothing in the records that will prove that the tone
and content of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the
fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal
effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically
unbeknown and beyond knowing.