Professional Responsibility (10) & (11): Disciplinary Proceedings

1. DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
a) Historical Background
b) Burden of Proof
c) Applicability of Double Jeopardy
d) Legal Officer and Advocates & Solicitors without practicing Certificates
- Section 82A Legal Profession Act (Act)

2. SECTION 83(2)(A) - (K)

a) Conviction of a criminal offence
b) Fraudulent or Grossly Improper Conduct
- Breach of usage or Rules of Conduct
c) Adjudicated Bankrupt and Section 124(5) (a) - (m) of the Bankruptcy Act
d) Undercutting
e) Employment of soliciting agents and touts
f) Misconduct - ‘Unbefitting’

3. COMPLAINTS AGAINST ADVOCATES & SOLICITORS

a) Complaints
b) Review Committee, section 85(6)
c) Inquiry Committee (Sections 84 and 86) of the Act
d) Composition
e) Time Frame
f) Report of the Inquiry Committee - Section 86(7)
g) Powers of the Inquiry Committee
h) Dissatisfied Complainants (Section 96)
i) Disciplinary Committee (Sections 90 to 95) of the Act
j) Composition
k) Findings of Disciplinary Committee (Section 93)
l) Dissatisfied Complainants (Section 97)

4. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE (SECTION 98)

5. REPLACEMENT ON ROLL OF A SOLICITOR WHO HAS BEEN STRUCK OFF (SECTION 102)

6. MISCELLANEOUS
a) Adverse Orders (Section 101)
b) No action in absence of bad faith (Section 106)
c) Emphasis on Time
d) Statistics

NB: Unless otherwise stated, all provisions cited herein are taken from the Legal Profession Act

1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Part VII, Legal Profession Act

Section 82
1) Any person duly admitted as an advocate and solicitor and any legal officer shall be an officer of the
Supreme Court
2) The provisions of any written law which imposes on officers of the Supreme Court any restrictions as to
practice as advocates or solicitors shall not apply to any advocate and solicitor by virtue only of
subsection (1)

- Jurisdiction of the Supreme court over all lawyers, pupils, legal service officers and non-practising
professionals (see also section 82A, below)
- Note: Amendments to the Act 1986: law soc called up before select committee; biggest frustration:
 - Fear of cover up by law oc when discip own members
- Discip committees dilatory – very slow in processing cases
- => new things introduced:
- one of this was the Concept of a “lay person” sitting in lay committee those who are related to
the legal profession (ie. Bankers; Engineers; Accountants/ etc). We now have lay persons judging
to ensure that the proceedings are carried out impartially. They are pple whom profession has
asosicaiton or dealinsg with eg doctors, engineers, accoutnatns and leading industrial figures
- new provn stated to be: “Aimed at ensuring legal profession distinguished by honest competent
practitioners of the highest standards who will be able to the increasing expectations of the general public
and the business community.”

1.1 Purpose of Disciplinary Action:

• The Law Society of Singapore v Tham Yu Xian Rick [1999] 4 SLR 168 held that disciplinary
action serves 3 functions: punishment of the errant solicitor, deterrence against similar
defaults by other like minded solicitors, protection of public confidence in the administration
of justice
Tham Yu Xian - Facts
Tham was charged with abetting a ‘foreign person’ to acquire an interest in a residential property, an offence
under s 3(1)(c) of the Residential Property Act (Cap 20). The charge alleged that he had acted for one Ang in
his purchase of the property as Lim’s (the foreigner’s) nominee and prepared a trust deed to that effect. Tham
claimed trial, denying that he had prepared the trust deed. Tham was convicted and fined.
Subsequent to his conviction, a charge was formulated against Tham stating that by reason of his conviction,
he was guilty of conduct implying a defect of character which made him unfit for the profession under s
83(2)(a) of the Legal Profession Act (‘Act’). The Disciplinary Committee found that the charge against the
respondent was proved and that there was cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action to be taken
pursuant to s 83(1) of the Act. During the show cause proceedings, Tham submitted, by way of mitigation, that
he regretted what he had done, that he had derived no financial benefit from the matter, aside from the
usual conveyancing fees; that his conduct amounted to no more than an isolated error of judgment and
that his offence was ‘technical’.
Held, ordering the respondent to be struck off the rollls:
(1) The conviction of a criminal offence which implied a defect of character prima facie rendered an
advocate and solicitor unfit for his profession. The nature of the offence was material, for not every violation
of criminal law implied a defect of character. The penalty imposed as a result of the conviction must also be
taken into account, as an indication of the moral turpitude or obliquity involved. The degree of moral
blameworthiness was also to be weighed in deciding the appropriate disciplinary action to be taken. The
offence need not involve money, but if the solicitor was shown to have acted dishonestly or where he fell short
of the required standards of integrity, probity or trustworthiness, striking off would invariably follow.
(2) Whether the offence was committed in a professional capacity would be irrelevant because due cause
was based on the nature of the offence committed. However if the offence was committed in the offender’s
capacity as an advocate and solicitor, that was an aggravating factor which the court would be entitled to take
into account.
(3) The standard of judgment to be applied in a scrutiny of the misconduct pursuant to s 83(2)(a) of the Act
was that which was fixed by the court. Disciplinary action under s 83 of the Act served three functions: (a)
punishment of the errant solicitor for his misconduct, (b) deterrence against similar defaults by other like-
minded solicitors in the future, and (c) protection of public confidence in the administration of justice.
Therefore orders made should not only have a punitive but also a deterrent effect.
(4) In the present case, the offence for which the respondent was convicted was one involving dishonesty
and was not merely ‘technical’ in nature. It was tantamount to the commission of a fraud on the authorities,
and an intentional circumvention of the law of the land, which was Tham’s duty – as an advocate and solicitor
– to uphold. As an advocate and solicitor of 18 years’ standing, Tham should have known better. The gravity
of the offence was compounded by the fact that Tham committed it in his professional capacity as an advocate
and solicitor and that he had abused his position as a member of a respected and honourable profession.
(5) Where the case was one involving dishonesty, the weight attached to a mitigation plea was virtually
negligible, as striking off would be the consequence as a matter of course. In the light of the
circumstances and taking into account the paramount considerations of the protection of the public and
the preservation of the good name of the legal profession, the respondent was ordered to be struck off
the roll.
2. TRIBUNAL’S BURDEN OF PROOF

- Criminal burden of proof is relevant std for charge under 82A and 83.2
- Applied in case of A & F adv and solicitor
- Ahmad khalis also spoke of this
- When adv and sol confronted with charge – must ensure that high std of proof observed because this is his
likelihood; cannot condemn lawyer oni mere balance of probabilities
- Privy Council cases adopted
- Criminal burden of proof is the relevant standard for charge under sections 82A and 83(2)
- Section 83 Charge is very serious
- Legal Profession’s disciplining is in the full glare of the public. The report of the Disciplinary
Committee is published and the entire record of the proceedings and the findings can be made available
to the public.
- Can attract disbarment
- Any misconduct or deceit or moral turpitude cannot be judged on the balance of probabilities

Bhandari v Advocates Committee (PC) [1956] 1 WLR 1445

In this case, lawyer fr Canada appeared before judge. Did not disclose judgement tt he had received earlier
involving same matter with same cient before the present charge.
B: Kenyan lawyer Charged with misleading the court. Civil standard used in this case, held to be wrong. B
failed to inform the judge that there was another judgment on the same matter with the same client obtaining
judgment.
Held:
In every allegation of professional misconduct involving an element of deceit or moral turpitude, a high
standard of proof is called for.
cannot envisage any body of professional men sitting in judgment on a colleague who would be content to
condemn on a mere balance of probabilities.
- this seems to their lordships an adequate description of the duty of a tribunal.

3. APPLICABILITY OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY RULE

- 1983 – concept of double jeopardy

- The Doctrine of Autrefois convict and acquit is applicable to disciplinary proceedings under a statutory
code by which any profession is governed
- NB: Applicable alike to civil and criminal litigation (Harry Wee’s case)

 Note: the 2 cases are consistent. Can be distinguished because of Section 94A.

Society to apply to court for cases involving fraud or dishonesty

94A. —(1) Where an advocate and solicitor has been convicted of an offence involving fraud or dishonesty,
whether the offence was disclosed as a result of an investigation under section 87 (3) (b) or otherwise, the
Society shall, without further direction or directions, proceed to make an application in accordance with section
98.
(2) Where there is an appeal against conviction, the Society shall not make an application under subsection (1)
until the appeal has been withdrawn or deemed to have been withdrawn or disposed of by the appellate court.

Harry Lee Wee v Law Society [1985] 1 MLJ 1 (PC) (IMPORTANT CASE**)
“Doctrine of Autrefois” applied  complaint against Wee was identical or so nearly, to entitled him to rely on
this principle.

Unusual case.

1976, wee was president of law soc of sg. In feb 1976, realised that clents acct had monies missing, one legal
assistant by name of sundram resp for amt of 300000 which went missing. Burden for making money good
into clients acct was on wee since he was sole prop. But he insisted on sundram reimbursing the sums. He did
not report him to the police which he shld have done. Neither did he report it to the law soc.
In june 1976, sundram made good that amt of money. Wee tried to hide what transpired. Did not get own
auditors but got indep auditors to verify the accts. But did not help – acctants said that this was clear
defalcation. He had no choice but to rpoert it to law soc and police.

Sundram charged with crim breach of charge, went to prison.

Wee subj to discip proceedings. Inquiryt committee – discip committee. Whist facing discip committee, police
because he had not reported in view of s213 PC, proceeded on offence with view of getting restitution. He
faced 9 charges.

Conviction of fraud or dishonesty – sent to discip comitte (in those days). Wee therefore faced two sets of
charges – delayed proceedings; discip proceedings.

Held that shld have held both concurrently. Looking at whole proceedings, whatever labels put under
proceedings – all arose from same set of facts. Ie failure to report sundram and failure to perform restitution.

First delay proceedings – suspended for 2 yrs

Discip proceedings – second judgement then pronounced and suspended for another 2 yrs.
So altogether 4 yrs

PC gave a critical judgement and said that wrong for punishnment of two times. Made party pay sol client
costs as well – law soc paid a lot.

Wee (sole proprietor) discovered $300 000 missing from client’s account that was taken by his Legal Assistant.
He confronted his LA. He threatened to report the LA if the LA did not make restitution. But Harry Wee repaid
the amount and did not report it to the Law Society or to the Police. Auditors checked and affirmed that the
sum of money was missing. He tried to get accounts to cover it but could not, and only then did he report it to
the Law Society.
Whilst dealing with (1) “delay proceedings”, the police stepped in.
Police found Wee to have (2) committed an offence under s. 213 PC (accepting restitution without divulging
what had happened)  charged and convicted Wee
LPA: If convicted, have to commence disciplinary proceedings.

*First instance: For 1st disciplinary matter, suspended for 2 years

*CA: suspended for another 2 years

*PC: On Wee’s appeal…

1. Law Society should have held the 2 matters concurrently, since both sets of disciplinary proceedings
arose from the same conduct
2. “Unnecessary duplication” / undue hardship on Mr Harry Lee Wee
3. The essence of Mr Wee’s attack on the second order can be shortly stated. Both sets of
disciplinary proceedings arose from exactly the same conduct by Mr Wee and although it was
possible to attach a different label in each case to the particular form of professional
misbehaviour alleged, the gravamen of the complaint against him in each case was either
identical or so nearly, so as to entitle him either to rely on the principle, applicable alike to
criminal and civil litigation, that the unnecessary duplication of proceedings is an abuse of
process which the court has an inherent jurisdiction to restrain.
4. Abuse of process which court has inherent jurisdiction to restrain
5. For 2nd Disciplinary proceedings: Thus, Law Society made to pay costs and on an S&C basis (2x of
P&P!!!)
NB: Law Society objected to Wee’s appeal but lost!

 Now, with section 94A LPA – (NEW!)

 Applied in Edmund Nathan’s case below
 Convicted of fraud offence – no need to go to discip proceedings anymore, go straight to court of 3 judges

 (ie diff fr harry lee wee case – court has jurisdiction and discretion under code)

Section 94A(1), LPA

Where an advocate and solicitor has been convicted of an offence involving fraud or dishonesty, whether the
offence was disclosed as a result of an investigation under s. 87(3)(b) or otherwise, the Society shall, without
further direction or directions, proceed to make an application in accordance with s. 98.

NB: Section 98 is an application for an order to show cause

Order to show cause
98. —(1) An application that a solicitor be struck off the roll or suspended from practice or censured or that he
be required to answer allegations contained in an affidavit shall be made by originating summons ex parte for
an order calling upon the solicitor to show cause.
(2) An application under subsection (1) may be made to a Judge and shall include an application for directions
as to service if the solicitor is believed to be outside Singapore.
(3) If the solicitor named in the order is or is believed to be within Singapore, the provisions of the Rules of
Court (Cap. 322, R 5) for service of writs of summons shall apply to the service of the order.
(4) If an order to show cause is made, a copy of the affidavit or affidavits upon which the order was made shall
be served with the order upon the solicitor named in the order.
(5) An application to make absolute an order to show cause must be made by motion in the same proceedings
and, unless the Judge otherwise directs, there must be at least 8 clear days between the service of the notice of
the motion and the day named therein for the hearing.
(6) Any order absolute, made in cases where personal service of the order to show cause has not been effected,
may be set aside on the application of the solicitor on good cause being shown.
(7) The application to make absolute and the showing of cause consequent upon any order to show cause made
under subsections (1) and (2) shall be heard by a court of 3 Judges of the Supreme Court, and from the
decision of that court there shall be no appeal.
(8) The Judge who made the order to show cause shall not thereby be disqualified from sitting as a member of
the court of 3 Judges under subsection (7).
(9) The Chief Justice or any other Judge of the Supreme Court shall not be a member of the court of 3 Judges
when the application under subsection (7) is in respect of a complaint made or information referred to the
Society by him.
(10) subject to this section, the rules committee may make rules for regulating and prescribing the procedure
and practice to be followed in connection with proceedings under this section and under sections 100 and 102,
and in the absence of any rule or rules dealing with any point of procedure or practice, the rules of court may
be followed as nearly as the circumstances permit.

1998 – another similar case to harry lee wee:

Law Society v Edmund Nathan [1998] 3 SLR 414

EN acted for Mr Fernandez and his wife  both wanted a loan
Misled Bank as to costs of property;
Thus, (1) EN was charged
Client also lodged a complaint.
EN: penalty of $3000 by order of Enquiry Committee convened by law soc

in meantime, after this ->

(2) police: charged en for attempted cheating (en aided and abetted) ( convicted uner section 417pc read with
s109pc

en raised opposition, citing harry wee’s case

*ca:
distinguished harry wee’s case, (even though arguably, facts are more or less the same) noting the new section
94a (1).
(1) harry wee had to go through entire proceedings
(2) proceedings before the inquiry committee and a penalty of $3000 in en’s case, do not amount to a
conviction; only a penalty for professional misconduct
 (3) en only went before inquiry committee, which only investigates and recommends, and does not charge.
thus, disciplinary action not taken, only inquisitorial.
(4) thus, ca cannot apply harry wee’s case (doctrine of autrefois not applicable ( plea of autrefois convict
cannot be raised at the show cause proceedings founded on en’s conviction of attempted cheating).
(5) In other words, the proceedings before the inquiry committee and the imposition of a penalty of
$3,000 by the Council under s 88(1) of the Act does not amount to a “conviction” such that the plea
of autrefois convict can be raised at the show cause proceedings founded on the respondent’s
criminal conviction of attempted cheating, although the facts on which the respondent was
convicted of the offence of attempted cheating and the complaint inquired into by the inquiry
committee are the same.

4. LEGAL OFFICERS & SOLICITOR WITHOUT PRACTISING CERTIFICATES – SECTION

82 (12)

• read section 83 –
 ALL ADV AND SOL are subj to discip proceedings

83. —(1) All advocates and solicitors shall be subject to the control of the Supreme Court and shall be liable on
due cause shown to be struck off the roll or suspended from practice for any period not exceeding 5 years or
censured.

- Section 82(12)

On completion of the hearing of the application under subsection (10), the court may-
(a) censure the legal officer or non-practising solicitor;
(b) prohibit him from applying for an practising certificate for such period not exceeding 5 years as it may
specify;
(c) order that his name be struck off the roll;
(d) order him to pay a penalty of not more than $5,000; or
(e) make such order as it thinks fit.

- Inquire committee has jurisdiction over Legal Officers (Francis Seow’s case)
- Now, with section 82A, Legal Officers can also be subject to complaint proceedings.
- S82A was inserted to [provide a new procedure for the disciplinary of legal officers and non-practising
solicitors. The Law Society has no jurisdiction over such persons.
- This new section 82A provides that an application to show cause may be made with the leave of the Chief
Justice where any legal officer or non-practising solicitor has been guilty of such misconduct unbefitting a
legal officer or an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an
honourable profession or has been adjudicated a bankrupt.
- Upon such an application, the Chief Justice may grant leave and appoint a Disciplinary Committee to
inquire into the complaint if he is of the opinion that there is a prima facie case of misconduct against a legal
officer or non-practising solicitor, the matter will be heard by a court of 3 judges of the Supreme Court.
- Upon completion of the hearing, the court may strike the person off the roll, prohibit him from applying for
a practising certificate for up to 5 years, censure him or order him to pay a penalty of up to $5000.

Section 82A
(2) All legal officers and non-practising solicitors shall be subject to the control of the Supreme Court and shall
be liable on due cause shown to be punished in accordance with this section.
(3) Such due cause may be shown by proof that a legal officer or a non-practising solicitor, as the case may be
-
(A) has been guilty in Singapore or elsewhere of such misconduct unbefitting a legal officer or an advocate
and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession; or
(B) has been adjudicated bankrupt and has been guilty of any of the acts or omissions mentioned in section
124(5)… of the Bankruptcy Act (Cap. 20)
…
 (7) The Disciplinary Committee shall hear and investigate into the complaint and submit its findings of fact
and law in the form of a report to the Chief Justice.

- Situations where disciplinary proceedings can commence (ss. (3)) –

1) Unbefitting conduct
2) Adjudicated bankrupt under s. 124 Bankruptcy Act

- Procedure to commence proceedings: by ex parte originating summons + affidavit setting out the allegations
of misconduct (ss. (5))
An application for such leave shall be made by ex parte originating summons and shall be accompanied by an
affidavit setting out the allegations of misconduct against the legal officer or non-practising solicitor.

- Only the Chief Justice may grant leave of court, where the applicant has made out a ‘prima facie case for an
investigation into his complaint’ (ss. (6))
Where the Chief Justice is of the opinion that the applicant has made out a prima facie case for an investigation
into his complaint, the Chief Justice may grant such leave and appoint a Disciplinary Committee under section
90.

- Possible punishment (ss. (12)(a)-(e))–

1) Censured
2) Prohibited from applying for practising certificate for a period not exceeding 5 years
3) Struck off roll
4) Pay penalty of not more than $5000; or
5) Any other order as the court thinks fit

 NB: Nothing may stop the Legal Service from starting its own separate proceedings
 Note: Different rules apply to lawyers, legal officers and non-practising solicitors

5. SECTION 83, LPA (VERY IMPORTANT)

- for lawyers in private practice

 Pupils: Section 83 applies to pupils, too! (ss. (3))

Section 83(3)
Pupils shall, with the necessary modifications, be subject to the same jurisdiction as can be exercised over
advocates and solicitors under this Part; but in lieu of an order striking him off the roll or suspending him, an
order may be made prohibiting the pupil from petitioning the court for admission until after a date specified in
the order.
 Only difference is that call will be deferred (for any length of time eg 3 yrs)

- - all a & s are subject to the control of the supreme court and shall be liable on due course shown
 To be censured
 Suspended from practise for a period of 5 years
 Struck off

- Section 83(1) was amended to empower the High Court to suspend an advocate and solicitor for up to 5
years and to add a new clause upon which the High Court may discipline an advocate and solicitor, namely,
if he has been guilty of such misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme
Court or as a member of an honourable profession.

Power to strike off roll or suspend or censure

83. —(1) All advocates and solicitors shall be subject to the control of the Supreme Court and shall be liable
on due cause shown to be struck off the roll or suspended from practice for any period not exceeding 5 years
or censured.
(2) Such due cause may be shown by proof that an advocate and solicitor —
 (a) has been convicted of a criminal offence, implying a defect of character which makes him unfit for his
profession;
(b) has been guilty of fraudulent or grossly improper conduct in the discharge of his professional duty or
guilty of such a breach of any usage or rule of conduct made by the Council under the provisions of this Act as
amounts to improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor;
(c) has been adjudicated bankrupt and has been guilty of any of the acts or omissions mentioned in section
124 (5) (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (h), (i), (k), ( l) or (m) of the Bankruptcy Act (Cap. 20);
(d) has tendered or given or consented to retention, out of any fee payable to him for his services, of any
gratification for having procured the employment in any legal business of himself or any other advocate and
solicitor;
(e) has, directly or indirectly, procured or attempted to procure the employment of himself or any advocate
and solicitor through or by the instruction of any person to whom any remuneration for obtaining such
employment has been given by him or agreed or promised to be so given;
(f) has accepted employment in any legal business through a person who has been proclaimed a tout
under any written law relating thereto;
(g) allows any clerk or other unauthorised person to undertake or carry on legal business in his name,
that other person not being under such direct and immediate control of his principal as to ensure that he does
not act without proper supervision;
(h) has been guilty of such misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme
Court or as a member of an honourable profession;
(i) carries on by himself or any person in his employment any trade, business or calling that detracts
from the profession of law or is in any way incompatible with it, or is employed in any such trade, business or
calling;
(j) has contravened any of the provisions of this Act in relation thereto if such contravention warrants
disciplinary action; or
(k) has been disbarred, struck off, suspended or censured in his capacity as a legal practitioner by whatever
name called in any other country.
(3) Pupils shall, with the necessary modifications, be subject to the same jurisdiction as can be exercised
over advocates and solicitors under this Part; but in lieu of an order striking him off the roll or suspending him,
an order may be made prohibiting the pupil from petitioning the court for admission until after a date specified
in the order.
(4) The jurisdiction given by subsection (3) shall be exercised by a single Judge.
(5) In any proceedings under this Part, the court may in addition to the facts of the case take into account the
past conduct of the person concerned in order to determine what order should be made.
(6) In any proceedings instituted under this Part against an advocate and solicitor consequent upon his
conviction for a criminal offence, an Inquiry Committee, a Disciplinary Committee and a court of 3
Judges of the Supreme Court referred to in section 98 shall accept his conviction as final and conclusive.

5.1 Grounds on which solicitor may be suspended, censured or struck off – section 83(2)
- sets out the circumstances under which a solicitor may be asked to “show cause”.
- An amendment in 1989 states that in disciplinary proceedings consequent upon conviction for a criminal
offence, the conviction should be accepted as final and conclusive by an Inquiry Committee, a Disciplinary
Committee and a Court of 3 judges. They therefore cannot go behind the conviction in these circumstances.

11 Grounds –
“Such due cause may be shown by proof that an advocate and solicitor –

(a) Conviction of criminal offence

Such due course may be shown by proof that an advocate and solicitor has been convicted of a criminal
offence, implying a defect of character which makes him unfit for his profession;

- Require information to show if/ not been convicted

- Question of appropriate order to be made, assuming charged for offence
- Consider (guidance from rick tham case) –
1) Nature of offence – whilst crucial, not the only relevant issue
2) Penalty imposed upon conviction – indicative of moral turpitude or obliquity invloved
 3) Further or in the alternative, the degree of moral blameworthiness – also to be weighed in the
balance in deciding the appropriate penalty to be imposed.
4) Striking off  dishonesty + test in R Samuel’s case. Striking off would invariably follow where
the solicitor is shown not only to have acted dishonestly, but also where he has fallen short of the
required standards of integrity, probity and trustworthiness.

- Types of offences:
 Disclose everything!
 Traffice offences may not be that impt but still disclose
 Shopliftg/ VCH/ etc

- Standard of judgment applied: fixed by courts, since the courts admit advocates and solicitors in the
first place, thus they reserve the right to strike them off
- Should always disclose all offences (no need for parking offences).

Law Society v Narinder Singh s/o Malagar Singh [1998] 1 SLR 328
Held:
Clear that the respondent’s conviction under the Prevention of Corruption Act was a conviction which fell
within the meaning of section 83(2)(a), LPA.
Respondent’s willingness to assist his client in essentially getting a bribe in return for a confession implied a
defect of character which made him unfit to be a solicitor.

(b) Fraudulent or grossly improper conduct

… has been guilty of fraudulent or grossly improper conduct in the discharge of his professional duty or guilty
of such a breach of any usage or rule of conduct made by the Council under the provisions of this Act as
amounts to improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor;
: – obj test – brought disgrace to urself as solicitor and to ur profession. And case cited ->>>

Rajasooria v Disciplinary Committee [1955] 21 MLJ 65

Corporate lawyer acted for 90 shareholders who wanted EGM to be convened – 2 requisitions; R took
signatures on earlier requisition and pasted signatures on the 2nd one.
*Problem: some 30 shareholders were no longer shareholders at the time of the 2nd requisition, never checked,
misleading the Register, the Company. RCB said his procedure was wrong. He did not check to find out if the
SHs were still sitting. He submitted false documents.
*Held:
(1) For an advocate & solicitor to knowingly and deliberately submit a false document intending to be
acted upon was grossly improper conduct as being dishonourable both to himself and his profession.
(2) Submission of such a document with such intention in itself involved an element of deceit
(3) A finding of an intention to deceive is not always an essential element in ‘grossly improper conduct’: Law
Society v Lim Kiap Khee (OS 600376 of 2001)

- Includes gross/ culpable negligence –

O Francis Seow: breach undertakings to the Attorney-General (to give certain files)
O David Marshall: let matter be published in the papers
O Surish kuman – acted for client and negligent/dilatoryover client’s interest – fialrue to file defence
ended in judgement against her. It was his fault. When realised his mistake, went though agreement
iwht plaintiff’s sol to pay sum every mth. Client through no fault of hers. He defaultd on the
payment however. She was made bankrupt. Complaint. He breched undertaking by failing to
honour payments to be made. So innocent person adjudicated bankrupt because of him.
o e.g. failure to file a Defence in time, resulting in judgment in default and failure to rectify it
properly subsequently.

- Important: Is the standard of unbefitting conduct under section 83(2)(h) the same as grossly improper
conduct under section 83(2)(b)?
 - charge under section 83(2)(b) is higher as it is dishonourable both to himself and to his profession.
- Section 83(2)(h) is more of a catch-all provision. It can be invoked when the solicitor’s conduct does
not fall within any of the other grounds but is nevertheless unacceptable.
- “Unbefitting conduct” less strict than “grossly improper conduct”.

See also Law Society v Ng Chee Song [2000] 2 SLR 165

Facts: The respondent (“Ng”) was admitted to the Singapore bar in 1995. In 1996, he acted for both the
purchasers/mortgagors, and the mortgagees (“Public Finance”) in a purported purchase of residential units by
the former. When the mortgage loans were disbursed and forwarded to him by Public Finance, he extended
part of it as loans to others and earned commissions on these transactions (“the loan/commission scheme”). Ng
failed to register the mortgages after the purported purchases, and also did not inform Public Finance of the
loan/commission scheme, and that the purchasers/mortgagors were his nominees. As such, Public Finance
were under the impression that the mortgage loans were straightforward mortgage transactions.

Pursuant to a complaint by Public Finance, the Disciplinary Committee found him guilty under ss 83(2)(b) and
83(2) (h) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 1997 Ed), and determined that there was a cause of sufficient
gravity for disciplinary action. The Law Society applied to make absolute an order to show cause made against
Ng.

Held, striking off the rolls:

(1) “Grossly improper conduct” is defined as “conduct which is dishonourable to the respondent as a
man and to his profession”. It also applies to the situation where a solicitor prefers his own interests to that of
his client. Ng was guilty of grossly improper conduct and due cause for disciplinary action was shown under
s 83(2)(b) for the following reasons (a) he acted dishonestly and against the interest of Public Finance in using
the mortgage loans for his own personal profit and deliberately concealing this from them, and (b) he acted
irresponsibly and in callous disregard of his clients’ interests by failing to ensure the proper disbursement of
the mortgage loans.

(2) “Conduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor” covers misconduct in both the solicitor’s
professional and personal capacity, and the standard of judgment to be applied to the solicitor’s
misconduct is fixed by the court and not by his peers. Ng was guilty of conduct unbefitting an advocate and
solicitor and due cause for disciplinary action was shown under s 83(2)(h) as he was irresponsible in not
registering the mortgages and without valid explanation.

(3) The principles of disciplinary sentencing are - (a) a solicitor will be struck off the rolls if he has acted
dishonestly, and (b) where he has not acted dishonestly but falls below the required standards of integrity,
probity and trustworthiness, he will be struck off if his lapse indicates the lack of character and
trustworthiness, (c) the need to protect the public, and (d) the need for the sentence to have a punitive as well
as deterrent effect. The mitigating factors in Ng’s case were without merit, and he was struck off the rolls.

Per Curiam:

All advocates and solicitors, regardless of the extent of their experience, must behave honourably. A brief
period in practice is not a valid reason for non-observance of strict standards of conduct.

(c) Adjudicated bankrupt under s. 124 Bankruptcy Act – section 83(2)(c)

… has been adjudicated bankrupt and has been guilty of any of the acts or omission mentioned in section
124(5)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (h), (i), (k), (l), or (m) of the Bankruptcy Act (Cap. 20)’

- note: an undischarged bankrupt cannot leave singapore without permission of the official assignee.
- see Law Society Of Singapore V Chiong Chin May Selena [2005] Sghc 148
 o bankruptcy does not, however, invariably connote dishonesty; nor does it preclude a solicitor from
resuming practice once he had been discharged.
O the purport and intent of s 83(2)(c) of the lpa makes it amply evident that a solicitor who has been
made a bankrupt, without being guilty of any impropriety, is not ipso facto denied a right to
practise because of a prior act of bankruptcy or indeed, actual bankruptcy.
o a solicitor will have his name struck off the roll if he is found guilty of any of the acts or omissions
specified in s 124(5) of the bankruptcy act (cap 20, 2000 rev ed) (“ba”). in this case, the respondent
did not commit or omit to do any of the acts stated in s 124(5) of the ba. her bankruptcy was the
direct consequence of her illness and clouded judgment. assoc prof leslie lim explained that her
spendthrift habits were well-established symptoms of hypomania or mania.

(d) Undercutting – section 83(2)(d)

… has tendered or given or consented to retention, out of any fee payable to him for his services, of any
gratification for having procured the employment in any legal business of himself or any other advocate and
solicitor;

- Promote fair professional practice amongst lawyers

- “Gratification” definition in Prevention of Corruption Act very wide:

“[G]ratification” includes –
(a) money or any gift, loan, fee, reward, commission, valuable security or other property or interesting
property of any description, whether movable or immovable;
(b) any office, employment or contract;
(c) any payment, release, discharge or liquidation of any loan, obligation or other liability whatsoever,
whether in whole or in part;
(d) any other service, favour or advantage of any description whatsoever, including protection from any
penalty or disability incurred or apprehended or from any action or proceedings of a disciplinary or penal
nature, whether or not already instituted, an including the exercise or the forbearance from the exercise of
any right or any official power or duty; and
(e) any offer, undertaking or promise of any gratification within the meaning of paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and
(d);

- Eg. Discounts in professional charges

- Note non-contentious proceedings under Solicitors Remuneration Order – charging on scale (got to keep
within)

Law Society v Lee Cheong Hoh [2001] 2 SLR 80

Facts: He was a former District Judge who went into private practice. He offered 10% kickback profit to
another Raymond mak, only a clerk, who got him work from car workshops. Paid more than junior partners in
the firm because of the firm! Raymond mak felt tt not paid enough, went to join another firm. Tried to get his
files. In meantime, CPIB started to investigate this case. He was charged for forgery, went to prison. He also
lodged complaint against lee cheong hoh. Lee cleimd did not pay him commission but performance bonus.
Held: But in fact, this was in substance a commission. Eventually found guity and suspended.
Note that under the rules you cannot share professional fees with an unqualified person. He was suspended for
three years.

(E) Procured employment via agents – section 83(2)(e)

… has, directly or indirectly, procured or attempted to procure the employment of himself or any advocate and
solicitor through or by the instruction of any person to whom any remuneration for obtaining such employment
has been given by him or agreed or promised to be so given;

Law Society of Singapore v Lau See Jin Jeffrey [1999] 2 SLR 215
 Facts: A lot of conveyance work. Another firm, good knowledge of market in China-NewStart gave Jeffrey
Lau 30% for every deal referred. Jeffrey Lau termed it as disbursement, service fee NOT part of legal fees.
Later Jeffrey Lau wanted to rescind the agreement. NewStart lodged proceedings. >>”show cause”
proceedings.
Held: breach of section clearly. This was a fee being paid to get business. Look at the facts objectively. What
was the intention of him entering into the agreement? >>> To benefit himself, therefore guilty under this
section. Suspended for 5 years.

Note: Under the rules, you cannot share fees with an unqualified person.

(F) Employment via Touting – section 83(2)(f)

… has accepted employment in any legal business through a person who has been proclaimed a tout under any
written law relating thereto;

Lee Chong Ho v Law Society

LCH: District Judge before going into private practice
Employed Mark (clerk) who was familiar with accident cases.
Gave Mark special employment contract: 10% more over basic contract. However Mark felt he was not being
paid enough and lodged a complaint
CPIB: charged, jailed and fined LCH
Law Society took on the case later
*Held:
LCH was using Mark like a tout (or agent)  suspended for 3 years

Law Society v Lau Sin Jee Jeffrey [1991] 2 SLR 215

*Held:
Look at substance of transaction
- Agreement to get 30% of fees
- Sale & Purchase agreement, thus service fee is OK

(G) Improper delegation – section 83(2)(g)

… allows any clerk or other unauthorised person to undertake or carry on legal business in his name, that other
person not being under such direct and immediate control of his principal as to ensure that he does not act
without proper supervision;

Clerk or unauthorised person

- The question whether there has been an improper delegation. As it was put in a leading case it is whether
the delegated tasks are merely ministerial or those which a Solicitor cannot delegate but to which he is
bound to give his personal responsibility and skills.

(H) Misconduct unbefitting of the legal profession – section 83(2)(h)

… has been guilty of such misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court
or as a member of an honourable profession;

- New section (read: IMPT!)

- Potentially very very wide.
- Section 83(2)(h) is more of a catch-all provision. It can be invoked when the solicitor’s conduct does not
fall within any of the other grounds but is nevertheless unacceptable.
- “Unbefitting conduct” less strict than “grossly improper conduct”.

Law Society v Arjan Chotrani Bishan [2001] 1 SLR 684

Facts: Solicitor kept documents, refused to give them.
1) Misconduct under s. 83(2)(h) has to be conduct unbefitting of an advocate and solicitor
 2) Standard of judgment to be applied as fixed by the court, not by peer judgment
3) Solicitor would infringe this section if he was guilty of conduct such that it would render him unfit to
remain as a member of an honourable profession

Unbefitting conduct from 5 Different Points of Views

Unbefitting conduct Example(s)
towards…
1. Court • False Affidavit
• Intimidate witness (see section 152 Evidence Act) e.g.
cross examination of witness without any foundation.
2. Law Society • Failed to implement undertaking to Law Society
• Failure to file reports in time
3. Practice • Failed to give proper attention to client’s affairs
• Charge improper fees
• Drawing up excessive bills
4. Clients • Giving legal advice under the influence of alcohol
• Taking advantage of inexperience (of clients)
5. Persons other than • False information to another solicitor
clients • Grossly betraying client’s confidence
• General offensive behaviour
• Using foul language

(I) Engaging in another profession/ employment which is incompatible with the legal profession –
section 83(2)(i)

… carries on by himself or any person in his employment any trade, business or calling that detracts from the
profession of law or is in any way incompatible with it, or is employed in any such trade, business or calling;

- Especially if the solicitor holds a practising certificate!

- test – whether detracts from ur status as lawyer
- e.g. maid employment agencies/estate agencies (because of danger of touting)

SECTION 15 – ENGAGING IN ANOTHER PROFESSION

- has to satisfy 2 things:
• the profession or business must be an honourable one
• must not be calculated to attract business to him unfairly
- either it would be considered not an honourable profession, or it may be said that he is doing it merely
to attract business to himself
- no objection to a solicitor taking on directorships in companies so long as he is not the executive
director and also receiving remuneration for it: Rule 11 of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct)
Rules

Executive appointment
11. An advocate and solicitor shall not accept any executive appointment in any company.

- can attend meetings and be paid director’s fees

- Re An Advocate [1964] 1 MLJ 1:
• Was persuaded by a friend that there was a good market for ladies underwear
• On his next trip, he took with him a sample of ladies undergarments and proceeded to advertise in
the press giving his hotel room number for the potential customers to view the goods
• Was charged for bringing the profession into disrepute and was suspended for a period

(J) Contravened provision of the LPA – section 83(2)(j)

 … has contravened any of the provisions of this Act in relation thereto if such contravention warrants
disciplinary actions;

Note: section 71, LPA –

- Council is empowered to make rules
- Breach of such rules may result in disciplinary action

Rules as to professional practice, etiquette, conduct and discipline

71. —(1) Without prejudice to any other power to make rules, the Council may make rules for regulating the
professional practice, etiquette, conduct and discipline of advocates and solicitors.
(2) Such rules shall not come into operation until they have been approved by the Chief Justice who may if he
thinks fit consult any of the other Judges before giving his approval.
(3) Disciplinary proceedings may be taken against any advocate and solicitor who contravenes any rules
made under this section.

(K) Disbarred elsewhere than in Singapore – section 83(2)(k)

… has been disbarred, struck off, suspended or censured in his capacity as a legal practitioner by whatever
name called in any other country.

Show cause
• S. 83(2) of the Act sets out the circumstances under which a solicitor may be asked to “show
cause”

(1) An advocate and solicitor may be disciplined even thought the conduct or act in question had
nothing to do with his character as a solicitor: Re Gopalan Nair [1993] 1 SLR 375
Gopalan Nair - Facts
These show cause proceedings against the respondent Nair arose out of two letters he wrote to the Attorney-
General (AG). Nair had written the two letters after veteran lawyer and politician JBJ successfully appealed
against a Singapore High Court decision to strike him off the roll of advocates and solicitors. Nair questioned
the AG about the JBJ case and demanded certain explanations. On 27 September 1989, the AG lodged a
complaint against Nair with the Law Society for writing the threatening letters. On 30 October 1989, Nair
published the correspondence between himself and the AG by faxing the letters to various law firms in
Singapore. Nair was referred to the disciplinary committee (DC) on two charges of having threatened the AG
and on a further charge of falsely accusing the AG. The DC determined that cause of sufficient gravity for
disciplinary action existed against Nair.
Held, suspending the respondent from practice for two years:
(1) Nair wrote the letters in his capacity as an advocate and solicitor, on a matter that concerned his
profession. He was indisputably taking to task another member of his profession. An advocate and solicitor did
not act in his professional capacity only when he acting for his client. It was misconduct if an advocate and
solicitor were to threaten or abuse a judge. There was no difference in the nature of misconduct if the threat
was uttered against the AG in respect of the latter’s professional duty. Similarly if an advocate and solicitor
unjustifiably discredited his professional brethren, it would be an act done in a professional capacity.
(2) An advocate and solicitor may be disciplined even though the conduct or act in question had nothing to
do with his character as a solicitor. In this case, Nair’s letters sought to show that the AG was less than honest.
Nair clearly showed himself to be on the war-path to ‘expose’ the AG. The threat was apparent.
(3) The writing of offensive and abusive letters could subject a solicitor to disciplinary action. What Nair did
were acts which rendered him liable to be disbarred or struck off the roll of the court or suspended from
practice or censured if he were a barrister or solicitor in England.
(4) The office of the AG, like that of a judge, was an essential pillar of our legal system and no advocate and
solicitor should be allowed to undermine the integrity of that office. The misconduct here was serious. Nair
was ordered to be suspended from practice for a period of two years.

• No requirement that the offence be connected in any way with the discharge of the solicitor’s
professional duties: Re Knight Glenn Jeyasingam [1994] 3 SLR 531
Knight Glenn - Facts
The respondent Knight was an advocate and solicitor. He pleaded guilty to a charge under s 6(c) of the
 Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap 241). Knight was convicted and a disciplinary committee (DC) of the Law
Society was appointed to hear and investigate certain complaints made against Knight. The amended charge
against Knight in the disciplinary proceedings was that he was guilty of conduct implying a defect in character
which made him unfit for his profession within the meaning of s 83(2)(a) of the Legal Profession Act
(Cap 161, 1990 Ed). The DC concluded that the charge had been proven and that cause of sufficient gravity
existed for disciplinary action against Knight under s 83(1) of the Act. Knight was accordingly called to show
cause why he should not be dealt with under the provisions of s 83(1). He argued that he should be treated
leniently on account of the mitigating factors in his case and also the prejudice allegedly caused by the time
lag which elapsed before the commencement of disciplinary proceedings.
Held, ordering that the respondent be struck off the roll:
(1) Knight’s offence was not committed with the discharge of his professional duties as an advocate and
solicitor and was of no mitigating value whatsoever. The charge against Knight required only that it be shown
that he had been convicted of a criminal offence. It was immaterial whether or not the offence had involved
him acting in his professional capacity.
(2) The time lag before disciplinary proceedings were commenced against Knight did not constitute an
“inordinate delay” on the part of the Law Society. The Society acted only with circumspection in seeking legal
advice before bringing its disciplinary jurisdiction to bear on the respondent. Moreover, the allegation of
prejudice caused to Knight was based mainly on conjecture.
(3) Where the court had to consider the appropriate order to be made in respect of an advocate and solicitor
convicted of a criminal offence, particularly one involving dishonesty, the paramount considerations must be
the protection of the public and the preservation of the profession’s reputation. The court could only take note
of the mitigating factors in so far as they were consistent with these two related objectives.
(4) In the present case, Knight was, at the time of the offence, holding a position of considerable
significance within the legal profession. His conviction of a crime of deceit wrought a negative effect on
public confidence in the integrity of the profession. The court was of the view that it would be contrary to the
interest of the public as well as those of the profession if he were not struck off the roll; and it was accordingly
so ordered.

• In Re Mohd Jiffry Muljee [1994] 3 SLR 520, it was held that it would be an aggravating factor if the
misconduct were to be committed in the course of the respondent’s professional duties as an advocate
and solicitor
Mohd Jiffry - Facts
The respondent Jiffry was an advocate and solicitor. He was charged and convicted of six charges – four for
conspiracy to commit criminal breach of trust and two for conspiracy to cheat – while acting owners of two
plots of land which were being redeveloped. The Law Society then called on Jiffry to show cause why he
should not be dealt with under s 83 of the Legal Profession Act (the Act).
Held, ordering that the respondent be struck off the roll:
(1) In this case, the convictions implied a defect in Jiffry’s character as they each involved fraud and
dishonesty. Moreover, they were committed in the course of his professional duties as an advocate and
solicitor.
(2) Section 83(5) of the Act prevents the court from going behind the convictions at such proceedings. It
was thus not open to Jiffry to argue that he was wrongly convicted. The sole question before the court was
what consequences should flow from the fact that he had in fact been convicted of the offences charged.
(3) The offences all involved fraud and dishonesty. They also involved large sums of money. Most
importantly, the offences were carried out in Jiffry’s capacity as an advocate and solicitor. In view of. these
facts, Jiffry was ordered to be struck off the roll of advocates and solicitors.

5.2 Scope of section 83

Law Society v Rick Tham [1999] 4 SLR 168

Tham acted for Indonesian client Lim, who wanted to purchase landed property (permission required) from
Land Dealing Unit. Client cldnt get permission.
Tham tried to get Singaporean nominee by name of steven to buy property and trust deed (M’s client:
beneficiary nominee-trustee) for client (to get the property on client’s behalf)
Client did not get permission again second time round
The Singaporean nominee lodged a caveat against the property and the client subsequently lodged a police
report.
 *Held:
Disciplinary action under s. 83 serves 3 functions –
(1) Punishment of an errant solicitor
(2) Deterrence against similar defaults by other like minded solicitors in future.
(3) Protection of public confidence in the administration of justice (very impt – it is members of public
who are worried – must restore public confidence therefore)
Tham struck off.

*How will the courts be guided (in determining appropriate punishment)?

Case-by-case basis

Law Society v Loo Choon Beng (OS 258/95)

In considering the appropriate punishment to be meted out, the Court will consider the following –
(1) Degree of culpability of the alleged conduct
(2) Whether solicitor was motivated by dishonest intentions (This is important)
(3) Whether the alleged conduct implied a defect of character as to make him unfit for the profession

*Circumstances arising in disciplinary action?

i. Dishonesty
II. Not dishonest, but fallen below the required standards of integrity, probity and trustworthiness –
Ravindra Samuel
III. Conduct or act in question had nothing to do with character as solicitor – Re Gopalan Nair [1993] 1
SLR 275
IV. No requirement that offence be connected in any way with the discharge of the solicitor’s professional
duties – Re Knight Glenn Jeyansingam [1994] 3 SLR 531
v. However, in Mohd Jiffry Muljee [1994] 3 SLR 520, it was held that it will be an aggravating factor if
the misconduct were to be committed in his professional capacity.

Ravindra Samuel [1999] 1 SLR 696

RS had a mental problem but still worked for the firm. He pocketed client’s payment and made a memo noting
that client had not paid.
The firm lodged a report against him and he was struck off the rolls.
*Held by the Chief Justice:
“A solicitor will almost invariably be struck off the roll where the charge against him involves proven
dishonesty. If a solicitor has not acted dishonesty, but if is shown to have fallen below the required
standards of integrity, probity and trustworthiness, he will nonetheless be struck off the roll, as opposed
to merely being suspended, if his lapse is such as to indicate that he lacks the qualities of character and
trustworthiness which are necessary attributes of a person entrusted with the responsibilities of a legal
practitioner.”
- Therefore, If a solicitor was not dishonest in any way but had fallen below the required standard of integrity,
probity and trustworthiness, he can nonetheless be struck off the roll.
RS’ lapse indicated he lacked qualities of character and trustworthiness.
Above ratio has been used over and over again in discip cases

Law Society of Singapore v Dhanwant Singh [1996] 1 SLR 429

Facts: The respondent was convicted in the District Court on three counts of abetting his clients to omit
attending court by producing false medical certificates. It was not disputed that the convictions pertained to
acts done by the respondent acting in his capacity as an advocate and solicitor and implying a defect of
character which made him unfit for his profession, and that due cause had been shown. The only issue before
the court was the question of determining the appropriate penalty as it was his partner, one Guru, who had
effective control over the administration of the firm, and who was the prime mover of the arrangement
whereby the false medical certificates were obtained.

Guru himself had earlier been convicted in respect of other clients in the firm. He had been sentenced to three
weeks’ imprisonment besides being fined $1000 unlike the respondent who had not been given a custodian
 sentence. Guru had been dealt with under section 83(1) of the legal Profession Act (Cap 161) by being struck
off the roll of advocates and solicitors.

Held: Striking the respondent off the roll of advocates and solicitors that the principles of sentencing for a
criminal offence had little relevance when it came to meting out the appropriate penalty for professional
misconduct. An advocate and solicitor was an officer of the court. As such it was the bounded duty of every
advocate and solicitor, no matter if he was the precedent partner in the firm or just a legal assistant or whether
he had a great many years of practice behind him or just a few years, to uphold the integrity of the
administration of justice in the courts and not to thwart it by delaying the judicial process by such nefarious
means as the one in this case. The seriousness of the offences of which the respondent was convicted cannot be
minimised on any account. When an advocate and solicitor intentionally abetted a client from delaying the
judicial process, which very process it was his bounded duty to uphold. It showed an extreme defect of
character. Bearing in mind that section 12(1) of the Act expressly provided that no qualified person was to be
admitted as an advocate and solicitor unless he was of good character, a period of suspension even for the full
period of five years would be neither adequate not appropriate. There was only one penalty appropriate in this
case and that was being struck off the roll of advocates and solicitors.

See also Law Society of Singapore v Ezekiel Caleb Charles James [2004] 2 SLR 256:
Here he was in khattar wong. Hemade big mistake – dishonesty in dispute, he settled case when did not have
auth to do so. No mandate given to settle partr case. But he had to get money to pay public trustee, so went to
clients acct, took balance and paid the public trustee. Wrong. Cannot touch client’s account.
Facts: He settled matter betond client’s mandate and he had to make good the money. He took the money from
the general client’s account.
He argued that he was stressed
Held: Stress is part and parcel of the legal profession and cannot be an excuse for dishonesty.

Law Society of Singapore v Loh Wai Mun Daniel [2004] 2 SLR 261:
Where the case involves an offender of proven dishonesty, the weight to be attached to a plea in mitigation
is negligible and a striking off would be the consequence as a matter of course.

Principles and Cases:

• The Law Society of Singapore v Dhanwant Singh:
 Abetting his clients to omit attending court by producing false medical certificates
 Implied a defect of character which made him unfit for his profession
 Suspension was more appropriate than a striking off as it was his partner, Guru, who had effective
control over the administration of the firm, and was the prime mover of the arrangement whereby the
false medical certificates were obtained
 Guru was sentenced to 3 weeks’ imprisonment besides being fined $1,000 and was struck of the roll of
advocates and solicitors

(2) Principles of sentencing for a criminal offence had little relevance when it came to meting out the
appropriate penalty for professional misconduct
 An advocate and solicitor was an officer of the court, was their duty to uphold the integrity of the
administration of justice

(3) S. 12(1)(b) Legal Profession Act (the Act) expressly provides that no qualified person was to be
admitted as an advocate and solicitor unless he was of good character, a period of suspension even for
the full period of 5 years would be neither adequate nor appropriate
 There was only one penalty appropriate in this case and that was for the respondent to be struck off the
roll of advocates and solicitors
• Law Society of Singapore v Narinder Singh s/o Malagar Singh:
 Respondent’s conviction for an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act was a conviction which
fell within s. 83(2)(a) of the Act
Power to strike off roll or suspend or censure
83. —(2) Such due cause may be shown by proof that an advocate and solicitor —
(a) has been convicted of a criminal offence, implying a defect of character which makes him
unfit for his profession;
• The Law Society of Singapore v Ravindra Samuel, held:
 Invariably stuck off the roll where the charge against him involves proven dishonesty
 If a solicitor is not shown to have acted dishonesty, but is shown to have fallen below the required
standards of integrity, probity and trustworthiness, he will nonetheless be struck off the roll, as opposed
to merely being suspended, if his lapse is such that he lacks qualities of character and trustworthiness
which are necessary attributes of a person entrusted with the responsibilities of a legal practitioner
• The Law Society of Singapore v Ong Ying Ping [2005] SCGH 120 & The Law Society of Singapore v
Joseph Chen Kok Siang [2006] 1 SLR 273:
 Both solicitors were suspended from practice for 2 and 4 years respectively after they intentionally
misled the prison authorities
 In Ong’s case, he tricked the prison officers into allowing the prisoner’s wife to be present at his
interview with the prisoner by claiming that she was actually his assistant
 In Joseph’s case, the solicitor was not allowed to interview his client regarding an offence the latter had
committed in prison as it was an institutional disciplinary matter, he then pretended to be “just a friend”
of his client’s when he accompanied his client’s grandmother on a visit that was supposed to be
restricted to family, relatives and reputable friends only
 Both got away with suspensions only because these were the first cases of their kind in Singapore
 In Ong’s case, the court warned that any similar transgressions in future would be dealt with more
severely

(4) While an advocate and solicitor was expected to uphold his client’s interests fearlessly and to the best
of his ability, that duty most definitely did not include taking the law into his own hands or warrant the
giving of misleading information to public officers

5.3 Miscellaneous

I. Mitigation does not matter with regards to disciplinary proceedings: Rick Tham (where dishonest,
striking out is the ultimate punishment). See also Arjan Bishan. He said he was sick. Suffering from
cancer, but that does not affect the decision of the three judges in the DP.

II. Nothing to stop the Law Society from hauling up past conduct (s 83(5))

Section 83(5)
In any proceedings under this Part, the court may in addition to the facts of the case take into account the past
conduct of the person concerned in order to determine what order should be made.

III. Where conviction is for a criminal offence, cannot go behind the offence and deal with it as a
conviction per se! The conviction is taken to be ‘final and conclusive’ (s83(6))

Section 83(6)
In any proceedings instituted under this Part against an advocate and solicitor consequent upon his conviction for
a criminal offence, an Inquiry Committee, a Disciplinary Committee and a court of 3 Judges of the Supreme
Court referred to in section 98 shall accept his conviction as final and conclusive.