Constitutional Law II
a. Accused is informed why he is
Bill of Rights
I. THE DUE PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION
AND CONTRACT CLAUSES AS LIMITATIONS
ON POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND
TAXATION
Art. III, Sec. 1. No person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
Art. III, Sec. 10. No law impairing
the obligation of contracts shall be
passed.
LIMITATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY
Inherent in sovereignty, and therefore
not even required to be conferred by the
Constitution, are the police, eminent domain,
and taxation powers. The Bill of Rights,
notably the due process, equal protection and
non-impairment clauses, is a means of limiting
the exercise of these powers by imposing on
the State the obligation to protect individual
rights. The Bill of Rights is addressed to the
State, notably the government, telling it what it
cannot do to the individual.
A. Due process - Procedural and
Substantive
Civil Procedural Due Process
In civil cases, the SC laid down its
elements in the case of Banco Espanol Filipino
v. Palanca:
a. Court with jurisdiction over the
subject matter.
b. Court with jurisdiction over the
party-defendant
c. Judgement rendered according to
law.
d. Defendant given the oppotunity to
be heard (requirement on notice and hearing)
Criminal Due Process
In criminal cases, the elements were
laid down in Vera v. People:
proceeded against, and what charge he must
answer.
b. Judgment of conviction is based
on evidence that is not tainted by falsity, and
after the defendant was heard.
If the prosecution produces the
conviction based on untrue evidence, then it
is guilty of depriving the accused of due
process. Thus false testimony can be
questioned by the accused regardless of the
time that lapsed.
c. Judgment according to law
d. Tribunal with jurisdiction
Administrative Due Process
In administrative proceedings, the
elements were laid down in the case of Ang
Tibay v. CIR as the "seven cardinal primary
rights" in justiciable cases before
administrative tribunals:
a. There must be a hearing, where a
party may present evidence in support of his
case.
b. The tribunal must consider the
evidence presented by a party.
c. While the tribunal has no duty to
decide the case correctly, its decision must
be supported by evidence.
d. The evidence supporting the
decision must be substantial. Substantial
evidence is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.
e. The evidence must have been
presented at the hearing or at least contained
in the record and known to the parties affected.
f. The tribunal must rely on its own
independent consideration of evidence, and
not rely on the recommendation of a
subordinate.
g. The decision must state the facts and
the law in such a way that the parties can
know the issues involved and the reasons for
the decision.
Substantive Due Process
Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659 (1987)
F: Petitioners' 6 carabaos were
confiscated by the police for having been
transported from Masbate to Iloilo in violation of
EO 626-A. He brought an action for replevin,
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challenging the consitutionality of the EO. The
trial court sustained the confiscation of the
animals and declined to rule on the validity of
the law on the ground that it lacked authority to
do so. Its decision was affirmed by the IAC.
Hence this petition for review.
HELD: (1) Under the provision granting the SC
jurisdiction to "review, revise, reverse, modify
or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or
rules of court may provide final judgments of
lower courts" in all cases involving the
constitutionality of certain measures, lower
courts can pass upon the validity of a statute in
the first instance.
(2) There is no doubt that by banning
the slaughter of these animals (except where
there at least 7 yrs. old if male and 11 yrs old if
female upon the issuance of the necessary
permit) the EO will be conserving those still fit
for farm work or breeding and preventing their
improvident depletion. We do not see,
however, how the prohibition of the
interprovincial transport of carabaos can
prevent their indiscriminate slaughter,
considering that they can be killed any where,
w/ no less difficulty in on province than in
another. Obviously, retaining the carabao in
one province will not prevent their slaughter
there, any more than moving them to another
province will make it easier to kill them there.
As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to
apply to it as otherwise, so says the EO, it could
be easily circumsbcribed by simply killing the
animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement
of the live animals for the purpose of preventing
their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should
follow that there is no reason either to prohibit
their transfer as, not to be flippant, dead meat.
(3) In the instant case, the carabaos
were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station
commander, were returned to the petitioner
only after he had filed a complaint for recovery
and given a supersedeas bond w/c was ordered
confiscated upon his failure to produce the
carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The
EO defined the prohibition, convicted the
petitioner and immediately imposed
punishment, w/c was carried out forthright. The
measures struck him at once and pounced upon
the petitioner w/o giving him a chance to be
heard, thus denying him elementary fair play.
(4) It is there authorized that the
seized prop. shall "be distributed to charitable
institutions and other similar institutions as the
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may see fit, in the case of
carabeef, and to deserving farmers through
dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may
see fit in the case of carabaos." The phrase
may see fit is an extremely generous and
dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is
laden w/ perilous opportunities for partiality and
abuse, and even corruption. One searches in
vain for the usual standard and the reasonable
guidelines, or better still, the limitations that
the said officers must observe when they make
their distribution. VV.
B. Due Process and Police Power
Bautista v. Juinio, 127 SCRA 329 (1984)
Ban on Use of Heavy Cars on Week-ends and
Holiday s Valid.
F: LOI 689 banned the use of vehicles w/ A
and EH plates on week-ends and holidays in
view of the energy crisis. It excepted, however,
those classified as S (Service), T (Truck), DPL
(Diplomatic), CC (Consular Corps), and TC
(Tourist Cars). The resps., Min. of Public Works,
Transportation, issued memo. providing
penalties for viol. of the LOI, namely, fine,
confiscation of vehicles, and cancellation of
registration. The petitioners brought suit
questioning the validity of the LOI on the
ground that it was discriminatory and a denial
of due process. The resps. denied the
petitioner's allegations and argued that the suit
amounted to a request for advisory opinion.
HELD: (1) Petitioners are owners of an 8
cylinder 1969 Buick and of a 6 cylinder Willy's
Kaiser Jeep. The enforcement of the LOI to
them would deprive them of prop. They,
therefore, have standing to challenge the
validity of the LOI.
(2) But the LOI cannot be declared void
on its face. It has behind it the presumption of
validity. The necessity for evidence to rebut
such presumption is unavoidable. As
underlying the questions of fact may condition
the constitutionality of legislation the
presumption of validity must prevail in the
absence of some factual foundation of record
overthrowing the statute. The LOI is an energy
conservation measure; it is an apporpriate
response to a problem.
(3) Nor does the LOI deny equal
protection to the petitioners. W/in the class to
w/c the petitioner belongs the LOI operate
equally and uniformly. That the LOI does not
include others does not render it invalid. The
govt is not required to adhere to a policy of "all
or none."
(4) To the extent that the Land
Transpo. Code does not authorize the
impounding of vehicles as a penalty, to that
extent the memo. of the resps. would be ultra
vires. VV.
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Velasco v. Villegas, 120 SCRA (1983)
Ordinance Prohibiting Barbershops from
Rendering Massage Services Valid.
F: The ordinance was enacted for a two-
fold purpose: (1) To enable the City of Mla. to
collect a fee for operating massage clinics
separately from those operating barber ships
and (2) To prevent immorality w/c might
probably arise from the construction of separate
rooms.
HELD: The SC has been most liberal in
sustaining ordinances based on general welfare
clause. VV.
Cruz v. Paras, 123 SCRA 569 (1983)
F: The petitioners are operators or
nightclubs in Bocaue, Bulacan. they filed
prohibition suits to stop the Mun. of Bocaue
from enforcing an ordinance prohibiting the
operation of nightclubs, cabarets, and dance h
alls in that mun. or the renewal of licenses to
operate them. The CFI upheld the validity of
the ordinance and dismissed the petition.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
HELD: A mun. corp. cannot prohibit the
operation of nightclubs. Nightclubs may be
regulated but not prevented from carrying on
their business. RA 938, as orginally enacted,
granted municipalities the power to regulate
the establishment, maintenance and operation
of nightclubs and the like. While it is true that
on 5/21/54, the law was amended by RA 979
w/c purported to give municipalities the power
not only to regulate but likewise to prohibit the
operation of nightclubs, the fact is that the title
of the law remained the same so that the power
granted to municipalities remains that of
regulation, not prohibition. To construe the
amendatory act as granting mun. corporations
the power to prohibit the operation of
nightclubs would be to construe it in a way that
it violates the constitutional provision that
"every bill shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof."
Moreover, the recentyly-enacted LGC (BP 337)
speaks simply of the power to regulate the
establishment, and operation of billiard pools,
theatrical performances, circuses and other
forms of entertainment. Certiorari granted.
VV.
C. Due Process and Eminent
Domain
The taking by the State of private
property in an expropriation proceeding must
be: (1) for public use, (2) with just
compensation, and (3) upon observance of
due process.
Article III, Sec. 9. Private property
shall not be take for public use without
just compensation.
Article XII, Sec. 18. The State may,
in the interest of national welfare or
defense, establish and operate vital
industries and, upon payment of just
compensation, transfer to public
ownership utilities and other private
enterprises to be operated by the
government.
1. Taking either for public use or
public purpose.
Public Use
Public use is equivalent to public
purpose. It is not confined merely to use by the
public at large (e.g. roads). It is enough that it
serves a public purpose, even if it benefit a
large group of people short of the public in
general (e.g. expropriating property for the
relocation of squatters).
Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes 123 SCRA
220
F: The Philippine Tourism Authority sought
the expropriation of 282 Ha of land in Barangay
Malubog and Babag in Cebu City. upon deposit
of an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of
the property, the CFI authorized the PTA to take
immediate possession of the property. The
charter of the PTA authorizes it to acquire
through condemnation proceedings lands for
tourist zone development of a sports complex.
The petitioners who are occupants of the lands,
filed a petition for certiorari in the SC. They
contended that (1) the taking was not for public
use; (2) the land was covered by the land
reform program; and (3) expropriation would
impair the obligation of contracts.
HELD: The concept of public use is not limited
to traditional purposes for the construction of
roads, bridges, and the like. The idea that
"public use" means "use by the public" has
been discarded. As long as the purpose of the
taking is public, then the power of eminent
domain comes into play. It is accurate to state
then that at present whatever may be
beneficially employed for the general welfare
satisfies the requirement of public use. The
petititioners have not shown that the area being
developed is land reform area and that the
affected persons have been given emancipation
patents and certificates of land transfer. The
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contract clause has never been regarded as a
barrier to the exercise of the police power and
likewise eminent domain. VV.
Sumulong v. Guerrero 154 SCRA 461 (1987)
F: On December 5, 1977, the National
Housing Authority filed a complaint for the
expropriation of 25 hectares of land in Antipolo,
Rizal pursuant to PD 1224 authorizing the
expropriation of private lands for socialized
housing. Among those lands sought to be
expropriated are the petitioners' lands. They
brought this suit in the SC challenging the
constitutionality of PD 1224.
HELD: Petitioners contend that socialized
housing for the purpose of condemnation
proceedings is not public use since it will benefit
only a handful of people. The "public use"
requirement is an evolving concept influences
by changing conditions. Urban renewal or
redevelopment and the construction of low-cost
housing is recognized as a public purpose, not
only because of the expanded concept of public
use but also because of specific provisions in
the Constitution. Shortage in housing is a
matter of state concern since it directly and
significantly affects public health, safety, the
environment and, in sum, the general welfare.
Petitioners claim that there are vast areas of
lands in Rizal hundreds of hectares of which are
owned by a few landowners only. Why should
the NHA pick their small lots? Expropriation is
not confined to landed estates. The test to be
applied for a valid expropriation of private lands
was the area of the land and not the number of
people who stood to be benefitted. The State
acting through the NHA is vested with broad
discretion to designate the property. The
property owner may not interpose objections
merely because in their judgment some other
property would have been more suitable. The
provisions on just compensation found in PD
1224, 1259, and 1313 are the same provisions
which were declared unconstitutional in EPZA v.
Dulay (1987) for being encroachments on
judicial prerogatives. VV.
2. Just compensation must
be judicially determined
Just Compensation
Just compensation is the fair and
reasonable equivalent of the loss sustained by
the owner of the property due to the taking; it
is the fair market value of the property
measured at the time of the taking, no matter
how long ago it was taken (e.g. the time of the
taking was in the 1920's, the time of payment
was in the 1960's, in the Ministerio and
Amigable cases, supra), and using the
conversion rates at the time of taking
(because according to those cases, Art. 1250
of the Civil Code applied only to contractual
obligations).
EPZA v. Dulay 149 SCRA 305 (1987)
F: The San Antonio Development
Corporation was the owner of a piece of land in
Lapu-Lapu City which the EPZA expropriated in
1979. The commissioners appointed by the trial
court recommended that the San Antonio
Development Corp. be paid P15.00 per square
meter. EPZA filed a petition for certiorari,
arguing that under PD 1533 the compensation
should be the fair and current market value
declared by the owner or the market value
determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.
HELD: The method of ascertaining just
compensation under PD 1533 constitutes
impermissible encroachment on judicial
prerogatives. Although the court technically
would still have the power to determine the just
compensation for the property, following the
decree, its task would be relegated to simply
stating the lower value of the property as
declared either by the owner or the assessor.
Just compensation means the value of the
property at the time of the taking. It means a
fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All
the facts as to the condition of the property and
its surroundings, its improvements and
capabilities should be considered. In this case,
the tax declarations used as basis for the just
compensation were made long before the
declaration of martial law when the land was
much cheaper. To peg the value of the lots on
the basis of those documents which are
outdated would be arbitrary and confiscatory.
VV.
Manotok v. NHA 150 SCRA 89 (1987)
F: Petitioners are the owners of two large
estates known as the Tambunting Estate and
Sunog-Apog in Tondo, Manila, both of which
were declared expropriated in two decrees
issued by President Marcos, PD 1669 and PD
1670. The petitioners contend that the decrees
violate their constitutional right to due process
and equal protection since by their mere
passage their properties were automatically
expropriated and they were immediately
deprived of the ownership and possession
thereof without being given the chance to
oppose such expropriation. The government on
the other hand contends that the power of
eminent domain is inherent in the State and
when the legislature or the President through
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his law-making powers exercises this power, the
public use and public necessity of the
expropriation and the fixing of the just
compensation become political in nature and
the courts must respect the decision.
HELD: The challenged decrees are unfair in the
procedures adopted and the powers given to
the NHA. The Tambunting subdivision is
summarily proclaimed a blighted area and
directly expropriated by decree without the
slightest semblance of a hearing or any
proceeding whatsoever. The expropriation is
instant and automatic to take effect
immediately upon the signing of the decree. No
deposit before the taking is required. There is
not provision for any interest to be paid upon
unpaid installments. Not only are the owners
given absolutely no opportunity to contest the
expropriation, or question the amount of
payments fixed by the decree, but the decision
of the NHA are expressly declared beyond
judicial review. PD 1669 and 1670 are declared
unconstitutional.
Teehankee, CJ, concurring: The judgment at bar
now learly overturns the majority ruling in JM
Tuason v. LTA that the power of Congress to
designate the particular property to be taken
adn how much may be condemned thereof
must be duly recognized, leaving only as a
judicial question whether in the exercise of such
competence, the party adversely affected is the
victim of partiality and prejudice. The SC now
rules that such singling out of properties does
not foreclose judicial scrutiny as to whether
such expropriation by legislative act
transgresses the due process and equal
protection and just compensation guarantees of
the Constitution. VV.
3. Due process must be
observed
De Knecht v. Bautista 100 SCRA 660
(1980)
F: The plan to extend EDSA to Roxas
Boulevard to be ultimately linked to the Cavite
Coastal Road Project, originally called for the
expropriation of properties along Cuneta
Avenue in Pasay City. Later on, however, the
Ministry of Public Highways decided to make
the proposed extension pass through Fernando
Rein and Del Pan Streets. Because of the
protests of residents of the latter, the
Commission on Human Settlements
recommended the reversion to the original
plan, but the Ministry argued the new route
withh save the government P2 million. The
government filed expropriation proceedings
against the owners of Fernando Rein and Del
Pan streets, among whom was petitioner.
HELD: The choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan
streets is arbitrayr and should not receive
judicial aprpoval. The Human Settlements
Commission concluded that the cost factor is so
minimal that it can be disregarded in making a
choice between the two lines. The factor of
functionality strongly militates against the
choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets,
while the factor of social and economic impact
bears grievously on the residents of Cuneta
Avenue. While the issue would seem to boil
down to a choice between people, on one hand,
and progress and development, on the other, it
is to be remembered that progress and
development are carried out for the benefit of
the people. VV.
Republic v. De Knecht, 182 SCRA 142
(1990)
F: De Knecht was one of the owners of
several properties along the Fernando Rein-Del
Pan streets which the Government sought to
expropriate to give way to the extension of
EDSA and the construction of drainage facilities.
De Knecht filed a case to restrain the
Government from proceeding with the
expropriation. Her prayer was denied by the
lower court but upon certiorari, the SC reversed
the lower court decision and granted the relief
asked for by De Knecht ruling that the
expropriation was arbitrary. The case was
remanded to the lower court.
No further action was taken despite
the SC decision until two years later, in 1983,
when the Government moved for the dismissal
of the case on the ground that the Legislature
has since enacted BP 340 expropriating the
same properties for the same purpose. The
lower court denied tthe motion. Appeal.
RULING: While it is true that said final judgment
of this Curt on the subject becomes the law of
the case between the parties, it is equally true
that the right of petitioner to take private
properties for public use upon payment of just
compensation is so provided in the Constitution
and the laws. Such expropriation proceeding
may be undertaken by the petitioner not only
by voluntary negotiation with the land owners
but also by taking appropriate court action or by
legislation.
When BP 340 was passed, it appears
that it was based on supervening events that
occured after the 1980 decision of the SC on
the De Knecht case was rendered. The social
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impact factor which persuaded the Court to
consider this extension to be arbitrary had
disappeared.
Moreover, the said decision is no
obstacle to the legislative arm of the
Government in thereafter making its own
independent assessment of the circumstances
then pravailing as to the propriety of
undertaking the expropriation of properties in
question and thereafter by enacting the
corresponding legislation as it did in this case.
The Court agrees in the wisdom and necessity
of enacting BP 340. Thus the anterior decision
of the Court must yield to the subsequent
legislative fiat. Charo.
NAPOCOR v. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1 (1991)
F: For the construction of its 230 KV
Mexico-Limay transmission lines, Napocor's
lines have to pass the lands belonging to
respondents. Unsuccessful with its negotiations
for the acquisition of the right of way
easements, Napocor was constrained to file
eminent domain proceedings.
ISSUE: W/N petitoner should be made to pay
simple easement fee or full compensation for
the land traversed by its transmissin lines.
RULING: In RP v. PLDT, the SC ruled that
"Normally, the power of eminent domain results
in the taking or appropriation of the title to, and
possession of, the expropriated property, but no
cogent reason appears why said power may not
be availed of to impose only a burrden upon the
owner of the condemned property, without loss
of title or possession. It is unquestionable that
real property may, through expropriation, be
subjected to an easement of right of way." In
this case, the easement is definitely a taking
under the power of eminent domain.
Considering the nature and effect of the
installation of the transmission lines, the
limitations imposed by the NPC against the use
of the land (that no plant higher than 3 meters
is allowed below the lines) for an indefinite
period deprives private respondents of ts
ordinary use.
For these reasons, the owner of the
property expropriated is entitled to a just
compensation which should neither be more nor
less, whenever it is possible to make the
assessment, than the money equivalent of said
property. Just equiivalent has always been
understood to be the just and complete
equivalent of the loss which the owner of the
thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of
the expropriation. The price or value of the land
and its character at the time of taking by the
Govt. are the criteria for determining just
cmpensation. Charo.
D. Equal Protection
Art. III, Sec. 1. No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of
the laws.
Art. XIII, Sec. 1. The Congress
shall give highest priority to the
enactment of measure that protect and
enhance the right of all the people to
human dignity, reduce social, economic,
and political inequalities and remove
cultural inequities by equitably diffusing
wealth and political power for the common
good.
To this end, the State shall
regulate the acquisition, ownership, use,
and disposition of property and its
increments.
1. Economic equality
Art. XIII, Sec. 2. The promotion of
social justice shall include the
commitment to create economic
opportunities based on freedom of
initiative and self-reliance.
Art. XIII, Sec. 3. The State shall
afford full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized, and
promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all
workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to
strike in accordance with law. They shall
be entitle to security of tenure, humane
conditions of work, and living wage. They
shall also participate in policy and
decision-making process affecting the
rights and benefits as may be provided by
law.
The State shall promote the
principle of shared responsibility between
workers and employers and the
preferential use of voluntary modes in
settling disputes including conciliation,
and shall enforce their mutual compliance
therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the
relations between workers and employers,
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recognizing the right of labor to its just
share in the fruits of production and the
right of enterprises to reasonable returns
on investments, and to expansion and
growth.
Art. XII, Sec. 10. The Congress
shall, upon recommendation of the
economic and planning agency, when the
national interest dictates, reserve to
citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations at least sixty
per centum of whose capital is owned by
such citizens, or such higher percentage
as Congress may prescribe, certain areas
of investments. The Congress shall enact
measures that will encourage the
formation and operation enterprises
whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges
and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, the State shall
give preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and
exercise authority over foreign
investments within its national jurisdiction
and in accordance with its national goals
and priorities.
Id., Sec. 2. xxx
The State shall protect the nation's
marine wealth in its archipelagic waters,
territorial sea, and exclusive economic
zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment
exclusively to Filipino citizens.
Art. III, Sec. 11. Free access to the
courts and quasi-judicial bodies and
adequate legal assistance shall not be
denied to any person by reason of
poverty.
Art. VIII, Sec. 5. The Supreme Court
shall have the following powers:
xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning
the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, the admission
to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar,
and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide
a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade,
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rights of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
shall remain effective unless disapproved
by the Supreme Court.
There are areas of economic activity
which can be limited to Filipinos. The
Constitution itself acknowledges this in various
places - exploitation of marine wealth (Art. XII,
Sec. 2 par. 2), certain areas of investment (Art.
XII, Sec. 10), to name a few.
In Ichong v. Hernandez, 201 Phil. 1155
(1937), the SC upheld the validity of the law
which nationalized the retail trade. For the
protection of the law can be observed by the
national interest.
Ichong v. Hernandez, 201 Phil. 1155 (1937)
But there are areas where aliens cannot
be kept away for the simple reason that they
cannot be deprived of a common means of
livelihood, especially when they are admitted to
the country as immigrants.
In Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Isai Po Ho, 86
SCRA 270 (1978), the SC invalidated a city
ordinance imposing a P500 permit fee for aliens
who wish to engage in the pursuit of an
occupation. The SC noted that this violated the
uniformity of taxation, and deprived aliens of
the right to earn a common livelihood.
Villegas v. Hiu Chiung Tsai Pao Ho 86 SCRA 270
(1978)
F: An ordinance of the City of Manila
prohibited the employment of aliens in any
occupation or business unless they first secured
a permit from the Mayor of Manila and paid a
fee of P500. Respondent, an alien, employed in
Manila, brought suit and obtained judgment
from the CFI declaring the ordinance null and
void.
HELD: The ordinance is a tax measure. In
imposing a flat rate of P500, it failed to consider
substantial differences in situations among
aliens and for that reason violates the rule on
uniformity of taxation. It also lays down no
guide for granting/denying the permit and
therefore permits the arbitrary exercise of
discretion by the Mayor. Finally, the ordinance
denies aliens due process and the equal
protection of the laws. VV.
In Vera v. Cuevas, 90 SCRA 379 (1979),
Sec. 169 of the NIRC requiring manufacturers of
skimmed milk (non-fat) to put on its label the
warning that the milk is harmful for infants, was
struck down as unconstitutional on the ground
that it did not require the same labeling in the
case of filled milk (coco-fat added)
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At that time of the decision thought, the
law was already inoperative.
Vera v. Cuevas 90 SCRA 379 (1979)
F: Respondents are engaged in the
manufacture and sale of filled milk products.
They brought an action in the CFI for a
declaration of their rights in respect of section
169 of the Tax Code. This provision required
that "all condensed skimmed milk in whatever
form, from which the fatty part has been
removed totally or in part or put on sale in the
Philippines shall be clearly and legibly marked
on its immediate containers with the words:
This milk is not suitable for nourishment for
infants less than one year of age.
HELD: Sec. 169 of the Tax Code has been
repealed by RA 344. At any rate, Sec. 169
applied only to skimmed milk and not to filled
milk. Sec. 169 is being enforced only against
respondent manufacturers of filled milk but not
against manufacturers of skimmed milk, thus
denying them the equal protection of the laws.
VV.
2. Political equality
Art. III, Sec. 18. (1) No person
shall be detained solely by reason of his
political beliefs and aspirations.
Art. IX, C, Sec. 10. Bona fide
candidates to public office shall be free
from any form of harassment and
discrimination.
In Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392
(1980), the SC upheld the validity of sec. 4 of
Batas Blg. 52 disqualifying retired elective local
officials who have received retirement benefits
and would have been 65 years old at the start
of the term. It does not violate equal
protection, for it gives younger blood the
opportunity to run the local government.
Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980)
F: Sec. 4 of BP 52 provides in part that
"any retired elective provincial, city ot
municipal official who has received payment of
the retirement benefits to which he is entitled
under the law and who shall have been 65
years of age at the commencement of the term
of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall
not be qualified to run for the same elective
local office from which he has retired."
Petitioner, Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, sued for
prohibition to enjoin enforcement of the law on
the ground that it was contrary to the equal
protection and due process guarantee of the
Constitution.
HELD: Dumlao has not been injured by the
application of the provision. No petition seeking
his disqualification has been filed against him.
His petition is a mere request for advisory
opinion. Nevertheless, because of public
interest, the question should be resolved. The
purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of
younger blood in local governments and
therefore, not invalid. The retired employee in
effect declares himself tired and unavailable for
the same government work. VV.
In Igot v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980),
however, the disqualification of candidates con-
victed or simply charged with national security
offenses was struck down as unconstitutional,
for violating the presumption of innocence and
thus ultimately the equal political protection.
Igot c. Comelec 95 SCRA 392 (1980)
F: Romeo Igot, as taxpayer, voter and
member of the bar, and Alfredo Salapantan Jr.,
as taxpayer and voter, sued for prohibition to
enjoin enforcement of BP 52, sec. 4 of which
provides for the disqualification as candidate of
any person convicted of subversion,
insurrection or rebellion or similar offenses.
HELD: Neither petitioner has been convicted
nor charged with acts of disloyalty nor
disqualified from being candidates for local
elective positions. They have no personal or
substantial interest at stake and therefore no
locus standi. Neither can they sue as taxpayers
because the statute does not involve
disbursement of public funds. VV.
3. Social equality
Art. XIII, Sec. 1. The Congress shall
give highest priority to the enactment of
measure that protect and enhance the
right of all the people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities and remove cultural inequities
by equitably diffusing wealth and political
power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall
regulate the acquisition, ownership, use,
and disposition of property and its
increments.
.
Constitutional Law II
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE
A. Arrests, Searches and Seizures
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the
people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose,
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the person or
things to be seized.
Sec. 3. The privacy of
communication and correspondence shall
be inviolable, except upon lawful order of
the court, or when public safety or order
requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
Any evidence obtained in violation
of this or the preceding section, shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
1. Requirements for Search
Warrants
Yee Sue Kuy v. Almeda, 70 Phil. 141 (1940)
F: By virtue of the sworn application of
Almeda, the Chief agent of the Anti-Usury
Board, a SW was issued to search the store and
premises of the petitioner, accused of violating
the Anti-Usury Law. Receipt books, PNs and
other articles were seized and retained in the
possession of the Anti-Usury Board.
ISSUE: W/n the requirements for the issuance of
valid SW were complied with.
RULING: YES. The applicant, Almeda, in his
application, swore that "he made his own
personal investigation and ascertained that
petitioner is lending money without a license,
charging usurious rates." The witness he
presentted testified before the judge and swore
that he knew that YEE was lending without a
license because he personally investigated the
victims who secured loans from the petitioner.
Their affidavits were sufficient for, thereunder,
they could be held liable for perjury. The
existence of probable cause has been
determined by the justice of the peace before
issuing the warrant complained of, as shown in
the warrant itself. Charo.
Pasion vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689,
(1938)
F: This is a petition for mandamus
presented to secure the annulment of a search
warrant (SW) & 2 orders of the resp. judge, &
the restoration of certain documents alleged to
have been illegally seized by an agent of the
Anti-Usury Board.
Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usury
Board, obtained from the justice of the peace of
Tarlac, Tarlac, a SW, commanding any officer of
the law "to search the person, house or store of
the petitioner for certain books, lists, chits,
receipts, documents & other papers relating to
her activities as userer."
On the same date, Almeda,
accompanied by a captain of the PC, went to
the office of the petitioner, and after showing
the SW to the petitioner's bookeeper, Salas, &
w/o the presence of the petitioner, who was ill
and confined at that time, proceeded w/ the
execution thereof. Two packages of records & a
locked filing cabinet containing several papers
and documents were seized by Almeda and a
receipt thereof issued by him to Salas.
Separate criminal cases were filed against
petitioner. Petitioner demanded the return of
the documents seized. Bu motion, pet.
challenged the legality of the SW and the
devolution of the documents demanded. By
resolution, the resp. judge of CFI denied the
petitioner's motion for the reason that though
the SW was illegal, there was a waiver on the
part of the petitioner.
The resolution of 10/5/37 & the order
of 1/3/38 are sought, together w/ the SW, to be
nullified in these proceedings.
HELD: Freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures is declared a popular right and for
a SW to be valid, (1) it must be issued upon
probable cause; (2) the probable cause must
be determined by the judge himself and not by
the applicant or another; (3) in the
determination of probable cause, the judge
must examine, under oath or affirmation, the
complainant and such witnesses as the latter
may produce; & (4) the warrant issued must
particularly describe the place to be searched
and persons or things to be seized.
In the instant case, the existence of
probable cause was determined not by the
judge himself but by the applicant. All that the
judge did was to accept as true the affidavit
made by agent Almeda. It does not appear that
he examined the applicant and his witnesses, if
any. Even accepting the description of the
prop. to be seized to be sufficient and on the
assumption that the receipt issued is sufficiently
detailed w/in the meaning of the law, the prop.
Constitutional Law II
seized were not delivered to the court w/c
issued the warrant, as required by law. Instead,
they were turned over to the resp. provincial
fiscal & used by him in building up cases
against petitioner. Considering that at the time
the warrant was issued, there was no case
pending against the petitioner, the averment
that the warrant was issued primarily for
exploration purposes is not w/o basis.
IS THERE A WAIVER? No express
waiver.
IS THERE AN IMPLIED WAIVER? None.
To constitute a waiver of constitutional
right, it must appear first that (1) the right
exists; (2) that the person involved had
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the
existence of such right; (3) that said person
had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
It is true that the petitioner did not
object to the legality of the search when it was
made. She could not have objected bec. she
was sick & was not present when the warrant
was served upon Salas. Certainly, the
constitutional immunity from unreasonable
searches and seizures, being a personal one,
cannot be waived by anyone except by the
person whose rights are invaded or one who is
expressly authorized to do so in his or her
behalf. The failure on the part of the petitioner
and her bookkeeper to resist or object to the
execution of the warrant does not constitute an
implied waiver of the consti. right. It is but a
submission to the authority of the law. The
delay in making the demand for the return of
the documents seized is not such as to result im
implied. waiver. RAM.
Burgos v. Chief of Staff 133 SCRA 800
(1984)
Illegal search of newspaper offices and press
freedom
F: On the basis of two warrants issued by
the RTC of QC, the offices of the Metropolitan
Mail and the We Forum were search and
printing machines, paraphernalia, motor
vehicles and other articles used in the printing,
publication and distribution of the newspapers
as well as papers and other literature seized on
the ground that they were used in the
commission of the crime of subversion.
Petitioners brought and action to annul the
warrants and compel the return of the things
seized.
HELD: Petitioners' thesis is impressed with
merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as
such facts and circumstances which would lead
a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed
and that the objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. When addressed to a newspaper
publisher or editor, the application for a
warrant must contain a specification stating
with particularity the alleged subversive
materials he has published or intending to
publish. Broad statement in the application is a
mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the
requirement of probable cause. Another factor
that makes the search warrants constitutionally
objectionable is that they are in the nature of
general warrants. In Stanford v. State of Texas,
the US SC declared this type of warrant void.
VV.
Corro v. Lising 137 SCRA 341 (1985)
F: Respondent Judge issued a search
warrant for the seizure of articles allegedly used
by petitioner in committing the crime of
sedition. Seized were printed copies of the
Philippine Times, newspaper dummies,
typewriters, mimeographing machines and tape
recorders, video machines and tapes. The
petitioner moved to quash the warrant but his
motion was denied.
HELD: The statements made in the affidavits
are mere conclusions of law and do not satisfy
the requirement of probable cause. The
language used is all embracing as to include all
conceivable words and equipment of petitioner
regardless of whether they are legal or illegal.
The search warrant under consideration was in
the nature of a general warrant which is
objectionable. VV.
Bache & Co. (Phil.) v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 (1971)
F: The Com. of Internal Revenue through
Rev. Examiner de Leon filed an application for a
SW against Bache & Co. and its pres.,
Seggerman for violation of the provisons of the
NIRC. As Judge Ruiz was then conducting a
hearing, the deposition of de Leon and his
witness, Logronio, was taken by the Dep. Clerk
of Court. The deposition was later read to the
judge who asked the witness to take an oath as
to the truth of his statements. The judge then
signed the SW and accordingly issued the same.
ISSUE: W/n the requirements for the issuance of
valid SW were complied with.
RULING: NO. The judge did not personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses.
The judge did not have the opportunity to
observe tthe demeanor of the deponents and to
propound initial and follow-up questions which
Constitutional Law II
his judicial mind, on account of his training, was
in the best position to conceive. This is
important in arriving at a sound inference on
the all-importatnt question of w/n there was
probable cause. Charo.
Prudente v. Dayrit, 180 SCRA 69 (1990)
F: Judge Dayrit, upon applicatin of P/Maj.
Dimagmaliw, supported by a "Deposition of
Witness," executed by P/Lt. Angeles, issued a
search warrant for the search and seizure of
arms, ammunitions and explosives in the
premises of the PUP which were supposed to be
in possession of Dr. Prudente. In enforcing the
warrant, 3 fragmentation grenades were found
in the bathroom of the office of Dr. Prudente.
ISSUE: W/n the searrch warrant was valid.
RULING: NO.
(1) The warant was not issued on the
basis of personal knowledge of the applicant
and his witness. The probable cause required
under the Constitution for the issuance of a
search warrant must be in connection with one
specific offense, and the judge must, before
issuing the warrant, personally examine in the
form of searching questions and answers, in
writing and under oath, the complainant and
any witnesses he may produce, on facts
personally known to them and attach to the
record their sworn statements together with
any affidavit submitted. However, in the case at
bar, Dimagmaliw merely stated in his
application that his knowledge was based "on
gathered infrmation from verified sources." The
same holds true for the affidavit of Angeles.
Moreover, the judge did not examine
Angeles in the form of searching questions and
answers. What appears on the record are
leading questions answereable by yes or no.
(2) As to the claim that the SW failed to
particularly describe the place to be searched,
the SC ruled that the description of the place to
be searched is sufficient if the officer with the
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain
and identify the place intended to be searched.
Here, the SW described the place as PUP, with
its address and specifically mentioned the
offices of the "Dept. of Military Science and
Tactics on the ground floor and the Office of
the President at the 2nd floor and the other
rooms in that floor." This is deemed sufficient.
(3) There was also an issue as to w/n the
SW was issued for one specific offense. The
warrrant was issued for violation of PD 1866
which punishes several offenses. While there
was failure to state the particular provision of
the law violated, the warrant itself qualified the
description of the offense as "illegal possession
of firearms, etc." This suffices to cure the
defect.
The fact that the word "etc." was added
to refer to ammunitions and explosives did not
violate the rule on single offense, for
notwithstanding that possession of firearms,
explosives and ammunitions are punished in
different sections of the PD, they are treated as
belonging to a single specie. An exception to
the rule that a warant shall be issued for a
single offense is when existing laws prescribe a
single punishment for various offenses. Charo.
Olaes v. People, 155 SCRA 486 (1987)
F: Petitioners claim that the SW issued by
resp. judge was invalid. They also question the
extrajudicial confession taken from them
without according them the right to assistance
of a counsel. The articles seized by virtue of the
SW consisting of dried marijuana were admitted
as evidence for violation of RA 6425 or
Dangerous Drugs Act.
RULING: While it is true that the caption of the
SW states that it is in connection with "the
violation of RA 6425," it is clearly recited in the
text thereof that "there is probable cause to
believe that Olaes of Olongapo City has in his
possession and control, marijuana dried stalks
which are suject of the offense stated above."
Although the specific section of the law is not
stated, there is no question at all that the
specific offense alleged to have been
committed as basis for determining probable
cause is alleged. Furthermore, the SW
specifically described the place to be searched
and the things to be seized.
As to the extrajudicial confessions of the
accused, the same are deemed inadmissible
against them. In People V. Galit, the Court
declared that: " At the time the person is
arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting
officer to inform him of the reason for the
arrrest and he must be shown the warrant of
arrest, if any; he shall be informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to
counsel, and that any statement he might make
could be used against him. The person arrested
shall have the right to communicate with his
lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the
most expedient means - by telephone if
possible - or by letter or messenger. It shall be
the responsibility of the arresting officer to see
to it that this is accomplished. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in
the presence of counsel engaged by the person
arrested, by any person on his behalf, or
appointed by the court upon petition either of
the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf.
Constitutional Law II
The right to counsel may be waived but the
wiaver shall not be valid unless made with the
assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained
in violation of the procedure herein laid down,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or
in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence."
These requirements were even made
stricter under the 1987 Constitution which
provides that the rights of a person under
custodial investigation cannot be waived except
when made in writing and in the presence of
counsel. Charo.
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force v. CA,
171 SCRA 348 (1989)
F: The PASTF was created by virtue of PD
1936 to serve as the President's arm called
upon to combat the vice of dollar salting or the
blackmarketing and salting of foreign exchange.
ISSUE: W/N the PASTF is "such other officer as
may be authorized by law" to issue warrants
under the 1973 Constitition.
RULING: NO. The Court, in reviewing the powers
of the PASTF under its enabling law, sees
nothing that will reveal a legislative
intendement to confer upon the body, quasi-
judicial responsiibilities relative to offenses
punishable by PD 1883. Its undertaking is
simply to determine w/n probable cause exists
to warrant the filing of charges with the proper
court, meaning to say, to conduct an inquiry
preliminary to a judicial recourse, and to
recommend action of appropriate authorities.
The Court agrees that PASTF exercises,
or was meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers,
and on that ground, it cannot be said to be a
neutral and detached judge to determine the
existence of probable cause for purposes of
arrest or search. Unlike a magistrate, a
prosecutor is naturally interested in the success
of his case. Although his office "is to see to it
that justice if done and not necessarily to
secure the conviction of the accused," he
stands invariably, as the accused's adversary
and his accuser. To permit him to issue
warrrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to
make him both judge and jury in his own right,
when he is neither. This makes to our mind and
to that extent, PD 1636 as amended by PD
2002, unconstitutional.
The "responsible officer" referred to
under the Cosntitution is one not only
possessing the necessary skills and competence
but more significantly, the neutrality and
independence comparable to the impartiality
presumed of a judicial officer.
Salazar v. Achacoso, 183 SCRA 145
F: Pursuant to the powers vested by PD
1920 and EO 1022, POEA Administrator
Achacoso ordered the closure of the
recruitment agency of Horty Salazar, having
verified that she had no license to operate a
recruitment agency. He further ordered the
seizure of the documents and paraphernalias,
being used or intended to be used as the
means of commiting illegal recruitment. This
order was enforced on 26 January 1988.
Petitioner filed this suit for prohibition.
Issue: May the POEA (or the Sec. of Labor)
validly issue warrants of serach and seizure (or
arrest ) under Art. 38 of the Labor
Code?
HELD: NO.
The provisions of PD 1920 and EO 1022,
now embodied in Art. 38 of the Labor Code, are
the dying vestiges of authoritarian rule in its
twilights moments. Under Art. III, Sec 2 of the
1987 Constitution, it is only judges and no
other, who may issue warrants of arrest and
search. The exception is in cases of deportation
of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the
President of the Commissioner of Immigration
may order arrested, following a final order of
deportation, for the purpose of deportation.
The Sec. of Labor , not being a judge. may no
longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence,
the authorities must go through the judicial
process. To that extent, we declare Art. 38,
par. C of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and
of no force and effect.
a. Existence of probable cause.
Probable cause is such facts and circum-
stances as would reasonably make a prudent
man believe that a crime have been committed
and that the documents or things sought to be
searched and seized are in the possession of
the person against whom the warrant is
sought. Without probable cause, there can be
no valid search warrant.
In Stonehill v. Diokno, 20
SCRA 385 (1967), 42 search warrants were
issued for alleged violation of Central Bank
Laws, the Tariff and Customs Code, the NIRC,
and the Revised Penal Code. The SC voided the
warrants on the ground that it was impossible
for the judge to have found probable cause in
view of the number of laws alleged to have
been violated by the petitioner. How could he
even know what particular provision of each law
had been violated? If he did not know this, how
could it be determined if the person against
whom the warrant was issued was probably
Constitutional Law II
guilty thereof? In truth, this was a fishing
expedition, which violated the sanctity of
domicile and privacy of communications. To
establish the requirement of probable cause,
the rule is: One crime, one warrant.
b. As determined by a judge
Under the 1987 Constitution, only a
judge can issue a warrant; the offensive and
much abused phrase "and other responsible
officer as may be authorized by law" in the
1973 Constitution has been removed
c. After personally examining under oath
or affirmation the complainant and his
witness.
The examination conducted by the
judge takes the form of searching questions.
The requirement that the judge must
personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses means that the actual examination
cannot be delegated to someone else, like the
clerk of court.
So said the Court in Bache and Co. (Phil)
v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 (1971). In this case, when
the BIR agent and his witnesses arrived in court
in the middle of a hearing, the judge suspended
the hearing and directed the branch clerk to
examine and take the testimony of the
witnesses in his chambers. After he was
through with the hearing, he went back to his
chambers and finding that the examination was
finished, asked the BIR agent and his witnesses
if they affirmed what they what they testified
to, after which he issued the search warrant in
question.
d. On the basis of their personal
knowledge of the facts that they are
testifying to.
The determination of the
reasonableness of the judicial warrant must be
based on the affidavit of one who has personal
knowledge of the facts to which he testifies.
The testimony cannot be based on mere belief.
Neither can it be based on a report. Otherwise,
the warrant is void.
Thus, in Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133
SCRA 800 (1984), reiterating the 1937 case of
Rodriguez v. Villamiel, the testimony based on a
military report that the newspaper We Forum
was used for subversive were held to be not a
personal knowledge and so was inadmissible.
Likewise, in Corro v. Lising, 137 SCRA
541 (1985), the testimony based on
investigation reports that certain items in the
Philippine Times were subversive were held to
be not personal knowledge, and thus the search
warrant issued was not valid.
e. The search warrant must describe
particularly describe the place to be
searched and the things to be seized.
Failure to state with particularity the
place to be searched and items to be seized
makes the warrant used for fishing evidence (a
general warrant) which is void.
In Burgos v. Chief of Staff, the
description which read "subversive documents,
leaflets, papers to promote the objective of the
Movement for a Free Philippines, the Light a
Fire Movement, and the April 6 Movement"
were held not to be particular descriptions, thus
making the warrant a general warrant.
In Corro v. Lising, the search and seizure
of "printed copies and dummies of Philippine
Times, subversive documents, articles, printed
matters, handbills, leaflets, banners, and
typewriters, tape recorders, etc." was again
invalidated for the description was not at all
particular or specific, thus making the warrants
general warrants.
When it comes to printed matters, the
offensive material need not be set out in full. It
is enough if it specifies the issues and the title
of the articles. The instruction to seize
"subversive materials" is not valid because the
determination of whether a material is
subversive or not is not for the police officer to
decide; no unfettered discretion must be
granted to him.
The matter is different if goods were
searched and seized because of their intrinsic
quality (as when they are stolen or smuggled),
than if the goods were searched for the ideas
they contain (as when a "subversive newspaper
is sought). In the latter case, a more detailed
description of the physical features of the item
is required to avoid delegating the appreciation
of ideas, and thus threaten free expression.
2. When Search May Be Made without a
Warrant
(a) When search is made of moving vehicles
The reason is the person may escape
easily if a warrant has to be applied for the
mean time. In the Tariff and Customs Code,
customs agents are specifically authorized to
search and seize vehicles even without a
warrant.
Constitutional Law II
Checkpoints are valid in some instances
depending on the purpose (e.g. apprehend a
suspected criminal) and the circumstances (e.g.
probable cause that the criminal is inside the
car). There is no question that when a child has
been reported kidnapped in a community, the
police can stop all cars and check if the
detained child is in any one of them.
(b) When search is an an incident to a
valid arrest.
Rule 126, Sec. 12. Search incident
to lawful arrest.-- A person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used
as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant. (Rules of
Court.)
A person arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything that proves the
commission of the offense. It follows that the
search can only be made within the area of
control of the arrested person, and within the
time of the arrest.
In Nolasco v. Cruz Pano, 139 SCRA 152
(1985); Milagros Roque and Cynthia Nolasco
were arrested at the intersection of Mayon and
Margal Streets in QC at 11:30 a.m., having been
wanted as high officers of the CPP. At 12:00
noon, Roque's apartment located 2 blocks
away, was searched and some documents
seized. The SC at first held that the search was
valid even if the warrant issued was void for
failing to describe with particularity the things
to be seized, because it was an incident of a
valid arrest.
But after the EDSA revolution, the
reconstituted SC granted the motion for
reconsideration and held that just because
there was a valid arrest did not mean that the
search was likewise valid. To be valid, the
search must be "incidental" to the arrest, that
is, not separated by time or place from the
arrest. If the basis for allowing incidental
searches is looked into, one can see that this
situation is not one involving a valid incidental
search.
The law allows the arresting officer to
search a person validly arrested (by frisking him
for instance) because (a) a weapon held by the
arrested person may be turned against his
captor and (b) he may destroy the proof of the
crime, if the arrested officer has to first apply
for a search warrant from a judge.
If, in the Nolasco case, the search was
conducted 30 minutes after the arrest, there is
no longer any danger that the captured may
turn against the captor; and if the documents in
the apartment were 2 blocks away, the search
would no longer be justified since there is no
way for Roque to go back to the apartment and
destroy the documents, having been arrested
already.
Nolasco v. Cruz Paño 139 SCRA 152 (1985)
F: Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested
together with Cynthia Nolasco by the
Constabulary Security Group. Milagrso had been
wanted as a high ranking officer of the CPP. The
arrest took place at 11:30 a.m. of August 6,
1984. At noon of the same day, her premises
were searched and 428 documents, a portable
typewriter and 2 boxes were seized. Earlier that
day, Judge Cruz Paño issued a search warrant
for rebellion against Milagros. On the basis of
the documents seized, charges of subversion
and rebellion were filed but the fiscal's office
merely charged her and Nolasco with illegal
possession of subversive materials. Milagros
asked for suppression of the evidence on the
ground that it was illegally obtained. The search
warrant described the things to be seized as
"Documents, papers and other records of the
CPP, NPA and NDF, xxx".
HELD: The search warrant is void because it
fails to describe with particularity the things to
be seized. It does not specify what the
subversive books and instructions are and what
the manuals not otherwise available to the
public contain to make them subversive. There
is absent a definite guideline as to what items
might lawfully be seized, thus giving the officers
discretion regarding what articles they should
seize. It is thus in the nature of a general
warrant. But the seizure of the articles could be
justified as an incident of a valid arrest. It is a
general rule that, as an incident of an arrest,
the place of premises where the arrest was
made can also be searched without a search
warrant.
(c) When things seized are within plain
view of a searching party
Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 (1986)
F: The challenged SW was issued by the
resp. judge on 5/10/84. The petitioner's house
was searched 2 days later but none of the
articles listed in the warrant was discovered.
The officers conducting the search found 1 colt
Magnum revolver & 18 live bullets w/c they
confiscated. They are now the bases of the
charge against the petitioner.
Constitutional Law II
RULING: Search warrant issued by resp. judge
is hereby declared null and void and
accordingly set aside.
The petitioner claims that no
depositions were taken by the resp. judge in
accordance w/ Rule 126, Sec. 4 of the ROC, but
this is not entirely true. Depositions were taken
of the complainant's 2 witnesses in addition to
the affidavit executed by them. It is correct to
say, however, that the complainant himself was
not subjected to a similar interrogation.
By his own accounts, all that resp. judge
did was question Capt. Quillosa on the contents
of his affidavit only "to ascertain among others,
if he knew and understood the same," and only
bec. "the application was not yet subscribed
and sworn to." The suggestion is that he would
not have asked any questions at all if the
affidavit had already been completed when it
was submitted to him. In any case, he did not
ask his own searching questions. He limited
himself to the contents of the affidavit. He did
not take the applicant's deposition in writing
and attach them to the record, together w/ the
affidavit presented to him. Such written
deposition is necessary in order that the Judge
may be able to properly determine the
existence or non-existence of the probable
cause, to hold liable for perjury the person
giving it if it will be found later that his
declarations are false. (Mata v. Bayona.)
The applicant was asking for the
issuance of the SW on the basis of mere
hearsay and not of info. personally known to
him. His application, standing alone, was
insufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant
sought. It was, therefore, necessary for the
witnesses themselves, by their own personal
info., to establish the applicant's claims.
Even assuming then that it would have
suffied to take the deposition only of the
witnesses and not of the applicant himself,
there is still the question of the sufficiency of
their depositions.
A study of the deposition taken from
witnesess Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida,
who both claimed to be "intelligence informers,"
shows that they were in the main a mere
restatement of their allegations in their
affidavits, except that they were made in the
form of answers to the questions put to them by
the resp. judge.
One may well wonder why it did not
occur to the resp. judge to ask how the witness
could be so certain even as to the caliber of the
guns, or how far he was from the window, or
whether it was on the first floor or second floor,
or why his presence was not noticed at all, or if
the acts related were really done openly, in the
full view of the witnesses, considering that
these acts were against the law. These would
have been judicious questions but they were
injudiciously omitted. Instead, the declaration
of the witnesses were readily accepted and the
warrant sought was issued forthwith.
SOL-GEN ARGUES THAT THE PETITIONER
WAIVED WHATEVER DEFECT WHEN THE
PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED TO THE
SEARCH AND MANIFESTED HIS CONFORMITY IN
WRITING.
We do not agree. What we see here is
pressure exerted by the military authorities,
who practically coerced the petitioner to sign
the supposed waiver as guaranty against a
possible challenge later to the validity of the
search they were conducting.
Malum Prohibitum.-- It does not follow
that bec. an offense is malum prohibitum, the
subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se.
Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita, but the
subjects of this kind of offense may not be
summarily seized simply bec. they are
prohibited. A SW is still necessary.
Motion to Quash.-- Petitioner should
have, before coming to the SC, filed a motion to
quash the search warrant by the resp. judge.
But as we said and did in Burgos, "this
procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take
cognizance of this petition in view of the
seriousness and urgency of the consitutional
issues raised." RAM.
Pita v. CA, 178 SCRA 362 (1989)
F: Pursuant to the Anti-Smut Campaign of
Mayor Ramon Bagatsng, policemen seized and
confiscated from dealers, distributors,
newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila
sidewalks, magazines, publications and other
reading materials believed to be obscene,
pornographic, and indecent and later burned
the seized materials in public. Among the
publications seized and later burned was "Pinoy
Playboy" magazines published and co-edited by
plaintiff Leo Pita. After his injunctive relief was
dismissed by the RTC and his appeal rejected
by CA, he seeks review with SC, invoking the
guaranty against unreasonable searches and
seizure.
Issue: W/N the search and seizure was illegal
HELD: YES.
It is basic that searches and seizure may
be done only through a judicial warrant ,
otherwise, they become unreasonable and
subject to challenge. In Burgos v Chief of Staff
(133 SCRA 800) , the SC countermanded the
orders of the RTC authorizing the serach of the
Constitutional Law II
premises WE Forum and Metropolitan Mail, two
Metro Manila Dailies, by reason of a defective
warrant. There is a greater reason in this case
to reprobate the questioned raid, in the
complete absence of a warrant, valid or invalid.
The fact that the instant case involves an
obscenity rap makes it no different from
Burgos, a political case, because speech is
speech, whether political or "obscene".
The authorities must apply for the
issuance of the a search warrant from the judge
, if in their opinion, an obscenity rap is in order.
They must convince the court that the materials
sought to be seized are "obscene" and pose a
clear and present danger of an evil substantive
enough to warrant State interference and
action. The judge must determine WON the
same are indeed "obscene": the question is to
be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the
judge's sound discretion. If probable cause
exist, a search warrant will issue.
(d) Stop and Frisk
Posadas v. CA, 188 SCRA 288 (1990)
F: Patrolmans Ungab and Umpar, both
members of the INP of the Davao Metrodiscom
assigned w/ the Intelligence Task Force, were
conducting a surveillance along Magallanes, St.,
Davao City. While they were w/in the premises
of the Rizal Memorial Colleges, they spotted
petitioner carrying a "buri" bag & they noticed
him to be acting suspiciously. They approached
the petitioner and identified themselves as
members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to
flee but was stopped by the 2. They then
checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where
they found 1 caliber .38 Smith & Wesson
revolver, w/ 2 rounds of live ammunition for a .
38 cal. gun, a smoke grenade, & 2 live
ammunition for a .22 cal. gun. Petitioner was
brought to the police station for further
investigation. He was prosecuted for illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions in the
RTC of Davao City wherein after a plea of not
guilty, and trial on the merits, a decision was
rendered finding petitioner guilty. The CA
affirmed the appealed decision in toto.
Hence, the petition for review, the
main thrust of w/c is that there being no lawful
arrest or search and seizure, the items w/c were
confiscated from the possession of the
petitioner are inadmissible in evidence against
him.
The Sol-Gen argues that under Sec.
12, R 136 of ROC, a person lawfully arrested
may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything (w/c may be) used as proof of a
commission of an offense, w/o a SW.
HELD: From Sec. 5, R 113, ROC, it is clear that
an arrest w/o a warrant may be effected by a
peace officer or private person, among others,
when in his presence the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense, or when an
offense has in fact, just been committed, & he
has personal knowledge of the facts indicating
that the person arrested has committed it.
At the time the peace officers identified
themselves and apprehended the petitioner as
he attempted to flee, they did not know that he
had committed, or was actually committing, the
offense. They just suspected that he was hiding
something in the buri bag. They did not know
what its contents were. The said circumstances
did not justify an arrest w/o a warrant.
However, there are many instances
where a warrant & seizure can be effected w/o
necessarily being preceded by an arrest,
foremost of w/c is the 'stop & search' w/o a SW
at military or police checkpoints, the
constitutionality of w/c has been upheld by this
Court in Valmonte v. de Villa.
As bet. a warrantless search and seizure
(S & S) conducted at military or police
checkpoints and the search thereof in the case
at bar, there is no question that, indeed, the
latter is more reasonable considering that,
unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis
of a probable cause. The probable cause is that
when the petitioner acted suspiciously and
attempted to flee w/ the buri bag, there was a
probable cause that he was concealing
something illegal in the bag and it was the right
and duty of the police officers to inspect the
same.
It is too much indeed to require the
police officers to search the bag in the
possession of the petitioner only after they shall
have obtained a SW for the purpose. Such an
exercise may prove to be useless, futile and
much too late.
As the Sol-Gen said:
"The assailed S & S
may still be justified as akin to a
'stop and frisk' situation whose
object is either to determine the
identity of suspicious individuals
or to maintain the status quo
momentarily while the police
officers seeks to obtain more info.
... The US SC held in Terry v.
Ohio that "a police officer may in
appropriate circumstances & in
an appropriate manner approach
a person for the purpose of
investigating possible criminal
behaviour even though there is
no probable cause to make an
arrest." In such a situation, it is
reasonable for an officer rather
Constitutional Law II
than simply to shrug his shoulder
and allow a crime to occur, to
stop a suspicious individual
briefly in order to determine his
identity or maintaing the status
quo while obtaining more info."
PETITION DENIED. RAM.
(e) When there is a valid express waiver
made voluntarily and intelligently.
Waiver cannot be implied from the fact
that the person consented or did not object to
the search, for it many happen that he did so
only out of respect for the authorities. The
waiver must be expressly made.
People v. De lara
F: After a surveillance conducted, a buy-
bust operation was conducted by the police, as
a consequence of which, accused was arrested.
The accused already pocketed the marked
money and handed two foils to the police when
he sensed the presence of police operatives.
He tried to retrieve the two foils but he was
prevented from doing so. He tried to escape by
running inside his house. The police pursued
him and were able to subdue him. The accused
admitted that he kept prohibited drugs in his
house. He even showed the arresting officers a
blue plastic bag containing prohibited drugs.
The team, together with the accused,
proceeded to WPD headquarters for
investigation. During the investigation, accused
was apprised of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to have the assistance of
counsel. When appellant was asked to give a
written statement, he refused to do so pending
arrival of his lawyer. Accused contends that his
arrest and the seizure of the bag containing
prohibited drugs was null and void. He also
contends that he was not assisted by counsel
during custodial investigation, where he was
forced to sign the photocopy of the marked
money, the Receipt of Property Seized, and the
Booking and Information Sheet.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest of the
accused and the seizure of the plastic bag were
valid.
RULING: YES. The accused was caught in
flagrante as a result of a buy-bust operation.
There was no need for a warrant. The
policemen were not only authorized but were
also under obligation to apprehend the drug
pusher even without a warrant. The
policemen’s entry into the house of the accused
without a search warrant was in hot-pursuit of a
person caught committing an offense in
flagrante. The arrest that followed the hot-
pursuit was valid. The seizure of the plastic bag
was the result of the accused’s arrest inside the
house. A contemporaneous search may be
conducted upon the person of the arrestee and
the immediate vicinity where the arrest was
made.
ISSUE: Whether the documents signed by the
accused during the investigation were
admissible in evidence.
RULING: NO. There was no showing that
accused was then assisted by counsel nor his
waiver thereto put into writing. (The rejection
of these evidence would not affect the
conviction of the accused in view of the
abundance of other evidence establishing his
guilt.) Bam.
People v. de Gracia, 233 SCRA 716 (July 6,
1994)
F: The incidents involved in this case took
place at the height of the coup d'etat staged in
December, 1989. Accused-appellant Rolando
de Gracia was charged in two separate
informations for illegal possession of
ammunition and explosives in furtherance of
rebellion, and for attempted homicide.
Appellant was convicted for illegal possession of
firearms in furtherance of rebellion, but was
acquitted of attempted homicide.
Surveillance was undertaken by the
military along EDSA because of intelligence
reports about a coup.
Members of the team were engaged by rebels
in gunfire killing one member of the team. A
searching team raided the Eurocar Sales Office.
They were able to find and confiscate six
cartons of M-16 ammunition, five bundles of C-4
dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and
"molotov" bombs inside one of the rooms
belonging to a certain Col. Matillano. De Gracia
was seen inside the office of Col. Matillano,
holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through
a door. The team arrested appellant. They were
then made to sign an inventory, written in
Tagalog, of the explosives and ammunition
confiscated by the raiding team. No search
warrant was secured by the raiding team.
Accused was found guilty of illegal possession
of firearms.
That judgment of conviction is now
challenged before us in this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not there was a valid search
and seizure in this case.
Ruling: YES
Constitutional Law II
It is admitted that the military
operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office
were not armed with a search warrant at that
time. The raid was actually precipitated by
intelligence reports that said office was being
used as headquarters by the RAM. Prior to the
raid, there was a surveillance conducted on the
premises wherein the surveillance team was
fired at by a group of men coming from the
Eurocar building. When the military operatives
raided the place, the occupants thereof refused
to open the door despite requests for them to
do so, thereby compelling the former to break
into the office. The Eurocar Sales Office is
obviously not a gun store and it is definitely not
an armory or arsenal which are the usual
depositories for explosives and ammunition. It
is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of
automobiles. The presence of an unusual
quantity of high-powered firearms and
explosives could not be justifiably or even color-
ably explained. In addition, there was general
chaos and disorder at that time because of
simultaneous and intense firing within the
vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp
Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel
forces. The courts in the surrounding areas
were obviously closed and, for that matter, the
building and houses therein were deserted.
Under the foregoing circumstances, it is
our considered opinion that the instant case
falls under one of the exceptions to the
prohibition against a warrantless search. In the
first place, the military operatives, taking into
account the facts obtaining in this case, had
reasonable ground to believe that a crime was
being committed. There was consequently more
than sufficient probable cause to warrant their
action. Furthermore, under the situation then
prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity
to apply for and secure a search warrant from
the courts. Under such urgency and exigency of
the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be
dispensed with.
There are two separate statutes
penalizing different offenses with discrete
penalties. The Revised Penal Code treats
rebellion as a crime apart from murder,
homicide, arson, or other offenses, such as
illegal possession of firearms, that might
conceivably be committed in the course of a
rebellion. Presidential Decree No. 1866 defines
and punishes, as a specific offense, the crime of
illegal possession of firearms committed in the
course or as part of a rebellion.
Subject to the presence of the requisite
elements in each case, unlawful possession of
an unlicensed firearm in furtherance of rebellion
may give rise to separate prosecutions for a
violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No.
1866, and also a violation of Articles 134 and
135 of the Revised Penal Code on rebellion.
Double jeopardy in this case cannot be invoked
because the first is an offense punished by a
special law while the second is a felony
punished by the Revised Penal Code, 24 with
variant elements.
Presidential Decree No. 1866 imposes
the death penalty where the illegal possession
of firearms and ammunition is committed in
furtherance of rebellion. At the time the offense
charged in this case was committed under the
governance of that law, the imposition of the
death penalty was proscribed by the
Constitution. Consequently, appellant De Gracia
could only be sentenced to serve the penalty of
reclusion perpetua which was correctly meted
out by the trial court, albeit with an erroneous
recommendation in connection therewith.
3. Constitutionality of checkpoints and
"areal target zonings."
Valmonte v. De Villa, 170 SCRA 256 (1989)
F: On 1/20/87, the NCRDC was activated
w/ the mission of conducting security operations
w/in its area or responsibility and peripheral
areas, for the purpose of establishing an
effective territorial defense, maintaining peace
and order, and providing an atmosphere
conducive to the social, economic and political
dev't of the NCR. As part of its duty to maitain
peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela and
MM.
Petitioners aver that, bec. of the
institution of said checkpoints, the Valenzuela
residents are worried of being harassed and of
their safety being placed at the arbitrary,
capricious and whimsical disposition of the
military manning the checkpoints, considering
that their cars and vehicles are being subjected
to regular searches and check-ups, especially at
night or at dawn, w/o a SW and/ or court order.
Their alleged fear for their safety increased
when Benjamin Parpon, was gaunned down
allegedly in cold blood by members of the
NCRDC for ignoring and/ or continuing to speed
off inspite of warning shots fired in the air.
HELD: Petitioner's concern for their safety and
apprehension at being harassed by the military
manning the checkpoints are not sufficient
grounds to declare the checkpoints per se,
illegal. No proof has been presented before the
Court to show that, in the course of their routine
checks, the military, indeed, committed specific
violations of petitioners' rights against unlawful
search and seizure of other rights.
The constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures is a
personal right invocable only by those whose
rights have been infringed, or threatened to be
infringed.
Constitutional Law II
Not all searches and seizures are
prohibited. Those w/c are reasonable are not
forbidden.
The setting up of the questioned
checkpoints may be considered as a security
measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its
mission of establishing effective territorial
defense and maintaining peace and order for
the benfit of the public. Checkpoints may not
also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to
destabilize the govt, in the interest of public
security.
Between the inherent right of the state
to protect its existence and promote public
welfare and an individual's right against a
warrantless search w/c is, however, reasonably
conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the
military is susceptible of abuse by the military
in the same manner that all governmental
power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost
of occasional inconveninece, discomfort and
even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints
during these abnormal times, when conducted
w/in reasonable limits, are part of the price we
pay for an orderly society and a peaceful
community.
Guazon v. De Villa, 181 SCRA 623 (1990)
F: This is a petition for prohibition w/ prel.
inj. to prohibit the military and police officers
represented by public respondents from
conducting "areal target zonings" or "saturation
drives" in MM.
The 41 petitioners state that they are
all of legal age, bona fide residents of MM and
Taxpayers and leaders in their respective
communities.
Accdg. to the petitioners, the "areal
target zonings" or "saturation drives" are in
critical areas pinpointed by the military and
police as places where the subversives are
hiding. Petitioners claim that the saturation
drives follow a common pattern of human rights
abuses.
Respondents stress 2 points. First,
the resps. have legal authority to conduct
saturation drives. And, second, they allege that
the accusations of the petitioners about a
deliberate disregard for human rights, are total
lies.
Resps. cite Art. VII, Sec. 17 of the
Const.:"The Pres. shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus and offices.
He shall ensure that the laws are faithfully
executed."
They also cite sec. 18.:"The Pres.
shall be the Commander-in-chief of all AFP and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call
out such armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. xxx
HELD: The Court believes it is highly probable
that some violations were actually committed.
This is so inspite of the alleged pleas of
barangay officials for the thousands of
residents"to submit themselves voluntarily for
character and personal verification." However,
the remedy is not to stop all police actions,
including the essential and legitimate ones.
We see nothing wrong in police making their
presence visibly felt in troubled areas. Police
cannot respond to riots or violent
demonstration if they do not move in sufficient
numbers. A show of force is sometimes
necesary as long as the rights of the people are
protected and not violated. A blanket
prohibition such as that sought by the
petitioners would limit all police actions to one
on one confrontation where search warrants
and warrants of arrest against specific
individuals are easily procured. Anarchy may
reign if the military and the police decide to sit
down in their offices bec. all concerted drives
where a show of force is present are totally
prohibited.
The remedy is not an original action for
prohibition brought through a TP's suit. Where
not one victim complains, and not one violator
is properly charged, the problem is not initially
for the SC. It is basically one for the executive
departments and for the trial courts.
Under the circumstances of this TP's
suit, there is no erring soldier or policeman
whom we can order prosecuted. In the absence
of clear facts ascertained through an orderly
procedure, no permanent relief can be given at
this time. Further investigation of the
petitioners' charges and a hard look by admin.
officials at the policy implications of the prayed
for blanket prohibition are also warranted.
In the meantime, and in the face of a
prima facie showing that some abuses were
probably committed and could be committed
during future police actions, we have to
temporarily restrain the alleged baning on
walls, the kicking in of doors, the herding of
half-naked men to assembly areas for
examination of tattoo marks, the violation of
residences even if these are humble shanties of
squatters, and other alleged acts w/c are
shocking to the conscience.
4. Wire Tapping
Gaanan v. IAC, 145 SCRA 112 (1986)
F: Complainant Atty. Pintor and Montebon
offered to withdraw the complaint for direct
assault they filed against Laconico after
demanding P8,000 from him. This demand was
heard by Atty. Gaanan through a telephone
Constitutional Law II
extension as requested by Laconico so as to
personally hear the proposed conditions for the
settlement. Atty. Pintor was subsequently
arrested in an entrapment operation upon
receipt of the money. Since Atty. Gaanan
listened to the telephone conversation without
complainant's consent, complainant charged
Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the Anti-
Wiretapping Act (RA 4200).
ISSUE: W/N an extension telephone is among
the prohibited devices in Sec. 1 of RA 4200 such
that iuts use to overhear a private conversation
would constitute an unlawful interception of
communication between 2 parties using a
telephone line.
HELD: NO
An extension tel. cannot be placed in
the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph,
or other devices enumerated in Sec. 1 of the
law as the use thereof cannot be considered as
"tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line.
This section refers to instruments whose
installation or presence cannot be presumed by
the party or parties being overheard because,
by their very nature, they are not of common
usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping,
intercepting, or recording a tel. conversation.
The tel. extension in this case was not installed
for that purpose. It just happened to be there
for ordinary office use.
Furthermore, it is a general rule that
penal statutes must be construed strictly in
favor of the accused. Thus in the case of doubt
as in this case, on WON an extension tel. is
included in the phrase "device or arrangement"
the penal statute must be construed as not
including an extension tel.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional
Record shows that our lawmakers intended to
discourage, through punishment, persons suchj
as government authorities or representatives
of organized groups from installing devices in
order to gather evidence for use in court or to
intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted
advantage over the tel. users. Consequently,
the mere act of listening , in order to be
punishable must stricly be with the use of the
enumerated devices in RA 4200 or others of
similar nature.
5. What may be seized
Rule 126, sec. 2. Personal
property to be seized.-- A search warrant
may be issued for the search and seizure
of the following personal property:
(a) Subject matter of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other
proceeds or fruits of the offense; and
(c) Used or intended to be used as
a means of committing an offense. (Rules
of Court.)
6. Exclusionary Rule
Art. III, Sec. 3. xxx
(2) Any evidence obtained in
violation of this (privacy of communication
and correspondence) or the preceding
section (unreasonable searches and
seizures) shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
One of the remedies of one who was
victimized by an illegal search is to ask for the
suppression of the things seized and the
evidence illegally taken.
The exclusionary rule prohibits the use
of any evidence obtained in violation of secs. 2
and 3 (1) of Art. III for "any purpose" and in
"any proceeding". The evidence is absolutely
useless. This has not always been the case.
In Moncado v. People's Court (1948), the
SC, following the U.S. case of Wolf V. Colorado,
rules that evidence illegally obtained is not
necessarily excluded if is otherwise admissible
under the rules of evidence. In such case, the
evidence admitted, without prejudice to any
criminal, civil or administrative liability of the
officer who illegally seized it. In other words,
the admissibility of the evidence is not effected
by the illegality of the means by which it was
acquired.
It was in Stonehill v. Diokno, supra,
following the U.S. case of Maop v. Ohio 1969,
when the exclusionary rule was first adopted in
the Philippines, the SC noting that the total
suppression of the thing seized is the only
effective means of ensuring the constitutional
right which it seeks to preserve. The Court
noted, the insufficiency of the other remedies
(e.g. action for damages, criminal punishment,
resistance), especially in the Philippines where
violations were committed by those in power
and were thus equipped with the pardoning
power to water down the gravity of the other
penalties imposed to violators of those
constitutional rights.
The victim may or may not get back the
thing seized, depending on whether it is
contraband or not. It the thing is contraband, it
would not be returned, and only its suppression
can be asked for. But if the thing is legal, the
party can ask for its return, even if no criminal
prosecution has yet been filed, as in the
Stonehill case.
Constitutional Law II
Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967)
F: Upon application of the officers of the
govt (resp. prosecutors), several judges (resp.
judges) issued a total of 42 search warrants
against petitioners &/ or the corporations of w/c
they were officers, directed to any peace
officer, to search the perons named and/ or the
premises of their offices, warehouses, and/ or
residences, and to seize several personal prop.
as the "subject of the offense; stolen or
embezelled or the fruits of the offense," or
"used or intended to be used as the means of
committing the offense" as violation of CB Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws (TCC), NIRC and the
RPC."
Alleging that the aforementioned
search warrants are null & void, said petitioners
filed w/ the SC this orig. action for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus & injunction. The writ
was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the
papers, documents, and things seized from the
officers of the corporations; but the injunction
was maintained as regards those found &
seized in the residences of petitioners.
ISSUES: (1) With respect to those found &
seized in the offices of the corporations, w/n
petitioners have cause of action to assail the
validity of the contested warrants.
(2) In connection w/ those found &
seized in the residences of petitioners, w/n the
search warrants in question and the searches
and seizures made under the authority thereof
are valid.
(3) If the answer in no. 2 is no, w/n
said documents, papers and things may be
used in evidence against petitioners.
HELD: (1) No. Petitioners have no cause of
action to assail the legality of the contested
warrants and the seizure made in pursuance
thereof bec. said corporations have their
respective personalities, separate and distinct
from the personality of petitioners. The legality
of a seizure can be contested only by the party
whose rights have been impaired thereby and
that the objection to an unlawful search and
seizure is purely personal and cannot be avalied
of by 3rd parties.
(2) No. Two points must be stressed in
connection w/ Art. III, Sec. 2 of the Consti: (a)
that no warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause to be determined by the judge in the
manner set forth therein; & (b) that the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be
seized.
None of these requirements has been
complied w/. It was stated that the natural and
juridical persons has committed a violation of
CB laws, TCC, NIRC & RPC. No specific offense
had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof w/ respect to the offense
committed were abstract. As a consequence, it
was impossible for the judges who issued the
warrants to have found the existence of a
probable cause, for the same presupposes the
introduction of competent proof that the party
against whom it is sought has performed
particular acts, or committed specific omissions,
violating a given provision of our criminal laws.
General search warrants are outlawed
bec. they place the sanctity of the domicile and
the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims,
caprice or passion of peace officers.
The warrants sanctioned the seizure of
all records of the petitioners and the
aforementioned corporations, whatever their
nature, thus openly contravening the explicit
command of our Bill of Rights-- that the things
to be seized be particularly described-- as well
as tending to defeat its major objective: the
elimination of general warrants. RAM.
7. Civil Action for Damages
A civil case for damages can also be
filed pursuant to Article 32 of the Civil Code.
In Aberca v. Ver, the SC held that even if
the privilege of the writ is suspended, the court
can nevertheless entertain an action not only
against the task force but even against the top
ranking officials who ordered the seizure, to
recover damages for the illegal searches and
seizures made in a despotic manner. By so
doing, one can indirectly inquire into the validity
of the suspension of the privilege.
8. Search and Seizure by Private Persons
People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57 (1991)
F: Before delivery of appellant's box to the
Bureau of Customs and/ or Bureau of Posts, Mr.
Job Reyes (proprietor) & husband of Anita
Reyes, following standard operating procedure,
opened the boxes for final inspection. When he
opened appellant's box, a peculiar order
emitted therefrom. His curiosity aroused, he
squeezed one of the bundles allegedly
containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside.
Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a
cellophane wrapper protruding from the
opening of one of the gloves. He made an
opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and
took several grams of the contents thereof.
Job Reyes reported the incident to the
NBI and requested a laboratory examination of
the samples he extracted from the cellophane
wrapper.
It turned out that the dried leaves
were marijuana flowering tops as certified by
Constitutional Law II
the forensic chemist of the Narcotics Section of
the NBI.
Thereafter, an information was filed
against appellant for violation of RA 6425.
APPELANT CONTENDS that the evidence subject
of the imputed offense had been obtained in
violation of his consti. rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures and
privacy of communication and therefore argues
that the same should be held inadmissible in
evidence.
The case at bar assumes a peculiar
character since the evidence sought to be
excluded was primarily discovered and obtained
by a private person, acting in a private capacity
and w/o the intervention and participation of
state authorities.
ISSUE: May an act of a private individual,
allegedly in violation of appellant's
constitutional rights, be invoked against the
state?
HELD: We hold in the negative. In the absence
of governmental interference, the liberties
guaranteed by the Consti. cannot be invoked
against the State. This constitutional right
refers to the immunity of one's person, whether
citizen or alien, from interference by govt. xxx
(Villanueva v. Querubin.)
The contraband in the case at bar
having come into possession of the govt w/o the
latter transgressing appellant's rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures (S & S), the
Court sees no cogent reason why the same
should not be admitted against him.
Appellant, however, would like this
Court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal
search and seizure of the evidence later on
used in prosecuting the case. The arguments of
appellant stands to fall on its own weight, or the
lack of it.
First, the factual considerations of the
case at bar readily foreclose the proposition
that NBI agents conducted an illegal S & S of
the prohibited merchandise. Records of the
case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes,
the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who
made the search/ inspection. Such inspection
was reasonable and a SOP on the part of Mr.
Reyes as a precautionary measure bef. delivery
of packages to the Bureau of Customs or
Bureau of Posts.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI
agents did not convert the reasonable search
effected by Reyes into a warrantless S & S
proscribed by the Consti. Merely to observe
and look at that w/c is plain sight is not search.
Having observed that w/c is open, where no
trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is
not search.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the
Consti. is not meant to be invoked against acts
of private individuals finds support in the
deliberations of the Con Com.: " xxx The Bill of
Rights governs the relationship between the
individual and the state. Its concern is not the
relation between individuals, between a private
individual and other individuals. xxx"
(Sponsorship speech of Commissioner Bernas.)
The constitutional proscription against
unlawful S & S therefore applies as a restraint
directed only against the govt and its agencies
tasked w/ the enforcement of the law. Thus, it
could only be invoked against the State to
whom the restraint against arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
It the search is made at the behest or
inititiation of the proprietor of a private
establishment for its own and private purposes,
as in the case at bar, and w/o the intervention
of police authorities, the right against
unreasonable S & S cannot be invoked for only
the act of private individuals, not law enforcers,
is involved. In sum, the protection against
unreasonable S & S cannot be extended to acts
committed by private individuals so as to bring
it w/in the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by
the govt.
9. In the issuance of warrants of ARREST,
as distinguished from SEARCH warrants,
the judge may rely simply on fiscal's
certification as to probable cause
Compare Rule 112, Sec. 6 (on warrants of
arrest) with Rule 126, Sec. 4 (on search
warrants.)
Rule 112, Sec. 6. When warrant of
arrest may issue.-- (a) By the Regional
Trial Court.-- Upon the filing of an
information, the Regional Trial Court may
issue a warrant for the arrest of the
accused.
(b) By the Municipal Trial Court.--
If the municipal trial judge conducting the
preliminary investigation is satisfied after
an examination in writing and under oath
of the complainant and his witnesses in
the form of searching questions and
answers, that a probable cause exists and
that there is a necessity of placing the
respondent under immediate custody in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice,
he shall issue a warrant of arrest. (Rules
of Court.)
Rule 126, Sec. 4. Examination of
complainant; record.-- The judge must,
before issuing the warrant, personally
examine in the form of searching
questions and answers, in writing and
Constitutional Law II
under oath the complainant and any
witnesses he may produce on facts
personally known to them and attach to
the records their sworn statements
together with any affidavits submitted.
The requirement in the case of warrants of
arrest is relaxed in that the judge can rely on
the certification of the fiscal that the latter has
conducted the preliminary investigation and has
found probable cause on the part of the
accused. The judge can issue the warrant on
the basis of the information filed by the fiscal
and the certification of probable cause.
The SC has allowed this practice in
Amarga v. Abbas, 98 Phil. 739 (1956), noting
that it has been practice long settled and that a
judge can issue an order to arrest on the basis
of the certificate.
Of course, if the judge is in doubt, he
can always ask the fiscal to submit the records
of the preliminary investigation, so he could
determine for himself if, on the basis of the
affidavits, there exists probable cause. It he is
satisfied with the affidavits, he need not
summon the affiants.
Amarga v. Abbas, 98 Phil. 739 (1956)
F: Municipal Judge Samulde conducted a
preliminary investigation (PI) of Arangale upon a
complaint for robbery filed by complainant
Magbanua, alleging that Arangale harvested
palay from a portion of her land directly
adjoining Arangale’s land. After the PI, Samulde
transmitted the records of the case to Provincial
Fiscal Salvani with his finding that “there is
prima facie evidence of robbery as charged in
the complaint”. Fiscal Salvani returned the
records to Judge Samulde on the ground that
the transmittal of the records was “premature”
because Judge Samulde failed to include the
warrant of arrest (WA) against the accused.
Judge Samulde sent the records back to Fiscal
Salvani stating that although he found that a
probable cause existed, he did not believe that
Arangale should be arrested.
Fiscal Salvani filed a mandamus case
against Judge Samulde to compel him to issue a
WA. RTC dismissed the petition on the ground
that the fiscal had not shown that he has a
clear, legal right to the performance of the act
to be required of the judge and that the latter
had an imperative duty to perform it.
Neverhteless, Judge Samulde was ordered to
issue a WA in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 112
of the 1985 Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether it is mandatory for the
investigating judge to issue a WA of the
accused in view of his finding, after conducting
a PI, that there exists prima facie evidence that
the accused commited the crime charged.
HELD: THE PURPOSE OF A PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE THE
ISSUANCE OF A WA BY THE INVESTIGATING
JUDGE OR OFFICER.
Under Rule 112 of the 1985 ROC, a PI is
conducted on the basis of affidavits to
determine whether or not there is sufficient
ground to hold the accused for trial. To
determine whether a WA should issue, the
investigating judge must have examined in
writing and under oath the complainant and his
wirtnesses by searching questions and answers;
he must be satisfied that a probable cause
exists; and there must be a need to place the
accused under immediate custody in order not
to frustrate the ends of justice. It is not
obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon the
investigating judge to issue a WA, for the
determination of whether it is necessary to
arrest the accused in order not to frustrate the
ends of justice, is left to his sound judgment or
discretion.
The fiscal should, instead, have filed an
information immediately so that the RTC may
issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused.
Bam.
Beltran v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 (1988)
F: The Pres. of the Phils. filed a complaint
for libel against the petitioners, who were
publisher and columnist of the Philippine Star,
based on the following statement in Beltran's
column of Oct. 12, 1987 entitled "The Nervous
Officials of the Aquino Administration:" "If you
will recall, during the Aug. 29 coup attempt, the
Pres. hid under her bed, while the firing was
going on-- perhaps the first Commander-in-
Chief of the AFP to have to do so."
Instead of submitting his counter-
affidavit, Beltran moved to dismiss the
complaint. The fiscal deniend his motion after
finding a prima facie case against the
petitioners and filed the case in court w/c
thereafter issued warrants of arrest against the
petitioners. The petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition.
HELD: The addition of the word "personally"
after the word "determined" (Art. III, Sec. 2) and
the deletion of the grant of authority by the
1973 Consti. to issue warrants to "other
responsible officer as may be authorized by
law," has apparently convinced petitioner
Beltran that the Consti. now requires the judge
to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses in his determination of probable
Constitutional Law II
cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest.
This is not an accurate interpretation. What the
Consti. underscores is the exclusive and
personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself of the existence of probable
cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, the judge is not required to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses.
Following established doctrine and procedure,
he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and
the supporting documents submitted by the
fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause
and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no
probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's
report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable
cause. Sound policy dictates this procedure,
otherwise judges would be unduly laden w/ the
preliminary examination and investigation of
criminal complaints instead of concentrating on
hearing and deciding cases filed before their
courts.
xxx
10. When arrest may be made without a
warrant
Rule 113, Sec. 5. Arrest without
warrant; when lawful.-- A peace officer or
a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense, has in fact
just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment of place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs
(a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or
jail, and he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Rule 112, Section. 7.
(Rules of Court.)
Rule 113, sec. 5 talks of "citizen
arrests", cases where an arrest can be made
either by the peace officer or a private person
without need of a warrant.
The key element in the first case is that
the offense was committed "in his presence".
The key element in the second case is that he
has "personal knowledge".
Thus, in People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1
(1986), the arrest made by the constabulary
without a warrant of a farmer on the basis of
information that he was a subversive was held
unconstitutional, since there was no personal
knowledge of the offense itself.
The gun and subversive documents
found by the officer and admitted by the former
to be his were likewise held inadmissible
because the admission violated the Miranda
rule.
a. Strict enforcement of rule
People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1986)
F: On the basis of info. given by Cesar
Masamlok, the appellant was arrested while
plowing his farm in Tiguman, Davao del Sur, on
May 13, 1982, on charges of illegal possession
of firearm in furtherance of subversion. A .38
caliber revolver was found buried under his
house. Subversive documents were also seized
from a place near his house. Two arresting
officers testified that the appellant had readily
admitted ownership of the gun and the
documents. The appellant was found guilty of
the charge and sentenced to 20 years of
reclusion temporal, as minimum, to reclusion
perpetua, as maximum, and the gun and
documents were ordered confiscated.
HELD: (1) Under R 113, Sec. 5 (a), the
arresting officer must have personal knowledge
that the crime has been committed, is being
committed, or is about to be committed, in
order to justify an arrest w/o a warrant. The
offense must also be committed in his presence
or w/in his view. There is no such personal
knowledge in this case. Hence the arrest of the
appellant was illegal.
(2) Consequently, the incidental search
and seizure were likewise illegal and the firearm
and document are inadmissible in evidence.
(3) The prosecution argues that the
appellant admitted ownership of the gun and
claims that it was he who pointed to the place
where the subversive documents were hidden.
However, as the appellant was not informed of
his constitutional rights at that time, his
admission is inadmissible under [Art. III, Sec. 12
(1).] It is true that 6 days later he executed a
confession before the fiscal w/ the assistance of
counsel, but it was then already too late.
(4) As the remaining evidence against
the appellant is the testimony of Cesar M. and it
is uncorroborated and unreliable, the appellant
Constitutional Law II
should be acquitted, but the gun and the
subversive documents must be confiscated.
People v. Rodriguez, 232 SCRA 498 (April
25, 1989)
F: Pat. Marvin Pajilan received a phone call
from the desk officer of Sub-Station I, namely,
Michael Orbeta, who informed him that a person
named 'Alyas Allan' was selling marijuana at No.
8199 Constancia St., Makati, Metro Manila and
requested that said person be apprehended.
Acting on this phone call of desk officer Michael
Orbeta, a team of policemen posted themselves
about 10 to 15 meters from the house located
at 8199 Constancia St., Makati. They saw a
tricycle with 3 persons on board, a driver and 2
passengers, stop in front of the house at 8199
Constancia St. They also saw a male person
come out of the said house and approach and
talk to the driver of the tricycle. After a while
they saw the male person go back to the house
and a little later come back and hand to the
tricycle driver 'a suspicious stuff of a cigarette,
a marijuana cigarette', they further saw the
tricycle driver in turn give something to the
male person. Pat. Pajilan together with his
companions approached the male person and
the tricycle driver and after introducing
themselves as police officers, they asked the
male person, the tricycle driver and his 2
passengers to bring out the contents of their
pockets, which the male person, the driver and
the passengers of the tricycle did. The male
person brought out from his pockets 2 small
plastic bags containing suspected marijuana
leaves. The tricycle driver brought out from his
right front pocket 3 sticks of suspected
marijuana cigarettes. Nothing illegal was found
in the pockets of the 2 passengers of the
tricycle.
The appellant contends that the
police officers had no personal knowledge that
he was indeed handing marijuana to Enrico
Bacod as they were 10-15 meters away from
the alleged sale transaction. The arrest
therefore was not valid as the requirements for
a warrantless arrest were not complied with.
Issue: Was the warantless arrest valid?
Ruling: YES.
The warrantless arrest made by the law
enforcers was valid since it falls under the
provisions of Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the Rules of
Court which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when
lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an of-
fense;
Having caught the appellant in flagrante
as a result of the buy-bust operation, the
policemen were not only authorized but were
also under obligation to apprehend the drug
pusher even without a warrant of arrest. The
police officers were tipped off by an informer
about the illegal trade of the accused. The
exact location where this trading in drugs was
taking place was given to them. The 'suspicious
stuff' taken from the accused were confirmed to
be marijuana after tests were conducted on
them. The attendant circumstances taking
place before their eyes led the police officers to
reasonably conclude that an offense was actu-
ally being committed.
b. Exceptions to strict enforcement
(1) "Continuous" crimes of subversion
Umil v. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311 (1990)
These are 8 petitions for habeas corpus
(HC) filed bef. the Court. The Court finds that
the persons detained have not been illegally
arrested nor arbitrarily deprived of their
constitutional right to liberty and that the
circumstances attending these cases do not
warrant their release on HC.
An arrest w/o a warrant, under Sec. 5,
pars. (a) and (b) of Rule 113, ROC, as amended
is justified when the person arrested is caught
in flagrante delicto, viz., in the act of
committing an offense; or when an offense has
just been committed and the person making the
arrest has personal knowledge of the facts
indicating that the person arrested has
committed it.
The persons in whose behalf these
petitions for HC have been filed had freshly
committed or were actually committing an
offense, when apprehended, so that their
arrests, w/o warrant were clearly justified, and
that they are, further detained by virtue of valid
informations filed against them in court.
I
In Umil v. Ramos, RIOU-CAPCOM
received confidential info. about a member of
the NPA-Sparrow unit being treated for a
gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in
Roosevelt Ave., Q.C. It was found that the
wounded person, who was listed in the hospital
records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando
Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad,
responsible for the killing of 2 CAPCOM soldiers
the day before. Dural was then transferred to
the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM.
Upon positive identification by an
eyewitness, Dural was referred to the Caloocan
Constitutional Law II
City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and
thereafter filed w/ the RTC-Caloocan City an
info. charging Dural w/ the crime of "Double
Murder w/ Assault upon agents of persons in
authority."
The petition for HC, insofar as Umil &
Villanueva are concerned, is now moot and
academic and is accordingly dismissed, since
the writ does not lie in favor of an accused in a
crim. case, who has been released on bail.
As to Dural, he was not arrested while in
the act of shooting the 2 soldiers. Nor was he
arrested after the commission of said offense
for his arrest came a day after the shooting
incident. However, Dural was arrested for being
a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive
organization. Subversion being a continuing
offense, the arrest of Dural w/o warrant is
justified as it can be said that he was
committing an offense when arrested.
The arrest of persons involved in
rebellion whether as its fighting armed
elements, or for committing non-violent acts
but in furtherance of rebellion, is more an act of
capturing them in the course of an armed
conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the
purpose of immediately prosecuting them in
court for a statutory offense. The arrest,
therefore, need not follow the usual procedure
in the prosecution of offenses w/c requires the
determination by a judge of the existence of
probable cause bef. the issuance of a judicial
warrant and the granting of bail if the offense is
bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial
warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or
capturing persons committing overt acts of
violence against govt forces, or any other
milder acts but equally in pursuance of the
rebellious movement. xxx (Garcia-Padilla v.
Enrile.)
Dural was found guilty of the charge and
is now serving the sentence imposed upon him
by the trial court. Thus, the writ of HC is no
longer available
II
The arrest of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo
Buenaobra, w/o warrant is also justified.
In view of the revelations made by
Rogelio Ramos, a former NPA, the Constantino
house in Marikina Heights was placed under
military surveillance and on 8/12/88, pursuant
to a search warrant , a search of the house was
conducted at 5 PM by CISC-NCD & CSG. In the
course of the search were found several
firearms, regular power supply, antennae,
speaker and subversive documents.
When confronted, R. Constantino (RC)
could not produce any permit or authority to
possess the firearms, ammunition, radio, etc.
He was brought to CIS HQ for investigation.
When questioned, he refused to give a written
statement, although he admitted that he was a
staff member of the executive of the NUFC and
a ranking member of the International Dept. of
the CPP.
At about 8 PM, same day, Buenaobra
arrived at RC's house. When arrested, he
readily submitted to the military agents that he
is a regular member of the CPP/ NPA and that
he went to the place to deliver letters to "Ka
Mong," referring to RC and other members of
the rebel group. Also found in Buenaobra's
possession was a piece of paper containing the
jumbled tel. no. of Florida Roque, sister of
Amelia Roque, aka. "Ka Nelia." They went to
the address on 8/13/88 and arrived at the place
about 11 AM. After identifying themselves as
military agents and after seeking permission to
search the place, w/c was granted, the military
agents conducted a search in the presence of
the occupants of the house and the barangay
captain of the place.
The military found the place to be
another safehouse of the NUFC/ CPP. They
found firearms, subversive documents, ledgers,
journals, vouchers, among others. Amelia
admitted ownership of the documents seized.
Roque was brought to the Caloocan City
Fiscal for inquest after w/c an info. charging her
w/ viol. of PD 1866 was filed. Another info. for
viol. of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against
Roque and also to Buenaobra.
A petition for HC was filed bef. this Court
on behalf of Roque and Buenaobra. At the
hearing, Buenaobra manifested his desire to
stay in the PC-INP stockade at Camp Crame,
Q.C. Accordingly, the petition for HC on his
behalf is now moot and academic.
III
Anonuevo v. Ramos.
The arrest of Domingo Anonuevo (A)
and Ramon Casiple (C) w/o warrant is justified.
At about 7:30 PM on 8/13/88, A and C
arrived at the house of RC w/c was still under
surveillance. The military noticed bulging
objects on their waist lines. When frisked, the
agents found them to be loaded guns. They
were asked to show their permit or license to
possess or carry firearms and ammunitions but
they could not produce any. Hence, they were
brought to PC HQ for investigation.
At the PC stockade, A was identified as
"Ka Ted," and C as "Ka Totoy" of the CPP by
their former comrades.
On 8/15/88, an info. charging them w/
viol. of PD 1866 was filed bef. RTC-Pasig. On
8/24/88, a petition for HC was filed bef. this
Court.
Constitutional Law II
HELD: The petitioner's claim that they were
unlawfully arrested bec. there was no previous
warrant, is w/o merit. The records show that
they were carrying unlicensed firearms and
ammunitions in their person when
apprehended.
There is also no merit in the contention
that the info. filed against them are null and
void for want of prel. inv. The filing of an info.,
w/o a prel. inv., having been first conducted, is
sanctioned by Rule 112, Sec. 7, ROC.
Petitioners refused to sign a waiver of
the provisions of Art. 125, RPC. Nor did
petitioners ask for prel. inv. after the
informations had been filed against them in
court.
IV
Ocaya v. Aguirre.
On 5/12/88, agents of the PC
Intelligence and Investigation Division of Rizal
PC-INP Command, armed w/ a search warrant,
conducted a search of a house located at
Marikina Green Heights, believed to be
occupied by Benito Tiamson, head of the CPP-
NPA. In the course of the search, Ocaya
arrived in a car driven by Danny Rivera.
Subversive documents and several rounds of
ammunitions for a .45 cal. pistol were found in
Vicky Ocaya's car. They were brought to the PC
HQ for investigation, when O. could not produce
any permit or authorization to possess the
ammunition, an info. charging her w/ viol. of PD
1866 was filed w/ RTC-Pasig. Rivera was
released from custody.
On 5/17/88, a petition for HC was filed
on behalf of these 2.
HELD: Vicky O. was arrested in flagrante
delicto so that her arrest w/o warrant is
justified. No. prel. inv. was conducted bec. she
was arrested w/o a warrant and she refused to
waive the provisions of Art. 125 of the RPC,
pursuant to R112, Sec. 7, ROC.
V
The petitioners Ocaya, Anonuevo,
Casiple and Roque claim that the firearms,
ammunitions and subversive documents alleged
to have been found in their possession, when
arrested, did not belong to them, but were
planted by the military to justify their illegal
arrest.
The petitioners, however, have not
introduced any evidence to support their claim.
On the other hand, no evil motive or ill will on
the part of the arresting officers that could
cause the said officers in these cases to accuse
the petitioners falsely, has been shown.
As pointed out by the Sol-Gen, the
arrest of the petitioners is not a product of a
witch hunt or a fishing expedition, but the result
of an in-depth surveillance of NPA safehouses
pointed no less than by former comrades of the
petitioners.
VI
Espiritu v. Lim.
Deogracias Espititu is the Gen. Sec. of
PISTON. Petitioner claims that at about 5 AM of
11/23/88, while he was sleeping in his home
located at Sta. Mesa, Mla., he was awakened by
his sister who told him that a group of persons
wanted to hire his jeepney. When he went
down to talk to them, he was immediately put
under arrest. When he asked for the warrant,
the men bodily lifted him and placed him in
their owner type jeepney. He demanded that
his sister be allowed to accompany him, but the
men did not accede to his request.
An info. charging him w/ viol. of Art.
142, RPC (Inciting to sedition) was filed against
him.
In the afternoon of 11/22/88, during a
press-con at the NPC "Deogracias E. through tri-
media was heard urging all drivers and
operators to go on nationwide strike on
11/23/88 xxx."
Policemen waited for petitioners outside
the NPC in order to investigate him, but he gave
the lawmen his slip. He was next seen at about
5 PM at a gathering of drivers and
sympathizers, where he was heard as saying,
"Bukas tuloy and welga natin ...
hanggang sa magkagulo na."
Since the arrest of the petitioner w/o
warrant was in accordance w/ the provisions of
R 113, Sec. 5 (b), ROC, and the petitioner is
detained by virtue of a valid info. filed w/ the
competent court, he may not be released on
HC.
VII
Nazareno v. Station Commander.
At about 8:30 AM of 12/14/88, one
Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in
Alabang, Muntinglupa, MM. One of the suspects
in the killing was Ramil Regala who was
arrested by the police on 12/28/88. Upon
questioning, Regala pointed to Nazareno as one
of his companions in the killing of Bunye II. In
view thereof, the officers, w/o warrant, picked
up Nazareno and brought him to the police HQ
for questioning.
xxx
On 2/1/89, the presiding judge of the
RTC-Binan, Laguna, issued a resolution denying
the petition for HC, it appearing that said
Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the
Constitutional Law II
respondents by reason of an info. filed against
him w/ the RTC-Mkti., MM.
HELD: The arrest of Nazareno was effected by
the police w/o warrant pursuant to Sec. 5 (b), R
113, ROC, after he was positively implicated by
his co-accused; and after investigation by the
police.
The obligation of an agent of authority
to make an arrest by reason of a crime, does
not presuppose as a necessary requisite for the
fulfillment thereof, the indubitable existence of
a crime. For the detention to be perfectly legal,
it is sufficient that the agent or person in
authority making the arrest has reasonably
sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an
act having the characteristic of a crime and that
the same grounds exist to beleive that the
person sought to be detained participated
therein." (Peo. v. Ancheta.)
VIII
In all the petitions here considered,
criminal charges have been filed in the proper
courts against the petitioners. The rule is that if
a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is
in the custody of an officer under process
issued by a court or judge, and that the court or
judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or
make the order, or if such person is charged
before any court, the writ of HC will not be
allowed. (Sec. 4, R 102, ROC.)
On the Ilagan Doctrine.
As the Court sees it, re-examination or
re-appraisal, w/ a view to its abandonment, of
the Ilagan case doctrine is not the answer. The
answer and the better practice would be, not to
limit the function of HC to a mere inquiry as to
w/n the court w/c issued the process,
judgement or order of commitment, or bef.
whom the detained person is charged, had
jurisdiction or not to issue the process,
judgment or order or to take cognizance of the
case, but rahter, as the court itself stated in
Morales, Jr. v. Enrile, in all petitions for HC, the
court must inquire into every phase and aspect
of petitioner's detention-- "from the moment
petitioner was taken into custody up to the
moment the court passes upon the merits of
the petition;" and "only after such a scrutiny
can the court satisfy itself that the due process
clause of our Constitution in fact has been
satisfied."
Umil v. Ramos, 202 SCRA 251
PETITION SEEKING SEPARATE MOTIONS FOR
RECONSIDERATION FROM THE COURT'S
DECISION PROMULGATED ON 9 JULY 1990
The decision (on July 9, 1990) did not
rule that mere suspicion that one is a CPP or
NPA is a valid ground for his arrest w/o warrant.
We find no merit in the motions for
reconsideration.
Rolando Dural.-- His arrest w/o warrant
is justified as it can be said that, w/in the
contemplation of Sec. 5 (a), R 113, ROC, he was
committing an offense, when arrested, bec.
Dural was arrested for being a member of the
NPA, an outlawed org., where membership is
penalized, and for subversion w/c, like rebellion
is, under Garcia v. Padilla, a continuing crime.
Dural did not cease to be, or become
less of a subversive, FOR PURPOSES OF
ARREST, simply bec. he was, at the time of
arrest, confined in the St. Agnes Hospital. Dural
was identified as one of several persons who,
the day before his arrest, w/o warrant, had shot
2 CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. Dural,
given another opportunity, would have shot or
would shoot other policemen, anywhere as
agents or representative of an organized govt.
It is in this sense that subversion and rebellion
are anchored on an ideological base w/c
compels the repetition of the same acts of
lawlessness and violence until the overriding
objective of overthrowing organized govt is
attained.
His arrest was based on "probable
cause."
Sec. 5, R 113, ROC, requires 2
conditions for a valid arrest w/o warrant: (1)
the person to be arrested has just committed an
offense and (2) the person arresting has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested is the one who committed
the offense.
It has been ruled that personal
knowledge of facts in arrests w/o warrant
must be based upon probable cause, w/c
means on actual belief or reasonable grounds
of suspicion.
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable
when, in the absence of actual belief of the
arresting officers, the suspicion that the person
to be arrested is probably guilty of committing
the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e.,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong
in themselves to create the probable cause of
guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion therefore must be founded on
probable cause, coupled w/ good faith on the
part of the peace officers making the arrest.
Said confidential info. received by the
arresting officers, to the effect that an NPA was
being treated for a gunshot wound was based
Constitutional Law II
on actual facts and supported by circumstances
sufficiently to engender a belief that an NPA
member was truly in said hospital. The actual
facts supported by circumstances are: (1) the
day bef., or on 1/31/88, 2 CAPCOM soldiers were
actually killed in Bagong Bo., Caloocan City by 5
"sparrows" including Dural; (2) a wounded
person listed in the hospital records as "Ronnie
Javelon" was actually then being treated in said
hospital for for a gunshot wound; (3) "Ronnie
Javelon" and his address entered in the hospital
records were fictitious and the wounded man
was in reality Dural.
On good faith.-- The peace officers who
arrested Dural are deemed to have conducted
the same in good faith, considering that law
enforcers are presumed to regularly perform
their official duties.
A few days after Dural's arrest, an info.
charging him w/ Double murder w/ assault
against agents of persons in authority was filed
in RTC-Caloocan City. He was placed under
judicial custody. On 8/31/88, he was convicted
and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
As to A. Roque., W. Buenaobra, D.
Anonuevo, R.. Casiple & V. Ocaya, their arrests,
w/o warrant, are also justified. They were
searched pursuant to a warrant issued by a
court of law and were found w/ unlicensed
firearms, explosives and/ or ammunitions on
their persons. They were, therefore, caught in
flagrante delicto w/c justified their outright
arrest w/o warrant under Sec. 5 (a), R113, ROC.
A few days after their arrests, informations were
filed in court against said petitioners placing
them w/in judicial custody and disposition.
Buenaobra's petition is moot bec. he had
chosen to remain in detention.
The reason which compelled the military
agents to make the arrests w/o warrant was the
info. given to the military that 2 safehouses
(one occupied by RC and the other by Benito
Tiamson) were being used by the CPP/ NPA for
their operations, w/ info. as to their exact
location and the names of RC and BT as
residents and occupants thereof.
And at the time of the actual arrests,
the following circumstances surrounded said
arrests (of Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo and
Casiple), w/c confirmed the belief of the military
that the info. they had received was true and
the persons to be arrested were probably guilty
of the commission of certain crimes: first, the
search warrant was duly issued to effect the
search of the Constantino safehouse; second,
found in the safehouse was a person named RC,
who admitted that he was a ranking member of
the CPP, and found in his possession were
unlicensed firearms and communist equipment;
third, at the time of their arrests, in their
possession were unlicensed firearms,
ammunitions, and/ or subversive documents,
and they admitted ownership thereof as well as
their membership in the CPP/ NPA. And then
shortyly after their arrests, they were positively
identified by their former comrades as CPP/ NPA
members.
An arrest is in the nature of an
administrative measure. The power to arrest
w/o warrant is w/o limitation as long as the
requirements of Sec. 5, R 113 are met. This
rule is founded on an overwhelming public
interest in peace and order in our community.
"xxx The legality of the detention does
not depend upon the fact of the crime, but xxx
upon the nature of the deed, wherefrom such
characterization may reasonably be inferred by
the officer or functionary to whom the law at
the moment leaves the decision for the urgent
purpose of suspending the liberty of the
citizen." (US v. Sanchez.)
ESPIRITU was arrested w/o warrant, not
for subversive or any "continuing offense," but
for uttering the words "Bukas tuloy ang welga
natin xxx hanggang sa magkagulo na" w/c in
the perception of the arresting officers, was
inciting to sedition.
Many persons differ as to the validity of
such perception and regard the language as
falling w/in free speech guaranteed by the
Consti. But, the authority of the peace officers
to make the arrest, w/o warrant, at the time the
words were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still
another thing. In the balancing of authority and
freedom, w/o obviously becomes difficult at
times, the court, has in this case, tilted the
scale in favor of authority but only for purposes
of the arrest (not conviction.)
Supervening events made this case
moot and academic. for E. had bef.
arraignment asked the court a quo for re-
investigation, the peace officers did not
appear. Case against E. has been provisionally
dismissed and his bail cancelled.
NAZARENO'S ARREST.-- Although the
killing of Bunye II occured on 12/14/88, while
Nazareno's arrest w/o warrant was made only
on 12/28/88 or 14 days later, teh arrest falls
under Sec. 5 (b), R113, since it was only on
12/28/88 that the police authorities came to
know that Nazareno was probably one of those
guilty in the killing of Bunye II and the arrest
had to be made promptly, even w/o a warrant
(after the police were alerted) and despite the
lapse of 14 days to prevent possible flight.
Nazareno has since been convicted by
the court a quo for murder and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua.
ADMISSIBLITY OF EXTRA-JUDICIAL ADMISSION.
Constitutional Law II
These admissions strengthen the Court's
perception that truly the grounds upon w/c the
arresting officers based their arrests w/o
warrant, are supported by probable cause, i.e.,
that the persons arrested were probably guilty
of the commission of certain offenses, in
compliance w/ Sec. 5, R 113, ROC. To note
these admissions, on the other hand, is not to
rule that the persons arrested are already guilty
of the offenses upon w/c their warrantless
arrests were predicated. The task of
determining the guilt or innocence of persons
arrested w/o warrant is not proper in a petition
for HC. It pertains to the trial of the case on the
merits.
(2) Illegal Possession of guns or drugs
People v. Linsangan, 195 SCRA 784
F: Accused Linsangan was arrested after a
“buy-bust” operation. The two marked ten-peso
bill were retrieved from him. He was asked to
sign his name on the two marked bills. The ten
handrolled cigarette sticks confiscated from the
accused were submitted for examination. After
finding these positive for marijuana, a case was
filed for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law.
Linsangan denied the charge. The trial court
found Linsangan guilty. Upon appeal, one of
the assertions of Linsangan was that the trial
court erred in not holding that when the
policemen required him to initial the marked
bills, they violated his constitutional right to
counsel, to remain silent, and not to incriminate
himself while under custodial investigation.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A
VIOLATION OF THE ACCUSED’S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WHEN HE WAS MADE
TO SIGN THE MARKED BILLS.
HELD: Although the accused was not assisted
by counsel when he initialed the P10-bills that
the police found tucked in his waist, his right
against self-incrimination was not violated for
his possession of the marked bills did not
constitute a crime; the subject of the
prosecution was his act of selling marijuana
cigarettes. His conviction was not based on the
presence of his initials on the marked bills, but
on the fact that the trial court believed the
testimony of the policemen that they arrested
him while he was actually engaged in the
selling marijuana cigarettes to a member of the
arresting party. The trial court gave more
credence to their categorical declarations than
to the appellant’s denials. That is as it should
be for as law enforcers, they are presumed to
have performed their official duties in a regular
manner. Their task of apprehending persons
engaged in the deadly drug trade is difficult
enough without legal and procedural
technicalities to make it doubly so.
11. Immunity from arrest of
members of Congress
Art. VI, Sec. 11. A Senator or
Member of the House shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six (6) years
imprisonment (prision correcional), be
privileged from arrest while Congress is in
session. xxx
B. Rights of Persons under
custodial interrogation
Art. III, Sec. 12. (1) Any person
under custodial investigation for the
commission of an offense, shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided
with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence,
threat, intimidation, or any other means
which vitiate the free will shall be used
against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar
forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission
obtained in violation of this or sec. 17
hereof, shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal
and civil sanctions for violations of this
section, as well as compensation to and
rehabilitation of victims of torture or
similar practices, and their families.
Source: Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966)
According to Chief Justice Warren, when
a defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar
atmosphere and run through menacing police
interrogation procedures, where compulsion is
forcefully potential and his will is likely to be
subjugated, the officers must undertake to
afford proper safeguards by the reading of the
"Miranda rights" at the outset of the
investigation to ensure that the statements
made are truly the product of free choice.
Constitutional Law II
Any person under custodial or police
investigation has the right to be informed of the
following rights:
1. Right to remain silent
a) To make him aware of it.
b) To overcome the inherent pressure
of the interrogating atmosphere
c) To show the individual that his
interrogators are prepared to recognize his
privilege should he choose to invoke his right.
2. Right to be reminded that if he waives his
right to remain silent, anything he says can and
will be used against him.
a) To warn him of the consequences of
waiving his right to remain silent.
b) To make him aware that this is an
adversary system, and that the police are not
acting in his interest.
3. Right to counsel before and during the
interrogation
a) To mitigate the dangers of
untrustworthiness in his testimony, since the
inherent pressures initially overcome by the
right to remain silent may again run unless
coupled with the right to counsel.
b) To lessen the possibility of coercion
by the police.
4. Right to be reminded that if he cannot afford
counsel, then one will be provided for him by
the state.
a) To inform him that if he does not
have counsel or cannot afford one, he does not
have to defend himself alone.
b) To inform him that his poverty is no
reason why he should lose his right to counsel.
(The reading of these rights is no less
indispensable even if the person arrested is a
prominent Constitutional lawyer. Although he
may already know these rights, the purpose is
not so much to inform him, as to assure him
that his interrogators are willing to respect his
rights amidst the pressure of custodial
investigation.)
The reading of these rights is required
during "custodial investigation".
A police investigation consists of 2 stages:
1) "General exploratory investigation" -
when the investigation consists merely of
general questions to find out who might be the
culprit, but without being directed at anyone's
guilt in particular. At this stage, the Miranda
rule is not yet applicable; otherwise, people who
could otherwise explain their innocence would
be arrested.
2) "Custodial investigation" - when the
investigation now focuses on the guilt of a
person such that he is no longer allowed to
leave the premise. It is at this stage that the
Miranda ruling is necessary, since the purpose
of the interrogation is to evince evidence that
can be used to prosecute the person.
For instance, when A, a policeman, sees
X running with a stained knife away from an
apparently dead man, he can rung after X and
having grabbed him, ask him for an explanation
as to what he saw without reading his Miranda
rights. But once A arrests X and starts
interrogating him in the police precinct, then his
rights must now be read, for there can only be
one purpose to the questioning, and that is to
elicit evidence to be used to prosecute him.
Mendoza, The Right to Counsel During Custodial
Investigations, 2 Law Rev. No. 10, 2 (1988); 61
Phil. LJ 409
I. RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS DEVELOPED AS
PART OF PROTECTION AGAINST INVOLUNTARY
CONFESSIONS.
Since the introduction of the American
accusatorial system of criminal procedure in the
Phils., the rule has been that involuntary
confessions are inadmissible in evidence
against the accused.
The question is on whom the burden of
proof is placed. The early rule placed the
burden of proving that the confession was
voluntary and, therefore, admissible in
evidence, on the prosecution. (Sec. 4, Act No.
619.) It was held that a confession not shown
to have been voluntarily given could be
objected to at any stage of the proceedings,
even for the first time on appeal in the SC.
Act No. 619 was later repealed by the
Admin. code of 1916, w/c placed the burden of
proof on the accused to show that his
confession was involuntary. Under the new
rule, it was sufficient that the confession was
given under conditions w/c accredit prima facie
its admissibility.
In 1953, a further change took place
when the SC held in Peo. v. de los Santos that
"A confession, to be repudiated, must not only
be proved to have been obtained by force and
violence, but also that it is false or untrue, for
the law rejects the confession when, by force or
violence or intimidation, the accused is
compelled against his will to tell a falsehood,
not even when such force and violence he is
compelled to tell the truth. In the later case of
Peo. v. Villanueva, the Court stated "the
Constitutional Law II
admissibility of that kind of evidence depends
not on the supposed illegal manner in w/c it is
obtained but on the truth or falsity of the facts
or admission contained therein.
The illegality of the means used in
obtaining evidence does not affect its
admissibility (Moncado v. People's Court.)
THE EFFECT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN
SEARCH AND SEIZURE CASES
The adoption in 1967 of the
exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases
(Stonehill v. Diokno) worked a parallel in the law
of confession. W/o expressly overruling its
decision in de los Santos and Villanueva, the
Court, in Peo. v. Urro, went back to the former
rule that involuntary or coerced confessions,
regardless of their truth, are null and void. xxx
Involuntary or coerced confessions obtained by
law, w/c proscribes the use of such cruel and
inhuman methods to secure confessions. xxx
Indeed, in the US, it is said that an
"unconstitutional coercion will render
inadmissible even the most unquestionably true
inculpatory statements." xxx This is not bec.
such confessions are unlikely to be true but bec.
the methods used to extract them offend an
underlying principle in the enforcement of our
criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial and
not an inquisitorial system -- a system in w/c
the State must establish guilt by evidence
independently and freely secured and not by
coercion prove its charge against an accused
out of his own mouth xxx." (Rogers v.
Richmond, J. Frankfurter.)
THE MIRANDA RULE
The prosecution may not use
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,
stemming from custodial interrogation of the
def. unless it demonstrates the use of
procedural safeguards effective to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination. By
custodial interrogation, we mean questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken to custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way. xxx
II. IN TURN, MIRANDA WARNINGS WERE
DEVISED AS MEANS OF SECURING THE RIGHT
TO COUNSEL.
Miranda v. Arizona requires certain
warnings to be given by police interrogators
bef. a person in custody may be interrogated,
w/c have been adopted by the Phil. SC:
1. The person in custody must be
informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he
has a right to remain silent. The purpose is to
apprise him of his privilege not to be compelled
to incriminate himself, to overcome the
inherent pressures of the interrogation
atmosphere, and to assure the individual that
his interrogators are prepared to recognize his
privilege, should he choose to exercise it.
2. The person in custody must be
warned that anything he will say can and wilol
be used against him. This warning is intended
to make him aware not only of the privilege but
also of the consequences of foregoing it.
3. Since the circumstances surrounding
in-custody interrogation can operate very
quickly to overbear the will of one merely made
aware of his privilege by his interrogators, it is
indispensable that he has the assistance of
counsel.
THE CUSTODIAL PHASE OF INTERROGATION
At what stage of the police interrogation
must the warnings be given? The Consti. does
not state at what stage of the interrogation
process they must be made. but in Miranda,
the court specified that it is only at the custodial
phase of the interrogation that its ruling
applied. As the Court indicated in Escobedo v.
Illinois, it is only after the investigation ceases
to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime
and begins to focus on a particular suspect, the
suspect is taken into custody, and the police
carries out a process of interrogation that leads
itself to eliciting incriminating statements that
the rule begins to operate.
In Gamboa v. Cruz, the accused was
arrested, w/o a warrant, for vagrancy. He was
taken to police precint no. 2 in Mla. The next
day, he was included in a police line-up of 5
detainees and was pointed to by the
complainant as a complanion of the main
suspect on the basis of w/c the accused was
ordered to stay and sit in front of the
complainant, while the latter was interrogated.
The accused was then charged w/ robbery. The
accused moved to dismiss the case against him
on the ground that he had been denied the
assistance of counsel during the line-up. His
motion was denied. Hence, this petition for
certiorari.
HELD: The right to counsel attaches only upon
the start of an interrogation, when the police
officer starts to ask questions designed to elicit
info. and/ or confessions or admissions from the
accused. As the police line-up in this case was
not part of the custodial inquest, the petitioner
was not entitled to counsel xxx.
III. WAIVER OF RIGHTS.
Constitutional Law II
It is important to distinguish bet. the
waiver of rights and the waiver of warnings.
The first can be made provided that the waiver
is "voluntary, knowing and intelligent" but the
second cannot. As the warnings are the means
of insuring that the suspect is apprised of his
rights so that any subsequent waiver of his
rights can be "voluntary, knowing and
intelligent," it is obvious that there can be no
valid waiver of the warnings. A waiver of rights
will not be presumed.
1. With respect to confessions obtained
bef. Jan. 17, 1973, the rule that the suspect
must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent and to have the assistance of counsel
does not apply. such confessions, even though
presented in evidence in a trial after the
effectivity of the 1973 Consti., are admissible,
provided they are voluntary, using the
traditional test of voluntariness.
2. With respect to confessions obtained
after Jan. 17, 1973, but before March 20, 1985,
when the decision of Peo. v. Galit was handed
down, the rule is that the voluntariness of a
waiver of the rights to silence and to counsel
must be determined on a case-to-case basis,
taking into account the circumstances under
w/c the waiver was made.
3. With regard to confessions obtained
after March 20, 1985 but before Feb. 2, 1987,
when the present Consti. took effect, the rule is
that a waiver of the rights to remain silent and
to the assistance of counsel, to be valid, must
be made w/ the assistance of counsel.
4. With regard to confessions given
after Feb. 2, 1987, the present Consti. requires
that the waiver to be valid, must be in writing
and w/ the assistance of counsel.
IX. THE EXLUSIONARY RULE.
Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or Sec. 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him, the
Consti. says. No distinction is made bet.
confession or admission. Although the previous
Consti. spoke of confessions only, I have argued
that it was not so limited but that it also
embraced uncounselled statements. For "if a
statement made wore in fact exculpatory, it
could ... never be used by the prosecution, in
fact, statements merely intended to be
exculpatory by the defendant are often used to
impeach his testimony at trial or to
demonstrate untruths in the statement given
under interrogation and thus to prove guilt by
implication."
EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The phrase "for any purpose in any
proceeding" conveys the idea that the rule
excluding evidence illegally obtained is
absolute. No similar phraseology is used in the
exclusionary rule implementing the Miranda
rule. Does this mean there can be instances,
where uncounselled statements may
nevertheless be admissible in evidence, albeit,
for a limited purpose?
In Harris v. US, it was held that although
a confession obtained w/o complying w/ the
Miranda rule was inadmissible for the purpose
of establishing in chief the confessor's guilt, it
may nevertheless be presented in evidence to
impeach his credit. Petitioner, as a def., in a
prosecution for selling heroin, claimed that what
he had sold to a police officer was baking
powder, as part of the scheme to defraud the
purchaser xxx The shield provided by Miranda
cannot be perverted into a license to use
perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk
of confrontation w/ prior inconsistent utterance
In New York v. Quarles, the SC created a
"public safety" exception to the Miranda rule.
xxx. "There is public safety exception to the
requirement that Miranda warnings be given
before a suspect's answers may be admitted in
evidence." It held that the warnings were not
themselves Constitutional rights but merely
"prophylactic" measures to insure the right
against self-incrimination. The Court noted the
cost imposed on the public by the rule, namely,
that the giving of warnings might deter
suspects from answering questions and this
might lead in turn to fewer convictions. It then
ruled that the social cost is higher when the
giving of warnings might deter suspects from
answering questions than are necessary to
avert an immediate threat to public safety.
When answers are not actually coerced, this
social cost outweights the need for Miranda
safeguards. In such exigent circumstances,
police officers must not be made to choose bet.
giving the warnings at the risk that public safety
will be endangered and withholding the
warnings at the risk that probative evidence will
be excluded.
People v. Bolanos, 211 SCRA 262
F: Bolanos was convicted for Murder. The
victim, Pagdalian was found dead, sustaining
stab wounds. When the policemen inquired
about the circumstances of the incident, they
were informed that the deceased was with two
companions, on the previous night. The accused
was apprehended. In the vehicle where the
accused boarded, on his way to the Police
Constitutional Law II
Station, Bolanos allegedly admitted that he
killed Pagdalian because he was abusive.
ISSUE: Whether or not the admission in the
jeep was admissible in evidence.
HELD: The trial court, in admitting the extra-
judicial confession of the accused in evidence,
violated his Constitutional right to be informed,
to remain silent and to have a counsel of his
choice, while already in police custody. Since
the extra-judicial confession was the only basis
for the conviction of the accused, the trial
coust’s judgment was reversed. Bam.
People v. Bandula, 232 SCRA 566
F: After he and his wife were
individually hogtied and their house
ransacked, Atty. Garay was found dead
with 3 gunshot wounds . For his death
and the loss of their things on the
occasion thereof, Bandula, Sidigo,
Dionanao, and Ejan were charged in court
for robbery with homicide. On the basis of
the extrajudicial confessions (EJC)
allegedly made by Bandula and Dionanao
during their custodial investigation which
the court found to "have all the qualities
and have complied with all the
requirements of an admissible confession,
it appearing from the confession that
acussed were informed of their rights
under the law regarding custodial
investigation and were duly represented
by Counsel (Atty. Zerna)", it disregarded
the defenses interposed by the accused
and convicted Bandula. The 3 other
accused were acquitted for "insufficiency
of evidence".
Issue: W/N the extrajudicial confession
of Bandula conformed with the
constitutional requisites for its validity,
hence admissible in evidence.
HELD: NO
From the records, it can be
gleaned that when accused Bandula and
Dionanao were investigated immediately
after their arrest, they had no counsel
present. If at all, counsel came in only a
day after the custodial investigation with
respect to Dionanao, and 2 weeks later
with respect to Bandula. And counsel who
supposedly assisted both accused was
Atty. Zerna, the Municipal Attorney of
Tanjay, whose interest is admittedly
adverse to the accused and who is not an
independent counsel. On top of this,
there are telltale signs that violence was
used against the accused. Certainly,
these are blatant violations of of Sec. 12,
Art III of the 1987 Constitution which
protects the rights of the accused during
custodial investigation. Suzette.
1. Miranda rule not applicable to
confessions executed before January 17,
1973
2. Not applicable to res gestae statements
People v. Dy, 158 SCRA 111 (1988)
Res gestae (a Latin phrase meaning "things
done") is an exception to the rule against
Hearsay evidence. Res gestae is based on the
belief that because certain statements are
made naturally, spontaneously and without
deliberation during the course of an event, they
leave little room for
misunderstanding/misinterpretation upon
hearing by someone else( i.e. by the witness
who will later repeat the statement to the court)
and thus the courts believe that such
statements carry a high degree of credibility.
Evidence which can be admitted into evidence
as Res gestae fall into three headings:
Words or phrases which either form part of, or
explain a physical act,
Exclamations which are so spontaneous as to
belie concoction, and
Statements which are evidence as to someone's
state of mind.
3. Not applicable to statements given in
administrative investigations
People v. Ayson, 175 SCRA 216 (1989)
It should at once be apparent that
there are two (2) rights, or sets of rights,
dealt with in the section, namely:
1) the right against self-incrimination
i.e., the right of a person not to be compelled to
be a witness against himself set out in the first
sentence, which is a verbatim reproduction of
Section 18, Article III of the 1935 Constitution,
and is similar to that accorded by the Fifth
Amendment of the American Constitution, and
2) the right of a person in custodial
interrogation, i.e., the rights of every suspect
"under investigation for the commission of an
offense."
Parenthetically, the 1987 Constitution
indicates much more clearly the individuality
and disparateness of these rights. It has placed
the rights in separate sections. The right
against self- incrimination, "No person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself," is
Constitutional Law II
now embodied in Section 17, Article III of the
1987 Constitution. The rights of a person in
custodial interrogation, which have been made
more explicit, are now contained in Section 12
of the same Article III.
Right Against Self-Incrimination
The first right, against self-incrimination,
mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, is accorded to every person who
gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under
compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal,
or administrative proceeding. The right is NOT
to "be compelled to be a witness against
himself." It prescribes an "option of refusal to
answer incriminating questions and not a
prohibition of inquiry." It simply secures to a
witness, whether he be a party or not, the right
to refuse to answer any particular incriminatory
question, i.e., one the answer to which has a
tendency to incriminate him for some crime.
However, the right can be claimed only when
the specific question, incriminatory in character,
is actually put to the witness. It cannot be
claimed at any other time. It does not give a
witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to
decline to appear before the court at the time
appointed.
The right against self-incrimination is
not self-executing or automatically operational.
It must be claimed. It follows that the right may
be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a
failure to claim it at the appropriate time.
Rights in Custodial Interrogation
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution also treats of a second right, or
better said, group of rights. These rights apply
to persons "under investigation for the
commission of an offense," i.e., "suspects"
under investigation by police authorities; and
this is what makes these rights different from
that embodied in the first sentence, that
against self-incrimination which, as aforestated,
indiscriminately applies to any person testifying
in any proceeding, civil, criminal, or
administrative.
This provision granting explicit rights to
persons under investigation for an offense was
not in the 1935 Constitution. It is avowedly
derived from the decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court in Miranda v. Arizona, a decision
described as an "earthquake in the world of law
enforcement."
Section 20 states that whenever any
person is "under investigation for the
commission of an offense"--
1) he shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of
such right,
2) no force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates
the free will shall be used against him; and
3) any confession obtained in violation
of these rights shall be inadmissible in
evidence.
Miranda rights
He must be warned prior to any
questioning that he has the right to remain
silent, that anything he says can be used
against him in a court of law, that he has the
right to the presence of an attorney, and that if
he cannot afford an attorney one will be
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he
so desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights
must be afforded to him throughout the
interrogation. After such warnings have been
given, such opportunity afforded him, the
individual may knowingly and intelligently
waive these rights and agree to answer or make
a statement. But unless and until such warnings
and waiver are demonstrated by the
prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained
as a result of interrogation can be used against
him.
The objective is to prohibit
"incommunicado interrogation of individuals in
a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in
self- incriminating statement without full
warnings of constitutional rights."
The rights above specified, to repeat,
exist only in "custodial interrogations," or "in-
custody interrogation of accused persons."
And, as this Court has already stated, by
custodial interrogation is meant "questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way."
Rights of Defendant in Criminal Case As
Regards Giving of Testimony
In fine, a person suspected of having
committed a crime and subsequently charged
with its commission in court, has the following
rights in the matter of his testifying or
producing evidence, to wit:
1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN
COURT (or with the public prosecutor, for
preliminary investigation), but after having
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his liberty in some significant way, and on
being interrogated by the police: the continuing
right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
Constitutional Law II
informed thereof, not to be subjected to force,
violence, threat, intimidation or any other
means which vitiates the free will; and to have
evidence obtained in violation of these rights
rejected; and
2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN
COURT
a) to refuse to be a witness;
b) not to have any prejudice
whatsoever result to him by such
refusal;
c) to testify in his own behalf,
subject to cross-examination by the
prosecution;
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse
to answer a specific question which
tends to incriminate him for some crime
other than that for which he is then
prosecuted.
It is clear from the undisputed facts of
this case that Felipe Ramos was not in any
sense under custodial interrogation, as the term
should be properly understood, prior to and
during the administrative inquiry into the
discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which
he appeared to have had a hand. The
constitutional rights of a person under custodial
interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution did not therefore come into
play, were of no relevance to the inquiry.
4. Custodial Phase of Investigation
Police Lineups
Gamboa v. Cruz June 27, 1988
Police line-up not part of custodial inquest
F: Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy in
Manila. The following day, he was included in a
police line-up and was identified as one of the
suspects in a robbery case. He was later
charged with robbery and charged. He moved
to dismiss the case on the ground that the
conduct of the line-up, without the assistance of
counsel, was unconstitutional.
HELD: The police line-up was not part of the
custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet
entitled, at such stage, to counsel. VV.
US v. Wade, 388 US 218 (1967)
People v. Hatton, 210 SCRA 1
F: Algrame was stabbed at the back while
walking with several companions including
Ongue who vaguely recognized the assailant,
describing the latter as a "mestizo." Two days
later, Ongue was invited by the police to
identify the suspect in a police line- up. Hatton
was pointed by Ongue as the assailant. Hatton
alleges that at the time that he was made to
stand in the police line-up, he was not assisted
by counsel. Hence, his identification therein by
Ongue is inadmissble.
RULING: When the suspect was brought to the
police station for indentification, technically, he
was not yet under custodial investigation. Thus,
the right to counsel does not yet apply.
However, there is every reason to doubt
the regularity of the identification of the suspect
by the witness. During the proceedings in the
police station, Ongue identified Hatton not
because he was certain that Hatton was really
the assailant but because he was the only
mestizo in the station and because he was
pointed by the police as the suspect. This
cannot be considered as positive identification
of the accused by the witness.
5. Tests of Validity of Waiver of Miranda
Rights
No valid waiver.
People v. Caguioa 95 SCRA 2 (1980)
Right to counsel may be waived provided the
waiver is voluntary, knowing and intelligent
F: Respondent Paquito Yupo was accused
of murder in the CFI of Bulacan. The prosecution
presented Corporal Conrado Roca of the
Meycauayan Police who identified a statement
of the accused during a police interrogation and
his alleged waiver of the right to remain silent
and to counsel. When Roca was questioned on
the incriminating answers in the statement, the
defense objected, contending that Yupo's
statement was given without the assistance of
counsel. Respondent Judge sustained the
objection on the ground that the right to
counsel cannot be waived.
HELD: The right to counsel during custodial
interrogation may be waived provided the
waiver is made intelligently and voluntarily,
with full understanding of its consequences. In
this case, the statement made only a
perfunctory opening question, after informing
the suspect that he was under investigation,
that he had a right to counsel and that anything
he said could be used for or against him and
after asking whether he was willing to answer
questions and he answered "yes." The
statement was in Tagalog which the defendant,
a native of Samar, had not been shown to be
fully acquainted with. The date of execution of
Constitutional Law II
the statement before the municipal court was
not indicated. The separate statement signed
by the defendant stating he was made to read
the opening statement containing the Miranda
warnings and that they were explained to him
all the more engenders doubt as to whether the
defendant was properly informed of his right.
People v. Tampus 96 SCRA 624 (1980)
Public trial; waiver of right to counsel
F: Jose Tampus and Rodolfo Avila were
prisoners at the National Penitentiary in
Muntinlupa, Rizal. On June 14, 1976, they
attacked and killed Celso Saminado, another
prisoner. Afterwards, they surrendered to the
prison guard, saying "surrender po kami.
Gumanti lang po kami." Two days later, they
gave extrajudicial confessions admitting the
killing. They were accused of murder and
pleaded guilty. They took the witness stand and
affirmed their confessions. Tampus was
sentenced to death while Avila to reclusion
temporal. Trial took place at the Penitentiary.
On review, it was contended that Tampus was
denied the right to a public trial and to counsel.
HELD: The record does not show that the public
was actually excluded from the place where the
trial was held or that the accused was
prejudiced by the holding of the trial there.
Anyway, the right to public trial may be waived.
In another case where Avila was also a
defendant, the SC directed that, for security
reasons, Avila's trial be held in the National
Penitentiary. The accused was warned in
Tagalog that he had a right to remain silent and
to counsel but despite this, he was willing to
answer questions of the police. There is no
doubt that the confession was voluntarily made.
The truth is that shortly after the killing,
Tampus and Avila admitted their guilt. That
spontaneous statement, elicited without
interrogation, was part of the res gestae and at
the same time was a voluntary confession of
guilt. By means of that statement given freely
on the spur of the moment without any urging
or suggestion, the two waived their right to
remain silent and to counsel.
People v. Poyos 143 SCRA 543 (1986)
No valid waiver of right to counsel and to
silence
F: Poyos was convicted of the murder of a
77-year-old woman and sentence to death. His
conviction was based solely on his extrajudicial
confession which he disowned in court. The
confession was given to the police and
subscribed before the clerk of court and
contains a waiver.
HELD: It is doubtful, given the tenor of the
question whether there was a definite waiver by
the suspect of his right to counsel. His answer
was categorical enough, to be sure, but the
question itself was not since it spoke of a waiver
only "for the moment." As worded, the question
suggested a tentativeness that belied the
suspect's supposed permanent foregoing of his
right to counsel, if indeed there was any waiver
at all. Moreover, he was told that he could hire
a lawyer but not that one could be provided for
him for free. VV.
Since Royo's conviction for murder was
based on a written confession showing that he
was apprised of his right not only by the police
but also by the fiscal, but that he waived these
rights, then the waiver found to be voluntary,
knowing and intelligent and thus admissible.
b. The Galit Rule (March 20, 1985 to Feb.
2, 1987)
It is not enough that the confession is
voluntary, knowing and intelligent. The waiver
must be made in the presence of counsel.
Waiver of the right to counsel must be made
with the assistance of counsel. This rule applied
from March 20, 1985 to February 2, 1987.
In People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 485 (1985),
the SC, reiterating a dictum in Morales v. Enrile,
121 SCRA 538 (1983), ruled that no custodial
investigation should be conducted unless it be
in the presence of counsel, and that although
the right to counsel may be waived, the waiver
should not be valid unless made with the
assistance of counsel.
In the Galit case, however, the adoption
of the Morales obiter was also an obiter. The
confession in this case was traditionally
involuntary, and so the SC did not need the
Morales obiter in order to disallow the
confession.
Under the facts of the case, the accused
Galit was convicted of robbery with homicide on
the basis of his confession, which was obtained
through torture. The NBI investigators covered
Galit's face with a rag and then pushed it into a
toilet bowl full of human waste. It was only
after they had broken his will that he signed the
confession and posed for pictures for re-
enactment as directed by the investigators.
People v. Galit 135 SCRA 465 (1985)
F: Defendant was convicted of robbery
with homicide by the Circuit Criminal Court. The
Constitutional Law II
principal prosecution witness testified that he
heard the defendant and his wife, who was the
mother of the witness' wife, quarrelling the
morning after the crime. He said the defendant
wanted to leave their house because he and his
companions had robbed "Aling Nene." The
prosecution also presented the extrajudicial
confession of the defendant.
HELD: The confession of the defendant is
inadmissible because it was obtained through
torture. The NBI investigators covered the
defendant's face with a rag and then pushed in
into a toilet bowl full of human waste. It was
only after they had broken his will that the
defendant signed the confession and posed for
pictures for reenactment as directed by the
investigators. The defendant is from Samar and
there is no showing that he understood Tagalog.
It was two weeks after he executed the
salaysay that his relatives were permitted to
visit him. His statement does not contain any
waiver or right to counsel and yet during the
investigation he was not assisted by one. These
constitute gross violations of his right. The SC
cited the case of Morales v. Ponce Enrile where
it laid the procedure in custodial investigations:
No custodial investigation shall be conducted
unless it be in the precense of counsel engaged
by the person arrested, or by any person on his
behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition
either of the detainee himself or of anyone on
his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived
but the waiver shall not be valid unless made
with the assistance of counsel. Any statement
obtained in violation of this, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part,
shall be inadmissible in evidence.
Whatever doubt as to the validity of the
Galit rule, however, was laid to rest by the SC in
People v. Sison, 142 SCRA 219 (1986). The
Court held that in People v. Galit, which was
decided en banc and concurred in by all the
Justices except one who took no part, the Court
was out to rest all doubts regarding the ruling in
Morales v. Enrile, and embraced its ruling.
In this case, the prosecution sought to
prove its charge of subversion against Asis by
means of her confession given in the hospital, in
which she admitted through a leading question,
that she was a member of the NPA and that she
was wounded in the encounter. The SC upheld
the trial court's decision excluding the
confession on the ground that the waiver of the
Miranda rights was made without the assistance
of counsel.
People v. Sison 142 SCRA 219 (1986)
F: Jocelyn de Asis was accused of
subversion. At the trial, the Fiscal offered as
evidence an extrajudicial confession given by
her in the hospital. In that confession, she
admitted, through a leading question that she
was a member of the NPA. The trial court
excluded the confession on the ground that the
waiver of Miranda rights was made without the
assistance of counsel. The prosecution contends
that the ruling in Morales v. Ponce Enrile that
the right to counsel may be waived only with
the assistance of counsel, was only a dictum.
HELD: In the case of People v. Galit, which was
decided en banc and concurred in by all Justices
except one who took no part, the SC put to rest
all doubts regarding the ruling in Morales v.
Ponce Enrile and Moncupa v. Enrile.
People v. Lim, 196 SCRA 809 (1991)
In People v. Nabaluna, 142 SCRA 446
(1986), Nabaluna et. al. were convicted of
robbery with homicide on the basis, among
others, of extrajudicial confessions taken in
1977. The confessions and the special counsel
before whom the confessions were signed prove
that the Miranda warnings were given, but
these were not made in the presence of
counsel. The SC, in allowing the confession,
ruled that the GAlit ruling could not have a
retroactive effect, especially since in this case
the trial court decision was already rendered
before the SC pronouncement.
People v. Lasac 148 SCRA 624 (1987)
F: Appellant was convicted of parricide on
the basis of a confession and circumstantial
evidence which the trial court found substantial
to establish guilt.
HELD: The waiver by the appellant of his right
to counsel was made without the assistance of
a counsel. The SC has held in Morales v. Ponce
Enrile, People v. Galit and People v. Sison
(1986) that this requirement is mandatory. Any
statement obtained in violation of this
procedure shall be inadmissible in evidence.
VV.
c. New rule on waiver (Feb. 2, 1987)
Art. III, Sec. 12 (1): Waiver must be in writing
and made in the presence of counsel
Art. III, Sec. 12. (1) Any person
under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to be
Constitutional Law II
informed of his right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
Under the new Constitution, any waiver
must now be made (1) in writing, and (2) in the
presence of counsel.
6. The burden of proving voluntariness of
waivers is on the prosecution
The burden to prove that there was a
valid waiver of the Miranda warning devolves
upon the one seeking to present the confession,
that is, on the prosecution. This rule applies
whether in the pre-Galit, Galit, or 1987 rule.
In People v. Jara, 144 SCRA 516 (1986),
the SC noted that the stereotype "advice"
appearing in practically all extrajudicial
confessions which are later repudiated has
assumed the nature of a legal form.
Investigators automatically type it together with
"opo" as the answer, or ask the accused to sign
it or even copy it in their handwriting. Its tired
punctilious, fixed and artificially stately style
does not create an impression of voluntariness
or even understanding on the part of the
accused.
Whenever a Constitutional protection is
waived by one entitled to that protection, the
presumption is always against the waiver.
Thus, the prosecution must prove with strongly
convincing evidence that indeed the accused
willingly and voluntarily submitted his
confession, and knowingly and deliberately
manifested that he was not interested in having
a lawyer assist him during the taking of that
confession.
People v. Jara, 144 SCRA 516 (1986)
F: Appellants were found guilty of robbery
with homicide for the killing and robbery of
Ampara vda. de Bantigue on June 9, 1978. In
another case, two of the appellants were found
guilty of homicide for the killing on the same
date of Luisa Jara while Felicisimo Jara, the
husband of the deceased, was found guilty of
parricide. Two of the appellants, Raymundo
Vergara and Bernardo Bernadas, made
extrajudicial confessions implicating Jara as the
mastermind. The confessions were taken while
the two were held incommunicado in the
presence of five policemen and after two weeks
of detention.
HELD: The stereotyped "advice" of the Miranda
rights appearing in practically all extrajudicial
confessions which are later repudiated assumed
the nature of a legal form or model. Its tired,
punctilious, fixed and artificial style does not
create an impression of voluntariness or even
understanding on the part of the accused. The
showing of a spontaneous, free and
unconstrained giving up of a right is missing.
Whenever a protection given by the
Constitution is waived by the person entitled to
that protection, the presumption is always
against the waiver. Consequently, the
prosecution must prove with strong, convincing
evidence that indeed the accused willingly and
voluntarily submitted his confession and
knowingly and deliberately manifested that he
was not interested in having a lawyer assist him
during the taking of that confession. That proof
is missing in this case.
7. What may be waived: The right to
remain silent and to counsel, but not the
right to be given "Miranda warnings"
The right to remain silent and to
counsel, which are the effectuations of the
Miranda rights, can be waived.
What cannot be waived are:
1. The right to be given the Miranda
warnings. (For how can one waive what one
does not know?)
2. The right to counsel when making
the waiver of the right to remain silent or to
counsel.
8. Exclusionary rule
Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx
(3) Any confession or admission
obtained in violation of this or Section 17
hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.
Note than under [Art. III, Sec. 3(2)] the
exclusionary rule reads: (any evidence obtained
in violation of this or the preceding section shall
be inadmissible "for any purpose in any
proceeding."
There are two exceptions to the
exclusionary rule. One, to impeach the
credibility of the accused. Two, public safety.
Impeach the credibility
The unwarned or uncounselled
confession is not totally without use. While it is
Constitutional Law II
not admissible to prove the guilt of the accused,
it may be used against him to impeach his
credibility by showing that he is lying in court,
so ruled the U.S. Supreme Court in Harris v.
New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)
In this case, Harris was arrested for
twice selling heroin to an undercover police
agent. He confessed to the crime during the
police interrogation, but the confession was
uncounselled, and so it was held as
inadmissible in evidence. But when Harris took
the witness stand, he testified that what he sold
was baking powder in order to defraud the
police agent. The SC allowed the prosecution to
introduce the uncounselled statment to show
that he was lying.
In justifying the admission of the
testimony, Justice Burger said that it is one
thing to say that the government cannot make
an affirmative use of the evidence unlawfully
obtained, and quite another to say that the
defendant can turn the illegal method by which
the evidence in the possession of the
government was obtained to his own
advantage, providing himself with a shield
against perjury and the contradiction of his
untruths.
The reason, continued the Court is that
the shield provided by the Miranda rights
cannot be perverted into a license to use
perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk
of confrontation with prior inconsistent
utterances.
Public Safety
Public Safety may justify the police in
taking confessions without prior warning. Thus
ruled the U.S. Supreme Court in New York v.
Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984).
New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626
(1984).
In the case, the Court excused the
giving of the Miranda warning because the
public safety required that the weapon had to
be located before it could be used by the
accused against those in the supermarket.
The criticism hurled against this ruling is
that while the police may be justified in forcing
the assailant to say where the weapon is
located, he is not justified to present this in
evidence in the subsequent criminal
prosecution.
C. Right to bail
Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except
those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when the evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. the right to bail shall not
be impaired even when the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required.
1. When right may be invoked
The right to bail is available from the
very moment of arrest (which may be before or
after the filing of formal charges in court) up to
the time of conviction by final judgement (which
means after appeal).
No charge need be filed formally before
one can file for bail, so long as one is under
arrest. So ruled the SC in Heras Teehankee v.
Rovica. 75 Phil.634 (1945).
The case was unique in that after the
war, the People's Court Act amended Art. 125 of
the RPC to allow for a longer time to detain
persons because of the impossibility of filing
charges within the reglementary period due to
the number of indictees.
Bail and Habeas Corpus
In the case of bail, there is an implicit
recognition that the arrest and detention, are
valid, or that even if they were initially illegal,
such illegality was cured by the subsequent
filing of a case in court. Thus, the prayer in bail
is that one be released temporarily from such
valid detention, and this can be made anytime
after arrest.
In habeas corpus, the assumption is
precisely that the arrest and detention are
illegal, so that the prayer is to be released
permanently from such illegal detention. When
the privilege of the writ is suspended, the arrest
and detention remain illegal, but the remedy
afforded by law to the victim is not available.
Under the 1987 Constitution, though the effect
of the suspension has been considerably
lessened to the need to file a case within 72
hours from the illegal arrest, otherwise the
detainee is to be released.
The Constitution now provides,
overruling Morales v. Enrile, that the suspension
Constitutional Law II
of the privilege of the writ does not carry with it
the suspension of the right to bail. Habeas
Corpus refers to illegal detention, while bail
refers to legal detention, or even detention that
started as illegal but was cured by the filing of a
case in court.
2. When bail is a matter of right, when it
is a matter of discretion
Bail is a matter of right in all cases not
punishable by reclusion perpetua.
It is a matter of discretion in case the
evidence of guilt is strong. In such a case,
according to People v. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522
(1966), the court's discretion to grant bail must
be exercised in the light of a summary of the
evidence presented by the prosecution. Thus,
the order granting or refusing bail must contain
a summary of the evidence for the prosecution
followed by the conclusion on whether or not
the evidence of guilt is strong.
The only time bail may be denied is
when (a) the offense is punishable by reclusion
perpetua, and (b) the evidence of guilt is
strong.
With the abolition of the death penalty
(III, 20), and the automatic commutation of a
death sentence to reclusion perpetua, it is
contended that when the 1987 Constitution
denies the right to bail in offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua, it is meant to apply only
to those crimes which were once punishable by
death. For if it includeds even those crimes
which before and now are really punishable by
reclusion perpetua, it would go against the very
spirit of the Constitution.
People v. Donato, 196 SCRA 130 (1991)
3. Bail in courts-martial
Commendador v. De Villa, 200 SCRA 80 (1991)
4. Standards for fixing bail
Rule 114, Sec. 6. Amount of bail;
guidelines.-- The judge who issed the
warrant or granted the application shall
fix a reasonable amount of bail
considering primarily, but not limited to
the following guidelines:
(a) Financial ability of the accused
to give bail;
(b) Nature and circumstances of
the offense;
(c) Penalty of the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of
the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) The weight of the evidence
against the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused
appearing in trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bonds;
(i) The fact that accused was a
fugitive from justice when arrested; and
(j) The pendency of other cases in
which the accused is under bond.
Excessive bail shall not be
required.
Where the right to bail exists, it should
not be rendered nugatory be requiring a sum
that is excessive, otherwise, it becomes "a
promise to the ear to be broken to the hope, a
teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in a
pauper's will" (Jackson). Thus, said the SC in De
la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1 (1971).
In this case, a bail of P1.195 million
imposed against Mayor Camara for charges of
12 murders and 12 frustrated murder was found
excessive.
The SC laid down the following
guidelines in fixing the amount of bail in
Villasenor v. Abano, 21 SCRA 312 (1967), later
contained in sec. 6 of Rule 114.
1. Ability of the accused to give the
bail.
2. Nature of the offense.
3. Penalty for the offense charged.
4. Character and reputation of the
accused
5. Health of the accused.
6. Character and strength of the
evidence.
7. Probability of the accused appearing
in trial.
8. Forfeiture of other bonds.
9. Whether the accused was a fugitive
from justice when arrested.
10. If the accused is under bond for
appearance at trial in other cases.
Even when the accused has previously
jumped bail, still he cannot be denied bail. the
remedy in this case is to increase the amount
of the bail (Siquiam v. Amparo).
5. Right to bail and right to travel
abroad
Art. III, Sec. 6. The liberty of abode
and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national
Constitutional Law II
security, public safety, or public health, as
may be provided by law.
In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, 142
SCRA 149 (1986), the SC disallowed a person
released on bail to travel abroad for a business
trip. The Court gave 2 reasons why bail
operates only within the country.
One, the accused may be placed beyond
the jurisdiction of the court if he were allowed
to leave the Philippines without sufficient
reason, thus affecting one of the conditions in
the grant of bail, namely to have the accused
available whenever the court requires his
presence.
Two, implicit in the bail is the
agreement between the State and the surety
that the State will do nothing to make it difficult
for the surety to arrest the defendant upon
order of the court. If the court thus allows his to
leave, then the State loses its right to order the
forfeiture of the bond because it itself has
breached its obligation to the surety.
The case leaves the question of allowing
an accused under bail to go abroad for
humanitarian reasons open-ended. This reason
was not foreclosed by the Court, which hinted
that the accused could be allowed to leave if he
had "sufficient reason". What the Court found
insufficient was the business trip.
Manotoc v. CA, 142 SCRA 149 (1986)
F: Petitioner is a principal stockholder of
two corporations, in one of which he was the
president. The firms were placed under a
management committee by the SEC and
petitioner was placed "on hold" by the
Commission of Immigration. Petitioner was
charged with estafa. He later asked for
permission to leave the country for business
reasons, but his request was denied by the
courts. He filed a petition for certiorari but his
petition was also dismissed for lack of merit. He
appealed to the SC.
HELD: The condition imposed by Rule 114, sec.
1 upon the accused to make himself available
whenever the court requires his presence,
operates as a valid restriction on his right to
travel. The constitutional right to travel is not
absolute, but is subject to lawful orders of the
court. VV.
6. Waiver of the Right to Bail
People v. Donato, 198 SCRA 130 (1991)
D. Rights during trial
Art. III, Sec. 14. (1) No person
shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law.
In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel,
to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet
the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of
the accused provided that he has been
duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.
1. Presumption of innocence
In People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 69
(1971), the SC noted that the requirement of
proof beyond reasonable doubt is a necessary
corollary of the constitutional right to be
presumed innocent.
In Igot v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980),
a law disqualifying candidates charged with
national security offences was struck down as
unconstitutional, for violating the presumption
against innocence.
In Alejandro v. Pepito, 96 SCRA 322
(1980), a judge who allowed the accused to
present his evidence ahead of the prosecution,
over the objection of the prosecution, after the
acused admitted the killing but invoked self-
defense, was reversed by the SC on the ground
that this change in the order of trial violated the
constitutional presumption of innocence which
places the burden proof on the prosecution.
This ruling was modified by Rule 119,
sec. 3 (e) of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure which now reverses the order of trial
when the defendant admits the act but invokes
a justifying or exempting circumstance.
People v. de Guzman, 231 SCRA 739
F: De Guzman, Castro and Catap
were charged with murder for the killing
of an unidentified person on Nov. 16,
1994. Only De Guzman and Castro were
Constitutional Law II
arrested and both pleaded not guilty.
They were convicted by the court mainly
on the basis of the testimony of Adelia
Angeles. She positively identified the 2
accused as the persons who were with
Catap who maltreated an unidentified
person whom they had tied to an ipil-ipil
tree and upon seeing her, she testified
that they untied the man and brought
him towards the direction of the Pasig
river which was only 3 houses away. This
was further strengthened by the
extrajudicial confession (EJC) of accused
Castro to Police Corporal Dominador
Cunanan that it was Catap who killed the
victim and that he and de Guzman acted
only as look-outs.
Issue: W/N the constitutional
presumption of innocenec of the accused
has been overcome.
HELD: YES
Though there is no direct evidence
to link the 3 accused to the killing of the
unknown victim, the circumstantial
evidence presented satisfied Sec. 4, Rule
133 ROC namely: (1) there is more than
one circumstance; (2) the facts from
which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce
conviction beyond resonable doubt.
With regard to the EJC of Accused Castro
to Police Cpl. Cunanan, there is no evidence
that Cunanan had any motive to falsely testify
against accused. While it is true that accused's
EJC was made without the advice and
assistance of counsel, hence inadmissible as
evidence, it could be treated as a verbal
admission of the accused established through
the testimonies of persons who heard it or who
conducted the investigatiuon of the accused
(Peo v Molas 218 SCRA 473). Moreover in Peo
v Alvarez, the court ruled that an extrajudicial
confession is admissible against a co-accused
when it is used as a circumstantial evidence to
show the probability of the participation of said
co-accused in the crime committed.
2. Right to be heard personally or by
counsel
Adequate legal assistance shall not be
denied to any person by reason of poverty (Art.
III, Sec. 11.) No matter how educated one may
be, he may not know how to establsih his
innocence for the simple reason that he does
not know the rules of evidence said the SC in
People v. Holgado, 85 Phil 752 (1952).
People v. Holgado, 85 Phil 752 (1952)
F: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in
the court of First Instance of Romblon with
slight illegal detention because he did
"feloniously and without justifiable motive,
kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the
house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours
thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her
personal liberty." Accused, unaided by counsel,
pleaded guilty and said that he was instructed
by Mr. Ocampo to do so.
Accused was convicted of a capital
offense.
Since the accused-appellant pleaded
guilty and no evidence appears to have been
presented by either party, the trial judge must
have deduced the capital offense from the facts
pleaded in the information.
Ruling: Under the circumstances, particularly
the qualified plea given by the accused who
was unaided by counsel, it was not prudent, to
say the least, for the trial court to render such a
serious judgment finding the accused guilty of a
capital offense, and imposing upon him such a
heavy penalty as ten years and one day of
prision mayor to twenty years, without absolute
any evidence to determine and clarify the true
facts of the case.
The proceedings in the trial court are
irregular from the beginning. It is expressly
provided in our rules of Court, Rule 112, section
3 (now Rule 116, Sec. 6), that:
If the defendant appears without
attorney, he must be informed by the court that
it is his right to have attorney before being
arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the
aid of attorney, the Court must assign attorney
de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must
be allowed for procuring attorney.
Not one of these duties had been
complied with by the trial court.
One of the great principles of justice
guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no
person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law", and that all
accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel." In criminal cases there
can be no fair hearing unless the accused be
given the opportunity to be heard by counsel.
The right to be heard would be of little avail if it
does not include the right to be heard by
counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated
man may have no skill in the science of the law,
particularly in the rules of procedure, and,
without counsel, he may be convicted not
because he is guilty but because he does not
know how to establish his innocence. And this
can happen more easily to persons who are
ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that
the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so
Constitutional Law II
important that it has become a constitutional
right and it is so implemented that under our
rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court
to apprise an accused of his right to have an
attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he
desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential
that the court should assign one de oficio if he
so desires and he is poor grant him a
reasonable time to procure an attorney of his
own.
Q: What happens if the accused files a
demurrer to the evidence of the prosecution (on
the ground that the prosecution failed to tender
a case) and this motion is denied -- could the
defense still present its own evidence?
In Abriol v. Homeres, 84 Phil 525,
(1949), the SC ruled in the affirmative,
contending that the right of the accused to
present his evidence is a constitutional right
which cannot be defeated by the dismissal of
the motion of demurrer.
Filing of demurrer to evidence is a
WAIVER of right to be heard (Rule 119,
Sec. 15.)
Abriol v. Homeres, 84 Phil 525, (1949)
F: Fidel Abriol, together with six other
persons, was accused of illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition. After the prosecution
had presented its evidence and rested its case,
counsel for the defense moved to dismiss the
case on the ground of insufficiency of the
evidence to prove the guilt of the accused. After
hearing the arguments for and against the
motion for dismissal, the court held the proofs
sufficient to convict and denied said motion,
whereupon counsel for the defense offered to
present evidence for the accused. The
provincial fiscal opposed the presentation of
evidence by the defense, contending that the
present procedural practice and laws precluded
the defense in criminal cases from presenting
any evidence after it had presented a motion
for dismissal with or without reservation and
after said motion had been denied, and citing
as authority the case of United States vs. De la
Cruz, 28 Phil., 279. His Honor Judge S. C.
Moscoso sustained the opposition of the
provincial fiscal and, without allowing the
accused to present evidence in their defense,
convicted all of them and sentenced the herein
petitioner to suffer seven years of imprisonment
and to pay a fine of P2,000.
Issue: Whether the accused should be allowed
to present evidence after the denial of their
motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence of the prosecution
Ruling: The accused should be allowed to
present evidence.
1. The refusal of Judge Moscoso to allow
the accused-petitioner to present proofs in his
defense after the denial of his motion for
dismissal was a palpable error which resulted in
denying to the said accused the due process of
law guaranteed in the Bill of Rights embodied in
the Constitution, it being provided in Article II,
section 1 (17), of the Constitution that in all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel
and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses in his behalf. There is
no law nor "procedural practice" under which
the accused may ever be denied the right to be
heard before being sentenced.
Now that the Government cannot appeal
in criminal cases if the defendant would be
placed thereby in double jeopardy (sec. 2, Rule
118), the dismissal of the case for insufficiency
of the evidence after the prosecution has rested
terminates the case then and there. But if the
motion for dismissal is denied, the court should
proceed to hear the evidence for the defense
before entering judgment regardless of whether
or not the defense had reserved its right to
present evidence in the event its motion for
dismissal be denied. The reason is that it is the
constitutional right of the accused to be heard
in his defense before sentence is pronounced
on him. Of course if the accused has no
evidence to present or expressly waives the
right to present it, the court has no alternative
but to decide the case upon the evidence
presented by the prosecution alone.
2. The main question to decide is
whether the writ of habeas corpus lies in a case
like the present.
We have already shown that there is no
law or precedent which could be invoked to
place in doubt the right of the accused to be
heard or to present evidence in his defense
before being sentenced. On the contrary, the
provisions of the Constitution hereinabove cited
expressly and clearly guarantee to him that
right. Such constitutional right is inviolate. No
court of justice under our system of government
has the power to deprive him of that right. If the
accused does not waive his right to be heard
but on the contrary as in the instant case
invokes that rough, and the court denies it to
him, that court no longer has jurisdiction to
proceed; it has no power to sentence the
accused without hearing him in his defense; and
the sentence thus pronounced is void and may
be collaterally attacked in a habeas corpus
proceeding.
Although the sentence against the
petitioner is void for the reasons hereinabove
Constitutional Law II
stated, he may be held under the custody of the
law by being detained or admitted to bail until
the case against him is finally and lawfully
decided. The process against him in criminal
case No. 1472 may stand should be resumed
from the stage at which it was vitiated by the
trial court's denial of his constitutional right to
be heard. Up to the point when the prosecution
rested, the proceedings were valid and should
be resumed from there.
People v. Donesa, 49 SCRA 281 (1973)
Grant of demurrer is equivalent to an acquittal
F: After prosecution presented its
witnesses, the defense moved for dismissal of
the case on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. The judge granted the motion.
Issue: Did such dismissal operate as an
acquittal of the accused?
Ruling: YES
A dismissal ordered after the
termination of the presentation of the evidence
for the prosecution has the force and effect of
an acquittal. Since there is a failure to prove the
guilt of the accused, the case must be
dismissed, and it will be a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense even though it
was ordered by the Court upon motion or with
the express consent of the defendant, in exactly
the same way as a judgment of
acquittal.
Rule 119, Sec. 15. Demurrer to
evidence.-- After the prosecution has
rested its case, the court may dismiss the
case on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence: (1) ont its own intitiative after
givint the prosecution an opportunity to
be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused
filed with proper leave of court.
If the court denies the motion for
dismissal, the accused may adduce
evidence in his defense. When the
accused files such motion to dismiss
without express leave of court, he waives
the right to present evidence and submits
the case for judgment on the basis of the
evidence for the prosecution. (Rules of
Court.)
3. Right to free legal assistance
Art. III, Sec. 11. Free access to the
courts and quasi-judicial bodies and
adequate legal assistance shall not be
denied to any person by reason of
poverty.
People v. Rio, 201 SCRA 702 (1991)
F: On 29 December 1989, the accused-
appellant Ricardo Rio, in two (2) letters dated
14 December 1989, addressed to Division Clerk
of Court Fermin J. Garma and to Assistant Clerk
of Court Tomasita M. Dris, manifested his
intention to withdraw the appeal due to his
poverty.
Paraphrasing Mr. Justice Malcolm, "Two
(2) of the basic privileges of the accused in a
criminal prosecution are the right to the
assistance of counsel and the right to a
preliminary examination. President Mckinley
made the first a part of the Organic Law in his
Instructions to the Commission by imposing the
inviolable rule that in all criminal prosecutions
the accused 'shall enjoy the right ... to have
assistance of counsel for the defense' ". Today
said right is enshrined in the 1987 Constitution
for, as Judge Cooley says, this is "perhaps the
privilege most important to the person accused
of crime."
"In criminal cases there can be no fair
hearing unless the accused be given an
opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to
be heard would be of little meaning if it does
not include the right to be heard by counsel.
Even the most intelligent or educated man may
have no skill in the science of the law, particu-
larly in the rules of procedure, and, without
counsel, he may be convicted not because he is
guilty but because he does not know how to
establish his innocence. And this can happen
more easily to persons who are ignorant or
uneducated. It is for this reason that the right
to be assisted by counsel is deemed so
important that it has become a constitutional
right and it is so implemented that under our
rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court
to apprise an accused of his right to have an
attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he
desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential
that the court should assign one de oficio for
him if he so desires and he is poor, or grant him
a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his
own."
This right to a counsel de oficio does not
cease upon the conviction of an accused by a
trial court. It continues, even during appeal,
such that the duty of the court to assign a
counsel de oficio persists where an accused
interposes an intent to appeal. Even in a case,
such as the one at bar, where the accused had
signified his intent to withdraw his appeal, the
court is required to inquire into the reason for
the withdrawal. Where it finds the sole reason
for the withdrawal to be poverty, as in this case,
the court must assign a counsel de oficio, for
despite such withdrawal, the duty to protect the
rights of the accused subsists and perhaps, with
Constitutional Law II
greater reason. After all, "those who have less
in life must have more in law." Justice should
never be limited to those who have the means.
It is for everyone, whether rich or poor. Its
scales should always be balanced and should
never equivocate or cogitate in order to favor
one party over another.
It is with this thought in mind that we
charge clerks of court of trial courts to be more
circumspect with the duty imposed on them by
law (Section 13, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court)
so that courts will be above reproach and that
never (if possible) will an innocent person be
sentenced for a crime he has not committed nor
the guilty allowed to go scot-free.
In this spirit, the Court ordered the
appointment of a counsel de oficio for the
accused-appellant and for said counsel and the
Solicitor General to file their respective briefs,
upon submission of which the case would be
deemed submitted for decision.
From the records of the case, it is
established that the accused- appellant was
charged with the crime of rape in a verified
complaint filed by complainant Wilma Phua Rio,
duly subscribed before 3rd Assistant Fiscal
Rodolfo M. Alejandro of the province of Rizal,
which reads as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of
March, 1984, in the Municipality of Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, by means of force and
intimidation did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the undersigned Wilma Phua
against her will.
On 26 June 1985, at the arraignment,
the accused-appellant, assisted by Atty. Leonido
Manalo of the Makati CLAO office, as counsel de
oficio, entered a plea of not guilty to the offense
charged.
xxx
The trial court found the accused-
appellant guilty of the crime of rape.
The theory of the defense at the trial
level was grounded on alibi. The accused
claimed that at the time of the alleged com-
mission of the crime of rape he was in Romblon.
This claim was corroborated by the accused's
brother, Amado Rio. However, this claim was, as
aforestated, rebutted by the prosecution's
submission of the voter's affidavit executed by
the accused in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila on 31
March 1984 when appellant claimed he was in
Romblon.
HELD: On appeal, appellant's counsel de oficio
changed the theory of the defense. The new
theory presented by counsel de oficio is that
Wilma Phua consented when accused-appellant
had sexual intercourse with her on 24 March
1984. It was stressed by counsel de oficio that
the rape occurred on 24 March 1984 and that,
allegedly, it was the fourth time accused had
abused complainant. This allegation as well as
the fact that complainant failed to lock the door
to the bathroom could only have been due to
the fact that there was consent. The charge was
filed, according to defense counsel de oficio,
only because the complainant's mother caught
them.
This theory of the defense on appeal
that there had been consent from the
complainant, fails to generate doubt as to the
accused's guilt, for it would be an incredulous
situation indeed to believe that one, so young
and as yet uninitiated to the ways of the world,
would permit the occurrence of an incestuous
relationship with an uncle, a brother of her very
own mother. The Court notes the sudden swift
in the theory of the defense from one of total
denial of the incident in question, by way of
alibi, to one of participation, that is, with the
alleged consent of the complainant. This new
version could only be attributed by the Court to
the fact that counsel on appeal is different from
the counsel in the trial court. Although the
Solicitor General has suggested that this
sudden shift be interpreted as an afterthought
by the accused or a desperate effort to get
himself acquitted, the Court deems it more
likely that this shift was caused by counsel de
oficio's preparation of the appellant's brief
without examining the entire records of the
case. If the appointed counsel for the accused,
on appeal, had read the records and transcripts
of the case thoroughly, he would not have
changed the theory of the defense for such a
shift can never speak well of the credibility of
the defense. Moreover, the rule in civil
procedure, which applies equally in criminal
cases, is that a party may not shift his theory on
appeal. If the counsel de oficio had been more
conscientious, he would have known that the
sudden shift would be violative of
aforementioned procedural rule and detrimental
to the cause of the accused-appellant (his
client).
The Court hereby admonishes members
of the Bar to be more conscious of their duties
as advocates of their clients' causes, whether
acting de parte or de oficio, for "public interest
requires that an attorney exert his best efforts
and ability in the prosecution or defense of his
client's cause." Lawyers are an indispensable
part of the whole system of administering jus-
tice in this jurisdiction. And a lawyer who
performs that duty with diligence and candor
not only protects the interests of his client; he
also serves the ends of justice, does honor to
the Bar and helps maintain the respect of the
community to the legal profession. This is so
because the entrusted privilege to practice law
Constitutional Law II
carries with it correlative duties not only to the
client but also to the court, to the bar and to
the public.
While a lawyer is not supposed to know
all the laws, he is expected to take such
reasonable precaution in the discharge of his
duty to his client and for his professional
guidance as will not make him, who is sworn to
uphold the law, a transgressor of its precepts.
The fact that he merely volunteered his
services or the circumstance that he was a
counsel de oficio neither diminishes nor alters
the degree of professional responsibility owed
to his client. The ethics of the profession
require that counsel display warm zeal and
great dedication to duty irrespective of the
client's capacity to pay him his fees. Any
attempted presentation of a case without
adequate preparation distracts the
administration of justice and discredits the Bar.
4. Right to be informed of nature and
cause of accusation
The arraignment in criminal prosecution
is precisely intended to comply with the right of
the accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. As noted
in Vera v. People, procedural due process
requires that the accused must be informed
why he is being prosecuted and what charge
he must meet.
Borja v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 (1977)
No valid trial in absentia without arraignment
F: Petitioner was accused of slight physical
injuries in the City Court of Cebu. After one
postponement due to petitioner's failure to
appear, the case was reset. Again, petitioner
failed to appear, despite notice to his
bondsman. The court then allowed the
prosecution to present evidence despite the
fact that petitioner had not been arraigned.
After the offended party had testified and
presented documentary evidence, the court
found petitioner guilty. The CFI affirmed the
decision. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
HELD: Respondent Judge committed a grave
abuse of discretion and his decision is void.
Because petitioner was not arraigned, he was
not informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against him. Arraignment is an
indispensable requirement in any criminal
proceeding.
5. Right to speedy, impartial and public
trial
(1) Speedy Trial
The right to a speedy trial means one
that is free from vexatious and oppressive
delays. Its objective is to free the innocent
person from anxiety and expense of a court
litigation, or otherwise, to have his guilt
determined within the shortest possible time,
compatible with the presentation and
consideration of whatever legitimate defense
the accused may interpose.
While reasonable delay may be allowed
as determined on a case to case basis, an
unreasonable delay on the part of the
prosecution to present its case, thereby causing
the threat of penal liability to remain hanging
over the head of the accused for an extended
period of time, violates the right of the accused
to a speedy trial.
The remedy of the accused in this case
is habeas corpus if he has been restrained of his
liberty, or certiorari, prohibition or mandamus
for the final dismissal of the case; and dismissal
based on the denial of the right to speedy trial
amounts to an acquittal.
So said the SC in Acevedo v. Sarmiento,
36 SCRA 247 (1970), a case involving the
prosecution for damage to property through
reckless imprudence which had been pending
for 6 years, the last step taken being the start
of the cross-examination of the complaining
witness, who did not appear thereafter. The SC
ordered the case dismissed with prejudice, thus
acquitting the accused.
(2) Public Trial
A public trial does not require that the
entire public can witness the trial. It is enough
if it is conducted at a place where one's
relatives and friends can be accommodated and
the public may know what is going on.
The right is not absolute. The court can
order the public out of the trial room in the
interest of morality and order.
In Garcia v. Domingo, 52 SCRA 143
(1970), the SC dismissed the contention of one
party that the trial was conducted inside the
chamber of the judge on the ground that the
objection came too late (the party only
complained after the 14th hearing) and that the
place was agreed upon by the parties for their
mutual convenience (the judge's room was air
conditioned).
Garcia v. Domingo, 52 SCRA 143 (1970)
The pivotal question in this petition for
certiorari and prohibition, one which thus far
Constitutional Law II
has remained unresolved, is the meaning to be
accorded the constitutional right to public trial.
Issue: Is the holding of trial in the chambers of
the judge violative of the right to a public trial?
Ruling: NO
The defendants in this case agreed that
the hearings be held in the chambers. On
fourteen separate occasions this was the case
and there was no objection on their part. There
was no evidence to substantiate the claim that
any other person was excluded from the
chambers. It is thus evident that what took
place in the chambers of the city court judge
was devoid of haste or intentional secrecy.
The trial must be public. It possesses
that character when anyone interested in
observing the manner a judge conducts the
proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There
is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a
stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No
relationship to the parties need be shown. The
thought that lies behind this safeguard is the
belief that thereby the accused is afforded
further protection, that his trial is likely to be
conducted with regularity and not tainted with
any impropriety. It is not amiss to recall that
Delegate Laurel in his terse summation the
importance of this right singled out its being a
deterrence to arbitrariness. It is thus
understandable why such a right is deemed
embraced in procedural due process. Where a
trial takes place, as is quite usual, in the
courtroom and a calendar of what cases are to
be heard is posted, no problem arises. It the
usual course of events that individuals desirous
of being present are free to do so. There is the
well recognized exception though that warrants
the exclusion of the public where the evidence
may be characterized as "offensive to decency
or public morals."
What did occasion difficulty in this suit
was that for the convenience of the parties, and
of the city court Judge, it was in the latter's air-
conditioned chambers that the trial was held.
Did that suffice to investigate the proceedings
as violative of this right? The answer must be in
the negative. There is no showing that the
public was thereby excluded. It is to be
admitted that the size of the room allotted the
Judge would reduce the number of those who
could be present. Such a fact though is not
indicative of any transgression of this right.
Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions.
Some are smaller than others. Moreover, as
admitted by Justice Black in his masterly In re
Oliver opinion, it suffices to satisfy the
requirement of a trial being public if the
accused could "have his friends, relatives and
counsel present, no matter with what offense
he may be charged."
Then, too, reference may also be made
to the undisputed fact at least fourteen
hearings had been held in chambers of the city
court Judge, without objection on the part of
respondent policemen. xxx
(3) Impartial trial
One aspect of an impartial trial is a
neutral magistrate who exercises cold
impartiality.
In Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927),
it was held that a town mayor who was paid on
the basis of the fine he imposes for every
conviction for violation of the drinking laws,
could not be an impartial judge. Under such a
situation, he would be interested in convicting
those he tries so he would earn more.
Another aspect of an impartial trial is an
impartial tribunal bound by the Bill of Rights
and the strict rules of evidence and procedure.
In Olaguer v. Military Commission, 150
SCRA 144 (1987), the SC held that a civilian
cannot be tried by a military court (in
connection with the Light a Fire Movement) so
long as the civil courts are open and operating,
even during Martial Law.
6. Right to confront witness
The purpose of this right is to enable the
accused to test the credibility of the witness.
The best means of confrontation is the process
of cross-examination.
7. Right to secure attendance of
witnesses (and the production of evidence
in his behalf)
There are various means available to
the parties to compel the attendance of
witnesses and the production of documents and
things needed in the prosecution or defense of
a case in an adversarial manner: subpoena and
subpoena duces tecum: depositions and other
modes of discovery; perpetuation of
testimonies.
8. Trial in Absentia
Although the right to be present is not
explicit in the provision, it is inferrable from the
phrase "trial may proceed notwithstanding the
absence of the accused"
This right to be present may, however,
be waived by the accused. Rule 115, sec, 1(c),
talks of 3 ways that the waiver may take place:
(a) express waiver pursuant to the stipulations
set forth in his bail bond, unless his presence is
Constitutional Law II
specifically ordered by the court for purposes of
identification; (b) implied waiver when the
accused without any justifiable cause is absent
at the trial on a particular date of which he had
notice; and (c) implied waiver when the accused
under custody who had been notified of the
date of trial escapes.
In cases in which there have been a
waiver of the right to be present, whether
expressed or implied, the trial may be held "in
absentia". The requisites of a valid trial in
absentia are: (i) the accused has been
arraigned; (ii) he was duly notified of the
hearing; and (iii) his failure to attend the trial is
unjustified.
There can be no valid trial in absentia
unless the accused has been arraigned, ruled
the SC in Boria v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422
(1977), a case involving a charge for slight
physical injuries where the accused failed to
appear and so the trial court allowed the
prosecution to present its evidence even if the
accused has not yet been arraigned.
Arraignment is crucial because it informs the
accued of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. Conviction without
arraignment violates due process and ousts the
court of its jurisdiction.
Boria v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 (1977), supra.
HELD: The subsequent trial in absentia
deprived petitioner of his right to be heard by
himself and counsel. The indispensable
requirement for trial in absentia is that it should
come after arraignment. VV.
Waiver of the right to be present implies
also waiver of the right to present evidence.
Thus, if the accused fails to attend trial (which
presupposes arraignment), without any
justifiable cause, the prosecution can proceed
with the presentation of the evidence, and
thereupon, the court may consider the case
submitted for decision. The court will decide
the case on the basis only of the prosecution's
evidence. This does not violate the
constitutional presumption of innocence
because it does not mean that the judgment of
the trial court will result in conviction.
So ruled the SC in People v. Salas, 143
SCRA 163 (1986), which further ruled that trial
in absentia applies even to capital cases.
People v. Salas 143 SCRA 163 (1986)
Trial in absentia applies even to capital cases
F: Mario Abong was originally charged with
homicide in the CFI Cebu but before he could be
arraigned, the case was reinvestigated on
motion of the prosecution. As a result of the
reinvestigation, an amended information was
filed, with no bail recommended, to which he
pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced but while it
was in progress, the prisoner took advantage of
the first information filed and succeeded in
deceiving the city court of Cebu into granting
him bail and ordering his release. The
respondent Judge, learning of the trickery,
cancelled the illegal bail bond and ordered
Abong's re-arrest. But he was gone.
Nonetheless, the prosecution moved that the
hearing continue in accordance with the
constitutional provision authorizing trial in
absentia. The respondent Judge denied the
motion and suspended all proceedings until the
return of the accused. Hence, this petition.
HELD: The doctrine laid down in People v.
Avanceña has been modified by Art. IV, sec. 19
[now Art. III, sec. 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution]
which allows trial in absentia. The prisoner
cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued
prosecution and possible eventual conviction
provided only that (a) he has been arraigned;
(b) he has been duly notified of the trial; and (c)
his failure to appear is unjustified. The right to
be present at one's trial may now be waived
except only at that stage where the prosecution
intends to present witnesses who will identify
the accused. The defendant's escape will be
considered a waiver of this right and the
inability of the court to notify him of the
subsequent hearings will not prevent it from
continuing with his trial. VV.
Trial in absentia was introduced only in
the 1973 Constitution to remedy a situation in
which criminal prosecution could not move
because the accused has either escaped or
jumped bail.
In People v. Prieto, 84 SCRA 198 (1978),
the SC ruled that trial in absentia does not
justify the accused to jump bail. Just because th
Constitution allows trial in absentia does not
mean that the accused is now free to waive his
right to be present during the trial. If he does,
he runds the risk of having his bail bond
forfeited.
Provision for trial in absentia not a justification
for jumping bail
F: For repeated failure of the accused
Dario Gamayon to appear, respondent Judge
declared the bail bond forfeited and required
the bondsmen to produce the accused within
thirty days and to show cause why no judgment
Constitutional Law II
should be rendered against them. However, on
motion of defense counsel, who invoked the last
sentence of Art. IV, section 19 [now Art. III, sec.
14(2)] on trial in absentia, respondent Judge
reconsidered his order. He argued that "if trial
could be conducted after the accused has been
arraigned and identified, the conclusion is
inescapable that issuing an order of forfeiture of
the bail bond is premature." The prosecution
filed a petition for certiorari.
HELD: The innovation introduced by the
present Constitution goes no further than to
enable a judge to continue with the trial even if
the accused is not present under the conditions
therein specified. It does not give the accused
the right to jump bail. VV.
Gimenez v. Nazareno, 160 SCRA 1 (1988)
In trial in absentia accused waives the right to
present evidence and confront witnesses
F: Teodoro dela Vega Jr., together with five
others, was charged with murder. After
arraignment, during which he pleaded not
guilty, the case was set for hearing on Sept. 18,
1973 but he escaped. He was tried in absentia.
The trial court rendered judgment dismissing
the case against his co-accused but it held in
abeyance the proceedings against him in order
to give him the chance to cross examine the
witnesses against him and present evidence.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
HELD: Was the jurisdiction lost when the
accused escaped from the custody of the law
and failed to appear during the trial? No. As we
have consistently ruled, jurisdiction once
acquired is not lost upon the instance of parties
but continues until the case is terminated. The
lower court was correct in proceeding with the
reception of evidence but it erred when is
suspended the proceedings as to the
respondent. The court need not wait for the
time until the accused finally decides to appear.
To allow this delay is to render ineffective the
constitutional provision on trial in absentia.
9. When presence of the accused is a
DUTY
In People v. Avancena, 32 O.G. 713, the
SC held that (a) the accused has the right to be
present during trial; (b) if he is in the custody
of the law, presence in all stage is likewise a
duty during (i) arraignment, (ii) entering a plea,
and (iii) promulgation of judgment. This rule
however has been modified.
As things stand, the following are the rules:
1. Generally, the accused has the right
to be present at all stages the trial (from
arraignment to rendition of judgment).
2. If the accused is in the custody of the
law, his presence during the trial is a duty only
if the court orders his presence to enable the
prosecution witnesses to identify him. (People
v. Salas, infra. reiterating Aquino v. Military
Commiission, infra. modifying People v.
Avancena, infra.)
3. Although the accused is not in the
custody of the law (and more so if he is in the
custody of the law), his presence is required in
the following cases:
a) Arraignment, regardless of
the offense;
b) Entering a plea, regardless of
whether the plea is guilty or not guilty.
c) Promulgation of judgment,
except that when the judgment is for a
light offense, he may be represented by
his counsel or a personal emissary.
a. Arraignment and plea,
whether of innocence or of guilt
Rule 116, Sec. 1. Arraignment and
plea; how made.--
xxx
(b) The accused must be present
at the arraignment and must personally
enter his plea. Both arraignment and plea
shall be made of record, but a failure to
enter of record shall not affect the
validity of the proceedings.
b. During trial, for identification
People v. Salas, 143 SCRA 163 (1986), supra.
HELD: The right to be present at one's
trial may now be waived except only at
that stage where the prosecution intends
to present witnesses who will identify the
accused.
c. Promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a
light offense, in which case accused may
appear by counsel, or a representative (Rule
120, Sec. 6.)
E. Priviledge against self incrimination
Art. III, Sec. 17. No person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself.
Constitutional Law II
Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him. [Art. III,
Sec. 12 (3)]
1. Scope of privilege:
Compulsory Testimonial self-incrimination
The privilege covers only testimonial
incrimination obtained compulsorily. It refers
therefore to the use of the mental process and
the communicative faculties, and not to a
merely physical activity. If the act is physical or
mechanical, the accused can be compelled to
allow or perform the act, and the result can be
used in evidence against him.
Thus the accused can be required to
allow a sample of a substance taken from his
body (U.S. v. Tan Teng. 23, Phil. 145 (1912)).
F: This defendant was charged with the
crime of rape. He was found guilty of the
charge. He appeals the decision on the ground
that the lower court erred in admitting the
testimony of the physicians about having taken
a certain substance from the body of the
accused while he was confined in jail and
regarding the chemical analysis made of the
substance to demonstrate the physical
condition of the accused with reference to a
venereal disease. It was discovered that the
rape victim was infected by venereal disease so
that the finding of venereal disease in the
accused was material to his conviction.
Upon this information the defendant
was arrested and taken to the police station and
stripped of his clothing and examined. The
policeman who examined the defendant swore
from the venereal disease known as gonorrhea.
The policeman took a portion of the substance
emitting from the body of the defendant and
turned it over to the Bureau of Science for the
purpose of having a scientific analysis made of
the same. The result of the examination showed
that the defendant was suffering from
gonorrhea.
Issue: Whether or not the information that the
accused has gonorrhea may be used against
him
Ruling: YES. The accused was not compelled to
make any admissions or answer any questions,
and the mere fact that an object found on his
person was examined: seems no more to
infringe the rule invoked, than would the
introduction in evidence of stolen property
taken from the person of a thief.
The substance was taken from the body
of the defendant without his objection, the
examination was made by competent medical
authority and the result showed that the
defendant was suffering from said disease. As
was suggested by Judge Lobingier, had the
defendant been found with stolen property
upon his person, there certainly could have
been no question had the stolen property been
taken for the purpose of using the same as
evidence against him. So also if the clothing
which he wore, by reason of blood stains or
otherwise, had furnished evidence of the
commission of a crime, there certainly could
have been no objection to taking such for the
purpose of using the same as proof. No one
would think of even suggesting that stolen
property and the clothing in the case indicated,
taken from the defendant, could not be used
against him as evidence, without violating the
rule that a person shall not be required to give
testimony against himself.
But the prohibition of compelling a man
in a criminal court to be a witness against
himself, is a prohibition of the use of physical or
moral compulsion, to extort communications
from him, not an exclusion of his body as
evidence, when it may be material. The
objection, in principle, would forbid a jury
(court) to look at a person and compare his
features with a photograph in proof. Moreover
we are not considering how far a court would go
in compelling a man to exhibit himself, for when
he is exhibited, whether voluntarily or by order,
even if the order goes too far, the evidence if
material, is competent.
The prohibition contained in section 5 of
the Philippine Bill that a person shall not be
compelled to be a witness against himself, is
simply a prohibition against legal process to
extract from the defendant's own lips, against
his will, an admission of his guilt.
Mr. Wigmore, in his valuable work on
evidence, in discussing the question before us,
said:
If, in other words, it (the rule) created
inviolability not only for his [physical control] in
whatever form exercised, then it would be
possible for a guilty person to shut himself up in
his house, with all the tools and indicia of his
crime, and defy the authority of the law to
employ in evidence anything that might be
obtained by forcibly overthrowing his
possession and compelling the surrender of the
evidential articles a clear reductio ad
absurdum. In other words, it is not merely
compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, . .
. but testimonial compulsion. (4 Wigmore, sec.
2263.)
The main purpose of the provision of the
Philippine Bill is to prohibit compulsory oral
examination of prisoners before trial. or upon
trial, for the purpose of extorting unwilling
confessions or declarations implicating them in
the commission of a crime. (People vs. Gardner,
144 N. Y., 119.)
Constitutional Law II
The doctrine contended for by appellant
would prohibit courts from looking at the fact of
a defendant even, for the purpose of disclosing
his identity. Such an application of the
prohibition under discussion certainly could not
be permitted. Such an inspection of the bodily
features by the court or by witnesses, can not
violate the privilege granted under the
Philippine Bill, because it does not call upon the
accused as a witness it does not call upon the
defendant for his testimonial responsibility. Mr.
Wigmore says that evidence obtained in this
way from the accused, is not testimony but his
body his body itself.
The accused can be ordered to expel
the morphine from his mouth (U.S. v. Ong Sio
Hong 36 Phil 735, (1917)).
U.S. v. Ong Sio Hong 36 Phil 735, (1917)
Counsel for appellant raises the
constitutional question that the accused was
compelled to be a witness against himself. The
contention is that this was the result of forcing
the accused to discharge the morphine from his
mouth. To force a prohibited drug from the
person of an accused is along the same line as
requiring him to exhibit himself before the
court; or putting in evidence papers and other
articles taken from the room of an accused in
his absence; or, as in the Tan Teng case, taking
a substance from the body of the accused to be
used in proving his guilt. It would be a forced
construction of the paragraph of the Philippine
Bill of Rights in question to hold that any article,
substance, or thing taken from a person
accused of crime could not be given in
evidence. The main purpose of this
constitutional provision is to prohibit testimonial
compulsion by oral examination in order to
extort unwilling confessions from prisoners
implicating them in the commission of a crime.
(Harris vs. Coats [1885], 75 Ga., 415.)
The accused can be made to take off
her garments and shoes and be photographed.
(People v. Otadura, 96 Phil 244 (1950)).
A woman accused of adultery can be
compelled to show her body for physical
investigation to see if she is pregnant (Villaflor
v. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 (1920)). Viewed
against present standards, however, it is
possible that this method of determining
pregnancy would violate due process as being
too barbaric.
Villaflor v. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 (1920)
F: The facts are not dispute. In a criminal
case pending before the Court of First Instance
of the city of Manila, Emeteria Villaflor and
Florentino Souingco are charged with the crime
of adultery. The court ordered the defendant
Emeteria Villaflor, to submit her body to the
examination of one or two competent doctors to
determine if she was pregnant or not. The
accused refused to obey the order on the
ground that such examination of her person
was a violation of the constitutional provision
relating to self-incrimination. Thereupon she
was found in contempt of court and was
ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until
she should permit the medical examination
required by the court.
Issue: Whether the compelling of a woman to
permit her body to be examined by physicians
to determine if she is pregnant, violates that
portion of the Philippine Bill of Rights
Ruling: The constitutional guaranty, that no
person shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, is limited to a
prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-
incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is
that, an ocular inspection of the body of the
accused is permissible. The proviso is that
torture of force shall be avoided. Whether facts
fall within or without the rule with its corollary
and proviso must, of course, be decided as
cases arise.
It is a reasonable presumption that in an
examination by reputable and disinterested
physicians due care will be taken not to use
violence and not to embarass the patient any
more than is absolutely necessary. Indeed, no
objection to the physical examination being
made by the family doctor of the accused or by
doctor of the same sex can be seen.
The taking of footprint sample to see if it
matches the ones found in the scene of the
crime is allowed (People v. Salas and People v.
Sara).
However, making the accused take
dictation to get a specimen of her handwriting
is not allowed, for this involves the use of the
mental process. [Bermudez v. Castillo, 64 Phil.
485 (1937).]
Bermudez v. Castillo, 64 Phil. 485 (1937)
F: In connection with this administrative
case, said respondent filed, six letters which, for
purposes of identification, were marked as
Exhibits 32, 34, 35, 36 and 37. He contends that
said six letters are the complainant's, but the
latter denied it while she was testifying as a
witness in rebuttal.
Constitutional Law II
Respondent required complainant to
copy the letters in her own handwriting in the
presence of the investigator. The complainant,
refused invoking her right not to incriminate
herself. The investigator, upholding the
complainant, did not compel her to submit to
the trial required, thereby denying the
respondent's petition.
Issue: Whether or not the complainant may be
forced to make a copy of the letters in her own
handwriting
Ruling: No. It would violate her right against
self- incrimination.
The constitution provides: "No person
shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself." It should be noted that before it was
attempted to require the complainant to copy
the six documents above-stated, she had sworn
to tell the truth before the investigator
authorized to receive statements under oath,
and under said oath she asserted that the
documents in question had not been written by
her. Were she compelled to write and were it
proven by means of what she might write later
that said documents had really been written by
her, it would be impossible for her to evade
prosecution for perjury.
The reason for the privilege appears
evident. The purpose thereof is positively to
avoid and prohibit thereby the repetition and
recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure
of compelling a person, in a criminal or any
other case, to furnish the missing evidence
necessary for his conviction. If such is its
purpose, then the evidence must be sought
elsewhere; and if it is desired to discover
evidence in the person himself, then he must be
promised and assured at least absolute
immunity by one authorized to do so legally, or
he should be asked, one for all, to furnish such
evidence voluntarily without any condition. This
court is of the opinion that in order that the
constitutional provision under consideration
may prove to be a real protection and not a
dead letter, it must be given a liberal and broad
interpretation favorable to the person invoking
it.
In view of the foregoing consideration
and holding, as it is hereby held, that the
complainant is perfectly entitled to the privilege
invoked by her, the respondent's petition is
denied.
Also requiring the accused to reenact
the crime is not allowed, for this also involves
the mental process.
People v. Olvis, 154 SCRA 525
F: Villarojo, Cademas and Sorela were
convicted in the lower court of murder for the
death of Bagon. Olvis, the alleged principal by
inducement, was acquitted. The three accused
were convicted on the basis of the extrajudicial
confessions executed by them in the presence
of a counsel summoned by the NBI to handle
appellants' case, and the reenactment done by
them of the circumstances surrounding the
killing.
RULING: The extrajudicial confessions are
inadmissible. They were made in the presence
of a counsel summoned by the NBI and not of
appellants' own choice. He cannot therefore be
said to have been acting on behalf of the
accused when he lent his presence at the
confession proceedings.
But the accused were denied their right
to counsel not once but twice when they were
forced to re-enact the crime. Forced re-
enactments like uncounselled and coerced
confessions come within the ban against self-
incrimination. This constitutional privilege has
been defined as a protection against testimonial
compulsion but this has since been extended to
any evidence communicative in nature acquired
under circumstances of duress. Essentially, the
right is meant to avoid and prohibit positively
the repetition and recurrence of the certainly
inhuman procedure of compelling a person, in a
criminal or any other case, to furnish the
missing evidence necessary for his conviction.
People v. Go, 237 SCRA 73
F: After a buy-bust operation accused were
arrested by the police. Upon the presentation
of a search warrant, the house of the accused
was searched, and several prohibited drugs
were seized. They were charged with and
convicted of violation of the Dangerous Drugs
law. They contended that they had not been
shown a search warrant. In concluding that a
search warrant had been presented to the
accused prior to the search, the trial court relied
on a document entitiled “Certificate of Re-
conduct of Search”, signed by the accused.
ISSUE: Whether or not such document is
admissible in evidence.
RULING: IT CANNOT BE ADMITTED IN ITS
ENTIRETY.
The second paragraph of the
Certification amounts to an implied admission
that shabu, the marked money, and shabu
papaphernalia had been found by the police
authorities at the residence of the Go spouses
and therefore, subject to the control and
custody of the accused (the spouses) and
necessarily in their possession. To this extent,
the “Certification” is a declaration against the
Constitutional Law II
interest and tacit admission of the crime
charged. The second paragraph of the
Certification is a self-incriminatory statment
made at a time when the spouses were not
assisted by counsel and under circumstances
(in the course of or immediately after the
search of the residence and seizure of
quantities of shabu) which render intelligent
waiver of their right against self-incrimination
open to serious doubt.
The Court considers that there is
nothing to prevent admission of the
“Certification” to substantiate the fact that a
search warrant issued by a judge had been
brought to the attention of the spouses in the
course of the raid or buy-bust operation carried
out at their residence and that in the course
thereof, no force or intimidation had been
exercised upon the spouses.
Notwithstanding such, the accused were
convicted of the crime charged against them.
2. In what proceedings available
The privilege is available in any
proceedings, even outside the court, for they
may eventually lead to a criminal prosecution.
In Pascual v. Board of Medical
Examiners, 28 SCRA 344 (1969), the SC held
that the privilege against self-incrimination
extends to administrative proceedings which
possess a criminal or penal aspect. In this case,
it was held that a doctor who was being
investigated by a medical board for alleged
malpractice and would lose his license if found
guilty, could not be compelled to take the
witness stand without his consent.
Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA
344 (1969)
F: Arsenio Pascual, Jr., petitioner-appellee,
filed on February 1, 1965 with the Court of First
Instance of Manila an action for prohibition with
prayer for preliminary injunction against the
Board of Medical Examiners, now respondent-
appellant. It was alleged therein that at the
initial hearing of an administrative case for
alleged immorality, counsel for complainants
announced that he would present as his first
witness herein petitioner- appellee, who was the
respondent in such malpractice charge.
Thereupon, petitioner-appellee, through
counsel, made of record his objection, relying
on the constitutional right to be exempt from
being a witness against himself. Respondent-
appellant, the Board of Examiners, took note of
such a plea, at the same time stating that at the
next scheduled hearing, on February 12, 1965,
petitioner-appellee would be called upon to
testify as such witness, unless in the meantime
he could secure a restraining order from a
competent authority.
A decision was rendered by the lower
court on August 2, 1965, finding the claim of
petitioner-appellee to be well-founded and
prohibiting respondent Board "from compelling
the petitioner to act and testify as a witness for
the complainant in said investigation without
his consent and against himself."
HELD: Petitioner could suffer the revocation of
his license as a medical practitioner, for some
an even greater deprivation.
Why it should be thus is not difficult to
discern. The constitutional guarantee, along
with other rights granted an accused, stands for
a belief that while crime should not go
unpunished and that the truth must be
revealed, such desirable objectives should not
be accomplished according to means or
methods offensive to the high sense of respect
accorded the human personality. More and
more in line with the democratic creed, the
deference accorded an individual even those
suspected of the most heinous crimes is given
due weight. To quote from Chief Justice Warren,
"the constitutional foundation underlying the
privilege is the respect a government ... must
accord to the dignity and integrity of its
citizens."
Thus according to Justice Douglas: "The
Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause
enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy
which government may not force to surrender
to his detriment." So also with the observation
of the late Judge Frank who spoke of "a right to
a private enclave where he may lead a private
life. That right is the hallmark of our
democracy." In the light of the above, it could
thus clearly appear that no possible objection
could be legitimately raised against the
correctness of the decision now on appeal. We
hold that in an administrative hearing against a
medical practitioner for alleged malpractice,
respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot,
consistently with the self-incrimination clause,
compel the person proceeded against to take
the witness stand without his consent.
In Galman v. Pamaran, infra, the
privilege was held to extend to fact-finding
investigation by an adhoc body.
Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274 (1985)
A person can be compelled to testify provided
he is given immunity co-extensive with the
privilege against self- incrimination
F: The respondents led by General Fabian
Ver and Major General Prospero Olivas testified
before the Agrava Board looking into the killing
Constitutional Law II

of former Senator Benigno Aquino. They were
subsequently accused of murder in two cases
for the killing of Sen. Aquino and Rolando
Galman. They were charged as accessories in
both. The prosecution offered in evidence the
testimony of Ver and Olivas before the Agrava
Board, but on the latter's objections, the
Sandiganbayan excluded the testimony. The
private and public prosecutions filed petitions
for certiorari.
HELD: The persons summoned to testify before
the Agrava Board were "under investigation for
the commission of the offense" within the
meaning of Art. III, sec. 12. It is to be noted that
the framers of the Constitution did not adopt
the Miranda reference to "custodial
investigation." The subject matter dealt with
and the questioning before the Agrava Board
indubitably evinced purposes other than merely
determining the surrounding facts and
circumstances of the assassination. The
respondents were called to determine their
probable involvement in the crime. Yet they
were not informed or at the very least warned
of their right to remain silent and that any
statement given by them may be used against
them. The first portion of Sec. 5 of PD 1886
denied them the right to remain silent, and
gave power to the Board to punish refusal to
testify. The SC said it is not satisfied that when
they testified they waived their constitutional
right not be compelled to be a witness against
themselves, much less their right to remain
silent. The SC also said it cannot be contended
that the privilege against self- incrimination
applies only to criminal prosecutions. Art. III,
sec. 17 of the Const. provides that "No person
shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself."
of a witness. The problem concerns the extent
of immunity that the State must grant in order
to protect the privilege against self-
incrimination.
Transactional Immunity
In a transactional immunity, a person is
given immunity from prosecution of the crime in
connection with which he gave his testimony.
The immunity is from the prosecution, not
merely from the use of the testimony. Thus,
even if the guilt of the person testifying can be
proven by independent means, he can not be
prosecuted anymore.
Use and Fruit Immunity
In a use and fruit immunity, a person is
exempted from the use of his testimony as well
as the leads (fruits) that the testimony opened
up in a criminal prosecution arising from what
he testified on. The immunity in this case is
from the testimony given. Thus, if the state can
procure evidence, independent of the testimony
and its fruits, it can prosecute the person
testifying nevertheless.
History in the United States
In Councilman v. Hitchcock (1892), the
SC ruled that the only way to respect the right
against self-incrimination is to give
transactional immunity; anything less violates
the constitutional right.
Thus, Congress in 1893 passed the
Compulsory Testimony Act, providing for
transactional immunity.

In 1964, the U.S. SC in Murphy v.

Compare People v. Ayson, 175 SCRA 216
(1989), supra.
3. "Use and Fruit Immunity"
"Transactional Immunity"
When the State requires testimony to be
made before a board or body, it has to grant
immunity by means of law to the persons
testifying, so as not to violate their right against
self-incriminatrion. This is the only way to
reconcile two conflicting values; public interest
to get certain relevant information, say, to
legislation, that can only be supplied by the
testimony of certain persons and the highly
primed constitutional right not to make a
person a witness against himself.
Through an immunity statute, the state
in effect exchanges immunity for the testimony
Waterfront Commission of New York hinted that
it was not really necessary to give transactional
immunity in order to protect the right against
self incrimination.
v.
This gave the U.S. Congress the cue to
revise the Compulsory Testimony Act and
provide for a "use and fruit immunity".
With the validity of this limited immunity
was raised, the SC in Castigas v. U.S. and
Zicarelli v. U.S. ruled that the right is amply
protected by the use and fruit immunity.
In the Philippines
There is no fixed rule in the Philippines.
"Transactional immunity" can be found in the
following:
Constitutional Law II
Art. XIII, Sec. 18. The Commission
on Human Rights shall have the following
powers and functions
xxx
(8) Grant immunity from
prosecution to any person whose
testimony or possession of documents or
other evidence is necessary or convenient
to determine the truth in any investigation
conducted by it or under its authority.
Use and Fruit Immunity
On the other hand, "use and fruit
immunity can be found in P.D. 1886, which
created the Agrava Fact Finding Board, and
which was the subject-matter of Galman v.
Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274 (1985).
In this case, Ver and other high-ranking
AFP officials were made to testify before the
Agrava Board investigating the double murder
of Sen. Aquino and Galman. Under P.D.1886,
every person summoned by the Board has to
appear and testify on pain of being held in
contempt. Any testimony made, in turn, was
exempted from being "used" in a criminal
prosecution. Despite this however, a case was
file against Ver in the Sandiganbayan, and one
of the evidence presented was the testimony he
made before the Board. When objected to, the
Sandiganbayan sustained the objection. And so
the matter was raised to the SC on certiorari.
The SC held that the testimony could
not be used in a subsequent proceeding. it
hinted that were it not for the provision in the
decree conmpelling attendance and testimony
on pain of being held in contempt, the accused
could have invoked the right against self-
incrimination. But since the state needed the
testimony, it gave them immunity and so now,
the State must honor its obligation and disallow
the use of the testimony in the criminal
prosecution.
Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274 (1985),
supra.
HELD: Immunity statutes may be generally
classified into two: one, which grants "use
immunity" and the other, which grants what is
known as "transactional immunity." The
distinction between the two is: "Use immunity"
prohibits use of a witness' compelled testimony
and its fruits in any manner in connection with
the criminal prosecution of the witness. On the
other hand, "transactional immunity" grants
immunity to the witness from prosecution for an
offense to which his compelled testimony
relates. PD 1886, sec. 5 grants merely immunity
from use of any statement given before the
Board, but not immunity from prosecution by
reason or on the basis thereof. VV
4. Exclusionary rule
Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx
(3) Any confession or admission
obtained in violationof this or Section 17
hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.
The paradigmatic application of the
exclusionary rule is a traditionally coerced
confession, and not so much on uncounselled
statement. A fortiori, testimony forced out of a
person cannot be used in evidence against that
person.
5. Effect of denial of the privilege by
court
When the privilege against self-
incrimination is violated outside of court, say,
by the police, then the testimony, as already
noted, is not admissible under the exclusionary
rule.
When the privilege is violated by the
court itself, that is, by the judge, the court is
ousted of its jurisdiction, all its proceedings are
null and void, and it is as if no judgment has
been rendered. A classic case is Chavez v.
Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 663 (1968).
Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 663 (1968)
F: The thrust of petitioner's case presented
in his original and supplementary petitions
invoking jurisdiction of this Court is that he is
entitled, on habeas corpus, to be freed from
imprisonment upon the ground that in the trial
which resulted in his conviction he was denied
his constitutional right not to be compelled to
testify against himself. There is his prayer, too,
that, should he fail in this, he be granted the
alternative remedies of certiorari to strike down
the two resolutions of the Court of Appeals
dismissing his appeal for failure to file brief, and
of mandamus to direct the said court to forward
his appeal to this Court for the reason that he
was raising purely questions of law.
Accused Chavez was made to testify
as a witness for the prosecution without him
being considered a state witness inspite of
objections by his counsel.
Roger Chavez was found guilty. The
court had this to say: "Roger Chavez does not
offer any defense. As a matter of fact, his
testimony as witness for the prosecution
establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt."
The trial court branded him "a self- confessed
culprit".
Constitutional Law II
Issue: Whether or not Chavez right against self-
incrimination was violated
Ruling: YES
The right agianst self-incrimination is
"not merely a formal technical rule the
enforcement of which is left to the discretion of
the court"; it is mandatory; it secures to a
defendant a valuable and substantive right; it
is fundamental to our scheme of justice.
The constitutional proscription was
established on broad grounds of public policy
and humanity; of policy because it would place
the witness against the strongest temptation to
commit perjury, and of humanity because it
would be to extort a confession of truth by a
kind of duress every species and degree of
which the law abhors.
Therefore, the court may not extract
from a defendant's own lips and against his will
an admission of his guilt. Nor may a court as
much as resort to compulsory disclosure,
directly or indirectly, of facts usable against him
as a confession of the crime or the tendency of
which is to prove the commission of a crime.
Because, it is his right to forego testimony, to
remain silent, unless he chooses to take the
witness stand with undiluted, unfettered
exercise of his own free, genuine will.
Compulsion as it is understood here
does not necessarily connote the use of
violence; it may be the product of unintentional
statements. Pressure which operates to
overbear his will, disable him from making a
free and rational choice, or impair his capacity
for rational judgment would in our opinion be
sufficient. So is moral coercion "tending to force
testimony from the unwilling lips of the
defendant."
Petitioner, as accused, occupies a
different tier of protection from an ordinary
witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be
compelled to take the witness stand and claim
the privilege as each question requiring an
incriminating answer is shot at him, and
accused may altogether refuse to take the
witness stand and refuse to answer any and all
questions. For, in reality, the purpose of calling
an accused as a witness for the People would be
to incriminate him.
xxx With all these, we have no
hesitancy in saying that petitioner was forced to
testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of
his constitutional right to remain silent. It
cannot be said now that he has waived his right.
He did not volunteer to take the stand and in
his own defense; he did not offer himself as a
witness; on the contrary, he claimed the right
upon being called to testify. If petitioner
nevertheless answered the questions inspite of
his fear of being accused of perjury or being put
under contempt, this circumstance cannot be
counted against him. His testimony is not of his
own choice. To him it was a case of compelled
submission. He was a cowed participant in
proceedings before a judge who possessed the
power to put him under contempt had he
chosen to remain silent. Nor could he escape
testifying. The court made it abundantly clear
that his testimony at least on direct
examination would be taken right then and
thereon the first day of the trial.
The course which petitioner takes is
correct. Habeas corpus is a high prerogative
writ. It is traditionally considered as an
exceptional remedy to release a person whose
liberty is illegally restrained such as when the
accused's constitutional rights are disregarded.
Such defect results in the absence or loss of
jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial
and the consequent conviction of the accused
whose fundamental right was violated. That
void judgment of conviction may be challenged
by collateral attack, which precisely is the
function of habeas corpus. Habeas corpus is
proper to challenge a conviction where the
consitutional rights of the accused were
violated.
A court which denies the accused of his
constitutional rights is ousted of its jurisdiction.
The judgment of conviction pronounced by a
court without jurisdiction is void, and one
imprisoned thereunder may obtain release of
habeas corpus.
Notes on the case: In this case, the
accused Chavez was compelled by the judge
with the threat of being held in contempt to
take the witness stand, in spite of his objection
that he had the right to remain silent and not to
be a witness against himself. And so he took
the witness stand and was convicted by
qualified theft. He appealed but the lawyer
failed to file the appellant's brief and so the
appeal was dismissed, the judgment became
final and executory, and he served his
sentence. Years later, Chavez went to the SC
on habeas corpus, contending that his
convictioin was void because it was rendered on
the basis of evidence obtained in the violation
of his right against self- incrimination. The SC
granted the petition and released him.
Habeas Corpus, as shown by this case,
is an extraordinary post-conviction, mid-
sentence, remedy. The petition for habeas
corpus is such that it inquires into all questions
of illegal detention. When the judge compelled
the accused to take the witness stand, he was
ousted of his jurisdiction and all subsequent
proceedings became void. Ultimately, the
judgment of conviction and even the sentence
were likewise void, thus making the detention
of Chavez illegal, and thus actionable by
habeas corpus.
Constitutional Law II
The case also illustrates the difference
between the ordinary witness and the accused.
A witness can be conmpelled to take the stand;
he can only object to the questions as they
come, invoking his right against self-
incrimination.
But in the case of the accused, he
cannot even be made to take the witness stand,
for the only purpose of such is to incriminate
him.
Of course, the moment the accused
agrees to take the stand, he is deemed to have
waived his right, and must now thus submit
himself to cross-examination.
E. Right to an impartial tribunal and trial
of civilians by military courts
Animas v. Minister of National Defense, 146
SCRA 406 (1986)
F: This petition challenges the
jurisdiction of a military tribunal to try twelve
accused persons, only one of whom is in the
military, for the offense devoid of any national
security or political complexion and committed
long before the proclamation of martial law,
The petitioners were charged with
murder in connection with the alleged killing of
Yanson, a political leader,during the November
11 elections.
The accused were arrested almost a
year later, on September 21, 1972 after martial
law was proclaimed. It was only in 1974 that a
"summary preliminary investigation" was
conducted by a PC captain belonging to the
Judge Advocate General Service. The petitioners
were recommended for prosecution before the
Military Tribunal, considering that one of them,
petitioner Sgt. Rodolfo Animas is a military
personnel. Thereafter, the Judge Advocate
General filed the corresponding charge sheet,
but he modified the crime charged from
"Murder" to "Violation of Section 878 of the
Revised Administrative Code" in Relation to
Section 2692 of the same Code and Presidential
Decree No. 9, " Illegal Possession of Firearms
with Murder."
On February 16, 1978, the Minister of
National Defense referred the case to the
Military Tribunal's Branch of the Judge Advocate
General's Office (JAGO) which in turn assigned
the same to respondent Military Commission
No. 27.
Issue: Whether or not Military Commission No.
27 is without jurisdiction over the criminal case
Ruling: The military court is without jurisdiction.
We apply the rule in Rolando A. de
Guzman v. Hon. Alejandro R. Leopando, et al,
(G.R. No. 62798, December 22, 1983 and March
13, 1984) where the lone military personnel was
ordered tried together with 19 civilians accused
before a civil court. It is also clear from the
records that the acts for which Sgt. Animas was
charged had nothing to do with the
performance of official duty.
The crime for which the petitioners were
charged was committed on November 10, 1971
long before the proclamation of martial law.
There was no question about the case being
prosecuted by civilian fiscals and tried by civil
courts at the time. Now that it is already late
1986, and martial law is a thing of the past,
hopefully never more to return, there is no
more reason why a murder committed in 1971
should still be retained, at this time, by a
military tribunal.
Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34,
150 SCRA 144
Military trial of civilians void even under Martial
Law if the civil courts are open
F: Petitioners were found guilty of
subversion by the respondent military
commission and sentenced to death. They filed
a petition for habeas corpus, certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus before the SC,
questioning the jurisdiction of the military
tribunal.
HELD: In Aquino v. Military Commission (1975),
the SC held that "Martial law creates and
exception to the general rules of exclusive
jurisdiction, and renders offenses against the
laws of war as well as those of a civil character,
triable by military tribunals.xxx" Due process,
however demands that in all criminal cases
prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to,
among others, a trial. As explained by Justice
Teehankee in his dissenting opinion in Aquino v.
Military Commission supra: "Judicial power is
vested by the Constitution exclusively in the SC
and insuch inferior courts as are established by
law. Judicial power exists only in the courts
which have the exlcusive power to hear and
determine those matters which affect the life or
liberty or property of a citizen." Since we are
not an enemy occupied territory and even on
the premise that martial continues in force, the
military tribunals cannot try and exercise
jurisdiction over civilians for civil offenses
committed by them which are properly
cognizable by the civil courts.
xxx
"The presiding officer at a court martial
is not a judge whose objectivity and
independence are protected by tenure and
undiminshed salary and nurtured by the judicial
tradition, but is a military officer. Substantially
different rules of evidence and procedure apply
in military trials. Apart from these differences,
Constitutional Law II
the suggestion of the possibility of influence on
the actions of the court-martial by the officer
who convenes it, selects its members and the
counsel on both sides, and who usually has
direct command and authority over its
members is a pervasive one in military laws,
despite strenuous efforts to eliminate the
danger. VV.
Cruz v. Ponce-Enrile, 160 SCRA 702 (1988)
F: Habeas corpus proceedings were
commenced in this Court on October 1, 1986 to
test the legality of the continued detention of
some 217 so-called "political detainees
arrested in the nine-year span of official martial
rule and committed to the New Bilibid Prisons in
Muntinlupa. All had been made to stand trial for
common crimes before various courts martial;
if any of these offenses had any political color,
this had neither been pleaded nor proved.
Of the 217 prisoners, 157 are
civilians, and only 26 confirmed as military
personnel.
Issue: Whether or not military courts have
jurisdiction over civilians
Ruling: No
As held in Olaguer: A military
jurisdiction or tribunal cannot try and exercise
jurisdiction, even during the period of martial
law, over civilians for offenses allegedly
committed by them as long as the civil courts
are open and functioning, and that any
judgment rendered by such body relating to a
civilian is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on
the part of the military tribunal concerned
The fact cannot be ignored, however,
that crimes appear to have been committed,
and there are accusations against herein
petitioners for those offenses. Olaguer cannot
and does not operate to absolve the petitioners
of these charges, or establish that the same are
baseless, so as to entitle them to immediate
release from detention. It is not to be forgotten
that the victims in offenses ascribed to the
petitioners have as much interest as the State
has to prosecute the alleged authors of the
misdeeds. Justice will be better served if the
detention of such of the petitioners as are not
hereby ordered released or excepted, is
continued until their cases are transferred to
the ordinary courts having jurisdiction, and the
necessary informations have been filed against
them therein, as has already been done in the
case of petitioners Imperial D. Usman and Samu
Gumal. The State should be given a reasonable
period of time to accomplish this transfer, at
which time the petitioners may apply for bail for
their temporary release.
The Solicitor General not unreasonably
anticipates questions to arise as to the
availability of certain defenses to the petitioners
upon their prosecution before the civil courts. It
seems evident, however, that no breach of the
constitutional prohibition against twice putting
an accused in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense would result from the retrial of
the petitioners" cases, for the simple reason
that the absence of jurisdiction of the courts
martial to try and convict the petitioners
prevented the first jeopardy from attaching.
Valid previous proceedings are required in order
that the defense of double jeopardy can be
raised by the accused in the second
prosecution.
G. Bills of attainder-- Legislative
adjudication of guilt
Bill of Attainder
A "bill of attainder" is a law which
substitutes the legislative determination of guilt
for a judicial determination. Through a statute,
the legislature finds individuals or groups guilty,
without the benefit of being proven so in court.
A bill of attainder is of two kinds: (i) bill
of attainder proper (legislative imposition of the
death penalty) and (ii) bill of pains and
penalties (imposition of a lesser penalty).
In People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 (1972),
the Anti-Subversion Law (RA 1700) which
declared the Communist Party of the Philippines
a clear and present danger to Philippine
security, and thus prohibited membership in
such organization, was contended to be a bill of
attainder. The SC, however, dismissed the
contention, holding that although the law
mentions the CPP in particular, its purpose is
not to define a crime but only to lay a basis or
to justify the legislative determination that
membership in such organization is a crime
because of the clear and present danger to
national security.
People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 (1972)
F: Posed in issue in these two cases is the
constitutionality of the Anti-Subversion Act,
which outlaws the Communist Party and other
"subversive associations", and punishes any
person who "knowingly, willfully and by overt
acts affiliates himself, with, becomes or remains
a member," of the Party and of any other
similar "subversive" organization.
ISSUE: W/N this law is a bill of attainder.
Constitutional Law II
HELD: NO
A bill of attainder is a legislative act
which inflicts punishment without trial. Its
essence is the substitution of a legislative for a
judicial determination of guilt. The
constitutional ban against bill of attainder
serves to implement the principle of separation
of powers by confining legislatures to rule-
making and thereby forestalling legislative
usurpation of the judicial function.
When the Act is viewed in its actual
operation, it will be seen that it does not specify
the Communist Party of the Phils (CPP) of the
members thereof for the purpose of
punishment. What it does is simply to declare
the Party to an organized conspiracy for the
overthrow of the Government for the purposes
of the prohibition against membersip in the
outlawed organization. The term "CPP" is used
solely for definition purposes. In fact the Act
applies not only to the CPP but to "any other
organizatuiion having the same purposes and
their successors". Its focus is not on individuals
but on conduct.
Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a
bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary
to charge Communists in court, as the law
alone, without more would suffice to secure
their punishement. But the undeniable fact is
that their guilt still has to be judicially
established. The Government has yet to prove
at the trial that the accused joined the Party
knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that
they joined with the specific intent to further its
basic objectives.
H. Right to a speedy disposition of cases
Art. III, Sec. 16. All persons shall
have the right to a speedy disposition of
their cases before all judicial, quasi-
judicial, or administrative bodies.
The right to a speedy disposition of
cases complements the right to a speedy trial.
After the case has been submitted for decision,
so that technically the trial stage is terminated,
the Constitution mandates that the judicial,
quasi- judicial or administrative body or tribunal
must decide the case consistent with the right
of the accused to a speedy disposition of his
case.
To carry out this mandate, the
Constitution in several other places provides
periods for deciding a case:
The Supreme Court has to decide cases
within 24 months from the date of submission
of the case for decision which is the date of
filing of the last pleading [Art. VIII, Sec. 15 (1).]
III. SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS UNDER THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE
A. What acts cannot be criminalized
1. Mere beliefs and aspirations
Art. III, Sec. 18. (1) No person
shall be detained solely by reason of his
political beliefs and aspirations.
2. Debts and civil obligations
Art. III. Sec. 20. No person shall be
imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a
poll tax.
What the law prohibits is imprisonment
for non-payment of a contractual obligation.
When one is convicted of estafa and
sent to prison, the imprisonment is not for the
non- payment of debt but for the deceit or
abuse of confidence employed by the convict.
Thus, in Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA
123 (1986), the SC again upheld Batas Blg. 22
(Bouncing Checks Law) as not unconsitutional
for being violative of the rule against non-
imprisonment for debt. It is true that under this
law deceit is not necessary. It is, however, a
valid exercise of the State of its power to
determine what acts constitute a crime.
What the Consitution further prohibits is
imprisonment for non-payment of poll tax,
which is a tax imposed on certain persons
regardless of their property or business. The
prohibition does not apply to non-payment of
property taxes and taxes on privilege.
Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323 (1986)
F: BP 22 punishes any person "who
makes or draws and issues any check on
account or for value, knowing at the time
of issue that he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
the payment of said check in full upon
presentment, which check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds xxx" Petitioners
challenged the constitutionality of BP 22
on the following grounds: 1) It offends the
constitutional provision prohibiting
imprisonment for debt; 2) it impairs
freedom of contract; 3) it contravenes the
Constitutional Law II
equal protection clause; 4) it unduly
delegates legislative and executive
powers; and 5) its enactment is flawed
because the Interim Batasan prohibited
amendment of the bill on 3rd reading.
HELD: The gravamen of the offense
punished in BP 22 is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check or a check that
is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. It is not the non- payment of an
obligation which the law punishes. The
law punishes the act not as an offense
against property but as an offense against
public order. Recent statistics show that
one third of the entire money supply of
the country consists of currency in
circulation. These demand deposits in the
banks constitute the funds against which
commercial papers are drawn. The
amount concerned justifies the legitimate
concern of the state in preserving the
integrity of the banking system.
3. Acts which when done were innocent
Art. III, Sec. 22. No ex post facto
law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
Ex Post Facto Law
An "ex post facto law" is a law that seeks
to punish an act which, when committed, was
not yet a crime or was not as heavily punished.
It is a law that retroacts to the day of the act so
as to cause prejudice to the person performing
the act. Its unfairness consists in the fact that
the person could not have known the act was
criminal, and thus could not have avoided the
crime. When a law is more favorable to the
accused, however, it is allowed to retroact.
In re Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., 35 SCRA 428
F: This petition for declaratory was filed by
Kay Villegas Kami Inc., claiming to be a duly
recognized non-stock and non-profit corporation
created under the laws of the land, and praying
for the detremination of the validity of Sec. 8,
RA 6132 and a declaration of petitioner's right s
and duties thereunder. Petitioner claims that
the challenged provision constitutes an ex post
facto law.
ISSUE: W/N it is an ex post facto law.
HELD: NO
An ex post facto law is one which:
1. Makes criminal an act done before
the passage of the law which was innocent
when done, and punishes such an act;
2. Aggravates a crime , or makes it
greater than it was, when committed;
3. Changes the punishment and inflicts
a greater punishment than the law annexed to
the crime when committed;
4. Alters the legal rules of evidence,
and authorizes conviction upon less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of
the commission of the offense;
5. Assuming to regulate civil rights and
remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or
deprivation of a right for something which when
done was lawful; and
6. Deprives a person accused of a crime
of some lawful protection to which he has
become entitled, such as the protection of a
former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty. [Quoting Mekin v.
Wolfe, 2 Phil. 74 (1902)]
This constitutional prohibition refers
only to criminal laws which are given
retroactive effect.
While it is true that Sec. 18 penalizes a
violation of any provisin of RA 6132 including
Sec. 8(a) thereof, the penalty is imposed only
for acts committed after the approval of the law
and not those perpetrated prior thereto. There
is nothing in the law that remotely insinuates
that its provisions shall apply to acts carried
out prior to its approval.
B. What punishments cannot be imposed
1. Involuntary servitude
Art. III, Sec. 18 (2) No involuntary
sevitudes in any form shall exist, except
as a punishment for a crime whereof the
party shall have been convicted.
2. Excessive fines
Art. III, Sec. 19. (1) Excessive
fines shall not be imposed. nor cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment
inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty
be imposed, unless for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the Congress
hereafter provides for it. Any death
penalty already imposed shall be reduced
to reclusion perpetua.
3. Cruel, degrading and inhuman
punishments
Art. III, Sec. 19. (1) Excessive
fines shall not be imposed. nor cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment
inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty
be imposed, unless for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the Congress
hereafter provides for it. Any death
Constitutional Law II
penalty already imposed shall be reduced
to reclusion perpetua.
Id., Sec. 12. xxx
(2) No torture, force, violence,
threat, intimidation, or any other means
which vitiate the free will shall be used
against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar
forms of detention are prohibited.
Assuming that judgment has been
rendered and the accused has been convicted
the Constitution now further prescribes certain
standards as to the punishment that can be
meted out. After all, due process prohibits
barbaric and disproportionate penalties.
The employment of physical,
psychological or degrading punishment against
any prisoner or detainee, or the use of
substandard or inadequate penal facilities
under subhuman conditions, shall be dealt with
by law. [Art. III, Sec. 19 (2).]
In 1935, the prohibition was against
"cruel and unusual" penalty, in 1973; it was
against "cruel or unusual " penalty; in 1987, the
prohibition is against "cruel, degrading or
inhuman" punishment. The purpose in
changing the phraseology is to allow for
experimentation, and not to fix the concept of
what is cruel to the standards of the present
civilization, or those of antiquity. This notion is
supposed to expand and grow, so that what
today is considered as acceptable may in the
next generation be deemed as cruel penalty.
Whether the cruelty of a punishment
depends on its form or whether it depends on
its severity has been ambivalently answered by
the SC:
In People v. dela Cruz, 92 Phil. 900
(1953) the SC ruled that it was the form of
punishment as fixed in antiquity (pillory
desembowelment, etc.) and not its severity,
that constituted "cruel and unusual" penalty
under the 1935 Constitution. Thus a An accused is presumed innocent until
disproportionate penalty (10 years
imprisonment for theft) is not cruel or unusual
because it is only a matter of severity of an
acceptable form of punishment (imprisonment).
The SC spoke in a different way in
People v. Borja 91 SCRA 340 (1979), Borja was
sentenced and he served at the national
penitentiary for 20 years before the case came
to the SC. The Court said that Borja had been
living in the shadow of death. Although the
sentence was initially valid, it had become cruel
by the lapse of time. And yet, this was a form
of penalty that was neither cruel nor unusual.
People v. Munoz, 170 SCRA 107 (1989)
F: The accused are four of the 11
bodyguards of a mayor who killed three persons
on suspicion that they were cattle rustlers. They
were found guilty of murder. Three appealed to
the SC which found them equally liable for the
killing. The penalty for murder under the RPC is
reclusion temporal to death. The question
concerns the penalty to be imposed in view of
Art. III, sec. 19 which provides that "Neither
shall the death penalty be imposed, unless for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes,
Congress provides for it. Any death penalty
already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua."
HELD: Art. III, section 19 does not change the
periods of the penalty prescribed by Art. 248 of
the RPC except insofar as it prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty adn reduces it
to reclusion perpetua. The range of medium and
minimum penalties remain the same. VV.
People v. Lubreo, 200 SCRA 11 (1991)
F: A complaint for homicide was filed with
MTC of Del Carmen, Surigao del Norte, charging
Remelito Lubreo along with crime of Homicide
in connection with the killing of Mamerto
Sanico. Judge Gorgolon of said court conducted
both the preliminary investigation and
preliminary examination. Thereafter, he
forwarded the records of the case to the Office
of Provincial Fiscal. The fiscal conducted his
own PI and on the basis thereof, he filed an
information for murder not only against remelito
but also against Lucresio Lubreo. Trial Court
find them guilty of the crime charged.
ISSUE: W/N the constituional presumption of
innocence in favor of Lucrecio has been
overturned by the prosecution
HELD: NO.
the contrary is proved. The burden of proof is
upon the prosecution and until such burden is
sufficiently discharged , the accused continues
to enjoy the presumption of innocence. In the
instant case, the lower court convicted Lucrecio
on the basis of its conclusion that he was
positively identified by witnesses Nenita Monter
and Epifanio Pangatungan as one of the
assailants, and that therefore, his defense of
alibi would not prosper. Unfortunately, the
testimonies of the abovementioned witnesses
did not categorically stated or proved that
Lucrecio took part in hacking the victim.
Constitutional Law II
Though Monter categorically stated in
her direct examination that she saw the
accused Lucresio hacking the victim, in the "re-
enactmment", she however candidly informed
the court Lucresio was just standing by and she
could not remmenber as to who actually hacked
the victim. From her version, the participation
of Lucrecio is at one enveloped inserious doubt.
It is worse in the case of Pangatungan. While
he stated that "Lucrecio abetted in hacking as if
they will come one after the other in hacking
his mind (sic) and the neck", he never
elaborated as to what "abetted in hacking "
means. He could not even specify the part of
the body of Mamerto which was hit by
Lucrecio.
There is evidently insufficient evidence
to show the actual participation of Lucresio in
teh crime. There being no evidence of
conspiracy, he cannot be held for the acts of his
co- appellant.
4. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado and other forms of
detention and the use of substandard or
inadequate penal facilities
Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx
(2) No torture, force, violence,
threat, intimidation, or any other means
which vitiate the free will shall be used
against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar
forms of detention are prohibited.
Id., Sec. 19. xxx
(2) The employment of physical,
psychological, or degrading punishment
against any prisoner or detainee or the
use of substandard or inadequate penal
facilities under subhuman conditions shall
be dealt with by law.
5. Indefinite Imprisonments
People v. Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90 (1989),
supra.
C. The protection against double jeopardy
Art. III, Sec. 21. No person shall be
twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense. If an act is punished by
a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a
bar to another prosecution for the same
act.
Elements of double jeopardy, (Rule 117, Sec 7;
People v. Obsania, 23 SCRA 249 (1968):
(1) Court of competent jurisdiction;
(2) A Complaint or Information
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction;
(3) Arraignment and plea by the
Accused;
(4) Conviction, acquittal, or dismissal of
the case without the express consent, of
the accused.
Subsequent prosecution is barred for the
following:
(1) Same offense
(2) Attempt of the same offense
(3) Frustration of the same offense
(4) Offense necessarily included in the
1st offense (All the elements of the 2nd
constitute some of the elements of the 1st
offense)
(5) Offense that necessarily includes the
1st offense (All the elements of the 1st
constitute some of the elements of the 2nd
offense)
Exceptions to no. 5:
(1) The graver offense developed die to
"supervening facts" arising from the same act
or omission constituting the former charged.
Thus, in Melo v. People, 85 Phils. 766
(1950), the SC allowed the amnedment of the
information from its original cahrge of
frustrated homicide, because after the filing of
the information, the victim died.
(2) The facts constituting the graver
charge became known or were discovered only
after the filing of the former complaint or
information.
This overrules People v. Yorac, where
the SC disallowed the amendment of the
information from slight physical injuries to
frustrated murder after the prosecution
subjected the victim to another medical
examination and found a wound, that it was the
fault of the prosecution if they had an
incompetent medical examination.
(3) The plea of guilty to the lesser
offense was made without the consent of the
fiscal and the offended party.
Identity of offenses and identity of act
When an act gives rise to two or more
offense which are punished by the same
authority, and an individual is convicted,
acquitted, or the case dismissed without his
consent, of one of these offense (Crime A),
there is no double jeopardy if he is charged of
Constitutional Law II
another offfense (Crime B) flowing from the
same act. Double jeopardy arises only when he
is again charged of that same offense (Crime
A). Thus, this is called double jeopardy by
"identity of offenses".
But when an act which give rise to two
or more offenses is punished by two different
authorities (a law and an ordinance), then if an
individual is convicted, acquitted, or the case
dismissed without his consent, of any of these
offenses punished by one authority (Crime A by
law), even if he is charged of another offense
which is punished by the other auhtority (Crime
B by ordinance), there is double jeopardy,
because both offenses, one punished by a law
and the other punished by an ordinance, flowed
from the same act. Thus, this is called double
jeopardy by "identity of act."
Sum: If only a law in involved, there is
double jeopardy only when there is an identity
of offenses. But is a law and an ordinance are
involved, there is double jeopardy when there is
an identity of act.
Identity of Offenses:
If a married man maintains as
concubine a married woman not his wife, the
man is guilty of both concubinage and
adultery. From the same act (cohabiting with
the married woman), two offenses arise. And
yet he can be prosecuted for both because, the
two offenses coming from the same authority,
there is no identity of offenses.
Identity of Act:
People v. Relova, 48 SCRA 292 (1987),
Relova was prosecuted under an ordinance of
Batangas City for the use of wiring to tap
electricity without permission from the local
authorities, but the case was dismissed because
the crime has prescribed. So the fiscal filed a
case for theft of electricity under the RPC. The
SC ruled there was double jeopardy already,
and so the second case could no longer be
filed. For although the offenses were different,
both flowed from the same act. And in this
case, the act was punished by a law and an
ordinance.
Loss of Jurisdiction: No double jeopardy
If the court has no jurisdiction, or was
ousted of its jurisdiction beccause it violated the
right to due process of the parties, the decision
is null and void, the accused may again be
charged.
In People v. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166
(1985), the SC, held that the move by the trial
court of summarily dismissing a criminal case
for theft on the ground that it merely involved a
question of ownership deprived the prosecution
of due process by denying it the chance to
introduce its evidence. This ousted the court of
its juridsiction.
In Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA
43 (1986), the SC declared the criminal
prosecution of the 26 accused in the Aquino-
Galman double murder case a "mistrial" after
the SC commission found that the
Sandiganbayan justices and the Tanodbayan
prosecutors had been summoned by the
President and instructed on how to conduct the
trial. Due process is a right not only of the
accused but also of the State. Once the court
deprives either party, which in this case is the
State, of a fighting chance, then it is ousted
from its jurisdiction, and double jeopardy would
not apply. Thus, the accused were ordered
retried.
1. Two situations contemplated
People v. Relova 148 SCRA 292 (1987)
F: Manuel Opulencia was charged wiht
violation of Ordinance No. 1 series of 1974 of
Batangas City prohibiting the installation of
electric wiring devices without authority from
the city government. He admitted installing the
electric wiring devices found by the police in
order to decrease the readings of electric
current. The case was however dismissed on
the ground that the offense had prescribed.
Fourteen days later, the City Fiscal filed another
case for theft against him. The court also
dismissed this case on the ground of double
jeopardy. The prosecution appealed contending
the offense was different.
HELD: The contention has no merit. The first
sentence of Art. III, sec. 21 states the general
rule: the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy is not available where the
second prosecution is for an offense that is
different from the offense charged in the first or
prior prosecution, although both may be based
from the same facts. The second sentence
provides an exception: that the protection
against double jeopardy is available although
the prior offense charged under an ordinance
be different from the offense charged
subsequently under the national statute such as
the RPC provided that both offenses spring from
the same act or set of acts. VV.
People v. City Court of Manila, Branch VI, 154
SCRA 175 (1987)
Constitutional Law II
F: Agapito Gonzales, together with Roberto
Pangilinan, was accused of violating Sec.7, in
relation to Sec. 11 RA 3060 and Art. 201(3) of
the RPC, in two separate informations filed with
the City Court of Manila. Upon arraignment,
accused Gonzales pleaded not guilty to both
charges. The other accused, Pangilinan, was
not arraigned as he is still at large. Gonzales
filed a motion to quash the informations in the 2
cases on the ground that said informations did
not charge an offense. Motion denied. Later,
he again moved to quash the information in one
of the Criminal case on the ground of duble
jeopardy, as there was according to him, also
pending aginst him another criminal case,
where the informatin allegedly contain the
same allegations as the information in the first
criminal case. Court granted the motion.
ISSUE: W/N there is double jeopardy.
HELD: NO
It is a settled rule that to raise the
defense of double jeopardy, 3 requisites must
be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have
attached prior to the second; (2) the first
jeopardy must have been validly terminated;
and (3) the second jeopardy must be for teh
same offense, or the second offense includes or
is necessarily included in the offense charged in
the first information, or is an attempt to commit
the same or a frustration thereof. All these
requisites do not exist in this case,
The 2 informations with which the
accused was charged , do not make only one
offense, contrary to private repondent's
allegation. In other words, the offense defined
in Sec. 7 of the RA 3060 punishing the
exhibition of motion pictures not duly passed
by the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures
does not include or is not included inthe
offense defined in Art 201 (3) of the RPC
punishing the exhibition of indecent and
immoral motin pictures.
The elements of the 2 offenses are
different. The gravamen of the offense
defined in RA 3060 is the public exhibition of
any motion pictures which has not been
previously passed by the Board of Censors for
Motion Pictures. The motion picture may be
indecent or immoral but if it has not been
previously approved by the Board, its public
showing constitutes a crimnal offense. On the
other hand, the offense punished in Art 201(3)
of the RPC is the public showing os indecent or
immoral plays, scenes, acts, or shows, not just
motion pictures.
The nature of both offenses also differs.
The crime punished in RA 3060 is malum
prohibitum in wh criminal intent need not ber
proved because it is presumed, while the
offense punished in Art. 201(3) of the RPC is
malum in se, which criminal intent is an
indispensable ingredient. Suzette.
2. Rules of Court provisions
Rule 117, Sec. 7. Former
conviction of acquittal; double jeopardy.--
When an accused has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent by a court of
compentent jurisdiction, upon a valid
complaint or information or other formal
charge sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction and after the accused
had pleaded to the charge, the conviction
or acquittal of the accused or the
dismissal of the case shall be a bar to
another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the
same or frustration thereof, or for any
offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense in the
former complaint of information.
However, the conviction of the
accused shall not be a bar to another
prosecution for an offense which
necessarily includes the offense charged
in the former complaint or information
under any of the following instances:
(a) the graver offense developed
due to supervening facts arising from the
same act or omission consituting the
former charge;
(b) the facts constituting the
graver charge became known or were
discovered only after the filing of the
former complaint or information; or
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser
offense was made without the consent of
the fiscal and of the offended party.
In any of the foregoing cases,
where the accused satisfied or serves in
whole or in part the judgement, he shall
be credited with the same in the event of
conviction for the graver offense.
Melo v. People, 85 P 776 (1950)
F: Conrado Melo was charged in the CFI,
Rizal with frustrated homicide , for having
allegedly inflicted upon Obillo, with a kitchen
knife and with intent to kill, several serious
wounds on different parts of the body, requiring
medical attendance for a period of more than
30 days, and incapacitating him from
performing his habitual labor for the same
period of time. On Dec. 29, 1949, at 8 am,
accused pleaded not guilty to the offense
chargde. At 10:15 am of the same day, Obillo
died from his wounds. An amended information
Constitutional Law II
was filed charging accused with consummated
homicide. Accused filed a motion to quash the
amended information alleging double jeopardy.
Motion denied.
ISSUE: W/N there is double jeopardy.
HELD: NO
Double jeopardy means that when a
person is charged with an offense and the case
is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or
in any other manner without the consent of the
accused, the latter cannot again be charged
with the same or identical offense. The phrase
"the same offense" has always been construed
to mean not only that the second offense
charged is exactly the same as the one alleged
in the first information, but also that the two
offenses are identical. There is identity
between the two offenses when the evidence to
support a conviction for one offense would be
sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other.
This rule of identity however does not
apply, however, when the second offense was
not in existence at the time of the first
prosecution, for the simple reason that in such
case there is no possibility for the accused,
during the first prosecution, to be convicted for
an offense that was then inesistent. Thus,
where the accused was charged with physical
injuries and after conviction the accused dies,
the charge for homicide against the same
accused does not put him twice in jeopardy.
Accordingly, an offense may be said to
necessarily include or to be necessarily included
in another offense, for the purpose of
detremining the existence of double jeopardy,
when both offenses were in existence during
the pendency of the first prosecution, for
otherwise, if the second offense was then
inexistent, no jeopardy could attach therefor
during the first prosecution, and consequently a
subsequent charge for the same cannot
constitute a second jeopardy. Suzette.
People v. City Court of Manila, Branch XI, 121
SCRA 637 (1983)
F: This is a petition to review the order of
the City Court of Manila Branch XI, dismissing
the information for homicide thru reckless
imprudence filed against Gapay, in a criminal
case on the ground of double jeopardy.
Respondent court held that the accused having
been previously tried and convicted of serious
physical injuries thru reckless imprudence for
the resulting death of the victim would place
the accused in double jeopardy.
ISSUE: W/N a person who has been prosecuted
for serious physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence and convicted thereof may be
prosecuted subsequently for homicide thru
reckless imprudence if the offended party dies
as a result of the same injuries.
HELD: YES
Well settled is the rule that one who has
been charged with an offense cannot be
charged again with the same or identical
offense though the latter be lesser or greater
than the former. However as held in the MELO
case, the rule of identity does not apply when
the second offense was not in existence at the
time of teh first prosecution , for the reason that
in such case there is no possibility for the
accused during the first prosecution, to be
convicted for an offense that was inexistent.
The victim Diolito de la Cruz died on the
day the information was filed , and the accused
was arraigned 2 days after or on October 20,
1972 . When the information for homicide thru
reckless imprudence was, therefore, filed on
October 24, 1972, the accused was already in
doubly jeopardy. Suzette.
People v. Yorac, 42 SCRA 230 (1971)
F: Accused Yorac was charged with slight
physical injuries before the City Court of
Bacolod, the offended party being Lam
Hock who, according to the medical cerificate
issued by Dr. Rogelio Zulueta, was confined
since April 8 1968 up to the present time for
head injury in Occidental Negros Provincial
Hspital. Accused pleaded guilty on April 16,
1968 resulting in his being penalized to suffer
10 days for arresto menor. On April 18, 1968,
the provincial fiscal filed an information
charging the same defendant with frustrated
murder arising from the same act against the
aforesaid victim Lam Hock for upon further
diagnosis, the healing period for the injuries
caused to accused was found to be longer. A
motion to quash was filed by the accused on
the ground of double jeopardy.
ISSUE: W/N the defendant, who had already
been convicted of slight physical injuries for
injuries inflicted on Lam Hock , and had served
sentence therefor, may be prosecuted anew for
frustrated murder for the same act committed
against the same person
HELD: NO.
In order not to violate the constitutional
prohibition on double jeopardy, there is the
indispensable requirement of the existence of a
new fact which supervenes for which the
defendant is responsible changing the character
of the crime imputed to him and together with
the facts existing previously constituting a new
and distinct offense.
Constitutional Law II
In this case, there is no supervening fact
which occurred to justify the non-existence of
double jeopardy. The wound causing the delay
in the healing of the injuries caused to the
victim was already in existence at the time of
the first examination of the doctor. Said delay
was caused by the very superficial and
inconclusive examination then made resulting
to a later finding of fracture. Suzette.
Barlongay: When defense of double
jeopardy available.-- (1) Dismissal based on
isufficiency of evidence; (2) dismissal bec. of
denial of accused's right to speedy trial; (3)
accused is discharged to be a state witness.
When defense of double jeopardy not
available.-- When the case is dismissed other
than on the merits upon motion of the accused
personally, or through counsel, such dismissal is
regarded as w/ express consent of the accused,
who is therefore deemed to have waived the
right to plea double jeopardy.
Yap v. Lutero, April 30, 1959
F: Yap was charged with reckless driving in
violation of a city ordinance. Later he was
charged again in another criminal case in the
same court with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence. Yap moved to
quash the latter information. Meanwhile,
petitioner was acquitted in the first case.
ISSUE: W/N there was double jeopardy.
RULING: YES. From the viewpoint of Criminal
Law, as distinguished from Constitutional or
Political Law - the offenses with which petitioner
was charged constitute, strictly different
offenses, although, under certain conditions,
one offense may include the other, and
accordingly, once placed in jeopardy for one,
the plea of double jeopardy may be in order as
regards the other.
Thus, if the injuries mentioned in the
second information were not established by the
evidence, petitioner could be convicted in the
first case of the very same violation of
municipal ordinance charged in the first case,
unless he pleaded double jeopardy. Charo.
Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43
F: The petitioners filed an action to nullify
the proceedings on the trial of the Aquino-
Galman duble murder case alleging that
respondents Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan
committed serious irregularities constituting
mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice
and gross violation of the constitutional rights of
the petitioners and the sovereign people of the
Philippines to due process of law. The SC
dismissed. Meanwhile, the Sandiganbayan
rendered its decision acquitting all the accused
of the crime charged. Respondents submitted
that in view of the SB decision, the case has
become moot and academic. Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration of the SC ruling. The
SC created the Vasquez Commisssion to look
into petitioners' allegations.
RULING: The report of the Commission revealed
that Pres. Marcos used the overwhelming
resources of the Government and his
authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a
mockery of the judicial process in this case. The
unwholly scenario for the acquittal of the
accused after the rigged trial would accomplish
the two principal objectives of satisfying the
public clamor for the suspected killers to be
charged in court and of giviing them, through
their acquittal, the legal shield of double
jepardy.
However, double jeopardy does not
attach where a criminal trial was a sham. A
dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of
acquittal such as in this case is a void
judgment. In legal contemplation, it is no
judgment. It neither binds nor bars anyone. The
criminal collusion as to the handling and
treatment of the cases by public respondents
completely disqualified them and voided ab
initio the SB verdict. DJ cannot be invoked
where the prosecution, which represents the
sovereign people in crimnal cases is denied due
process.
People v. Obsania, 23 SCRA 249
F: The information filed by the fiscal
alleged that through violence and intimidation,
Obsania had carnal knowledge of one Erlinda
Dollente against the latter's will. Later, the fiscal
amended the complaint to allege therein that
the offense was committed with lewd designs.
The accused after pleading not guilty moved for
the dismissal of the case on the ground that the
first information was fatally defective for failing
to allege "lewd desiigns," and that the amended
information did not cure the jurisdictional
infirmity. The motion of the defense was
sustained by the judge. Hence this appeal by
the fiscal.
RULING: The failure of the prosecution to allege
"lewd designs" in the first information does not
affect the sufficiency in substance of the
information, for unchaste motives are deemed
inherent in the very act of rape itself. In any
case, the lower court erred in dismissing the
case by failing to distinguish between the
concept of jurisdiction and insufficiency in
substance of an indictment.
Constitutional Law II
As to the question of double jeopardy,
the following requisites must have been
obtained to invoke the constitutional protection
against it:
(1) a valid complaint or information;
(2) a court of competent jurisdiction;
(3) the defendant had pleaded to the
charge; and
(4) the defendant was acquitted, or
convicted, or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.
The only remaining and decisive issue in
this case seems to be as to whether or not the
case was dismissed without the prior consent of
the accused.
The SC ruled that as a general rule,
when the case is dismissed, other than on the
merits, upon motion of the accused, such
dismissal is to be ragarded as with the express
consent of the accused and consequently he is
deemed to have waived his right to plead
double jeopardy and/or he is estopped from
claiming such defense on appeal by the
Government or in another indictment for the
same offense.
The exception to this is where the
dismissal is sought by the accused on the
ground that they were denied their right to a
speedy trial and that the government failed to
prosecute; in which case double jeopardy will
set in. The case of herein accused falls under
the general rule.
D. The privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus
Art. III, Sec. 15. The privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended except in cases of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires
it.
In case of invasion or rebellion, when
the public safety requires it, the President may,
for a period not exceeding 60 days, suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus...
The suspension of the privilege of the
writ shall apply only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or
directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of
the writ, any person thus arrested or detained
shall be judicially charged within 3 days,
otherwise he shall be released. (Art. VII, Sec.
18.)
A "writ of heabeas corpus" is a writ
directed to the person detaining another,
commanding him to produce the body of the
detainee at a designated time and place, and to
show cause why he should continue to be
detained.
The "privilege of the writ" is the right to
have the immediate determination of the
legality of the deprivation of physical liberty.
What is suspended is the privilege of the
writ, and not the writ itself. The writ will always
issue as a matter of course. But when the
privilege of the writ is suspended, all the
detaining office needs to do when he receives
the writ of habeas corpus is to show to the court
that the detainee is being detained for an
offense covered by the suspension, and the
court cannot inquire any further to find out if
the detention is legal. Under the Conmstitution,
this is so only for 3 days. After 3 days, the
Court can now require the detaining officer to
produce the body of the detainees and show
cause why he should not be released.
The suspension of the privilege of the
writ applied only to crimes related to invasion or
rebellion. An extensive discussion was made
under the Commander-in- Chief clause of the
President, supra. This rest of the section will be
confined to habeas corpus as a remedy in all
other offenses.
In general as already noted above, the
privilege of the writ is an extraordinary remedy
to question the illegality of the arrest or
detention, or any other restraint to liberty.
When all else is lost, it is the last recourse to
get someone out of his illegal detention.
1. Functions of the writ
Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 P 778 (1919)
Habeas corpus is available not only for
those who are in actual detention but even for
those whose liberty is merely restrained. Thus,
in Moncupa v. Enrile, 141 SCRA 233 (1986), the
SC granted habeas corpus to petitioner who,
though temporarily released, could not travel
outside Metro Manila, could not change his
residence, could not be interviewed by media,
and had to report to the military.
2. The writ of habeas corpus as a post-
conviction remedy
In Chavez v. Court of Appeals, supra,
habeas corpus was the remedy of one whose
confinement was the result of a void judgnment
of conviction arrived at after the judge violated
Constitutional Law II
due process by compelling him to take the
stand and testify against himself.
Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 633
(1986), supra.
In Gumabon v. Director of Prison, 37
SCRA 420 (1971), some persons who were
charged with the complex crime of rebellion
with homicide, rape, or other common crimes,
did not appeal their conviction and so were
sentenced accordingly. The other accused,
however, appealed their conviction, resulting in
a new ruling in People v. Hernandez to the
effect that there can be no complex crim of
rebellion with homicide, rape, etc., for these
common crimes are absorbed by rebellion. As a
result, while those who appealed were now free,
those who did not remained in jail. The SC
ruled that those who conrtinued to languish in
jail could avail of habeas corpus to question the
legality of their continued detention pursuant to
the ruling in People v. Hernandez.
3. Suspension of the privilege
Art. VII, Sec. 18.
Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 488 (1971)
E. Affirmative rights
1. Free access to the courts
Art. III, Sec. 11. Free access to the
courts and quasi-judicial bodies and
adequate legal assistance shall not be
denied to any person by reason of
poverty.
2. Protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights
Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx
(4) The law shall provide for penal
and civil sanctionsfor violations of this
section as well as compensation to and
rehabilitation of victims of torture or
similar practices, and their families.
3. Compensation to, and rehabilitation of,
victims of tortures
Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx
(4) The law shall provide for penal
and civil sanctions for violations of this
section as well as compensation to and
rehabilitation of victims of torture or
similar practices, and their families.
IV. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Art. III, Sec. 4. No law shall be
passed abridging the freedom of speech,
of expression, or of the press, or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the Government for redress of
grievance.
Id., Sec. 18. (1) No person shall be
detained solely by reason of his political
beliefs and aspirations.
xxx
A. Philosophical Basis of Guarantees
Free Market Place of Ideas
1. For the discovery of political truth
When men have realized that time has
upset many fighting faiths, they may come to
believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas-- that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market, and the truth is
the only ground upon which their wishes safely
can be carried out. (Justice Holmes, Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616. (1919)
The theory behind freedom of
expression is the principle that ours is a
democratic society, and so the only way to rule
ultimately is by, means of public opinion, which
is possible only when everyone can speak their
minds out and compete in the free market place
of ideas.
2. For self government
United States v. Bustos, 37 P 731 (1918)
Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800
(1984), supra
HELD: As a consequence of the search and
seizure, the premises of the "Metropolitan Mail"
and "We Forum" were padlocked and sealed,
with the further result that the printing and
publication of said newspapers were
discontinued. Such closure is in the nature of
previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to
the freedom of the press guaranteed under the
fundamental law and constitutes a virtual denial
of petitioner's freedom to express themselves in
print. This state of being is patenly anathematic
to a democratic framework where a free, alert
and even militant press is essential for the
Constitutional Law II
political enlightenment and growth of the
citizenry.
New York Times v. Sullivan, 380 US 51 (1964)
3. For individual protection
B. Prior Restraints
Thus any system of prior restraints of
expression comes to the Court bearing a heavy
presumption against its constitutionality, giving
the government a heavy burden to show
justification for the imposition of such restraint.
(New York v. United States (1971); also in New
York Times v. Pentagon and Bantam Books v.
Publication of Pentagon Papers).
Sanidad v. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 529 (1990)
Subsequent Punishment
And even subsequent punishment is
tempered by the greater interest of promoting
free public opinion. The most significant
expression is the law on libel.
We consider this case against the
background of a profound national commitment
to debate on public issues being uninhibited,
robust and wide-open, and that it may well
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and
public officials. The falsity of some of the
factual statements and alleged defamations do
not qualify the role. And just as factual error
afforded no warrant for repressing speech that
would otherwise be free, the same is true of
injury to official reputation. (New York Times v.
Sullivan, 380 U.S. 51 (1964)
The interest of society and good
government demands a full discussion of public
affairs. Whether the law is wisely or badly
enforced is a fit subject for proper comment.
Public policy, welfare of society, and the orderly
administration of government have demanded
protection for public opinion. The inevitable
and incontestable result has been the
development and adoption of the doctrine of
privilege. [Justice Malcom, United States v.
Bustos, 731 (1918).]
While, uncer the Revised Penal Code,
any defamatory statement is presumed to be
malicious (malice-in-law), when the defense
proves that the communication is privileged,
such a presumption of malice does not arise
because of the greater public interest involved.
If the communication is absolutely
privileged (as in parliamentary freedom of
speech), the prosecution cannot even prove
malice-in-fact.
If the communication is only qualifiedly
privileged (Art. 354 enumerates the 2
instances: fair and true reporting of an official
proceeding; legal moral or social duty), the
burden is shifted on the prosecution to prove
malice-in-fact, which the defense can overcome
by proving the truth of the defamatory
statement (which in the case of public officials
may or may not constitute a crime, so long as
related to the conduct of his office) and good
motive.
C. Content-Based Restrictions
1. Test of validity of content-based
restrictions
The U.S. Supreme Court and, by
haphazard imitation, the Philippine Supreme
Court, have evolved certain tests to regulate
the contents of speech.
Dangerous Tendency Test: When the
legislative body has determined generally, in
the exercise of its discretion, that utterances of
a certain kind involve such danger of a
substantive evil that they may be punished, the
question whether any specific utterance coming
within the prohibited class is likely, in and itself,
to bring the substantive evils, is not open to
consideration. In such cases, the general
provision of the statute may be constitutionally
applied to the specific utterance if its natural
and probable effect was to bring about the
substantive evil which the legislative body
might prohibit. [Gitlow v. New York, 268 US 652
(1925).]
Example: Art. 142. Inciting to sedition.
When the legislature has decided that one who
advocates a certain conduct is guilty of a crime,
the court cannot intrude. As it evolved, this test
was supposed to apply when there is a statute,
in contrast to the clear and present danger rule
which applies when the speech is not prohibited
by statute.
Clear and Present Danger Test: The
question in every case is whether the words
used are used in such circumstances and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent. It is a question of proximity and
degree. [Schenck v. United States, 249 US 47
(1919).]
The emphasis of the test is the nature of
the circumstances under which it is uttered.
The speech itself may not be dangerous. As
Constitutional Law II
Holmes said: "Many things that might be said
in time of peace are such a hindrance to its
effort that their utterance will not be endured so
long as men fight." Or saying "Fire" in a
crowded movie house.
Grave-but-improbable danger: Whether
the gravity of the evil, discounted by its
improbability, justifies such an invasion of free
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.
[Dennis v. United States, 341 US 494 (1951),
quoting Judge Learned Hand.]
This test was meant to supplant the
clear and present danger. They both
emphasize the circumstances of the speech, but
this latter test consider the weighing of values.
Direct Incitement Test: The
consitutional guarantees of free speech and
press do not permit a State to forbid or
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation, except where such advocacy or peech
is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action, and is likely to incite or produce
such action. [Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969), cited in Salonga v. Cruz Pano, 134
SCRA 438 (1985).]
The test emphasizes the very words
uttered: (a) What words did he utter? (b)
What is the likely result of such utterance? It
criticizes the clear and present danger test for
being top dependent on the circumstances.
Speaker may, when tested show no incitement
but you know the speaker is inciting to sedition.
Balancing of Interest Test: The court
must undertake the delicate and difficult task of
weighing the circumstances and appraising the
substantiality of the reasons advanced in
support of the regulation of the free enjoyment
of rights. [American Communication Ass'n v.
Douds, 339 US 383 cited in Gonzales v.
COMELEC, 27 SCRA 835 (1969A)]
The test applied when two legitimate
values not involving national secuirty crimes
compete. Involves an appoint of the competing
interest. (Gonzales v. Comelec)
In Aver v. Capulong and Enrile, for
instance, it is a question of balancing the
freedom of expression of the producer and the
right to privacy of Enrile.
(not in VV's revised outline)
Balancing of Factors Test: The truth is
theat the clear-and-present danger test is over-
simplified judgement unless it takes into
account also a number of other factors: (1) the
relative seriousness of the danger in
comparison with the value of the occasion for
speech or political activity, (2) the availability
of more moderate controls than those the State
has imposed, and perhaps (3) the specific intent
with which the speech is launched. (Freund,
quoted in Dennis v. United States in the
concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter).
2. Applications of tests in various
contexts
a. Freedom of expression and national security
Babst v. National Intelligence Board 132
SCRA 316 (1984)
F: Petitioners are journalists and
columnists. On different dates in July 1980, they
were summoned by military authorities for
interrogation regarding their work, feelings,
sentiments, beliefs, associations and even
private lives. In addition, one of them was
charged with libel by a General who sought to
recover P10 million in damages. They brought
an action for prohibition to stop the NIB from
questioning them and from filing libel suits on
matters that had been the subject of inquiry by
the NIB.
HELD: The petition has become moot and
academic. Be that as it may, it is not idle to
note that, while ordinarily, an invitation to
attend a hearing and answer some questions is
not illegal or constitutionally objectionable,
under certain circumstances, however, such an
invitation can easily assume a different
appearance as when it comes from a powerful
group composed predominantly of ranking
military officers and the designate interrogation
site is a military camp.
b. Freedom of expression and criticism of
official conduct: The Test of "Actual Malice"
Read Revised Penal Code, Articles 353-
354 and 361-362
Freedom of expression and libel
Freedom of speech versus right to
reputation. Libel is the most common form of
subsequent punishment. Although one cannot
be prevented from saying something before he
actually says it, one can be held liable for what
one has said if it causes damage to the rights of
others.
Soliven v. Makasiar; Beltran v. Makasiar, 167
SCRA 393 (1988)
F: The President of the Philippines filed a
complaint for libel against the petitioners, who
Constitutional Law II
were the publisher and columnist of the
Philippine Star, based on the following
statement in Beltran's column of Oct. 12, 1987
totle "The Nervous Officials of the Aquino
Administration": "If you recall, during the
August 29 coup attempt, the President hid
under her bed while the firing was going on -
perhaps the first Commander-in-Chief to do so."
Beltran did not submit a counter affidavit and
instead, moved to dismiss the complaint. The
fiscal denied his motion. Thus, this petition for
certiorari.
HELD: xxx
(3) As regards the contention of
petitioner Beltran that he could not be held
liable for libel bec. of the privileged character of
the publication, the Court reiterates that it is
not a trier of facts and that such a defense is
best left to the trial court to appreciate after
receiving the evidence of the parties. As to
petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel
case to proceed would produce a "chilling
effect" on the press freedom, the Court finds no
basis at this stage to rule on the point. VV.
Manuel v. Cruz-Pano, 172 SCRA 225 (1989)
Libel suits based on official criticisms should be
dismissed outright unless made in bad faith
F: Petitioner wrote the Chairman of the
Anti-Smuggling Action Center denouncing
abuses allegedly committed by ASAC agents
against petitioner's clients. Petitioner said the
agents subjected Ng Woo Hay to indignities and
took her necklace and bracelet and her son's
wristwatch plus HK$ 70. But the agents were
exonerated so petitioner filed criminal charges
of robbery. Petitioner found prosecutors
unsympathetic so he filed a civil action for
damages against the agents. Later, the Bulletin
Today published a news item based on
petitioner's letter to ASAC. This became the
basis of an action for libel brought against
petitioner and his clients. Petitioner moved to
quash the case but his motion was denied.
HELD: From the viewpoint of procedural and
substantive law, the charge is defective. The
letter constitutes privileged communication. It
was sent by petitioner in his capacity as lawyer
in the discharge of his legal duty to his clients.
He could also invke his civic duty as a private
individual to expose anomalies in the public
service. The complaint was addressed to the
official who had authority over them and could
impose proper disciplinary sanctions. As an
index of good faith, the letter was sent
privately, directly to the addressee without any
funfare nor publicity. As for the news report, it
is difficult to believe that the petitioner, an
ordinary citizen without known ties to
newspaper, could have by himself caused the
publication. It does not appear either that the
report was paid for like an advertisement. At
any rate, the news item is a true and fair report
of a judicial proceeding, made in good faith and
without comments or remarks. VV.
Newsweek Inc. v. IAC 142 SCRA 171 (1986)
F: Petitioner was sued for libel in
connection with the publication in the Feb. 23,
1981 issue of Newsweek of the article "An
Island of Fear." The plaintiffs, sugar planters of
Bacolod, complained that the article portrayed
them as exploiters of sugar workers. Petitioner
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that the article was not libelous since it did not
single any particular individual. The trial court
denied the motion and petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari in the IAC which was dismissed.
Thus, this appeal to the SC.
HELD: Where the defamation is alleged to have
been directed at a group or class, it is essential
that the statement must be so sweeping or all-
embracing as to apply to every individual in
that group or class, or sufficiently specific so
that each individual in the class or group can
prove that the defamatory statement
specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring
the action separately if need be. The disputed
portion which refers to plaintiff Sola never
singled out Sola. The news report merely stated
that the victim had been arrested by members
of a special police unit brought into the area by
Sola, the mayor. Hence, the report referring as
it does to an official act is within the realm of
privileged and is protected by the constitutional
guarantees of free speech and press. VV.
Notes: Since the Newsweek artciles
"Island of fear in the Visayas" did not specify
any individual, it cannot be libelous. An article
must be sufficiently, specific or at least
sweeping as to apply to all members of a group,
in order to be deemed libelous.
Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 116 (1970)
The pictures of a former mayor was
inadvertently published and mistaken for
another man who was a sanitary inspector and
fooled the authorities about the Babuyan
Islands, claiming of murders there, so they
could go and he could be rescued. An erratum
was published by the This Week magazine. The
SC, quoting Quisumbing v. Lopez, however,
found for plaintiff, but with reduced damages,
since the error in in this case could have been
checked consideringing that this was a weekly
magazine and not a daily.
Constitutional Law II
Quisumbing v. Fernando, 96 Phil 510 (1955)
Newspapers should be given leeway and
tolerance to enable them to courageously and
effectively perform their important role in our
democracy. In the preparation of stories, press
reporters and editors usually have to race to
their deadlines; and consistently with good faith
and reasonable care, they should not be held to
account, to a point of suppression, for honest
mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words.
.
Mercado v. CFI of Rizal 116 SCRA 93 (1982)
F: Petitioner was accused of libel on the
basis of a telegram which he sent to the
Secretary of Public Works requesting
investigation of Mrs. Virginia Mercado of the
Public Service Commission "as we have reason
to believe that she has enriched herself thru
corrupt practices xxx." He filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that his communication
was privileged, but his motion was denied. He
filed another motion which was also denied.
Thus, this petition for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition in the SC.
HELD: US v. Bustos is a landmark decision
antedating by forty years a similar decision of
the US Supreme Court to the effect that a libel
prosecution must survive the test of whether or
not the offending publication is within the
guarantees of free speech and free press.
However, Justice Malcolm in US v. Bustos was
careful to point out that qualified privilege and
this is one instance may be "lost by proof of
malice." What casts doubt on the good faith of
petitioner is his conduct, vis-à-vis private
respondent. The tenacity with which petitioner
had pursued a course of conduct on its face
would seem to indicate that a doubt could
reasonably be entertained as the bona fides of
petitioner. The prosecution should be given a
chance to prove malice.
c. Freedom of expression and the right to
privacy
Lagunzad v. Gonzales, 92 SCRA 476 (1979)
F: Lagunzad filmed the Moises Padilla
story based on a book written by Rodriguez.
xxx Nelly Amane who was a half-sister of
Padilla objected to the movie on the ground
that it contained a portrayal of Padilla's private
and family life, including scenes about his
mother, Maria Soto vda. de Gonzales, and a
certain "Auring" as Padilla's girl friend.
Subsequently, Nelly Amante, together w/ her
sister and mother, agreed to allow petitioner to
"exploit, use and develope the life story of
Moises Padilla for purposes of producing the
pictures," in consideration of P20,000.
Petitioner paid P5,000 but as he failed to pay
the balance agreed upon, he was sued.
Judgement was rendered against him by the
trial court, w/c was affirmed by the CA.
Petitioner appealed to the SC contending that
he was forced to enter into the agreement only
to avoid financial loss caused by delay in the
showing of the movie and the relatives of
Padilla did not have a property right in the life
of M. Padilla since Padilla was a public figure.
HELD: Petitioner's averment is not well taken.
Being a public figure does not automatically
destroy in toto a person's right to privacy. The
right to invade a person's privacy to
disseminate public information does not extend
to fictional or novelized representation of a
person, no matter how a public figure he or she
may be. In the case at bar, while it is true that
petitioner exerted efforts to present the true-to-
life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits
that he included a little romance in the film bec.
w/o it, it would be a drab story of torture and
brutality.
Freedom of expression, indeed,
occupies a preferred position in the hierarchy of
civil liberties. It is not, however, w/o
limitations. In the particular circumstances
presented and considering the obligations
assumed by petitioner under the agreement,
the validity of such agreement will have to be
upheld particular bec. the limits of freedom of
expression are reached when expression
touches upon matters of private concern. [In
the agreement signed by him, petitioner
admitted that in the picture produced, he had
"exploited the life story of Moises Padilla for
pecuniary gain, and other profit motives, and
(had) encroached upon the privacy of Moises
Padilla's immediate family, and (had) in fact
included, in the PICTURE's case, persons
portraying some of MOISES PADILLA's kin..."]
Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong April 29,
1988
F: Pivate respondent Juan Ponce Enrile
filed an action in the RTC of Makati to enjoin the
petitioners from producing the movie "The Four
Day Revolution," a documentary of the EDSA
Revolution in 1986 on the ground that it
violated his right to privacy. Petitioners
contended that the movie would not involve his
private life not that of his family. But the trial
court issued a writ of preliminary injunction and
ordered petitioners to desist from making the
movie making reference whatsoever to Ponce
Enrile. This, this action for certiorari.
HELD: Freedom of speech and expression
includes freedom to produce motion pictures
Constitutional Law II
and to exhibit them. What is involved is a prior
restraint by the Judge upon the exercise of
speech and of expression by petitioners.
Because of the preferred character of speech
and of expression, a weighty presumption of
invalidity vitiates measures of prior restraint.
The Judge should have stayed his hand
considering that the movie was yet
uncompleted and therefore there was no "clear
and present danger." The subject matter of the
movie does not relate to the private life of
Ponce Enrile. The intrusion is no more than
necessary to keep the film a truthful historical
account. He is, after all, a public figure. The
line of equilibrium in the specific context of the
instant case between freedom of speech and of
expression and the right of privacy may be
marked out in terms of a requirement that the
proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful
and historical in its presentation of facts. There
must be no showing of a reckless disregard of
truth.
Notes: Ayer sought to produce a movie
on the 4-day revolution. Enrile, who had
previously been asked for the use of his
character in the movie and had refused the
offer, sued to enjoin the filming because he did
not want any mention of his and his family's
name. The SC lifted the injunction issued by
the lower court on the ground that it amounted
to prior restraint, which is no better if imposed
by the courts than if imposed by administrative
bodies or by ecclesiatical officials.
In Ayer, the reference to Enrile is
unavoidable because his name is part of history
and this cannot be changed or altered; thus his
name can be used so long as only his public life
is dwelled only. But in Lagunzad, although
Moises Padilla was also a public figure, the
movie dealth with both the public and private
lives of Moises Padilla.
d. Freedom of expression and administration of
justice (contempt of court)
In re Ramon Tulfo, AM NO. 90-4-1545-0, April
17. 1990
Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, 170 SCRA 1 (1989)
Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil 152 (1957)
A contempt imposed by the court on the
party who sent a letter to the Presidential
Action Committee complaining about the delay
in the disposition of the agrarian case, was
lifted by the SC. It held that although such a
letter should have been sent to the SC and not
the PAC, it was nevertheless a valid exercise of
speech which did not significantly destroy, the
orderly administration of justice.
People v. Alarcon, 60 Phil 265 (1939)
A person can be held liable for making
comments on a pending case (sub judice) which
have the tendency to impair or obstruct the
orderly administration of justistice. But if the
case is not pending, such comment is a valid
exercise of the freedom of expression.
e. Symbolic Expression-- The Flag-
burning case
Flag burning when done to express
dissent is protected speech.
F: Respondent Johnson participated in a
political demonstration where he burned an
American flag while protesters chanted. No one
was physically injured or threatened with injury,
although several witnesses were seriously
offended by the flag burning. Johnson was
convicted of desecration of a venerated object
in violation of a Texas statute which (1)
prohibited the desecration of, among other
things, a state or national flag, and (2) defined
desecration as the physical mistreatment of
such objects in a way which the actor knows will
seriously offend one or more persons likely to
observe or discover the act. A state court of
appeals affirmed. The Court of Criminal
Appeals of Texas reversed, holding that the
desecration statute as applied violated the
defendant's right to freedom of speech under
the Federal Constitution's First Amendment,
because the statute (1) was too broad for First
Amendment purposes as it related to breaches
of the peace, and (2) was not adequately
supported by the state's purported interest in
preserving a symbol of unity.
ISSUE: Whether the flag desecration statute is
unconstitutional
HELD: YES. Decision Affirmed.
Johnson's conviction was inconsistent
with the First Amendment under the particular
circumstances because (1) Johnson's conduct
was sufficiently imbued with elements of
communication to implicate the First
Amendment, given that this flag burning was
the culmination of a political demonstration and
that the state conceded that the protester's
conduct was expressive; (2) the state's interest
in preventing breaches of the peace was not
implicated on the record in this case, since (a)
no disturbance of the peace actually occurred
or threatened to occur because of the flag
burning, (b) it cannot be presumed that an
audience which takes serious offense at a
particular expression is necessarily likely to
disturb the peace, and (c) the flag burning does
not fall within the small class of "fighting words"
Constitutional Law II
that are likely to provoke the average person to
retaliation and thereby cause a breach of the
peace; and (3) the state's asserted interest in
preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood
and national unity does not justify the
conviction, since (a) the attempted restriction
on expression is content-based, and thus
subject to the most exacting scrutiny, given
that the flag desecration statute is aimed not at
protecting the physical integrity of the flag in all
circumstances, but only against impairments
that would cause serious offenses to others and
is aimed at protecting onlookers from being
offended by the ideas expressed by the
prohibited activity, and (b) although the state
has a legitimate interest in encouraging proper
treatment of the flag, it may not foster its own
view of the flag by prohibiting expressive
conduct relating to it and by criminally
punishing a person for burning the flag as a
means of political protest.
f. Movies Censorship
While prior restraint is the general rule,
censorship in the movies is tolerated because
by the nature of the medium, it has a greater
impact on the audience and produces instant
reaction for the ideas it presents, unlike
newspapers which are read by people
separated by walls.
Gonzales v. Katigbak, 137 SCRA 356 (1985)
F: Petitioner was the producer of the movie
Kapit sa Patalim which the Board of Review for
Motion Pictures and Televisions allowed on
condition that certain deletions were made and
that it was shown on adults only. The petitioner
brought an action, claiming violation of their
freedom of expression.
HELD: Motion pictures are important both as a
method for the communication of ideas and the
expression of the artistic impulse. The power of
the Board is limited to the classification of films.
For freedom of expression is the rule and
restrictions the exception. The power to impose
prior restraint is not to be presumed, rather the
presumption is against its validity. Censorship is
allowable only under the clearest proof of a
clear and present danger of a substantive evil
to public safety, public morals, public health or
any other legitimate public interest. The Board
committed an abuse of discretion in subjecting
petitioner to difficulty and travail before the
movie was classified as "For adults only"
without deletion. However there is not enough
votes to consider the abuse of discretion grave
as it explained that there were reasons for its
action because of the scenes showing women
erotically dancing naked and kissing and
caressing each other like lesbians. VV.
Notes: The movie involved in this case
was "Kapit sa Patalim" which the censors
wanted to cut in some part and to label "For
Adults". The SC rules that movies are within
the constitutional protection of freedom of
expression, so that censorship is presumed to
be valid as constituting prior restraint. The only
case whe the Board of Censors can order a
deletion is when there is a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil against national
security or public morals or other public
interest. In all other cases, the Board can only
classify.
But a different standard must be
followed in television because of the pervasive
and intrusive influence of the medium on
people who watch its programs without having
to pay anything.
On the issue of obscenity, the SC held
that sex along is not necessarily obscenity, the
test being whether, using contemporary
community standards, the dominant appeal us
to the prurient interest. (Miller v. California).
Thus on this score, it found abuse of discretion
of the part of the Board for subjecting the
producer to difficulty and for entertaining a
narrow view of obscenity, but it lacked the
votes to rules that the abuse was grave.
Tests of obscenity:
(1) Whether the average person,
applying contemporary community standards,
would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest.
(2) Whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable
law.
(3) Whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political or
scientific value. (Miller v. California, 37 L. Ed.
2d 419.)
g. Radio Broadcast
In Eastern Broadcasting Corp. v. Dans, 137
SCRA 647, the SC held that radio broadcast also
enjoys the protection of the freedom of
expression. If closed down, the owners enjoy
the rights to due process according to the
standards set in Ang Tibay v. CIR.
But radio deserves greater regulation
than newspapers because it could invade the
privacy of everyone for no fee, and it is such
that one is likely to listen to what is being said.
Constitutional Law II
Eastern Broadcasting Corp. (DYRE) V. Dans, 137
SCRA 647 (1985)
F: The petitioners filed this action to
compel respondent government officials to
allow the reopening of Radio Station DYRE after
it had been closed for allegedly having been
used to incite the people to sedition. The
petitioner contended that it was denied due
process because no hearing was held and no
proof was submitted to establish a factual basis
for the closure. However, before the Court could
promulgate its decision the petitioner filed a
motion to withdraw its action on the ground
that it had sold the radio station to Manuel
Pastrana and that the National
Telecommunications Commission had
expressed its willingness to grant the requisite
license.
HELD: The case has been moot and academic.
However, for the guidance of the inferior courts
and administrative bodies, the following
guidelines must be observed: 1) The cardinal
primary requirements in administrative
proceedings as laid down in Ang Tibay v. CIR
should be followed before a broadcast station
may be closed; 2) All forms of communication
are entitled to the broad protection of the
freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, the
freedom of television and radio broadcasting is
somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom
accorded to newspapers and print media. This
limitation derives from the fact the broadcast
media have a uniquely pervasive presence in
the lives of all Filipinos; 3) The government has
a right to be protected against broadcasts
which incite listeners to violently overthrow it;
and 4) Broadcast stations deserve the special
protection given to all forms of media by the
due process and freedom of expression clauses
of the Constitution.
h. Freedom of Information
Art. III, Sec. 7. The right of the
people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents and
papers pertaining to, official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis
for policy development, shall be afforded
the citizen, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law.
Baldoza v. Dimaano, 71 SCRA 14 (1976)
Access of official records (the docket
book) for any lawful purpose (to look into the
criminal cases for a report on the peace and
order situation of the municipality) is
guaranteed. But it is subject to reasonable
conditions by the custodian of the records.
Garcia v. BOI, 177 SCRA 374 (1989)
D. Content-Neutral Restrictions
O'brien test: A government regulation is
sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the government; if it
furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on
alleged freedom of expression is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest. [US v. O'brien, 391 US 367 (1968),
adopted in Adiong v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712
(1992)]
1. Regulation of political campaign
National Press Club v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 1
(1992)
F: Petitioners herein were representatives
of mass media which were prevented from
selling and donating space or air time for
political advertisements under RA 6646.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6646 constitutes a
violation of the constitutional right to freedom
of expression.
RULING: NO. The Comelec has been expressly
authorized by the Constitution to supervise or
regulate the enjoyment or utilization of the
franchises or permits for the operation f media
of communication and information. The
fundamental purposes of such power are to
ensure "equal opportunity, time, and space, and
the right to reply," as well as uniform and
reasonable rates of charges for the use of such
media facilities, in connection with "public
information campaigns and forums among
candidates."
Of course, the law limits the right of free
speech and of access to mass media of the
candidates themselves. The limitation however,
bears a clear and reasonable connection with
the objective set out in the Constitution. For it is
precisely in the unlimited purchase of print
space and radio and television time that the
resources of the financially affluent candidates
are likely to make a crucial difference.
Adiong v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712 (1992)
F: Petitoner, Adiong, a 1992 senatorial
candidate, assails Comelec Resolution No. 2347
insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and
Constitutional Law II
stickers on mobile places, public or private, and
limits their location or publication to authorized
posting areas.
ISSUE: Whether or not the resolution is
constitutional.
RULING: NO. The prohibition unduly infringes on
the citizen's fundamental right of free speech.
There is no public interest substantial enough to
warrant the kind of restriction involved in this
case. The posting of decals amd stickers in
mobile places does not endanger any
substantial government or public interest.
Under the clear and present danger rule, not
only must the danger be patently clear and
pressingly present but the evil sought to be
avoided, must be so substantive as to justify a
clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument
to be stilled.
Significantly, the freedom of expression
curtailed by the prohibition is not so much that
of the candidate or the political party. The
regulation strikes at the freedoom of an
individual to express his preference and, by
displaying it on his car, to convince others to
agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a
candidate but once the car owner agrees to
have it placed on his private vehichle, the
expression becomes a statement by the owner,
primarily his own and not of anybody else.
Morever, The restriction is so broad that
it encompasses even the citizen's private
property, which in this case is a privately owned
vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition,
another cardinal right guaranteed under the
Constitution is violated which is that no person
shall be deprived of his property without due
proocess of law.
2. Freedom of Assembly
Public Assembly Act of 1985 (Batas Blg. 580)
A permit to hold a rally must be filed
with the Office of the Mayor at least, five
working days before the day of the rally.
But no permit from the mayor is
required in case the rally is going to be held in
(i) freedom parks, (ii) inside a private property
(provide with consent of the owner), and (iii)
campuses of state universities (which are left to
university authorities)
The application must be in writing and
must include: (1) names of the organizers and
leaders, (2) date and time, place and street, (3)
size (4)manner of the use of the street, (5)
sound system to be used (6)purpose. It must
also have a statement of the duties of the
rallyists.
The written application is filed with the
Office of the Mayor. Acknowledgemet is given
of its receipt. If the Mayor refuses to accept the
application, then it is enough for filing purposes
if a copy is posted in the premises.
The Mayor has 2 working days to act on
the application. If he does not act, it is deemed
granted.
But if he thinks that the rally creates a
"clear and present danger" to public peace,
order, health, etc., and he has proof of this, he
should not deny the application right away. He
should hold a hearing during which the
applicant can be heard. If after hearing he is
still not satisfied that no danger exists, then he
can deny the application.
The applicant can then go to any court
other than the Supreme Court for the review of
the decision of denial of the mayor. The courts
have 24 hours to act on the petition. If the
judgment is a reversal of the denial, or in any
case if the applicant is satisfied with the
decision, the judgment becomes final and
executory immediately, and no appeal can be
taken by the local authorities anymore.
But if the decision is not satisfactory to
the applicant, then he has 48 hours from receipt
to appeal to the SC.
During the rally, the police must be
limited to maintaining peace and order and so
must stay away by 100 meters from the
rallyists. They must be in full uniform, with
their names visibly written. They can carry no
firearm except a nighstick, but they are allowed
protective devices.
If they anticipate trouble, the police
must call the attention of the leader of the
rallyists. When trouble actually erupts, the
police must not disperse the crowd right away
but first give a warning. If violence persists,
they must give a second warning. If still
violence continues, only then can they fight
back.
If a rally does not have a permit, the
police can disperse the crowd, but they cannot
use violence. Penalty is imposed only on the
leaders and organizers.
Among the duties of the rallyists are: (a)
to inform the members of their duty under the
law, (b) to police their own rank, and (c) to
cooperate with local authorities in maintaining
peace and order.
Constitutional Law II
Notes: The freedom to use public places
to peaceably assemble is best expressed thus:
"Wherever the title or steets and parks may
rest, they have immemorially been held in trust
for the use of the public and, time out of time
have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thought betwee citizens, and
discussing public questions." (Justice Roberts.
Hague v. CIO)
Although under a "permit system",
before one can use a public place, one must
first obtain prior permit from the proper
authorities, the principle has always been that
one has the right to a permit, subject only to
reasonable regulation. The validity of the
permit system has been upheld by the Court,
provided, (a) it is concered only with the time,
place and manner of assembly ad (b) it does
not vest on the licensing authority unfettered
discretion in choosing the groups which could
use the public place and discriminate others.
As held by the SC in Primicias vs
Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71, the City Ordinance of
Manila giving authority to the Mayor to issue
permits for parades should be construed to be
limited to the time, place, and manner of the
parades socially to secure public order,
convenience and welfare. Thus, denying the
Nacionalista Party a permit to hold a rally at the
Plaza Miranda on the ground that passions
raised by the recent national election were still
high and a rally to protest election anomalies
could only exacerbate the matter, was
overturned by the court.
Primicias vs Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71
F: This is an action for mandamus
instituted by petitioner Primicias, campaign
manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties, to
compel Mayor Fugoso of the City of Manila to
issue a permit for the holding of a peaceful
public meeting at Plaza Miranda for the purpose
of petitioning the government for redress of
grievances. The Mayor denied the application
on the ground that passions still run high due to
the recent election, and a rally to protest
election anomalies might threaten breaches of
the peace and disruption of public order.
ISSUE: W/n the Mayor can refuse to grant the
permit.
RULING: NO. The police power granted to the
Mayor under the Ordinance enacted by the
Municipal Board pursuant to its authority under
the Revised Administrative Code which
pertains to the use of streets and public places,
can be construed only to mean the power to
regulate, which means and includes the power
to control, govern, and to restrain but cannot be
construed as synonymous with "suppress" or
"prohibit."
The Court quoted with approval the
decision in the American case Cox v. State of
New Hampshire, " a statute requiring persons
using public streets for a parade or procession
to procure a special license therefor from the
local authorities is not an unconstitutional
abridgement of the rights of assembly or of
freedom of speech and press, where, as the
statute is construed by the state courts, the
licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the
issuance of licenses, to a consideration of the
time, place, and manner of the parade or
procession, with a view to conserving the public
convenience and of affording an opportunity to
provide proper policing, and are not invested
with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse
license..."
But under the same ordinance, the SC,
in Navarro v. Villegas, 31 SCRA 730 (1970),
upheld the mayor's refusal to grant permit to a
group during weekdays, on a finding that
everytime there was an announced rally, stores
closed and business was gravely affected
because of violent incidents. It found the policy
of the mayor to allow rallies only during
weekends to be reasonable.
Navarro v. Villegas, 31 SCRA 730 (1970)
F: The petitioner, acting in behalf of the
Movement for a Democratic Philippines (MDP),
an association of students, workers and
peasants, applied for a permit from the Mayor
of Manila to hold a rally at Plaza Miranda.
Respondent Mayor denied the application to
hold the rally on the date and time specified by
petitioners in view of the events that transpired
during the last demonstration held by them
which ended in the destruction of public and
private property, loss of a few lives, injuries to a
score of other persons and the closing down of
schools, offices and many stores. The Mayor
suggested that the MDP utilize the Sunken
Gardens near Intramuros for its rally and that
the rally be held during weekends and earlier
during the day so that it may end before dark.
Petitioner challenged the action of the
Mayor on the ground that the same constitutes
a violation of their right to freedom of assembly.
Petitioner contended that the right of the
people to peaceful assembly and to petition the
government for redress of grievances may be
exercised without the prior necessity of
securing a permit from the government and
that such right cannot be fully enjoyed without
the corresponding right to use public places for
that purpose.
Constitutional Law II
ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor`s denial to
issue a permit amounted to a violation of
petitioner`s right to freedom of assembly.
HELD: NO.
The respondent Mayor has not denied
nor absolutely refused the permit sought by
petitioner. He has expressed willingness to
grant the permit for the peaceful assembly
during certain days and time, and at a place
when they would not disrupt the normal
activities of the community.
The respondent mayor possesses
reasonable discretion to determine or specify
the streets or public places to be used for the
assembly in order to secure convenient use
thereof by others and provide adequate and
proper policing to minimize the risks of disorder
and maintain public safety and order.
Petitioner has failed to show a clear
specific legal duty on the part of respondent
Mayor to grant their application for a permit
unconditionally. Experience in connection with
present assemblies and demonstrations have
shown that they pose a clear and imminent
danger of public disorders, breaches of the
peace, criminal acts, and even bloodshed as an
aftermath of such assemblies, which, petitioner
has manifested, it has no means of preventing.
Charo.
In Ignacio v. Ela, 99 Phil. 346 (1956), the
majority upheld the mayor's denial of permit to
members of the Jehovah's Witnesses sect for
the use of a klosk within the town plaza in order
to avoid any untoward incident with members
of the Roman Catholic Church, whose tenets are
opposed to those of the petitioners, and whose
church is very near the klosk.
Ignacio v. Ela, 99 Phil. 346 (1956)
F: The Mayor denied a permit to the
members of the Jehovah's Witnesses to use the
kiosk in the town plaza for the purpose of
holding a public lecture on the ground that the
permit, if granted, may give rise to disturbance
of the religious ceremonies being performed by
the Catholic Church which was said to be within
hearing distance from the kiosk and which
might lead to any untoward incident with
members of the rival denomination.
ISSUE: W/N the denial is valid.
In J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA
553 (1983), the SC found no basis for the denial
of permit to the Anti-Bases Coalition to hold a
march from Luneta to the street fronting the
U.S. Embassy. It affirmed the general rule that
the use of streets is free to all. It found the fear
entertained by city authorities that the rallyists
might be agirated by provocateurs to be
unfounded, given the report of the NPD that
adequate security measures were provided by
the police.
The Court did not rule on the validity of
the ordinance of Manila prohibiting any rally
within 200 meters from any foreign embassy as
a means of complying with the Geneva
Convention that requires the host country to
protect the premises and personnel of the
embassy.
Then it gave guidelines for the issuance
of permits (now in BP 9801 (i) any group which
applies must do so within a sufficient time so
the authority can have time to act: (ii) if a
disagreement arises over a denial of a permit,
the applicant can question the denial in the
lower court, which can try questions of fact and
law, and (iii) appeal can be made to the SC on
an expedited procedure.
J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553 (1983)
F: Retired Justice JBL Reyes, on behalf of
the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought a permit from
the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and
rally on Oct. 26, 1983 starting 2 p.m. from
Luneta to the gates of the US Embassy. He filed
this petition because as of Oct. 20, there was
yet no action on his request to hold a rally.
HELD: Free speech, like free press, may be
identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully any matter of public concern without
censorship or punishment. There is to be no
previous retraint whether in the form of libel
suits, prosecution for damages, or contempt
proceedings unless there is a "clear and present
danger of a substantive evil that the State has a
right to prevent." There can be no legal
objection, absent the existence of a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil to the
holding of a peaceful rally at Luneta. Neither
can there be objection to the use of the streets
up to gates of the US Embassy. A statute
requiring persons to secure a special license to
use public streets for a procession is not
unconstitutional. The licensing of authorities are
strictly limited to the consideration of the time,
place and manner and the authorities are not
invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or
refuse a permit.
In German v. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514
(1985), the SC upheld the power of the city
authorities to close JP Laurel Street fronting
Malacanang from all rallies as a form of "area
restriction", in order to protect the President
Constitutional Law II
and his family, based on the incident in the
early 70s when the gates of the palace were
almost stormed. The rallyists in this case
purported to merely worship at St. Jude's.
In case a rally is held in a private place,
no permit from the mayor is required.
However, the consent of the owner of the place
must be acquired.
German v. Barangan 35 SCRA 514 (1985)
F: On Oct. 2, 1984 the petitioners who
were businessmen, students and employees,
met on JP Laurel Street in Manila for the
ostensible purpose of hearing mass at the St.
Jude Chapel which adjoins the Malacañang
grounds. They wore yellow T-shirts and, with
clenched fists, marched on the street and
shouted anti-government invectives. They were
stopped from proceeding to the chapel by the
Presidential Security Command. They brought
an action for mandamus.
HELD: The yellow T-shirts worn by some of the
marchers, their fists clenched and chants of
anti-government investives support the
government's claim that the petitioners purpose
was not really to worship at the chapel but to
hold an anti-government demonstration close to
the residence of the President. The restricted
use of JP Laurel Street is justified. The need to
secure the safety of heads of states cannot be
overemphasized. The threat to their lives is
constant and felt throughout the world. The
petitioners were not restrained in their freedom
of religion but only in the manner by which they
had attempted to translate the same into
action.
In Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA
359 (1984) and Arreza v. GAUP, 13 SCRA 94
(1985), the SC upheld the right to expression of
students who held a rally in a private
university. But since they held it beyond the
time granted in a place other than the one
allowed by the administration, their suspension
was condoned.
Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359 (1984)
F: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme
Student Council of the Gregorio Araneta
University Foundation. They were granted a
permit to hold a meeting to protest the merger
of two units of the university. On the scheduled
date, the students continued their meeting
beyond the scheduled time and held it in a
different place from that indicated in the
permit. They expressed in a vehement
language their opposition to the merger and as
a result, classes and office work was disturbed.
Petitioners were placed under preventive
suspension. On appeal, they were found guilt of
holding an illegal assembly and oral
defamation. They were suspended for one
academic year. They filed a petition for
certiorari in the SC.
HELD: The petititon may be considered moot
and academic considering that the TRO issued
by the SC allowed the students to enroll. But
there is a need to pass squarely on the
constitutional question. Respect for the
constitutional rights of peaceable assembly and
free speech calls for the setting aside of the
order of suspension. Suspending them for one
year is out of proportion considering that the
vigorous presentation of views was expected.
The excitement of the occasion, the propensity
of speakers to exaggerate and the exuberance
of the youth should be taken into consideration.
Arreza v. GAUP, 13 SCRA 94 (1985)
F: Petitioners were officers and members
of the Student Council of the Gregorio Araneta
University Foundation. They were refused
enrollment for having led a rally on Sept. 28,
1982.
HELD: As held in Malabanan v. Ramento: "If in
the course of such demonstration, with an
enthusiastic audience goading them on,
utterances, extremely critical, at times even
vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite
understandable. They would be ineffective if
during the rally they speak in the guarded and
judicious language of the academe. At any rate,
even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to
accord full credence to their fiery exhortations.
They take into account the excitement of the
occasion, the propensity of speakers to
exaggerate, the exuberance of youth. xxx" The
refusal of the university to enroll the students is
a highly disproportionate penalty.
Notes: Note that while the permit
system is not allowed in the case of publication,
it is allowed in the case of assembly. In
publication, censorship is presumptively
unconstitutional. There is very little possibility
or justification for the regulation of news. The
remedy in this case is prosecution or
subsequent punishment.
But in assembly regulation is allowed
because it is needed by the very nature of the
expression, when people use streets, they may
deprive other groups which want to use the
streets too. So as long as only the incidents of
speech are regulated, the measure is
constitutionally acceptable.
Nestle Phils. Inc. v. Sanchez 154 SCRA 541
(1987)
Constitutional Law II
F: While these cases were pending in the
SC, the labor unions involved intensified the
pickets they had been conducting in front of the
Padre Faura gate of the Court and set up picket
quarters, at times obstructing access to and
egress from the Court's premises. When
required to show cause why they should not be
held in contempt of court, their lawyer
apologized and assured that the above incident
would not be repeated.
HELD: The Court will not hesitate in future
similar situations to apply the full force of the
law and punish for contempt those who attempt
to pressure the Court into acting one way or the
other in any case pending before it. Grievances
must be ventilated in the proper channels, i.e.
through appropriate petitions or pleadings in
keeping with the respect due the courts as
impartial administrators of justice. Moreover,
"parties have a constitutional right to have the
causes tried fairly in court by an impartial
tribunal, uninfluenced by publication or public
clamor xxx" The acts of respondents are not
only an affront to the dignity of this Court but
equally a violation of the above-stated right of
the adverse parties and the citizenry at large.
3. Freedom of Association and the right to
strike in the public sector
Art. III, Sec. 8. The right of the
people, including those employed in the
public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged.
The inclusion of the right to unionize in
this article is ill-advised because while the right
to unionize is an economic and labor right, the
right to association in general is a civil- political
right.
Discussed elsewhere is the argument
why public employees cannot engage in
collective bargaining and strike.
SSS Employees Assn vs CA, 175 SCRA 686
(1989)
F: SSS filed w/ the RTC-QC a complaint for
damages w/ a prayer for a writ of prel inj.
against petitioners SSSEA, alleging that the
officers and members of the latter staged an
illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to
the SSS building preventing non-striking
employees from reporting to work and SSS
members from transacting business w/ SSS.
The Public Sector Labor-Management Council
ordered the strikers to return to work but the
strikers refused to do so. The SSSEA went on
strike bec. SSS failed to act on the union's
demands.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, w/c motion
was denied. The restraining order w/c was
previously issued was converted into an
injunction after finding the strike illegal.
Petitioners appealed the case to the CA. The
latter held that since the employees of SSS are
govt employees, they are not allowed to
strike.
HELD: Employees in the Civil Service may not
resort to strikes, walkouts and other temporary
work stoppages, like workers in the private
sector, in order to pressure the Govt. to accede
to their demands. As now provided under Sec.
4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to
Govern the Exercise of the Right of Govt. EEs to
Self-Organization which took effect after the
initial dispute arose, the terms and conditions of
employment in the Govt, including any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof and govt.
owned and controlled corporations with original
charters, are governed by law and employees
therein shall not strike for the purpose of secur-
ing changes thereof.
The statement of the court in Alliance of
Govt Workers v. Minister of Labor and
Employment (124 SCRA 1) is relevant as it
furnishes the rationale for distinguishing bet.
workers in the private sector and govt
employees w/ regard to the right to strike?
Since the terms and conditions of
govt. employment are fixed by
law, govt. workers cannot use the
same weapons employed by
workers in the private sector to
secure concessions from their
employers. The principle behind
labor unionism in private industry
is that industrial peace cannot be
secured through compulsion of
law. Relations bet. private
employers and their employees
rest on an essentially voluntary
basis. Subject to the minimum
requirements of wage laws and
other labor and welfare
legislation, the terms and
conditions of employment in the
unionized private sector are
settled through the process of
collective bargaining. In govt
employment, however, it is the
legislature and, where properly
given delegated power, the
administrative heads of govt w/c
fix the terms and conditions of
employment. And this is effected
through statutes or
administrative circulars, rules,
and regulations, not through
CBA's
Constitutional Law II
E. Academic Freedom
Garcia v. Faculty of Admission, 68 SCRA 277
(1975)
F: The FAC of the Loyola School of
Theology refused to readmit petitioner, Garcia,
in its M.A. program because they felt that "her
frequent questions and difficulties were not
always pertinent and had the effect of slowing
down the progress of the class;" that it would
be "to the best interest (of the petitioner) to
work with a faculty that is more compatible with
her orientation. Garcia assailled her expulsion
for being unreasonable; that the reasons given
therefor were invalid for nowhere did it appear
that her conduct constituted a violation of the
school's regulations and grave misconduct.
ISSUE: Whether or not the FAC can be
compelled by mandamus to readmit petitioner.
RULING: NO. The Constitution recognizes the
enjoyment by institutions of higher learning of
the right to academic freedom. The school
decides for itself its aims and objectives and
how best to attain them. It is free from outside
coercion or interference save possibly when the
overriding public welfare calls for some
restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy
certainly extending to the choice of the
students.
The collective liberty of an organization
is by no means the same thing as the freedom
of the individual members within it. In
considering the problems of academic freedom,
one must distinguish between autonomy of the
university, as a corporate body, and the
freedom of the individual university teacher.
The personal aspect of the freedom
consists of the right of each university teacher
to seek and express the truth as he personally
sees it, both in his academic work and in his
capacity as a private citizen. This status of the
individual teacher is as important as the status
of the institution to which he belongs and
through which he disseminates learning.
On other hand, the internal conditions
for academic freedom in a university are that
the academic staff should have de facto control
of the following functions: (a) admission and
examination of students; (b) curricula for
courses of study; (c) appointment and tenure of
office of academic staff; and (d) allocation of
income among the different categories of
expenditure. It is the business of a university to
proviide that atmosphere which is most
conducive to speculation, experiment and
creation. It is an atmosphere in which the four
essential freedoms of a university prevail - to
determine for itself who may teach, what may
be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may
be admitted to study.
For the above reason, mandamus is not
available for the petitioner. There is no duty on
the part of the School to admit her to study
since the School clearly has the discretion to
turn down even qualified applicants due to
limitations of space, facilities, professors and
optimum classroom size and component
considerations. There are standards to meet
and policies to pursue. What a student
possesses is a privilege rather than a right.
UP v. Ayson, 176 SCRA 647 (1989)
F: In 1972, the UP BOR approved the
establishment of the UPCB Highshool to serve,
among others, "as a laboratory and
demonstration school for prospective teachers -
provided that UPCBHS must be self-supporting."
However, the Dept of Professional Education in
Baguio was never organized. So, the BOR
decided to phase out UPCBHS for failing to
attain the conditions for its creation. The
UPCBHS Foundation Inc. sought to restrain the
University from phasing out the UPCBHS.
ISSUE: Is secondary public education
demandable in an institution of higher learning
such as the UP?
RULING: NO. UP invokes its exercise of
academic freedom. Private respondent invokes
the right to quality education and to free
secondary education.
The rights invoked by private
respondent may be asserted only as against the
Government through the DECS. UP was created
under its charter to provide advanced tertiary
education. An institute of higher learning cannot
be compelled to provide for secondary
education.
It is beyond cavil that UP as an
institution of higher learning enjoys academic
freedom. UPCBHS was established subject to a
number of conditionalities. Failing on such
conditions, UP can order its abolition on
academic grounds. Charo.
UP v. CA, Feb. 9, 1993
F: Former PANAMIN Minister Manuel
Elizalde and the Tasaday representative filed a
complaint for damages and declaratory relief
against UP Professors Jerome Bailen and Zeus
Salazar who disputed the authenticity of the
Tasaday find and made a proposition in various
conferences attended by them that Elizalde
merely fabricated the discovery of the
Tasadays.
UP intervened, aaserting its duty to
protect the respondents as faculty members for
Constitutional Law II
acts and utterances made in the exercise of
academic freedom. The lower court denied UP's
motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of
action. Hence this petition.
RULING: With respect to the prayer of the
complaint for "judgment declaring the Tasadays
to be a distinct ethnic community, the lower
court is cautioned that the same is akin to a
prayer for a judicial declaration of Philippine
citizenship which may not be granted in a
petition for declaratory relief. The complaint
was filed mainly to vindicate plaintiff's dignity
and honor.
Indeed, it is beyond the province of the
court to make pronouncements on matters
beyond its ken and expertise. To be sure, in
resolving the complaint for damages, the court
may find congruence in what is justiciable and
what falls within the field of the sciences. Still, it
is best to keep in mind that its proper role and
function is the determination of legal issues.
V. FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Art. III, Sec. 5. No law shall be
made respecting an establishment of
religion; or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment
of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. No religious test shall
be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights.
A. Non-Establishment Clause
The clause prohibits excessive
government entanglement with, endorsement
or disapproval of religion [Vicoriano v. Elizalde
Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54 (1974); Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 US 668 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); Allegheny County v. Greater
Pittsburg ACLU, 492 US 574 (1989).]
The clause prohibits the State from
establishing a religion. In assessing the validity
of the law, the questions to be asked are:
a. Is the purpose of the law religious,
or is it secular?
b. Does it or does it not inhibit or
advance religion?
c. Is its effect to promote or to avoid an
excessive entaglement between the State and
religious matters in religion?
The Non-Establishment clause is
violated when the State gives any manifest
support to any one religion, even if nothing is
done against the individual.
It is likewise violated if the State favors
all religions, for there may be atheists who are
not so favored.
1. Operation of sectarian schools
While the ownership, creation and
management of educational institutions must
be in the hands of Filipinos or 60% Filipino-
owned corporations, sectarian schools and
those run by religious groups and missions
board are exempted from these requirements,
provided the administration is in the hands of
Filipinos, who could be sectarian. [Art. XIV, Sec.
4(2).]
2. Religious instruction in public schools
Provided it is upon the written petition
of the parents and it is at no cost to the State
(although this is not entirely possible, because
the use of classrooms and electricity are costs
in the State), religious instruction in public
elementary and secondary schools during class
hours, by one approved by the authorities of the
religion of the child or ward is allowed. [Art.
XIV, Sec. 3(3).] Religion can even be integrated
in the school curriculum. [Civ. Code, 359 (1).]
3. Anti-evolution laws
In Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968), the SC held that the teaching of the
Darwinian theory of evolution cannot be
prohibited from public shools by parents whose
religions finds the theory offensive.
4. Prayer and Bible-reading in public schools
In Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1967),
the SC disallowed the conducting of an
interdenominational prayer before the start of
classes in public schools as, violative of the
Non- Establishment clause.
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1967)
F: The respondent Board of Education upon
the recommendation of the State Board of
Regents, directed the School's District principal
to cause the recitation in public schools of a
brief, denominationally neutral prayer. Its
observance on the part of the students was
voluntary.
RULING: The Court ruled that the State of New
York, by using its public school system to
encourage the recitation of the Regent's prayer
has adopted a practice wholly inconsistent with
the Establishment Clause. The prayer was
composed by govt officials as part of a
Constitutional Law II
governmental program to further religious
beliefs. The constitutional prohibition against
laws respecting an establishment of religion
means at least that it is not part of the business
of the government to compose official prayers
for any group to recite as part of a religious
program carried on by the govt.
The clauses of the 1st Amendment
which prohibit laws respecting an establishment
of religion and abridging the free exercise
thereof, although overlapping in certain
instances, forbids two diff kinds of
governmental encroachment upon religious
freedom. The stablishment clause, unlike the
free exercise clause, does not depend upon any
showing of direct governmental compulsion and
is violated by the enactment of laws which
establish an official religion, whether or not
those laws operate directly to coerce non-
observing individuals. It rests on the belief that
a union of govt and religion tends to destroy
govt and to degrade religion, and upon an
awareness of the historical fact that
governmentally established religion and
religious persecutions go hand in hand.
In Abington School District v. Schemp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963), it likewise disallowed the
reading of a passage from the bible without
comment in public schools as contrary to the
Non- Establishment clause.
Abington School District v. Schemp, 374 U.S.
203 (1963)
The issue was whether the establishment clause
was violated by a Pennsylvania Statute or a rule
of the Board of Commissioners of Baltimore
adopted pursuant to statutory authority
requiring the reading without comment, at the
opening of each school day, of verses from the
Bible and the recitation of the Lord's prayer by
the students in unison. The students and
parents may refuse to participate in the school
exercises. These exercises were prescribed as
part of the curricular activities of students who
are required by law to attend school and held in
school buildings under the supervision and
participation of teachers employed in those
schools.
RULING: YES, the establishment clause was
violated.
The establishment clause prohibits a
state from placing official support behind the
tenets of one or all orthodoxies and the free
exercise clause guarantees the right of every
person to freely choose his own course with
reference to religious training, teaching and
observance, free from any compulsion from the
State.
The test in determining whether a
legislative enactment violates the
Establishment clause which withdraws all
legislative power respecting religious belief or
the expression thereof, is the PURPOSE and the
PRIMARY EFFECT of the enactment. If either is
the advancement or inhibition of religion, then
the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative
power as circumscribed by the First
Amendment. To withstand the strictures of the
establishment clause, there must be a secular
legislative purpose and a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion.
The place of the Bible as an instrument
of religion cannot be gainsaid. This is
particularly so where the State's recognition of
the pervading religious character of the
exercise is evident from the rule's specific
permission of the alternative use of the Catholic
Douay version of the Bible as well as from a
recent amendment permitting non-attendance
at the exercises, none of those factors being
consistent with the contention that the Bible is
used either as an instrument for non-religious
moral inspiration or as a reference for the
teaching of secular subjects.
5. Tax exemption
Art. VI, Sec. 28. xxx
(3) Charitable institutions,
churches, parsonages or convents
appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit
cemeteries, and all lands, buildings and
improvements, actually, directly, and
exclusively used for religious, charitable
or educational purposes shall be exempt
from taxation.
The ruling in Bishop of Nueva Segovia v.
Provincial Board, 51 Phil. 352 (1927) is
modified to the extent now that the property
must be "actually, directly and exclusively"
used for religious purposes to be exempt.
If not for religious purposes, educational
purposes.
Bishop of Nueva Segovia v. Provincial Board, 51
Phil. 352 (1927)
F: The plaintiff, the Roman Catholic
Apostolic Church, represented by the Bishop of
Nueva Segovia, is the owner and occupant of a
parcel of land in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. On
the south siide is a part of the church yard, the
convent and an adjacent lot used as vegetable
garden. In the center is the remainder of the
churchyard and the church. On the north side is
an old cemetery and the base of what was once
a tower. The Prov. Board imposed a tax on the
whole land.
ISSUE: Whether or not the taxation is legal.
Constitutional Law II
RULING: NO. The exemption in the payment of
the land tax mandated in the Constitution in
favor of the religious entities refers to the home
of the priest who presides over the church and
who has to take care of himself in order to
discharge his duties. It therefore must include
not only the land actually occupied by the
church but also the adjacent ground destined
for the ordinary incidental uses of man.
Except in large cities where the density
of the population and the development of
commerce require the use of large tracts of
land for buildings, a vegetable garden belongs
to a house and, in the case of a convent, its use
is limited to the necessities of the priest.
Therefore, which comes under the tax
exemption.
As to the lot which was formerly the
cemetery, while it is no longer used as such,
neither is it used for commercial purposes and,
accdg to the evidence, is now being used as a
lodging house by the people who participate in
religious festivities. The same constitutes an
incidental use in religious functions. It also
comes within the exemption.
6. Public aid to religion
The payment or use of public money or
property for any religious institution or clergy is
not allowed; except in those cases provided in
the Constitution: priests assigned in the AFP,
penal institution, government orphanage, or
leprosarium. [Art. VI, Sec. 29 (2)]
But in Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201
(1937), the SC held that the stamp printed by
the government showing the map of the
Philippines with a rosary to commemorate the
33rd International Eucharistic Congress to be
held in Manila did not violate the Non-
Establishment clause because its main purpose,
was to call the world's attention to Manila as the
site of an international congress, and whatever
benefit it gave the Catholic Church was only
incidental.
Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201 (1937)
F: The petitioner, Mons. Aglipay, Head of
the Phil. Ind. Church, sought to restrain
respondent Director of Posts from issuing and
selling postage stamps commemorative of the
33rd International Eucharistic Congress. The
Director issued the stamps under the provisions
of Act 4052 which appropriates public funds for
the cost of the plates and printing of the
stamps. Petitioner alleged that the issuance of
the stamps was done in violation of the
Constitutional provision that no public money or
property shall be appropriated for the use,
benefit or support of any sect or religion.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner's contention is tenable.
RULING: NO. Act 4052 contemplated no
religious purpose in view. What it gave the
Director of Posts was the discretionary power to
determine when the issuance of special postage
stamps would be advantageous to the
government.
The purpose in issuing the stamps was
to advertise the Philippines and attract more
tourists to this country. The officials concerned
merely took advantage of an event considered
of international importance to give publicity to
the country and its people. The stamp
contained a map of the Philippines and the
location of Manila, and an inscription as follows:
"Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Crusade."
What was emphasized was not the event but
Manila.
It was obvious that while the stamps
may be said to be inseparably linked with an
event of a religious character, the resulting
propaganda received by the Roman Catholic
Church was merely incidental and was not the
aim and purpose of the government.
In Ignacio v. Ela, supra, the dissenting
opinion of Justice Concepcion pointed out that
the mayor disapproved the application for a
permit not so much because he was afraid that
breach of peace would ensue but because he
wrongly though the kiosk should be used for
public purposes only and not for religious
purposes. When the Jehovah's Witness
members use the public squares, they are no
different from ordinary pedestrians or
promenaders who use the street: that they are
performing religious acts is only incidental. So
long as the use of public property is only
incidentalally and temporarilly for religious
purposes and so long as the use is such as to be
reasonably compatible with the use to which
other members of the community are similarly
entitled, then the non-establishment clause is
not violated. The tests then are (1) Is the use
of the public facility compatible with general
use? (2) Is the resulting benefit to the religious
group only incidental.
B. Free Exercise Clause
1. Flag Salute
Ebranilag v. Division Superindentent of Schools
of Cebu, 219 SCRA 256 (1993)
Conscientious Objectors cannot be compelled to
salute the flag.
Constitutional Law II
F: All the ptetitioners in these cases were
expelled from their classes by the public school
authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the
flag, since the national anthem and recite the
patriotic pledge as required by RA 1265 and by
Dept. Order No. 8 dated July 21, 1955 of the
DECS making the flag ceremony compulsory in
all educational institutions.
ISSUE: W/N school children who are members
of a religious sect known as Jehovah's
Witnesses may be expelled from school (both
private and public), for refusing, on account of
their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag
ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or
singing the Phil. National Anthem, saluting the
Phil. flag and reciting the patriotic pledge.
HELD: NO.
The idea that one may be compelled to
salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and
recite the patriotice pledge, during a flag
ceremony on pain of being dismissed from
one's job or of being expelled from school, is
alien to the conscience of the present
generation of Filipinos who cut their teeth on
the Bill of Rights w/c guarantees their rights to
free speech and the free exercise of religious
profession and worship.
xxx
xxx Forcing a small religious group,
through the iron hand of the law, to participate
in a ceremony that violates their religious
beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of
country or respect for duly constituted
authorities.
xxx
The sole justification for a prior restraint
or limitation on the exercise of religious
freedom is the existence of a grave and present
danger of a character both grave and imminent,
of a serious evil to public safety, moral, health
or any other legitimate public interest, that the
state has a right and duty to prevent. Absent
such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of
the pets. from the schools is not justified.
xxx
Although petitioners do not participate
in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not
engage in external acts or behavior that would
offend their countrymen who believe in
exercising their love of country through the
observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly
stand at attention during the ceremony to show
their respect for the right of those who choose
to participate in the solemn proceedings. As
there is no disruption, expulsion is
unwarranted.
However, if they should commit
breaches of peace by action that offend the
sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of
other persons, the school authorities have the
power to discipline them.
Compare West V. Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 US 624 (1943)
F: The State Board required public school
pupils to salute the flag of the United States
while reciting a pledge of allegiance under
penalty of expulsion entailing liability of both
pupil and parents to be proceeded against for
unlawful absence. Appellees, members of the
Jehovah's Witnesses, consider the flag as a
graven image which they are forbidden to
salute under their religious beliefs. The State
asserts the power to condition access to public
education.
ISSUE: W/N the compulsory flag salute is valid.
RULING: NO.
In connection with pledges, the flag
salute is a form of utterance. It requires an
affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind. It
is now a commonplace that censorship or
suppression of expression of opinion is tolerated
by the Constitution only when the expression
presents a clear and present danger of action of
a kind the State is empowered to prevent and
punish. Here the power of compulsion is
invoked without any allegation that remaining
passive during a flag salute ritual creates a
clear and present danger that would justify an
effort even to muffle expression.
To sustain the compulsory flag salute,
we are required to say that a Bill of Rights
which guards the individual's right to speak his
mind left it open to public authorities to compel
him to utter what is not in his mind.
The Court applies the limitations of the
Constitution with no fear that freedom to be
intellectually and spiritually diverse or even
contrary will disintegrate the social
organization. To believe that patriotism will not
flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary
and spontaneous instead of a compulsory
routine is to make an unflattering estimate of
the appeal of our institutions to free minds.
2. Freedom to propagate religious doctrines
American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 P
386 (1957)
F: Plaintiff is engaged in the distribution
and sale of bibles and religious articles. The City
Treasurer of Manila informed the plaintiff that it
was conducting the business of general
merchandise without securing the necessary
license and paying the requisite fee in violation
of the City ordinance. Plaintiff protested against
this requirement as constituting a restraint
upon the exercise of religion. It claimed that it
is not engaged in business which necessitates
Constitutional Law II
the securing of a license as it never made any
profit from the sale of its bibles.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance as applied
to petitioner is unconstutional for being in
restraint of petitioner's right to free exercise of
religion.
HELD: YES. The power to tax the exercise of the
privilege is the power to control or suppress its
enjoyment. Those who can tax the exercise of
religious practice can make its exercise so
costly as to deprive it of the resources
necessary for its maintenance. It is true that the
price asked for the religious articles was in
some instances a little bit higher than the
actual cost of the same, but this cannot mean
that plaintiff was engaged in the business or
occupation of selling said "merchandise" for
profit. The mark up can only be treated as
contributions by the faithfuls to the religious
cause. The Ordinance CANNOT be applied to
plaintiff society, for in so doing, it would impair
its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious
profession and worship, as well as its right to
disseminate religious beliefs.
3. Exemtion from union shop
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59
SCRA 54 (1974)
F: Benjamin Victoriano is an employee of
the Elizalde Rope Factory. In 1962, he resigned
from the respondent labor union on the ground
that the Iglesia ni Kristo of which he is a
member prohibits union membership. As the
union demanded his dismissal from
employment pursuant to a closed shop
agreement, Victoriano brought this action for
injunction. The CFI ruled in his favor exempting
from the closed-shop contracts members of
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
members in any labor organization. The union
appealed.
HELD: The statute does not violate the rights of
association. It does not impair the obligation of
contracts for not only are existing laws read into
contracts in order to fix the obligation of the
parties but the reservation of essential
attributes of sovereign power is also read into
such contracts. Neither does the law constitute
an establishment of religion. It has been held
that in order to withstand objections based on
this ground, the statute musr have a secular
purpose and that purpose must not directly
advance or diminish the interest of any religion.
Congress acted merely to relieve persons of the
burden imposed by union security agreements.
4. Disqualification from local government
office
Pamil v. Teleron 86 SCRA 413 (1978)
F: In 1971, Fr. Margarito Gonzaga was
elected mayor of Albuquerque, Bohol. A petition
was filed against him on the basis of section
2175 of the Revised Administrative Code
providing that "in nocase shall there be elected
or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics,
soldiers in active service, persons receiving
salaries from provincial funds, or contractors for
public works." The CFI dismissed the petition on
the ground that the ineligibility has been
impliedly repealed by section 23 of the 1971
Election Code.
HELD: The voting of the SC was inconclusive.
Seven justices held that section 2175 is no
longer operative. Justice Fernando held that
section 2175 imposed a religious test on the
exercise of the right to run for public office
contrary to Art. III of the 1935 Constitution.
Justice Teehankee held that section 2175 had
been repealed by the Election Code. Five
justices held that section 2175 is constitutional.
VI. LIBERTY OF ABODE AND OF TRAVEL
Art. III, Sec. 6. The liberty of abode
and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as
may be provided by law.
Salonga v. Hermoso 97 SCRA 121 (1980)
Right to travel
This is not the first time petitioner Jovito
Salonga came to the SC by way of a mandamus
proceeding to compel the issuance to him of a
certificate of eligibility to travel. In the first
case, Salonga v. Madella, the case became
moot and academic. The present petition is
likewise moot and academic. In the motion to
dismiss filed by the Solicitor General, it was
stated that the certificate of eligibility to travel
had been granted petitioner.
Nonetheless, in view of the likelihood
that this Court may be faced again with the
same situation, it is desirable that respondent
Travel Processing Center should exercise the
utmost care to avoid the impression that certain
citizens desirous of exercising their
constitutional right to travel could be subjected
to inconvenience or annoyance. The freedom to
travel is one of the most cherished. xxx
Constitutional Law II

Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 & 178

SCRA 760 (1989)

F: This petition for mandamus and

prohibition asks the Court to order the
respondents to issue travel documents to Mr.
Marcos and the immediate members of his
family and to enjoin the implementation of the
President's decision to bar their return to the
Philippines. The case for petitioners is founded
on the assertion that the right of the Marcoses
to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under
the provisions of the Constitution respecting
one's liberty of abode and right to travel.
Respondents argue the primacy of the right of
the State to national security over individual
rights.

RULING: The right involved in this case is not

the right to travel from the Philippines to other
countries or within the Philippines. Essentially,
the right involved is the right to return to one's
country, a totally distinct right under
international law, independent from although
related to the right to travel.
The right to return to one's country is
not among the rights specifically guaranteed in
the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty
of abode and the right to travel, but it is the
Court's well considered view that the right to
return may be considered as a generally
accepted principle of international law, and
under our Constitution, is part of the law of the
land. However, it is distinct and separate from
the right to travel and enjoys a different
protection under the Intl. Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights, i.e. against being arbitrarily
deprived thereof.
The request or demand of the Marcoses
to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot
be considered in the light solely of the
constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of
abode and the right to travel. It must be treated
as a matter that is appropriately addressed to
those residual unstated powers of the President
which are implicit in and correlative to the
paramount duty residing in that office to
safeguard and protect general welfare. In that
context, such request or demand should submit
to the exercise of a broader discretion on the
part of the President to determine whether it
must be granted or not.