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Translated by: Jack L. Rives, Lt Colonel, USAF Seminar H (Amb Newton) National War College September 18, 1992
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1. REPORT DATE
18 SEP 1992
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
18-09-1992 to 18-09-1992
5a. CONTRACT NUMBER 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S)
5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
see report
15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:
a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE
unclassified
unclassified
unclassified
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But to come to those who have become princes through their own merits and not by f o r t u n e . . , it will be seen that they owed nothing to fortune but the opportunity which gave them matter to be shaped into what form they thought fit; and without that opportunity their powers would have been wasted, and without their powers the opportunity would have come in vain.
- Machiavelli
The reasonable man adapts himself to the world: the unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself. Therefore all progress depends on the unreasonable man.
- George Bernard Shaw
We w e r e a p o o r country,
but worse, we w e r e v e r y d e m o r a l i z e d .
g a z e d to the n o r t h e a s t for both the cause and the p o s s i b l e There sea. lay Israel, She, the state we had long v o w e d to d r i v e was the p r o u d victor:
cure.
into the of
however,
as a c u l m i n a t i o n
h e r w a r s a g a i n s t us,
n a t i o n a l pride.
and t h e y w e r e u n w i l l i n g to enter m e a n i n g f u l n e g o t i a t i o n s . N e i t h e r our A r a b b r o t h e r s nor the w o r l d at large p r o v i d e d s u p p o r t to us. an u n r e l i a b l e My t h o u g h t s t u r n e d to the Soviets, ally. L o o k i n g into the night sky, real
The m y t h that
232
Israel loss of
I n e e d e d to a f f e c t the p s y c h e
c o u n t r y h a d b e e n r e d u c e d to a m e a n i n g l e s s p a w n in the b a l a n c e of p o w e r game. The status quo was a c c e p t a b l e to Israel and now but it was c l e a r l y
I k n e w the U n i t e d States had the c a p a c i t y to be an e f f e c t i v e mediator it was in the M i d d l e East, but I had to c o n v i n c e the A m e r i c a n s At the time, the A m e r i c a n s
in t h e i r
i n t e r e s t to do so.
had c h o s e n to d e - e m p h a s i z e our area; they w e r e p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h such matters Watergate intervene dispute. as Vietnam, detente, the o p e n i n g w i t h China, and the
debacle.
was b e c a u s e t h e y v i e w e d
For years,
for our
233
friendship
by p r o v i d i n g
substantial
aid.
equipment
and training.
s u p p o r t had d e g e n e r a t e d
to a h a l f - h e a r t e d
responsiveness to p r o v i d e M a n y of
delayed.
that were
Ultimately, in the s o v i e t
In July
1972,
I called to
ambassador
I refused I
arrogant manner
of d e a l i n g w i t h us.
Soviet m i l i t a r y
to depart my country.
equipment
The Soviet d e p a r t u r e worked to our benefit. p o p u l a r w i t h my countrymen, praised in Egypt. and my expulsion
They w e r e not
order was w i d e l y
Of course, diminished,
The p e r c e p t i o n
that the Soviet d e p a r t u r e meant we would not launch a m i l i t a r y offensive initiated country. was also important. In reality, we could not h a v e remained in without
234
the
limitations about
direct
superpower
involvement were
imposed.
The a n d no needed.
decisions
my nation's
security
consultation
with
or a p p r o v a l
f r o m any
other
able us
to s e c u r e
an a g r e e m e n t attack
with
Hafez
al-Assad
for
join 1972, to
in a c o o r d i n a t e d to a c t u a l
against
Israel.
I moved
war planning,
directing back
minister forces
flesh
He s o o n r e p o r t e d than I had
would
be r e a d y
For my Supreme
personal Council
reassurance of t h e armed
I convened in t h e
I feared
of m y mind, even to
He h a d
failed His
my plans
to t h e p r o p e r and
real to go
failure
to act:
afraid
him with
the proper on
the military we h a d
f o r an offensive power to a c h i e v e
satisfied
sufficient
my goals.
the military
w a s n o t enough.
I also
to had
standing
in t h e c o m m u n i t y lands been
of n a t i o n s . the Second
carved
o u t of A r a b nature
following shown
War.
aggressive by her
had
in 1957
clearly
cowardly
attack
in 1967.
Other
understand prospects
our p o s i t i o n
and to o f f e r diplomatic
support. isolation
the As a
of Israel.
235
block,
the t h i r d w o r l d c o u n t r i e s d e n o u n c e d the c o n t i n u i n g
Israeli
o c c u p a t i o n of A r a b lands.
M o s t of the A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s w e r e The t r a d i t i o n a l
it w a s fragile.
I w o u l d have to m o v e q u i c k l y to t a k e p r o p e r
lands.
The
issue w a s how to b r i n g the p r e s s u r e on Israel to a c h i e v e our objectives. Our b a c k r o o m efforts to r e a c h a s e t t l e m e n t w i t h the they
b e l i e v e d we had n e i t h e r the will nor the p o w e r to d e f e a t them. T h e y saw no r e a s o n to n e g o t i a t e a fair agreement. d r a m a t i c m o v e on our part, the S i n a i issue. Without a
Israeli l e a d e r s h i p w o u l d not r e s o l v e
I s t u d i e d the s i t u a t i o n o b j e c t i v e l y and
W h a t w e r e the risks of war? Israel w o u l d m e a n the end for me. survive; my physical
A n o t h e r m i l i t a r y d e f e a t by Politically, I c o u l d not An
success.
Even
I could f o r e s e e an e v e n t u a l I m a d e a n u m b e r of
S u r p r i s e was essential.
a l r e a d y b o l s t e r e d the Israeli belief t h a t we w o u l d not fight. whispers to a E u r o p e a n d i p l o m a t about "secret plans" in O c t o b e r were, as expected,
to v i s i t the
United Nations
T h e y t h o u g h t my a g g r e s s i v e s p e e c h e s w e r e e m p t y
In b o t h M a y and A u g u s t 1973, we e n g a g e d
battles,
237
W h e n the c e a s e - f i r e
S u p p o r t by my c o u n t r y m e n and also from our friends and a r o u n d the w o r l d h e l p e d us to m e e t our goals. e m b a r g o was t a k i n g effect, us r e a c h our objectives.
g a v e me the p o w e r to later p u r s u e p e a c e w i t h Israel d e s p i t e protests f r o m our A r a b friends. It was my people, a f t e r all, who
had s u c c e s s f u l l y
We had e a r n e d the r i g h t to
c o m p l e t e our m i l i t a r y t r i u m p h w i t h a f a v o r a b l e p e a c e s e t t l e m e n t .
T h e O c t o b e r War m e a n t the s u p e r p o w e r s w o u l d once a g a i n engage in the area. Their involvement in the war r e i n f o r c e d the
image of the M i d d l e East as a powder keg that could p r o v o k e a S o v i e t - A m e r i c a n confrontation. The v a r i o u s d i p l o m a t i c States
prospects
f o r c e I s r a e l to bargain.
238
A n a t i o n c a n n o t b a r g a i n w h e n its o p p o n e n t does not b e l i e v e it has the p o w e r to e s c a l a t e the stakes its will. Paradoxically, if n e c e s s a r y to e n f o r c e until
I w e n t to war to m a k e peace:
The c o m p l e x i t y of my story should not o b s c u r e s o m e s i m p l e truths. A leader m u s t c o n c e n t r a t e on a limited o b j e c t i v e and No s t r a t e g y can be diversions f r o m the
l o n g - t e r m goal can lead to failure. virtually situation hopeless. all the tools of s t a t e c r a f t
In the end,
I had u s e d The
in p u r s u i t of my plan.
I had p o n d e r e d that starry night may h a v e s e e m e d I saw it as an opportunity. we succeeded. W i t h some g o o d f o r t u n e The u l t i m a t e r e s u l t
239