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2009 CASES EVIDENCE MARCH Evidence; offer of testimony. The failure of the prosecution to offer the testimony of key witnesses to establish a sufficiently complete chain of custody of a specimen of shabu, and the irregularity which characterized the handling of the evidence before the same was finally offered in court, fatally conflict with every proposition relative to the culpability of the accused. It is this same reason that now moves us to reverse the judgment of conviction in the present case. Ronald Carino and Rosana Andes vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 178757, March 13, 2009 Evidence; testimony. Well settled is the rule that the testimony of a single, trustworthy and credible witness is sufficient for conviction. Likewise, the prosecution has the exclusive prerogative to determine whom to present as witnesses. It need not present each and every witness but only such as may be needed to meet the quantum of proof necessary to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of the other witnesses may, therefore, be dispensed with if they are merely corroborative in nature. We have ruled that the non-presentation of corroborative witnesses does not constitute suppression of evidence and is not fatal to the prosecutions case. People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo Rudy Soriano, G.R. No. 171085, March 17, 2009, Evidence; conspiracy. Jurisprudence teaches us that proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence, as the agreement itself may be inferred from the conduct of the parties disclosing a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense. It is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out. Therefore, if it is proved that two or more persons aimed their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, then a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert means is proved. Conspiracy was thus properly appreciated by the Sandiganbayan because even though there was no direct proof that petitioners agreed to cause injury to the government and give unwarranted benefits to Amago Construction, their individual acts when taken together as a whole showed that they were acting in concert and cooperating to achieve the same unlawful objective. The barangay officials award of the contract to Amago Construction without the benefit of specific plans and specifications, the preparation of work programs only after the constructions had been completed, the issuance and encashment of checks in favor of Amago Construction even before any request to obligate the appropriation or to issue a disbursement voucher was made, and the subsequent inspection and issuance of certificates of completion by petitioner employees despite the absence of material documents were all geared towards one purpose-to cause undue injury to the government and unduly favor Amago Construction. Felix T. Ripalda, et al. vs. People of the Philippines / Narcia A. Grefiel vs. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, et al. / Cesar P. Guy vs. the People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 16688082, March 20, 2009. MAY 1. 2. 3. JUNE 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. JULY 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. Arthur Zarate vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. Gingoog City, Misamis Oriental, G.R. No. 152263, July 3, 2009. People of the Philippines vs. Jojo Musa y Santos, et al., G.R. No. 170472, July 3, 2009. Sps. Henry O and Pacita Cheng vs. Sps. Jose Javier and Claudia Dailisan, G.R. No. 182485, July 3, 2009. Roberto Sierra y Caneda vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 182941, July 3, 2009. People of the Philippines vs. Charmen Olivo y Along, Nelson Danda y Sambuto and Joey Zafra y Reyes, G.R. No. 177768, July 27, 2009. People of the Philippines vs. Warlito Martinez, G.R. No. 182687, July 23, 2009. People of the Philippines vs. Benjie Resurrection, G.R. No. 185389, July 7, 2009. People of the Philippines vs. Willy Mardo Ganoy y Mamayabay, G.R. No. 174370, July 23, 2009. People of the Philippines vs. Leodegario Bascuguin y Agquiz, G.R. No. 184704, June 30, 2009. Francisco N. Villanueva vs. Virgilio P. Balaquer, et al., G.R. No. 180197, June 23, 2009. Siain Enterprises, Inc. vs. Cupertino Realty Corp. and Edwin R. Catacutan, G.R. No. 170782, June 22, 2009. Francisco G. Calma vs. Arsenio Santos, et al., G.R. No. 161027, June 22, 2009. Joven De Grano, etc., vs. Gregorio Lacaba, G.R. No. 158877, June 16, 2009. Rommel C. Briones vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 156009, June 5, 2009. People of the Philippines vs. Bonifacio Badriago, G.R. No. 183566, May 8, 2009. The People of the Philippines vs. Lorenzo Layco, Sr., G.R. No. 182191, May 8, 2009. Guido Catuiran y Necudemus vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 175467, May 8, 2009.

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9. AUGUST 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. People of the Philippines Vs. Felix Wasit, G.R .No. 182454, July 23, 2009.

People of the Philippines vs. Lito Macabare y Lopez, G.R. No. 179941, August 25, 2009. People of the Philippines vs. Marian Coroche y Caber, G.R. No. 182528, August 14, 2009 Julius Amanquiton vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 186080, August 14, 2009. People of the Philippines vs. Dante Gragasin Y Par, G.R. No. 186496, August 25, 2009. People of the Philippines vs. Edwin Mejia, G.R .No. 185723, August 4, 2009.

SEPTEMBER 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Joanie Surposa Uy vs. Jose Ngo Chua, G.R. No. 183965, September 18, 2009. People of the Philippines vs. Antonio Ortiz, et al., G.R. No. 179944, September 4, 2009. People of the Philippines vs. Aristo Villanueva, G.R. No. 178543, September 4, 2009. People of the Philippines vs. Mariano Sapigao, Jr., G.R. No. 178485, September 4, 2009. People of the Philippines Vs. Roldan Arcosiba alias Entoy, G.R. No. 181081. September 4, 2009 Gilbert Zalameda vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 183656, September 4, 2009. People of the Philippines vs. Domingo Araojo, G.R. No. 185203, September 17, 2009. Allan Dizon vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 170342, September 18, 2009. People of the Philippines vs. Lorenzo Oliva y Rosela, G.R. No. 187043. September 18, 2009 Edgar Mercado vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 161902, September 11, 2009.

OCTOBER 1. Gregorio Destreza vs. Atty. Ma. Garcia Rioza-Plazo, et al., G.R. No. 176863, October 30, 2009. 2. Charlie T. Lee vs. Rosita Dela Paz, G.R. No. 183606, October 27, 2009. 3. Aqualab Philippines, Inc. vs. Heirs of Marcelino Pagobo, et al., G.R. No. 182673, October 12, 2009. NOVEMBER 1. Norton Resources and Development Corporation vs. All Asia Bank Corporation, G.R. No. 162523, November 25, 2009. 2. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. vs. Hon. Salvador y Apurillo, et al., G.R. No. 168746, November 5, 2009. 3. Bank of the Philippines Islands, etc. vs. Evangeline L. Puzon, G.R. No. 160046, November 27, 2009. DECEMBER 1. Hearsay; inadmissibility. We cannot subscribe to the CAs computation of RHCs indebtedness to DBP which was pegged at P612,476,182.08, inclusive of interest. The CA set aside the RTCs holding thereon and based its finding on the Statement of Total Claim prepared by DBP. These documents show that RHCs deficiency balance as of August 31, 2002, after deducting the total purchase price of the subject properties and the insurance proceeds plus the corresponding interest computed at 21% per annum from 1984 to August 21, 2002, is P612,476,182.08. However, as correctly pointed out by petitioners, these documents are inadmissible and constitute hearsay evidence because the persons who prepared the documents were not presented in court and subjected to cross-examination. Resort Hotels Corporation, Rodolfo M. Cuenca Investment Corporation vs. Development Bank of the Philippines and SM Investment Corp.,G.R. No. 180439, December 23, 2009.

2.

Notarized document; presumption. Petitioners seem to have overlooked the fact that the deed of donation inter vivos is a notarized document. According to Section 30, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law, may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being a prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved. A notarial document is evidence of the facts expressed therein. A notarized document enjoys a prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution. Clear and convincing evidence must be presented to overcome such legal presumption.

In the instant case, petitioners failed to adduce sufficient evidence to overcome the above presumption. The only evidence offered by petitioners to impugn the deed of donation inter vivos was the testimony of petitioner Elisa, wherein she stated that the contents of the deed could not have been true, given that petitioners inherited the subject property from Victoria Mendoza, the daughter of Ignacio with his first wife Juana. Such testimony was utterly lacking. Furthermore, the Court finds nothing wrong and/or unusual in the fact that the deed of donation inter vivos was produced and made known to petitioners only in the early part of the year 2006 or more than sixty (60) years after its execution. Understandably, it was only when petitioners claimed ownership of a portion of the subject property that respondents were

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compelled to assert their own title to the property, which they traced to the deed of donation inter vivos. Herminio M. Gutierrez, et al. vs. Flora Mendoza-Plaza, et al., G.R. No. 185477, December 4, 2009. 3. Writ of Amparo; evidence. These characteristics namely, of being summary and the use of substantial evidence as the required level of proof (in contrast to the usual preponderance of evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt in court proceedings) reveal the clear intent of the framers of the Amparo Rule to have the equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in addressing Amparo situations. The standard of diligence required the duty of public officials and employees to observe extraordinary diligence point, too, to the extraordinary measures expected in the protection of constitutional rights and in the consequent handling and investigation of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearance cases.

4.

Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply with the substance and form requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the allegations by substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the respondents must then respond and prove their defenses based on the standard of diligence required. The rebuttable case, of course, must show that an enforced disappearance took place under circumstances showing a violation of the victims constitutional rights to life, liberty or security, and the failure on the part of the investigating authorities to appropriately respond. Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Jr., chief, Philippine National Police [PNP], et al. vs. Mary Jean B. Tagitis, herein represented by Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla, Jr. attorney-in-fact, G.R. No. 182498. December 3, 2009.

5.

Writ of Amparo; totality of evidence. The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test.

Strictly speaking, we are faced here with a classic case of hearsay evidence i.e., evidence whose probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witnesses (the respondent, Mrs. Talbin and Col. Kasim himself) but on the knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand (the informant). To say that this piece of evidence is incompetent and inadmissible evidence of what it substantively states is to acknowledge as the petitioners effectively suggest that in the absence of any direct evidence, we should simply dismiss the petition. To our mind, an immediate dismissal for this reason is no different from a statement that the Amparo Rule despite its terms is ineffective, as it cannot allow for the special evidentiary difficulties that are unavoidably present in Amparo situations, particularly in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The Amparo Rule was not promulgated with this intent or with the intent to make it a token gesture of concern for constitutional rights. It was promulgated to provide effective and timely remedies, using and profiting from local and international experiences in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, as the situation may require. Consequently, we have no choice but to meet the evidentiary difficulties inherent in enforced disappearances with the flexibility that these difficulties demand. To give full meaning to our Constitution and the rights it protects, we hold that, as in Velasquez, we should at least take a close look at the available evidence to determine the correct import of every piece of evidence even of those usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence taking into account the surrounding circumstances and the test of reason that we can use as basic minimum admissibility requirement. In the present case, we should at least determine whether the Kasim evidence before us is relevant and meaningful to the disappearance of Tagistis and reasonably consistent with other evidence in the case. Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Jr., chief, Philippine National Police [PNP], et al. vs. Mary Jean B. Tagitis, herein represented by Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla, Jr. attorney-in-fact, G.R. No. 182498. December 3, 2009.