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@ Introduction
@ Literature Review
Type of Offshore Structure
Causes of Failure on Offshore Structure
Type of Offshore Pipeline
Causes of Failure on Offshore Pipeline
@ Case Study and Discussion
Bravo Ekofisk
Alexander Kielland
Piper Alpha, North Sea
West Gamma
Sleipner A
Mumbai High North Platform
@ Lesson Learnt
@ Conclusion
6 
 
Offshore structure and pipeline system are located at the
undulate ocean - susceptible to a lot of uncertainties.

Plenty of accidents that result in fatalities,

environmental damage or property damage have occurred

@ Safety = absent of accident

can be done by hazard identification
Knowledge from the past accidents serves as an
important input to hazard identification.
It is vital to avoid accidents in the future.
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Type of Offshore Structure

For the purpose of exploitation

of oil and gas under the seabed,
various type of offshore structure
has been built:
Ñ Fixed offshore structure
Ñ Concrete gravity base structure
Ñ Tension leg platform
Ñ Floating production storage and offloading system (FPSO)
Ñ Shutter tanker
Ñ Semi-submersible vessel
Ñ Self-elevating jack-up

- Example:
@ Fixed offshore structure are only suitable on the shallow water
@ FPSO system will be more suitable for deepwater
 Causes of Failure on Offshore Structure

@ Failure resulting from statistical variations in loads and structural load bearing
capabilities
@ Failure due to accidents
@ Failure due to a human error during design, fabrication and operation of structures

Arne Kvitrud (2001) claimed that human errors are

the most important contributor to the risk of failure.

This conclusion is drawn based on the studies

on the four major structural accidents in Norway

 Type of Offshore Pipeline

Offshore pipelines can be categorized into four groups:

@ Flow line
@ Gathering line
@ Transmission line (trunk line)
@ Distribution line

Ñ Flow line carries untreated hydrocarbon products directly from

reservoir to platform or subsea manifold. (Diameter 5 - 25cm)
Ñ Gathering line connects from one platform to another platform and
usually used to transmit oil and gas from processing field and
storage facilities to a large storage tank where it is gathered for
pumping to another long distance. (Diameter 10 - 92cm)
Ñ Transmission line is used to carry the combined flow from one or
many platforms to onshore. (Diameter range up to 142cm)
Ñ Distribution line used to transfer oil and gas to the nearest cities and
used as the combustible material.
 Causes of Failure on Offshore Pipeline
@ Expansion and Global Buckling
Ñ Due to the restraint provided by the seabed fiction, a pipeline expansion only occurs
at the end .
Ñ At undisturbed sections of the pipeline, the restraint against thermal and pressure
induced expansion may cause a compressive pipeline force which would result in a
global buckling mechanism
Ñ The resulting buckling configuration such as mode, wave length and amplitude
depends upon the frictional resistance between the pipe and soil.

@ External or internal corrosion

Ñ Corrosion is actually a chemical mechanism that corrodes the steel and later
weakens the strength of it
Ñ Corrosion on the internal wall of a natural gas pipeline can occur when the pipe
wall is exposed to water and contaminants in the gas, such as O2, H2S, CO2, or
chlorides.
@ Casting Porosity
Ñ Casting porosity can be related to insufficient liquid being fed to the
mold, low liquid metal temperature, improper mold and gating
design, etc.

@ Mechanical damage
Ñ Mechanical damage normally consists of gouges and dents - created
by excavation or handling equipment during construction.

@ Metal fatigue
Ñ Metal fatigue is caused by repeated cycling of the load.
Ñ The process of fatigue consists of three stages i.e. initial cracking,
progressive crack growth across the part and final sudden fracture of
the remaining cross section.

Equipment failure
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 Bravo Ekofisk

@ Blow out 22 April 1977

@ No fire, but 22 500 tonnes oil released
@ Accident happened during removal of valve for maintenance and well stabilisation
- unsatisfactory installation of down hole safety valve during night
- mud started leaking out next morning
- safety valves (BOP) on deck were not closed
@ Oil recovery equipment mobilised took several days.
Only 4% of the oil recovered.
@ A total spill estimate between 13,000 m3 and 20,000m3
 Alexander Kielland

@ Fatigue crack in one of its six

bracings (bracing D-6).
@ Rupture / collapse in the other
5 braces.
@ Loss of column D
@ The rig immediately listed to one
side at an angle of 35 degrees
@ Initial collapse occurred within a
minute but the Kielland remained
floating for another 14 minutes
@ Evacuation - only two of the seven
lifeboats launched successfully
@ After around 15 minutes, Kielland
capsizing
@ 89 survived and 123 fatalities
 Piper Alpha, North Sea

@ Gas audibly leaked out at high pressure, ignited and exploded, blowing through the
firewalls
@ Fire spread through the damaged firewalls, destroyed some oil lines and soon large
quantities of stored oil were burning out of control
@ Automatic deluge system had been turned off
@ After 20 minutes, fire had spread and become hot enough to weaken and then burst
the gas risers from the other platforms.
@ All routes to lifeboats were blocked
by smoke and flames, and in the lack
of any other instructions, they made the
jump into the sea hoping to be rescued by boat.
@ Explosion result a total insured loss of
$ 3.4 billion and 167 men died.
 West Gamma

@ On 20 August 1990, the West Gamma accommodation jack-up ran

into a gale (with waves up 12 meters and winds gusting 60 knots)
@ The rig first lost its helideck to a large wave and then lost its tow
with the Normand Drott during the storm
@ As night fell, one of the deck lifeboats broke loose, damaging vent
pipes and access hatches and causing down-flooding in the rig's hull
@ Evacuation by helicopter (not possible) - due to the damage
sustained to the helideck and helicopter winching was not possible
due to the high winds
@ The reasons contribute to the sinking of the West Gamma including
the bad weather, loss of the towline, structural failure and flooding
 Sleipner A

@ In August 1991, prior to the mating of the hull

and the deck unit, the hull was towed into
Gandsfjord where it was to be lowered in
the water in a controlled ballasting operation
at a rate of 1m per 20 minutes.
@ As the hull was lowered to the 99m mark, rumbling noises were heard followed by
the sound of water pouring into the unit.
@ A cell wall had failed and a serious crack had developed, and sea water poured in at
a rate that was too great for the deballasting pumps to deal with.
@ Within a few minutes, the hull began sinking at a rate of 1m per minute.
@ Total loss of about $700 million.
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 Mumbai High North Platform

@ The fire occurred on 27 July 2005 - a multipurpose support vessel

(MSV), Samundra Suraksha,100m long, hit one of the MHN
platform risers.
@ The fire was so intense that the MHN was abandoned in accordance
with the disaster management plan of offshore operators
@ Within two hours, the whole platform collapsed into the sea with a
few foundation piers left
@ A Pawan helicopter positioned on it was also lost
@ 11 people died and 11 others were reported missing

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Bravo Ekofisk (1977) Ñ Human Error - mechanical failure of the safety valve during earlier
maintenance
Ñ Operational Error ± Lack of safety planning and procedure for maintenance

Alexander Kielland (1980) Ñ Fatigue failure of one brace

Ñ Inadequate evacuation
Ñ Fabrication defect due to bad welding and inadequate inspection
Ñ No fatigue design check carried out
Ñ Lack of life boats, survival suits
Ñ Long mobilizing time for rescue vessels
Piper Alpha (1988) Ñ Leak from partly demounted pump
Ñ Escalation after first gas explosion
Ñ No evacuation ± rescue vessel was not alarmed
Ñ The condition of the pump was not reported to the control room
Ñ Fire pumps/sprinkler system were not automatically initiated - because they
were in a manual mode

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West Gamma (1990) Ñ Bad weather
Ñ Loss of towline
Ñ Structural failure
Ñ Flooding
Sleipner A (1991) Ñ Caisson wall fractured due to low strength
Ñ Flooding and sinking in 18 minutes
Ñ Inadequate reinforcement
Ñ Inadequate internal and external control of design
Ñ Codes did not specify requirement to pumping capacity or
watertight subdivision to limit flooding under such conditions
Mumbai High North Platform Ñ Risk assessment processes did not control the threat to the risers
(2005) Ñ Procedures to manage vessel ± vessel operate near riser location
Ñ No structural protection for riser
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 Bravo Ekofisk

@ Investigation focused on lack of safety planning and procedures during maintenance ±

a general need for better organisation of safety by operators
@ Contributed to develop and implement specific regulations for oil companies own
control by the oil directorate
@ Intensified focus by authorities and industry to improve organisation and equipment for
oil recovery after blowouts
@ Rescue vessel mobilization requirement established ± on the spot within 25 minutes of
an accident
 Alexander Kielland

@ Cracks introduced during construction must be detected before the

unit is launched.
@ When fatigue cracks might grow, means to detect such cracks before
they grow to a critical size must be implemented.
@ If a floating unit develops severe listing, there should be a last
barriers (i.e. buoyancy volume or a righting force) in order to allow
time for organise and safe evacuation of personnel.
@ Conventional lifeboats are not satisfactory in bad weather
conditions. The experience from this accident was the driving force
behind the development of free fall lifeboats for offshore
applications.
@ It was clearly demonstrated that the rapid and steep inclination angle
makes orderly escape and evacuation very difficult.
@ It was realised that the rescue of survivors from lifeboats by
traditional vessels was impossible in bad weather conditions.
@ The role and the capabilities of the standby vessel were questioned
after the accident, when it was realised that it took the vessel 1 hour
before it could attend the scene of the accident.
 Piper Alpha

@ Regulatory control of offshore installations

@ Adherence to Permit-to-Work System
@ Disabling of protective equipment by explosion
@ Need for safety training
@ Auditing is vital
@ Proper isolation of plant for maintenance
@ Limit inventory on installation and in pipelines
@ Emergency Shutdown Valves
@ Temporary Safe Refuge (TSR)
@ Evacuation and Escape
@ Use of wind tunnel tests and explosion simulations in design
 West Gamma

@ When the jack-up is in transit, the legs have been retracted, and may
pose a very large obstruction for helicopter approach, if the helideck
has not been located with this in mind.
@ The most critical aspect was a sufficiently high speed for the
lowering and retrieval of the Fast Rescue Crafts (FRC).
@ The crane used for deployment and retrieval of the FRC should also
be located as close to midships as possible, where movement are
least.
@ A need was also demonstrated to be able to retrieve the FRC with
more than nine persons onboard.
 Sleipner A

@ Personnel play an extremely important role in promoting safety ± competency,

experience and knowledge is important.
@ We need to ensure that the safety barriers are maintained so as to control / mitigate
accidents.
@ Never be overconfident - we should always make sure all the calculation and design
have done properly and accurately.
@ Design changes to be verified against original design.
@ Allow time and resources for independent 3rd party verification with detailed scope to
be defined by verification contractor.
@ Do not have blind faith in computer models ± use other programs or program versions
for verification.
@ Never think of a job as just routine.
 Mumbai High North Platform

@ Critical Barriers (managing the threats)

- Properly designed fenders, addressing all credible threats
- Install risers within protective sleeves such as caissons or J tubes
- Locate risers away from platform loading zones
- Protect risers from hazards by location, barriers, or other means
- Avoid vessel operations near riser locations
- Provide subsea isolation valves (SSIVs) to limit consequences of
riser damage
@ The Need for Better Design
@ The Need for Incident Reinforces
- Development, implementation and maintenance of associated risk
management measures
- Adoption of collision avoidance and protection measures which at
least meet current good practice as described in Oil & Gas UK
- Management arrangements to ensure that the risk management
measures are effective and observed in practice.
×



@ The lessons that still need to be remembered is that human factors play a decisive
role in safety and that proper safety culture and management are required in the
involved organisations.
@ The requirements in the standards should be:
- compatible with available design tools, such as finite element analysis programs
- easy to understand for engineers, in order to avoid gross errors
- specific and not open to interpretation.
@ Engineers should have relevant education, also including education in preparation
of design documentation that can be verified by others.
@ Organisations must take a responsible attitude to competence planning and quality,
applying the principles of triple bottom line and Corporate Social Responsibility.
@ We must identify possible failure scenarios that may lead to critical situations and
perform independent verification.
©  !!