Hayley Smith-Kirkham

PSY 103 Wessinger

Paper Part 2

Global Nuclear Disarmament as a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

It is rare when a pivotal political controversy with global reach can last sixty or

more years, becoming more convoluted and menacing over time rather than less, without

reaching a resolution either through war, coercion, or cooperation. But as the Cold War

revealed, swift and definitive solutions can become nearly impossible as the fates of

nations grow increasingly interdependent. Although it may seem that interdependence

should breed cooperation and suppress competition, power struggles between nations

remain as intense and important as ever. Worldwide nuclear disarmament—the abolition

of all existing nuclear weapons and a ban on the future development of them—has been a

global point of concern since World War II. It can be analyzed in terms of the Prisoner’s

Dilemma Game (PDG), a model developed within game theory to explain and predict

strategic interactions. Specifically, global disarmament can be seen as a cooperative, non-

zero sum game between groups rather than individuals. But if this real-world issue fits

into a behavior-predicting model, why has a solution not occurred or even been predicted?

In addition to laying out the elements of nuclear disarmament that can be analyzed through

the PDG, this paper will also examine some of the ways in which the realpolitiks of

nuclear technology and the chaos of real life convolute what would otherwise be a

predictable, logical conclusion.

The deployment of nuclear weapons by the United States at the end of World War

II changed the nature of war, politics, and diplomacy forever. When the Soviet Union
acquired nuclear capabilities shortly thereafter, every nation in the world suddenly and

irrevocably felt the weight of the doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD). Since

then, nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament have become integral topics in global

politics. The elimination of atomic weapons, and all weaponry capable of mass

destruction, was a founding goal of the United Nations, included in the General

Assembly’s first resolution in 1946 (Duarte 2009). In the 21st century, these issues can no

longer be pushed aside. The many effects of globalization are causing the materials and

knowledge necessary for nuclear development to become increasingly available. There is

fear in the United States of terrorist organizations acquiring nuclear weapons. The actions

of Iran and North Korea are being scrutinized and reported on constantly and with an

alarming sense of urgency. Developing nations have begun to demand rights and a voice.

Of the multitude of summits, treaties, organizations, resolutions, and sanctions that have

emerged, possibly the most significant is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The Non-Proliferation Treaty was created in 1968 with three overarching goals—

non-proliferation, disarmament, and the right to use nuclear technology peacefully (UN

2002). Currently 189 nations are party to the treaty, including the five official possessors

of nuclear weapons (the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China).

Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea represent the only four recognized states that

aren’t party to the treaty. The latter three have openly claimed and demonstrated their

possession of nuclear weapons, while Israel remains secretive.

The Prisoner’s Dilemma is, most commonly and at its simplest, a specifically

structured game involving two players with two possible “moves” each, and a particular

composition of pay-offs (the values may vary, but the proportions and incentives remain
intact). The structure of the outcomes, or pay-offs, can be described as zero-sum; in which

one player’s “win” constitutes another’s “loss.” However, there are a number of variations

that can result by altering the basic structure of the game. The figure below illustrates the

pay-off matrix for the standard PDG as well as three distinct and widely applicable

modifications.

(Wolf et al, 2008)

Before examining the specific structure the PDG takes in relation to nuclear disarmament,

it’s necessary to identify the players (A and B), the possible “moves” or actions (X and Y),

and what the pay-off values represent. These won’t change even as the dynamics of the

game change.

Although every nation in the world is necessarily involved to some degree in this

global controversy, by choice or not, it would be impractical to treat each one as an

individual player, primarily because it would be nearly impossible to estimate a pay-off

matrix for almost 200 separate participants. What’s more, even though the outcome will

affect the entire world, not all nations are in a position to make moves. Many developing

countries, for example, probably have no interest in acquiring nuclear weapons, little fear

of being targeted by them, and loose enough ties to the major power so that loyalty isn’t a

rallying point. Rather, nations should be grouped together based on similarities in

incentives, standing, and/or goals. The nature of the standard PDG can be summarized as

follows,

It is a behavior situation in which each player's best choice of action depends

on the action he expects the other to take, which he knows depends, in turn,
on the other's expectations of his own. This interdependence of expectations
is precisely what distinguishes a game of strategy from a game of chance or
a game of skill. (Schelling 1958)
It can be seen from this description that nations should be grouped together only insofar as
their expectations, and the incentives that will guide their choice of action, align. The
choice of grouping would likely vary among researchers based on perspective or the choice
of relevant variables for deciding. However, a simplified division could be made between
those nations that want non-proliferation and complete or near-complete disarmament, and
those that want the right to develop and/or maintain nuclear weapons technology. In this
way, India would be grouped together with the United States despite the fact that the
former is not party to the NPT. Iran, who is party to the NPT despite having been found in
non-compliance, would be grouped with North Korea, Pakistan, etc. These are not
normative judgments, conferring on each group “right” and “wrong” or “good” and “evil.”
They are simply reflections of opposing incentives and goals. All nations undoubtedly
want peace for their people, but as The Prime Minister of India Manmohan Singh stated,
“We believe that India’s security will be enhanced, not diminished, by the complete
elimination of nuclear weapons the world over” (Ani 2009). The basic conflict is thus
established—some nations value nuclear weapons as necessary for their security, while
others such as India value disarmament.
Secondly, all of the specific, concrete actions available to nations—those actions
that will “finish” the game and yield outcomes to the players, or change the structure of the
game—must be simplified into two disparate moves, X or Y. In the standard PDG, X
represents cooperation while Y represents defection. This distinction is not arbitrary, and
its importance can be seen in the pay-off matrix above. When both players cooperate by
choosing X, they each receive a pay-off of 90. When they both defect, their pay-off is one-
third lower at 60. Thus, cooperation and defection have unique, meaningful consequences
within the PDG. So what represents cooperation, and what represents defection, when the
two players have almost perfectly opposite goals (disarmament vs. holding weapons)?
Arguably, holding or developing weapons is inherently a competitive action, and thus
should be represented by Y. Eliminating, destroying, or binding oneself to the promise not
to develop weapons is a cooperative choice that should be represented by X.
The pay-offs should represent the level of national security for each player that will
result for each given combination of moves. In the standard PDG, Country A is safest
(earns the maximum pay-off of 120) when they defect (hold weapons) and Country B
cooperates (eliminates weapons). In this case, Country B is in the least safe position
(earning the minimum pay-off of 30). This is easily understood intuitively—if you have
nuclear weapons, and your enemy doesn’t, you are almost perfectly safe from him. The
United States proved this (tragically and atrociously) when they defeated Japan in World
War II after deploying atomic weapons. When both countries cooperate by choosing X
they both receive the second-highest payoff of 90. In a world without nuclear arms,
traditional warfare can still occur. In this case, neither country has the protection of being
the single possessor of atomic weaponry (which would put them at 120), but at the same
time neither is in the dangerous position of being the only one without (which would put
them at 30). The bottom-right pay-off, in which both countries hold nuclear weapons,
yields a payoff of 60 to both. They are neither as safe as they would be in a nuclear
weapon-free world, nor in as much danger as if only the other country defected. It is a
precarious, medium-level of safety that can likely be attributed to the doctrine of Mutual
Assured Destruction (MAD). Although this specific pay-off structure will be altered in the
PDG variations used throughout the rest of the paper to examine global disarmament, it is
useful to examine the significance of the outcomes in the standard PDG.
So, how can the PDG game be modified to better reflect the reality of the nuclear
disarmament process? The most significant difference between the standard PDG and the
three other models presented above (Chicken, Leader, and Battle of the Sexes) is that of
zero-sum as opposed to non-zero-sum games. The PDG is zero-sum; one player’s win
necessitates another’s loss. In the PDG pay-off matrix above, player A has the lowest pay-
off specifically when player B has the highest, and vice versa. In the remaining three
models, however, the outcomes are non-zero-sum (or variable-sum) and players can both
earn higher pay-offs by working together. “Non-zero-sum games are frequently referred to
as ‘bargaining games’ and do in fact possess two characteristics which are generally
considered to be the essential features of bargaining situations, viz., (a) conflict of interest
and (b) the possibility of mutual gain through co-operation” (Willis 1959). These
bargaining games can also be referred to as mutual-dependence or correspondence of
outcomes games (Schelling 1958). A zero-sum situation could be found when one nation
tries to usurp another nation’s territory entirely, such as the Soviet Union did in Eastern
Europe. In this case, one country will win and the other will lose. There are no mutual
gains to be had through working together. Nuclear disarmament retains the conflict of
interest inherent to strategic interaction, but there are definite gains to be made by working
together. The first-best “win” for the states that want nuclear disarmament would be,
unsurprisingly, complete disarmament. This outcome doesn’t contain the worst loss for
the other player though, as it would in the PDG. The worst loss for both players would be
an arms race or mutually assured destruction. Following this logic, the most appropriate of
the three models above would be Chicken. This version specifically applies to situations in
which MAD is possible, and was used by Bertrand Russell as a model of nuclear
brinkmanship during the Cold War (Wolf, 2008).
An additional aspect of the mutual-dependence game is the role of communication.
In zero-sum games, communication is valueless since players have nothing to gain by
working together. When these gains are possible, communication can take many forms
and play many roles (Scodel 1959).
These are the "games" in which, though the element of conflict provides the
dramatic interest, mutual dependence is part of the logical structure and demands
some kind of collaboration or mutual accommodation—tacit, if not explicit—even if
only in the avoidance of mutual disaster. (Schelling 1958)

These two categories of communication, tacit and explicit, can both be found within the
nuclear disarmament process. The following example from Schelling illustrates tacit
bargaining; “…diplomatic bargaining that would be embarrassing to both sides if
overheard by other countries may be less than fully articulate.” He concludes,
In these cases, while speech may be part of the bargaining process, actions are also
part of it, and the game is one of ‘maneuver’ rather than just talk. Furthermore, if
there are moves available to the players, so that it is an advantage to get on with the
maneuver even while negotiating, and particularly if some maneuvers become
visible to the other player only after a time lag, there is no reason to suppose that an
instantaneous moratorium on maneuver will reign from the outset; in that case, the
game progresses while the talk is going on. (Schelling 1958)

These maneuvers can have three important effects on the game, as described by
Schelling. They can reveal information about the other player’s value system or the
choices of action available to them, they allow a player to commit himself to
certain actions when speech can’t, and they progress at a speed that is determined
unilaterally, “not dependent on formalities of agreement at a conference”.
Schelling describes these types of bargaining games as a dynamic process of
mutual accommodation, in contrast to pure explicit communication culminating in
crystallized agreement. In other words, tacit communication sends signals to
players that can, over time, allow them to better understand each other’s nature—
their incentives, values, goals, etc. A better understanding of the other’s rationality
aids players in making their own strategic, rational choices. It is important to note,
though, that these signals are not guaranteed to be truthful and they can also make
mutual understanding more difficult. In addition, maneuvers can make the game
dynamic, so that its nature changes over time.
Maneuvers seem especially important when it comes to nuclear technology,
as in the case with Iran. The United States doesn’t believe Iran’s claims that their
nuclear development programs are intended only for developing energy sources
(David 2008). Since the U.S. doesn’t trust Iran’s explicit claims, their perception
of Iran’s “values” must, therefore, depend largely on observable actions.
Maneuvers thus acquire crucial importance, as they can completely alter the way
players will rationally interact. The following statement from an Economist article
titled “Banning the Bomb” illustrates the nature of tacit communication—“North
Korea let off some kind of bomb in 2006, and nobody is certain that it will honour
a later promise to disarm” (David 2008). It’s possible that North Korea didn’t
intend for the bomb testing to be a symbolic action to other players, and that they
simply had to test it and the world noticed (it’s difficult to conceal an exploding
bomb). However, as a rational actor North Korea necessarily had to take into
account the fact that other nations would witness the bomb testing. How did they
anticipate this action would affect the credibility of their promise to disarm? There
is no way of knowing. Furthermore, the fact that the type of bomb is not clear
could have been intentional. One possibility is that North Korea didn’t possess
nuclear arms but wanted to send the signal that they did. There are simply too
many ways this action, and North Korea’s intentions, can be interpreted. In the
long-run, iterated process that constitutes human history, though, nations can
observe many such maneuvers and claims over time and begin to synthesize a
perception of the other’s value system.
Explicit communication forms can broadly be grouped into commitments and threats.
Although they are explicit, “The dependence of the two players on conveying their
intentions to each other and perceiving the intentions of each other, of behaving in
predictable patterns and acquiescing in rules or limits, is much the same as before [under
tacit communication]” (Schelling 1958). The rules of rationality still apply—how is any
player to know the other is telling the truth, or will follow through on a commitment or a
threat? What’s more, how could a player convey a genuine, authentic truth without being
doubted? These difficulties are not guaranteed to be solvable in every case; uncertainty is
the rule and certainty the exception that can occur when special cases can apply. The
special case that allows commitments to be trustworthy is if the committing player can
enforce it against himself. A legal or contractual binding would take the commitment out
of the realm of “communication” and into the arena of “moves.” Thus, the player must
make an irreversible maneuver that reduces his own freedom of choice (Schelling 1958).
As Schelling points out, this is equivalent to a first move.
The question arises of whether there are any useful commitments that can be made
and self-enforced by either side of the nuclear arms dilemma. It seems that there aren’t. If
the United States wanted to make an irreversible commitment to eliminating nuclear arms,
the only way to self-enforce it would be to actually do it. That would no longer be simply
a commitment, though, but would become their “move,” represented by X. The United
States won’t make this move, though, until after the other parties choose X. Put simply,
the United States won’t abolish their weapon stockpiles until the dissenting nations do and
have an enforceable promise not to develop new ones. There isn’t a viable commitment
for the other group of nations to make, either. They have no interest in committing to X,
but don’t need to convey a commitment to Y. Their possible commitment to Y is the
source of conflict.
The second form that explicit communication can take is threats. Schelling describes
the basic components of threats as follows.
The distinctive character of a threat is that one asserts that he will do, in a
contingency, what he would manifestly prefer not to do if the contingency
occurred. The motive behind the threat is to coerce or to deter, to constrain
the other player's choice of action. It works by altering the other player's
expectation of how the threatening player would react; it is an attempt to alter
the threatener's own incentives as they are seen by the party threatened.

He goes on to point out that players threaten retaliation not because the retaliation itself
would benefit them, but rather in the hope that creating the risk of retaliation will prevent
the contingent action from occurring (Schelling 1958). Although threats and commitments
are similar insofar as they are a renunciation of choice, they differ in their applicability. As
mentioned above, the commitment is equivalent to a first move. Thus, it is used when first
move is an advantage. The threat is essentially a second move, since it requires the other
player to commit an action first. Thus, it is used when the second move is advantageous.
As before, there don’t appear to be any useful threats open to either player. The
sanctions that have been made are insufficient; they have not been a forceful enough threat
to induce any action (David 2008). If the United States told Iran “Destroy your nuclear
weapons or we will bomb you,” their response is likely to be anything but disarmament.
The countries resisting weapons control don’t have any inherent incentive to induce the
other powers to choose disarmament or weapons building. Thus, explicit communication
through commitments or threats finds no effective role in this particular dilemma.
The most formidable obstacle facing nuclear disarmament is that it actually
constitutes a game-within-a-game. It’s one thing to reach a multilateral agreement about
nuclear disarmament, but it’s another entirely for every nation to actually destroy their
weapons stockpiles. Even then, the option remains for the future development of weapons.
Returning to Schelling,
Agreements are unenforcible if no outside authority exists to enforce them or
if non-compliance would be inherently undetectable. The problem arises,
then, of finding forms of agreement, or terms to agree on, that provide no
incentive to cheat or that make non-compliance automatically visible or that
incur the penalties on which the possibility of enforcement rests.
(Schelling 1958)

The closest thing to an “outside authority” in this case would be the UN, or an
enforcement arm of the NPT. But neither can act with absolute authority and there
exists no body with the power of enforcement. This means that even if an
agreement was reached (meaning the first game reached a conclusion) actually
destroying stockpiles (the second game) presents it’s own, more difficult problem.
Specifically, no nations will want to “move” first. If Iran complied and destroyed
their weapons, what would stop other powers from cheating and keeping their
weapons (secretly or publicly)? Iran would have lost all of their bargaining power
and would effectively be at the mercy of the cheating countries. Unfortunately, this
seems to reflect the history of the nuclear disarmament process.
There is no reason to give up hope, though. Schelling allows room for
optimism in the case of unenforceable agreements.
Trust is often achieved simply by the continuity of the relationship between
parties and the recognition by each that what he might gain by cheating in a
given instance is outweighed by the value of the tradition of trust that makes
possible a long sequence of future agreement.

If nations can learn to find common ground above and beyond particular disputes
(even if they are as momentous as nuclear weapons), trust can be established. A
tradition of such trust could turn these dilemmas into resolvable issues.
References

Ani. “India committed towards world free of N-weapons: PM,” Indianexpress.com.

24 Nov 2009.

“Brief Background [of NPT],” United Nations. <http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/

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David, Peter. “Banning the Bomb,” The Economist. 20 Dec 2008.

Duarte, Sergio. “The Secretary-General’s Five-Point Plan on Nuclear

Disarmament.” United Nations. 12 Oct 2009.

Schelling, Thomas C. “The Strategy of Conflict Prospectus for a Reorientation of

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Scodel, Alvin and J. Sayer Minas, Philburn Ratoosh, Milton Lipetz. “Some
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