A comparative analysis of audience perceptions of press freedom among local and expatriate communities in the United Arab Emirates

October 2010

Barry Thomas Lowe

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank all those who took the time to respond in a thoughtful manner to the survey questions posed. In particular I want to thank Shamma Al Naqbi, Abeer Al Rasbi and Asma Jooaan for their time and valuable cultural insight into the topics under discussion. Their help in assisting with the collection of data and in providing Arabic translations was much appreciated.

Abstract

This paper compares audience perceptions of media freedom in the United Arab Emirates. It takes a broadly cultural studies approach to identify areas of divergence rooted in the political-economic, socio-historical and cultural background of western expatriates and Emirati women. Taking a ritual model of communication, it examines the idea that mass media are a key source of cultural narrative with the normative task of mythologizing cultural ideals. In the attempt to reconcile those ideals with reality, the media face both temporal and spatial restrictions that manifest in a distorted public sphere, subsequently becoming embedded in renewed perceptions about a societys cultural narrative.

Contents Introduction 3

Chapter 1 Perceptions of media freedom in the United Arab Emirates; A comparative analysis World Public Opinion comparison valid claims? The media landscape in the UAE a brief overview Level of support for the principle of a free press The media as supporter of government policies From normative expectations to content: some UAE examples Individualism versus more individualism Trust in sources: personal versus impersonal trust 11

Chapter 2 Freedom and mass media: Cultural ideals and the limits of realization The ritual media: a cultural narrator of myth and identity The realizabilty of the Public Sphere Media freedom in the west: a socio-historical perspective Personal versus Impersonal Trust sources of authority A culture of trust? The medias challenge in the UAE Loss of identity; loss of meaning Collective private spheres; national, tribal and Islamic identity The threat of sharing 38

Chapter 3 Truth and freedom in a globalized world The threat of sharing: mediations of identity Reflection on the research limitations 57

Bibliography

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Appendices (Media freedom Questionnaire & Interview notes) Introduction

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Perceptions of media restrictions

This paper aims to explore audience perceptions of press freedom (and media freedom more generally) within the context of perceived normative ideals concerning democracy, society and the role of the media within the United Arab Emirates. It draws on global surveys conducted by the World Press Index and the World Public Opinion organization, in particular to critically assess the WPO conclusion that many Muslims accept press restrictions to preserve political stability, (Kull, 2008, p1) and the Freedom House mapping of the UAE as not free. (freedomhouse.org, 2010)

A key caveat should be noted at the outset. This study, taking a broadly cultural approach, deals with the general concept of perceptions of media freedom further research is needed to map in detail the instrumental restrictive mechanisms (both formal and informal) that operate in the Emirati media system. The inevitable gap between perception and actual media freedom is not critically examined here. The aim is rather to suggest key factors that influence normative ideals about media freedom on a perceptual level from the perspective of a ritual model of communication. (Carey, 1975) The problematic nature of media freedom;

Press freedom is widely accepted as an indispensible and quantifiable measure of a societys democratic credentials. There is a common understanding that democracy and press freedom are strongly connected and mutually reinforcing. (de Smaele, 2002, p1.) At the same time, consensual definitions of democracy and the concept of freedom have proven widely elusive, with many analysts settling for some variation of the Platonic continuum between tyranny and democracy in describing particular societies, and some making a key distinction between positive and negative freedom i.e. the freedom to contrasted with the freedom from. (ibid) 4

Culture and freedom

The core concepts examined in this paper are therefore viewed as sites of conflict, as highlighted by debates over the extent to which political participation is possible within social parameters more specifically the perception of existing opportunities for individuals to participate in and influence debates about the key decisions that affect society (Kaldor & Vejvoda, 1999, p3) which theories of the public sphere contest.

The concept of the public sphere is illustrative of a cultural ideal, useful as an analytical tool, yet, once objectified and stripped of socio-cultural context, a potential source of misunderstanding. A critical assessment could be made of the tacit assumptions prevalent in many studies informed by western ideals, one of which is the idea that culture should be disregarded as a variable in measuring freedom. Traditional media in the west have become part of a process in which audiences have become defined as consumers, involuntarily working for advertisers (Smythe, 1989). Capitalist ideology must therefore be regarded as a cultural variable, shaping the way freedom is defined. If the influence of the consumer is reactive rather than proactive (Curran, 2005) in a democratic society, the right to vote seen as an objective measure of freedom ought to be critically considered. The choice in a capitalist, two-party system, is often portrayed by a western media as a feature distinguishing democracies from authoritarian states, as if freedom were an absolute.

An interesting question remains: how do residents living under externallylabeled, restrictive regimes, actually continue to perceive themselves to be free? How do they assess press norms in their socio-cultural contexts, and what is meant or understood by the term restriction. A western / non-western dichotomy is useful in highlighting general patterns of consensus as to what constitutes a restriction on media freedom according to cultural norms.

Social constructions: Factors shaping perception

Regarding media freedom, three social factors are considered as having a crucial, determining effect. Firstly, the material, political-economic conditions under which people live pose questions about who controls a societys resources and how this translates into relationships of power. Secondly, the socio-historical forces that contextualize those relationships, including questions of colonialism, neo-colonialism and the relative maturity of a society expressed in terms of its established national identity. Thirdly, the rituals, values and beliefs, including the traditional mythologizing of identity, that constitute cultural norms and expectations.

Cultural Imperialism: avoiding ethnocentrism

A consideration of these three factors is necessary to avoid ahistorical, deterministic ethnocentrism which can manifest in charges of cultural imperialism.

While the tools for measuring levels of press freedom and democracy (such as those used by the World Press Index) can serve as a useful trans-national indicator of general trends, their vulnerability to cultural blindness (a bias towards western ideals of liberal democracy and the public watchdog model of the press) frequently produce only superficially meaningful conclusions. Worse still, these may perpetuate cultural stereotypes, an endorsement of uncritical beliefs about which societies are free and not free, and the ideological inference that such measurements seek to answer the question, How long before they become more like us? The question, underlying studies aiming to use press freedom as a predictor of future democratization, (see Freedom of the Press, Democracy & Democratization) must be preceded by a consideration of cultural blindspots. As Boorstin (2010) notes, the greatest obstacle to discovery is not ignorance, it is the illusion of knowledge. Western ideals have all too often been used in 6

practice to justify political and military action undermining the very ideals they purport to defend in the process. Above all, the charge of hypocrisy can only be avoided if proclamations of beliefs in freedom and democracy are more than necessary illusions. (Chomsky, 1998) Before applying standards of freedom to other cultures, it is essential that those ideals stand up to intellectual rigour closer to home. Considering press freedom as a culturally situated practice, its restrictions are likely to be perceived differently by culturally distinct communities within a single society. A comparison between western expatriates and Emiratis within the UAE, aims to illuminate some of the complexities of conceptualizing theories of democracy, press freedom and the public sphere into practice.

The non-realizability of the public sphere

Reconciling the clear disparity between the idealized public sphere and the practical, political and economic limitations of such a theory in practice has meant, for many western scholars, the need to question the underlying assumptions and promises of liberal democracies.

A political economy analysis has highlighted, for example, how corporatization and capitalist ideology distort access to the public sphere (Murdock & Golding, 1995) and undermine the meaning of mediated content (Taylor & Harris, 2008). A socio-historical perspective suggests a replacement of religious authority and synoptic beliefs with secular humanist ideals based on rationalism. (Habermas, 1989) This has led to a new western Secular Christianity (Gray, 2007) resulting in the failure of the grand, twentieth century, social engineering projects of Nazism and Soviet Communism. And the more successful rise of the nation state and modern imperial empires. Cultures, meanwhile, continue to be subjected to an ongoing temporal conflict between traditional and modern values, exemplified by the profaning effect of commodification, (Habermas, 1989) and the spatial pressures of globalization.

A ritual approach to communication allows us to view media as cultural mythologizers creating and sustaining the perception that our illusions constitute a real basis for social action.

Aims and limitations

This introduction has set out some of the key concepts and questions involved in comparing perceptions of media freedom. The aim is not to defend one theory over another nor to endorse a relativist approach but to examine some of the problems that such a defense, frequently made explicitly and implicitly in the literature, must overcome. Democratic and non-democratic populations in the absence of brute force and tyranny are likely to continue to believe in their essential free will. In sustaining this notion, the media operate in the ritualized sphere of cultural illusions. A particular societys need to attach labels to the media as free, as moral arbiter, as watchdog, as source of truth and authority depends on the complex interaction of political economic, socio-historical and cultural factors, the results of which are almost always paradoxical, contradictory and hypocritical.

An understanding of how this process influences perceptions of the media in the UAE will, it is hoped, yield further lines of enquiry in an environment which currently lacks a body of empirical research. Since the presence of expatriate communities in the UAE is likely to be sustained for the foreseeable future, normalizing the exposure of locals to foreign cultures, the media is likely to play a key role in cross-cultural integration.

As part of a globalized, neo-colonial political context in which media soundbytes talk of a war on terror, an axis of evil, and a clash of civilizations, the urgency of nurturing cultural understanding, particularly in media studies, has never been more well-defined. It is through the media, after all, that perceptions of identity, otherness, and community gain social validity. 8

Chapter one presents a cross-cultural comparison of western and Emirati perceptions of media freedom, highlighting the socio-cultural factors that account for key areas of divergence, and confirming the WPO finding that Muslims are generally more willing to accept more media restrictions.

Some of the problems in theorizing cultural ideals of the media are explored in chapter two. In particular, the realizability of a mediated public sphere is examined and the question of what, in the absence of a public sphere, acts as a replacement. Taking a ritual communication model and assessing political economic, socio-historical and cultural factors, the concept of identity, encompassing national, tribal and Islamic identities, is considered as the key factor in defining and limiting private and public spheres in Emirati society. The role of identity in restricting media freedom is considered as equally significant as any direct political control.

In concluding, chapter three offers a brief consideration of some of the implications of the data presented and the potential areas for theoretical development concerning media freedom in the UAE (and non-western contexts in general). A call for further research considers likely future developments in the rapidly expanding field of new media.

Methodology

From the outset it was clear that a comparative analysis would need to identify cultural variables that might lead to variations in perception of press freedom between the two subject groups. In keeping with a cultural studies approach, this study aimed to apply a holistic, ethnographic character which utilized focus group observations and journal entries to add depth to the quantitative data presented in the WPO studies. By triangulating this data, it was hoped that some of the complexities of socio-cultural context would emerge to challenge the western-biased theoretical assumptions regarding, among other issues, the concepts of freedom, normative perceptions of national and self-identity and the role, norms and status of the press (and other media) in society.

An in-depth, online survey was administered with questions categorized into five parts.

1. Personal information (including religious affiliation and family income) 2. Reproduction of a World Public Opinion survey (2008) containing six questions regarding freedom of the media 3. Audience perceptions of press freedom in the UAE (including questions about trustworthiness of various sources, content of news and media norms) 4. Self-identity and society (including questions about the role of the individual in society and the degree to which individuals considered themselves religious followers or questioners of authority) 5. Questions specifically relating to new media (in anticipation of the perceived growing importance of the internet and the potentially diminishing role of traditional press)

The survey was completed by 30 expatriate westerners living in the UAE and by 57 Emirati females all of whom are currently within the higher education system of the country. The sample groups all reside within the northern Emirate of Ras Al Khaimah, a medium sized city 75 km north of Dubai. 10

Following initial analysis of the survey results, follow-up interviews were arranged with both Emiratis and expatriates. Selected transcripts from focus groups were combined with journal notes and personal observations taken over the course of several months in my role as a faculty member at the Higher Colleges of Technology Womens College in Ras Al Khaimah.

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Chapter 1: Perceptions of media freedom in the United Arab Emirates; A comparative analysis World Public Opinion comparison valid claims?

Data collected by the World Public Opinion organization (2008) are largely supported by the sample survey presented here. It is important to note that the WPO survey did not sample according to national, gender-specific or cultural sub-groups within the selected countries, although the international data set collected clearly differentiated between Muslim and western countries, concluding that, many Muslims accept press restrictions to preserve political stability. (2008) Given the unusual demographic situation in the United Arab Emirates a Muslim country in which Emirati nationals constitute roughly twenty percent of the population a comparison of perceptions of press freedom has been made with western expatriates, mainly hailing from the US and the UK. It was assumed at the outset (and subsequently supported by the close correlations with WPO findings) that the western expatriates held typical perceptions of press freedom considering their nationality and cultural backgrounds. An initial comparison against WPO data therefore serves as both a test of validity as well as an opportunity to analyze the findings with more socio-cultural depth. 1(i) Western expatriates the importance of media freedom from government
How important is it for the media to be free to publish news and ideas without government control?

Very important

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1(ii) Emirati women the importance of media freedom from government

How important is it for the media to be free to publish news and ideas without government control?

Very important Somewhat important

Although there is widespread support for the general principle of press freedom1 without government control, it is notable that, by a proportion of 96.7% to 55.6%, westerners consider the issue very important. Emiratis (and, it may therefore be inferred, Muslims) do appear to hold some degree of reservation about the freedom of the press. None of the respondents in either group considered the issue not important.

Perhaps the most obvious place to start any comparative analysis of Muslim Emiratis and western expatriates, is with the system of government in place in the UAE compared to the US or UK. The centrality of Islam, and Sharia law, to Emirati governance is in direct contrast to the secular, liberal systems of representative democracy in the west. In general terms, the concept of separation of religion and politics is fundamental to the mechanisms of government in the west and, consequently, the theories of press freedom center on the assumption of their independence from religious authorities. Western politics is therefore characterized by its theoretical pluralism, and media norms fundamentally revolve around the ideal of universal participation and impartial mediation (however flawed they may be in practice).
1

The term press freedom is used synonymously throughout with media freedom

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Partiality, however, is essential to an Islamic political system. The UAE employs a dual legal system of Sharia (Islamic) law and civil courts, reflecting the instrumental role of religion within society. No reading of the UAEs cultural values can therefore be undertaken without reference to its Muslim identity and the tendency towards synoptic beliefs that may be portrayed in the press as black and white issues.

The distinction between treating information as a public right or as a privilege the universalism versus particularism dichotomy (de Smaele, 2002) helps to explain why certain information in the UAE is not considered open to public debate. Religious doctrine in the Islamic world has largely been the preserve of Islamic scholars since the historical decline of The Golden Age of Islam in which philosophers such as Abu Ghazali encouraged rational discourse and skepticism. This has created a particularist approach to religious interpretation reflected by a lack of critical debate on what are seen as taboo subjects in the Emirati press.

Whereas expatriates were fairly evenly divided between religious and nonreligious affiliation, 98.7% of Emiratis identified themselves as Muslim.

2(i) Western Expatriates government limits on access to internet content

Do you think that people in the UAE should have the right to read whatever is on the internet or do you think that the government should have the right to prevent people from having access to some things on the internet?

People should have the right to access whatever is on the internet Government should have the right to limit some things on the internet

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2(ii) Emirati women - government limits on access to internet content

Do you think that people in the UAE should have the right to read whatever is on the internet or do you think that the government should have the right to prevent people from having access to some things on the internet?

People should have the right to access whatever is on the internet Government should have the right to limit some things on the internet

Regarding internet freedom, the data conformed to WPO expectations in that western groups were much more likely to support access to all internet content. Support for government control of some things on the internet was much higher among Emirati groups indeed, much higher (77.7%) than the WPO average (62%).

This fits the overall pattern of Muslim groups accepting more direct forms of government censorship, especially where perceived harms to cultural and political norms is expressed. In some [Middle Eastern] countries, the use of the internet is still limited as the fear of people coming into contact with socially, culturally and politically undesirable material is very dominant. (Mowlana, 2002, p20)

The government in the UAE is seen as the protector of cultural values and public decency. At the same time, internet use (especially by the younger generations) remains extremely popular and continues to proliferate onto handheld and mobile devices (UAE teenagers are among the most connected in the world (Gulf Times, 2010). Particular concern about content focuses on the sharing of images (especially pornography) and personal information. Many dating sites remain banned and, recent threats to ban the 15

use of Blackberry handsets, although framed as a security issue, have been perceived as an attempt to restrict the sharing of encrypted data which allow users to access content deemed incompatible with Islamic values. Its partly fear over young children getting access to bad things, but older students too, college students want to meet online which is against the tradition. (Shamma Al Naqbi, interview: 09.2010) Since Blackberry ownership is extremely high among the student population precisely because the technology in use is able to bypass restrictions imposed by Internet Service Providers, a clear discord exists between public expressions of support for government restrictions on internet content and support for the right of individuals to access that content in private. In practice, Etisalats (the countrys largest Internet Service Provider) censorship policies and their list of banned websites, are necessitated by a general feeling among Emiratis that the government must be seen to be fulfilling a duty to protect cultural values. The situation regarding the internet has implications for the perceptions of media freedom more generally in the UAE, especially to the ways in which public and private spheres are both conceptualized and constituted. Cultural imperatives may have more to do with framing the debate than political economy considerations. 3 (i) Western Expatriates the right to publish news and ideas without control
Do you think:

The media should have the right to publish news and ideas without government control.

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3 (ii) Emirati women the right to publish news and ideas without control
Do you think:

The media should have the right to publish news and ideas without government control.

The government should have the right to prevent the media from publishing things that it thinks will be politically destabilizing.

Again, the data shows local variance while conforming to the overall trend predicted by the WPO study. At 57%, the WPO average level of support for the right to publish without government control is almost exactly halfway between expatriates in the UAE (80%) and Emiratis (31%). There is a clear cultural distinction in the data, perhaps best explained by the difference in interpretation of politically destabilizing.

Hegemonic theory points to the appearance of democratic political stability as a consequence of a continual process of negotiation in which acceptance of, and resistance to, competing sources of power accounts for overall structural stability characterized by constant instability. In contrast, politically destabilizing may be popularly perceived by Emiratis as a contra-Islamic concept. In theory, an Islamic state must be, self-evidently, governed according to the permanent and immutable laws of scripture. A media system which emerged to directly challenge this core belief would not only be unlikely in the UAE, it is specifically legislated against by laws protecting the government from public criticism. These laws go further than the protection of individual leaders from personal insult, slander or libel, but extend to the prohibiting of un-Islamic practices. Although referring to Iran, the 17

belief that the media must refrain from diffusion or propagation of destructive and anti-Islamic practices (Mowlana, 1983) is common throughout the Middle East, including the UAE. 4(i) Western expatriates how much media freedom?
Do you think that in the UAE the media should have:

More freedom Less freedom The same amount of freedom as they currently do

4(ii) Emirati women how much media freedom?

Do you think that in the UAE the media should have:

More freedom Less freedom The same amount of freedom as they currently do

A majority of Emiratis are happy with the current state of media freedom this may however be more to do with the fact that the media is not necessarily perceived as a necessary source of truth. Since expatriates seem less satisfied with Emirati media freedom (despite having access to more

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alternative sources and online Virtual Private Networks VPNs) it is possible that ideological belief in the cultural ideal of press freedom is a factor here. The media landscape in the UAE a brief overview

There are anywhere from fifteen to thirty (or more) English language newspapers published inside the UAE (depending on the quantifying criteria) and a similar number of Arabic publications. International and regional publications include The Times, Financial Times, Gulf News and the Khaleej Times.

The situation is similar in terms of television and radio broadcasters operating English and Arabic language programming from within the Emirates. A majority of Emiratis and western expatriates also receive programming from the international satellite services of the Orbit Showtime Network and Star Asia which carry CNN, Sky news, BBC World and Al Jazeera, among others.

In terms of international news, therefore, a plethora of options are available to both Arabic speaking Emiratis and English speaking expatriates. However, a common complaint of both surveyed groups is the lack of attention on local issues by locally produced media outlets with many individuals turning to alternative sources such as blogs and social networking sites, or personal contacts to find out what is happening within local communities.

Dependent on government licenses, which (in theory) can be revoked without warning, media organizations are typically dependent on the patronage and financial backing of members of the government and their business affiliates. Unsurprisingly, as a result, UAE-based newspapers are noticeably lacking in negative reporting about the UAE, especially anything related to the UAE government. (dubaifaqs, 2010)

Although editors have widely reported not receiving explicit government directives to refrain from negative or critical reporting, precedent has shown that severe penalties are likely for anyone straying too far from acceptable 19

boundaries. In 2009, El Emarat Al Youm, an Arabic newspaper, was suspended from publication for 20 days. The newspaper had been sued by the owners of the Warsan Stables (the Abu Dhabi Royal Family) for publishing a story in 2006 claiming their horses had been drugged with steroids. (ibid)

In practice, self-censorship within the media is the norm, practiced as a safeguard against jeopardizing the patronage and sponsorship of prominent public figures or the withdrawal of advertising revenue by their business affiliates many of whom wish to avoid association with controversial publications. Although I have found no evidence of a license to publish actually being revoked, this is likely proof of the effectiveness of selfcensorship among local media. This censorship is somewhat nebulous as it is driven internally by the media, rather than from an explicit external instruction not to publish bad news about the UAE (at least not a public proclamation to make it clear what is permitted and what is not). (ibid) The absence of explicit public proclamations of what is acceptable is, I will show later, tied to underlying cultural variables. The implications for media in the UAE, operating without constitutional support for freedom of expression, have tended to naturally orientate editors and journalists along a framework of accountability towards the state and its rulers. The emphasis, (and expectation) therefore, has frequently been on the medias role in helping to maintain a strong sense of national and cultural identity particularly unsurprising in a country not yet forty years old.

In general, a comparison with WPO data supports the validity of the survey results presented. Overall trends are confirmed between western and Muslim perceptions. Expatriate groups and Emiratis do, however, show significantly higher and lower extremes of opinion, suggesting that the socio-cultural background of each group has a measurable effect in the shaping of perceptions about freedom of the media.

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Level of support for the principle of a free press

As shown above (graph 1(ii) and 1 (ii)) western expatriates show stronger support for the principle of freedom of the media. Ideas about secular, pluralist governance and universalist approaches to information undoubtedly frame perceptions of the issue. But, as de Smaele notes, there is also a cultural distinction between the notion of positive freedom, namely the freedom to [contrasted with] the liberal view, common in the West of negative freedom, or freedom from. (2002)

Muslim societies, including the UAE, tend to accept the need for limits to be placed on cultural and political freedoms. To westerners, such limits are perceived as restrictions on the individuals right to pursue his or her own interests, and therefore as antithetical to the fundamental capitalist principles which underlie the democratic ideal. Although analyzing Soviet media, de Smaeles words could be equally applied to the concept of press freedom in the UAE, which does not adhere in the same ways to western free market capitalism, and the constraints brought about by the need to act according to profit motives. The media are thus free to do their duties as instruments of the state, (ibid.) including the important task of helping to unify seven historically separated Emirates under the banner of a new nation.

Accepting (or not) the deferral of rights and freedoms to government is therefore partially explained by politico-economic ideologies, themselves created by culturally determined concepts of freedom (historical influence of material, economic conditions cannot be overlooked when examining cultural variables). Gramscian hegemony illuminates the process by which democracies avoid revolt, despite the need of most western governments, to impose a system of taxation. Freedom of expression can be seen as one of the guaranteed rights conferred by the state in exchange for taxes, and both sides perceive a gain.

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Perceived gains in the UAE owe more to the role of government as custodian, upholding Islamic values and protecting citizens privacy. The discouragement by the political classes of debates about participatory democracy and freedom of expression is significantly eased by the payment of rents, Wittmans (2006) term for the financial subsidies afforded by the UAEs position as a major exporter of oil and gas revenues.

The media as supporter of government policies Emirati support for the government right to limit politically destabilizing news and ideas is strong (graph 3(i) and 3(ii)) and likely to have been strengthened in the wake of the international coverage of the Florida pastor. Indeed, the perceived role of the press is a key area of divergence among the sample groups, with nearly half of Emirati women expressing a belief in the instrumental role of the media, whose main duty is seen as supporting the state and its rulers.

5(i) Western expatriates normative media roles

Which statement best describes the role of the media in society? Choose ONE answer only.
The media should be a public watchdog, supporting all citizens (including minorities) and protecting personal freedoms against government power - criticizing when necessary. The media should help the government fulfill its policies and should not question the need of government to provide security and a strong national identity. The media should act independently of both government and citizens and should treat each side equally

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5(ii) Emirati women normative media roles

Which statement best describes the role of the media in society? Choose ONE answer only.
The media should be a public watchdog, supporting all citizens (including minorities) and protecting personal freedoms against government power - criticizing when necessary. The media should help the government fulfill its policies and should not question the need of government to provide security and a strong national identity. The media should act independently of both government and citizens and should treat each side equally

In contrast, most expatriates support the independence of the media, even above the traditional press freedom ideal of the media as public watchdog. Unsurprisingly, this is reflected by the weak levels of support among westerners for conceptualizing the media as a protector of government authority.

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6(i) Western Expatriates the role of media in society

What should the role of the media in society be? Do you feel strongly that the media should fill the following roles? 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Protecting the Supporting Making money rights of all government should be a citizens (public authority priority (profit first) watchdog) (protecting power)

The media should do this The media should not do this I do not feel strongly either way (unsure)

In stark contrast, Emiratis explicitly perceive that support for government authority should be a media norm. The suggestion here is that the underlying principle goes deeper than the duties of nation building or the protection of Islamic values previously mentioned as explanatory factors for perceptions of media freedom among Emiratis.

That westerners seem instinctively to veer away from authoritarian models of governance and media deference is unsurprising given their cultural history the Watergate scandal which brought down Nixon is within the living memories of most of the expatriate respondents. The press role in exposing political abuse of power in this one incident has seemingly cemented its watchdog status (mythical or otherwise).

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In contrast, at the time of Watergate, the UAE was in its infancy, with no recognizable national media system of its own. The socio-historical context of new Emiratis was steeped in a long tradition of tribal culture in which hierarchical family clans vied for power over vaguely bordered territories. The respect for authority, nurtured by an oral tradition which emphasized face to face communication and personal (as opposed to impersonal) trust, had not been undermined by anything approaching the magnitude of a Watergate. The concept of saving-face in public, common outside western culture, and based on a respect for positions of authority (typically meaning tribal elders), gives a socio-cultural dimension to the question of the medias social responsibilities. 6(ii) Emirati Women the role of media in society
What should the role of the media in society be? Do you feel strongly that the media should fill the following roles? 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Protecting the Supporting Making money rights of all government should be a citizens (public authority priority (profit first) watchdog) (protecting power)
The media should do this The media should not do this I do not feel strongly either way (unsure)

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From normative expectations to content: some UAE examples

So far, the analysis of perceptions of media freedom have considered the different ways that Emiratis and expatriates view culturally acceptable restrictions versus protections; the presence or absence of religion in the political sphere; the importance of nation building; opposing views of freedom; and the legacy of a tribal, oral tradition.

Below, we examine more specifically the question of content.

7(i) Western Expatriates v Emirati Women: Comparing attitudes to UAE media

Western Expatriates: Agree (%) It is extremely important that news in the media is accurate. In general, the media in the UAE cover all the important social issues. The media in the UAE regularly ignore important issues. The rulers of the UAE get too much coverage in the media. Emirati Women: Agree (%)

96.3% 14.2% 57.1% 75%

67% 82.4% 32.4% 35%

Clearly accuracy in the media is considered important by both survey groups, although once again, Emirati support for the principle appears tempered. This could simply be a reflection of the reality the well-known practice of media self-censorship resulting in lower expectations among Emiratis who generally support the justifications for content omissions. It is also possible that the effect also reinforces a cultural expectation that the media per se is not considered to be a source of authenticity. Compared with the Quran, media sources are understood to be inevitably prone to the distortions of pluralism, universalism and relativism.

In terms of the issues covered by the media also, there is a clear difference of perception. Again, whereas the western ideal of a public sphere, mediated by

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the press, is theoretically an inclusive domain open to challenge by the free market of ideas, Muslim cultures may tend to accept that the discussion of some important issues falls outside the purview of public media debate.

Certainly this possibility is confirmed by the different ways in which Arabic and English is applied in Emirati culture. The requirement to learn English is now widespread in the UAE. Perceived as a global language, and as part of the drive towards modernization, the acquisition of English is a key strategy of the Education Ministries in the country. Indeed, some of the Emirati respondents report that more than 50% of their media use is conducted in English, and many young Emiratis are comfortable with the idea that English is the language of choice for conducting business.

Interestingly, when asked if they had ever read the Quran in English, most Emiratis thought the question to be peculiar. That wouldnt make sense Arabic is the language of our culture. The Quran is the source of that culture. Outside that, language is just for practical uses. (Al Naqbi interview, 09, 2010)

Further research is required to properly analyze the role of language and the use of Arabic and English in Emirati society. However, the compartmentalizing of Arabic and English in this way, based on the distinction between cultural and non-cultural sources, suggests that for some, the media are perceived as being outside the culture and subsequently not to be regarded as a cultural guide. The public sphere of the media the sphere of business is therefore perceived to play a practical, cohesive role in unifying the nation under the governance of the countrys rulers, without necessarily impinging upon the cultural, private, sphere. Provided the media is limited to the protection of these principles, it is seen to be fulfilling its chief function.

That the media does so is evidenced by the daily prominence on the front pages of the details of official government duties being completed in service to the nation and the preoccupation with the formalities of governance a fact

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that Emiratis do not generally perceive to be excessive (in contrast to expatriates).

8(i) Western Expatriates v Emirati Women: Comparing attitudes towards topics covered
Consider the following topics. Do you believe that traditional media in the UAE (i.e. media published or broadcast from inside the country) gives enough attention to them? Too much attention Not enough attention The right amount of attention

Ex-pat: Western Expatriates UAE: Emirati Women

Religious teaching and guidance Law / Individual civil rights The political system in the UAE Opportunities for citizens to participate in politics

Expats 39% 7% 14% 0%

UAE

Expat

UAE

Expat

UAE

44% 27% 50% 38%

4% 50% 39% 64%

30% 30% 18% 14%

29% 21% 25% 7%

32% 36% 27% 26%

Somewhat surprisingly, Emiratis give slightly more support for the idea that religion receives too much coverage in the national media lending weight to the argument discussed above that the media, as an explicitly public model of communication, may very well be conceptualized in the UAE as a politicoeconomic structure. To many Emiratis, the traditional oral sermons of Friday prayers remain the rightful location for religious contemplation. As Habermas has noted, the reimagining of religious works as cultural products in the western public sphere meant that these products lost their aura of extraordinariness [leading to] the profaning of their sacramental character. (1989, p239) The threat of the profane (the act of making the private, public) is an influencing cultural factor in why Emirati resistance to western free press models persist, often expressed in terms of the protection of Islamic values and the nature of cultural taboos.

Avoidance of covering political participation is clearly perceived differently, and not merely as a result of the role of Islam in the governance of the UAE. 28

There is little support for more attention to be given to political issues by Emiratis in general, a fact which the socio-historical background of the region helps to explain. The feudal and tribal traditions of the Emiratis have, in addition to promoting a strong respect for authority, resulted in a strong sense of personal trust in contrast with western culture which tends to place its trust, as part of the hegemonic process, in abstract, impersonal institutions and ideals. These ideals the free press, the public sphere, democracy however unrealizable in practice, maintain a powerful, mythical role in the ritual expression of cultural communication and social practice among western expatriates. The continued importance of face to face communication in the UAE reflects a long tradition of cultivating personal relationships the result of which is the current widespread practice of wasta (roughly translated as pulling strings for someone.) Business among Emiratis tends to be conducted mainly with close associates and extended family a practice reflected across all sectors of Emirati society including government. The cultivation of wasta and good connections, as every new expatriate quickly understands, is the key to getting things done.

Public media scrutiny of this practice would demand transparency and a faith in impersonal, bureaucratic mechanisms that Emiratis have traditionally managed to live without partly due to the relatively small number of tribes that make up the seven Emirates. Locals value their autonomy and the preservation of their traditional protections from public scrutiny something reflected in perhaps the most surprising finding presented here.

Individualism versus more individualism!

A widespread assumption about Middle Eastern culture has been based upon the presumed foundation of collective values the strong support for the belief in the equality of all Muslims based on closely shared communal beliefs and a sense of duty and kinship. Western culture, on the other hand, has been characterized as individualist in nature, based on the notion of individual liberties and the private pursuit of capital. There is certainly evidence to 29

support both assumptions regarding perceptions of press freedom, the data here has suggested a contrast between seeing the role of the media as a unifying force, placing protections on cultural values, and seeing it as a public forum of scrutiny, rejecting external restrictions.

As expected, western expatriates, though largely favoring the middle ground, tend towards the individualist end of the scale: 9(i) Western Expatriates collective duties versus individual rights
Are collective duties or individual rights more important?

20 15 10 5 0

Individual Rights Versus Collective Duties

5 Collective duties always most important 4 3 Both are equally important 2 1 Individual Rights always most important

However, the hypothesis that, in the case of Emiratis, the results would be reversed based on assumed cultural collectivism is resoundingly refuted:

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9(ii) Emirati Women collective duties versus individual rights

Are collective duties or individual rights more important?

14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 Individual Rights Versus Collective Duties

5 Collective duties always most important 4 3 Both are equally important 2 1 Individual Rights always most important

Public Collectivism and Private Individualism

The assumptions of Emirati collectivism owe much to its Arabic and Islamic setting. It is certainly true that collective identity is apparent in the UAE in a number of ways. From birth, children typically carry with them a cultural and patriarchal lineage in the tradition of taking, in addition to a given first name, the names of their patriarchal forebears in some cases up to five generations and beyond. The family name therefore signifies a clearly understood tribal affiliation long pre-dating the creation of the UAE as a sovereign nation.

This tribal identity has spatial significance, both in terms of the geographical area traditionally associated with a particular tribe and, in a new national 31

context, as an indicator of relative social status within Emirati culture. As mentioned, business and government are filled with examples of strategic alliances formed on the basis of tribal affiliation and kinship. Media organizations are no exception, with many daily newspapers (not to mention schools, colleges, museums, and many other social institutions) are patronized by some of the most influential tribal-family names.

While the issue of self-censorship (graph 4i and 4ii) indicates that such bonds are rarely, if ever, exposed to public scrutiny in the media, the suggestion that this is merely symptomatic of an authoritarian system of self-interest requires careful consideration. It is important to locate the practice in the appropriate socio-cultural context. A self-proclaimed liberal democratic system, in theory, explicitly rejects all forms of nepotism, tending towards a negative idea of freedom the freedom from state obligations. (de Smaele, 2002) Public figures are presumed to have earned their positions through having passed the test of scrutiny of the public sphere, mediated through mass communications channels such as the press and television or radio although clearly one does not need to search far for examples of the fallibility of this process. But what of a system which makes no such claims of democratic ideals in which tribal affiliation and collective values have become neither politically suspect nor profaned or undermined by public scrutiny? Perceived through a paradigm of western individualism, such a system may be too readily dismissed as prone to distortion (at best) or corrupt (at worst). (The possibility that culturally-embedded individualism may actually be the source of corruption (not its result) is worth noting). Seen from the standpoint of a collective culture, however, a strong sense of normative social duty persists, and is certainly expected of public officials. In the UAE as in the west one must be seen to do ones duty, and, just as in the west, good public relations and good press are essential components of cultivating a good image. However, it may be argued that, in general, the west lacks (or has lost) a dimension of personal trust, both in a spatial and a 32

temporal sense, due to the necessity of conducting politics through mediation. In the US, for example, the size of the country, its various time zones, and the loss of a recognizably typical workday (a side-effect of the introduction of flexibility into labour markets under neo-liberal economics) ensure the mediation of public life is ever more impersonal. Some political economists have argued that an entirely mediated politics has given public discourse a theatrical flavour, now dominated by 24-hour news cycles and reality television the public sphere, they say, has become an arena of distraction precipitating a loss of meaning, both semantically and politically. (Taylor & Harris, 2008) In the UAE, while the countrys rulers are not without their public dressings, they remain more personally accountable to their extended families and associates, meeting in person with far higher numbers of the population than is possible in the west. The founding father imagery fondly remembered in American history is very much a living concept in the UAE. (Al Naqbi interview, 09.2010)

Additionally, Emirati culture is very much concerned with saving public face. As a consequence, the private sphere has become a sacramental space, clearly differentiated from the public. Unlike the commodification process identified in the west (Garnham, 1986) a process driven by support for the right (some might say obligation) of the individual to outcompete business or political opponents in a free market environment, the UAE remains determined to protect both the individuals right to privacy within the private sphere, and the notion of positive freedom the freedom to perform social duties. (de Smaele, 2002) In doing so, it is fulfilling a perceived cultural, and largely unquestioned, obligation to prevent the profanity of sacred family (and religious) values. The support for individualism (9ii), in the context of a survey mediated public spaces, is likely a consequence of this desire to preserve privacy.

Trust in news sources: personal versus impersonal trust

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If Emirati culture is seen, therefore, as one in which tribal traditions extol the notion of respect for authority and encourage greater feelings of duty towards, and trust in, personal relationships, one would expect this to translate into how media sources are perceived.

10(i) Western Expatriates trust in news sources

How reliable, accurate or trustworthy do you rate the following news sources: Answer Options National newspapers International newspapers Online news websites Radio Local / National TV International TV (cable / satellite) Online Social Networking (e.g. facebook / twitter) Internet blogs (e.g. citizen journalists) Friends, family or colleagues Very reliable 1 7 6 4 3 5 0 0 2 Somewhat reliable 20 20 19 22 17 21 15 18 23

10(ii) Emirati Women trust in news sources

How reliable, accurate or trustworthy do you rate the following news sources: Answer Options National newspapers International newspapers Online news websites Radio Local / National TV International TV (cable / satellite) Online Social Networking (e.g. facebook / twitter) Internet blogs (e.g. citizen journalists) Friends, family or colleagues Very reliable 22 9 10 14 18 16 6 9 12 Somewhat reliable 12 25 18 18 11 13 18 9 19

Clearly, as news sources, Emiratis tend to trust social networking, blogs, and friends / family more than expatriates. Unsurprisingly, they prefer to rely on local sources of news rather than the international sources preferred by expatriates, although Qatar-based Al Jazeera is highly respected. (Al Naqbi interview, 09.2010) Overall, there is a clear distinction between how reliable news content is perceived to be in the media in general, possibly as a result of the different cultural expectations of what appears in the news.

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It is also possible, however, that the results merely indicate a greater level of skepticism from expatriate groups who, as well as representing a significantly older demographic, may be well versed in treating mediated news with a pinch of salt although this could be interpreted as another indication of the effects of ubiquitous infotainment in the western media, and the levels of resistance built up by westerners to the distortions of commodification.

Either way, there is nothing in the data that refutes the idea that personal trust in sources of authority may account for the Emirati perception that the media ought to act as a mirror of cultural values, preserving the distinction between public and private spheres, and guarding against westernized, commodified profanities.

In practice, both expatriates and Emiratis display remarkably similar views when asked whether one can believe everything one reads in the paper one of the few areas of close agreement. 11(i) Western expatriates dont believe everything you read
"You should NOT believe everything you read in the paper." Thinking about newspapers in the UAE, how strongly do you agree / disagree with this statement?

I strongly agree I agree somewhat

11(ii) Expatriate Women Dont believe everything you read

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"You should NOT believe everything you read in the paper." Thinking about newspapers in the UAE, how strongly do you agree / disagree with this statement?

I strongly agree I agree somewhat

This suggests a shared awareness that, whatever the normative expectations and cultural demands of how the media should operate, in practice, ideals are rarely realized. Interestingly, when asked to justify their skepticism, Westerners tended to support political economy criticism of the public sphere, indicating that, in their view, the media tend to sensationalize news following a profit motive something that self-censorship and cultural taboos would almost certainly curtail. On balance, however, there is no doubt that expatriates perceive the government to be the overriding factor in limiting what media content is allowed.

If you agreed with the statement above (11i), what reasons would you give? Selected this response (%): Expatriates The media often try to sensationalize a story to make money The government limits what the media can talk about The media do not have all the facts 42.3 Emiratis 18.8

80.8

43.8

30.8

59.4

Emiratis, in contrast, do not perceive newspapers in the UAE to be particularly sensationalist. Rather, they suggest that not having all the facts is the main reason why one should regard media content skeptically. This may well be an

36

acknowledgement of the general lack of transparency across public institutions (getting access to social statistics is notoriously difficult to secure in the UAE, not to mention reliable economic and political data), which the media have to deal with. It may also be influenced by the feeling that facts themselves are culturally determined, and some of them fall outside the purview of the mediated public sphere, and inside the synoptic realm of religious doctrine.

Summary: Cultural variables in the constitution of public and private spheres

The presentation of data here broadly corresponds to WPO studies which identify a greater acceptance on the part of Muslims of media restrictions. Comparisons with western expatriate groups reveal differences in perceptions of media freedom which have to do with the constitution of public and private spheres and the role of the media in preserving or challenging them. Crucially, the media in the UAE are seen to operate consistently with the socio-cultural beliefs prevalent in society.

Support for secular, democratic theories of political representation and mediation among westerners, despite the apparent acknowledgement of the rift between idealized and realized forms of the public sphere, remains strong. A secularized culture, explicitly supportive of the separation of religion and state, and generally accepting of capitalist, free market ideology, appears to uphold the principle that freedom individual and media represents the only remaining path to truth (however subjectively formulated it may be), The media are expected to be unbiased, objective and social partners in the quest for reliable, accurate and trustworthy information about the world and our place within it. The breaking of cultural taboos, the profaning of the previously sacred, the commodification of knowledge and the turn towards postmodernist relativism and the politics of banality (Taylor & Harris, 2008), though still contested issues, do not appear to have diminished western faith in the 37

principle of a free media. Western expatriates remain staunch humanists, at least in theory.

In contrast, Emiratis, given their unique socio-historical roots, their triballybased, politico-economic foundations, and their cultural and religious traditions, perceive the concept of a free media as a western import and the price of accepting it at face value as too high. Preservation of the private sphere, the sacred, and the hierarchical distribution of power via personal networks, is considered to be beyond the sphere of public scrutiny. Whilst the risk of corruption remains high, it is tempered by the need to retain a strong sense of cultural and national identity. Loyalty to these ideals remains high among the all-female group surveyed, despite the fact that they ensure the continuance of a largely patriarchal society in which the father figure remains the key symbol of respect. The media are perceived as necessary for performing a functionalist, statist role, crucial to the economic interests of the nation, but limited as the ultimate arbiters of cultural value and truth. The recent increase of exposure to western media has done little to alter the perception that freedom has too many pitfalls, and while the UAE enjoys prosperity for its minority nationals, conservatism is likely to hold sway,

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Chapter Two Freedom and the media: Cultural ideals and the limits of realization Society requires distraction so as to deflect consciousness from both the fact of structured inequality and the meaninglessness of existence following the death of God. (Rojek,, 2001) The private people for whom the cultural product became available as a commodity profaned it inasmuch as they had to determine its meaning on their own. (Habermas, J. 1989) In evolutionary prehistory, consciousness emerged as a side effect of language. Today it is a by-product of the media. (Gray, J. 2001)

The ritual media: a cultural narrator of myth and identity

Theories of media freedom are central to the ways in which societies construct and conceptualize various public and private spheres and, ultimately, to how cultures reconcile their daily, lived experience with fundamental beliefs about truth (including the paths to it) and how best to conceptualize the relationship between self and social identities. As a key source of social narrative, the media are fundamental in shaping and sustaining a clear cultural identity based on collectively identifiable values, beliefs and myths.

This is recognized in the ritual model of communication which is concerned with the maintenance of society in time not the act of imparting information but the representation of shared beliefs. (Carey, in McQuail, p70) It is culturally embedded practice, therefore, that determines the realizability and plausibility of the public sphere as a conceptual space of publically mediated communication to the extent that shared cultural traditions and values, rooted in a socio-historical past, interact, conflict, and ultimately negotiate with material, political and economic conditions in a hegemonic process that feeds 39

back into our culture through the media and are thus sustained across time and space. Hegemony is rarely made explicit it is implied, abstracted, and frequently based on cultural assumptions and necessary illusions. (Chomsky, 1989) A pertinent example being the recent and vocal proclamations of the US government (particularly in the run up to the Iraq invasion of 2003) that the United States was motivated by encouraging the global spread of democracy. It has been a familiar refrain of the US for over half a century. It is also flatly contradicted by history. There have been numerous examples of democratically elected governments being deliberately undermined or overthrown directly and indirectly by the US, while it continues business as usual with non-democratic allies wherever economic interest coincide. Since a free press, concerned with truth (or at least accuracy) would unambiguously reflect the historical record, we must conclude not only that the idea that the US government is a defender of democracy is a fallacy, but the idea of a free press may also be nothing more than a useful cultural illusion whose purpose is not to seek truth at all. Yet the illusion is maintained and reinforced, voluntarily or otherwise, by a society which claims to embody the democratic ideal of the public sphere.

In a society which makes no such democratic claims, why then should the belief in a free press be a shared cultural assumption (illusory or otherwise)? Yet the support for the right to access information about the world and relevant to our lives as citizens is universally strong the United Arab Emirates being no exception.

What are not universal, are the socio-cultural contexts in which this information is framed, and the ways in which a countrys media system is tasked with collecting, analyzing and disseminating it. This agenda-setting process necessarily involves an inescapably culturally-bias and systematic selection and omission of facts about the world, the product of which routinely align with the prevailing cultural hegemony determined by epistemological 40

beliefs about how we know what we know, and how we construct identity both individually and collectively. This includes questions of where our knowledge is sourced, who we consider to be trustworthy and authoritative, and how our social roadmaps to truth are constituted.

A complex interaction between political-economic conditions, socio-historical circumstances and cultural traditions ultimately determines the realizability of the Public Sphere ideal and the subsequent norms regarding media freedom. However, while public sphere analysis has largely been concerned with issues of access and content and the determining role of the media in defining them it has been easy to overlook the significance of the media, not only in their particular dissemination of information, (their methods and channels) but also in their cultural meaning and their ritualized representation of myths.

Mass media, devoid of cultural context, as a ritual model indicates, are not inherently free. Rather, they are bound by the material conditions present in a particular time and space. As myth-makers, media may (and perhaps ought to) try to transcend this reality but in practice, normative values of press freedom are always restricted. Theories of the public sphere which seek to conceptualize the spaces in which media operate, illustrate clearly the irreconcilable gap between well-intentioned ideals and necessarily compromised realities.

The realizability of the public sphere

The public sphere in the west can conceivably be viewed as a capitalist myth, (a form of sociological bribery inferred by Gramsci (1971)) based on economic necessity and articulated in free market philosophies and a hegemonic tradeoff based on the mutual needs of the state and individual public and private spheres of activity.

41

Without the need for nation states to raise taxes, it is doubtful that the need to conceptualize public spaces as arenas of discourse leading to political action would have arisen.

I want to explore the idea that the public sphere ideal in the west has a sociocultural purpose which stems from the irreconcilability between ideal and lived experience. As such, it retains mythical properties that the media are tasked with articulating. By doing so, it is possible that we may assess what has been learnt in the west about the limitations of the public sphere and ask whether a western free press model is likely to be useful in understanding media in a globalized age, especially considering the cultural and political diversity of the international community.

Much of the literature on the public sphere suggests that, conceptually, it embodies a democratic ideal; the implication being that its application to a non-democratic society is, by definition, theoretically impermissible. At the same time, no serious analyst of Habarmass (1989) model would dare to suggest that anything like a perfectly functioning public sphere is realizable in practice, regardless of the democratic credentials of the society being examined.

Much analysis of the Habermasian bourgeois public sphere has focused on its particular shortcomings. Since its emergence in European coffeehouses, it has clearly never been public. It had rules of entry, socially and culturally determined by the prejudices of historical circumstance. Women and the nonbourgeois were excluded not on principle, but as a result of, in the first instance, cultural tradition, and in the latter, political economic discrimination.

It is instructive that exclusion from the public sphere was (and remains) correlated to the individuals economic worth to the state. As tax revenue generated by women gradually increased, so too did consideration of their participation in the public sphere, but feminist gains have historically had to overcome many forms of resistance to become accepted. Neo-Marxist analysis has focused on this constant struggle against dominant elites, 42

despite the frequent professions of working in the common interest, in order to achieve even modest concessions.

Such readings, however, (while still perfectly valid, despite criticism that they portray populations as enthralled and manipulated consumers (Thompson, 1993)) tend to reinforce the potential realizability of the democratic ideal and the validation of a key cultural myth, namely that it is the gradual and inevitable march of progression, championed only by a free media, that will eventually lead to a perfected society. (Gray, 2007) By implying that there are removable barriers to the full participation, the practical impossibility of the public sphere due to its inherently non-dialogical nature of mediated communication, is rarely addressed. (Thompson, 1993) Perhaps because of the unpalatable conclusion which follows that the media themselves are a restriction on the public sphere ideal.

Missing from much contemporary analysis is clearly not the identification of particular barriers to participation in the public sphere, but the basic question of its mutual epistemological purpose and therefore its usefulness to democratic idealists, media agenda setters and to the wider population.

Examining the question holistically avoids the risk of overlooking the ritual nature of human cultures which however they may be fine-tuned serve universal, psychological needs. The point is not to posit a relativist claim of validity towards societies with more or less perfect public spheres, but to examine Careys insight that communication serves an essential role in mythologizing culture.

Thompson (1993) and Garnham (1986), in contrast to the Frankfurt School, are right to highlight the uncritical portrayal of audiences as passive and powerless. That is not to say that modern western audiences are not largely defined as consumers they most certainly are. But they are not necessarily enthralled and manipulated, rather, as human beings with a need to perceive themselves to be free, they are willing believers in cultural myths. The human capacity for self-denial and unconscious motivation is becoming much more 43

widely understood in social-psychology, (Hauser, 2006) raising the possibility that ritual mediation partially serves to manifest the common perception that ignorance is bliss.

Media freedom in the west: a socio-historical perspective

If one accepts that the starting point for tracing the rise of western democracy, the concept of the public sphere and free press theory, is the application of Guttenbergs printing press in western Europe, then a corollary can be drawn between the undermining of church authority, the separation of religion and politics, and the rise of humanistic ideas about society, politics, economy and, ultimately, truth and knowledge. The epistemological split between synoptic beliefs in religious doctrine and a general sense of post-enlightenment selfdetermination, based largely on empirical scientific methodology, has come to define western culture albeit rather simplistically as one in which unquestioned faith in God is no longer universally considered the exclusive path to truth. As centuries of feudalism and the hierarchical rule of kings were overturned, secularism, pluralism and individualism manifested as democracy, the public sphere and economic liberalism all mediated through the new mass communication technologies.

The key role of the media has been the focus of much critical analysis positing a gradual decline in the public sphere ideal and the distancing from its original ideal purpose freedom of expression in the pursuit of truth. Two key consequences have been identified; the corporatization of public spaces and the profaning of the formerly sacred, both of which essentially serve to reconstitute culture artifacts as cultural products, thus setting a price them. Once this has been done, cultural value becomes negotiable in principle, and open to interpretation; in practice, value becomes fixed by the non-dialogical nature of mediated communication, due to the crucial fact that products retain value only under scarcity conditions. Any free market in goods, services or 44

ideas is thus defined by a gradual diminishing of the public sphere and the emergence of ever-more sharply distinct private spheres.

As Hardt and Negri (2009) have noted, the bourgeois public sphere appeared under the emerging framework of scarcity economics, characterized by control of production and markets. Access to these markets required a willing participation in a new hegemonic negotiation of power which can be seen as the price of doing business in a political-economy based on a centralized system of taxation. Mass media thus began life as a by-product of this union of state, capital and taxation, emerging out of the shift away from feudalism towards to capitalism.

The public sphere was defined from the start by its entry barriers, by virtue of the fact that scarcity economics is inherently exclusive. Furthermore, the currency of the coffeehouses, i.e. knowledge, was newly commodified, traded in, and competed over with no one source assumed to hold a monopoly on truth. For a time certain sectors of society prospered under the industrial revolution and living standards for some- improved. Increasing literacy rates and the emergence of the penny press were powerful influences during the creation of new cultural-industrial myths, purporting to validate democratic ideals including freedom of the press.

Gramscian hegemony illustrates how acceptance of these new cultural myths has continued, becoming normalized in the press and other media, and replacing the now profaned and outdated faith in religious authority with a new faith in secular, humanist progress. (Gray, 2007) Despite the non-eradication of poverty, the morally dubious expansion of colonialism, and the exclusion of women and other minorities, the need to believe in cultural myths, ritually expressed, (particularly those that cultivated a strong sense of identity) proved seductive enough for democratic ideals to enter western consciousness.

With the separation of religion and politics, profanity needed to be justified and democracy needed to promise much. The media was tasked with delivering the perception that those promises were realizable, whilst benefiting 45

from presenting themselves as modern social arbiters. The new western public sphere, from a ritual communication perspective, was a necessary illusion for a new capitalist ideology which required both taxes and consumers. The Public sphere, democracy and press freedom were all constituent parts of a new hegemony which promised what it could never fully deliver: dialogical discourse and the political empowerment of individuals.

Dissenters, meanwhile, according to political economists and neo-Marxist observers, have been largely been pushed to the margins of the debate by a contemporary mainstream media that has paid far too little attention to the corporatization of the public sphere (Boyd-Barrett, 1995) and to rising political apathy and inaction. Some have even characterized mediated political discourse in todays western free media as a banality of politics [in which] formats like Reality TV and docudrama play an ideological role in the obfuscation of [this] essential passivity. (Taylor & Harris, 2008)

The private self, in a reconceptualized producer / consumer dichotomy, has become the commodified self, profaned in the act of becoming a public participant in a capitalist free market and sustained by the unfulfilled myths of secular progress.

The obsession with freedom has been identified as marking a cultural shift towards relativism and postmodernism, to the point where identity itself is no longer mythologized as a fixed and stable truth, but a mediated, and thus instantaneously re-inventable, concept (the influence here of new communications technologies should not be overlooked). In the context of globalization, cultural clashes, particularly with those outside the west who have retained a strong, Islamic identity, are hardly surprising.

Personal v Impersonal Trust sources of authority

The fact that a culture of democracy is insufficient in practice to protect the public sphere from distortion, except in ideal and mythologized forms, helps to 46

explain the key challenge of globalization. The attempt to export ideals that, while unrealizable in the west, continue to be validated by normative theories of a free media, has met with resistance and hostility in societies with very different economic conditions, socio-historical traditions and cultural values.

As de Smaele has pointed out, democracy is a non-dichotomous concept which can never be merely implanted into a society. Neo-imperialist attempts to export democracy have largely been met with varying degrees of resistance to westernization, reflected in the Middle East in media policies [which] have to be seen in the context of the regions shared history of colonization. (Sakr, 2005)

Although codified in more subtle language than that used by Lerner and Schramms modernization theory, (Mohammadi, 1995) todays attempts to spread democratic values under the various umbrellas of humanitarianism, liberation and development, are widely perceived in the Middle East as a continuation of neocolonial hegemony, with a US / UK dominated global news network crucial to establishing a new veneer of validity for what are considered primarily economic agendas. In the Middle East, the invasion of Iraq was unambiguously seen as being motivated by control of resources, and had little to do with bringing freedom to Iraqis.

Even when taken at face value, western proclamations of spreading democracy are premised on a secular faith in a theoretical and abstracted system of democracy which in practice seems remarkably adept at producing bad apples and mistakes; (The Corporation, 2006) unfortunately, the consequences of western noble intentions are often counted in human lives for the colonized.

The case of pre-revolutionary Iran is instructive. Here, a western-backed development strategy was undermining the very basis of cultural identity and traditional values, (Mohammadi, 1995) a pattern repeated elsewhere in the Middle East whenever exported media arrived in societies that already

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possessed strong cultures, and strong traditions of social communication. (Mowlana, 2002)

Historically, whereas economic imperatives have always resulted in strong trade relationships, there has been little reason for Middle Eastern societies to accept western cultural myths, particularly as they are seen, not through the rose-tinted lens of a western media, but as the denial of a self-evident loss of identity rooted in the profaning of the sacred and the deferral of trust to abstract and depersonalized economic and political institutions and the reimagining of people as consumers.

The issue of trust must be emphasized, for it is the crucial ingredient, both in sustaining cultural mythologies, and in forming normative ideals about social institutions, including the media. The value that has been singled out as most contributive to a civic or democratic culture is trust, and more specifically, impersonal trust in contrast with personal trust. (de Smaele, 2020). This key distinction in trust, explains many of the areas of divergence between expatriate and Emirati perceptions of media freedom.

In the west, impersonal trust can be conceived of as trust in abstract, systemic models characterized by both the symbolic representation and the explicit articulation of an individuals rights, Crucially, it depends on the perception of transparency and the impartial monitoring of the system to report abuses free press theory originally arose from the idea that democracies required a media watchdog to fulfill this role.

An interesting paradox of the notion of impersonal trust is that, while theoretically it demands collective ideals the belief that impersonal trust depends on a willing consensus of all participants to defer some individual control for the greater, systemic good in reality, analysis of both public and private spheres have revealed the extent to which distortions of self-interest have come to define modern politics, free markets and social discourse, despite the supposed moderating presence of a free media. Impersonal trust,

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in practice, frequently leads to competitive conditions (in ideas and capital) which encourage individualism.

The combination of impersonal trust and individualism has contributed to a cultural paradigm in which negative freedom (i.e. freedom from constraint) is valued. (de Smaele, 2002) Although the degree to which government is perceived to be a restricting force is contested, a basic cultural belief in the individuals right to express dissent and to pursue private wealth accumulation have become well-established values.

The right to dissent, thus challenging (and profaning) the formerly sacred (Habermas, 1989) have been identified as key features of western democratic ideals, and an expected norm of a free press. Consequently, reverence for authority manifested in some societies as a cult of personality has largely been replaced by permissive (or even obligatory) attitudes towards political satire and the right to publically scrutinize state officials. Western media would no doubt claim that this is evidence of their fulfillment of their watchdog role providing a forum for dissent and guaranteeing transparency.

In contrast, many traditionally tribal, authoritative cultures that have retained a stronger faith in personal trust, have tried to maintain a less abstracted form of deference to the ruling classes even as the contemporary pressures of globalization and modern economic development frequently clash with traditional ways of life. A combination of tribal socio-history and, significantly, vast natural resources, has allowed the UAE to maintain a cultural identity forged on personal trust that has not been undermined by the need to impose taxes and thus submit to some form of secularized hegemony. Again, the notion of personal trust raises a paradox while conceptually an individualized deferral of control to an identifiable (typically elder) leader the practical consequences are that these individuals become more personally responsible and accountable for the maintenance of collective values within the culture.

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Whereas not taking things personally is an espoused virtue in the west (and essential for political survival), tribal authorities tend to preside over a cultural environment in which publicly saving face is vitally important. Self-censorship within the media in such a socio-cultural context is often exercised as the restraint of an individuals right to voice dissent a form of positive freedom in which the freedom to participate in public life is conceptualized as the freedom to contribute to socially beneficial objectives. (ibid)

A culture of trust? The medias challenge in the UAE In an economically stable environment like the UAE, the cult of personality in evidence owes more to the perception of what the rulers of the country have been able to achieve. The UAEs economic transformation in the last few decades has been remarkable and in the context of forging a new national identity from tribal Emirates that were separated only a generation ago, the countrys father figures are plausibly represented as having pulled off the fine balancing act between maintaining traditional Islamic and socially responsible values respect for authority being chief among them and sustaining a broadly popular appeal

The daily lived experience of the majority of Emiratis, therefore, is one in which the countrys leaders are seen to be taking personal responsibility for prosperity and the protection of Islamic cultural values for nationals. Calls for modesty, the preservation of traditional family roles and moderate Islamic values are largely heeded (the vast majority of Emiratis continue to choose to wear national dress) and subsequently reflected in the media. Since childhood, the media message has been repeated daily family values, tradition, respect and national duties are leaders are always following them, and asking us to do the same. (Al Naqbi interview, 09.2010)

The tribal legacy of personal trust has become part of the cultural mythology of Emirati society, and media norms dictate that it maintains a central place in the public narrative. However, the potential for abuse of this trust and the 50

inherent danger of corruption, while easily identifiable by western free press theory, remains largely unexamined. Partly, this is explained by the traditional approach to doing business in private, with close affiliates, and the practice of wasta (doing favours). Significantly, the economic wealth of the UAE incentivizes the formalization of these business practices into the political and cultural spheres, where they benefit the most powerful families with the largest state and religious connections. So long as a perception of trust is maintained much more easily achievable under a system of rents than of taxes normative expectations of the media tend to focus on the protection of national and cultural identity against exposure to the excesses of the west. The western media can usually be relied upon to provide reminders of neo-colonial hypocrisy, most popularly in their continuing support for Israel, to underline the perception that the ideals espoused by a western free press have long since been discredited in the Middle East. A media spiral of silence (Noelle-Nuemann, 1984) at home is offset against robust and critical analysis of foreign political deeds. Restriction of criticism within the UAE is widely perceived as a protection against a loss of identity and a price worth paying.

Loss of identity; loss of meaning

The comparative lack of personal trust in the west, must be seen in the context of an overall perception of a wider loss of identity inherent in critiques of postmodernism and cultural relativism.

An unfortunate consequence of the reliance in the west on the media to provide a forum for public discourse is not just that a corporatized public sphere determines conditions of access, or that the profanity of the sacred has commodified culture trends that the media have not only failed to prevent, but also actively participated in but crucially in the undermining of trust in the new humanistic mythologies that promised to replace the synoptic view of religious authority. In such a climate, the tendency is for individuals to 51

take less personal responsibility, blaming social woes instead on a hegemonic system increasingly perceived as imbalanced and unequal, and descending into cynicism, apathy and complacency. The loss of meaning of journalistic objectivity, and its replacement with diktats of impartiality and balance (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2001), is symptomatic of a general erosion of faith in western societys ability to reconcile negative freedom with a collectively mythologized sense of identity. The problematic notion of the west is part of the problem, since the cultural diversity of Europe, for example, has itself been weakened by the Americanization of popular culture. The loss of national identity implied, while clearly contested, fits with a general pattern of increasing public cynicism and political apathy.

Falling voter turnout in the west is perhaps the clearest indication that democratic ideals have not been reconciled with material social conditions. Instead, global trends show a consistent widening of the gap between rich and poor, the continuation of worldwide poverty, the economic instability of global markets, and the growing threat to the environment. Faced with the increasingly complex challenge of sustaining necessary illusions, some analysts have suggested that the media has turned more and more to distraction and sensationalism, more akin to McLuhans notion of narcosis than Benjamins hopes of empowerment. (Taylor & Harris, 2008)

Identity in the west has thus become defined in terms of the consumer; even political participation, it has been argued, has become distorted by the free market and its undermining of real choice and rational discourse. (Curran, 2005) The determination to avoid the loss of identity associated with unrestricted western capitalist ideology, helps illuminate the importance attributed to retaining a sense of self in national, tribal and Islamic identities in the UAE, and may also partially explain the desire to preserve their sanctity in the distinction between protected private spheres and a restricted public sphere.

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Collective Private Spheres: National, tribal and Islamic identity in the UAE

Ritualized social practice in the UAE continues to include both repeated pledges of allegiance to the nation and daily communal prayer and congregation. National media routinely present the official state duties of the leaders as the first item on the news agenda.

In the UAE, the relative youth of the country, the perceived need to establish a national identity in a state as yet without a strong sense of temporal or spatial permanence, is significantly higher and undoubtedly linked to a media characterized by both internal and external restrictions. These restrictions, in fact, are considered normative among the majority of Emiratis,

Critiques of Nationalism and the media have highlighted the belief that commonalities in the population ancestry and kinship need to be mythologized. In the UAE, this is actually far less true than in the west. The notion of personal trust survives in he UAE partially on the basis that many of the population have opportunities to meet (although not necessarily interact with) prominent members of the ruling class and all tribes have informal networks connected to and affiliated with channels of politico-economic power. While predominantly a patriarchal society, women have recently joined the ranks of ministers and education for females is no strongly supported.

The media do not purely define, mediate or reflect society, but are crucial, as the ritual communication model emphasizes, as cultivators of certain ideological, political, economic and cultural beliefs. The media are thus key components of a cultural narrative with much more than a merely symbolic power to frame the cultural agenda.

Regulated within nationally defined legal structures, the media naturally operate within the sphere of cultural and political influences embodied by the nation state. The emergence together of the state and mass media systems, illustrates the unifying role that the press is expected to play. (For western 53

expatriates, taking for granted in many cases the established concept of nationhood, it is perhaps easy at times to perceive a defensiveness within the media in the UAE as a symptom of opaque and unreflective resistance to the beliefs and values of the west. Certainly the age of the internet is likely to increase wariness of a new cultural imperialism). Arab nationalism is hardly a new phenomenon some have in fact suggested that it is the key framework from which any analysis of Arab media must begin. (Sakr, 2005) However, the term can be misleading. Applying it to the context of Eastern Europe or Russia, nationalism denotes a long-standing socio-cultural narrative in which outsiders have been frequently scapegoated for causing social problems. The targeting of Europes Jewish populations being a case in point.

Nationalism among Arab countries in contrast, is a far more recent concept. Certainly born in a neo-colonial context which continues to keep Arab populations naturally cautious about western agendas, the fact is that economically the west and the Arab Middle East are symbiotically linked in a mutual economic dependency based on oil. Arab nations have been in a position to reclaim political self-determination within the parameters of this mutual economic pact and to reconfigure the old centre-periphery model of colonialism. In general, national resources have been used to develop modern social infrastructures (developing education, health, transport etc) for the benefit of national populations. Rather than scapegoating outsiders, economic conditions have allowed foreigners from the west to be largely welcomed and accepted as crucial partners in the development process, while rents allow Emiratis to reap the rewards.

The threat of sharing

The relationship (between Emiratis and western expatriates) has been defined at the outset as an economic not a cultural one, and as with any 54

employment contract, there are clauses, even if they are not routinely made explicit. While Emiratis forge a national identity, it remains extremely rare for foreigners to gain citizenship. Even modest integration has been met with disapproval. (Gulf Times, 05.2010) The protection of a separate, cultural and private sphere for Emiratis is seen as a national priority as protection against western excess. (Naqbi interview, 09.2010)

As a result, cultural integration remains limited, reflected in a media system which is largely divided up to cater for various communities. Western expatriate perceptions of press freedom in the UAE are therefore, however well articulated, based only on a partial understanding. Emiratis however, do often use English language media produced inside the country and abroad. Interestingly, English is seen as the language of commerce and Arabic as the language of culture (Al Naqbi interview, 09.2010) further distinguishing between cultural and economic spheres.

Perhaps the most significant restriction to the realization of a culturally integrated public sphere in the UAE is the regulatory sponsorship system of employment. Expatriates rely on the personal sponsorship of individual company representatives. A contract which can be terminated at any time with little legal recourse for non-nationals is, in practice, very effective at promoting self-censorship in all professions, but it has particular significance for the many expatriate journalists and editors working in the Emirati media.

Criticism of the economic, regulatory or, especially, the cultural aspects of Emirati society, either by locals or expatriates, is very much viewed as a matter for the private sphere where loss of face, particularly in the midst of an influx of foreigners, can be avoided. That such criticisms are voiced is not in doubt the overriding perception of cultural homogeneity, despite the cohesive power of a shared Islamic faith and the biological fact of kinship, is not as straightforward as it may appear. Strong tribal identities are still fostered within the family unit, and certain affiliations have always wielded more power than others. 55

Whereas the secular party system of western politics has created the normative expectation that the medias role is to publically weigh up, analyze and present opposing views (whatever happens in practice) a tribal authority depends on hereditary succession which, in the absence of brute force to maintain control, depends upon maintaining a popular perception of personally representing the common good.

Rather than public mediation, informal channels of tribal power are cultivated through a form of social networking, known locally as wasta. Loosely translated as pulling strings, wasta represents a socio-cultural tradition of performing favours for family and friends, and is often considered a duty or the completion of an Islamic duty. Tribal elders have always been expected to be available for consultation and, provided the relationship is suitably convivial, to use their personal influence to help out.

In concluding, the final, overriding importance of Islamic identity on conceptualizing notions of public and private spheres in he UAE must be emphasized. Summing up, I have highlighted the benefits of using a ritual model of communication to understand cultural ideals as mythologies sustained and mediated by the social narrative of the mass media. In examining notions of democracy, the public sphere and free press theory in the west, I have suggested that the continued belief in a secular, capitalist cultural identity, despite all the distortions that critics have highlighted, depends on a continued acceptance in the necessary illusions and mythologizing role of the media. These myths are the result of a combination of political-economic conditions, socio-historical factors and cultural traditions.

In the west, these forces have combined to reconceptualize the previously synoptic belief in religious authority as a new belief and impersonal trust in secular humanism in which freedom of the media plays an essential role. Capitalist ideology can be seen to have largely replaced religious authority, premised on the only partially realizable faith in social progress and participation in a socially just public sphere. 56

In replacing religion as the single source of truth, the west has mythologized freedom as the only alternative. Consequently, protection of the individual right to freedom has resulted in a significant loss of cultural identity, and even those who maintain religious conviction have witnessed the profaning effects of commodification and increasing consumerism.

In the UAE, a determination to forge a strong national identity, based on tribal traditions and support by economic rents, is partially a response to the perceived hypocrisies of western colonialism and a desire for selfdetermination. The preservation of tribal affiliations and the concepts of personal trust and wasta partially explain the clear definition of private (i.e. non-transparent, non-democratic) spheres in Emirati society. A more complete understanding must however highlight the cultural necessity of protecting the sacred by restricting what is subject to public scrutiny and commodification. Fundamentally, this depends on the cultivation of a collective Islamic identity in which synoptic belief in an undisputed source of truth remains central to most peoples lives.

The pressing question of what safeguards the potential for corruption and abuse of power in a system characterized by voluntary self-censorship rather than public scrutiny remains pertinent. It is not, however, a question that western free press theory appears, as yet, to have answered.

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Truth and freedom in a globalized world At the time of writing (September 7th 2010) a news story broke from Florida in the US of an American pastor who was planning to commemorate the anniversary of the September 11th terrorist attacks by burning a stack of Qurans. In the worldwide public condemnation that followed, it became clear that his proposed actions were protected by US law under the right to freedom of speech. Leaving aside the issue of international media choosing to publicize the story, many supporters of freedom of the press found it difficult to reconcile their belief in the principle with support for such provocative intentions.

The threat of sharing: mediations of identity

The issue highlights fundamental questions about truth and freedom, and how they are reflected in a self-identity which is always culturally situated. In the west, freedom has long been heralded as the only path to truth. Defined by secular humanists, influenced by the rise of empirical method in natural sciences, theories of press freedom were meant to ensure enlightenment by mediating discourse in the public sphere and reaching rational conclusions. In the natural sciences, however, there are always a multitude of unsuccessful experiments preceding a breakthrough. By rejecting a synoptic, religious authority, secular humanists constructed new ideals which became subject to political economic agendas and cultural mythologizing. Capitalist ideology replaced religious dogma, and eventually led to the commodification of culture, thanks in large part to the medias support.

In contrast, societies that have retained a synoptic worldview and a strong religious identity, have been largely content to avoid the consequences of pluralism. Exposure to western colonialism and cultural imperialism has largely confirmed their belief that they were right to do so. In the UAE, perceptions of a restricted and censored media do not appear to cause any sense of existential crisis among Emiratis. The idea that truth ought to be derived from a theoretically free press is irreconcilable with their own cultural 58

myths and traditions. The media in a non-secular system can only be conceived in functionalist terms, as a tool for the distribution of socially useful information. It is preferable that this information be accurate and therefore maximally useful, but in the act of reproducing human utterances, the media is prone to fallacy.

Freedom of the media in a globalized world thus faces significant challenges. Cultural perceptions are ever more likely to clash as we realize that issues like environmental degradation can only be successfully tackled together. National media systems that uncritically sustain mythologized ideals while, at the same time, scrutinizing the behaviour of others, face increasing scrutiny themselves, and the growing perception of an increasingly media literate population, that the narrow agendas they serve, are antithetical to the planets needs.

Rampant consumerism cannot be sustained. Neither can it be taken for granted that non-democratic states can continue to rely on relatively benign, and economically subsidized, forms of authority. The old paradigm of scarcity economics that has produced these phenomena by prioritizing the control of resources including knowledge in top-down, hierarchical systems that distort and restrict public spheres, now faces the challenge of new media. With it comes the intriguing possibility of a potential paradigm shift towards a gift economy, in which value depends upon increasing participation, rather than limiting and monopolizing it.

The threat of sharing, realized in the west as a capitalist hegemony and manifest in the UAE as a protection of cultural identity and preservation of political stability, may soon become supplanted by the threat of not sharing, if the internet is finally able to deliver a dialogical and global public sphere. Whatever the outcome whether people use the power to take back and reshape their collective, cultural myths or distract themselves with postmodern reinventions of their own identities understanding the media will remain paramount.

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Reflection on the research limitations The attempt to measure perception, that is the opinions and attitudes of a representative sample of a population, must be clear about what it is, and is not, possible to achieve. Firstly, the small size of the sample groups tested, should not be regarded as definitively representative of national or cultural significance, especially since the Emirati group was specifically restricted to young, female, Emirati students. Equally important, as a cultural study, the neurological link between perception, consciousness and articulation, was never the object of investigation. The importance of that link cannot be underestimated, however, as without it, the findings presented rely more heavily on the interpretations of survey respondents and the author, neither of which can be independently verified.

The rationale behind this choice was partly an acknowledgement that a survey of the general populace was beyond the resources of this paper, but also a desire to target a specific subsection of Emirati nationals who. Young Emirati women were chosen to represent both a new generation of nationals and, as women, a section of society who have traditionally played a less prominent role in political leadership. It was felt that if any sample group of Emiratis was likely to express a strong perception of being restricted within their own society, it was young women, albeit with the proviso that they were also likely to maintain strong beliefs about the role of religion in social and political affairs. The expatriate sample group consisted of westerners (90% of whom were either North American or British), For comparative purposes, it was important to select a cultural group whose formative years had been spent in a democratic political system, the rationale being that they would share some of the cultural assumptions underlying the role of a free press in a democratic society and be familiar with the arguments broadly supportive of the right to free speech, political participation and the right to information. Another important assumption was that westerners were likely to believe in the separation of religion and politics and to be broadly secular, whatever their 60

personal religious beliefs. More methodical screening would have reduced the reliance on assumptions.

The lack of a third group representing south Asian expatriates is a significant absence from the data set presented, especially considering that this group represents around 50% of the total population. Predominantly low paid, manual and domestic laborers, their perceptions of press freedom (and their rights to representation within the public sphere more generally) are likely to be significantly different compared to those of both Emiratis and westerners who enjoy privileged status.

The decision not to precede data collection with a clear hypothesis was largely due to the general lack of available first-hand research, concerning both the issue of press freedom in the UAE and empirical studies targeting social opinion across the Emirates more generally. The distinct lack of research (and problems of access to what little has been done by public and private institutions) meant that there was little empirical or theoretical groundwork upon which to build. By perhaps trying to over compensate, the ambitious scale of the survey possibly lacks sufficient focus, seeking instead to represent broad views across a number of theoretical strands. It is to be hoped that the selection of data presented, and the attempted isolation of significant cultural variables, can be considered a small step towards addressing the concerns outlined above. There is undoubtedly wide scope for expanding research activities regarding public opinion of media freedom in the UAE. The methodology selected here, designed as it is to elicit general feelings, aims to suggest frameworks in which more specific questions might be posed.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Audience Perceptions of Media Freedom in the Middle East

Survey distributed online at https://www.surveymonkey.net/MySurvey_EditorFull.aspx?sm =AsS9VDdi4RwXvmbM6a4ckWx6j0dhurBHJu5VcIftKTk%3d

Appendix 2: Original notes of recorded interviews

02.09.2010 Cultural background of Emirati students*; group discussion with: Shamma Al Naqbi Abeer Al Rasbi Asma Jooan (Emirati English faculty at Ras Al Khaimah Womens College, UAE)

09.09.2010 Follow up interview on perceptions of media freedom in the UAE with: Shamma Al Naqbi Abeer Al Rasbi

*Original digital recording was deleted I regret I have not been able to reproduce a full transcript here

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