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G.R. No.

156364 September 3, 2007

JACOBUS BERNHARD HULST, petitioner,


vs.
PR BUILDERS, INC., respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court assailing the Decision1 dated October 30, 2002 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 60981.

The facts:

Jacobus Bernhard Hulst (petitioner) and his spouse Ida Johanna Hulst-Van Ijzeren (Ida),
Dutch nationals, entered into a Contract to Sell with PR Builders, Inc. (respondent), for
the purchase of a 210-sq m residential unit in respondent's townhouse project in
Barangay Niyugan, Laurel, Batangas.

When respondent failed to comply with its verbal promise to complete the project by
June 1995, the spouses Hulst filed before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) a complaint for rescission of contract with interest, damages and attorney's
fees, docketed as HLRB Case No. IV6-071196-0618.

On April 22, 1997, HLURB Arbiter Ma. Perpetua Y. Aquino (HLURB Arbiter) rendered
a Decision2 in favor of spouses Hulst, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the


complainant, rescinding the Contract to Sell and ordering respondent to:

1) Reimburse complainant the sum of P3,187,500.00, representing the purchase


price paid by the complainants to P.R. Builders, plus interest thereon at the rate of
twelve percent (12%) per annum from the time complaint was filed;

2) Pay complainant the sum of P297,000.00 as actual damages;

3) Pay complainant the sum of P100,000.00 by way of moral damages;

4) Pay complainant the sum of P150,000.00 as exemplary damages;

5) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and for other litigation expenses; and

6) Cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.3

Meanwhile, spouses Hulst divorced. Ida assigned her rights over the purchased property
to petitioner.4 From then on, petitioner alone pursued the case.

On August 21, 1997, the HLURB Arbiter issued a Writ of Execution addressed to the Ex-
Officio Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas directing the latter to
execute its judgment.5

On April 13, 1998, the Ex-Officio Sheriff proceeded to implement the Writ of Execution.
However, upon complaint of respondent with the CA on a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition, the levy made by the Sheriff was set aside, requiring the Sheriff to levy first
on respondent's personal properties.6 Sheriff Jaime B. Ozaeta (Sheriff) tried to implement
the writ as directed but the writ was returned unsatisfied.7

On January 26, 1999, upon petitioner's motion, the HLURB Arbiter issued an Alias Writ
of Execution.8

On March 23, 1999, the Sheriff levied on respondent's 15 parcels of land covered by 13
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT)9 in Barangay Niyugan, Laurel, Batangas.10

In a Notice of Sale dated March 27, 2000, the Sheriff set the public auction of the levied
properties on April 28, 2000 at 10:00 a.m..11

Two days before the scheduled public auction or on April 26, 2000, respondent filed an
Urgent Motion to Quash Writ of Levy with the HLURB on the ground that the Sheriff
made an overlevy since the aggregate appraised value of the levied properties at
P6,500.00 per sq m is P83,616,000.00, based on the Appraisal Report12 of Henry Hunter
Bayne Co., Inc. dated December 11, 1996, which is over and above the judgment
award.13

At 10:15 a.m. of the scheduled auction date of April 28, 2000, respondent's counsel
objected to the conduct of the public auction on the ground that respondent's Urgent
Motion to Quash Writ of Levy was pending resolution. Absent any restraining order from
the HLURB, the Sheriff proceeded to sell the 15 parcels of land. Holly Properties Realty
Corporation was the winning bidder for all 15 parcels of land for the total amount of
P5,450,653.33. The sum of P5,313,040.00 was turned over to the petitioner in satisfaction
of the judgment award after deducting the legal fees.14

At 4:15 p.m. of the same day, while the Sheriff was at the HLURB office to remit the
legal fees relative to the auction sale and to submit the Certificates of Sale15 for the
signature of HLURB Director Belen G. Ceniza (HLURB Director), he received the Order
dated April 28, 2000 issued by the HLURB Arbiter to suspend the proceedings on the
matter.16
Four months later, or on August 28, 2000, the HLURB Arbiter and HLURB Director
issued an Order setting aside the sheriff's levy on respondent's real properties,17 reasoning
as follows:

While we are not making a ruling that the fair market value of the levied
properties is PhP6,500.00 per square meter (or an aggregate value of
PhP83,616,000.00) as indicated in the Hunter Baynes Appraisal Report, we
definitely cannot agree with the position of the Complainants and the Sheriff that
the aggregate value of the 12,864.00-square meter levied properties is only around
PhP6,000,000.00. The disparity between the two valuations are [sic] so egregious
that the Sheriff should have looked into the matter first before proceeding with the
execution sale of the said properties, especially when the auction sale proceedings
was seasonably objected by Respondent's counsel, Atty. Noel Mingoa. However,
instead of resolving first the objection timely posed by Atty. Mingoa, Sheriff
Ozaete totally disregarded the objection raised and, posthaste, issued the
corresponding Certificate of Sale even prior to the payment of the legal fees (pars.
7 & 8, Sheriff's Return).

While we agree with the Complainants that what is material in an execution sale
proceeding is the amount for which the properties were bidded and sold during
the public auction and that, mere inadequacy of the price is not a sufficient ground
to annul the sale, the court is justified to intervene where the inadequacy of the
price shocks the conscience (Barrozo vs. Macaraeg, 83 Phil. 378). The difference
between PhP83,616,000.00 and Php6,000,000.00 is PhP77,616,000.00 and it
definitely invites our attention to look into the proceedings had especially so when
there was only one bidder, the HOLLY PROPERTIES REALTY
CORPORATION represented by Ma, Chandra Cacho (par. 7, Sheriff's Return)
and the auction sale proceedings was timely objected by Respondent's counsel
(par. 6, Sheriff's Return) due to the pendency of the Urgent Motion to Quash the
Writ of Levy which was filed prior to the execution sale.

Besides, what is at issue is not the value of the subject properties as


determined during the auction sale, but the determination of the value of the
properties levied upon by the Sheriff taking into consideration Section 9(b) of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure x x x.

xxxx

It is very clear from the foregoing that, even during levy, the Sheriff has to
consider the fair market value of the properties levied upon to determine whether
they are sufficient to satisfy the judgment, and any levy in excess of the judgment
award is void (Buan v. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 424).

x x x x18 (Emphasis supplied).

The dispositive portion of the Order reads:


WHEREFORE, the levy on the subject properties made by the Ex-Officio Sheriff
of the RTC of Tanauan, Batangas, is hereby SET ASIDE and the said Sheriff is
hereby directed to levy instead Respondent's real properties that are reasonably
sufficient to enforce its final and executory judgment, this time, taking into
consideration not only the value of the properties as indicated in their respective
tax declarations, but also all the other determinants at arriving at a fair market
value, namely: the cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, its
actual or potential uses, and in the particular case of lands, their size, shape or
location, and the tax declarations thereon.

SO ORDERED.19

A motion for reconsideration being a prohibited pleading under Section 1(h), Rule IV of
the 1996 HLURB Rules and Procedure, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with the CA on September 27, 2000.

On October 30, 2002, the CA rendered herein assailed Decision20 dismissing the petition.
The CA held that petitioner's insistence that Barrozo v. Macaraeg21 does not apply since
said case stated that "when there is a right to redeem inadequacy of price should not be
material" holds no water as what is obtaining in this case is not "mere inadequacy," but
an inadequacy that shocks the senses; that Buan v. Court of Appeals22 properly applies
since the questioned levy covered 15 parcels of land posited to have an aggregate value
of P83,616,000.00 which shockingly exceeded the judgment debt of only around
P6,000,000.00.

Without filing a motion for reconsideration,23 petitioner took the present recourse on the
sole ground that:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN


AFFIRMING THE ARBITER'S ORDER SETTING ASIDE THE LEVY MADE
BY THE SHERIFF ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES.24

Before resolving the question whether the CA erred in affirming the Order of the HLURB
setting aside the levy made by the sheriff, it behooves this Court to address a matter of
public and national importance which completely escaped the attention of the HLURB
Arbiter and the CA: petitioner and his wife are foreign nationals who are disqualified
under the Constitution from owning real property in their names.

Section 7 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be


transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. (Emphasis supplied).

The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain. Private land may be transferred or conveyed only to
individuals or entities "qualified to acquire lands of the public domain." The 1987
Constitution reserved the right to participate in the disposition, exploitation, development
and utilization of lands of the public domain for Filipino citizens25 or corporations at least
60 percent of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos.26 Aliens, whether individuals or
corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring public lands; hence, they have also
been disqualified from acquiring private lands.27

Since petitioner and his wife, being Dutch nationals, are proscribed under the
Constitution from acquiring and owning real property, it is unequivocal that the Contract
to Sell entered into by petitioner together with his wife and respondent is void. Under
Article 1409 (1) and (7) of the Civil Code, all contracts whose cause, object or purpose is
contrary to law or public policy and those expressly prohibited or declared void by law
are inexistent and void from the beginning. Article 1410 of the same Code provides that
the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not
prescribe. A void contract is equivalent to nothing; it produces no civil effect.28 It does
not create, modify or extinguish a juridical relation.29

Generally, parties to a void agreement cannot expect the aid of the law; the courts leave
them as they are, because they are deemed in pari delicto or "in equal fault."30 In pari
delicto is "a universal doctrine which holds that no action arises, in equity or at law, from
an illegal contract; no suit can be maintained for its specific performance, or to recover
the property agreed to be sold or delivered, or the money agreed to be paid, or damages
for its violation; and where the parties are in pari delicto, no affirmative relief of any kind
will be given to one against the other."31

This rule, however, is subject to exceptions32 that permit the return of that which may
have been given under a void contract to: (a) the innocent party (Arts. 1411-1412, Civil
Code);33 (b) the debtor who pays usurious interest (Art. 1413, Civil Code);34 (c) the party
repudiating the void contract before the illegal purpose is accomplished or before
damage is caused to a third person and if public interest is subserved by allowing
recovery (Art. 1414, Civil Code);35 (d) the incapacitated party if the interest of justice so
demands (Art. 1415, Civil Code);36 (e) the party for whose protection the prohibition by
law is intended if the agreement is not illegal per se but merely prohibited and if public
policy would be enhanced by permitting recovery (Art. 1416, Civil Code);37 and (f) the
party for whose benefit the law has been intended such as in price ceiling laws (Art.
1417, Civil Code)38 and labor laws (Arts. 1418-1419, Civil Code).39

It is significant to note that the agreement executed by the parties in this case is a
Contract to Sell and not a contract of sale. A distinction between the two is material in the
determination of when ownership is deemed to have been transferred to the buyer or
vendee and, ultimately, the resolution of the question on whether the constitutional
proscription has been breached.

In a contract of sale, the title passes to the buyer upon the delivery of the thing sold. The
vendor has lost and cannot recover the ownership of the property until and unless the
contract of sale is itself resolved and set aside.40 On the other hand, a contract to sell is
akin to a conditional sale where the efficacy or obligatory force of the vendor's obligation
to transfer title is subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain event, so that if
the suspensive condition does not take place, the parties would stand as if the conditional
obligation had never existed.41 In other words, in a contract to sell, the prospective seller
agrees to transfer ownership of the property to the buyer upon the happening of an event,
which normally is the full payment of the purchase price. But even upon the fulfillment
of the suspensive condition, ownership does not automatically transfer to the buyer. The
prospective seller still has to convey title to the prospective buyer by executing a contract
of absolute sale.42

Since the contract involved here is a Contract to Sell, ownership has not yet transferred to
the petitioner when he filed the suit for rescission. While the intent to circumvent the
constitutional proscription on aliens owning real property was evident by virtue of the
execution of the Contract to Sell, such violation of the law did not materialize because
petitioner caused the rescission of the contract before the execution of the final deed
transferring ownership.

Thus, exception (c) finds application in this case. Under Article 1414, one who repudiates
the agreement and demands his money before the illegal act has taken place is entitled to
recover. Petitioner is therefore entitled to recover what he has paid, although the basis of
his claim for rescission, which was granted by the HLURB, was not the fact that he is not
allowed to acquire private land under the Philippine Constitution. But petitioner is
entitled to the recovery only of the amount of P3,187,500.00, representing the purchase
price paid to respondent. No damages may be recovered on the basis of a void contract;
being nonexistent, the agreement produces no juridical tie between the parties involved.43
Further, petitioner is not entitled to actual as well as interests thereon,44 moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

The Court takes into consideration the fact that the HLURB Decision dated April 22,
1997 has long been final and executory. Nothing is more settled in the law than that a
decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer
be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law and whether it was made by the court that rendered it or by the
highest court of the land.45 The only recognized exceptions to the general rule are the
correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice
to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of
the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.46 None of the exceptions is
present in this case. The HLURB decision cannot be considered a void judgment, as it
was rendered by a tribunal with jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint.47

Ineluctably, the HLURB Decision resulted in the unjust enrichment of petitioner at the
expense of respondent. Petitioner received more than what he is entitled to recover under
the circumstances.

Article 22 of the Civil Code which embodies the maxim, nemo ex alterius incommode
debet lecupletari (no man ought to be made rich out of another's injury), states:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other
means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter
without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.

The above-quoted article is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, the
provisions of which were formulated as basic principles to be observed for the rightful
relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order; designed to
indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience; guides for
human conduct that should run as golden threads through society to the end that law may
approach its supreme ideal which is the sway and dominance of justice.48 There is unjust
enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of another, or when a
person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice,
equity and good conscience.49

A sense of justice and fairness demands that petitioner should not be allowed to benefit
from his act of entering into a contract to sell that violates the constitutional proscription.

This is not a case of equity overruling or supplanting a positive provision of law or


judicial rule. Rather, equity is exercised in this case "as the complement of legal
jurisdiction [that] seeks to reach and to complete justice where courts of law, through the
inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special
circumstances of cases, are incompetent to do so."50

The purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction in this case is to prevent unjust
enrichment and to ensure restitution. Equity jurisdiction aims to do complete justice in
cases where a court of law is unable to adapt its judgments to the special circumstances of
a case because of the inflexibility of its statutory or legal jurisdiction.51

The sheriff delivered to petitioner the amount of P5,313,040.00 representing the net
proceeds (bidded amount is P5,450,653.33) of the auction sale after deducting the legal
fees in the amount of P137,613.33.52 Petitioner is only entitled to P3,187,500.00, the
amount of the purchase price of the real property paid by petitioner to respondent under
the Contract to Sell. Thus, the Court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction may validly
order petitioner to return the excess amount of P2,125,540.00.

The Court shall now proceed to resolve the single issue raised in the present petition:
whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the HLURB Order setting aside the levy
made by the Sheriff on the subject properties.

Petitioner avers that the HLURB Arbiter and Director had no factual basis for pegging
the fair market value of the levied properties at P6,500.00 per sq m or P83,616,000.00;
that reliance on the appraisal report was misplaced since the appraisal was based on the
value of land in neighboring developed subdivisions and on the assumption that the
residential unit appraised had already been built; that the Sheriff need not determine the
fair market value of the subject properties before levying on the same since what is
material is the amount for which the properties were bidded and sold during the public
auction; that the pendency of any motion is not a valid ground for the Sheriff to suspend
the execution proceedings and, by itself, does not have the effect of restraining the Sheriff
from proceeding with the execution.

Respondent, on the other hand, contends that while it is true that the HLURB Arbiter and
Director did not categorically state the exact value of the levied properties, said properties
cannot just amount to P6,000,000.00; that the HLURB Arbiter and Director correctly
held that the value indicated in the tax declaration is not the sole determinant of the value
of the property.

The petition is impressed with merit.

If the judgment is for money, the sheriff or other authorized officer must execute the
same pursuant to the provisions of Section 9, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, viz:

Sec. 9. Execution of judgments for money, how enforced. –

(a) Immediate payment on demand. - The officer shall enforce an execution of a


judgment for money by demanding from the judgment obligor the immediate
payment of the full amount stated in the writ of execution and all lawful fees. x x
x

(b) Satisfaction by levy. - If the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the
obligation in cash, certified bank check or other mode of payment acceptable to
the judgment obligee, the officer shall levy upon the properties of the
judgment obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be
disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from execution, giving the
latter the option to immediately choose which property or part thereof may be
levied upon, sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment obligor does not
exercise the option, the officer shall first levy on the personal properties, if any,
and then on the real properties if the personal properties are insufficient to answer
for the judgment.

The sheriff shall sell only a sufficient portion of the personal or real property
of the judgment obligor which has been levied upon.

When there is more property of the judgment obligor than is sufficient to


satisfy the judgment and lawful fees, he must sell only so much of the
personal or real property as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful
fees.

Real property, stocks, shares, debts, credits, and other personal property, or any
interest in either real or personal property, may be levied upon in like manner
and with like effect as under a writ of attachment (Emphasis supplied).53
Thus, under Rule 39, in executing a money judgment against the property of the
judgment debtor, the sheriff shall levy on all property belonging to the judgment debtor
as is amply sufficient to satisfy the judgment and costs, and sell the same paying to the
judgment creditor so much of the proceeds as will satisfy the amount of the judgment
debt and costs. Any excess in the proceeds shall be delivered to the judgment debtor
unless otherwise directed by the judgment or order of the court.54

Clearly, there are two stages in the execution of money judgments. First, the levy and
then the execution sale.

Levy has been defined as the act or acts by which an officer sets apart or appropriates a
part or the whole of a judgment debtor's property for the purpose of satisfying the
command of the writ of execution.55 The object of a levy is to take property into the
custody of the law, and thereby render it liable to the lien of the execution, and put it out
of the power of the judgment debtor to divert it to any other use or purpose.56

On the other hand, an execution sale is a sale by a sheriff or other ministerial officer
under the authority of a writ of execution of the levied property of the debtor.57

In the present case, the HLURB Arbiter and Director gravely abused their discretion in
setting aside the levy conducted by the Sheriff for the reason that the auction sale
conducted by the sheriff rendered moot and academic the motion to quash the levy. The
HLURB Arbiter lost jurisdiction to act on the motion to quash the levy by virtue of the
consummation of the auction sale. Absent any order from the HLURB suspending the
auction sale, the sheriff rightfully proceeded with the auction sale. The winning bidder
had already paid the winning bid. The legal fees had already been remitted to the
HLURB. The judgment award had already been turned over to the judgment creditor.
What was left to be done was only the issuance of the corresponding certificates of sale to
the winning bidder. In fact, only the signature of the HLURB Director for that purpose
was needed58 – a purely ministerial act.

A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given
state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority,
without regard for or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety
of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to
decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not
ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither
the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.59 In the present case, all the requirements
of auction sale under the Rules have been fully complied with to warrant the issuance of
the corresponding certificates of sale.

And even if the Court should go into the merits of the assailed Order, the petition is
meritorious on the following grounds:

Firstly, the reliance of the HLURB Arbiter and Director, as well as the CA, on Barrozo v.
Macaraeg60 and Buan v. Court of Appeals61 is misplaced.
The HLURB and the CA misconstrued the Court's pronouncements in Barrozo. Barrozo
involved a judgment debtor who wanted to repurchase properties sold at execution
beyond the one-year redemption period. The statement of the Court in Barrozo, that "only
where such inadequacy shocks the conscience the courts will intervene," is at best a mere
obiter dictum. This declaration should be taken in the context of the other declarations of
the Court in Barrozo, to wit:

Another point raised by appellant is that the price paid at the auction sale was so
inadequate as to shock the conscience of the court. Supposing that this issue is
open even after the one-year period has expired and after the properties have
passed into the hands of third persons who may have paid a price higher than the
auction sale money, the first thing to consider is that the stipulation contains no
statement of the reasonable value of the properties; and although defendant'
answer avers that the assessed value was P3,960 it also avers that their real market
value was P2,000 only. Anyway, mere inadequacy of price – which was the
complaint' allegation – is not sufficient ground to annul the sale. It is only
where such inadequacy shocks the conscience that the courts will intervene. x
x x Another consideration is that the assessed value being P3,960 and the
purchase price being in effect P1,864 (P464 sale price plus P1,400 mortgage lien
which had to be discharged) the conscience is not shocked upon examining the
prices paid in the sales in National Bank v. Gonzales, 45 Phil., 693 and Guerrero
v. Guerrero, 57 Phil., 445, sales which were left undisturbed by this Court.

Furthermore, where there is the right to redeem – as in this case – inadequacy


of price should not be material because the judgment debtor may re-acquire
the property or else sell his right to redeem and thus recover any loss he
claims to have suffered by reason of the price obtained at the execution sale.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied).62

In other words, gross inadequacy of price does not nullify an execution sale. In an
ordinary sale, for reason of equity, a transaction may be invalidated on the ground of
inadequacy of price, or when such inadequacy shocks one's conscience as to justify the
courts to interfere; such does not follow when the law gives the owner the right to redeem
as when a sale is made at public auction,63 upon the theory that the lesser the price, the
easier it is for the owner to effect redemption.64 When there is a right to redeem,
inadequacy of price should not be material because the judgment debtor may re-acquire
the property or else sell his right to redeem and thus recover any loss he claims to have
suffered by reason of the price obtained at the execution sale.65 Thus, respondent stood to
gain rather than be harmed by the low sale value of the auctioned properties because it
possesses the right of redemption. More importantly, the subject matter in Barrozo is the
auction sale, not the levy made by the Sheriff.

The Court does not sanction the piecemeal interpretation of a decision. To get the true
intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be isolated and
resorted to, but the decision must be considered in its entirety.66
As regards Buan, it is cast under an entirely different factual milieu. It involved the levy
on two parcels of land owned by the judgment debtor; and the sale at public auction of
one was sufficient to fully satisfy the judgment, such that the levy and attempted
execution of the second parcel of land was declared void for being in excess of and
beyond the original judgment award granted in favor of the judgment creditor.

In the present case, the Sheriff complied with the mandate of Section 9, Rule 39 of the
Revised Rules of Court, to "sell only a sufficient portion" of the levied properties "as is
sufficient to satisfy the judgment and the lawful fees." Each of the 15 levied properties
was successively bidded upon and sold, one after the other until the judgment debt and
the lawful fees were fully satisfied. Holly Properties Realty Corporation successively
bidded upon and bought each of the levied properties for the total amount of
P5,450,653.33 in full satisfaction of the judgment award and legal fees.67

Secondly, the Rules of Court do not require that the value of the property levied be
exactly the same as the judgment debt; it can be less or more than the amount of debt.
This is the contingency addressed by Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. In the levy
of property, the Sheriff does not determine the exact valuation of the levied property.
Under Section 9, Rule 39, in conjunction with Section 7, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court,
the sheriff is required to do only two specific things to effect a levy upon a realty: (a) file
with the register of deeds a copy of the order of execution, together with the description
of the levied property and notice of execution; and (b) leave with the occupant of the
property copy of the same order, description and notice.68 Records do not show that
respondent alleged non-compliance by the Sheriff of said requisites.

Thirdly, in determining what amount of property is sufficient out of which to secure


satisfaction of the execution, the Sheriff is left to his own judgment. He may exercise a
reasonable discretion, and must exercise the care which a reasonably prudent person
would exercise under like conditions and circumstances, endeavoring on the one hand to
obtain sufficient property to satisfy the purposes of the writ, and on the other hand not to
make an unreasonable and unnecessary levy.69 Because it is impossible to know the
precise quantity of land or other property necessary to satisfy an execution, the Sheriff
should be allowed a reasonable margin between the value of the property levied upon and
the amount of the execution; the fact that the Sheriff levies upon a little more than is
necessary to satisfy the execution does not render his actions improper.70 Section 9, Rule
39, provides adequate safeguards against excessive levying. The Sheriff is mandated to
sell so much only of such real property as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful
fees.

In the absence of a restraining order, no error, much less abuse of discretion, can be
imputed to the Sheriff in proceeding with the auction sale despite the pending motion to
quash the levy filed by the respondents with the HLURB. It is elementary that sheriffs, as
officers charged with the delicate task of the enforcement and/or implementation of
judgments, must, in the absence of a restraining order, act with considerable dispatch so
as not to unduly delay the administration of justice; otherwise, the decisions, orders, or
other processes of the courts of justice and the like would be futile.71 It is not within the
jurisdiction of the Sheriff to consider, much less resolve, respondent's objection to the
continuation of the conduct of the auction sale. The Sheriff has no authority, on his own,
to suspend the auction sale. His duty being ministerial, he has no discretion to postpone
the conduct of the auction sale.

Finally, one who attacks a levy on the ground of excessiveness carries the burden of
sustaining that contention.72 In the determination of whether a levy of execution is
excessive, it is proper to take into consideration encumbrances upon the property, as well
as the fact that a forced sale usually results in a sacrifice; that is, the price demanded for
the property upon a private sale is not the standard for determining the excessiveness of
the levy.73

Here, the HLURB Arbiter and Director had no sufficient factual basis to determine the
value of the levied property. Respondent only submitted an Appraisal Report, based
merely on surmises. The Report was based on the projected value of the townhouse
project after it shall have been fully developed, that is, on the assumption that the
residential units appraised had already been built. The Appraiser in fact made this
qualification in its Appraisal Report: "[t]he property subject of this appraisal has not been
constructed. The basis of the appraiser is on the existing model units."74 Since it is
undisputed that the townhouse project did not push through, the projected value did not
become a reality. Thus, the appraisal value cannot be equated with the fair market value.
The Appraisal Report is not the best proof to accurately show the value of the levied
properties as it is clearly self-serving.

Therefore, the Order dated August 28, 2000 of HLURB Arbiter Aquino and Director
Ceniza in HLRB Case No. IV6-071196-0618 which set aside the sheriff's levy on
respondent's real properties, was clearly issued with grave abuse of discretion. The CA
erred in affirming said Order.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 30,
2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60981 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Order dated August 28, 2000 of HLURB Arbiter Ma. Perpetua Y. Aquino
and Director Belen G. Ceniza in HLRB Case No. IV6-071196-0618 is declared NULL
and VOID. HLURB Arbiter Aquino and Director Ceniza are directed to issue the
corresponding certificates of sale in favor of the winning bidder, Holly Properties Realty
Corporation. Petitioner is ordered to return to respondent the amount of P2,125,540.00,
without interest, in excess of the proceeds of the auction sale delivered to petitioner. After
the finality of herein judgment, the amount of P2,125,540.00 shall earn 6% interest until
fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Reyes, JJ., concur.

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