The Nomonhan Incident: Imperial Japan and the Soviet Union

Author(s): Katsu H. Young

Source: Monumenta Nipponica, Vol. 22, No. 1/2 (1967), pp. 82-102
Published by: Sophia University
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 The Nomonhan Incident
IMPERIAL JAPAN AND THE
SOVIET UNION

by KATSU H. YOUNG

(I INTRODUCTION

A afterthe establishmentof relations,the Soviet Union cameto be lookedupon

DECADE
as the primarythreat to the security of ImperialJapan.The Chief of Staff of the
KwantungArmy expressedthis opinionin a talk with AritaHachir6,who became
ForeignMinisterin the CabinetofHirotaK6kiia few dayslater(April2, I936). On this oc-
casionit was observedthat in recentyears the nationalpower of the Bolshevikstate had
beenincreasingsteadily,andthat it now possessedanarmyof over one millionfourhundred
thousandhavingidealorganization,equipment,andso forth.It was alsoobservedthat there
hadbeenanespeciallyremarkableincreaseof Sovietmilitarystrengthin the FarEast.It was
thought that, as a naturalresult of this fact, Soviet diplomacytowardJapanhad assumed
an aggressively"hard"line-in contrastto the "soft"and passiveline of earlieryears.2

(II BACKGROUND TO NOMONHAN

THE Soviet Union had pursueda ratherconciliatorydiplomaticpolicy towardJapansince

the two countriesopened relationsin I925. However, conclusionof the Anti-Comintern
PactbetweenJapanand Germanyin November,I936, markedthe beginningof a rapidde-
relations.As the ChinaIncidentdeveloped,relationsbetween
teriorationin Soviet-Japanese
the two nationsbecameever moredifficultand complex.Continualand numerousborder
disputeseruptedalong the frontiersof Manchukuofacingthe Soviet Union and Mongolia;

MTHE AUTHOR is currently completing her disserta- t A, Tokyo, I950-5i and I956, V, 44; "Kanto-
tion at the University of Washington. It is tenta- gun no nimmu ni motozuku taigai shomondai ni
tively entitled "TheJapanese Army and the Soviet kansuru gun no iken" A*_ f- ) * I < 13'11
-
Union, I936-4I." This article is a portion of that # - - v M 7 69* I J ,(The KwantungArmy's
dissertation. She wishes to acknowledge with Opinion on the Various Problemsof Foreign Rela-
gratitude a grant (the Shirley Farr Fellowship) tions from the Point of View of the Duties of the
from the American Association of University Army), in Nihongaikonempyo narabini shuyobunsho
Women which supported her researchduring the Ei
*t*+ A-)- X t (Chronological Tables
year i965-66. and Major Documents Pertaining to Japan's For-
1 4E,a/Ji e
A W eign Relations), Gaimush6 S1*d- , ed., 2 vols.,
2Harada Kumao , eAi' it4, Jutsu d& Saionjikd Nihon kokusai reng6ky6kai El4I1I 14,
to seikyokux5 F Z & (Prince Saionji and the Tokyo, I955, II, 330-335.
Political Situation), 9 vols., Iwanami shoten M it
 YOUNG. "The NomonhanIncident" 83

old issues such as the northernseas fisheriesandJapaneseexploitationrights in northern

Sakhalincontinued,and a new problemwas posed by Soviet assistanceto the Chinese.3
The borderdisputes,which were oftenaccompaniedby militaryaction,were reportedcon-
stantly in the newspapers.This served as a constantreminderof the Soviet threat to the
"life line" of the JapaneseEmpire,the Kanch'atzuaffairof the early summerof I937 being
used as but one example.4But the firstreallylarge-scalemilitarystruggle to developfrom
disputes over the ill-definedManchukuoanfrontierwas the Changkufeng5 Incident.This
brokeout in July, I938, at the junctureof the frontiersof Manchukuo,Korea,andthe Soviet
Union.
OnJulyi i, a groupof aboutfortySovietsoldiersclimbedahillontheManchukuoan frontier,
after which they constructeda fortifiedposition. The JapaneseArmy regardedthis as
a violation of the frontier.Fighting soon began, and reinforcementswere dispatchedby
both sides. The Japaneseforces engaged eventually included one full division from the
KoreanArmyandreinforcingunits fromthe KwantungArmy,while the Sovietsemployed
at least two artillerydivisions.Fromthe outset the positionof the KwantungArmy Head-
quarterswas that the employmentof forceswas absolutelynecessary;thatthe Sovietforces
must withdrawfromChangkufeng;and that at that time the SovietUnion would not dare
to enlargethe theaterof operationseven if theJapaneseusedmilitaryforcesto dislodgethem
fromthe disputedhill. This judgementwas baseduponmilitaryintelligencereportsstating
that therewas no sign of any Sovietintentionto dispatchlarge-scalereinforcements,as well
as the belief that bitter strifeexisted between the Red Army and the Soviet SecretPolice
(G.P.U.).6 The mannerin which the Kanch'atzuaffairhad been settled the previous
summeralso promotedthis judgement.
3 China and the Soviet Union concluded a five- nese and Manchukuoantroops fought with the
year Sino-Soviet nonaggression pact in Nanking Soviet forcesand sank a Soviet gunboat.Shige-
on August 2I, I937, one month and a half after the mitsu Mamoru* + A, the JapaneseAmbassador
Marco Polo Bridge Incident. At about the same to the SovietUnion,presentedanofficialprotestto
time rumors of a Sino-Soviet military alliance and the Sovietgovernment,andas a resultnegotiation
secret treaties were also circulating. See Tanaka tookplacebetweenhimselfandthe SovietPeoples'
Bun'ichiroel t A - O, "Nis'sokoshoshi" El / Rz Commissarfor ForeignAffairs,MaximLitvinov.
)fa (A History of Diplomatic Relations between Litvinov promised that the Soviet troops and
Japan and the Soviet Union), Gaimush6 Oakyoku gunboatswouldbe withdrawnfromthe islandand
daiikka.*F Krt.A,97 g- , Tokyo,April,I942,' its neighboringwaters.The Red Armywithdrew
originally classified as "Secret," p. 233. This is one fromthe islandonJuly5, I937. JFOA,SP4, pp.37-
of the items listed in Cecil H. Uyehara, Checklist 72; Asahishimbun 4YEl AMJ, June 22 andJuly 4,
of Archives in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign I937; andHataIkuhikot4 , "Nitchuisens6 no
Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, I868-I945. Microfilmedfor gunjiteki tenkai, I937-4I" El t' A 0) X
the Library of Congress, I949-5I, Photoduplica- ASnAI937-4I (MilitaryDevelopmentof the Japa-
tion Service, Library of Congress, Washington, nese-ChineseWar,I937-4I), in Taibeiyd sensoe no
D.C., I954. Its number in the microfilmed collec- michik;* A+ a)i (The Road to the Pa-
tion is SP 4, Reel SP 3. Hereafter this referencewill cific War),TsunodaJunA W 'III, ed., 8 vols., Asahi
be cited as JFOA, SP 4. shimbunsha, Tokyo, I963, IV, 80-8I.
4 On June I9, I937, Soviet troops occupied
Kanch'atzu ts --, an Amur river island. Japa- 6 Harada,vii, 55-56
84 Monumenta
Nipponica,
XXII, I-2

Despitethis initiallyoptimisticview, as the fighting grewmoreintenseits issuebeganto

swing in favorof the Soviet forcesbecauseof their advantageoustopographicalposition
and superiorequipment, organization,and tactics. Accordingly, the Kwantung Army
Headquartersdecidedto mobilizeits forcesforan attackupon the Sovietflank,therebydis-
tractingthemfromthe originalpointofdispute.The entireKwantungArmyforcesstationed
in the EasternFrontierZone wereput on emergencyalert,7while in Tokyo on July 2I the
WarMinister and the Chiefof the GeneralStaffrequestedimperialsanctionfor the use
of all forces.The Emperor,however, refusedto comply with the request.This naturally
frustratedand infuriatedthe KwantungArmy authoritiestremendously.8
By earlyAugust,both the WarMinistryandthe GeneralStaffwereclamoringforan early
settlement by diplomaticmeans.The militaryeven agreedto abandonthe disputedhill.
The army'sanxiety for an end to hostilitieswas evident in the decisionsof a Three Minis-
ters' Conference(War,Navy, andForeignAffairs)held on August 5. The confereesagreed
that the negotiationswould be basedon the Hunch'un9Treaty of i886, as the SovietUnion
insisted,and that it was essential to concludea truce speedilyin orderto avoid large-scale
hostilities.Japanmust thereforebe preparedto give up Changkufeng.ShigemitsuMamoru,
thenAmbassadorto the SovietUnion,was notifiedofthe decision.OnAugust IO Shigemitsu
met with MaximLitvinov and presenteda draftproposalfor a truce. This documentcon-
tainedthe stipulationthat theJapaneseforceswouldwithdrawone kilometerfromthe effec-
tive line of fighting as of midnightof August io, while the Soviet forceswere to remainin
the positionsthey held at that hour.Litvinov replied that in the interests of equitability
both sidesshouldmerelyceasemilitaryoperationsat the suggestedhourwhile maintaining
theirexisting positions.The Japaneseambassadorreadilyacceptedthis Soviet counterpro-
posal,an agreementwas reached,-anda truceeffectuatedon August II, I938.10
Less than a month prior to the ChangkufengIncident, Major-GeneralIshiwaraKanji,
acting for the Chief of Staffof the KwantungArmy, who was then absent, sent a secret
telegram entitled "Matters Relating to VariousTroubles on the Soviet-Manchukuoan
Border"to the Vice-Ministerof War, Lieutenant-General Toj6 Hideki.I In essence, this
telegramwas a requestfrom the KwantungArmy that the War Minister grant it a carte
blanche respectingany futureproblemswhich might arise between the Soviet Union and
7 Tsuji Masanobu itiA:1, Nomonhan/ e v - p. i6. (Hereafter referred to as IMTFE, Sokkiroku.
', T6a shob6 tA -, Tokyo, I9So, p. 39. This is the official Japanese transcript.) For the
8 Harada, VII, 48-54; Yabe Teiji l41 , truce negotiations, see JFOA, SP 4, pp. 377 and
KonoeFumimaroit* ;&, 2 vols., K6bund6 A A 379-380; Harada, vii, 58-6o, 68-69, and 74-7S5An
t, Tokyo, I952, II, 537-558; Hata, pp. 84-85. extract of the record of the talks between Litvinov
9 g * and Shigemitsu is to be found in the International
10 For the development of the Changkufeng Military Tribunal for the Far East, "Transcript
Incident, see JFOA, SP 4, pp. 376-378; Hata, pp. of Proceedings," pp. 7760-7763, 7825-7826, and
82-94; Harada, VII, So-SI, 55-56, and 65-66; and 78i8. (Hereafter referredto as IMTFE, Transcript.
Kyokutikokusai gunjisaibansokkiroku t -?$-f A This is the officialEnglish transcript.)
1it* (Stenographic Record of the Interna- 11 R1 ,A--A
tional Military Tribunal for the Far East), No. go,
 YOUNG. Incident"
"TheNomonhan 8S
Manchukuo,especiallyborderdisputes.The messagealsotouchedon the problemof future
coordinationbetween the Kwantungand KoreanArmies,the lackof which in the past had
hinderedthe satisfactorysolutionof border disputes with the Soviets.12This telegram
makesit clearthat the KwantungArmy desiredto have the power to settle the frequent
borderdisputes, and furthermore,to end the competitive attempts of the KoreanArmy
to participatein the settlementof suchdisputes.These factssuggest that the outbreakof the
ChangkufengIncidenton the Korean-Manchukuoan-Soviet frontierless than one month
after the telegrammay have been more than just accidental.At any rate, the evidence
seems to suggest that since the time of the Kanch'atzuaffaira year before,the attitude of
the KwantungArmy had been very provocative,and its leadingofficershad been firmin
their convictionthat the Soviet Union would not strikeat Japanwhile she was engagedin
herwarin China.Anotherfactorbehindthe ChangkufengIncidentmayhavebeenthe pros-
pect of the transferof somepowerfulunits of the KwantungArmyto the Chinafront.From
the point of view of the KwantungArmy,this was highly undesirable.Therefore,it is quite
plausibleto assumethat the KwantungArmyintendedto preventthis developmentby one
meansor other. A small-scalewar with the Soviet Union would be the most effectiveway
to persuadethe armyauthoritiesin Tokyo of the absolutenecessityof a strong and intact
KwantungArmy for the defenceof Manchukuo.In short, it would seem that the purpose
of the KwantungArmyin beginningthe Changkufengaffairwasnot only to test the strength
andpreparednessof the Red Armyin the FarEast,but to convincethe armyauthoritiesin
Tokyo of the importanceof its existing missionin Manchukuo.13As it turnedout, the
encounterendedin a disastrousdefeatfor theJapaneseforces,andcost approximatelyI,3 50
casualties.14
Thus, relying on intelligencereportswhich assuredthem that the Soviets would not
strikebackin forceat that time, the Japanesearmiesin Manchukuoand Koreacommitted
a grave blunderin determiningupon hostilitieswith the Red Army. What, then, was the
explanationof the unexpectedreactionof the "enemy,"a reactionwhich dealt theJapanese
forcesa dishonorabledefeat?Botharmyandgovernmentcirclesbelievedthat the formidable

12 T-779, Reel I09, FramesI87I7-I97I9, Manso of this note constitutesthe item numberof this
kokkydkannokakushu ken-A V @g
shogaijikenni kansuru source in the Checklist. Sourcescited from this
; / - P"4 @ ---J- M A )/f+t (DocumentCon- documentarycollectionwill be givenin the above
cerning Various Violations of the Manchukuoan- formwhenthey areincludedforthe firsttime.
Soviet Border), June i6, I938, from the Acting 13 An affidavitdated February22, I946, from
Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army to the Vice- Major-GeneralAkikusa Shun {kX &PA4t, in
Minister of War, Manji dainikki(mitsu) ;A k aW IMTFE,Transcript, p. 78I6, andIMTFE,Sokkiroku,
t&(t), 34 volumes, I938, xiv, No. 29, U.S. No.go, p. I7.
National Archives No. I6046. The above is one *14 The Japanesetroops suffered450 dead and
of the items included in John Young (comp.), goo wounded, while the Soviet casualtieswere
of SelectedArchives I,200 dead, 2,000 seriouslywounded,and 2,200
of MicroftlmReproductions
Checklist
of the 7apaneseArmy, Navy, and OtherGovernment slightlywounded,accordingto oneJapanese source.
Agencies,I868-I945, Georgetown University Press, SeeJFOA,SP4, p. 38I.
Washington D.C., I959. The number at the head
86 MonumentaNipponica,xXu, I-2

responsewasmotivatedby a desireto divertJapanese forcesandattentionto the northern

borderat the verytimewhentheImperial Armywasaboutto beginthe campaign forthe
reductionof Hankowin China.15 This undertaking wasconsidered to be the mostimpor-
tantoperation sincetheopeningofthestruggleinChina.Thus,boththeSovietreactionand
theresultingestimateof Sovietintentionswerefactorsin thearmy'sanxietyto localizeand
terminatethe Changkufeng affairat allcost.
Theencounter wasa greatshock,andtaughttheJapanese forcesin Manchukuo andKorea
a lessonrespectingthe actualstrengthanddetermination of the Soviet forcesin the Far
East.The shock,however,wasnotsevereenoughto altertheviewsandpoliciesofthelead-
ing elementsof the twoJapanese armies(asis shownby Nomonhan lessthana yearlater).
On the contrary,it onlyservedto deepentheirconvictionthatthe SovietUnionwasthe
principalenemyof theJapanese Empirein the FarEast,andthatan all-outwarwith the
Sovietswasinevitable-amerematterof timeandfavorable opportunity. It waswith this
convictionin mindthat, fourmonths afterthe settlement of the Changkufeng Incident,
theKwantung Armycompileda lengthy,confidential studyentitled"TheInfluence of the
Changkufeng Incidenton the PopularFeelingsof the Manchukuoan People." The Staff
Officeof theKwantung Armyhadbasedthe studyon variousintelligencereportsreceived
duringandafterthe incident.The reportwas sent to the WarMinistryas an important
reference work.Its introduction showedthatthecommand of theKwantungArmylooked
uponthe incident as a miniature model of what a war
full-scale with the Sovietswouldbe
like,andthatthebehaviorof thevariousethnicgroupswithinManchukuo wasthoughtto
constitute a veryimportant factorin the development of such a war. After a detailedtreat-
mentof theincidentandits effectson thepopulace ofManchukuo, theauthorsofthedocu-
mentsummedup theirviewsin the followingmanner:
"Withnumerically smallforcesbut greatendurance andprudence,the Japanese
Armywas able to crushthe mightymaterialpowerof the SovietUnion,and
maintainthe Manchukuoan borderline securely.All quarters[of the Manchu-
kuoanpeople]areequallyimpressed by the greatcapacities of theJapanese Army,
andin particular,theconfidence oftheManchukuoan peoplein theJapanese Army
wasgreatlyenhanced."
This documentwas marked"top secret,"andneverintendedforpublicdistribution.
Nevertheless, theKwantung Armydidnotfranklyadmitits defeat.Ratherto thecontrary,
it indulgedin moreself-praise thanself-criticism. Thus,the reportmayhavebeenan at-
temptto propagandize the HighCommand andtheWarMinistry,therebyenhancingthe
prestigeoftheKwantung ArmywithintheImperial Armyasa whole.Onlythephrase"the
mightymaterial powerof theSovietUnion"gavesomeevidenceofactualreevaluation and
apprehension. Thereis no doubt,however,thatthe command of the Kwantung Army had
becomeverymuchawareofthenecessityforgreatereffortandexpenseto equipthemselves

15 Loc. cit. Seealsothe followingnote.

 YOUNG. "The NomonhanIncident" 87

with modernmechanizedarmsin orderto be able to match the Red Armyin the future.16
The year I938 was slipping away as the China campaigncontinued rolling on with
little hope of an end. At home the Japanesegovernmentwaspainfullytornoverthe issueof
strengtheningtreatyrelationswith GermanyandItaly.The leadersofthe KonoeCabinethad
agreedthat an anti-Sovietmilitaryalliancewith thosepowers-as an extensionof the Anti-
CominternPact-would be conduciveto a speedyand favorabledisposalof the ChinaInci-
dent. It was felt that such treatyrelationswould alleviatethe Soviet threatfromthe north,
therebyallowingJapanto shift a part of the KwantungArmy fromManchukuoto the mil-
itarytheaterin China.17Whenit was discoveredthat the Germansdesireda generalmilitary
alliancedirectedagainstotherunspecifiedpowersin additionto the Soviet Union, the army
quickly expressedits willingness to accept this proposal.The civilian leaders and the
navy, on the otherhand,steadfastlyopposedit, insistingthat the new treatycould have no
othernationthanthe SovietUnionasits object.Unableeitherto concludethe ChinaIncident
or resolvethe disagreementover the proposedalliance,the KonoeCabinetresignedenbloc,
and the new year witnessed the birth of a cabinetheadedby BaronHiranumaKiichir5.18
During the tenure of the HiranumaCabinetover seventy sessionsof the Five Ministers'
Conference(the Prime Minister, and the Ministers of War, Navy, Foreign Affairs,and
Finance)were held in a seven-monthperiod. These constant meetings were an effort to
settle the disagreementsinheritedfrom the Konoe governmentrespectingthe proposed
alliance.War Minister Itagaki Seishirocontinued to insist that the Germanproposalbe
accepted,andwas sharplyopposedby the Foreignand Navy Ministers,Arita Hachiraand
Yonai Mitsumasa,19respectively.(All three of these ministers retained their portfolios
when the changeof cabinettook place.)GermanyannexedCzechoslovakiain March,I939,
therebygreatlyintensifyingthe antagonismbetweenthe Axisandthe westernpowers,aswell
as the apprehensionsof the opponentsof an Axis alliancewithinJapan.Within the context
of suchinternationaldevelopmentsthe problemof the proposedalliancewas becomingever
moredifficultto resolve.The army beganto busy itself with activities calculatedto bring
about the early conclusionof the alliance.It employedvariousrightist groups to stir up
publicopinionduringthe T'ientsinIncident(a consequenceofJapanesemilitaryoperations
in China), and variousManchukuoanborderdisputeswere prominentlypublicized.20All
this was intendedto makepublicopinionfavorableto the Axis, andto forcethe government

16 T-783, Reel I09, Frames I874I-I8796, 17 IMTFE, Sokkiroku, No. 74, p. 8.

Chokoho jiken no Manshbkoku minshinni oyoboshitaru 18 _f. -f

eiky5ni kansuruken MA * 4t - / AfjAg , _: A 19 4ki

k , 4t
20 The army, especially the Military Affairs
, -/ #
A, -V _ M 7 A'/4+ (Document Concerning
the Effect of the Changkufeng Incident on the Section of the War Ministry, was supplying funds
Psychology of the Manchukuoan People), Decem- to various rightist groups, and the kempeitaiT,-
ber I, I938, from the Chief of Staffof the Kwantung (Military Police) gave such groups guidance on the
Army to the Vice-Minister of War, Manji dai nikki conduct ofanti-British demonstrations.See Harada,
Cmitsu934 vol., I938, xxxiv, No. 20, U.S. National VIII, I$, I7-I8, 2I-22, and 39.
Archives No. i6o65.
 88 Monumenta
Nipponica,
xxIi, I-2

to concludethe desiredtripartitealliance.Amidsttheseforeignanddomesticcircumstances
the NomonhanIncidenterupted.

(III NOMONHAN

RECORDED violationsof the frontiersof Manchukuowith the Soviet Union and Mongolia
by both Sovietand MongolianforcesgraduallyincreasedfromI937 throughI939. In I937,
also the yearof the Kanch'atzuIncident,theJapanesegovernmentrecordedII3 suchviola-
tions. In I938, the year of the Changkufengaffair,the total numberrose to i66. Finally,in
I939 the numberof violationsreachedits apogee, I95 being recordedby the Japaneseau-
thorities.21The NomonhanIncident,which took place from the late spring through the
autumnof I939, was by far the most large-scaleandseriousof all the borderincidents be-
tweenJapaneseforcesandthe Red Army.Its effecton the viewsof theJapanesemilitarywas
immeasurablyfar-reaching.
In AprilI939, one monthpriorto the outbreakof the NomonhanIncident,the Kwantung
Army authoritiesdevised a documententitled "GeneralPrinciplesin Dealing with Man-
chukuoan-SovietBorderDisputes."22This was transmittedas a directive to the frontier
forcesunderthe commandof the KwantungArmy.It statedthat in obscureareaswhere the
actualdemarcationof the borderwasunclear,the localKwantungArmycommandersin such
areaswereto establishand authorizea line "independently,"and then notify the frontier
forces.Subsequentlythis actionwas to be reportedimmediatelyto the Commanderof the
KwantungArmy.If and when such a borderlinewas violated,the frontierforcein the area
was to chastize the violatorswithout delay. Further, the KwantungArmy Commander
authorizedthe frontierforcesto advanceinto Soviet or Mongolianterritorytemporarily,
if the protectionof the frontieror the chastisementof frontierviolatorsrequiredit. The
frontierforceswereinformedthat in the futurethey wereexpectedto defendthe borderin a
"positive"fashion,andany consequencesderivingfromsuchdefensewouldbe the responsi-
bility of the Commanderof the KwantungArmy.
As alreadynoted,in JuneI938, someten monthspriorto the issuanceof the "principles"

21 The figures cited are taken from JFOA, SP 22 "Man-Sokokkyofuns6 shoriyoko" A 1v

4, p. 370. The Soviet record ofJapanese violations
of Soviet territory by air, sea, and land during the
period I932-45 is to be found in IMTFE, Tran-
script,pp. 7744-45, and IMTFE, Sokkiroku, No. go,
p. 4. Chronologically, the Soviet data correspond
in their peak to those presented in the Japanese
source noted above. Thus, the Soviet Prosecutor
declaredbefore the InternationalMilitary Tribunal
for the Far East: ". . . these violations reachedtheir
highest level during the years I937-39, when the
Japanese aggressors expected to attain their ob-
jectives by provoking a large-scale war with the
Soviet Union.... "See IMTFE, Transcript, p. 7747.
)t;*t+4ff] (General Principles in Dealing
with Manchukuoan-Soviet Border Disputes), in
Nitcbisenso E 4P43+ (The Japanese-ChineseWar),
3, Gendaisbishiryo,x, ed. Tsunoda Jun et al., Misuzu
shob6 8 - 9 t, 4 Tokyo, I964, pp. I06-I07
(Document 4). Hereafter this source is cited as
Gendaisbi sbiryo,X, with relevant page and docu-
ment number cited. See also Hayashi Sabur6 +Ik
: , TaibeiyJsensorikusengaishi -I-i# +4 fA
AP (An Outline History of Land Operations in
the Pacific War), Iwanami shoten, Tokyo, I960,
pp. 2I-22; and Tsuji, pp. 46-47.
 YOUNG. "The NomonhanIncident" 89

of frontierdefense,Major-General IshiwaraKanjiof the KwantungArmyStaffhaddispatched

a secrettelegramto the Vice-MinisterofWarrequestingthat theKwantungArmyCommand
be given discretionarypower to disposeof borderdisputesbetween the Soviet Union and
Manchukuo.This requestof the KwantungArmywasessentiallygrantedin the earlyspring
of I939, afterthe ChangkufengIncident.The defenseof the Hunch'unregion (which in-
cludedChangkufeng)was put underthe commandof the KwantungArmy,andthe Korean
Army was made responsiblefor defensewithin Koreaonly.23Thus, the directive on the
"principles"of borderdefenseissuedin AprilI939 actuallyrepresentedthe realizationof the
long-cherisheddesiresof the KwantungArmy authorities.Despite the bitter experience
whichthey hadgainedat the handsofthe RedArmyin the Changkufengaffairin the summer
of I93 8, they wereexhibitinganextremelyprovocativeandbelligerentattitudeby the spring
ofI939.
The Nomonhanaffairbeganin May with a clashbetweenJapaneseandOuterMongolian
troopsin the neighborhoodof the village of Nomonhan,which was nearthe Khalkhariver
(Khalkin-Gol).The MongolianPeople'sRepublic was associatedwith the Soviet Union,
the two countrieshavingconcludeda mutualassistancepact in April I936. The areaof the
fightingwas oneof the numerous"obscure"placeswhere the borderhad never been clearly
defined.TheJapaneseheld thatthe borderranalongtheKhalkhaRiver, whilethe Mongolian-
Soviet frontierguardsclaimedthat it ran throughthe village of Nomonhan,thirteenkilo-
meterseast of the river.
On May I2 KwantungArmy frontierguards observed about 700 Outer Mongolian
cavalrycrossingthe KhalkhaRiver.TheJapaneseimmediatelydecidedthat this was a fron-
tierviolation.24In accordancewith theirinstructionsin the directiveof April,they attacked
and repulsedthe "invaders"in orderto "chastize"them. Then the Mongolianforcesre-
inforcedthemselvesand counterattackedin order to defendwhat they regardedas their
23 Tsuji, p. 40. and 224-225; No. 83I,July IS, I939, pp. I9I-I95;
24 "Nomonhan jiken kimitsu sakusen nisshi" No. 832, August I, I939, pp. i98-203; No. 833,
JT^ - -t t44$*v v Q (Secret Diary of August IS, I939, pp. I9I-I94; No. 834, September
Military Operations during the Nomonhan Inci- I, I939, pp. I85-I87; No. 835, September iS, I939,
dent), with attached documents, compiled afterthe pp. 207-208; and No. 836, October i, I939, pp.
incident by the Operations Section of the Staff 374-375. Other Japanese accounts may be found
Officeof the Kwantung Army, includes the Army's in JFOA, SP 4, pp. 5I3-520; Tsuji, pp. 45-224;
account of the affair as well as I04 documents, Hayashi, pp. 22-23; Shigemitsu Mamoru, Showa
mostly telegrams. These were exchanged between no doran 8fw, X khiL (The Sh6wa Upheavals), 2
the Staff Office of the Kwantung Army and its vols., Chfi6k6ron sha 1' <=zg1I, Tokyo, i952,
subordinates at the scene of battle on the one I, 242-245; and Ashida Hitoshi w Jt, Dai niji
hand, and the military authorities in Tokyo on sekaitaisen gaikosbi i _ (The
the other. See Gendaishishiryo, X, 7I-I49. For Diplomatic History of World War ii), Jiji tsuishin
an almost day-by-day account of the development sha Q+- A4, Tokyo, I959, pp. I24-I27. For the
of the Nomonhan affairfrom the Japanesepoint of Soviet version, see IMTFE, Transcript,p. 7846-
view, see Gaikojiho 4t, xc, No. 828, June i, 7849. (The Russians claim that the Nomonhan
I939, pp. 2I2-2I3; No. 829,June IS, I939, pp. 200- Incident started on May ii.)
202; and xci, No. 830, July I, I939, pp. 2I7-2I8
go MonumentaNipponica,xxI, I-2

rightfulfrontier.Thereafterthereensueda seriesof small-scaleattacksand counterattacks

in which the Japaneseforceswere repeatedlydefeated.On May 28 a Japaneseforceof 200
men and ten light armoredcarswas wiped out by enemy tanks.Later,on June i8 and I9,
Soviet bombersraidedJapaneseoutposts, and their infantrypenetratedNomonhanunder
the coverof Soviet artilleryand mechanizedforces.The Chiefof Staffand the Commander
of the KwantungArmythen decidedindependently,without referringthe matterto Tokyo,
to commitalmostall theirforces(without transferringthe forcesin the EasternandNorthern
BorderZones). Accordingly,the entire 23d and a part of the 7th Division were sent to the
Nomonhanareaas reinforcements.Shortlyafterthis (on June 25), the Chiefof Staffof the
KwantungArmy (GeneralUeda Kenkichi)sent a telegramto the Vice-Ministerof War
(Lieutenant-General YamawakiMasataka)andthe Vice-Chiefof the GeneralStaff(Lieuten-
ant-GeneralNakajimaTetsuzo) in Tokyo requestingthat the ninety fighter planesof the
KwantungArmybe supplementedwith thirty more,so that the operationcouldcontinue.25
This requestwas madedespite a telegramreceivedon the previousday fromthe Vice-
Chief of the GeneralStaffinstructing the KwantungArmy to prevent the fighting from
spreading,andprohibitinganyadvanceinto OuterMongolia.This telegramwas dispatched
when the GeneralStafflearnedof the KwantungArmy'splan, which was leakedby a staff
memberof the said armyon a missionto Tokyo. It specificallywarnedagainstair-raidson
Mongolianterritorywhich the KwantungArmyindeedhadplannedin secretin retaliation
for the earlierSoviet bombardment.The GeneralStaffOfficein Tokyo also informedthe
militaryforcesin Manchukuothat the Chiefof the OperationsGroupof the GeneralStaff
(Lt. ColonelArisueYadoru)was being sent to the sceneof the fighting.26The telegramhad
an effectcontraryto its intention,however,for the KwantungArmy Commandwas deter-
minedto concludethe affairsuccessfullybeforethe Tokyo peoplecouldarrive.Earlyin the
morningofJune27, sixty bombersandeighty fightersoftheKwantungArmyraidedTamusk,
Sambez,and other Soviet outposts in Outer Mongolia,and inflictedconsiderablelosseson
the enemy.Lt. ColonelArisueof the Tokyo Officearrivedin Hsingkingin the afternoonof
the same day.27
To the triumphanttelegramof the KwantungArmy to the Tokyo GeneralStaff, the
answerwas cold and admonishing.A seriesof telegramsfromthe Chiefand Vice-Chiefof
the GeneralStaffprohibitedthe KwantungArmy from any operationoutside the Man-
chukuoanborder,and their activity was restrictedto groundoperations.28By the end of
June, however, all of the 23d InfantryDivision, a part of the 7th InfantryDivision, two
tank regiments,and severalBargutMongoliancavalryregimentshad been concentrated
25 44 il tt Z A. T-786, Reel (mitsu), 34 vols., I939, XIII, No. I9, U.S. National
IO9, Frames I8873-I8874, Hoji hikokishikyfihairyo Archives No. I6079.
no ken7 4,-. AEr t *., o) e f (Document Con- 26 Ibid . Gendaishi shiryo,x,I24 (Document 37).
cerning the Request for the Speedy Supply of War- 27 Ibid., p. I24 (Documents 35, 36, and 38);
planes), June 25, I939, from the Chief of Staffof the and Tsuji, p. iii.
Kwantung Army to the Vice-Minister of War and 28 Gendaishishiryo, x, I25-I26 (Documents 39,

the Vice-Chief of the General Staff, Manju dai nikki 4I, 42, and 43).
 YOUNG. "The NomonhanIncident" 91

in the Nomonhanarea.When all of the forcesmobilizedwere concentrated,the coreof the

Japaneseforceswas supposedto consist of thirteeninfantrybattalions,112 anti-tankguns,
seventy tanks, 400 motor vehicles, and i8o warplanes.
At this point the commandof the Red Armyconcludedthat the KwantungArmyplanned
to smashthe Mongoliandefensessuddenly,and then breakforthwith its mainforcesinto
the rearcommunicationszone of the Soviettroops.Therefore,the Red Armyalsoreinforced
itself, so that its forcesnow amountedto threerifledivisions,five mechanizedandarmored
regimentshaving 86o tanksand armoredcarsandtwo Mongoliancavalrydivisions.29
While the KwantungArmy was severely restrictedin its operations,the Soviet planes
freelyraidedthe Japaneseforceson the bare ground,causinggreatdamage.In the light of
this development,on August 7 the Chiefof the GeneralStaffreversedhis orderand author-
ized the KwantungArmy to raidthe enemy air basesin the neighborhoodof Tamuskand
furthereast if such action was absolutelynecessaryfor the successfulexecutionof ground
operations.30 In orderto meet with the greatlyreinforcedenemyforces,on August I0 a 6th
Armywas newlyorganizedunderthe commandofLt. GeneralOgisuRippei31forthe specific
purposeof dealingwith the Nomonhanfighting. Its corewas the 23d InfantryDivision.
FromaboutAugust20 the Sovietforceslauncheda full-scaleoffensive.Employingsuperior
tanks and artilleryas well as moreflexibletactics, the Red Army dealt the Japaneseforces
a crushingdefeat.The majorpart of the 7th Division was sent to reinforcethe 6th Army,
but by the end ofAugust the 23dInfantryDivisionwasalmostcompletelydestroyed,having
sustainedover II,000 casualties.The fighting continuedinto September.
Its completedefeatnotwithstanding,the KwantungArmy preparedfor a new offensive
in early September.The 2nd and 4th Divisionswere orderedinto the battle area,and the
overallforcesof the 6th Army were apparentlyincreasedabout threefold.On September
2 the Commanderof the KwantungArmy(GeneralUeda)issued the followingdirectiveto
boost the moraleof his troops:"The presentengagementis entirelydifferentfromearlier
borderdisputes;it is a decisivebattle betweenJapanand the SovietUnion. The destiny of
our Empiredependson its outcome... ." On the fifth the commandinggeneralof the 6th
Army (Lt. GeneralOgisu) also issued a proclamationto all his subordinates.Its purpose
was similarto thatof GeneralUeda.It openedwith the statementthat the Army's"glorious"
task of defendingthe northwesternareahadfailedbecausean earlierorderfor the reorgani-
zationof the Japaneseforceshad been poorlyexecuted,and the Army had been cast there-
after into a "whirlpool"of irregularwarfareon the Manchukuoan-Mongolian border.
Respecting the shattered23d Infantry Division the pronouncement said: "Thanks to the
braveandresoluteactionof allofthe unitsunderthe commandofLt. GeneralKomatsubara,32
disorderin the courseof the battlewas kept to a minimum."The commanderthencontinued
on the subjectof the Army'sfutureplansand the significanceof the conflict:
29 pp. 7847-7848; Tsuji, p.
IMTFE, Transcript, 31 42 A1_r
I04; Hayashi, p. 23. 32 ,4
30 shiryo,x, i28 (Document 48).
Gendaishi
92 MonumentaNipponica,XXI<,I-2

"The Armyis now preparingfora new offensivein the DzindzinSumearea.At this

criticalmomentthe Commanderof the KwantungArmyhas decidedto aid us by
sendingthe best troopsin Manchuria.He will transferthem to the future battle
area,placethem undermy command,andplanurgentmeasuresforthe settlement
of the conflict.... The matteris now beyondthe stage of a merefrontierconflict.
We arenow waginga sacredwarin China,andany changein ourpositionherewill
acquireextremelygraveimplicationsfor our countrybecauseof the complexsitu-
ation at home and abroad."
The mainpoint of the proclamationthenfollowed:The effortof the Army hadto be concen-
tratedon uniteddeterminationto strikeimmediateand crushingblows againstthe enemy.
Thus, the "growinginsolence"of the Sovietswould be annihilated,andJapanwould have
shown the world the "might of the flower of the ImperialArmy."33
Thus, as late as September5-almost fourmonthssince the beginningof the Nomonhan
Incident,afterrepeateddefeatsand heavy losses, and contraryto directivesfromTokyo-
the KwantungArmy remainedextremely belligerent,"full of brave and decisive spirit,
andcertainofvictory."Inpart,this attitudehadits originin the psychologyofthe command-
ing echelonsof the Army. After repeatedlosses and heavy defeats, the Nomonhanaffair
hadbecomea decisivetest of the Army'sprestige.They pridedthemselvesuponbeing the
creamof theJapaneseArmy,andit is not surprisingthat the morenumerousanddisastrous
their defeats, the more stubbornand belligerenttheir attitude. However, on September
iS a truceagreementwas reachedin MoscowbeforetheJapanese reinforcementscouldreach
the Nomonhanarea.The truce was negotiatedby the JapaneseAmbassadorto the Soviet
Union,Togo Shigenori,34and the new Peoples'CommissarforForeignAffairs,Vyacheslav
Molotov.On Septemberi6 hostilitiesceasedat Nomonhan,over four bloody months after
they had begun.35
However, the extremelybelligerentstanceof the militaryin Manchukuodid not neces-
sarilycorrespondwith thatofthe GeneralStaffandthe WarMinistryin Tokyo. Theseorgans
possesseda morebroadand dispassionateview of nationaldefenseproblems.They did not

33 This directive of the Commanderof the
KwantungArmyis to be foundin Gendaishi shiryo,
X, I42 (Document83); forthe text of the proclama-
tionissuedby the Commander of the 6thArmy,see
IMTFE,Sokkiroku, No. 9I, pp. 7-8; and IMTFE,
pp. 7858-7860.Forthe orderof battleof
Transcript,
the 6th Army, see Gendaishi shiryo,x, IoS-io6
(Document3).
34
35 On May3, I939,aftereighteenyearsof serv-
ice as Peoples' Commissarfor Foreign Affairs,
MaximLitvinovwas suddenlydismissed.Rumors
of his possible dismissalhad begun as early as
Januaryof I938,whenAndreiZhdanovhadopenly
attacked Litvinov in the Supreme Soviet, criticiz-
ing his diplomacy as a "soft" line. (At the time of
his denunciation of Litvinov, Zhdanov had just
been appointed as the first Chairmanof the newly
established Standing Committee for Foreign
Affairs in the Supreme Soviet.) See William L.
Langer, ed., An Encyclopediaof World History,
Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, I960, revised
edition, pp. I036-I037. For a representative Japa-
nese observation on the change in Soviet policy,
see End6 Ichiro 4U- O, "Sorensekishoku gaiko
no daitenkan" v t_ L.a1Z o) *U& (The Volte-
face of Red Diplomacy), Gaikojiho, LXXXVI, No. 8oo,
April I, I938, pp. I77-I85.
 YOUNG. "The NomonhanIncident" 93

desirea conflictwith the SovietUnionat a timewhenjapanwasalreadymiredin thebottom-

less pit of China. Furthermore,unlike the KwantungArmy, the military authoritiesin
Tokyo werewell awarethat the Red Armyin the FarEast had some thirty divisionsunder
its command,while the Japaneseforcesin Manchukuoin May I939 amountedto only eight
divisions. This situationderived from the prospect of a long war in China.36Thus, in
contrastto their attitude at the time of the ChangkufengIncident(when the WarMinister
and the Chiefofthe GeneralStaffhadrequestedimperialsanctionforthe useof force),by the
summerof I939 the GeneralStaffwishedto keepthe KwantungArmyfullyundercontrol.
They endeavoredto do so at all cost, as was evident from their directives urging the
KwantungArmy authoritiesto prevent the spreadof the conflict. However, the Tokyo
authoritiesfailed to accomplishthis.
Three majorfactorsexplainthis failureof the centralauthoritiesto controlthe Kwantung
Army.The firstwas the long-establishedtraditionof strong,defiant,andindependentarmies
stationedoutsideJapan.The KwantungArmy was itself the most notableexampleof this.
The ManchurianIncidenthadbeen glorified,and,consciouslyor unconsciously,the Kwan-
tung Army tried to maintainthis precedent.But it hadbeendisappointedandfrustratedby
disapprovingdirectivesfromTokyo. The Kanch'atzuaffairand the ChangkufengIncident
were casesin point, and the highestechelonsof the KwantungArmyfelt that theirprestige
andauthorityover theirsubordinateshadsufferedas a result.By the time of the Nomonhan
Incidentthey were determinedto carryout "positivelythe duty and responsibilityof the
KwantungArmy,even if it wereagainstthe will andcommandsof the Chiefof the General
Staff."The air-raidonJune27, I939, on the Soviet-Mongolianbasesof TamuskandSambez
was executedin this spirit.Theirjustificationwas that it was strategicallynecessaryto the
executionof theirduty, andtherefore,it was within the properauthorityof the Commander
of the KwantungArmy, and there was no necessity to requestimperialsanction.Extreme
cautionwas taken to keep the air-raidsecret, because"if reported,they [i.e., the Tokyo
authorities]would undoubtedlyopposeit." As the result of an order,on July 20 the Chief
of Staffof the KwantungArmy(Lt. GeneralIsogaiRensuke)37flew to Tokyo, wherehe was
confrontedwith an "Outline Policy for Dealing with the Nomonhan Incident" in the
presenceof all the importantGeneralStaffand the WarMinistrypeople.Developedby the
WarMinistryand approvedby the Chiefof the GeneralStaff,the essenceof this policy was
an early conclusionof the struggle,honorablyor dishonorably.Havingstudiedthis policy,
the Commandof the KwantungArmydisagreedanddecidedto "ignore"it.38A defiantat-
titude was thus strikinglyevident throughoutthe courseof the NomonhanIncident.
The secondfactorin the failureof the centralauthoritiesto controlthe KwantungArmy
was the army GeneralStaff'sacceptanceof the KwantungArmy's claim of the authority
36 Hattori Takushir6 Lt4-fI- -'9O, Dai t5a senso 37 ,& &,
zenshi* t AA +?- -k (A Complete History of the 38 Gendaishi x, 8o-8i; Tsuji, p. 2I7; Hata,
shiryo,
GreaterEastAsia War),4vols., Masu shobo 4 t -, p. I02.
Tokyo, I949, I, 44-45.
94 Monumenta
Nipponica,
XXII, I-2

to define the frontiersof Manchukuo.As the "GeneralPrinciplesin Dealing with Border

Disputes"had indicated,the KwantungArmy was determinedto exercisethis authority
in all casesin which the actualfrontierwas obscureor poorlydelineated.In the case of the
Nomonhanregion,it was assertedthat the Khalkhariverwas the "natural"frontierbetween
Mongoliaand Manchukuo.The militaryauthoritiesin Tokyo readilyacceptedthis claim,
and so all quartersin the capital-whether militaryor civilian-took the view that this
bordermust be defendedagainstSovietandMongolianencroachments.Therefore,although
the GeneralStafforderedthe KwantungArmy authoritiesto limit the fighting and not to
advanceinto Mongolia,it also orderedthe defenseof the borderas definedby the inde-
pendentdecisionof the KwantungArmy.39Sinceit was the obscurityof the frontierwhich
was the root of the conflict,in acceptingthe definitionof the borderaccordingto the Kwan-
tung Army authoritiesthe GeneralStaffnotonly failedto reducethe possiblityof hostilities,
but probablyenhancedit.
The thirdfactorbehindthe GeneralStaff'sfailureto controlthe KwantungArmywas the
generalopportunismof the Tokyo military.That is, they wished to utilize the Japanese-
Soviet crisisto forcethe governmentto concludean alliancewith GermanyandItaly. This
opportunismwas characteristicof both the War Ministry and the GeneralStaffOffice.
The anti-Britishpropagandaencouragedby the military organs had as its objective the
creationof a public opinionwhich would coerce the cabinet into an Axis alliance.Thus,
as long as the Tokyo militaryfelt that the NomonhanIncidentwas undertheircontroland
no realdangerof a full-scalewar existed, they had little reasonto opposeits continuation.
Indeed,its existencewasa politicaladvantage.However,when they beganto loseconfidence
in theircontrolof the affair,apprehensionquicklyreplacedtheirpreviouslycomplacentop-
portunism.In the Five Ministers'ConferenceofJuly i8, WarMinisterItagakiurged that
the incident be turnedover to the ForeignMinistry for early diplomaticresolution.Yet,
even on this occasionhe did not forget to propagandizethe army'sobjectivesby pointing
out that the currentincidentunderlinedthe absolutenecessityfor a tripartitealliancewith
the Axis powers.40
The Nomonhanaffairalso highlighted anotheraspect of the opportunismand rancor
which prevailedbetween variousgovernmentalgroups;namely, the conflictbetween the
armyon the one hand,andthe navyandthe civilianministerson the other. In earlyAugust,
even beforethe mainSovietoffensiveandwhileJapanesemilitaryunits were still in the pro-
cess of being concentratedin the areaof hostilities, the War Ministerrepeatedhis earlier
appealfor a diplomaticsettlement.But the reactionof the other ministers,and especially
that of the Navy Minister,was most unfavorableto the request.AdmiralYonai utilized
the occasionto rebukethe WarMinister,saying that the armyshould have consulted the
governmentbeforebeginninghostilities."It is farfromagreeable,"saidthe Navy Minister,
"thatyou startedthe incidentwhile concealingit fromus, and then onceyou failyou bring

39 Harada, VIII, 9. 40 Ibid.,VIII, 24.

 YOUNG. "The NomonhanIncident" 95

it up to us forremedy.Whydon'tyou continuefightinguntilyou recoverthe frontierline?"41

This statementof AdmiralYonaiis extremelyinteresting.It probablycanbe takento reveal
its author'spersonaldisgust and antipathytowardthe WarMinisterand the army, but it
alsoreflectedthe attitudeof the navy as a whole, and,judgingfromtheir lack of enthusiasm
for the War Minister'splea, of the civilianministersas well. Exactlyas in the case of the
beginningof the ChinaIncident,a matterof grave nationalimportanceand seriousinter-
nationalconsequencewas handlednot fromthe pointofview of a coollycalculateddiplomacy
of nationalinterest,but fromthe point of view of personalantagonism,jealousy,and group
rivalry.Yet, regardlessof this low qualityof motivationin formulatingpolicy, once deter-
mined,policy becamethe "immovablecourseof the Empire."Later,if revisionoccurredat
all, it was moreoften than not too late.
When the Nomonhanaffairbegan, the Japanesegovernment'sinitial policy was to treat
it as a localproblembetweenOuterMongoliaandManchukuo.Cautionwas alsoexercised
to avoid giving recognitionto the Soviet-MongolianMutualAssistancePact of I936, or to
the actual Soviet dominationover Outer Mongolia.42However, Soviet bomberraids on
Japanesebasesin ManchukuoonJulyi6 wereanominoussign that the fightingmight spread
beyond the Nomonhanarea,so the consensusofJapanesegovernmentalopiniongradually
cameto favoran earlysolutionof the conflict.As mentionedalready,in the Five Ministers'
Conferenceof July i8, it was decided to begin negotiationswith the Soviet government
at "an appropriatemoment," and thereforea directive telegramwas dispatchedto the
JapaneseAmbassadorin Moscow. This actionwas in compliancewith the requestof War
MinisterItagaki.It was hopedthat the "appropriate moment"wouldariseaftertheJapanese
forcesin the Nomonhanregion had repulsedthe enemy from the area to the east of the
Khalkhariver.However,the Japanesegovernmentwaited in vain for this to occur,and in
the interval the GeneralStaffbecameever more apprehensiveand repeatedlyurged the
governmentto expedite the conclusionof an agreementwith Moscow. Accordingly,the
ForeignMinisterinstructedAmbassadorTogo to soundSovietopinionwithout specifically
indicatingthatJapanwas eagerto settle the affairby diplomaticmeans.Yet anothermonth
filledwith disastrousdefeatsand heavy losses slippedby, to the desperationof the General
Staff.
Following the signing of the Soviet-GermanNon-AggressionPact on August 23, I939,
a changeof cabinetstook placein Japan.The new governmentwas headedby GeneralAbe
Nobuyuki,43andit was decidedto focusforeignpolicyon the two objectivesof resolvingthe
China Incident and coordinatingrelationswith other powers in a mannercalculatedto
realizethe goalof a "New Orderin EastAsia."Inparallelwith thisprincipleof foreignpolicy,

41 Ibid.,VIII, 8S. text dealingwith the Soviet-Japanese

negotiations
42 The Japanese government had not recog- for the settlementof the NomonhanIncidentis
nized the mutual assistance treaty between the basedprimarilyon informationfromJFOA,SP 4,
Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic, PP. SI7-535.
concluded in I936. The following portion of the 43 4[ 4ti
96 Nipponica,
Monumenta XXII, I-2

it was alsodecidedto "coordinate"relationswith the Soviet Union. The settlementof the

NomonhanIncident was to be a pivot for the reorientationof Soviet-Japaneserelations.
Then the SecondWorldWarbrokeout in Europeon September3, andthiscausedyet another
revisionofJapanesepolicy towardthe Soviet Union. This new policy was to take the form
of a proposalto the Soviets for generaldiplomaticnegotiationsaimed at improving the
relationsof the two countries.Meanwhile,the basis for the applicationof the new policy
was to be laid through the speedy settlement of the Nomonhanaffair.
In accordancewith instructionsfromthe ForeignMinistry,on September9 Ambassador
T6g6 initiatednegotiationswith Molotov. Tog6 beganby proposingthe establishmentof
internationalcommitteesfor the peacefulresolutionof borderdisputesand the demarcation
of frontiers.He proceededon the assumptionthat the NomonhanIncidenthadbegun with
a violationof the territoryof Manchukuoby Outer Mongolianforces,and proposedthat
the disputedareabe demilitarizeduntil the boundarywas clearlyestablished.T6g6 then
arguedthat sincetheJapaneseArmywas now concentratingnew forcesin the areaof battle
fora new offensive,when a greaterarmedclash occurredin the future, the prospects for
the proposedcoordinationof relationsbetweenthe two nationswould then becomemuch
less favorable.
Therefore,in orderto avoidthis, he said,it was mandatorythat an agreementbe reached
quicklybetweenMolotov and himself.But the Soviet ForeignCommissardid not comply
with these proposalsreadily.Afterprolongedtalks in which individualsessionssometimes
lasted for severalhours, a compromisewas finally reachedfor a truce at Nomonhanon
Septemberi5, I939. At 3 PM on the followingday a joint communiqueon the compromise
trucewas issued.It stipulatedthat: (i) The Japanese-Manchukuoan andSoviet-Mongolian
forcesshould cease all militaryactivi-tyat 2 PM on Septemberi6 (Moscow time); (2) the
forcesof the antagonistswould remainin the positionswhich they had occupiedas of I PM
on SeptemberI 5; (3) the militaryrepresentativesof bothpartiesshouldimplementimmedi-
ately the stipulationscontainedin (i) and (2) above; and (4) prisonersof war and dead
shouldbe exchanged,andforthis purposethe militaryrepresentativesof bothpartiesshould
consult mutuallytowardan agreementwhich should then be executedimmediately.The
joint communiquealsoincludeda resolutionprovidingfor the organizationof an interna-
tionalcommitteeto definethe frontierin the disputedarea.The committeewas to be com-
posedof two representativesfromeachof the fourcountriesconcerned(i.e., Japan,Manchu-
kuo, the SovietUnion, andOuterMongolia).
All of the provisionsof the truce agreementwere speedilyeffectuatedexcepting the ex-
change of prisonersof war, which was delayed considerablyby Soviet effortsto link the
matter to other unresolvedproblemsbetween the two nations.This Soviet attempt was
understandablebecause the Japaneseprisonersin their hands numberedii6, while the
Japanesemilitary held only two Russian prisoners.When the prisonerswere finally ex-
changedin late Aprilof I940, the JapaneseForeignMinisterlaughinglycommentedto an
unofficialgatheringthat he would not have dared to have the numberof prisonersheld
 YOUNG. "The NomonhanIncident" 97

by eachsideprintedin theJapanesenewspapers.44 The demarcationof the frontierbetween

Outer Mongolia and Manchukuoalso proved to be a difficult matter. After protracted
negotiationsin Chita, Harbin,and then Moscow-the whole processextendingover nine
months-a compromiseagreementwas reachedonJune9, I940. This newly definedborder
correspondedapproximatelyto the originalSoviet claim.
The defeatwhichit sufferedin the NomonhanIncidentshockedtheJapaneseArmy great-
ly, and the after-effectsenduredfor a considerabletime. Nomonhanwas also the army's
first encounterwith an enemy furnishedwith the most modernequipmentand trainedin
the latest tacticaltheory.
While the incident was in progressit was widely believed, both in military and other
governmentalcircles,that the Sovietshadbecomeveryprovocativesince the conclusionof
the Anti-CominternPact in I936, and that their attitude toward the problemof border
disputeswas politicallymotivated.It was believedthat the Sovietshadnot only beenassist-
ing the Chinesemilitarilyin orderto aid their resistanceto Japanand thus protractthe war
in China,but that they had been provokingthe many borderclashesin orderto dissipate
Japanesemilitarypowerin relationto that of the Soviet Union.45This convictionwas but
the reflectionof their own apprehensions.It revealedthat they fearedthe prospectof any
serious,large-scale,or prolongedborderincidents becausesuch developmentscould well
dissipatemuch of Japan'sactualreservoirof militarycapability.The NomonhanIncident
demonstratedthe validity of their apprehensions.
Afterthe conclusionof the incidentmanyof the KwantungArmy'sleadingofficerswere
held responsibleand were calledto accountby the GeneralStaff,which effectedtheir re-
moval.46On September7, even beforethe hostilitieshad been terminated,GeneralUeda,
the Commanderof the KwantungArmy, and Lt. GeneralIsogai, its Chief of Staff, were
forced to retire. Ueda was replacedby GeneralUmezu Yoshijir6.47He instituted a new
policyfor the preventionof futureborderdisputesand incidentssoon afterthe end of the
Nomonhanfighting. KwantungArmy units stationed in areas where the frontier was
unclear were withdrawn slightly. Also, it was orderedthat when Soviet or Mongolian
forcesadvancedinto areaswhere the borderwas inadequatelydefined,the Commanderof
the KwantungArmy alone would make the decisionfor or againstmilitaryaction versus
the intruders.This was a completereversalof the policy laiddown in the "GeneralPrinci-
ples in Dealing with Border Disputes" issued in the previous April. The "positive"

44 Harada,VIII, 226.
45 JFOA, SP 4, p. 370; and Hayashi, p. 23.
46 Some members of the General Staff also were
forced to retire. The staff members of the First
(Operations) Section of the Kwantung Army were
mostly transferredto other posts. However, before
long they were again in the most responsibleTokyo
military posts, and many were leaders during the
Pacific War. See Hayashi, pp. 25-26. Some com-
manders of the Nomonhan battles chose suicide
rather than return to Japan as defeated soldiers.
See Okada Keisuke, OkadaKeisukekaiko-rokuP11a1
i44-v7 ijK (Memoirs), Mainichi shimbunsha -X
E AMM1,Tokyo, I950, p. I45; and Gendaishishiryo,
X, I48-I49 (DocumentsI02 and I04).
47

MN: XXII, I-2 G

98 MonumentaNipponica,XXII, I-2

attitude formerly encouragedin the frontier forces was now no longer permitted.48
The NomonhanIncidentalso gave the Japanesemilitaryleadersa basisfor the reevalua-
tion of the relativepower of the Red Army and their own forces.If the ChangkufengIn-
cidentof the previoussummerhadnot taught the military(especiallythe KwantungArmy)
any lesson,the NomonhanIncidentmost certainlydid so.49 It remaineddeeplyengravedin
their thoughtson the futurecourseof the Empirein the internationalscene. Both govern-
mentaland militaryauthoritieswere deeply concernedrespectingthe effectof Nomonhan
on public opinionin both Japanand Manchukuo.In Septemberof I939 one Diet member
observedthat the Japanesedefeatshad a very adverseeffectupon the outlookof the Man-
chukuoanpublic, and that the Manchukuoansoldierywho had witnessed personallythe
superiorpower of the Red Army were now propagatingthis effect to the public at large,
much to the dismayand chagrinof the governmentalauthoritiesin Manchukuo.50
It was the overwhelmingsuperiorityof the Soviet mechanizedforceswhich most im-
pressed the Japanesemilitaryleaders.On October 3, I939, at a Conferenceof Provincial
Governors,War Ministry authoritiesmade public a statementin which they implicitly
acknowledgedthe defeatwhich the Japaneseforceshad suffered.This was a most unusual
event. The statementsaidthat "ourarmycontinuedthe struggleto the death with inferior
forces, and staged repeateddaring offensivesagainst the superiorSoviet and Mongolian
forces,especiallytheir overwhelmingmechanizedtroops, and inflicted heavy losses upon
the enemy." However, the military authoritiescontinued, the recent incident had been
fought with the latest in modernmilitarytechnology,and it had taught them the serious
lessonthat in modernwarfarethe materialaspectof equipmentwas of equal,if not superior,
importanceto the spiritualor mental aspect of militarypreparationand training.51This
appearedto be a basicrevisionof the traditionalviews long heldin Japanesemilitarycircles.
However, the reportscited below, as well as the subsequentPacificWar, show that this
changeof viewpoint was moreapparentthan actual.
Followingthe truce,the StaffOfficeof the KwantungArmyestablishedan "Investigating
Committeefor Researchinto Military Preparations."In late November I939 this organ
completeda reporton the NomonhanIncident.52This was a lengthy document"basedon
48 Hayashi, p. 24. Governors held in Tokyo. See Asahi shimbun,
49 In June of I939 the Emperorremarkedto the October4, I939.
Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Yuasa Kurahei WA 52 T-803, Reel I09, Frames I9024-I9127,
kf, that the Japanese Army was not indicating Nomonhanjiken / -E- >" :V 1;% t t
kenkyiibhkoku
that it had learned anything from its experience +- (A Report on the Investigation of the Nomon-
in the Changkufeng Incident a year previously. hanIncident),Gunjikimitsu * * T- (Military
See Harada, VIII,4. Secret),November27, I939, from the Chairman
50 Statement to Harada by Sakurauchi Yukio of the Investigating Committee, Kwantung Army
a Minseit6 Ptt man and former (Kant6gun heibi kenkyiuch6saiinch6 FA.
Minister of Agriculture and Forestry. Harada, ;%fl;A 4X A ), to the Vice-Minister of War,
viiI, 89-go. Riku mankimitsudai nikkia k. Q X I, 1940,
51 Statement of the War Ministry authorities No. 42, U.S. National Archives No. I4550.
on October 3, I939, at a Conferenceof Provincial
 YOUNG. "The NomonhanIncident" 99

the lessonsgaineddirectlyfromthe NomonhanIncident"andcopieswereforwardedto the

WarMinistry. The conclusionspresentedin the reportwere essentiallythe sameas those
put forwardin theWarMinistrystatementof October,thoughthey werepresentedingreater
detail. The traditionalemphasisupon "moral"trainingwas reaffirmed,but the factorof
materialequipmentwas alsogiven greatstress.In the light of the recentincident,the report
noted, it was indubitablyclearthat the spiritual(or moral)factorwas the most important
element in achievingmilitaryvictory, as traditionallyheld. Therefore,it was of cardinal
importanceto stress this factornot only for the moraladvancementof individualsoldiers,
but also for the purposeof strengtheningthe unity, andthe senseof responsibilityandobe-
dience, within military organizations.However, to have its maximumeffect, the moral
element must also be accompaniedby the material,or physicalelementof equipmentand
preparation.The reportalsoacknowledgedthat the principallessongainedin the Nomonhan
Incidentwas that the Japaneseforceshad to combinethese two elementsin orderto defeat
the greatmaterialstrengthof the enemy.53
The reportthenwent on to reassessthe Red Armyin the light ofits demonstratedstrength
in modernweaponsand equipment.The authorswere particularlystartled,to the point of
admiration,by the demonstrablyimmenseresourcesof the Soviet forcesin ammunition;
by the amazingcapabilityin transportwhich enabled the Red Army to supply all war
materialsplentifullydespitethe locationof the battleareamorethan6oo kilometersfromthe
nearestrailheads;and by the incomparablesuperiorityof the Soviet artilleryand tanks, a
factorwhich gave them much greaterfire power than the Japaneseforces.Stresswas also
laid on the extremetacticalflexibilityof the Soviet forces,which, it was noted, was quite
unlikethe rigidity and cumbersomequalitiesformerlycharacteristicof the Tsarist armies.
Finally,contraryto Japaneseexpectations,the Soviet troopshad provento be both coura-
geous and tenaciousin battle.
In contrastto this estimationof the Red Army, the authorsof the reportwere painfully
consciousof the materialinferiorityof the Japaneseforces.Naturally,therefore,the Kwan-
tung Armystudy warnedof the dangersof a long warwith the SovietUnion.If the Japanese
Army were to be able to fight a successfulwar with the Soviets,it would be necessaryto
conductthe war so that it couldbe concludedwithin a desiredlength of time.54
The centralmilitaryauthoritiesin Tokyo also constituteda committeefor researchinto
the Nomonhanaffair.They wishedto reevaluateSovietpoweraswell as the armamentof the
JapaneseArmy and the strategy to be followedin planninga futurewar againstthe Soviet
Union.The findingsof this committeewere similarto those of the KwantungArmyorgan.
However,the focalpoint of the argumentof the centralcommitteewas the basicquestionof
whethertheJapaneseArmy,poorin modernequipmentand deficientin fire power,should
be thoroughlyremodeledandreorganized,or merelyshouldbe strengthenedwith new and
additionalequipmentin a supplementalmanner.The difficultyof the first alternativewas

53 T-803, Reel I09, Frame I9029. 54 Ibid.,Frame I9I09; and Hayashi, p. 24.
IOO MonumentaNipponica,xX, I-2

clearlyseen by the authorities:It might requiresuch a fundamentaldegreeof reformthat

the foundationsof the existing politicaland economicsystem would be shaken.In other
words, it would be more than a revisionof the militarystatus quo. This was the ultimate
dilemmawhich ceaselesslyhauntedthe rulersof ImperialJapan.Therefore,afterextensive
discussion,the questionwas settled in favorof the latteralternative.This was a victory for
the traditionalschool of thought which emphasizedthe spiritualfactorover the material
as the basisofwar potential.It was in linewith the traditionalvaluesof the existingJapanese
socialsystem.55
The NomonhanIncidentthus gave rise to immeasurablygreatrepercussionswithin the
JapaneseArmy. Regardlessof what the Soviet Union may have intended to achieve, this
demonstrationof the might of the Red Armyandthe ignominyof the defeatsufferedby the
highly consideredKwantungArmy had the effectof causingthe Japanesemilitaryauthori-
ties to restrainthe previous militancy of the forces stationed in Manchukuo.After the
NomonhanIncident borderdisputes along the frontiersof Manchukuodeclined sharply.
The causeto whichboth the militaryauthoritiesandtheJapanesepublicattributedthis was
the recentlyconcludedSoviet-GermanNon-AggressionPact.56It is of coursetrue that this
developmentboth radicallyaltered the power situationin Europeand placedJapanin a
state of politicalisolation.However, the Nomonhanaffairbasicallyalteredthe estimateof
the Soviet Union held by the Japanesemilitary,as well as theirestimateof their own capa-
bilities vis-dv-isthose of the Red Army.AfterNomonhanthe keynote of the attitude of the
Japanesemilitaryleaderswas caution,and the changeof policy towardthe Soviet Union, a
change characterizedby the attempt to reduce frictionbetween the two countries,was
basicallythe result of this new attitudeof the army.

CIV AFTERMATH OF NOMONHAN

WE HAVE emphasizedthat the principalandmost durableconsequenceof Nomonhanwas a

loss of confidenceon the part of the Japanesemilitary.Their attitude becamemuch more
circumspectin mattersconcerninghostilities with the Soviet Union. This reticencewas
mirroredby later diplomaticpolicy, which becameopportunisticin the extreme.Anxiety
producedthe TripartitePactwith Nazi GermanyandFascistItaly in the fallof I940, while
on the otherhandthe Soviet-Japanese NeutralityPactwas concludedin the springof I94I.
Both militaryand civilianleaderswere not only acutely consciousof the dangerof Soviet
territorialencroachments,but-and even more so-of ideological penetration.In this

55 Hayashi, pp. 24-25. Hayashi attributes this War.

hadprevailedatthetimeoftheRusso-Japanese
decision to the fact that theJapanese Army had not YoshimoriAi
56 For example,see Tachibana

been thoroughly indoctrinated with the concepts , "Morotofu gaik6nokyokut6e nohattei"e a

of modern fire power which were developed in the 1-ov
9-> e o)
4-e (TheExtensionofMolo-
course of the First World War. Consequently, the tov's Diplomacy into the Far East), Gaikojiho,
army leaders were unable to escape from the older xcii, No. 840, December I, I939, pp. I7I-I82.
concepts of fire power and its employment which
 YOUNG. "The NomonhanIncident" IOI

analysisI havenot dwelt uponthe ideologicalaspect,but it cannotbe emphasizedtoo much

that the fearof Bolshevismin both militaryand civiliancirclesof leadershipgave a special
qualitytoJapaneserelationswith the SovietUnion-a qualitynot possessedby her"power"
relationswith otherantagonistssuchas the UnitedStatesandGreatBritain.To manyof the
most influentialmilitaryandcivilianleadersthe threatposedby Bolshevikideologywas the
most fearfulforthe "NationalPolity."Forthe militarytherehadalwaysexistedthe strategic
dilemmaexpressedby the slogans"defendthe north,advanceto the south"and"defendthe
south, advanceto the north."After Nomonhanit seemed that the latter coursewas im-
possiblewithout allies. Still, the dilemmabecameever more acute as the endless China
affairbroughtJapaninto confrontationwith the United Statesas well as the Soviet Union.
WhenGermanyinvadedthe SovietUnion onJune22, I94I, ForeignMinisterMatsuoka
Yosuke57urgedan immediateattackon the Bolshevikenemy.Matsuoka'sentirediplomacy
was baseduponthe assumptionof a Germanvictoryin Europe,andin the light of rapidlyde-
terioratingrelationswith the United States he was eager to hasten the realizationof his
calculations.But with the experienceof Nomonhanfreshin theirmemory,the army leaders
were not able to overcometheir irresolution.From the middle of July, the GeneralStaff
begana large-scalemobilizationwith the view of strengtheningthe KwantungArmyforan
attackon the Sovietrearat "anadvantageousmoment."Inpractice,this meantwheneverthe
Germanattackseemedto be certainof success.The mobilizationcontinuedinto September,
andthe effectivemanpowerof the KwantungArmywas almostdoubled(fromabout400,000
to 700,000 troopsorganizedinto I6 divisions,with 600 warplanesand I40,000 horses).All
mannerof war materialand equipmentwas concentratedin Manchukuoand Korea.All
these preparationswere cloaked under the designation"KwantungArmy Special Ma-
neuvers."58
But the briefmonthsof the Manchuriansummerslippedaway hurriedlyas the military
commandawaiteda favorableopportunity.They were torn painfullybetween their strong
desireto attackthe Bolshevikstate-long heldto be the ultimateenemyof the Empire-and
the fearthat they would be defeated.Meanwhile,the crisiswith the United Statesturned
strategicthoughtto the south.In earlyAugustanevaluationofthe situationpreparedby the
RussianSectionof the IntelligenceBureauof the GeneralStaffOfficewas presentedto the
Chiefof Staff.August9, I94I,witnessed the quietdisappearancefromthe army'stimetableof
the plan to invadeSoviet territory.Instead,the armywas now to returnto the other area

57 4 t German attack upon the Soviet Union, the Far

58 The policy decision of July 2, I94I was con-
sidered, of course, to be extremely secret, and
every precaution was taken to prevent its dis-
closure. Despite the extreme care exercised,
however, the entire matter was known in Moscow
almost immediately via the famous Sorge espionage
organization. Shigemitsu, pp. 92-99; Hattori, i,
i58; and Hayashi, pp. 3I-32. At the time of the
Eastern forces of the Red Army consisted of ap-
proximatelythirtydivisions,2,300 tanks,andI,700
warplanes. Hattori, I, i59. Additional information
on the "Kwantung Army Special Maneuvers"
(Kantdgun tokubetsuenshb M.t f 1,4V,ab-
breviated as Kantokuen)can be found in IMTFE,
No. 86, pp. I2-I6; No. 93, pp. 5-i2; and
Sokkiroku,
No. 227, pp. 4-I6.
I02 Monumenta
Nipponiica,
XXII, I-2

with whichit hadlong beenpreoccupied:the SouthSeas.This was the latest productof the
ever-dominantinteractionof anxietyand opportunism.
Thus the Japanese-Soviet NeutralityPact survivedthe summerof I94I -if only because
therewas apparentlyno favorableopportunityto breakit. However,even afterthe plan to
attackthe SovietUnionwas abandoned,theJapaneseforcesfacingthe Bolshevikstate were
never substantiallydecreased,and a continuouseffortwas made to equip themwith ever
better and more modernequipment. The military facilities of Korea and Manchukuo,
such as railways,armories,and militarybases were continuallyimprovedand expanded.
This was true even at the heightof the PacificWar,whenJapanwas ever more desperately
in need of increasedmilitaryforcesand materielin the SouthSeastheaterof war.59
Priorto andduringthe periodwith which we have beenconcernedthe army'straditional
fearof and hostility towardthe Soviet Union was unalterable.The Bolshevikneighborwas
alwayslookeduponas anever-presentthreatto the "life-line"of the Empire,not to mention
its ideologicalprinciples.This was so despiteallvicissitudesofpolicyandattitudebasedupon
the variable"powerpositions"of the two states as seen fromTokyo. The anti-Bolshevism
of Japanesegovernmentalleaders-whether military or civilian-was implacableand in-
variable.It was the ultimateandunchangingfoundationof ImperialJapan'sattitudetoward
the Soviet Union.
But on the level of pragmaticpolicy, afterthe summerof I94I the Japanese-SovietNeu-
tralityPactbecamethe indispensablepremiseofJapan'sability to dealwith the problemof
the SouthSeas.It is one of the most sublimeironiesof historythat underthe pressureof later
events the ImperialJapaneseGovernmentwas forcedincreasinglyto rely upon the hated
Bolsheviksfor the maintenanceof the conditionslaid down in the NeutralityPact.

59 Hattori, I, I60-I62; and Tanemura Sak6 S ters), Daiyamondosha Y 4 -e & v 1V

4, Tokyo,
*ttt, Daihon'ei kimitsu nisshi k * *t J!NlQ I952, pp. 73-76.
(The Secret Journal of the Imperial Headquar-