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  • Ontology by James K. Feibleman - Entire Book

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    Johannes Tinctoris
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    135 vizualizări414 pagini

    Ontology by James K. Feibleman - Entire Book

    Încărcat de

    Johannes Tinctoris

    Drepturi de autor:

    Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
    Descărcați ca PDF sau citiți online pe Scribd
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    din 414
    ONTOLOGY JAMES K. FEIBLEMAN A GREENWOOD PRESS, PUBLISHERS NEW YORK 168 Reine) wi the pein a "Te Jae Hopi Pe HUNTINGTON CAIRNS Fit Ciesooepitig 1968 amare oF Comms Cstpve Cart Numer: 688555, FOREWORD ‘The primary aim of thin work is the establishment, among seientificaliymindrd men, of specuseie onwlogy aa legitimate field of inquiry, The secondary aim isthe suggestion of» particular stem of finite ontology ax 2 contribution to the nature ofthis fe, “The actual writing was begun in April, 163. The following pages represent even now litle more than a rough third deat Perhaps the labor of improving it should ate Bent continued and the manuseript saved for posthumous publiation; but instead a second, revised edition is planned, Parts of Chapter II, section & and of Chapter 1, section, were combined and read before the Souttern Society for PhE Towophy and Peychology at the University of Virginia meeting on April 19, 1946, under the tine, "The Genesis of che Dialectic. and later published in the Journal of Philosophy end Phenorme- ological Research, vol. VII (1048). p. 668. Parts of Chapter Vi, section 3, were read before she sime Society at the Biloxi, Misissippi meeting on April 15, 1949, under the tide, “The Analysis of Perception.” The fst section of Chapt If, entitled "§ Defense of Ontology.” was 38 before the Graduate Philos phy Club nf Yale Univesity on November 19, 1948, snd lier published in the Journal of Philozpty, vol. XLVI (1849), p. 4, Portions of Chapter I, section 5. unter che tge," Cass Member Ship and the Ontological Prablem,” were read belore the Graduate Philosophy Club of the University nf Virginia and published ia Philosophy of Science, Vol, XWIL (2950), p. 254. Portions of [Chapter TL section 2, were read before The Intemational Congress of Mathematicians meeting in Boston, September 1, 1950. Mrs Katherine Ouellewe and My. Anvrew J. Revk cendere auabie assistance in seeing the book through the pres, and Mr. Reck made many weful Suggestions, The friendship understanding and encouragement of Mr. Huntington Cairn in some very dark Years ‘mtkes him largely responsible for whatever is good in these pages. IKE PART ONE, INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 1, HISTORICAL ORIENTATIONS INTRODUCTION 2, THE PROPERSTARTING POINT OF PinILoSOPHY (A) The Wort an Is Estar (8) Himonteny tenes (6) Tue tsmegener oF Ensreouser (0) The bevranare oF Gyros. (0) Tae Pasay amore San () Stieke Semen (3 SSTSeee 0 ray oe oi &R somes Boa, G3 ies (9 M5 Senco ese 5 ia i) ‘The Beginning Here Now. a 4 ROA ADEALISH AND NOMINALISM TO REALISM (8) Tee Tre Psoons (8 Fert a efi (i) ary Adventures (0) ower sta on (@) Tae nace hay owe ) ) Rigumenc gsi Nomtnat In Gene cB definens sf eran } acenens St ee (> Pasting Renn oy Pie Sa sca, GB Ob eee conrenTs ISTRODUCTION TO REALISM (A) Conciente Ronson (3) aor Enomer 1 RED CHAPTER IL, ABSTRAGT CONSIDERATIONS [A DEFENSE OF ONTOLOGY (@) Oxrotcy as Boosie (8) Ontouny as Awoeere (6) Onrotcr se Usonuosstanie {b} Ovtovoey as Dorman (2) Guimey as Now Erna (8) Ovrouoey ms Onrsta 0 Connon See (6) Omronoce as Ionrrarance (i) rrmxrve Coneenone ONTOLOGY AS THE WIDEST FINITE SYSTEN. (A) Tre Mrasme oF te Wins Sart (3) Te Letens Sasene or Onveuoccal Stes {© Tae Nevers or te Prone (The Probie of Ai (The Probl of essa Tine Coonsnarn or Serenanic Poor (omen Capea ONTOLOGY AS A POSTULATE SET (A) Gostrions fom re Porizar Se, (8), Onoucer #8 Boron (6) Boson ro nae fein “THE ONTOLOGICAL LANGUAGE (A) The Guo oF « Lasevice (8) Toe Onresocee Vacances PENOMENOLOGICAL BEGINNINGS (A) The Fautke oF & Pur Osroxaccas Punsonenney (Tae Pusxoxmacoerene Careeones ) Bton (i) Orato: (i), Badene for te ine. Br 13 conTENTS (ONTOLOGICAL PosTTIVSN (Wir Ostototen, Rost (3) Thee Revnen Porseare se {GF Owressoe {B) Toe Doonan Retenasen “THE PLAN OF THIS WoRK PART TWO ‘THE SYSTEM OF ONTOLOGY CHAPTER 111, THE UNIVERSE OF ESSENCE 4. PRE-LOGICAL ONTOLOGY oy toe Pre Poros (BEC Rng Anny oo $a Ones Fer {8 Te tan Pore (Ot Nonaeadicion: (Gi) Of Bxcdaed Saate (0) Toe Lecent Tasman. Tt Poa (Bt eneate (2) Ot Grtaion (6) Te Ave Tee 4. THE PRIMARY GATECORIES. (a) Eee (Eases {© Dus ees (8) Resune sve ye Renan oF me Times Uva, vs bo a 26 xi conTENTS 4. THE SECURE OF rossumLITY (8) The Exton on None» ©) 65 ARR Recto ove fof Bere 3 Sib tol ite (© Vets n Onecare (Tee Oe) a Cees "Belg Seka tiie oa a 3 ie Cues Gi) ptt Kata be Tal Smn ("The Gu Donan ae Reel (ORE scant Suan (thorn Rinse ease en (2) SraceeToee (Spa Gh Mie (8) Matron aor iy Maer & Bes (A) Covmmener Ener (8) Enmwsnansuen Vai (© Eamets Lose CHAPTER IV, ‘THE UNIVERSE OF EXISTENCE (rms 6B Bieta; (3 ee 29 AA e 26 zs CONTENTS (@) Tee Prone of ActUNL Ime, a 3 "rT en Tag TRS tit se Prt Beet (6) Ye comeavons oF Exot: ° 3 8 As A LOCUS OF STRUCTURES (@) Faqiomiew " a a im) ° (6) Di Type at inl 3 be % ‘Pik ‘betwen Panu Pinive Response” Fees. She Repome, Reseone ‘Fhe Rule of Imerscuon (o) Pivcat bescnrnse 0 a ‘The Exumple ot» Vetical tomorpic Amiogs 5. THE GRADED SERIES OP INTEGRATIVE LEVELS. © Te ©) be ) ) el Hee, ‘The Poycologic The Cultura (©) Tmrorenese Lees i o a ore a @ “The Ontological tear “The Theory ot Reverberations 4. ELEMENTS OF EXISTENCE. () Tae () Prancravons Bene @ a a «) ok Fe rr a 8 Ee 3) cou apr Ss ne Ae oie : a fel rere 3 Ge bee a Pe eee SI 3 tenet, as Q SESE: E pee ia ee ee a Die re ae CHAPTER V, THE SUBORDINATE UNIVERSE OF DESTINY 1. THE NATURE OF DESTINY 5 so (A) Tue Massive or Deer Ao ‘tM edi of ea i (3) The Oacigcal nea : (0), Deseo a8 re Tro Une. ao 2, THE ELEMENTS OF EVENTUALITY (D'Tive Objeaiy. 408 (8) Fesenons 5 0 (@) Gouna food : 405 (© Powsrauny ee an (A) Toe Tees or Vinarone Seat Ds (@) Tae Loci or Benes : a0 (0) Theisen of Hisary ia & Tetaiine pins fh coNTENTS “Tie FRAMES OF DESTINY “ ® Tie bieover . Mow Sess ke te) Eo ation B Dae (8) Sotend w % ° (3) Matritcm 3) Spain pac avo nie Psvcnotaciens Onsen iy tbe won aft Subj TMS Sipe ity 6 THE scuENcES a“ ° ° » e ® ic vigates (ie ter Soren Ce ee ia jain roars = hice ants. MR a De 1 seipere (3 Muse AB Baan wi conrenTs CONTENTS wit 6) Rebile: ¢ A 2 4 a Acquistion oF sOWLEBGE: CONCEPTION Gems nae "0 Reema 0) Sn reste BS we (0) Chrernon Once Senses OPA Tom Hie, Das ooo Sesto freon bre ea ean sant ae , frm (¥) Individual Human ‘Evhics, 498 4) Tae Thsgty or Ductions (i) Sava eas : co {9 Betucions (©) Te neat Dom Dll ia : © Camoneot a sem = ot Uae ew a mais S @ sasrans & Sameer : a RA Bpi sie ie 2) inert En PART THREE (©) Mowe ere LT a oe a DEMONSTRATIONS AND APPLICATIONS (Soren mcpendene cSt ae (Shem Sete wi ©) Freesat oe CHAPTER VI. THE SPECIAL CASE OF EPISTEMOLOGY & a a 1 HE EL oF asomzDCE ar 6. THe COMMUNICATION OF KNOWLEDGE as (8) Ensmatny Saino Que pe ooo @) Ererooiooy aw Prsoaet Fille 4 San nnd 3 (© Tw ens rnc a (3 Pasi a) The Ton oF Mean a 2. THE CAPACITY FoR KNOWLEDGE ss pees cd 4. Te QUALITY OF RNOWLEDCE os {8} Noocancry a Fae on © Tat rein. 2 A Beis i 2 ‘3. THE ACQUISITION OF KNOWLEDGE: PERCEPTION. 548 (8) Eoriow " a (9) ‘Aauttas ay Enon Bs & Svea 18 8) Mewar (2) Shum St De ra ect Cen 8 ea {i Develop Pepton eee "Bebe in Cera (tee : ea (Re a rate! awit CONTENTS (©) Troy oF He Ene, a 1G Be ln aa Ss i) The Eira gsi ominan Oxi o (8) “The Iaest or Rowdee eo 9. CONCLUSIONS AS TO THE VALIDITY OF EPISTEMOLOGY. 62 CHAPTER VIL THE ALL-PRESUMPTIVE CALCULUS, 1 ONTOLOGY As A siABOLIC SYSTEM, os 1) Ououpes, Lae a tes, Oven ous B The Lage a Sool ei (8) Ontowcy ar a Locese Catv ee (©) Tar Conrsosnar Masten Cn 2 HEansvsreM wo (A) Nave of tHe ARSvaror os (a) orcears som tar ARSE « (Toe Ace Peer Cas llae 8. COMPARATIVE DEMONSTRATIONS COMPLETENESS... 688 (8) Wer rue Paton oF Onan ‘0 (8) Winn Dace Maen to ‘ e Gooch lao he Fora Suse Gg "Ontlopion See sol on 4. FUNCTIONAL LIMITATIONS: CONSISTENCY 10 (8) Tae Lian oF Proce : 00 (Q) The Laue oF Insets to CHAPTER VII. SAMPLES OF APPLICATIONS 1. THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR ONTOLOGY. 2) Reeser: “Tne Satan Eaenee (@) Toe Mevinevneat roto” Paseneat Arrlation 1) Owen Tne wo ar net Rpts CONTENTS (8) Onsoiser ow Pesce 0 Taco ()Practcem Delivery ppled Only © (Deicke tines i) Imvolving implica Theory i) tovteing Exp Theory {THE Af SYSTEM AS A GOING CONCERN. (@). Ie tie Lasconor oF Coon See (8) iste Prowent nw Manet Laon Oe er Tt races (3 rai ie Hee tpt teats opran tar. @ Tanteecor face (A). Essce: Fratne ane Remonne a Be, (@) Besar: Done a Bene {6 Desrmws Asem we Bene (D) Enmowoiey: Keown Bene (2) Atcrmowerne cunts iy Speman Beng Tae Ro ate cae {6 APPLICATIONS TO CULTURES Sia Epic Fc (3 ta tree Fey (8) Swe Proere 1b Empl Fi (8 in Talore Pe 1. PRINCIPLES OF TECHNIQUES. 8. THE CATAPLEXY OF HUMANISM. on PART ONE, INTRODUCTION mn this part the chief purpose will be to set forth an orient tion toward the Wert asa whole. Chapters are devoted to prede ‘cewots and putallels, and ehe central ideas approached it sich ‘way a 1 minimize the dificuldies in the path of a general ‘comprehension ofthe sistem of ontology which isto follow cuarren 1 HISTORICAL ORIENTATIONS 1. PREMUNITIO “T 1S PERHAPS impossible to introduce 2 philosopty to any ‘one who his not st taken something of thte philosophy for granted. The reaton for this is that there is nothing that can be serted in a general way that does not presuppose a philosophy. If, for instance, we say that the metaphysical principles upon ‘which philosophical method relies prime that method, we have already affirmed he philosophy which ress upon those principles No one in the last analysis can understand a philosphy who i not already somewhat i » position to aecepe it. In this chapter litte more is attempted than the orientation ofthe eader toward the sympathetic standpoint from which the philosophy of axioogic realism can be comprehended. In so doing, of course the philoso: phy itself is assumed as given and is categories used but thi Aefectve procedure cannot be altogether avoided, The defects are ta leas held toa minimum, Here then i another system of philosophy. Te ie well to ste its purpose atthe outset, and fortunately, the purpose of « phi lowoply is easy to state. Te isto find the nature of the universe of all universes hile a che same time saving the fats, to aeconne for every type of detail in the world as wel as to seek out reasons for the very existence of such detail. A philosophy is 1 sctlemodel ofall that we can describe from our experience ot imagine, 3 ‘move based on an ontological stem. All eorts3t finding rate’ purport to be the final ruth aecertinable at he times and although as consistent and inclusive as posible, they allow for 3 4 onroLocy the possibility of their own limitations and eventual overthrow. But they need never be proved completely false any more than they can hope to be proved absolutely tue, and so each may contribute something ialectcaly to the sum of wth. A spster ‘of ontology, then, isan imaginative work which has clung to the facts, a work of art which answers to the most rigorous Fequite- ments of the scientific method. ‘Ontology proper isa field of inquiry and not the mame of 2 particular philosophy. In Bentham's definition, ontology, ° the Feld of supremely abstract entities, isa yet untrodden labyrinth” Bentham's "supremely abstract entities” are the categories of tuaditional metaphysics, or, a6 we should say in reference to a ‘modern logical ot mathematical system, the undefined terms em ployed in the unproved propositions which constitute the post Tate ofthe sistem. Ontology. then, isa speculative fed, for there is more thaw ome set of abstract entities claiming to he the set of supremely abstract entities in other words, there are rival ontologies and none is generally accepted by common agreement ‘There is no oficial ontology: contending ontologies man support their elaims on the bass of the ame criteria used by other kinds fof systems: consistency, completeness and applicability. Rival ‘ontologies exit theoretically and practically, and assert both ab- stratly and concretely their various claims. ‘They exist theoreti tally in the writen and spoken words of the profesional philoe fophers. We shall see that their practical exinence is somvehat more concrete, for they exist practically as elements of culture. “This x an easy in systematic philotophy, neither the frst nor the last A Tundamental theory of realist is set forth in this work Iie a treatise of ontology because it subscribes to that theory of metaphysics in which epistemology i eemed to be a special ease ot ontology. “Metaphysics” is ambiguous, aterm employed some times for ontology alone and sometimes for ontology and epi temology. Since this isa system in which knowledge i held to be 4 particular Lind of being, itis deemed more accurate to employ ‘ontology a8 a designation although, in the sense described, met: physics would not have been a misnomer. " Metaphysics” has HISTORICAL ORIENTATIONS 5 ‘vague mystial connotations and his aspect of it has recently been Tevived by some of the lunatic fringe of thinkers. However, we Shall nt altogether exeape from the use of the term. Although ‘ontology will be the chief designation, we shall se * metaphysis” from time to time to denote the combination of ontology and epluemology, ‘When we come to present a philosophical sytem based on a system of ontology, we find that we cannot start where philosophy itself begins, either in the history of philosophy, so far as we are able to trace its origins in antiquity, oF in the development ofthe individaal a5 he first comes to speculate about the nature of things. For what we wish to coesider is logical and coherent both of these at once, 0 0 speak-rather than historical and dialectical, ‘The latter are fixed methods of inquiry, but phi- losophy il is somewhae wider. “The best presentation of a sstem of philosophy from the viewpoint ofits wnderstanidng by the reader may be an historical fone. To derive 2 complete positon step by step. in the way in Teich ic was frst discovered, is t9 make it easier to grasp. But ‘while dhs method has certain advantages of elucidation, it has Corresponding disadvantages which appear to be more serious. lad the sytem been arrived at logically, with fist elements being uncovered fist, there would have been no problem, since the logical order and the historical onler would have been the same, Such a fortunate acident is rarey the ease: ic was not the ease hee, Even granted the diffeuities which confront us on the other alternative, itis the system itself which must remain eenteal; a escrption of origins, in addition to is limitations as description, tay be the source of peculiar cafusions ofits own: nothing is altogether accounted for in any deailed recital of mere develop tment, however complete sich a recital may be. For what is being prevented is, aftr all, system; and a system is best exhibited as 2 aystem, that is logically rather than bistorially. This is the Consideration which finaly governed here in the matter of procedure, Philosophy i+ not the property of philosophers. Tes imptiie 6 onroLocy inthe mature of things. In persons, this implicit nature is termed the content ofthe soul. The importance of philosophy i matter not of discourse bun of being, We are driven to place emphasis "upon pilowphy asa study by the Importance of being of existing things their values and relations, and not because of the study ell In other words, the study of philosophy is rendered im: portant by the importance of the field of philosophy rather than the revere, The field does not depend upon the study but the sudy depends upon the fet “The study of philosophy is pursed by those eho have the technical proficieney demanded by an abstruse fel, but everyone is profoundly involved in the philosophical nature of things and ‘events. Many, unfamiliar with a new voeabulary or with an ald fone fo which new meanings have Deen assigned, ate unable to ‘examine their own predicament. Others who may have acquired the necesary ermado not aways Know what thie own philosophy is. The difficulties are subtle and the reasons for concerning ou Selves with them far from apparent. Devotion to philosophy may lead up astray, since there are #9 Many mote philosophical views thon there are true ones. Te may do Teas toned the truth and its power. Neglet of philosophy ie ewofld in iteefet. Philosopy fainot be hurt hut actual philewophy, the applications or practice of philosophy, can. Firs, the effect of philosophy on the world isco some small extent inflxenced by attention tot. Secondly, 40 remain tinaware ofthat which afects us isto violate elementary Seltinterest. We cannot aflord to ignore what directly and im smediately touches vs Te is only through a comprehension of the immensities of the Forces which concern our existence, the remote stretches of space and the enormous periods of time, the vast regions of bodies, the unlimited number of persons and instirutions, upon all of ‘which we somehow depend, that we come to the conteption of impersonal concern. All animals know how to reson and some re artful, but only man is capable of detached inquiry. Only to ‘an hae it ocurred to occupy Bizself with seeking t9 know the fonder of the world apart from his efforts to discover his proper funetion in it To desive food and a mate is animal, but to be HISTORICAL ORIENTATIONS 1 Inquisitive too is human, A sytem of philosophy which seks to tify the craving for the knowledge of order is an attempt 10 Sati the higher hunetion of dhe human animal “The chief purpose of this book is expository. A system of {hilesophy must be understood before it can be either proved oF Uifended. Thus indulgence is the required attitude of those who “approwch the comprehension of 2 ev sjstem, for the attempt 10 tinderstand woud fail without a slight inclination in favor of Sympathy with i A whole view of the sytem can only be gained through an acquisiion of the knowledge of its details in some Chronology of succession, Leading to the view of how they belong, together in logial order of relations. ‘Thus what is presented Inee is postive system which, i is hoped, will be accepted bot as constrictive and av suggestive “After the fast chapter. Which contains ap attempt at orienta tion, all controversy and she refutation of rival philosophies are held to-2 minimam, indulged in no more than seems required for ‘exposition by means of contrast. No doubt any postion implies the refutation of its contradictory and of its opposites, and in that ense the whole work is argumentative and conuoversish. This fanmot be avoid, yet the point 10 remember is thar the eect ineended isan airmative one ‘Of course, every such sfstem is inferentally polemical. But this aspect is secondary. ‘Thus other philosophies are contrasted only tothe extent to which such contrast offers illustrative vale Of the system presented ere. Te is necessary to consider a new fystem in the light of the history of philosophy and of present Bhowledge, Dut it is fst oo imporant to defend this system gains those of its contemporaries who difer from the view it epresents, No philesoptier writes exclusively for the present ‘ohh i after al, already the deductive property ofthe philoso tiers of the pas. ‘The ftir alone concemns him, a least to the fxtent 10 which he is philosopher. Te is beter to explain this than to slope the false attitedes of pride or of mock humility. Te, is simply afar that the system makes the pretension co trath—t0 some permanent truths i the light of valid present knowledge, 5 onToLocy and to Limied eruth in the Tight of the limitations of knowledge at any given time, such as the present 2. THE PROPER STARTING POINT OF PHILOSOPHY (A) Tue Worta 4% Its Bscare Philosophy surprises us in the middle of things. As children we were natural metaphysicians and asked cosmicallycentered questions. And ie wis not until we were old enough to have 30 Aulred the reqssite tools for abstract inquiry that we were able to took stematially into the peoblem of what ite all about. By then we had already presupposed a grext deal. For in the mean ‘while, if we lived at al twas in accordance with che beliefs fom Which we acted: frm the very inception of our existence we found Dursclves in the middle not of beliefs but of actions: and in a8 riteing to ourselves that we do have beliefs, we lear that we have liaelosed a philosophy. ‘We must lea to distinguish between extensive and eryptic philosophies. Ostensive philosophy is that postion which i vowed! i is one which ict forth more of less clearly in the oral for written words of the professional philosophers. or inthe acknovledged allegiance to Some sated position on the part ofthe pedestrian helever ‘The cryptic philosophy is that position which fs ascumed by all feelings, by al actions and by all elie, whether stated or otherwise, on the part ofthe professional philosopher as ‘well asthe pedestrian believer. It les hehind everything that is not ite im human culture, and is asomed in all non-human, nnaave, impli i the nature of things. The cryptic philowophies ‘of cultures differ, tae philosophy imple in the nate of things is one of which we seck knowledge, but even to asume this i 10 assume a (aeit unknown) philenophy- AI our iavextigations in philosophy rest ulimately upon out ‘qualitative experience and how we analyze it structurally. They slepend also, ofcourse, upon ox capacity for rceivng experience But the experience which we receive qualitatively and. analyze seueturaly is experience ofsomethi urd us; there isa world HISTORICAL ORIENTATIONS ° which we experience. Philosophy asthe explanation of sis world hun ves pom is accuracy a8 graph and is faithfulness in repre senting the whole of that world. “Ta hecoe seltawar, to compreend the human predicament fs tocome suddenly upon the knowledge chat as finite individuals tne are divided. Everyone, che literate as well as the learned, has {vays felt that we must ether seek to escape from this world er be Timited voit, Neither ofthese alternatives i feasible, although it must be admitted that they are the ones which have chilly igoverned men's thoughts and actions. Cultures have been guided by the authorized determination to live exclusively in his world ffs with equal exclusivity in some other. Neither has wotked out fn practice to anyone's entire satisfaction. ‘The thi altematve, a balance between this world and some ‘oes has never been given a fae tial. Thus the bridge between the ephemeral and she persistent becomes the chief preoccupation ‘of the man of purpore, be he theorescian or practisionet, ‘We do not start out with interes in another worl but with involvement in this one. ‘The occasion for the study of philosophy isour inquisciveness concerning existence. But existence by itself has proved incapable of yielding any satisfactory explanation of fell. Existence consiss in incomplete parts for which we require a whole. That whole is furnished by the general postulate of fesence, ofall postulates the most reasonable and required. Since rothing in exisence is complete, independent, sltsuficient or absolutely whole, the postulation of essence seems necesary 10 txplain existence. How many diferent names and what diverse conceptions have been wed for the idea of essencet What a snyriad of heavens for the world’s escape! (2) Historical BroDwwiNes How long has such speculation been going on and how did i fire avise? Ie is difieue to say because our records are 90 in ‘complete. Out of te eaimated milion yeas that human beings have been living on the earth, we have »sagre knowledge of only some few thousands, Tei useless, then, to speculate when the data 0 onroLocy are not aailable. We know that tothe primitive, che myth i a practical form of reasoning: tha there is no such thing a8 an un Applied eruth and that effectivenes i the only form of being: but the primitive is too advanced for our purpose. Tylor im his Primitice Culture asserted that the theory of ideas arote trom ‘objecephantoms under the infizence of religion on philosophy. But we are even speculating when we start from the advance cultures. Breasted has pointed out in The Dawe of Conscience thatthe ancient Fayptians represent abstract truth as the god ess, Made; and hence that was dhrough Egyptian religion that ideas (or univerais) were credited with objective existence. The Grecks may have learned this fom Egypt, but we do not know that they did. The earliest sytemati attempts at abstract knov- ccge were probably mathematical, Burnet in his Early Greek Philosophy quoted Aritoxcnos to the elfect that Pythagoras wat the fis tocarry tha study beyond the needs of commerce. Mathe- ‘matics, then, may have. preceded philoophy historically and Philosophy may have been a development of it. It this is true, then philexophy could very well have arisen through the expan son of the explanatory texts accompanying the formulae. ‘The ‘emphasis thus given to philosophy throws it in the way of ender- seanding the abstract nature of logical relainas better than it does the abstract nature of powers forces oF values. The attempt of modern vatietes of she realistic philosophy i not only to resore logical realism but also ta develop axiologic realign, the abstract and independent reality of values as well a of Felatons ‘The sty of philosophy muse not be allowed to confuse the foundation of philosophy with the beginnings of plow. Te has much to lata from a Study of beginnings, but the foundations are concerned with logical rather than historical priority. ‘The ‘order in which things happen isnot necessiily the order in which they ough to happen, If history and logic were one and the same, there would not be the necessity ta distinguish between thes, fo then ve should mean the same things by them, But we Kno ehat the diference is an Important factor ia our effons at understand ing. We cannot begin by acepting everything jst a8 it ecu ‘We must perforce begin with what we believe and endeavor to HISTORICAL ORIENTATIONS nu iscover what is true, Since belief isnot axbiteary nor voluntary but ie governed hy reason and fac, the nature of things holds the key to belie. The way im vehich philosophy developed does not reveal the seructure of philosophy. The development of philoso py must bea separate concern. Philosophy can only have started from faith. The Tease faith to permit philosophy 1 method is faith in the logic inherent in ‘eatoning, in the value inherent in feeling, and in the world of fact which experience reveals. Through reasoning we gain the knowledge of logic upon which our resoning depends. Through feeling we gain the knowledge of values upon which our feeling Alepends. And through experience we gain the knowledge of an texternal world upon which our experience depends. ‘These th ements are at once a st of principles and a metbod. The stern ‘of philorophy here termed axioogic reli, like the presentation fof all philosophical systems, sunt begin either with a set of Principles, or with a method whereby the see of principles was Siscneted. Which eame frst: the method with its sumed prin ples, o the principles with their deduced method? Its dificult Jf not impossible 10 say with certainry, ‘There is some evidence pointing toward the primacy of the principles. Its impossible to fonsider the method itself 5 that upon which the method stands ‘Metod presupposes something taken for granted, the premises presuppotcd by the method. On the other hand, hiserically the Drenises of the method rest themselves on the method whereby they were discovered. ‘The basis of method ie st of logical posts lates, that of method, historical development, Ici imposible to have bork, 30 we must suppose that the start fs made from prin: ‘ips rather than from method. (©) Tue Puaorguacy oF EnsrExot0ey Notice that among the phenomenological frst steps which the seating point of philowphy takes, knowledge as a proces is ex cluded. OF course, the knowledge proces is an element in the pursuit of knowledge: without some understanding of principles and methods and what they mean, no inquiry cul be attempted, ke onToLocy “Thee is undeniably a process whereby knowledge is acqied Bator werd reson we ent Begin the diaconery of Know ‘ge by an camiaton ofthe knowlege proce, witha ew to ‘ecraining its relbily, for several Yess We canoes epi au loquty with am cxaminaon of the reliability ofthe Enowiedge procs. forthe hnowge proces i then for gas hy the ny 3th beginning Since we a xan the pote ncmadge nly by ean the rece of noledge. wo dele it ivalid wold be to declare ca fngeiy Int alii vai ants by allowance, “hk teknow of way in wih we an deo vai of the rece of tice, avn se knowlege och sai wonld be ceo Knowledge which ould hae vo have been asive at by the very pret a cling Keown Me cannot begin with an examination of the knowledge pro- est beaut the eld which wo wih to examine fh of Being, Not all icing is known, though ll Knowledge tart of bring. ‘Theres every renton to believe that more wl be hnown ‘nhc fae han ha ben known in be Pt. sn Baan in the pron Hence Snowiedge i Ines, wile being feed Being i wider an knowledge and we cannot inca for Knowle of being by ling oan toa sd of ou roege of ig excep in ey ited way. ‘A dd eu why we catou begin ou sadly of philosophy with an examination fe knowlege roe allows. Sn Erode tat parti and inte faethe extent fo which ics pata and nite, and since emptrcal kde me of ecm vay be pai an Vnite lls tat Eoce tian van be ue tame exten: and n0 cpemolgy, te theory of Knowledge, # theory of nce Invling par and Timi fords. por bis forthe whol of plows Only at Infence ofthe hole Teng on any tgatent, oes domenhat ete, ine includes epemclogy bo makes Troster inference frm bnowleige tan pinemelogy ot ex cero jie in making. "hus we ma pe om 3 com HISTORICAL ORIENTATIONS Is scaly marow topic ike epiemalogy to a broader one like ontology in seeking the proper starting point for philosophy. 1h the last analysand ontology ithe lst alse ne ust dear co rear the mades of being independ of the way fn ‘hich weve gained cur knowledge of them, for thete evident that they do poses sue independence. We mnt year fat st scpaie fon our experience of sem, and univerat a eles 8 apat from the proces of sbtaction by which we come to now bout them. Epistemology setae titers infor agua tance, but anttogy ignores the iethad whereby we sence Anovledge of the matute of things in favor ofan terest the rature of thing. To start 4 philwophial stem with ere mology in an ears zo ground Il knowledige tn experince to asim an ontology, whereas in philwophy nothing ought co be sumed without explcg acknowledgment of that Tac Hisory st not be confused wih logan we discover the aye te ‘hich we subscribe nan hisoriel nde aher ta ithe legen border ofthat system set. ‘This ster of philosophy, theo, willbe center on theory of ontology and on systematic eacarches both in ontology mid elated elds. The system as Been reached Oy inductch a acon wihe, yt without detrating in any way fom te dee ‘cruciate. Inthe method which is employe, infucion taboo Intelyneressry and cceus tie, le dedartion so tore tice. The starting point ofthe method is inductive, an there 42 cotseuent inductive proces, but there ae consequent dstive proces, oo, nl the al produ anand by the condition of deduction the system i inert deductive Wecai se trom tis ha dation i historically mre toons than dasuction but that dedtion is ogialy and fnale mane important han indeton Philospsaimately the product of how we dink and fel about what happens tous, Werhave seen tat fr ety seine to be consent they ast follow te ws of loi for oe fectongs to have vale they must obey the principles of saioony, aa fee Dur experience 10 be sound ie must Yield to the theeyy of phe samenslsy. OF cour, such a rete Iver wide open the 4 onroLocy quustion of wat logic isto be followed, what values chosen and ‘what analysis of experience adopted. ‘These three sis, together ‘with the validity ofthe knovledge proces to be taken for granted tanil 3 later theory of epistemology can be derived from them, igve rhe to an ontology which is central in importance in phi. Tewophy and upon which all branches of philowophy that remain must depend. "We do not begin with epistemology but we do end by including an epistemology of the kind that our ontology calls for. Kant has at least demonstrated that no philosophy ean be complete that doesnot go thorouglly into the questions raked by «epistemology. And ifthe epistemology called for by our postulated ‘ontology prove to be invalid, then of course either it has not been validly deduced from the ontology of the ontology itself sands demonstrated inadequate (D) Tue Isevrrantuery or Oxrorocy “That everyone, even the most astute technical philosopher, ‘even the most empirical epistemologist, begins with elif, mt 4 familiar a proposition. ‘We begin, it must be admitted, with a ‘ertain amount of belief rather than with doubt. For se must begin by asirtng something, even if our asertion concerns only anvsim or a method of inquiry; and our aertion involves belief jn something, even if that something is only doubt itself. Ts sis Deliefa minitnat belie, isi the least posible o should we begin swith doubt and not with belie at all? These are the questions ‘which must next concern us. ‘We shall shortly engage upon a discussion of classic scepticism and dogmatism, and attempt fo etimate the outcome. But before wwe do ao there is one point st leat which remains to be made, This concerns the eifcvity of avoiding ontological presup positions. Teontology could have been avoided by fat, i would have Deen, many times over. Ontology fas been condemned, ignored, voided and dismise so often that we nd i hardin these days to suppose thoc the scientifcally:minded could still ake it seriously. Tohas been confused with arbitrary theological and absolutistic HISTORICAL ORIENTATIONS 5 systems and vigorously aac bt a8 we shall we inthe nest hope it may not be inkerey guilty of these charges merely Secauve they have hisorc! jinn. ‘There ino nee Connected wich mere conurrence in history; the Ung that hap fen together may or nay not belong together. Be tata it may, The tact rma tat ontology, Tike she snake sen om the wall {terion tomers will nt go aay merely Decne we igh ei ito dos. Philos, oral the atemp at this daifetion, Simpifcaion and ehuiation, remains slippery and elusne Haan jst whe we think we have pinned to the oaed her any again. The most familiar method of attempting wo ecape from nvlogy i to appeal to some oer more sppareny relble or mpreal ete for philowphialeatements and bits We {may pt down some of hee a random. Philwpies Rave wanted to begin wid sense impesions, human natire, experience, Kowleige,pstultes. Every one of thx stempes has produced Something of merit. A vie of phil, evident that with Timid notions and strenows consistency, partial tras which tight otherwise have been understesed or overlooked si tm tip: However the original purpose fail ager for ontology i Implied inal these efforts, We do not have to know that we a Prenpposing certain onclogial ponulstes by our Hough's, oUF Tesings and our actions, in ender to preoppore them: any more than we have co know that what we ae vexing i prove fri 0 be pre. No though, no feng, no action, no sail OU instaton, nothing, fac, tat people do singly oF cole ieee from the asumption of certain generals; and no con ‘iounes of this truth i neceway to Ka existence, The ony Point i that here (arin all cues) there to spernBenSt ot ‘ire in ignorance. Scraer sid that the unexamined lite is not wort Hsing. He might have added that the complete examination of ite tea hopeles Heal. The average man of today thinks nothing Or thse things ater e has sacredd with he help of bi amily re eachers in suppresing the natal metaphyseal and theo Tog curity which was rong in him during his childhood. 6 onroLocy But the miore aware persons, the professionals who have made such considerations their work, ave equally enmeshed in the eror fof taking for granted more than they knew. ‘Tie English em Pircits ate no freee of ontologien! assumptions of which they ought nothing than ate the modern pragmatis. ‘The pro- fessional epistemologist better equipped than anyone else to probe his own sinconscous presuppositions, yet ita thinker of the dimensions of Kant wae nnable o do 50 (and itis true that hae wae unable, for in hi efforts to construct giant aynthesis he failed utterly toate the abolete nominate of the positon that he took up when he asumed ehae metaphysics is a property of cognition), then there is litle chance of anyone else accompsh ing it The modern logician and mathematician who i 2c Ccusomed to the postultional metho (hich indeed he now holds to be the only reliable one) sill has diffculey im under scanding that behind his logval postuleset there are postulates, and behind. his mathematic) system there must Iie metamathe ‘matical systems. “The fist elfort of everyone who comprehends the power of ontology ought to be directed toward discovering ‘what implicit ontological presuppositions are contained in his position-wish the advance warning that the returas on such a wenture are apt to be poor, since they Fequite the wtmost in concentration and are largely doomed ‘Yet without this effort, how can philosopher call himself a philosopher? For philosophy inthe fst place. perhaps, « verti buuseness is nerasiary. The philoopher is simply one who stub borly concentrates upon his blindside. He fails tte after time 1 see what everyone else considers so obvious that speciation about it amounts to ridiculousnes, He most ask himsel over and over,” Yes, but then what am [aking for granted?" And after that, Buc if tha ie what Take for granted, what am I taking for ranted in taking that for granted?” ‘There are limits 10 this retrogresion only because she agement i ercuar, hut it muse ‘he pad ack at lens o the point where the circularity becomes painfully apparent. ‘Ontology i inevitable: we may aswell fave wp t0 it And ever though the ontologist himeelE be guilty of taking for granted some HISTORICAL ORIENTATIONS ” ontology other than the one Ke napposes, we can tll something about the consequences of applying deductions even it we only ‘now a litle about the hidden postates from whence they How 8. SCEPTICISM AND DOGMATISM (A) Tue Fauiacy oF Ansovure Scerrtssie 1 nominatisn is he chery af the sole veaiy of actual physica particulars and realism is the deni ofthat theory, then sceptics ave natural nominalists. but the greatest of septic have charmed ‘oth realists and nominaliss, because their arguments mst be ansyered before any more dogmatic position may be sifely 3 sumed, and also because therelore the¥ afford an historical star. ingpoine for the construction of systematic philosophy ‘The three varieties of septicins are (@) objective, (if) sub jective and (ii) limited, () Objective Scepticion Since scepticism is proposition about the limits of knowledge, the category of objective septcis must of tecessity remain a empty one. If some ultazadical sceptics wished to sh te ‘ais beyond the statement of the iemposibility of knowing the externa? world and to the further statement of the impeasibilty ofthe existence or being ofan external world, it would turn into its opposite: for this would na longer be a proposition of sept. ism bu rather one of dogmatism, albeit negative dozmatim For it would go beyond what could be demonstaced. Hence scepticism is denied all assertions concerning the existence oF being of an external world and mist confine iy claims to the subjective category Biy the same argument it is denied all assertions concerning ‘ontology and must confine itself ro epistemology. The route away {0m epistemology ito ontology lies though either extreme st jectivism or extreme objectivsm, ‘The former alternative will be treated in the next section. The later i ejected ec sept. «sm, ax we have just noted, i prohibited altogcther Ine making 1s onToLoGy statements concerning the objective category. But if septiciam enjoined from asertions about the objective category enjoined alo from astersions about the conditions of what lies though and beyond the abjecive eategory, namely the conditions fof 2 world which in no wie depends upon our knowledge of i Hence if we ate allowed co anticipate the rejection of extreme sub jectiviem, then the point is sustained, namely that septeig ie ‘Confined to knowledge theory and can make no statements what socver concerning being. ‘We have seen that absolute scepticism ofthe objective vaviery is wntenable, because scepticism can mate no statements con cerning the object of Knowledge, and neither can it go beyond the object of knowledge »9 make statements concerning the world fmany sense in which the world is independent of knowledge, In other worl, since objective epistemological scepticism is un. tenable, objective ontological septic is impossible. We must ‘onelude that there can be no abwolute scepticism of the objective (i) Subjective Scepticism ‘The second variety of absolute scepticism is subjective sept cam. “This is the vatiety that is known historically simply 35 Scepticism. Scepticism is a classic postion: thats to say, it es been frequently maintained and ably defended. We may do well to consider the arguments of some ofits leading exponents. OF the theee greatest sceptics in the history of pilosopy, anyone ends ‘withthe septial postion althzagh al tare with it. Let us com sider them in the following order: a) Sextus Empiricus, (D) Descartes and fc) Hume. (@) Sextus Empiricns ‘The Supensive Philosophy of Sextus Empiricus as contained in his Outlines of Pyrshontsm is probably a compilation, bur it ray be reganded as fairly representing che Sceptic School. ‘The position set forth by the Suspensive Piilowphy is the result of a philosophical inquiry which has led to nothing postive, and is fot an arbitrary postion declared in advance of inquiry. In brie the Suspensive Philosophy maincains ght the aim of seepecism is HISTORICAL ORIENTATIONS 19 to attain quietde by balancing every proposition with » contra

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