oer, Osama Bin Laden: A Case Study Part I: Summary and Analysis Abstract This document provides an open-source examination of the threat posed by Osama bin Laden, his al Qaeda organization, and allied terrorist organizations. It includes a summary of the relevant history, the lessons learned from the 1998 African embassy bombings and from the follow-on cruise-missile strikes, the threat of future attacks using weapons of mass destruction, and a set of observations, conclusions and recommendations. Sandia National Laboratories P.O. Box 969 Livermore, CA 94551-0969EXECUTIVE SUMMARY enw INTRODUCTION. CAVEATS. OSAMA BIN LADEN... GENERAL OBSERVATIONS. ‘THe MAN STRENGTHS. AL QAEDA MOTIVES AND PHILOSOPHY. ‘Composition AND RECRUITMENT. ‘STRENGTHS, ASSETS, AND CAPABILITIES. ‘WEAKNESSES. ‘THE 7 AUGUST 1998 AFRICAN EMBASSY BOMBINGS... Tux Gop News. ‘Tue Bap News.. ‘THE ROTTOM LINE, DOS FINDING: = DOS RECOMMENDATIONS ‘THE 20 AUGUST 1998 CRUISE MISSILE STRIKES "THE DISADVANTAGES OF RETALIATION. ‘THE ADVANTAGES OF RETALIATION, WMD THREAT ASSESSMENT... Lever or INTEREST. ‘THE GOOD NEWS.. ‘THE BAD NEWS... NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ‘Tue FurURE.. RISK ASSESSMENT... ‘CONCLUSIONS. RESPONSE OPTIONS wvINTELLIGENCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT OPTIONS.. OPTIONS FOR REDUCING OUR VULNERABILITY. MILITARY OPTIONS. ‘TARGETING BIN LADEN... DIPLOMATIC OPTIONS ‘MISCELLANEOUS OPTIONS... ‘OPTIONS FOR THE SPONSOR STATE. THE BIG PICTURE ..Executive Summary This study represents an attempt to assess the threat posed by Osama bin Laden, his al Qaeda organization, his associates, and affiliated organizations. ‘The report consists of two parts, Part Il, which was completed first, consists of a detailed compilation of open-source historical information related to the lives and activities of Osama bin Laden and of other relevant individuals and organizations. The data compiled in Part Il are organized by timeframe, by topic, or by region and are presented in a viewgraph format. Part I consists of a high-level sumimary of Part II, an analysis of the overall level of the threat, lessons learned, and options for the future. Part lis presented in.a report format. ‘The study and the findings of this study can only be understood properly when examined in context. To this end, several constraints and caveats are important: © The study consists of an analysis of existing data that was gathered from existing reports: No new data was collected or generated as a part of this study. The study relies exclusively upon second-hand sources of information (¢.g., news media). The study relied exclusively upon open-source information: ‘The completeness of the study was resource-limited. When this study was first started, there was no intent to publish. For that reason, source citations and archives are incomplete. The historical summary contains some inconsistencies. Resource limitations precluded the effective resolution of all such inconsistencies. © The findings and conclusions are subject to change as new data emerges over time, Findings * Osama bin Laden is not a new threat. He is a capable adversary with many strengths. Likewise, his al Qaeda organization poses a significant threat and possesses many strengths and assets. However, it also has a number of exploitable weaknesses. © The 7 August 1998 African embassy bombings should not be taken to imply that our intelligence and physical protection programs are a failure. On the contrary, many positive findings emerge after examining the full story in detail. On the other hand, there are many lessons leamed and recommendations for future improvement. The 20 August 1998 retaliatory cruise missile strikes did little to help solve the problem posed by bin Laden and may ultimately prove to have done more harm than good. However, the issue is complex, and there are a wide range of possible advantages to retaliation which motivate such strikes. aE, 4EE: © The risk of future attacks by Osama bin Laden or his associates using weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) is not insignificant. We find that the risk is greatest for radiological dispersion incidents, followed by use of low-end chemical or biological agents, A detailed set of findings and a quantitative assessment of various options is included in the body of this report. ‘© Many options exist for our future response to the bin Laden threat (and to the terrorist threat in general). The body of this report contains a list of options for intelligence collection and law enforcement, vulnerability reductions, military options, diplomatic options, options for sponsor states, and more. It is our finding that the root cause of the Islamic militant threat is the widespread and deep-seated discontent among a large segment of the Islamic. world, as opposed to the actions or agitation of any one individual or group of individuals. As such, the diplomatic options are likely to provide the broadest and most effective long-term reduction in the threat, However, the threat can never be, and never will be, eliminated completely. General conclusions Terrorism is not dead (although it has shifted from Marxist-oriented to religious-oriented) State sponsorship of terrorism is not over (although it has shifted from Soviet-dominated to third-world-dominated) Terrorism can be unpredictable and future threats may evolve from very unexpected sources Terrorism is a global phenomenon Our problems with terrorism are exacerbated by our position and by our image in the world Religion is a powerful motivational factor in modern terrorism Religion is a protective shield which complicates counter-terrorism Killing is an explicit goal of many modern terrorists Modern terrorism is not easily countered Despite repeated attacks over a period of many years, the truck bomb remains a very potent weapon and remains difficult to defend against Despite repeated warnings over a period of many months, the Nairobi bombing was not prevented Although the Aftican bombings represent a failure of sorts, we do NOT find negligence to have been a significant contributing factor Although we may have underestimated the local threat in East Aftica, we were more the victims of resource constraints than of poor intelligence or of a poor threat response Our overall counter-terrorist capabilities are strong, ‘We have a record of successes that we can be proud of However, the terrorist can always seek out the weakest targets The “war” against terrorism will never be “won”: terrorism will always be a world problem. We are seeing increasing attention domestically to terrorism as a threat to national security TD 5TPS + Weare seeing increasing worldwide recognition of terrorism as a global phenomena ‘© We are secing improvements in the global response to terrorism WMD terrorism © Current terrorist interest in WMD agents and weapons suggests a trend toward new terrorist capabilities in the future © However, the timing of any evolution towards new methods and capabilities is highly uncertain «Furthermore, the current effectiveness and availability of explosive devices make it likely that the vehicle bomb will remain a dominant tool for some time yet « Inaddition, the apparent inability of al Qaeda to acquire and employ WMD agents or weapons (even after years of trying and with significant resources at their disposal), suggests that the threat of WMD terrorism may be smaller at the present time than we currently seem to imagine © Nonetheless, the obstacles standing in the way of WMD acquisition and employment are not insurmountable and some forms of WMD employment must be considered quite plausible in the futureIntroduction This study began immediately following the tragic bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in August of 1998. It follows in the footsteps of several earlier studies in which analysts at Sandia National Laboratories attempted to piece together a complete and coherent picture of various terrorist groups in order to understand how terrorist threats were evolving and what that meant for those of us tasked with the protection of nuclear explosive devices from seizure and use by such groups. In the course of these studies, we have found that the first and most difficult task is simply to gather together and organize the vast wealth of information which becomes available following any international terrorist incident. Even though we all follow events in the media, itis difficult, if not impossible, to get a clear and coherent understanding of major terrorist events, and what they mean for the future, by following the news in the order in which it becomes available, Different bits of information which are closely related may emerge months apart. Some bits of information do not even seem to be related whien they are digested months apart, but it becomes apparent that they are related, and that the relationship can lead to important lessons, when they are seen side-by-side. For that reason, we begin a painstaking process of gathering huge amounts of data as it becomes available and assembling it in an order that makes sense. Once this process is complete, itis as ifa large puzzle has been assembled: a big picture often emerges which was not recognizable from the pieces alone. In fact, many different pictures, or lessons, emerge from various comers of the puzzle. An example might help to illustrate the value of this process. Consider the Aum Shinrikyo cult and their involvement with various chemical anid biological agents. Most observers, including the vast majority of site security personnel, security systems designers (scientists and technologists), and military officers know very little ahout the cult, their capabilities, and what they tried to do. Many, in fact, remain unaware that the Tokyo sarin incident was not the only attempt to use chem/bio agents nor that the cult was involved with many agents other than sarin, A good compilation of the facts reveals many things, among them the fact that the cult was involved with many agents other than sarin alone, that they tried biological agents before turning to chemical agents, and that they = capable of more sophisticated attacks than that for which they are best-known, namely the punctured plastic bags on the Tokyo subway trains. A similar story exists for Osama bin Laden. Most people had never heard of him prior to the August 1998 African embassy bombings and still know nothing of his involvement in a wide variety of other terrorist acts and of his affiliations with various guerilla groups. An examination of bin Laden’s activities makes it clear that bin Laden has been involved in fighting for Islamic causes since long before the Bast Aftican embassy bombings, that he has had significant state support (as opposed to being the freelance agent 7 7