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Gerbert R. Corpuz v. Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas and the Solicitor General
G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, THIRD DIVISION, (Brion, J.)
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking a direct appeal from the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
grants aliens like Corpuz the right to institute a petition for judicial recognition of
a foreign divorce decree.
HELD:
Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED.
The Supreme Court qualifies the above conclusion - i.e., that the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens -
with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to
dismiss Gerbert's petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of
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the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition
of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the alien's national law have been duly proven
according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in
favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
provides for the effect of foreign judgments.
A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose
the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner's presumptive evidence of a
right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be
taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the
foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata between
the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
It is indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological
disorder itself.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the
RTC which granted the annulment of marriage of the Marable spouses based on
the evidence of Rosalino’s psychological incapacity.
HELD:
Appeal DENIED for lack of merit. CA Decision AFFIRMED.
show that when respondent learned of his affair, he immediately terminated it. In
short, Rosalino’s marital infidelity does not appear to be symptomatic of a grave
psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his spousal
obligations. It has been held in various cases that sexual infidelity, by itself, is not
sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity. It must
be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make Rosalino completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of marriage. That not being the case with Rosalino, his claim of
psychological incapacity must fail. It bears stressing that psychological
incapacity must be more than just a “difficulty,” “refusal” or “neglect” in the
performance of some marital obligations. Rather, it is essential that the
concerned party was incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. In Santos v. Court of
Appeals. the intention of the law is to confine the meaning of “psychological
incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.
In this case, Alain’s marriage to Caridad was declared void under Article
36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the
liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the
rules on co-ownership.
absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued upon compliance with Article[s]
50 and 51 of the Family Code. Alain filed a petition questioning that
requirement. The RTC partially granted the petition with modifications stating
that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued after liquidation,
partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and
distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
HELD:
RTC Decision AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must
be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.9
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between Alian
and Caridad.
The Court agrees with Alain that the trial court erred in ordering that a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation,
partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not
apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section
19(1) of the Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the
petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or
decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance
with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule
on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule
applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final
judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50
of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared
void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void
without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
There being absolutely no proof that the Pandacan property was judicially
or extrajudicially constituted as the Ramos’ family home, the law’s protective
mantle cannot be availed of by Ramos, et. al.
the requirement resulting to the denial of the motion to quash the writ of
execution. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding the levy upon the
Pandacan property.
HELD:
Petition DENIED.
If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family
Code or before August 3, 1988, then it must have been constituted either
judicially or extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231
and 233 of the Civil Code. Judicial constitution of the family home requires
the filing of a verified petition before the courts and the registration of the
court’s order with the Registry of Deeds of the area where the property is
located. Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is governed by Articles 240 to
242 of the Civil Code and involves the execution of a public instrument which
must also be registered with the Registry of Property. Failure to comply with
either one of these two modes of constitution will bar a judgment debtor from
availing of the privilege.
On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of
the Family Code on August 3, 1988, there is no need to constitute
extrajudicially or judicially, and the exemption is effective from the time it
was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art.
154 actually resides therein. Moreover, the family home should belong to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse,
its constitution must have been with consent of the other, and its
value must not exceed certain amounts depending upon the area where it is
located. Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply as
provided under Art. 155 for which the family home is made answerable must
have been incurred after August 3, 1988.
And in both cases, whether under the Civil Code or the Family Code, it is
not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such
property is a family home. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved.
In the present case, since Ramos, et. al. claim that the family home was
constituted prior to August 3, 1988, or as early as 1944, they must comply with
the procedure mandated by the Civil Code. There being absolutely no proof
that the Pandacan property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as the
Ramos’ family home, the law’s protective mantle cannot be availed of by
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Ramos, et. al. Parenthetically, the records show that the sheriff exhausted all
means to execute the judgment but failed because Ramos’ bank accounts were
already closed while other properties in his or the company’s name had already
been transferred, and the only property left was the Pandacan property.
The Court is mindful that the best interests of the child in cases involving
paternity and filiation should be advanced. It is, however, just as mindful of the
disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of
the putative father’s legitimate family.
The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals and the trial court’s
decision was reversed. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the filiation of Archbencel as illegitimate daughter of Ben-
Hur Nepomuceno is established by the handwritten note submitted as
documentary evidence.
HELD:
Petition GRANTED.
1. The spouses;
2. Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
3. Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and
illegitimate children of the latter;
4. Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate
and illegitimate children of the latter; and
5. Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-
blood.
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In the present case, Arhbencel relies, in the main, on the handwritten note
executed by petitioner. The note does not contain any statement whatsoever
about Arhbencel’s filiation to petitioner. It is, therefore, not within the ambit of
Article 172(2) vis-à-vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as
competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private
handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.
The note cannot also be accorded the same weight as the notarial
agreement to support the child referred to in Herrera. For it is not even
notarized. And Herrera instructs that the notarial agreement must be
accompanied by the putative father’s admission of filiation to be an acceptable
evidence of filiation. Here, however, not only has petitioner not admitted
filiation through contemporaneous actions. He has consistently denied it.
however, just as mindful of the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause
to the privacy and peace of the putative father’s legitimate family.
Remo filed an appeal to the Office of the President which was dismissed.
The same action was filed to the Court of Appeals resulting also to denial. All
motions for reconsiderations filed to both offices were also denied. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Remo, who originally used her husband’s surname in her
expired passport, can revert to the use of her maiden name, despite the
subsistence of her marriage.
HELD:
Petition DENIED.
Title XIII of the Civil Code governs the use of surnames. In the case of a
married woman, Article 370 of the Civil Code provides:
(1) HER MAIDEN FIRST NAME AND SURNAME AND ADD HER
HUSBAND’S SURNAME, OR
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We agree with Remo that the use of the word “may” in the above
provision indicates that the use of the husband’s surname by the wife is
permissive rather than obligatory.
Clearly, a married woman has an option, but not a duty, to use the
surname of the husband in any of the ways provided by Article 370 of the Civil
Code. She is therefore allowed to use not only any of the three names provided
in Article 370, but also her maiden name upon marriage. She is not prohibited
from continuously using her maiden name once she is married because when a
woman marries, she does not change her name but only her civil
status. Further, this interpretation is in consonance with the principle that
surnames indicate descent.
In the present case, Remo, whose marriage is still subsisting and who
opted to use her husband’s surname in her old passport, requested to resume
her maiden name in the replacement passport arguing that no law prohibits her
from using her maiden name.
Since Remo’s marriage to her husband subsists, placing her case outside
of the purview of Section 5(d) of RA 8239 (as to the instances when a married
woman may revert to the use of her maiden name), she may not resume her
maiden name in the replacement passport.
The Court notes that Remo would not have encountered any problems in
the replacement passport had she opted to continuously and consistently use
her maiden name from the moment she was married and from the time she first
applied for a Philippine passport. However, Remo consciously chose to use her
husband’s surname before, in her previous passport application, and now
desires to resume her maiden name. If we allow petitioner’s present request,
definitely nothing prevents her in the future from requesting to revert to the use
of her husband’s surname. Such unjustified changes in one's name and identity
in a passport, which is considered superior to all other official
documents, cannot be countenanced. Otherwise, undue confusion and
inconsistency in the records of passport holders will arise. Thus, for passport
issuance purposes, a married woman, such as Remo, whose marriage subsists,
may not change her family name at will.