Cayetano vs. Monsod Sarmiento vs.
COMELEC
201 SCRA 210
September 1991
Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to
the position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because
allegedly Monsod does not posses required qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article
IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must
not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine
Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law
is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of
such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services,
contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past
work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of
industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor
– verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC
chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years
does In the view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
212 SCRA 307, August 6, 1992
Facts: This special civil action for certiorari seek to set aside the Resolutions of
Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in the following Special Cases:
1) G.R. No. 105628 — SPC No. 92-266
2) G.R. No. 105725 — SPC No. 92-323
3) G.R. No. 105727 — SPC No. 92-288
4) G.R. No. 105730 — SPC No. 92-315
5) G.R. No. 105771 — SPC No. 92-271
6) G.R. No. 105778 — SPC No. 92-039
7) G.R. No. 105797 — SPC No. 92-153
8) G.R. No. 105919 — SPC No. 92-293
9) G.R. No. 105977 — SPC No. 92-087
Issue: Whether the challenged Resolutions above specified (the SPC) as having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion in that, inter alia, the Commission, sitting en banc,
took cognizance of and decided the appeals without first referring them to any of it
Divisions.
Held: The COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, when it resolved the appeals of petitioners in the above mentioned Special
Cases without first referring them to any of its Divisions. Section 3, subdivision C, Article
IX of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided
by the Commission en banc.
Said Resolutions are therefore, null and void and must be set aside. Consequently, the
appeals are deemed pending before the Commission for proper referral to a Division.
A resolution directing the COMELEC to assign said Special Cases to the Divisions
pursuant to Section 8, Rule 3 of its Rules on assignment of cases would, logically, be in
order. However, Section 16 of R.A. No. 7166 6 provides that all pre-proclamation cases
pending before it shall be deemed terminated at the beginning of the term of the office
involved. The terms of the offices involved in the Special Cases subject of these petitions
commenced at noon of June 30 1992. These cases have thus been rendered moot and such a
resolution would only be an exercise in futility.
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Therefore, the instant petitions are DISMISSED but without prejudice to the filing by
petitioners of regular elections protests. If the winning candidates for the positions involved
in the Special Cases subject of these petitions have already been proclaimed, the running of
the period to file the protests shall be deemed suspended by the pendency of such cases
before the COMELEC and of these petitions before this Court.
Quinto vs Comelec
G. R. No. 189698
FACTS: Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition against the COMELEC for issuing a resolution declaring
appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their
positions. In this defense, the COMELEC avers that it only copied the provision from Sec.
13 of R.A. 9369.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid.
HELD: NO. In the Fariñas case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA. 9006 repealing
Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) for giving undue benefit to elective officials
in comparison with appointive officials. Incidentally, the Court upheld the substantial
distinctions between the two and pronounced that there was no violation of the equal
protection clause. However in the present case, the Court held that the discussion on the
equal protection clause was an obiter dictum since the issue raised therein was against the
repealing clause. It didn’t squarely challenge Sec. 66.
Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive and elective officials. Applying the 4
requisites of a valid classification, the proviso does not comply with the second
requirement – that it must be germane to the purpose of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental
position to promote one’s candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence of
the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and
discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty
would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The
restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electorate
arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty
because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.
Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without
distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in government or not. Certainly, a
utility worker in the government will also be considered as ipso facto resigned once he files
his certificate of candidacy for the election. This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is
unimaginable how he can use his position in the government to wield influence in the
political world.
The provision s directed to the activity any and all public offices, whether they be partisan
or non partisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay level.
Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right
involved on such a sweeping scale.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Commission on Elections. The
latter moved to question an earlier decision of the Supreme Court declaring Section 4 (a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 unconstitutional. Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution
No. 8678 provides that, "Any person holding a public appointive office or position
including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and
employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy." Be it noted that
petitioners of the above-entitled case are appointive officials who intend to be elected in
the previously held 2010 elections and who felt aggrieved by the issuance of the questioned
resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is constitutional.
RULING: The Supreme Court overruled its previous decision declaring the assailed
resolution unconstitutional. Here, it strongly upholds the constitutionality of the resolution
saying that it does not violate the equal protection clause. It is settled that the equal
protection clause does not demand absolute equality; it merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. The test used is reasonableness which requires that:
1. The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
2. It is germane to the purposes of the law;
3. It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
4. It applies equally to all members of the same class.
In the case under consideration, there is a substantial distinction between public and
elective officials which has been rendered moot and academic by the ruling made in the
case of Farinas, etl. al. vs. Executive Secretary, et. al.
Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is constitutional.
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Case Digest on Soller v. Comelec G.R. No. 139853 (Sept.5, 2000)
November 10, 2010
FACTS: Petitioner and respondent were opposing candidates for mayor. Petitioner was
proclaimed elected. Respondent filed with Comelec a petition for annulment of
proclamation. A week later, he filed an election protest in the RTC. Petitioner moved to
dismiss the protest on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, forum shopping, and failure to
state a cause of action. The RTC denied motion. Respondent also filed certiorari with
Comelec en banc which was later denied.
HELD: The authority to resolve petitions for certiorari involving incidental issues of
election protests falls within the jurisdiction of the Division of the Comelec and not with
the Comelec en banc. If the principal case is cognizable on appeal by a Division, there is
no reason why petitions for certiorari relating to incidents of election protest should not be
referred first to a Division of the Comelec for resolution.
ADIONG v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 103956
March 31, 1992
FACTS: On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant
to its powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos.
6646 and 7166 and other election laws. Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:
Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. — The following are lawful election propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals… Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted
only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda. —
It is unlawful:…
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any
place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common
posted areas and/or billboards…
Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections assails
the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in
"mobile" places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is
violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act
No. 6646.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on
"mobile" places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized
posting areas that it fixes.
HELD: The petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution
No. 2347 of the COMELEC providing that "decals and stickers may be posted only in any
of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof" is
DECLARED NULL and VOID. The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and
stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in designated areas provided
for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds. The prohibition
unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the
Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the
questioned prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the political party. The
regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by
displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him.
Also, the questioned prohibition premised on the statute (RA 6646) and as couched in the
resolution is void for overbreadth. The restriction as to where the decals and stickers should
be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this
case is a privately-owned vehicle (The provisions allowing regulation are so loosely
worded that they include the posting of decals or stickers in the privacy of one's living
room or bedroom.) In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by
the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that
no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. (The right to
property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation but when this right is joined by a
"liberty" interest, the burden of justification on the part of the Government must be
exceptionally convincing and irrefutable. The burden is not met in this case.)
Additionally, the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate
equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article
II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the
Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private
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vehicles. It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas,
tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the
vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election
propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate.
In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public
or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship
which cannot be justified by the Constitution.
Dimaporo v. Mitra
202 SCRA 779 / G.R. No. 96859
October 15, 1991
FACTS: Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second
Legislative District of Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. On 15
January 1990, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao in the
immediately following elections. Upon being informed of this development by the
COMELEC, respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives excluded
petitioner's name from the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives pursuant to
Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code which states:
Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one
which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall
be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter addressed to
respondent Speaker, expressed his intention "to resume performing my duties and functions
as elected Member of Congress. He maintains that he did not thereby lose his seat as
congressman because Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative under the
present Constitution, being contrary thereto, and therefore not applicable to the present
members of Congress.
In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the term of office of members of the
House of Representatives, as well as the grounds by which the incumbency of said
members may be shortened, are provided for in the Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII
thereof provides that "the Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local
officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992," while
Section 7, Article VI states: "The Members of the House of Representatives shall be
elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at
noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. He asserts that under the
rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is
repugnant to these constitutional provisions in that it provides for the shortening of a
congressman's term of office on a ground not provided for in the Constitution.
Moreover, he claims that he cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a
congressman holds another office or employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a
certificate of candidacy is not equivalent to holding another office or employment.
ISSUES:
1. IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 OPERATIVE UNDER THE
PRESENT CONSTITUTION?
2. COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE RESPONDENT
SECRETARY, 'BY ADMINISTRATIVE ACT', EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER FROM
THE ROLLS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY PREVENTING
HIM FROM EXERCISING HIS FUNCTIONS AS CONGRESSMAN, AND DEPRIVING
HIM OF HIS RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AS SUCH?
HELD:
The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
1. The officials running for office other than the ones they are holding will be considered
resigned not because of abuse of facilities of power or the use of office facilities but
primarily because under our Constitution, we have this …chapter on accountability of
public officers (both in the 1973 and 1987 constitution). Section 1 of Article XI (1987) on
"Accountability of Public Officers" states that:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Under this commentary on accountability of public officers, the elective public officers
must serve their principal, the people, not their own personal ambition. Petitioner failed to
discern that rather than cut short the term of office of elective public officials, this statutory
provision (Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881) seeks to ensure that such officials serve
out their entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office
and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their
candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position. This is consonant with the
constitutional edict that all public officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and
not trifle with the mandate which they have received from their constituents.
Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate
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of candidacy for another office, an overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation of the
elective office presently being held, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure,
not his term. Forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the
certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the moment and act of filing are
considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new
election or appointment can restore the ousted official. The law does not make the
forfeiture dependent upon future contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable.
That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the
Constitution itself as a mode of shortening the tenure of office of members of Congress,
does not preclude its application to present members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI
provides that "(t)he President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from
office, on impeachment … All other public officers and employees may be removed from
office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. Such constitutional expression clearly
recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the
tenure of a Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive. The expression in the
constitution of the circumstances which shall bring about a vacancy does not preclude the
legislature from prescribing other grounds
such regulations and conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any
restrictions which public policy may dictate on his office.
Marquez v. COMELEC
Facts: Marquez, a candidate for an elective position in Quezon Province during the 1998
elections, filed a petition praying for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of
Rodriguez on the ground of disqualification under section 40 of the Local Government
Code (Section 40. Disqualification. The following persons are disqualified from running
for any local elective position... (e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases
here or abroad.) Rodriguez is allegedly criminally charged with insurance fraud in the
United States and that his arrest is yet to be served because of his flight from the country.
The COMELEC dismissed Marquez’s Petition. Rodriguez was proclaimed the Governor-
elect of Quezon.
Issues: WON Rodriguez, at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is said to be a
fugitive from justice as provided for in section 40 of the Local Government Code.

Additionally, this Court has enunciated the presumption in favor of constitutionality of Held: “Fugitive from justice” does not mean a person convicted by final judgment. It
legislative enactment. To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and includes those who after being charged flee to avoid prosecution. The COMELEC is
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication. A directed to proceed and settle the case in conformity of the given clarification with the term
doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice. “fugitive from justice”.

2. As administrative officers, both the Speaker and House Secretary-General perform

ministerial functions; It was their duty to remove petitioner's name from the Roll
considering the unequivocal tenor of Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881. When the
COMELEC communicated to the House of Representatives that petitioner had filed his
certificate of candidacy for regional governor of Muslim Mindanao, respondents had no
choice but to abide by the clear and unmistakable legal effect of Section 67, Article IX of
B.P. Blg. 881. These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an
alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might
seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in
all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon
them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the
government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey
it.

In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a public office is a public trust. It is
created for the interest and benefit of the people. As such, the holder thereof is subject to